1953

Plato's theory of social organization.

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http://hdl.handle.net/2144/10769

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PLATO'S THEORY OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

by

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(A.B., Boston University, 1951)

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 1953
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| ABSTRACT |
INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to formulate from the philosophy of Plato, a coherent theory of a working social order. The term "social order" will define the synthesis of the state, the laws governing social intercourse, the social economy, the religion, the education, and the art. Singly, no one of these activities is sufficient to differentiate one society from another, for they too often overlap. Yet, a distinction is possible, in which, many times, the observer can give no specific criterion except that it is an elusive "attitude" or "custom" peculiar to the group. This "attitude" is the common purpose which colors and individualizes the activities of the group.

2. The method of investigation

The method of investigation used will be an attempt to define Plato's doctrine of society through a study of what he considered as its origins, its functions, its structure, and its purpose. To accomplish this, an integration of the historical concept of arete, cultural aim, and of the philosophical principles with the theory will be made. The study will center about three dialogues, the Republic, the Statesman and the Laws. Other dialogues will be used when
necessary, to add to the development of Plato's thought. The **Republic** is Plato's first formal presentation of an educational theory which is to form the base for the reformation of Greek society.¹ In order to indicate the principles upon which this theory will operate, he discusses the ethical problems as influences on the vices or virtues of a social order. The **Republic** is a statement of how proper education can cure the "ills of society".² Later in the **Laws**, Plato modifies the details of this educational system, but retains its principles.³ The **Statesman** is Plato's formal statement of a political theory.⁴ In this dialogue is presented the mechanism of the state, that is, the structure within which the several factors of a social order operate. Plato defines statesmanship and differentiates this occupation from the other forms of occupation which maintain the economy of the social order. The **Laws** is an attempt to realize the unified picture of the total structure of the social order. The fact that the **Laws** seems

1. **Rep.**, II. 376 (Cornford ed.). All further references to the **Republic** will be from the Cornford edition unless otherwise stated.

2. **Rep.**, II. 377; III. 401, 412; IV. 420, 421, 422.

3. **Laws**, I. 643, 644; II. 653 (Jowett ed.). All further references to the **Laws** and other dialogues, with the exception of the **Republic** will be from the Jowett translation, 3rd edition.

4. **Statesman**, 259.
to contradict the earlier impressions of the Republic and the Statesman in many areas, may be the result of Plato's attempt to synthesize his several theories of man and society into one work. Such a synthesis may have required their modification in order to derive an organic unity. It is unfortunate that Plato died before this last manuscript could have been finally revised. A.E. Taylor feels that this lack of revision is responsible for the doubt of its authenticity in some quarters.\(^1\)

In addition to the study of these dialogues, the method includes a comparative study of some other theories of social organization, in the hope of discovering how much validity Plato's concept of social order has for contemporary forms.

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3. The work of previous investigations

Many men faced with the problems of their own periods have turned to the dialogues of Plato for a hint to their solution. The positive influence of such a study can be seen in the list of authors on a utopian form of society which increased after the publication of Sir Thomas More's Utopia. Some scholars, however, although admitting the philosophic insight of Plato, have criticized his social theories vigorously. The most noteworthy is

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1. Taylor, PMW, 14.
R. Crossman in Plato Today. More recent is Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies. Some have defended Plato such as Rupert Lodge in Plato's Theory of Education. Worthy of notice is J.B. Skemp's introductory chapters to Plato's Statesman which seem to present a very understanding perspective on Plato's purpose.

Attention is again brought to Crossman's Plato Today for its form of presentation. The author's purpose is admired in so far as this is similar to the purpose of this thesis. The objections to this book are (1) that the author bases his argument almost exclusively on the Republic and (2) the author's reasons explaining why Plato "failed". Crossman states that Plato justifies the structure of the Republic in the axiom that "the common man is unreasonable".  

From this point, he develops his other criticisms of Plato: (1) that this is a "bias in favor of aristocracy" (2) that the rule of the philosopher-king denies the fallibility of human reason, and (3) that human personality is denied.

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1. Crossman, PT, 280.
2. Crossman, PT, 283.
3. Crossman, PT, 294.
4. The scope of this thesis

The position in this thesis will contradict Crossman's axiom. Plato's theory is based upon man as a creature of reason. True, all men do not have full control of their capacity for reasoning as "no two people are born exactly alike. There are innate differences which fit them for different occupations."\(^1\) However, there will be no a priori separation into classes. The process of education will constitute the test by which each individual himself will determine his position. The "one who has come unscathed through every test in childhood, youth and manhood shall be Ruler to watch over the commonwealth."\(^2\) In addition, Plato's Myth of the Classes shows that at least the classes would not be rigid.\(^3\) The council of philosopher-kings is to lead by persuasion rather than by force. The art of persuasion cannot operate unless the tool of reason is present both for the persuaded and the persuader.

In the development of this thesis, the emphasis will not be upon finding reasons for the ineffectualness of Plato's theory, but rather that of presenting the spirit of the theory positively.

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CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF ARETE

It was not by accident that Plato emphasized the role of education as the basic factor in realizing the ideal order of social organization. The spiritual history of the Greeks can be illuminated by tracing the development of the idea of arete. Arete means the aim of the culture of the people. In modern thought, a similar meaning is conveyed in the concept of a philosophy of education. Werner Jaeger has convincingly shown the origin and the consequent broadening of this concept in the Greek tradition. The following is a concise statement of the development of this concept based on the outline of Jaeger's Paideia.

The concept of arete is important to the study of Plato's theory of social organization because it brings to light the essential spirit of Greek personality. Each phase of the history of Greece is marked by a cultural deviation; a deviation brought about by minds interested in finding truth wherever it might be, whether in physical things or in things of the spirit. The purpose of Greek adventures in culture consistently has been to find the satisfying life for the individual as a part of the social group. The predecessors

1. Jaeger, PIIGC.
of Plato left this heritage to him.

1. The Homeric Period

Greece of the Homeric Period was engaged in a struggle to determine its political supremacy in the Aegean. Naturally, the emphasis would be on strength and skill in battle. Heroic valor, courage and honor were the virtues to be inculcated.

Shall then the Grecians fly? O dire disgrace!
And leave unpunished this perfidious race?
Shall Troy, shall Priam and the adulterous spouse
In peace enjoy the fruits of broken vows?
And bravest chiefs, in Helen's quarrel slain,
Lie unrevenged on yon detested plain? 1

Yet the outlook was not onesided, for it was geared to more than merely physical development. Nobility of mind was the complement of action, the aristocratic morality of pride.

Warriors like you, with strength and wisdom bless'd
By brave examples should confirm the rest.2

Companion to these was the social sense of duty. The total effect, therefore, was a purpose to achieve superiority of mind and body.

The standards for these ideals were derived from the structure of Homeric society itself, which was aristocratic. The form of government was monarchic with a literal

meaning to the divine right of kings, for the king was ruler by heredity and claimed direct ancestry from the gods.

Hence shall thou prove my might, and curse the hour
Thou stand'st a rival to imperial power;
And hence to all our host it shall be known
That kings are subject to the gods alone.¹

He performed the functions of judge, priest and general.

Ill fits a chief who mighty nations guides
Directs in council and in war presides
To whom its safety a whole people owes,
To waste long nights in indolent repose.²

Next to the king were the members of his council who claimed, equally with him, divine ancestry. The rest of the society was made up of the people and slaves, who as mere mortals, with no claim to divine ancestry, must be content to be led.

But if a clamourous vile plebeian rose,
Him with reproof he check'd or tamed with blows.
Be still thou slave, and to thy betters yield!
Unknown alike in council and in field!³

The arete for this society, therefore was nobility.

Education for its achievement was provided through poetry and myth which idealized the past actions of heroes.

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3. Homer, Iliad II. 235-244 (tr. Alexander Pope).
The principle of learning was imitative.  

The aristocratic structure of the Platonic society is indebted to the traditions of this Homeric society.

2. The Period of Hesiod

Hesiod as represented in his poem "Works and Days", shifted the location of arete from the nobility to the peasant. Work as a value in itself became the arete.

Neither doth Famine ever consort with men who deal straight judgments, nor Doom; but with mirth they tend the works that are their care.¹

Diligence prospereth work, but the man who passeth off ever wrestleth with ruin.²

For good husbandry is best for mortal men and bad husbandry is worst.³

By the end of the eighth century, the transition from a monarchic form of government to an oligarchic was complete. The landed group held full political power. Simultaneously with this change was the development of trade routes resulting in subsequent colonization.⁴

As trading became increasingly important, a new class arose. These were the men who invested in the new enterprise. Their prestige was based on money rather

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than on lineage or property. As their power grew, they edged the aristocrats. However, in order to gain control, they sought alignment with the discontented peasants. Thus with their finances and the power of the number of the peasant class, the aristocracy found itself on the defensive. The new class was the champion of the underdog. The way was being paved for the tyranny of the seventh and sixth centuries. However, the peasants, although being free from the aristocratic regime, were becoming more miserable. For now, instead of agriculture for the supply of food to the populace, there was cultivation of vineyards and olive groves for the merchandising of overseas commerce. The problem of justice came to the foreground. Thus Hesiod again spoke for the peasant class. The ideal of justice asserted itself as a guiding principle.

For the Immortals are nigh among men and remark them that with crooked judgments oppress one another, taking no heed of the anger of the gods...Also there is the maiden Justice...and whenever one injureth her with crooked reviling...she...telleth of the unrighteous mind of men, till the people pay for the folly of their kings.2

Poetry continued to be the medium of reaching people. Hesiod's "Works and Days" was an example of the new content of the poems which expressed the problems of the

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toiling class, rather than extolling the prowess of the nobility. The choice of myths changed accordingly. The myth of the five races of mankind by Hesiod showed the changes of society from the aristocracy, which claimed descent from the gods, through to the discontent of his own period. His aim must have been the development of awareness in the individual of the causes of social difficulty, along with proposed solutions for the removal of these causes.

Arete, therefore, was not to be acquired merely by imitation of the heroic deeds of the warriors of a past age, but rather through reason and understanding.

This concern with justice and this emphasis on reason is to reappear in the Platonic works.

3. The Spartan State

By the middle of the sixth century Sparta had established itself as the sole military giant of the Greek world. This supremacy was the result of a tight internal policy based upon the theory that the individual was subordinate to the state. Protection of the state from invasion became the chief aim of its citizens.

In Sparta, therefore, civic education developed. Training for military service began in childhood. The conditions, supervised by the state, were designed to develop toughness, obedience, and military efficiency. Xenophon related his first-hand experience of the Spartan system.

I first noted the unique position of Sparta amongst the states of Hellas, the relatively sparse population and at the same time, the extraordinary power and prestige of the community.¹

It is transferred to the legislator (Lycurgus) who gave them those laws, obedience to which has been the secret of their prosperity.²

The training of the body as incumbent no less on the female than the male; and in pursuit of the same idea instituted rival contests for running and tests of strength for women as well as for men.³

Instead of leaving it to each member of the state privately to appoint a slave to be his son's escort, he set over the young Spartans a public guardian...with complete authority over them.⁴

In fact, the very privilege of citizenship depended upon the successful attainment of the rigorous goals set by the state. It was not until the age of thirty that the true rights and

¹. Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, in Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 131.
². Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 131.
⁴. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 133.
duties of citizenship began. Then, this also depended upon the fulfillment of three conditions which were (1) birth, (2) training according to the laws, and (3) membership in one of the dining messes.¹

To further free the citizen for service to the state, it was illegal for Spartans to participate in trade or manufacture, and to have either gold or silver.²

Thus the Spartan education was the outgrowth of an oligarchic political structure. Its arete was patriotism. Glory and exaltation of the polis above the individual were the contents of the cultural aim. Again the means was through poetry, but instead of praising the heroism of personality, the heroism of the citizen as patriot was sung. "To die for one's country is a hero's death",³ and obedience to the dictates of the state was the ideal.

Without a doubt, Plato was influenced by the social structure of the Spartan state, and perhaps admired its disciplined order. He certainly was well acquainted with the conditions and the constitution⁴ of Sparta as evidenced in the long discussion in the Laws, Book I, of the positive and

³. Jaeger, PIGC, 87.
⁴. Rep., VIII. 544
negative points of this social form. Both the Republic and the Laws accept the equality accorded women, the emphasis upon gymnastics, the control of education from birth by the state, and the institution of common meals. However, Plato criticized the military state and the lack of sufficient concern for the things of the spirit--music, literature, and the like.

4. The Sophists

With the city-state of the fifth century and its new democratic structure, protagonists of a different arete arose. The paideia of previous periods was a means to the attainment of arete. (Paideia is the conscious striving for set values. It is the educational system within a cultural structure, which is organized to preserve and transmit an ideal physical and intellectual character. It is the effort to establish a pattern that will permeate the life of each individual member of the cultural group.) Education now became an end in itself and lost the equivalence to culture in its broader meanings. Education and arete became one. This new arete was knowledge, political knowledge, and its exponents were the Sophists.

1. Rep., V. 452; II. 377; III. 403, 416; Laws, VI. 762, 781; VII. 804.
2. Rep., III. 401; VIII. 544-545; Laws, I. 629-630.
3. Jaeger, PIGC, xlii, xvi, xvii.
By the beginning of the fifth century, the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno had been pushed to their logical conclusions. Skepticism followed in the wake of the theories of flux and the incompatibility of the one and the many. The leading Sophists derived their positions from the futility of reconciling these theories with the problem of knowing. Protagoras concluded that knowledge is relative and that only opinion is constant; therefore power rested in strength. His premise was that "Man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that is not." Gorgias held that knowledge was impossible for "nothing exists;...if anything did exist we could never know it;...if perchance a man should come to know it, it would remain a secret, he would be unable to describe it to his fellow-men." Thus power rested in the excellence of oratory. Prodicus with his emphasis on grammar and practical ethics, placed power in the ability to use syntax. Hippias, the most learned, advocated the liberal education for itself. In general, therefore, the sophists, unhappy with the irresolution of the early philosophies, made the preparation for civic life important. For nearly one hundred years, they held the monopoly of liberal education.

2. Bakewell, SBAP, 67.
In the democratic social order of the period, each citizen had an important role in the governing policy of the state. Political techne (art as skill) became a necessity. Eloquence was the virtue to be developed. Intellectual power and ability as an orator were imperative. Unfortunately, there was no common cultural aim such as unified the earlier periods. Man as the measure determined his individual goals, and various principles of what constituted knowledge existed together. This is exemplified in the Sophists themselves.

With no educational ideal, the system deteriorated into a shallow dilettantism. The criterion of knowledge was based on the power of persuasion through style, rhetoric and the ability to outpoint the opposition in debate. Truth was subordinate to semantics.

Plato was disturbed by this empty concept of arete. His wish was to find an intelligible principle of value which would give content and universality to the Hellenic point of view. The result of the fifth-century emphasis upon the isolated individual caused him to seek this all-inclusive principle in man as a social animal. The Platonic arete, therefore, would be a socially oriented concept.
1. The Possibility of Social Control

All theories of social organization are based on the assumption that social control is possible. However, the difficulty lies with the means of achieving it. The failure of the methods employed so far to set up the proper conditions, has resulted in the belief, that maybe ideal social relations are unattainable, and that any attempt to confine the activities of the group is harmful, because such a move creates artificial conditions which deter the natural progress of society. Yet an approximation to these ideal relations, it must be admitted, is most desirable.

Stephen Pepper makes this statement on the conditions of social control:

Pessimism regarding social prediction and control is not seriously a denial of its occurrence, but disappointment over its extent.¹

Pepper defines prediction as a statement about future events as based on evidence; control as the application of predictions to the attainment of human purpose.²

¹ Pepper, Art.(1942), 29.
² Pepper, Art.(1942), 30.
According to Pepper, this prediction must be accomplished at three levels: the level of science, the level of psychology and the level of the social and ethical. Unless there is control at level three, activities at the levels of the first two items are useless.

Pepper's position is admirable, for the ethical aspect of society is too frequently ignored in the race to control science and psychology. However, to say that activities occurring on the level of natural science are wasted unless they have reverberations in the ethical life of a social order is to reduce each phase of a society to ethics. No one phase can absorb the other phases. They must co-exist in harmony. The aim should be to control their development so that no phase advances too far beyond the other and thus produces a lag.

Pepper presents three "theories" of social control:

1. The functional which can be either resultant or emergent is the mechanistic view that social behaviorism is to be controlled through individual behavior.

2. Social determinism which is a theory of distinct social laws independent of human behavior.

3. The exhortational view which has ethical ideals as the goal and uses the method of persuasion.

He dismisses the exhortational theory for the

reason that it implies a bifurcation between the empirical world and the ideals. Therefore an empirical theory of social control denies the reality of ideals. "Thus" he continues, "either the Exhortational Theory boils down to propaganda which is injurious enough", or it is in search of empirical social laws.¹

Pepper admitted the possibility of social control. Another writer, Popper, in the Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I, exhibits the pessimism of which Pepper accuses some. His book is against all social philosophies which raise the claims of a discovery of laws of history which enable them to prophesy the course of historical events.² This type of theory he labels "historicism". He calls such theories reactionary movements which have tried and are trying to upset civilization and regress to tribalism.³ Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx are lumped together. The manifestations of historicism are in theories which have a (1) doctrine of chosen people, (2) law of nature, (3) law of spiritual development, and (4) law of economic development.

In place of such social theories, Popper would substitute a scientific study of social institutions and their workings. He would introduce gradual reforms in

1. Pepper, Art. (1942), 34.
2. Popper, OSE, 3.
3. Popper, OSE, 1.
schools, legal systems, forms of government and penal institutions. This piecemeal planning (social engineering) through the study of individual institutions, is possible and leads to social progress. Large scale planning (historicism) is impossible and Utopian and leads to disillusion and disorder.

An adequate rebuttal to Popper is made by Mardiros.

If the personal factor makes large scale planning impossible, it must make piecemeal planning impossible too.¹

At any given stage in history man is faced with certain alternative futures and that he has a choice between these alternatives. A rational choice between them will involve the taking of large scale action to shape the future in accordance with the best of these alternatives. A refusal to choose, or a choice of actions inadequate to the occasion will result in the loss of human freedom.²

Pepper claims that all social theories stated in terms of Platonic forms are varieties of the theory of social determinism.³ This position seems to ignore Plato's emphasis upon the supremacy of the law of reason in man, and the principle of persuasion as presented in the Timaeus.

The social order as posited by Plato is more likely of the exhortational view. The ethical ideals are inspired by the philosopher-kings and become the goals of the whole

¹ Mardiros, Art. (1948), 344.
² Mardiros, Art. (1948), 349.
³ Pepper, Art. (1942), 83.
society, through its members, by the power of persuasion in the philosopher-king. To say that Plato admits of social laws independent of human behavior is to confuse the source with its tributaries.

Plato believed firmly in the validity of social control. His method would be an extensive and intensive education from birth through adulthood. For those who are already matured, he would use the method of persuasion as the only type of control suitable to a mind. His concern was not very much with the products of the old order, but rather with the coming generation, which pliable in youth, would be molded in accord with justice through reason for efficient functioning in the social order.

In training the members of the social order, one has to decide first, what kind of city constitutes his ideal, and then proceed to construct social and educational institutions such as are required by that ideal. Plato constructs the ideal city of the Republic and the model city of the Laws (in which he considers the human conditions under which his ideal is realizable).

The exposition in the Republic deals primarily with the dynamic elements of the social order. It is concerned with the difficult job of defining the principles which are

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1. Laws, IV. 718, 723.
the spirit, the arteries of a society. The problems which must be met in all theories of social order are: What is the origin and nature of the state? What is justice? What is the good life? What relationship among the members of a social order will allow the maximum approximation in attaining the happiness of all? What institutions must exist to provide a suitable environment for the achievement of the goals of the social order?

The Laws gives the proposed state specific and practical treatment. It is concerned with the machinery of the social order. The result is a greatly modified version of that which is presented in the Republic. Much of the idealism that expressed faith in the positive side of human nature gives way to a pronounced pessimism. In the Republic, reason is the guide to action, whereas in the Laws, the codified principles are second only to the deity. The former is a social philosophy; the latter, a treatise on the state.

2. The Psychological Principles

To understand a certain society and its form of organization, it is profitable to become acquainted first with the theory of man upon which it is based.

Man is a rational being. In Plato's theory this is the factor in man which sets him apart from other living beings is his reason.\(^1\) When he is aware of this distinction

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and lives in accord with his rational principle, he functions as man in his highest capacity, which is, sharing in the immortality of divine things. Mere possession of the faculty for reason is not sufficient. It must be exercised constantly in order to develop fully.

Man is a moral creature. His reason, the instrument of personal freedom, permits him to choose from alternative courses of action. In addition to reason, man has will (the "spirited element"), and desires (the "appetites"). When reason controls the will and selects the desires which may be manifested without harmful effects the life of the individual is virtuous. Each part of his nature is functioning at its proper level in its right proportions. This differentiation of the functions of the three aspects of man's nature results in the attainment of the virtue of justice. When the "spirited element" is in true function, the virtue is courage; when reason rules and guides the other parts, the virtue is wisdom; when there is harmony within the total nature, the virtue is temperance.

1. Timaeus, 89.
2. Timaeus, 89; Rep., IV. 441.
5. Rep., IV. 441.
Man is a social animal. There is an interdependence of rational beings produced by the fact that each individual comes into existence endowed with unique abilities.\(^1\)

Each person fulfills his own nature only by developing and using these abilities in his particular place in the social order. This is the road to perfect virtue and happiness.

The type of social order must be so organized that man can realize his nature. The reform of society must begin at the top, among the rulers, and reach down to the lower orders of society. If the rulers are educated to know the principles of reality and their own nature and the nature of their subjects, the state will be well-ordered and the need for legislation and retributive laws will be at a minimum. In the perfect state, all the groups will function in complete harmony. The just state does not seek to secure the happiness of any one class but to secure "the greatest possible happiness" for the society as a whole.

3. The Role of Vocation

The principles by which the vocations of the members of the social order are determined are the reasons for the origin of the state.\(^2\) Man is of necessity a social

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1. Rep., II, 368, 369, 374; III. 394.
2. Rep., II. 368.
animal. Each individual has innate differences and he has needs. These innate differences limit his capacity to satisfy all his needs. It is only in the exchange of social intercourse that the proper fulfillment of these needs is possible. In the pooling of special abilities, all are able to pursue an aptitude for the sake of efficiency.

The best social order, therefore, is one which recognizes the differences among men, and provides for the proper division of their labor as they contribute to the maintenance of the group.

This is the pattern of the Platonic order. There are to be specialized training programs to suit the several member groups of the social order.

He who would be good at anything must practice that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in the particular way which the work requires.

He who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state, has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, and does not admit of being made a secondary occupation.

The occupations grouped hierarchically from that needing the most intensive training at the level of dialectics to that of manual skill are (1) Ruling, (2) Executive, (3)

2. Laws, I. 643.
Military, (4) Professional, (5) Handicraft and Trading and (6) Farming. The duties of the rulers and the executives are deliberation, supervision, and direction. They perform the following activities:

1. Deliberate in councils upon policies.
2. Decide upon the church calendar dates of court-of-justice sessions, dates of peacetime military sports meet.
3. Initiate and revise laws as occasion arises.
4. Scrutinize the qualities of magistrates and supervise their conduct in office.
5. Supervise the behavior of citizens in home, street, temples, in peace, and in war.
6. Appoint visitors to travel and observe foreign institutions and report back, with suggestions for the improvement of the home institutions.
7. Sit in all important administrative positions and (after 60 years of age) to all important representative positions.

Citizens of the state are limited to the occupations of husbandry, shepherds and bee-keepers, and to the superintending of the implements used in these. Only the metics (foreigners within the state) may practice the occupation of

2. Laws, VIII. 842.
handicraft arts.\textsuperscript{1} To the metics also are left the business of trading and retail merchandising.\textsuperscript{2} Even these non-citizens are confined to pursuing and managing one craft and no more, upon the principle that the individual can attain excellence in only one occupation, and that, the one for which he is naturally endowed.

Technical education for the professions is on two levels. The lower phase is concrete, practical and dependent upon association and practice rather than upon insight. The higher phase rests partly upon experience and training, but requires for its full development, the insight which comes from the serious systematic study of philosophy.\textsuperscript{3} This means that there are two positions to be filled in each profession, the master and the assistant. The master accomplishes his end through persuasion for he understands the essences of the situations which develop in his profession. On the other hand, the assistant can only use dogmatism for his knowledge comes from imitating the master and from personal experience.\textsuperscript{4} However, both phases are necessary to the attainment of the ends of the professions in order to insure efficient service to the community, for the method

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] \textit{Laws}, VIII. 846.
\item[2.] \textit{Laws}, VIII. 842; 849.
\item[3.] \textit{Rep.}, III, 408-409.
\item[4.] \textit{Laws}, IV, 720.
\end{itemize}
must suit the clients. ¹

The medical profession ensures the continuation of physical health. Its duty is not to prolong the life of the invalid but rather the life of those already in good health. ² The legal profession ensures moral and political well-being. It requires a wide experience of men and affairs, thorough training in the habits of law and philosophic insight into the ideal principle of value. ³ The educator directs music and gymnastics and judges the contests in these fields. The ministry of education is the highest office of the state. ⁴ The theological profession interprets the prophecies and the poets. ⁵ The military profession is concerned with the protection of the community in case of war, the making of roads, the care of fountains and streams, irrigation and is required to have exact knowledge of the geography and topography of the locality. It also decides the issues on minor cases. ⁶ These professions are positions for the auxiliaries (also known as guardians or wardens) who make up the second class of the social order.

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3. Laws, VI. 770; XII. 964.
5. Laws, VI. 769.
4. The Family

The best state maintains justice in ratio to the ordering of its parts. Revision of the structures of the vocational life and the educational institutions is ineffectual unless a correlative revision is made in the social unit known as the family. This is a principle of an organic social theory.

The ideal family unit for Plato as expressed in the Republic is the state in which all its members are unified by a common share in all its pleasures and pains. This unity of emotion can be truly attained only if the possessive adjectives of "mine" and "yours" are eliminated from the vocabulary.1 Any other unit less than perfect.

However, recognition of the difficulty in obtaining this condition until man is thoroughly educated, forced Plato to delineate a second best order as in the Republic2 and a third best order as found in the Laws.3 An important difference comes up between the two dialogues because of this distinction.

2. Rep., V. 457.
3. Laws, VI. 772.
In the Republic, the communal life, with wives and children in common, is advocated for the rulers and executives to insure the maintainance of their highly moral character.¹ With the removal of private property comes the elimination of private interests as a danger to the public interest. There is no cause for distraction in the duty of ministering to the greatest good for the whole social order, and the rulers are free from the pressure power arising from the concerns associated with family ties.² When this is combined with the strict control of the mating process to secure the fittest type of offspring, the result is a high ratio of probability that superior individuals will evolve. The aim is to unite persons of equal abilities and stations with like personalities mating.³

The institution of certain festivals is the instrument by which brides and bridegrooms are introduced.⁴ Although the combination of the couples is decided beforehand by the rulers, an illusion of free choice is enacted through the ceremony of the drawing of lots (prearranged to

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¹ Rep., V. 457.
² Rep., V. 463-464.
³ Rep., V. 459.
⁴ Rep., V. 459.
coincide with the above mentioned decision) by the participants. This deception is necessary to avoid dissatisfaction, for then, the "inferior candidate may blame his luck rather than the rulers." ¹

The better children from this union will be taken to the public nurseries where their education in the good life is to begin, while the others (inferior and defective) "will be hidden away, in some appropriate manner that must be kept secret". ² All children conceived at the same festival are to be considered brothers and sisters and are to have the same parents in common. This is a precaution against incestuous unions.

In the Laws, marriage regulations are modified greatly. Monogamous marriage is advocated for all members of the social order, with the privilege of choosing one's mates. ³ This modification is possible because the equal distribution of all properties and facilities is relevant to everyone rather than to only the ruling class as in the Republic. ⁴ However, the advice of the state is that unlike personalities and classes should marry (rich and poor, wise with the less wise, and the like). This suggestion is made

¹. Rep., V, 460, 459.
². Rep., V, 460. Cornford notes that the implied infanticide would concern only the defective, the inferior being relegated to the lowest class. RCP, 160.
³. Laws, VI, 772.
⁴. Laws, VI, 740.
with the well-being of the state in mind, for a series of marriages in which like with like are united, would result in an inequality in the distribution of property and in the unbalance of the dispositions of the citizens. However, this is simply an advice and should not be made compulsory by written law. This position opposes the static nature of the ideal Republic to the vigorous nature of the practical state of the Laws.

Another modification concerning marriage is that in the Laws, the festivals for the betrothals are managed by the immediate families of those to be mated. The state maintains only that they be moderate and in keeping with the means of the families. As in the Republic, prospective wives and husbands meet at the choric festivals which they attend in the nude, the better that the physical graces may be seen before the contract is filled.

In both dialogues, marriage as the union of the sexes in the role of progenitors, is properly the administration of the state. It is a public function and a duty, and as such must be under constant supervision for the first

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1. Laws, VI. 773.
2. Laws, VI. 773.
3. Laws, V. 775.
ten years. To have children is an obligation, therefore any union which remains sterile for that period is dissolved.¹ Privileges and honors are extended to parents to encourage child-bearing, while taxes are imposed on any male remaining a bachelor over the age of thirty-five. Widows and widowers who have insufficient number of children are obligated to remarry.² This reform of the institution of marriage is essential for moral and eugenic reasons, which if ignored, result in dissonance in the harmony of the well-ordered state.³

The specific concern with planned parenthood is the attempt to maintain constant, the number of citizens.⁴ In the Laws, the provision which circumscribes the number of citizens to 5040 also limits the number of families.⁵ In the case of the death of the male head of the family, inheritance is passed on to a son.⁶ Other sons are adopted into the families of other citizens, and the daughters of the deceased are married off.⁷ If the widow is young enough

¹. Laws, VI. 784.
². Laws, VI. 774.
³. Rep., V. 457.
⁴. Rep., V. 459.
⁵. Laws, VI. 771.
⁶. Laws, XI. 923.
⁷. Laws, XI. 923, 924.
to have yet the desire for male companionship, or if older and still able to produce, but without children by the previous marriage, she is duty-bound to marry again.\footnote{Laws, XI. 930.} This dissolution of the family when it ceases to be harmonious with the well-being of the state is characteristic of the principle basic to all institutions in the Platonic social order.

Although Plato surrenders his ideal of marriage in the \textit{Republic} to the practical form as described in the \textit{Laws}, he retains the unbending morality that must exist between the sexes. Citizens should at least be able to be as continent as "birds and beasts in general, who are born in great multitudes, and remain until the age of procreation virgin and unmarried."\footnote{Laws, VII. 840.} Illicit love and adultery are punishable by deprivation of civic honors and privileges.\footnote{Laws, VIII. 841.}

Plato, however, is aware that human nature is generally weak in relation to the emotional life. He recognizes that legal measures alone are not sufficient to prevent the misuse of love. Thus he proposes additional means through which the citizens may achieve a wholesome and holy sex life. These are means based on the principle

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Laws}, XI. 930.
\item \textit{Laws}, VII. 840.
\item \textit{Laws}, VIII. 841.
\end{itemize}}
of piety, the love of honor, and the desire of beauty in the soul.¹ The legislators shall consecrate the union of the sexes, thereby establishing the power of tradition which few would dare to flaunt.² In addition, the citizens must occupy themselves with work to divert their energies into other channels.³ An unwritten law must be sanctioned that concealment of any violation, although not desirable, is honorable and that open vice is dishonorable.⁴

The social relationship among members of a family is one of obedience, honor, and respect.⁵ The younger is subject to the elder, the wife to the husband, and the child to the parent. Aged parents are to be honored, for the gods have a special reception to their prayers.⁶ Any neglect and ill-treatment of these parents are punishable by law. Offenders under forty years will receive "stripes and bonds", and those over forty will be brought before a court

1. Laws, VIII. 841.
2. Laws, VIII. 838.
3. Laws, VIII. 841.
4. Laws, VIII. 841.
5. Laws, V. 729.
of all the eldest citizens who will judge and impose both fine and punishment to any degree.¹

Instruction in the care and education of children is developed in detail. The youth are important in the Platonic society because it is they who will eventually realize the ideal social order. They will not have been handicapped by the practices and traditions of the institutions of the past order which so much hinder their elders. Indoctrination into the new forms of the state will be painless, for youth is pliable.²

Plato's provisions for the care of the child prove his insight in the area of child-psychology. His list compares favorably with the principles which today's parents find expressed in the writings of Ilg, Gesell, Ames and Spock. The pregnant women must find exercise by walking about.³ After birth, the infant's psychological needs must be met. These are: the need for movement and cutaneous stimulation, the soothing effect of rhythm, the protection from disturbing fears during early childhood to avoid crushing the spirit, the provision of quiet and adequate amusement.⁴

1. Laws, XI. 932.
2. Laws, II, 663; VII. 788.
3. Laws, VII. 789.
4. Laws, VII. 790-792.
Plato voices his opinion that the first three years of life are the most important since they are the most impressionable.\(^1\) If the social order is to have adults whose souls are "gentle and cheerful" rather than "discontented and ungracious", it is necessary that the critical period of early childhood be free from unnecessary sorrow, fear and pain.

In both the Republic and the Laws, slave-nurses carry the burden of the heavy and exhausting work associated with the early years of child-care. From the age of three onward the state assumes the education of the child.

Plato denies that the place of woman is necessarily the home.\(^2\) As seen in the Republic, the woman is freed from the responsibilities that are pertinent to the situation of the private home-maker.\(^3\) The communal life literally sets her free to participate in public activities. In the Laws, woman is partially restricted until her children no longer need her supervision. However, the institution of slaves relieves the private wife of the drudgery of heavy house duties.

The nature of woman is the same as that of man for she is born with natural endowments just as man is.\(^4\) Therefore,

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1. *Laws*, VII. 792.
after receiving equal education, there is no natural reason (i.e. according to nature) which prohibits her participation in public life. Plato uses "nature" in the sense of having capacity to perform duties, rather than in the meaning of the subjective self. In fact, he would say that, in the latter sense, the nature of woman is inferior to that of man in possession of virtue.

Nevertheless, for the welfare of the whole social order, the activities of women must be regulated in the same manner as that of men. To neglect the role of women is as much as neglecting one-half of the state. Therefore, with natural gifts for all occupations being in both sexes, women must be trained for their part in the management of social duties.

In the Republic, which develops the training of the Guardians, women share the life and duties of this class. In the Laws, the duties of women in legislature are concerned with the guidance of procreation, birth, and early education. As "controllers of marriage", they are 1) to see that the marriage laws are obeyed, and to bring and press charges where necessary, 2) to supervise pre-school training of

1. Rep., V. 454.
2. Rep., V. 453; Laws, VI. 761.
3. Laws, VI. 781.
4. Laws, VI. 784, 794.
children with right of appeal to police authorities to enforce their directions, 3) to assist in settling disputes between husband and wife, 4) to maintain the biological and biosocial continuity of the community.

Even here, Plato remains true to his principles that the individual must fulfill his capacity through the group. Although women are broadly given an equal opportunity in education and in office holding, their role is geared to their peculiar function as the principal factor in the propagation of the race. Woman is emancipated but not transformed. She is equal as a rational creature but specialized by the nature of her function as mother.

One note of complete accord stands out in the discussion of family life in both the earlier and the later dialogues, and that is the institution of eating meals in community halls.¹ This is the natural corollary of the fundamental principle of a social means of production.

Plato expresses regret that the institution of common meals is only a "second-best form of policy", the ideal being the abolition of private property in all forms - houses, women and children.²

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¹ Rep., V. 458; Laws, VI. 781
² Laws, VII. 807.
5. The Epistemological Basis

The core of Plato's epistemology is the theory of anamnesis which states that knowledge is acquired, not through the senses or as information conveyed from one mind to another, as in teaching, but by recollection in this life, of realities and truths seen and known by the soul before its incarnation. This position does not deny the part of sensory experience in the knowing process, but rather relegates sense data to their proper place.

It is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it.¹

If we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone.²

Two basic doctrines are evident, 1) the immortality and divinity of the rational soul and 2) the real existence of the objects of knowledge in a realm distinct from that of sense; hence an epistemological dualism.

The two orders of things are the realm of the unseen and the realm of the seen. In the realm of the unseen, the objects are simple, unchanging and eternal, whereas the objects of the realm of the seen are complex, changing and temporal.

1. Phaedo, 75.
Both of these realms are within experience and as such have corresponding levels of knowing. There is knowledge and there is opinion.¹ Then there are the objects of knowledge, those of opinion, and the states of mind which apprehend these objects.² In the Republic, Plato introduces the principle of the Line to explain the progressive structure of the nature of knowing.

There are two main parts to the Line - the intelligible order and the visible order.³ The objects of knowledge in the intelligible order are mathematics, Forms and the Good.⁴ The corresponding states of mind for mathematics and Forms are thinking and dialectic.⁵ The objects in the visible order are images and things, and the corresponding states of mind are conjecture and belief.⁶ All objects except the Good have corresponding states of mind.⁷ This means that the Good cannot be known merely through the regular

1. Rep., V. 476.
2. Rep., V. 477, 478.
4. Rep., VI. 509, 510; VII. 517.
5. Rep., VI. 511.
7. Rep., VII. 518; VI. 508.
development of mental ability, but is grasped by spiritual intuition which transcends the general means of attaining knowledge.¹ However, it is necessary for the mind to function at all stages before the intuitive spark can develop to bridge the gap between the Forms and their ultimate source, the Good.² In the Allegory of the Cave, Plato illustrates the gradual development requisite to knowledge of the Good, just as seeing the sun takes a gradual adjustment of the eyes to the intensity of sunlight.³

The objective of the individual should be knowledge rather than mere opinion, for knowledge is concerned only with reality, while the objects of opinion lie between the extremes of reality and unreality.⁴ The objects of opinion have this indeterminate position because of their complexity and relative value as things in the visible world.⁵

The Good is the ultimate source of reality and of the faculty for knowing.⁶ In order to gain knowledge of the complete truth, the Good must be apprehended. A continuation of the analogy to the Sun describes the function of the Good.

¹. Rep., VII. 518.
². Rep., VII. 517.
³. Rep., VII. 514, 517; VI. 508.
⁴. Rep., V. 478.
⁵. Rep., V. 478.
⁶. Rep., VI. 508.
Just as sunlight is needed in order to see colours and shapes distinctly, so the Good is the cause of understanding of the several objects of opinion and knowledge.\(^1\) The individual who intuits the Good is able to recognize the relationship of images and things in the world of flux to the symbols and Forms in the external world. This is wisdom which only a few, whose desire for truth keeps them on the path unwaveringly, do attain.

However, this intelligence is amoral. It may be used for either much good or great harm.\(^2\) Therefore, men must be trained from childhood through habit and practice, to treasure virtue.\(^3\) The soul of every man has the capacity for learning the truth and the educational institution is the opportunity for its development.\(^4\) The welfare of the social order, therefore, depends upon an adequate and closely organized system of education. Thus, to insure this, the state must be in control of education.\(^5\)

6. The Role of Education

Plato is the point of synthesis between the idealistic education of the Homeric period and the pragmatic edu-

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cation of the age of the Sophists. His system avoids both
idolatry of the past as well as preoccupation with the present.
He looks to the future. The aim of a sound system of education
is to develop men who are better than their forebears physi-
cally and spiritually.1

The objective of the state is to promote the
virtuous life.2 Only a system based on an ethical principle
can hope to achieve perfect unity. Legislation alone is in-
sufficient to prevent greed and strife which arise from the lack
of virtue. Education must seek to promote leaders of the state
who recognize the gods as the source and unity of virtue.3

The treatment of education in the Laws and the
Republic differs only in emphasis. In the Laws, common edu-
cation for the citizens is developed; in the Republic, only
the education for the rulers is elaborated.

1. Common Education

From infancy up to the age of three, the aim is to
avoid the experiences of fear, unnecessary pain and excessive
pleasure. Fear produces a cowardly nature; unnecessary pain
embitters the disposition; and excessive pleasure defeats the
habit of moderation. To cultivate courage, gentleness, bene-
volence, and kindness, the psychological needs of the child
should be met.4

2. Laws, XII. 963.
3. Laws, XII. 966.
4. Laws, VII. 791, 792.
Between the ages of three and six, the aim is discipline,\textsuperscript{1} which will be cultivated during supervised play. The child, however, will not be allowed to manifest his natural play instinct when he meets the other children at the temples.\textsuperscript{2} The games are determined by the legislature to insure the habits of good taste. Uniformity in the outlets of all the children will establish similar habits. If the child is allowed innovation in his play, the institutions of the state may be endangered, for such a child is a potential revolutionist.\textsuperscript{3} The duties of the nurses, who supervise the play period and who are themselves under supervision of twelve matrons, are to maintain proper behavior, orderliness, and to squelch all signs of self-will.\textsuperscript{4}

After the age of six, the sexes are separated, but the education remains equal.\textsuperscript{5} To the age of ten, the subject matter is music and gymnastics, which is subdivided into dancing and wrestling.\textsuperscript{6} The aim of music is the improvement of the soul.\textsuperscript{7} Therefore, only the models consecrated by law

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. \textit{Laws}, VII. 793-794.
\item 2. \textit{Laws}, VII. 797.
\item 3. \textit{Laws}, VII. 797, 798.
\item 4. \textit{Laws}, VII. 794.
\item 5. \textit{Laws}, VII. 794.
\item 6. \textit{Laws}, VII. 795.
\item 7. \textit{Laws}, VII. 795.
\end{itemize}
Education for the youth between the ages of ten and twenty is divided into three periods. The first three years are devoted to reading and writing skills; the following three years to music composition; and the last phase to further gymnastics.¹

Higher education begins at the age of twenty. Three subjects make up the curriculum: arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. However, there will be two kinds of presentation of the subjects, the one scientific and the other popular.² The scientific treatment will be for a few citizens who are selected on the basis of their abilities as potential rulers; while the popular treatment is for the masses, who need only a general education.

ii. Special Education

In the Republic, the technical training for the potential rulers is discussed.³ The earlier phases of education presented above, are concerned with transient objects.⁴

¹. Laws, VII. 810, 814.
². Laws, VII. 818.
This later phase progresses to universal and steady objects. These studies introduce the pupils to symbols and first principles, and are detached from the world of sense. Thinking begins with abstract concepts as the objects of knowledge. The pupils no longer learn by imitation but from understanding. Arithmetic forces the mind to call upon reason in order to calculate, and to discover the nature of numbers. Geometry trains the mind to comprehend forms and to do independent research. Astronomy prepares the mind further for abstraction by centering the attention on the mysteries of the universe.

Between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, the pupils are now concerned with discovering the first principles themselves. This stage of education is dialectic. They are now able to know the Forms directly. There is insight and true knowledge. The aim of study at this level is to know the source of the Forms, to grasp the fundamental principle which is the basis of the Forms, the Good. This is the highest point of human knowledge. Caution is taken that the pupils are not exposed too quickly to this realm of knowledge until they are mature enough to avoid confusion.

The summit of the intelligible world is reached in philosophic discussion by one who aspires, through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses, to make his way in every case to the essential reality and perseveres until he has grasped by pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is what we call Dialectic.1

The last training comes when the pupils return from their isolated studies to apply the principles in an active way in the social order.2 The pupils who completed the scale of knowledge participate as philosopher-kings in the council of rulers to direct the whole social order.3 This completes the formal training of the citizens. However, in order that they maintain their standard, study must become a continuous activity in their lives.

7. The Metaphysical Basis

It is difficult to state conclusively the metaphysics of Plato. Is reality one or many, of one kind or two or three? The traditional interpretation of Plato's concept of reality is that it is a dualistic system whose aspects are the realm of Form or Idea and the realm of phenomena or matter. There is evidence to support this position

in the Republic.¹ The Laws add some slight evidence in the discussion which distinguishes between soul and body. Soul is prior to body and is the origin of all change.² What confuses the issue is that in the Republic, Plato is really concerned with epistemological problems, so that the problem of the nature of reality is subordinate to the former. He later deals with the metaphysical basis for the Republic in the Timaeus.³

The problem of being and becoming in Plato comes nearer to the solution.⁴ Metaphysics is the subject matter in the Timaeus and the Philebus. Additional information with this problem is in the Theaetetus⁵ and the Sophist.⁶

Both the Timaeus and the Philebus advance a theory which classified existence into three kinds, with a dominating yet transcendent principle as the coordinating factor. In the Timaeus, these are the uncreated Forms, souls, and the

1. Rep., V. 777, 478; VI. 505, 506, 508, 509; X. 596.
2. Laws, X. 892, 893, 895, 896.
4. Rep., V. 478, 479; Timaeus, 28, 29, 37-38; Philebus, 54; Sophist, 248-252.
Receptacle with the Creator as the principle. In the Philebus, the classification is the Infinite, the Finite, the compound of infinite and finite, and the creative principle.

The Forms are the eternal patterns and may be presumed to be the laws of reason from which the creator acts. The evidence is that they are co-existent with the creator. Souls are immortal though created and are the principle of reason. Souls created by the Creator are lesser gods. The souls of men are created by the lesser gods. The Receptacle is the indeterminate locus of creation. As the space-time continuum it is formless.

The Finite is the category of specification and is the limited; the definite. The Infinite is unlimited plurality, the indefinite and the qualitative. The compound of the two is the particular and is unity in multiplicity.

1. Timaeus, 28, 29, 41, 49, 50.
2. Philebus, 23, 27.
3. Timaeus, 28-29.
4. Timaeus, 41.
5. Timaeus, 50, 38.
The following is a summary of the processes of reality as elicited from the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus*. The origin of creation is goodness⁠¹ and reason.⁠² The Creator made the visible world because, "He was good, and the good... being free from jealousy...desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be".⁠³ Therefore, being reasonable, he first created souls, for the soul is the seat of reason.⁠⁴ The universe was then created through the union of the definite with the indefinite (the Forms and the Receptacle of the *Timaeus*), and the limited with the unlimited (the Finite and the infinite of the *Philebus*).⁠⁵

The actuality of this tangible creation was the unsolved problem of becoming for Plato. He admits that the Receptacle as the "nurse of all generation" is difficult to describe⁠⁶ and that the compounded is difficult to understand.⁠⁷ It is neither complete being nor non-being, but manifests the characteristics of both.⁠⁸ The impermanence of the world of

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1. *Timaeus*, 29-30
sense violated Plato's conviction that reality is absolute, eternal, intelligible, and unchanging. In his attempt to justify this feeling, Plato seeks intellectual certainty by reverting often to the problem of becoming.

The question is posed:

Now if there is something so constituted that it both is and is not, will it not be between the purely real and the utterly unreal?2

What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is?3

A constant passion for any knowledge that will reveal to them something of that reality which endures for ever and is not always passing into and out of existence.4

And do all these things which we call self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent and nothing whatever besides them.5

The denial that reality is either all flux or all identity is advanced:

The moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any time.6

1. Rep., VI. 511, V. 476.
2. Rep., V. 476.
3. Timaeus, 27.
5. Timaeus, 51.
6. Parmenides, 156.
The philosopher...cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms; and we will be utterly deaf to those who assist universal motion....He will include both the moveable and immovable in his definition of being and all.1

The answer is given:

The last two belief and imagining taken together constitute the apprehension of appearances in the world of Becoming; the first two knowledge and thinking intelligence concerned with true Being.2

That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is.3

Thus have I concisely given the result of my thoughts; and my verdict is that being and space and generation, these three, existed in their three ways before heaven.4

The conclusion assumed as probable in this thesis is that the ultimate reality is one. This ultimate is the Creator or creative principle, sometimes referred to as the Good.5 The attributes of the Creator are intelligence or reason, absolute existence, perfection with its corresponding attribute of identity, and goodness. Thus the theory that the true, the good, and beautiful are one becomes acceptable.

1. Sophist, 249.
2. Rep., VII. 534.
3. Timaeus, 28.
4. Timaeus, 52.
5. Rep., VI. 508; VII. 518; Timaeus, 28; Philebus, 27.
This suggestion that Plato's metaphysics is a qualitative and quantitative monism is based on the arguments in the *Timaeus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Sophist*. The term "quantitative monism" needs modification. It does not mean that reality is one indivisible, undifferentiated totality. It implies, rather, that reality is an integrated unity by relation of interacting entities.

These entities are three, and are the Creative Principle (Creator), the Forms, and Space (Receptacle). The reduction of reality to this unity in plurality is arrived at through the problems of "being" and "non-being", and of "change" and "identity." First, "being" must be equated with "identity" and "non-being" with "change". Second, "being" must be considered the characteristic fundamental to the Forms, and non-being", the chief characteristic of the Receptacle. Third, it must be explained how the Forms and the Receptacle, with characteristics that should make them mutually incompatible ("being" and "non-being"), can interact to form the "things" of the sensible world. The explanation of this interaction is the factor which decides the nature of reality. This problem of interaction is but

5. *Sophist*, 252-257.
a different approach to the problem of becoming with which Plato was concerned.¹

The argument must begin with positing mind or intelligence as the only causal agent.² Both "change" and "identity" are necessary to the perfect existence of mind.³ For, motion, which is a necessary aspect of "change", must be an attribute of mind if it is to be deemed causative. Creation is movement. On the other hand, identity of the mind with itself must be retained if creation is to be possible, for there must be "other than", if the distinction between creator and created is to be valid. However, the concept of "change" carries with it the notion of more than one, for an entity cannot "change" without being other than itself. Plato resolved this problem by explaining that mind alone is such that it has both unity and plurality.⁴

The Creative Principle is the factor which co ordinates "being" and "non-being", that is, the Forms and the Receptacle.⁵ "non-being" is neither the one or the many, that is, neither the Creative Principle nor the Forms.⁶

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1. Discussed earlier in this thesis, 47-49.
2. Philebus, 30; Timaeus, 29, 30; Rep., VI. 508; Laws, X. 892, 896.
4. Sophist, 249.
5. Timaeus, 48, 50-51, 53.
6. Sophist, 238.
It exists as relation. As the natural recipient of all impressions, it provides the locus for the relation of Forms to one another, which by reason of their absolute nature would otherwise be mutually exclusive. "Being" admits of plurality for the Forms are infinite in number. However, "being" is also a unity, for each Form is one indivisible unit. Although "being" and the "one", are co-equal and co-extensive, "being" does not have the "same significance as one." The "one" or Creative Principle participates in "being" and "non-being" alike. It is both prior to and after its components. As the causal agent, it is prior. As the unity of the three aspects, it is after. Nothing could exist without the "one". Dialectics claims the interaction of the Creative Principle with the Forms and the Receptacle through the principles of identity and differentiation.

2. Timaeus, 50.
3. Parmenides, 132, 134; Timaeus, 50.
4. Sophist, 245.
5. Parmenides, 145, 142.
8. Parmenides, 166.
10. Sophist, 255-256.
Coexistent with the Creator but not separate from him are the Forms or ideas, and the Receptacle or space. These may be considered part of the nature of the Creator; the Forms being his logical principles or laws of reason and the Receptacle being the irreducible element of brute fact. This is the Platonic Trinity.

The relation of the Creator to the Sensible world is that he is the source and sustainer of all becoming. That the things of the world seem to have separate existence, is an illusion created by minds unable to distinguish the shadow from the real thing.

The relation of the Creator to man as finite soul or mind is that of creator to creature. Man's role in the universe is to strive to attain the virtue or goodness which has its supreme manifestation in the Creator. It is only when man achieves the virtuous life that he ceases to become and attains the unity of identity with the Creator.

8. The Place of Art

No other art critic has remained a point of controversy for such a long period as Plato. The reason is that Plato was perhaps the first Western thinker to formulate the idea of censorship.

Today, with the growing interest in Socialism, many persons are concerned with the problem of the place of
9. The Role of Religion

Through his concern about the nature of the soul, Plato revealed his interest in the ethical aspect of life. The Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and the Gorgias discuss the problem of immortality and life after death. However, it is not until the Laws that ethics is incorporated fully into a political setting.

In fact, the basis of the state is God.¹ The Athenian Stranger opens the dialogue with the question, "Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the author of your laws?"² The object of laws is to make their adherents happy, as all goods, which are of two kinds ---human and divine, come from them. Since the human good is subordinate to the divine good, the state which strives for the latter will naturally achieve the former.³

The concept of God has a function in every phase of the social order for he is the "measure of all things".⁴ First, the organizational structure of the state is based on the sacred number of 5040, and the sacred number 12. The state is divided into twelve sectors, each part dedicated to

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1. Laws, I. 624.
2. Laws, I. 624.
some god and honored with his name. The citizens are divided also into twelve tribes. Each city has a guiding or sacred principle given by nature.

Since "God is the natural and worthy object of a man's most serious and blessed endeavors", worship is decreed by law. This is in effect the advocacy of a state religion. The state sets up temples to the gods and proclaims the form in which worship is to be practiced. There are to be 365 sacrifices a year, one each day, and twelve feasts a year celebrated each month to one of twelve gods. Each citizen is requested to live a holy life dedicated to "sacrificing and singing and dancing" in order to propitiate the gods. He is to offer prayers and libation to god before meals and be aware that his soul is most divine and his only true possession.

There are to be appointed officers of the temple, who are to be chosen by lot, so as to allow guidance in the selection by god. These priests and priestesses, who must be over sixty years of age, are the servants of god. The tenure of the priests and priestesses is one year and no more. As interpreters of life, these holy citizens receive the laws about divine things from the Delphic Oracle.

1. Laws, VIII. 803.
2. Laws, VIII. 803.
3. Laws, VI. 759.
Fear of god is to be part of the education of the young so as to prevent wrongdoing, especially the evil of participation in unnatural loves.

Magistrates and courts of law are built near the temples in recognition of the foundation of the laws in religion.

The divine goods of wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage are to be within the state through its members if the human goods of health, beauty, strength and wealth are to be attained.

The greatest crime is the negligence of the religious life. On this principle is based the denial of the handicrafts as a vocation to the citizen. Such occupation soon becomes a driving force to increase one's gains and leads to preoccupation with things that are eventually harmful to the soul. States with an economy so grounded are ever at war and disdain peace.

Religion is the standard by which censorship is exercised. The poet, who has not lived a good life, and whose songs are not dedicated to the gods, is prohibited from contributing poetry in commemoration of great events.

This intensity regarding religion has made Plato criticize the philosophical life which is given so much stature in the Republic. He condemns the philosopher's emphasis upon mind and criticizes the natural philosophy
which explains the universe in scientific terms.\(^1\)

In the *Republic*, what religion is to be abstracted is personal; in the *Laws*, religion is dogmatic. This change is compatible with the tone of pessimism which seems to be the underlying vein distinguishing the *Laws* from the *Republic*. In the *Republic*, knowledge of the Good is followed by the good life. In the *Laws*, knowledge is not sufficient to insure goodness and must be supplemented by the enforcement of *Laws*.

10. The State and Citizenship

1. The State

The existence or origin of the state is based on the principle of natural contract,\(^2\) and on the principle of the common holding of goods.\(^3\)

In the *Republic*, a society is a natural state where man, because he is not self-sufficient, is in voluntary association with other men through a mutual exchange of the values of their unique capacities.\(^4\) This simple society expands as other values besides those necessary for mere existence are developed.

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The best state, therefore, is that which maintains a relation based upon the natural distinction according to individual aptitude. This relation is to be maintained in all spheres. It is only on this basis that justice for all may be achieved.\(^1\) However, distinction is not all in the well-organized state. There must also be a unity wherein each individual citizen is an integral part.\(^2\) This notion of unity has its attendant obligations. In keeping with the recognition that all men are not equal in the capacity to fill all functions, there are those few who can rule and the many who must accept the position of the ruled.\(^3\) Thus legislation will be made not to satisfy the wishes of the masses but rather to meet the true needs and interests of the group.\(^4\) Should the masses choose to disobey such legislation, then the harmony and unity of the state will be disrupted.

Other distinguishing features of the best state are that it is peaceful.\(^5\) Neither wealth nor poverty exist to hinder the spirit of friendliness that should permeate its structure.\(^6\)

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2. Rep., V. 462.
4. Statesman, 293-301.
5. Laws, I. 625.
11. The Citizenship

The members of the social order are of three groups. There are the citizens proper of the state, the metics or foreigners who reside in the state, and the slaves. This division found in the society delineated in the *Laws*, is a departure from the natural classification which would have arisen from the exercise of social contract expressed in the *Republic*, or from art (techne) as the norm to determine function as advanced in the *Statesman*.

The question may be asked whether Plato intentionally abstracts those approaches to the internal structures of the state, or whether each view is a revision of the other. The latter suggestion seems more plausible. As Plato's zeal increased, he wished to have his idea of a social order take root in a reform of the Athenian state. The lofty ideals of the *Republic* were too inaccessible. After the unhappy experience of Plato at Syracuse, the *Laws* represents his greatly modified but accessible social order.

The number of the citizens is not to exceed 5040. Such a number is convenient for it facilitates the division of property, which should be neither more nor less than that

which allows a moderate standard of living. It must be recalled that excess in either wealth or poverty will result in loss of harmony in the state.

In the ideal state, the citizens would comprise one big family with no class distinction, and have all possessions in common. However, Plato regrets that this is not possible. Precise equality in possessions cannot be legislated. Some will accumulate more than others. In addition, inequality of wealth provides a more objective standard for classification than either ancestry or personal charm. The most that the state can do is to limit the amount of possessions so that neither extreme wealth nor poverty exists. Citizens who accumulate in excess of that allowed by the state must "give back the surplus to the state, and to the Gods who are patrons of the state." Failure to do this will invite severe punishment.

1. Laws, V. 737.
5. Laws, V. 744.
Such limitation on possessions is to insure the happiness of the citizens. Their proper concern should be the attainment of virtue.\textsuperscript{1} Preoccupation with acquiring wealth becomes distracting and interferes with education for the good life.

An additional objection is that the very rich man cannot be a good man. Plato feels that it is only by dealing in unjust as well as just methods that an individual can acquire wealth. Therefore, after having proved that the unjust life leads to unhappiness,\textsuperscript{2} he is confident that limitation on possession protects the best interest of the citizens.

The life of the citizens is to be devoted to the gods and to the development of their mental and physical capacities.\textsuperscript{3} Therefore, they should perform the necessary duties connected with public and private life as quickly as possible during the first part of each day, leaving the remainder free for the pursuit of the good life,\textsuperscript{4} that is, in study.

This is the reason for the presence of metics and slaves in the social order. These members assume the respons-

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. \textit{Laws}, VI. 770; IV. 718; \textit{Rep.}, IV. 441.
\item 2. \textit{Rep.}, IX. 576-587.
\item 3. \textit{Laws}, VII. 803, 807.
\item 4. \textit{Laws}, VII. 808; VIII. 847.
\end{itemize}
sibility for providing the products necessary to the economic health of the state. They can be likened to subject nations. Without the privilege of citizenship, nevertheless, they must conform to the jurisdiction of legislation.

Metics are foreigners who have settled within the state. They are welcome on condition that they work as artisans and agree to leave at the end of twenty years. All that is required of them is good conduct. Those who have contributed exceptionally to the progress of the state may petition for an extension of stay. To them are relegated the occupation of retail trade, the buying and selling of goods. Citizens are prohibited from trading because of its tendency to generate corruption.

Thus Plato would risk the souls of non-citizens, for their "corruption will be the least injury to the state." Is this a singular lack of the spirit of humanism in Plato? Perhaps, for one who has shown so much insight in the nature of man, this is disturbing. Yet, this is a manifestation of the essential Greekness of Plato that he should dismiss non-Greeks as unworthy of being saved?

1. **Laws**, VII. 850.
2. **Laws**, XI. 920.
How does Plato conceive of slavery? The Greek word for slavery (δουλεία) had different meanings. The legal definition covers the absence of political rights or independence. The moral definition covers the lack of depth of knowledge and strength of will. The definition in terms of social relations indicates the subjects of absolute government. Plato uses the term "slavery" in all these forms.

Thus, slavery, is the worst condition of existence. To preserve the best existence for the citizens, Plato insists that law must prevent the practice of enslavement among Hellenes. Slaves should be acquired from other nations.

Unfortunate as it is that Plato should allow this miserable life for men in his ideal state, yet he attempts to alleviate some of the undesirable practices connected with the institution of slavery. His reforms, however, are made not so much for the betterment of the slaves themselves but with an eye for securing the most benefits for the state.

3. Rep., V. 469.
4. Laws, VI. 777.
Slaves who are justly treated are less likely to revolt.\(^1\) Also, slaves who have virtuous masters will in some degree absorb a little virtue through association.\(^2\)

The slaves have no separate occupation such as the metics, who have exclusive right to the crafts and commerce. Their duties are determined by those of the citizens who are their masters. In other words, the slaves are the assistants who perform the labor under the direction and supervision of the citizens.\(^3\)

iii. The Administration

The aim of legislation is "to secure the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole."\(^4\) To protect this aim, there must be constant vigilance to curtail any "innovation upon the established system of education either of body or of mind."\(^5\)

In the Republic and the Statesman, Plato minimizes the rule of legislation to perfect the social order.\(^6\) The

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1. Laws, VI. 777.
2. Laws, VI. 777.
3. Laws, VI. 778; VII. 806; IV. 720
philosopher-kings and the statesmen are above law. However, with his later disposition toward the practical rather than the ideal, Plato, in the Laws, reverses the position of the rulers and the law. The rulers become the servants of law. Nevertheless, he retains the principal character traits which distinguishes those who are to rule from the masses. The Republic and the Statesman support an aristocratic monarchy or at most an oligarchy, but the Laws introduces a form of representative government.

In the Laws, political obligation is distributed among four bodies. These are the Nocturnal Council, the Chief Magistrates, the Senate, and The General Assembly.

The Nocturnal Council is the advisory board of the State. Its duties are to review the laws and to suggest additions to the law based on the findings of observers of other forms of government. The members of this body are the sages of the social order. They are the priests who have attained perfect virtue, the ten eldest guardians (minimum age is sixty) who have spent at least ten years traveling and studying the constitutions of other states, the minister of education, and all former ministers of education, and their proteges (between the ages of thirty and forty) who are promising

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1. Rep., VI. 500; Statesman, 297.
2. Laws, VI. 757.
3. Laws, XII. 952, 961.
young leaders. This formidable group is the "preserving power" in the state.

The magistrates who number thirty-seven, are elected for a term of not more than twenty years by the citizens. They are chosen by a process of elimination through three consecutive elections, and must be between fifty and seventy years of age. Their responsibilities are to legislate, to be guardians of the law, and to register the property holdings of the citizens. They also nominate the men from among which three generals will be elected. These generals in turn appoint the rest of the military officials.

The Senate will consist of three hundred-sixty members, that is, ninety representatives for each class. These men shall be elected by the citizens under compulsory vote, their term of office lasting for only one year. To

1. Laws, XII. 951, 961.
2. Laws, XII. 961.
3. Laws, VI. 753.
5. Laws, VI. 769.
7. Laws, VI. 756.
this group belong the sphere of the Department of Interior. They supply information concerning the state and are alert to internal disturbances.¹

Other officials whose affair is the municipality of the state will be either appointed or elected. These shall be the wardens of the city, the wardens of the agora (market-place), the clergy, the interpreters of the Delphic Oracle, and the temple treasurer.²

The General Assembly is made up of the remainder of the citizens who are summoned and adjourned by the Senate.³ Attendance at the call to assembly is compulsory for citizens of the first two classes under penalty of fine. The citizens of the third and fourth class are free to attend at will except in cases of great importance, at which time the summons will take the form of a command to all.⁴ Thus, Plato has conceded to self-government in the accessible social order.

¹ Laws, VI. 758.
² Laws, VI. 759-760.
³ Laws, VI. 758.
⁴ Laws, VI. 764.
II. Conclusion and Recapitulation

Every philosophy which is to move beyond the realm of pure theory into the sphere of utility through practical application must have an interpretation of man and his relation to the universe. From such an investigation ethics or a system of values invariable is formed. This is not the total effect of a theory of man, however, for in addition to those already mentioned, it is the core of the political theory evolved. To understand a certain society and its form of organization is to become acquainted with the theory of man upon which it has foundation.

There are certain positions which the observer of mankind can take. Man may be thought of either as innately bad, i.e., selfish, or as innately good, i.e., altruistic, or as neither good nor bad by nature but the product of influences, or as having biological and psychological limitations, which he can overcome by use of his will to determine his resulting nature.

The fourth position seems to express the Platonic conception. Perhaps it is here that the clue to guide us in abstracting a composite picture of the citizen is found. His discussion of the soul with its hierarchical parts of reason, spirited element, and the appetites define the psychological factor in man, and the biological factor is given in his postulation that each individual comes into being endowed with unique abilities. Man's function is to
fulfill his nature by living in accord with his rational principle and by developing his special abilities which become useful only in its place in the social order.

The good for Plato is both absolute and relative. As an absolute principle, it is that efficient fulfillment of function in the whole. As a relative principle, it is that each function is different and arranged in a hierarchical scale. Therefore, since every man can fulfill his function, it is possible for all men to be good but not equally good.

What are the virtues which man must seek to develop? When "each part of his nature is exercising its proper function, of ruling or being ruled" then a man may be called virtuous and possesses the virtue.¹ When reason rules and guides the other parts of the soul, the virtue is wisdom; when the spirited element is in true function, the virtue is courage; when there is "unanimity and concord" of all those parts, when there is "no conflict between the ruling element and its two subjects", the virtue is temperance. The total state of the soul in an inclusive harmonious overture results in the supreme virtue of justice.²

The will of the citizen in the social order is to know the good and thus attain the virtuous life. As was

¹. Rep., IV. 442.
². Rep., IV. 442-443.
pointed out earlier, the efficacy of the will depends upon the unique capacities of the individual. Thus all cannot know the good equally but rather, each can know degrees of the whole. Citizens, therefore, are distinguishable through their knowledge. The state, being just, guides them up the ladder with the educational system. At that point where each can go no higher, there is his position.

The citizen who reaches the top and knows the good in its entirety is the philosopher and the only member who is fit to rule. He is the man whose actions are virtuous without effort, because he can discern the essence of things without ever confusing the parts that partake of their character. He is the statesman for he has the techne of ruling which requires a knowledge of the whole. He can direct the state.

The citizen who understands the distinctions among things, knows the good as relative. He lacks knowledge of the absolute good but is capable of executing the duties specified by the insight of the ruler. This citizen's role is to assist the philosopher in protecting the virtues of the state by keeping its functions distinct.

The citizen who cannot separate the natures of things into their several categories but who is merely aware of their existence is nevertheless able to work with these
things. Efficiency, however, must come with instructions given by the ruler through the assistants. Without his guidance this most limited citizen would end in confusion and be unable to achieve his individual goal, for ignorance of his proper function would result in disorder and eventually unhappiness for himself and others in the social order.

Despite the division of the citizens in terms of the most virtuous, less virtuous, and the least virtuous all are important to the state. The removal of one is the dissolution of the social order.

Man is a composite of the spiritual and the physical. His essence is the spiritual element and thus he is immortal; his physical nature is the concretion of his essence in the sensible world. He is elevated above the level of other living things by the peculiar quality of his soul.

In addition to the senses and the will, which he has in common with animals, he is blessed with intellect. Therefore, he is by nature moral and capable of ethics. His particular function, as moral creature, is to realize to the fullest capacity the conditions of a virtuous life. To be ignorant of this function is the greatest evil. To this end, he must exercise the reason of the soul in control of his will and his sensible desires.
The intellect is the instrument of communication, therefore man is a social creature. As each individual is born with unique abilities which make him capable of excellence in one particular function, it is the duty of man to himself and to his companions, to associate himself with others in a social order, wherein, the exchange of skills and capacities, will provide each with the proper medium for development and self-realization.

Reality is one but has the appearance of many. This illusion arises from the fact that there are degrees of Reality. The true essences of things are in the realm of Forms and their concretion, in the realm of the Sensible World. All things participate in both realms, including man.

It is only through the law of reason, which is order and so orders all things, that man is able to distinguish between the true essences of things as they exist in the realm of Forms from the imitations of the essences by the physical objects in the realm of the Sensible World.

As there are degrees of reality, so are there degrees of knowledge of the law of reason. Man's status in the social order, then is determined by the approximation of his individual reason to the general law. He who achieves the highest use of his reason is wisest and as philosopher should be king. He who attains the next lower level is courageous and as guardian should protect the state. He who falls in the
lowest level is acquisitive and a worker should produce the goods for the state.

The social structure is the instrument through which men and reality interact. The institutional core is education. The goal is the harmonious unity with an organic order. The result is development of individual capacities. The mechanism is government through knowledge of the essence of reality.
CHAPTER III

THE DEFINITION OF PLATO'S THEORY OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, ITS RELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. The Definition

Plato states in Epistle VII that he has written no work which describes his philosophy of the various subjects which he taught. He hints that if he had formulated such a philosophy, he would communicate it only to a privileged few whose understanding merits such a discourse. Plato, apparently, is mindful of the lesson which the life of Socrates taught him. The product of his years of contemplation are too vital and sacred to him to be made the object of contempt and to be used indiscreetly by the base majority.¹

However, it would be strange if he did not believe in the doctrines which he expresses through the writings of a lifetime. Whatever his reason for cautioning Dion on this point, we must proceed as if it were not said, as if his writings are to be understood as being more than literary accomplishments. The Seventh Epistle was written by a disillusioned Plato who saw his precious ideals, as found in the Republic and other dialogues written before his venture in Syracuse, in disrepute. His own words witness this observation.

¹. Epistle, VII. 341 c, e; 342.
If, however, he really was seriously concerned with these matters and put them in writing, then surely not the gods, but mortals have utterly blasted his wits?¹

Plato's theory of social organization cannot be defined by any "ism," such as have cluttered the nineteenth century. The social order is not merely a political structure, but is the phenomenal representation of the noumenal order which exists in the realm of ideas.²

Like every object in the sensible world, the state has a form.³ Thus every institution which is established must be incorporated so as to bring the state nearer and nearer to the perfection of its ideal.

For the state to achieve this objective, it must exemplify the saving principle of a unity which transcends the multiplicity of its parts.⁴

There must be the recognition that although there is plurality in unity, the relative exists for the sake of the absolute.⁵ Inasmuch as the realm of forms presents order

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1. Epistle VII, 344c, d.
2. Timaeus, 30, 52, 88.
4. Theaeetetus, 204; Laws, XII. 962; Rep., V. 461.
5. Philebus, 16-17, 53.
by its hierarchical system, so must the state order its chaos
by the subordination of the many to the one. In this manner,
each part of the social order receives meaning from participation
in the total meaning, for there can be no meaning without
relation.

The unifying factor in the state is the universal
acceptance of the principle that man's proper duty is to
seek the divine.1 "God is the natural and worthy object of
our most serious and blessed endeavors."2 Justice in the
state differentiates the parts of the whole through their
particular functions, but virtue in the state is the re-
uniting of the parts of the whole as one.3

Plato's social structure is fashioned to this
end. The philosopher, as the only citizen who can grasp the
relation of the parts to the whole, is the individual who
must bring order to the chaotic mass of confused citizens.
He represents the creator in the sensible world.

If this proposed definition of Plato's social philo-
sophy is valid, then it is difficult to understand the struggle
by various factions to reconcile it with any form of social
theory, namely, Utopianism, Fascism, Socialism, or Democracy.

1. Timaeus, 90.
2. Laws, VII. 803.
Plato would not have recognized any one as the one, immutable, perfect state. The test lies in the differences between the world of becoming and the world of forms. Forms are changeless; things are perishable. Forms are perfect; things are imperfect. The world of forms is one; the world of becoming many. Thus any state existing in the sensible world is destined to succumb to the flux of things. The best state, however, constantly striving to avoid that change which leads to decay, eventually goes the way of all sensible things. Hope for the future is in the fact that the eternal Form will again become concrete. What shape succeeding states will have is unpredictable.

2. Plato and Utopianism

Utopias are the dreams of men with a vision. They visualize the perfect society wherein the goods necessary for existence are equitably distributed, wherein the individual can realize himself spiritually as well as physically. It is this urge to find utopia which makes life tolerable. This privilege to idealize distinguishes men from beasts, and is the path to salvation for the world.

Plato and Sir Thomas More are among the many writers who have had this "will-to-utopia."
Berneri quotes George Woodcock on this statement of More's *Utopia*:

A kind of extension to a logical conclusion of Plato's *Republic* and all the other utopias which were hostile to human individuality.¹

Contrary to Woodcock's opinion, this is the very basis of their difference. More was attacking the concept of individuality prevalent at his time. He was attempting to establish the principle of the brotherhood of man, and with it, the equality of all men.² In *Utopia*, all citizens without exception, participated in all forms of social life—production, protection of the state, and government. More's *Utopia* was classless. All members of the state were citizens, and all lived the communal life.³

Plato's social order stemmed from the desire to liberate individuality. The citizens are stratified in accord with their function, which is kept distinct as legislators, protectors of the state, and producers.

The objection may now be raised that Plato shifted rather than liberated individuality. The answer rests on

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1. Berneri, *JTU*, Xi.
2. UTO, (Armes ed.), 170.
the meaning of individuality. To be individual is to be unique.¹ No two persons possess equal aptitudes in all things. The acceptance of the uniqueness of personality may possibly lead to anarchy. However, the lawlessness of anarchy would eventually destroy personality. One cannot exercise and develop individuality either in vacuo or when, in social communion, one is free to act without a limiting framework for reference. In the former, individuality has no meaning; and in the latter, overlapping or conflicting interests will impose a forceful limit. Individuality develops at its optimum, not centrifugally but rather in a straight line. Plato, who experienced the effects of a growing anarchy during the fourth century, was all too aware of this.

Despite the difference of the purposes underlying the ideal societies of Plato and More, the authors evolved strikingly similar institutions to advance the materialization of these purposes. A few examples are 1) the emancipation of women by providing equal education and equal opportunity for public office, 2) the regulation of marriage by the state and the replacement of the natural family with the civil family, 3) the community of property, 4) the prohibition of the possession of gold or silver, 5) the establishment of the minimum working-day.

¹ Rep., II. 369.
These and other similarities come from the conviction that the good and virtuous life is possible only from the recognition that man's purpose is to look to the divine, who as the principle of the law of reason is above everything and is the only true guide for action. Both Plato and More held that the life according to nature is that which seeks to develop the intelligence peculiar to man.

Yet, Plato would have denied that More's utopia was just. The principle which distinguishes the members according to function is lacking in Utopia. Therefore, Plato would assert that More had not truly grasped the concept of the whole, for the nature of the One is not unlimitedly, undividedly one, but many.¹

3. Plato and Fascism

Can the Platonic social order be labeled fascist? Before an answer is offered, an inquiry into what constitutes Fascism is called for.

Popular opinion classifies the social order which existed in Germany during the Nazi regime, along with that of Italy under Mussolini's rule, as well as that of Spain under Franco, as Fascistic. Acton, in his article refuting the alleged Fascism of Plato, deals only with the Hitler rule.²

1. Parmenides, 144 ff.
The position in this thesis is to make a distinction which is in agreement with Oakeshott. The German state under Hitler should rightly be called National Socialism. Mussolini is the true author of Fascism, and it is only from him that the "sole reliable statement of the doctrine" has come.1

Fascism is distinguishable from National Socialism chiefly in the area of economics and its lack of Racism, which characterized the National Socialist order. It repudiates socialism as backward.2 In the words of Mussolini, "Neither has Fascist conception of authority anything in common with that of the police-ridden state."3 Fascism is a new fact in history.4

The following development of the principles in Fascism is based on the article, "The Doctrine of Fascism", submitted by Mussolini to the Enciclopedia Italiana in 1932.5

The Fascist state is the synthesis of all values into the one value designated by the leader.\(^1\) Patriotism is allegiance to the principle that the state is the only true individual.\(^2\) The citizen, by himself, has no value outside the state.\(^3\)

The Fascist state is a very moral social order. It is the morality of Stoicism. The citizen must be serious, religious, and self-denying. He must disdain the comfortable life in favor of a life of discipline and work.\(^4\)

The Fascist state, the highest and most powerful form of personality, is the spiritual force which assumes the moral and intellectual life of individual men. It is the totality of all personalities, for man is conceived not as an individual separated from all others and standing by himself, but as a facet of the only true reality, which is the state.\(^5\)

Therefore, as an individual must fight to survive, so must the state fight to preserve its personality. There

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1. Mussolini, DOF, 7.
3. Mussolini, DOF, 10.
5. Mussolini, DOF, 8, 13. Also, the "Charter of Labor" (April 21, 1927) in DOF, 133.
is no lasting peace in the world where the species is ever in the struggle of the "survival of the fittest." The citizen must ever be prepared for war. The "Fascist Decalogue" reinforces this militarism. Note points (1), (5), and (7) of the 1934 version.

(1) Know that the Fascist and in particular the soldier, must not believe in perpetual peace.

(5) The rifle and cartridge belt, and the rest, are confided to you not to rust in leisure, but to be preserved in war.

(7) Discipline is the soul of armies.

Mussolini has given an external explanation for most aspects of the Fascist doctrine. There is one which he does not attempt to explain, however, and that is, the origin of the supremacy and uncontested power given the word of the Duce. Points (9) and (10) of the 1934 edition of the "Fascist Decalogue" and point (10) of the 1938 edition state, "Mussolini is always right," and "One thing must be dear to you above all: the life of the Duce."2

What are the characteristics of Fascism in light of these statements?3


1. It is a revolt against reason. The emotions of the citizens are appealed to on an ethical basis. Italy has a strong religious tradition through the Roman Catholic Church. The history of discipline and self-denial in service to one principle can be traced through the religious orders of the monastic life. This tradition had already established that happiness in this world is not a worthy end. Thus when Mussolini stated that, "Fascism...does not consider 'happiness' is possible upon earth", the citizens were not shocked.

2. It contends that the best culture or civilization is that which survives. This survival, however, is maintained by might rather than right reason.

3. It has a single rigid morality. This is the ethical will of the state which is the creator of right.

4. It is nationalistic with private and group interest subordinated to the good of the nation.

5. It is based on an acceptance of ethical relativism. Therefore, unity is secured through the value dictated by the state.

6. It holds that personality is stronger than laws. Hence the concentration of power in the Duce.

7. It denies teleology. There is no plan in history; therefore, no progress. The concern of the state is to solve only the problems which arise historically of themselves in themselves.
The points of contact with Fascism in Plato are those arising from organizational similarity. The Platonic social order with its hierarchical organization for the well-ordered state in which there is government by experts for the people's good rather than the people's wishes; its state control of economics, religion, and education; its rigid censorship of art and morals; its process of indoctrination through social and political myths are all elements of authoritarianism compatible with the Fascist state.

To call Plato a Fascist, however, is to confuse the means with the end and to deny the special spirit of Platonism. The very basis of Plato's social order is the rejection of irrationalism. Reason dominates the Spirited Element and the Appetites. Leadership is not by the mightiest but the wisest. His legislators are carefully educated men who lead virtuous lives. No statement in Mussolini's article provides this distinction.

Plato, in rejecting the position of the Sophists, denies the validity of relativism. Values are absolute and objective with their source in the Good. The philosopher-king does not originate values, but merely grasps their essence in contemplation of the Good. He is the interpreter, not the creator of values.

Plato rejects war and advocates peace. 1

1. Laws, I. 628; VIII. 828.
War is a necessary evil which must be avoided as much as possible. The virtuous life cannot be maintained in the disorder of a state at war. Persuasion is far nobler than force,\(^1\) and the gentler it is, so is the degree of superiority it has in the intercourse of men. Hoernle raises a note of dissent about the pacifism of Plato as he asks:

What is the purpose of the armed helpers in Plato's Ideal State, in their relation to the internal enemies of the city, except to execute, at the behest of the philosopher-kings, such moral and social surgery on infection—spots of spiritual disease?\(^2\)

Plato might have answered that force is justifiable if the good of the whole is to be achieved. Consistent pacifism is nihilism. The social order must be protected from attack by nations seeking to expand their territorial possessions,\(^3\) as well as the subversive activities arising internally.\(^4\) Therefore, the rulers must have adequate knowledge in the strategies of warfare,\(^5\) and provide training in peacetime, as a precaution to keep the military element prepared.\(^6\) Only the rulers have the authority to declare war.

\(^{1}\) Laws, X. 887; IV. 720.

\(^{2}\) Hoernle, Art. (1938), 166-182.

\(^{3}\) Rep., II. 373.

\(^{4}\) Rep., IV. 422; VIII. 547.

\(^{5}\) Statesman, 304.

\(^{6}\) Laws, VIII. 829, 830; XII. 942.
Citizens who promote strife for personal gain will receive capital punishment.¹

Plato, therefore, would reject the military state of Fascism on the same grounds that he based his distinction of what constitutes a crime in the Laws. It is this, that the intent or purpose of the act is more important in judging its rightness than the results.²

The similarity of the structures of the two social orders may be said to arise from agreement in the following sentiment echoed by Mussolini:

Fascism denies that numbers, as such, can be the determining factor in human society.³

Democracy is a kingless regime infested by many kings who are sometimes more exclusive, tyrannical, and destructive than one, even if he be a tyrant.⁴

4. Plato and Socialism

On the basis of the Republic, V. 457 B-466 D and the Laws, VII. 807 B, Plato has gained a reputation for advancing the cause of Communism. Again, it can be shown that

1. Laws, XII. 955.
2. Laws, IX. 862.
to allege such a system as the important doctrine of his works is to fall into misinterpretation through the error of misplaced emphasis.

By applying the method of comparison used in section three, it is hoped that a conclusion free from distortion may be obtained.

The definition of Socialism is difficult to form, for the theories of human society advanced under its label are several and varied. Historically, Socialism can be reduced to the principle that private property is inherently evil, and that to overcome the ill-effects which it fosters in society, it is necessary to abolish it entirely in favor of public-owned property. The correlative condition following upon this, is a classless society wherein all goods are equitably distributed.

Socialism usually follows the development of an industrial revolution in a nation, as anathema to the Capitalist groups in power. Thus, the earliest forms in Western Europe began in Great Britain and France. Sir Thomas More's Utopia is a type of Socialism.

This Utopian form of Socialism was displaced, during the middle part of the nineteenth century by a new type, called "Scientific Socialism." This latter form, expounded by Karl Marx, became one of the most important influences in the development of political thought, and the organization of
social relations. In recognition, therefore, of the contribution of Marxism to the social studies, the discussion on Socialism will be based on its principles.

Scientific socialism is distinguished from Utopian socialism by its approach, which is based on experience and history rather than on the moral ideals generated from the principle that there is a spiritual life for men beyond the physical. As a result it has also been called "Historical Materialism".1

To fully treat the theory of Marxism is beyond the scope of this thesis. It would necessitate a separate thesis, in order to expand adequately the principles involved. Therefore, for the present purpose, some fundamental principles will be enumerated, followed by a synoptic interpretation.

There are four main tenets which support the theory of Scientific Socialism:

1. Social consciousness as the outcome of social existence is explained by materialism.2 In other words, the conditions of life determine the methods of the production of goods, which combination, in turn, gives rise to ideas.3

1. Lenin, TKM, 16; Burns, WIM, 15.
2. Lenin, TKM, 15.
3. Lenin, TKM, 16; Burns, WIM, 13.
2. Class struggle is inevitable. Inasmuch as the methods of production differ, society will be divided into classes (i.e., those who have the same means of production belong to one group). Therefore, with the origin of ideas being contingent upon production, each class will have different ideas which will conflict.

3. Commodity production is the law of economics. Human needs are satisfied by the production of commodities. An exchange-value is placed upon these commodities by men bargaining with one another. However, as the state becomes more complex, there is social division of labor. The simple pattern of exchange is abandoned, and the products of labor are sold for money-value. Those who use money as the medium of exchange soon develop a surplus value, for the worker produces more than he is paid for. With the surplus value, the buyer is able to invest by disenfranchising others with less money-value. This creates surplus labor time, that is, more labor is available to the buyer. As surplus labor increases, the products of labor increase disproportionately, while the money-value for labor decreases.

4. The only solution lies in the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Pressure from the united action of workers

1. Lenin, TKM, 17; Burns, WIM, 9.
2. Lenin, TKM, 18-20.
3. Lenin, TKM, 29.
brings about the socialization of the means of production with the resulting condition that the products of labor are owned by society.

The basis of a socialist theory of the state is the concept that man is the product of environmental forces. His thoughts do not originate action, but are themselves the results of man interacting physically with his environment. The most important single factor in this interaction is the economic. Man's primary aim is to satisfy his physical needs. In the process of securing these needs, he enters a competitive field (the struggle for survival of the fittest). He finds that to maintain a footing, he cannot live from day to day but must accumulate "goods" to insure his security. These "goods" become private and are his "property". Property is now the symbol of his "fitness" to survive. As the distribution of goods become increasingly uneven, men separate into classes--those who have, those who have less, and those who have none. The "those who have none" really have one

1. Burns, WIM, 15-16.
2. Lenin, TKM, 18.
3. Lenin, TKM, 18; Burns, WIM, 17.
5. Burns, WIM, 17.
"good" and that is, themselves, in the form of labor value. In order to continue in the competition, they have only one course for action, which is to exchange their one commodity for the "goods" of others. It is here that the conflict lies. If the exchange were carried on fairly, that is, equal "goods" for equal labor value, they would themselves eventually begin an accumulation. But the exchange is one-sided and they remain in the same state of having nothing.

The theorist of socialism, therefore, deduced that private property was the greatest evil in the history of social orders. Thus Marx and Engels say, in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), that the distinguishing features of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. They would make the standard by which everything is measured, not property but labor. That which would distinguish one man from another is his capacity for production as determined by individual endowment.

There are methods generally applicable to most societies which would correct the evil of private ownership.

1. Burns, WIM, 17.

The following list is taken from the *Manifesto of the Communist Party.*

1. The abolition of property in land, and the application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive income tax.
3. The abolition of all rights of inheritance.
4. The confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. The centralization of credit in the hands of the state by means of a national bank.
6. The centralization of means of communication and transport.
7. The extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state.
8. The equal obligation of all to work.
9. The combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries.

This presentation of the position of Socialism has limited the evidence to the Marxian view because that view is the only one that is more than a proposal for the correction of immediate ills. It is in addition, a philosophy of man

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and his world. Marx had an eye not for the reform of any particular state but for a reform of the total social order. Despite the denials of present day Marxists, who pride themselves as the only realists in a world of men with their heads in the clouds, Marx was a man with visions. The classless society is an ideal.

Marx's Manifesto is comparable in kind to the Republic of Plato; the concretion of his philosophy in the Constitution of the USSR is in direct ratio with the Laws of Plato. There is the descent from the ideal state to the practical state in recognition of the limitation of man.

Plato would criticize the Socialist state on its most vital assumption. Man's real need is not the satisfaction of his physical wants, but the attainment of spiritual peace. He would acknowledge that material wants must first be satisfied before the pursuit of the life of reason can be achieved. This awareness was the motivation for his institution of the communal life for the Guardians. To make the end of the individual the acquisition of material happiness, however, is to subordinate Reason to the Appetites. Such an ideal would remove the factors that raise man above the level of beasts.

1. Rep., II. 358-367; IV. 444; IX. 587.
Contrary also to the sense of rightness in Plato, is the location of the source of man's goal in the sensible world. The only true origin of ideals is the realm of Forms with the Good as the guiding principle.

Plato would be critical of the assumed theory which underlies the principle that man is by nature in competition to survive. Society, for Plato, originated not in competition, but in mutual aid. He would substitute the phrase, "association for the survival of all", for "struggle in the survival of the fittest". Man in the natural state is not evil but becomes evil in the unordered excesses of the luxurious state.

Plato would be critical of the supremacy of the proletariat. Each individual has a specific function to perform. To extend the responsibility of government to workers is a violation of this principle. Only a few are endowed with the natural capacity to lead by way of reason. The rule of the proletariat would reduce the social order to the confusion of a chaotic "democracy".

All is not antithesis between Plato and Socialism. The "withering away of the state" into a classless society is an ideal that would find favor, for then each citizen would be free to gain understanding by the development of his mind.
As Heberle says it, "In the morning a ditch digger, in the evening, a critical philosopher". Article 122 of the Constitution of the USSR is an echo of the position of women in Plato's social order.

Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, culture, social and political life.

The realization of these rights of women is ensured by affording equally with men the right to work; payment for work, rest, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, pregnancy leave with pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

The one meeting point common to Socialist and the Platonist is devotion to an ideal. Zeal for the cause is rewarded with honor. The most earnest citizen of the Socialist order is usually elected to leadership. The citizen of Plato's social order who is zealous in pursuing the life of virtue is revered as a holy man.

5. Plato and Catholicism

At first glance, one may question whether there can be any parallel between the social order advocated by

1. Heberle, SM, 79.
2. Constitution, 40.
Plato and the Roman Catholic Church. The comparison about to be discussed is striking in its points of contact.

In the Catholic faith, the Church is said to be one, apostolic and catholic. It is one in that it is the revealed and inspired organ of God's will. It is catholic in that it is universal. The Church, therefore, is the earthly order of the spiritual realm. Mankind, the many and the particular, achieve unity and universality in the brotherhood of worship.

Structurally, it is an hierarchy that imitates the heavenly organization. The Pope is at the top of the pyramid because his holiness enables him to communicate with God, the head of the spiritual organization. Thus privileged, he has the wisdom inspired by this communion. His assistants are the Cardinals and Bishops who are also wise men in their holiness. The level of priests are the protectors of the Church, who by their knowledge of the precepts of the Church can counsel men in guiding their lives virtuously. The worshippers are the supporters of the Church. It is they who by their labor leave the holy Fathers free to learn the will

1. Malloy, CFI, 21.
of God. Where the order of monks and nuns and those who lead the secluded life are incorporated in this hierarchy is a doubtful point. They are at once like all the members of the Church body. Perhaps it would be a fair statement to say that they are singular and autonomous.¹

The aim of every Catholic is to live the good life.² What constitutes the good varies for each according to his function. For some it is contemplation; for others it is teaching the word of God to the people, and still yet for others it is by the doing of good works of charity and brotherhood, and in the efficient performance of their regular duties.³

The Pope is the unchallenged legislator and leader whose word is sanctified in law. The worshippers accept the laws as truth. They do not presume to interpret, for they acknowledge that their understanding is limited in such matters.⁴

Plato's social order is organizationally such a structure. His divine Good is the inspiration of the laws of the philosopher-king. The Laws constructs the model city upon a religious foundation.

2. Key of Heaven (Lelen ed.), 11, 18.
Tell me, Stranger, is God or a man supposed to be the author of your laws?¹

What may be the true doctrine...you will hereafter discover, by the help of the legislator and others...for the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters.²

One soul or more? More than one...we must not suppose that there are less than two— one the author of good, and the other of evil.³

The best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path.⁴

The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the preservation and perfection of the whole, and each part has an appointed state of action and passion; and the smallest action or fraction of any part affecting the minutest fraction has a presiding minister. And one of these partisans of the universe is thine own...which, however little, has the whole in view.⁵

But the formation of qualities he left to the wills of individuals.⁶

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1. Laws, I. 624.
2. Laws, X. 888.
No man shall have sacred rites in a private house...let him place his offerings in the hands of priests or priestesses.¹

Not only is the Laws religious, but its religion has transcended the Greek culture of many gods to hint at a sole creator. These passages, combined with the story of creation in the Timaeus, are peculiarly Christian. It lacks, however, the doctrines of salvation through grace. In its place, the will to virtue is primary.²

We have disclosed the religious element in Plato. Can the reverse, that is, the civil element be found in the Roman Catholic Church? The following excerpts from different Encyclicals provide the answer:

Man's natural instinct is to live in civil society for he cannot attain in solitude the necessary means of life, nor development of his mental and moral faculties; and therefore, by a divine provision, he is born for a domestic and civil union and association with men, by which alone the needs of life can be adequately supplied.³

The State must not absorb the individual or the family.⁴

Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them.⁵

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2. Laws, X. 904.
3. Immortale Dei (1885) (Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 45-46).
5. Quadragesimo Anno (1931) (Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 58).
Man can judge of this contingency, as we say, only because he has a soul that is simple, spiritual, and intellectual...knowing the unchangeable and necessary reasons of what is true and good, it sees that no particular kind of good is necessary to us.

The safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a governor's whole reason of existence.

The real perfection of all creatures is found in the prosecution and attainment of their respective ends; but the supreme end to which human liberty must aspire is God.

The affinity of the two areas of theory cannot be disputed. In fact, it would seem probable that Plato might be at home in the Roman Church.

1. Libertas (1888) (Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 60).
2. Rerum Novarum (1891) (Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 56).
3. Libertas (1888) (Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 63).
The purpose of this thesis is to find a coherent theory of a working social order as implicit in Plato's philosophy. "Social order" has been defined as the synthesis of the activities of man in a group unified by a common purpose.

The study, centering about three dialogues, the Republic, the Statesman and the Laws, attempts to reach a definition of the Platonic social order by studying its origins, its functions, its structure, and its purpose. It also seeks to present the relation of the Greek concept of arete to the change in societies from the Homeric period to the time of Plato.

Correlated to the study is a comparison of Plato's social order to some other theories of social organization.

Chapter I develops the concept of arete, which is defined as the aim of the culture of a people. The arete of the Homeric period was nobility. It left its mark on the aristocratic structure of the Platonic society. During the period of Hesiod, the arete shifted to the ideal of justice which reappeared as one of the principles for achieving the best state in Plato's Republic. With the dominance of the state, arete emphasized patriotism as the proper aim of the
people. Plato was influenced by the disciplined institutions which characterized the Spartan way of life. As the Sophists of the fifth century became important in Greek society, arete again changed in content. This time the ideal was the acquisition of education as a means to prominent political life. However, it was education based on a theory of relativism and individualism. Plato retained the emphasis on education, but based his system in an intelligible principle of value that would point out the nature of man as a social animal.

Chapter II is on analysis of the social structure. It probes the possibility of social control by presenting two opposite opinions on the subject. Pepper, in the "The Conditions of Social Control," defends the positive side, with Popper, in the Open Society and Its Enemies, taking the negative viewpoint. The attempt is made to prove that Plato believed in the validity of social control. There is a brief presentation of the psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical principles of Plato which is used to show that the Platonic state had a basis in his philosophy.

The role of vocation is determined by the theory that men as social animals are differentiated from one another by the possession of unique and natural abilities. Through the recognition of these innate differences, each individual would function in his special place in the social order.
The institution of the family is based on the principle of unity. The communal life is advanced as the means to the attainment of this unity, for private interests arising from private possessions are a danger to public interest. It is the responsibility of the state to supervise the family in order that adherence to this principle may be maintained. The State, therefore, regulates all the phases associated with marriage—courtship, childbearing, and relationship among the members of the family.

The role of education is to prepare the members for the virtuous life, which is the objective of the state. This institution is also state controlled. From birth through adulthood, each step in the education of the individual is legislated.

The place of art in the Platonic social order is a functional one. Art, defined as imitation and as play, is an excellent means of indoctrination in the objectives of the state. Therefore, as a tool of education, art is strictly censored to insure the imitation of the proper objects.

Religion is ground for the organization of the state. God is the "measure of all things". Therefore, the concept of God is manifested in every phase of the social order. Human goods have their basis in divine goods. It is the duty of the state to instil the fear of God in its members through education.
The state exists because the individual is unique. That is, men possess innate abilities in varying degrees for widely different occupations. Therefore, men came into voluntary association with one another through a mutual exchange of the values of their unique capacities.

However, if the state is to continue to exist, there must be a principle other than differentiation—unity. Unity is possible when the aim of legislation is to produce the greatest possible happiness for the whole society. The state orders its institutions on the theory that possessions should be held in common or, if this is impossible, that possessions should be equitably distributed. Such limitation on property is to prevent the conflict which arises when some citizens have more economic security than others.

Chapter III defines the theory of Plato's social organization. The social order is the unity in the multiplicity of men in their several functions. There is justice in the order when each member finds his proper niche. There is virtue, when the several members, so differentiated, are reunited in their adherence to the universal acceptance of the principle that man's proper duty is to seek the divine.

Also developed in this chapter, is a comparative study of Plato's social order with other forms of social
organization. The conclusion is that, despite the many points of contact in principles and institutional structures, Plato's proposed society is neither Utopian, Fascistic, nor Socialistic. There, may be good reason, however, to consider the theory that Plato's social structure is a religious order. This suggestion arises from the comparison with the Roman Catholic Church.
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The Searching Mind of Greece.

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Plato's Theory of Man.
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to find a coherent theory of a working social order as implicit in Plato's philosophy. "Social order" is to be defined as the synthesis of the activities of man in a group unified by a common goal. The study is centered about three dialogues, the Republic, the Statesman and the Laws. The study seeks to present the relation of the Greek concept of arete to the thought of Plato. Correlated to the study is a comparison of the Platonic social order to some other theories of social organization.

Arete which means the aim of the culture of a people is an important concept to the study of Plato's theory of social organization. Tracing the development of this concept in the history of Greece from the Homeric period through to Plato, brings to light the influence of each phase of Greek culture on Platonic thought. The predecessors of Plato left him the heritage of aristocracy, justice, discipline, and education. Plato added content and universality with his emphasis upon the value of the integrated personality in an integrated society. Man as a member of a social group took precedence over man as an individualist.
Plato's concern with the importance of social organization shows an assumption that social control is valid. The form of control to be used is extensive and intensive education of the members of society from birth through adulthood. The principle of persuasion is to be the instrument, for the rational factor in man must be recognized. The institutions within which control is to operate are to be based on the principles of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics.

The psychological principles are 1) that man is rational, 2) that man is moral, 3) that man is a social animal, and 4) that man as an individual is unique. The society organized around these principles is one that allows each member within it to fulfill his nature through the development and use of his unique abilities in a vocation suited to these particular abilities; and is one that acknowledges the interdependence of individuals, by ordering itself in such a way as to prevent the dominance of any one group of its members to the hindrance of another. In such a society the happiness of the group as a whole is primary.

The epistemological principles are 1) that true knowledge transcends the data acquired through the senses,
2) that the objects of knowledge are real existents in a realm distinct from the sensory sphere, 3) that the process of knowing is a progressive one and must be carefully supervised if the proper objects of knowledge are to be known, 4) that the development of the spiritual life is a vital factor to the attainment of knowledge. A society based on these principles must establish a sound system of education which recognizes that ethics is necessary to perfect unity in social activity.

The metaphysical principles are 1) that reality is a synthesis of identity and differentiation, 2) that reality is rational, 3) that reality is moral, and 4) that reality is perfect. The society founded on these principles must seek to incorporate the characteristics of reality. The function of each institution must be kept distinct but the totality of institutions must function harmoniously. Vocation, the family, education, art, religion and citizenship are many yet one. This society must hold as its foundation the religious life in acknowledgement of a supreme rational principle which is the source and sustainer of all unity.

Plato's social structure is not an end in itself. It is the instrument through which the nature of reality is
apprehended. As the phenomenal representation of the noumenal order, its purpose is to enable man to realize his true nature, which is spiritual.

Comparison with other theories of social organization brings out the universal quality of Plato's proposed social order. It includes many of the best points of Utopianism, Fascism, Socialism and Catholicism within its structure, yet is distinct by its high attainment of unity in multiplicity. The law of reason, the principle of order, the theory of the classless society and the acceptance of a creative principle that transcends man in his mortality, but is yet within him, are all contained in Plato's theory of social organization.