The ethics of Bertrand Russell ..

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Thesis

THE ETHICS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

by

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THE ETHICS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL.

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THE ETHICS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

I. Introduction.

A. The Scope and Aim of this Thesis.

An extensive study of the theoretical and practical ethics of Bertrand Russell is undertaken. Analysis and criticism of his thought is attempted. His social views are presented as briefly and comprehensively as seems possible with the mass of material available. As a background, for anyone not familiar with Russell's philosophy, a brief survey of his epistemological and metaphysical views is presented. Changes in his ethical views are indicated, but no attempt is made to show the changes in his general philosophy.

B. A Note on His Life.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell was born at Trellech, England, May 18, 1872. He is now the 3rd Earl Russell. He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and became a lecturer and Fellow of Trinity. He was elected Fellow of the Royal Society in 1908. In 1894 he married Alys, daughter of R. Pearsall Smith of Philadelphia, but she divorced him in 1921. In the same year Russell married Dora Winifred, daughter of the late Sir Frederick Black, K. C. B. There are two children, a son and a daughter, by this marriage.

Bertrand Russell's grandfather was Lord John Russell, "one of the greatest Liberal Prime Ministers of the last century," who was noted for his fearlessness and honesty, and worked for emancipation of the Jews and freedom for Canada and Australia. Bertrand's father was a noted free thinker, and he "wrote strongly for

1 "Thought of Bertrand Russell," Living Age, 310 (1921) pp. 585-589.
free thought in religion." Bertrand was only two years old when his mother died, and three when his father died, after which he went to live with his grandmother, who "was a Scotch Presbyterian but at the age of seventy became converted to Unitarianism." The result was that Bertrand was "taken on alternate Sundays to the parish church (Episcopalian) and to the Presbyterian church, while at home (he) was instructed in the tenets of the Unitarian faith."¹ He is himself a fearless proponent of freedom in politics, in industry, in education, and in society. When his ancestry and environment in the early years is considered, it is not surprising that this is so.

Concerning his early training he says, "From the age of eleven, when I began the study of Euclid, I had a passionate interest in mathematics, combined with a belief that science must be the source of all human progress. Youthful ambition made me wish to be a benefactor of mankind, the more so as I lived in an atmosphere in which public spirit was taken for granted."² He found later that while abstract mathematics was a simple subject for him, the more concrete matters of science did not come easily, so he gave up the scientific career he had hoped to follow. He then turned to philosophy and the study of logic led him more deeply into mathematics. After reading Mill's Logic, he determined that he "would find out whether any grounds were ascertainable for regarding mathematics as true."³ This proved to be an

²Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Introduction, p. IX.
³Ibid.,p. X.
extensive task and took a period of nearly twenty years to complete. In 1910, in collaboration with A. N. Whitehead, he published *Principia Mathematica*, which, he says, "contained all that I could hope to contribute towards the solution of the problem." He adds, "The main question remained, of course, unanswered; but incidentally we had been led to the invention of a new method in philosophy and a new branch of mathematics."\(^1\)

Russell was always interested in politics and took an active part in the campaign for women's suffrage from 1907 onwards.\(^2\) His interests continued to be mainly academic and abstract, however, until the coming of the World War. Then all was changed. In fact, Will Durant declares "There have been two Bertrand Russells: one died during the war; and another who rose out of that one's shroud, and almost mystic communist born out of the ashes of a mathematical logician."\(^3\) Russell was amazed at the attitude of both governments and people towards the war. "It became obvious," he says, "that I had lived in a fool's paradise. Human nature, even among those who had thought themselves civilized, had dark depths that I had not suspected. Civilization, which I had thought secure, showed itself capable of generating destructive forces which threatened a disaster comparable to the fall of Rome. Everything that I had valued was jeopardized, and only an infinitesimal minority seemed to mind."\(^4\) Abstract pursuits became impossible and Russell wrote much in an effort to arouse the

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1 Loc. cit.
2 Ibid., 8.XI.
4 Bertrand Russell, op. cit., pp. XI-XII.
general public to undertake the building of "a pacific society." In 1916 he wrote to President Wilson asking him to use his influence to stop the war before it destroyed Europe. He was not successful in arousing the people, but he had to pay the penalty for his fearless thinking and speaking.

For his opposition to the war on grounds of "common sense and humanity," and for upholding conscientious objectors in their contentions and opinions, he was fined one hundred pounds in 1916. He was dismissed from his professorship at Trinity College, Cambridge, and was refused permission to come to America to deliver a series of lectures at Harvard University in the same year. He was forbidden to lecture at home also, unless he would give assurances that he would say nothing which the military authorities might deem dangerous. He refused to give such assurances because, he declared, he could not tell in advance what they might object to, or just what they might consider dangerous to the interests of the war. He served a sentence of six months in prison for writing an article "warning the English people that employment of American troops in Britain involved serious danger." Thus Russell has vindicated his faith in freedom by suffering for it.

Though he hates violence and oppression in every form, Russell is not an anarchist. He believes law and order necessary for the progress of humanity, and would have the police use force if necessary to preserve it, but the use of force by private individuals he believes harmful. He appears to have thought very

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1 "Thought of Bertrand Russell," Living Age, p. 587.
2 Ibid., p. 588.
highly of Communism at one time, but he was disappointed by the oppressive tactics of Communists in Russia, though he blames outside capitalists for much of Russia's trouble.¹

When the war was over he found himself unable to return to academic pursuits, so he traveled through eastern Europe and Asia, spending five weeks in Russia and about a year lecturing in China. He was interested now chiefly in society and social institutions, and found much that interested him in these countries so different from those where western civilization holds sway.² During the years since, he has devoted himself largely to the study of social conditions with an eye to the amelioration of existing evils in human society. His interest in science and philosophy has been considerable, but chiefly in their bearing on social problems. He believes that there is no one key to the solution of these problems, but holds that all viewpoints in philosophy and all branches of science must combine to build a better social order.³

Though not a professed follower of Christ, but, indeed, a professed atheist, we are told that Russell's attitudes often remind one of the Nazarene, and especially is this true in his reverence for the souls of young children.⁴ Will Durant declares he is "a better Christian than many who mouth the word."⁵

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¹ Loc. cit.
² Selected Papers, ibid., pp. XII-XIII.
³ Ibid., p. XVIII.
⁴ Will Durant, op. cit., p. 589.
⁵ Will Durant, op. cit., p. 529.
C. Russell's Position in Philosophy.

1. His Relation to English Philosophy.

Though we are told that no "ism" quite fits Russell,¹ all agree that he classifies as a new realist and is frequently mentioned as the leading figure of that realistic philosophical movement which has arisen recently in England and America. Previous to his becoming known as a philosopher, Russell was a professor of mathematical science. From this he passed on to the field of philosophy, drawn very strongly no doubt by his interest in humanity and its social problems. But his earlier interests in mathematics have given him a predisposition for logic, so that he takes very kindly to the analytic method of new realism and is known as a "logical atomist" by some. He was probably influenced towards logic by his studies in the mathematical philosophy of Leibnitz during his earlier years.

We are told that Russell "achieves the remarkable result of standing for a naive empirical realism, and, with the same uncompromising firmness, for a high and dry Platonic idealism, or, since, in his philosophy, both are forms of realism, for realism in the modern sense and for realism in the medieval sense."² Though he has his critics, his originality and power are admitted generally, and he is spoken of in the highest terms by such men as R. E. Perry, Bradley, Bosanquet, and Royce, all of whom by no means agree with his philosophical views.³

²Loc. cit.
2. His Epistemological Views.

Russell has remarkable command of modern mathematical logic. For him "philosophy is the austere vision of eternal truth, majestic in its isolation from man's paltry life," and of the "unchanging bonds of logical implication."¹ This newer mathematics of groups and series "claims to have devised a calculus of relations which will cover all 'entities' whatsoever; not only volumes and numbers, but persons, ideas, sensations, emotions, prices, moral values, commercial transactions,—anything you please. From this point of view truth of any kind is a question of mathematical relations; and what cannot be expressed in symbols is not true."² Thus Russell's "real" world consists only of logical relationships, applicable to all possible worlds, so that they do not prove very helpful in solving problems in our world. They may solve some mathematical problems but not many other more common problems. It appears to be simply the case of a narrow and restricted type of logic pronouncing its own supremacy over the rest of life.³

In his earlier works, The Problems of Philosophy and Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell makes a sharp distinction between the world of sense data and the world of physics.⁴ The sense data constitute our experience. Yet these sense data are independent of the mind. If I see a table, I do not see the real physical table. What I see is one "perspective" of a sensible

¹A. K. Rogers, English and American Philosophy Since 1800, p. 429.
²W. Fite, op. cit.
⁴J. A. Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, pp. 289.
object that is my experience of the table. The "perspective" is the group of sense data which constitutes the sensible object from that one particular point of view. Any sensible object, then, consists of the total series of "perspectives" from all possible points of view.

"Since these perspectives are related to the percipient, and to one another according to certain laws which are formulated in the science of physics, 'Things are those series of aspects which obey the laws of physics. That such series exist is an empirical fact, which constitutes the verifiability of physics.' But physics presupposes one common space. Now the individual does not sense one space—the space of sight differs from the space of touch. The one space for the individual is an intellectual construction."1

Now each individual has only his own private space or "perspective," but there are as many spaces as there are observers, and there are an infinite number of possible spaces which an infinite number of possible observers might perceive. These possible aspects exist whether there is anyone to perceive them or not, because things exist regardless of whether there is anyone to know about them or not. Here is where realism makes one of its sharp breaks with the absolute idealism of Berkley. But all "these aspects constitute the system of perspectives which makes up the real world of physics."2 Thus the common space of the object is a logical construction from all these private spaces.3

"It is to be noted that, in order to get from the 'private' world of each separate individual into this public space-system, Russell has to assume the existence of other minds. He admits that we cannot offer very strong proof of the existence of other minds, but holds that we cannot help believing in them."4

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1Ibid., p. 290.
2Ibid., p. 291.
4J. A. Leighton, op. cit., p. 291.
It appears that so far Russell is a dualist in his epistemological outlook, in which he differs from American realists, who hold to monism in epistemology. He assumes that minds exist and are active in making logical constructions. Sense data also exist for minds but are caused by something outside of minds. Then there is also the physical object which exists independently of any and all minds. Since all that we know of this object is logical construction that the mind makes out of the sense data, it is difficult to say just what the physical object really is. Also the relation of objects perceived to the sense data seems rather uncertain. "Ghosts and centaurs are things equally real with trees and mountains, except that they cannot be correlated in the same space construction,.... an explanation convenient for a theory of error, but not intrinsically convincing."¹ Thus Russell appears to have returned to sensationalism. His contention that the mind is active in the logical construction of the sensible object, and that the physical object is such as can never be truly experienced by the mind reminds one of Kant's doctrine of the creative activity of the mind and the "thing-in-itself." Is it possible that the "thing-in-itself" thrown out the back-door by the realists could "climb up some other way" and be reinstated in a new scientific dress?

It should be noted also that when Russell takes for granted the making of logical construction by the mind, he not only assumes a mind capable of organization, but he also assumes that

the isolated sense data are capable of being organized into a system, which means essentially that they are already part of a system.¹

3. His Metaphysical Views.

Metaphysically, Russell is a pluralist or "logical atomist." He holds that terms and relations exist entirely independently of one another. It is the business of philosophy to reduce the complexes of experience to their simple atomic elements (terms and relations) by logical analysis.

In *The Analysis of Mind*, Russell takes the position of neutral monism held by most neo-realists. This view does not recognize minds or selves as separate entities. Everything is analyzed down to neutral entities, which may be either mind or matter. An object or a mind is simply a particular arrangement of these entities. "The person is constituted by relations of the thoughts to each other and to the body."² Leighton gives it as his judgment that this "'neutral' monism is only a new and specious name for materialism,"³ and many critics of the neo-realistic position agree with this. It is a pan-objectivism, which seeks to eliminate mind or consciousness as an independent agency in the metaphysical world, reducing everything to "terms and relations" or "logical atoms."

It seems clear that this is thorough-going materialism, even though much more refined than some classical forms of it.

³Ibid., p. 293.

Russell finds an "irreconcilable opposition between human ideals and the physical universe." Science presents a world purposeless and devoid of meaning, he thinks. I quote him:

"Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcomes of accidental collocations of atoms; no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built."

Man is the mysterious child of "Nature," subject to her power, yet "with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother." He is free "to examine, to criticize, to know, and in imagination to create." He is the only creature in the world having this power, "and in this lies his superiority to the resistless forces that control his outward life."

However, there are within man ideals which assert themselves gradually and man is not satisfied to worship blind Power as he finds it in nature. He demands a world of fact which shall be harmonious with his world of ideals, and, not finding it in the world of nature, he "creates God, all-powerful and all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what ought to be." The world of

2Ibid., loc. cit.
3Ibid., p. 48.
fact is not good and man is a helpless atom in it. Man finds himself confronted with the choice of worshiping an evil God that exists as Power in nature, or a goodness recognized as the creation of his own conscience. Man finds his true freedom in rejecting this Power from his heart and worshiping only the "God created by our own love of the good." "In action, in desire, we must submit perpetually to the tyranny of outside forces; but in thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellowmen, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while we live, from the tyranny of death."  

Thus we should submit our desires and aspirations to the Power that is; but our thoughts should remain free to create the world of freedom and beauty of the ideals. Through the imagination we can transform the world into our temple of worship. Here self must die out; it is only by renunciation of desires for power in the world of fact that we can find wisdom, insight, and heaven, in the world of ideals. To quote again:

"Of all the arts, Tragedy is the proudest, the most triumphant; for it builds its shining citadel in the very center of the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest mountain; from its impregnable watchtowers, his camps and arsenals, his columns and forts, are all revealed; within its walls the free life continues, while the legions of Death and Pain and Despair, and all the servile captains of tyrant Fate, afford the burghers of that dauntless city new spectacles of beauty. Happy those sacred ramparts, thrice happy the dwellers on that all-seeing eminence. Honor to those brave warriors who, through countless ages of warfares, have preserved for us the priceless heritage of liberty, and have kept uniedied by sacrilegious invaders the home of the unsubdued."  

So man must build his world of values without hope of cosmic

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1 Ibid., p. 50.
2 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
support for them, according to Russell's belief. Indeed, he must expect that they shall be ground to powder like himself.

"Brief and powerless is man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark.... The life of man is a long march through the night, surrounded by invisible foes, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal that few can hope to reach, and where none may tarry long. One by one, as they march, our comrades vanish from our sight, seized by the silent orders of omnipotent Death.... For Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power."1

I have quoted Russell at such length because of the majesty and grandeur of the view of life which he builds upon a foundation of absolute despair. To quote one reviewer:

"The ethical problem for the human race, to follow Bertrand Russell, is to discover how, in an alien and inhuman world, to preserve its aspirations untarnished.... Upon the basis of a seemingly pessimistic disillusion and a completely lugubrious despair, this 'scientific' philosopher invests his gloomy belief with so much nobility and courage that it becomes stimulating and inspiring instead of depressing."2

It is natural and logical that one who is a materialist in philosophy should despair of any basis in life for values, but it seems rather anomalous for a materialist to value so highly the ideal life of man. However, we find in George Santayana another of one who values the ideal life very highly, though

1Ibid., pp. 55-57.
2"Man's War with the Universe in the Religion of Bertrand Russell", Current Opinion, 65 (1918), pp. 45-45.
he claims to be a materialist. But why should it be worth while to cherish this ideal life so carefully if it is merely a passing whim of man's imagination? It appears that Russell finds facts in experience which conflict with his scientific theory, and in the interests of strict logic he sinks his facts in the interest of his theory. Yet, in the words of another critic:

"Russell's facts are more important than his theory. His facts are a world in which moral persons bravely strive on, even when appearances are most unfriendly, a loyalty to obligation that will not be frustrated while it can breathe. His theory is of a purposeless, godless universe. Do not his facts cry aloud for a God? If the universe is as he understands it to be, the existence of meaning and value in human experience is a sheer miracle."1

This seems to me a valid criticism of Russell's position.

Russell refuses to believe in the objectivity of values, or that the universe in any way seeks to conserve them, yet "the existence of values in human life is hard to explain if the universe itself be entirely indifferent to value."2 How shall we explain the rise of Russell's own idealism in all its grandeur as pictured above so graphically? Man is himself a product of this blind unconscious power that he believes nature to be, yet within man there appear these idealistic values which make life truly worth living. Does it not follow that these ideals exist within the world of nature if this is all the world there is? How can one escape, then, the logical conclusion that values are the product of nature through man? And if values are the product of nature then they must have a place in nature.

Where is Russell's logical analysis here, that it does not func-

1E. S. Brightman, Religious Values, pp. 58-59.
2E. S. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 161.
It appears that if there is any way for these values to exist outside the system of "logical atoms" and "relations" of which Russell holds the world is composed, then the world of atoms and relations, or "neutral entities," is not the only world, and we have a dualism. Russell seeks to get by this dilemma by denying reality to the ideal values, but here he is not true to experience, for he finds these ideals to be facts of experience capable of affecting man's life, since he may rise out of the world of nature to live in the world of ideals. If they have no objectivity how can they be capable of affecting man's life, or how could man experience them at all? It seems quite improper and unscientific for a "scientific philosopher" to pass by facts or experience as not worthy of serious consideration, yet this is what Russell appears to do. Of course, he considers them from one angle, and admits they are the most important thing in life, but he gives them no place in the world of nature, that is, according to his theory, there is no place for them. The existence of spiritual life in a completely materialistic universe is a "brute mystery" anyway, but Russell seems to dismiss it arbitrarily because it does not fit in his theory.

D. Russell's Regard for Science and His Use of Scientific Method in Philosophy.

In mathematics Russell found his ideal of reality, pure and perfect, in the form of a priori propositions, which stated relations that he held to be objectively real, regardless of
persons or things. With this as his ideal of reality he moved over into a study of science and philosophy. The impersonal nature of scientific method therefore appealed to him and he became a great admirer of science and scientists. Consequently he has come to have an almost undue amount of respect for the methods of science and some of its findings. Since science can deal only with material elements, and the immaterial facts and forces of life cannot be handled in such an impersonal and abstract way, Russell has given the material considerations an unduly exalted place, especially in his theories. He contends that scientific method should be applied in philosophy.¹ Further, he holds that scientific philosophy must be general; it must not deal with anything specific that exists in space or time, but may deal with such things as space and time themselves. "A philosophical proposition must be such as can be neither proved nor disproved by empirical evidence."² Such things belong to the field of science. Thus philosophy is practically identified with and limited to logic. It should deal with its problems piece-meal, and not as wholes. "The essence of philosophy as thus conceived is analysis, not synthesis." It is not to "build systems" but to "divide and conquer."³ This is surely carrying the scientific method over into philosophy with a vengeance.

Philosophy is sublimated to logic and logic is identified with pure mathematics. How can philosophy touch the practical

¹Mysticism and Logic, pp. 97-124.
²Ibid., p. 111.
³Ibid., p. 113.
problems of life? Where do the empirical facts of life fit in such a view?

It seems a strange inconsistency that Russell should be willing to recognize the abstractions of pure mathematics and pure logic as ultimate realities, partaking of the nature of Plato's ideas, that he is unwilling to recognize as real the values of man's inner life. These values he thinks but an anomaly in a hostile universe, too abstract to be considered as having a place in reality, yet logical abstractions are pure reality. By what standard shall these distinctions be drawn? Apparently only by the standard of Russell's desire to reduce everything to mathematics or analytical logic.

Another strange thing about his point of view is that he should hold the logical abstractions of pure reason to be the highest ultimates of reality, and yet deny that the power to think is inherent in the nature of things. Nature is unthinking, unconscious power, he contends. How does it happen then that these a priori propositions are universally valid? How does anything come to be a priori?
II. Russell's Ethical Views.

A. His Earlier Outlook.

It is a difficult matter to define Russell's ethical position exactly for his views have changed with the passing of the years, as the views of any live thinker are bound to do.

In his earliest essay on ethical subjects, "The Elements of Ethics," he has a thoroughly objective view of the "good." It is an ultimate idea which is better characterized and illustrated than defined, he thinks. The "good" is not confined to what exists, or what ought to exist. He denies that "good means what is desired," since there are many bad desires. He maintains that "good" and "bad" are not used in ethics to mean merely personal desires, but have an impersonal significance. That is, goodness is a property which a thing possesses regardless of opinions about it, for opinions may differ regarding the goodness of a given thing or action, but whatever goodness there is therein is an intrinsic element not affected by personal desires and opinions.  

Neither does knowledge about what exists throw any light upon what is good or bad. Things are not good or bad because they exist or do not exist. Evolutionary ethics holds that what has survived is the best, therefore what exists may be held to be "good," but Russell thinks this position untenable.

"Goodness," then, he seems to regard as an intrinsic quality which may attach to a thing regardless of persons, opinions, or the things so designated. It is a sort of Platonic idea, "laid

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1 Philosophical Essays, pp. 1-58.
2 Ibid., pp. 7-10.
up in heaven," which attaches to those things that are "good."
This "good" is the end toward which conduct aims. It is some-
thing apart from the personal judgment of it. In that sense it
is impersonal. If it is impersonal it is thus separated from
desires and impulses, which are personal, and must mean that it
is objective in the same sense in which we have seen that Russell
holds logical abstractions to be the only objective realities.

The terms "right" and "wrong" are applied to conduct, but
"the notion of good is wider and more fundamental than any no-
tion of conduct."¹ There are two methods of judging actions.
One, the utilitarian, "judges the rightness of an act by relation
to the goodness or badness of its consequences." The other,
the intuitionist, "judges by the approval or disapproval of the
moral sense of conscience." Regarding these two views Russell
says, "I believe that it is necessary to combine both theories
in order to get a complete account of right and wrong."² He
then proceeds to make a distinction between subjective and ob-
jective rightness. "The moral sense," referred to by the intu-
itionist, he says, "consists in a certain specific emotion of
approval towards an act." Thus an act is subjectively right
if the agent experiences a feeling of approval when he performs
the act. The difficulty here is that conscience may sometimes
be mistaken in what it approves, if the act is judged by conse-
quences. There is a sense in which a thing is judged right other
than that it is merely approved, and this is objective, in that

¹Ibid., p. 6.
²Ibid., p. 15.
it does not depend merely upon opinions and feelings. Thus an act which is subjectively right may be objectively wrong, since conscience approves the act, but the consequences show it to be wrong. This means that "objective" rightness must be judged from the standpoint of consequences. We should strive to train ourselves to give approval to things we believe objectively right, thus training the conscience to approve what is objectively right, and bringing subjective and objective rightness into agreement with each other. The wisest action is the one that will on the whole probably have the best consequences.¹ From these conclusions Russell comes to use moral and immoral to refer to the subjective aspect of an act, and the terms right and wrong to refer to the objective aspects of conduct as judged by consequences. An act is moral when it is what the agent judges objectively right after sufficient consideration; and it is right when of all possible acts it will probably get the best results.

Regardless of what determinists say, Russell thinks that occasions do arise where several alternatives present themselves, and "it is certain that we can both do which we choose, and choose which we will. In this sense all the alternatives are possible. What determinism maintains is, that our will to choose this or that alternative is the effect of antecedents; but this does not prevent our will from being itself a cause of other effects."² Morality, he claims, depends upon the assumption that volitions have causes, otherwise it would be useless to attempt

¹Ibid., pp. 21-24.
²Ibid., p. 37.
to influence the conduct of others. If causality played no part in human conduct, we could never be sure of anyone.

Russell rejects egoism as an adequate basis for establishing the "good" toward which our conduct should aim. He thinks the theory that a man will serve the general good best by serving his own good is refuted by common experience. Since egoism cannot be maintained, he concludes that "we ought to pursue the general good, and when this conflicts with self-interest, self-interest ought to give way."\(^1\)

Russell thinks that the differences of opinion as to moral judgments regarding the same thing could be largely removed by more adequate consideration of the facts involved. The philosopher often falls into error through trying to construct a system, and the moralist tends to become absorbed in the consideration of means—actions—rather than in the ends of conduct, which should be his chief interest.\(^2\) Ideas of what is good or bad do not vary as much as ideas of right and wrong which apply to conduct, and conduct varies in different circumstances, even though the same end may be in view. We often confuse means and ends in considering conduct also. In considering ends we should view them as a whole. The value of a complex whole cannot be measured by adding together the values of the parts. "The whole is often better or worse than the sum or the values of its parts," and "many goods must be estimated as wholes, not piecemeal; and exactly the same applies to evils."\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 49.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 52-53.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 54.
This statement regarding the value of wholes appears to be a direct contradiction of the analytic method which Russell advocates as the proper method to be used in philosophy. It also implies the objectivity of values, and is a surprising conclusion for a scientific analytic materialist, who elsewhere finds no place for values in the system of nature.

He concludes this study of ethics with the thought that the greater part of the differences in ethical views are due to mistaking means for ends, or to the influence of some "hasty theory" in falsifying immediate judgments. Clearer thinking should result in more agreement, which is probably the chief benefit of studying ethics, he thinks.

Russell appears to have forgotten his theory long enough to recognize that values do have some objective meaning in the world. Does he later sacrifice this decision in the interests of his theory? Perhaps his should not be termed a "hasty" theory, but it appears that he does sacrifice many of the values of experience in the interests of a logical theory, thus falling into the very error which, as we have noted above, he condemns in other philosophers on ethical subjects.

B. His Leaning Toward Subjectivism in His Later Outlook.

When we turn to the essay on "Mysticism and Logic" we find Russell maintaining that good and evil are subjective matters.

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1Mysticism and Logic, p. 113. Also cf. p. 16 above.
2Philosophical Essays, pp. 52-53. Also cf. p. 21 above.
3Mysticism and Logic, pp. 1-32.
"What is good is merely that towards which we have one kind of feeling, and what is evil is merely that towards which we have another kind of feeling." Ethical interest is simply the "hope of satisfaction to our human desires.... The difference between a good world and a bad one is a difference in the particular characteristics of the particular things that exist in these worlds." This difference attaches to things only from the standpoint of our personal desires, not from the standpoint of the things themselves, nor the philosophic view of them. The scientific attitude seeks only the facts, without regard to ethical considerations. Philosophy has seldom sought or achieved ethical neutrality, while the spirit of science is "submission," which is likely to achieve the best ethical results. "The good which it concerns us to remember is the good which it lies in our power to create--the good in our own lives and in our attitude towards the world."

Russell now attempts to make ethics entirely a subjective affair, yet declares there is a "good which lies in our power to create." Once a good is created, does it not become objective? Does it not become one of the terms to which other terms become related? If it is held to be but a relation between myself and something in the world, it is still real, since relations are among the fundamental realities, according to Russell. He maintains further, as stated above, that the scientific attitude

1Ibid., p. 27.
2Ibid., p. 29.
3Ibid., p. 31.
seeks only the facts. If this "good which....concerns us" is a fact then science must be able to deal with it, which means that it is objectively real, but if it is not a fact, then how can it concern us?

It should further be noted that in thus making good specific and personal, he is taking a position in direct opposition to his contention in "The Elements of Ethics" that good is general and impersonal, which we have already noted.\(^1\)

In the essay, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," he says, "All ethics, however refined, remains more or less subjective..."\(^2\) One wonders just how ethics can be "more or less subjective" without also being more or less objective. If it is only partially subjective then it must also be partially objective. However, it seems evident that Russell is trying to make ethics merely a subjective personal matter, depending entirely upon feeling and desire.

C. The Ethics of Desire and the Good Life.

1. Man's Relation to Nature and the Place of Values.

In a little book entitled, What I Believe, Russell sets forth desire as the basis for whatever ethical notions we have. In the first place, we should note that "Man is a part of Nature, not something contrasted with Nature."\(^3\) Then, "The philosophy

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\(^1\) Cf. p. 18 above.
\(^3\) What I Believe, p. 1.
of nature is one thing, the philosophy of value is quite another. Nothing but harm can come of confusing them. What we think good, what we should like, has no bearing whatever upon what is, which is the question for the philosophy of nature."¹ The result is that, though we are children of nature, "everything, real or imagined, can be appraised by us, and there is no outside standard to show that our valuation is wrong. We are ourselves the ultimate and irrefutable arbiters of value, and in the world of value Nature is only a part."² In the world of values we transcend nature, but "In the world of values, Nature in itself is neutral, neither good nor bad, deserving neither admiration nor censure. It is we who create value, and our desires which confer value."²

Thus it appears that man, though the child of nature, is able to create something apart from nature and not the product of it, yet to which nature and with it himself is amenable. Truly, this is logic "fearfully and wonderfully made." It seems to be dualism, pure but not simple.

2. Philosophical Development of the Ethics of Desire.

a. Ethics and Morals Contrasted and Defined.

In a chapter on "Ethics" in his book entitled Philosophy, Russell has set forth in the most complete form that I have found the process of thought by which he has arrived at his "Ethics of

¹Ibid., p. 14.
²Ibid., pp. 16-17.
Desire." He claims that ethics should furnish the principles from which to deduce the rules of conduct which belong to morals. Moral rules vary in different ages and among different races and nations to a surprising degree. "But ethics is concerned with something more general than moral rules, and less subject to change."¹

When some one says: "You ought to do so-and-so" or "I ought to do so-and-so," there is in the thought an "emotional content" which means "this is the act towards which I feel the emotion of approval." But we want "something more objective and systematic and constant than a personal emotion," so we must examine the reasons which are given for the claim that we "ought" to approve certain things. He points out that the ancients, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all dealt extensively with ethics, but "...the subject has not yet proved amenable to exact reasoning, and we cannot boast that the moderns have as yet rendered their predecessors obsolete."² One is rather thankful that he makes this admission.

In his somewhat earlier book, What I Believe, Russell maintains that the "ought" element of experience is the urge to do what society dictates we should do. It is the impulse toward social behavior. "What we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire."³ It is worth noticing that we do not always give our own emotional approval to what society

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¹Philosophy, pp. 225-226.
²Ibid., pp. 226-227.
³What I Believe, pp. 29-30.
demands. Apparently Russell has not reached definite conclusions about the "ought" experience.

b. Theories Regarding Virtue.

Russell thinks that in the beginning virtue consisted in obedience to some authority, religious, political, or social. The people of one community tend to universalize the code of moral rules which they accept, and think them proper for everyone, everywhere. Any age or nation having different customs is condemned. This view holds that "there are certain rules of conduct---e.g. the Decalogue---which determine virtue in all situations." Russell thinks there are several objections to this view, however, the first of which is that "the rules can hardly cover the whole field of human conduct." If anything is a "moral issue" we will have our course dictated for us by the rule, "regardless of consequences," while in other matters we we will have to consider the consequences. This results practically in having two codes, which is unsatisfactory. The second objection is that "a code of conduct which takes no account of circumstances" will sometimes have desirable, and sometimes undesirable consequences. The third objection is that we cannot tell which codes of rules to adopt. It is usually claimed that each of various codes is known by "revelation and tradition," but there is nothing to show which revelation is correct, except personal interest. "Thus we are driven to abandon the attempt to define virtue by means of a set of rules of conduct."1

1Philosophy, pp. 227-228.
There is another form of this view which holds that "no matter how moral codes may differ, a man should always obey that of his own time and place and creed." Thus a Mohammedan would not be condemned for practicing polygamy anywhere, but an Englishman would be condemned no matter where he lived. Russell says this view "makes social conformity the essence of virtue; or, as with Hegel, regards virtue as obedience to government." This might work well, he thinks, in an autocracy, but not in democratic countries.¹

It may be more nearly correct to "define right conduct by the motive or state of mind of the agent." Thus, "acts inspired by love are good, and those inspired by hate are bad." Practically Russell holds this is right, but philosophically it is "deducible from something more fundamental."² In this view I suppose Russell would include Kant's doctrine of the good will, but Russell does not consider it satisfactory, because it takes no account of consequences, as we shall see.

He points out that none of the views thus far considered judge conduct by its "consequences." The utilitarian philosophy, which makes consequences the standard of judgment, maintains that "happiness is the good, and that we ought to act so as to maximise the balance of happiness over unhappiness in the world." Russell does not think happiness is adequate as a definition of "the good," but does agree that "conduct ought to be judged by its consequences." For this reason, he thinks the moral code

¹Ibid., pp. 228-229.
²Ibid., p. 229.
should be changed whenever necessary to make it serve the public good.\(^1\) Here he appears once more to take an objective attitude toward the "good." Even though conduct should be judged by consequences, he thinks there is a specific "good" which should be sought. It is strange that Russell does not see how he objects values practically, though he refuses to do so theoretically.

c. How We Find the "Good."

We must now see "what constitutes the ends of right conduct." Russell says that he formerly held that there are certain general propositions about what is "good," which are known a priori, but that he now thinks that "good and bad are derivative from desire." He does not merely mean that the "good is the desired," for desires conflict, and "good is... mainly a social concept, designed to find an issue from the conflict." There will be conflicting desires, not simply between groups, but within the experience of a solitary individual. If one acts on the desire that is strongest at the moment, then other desires which are thought better in the long run, may be defeated. This conflict must be solved by the use of intelligence, and if there is a desire for a harmonious life, then desires consistent with each other must be encouraged.\(^2\)

When people live together in society, more desires conflict, and a neutral authority is necessary to attempt to harmonize them.

\(^1\)Loc. cit.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 230-231.
Sometimes this authority seeks to bring internal harmony within a group by creating "esprit de corps, public spirit, patriotism, etc." which directs quarrelsome impulses toward some outside group. This is a "partial and external" method, however, not likely to have satisfactory consequences in the long run.

It may be argued that more happiness can be derived from love than from hate, but Russell thinks this is not always true. For instance, many people got much satisfaction from hating the Germans during the war. For this reason he holds that the most important moral standards "cannot be inculcated from a personal point of view, but only from the point of view of a neutral authority." Therefore he claims that "ethics is mainly social." ¹

The neutral authority must seek to inculcate and develop desires that will be compatible for the greatest harmony within the group, that is, those that are "socially preferable." "Our desires are a product of three factors; native disposition, education, and present circumstances," Russell declares. The first we know but little how to deal with. The third is operative in an external way through the law, economic motives, social praise and blame, etc., "not by creating good desires, but by producing a conflict of greed and fear in which it is hoped that fear will win." The second factor, education, is the really vital method of training and changing men's desires, "so that they act spontaneously in a social fashion."²

¹Ibid., pp. 231-233.
²Ibid., p. 233.
What a man does is more important than what he feels, from the standpoint of society, "but it is impossible to cause a man to do the right thing consistently unless he has the right desires."\(^1\) One cannot have right desires by simply praising them or wishing to have them. Exhortation or teaching of specific moral rules is not sufficient to make people moral, Russell thinks. They must be taught to desire the right things.

d. The Supreme Moral Rule of the Ethics of Desire.

Russell now defines "good" and "bad" more explicitly.

"Primarily, we call something 'good' when we desire it, and 'bad' when we have an aversion from it. But our use of words is more constant than our desires, and therefore we shall continue to call a thing good even at moments when we are not actually desiring it....Moreover the use of words is social, and therefore we learn only to call a thing good, except in rare circumstances, if most of the people we associate with are also willing to call it good. Thus 'good' comes to apply to things desired by the whole of a social group. It is evident, therefore, that there can be more good in a world where the desires of different individuals harmonize than in one where they conflict. The supreme moral rule should, therefore, be: Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires."\(^2\)

To accomplish this end, social institutions should be such as to cause as little conflict of interests as possible between different individuals or groups, and individuals should be educated so as to have harmonious desires both within themselves, and with those of their neighbors.\(^3\)

If we seek harmonious desires, then "love is better than

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 233-234.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 234.
\(^3\)Loc. cit.
hate, since, when two people love each other, both can be satisfied, whereas when they hate each other one at most can achieve the object of his desire." We should encourage the desire for knowledge, for knowledge can be shared by all. The desire for property, or for power, are causes of conflict, however, since only a few can satisfy them. Respect for the rights of others, and impulses toward personal achievement in the creation of works of art or in scientific investigation should be developed by education. Where desires are harmonious, knowledge is good; but where desires conflict, knowledge may be very dangerous. This leads Russell to declare that "The conclusion may be summed up in a single phrase: The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."¹

This brings us directly to a consideration of the "Good Life" which Russell sets forth in a chapter under that title in What I Believe.

3. The Good Life.

Russell's view is, as stated above, that "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."² He holds that "neither love without knowledge, nor knowledge without love can produce a good life." He cites as an example of love without knowledge, the gathering of people to pray for relief from a pestilence, thus spreading the infection; and as an example of

¹Ibid., p.235.
²Loc. cit. Also What I Believe, p. 20.
knowledge without love, the use of science for destruction of life in the World War. "Although both love and knowledge are necessary, love is in a sense more fundamental, since it will lead intelligent people to seek knowledge, in order to find out how to benefit those whom they love."  

a. Meaning of Love.

By love Russell means the emotion of love, which is genuine interest, as constrained with the principle of benevolence which is "a pale emotion nine parts humbug." Benevolence, however, seems the best word he can find to denote the desire for the welfare of others. Love is a combination of delight and well-wishing. "Delight without well-wishing may be cruel; well-wishing without delight easily tends to become cold and a little superior." 

In a perfect world we might love every being but in our actual world it is impossible to feel delight in some things, which we find disgusting. "Not to mention human beings, there are fleas and bugs and lice." One cannot feel "wholly benevolent" toward a rival lover. Delight must be an ingredient of the best love, but it is selective, and compromises with benevolence will be necessary, since "instinct has its rights, and if we do violence to it beyond a point it takes vengeance in subtle ways." We must always take account of human limitations, which makes knowledge necessary.

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1 Ibid., p. 21
2 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
3 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
5 Ibid., p. 28.
b. Meaning of Knowledge.

By knowledge, Russell means the sort of knowledge science gives rather than what is commonly called ethical knowledge, for, he says, "I do not think there is, strictly speaking, such a thing as ethical knowledge." The rightness or wrongness of a given course of conduct must be decided by "reference to its probable consequences." Science should determine how to achieve whatever ends are desired. ¹

Rules of conduct must be tested by consequences, that is, whether they realize desired ends. When we say we "ought" to desire certain ends, we are simply recognizing social pressure, for "What we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire." The feeling that one "ought" to do something, then, is just the pressure of custom and convention, which influences our behavior through desire for approval and fear of disapproval. ¹

Suppose your child is ill. "Love makes you wish to cure it, and science tells you how to do so." You do not pause to prove it is better to cure the child. "Your act springs directly from desire for an end, together with knowledge of means." The same principle operates in regard to all our conduct. In some cases our knowledge is more adequate to accomplish a desired end than in others. We cannot make people do what they do not wish to do, however. "What is possible is to alter their desires by a system of rewards and penalties, among which social approval and

¹Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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disapproval are not the least potent....Outside of human desires there is no moral standard."¹

4. Desire as the Basis of Ethics and the Good Life.

Russell contends that the only difference between ethical knowledge and scientific knowledge is that ethical knowledge consists in knowing whatever facts are necessary to accomplish the fulfillment of our desires. So, he argues, "what distinguishes ethics from science is not any special kind of knowledge, but merely desire. The knowledge required in ethics is exactly like the knowledge elsewhere; what is peculiar is that certain ends are desired, and right conduct is what conduces to them."²

In a sense, then, ethical knowledge must also be scientific, and the more proof we have that a certain kind of conduct will achieve the desired ends, the better ethical knowledge it is. It seems to follow, then, that the best ethical knowledge would be the most purely scientific. The only standard to decide our course of conduct, once we have learned what ends can be attained by certain courses of conduct, which might be a matter for science to determine, is our desire. Having decided what ends we desire, we then merely choose the course of conduct that will attain those ends.

The effectiveness of an ethical argument, therefore, lies in the amount of scientific proof that can be adduced to show that a given course of conduct will attain the desired ends. But

¹Ibid., pp. 31-32.
²Ibid., p. 32.
desire remains the standard that determines what ends we shall choose, and ethical education "consists in strengthening certain desires and weakening others."\(^1\)

Although Russell thinks that desire is the basis of all ethics, and that it furnishes the only moral standard in attaining the "good life," I think that in the "good life" itself he sets a standard for the desires to achieve. I shall try to bring this out in the course of my criticism which follows.

5. Criticism of Russell's Ethics of Desire.

When desire is declared to be basis of right conduct, it seems to me that the question still remains as to how we shall determine what are the right desires. A standard is needed, for desires are personal things, and they never stand off for us to look at them. It is a very easy matter for us to deceive ourselves into believing our purposes are altruistic, even though at root they are selfish, when we desire something very much. If the desires are to be guided by the training society gives through approval and disapproval, then social custom and convention must have a large part in determining our aims, but this is a heteronomous influence, and, as we shall see presently, Russell is much opposed to it.

There appears to be another danger too. When Russell contends that the only difference between ethical knowledge and scientific knowledge is that ethical knowledge is what shows how

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 33.
to achieve the desired ends, he identifies much scientific knowledge as also ethical, for, he says, "The whole effectiveness of any ethical argument lies in its scientific part, i.e. in the proof that one kind of conduct, rather than some others, is a means to an end which is widely desired." This may lead to the theory that the "end justifies the means." It has been noted that Russell does not mean "quite simply that the good is the desired," and he recognizes that one cannot act merely on impulses that happen to be strongest at the moment, for this might result in defeating other desires that are stronger in the long run. However, if the knowledge of how to achieve desired ends is to be regarded as coldly scientific fact, not to be evaluated ethically, then it is logical to follow the principle that the end justifies the means. But this maxim cannot be maintained if the means are likely to produce harm that over-balances the good of the end in view.

Russell would probably answer that all conduct must be judged by its probable consequences, and would contend that if the conduct involved in attaining a desired end had undesirable consequences then the means of achieving it should be changed, or the end abandoned. If, however, the end in view is held to be sufficiently desirable, or the desire for that end is sufficiently strong in the long run, then it is likely to follow that the means involved will be disregarded, especially if there seems to be no other means.

1Loc. cit.
2Philosophy, pp. 230-231.
3Everett, Moral Values, pp. 57-58.
4What I Believe, pp. 29-30.
to attain the desired ends. On the basis of desire there is no other standard than the desire, and if it is sufficiently strong, it will naturally override whatever stands in its way.

Perhaps Russell would say that this difficulty is removed by educating the desires, which, as we have seen, he thinks, "consists in strengthening certain desires and weakening others." But there must be some standard to determine what desires are to be strengthened and what ones weakened. In this regard, Russell says, "I desire to see approval given to behavior likely to realize social purposes which we desire and disapproval to opposite behavior."¹ From this it appears that "social purposes" might be taken as the standard, and the means of altering the desires of people so as to conform to this standard is "by a system of rewards and penalties, among which social approval and disapproval are not the least potent."² But in the process of education of the desires to achieve the desired "social purposes," some one must determine what these "social purposes" are, and what desires will achieve them, and also what "system of rewards and penalties" will result in developing the proper desires. If "social approval and disapproval" are to be recognized as "not the least potent" and used, then it means that the desire for social approval is thought to be one of the strongest desires and is used accordingly. What is this but desiring "merely what someone else wishes us to desire?"³ Yet this is just what Russell says "ought" means, and he condemns the "ought" experience as merely the pressure of

¹Ibid., p. 30.
²Ibid., pp. 31-32.
³Ibid., p. 29.
authority, convention, and custom, and thinks it should have no place in ethical considerations. However, the ethics of desire, which he advocates, is to be judged and enforced by exactly the same standards and methods of social approval and disapproval, that is, largely through custom and convention. Whether it be called "ought" or the desire for realization of "social purposes," it has the same urge underlying it in the experience of the individual person, and a large part of that urge is due to "social approval and disapproval." It seems as though the "ought" which Russell threw so unceremoniously "out the window" has quite ceremoniously walked back in "by the door," dressed in a new garb.

Though Russell contends that "outside of human desires there is no moral standard,"¹ we have noted that he practically recognizes "social purposes" as the standard for judging conduct. This is after all much the same object that is aimed at in the standards set by custom and convention which a person receives from the social group, and which are enforced by a system of rewards and penalties, or social approval and disapproval. His standard is not as new as he thinks it is, except that he would have the "social purposes" determined by scientific means rather than the more haphazard methods society has used in the past.

He has placed the motive power urging us toward conformity to those standards that society dictates we should adopt in the desires rather than in the voice of conscience, commonly interpreted as the "ought" experience. He has given us another

¹Ibid., p. 32.
interpretation of human experience that he thinks more scientific, but which we cannot be sure is really any closer to the facts than is the other. It may be that it satisfies a materialist, who refuses to recognize the integrity of the self in psychology, better than the older interpretation of the experience of obligation, but in his attitude Russell displays much the same dogmatism, which he condemns so enthusiastically in others.

Russell would no doubt say that if conduct is "inspired by love," then love would prevent one from indulging in a desire which knowledge showed would have bad "consequences." This seems to me inadequate, however, since a desire for some selfish end or for something for someone else may be "inspired by love" for oneself or another, and, if the desire is strong enough, knowledge may seek the fulfillment of that desire at the expense of everything else. Here again the end might easily be thought to justify the means. There seems to be no guarantee that the desire for realization of "social purposes" would be any stronger from this point of view than from that of Kant who held that a good act is one inspired by the "good will." After all, I do not see that there is likely to be any difference between conduct inspired by love or by a good will.

It appears to me that there is just as likely to be good "consequences" from acting from a "good will" which regards every person as an end in himself, as from acting from desire even though "inspired by love," since the latter case it may be much easier to regard some people as means to be used in the attainment of the desired ends.
The love that Russell means, noted above, is the personal emotion of love, which, unless universalized, is apt to partake of all the selfishness that personal love may involve. If it is universalized it becomes benevolence or good will, of which Russell is distrustful, though he admits that it is a necessary element in love. This universalized love may be very similar to the attitude of Kant's good will. The physical sensations of love, such as the "delight" which Russell mentions, will be lacking in good will, but otherwise the differences of attitude may not be great. To say that an act is "inspired by love" does not seem very different from saying that it is the product of "Good Will." Perhaps Russell is not as far from Kant in principle as he thinks he is.

Desire must no doubt play an important part in any ethics of value, as Prof. Everett has pointed out, but to declare that "outside of human desires there is no moral standard," as Russell does, seems to be surrendering to the maxim of "every man for himself." In The Conquest of Happiness Russell makes consistency and harmony the standard for desire, but this does not solve the problem, for one's desires may be utterly consistent and harmonious for an antisocial end. Desires are unstable individual impulses, the product of instinct and environment for the most part, rather than reason. Russell would have them trained for "social purposes," but this is setting up a standard outside of desire itself. Desires are the driving power of conduct to a large extent, but without ideals in life to set a standard for the desires to aim at, we have nothing to differentiate a good life from a bad one.

1W. G. Everett, Moral Values, p. 181.
It seems that, despite the fact that he claims there is no moral standard outside of desires, Russell has really set up an ideal standard in his conception of the "good life." He intends that the "good life" shall be the desired. It is achieved through "love," which is an attitude of personal interest and desire for general well-being, guided by the best knowledge for the accomplishment of "social purposes." Here is a standard outside of the desires, which the desires should be trained to accept. After all, it does not seem that this is very far from the standard of universalized good will, as set forth by Kant.

Russell also recognizes many ideal values of life which should be achieved to make life good, which really set standards for conduct. So in practice Russell appears to be quite inconsistent with his claim that there is no moral standard outside desire. The one place where he seems really to follow the principle of desire more clearly than anywhere else is in the matter of sex. One might almost think that sex has no "social purposes." We shall consider his attitude on sex a little further on.

D. Moral Codes and Conventional Morality.

1. Place of Moral Codes.

Russell recognizes the need and place for moral rules and codes. In one of his early essays he says, "The importance of precepts such as the Ten Commandments lies in the fact that they are simple rules, obedience to which will in almost all cases
have better consequences than disobedience."¹

Later he declares, "The practical need of morals arises from the conflict of desires, whether of different people or of the same person at different times or even at one time."² He holds that Bentham's principle of "enlightened self-interest" is not satisfactory, because prudence may lead to cruelty toward others, though "prudence is a part of the good life."³ Moral codes furnish "a method of enabling men to live together in a community in spite of the possibility that their desires may conflict."⁴ Methods of applying codes vary. There is the method of the criminal law, which inflicts disagreeable consequences for undesirable acts; and the method of social censure. But Russell thinks there is "another method, more fundamental, and far more satisfactory when it succeeds. This is to alter men's characters and desires in such a way as to minimize occasions of conflict by making the success of one man's desires as far as possible consistent with that of another's." Thus love is better than hate, for "two people between whom there is love succeed or fail together, but when two people hate each other the success of either is the failure of the other."⁵

All moral codes should be examined, Russell thinks, to see whether they are "such as wisdom and benevolence would have decreed."⁶ He finds much that is both unwise and sadly lacking in

¹Philosophical Essays, p. 20.
²What I Believe, p. 35.
³Ibid., p. 35.
⁴Ibid., p. 37.
⁵Ibid., p. 38.
⁶Ibid., p. 39.
benevolence in our conventional morality of sex and marriage, and in education and the state. Much of the difficulty he blames on religious superstition and on the superstition of nationalism.¹

He believes that "moral rules ought not to be such as to make instinctive happiness impossible."²

2. His Criticism of Conventional Morality.

Russell began to be critical of conventional morality in his early ethical writings, where he declares, "Most conventional codes embody some degree of unwarrantable selfishness, individual, professional, or national, and are thus in certain respects worthy of detestation."³ This point of view grows with the years. In the essay entitled, "On the Value of Scepticism," he holds that for the most part, actions are due to habits rather than beliefs, though our most important actions are associated with beliefs. However, beliefs are seldom based on evidence, but upon selfish motives which are unconscious, and for which we invent reasons. Shrewdness is unconscious reason working for our own interests.⁴ The impulses which further our lives and the lives of others include "the joy of life, love, and art, which is psychologically an offshoot of love." The lower impulses of the instinctive life include "competition, patriotism, and war." Conventional morality does everything to discourage

¹Ibid., pp. 40-54.
²Ibid., p. 50.
³Philosophical Essays, p. 22.
⁴Sceptical Essays, pp. 11-25.
the first group of impulses and to encourage the second group. "True morality would do the exact opposite." We may trust the care of those whom we love to instinct; but not so those whom we hate. Those not of our group are apt to be conceived abstractly, and we are likely to persuade ourselves that even acts motivated by hatred really have a lofty motive, though it may be selfish. Russell declares further:

"Only a large measure of scepticism can tear away the veils which hide the truth from us. Having achieved that, we could begin to build a new morality, not based on envy and restriction, but on the wish for a full life and the realization that other beings are a help and not a hindrance when once the malignancy of envy has been cured. This is not a Utopian hope; it was partially realized in Elizabethan England. It could be realized to-morrow if men would learn to pursue their own happiness rather than the misery of others. This is no impossible austere morality; yet its adoption would turn our earth into a paradise."  

In the essay on "Dreams and Facts" he holds that beliefs are the outgrowth of desires, and are usually wholly irrational. Beliefs are day dreams, often dispelled by discovery of facts.  

In an ironical essay, entitled, "The Harm that Good Men Do," Russell upholds Bentham's utilitarianism against Kant. He says that Kant's view is that all virtue must be inspired by the moral law, and not by affection for the person affected. This is obviously unfair to Kant, for he insisted that every person should always be treated as an end, never as a means. According to current ideas, Russell continues, virtue is simply conformity to conventional ideas of "goodness," or what custom says "ought" to be. The conventionally "good" man may not make

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1Sceptical Essays, pp. 24-25.
2Ibid., pp. 26-35.
3Ibid., pp. 111-123.
anyone happier; and the conventionally "bad" man may do much good. He concludes that "a good man is one whose opinions and activities are pleasing to the holders of power." That is, a "good" man in what Russell regards as the conventional sense.

A few sentences casting further light upon his point of view follow: "The standards of 'goodness' which are generally recognized by public opinion are not those which are calculated to make the world a happier place." This he claims is due to tradition and "the unjust power of . . . dominant classes."¹

"Current ethic is a curious mixture of superstition and rationalism." Our virtue is negative; it"consists in not doing rather than in doing." Love is positive; the Gospel precept to "love thy neighbor as thyself" is positive.²

Russell says Bentham advocated, as the basis of morals, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number," but those who seek it are persecuted. He continues, "We need a morality based upon love of life, upon pleasure in growth and positive achievement, not upon repression and prohibition. A man should be regarded as 'good' if he is happy, expansive, generous, and glad when others are happy; if so, a few peccadillos should be regarded as of little importance."³

Thus we see how thoroughly disgusted Russell has become with our conventional morality, and goes to extremes in opposing it.

¹Ibid., p. 119.
²Ibid., p. 121.
³Ibid., p. 122.
a. Superstition in Conventional Morality.

We have just noted that Russell condemns much current morality as a "curious mixture of superstition and rationalism." He makes a strong case for his charges of superstition. Elsewhere he declares, "Current morality is a curious blend of utilitarianism and superstition, but the superstitious part has the stronger hold, as is natural, since superstition is the origin of moral rules."¹ This is because primitive peoples thought certain acts displeasing to the gods, and that the doing of these acts would bring punishment upon the whole community. Anyone who displeased a god committed sin, and since the whole community might be involved in the consequences of the sin, it was to the interest of all that he should atone for it. This led to belief in superstitions, and the individual who would not conform to superstitious customs was a threat to the community, according to their belief, and should be punished or destroyed.

However, the man of scientific outlook will examine all acts considered sinful to see whether they do any harm. "And he will find that especially in what concerns sex, our current morality contains a very great deal of which the origin is purely superstitious."² People have large families, though they cannot support them properly, because superstition dictates that they should.³ While nursing mothers and children are starving for milk, he asserts:

¹What I Believe, pp. 39-40.
²Ibid., p. 41.
³Ibid., pp. 42-43.
Public authorities will spend vast sums on paving rich residential districts where there is little traffic. They must know that in taking this decision they are condemning a certain number of working-class children to death for the crime of poverty. Yet the ruling party are supported by the immense majority of ministers of religion, who, with the Pope at their head, have pledged the vast forces of superstition throughout the world to the support of social injustice.¹

Here we get an inkling of Russell’s point of view and the reason he is so bitter against much of our conventional morality and conventional religion as found in the churches.

He blames superstition for much evil in our educational systems. Many things are not taught that children should learn because of superstition, especially in matters regarding sex.²

Superstition, combined with economic reasons, leads to imposing unmarried teachers upon children.³ Clergymen, he thinks, are the worst teachers of morals, for “they condemn acts which do no harm and they condone acts which do great harm.”⁴ This is especially true as regards sexual relations, and the encouraging of large families. Superstition is the cause of the lack of sex-education.⁵

He finds one thing even more harmful than theological superstition, and that is “the superstition of nationalism, of duty to one’s own State and to no other.”⁶

Another place where society suffers from superstitious morality is in the treatment accorded to criminals. "The view that criminals are 'wicked' and 'deserve' punishment is not one which

¹Ibid., pp. 44-45.
²Ibid., p. 45.
³Ibid., p. 46.
⁴Ibid., p. 47.
⁵Ibid., pp. 47-51.
⁶Ibid., p. 51.
a rational morality can support."  
Society must try to prevent people from doing certain things, of which murder is an example, but if two methods are "equally effective in preventing murder, the one involving least harm to the murderer is to be preferred." The criminal is a sick part of society and needs curative treatment, not merely punishment. Harm to the murderer is regrettable, but sometimes may be necessary. However, "the vindictive feeling called 'moral indignation' is merely a form of cruelty. Suffering to the criminal can never be justified by the notion of vindictive punishment. If education combined with kindness is equally effective, it is to be preferred; still more is it to be preferred if it is more effective."  

Elsewhere, Russell declares that primitive morality grew out of the taboo, purely superstitious, which forbade harmless acts through fear of magical power. The prohibition of murder, for example, was originally due to superstitious fear of the murdered man's blood (ghost). It was thought that blood guiltiness could be removed by ceremony, whence came the idea of repentance as the "washing out" of guilt. In the same way many other moral ideas that are current originated in superstition.

b. Fear as a Disruptive Force in Moral Life.

Time and again Russell inveighs against fear as one of the most destructive elements in our lives. Fear is at the root of

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1Ibid., p. 52.
2Ibid., p. 53.
3Sceptical Essays, pp. 119-120.
much that is evil in our conventional morality. He finds fear at the root of much malevolence in society. Many people have "a haunting fear of ruin," or "that they will lose their job or their health," or a great many other things, most of which never come to pass.¹ "The frantic pursuit of security" leads to hatred, cruelty, and war. Russell has summed up the case against fear in a recent article² in which he declares that fear and hatred are at the bottom of war and international anarchy. He traces many of our difficulties, both individual and social, to fear. The love of power and desire for possession in economic and political relations and in sexual morals, he finds are rooted in fear. Education which inculcates some orthodoxy instead of teaching pupils to think is due to pursuit of some fancied security, inspired by some irrational fear.²

He recognizes that rational fear must have a place in life, but irrational fear is wholly bad, and the cause of much trouble. He thinks that "one of the chief concerns of the scientific moralist must be to combat fear. This can be done in two ways: by increasing security, and by cultivating courage."³ He believes that increasing security will diminish cruelty and hatred. Oppression has been one great cause of fear, and justice can do away with this. Through education and science courage can be increased; indeed, he thinks it likely that "there is no limit to what science could do in the way of increasing courage."⁴

¹What I Believe, p. 69.
³What I Believe, p. 70.
⁴Ibid., p. 75.
Puritanism is one of the types of conventional morality which Russell regards as unqualifiedly bad. He thinks that the Puritanical contempt for pleasure has led us into contempt for happiness. In condemning art, Puritanism has thwarted the creative impulses, producing an element of cruelty in conventional morality.¹ "We may define a Puritan," he says, "as a man who holds that certain kinds of acts, even if they have no visible bad effects upon others than the agent, are inherently sinful, and ought to be prevented by whatever means is most effectual."² He admits that Puritanism has championed democracy and freed the slaves, but its moral fervor usually results in lack of sympathy.

"The practical objection to Puritanism, as to every form of fanaticism, is that it singles out certain evils as so much worse than others that they must be suppressed at all costs. The fanatic fails to recognize that the suppression of a real evil, if carried out too drastically, produces other evils which are even greater."³

Puritanism has developed the love of power, which, though it "camouflages itself as love of doing good," produces tyranny, hatred, and war. The Puritanic "sense of sin" makes men unhappy, and gives a feeling of inferiority. Further, "Our nominal morality has been formulated by priests and mentally enslaved women. It is time that men who have to take a normal part in the normal life of the world learned to rebel against this sickly nonsense."⁴ Its influence may be checked by "a broader education and a wider knowledge of mankind."⁵

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¹ How To Be Free and Happy.
² Sceptical Essays, p. 124-125.
³ Ibid., p. 127.
⁴ The Conquest of Happiness, p. 104.
⁵ Sceptical Essays, p. 131.
3. His Views on Sex and Sexual Morality.

Russell's attack on traditional and conventional morality regarding sex matters runs like a refrain through most of his writing on ethical and social questions. He thinks that "especially in what concerns sex, our current morality contains a very great deal of which the origin is purely superstitious." ¹ He says that the present morals regarding sex and marriage have developed from interest in maintaining the authority of the father, combined with the ascetic attitude of Christianity, which felt there was "something essentially impure in the sexual act,"² though this was entirely due to superstition.

Russell holds that two questions should be asked regarding any system of marriage: First, how does it affect the development and character of the men and women concerned? Second, what is its influence on the propagation and education of children?³ He thinks our present laws regarding marriage tend to depress life rather than give it chance for expression. The law should only be "concerned with marriage through the question of children, and should be indifferent to what is called morality, which is based upon custom and texts of the Bible, not upon any real consideration of the needs of the community."⁴

Again and again Russell reiterates the idea that society should have no part whatever in the regulation of the private sex relations of individuals, unless or until children come on

¹What I Believe, p. 41.
²Marriage and Morals, p. 57.
³Why Men Fight, p. 185.
⁴Ibid., p. 201.
the scene, in which case the state should step in with full authority to look after their welfare more than at present.\(^1\) He says further, "I think that all sex relations which do not involve children should be regarded as a purely private affair, and that if a man and woman choose to live together without having children, that should be no one's business but their own."\(^2\) He would not have us forget, however, that "children, rather than sexual intercourse, are the true purpose of marriage."\(^3\)

For love Russell has a very high regard. "Love is what gives intrinsic value to marriage, and, like art and thought, it is one of the supreme things which makes human life worth preserving." Marriage cannot be good without love, but ultimate satisfaction cannot be found in love alone, as it is "too circumscribed." Marriage at its best has a "purpose which goes beyond love." It must "stretch out into the future," and "be always growing, and infinite with the infinity of human endeavor." Most people find the needed purpose in children. When this need remains unsatisfied it often causes much unhappiness.\(^4\)

There is sometimes antagonism between religion and natural love because of the ascetic strain in Christianity.\(^5\) He finds that economic success is the greatest enemy of love, however, as it takes so much of a man's time and energy. Love and offspring are needed to make life good, for "Love, children, and work are the great sources of fertilizing contact between the

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\(^1\)How To Be Free and Happy, pp. 34-35; What I Believe, p. 49.  
\(^2\)Marriage and Morals, p. 165.  
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 166.  
\(^5\)Marriage and Morals, p. 120.
individual and the rest of the world."\(^1\)

Russell believes, however, that, though monogamous marriage worked well among primitive people, as we become civilized we develop more individuality, and there is less likelihood of lifelong happiness with a single partner. Divorce may be one solution, but is undesirable where there are children. For their sake, unfaithfulness in marriage must often be overlooked. For happiness in marriage, there should be complete equality, mutual freedom, the most complete physical and mental intimacy, and a similarity in regard to standards of values. "Given these conditions, I believe marriage to be the best and most important relation that can exist between two human beings."\(^2\)

Further, Russell holds that "in a rational ethic, marriage would not count as such in the absence of children."\(^3\) He thinks that the "companionate marriage" proposed by Judge Ben B. Lindsey is "the proposal of a wise conservative," who is seeking "to introduce some stability into the sexual relations of the young, in place of the present promiscuity."\(^4\) He thinks this much better than prostitution, which endangers the health of the community, and degrades the persons practicing it. He says, "People may come together for sex alone, as occurs in prostitution, or for companionship involving a sexual element, as in Judge Lindsey's companionate marriage, or finally, for the purpose of rearing a family. These are all different, and no

\(^{1}\text{Marriage and Morals, p. 126.}\)
\(^{2}\text{Ibid., p. 143.}\)
\(^{3}\text{Ibid., p. 153.}\)
\(^{4}\text{Ibid., p. 162.}\)
morality can be adequate to modern circumstances which confounds them in one indiscriminate total."¹

Russell thinks we should be concerned about the family, chiefly because of its effect upon the children. The development of individualism and the movement for equality of women with men have weakened the family very much, and may result in the elimination of fatherhood in care of the family. The state would take over the functions of the father in the care of children, resulting in a maternal society.² The result would not likely be good, however, for children need the masculine touch, especially boys,³ and the lack of companionship would affect both men and women seriously. The emotional life of men would tend to become trivial and thin, leading to boredom and despair, and indifference to procreation.⁴ Women might no longer desire children, and professional motherhood would become necessary, tending to make life mechanical.⁵ State training of children would result in dead uniformity among persons.

Sex is physical, while love is ideal, but the two should blend and find fruition in the marriage union.⁶ The sex instinct is not satisfied by the sex act alone; it needs courtship, love, and companionship to make it satisfactory.⁷ "The essence of a good marriage is respect for each other's personality, combined with a deep intimacy, physical, mental, and spiritual, which makes

¹Marriage and Morals, p. 157.
²Ibid., pp. 91-92 and pp. 183-188.
³Ibid., p. 195.
⁴Ibid., pp. 200-203.
⁵Ibid., p. 215.
⁶Ibid., p. 285.
⁷Ibid., p. 297.
a serious love between man and woman the most fructifying of all human experiences.¹ Russell thinks that failure to satisfy the sex instinct is dangerous to life, for he says, "To be unable to inspire sex love is a grave misfortune to any man or woman, since it deprives him or her of the greatest joys that life has to offer. This deprivation is almost sure sooner or later to destroy zest and produce introversion."²

The taboos of conventional morality militate against freedom in marriage relations which is essential for the satisfaction of love and instinct, according to Russell. "The only sex relations that have real value are those in which there is no reticence and in which the whole personality of both becomes merged in a new collective personality. Of all forms of caution, caution in love is perhaps most fatal to true happiness."³

E. The Place of Happiness in the Good Life.

Russell should doubtless be classified as a hedonist, though he is far from regarding pleasure as the chief thing to be sought after in life. He declares pleasure is not an end in itself, although it may add greatly to the satisfaction of life. Neither does happiness consist in a good income, as only a certain minimum of material things is essential for happy living. He thinks Jesus teaches a good formula for happy living: "Take no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye

¹Marriage and Morals, p. 320.
³Ibid., p. 185.
shall be clothed." We let minor things annoy us too much. If we get rid of fear and worry we may enjoy "the freedom of the universe."¹

Russell believes that life should be expansive and creative, giving the great impulses opportunity for expression. Discipline is necessary, "but the discipline you have in your life should be one determined by your own desires and your own needs, not put upon you by society or authority."² One immediately wonders just how much disciplining power there is in desire, except for selfish impulses. Desire is a personal affair, and can hardly be depended upon to discipline us in a social way, except in so far as it leads us to conform to society's demands in order to enjoy its approval or avoid its disapproval, but this is just what Russell calls conformity to conventional standards. He recognizes social obligation, but one wonders how much desire may be depended upon to enforce it, since it is unstable and impulsive.

Russell considers individual freedom one of the essential elements of happiness. He finds this is interfered with by the great amount of "active malevolence" in the world, which is "The worst feature of human nature, and the one which it is most necessary to change if the world is to grow happier."³ This malevolence is due to various causes, but one of the principle ones is fear. Fear, as we have seen, is best overcome

¹How To Be Free and Happy, p. 28.
²Ibid., p. 33.
³What I Believe, p. 68.
by increasing general security and developing courage in people. Other causes of malevolence are envy and disappointment. These could be largely overcome by making life "happier and fuller," which science could do much to accomplish if properly used.¹

To attain happiness Russell would have life less regulated and methodical, giving "nature" more opportunity for free play and development. Artificial conditions thwart the natural impulses too often, and cause unhappiness.² We should make physical nature serve human nature. So far, we have used science too much for destructive ends, "but this phase will pass when men have acquired the same domination over their own passions that they already have over the physical forces of the external world. Then at last we shall have won our freedom."³ And with this freedom, Russell believes, will come happiness.

In his book, The Conquest of Happiness, Russell enters into a discussion of the causes of unhappiness. He says, "I believe this unhappiness to be very largely due to mistaken views of the world, mistaken ethics, mistaken habits of life, leading to destruction of that natural zest and appetite for possible things upon which all happiness, whether of men or animals, ultimately depends."⁴ Chance may play some part, but "given average good fortune," he believes it lies "within the power of the individual" to achieve happiness in this life.

Here he gives some interesting side-lights upon his own

¹Ibid., pp. 78-79.
²Ibid., p. 84.
³Ibid., p. 87.
⁴The Conquest of Happiness, p. 16.
life, concerning which he says:

"I was not born happy. As a child my favorite hymn was: 'Weary of earth and laden with my sin.' At the age of five, I reflected that, if I should live to be seventy, I had only endured, so far, a fourteenth part of my life, and I felt the long-spread-out boredom ahead of me to be almost unendurable. In adolescence, I hated life and was continually on the verge of suicide, from which, however, I was restrained by the desire to know more mathematics. Now, on the contrary, I enjoy life; I might almost say that with every year that passes I enjoy it more. This is due partly to having discovered what were the things that I most desired, and having gradually acquired many of these things. Partly it is due to having successfully dismissed certain objects of desire....as essentially unattainable. But very largely it is due to a diminishing preoccupation with myself."1

Russell says that his early training was Puritanical, which led him to morbid introspection, but that as external interests developed and interest in his own deficiencies grew less, his happiness increased. Therefore he advocates wide interests outside oneself. "Every external interest inspires some activity which, so long as the interest remains alive, is a complete preventive of ennui. Interest in oneself, on the contrary, leads to no activity of a progressive kind."2

He thinks vanity and love of power are normal elements of human nature, but should not be excessively developed. In fact, over-development of any one element of human nature at the expense of the others is likely to cause unhappiness. The person who feels completely thwarted may seek "distraction and oblivion" in pleasure. Pleasure becomes "temporary suicide" bringing a "momentary cessation of unhappiness."3

Cynicism may be produced by achieving one's desires too

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1 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
2 Ibid., p. 18.
3 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
easily, for "to be without some of the things you want is an indispensable part of happiness."\(^1\) Some despair because everything changes and passes, but Russell thinks this should be ground for optimism rather than pessimism, since it makes for progress.

He thinks that love is bringing more joy to life than formerly. "There is now a great deal more happiness in connection with love and a great deal more genuine belief in the value of love than there was sixty years ago." Love is to be valued, first, "as in itself a source of delight," and second, "because it enhances all the best pleasures, such as music, and sunrise in the mountains, and the sea under the full moon."\(^2\) Could anything be more idealistic? Yet Russell has no place for values in his scheme of reality!

Competition, which is so prevalent in all phases of our modern life, he finds to be a great source of unhappiness.

Boredom and excitement he regards as extremes to be avoided, since an overdose of either will bring unhappiness. "Boredom, however, is not to be regarded as wholly evil.... A life too full of excitement is an exhausting life, in which continually stronger stimuli are needed to give the thrill that has come to be thought an essential part of pleasure."\(^3\) Training oneself to endure a certain amount of boredom will be beneficial, and contribute to contentment in living.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 29.
\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 37-39.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 61.
Undue fatigue, due to overwork or worry, may cause unhappiness. In regard to worry, Russell thinks that if misfortune threatens, it is best to consider "deliberately what is the worst that could possibly happen," and then realize the reasons why this would not really be so serious, since "nothing that happens to oneself has any cosmic importance." "Worry is a form of fear," and fear is generally due to "some danger which we are unwilling to face." We should face fear "rationally and calmly" until it becomes familiar and "familiarity will blunt its terrors." He advises, "When you find yourself inclined to brood on anything, no matter what, the best plan always is to think about it even more than you naturally would until at last its morbid fascination has worn off." Russell is apparently following the advice of the old adage: "Familiarity breeds contempt." There is no doubt truth in it in regard to some things. One wonders about it though in the light of what psychology tells us concerning the laws of habit formation, and what the psycho-analyst tells us about obsessions. Brooding along some lines is dangerous, and produces very bad results. It has led some to suicide and murder. Hasn't Russell considered this? Also it does not fit in well with his condemnation of introspection because it leads to morbidity, noted above.

Envy and jealousy Russell finds are two of the greatest enemies of happiness. Civilization seems to have increased envy rather than to have remedied the evil. Unless a remedy

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1Ibid., pp. 77-78.
is found, however, he thinks "our civilization is in danger of going down to destruction in an orgy of hatred."¹

Hatred seems more prevalent than friendly feeling among people to-day because civilization makes us dissatisfied. We feel we have "missed the meaning of life." We see better possibilities than we have achieved. Russell thinks we have not reached the final stage in evolution, but to find the way to something better "civilized man must enlarge his heart as he has enlarged his mind. He must learn to transcend self, and in so doing to acquire the freedom of the Universe."²

From the Puritanical outlook on life we have inherited a "sense of sin," which gives a feeling of inferiority, divides personality, and makes us self-centered.³

The persecution mania, which causes unhappiness to many, is generally due to an over-inflated sense of one's own importance. Fear of public opinion is a cause of much inhibiting of thought and action, especially among young people. On this point Russell says: "While it is desirable that the old should treat with respect the wishes of the young, it is not desirable that the young should treat with respect the wishes of the old." In general, "there is too much respect paid to the opinions of others."⁴ Russell is thinking here of progress and the possibility of individual development of initiative and originality, no doubt, but how can reverence for the past be developed if

¹Ibid., p. 92.
²Ibid., pp. 93-94.
³Ibid., pp. 106-108.
⁴Ibid., pp. 135-136.
the young are not to respect the wishes of the old? Or how can antisocial tendencies be checked without resort to harsh measures? Apparently Russell has a constant battle on between his individualistic desires and his realization of the importance of social values, with one sometimes emerging as victor, and sometimes the other. Of course, there is much truth on both sides, and it is difficult to strike a balance. Perhaps Russell does as well as most of us could.

After this minute analysis of the causes of unhappiness, Russell sets forth the things making for happiness as he sees them. He decides that happiness is possible in this world. He thinks men of science find it easier to be happy than most of the educated classes.¹ He regards companionship and co-operation as essential elements for happiness. A hobby is likely to contribute greatly to happiness, since it furnishes "a means of escape from reality." "A friendly interest in persons and things," he thinks the greatest source of happiness, but "an interest in impersonal things" is also a help.²

There should be "zest" in living if one would be happy. Affection contributes to it and "gives general self-confidence towards life."³ Children need it especially. In sex-love it contributes greatly to "reciprocal happiness." Russell finds that "of all the institutions that have come down to us from the past none is in the present day so disorganized and derailed

¹Ibid., p. 146.
³Ibid., pp. 160-178.
as the family," and believes that "this failure of the family to provide the fundamental satisfactions which in principle it is capable of yielding is one of the deep-seated causes of the discontent which is prevalent in our age."¹ There has been a great change in the relationships of parents and children. "Parents are no longer sure of their rights as against their children; children no longer feel that they owe respect to their parents."² (It seems that one might expect this to follow if the principle that Russell laid down that "the young should not respect the wishes of the old" is to be taken seriously, but perhaps the consequences of that principle may be undesirable in some respects.)

One of life's deep satisfactions is found in parenthood, Russell believes. "To be happy in this world, especially when youth is past, it is necessary to feel oneself not merely an isolated individual whose day will soon be over, but part of the stream of life flowing on from the first germ to the remote and unknown future."³

"Work" he finds desirable "as a preventive of boredom."⁴ But there should be in it "continuity of purpose," along with the opportunity for the "exercise of skill", and the doing of a constructive task. "The satisfaction to be derived from success in a great constructive enterprise is one of the most massive that life has to offer."⁵

¹Ibid., p. 187.
²Ibid., p. 193.
³Ibid., p. 198.
⁵Ibid., p. 216.
"Impersonal interests" contribute to happiness by drawing one's attention away from oneself, and helping to "a sense of proportion," Russell thinks. "A large conception of man and his place in the universe" will keep us from becoming unduly impressed with the importance of our own time and place in the world. When tempted to adopt dubious methods to gain immediate ends, if the long road man has come from barbarism is kept in mind, "you will realize that the momentary battle upon which you are engaged cannot be of such importance as to risk a backward step towards the darkness out of which we have been slowly emerging." Even though defeated temporarily, having in mind "purposes that are distant and slowly unfolding," the consciousness of being linked with "a great army of those who have led mankind towards a civilized outlook," will result in "a certain deep happiness." Thus "life will become a communion with the great of all ages, and personal death no more than a negligible incident." ¹

Once a person has realized what makes "greatness of soul" he cannot be content to be petty, self-seeking, and fearful of fate, declares Russell. He "will open wide the windows of his mind, letting the winds blow freely upon it from every portion of the universe." He will realize the limitations and brevity of human life, and that "in individual minds is concentrated whatever of value the known universe contains."² Breadth of interests enables one to "bear misfortune well," not leaving "the whole meaning and purpose of life at the mercy of accident."

¹Ibid., p. 226.
²Ibid., pp. 227-228.
To sum up, Russell holds that for happiness a few simple but indispensable things are needed: food and shelter, health, love, successful work, the respect of one's fellows, and, for some, parenthood. The rest is in one's attitude of mind toward the universe and his fellowmen.

F. Education in Relation to the Good Life.

1. Reason As A Factor in Life.

Russell thinks that reason has been the most powerful factor in the shaping of the history of the world, and that it is dominating life more and more. "To save the world requires faith and courage: faith in reason, and courage to proclaim what reason shows to be true. It is not a hopeless task to save the world, but it will never be achieved by those who allow themselves to think it hopeless."¹

He thinks that "rationality in opinion is merely...the habit of taking account of all relevant evidence in arriving at a belief."² Science seeks objective truth, or fact; theoretical rationality consists in basing beliefs on facts, or evidence, rather than upon "wishes, prejudices, or traditions." Practical rationality is difficult to obtain because of conflicting desires and passions. "Rationality in practice may be defined as the habit of remembering all our relevant desires, and not only the one which happens at the moment to be strongest."

²Sceptical Essays, pp. 46-47.
Ultimately, "the control of our acts by our own intelligence" is of most importance. "It is to intelligence, increasingly widespread, that we must look for the solution of the ills from which our world is suffering." ¹

Russell believes that the reason modern youth tends to be largely cynical is that the intellectual person has no place of recognition in the modern world unless "he is willing to sell his services to the stupid rich, either as propagandist or as court jester." This results in the sacrificing of his ideals, and he covers the loss by "a dash of cynicism." Men of science have an opportunity to use their brains in worth-while ways, but a person with literary training cannot exercise it "in any manner that appears important to himself." The only way out is to educate those who hold power and run the world of affairs. This is no doubt very difficult, but Russell believes it is not impossible.²


Russell holds scientific method in very high regard, and believes that the attitude of mind employed in scientific research should be applied as far as possible in all the activities of life. One reason for its desirability is that "scientific method sweeps aside our wishes and endeavors to arrive at opinions in which wishes play no part."³ Further,

¹<sup>1</sup> _Sceptical Essays_, p. 54.
³_The Scientific Outlook_, p. 44.
the scientific temper never asserts that what we now believe is "exactly right;...It is a stage on the road towards exact truth."¹

He thinks it possible that "scientific scepticism....may lead in the end to the collapse of the scientific era."² Science is becoming chiefly the "pursuit of power," while the "pursuit of truth" is being destroyed by scepticism as to the possibility of finding truth.³

3. Purpose and Method in Education.

Russell says that education seeks "the formation, through instruction, or certain mental habits and a certain outlook on life." The whole life is built around the instincts and impulses, and the purpose of education is to enlarge the scope of these impulses that nature has provided. It should not try to implant a set of virtues, or to overcome or oppose these impulses, and so thwart or eradicate nature, as some traditional theories have taught.⁴

"Education destroys the crudity of instinct, and increases through knowledge the wealth and variety of the individual's contacts with the outside world, making him no longer an isolated fighting unit, but a citizen of the universe, embracing distant countries, remote regions of space, and vast stretches of past and future within the circle of his interests. It is this simultaneous softening in the insistence of desire and enlargement of its scope that is the chief moral aim or education."⁵

¹Ibid., p. 65.
²Ibid., p. 94.
³Ibid., p. 100.
⁴Mysticism and Logic, p. 37.
⁵Ibid., p. 39.
The intellectual aim of education, he thinks, is "to make us see and imagine the world in an objective manner....and not merely through the distorting medium of personal desire." Education is to be judged successful "in proportion as it gives us a true view of our place in society," in the world and the universe.¹

He thinks education should train us in the application of scientific attitudes toward the problems of living. "The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all other desires in the interests of the desire to know."² The scientific attitude is ethically neutral; it is an attitude of disinterested curiosity which gives escape into a larger life. It is this method which education should always use.

Again, Russell declares that education should train pupils to think, to adventure mentally, to "find in creative thought an outlet which is neither wasteful nor cruel, but increases the dignity of man by incarnating in life some of that shining splendor which the human spirit is bringing down out of the unknown." In general, people fear thought more than death, he says, because it is revolutionary, indifferent to authority and established institutions, with an anarchic element about it. "Thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world, and the chief glory of man." Education should be inspired by "a shining vision of the society that is to be," rather than interested simply in maintaining existing institutions.³

¹ Ibid., p. 42.
² Ibid., p. 44.
³ Why Men Fight, pp. 178-180.
4. Criticism of Traditional Methods in Education.

Russell condemns traditional education because it has become a political institution, seeking to induce beliefs rather than thought. The worship of success leads to ruthlessness, and education "is infected through and through with ruthlessness and glorification of social inequality." Universal compulsory education has been adopted in democratic countries in order to make democracy possible, or for commercial advantages, so that state education has a bias. Parents frequently manipulate the education of their children so as to further their own interests. Thus all powers with authority tend to disregard the child as an end in itself. We have already noted that Russell believes that superstition pervades much of our traditional education. Reform is needed, he maintains, for at present "everything concerned with the creation of life is thought abominable, while everything concerned with taking life is exalted as noble." This he calls "the morality of suicide," due to "the fact that we attach value to power, rather than to fulness of life."

Even under socialism Russell thinks there would be danger of the state using education to further its own creed, withholding what knowledge it chose and so making progress impossible. It might even be less progressive than at present.

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1 Why Men Fight, p. 175.
2 Sceptical Essays, pp. 191-195.
3 What I Believe, p. 45.
5 "Socialism and Education," Harper's, 151 (1925) pp. 413-417.
5. Ideals for Education in Achieving the Good Life.

Russell says, "The ideal system of education must be democratic, although that ideal is not immediately attainable." ¹ We must always beware of "a dead level of uniformity." In the debate as to whether education should be "useful" or "cultural", we must be careful lest we come to attach "intrinsic value only to physical satisfactions." "The real issue is: should we, in education, aim at filling the mind with knowledge which has direct practical utility, or should we try to give our pupils mental possessions which are good on their own account?"²

It is important that education should aim to diminish physical evils, but we cannot afford to ignore the "humanistic elements" of education. For,

"To know something of great literature, something of world history, something of music and painting and architecture, is essential if the life of imagination is to be fully developed. And it is only through the imagination that men become aware of what the world might be; without it, 'progress' would become mechanical and trivial. But science, also, can stimulate the imagination."³

Russell points out that "in a mechanistic civilization, there is grave danger of a crude utilitarianism, which sacrifices the whole, aesthetic side of life to what is called 'efficiency'." He holds that language is not "merely a means of communication," but should also be "a vehicle of beauty."⁴

Instead of discipline through force, self-discipline is now taught children through games. Thus habits are formed.

¹Education and the Good Life, p. 16.
²Ibid., p. 23.
³Ibid., pp. 29-30.
⁴Ibid., p. 31.
Before undertaking to educate a person, we need "some conception of the kind of person we wish to produce," and what sort of education will achieve this result. The educator should love the children for themselves, but this is not enough; "it is necessary also that he should have a right conception of human excellence....Even those who love all mankind may err through a wrong conception of the good life."¹

Russell gives four characteristics which he believes "form the basis of an ideal character: vitality, courage, sensitivity, and intelligence."² He believes that a single generation of intelligent, fearless men could "sweep away the cruelty and pain which we endure because we are lazy, cowardly, hard-hearted, and stupid." Education can make us good or bad. "Education is the key to the new world."³

If he were given power to reorganize higher education, Russell would attempt to give young people a vivid realization of the past, and of the possibilities of the future, emphasizing the transitoriness of physical life. At the same time, he would impress them with "the greatness of which the individual is capable, and the knowledge that throughout all the depths of stellar space nothing of equal value is known to us."⁴

Once again let us remind ourselves that Russell is a materialist with no place for values in ultimate reality!

¹Ibid., pp. 58-59.
²Ibid., p. 60.
³Ibid., p. 83.
III. Russell's Social Views.

A. In General.

Russell's interest in social theories began years ago. He published a study of German Socialism in 1895. It was both historical and critical. He sympathized with the aims of the movement so far as it promoted humanitarian interests, but he believed some changes would be necessary in the doctrines and program of Marxian Socialism.¹

Since the War, Russell's interest in society and social reforms has grown tremendously, and almost every book or magazine article he writes has some discussion of social subjects.

About 1921-1922 Russell spent five weeks in Russia and a year in China, during which time he developed a new appreciation of eastern culture and ideals of happiness. He finds among them the same fundamental requirements for a happy life as among the western peoples, but he thinks that they are more interested in pursuing them than we are. For the most part they are not interested in seeking power and dominion. They have more tolerance and patience than have we. On the whole, he thinks the West may learn as much from the East as the East from the West. The only place we can claim superiority to the East is in scientific method and scientific discovery, but this may not turn out to be to our advantage unless we can get a better conception of the ends of life.²

¹German Social Democracy.
²The Problem of China; also Sceptical Essays, pp. 101-110.
In collaboration with his wife, Mrs. Dora Russell, he has written an article on "What Makes A Social System Good or Bad?" They maintain that there are "two elements in a good society: (1) the present well-being of those who compose it, and (2) its capacity for developing into something better." They think people are losing faith in our present system, and a new faith is needed, or a new system that people can believe in. "No man can be happy unless he feels his life is in some way important; so long as his life remains a futile round of pleasures or pains leading to no end, realizing no purpose that he can believe to be of value, so long it is impossible to escape despair." Then appear words with a Kantian ring. "Although it may sound old-fashioned to say so, I do not believe that a tolerable existence is possible for an individual man or a society without some sense of duty....There is only one kind of duty that the modern man can acknowledge without superstition, and that is duty to the community."  

Although he is a socialist himself, Russell has come to the conclusion that State Socialism and Communism are both unsatisfactory, because of the dangers of bureaucracy and dead uniformity, which could easily stifle individuality. He thinks now that Guild Socialism combined with Syndicalism and some elements of Anarchism would likely to be the most satisfactory system.

In analyzing the great movements of history from the Hegelian point of view, showing the oscillations from synthesis and

3 *Proposed Roads to Freedom.*
intolerance to analysis and tolerance, and back again, he concludes that we are now in a synthetic and intolerant age, which brings us Bolshevism and Fascism. There are only two great powers in the world: America representing Capitalism in the West, and Russia representing Bolshevism in the East. He criticizes the philosophy of each and concludes that both are founded on economic principles of organization, so that neither take into account the biological side of man's life. He thinks that neither capitalism nor communism is adequate to meet the needs of human life, for "The fundamental delusion of our time, in my opinion," he says, "is the excessive emphasis upon the economic aspects of life."^2

Russell believes that America is developing a new philosophy. It is an industrial and machine philosophy, dominated by the belief that man is master of his fate and need not submit to many physical evils that were formerly feared. European philosophy has been dominated by "contemplation," which gives an attitude of reverence toward the universe, "hardly compatible with the belief in man's omnipotence through the machine." American philosophy has an Instrumental Theory, he thinks, which might be defined thus: "To know something is to be able to change it as we wish." It believes that even human nature can be changed, and education can produce better people. He believes that America is leading the way in a great transition of thought. It is a period barren of art, but perhaps new art forms will emerge

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2Ibid., p. 324.
"appropriate to modern life," He finds a painful part of this changing outlook is "the diminution in the value and independence of the individual," but in a machine civilization the group becomes the most important item. But the mastery over nature which the machine gives, he thinks worth a high price.

In recent travels in America Russell has found there is great similarity in the type and viewpoint of the people in all parts of the country. Uniformity appears not only in material matters, but also in thought and opinion. This uniformity has advantages and disadvantages. The chief advantage is that "it produces a population capable of peaceable co-operation;" while the chief disadvantage is that "it produces a population prone to persecution of minorities." Russell thinks it is "a mistaken conception of democracy" to believe that "all men should be alike." They should really be like the different parts of an organism, not all like one part. The businessman is coming to be the standard type in America. He admits that standardization is likely to increase the happiness of the average man, since it makes it easier for him to fit into society, but it has great disadvantages for the exceptional individual. Russell thinks Europe will ultimately follow America in standardization of life, which will probably make internationalism easier of accomplishment.

He believes now that "the road to Utopia is clear; it lies partly through politics and partly through changes in the individual." In politics, we must establish an international

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government. He thinks this will be achieved through "the world government of the United States." The individual must be made "less prone to hatred and fear," which is a matter "partly physiological and partly psychological." If the health of the young is adequately cared for and their "vital impulses" are given proper scope for development, "men and women will grow up more courageous and less malevolent than they are at present." With this kind of people and an international government "the world might become more stable and civilized," but at present "every increase in scientific knowledge brings the destruction of civilization nearer."1

B. The Place of the Individual in Society.

It sometimes seems that Russell is fighting for the rights of the individual most of the time, yet he declares, "The individual is not the end and aim of his own being; outside the individual, there is the community, the future of mankind, and the immensity of the universe in which all our hopes and fears are a mere pin-point."2 On the other hand, "political ideals should be based upon ideals for the individual life,"3 and "political and social institutions are to be judged by the good or harm that they do to individuals."4 Most of our institutions at present "rest upon two things: property and power,"5 which tend to repress the creative impulses. We should seek to develop

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1Ibid., p. 134.
2Ibid., p. 207.
3Political Ideals, p. 4.
5Ibid., p. 16.
the distinct individuality of each person, giving all the freedom possible to the creative impulses, thus increasing self-respect and reverence for others.

The individual is helpless before the vast modern state, Russell thinks, yet our civilization cannot eliminate vast organization, but it can make their management democratic. He believes that "Democracy is a device—the best so far invented—for diminishing as much as possible the interference of governments with liberty." There should be the utmost freedom for individuals and societies in conducting their own affairs, but not in their dealings with others. Governments must use force sometimes, no doubt, but "the coercion of an individual or a group is always in itself more or less harmful," and "Forces should only be used against those who attempt to use force against others, or against those who will not respect the law in cases where a common decision is necessary."

In the economic life of the community and in international relations, more regulation, and maintenance of law and order is needed. In matters regarding other than material possessions, however, public control should be almost done away. The tendency of public opinion to press the individual into a conventional mold should be stoutly resisted. The creative impulse of the artist should be given free play. "To respect it in oneself and in others makes up nine-tenths of the good life."

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1 Why Men Fight, pp. 61-64.
2 Political Ideals, p. 25.
3 Ibid., p. 30.
4 Ibid., pp. 28-30.
5 Ibid., pp. 105-110.
6 Ibid., p. 128.
Russell believes that the community should not interfere in "matters where what one man possesses is not obtained at the expense of another," that is, in matters of opinion, knowledge, and art.¹ The "maximum of freedom" will be secured when character is formed by education "so that men may find their happiness in activities which are not oppressive." This should be done by teaching children "to live and let live."

Thus we see that Russell's aim is the fullest, freest, happiest life possible for the individual, but he realizes that this cannot be obtained except in co-operation with his fellow-men. Russell's optimism as to the possibilities is shown in the declaration he makes that in twenty years, by united effort, the civilized countries of the world could "abolish all abject poverty, quite half the illness in the world, and the whole economic slavery which binds down nine-tenths of our population; we could fill the world with joy and beauty, and secure the reign of universal peace."²


So we see that Russell believes that the achievement of "the Good Life" for the individual is a social affair. Traditional ideas of "salvation" have been individualistic, but in the modern world we need "rather a social than an individual conception of salvation."³ The good life demands for its

¹Sceptical Essays, p. 180.
²Political Ideals, p. 35.
³What I Believe, pp. 56-57.
realization "a multitude of social conditions," such as knowledge that requires extensive research, and education, which can only be carried on by governments. Thus, "in all that differentiates between a good life and a bad one, the world is a unity, and the man who pretends to live independently is a conscious or unconscious parasite."\(^1\) Living the good life involves many elements, education, friends, love, children, if desired, good health, interesting work, and sufficient income to prevent want and anxiety. Consequently, "the good life must be lived in a good society, and is not fully possible otherwise."\(^2\)

Another unfortunate feature of our individualistic idea of salvation is the belief that it comes in a catastrophic form. Consequently, we attempt to overthrow tyranny and war by use of war. Russell thinks that revolutions may sometimes be necessary, but "they are not short cuts to the millenium. There is no short cut to the good life, whether individual or social." The good life must be built up by developing intelligence, self-control, and sympathy.\(^3\) It is a process of gradual improvement.

C. His Views on the State.

Russell recognizes the need for the State in regulating the relations of people in society, but as usually managed it tends to become oppressive and makes for anarchy among nations in the world as a whole.\(^4\) Only a world state could really

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1Ibid., p. 59.
2Ibid., pp. 50-51.
3Ibid., p. 54.
4*Why Men Fight*, pp. 52-50.
accomplish the purpose which a state should accomplish, by sub-
stituting law for force in the relations between all groups. 
Even law is not wholly satisfactory in settling disputes, as it is "too static, too much on the side of what is decaying, too little on the side of what is growing," but it is better than force. 1

States have supreme power over their subjects, and they 
punish "with impartial rigor, both those who kill their compa-
triots and those who refuse to kill foreigners." This, Russell 
thinks, "is the politics of Bedlam." 2 Ultimately, the chief 
part of the power of the State rests upon public opinion, 3 
which is maintained in favor of the State by tradition and by 
patriotism. Patriotism is a combination of love and pride, 
which amounts almost to a religion, but falls short of becoming 
a real religion because it lacks universality. But it teaches 
men to subordinate themselves to the State, and "when once men 
have learned to subordinate their own good to the good of a 
larger whole, there can be no valid reason for stopping short 
of the human race." 4 Hence the world-state.

Russell thinks the State should: (1) Maintain and promote 
the general welfare, in regard to health, education, care of 
children, and encouragement of scientific research. (2) Pro-
mote law and order, avoiding injustice in administering the law 
as far as possible. Voluntary organizations should be encouraged

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1 Ibid., p. 56.  
2 Ibid., pp. 46-47.  
3 Ibid., p. 50.  
4 Ibid., p. 57.
to carry out any of these functions that they can. Individual initiative should be encouraged, with little insistence on uniform system.¹

He thinks it is an error to suppose that there is a good of the State apart from and higher than the good of the individuals composing the State. The State is an "organism", in that the parts are interdependent, but the idea that there is a "good of the State" that is something peculiar to it, is an administrator's fallacy, meaning the "good of the statesmen." According to that point of view, each person is simply a part of the machine, and individual happiness does not count.²

The chief source of evil in the State lies in the supposed right of the State to use military force to enforce its will on other States, and "so long as war remains a daily imminent danger the State will remain a Moloch, sacrificing sometimes the life of the individual and always his unfettered development, to the barren struggle for mastery in competition with other States."³

1. The Evil of War.

When the World War came on, Russell was amazed at the enthusiasm with which people took up the business of killing and destruction. He felt that "The degradation of science from its high function in ameliorating the lot of man is one of the most painful aspects of this war."⁴ He appealed to the intellectuals

¹Ibid., pp. 70-78.
³Why Men Fight, pp. 77-78.
⁴Justice in War-Time, p. 17.
to stop the war, but to no avail, for events were in the grip of passions too elemental to heed this appeal. As a result, Russell became an avowed opponent of the war-system as it operates among states in the modern world. He concluded that, though some wars seem justified because they appear to have brought some good to mankind, in the long run the balance of evil is much against them, and warfare has now become so destructive that nothing can be said for it.¹

After some study of the matter Russell decided that passive resistance could accomplish far more than armies and navies, but as there is small chance that nations can be made to adopt this method, he comes to the conclusion that the creation of a strong central authority is about the only way to end war soon.²

Russell foresaw grave danger for civilization in the war, and realized that the war would destroy many of the finer qualities in the souls of the men who were fighting, and that brutality and cruelty would be inculcated by the act of war. Many of them would lose their ability to be useful citizens, he felt. "The habit of violence, once acquired, however legitimately, is not easily set aside, and the respect for law and order is likely to be much less after the war than it was before," he declared.³ If we remember that he wrote this in 1915, and then note the great wave of crimes following the war, and in which we are still engulfed, we may be able to realize his prophetic ability. He thought, too, that governments would be more autocratic after

¹Ibid., p. 38.
²Ibid., pp. 40-59.
³Ibid., p. 113.
the war, and the great development of dictatorships justifies him. In regard to ending war by means of war, he says, "It is peace, not war, that in the long run turns men's thoughts away from fighting." 1

"Blind impulse is the source of war," Russell holds, and that impulse is purposeless in itself. 2 "Impulse is the expression of life," but should be turned to creative purposes. He can find no support for war on rational grounds. War is only large-scale duelling. "A nation which believes that its welfare can only be secured by suffering and inflicting hundreds of thousands of equally horrible sacrifices, is a nation which has no very spiritual conception of what constitutes national welfare." He believes further, that "it would be better to forego material comfort, power, pomp, and outward glory than to kill and be killed, to hate and be hated, to throw away in a mad moment of fury the bright heritage of the ages." 3

As we have learned gradually to free our conception of God from savagery, so, he believes, we must free our national ideals. "The world is ruled by a wrong spirit," which cannot be changed overnight, but, in the long run, it will respond to vital thinking, for, he believes, "The power of thought....is greater than any other human power." 4 Community life demands integration, but it must be on an international scale if we are to avoid war. 5

Our present system of organization fosters the possessive

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1Ibid., p. 115.
3Ibid., pp. 114-116.
4Ibid., p. 247.
5Ibid., pp. 255-256.
impulses, which are hostile to the creative impulses. Now, "possession means taking and keeping some good thing which another is prevented from enjoying; creation means putting into the world a good thing which otherwise no one would be able to enjoy." This leads Russell to declare that "the supreme principle, both in politics and in private life, should be to promote all that is creative, and so to diminish the impulses and desires that center around possession."1

The real need of the world is for a new philosophy or religion to replace the view that income is the principle thing. In the meantime, some international organization is necessary, for "the civilized races of the world are faced with the alternative of co-operation or mutual destruction."2

3. Internationalism As a Way Out.

In other things than trade, Russell finds that "the interests of nations coincide in all that makes what we call civilization." Science, art, and literature are the property of all. If we consider what things make us civilized beings, "we shall find that none of them are things in which any one nation can have exclusive property, but all are things in which the whole world can share." Scholars, and scientists of many nations can work together, and feel themselves "an outpost of civilization, building a new road into the virgin forest of the unknown."3

1Ibid., pp. 257-258.
3Ibid., p. 627.
Russell has contended for the establishment of an international authority in many articles and books written since the war. In a recent article he asserts that, though many have despaired of the possibility of getting rid of war, he still believes "that the road to a better state of affairs is still open to mankind." He observed that during the war many observed moral rules simply in order to make the war more effective, that is, more destructive. So he realized that "rules of conduct, whatever they may be, are not sufficient to produce good results, unless the ends sought are good." On one point he now agrees with the Apostle Paul, "that no obedience to moral rules can take the place of love, and that where love is genuine, it will, if combined with intelligence, suffice to generate whatever moral rules are necessary." Here again is a statement that reminds one very much of Kant's principle of the Good Will as the basic principle in moral conduct.

We are still too much subject to fear, and need education to a "more lordly psychology." Most of our fear and competition is folly, for we have plenty of the necessities to go around, if we would distribute them wisely. "International government, business organization, and birth control should make the world comfortable for everybody." But as long as armed forces are maintained by independent nations there will be little security. Only when force is controlled by a neutral authority will war disappear from the world.

2Ibid., p. 132.
3Ibid., p. 133.
D. His Views Regarding Property and Economic Systems.

Russell holds that the worship of money is bound up with inward defeat. The decay of life promotes the religion of material good; and this, in turn, hastens the decay of life. He who worships money has ceased to hope for happiness through his own activities. The fear of losing money is also a cause of worry, eating away men's power of happiness. The happiest people are apt to be those with some purpose which shuts out an interest in money. Yet all political thought occupies itself chiefly with satisfying men's economic desires.¹

Russell sets forth four tests that may be applied to an industrial system. (1) Does it obtain maximum production? (2) Does it make for justice in distribution? (3) Does it allow a tolerable existence for the producers? (4) Does it give the greatest possible freedom and stimulus to vitality and progress? He claims that the present capitalistic system aims at the first, maximum production. Socialism aims at the second and third objects. The fourth purpose is really the most important, but neither capitalism nor orthodox socialism seeks it.²

With modern methods of machine production, Russell believes that a few hours labor a day would produce all that is really needed, and that time now spent on producing luxuries could be leisure for pursuit of education, art, and scientific investigation, thus developing the capacity for intelligent pleasure.

Russell would have all rent paid to the State. Inheritance

¹Why Men Fight, pp. 117-126.
²Ibid., p. 127.
simply creates an idle class, conservative and timid. Though it is commonly thought that men labor to found an estate for a family, Russell maintains that the best work is done for interest in the work for its own sake. Men are actuated by the love for power which money gives. Even if slightly less work were done, however, it would be worth while to abolish inheritance in order to get rid of the idle rich, "with the oppression, feebleness, and corruption which they inevitably produce."¹

He thinks there is no principle in the present economic system. It started from conquest and has become stereotyped by law. Socialism, he thinks, aims at justice, and would attempt to abolish the existing inequalities, on the principle of equal income for equal service. Even this would not guarantee happiness however. He believes that "The most important purpose that political institutions can achieve is to keep alive in individuals creativeness, vigor, vitality, and the joy of life."² These things make for happiness in living. A good system "should not cramp men's private affections," and it "should give the greatest possible outlet to the impulse of creation."³ He thinks that "the chief defect of the capitalistic system is that work done for wages very seldom affords any outlet for the creative impulse."⁴ The employee in industry must do simply what he is told, and the production process divides up the labor, giving each one only one little operation, so that the instinct for creation finds no satisfaction in the work. Russell thinks,

¹Ibid., p. 137.
²Ibid., p. 143.
³Ibid., p. 144.
⁴Ibid., p. 145.
however, that socialism, with the State as the employer, would be no better in this respect. The defect is inherent in our industrial system.

He believes that capitalism need not be abolished, but that industry could be made more democratic. "The present economic system, by robbing most men of initiative, is one of the causes of the universal weariness which devitalizes urban and industrial populations, making them perpetually seek excitement." As a result, even war is welcomed as a break in the routine.\(^1\) He thinks our whole system is "an abomination," because it "separates the man from the purpose for which the work is done," which is "concentrated in the capitalist," with the result that the wage-earner's purpose is centered not in production, but on wages. The capitalist seeks production, while the worker seeks wages, so that the system cannot work smoothly or efficiently.\(^2\)

Also, Russell finds many "pitfalls in socialism."\(^3\) He thinks state control of industry would be no improvement over private ownership. Stockholders would simply become holders of government bonds. There would be no advance toward democracy in industry, since government officials are not apt to be sympathetic to labor, so there would be no more freedom for employees, and perhaps not as much. State socialism is not a truly democratic system. There would be danger of dead uniformity in it. Also, possession of power tends to produce love of power, and the

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 147.  
\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 148.  
\(^{3}\)Political Ideals, pp. 73-101.
power in the hands of officials might easily lead to oppression of minority groups. "The problem of the distribution of power is a more difficult one than the problem of the distribution of wealth."\(^1\)

In a democracy, Russell thinks "the tyranny of the majority is a real danger," for right is often on the side of the minority, and "progress comes through the gradual effect of a minority in converting and altering custom."\(^2\) He thinks also that, according to the principles of democracy, any group has the right to resort to direct action for amelioration of trade conditions, for purposes of economic reconstruction, or for political ends.\(^3\)

Russell believes that various industrial groups should be autonomous in their own affairs, with a neutral authority to adjust relations between groups. But, though the socializing of industry might help, we must always be careful not to regard "man as a tool for producing goods, rather than goods as a subordinate necessity for the non-material side of human life."\(^4\)

Industrialism has used science only from utilitarian motives, but Russell believes that "Pure science is infinitely more valuable than its applications." So far, its applications "have been in the main harmful, and will only cease to be so when men have a less strenuous outlook on life." On the whole, our social system is destructive of what is excellent. "If excellence is to survive, we must become more leisurely, more just, less utilitarian, and less 'progressive.'"\(^5\)

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 87.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 93.
E. What Science Can Do.

Science is chiefly responsible for the fact that man is no longer so much at the mercy of his physical environment as formerly. "To the modern man," says Russell, "his physical environment is merely raw material, an opportunity for manipulation." ¹ To the modern industrialist everything is an instrument, and the love of power has found a means to satisfy itself in a measure, though it means the thrusting aside of "all the other impulses that make the complete human life. Love, parenthood, pleasure, and beauty are of less account....Manipulation and exploitation are the ruling passions." The modern big business men possess more power than any humans ever had in the past. "They can settle who shall starve and who shall become rich, they can divert the course of rivers, and decree the fall of governments."²

Russell thinks it possible that science will enable man to produce his food synthetically without the aid of plants and animals. Men may learn to alter themselves, and "what they will make of the species I do not venture to predict," says Russell.³ With the decrease of the death and birth rates populations will tend to become stable. Predetermination of sex may become possible, and it is hard to tell what the effect of this might be. Through psychology the thinking and desires of men may be altered and regulated. "The power of psychological technique to mould the mentality of the individual is still in its infancy.

¹The Scientific Outlook, p. 151.
²Ibid., pp. 152-153.
³Ibid., p. 165.
and is not yet fully realized."¹ Propaganda, especially through the press and the moving pictures (cinema), plays a very great part in molding society.

¹"The Scientific Society."

Psychological and economic technique are making it possible to create artificial forms of social organization to fulfill certain purposes. The chief difficulty, Russell thinks, with this is that it makes sudden changes in living habits which creates a nervous strain that may have disastrous results.²

The present economic depression shows the need for international organization, Russell claims. The result of modern industrialism should be wealth, but it is, in fact, poverty. "The advantages of world-wide organization, both in preventing the waste of economic competition and in removing the danger of war, are so great as to be becoming an essential condition for the survival of societies possessing scientific technique."³

He believes we must go on to world-wide organization unless we are to abandon scientific technique, but we will not do this unless we suffer "a cataclysm so severe as to lower the whole level of civilization."⁴ For, "science increases our power to do both good and harm, and therefore enhances the need for restraining destructive impulses. If a scientific world is to survive, it is therefore necessary that men should become

¹Ibid., p. 185.
²Ibid., pp. 206-208.
³Ibid., p. 212.
⁴Ibid., p. 213.
tamer than they have been.\textsuperscript{1}

In "the scientific society" the individual will find himself and his activities more regulated than at present, in the interests of the whole group. Every government believes itself omniscient, and, unless restrained by traditional prejudices, "will advocate more interference with liberty than is wise."\textsuperscript{2}

But things would be no better under socialism and communism than under capitalism; perhaps they would be worse, since political and economic power are concentrated in the same hands. Russell fears that equality, like liberty, will prove to be "no more than a 19th century dream."

The scientific government will "have its eye upon society rather than upon the individual," and "will make the individual suffer for the public good." It will regard the individual as merely part of the social organism.\textsuperscript{3}

It seems to me we should inquire whether this is a real advance, or whether we should not be reverting, in principle, to the old tribal ethics, which subordinated the individual completely to the group. If development is in cycles, perhaps we are due for such a movement. Individualism has gone to an extreme, some have thought, and now we are preaching social responsibility. Perhaps science will carry us to the other extreme, and we shall have to fight for our individualism again.

Of course, Russell admits that this is "a fancy picture, and whatever really happens in the future is likely to be

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 215.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 223
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., pp. 234-235.
something which cannot be foreseen." A scientific civilization might prove "essentially unstable." It may be threatened by war, and the falling birth-rate may make the race fail to reproduce its own numbers.\footnote{1} It would take the adventure out of life, and the security men have always sought would be had, but "they may not think it worth the price they will have paid for it."\footnote{2}

Education in the scientific society would be designed to train one group to rule and another to be ruled. The majority of men and women would be taught to be "docile, industrious, punctual, thoughtless, and contented." Contentment would be the greatest virtue.\footnote{3}

Scientific methods of breeding will be used in reproduction. Fathers and mothers will be separated from their offspring, and only mothers will be important to the process, except for eugenic purposes in producing the ruling classes. Artificial impregnation and prematurely induced birth might make life even more unnatural.

Russell foresees these things as possibilities of scientific technique carried to an extreme, but he is not enamoured of the picture. He thinks that "Just as the sun worship of the Aztecs demanded the painful death of thousands of human beings annually, so the new scientific religion will demand its holocausts of sacred victims....In the end such a system must break down either in an orgy of bloodshed or the rediscovery of joy."\footnote{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1}{Ibid., op. 237-239.}
\item \footnote{2}{Ibid., pp. 241-242.}
\item \footnote{3}{Ibid., p. 243.}
\item \footnote{4}{Ibid., pp. 258-259.}
\end{itemize}
IV. Russell's Attitude Toward Religion.

A. His Estimate of Traditional Religion and the Churches.

Russell thinks that the advance of learning, the development of historical research, and scientific discovery have "battered down some part of the edifice of Catholic dogma, until, for almost all thinking and instructed people, the most that seems defensible is some inner spirit, some vague hope, and some not very definite feeling of moral obligation." At any rate, he believes that "the decay of dogmatic religion is, for good or evil, one of the most important facts in the modern world."^1

The Protestant religion is primarily personal, while the Catholic religion is primarily social in outlook. The Catholic Church, however, has hardened into a system preventing growth. The clergy suffers from professionalism, which is a danger to religion. The clergy should consist, he thinks, of men who earn their living in other ways, and so do not fall into a remote morality.3

A new spirit cannot come into the world through the believers in a traditional religion, for they are looking backward, not forward. Also, the teaching of Christ, "admirable as it is, remains quite inadequate for many of the social and spiritual issues of modern life." If a religious view of life and the world is to again dominate the thinking of free-minded men, it must have "a morality of initiative, not of submission; a

^1Why Men Fight, p. 215.
^2Ibid., p. 216
^3Ibid., pp. 218-220.
morality of hope rather than of fear, of things to be done rather than things to be left undone."¹ As his idea of what religion should be, Russell gives the following:

"The religious life that we must seek will not be one of occasional solemnity and superstitious prohibitions, it will not be sad and ascetic, it will concern itself little with rules of conduct. It will be inspired by a vision of what human life may be, and will be happy with the joy of creation, living in a large free world of initiative and hope. It will love mankind, not for what they are to the outward eye, but for what imagination shows that they have it in them to become. It will not readily condemn, but it will give praise to positive achievement rather than negative sinlessness, to the joy of life, the quick affection, the creative insight, by which the world may grow young and beautiful and filled with vigor."²

As I read this description of what Russell believes a modern life-giving religion should be, it seems to me a remarkable embodiment of what I find in the life and teachings of Jesus. Russell has just condemned the teaching of Jesus as inadequate for the needs of modern life, but here Russell has given us only principles, not rules, which were the essence of the attitude of Jesus toward mankind and the world.

The activities of men, Russell finds, are derived mainly from three sources: instinct, mind, and spirit. To the life of the spirit belongs art and religion. Here lies the possibility of love or hate, reverence and worship, the "sense of obligation," the "feeling of imperativeness," and of "acting under orders." Yet "deeper than all these there lies the sense of a mystery half revealed, of a hidden wisdom and glory, of a transfiguring vision in which common things lose their solid importance and become a thin veil behind which the ultimate truth of the world..."

¹Ibid., pp. 221-222.
²Ibid., pp. 222-223.
is dimly seen." Such feelings are "the source of religion," and if they should die our "most of what is best would perish out of life."¹

Though Russell has a very high estimate of religion itself, the traditionalism of the church arouses his ire. Because of it, he thinks the church has opposed movements for freedom, and have encouraged blood-thirsty wars, so that the world would have been better off without the church for the last six hundred years. If society is to improve, he thinks it must be emancipated from the church, and he finds the decay of religion one of the hopeful signs of the present.²

In primitive times most men were agriculturalists or fishermen and had to contend with natural forces, which seem to arouse the religious feelings. Modern men work mostly in industrial plants where they see little of natural forces at work, so they tend to atheism and materialism. Therefore, Russell thinks, "The fact is that religion is no longer sufficiently vital to take hold of anything new; it was formed long ago to suit certain ancient needs, and has subsisted by force of tradition, but is no longer able to assimilate anything that cannot be viewed traditional. Hence the alteration of daily habits and interests resulting from industrialism has proved fatal to the religious outlook, which has grown dim even among those who have not explicitly rejected it."³

He thinks also that belief in God for many modern people has come to serve a utilitarian purpose for improving the world. For intellectual reason, too the idea of God has become vague compared to what it was for those accepting traditional ideas. Furthermore, the churches are not an acceptable basis for modern idealism,

since, through their endowments, they "have become bound up with the defense of property. They tend also to have "an oppressive ethic" toward pleasures that the young find harmless. A young man, accepting "whole-heartedly the teaching of Christ," is likely to find himself in opposition to official Christianity, as much an outcast as a militant atheist.  

B. His Own Religion.

Although Russell can find no satisfaction in anything that traditional religion has to offer, he does have a very high regard for the spiritual elements of life, as we have frequently noted. The life of the spirit, he says,

"Brings with it the joy of vision, of the mystery and profundity of the world, of the contemplation of life, and above all the joy of universal love. It liberates those who have it from the prison-house of insistent personal passion and mundane cares. It gives freedom and breadth and beauty to men's thoughts and feelings, and to all their relations with others. It brings the solution of doubts, the end of the feeling that all is vanity. It restores harmony between mind and instinct, and leads the separated unit back into his place in the life of mankind. For those who have once entered the world of thought, it is only through the spirit that happiness and peace can return."  

Russell thinks that those who have tried to find support for religious belief in the recent statements of some scientists regarding the uncertainty discovered in the causal laws do not realize the implications of the assumption. If we cannot depend upon causal laws, than all inference fails, and we cannot "know anything outside of our personal experience."  

1 "Why Is Modern Youth Cynical?" Harper's, 160 (1930) p. 721.  
2 Why Men Fight, p. 244.  
3 The Scientific Outlook, p. 107.
no evidence in science that the world was made by a Creator. It may seem odd that the universe should begin spontaneously, "but there is no law of nature to the effect that things which seem odd to us must not happen." He then adds this pessimistic note, "I see no comfort to be derived from the supposition that this very unpleasing universe was manufactured of set purpose."¹

The problem of evil seems to stand insurmountably in the way of belief in God for Russell.

"For aught that I know to the contrary, there may be a Being of infinite power who chooses that children should die of meningitis, and older people of cancer; these things occur, and occur as the result of evolution. If, therefore, evolution embodies a Divine Plan, these occurrences must also have been planned. Again, I am told that though the child himself may not have sinned very deeply, he deserves to suffer on account of his parents' wickedness. I can only repeat that, if this is the Divine sense of justice, it differs from mine, and that I think mine superior....Fortunately, however, the evidence of Divine Purpose is non-existent; so at least one must infer from the fact that no evidence is adduced by those who believe in it. We are, therefore, spared the necessity for that attitude of impotent hatred which every brave and humane man would otherwise be called upon to adopt towards the Almighty Tyrant."²

Russell has a religion of his own, however, and I think we may say that science is its creed. "Science is in its essence nothing but the systematic pursuit of knowledge, and knowledge, whatever ill uses bad men may make of it, is in its essence good. To lose faith in knowledge is to lose faith in the best of man's capacities; and therefore I repeat unhesitatingly that the unyielding rationalist has a better faith and a more unbending optimism than any of the timid seekers after the childish comforts of a less adult age."³

¹Ibid., p. 118.
²Ibid., pp. 130-131.
³Ibid., pp. 132-133.
The ethics of Christianity is individual, Russell notes, but the new scientific ethic which he thinks is developing has "its eye upon society rather than upon the individual." This is another reason why Russell finds no place for traditional religion in the new scientific society.

1. "Science and Values."

Perhaps it would be unfair to Russell to leave the consideration of his views on science without noting his estimate of values as against science.

In the scientific society as he has outlined it, Russell admits that "the power impulse has completely overwhelmed the impulse of love, and this is the psychological source of the cruelties which it is in danger of exhibiting." Further, he believes that this "scientific society....is incompatible with the pursuit of truth, with love, with art, with spontaneous delight, with every ideal that men have hitherto cherished." The danger lies in power sought for its own sake, not "for the sake of genuine good."

Russell thinks that he who enjoys nature need not feel he has lived in vain, and if science makes it possible for more people to realize these joys, it will be doing well, but

"When it takes out of life the moments to which life owes its value, science will not deserve admiration, however cleverly and however elaborately it may lead men along the road to despair. The sphere of values lies outside science, except in so far as science consists in the pursuit of knowledge."

1 Ibid., pp. 234-235.
2 Ibid., pp. 263-264.
Science as the pursuit of power must not obtrude upon the
sphere of values, and scientific technique, if it is to enrich
human life, must not outweigh the ends which it should serve. 1

Yet Russell will give values no objective existence among
the realities of the universe.

He complains that the men who dominate our world are for
the most part men who are contemptuous of the past. They know
nothing of history and care not for its wisdom. "Men in the
past were often parochial in space, but the dominant men of our
age are parochial in time. They feel for the past a contempt it
does not deserve, and for the present a respect that it deserves
still less." We should learn as a maxim: "It is better to do a
little good than much harm." 2 We should also realize that the
supreme good is not rapid locomotion nor production of material
good.

Russell believes that "Even more important than knowledge
is the life of the emotions. A world without delight and with-
out affection is a world destitute of value." We must not be-
come "so intoxicated by new power as to forget the truths that
were familiar to every previous generation. Not all wisdom is
new, nor is all folly out of date." Scientific technique will
be dangerous unless we develop a new moral outlook in which
"submission to the powers of nature is replaced by respect for
what is best in man." 3

1 Ibid., pp. 254-256.
2 Ibid., pp. 267-258.
3 Ibid., p. 269.
V. What I Think About Russell and His Ethical Views.

For the most part I have very much enjoyed the writings of Russell that I have gone through. At times he amuses me, at times he makes me angry, but nearly always he makes me think. His usually keen analysis and his ready wit, with its irony and sarcasm, make his studies of social problems especially interesting. Though I cannot always agree with him, I can often sympathize with his conclusions when I remember his point of view.

I appears to me that his "rugged individualism" often clashes with his recognition of man's social responsibilities. I have already criticized his ethics at some length. Although he thinks that desire is the only standard for moral conduct, which after all is no standard, he constantly regards the "good life" as the real practical standard, and the good life he defines in ideal terms. Again, while denying the theory of moral obligation, he is constantly recognizing it in urging man's duty to seek the good life, and his responsibility to society.

Perhaps Russell is right in denying moral obligation in theory in view of his metaphysics, for, as A. E. Taylor has pointed out,1 it is impossible to recognize persons as of moral worth or having moral responsibility if the existence of persons as entities is denied. If "I" am no more than a passing phase of a chance arrangement of a string of "neutral entities," or "events," then it is evident that to say "I ought" to do something has no significance that intelligence can recognize.

Russell might do well to revise his metaphysics, and then he could make his ethics more logical.

Another place where Russell shows the need for a different theory of reality is in his theoretical and practical treatment of values. Though he finds no place for values in the nature of things, and gives them no permanent existence, he recognizes them practically as the most real, the most significant, and the best things in life.

The place where I find it most difficult to follow Russell in his practical morality is in his treatment of sexual morals. He insists upon the utmost freedom in the sexual relations of men and women, holding that they are purely their own private affair, since these relations affect no one but themselves. Yet the sex instinct is the most social of all the instincts, and its very purpose and significance is found in the propagation of other persons, so that it seems to me he loses his social sense here. Perhaps it is simply that in his reaction from conventional morality he has swung to another extreme, but it seems as if his rational outlook should give him better balance. One is tempted to inquire if this is where he finds his moral standard of desire! Apparently, his own experience with marriage has not been normally satisfactory, in that his first marriage was childless and ended in divorce, so that this may throw some light on his attitude toward marriage and sex.

Although professedly atheistic and non-religious, I sometimes wonder if Russell has not a nobler religion of a type than
many who profess to be religious in the orthodox sense.

Russell is a stimulating personality. He appears to be a practical idealist who has fallen into irreconcilable contradictions in his metaphysics. But no doubt we are all inconsistent in spots, and biased on certain issues, so it were well not to throw too many stones. I would recommend the reading of Russell to anyone who is not afraid to face the facts of life and think. It will not do to read one or two articles or essays, however, and think you know the man.
SUMMARY

A sketch of Russell's life was first presented and it was noted that he is an apostle of freedom and of social reform. Then his viewpoint in philosophy was considered. He is a dualist in epistemology, and a pluralistic realist in metaphysics, sometimes known as a "logical atomist." His views of the relations of man to the universe were then considered, and it appeared that he considers man something of an anomaly in the system of nature, doomed to struggle for his ideals without hope that the universe will ever be on his side, since it has no place for these ideal elements of life. It was noted too that he believes that the analytic methods of science should be applied in philosophy.

In his ethical outlook, it appeared that Russell had a rather objective view of the "good" in his earlier writings, but later he turned toward subjectivism, holding that the "good" is something which it "lies in our power to create." After examining various theories of virtue, he comes to the conclusion that desire is the only standard of moral conduct. The "good" he now regards as a "social concept" to aid in finding a way among conflicting desires. A study was then made of his concept of the "Good Life," which he holds, "is inspired by love and guided by knowledge." His theory of desire as the moral standard was next criticized, as was also his definition of the "Good Life." This criticism holds that his theory might lend itself to the maxim that "the end justifies the means," and also contends that, though Russell claims that desire is the only moral standard, it is really no standard, and that Russell himself has really
set up a standard for desire in his conception of the "Good Life," which is an ideal standard.

Next was noted Russell's opposition to whatever is conventional, traditional, or customary in morals, especially such as might be thought to have any basis in superstition or irrational fears. He regards superstition and fear as always and everywhere bad. He blames Puritanism for tyrannous attitudes in some people and inferiority in others. In sexual affairs Russell would cast off all conventional restraints in the relations of individuals, holding that society should be interested in marriage only in case children issue from the union. The thwarting of the sexual instinct and the love aspirations of life, he regards as one of the greatest calamities that can occur to a person. He places a very high estimate on happiness, and thinks it is attainable in the present world, provided we have a certain minimum of physical needs supplied, and that we develop the right psychological attitudes. Science can help us to the first and education to the second of these things, thus making the "Good Life" possible. Education has usually been used to instil some political or religious dogma or point of view, he thinks, but if properly used it could develop "vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence," thus opening up new life to man, and enabling him to build a new world.

In his social views, Russell has not become attached to any one theory or system, it appears. He would draw freely from all proposed schemes, seeking an organization of society in which the creative impulses of life should have opportunity
for full and free development, keeping always in mind that the individual is but a unit in a great social organism. "The good life," he believes, can only be live in "a good society." The State he regards as something of a necessary evil, since it will usually bring more regulation into individual life than is good, though governments are necessary for accomplishing some things that require large organization, such as education, health, scientific research, and promotion of law and order. However, wars come as a result of the irresponsible use of power by states, and he finds that war accomplishes much more evil than good, so he advises an international neutral authority to regulate relations between states, doing away with the present anarchy among nations, which threatens the destruction of our civilization.

Russell thinks it a mistake to regard the accumulation of property as the chief end of life, and likely to distort life. He would have whatever organization of economic life would give men the most freedom and interfere least with instinctive happiness. He thinks there should be as much autonomy in industrial groups as possible.

In science he thinks there lies the means for man to become the master of nature, removing most of the physical evils from which the human race has suffered. He foresees the possibility of a "scientific society" in which the individual life would be used simply as an element in the organism of society. He thinks there is danger that such interference might easily go
so far as to make life so artificial that the instinctive life of man would revolt, and this sort of a society would break down.

Russell believes that traditional religion has become too stereotyped and bound up with the maintainance of existing institutions to be capable of furnishing men with progressive spiritual leadership, which is much needed, for he places a very high valuation on the spiritual side of life. The problem of evil seems to furnish an insurmountable obstacle to his belief in God. He finds his creed in science, but places his faith in the ideal values of live, though he finds no place for them in ultimate reality beyond man.

The thesis closed with the writer's own estimate of Russell as a profound believer in ideals, but holding to a materialistic metaphysics unfitted to his faith, and having, perhaps, an abnormal complex in regard to matters of sex.
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