UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO 
LIBRARY 



purchased for the 

Centre of 
Criminology Collection 



from a grant by 

THE DONNER CANADIAN 

FOUNDATION 




BIBLIOTHECA INDICA ; 

A 

COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS; 

\ 

PUBLISHED UNDEB THE SFPEEINTENDENCE OP THE 

ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. 

NEW SERIES No. 81. 




THE SA NKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA, 



WITH EXTRACTS FEOM 

| 

YIJNA NA BHIKSU 3 COMMENARY, 



TRANSLATED BY 



J. E. BALLANTYNE, LL. D. 

FASCICULUS II. 



CALCUTTA: 

PEINTED BY 0. B, LEWIS, AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PEESS. 
1865. 



SANSKRIT WORKS PUBLISHED, 

IN THE NEW SERIES. 

The Vais eshika Sutras, with. Commentaries, by Pandita Jayanarayana 
Tarkapanchanana. Complete in five Fasc. Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10. 

The Sandilya Sutras with S wapnes wara s Commentary. Edited by 
Dr. J. E. Ballantyne, LL. D. Complete in one Fasc. No. 11. 

The Kaushitaki-Brahmana Upanishad with S ankarananda s Com 
mentary, edited, with a translation, by E. B. Cowell, M. A. Complete 
in two Fasciculi, Nos. 19 and 20. 

A translation of the Surya Siddhanta and Siddhanta -S iromani, by 
Pandita Bapu Deva S astri, under the superintendence of Arch 
deacon Pratt. Nos. 1, 13 and 28. 

The Kavyadars a of S ri Dandin, edited, with a commentary, by 
Pandita Premachandra Tarkabagis a. Complete in five Fasciculi. 
Nos. 30, 33, 38, 39 and 41. 

The Brihatsanhita of Varaha-Mihira. Edited by Dr. H. Kern. Com 
plete in seven Fasciculi. Nos. 51, 54, 59, 63, 68, 72 and 73. 

A translation of the Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila, by J. E. Ballan 
tyne, LL. D. Fasc. I, and IL Nos. 32 and 81. 



SANSKRIT WORKS IN PROGRESS. 

The Das arupa with the exposition of Dhanika. Edited by F. E. 

Hall, D. C. L. Fasc. I., II. Nos. 12, and 24. 
The Narada Pancharatra. Edited by Eev. K. M. Banerjea. Fasc. 

I. II. III., Nos. 17, 25 and 34. 

The Maitri Upanishad, with the commentary of Eamatirtha, edited, 
with an English Translation, by E. B. Cowell, M. A. Fasc. I. and 

II. Nos. 35 and 40. 

The Mimansa Dars ana, with the commentary of Sahara Swamin, 
edited by Pandita Mahes achandra Nyayaratna, Fasciculus I. 
No. 44. 

The Taittiriya A ranyaka of the Black Yajur Veda, with the Com 
mentary of Sayamicharya, Edited by Babu Eajendralala Mitra. 
Fasc. I. and II. Nos. 60 and 74. 



BIBLIOTHECA INDICA; 

A 

COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS 

PUBLISHED UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF 

THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. 

NEW SERIES. 

Nos. 32 & 81. i 



THE 

SANKBYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA, 

WITH EXTRACTS FROM 

VIJNA NA BHIKSU S COMMENTAKY, 

TRANSLATED BY 

J. E. BALLANTYNE, LL. D. 



CALCUTTA : 

PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. 

18G5. 



6 
/33 







THE 

SANKHYA APHORISMS 

or 

KAPILA. 

BOOK I. 



ii ^ it 

1. Well, the complete cessa- 

The summum oonum. 

tion of pain [which is] of three kinds 
is the complete end of man. 



o. . A * h - 2 - The effectuation of tins 
num, is not to be attained by [complete cessation of pain] is not [to 

ordinary means. , ,-. , 

be expectcdj by means of the visible 

[ means of obviating evil, such as wealth, &c.- ], for we sec 
[ on the loss of wealth, &c. ] restoration [of the misery and 
evil] after [its temporary] cessation. 



The question whether the ApJl. 3. [Let US consider the doubt 

end may not be attained bu i\ A-\ A\ i> i rji i- 

the recurrent use of ordinary Uiat J tlie S0ul s (lesire [ ilie Cessation of 

means - pain may result] from [recurrent and 

sustained] exertions for the obviation [of pain], as in the case 
of the obviation of daily hunger. 



The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 



II 8 II 



4p/i t 4. This [method of pallia- 
TMs suggestion negatived. * . L 

tires] j is to be rejected by those who 

are versed in evidence, because it is not everywhere possible [to 
employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there 
would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect 
fitness [of the appliances] . 



Scriptural evidence in fa- ^k. 5. Also [an inferior method 
vour of this view. of ^flance from " the ills that flesh is 

heir to," ought not to be adopted] because of the pre-eminence 
of Liberation [from Bondage/ as proved] by the text [of 
scripture declaratory] of the pre-eminence above all else [ of 
Liberation, as the effectual remedy] . 



ii ^ ii 

t 6. And there is no difference 
between the two, [no difference in 

the applicability of liberation, as the remedy, on either of the 
suppositions, which we shall now consider, viz., that the bondage 
is essential or that it is adventitious.] 

: II 



Anh. 7. There were no rule in the 

"Liberation must be possible, ... . 

else the means would not enjoining of means for the liberation 



lave leen enjoined. Q ^ ^^ m ,^ W ^ [because, 

to explain the meaning by an illustration, "fire cannot 
be liberated from its heat which is essential to it, since that 
which is essential exists as long as the substance exists."] 



would be nuga- Aph. 8. Since an essential nature 
tory if pain were inevitable. ig imp e r i s hable, unauthoritativeness, 
betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against 



The Chief End of Man. 3 

the scripture, instructing us to get free from pain, if pain were 
essential to humanity : and this is out of the question, 
Scripture being assumed here, as in all others of the six systems, 
to be an exact measure of truth] . 






An impracticable injunc- 4P^ 9. There is no rule where 
tion is no rule. something impossible is enjoined ; 

though it be enjoined, it is no injunction [" but only the sem 
blance of an injunction ; because it stands to reason that not even 
the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity."] 



A doubt whether the essen- -4P&- 10 - If [some one says] as 

tial be not removable. ; n the cage of 



[ something essential may be not irremoveable ; then he will 
find his answer in the next aphorism. The doubter is supposed 
to argue " the destruction even of what is essential ( in spite 
of what is stated under Aph. 1 ) -is seen; as for example, the 
essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the 
essential power of germination in a seed is removed by fire. 
Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the 
seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the 
bondage of the soul even though it were essential. So too there 
may be (without any impropriety) the enjoinment of the means 
thereof."] 

\\\\\\ 



Decision that an essential A ^ " --Since both perceptible- 

property may be hidden but ness and [subsequent] noii-percepti- 

not removed. , , 

bleness may belong to some power 

[which is indestructible], it is not something impracticalle that 
is enjoined [when one is directed to render some indestructible 
power imperceptible. "In regard even to the two examples 
mentioned in Aph. JO, people do not give an injunction for the 
positive destruction of something essential, which is indestruc- 
2 B 



4 The SdnkJtya Ap /tor isms. Book I. 

tible. Why do we say this ? Because in these two instances of 
the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power, the 
powers, namely, of appearing white, and of germinating, there 
are merely the manifestation and afterwards the hiding of the 
whiteness, See., but not the removal of the whiteness or of the 
power of germination ; because that is to say the whiteness 
of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed 
can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, 
in the case of the dyed cloth, and by the will of the Yogi the 
possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted 
seed." An example more in accordance with modern views, 
when the Scientist has superseded the Yogi, would be that of 
Chlorine with its suffocating odour hidden by union with 
Sodium in culinary salt, but ready to reappear fresh in its inde 
structibility on the addition of Sulphuric Acid and black Oxide 
of Manganese. But the destruction of Bondage is enjoined ; 
hence it cannot be essential to man. " Wishing to disprove also 
the notion that it is the result of some adherent cause, he rejects 
the various supposable causes, viz., Time &c."] 



,_. ApA. 12. Not from connection with 

Time, ivnwh, applies to al, 

cannot be the cause of the time [does bondage befall the soul], be- 

londage of a part. , . ,, ,. , , 

cause this, all-pervading and eternal, 

is eternally associated [with all, and not with those alone who 
are in bondage] . 



S^WTJI ^ II 

Place, for the seme reason, ApJi. 13. Nor [does bondage arise] 
cannot le the cause. from connection withjplace either, for 

the same reason. 



: II 78 II 

The soul is not Jcept in A P h U ~ N r [ d 6S the bondage 

londage ly its being condi- of the soul arise] from its being con- 

tioned. 



ditioned [by its standing among 



cir- 



Soul s Bondage rcflectional only. 5 

cumslances that clog it by limiting it], because thai is the fact 
in regard to [not the soul but] the body. 



Aph. 15. Because this soul is [un- 
TJie soul is absolute. . 

associated with any conditions or cir 

cumstances that could serve as its bonds : it is] absolute. 
[" The word iti here shows that it, i. e. the assertion conveyed 
in the aphorism, is a reason, the construction, with the pre 
ceding aphorism, being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, 
it belongs only to the bod// to be conditioned."] 



II ^ II 

The fruit of works belongs Apli. 16. Nor [does the bondage 
not to the soul. of sou i ^{^ f rom an y wor k, because 

these are the property of another, [viz., the mind,] and because 
it [the bondage] might be eternal [if the case were as you 
imagine ; for, " if through a property of another, the bondage of 
one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall 
even the liberated" through some acts of some one else.] 



n 8 ii 



If ;t were the 

must belong to the soul, and of any other, then there could not be 
diverse experience, [ there could be 

no such different experience as one man s experiencing pain and 
another man s not," for, it must be remembered, it is not in 
point of mind but of soul that men are held by Kapila to be 
numerically different; " therefore it must be admitted that 
pain is connected with the soul also. And this (pain that 
belongs to the soul) is in the shape merely of a re/lection of the 
pain" that attaches to its own attendant organism]. 



Aph. IS. If [you say that the 

Nature ts not the imme- u J 

diate cause of the soul s soul s bondage arises] from Nature as 
its cause, [then I say] no, [because] 



6 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 

that also is a dependent thing, [ " because that also, i. e. Na 
ture also, is dependent ( for its power of seemingly binding or 
influencing soul ) on the conjunction which is to be mentioned 
in the next aphorism." " Therefore, since Nature can be the 
cause of bondage only as depending on something else ( i. e. 
on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism), through 
this very sort of conjunction it follows that the bondage is refl.eC 
tional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire," 
water being held to be essentially cold, and only to seem hot 
while the heat continues in conjunction with it]. 



T .,, . , ApTi. 19. But not without the 

What really is the rela 
tion of its bondage to the conjunction thereof [i. e. of Nature] 

is there the connection of that [i. e. 

of pain] with that [viz. the soul] which is ever essentially a pure 
and free intelligence, [while the bondage of the soul is reflec- 
tional and not inherent in it either essentially or adventitiously. 
" For if bondage were produced by the conjunction (of the soul) 
with nature, as colour is produced by heating ( in the case of 
a jar of black clay which becomes red in the baking ), then, 
just like that, it would continue even after disjunction 
therefrom," as the red colour remains in the jar after the fire 
of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas the red colour 
occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not 
without the China-rose, ceases on the removal thereof. " Next 
he rejects certain causes of [the soul s] bondage preferred by 
others."] 



The Veddntic tenet on this Aph. 20. Not from Ignorance, too, 
point disputed. [does th(J g()ul , g bon(]a ^ ag the 

Yedantin holds, arise], because that which is not a reality is 
not adapted to binding, [for "the binding of any one with a 
rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed/ 5 ] 



The Yeddnta confuted. 



Aph. 21. If it [ Ignorance ] be 

The Veddntin cannot evade u c 

the objection without stultify- [asserted by you to be] a reality, then 



there is an abandonment of the [Ve 
dantic] tenet [by you who profess to follow the Vedanta], 



n ^ n 

The VUti cannot Mad, A * Jl - 22 -~And [if you assume 

the objection unthout conced- e Ignorance to be a reality, then] there 

ing a duality. ... T r, i 

would be a duality through [there 

being] something of a different kind [from soul, which you 
asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing. " For the 
followers of the Veddnta, asserting non-duality , hold that there 
is neither a duality through there being something of the same 
kind with soul nor through there being something of a different 
kind."] 



The - Veddnlin must not A ^ ^ ~ lf [ the Vedantin alleges, 
allege that 1 ignorance is at regarding Ignorance/ that] it is in 
once real and unreal. . , , 

the shape of both these opposites, 

[ then we shall say Nay, for the reason to be assigned in the 
next aphorism]. 



There is no such thina as a A ^ 1 24 -~ [ T the suggestion that 

thing at once real and un- f Ignorance is at once real and unreal 
real. 

we sayj no, because no such thing is 
known [as is at once real and unreal] . 



A question whether the Ve- A ^ 1 25, [Possibly the Vedantin 

i&adicti*** t0 aVOid Se ^ may remon strate ] " We are not 

asserters of any Six Categories like the 

rais eshikas and others" [like the Fais eshikas who arrange all 



8 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 

things under six heads, and the Naiydyikas who arrange them 
under sixteen ; " therefore we hold that there is such a thing 
unknown though it be (to people in general) as Ignorance 
which is at once real and unreal, or (if you prefer it) which 
differs at once from the real and the unreal ( see Veddnta-sdra 
21 ), because this is established by proofs," scriptural or 
otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not 
comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama s scheme 
of argumentative exposition, see Nyaya Aphorisms, Aph. 35. 
This Vedantic pretence of evading the objection by disallowing 
the categories of the Nyaya, he disposes of as follows.] 



ii 

The self-contradictory is ApJi. 26. Even although this be not 
altogether inadmissible. compulsory [that the categories be reck 

oned six or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, 
else we come to the level of children and madmen and the like : 
[for, " let there be no system of categories, still, since leing and 
not-lemg are contradictory, it is impossible for any disciples to 
admit, merely on your worship s assertion, a thing at once 
real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness ; 
otherwise we might as well accept also the self-contradictory 
assertions of children and the like ; such is the meaning."] 

n n 



Theoretical theory of a A P Jl > 27. [The bondage] thereof, 
succession of momentary ob- moreover, is not caused by any inflii- 

jects from all eternity -, as . .. . r 

causing the soul s bondage, ence of objects from all eternity, [as 
those imagine who assert that there 

exist external objects, of momentary duration individually, each 
being, however, replaced by its fac-simile the next instant, so 
that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something 
equivalent to continuous duration, and so that by the influence 
of these the bondage of the soul is occasioned.] 



Heretical Theories refuted. 



$fa 



^ *&? cannot act where A ph. 28. Also between the external 
e7 ** not and the internal there is not the rela 

tion of influenced and influence!-, because there is a local separa 
tion, as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him 
that stays at Pataliputra, [and, "in the opinion of these 
(persons whose theory we are at present objecting to), the soul 
is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that 
which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced 
and the influencer as regards an external object. Why? Because 
they are separated in regard to place, like two persons the one 
of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pataliputra ; 
such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 
influence (vdsand) is seen only when there is conjunction, such 
as that of madder and the cloth ( to which it gives its colour ) 
or that of flowers and the flower-basket ( to which they impart 
their odour.") And if these heretics reply " The influence of 
objects (on the soul) may be asserted, because there is a contact 
with the object, inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to 
the place of the object, just as the senses according to your 
worship," then we declare as follows.] 



II 

On the heretical view the A l ljl 29 l lt is impossible that the 

S u1 8 b nda g e should arise ] from ail 

influence received in the same place 
[where the object is, because, in that case,] there would be no 
distinction between the two [the bond and the free, the free 
soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as liable to come 
across objects as any other ] . 



The heretics attempted Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to 
save his theory, suggests that a differ- 



10 The Sd-nkJiya Aphorisms. Book I. 

ence between the two cases does exist] in virtue of the unseen 
[ i. e. of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in 
the next aphorism. We suppose the heretic to argue " But 
then, granting that they (the free soul and the bound) are alike 
in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they 
become conjoined with them in one and the same locality, yet 
the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of 
the unseen" -i. e. from the merit or demerit of this or that 
soul, the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit 
being able to encounter with impunity the object that would 
enchain one differently circumstanced.] 



Each lack must bear its dph. 31. They [the soul to-day 
own burden. anc j ^ Q sou \ to-morrow, on your theory 

of momentary duration,] cannot stand in the relation of deserver 
and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same 
time ; [ " that is to say, since, in thy opinion, the agent and 
the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time 
( believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects 
momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of 
souls also is of a like description ), there is positively no such 
relation (between the soul at one time and its successor at 
another) as that of deserver and bestower (or transmitter of its 
merits or demerits) ; because it is impossible that there should 
be an influence of objects taking effect on a patient ( say the 
soul of to-day ) occasioned by the unseen (merit or demerit) 
belonging to an agent" ( say the soul of yesterday ), which, 
on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different indivi 
dual.] 



Whether merit may or may A P Jl 32 - If [ the Heretic suggests that] 
not be imputed. the case is like that of the ceremonies 

in regard to a son, [ then he will find his reply by looking 



The Theory of Incessant Flux. 1 1 

forward. The heretic admitting the principle that the merit or 
demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent may urge that 
" as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such 
as that (ceremony see Colebrooke s Hindu Law, vol. 3, p. 104 
celebrated) in anticipation of conception, which (no doubt) 
belongs to i\iQ father (who performs the ceremonies to propitiate 
the gods), in like manner there may be an influence of objects 
on the experiencer ( say the soul of to-day ) through the 
merit or demerit that belongs even to a different subject ( say 
the soul of yesterday ) : such is the meaning" of the heretic. 
He refutes this by showing that the illustration is not a fact.] 



This rvili not help the here- A P Jl - 33 [Your illustration proves 
tic s argument. nothing,] for on that : theory [of you 

heretics], there is no one permanent soul which could be conse 
crated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c. [ i. e. 
" on thy theory moreover the benefit of the son, by means of the 
performance of the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., 
could not even take place, because, on that theory there is not 
one (self-identical) soul, continuing from the time of conception 
to birth, which could be consecrated (by the ceremonies in ques 
tion) so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the 
time subsequent to birth ( such as the investiture with the 
sacred thread, for which the young brahman would not be a fit 
subject if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had 
been omitted ) ; and thus your illustration is not a real one" 
on your own theory ; (it is not a thing that you can assert as a 
fact.) " And according to my theory also your illustration is not 
a fact, seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should 
arise from the merit deposited in the son by means of the cere 
mony regarding the son, for it is an implied tenet (of my school) 
that it (the soul) is permanent (in its self- identity, so that it is 
c 2 



12 77/6 Sdukhya Aphorisms. Book I. 

a conceivable depositary of merit), and there is the injunction* 
of Manu eh. 2. v. 26. , with regard to the ceremonies in 
question, which proceeds on the assumption of the possibility of 
imputed righteousness]. 



Aph. 34. Since there is no such 
Whether bondage too may 
-not le momentary and so re- thing as a permanent result [ may 

quire no caiise. ,1 ., , .. -, . -, 

some other argue on the heretical view], 

the momentariness [of bondage also is to be admitted. "And 
thus the position fallen back upon is, that bondage need have 
no cause at all. And this is the application of the argument 
viz. 

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary : 

(2) Because it exists : and 

(3) Every thing that exists is momentary, as the apex 

of the lamp-flame, or the like. 

And (continues the heretic ) this (reason viz. exis 
tence ) does not extend unduly ( as you may object ) to the 
case of (whatyow choose to regard as & permanent product, such 
as) a jar or the like, because that also (in my opinion) is like the 
subject in dispute (in being momentary), this being precisely 
what is asserted in the expression Since there is no such thing 
as a permanent result/ "] 



The fact of recognition A P^ 35 Nay [we reply to these 
proves that things are not heretics, things are not momentary in 

momentary. 

their duration], for the absurdity of 

this is proved by recognition: [" in fact nothing is momentary, 
because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the 
opposite argument to yours taken from such facts of recognition 
as What I saw, that same do I touch/ (an argument which 
may be fully stated as follows) viz. 



Things are not momentary. 13 

(1) Bondage, &c., is a permanent thing ( not a 
momentary thing ) ; 

(2) Because it exists : and 

(3) Every thing that exists is a permanent thing, as 

a jar, or the like."] 



Apli. 36. And [things are not mo- 
That things are momenta- .7 

ry is contradicted by Scrip- mentary] because this is contradicted 

by Scripture and by reasoning :-[ that 

is to say, nothing is momentary, because the principle that the 
whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is 
contradicted by such texts as this viz. All this, O ingenuous 
one, was antecedently existing/ and by such scriptural and 
other arguments as this, viz. How should what exists proceed 
from the non-existent ? " 



ii 

The Tiered sillustrationis A P^ ^. And [we reject the argu- 
not a truth. ment of this heretic] because his in 

stance is not a fact: ["that is to say, the principle of the 
momentariness of all things is denied, because this momentary 
character does not in fact belong to such instances as the apex 
of the lamp -flame (on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy 
generalization) : moreover thou quite errest in regard to momen 
tariness in that instance from not taking account of the minute 
and numerous instants (really included in a duration the latens 
processus of which thou failest to discern). Moreover if the 
momentary duration of things be asserted, then there can be no 
such thing as the relation of cause and effect in the case of the 
earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that 
there is no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, because 
it is proved to be a reality by the fact that otherwise there would 
be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect ( 



14; The Sdnkkya Aphorisms. Book I. 

and who therefore sets in operation the causes adapted to its 
production). With reference to this he declares as follows."] 



Anli. 38. It is not between two 

The causal relation is not 

things that arise si- things coming simultaneously into ex 
istence that the relation of cause and 

effect exists, [for, let us ask, " does the relation of product 
and material cause exist between the earth and the jar as simul 
taneously coming into (their supposed momentary) existence, or 
as successive? Not the first, because there is nothing to deter 
mine that, and because we should not in that case find the man 
who wants a jar operating with earth, &c., (with a view to the 
jar s subsequent production.) Neither is it the last, in regard 
to which he declares as follows."] 



A product cannot survive A P ]l - 39 Because when the antece- 
its substantial cause. dent departs, the consequent is incom 

petent [either to arise or to survive it.] 

II II 

Aph. 40. Moreover not, [on the 
theoi 7 of the momentary duration of 



impossible, if things be mo- things, can there be such a relation as 

mentary. 

that of cause and effect,] because while 

the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is 
incompatible, because the two keep always asunder. [" To com 
plete the aphorism we must say, moreover, (on the theory 
objected to) there can be no such relation as that of cause and 
effect, because at the time when the antecedent exists, the conse 
quent cannot co-exist with it, the two being mutually exclusive. 3 
The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect are (1) 
this concomitancy of affirmatives that while the product exists, 
the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of nega- 



The External known Presentativefy . ] 5 

tives that when the substance no longer exists, the product no 
longer exists : and these two (conditions on your theory ) 
cannot be, because, since things (in your opinion) are momentary 
in their duration, the two ( viz., the substance and the product 

), inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong 
to opposite times/ (and cannot therefore co-exist, for the 
product according to you does not come into existence until 
its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of 
the causal relation just defined. But then the heretic may say 

do not let the co-existence of substance and product be insisted 
upon as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, 
but) " let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as 
it belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of its 
antecedence. To this we reply as follows."] 



Antecedence to the product. ^M- 41. If there were merely an- 
te^from^h^Instruj ^ Mat ~ tecedence, then there would be no deter 
mination [of a substantial or material 

cause as distinguished from an instrumental cause; but as 
we need scarcely remind you, "that there is a distinction 
between substantial and instrumental causes, the whole world 
is agreed. Other heretics say < Since no thing exists except 
Thought, neither does Bondage, any more than the things of a 
dream. Therefore it has no cause, for it is absolutely false. He 
rejects the opinion of these" as follows]. 



: II 8^ II 

We have the evidence of A ^ 1 42 Not Thought alone exists, 



external : ["that is to say the reali 

ty is not Thought alone, because external objects also are proved 
to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition." " But then (these 
heretics may rejoin) From the example of intuitive perception 
in dreams (cf. Butler s Analogy, Part I. ch. I.), we find this ( 



1 G The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book /. 

your supposed evidence of objective reality ) to exist even in 
the absence of objects ! To this we reply."] 



The denial of the external Aph. 43. Then, since, if the 0110 

amounts to Nihilism. doeg not exist ^ tlie other doeg not ex j st ^ 

there is a void [ i. e. nothing exists at all. " Why ? Because 
if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist. For 
it is intuition that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the 
external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of 
thought also would not establish the existence of thought." 
" Then let the reality be a mere void ; and therefore the search 
ing for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is 
all: with such a proposal (as recorded in the next aphorism) 
does (some one who may claim the title of) the very crest-gem 
of the heretics rise up in opposition."] 



The heretic goe, the legth ^ * 4 The realit 7 is the void; 

of asserting sheer Nihilism. what is, perishes, because to perish is 

the habit of things : [" The void alone ( says this prince of 
heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all ) is the reality 
( or the only truth ). Since every thing that exists perishes, 
and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore as 
of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, 
Bondage, Sec., in the midst (of any beginning and ending), has 
merely a momentary existence, is phenomenal and not real. 
Therefore who can be bound by what ? this (question) is what 
we rest upon." " The reason assigned for the perishableness of 
whatever exists is { because to perish is the habit of things/ 
because to perish (or vanish into nothing) is the very nature of 
things. But nothing continues after quitting its own nature 
( so that nothing could continue if it ceased to perish), such 
is the meaning."] 

I. He rejects [this heretical view.] 



Nihilism denied. 1 7 



ii iii 

Nihilism denied^ as the in- Apk. 45. This is a mere counter- 

discernible is indestructible. assertion Q f un i nte lligent persOHS- 

[" i. e.j of blockheads, a mere idle counter-assertion, that a 
thing must needs be perishable because it exists ; (and such an 
assertion is idle) because things that are not made up of parts, 
since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot 
perish. But what need of many words ? It is not the fact that 
even products perish, for, just as by the cognition that the jar 
is old 3 [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new 
to that of old], so too by such a cognition as this that the jar 
has passed away/ it is only settled that the jar, or the like, in 
the condition of having passed away, still is."~\ 



Apli. 46. Moreover this [nihilistic 

Nihilism is open to the 

same objections as loth the theory is not a right one] because it 

and the Ideal has the same fortune as both the views 



[which were confuted just before by 

the fact of recognition, ( which is at least as little consistent 
with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things), 
and the intuition of the external, see Apks. 35 and 42. 
" Moreover as for the opinion which is accepted by these (here 
tics) viz. Let ike mere void (of absolute nonentity) be the 
soul s aim andsummum bonum, since herein consist at once the 
cessation of pain ( which cannot continue when there is abso 
lutely nothing} and also the means thereof ( since there can 
be no further means required for the removal of any thing if it 
be settled that the thing positively does not exist)/ this too 
can hardly be, so he declares as follows"] . 



The touts aim is not anni- ^M- 4 <7 . In neither way [whether 
filiation. ag a Tneans or as an end ] is this [an 

nihilation] the soul s aim, [ "because the whole world agrees 



1 H Tfie Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 

that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide 
in it, that is to say, because (they hold, while) you do not hold, 
that there is a permanent soul/ see Aplis. 33 in respect of 
which the liberation or beatification should be possible or even 
predicable] . 



It is ly no movement that A ph. 48. Not from any kind of motion 
ite soul gets into -bondage. __[ suc h as its entrance into a body 
does the soul s bondage result as some have imagined] . 



What is all-pervading does Apli. 49. Because this is impossible 
not change place. f or w ^ at j g i nac ti ve [or, in other 

words, without motion, as the soul is, because all-pervading, and 
therefore incapable of changing its place] . 



Were the soul limited it 4p&- 50 - [ We cannot admit that the 
might be perishable. sou i j s O fa er than all-pervading, because] 

by being limited, since it would come under the same conditions 
as jars, &c., [in being made up of parts, and hence destructible,] 
there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishable- 
ness] . 



Soul moves not, any more A P k - 51 - The [Vedic] text regard- 

than Space. ing the motion [of the soul], moreover, 

is [applicable only] because of the junction of an attendant, as 
in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we 
talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar. 
" Since there are such proofs of the soul s unlimitedness as the 
declaration that It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent/ the 
text regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference 
to a movement pertaining (not to the soul but) to an atten 
dant/ viz. Nature]. 



The Soul s bondage. 19 

c 



Anli. 52. Nor moreover [does the 

The bondage of the soul is 

no result of any merit or bondage of the soul result from the 
merit or demerit arising] from works, 
because these belong not thereto, see Aph. 16]. 



Else bondage might cUng 53 If the case were otherwise 

even to the emancipated. [than as I say] , then it [the bondage 

of the soul] might extend unduly [even to the emancipated, for 
the same reasons as those stated under Aph. 16]. 



i w ii 

Aph. 54. And this [opinion that 
A single text of scripture ^ bondage of the soul arises from 

upsets equally all the hereti 

cal notions of the soul s rela- a ny of these causes alleged by the 
tion to bondage. , . . , 

heretics] is contrary to such texts as the 

one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities ; and so 
much for that point. [The case then stands thus, that " the 
immediate cause of the bondage of the soul is just the conjunc 
tion of Nature and of the soul."] 

?lihh S^SfiRl TOWWl II 11 II 

Aph. 55. Moreover the conjunction 

How the true cause of bond- 

age affects not the emand- thereof [viz. of Soul and Nature,] does 
pated not, through non-discrimination, take 

place [in the case of the emancipated], nor is there a parity [in 
this respect between the emancipated and the unemancipated, 
as the heretics object there must be] . 



Aph. 56. The removal of it [viz. 

No n- discrimination is re- . . , ^ , , 

moveable by discrimination, non-discrimination ] is to be eilecte 
alone - by the necessary means, just like dark- 

ness, [which is removed by light alone] . 
D 2 



20 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 



An/i. 57. Since the non-discrimina- 

The discrimination of Na 

ture, as other than soul, in- tion of other things [such as the body, 
voices all discrimination. .11 j Tor 

the human understanding, &C., irom 

soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], 
the cessation of this will take place on the cessation of that 
Nature, [from which, the body, the human understanding, &c., 
arise. " The state of the case is this ; as, when the soul has 
been discriminated from body, it is impossible but that it should 
be discriminated from the colour and other properties the effects 
of the body (which is the substantial cause of its own properties), 
so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the cause 
when soul, in its character of unalterableness &c., has been dis 
criminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain 
a conceit of (the soul s being any of) the products thereof (i. e. 
of Nature), such as the understanding and the like, which have 
the character of being modifications (of primal Nature, while the 
soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable) . " But then (some 
one may say) if we admit the soul s bondage (at one time) 
and its freedom (at another), and its discrimination (at one 
time) and its non-discrimination (at another), then this is in 
contradiction to the assertion (in Aph. 19) that it is ever essen 
tially a pure and free intelligence : and it is in contradiction to 
such texts as this viz., ( The absolute truth is this, that neither 
is there destruction (of the soul), nor production (of it), nor is 
it bound, nor is it an effecter (of any work), nor is it desirous of 
liberation, nor is it indeed liberated? (seeing that that cannot de 
sire or obtain liberation, which was never bound). This charge of 
inconsistency he repels as follows."] 



II 

The bondage of the soulis 4p%- 58. It is merely verbal, and 
merely verbal. no ^ a rea lity, [this so-called bondage of 

the soul,] since it [the bondage] resides in the mind [and not in 



The Discrimination of Soul and Nature. 21 

the soul : for " since bondage &c. all reside only in the mind (and 
not in the soul), all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal 
i. e. it is vox et praeterea nihil/ because it is merely a reflection 
like the redness of (pellucid) crystal (when a China-rose is near 
it) ; but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness 
of the China-rose itself. Hence there is no contradiction to what 
had been said before," as the objector would insinuate.] 



ii <i<* n 

Aph. 59. Moreover it [the non-dis- 

The truth must be directly . . . i -v T 

discerned, and not merely crimination of Soul from Nature] is 



not to be removed b y ar g ument as V iat 

of the person perplexed about the points 
of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cogni 
tion [ i. e. without his directly perceiving how the points of the 
compass really lie, to which immediate perception testimony 
or ( inference may conduce, but the necessity of which these media 
or instruments of knowledge cannot supersede. A man with the 
jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may 
infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or 
he may believe the testimony of a friend that it is white ; but still 
nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the 
chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness. " Having thus, 
then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate 
discrimination (of soul from Nature), the next thing to be set forth 
is what is meant by the discrimination/ here referred to ;" and 
" this being the topic, in the first place since, only if soul and 
Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the 
one from the other, therefore that instrument of right know 
ledge 7 (pramdna) which establishes the existence of these (two 
imperceptible realities) is first to be set forth."] 



The evidence for things Aph. 60. The knowledge of things 
imperceptible. imperceptible is by means of Inference, 



22 The Sdnkkya Aphorisms. Book I. 

as that of fire [when not directly perceptible] is by means of 
smoke, &c. [" Moreover, it is to be understood that that which 
is (true, but yet is) not established by Inference/ is established 
by Revelation; but since Inference* is the chief (among the 
instruments of knowledge) in this (the Sankhya) System, 
f Inference only is laid down (in the aphorism) as the chief 
thing, but Revelation is not disregarded" in the Sankhya sys 
tem, as will be seen at Aph. 87. " He next exhibits the order 
of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and 
the relation of cause and effect (among these severally), prepa 
ratorily to the argument that will be afterwards stated. "] 






1 ^ u 

The twenty-five realities A P^ 61. Nature (prakriti) is the 

enumerated. B ^ Q O f equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) 

Passion (rajas) and Darkness (tamos) ; from Nature [pro 
ceeds] Mind (mahat)y from Mind Self-consciousness (ahankdra) t 
from Self-consciousness the five Subtile Elements (tanmdtra), 
and both sets [external and internal] of Organs (indriya) t and 
from the Subtile Elements the Gross Elements (sthiUa-lMla) . 
[Then there is] Soul (purusha) : such is the class of twenty-five. 
(_" The state of equipoise of the three things called Goodness 
&c., is their being neither less nor more ( one than another ), 
that is to say the state of not being (developed into) an 
effect (in which one or other of them predominates) : and 
thus Nature is the triad of Qualities (guna) distinct from 
the products (to which this triad gives rise) ; such is the 
complete meaning." " These things, viz. Goodness &c., (though 
spoken of as the three Qualities), are not Qualities (guna) in 
the Vais eshlka sense of the word, because (the f Qualities of 
the Vais eshika system have themselves no qualities, see Kanada s 
16th Aph. while) these have the qualities of Conjunction, Dis- 



The twenty -five realities, 23 

junction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this Saukhya sys 
tem, and in Scripture, the word f Quality (gwna) is employed 
(as the name of the three things in question) because they are 
subservient to Soul (and therefore hold a secondary rank in the 
scale of being), and because they form the cords ( which the 
word guna also signifies ), viz. Understanding 5 &c., which 
consist of the three (so called) Qualities/ and which bind as a 
(cow or other) brute-beast, the Soul." " Of this (Nature) the 
principle called the great one (makat), viz. the principle of 
Understanding 3 (buddhi), is the product. Self-consciousness 
is a conceit (of separate personality). Of this there are two 
products, (1) the Subtile Elements and (2) the two sets of 
Organs. The < Subtile Elements are (those of) Sound, Touch, 
Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of Organs, through 
their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven 
kinds. The products of the Subtile Elements are the five 
Gross Elements. But { Soul is something distinct from either 
product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five, the aggre 
gate of things : that is to say, besides these there is nothing." 
" He next, in several aphorisms, declares the order of the infer 
ring" the existencjjof these principles the one from the other]. 



* - 62 --[ The knowledge of the 

tile Elements is inferred from existence! of the Subtile Elements is 
that of the Gross. 

[by inference] from the Gross Ele 

ments /[for "Earth, &c., the Gross Elements/ are proved to 
exist by Perception ; and thereby ( i. e. from that Perception, 
for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gautama s 
5th Aphorism ) are the Subtile Elements inferred (the 
oToixaa fTToi\dwv of Empedocles) ; and so the application (of the 
process of inference to the case) is as follows : 

(1). The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the 
absolute limit (of simplification, or of the atomic), consist of 
things (Subtile Elements, or Atoms,) which have distinct 



24 The SdnhJiya Aphorisms. Book I. 

qualities, ( the earthy element having- the distinctive quality of 
Odour, and so of the others) : 

(2). Because they are gross : and 

(3). (Everything that is gross is formed of something less 
gross, or in other words more subtile,) as jars, webs, &c./ the 
gross web being formed of the less gross threads, and so of the 
others.] 



n ^ \\ 

And thence that of self- A P ll < 63. [The knowledge of the 
consciousness. existence] of Self-consciousness is [by 

inference] from the external and internal [organs] and these 
[ f Subtile Elements mentioned in Aph. 02. " The application 
(of the process of inference to the case) is in the following (some 
what circular) manner : 

(1). The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of 
things consisting of Self-consciousness : 

(2). Because they are products of Self-consciousness : 
(3). Whatever is not so ( i. e. whatever is not made out of 
Self-consciousness) is not thus ( i. e. is not a product of Self- 
consciousness) as the Soul -which, not being made up there 
of, is not a product of it." " But then if it be thus (i. e. if it be, as 
the Sankhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up 
of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 
Understanding/ or Intellect/ or Mind/ the first product of 
Nature see Aph. 61 ,) then (some one may object, that,) 
since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the pot 
ter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disap 
pear on the beatification of the potter whose understanding then 
surceases ; and this ( the objector may go on to say ) is not 
found to be the case, because another man (after the beatification 
of the potter) recognizes that This is that same jar (which you 
may remember was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance.) 
In reply to this we say " Say not so, because, on one s beatifi 
cation, there is an end of only those modifications of his inter- 



How these realities are inferred: 25 

nal organ or f Intellect which could be causes (as the jar no 
longer can be) of the emancipated soul s experiencing (either good 
or ill), but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, 
nor (an end) of intellect altogether ;" so that we might spare 
ourselves the trouble of further argument so far as concerns 
the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect 
of the potter surceases on his beatification : but we may 
go further and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of 
the intellect of the beatified potter, without conceding any 
necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory 
of the case may be stated as follows : " Or (as Berkeley sug 
gests in his Principles of Human Knowledge, ch. vi.) let the 
Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the 
like continue to exist, and not the Self-consciousness of the 
potter," who may lose his Self-consciousness, whereas the 
Deity the sum of all life Hiranya-garbJia (see Veddnta-s ara 
62,) never loses His Self-consciousness while aught living con 
tinues.] 



And thence that of In- Aph. 64. [The knowledge of the 
**&** existence] of Intellect is [by inference] 

from that [Self-consciousness " That is to say, by inference 
from (the existence of) that viz. Self-consciousness which 
is a product, there comes the knowledge of Intellect (buddhi) 
the great inner organ (antakkarana) and hence called the 
great one (makat), (the existence of which is recognised) 
under the character of the cause of this (product viz. Self-con 
sciousness). And so the application ( again rather circular 
of the process of inference to the case) is as follows : 

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the 
things that consist of the moods of judgment (or mind), 

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment 
( proceeding in the Cartesian order of f cogito, ergo sum,) 
and 



26 The SdnJckya Aphorisms. Book L 

(3) Whatever is not so ( i. e. whatever is not made out of 
judgment or mental assurance ), is not thus (i. e. is not a product 
of mental assurance ) as the Soul" (which is not made out of 
this or anything antecedent.] 



And, thence that of No- <4p%" 65 - [ The knowledge of the 
existence] of Nature is [by inference] 

from that [ Intellect. ] [ The application (of the process of 
inference to the case) is as follows : 

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and 
Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections, 
of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness : 

(2) Because, whilst it is a product (and must therefore have 
arisen from something consisting of that which it itself now 
consists of), it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness : and 

(3) (Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, 
Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which 
consists of these,) as lovely women, &c. 

Tor, an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and 
therefore (is known to be mainly made up of or) partakes of the 
quality of Goodness ; the indiscreet one gives pain to him, 
and therefore partakes of the quality of Foulness ; and she 
who is separated (and perhaps forgotten), occasions indifference, 
and so partakes of the quality of Darkness. 3 " " And the appro 
priate refutation (of any objection) in this case is (the principle) 
that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be (in 
every case) in conformity with the qualities of the cause/ ] 



n ^ n 

The argument for the exist- <4p&. 66. [The existence] of Soul 
[is inferred] from the fact that the 

combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] 
is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature or any of its 
similarly unintelligent products. " But the application (of the 
argument in this particular case is as follows) ; 



Nature and Soul uncreated. 27 

(1) The thing in question viz. Nature, the Great one/ and 
the rest (of the aggregate of the unintelligent), has, as its 
fruit (or end), the (mundane) experiences and the (eventual) 
liberation of some other than itself ; 

(2) Because it is a combination (or compares) ; and 

(3) (Every combination,) as a couch or a seat, or the like," (is 
for another s use, not for its own, and its several component 
parts render no mutual service).] 

ii 



Argument for the eternity A ^ 67. Since the root has no 

of nature. roo t ? the root [of all] is root-less, 

[that is to say, there is no other cause of Nature, because there 
would be a regressus in infinitum if we were to suppose another 
cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another 
cause, and so on without end.] 



Theempioyment of the term 4?*- 68 Even if there be a succes- 

Primal Agency, or Nature, is S [ QU t | iere J g a fa\i at some One point, 

merely to debar the regressus 

in infinitum. and so it is merely a name, [that we 

give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of 
things under the name of Nature/ " Since there would be the 

O 

fault of regressiis in infinitum if there were a succession of causes 

another cause of Nature, and another cause of that one again, 
there must be at last a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, 
somewhere or other, at some one uncaused, eternal thing; 
therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-kriti) 

for this word praJcriti (usually, and conveniently, rendered by 
the term Nature,} is nothing more than a sign to denote the 
cause which is the root."] 

n 



Nature and soul alike ^X*. 69. Alike in respect of Nature 
uncreated. and of both [Soul and Nature, is the 

argument for the uncreated existence.] 
E 2 



28 The SdukJtya Aphorisms. Book I. 



All do not profit ly the A P Jl - 70. There is no rule [or neces- 

samng truth, because it is g it y that all should arrive at the truth ] 

only the lest kind of people 

that are fully amenable to because those who are privileged [to 



engage in the enquiry] are of three 
descriptions [ " through their distinction into those who, in 
reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these by the dull, 
the (Sankhya) arguments are frustrated (and altogether set aside) 
by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Baud- 
dhas, &c. By the mediocre, they (are brought into doubt, or, 
in other words,) are made to appear as if there were equally 
strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments 
which really prove the reverse (of what these persons employ 
them to prove), or by arguments which are not true; ( see the 
section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangr alia] . But it is only the 
lest of those privileged that reflect in the manner that has been 
set forth (in our exposition of the process of reflection which 
leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature) ; such is the 
import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the 
manner so set forth forth ; such is the literal meaning."] 



II 

Great one 1 is Aph. 71. That first product [of the 
meant Mind. Primal Agent, Nature,] which is called 

the Great one/ is Mind. [" Mind (manas) is so called 
because its function is * thinking (manana). By thinking is 
here meant judging (nis chaya) : that of which this is the 
function is intellect (buddhi) ; and that is the first product 
that called the Great one 



The relation of Self-con- A$h. 72. Self-consciousness/ is 
piousness to Mind. tha{ . which j g Su b se quent [to Mind, 

"That is to say, Self- consciousness is the next after the Great 



Nature the sole cause. 29 

conceit (which brings out the "Ego in every case of cognition, 
the matter of which cognition would else have lain dormant in 
the bosom of Nature the formless Objective) it therefore 
follows that the others (among the phenomena of mundane exist 
ence) are effects of this (Self-consciousness); and so he declares 
as follows"] . 

11 ^& II 



All products, save Mind, 4P& 73. To the others it belongs 

resultfrom Self-consciousness. to be tlie p roc l u cts thereof [ i. 6. of 
Self-consciousness] . 

ll ^8 u 



Aph. 74. Moreover, mediately, 

Nature, immediately^ the 

cause of Mind, is mediately through that [i. e. the ( great one 7 
the cause of all other products. ^ ^_^ ^ ^ [ cause _viz. Na- 

ture ] is the cause [of all products] , as is the case with the 
Atoms, [ u for in the theory of the Vais seshikas, the Atoms 
are the cause of the jar or the like, only [mediately] through 
combinations of two atoms, and so on." " But then, since 
both Nature and Soul too are eternal, which of them is [really] 
the cause of the creation s commencing? In regard to this he 
declares as follows."] 



Why Nature is the sole Aph. 75. While both [Soul and 

cause - Nature] are antecedent [to all products] , 

since the one [viz. Soul] is devoid of this [character of being a 
cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two [ viz. 
Nature. " But (some one may say) let Atoms alone be causes, 
since there is no dispute (that these are causal). In reply to this 
he says"]. 

1 1 u 



Why Ue a,, of a f las- A P 1 76.-What is limited cannot 

tic Nature is preferable to be the substance of all things, [ a as 

that of Atoms. . , . 

yarn cannot be the (material) cause 01 



30 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book /. 

a jar ; therefore it would (on the theory suggested) be neces 
sary to mention separate causes of all things severally, and it is 
simpler to assume a single cause ; therefore Nature alone is the 
cause," " and he alleges scripture in support of this," as 
follows] . 



II 

Scripture declares in fa- Apli. 77. And [the proposition that 
Nature is the cause of all is proved] 

from the text of scripture that the origin [of the world] is 
therefrom, [for " Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is 
the cause of the world, in such terms as From Nature the world 
arises/ &c." "But then (some one may say), a jar which 
antecedently did not exist, is seen to come into existence ; let, 
then, antecedent non-existence be the cause (of each product), 
since this is an invariable antecedent," (and hence a cause 
the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause/ if Dr. 
Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted.) To this he replies] 

78. A thing is not made out 
of nothing [ " that is to say, it is 
not possible that out of nothing i. e. out of a nonentity a thing 
should be made i. e. an entity should arise. If an entity were 
to arise out of a nonentity, then since the character of a cause is 
visible in its product, the world also would be unreal." Well, 
" let the world too be unreal, what harm is that to us ? (if 
any ask) he therefore declares as follows."] 



Reasons why the world is Apli. 79. It [the world] is not un 
real, because there is no fact contradic 
tory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of 
depraved causes [leading to a belief in what ought not to be 
believed. " When there is the notion, in regard to a shell (of a 



The world is not unreal. 31 

pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver), that it is 
silver, its being silver is contradicted by the (subsequent and 
more correct) cognition that this is not silver. But, in the case in 
question (that of the world regarded as a reality ), no one 
ever has the cognition, c This world is not in the shape of an 
entity/ by which (cognition if any one ever really had such 
_ ) its being an entity might be opposed." " And it is held 
that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause, e. g. 
some one s cognition of a (white) conch -shell as yellow, through 
such a fault as the jaundice (which depraves his eye-sight). 
But, in the case in question ( that of the world regarded as a 
rea lity ) , there is no such (temporary or occasional) depravation 
(of the senses), because all, at all times, cognize the world as a 
reality ; therefore the world is not an unreality." " But then 
(some one may suggest) let nonentity be the (substantial) 
cause of the world, still the world will not (necessarily therefore) 
be unreal. In regard to this he declares as follows."] 



II Co II 

ApJi. 80. If it [the substantial 

The product of something ^ L 

is something, and of nothing cause ] be an entity, then this would 

be the case [that the product should be 

an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith : but if [the 
cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case 
[that the product should be real] since it is a nonentity [like 
the cause with which it is united in the relation of identity] ? 
" [But then ( a follower of the Mimdnsd may say), since (it would 
appear that) nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, 
let works alone be the cause of the world ; what need have we 
of the hypothesis of Nature ? J To this he replies."] 



Action cannot serve as a Aph. 81. Nay, for works are not 

substratum. adapted to be the substantial cause (of 



32 The SdnJehya Aphorisms. Book I. 

any product.) ["Granting that the unseen (merit or demerit 
arising from actions) may be an instrumental cause (in bringing 
about the mundane condition of the agent), yet we never see 
merit or dement in the character of the substantial cause (of 
any product), and our theories ought to show deference to our 
experience." 

"But then (some one may say) since Liberation can be 
obtained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what 
occasion is there for (our troubling ourselves about) Nature ? To 
this he replies."] 



Salvation is not to le ol- Aph. 82. The accomplishment 

tainedly ritual olservances. ^^ [{> ^ of Liberation] is not, 
moreover, through scriptural rites : the chief end of man 
does not consist in this [that is gained through such means] ; 
because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, 
[and is therefore & product and not eternal], there is [still left 
impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births. 



In regard to tie attain- Aph. 83. There is scripture for it 
that he who has attained to discHmina- 
the Sdnkya. tion in regard to these [i. e. Nature 

and Soul] has no repetition of births ; [for " there is a text 
declaring that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinc 
tion, there shall be no repetition of births ; the text viz. 
1 He does not return again/ &c."] 

u 



Pain can only lead to pain, Aph. 84. From pain [occasioned, 

not to liberation from it. ^ ^ t() victims in sacr ifice] must Come 

pain [to the sacrificer, and not liberation from pain], as there 
is not relief from chilliness by effusion of water. [For, " if Li- 



Evidence. 

i \ 

the end A ? h 85. [Liberation cannot arise 
contemplated makes no dif- from acts] because, whether the end 

ference in regard to the tran- . . 

sitor mess of what is effected be something desirable or undesirable, 
ty "* [and we admit that the motive of 

the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim, ] this makes 
no difference in regard to its being the result of acts [and 
therefore not eternal but transitory, " because it is a produc 
tion."] And " the text which declares that works done with 
out desire are instruments of Liberation, has reference to 
knowledge (which, I grant, may be gained by such means), and 
Liberation comes through knowledge, so that these works 
are instruments of Liberation mediately ;" [ but you will 
recollect that the present enquiry regards the immediate cause] . 



II c ^ II 

The right means effect Li- Apli. 86. Of him who is essenti- 
beration once for all. ally liberated, his bonds having abso 

lutely perished, it [i. e. the fruit of his saving knowledge] is 
absolute : there is no parity [between his case and that of 
him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a tem 
porary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth. 
Well, "it has been asserted (in Aph. 61) that there is a class 
of twenty-five (things which are realities) : and since these 
cannot be ascertained (or made out to be true) except by proof t 
therefore he displays this," i. e. he shows what he means by 
proof] . 



What is meant by evi- 4P 7ji - 87 - TIie determination of 
dence - something not [previously] lodged in 

both [the Soul and the Intellect] nor in one or other of them, 
is right notion (prama). What is in the highest degree 



e 

F 



34 The SdnJiJii/a Aphorisms. Book I. 

productive thereof [ i. e. of any given right notion ] , is 
that, [ i. e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pra- 
mdnaj. Not lodged i. e. not deposited in one rightly 
cognizing (pramdtri), in short, not previously got at. The 
discrimination/ i. e. the ascertainment (or right apprehen 
sion) of such a thing or reality, is right notion : and whe 
ther this be an affection of both i. e, of Intellect and also 
of Soul (as some hold that it is), or of only one or other of 
the two (as others hold), either way, that which is in the 
highest degree productive of this right notion is (what we 
term proof or) evidence (pramdna). Such is the definition 
of evidence in general, the definition of its several species 
falling to be considered hereafter. " It is with a view to the 
exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that 
we employ (when speaking of the result of evidence) the 
expressions not previously known (which excludes things 
remembered), and reality (which excludes mistakes and 
fancies), and discrimination " which excludes doubt. And 
"in regard to this (topic of knowledge and the sources of 
knowledge), if right notion, is spoken of as located in the 
Soul, then the proof or evidence is an affection of the Intellect. 
If on the other hand, the right notion is spoken of as located 
in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection (of that, the 
affections of which are mirrored by the Soul), then it (the 
proof or evidence or whatever we may choose to call that 
from which right notion results), is just the conjunction of 
an organ (with its appropriate object, such conjunction giving 
rise to sense-perception ), &c. But if both the Soul s cogni 
tion, and the affections of the Intellect, are spoken of as 
(cases of) right notion, then both of these aforesaid ( the 
affection of the Intellect in the first case, and the conjunction 
of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case 
) are (to receive the name of) proof (pramdna) . You are 
to understand that when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken 
of as evidence, it is only as being mediately" the sources of 



Perception defined. 35 

right knowledge. " How many kinds of proofs then are 
there ? To this he replies."] 

HWi rffef T ^faf^lftwfolV II CC || 

*ftre kinds of A P h - 88. Proof is of three kinds : 
evidence. there is no establishment of more, be 

cause if these be established then all [that is true] can be 
established [ by one or other of these three proofs, viz., sense 
(pratyafoha) , the recognition of signs (anumdna) , and tes 
timony (s abda) , to the exclusion of comparison which is 
reckoned in the Nyaya a specifically distinct source of know 
ledge, &c.] 



Apli. 89. Perception (pratyaJksha) 

Perception defined. . . , , . 

is that discernment which, being 111 

conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form 
thereof [ as water assumes the form of the vessel into which 
it is poured ] . 



C* II 

Apli. 90. It is not a fault, [in the 
definition, that it does not apply to 
apply to the perceptions of fa Q perceptions of adepts in the Yoga,"] 

the mystic. . , T 

because that of the adepts m the Yoga 

is not an external perception, [since the adepts of the Yoga 
do not perceive through the external organs of sense. But, 
although this reply is as much as the objector has any right 
to expect, the real justification of the definition in question 
is next stated] . 



m 91. Or, there is no fault [in 

But the definition does ap 

ply to the perceptions of the the definition] because of the conjunc 
tion, with causal things, of that [mys 

tical mind] which has attained exaltation [ " since the mind 
F 2 



36 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 

of the Yogi, in the exaltation gained from the habitude pro 
duced by concentration, does come into conjunction with things 
(as existent) in their causes," whether or not with the things 
as developed into products perceptible by the external senses. 
And "here the word rendered causal (Una) denotes the 
things, not in conjunction (with the senses), alluded to by the 
objector : for we, who assert that effects exist (from eternity 
in their causes before taking the shape of effects, and likewise 
in these same causes when again resolved into their causes), 
hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and 
that hence its conjunction (with the mind of the mystic or 
the clairvoyant) is possible." " But then (some one may 
say still this (definition) does not extend to the Lord s per 
ceptions, because, since these are from everlasting, they can 
not result from (emergent) conjunction. To this he replies"] . 

II 

That any < Lord? exists is ^h. 92. [This objection to the 
not proved. definition of Perception has no force] 

because it is not proved that there is a Lord (is war a) ; [but 
observe that this demurring to there being any ( Lord/ is 
merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of certain 
partisans (who hold an opinion not recognised by the major 
ity) ; therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed 
is because it is not proved that there is a Lord/ but not 
the expression because there is no Lord. And further, " on 
the implication that there is a Lord/ what we mean to speak 
of (in our definition of Perception in Aph. 89 ) is merely 
the being of the same kind with what is produced by con 
junction" of a sense-organ with its object, and the percep 
tions of the c Lord may be of the same kind with such 
perceptions, though they were not to come from the same 
source. ] 



TJi-at any Lord exists, is not proved. 37 



A dile mm a to exclude A P h 93.- [And ^ther] it is not 

proof that there is any proved that He [the Lord ] exists, 

because [whoever exists must be either 

free or bound, and] of free and bound, He can be neither the 
one nor the other. 



II 8 II 

Apli. 94. ["Because] either way He 
The force of the dilemma, M , L . J . 

would be memcient, [ since, if He 

were free, He would have no desires which (as compulsory 
motives, would) instigate Him to create ; and, if He were 
bound, He would be under delusion ; He must be (on either 
alternative,) unequal to the creation, &c., of this world. 
" But then (it may be asked,) if such be the case, what be 
comes of the scripture texts which declare the Lord ? J To 
this he replies."] 

1 11 II 



The import of the texts Apli. 95. [The scriptural texts 

which speak of the Lord: wnicll make men ti on of the Lord/ 

are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to 
the recognised [deities of the Hindu pantheon. But then, if 
God be nothing but the Soul, and if Soul does nothing, then 
" what is heard (in scripture viz. ) the fact that it (viz. 
Soul) is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case, 
for, in the world, we speak of government only in reference 
to modifications (preceded and determined) by resolutions 
(that so and so shall take place), &c. To this he replies"] . 

ri^f^T^faSRcS flfWTil <<* II 

Soul, like the loadstone, A P^ 96. The governorship there. 
acts not by resolve but o f n e> o f g ou i over Nature] is from 
through proximity. . 

its proximity [thereto, not from its 

resolving to act thereon ], as is the case with the gem [ the 



o8 The Sdnlihija Aphorisms. Book I. 

load-stone in regard to iron. For, if it were alleged tliat its 
(Soul s) creativeness or its governorship were through a resolve 
(to create or to govern,) then this objection would apply ; 
but (it is not so for) by us (Sankhyas) it is held that the 
Soul s governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, 
is merely from its proximity (to Nature) " as is the case with 
the (load-stone) gem;" for "as the gem, the load-stone, is 
attracted by iron, merely by proximity, without resolving 
(either to act or to be acted upon), so by the mere conjunction 
of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle called 
the Great One (or Mind see Aph. 61). And in this alone 
consists (what we speak of as) its acting as creator towards 
that which is superadded to it :" and thus it is declared (in 
some one of the Puranas) " As the iron acts whilst the gem 
(the loadstone) stands void of volition, just so the world is 
created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is that 
there is in the Soul both agency (seemingly), and non-agency 
(really) : it is not an agent, inasmuch as it is devoid of voli 
tion ; and it is an agent, merely through approximation" 
to Nature] . 



11 

In like manner Embodied Aph. 97. 111 the Case of individual 

souls do not energize. products also, [the apparent agency J 

of animal souls [is solely through proximity. But then (some 
one may say), if there were no eternal and omniscient Lord/ 
then, through the doubt of a blind tradition (in the absence 
of an intelligently effective guardianship), the Vedas would 
cease to be an authority (a possibility which, of course, can 
not be entertained for an instant). To this he replies"] . 

11 ^ u 



Aph. 98. The declaration of the 

Hovo the I edas need not 

any * Lord* to authenticate texts or sense |_of the Veda, by 

Brahma for example], since he knows 

the truth [is authoritative evidence. "But then if Soul, by 



Inference and Testimony. 39 

its simple proximity (to Nature) is an overruler in a secondary 
sense only of the term, ( as the magnet may be said, in a 
secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is 
entertained that actually, and literally, the iron draws the 
magnet, ) then who is the primary (or actual) overruler (in 
the creation of the world) ? In reference to this he says"] . 



It is in tie sMpe of the 

internal organ that Nature through its being enlightened thereby 

affects Soul. . . 

[ i. e. by boul J is the over-ruler, 

as is the iron [in respect of the magnet. " The internal 
organ, i. e. the understanding, is the over-ruler, through its 
fancying itself to be Soul, (as it does fancy) by reason of its 
being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to 
reflect itself in (and contemplate itself in) Soul; just as the 
iron* that is to say as the attracting iron, though inactive, 
draws (the magnet) in consequence of its mere proximity," 
and so acquiring magnetism by Magnetic Induction] . 

He now, (having discussed the evidence that consists in 
direct perception), gives his definition of an induction (anu- 
mdnaj . 



30 



Aph. 100. The knowledge of the 
connected [e. g. fire] through per 

ception of the connection [e. g. of fire with smoke] is infer 
ence. 



Aph. 101. Testimony [such as is 

Valid Testimony defined. ^.^ ^ ^ name of 



is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed] , 



40 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 



a. tM. of no. A P h - l 2 --Sinee the establishment 

dence have been here set of [the existence of] both [soul and 

not-soul] is by means of evidence, 

the declaration thereof [i. e. of the kinds of evidence,, has 
been here made. And " among these (several kinds of proof) 
he now describes that one by which especially viz. by a proof 
which is one kind of inference Nature and Soul are here to 
be established discriminatively"]. 



The existence of Soid and Apli. 103. The establishment of 
Nature argued from analog. ^^ [Nature and Soul] is by analogy 

[the necessity of axes for cutting, leading us, analogically, to the 
necessity of Senses for perceiving, which Senses are products of 
Nature ; and, again, that houses, and other, structures, exist not 
for themselves, leading us to the conclusion that Nature, which 
is a compound thing, is not designed for itself but for something 
different, viz. Soul. "But then (some one may say) since 
Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, (and the result 
of her action is the bondage of the Soul,) there should constantly 
be experience (whether of pleasure or of pain), and hence no 
such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies"]. 



: n ^08 n 

When it is that experience A P^- 104. Experience [whether 



ceases - 



of pain or pleasure] ends with [the 
discernment of] Thought [or Soul, as contradistinguished 
from Nature. " By Thought is meant Soul. Experience 
(whether of pain or pleasure) ceases on the discerning thereof. 
As antecedent non-existence/ though devoid of a beginning, 
( see Tarkaaanyraha 92) surceases ( when the thing an 
tecedently non-existent begins, to be ), so eternal Nature 
( eternal as regards the absence of any beginning ) con 
tinues (no further than) till the discernment of the difference 



Soul neither acts nor experiences. 41 

(between Nature and Soul) : so that experience (whether of 
pain or pleasure) does not at all times occur : such is the state 
of the case." But some one may say if Nature be agent, and 
Soul experience^ then it must follow ( which seems unrea 
sonable ) that another is the experiencer of (the results of) the 
acts done by one different. To this he replies"] . 



The fruit of the action is Aph. 105. The experience of the 
not always the agents. fruit may Belong even to another than 

the agent, as in the case of food, &c., [ for, " as it belongs 
to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not 
the agent, viz. the master, to enjoy the fruit thereof ( i. e. 
the fruit of the cook s actions ), so is the case here." But, 
" having stated this exoteric principle, he next declares his 
own doctrine" on the point] . 



II ^ II 

That Soul acts and experi- A P h - 106. Or [to give a better 
fnces is an error. account of the matter than that given 

in Aph. 105 ], since it is from non- discrimination that it is 
derived, the notion that the agent [ soul being mistaken for 
an agent ] has the fruit [of the act, is a wrong notion. For 
" the soul is neither an agent nor a patient, but, from the fact 
that the Great Principle ( the actual agent ) is reflected in 
it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent." And " it 
is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul 
that this takes place, i. e. that the conceit takes place that 
it is the agent that experiences the fruit ;" whereas the ac 
tual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experi 
ence neither pain not pleasure] . 



Soul is really neither agent Aph. 107. And when the truth is 

nor experiencer. ^ there ig neitliep> [ < W }, on the 

truth is told (and discerned), i. e. when, by means of evidence, 

G 



42 The Sank hi/a Aphorisms, Book I. 

Nature and Soul are perceived (in their entire distinctness one 
from the other), * there is neither i. e. neither the condition 
(as regards soul) of an agent nor a patient." 

" Having thus discussed (the topic of) evidence, he next 
states the distribution of the object-matter of evidence"]. 



What is perceptlUe under 108 -[ A ^llg may be] an 

certain circumstances may be object [perceptible] and also [at an- 
imperceptible under others. . . -, , . T 

other time] not an object, through 

there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of 
[conjunction of the sense with the thing] or [on the other 
hand] an appliance of the sense [to the thing. To explain 
the &c./ and exemplify the causes that may prevent the con 
junction, required in order to perception, between the thing 
and the sense, we may remark that " it is in consequence of 
great distance that a bird (flying very high up) in the sky is 
not perceived ; (then again) in consequence of extreme proxi 
mity the collyrium located in the eye (is not perceived by the 
eye itself) : a thing placed in (the inside of, or on the 
opposite side of,) a wall (is not perceived) in consequence of 
the obstruction : from distraction of mind the unhappy, or 
other (agitated person), does not perceive the thing that is at 
his side ( or under his very nose ) : through its subtilty 
an Atom (is not perceived) : nor is a very small sound when 
overpowered by the sound of a drum : and so on." Now 
"how," or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerat 
ed, (( comes the imperceptibleness of Nature ? In regard 
to this he declares"] . 

II 



n u u f TV , A P h - 10 9. Her [i. e. Nature s] 

The subtilty of Nature. 

wnperceptibleness arises from her sub 
tilty, [and " by ( subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to 



Nature, not Atoms. 43 

investigate, not ( as a Naiyayika might perhaps here prefer 
understanding the term ) the consisting of Atoms, for 
Nature is (not atomic, in the opinion of the Sankhyas, but) 
all-pervasive." " How then (it may be asked) is (the existence 
of) Nature determined ? To this he replies"] . 



i ^\o \\ 

Nature inferred from the &pll. 110. [Nature exists] because 

existence of productions. j ier ex i s t en ce is gathered from the 

beholding of productions [" which have the three Qualities," 
see Aph. 61., and the existence of which implies a cause, 
to which the name of Nature is given, in which these three 
constituents are held to exist .from eternity]. 



i u 11 



ApJi. 111. If [you throw out the 
A doubt thrown on the . 

existence of Native ly the doubt that] it [ viz. the existence oi 
contradiction of dissentients. Nature _-| is not established, because 

of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, the Naiyd^ 
yikas asserting that atoms are the cause of the world, and 
the Veddntins that Brahma is the cause, then he retorts as 
follows] . 



u 

Mutual denials settle no- Apll. 112. But since thus each 

[doctrine] is established in the opi 
nion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive. 
" If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the oppo 
nent, then (look you) there is dissent against the other side 
too, so how should it be established ?" " Well then ( the 
opponent may say ), let (the inference of) cause from effect 
be granted, how is it that this (cause) is Nature and nothing 
else ( such as Atoms, for instance) ? To this he replies"]. 
G 2 



44 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 



II \\B II 

Nrturette onl,, ^potle. W- - BeCauSe [ if We re 

sis consistent with ivhat up- to infer any other cause than Nature] 

we should have a contradiction to 

the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit. For "if 
the character of cause (of all things around us) belonged to 
Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the 
fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, 
which is recognisable in the world ;" because nothing, we 
hold, can exist in the effect which did not exist in the cause, 
and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms. " He 
next repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect 
is that of what existed (antecedently) or of what did not 
exist at least potentially Aph. 117.] 



What never existed will Aph. 114. The production of what 

never exist. ig nQ en ^^ aa ft man > s l lorn ^ 

not take place. 



A product cannot oe of Aph. 115. Because of the rule 
noth 9- that there must be some material [of 

which the product may consist. c And only when both are 
extant is there from the presence of the cause the presence of 
the effect : otherwise everywhere, and always, every effect 
might be produced," the presence of the cause being, on the 
supposition, superfluous. " This he insists upon as follows"] . 



Else any thing might occur Aph. 116. Because every thing 

at any time anywhere. .-. -, -i 

is not possible every where, always, 
[which it might be if materials could be dispensed with. tf And 
for the following reason also, he declares, there is no produc 
tion of what existed not" antecedently] . 



Production only manifestation, 45 



Effects pre-exist potential- A.ph. 1 1 7. Because it is that which 
ly in their causes. is competent [to the making of any 

thing] that makes what is possible [as a product of it. ff For 
the being the material (of any future product) is nothing else 
than the fact of (being it potentially, i. e. of) having the 
power to be the product ; and this power is nothing else than 
the product s condition as that of what has not yet come to 
p ass . therefore,, since that which has the power/ viz., the 
cause, makes the product which is capable (of being made 
out of it), it is not of any nonentity that the production takes 
place j" but of an entity whose esse antecedently was possi 
bility]. 



Tke product is nothing W- H8.-And because it [-the 
eke than (he cause. product ] is [nothing else than] the 

cause [in the shape of the product] . 

. n ^t n 

If P* be alle S ed that] 



is can be said to become. there is no possibility of that becom 

ing, which already is [then the answer will be found in the 
next aphorism] . 

*v *\ 

II \*(* II 



Aph. 120. Nay, [do not argue 

Production is only mam- f J L 

festation, and so of the oppo- that what is cannot become, for J the 

employment and the non-employment 

[of the term production ] are occasioned by the manifestation 
[or non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced or not. 
< As the whiteness of white cloth which had become dirty is 
brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the 
operation of the potter is the pot brought into manifestness ; 
whereas, on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden," and 



46 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 

no longer appears as a pot. " And manifestation 5 (is no 
fiction of ours, for it) is seen ; for example, that of oil, from 
sesamum-seeds, by pressure ; of milk, from the cow, by milk 
ing ; of the statue, that resided in the midst of the stone, by 
the operation of the sculptor ; of shelled rice from rice in the 
husk, by threshing ; &c." And " therefore the employment 
or non-employment of the term the production of an effect 
are dependent on manifestation dependent on the manifesta 
tion of the effect : that is to say, the employment of the 
term production is in consequence of the manifestation (of 
what is spoken of as produced), and the non-employment of 
the term production is in consequence of there being no mani 
festation (of that which is therefore not spoken of as pro 
duced), but (the employment of the term production is) not 
in consequence of that becoming an entity which was not an 
entity." But " if (the employment of the term) production is 
occasioned by (the fact of) manifestation, by what is occasion 
ed the employment of the term destruction ? To this he re 
plies"]. , 



What is meant ly destruc- Aph. 1 2 1 .Destruction ["of any 

tion. . J 

thing] is the resolution [of the thing 

spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was 
produced, as when, by the blow of a mallet, a jar is resolved 
into its cause, i. e. into the particles of clay which constituted 
the jar. But some one may say if there were only a reso 
lution (of a product into that from which it arose), a resur 
rection (or iroAiyyowio) of it might be seen, and this is 
not seen : well (we reply) it is not seen by blockheads, 
but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, 
when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth 
(as when burned to ashes) : and the earth is changed into 
the shape of a cotton-tree ; and this (successively) changes into the 
shape of flower, fruit, and thread (spun again from the fruit of the 



What is meant by destruction. 47 

cotton-plant). So is it with all entities." But "pray (some 
one may ask) is this manifestation (that you speak of under 
Aph. 119) something real, or something not real ? If it be some 
thing real (and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be) 
then all effects (during this constant manifestation) ought con 
stantly to be perceived ; and if it be not real, then there would 
be a non-existence of all products [in the absence of all mani 
festation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real 
and] there must be [in order to give rise to it] another mani 
festation, and of this another, [ seeing that a manifestation 
can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation, on 
the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less 
than its cause] , and thus we have a regressus in infinitum. To 
this he replies." 



How manifestation may Aph. 122. You are to understand 

occur without being an entity. that Sliccess i ve ly, as is the Case with 
seed and plant, [ manifestation may generate manifestation 
from eternity to eternity. " Be it so, that there are thousands 
of manifestations, still there is no fault, for there is no starting 
point, as is the case with seed and plant," which people 
may suppose to have served from eternity as sources one to 
another reciprocally] . 



The objections to the theory A P^ 123. Or, [at all events, our 
of manifestation retorted. theory of manifestation is as] blame 
less as [your theory of] production : [for let us ask, " pray 

is production produced, or is it not ? If it is produced, then 
of this (production of production) there must be production ; 

so that there is a regressus in infinitum, (such as you allege 
against our theory) . If it be not produced, then, pray is this 
because it is un-real, or because it is eternal ? If because it 
is un-real, then production never is at all, so that it should 



48 The Stinkhya Aphorisms. Book. I. 

never be perceived, (as you allege that it is) . Again, if (pro 
duction is not something produced) because it is eternal, then 
there should be at all times the production of (all possible) 
effects, (which you will scarcely pretend is the case). Again, 
if you say, since production itself consists of production, 
what need of supposing an ulterior production (of produc 
tion) ? then, in like manner, (I ask,) since manifestation 
itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an 
ulterior manifestation (of manifestation) ? The view which 
you hold on this point is ours also," and thus every objection 
stated or hinted under Aph. 121., is capable of being retorted]. 



The characters common to Aph. 124. [A product of nature 

all products. j g -| cause( ^ un-eternal, mutable, not 

all-pervading, multitudinous, dependent, mergent. 

a. t Caused i. e. having a cause. Un-eternal/ i. e. de 
structible. Not all-pervading/ i. e. not present everywhere. 
f Mutable i. e. distinguished by the act of leaving (one form) 
and assuming (another form). It (the soul) leaves the body it 
had assumed, (and probably takes another) ; and bodies, &c., 
move (and are mutable, as is notorious). Multitudinous i. 
e., in consequence of the distinction of souls, ( each man 
e. g. having a separate body. Dependent i. e. on its 
cause. Mergent, that is to say, it (i. e. each product, in due 
time,) is resolved into that from which it originated. But 
some one may say " if realities be the twenty-five (which the 
Sankhyas enumerate see Aph. 60 and no more), pray, are 
such common, operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely 
nothing ? (if you say that they are so) then you give up what 
you see in order to save a hypothesis, with which that which 
you see is irreconcilable. To this he replies."] 



Qualities in the Nydya and Sdnkhya. 49 



The qualities of tie Nyd. A * h 125. There is the establish- 

ya are implied in the term ment of these, [24 ( Qualities of the 

Nydya, which you fancy that we do 

not recognise because we do not explicitly enumerate them,] 
either by reason that these ordinary qualities [ as contradis 
tinguished from the three Qualities of the Sankhya ] are in 
reality nothing different ; or [ to put it in another point of 
view ] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature [ in 
which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied] . 



The characters common to A l^ 1 26. Of both [Nature and her 

Nature and her products. products] the fact that they consist 
of the three Qualities and that they are irrational [is the 
common property] . 



In what the three Quali- dph. 127. The Qualities differ in 
ties differ. character, mutually, by pleasantness, 

unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms severally the 
Qualities present themselves] . 



I \\^ II 

In what respects the Qua- Apli. 128. Through Lightness and 

lities agree as well as differ. Q ^ QY habits, the Qualities mutually 

agree and differ : [ i. e. through the characters of Light 
ness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the Qualities differ. Their 
agreement is through what is hinted by the expression and 
other/ And this consists in their mutually predominating 
(one over the other from time to time), producing each other, 
consorting together, and being reciprocally present ( the 
one in the other ), for the sake of the soul." " By the ex- 
H 



50 The Sdiikhya Aphorisms. Book. I. 

pression ( in Aph. 124 ) caused/ &c., it was declared that 
the Great one/ or Mind, &c., are Products. He states the 
proof of this] . 



Proof that Hindoo., are A P h 129 . Since tlie 7 * other 

products. than both [Soul and Nature the only 

two uncaused entities "], Mind, and the rest, are products, as 
is the case with a jar or the like. ["He states another 
reason."] 



of their mea- 

sure, [which is a limited one, Mind 
and the rest are products ; whereas the only two that are un 
caused, viz. Nature and Soul, are unlimited] . 



AtUrd proof. A ? h 181 ~ Because tne J conform 

[to Nature. Mind and the rest are 

products, (( because they will (follow and) correspond with 
Nature, i. e., because the Qualities of Nature are seen in all 
things :" and it is a maxim that what is in the effect was deriv 
ed from the cause, and implies the cause] . 



A fourthproof. A ^ 132 -~ And fina %; because it 

is through the power [of the cause 

alone, that the product can do aught, as a chain restrains an 
elephant only by the force of the iron that it is made of] . 






Converse proof of the Aph. 133. On the quitting there 
of [ quitting the condition of pro 
duct ] , there is Nature or Soul, [into one or other of which 
the product must needs have resolved itself. "Product or 
not-product, such is the pair of alternatives. ( On the quitting 



Proofs that Mind, fyc. are products. 51 

thereof/ i. e. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of 
product, Mind and the rest (of necessity) enter into Nature 
or Soul," these two alone being not-products. But perhaps 
some one may say " Mind and the rest may exist quite inde 
pendently of the pair of alternatives (just mentioned). In 
regard to this he declares as follows"] . 



A P ]l - 134,-If they were other than 
le at all, if neither product these two they would be void [ see- 

nor Hot-product. . 

ing that there is nothing self-existent 

besides Soul and Nature. " Well now, (some one may say,) 
why should it be under the character of a product that Mind 
and the rest are a sign of (there being such a principle as) 
nature ? They may be (more properly said to be) a sign 
merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this 
he replies"] . 



What kind of causes can Apli. 135. The cause is inferred 

le inferred from their effects. fr()m the effect j_ in ^ ^ Qf Na _ 

ture and her products ], because it accompanies it. [" That 
(other relation, other than that of material and product, which 
you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,) may 
indeed be where the nature (or essence) of the cause is not seen 
in the effect, as (is the case with) the inference from the rising 
of the moon that the sea is swollen (into full tide, rising, with 
maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from 
her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the 
Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart 
from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause moon-rise 
is not seen in the effect tide ; and consequently, though 
we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have 
been inferred from the effect) . But in the present case, since 
we see in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the 
H 2 



52 The SdtiWiya Aphorisms. Book I. 

cause is inferred from the effect. Because it accompanies 
it i. e. because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties 
of Nature/ i. e. Nature herself actually present, as we see 
the clay which is the cause of a jar actually present in the jar. 
But it may still be objected, if it be thus, then let that prin 
ciple itself the Great one/ or Mind, be the cause of the 
world : what need of Nature ? To this he replies"] . 



How Mind must have an 4ph. 136. The undiscrete, [Nature, 
tecedent - must be inferred] from its [discrete 

and dissoluble] effect, [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, 
[which constitute Nature. " It goes to dissolution such is 
the import of the term linga, here rendered ( effect/ From 
that (dissoluble effect), viz. the Great principle, or Mind, 
in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. 
And that the Great principle, in the shape of ascertainment 
(or distinct intellection), is limited (or discrete), and perishable 
is established by direct observation. Therefore ( i. e. since 
Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,) 
we infer that into which it is resolvable," in other words its 
f cause/ here analogously termed lingin, since effect had 
been termed ling a. " But then, (some one may say,) still some 
thing quite different may be the cause (of all things) j what 
need of this Nature of yours ? In regard to this he remarks 
as follows"] . 



Why Nature, and nothing Apli. 137. There is no denying 

else, * be the root of all. ^ it [__ Nature _] is because of its 

effects ; [ for, " is the cause of this (world) a product or not 
a product ? If it were a product, then, the same being (with 
equal propriety to be assumed to be) the case with its cause, 
there would be a regressus in infinitum. If effects be from any 
root ( to which there is nothing antecedent ), then this is 
that" to which we give the name of Nature] . 



The Soul. 53 



^ n 

it is not from any effect Aph. 138. [The relation of cause 
that Soulis inferred. an( j e ff ec t is] not [alleged as] the 

means of establishing [the existence of Soul], because, as is the 
case with [the disputed term] f merit/ there is no dispute about 
there being such a kind of thing, [though what kind of tiling 
is matter of dispute. " The dispute is (not as to Soul s being, 
but) as to its peculiarity (of being), as (whether it be) multi 
tudinous or sole, all-pervading or not all-pervading, and so forth. 
Just as in every (philosophical system or) theory there is no 
dispute as to (there being something to which may be applied the 
term) merit (dliarma) , for the difference of opinion has regard 
to the particular kind" of thing, such as sacrifices according to 
the Mimansa creed, or good works according to the Nyaya, 
which shall be held to involve merit. But some one may 
say " Souls are nothing else than the body and its organs, &c. ; 
what need of imagining anything else ? To this he replies"] . 



Aph. 139. Soul is something else 
Materialism scouted. .. 

than the body, &c. 



The discerpiille is sulser- Aph. 140. Because that which is 
vient to the indiscerptible. combined [and is therefore discerp- 

tible,] is for the sake of some other [not discerptible. " And 
that which is discerptible is intended for something else that 
is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that 
is discerptible, there would be a regressus in mjmitum ; combin- 
edness ( involving discerptibleness ) exists occultly in Na 
ture as well as the rest, because, otherwise, discerptibleness 
would not prove discoverable in the products thereof"] . 



54 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. 



Soul presents no symptom Apll. 141. [And Soul is Something 

of being material. Q ^Q than the body, &c.] , because there 

is [in Soul] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c. [ i. e., 
" because they are not seen in it"] . 



n 

Another proof that soul is Aph. 142. And [Soul is not mate 
rial] because of its superintendence 

[over Nature. " For a superintendent is an intelligent being, 
and Nature is unintellio ent."! 

o J 



Apli. 143. And [Soul is not mate- 

Anotner proof. 

rial] because of its being the ex- 

periencer. [" It is Nature that is experienced ; the experi- 
encer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably 
the same, is not (really) an experiencer, still the assertion (in 
the aphorism) is made because of the fact that the reflection 
of the Intellect befals it," and thus makes it seem as if it ex 
perienced : see Aph. 58. W ell, " efforts are engaged in for the 
sake of Liberation. Pray, is this (for the benefit) of the Soul 
or of Nature," since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it 
seems, the experiencer ?] 



i ^88 ii 

For Soul, not Nature, is Aph. 144. [It is for Soul and not 

liberation, tinted. for Nature,] because the exertions are 

with a view to isolation [from all qualities, a condition to 
which Soul is competent, but Nature not. For " the very 
essence of Nature cannot depart from it (so as to leave it in the 
state of absolute solitary isolation contemplated,) for the three 
Qualities are its very essence, (the departure of which from it 
would leave nothing behind) ; and because it would thus prove 
to be not eternal ( while in reality it is eternal,) The isola- 



Nature of the Soul. j$ 

tion ( Icwivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities 
are reflectional (and not constitutive see Aph. 58 ) and that 
is Soul"]. 



Aph. 145. Since light does not per- 
TJie nature of the Soul. . . 

tain to the unintelligent, light, [which 

must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, 
which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest. 
" It is a settled point that the unintelligent is not a light 
(it is not self-manifesting) . If Soul also were unintelligent 
( as the Naiyayikas hold it to be in substance knowledge 
being by them regarded not as its essence or substratum but 
as one of its qualities ), then there would need to be another 
light for it; and, as the simpler theory, let Soul itself consist 
essentially of light." " And there is scripture (in support 
of this view : for example the two following texts from the 
Vrihaddranyaka Upanishadj : Wherewith shall one distin 
guish that wherewith one distinguishes all this (world) ? 
Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer T 
But the Naiyayika may urge " let Soul be unintelligent 
[in its substance], but having Intelligence as its attribute. 
Thereby it manifests all things, but it is not essentially intelli 
gence. To this he replies"] . 



Aph. 146. It [Soul] has not In- 

(Soul has no quality. 

telligence as its attribute, because it 

is without quality. [ ff He declares that there is a contradic 
tion to Scripture" in the view which he is contending against.] 



II ^ II 

Scripture higher evidence ^pli. 147. There is no denial [to 
than supposed intuition. b e allowed] of what is established by 

Scripture, because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this 
[i. e. for the existence of qualities in the Soul] is confuted [by 



56 The Sdnlthya Aphorisms. Book I. 

the scriptural declaration of the contrary. " The text For 
this Soul is un-companioned/ &c., would be confuted if there 
were any annexation of qualities" to Soul : and the notion of 
confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment] . 



Aph. 148. [If soul were unintelli- 
g-t] it would not be witness [of its 
own comfort] in profound [and dream 

less] sleep,, &c. [" But that this is not the case (may be infer 
red) from the phenomenon that I slept pleasantly, &c. By 
the &c/ (in the aphorism) dreaming is included." " The 
Vedantins say that e soul is one only ; and so, again, For 
Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish : 7 
Being one (only), it is divided (into a seeming multitude) by 
Nature (s dkti) i. e. Illusion (may a) , but not through its 
own essence, ( to which there does not belong multiplicity)/ 
In regard to this he says as follows."] 



Aph. 149. From the several allot- 
^ There is a multiplicity of ment of ^^ &( ^ ft multiplicity o f 

souls [is to be inferred. (t If soul 
were one only, then when one is born, all would be born, 



n 

Aph. 150. [The Vedantins say 
ein ^ a Difference in its 
investments, moreover, multiplicity 
attaches [seemingly] to the one [Soul], as is the case with 
Space by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that 
they occupy. But the argument, though partially stating a 
truth, does not prove the non-plurality of Soul. " As Space 



Plurality of Souls. 57 

is one, (and yet) in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, 
jars, &c. when the jar is destroyed, it is (familiarly) said 
the jar s space is destroyed (for there then no longer exists 
a space marked out by the jar) ; -so also, on the hypothesis of 
there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of cor 
poreal limitation, on the destruction thereof ( i. e. of the 
limitation occasioned by any particular human body ), it is 
merely a way of talking (to say) The soul has perished/ 
(This indeed is so far true that there is really no perishing of 
the soul, but then it is true) also on the hypothesis that there 
are many souls ; (and it mast be true,) otherwise, since soul is 
eternal ( without beginning or end as both parties agree ), 
how could there be the appointment of birth and death ?"] 



! ?j TOST n 

Apli. 151 . The investment is differ- 
Eefutation of the Veddnta Q ^ f according to the Vedantins ] , 

on this point. 

but not that to which this belongs 

[ and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be 
seen. " The investment is different (there are diverse 
bodies, of John, Thomas, &c.) ; that to which this belongs 
_ i. e . that (Soul) to which this investment (of body in all its 
multiplicity) belongs, is not different ( but is one only ) ; 
such is the meaning. And (now consider), in consequence 
of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there 
were the destruction of something else, because this (if it 
.were evidence of a thing s being destroyed) would present 
itself where it ought not (the destruction of Devadatta e. g. 
presenting itself as a fact when we are considering the case 
of Yajnadatta, who is not for that reason to be assumed to 
be dead) ; and on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the 
(fact that the Vedanta makes an) imputation of inconsistent 
conditions is quite evident, since Bondage and Liberation do 
not (and cannot) belong (simultaneously) to one. But the 
conjunction and (simultaneous) non-conjunction of the sky 



58 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. I. 

(or space) with smoke, &c., (of which the Vedantin may seek 
to avail himself as an illustration,) are not contradictory, for 
Conjunction is not pervasion ;" ( whereas, on the other hand, 
it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one 
portion of a monad, and Liberation affecting another portion, 
as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree 
without being in conjunction with the stem] . 



The Sdnkhya M free from A P h 152. Thus [ i. e. by taking 

the charge o/ absurdity to the Sankhya view ] there is no im- 

vohich the Vedanta is open. 

putation of contradictory conditions 

to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinite 
ly extended monad. " But (the Vedantin may contend) we 
see the condition of another attributed even to one quite 
different, as e. g. Nature s character as an agent (is a,ttri- 
buted) to soul which is one other (than Nature). To this 
he replies"]. 



I mp utationi S not proof. ^ ^Even though there be 

[imputed to Soul] the possession of 

the condition of another, this [ that it really possesses 
such] is not established by the imputation, because it 
[Soul] is one [absolutely simple unqualified entity. The no 
tion " that Soul is an agent is a mistake, because, that Soul is 
not an agent is true, and the imputation (of agency to Soul) 
is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue 
is not real." " But (the Vedantin may say) then thus there 
will be an opposition to the scripture, for according to that 
Brahma is one without a second ; there is nothing here 
diverse ; death after death does he (deluded man ) obtain 
who here sees as it were a multiplicity/ To this he replies"] . 



So ids generically one, numerically plural. 59 

n 



Scripture, spea^n, of Soul " ^.-There is BO Opposition 

as one, is speaking of it gene- to the scriptures [declaratory] of the 
non-duality [of Soul], because the 

reference [in such texts] is to the genus [or to Soul in general. 
" By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same 
nature ; and it is to this alone that the texts about the non- 
duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness 
(of Soul, meaning by its indivisibleness the impossibility 
that there should be more souls than one, that is meant in 
such texts ) because there is no motive" for viewing Soul as 
thus indivisible. " But then ( the Vedantin may rejoin ) 
Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single 
soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, 
(and that each is at once bound and free). To this he re 
plies"]. 



Apli. 155. Of him [i. e. of that 
TTie compatibility of Bond- goul n ^ y w ^ om the cause of Bondage 

age and Freedom. 

is known, there is that condition [of 

isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact 
that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he really was not 
bound even when he seemed to be so. The soul in Bondage 
which is no real bondage, may be typified by Don Quixote 
hanging in the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous 
precipice, and bound to hold on for his life, from not knowing 
that his toes were within six inches of the ground. Well, 
rejoins the Vedantin, " Bondage (as you justly observe ) is 
dependent on non-perception (of the truth), and is not real : 
it is a maxim that non-perception is removed by perception : 
and, on this showing, we see the (force of the) reasoning on 
the hypothesis that soul is one, but not on that of Soul s being 
multitudinous. To this he replies".] 
i 2 



60 The Sdnklvya, Aphorisms. Booli. I. 



ii 

Aph. 156. Nay because the blind 

. Hejeeretti the Veddntin. , i , i ,1 

do not see can those that have their 

eyesight not perceive ? [" There are many arguments (in 
support of the view) of those who assert that souls are many/ 7 
though you do not see them.] 



Aph. 157. Yamadeva, as well as 

otliers > has been Derated, [if we are 
to believe the scriptures, therefore] 
non-duality is not [asserted in the same scriptures in the Yedan- 
tic sense. c In the Puranas, &c., we hear Yamadeva has been 
liberated/ Suka has been liberated/ and so on. If Soul were 
one, since the liberation of all would take place on the libera 
tion of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity (of separate 
and successive liberations) would be self-contradictory." But 
the Yedantin may rejoin " on the theory that Souls are 
many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time 
to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees all 
having been liberated, there should be a universal void : 
but on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the 
departure of an adjunct/ which, the Yedantin flatters him 
self, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to 
the Sankhya. To this he replies.] 

I F II 



Aph. 158. Though it [the 

As it has been, so will it be. 

world ] has been from eternity, 

since there, up to this day, has not been [an entire emptying 1 
of the world], the future also [may be inferentially expected 
to be] thus [as it has been heretofore. " Though the world 
has been from eternity, since up to this day we have not seen 
it become a void, there is no proof (in support) of the view 
that there will be Liberation" of all Souls so as to leave a void] . 



Plurality of Souls is Scripture Doctrine. 61 



n 

The stream of mundane ^pll. 159. A S HOW [things are, 

mgs will flow on for ever. ^0] everywhere [will they continue to 
go on j hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of 
the course of mundane things. " Since souls are (in number) 
without end, though Liberation successively take place, there 
will not be (as a necessary consequence) a cutting short of 
the world. As now, so every where, i. e. in time to come 
also, there will be Liberation, but not therefore an absolute 
cutting short (of the world), since of this the on-flowing is 
eternal." Moreover, " on the theory also that Liberation is 
the departure of an adjunct we should find a universal void, 
so that the doubt is alike (in the application to either view) . 
Just as there might be an end of all things on the successive 
liberation of many souls, so since all adjuncts would cease 
when (the fruit of) works ( this fruit being in the shape of 
Soul s association with body as its adjunct ) came to an end, 
the world would become the void," on the Vedanta theory 
as well as on the Sankhya one. If the Vedantin says " there 
will not be a void, because adjuncts are (in number) endless ; 
then it is the same on the theory that Souls are many too ; 
for while those get liberated who become knowing (in regard 
to the fact that Nature and Soul are different), there will not 
be a void, because there is everlastingly no end of multitudes 
of souls in the universe." But some one may ask " is Soul 
essentially bound or free? If (essentially) bound, then, since 
its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation ; for if it 
(the essence) departed, then it (Soul) would (cease with the 
cessation of its essence and) not be eternal. If (on the other 
hand, you reply that it is essentially) free, then meditation, 
and the like, (which you prescribe for the attainment of liber 
ation) is unmeaning. To this he replies."] 



62 The Sdnklaja Aphorisms. Boole I. 



Soul is ever free, Uough it A P h 160 ^ [Soul] is altogether 

in all sorts free, [but seemingly! multiform for 

,., , . 

different in appearance from a free 

thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound. " It 
is not bound, nor is it liberated, but it is ever free ; (see Aph. 
19). But the destruction of ignorance (as to its actual free 
dom) is effected by meditation, &c.," which are therefore not 
unmeaning, as alleged under Aph. 159. " It has been de 
clared that Soul is a witness. Since it is a witness ( some 
one may object ) even when it has attained to discriminating 
(between Nature and Soul), there is no Liberation, (Soul, on 
this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity but some 
thing combined with the character of a spectator or witness.) 
To this he replies."] 



Aph. 161. It [Soul] is a witness 

How Soul is a spectator. , " 

through its connection with sense- 
organs [ which quit it on Liberation] . 



Aph. 162. [The nature of Soul 

The real condition of Soul. 

is] constant freedom, [ " that is to 

say, it is positively always devoid of the Bondage called Pain, 
because Pain, and the rest, are modifications of Understand 
ing," which is a modification of Nature, from which Soul 
is really distinct] . 



u 

Aph. 163. And finally [the nature 

Sours indifference. 

of the Soul is] indifference [to Pain 

and Pleasure alike. " By indifference is meant inaction." 
But some one may say " the fact of Soul s being an agent 
is declared in Scripture : how is this ( if, as you say, it 
be not an agent) ? To this he replies] . 



The real condition of 8oul. 63 



I! 

How Soul, rohich is not an ^ph. 164. Its [Soul s fancy of] 

agents yet spoken of as such. being an agent is from the prox i. 

mity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect. [" Its 
being an agent i. e. its, Soul s, fancy of being an agent, 
is from the proximity of Intellect/ i. e. from the influence 
of Nature," see Aph. 19 of which Intellect see Aph. 61 
is a modification. " The repetition of the expression from 
the proximity of Intellect is meant to show that we have 
reached the conclusion : for thus do we see (practised) in the 
scriptures/ e. g. where it is said in the Yeda " Soul is to 
be known, it is to be discriminated from Nature : thus it does 
not come again, it does not come again." " So much, for 
the First Book that on the (topics or) object-matter (of the 
Sankhya system)."] 



64 The Bdnkhya Aphorisms. Book IT. 



BOOK II. 



INTRODUCTION. 

[ ff THE object- matter (of tke Institute) has been set forth. 
(in B. I.). Now,, in order to prove that it is not the Soul that 
undergoes the alterations (observable in the course of things), 
he will tell diffusely in the Second Book how the creation is 
formed out of the Primal Principle. There too the nature of 
the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to 
the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, 
according to the verses : " Whoso rightly knows its changes, 
and the Primal Agent [Nature], and Soul the eternal; he, 
thirsting no more, is emancipated," we remark that, with 
reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three 
(things mentioned in these verses) require to be known. And 
here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration 
that if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without 
a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound 
he states the motive for the creation of the world.] 



1 \\\ 

Aph. 1. Of Nature [the agency, 
The motive for creation. , . 

or the becoming a maker, is] for the 

emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently] eman 
cipated, or else for [the removal of] itself. [" The expression 
the becoming a maker is borrowed from the last aphorism 
of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world for the 
sake of removing the pain, which is really a shadow, belong 
ing to the Soul which is in its very nature free from the bonds 
of pain, or ( to explain it otherwise ) for the sake of 



Creation incessant. 65 

removing pain (connected) by means of but a shadowy link ; 
or (on the other hand) it is for the sake of itself/ that is 
to say, for the sake of removing 1 the actually real pain (which 
consists) of itself." " Although experience (of good and ill) 
also, as well as Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet 
Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the princi 
pal one." " But then if creation were for the sake of Eman 
cipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through 
creation once for all, there would not be creation again and 
again : to which he replies."] 



Apli. 2. Because this [Emancipa- 

Successive creation why. . . n 

tion] is [onlyj of him that is devoid 

of passion, [" emancipation does not take place through creation 
once for all, but it is (the lot only) of him that has been 
extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, 
death, sickness, &c. ; and therefore (successive creation goes 
on) because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of 
him in whom complete dispassion has arisen through the 
knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul : such is 
the meaning." " He tells the reason why dispassion does 
not take place through creation once for all."] 



Force of the foregoing A l>h. 3. It is not effected by the 
reason " mere hearing, because of the forcible- 

ness of the impressions from eternity. [" Even the hearing 
(of scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul 
is enounced,) comes ( not to all alike, but only ) through 
the merit of acts done in many births (or successive lives). 
Even then, dispassion is not established through the mere 
hearing, but through direct cognition ; and direct cognition 
does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of 
false impressions that have existed from eternity, but (the 
required direct cognition takes place) through the completion 



66 The Sdnlihya Aphorisms. BuoTt, II. 

of Concentration, and tliere is an abundance of obstacles to 
Concentration ( see Yoga Aphorisms, B. II.) ; therefore 
only after many births does dispassion and Emancipation take 
place at any time of any one at all : such is the meaning. 
He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation."] 



Another reason for conti- Aph. 4. Or as people have sever- 
*vo* creation. a \\ y many dependent [on them, as 

wife, children, &c., so also the Qualities, have to emanci 
pate innumerable Souls severally. Therefore, however many 
Souls may have been emancipated, the on-flow of creation 
takes place for the emancipation of other Souls, for Souls are 
(in number) without end/ "But why is it asserted that 
Nature alone creates, when, by the text From that or this 
Soul, proceeded the Ether/ &c., it is proved that Soul also 
creates ? To this he replies."] 



Apli. 5. And since it [the charac- 

Nature, not Soul, creates. 

ter of creator] belongs really to 

Nature, it follows that it is fictitiously attributed to Soul. 
[" But how is it laid down that Nature s creativeness is real, 
since we are told (in scripture) that creation is on a level 
with a dream ? To this he replies."] 



n 3 n 

The reality of Nature** ^ph. 6. SlDC6 it IS proved from 

creativeness. ^ Q pro a uc ts, [" for products are real, 

inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts." The 
reality of external things is established here just as it is by 
Locke, who says " I think God has given me assurance enough 
as to the existence of things without me ; since by their 
different application I can produce in -myself both pleasure 
and pain (arthaj, which is one great concernment of my 
present state/ These existing products being admitted, the 



Soul no creator. 67 

Sankhya argues that they must have a cause ; and, as this 
cause means neither more nor less than something creative, 
whatever proves the existence of the cause, proves, at the 
same time, its creative character] . 



n 

Apli. 7. The rule is with reference 

Who escape nature. 

to one knowing, just as escape from 

a thorn, [ for " as one and the same thorn is not a cause of 
pain just to him who, being one knowing/ i. e., aware of it, 
escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of others, 
so Nature also is escaped just by one knowing/ one 
aware, one who has accomplished the matter ; just to him 
does it not consist of pain ; but to others, who are not know 
ing, it actually is a cause of pain; such is the rule/ 
meanin the distribution." 



Soul not creative, though Aph. 8. Even though there be con- 

associated with what is ,. j unction [ o f So ul] with the other [viz. 

Nature], this [power of giving rise to products] does not 
exist in it [Soul] immediately, just like the burning action 
of iron. [" Even though there be conjunction with Nature, 
there belongs to Soul no creativeness immediately/ i. e., 
directly. An illustration of this ie, like the burning action 
of iron : as iron does not possess directly a burning power, 
but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the 
fire conjoined with it ; such is the meaning. But in. the 
example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alter 
ation of both, for this is proved by sense-evidence ; but in 
the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by 
the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness in postu 
lating the modification of both ; because, otherwise, by the 
conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held that the colour 
of the crystal was changed."] 
K 2 



68 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. fioolt, II. 



Apli. 9. When there is passion or 

Creation when. 

dispassion, there is concentration [in 

the latter case, and] creation [in the former. " When there 
is passion, there is creation ; and when there is dispassion, 
there is concentration/ i. e., the abiding (of Soul) in its own 
nature ; in short, emancipation/ ] 



10. In the order of Mind, 

Order of creation. 

&c., [is the creation] of the five ele 
ments [ or of the material world] . 

\\\\\\ 

H. Since creation is for the 



Nat * product* not for 
themselves. sake of Soul, the origination of these 

[products of Nature] is not for their own sake. 



II II 

Relative time and space Apli. 12. [Relative] Space and 
^nce. Time [arise] from the Ether, &c., [but 

" the Space and Time which are eternal (and absolute), those 
two, being the source of the Ether, are really sorts of qualities 
of Nature ; therefore it is consistent that Space and Time 
should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which are 
limited, these arise from the Ether, through the conjunction 
of this or that (limiting) object." " Now he exhibits, in 
their order, through their nature and their habits, the things 
mentioned (in Aph. 10) as in the order of Mind, &c."] 



^f : n ^ H 

Mint r Intellect define. , ^Intellect is judgment. 

[" Intellect is a synonym e of the 

Great Principle (or Mind, see B. I. 71) ; and judgment/ 
called also ascertainment, is its peculiar modification; such 



Nature of Space and Time. C9 

is the meaning ; but they are set forth as identical, because 
a property, and that of which it is the property, are indivisi 
ble. And it is to be understood that this Intellect is Great/ 
because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because 
it is of great power." " He mentions other properties also of 
the Great Principle."] 






Apli, 14. Merit, &c., are products 
of it, [for "Merit, Knowledge, Dis- 

passion, and (supernatural) Power, are formed out of intellect, 
_ not formed of self -consciousness (ahanMraJ , because intel 
lect alone (and not self-consciousness), is a product of super 
lative Purity," without admixture of Passion and Darkness. 
" But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of demerit, 
in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle, &c., be 
accounted for ? To this he replies"] . 



Opposite products of in- ^ 15. The Great one [Intel- 
tellect. i ec t ] becomes reversed through ad 

jacent tincture, [i. e., " through being tinged by Passion and 
Darkness, it also becomes reversed i. e., vile, with the 
properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and want 
of (supernatural) Power." " Having characterised the Great 
Principle, he defines its product Self-consciousness"] . 



Apli. 16. Self-consciousness is a 

Self-consciousness. ., r ... . ,1-1^ 

conceit, [ what makes the &go, as 

a potter (makes a pot), the thing (called) the internal 
instrument ( ant a bar ana) ; and this, inasmuch as a property 
and that of which it is the property are indivisible, is spoken 
of as a conceit (viz. of personality/) in order to acquaint 
us that this is its peculiar modification. Only when a thing- 
has been determined by intellect ( i. e., by an act of judg- 



70 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Boole II. 

menfc see Apli. 13 ), do the making of an Ego, and the 
making of a Meum, take place"] . 



I 

Products of Self-conscious. 4p^ 17. The product of it [viz. 
of Self-consciousness] is the eleven 

[organs] , and the five Subtile Elements, [but among these 
he mentions a distinction"] . 



Aph. 18. The eleventh, consisting 
The Mind whence. 

of [the principle of] Purity, proceeds 

from modified Self-consciousness. 

[" The eleventh/ i. e., the completer of the eleven, viz., 
the Mind, (or f the internal organ/ which is not to be con 
founded with f the great one called also Intellect and Mind), 
alone among the set consisting of sixteen [Aph. 17] consists 
of Purity : therefore it is produced from Self-consciousness 
( modified/ i. e., pure ; such is the meaning. Arid hence, 
too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the 
Passionate Self-consciousness, and the Subtile Elements from 
the Dark Self-consciousness"] . 



II 

19 



Of * Organ*. 

of action and the organs of under 

standing, another is the eleventh. [" The organs of action are 
five, the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the 
generative organ ; and the organs of understanding are five, 
those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and 
smell. Along with these ten, another/ viz., the Mind, is 
f the eleventh/ i. e., is the eleventh organ."] 



Aph. 20. They [the organs] are 

The Nyai/a view rejected. J L 

not formed of the Elements, because 
there is scripture for their being formed of Self-consciousness. 



Order of development. 71 



^ II 

Apli. 21. The text regarding ab- 
A text explained. , . . . 

sorption into deities is not [declara 

tory] of an originator, [ for although a thing, e. g., a jar, 
when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being 
resolved into its originator, viz., into earth, yet <( we see the 
absorption of a drop of water into what notwithstanding is 
not its originator, viz., the ground," and such is the absorp 
tion into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not 
originally emanate.] 



11 ^ n 

Aph. 22. [No organ is eternal as 
JV T o organ eternal. -1,1-11 

some hold the mind to bej, because 

we have scripture for their beginning to be, and because we 
see their destruction, [ for " we are certified of their de- 
structibleness by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, 
&c., the mind also, like the sight and the rest, decays."] 



ii ^ ii 

TJie Sense not to le con- A ph. 23. The Sense is supersen- 
founded with its site. suous, [it being the notion] of mis 

taken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its 
gite [ Sight, e. g., in identity with the eye-ball] . 

i 

All the organs not one -Aph. 24. Moreover, a difference 
.being established if a difference of 
powers be conceded, there is not a oneness [of the organs. 
" Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to 
one single organ, the diversity of organs is established, be 
cause the powers are the organs." And if you say " there is 
something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs 
to arise from one single Self-consciousness, he replies"]. 



72 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book II. 



ii 

Theoretical considerations A ph. 25. A theoretical objection 

cannot upset facts. i. r c i , -\ / 1 

is not [of any weight] m the case of 
what is matter of ocular evidence. 



^ ii 

Diversified operation of Apli. 26. The Mind identifies itself 
with both [" the organs of intellection 
and of action/ as he proceeds to explain] . 



HovtUs happens. , ^ 27 -~ B 7 reason of the varie- 

ties of transformation of [which] the 

Qualities [are susceptible], there is a diversity [of their pro 
duct the Mind] , according to circumstances. [For, " as one 
single man supports a variety of characters, through the force 
of association, being, through association with his beloved, 
a lover, through association with one indifferent, indifferent, 

and, through association with some other, something other, 

so the Mind also, through association with the organ of 
vision, or any other, becomes various, through its becoming 
one with the organ of vision, or any other, by its being 
(thereby) distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the 
like/ ] 



^c n 

28 - f b th f 



Wka* tke organs deal M . 

the object is that list of things] begin 

ning with Colour, and ending with the dirt of Taste, [ " mean 
ing by the dirt of the tastes of food, &c., ordure, &c.," into 
which the food, consisting of the quality Taste, &c., is partly 
transformed] . 



Mind the c Sensus Communis. 73 



II 

The Organs and their pos- A P h - 29. The being the seer, &c., 
sessors - belongs to the Soul; the instrumen 

tality belongs to the Organs, [ " for as a king, even without 
himself energizing, becomes a warrior through his instrument, 
his army, by directing this by orders simply, so the Soul, 
though quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., be 
comes a seer, a speaker, and a judger, and the like, merely 
through the proximity called Conjunction/ because it moves 
these as the loadstone" does the iron, without exerting any 
effort] . 



n ^ ii 

Differences in the infernal -Aph. 30. Of the three [internal 
rg ans organs, meaning here (1) Intellect, (2) 

Self-consciousness, and (3) the Mind], there is a diversity 
among themselves, [" the aspect of Intelligence being atten 
tion, of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality], of the 
Mind, decision and doubt] . 



uraren ^nw ^ u u 



A character common to the Aph- 31. The five airs, Breath, 
&c., are the modification, in common, 
of the [three internal] instruments ; [ " that is to say, the 
five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known 
as airs/ because of their circulating as the air does, these 
(animal spirits) are the joint or common modification/ or 
kinds of altered form, ( of the instruments/ i. e., of the triad 
of internal instruments." And " the opinion is not ours, as 
it is that of the Vaiseshikas, that the modifications of the 
organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously ; - 
so he next tells us"]. 

L 



74 The SdnJihya Aphorisms. Pool;. 77. 



tense-impressions, $c., not Apli. 32. The modifications of the 
exclusively successive . organs take place both successively 

and simultaneously. 

firep ii ^ ii 

ideas which constitute . 33. The modifications [of the 

the world. understanding, which are to be shown 

to be the cause of the world, and] which are five, are [some 
of them] painful and [others] not painful, [and " that the 
modifications are of five sorts, is declared by Patanjali s aphor 
ism," see Yoga Aphorisms B. I., 6] . 
He acquaints us with the nature of Soul. 



Aph. 34. On the cessation thereof 

Soul s relation thereto. 

[viz., of mundane influences] , its tinc 

ture ceasing, it [Soul] abides in itself, [ " that is to say, 
during the state of repose of these modifications, it (the 
Soul), the reflection of these having ceased, is abiding in 
itself, being at oilier times also, as it were, in isolation, 
( though seemingly not so). And to this effect there is a 
triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga," viz. B. I., 2, 3, and 4] . 



ii ^n 

Aph. 35. And as [by] a flower the 

This illustrated. 

gem, [1. e., " as the gem called 

rockcrystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes 
red, not abiding in its own state, and, on the removal 
thereof, becomes colourless, abiding in its own state, in 
like manner" is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction 
of the Qualities. " But then (it may be asked), by whose 
effort does the aggregate of the organs come into operation, 
since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied that there is 
any Lord (or Demiurgus) ? To this he replies"] . 



lite Organs. 75 



n ^ n 

What moves the Organs Aph- 36. The Organs also [ just 
to V erate as Nature energizes] arise, for the 

sake of Soul, from the development of desert, [which, we 
repeat, " belongs entirely to the investment," the Soul not 
really possessing either merit or demerit. " He mentions an 
instance of a thing s spontaneously energizing for the sake 
of another"]. 



n 

Aph. 37. As the cow for the calf 

An illustration. 

[" quite spontaneously distils milk, 

and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, 
Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously ; such is the 
meaning. A.nd it is seen that, out of profound sleep, under 
standing of its own accord wakes up"] . 



II ^ II 

Aph. 38. Organ is of thirteen 

The number of the Organs. 7 

sorts, through division of the subor 

dinates, [" division of the subordinates having reference to 
the fact that it is understanding which is the principal organ." 
" But then, understanding (it seems) alone is the principal 
instrument in furnishing its object (of emancipation) to Soul, 
and the instrumentality of the others is secondary, in this 
case what is meant by secondariness ?" why are they said to 
be instrumental at all ? Pie replies] . 



Efficiency of the organs A ph- 39. Because the quality of be- 
v lience - ing most efficient, is conjoined with 

the organs, as in the case of an axe. [" The quality of the 
(principal) organ, the understanding, in the shape of beino- 
most efficient, on behalf of soul, exists derivatively in the 
(other derivative) organs ; therefore it is made out that an 
organ is of thirteen kinds ; such is the connexion with the 
L 2 



76 The SduJchyn Aphorisms. Book II. 

preceding aphorism." " As in the case of an axe/ As, 
although the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to 
our non-possession of the result, is the principal efficient in 
the cutting, yet the axe also is an efficient, because of its close 
proximity to the being the principal efficient ; so here also : 
such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-con 
sciousness is secondarily efficient, meaning to imply that it is 
one with the internal organ. Specifying the precise state of 
the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, 
he says] 



H 8 H 

Pre-eminent efficiency of p. 40. Among the two [the 

intellect illustrated. external and the internal organs] the 

principal is Mind, just as, in the world, among troops of 
dependents. [" Among the two/ viz., the external and the 
internal, Mind/ i. e., understanding simply, is the princi 
pal/ i. e., chief; in short is the immediate cause; because 
it is it that furnishes Soul with its end ; just as, among 
troops of dependents, some one single person is the prime 
minister of the king, and the others, governors of towns, &c., 
are his subordinates; such is the meaning." And it must 
be carefully observed that " here the word Mind does not 
mean the third internal organ" spoken of in Apli. 30, but 
Intellect, or c the Great One/] 



why Understand- Aph. 41. [And Intellect is the 
toff the principal. principal or immediate and direct effi 

cient in Soul s emancipation,] because there is no wandering 
away, [" that is to say, because it (understanding) pervades 
all the organs, or because there is no result apart from it"] . 



n 8^ ii 

Aph. 42. So too because it [the 

Another reason. 

understanding] is the depository 01 

all the self- continuant impressions, [" and not the Sight, &c., 



The Great One, why so called. 77 

or Self-consciousness, or the Mind ; else it conld not happen 
that things formerly seen, and heard, &c., should be remem 
bered by the blind, and deaf, &c."] . 



Aph. 43. And because we infer 

Another reason. 

this [its pre-eminence] by reason of its 

meditating : [" for the modification of thought called medita 
tion is the noblest of all the modifications (incident to Soul 
or pure Thought whose blessedness or state of emancipation 
it is to have no modification at all), and the Understanding 
itself, which, as being the depository thereof, is further named 
Thought (chitta, from the same root as chintd ), is nobler 
than the organs whose modifications are other than this." 
" But then suppose that the modification meditation belongs 
only to the Soul ( suggests some one). To this he replies"]. 



Meditation not essential A l }li " 44. It cannot be of its Own 

in SouL nature, [ " that is to say, meditation 

cannot belong to Soul essentially, because of the immobility" 
of Soul, whereas meditation is an effort. 



An organ may be relative- A P h 45. The Condition [ as re- 

ly principal and secondary. g ar ds Soul s instruments - ] of SBCOnd- 

ary and principal is relative, because of the difference of 
function, [ e. g., "in the operations of the Sight, &c., the 
Mind is principal ; and in the operation of the Mind, Self- 
consciousness, and in the operation of Self-consciousness, In 
tellect is principal," or precedent. "But then, what is the 
cause of this arrangement, viz., that of this (or that) Soul, 
this (or that) Intellect alone, and not another Intellect, is the 
instrument ? With reference to this he says"] . 



78 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. IT. 



II 8<* II 

Each one reap* a* he hath A P Jl 46. The energizing [of this 

sowed. O1 , that Intellect] is for the sake of 

this [or that Soul], because of its having been purchased by 
the works [or deserts] of this [or that Soul] , just as in the 
world. ["As in the world (or in ordinary affairs), whatever 
axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, e. g., of 
buying, by whatever man, the operation of that (axe, or the 
like), such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man (who 
purchased it) : such is the meaning. The import is, that, 
therefrom is the distributive allotment of instruments" inquired 
about, under the preceding aphorisms. And we must again 
repeat that " although there is no act in Soul, because it is 
immoveable, still, since it is the means of SouPs experience, 
it is called the act of Soul, just like the victories, &c., of a 
king (which are really the acts of his servants), because of 
Soul s being the owner" of the results of acts, as the king is 
of the results of the actions of his troops. And " in order 
to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up," as 
follows.] 

f\ ^ *"s. t. A. V ^V 

II 8^ II 



Apli. 47. Admitting that they [ 

Summing up. ^ ^.^ instmments of Soul ^ all] 

equally act, the pre-eminence belongs to Intellect, just as in 
the world, just as in the world, [ " because, that is to say, 
it is just as the pre-eminence, in the world, belongs to the 
prime minister, among the rulers of towns, and the rest, 
even although there be no difference in as far as regards their 
being (all alike workers) for the sake of the king. Therefore, 
in all the institutes, is Intellect alone celebrated as the great 
one/ The repetition (viz., just as in the world, just as in 
the world/) implies the completion of the Book"]. 



79 



BOOK III. 



INTRODUCTION. 

[" From this forward, the gross product of Nature, the 
great elements and the duad of bodies, are to be described ; 
and thereafter the going into various wombs, and the like, 
(this description being given) with a view to that less perfect 
degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one s engag 
ing upon the means of knowledge ; and thereafter, with a 
view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of know 
ledge are to be told : so the Third Book commences."] 



Apli. I. The origination of the 

The elements whence. , . . 

diversified [world of sense] is from 

that which has no difference, [ i. e., " from that in which 
there exists not a distinction in the shape of calmness, fierce 
ness, dulness, &c., viz., the Subtile Elements, called the 
five somethings simply ; } from this (set of five) is the origi 
nation of ( the diversified/ (so called) from their possessing 
a difference in the shape of the calm, &c., viz., the gross, 
the great Elements : such is the meaning. For the fact of 
consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, 
and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater and less, 
&c., in the gross Elements only, not in the Subtile, because 
these, since they have but the one form of the calm, are mani 
fest to the ( concentrated " practitioners of meditation, but 
to no others. " So then, having stated, by composing the 
preceding Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, 
he states the origination, therefrom, of the duad of bodies"] . 



80 Tlie Sdnkkya Aphorisms. Book III. 



^ II 

Aph. 2. Therefrom [i. e., from the 

The Body whence. 

twenty-three -Principles, there is the 

origination of] the Body [or pair of Bodies, the Gross and 
the Subtile. " Next he proves that mundane existence could 
not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the 
twenty-three -Principles"] . 

H n 



Aph. 3. From the seed thereof 

Mundane existence whence. 

is mundane existence: [" thereof, 

i. e., of the Body ; f from the seed/ i. e., from the Subtile 
one, as its cause, in the shape of the twenty-three Principles, 
is mundane existence/ i. e., do the going and coming of 
Soul take place ; for it is impossible that, of itself, there 
should be a going, &c., of that which, in virtue of its all- 
pervadingness, is immovable : such is the meaning. For 
Soul, being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only 
by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, 
with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works"] . 



ii a ii 

Mundane existence till 4. And till there is discrimi- 

nation, there is the energizing of these 
which have no differences, [for " of all Souls whatever, devoid 
of the differences of being Lord or not Lord, &c., ( though 
seemingly possessed of such differences, ) energizing/ i. e., 
mundane existence, is inevitable just till there is discrimina 
tion (of Soul from its seeming investments), and it does not 
continue thereafter"] . 



i ii y n 

Aph. 5. Because of [the necessity 

The reason of this. 

of] the other s experiencing, |_i. e., 

because of the necessity that the other/ i. e., that that (Soul) 
which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of 
its own (reputed) acts"] , 



The gross and subtile bodies. 81 



Soul s bondage only seem- ^- 6 -~ Tt [Soul] IS HOW quite 

ff- free from both; [ " now/ i. e., 

during the time of mundane existence, Soul is really free 
from both/ i. e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure 
and pain, &c."] . 

UFI3I 



d Strife ito- 4^- 7. The Gross [Body] usually 
ties distinguished. arises from father and mother; the 

other one is not so : [" the Gross one arises from father and 
mother usually/ i. e., for the most part, for there is mention 
also of a Gross Body not born of a womb ; and ( the other/ 
i. e., the Subtile Body, is not so/ i. e., does not arise from 
a father and mother, because it arises from creation, &c." 
"He next decides the question through disguise by which 
one, of the Bodies Gross and Subtile, the conjunction of 
the pairs (pleasure and pain, &c.,) with Soul takes place"] . 

^foir^SR ufer wm^ira ^?rc^i ii c ii 

Which of the lodie* is the ^p7i. 8. To that which arose ante- 
cause of So^s bondage. cedently it belongs to be that whose 

result is this, because it is to the one that there belongs 
fruition, not to the other : [ that is to say, " to have pleasure 
and pain as its effect (reflected in Soul), belongs to that 
Subtile Body alone whose origin was antecedent/ i. e., at the 
commencement of the creation (or annus magnus) . Why ? 
because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs 
to only the one/ i. e., the Subtile Body, but not to the 
other/ i. e., the Gross Body, because all are agreed that there 
is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a body of earth"] . 



dL II 

The Subtile Body how con- Aph. 9. The seventeen, as one, 
Mtuted. are the Subtile Body. [" The Subtile 

Body, farther, through its being container and contained, is 
M 



82 The Sdnlthya Aphorisms. Hook III. 

twofold. Here the seventeen ( to be just mentioned ), 
mingled, are the Subtile Body ; and that, at the beginning of 
a creation, is but one, in the shape of an aggregate ( as the 
forest, the aggregate of many trees, is but one ) : such is 
the meaning. The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five 
Subtile Elements, and Understanding. Self-consciousness is 
included under Understanding.-" " But (one may ask) if the 
Subtile Body be one, then how should there be diverse experi 
ences accordingly as Souls are numerically distinct from one 
another ? To this he replies"] . 



How there come to be in- Apli. 10. There is distinction of 
individuals through diversity of de 

sert ; [ for " although at the beginning of the creation (or 
annus magnus), there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape 
of that investment ( of Soul, see Veddnta-sdra Apli. 62 _ 
named) Hiranya-garbha, still, subsequently moreover, there 
becomes a division of it into individuals, a plurality parti- 
tively in the shape of individuals, as at present there is, of 
the Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the 
shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He tells 
the cause of this, saying, ( through diversity of desert/ 
meaning through actions, &c., which are causes of the expe 
riences of other animal souls." " But then, on this showing, 
since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, 
is (what ought to be denoted by the term) Body, how is the 
term Body applied to the Gross one ? To this he replies"] . 



Why the gross Body is Aph. 11. Because of its being ap- 
plied to it [-viz., to the Subtile one], 

it is applied to the Body which is the tabernacle of the abid 
ing thereof. 



The subtile body. 83 



f i?Fsn?r 

The Subtile Body depen- Apli. 12. Not independently [can 
dent on the gross body. fa e Subtile Body exist], without that 

[Gross Body], just like a shadow and a picture: ["that 
is to say, the Subtile Body does not stand independently, 
without that/ i. e., without a support ; as a shadow, or as 
a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having 
abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go to another world, it 
is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve 
as its tabernacle : such is the import." " But then (it may 
be said), of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, 
as the Air, or the like, let the Ether (or Space) , without its 
being attached to anything, be the site, it is purposeless to 
suppose anything else : to this he replies"] . 



For it must have a mate- Aph. 13. Nay, even though it 
rial support. k e i^ted, because of its association 

with masses, just as the sun ; [ " for since, just like the 
sun, it consists of light it is inferred to be associated with 
a mass. All lights, the sun and the rest are seen only 
under the circumstances of association (of the luminiferous 
imponderable) with earthy substances ; and the Subtile Body 
consists of Purity/ which is Light, therefore it must be 
associated with the Elements"] . 



II \% 1 1 

Ap h. 14. It is of atomic mafmi- 

Size of the Subtile Body. 

tude, for there is scripture for its 

acting : [ f It the Subtile Body, is of atomic magnitude/ 
i. e., limited, but not absolutely an atom, because it is declar 
ed to have parts. Wherefore ? for there is scripture for its 
acting/ i. e., because there is a text about its acting. When 
a thing is all-pervading, it cannot act, (action being motion) : 
but the proper reading is because there is scripture for its 
moving. "] 

M 2 



84 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Tiuok. III. 



H 



Aph. 15. And because there is 

Another proof of this. J ~ 

scripture for its being formed of food. 



Why the Subtile Body mi- Apli. 16. The mundane existence 
* rate * of Subtile Bodies is for the sake of 

Soul, -just like a king s cooks : \_" that is to say, as the 
cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, 
so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul." 
" The Subtile Body having been discussed in respect of all 
its peculiarities, he next discusses the Gross Body so also"] . 



1 1 II 



r Aph. 1 7. The Body consists of the 

The Gross Body ivhence. 

five elements. 



ii 



Aph. 18. -Some say that it consists 

Another opinion. 

of four elements, [ alleging this 

" with the import that the Ether does not originate" any 
thing] . 






Aph. 19. Others say that it con- 

Another opinion. 

sists of one element, [" meaning that 

the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely 
nourishers. Or of one element means of one or other ele 
ment :" see the Eosicrucian doctrine in the Tarka-sangraha, 
13, &c]. 



Intellect not the result of Apli. 20. Intellect is not natural 

organization. [_ a natural regult Q f organ i za tion ] 

because it is not found in them severally ; \_" that is to say, 



Intellect not the result of Organization. 85 

since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, 
intellect is not natural to the Body which consists of the 
Elements, but is adventitious"]. 



Apli. 21. And [if the Body had 
intellect natural to it] there would not 

be the death, &c., of anything, [" for death, profound sleep; 
&c., mean the body s being non-intelligent ; and this, if it 
were by its own nature intelligent, would not take place, 
because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the 
thing remains." " Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion 
(in Aph. 20), viz., because it is not found in them severally/ 
he repels it"] . 



An illustrative objection A P ll > 22. If you say that [Intellect 
disposed of. results from organization, and that] it 

is like the power of something intoxicating, [the ingredients of 
which separately have no intoxicating power, we reply, that] 
this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen in each [ele 
ment something conducive to the result. " If it liad been 
seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the compound 
might have had place. But in the case in question, it is not 
the case that it is seen in each. Therefore, in the illustration 
(of something intoxicating resulting from mixture), it being 
established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is in each ingre 
dient a subtile tendency to intoxicate, it is only settled that, 
at the time when these combine, there will be a manifestation 
of the (latent) power of intoxicating ; but in the thing illus 
trated, it is not established by any proof whatsoever, that 
there is intelligence, in a subtile (or undeveloped) state, in 
the elements separately." In Aph. 16, "it was stated that 
the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul : in 
regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation 



86 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Boole III. 

dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means 
their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul 
are accomplished"] . 



I ^ II 

Purpose of the Subtile 4ph. 23. From knowledge [ac- 
Body, taking a gross one. quired Curing mundane existence, 
comes] salvation [soul s c 



Apli. 24. Bondage [which may be 

Bondage whence. , J 

viewed as one of the ends which soul 

could arrive at only through the Subtile Body], is from mis- 
conception. 



ii 

KnoMge has neither co- A P U 25. Since this [viz., know- 

operater nor substitute, in ledge] is the precise cause [of libera- 

liberating Soul. . 

tion], there is neither association [of 

anything else with it, e, g., good works], nor alternativeness, 
[e. g., of good works in its stead] . 



This illustrated. ^ 26 - The emancipation of soul 

does not depend on both [knowledge 

and works, or the like] , just as [any end that one aims at is 
not obtained] from dream and from the waking state, [to 
gether or alternatively, which are severally] illusory and not 
illusory. [" But even if it be so ( may some one say ), 
there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of 
the truth, with that knowledge which is termed Worship of 
(the One all-constitutive divine) Soul, since there is no illu- 
sorincss in this object of Worship. To this he replies"] . 



Worship. 87 



M*n>* conception of the Aph. 27. Even of that other [the 
All is faulty. object of worship just mentioned], it 

[ the non-illusoriness ] is not complete, \_" because ima 
ginary things also enter into (our conception of, and overlie, 
and disguise) the object of worship the (One all-constitutive) 
Soul." " And he next tells us in what part of it is the 
illusoriness of the (object of) Worship" just referred to] . 



Aph. 28. Moreover it is in what is 

Where the fault applies. 

fancied that it is thus [illusory ; " in 

that portion, of the thing meditated, which (portion of it) 
is fancied by the Mind, ( while it does not exist in reality). 
For, the object of worship having been declared in such 
texts as All this indeed is Brahma/ the illusoriness belongs 
entirely to that portion (of the impure conception of ( the A1P 
which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect 
of) the world." " Then what profit is there in Worship ? 
\V ith reference to this, he declares" as follows] . 



II 

Aph. 29. From the achievement of 

The fruit of Worship. 

[the worship termed] meditation there 

is to the pure [Soul] all [power], just like Nature, ["that 
is to say, as Nature creates, sustains and destroys, so also 
the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by insti 
gating Nature, creates, &c.," [but this is not Liberation or 
Soul s chief end. " It having been settled that Knowledge 
alone is the means of Liberation, he now mentions the means 
of Knowledge"]. 



II ^H 

Removal of obstacles to A P h - 30. Meditation is [the cause 
knowledge. o fj t ] ie remova l o f Desire [" that 



88 The Sdnltliya Aphorisms. Book III. 

affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of 
knowledge"] . 



Meditation at what point Apli. 31. It [Meditation, "from 
the effectuation of which, and not from 

merely commencing upon it, Knowledge arises,"] is perfected 
by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which 
ought to be abstracted from all thoughts of anything] . 



Practices conducive tome. Aj)h. 32. This [Meditation] is per- 
ditaiion - fected by Kestraint, Postures, and 

one s Duties. 



Aph. 33. Restraint [of the breath] 

Restraint of the Ireath. . a 

is by means of expulsion and retention. 

a. That it is f of the breath is gathered from the notorious- 
ness [of its being so] . 

6. He characterises Postures, which come next in order. 



Aph. 34. Steady, and [promoting] 
ease, is a [suitable] Posture, [ such 
as the crossing of the arms"]. 



Aph. 35. One s Duty is the per- 

One s duty. J 

formance of the actions prescribed for 
one s religious order. 



Knowledge and misconception. 89 



II 

Knowledge, by Concent- Aph. 36. Through Dispassion and 



tion, how attained. Practice, [" mere Practice, in the 

shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, 
and its instrument Concentration, takes place in the case of 
the best of those competent" to engage in the matter at all. 
" Thus has liberation, through knowledge, been expounded. 
After this the cause of Bondage, Misconception," declared 
in the assertion Bondage is from Misconception," is to be 
expounded ; and first he states the nature of Misconception"] . 



n ^> n 

Aph. 37. The kinds of Misconcep- 

Misconception divided. . 

tion are live, [viz., Ignorance, Ego 

tism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of dissolution, the five men 
tioned in the Yoga/ see Yoga Aphorisms, B. II., 3] . 



5 n ^ u 

Aph. 38. But Disability [the cause 

The varieties of Disability. , . 

of Misconception] is of twenty- eight 
sorts [ as explained in the Toga] . 

<5feraT n ^ n 

Aph. 39. Acquiescence is of nine 

Acquiescence. 

sorts. 



Perfections. 

sorts. 



II 8 II 

Aph. 40. Perfection is of eight 



Aph. 41. The subdivisions [of Mis- 

Their subdivisions. . 

conception] are [such] as [they have 

been declared] aforetime [" by preceding teachers ; they 
are not explained here, for fear of prolixity"] . 

N 



90 Tito Sdnlchi/a Aphorisms. Bool- HI. 



n 8^ ii 

AnJi. 42. So of the other [Viz. 
Of this further. 

Disability, the divisions, which are 

twenty-eight, are to be found elsewhere]. 

55% II 8^ II 

A ph. 43. Acquiescence is nine- 

Acquiescence divided. 

fold, through the distinction of the 

internal and the rest, [and " this aphorism is explained by 
a memorial verse," viz., No. 50, which see in Professor 
"Wilson s edition of the Sdnkhya Kdrihds] . 

II 88 II 

Perfection diMed. ^ 44 -- Tllr g h Reasoning, Ac., 

[which are its subdivisions,] Perfec 

tion [is eight-fold, being divided into Eeasoning, &c. ; and 
" this also has been explained in a memorial verse," No. 51, 
which see in Professor Wilson s edition. " But then, how 
is it said that Perfection consists only of Eeasoning, &c., 
seeing that it is determined in all the Institutes that the eight 
Perfections, viz., (the capacity of assuming) Atomic bulk, 
&c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c. ? To 
this he replies"] . 

fan i 

Apli. 45. Not from any other [than 
The enumeration defended. 

what we have just stated, does real 

Perfection arise ; because what does arise therefrom, e. g. 
from austerities, is] without abandonment of something else 
[viz., Misconception ; " therefore that Perfection, since it is 
no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a semllance of 
a Perfection, and not real Perfection." Next, " the indivi 
duated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the asser 
tion The distinction of individuals arises from the difference 
of desert, is set forth diffusely"] . 



The creation and its parts. 91 

II 8^ II 

Tl ie creation viewed in its ^>li. 46. [The creation is that] of 
parts. which the subdivisions are the demons, 

&c., [and " this is explained in a memorial verse," No. 53, 
which see in Professor Wilson s edition] . 

-v ^ _^_ ... 



This creation also for 4^- 47. From Brahma down to 
SouVs sake. a p 0s ^ for its [Soul s] sake is creation, 

till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature, on 
which Soul s liberation ensues] . 



Apli. 48. Aloft, ["above the 
orld of 
abounds in [the Quality of] Purity. 



The celestial world. . -. ,.-, .. r ,-, ,. -> 

world of mortals"] it [the creation] 



II 8c!L II 

Apli. 49. Beneath, ["that is to 
say, under the world of mortals"] 
[the creation] abounds in Darkness. 



Apli. 50. In this midst \_" L e. in 

The world of mortals. in _ , ,.-, . ri 

the world of mortals J it [the crea 

tion] abounds in Passion. [" But then, for what reason are 
there, from one single Nature, creations diverse in having, 
in excess, purity and the rest ? With reference to this he 
says."] 



Why Nature operates di- 4ph- 5J. By reason of diversity 
versel ff- of desert is Nature s [diverse] beha 

viour, just like a born slave, [ " that is to say, as of him 
who is a slave from the embryo state upwards, there are, 

N 2 



92 TJte Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book III. 

through the cleverness arising from the habit of being a 
dependent, various sorts of behaviour, i. e., of service, for 
the sake of his master, -just so" does Nature serve Soul in 
various ways. " But then if the creation aloft is abundant 
in Purity ( the element of joy ), then, since Soul s object 
is really thereby effected, what need is there of Liberation ? 
To this he replies"] . 



Why Heaven is to le 4ph 52. Even there, there is re 
turn [to miserable states of existence] ; 

it is to be shunned by reason of the successive subjections to 
birth [from which the inhabitants of heaven enjoy no im 
munity] . 



Tranritoriness of heavenly ^P^. 53. Alike [belongs to all] 

the sorrow produced by decay and 

death : [" common to all alike, those that are aloft and those 
beneath, beginning with Brahma and ending with a stock, 
is the sorrow produced by decay and death : therefore more 
over is it (heaven) to be shunned." " What need of more ? 
The end is not effected by absorption into the cause either, 
as he tells us"] . 



Absorption into Nature Apli. 54. Not by absorption into 
MKffedual. the cauge is tliere accomplishment- of 

the end, because, as in the case of one who has dived, tliere 
is a rising again. ["In the absence of knowledge of the 
distinction (between Soul and Nature), when indifference to 
wards Mind, &c., has resulted from devotion to Nature, then 
absorption into Nature takes place ; for it is declared 
Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature/ Even 
through this, i. e., the absorption into the cause, the end is 
not gained, because there is a rising again, as in the case 



Absorption into Nature. 93 

of one who has dived/ As a man who has dived under water 
rises again, exactly so do Souls, which have been absorbed 
into Nature, re-appear (at the commencement of a new annus 
magnus), in the condition of Lords : because it is impossible 
that one s Faults should be consumed without a familiarity 
with the distinction (between Soul and Nature), in conse 
quence of the re-appearance of Passion through the non- 
destruction of habits, &c." " But then, the cause is not 
by any one caused to act ; being independent, then, why 
does she (Nature) make that grief-occasioning resurrection of 
her own worshipper ? To this he replies/ 7 ] 



Nature free to act, yet pl. 55. - Though she be not COn- 

guided ly an end. strained to act, yet this is fitting, be 

cause of her being devoted to another. [" Though Nature is 
not constrained to act/ not instigated, not subject to the 
will of another, yet this is fitting/ it is proper that he who 
is absorbed in her should arise again : why ? because of 
her being devoted to another/ i. e., because she seeks Soul s 
end. The meaning is, that, he who is absorbed in her is 
again raised up by Nature for the sake of Soul s end which 
consists in knowledge of the distinction (between Nature and 
Soul). And Soul s end, and the like, are not constrainers of 
Nature, but occasions for the energizing of her whose very 
being is to energize ; so that there is nothing detracted from 
her independence." He mentions further a proof that Soul 
rises from absorption into Nature."] 



The gain of absorption in- ^ph. 56. [He who is absorbed in- 
to Mature. ^ ^ o Nature must rise again] for he be 

comes omniscient and omnipotent, [" The Lord, the First 
Spirit" in a subsequent creation. "But then, if that be so, 
it is impossible to deny a Lore?/ which, nevertheless; the 
Sdnkhyas seem to do ; to this he replies] . 



The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Boole III. 



In what sense there is a Apli. 57. The existence of Slich a 

Lord is a settled point, [for " it is 

quite agreed by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he who 
had been absorbed into Nature ; for the ground of dispute 
(between the SunMtyas and the rest) is altogether about an 
eternal Lord." " He next expounds diffusely the motive for 
Nature s creating, which was mentioned only indicatorily in 
the first aphorism of the Second Book/ ] 



Natures disinterestedness. A V h 68 --Nature s creating is for 
the sake of another, though it be 

spontaneous, for she is not the experience!-, just like a cart s 
carrying saffron [for the sake of its master. " But then, _ 
it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should 
be spontaneously a creator, for we see that a cart, or the 
like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To 
this he replies."] 



Nature s spontaneous ac- Apli. 59. Though she be unintelli- 
gent, yet Nature acts,~-as is the case 

with milk; ["that is to say, as milk, without reference to 
men s efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd, _ 
so Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the 
form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other." 
And in regard to this aphorism the commentator observes, 
"this is not rendered tautological by the aphorism As a 
cow for her calf/ because there the question was only of the 
operation of instruments, and because cows are intelligent."] 

By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he 
mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid. 



Nature acts. 95 



Aph m CO. Or as is the case with 

Another illustration. . -. f 

the acts, [or on-goings], for we see 

them, of Time, &c., \_" the spontaneous action of Nature is 
proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, 
takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season s 
now departing and another s coming on : let the behaviour 
of Nature also be thus, for the supposition conforms to 
observed facts." " But still, a senseless Nature would never 
energize, or would energize the wrong way, because of there 
being (in her case) no such communing as This is my 
means of producing experience, &c. To this he replies."] 



Apli. 61. From her own nature she 

Nature acts from habit. , . . , ,.-, 

acts, not from thought, just like a 

servant, [ " that is to say, as, in the case of an excellent 
servant, naturally, just from habit, the appointed and neces 
sary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view 
to his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit 
alone."] 

n 11 



Or ihwgh tie influence of p. 62 .Or from attraction by do- 

ser t s w hich have been from eternity. 



1 ^ u 

Nature desists tvhen tlie Arfi. 63. From discriminative 
end is gained. knowledge is there a cessation of 

Nature s creating, just as is the case with a cook when the 
cooking has been performed. \_" But at that rate, since 
Nature s creating ceases through the production of discrimi 
native knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find 
all liberated. To this he replies."] 



96 The SdnJchya Aphorisms. Book III. 



^8 11 

Liberation of one involves Aph. 64. Another [i. e., one devoid 
of discriminative knowledge] remains 

like another, [i. e., just like one bound by Nature, ] through 
her fault, [i. e., through the fault which may be described as 
her not accomplishing that soul s aim] . 



n 

Aph. 65. [The fruit of Nature s 

Liberation consists in what. 

ceasing to act,] the solitariness of 

both [Nature and Soul], or [ which comes to the same 
thing ] of either, is liberation. [" But then, how should 
Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the 
shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, 
again engage in creation for the sake of another Soul ? And 
you are not to say that this is no objection because Nature 
consists of different portions, (it is not another Nature but 
the same,) because we see that, even out of the (mortal) 
constituents of the liberated person, his dust, &c., things are 
created for the experience of another. To this he replies."] 




How Nature affects one Apli. 66. Moreover [when Nature 
has left off distressing the emanci 

pated] she does not desist in regard to her creative influence 
on another, just as is the case with the snake [which ceases 
to be a terror] in respect of him who is aware of the truth 
in regard to the rope [which another still mistakes for a 
snake. "And Nature is likened to a snake, because of her 
disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain unintelli 
gent persons, calling themselves Veddntins, having quite failed 
to understand that such is the drift of such examples as those 
of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that Nature is an abso 
lute nothing, or something merely imaginary. The matters of 



How Nature acts. 97 

scripture, and of the legal institutes, are to be elucidated by 
means of this or that example offered by the SdnWiyas who 
assert the reality of Nature ; it is not the case that the mat 
ter is simply established to be as is the example," the analogy 
of which is not to be overstrained as if the cases were parallel 
throughout.] 



ii 

Another consideration why A ph- 67. And from connection with 
Nature should act. Desert, which is the cause, [Nature 

(< creates, for the sake of another Soul" than the emancipated 
one. " But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch 
as they do not desire (Nature s interference), what is it that 
here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and 
desist in regard to that one ? To this he replies"] . 



Nature s selection Jwo de- Aph. 68. Though there is [011 soul s 
fc w*. part] this indifference, yet want of 

discrimination is the cause of Nature s service, [" Nature, just 
through [her own] non-discrimination, saying " This is my 
master/ " This is I myself," serves Souls (towards their 
eventual emancipation) by creation, &c. And so, to what 
Soul, not having discriminated herself therefrom, she has the 
habit of showing herself, in respect just of that one does 
Nature energize : and this it is that determines her." But 
" since it is her nature to energize, how can she desist even 
when discrimination has taken place ? To this he replies"] . 



Nature energizes only till Apli. 69. Just like a dancer, does 
the end i, attained. sll( ^ though she had been energizing, 

desist, because of the end s having been attained ; [ for 
" Nature s disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, 
and not universally. Therefore is it declared that Nature 
desists, though she had been energizing, when the end has 



98 The SdnMtya Aphorisms. Hook JH. 

been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul s aim. 
Just as a dancer, who had been energizing with the view of 
exhibiting a dance to the spectators, desists on the accom 
plishment of this"] . 



Anli. 70. Moreover, when her fault 
This illustrated. 

is known, Nature does not approach 

[Soul], just like a woman of good family; [ "that is to 
say, Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul s having seen her 
fault, in her transformations and her taking the shape of 
pain, does not again approach Soul ; just like a woman 
of good family/ i. e., just as a (frail) woman of good family, 
ashamed at ascertaining that her fault has been seen by her 
husband, does not approach her husband." " But then, 
if Nature s energizing be for the sake of Soul, then Soul 
must be altered by Bondage and Liberation ( and not remain 
the unalterable entity which you allege it to be) . To this 
he replies"] . 

n 



Aph. 71. Bondage and Liberation 

Soul s relation to Bondage. 

do not belong actually to boul, [and 

would not even appear to be] but for non-discrimination. 
[" But, in reality, the aforesaid Bondage and Liberation be 
long to Nature alone : so he asserts :"] 



Aph. 72. It really belongs to 

Bondage is really Nature s. 

Nature, through consociation, like a 

beast, [i. e., " through her being hampered by the habits, &c., 
which are the causes of Pain ; just as a beast, through its 
being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Libera 
tion : such is the meaning.] 



Nature s bondage and liberation. 99 



How Nature binds and ^p/z, 73. In seven ways does Nature 
liberates herself. b ind h erse i like the silk-worm ; in 

one way does she liberate herself, [ for, " by Merit,, Dispas- 
sion, supernatural Power, Demerit,, Ignorance,, Non-dispassion, 
and Want of power, by habits,, causes of Pain, in the shape 
of these seven, does Nature bind herself with Pain, like the 
silk-worm/ i. e., just as the worm that makes the cocoon 
bind itself by means of the dwelling which it itself constructs. 
And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain in one 
way/ i. e., by Knowledge alone. " " But then, that which 
you assert, viz., that Bondage and Liberation result from 
Non-discrimination alone, is improper, because Non-discrimi 
nation can neither be quitted nor assumed, and because, in 
the world, Pain, and its negative Pleasure, can themselves be 
neither quitted nor assumed : otherwise ( if you still insist 
on retaining the opinion objected to ) there is disparagement 
of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself ( not 
leaving it to a commentator ) explains what was asserted in 
the fourth aphorism"] . 



n 

Aph. 74. Non- discrimination is the 

An objection met. 

cause |_ not the thing itself ], so 

that there is no disparagement of sense-evidence, [for " what 
was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination was only 
the occasion of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that 
Non-discrimination itself was these two ; therefore there is no 
disparagement of sense-evidence," for, though we see that 
Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted, yet 
we also see that causes of them can be assumed or quitted. 
" He next mentions, among the means conducive to Discrimi* 
nation, Study, which is the essence of them"]. 
o 2 



100 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book III. 



Apli. 75. Discrimination is per- 

Means of Discrimination. 

fected through abandonment [of every 

thing] expressed by a " Nay nay," through study of the 
[twenty-five] Principles, [the student " abandoning, by a 
c Nay nay/ in regard to things unintelligent, ending with 
Nature, the conceit (that Nature, or any of her products, is 
Soul). All the others [enumerated in the list of means are 
only supplemental to Study"] . 

He states a specialty in regard to the perfecting of Dis 
crimination. 



The means not efficacious 4^- 76. Through the difference 
everywhere. O f those competent [to engage in the 

matter at all] , there is no necessity [that each and every one 
should at once be successful ; for " since there is a division, 
of those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be 
made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimi 
nation will be accomplished : such is the meaning. There 
fore each one should, by cleverness in study, acquire for him 
self the highest degree of competency : such is the import"] . 



u ^ u 

Imperfect Discrimination Apli. 77. Since what [Pain] has 
inefficacious. been repelled, returns again, there 

comes, even from medium [but imperfect] discrimination, 
experience [which it is desired to get entirely rid of. " But 
sluggish Discrimination ( lower even than the middling 
variety ), antecedently to direct intuition, consists only of 
Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating : such is the division" 
of Discrimination] . 



Liberation during life. 101 



Aph. 78. And he wlio living is 

Of Liberation during life. -, r ,, , ,1 T.- x- 

liberated [" is just m the condition of 

medium Discrimination." " He adduces evidence for there 
being some one liberated though still living"] . 

I <. II 

Aph. 79. It is proved, by the fact 

Proof that this may be. L r . 

ol instructed and instructor, |_ that 

there are such as are liberated during life, by the mention, 
in the Institutes, on the subject of Liberation, of the relation 
of preceptor and pupil : i. e., because it is only one liberated 
during life who can [really] be an instructor" in this matter] . 



Apli. 80. And there is scripture 
Further proof . 

\_" for there being persons liberated 

during life"] . 

tprenaOTCTa 11 c^ n 

Aph. 81. [And not through mere- 

A suggestion repelled. . .. 

ly hearing is one qualified to become 

an instructor,] otherwise [ " we should have a blind handing 
down" of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted 
or lost. " But then, when, through Knowledge, one s works 
( which are the cause of mundane existence ) have perished, 
how can there still be life ? To this he replies"] . 



How life is compatible ^dth Aph. 82 . Possessed of a body [the 
Liberation. emancipated sage goes on living], 

just like the whirling of a wheel, [ for as " even on the 
cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel of itself 
revolves for some time in consequence of the motal inertia 
resulting from the previous action ; so, after knowledge, 



102 The Sankhiju Aphorisms. Boole III. 

though actions do not arise, yet, through the self-continuant 
action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he 
remains living yet liberated;" and if he did not, but every 
one who gained true knowledge were to disappear on gaining 
it, true knowledge would cease to be handed down orally, 
and Kapila probably did not contemplate books, or did not 
think these a secure depository of the doctrine. " But then, 
since the continuance of experience, &c., is put an end to by 
that f Meditation with distinct recognition of the object, 
which (see Yoga Aphorisms, B. I. 17) is the cause of 
knowledge, how can one retain a body ? To this he replies"] . 



Difficulty of slmjjling off Apli- 83. This [retention of a 
this mortal coil. body] is occasioned by the least ves 

tige of impression, [" by even the least access of those im 
pressions of objects which are the causes of having a body." 
Finally, "he sums up the sense of the declarations of the 
Institute"] . 



11*811 

. , . Apli. 84. That which was to be 

JLtecapitulalion. 

done has been done, when entire ces 

sation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination ; not other 
wise not otherwise ; [and " so much for the Third Book, 
on Dispassion"] . 



103 



BOOK IV. 



[" Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognised 
in the Institute, the means of discriminative knowledge are 
to be displayed: so, for this purpose, the Fourth Book is 
commenced/ ] 



Soul <e rightly hearing A P ]l L As in the Case of the 

the trutk. king s son, from instruction as to the 

truth, [comes discrimination between Soul and Nature, " The 
story here is as follows. A certain king s son, in consequence 
of his being born under the (unlucky) star of the tenth por 
tion (of the twenty- seven portions into which the ecliptic 
is divided), having been expelled from his city, and reared 
by a certain forester, remains under the idea that I am 
a forester/ Having learned that he was alive, a certain minis 
ter informs him Thou art not a forester, thou art a king s 
son/ Just as he immediately, having abandoned the idea of 
his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state 
saying I am a king/ so too it ( the Soul ), in conse 
quence of the instruction of some kind person to the effect 
that f Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which 
manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art thyself a portion 
thereof, having abandoned the idea of being Nature ( or 
of being anything material or phenomenal ) rests upon its 
own nature, saying Since I am the son of the Deity, I 
am myself Deity, and not something mundane different there 
from/ Next " he exhibits another story, to prove that even 
women, S udras, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through 
a Brahman, by hearing tho instructions of a Brahman"]. 



104 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book IV. 



Even when the instruction Apll. 2. - As ill the Case of the gob- 

is not addressed to the hearer. H n ^_ ev en when the instruction was 
for the sake of another, [the chance hearer may be benefited. 
" Though the instruction in regard to the truth was being 
delivered, by the divine Krishna, for Arjuna s benefit, know 
ledge of the distinction (between Soul and Nature) was pro 
duced in the case of a goblin standing near (and overhearing 
the discourse) : and so too it may happen in the case of 
others"] . 



II ^ II 

Apli. 3. Eepetition [is to be 

Necessity of inculcation. 

made], if not from once instructing 

[the end be gained. " That is to say, a reiteration of 
instruction also is to be made, because, in the Chhdndogya 
Upanishad, and the like, there is mention of Aruni and the 
like as having more than once instructed S wetaketu and 
others." Next, "with a view to the removal of desire, he 
sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul s 
accompaniments"] . 



n 8 ii 

Transitoriness of mundane Aph. 4. As ill the case of father 

t nn 3 s - and son, since both are seen [ the 

one to die, and the other to be born. " That is to say, 
Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence 
of its being inferred in respect of one self also, that there are 
death and birth, since these are seen in the case of father 
and son." And " he next explains by illustrative stories, the 
subservients to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom 
knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion"] . 



Voluntary abandonment. 105 

tt Sim^TJllWJW l| yj| 

Aph. 5. One experiences pleasure 

Yolnnian/ distinguished . . 

from involuntary abandon- or pain [alternatively] from [volun 
tary] abandonment or [forcible] sepa 

ration ; as in the case of a hawk, [" for a hawk, when he 
has food before him, if he be driven away by any one, is 
grieved by being separated from the food ; but if of his own 
accord he leaves it, then he is freed from grief"] . 



How Soul ouyU to aba- A P ]l - 6. As in the case of a snake 

do* Mature. and ^ gkin . [_ t ] mt ig to sayj _ as 

a snake readily abandons its old skin, from knowing that it 
ought to be quitted ; just so he who desires liberation should 
abandon Nature, experienced through a long period, and effete, 
when he knows that it ought to be quitted." And " when 
abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest ; 
so, in regard to this, he says"] . 

f^IWRT II ^ II 

Aph. 7. Or as an amputated hand ; 

Its resumption prohibited. 

[ i. e., as no one takes back again 

an amputated hand, just so this (Nature), when abandoned, 
he should not readmit"] . 

w*Fngft*M wra w?ranii * n 

J)i to be sacrificed to A P ll > 8. What is not a means [of 
* " " liberation] ought not to be thought 

about, [as this only conduces] to bondage, as in the case of 
Bharata, [ for <( that which is not an immediate cause of 
Discrimination, even though it may be a duty, still is not 
to be thought about/ i. e. intention of the mind towards 
the performance thereof is not to be made ; since it is a 
cause of Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination, 
as in the case of Bharata/ that is to say, as was the 
case with the great sage Bliarata s cherishing of Dinanatha s 
young fawn, though this was in accordance with duty"] . 
p 



] 06 The Sdnklnja Aphorisms. Boole IV. 



|1 II 

Aph. 9. Through [association 

Company to be avoided. 

with] many, there is obstruction to 

concentration through Passion, &c., as in the case of a girl s 
shell-bracelet ; [ so " association is not to be made with 
many, because, when there is association with many, there 
is disturbance, through the development of Passion, &c., 
which destroys concentration, just as a jingling is produced 
by the mutual contact of the shells on a girl s wrist"] . 



n wsroq f ii \ it 

Aph. 10. Just so also from ["the 

Even that of one. 

company of] two [ "there is ob 

struction to concentration ; therefore one ought to abide 
alone"] . 



^1 II 

Blessedness of those that A$ll. 11. - He who IS without hope, 

expect nothing. iB happy, just like Pingala ; [ i. e., 

" having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the 
happiness called contentment/ ( just like Pingala, that is 
to say, just as the courtesan, called Pingala, desiring a lover, 
having found no lover, being despondent, became happy when 
she had left off hoping." " But then, granting that Pain 
may cease on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be 
happiness in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied. 
That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of 
Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, of itself 
resumes its influence on the departure of hope, just as is the 
case with the coolness of water which (supposed natural cool 
ness) had been hindered (from manifesting itself) by heat ; 
there is not in this case any need of means. And this in 
reality is what is expressed by the word happiness. " " Since 
it is an obstructor of Concentration, exertion with a view to 
experience is not to be made, since this may be effected 
otherwise, as he next states"] . 



Eclecticism. 107 

H 



Aph -. 12 -[ e y be 

even without exertion, like a serpent 
happy in another s house, [" as it has been said, The 
building of a house is painful, and in no way pleasant; a 
serpent, having entered the dwelling made by another (e. g., 
a rat), does find comfort/ " And " from Institutes, and 
from preceptors, only the cream is to be accepted, since other 
wise it may be impossible to concentrate the attention ;" so 
he next tells us] . 



A lee-UTce eclecticism re- Apll. 13. Though he devote him- 

commended. gelf fco manv j ns titutes and teachers, 

a taking of the essence [is to be made], as is the case with 
the bee, [" as it has been said ( From small Institutes and 
from great, the intelligent man should take from all quarters 
the essence, as the bee does from the flowers/ " Be the 
other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimi 
nation is to be effected only by intentness through maintain 
ing Meditation, as he next tells us"] . 

I 1 \s ii 

Aph. 14. The Meditation is not 
Intentness on one object. 

interrupted of him whose mind is in 

tent on one object, like the maker of arrows ; [ for, " as 
in the case of the maker of arrows, with his mind intent 
solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of other 
thoughts was not interrupted even by a king s passing at his 
side, so too, of him whose mind is intent on one point, there 
is in no way an interruption of meditation/ i. e., a failure to 
exclude other thoughts"] . 

II H 



7?tf/ not to le transgress- ^pli. 15. Through transgression of 
edwiih impunity. tne enjoined rules, there is failure in 

the aim, as in the world : [ < whatever rule, for the prac- 
p 2 



108 The Sdnl-hya Aphorisms. Bool- IV. 

tisers of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, 
if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the perfecting of 
knowledge, is not effected ; as in the world/ that is to 
say, just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., 
in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, the effect 
thereof will not be obtained"] . 



Rah* m*t not be forgot- A P l1 16. Moreover if they [the 
ten - rules] be forgotten, as in the case 

of the female frog, [the end will be lost. " And the story of 
the female frog is this. A certain king, having gone to hunt, 
saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited 
in marriage by the king, made this stipulation, When water 
shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart/ But on 
one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king 
Where is water? The king too, forgetting his agreement, 
showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog 
Kdmarupini, daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the 
water ; and then the king, though he sought her with nets, 
&c., did not regain her." " He next mentions a story, with 
reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the 
teacher, as well as hearing them"] . 



tion necessary as veil - 1 ?. Not ^eil though instruc- 

as hearing. j on ^g near d, is the end gained with 

out reflection, as in the case of Virochana ; [ and " by 
reflection is meant such consideration as determines the 
import of the teacher s words. Without this, though the in 
struction be heard, knowledge of the truth does not neces 
sarily follow; for it is written that, though hearing the 
instructions of Prajapati, Yirochana, out of Iiidra and Yiro- 
,* erred through the want of reflection"] . 
* See Ckhdndogya UpanishacL 



Reflection necessary. 109 



\\\*\\ 

Aph. 18. Of those two [viz.Indra 

Of this further. / . 

and Virochana], it LVIZ.^ reflection J 

was seen in tlie case of Indra, [and not of Yirochana, on 
whom the instruction was therefore thrown away]. 



fR?[ll K II 

Apli. 19. Having performed rever- 

The process requires time. . , 

ence, the duties of a student, and 

attendance, there is success after a long time, as in Ms case ; 
[ that is to say, as in the case of Indra, so in the case 
of another too, only by having exhibited, towards one s pre 
ceptor, reverence, the study of the Vedas, service, &c., is 
there success/ i. e., the development of truth, not other 
wise"] . 



Aph. 20. There is no determina 

te time for the process .,- ,. ,, n 

waif embrace successive slates tlOll of the time, - as in the Case Ot 

S bein 3- Yamadeva, [ i. e., " there is no neces 

sity, as regards the time, that, in the arising of knowledge, 
it must be, e. g., from present causes alone ; as in the case 
of Yamadeva/ that is to say, as, in consequence of causes 
pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of 
Yamadeva, even when in embryo, so may it in the case of 
another." 

" But then, since it is written that the means of know 
ledge need be no other than devotion to those [viz., Brahma, 
&c.,] who (unlike the Absolute) have Qualities, knowledge 
may result from this. Why, then, a hard and subtle process 
of Concentration ? To this he replies"] . 



HO The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. IV. 



II ^ II 

Inferior means not alto- Apll. 21. Through devotion to 

something under a superinduced form, 

[attainment or approach towards perfect knowledge takes 
place] by degrees, as in the case of those who devote them 
selves to sacrifices : [that is to say " through devotion to 
the Souls, Brahma, Vishnu, S iva, &c., under the forms super 
induced on them, the perfecting of knowledge takes place ( by 
degrees/ i. e., by the successive attainment of the world of 
Brahma, &c., or else through the purification of the Good 
principle, &c., but not directly; just as is the case with 
sacrificers" whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be ex 
piated, throws them back so far, in the road to emancipation. 
" He tells us, that, moreover, there is no necessity that the 
successive rise to the world of Brahma should perfect one s 
knowledge"] . 



Scriptural proof that hea- Aph. 22. Moveover, after the at- 
. not liberation. taininent of what [like the world of 

Brahma ] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there 
is return [to mundane existence] ; because it is written [in 
the 5th Prapdtlialia of the Chhdndogya Upanishad], "From 
conjunction with the five fires, there is birth." &c. He next 
exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the perfecting of 
knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free 
from passion"] . 



Apli. 23. By him who is free from 

Discrimination illustrated. 

passion, what is to be left is left, and 

what is to be taken is taken, as in the case of the swan 
and the milk ; [ " that is to say, only by him who is free 
from passion is there a quitting ( of what is to be left/ i. e., 



Good society. Ill 

of Nature, &c., and a taking ( of what is to be taken/ i. e., 
of Soul : as it is only the swan, and not the crow, or the 
like, which, out of milk and water mingled, by means of 
leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk," as 
the Hindus insist it does] . 



II ^8 II 

Apli. 24. Or through association 

.Benefit of good society. 

with one who has obtained excellence, 

just as in the case thereof; ["that is to say, more 
over, from association with him by whom excellence/ i. e., 
excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid 
(discrimination) takes place, as in the case of the swan. 
Just as in the case of Alarka, Discrimination manifested itself 
spontaneously, merely through association with Dattatreya"] . 



Danger of unsuitable so- Ajph. 25. - Not of his OWn aCCOrd 

should one go near one influenced by 
desire, just like the parrot ; [ " that is to say, just as the 
bird called a parrot, by reason of its being exceedingly beauti 
ful, does not ( by going near people ) act in a rash manner, 
through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for 
its beauty." And next " he states the harm of association 
with the passionate"] . 



Aph. 26. [Else he may become] 

Of this further. L , 

bound by conjunction with the cords, 

as in the case of the parrot ; [for " in the case of associat 
ing with those persons, he may become bound by conjunction 
with the cords/ i. e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., 
( the Qualities, punningly compared to cords ) just as in 
the case of the parrot/ that is to say, just as the bird 
called a parrot becomes bound by the cords, i. e., the ropes, 
of the hunter." So " he determines, by two aphorisms, the 
means of dispassion"] . 



112 The Sditkkya Aphorism*. Boole IV. 



Apk. 27. Not by enjoyment is de- 

Means of dutpasston. 

sire appeased; just as in the case of 

the saint j ["that is to say, as, in the case of the saint, 
Saubharij desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so also in 
the case of others is it not." And further ] . 

^ra^sn^TJ n ^ ii 

Apk. 28. From seeing the fault of 
Of thi* fitter. * b 

both, L ! G -> only from seeing 

the fault, e. g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, 
&c., of both/ i. e., of Nature and her productions, does the 
assuaging of Desire take place, just as in the case of the 
saint. For it is written that Saubhari became indifferent to 
society, just through seeing the evil of society." And " he 
tells us that incapacity even to accept instruction attaches to 
him who is affected by the fault of Desire, &c.] . 



H i II 



Agitation excludes inntruc- Apli . 29. Not in the case of him 
iion - whose mind is disturbed does the seed 

of instruction sprout, as in the case of Aja; ["in him 
whose mind is rendered impure by Passion, &c., not even does 
a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge 
which is in the shape of instruction ; ( as in the case of Aja/ 
that is to say, as not a sprout from the seed of instruction, 
though offered to him by Vasishtha, sprang up in the king 
named Aja, whose mind was disturbed by grief for his wife. 

What need of more ? " . 



Apk. 30. Not even a semblance of 

Of this farther. . l . . 

this [true knowledge arises in him 

whose mind is disturbed], as in the case of a rusty mirror, 
[ for " even superficial knowledge does not arise, from in- 



Heaven not perfect Hiss. 113 

struction, in one whose mind is impure, through the obstruc 
tion caused by its wandering away, e. g., to other objects, 
just as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror, through the 
obstruction caused by the impurities"] . 



necessarily Aph. 31. Nor, even though Sprung 

perfect knowledge. therefrom, is that [knowledge neces 

sarily] in accordance with that [instruction, this not having 
been entirely understood,] just like the lotus, [that is to 
say, "just as the lotus, though the seed be of the best, is 
not in accordance with the seed when the swamp is faulty. 
The mind of the student is compared to the swamp/ in which 
the lotus-seed was sown. But then, " since Soul s end is 
gained by the attainment of supernatural power in the worlds 
of Brahma, &c., to what purpose is the production of know 
ledge, with so much toil, for liberation ? To this he replies"] . 



3rT II ^11 

Apli. 32. Not, even on the attain- 
Heaven not perfect bliss. 

ment 01 glorification, has that been 

done which was to be done, as is the case with the per 
fection of the objects worshipped, as is the case with the per 
fection of the objects worshipped, [for "even though one attain 
to supernatural power, that has not been done which was to 
be done/ i. e., the end has not been gained, because it 
is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess : as is the 
case with the perfection of the object worshipped/ that is 
to say, as, though the possession of perfection (so-called) 
belongs to the objects worshipped/ i. e., to Brahma, &c., still 
that has not been done which was to be done, since it is 
written that even these, while in the sleep of Concentration, 
&c., still practice Concentration ( from fear of losing what 
they have attained to ) : just in like manner is the case 
with him who, by the worship of these, has attained to glorifi 
cation"] . 

Q 



114 



BOOK V. 



[ u The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun 
a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the crude notions of others 
in regard to his Institute. Here, in the first place, he disposes 
of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression 
Well then/ in the first Aphorism (of Book I.), is purposeless/ 3 ] 



Seasons for a Benedictory Aph. 1. The US6 of a Benediction 

opening. p s justified] by the practice of the 

good, by our seeing its fruit, and by scripture. [" The word 
iti is intended to preclude the expectation of any other rea 
sons." " He next repels those who entertain the prima facie 
view, that what was asserted in the expression Because it is 
not proved that there is any Lord ( see B. I. Aph. 92.), is 
not made out, because (forsooth) His existence is proved by 
his being the giver of the fruits of works."] 



Aph. 2.. Not from its [ the 

Needlessness of a Lord. 

worlds J being governed by the 

Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works 
[ i. e., by merit and demerit ] that this is accomplished, . 
[" by works alone, which are indispensable," and if we do 
make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He 
cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works] . 



The supposed Lord would Aph. 3. [If a Lord were governor, 
le selfish. then] having intended his own benefit, 

His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with or 
dinary governors] in the world. 



Objections to there being a Lord. 115 



8 || 

And therefore not the Lord -Apll,. 4. [He must then be] just 

spoken of. l^ e a W orldly lord, [and] otherwise 

[than you desire that we should conceive of Him ; for " if we 
agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be some 
thing mundane, just like a worldly lord ; because, since his 
desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he 
must be liable to grief, &c"]. 



Aph. 5. Or [" if whilst there exists 

The difficulty perhaps ori- -1-1,1 i T J 1 

ginatesina mistaken expres- also a world, there be a Lord, then, 
non - let yours, like ours, be merely "] a 

technical term [" for that soul which emerged at the com 
mencement of the creation, since there cannot be an eternal 
Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness 
and the having an unobstructed will"] . 



Oljection to there leing a ^P ll > 6. This [that there is a Lord] 

cannot be established without [assum 
ing that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indis 
pensable cause [of all energizing] . 



Aph. 7. Moreover were that [Pas- 

This objection further. 

sion] conjoined with Him, he could 

not be eternally free, [" and thus the tenet (of His eternal 
freedom) must be surrendered." " Pray (let us ask) does 
Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the 
wishes, &c., which. we hold to be powers of Nature ( not 
properties of Soul ) or from an influence through proximity 
simply, as in the case of the magnet ? Of these he condemns 
the former alternative"] . 
Q 2 



116 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. V. 



c u 

Objection on one branch of Aph. 8. If it were from the con 
junction of the properties of Nature, 

it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture 
denies of Soul. " In regard to the latter alternative he says"] . 



Objection on the other Aph. 9. If it were from the mere 
lranch - existence [of Nature, not in associa 

tion, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong 
to every one ; [ ( that is to say, if Thought obtains Lordship 
merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which 
becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is 
settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indiffer 
ently, experiences in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) 
have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all ex- 
periencers that Nature produces Mind, &c. ; therefore your 
tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown"] . 



Denial that there is any Apll. 10. It is not established [that 

real evidence of a Lord. tliere ig an eterna l Lord] , because there 

is no real evidence of it, [ " in the first place, there is not 
$ewse-evidenoe, so that only the evidence of inference and of 
testimony can be offered ; and these are inapplicable ;" as he 
proceeds to show] . 



Denial that it can be estab- 4M- H- There is no inferential 

listed by inference. prQof j- Qf fo QTQ being & Lord], because 

there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a 
sign and that which it might betoken ; " and so there is 
no inferential proof of there being a Lord ; because, in such 
arguments as Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is 
a product/ the fact of invariable concomitancy is not estab 
lished, since there is no compulsion" that every product should 
have had an intelligent maker] . 



Objections to there being a Lord. 117 



I ^ II 

Denial that there is scrip- 4^- 12. Moreover, there is scrip- 
ture f r it- ture for this [world s] being the pro 

duct of Nature [ not of a Lord. So, leaving this topic, <e he 
refutes diffusely, by a cluster (of seven aphorisms), the opinion 
of an opponent in regard to that which was established in 
(Aph. 20 of) the first section, viz., Bondage does not arise 
from Ignorance (conjoined with Soul) "] . 



Coition in Me , ase of A P h 13- With tbat which is soli - 
ike solitary, were a contra- tary, there cannot be conjunction of 

the power of Ignorance, [and " since 

Soul has no association (with anything whatever) it is plainly 
impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance." 
" But then (it may be replied,) what is to be asserted is, that 
the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Igno 
rance (which is a negation, or nonentity), and so, since this is 
no reality, there is no association occasioned thereby. To this 
he rejoins"] . 



8 II 

Aph. 14. Since the existence of 

A suggestion repelled. , L 

tins [alleged negative Ignorance] is 

established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunc 
tion, there is a vicious circle, [" i. e., a resting of each on the 
other alternately, or resting a thing on itself, in short, a 
regressus in infinitum." And " in reply to the suggestion (of 
the Naiyayika) but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, 
the regressus in infinitum is no objection, he replies"]. 



Aph. 15. It is not as in the case 

The world has a beginning. 

of seed and sprout, for we hear in 

scripture that the world [ t( mundane state of souls, consist 
ing of all undesirable things, Ignorance, &c.,"] has a begin- 



118 The SdnJthya Aphorisms. Book V. 

ning ; [ " because we hear in scripture that these cease to 
exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c." 
"But then (you Vedantins will say ), according to us Igno 
rance is technically so termed, and is not, e. g., in the shape, 
specified by the Yoga, of supposing what is not soul to be 
soul i and so, just like your Nature/ since this (Ignorance) 
of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, 
there is no detriment to the solitariness thereof: in regard to 
this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the 
word Ignorance/ he objects to it"]. 

II II 



Soul and knowledge not Aph. 16. [" If the meaning of the 
identical - word Ignorance (avidyd) be only 

otherness than knowledge/] then Brahma \_" soul itself] 
would be found to be excluded, [ " to perish, through his 
being annihilable by knowledge,"] since He is other than 
knowledge. 



n 

Knowledge, not excluding Aph. 17 - Were there not exclu- 

ignorance.wereresultless. gion [ of fo Q existence by ignorance 

by knowledge,] then there would be resultlessness, [ " be 
cause of its not debarring Ignorance," which is the only result 
competent to knowledge. " He censures the other alterna 
tive," that knowledge might exclude Soul] . 



II ^ n 

On the Teddnta theory the -Aph. 18. If [on the other hand] 

world ought to vanish. ^ [I gnorance ] meant the being 6X- 

cludable by Knowledge, it would be predicable in like manner 
of the world also, [ for, " if, on the other hand, the being 
excludable by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, be what 
is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case the world/ the 
whole mundane system, Nature, Mind, &c., would also in like 
manner be Ignorance; and so, the whole system of things 
being Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by 



The Veddnta theory. 

one man s knowledge, the world should become invisible to 
others also"] . 



The Veddnta theory self- Apli. 19. If it [Ignorance] were 
contradictory. o f t j iat na ture [i. e., " suppose it to be 

the case that to be Ignorance means simply the being exclud 
able by Knowledge, still] it would have had a commencement, 
[" for such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in 
souls ( as held by Vedantins, see Aph. 15 ), but must have 
had a commencement for it is proved by such texts as " Con 
sisting of knowledge alone," &c., that at the time of the. 
universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge 
alone. Therefore it is settled that there is no other Ignorance 
than that stated in the Yoga system, and this is a property 
of the understanding, not of the soul." Now, " by a cluster 
of (six) aphorisms he clears up the prima facie view of an 
opponent in regard to that which was stated in the same Book 
( Book V v Aph. 2 ), that Nature s energizing is due to 
desert"]. 



Aph. 20, There is no denying 

Desert is undeniable. . 

desert, [" on the ground of its being 

no object of sense, because it is inferred,"] because of the 
diversity in the operations of Nature [ accommodating one 
person and inconveniencing another, which would otherwise 
be unaccounted for] . 



n ^ H 

Aph. 21. It [the existence of De- 
Proofs of this. 

sertj is established by scripture, by 

tokens, &c. 

II II 



Sense-evidence not the only A P h - 22. There is hero no neces- 
nd of evidence. s ^y [- ^ ia ^ a thing of which there is 



120 The SdnJchya Aphorisms. Boole V. 

no sense-evidence must be non-existent," ] because there 
is room for oth-er proofs. 



i ^ n 

_ .. Aph. 23. It is thus, moreover, in 

Dement as certain as merit. 

both cases, ["the evidence applies 
to Demerit just as it does to Merit"] . 



The proof of eac, Me same. 24 ~ If ^ P TOof be from an 

argument [" in this shape, viz., that 

otherwise an injunction would be unaccounted for ; but there 
is none such in respect of demerit, so how can scriptural or 
logical argument be extended to demerit ? If any one says 
this, it is not so, since the token exists"] alike in respect of 
both, ["i. e., of both merit and demerit: because prohibitory 
injunctions, such as He should not approach another s wife/ 
betoken demerit"] . 



Merit, **., Mere in vAat. 25 -" It ls f the lllteraal or 

gan [ not of soul ] that Merit, &c., 

[" the &c./ including all those that are stated in the Vais e- 
shika Institute as peculiar qualities of soul,"] are the properties. 
[To the objection that the existence of an internal organ, 
as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is 
debarred by scripture, he replies.] 



n ^ u 

The qualities exist, though Aph. 26. And the existence of the 
notinsouL Qualities ["Purity, &c., and their 

properties, happiness, &c., and their products also, Mind, 
&c.,"] is not absolutely debarred [by scripture. " They are 
not to be denied as existences but it is to be altogether 
denied that they belong to soul, just as we deny that heat 



The Chdrvdka opinion discussed. 121 

( i n r ed hot iron ) belongs to the iron." " In regard to the 
doubt, why, again, may we not deny them an essence, as 
we do to what is meant by the words sleep, wish, &c. ? he 
says. "] 



Aph. 27. By a conjunction of the 

The above thesis argued. 

five members [of an argumentative 

statement], we discern that Happiness exists: [and " here, 
in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes 
happiness alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a 
representative of the entire matter : but the better reading 
is, we discern that Happiness, $-c., exist/ The five members 
of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, 
Example, Synthesis (of the two premises), and Conclusion ; 
and he means that by the conjunction/ i. e., the combination, 
of these, all things, happiness, &c., are proved to exist. And 
the employment (of the argument) is this : 

f Pleasure is real ; 

Because it produces motion in something ; 

Whatever produces motion in anything is real, as are 
sentient beings ; 

And pleasure produces motion in things, as in horripilation, 
&c. ; 

Therefore it is real/ 

" The Chdrvdka next doubts whether there be any evidence 
other than sense-evidence, since (he contends) there is no 
truth in the assertion (of an inductive conclusion) that such 
and such is pervaded by such and such, &c."]. 



The validity of inference Aph. 28. Not from once apprehend- 
questioned. j n g [concomitance of a supposed token 

and thing betokened], is a connection, [i. e., a pervadedness 
or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened] 
established; ["and frequency (of the same apprehension) 
R 



122 The SdnMiya Aphorisms. Book V. 

follows (the rule of the single apprehension, just as a thousand 
times nothing amounts to nothing) ; therefore (argues the 
sceptic) since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness 
is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. This 
he clears up"] . 



n 

Aph. 29. Pervadedness is a con- 

This point cleared up. 

staiit consociation of characters, in 

the case of both, or of one of them ; [" Consociation of 
characters/ i. e., consociation in the fact of being characters 
(or properties of something) : in short concomitancy. And so 
we mean, that, that concomitancy is pervadedness/ (furnish 
ing solid ground for inference) which is absolutely non-errant, 
whether in the case of both, predicate and reason, or in the 
case of the reason only. Of both is mentioned with refer 
ence to the case of equal pervadedness ( e. g., every 
equilateral triangle is equiangular, and conversely every equi 
angular triangle is equilateral). And the invariableness may 
be apprehended through an appropriate confutation (or reductio 
ad absurdum of the denial of it) ; so that there is no impos 
sibility in apprehending pervadedness " and of inferring on 
the strength of it] . 



not an addi- Aph. 30. It [Pervadedness] is not 

tional principle. [ as gome think, S66 Aph. 31] ail 

additional principle [over and above the twenty-five, B. I. 
Aph. 61,] for it is unsuitable to postulate entities [" praster 
rationem"] . 



A heterodox opinion re- Apli. 31. But [certain] doctors say 
Pervadedness: i}i ^ i t [Pervadedness] is [another 

principle, in addition to the twenty-five ], resulting from 
the power of the thing itself. [These "other teachers assert 



The Panchas ikha s opinion discussed. 123 

that Pervadedness is positively a separate principle, in the 
shape of a species of power generated by the native power of 
the pervaded/ But (they continue) Pervadedness is not 
simply a power of the (pervaded) thing itself, else it would 
exist wherever the thing is, (which pervadedness does not 
do,) for even smoke, when it has gone to another place [than 
the point of its origination], is not attended by fire. And, by 
going into another place, that power is put an end to ; there 
fore ( contend these teachers ) there is no over-extension 
in the above-stated definition ; for, according to our doctrine, 
the smoke (which betokens fire) is to be specialized as that 
which is at the instant of origination."] 

n^ n 

Option of ae TanAa. . 32.-Tlie Panchas ikha says 

that jt ( Pervadedness 3 ) is the posses* 
sion of the power of the sustained : [for, says the Panclia- 
s ikha, " pervadingness is the power which consists in being 
the sustainer, and Pervadedness 3 is the having the power 
which consists in being the sustained, for Intellect and the 
rest are treated as being pervaded (or invariably attended) by 
Nature, &c.," and this just means that each product in 
succession is sustained by what preceded it in the series. 
" But then, why need a power of the sustained be postu 
lated ? let Pervadedness &e simply an essential power of 
the tUng pervaded. To this the Panchas ikha replies "] . 

^l^WW II ^ II 

The PanchaMha , reply p. 33. The relation is not an 

to an objection. essential power, for we should have 

[in that case] a tautology, [" because, that is to say, just as 
there is no difference between water-jar and jar for water/ 
so also there is none in the case of Intellect and what is 
Pervaded " by Nature, of which Intellect consists. And <( he 
himself explains the Tautology "] . 
B 2 



124 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms, Bouk V. 



Aph. 84, Because we should find 

2 he reason why. 

the distinction unmeaning, [as Intel 

lect does not differ from Nature at all except as does the sus 
tained from the sustainer. " He (the Panchas ikha) mentions 
another objection"] . 



Apli. 35. And because it Fperva- 

A further reason. 

dedness] would not be reconcileable 

in buds, &c., ["for buds, &c., are invariably attended (at 
their origination) by trees, &c. ; but this cannot be called 
simply an essential power in the bud, because, since the essen 
tial power ( that which belongs to the bud of being a bud ) 
does not depart even in the case of an amputated bud, we 
should even then find it attended (by the tree which, however, 
no longer accompanies it). But the power (see Aph. 32, which 
consists in having the character) of the sustained/ is des 
troyed at the moment of amputation, so that there is no Per- 
vadedness then," " But then what ? the Panchasikha says 
that Pervadedness is not a result of any essential power. 
Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire ( see Aph. 32 
where he contends that sustained ness is what really ex 
presses pervasion ), it would turn out that it (viz., smoke) 
is not (as token and betokened) accompanied by fire. So, 
with reference to this, he says"]. 



ly, that this would prove Aph. 36. Were it [tlmsj settled 
to much - that it is a power of the sustained/ 

then by the like argument, its dependence on an essential 
power, as pretended by the heterodox doctors referred to in 
Aph. 31, might be proved also, and thus the argument 



Sound and sense. 125 

proves nothing as it proves too much. " It was with a view 
to substantiating what was stated (in Aph. 27), viz., The 
Qualities, and the rest, are established (as realities) by the 
employment of the five-membered (form of argumentative ex 
position)/ that he has repelled, by an exposition of Pervaded- 
ness/ the objection to Inference as evidence ( or as a means 
of attaining right notions). Now, in order to establish the 
fact that words, of which the five-membered (exposition) con 
sists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others 
to a word s being a means of right knowledge, in the shape 
of (the objection of) its being inadequate, is disposed of, by 
means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words"] . 

ii n 



Aph. 37. The connection between 

Sound and sense. , . ,, 

word and meaning is the relation 01 

expresser and expressed. [" To the c meaning 7 belongs the 
power termed expressibleness, to the word the power termed 
expression ; simply this is their connection/ their inter 
relation as it were. From one s knowing this (connection 
between a given word and meaning), the meaning is sug 
gested (or raised in the mind) by the word."] 



Apli. 38. The connection [between 

Sense of words how learnt. , 

a wqrd and its sense] is determined 

by three [means, <( by means of these three, viz., information 
from one competent (to tell us the meaning), the usage of the 
old man (whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe 
what actions ensue in consequence, see the Sdhitya Darpana, 
Aph. 11 ), and application to the same thimg which has a 
familiar name," whence we gather the sense of the less 
familiar synonym] . 



Imperatives and predict- A P h 39. There is no restriction 
[" no necessity that this apprehension 



126 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. 

of the meaning of a word, should be restricted"] to what is 
to be done ["should occur only in the case of something 
(directed) to be done/ ] because we see it both ways, [i. e., 
" in (the secular life and dealings of) the world, we see the 
usage of the old man, &c., in regard to what is not to be done 
( being something ^already extant ) also, as well as in 
regard to what is to be done"] . 

%i% cOTrara ^i&nlfw ii a n 

Scriptural and secular Aph- 40. He who is accomplished 

sense of words the same. in the gecu l ar [connection of Words 

with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda. 



Aph. 41. Not by the three [means 
A doubt. Lin 

mentioned in Aph. 08, objects some 

one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered], because the 
Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses. 



i. 42. Not so, [what is meant 
This cleared up. 

by the V eda is not something trans 

cending the senses], because sacrificings, &c., are in them 
selves merit, pre-eminently ; [" and sacrificings, &c., since they 
imply wishings, &c., (of which we are perfectly conscious,) are 
not something transcending intuition. But the nature of merit 
(which the objector alleges to transcend intuition) does not 
belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrificings, &c., 
whence what is enjoined in scripture need be beyond intui 
tion." And " he repels also what has been asserted, that, 
inasmuch as it (the Veda) is superhuman, there can be no 
information from any competent person" in regard to its 
import] . 



The Veda not eternal. 127 



8^ 11 

Knowledge of the Veda 4P 7t - 43. The natural force [of the 
traditional. terms in the Veda] is ascertained 

through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively 
transmit the knowledge. " But still, how can there be appre 
hension of the sense of scriptural terms in the case of Gods, 
fruits (of actions), &c., which transcend sense? To this he 
replies"] . 

: ii 88 II 



Intelligibility of the Veda Apli. 44. This really takes place, 
undeniable. because they [viz., the words] give 

rise to knowledge both in the case of things adapted [to 
sense] and things not adapted. 



Eternity of the Teda i. 45. The Veda is not from 



eternity, for there is scripture for its 
being a production. 



Aph. 46. They [the Vedas] are 

The Lord not the author. 

not the work ot [the bupremej Man, 

because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom 
you allude to as being possibly] their maker. [" Supply 
because we deny that there is a Lord. And " adverting 
to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he 
ays."] 



Who are not authors of p 47. Since both the liberated 

the Veda is unsuited [to the work, by his indif 

ference], and the unliberated [by his want of power, neither 
of these can be author of the Vedas. " Then in that case, 
since they are not the work of (the Supreme) Man, it follows 
that they are eternal. To this he replies"] . 



128 The SdnWuja Aphorisms. Booh V. 



Aph. 48. As in the case of sprouts. 

An illustration. 

&c. } their eternity does not follow 

from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man. [" But 
then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are produc 
tions, we must infer that they are the work of (the Supreme) 
Man. To this he replies. 3 ] 

Tfqmft r^TJT IS^Tf^reflf?: II 8<E II 

Apli. 49. Were this the case with 

Plants denied to be works. 

these also, [viz., that vegetables are 

works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c., 
[for " it is seen in the world, as an invariable fact, that what 
ever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would 
be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend/ 3 for we see 
no embodied Supreme Man, to whose handiwork the sprouts 
of the earth could be referred. " But then, since they were 
uttered by the Primal Man, the Vedas moreover are really 
the work of (the Supreme) Man : to this he replies 33 ] . 



Only what w voluntary is ^ph. 50. That [only] is Mail s 

a worlc work, in respect of which, even be it 

something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place, 
[i. e., a consciousness that Thought preceded. 33 " Thus it has 
been remarked that a thing is not Man s work merely though 
its having been uttered by Man : for no one speaks of the 
respiration during profound sleep as being Man s work (or 
voluntary act). But what need to speak of antecedence of 
Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed 
of themselves from the Self-existent, through the force of 
fate, unpreceded by thought. Therefore they are not (a Su 
preme) Man 3 s work. 33 " But then, in that case, since they are 
not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sen 
tences, like the speech of a parrot the Yedas also can convey 
no right knowledge. To this he replies 3 ] . 



The Vedas their own evidence. 129 



: UfflTCSRT H ^ H 

The Vedas their own em- Aph. 51. They are self-evidently 
conveyers of right knowledge, from 

the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly. " The 
authoritativeness of the whole of the Vedas is established, not 
by such a thing as its being based on the accurate knowledge 
of the enouncer, but quite spontaneously ; because as for 
its own/ i. e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, 

thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations 
(which produce the result promised), and in the medical scrip 
ture ( the following of which leads to cures ), &c. And so 
there is the aphorism of the Nydya (B. II. 68), And the 
fact of its being a cause of right knowledge, like the invoca 
tions and the medical scripture/ &c." " In regard to the 
proposition (laid down in Aph. 26, viz.,) And the existence 
of the Qualities is not absolutely debarred/ there was alleged, 
and expounded (under Aph. 27) syllogistic-ally, one argument, 

viz., by the establishing the existence of Happiness, &c. 
Now he states another argument in respect of that" same 
proposition] . 



Cognition is evidence of Aph. 52. There is no Cognition of 
the n on -existent, such as a man s 

horn ; [so that not only is the existence of pleasure, &c., 
proved by the reasoning (under Aph. 27), it is proved also by 
mere consciousness. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely 
nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for 
because there is no cognizing of a man s horn, and the 
like/ which have no existence at all. " But then, (interposes 
the Naiyayika,) if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be 
absolutely real ; and then, in the expression not absolutely 
debarred ( in Aph. 26 ), the word c absolutely is (super 
fluous, and hence) unmeaning. To this he replies"] . 
s 



130 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. V. 



The QvaWes, Sfc., not ab> A P^- 53. It is not of the real [that 
soUtely real. there is here cognizance], because ex 

clusion is seen [of the Qualities, " for we see that they are 
excluded ( and not admitted to exist ) at the time of des 
truction (of the mundane system), &c. 77 " But then, even on 
that showing (interposes the Vedantin, jumping at the admis 
sion ) } ] e t the world be different both from real/ and 
unreal/ in that case also the denial (in Aph. 26) of its being 
absolutely unreal is quite justifiable/ 7 and, moreover, in strict 
accordance with Yedantic doctrine. To this he replies] . 



A Vedantlc advance re- A ph. 54. It is not of what Cannot 

kg [intelligibly] expressed [that there 
is cognizance] because there exists no such thing ; [ " and 
there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such a thing 
as is not to be expressed as either existing 7 or not existing / 
because there exists no such thing/ i. e., because nothing 
is known other than what exists or what does not exist : 
such is the meaning. The import is, because it is proper to 
form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen. 77 
" But what then ! on that showing, do you really approve 
of (the Nyaya notion of) ( cognizing otherwise 7 ( or our 
fancying that nature to belong to one which belongs to an 
other) ? He replies Nay 77 ] . 



Aph. 55. There is no such thino- 

A Nydya vieiv rejected. . . . 

as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing 

that as belonging to one which belongs to another], because 
your proposition is self-destructive. [" The meaning is, that 
this also is not proper to be said, viz., that one thing appears 
under the character of another thing ( e. g., a rope under 
the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken in 
the dusk), l because your proposition is self-destructive. 7 Of 



Qualities not absolutely real. 131 

another nature (e. g., snakehood), in a different thing (e. g., 
a rope), equivalence to a man s horn is (what is virtually) ex 
pressed by the word otherwise ( than the truth, both a 
mail s horn and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken 
for a snake being alike otherwise than real) j and (yet) its 
cognition (thus) otherwise is asserted ( as if that could be 
cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized ) ! 
Hence your proposition is self- destructive ; for even those 
who contend for cognizing otherwise (as one mode of cogni 
tion) declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impos 
sible." Now, " expounding what he had said above, (in Aph. 
26), not absolutely debarred/ he sums up his doctrine/ ] 

^^r^ifMrereiwr 11 ^ 11 

Aph. 56. They [the Qualities are 
cognized rightly and wrongly, through 

their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise. 
" There is non-denial as far as regards their existing at all, 
because all things ( and things are made up of the Quali 
ties ) are eternal ; but there is denial relatively, in Soul, 
of all things, just as is the case with the redness, &c., in 
webs, &c.," which may have no redness without its following 
that redness altogether and everywhere is nonexistent. " This 
investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, 
having incidentally presented itself in this connection, is set 
forth at the end of it"]. 



The Yoga theory of speech ^ph. 57. A WOI d does not consist 

rejected. o f [ w hat the Yogas call] the " ex- 

presser" (sphofaj, by reason both of cognizance [ which 
would disprove the existence of such imaginary thing ], and 
non-cognizance [ which would in like manner disprove it. 
" It is held by the Yogas that there exists, in distinction from 
the several letters, an indivisible unit, the word, such as 
jar, &c., (which they call) the ( expression ; just as there 
is ajar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else 
a 2 



152 The Sdnkkya Aphorisms. Book V. 

than the parts, the body, neck, &c. ; and that particular 
sound, termed a word, is called the expresser/ because of its 
making apparent the meaning : such a word ( we Sdnkhyas 
assert in opposition to the Yogas ) is without evidence (of 
its existence). Why? by reason both of cognizance and of 
non-cognizance ( as thus) ; Pray is that word (which you 
choose to call the ( expression 7 ) cognized or not? On the 
former alternative, what need of that idle thing ( the sup 
posed, expression ? For) by what collection of letters, 
distinguished by a particular succession, this ( expression ) 
is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. 
But on the latter alternative (viz., that it is not cognized), the 
power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to 
an expression, which is not cognized. Therefore the hypo 
thesis of an expressed is useless/ " The eternity of the 
Yedas was contradicted before ( under Aph. 45 ) : now 
he contradicts also the eternity of letters. ] 



The eternity of letters A P h - 58. Sound is not eternal, be- 
<* enied - cause we perceive it to be made : [so 

" it is not proper to say (as the Mimdnsakas say) that letters 
are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e. g., that 
This is that same G ; for they are proved to be non-eternal, 
by the cognition, e. g., that (the sound of) G has been pro 
duced : such is the meaning. And the recognition has refer 
ence to the liomogeneousness with that (one which had been 
previously heard) : for, otherwise, it would turn out that a 
jar, and the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognised"]. 

He ponders a doubt. 



Aph. 59. [But then, someone may 
A douht. 

say,] there is [in the case of sounds] 

the manifestation of something whose existence was previously 
settled, as [the manifestation] of a [pre-existent] jar by a 



Sound not eternal. 1 33 

lamp ; [and so " of Sound,, whose existence was previously 
a fact, the manifestation through noise, &c., that alone is 
the object in the cognition of its production ( which you 
speak of in Aph. 58). He repels this"]. 



Aph. 60. If the dogma of pro- 

The doubt disposed of. . r . 

ducts being real [is accepted by youj, 

then this is a proving of the already proved, [ for " if you 
say that manifestation means the taking of a present condi 
tion by means of rejecting an un-arrived (or future) condition, 
then this is our dogma of the reality of products ( B. I., 
113); and such an eternity belongs to all products ( not 
specially to Sound ), so that you are proving the already 
proved (or conceded) ; such is the meaning. And if, mani 
festation is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition 
of what is presently real, then we should find (on your 
theory ) that jars, &c., also are eternal ; because it would be 
proper (on that theory ) that the object in the perception 
of production, by the operation of the causes ( the potter, 
& c> ^ should be that of knowledge only/ and just as the 
jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it, so the jar must be 
only shown by the potter. Now " an objection, not previously 
mentioned, is to be adduced ; therefore the refutation of the 
non-duality of Soul is recommenced" having been already 
handled under B. I., 149]. 



Non-dual^ of Soul de- ^h. 61. Non- duality of Soul is 
nied on grounds of Inference. no ^ for its distinctions are cognised 
through signs, [ " by the sign that one quits Nature (or 
escapes from the mundane condition), while another does not 
quit it, &c." " But in regard to the non-distinction, between 
Soul and not- Soul, asserted in the texts All this is Soul only/ 
All this is Brahm only/ he tells us how there is even sense- 
evidence destructive of this" allegation that there is no duality 
.at all]. 



134 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. 



1 1 

yon-duality denied on Apli. 62. Moreover, there is not 
[non-difference of Soul] from not- Soul, 

because this is disproved by sense-evidence, [ " because, if 
Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also 
not be different from a jar and a web, since the jar, e. g., 
would not be other than the web which (by hypothesis) is not 
other than the Soul : and this is excluded by sense- evidence, 
which constrains us to apprehend a distinction" between a 
jar and a web] . 



A ph. 63. Not between both f 

The reasons combined. 

Soul and not-Soul, is there non- 

difference], for that same [couple of reasons given in Aphs. 
61 and 62. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such 
texts as, All this is Soul alone ? To this he replies"] . 

H 8 II 



Apli. 64. There it is for the sake 

Scripture accommodates it 

self to human frailty of un- of something else, in respect of the 

deratandina. -.. ... r . . , . 

undiscriminating, |_ 1. G., the obser 

vation is (designed to be) provocative of meditation. For in 
the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and 
the embodied, the experienced and the experience!*, are re 
garded as indifferent/ and Scripture humours the worldling s 
delusion, with a view to eventually getting him out of it. 
" He declares that, according to the asserters of (there being 
nothing existent but) a Single Soul, there could be no material 
cause of the world"]. 



I *fd n 

A ph. 65. Neither Soul, nor Ignaor- 

The Veddnta, system sup- 

plies no material, for the ance, nor both, can be the material 

cause of the world, because of the 

solitariness [of Soul. For <{ the soul alone, or Ignorance 



Nan-duality denied. 135 

lodged in the soul, or both together like a pair of jar-halves 
(conjoined in the formation of a jar) , cannot be the material 
of the world, because of the solitariness of the soul. For 
thing s undergo alteration only through that particular con 
junction which is called association / hence the (ever) soli 
tary soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot 
serve as a material cause : nor can it do so by means of 
(association with) Ignorance either, because the conjunction 
of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitari 
ness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material 
is impossible, even as it is that either severally should be the 
material, just c because of the solitariness ; such is the mean 
ing. And if you choose that Ignorance shall subsist as a sub 
stance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there 
is an abandonment of the non-duality" which you Vedantins 
contend for. " He himself (at B. I., 145) decided that the 
soul consists of light (or knowledge) . In regard to this he 
repels the prima facie view, founded on the text Brahm is 
reality, knowledge, and joy/ that the essence of the soul 
is joy also"]. 



Soul not joy and know- ^ph. 66. The two natures, joy and 
ledge both. knowledge, do not belong to one, 

because the two are different, [ " a single subject has not 
the nature both of joy and of intelligence, because, since 
pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, 
pleasure and knowledge are different." " But then, in that 
case, what becomes of the text, that it (Soul) consists of joy ? 
To this he replies"] . 

^ftfWIWr: H fS i| 

A Veddnta term explained Aph. 67. Metaphorical [is the word 
joy, in the sense] of the cessation of 

pain, [ for "the word joy/ in the scriptural expression 
which means really the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. 
This is stated in the maxim Pleasure is the departure of both 



136 The Sdnhhya Aphorisms. Book V. 

pain and pleasure/ y And " he states the cause of this meta 
phorical employment"] . 

ii c ii 



Why the term was used in Aph. 68. It is [as] a laudation of 
a sense not literal. emancipation, for the sake of the dull, 

[that the scripture lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation, 
consisting in the cessation of pain, which (cessation) is the 
essence of the soul ;" for the soul is such joy as consists in 
the absence of pain. Next, " in order to justify perfectly the 
demonstration already given ( in B. III., 14, 15, &c. ) of 
the internal organ, he repels the prima facie view that the 
Mind is all-pervading"] . 



The Mind not att-penad- A P ]l - 69. The Mind ["meaning 
in 9- the totality of the internal instru 

ments," ] is not all-pervading, for it is an instrument, 
[" as a saw, or the like, is,"] and because it is moreover 
an organ. 



Aph. 70. [The Mind is not all- 
ProofoftJiis. z ,. L . 

pervading], for it is moveable, since 

there is scripture regarding the motion ; [ " that is to say, 
since, inasmuch as there is scripture regarding the going of the 
Soul ( which, being all-pervading, cannot go ) into another 
world, it is settled that it is its adjunct, the internal organ, 
that is moveable, and so it cannot be all-pervading. u In 
order to prove that it is a product, he repels also the opinion 
that the Mind is without parts"] . 

?reimif}3qrijl ^ il 

Aph. 71. Like a iar, it [the Mind] 
The Mind has parts. . L 

is not without parts, because it comes 

in contact therewith [i. e., with several Senses simultaneously. 
" The word therewith refers to organ, which occurs in a 
preceding aphorism (69). The Mind is not without parts, 



The mind not all-pervading. 137 

because it comes in contact simultaneously with several sense- 
organs ; but, like a jar, it is of medium size ( neither infinite 
nor atomic ), and consists of parts. " "And it is to be 
understood that the internal organ when in the state of a 
cause (and not modified and expanded, e. g., into knowledge, 
which is its product ) is indeed atomic."] 



Apli. 72. Everything except Na 

Eternity belongs to what. 

ture and boul is uneternal. 

^ wrawi wi*r 

Soul and Nature not made A P^- 73. No parts [from the pre- 
up of parts. sence of which in the discerptible one 

might infer destructibility] are found in the Experiencer, for 
there is scripture for its being without parts, [" for there are 
such texts as without parts, motionless, quiescent, unobjec 
tionable, passionless/ " It has been stated that Emancipa 
tion is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, 
he repels the opinions of others in regard to Emancipation - ] . 



A view of Emancipation ^pli. 74. Emancipation is not a 
disputed. development of joy, because there are 

TLO properties [in Soul." in the shape of joy"]. 



Aph. 75. Nor, in like manner, is 

Second view disputed. . . 

it the excision ot special qualities 
[" because there are no properties" in Soul] . 



Apli. 76. Nor [is Emancipation] 

A third vietv disputed. . 

any particular going ot that [boui 

" to the world of Brahma,"] which is motionless [and there 
fore does not go] . 



138 The Stiiikhya A^nn-isnif. Book V. 



u 

Apli. 77. Nor is it [Emancipation] 
A fourth mew disputed. . 

the removal ot the influence ot [in 

tellectual] forms, because there is the objection that this 
would be momentary, &c. [For, " the opinion of the Nihilist, 
that the Soul consists of momentary knowledge, that Bondage 
is the modifying thereof by objects, and that emancipation is 
the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory, is 
inadmissible, because through the fault of momentariness, &c., 
such emancipation (as merely momentary like all else,) is not 
the Soul s aim."] 



Apli. 78. Nor is it [Emancipation] 

A fifth view disputed. L 

destruction of all, tor this has among 

other things the fault of not being the Soul s aim: ["the 
entire destruction also of the Soul, which consists of know 
ledge, is not emancipation, because, among other reasons, 
we do not see in the world that the annihilation of the soul 
is the soul s aim"] . 



Aph. 79. So too the Void f "the 

A sixth view disputed. 

annihilation of the whole universe 

consisting of cognition and the cognizible, is thus also not 
emancipation, because Soul s aim is not effected by Soul s 
annihilation"] . 



80. And conjunctions termi- 

A seventh view disputed. 

nate in separations, therefore it is not 

the acquisition of lands, &c., [that is Emancipation ; for, " from 
its perishability, possessorship is not emancipation"] . 



Wrong views of Emancipation. 139 



Apli. 81. Nor is it [Emancipa- 

An eighth view disputed. , _ . . . 

tion] conjunction of the Part with the 

Whole ; [ Emancipation is not absorption of the part/ i. e., 
the Soul, into the Whole/ i. e., that of which it is (on the 
view in question) a part, viz., the Supreme Soul, for the 
reason assigned (in Apli. 80) viz., conjunctions terminate 
is separation/ and because we do not admit a Lord, (B. I. 92), 
and because thus self-dissolution is not Soul s aim"] . 



Apli. 82. Nor is it [Emancipation] 

A ninth view disputed. . . -11 

moreover conjunction with the power 

of becoming as small as an atom, &c., since, like other con 
junctions, the cessation of this must necessarily take place. 



Apli. 83. Nor, just as in that case 

A tenth view disputed. 

[of other superhuman powers, such 

as assuming atomic bulk,] is it [Emancipation] moreover con 
junction with the rank of Indra, &c., [" by reason of perish- 
ableness," of this as well as the others. He next " repels 
the objection of an opponent to what has been stated (under 
B. I., 61), that the Organs are products of Self-conscious 
ness"] . 

^ II 



Apli. 84. The Organs are not form- 

Tlie organs whence. 

ed of the Elements [as the Naiyayikas 

assert], because there is scripture for their being derived from 
self-consciousness. \_" Holding to the opinion that Power, &c., 
also are principles, he repels the determination of categories 
[insisted upon by] his [various sects of] opponents, and the 
notion that Emancipation comes through a mere knowledge 
of these" categories.] 
T 2 



140 The SdnJfhya Aphorisms. Bool: V. 



* of the r. Aph. 85 - The rule of six categories 

seshika objected to. ^ not ^ correct one ] f nor Joes 

Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the 
Vais eshikas maintain] . 



Aph. 86. So too is it in the case 

And those of the Nydya,$c. , 

ot the bixteen, [categories of the 
Nydya\, &c. 

ipg^isifn ffiBirpia^ \\w\\ 

Tfo eternity o/ ^ow Aph. 87. [The five Elements being 
scriptural. products, as declared in B. I., Aph. 

61,] Atoms are not eternal [as alleged in the Nydya], for there 
is scripture for their being products ; [and although that text 
of scripture is not now seen by us, because it has disappeared 
in the lapse of time, &c., yet it is to be inferred from the 
words of the doctors, and from the statement of Manu" in 
Ch. I. v. 27. " But then, how can an Atom, which is without 
parts, be a product ? To this he replies"] . 

ras n 

The scripture decisive of p. . Since it is a product, it 

the question. j s no ^ without parts, [" that is to 

say, since the fact, established by scripture, of their being 
products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the (so-called) 
Atoms of Earth, &c., are not without parts." "He repels the 
objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognizance of Nature or 
Soul is impossible because (forsooth) the cause of a thing s 
being directly cognizible is colour"] . 



Aph. 89. There is no necessity 

that direct cognition should have 

colour as its cause : [" it is no rule that to be directly cogni- 



Dimension and gc.nus. 141 

zable should result from colour only ( or other object of 
sense ) as the cause, because direct cognition may result 
from Merit, &c., also/ e. g., mystical practices, and so forth. 
" Well, if that be the case, pray, is the dimension of an Atom 
(on the consideration of which the Naiyayikas rear certain 
speculations) a reality or not? With reference to this he 
decides the question of dimension" as follows] . 



I c*o II 

Aph. 90. There are not four varieties 

Dimension of what kinds. , , , , -, 

of dimension, because those can be 

accounted for by two : [" there are not four kinds of dimen 
sion, viz., small, great, long, and short, but there are only 
two sorts, ( because those can be accounted for by two/ 
that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by 
merely two, the atomic (or positively small) and the great ; 
such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely 
subordinate kinds of the dimension called great, else we 
should have, e. g., no end of dimensions in the shape of the 
crooked, &c." " He rebuts the Nihilist s denial of genera/ 
as follows] . 



ii ^ ii 

proved ly recogni- A P h - 91 .-Though i/u*^ [indm- 

tion. duals] be un-eternal, recognition, as 

being associated with constancy, is of the genus. 



II d^ II 

Aph. 92. Therefore it [genus] is 

And not to le denied. . r , ,. 

not to be denied. f " But then, (it 

may be said,) recognition is to be accounted for simply by 
a iwnexistence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not 
the thing (recognized), and let this be what is meant by the 
word genus : to this he replies"] . 



142 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. 



Apli. 93. It [genus] does not con- 

Genns positive, not negative. , , . 

sist in tlie exclusion of something else, 

because it is cognized as an entity; [" because This is that 
same is the cognition of something positive ; for otherwise 
the only thing cognized would be This is not a non-jar/ 
" But still, recognition may be caused by likeness : To this 
he replies/ ] 



Likeness not a distinct -Apli. 94. Likeness is not a sepa- 
prmciple. ra ^ e p r i nc ipi e ^ f or j(j j s directly appre 

hended [as one manifestation of Community/ " Likeness 
is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.," the 
likeness of a fair face to the moon, e. g., consisting in the 
sameness of the pleasureable feeling, &c., occasioned by the 
sight of either. " The conjecture let likeness be just a pecu 
liar power, and not (a modified aspect of) Community, he 
repels."] 



Apli. 95. Nor is it [likeness] a 
Nor a peculiar power. 

manifestation of something s own 

power, because the apprehension of it is different [" from the 
apprehension of a power : for the cognition of a power is 
not dependent on the cognition of another thing ; the cogni 
tion of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cogni 
tion of a correlative, as is the case with the cognition of a non- 
existence, so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous." 
"But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be 
merely that they have (all alike) the name, e. g., of jar : to 
this he replies."] 



Likeness discussed. 143 



Nor the relation between ^pU. 96. Nor moreover is it [like- 

names and things. ness] the connection between name 

and named, [" because he who does not even know the con 
nection between a name and the thing named, may yet cognize 
a likeness" e. g., between two jars.] 

sj ^^(JptWllftBW II <^> II 

Aph. 97. That connection [be- 

How it cannot le so. -n 

tween name and named J is not eter 

nal, since both [the correlatives] are uneternal, [ " how then 
should there be, through that, the likeness of a departed thing 
in a thing present ?" " But then, though the correlatives 
be uneternal, let t the relation be eternal, what is to hinder 
? to this he replies."] 



Another suggestion repell- p. 98. The Connection is not ^ SO 

ed > [ not eternal ], for this reason, viz., 

because this is excluded by the evidence which acquaints us 
with the thing ; [i. e., the supposition is inconsistent with the 
definition of the term. For " Connection exists only where 
disjunction is incidentally possible, because otherwise there 
is no room for the supposition of connection, the case being 
accounted for, just by the natural state of the matter. And 
this incidental disjunction is impossible if connection be eter 
nal ; therefore connection is not eternal." "But on this 
showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal (connec 
tion called) Co-inherence between those two eternals a Quality 
and thing qualified," which Co-inherence, or intimate relation, 
is one of the categories of the Nyaya. To this he replies.] 



n < u 

The Category of intimate <dph. 99. There is so such thing as 
Relation rejected. Co-inherence, [such as the Naiyayikas 



144 The Sdnkhya Aphori-sms. Book V. 

insist upon,] for there is no evidence of it. [" But then, (it 
may be said,) the evidence of it is the perception that some 
thing is qualified (or conjoined with a quality which inheres 
in it), and the unaccountableness otherwise of the cognition 
of something as qualified. To this he replies."] 



i n \** n 

Aph. 100. Neither perception nor 
This argued. * r 

inference |_is evidence for the existence 

of Co-inherence], since, as regards both alike, ["i. e., the 
perception of qualifiedness and the inferring of it/ ] the case 
is otherwise disposed of, [" viz., just by the natural state (of 
the thing and its qualities), so neither of the two ( percep 
tion and inference ) is evidence for (the imaginary category 
called) Co-inherence." " It is a tenet that from the agitation 
of Nature the conjunction of Nature and Soul takes place, 
and thence results creation. In regard to that there is this 
objection of the atheists, that, Nothing whatever possesses 
the action called agitation ; everything is momentary ; where 
it arises even there it perishes; therefore there is no motion 
inferrible from conjunction (of anything) with another place, 
(the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground, 
not being that fruit no longer existent which appeared to 
drop from the tree)/ To this he replies."] 



Motion is matter of per- Aph. 101. Motion is not a matter 
O f inference, for he who stands near 
has direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to. 

[" In Book Second the different opinions merely were men 
tioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth, 
but no particular one was settled. In regard to this ques 
tion he denies the view of an opponent."] 



Subtile and Gross body. 145 

ltK ^raRflfn^n^I IFr 11^ ^ II 

Aph. 102. The Body does not 

The Body is of earth only. 

consist of five elements,, because many 

[heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material, [ and 
the Sdnkhya opinion is that, whilst there is but one material, 
the material of every Body is earth] . 

fi fam % 



There is a Sultile as well l> 103. It [the Body] is not 

as a Gross Body. necessarily the Gross one, for there 

is also the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one. 

\_" Senses, ( the organ of vision, for example, ) distinct 
from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order 
to demonstrate this point, he refutes the opinion that the 
senses reveal what they do not reach to."] 



Connection between sense . 104. The senses do not reveal 

and object. what they do not reach to, because 

of their not reaching, or because [else] they might reach 
everything ; [ " for we do not see that lamps, or the like, 
reveal what they do not reach to ; and because, if they were 
to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them 
revealing all things, those walled off, and the like. There 
fore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake 
of connection with the distant sun, &c. : such is the import. 
And the instruments reveal the objects just by delivering the 
object to the soul, for they are themselves unintelligent, as 
a mirror reveals the face ; or, in other words, their revealing 
an object is just their taking up an image of the object." 
" He repels the conjecture but then, in that case, the opinion 
(of the Naiyayika) that the sight is luminous is quite right, 
for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance in the form 
of rays."] 



146 The Sdnkhya Aphonvm*. Book V. 



The Sight not formed of A P^> 1 05. Not because Light glides 
[ and the Sight does so too ] is the 
Sight luminous [or formed of Light] because the thing is 
accounted for by [the theory of] modifications [to be now 
explained. " The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous 
on the ground that light is seen to glide ; Why ? because, 
just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, 
the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modi 
fication : such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without 
having parted from the body, glides out, ever so far, from the 
end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, (and 
thus smells a distant flower,) just so the Sight, though a 
non-luminous substance, without quitting (connection with) 
the body, instantly darts off ( like the protruded feeler of 
a polyp ) to a distant object, such as the sun, by means of 
the species of change called modification." " But what is the 
proof that there is any such modification ? To this he replies"] . 



Aph. 106. By the sign of the dis- 

Proof of Us theory of L . J . 

vision, that it accounts for play of the attained object, the [exist 
ence of the] modification [which could 
alone account for that display] is proved. 

[" He shows us the nature of the modification, to account 
for the going though without parting from the Body."] 



if% 



Aph. 107. The modification is 

Of the theory further. . . 

another principle than a fragment or 

a quality [of the Sight or other sense] , because it is for the 
sake of connection that it glides forth: ["the modification 
is not a fragment of the Sight, or other sense, a part dis 
joined like a spark, nor a quality, e. g., Colour, for this 



Connection between sense and object. 147 

reason, viz., because it is for the sake of connection that it 
glides forth but, whilst being a portion thereof, the modifi 
cation is something else than a fragment or a quality. For if 
there were disruption, connection of the sun, &c., with the 
Sight, would not take place, and if it were a quality, the 
motion called gliding forth, would be unaccountable ;" 
for a quality cannot move by itself. " But if thus the modi 
fications are substances, how is the term modification applied 
to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c. ? To 
this he replies"] . 



"Modifications" may le ^ph. 108, It [the term < modifica- 

qualities as well as substances. fcion ] i s no t confined to Substances, 



because it is etymological [ not technical, and applies ety- 
mologically to a quality as well. " Since it is also stated in 
scripture that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, 
the doubt may occur whether the texts are perhaps to be 
applied distributively according to the difference of particular 
worlds. In regard to this he says"] . 



The materials of the or- l. 109. Not though there be a 

gans everywhere the same. difference of locality, is there a differ 
ence in the material [of which the organs are formed] ; the 
rule is as with the like of us : ["not through difference of 
place, as the world of Brahma and the like, is it also the fact 
that the organs have any other material than self-conscious 
ness ; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of 
self-consciousness, as is the case, e. g., with us who live in 
this terrestrial world ; for we hear (in scripture) of only one 
Subtile Body (made up of the organs) transmigrating through 
the different localities." " But then, at that rate, how is the 
text relating to the materiality (of the organs) to be accounted 
for ? To this he replies"] . 
u 2 



148 The Sdnhhya Aphorisms. Book V. 



A non-literal text account- Aph. 110. The mention thereof 
[ of materiality as if belonging to 

the organs, ] is because there is [intended to be made there 
by a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause : 
[ " that is to say, there is designation as the material cause, 
in the case even where the cause is but concomitant, with a 
view to indicating its importance; just as fire is (spoken of 
as arising) from fuel, ( which fuel is a necessary concomitant 
of, though not really the substance of, the fire ) ; hence are 
they (the organs) spoken of as being formed of the Elements. 
For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Ele 
ment, are the Organs, the Sight, &c., formed from the accom 
panying Self-consciousness, capable of existing ; just as fire, 
in reliance on an earthly support, results from the attendant 
Light" or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone] . 



Apli. 111. The heat-born, 
Vaneties of Gross Bodies, 

born, womb-born, vegetable, thought- 

born, and spell-born, such is not an exhaustive division [of 
Gross Body, though a rough and customary one. " It was 
stated before, that Body has only one Element as its mate 
rial. In this same connection he observes discriminatively as 
follows"]. 






T Material of Xotie, 

the material : in consideration [how 

ever] of some speciality, there is the naming as this or that 
[other element than earth, as entering into the constitution 
of some given body,] as in the preceding case [treated under 
Aph. 110, " of the materiality of the Organs"]. 



The Gross Body. 149 



The vital air not the ma- Aph. 113. The vital air is not, [on 
terial of the Body. fa Q a n e g a ti n that it is " the principal 

thing in the Body," to be considered] the constitutor of the 
Body, because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through 
the power of the organs, [and " does not subsist in the 
absence of the organs : therefore, since, in a dead Body, in 
consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence 
of the vital air, the vital air is not the constituent of the Body." 
t( But then, at that rate, since the vital air is not the cause 
of the Body, the Body might come into existence even with 
out the vital air : to this he replies"] . 



Soid essential to a living -dph. 114. The site of experience 
[viz., the Body] is constructed [only] 
through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul], other 
wise should we find putrefaction, [ " and thus, by the several 
operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a 
concomitant cause of the Body, through the sustaining of it." 
" But then, (it may be said) it is only the vital air itself that 
can be the superintended because it is this which operates, 
not the Soul, since it is motionless, and since there is no use 
in the superintendency of what does not operate. To this 
he replies"] . 



The soul" acting ly other s Apli. 115. Through a servant, not 
directly, is superintendence [exer 

cised] by the master, [ and " in the constituting of the 
Body, superintendence/ in the shape of energizing, is not 
( directly/ i. e., immediately, (exercised) by the master/ i. e., 
by Soul, but through its servant, in the shape of the vital 
airs ; just as in the case of a king s building a city." " It 



150 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Boole V. 

was stated befere (B. II. Apli. 1,) that Nature s (exertion) is 
for the emancipation of the already free. In reference to the 
objection of opponents in regard to this, viz., How can the 
soul be eternally free when we see it bound ? with a view 
to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says"] . 



Aph. 116. In Concentration, pro- 
Soul ever free. 

found sleep, and emancipation, it 

[Soul] consists of Brahm : [ but " then what is the difference 
of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To 
this he replies"] . 



Perfect and imperfect Aph. 117. In the case of the two, 

emancipation. ["viz., concentration and profound 

sleep"] it ["the identity with Brahm"] is with a seed, ["i. e., 
associated with some cause of Bondage" or re-appearance in 
the mundane state] : in the case of the other [" i. e., in eman 
cipation,"] this [cause] is absent, [ " this is the distinction." 
" But then, Concentration and profound sleep are evident, 
but what evidence is there of Emancipation ? This objection 
of the atheist he repels"] . 

wifa ^renfi SEHRI 55 ti n \\* n 

The reality of Umancipa- Apli. 118. But there are not the 
iwn two [only, viz., Concentration and 

profound sleep,] because the triad also [emancipation inclu 
sive] is evident, just as are the two. [" The meaning is, that 
since Emancipation also is evident/ i. e., is inferrible, through 
the example of Concentration and profound sleep, there are 
not two, viz., profound sleep and Concentration only, but 
Emancipation also really is. And the argument is thus : 
the quitting of that identity with Brahm which (identity) 
exists during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through 
the force of the faults, Desire, &c., lodged in the mind ; and 



Perfect and imperfect emancipation. 151 

if this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results 
a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c., 
and it is just this that is Emancipation.^ <f But then ( sug 
gests some one, with reference to Aph. 117 ), granting that, 
even notwithstanding the existence of the seed (or source 
of return to the mundane state) called Memory, a mental 
modification after the form of any object does not arise during 
concentration, inasmuch as Memory is (then) dulled (or dead 
ened) by apathy, yet in profound sleep since Memory prevails 
there will really be cognition of objects, consequently it is 
not proper to say that there is identity with Brahm during 
profound sleep. To this he replies."] 



Memory inactive during p. 119. There is not the revela- 

profound sleep. tion ^ by memor ^ o f an ob j ect likewise 

during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [ such as 
sleep ] ; the secondary cause does not debar the principal : 
[ Thus, " as in the case of apathy, so also when there is 
the conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal 
its own objects, does not remind us of its objects. For the 
secondary/ the subordinate, Memory, cannot defeat the more 
potent fault of Sleep : such is the meaning. For the really 
more potent fault makes the memory powerless, incompetent 
to produce its effects :" and so there is nothing in this to 
prevent identification of soul with Brahm during profound sleep 
any more than during apathetic Concentration. " It was 
stated in the Third Book (Aph. 83), that the retention of a 
Body by him who is emancipated while yet living, is in conse 
quence of a mere vestige of impression. To this it is objected 
as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the (alleged 
person) emancipated during life, just as in the case of the 
like of us, (and this experience continuous) even though it 
may be constantly in respect of a single object: now this 



152 Tlie Sdnkkya Aphorisms. Book V. 

is unaccountable (on the hypothesis of his really being eman 
cipated), because the antecedent impression is annihilated 
exactly on its having produced the first (instant of) experience, 
and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as 
knowledge debars it, just as is the case with Merit. To this 
he replies."] 



Apli. 120. A single impression 

An objection met to tJte * 

of emancipation in [suttices to generate and] lasts out the 



oaeyet living. experience ; but there are not differ 

ent impressions one to each [instant of] experience, else 
we should have a postulation of many [ where a single one 
may suffice. " In like manner in the case of the whirling of 
the potter s wheel, the self -continuant principle, called motal 
inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the 
completion of the whirling"] . 



The Vegetable organism A P ]l 121. Knowledge of the exter- 

really a Body. na j j s no ^ indispensable [to constitute 

a Body] ; trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible 
flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [" which have internal con 
sciousness"] are also sites of experiencer and experience, 
just as in the former case, [" the former case meaning the 
putrescence already mentioned of the Bodies of men, &c v 
which takes place in the absence of the superintendence of 
an experiencer (the living soul) . Just in the same way does 
withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c. And 
to this effect there is scripture"] . 



Law a* well a* scripture * ^pli. 122. And from the legal in- 
is authority for this. stitutes [may the same fact be infer 

red that, vegetables have bodies and are conscious. " But 



Different kinds of bodies. 153 

then, from the fact of trees, &c., also being thus conscious, 
we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this 
he replies"] . 



Vegetables not moral A P^ 123. Not merely through a 
agents. Body is there susceptibility of Merit 

and Demerit, for the scripture tells us the distinction, 
[" because we are told in scripture that the liability results 
from the being distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the 
like" [animal Body, not vegetable] . And " showing that the 
liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of 
Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds"] . 



of three principal ^plt-. J 21, Among the three [ i. 
e., among those highest, lowest, and 
intermediate, all living beings, ] there is a threefold distri 
bution, the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the 
Body of both. [" Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the 
pre-eminent sages, a Body of experience to Indra and others, 
and a Body of both to the royal sages. Here the division is 
(not exhaustive, but) into three, because of the pre-eminence 
of these, for otherwise we should have all alike possessed 
of a Body of experience" like Indra. " He mentions also 
a fourth Body."] 



H 

. 125. Not any one of these 
A fourth, kind of Body. . , f ,, , . rc 

moreover is that ol tne apathetic, [tor 

" the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all 
these three ; such as was that of Dattatreya, Jadabharata, 
and others"] . 

x 



154 The SdnTshya AUovisms. Jwolt V. 



Argument acainst the exis- p. 126. - Eternity does not [as 

tence of a Lord. alleged by those who wish to estab 

lish the existence of a Lord] belong to knowledge, &c., even 
in the case of the particular site [ viz., that of the supposed 
Lord ] , just as is the case with fire, [ that is to say, 
just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the 
empyrean fire also is not eternal"] . 



ii 

The argument really ex Aph. 127. And because the site 

alundantid. [ viz., the supposed Lord] is un 

real, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether know 
ledge, &c., may be eternal or not. " But then, at that rate, 
how can it be even conceivable that there should arise Omni 
science, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe, since 
we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers 
( though we do see some ) arising from penance and the 
rest (of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers) ? 
To this he replies"] . 



The height to which asce- Apli. 128. The marvellous effects 
titism may elevate. of concentration, just like the effects 

of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid ; [" that is to say, by 
the example of the wonderful virtues of drugs, &c., the super 
human powers also of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which 
result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of 
creation, &c., are established." And " he refutes him who 
asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements, since this is 
hostile to the establishment of the existence of Soul"] . 

51 }JrllrN USNfil!?: ^<ij$fq ^ ^cEr- 

sfq ^ ii ^i ii 

Argument against Mate- 4$k. 129. Thought does not be- 

rialism long to the Elements, for it is not 



Argument against Materialism. 155 

found in them separately, nor moreover in the state of com 
bination, nor moreover in the state of combination : [ 
"Thought does not exist in the five Elements even when in 
the state of combination, because we do not find Thought in 

O 

them severally at the time of disjunction," and there can be 
nothing in the product which does not pre-exist in the cause] . 



1 56 



BOOK VI. 



[" HAVING explained in four Books all the matter of the 
Institute, and having thoroughly established it by refuting the 
opinions of opponents in the Fifth Book, now in a Sixth 
Book he recapitulates the same matter which is the essence 
of the Institute, while condensing it. For, by making further 
what is called a systematic exposition, the learners acquire an 
undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge. Therefore 
reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault, because the 
method is that of fixing a stake (by repeated blows) ; and 
because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced."] 



Apli. 1. Soul is, for there is no 

The existence of Soul, . g 



aware of this that I think/ ( cogito ergo sum ) because 
there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore all that is to 
be done is to discriminate it" from things in general]. 



Aph. 2. This [soul] is different 

^ ^ ^^ & ^ becauge o 

geneousness [or complete difference between the two]. 



Soul is not Body, $c. ^^ & ^ becauge of hefcero . 



The <** of Un 9 ua 9 e is - 8.-Alao because it [the Soul] 

evidence for this. i s expressed by means of the sixth [or 

possessive] case, [ " for the learned express it by the posses 
sive case in such examples as This my body/ This my 
understanding / for the possessive case would be unaccount 
able if there were absolute non- difference" [between the Body, 



Soul s aim how accomplished. 157 

or the like, and the Soul to which it is thus attributed as a 
possession. "But then, suppose that this also is like the 
expression The Soul s Thought ( Soul and Thought being 
identical), Rahu s head (the irunkless Rahu being all 
head), < The statue s body/ &c. To this he replies"]. 

8 || 

f 



An oljection disposed of. 

the statue, because [" when we say 

the statue s body/ there is a mere fiction," for] there is 
there a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with 
the thing, [sense being the evidence that there is here no 
body other than the statue ; " but in such an expression as 
My Body/ there is no contradiction of the evidence, for the 
contradiction is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul"]. 



Sours aim Tiow accom- Aph. 5. Through the entire sur- 
ph& cease of pain, there is done what was 

to be done; [and if you say, "But then, since there is an 
equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the removal 
of Pain there is cessation of Pleasure also, that cannot be 
Soul s aim :" to this he replies] . 



Pleasure no compensation Apll. 6. Not Such fondllCSS for 

pleasure is there to Soul as there is 

annoyance from Pain, [" and so the aversion to Pain, having 
excluded also the fondness for Pleasure, gives rise to a desire 
for the cessation of Pain simply ; so that there is not an 
equality of gain and loss/ but a clear gain in the desired 
release] . 



Pleasure sparingly dis- -Apli. 7. [" And pain is inultifari- 
pen ous in comparison of pleasure], for 

[only] some one somewhere is happy, [ " among innumerable 



158 The SdnWnja Aphorisms. Book VI. 

grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few, a man, 
a god, or the like, are happy"] . 



Aph. 8. It [Pleasure] also is varie- 
1 Surgit amari aliquid. . 

gated by rain theretore the discri 

minating cast it into the scale of [and reckon it as so much] 
Pain. 

n 



Cessation of suffering is a ^pll. 9. -If you Say that this [ces- 

joy. sation of Pain] is not Soul s aim, in 

asmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not 
as you say, for there are two kinds [of things desired. " For 
we see amongst men quite a distinct aspiration ( the first ) 
May I be happy/ (the second) May I not be miser 
able/ " and the latter is our conception of beatitude] . 



l V H 

Aph. 10. The Soul [ some one 

A doubt. -, -, v , /. 

may suggest ] has no quality, lor 

there is scripture for its being unaccompanied, [and " there 
fore the cessation of Pain (a property which does not belong 
to it) cannot be Soul s aim." " He clears up the doubt"]. 



Aph. 11. Though it [the Pain] be 
the property of something else, yefc 

it exists in it [the Soul] through non- discrimination, [for 
" though the qualities, pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to 
the Mind, they exist, i. e., they abide in the shape of a reflec 
tion, in it, viz., in Soul; through non-discrimination as 
the cause, that is to say, through the conjunction of Nature 
with Soul. And this has been expounded in the First Book." 
Well, " the binding of Soul by the qualities (or fetters) arises 



Non-discrimination from etern ihj . 1 59 

from non-discrimination, bnt from what does non-discrimi 
nation arise ? With reference to this he says"] . 



12. Non- discrimination [of 

Two reasons why non-dis- -..,.. , 

crimination must lave been Soul from Nature] is begmmng-less, 
from eternity. because otherwise two objections would 

present themselves, [ " for, had it a beginning, then if [1] 
it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befal even the . 
liberated ; and if [2] it were produced by Desert, &c., there 
would be a regressus in infinitum, inasmuch as we should have 
to search for another (previous instance of) non-discrimination 
to stand as the cause of that Desert, &c., also." " But then, 
if it be without beginning, it must be endless ; to this he 
replies"] . 



ApJi. 13. It [non-ctiseriminationi 

Non-discrimination, though 

from eternity, may be cut cannot be everlasting [in the same 
manner] as the soul is, else it could 

not be cut short [ as we affirm that it can be. " It is not 
everlasting, indivisible, and beginning-less, in the same way 
as the soul is ; but it is beginning-less in the shape of an 
on-flow (which may be stopped) ; for otherwise the cutting 
short of a beginning-less entity would be unfeasible," though 
the beginning-less antecedent non-entity of a given jar may 
be readily understood to terminate on the production of the 
jar]. 



, , Aph. 14. It [Bondage] is annihi- 

jBondage how destructible. 

lable by the appropriate cause [discri 

mination of Soul from Nature], just as is darkness [annihilable 
by the appropriate cause, viz., Light] . 



ICO The Sdnkhya Aplim-isms. DonJc VI. 



1 1 

Apli. 15. Here also \ viz., in the 
This enforced. 

case of Bondage and Discrimination, 

as in the case of Darkness and Light ] there is adaptation, 
[as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation 
[Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not 
where not] . 



Aph. 16. Since it cannot be fac- 

Jionaage not innate. 

counted for in] any other way, it is non- 

discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, [" which 
cannot be innate." " But then, since liberation also, from its 
being a product, is liable to destruction ; Bondage should take 
place over again : to this he replies"]. 



Apli. 17. Further, Bondage does 

not recur, 

not again attach to the liberated, be 
cause there is scripture for its non-recurrence. 



I ?c II 
> 

Apli. 18. Else it [liberation] would 

Evidence of this. 

not be Soul s aim [ which it is]. 

^iMrqrofa^wT! u v? n 

Apli. 19. What happened to both 

Jborce of the evidence. 

would be alike, [if liberation were 

perishable. " That is to say, there would be no difference 
between the two, the liberated and the bound, because of their 
being alike liable to future bondage ; and therefore such (per 
ishable emancipation) is not SouFs aim," but emancipation 
final and complete. " But then, at that rate, if you acknow 
ledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the 
free, how is it that you have asserted (B. I., Aph. 19) the 
eternal freedom (of all souls alike ?) To this he replies"]. 



Nature o Liberation. 161 



Aph. 20. Liberation is nothing 
other than the removal of the obstacle 

[to the soul s recognition of itself as free. " But then, at 
that rate, since Bondage and Liberation are unreal, Liberation 
must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what 
is Soul s aim" as some positive and real acquisition, not merely 
a removal of a screen. He replies] . 



Apli. 21. Even in that case there 
is no contradiction, [-for " even if 

Liberation consist [only] in the removal of an obstacle, there 
is no contradiction in its being Soul s aim." " But, if Libera 
tion be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be 
accomplished through mere hearing (of the error which stands 
in the way), just as a gold coin on the neck, (which we have 
sought for in vain while it was) withheld from us by ignorance 
(of the fact that it has been tied round our neck with a 
string), is attained (on our being told where it is) : to this 
he replies"] . 

^fwRtf^n^ faw n ^ il 

Aph. 22. This [attainment of Li- 

Anotker objection repelled. , . f , - 

beration on the mere hearing ot the 

truth] is no necessity, for there are three sorts of those com 
petent [to apprehend the truth, but not all are qualified to 
appropriate it on merely hearing it. " Not hearing alone is 
seen to be the cause of knowledge, but there are others also" 
as he proceeds to show] . 



^ I 

utility of other means 6e- Aph. 23.-Of others [-other means 
fides hearing. besides hearing ] for the sake of re 

inforcement, [there is need, as he goes on to show] . 

Y 



1G2 Th9 Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book VI. 



Formality in postures- not A$h- 24. There is no [absolute] 
imperative. necessity that what is steady and [pro 

moting] ease, should be a [particular] posture [ such as any 
of those referred to at B. III., Aph. 34 ; i. e., " there is no 
necessity that a posture should be the lotus-posture/ or the 
like, because whatever is steady and (promotes) ease, is a 
(suitable) posture 7 "] . 



TJie efficient means of Con- <Apll. 25. Mind without an object 

cent> ation - is Meditation, [ that is to say, 

what Internal Organ is void of all modification, that is Medi 
tation/ i. e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the 
modifications of Intellect ; for it will be declared how Medi 
tation effects this" exclusion of the modifications of intellect, 
and the means here assume the name of the result. " But 
then, since Soul is alike whether there be Concentration or 
non-concentration, what have we to do with Concentration ? 
Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up"] . 



The distinction not with- Apli. 26. If you say that even both 

out a difference. wayg there ig nQ difference ^ ifc ig not 

so ; there is a difference through the exclusion [in the one 
case] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other 
case. " But how can there exist a tinge in that which is 
unassociated" with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to 
be ? To this he replies] . 



Soul tinged ly wJiat does ^lll. 27. - Though it [Soul] be im- 

not belong to it. associated, still there is a tingeing 

[reflectionally] through non-discrimination, [for, " though 
there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated (with 
tincture or anything else), still there is as it were a tinge ; 



Meditation. 163 

lience tlie tinge is treated as simply a reflection by those who 
discriminate the tinge" from the Soul which it delusively 
seems to belong to] . 

siTOfzsRihfa %i<rcw fa^fwJFn ii ^ ii 

It, seeming presence ex- 4A 28. As is the Case with the 

P^ned, Hibiscus and the crystal [B. I., 19], 

there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such] . 



: \\\f.\\ 

Apli. 29. [And as for the afore- 

How to le got rid of. . , f 

said tinge] it is .debarred by Medita 
tion, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c. 



The ancient dogma on tUs ? 30. It is by the exclusion of 

P oiltt - dissolution and distraction, say the 

teachers, [ " that is to say, through the removal, by means 
of Meditation, &c., of the Mind s condition of (being dissolved 
in) Sleep, and condition of (waking) Certainty, &c., there 
takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the 
condition; because, on the exclusion of any (real) object, 
there is the exclusion also of its reflection ; so say the ancient 
teachers"] . 



Meditation may take place A P h - 31. There is no rule about 
anywhere. localities, for it is from the tranquillity 

of the Mind [that Meditation, or the like, results ; " there 
fore such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it." " The 
discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to 
the unchangeableness of Soul, he discusses the cause of the 
world"] . 



Nature the material of the A P h - 32. Nature is the primal ma- 
world. terial, for there is scripture [to the 

effect] that the others [" Mind, &c.,"j are products. 
v 2 



164 The Sd,,Hi/a A^lnn-lsms. Book VI. 



Soul not the material of Apll. 33. - Not to Soul does this 

belong, [viz., to be the material of the 

world], though it be eternal, because of its want of suitable 
ness, [for " suitableness to act as material implies the pos 
session of qualities, and the being associable : and by reason 
of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal ( and 
therefore no product ) cannot serve as material." " But 
then, since, from such texts as Many creatures have been 
produced from Soul/ we may gather the fact that Soul is a 
cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought not 
to be accepted : having pondered this, he replies"] . 



The opposite mew ttnscrip- A P Jl - 34. The illogical outcaste 
iural - does not gain [a correct apprehension 

of] Soul, because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to 
scripture, [ for <( the various views, in regard to Soul s 
being a cause, which are conceivable, are all opposed to scrip 
ture; therefore the base illogical holders of these have no 
knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be under 
stood that those also ( e. g., the Naiyayikas ) who assert 
that the Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, 
&c., are quite illogical, these also have no correct knowledge 
of Soul. And if it be asserted that Soul is a cause (of the 
world) just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, &c., 
( and towards which it stands in the relation of a cause in 
so far as without the room afforded by it these could not 
exist ), then we do not object to that, for, what we deny 
is only that there is transformation" of Soul, as material, into 
the world, as product. But, ec since we see, that, in the case 
of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the (material) cause is 
nothing else than earth, &c., how can Nature be the material 
of all? To this he replies"]. 



Nature the Material cause. 165 



Nature the ultimate mate- A P Jl - 35. Though but mediately 

rial came. ^ Q cause o f products] , Nature is 

inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes], 
just as are Atoms [by the Vais eshikas]. 



11 ^ n 

Aph. 36. It [Nature] is all-per- 

Nature all-pervading. 

vading, because its products are seen 

everywhere. ["But then,, only if it be limited, can it be said 
that Wherever a product arises, there does it (Nature) go 
(or act) ;" for what is unlimited, and fills all space, can find 
no other space to move into, " to this he replies."] 



II 

37. Though motion may at- 

An objection parried, . . -. 

tach to it, this does not destroy its 

character as ultimate cause, just as is the case with the 
Atoms [_" the earthy and other Atoms, according to the 
opinion of the Vais eshikas"] . 



n ^c n 

Aph. 38. Nature is something in 

Nature the proper substi- .,,,:,..:, r . 

fate for eight of the substan- addition to the familiarly known [nine 
ces in theNydya list. Substances of the Naiyayikas] : it is 

no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine : 
" and the argument here is the scriptural declaration that eight 
(of the pretended primitive substances) are products" ] . 



Nature consists of the three Aph. 39. Purity, and the others, 
Qualities. are no j. ^ ne properties of it, [viz., Na 

ture], because they are its essence, "because they are what 
constitute Nature"] . 



166 The SdnHi/a Aphorisms. Uuult VI. 



ii 8 ii 

4?*; 40Nature, though it does 
not enjoy [the results of its own ener 

gizing], creates for the sake of Soul, like a cart s carrying 
saffron [for the use of its master. See B. III., 58], 

wrafaan?? ^fstf^aw n %\ ii 

Nature treats each accord- Apli. 41. The diversity of creation 
is in consequence of the diversity of 

Desert. \_" But then, granting that creation is due to Nature, 
yet whence is destruction ? for a contrary couple of results 
cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he replies."] 

^TO^ispqwt ofji^jj II 8^ II 

Contrary results from Na- Apll. 42. The two results are 

through equipoise and the reverse of 

equipoise; [for "Nature is the triad of. Qualities, Purity, 
&c. ; and their reverse of equipoise is their aggregation in 
excess or defect ; the absence of this ( reverse of equipoise ) 
is equipoise ; through these two causes two opposite results, 
in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one arid 
the same." " But then, since it is Nature s nature to create, 
there should be the mundane state even after the (discrimi 
native) knowledge (which is alleged to put an end to it). To 
this he replies"] . 



Nature, ! energy does not <A.ph. 43. - Since [ or when ] the 

emancipated has understood [that he 

never was really otherwise], Nature does not create, just as 
in the world [a minister does not toil when the king s purpose 
has been accomplished. " But then, Nature never rests from 
creating, for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant ; 
and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated 
also Bondage may come again : to this he replies"]. 



Multeity of Soul. 1G7 



8 II 

ApJi. 44. Even though it [Nature") 

reason why Nature . . . . 

invade the emanei- may invade others [with its creative 
pa e influences],, the emancipated experi 

ences not, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause 
[ e. g., n on- discrimination, in the absence of which there 
is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to 
Nature s invasion. " But then, this arrangement could be 
possible then only if there were a multiplicity of souls ; but 
that is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul : 
having pondered this doubt, he says"] . 



Multeity of So*a proved ^h. 45. The multeity of Soul is 
from the Veda. proved by the distribution [announced 

by the Veda itself " in such texts as whoso understand this 
these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow/ y 
11 But then, the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may 
be through the difference of adjunct : to this he replies"] . 



Unity excluded ly the sup- Aph. 46. If [you acknowledge] an 
position of Soul s. adjunct [of Soul], then, on its being 

established, there is duality, [ upsetting the dogma founded 
on in Aph. 44. " But then, the adjuncts, moreover, consist 
of ( Ignorance ( which, according to the Vedanta, is no 
reality ), so that by these there is no detriment to (the 
Vedantic dogma of) non-duality : with reference to this doubt 
he says"]. 



The Vedanta cannot evade ^ph. 47. Even, by the two the 

non-duality. authority is contradicted, [" even by 

acknowledging the two, viz., Soul and Ignorance, a contra- 



108 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Bool: VI. 

diction is constituted to the text (which is alleged as) the 
authority for non-duality"]. 



n. e MM ,, mf , f a. A I h - 48 Tlle P rima facie view [ f 

Teddnta tenet implies a con- the Vedanta] is not [to be allowed 

tradiction, c , . . _ 

any iorce as an objection], because by 

[admitting] two [ viz., Soul and Ignorance ], there is no 
opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature] ; 
and the subsequent [dogma that one single Soul is the only 
reality is not to be allowed], because of the non-existence of 
a proof,"] which proof, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, 
constitute a duality.] 



Self-manifestation contra- Apll. 49. [And] in its [Soul s] 

dictor y- being demonstrated by the light [of 

itself as you Vedantins say it is] , there is the [unreconciled] 
opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contra 
diction. " But then, there is no contradiction here between 
patient and agent, because it (the Soul), through the property 
of light which is lodged in it, can itself furnish the relation 
to itself, just as the Vais eshikas declare, that, through the 
intelligence lodged in it, it is itself an oljcct to itself: to 
this he replies"] . 



Illuminating function of Aph. 50. This (Soul), in the shape 
Soul of Thought, discrepant from the non- 

intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent [which is discrepant 
from Soul. " But then, at this rate, if duality be established 
in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the text 
declaring non-duality ? to this he replies"] . 



The world real. 169 

pSW ?J%f : II *i\ II 

Apli. 51. There is no contradiction 

A salvo for the Vedlc view. 

to scripture [in our view], because 

that [text of scripture which seems to assert absolute non- 
duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have 
desires, [ and who would be the better for believing in " the 
nothingness of the things of time"] . 



The wit, reality irre- ^pli. 52. The world is real, be- 
fragalle. cause it results from an unobjection 

able cause, and because there is [in Scripture] no debarrer 
[of this view of the matter. " We see, in the world, that 
no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the (fancied) yellow 
ness of (invariably white) conch-shells, and the like, inas 
much as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when (not 
normal, but) injured by (i. e., under the injurious influence 
of) Sleep, &c. : and this is not (the state of things) in the 
(waking) Universe in which Mind is the first" according to 
B. I., 71. And "he declares that the Universe is real, not 
merely in its existent state (at any given instant), but also 
always"] . 



Aph. 53. Since it cannot be in 

Creation excluded. 

any other way, manifestation [of what 

ever is manifested] is of what is real [i. e., of what previously 
existed ; for, " since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is 
impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what 
does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really 
existed (previously) in a subtile form." And " though it is 
declared that the being the agent and the being the experi- 
encer belong to diverse subjects, he justifies the distribution 
(of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul), 
by two aphorisms" as follows]. 
z 



170 The Sdnkhya Ap}iori#m8. Book VI. 

C 



Aph. 54. Self-consciousness, not 

The real agent who. 

Soul, is the agent. 



Experience is got rid of Apli. 55. Experience surceases at 
[discrimination of] Soul [as being 

quite distinct from Nature], since it arises from its [Soul s] 
.Desert, [ which is not really Soul s, but which, while non- 
discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul, just as the fruits 
of the acts of a king s ministers are made over to the king. 
And, " he shows the reason for what was stated before, that 
surcease of action does not result from goings to the world 
of Brahma," as follows] . 



Paradise no security Aph. 56. Even in the world of the 

transmigration. 



dane existence], because of there really being a cause [of such 
return, " such a cause, viz., as Non- discrimination, Desert, 
&c. But if you say, " through the counsels of the persons 
dwelling in these various (super-mundane) worlds, there ought 
to be no return (to mundane existence) : to this he replies"] . 



. . , Aph. 57. Not by the counsel of 

J. Ins point enforced. 

[supra-mundane] people is there effec 

tuation [of emancipation], just as in the former case, [ the 
case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors. "But 
at this rate, what becomes of the text that there is no return 
from the world of Brahma ? to this he replies"] . 

qrcHpra ?rf%iT fagfeigfa n 15 n 

A salvo for a scriptural Aph. 58. There is scripture [de 

claratory] of Emancipation [on going 

to the world of Brahma], this [emancipation] being effected 



Salvoes for scriptural texts. 171 

[more readily in that world than in this, but only] by the 
intermediacy [of the appropriate means. And " he justifies 
the text of Soul s going (to the locality where it is to experi 
ence), even though it be all-filling," and can therefore have 
no place into which to move] . 



u 

Apli. 59. And, in accordance with 
the text of its " going," though it 



ace 



[Soul] is all-pervading, yet, through time, it reaches its pl 
of experience [ or body ], through conjunction with an 
adjunct, as in the case of Space ; [for, " as Space, though 
it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular 
place in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct such 
a jar," when we say " the space occupied by the jar is 
moved to the place to which the jar is carried," so is it 
here. And " he expounds, in two aphorisms, the statement 
that the site of experience (the body) is formed through the 
superintendence of the experiencer (Soul) " as follows] . 



no Body s existence de- A l )h 60. This [constitution of a 

pendent on Soul. body] is not accomplished in the case 

of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul], 
because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul 
is absent] . 



Divert not the maTcer of ^ph. 61. If you Say that [inde- 

tlie Body. pendently of any superintendence] it 

is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so,] since 
what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] 
is incompetent thereto, as is the case with [unapplied] water, 



172 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book FJ. 

&c., in respect of a plant. [" That is to say, because it 13 
impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with 
the semen and other (elements of the Body), should operate 
through Soul in the construction of the Body, &c., just as it 
is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through 
the husbandman, in the production of a plant. " " According 
to the theory of the Vais eshikas and others, it is settled that 
Soul is the superintendent (in the construction of the Body) 
in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert ; but he tells us, 
that, in his own doctrine, since Desert, &c., are not pro 
perties of Soul, the Soul cannot through these be the cause 77 
of the Body]. 



Aph. 62. For this is impossible 

Reason for this. 

[ that the Soul should, through its 

Deserts, fyc., be the cause of Body] , because it has no qualities, 
for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-con 
sciousness [ not of Soul. " And so, in our opinion, it is settled 
that the Soul superintends (in the causing of the body) quite 
directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything 
intermediate." " But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the lirnit- 
edness of the living soul, which is set forth in scripture, is 
not a fact. To repel this doubt, he says"] . 



ii ^ n 

Soul Jiow limited and tm- -Aph. 63. The nature of a living 
limited. gou l Belongs t o that which is qualified, 

[ not to Soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct 
and indirect arguments, [ for, " to be a living soul means 
the being possessed of the vital airs, and this is the char 
acter of the soul distinguished by personality, not of pure 
Soul," which is unlimited. " Desiring now to set forth the 
difference between the products of Mind (or the Great Prin 
ciple) and of Self- consciousness, he first states the products 
of Self-consciousness"]. 



27*> real agent. 173 



Aph. 64, The effectuation of works 

The real agent what. . . 01^ 

is dependent on the agent belt-con 

sciousness, not dependent on a Lord [such as is feigned by 
the Vais eshikas] , because there is no proof [of the reality 
of such. And " by this aphorism is set forth, as is also 
established by scripture and the legal institutes, the creative 
and the destructive agency of Brahma and Rudra (respec 
tively), due to their adjunct, Self-consciousness" or personality. 
" But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the 
others, still who is the maker of Self-consciousness ? to 
this he replies"] . 

^liifffNrf ^WJHU. i m 1 1 

ApJi. 65. It is the same as in the 

The real agent ivJience. _ r . , 

arising of Desert, [just as at the 

creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature 
energizing, results solely from the particular time, since, if 
we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we 
should have an infinite regress, just so Self-consciousness 
arises from the time alone as the cause, but there is not 
another maker thereof also ; thus are the two cases alike"] . 



ApJi. 66. The rest is from Mind 

Orthodox recognition of . . . 

Brahmd S iva and Vishnu [the Great Principle. I hat is to say 
put forward. "what is other than the products 

of Self-consciousness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, 
viz., Preservation, &c., results from the Great Principle, be 
cause it, that is to say, inasmuch as it consists of pure 
Goodness, having no Conceit, Passion, &c., is moved solely 
by benevolence towards others. And by this aphorism is 
declared the character as Preserver, of Vishnu, due to the 



1 74 The SdnWiya Aphorisms. I?oo/j VI. 

Great Principle as adjunct" of the soul which, without adjunct, 
would neither create, preserve, nor destroy. See Aph. 64. 
"It has been stated before that the relation of Nature and 
Soul as the experienced and the experiencer is caused by Non- 
discrimination (of the one from the other). Here what is 
Non- discrimination itself caused by ? With reference to this 
doubt he states that all philosophers in common reject the 
objection that we should have an infinite regress on the 
supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination, because this 
(regress) is vnlid" an infinite regress, which is in conformity 
with the truth, being no sound cause of objection] . 



II 

Aph. 67. The relation of possessed 

A theory wntcn may be ac- 

quie*ced in without detriment and possessor also, if attributed [as it 
is by some] to Desert, in the case of 

Nature [and Soul], is beginning-less, as is the relation of seed 
and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of 
alternants] . 



Apli. 68. Or [the case is the same 

A second. 

one of a valid infinite regress,] if it 

[the relation between Nature and Soul] be attributed to Non- 
discrimination [of soul from Nature], as the Panclias ikha 
[holds]. 



Aph. 69. [The case is the samel 
A third. . L 

ifj- as Sanandanacharya does, we attri 

bute it [the relation between Nature and Soul] to the Subtile 
Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends 
Soul even during the periodical annihilations of the world. 
And in conclusion " he sums up the import of the declarations 
.of the Institute"]. 



The Summing up. 175 



Aph. 70. Be that the one way or 
the other, the cutting short thereof 

[ v i Ztj O f the relation between Nature and Soul] is Soul s 
aim, the cutting short thereof is Soul s aim. 



BIBLIOTHECA INDICA: 

A COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS, 

PUBLISHED UNDEE THE STJPEEINTENDENCE OF THE 

ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. 



SANSKRIT WORKS IN PROGRESS, * 



THE OLD SEEIES. 



The LAXITA VISTAEA, or Memoirs of the Life and Doctrines of SAKYA SINHA. 
Edited by Babu KAJENDEALALA MITEA. Already published, Fasciculi I. II. 
III. IV. and V. Nos. 51, 73, 143, 144 and 145. 



The Prakrita Grammar of Kramadis wara. Edited by Babu RAJENDEALALA 
MITEA. 



The TAITTIETA SANHITA of the Black Yajur Vda. Edited by Dr. E. ROEB. 
and E. B. COWELL, M. A. Published, Fasciculi I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. 
IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. and XIX. IS os. 92, 117, 
119, 122, J31, 133, 134, 137, 149, 157, 160, 161, 166, 171, 180, 185, 193, 202 
and 203. 

The TAiTTiEfYA BEAHMANA of the Black Yajur Veda. Edited by Babu 
RAJENDEALALA MITEA. Published, Fasciculi I. II. III. IV< V. VI. VII. VIII. 
IX. X. XL XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. and XX., Nos. 
125, 126, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 175, 176, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192. 
196, 197, 204 and 210. 

An English Translation of the SAHITYA DAEPANA by DE. BALLANTTNE. 



* For a list of the Persian and Arabic works in progress, see No. 130 of the 

Bibliotheca Indica. 



SANSKRIT WORKS PUBLISHED, 

IN THE OLD SERIES. 

Former Reduced 

Price. Price. 
The fu st two Lectures of the Sanhita of the Rig Wda, 

with the Commentary of Madhava Acharya. Edited by 

Dr. E. Roer, Nos. 1 to 4, .. .. ..400 280 

The Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, with tlie Commentary 

of S ankara Acharya, and the Gloss of Ananda Giri. 

Edited by Dr. E. Roer, Nos. 5 to 13, 16 and 18, ..1100 6140 

An English Translation of the above Upanishad and Com 
mentary. Nos. 27, 38 and 135,.- .. ..300 1140 
The Chhandogya Upanishad, with the Commentary of S an 
kara Acharya, and the Gloss of Ananda Giri. Edited by 

Dr. E. Roer, Nos. 14, 15, 17, 20, 23 and 25, ..600 3 12 

An English translation of the Chhandogya Upanishad of 

the Sama Veda, by Babu Rajendralala Mitra. Fasciculi 

I. and II. Nos. 78 and 181, .. .. ..000 140 

The Taittiriya, Aitare"ya and S wetas watara Upanishads with 

Commentary, &c. Nos. 22, 33, and 34, ..300 1140 

The I s a, Kena, Katha, Pras na, Mundaka, and Mandukya 

Upanishads, with Commentary, &c. Edited by Dr. E. 

Roer, Nos. 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 31, .. ., 600 "3120 

The Taittiriya, Aitareya, S wetas watara, Kena, I s a, 

Katha, Pras na, Mundaka and Mandukya Upanishads. 

Translated from the Original Sanskrit, by Dr. E. Roer, 

Nos. 41 and 50, .. .. ".. ..200 140 

Division of the Categories of the Nyaya Philosophy, with 

a Commentary and an English Translation, by Dr. E. 

Roer, Nos. 32 and 35, .. ..200 140 

The Sahitya-Darpana, Toy Viswanatha Kaviraja, edited by 

Dr. E. Roer, Nos. 36, 37, 53, 54 and 55, .. ..500 400 

The Chaitanya Chandrodaya Nataka of Kavikarnapura, Edit 
ed by Babu Rajendralal Mitra, Nos. 47, 48 and 80, . . 300 1 14 
Tho Uttara Na ishadha Charita,* by S ri Harsha, with, 

Narayana s Commentary. Edited by Dr. E. Roer, Nos. 

39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 52, 67, 72, 87, 90, 120, 123 and 124, 12 780 

The Sankhya-Pravachana-Bhashya. Edited by Fitz- 

Edward Hall, A. M. Nos. 94, 97 arid 141, .. ..000 1 14 

The Sarvadars ana Sangraha ; or an Epitome of the dif 
ferent systems of Indian Philosophy. By Madhavacharya, 

Edited by Pandita IVwarachandra Vidyasagara. Nos. 

63 and 142, .. .. 7. ..000 140 

The Surya-siddhanta, with its Commentary the Gudhartha- 

prakas aka. Edited by FitzEdward Hall, A. M. Nos. 

79, 105, 115 and 146, .. .. ..000 280 

The Tale of Vasavadatta, by Subandhu, with its Com 
mentary. Edited by F. E. Hall, A. M. Nos. 116, 130, 

148, .. .. .. -. ..0001 14 

The Elements of Polity, by Kamandaki. Edited by Bbu 

Rajendralala Mitra. Nos. 19 and 179, .. ..000 140 

The Markandeya Purana. Edited by the Rev. K. M. 

Bannenea. Fasciculi I. II. III. IV. V. VI. and VII. 

Nos. 114, 127, 140, 163, 169, 177 and 183,.. .. 000 460 

The VEDANTA SU TBAS. Commenced by DE. ROEE, and 

completed by Pandita Ramanarayana Vidyaratna, Nos. 64, 

89, 172. 174, 178J 184, 186, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200 and 

20L, .. .. .. .. .,000 820 



B Kapila 

133 The Sankhya aphorisms 

K33S34 

1865 





PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE 
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET 

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY