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The price of private prisons

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THE PRICE OF PRIVATE PRISONS
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE US

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ABSTRACT

Almost every year, for the past three decades, the number of private prisons in the United States has grown. These private correctional institutions are advertised as effective ways for the government to cut costs and manage the high incarceration rates in the United States. However, despite these claims, the effectiveness of private prisons has been under increased scrutiny by human rights groups and American citizens. This paper examines whether or not private prisons are effective at reducing crime. My statistical analysis suggests that private prisons are actually ineffective at rehabilitating prisoners. These results question the implementation of private prisons across the United States, because if they are not effectively reforming prisoners or reducing crime, the price of privatization may be too high.

INTRODUCTION

Headlines documenting justice reform and calling for change are becoming familiar. In the fall of 2015, the front page of the New York Times showcased covers ranging from “U.S. to Begin Freeing 6,000 From Prisons,¹” to “A ‘Privatization of the Justice System.’²” Sometimes the front page documented social change, describing something like, “Police Leaders Join Call to Cut Prison Rosters,³” and others times the cover offered something like, “A New Look at Sex Offenders and Lockups that Never End.⁴” Even during Pope Francis’ visit to the United States the Times’ headlines read, “Pope Departs After Showing a Deft Touch” underneath a cover photo of the pope shaking hands with prisoners in Philadelphia.⁵ Political candidates for the 2016 presidential race are practically required to take a stance on justice reform and people are becoming more outspoken every day. The debatable outcomes from the “tough on crime” era, accusations of structural discrimination and increased privatization have only fueled skepticism from the American people. The authors of *Prisons in the Americas in the Twentieth Century: A Human Dumping Ground* remind us that the seven basic principles of the American Correction Association (ACA) are humanity, justice, protection, opportunity, knowledge, competence, and accountability;⁶ but recently, there has been a lot of debate over the adherence to these principles. The justice system is under scrutiny and the future of crime policy is uncertain.

One of the most contentious issues lately has been the emergence of private correctional institutions. Correctional institutions, by definition, should correct the behavior of the

¹ C. J. Chivers, "U.S. to Begin Freeing 6,000 From Prisons," *The New York Times*, October 7, 2015,

² Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Michael Corkery, "A 'Privatization of the Justice System,'" *The New York Times*, November 2, 2015,

³ Timothy Williams, "Police Leaders Join Call to Cut Prison Rosters," *The New York Times*, October 21, 2015

⁴ Monica Davey, "A New Look at Sex Offenders and Lockups that Never End," *The New York Times*, October 30, 2015

⁵ Jim Yardley and Laurie Goodstein, "Pope Departs, after Showing a Deft Touch," *The New York Times*, September 29, 2015,

⁶ Jonathan D. Rosen and Marten W. Breinen, *Security in the Americas in the Twenty-First Century : Prisons in the Americas in the Twenty-First Century : A Human Dumping Ground* (n.p.: n.p., 2015)

individuals, and private correctional institutions should be no different. However, private prisons make money when people are in prison, so providing correctional and rehabilitation services is inherently against their interest. The concern is that prisoners from private prisons are more likely to reoffend and return to prison because private prisons have an incentive not to provide strong reentry programs. The question before us is whether or not private prisons are more or less effective than public prisons at reforming prisoners. Through the careful analysis of crime rates, incarceration rates, and private prison data, I have investigated the paradoxical role of private prisons in the United States and examined whether or not they are effective institutions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

An International Incarceration Comparison

In 2014, over 1.5 million people were incarcerated in both federal and state prisons in the United States⁷ and it is becoming common knowledge that the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world. Roy Walmsley's report for the International Centre for Prison Studies showcases the significant disparity between the incarceration rates in the United States and in every other nation.⁸ According to this report, for every 100,000 people in the United States, 716 are incarcerated. This figure, which is based on US Census information from 2011, actually signals a decrease in the United States incarceration rate. In 2009, for example, the number was 743 for every hundred thousand.⁹ Despite the recent decrease, the fact remains that the United States leads the world in per capita incarceration rates by a significant margin, especially compared to other industrialized nations.

⁷ E. Ann Carson, *Prisons in 2014* (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 2015)

⁸ Roy Walmsley, *World Prison Population List* (London: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2013)

⁹ Roy Walmsley, *World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition)* (London: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2013)

Walmsely's report explains that almost half of the world's prisoners are housed in the United States, Russia and China. No countries, except for the Seychelles (709) and St. Kitts (714), come close to the per-capita prison population rate in the United States.¹⁰ Many theorists have attempted explain why US prisons house so many people. While it is clear that the United States incarcerates far more people per capita than any other industrialized nation, there is a lot of debate over why this happens and whether it is necessary. Many people attribute the mass incarceration to strict public policy. Others cite social causes such as the education gap, the prison-pipeline or recidivism.

In this paper, I will briefly address a few of the theories for high incarceration rates, paying particularly close attention to the reasons why people are staying in US prisons for so long and whether or not the US incarceration system is effective at reforming prisoners. Specifically, this project investigates whether or not private prisons are an effective strategy for the US corrections system.

Over the last few decades, the United States has been one of only eleven countries in the world to engage in prison privatization. In fact, the United States holds more people in private prisons than any other country in the world.¹¹ Around the world, one of the most common uses of private prisons is for the detention of immigrants. In the UK, 73 percent of immigrant detainees are held privately and Australia has instituted a wholly privatized immigrant detention system.¹² There is serious concern worldwide from individuals and human rights groups about the problems with for-profit incarceration systems. Concerns vary from substandard care to

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Cody Mason, *International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization* (Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2013).

¹² *ibid.*

inadequate conditions and the incentive for higher rates of imprisonment in order to maximize profits.¹³

Recent History of US Crime and Policy

As we have discussed, stories about mass incarceration rates and the broken judicial system were very prevalent in 2015. This is, in part, because public opinion on the matter seems to be changing and people are more interested in discussing the problems with the justice system.

The Peter D Hart Research Institute has documented that, since the 1990's, public opinion has become less supportive of strict enforcement and sentencing policies¹⁴. Instead, people are becoming more supportive of reallocating government money toward rehabilitation services, reentry services and programs that target the root of crime.¹⁵ An opinion poll conducted by the Opportunity Agenda, a criminal justice advocacy group based in New York, shows that in particular, people seem to favor rehabilitation and treatment services for those convicted of low-level drug crimes.¹⁶ While opinion polls do not always accurately reflect true public opinion due to potential issues such as survey bias or sampling errors, these results still suggest that the public opinion is shifting.

Despite public dissatisfaction with high incarceration rates, US incarceration numbers have continued to increase over the last few decades. Figure 1 demonstrates the dramatic increase in the total number of people incarcerated and the incarceration rates across the United States. The y-axis on the left and the corresponding black line show the total number of people detained in the US justice system. The y-axis on the right and the dotted line show the


¹³ Lana Nassar, *Human Rights Implications of Private Prisons* (Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Advocates, 2013).

¹⁴ Peter D Research Institute Hart, Inc, *Changing Public Attitudes toward the Criminal Justice System* (n.p.: Open Society Institute, 2002)

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ *An Overview of Public Opinion and Discourse on Criminal Justice Issues* (New York, NY: Opportunity Agenda, 2014),

incarceration rate per 100,00 people. Visually, there is a very clear relationship between these two lines. Not until recently have the incarceration rates begun to plateau.



As pictured in Figure 1, incarceration rates have grown so rapidly that it appears as if there must be an incentive to keep people in prisons because, even as crime rates drop, the incarceration rate has continued to rise. In the wake of sweeping crime policy changes in the 90s, the United States experienced a dramatic decrease in crime.¹⁷ Many people, including the Clinton administration, attributed this drop in crime rates to the changes in public policy. Stevin Levitt, one of the coauthors of *Freakonomics*, and a professor at the University of Chicago, postulates that the decline in crime across the United States is largely due to increases in the number of police, the rising prison population, the waning crack epidemic, and the legalization

¹⁷ Alan J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, *Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2000*

of abortion.¹⁸ He also explains that some of the most commonly cited reasons for the decrease in crime, such as changing demographics, gun control laws, and increased use of the death penalty had little direct role on the decline in crime.

In the past, the costs of maintaining prisons might have been an effective deterrent to high incarceration rates, but in the last few decades, fewer prisons are under state control. While most people would agree that keeping a person in prison limits their ability to commit crimes, this strategy only works as long as that person remains incarcerated. It is costly to keep so many people behind bars, so in theory, it would be in the best financial interest of the government to keep people out of prisons, particularly because the government is not making money by keeping prisoners in prison, it is losing money.

To cut spending, the government has been outsourcing to private, for-profit contractors to help cut costs. Unlike the government, these for-profit firms benefit when inmates stay behind bars. This policy shift has raised some very serious concerns about our justice system. Before we delve into the specific role of private prisons in society, it is important to understand how prisons work and the services that they provide.

Recidivism and Re-Entry Programs

One potential solution to the problem of high incarceration rates would be for prisons to provide quality re-entry services so that people leaving prison are less likely to reoffend. However, the paradox of private prisons is that offering quality reentry services would be against their interest because it would lower incarceration rates.

High recidivism rates are clear cause of mass incarceration in the United States. Once a person is released from his or her sentence, he or she is very likely to re-offend. According to the

¹⁸ Steven D. Levitt, "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 1 (Winter 2004)

US Department of Justice, about two thirds of released prisoners were arrested for a new crime within 3 years, and three quarters were arrested within five years.¹⁹ This is a very sobering statistic, because, in theory, it implies that correctional facilities are not doing an adequate job correcting behavior. This reality impacts a very large number of people, particularly people of color. In 2001, 4.3 million Americans were former prisoners.²⁰

Rather than concluding that prisoners are predisposed to reoffend, there is increasing evidence to support the hypothesis that prisons are failing to support their inmates. Essentially, this hypothesis suggests that the issue is not prisoners who want to reoffend, or people who are inherently criminal; the issue is that prisons themselves are not helping former inmates develop the necessary skills to stay out of prison. The conclusion to this hypothesis is that high recidivism rates indicate that the prisons are failing their mandate as “correctional” facilities.

In an effort to reduce recidivism, prisons are required to provide support to inmates to help with the transition into the free world. All prisons are required to offer at least basic reentry services, even private prisons. These reentry services vary significantly from state to state, prison to prison and inmate to inmate. The most basic re-entry service that prisons offer is education, particularly in youth prisons. There is very strong evidence that there is a causal relationship between education programs and successful reentry into society.²¹ Additionally, the costs of education are usually very small compared to the other costs of incarceration.

Boston University is one of the few universities to offer college courses to inmates. BU holds university courses for both men and women behind bars as an extension of the

¹⁹ Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, and Howard N. Snyder, *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010* (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 2014)

²⁰ Thomas B. Bonczar, *Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001* (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2003)

²¹ Lois M. Davis et al., *Evaluating the Effectiveness of Correctional Education* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2013).

metropolitan college.²² Sadly, these programs are rare, in part because the financial burden often falls on the university. However, programs such as these can be incredibly important. A study by the RAND Corporation concludes that inmates who participate in correctional education programs had 43 percent lower odds of recidivating.²³ Since there is such strong evidence that correctional programs are a very effective way to reduce recidivism, one potential strategy to reduce crime would be to enhance these programs to keep people from return to prison.

It is very well documented that education and success are intimately related and that a poor education greatly increases a person's chances of incarceration. These issues become even more relevant when we examine the education statistics of inmates. In 2004, around 36 percent of the individuals in state prisons had not completed high school. This is almost twice the national average of 19 percent.²⁴ For this reason, weaknesses in the education system are often referred to as the school-to-prison pipeline due to the fact that failing schools are funneling students into prison. However, these inmates do not only lack education in the formal sense, they regularly lack vocational skills or job experience. It follows logically that without an education, and without vocational skills, many of these inmates are primed to reoffend, primarily because without an education it is very hard to find a job and very hard to support oneself.

The quality of re-entry programs appears to be more significant than a person's length of time in prison when it comes to finding employment in the free world. A study done by Jeffrey Kling on behalf of The Brookings Institute, and published in the *American Economic Review* found no consistent evidence of adverse labor market consequences for people who were

²² "Prison Education Program," Boston University, <http://sites.bu.edu/pep/>.

²³ Lois M. Davis et al., *Evaluating the Effectiveness of Correctional Education: A Meta-Analysis of Programs That Provide Education to Incarcerated Adults* (n.p.: Rand, 2013)

²⁴ Ibid.

incarcerated for longer periods of time.²⁵ However, in general, people who have been incarcerated have a much harder time finding employment than those who never spend time behind bars²⁶. The goal of re-entry programs is to attempt to ease this challenge, but the effectiveness of re-entry programs varies significantly. For this reason, many people who call for prison reform have been particularly critical of re-entry programs.

The Emergence of Private Prisons



The emergence of private prisons and for profit correctional facilities has added a new variable to the debate over punitive policy and the role of prisons in society. An article entitled “How for-profit prisons have become the biggest lobby no one is talking about,” published in the Washington Post during the spring of 2015 attempted to expose the private prison industry, claiming that these companies are quietly lobbying the government and making money at the expense of the American people.²⁷ It is certainly true that the prevalence of private prisons has grown significantly in the last few decades, and it is also true that there is not a lot of literature on their lobbying efforts. However, as activists such as Bruce Western, Michelle Alexander and Inimai Chettiar begin to gain more recognition, the issue of prisons, and the broad impact that they have on the community, is becoming very topical.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the dramatic rise in private prisons across the United States and the increased percentage of prisoners that are housed in private institutions. Not only have private prisons grown, but also the percentage of prisoners in private prisons continues to grow as states continue to rely on privatization as an option for criminal justice.

²⁵ Jeffrey R. Kling, "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings," *American Economic Review*, January 2006

²⁶ Shadd Maruna and Russell Immarigeon, *After Crime and Punishment: Pathways to Offender Reintegration* (Portland, OR: Willian Publishing, 2004)

²⁷ Michael Cohen, "How For-Profit Prisons Have Become the Biggest Lobby No One is Talking About," *Washington Post* (Washington DC), April 28, 2015



The services that private prisons offer vary greatly in society. Sometimes, cities or local municipalities contract with private companies to build city jails for people awaiting trial, or just recently arrested. In this case, there is probably not much variation between private and public prisons because the facility itself is a temporary location for prisoners. Perhaps the most common example of privatization in the prison industry has been their use in the detention and transfer of criminal aliens. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency has contracted with the major private prison corporations to build and/or operate many of its transitional facilities.

A primary concern with private prisons is the level of influence that they have in the government. In the last few decades, private prisons have been lobbying in Congress, at the state level and at the local level. Lobbying can include anything from petitioning the government for contracts to supporting tough crime laws in order to maintain high incarceration rates. For example, in a comparative analysis of the UK and the USA, Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn found that the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative public policy

group, has been very active in promoting harsher sentencing and pro-privatization policies.²⁸ This is significant because, as the article tells us, 70 percent of the ALEC is funded by corporate donations, including contributions from the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the largest private corrections company in the United States.

Sometimes contributions from private prisons are direct and sometimes, private prisons companies will funnel money toward lawmakers to indirectly support stricter sentencing or tougher enforcement. One highly publicized example of private prison corruption occurred in Pennsylvania in 2010. This case is sometimes referred to as the “Kids for Cash” scandal because a Judge in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania was found guilty of racketeering and corruption after receiving bribes from a private prison company to sentence juveniles to prison in an affiliated private facility. The amount totaled around \$1 million and the crimes ranged from possession of drug paraphilia to stealing a jar of nutmeg and posting web page spoofs of an assistant principal.²⁹ All of these juveniles received prison sentences and were sent to a private prison owned by the same people who were paying the judge. Stories like this one have raised doubts about private prisons across the United States.

The rise of private prisons seems to have corresponded with the “tough on crime” years. However, now that there is a growing call to reduce the inmate population, their place in the United States is being called into question. Another article in the Washington Post, published in 2014, explains that we have surprisingly little information about the quality and performance of private prisons.³⁰

²⁸ Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, "Comparative Criminal Justice Policy-Making in the United States and the United Kingdom," *British Journal of Criminology* 45, no. 1 (2005)

²⁹ Walter Palvo, "Pennsylvania Judge Gets 'Life Sentence' For Prison Kickback Scheme," *Forbes*, August 12, 2011.

³⁰ Sasha Volokh, "Are Private Prisons Better or Worse than Public Prisons?," *Washington Post* (Washington DC), February 25, 2015

As we evaluate the role of private prisons, one very important consideration is to examine their effectiveness, particularly relating to reentry and recidivism rates. The paradox of private prisons is that they profit when people are incarcerated, but theoretically, correctional facilities are designed to prep inmates for reentry into the free world. Practically, it would be in the best economic interest of a private prison for a person to reoffend because then they would return to prison and the private company would profit. While this makes sense in theory, the question is whether this happens in reality. This consideration leads us to following the question: are recidivism rates higher among inmates that were formally housed in private prisons?

Andrew Spivak of the University of Nevada, and Susan Sharp of the University of Oklahoma published an article in the *Crime & Delinquency* journal that examines this question of post release performance from private prisons. The article explains that the then-existing empirical evidence to answer this question was limited to only four studies, and all of them were done in Florida. Their analysis evaluates private prisons in Oklahoma, and unlike the preceding studies, Spivak and Sharp's findings were significant and suggested that private prison inmates have a greater hazard of recidivism.³¹

Spivak and Sharp obtained their data from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections and used a Cox proportional hazards survival regression analysis to evaluate recidivism. The survival analysis allows for Spivak and Sharp to account for multiple dependent variables and account for hazard in the regression. The findings of this study were unique, because the previous studies had actually found lower recidivism rates among private prison inmates.³² This study, however, demonstrates a significantly greater hazard of re-offense for prisoners in private prisons. Specifically, longer time spent in private prisons indicates an increase in the hazard of recidivism

³¹ Andrew L. Spivak and Susan F. Sharp, "Inmate Recidivism as a Measure of Private Prison Performance," *Crime & Delinquency* 54, no. 3 (July 2008)

³² Ibid.

while longer time spent in public prisons indicates a decrease in the hazard. In the conclusions of their study, Spivak and Sharp caution readers on their interpretation of these findings due to the possibility of many confounding variables. Notably, the demographics of prisoners in private prisons in Oklahoma were younger, had shorter sentences, were more likely to have drug offenses and more likely to be released on probation. All of these factors can complicate the regression results, so in my analysis I was very careful to control for these factors as much as possible.

Since Spivak and Sharp completed their study, a number of articles have been published examining this question in other states. Grant Duwe and Valarie Clark published an article more recently in the *Criminal Justice Review* that examined the post release performance of inmates in Minnesota. Their findings too suggest that the private prisons are not more effective in lowering recidivism rates.³³ Specifically, Duwe and Clark's analysis shows that prisoners from private prisons are associated with a greater risk of recidivism across 20 different regression Cox models. However, the article also explains that evidence on this subject has been mixed and seems to vary depending on the state and the research methods. For Example, Duwe and Clark's analysis directly conflicts with Spivak and Sharp despite the fact that they both attempt to isolate the same causal relationship. With such varying results, and conflicting data, this question clearly requires more research, and the effectiveness of private prisons remains debatable.

OPERATIONALIZATION

Project Design

As we have discussed, there is an inherent paradox in the service that private prisons provide because they are required to offer reentry services to inmates, but the companies profit

³³ Grant Duwe and Valarie Clark, "The Effects of Private Prison Confinement on Offender Recidivism: Evidence from Minnesota," *Criminal Justice Review* 38, no. 3 (2013)

from higher incarceration rates. Therefore, the general hypothesis is that private prisons will be less effective than public prisons. In theory, the data collection and analysis in this project should examine the success of private prisons by comparing the re-offense rates of prisoners from both private and public prisons. Another way to approach the hypothesis might be to examine the crime rates in areas that have private prisons and compare that data against areas without private prisons.

Ideally, this project would focus on the individual successes of people who have been released from private prisons compared to individuals released from state-run prisons. These individuals would be studied as two distinct groups of people: those who had served time in a public prison and those who had served time in a private prison. Once individuals had been categorized accordingly, the data would trace the rate of recidivism in each group over the next few years. After an interval of time, generally five years, each group would have a distinct collective re-offense record. Analysis of this re-offense record would help to measure the success of public versus private prisons. If the data showed that prisoners from private prisons tended to reoffend at higher rates than prisoners from public prisons, the hypothesis would be correct.

In this scenario, certain controls, such as the types of crimes and length of prison sentences would be essential for accurate findings. For example, an effective case study might include individuals from both private and public prisons who had committed violent crimes in the state of Arizona and had served sentences between five and ten years. This data would show whether or not the individuals who had served their sentences in private prisons had higher recidivism rates than their peers who had served time in public prisons. Another option would be to include length of sentences in a private prison as a control. If people who served longer

sentences in private prisons had higher recidivism rates, it might challenge the long-term consequences of a sentence in a private prison versus a public prison.

Unfortunately these data are not available. There has been research on recidivism in the United States, but the data available do not help answer this question. Just recently, in 2015, the US Department of Justice released a recidivism report that traced the criminal history patterns of prisoners released in 30 different US states. This report demonstrates striking results that indicate that the recidivism rate in the first five years after releases from prison has risen to 77 percent in the United States.³⁴ However, the data is mostly general data on recidivism and does not account for the public or private ownership of the correctional facilities so the 2015 study does very little to address this hypothesis.

In the absence of direct data that catalogues the recidivism of prisoners from public and private prisoners, we turn to alternative dependent and independent variables. Rather than focus on individual offenders and individual crimes, we can instead focus on private prisons and overall crime rates. Recall the initial hypothesis that private prisons are less effective at correcting the behavior than public prisons. If this is true, then the crime rates in jurisdictions with private prisons should be comparatively higher. Essentially, higher recidivism rates will also mean higher overall crime rates. Notably, this is a tricky relationship to measure because there are possibly countless confounding variables. Just because a jurisdiction with a private prison has a higher crime rate than a jurisdiction without one does not necessarily implicate the private prison. For this reason, comparing states or counties with private prisons to states or counties without private prisons will not necessarily tell us what we want to know. Instead, it is more effective to compare jurisdictions against themselves. This means examining crime rates in

³⁴ Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, and Howard N. Snyder, *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010* (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 2014).

jurisdictions before they build a private prison and comparing the crime rates after the private prison has been built.

As we have discussed, crime rates have been declining across the United States since the 1980s, so simply because crime rates are lower after the construction of a private prison does not necessarily tell us that private prison are more effective. Year fixed effects can help account for aggregate change across all districts and states, such as cultural or legal changes, that are not necessarily related to the construction and implementation of private prisons.

The final step before collecting actual data on private prisons was to determine what jurisdictional level might be the most effective. Private prisons exist across the country, but their physical location does not always tell us everything about the demographics of their inmates. The choice lies between whether to analyze private prisons and crime rates at the county level or at the state level. Police and law enforcement is usually handled at the city or county level, but prisons are usually administered at the state level. A person may commit a crime in one county and then be incarcerated in a different one, but this person rarely moves across state lines. Therefore, the most effective level of prison analysis is at the state level. The three most notable exceptions to state-level prison administration are the US Marshalls service, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, and a collection of federal prisons. All three of these categories of private prisons were ultimately excluded from the analysis and the rationale behind these exclusions is outlined in the following pages.

Private Prison Data Collection

The first step in data collection was to locate and categorize all of the private prisons in the United States. Because the project analyzes the consequences of private prisons after they have been built, it is also necessary to record the year that each private prison opened or was

privatized. Unfortunately, the justice department does not have a condensed list of US private prisons. Due to the inherently private nature of private prisons, their information is noticeably more restricted than their public counterparts. Therefore, in order to create a complete dataset, the information and statistics used in this project originate from a wide variety of sources.

The data about the private prisons comes primarily from the companies themselves, but sometimes, public records, individual crime enforcement jurisdictions, the Department of Justice and news articles helped to complete the dataset. Over the years, many private prison companies have emerged in the United States; but because they are competitive companies, most of them have merged with one another. The result has been the emergence of a few very large agencies. Today, there are three companies that own and operate the majority of the private prisons in the United States: Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), Management and Training Corporation (MTC) and the GEO Group Inc. CCA, MTC and GEO were founded in 1983, 1981 and 1984³⁵ respectively.

Due to their relative monopoly in the private corrections market, this project focuses specifically on the corrections facilities run by these three corporations. Sometimes, companies retain their original names after a merger but they are under the same management. For example, in 2015 CCA acquired Avalon Correctional Services,³⁶ but despite the acquisition, the Avalon facilities still have their original names. Whenever this was the case, the data for this project categorizes the facility according to its parent corporation.

Each company publishes the locations of every facility they operate on their webpage, but some facilities are not relevant to the analysis of this project. We will discuss which facilities

³⁵ The years that each private prison was founded are all available on the corporate websites: "About CCA," Corrections Corporation of America. "Overview & Mission," Management & Training Corporation. "About Us," The Geo Group Inc., http://www.geogroup.com/about_us.

³⁶ "CCA Announces Acquisition of Avalon Correctional Services, Inc.," *Global Newswire*, October 29, 2015,

were excluded, but initially every facility was added to the dataset. The complete private prison dataset includes the name of the facility, the customer for the facility, the exact location of the prison, the year it opened, the total capacity, the sex of the inmates, the parent corporation and the facilities accreditations. The customer of the facility refers to the jurisdiction that licensed the contract for a private prison. For example, the customer could be The Arizona Department of Corrections, the US Marshall's service or a local municipality.

Whenever this information was available on the corporate website, it was included in the matrix. However, in some cases, not all the necessary information was available for a particular facility. Whenever this was the case, other sources filled holes in the data. The departments of justice for individual states provided a lot of missing information and in other cases the information was more difficult to find. A complete list of the private prisons in the United States is available in Appendix 1. The appendix includes all of the sources consulted in the compilation of the dataset. Whenever an observation originates from somewhere other than the corporate website, it is indicated with a footnote. Many of the facilities were omitted from the statistical analysis and these facilities are shaded in the appendix.

Facilities were omitted from the analysis whenever their services were not directly relevant to this hypothesis. This project focuses on the impact of private prisons on the crime rates at the state level. The most commonly excluded facilities were those contracted by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE). ICE detention facilities deal specifically with immigrant and alien transport. Specifically, ICE "identifies and apprehends removable aliens, detains these individuals when necessary and removes illegal aliens from the United States."³⁷ Prisoners held in ICE facilities rarely reenter the community because they are deported. Since these facilities are transitional holding facilities rather than correctional institutions, they

³⁷ "Enforcement and Removal Operations," US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/ero>.

are not related to this hypothesis, which focuses on the effectiveness of private correctional institutions. In many cases, the private prison corporate website indicated that the facility was under ICE contract. This information was corroborated and supplemented with data from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency itself, which provides the locations of its detention centers on its website.³⁸

Facilities under contract by the US Marshal Service were excluded from the analysis for a similar reason. The US Marshals house and transport prisoners until they are either acquitted or convicted.³⁹ Once convicted, US Marshals prisoners are transferred to a federal prison to serve their sentence. Therefore, US Marshals facilities are very similar to ICE facilities because their primary function is temporary detainment and prisoner transport.

Aside from ICE and US Marshals facilities, city jails, leased facilities, vacant facilities and halfway houses were also omitted from the analysis. A few cities contract with private corrections companies for their city jails, but a city jail is also a temporary holding facility for people either waiting for transfer to another facility or acquittal. Vacant facilities and leased facilities were omitted because they either house no prisoners or are privately owned facilities that are operated by the state. Facilities are only relevant to this analysis if they are operated by private corporations, therefore those private facilities that are still operated by the state or other municipalities are not relevant. Privately run halfway houses were the last group of facilities that were not included because they often house a very small number of clients for a very brief period of time. While their function is directly related to corrections, halfway houses have a different mission than prisons and are generally transitional facilities.

³⁸ "Detention Facility Locator," US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities#wcm-survey-target-id>.

³⁹ "Defendants in Custody and Prisoner Management," US Marshals Service, <http://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/>.

All Corrections Corporation of America facilities were included in the original list of prisons, but the GEO Group and Management and Training Corp have services that are not correctional. Information on these facilities was never recorded for this project. Specifically, GEO divides US facilities into two categories: corrections and community. Correctional facilities have all been recorded, but the GEO-community facilities include mental health, reentry programs, and drug rehabilitation facilities. These facilities were not included in this project because they are largely transitional and the data is much less concrete due to the fast turnover. Both GEO and MTC have an international presence and those facilities are not pertinent to this project. MTC also runs a Job Corps program that provides education and training to young people across the country.⁴⁰ This program is independent of the justice system so it was not incorporated.

Overall, after all the data collection and categorical exclusions of certain types of facilities, only 17 states have relevant private prisons. However, all 50 states have complete data in the dataset and therefore, the dataset is strongly balanced.

Crime Data Collection

After organizing the number of facilities down to a relevant and usable list of observations, the information was merged with state-level crime data. Recall that private prisons have been recorded at the state level, so state-level crime data fits neatly into the analysis. The crime data used in this analysis comes directly from the US Department of Justice. The Department of Justice has created a database of crime statistics that are publically available via the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program.⁴¹ Specifically, the UCR program holds statistics on both violent crimes and property crimes. Violent crime includes murder and non-negligent

⁴⁰ "Job Corps Overview," Management and Training Corporation, <https://www.mtctrains.com/education-training/job-corps-overview>.

⁴¹ "Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics," US Department of Justice, <http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm>.

homicide, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault. Property crime includes burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Arson is notably missing from the list of crime statistics available from the Uniform Crime Reporting program.

The UCR program offers data that is organized either by specific offense, locality or by year. This project includes property crimes and violent crimes. These two crime categories represent the majority of sentences that are served in U.S. private prisons. This analysis does not include crimes related to the possession or distribution of narcotics because data on drug crimes is much more difficult to isolate. In the case that a drug crime leads to a violent crime or property crime, the property or violent crime is reflected in the data.

The relevant crime data is aggregated to the state level and then organized by year with the first observations from 1980 and the most recent available from 2012. For each of the 33 years, crime data is available for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The final matrix includes: the raw number of crimes committed in each state by year, the population of each state, and the crime rates per 100,000 people. Crime rates were measured in three categories: total property crime, total violent crime, and a composite of total crime.

In addition to the information on private prisons and the state-level crime data, the third component of data organization involved the collection of total prison populations in each state from 1980 through 2012. Total prison populations include both public and private prisons and the data comes from annual reports by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.⁴² This same data was reported in a much more accessible format by the Sentencing Project.⁴³ The actual data points in this project come from the Sentencing Project's publication, but I also corroborated the numbers against the Bureau of Justice Statistics to ensure that the data are accurate.

⁴² "Publications & Products: Prisoners." Bureau of Justice Statistics.
<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=40>.

⁴³ "The Sentencing Project Interactive Map," The Sentencing Project, <http://sentencingproject.org/map/map.cfm>.

Each year, the Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes a report that summarizes the number of prisoners in each state and contains demographic information about US prisons. Since private prisons began emerging in the 1980s, and crime statistics for this project were included as far back as 1980, prison demographics were considered as far back as 1980 as well. Information about inmate populations in Washington DC proved very difficult to find because it was neither available from the Bureau of Justice Statistic nor the Sentencing Project. Ultimately, Washington DC was not included in the final analysis but it is worth noting that the District of Columbia has one of the highest incarceration rates in the country.⁴⁴


Data Organization

To merge all of these observations together, the private facilities were organized by state and the total number of private prisons was added to each state observation for each year. For example, Indiana built its first relevant private prison in 1997. For the 1997 Indiana observation, one private prison was recorded with a capacity of 1030. This figure rolls over to 1998 and so on until Indiana adds another private prison in 2005. Now that Indiana has two private prisons, the 2005 observation records 2 private prisons with a collective capacity of 4124. This process was repeated for every state and every private prison. By 2012, 17 total states had at least one private prison that was included in this project. Figure 4 above shows the general distribution of private prisons across the United States using the most current data from 2012.⁴⁵ From a quick glance, it appears that private prisons are mostly concentrated in the southern half of the United States. Notably, Texas has many more private prisons than every other state.

⁴⁴ Robert E. Pierre, "D.C. Is Fourth in Nation in Incarcerating Residents, Report Says," *Washington Post* (Washington, DC), April 17, 2008

⁴⁵ Figure 4 only represents the private prisons that are included in this paper. The actual number of private prisons in each state is much higher when ICE-operated and other excludable facilities are represented.

Figure 4
Distribution of Private Prisons in 2012



In three cases, private prisons relevant to this project are located in one state but house prisoners from a different state. Whenever this was the case, the prison data was recorded under the client state rather than the physical location. This decision was based on the conclusion that prisoners in these prisons commit crimes in their home states and then return to their home state after they serve their sentence. The first example of this scenario is the *Saguaro Correctional Center* in Arizona, which houses prisoners from Hawaii. Presumably, it is much less expensive to house Hawaiian prisoners in Arizona than in Hawaii proper. In 2007, this facility housed the majority of Hawaii's male prison population.⁴⁶ All data from this facility was recorded under the state of Hawaii. The second example is the *Rivers Correctional Institute* in North Carolina, which houses prisoners from Washington DC. The District of Columbia was ultimately excluded from the analysis due to the limited data available, but this prison was initially recorded under the District of Columbia, not North Carolina. The final example is the *North Lake Correctional Facility*, operates under an intergovernmental agreement between the states of Washington and

⁴⁶ Kat Brady, "Using Private Prisons Costs More than It Seems," *Star Advisor* (Honolulu, HI), June 18, 2010.


Vermont to house prisoners in a facility located in Michigan. Due to the overlapping jurisdictions of this facility and the lack of clear data about the exact origin of the inmates, it was excluded from the final analysis.

After all of the raw data was collected, a number of additional variables were added. The incarceration rate was added to the data by dividing the total annual number of prisoners by the estimated population of each state. This equation gives us the proportion of people that are incarcerated in each state, each year. Like Crime Rates, incarceration rates are often expressed per 100,000 people. Multiplying the proportion by 100, instead of 100,000, gives us the percentage of people incarcerated, which is easier to visualize in this analysis. Both the percentage of people incarcerated and the number of people incarcerated per 100,000 will have the same levels of statistical significance, but the results will have different scales. State populations were provided for this variable as a part of the crime statistics from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

The prominence of private prisons was measured by dividing the current capacity of private prisons in each state by the total number of prisoners in each state. In some cases, private prisons have built expansions and changed their capacities since their opening. Whenever this information was available, it was accounted for. Figure 3 from before, which shows us the overall percentage of US prisoners that are housed in private prisons. The overall percentage remains small because many states do not use private prisons at all.

Now that we know the percentage of prisoners that are housed in private prisons, we can see just how much individual states depend on private correctional institutions. Figure 5 shows

the percentage of people housed in private prisons across all 50 states in 2012. Darker shading indicates greater percentages of prisoners housed in private prisons.⁴⁷



It is clear that some states have become more reliant on private prisons to house prisoners than others. Most notably, Minnesota, New Mexico and Hawaii now house more than 50% of their prisoners in private prisons. Maps from the years 1990 and 2010 are included in Appendix 2 for comparison.

The complete data set includes individual observations for all 50 states and the District of Columbia over the course of 33 years. For each state, the population, the crime data, the number of inmates, incarceration rates, the number of private prisons, the size of private prisons, and the percentage of prisoners housed in private prisons are all recorded. As previously mentioned, the District of Columbia is missing the total number of inmates and the corresponding incarceration rates so it was eventually omitted. In total, there are 1716 observations and 36 distinct variables. Appendix 1 includes a list of all the private prisons considered in this project. As noted before,

⁴⁷ The private prison data expressed in all figures and tables refers only to the prisons that were not excluded from the analysis

if a prison was not included in the final analysis, there is a brief justification in Appendix 1 and the excluded prison is shaded darker than the other relevant facilities.

Dependent and Independent Variables Definitions

In this project, the independent variable must measure the influence of private prisons at the state level and the dependent variable should measure their impact on crime. Rather than use the number of private prisons, or the number of people in private prisons, the variable that reflects the prevalence of private prisons most accurately is the percent of prisoners in private prisons. As we have seen in Figure 3, the percentage of prisoners in private prisons across the United States has grown significantly since the 1980s, but still remains fairly small overall.

Defining the dependent variable was a little trickier than the independent variable. As previously mentioned, instead of examining the re-offense rate of prisoners from private prisons and prisoners from public prisons, the best measurable indicator of private prisons' effectiveness is crime rate. Because there are many different types of crimes and not all of them are relevant to private prisons, the relationship between crime rates and private prisons will vary.

Regression Analysis

A regression analysis is the most effective way to examine the relationship between the crime rate and private prisons. In order to determine the proper regression model to use, it is important to understand what kind of data this is. In this case, we are looking at panel data, also known as longitudinal data, or cross sectional time-series data. Panel data observes the behavior of entities over time, and in this case, entities in this panel data are states and the unit of time is measured in years. Through the analysis of panel data, I can observe changes that do not necessarily crossover between states. This is very important for this project because I am interested in the state-level consequences of private prisons.

I model state crime rates as a function of the percentage of each state's prisoners in private prison. To control for factors that are difficult to measure and could impact crime rates, I used state and year fixed effects to help isolate the relationship between private prisons and crime. State fixed effects allow us to examine the impact of the growth of private prisons, controlling for time-invariant differences between states. The year fixed effects allow us to control for other special events over time that affect everyone but are not easy to measure, such as cultural shifts and new laws.

In each regression, I measured the dependent variable in three different ways. The first way considers all 50 states. For many types of analysis, it would be helpful to incorporate all states in the regression, including the ones that do not have private prisons, because the states without private prisons would provide a point of comparison for states with private prisons.

The second regression option only measures crime data in each state after it builds the first private prison. For example, Tennessee's first private prison was built in 1984 so I would only include observations from Tennessee beginning in 1984 and onward. This option is initially appealing because it isolates the years that states have private prisons. However, because I am looking at change over time, it is better to include as many years as possible. For this reason, this regression option is not suited for this analysis.

The third, and best, regression option is a regression analysis that only includes crime data from those states with private prisons, but also includes observations as far back as 1980. This regression can analyze change over time more effectively and, by excluding states that do not have private prisons, there is no risk of deflating the relationship due to the dominance of states with zero percent of their prisoners in private prisons.

During the regression analysis, all three types of regressions were run, but the third regression option consistently provided the strongest results. Therefore, all the regression results that I report only include the 17 states that have private prisons, and date back to 1980.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The different regressions, with different crime statistics as the dependent variable, reveal that there may be a connection between the percentage of prisoners in private prisons and the crime rate. The key to understanding this relationship is to understand which crime statistics are most relevant. The results change significantly depending on which crime rates are used as the dependent variable. Analyzing the types of crimes that are most prevalent in private prisons will help us to fully understand the results. Private prisons tend to house specific types of inmates that have committed certain types of crimes. As we control for the types of crimes that are most commonly reflected in private prisons, the relationship between private prisons and the crime rate gets stronger. Table 1 shows the results of the first four regressions in my analysis:

Table 1: Regression Model Results with State and Year Fixed Effects

	Model One Total Crime Rate	Model Two Property Crime Rate	Model Three Violent Crime Rate	Model Four Violent Crime Rate (Excluding Murder)
% of Prisoners Private Prisons	5.925 (5.064)	3.433 (4.660)	2.492 (0.841)**	2.465 (0.837)**
Constant	5,972.925 (203.660)**	5,469.023 (187.031)**	503.906 (18.404)**	493.896 (18.355)**
R^2	0.71	0.72	0.49	0.48
N	561	561	561	561

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

In Table 1, we see the coefficients and the standard errors for each regression. One asterisks beside the standard error denotes statistical significance to the .05 level and two marks the .01 level. The data suggest that there is no relationship between the percent of prisoners in

private prisons and total crime rate. As previously mentioned, the total crime rate, in this case, is the total number of property crimes and violent crimes committed per 100,000 people. Model one, which uses total crime rate as the dependent variable, hints at the possibility of a positive relationship, but the results are weak and the standard error is very large. The coefficient is positive, which supports the hypothesis, but a 5.92 increase in the total crime rate for each one percentage point increase in prisoners housed private prisons is also very small, especially considering that the constant for the total crime rate is almost 6,000. The results also lack statistical significance. These results mean that, at this point in the analysis, I cannot confidently reject the null hypothesis that private prisons have no relationship to crime rates.

There are many possible explanations to justify why the results of the first regression were insignificant but the most logical reason is that the total crime rate includes a lot of crimes that are not relevant to the success of private prisons. The total crime rate includes property crime ranging from burglary to motor vehicle theft and violent crime ranging from robbery to murder. The consequences for these crimes vary greatly, and not everyone who commits a burglary, for example, serves a sentence in prison. Across the data, property crime rates are, on average, nine or ten times larger than violent crime rates so they represent a large majority of the total crime rate. Additionally, property crime rates are generally seen as less serious than violent crimes and consequently, property crimes offenders spend less time in jail, if they go to jail at all. Another important distinction is that the total crime rate, provided by the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, documents the total number of crimes committed, not the number of arrests made or the types of sentences served. Many property crimes remain unsolved, whereas violent crimes are seen as a higher priority.

A closer look at private prisons in the state of Texas helps to reaffirm that property crimes are probably not linked directly to private prisons. For most states, individual data on the types of sentences being served in private prisons are unavailable, which means that it is difficult to determine which crimes are most relevant to private corrections. However, in Texas, individual data on every adult prisoner is available online. A closer look at the demographics of Texas prisons and the criminal records of prisoners reveals that people rarely land in private prisons for just property crimes.⁴⁸


To rule out property crime completely, I ran a regression with just property crime. This is model two on Table 1. As expected, a regression analysis with just property crime rate as the dependent variable has an even weaker coefficient and is statistically insignificant. This does not necessarily mean that violent crimes will be statistically significant, but it does help reaffirm that property crime is not directly related to the success of private prisons.

For regression model three, I isolated violent crimes as the dependent variable. The results in Table 1 show that using the violent crime rate as the dependent variable is statistically significant, with a much smaller standard error. The coefficient of 2.49 is not very big, but the constant is much smaller for violent crime rates, which means that this coefficient is much stronger. For context, Figure 6 demonstrates the annual changes in violent crime for all 17 states.

As we can see from Figure 6, on the following page, the violent crime rate has gone down in just about every state since the late 1980s and early 1990s. The lines overlap a lot, but the most important observation is that crime as a whole increased in the 1980s and then began to fall in the 1990s. Most recently, in 2012, crime rates are lower in most states than they have been in decades. The reasons for this drop in crime are not entirely clear and many studies have tried to isolate the cause of the dramatic drop. The hypotheses to explain this crime behavior have

⁴⁸ "Prison Units," Texas Tribune, <https://www.texastribune.org/library/data/texas-prisons/units/>.

varied greatly. Scholars have concluded that maybe effective policing, or rising prison populations, and even the legalization of abortion after *Roe V. Wade*⁴⁹ could have been the catalysts for the drop in crime. For the purposes of this project, the underlying explanation for this drop in crime is not particularly relevant unless it is caused by the advent of private prisons. Year fixed effects account for the aggregate trends that may have caused the drop in crime over the years so that the regression analysis can isolate the relationship between private prisons and crime. Additionally, just because the crime rate is dropping does not necessarily mean that private prisons are working effectively.



If private prisons are effective, for every increase in private prisons, there should be a drop in the crime rate. Because the growth of private prisons and the crime rates are moving in

⁴⁹ Steven D. Levitt, "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 1 (Winter 2004)

opposite directions, at first glance, this might be a tempting conclusion. However, a positive coefficient suggests that the hypothesis is correct—that the increase in private prisons correlates with an increase in crime. The coefficients from the regression analysis and the smaller errors suggest that the growth of private prisons and crime have a positive relationship. This suggests that as private prisons grew, crime rates to rose, even though crime rates overall were falling.

The evidence is just as strong if we exclude murder from the violent crime rates. This regression, with all violent crimes except murder as the dependent variable, was model four in Table 1. The coefficient for model four is very similar to model three. The results are very close, which is understandable because murder accounts for a very small percentage of violent crime.

Excluding murder is justified because people convicted of murder serve much longer sentences, which means that the data on their re-offense rates is still pending because they are still in prison. Additionally, prisoners convicted of murder are rarely detained in private prisons. Instead, they usually serve their sentences in federal, higher security facilities.

Table 2: Regression Model Results for Individual Violent Crimes

	Model Five Robbery Rate	Model Six Aggravated Assault Rate	Model Seven Murder Rate	Model Eight Forcible Rape Rate
% of Prisoners in Private Prisons	0.752 (0.318)*	1.571 (0.580)*	0.028 (0.013)	0.143 (0.055)*
Constant	174.424 (8.179)**	280.535 (12.953)**	10.029 (0.513)**	38.941 (2.156)**
R^2	0.46	0.44	0.56	0.28
N	561	561	561	561

• $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Regressions for each of the individual violent crimes, except murder and non-negligent homicide, all yield statistically significant results as well. The results of these regressions appear in Table 2 as models five through eight. All of these coefficients are still positive, which supports

the hypothesis. Understandably, each regression for these individual crimes as dependent variables has a smaller coefficient. When combined, as they were in models three and four, into one dependent variable, there is a stronger relationship. For reference, the complete regression tables that also express the annual change in crime are available in Appendices Three and Four.

POTENTIAL CONCERNS

The findings of this study show that there is a positive correlation between the growth of private prisons and the violent crime rate. However, as always the concern is whether or not this correlation actually indicates causation. There are a number of reasons that the data could have indicated a positive relationship between the percent of prisoners in private prisons and the violent crime rate. At this point, the most effective way to substantiate the findings of this study would be to collect data at the individual level and compare the post-release outcomes of people who served sentences in private prisons to those who served sentences in publicly operated prisons.

While the final data matrix is as complete as possible, as always, there are some notable concerns. As we have discussed, ideally the data would trace recidivism at the individual level. The consequence of widening the frame to study general trends in crime rates is that there is a lot more room for confounding variables to interfere with the results. Comparing states against themselves helps to control for some of these confounding variables, but there are still opportunities for interference. Even if there were no concerns about confounding variables, studying crime data at the state level is far less acute than studying recidivism at the individual level and the results will be more general.

While the justification behind excluding any facility is rationally based on the impact that it will have on the research, there is still some room for subjectivity. Of the facilities that were

originally recorded, a large percentage of them were ultimately excluded from the statistical analysis. There are also a number of facilities such as the aforementioned GEO-community facilities that were never even recorded due to their blanket excludability. No facility was excluded without justification, but the results of this project may have been different had all private facilities been included, or had been included based on different criteria.

There is no cause for concern with the state-level crime data or with the estimated populations of each state from which incarceration rates and crime rates were derived. All of this data is directly available from the US Department of Justice and in their records. However, the data on private prisons and the number of people in private prisons is probably not a perfect reflection of the true values. Actual occupancy of each of these prisons is not widely available. Instead, this project recorded the capacity of private prisons and used that number as the marker of how many people are incarcerated in private prisons. Unfortunately, this method assumes that the private prisons are always operating at or near capacity. Ideally, the number of people in private prisons would be an exact number for each year, particularly because exact data on the total number of people in prison is readily available for each state. Whenever possible, the data reflects expansions and construction in private prisons over the years. This accounts for the fact that private prisons have not had the same capacity for the entirety of their existence. However, there is not cause for great concern that the percentage of people in private prisons is overly inflated, particularly because there has been concern about prison over-crowding in the United States for decades.⁵⁰

As previously mentioned, the state of Texas offers information about all of the prisoners in its system so, in theory, it would be possible to verify the actual Current occupancy of each private prison in Texas. Using Texas as a model, we could generate a multiplier that estimated

⁵⁰Gerald G. Gaes, *Prison Crowding Research Reexamined* (n.p.: Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1994)

the percentage of full capacity in each private prison by averaging the fullness of all the Texan facilities. This multiplier could help estimate the actual occupancy of each private prison across the country. The reason that this process was not included in this project is because the occupancy of prisons in Texas does not necessarily have any relation to the occupancy of prisons in other states.

CONCLUSIONS

There are many reasons to be skeptical of private prisons in the United States. Horror stories such the Pennsylvania judge who accepted bribes from private prison owners and sent juveniles to prison for small crimes, as well as the underlying economic interest of private companies to keep people imprisoned, raise suspicions about whether or not private prisons deserve a role in our society. Whether or not we are inclined to support privatization or oppose it, it is essential that we continue to monitor these institutions and hold them accountable to the mandate they serve.

As we have discussed, one of the primary goals of a correctional institution is to offer rehabilitation services and, by definition, “correct” behavior. With this in mind, it follows that recidivism rates are an effective tool to measure the efficacy of prisons. In at least some respects, prisons with higher recidivism rates are not fulfilling their role in society as effectively as prisons with lower recidivism rates. Prisons are expensive, and keeping people out of prisons, in theory, should alleviate that financial burden from the state. However, private prisons have changed the game because they profit when people are in prison rather than out of it. Therefore, the concern that prisons will not offer strong reentry programs because it is not financially beneficial is very legitimate.

The data in my analysis suggest that private prisons are not effective at reducing crime rates. The significant results imply that, across states with private prisons, as private prisons grow, there is a correlated increase in crime. The data are strongest when violent crime rates are expressed as a function of the percentage of people in private prisons. While the coefficients are not particularly large, all of the results showed a positive relationship, which is concerning. Even a neutral relationship would be concerning because the prisons, in theory, should be lessening crime, not maintaining or growing it.

As I discussed in the potential concerns section, there are a number of factors that may have confounded this analysis. As Grant Duwe and Valarie Clark discussed in their analysis of private prisons in Wisconsin, the demographics of private prisons are different than other prisons. Inmates tend to be younger, are often affiliated with drug crimes and serve shorter sentences.⁵¹ Excluding irrelevant facilities controlled for as many of these factors as possible, but without the individual data on individual prisoners who came from private and public prisons, all else being equal, it is near impossible to rule out all confounding variables.

The state and year fixed effects helped to control for more variability in the results by accounting for aggregate changes unrelated to private prisons as well as time shocks that are the result of greater social movements. For future research into this subject, the next logical step would be to run regressions based on individual data rather than overall trends in crime and private prisons. This analysis would help to isolate the relationship more directly. Conclusively, in this analysis, the effectiveness of private prisons is still not entirely clear, but the significant results in certainly warrant further investigation.

⁵¹ Duwe and Clark, "The Effects of Private,"

Facility	Exclude?	State	Customer	Parent Corp	Year Privatized	Capacity
Adams County Correctional Center	Yes-ICE	MS	Federal Bureau of Prisons/ICE ¹	CCA ²	2007	2567
Adelanto Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	CA	City of Adelanto/California/ICE	GEO ³	2010	1940
Alexandria Transfer Center	Yes-ICE	LA	ICE	GEO	2013	400
Alhambra Jail	Yes-JAIL	CA	The City of Alhambra	GEO		67
Allen Correctional Center		LA	Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections	GEO	1990	1538
Arizona State Prison - Florence West		AZ	Arizona Department of Corrections	GEO	1997	750
Arizona State Prison - Phoenix West		AZ	Arizona Department of Corrections	GEO	1996	450
Arizona State Prison Complex–Kingman		AZ	Arizona Department of Corrections	GEO	2015	3400
Arizona State Prison-Marana		AZ	Arizona Department of Corrections	MTC ⁴	1994 ⁵	513
Aurora Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	CO	ICE	GEO	1986	1532
Austin Residential Reentry Center	Yes-HALFWAY	TX	Federal Bureau of Prisons	CCA		80
Austin Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice	CCA		421
Baldwin Park Jail	Yes-JAIL	CA	The City of Baldwin Park	GEO		
Bartlett State Jail		TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division	CCA	1995	1049
Bay Correctional Facility		FL	Florida Department of Management Services	GEO	2014	985
Bent County Correctional Facility		CO	Colorado Department of Corrections	CCA	1996	1466
Big Spring Correctional Center		TX	Federal Bureau of Prisons	GEO	2010	3509
Billy Moore Correctional Center		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1995 ⁶	513
Blackwater River Correctional Facility		FL	Florida Department of Management Services	GEO	2010	2000
Bradshaw State Jail		TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice	CCA	2004	1980
Bridgeport Pre-Parole Transfer Facility		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1987 ⁷	203
Brooks County Detention Center	Yes-MARSHALS	TX	Federal Bureau of Prisons & U.S. Marshals Service	GEO		
Broward Transitional Center	Yes-ICE	FL	ICE	GEO	2002	700
CAI - Boston Avenue		CA	Federal Bureau of Prisons & San Diego County	CCA	2013	120
CAI - Ocean View		CA	Federal Bureau of Prisons & San Diego County	CCA	2013	483
Carver Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	OK	Oklahoma Department of Corrections/Oklahoma Department of	CCA	1985 ⁸	556

¹ Judith Greene and Alexis Mazón, *Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive Unsafe Unnecessary* (n.p.: Justice Strategies, 2012),

² "CCA-Facilities List," Corrections Corporation of America, <http://www.cca.com/locations>.

³ "The GEO Group: Locations," GEO Group, <http://www.geogroup.com/maps/index/1>.

⁴ "Locations," MTC: Management and Training Corporation, <https://www.mtctrains.com/locations>.

⁵ "Marana," Arizona Department of Corrections, <https://corrections.az.gov/location/108/marana>.

⁶ "Unit Directory-Billy Moore Correctional Center," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/bm.html.

⁷ "Unit Directory-Bridgeport Pre-Parole Transfer Facility," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/t1.html.

⁸ "Carver Transitional Center," Avalon Correctional Services, <http://www.avaloncorrections.com/carver-center/>.

Corrections						
California City Correctional Center	Yes-LEASED	CA	**LEASED BY CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS	CCA		2304
Central Arizona Correctional Facility	Yes-ICE	AZ	Arizona Department of Corrections/ICE	GEO	2006	1280
Central Arizona Detention Center	Yes-ICE	AZ	US Marshals Service/ICE	CCA	1994	2304
Central Texas Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	TX	Bexar County, Texas & U.S. Marshals Service/ICE(IGA)	GEO	1987	688
Central Valley MCCF		CA	California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (CDCR)	GEO	1996 ⁹	700
Cheyenne Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	WY	Wyoming Department of Corrections	CCA		126
Cibola County Correctional Center		NM	Federal Bureau of Prisons	CCA	1998	1204
Cimarron Correctional Facility		OK	Oklahoma Department of Corrections	CCA	1997	1720
Citrus County Detention Facility	Yes-MARSHALS	FL	Citrus County/U.S. Marshals Service/U.S. Virgin Islands	CCA	1995	760
Cleveland Correctional Center		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1989 ¹⁰	520
Coastal Bend Detention Center	Yes-ICE	TX	ICE	GEO		1176
Coffee Correctional Facility		GA	Georgia	CCA	1998	3032
Corpus Christi Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice	CCA		110
Correctional Treatment Facility		DC	District of Columbia	CCA	1997	1500
Crossroads Correctional Center		MT	The State of Montana	CCA	1999	715
Crowley County Correctional Facility		CO	Colorado Department of Corrections	CCA	2003	1894
D. Ray James Correctional Facility	Yes-ICE	GA	Federal Bureau of Prisons & U.S. Marshals Service (IGA)	GEO	2010	2847
Dallas Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice	CCA	2011 ¹¹	225
Davis Correctional Facility		OK	The State of Oklahoma	CCA	1996	1600
Desert View MCCF		CA	California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (CDCR)	GEO	1996 ¹²	700
Diamondback Correctional Facility	Yes-LEASED	OK	CONTRACTED OUT	CCA		2160
Diboll Correctional Center		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1995 ¹³	518
Downey City Jail - LA County	Yes-JAIL	CA	Downey Police Department	GEO		30
East Hidalgo Detention Center	Yes-ICE	TX	US Marshals Service/ICE	GEO		1300
East Mississippi Correctional Facility		MS	Mississippi Department of Corrections	MTC	1999 ¹⁴	1376
East Texas Treatment Facility		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	2004 ¹⁵	2282

⁹ Anonymous post to Prison Talk web forum, "General Information and MCCFs," <http://www.prisonstalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-252783.html>

¹⁰ "Unit Directory-Cleveland Correctional Center," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/cv.html.

¹¹ Amy Martin, "At Dallas' Once Stylish Cabana Motor Hotel, Ex-Prisoners Struggle to Re-Enter the World," *Dallas Observer* (Dallas, TX), April 15, 2015.

¹² Anonymous post to Prison Talk web forum, "General Information and MCCFs."

¹³ "Unit Directory-Diboll Correctional Center," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/do.html.

¹⁴ "Private Prisons-East Mississippi Correctional Facility," Mississippi Department of Corrections, <http://www.mdcc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private-Prisons.aspx#East>.

¹⁵ "Unit Directory-East Texas Multi-Use Facility," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/xq.html.

Appendix 1-Private Prisons in the United States

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Eden Detention Center		TX	Federal Bureau of Prisons	CCA	1995	1558
El Paso Multi-Use Facility	Yes-HALFWAY	TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice/US District Court	CCA		324
El Paso Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice	CCA		200
Elizabeth Detention Center	Yes-ICE	NJ	ICE	CCA	1997	300
Eloy Detention Center	Yes-ICE	AZ	ICE	CCA	1994	1596
Florence Correctional Center	Yes-ICE/MARSHAL	AZ	Vermont/US Marshals Service/ICE	CCA	1999	1824
Fontana City Jail	Yes-JAIL	CA	Fontina	GEO		39
Fort Worth Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice/Texas Department of State Health Services	CCA		220
Gadsden Correctional Facility		FL	Florida Department of Corrections	MTC	1995 ¹⁶	1609
Garden Grove City Jail	Yes-JAIL	CA	Garden Grove	GEO		
Giles W. Dalby Correctional Facility	Yes-ICE	TX	Federal Bureau of Prisons (Criminal Aliens)	MTC	1999	2063
Golden State Modified Community Correctional Facility		CA	California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (CDCR)	GEO	1996 ¹⁷	700
Graceville Correctional Facility		FL	Florida Department of Management Services	GEO	2007 ¹⁸	1884
Great Plains Correctional Facility		OK	Federal Bureau of Prisons	GEO	2014	1940
Guadalupe County Correctional Facility		NM	Guadalupe County, New Mexico & New Mexico Corrections Department (IGA)	GEO	1996	600
Hardeman County Correctional Center		TN	The State of Tennessee	CCA	1997	2016
Heritage Trail Correctional Facility	Yes-HALFWAY	IN	Indiana	GEO	2010	1066
Houston Processing Center	Yes-ICE	TX	ICE	CCA	1984	1000
Huerfano County Correctional Center	Yes-LEASED	CO	CONTRACTED OUT	CCA		752
IAH Secure Adult Detention Center	Yes-ICE	TX	ICE	MTC		
Idaho Capp Facility		ID	Idaho Department of Corrections	MTC	2010 ¹⁹	442
Imperial Regional Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	CA	ICE	MTC		782
Jenkins Correctional Center		GA	The State of Georgia	CCA	2012	1150
Joe Corley Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	TX	US Marshals Service/ICE	GEO	2004	1517
Karnes County Correctional Center	Yes-ICE	TX	Karnes County, Texas & ICE (IGSA)	GEO	1998	679
Karnes County Residential Center	Yes-ICE	TX	Karnes County, Texas & ICE (IGSA)	GEO	2010	532
Kit Carson Correctional Center		CO	Colorado Department of Corrections	CCA	1998	1488
Kyle Correctional Center		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1989 ²⁰	530

¹⁶ "Gadsden Correctional Facility – Florida," Prison Handbook, <http://prisonhandbook.com/8481/gadsden-correctional-facility-florida/>.

¹⁷ Anonymous post to Prison Talk web forum, "General Information and MCCFs."

¹⁸ Anonymous post to Prison Talk web forum, "General Information and MCCFs."

¹⁹ "Correctional Alternative Placement Program (CAPP)," Idaho Department of Correction, https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/locations/prisons/correctional_alternative_placement_program.

²⁰ "Unit Directory-Kyle Correctional Center," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/ky.html.

La Palma Correctional Center		AZ	California Department of Corrections	CCA	2008	3060
Lake City Correctional Facility		FL	Florida Department of Management Services ²¹	CCA	1997	893
Lake Erie Correctional Institution		OH	Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction	CCA	2012	
Laredo Processing Center	Yes-ICE	TX	ICE	CCA	1985	404
LaSalle Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	LA	ICE	GEO	2006	1160
Lawrenceville Correctional Center		VA	Virginia Department of Corrections	GEO	2003	1536
Lawton Correctional Facility		OK	Oklahoma Department of Corrections	GEO	1997	2682
Lea County Correctional Facility		NM	Lea County, New Mexico & New Mexico Corrections Department	GEO	1996	1200
Leavenworth Detention Center	Yes-MARSHALS	KS	US Marshals Service	CCA	1992	1126
Lee Adjustment Center	Yes-VACANT	KY	VACANT	CCA	1998	845
Lindsey State Jail		TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice	CCA	2004	1031
Lockhart Correction Center		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1993 ²²	1000
Marion Adjustment Center	Yes-VACANT	KY	VACANT		1998	826
Marion County Jail II		IN	Marion County Sheriff's Department	CCA	1997	1030
Marshall County Correction Center		MS	Mississippi Department of Corrections	MTC	1996 ²³	1076
McFarland Female Community Reentry Facility		CA	California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (CDCR)	GEO	1986	300
McRae Correctional Facility		GA	Federal Bureau of Prisons	CCA	2000	2275
Mesa Verde Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	CA	City of McFarland/ICE	GEO	2015	400
Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility		TN	Nashville & Davidson County	CCA	1992	1348
Montebello City Jail	Yes-JAIL	CA	City of Montebello	GEO		25
Moore Haven Correctional Facility		FL	Florida Department of Management Services	GEO	1995	985
Moshannon Valley Correctional Center	Yes-ICE	PA	Federal Bureau of Prisons	GEO	2006	1820
Nevada Southern Detention Center	Yes-MARSHALS	NV	US Marshals Service	CCA	2010	1072
New Castle Correctional Facility		IN	Indiana Department of Correction	GEO	2005	3094
New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility		NM	The State of New Mexico	CCA	1989	611
North Central Correctional Complex		OH	Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction	MTC	1994 ²⁴	2852
North Fork Correctional Facility	Yes-LEASED	OK	CONTRACTED OUT	CCA	1998	2400
North Lake Correctional Facility	Yes-TWO STATES	MI	Washington Department of Corrections/Vermont Department of Corrections	GEO	1999	1740

²¹"Lake City Correctional Facility," Florida Department of Corrections, <http://www.dc.state.fl.us/facilities/region2/219.html>.

²² "Unit Directory-Lockhart Correctional Facility," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/lc.html.

²³ "Private Prisons-Marshall County Correctional Facility," Mississippi Department of Corrections, <http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private-Prisons.aspx#Marshall>.

²⁴ "North Central Correctional Complex," Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, <http://www.drc.ohio.gov/public/ncci.htm>.

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Northeast New Mexico Detention Facility		NM	Town of Clayton & New Mexico Corrections Department	GEO	2008 ²⁵	625
Northeast Ohio Correctional Center	Yes-MARSHALS	OH	US Marshals Service	CCA	1997	2016
Northwest Detention Center	Yes-ICE	WA	ICE	GEO	2004	1575
Ontario City Jail	Yes-JAIL	CA	The City of Ontario Police Department	GEO		40
Otay Mesa Detention Center	Yes-ICE	CA	US Marshals Service/ICE	CCA	2015	1567
Otero County Processing Center	Yes-ICE	NM	ICE	MTC		1089
Otter Creek Correctional Center	Yes-VACANT	KY	VACANT	CCA		656
Pine Prairie Correctional Center	Yes-ICE	LA	Louisiana Department of Public Safety, Parish County	GEO		1094
Prairie Correctional Facility	Yes-LEASED	MN	CONTRACTED OUT	CCA		1600
Queens Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	NY	US Marshals Service/ICE	GEO	2005	222
Red Rock Correctional Center		AZ	Arizona Department of Corrections	CCA	2006	1596
Reeves County Detention Complex (R1&R2)	Yes-ICE	TX	Reeves County & Federal Bureau of Prisons	GEO	2003	2407
Reeves County Detention Complex (R3)	Yes-ICE	TX	Reeves County & Federal Bureau of Prisons	GEO	2003	1356
Rio Grande Detention Center		TX	Office of Federal Detention Trustee—US Marshals Service	GEO	2008	1900
Riverbend Correctional Facility		GA	Georgia Department of Corrections	GEO	2011	1500
Rivers Correctional Institution		NC (DC)	Federal Bureau of Prisons (District of Columbia)	GEO	2000	1450
Robert A. Deyton Detention Facility	Yes-MARSHALS	GA	Office of Federal Detention Trustee—US Marshals Service	GEO	2007	768
Saguaro Correctional Center		AZ (HI)	The State of Hawaii	CCA	2007	1926
Sanders Estes Unit		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1989 ²⁶	1049
Silverdale Detention Facilities		TN	Hamilton County, Tennessee	CCA	1984	1062
South Bay Correctional Facility		FL	Florida Department of Management Services	GEO	1997	1898
South Central Correctional Center		TN	Tennessee Department of Corrections	CCA	1992	1676
South Louisiana Correctional Center	Yes-ICE	LA	ICE	GEO		
South Texas Detention Complex	Yes-ICE	TX	ICE	GEO	2005	1904
South Texas Family Residential Center	Yes-ICE	TX	ICE	CCA	2014	2400
South Texas Intermediate Sanction Facility		TX	Texas Department Criminal Justice	MTC	1993 ²⁷	459
Stewart Detention Center	Yes-ICE	GA	ICE	CCA	2006	1752
T. Don Hutto Residential Center	Yes-ICE	TX	ICE	CCA	1996	512
Taft Correctional Institution		CA	Federal Bureau of Prisons	MTC		2500

²⁵ "Northeast New Mexico Detention Facility," New Mexico Corrections Department Adult Prisons, <http://cd.nm.gov/apd/nenmdf.html>.

²⁶ "Unit Directory-Sanders 'Sandy' Estes Unit," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/vs.html.

²⁷ "Unit Directory-South Texas Intermediate Sanction Facility," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/xm.html.

Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility		MS	Tallahatchie County, State of California	CCA	2000	2800
Torrance County Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	NM	US Marshals Service/ICE/Torrance County Sherriff's Office/Sierra County/Bernalillo County/Curry County	CCA	1990	910
Trousdale Turner Correctional Center		TN	Tennessee Department of Corrections	CCA	2015	2552
Tulsa Transitional Center	Yes-HALFWAY	OK	Oklahoma Department of Corrections	CCA	1995 ²⁸	390
Turley Residential Center	Yes-HALFWAY	OK	Oklahoma Department of Corrections	CCA	1997 ²⁹	289
Val Verde Correctional Facility	Yes-ICE	TX	Val Verde County, Texas, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement/US Marshals Service/Bureau of Prison (IGA) & Department of Homeland Security-Border Protection (IGA)	GEO	2001	1407
Walnut Grove Correctional Facility		MS	Mississippi Department of Corrections	MTC	2001 ³⁰	962
Webb County Detention Center	Yes-MARSHALS	TX	US Marshals Service	CCA	1999	480
West Tennessee Detention Facility	Yes-ICE	TN	US Marshals Service/ICE/Homeland Security	CCA	1990	600
West Texas Intermediate Sanction Facility		TX	Texas Parole Division	MTC	1992 ³¹	289
Western Region Detention Facility at San Diego	Yes-MARSHALS	CA	Office of Federal Detention Trustee/ US Marshals Service	GEO	2000	770
Wheeler Correctional Facility		GA	The State of Georgia	CCA	1998	3028
Whiteville Correctional Facility		TN	Tennessee Department of Corrections	CCA	1998	1536
Wilkinson County Correctional Facility		MS	Mississippi Department of Corrections	MTC	1998 ³²	747
Willacy County Regional Detention Facility	Yes-MARSHALS	TX	US Marshal Service	MTC		568
Willacy County State Jail		TX	Texas Department of Criminal Justice	CCA	2004	1069

*All information contained in this appendix is either available on the corporate website or the alternative source has been noted with a footnote—the corporate sources are footnoted the first time that they appear in this appendix

**Shaded prisons have been excluded from the statistical analysis—the second column offers a brief rational for the omission

²⁸ "Tulsa Transitional Center," Avalon Correctional Services, <http://www.avaloncorrections.com/tulsa-center/>.

²⁹ *ibid*.


³⁰ "Private Prisons-Walnut Grove Correctional Facility," Mississippi Department of Corrections, <http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private-Prisons.aspx#WalnutGrove>.

³¹ "Unit Directory-West Texas Intermediate Sanction Facility," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/xn.html.


³² "Private Prisons-Wilkinson County Correctional Center," Mississippi Department of Corrections, <http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private-Prisons.aspx#Wilkinson>.

Appendix 2

Appendix 2-Part One
State Reliance on Private Prisons in 1990



Appendix 2-Part Two
State Reliance on Private Prisons in 2000



Appendix 3: Unabridged Regression Model Results with State and Year Fixed Effects

	Model One	Model Two	Model Three	Model Four
	Total Crime Rate	Property Crime Rate	Violent Crime Rate	Violent Crime Rate (Excluding Murder)
% of Prisoners Private Prisons	5.925 (5.064)	3.433 (4.660)	2.492 (0.841)**	2.465 (0.837)**
1980 (Base Year)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1981	-186.240 (68.310)*	-172.800 (62.188)*	-13.441 (7.986)	-12.956 (7.887)
1982	-378.242 (108.973)**	-348.582 (97.030)**	-29.671 (14.647)	-28.356 (14.522)
1983	-787.403 (142.779)**	-728.247 (130.532)**	-59.176 (14.721)**	-56.784 (14.643)**
1984	-886.212 (150.558)**	-833.701 (139.058)**	-52.491 (14.582)**	-49.965 (14.506)**
1985	-618.096 (177.291)**	-584.756 (166.963)**	-33.361 (14.126)*	-30.961 (14.049)*
1986	-316.044 (202.764)	-327.047 (191.319)	10.996 (16.233)	12.874 (16.280)
1987	-265.234 (211.171)	-256.882 (203.433)	-8.351 (13.030)	-5.967 (13.216)
1988	-242.247 (220.085)	-255.455 (208.026)	13.173 (16.921)	15.434 (17.053)
1989	-135.180 (226.985)	-166.634 (212.800)	31.452 (19.409)	33.935 (19.450)
1990	-50.392 (220.401)	-142.185 (203.163)	91.788 (24.469)**	93.604 (24.542)**
1991	-104.024 (230.666)	-217.861 (208.066)	113.836 (27.564)**	115.390 (27.511)**
1992	-232.177 (199.222)	-357.556 (179.926)	125.364 (28.536)**	127.264 (28.653)**
1993	-321.656 (204.823)	-448.926 (184.567)*	127.263 (29.924)**	129.032 (29.880)**
1994	-329.864 (202.828)	-432.300 (186.452)*	102.433 (27.414)**	104.282 (27.397)**
1995	-301.170 (220.625)	-392.662 (200.852)	91.483 (28.308)**	93.381 (28.157)**
1996	-500.003 (280.027)	-546.344 (255.873)*	46.347 (29.892)	49.221 (29.778)
1997	-673.577 (299.764)*	-692.726 (273.992)*	19.139 (30.934)	22.682 (30.847)
1998	-1,038.754 (310.477)**	-1,022.088 (283.275)**	-16.669 (32.477)	-12.534 (32.197)

1999	-1,511.384 (327.211)**	-1,451.134 (298.685)**	-60.249 (33.794)	-55.638 (33.545)
2000	-1,611.522 (328.776)**	-1,537.007 (300.461)**	-74.529 (33.199)*	-69.499 (32.901)
2001	-1,556.771 (321.973)**	-1,492.175 (291.028)**	-64.607 (35.769)	-59.535 (35.511)
2002	-1,537.268 (311.094)**	-1,466.452 (280.746)**	-70.819 (35.769)	-65.886 (35.505)
2003	-1,637.545 (310.781)**	-1,550.839 (280.604)**	-86.706 (36.286)*	-81.854 (36.000)*
2004	-1,746.763 (322.439)**	-1,652.668 (291.422)**	-94.100 (37.643)*	-89.207 (37.343)*
2005	-1,832.521 (316.731)**	-1,739.574 (284.025)**	-92.882 (39.299)*	-87.781 (38.980)*
2006	-1,999.413 (329.510)**	-1,924.252 (297.059)**	-75.154 (40.602)	-70.341 (40.271)
2007	-2,086.280 (352.860)**	-2,003.280 (317.471)**	-83.003 (42.082)	-78.388 (41.680)
2008	-2,243.774 (363.294)**	-2,140.285 (328.929)**	-103.482 (42.035)*	-98.376 (41.661)*
2009	-2,423.762 (374.461)**	-2,292.366 (338.928)**	-131.384 (43.811)**	-126.053 (43.338)*
2010	-2,575.030 (376.547)**	-2,412.551 (340.921)**	-162.462 (45.337)**	-156.549 (44.896)**
2011	-2,626.293 (382.345)**	-2,450.184 (346.183)**	-176.100 (46.859)**	-170.259 (46.360)**
2012	-2,691.128 (371.328)**	-2,512.035 (333.672)**	-179.099 (48.514)**	-173.142 (48.031)**
Constant	5,972.925 (203.660)**	5,469.023 (187.031)**	503.906 (18.404)**	493.896 (18.355)**
R^2	0.71	0.72	0.49	0.48
N	561	561	561	561

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Appendix 4: Unabridged Regression Model Results for Individual Violent Crimes

	Model Five Robbery Rate	Model Six Aggravated Assault Rate	Model Seven Murder Rate	Model Eight Forcible Rape Rate
% of Prisoners in Private Prisons	0.752 (0.318)*	1.571 (0.580)*	0.028 (0.013)	0.143 (0.055)*
1980 (Base Year)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1981	-2.576 (3.530)	-8.924 (5.535)	-0.524 (0.407)	-1.465 (0.719)
1982	-13.412 (5.875)*	-11.529 (10.538)	-1.335 (0.369)**	-3.429 (0.836)**
1983	-31.347 (7.145)**	-21.276 (9.708)*	-2.400 (0.386)**	-4.176 (1.035)**
1984	-36.490 (7.004)**	-11.055 (8.523)	-2.547 (0.411)**	-2.434 (1.483)
1985	-31.382 (7.244)**	2.270 (8.314)	-2.413 (0.415)**	-1.855 (1.509)
1986	-14.365 (8.512)	28.654 (11.103)*	-1.888 (0.321)**	-1.422 (1.482)
1987	-25.789 (8.543)**	21.922 (11.760)	-2.407 (0.399)**	-2.102 (1.566)
1988	-22.248 (10.709)	40.163 (13.114)**	-2.265 (0.396)**	-2.482 (1.692)
1989	-18.627 (11.407)	53.715 (13.962)**	-2.497 (0.396)**	-1.158 (2.088)
1990	-5.663 (11.373)	96.808 (17.794)**	-1.824 (0.443)**	2.430 (1.947)
1991	4.480 (11.594)	108.153 (19.997)**	-1.575 (0.421)**	2.765 (2.289)
1992	1.969 (9.429)	120.818 (23.177)**	-1.914 (0.534)**	4.471 (2.380)
1993	-0.748 (9.189)	125.791 (24.964)**	-1.807 (0.628)*	3.960 (3.306)
1994	-9.759 (8.768)	112.161 (22.551)**	-1.871 (0.652)*	1.853 (3.271)
1995	-12.594 (9.514)	106.026 (21.857)**	-1.933 (0.763)*	-0.060 (3.256)
1996	-21.692 (11.266)	71.782 (22.652)**	-2.899 (0.774)**	-0.861 (3.105)
1997	-32.534 (13.193)*	57.047 (22.164)*	-3.571 (0.842)**	-1.834 (3.281)
1998	-52.483 (14.716)**	42.777 (22.584)	-4.172 (0.811)**	-2.818 (3.351)

1999	-66.194 (16.326)**	15.775 (22.099)	-4.649 (0.832)**	-5.233 (3.383)
2000	-70.825 (16.575)**	7.625 (20.042)	-5.067 (0.794)**	-6.301 (3.390)
2001	-62.615 (16.793)**	9.974 (22.917)	-5.093 (0.869)**	-6.914 (3.420)
2002	-66.630 (16.340)**	5.687 (22.347)	-4.951 (0.824)**	-4.947 (3.639)
2003	-69.844 (16.704)**	-5.982 (22.254)	-4.882 (0.822)**	-6.031 (3.579)
2004	-74.046 (17.170)**	-9.971 (23.121)	-4.906 (0.816)**	-5.180 (3.823)
2005	-72.581 (17.625)**	-9.365 (24.549)	-5.147 (0.838)**	-5.846 (3.926)
2006	-64.589 (16.720)**	-0.105 (26.378)	-4.854 (0.851)**	-5.652 (3.923)
2007	-64.439 (17.000)**	-7.371 (27.080)	-4.652 (0.894)**	-6.594 (4.122)
2008	-68.742 (17.619)**	-21.786 (26.293)	-5.169 (0.862)**	-7.844 (4.138)
2009	-80.497 (18.363)**	-37.082 (26.531)	-5.357 (0.888)**	-8.478 (4.093)
2010	-93.984 (19.479)**	-52.285 (26.284)	-5.958 (0.880)**	-10.278 (3.982)*
2011	-96.756 (20.134)**	-62.786 (27.212)*	-5.878 (0.930)**	-10.722 (4.034)*
2012	-97.165 (20.317)**	-64.229 (28.518)*	-5.988 (0.913)**	-11.753 (4.066)*
Constant	174.424 (8.179)**	280.535 (12.953)**	10.029 (0.513)**	38.941 (2.156)**
R^2	0.46	0.44	0.56	0.28
N	561	561	561	561

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

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