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The political economy of knowledge: Salafism in post Soeharto urban Indonesia

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Dissertation

**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KNOWLEDGE:
SALAFISM IN POST-SOEHARTO URBAN INDONESIA**

by

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requirements for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the production and reproduction of knowledge among Salafi groups in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It specifically discusses the issues of how Salafi groups produce the knowledge they claim to be based on the authentic form of Islam in the context of social, political, and economic change. Salafis advocate the need for a return to the authoritative religious sources: the Holy Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Salafi *manhaj* (methods and paths of Salafi teachings). Without the last element, Salafis claim, the proper understanding and practice of Islamic teachings are impossible.

The research was carried out in three major sites: Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Makassar, where significant numbers of Salafis are found. Ethnographic fieldwork, conducted from January to June 2011, and from July 2012 to February 2013, focused on the individual roles, organizational networks, and historical and sociological processes which shaped the reproduction of Salafi knowledge.

To create an ideal community based on the Salafist understanding of Islamic ethics, many Salafis create separate enclaves where they erect *madrasa* and mosques, two strategic institutions fundamental for their development. Claiming to be based on the

authority of the Prophet, Salafis develop a medicine and market it to other Muslim groups. Most Salafis engage in endogamous marriage to maintain the groups' solidity. The roles of women within Salafi groups are highly circumscribed. While having careers is possible, women are expected to stay at home and take care of their families.

Salafis represent only a tiny minority of Indonesian Muslims, and they compete with a diverse admixture of Muslim groups, which challenge Salafi interpretations of Islamic knowledge. The political aspects of Salafism are visible in a number of matters of religious knowledge and practice. Salafis use the issues of religious purification as a political tool to maintain their identities and to attack other Muslim groups. Heated debates between Salafis and traditionalist, and to a lesser degree, reformist Muslims, which sometimes lead to violent conflicts, are inevitable. While creating sharp social and religious divisions, debates also result in an exchange of ideas among Muslim groups, heightening the diversity of Salafist forms of knowledge and practice.

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Glossary and Abbreviations

<i>Abangan</i>	nominal or non-practicing Muslim
<i>Adat</i>	custom, tradition
<i>Ahl al-sunnah wa-l jama'ah</i>	People of the prophetic tradition and the consensus of the <i>ummah</i>
<i>Aimmat al-madhahib</i>	the founders of the schools of thought
<i>Al-awrad al-ma'thura</i>	the authentic prayer
<i>Al-jarh wa ta'dil</i>	the <i>hadith</i> science of critics and fair evaluation
<i>Al-salaf al-salih</i>	the pious predecessors, the pious forbears
<i>Aurat</i>	parts of human body that need to be covered in ordinary public setting
<i>Baraka</i>	blessing
<i>Bid'ah</i>	a belief or practice for which there is no precedence in the time of the Prophet
<i>Da'i</i>	preacher
<i>Da'wah</i>	propagation, proselytization
<i>Daurah</i>	training
<i>Dhikr</i>	the act or reminding, the repetition of litanies
<i>Faqih</i>	specialist in Islamic jurisprudence
<i>Fatwa</i>	opinion on a point of law
<i>Fiqh</i>	Islamic jurisprudence

<i>Fitnah</i>	revolt, disturbance, involving the adoption of doctrinal attitudes that endanger the purity of Muslim faith
<i>Fitrah</i>	God's way of creating
<i>Hafidz</i>	someone who memorizes the entire Qur'an
<i>Halal</i>	lawful
<i>Halaqa</i>	Islamic study circle
<i>Harakah</i>	movement
<i>Haram</i>	unlawful
<i>Hijrah</i>	migration
<i>Hisab</i>	astronomical calculation
<i>Hizbiyyah</i>	factionalism
<i>Hujama</i>	cupping
<i>I'tikaf</i>	staying at mosques for religious devotion
<i>Ijma</i>	the unanimous opinion of the recognized religious authorities in a given time (in the field of Islamic law)
<i>Ijtihad</i>	individual reasoning, exerting one's self to form an opinion
<i>Imam</i>	prayer leader
<i>Istikmal</i>	completing Ramadhan into thirty days
<i>Istiwa</i>	God establishes at His Throne
<i>Kafa'ah</i>	equality
<i>Keluarga sakinah</i>	healthy and happy family
<i>Khatam</i>	completing reading the entire Qur'an
<i>Khilafiyah</i>	religious disputes

<i>Lailat al-qadr</i>	the night when the Qur'an was revealed
LIPIA	Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabia
<i>Ma'shiat</i>	sinful deed
<i>Madhhab</i>	an opinion with regard to particular case, and in law specifically, school of thought
<i>Mahram</i>	unmarriageable family members
<i>Makruh</i>	religiously discouraged
<i>Manhaj</i>	path, method, way
MORA	Ministry of Religious Affairs
<i>Muayyid</i>	non permanent officials of the organization
<i>Mubadzir</i>	waste
<i>Mubahala</i>	prayers where conflicting parties ask God's verdict by casting His curse on lying participant
<i>Mufti</i>	the person who gives the <i>fatwa</i>
<i>Muhibbin</i>	partisan, supporter
MUI	Indonesian Council of the Ulama
<i>Mukafa'ah</i>	stipend
<i>Multazim</i>	permanent official of the organization
<i>Muru'ah</i>	honor, dignity
<i>Nafqah</i>	livelihood
<i>Nikah massal</i>	Islamic marital ceremony performed for multiple couples
<i>Niqab</i>	women's clothes covering all parts of the bodies except eyes and hands

<i>Pesantren</i>	Islamic boarding school
<i>Qadhi</i>	judge
<i>Qiblah</i>	the direction of prayer
<i>Qiyam al-lail</i>	waking up during the night for religious devotion
<i>Qiyas</i>	reasoning by analogy, syllogistic procedure which consist in induction from the known to the unknown
<i>Qunut</i>	additional prayer in the morning prayer
<i>Raka'at</i>	cycle of prayer, a sequence of utterances and actions in prayer
<i>Ramadhan</i>	the tenth month in Islamic calendar, the fasting month
<i>Ruqya</i>	exorcism
<i>Sahabat</i>	the companion of the Prophet
<i>Sanad</i>	chain of transmission, largely used in the field of hadith, and Sufism to a lesser degree
<i>Santri</i>	student of <i>pesantren</i>
<i>Sheikh</i>	chief of any group, the head of religious establishment
<i>Silaturrahim</i>	social relation
<i>Sunnah</i>	the generally approved standard or practice introduced by the Prophet
<i>Ta'aruf</i>	pre-marriage introduction
<i>Ta'lim</i>	Islamic lecture
<i>Tabi'in</i>	generation after the Companions
<i>Tabzdir</i>	excessive, waste of wealth
<i>Tafaqquh fi al-din</i>	mastering religious knowledge

<i>Tafsir</i>	interpretation as a process and literary genre, generally of the Qur'an
<i>Tahfidz</i>	memorizing the Qur'an
<i>Tajdid</i>	renewal
<i>Takhayyul</i>	superstition
<i>Taklif</i>	religious obligation
<i>Talaq</i>	repudiation of a wife by a husband, a form of divorce
<i>Taqlid</i>	accepting authority or opinion, imitation
<i>Tarawih</i>	supplementary prayer during the month of Ramadhan
<i>Tarekat</i>	mystical fraternity, Sufi order
<i>Tarjih</i>	collection of <i>fatwa</i> as guidance for religious practices
<i>Tawhid</i>	the act of believing and affirming that God is one
<i>Ulil amri</i>	rulers, authorities
<i>Ummah</i>	Muslim community
<i>Ustadz</i>	male teacher
<i>Wajib</i>	obligatory
<i>Wali mujbir</i>	enforcing guardian
<i>Waqf</i>	the act of founding a charitable trust, religious endowme

Chapter One - Introduction

Most Indonesian people will never forget May 21, 1998, which was the day President Soeharto, after having been in power for more than three decades, delivered his last speech in Parliament. Having left for the Netherlands a few months before to complete my MA, I watched the event on television in the house of a senior Indonesian exile who had left the country in the 1960s and, sad to say, for political reasons had never been able to return to Indonesia ever since. Together with students from various groups: left and right, Muslim and Christian, secular and religiously devout, we watched one of the most defining moments in Indonesian modern history. The room eventually broke into cheers when Soeharto officially turned over his mandate to Parliament. Outside the Parliamentary building, students and activists celebrated this victory by singing and dancing. That very same day we returned to the same house to celebrate the victory of the Indonesian democratic coalition. We kept watching TV while we enjoyed our meal. Suddenly I saw something peculiar. In a corner of the Parliamentary building that was occupied by the students, there were men wearing *turbans* and long robes who were yelling and shouting.

Returning home in 1999, I turned my attention to Islamist organizations that aim at either the implementation of Islamic law or the establishment of an Islamic state. In 2000, in Jakarta, I managed to attend the first congress of the FKAJWJ (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah* – The Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet), a Salafi-inspired organization. It was

attended by at least 5000 Salafi members and supporters from all over the country. At the registration desk, I saw men wearing long robes and *turbans* and sporting long beards and moustaches. Looking at their faces and the way they moved -- some of them were wearing boots -- I assumed that many of them had been familiar with military skills. I was then involved in formal interviews with some of these men. During prayer time, all activities were stopped. They prayed collectively, and except for the security guards, nobody was around. After prayer, a senior member arose and gave a short lecture based on a particular *hadith* (the sayings and the deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) on the importance of creating solidarity among the *ummah* (Muslim community). When I left the congress, they gave me a pile of *hadith* books as a present. I thanked them, but many questions remained in my mind.

A few years later, I obtained some basic information about this group. Following the ethno-religious conflicts in various regions in Indonesia, the FKAWJ paramilitary group, calling itself Laskar Jihad, attracted public attention through the protests it staged in front of the Parliamentary building in Jakarta. Ambon, the capital of Maluku Province and one of the most conflict-torn regions in the Eastern part of Indonesia, previously knew relative peaceful relations between religious and ethnic groups. Conflicts sometimes occurred in the region, but Muslims and Christians who had long prided on their inter-religious harmony were able to maintain their unity. In January 19, 1999, while Muslim people celebrated the end of Ramadhan, conflict erupted. The violence was instigated by two groups of thugs (*preman*), but quickly escalated into communal conflicts.

Some scholars argue that the root of conflict started from August 1999 when North Maluku planned to become a new province and to benefit from Indonesia's new political and economic system (Wilson 2008; Sumanto 2013; Van Klinken 2007; Bertrand 2004). It is believed that local elites in the province who competed over political leadership mobilized their followers creating tensions within the grassroots. Islamist groups in Java saw the conflict as an attempt by Christian groups to cleanse the region of Muslims who had settled in the region (Sumanto 2013: 103-104). In response to this, the supporters of Laskar Jihad demanded the government take concrete actions to stop the Muslim-Christian conflicts that had escalated in various regions across Indonesia. To this end, on February 2000, Laskar Jihad sent its assessment team to Ambon and, three months later, May 2000, it dispatched its jihadists to Ambon (Hasan 2006: 185-214).¹

Laskar Jihad is one of the largest paramilitary organizations in Indonesia (Hasan 2006; Sidel 2007: 275-318; Barton 2004; Singh 2007; Jamhari and Jahroni 2004; Shoelhi 2002). Its emergence cannot be seen in isolation from a number of Salafi figures who were deeply concerned with the escalation of the Muslim-Christian conflicts in Ambon. After a public rally in Yogyakarta in April, 29 1999, they decided to create the FKAWJ and through this forum, they expressed their concerns to the authorities and demanded the authorities take the necessary actions to stop the conflicts from becoming worse. They also criticized President Abdurrahman Wahid for being indifferent on what happened in Maluku and accused him communist. One year later, after having received no response

¹ Laskar Mujahidin, a Muslim paramilitary group that has links with al-Qaeda, is the first to send its troops to Ambon on June, 1999. See "Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Network, Lessons from Maluku and Poso." *ICG Report* 2005.

from the government, they held the same rally in the same place, except this time the event was much bigger. Every Salafi organization across the country was invited to attend. A number of Salafi preachers delivered their speeches provoking the audience to wage jihad in Ambon. One of the decisions made after the rally was that they agreed to create a paramilitary organization that later was called Laskar Jihad. Since then mobilization and military trainings were organized across the Salafi enclaves. In 2002, after a successful peace agreement was brokered between the Muslim and Christian factions in Ambon, a number of Salafi *ulama* from Saudi Arabia issued a *fatwa* (opinion on a point of law, roughly glossed as “religious edict”) that called for the group to be disbanded and all members were urged to return to their local Islamic schools and resume their *da'wah* (proselytization) activities (Hasan 2005: 73-92; Jamhari and Jahroni 2004; Azca 2011; Wahid, 2014).

The deployment of Laskar Jihad in the conflict areas and the presence of the FKAWJ reintroduced the term “Salafi” into public discourse. The public began to return to discussion of Salafism and its connections with the changing social and political situation in Indonesia. Many scholars as well as the general public wondered how the Salafis had suddenly re-emerged and under what circumstances they had evolved. Long before that, the term Salafi-Wahhabi had been mentioned in connection with late eighteenth century Arabian religious puritanism that had been imported into Indonesia by returning pilgrims in West Sumatra (Abdullah1971; Dobbin 1974; A'la 2008), while Salafi-Wahhabis attacked the local form of Islam in the region that was deeply influenced by Sufism (Azra 2006; Fathurahman 2008). In the early twentieth century, the term was

reinstated and its spirit was implanted into Islamic modernism (Azra 2004; Saleh 2001; Noer 1973; Federspiel 1970; Abushouk 2007: 301-322). In general, Salafism refers to a specific form of Islamic puritanism. Salafis calls upon Muslim believers to return to the authoritative religious sources: the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad and the Salafi *manhaj* (methods and paths of Salafi teachings), without which, Salafis claim, the understanding and practice of Islamic teachings is deemed impossible (Hasan 2006: 31-33; Wahid 2014: 17-34). In a later development, Salafism incorporated many doctrines but its emphasis remained on the need to return to the pristine sources of Islam as reflected in its slogan "return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah." This slogan is reverberated by the Muhammadiyah, which, to some extent, has been influenced by Salafism (Yusuf 2005; Saleh 2001: 111-112; Nakamura 2012). Despite its Salafi ideological attachment, the Muhammadiyah is largely committed to Islamic modernism, a form of ideology promoted by Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) in which Muslim people are urged to "imitate" Western modernity without losing its Islamic ethical foundations. Muhammadiyah has successfully created thousands of schools across the country and provided health facilities to the public. Having said this, the emergence of Laskar Jihad was shocking. It was one of the most appalling incidents in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It did not only differ from the public notion of Salafism, it also threatened nascent civil liberty movements.

Post-Soeharto Indonesia saw a rapid increase in Islamic political activism (Jamhari and Jahroni 2004). Beside Laskar Jihad, there was also the Wahdah Islamiyah, established in 1998, later to be cited as Wahdah, a Salafi organization based in Makassar,

South Sulawesi (Jurdi 2007; Barton 2004). This organization did not have a paramilitary organization or provoked Muslims to wage jihad in conflict areas. On the contrary, it urged all Muslim groups not to get involved in the conflicts and it left the problems to be solved by the authorities. According to the Wahdah, the political mobilization and military deployment in response to the conflicts were illegitimate as long as the government was able to solve them, as they are the *ulil amri* (the rulers) all Muslims have to obey. The Wahdah's main agenda is to disseminate reformist Salafi teachings through *da'wah* and education. It trains *da'i* (preacher) and erects *madrassa* across the province and neighboring areas. The Wahdah is a Salafi group that emerged before the collapse of the New Order regime. Its roots can be traced to an intra-campus organization in the 1980s in South Sulawesi that gained momentum in the mid-1990s when the New Order was about to collapse. It was established by Salafi students many of whom were graduates from Saudi Arabian universities (Jurdi 2007: 57-120).

Scope of the Dissertation

This dissertation concerns Salafi teachers and students, men and women, who actively engage in the reproduction of Islamic knowledge in Indonesia. With men wearing long beards and women wearing the *niqab*, a veil that covers their bodies leaving only their eyes visible, Salafis claim to practice a form of Islam believed to be rooted in the first Muslim generations and they believe that this form of Islam is the most authentic one that should be imitated by later Muslim generations. The word *salaf* -- literally meaning "to precede" -- refers to the period of the first three Muslim generations: the

Prophet Muhammad, the Companions (Ar. *Sahabat*), and the Followers of the Companions (Ar. *Tabi'in*). Salafis believe that they are the pious Muslim predecessors (*al-salaf al-salih*) and the finest generations who exemplified the ideal form of Islam later Muslim generations have to emulate (Al-Rasheed 2007; Saleh 2001; Commins 2006, Hasan 2006; Wahid 2013).² With the Qur'an on their right hands, and the Sunnah (the generally approved standard or practice introduced by the Prophet Muhammad) on their left hands, and the implementation of Salafi *manhaj*, Salafi groups call on Muslim believers to comply with Islamic doctrines, and to avoid all forms of *bid'ah* (a belief or practice that has no precedence in the time of the Prophet, roughly glossed as "religious innovation"). Through their mosques and *madrasa*, they came up as a new emerging authority challenging the established *ulama* (religious scholars) (Wahid 2013: 111-150; Rahmat 1998).

The social settings in which the Salafis reproduce their knowledge are extremely fundamental. These social settings, in which Salafis flourish, refer to changing social, political, and economic situations before and in the aftermath of Soeharto's downfall (Ramage 2005; Hefner 2000; Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Schwarz and Paris 1999). A regime change from authoritarian to democratic by definition provides civil liberty movements with the room to actively engage in shaping public policies. Salafis took part in this change and, together with other groups, they demanded larger political

² The high veneration of Salafi groups for the first pious Muslim generations is based on the *hadith*: "The best generation is my generation then those who follow them then those who follow them" (Narrated by Bukhari).

³ Sururi is a term to denote the followers of Muhammad ibn Surur al-Nayef Zain al-Abidin, a Syrian Salafi who adopts the political ideals of Muslim Brotherhood.

⁴ Interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta 7 February, 20, 2012.

participation. At this critical juncture, Salafis shaped and reshaped Islamic knowledge pertinent to their interests. Bearing this in mind, over the last decades, Salafis have established strategic institutions through which they were able to produce their knowledge and to reach a wider Muslim audience among whom to promote their ideologies. Using charity funds from Middle Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, and later on from their own members, Salafis established *madrasa* and schools as their social and religious bases while offering Islamic knowledge to Indonesian students.

The diversity of Indonesian Islam caused Salafis to encounter other Islamic groups. Both Salafis and non-Salafis shape the reproduction of Islamic knowledge. Sunnis are the majority (99%), Salafis comprise less than 1 %. The reproduction of knowledge in Indonesia is thus characterized by intense discussions between different Islamic organizations: Salafis and non-Salafis, NU (Nahdhatul Ulama -- traditionalist Muslim group) and Muhammadiyah (modernist Muslim groups), Sunnis and Shiites. Their different social and historical backgrounds and overlapping social settings had their bearing on the actors and the kinds of knowledge they acquired that resulted in such impressive diversity. As a result, knowledge about Salafism is far from uniform. Rather it constantly changes depending on existing conditions (Jamhari and Jahroni 2004; Hilmy 2010: 179-203).

Theoretical Framework

This dissertation focuses on the reproduction of knowledge (Barth 1993; Hefner 1987; 1989; Geertz 1983; Eickelman 1979; Bourdieu 2007; Berger 1967). It specifically

deals with the issues of how Salafis produced their knowledge; what factors contributed to the reproduction of their knowledge; and why and how they produce knowledge in a specific way. The political economy of knowledge refers to a situation where actors produce knowledge depending on existing social, political, and economic conditions. It deals primarily with structures and power-relations and how the transmission of knowledge shapes and in turn is shaped by the configuration of social and economic relations among groups and classes in different societies (Eickelman 1979: 386-393).

This study falls within the field of the anthropology of knowledge. Anthropology of knowledge is concerned with the question of how people produce their knowledge in a given time and place. Anthropologists define knowledge not only as the result of a cognitive process related to the human brain but also as a social construct. In my definition of knowledge I follow Fredrik Barth, a Norwegian social anthropologist who has a clear social actor-based view on human culture. Barth argues that knowledge is “a major modality of culture which includes feelings as well as thoughts, embodied skills as well as taxonomies, and other verbal models, all aspects through which people employ to interpret and act on the world” (Barth 1995: 65-68). His definition, in my opinion, is able to encompass all aspects of human knowledge beyond the conventional definition of knowledge which only includes human cognition. With this theoretical framework in mind, I can describe and analyze the formal Salafi institutions: *ulama*, *madrasa*, and other organizations and their roles in producing knowledge in the context of the changing Indonesian social, political and economic system which allows for the diversity of knowledge.

Barth's theoretical framework on knowledge is closely related to social institutions and authority. Doing ethnographic research in Bali in Pagatepan, a Muslim village, and adjacent Prabakula, a Hindu village, Fredrik Barth was confronted with the issue of religious authority. Prabakula and Pagatepan are social entities through which villagers developed their own culture and knowledge. In Prabakula, the process of cultural reproduction centered on and around temples and priests. People observed religious rituals and ceremonies under the guidance of the priests' knowledge. Priests served as the guardians of the Hindu tradition. Marriage, kinship, death, and other daily and household affairs were arranged following the guidance of the priests. The role of the *pedanda*, the highest priest, was to perform rites for the sake of the entire community with the assistance of *pemangku*, lower-ranking priests. In Pagatepan, the *ulama* were believed to have the highest authority enabling them to interpret the sacred texts. Their authority was achieved through long training and education. Many of them were sent to *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in East Java, and some of them even traveled as far as Mecca and Cairo to add to their religious knowledge. Once they had finished their studies, they returned to Pagatepan to teach the religion of the Prophet among the villagers. Therefore, the institution of *ulama* was central in shaping people's knowledge (Barth 1993: 29-56).

While social factors and historical backgrounds are extremely important in shaping human knowledge, Robert W. Hefner pointed to the importance of the configuration of social practices and the processes of cultural knowledge (1989: 1-20). The role of priests as the guardians of the Tengger tradition was central to the system of

social action in the Tengger highlands in East Java where Hefner carried out his research. The priests were local elites who were solely responsible for the preservation of the Tengger liturgy. The public did not have access to this liturgy and they served as observers during religious ceremonies, providing food and financing them. Furthermore, throughout Tengger history, priests constituted a privileged group endowed with literacy skills that allowed them to access sacred knowledge. This resulted in so-called “restricted literacy,” literary skills that only belonged to the elites (Goody 1968; Hefner 1989).

John Bowen uses knowledge as a discursive system when he did his research in the Gayo highlands, which is part of Aceh Province (Bowen 1991). According to his theory, knowledge should be understood not only through historical backgrounds and social settings, but also in relation to traditions. Islam is rich with traditions which are embodied in scholarly works, religious rituals, and social practices. Even though the people in Gayo had converted to Islam in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they still practiced rituals that were rooted in local traditions. To answer the question as to whether these rituals and practices are Islamic or un-Islamic, Bowen traced them back to their origins in discursive Islamic knowledge. Based on his observations, it is clear that all the actions Gayo Muslims undertake can be traced back to larger discursive traditions derived from local and universal traditions (Bowen 1993: 8-9).

Influenced by the Scottish philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre (2013), Talal Asad (1986) is credited with developing a theory of knowledge as a discursive system. Within this theoretical framework, Asad argues that it is insufficient to look at Islam simply as a social phenomenon. Rather, Islam should be seen as a discursive tradition, one that

reveals the interconnections between narratives of actors and the ways they understand the texts (Asad 1985: 1-2). Understanding Islam involves a wide range of social relationships, as well as formal and informal institutions, all of which reflect power relations. Bearing this in mind, Salafism is not only an ideal type of Islamic knowledge but also a system that differentiates correct practices from incorrect ones. According to Salafis, the correct Islamic knowledge can only be attained by referring to the authoritative texts and the employment of Salafi *manhaj*, and this should be made under the guidance of the Salafi *ulama* who have the authority to interpret the texts. Salafism is not only embedded in the authentic religious texts, but also in the institution of the Salafi *ulama*. They are claimed to be the guardians of Salafi knowledge who, by training and education, claim to possess the authority to interpret religious texts and, by doing so, are able to shape the religious views and practices of ordinary Muslim believers (Hasan 2006: 31-33; Wahid 2013: 17-24; Haykel 2009: 33-57; Al-Rasheed 2007: 22-58).

With these theoretical backgrounds, some points need to be discussed. According to Islamic ethics, all the people have the same access to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and all scholarly works composed by religious scholars. All believers are obliged to have the necessary degree of knowledge required for performing individual religious rituals. Those who have the capacity to gain higher knowledge are urged to acquire it as they are expected to become new religious scholars in replacement of the old ones. There is no restriction for Muslims to study and to possess knowledge. In practice, however, only those people who have finished certain training and possess specific skills have access to the texts. Possession of knowledge within the Muslim community is in practice related to

the religious authorities where only members of the elites are able to possess knowledge and can become *ulama* (Eickelman 1992; Mottahedeh 1985).

In Sunni Islam, people who possess religious knowledge are called *ulama* (s. *alim*), meaning the leader of religious establishment. The term has actually a more general connotation and denotes scholars of almost all disciplines, while scholars on Islamic law are called *fuqaha* (s. *faqih*, from the word *fiqh*, meaning “to understand”). However, later on the word *ulama* also came to include the *fuqaha*. *Ulama* serve as the guardians, transmitters, and interpreters of Islamic knowledge (Zaman 2002; Metcalf 1982, Messick 1993; Dhofier 1999; cf. Geertz 1960). With their skills, they provide answers to the religious and social questions and issues the Muslim communities are confronted with. From the early periods of Islam, the states appointed *ulama* to take care of disputes among the Muslim community. They were called judges (Ar. *qadhi*) whose decisions were binding for the disputants. Apart from that, there were individual *ulama* who issued *fatwa* upon requests. They are called *mufti* (those who give the *fatwa*). Their *fatwa* are not binding, although their influences can be extensive (Zubaida 2005: 40-73; Masud 2005; Vikor 2005: 140-184; Vogel 2000: 5).

Unlike the guardianship of Hindu priests who serve as religious specialists, the guardianship of the *ulama* includes religious as well as non-religious matters. Muslims go to *ulama* to consult them on individual and social matters. Furthermore, unlike a Hindu Tengger priest, whose authority is based on his hereditary lineage, the authority of the *ulama* is made possible by long training e.g. studying in *madrassa* (Barth 1993; Zaman 2002, Mottahedeh 1985, Dhofier 1999). From pre-modern until modern periods, many

Indonesian *ulama* travelled to Mecca to obtain religious knowledge and to build up their authority (Azra 1994, Basri 2008, Mas'ud 1997). Although *ulama* may not have formal political mechanism to enforce their judgments, there are many other mechanism of social enforcement where the *ulama* shape public policies (Asad 2009; An-Naim 2008; 1-44; Abou El Fadl 2001: 141-169). Some Muslim countries that apply Islamic law have to be exempted here; in Saudi Arabia *ulama* do have the capacity to enforce their opinions (Al-Rasheed 2007: 1-58; Brown 2003: 31-32). This practice has been criticized by many scholars who think that the Saudi *ulama* act like the Catholic clergy in Medieval Europe who were able to sanction and punish ordinary believers. L. Carl Brown, a noted scholar on Islamic history, calls the model of Saudi Arabian state-*ulama* relations a Muslim-Church government (Brown 2000: 31-42). Meanwhile, Khaled Abou El Fadl claims that the Saudi *ulama*, thanks to the support of the state, have turned into an authoritarian institution (El Fadl 2001b).

Throughout the history of the Sunni Muslims, official or individual *ulama* remained figures of authority. As guardians of religious orthodoxy and as the transmitters of Islamic knowledge, *ulama* enjoyed many privileges and they lived under the patronage of Muslim rulers. Salafis are part of Sunni Islam; they are the followers of the Hanbali School in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and followers of the pious religious scholars who oppose the use of *ta'wil* (syllogism) in theology (Vogel 2000: 33-82). The intellectual genealogy of Salafism is claimed to be rooted in the first generations of Islam, continued by Salafi scholars throughout Islamic history up until the modern period (Meijer 2009: 1-27; Haykel 2009: 33-57). Salafism is not only an historical entity; it is a method (Al-

Rasheed 2007: 22-58). They do not recognize the authority of *ulama* who, in their eyes, do not comply with the *salafi manhaj*.

The term “salaf” means “to precede,” and “manhaj” means “path.” A salafi thus can be defined as one who follows the path of the pious predecessors (*al-salaf al-salih*) consisting of the Prophet, the *Sahaba* (Companions), and the *Tabi'in* (The Followers of the Companions). They are the best Muslim generations to be imitated by the later ones. The authority of *al-salaf al-salih* has been granted by the *hadith* which says, “The best people are those of my generation, then those who come after them, then those who come after them,” (Narrated by Bukhari). The Salafi *manhaj* thus can be defined as those principal teachings promulgated by these early generations who had been guided by the Prophet. The Salafi *manhaj* emphasizes the importance of the texts (the Qur'an and the Sunnah) as the most authentic religious sources. The term “salaf” is frequently opposed to “khalaf” meaning “successors” or “the later generations” believed to have created various religious innovations. This can be seen in the opinion of the Salafi ulama: *Kullu khairin fi-l ittaba' man salaf, wa kullu sharrin fi-l ittiba' man khalaf* (Every good is in the following of the Salaf, and every evil is in the following of the Khalaf). For this reason, Salafis oppose the authority of Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1111) on the basis that he used logic in his interpretation of religion. Salafis also oppose the scholarship of Muslim mystics (Ar. *Sufi*) who, in building their teachings, used weak sources. Apart from doctrinal differences, what makes Salafis, or to be more precise, Wahhabis, different from other Sunni groups is their alliance with the Saudi Arabian rulers. From the inception of the Saudi dynasty in the late eighteenth century, the coming of the second

Saudi state in the nineteenth century until the formation of modern Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, the Wahhabis were loyal collaborators to the rulers (Al-Rasheed 2006: 22-58).

Al-Wala' wa-l Bara', al-Hijrah wa-l Takfir

Salafis have created a number of doctrines in relation to their identity as a distinct religious group (Meijer 2009: 1-32; Haykel 2009: 33-57; Lacroix 2009: 58-80). These doctrines have been inspired by Arabian tribal traditions as well as by the Qur'an, which incorporates pre-Islamic doctrines. One of these doctrines is *al-wala' wa-l al-bara'* (roughly translated as "loyalty" and "disavowal"). This doctrine creates a specific identity among Salafi followers and distinguishes them from non-Salafis. Its origin can be traced back to the pre-Islamic period when Arabs pledged their loyalty and solidarity to their tribes and thus created sharp boundaries between groups. In early Islamic history, the Kharijites were the first Muslim group to have used this doctrine when they denounced the political leadership of both Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib (599-661) and his opponent Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan (602-680). They declared both as *kafir* (unbeliever) given that the verdict of both was not based on the book of Allah (Wagemakers 2009: 81-106).

Majority Sunni groups never recognized the doctrine of *al-wala' wa-bara'* and there is huge disagreement among Salafi *ulama* about this doctrine. Ahmad ibn Hanbal considered it *bid'ah* and thus unjustifiable. Later, Ibn Taymiyya revitalized the doctrine (Wagemakers, *Ibid*, p. 85). According to him, Islam was surrounded by many enemies, and in his view, non-Islamic cultures had contaminated the true path of Islam (Leaman 1995: 123-124). As a result, Muslims should not display *walaya* (loyalty) and *mawadda*

(friendship) to non-Muslims. Although he did not use the term *walaya*, he deliberately reminded Muslim believers to stay away from the enemies of Islam (logicians, mystics, Shiites) otherwise they would become parts of them. Notwithstanding this development, the doctrine of *al-wala' wa-l bara* remained marginal among Salafis until the advent of the revivalist movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century who was reportedly unforgiving against all forms of *bid'ah* and *shirk* and who declared their practitioners to be *kafir* (Al-Rasheed 2002: 17).

In the modern period, the permutations of Salafi doctrines have been pervasive as Salafis responded to, and against, modernity because of its serious consequences for the ways of live of the Muslim communities. The doctrine has major implications for the social and political divides between Salafis and non-Salafis, Muslims and non-Muslims. It even creates sectarianism and it has become a recipe for Islamic extremism (Wagemakers 2009: 81-106). Furthermore, adherence to the doctrine results in extreme piety among Salafi followers who live in separate enclaves and refuse social integration with the non-Salafi communities they deem un-Islamic. Salafi separation from contemporary societies gives birth to enclave cultures and intends to maintain the holiness of the Salafi world and to distinguish it from the outside world which is un-holy (Almond *et. al.* 2003: 23-32).

An extension of the *al-wala' wa-l bara'* doctrine is the doctrine of *al-hijrah wa-l al-takfir* (migration and excommunication) (Paz 2009: 267-280) that urges Salafi groups to get involved in politics, or, to be more precise, engage in jihad as a mechanism of self-defense. At this point, jihad, literally meaning “internal and external efforts to be good

Muslims,” has become identical with holy war. Influenced by this doctrine, Juhaiman al-Utaibi (1936-1980) seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 on the grounds that the Saudi Arabian government had deviated from the true path of Islam and thus was *kafir* or *kufir* (unbeliever) despite its claim to implement the Sharia (Hegghammer and Lacroix 2007: 103-122). Juhaiman believed that God has given *millat Ibrahim* (the religion of Abraham) as a complete way of life where Muslim believers offer their loyalty to God alone and disavow all forms of *shirk* (polytheism). This commitment should be made by displaying enmity to unbelievers (*al-kafirun*) and polytheists (*al-mushrikun*) which separates the followers of the true faith from those who do not. In situations where Muslim believers are still weak, they should migrate (*hijrah*) to safe places where they can stick together and prepare the necessary conditions for *qital* (war) against unholy authorities.

After Juhaiman, the doctrine was further elaborated by the Jordanian Salafi figure, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), who combined radical thought with extreme piety (Wagekamers 2007: 81-106). According to him, loyalty belongs to God alone. Thus people who direct their loyalty at something other than God, such as institutions and laws, are *kufir*. Very much like Juhaiman, al-Maqdisi elaborated the doctrine by expanding the concept of *millat Ibrahim* as a complete and totally encompassing way of life. Al-Maqdisi argued that Islam does not need any additions or revisions as it is a comprehensive ideology. As a result, it is unacceptable to mix Islam with men-made laws, national constitutions or modern political and social systems such as democracy and human rights. According to al-Maqdisi, Muslim regimes who apply this mixture are

kufr despite their claims to be Muslim regimes, and Muslims who abide to these man-made laws are also *kufr* as they create *andadan* (equals) to God (QS 2: 165) which means that their loyalty is invalid.

Al-Maqdisi was not the first to deal with this doctrine. Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, had earlier developed a similar doctrine. In his *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestone) he stated that contemporary Muslim societies lived in a way comparable to the ways of living in the period of ignorance (Ar. *jahiliyya*) when the laws of *taghut* (tyrant) had been their guidance. They were usurpers as the right of legislation (Ar. *hakimiyya*) solely belongs to God. With this doctrine, Qutb obviously criticized the Egyptian rulers who introduced socialism as the national ideology. In a later development, this idea inspired various Islamist groups to develop the doctrine of *al-Jihad al-Farida al-Ghaiba* (The Neglected Duty) which provided the ideological foundation for President Anwar *Sadat's* assassination in 1981 (Jansen 1986).

Among Salafi groups, the implementation of *al-hijra wa-l takfir* has far reaching political consequences because it means that people who pledge their allegiance to institutions such as states are also *kufr*. It is obvious that, with this doctrine, al-Maqdisi criticized a number of Muslim regimes in the region that claimed to enforce the Sharia, but in fact mixed it with alien elements deemed un-Islamic. Over the last decades, this doctrine has inspired many Salafi groups to resort to violence and to perpetrate terror attacks against the unholy forces in the region. It inspired Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist who perpetrated suicide bombings in Iraq in the early 2000s and who is al-Maqdisi's ideological son.

Global Salafism

Global Salafism is the result of the Saudi Arabian initiative to accommodate its religious establishment (Meijer 2009; Hegghammer 2010). It is relevant to note that in Saudi Arabia, the *ulama*, particularly those affiliated with Wahhabism, are parts of state officials. In Saudi Arabia, the alliance between the state and the *ulama* is part of its history, and through the *ulama*, Saudi Arabia extends its political power over other Muslim countries. Claiming to be an Islamic state, it needs the authority of the *ulama* to legitimize its legacy. In return, the *ulama* are given the authority to shape public policies especially on education (Al-Hefdhhy 1994; Prokop 1994: 77-89). Over the last decades, students from all over the Muslim world have been invited to study at Saudi Arabian universities under the patronage of their *ulama*. Thus, there is a strong connection between the global Salafi community and Saudi Arabian *ulama*, even so, not all Salafi groups regard Saudi *ulama* with the same respect. There have been instances of contestation between some Salafi groups and the Saudi religious establishment. Current Salafi scholarship is based on a hierarchical structure where two Saudi *ulama*, Bin Baz (d. 1999) and Muhammad Sholeh al-Uthaimin (d. 2001) sit at the top, followed by Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), the Yemeni Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i (d. 2001), and the Saudi Rabee bin Hadi al-Madkhali (b. 1931).

Political patronage has become the common feature that defines Salafi organizations. Over the last decades, on the one hand, the Saudi senior *ulama* have been trying to control the Salafi communities all over the world to remain consistent with Salafi teachings. On the other hand, Salafi groups find themselves in different social and

political contexts. These relations are difficult to resolve and make Salafi organizations' fragile (Hasan 2009: 169-188). This is the reason why, time and again, ruptures occur among the Salafis. The issue of Sururi³ is a case in point. It started with the arrival of Abd al-Khaliq, a prominent Salafi figure at Ihya al-Turath, a Kuwaiti-based charitable organization, to al-Irshad *madrasa*, one of the most important Salafi institutions in Central Java, Indonesia, in 1996. Believing that Salafis should refrain from politics, Ja'far accused Al-Khaliq and his colleagues at al-Irshad *madrasa* as Sururis and not committed to the Salafi teachings. Due to his criticism, Ja'far was shunned by Salafi fellows (Wahid, 2013: 62). Another rupture took place in the aftermath of the Ambon and Poso conflicts. Ja'far dedicated much of his time to *da'wah*. To do so, he was involved with Salafi and non-Salafi Muslim preachers. He argued that maintaining good relations with fellow Muslims is as important as *da'wah* itself. To his surprise, his colleagues accused him of being lenient in the way he executed the *salafi manhaj* and they reported his "disloyalty" to the senior *ulama* in Saudi Arabia. No less than Bin Baz' successor, Sheikh Rabi' bin Hadi al-Madkhali, issued a *fatwa* that Ja'far deviated from the true Salafi path. Apart from that, his rebellious attitudes towards the Indonesian authorities leads to his isolation from Salafi communities.⁴

In Indonesia, Salafis face the diversity of Islam. They are forced to face other Islamic groups, which shapes the reproduction of their knowledge. Salafi groups' social activism caused the Indonesian government to issue a strategic policy allowing Salafi

³ Sururi is a term to denote the followers of Muhammad ibn Surur al-Nayef Zain al-Abidin, a Syrian Salafi who adopts the political ideals of Muslim Brotherhood.

⁴ Interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, February, 20, 2012.

students to attend public universities and thus enabling them to become part of the larger Indonesian Muslim community. Adjusting to the political situation, many of the Salafi schools adopt the national curriculum and compete for financial educational aid. While focusing on the Sharia and a body of knowledge concerning *aqidah* (theology), *fiqh*, and Qur'anic teachings, Salafi schools also provide their students "secular sciences" such as mathematics and physics (See, e.g. Hefner 2009; Burhanudin and Afriyanty 2006; Jamhari and Jabali 2002).

Salafism as Knowledge

Salafis believe that the ideal model for the practice of Islam can only be found in the periods of the Prophet Muhammad, the Companions, and the Followers of the Companions (Al-Rasheed 2007: 1-58; Hasan 2006: 31-33). By employing the Salafi *manhaj*, followers of Salafism are concerned with implementing the purification of Islamic practices to more closely reflect what they deem to represent the most authentic form of Islam (Peacock 1978, Federspiel 1970). It is claimed that the roots of Salafism can be found in the members of the first generation of Muslims who had been very cautious in their interpretation of the Qur'an. Salafism's founding fathers were claimed to have prevented from making speculation on the anthropomorphic verses on God's attributes. Being questioned about "how God *istiwa* (establishes above His throne)" (Q.S. 7:54), Malik ibn Anas (711-795 CE/93-179 AH), the founder of the Maliki School of thought and one of the Salafi *ulama*, replied that "*Istiswa* is understandable, *kayf* (the modality) is incomprehensible, and asking about it is innovation (*bid'ah*)."¹ The most

important teaching of Salafism is to practice *tawhid* (the act of believing and affirming that God is one), and to combat all forms of *shirk* (polytheism), which is the most dangerous innovation against the purity of Islam (Haykel 2009: 51-57). Salafis are extremely hostile to all forms of saints who serve, they believe, as intermediaries between God and human beings. According to Salafis, these practices are usually a mix of Islam and indigenous rituals and can be found in mysticism and mystical brotherhoods.

One criticism launched against Salafism is that Salafis have become trapped in extreme literalism as they are extremely dependent on the texts without taking into considerations the social and political discourses that exist within the Muslim communities. As a result, Salafi religious and social practices are characterized by unreasonableness, antiquity, and a-historicity (El Fadl 2001b). To uphold *tawhid*, Salafis claim to have eradicated all practices of *bid'ah* and *shirk* by destroying religious sanctuaries and saints' graves. This can still be seen in modern Saudi Arabia where the government, with the support of its religious establishment, destroyed historical sites dating from the early periods of Islamic history. Right on top of these demolished archeological remnants, the government built a mega mall, a super hotel, and sky scrapers. The ambivalence of the Salafi doctrines is that Mecca is turning into another "Las Vegas" where wealthy pilgrims regularly spend their money without having any spiritual enrichment.⁵ In Saudi Arabia, puritanism meets consumerism. On the one hand, they are very puritan especially with regard to women's issues; they oppose gender equality and

⁵ Jerome Taylor, "Mecca for the rich, Islam's holiest site 'turning into Vegas,'" *The Independent*, September 24, 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/mecca-for-the-rich-islams-holiest-site-turning-into-vegas-2360114.html>. Accessed 19 January, 2013.

democracy as alien elements to Islam. On the other hand, they succumb to Western capitalism (Ayubi 2003 :75-78).

The roles of the texts within Salafi groups are extremely important. The Qur'an and the Sunnah are the most authoritative texts, followed by the examples and views of the *Sahabat* (Companions) and the *Tabi'in* (the Followers of the Companions) who are committed to Salafi teachings (Vogel 2000). Salafi's closeness to the texts is reflected in their claim as being *Ahl al-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* (People of the Prophetic Tradition and the Consensus of the Ummah), as opposed to their opponents whom they call *Ahl al-Bid'ah Wal Hawa* (People of the Innovation and Desire) (Wahid 2013). Every time Salafis encounter problems, they will look for solutions first in the Qur'an, then in the Sunnah. If they do not find what they need in both sources, they will look at the examples and the views of the Companions and the *Tabi'in*. Having said this, Salafis actually bypass the institutions of the *madhhab* (an opinion with regard to particular case, school of law), the scientific tool that bridges the present and the distant past. As a result, Salafis tend to be anti-intellectual and a-historical and they present the distant past into the here and now (El Fadl 2001b: 16-17). While *ijtihad* (individual reasoning, exerting one's self to form an opinion) is possible, it is limited to the collections of the Hanbali school of thought and fail to take into account the social dynamics of Muslim communities. Salafis revitalize the century-old views their Salafi teachers developed. For this reason, some scholars argue that Salafis are in essence revivalists (Lapidus 1983: 6-18; Nasr 1996; Dobbin 1983; Roy 1996). Their predisposition towards the past distinguishes Salafis from neo-modernist groups, who travel to the past to return to the present

(Rahman 1984: 20).

Politics is the most important but yet fuzzy aspect of Salafism. In this regard, Salafis are divided into three groups: (1) quietists, (2) discrete, and (3) covert (Meijer 2009: 16-24; Wiktorowicz 2001). Quietists are those Salafi groups who totally abstain from political involvement. According to this group, Salafi *ulama* are obliged to offer religious guidance to Muslim believers, while politics should be left in the hands of rulers and viziers. Quietists believe that politics should be kept at a distant because it could lead people's attention away from their worship of God, and it divides Muslims and makes them oppose each other. This group can be traced back to many of the Companions of the Prophet who refrained from politics when political crises occurred. Instead they lived in their sanctuaries and focused on their piety. The discrete engage in politics but limit themselves to offering advice to the rulers. This form of politics has been practiced by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who, despite having been arrested by the Abbasid rulers, did not urge his followers to rebel against them. Rather, he continued to advise them. Salafis are fascinated by his story as they see him as the Salafi scholar *par exemple*. The last group is engaged in official politics including formal organization and political mobilization. To achieve their goals, some Salafi groups do not hesitate to resort to violence (DeLong-Bas 2004; Hegghammer 2010).

In their history, the Wahhabi *ulama* were engaged in offering *nasiha* (advice) to the Saudi rulers on particular public issues especially with regards to education and women's issues. This model has changed recently as a result of the major reforms initiated by the rulers. There are advisory boards (Ar. *majlis*) where senior *ulama*

regularly offer advice to the rulers in very formal ways. In the post-Gulf War I, and II periods, many Salafi groups in Saudi Arabia were engaged in terror attacks against the formal authorities because they were opposed to the stationing of U.S. military troops in the country. In response to this, the Saudi religious establishment issued a number of *fatwa* to support its legitimacy. No less than Sheikh Bin Baz agreed with the stationing of the U.S. troops to defend the kingdom against Saddam Hussein. His *fatwa* was challenged by *fatwa* from informal *ulama* who stated otherwise leading to social unrest in the country (Brachman 2008; Okruhlik 2004).

Outside Saudi Arabia, the reality of Salafi-state linkages is even more complex. Salafis are exposed to a variety of social and political conditions resulting in their adjustments to local circumstances. In countries where governments are less effective, Salafis combine political activism with charity organizations. This can be seen in Lebanon where Salafi factions have been active in proselytization and education programs (Pall 2014; cf. Norton 2009; Deeb 2006). They built *madrasa* and mosques with donations from local and regional Muslim communities. Some Lebanese Muslim groups see Salafism as a potential alternative for community development after the nation-states failed to create sustainable democracies and national prosperity. This led to the rise of various Islamic movements in the Middle East. Furthermore, Salafi groups' activities have reached unprecedented levels in North African countries (Meijer 2009: 189-220). They even challenge secular groups who, for decades, have settled in the communities. The presence of Salafi groups convinced a significant segment of the Muslim community that Salafism as a political ideology deserves to be considered. In

Egypt, where the state is strong, Salafis founded political parties and the Salafi-based political party al-Nour even became the second largest faction in Parliament.

In the course of history, Wahhabi-Salafi *ulama* obviously have been consistently involved in politics. This is even more so in the modern period when the Wahhabi-Salafis coalesced with the Saudi rulers in establishing the so-called Emirate of Dir'iyah (the first Saudi state, 1744-1818) (Al-Rasheed 2002: 1071). As a reward for this victory, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers were appointed as religious leaders, through which they were able to expand their influence over the interior of the Arabian peninsula. Fully backed up by Muhammad ibn Saud, the founder of the Saudi state, the Wahhabis eradicated all forms of what they regarded as *bid'ah*, persecuted Sunnis and Shiites, and they destroyed religious sanctuaries. The first Saudi state did not last long. It was destroyed in 1818 by Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt. Despite this defeat, the Wahhabis remained loyal to the house of al-Saudi that still controlled the interior of the peninsula. The Wahhabis made their comeback in politics in 1932 when they supported the revitalization of the power of the house of al-Saud. This coalition eventually brought the Wahhabis into power when the Saudi dynasty adopted Islamic law as state law and appointed the Wahhabis as its religious establishment. Nowadays, the Saudi religious establishment is dominated by the Nejd family, from which ibn Abd al-Wahhab originated (Al-Rasheed 2007: 28).

Authority and Power

In Islamic ethical thought, authority is based on the premise that only God knows

the truth. Human's endeavor to find the truth is highly appreciated even if they cannot arrive at it (El Fadl 2001b: 23-36). In one *hadith*, the Prophet Muhammad says, "If a judge makes a ruling, and he is correct, then he will have two rewards. If he is incorrect, then he will have one reward." Many *ulama* interpret this *hadith* as God's benevolence on the human search for the truth. A judge receives two rewards for his decision to engage in *ijtihad* and for being correct; one reward is given to a judge when he engages in *ijtihad* but he is wrong (El Fadl 2001b: 24). Over Islamic history, Muslim jurists have striven to apply their reasoning to arrive at solutions, which they think are appropriate with the contents of the texts, social and historical circumstances, and human wisdom (Zubaida 2005; Abdul Haqq 2006: 1-42; Vikor 2005). At the end of their endeavor, jurists would submit their conclusions to God by saying *Allahu a'lam bi al-shawwab* (God knows the truth) which is a way of showing their fallibility (El Fadl 2001b).

Realizing their weakness, *ulama* have in fact combined three aspects: knowledge, respect, and humility leading to the plurality of knowledge (Ramadan 2010). Sunni *ulama* have practiced this principle over the centuries. Al-Shafi'i, the Muslim jurist and the founder of the Shafi'i School of thought, says, "My opinion is correct with the possibility of being wrong, their opinion is incorrect with the possibility of being correct."

The development of authority in Islam has always been closely related to power. Along with the expansion of Muslim rule, judges were sent to new territories to solve religious disputes among the Muslim community. The Prophet Muhammad appointed several judges to take up the responsible for taking care of this task. The most noted story is that of Mu'adz ibn Jabal who, being asked by the Prophet on how he resolved the

disputes, deliberately said that he would apply *ijtihad* and he did not care whether his *ijtihad* was right or wrong. The appointment of judges was continued by *Al-Khulafa al-Rashidun* (the Righteous Caliphs). During the time of the Muslim dynasties, the institution of judges was integrated into the state bureaucracy. Judges were appointed and endorsed by the *Sheikh al-Islam* (the Grand Judge) who had the highest authority. During the Ottoman period, religious authority went through a vigorous development. The *Sheikh al-Islam*, whose offices were located in Istanbul, was assisted by *qadhi* and *mufti*. While *qadhi* were responsible for judiciary laws, the *mufti* assisted and guided Muslim believers in religious matters (Zubaida 2005: 40-73; Ramadan 2006, Masud 2005).

Apart from formal authorities, informal or traditional authorities also played a significant role within the Muslim community. They provided spiritual guidance and religious education for the Muslim community. Their lives were supported by charities, particularly *waqf* (the act of founding a charitable trust, religious endowment) donated by wealthy individuals. Different from formal *ulama* who received their authority from the state, informal *ulama* built up their authority by providing religious services to the communities. In pre-modern Islam, peripatetic scholars consisting of *ulama* and Sufi *sheikhs* contributed to the expansion of Islamic territories. Along their travels, they built religious sanctuaries and Sufi lodges and dispersed the Islamic message to the local populations (Berkey 2011). However, everything changed with the birth of nation-states. The incorporation of the *ulama* into the state led to prolonged conflict between formal and informal authorities. The revolts that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been associated with the collapse of informal authorities (Kartodirdjo

1984). Apart from opposition against formal authorities, the modern period also witnessed one of the most creative moments in *ulama* history. It led to Islamic reform where the *ulama* redefined their roles in the new emerging nation-states (Metcalf 1982; Zaman 2010, Saleh 2001; Noer 1973).

The Sunnis are the largest Muslim sect in the world comprising more than 85 per cent, and Shiites are the second largest (15%) (Blancard 2010). Sunnis are divided into four major schools of thought (Ar. *madhhab*): Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali, and two groups in theological thinking (Ar. *aqidah*): Ash'arite and Maturidiyya. Meanwhile the Shiites are divided into, at least, three major sub-sects: the Twelver (Ithna'ashriyya), Isma'ili, Zaidi, and Ibadi. There are at least three different models of authority in Islam: the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Khawarijs (Dabashi 1993). After the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Sunnis were able to routinize and institutionalize authority by creating a body of learned men believed to have the authority to interpret the Qur'an and the Sunnah, on which the Salafis build their authority (Al-Rasheed 2007; Hasan 2006: 31-33). This structure granted Sunnis a high level of power and control. The Shiites, believing in the divinely inspired character of the Prophet Muhammad, challenged Sunni authority and proposed the idea that religious and political leadership should be in the hands of the Prophet's heirs. It is believed that they inherited the Prophet's charismatic authority to a lesser degree. This is known as the perpetuation of authority, which gave rise to the doctrine of the infallibility of the *imam* (spiritual and political leadership of the *ummah*) an idea that became central to Shiite teachings. The Khawarijs, opposing both these methods of authority, proposed the idea that authority should belong to any Muslim

regardless of skin color, origin, and social status. From the Khawarij perspective, as long as people are good Muslims, they have the right to interpret God's word.

The Salafi-Wahhabis are parts of Sunni Islam. They are the followers of the Hanbali School of thought. Salafis share many similarities with other Sunni sects in doctrines and religious practices. In Saudi Arabia, Islam is the religion of the state, Wahhabism is its official discourse, and the Wahhabi *ulama* are its religious establishment. In this context, Wahhabism implies power and power relations. In the current Saudi Arabian political structures, many Salafi *ulama* are state notables. They enjoy a number of privileges given to them by the state because of their contribution to the formation of the state. In return, Salafi *ulama* provide legitimacy for the continuation of the Saudi dynasty. The inclusion of the *ulama* into the state bureaucracy in turn shaped their authority. This led to the excessive power the *ulama* enjoy and the degree to which they are able to inspect and punish ordinary believers (Okruhlik 2005: 189-212; El Fadl 2001a).

As a Sunni sect, Salafis build their authority by directly referring to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Furthermore, Salafis also believe in the importance of the *manhaj salafi*, which distinguishes them from the other Sunni groups. This method is deemed relevant for the reconstruction of authentic Islam. Whereas this is a Salafi conventional method, its employment has political implications. Salafis use this method to bypass the established of traditional Islamic scholarship that was built up during the fourteen centuries after the Hijra. Along history, there have been conflicts between the two groups (Al-Rasheed 2002: 39-71). In the modern period, with the support of the Saudi dynasty,

this challenge has been more pervasive. Following the triumphant conquest of Muhammad Saud in the 1930s, non-Wahhabi scholars were marginalized and expelled from Mecca. It is relevant to note that, although traditional Islamic scholarship was embodied in the *madhhab* institutions and that these institutions have been in serious decline since the medieval period, their methodology cannot be ignored (El Fadl 2001a; 2001b).

Global Salafism started to take root in Indonesia in the 1980s. It began by the establishment of the Saudi-sponsored college LIPIA (Institute for Islamic Sciences and Arabic) in Jakarta. Due to the availability of scholarships, the institute attracted Muslim students. The better students were urged to continue their studies at Saudi universities. In the 1990s, these graduates returned home and promoted Salafism among the wider Indonesian Muslim community. With strong financial support from Saudi Arabia as well as from other Middle Eastern countries, they extended their network by building their institutions: *madrasa*, mosques, and charity organizations. In the mid-1990s, Salafism began to challenge the Indonesian religious establishment. They questioned the validity of certain rituals that belonged to the traditionalist NU (Nahdhatul Ulama—the Awakening of the *Ulama*) (Rahmat 1998; Jamhari and Jahroni 2004; Bubalo and Fealy 2005). Salafis usually live in relatively separated urban or semi-urban enclaves where they built their mosques and *madrasa* through which they promote Salafism to the Muslims around them. Due to the changing urban social and religious landscapes, many urban Muslims have become interested in Salafism. At present, there are 136 Salafi schools across the country many of which are located in Java with a total of 36,112

students (See Appendice 2).

Salafis currently engage in shaping and reshaping Islamic discourses across Indonesia. While maintaining their relationship with their Middle Eastern patrons, Indonesian Salafi groups are forced to face the diversity of Indonesian Islam and share new ideas. Over the last decade, Islamic discourses in Indonesia are characterized by intense discussion between diverse Islamic organizations: Salafis and non-Salafis, traditionalists and modernists, Sunnis and Shiites.

Methodology

This dissertation combines my personal knowledge as a Muslim and as a student of Islam. I hope that my knowledge of Islamic texts will offer a rich perspective for my research, which becomes the highest aim of every anthropology student. Salafism is an integral part of my knowledge, something that has shaped my understanding of Islam. I was introduced to Salafism teachings many years ago when I studied in a *pesantren*. I want take benefit from my personal knowledge in this research.

Most Indonesian Muslim reject radical Salafism. However, they accept the importance of the *ahl al-salaf*, the first three generations of pious predecessors. The traditionalist NU group claims to practice Salafi teachings although its members prefer to call themselves the *Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama'ah*. Likewise, the Muhammadiyah, Persis, and al-Irshad, the modernist organizations in the country, also claim to be Salafi. Their understanding on Salafism, however, much more reflects their encouragement to engage in *ijtihad*. Both the traditionalists and the modernists reject Wahhabism as a form of

Salafism. While overlapping in many aspects with these organizations, the newly emerging kind of Salafism I will discuss in this dissertation is highly distinct. It is oriented towards Saudi Wahhabism, and rarely accepts aspects of the religious diversity it encounters in other Islamic ideologies. Looking more closely, the traditionalist NU and Salafis have much in common, especially with respect to their inclination toward scholarly works on *hadith* and, to a lesser degree, *tafsir* and *fiqh*.⁶ With the exception of studies on philosophy, mysticism, and logic -- which the Salafis reject -- both groups read the same books and respect the same *ulama*. Claiming to be the guardians of traditional Islam, the traditionalists do not read the fruits of Wahhabi scholarship. In the same vein, Wahhabis reject the religious rituals associated with traditionalists such as visiting the graves as they believe these rituals to be *bid'ah*. The Wahhabis also reject mysticism and mystical brotherhoods.

After returning home in 1999 upon the completion of my MA at Leiden University, I worked at the Center of the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) and was involved in a number of democracy projects. The purpose of these projects was to discover whether Islam is compatible with democracy. Working as a researcher, I travelled around Indonesia and visited hundreds of Islamic schools belonging to many different Muslim groups, some of which belonged to the Salafis. When I explained the intention of my visit and the aims of the projects, most of them funded by Western

⁶ Salafis and traditionalist NU share the *al-kutub al-sittah* (the six canonical collections of *hadith*) which has become the main references for Sunni Muslims. These collections are *Shahih Bukhari*, *Shahih Muslim*, *Sunan Abu Dawud*, *Sunan al-Nasa'i*, *Sunan Attirmidzhi*, *Sunan Ibn Majah*. They also share the *al-Muwatta*, the collection of *hadith* by Malik ibn Anas. Salafis share many scholarly works on *fiqh* (Islamic law) and *tafsir* (interpretation, exegesis) based on authentic *hadith* such as *al-Umm* of al-Shafi'i (*fiqh*) and *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* (*tafsir*).

agencies, some Salafi groups became uneasy and even refused to be interviewed. In general, however, most Salafis I spoke with responded positively to the projects. Some of their reticence can be explained by the fact that various Salafi leaders were under intense investigation by the authorities after terrorist attacks had taken place in the country in 2001. Many of these leaders had even been arrested.

During my dissertation fieldwork and recollecting my research experience with Salafis when working for the PPIM, I assured myself that I would not repeat the same mistake. I approached Salafis via existing contacts and connections my institution and I had developed with them. The result was incredible. Although I had to explain that my dissertation project had nothing to do with the contra-terrorism campaign, or was in any way connected to the Indonesian Intelligence Agency (BIN), in general I was more than welcome. The secret lies in the fact that Salafis put great trust in personal endorsements and informal relations.

This project benefitted from the research I had conducted for the PPIM. From 2000 to 2005, the organization conducted annual surveys on Islam and democracy. In 2004, a project mapped out the Islamic organizations in Indonesia, including Salafi organizations that were often run by students who had previously studied in Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that the transmission of Salafism into Indonesia would not have been possible without their involvement. Furthermore, I used the archives of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (MORA), which facilitated exchange programs between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

Most of my research activities concentrated on three different sites: Yogyakarta

(Central Java), Makassar (South Sulawesi), and Jakarta and surroundings. These places have turned into major Salafi centers in Indonesia. In Yogyakarta, my fieldwork focused on Piyungan, Banguntapan, and Kaliurang for three months, from January to March 2011. I made several visits afterwards even for a short time. In Makassar, the research was focused on the headquarters of the Wahdah Islamiyah, the largest Salafi organization in the eastern part of Indonesia located in Jalan Antang Raya; and at the Institute for Islamic Studies and Arabic (STIBA, the Wahdah Islamiya's institute) located in the Manggala district. The part of my research in Makassar was carried out from April to June 2011. In Jakarta and environs, the research focused on the regions of Ciputat, Pasar Minggu, and Depok from July 2012 to February 2013. In addition, I conducted two weeks of fieldwork in Banda Aceh in April 2013, and one-week in Bandung, West Java.

Two main methods were used in the course of my fieldwork for this dissertation: in-depth interviewing and observation. I interviewed dozens of Salafi preachers, teachers, students, professionals, organizational officers, elders, and youths (all of them male). Due to the enforcement of gender segregation in these Salafi communities, female assistants carried out all the interviews that had to be conducted with women. In Yogya, two female research assistants helped me with interviewing fifteen Salafi women. Besides interviews, I also observed Salafi rituals and social practices. This helped me to discover that collective prayers, one of the Salafi practices, are related to the creation of collective identity. Likewise, hand-shaking, cheek-kissing, hugging, and other fleeting encounters between Salafi members reflect specific meanings, all related to the community identity-making process. Salafis use various expressions to maintain in-group feeling and

solidarity, for instance, they use the terms *akhi* (brother) and *ukhti* (sister) for their own members. Outsiders do not belong to these categories.

The Structure of the Dissertation

By providing a sociological background that outlines and highlights Salafism in Indonesia, I start in Chapter One with the “Introduction” that provides a general outline of the dissertation. The chapter also discusses the theoretical framework and the methodology I use and presents the structure of the dissertation.

Chapter Two is entitled: “An Overview of Indonesian Islam and Salafism.” This chapter provides the sociological and historical backgrounds of Indonesian Islam. It discusses the different Muslim groups in Indonesia and their understanding of Islam. The chapter further discusses the changing Indonesian social circumstances in the late 1990s and the political and social contexts that enabled Salafis to develop their knowledge.

Chapter Three is entitled: “Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism”. This chapter provides the wider sociological and political backgrounds that gave birth to Indonesian Salafi groups, which took their full shape after the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998. It discusses Saudi Arabian initiatives to promote an education system in Indonesia, and the roles of Islamic movements at home in Indonesia. The chapter specifically highlights Saudi Arabian-inspired Salafism, which is highly distinct from Salafi groups in Indonesia, and how this is related to the institutionalization of Indonesian Salafi groups. The chapter also describes how Salafi groups use charities to establish *madrassa* across the country.

Chapter Four is entitled “Through the Ma’had They Learned Sharia, then They Became ‘Salafis’”. This chapter discusses the reproduction of knowledge in Saudi Arabia-sponsored schools in Jakarta. It primarily focuses on the different historical and social backgrounds of the students, their socialization with other students and professors resulting in a diversity of knowledge. At the end of this chapter, I include two models of students who, having different understandings on Salafism, have shaped the further transformation of Salafism in Indonesia.

Chapter Five is entitled “Ritual, *Bid’ah*, and the Negotiation of the Public Sphere.” This chapter discusses the opposition to *bid’ah*, one of Salafism’s major principles, and how Salafis use it to extend their influence over other Muslim groups. It discusses the “logic” behind the prohibition of *bid’ah* and its relation to social practices. Having fixed rituals, Salafis are able to maintain a degree of spirituality that can easily be transformed into a profusion of social practices. The last part of this chapter discusses rituals among traditionalists and their impact on their social practices. Different from Salafis who are concerned with “authentication”, traditionalists capitalize on rituals and link them to larger social engagement.

Chapter Six is entitled “Reframing the Prophet’s Medicine in the Indonesian Competitive Market.” This chapter highlights various Islamic medicines and treatment practices Salafis reinvented as a result of their encounter with classical Islamic scholarship on medicine. Salafis revitalize Islamic medicine not only as a matter of faith, but also in response to the poor public health services in Indonesia. Salafis promote Islamic medicine to the public as an alternative for medication. Being rooted in the

tradition of the Prophet, Islamic medicine is combined with traditional medicine to attract consumers.

Chapter Seven is entitled “Marry a woman for her faith, otherwise your hands will be smeared with dust” and discusses the roles of women in Salafi communities. It specifically deals with issues ranging from matchmaking and marriage to mothering and raising children. It analyses how men and women share responsibilities and recognizes that although the division of labor between men and women is obvious, this does not mean that Salafi women cannot surpass their conventional obligations.

Chapter Eight is the Conclusion of the dissertation. It is about the diversity of Salafi knowledge.

Chapter Two - An Overview of Indonesian Islam and Salafism

Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, but it is not an Islamic state. Since the declaration of the country's independence on August 17, 1945, Indonesia has been committed to being a religiously pluralist country. In addition to the Muslim majority (87.18 %), Indonesia is also home to Protestants (6.98%), Roman Catholics (2.91%), Hindus (1.61%), Buddhists (0.72%), and adherents to Kong Hu Chu (0.05%).⁷ Although many local religions are still practiced around the country, the state only recognizes the six religions listed above. The principles of the Pancasila⁸ (Five Pillars) act as the moral and legal foundation of the state, which grants believers the religious freedom to practice their faiths. The Pancasila is the middle path which was made between Muslims and non-Muslim groups through a long confrontation during the state's formative period. It is a secular philosophy, but its first pillar states that "Belief in One Supreme God" (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) is an essential aspect of citizenship, expressing the importance of religion in Indonesia (Suryadinata 2000; Darmaputera 1988; Assyaukanie 2009).

While stressing the importance of civil liberties and freedom of expression, another document called the Piagam Jakarta (The Jakarta Charter) allowed for the

⁷ According to the Indonesian Statistics Bureau (BPS), the total number of the Indonesian population is 237.641.326 million, <http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1267>, accessed 20 January, 2013.

⁸ The Pancasila is the official philosophical foundation of the state of Indonesia. "Panca" means "five", and "sila" means "pillar" or "principle". The five pillars are as follows: (1) Believe in One Supreme God, (2) Just and civilized humanity, (3) The unity of Indonesia, (4) Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives, (5) Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

possibility of Muslim groups to enforce Islamic law among them. In addition to the Pancasila's first pillar "Belief in One Supreme God" there is the stipulation that says, "*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*" (with the obligation for Muslims to implement the Sharia for its adherents) (Anshari 1981). This stipulation, however, was subsequently dropped due to objection from Christians and national leaders—many of whom were Muslims, who argued that the constitution should not treat citizens based on their faith, but rather on equality before the law. During Soekarno's era (1945-1965), various Muslim factions in the Constituent Assembly stressed the importance of this document and demanded the government implement the Sharia for Muslims. This issue caused long political deadlock leading to Soekarno's dissolution of Parliament in 1959 (Ma'arif 1985; Feith 2006). In spite of this defeat, the idea of the Jakarta Charter remained strong among particular Muslim groups especially the modernists. During Soeharto's New Order era, due to ideological unification by imposing the Pancasila as the sole foundation for social and political organizations, the issue of the Piagam Jakarta became an intensely debated topic among Muslim activists (Fatwa 1999; Husaini 2005; Mujiburrahman 2006).

A breakthrough to end the controversy on the status of Islam in the nation-state was made by Nurcholish Madjid, one of the most renowned Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and the chairman of HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* – Indonesian Muslim Student Association). In 1970, Madjid eloquently said "Islam Yes, Islamic Parties No." He made this statement to attack senior Masyumi politicians, the largest Islamic party during the Soekarno era with which HMI was affiliated, who still struggled

for the installation of an Islamic state. The issue of the Piagam Jakarta reemerged when Soeharto stepped down from his presidency in 1998. The democratic political system which was put in place afterwards allows for the possibility of revisiting the Jakarta Charter. But again, the issue was unpopular among majority Muslim groups and only minority factions supported it in Parliament. The majority of Muslims continue to believe that the Pancasila, which does not stipulate any religious preference for its citizens, is the best model to sustain Indonesia's religious diversity (Hilmy 2010: 61-88; Latif 2006: 418).

Early Islam

Before the arrival of Islam in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and Christianity in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, Indonesia was the home of Hindus and Buddhists next to the practitioners of hundreds of indigenous religions (Geertz 1980; Hefner 1989). In the past, Hindus as well as Buddhists built great kingdoms throughout the region and the remains of this ancient heritage have survived until today. It is generally believed that conversion to Islam did not involve a military conquest (Ricklefs 2007: 1-7; Azra 2006: 1-25). Rather it occurred through adaptation and assimilation. Various Javanese literary works from the sixteenth century reveal that the Islamic teachings that were introduced among the local population were mixed with Hindu-Buddhist philosophical ideas. Some works even incorporated pantheistic and monistic ideas into their teachings (Zoetmulder 1995; Subardi 1967). Nevertheless, this fact demonstrates that, although part of the Javanese aristocracy had converted to Islam in the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, their concern with the ancient civilizations remained strong. They maintained a form of Islam that was embedded in highly mystical terms deemed appropriate for the continuation of their legacies (Ricklefs 2007).

Scholars generally agree that no intensive Islamization took place in Indonesia until the involvement of Muslim traders who dominated sea commerce -- stretching from China in the east to the Arabian Sea in the west -- from the fourteenth century until the advent of Western colonialism in the early seventeenth century (Reid 1993b). Before the coming of Islam, there had been Indian and Arab traders in the archipelago; they controlled the commerce of precious spices such as nutmeg, cloves, cinnamon, pepper, ginger, and many others. This remained so after they had converted to Islam. Muslim traders have contributed to the dissemination of Islam among the local populations particularly those in and around sea ports. They created settlements along the coastal areas, married local women and created the first Muslim communities in the archipelago. Historical evidence shows that there had been Muslim settlements in Java and Sumatra in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the development was even more rapid from the fourteenth century onwards (Candrasasmita 2009; Reid 1993b; Pijnappel 1972; Snouck Hurgronje 1924).

The settlement of Muslim traders in coastal areas attracted the rulers of the local principalities in the interior to enter into political alliances (Syam 2005). One by one these rulers converted to Islam and reaped the benefits of the maritime commerce. This development was very sensible considering the fact that the power center in the south, where a Hindu-Buddhist kingdom was established, went through a period of serious

decline due to succession issues and revolts. Another important aspect of this changing political configuration was that there was a continuation of the status quo. The transfer of power from the Hindu-Buddhist kings to Muslim rulers was relatively smooth due to the fact that the latter were in fact the descendants of the former. The Islamization of West Java in the fourteenth century, for instance, was made a great success due to the role of the descendants of Prabu Siliwangi, the last king of the Hindu Pajajaran kingdom (Sulendraningrat 1984). Likewise, the descendants of the Hindu Majapahit kingdom in East Java played a significant role in Islamizing Java's coastal areas. According to the *Babad Tanah Jawi*, one of the Javanese historical accounts that help scholars illuminate aspects of the spread of Islam in Java, Java's Muslim preachers (Ind. *Wali Songo*) and rulers who supported the Islamization in the interior parts of the island are believed to have been descendants of Majapahit rulers. By claiming their roots back to the Majapahit kingdom, they obtained legitimacy from their subjects enabling them to maintain their power (Ras 1987: 343-356; Wieringa 1999: 244-263).

According A.C. Milner, a noted British historian on Southeast Asia, the rapid and massive conversion to Islam in Java from the thirteenth century onward was made possible due to the concept of the "Indic state" in the archipelago (Milner 1981: 46-70; Burhanudin 2007). According to this concept, the raja or king plays a pivotal role (raja-centric). The role of the king was not merely limited to the function of sustaining social and political order, but he also had to perform public rituals. Assisted by the highest priests, the kings performed public rituals such as offerings to the sea or to the mountains, and behind them their subjects joined these rituals (Geertz 1980). It was the king who

performed the rituals to start the planting season, harvest, disaster eviction, et cetera and thus, when the kings converted to Islam, their subjects would voluntarily do the same thing as otherwise public rituals could not be held. Another consequence of the royal involvement in the conversion process was that the knowledge from earlier traditions was preserved for the survival of the kingdom and its entire population. This knowledge was incorporated within the knowledge taken from the Islamic tradition. It is this syncretic character which characterized Islam in Java in its early periods (Ricklefs, 2006).

Outside Java, the Islamization process took different patterns. It is believed that the form of Islam as promulgated on Sumatra's coastal areas was heavily influenced by Sufism. The first place that needs to be mentioned is Aceh, located at the extreme tip of North Sumatra. Aceh is believed to be the first place to have received Islam in the archipelago. The local population converted to Islam roughly around the eleventh to twelfth centuries. There were some kingdoms in the area, among others, Samudra Pasai (established in 1267) and Aceh Darussalam (established in 1511). Since the beginning, both kingdoms were committed to a more orthodox form of Islam. Muslim traveler Ibn Battuta, who visited Samudra Pasai in 1345, reported that the local population had embraced the Shafi'i *madhhab*, and that the ruler was a pious Muslim who practiced Islam with great zeal (Laffan 2009: 17-49). Meanwhile Aceh Darussalam was one of the greatest Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago and it created an Islamic imperium together with Mughal India, and Ottoman Turkey. Islamic institutions such as *qadhi* and *Sheikh al-Islam* were established, and Islamic doctrines had been incorporated into a set of references by which *qadhi* made their decisions over family matters. A more Sufi form of

Islam had been introduced in Aceh, despite controversies between the followers of Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1590) and those of Nur al-Din al-Raniri (d. 1658) (Hadi 1999).

The role of Sufi preachers was also prominent in Minangkabau, West Sumatra. Some studies found that followers of the Tarekat Shattariyya played an important role in introducing Islam to the region (Azra 2005). It is relevant to note that one of the features of the Shattariyya order is its ability to absorb local elements enabling it to further develop into mutual co-existence with local cultures (Katkova 2008). Later studies found that the *Wahdat al-Wujud* (the Union of Being) doctrine, which had become part of the Shattariyya doctrine, was promulgated by, among others, Muslim mystic Ibrahim al-Kurani (1616-1690) and that it shaped Islamic discourses within the local Muslim populations (Fathurahman 2003; 2012). It is relevant to note that the *Wahdat al-Wujud* doctrine has been very prominent and contributed to and shaped the Islamic discourse in Southeast Asia and the Indonesian-Malay world. According to Azyumardi Azra, one of the most noted Muslim scholars and expert on modern Islamic history, this form of Sufism was highly orthodox as it combined the speculative mystical doctrines of the *Martabat Tujuh* (The Seven Grades of Being) and the injunctions of the Sharia (Azra 2005). This fact gave birth to neo-Sufism, a form of Sufism which encourages, totally different from heterodox Sufism which tends to fatalism and discourages the Sharia, social and political activism and mystical-Sharia piety. The influence of neo-Sufism can be seen in the further Islamic movements in the regions which inspired a number of Muslim scholars, among others, Abd al-Shamad al-Palimbani (1704-1792) who composed a text on the virtues of jihad, roughly glossed as “holy war,” against the Dutch

colonialists. Along the regions, the followers of this brotherhood established lodges and Sufi *zawiya* (Eng. hut) linking the coastal areas and the interior part of the Minangkabau which still practiced their custom (Ind. *adat*). Furthermore, the order also created intellectual networks linking the Indonesian-Malay world with the Indian Sub-continent and the Middle East (Azra 2005, Fathurahman, 2012). This form of Islam remained so until the eighteenth century when the Padri movements brought a form of revivalist Islam to the regions (Abdullah 1971; Dobbin 1974; Hadler 2008).

A more Sufi Islam was also promulgated in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Peripatetic Muslim scholars from Aceh, Minangkabau, South Kalimantan, Java, and the Malay Peninsula, many of them Sufis, travelled to Makassar as one of the greatest ports in the Eastern part of the archipelago, and they contributed to the introduction and conversion of local populations to Islam. Local rulers reportedly provided shelters and funds for scholars to stay even longer in the area to teach Islam to the local population. Although Islam had come to Makassar since the fourteenth century, the local Muslim population reportedly still practiced a variety of indigenous rituals. However, the regular arrival of Sufi preachers into the region gradually contributed to the development of Islamic discourses with a more Sufi character and the Muslim population became more orthodox. To maintain orthodoxy and sustain the legitimacy of their power, local rulers incorporated Islamic doctrines, although limited to family matters, into their political organizations. *Khatib* (preachers), *imam* (prayer leaders), and *qadhi* were appointed and they were part of state's apparatus (Azra 2004: 87-88).

Roughly in the early part of the seventeenth century, a form of orthodox Islam

gained firmer roots in the region, and this period saw the rise of one of the greatest Muslim scholars in the region who, during his career, developed into a renowned international figure. He was Muhammad Yusuf ibn Abdullah al-Maqassari (b. 1627), a great Muslim mystic who introduced the Khalwatiyya order into the Indonesian-Malay world. The popularity of al-Maqassari goes beyond his native region as he, during his lifetime, travelled around the world to seek knowledge and to disseminate his order. Returning from his study in the Middle East to his hometown, al-Maqassari found that the local population did not abide by the Sharia. Gambling, cock-fighting, drinking arrack (a distilled alcoholic drink primarily produced in Southeast Asia and South Asia), and smoking opium were widely practiced while superstitious beliefs and indigenous rituals had been preserved (Azra 2004: 94). Al-Maqassari petitioned to the local rulers to abolish these kinds of practices, but they failed to do so. This fact eventually made him travel to Banten, an Islamic kingdom on the Western tip of Java, where he had close relation with its rulers. It was this Islamic kingdom that represented the last powerful trading power in the archipelago (Ibid, 95). As Azra noted (2004), al-Maqassari was a neo-Sufi. He combined the principles of Sufism and the injunctions of the Sharia. Very much like al-Palimbani, he urged Muslim people to wage jihad against the Dutch colonizers. Together with Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa (1631-1695), the ruler of Banten, al-Maqassari opposed the Dutch domination which monopolized the spice trade. In 1682, he was arrested by the Dutch and exiled to Ceylon. He was later moved to Cape Town, South Africa where he died in 1692 (Ibid, 97). It is clear that a more orthodox Islam had gained firmer roots in the archipelago at least since the sixteenth century and that Islam had become an

important part of the cultural identities of the Muslim populations in the archipelago. But this fact seems to be lacking in the perspectives of some Western observers who hold the view that Islam was a marginal factor; and that it was no more than a thin veneer, which could easily wear off because of the wave of modernization (Van Leur, 1955, Geertz 1976). Azyumardi Azra recently criticized these perspectives and he calls them “the mythologizing of Indonesian Islam” (Azra 2005). While Indonesia is located relatively far away from the heartland of Islam in the Middle East, connections with the great tradition have been made since the first day Islam arrived in the archipelago and over time, Indonesian students regularly made their way to Mecca and Medina (Azra 2004; Basri 2008). These students were called *Ashab al-Jawiyyin* (Friends of Java), a term referring to a group of students who came from Indonesia and the Malay world. Upon their return, they served as the harbingers of knowledge on the faith the preservation and continuation of the little tradition.

Education

Intensive contacts between the archipelago and the centers of Islamic learning in Mecca and Medina did not begin until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. All over history, a group of people from the archipelago had studied in these holy cities. Returning home, they became religious scholars (*ulama*) and they introduced Islam to the local populations. It is believed that *pesantren* were the prototypes of Islamic education institutions in the archipelago. In different regions they carry other names (in Java and Madura *pesantren*, in Aceh *dayah*, Minangkabau *surau*, Patani *pondok*) (Yasmadi 2002;

Madmarn 2002). According to some sources, the origins of *pesantren* can be traced back to the *kuttab* institution in the Middle East where a group of students were lodged and studied under a *sheikh* (Madjid, 1997: x-xii). The word *pondok*, frequently added to *pesantren* (*pondok pesantren*), is taken from the Arabic *funduq*, meaning lodges or inn. Other sources assert that the word *santri* is taken from Sanskrit *shastri* meaning disciples referring to students studying Vedanta scriptures under the auspices of Brahman priests (Pohl 2009:96-99). According to Zamakhsyari Dhofier, one of the most noted Indonesian anthropologists, before the establishment of *pesantren*, students were lodged in huts located around the house of a *kyai* (Javanese term for Muslim scholar) (Dhofier 1999: 45). Along with the growing number of students, a permanent building for students was erected. The main elements of *pesantren*, besides *kyai* and *santri*, are books containing classical Islamic scholarship called *kitab kuning* (yellow books because printed on yellow paper). Being followers of the Shafi'i *madhhab*, the books taught in the archipelagos are of the Shafi'i school. *Pesantren* are very concerned with teaching *fiqh* (Islamic laws) to its students as *fiqh* is related to the everyday needs of every Muslims (Van Bruinessen 1995; Dhofier 1999; Ibrahim *et al.* 1985; Burhanudin 2002).

The rapid growth of *pesantren* did not take place until the mid-nineteenth century (Van Bruinessen 1994b). Intensive dialogue with other parts of the Muslim world, the rise of Islamic reformism in Arabia, and the deep encroachment of Western colonialism spurred the institutionalization of *pesantren* (Ibid, 121-145). Furthermore, the emergence of wealthy Muslim merchants who linked Indonesian Islam and Islamic reform in the Middle East made *pesantren* even more important. Many wealthy merchants went to

Mecca to perform the hajj and to study. Returning home they established *pesantren* to promote Islam among the Muslim population who still practiced local rituals. In this period, a further process of Islamization began to take shape. As a result of this, from 1875 onwards, tension between Sharia-minded Muslims called *santri* and syncretic Javanese called *abangan* was inevitable (Ricklefs, 2007: 30-104). As Islamic elements began to crystallize in social life, the distinction between *abangan* and *putihan* began to emerge and self-identification became more apparent than ever before. This was exacerbated by the politics the Dutch adopted, which were not in favor of Islam (Ricklefs 2014: 1-104).

In modern Indonesian history, *pesantren* play crucial roles. They function as institutions to standardize and systematize Islamic doctrines. As Martin van Bruinessen argues, a Dutch scholar who makes extensive research on Indonesian Islam, the roles of *pesantren* are extremely important as they transmit and guard traditional Islam in Indonesia (Van Bruinessen 1994b; Lukens-Bull 2001; Hefner 2009). A body of Islamic knowledge was systematically put into practice by the *ulama*; *khatib*, *imam*, and local Qur'anic teachers introduced Islam more profoundly to the local communities, while *santri* learned Islam under authoritative religious figures. Shafi'i scholarly works, particularly those pertaining to *fiqh*, and the works of *aqidah* of the Ash'arite *madhhab* were taught. *Tafsir* (exegesis), *tasawwuf* (Sufism), and *nahwu* (Arabic grammar) were also taught. This process is called "recentering Islam" (Hefner 2009: 16). Muslims no longer build their piety based on rites of the passage, but on the Sharia. As a result, mosques were erected across villages and more regular Friday congregations were held

(Hefner, 1989: 241-247).

In the early twentieth century, Indonesia experienced a revival of Islamic education. Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, the development of Islamic education in Indonesia is the most dynamic one (Hefner 2007: 25). This is due to the fact that some modernist Muslim organizations in the country considered modern education the most important item on their agenda. Apart from *pesantren*, which had become the bastions of traditionalist Islam, modernist Muslim groups initiated a mass-based school system for generations of young Muslims. The most important feature of these new schools is that they use Western education methods. It uses a curriculum, a grade system, and modern discipline. Students are required to wear ties and trousers replacing sarong and caps. Furthermore, unlike *pesantren* which only provided instruction in religious sciences, the new schooling system provides religious as well as “secular” sciences. Mathematics, geography, and music are now taught to the students, besides Qur’anic sciences. The background of the establishment of modern Islamic education is political. The Dutch only provided education for children of the native nobilities who worked for the colonial administration in the expectation that they could be recruited as new future bureaucrats. Apart from the Dutch policy on education, the rise of modern Islamic education was also influenced by Islamic modernist movements. One of the items on the agenda of Islamic modernism is that it promotes education for the young Muslim generations, while they are also equipped with modern sciences (Noer 1973; Saleh 2001).

The Muhammadiyah is credited as the pioneer of modern Islamic education in Indonesia. It was established in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan, a Muslim scholar who had

studied in Mecca for a long period and who admired the Islamic modernism of Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's Pan Islamism. With this in background, he Muhammadiyah is committed to purifying religious practices and improving Islamic education (Peacock 1978; Saleh 2001; Noer 1973; Nakamura 2012). Between 1913 and 1918, it built five schools in its hometown Yogyakarta, and in 1925 it had 55 schools over major cities in Java and Sumatra. This organization does not only provide education for boys, but also for girls. Women's schools which offer education as well as vocational training were established across the country. Unlike the Nahdhatul *Ulama*, which had once been involved in politics (1952-1984), the Muhammadiyah has never been involved in politics. The Muhammadiyah quickly developed in Minangkabau, one of the regions in Sumatra that experienced Islamic revivalism since the late eighteenth century. Besides education, it is also active in improving public health institutions. Nowadays, it has the largest educational institutions in Indonesia.

Salafism and Wahhabism

The origin of Salafism can be traced back to the ideas of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855). He is the founder of the Hanbali *madhhab*, which supports the supremacy of *hadith* as a method of legal thinking (Abdal Haqq 2006: 28-29). Ibn Hanbali lived at a time when Muslim intellectuals were engaging other Muslim intellectuals who were reading and commenting on Greek works that had been preserved and in many cases rewritten by Muslim scholars. The study of philosophy and the employment of logic had been extremely pervasive and had influenced a group of rational Muslim theologians called the

Mu'tazili. Under the influence of Mu'tazili theologians, Caliph al-Ma'mun (786-833) of the Abbasid dynasty applied a policy through which he inspected and punished state officials who did not comply with the Mu'tazili view that the Qur'an was created. This policy is called *al-Mihna*.⁹ Ahmad ibn Hanbal was arrested because he opposed this view. He believed that the Mu'tazili view runs counter to Islamic doctrine, which stipulates the eternity of the Qur'an as it is the word of God. Despite this arrest, Ibn Hanbal did not oppose the Caliph, nor did he urge his followers to revolt against the Caliph. Ibn Hanbal's submission to and compliance with the rulers gave rise to the doctrine of "total obedience" and the obligation to advise the ruler (Haykel 2009: 33-51).

In a later development, Ibn Hanbali's ideas inspired Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), one of the most noted medieval Muslim scholars and a Salafi thinker. He lived in a period when the Muslim world experienced a serious decline as a result of the Mongol invasion, which destroyed many aspects of Muslim civilizations. Living under such a condition, Ibn Taymiyya felt that Islam was surrounded by alien influences which sought to destroy it by sneaking around and poisoning Muslim's minds. Ibn Taymiyya had a wide range of intellectual enemies, not only the philosophers, but also unionist Sufis, and the Shiites. He was a great polemist and he was against any ideology that contravened what he thought to be Sunni orthodoxy (Leaman 1995: 123-124). It is relevant to note that he lived after two great Muslim scholars who shaped the Islamic intellectual trajectories: Ibn Sina (980-1037) and Al-Ghazali (1058-1111). While the former introduced Aristotelian

⁹ *Al-Mihna* is an inquisitorial method by which the state inspects and punishes the faith of the believers. See Walter M. Patton, *Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Mihna* (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1897).

philosophy and neo-Platonic mysticism into the Muslim world, the latter used logic as a method of thinking and legal reasoning. Both, Ibn Taymiyya believed, were against the theological and ethical foundations of Islam as they reduced the sanctities of the texts to speculative enterprises. To this end, he composed a treaty in which he totally rejected Greek logic (Hallaq 1993). So if logic was overthrown, all the intellectual disciplines stemming from it such as Ibn Sina's *hikmah* (Ar. gnosis) and Al-Ghazali's *mantiq* (Ar. logics) thus could also be invalidated. In the field of philosophy and theology (Ar. *kalam*), Ibn Taymiyya produced a great work which remains influential until today. He argued that philosophy and theology can be used to defend orthodoxy as long as they are used in conjunction with the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Madjid 1985). Relying on the texts, his successors regarded him as one of the founders of Salafi teachings.

Reformism and Revivalism

In the modern period, there are two different streams of Salafism. The first takes the form of Islamic reformism, and the second that of Islamic revivalism. Many scholars seem to use both terms interchangeably as if there is no difference between the various Islamic ideologies ranging from puritanism, political activism, to global jihadism (Osella and Osella 2008: 247-257; Lapidus 1983; Nasr 1996; Hegghammer 2010, Metcalf 1982). While both terms refer to ideas of re-ordering the Muslim community into Islamic orthodoxy by employing the authoritative Islamic sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah, purifying religious practices from all forms of religious innovation, and upholding the purest form of *tawhid*, both terms serve different purposes. The main agenda of reformist

Muslims is to put Islam compatible with modernity through long civilizational dialogues and peaceful processes. They are concerned with the agenda of how Muslims are able to create modern institutions. Like modern Westerners, Muslims should be able to have good schools, public health institutions, and economic systems without losing their moral grounds or their philosophical foundations. Conversely, revivalist Muslims are concerned with turning Islam into a political identity, an ideology, by which they live and create clear boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. Furthermore, some revivalist Muslims want to seize the power from the hands of secular regimes, be they democratic or authoritarian. In the modern period, both terms have ideological dimensions but both groups use different methods, approaches, and strategies. With this in mind, Islamic reformism overlaps, or meets, Islamic modernism, while Islamic revivalism meets with Islamic fundamentalism (Roy 1996). Ira M. Lapidus, a noted scholar on Islamic history, aptly wrote that Islamic reformism is a response to modernity, while Islamic revivalism is a response against modernity (Lapidus 1997: 444-460).

The ideas of two Egyptian reformers Muhammad Abduh¹⁰ and Rashid Ridha¹¹ can be regarded as the prototypes of Islamic reformism as both called for the need of reforming Islam, while encouraging *ijtihad*. This movement was a response to prevailing conditions in the Islamic world, which was experiencing a period of a stagnant intellectual discourse as a result of the conservative religious establishment as well as

¹⁰ Muhammad Abduh (1845-1905) wrote several works including, *Risalah al-Tawhid* (The Book of Tawhid), *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* (The Firmest Bond), and *al-Manar* (The Light House).

¹¹ Muhammad Rashid Ridha (1865-1935) continued the publication of *al-Manar* after Abduh's death in 1905. *Al-Manar* is a collection of religious *fatawa* based on questions coming from different parts of the Muslim world. It consists of 12 volumes.

because of the stifling effects of Western colonialism and imperialism. During this period, it was claimed that the gate of *ijtihad* was closed, and that it was sufficient for Muslim believers to engage in *taqlid* (acceptance or submission to authority, loosely glossed as “blindly imitate”) the opinions of earlier *ulama* as embodied in the traditions of their *madhhab*. Abduh and Ridha’s ideas have inspired Islamic reforms in many parts of the Muslim world. In Indonesia, this can be seen in the Islamic organizations Muhammadiyah and Persis, the two main modernist Muslim groups, established in 1912 and 1923 respectively, which had been influenced by their ideas (Saleh 2001: 105-195, Eliraz 2004; Noer 1973). While supporting *ijtihad*, these two modernist thinkers urged Muslims to embrace Western culture and civilization particularly modern education and modern institutions. Abduh published his ideas through *al-Urwah al-Wuthqa* (The Firmest Bond), a journal that reached an extensive readership all over the Muslim world.¹² His colleague and pupil, Ridha continued this reform, albeit with a strong revivalist outlook (Abushouk 2007: 301-322).

This form of Islamic revivalism can be found in the teachings of the 18th century Arabian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). He was a charismatic *ulama* from the rural area of Nejd who had to witness that the everyday life of the Muslim community was enmeshed with local practices such saint-veneration and shamanism (Al-Rasheed 2002: 1-38). Given this fact, he was harshly opposed to any form of religious innovation.

¹² *Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* was edited in Paris by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh and published between March and October 1884. After eighteen issues had appeared, it ceased publication in 1884, probably owing to financial problems. The magazine was distributed free of charge leading to its enormous influence across the Muslim world, calling upon Muslim to unite against Western colonialism and imperialism.

Unlike Abduh who had extensive contacts with Western civilization, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had never been in touch with any civilization other than rural Arabian culture. He wrote a number of scholarly works, which mainly focus on *aqidah* and *fiqh*. His Magnus Opus is *Kitab al-Tawhid* (The Book of *Tawhid*), which is a collection of all of his teachings and has become the most important reference for the Salafi groups all over the world. He urged his followers not to offer any lenience to the practices of polytheism (Ar. *shirk*) and *bid'ah*. Due to this imperative his followers reportedly destroyed religious shrines and mystic lodges found across the country that belonged to various mystical brotherhood (Al-Rasheed 2007: 22-58).

Saudi Arabia claims to be an Islamic state, and Islam in the form of Wahhabism is the religion of the state (Abouhaseira 1998; Al-Yassini 1982; Al-Rasheed 2007; Yamani 2004). It shapes state policies, and serving as society's moral code. Given that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, it enforces the Sharia as its official law. This law is primarily based on the collection of *fatwa* from the Hanbali school of thought, which has become Wahhabism's main source, although other Sunni groups, and, to a lesser degree, Shiites and Sufi mystics, are also found in the country (Yamani 2004: 1-20). In return to their contribution during the formation of the Saudi state, the Wahhabi *ulama* became state notables endowed with total authority to interpret Islam for the Muslim community. Despite there are non-official *ulama* who distant themselves from the state, their positions are peripheral. The current Saudi religious establishment is dominated by the Nejd family, the descendants of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Al-Rasheed 2007: 28). There is a strong connection between the institutions of the *ulama* and the state. Wahhabism has

become the hegemonic discourse in Saudi Arabia, which hardly ever accepts religious diversity. It claims to monopolize “religious interpretation or the legitimacy of the political power it supports” (Al-Rasheed 2007: 5).

Frank Vogel, a scholar on Islamic law especially finance and other contemporary application, has a different understanding of the reproduction of religious discourse in Saudi Arabia (Vogel 2000). He has done extensive research on the Saudi legal system, which, he believes, still provides ample room for religious diversity as Muslim jurists are encouraged to exert *ijtihad*. While it is true that Saudi gives sustenance to the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, in reality it provides room for its judges to use their discretions not only based on the Hanbali *madhhab*, to which most of the Saudis adhere, but also to other Sunni *madhhabs*, as long as these differences follow the injunctions of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. *Ijtihad* is made possible by a huge collection of legal opinions of earlier Hanbali *ulama*. It is also possible that judges base their decisions on other Sunni traditions as long as their judgments are founded on the authoritative texts. Having said this, Vogel argues that, quite contrary to existing presumptions on Wahhabism, Wahhabi *ulama* still enjoy a great deal of religious freedom (Vogel 2000: 3-168).

Vogel’s argument is problematic, however. First, the Sharia, or more precisely Hanbali-Wahhabi based *fiqh*, which offers a great deal of flexibility, has been subjected to the preferences of the religious establishment and the rulers. This is so given the fact that most, if not all, religious functionaries such as *mufti*, *qadhi*, and *imam*, as I argued earlier, are dominated by Wahhabi *ulama*. Second, given the fact that the Sharia is only

binding to Muslim believers, its enforcement upon non-Muslims is unacceptable. The neutrality of the state is required in the sense that it does not take the side of the interests of one particular religious group. In this context, it is relevant to look at An-Na'im's argument on the importance of the secular state. He witnessed how the state, through its religious establishment, imposes a particular interpretation of the Sharia, which leads to its abusive enforcement. As a result, he argues, a secular state is needed, which is neutral in character, a state "which does not claim or pretend to enforce the Shari'a". This is because the Sharia is a set of norms, that "cannot be coerced by fear of state institutions or faked to appease their officials." (An-Na'im 2007: 1).

The infusion of the Sharia and the Saudi political system has been indeed problematic. On the one hand, the state seeks to modernize society and accommodate the interests of the religious establishment. On the other hand, the *ulama* seek to exert their authority by influencing public policy. This leads to an ambivalent relationship between the state and the religious establishment. Two episodes taken from contemporary Saudi history clearly reflect this problem. In the late 1950s, Crown Prince Faisal established Al-Hanan, a school for girls in Jeddah. Many of the royal families sent their daughters to this school. Unlike other schools, Al-Hanan was different. It was modern, used novel teaching methods, had a teaching staff with a modern outlook, and taught subject matters combining religious and secular sciences. Soon afterwards, the *ulama* as well as the ordinary population, turned against the modernization of women's education. The reason was that such a reform would clearly invite the risk of leading to *fitnah* (revolt, disturbance). Nevertheless, Crown Prince Faisal insisted on this reform by establishing

the General Presidency for Education for Girls in 1960. It was the institution responsible for establishing and regulating girls' education and many royal family members who had previously been educated in the West were said to have supported this institution. Not all *ulama*, of course, were against the modernization of education for women. The fact that Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, a moderate *alim* supervised this institution, is interesting and demonstrates that the *ulama* institution was not monolithic. This being so, opposition under the leadership of conservative *ulama* remained pervasive, and the extent to which ordinary people were ready to resort to violence was remarkable. This episode demonstrates that the *ulama*, who claimed to be the guardians of religious orthodoxy, were vehemently opposed to reform (Al-Hefdhy 1994: 13-90).

Contrary to what Crown Prince Faisal had done, in the early 1980s, King Fahd created a policy in which he pushed the *ulama* into lending their even more serious support to his legitimacy. Following the short-lived seizure of the Grand Mosque by extremists in 1979, King Fahd adopted a number of policies that may best be described as belonging to "accommodative politics". He did so to demonstrate that the state remained consistent with Islamic ideals. In doing so, he sought Islamic legitimacy by changing his title from "His Majesty," to *Khadim al-Haramain al-Sharifain* (Custodian of the Holy Cities). This was followed by his insistence to tighten up public polices and social life. Gender segregation became more profound, and the *mutawwa* (Sharia police) were given more leeway to inspect and arrest those people who did not comply with state regulations (Okruhlik 2005: 189-212). The King also proposed major reforms in the Saudi educational system. New campuses and world-class universities were built across the

country, more scholarship was provided to students especially for those mastering Islamic studies, religious sites were refurbished and renovated, and an exchange program with Muslim countries - including Indonesia - was set up. All these things were created to bolster the image that Saudi Arabia is the center of Islamic learning. As a result, conservative *ulama* took full advantage of this policy as they were appointed as grand *mufti* and university professors at home as well as abroad and this policy revived the authority of the Wahhabi religious establishment.

The Fragmentation of Salafism

Since the 1960s, Saudi Arabia has attempted to become the center of learning for Sunni Muslims. As I argued earlier, during and in the aftermath of the formation of the Saudi state, traditional Islamic scholarship that belonged to other Sunni sects had gradually been obliterated leading to the absence of legitimate scholarship at home. To address this absence, the Saudi government, together with its *ulama*, installed a new kind of scholarship that supported Wahhabi-Salafi traditions. Shaikh Abdullah ibn Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz (1910-1999), who subsequently became the most important Salafi scholar and the Saudi grand *mufti*, was the architect of this project. He invited Muslim scholars, among others, Shaikh Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914-1999) to Saudi to teach at the Islamic University of Medina. Although al-Albani taught there for only a short period, he nevertheless laid down the foundations for the development of the Salafi teachings. He has been credited for revitalizing the science of *hadith* leading him to be entitled *al-muhaddith al-qarni* (the *hadith* scholar of the century). As may be seen from his family

name, he hailed from an Albanian background. In 1923, he was nine-year old when his family left the country following the collapsing of the Ottoman Empire and moved to Syria. Coming from a Hanafi-practicing family background, young al-Albani was deeply immersed in the study of *hadith*. His intellectual journey further brought him into Egyptian reformist camps, which resulted in his hostility to popular Islam and mysticism. In 1961, Bin Baz invited him to teach at the Islamic University of Medina. His criticism of the Saudi enforcement of women's veiling led him to an enduring conflict with other *ulama*, resulting to his departure in 1963 (Lacroix 2009: 58-80).

What is important here is that al-Albani urged the application of the traditional methods, called *ilm al-jarh wa ta'dil* (the science of critique and fair evaluation), to all existing *hadith* including those included in the two canonical works by al-Bukhari and Muslim, many of which he considered as weak.¹³ For Al-Albani, the application of *hadith* in religious matters, which is at the apex of religious science and devoid of any logical reasoning, was more fundamental than any inclination of regardless what religious denomination. His idea was to criticize the Saudi religious orientation, which, he believed, too fanatically remained based on the Hanbali tradition on *fiqh*, as well as their inclination to lend their ears to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings on *aqidah*. Al-Albani inevitably revolutionized the Salafi religious perspectives and he inspired religious entrepreneurs to challenge the establishment of the traditional Wahhabi *ulama* who enjoyed a great deal of privilege from the government (Ibid). Being a neo-*ahl al-*

¹³ *Al-jarh wa al-ta'dil* is a method of evaluation *hadith* scholars developed *hadith* to determine the quality of a *hadith* by looking at the reliability of its transmitter (*sanad*). This science is also called *ilm al-rijal al-hadith* (the science of the *hadith* transmitter).

hadith scholar, he was in a detrimental position against the Muslim Brotherhood political camps which frequently succumbed to cheap political ends by violating the doctrine of obedience to the rulers.¹⁴

From the late 1960s onwards, in support of the solidarity of the *ummah* (Muslim community), Saudi Arabia became the shelter for Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) activists who experienced oppression and persecution from Middle Eastern and North African authorities (Hegghammer and Lacroix 2007: 103-122). Their presence inevitably had a profound impact on the reproduction of the Saudi Islamic discourse in general and that of Salafism in particular. The encounter of Salafism and Ikhwanul Muslimin ideology is one of the most defining moments in the development of Salafism. This is because the latter provides political elements to the former. Since this encounter, Salafi scholarship has been filled up with Ikhwan borrowings. One of these borrowings is the formulation of Salafism as an all-encompassing system as reflected in the concept of the *manhaj* Salafi.¹⁵ The Ikhwan developed the theory of the *manhaj* by abstracting it

¹⁴ The Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) was founded in 1928 by the Egyptian scholar and school teacher Hassan al-Banna. It is a Pan-Islamic, social-religious organization. Its ultimate goal is to create the Muslim *ummah* based on Islamic principles.

¹⁵ *Manhaj* means principle, method, or path. *Salafi manhaj* is the principal teachings of Salafism, which consists of three major aspects: (1) the strict employment of the *hadith*; (2) the denouncement of *qiyas*; and (3) the rejection of formal and informal politics. With the *salafi manhaj*, the Salafis denounce anthropomorphism (*mujassimah*), rational philosophy (*mu'tazila*), mysticism and Sufism, the Shiites, and the Ahmadi. The concept of *salafi manhaj* is highly ambivalent. On the one hand, Salafis claim to denounce politics. On the other, they engage in political movements. Adhering to the doctrine of *al-wala' wa-l bara'* (obedience and disavowal), reinvented by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), Salafis are highly political as they restore their identities and create a sharp division with non-Salafis. An extension of this doctrine is found in the doctrine of *al-hijrah wa-l al-takfir* (migration and excommunication). With this doctrine, Salafis isolate themselves from the outside world and they live in separate enclaves and believe that the outside world is unholy. Both doctrines are believed to have contributed to religious

from the life of the Prophet Muhammad called *fiqh sirah* (the proper understanding on the life of the Prophet Muhammad).¹⁶ *Fiqh sirah* concerns the gradual steps in the formation of the Muslim *ummah*. In great detail, it explains the processes of the way the *ummah* is to be created. It starts with the strategies and techniques the *ummah* should use to survive and to grow from a tiny minority group to a significant majority, from the *hijrah* (migration) to capture power, establish a state, and create a global *ummah*. As a result, Salafism has become highly politicized leading to political activism in the late 1970s.

Apart from the Ikhwan's ideology, contemporary Saudi political activism was related to the Saudi past as well as to its uneven economic development. In the 1960s, there emerged the Sahwa (The Awakening), a blend of religious puritanism and political activism. Sahwa membership was dominated by puritan students hailing from the nomadic and marginal Saudi population (Hegghammer 2010; Hegghammer and Lacroix 2007; Al-Rasheed 2007). They took very punitive actions against the practice of *bid'ah* within the Saudi communities as well as critical of the government for having deviated from Islamic principles. Furthermore, many Sahwa members were descendants of Ikhwan

extremism and global jihadism. See Jose Wagemakers. 2009. "The Transformation of the Radical Concept *al-Wala' wa-l Bara'* in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi" in Roel Meijer (ed.), *Global Salafism, Islam's New Religious Movement*. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishing Ltd.

¹⁶ The Salafis did not use the term '*manhaj*' until recently as a result of their encounter with the Ikhwan. Several Ikhwan-turned-Salafis authored important works on *fiqh sirah*, from which the '*manhaj*' as a method was developed. See Munir Muhammad al-Ghadban *Al-Manhaj al-Haraki li al-Sirah al-Nabawiyah* (The Path of the Movement on the Life of the Prophet Muhammad) (Jordan: Maktabah al-Manar, 1997); Muhammad Said Ramadhan al-Buthi, *Salafiyah Marhalah Zamaniyah Mubarakah La Madhhab al-Islami*. Damascus: Darul Fikri, 1978).

rebellious groups, who revolted against the government in the 1920.¹⁷ One of its members was Juhaiman al-Utaibi, who led the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. The Juhaiman rebellion could be easily oppressed, but it clearly showed that the regime was highly vulnerable.

In the post-Grand Mosque seizure, Saudi Arabia experienced tremendous political and social problems at home as well as abroad. At home, it faced civic coalition movements that demanded wider political participation and civil rights as well as Salafi activists who criticized the regime for having succumbed to Western hegemony. Abroad it was forced to back up Iraq in the West's confrontation against Iran which sought to extend the West's political influence. Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait and the stationing of U.S. military troops on Saudi Arabian territory complicated problems at home.

Gulf Wars I and II had a major impact on the fragmentation of Salafi-inspired activist groups (Hegghammer 2010; Al-Rasheed 2008: 199-220, Meijer 2009). It also led to a deep divide between senior and junior Salafi scholars (Hasan 2006: 80-83; Wahid 2013: 35-44). The senior scholars, particularly the Saudi state *ulama* such as the grand *mufti* Shaikh Bin Baz, fully supported the stationing of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia territory in order to prevent greater damage that might result from Saddam

¹⁷ Having no relation to Egypt's Ikhwanul Muslimin, the Saudi Ikhwan largely consist of former Saudi soldiers who participated in Abdul Aziz's military expansion. They wanted to expand their territory in order to establish a new Islamic caliphate. Ibn Saudi did not support the Ikhwan's idea as it could challenge the British presence in the neighboring countries. The Ikhwan revolt could easily be oppressed but its remnants remained to be seen in further Saudi political dissents. See Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The History of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited," *International Journal for Middle East Studies*, No. 39 (2007), pp. 103-122.

Hussein's occupation. Younger Salafi scholars such as Muhammad Surur Zayn al-Abidin (b. 1938) combining Ikhwan-Qutbism with a Salafi-Wahhabi religious orientation, were deeply disappointed with the impotency of the Muslim regimes against Western domination. To create a new form of Islamic activism while plagued by mainstream Salafi quietism, al-Abidin established *al-salafiyyun* (the Salafis), or *al-sururiyyun* (the Sururis) as their foes called it, a group largely consisting of Ikhwanul Muslimin activists and al-Albani-inspired neo-*ahl al-hadith*. His ideas inspired the rise of the Saudi dissidents such as Salman al-Audah and Safar al-Hawali as well as various Salafi-jihadist such as Osama bin Laden after the Gulf War (Fandy 2001).

Apart from the current Saudi Arabian political situation and its influence on the transformation of Salafism, the articulation of civil rights movements has had a great impact on the state-Islam relationship and the fragmentation of religious authority. The rise of the young educated Saudi generation, many members of which had studied in the West, the availability of technology and communication systems, and the growing fragmentation of authority perpetuated the movements. Over the last decades, there emerged the efflorescence of ordinary citizens discussing individual rights, political participation, and good governance. The business-as-usual attitude of the members of the royal family was seen as the biggest problem. It caused corruption and the extreme accumulation of wealth at their hands.

The Development of Salafism in Indonesia

The presence of Salafism in Indonesia is by no means new. Its history goes back

to the eighteenth century when West Sumatran pilgrims brought home the ideas of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This gave rise to the Padris, a revivalist Muslim group who sought to combat all mystical practices associated with traditional Muslim groups. The Padris also attacked the traditional elite, which they accused of protecting local rituals leading to a long-standing conflict between the Padris, traditionalist Muslims, and local elites. The tripartite conflict turned even more complicated when the Dutch joined in supporting the traditional elites who had become the local administrators of the Dutch. The Padri War (1803-1837) is one of the longest wars in Indonesian history. Even though the Padris were officially defeated by the Dutch in 1837, its remnants spread across the region paving the way for the *Kaum Muda* (reformist Muslim groups) in the late nineteenth century (Abdullah 1971; Dobbin 1983; Hadler 2008).

In 1912 Java, the Muhammadiyah was established. The Muhammadiyah is an organization often referred to as modernist Muslim (Noer 1973; Saleh 2001). In the Indonesian context, the term 'modernist' refers to various Muslim groups who have been exposed to the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Ridha (1865-1935). While al-Afghani's ideas reflect much more on Pan-Islamism and the need for the Muslim world to unite against Western colonialism, Abduh's ideas reveal the need for Muslims to build modern educational institutions that combine religious and secular disciplines, as well as to reform Islamic thought and practices (Abushouk 2007; Saleh 2001; Noer 1973). Islamic reform, Abduh believes, includes four important items: (1) the return to the pristine sources of Islam: the Qur'an and the Sunnah; (2) the encouragement of *ijtihad*; thus (3) denouncing *taqlid*; and (4) the

revitalization of Arabic linguistics for properly engaging in *ijtihad*. Abduh explicated these ideas in the journal *al-Manar* (The Light House), which had a wide readership among young Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia and the Malay world (Abushouk 2007: 301-322).

After Abduh's death in 1905, his pupil Ridha continued the reform by publishing the journal. Different from his master, Ridha seemed to have focused on Islamic purification. It is worth noting that one of the journal's sections is dedicated to responding to various questions it received from different Muslim strains. Most of the questions were related to modernist-traditionalist debates. The issues of *islah* (reform), *tajdid* (renewal), *ijtihad*, and *taqlid* had become very popular as a result of the conflict between traditionalist and modernist Muslim groups at the grassroots level. In response to these questions, Ridha frequently referred to the opinions of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, two Muslim scholars who laid down the Salafi principles. On other occasions, he also supported the opinion of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. Because of this, Ridha, by virtue of *al-Manar*, has by design contributed to the revivalist elements in the formulation of Islamic modernism (Ibid).

Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923) was a devoted reader of the journal. Having family who served as religious functionaries at the court of Yogyakarta Dahlan was deeply concerned with the many rituals the court preserved. At a very young age, he showed his resentment of the syncretic nature of Javanese Islam and the indulgence of the court's religious elites. He decided to go to Mecca to study truer Islam, which, he thought, should be compatible with modernity. His departure to Mecca took him to highly Islamic

intellectual circles where he was exposed to al-Afghani, Abduh, and Ridha's ideas (Saleh 2001; Noer 1973). After returning home, in 1912 to his hometown Yogyakarta, he founded the Muhammadiyah, an organization concerned with education and religious purification. Soon the Muhammadiyah attracted well-educated urban Muslims consisting of teachers and wealthy merchants. It is the first Islamic organization in Indonesia that was concerned with modern mass-education. Applying modern disciplines and the wearing of school uniforms in replacement of the traditional sarong and cap, the Muhammadiyah established schools across the country combining secular sciences and religious knowledge. It sought to produce teachers who had modern and puritan perspectives on Islam by whom a truer Islam was to be advocated to the Muslim people. It is also the first organization to provide education for women, inspiring other Islamic organization to promote a similar agenda (Burhanudin and Afrianty 2006).

Following Islamic reformism's Abduh and Ridha, Muhammadiyah is thus a reformist Islamic organization. As a Salafi-inspired organization, it calls upon Muslim believers to return to the pristine sources of Islam. It claims not to be attached to any one of the four Sunni *madhhab* (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali), when pronouncing a *tarjih* (collection of fatwa as guidance for religious practices, roughly glossed as "selected *fatwa*") for its followers (Saleh 2001: 46-104). It claims to have promoted *ijtihad* and *tajdid* as reflected in the use of *hisab* (the astronomical calculation), instead of *rakyat* (sightseeing), on the coming of Ramadhan and the celebration of Idul Fitri (Islamic holiday at the end of the fast). Its preachers have been involved in fierce debates with those of the traditionalist NU on religious purification such as ending grave visits

and the commemorations of the dead, and mystical fraternity (*tarekat*). The former accused the latter of practicing TBC, an acronym of *takhayul* (superstition), *bid'ah* (innovation), and *churafat* (fetishism), equating them with contagious tuberculosis (Khalil 2001, Kuntowijoyo 1991; Qodir 2010; Noer 1973: 86-87; Mughni 1994: 38-46).

Apart from religious purification, the Muhammadiyah also supports the unity of the *ummah*. It is reported that Dahlan, its founder, was very tolerant towards other Islamic sects including the Ahmadiyah. Contacts between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah began in 1924 when a delegation of the latter, on its voyage to China for Islamic propagation, visited Yogyakarta and met with officials of the latter. Despite later deteriorating relationships between both organizations because of the controversy on Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's prophecy, the Ahmadiyah had followers within the Muhammadiyah. One of Dahlan's family members, Irfan, was determined to obtain a better understanding of the sect. He travelled to Pakistan and studied at the Ahmadi College in Lahore. After having finished his study, he never returned to Indonesia but instead travelled to Southern Thailand where he promoted Islamic propagation among Thai Muslims until his death in 1967 (Beck 2005: 210-246).

The Muhammadiyah is so far the second largest Islamic organization in the country. Together with the traditionalist NU (Nahdhatul *Ulama*), Muhammadiyah shapes the reproduction of Islamic discourses in Indonesia. Both organizations are regarded as bastions of moderate Islam and to have contributed to sustainable democracy over the last decades in Indonesia. In 2004, the Muhammadiyah used cultural approaches (Ind. *Da'wah kultural*) to deal with contemporary issues (Qodir 2010). Under the

leadership of Din Syamsuddin, the current top executive of the organization, the Muhammadiyah is very concerned with interfaith and civilizational dialogues, international solidarity, and environmental issues. This shift is a breakthrough in the organization which was previously concerned with purification and Islamic education. While making progress in establishing schools, campuses, and hospitals, the Muhammadiyah seems to have abandoned *tajdid* programs which had been the *raison d'être* of the organization. According to Azyumardi Azra, an Indonesian Muslim scholar who is also a Muhammadiyah cadre member, the Muhammadiyah seems to be trapped in corporate culture. This fact makes young cadres who are concerned with the *tajdid* program disappointed, making them go over to Salafi organizations.

Two other Islamic organizations were influenced by Islamic reformist notions: Persis and al-Irshad. Persis, an abbreviation of Persatuan Islam (The Unity of Islam), was established in Bandung, West Java, in 1923. Its founder is Ahmad Hassan, a Singapore-born Muslim who dedicated his life to education and Islamic propagation. He was active in the anti-colonial movement for Islamic rather than for nationalist reasons. Compared to the Muhammadiyah, Persis is stereotyped for its rigidity on Islamic interpretation and because it is more concerned with religious purification (Federspiel 1970; Saleh 2001: 106; Mughni 1994). This being so, Persis seems to have failed to achieve wider support among Indonesian Muslims as well as to build organizational networks across the country. The journal *Al-Muslimun* (The Muslim People) is its mouthpiece and it discusses issues ranging from religion, politics, to social affairs. Highly influenced by al-Afghani's Pan Islamism, Persis is deeply concerned with global Muslim affairs. Despite being

relatively small, it has successfully produced militant cadres active in national politics as well as prominent religious scholars. One of its cadre members is Mohammad Natsir, a prominent Muslim figure as well as a prominent politician.

Jami'ah al-Islah wal Irshad, or al-Irshad, is another reformist organization. It was founded by Syeikh Ahmad Soorkati (1875-1943). Born to a Sudanese Muslim scholar, Soorkati spent his early education in Mecca under the auspices of prominent Meccan *ulama* until he earned the title of *al-Allamah* (the learned man). He taught at al-Haram, the most important learning center in Mecca and made close contacts with a number of Indonesian students. In the early twentieth century, he came to Jakarta to teach at the *madrasa* of Jami'at al-Khair, an organization established by the Hadhrami community in Indonesia. It is worth noting that most of the members of this organization are *sayyid*, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, who practice endogamous marriages. To maintain their privileges and their pure bloodlines through the paternal lineage, the Hadhrami adhere to the so-called *kafa'ah* (equality) (Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Azra 1995: 1-33). According to this system, a *sayyidah* (female *sayyid*) can only be married to a *sayyid*, while a *sayyid* can marry any woman. The conflict began when Soorkati, being questioned about this *kafa'ah*, argued that Muslim women can marry any men as long as they are Muslims. His opinion sparked criticism among the Hadhrami community who eventually forced him to leave the organization in 1904. The controversy about *sayyid* and non-*sayyid* was one of the big issues which led to a deep divide within the Hadhrami community in Indonesia. Enjoying wide support, al-Soorkati established al-Irshad in 1914 with its main concerns on education and Islamic propagation. The organization was

able to extend its influence and network, not only in Jakarta but also in the northern Javanese coastal areas, attracting non-*sayyid* Hadhramis. Al-Soorkati died in 1943. The weak organizational leadership as well as the destruction of many al-Irshad schools during the Japanese occupation led to its gradual decline.

Traditionalist Islam

On the opposite side of Islamic modernism lays traditionalist Islam, represented, among others, by the Nahdhatul *Ulama* (The Awakening of the *Ulama*—NU). NU followers largely consist of rural Muslims: peasants, artisans, laborers, and petty merchants (Dhofier 1982; Barton and Fealy 1996; Van Bruinessen 1995). NU followers highly rely on traditional Islamic scholarship particularly of the four Sunni *madhhab* with the emphasis on the Shafi'i school. Traditionalist Muslims combine the exoteric dimension of Islam as embodied in the Sharia (Islamic law) with the esoteric dimension as embodied in Sufism (Islamic mysticism) (Dhofier, 1999). For traditionalist Muslims, al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who successfully combined the Sharia with Sufism, is one of the most important figures and traditionalists study his works, particularly *Ihya Ulum al-Din* (The Revival of Religious Science). Traditionalist NU is the largest Islamic organization (40%), followed by the Muhammadiyah (15%), and Persis (4%) (Survey PPIM, 2003).

The NU was established in 1926 in response to the modernist movements that “threatened” the continuation of Islamic traditionalism. Its establishment was the continuation of the so-called Hijaz Committee in 1925. The committee was assembled in response to the victory of Ibn Saud who vowed to destroy the traditional Sunni *madhhab*

in Mecca and Medina, and the modernist movements in Indonesia which attacked traditional Muslim groups. NU claims to be the bastion of the *Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama'ah* shortened as *Aswaja*. It also claims to be Salafi in the sense that it follows the pious Salafi *ulama* as reflected in the term *pesantren salaf*, a kind of *pesantren* that focuses on the mastery of traditional Islamic knowledge, despite they prefer to be called *Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama'ah*. Compared to modernist Muslims, traditionalist Muslims are relatively tolerant towards local practices such as the annual commemoration of the dead (Ind. *haul*) sainthood, and saint worship, which modernist denounce as syncretic or at least as a less-orthodox practice.

Modernist-traditionalist conflicts in Indonesia have been enormous leading to social and political divisions between both groups. This pattern can be seen in the configuration of the political structures throughout Indonesian history. Whereas the modernists were politically affiliated with the Masyumi, established in 1946, the traditionalists were affiliated with the NU. Before that, modernist and traditionalist Muslim groups joined the Japan sponsored-Islamic umbrella organization MIAI (*Majlis Islam A'la Indonesia – High Commission of Indonesian Muslim Organization*) in 1943. After Indonesian's independence, the body was dissolved and a new body named Masyumi was formed. Muslim organizations joined this body in an attempt to challenge nationalist political maneuvering in Parliament. In 1952, due to unfair political sharing within the Masyumi-led coalition, the traditionalist Muslim groups represented in the NU left the Masyumi and formed an independent political party. In the aftermath of Soekarno's 1959 decree, the NU joined Soekarno's tripartite coalition, which consisted of

nationalists,¹⁸ Muslims and communists,¹⁹ and by so doing it left the Masyumi-led opposition camp.²⁰

A similar pattern emerged in the early 1990s. It is relevant to note that, since he came to power in the aftermath of the bloody attempted coup in 1965, allegedly by the communist, Soeharto did not invite Muslim groups to join his regime. Instead he involved minority groups consisting of Javanese *abangan*, some of whom were Christians. Fully backed up by ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) and Golkar (his political party), Soeharto seized virtually absolute power. Realizing that Muslims were in the majority and the influence of the urban Muslim middle class, in the 1990s, he began to take side with Muslim groups and ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*—Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) was established. Muslim groups involved in the organization, Hefner calls them ‘the regimist Muslims’ (Hefner 2000), saw ICMI as

¹⁸ There is no clear-cut definition between “Muslims” and “nationalists” in modern Indonesian history. “Muslims” can be nationalist and nationalists can be Muslims. The term “Muslim” faction is usually associated with the Masyumi-led coalitions, and “nationalists” to PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian Nationalist Party)-led coalition.

¹⁹ Communism came to Indonesia in the early twentieth century through the Dutch Marxist-Communist, Henk Sneevliet. Communism attracted many Indonesian nationalist figures in their attempt to fight colonialism. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was established in 1914 under the name ISDV (*Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging*). It revolted against the government in 1926 and again in 1948. During the 1955 general election, the Communist party occupied the fourth position after PNI, Masyumi, and NU. The Indonesian Communist Party was charged of being behind the bloody *coup d'état* in 1965, leading to its prohibition in the same year. On the PKI and the 1966 mass killing see Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings 1965-1966,” *Asian Survey* Vol. 42, No. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 550-563; Hermawan Sulistyono, “The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia’s Mass Slaughter (Jombang-Kediri 1965-1966),” PhD Dissertation, Arizona State University, 1997.

²⁰ During the period of Liberal Democracy (1955-1959), the nationalist groups were represented by PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), whereas Muslims were represented by Masyumi and NU. Due to the absence of a majority in Parliament, plenary sessions frequently ended in deadlock. With his 1959 decree, Soekarno dissolved Parliament and returned to the 1945 Constitution.

the best chance for Muslims to seize power, and its establishment was like the recognition of Muslim civil society. Given the fact that the idea of the establishment of the ICMI came up within modernist intellectual circles, most of its officials hailed from modernist groups. Some traditionalist Muslims joined the organization, but their positions were marginal.²¹

Local Initiatives, Global Politics

In 1958-1960 some Masyumi politicians were involved in the CIA-sponsored PRRI (*Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*—Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)-Permesta rebellion. As a result of this, Masyumi was dissolved in 1960 leading to the arrest of its political figures. In the same year, a new brand political party Parmusi (*Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia*—Indonesian Muslim Union) was established, and many former Masyumi members joined this new party. In spite of this development, most of the Masyumi politicians were disappointed with Sukarno's authoritarian policies. As a result of this they made a big shift by turning the movement away from politics towards education and Islamic propagation (*da'wah*). Education and *da'wah* were two important agendas Muslim groups had almost neglected during the heydays of Islamic politics in the 1950s. The DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islam*

²¹ ICMI is the umbrella organization consisting of technocrats, intellectuals, bureaucrats and Muslim figures through which various Islamic policies were implemented. The ICMI swept away all strategic positions in the national, provincial, and local governments, leading to sectarian conflicts that emerged a few years later after Soeharto had stepped down from power. See Robert W. Hefner *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). On the communal conflict during and in the aftermath of the regime change in 1998, see Gerry van Klinken, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Indonesia—Indonesia Commission for Islamic Propagation) was established in Jakarta in an attempt to revive the spirit of *da'wah*, to revitalize mosques, *madrasa*, and Muslim students, and to promote the solidarity of the *ummah* (Husin 1998).

The role of former Masyumi top leader and Muslim preacher, Mohammad Natsir in the establishment of the DDII is extremely important as it brought the modernist Muslim groups closer to the Salafi camps (Van Bruinessen 2012; 2013; Husin 1998). He was born in Solok, West Sumatra, to a local government employee. After he completed his early education in his hometown, Natsir moved to Bandung where he made close contact with Ahmad Hassan, a prominent modernist figure and the founder of Persis. Natsir admitted that his interest in Islam emerged through Hassan. He read many books by Western and reformist Muslim intellectuals including the Pakistani Jama'ati Islami ideologue, Abul A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979). He started his political career when he was chosen as the leader of the *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Young Muslim Association), because of which he entered the national arena. His name gained wider notoriety when he polemicized with future President Soekarno on the relation between Islam and the state. Although Natsir was a Muslim politician, he never supported the notion of an Islamic state. Rather, following Mawdudi, he believed in the so-called theo-democratic state or divine democracy (Mawdudi 1992). Unlike in Christian Europe where a body of clergy was authorized to define public policy, in a divine democratic state, public policy is made through the involvement of the *ummah*. It is clear that Natsir's concept of democracy was largely shaped by the ideas of majoritarianism and in his opinion, the Muslim population should be given more privileges given the fact they were in the majority (Mahendra

1999).

Shifting from politics from 1960s, Natsir developed his career in many international Islamic organizations. It is not an exaggeration to say that at that time Natsir is the only Indonesian Muslim figure whose reputation was internationally recognized. In the early 1970s, Natsir made a great achievement, and it was made possible by his close relation with the Saudi Arabia rulers. It is relevant to note that, experiencing oil-driven economic development, Saudi sought to increase its dominant role in regional as well as global Muslim politics. In the post-Nasser period, there were no significant players in the Middle East. The kingdom utilized this absence and worked to revitalize the World Muslim League (*Rabitha Alam Islami*) through which it was able to extend its influence over other Muslim countries (Van Bruinessen 2012). Established in 1963, the League was eclipsed by the third world's NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) and Jamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabism. It is necessary to note that, given the League was an international Islamic organization, it invited many Muslim groups and Islamic organizations from all over the Muslim world. In Indonesia, besides Natsir, it also invited Imam Zarkasyi, another modernist figure and the leader of well-known Islamic boarding school Pondok Pesantren Gontor in East Java, and Ahmad Syaichu, a traditionalist Muslim. Natsir's role was extremely dominant. He was the only Indonesian Muslim leader to have been awarded Saudi's most prestigious King Faisal Prize in 1984 (Van Bruinessen 2012).

In the mid-1970s, Shaikh Abd al-Aziz Abdullah al-Ammar, a prominent student of the Saudi Arabian Grand Mufti, Shaikh Abdullah ibn Abd Al-Aziz ibn Baz, visited Jakarta to meet Natsir. Al-Ammar talked about cooperation between both countries in

education and *da'wah* activities, and Natsir agreed to the idea. In the aftermath of this meeting, a college specializing on the Sharia and Arabic named LIPIA (Institute for Islamic Sciences and Arabic) was established in Jakarta. This institute was one of the most strategic Saudi institutions in Indonesia, one that helped to shape the transformation of Islamic knowledge in the country. It is likely that the government felt that the institute could be easily controlled because it was foreign-owned. However, the controversy over its establishment within elite Indonesian circles made it obvious that the decision to allow the foundation's establishment was made in highly politicized circumstances that did not take into account the long-term impact of the organization's presence in Indonesia.

Concerns that the Saudi government might use the organization to promote its ideology were evident from early on. Daoed Joesoef of the Ministry of National Education (MONE) was against the idea of establishing an Islamic institute, which he thought would only turn Muslims more fanatical. Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara from the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) fully supported the idea, however. Both men were reportedly involved in a fierce debate that symbolically represented two opposing camps: Joesoef standing for the secularist-nationalist group, and Alamsjah representing the Muslim groups (Parikesit and Sempurnadjaja 1995: 269-71). Mochtar Kusumaatmadja of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) worked to resolve the conflict by offering to take care of the institute's status. Unlike most religious institutions in Indonesia that were administered under MONE, the administration of LIPIA was and remains under MOFA (Mujiburrahman 2006: 362).

The al-Ammar-Natsir meeting symbolically marked the initial spread of Salafism

in Indonesia. In 1978, the first group of Indonesian students was dispatched to Saudi universities, most notably the Islamic University of Medina. This campus has remained the most important destination for Indonesian students ever since. Another destination is the Islamic University of Imam Ibn Saud in Riyadh, called *Jami'ah Imam*, and Umm al-Qura Islamic University in Mecca. Some Indonesian elites were in fact concerned about the fact that the project might be used by the Saudi government to extend its influence outside its territorial borders. Nevertheless, the project inevitably moved on. This was because from the start, the League and its associate foundations had been given the authority to enter into direct contact with local Islamic organizations in the country, among others the DDII, its most important local partner. The Ministry of Religious Affairs only facilitated those rare individuals who had problems with their visa applications.

During the first phase of the project, as I said earlier, both the Saudi and the Indonesian parties had agreed to LIPIA's foundation in Jakarta in 1980, and Al-Ammar assumed the role of its first director. This institute was to focus on the Sharia and on Arabic, a typical project made by the Saudis to improve its image as the center of Islamic learning. Due to the availability of scholarships, textbooks, and housing facilities, the institute soon attracted young Muslim students from rural backgrounds. Thanks to its extraordinary status, LIPIA is the first and foremost Saudi institution to effectively promote Salafism among the Indonesian Muslim audience.

In 1995, the papers for the second phase of the project were signed. Unlike the previous agreement, which authorized the League as the key player, the new agreement

allowed private institutions to take part in the project. One of these private institutions was the al-Haramayn Foundation, a charity foundation established by the Saudi royal family. It was made to distribute donations given by royal members to support Islamic institutions such as *madrassa* and mosques in Muslim countries that experienced conflicts (Burr and Collins, 2006). This foundation not only gained direct access to local partners, it was also allowed to create local branches. As a result, this period witnessed an abundance of funds transferred to Indonesia and the extensive roles of Arab (Saudi and non-Saudi) officials in the execution of the projects. The involvement of this foundation has been extremely important as it offered a more political tone to the Saudi project in Indonesia. It is reported that the background of this foundation is tinged with factionalism because of internal conflicts within the royal family. Many pious individuals within the royal family were opposed to the accumulation of extreme wealth and the corruption practices of royal family members, while witnessing that millions among the Muslim population all over the world lived under poor conditions. As a result, they mobilized donations and hired professionals to establish a modern charity institution. When the Mecca-born Saudi, Ahmad al-Amoudi was in office, the foundation channeled millions of dollars to support Salafi organizations in Indonesia as well as in other Muslim countries in Asia and Africa. The foundation was eventually shut down after it had been disclosed that al-Amoudi was linked to the al-Qaida network in Southeast Asia (IPRD Report 2009).

The Saudi Haramayn foundation is only one example of how Islamic charity may easily become politicized. While al-Amoudi's involvement in supporting terrorist

organizations is beyond this research project, two things should be given careful attention with regard to Saudi charity and its effect on Salafi organizations. First, given that charity is based on trust, it is at risk of being politicized. The politicization of charity is inevitable since it involves a wide range of actors with different ideologies and motives (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003). Second, given that it is poorly organized and largely involves personal and informal connections, it creates patron-client relationships at every level: donors, organizers, and beneficiaries (See Chapter Four). Because of this, Saudi-supported Islamic charity organizations have led to various conflicts on the third level, eventually affecting the overall performance of the Salafi organizations in Indonesia. Furthermore, given the fact that Salafis hardly ever respect religious diversity, it creates conflicts with other Muslim groups.

In the late 1990s, issues of Wahhabism emerged in Indonesia. The traditionalist NU was the first Muslim group to raise concerns on the *da'wah* of these Salafi groups. They accused the Saudi government that, through its charity organizations and Salafi foundations, it sought to wahhabize Indonesian Islam (Hasan 2002: 145-169). They were extremely offended that the Salafis provoked Muslim audiences by discussing *bid'ah* issues, which indirectly attacked traditionalists. It should be understood that the NU has always been very sensitive to the use of the term '*bid'ah*' as this term reminds them of a bitter past when modernist groups accused them of being *bid'ah*-practicing Muslims. In response to this, while claiming to be the followers of pious Salafi *ulama* of the *Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l Jama'ah*, the traditionalist NU uses the term "Salafi-Wahhabi" to denote Saudi-inspired Salafi groups and to distinguish them from other Salafi groups. In a

counter argument against the Salafis, NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly called Gus Dur) argued that Salafi-Wahhabis have an inferiority complex because they are the descendants of Musailamah al-Kazzab, a figure who claimed to have been a prophet after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. He is attributed with the moniker al-Kazzab (liar) for his falsehood. This inferiority, said Gus Dur, was then transformed into their harsh perspectives against women.²²

A decade earlier, controversy about the Salafism-Wahhabism issue began to attract MORA officials. It emerged because of some policies made by Munawwir Syadzali (1925-2004), who held the ministerial post from 1983 to 1993. During his term, he initiated a program to improve the quality of Islamic higher education by sending young scholars to the West to study various fields including Islamic studies. This program, however, was criticized. Various Islamist-Salafi groups such as DDII and FUI (*Forum Umat Islam*—Muslim Community Forum) posed the question how the idea of Muslim students studying Islam in the West could be justified (Hasyim, 2007). The DDII criticized the program of sending students to the West to study Islam. It claimed that the hegemony of the Christian West was behind this process (Husaini 2006). Furthermore, the program was considered as highly mistaken as it could bring the students into contact with fallacious Western ideologies. This controversy reminded one of the case of Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), a University of Chicago graduate and the most prominent Indonesian neo-modernist thinker, who, in the early 1970s, was accused of

²² “Gus Dur Marah Pada Wahabi,” *NU Online*, January 6, 2010, <http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,1-id,20941-lang,id-c,warta-t,Gus+Dur+Marah+pada+Wahabi-.phpx>. Accessed September, 15, 2013.

dispersing secularism among Indonesian Muslims. Based on this, Islamist-Salafi groups argued that the same mistake should not be repeated. They argued that many Western graduates so far had promoted the ideas of *sepilis*, an abbreviation of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism—the term coined after the English word “syphilis,” a sexually transmitted disease—to associate Western graduates with this filthy disease (Hasyim 2007).

In the early 2000s, MORA issued the policy that allowed Salafi students to attend public universities and thus to become part of the larger Indonesian community. At the same time, Salafi schools were allowed, together with public schools, to obtain government-provided educational aid. Furthermore, the government also qualified the certificate of the Salafi colleges as equivalent to public universities’ certificates.²³ During Maftuh Basyuni (2004-2009) ministerial stint, other strategic policies were made. He revitalized cooperation with Saudi Arabia. He also endorsed the construction of three LIPIA branches in the country despite there was delay for its implementation.

Figure 1

List of Cooperation between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia

1980	The opening of LIPIA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge
1995	MORA and <i>Rabithah Alam Islami</i> on education, training and social-religious programs
1996	MORA and WAMY (World Assembly of Moslem Youth) on exchange programs
2000	MORA and <i>al-Haramayn</i> Foundation on education, training and social-

²³ Equivalence (Ind. *Penyetaraan*) is a process by which an institution is regarded as “equivalent” to public universities. If it is equivalent, its graduates are able to develop careers as civil servants, army officers, and other public institutions. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is authorized to take care of this task.

	religious program
2001	MORA qualified LIPIA certificate equivalent to undergraduate degree
2002	MORA agreed on transforming LIPIA to Faculty of Islamic Studies and Arabic
2003	MORA and Islamic University of Medina on scholarship, training, exchange scholars, and book donation
2003	MORA gave full access to Islamic University of Medina for selecting potential candidates by visiting its network in Indonesia
2004	Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh made a report that the number of Indonesia students in Saudi was 87. Each was given scholarship between 850 to 2500 riyal, one retour ticket, accommodation, food, and lodging
2005	MORA and University of Imam ibn Saud in Riyadh on education
2009	MORA agreed on the reconstruction of three LIPA branches in Indonesia

There is an indication that the government was committed to integrate Salafi groups into wider Muslim groups. This can be seen in several policies made from 2001 to 2009. Based on interviews with some MORA officials, the integration policies had been made to improve the quality of *madrasa* and to make them able to compete with other public educational institutions. The radicalization of *madrasa* occurred when this institution became isolated and marginalized. *Madrasa* in Afghanistan had become militant and terrorist hotbeds because they were isolated from the outside world (Jabali and Jamhari, 2002). Meanwhile, Abuddin Nata, an expert on Islamic education in Jakarta, metaphorically made the simile that *madrasa* students used to swim in small rivers. Now it is time for them to go public and swim in the ocean (Nata 2003).

Chapter Three - Through the Ma’had They Learned the Sharia, then They Became “Salafis”

The rise of modern Indonesian Salafism cannot be seen separated from the establishment of LIPIA (*Ma’had al-Ulul al-Islamiyah wal ‘Arabiyah*—Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic), hereafter cited as the Ma’had. This is the first Saudi institute of higher learning in modern Indonesia that serves to transmit Salafism to Indonesia. Various scholars have paid attention to its roles and have seen it either as a modernist project (Husin 1998), a Wahhabi school (Van Bruinessen 2002: 117-154; Hasan 2005: 3-5), a radical agent (Rahmat 2005), a Saudi-inspired Salafi institution (Hefner, 2009), or a transmitter of Salafi doctrines (Wahid 2013). While these studies are useful, they do not discuss the reproduction of knowledge within the Ma’had in a fair way as it involves a wide range of actors. As a result, they fail to observe the diversity of knowledge within the Ma’had. Ever since its inception in the early 1980s, the Ma’had has become the locus where actors from different social and historical backgrounds actively engage in understanding the meaning of Salafism.

The Ma’had was founded in 1980. When it was still located in Salemba, Central Jakarta, it was called LPBA (Institute for Science and Arabic), and with 150 students, the Ma’had began its mission in the same year. Classes were held in the afternoon, to give students and people who had other activities in the morning the opportunity to join its programs. In 1990, the Ma’had moved to South Jakarta. Located in the Buncit area it now occupies two six-floor buildings and has now 2,500 students, 25% of them girls. The

Ma'had is a state institution and under the supervision of the Islamic University of Muhammad ibn Saud in Riyadh, popularly called *Jami'ah Imam*, while its daily operation is supervised by the Saudi Embassy in Jakarta.

The reproduction of knowledge in the Ma'had takes place in three main venues: class, mosque, and library. From Monday to Friday, from 7.30 AM to 3.30 PM, classes are held in the first building (from the third to sixth floors). Arabic is used as the language of instruction. The teachers or lecturers are called *ustadz* for males and *ustadzah* for females, meaning teacher or professor. Some senior *ustadz*, especially those of Arab origin, are called *sheikh*. Most *ustadz* are graduates from *Jami'ah Imam* in Riyadh. Disagreement is rare and when it occurs, students do not necessarily express their opinion in the classroom but they may send a letter or go to their teachers' office and talk.

Around 12 PM, when the call for noon prayers is heard, all classes are dismissed. Students attend the mosque, which is located on the fourth floor of the second building. The congregational prayer begins at 12.30 PM when all the students are presumed present. It is worth noting that there should only be one congregational prayer attended by the entire school community. The logic behind this is to cement solidarity and in-group feeling of the community. Second or third congregational prayers are only permissible under specific conditions, e.g. when there is not enough space in the mosque. Female students pray on the second floor while a microphone and CCTV connects them with the mosque. After praying, a *sheikh* or an *ustadz* usually delivers a sermon. Repeatedly the speaker will remind the attendants that *bid'ah* is heresy and that engaging in *bid'ah* will lead people to Hell. It is an effective means to advocate Islamic teachings

and to maintain the spirit of puritanism among the students.

Why Students Come

There are two qualities that differentiate the Ma'had from other Islamic institutes: (1) its specialization in Islamic law and Arabic, and (2) the availability of scholarships. It is generally known that having religious knowledge, at least for individual purposes, is considered a good thing. This is even more so if one is able to offer religious teachings to other Muslims. People with deep religious knowledge are highly respected within the Muslim community. Many Muslim parents expect one of their children to study Islamic knowledge more in depth so that they can teach the other family members who have not acquired it.

Students will master religious knowledge much better when they have proper Arabic language skills. These skills not only include the ability to read, but also to speak. The trend to know Arabic is the result of a campaign launched by Gontor Islamic boarding school and its affiliates, which popularized Arabic reading and speaking skills.²⁴ Because of this campaign, more people started to study Arabic. The number of students of the Department of Arabic in many Islamic institutions of higher learning steadily increased and competed with the number of students studying English. There was a great demand among the Muslim population to learn Arabic as it is considered one of the

²⁴ Pesantren Darussalam Gontor in Ponorogo, East Java, established in 1926, is one of the Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia that officially uses Arabic and English as languages of instruction. In the 1970s, across the country, its alumni established the same model of boarding schools. Gontor is one of the largest Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia that participates in promoting Arabic among the Muslim population.

symbols of Islam (Liddle 1996: 323-355; Hefner 1997: 77-103). Muslims were defined as modern not only by having the ability to speak English; they also should be able to speak Arabic. Bearing this in mind, the introduction of Arabic by the Ma'had was very timely. It attracted a large number of Muslim students to apply.

The availability of scholarships, called *mukafa'ah* (stipend) is another reason for students to come to the Ma'had. In theory, students used to receive their scholarship monthly. In practice they got it once every two to three months, depending upon the speed of fund transfers from Riyadh. At the end of the month, students lined up in front of the administration office awaiting their turn to sign and take their money. One by one, their names were called and a staff member gave them their money in sealed envelopes through a small window. This cash system remained in practice until bank transfers replaced it in 2012. Regardless of its unpredictability, *mukafa'ah* ensures that students are able to pay their rent and can buy food.

Apart from *mukafa'ah*, students also receive textbooks, and for the entire duration of their studies, they are not required to pay tuition fees. The availability of these scholarships is remarkable given the fact that most Islamic educational institutions in Indonesia do not provide stipends. As I described in Chapter 4, all throughout Islamic history, Muslim students enjoyed the fruits of charity to support them and to enable them to concentrate on their studies. However, this practice is inescapably linked with politics. It is obvious that, on the one hand, Saudi Arabia uses scholarships as a political tool through which it promotes its ideologies. On the other hand, students also respond to this action in different ways, making the reproduction of knowledge in the Ma'had far from

being uniform.

In the following sections, I will discuss the reproduction of knowledge within the Ma'had as expressed by a wide range of actors. The Ma'had uses several means such as a curriculum, training, discipline, and the *sheikh*-student relationship to produce knowledge, which eventually contributes to students' understanding of Salafism. The highly different social and historical backgrounds of the students and the teachers lead to a diversity of Salafism. Because of this, the Ma'had produces students who have different understandings of Salafism and who practice it in different ways.

As one can easily predict, most students are the graduates from top *madrassa* and Islamic boarding schools in the country. Most of them are from cadres of modernist Muslim organizations particularly DDII, followed by Persis, al-Irshad and the Muhammadiyah. The NU seems to have the smallest group of students to benefit from this scholarship provision. If there are NU students, they have to have come to the Ma'had on their own accord but probably not as representatives of the organization.²⁵

The Background of the Students

My encounter with Nafis was coincidental. I met him in the lobby of the Ma'had while I was waiting for my interview with a teacher. Nafis is from Garut, West Java. Garut is the stronghold of Persis, a modernist organization concerned with religious

²⁵ This issue remains debatable. According to some sources, from the beginning, the number of traditionalist students remained high, around 75%, even though they were not prioritized like modernist students. The number of modernist students significantly increased when, in 2001, the authorities fully recognized the certificates of the Ma'had. Personal interview with Ibrahim al-Fati, January 2015.

purification. His father, aged 65, was a local teacher who had previously studied in a local Persis *madrassa*. Like many Persis followers, his father was concerned with the fact that some Muslim people still practiced local rituals such as visiting saints' graves to seek *baraka* (blessing) and that they continued to commemorate the dead. In his youth, he had even campaigned to boycott these rituals, which he considered *bid'ah*. Being a puritan, so to speak, his father only performed rituals that were clearly supported by *hadith*. He performed various supplementary prayers (*salat sunnah*) and he read the *al-awrad al-ma'thura* (the *dhikr* practiced by the Prophet Muhammad). His father's puritan attitude influenced the entire family including his mother whose extended family still made offerings to their ancestral spirits. Nafis said that his father gradually advised his mother to abandon those practices and he taught her how to walk the right path of Islam.

Figure 2
The Statistics of LIPIA Students (Total 2350 in 2012)

School of Origin			Economic Status					Place of Origin	
<i>Madrassa</i>	<i>Pesantren</i>	Public	Peasant	Merchant	Labor	Teacher	Other	Rural	Urban
45%	39%	16%	30%	37%	7%	5%	21%	75%	25%

The religious orientation of the family also influenced that of Nafis. He imitated what his father did and he took him as his model for how to live as a Muslim. Apart from providing religious orientation, his father also taught him how to be pious and how not to abandon the Sharia. Being a seeker of knowledge, his father advised him to keep his stomach almost empty and not to eat too much as too much food affects the entire body

and may lead to sleepiness and laziness. He was urged to fast every Monday and Thursday as fasting is good for people's mental and physical health. His father's religious training was also completed by *qiyam al-lail* (waking up during the night), to pray to God while other people were asleep. By doing so, the seeker of knowledge would be really keen and able to grasp the knowledge of God. During Ramadhan these practices were intensified and he was expected at least to finish his *khatam* (completing reading of the all the chapters of the Qur'an) once during this month. While fasting during the day, he went to the local mosque at night. It was in the mosque that his enthusiasm to study in the Ma'had emerged. During Ramadhan, Ma'had students return home for a break. The local mosques in their hometowns invited them to deliver sermons before the congregants and in many cases, these sermons were delivered in Arabic. Nafis was impressed with their fluency in Arabic and with their ability to quote verses or *hadith* in support of their arguments. His father was supportive when he said that he would like to continue his study in the Ma'had. To this end, as required by the Ma'had, Nafis had to memorize at least two chapters of the Qur'an.

Living as a student is a new experience for him. He socializes with other students regardless whether they are modernists or traditionalists. He noticed that students had different understandings of many aspects of Islam. Some students are concerned with *bid'ah* and warned other students of its dangers. Others are moderate and seem to focus more on their studies. This experience gradually shaped his understanding of Islam. His religious orientation is typical of that of Ma'had students. They are moderate in the sense that they are concerned with Islamic puritanism, but will respect those who think

differently. Although his father is a puritan, because he is well educated and widely socializes, he is able to accept religious diversity.

I learned many aspects of Islam for the first time from my father. He was a local Muslim teacher. My religious orientation can be described as puritan. But, since I attend the Ma'had, many things have changed in my life. When I came to the Ma'had, the discussion about *bid'ah* was really intensive. Almost every day I heard that word. This made me fully aware of the danger of *bid'ah*. But, on the other hand, I noticed that many people believe that some *bid'ah* are not blasphemous. At the end of the day, it depends on us which is better. (Interview with Nafis Khairi, Jakarta, July 17, 2012)

A few weeks later, I paid a visit to the dorm's chief. His name was Sugiono, a senior student. He had to take care of the new students who lived in the dorm for a transitional period. He was from Gresik, East Java. His background was highly Javanese and he comes from a group of people usually termed as *abangan* who are syncretic Javanese who still perform rituals from Hindu-Buddhist and animist traditions. In former times, there have been extensive conflicts between *abangan* and *santri*, the pious Muslim group leading to social and political divisions between both groups. In the 1980s, because of increased social encounters, the division between *abangan* and *santri*, especially at public universities became blurred. *Abangan* eventually went through a kind of re-Islamization after they had become involved in Islamic movements. Many of them became committed Salafis and joined Salafi organizations (See, e.g. Hasan, 2008: 263-282). Having secular educational backgrounds, they have non-religious jobs and work as finance experts, managers, and technicians and they assist Salafi scholars who have a religious educational background.

Before attending the Ma'had, Sugiono had studied for six years at the Ma'had al-Furqon al-Islami, one of the largest Salafi *madrasa* in Indonesia. He had been introduced to Salafism long before he attended the Ma'had and he had studied the Sharia and Arabic.

I was born into an *abangan* family. My father and my mother only recently started to live according to Islam. They did so because of me who intensively advised them to practice Islam. That's typical in my village. Many *abangan* people became Islamized because of the *da'wah* program of Salafi groups. I felt like I had become a reborn Muslim. I attended their *pesantren* and studied with them. (Interview with Sugiono, Jakarta, August, 20, 2012)

Compared to Nafis, Sugiono is very puritan. This is related to his historical background where he experienced a sort of “leap of faith.” As he is a Salafi cadre member, he is expected to expand the Salafi community in his hometown. As a result, he is a hard-working person and very disciplined more than any other student. Up to now, he has memorized eight chapters of the Qur'an, which means that he has been able to reach the number of chapters required for graduation. This means that students should at least memorize one chapter each semester (eight semesters in total, or four years). It is relevant to note that memorizing the Qur'an is the most difficult task and the main reason many students fail or drop out. He said that he had already memorized the Qur'an many years ago when he was still in Gresik. He just imitated his teachers many of whom were *hafidh* (person who has memorized the entire Qur'an—thirty chapters). He had not changed his discipline when he attended the Ma'had. In the morning, after morning prayer, he would sit on his rug for about an hour or so to repeat the chapters he had already memorized. During breaks, he would take out his pocket Qur'an, hum the text and start a new chapter, which he would repeat the next morning.

Besides the Qur'an, Sugiono also memorized a number of *hadith* related to religious practices. He was keenly aware of the arguments on the prohibition of the commemoration of the dead, visiting saints' graves to receive blessing and many other practices, which he considered *bid'ah*. He had done this many years ago when he was sent to remote areas to conduct *da'wah salafiyah* (Salafi propagation). Like any young preacher, he had to go through this process. In the field, he was forced to face the local Muslim population who kept practicing their alien rituals. His teachers advised him to memorize various *hadith* to counter their arguments. It was clear that he was keen to engage in *Salafi da'wah* to whichever person he met. He loved to talk for hours to explain Salafi teachings. Having my mobile phone number, he kept texting me Islamic messages during Ramadhan. He reminded me of the month's virtues especially during the last uneven nights when *lailat al-qadr* (the night when the Qur'an was revealed, having virtues better than a thousand months) was most likely to occur. He texted me again on Idul Fitri and he expressed the wish that Allah might accept our devotions and that we may return to our *fitrah* (God's way of creating).

Unlike many other students who were active outside campus, Sugiono focused on his studies. He would sit in the library during the day and stay in his room during the night. Sometimes he came to the dorm office to make sure that everything was all right. The *niyyat* (intention) for seeking knowledge should be restored at all times, which accords with the Ma'had's goal of being an institution for *tafaqquh fi al-din* (understanding on religious matters). Seeking knowledge is highly respected in Islam and learned men have the obligation to teach other Muslims who do not possess religious

knowledge. He disagreed with students who spent most of their time in a so-called *harakah*²⁶ (movement) or a *kajian*²⁷ (study club) as it would lead them to the wrong direction. Although the Ma'had officially did not forbid student organizations, it would dismiss students who participated in demonstrations or who protested against the Indonesian government or the Ma'had.

Why They Became “Salafis”

Salafis perform rituals and practices are believed to have been exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad. According to Sugiono, to become a Salafi means that one should set out on a long journey. Many years ago, when he was introduced to Salafism for the first time, his teacher taught him to look for answers in the Qur'an and in the Sunnah every time he faced problems: What does the Qur'an have to say about this issue? What does the Sunnah say about it? Is it allowed? Is it recommended? If the Qur'an and the *hadith* do not address the problem, look at the opinion of the pious Salafi *ulama*, they have inherited the Prophet's authority to talk about Islam. The Qur'an says, “So ask the people of the message if you don't know” (QS 16:43). He argued that Salafism is a method by which Muslim believers practice Islam by returning to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. As Islam is considered the perfect way of life, it does not need any addition, nor may

²⁶ *Harakah* refers to Ikhwan-inspired students who regularly organize meetings outside campus to discuss the thoughts of Ikhwan scholars. They are called *Tarbiyah*, a group, which inspired the Welfare and Justice Party (PKS), an Ikhwan-inspired political party. In relation to this, see for instance Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002).

²⁷ In this context, the term *kajian* refers to Nahdhatul Ulama students who regularly discuss the ideas of contemporary 'liberal' Muslim thinkers like Hassan Hanafi and Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid.

anything be omitted. Therefore, if the Qur'an says something, there is no option for Muslim believers but to except and obey it. If the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad says so, it means that there is blessing in it.

He further explained that the commands of the Qur'an and the Sunnah should be part of Muslims' lives. To this end, Muslims should imitate the Prophet Muhammad, the living Qur'an, and the perfect Muslim model. When asked about the Prophet's character, 'Aishah, the Prophet's wife, responded that his character was the Qur'an. His journey was not easy and it took time but Sugiono eventually felt that Salafism was the model of Islam he had been looking for. Being a Salafi means that he should put aside his *nafsu* (ego), which tends to lead to self-destruction, and submit himself to Allah's guidance. This means that he should behave in ways following the teachings of His Messenger. He always tried to practice Islam as much as possible. Starting from individual obligations like praying, fasting, and giving alms during Ramadhan, up to *fadhail al-a'mal* (recommended deeds) such as sporting a beard and pulling his pants above his ankles. To let the trousers touch the ground (*isbal*) is considered excessive and is prohibited in Islam. All these things should be done in expectation of God's rewards.

Nafis's story is different. When he came to the Ma'had for the first time, he was surprised to find that most students sported long beards, which in Indonesian culture is unpopular. Only if a man has a thick beard he would not let it grow because a man who lets his thin beard grow might be called a "goat". In his family, no one had a beard, including his father. When he expressed his amazement at what he had seen to his father, his father explained that having a beard is closely related to Arabian culture. After some

time he found that wearing a beard was recommended. “My God recommended me to wear a long beard and to clip my moustache.” “Two things are *fitrah*: clipping the moustache and sporting a beard” (narrated by Muslim). He eventually decided to grow a long beard even if it was very thin. Another *hadith* says that wearing a long beard is a token to differentiate between Muslims and polytheists. He also removed the rims of his pants. Wearing long pants is *tabdzir* (waste) and it is forbidden. When his family first saw the changes he made, his family was surprised but they eventually understood why he had made them. His father eventually decided to sport a long beard too just to show his respect for him.

The most difficult process in becoming a Salafi, Sugiono said, was to comply with the Sharia injunctions. Becoming a Salafi requires prolonged spiritual training.²⁸ Besides performing the obligatory prayers, he always did the supplementary ones as well. At night, at about 3.30 AM, he would wake up and go to the bathroom although it was cold. As the ablution water touched his face, he prayed to God. “O Lord! Make my face bright on the Day when the faces will turn dark. Do not darken my face on the Day when the faces are bright.” While pouring water on his right hand, he prayed “O Lord! Give my book of deeds in my right hand, and a permanent stay in Paradise on my left, and make my reckoning an easy one.” While pouring water on his left hand, he prayed “O Lord! Do

²⁸ Among Salafis, spiritual training refers to performing the standard practices such as prayers and reading the Qur’an as exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad. This term is not to be confused with spiritual training among Muslim mystics, which includes *dhikir* (incantation), *wirid*, and *tarekat* practices and methods. See Martin van Bruinessen and Julia D. Howell (eds.), *Sufism and the ‘Modern’ in Islam* (London: IB Tauris, 2007).

not give my book of deeds in my left hand, nor from behind my back, nor chain it to my neck. I seek refuge in You from the fire of Hell.” He completed his ablution and prayed.

“I bear witness that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah alone, Who has no partner; and I bear witness that Muhammad is His servant and His Messenger.”

“O Allah, make me among those who turn to You in repentance, and make me among those who are purified.”

“Glory is to You, O Allah, and praise; I bear witness that there is none worthy of worship but You. I seek Your forgiveness and turn to You in repentance.”

Wearing a white cap and pants above the ankle, he went to the mosque and prayed.

He used non-alcoholic perfume. Sometimes he did *siwak* (brushing teeth with arak—*Salvadora persica*). The Prophet Muhammad exemplified the ritual of prayer. It is fixed. The Prophet says, “You pray as you see me pray.” He began to pray by saying *Allahu Akbar*. He stood up facing the *qiblah* (the direction of the Ka’ba in Mecca). He almost whispered the *dua* (prayer) with modest speed. There should be a *tuma’ninah* (quiet moment, a full stop) between one movement and another. He would lengthen his prostration and put all the weight of his head on the rug. He said that prostration was the most intimate moment when he put all his problems before God. It took longer than the rest of the prayer. This was the reason why his forehead had become black. He would repeat his prayer repeatedly in the same tempo until he felt it was enough. The rest of the ritual was the *dua*. He would pray for God’s blessing for the rest of his life. He would pray to God to forgive his father and his mother. Having completed his prayer he would stay on his rug for *i’tikaf* (staying) waiting for the morning prayer.

Initially, he thought his training was very hard and he was sleepy during the day and he felt weak when he was performing recommended fasting (Ar. *sunnah*) on

Mondays and Thursdays. When he talked of his concern to his teachers, they said that he should persist and not give up. It took time for everything to turn into a habit. The routinization of his prayers, reading the Qur'an, and fasting had become the expression of his piety. He accompanied this by abstaining from committing *ma'shiat* (sinful deeds). If he would indulge in it, *ma'shiat* would become a stain, which would pollute the purity of his heart. Sugiono further asserted that someone should train based of his individual capacity as God never would burden His servants beyond their capability. In relation to this, the Prophet Muhammad had said *khairul umur adwamuha* (the best deed is a continuous one). Once a practice was established, one should not change one's lifestyle.

Sugiono combined his training with his alertness against *bid'ah*. All the Salafi *ulama* agree on the prohibition of *bid'ah* including the so-called *bid'ah hasanah* (good *bid'ah*) traditionalist Muslim groups claim are allowed. Salafi students have been trained about the danger of *bid'ah* long before they attended the Ma'had. They reject any form of *bid'ah* traditionalist students allow. As a result, the Ma'had had become a battlefield between Salafi and traditionalist students. He said that this was a good example of why *da'wah salafiyah* should be promulgated. It should be done with wisdom and good advice, and, when necessary, with argumentative reasoning. He himself had seen that many of his friends indulged in *bid'ah*. He would just keep quiet and wait for the right time to act and talk. He had used this strategy during his training in his Ma'had. He approached the local population, listened to their arguments and eventually he would talk. As a result, he said, they gradually abandoned their *bid'ah*. He personally did not agree with Salafi students who promote Salafism without using this kind of strategy. The

Prophet himself, he said, needed twenty-three years to promote his teachings among the Quraish population. In the Ma'had, religious training and alertness against the danger of *bid'ah* have been combined into the overall learning method. Moreover, through its teachers, the Ma'had provides spiritual guidance to the students and through this process the students gradually turn into Salafis.

“Purification Clinic”

Apart from spiritual training, the Ma'had has a “purification clinic”. It refers to the programs the Ma'had offers where students are urged to watch videos on *da'wah salafiyah*. However, the *da'wah salafiyah* is limited to the *da'wah* as formulated by Saudi-Wahhabi scholars. It begins with the history of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab who is credited with upholding the banner of *tawhid*, which his successors have continued up to modern times with contemporaries including Bin Baz and his students. Apart from that, the videos also showed the generosity of the Saudi royal families and their commitment to support Islamic *da'wah*. Here Salafism is coupled with Saudi propaganda. Non-Salafi-Wahhabi religious scholars do not feature at all in the videos.

The clinic reportedly offers a positive contribution to the purification of the students, the degree to which may vary from one student to the other. Students who previously studied in Salafi *madrassa* are more confident in their Salafi way of life. Meanwhile traditionalist students have gradually moved toward puritanism. Nashiruddin, a traditionalist student who graduated in 2010, argued that many traditionalist students were likely to abandon excessive rituals around the dead, which require much energy and

money. Although they still believe that these rituals are recommended, which is the original ruling, it is better to give up excessive rituals. Despite this purification tendency, traditionalist students claim not to be interested in Salafism. They just seek knowledge.

Nafis had different responses. He was unsure whether he was a Salafi or not. For him, becoming a good Muslim was much more important. He came to the Ma'had not in order to become a Salafi, but rather to seek knowledge and with this knowledge he hoped he could do something for his community. He always remembered his ailing father and the *madrassa* his extended family had built to commemorate his grandfather. It was dedicated to *da'wah* for the local community who still practice local rituals. Many people in his village claim to be descendants of Prabu Siliwangi, the greatest and the last king of the fourteenth century Pajajaran Hindu kingdom in West Java that was defeated by the Muslim ruler from Banten. The local community has maintained specific rituals to commemorate ancient Sundanese culture. They perform various rituals as the season progresses. He would love to finish his study as soon as possible and return to his village especially because since the last decades indigenous religions have revived because the people now enjoy freedom of expression. Bolstered by civil rights arguments, the people have gone back to the religion of their ancestors. He feels it is his obligation to promote the spirit of *tawhid* among the villagers much like his father did many decades ago. He admitted that he came from a Persis background, which was very concerned with religious purification. Nevertheless, he added, Persis also has a modern interpretation of Islam. His attitude, he said, conformed to the Ma'had's goals. The Ma'had officially does not produce Salafis. Salafi-ness is resulted from complex relationships between the

students and Saudi *sheikhs*, many of whom are Wahhabi-Salafi scholars. Some scholars teaching at the Ma'had, including Indonesian scholars, are open-minded. Despite this complexity, he was able to differentiate between the official attitudes of the Ma'had and the Salafi tendency within the Ma'had. Many of his classmates want to become Salafis and they asked him to join. He replied that he had already become a Salafi before coming to the Ma'had. He argued that all Muslims were Salafi, only the degree to which differed from one person to another.

In regard to this, Nashiruddin also argued that the traditionalist NU, to which he belonged, claimed to be Salafi too. This can be seen from the term '*pesantren salaf*' (*salaf* boarding school), a boarding school which specialized in and only offers religious knowledge. The traditionalist NU understands Salafism as a set of teachings laid down by the early *ulama*, starting from the Prophet Muhammad, the *Sahabat* (the Companion), the *Tabiin* (the Followers of the Companion), and the *aimmatul madhahib* (the founders of schools of thought). The spirit of Salafism was further continued by *ulama* coming from different periods and places. Traditionalist students were proud of the nine saints of Java (Ind. *Wali Songo*) who were pious scholars and who are credited for having promulgated Islam in the archipelago. Many traditionalist students and scholars within the Ma'had believe that the Saudis, through the Ma'had, have hijacked Salafism and have narrowed its meaning to Wahhabism. However, they did not bring up their concerns in front of their Saudi *sheikhs* or professors. For pragmatic reason they act as yes-men, while outside the Ma'had they would mock Wahhabism.

Most students believe that the Ma'had has in fact given a positive contribution to the development of their religious understanding – including their understanding of Salafism. Students with different backgrounds come to the Ma'had: Salafis, and members of the NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and the Jama'ah Tabligh. In this institution, they are forced to share their ideas. It is undeniable that some Salafi groups are extreme in their religious attitudes and they not only accuse other groups of being *bid'ah* practitioners, they even attack and prosecute them. The many incidents that took place in the country and that were allegedly committed by Salafis just give Salafism a bad name. The best way to resolve this problem is to integrate Salafi groups into the wider Muslim community rather than to isolate and reject them. In relation to this, Nashiruddin says:

I love the fact that the Ma'had has turned into the place where many ideas are exchanged. We are traditionalist, modernist, Tablighis, and Salafis. We are forced to exchange. Having said this, I reject the public opinion that the Ma'had produces Wahhabis. No, that's not true. I am still a *nahdhiyyin* [the follower of NU] even if people outside would call me a Wahhabi. (Interview with Nashiruddin, Jakarta, October, 14, 2013)

Integration and social relations between students create mutual understanding. This is exactly what happens in the Ma'had. Salafi students tend to become more open and respectful of other groups. Contrarily, NU students tend to become more orthodox. Nafis gave me as example that many NU friends now pray *tarawih* (the additional prayers during the month of Ramadhan) with eleven *raka'at* (cycles), which he believes is more accurate than twenty three *raka'at*, and many NU friends do not read *qunut* during the morning prayer. On the contrary, traditionalist students argue that the NU has for a long time perceived *qunut* as *sunnah* (recommended) not *wajib* (obligatory). They

admit that sometimes they practice it, and sometimes they do not. Based on these stories, the students' understanding of Salafism widely varies. It depends upon their historical background e.g. modernist, traditionalist, as well as their social life inside and outside the Ma'had. Traditionalists, modernists, and Salafis share a great deal of Salafism as an authentic form of Islam.

The presence of Saudi *sheikhs*, however, charged with upholding the right path of Islam and a huge collection of Wahhabi scholarship inevitably shapes the reproduction of the knowledge of the students. It tends to create uniformity among the Salafis. This tendency is resulted from the use of Salafi-Wahhabi scholarship that ignores the scholarship of the mainstream Sunni traditions. A number of primary courses such as *aqidah* and *fiqh* have become the specialty of the Saudi *sheikhs*. They also give lectures on Islam. Indonesian *ustadz* usually teach *nahwu* (grammar) or particular Shafi'i books, secondary knowledge. They are also less paid compared to Saudis and non-Saudis. It is believed that Saudi *sheikhs* serve as orthodoxy's guardians and they are considered more learned than Indonesian scholars. The Saudi *sheikhs* regularly deliver sermons, lectures, seminars, and training for students. It is said that they were invited to enrich the students' understanding of Islam and to guard them from liberal fallacies. The term 'liberal' here refers to various study circles outside the Ma'had that blend contemporary Islamic ideas with Western post-modern philosophy. To the last point, many traditionalist students, many of whom claim to be a *mbalelo* (unruly) agree that they do not want to transgress the border.

State Schooling

I argue that the Ma'had is a form of a Saudi Arabia state schooling. Some anthropologists have discussed the role of the state in the reproduction of knowledge. This phenomenon is called state schooling (Fortna 2002; Hefner and Zaman 2007; Starret 1998). State schooling is a disciplinary institution in which the state seeks to control the reproduction of knowledge of students. In the modern period, cooptation by the state is crucial as the state increasingly penetrates the schools and seeks to control the knowledge of its citizens. Starret calls this process functionalization, “a process of translation in which intellectual objects from one discourse come to serve the strategic or utilitarian end of another discourse” (Starret 1998: 9). State schooling was also founded in the course of Islamic history. During the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the sultan built schools across the country to block the infiltration of Western missionaries’ influence. Their tasks were to redefine the Empire’s historical trajectories, to redraw the borders between the Ottomans and the West, and to rearticulate the roles of the state in society (Fortna 2002).

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, *madrasa* were built within the Muslim communities to challenge the rise of the Western educational system built by Western colonial administrations. This led to a dichotomy in the education system in many parts of the Muslim world. Elites usually attended Western schools, through which they were able to build careers as colonial administrators, whereas ordinary Muslims, maintaining their cultural legacies, attended the *madrasa* system. In India, *madrasa* were built not only to challenge the encroachment of British schools but also to preserve Muslim

identities and cultures under the domination of the Hindu majority (Sikand 2005).

Madrassa are the last bastions where Muslims seek refuge to preserve their religious orthodoxy. Apart from the politics of education, some scholars assert that the rise of *madrassa* within the Muslim communities was related to the high demand for standardizing and normativizing Islamic knowledge. The rise of *madrassa* is thus part of the recentering and the homogenization of religious knowledge. This can be seen in the championing of *fiqh* as the queen of religious science. It is the process of canonization in which knowledge was standardized based on written authoritative sources (Hefner and Zaman 2007).

Arabian Coffee, Indonesian Cookies

Despite of the roles of the state, the project of state schooling has largely failed to produce the desired singularity of knowledge. This is because actors had the opportunity to produce knowledge deemed in support of their interests. “While the school may be a mechanism of diffuse and invisible power, it is also an engine of tension and contradiction” (Starret 1998: 12). Given the fact that actors are exposed to larger social settings and that they have different historical backgrounds, the reproduction of knowledge is marked by a huge diversity.

As a state institution affiliated with Saudi Arabia, all the professors who teach at the Ma’had are appointed with the endorsement of Riyadh. They are state officials responsible for promoting Islamic education in line with the interests of Saudi Arabia. One of the officials is Mohammed Salim Al-Makki. After completing his degree at the

Faculty of Islamic Theology at the *Jami'ah Imam* in Riyadh, he was appointed as young lecturer there. After working at several posts at home, he was sent to Jakarta in 2010. He represents the newly emerging Saudi *ulama* after the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979 led by the extremist Juhaiman al-Utaiby. Al-Makki admitted that while maintaining its status as a state institution, the Ma'had failed to control the reproduction of the knowledge of its students. This is because students are exposed to a multiplicity of socialization and opportunities.

Figure 3

The salaries of the LIPIA professors and staffs (in Saudi riyal)²⁹

Degree/position	Saudi	Non-Saudi	Indonesia
Doctor	15000-25000	6000-9000	6000-8000
Magister	-	3000-4000	3000-4000
Undergraduate	-	-	2500
Staff	13.000-18.000		800-1000

The formal reproduction of knowledge, which largely takes place in class, the mosque, and the library, is thus challenged by the students' individual and informal life outside campus, and this is the most difficult problem. It even happened that a student had been involved in a terror attack because of his encounter with radical groups outside campus. He was dismissed forthright. Furthermore, the Ma'had also does not tolerate its students to be involved in protests either against the Indonesian government or the Saudi

²⁹ The Ma'had does not have standard salaries for its professors and other staff members. The salaries are negotiated between the individuals and the Ma'had. The gaps between the salaries of the Saudis, and non-Saudis and Indonesians are very high. This fact leads to conflicts between Saudi, non-Saudi and Indonesian professors and other staff members.

Arabian government. Al-Makki is very concerned with the fact that a number of people accuse the Ma'had of teaching radicalism, especially after 9/11. After this terror attack Of 9/11, the number of applicants had dropped significantly. Nevertheless, the Ma'had has so far survived because of good cooperation with the Indonesian authorities as well as with other Islamic institutions in the country.

Al-Makki answered all my questions cautiously or, to be more precise, diplomatically. As a state official, he did not want to offer wrong information about his institution or his country. At the end of the interview, he called someone to serve drinks and snacks. Strong Arabian coffee and dates and cookies were put on the table. He said the dates came from Saudi Arabia, but the cookies were locally made. He compared this to the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The Saudi built the Ma'had, but most of its students are Indonesians. He did not have any problem with my research. This meant, he said, that the Ma'had is important. Although the Ma'had has been criticized for a number of reasons, people still came.

Since its establishment, the Ma'had has been tinged with politics. The term politics here not only refers to the Ma'had's mission as an Islamic institute or to the accommodation of the Saudi religious establishment in it. It also includes the unpredictable relationship with the Indonesian authorities as well as the public criticism that accuse the Ma'had of promoting a non-conformist Islamic perspective among its students. All these factors have influenced the Ma'had's overall performance over the last three decades. Had it not been for the strong support of the Saudi and Indonesian authorities, the Ma'had should have been in serious decline.

Same School, Different Outcomes

Besides knowledge, the Ma'had also offers networks to its students and these networks not only refer to careers and scholarships the students may get from Saudi Arabian institutions, but also patron-client relationships with Middle Eastern Salafi *ulama*. These factors considerably shape the transformation of Salafism in Indonesia. These differences can be seen, at least, in two different groups: the Wahdah and Laskar Jihad. While the Wahdah has been one of the most successful Salafi groups in creating its organizational networks with its Middle Eastern patrons (Jurdi 2007; Bubalo & Fealy 2007), Laskar Jihad, after its encounter with the Yemeni Salafi scholar, Muqbin bin Hadi al-Wadi'i, turned out to be a paramilitary organization (Hasan 2005; Bonnefoy 2009: 321-341).

In the following section, I will describe two prototypes of students who influence the transformation of Salafism in Indonesia: Zaitun Rasmin from the Wahdah and Ja'far Umar Thalib from Laskar Jihad. They have different social and historical backgrounds, social lives, and careers after they had discontinued their studies in the Ma'had which both did not finish. Their attachment to the Ma'had was just a stepping-stone through which they could connect with other Islamic institutions. Zaitun Rasmin, the founder of the Wahdah Islamiyah, has inherited the spirit of Islamic modernism as laid down by Indonesian modernist figures, who call upon Muslim to create modern institutions as well as to purify religious practices. Meanwhile, the escalation of the Muslim-Christian conflicts in post-Soeharto Indonesia gave rise to a Salafi paramilitary group called Laskar Jihad. Ja'far Umar Thalib, its former commander, is a Salafi teacher who was responsible

for the deployment of this paramilitary group in Ambon and Poso, the two main conflict areas in the eastern part of Indonesia in the early 2000s. Claiming to be a purist, he renounced any political involvement and accused those involved in politics as *hizbiyyah* (factionalist). He had been involved in many conflicts with other Salafi figures, leading to the fragmentation of the Salafi groups in the country.

A “Reformist” Salafi

Long before attending the Ma’had, in the 1980s, Rasmin was a Muslim activist in Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi Province. This region was previously popular for its traveling preachers who promoted Islam in other parts of the country. During the 1950s, the province became a hotbed of the Darul Islam movement, a separatist organization that attempted to create an Islamic state (Van Dijk 1981; Van Bruinessen 2002). During the New Order, Makassar experienced one of the largest Islamic movements in the region. Together with his friend, Hasyim, Rasmin clandestinely organized a study club to discuss Islamic issues. At that time, the authoritarian New Order regime tightened its control over Muslim activists. The 1983 tragedy in Tanjung Priok, a district in the north of Jakarta, in which hundreds of Muslim activists had been killed or went missing, changed the direction of their movement. The tragedy was remarkable because a number of the victims were of Buginese or Makassarese ethnic backgrounds, the two main ethnic groups in South Sulawesi, who had close relations with the local activists. Amir Bikki, one of the Muslim public speakers killed in the incident, had been very popular among the activists and they circulated and reproduced his

cassettes among themselves.

In the aftermath of this incident, Rasmin and Hasyim agreed to re-orient their movement and they urged all their cadres return to school or to a *madrassa*. One day, as every day, they held a religious gathering and suddenly they realized that none of them was able to read or understand Arabic. They looked at each other and did not know what to say. Like many other activists, Rasmin read about Islam from translated books especially those written by Ikhwan such as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), Said Hawwa (1935-1989), and Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977). Thanks to the modernist Muhammadiyah, he was exposed to more modernist ideas, which later on shaped his movement. Fathul Mu'in Daeng Magading, a local Muhammadiyah leader, reportedly had said that he would give his van to anyone who could convince him of the legitimacy of the twenty-three *raka'at* (cycles) of the *tarawih* (supplementary prayer during the nights of Ramadhan). As known, the number of *raka'at* of the *tarawih* has always been controversial. Traditionalist NU perform twenty-three cycles, while modernist Muhammadiyah only eleven. Although Rasmin was not really interested in *khilafiyah* (religious disputes) issues, the modernist legacy nevertheless shaped his ideas. He is one of the modernist Muslim figures who brought back and even redefined Salafism within modernist circles.

In the mid-1980s, Rasmin headed to Jakarta but he only studied at the Ma'had for three semesters after which he left for the Islamic University of Medina. He enrolled at the Faculty of Sharia and studied with prominent Saudi scholars such as Sheikh Bin Baz and Sheikh al-Uthaimin. After finishing his study in the early 1990s, he worked in

various Saudi international bodies including the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Muslim League (WML). Having thus obtained these connections, he linked his nascent organization at home to these international Islamic bodies. He supported Wahdah cadres to pursue their advanced degrees at Saudi universities and many young Wahdah students were given this opportunity. At the same time, he managed to approach Saudi donors to establish a Ma'had-like institute in Makassar called STIBA (Institute for Islamic Science and Arabic) which was subsequently used as a long distant-class for the Islamic University of Medina.

In 1998, Rasmin returned to his hometown. At the time, the political climate was very heated. Many rumors circulated among the public of the possibility of a return to the tightened policies of the New Order. Other rumors said that Soeharto was a sinking ship and that conservative Islamism should not save him from sinking. Believing that the political situation was improving, in 1998, Rasmin and his colleagues took advantage of this moment to transform the legal status of their organization from a *yayasan* (foundation), founded in 1988, to an *organisasi massa* (mass organization). With this new status, the Wahdah was able to expand its activities and it created branches in every province in the country. All the cadres and the Muslim people who expected the Wahdah to have an important role in building Muslim communities in the region applauded this decision.

A Shift of Paradigm

The rise of the Wahdah cannot be seen separated from the decline of the Muhammadiyah. Many were dissatisfied with this organization. Some Wahdah cadres considered the Muhammadiyah too lenient in its acceptance of the imposition of the Pancasila (the five pillars) as the sole basis for all social and religious organizations in the country (Jurdi 2007). Others saw that the Muhammadiyah had abandoned its *tajdid* program which had been the organization's spirit. Many young cadres saw this as a critical juncture from which they could distinct themselves more clearly from the domination of the old generation. They were more concerned with the unity of the *ummah*, education improvement, and *da'wah*, while old generations were concerned with *khilafiyah* which made Muslims prone to divides and to oppose each other as happened with issues around the celebration of Idul Fitri.

As predicted, the celebration of Idul Fitri in 2012 was rife with controversy. Muhammadiyah followers, long before the arrival of the holy month, had issued a statement that they would celebrate Lebaran or Idul Fitri on a particular day. This was based on the Muhammadiyah's astronomical calculation usually called *hisab*. Other Muslim groups, using *rukyyat*, waited until the twenty-ninth of the month.³⁰ The first of Ramadhan, and the end of Ramadhan, as the Prophet Muhammad pbuh said, should be based on the sighting of the moon. Thus, "if you are unable to see the moon because of clouds, you should complete the number of fasting days to thirty." Coincidentally, that year, the moon was invisible during the 29th day of Ramadhan. This meant that they

³⁰ In the Islamic calendar, a month has twenty-nine or thirty days.

should complete (Ar. *istikmal*) Ramadhan for thirty days. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah followers had decided to celebrate Idul Fitri on that very day, which meant that they only fasted for twenty-nine days. This also meant that not all Muslims celebrated Idul Fitri on the same day. The Muhammadiyah argued that the government should not interfere in religious matters and that Muslims themselves should make their own decisions. Other Muslim groups, however, relied on the government's decree on the day of Idul Fitri. According to these groups, the government actually acted as a mediator between different Muslims factions.

Concerning public issues such as the celebration of Idul Fitri, the Wahdah follows the government. Zaitun said that Muslims should obey the government concerning Ramadhan and Idul Fitri. They have the authority on this issue. He further asserted:

We used to do *da'wah* in this way when we were still students. We opposed the government because we believed that the government was un-Islamic. But now, we have changed. After reading the Salafi books, we changed. The Salafis strongly emphasize the obligation to obey the rulers. The rulers are the *imam*, those people have the authorities to make regulations for the sake of society. The presence of an *imam* is obligatory. These are the fundamental principles of the Salafis. (Interview with Zaitun Rasmin, Makassar, May 10, 2011)

Zaitun's opinion on Idul Fitri is relevant in the sense that it supports the authority of the rulers on public matters. At the same time, this opinion is the result of the evolution of his religious thought. Many years ago, before he was introduced to Salafism, he always celebrated Idul Fitri in accordance with the Muhammadiyah. He even mocked other Muslim groups who followed the government arguing that the government did not have any authority in the matter. Later on he realized that this kind of *da'wah* only divided Muslim groups even further. His encounter with Salafism became a turning point,

not only for himself but also for all the followers of the organization. It all began when he attended the Ma'had and started to read Salafi books. He began to understand the importance of the state in public affairs when he studied Salafism in Medina. The Salafi doctrine on the obligation for rulers in public issues is obvious and this had been missing when he was still student.

Rasmin further asserted that some Muslim groups' insistence to celebrate Idul Fitri on their own and not following the government's decree on it, resulted in the disintegration of the Muslim ummah. To resolve this problem, he called upon Muslim believers to refer to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, so that they could celebrate the Idul Fitri according to the Sharia. Some *hadith* mention how the Prophet Muhammad gave his guidance on how this public holiday should be celebrated. "You fast as people fast. And you celebrate Idul Fitri as people celebrate it." (Narrated by Timidhi, Ibn Madjah and Abu Dawud). This *hadith* does not mention *rukyyat* or *hisab*. Rather, it emphasizes the inseparability and cohesion of the *ummah* and that fasting and celebrating Idul Fitri should be done collectively. According to Rasmin, Islam is rich with public ritual. It is a mechanism to maintain in-group feeling and the solidarity among the believers. If Muslims celebrate Idul Fitri on different days, this goal is hard to achieve. He always advised all Wahdah followers as well as the Muslim community in general to follow the government on this issue.

"First, it is important that the beginning of Ramadhan and the celebration of Idul Fitri are determined by the government as long as the government is legitimate on this issue regardless of the method they use... Second, all Muslim believers, including Muslim organizations and Muslim leaders that have the authority on this issue are obliged to offer their opinion to the government and let the

government make its decision. Third, individuals or Islamic organizations that believe Ramadhan has arrived, but the government, with its argumentation does not accept their testimony, are allowed to fast without showing off to others. Other Muslim people, who have not yet begun fasting, are obliged to follow the government. Fourth, when Muslims are convinced that it is already the month of Shawwal and thus they are no longer allowed to fast, but the government has not made any decision, they are not allowed to celebrate Idul Fitri prayers except with other Muslim people – who follow the government...³¹

In an attempt to solve the problem of the unity of the *ummah*, he named his organization Wahdah Islamiyah (The Unity of the Ummah). Although it does not renounce politics, the Wahdah is committed to be non-political. Individuals who become active in politics are asked to leave the organization. This decision was made based on the earlier disintegration of Islamic organizations when their members became involved in politics. The main activities of the Wahdah are *da'wah* and education. Their concept of *da'wah* is based on the teaching of *Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama'ah*. The Wahdah limits the use of the term Salafi to avoid debates, which have a negative impact on the organization. Instead it uses the term *Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama'ah*. Meanwhile the Wahdah's concept of education (Ar. *tarbiyah*) is based on the balanced and simultaneous application of *tazkiyah* (cleansing or purifying the self), and *ta'lim* (knowledge enrichment). It produces *da'i* (preachers) through a training called *tadrib al-du'at* (preacher training). After completing their training, preachers are sent to many parts of the country to expand the Wahdah network. Having inherited the modernist DDII spirit, it sends its preachers to remote areas to intercept Christian missionaries. Although Christianization is largely

³¹ Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, "Menyatukan Idul Fitri Secara Syar'i dan Elegan," *Harian Fajar*, October, 9 2007, <http://wahdah.or.id/2007/10/wawancara-khusus-harian-fajar-selasa-9-oktober-2007-halaman-19/> Accessed on December, 12 2012.

unheard of in post-Soeharto Indonesia, the Wahdah is convinced that some Churches are active in missionary activities in the Eastern part of the archipelago. Many local people reportedly converted to Islam after they had received the Wahdah's *da'wah*. The Wahdah also created branches in frontier islands where Muslim and Christian groups face each other. Nevertheless, the Wahdah promotes peaceful *da'wah* and denounces any violent means in promoting its faith as it is against Salafi teachings.

In education, the Wahdah has inherited the spirit of the Muhammadiyah, especially on the importance of setting up modern institutions. So far, it has established organizational branches in all the provinces in the country. In many branches, especially in South Sulawesi, its home-province, it has established dozens of schools, starting from kindergarten to high schools. Wahdah schools are characterized by having modern features: a curriculum, classes, grades, certificates, and orienting students to gain professional skills. The Wahdah seeks to produce students who have acquiring knowledge in modern sciences on the one hand, and religious knowledge on the other. Instead of traditional *madrasa*, the Wahdah runs modern educational institutions from elementary up to high schools and because it has an integrated curriculum – a combination between secular sciences and religious knowledge – the schools attract middle class Muslim families. Students are expected to become engineers or doctors – the professions most expected of the students. Apart from these integrated Islamic schools, the Wahdah runs various religious schools (*madrasa*), Islamic boarding schools, *tahfidz al-Qur'an* (memorization of the Qur'an) schools, and *ta'lim* (religious lectures) for women, youths, and housewives. Therefore, while “integrated Islamic schools” are meant

to produce Muslims with secular skills, the religious schools are to produce religious professionals such as *da'i* (preacher) and *ustadz* (teachers). According to Rasmin, the Wahdah seeks to balance the importance of organization and the prominence of *da'wah* as both are equally important.

A “Revivalist” Salafi

Ja'far Umar Thalib (born 1961) was once the most important Salafi figure and who had shaped the history of Salafi groups in Indonesia (Hasan 2005: Jamhari & Jahroni 2004). Although many Salafi leaders despise him, his influence remains remarkable. In 2000, he founded a Muslim militia that was subsequently deployed in Ambon and Poso, two areas where Muslims and Christians were in conflict. He believed it was obligatory to defend fellow Muslims against Christian assaults. Many Salafi figures were disappointed with Ja'far's leadership and his violations on the Salafi *manhaj* (Wahid, 2013: 65-66). They requested the *fatwa* from the Salafi ulama in Saudi Arabia on this matter. In 2002, Sheikh Rabi'i bin Hadi al-Wadi'i, the Saudi grand *mufti* and successor of Sheikh Bin Baz, issued an edict which stated that Ja'far had gone astray from the true path of Salafism. He was barred from entering Saudi Arabia for seven years (2001-2008). At home his colleagues opposed him. Nevertheless, he challenged his opponents to take a *mubahala*,³² but no one was willing to do it.

³² *Mubahalah* is a mechanism where two challenging people take an oath in the name of God in front of the public to demonstrate their self-truth and the fallacies of their challengers.

In the aftermath of the Bali Bombing in 2005, Ja'far made the alarming statement that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the religious scholar who was previously involved in a clandestine movement against the authorities, was behind the attacks as he promoted Kharijite ideologies. The term Kharijite refers to an extremist group who denounced the leadership of Caliph Ali ibn Abi Thalib and of Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan following the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE and declared both as infidels due to their negligence of the laws of God. It is relevant to note that despite the fact that Ja'far once sent paramilitary troops to Ambon and Poso, he argued that all he did was to defend the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia against separatist groups in Maluku. When the separatists would have been eradicated, he further asserted, he would disband the militia and he had no intention whatsoever of establishing an Islamic State. Due to his anti-separatist attitude, he was and remains close to the Indonesian military. Nowadays, he is frequently invited by the Indonesian National Contra-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) to offer his ideas on combating terror attacks in the country.³³

Ja'far was born to a Hadhrami family in Malang, East Java. He received his early education in a *madrassa* of al-Irshad, a modernist group founded by Sheikh Ahmad Soorkati. His ancestors were peripatetic scholars and preachers who had migrated from Yemen to the archipelago in the mid-nineteenth century and who had strong puritanical inclinations. It is hardly surprising that he grew up as a non-compromising figure. In the early 1980s, he studied at the Ma'had in Jakarta but did not graduate. He disputed with Sheikh Yasin, one of the teachers in the Ma'had and he did not agree with the subject

³³ Interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, February 15, 2011.

Sheikh Yasin taught namely the *Matan al-Ghayah wal al-Taqrīb* – popularly called *Matan Abu Syuja* – a text composed by the medieval Shafi’i scholar Abu Syuja Ahmad ibn Hasan al-Isfahani (1138-1197). This book is very popular among traditionalist NU Islamic boarding schools across the country. He considered that the subject was useless since it was devoid of references to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Each time Yasin came into the class, he stood up and left. Knowing that he was a brilliant student, the Director of the Ma’had, Abd al-Aziz ibn Ammar offered him a scholarship to study in Pakistan. He then studied at the Mawdudi Institute in Lahore but only stayed for less than a year. He was obsessed with crossing the border to join the Afghan *mujahid* (fighters) against the communist Soviets. He claimed to have joined Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction but he eventually joined the Salafi faction called *Jama’at Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wal Sunnah*. In Afghanistan, his Salafi commanders, many of whom were contingents from the Middle East, taught him many military skills such as guerilla tactics and strategies.

Returning from Pakistan in 1989, he taught at *Pesantren* Tengahan in Central Java, but only lasted for three months. He was ousted by the *pesantren* board due to his severe methods. In 1990, he flew to Dammaj in Yemen, where he met Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i, who eventually shaped his knowledge further. In al-Wadi’i, he found the ideal type of Salafi scholar who combined fortitude, humility, and knowledge. In his *Tuhfat al-Mubib ‘ala As’ilati al-Hadhīr wal Gharīb* (The Loved Gift for the Questions by the Present and Distant Friends), al-Wadi’i described Ja’far as a learned Indonesian student who, despite having lived for only a short period in Dammaj, could benefit much from his study. Meanwhile, Ja’far described his teacher as a learned and God-fearing

person who dedicated his life for the avocation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. His encounter with al-Wadi'i is interesting for a number of reasons. First, Al-Wadi'i was expelled from Saudi Arabia following Juhaiman al-Utaibi's short seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. He was accused of being involved in the coup. Returning to his hometown Dammaj, he founded Daar al-Sunnah, specializing on *hadith*. In this tiny town, he taught *hadith* and his popularity attracted students from all over the Muslim world. Second, al-Wadi'i had faced extremely difficult times during all of his life until his death in 1999. In the barren desert, he had to face San'a's secular regime, Shiite opposition to which a significant number of the Yemeni ethnic group al-Houthi subscribe, warlords, and extremist groups. Third, through al-Wadi'i's leadership, Ja'far not only saw him as the prototype of a Salafi scholar who fought with his pen, but also as a fighter who commanded his troops to combat the enemies of Islam.

From Assertive Politics to Quietism

According to Ja'far, formal politics is *haram* (unlawful) thus he can be categorized as belonging to the first group. Many Salafi classical thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya up to modern scholars such as Nasiruddin al-Albani reiterated quietism in relation to politics. In practice, Salafi communities often violate this principle. Quietists secretly offer advice to the rulers while distancing themselves from them. A deep immersion in politics, according to this group, would certainly distract the people's attention and energy away from *da'wah* and *tarbiyah*'s main obligation.

In Ja'far's experience, the political pendulum of the Salafis moves between quietism and assertive politics. Unlike Rasmin, who was more concerned with *da'wah* and education as well as constantly offering advice to the authorities, Ja'far displayed a belligerent attitude. According to him, jihad for defensive reasons was permissible and should be undertaken under *ulama* guidance. For this reason, he had created his paramilitary group under al-Wadi'i's guidance, and it was disbanded on the very same day al-Wadi'i issued a *fatwa* to do so. He argued that he never had any intention to oppose the rulers, nor had he ever provoked his followers to create a separate state as it is against Salafi teachings. In the course of history, Salafis always supported their rulers regardless whether they were just or not. During the interview with him on February 2012, to support his argument, he related the story of Ahmad bin Hanbal, one of the most respected Salafi *ulama*, who continued to pray for the caliph. When his son asked him why he kept praying for the caliph despite his cruelty against him, he answered that if he knew one request to be granted by God, he would have prayed for the ruler's enlightenment and forgiveness.

In the post-Laskar Jihad period, Ja'far lost many of his followers at home and his patrons abroad. Although he was able to maintain his connections with the Saudi religious establishment, some senior members still dismissed him. This had consequences for the Salafi groups in Indonesia. His colleagues even refused to see him. He returned to his *madrasa* in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. Realizing that many Salafi figures despised him, he admitted not to have made any provocative statement that might worsen the situation.

In view of the large numbers of attendants at his lectures, I asked him why he did not establish his own Salafi organization. To this question, he answered:

I am just a *guru ngaji* (religious scholar). I have the obligation to remind and advise the rulers to be in accordance with the right path of Islam. I have no intention of becoming a Salafi leader. I am just an ordinary person. Although many people ask me to do so, I am not interested. I just want to dedicate my life to *da'wah*. Sometimes the authorities invite me to give a talk on how to deal with radicalism. That is also my obligation. I just want to follow the pious Salafi *ulama* who kept advising their rulers even though they arrested them. (Interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, February 20, 2011)

Every Friday night, Ja'far holds a lecture in his *pesantren* and it is attended by senior Salafi students from across the region. They are teachers at Salafi *madrassa* and boarding schools. During the one I attended, he started his instruction slowly and with a low and heavy voice. He praised the Lord and asked his audience to thank Him. He lamented those who came late to the lecture adding that those who do not respect their teacher and his knowledge will not have any success in their studies. The book he used for this lecture was *Al-Irsad ila Sahih al-I'tiqad, al-Radd 'ala Ahl al-Shirk wa-l Batil* (Guidance for True Faith, a Refutation of Polytheism and Falsehood) by Salih bin Fawzan ibn Abd Allah al-Fawzan, a contemporary Saudi *ulama*. That night the lesson was about God's attributes, an issue which had become a fundamental point of dispute between the Mu'tazilite and the Salafis. Whereas the former argued that God does not have attributes, which might imply dualism in deity, namely a dualism of essence and attribute, Salafis argued that God has attributes. The Salafis further argued that all beings should have attributes. Saying that God has no attributes implies that God does not even exist. The problem is that there are a number of verses in the Qur'an which describe God

as having human-like attributes. “He (Allah Most High) then firmly established (*istawa*) Himself over the Throne” (Qur’an 7:54). To this verse, the Salafis propose the use of *al-tafsil fil itsbat wal ijmal fi al-nafyi* (specification over affirmatives and generalization over negation). Thus, it is irrelevant to ask whether God established Himself over the throne like the king, the sultan, et cetera. This question is discouraged because it may lead to *mujassima* (anthropomorphism).

The fundamental characteristic that differentiates Salafis from other Muslim sects is that it rejects *ta’wil* (syllogism), a philosophical method other Sunni sects use to interpret the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Having said this, Salafis totally reject philosophy, which in their opinion leads Muslims away from their understanding of the authoritative sources of Islam. In Salafi scholarship, there hundreds of books have been composed to refute philosophy and logics. Meanwhile other Sunni groups such as those of Hanafi and Syafi’i allow people to study logics as long as they are well trained in the Sharia. Since interpreting laws is almost impossible, Salafis tend to understand them as they are. If God commands Muslims to perform collective prayers, they will. If God forbids smoking, they will not. This is different, Ja’far said, from other Muslim groups such as the NU, who categorizes God’s commandments and prohibitions in various degrees, which eventually gave them the loopholes not to obey certain laws. Ja’far gave as example that many NU *kyai* smoke because they believe that smoking is only *makruh* (religiously discouraged) and they do not perform collective prayers because it is only *sunnah* (recommended). According to Ja’far, this kind of understanding and this way of

practicing Islam do not fit the injunctions in the Qur'an and the examples of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions.

In general, Salafi rhetoric skills are monotonous. They fill their speeches by quoting large numbers of Qur'anic verses, *hadith*, and the opinions of the Salafi *ulama*. They give answers by using Salafi examples. Ja'far is different. His style is a combination of that of a popular NU preacher, minus the jokes, and that of an academician who presents his subjects systematically. He is very communicative, changes his tone of voice and uses mimicry when necessary to make his audiences understand. This he complements with his wide knowledge of Islam. Many attendants were formerly associated with Laskar Jihad. Some of them come from distant places such as Solo, Semarang (Central Java Province), and Madiun (East Java). All these facts indicate that Ja'far remains influential, at least, within certain Salafi communities.

Chapter Four - Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism

In the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia sent its special envoy, Abd al-Aziz al-Ammar, to Indonesia. He was a student of Bin Baz, the Saudi grand *mufti* and the most respected contemporary Saudi *ulama*. The purpose of his visit was to discuss the possibility of cooperation between the two countries. In Jakarta, al-Ammar was welcomed by Mohammad Natsir, the prominent Muslim figure and former leader of the Masyumi, the largest Islamic political party during the Soekarno era. After the dissolution of the Masyumi in 1960, Natsir made a deliberate move from politics to social activism. He founded the DDII, an organization concerned with *da'wah* and Islamic education (Husin, 1998). Apart from that, he also developed international relations with Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and he became active in its international bodies. The al-Ammar-Natsir encounter was extremely important as it shaped the further direction of the Islamic movement at home (Hasan 2006: 47-54).

A few years later, an Islamic college specializing in Sharia and Arabic was founded in Jakarta and al-Ammar was appointed as its director. Even though there was a controversy about the issue, the college was eventually established (Mujiburrahman: 2006: 138). The college was officially part of the University of Imam ibn Saud of Riyadh. In practice, however, al-Ammar had set up the whole thing, from its curriculum, students' admission regulations, teacher recruitment, and, most importantly, networking with local Islamic organizations. Natsir supplied al-Ammar with students as many DDII

cadres were urged to study at this college. Promising students were given scholarships to pursue advanced degrees in Saudi Arabia. From the beginning, being close to Natsir, al-Ammar's political stand favored modernist groups and he hardly involved traditionalists (Van Bruinessen 2013: 47-70; Wahid 2014: 86). Apart from working with Natsir, al-Ammar was highly dependent on the Hadhrami, local ethnic Arabs originating from the Hadhramawt, Yemen, who served as intermediary groups between the Saudis and the Indonesian Muslim population. His encounter with the Hadhrami groups further shaped the process of Salafism's transformation to Indonesia. Throughout his career, al-Ammar made frequent travels across the country to extend his network and to search for strategic locations for establishing Saudi foundations. He married a local woman and had a family. In the mid-1980s, he was sent back home and was appointed as a high official at the Ministry of Hajj and Waqf, a Saudi institution which channeled donations to Muslim countries. Occupying this strategic position, his connection with various Muslim groups in Indonesia was intensified. He instructed nascent Salafi groups in the country to create formal organizations, through which Saudi donations could legally be transferred.³⁴

This chapter primarily discusses the links between Saudi Arabian Islamic charity organizations and the development of Salafism in Indonesia. It specifically deals with the issues of how Islamic charity helped Salafi groups create their institutions and how the Salafis distributed these charities to their own members. It also describes how they managed to survive when the flow of Saudi funds was no longer reliable. The chapter is based on fieldwork carried out in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Makassar, and, to a lesser extent,

³⁴ Interview with Ahmad Attamimi, Jakarta, March, 20, 2013.

Aceh. The primary focus of this chapter is on the way Islamic charity and Islamic charity organizations respond to existing social and political conditions by engaging in social and political activism. International Islamic charity organizations have shaped the transformation of Islamic movements over the last decades. Indonesian Salafi groups have benefitted from charities in various ways and they have enabled Salafi groups to create their institutions in Indonesia. It is no exaggeration to say that Indonesian Salafi groups have become the major players in the distribution of Saudi Arabian charities in the country. This process is inescapably linked with politics which further shapes the transformation of Salafism in Indonesia.

The Spills of Oil

The oil booming in the 1970s gave fundamental boost to the prominence of Saudi Arabia in the politics of the Muslim world. Starting from Saudi Arabia and then spreading out to the Gulf States, the oil revenues spilled over many Muslim countries. A great amount of these revenues has been used to help fellow Muslims in Asia and Africa who lived in poverty or were the victims of conflicts (Burr and Collins 2006: 27). This marked a new era of international Islamic charity which helped Islamic organizations in many parts of the world to enable them to create their institutions particularly *madrasa* and mosques. The abundance of Islamic charities facilitated the construction of *madrasa* and mosques and revitalized their roles within the Muslim community, which had seriously diminished in the nation-state period. As a result, new Muslim generations were born that had a better understanding of Islam. These sociological factors have changed

the global Islamic landscape leading to the reconfiguration of Islamic symbols (Smith-Hefner 2007). As part of this process, the young educated Muslim generation asked fundamental questions about their faith and its significance in their lives. This process, following Dale Eickelman, one of the most noted American anthropologists, is called objectification (Eickelman 1996: 38).

The presence of international Islamic charities facilitated Islamic movements that emerged in many Muslim countries (Burr and Collins 2006). These movements range from those concerned with civil rights that were engaged in social activism, supporting the agendas of nation-states which suffered from a lack of financial or human resources (Latif 2012: 74-128). At the same time, the presence of charities also facilitated the rise of Muslim revivalist groups that are concerned with reordering the Muslim community and its religious practices based on orthodox Islamic teachings, and with charity funds they built their *madrassa* and mosques and promoted a form of Islam which condemned religious innovations. As a part of their ideologies, the revivalists believed that Islam was not merely a matter of faith; it was also about politics and power, and their presence have been exploited by many regimes. In its attempt to cleanse the country of leftist groups, under the leadership of President Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan mobilized Islamist groups to support his military government. To this end, he worked with the Saudi Arabian government which was also concerned with the influence of Iran, which, at the same time, had mobilized Shiite groups in the region. In the aftermath, when the state was no longer able to support these Muslim revivalist groups, Pakistan experienced one of the most devastating sectarian conflicts in its history. Various religious groups be they Sunni-

Shiite, traditionalists-modernists, Salafi-non-Salafi competed with each other over the public sphere leading to long-standing conflicts between religious groups (Nasr 2000).

The provision of Islamic charity thus had far-reaching consequences. In some countries, where the state was less effective, it led to the rise of radical groups professing various ideological and political goals. The rise of Hamas, established in 1987 in the Occupied Territories with the aim of liberating Palestine, was made possible by the abundant provision of charity funds. Collecting charities from international Muslim communities, Hamas used them to erect public facilities such as schools and hospitals. The escalation of the conflicts in the Gaza Strip prompted militancy within the Hamas factions. This is especially true when it came to have a military wing called Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, in 1991. Hamas was subsequently categorized as a terrorist organization by the Western authorities (Abu Amr 1994; Burr and Collins 2006: 216-232). In this context, it is important to look at Jonathan Benthall's argument, a British anthropologist who made extensive research on Islam charity organization, that Islamic charities "pursued a mixture of humanitarian, religious, political, and sometimes military aims" (Benthall 2007: 6).

The rise of Salafism is part of a forceful revival of religion, which marked the turning of the millennium (Casanova 1998; Hefner 2000). This fact started from political unrest, which occurred in Saudi Arabia in the 1979. As I argued earlier (Chapter 2), in the aftermath of the Grand Mosque seizure by religious extremists in 1979, the kingdom enforced accommodative Islam. Accommodative Islam is a project in which the state uses Islamic symbols to accommodate the religious establishment. In return, the religious

establishment, or the *ulama*, provides legitimacy for the continuation of the house of al-Saud. The Saudi state refurbished and renovated religious sites, established Islamic colleges specializing on Sharia at home, and distributed educational aids abroad.

The impact of Saudi Arabia's accommodative Islam is pervasive. Some scholars argue that this project gave birth to global Salafism (Meijer 2013) and global jihadism (Hegghammer 2010), and Saudi Arabia becomes a kingdom without borders (Al-Rasheed, 2008). With its international network, Saudi attempts to export its Wahhabism to the rest of the Muslim world. Ever since, Salafism has become a global issue overlapping with other Islamic ideologies. Wherever it settled, Salafism has shaped local Islamic movements, and yet, at the same time, is being shaped by local contexts. As a result, global Salafism widely varies depending upon existing political structures that differ importantly from one place to another. In Indonesia, while maintaining relationships with their Saudi and other Middle Eastern patrons, Indonesian Salafi groups are now constantly forced to face a vibrant atmosphere where new ideas are shared with other Indonesian Muslim groups. The Salafi groups have regular encounters with the Nahdhatul *Ulama* (NU) and the Muhammadiyah, the two major Muslim organizations that claim to be the guardians of moderate Islam in the country (Hilmy 2011; Latif 2006; Jamhari and Jahroni 2004; Mujani 2003; Hefner 2000).

The institutionalization of Salafism in Indonesia was made possible with the generosity of Saudi charity contributing especially to the first step of its formation. The returning students who previously studied at Saudi universities helped its distribution. Through charities they created Salafi communities in the country by forging networks

with local Islamic organizations. Thanks to these charities, Salafis were able to create their institutions, particularly *madrassa* and mosques, two strategic institutions in Islam, through which they could reach wider Muslim audiences.

Charity in Islam

Offering *sadaqa* (charity) is highly recommended in Islam. It is the mechanism through which wealth is distributed from the rich to the poor to maintain social justice. The beneficiaries of charity are clearly stipulated in the Qur'an (QS 9: 60) and are called *al-asnaf al-thamaniyyah* (the eight beneficiary groups): (1) *faqir* (the poor), (2) *misikin* (the needy), (3) *amil* (the zakat collector), (4) *al-muallafatu qulubuhum* (new converts to Islam), (5) *riqab* (slaves), (6) *al-gharimin* (the bankrupt), (7) *fi sabilillah* (fighters for the cause of Allah), and (8) *ibnu sabil* (wayfarers, stranded travelers). *Zakat* is obligatory almsgiving intended to cleanse one's wealth and the amounts have been fixed according to the Sharia. *Zakat* has to be paid on certain properties such as gold, silver, cattle, and food. These are called *zakat mal* (*zakat* of wealth). The other form of *zakat* is called *zakat fitrah* which is made to purify one's soul. Apart from that, there are other forms of charities such as *hibah* (gift) and *waqf*. A *hibah* is a gift made by someone to someone else for the purpose of achieving a good end, while *waqf*, literally meaning to halt, is usually translated as "endowment". It is made when someone stops a portion of his or her wealth from operating for the benefit of the Muslim community. Endowment of lands is the most common. During medieval Islam, Muslim rulers and wealthy merchants

endowed land for the sake of religious institutions such as mosques and *madrasa*. It is believed that the benefit of a *waqf* will remain as long as the property endures.

During the first periods of Islam, charity was used to fund humanitarian and public projects. The institutionalization of charity took place along with the expansion of Islamic territories. Later, charity had gradually taken form and had become differentiated from non-charity. In medieval Islam, charity had been exclusively used to finance religious activities, while non-charity funds were used for humanitarian aid. The abundant practice of Islamic charity contributed to the institutionalization of the *ulama*. Their livelihood was supported with charity funds allowing them to fully concentrate on teaching and writing. *Zawiya* sheikh also took their benefits from charities through which they built lodges, which further supported the expansion of Islamic propagation, and local population acknowledged their patronage by paying them *zakat* (Singer 2008: 50). The foundation of *madrasa* was supported by the institution of charitable trusts, which guaranteed its establishment. By virtue of donations, in the classical and medieval periods, most of the students were able to attend a *madrasa* for free. Students were lodged in dormitories located nearby the residences of their professors and *sheikhs*. They were given scholarships and money to live and because of this, *madrasa* attracted students from poor families. In his autobiographic work, *al-Munqidz min al-Dhalal* (Rescuer from Misguidance), al-Ghazali (d. 1111) explained that, given the fact that his family was really poor, his father sent him and his brother to a *madrasa* so that they could continue their studies while their needs were fully taken care of by the founders of the *madrasa*. As George Makdisi, one of the noted scholars of Islamic history, describes, the

roles of charity in supporting learning institutions were very extensive throughout the Middle Ages. Due to the abundance of charity funds, religious scholars were well-paid and *fiqh* professors enjoyed the highest salaries compared to any others (Makdisi 1981: 153-171).

As George Makdisi further describes, of all Islamic charities, *waqf* is extremely important. It is an endowment where individual Muslims endow their property for the benefits of the Muslim community. The reason why *waqf* is so popular is that it gives Muslims the opportunity to create, so to speak, a “monument” for themselves or their families. A *waqif* (the founder of *waqf*) will certainly die but his *waqf* will remain for a long period. A number of great Muslim jurists have given their legal opinions (*fatwa*) on the importance of *waqf*. All Sunni *madhhab* with the exception of the Maliki agree on the eligibility of a donor to become a *waqf* administrator. However, the Maliki argue that the founder of a *waqf* may not by any means serve as its administrator because it might lead to conflicts of interest. In response to the Maliki’s argument, other Sunni *madhhab* proposed some requirements for the administrator (*mutawalli* or *nazir*). The administrators are required to act in accordance with existing terms. Once they fail to comply with these terms, a judge could cancel their right of administration of the *waqf*, and give it to someone else considered capable of complying with all the terms of the *waqf*. This requirement could avoid abuses being made by administrators. Likewise, if the founders appoint themselves as administrators, but are not trustworthy, a judge would have the right to dismiss them. With this requirement, the institutionalization of *waqf* was provided with an extremely important legal framework necessary for *waqf* practices

within the Muslim community and thereby had a tremendous impact on the development of institutions of learning (Makdisi 1981: 35-71).

Islamic Charity in the Modern Periods

In the nineteenth century, the rise of nation-states within the Muslim world had a major impact on Islamic charity and Islamic institutions (Gilsenan 1983: 44). Claiming to be the only authoritative institutions, the states took over *waqf* and other religious properties. They abrogated the privileges of the *ulama* and the Sufi brotherhoods who enjoyed various endowments they received from their followers. *Waqf* properties were nationalized, and almost all public *waqf* were bureaucratized in the modern nation-state. Some states even created specific ministries to administer Islamic endowments (Ar. *Wazarat al-Awqaf*) (Knut 2005: 344). Furthermore, charity was replaced by taxation, a “secular” concept through which the states required all its citizens to offer payments for the states’ expenditures (Masudi, 1991). The intrusive nature of the modern states impoverished the practice of charity and, in turn, of Islamic institutions. *Madrasa*, as the main Islamic institution, suffered the most.

Beginning in the twentieth century, a number of Islamic organizations took the initiative to organize charities and to improve Islamic education and social programs. This idea was highly modern and resonated widely among modernist Muslim organizations. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) emerged as the prototype of a modern Islamic organization that, through charity funds collected from among its own members, built schools, hospitals and other public facilities for the Muslim community

(Wiktorowicz, 2001: 83-108). This cause is hardly surprising given the fact that as a revivalist organization, the MB is concerned with building the Muslim community based on Islamic ethics. Furthermore, the MB is also concerned with creating a social justice system pertinent for the whole of society. To this end, Sayyid Qutb wrote a book entitled *Al-Adalah al-Ijtima'iyah fil Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) where he criticized the corrupt regime under the mask of socialism, and demonstrated that Islamic ethics are compatible with the modern society. In Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah is the first Islamic organization to organize charity in a modern way. Established in 1912, it promoted social activism through charities from which it built schools, hospital, and campuses across Indonesia. Collecting charities from its own members, it serves as an enduring civic organization which complements the roles of modern state institutions and it empowers the ordinary population from below with a variety of programs geared to community development, poverty alleviation, and social welfare. While maintaining inclusive Islam, the Muhammadiyah enriched the discourses of welfare by connecting its movement with Western funding agencies. This resulted in vibrant practices of Islamic charities within the organization (Latief 2013; Fauzia 2013: 139-172).

State Charity Organizations

Around 1970s, many Muslim countries began to create international Islamic charity organizations (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 69; Beranek 2010: 127-151; Latif 2013; Fauzia 2013). By virtue of modern charity organizations, charities have been collected and distributed beyond state borders. While their presence has been lauded by

the global Muslim communities, they also raised new problems. One of the most important problems is that, they overlap with politics. Politics cannot be separated from charity “that no charitable organization is in fact immune to political analysis, and that humanitarian and development aid in particular has an inescapable political dimension” (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 4). Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1980s and the Balkan War in the 1990s, the impact of these wars were enormous for the Muslim community. There are at least two reasons that deserve to be highlighted. First, it urged the Middle Eastern regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, to plunge into the politics of charity. Second, it prompted the rise of Islamic militia. These two aspects frequently overlapped. To this fact, Western authorities were considered “overreacted” (Benthall 2007: 6-7). As a result of this, since September 11, 2001, “Islamic charity has received some very bad press, with analysts and observers frequently emphasizing the links between charity and extremist violence” (Singer 2008: 2).

Saudi Arabia is the Muslim country with the largest Islamic charity organizations (Burr and Collins 2006: 26-47). Through its international bodies, it attempts to extend its political influence over other Muslim countries as well as to promote Wahhabism. It is relevant to note that Saudi Arabia was concerned with developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran which would avowedly export its revolution. In response to this, Saudi forged various networks with predominantly Sunni Muslim countries to intercept Iran’s infiltration. One of the strategies the Saudi adopted was through charity organizations. It has created dozens of international bodies to channel charities, funds, grants, and other forms of humanitarian aid. It is clear that the kingdom used charity as a political tool

leading to the rise of a Pax Saudica while it brought the Sunni world in the grasps of Wahhabism (Abaza 2009: 250-274).

There are at least three Saudi Arabian organizations to be highlighted here: *Rabithah Alam Islami* (World Muslim League-WML), IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization), and WAMY (World Association of Muslim Youth). Established in 1962, WML has representatives in other Muslim countries. Through this organization, Saudi Arabia seeks to unite the Muslim world under its leadership. Its secretary general, responsible for administering day-to-day organizational policies, is at present Abdullah ibn Abdul Mohsin al-Turki, who has always been a Saudi citizen. Through WML, Saudi Arabia challenges the secular NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) that seems to have lost its leadership position in the post-Nasser era. Its main task is to discuss the manifold problems the Muslim world faces particularly on education and public policies. It has published and distributed millions of copies of the Holy Qur'an with an English translation as well as other Islamic books including those written by Saudi *ulama*, all over the Muslim world. Through its consultative commission, which consists of senior *ulama*, MWL is authorized to issuing *fatwa* on specific religious issues. In 1974, it issued a *fatwa* against the Ahmadiyah asserting that it is considered a non-Muslim sect. Having an international reputation, its *fatwa* have become references for all Muslim groups across the globe. Bearing this in mind, the MWL is the most strategic Saudi Arabian institution to control the Sunni Muslim world under the guidance of Saudi Salafism (Burr and Collins 2006: 33-34; Haqqani 2010: 191).

The second is IIRO, which is part of WML. Established in 1978, IIRO is expected to play an important role in humanitarian programs (Burr and Collins 2006: 35; Benthall and Bellion-Jordan 2003: 11). It has organized humanitarian programs in Asia and Africa, helping fellow Muslims who are the victims of natural disasters, wars and political conflicts. Like other Saudi charity organizations, many IIRO officials are in fact Saudi *ulama* charged with offering advice on its programs. As a result, programs like Qur'anic instruction are included in IIRO programs. It channels financial support to erect mosques and *madrassa* in Asia and Africa. Its roles in Afghanistan gave birth to the rise of the Taliban, young Afghan students who, having completed their studies in Saudi Arabian schools became Wahhabism's mouthpiece. In many countries, IIRO is allowed to create local branches, allowing the infusion of Salafism to penetrate even deeper into the Muslim population. In Indonesia, IIRO created networks with various modernist Muslim organizations with similar religious orientations.

The last Saudi Arabian international body which exerts strong influence on the Muslim population is WAMY. Established in 1972, this organization is concerned with Muslim youth and aims to preserve their Muslim identities. Part of WML, this organization serves as a strategic institution to win the hearts and minds of the young Muslim generation. Having members in 60 countries, it seeks to guard the young Muslim generation from the waves of Western cultural domination as well as to protect Sunni youths from the Iranian-Shiite propaganda. In its heyday in the 1990s, it attracted many promising Muslim students in order to hold conferences and symposiums, conduct research and execute exchange programs. It annually invites students from all over the

Muslim world to perform the hajj and the *umrah* (small pilgrimage). Its presence has inspired youth movements all over the world (Burr and Collins 2006: 41-43).

On a second level there are a number of organizations whose task is to bridge the Saudi Arabian government and the Indonesian Muslim populations. These foundations have wide networks with local Islamic organizations that have become the recipients of their charity. They are run by professionals, many of whom having degrees in finance and economics and have close ties with the royal families. Their appointments should be with, and through, the endorsement of the royal families and the Saudi religious establishment. Officials who fail to abide to the rules may be fired and deported from the country. There are at least eleven major organizations that play important roles in distributing Saudi charities in Indonesia.³⁵ Most of them are located in Java (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya), and one is located in Makassar, South Sulawesi. As will be shown below, Java has played an important role in the process of the transformation of Salafism in Indonesia. Meanwhile Makassar has experienced strong Islamic movements over the last decades.

At the very end of this structure are Salafi preachers and teachers. They are the last chain of the transmission of Salafism among the Indonesian Muslim population. Their physical appearance is striking as they usually wear the Saudi *thawb*, having long beards and putting the hems of their pants up above their ankles. According to some sources, Salafi preachers, especially those who are attached to Saudi institutions, are well

³⁵ Nidaul Fitrah in Surabaya, al-Huda in Bogor, *al-Sofwa* in Jakarta, *al-Sunnah* in Cirebon, *al-Taifah al-Mansurah* in Kediri, *Markaz al-Faruq* in Jember, *Da'wah Islamiyah* in Rangkas Bitung, *Wahdah Islamiyah* in Makassar, *al-Imam* in Sukabumi, *Darun Najwa* in Jakarta, and *Eldata* in Jakarta (Interview with Ahmad Attamimi, Jakarta, March, 2012).

paid. For this reason, they can fully concentrate on their jobs as preachers and teachers. During the heydays of Saudi charity, roughly around the 1990s, their payments were even much higher than those of Indonesian civil servants. In the early 2000s, along with the issuance of the contra-terrorism act which hampered the flow of international funds, their payments were significantly reduced. This raised suspicion among the preachers and led to fragmentation.³⁶

Sadaqa Jariya

Despite the presence of formal charity organizations, many Muslims engage in charity in a very informal manner usually called *sadaqa jariya*. *Sadaqa jariya* is a charitable act that has an ongoing benefit to the recipients even after the death of the donor. So far, *sadaqa jariya* has been underrated and has been considered less significant than formal charity. Contrary to public assumption, *sadaqa jariya* has contributed to the development of Islamic institutions. Whereas formal charity very much depends on the global political situation, *sadaqa jariya* relies on informal ties and has nothing to do with politics. The month of Ramadhan is considered the best time for making charity donations. Muslim people all over the world seem to compete in their charity efforts during the entire month. The organization of people's charity involves individuals who are concerned with charity. It is a form of people-to-people networking and they are entrusted to collect charity based on their personal reputations.

³⁶ Interview with Ahmad Attamimi, Jakarta, March, 20, 2013.

Based on my observation, *sadaqa jariya* has contributed to the development of Salafi organizations. In the early 2000s, when the Indonesian authorities scrutinized formal Islamic charity organizations more cautiously, Salafi communities shifted to this form of charity. Personal connections have been revitalized and informal networks such as family ties, friendships, and teacher-student relationships were restored. All these things were done to maximize the target. In Saudi Arabia, *sadaqa jariya* is highly dependable. From the months of Ramadhan to Shawwal (four months), people seem to compete in giving donations. They would put SAR 100 (US\$ 27) in sealed envelopes and give them to those who knock on their doors. Some Indonesian students claim that the amount of money they obtained was large enough to sustain themselves until the pilgrim season arrived, which is in the month of Dhulhijjah. During that season, they obtained donations from pilgrims. It is important to say that this type of donation has become an important financial source for students all over the Middle Eastern countries, especially for those who do not have scholarships. An Azharite student explained how he collected this type of donation

I arrived in Mecca before Ramadhan. The immigration officials are flexible [during that month) and give more chances to the people to perform the *umrah* [small pilgrimage]. I remained there until the coming of the hajj, which was three months later. After Ramadhan, while the people were celebrating the Id, I moved around the city, going from one house to the next. In those days, the Meccan population prepared donations to be given to students like myself. The amount of money was more than enough to sustain my life until the coming of the hajj. During the hajj it was different. The city was swarmed with money. I was working as a guide for the hajj. The money was enough to pay for my living costs for the entire year. (Interview with Anwar Kosasih, Bogor, June, 2013)

Apart from these seasonal donations, the local population sometimes gives other forms of donations. *Wasiat* (will), *hibah* (grant), and *waqf* are the most common. *Wasiat* is a form of donation to be given after the death of its initiator, while *hibah* is an ordinary donation for religious or social activities. Of these donations, *waqf* is the most common, and its amount is much larger. It may amount to thousands to hundreds of thousands riyal. This form of donation will only be given to reliable institutions. Many Salafi students compete for this kind of donation by forming organizations which link universities, *ulama*, and local populations. Because of this kind of networks, in a rather informal way, businessmen and wealthy people trust them and offer their donations. These donations are further transferred to their colleagues in their countries of origin.

An inscription on the wall of a mosque that belongs to the Wahdah in Makassar tells how it works. The mosque was donated by a Medina woman who was willing to dedicate her wealth for religious learning. Because she did not know to which institution she wished to donate her wealth, she went to a local professor who recommended her to give it to Indonesian students. He said that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and has bright students, many of whom he knew personally. It is relevant to say that the Islamic University of Medina is located in that city. This university was set up to produce experts on Islamic law (Sharia) under the guidance of Saudi professors. It is famous for producing Salafi scholars to be sent to other parts of the Muslim world. Because of this connection, the donation was eventually given to the Indonesian students, and, as instructed by its benefactor, the money was used for mosque construction.

The practice of *sadaqa jariya* is managed in a very traditional way. Stories that circulated among NGO activists in Jakarta and Banda Aceh said that the Middle Eastern charity officials loved to bring the money in cash and to give it to the people in the streets. Some said that in the aftermath of the Tsunami, many Arabs acted like Santa Claus. This method became less and less in use following the terror attacks in the country, which enforced new regulations on the maximum amount of money allowed to be brought into the country by airline passengers. International transfers were still possible but they took much time. Because of this, many Salafi foundations reportedly collapsed due to lack of financial support. To resolve this problem, Salafis shifted to forging people-to-people networks. The donations were brought home by returning pilgrims and in this way, donations from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries continued to be distributed among Salafi institutions in Indonesia although the amount and frequency had declined significantly.

We depend on our students in Saudi Arabia in collecting *sadaqa jariya* from the Saudi *muhsinin* (the benevolent donors). We collect riyal from the local population and when the money reaches a certain amount, we manage to send it home. It was usual that the money were entrusted to the returning students or pilgrims. To pass immigration inspection, the money was divided into several portions so the officials were not suspicious. When they arrived at home, the money was then transferred to our institution. (Interview with Hasyim Sanusi, Makassar, May 25, 2011)

Minna aw Minhum?

Minna aw minhum? (Are they our friends or their friends?) is an expression to denote religious groupings among the Indonesian Muslim community. I heard it first a long time ago during my discussions with a former Masyumi supporter on contemporary

Indonesian Islam. Learning that I previously had studied in a traditionalist Islamic boarding school, he said that I was a part of the *nahdhiyyin* (the followers of NU) and that, during the period of Liberal Democracy in the 1950s, the NU had taken a different political stance than the Masyumi. He further told me that during the 1960s and 1970s, various Muslim organizations widely used this expression to set themselves apart from non-loyalists who might destroy their organizations from within. It resembles an internal code through which internal members communicate with each other. Non-members or outsiders who do not know Arabic may not understand the meaning of this expression. During the heyday of *politik aliran* (politics of ideology) in Indonesia, when tensions and suspicion among social and religious groups were extremely high, each created its own secret codes to prevent taping by the opponents (Mujiburrahman 2006: 339).

During my fieldwork in 2012, I heard this expression again from my informant Hifni who previously worked as an official at a Saudi Arabia charity organization in Jakarta. Every time he received a proposal, he asked his staff. “*Minna aw minhum?*” If the proposals were made by *minna*, they were put in different folders for further consideration. If they were made by *minhum*, they were thrown away. He further explained that this means that *minna* proposals were made by Salafi organizations. He could quickly see whether a proposal was *minna* or *minhum*. Most of the Salafi proposals would be favorably considered and granted as long as they met the requirements and provided funds were still available. On the contrary, non-Salafi proposals would be turned down.

Syamsuddin, a Salafi teacher and friend of Hifni's told a similar story. In the early 2000s, not long after he had moved to Bogor, about fifty kilometers to the South of Jakarta, some villagers came to his house. They wanted him to help them to build their own mosque. Along with the rapid increase of the population, the villagers felt that it was necessary to build a mosque for their own community. This idea had come up a long time ago. A local donor had already endowed a piece of land but due to lack of funds, the idea had never materialized. Syamsuddin told them to make a proposal and to complete it with the land ownership certificate and some photos. When the proposal was ready, Syamsuddin took it to Hifni who just had a brief look at it and then agreed. In the coming weeks, after verifying all the documents, Hifni sent some of his staff to the location and expressed the foundation's agreement to building a new mosque. He said that although the distance between the new and the old mosque was less than one kilometer as stipulated, due to the dense population on the site, this requirement could be waved. To avoid conflict with other Muslim groups, Salafi foundations require that the distance between an old and a new mosque should be at least one kilometer. But in practice, this distance can be ignored with the presence of, among others, dense populations. According to Hifni, the proposal was granted as Syamsuddin had guaranteed it. Syamsuddin then promoted Salafi *da'wah* among the local population. This task became much easier given the fact that he was an on-site Salafi teacher. Hifni said that many mosques to which his foundation had contributed funds, gradually escaped from their control due to the absence of on-site preachers. Local populations were generally opposed to Salafi *da'wah* because they did not have appropriate understanding on it.

Apart from this unanticipated situation, the success of a fund request was largely determined by informal connections, which include shared ethnic origin, ideologies, and organization. In addition, more than any other group, the role of the Hadhramis in distributing Saudi charities was extremely prominent.

The Hadhrami Connections

Compared with other ethnic groups, Hadhramis enjoy better relations with Saudi officials at least for two reasons. First, Hadhramis have a long reputation as intermediaries. Second, both Hadhramis and Saudis share many cultural similarities. The term Hadhrami refers to people originating from Hadhramawt, an ancient region in southern Yemen. For centuries they lived in a diaspora stretching from East Africa in the west, through the Indian sub-continent up to Southeast Asia in the east. They had migrated to find a better life but also to promote Islamic propagation. The Hadhramis are well known for their prominence in commerce, religious authority, and statesmanship. In each country they created settlements in coastal areas which they then turned into business centers, schools, and religious institutions (Freitag and Clarence Smith 1997; Ho 2006; Tagliacozzo 2009).

Claiming to be the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad as reflected in their titles *sayyid* (pl. *sada* or *sadat*), they occupy high positions in the social order (Camelin 1997: 147-156). Their lineages, skills, and social mobility ensured that their reputation remained unchallenged. Western colonial authorities were concerned with the Hadhramis' prominence. In Indonesia, due to their strategic leverage, they had been

appointed as intermediaries, bridging the gaps between the colonial administration and the native Muslim population. One Hadhrami figure who enjoyed a great privilege under colonial patronage was Sayyid Uthman ibn Yahya, a Hadhrami *mufti* from Batavia and advisor for native affairs to the Dutch East Indies government (Azra 1995: 1-33).

The Hadhrami community frequently suffered from internal conflicts. This is because it is a highly stratified community, and the *sada* have been, and remain, the most important social and religious group. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the prominence of the *sada* came to be challenged by non-*sada*. The latter argued that marriages between non-*sayyid* men and *sayyidah* women were legitimate. They came up with this idea to counteract the application of *kafa'ah* which stipulated that a *sayyidah* can only be married by a *sayyid*. The issue of *kafa'ah* led to a long-standing conflict between the Hadhrami communities in Indonesia and deep conflicts between both groups erupted leading to their division along social and political lines. The *sada* created the Jami'at al-Khair, while the non-*sada* created al-Irshad. Both organizations were active in education and social activities. In independent Indonesia, both organizations went through a period of serious decline as different political stands and ideological rivalries had major impact on the organizations (Mobini-Kesheh 1997: 231-248).

The venture of the Hadhramis was continued in the period of nation-state formation. A group of Hadhramis decided to support modern Indonesia by establishing the PAI (*Partai Arab Indonesia*—Indonesian Arab Party) thus severing their emotional identification with their homeland (Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 139-145). Others maintained their relations with their home country and experienced a downturn in 1967 when the

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) was declared. The socialist regime confiscated many Hadhrami properties at home without offering any compensation. In the aftermath of the communist coup in 1965, many Hadhramis left Indonesia and moved to Malaysia, Singapore, or returned to Yemen. The rise of power of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States as a new regional economic entity caused new patterns of migration, attracting many Hadhramis from all over Indonesia to migrate (Clarence-Smith 1997: 1-18).

The incorporation of the Hadhramis into the Saudi Arabian state was prioritized. Cultural similarities between the Hadhramis and the Saudis made the migration process easier compared to non-Hadhramis such as Javanese and members of other Indonesian ethnic groups. These new groups of Hadhramis met their fellows who had lived in Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah for centuries (Snouck-Hurgronje 2007: 208). In these cities, there has always been a sizeable Yemeni-Saudi population. Some families such as that of Bin Ladin successfully created their construction businesses in Saudi. In the early 1970s, Indonesian modernist Muslim organizations successfully approached the Saudi Arabian government to promote its education system beyond its territorial border. At that time, the Hadhramis were not involved. It had been an exclusive initiative of Mohammad Natsir, the internationally renowned Indonesian Muslim leader. He approached Saudi Arabia in an attempt to revive its international bodies and to resume support to Muslim groups in Indonesia. Once the connection was established, however, the Hadhramis gradually took over the project and controlled it for the benefit of their own groups.

The success of contemporary Hadhramis in distributing Saudi charities to Indonesian Muslim groups has been going on for generations. Sayyid Muhammad Asadullah, born in Batavia in 1910, is a prototype of a person of Indonesian-Hadhrami origin who, in the aftermath of the abortive coup in 1965, sought refuge in a Saudi Arabian state institution. After having completed his education and because of his language skills, he worked in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Jakarta. In the late 1960s, he moved to Saudi Arabia and he worked there as a journalist. He travelled extensively to Europe, Asia, and Southeast Asia and became what Abaza calls “a hybrid intellectual, the go-between different cultures of the Muslim world” (Abaza 2009: 250). Living apart from his relatives who lived in many parts of Indonesia, he regularly visited Jakarta to look up young Hadhrami students. He enticed many of them to study in Saudi Arabia and he helped them to find jobs after they had finished their studies. Although he was educated within a Hadhrami *madrassa*, he used to be uninterested in Salafism or any other form of Islamic puritanism. Working in Saudi Arabian international bodies, however, he gradually became one of its staunchest supporters, and his political standing can be read in every piece he wrote. He believed that Saudi Arabia was a great Islamic country, which had succeeded to the leadership over other Muslim countries in the aftermath of the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

Another pattern of a Hadhrami connection may be found in the profile of Salim Segaf al-Jufri, the grandson of Habib Idrus al-Jufri, the founder of al-Khairat, an Islamic organization established in 1930 in Palu, Central Sulawesi (Slama 2011: 238-257). Born in Surakarta, Central Java in 1954, Salim Segaf al-Jufri obtained his early education

under the tutelage of his grandfather. In 1972, he went to study at the Islamic University of Medina and he specialized in Sharia. Completing his doctoral degree in 1986, he returned to Indonesia and became a teaching staff at Saudi Arabia College (LIPIA) in Jakarta. According to Ahmad Zaini, a former college administrator, he was among the few Indonesian scholars who were well paid by the college. It was clear that the college highly respected al-Jufri's deep knowledge and his sada background, which seems to have been the reasons behind his appointment as a key figure in Saudi Arabian international bodies. From 1990 to 2000, he was appointed the representative of WAMY and IIRO for Southeast Asian Countries. With this strategic position, he used these bodies to support Islamic organizations in Indonesia, many of which belonged to the Hadhramis. Based on this historical precedence, it is hardly surprising that the Hadhramis were able to dominate the distribution of Saudi charities in Indonesia. Therefore, they shaped the transformation of Salafism, intermingled with the conflicts and disintegration pertinent to their history. Factionalism within the Hadhrami groups shaped the reproduction of Salafism and gradually took Salafism into another direction.

Salafism Derailed

Even though Saudi Arabia has international charity organizations, in general they are poorly administered and managed. There are three reasons for this. First, the distribution of Islamic charity is largely based on trust, which is in danger of being manipulated or misused by its recipients. Its distribution lacks preliminary assessments, has weak or wrong targets, and has insufficient standard operating procedures. Second, in

many countries where Saudi charity organizations operate, the distribution of charity is made by bypassing local authorities (Burr and Collins 2006: 10), which in turn leads to the politicization of charity. In Indonesia, while MORA acts as the formal representative of the Indonesian government, its position is insignificant. It does not have any authority to inspect or sanction fraudulent practices made by charity organizations. This fact causes the unfair distribution of charity funds. Third, the Saudi royal family and its religious establishment are in a position to penetrate the operations of the organizations. They can appoint or remove their officials and replace their managements with new ones that better fit their expectations.

Over its history, the house of al-Saud faced three internal opponents which could threaten its survival: the royal family, secular groups, and religious extremists (Fandy 1999: 41-48). All these opponents opposed the corrupt behavior of the dynasty through their publications, cassettes, and blogs and its alliance with the Western authorities particularly the U.S.. The obvious presence of the U.S. military forces in Saudi territory raised anger among the young Saudi generations whose voices were largely unheard in this authoritarian regime. They demanded larger political participation and freedom of expression. But so far, the state has still been able to maintain social and political order at home even if, to this end, it risked civil rights movements. While maintaining obedience at home, the kingdom suffered from rebels from abroad. Many Saudi civil right activists living abroad launched sharp criticism of the kingdom.

In relation to Saudi charity organizations, factionalism within the royal family which had become Saudi charity organizations' main donor, makes its management

unstable. It is an open secret that many royal family members are critical of the kingdom and of the extreme accumulation of wealth in the hands of certain royal family members, while, at the same time, the Muslim population in many parts of the world are living under poor conditions. In the 1980s, when various parts of the Muslim world experienced political conflicts, this criticism came to be transformed into a political ideology. To help their fellow Muslims in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya, adherent to this ideology created semi-state foundations (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 45-110; Burr and Collins 2006). Apart from distributing charities to the victims, these foundations engaged in Islamic militancy by supplying Afghan militants with weapons and heavy arsenals to counter Soviet bombardments. Young Afghans whose schools were ruined by the war were sent to Deobandi *madrasa* in Pakistan and were educated by Wahhabi scholars leading to the rise of the Taliban. For Bosnia and Chechnya, the foundation provided combatants from all over the Muslim world. The combination of charity and Islamic militancy also took place in Southern Thailand and the Southern Philippines (Gunaratna 2013; Abuza 2003; Singh 2007).

The involvement of pious but militant patrons eventually took the Saudi international charity organizations to the brink of collapse when its high rank officials were known to have connections with terrorist organizations. This can be seen, among others, in the case of Ahmed al-Amoudi who has family ties with Osama bin Laden. After serving in various countries, he was sent to Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia. In this region, he revitalized the old militant group led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and linked it to Al-Qaida. Its task was to reestablish the Islamic state, which was to

include greater Southeast Asia (ICG Report, 2002). This organization was reportedly involved in several terror attacks in the region and Western authorities listed the organization as a terrorist group. This fact nonetheless raised a public impression that the Salafis and the extremists, to some extent, are identical.

Apart from global politics, local politics also shaped the transformation of Salafism in Indonesia. In this case, the dominant role of the Hadhrami-Irshadis in distributing Saudi charity funds and its implication to the reproduction of Salafism deserves some attention. In the absence of a central figure after the death of its founder, Sheikh Ahmad Soorkati, Irshadi suffered from conflicts between moderate and puritan groups. Education programs that were the main program of the organization were abandoned. Religious authorities among the Irshadi members were diffused at the hands of petty *ulama* who, having limited resources, tended to compete with each other. Along with the shifting paradigm within the modernists, from politics to social activism, many Irshadi cadres returned to *da'wah* and joined Persis, which had a revivalist tendency (Van Bruinessen 2002: 117-154). In the early 1970s, the first educated Irshadi cadres in the New Order era were born. They were looking for more resources to revitalize the organization and they succeeded after their encounter with Saudi Arabian patrons.

More than any other Irshadi cadre, the role of Farid Okbah was prominent. Born to a Hadhrami family, he was raised in a highly puritan environment. After studying in a Persis *madrasa* in Malang, East Java, he emerged as a Muslim preacher. He was hostile

to local practices usually termed as *bid'ah* as well as an opponent of the Shiites.³⁷ It is relevant to mention that a small number of Hadhrami families in Indonesia are Shiite and they established their own religious institutions across the region and over time, tension with Sunni Muslim groups occurred (Zulkifli 2009). After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iranian government offered various scholarships to Shii students to study in Qum. This mobilization led to more serious conflicts with their Sunni counterparts. Therefore, Okbah was very harsh against Shiism, which he believed not to be an Islamic sect. His anti-Shii rhetoric made him quite popular and he was frequently invited by local Muslim communities to deliver talks on Shiism.

In the early 1990s, under al-Ammar's instructions, Okbah was involved in distributing Saudi Arabian charity funds in Indonesia. To do this, he contacted his colleagues and they created organizations. In Jakarta, they created *al-Sofwa*, the largest charity organization in Indonesia. In Cirebon, West Java, they created *al-Sunnah*, led by Umar Sewed, Okbah's junior and an al-Irshad activist. In Salatiga, Central Java, they revived a local Hadhrami school and turned it into a strategic Salafi institution. Thanks to strong financial support, this school is one of the largest Hadhrami schools in the country with a total of 2000 students. It is relevant to say that the school serves as a center of Salafi cadres in Indonesia. Ja'far Umar Thalib, another Irshadi cadre, used to teach at this school before he left and founded his own Salafi group. Okbah also created a *yayasan* (foundation) in Surabaya, East Java. In this province, the Irshadhi still enjoyed strong

³⁷ Interview with Hamid al-Jufri, Jakarta, July 17, 2013.

support from local Hadhramis. From Surabaya, the network was expanded to Malang and Jember, in East Java (Interview with Hamid al-Jufri, Jakarta, July 17, 2013).

The Salafi *Yayasan*

Yayasan is the Indonesian term for “foundation”. According to law, a *yayasan* is a legal institution allowed to carry out social and religious programs. Many education and social institutions in Indonesia are run by a *yayasan*. The fundamental nature of this institution is that it is a social and non-profit organization concerned with empowering people and strengthening civil society and thus it is exempted from taxation. In practice, there are usually political motives behind the establishment of a *yayasan*, ranging from maintaining the domination of a family to the promotion of a particular ideology. In relation to this, Salafi groups have used the status of *yayasan* to promote their ideologies. They use this strategy to hide from state control as well as from public scrutiny. Starting from the early 1990s, Salafi *yayasan* reached their peak in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was the period when Saudi foundations enjoyed a great deal of freedom to create networks with local partners. Hundreds of *yayasan*, big and small, were founded during this period. Some have huge areas of land and properties and survive until today, while many others are located in small rent-houses.

During my fieldwork in Yogyakarta in 2011, many Salafi *yayasan* were shut down, a fact that can be explained as follows. In the aftermath of the Bali Bombing in 2002 (Bali Bombing I), that killed 204 innocents, including 30 Indonesians, the international community exerted great pressure on Indonesia to act more firmly against

radical groups. To this end, the Indonesian authorities produced several legal products including a Contra-Terrorism Act in 2002. This was a long-awaited act that authorizes officials to take any necessary steps to prevent terror attacks and to pursue terrorist organizations in the country. A year later, a contra-terrorism special task force was formed. A number of terror attack perpetrators were arrested, and some schools linked to radicalism were raided or even closed. Attempts to eradicate terrorism further continued when, in 2010, the Indonesian authorities endorsed the Money Laundering Act. This act is actually meant to eradicate the rampant corruption in the country but appeared to have important consequences for Salafi financial resources.

What is more relevant for our discussion is that some perpetrators of the Bali Bombing had strong connections with a Salafi *madrasa* in East Java. Some of them are alumni of *Pesantren Al-Islam* in Lamongan, East Java, which has close connections with *Pesantren al-Mukmin* in Ngruki, Solo, led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (ICG Report 2002; 2004; Sidel 2009; Jamhari and Jahroni 2004). Since then the perception emerged that Salafi *madrasa* contribute to religious radicalism. While this was in some part true, the general perception was unfavorable for the development of Salafism which had just begun to gain momentum for its expansion. Salafis were pushed into the corner. Some schools reportedly lost their students, while others eventually were closed. Some big Salafi schools managed to survive by halting student education aid. It is relevant to note that before the implementation of the contra-terrorism act, many Salafi schools provided scholarships to their students. In the aftermath of the adoption of this act, aid was reduced

and transformed into necessary expenditures. Some schools reportedly cut spending by reducing meal quality and electricity usage.

This difficult situation was clearly visible when, in 2011, I made a visit to the Wahdah *madrassa* in Makassar, South Sulawesi. As soon as I entered the *madrassa* compound, I saw many announcements written in beautiful Arabic calligraphy. The students were required to speak Arabic. It was written that Arabic was the language of Islam and the language of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. A number of students welcomed me happily. They knew that a researcher from Jakarta was to visit them for several days but the gloomy walls of the *madrassa* revealed their suffering. Aman, a fifteen-year old student, described this situation as follows:

According to my teachers, when they were studying here, books, housing, and foods were for free. This did not include the fellowships the students received to pay for their living expenses. Excellent students would get promoted to study in Medina. But now, everything has changed. Every semester, I have to pay half the tuition fee. It is not expensive compared to public or private universities here, but this means a lot for poor students like myself. (Interview with Aman, Makassar, April, 30, 2011)

Beside studying, Aman had to work as a volunteer in the kitchen of the *madrassa* and he cooked food for other students. The kitchen assistant left many years ago and reportedly went to the city to find a new job. Aman further told me that other students were also volunteers and they provided a cleaning service, gardening, and driving. Senior students were involved as teaching assistants. Notwithstanding this, the "glorious past" remained visible. The road was nicely paved but the land was too big for the building constructions, and many buildings were left unfinished. The campus almost collapsed after the Makassar bombing in 2004 some perpetrators of which allegedly had links with

the Wahdah (Jurdi 2007: 198-199). After some investigations, it was clear that the attack had nothing to do with the Wahdah. Rather, it was perpetrated by other groups that had provoked the Wahdah to become involved in the incident. Hasyim, a top Wahdah official, indirectly revealed the financial problems they had in the aftermath of the Makassar bombing as he said:

We always received funds from *al-muhsinin* (donor) from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. The funds were used to build schools, mosques, and dorms. During Ramadhan, they organized an *iftar* (fasting meal). They gave us the best dates, *medjool* [the name of high-quality date]. During Idul Adha, they gave us money to buy animals to be sacrificed. So, we slaughtered them and distributed the meat among the local Muslims. But now, they only give cheap dates, and they gave the same amount of money [to buy animals]. Well, we don't want to be labeled *kufri ni'mat* (ungrateful people). We always say *alhamdulillah* for what we have. But, do they realize that the inflation rate in Indonesia is really high? This [inflation] should be taken into account. We still buy animals even though they are now much smaller. (Interview with Hasyim Sanusi, Makassar, May, 26, 2011)

In spite of this difficult financial situation, the Wahdah survives. There are some reasons for this. First, it successfully maintains intimate relations with the larger Muslim population and it has good connections with local and regional donors. This can be seen in its national congress in December 2011, where local authorities and Muslim businessmen, including former Vice President Jusuf Kalla were present. It is said that they donated hundreds of millions of rupiah for the important event. Second, although it is a Salafi organization, it does not monopolize the term Salafi-ness. Instead, it maintains a low profile and stays clear of the unproductive controversy on Salafism. Many Salafi organizations are involved in this controversy leading to their fragmentation. Third, since its inception in the 1990s, it has positioned itself as a modern and *da'wah* organization. It

builds schools and clinics across the region, while providing Islamic education and Qur'anic instruction classes. It produces qualified *da'i* (preachers) well suited for Islamic propagation. Forth, the Wahdah is able to respond to the challenges of middle class Muslims who really need a form of Islam that is truly embedded in their tradition and, at the same time, modern. As a result, it is hardly surprising that the Wahdah is one of the largest Islamic organizations in Eastern Indonesia.

Changing Urban Landscapes

Over the last two decades, a number of Islamic organizations and the urban Muslim population have co-existed due to their mutual engagements. It may be said that the urban landscapes have become the places where new Islamization takes place in Indonesia. This process is dubbed “urban santrization” (Azra 2002; Mahasin 1999: 138-144), a sociological term which refers to the rise of urban Muslim communities who are better educated and find themselves in better economic conditions. They returned religion back into the public sphere (Casanova 1994), and their presence contributes to a firm Muslim civic association (Hefner 2000). The Salafis contribute to, and are part of, this development. Given the opportunity to forge social and political structures, they largely participate in the reproduction of public discourses. Through this participation, they expect to be able to influence decision-making processes and the power distribution pertinent to their interests and to maintain their position as a new emerging authority (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004).

Changing urban landscapes are the result of the vigorous economic development during the New Order. The New Order regime was concerned with economic development from its inception in the mid-1960s. Its intention was to calm down the situation in Indonesia, which had just gone through a period of political turmoil following the bloody coup d'état in September 1965. One important step Soeharto's presidency made in the beginning was his decision to invite economists, headed by Widjojo Nitisastro, to take their place on his economic advisory board. The tasks of this board were to find ways to recover from the economic crisis, to stabilize the value of the rupiah, to slow down the inflation rate, and to make long-term strategic economic plans. The result was incredible. In a short time, Soeharto was able to overcome the economic problems and the country made significant progress. In the following years, the economic growth was stable on an average of about 7 percent per year (Hefner 1999: 40-72).

Indonesian social landscapes began to change significantly in the 1980s. New urban economic centers emerged in and outside Java. The first Muslim generations were born that were educated under the New Order and they played an important role in shaping public policies. They were actively engaged in social transformation and they distanced themselves from politics. After the imposition of the Pancasila as a sole foundation for political and social organizations in the early 1980s, many Muslim groups shifted from politics to social activism (Bush 2009). This shift marked the era of civil Islam, a form of Islam that promoted larger participation in shaping public life. This form of Islam is deemed supportive for the sustainable development of the democratic system (Hefner 2000).

The Distribution of Salafi Schools

The distribution of the Salafi foundations in Indonesia follows various patterns. The first is that it follows urban or semi-urban settlements. This pattern may be seen in Jakarta and in other major cities in the country. The districts of Pasar Minggu and Condet in the South of Jakarta have been Muslim settlements for centuries. There have been local Betawi and Hadhramis who have lived there for a long time. During the colonial period, they were the settlements of the *habaib*, an honorary title for the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, where they built *madrasa* and mosques where the local population learned about Islam. Nowadays these areas have changed dramatically. In the beginning of the New Order, while still being predominantly Muslim settlements, other ethnic and religious groups moved in. Along with the development of greater Jakarta, the local population was forced to sell their land and they moved to the South where they created the new city of Depok. A large number of Salafi communities may be found in these settlements. Many of them run small businesses for instance in fashion, Islamic books, herbal and other medicines, perfume, cosmetics, and all kinds of other items related to urban life. Some sell homemade *halal* (lawful) food such as cookies, bakso, tofu, and tempeh. They have contributed to the rise of the so-called pro-Sharia economy, a term referring to a number of economic activities such as banking, investment, exchange, insurance, and retail believed to be based on Islamic conjunctions.

Figure 4



The presence of Salafi groups in urban environments attracts many people, among others from among middle class Muslims. After gaining material wellbeing, they need spiritual enrichment. They meet Salafi groups who, having their own TV and radio stations, have better means to reach urban Muslim audiences. Based on my observation, many urban professionals have experienced a feeling of being reborn Muslims after their encounter with Salafi groups. To mark this spiritual journey, they build mosques or renovate old ones in their neighborhoods. This has been the case with Haji Jono, a restaurant owner and active member of al-Hijaz, a Salafi organization in Depok, West Java. Haji Jono is a typical Indonesian businessman who started his business from zero. In the early 1970s, after finishing his high school in Solo, Central Java, he migrated to Jakarta to find a job. After working in various companies, he decided to become a bakso (meatball) vendor and after a while he became successful. Then he opened a restaurant and sold a variety of Javanese food. One day, he met members of a Salafi group who

came to his restaurant. This meeting marked the start of a new phase in his life. He learned about Islam and he became an active member. He endowed a piece of land for the construction of a *madrasa* and a mosque. The *madrasa* specializes in *tahfidz*, the memorization of the Qur'an, targeting children aged from 5 to 12 from poor family backgrounds.

I am just an ordinary person. [He sighed]. After facing hardship, success will come to you. I have been working really hard since I was in high school. I was a bakso vendor. Many people came to me and said that my bakso was delicious. Then I opened a restaurant. My restaurant was always crowded. I was very successful but my spiritual life was really poor. *Alhamdulillah*, I was destined to meet these pious people [the Salafis—pointing out to the *madrasa* where the students were reading the Qur'an]. They taught me about Islam, they taught me how to perform the prayers and how to fast in the proper way, something I had never really thought about. You know, I am a Javanese who knows nothing about Islam. My parents are Muslims, but like many Javanese, they don't practice Islam. So, I endowed a piece of land for the construction of a *madrasa* and a *pesantren* here. (Interview with Haji Jono, Jakarta, February, 18, 2012).

The penetration of Salafi *da'wah* among the urban environment was made available by the advancement of technology. First, Salafis use radio, internet and publications through which they could reach urban Muslim audiences. This fact makes scholars currently focus on Islamic cyberspaces (Piela 2013; El Nawawy and Khamis 2009), and so far Salafis have one of the largest radio network in the country to promote their *da'wah* directly to Muslim families who need more programs on Islam. Urban Muslims be they professionals, housewives, women, and men, need information on how Islamic ethics shapes the family, womanhood, marriage, career, children upbringing, et cetera. They also need to know the right procedures for reading the Qur'an, performing their prayers and fasting, and a number of rituals that have become the concerns of every

individual Muslim. These needs are, to some extent, met by the abundance of Salafi programs which makes them more familiar with the Salafi form of Islam rather than traditionalist Islam. So every time they need a reference, they will try to find it in Salafi blogs rather than in classical Islamic *fiqh*. Second, equally important, Salafi preachers are very active in providing religious services, while many moderate Muslim preachers seem to compete in order to become popular preachers on TV, or to give religious sermons in offices or luxurious apartments from which they get lucrative payment. As a result, the mosques in the neighborhood are empty leading to takeovers by Salafi preachers.

The second pattern of the distribution of Salafi school is that it follows the Irshadi-Hadhrami settlements. As I argued above, al-Irshad was once strongly supported in the coastal areas of Java —from Cirebon in the west (West Java) to Surabaya in east (East Java Province), and in Solo in the center (Central Java) where Salafis had built their institutions. Surabaya and Malang on its Southside have the most important Irshadi *madrassa*. A number of Salafi foundations were established in these cities. Solo should be given some special attention. In this city, Salafism does not only overlap with al-Irshad, it also meets the city's vibrant historical past (Shiraisi 1990; Jahroni 2006: 107-142). In earlier days, Solo had been the center of all kinds of political activism: Islamism, nationalism, and communism. Long before the arrival of the Dutch, it had been the capital of Mataram, the strongest and the largest Muslim kingdom in Java. Solo was and remains the capital of Javanese culture which is syncretic in character. During the celebration of Ashura (the first month of the Islamic year), there are many Javanese

cultural events. The heirlooms of the *keraton* (palace) are exhibited to the public and the venerated white buffalo is paraded around the city.

It is important to note that Solo has one of the largest Salafi foundations in the country. There are at least four big Salafi *madrassa* in Solo, each having more than 500 students: Imam Bukhari (500), Ibn Taymiyya (600), al-Ukhuwwah (900), and Al-Irshad (1200) (See Appendice 2). These *madrassa* were founded by former Muslim activists who used to be active in university campuses around Solo. The prominence of these *madrassa* can be compared with NU *madrassa* in Jombang and Kediri, the two major traditionalist NU strongholds in East Java. They produce Salafi ustadz they sent across the country as well as to Southeast Asian neighboring countries.

The third pattern is campus-based networking. This pattern is found in Yogyakarta, also called Yogya for short, about 50 kilometer to the southwest of Solo. Yogyakarta is the new capital of Javanese culture and civilization after Solo, also called Surakarta, was defeated by the Dutch. Like Solo, Yogya is also a vibrant place, where syncretic Javanese meet Islamism; Muslims meet Christians; *abangan* meet *santri*. The people in Yogya enjoy a great deal of religious freedom and, as a city of education many campuses are distributed all over the city, attracting students from all over Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. It is obvious that Salafis have benefitted from the Yogya environment in a number of ways. First of all, they enjoy religious freedom. The local ruler has guaranteed religious freedom for the entire population. Second, Salafis get new recruits from among the Muslim student population. Based on my observation, most if not all of the leading Salafi figures, are former students who eventually left their

campuses, as graduates or drop-outs, with the purpose of seeking “true” Islam. After the Asas Tunggal policy in 1982 (the imposition of the Pancasila as the sole basis for social and political organizations in Indonesia), many students sought refuge in Salafi groups. They eventually found the ultimate truth in Salafism which offers the middle path between obedience to the rulers and the obligation of advising them. These former activists are now living in separate enclaves such as Banguntapan, Kaliurang, and Piyungan. Amin Murkantoro, a village chief (*Ketua RT*) in Banguntapan, describes the origin of Salafism in Yogya as follows:


I was a student activist in the 1980s. I studied at the Faculty of Forestry at UGM (Gadjah Mada University—the prominent public university in Yogya) and joined HMI (Muslim Student Association, the modernist student wing). After I finished my study, I joined a Salafi group. We built this settlement [Glondongan] after we reported to the authorities. They welcomed us. Everybody is welcome in Yogya as long as they obey the rules and respect each other. So, that’s Yogya. Muslims and Christians live side by side, traditionalists and modernists, *santri* and *abangan*, Salafis and non-Salafis. But, the most important reason is that we basically come from this area. We are students from various campuses in Yogya. (Interview with Amin Murkantoro, Yogyakarta, February 20, 2011)

While Salafis have successfully have built their settlements in many places in Java, this does not include Java’s northern coastal areas which have remained strongholds of traditionalist Muslim groups. It is worth noting that these northern coastal areas, called Pantura, and stretch from Cirebon in the west (West Java Province), Semarang in the center (Central Java Province), to Tuban and Lamongan in the east (East Java Province), have always been strongholds of traditionalist Muslim groups. In these areas, there are thousands of traditionalist *pesantren* and religious sanctuaries that have become the main destinations for Muslim pilgrims. The domination of traditionalist Islam in the north

coastal areas goes back to the process of Islamization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when Muslim preachers created *pesantren* to be the prototype of traditional educational institutions. Over time, *pesantren* networks developed along the lines of family lineages and marriage connections where descendants of local Muslim scholars created new *pesantren*. Some regions are even dubbed Kota *Santri* (The City of Students). As a result of this, Salafis were unable to penetrate into these areas. Meanwhile, in West Java, Salafis have established some important *madrasa* in Bandung and Tasikmalaya. It is obvious that their growth is supported by the puritan culture of the modernist organizations. In both regions are Persis strongholds and many local Muslim scholars remain loyal to this organization. The arrival of the Salafis into the regions in the 1990s revitalized the organization and restored its puritan culture.

Figure 5

The Distribution of Salafi Pesantren
in Java Island



Source:

www.indonesiamap.facts.co/indonesiablankmap.png

* modified by the author

The fourth pattern of the distribution of Salafi groups is the targeting of specific areas (*sasaran da'wah*), to which Salafi organizations sent their preachers to promote

Islam to local communities that still adhere to their indigenous religions, or to intercept Christian missionary activities. During the New Order, Christianization had been a major concern of various Islamic organizations such as DDII, and this has now been taken over by Salafi organizations, which in many respects share the same spirit. This is particularly true for the Wahdah, which regularly sent preachers to remote areas in Central and Eastern Indonesia such as Kalimantan, Maluku, and Papua. In East Kalimantan, Salafis, together with Hidayatullah (established in 1973), an organization focused on education, target Balikpapan and Samarinda, the two major cities in the province which have experienced rapid economic growth. In Sumatra, Salafis create many *madrassa* in Riau Province, concentrated in Pekanbaru, the capital of the province. There are eight Salafi *madrassa*/schools in this province with more than 1000 students. For decades, this province has been one of the most important migration areas. Meanwhile, in Papua, many Laskar Jihad ex-combatants who waged jihad in Maluku in the 2000s, turned preachers and teachers and established *madrassa* in Sorong, one of the fastest growing cities in the region.³⁸

It is important to say that the target areas outside Java largely overlap with, and use, migration patterns. Over decades, people from overpopulated Java have migrated to regions outside Java to look for a better life. They work in commerce, plantations, and mining. In these new places they create mosques and *madrassa*, and their need for religious teachers is met by Muslim organizations in Java. The DDII is very concerned with Islamic propagation in transmigration areas. When the Salafis emerged in the 1990s,

³⁸ Interview with Ustadz Badruddin, Yogyakarta, February 17, 2011.

they followed this pattern. Peripatetic Salafi filled the positions of religious teachers in these areas, providing Qur'anic learning for migrant families, a job hardly ever done by mainstream Muslim organizations. It is thus pretty obvious that the presence of Salafis outside Java is a continuation of Salafism in Java and has nothing to do with the local Muslim population. It is often said in the local communities that Salafis are *pendatang* (newcomers) from Java, not members of the local population.

Chapter Five - Ritual, *Bid'ah*, and the Negotiation of the Public Sphere

"Of all matters, the worst are innovations; and everything new is an innovation, and every innovation is a deviation, and every deviation leads to Hell-fire" (*Hadith*, narrated by Muslim).

When you attend Salafi gatherings, you will probably hear the word *bid'ah* more than a hundred times. You will hear that this is *bid'ah*, that is *bid'ah*, such and such is *bid'ah*, those and those are *bid'ah*. Everything is *bid'ah*. They define *bid'ah* in a very literal sense. They even prohibit reading the Qur'an with beautiful rhymes and saying the word *sadaqa Allah al-'adhiim* [God Almighty has spoken the truth] each time the *qari* [the reader] finishes it. In my opinion, this does not make any sense. Why? God loves beauty. This is also the reason why we decorate our mosques with beautifully inscribed Qur'anic verses. There is no reason to consider these things as *bid'ah*. If they are *bid'ah*, they are *bid'ah hasanah* (good innovations). (Interview with Muhammad Faiz, traditionalist Muslim teacher, Ciputat, September, 20, 2012)

Over the last two decades, the word *bid'ah* has made a comeback in Indonesian religious discourses (Jamhari and Jahroni 2004; Hasan 2005: 56; Wahid 2013: 27-29). Its return is related to Salafi preachers who often use the word to denounce the rituals of traditional Muslims,³⁹ which, in their view, deviate from the true path of Islam. From their pulpits and through their publications, TV and radio shows, Salafi preachers warn the Muslim population of the danger of *bid'ah* and the risk of hell for its practitioners.

³⁹ The designation 'traditionalist Muslims' as opposed to 'modernist Muslims', refers to a number of Muslim groups who embrace one of the four Sunni *madhhab* and, many of them, practice mysticism, sometimes in association with *tarekat*, Sufi fraternities. In Indonesia, the term refers to the followers of Islamic organizations such as the NU (The Awakening of the Ulama), PERTI (Islamic Education Union), Al-Washliyah, and NW (The Awakening of the Nation). On the modernist groups, see e.g. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movements in Indonesia 1900-1942*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973. On the traditionalist groups, see, e.g. Dhofier, Zamakhsyari. 1999. *The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java*. Temple, Arizona: Program for Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series.

Moreover, Salafis urge their Muslim audiences to return to the authoritative texts in religious matters, the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, and to stay away from any kind of innovations.

The return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and with it, the emphasis on the necessity of following the *salaḥī manḥaj* – without which a “correct” interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah is deemed impossible by Salafis, is part of a typically Salafi rhetoric and is not a new phenomenon in Indonesian Islam (Noer 1973; Saleh 2001; Federspiel 1970; Taufik 1971). In the early twentieth century, the Muhammadiyah and Persis, modernist Muslim groups that have been influenced by Salafism, launched a similar campaign. They warned the Muslim community against certain rituals such as *tahlil*⁴⁰ and *ziarah kubur* (visiting the graves).⁴¹ The campaign was so pervasive that for decades, *bid'ah* issues caused ongoing conflict and a deep division between traditionalists and modernists. This conflict remained in effect until the late 1960s. Along with education improvement, increased social engagement between both groups, and the modernization of Islamic institutions, these issues have disappeared to some extent and the division between modernists and traditionalists seems to have blurred (Hefner 2000; Azra 2005; Anwar 2009: 349-385).

⁴⁰ *Tahlil* is a ritual to commemorate the dead. It is commonly held from the first until the seventh night. It consists of several prayers, in particular the repetition of the words *la ilaaha illa Allah* (there is no God but Allah), from which the word *tahlil* originates, reading the Qur'an, and uttering the *salawat* (praises for the Prophet Muhammad). *Tahlil* is a public ritual and people in the neighborhood are invited to the house of the bereaved. Light meals and snacks are served after the ritual has finished.

⁴¹ Many traditionalists perform *ziarah kubur* as a part of doing good deeds. They not only regularly visit the graves of their ancestors, but also those of saints. Traditionalist Muslims visit the graves of their ancestors at least once a year, usually at the end of the fasting month.

Salafi anti-*bid'ah* rhetoric re-emerged around roughly the 1990s when graduates from Saudi universities returned home. Although they did not specifically direct the issue to traditionalists, the latter felt that it was directed to them which took them back to the bitter past when they were accused of being *bid'ah*-practicing Muslims, or, even worse, syncretic. This is felt even more acute in rural areas where traditionalists and Salafis live side by side. In response to these accusations, traditionalist retaliated by accusing Salafis of being Wahhabis, a pejorative term denoting a model of Islam which is harsh against women; they accuse Salafis of being Saudi Arabian agents intend to wahhabize Indonesian Islam (Hasan 2008: 263-282; Rahmat 2005). Religious disputes between Salafis and traditionalist have been so uncompromising that they had major consequences for religious harmony in Indonesia. In some regions, the disputes were so frantic that both sides almost resorted to violence.

As the most important Islamic institutions, mosques have become the battlegrounds where Salafis and traditionalists try to extend their influence over Muslims. This is even more so considering the fact that these institutions are poorly organized. Suspicion of the possibility of mosque misappropriation is often heard. Some studies found that radical groups use mosques to promote their teachings and to recruit new members (al-Makassary and Gaus 2010: 261-282). Realizing that their mosques have become Salafi targets, in early 2005, the NU and the Muhammadiyah certified their mosques and warned Salafis not to get involved in their businesses.⁴² In urban areas, this

⁴² “Jaga *Madrasah*, Masjid NU, Jangan Sampai Lepas.” *NU online*, July 12, 2014, <http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,2-id,56203-lang,id-c,daerah-t,Jaga+Madrasah++Masjid+NU++Jangan+Sampai+Lepas+-.phpx>. Accessed, August, 25, 2014.

concern is continued by strict regulations issued by the mosques' managements. Announcements were made that the mosques were only open during prayer times, especially at noon, and any public lecture planned to be held should be reported to the management.

While conflicts and contestation over mosques frequently occurred within the Muslim communities (Gaffney 1987:199-225; Van Dijk 2013: 15-24; Wai-Weng 2013: 175-190), mosque certification to prevent contending claims is a novel phenomenon. On the one hand, it reflects the intensity of the tension between the different Muslim groups in Indonesia. On the other hand, it shows the prominent position of the mosques in shaping religious discourse. Although mosques were never built along religious denominations, such as churches in Christianity, in practice Muslim groups control their mosques in order to keep them in line with their understanding of Islamic teachings. This gradually forced all Muslim groups to build their own mosques. In the 1950s and 1960s, Muhammadiyah followers in Ciputat built their own mosques setting them apart from those erected by traditionalist villagers. Recently, along with urbanization, new mosques have been built as old mosques were unable to accommodate the increasing numbers of attendants.

The total number of mosques across Indonesia has almost doubled from 392,044 in 1997, to 643,843 in 2004 (64%).⁴³ In some parts, this increase is attributed to Salafi

⁴³ This percentage is smaller than that for the growth of the number of churches (130 %) which has risen from 18.977 to 43.909 at the same period. MORA has made this information available to denounce Christian groups who complain about the bureaucratic barriers they face in erecting new churches, as happens in some regions. See "Pertumbuhan Masjid Kalah dari Gereja," *Republika Online*, October, 1, 2014, www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-

groups who, as new players, built new mosques to support their movements. With financial support from their Middle Eastern patrons, Salafis were able to build these institutions in many places. If we assume that each Salafi school has its own mosque (See Appendice 2), there should be around 150 Salafi mosques across the country. This does not include Islamic centers and *musalla* (chapels) built by Salafis. As a result, contestation between Muslim groups over the public sphere has become inevitable. It is relevant to note here that in Indonesia, mosques are managed very informally. Any Muslim with a certain level of religious knowledge is allowed to deliver sermons about themes ranging from religion to politics and on occasion, mosques have deliberately been used for political mobilization. Someone familiar with the current condition of Indonesian Islam would certainly agree that each Friday, when weekly congregations are held in the mosques, Muslim preachers attack each other on a number of issues.

This chapter deals primarily with the reproduction of religious knowledge in contemporary Indonesian Islam. It focuses on issues pertaining to ritual differences between Salafis and traditionalist Muslim groups and how their understanding of rituals relates to larger social and political issues. It will also discuss the roles of mosques in shaping Islamic discourses and how collective rituals such as Friday prayers and *tahlil* sessions have recently been politicized. Salafi groups use *bid'ah* to negotiate with others and by doing so allow themselves to exert power over the public sphere. It is a strategic tool that may change over time to address existing social and political contexts. Most of

nusantara/12/06/03/m51lw4-pertumbuhan-masjid-di-indonesia-rendah. Accessed November 5, 2014.

the data used in this chapter are derived from my fieldwork in Makassar, where I conducted research among the Wahdah Islamiyah, and in Ciputat, where I have lived for more than three decades.

The Issue of *Bid'ah*

Polemics on religious matters are universal and are found in many religions (Bowen 1993: 229-288; Geertz 1976; Woodward 1989). Polemics occur when theologians or religious scholars question the validity of particular religious doctrines or practices. To restore orthodoxy they refer to texts they see as the most authentic sources. In Islam, polemics occur not only on theological doctrines, but also on religious practices. In Indonesia, there is a huge diversity in religious practices, ranging from ablution procedures to the performance of the hajj. The differences are the results not only of the use of different methods but also of the difference in social settings in which texts are interpreted and their contents practiced. The interplay between texts and practices is inevitable. While texts represent the universality of Islam, religious practices represent localities and particularities. This interplay is far from stagnant and changes over time. Muslims constantly interpret and reinterpret the meaning of the texts, leading to the rise of Islamic reform (Saleh 2001, Azra 2004).

More than any other Islamic sect, Salafis are especially concerned with purification (Haykel 2009: 33-51). They are revivalist Muslims who are extremely concerned with reorienting the religious practices of the Muslim community to accord with the authentic sources. This principle has been emphasized again and again

throughout Salafi history. When Islam was deemed under attack by the remnants of Hellenic civilization, Salafi *ulama* rose and defended its purity. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Hanbali School, was one of the persons who pulled back the pendulum of Islam to the texts by turning the *hadith* into the second source, the first being the Qur'an, for his jurisprudence method. He preferred the use of a *hadith* to *qiyas* (reasoning by analogy) in religious matters even when its sources are weak. His method contrasts with that of Abu Hanifah, the founder of the Hanafi School, who put *qiyas* (analogy) as his major method. Because of this, Ibn Hanbal's school is highly literal leading to the rise of Islamic puritanism, as opposed to the Hanafi school, which is highly rational. Ibn Taymiyya continued this spirit of puritanism and he is seen as the founder of Salafism. Much like ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya was concerned with the fact that Islam had been contaminated by alien elements. He called upon Muslims to return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In the modern period, the idea of a revivalist Islam is found in the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. Like his predecessors, he called upon Muslim believers to uphold *tawhid*, and to stay clear from blasphemous practices. He lived in the Arabian desert where such practices as sainthood and saint worship had been ubiquitous. For this reason, he was hostile to the practices of *shirk* and idolatry (Al-Rasheed 2008: 22-58).

Intensive Islamization in the archipelago did not take place until the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Reid 1993). Historical accounts record that religious conversion merely included the utterance of the formal confession of the faith, circumcision, and the abstinence of consuming pork. The people's behavior and their religious practices

remained largely unchanged and they limited themselves to mystical synthesis (Ricklefs 2000). When Dutch scholars started to study Islam and local culture in the late nineteenth century, they found that the local population practiced rituals associated with indigenous religious. In the mid-twentieth century this had not changed as found by anthropologists who conducted their research at the time (Geertz 1960). Based on this historical evidence, it is understandable that in the early twentieth century, reformist Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Persis picked up rituals and ritual purification as one of their main themes. Blasphemous rituals were stamped out and religious practices were drawn into the significance of the texts.

Bid'ah literally means innovation, a belief or practice that has no precedence in the time of the Prophet. In a *hadith*, the Prophet Muhammad said, "Whoever introduces into our matters [religion] that which is not part of it, will have it [innovation] rejected." (narrated by Bukhari and Muslim). In the *hadith* I quoted above, the Prophet says, "Of all matters, the worst are innovations; and everything new is an innovation, and every innovation is a deviation, and every deviation leads to Hell-fire." (narrated by Muslim). Based on this *hadith*, the majority of the Muslim community believes that *bid'ah* is prohibited. The problem is that their understandings vary. In regards to this matter, Muslim scholars are divided into two groups. The first group is that of those *ulama* who argue that *bid'ah* includes all aspects of ritual that have no precedence neither in the period of the Prophet nor in that of the Companions. Most of the Salafi groups belong to this group. The second group believes that the prohibition of *bid'ah* only includes those rituals, which are considered bad (*bid'ah sayyiah*), while good *bid'ah* (*bid'ah hasanah*) is

permitted. The prominent Shafi'i scholar, Iz al-Din Ibn Abd al-Salam (662 H/1262 CE), goes even further. He divides *bid'ah* into five legal norms depending whether the practice contradicts the texts, judiciary consensus, or the Companion's precedence. Within this framework, he categorizes five kinds of *bid'ah*: *bid'ah wajibah* (obligatory innovation), *bid'ah mahrumah* (prohibited innovation), *bid'ah mandubah* (recommended innovation), *bid'ah makruhah* (reprehensible innovation), and *bid'ah mubahah* (permissible innovation) (Zamhari 2010: 25-35).

The second conception of *bid'ah* is quite popular. It was made to accommodate the flexibility of religion and its ability to absorb local elements pertinent to the dissemination of Islam and its survival. Without this conception, the practice of Islam would be rigid. Muslim teachers have practiced this model for centuries. This is also the reason why Islam could easily be disseminated in the Archipelago, which before that was influenced by Indic civilizations. The NU, who claims not only to be their descendants, but also the successors of their *da'wah*, continued the cultural approaches the Wali Songo had taken. It is important to say that many practices among the NU can be categorized as "*bid'ah*," but NU followers argue that they are engaged in *bid'ah hasanah* (good *bid'ah*), *bid'ah*, which is necessary as it contributes to vibrant and rich discourses among traditionalist Muslims. For instance, reading the Qur'an with melodious voices is in fact *bid'ah* since there is no precedence for it. Nevertheless, it is considered good *bid'ah* rather than blasphemous *bid'ah*. So it is not only permissible, but also recommended.

While this typology is useful, in practice it is hard to implement. This is because, first, the boundaries between "good" and "bad" *bid'ah* are matters of perspectives.

Modernists and traditionalist Muslim groups have long discussed this issue, but they hardly ever achieved a compromise. Second, some “*bid’ah hasanah*,” as the traditionalists may have called them, seem to have strayed too far from Islamic orthodoxy. They seem to “contradict” the principles of Islam, which emphasize the balance between material and spiritual life and to refrain from acting in an excessive manner. Based on some sources, it is said that in each *haul* (annual commemoration) of a local saint in Pati, Central Java, the cloth used to cover the tomb in the previous year has become more and more expensive. Nowadays it is auctioned and in 2012, a wealthy merchant from Surabaya, East Java, bought the cover for no less than IDR 275 million (around US\$ 26,000). It is said that the garment is used for different reasons. Many accept it as a gift, others see it as an amulet so that the criteria for *bid’ah hasanah* are apparently rather fluid.

Over the last decades, the modernist Muhammadiyah has been more lenient in terms of Islamic propagation (Qodir 2010). In 2004, it made an important shift from holding on to a puritan method to adopting a cultural approach (*da’wah kultural*). With this new approach, the Muhammadiyah expects that it may become more actively involved in the promotion of Islamic values. This shift is a breakthrough for the organization, which previously was recognized as a strong-minded reformist stronghold. Despite of this shift, Muhammadiyah followers still distance themselves from certain death rituals and refrain from performing them. They are unlikely to perform *ziarah kubur* or *tabarruk* by visiting saints’ graves. Their main reason is that these rituals might lead to *shirk* which in Islam is the greatest sin.

Salafis are even more adamant in denouncing such rituals. This is because, while having no legitimate arguments, rituals surrounding the death could potentially disturb and even harm the concentration of the believers while they worship God. In many religious sanctuaries, Salafis argue, it is found that instead of seeking God's blessing, people seek the help of dead saints, which is unacceptable. This is also the reason why the Wahdah, a Salafi organization in Makassar, reminds its followers to be careful when they perform *ziarah*. Hasyim, a Wahdah ustadz, says:

If you visit the grave of a saint, you will see many things which potentially may turn away your concentration from worshipping God. You see a tomb, offerings, incense, etc. This is not to mention that men and women mix, which is strongly prohibited. You also see people weeping and retreating inside the grave's compound for certain periods of time. They [the pilgrims] say that they don't worship the graves, or the saints. They just seek God's blessing. Ok. However, if they really seek blessing, why do they need to come to the graves? Blessing can be attained through performing religious obligations, reading the Qur'an and praying, etc. With these elements in the background, they may slip away from the correct practices of *ziarah* and fall into the practice of *shirk*. This is the problem. I love *ziarah* as it is recommended by the Prophet, it reminds people that one day they too will die. But we are concerned with the fact that the existing practices are against the Sharia. (Interview with Hasyim Sanusi, Jakarta, March 15, 2013)

It is obvious that the Salafi campaign against *bid'ah* is related to more fundamental issues: *menegakkan tawhid* (upholding *tawhid*) and *memerangi kemusyrikan* (fighting polytheism), which are the revivalist's main concerns. Many Salafi figures assert that performing *ziarah*, as can be seen in many places in Indonesia, tends to slip away from the Sharia's; most likely, visitors believe that blessing may be attained through the saints' intermediacy, which is unacceptable. Salafi preachers vehemently attack the existing practice of *ziarah*. On many occasions, they state that Islam urges its followers to

worship God directly and does not recognize any intermediacy, which is a remnant of pagan religions, where, to make it easy, people worship God in indirect ways through third parties. This is exactly what the Qur'an says about the Meccan polytheists. Having been asked why they worship idols rather than God the One, they responded: "We only worship them so that they may bring use nearer to Allah in position" (QS 3: 39). The Salafis further argue that the remnant of this pagan religion was transformed into the *tawajjuh* doctrine (imagining the face of the master for spiritual transmission), where a follower of a mystical brotherhood starts his mystical journey by imagining the face of the master (Trimingham 1998: 211).

An instance of how *ziarah* is practiced in Indonesia can be seen in the story of Imron, a Salafi ustadz from Ciputat, whose hobby was to visit the graves of the saints when he was young. When I visited him in his office on a sunny afternoon, he had just finished his teaching at his *madrassa*. He asked me to follow him into his office. He recalled the time when he was still in a state of *jahiliyah* (ignorance of divine guidance) by which he meant the period when he had not yet joined the Salafis.

Arriving at the grave of Sultan Hasanuddin in the 1990s, who was a Muslim saint and the founder of the Banten kingdom, he saw something, which he had never forgotten. The sanctuary was absolutely packed even though it was already 10 PM. Inside the compound, men and women formed a long line for their turn to be seated. The grave was sheltered by an iron platform and adorned by a beautiful green velvet cover decorated with Arabic script in gold. From outside, beggars came rushing in. They were sneaking among the attendants hoping for some small change. He then realized that it was the

month of Sha'ban, (Ind. *ruwah*, originally from the Arabic word *arwah* meaning spirit). It is common that in this month the local Muslim population visits the graves of their relatives and local saints. What surprised him was that the people sitting in the grave compound wore dirty clothes and that some were even asleep on the floor. Driven by curiosity, he joined the crowd and he tried to talk with them. Later on, he discovered that they were performing *nazar* (making an oath to perform good deeds) for different reasons. Some had been there for days and others even for weeks. Some were hoping to have children, while others wanted to have a spouse, be promoted, or become rich.

On another occasion, Imron told of his visit to the grave of Sunan Gunung Jati, one of the Java's nine saints, in Cirebon, West Java. There it was even more ominous. This is because Chinese religious paraphernalia were also present in the compound. According to the legend, the saint was married to a Chinese woman named Ong Tien, whose grave is located at the other side of the compound. Many Chinese pilgrims prayed at her grave, which was fully decorated with red and yellow Chinese lanterns. The smell of burning incense was intensely strong and had made him feel unwell. He left the compound immediately. Outside, in the parking lot, *preman* (unauthorized parking officials) demanded high prizes for guarding vehicles. Their voices mingled with those of street vendors who were busy offering their merchandise to the visitors. He was haunted with the question of how to explain what he had seen but there seemed to be no answers to his questions. When he started to join the Salafi *halaqa* (religious gathering), he told this story to his teachers. They said that these practices amounted to *shirk*, and *shirk* was identical with disbelief.

The terms *shirk* and *kafir* or *kufir* are extremely serious and Muslim groups generally understand this. In earlier times, modernists hardly ever used these terms in their attacks against traditionalist Muslims. Instead, they used the word TBC, an abbreviation of *Takhayyul* (superstition), *Bid'ah*, and *Churafat* (belief in supernatural beings). With this term, the former wanted to compare the latter to contagious, but curable, tuberculosis (TB). In earlier times, the public perception towards this disease was so bad that its victims were isolated. By comparing the practitioners of *bid'ah* to TBC patients, the modernists provoked their Muslim audiences to stay away from these, in their eyes, ridiculous practices. It also revealed the backwardness of the traditionalists who did not have access to public health institutions to seek cures for their patients. In response to the modernist accusation, the traditionalists did not use the term *kafir* or *shirk*. Instead, they used the term “anti-*tahlil*” meaning that they do not want to pray for their deceased relatives. It was accompanied with the statement that “as if a dog, not a human being, just died.” This statement had a huge impact for the Muslim people because within the Muslim community as dogs are considered impure and no one wants to die like an impure dog. To prevent their passing relatives from being understood as dogs, they held *tahlil* rituals. It was also believed that *tahlil* is the last thing family members can do to please their passing relatives in the Hereafter.

Salafis currently use the term *kafir* (literally meaning obliterating, covering, ungrateful, roughly glossed as unbelievers or disbelief) to denote those Muslims who enact rituals that potentially lead to *shirk*. In the Qur'an, the term *kafir* and its derivatives are mentioned repeatedly, signifying their danger from which all the believers should

seek God's protection. Its meaning is 'to cover' refers to a pre-Islamic practice when farmers buried seeds in the ground and covered/hid them with soil while planting. *Kafir* and *kufir* thus imply concealment and coverage. It is used to describe people who cover their hearts so that they are unable to comprehend God's truth (QS 2:7). The term is further used to denote the Meccan polytheists and the *Ahl al-Kitab* comprising of Jews and Christians who do not accept the prophecy of Muhammad (QS 98:1). In Islamic history, the term *kafir* was used for the first time by the Khawarij, a splinter group who, in the aftermath of the Battle of Siffin (657 CE), accepted neither the political leadership of Ali ibn Abi Thalib, the fourth caliph, nor that of his challenger Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, and regarded them both as *kafir* because they did not follow the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In the modern period, revivalist Wahhabi use the term to denote fellow Muslims who practice various forms of *bid'ah*.

It is important to say that, as I argued earlier, Muslims accusing other Muslims of being *kafir* is an unprecedented phenomenon in Indonesia. Its use by Salafis inevitably brings about, on the one hand, a deep divide in inter-religious relations within Muslim groups. On the other hand, it crystallizes a religious schism and sharpens social and political friction. A number of conflicts with varying degrees of violence have taken place. Predictably, the main battle took place between Salafis and traditionalist groups. Feeling under attacked by Salafis, Said Aqil Siradj, a top executive of the NU organization, has made a list of Salafi foundations that promote religious extremism. He even thinks that Salafi ideologies are a real threat to national integration and he demands

the authorities to stop being financially supported by the Middle East.⁴⁴

To a lesser degree, a battle is also taking place between Salafis and moderate Islamic institutions such as IAIN (*Institute Agama Islam Negeri*—State Islamic Institutes) and JIL (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*—Liberal Muslim Network). In 2002, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, a Salafi preacher and writer, accused the IAINs that they promote apostasy among their students (Jaiz 2002). This is because, as he believes, the institutions teach liberal thinking to their students leading them to be lax in the execution of their religious obligations. This attack is not new. The institutions have been the targets of criticism by Islamists for a long time. They are considered secular institutions that merely poison the minds of the young Muslim generation. As to JIL, the FUI (*Forum Umat Islam*—Muslim Community Forum), a Salafi-Islamist group in Bandung, West Java, condemned Ulil Abshar Abdalla, the JIL coordinator and young NU intellectual as being an apostate whose blood may legitimately be shed. It is relevant to note that JIL, a forum which regularly holds seminars and conferences on interfaith dialogue and pluralism, cooperates with Muslim and non-Muslim partners. Its presence has provoked Islamist groups as they think it promotes secularism and liberalism within the Muslim community. Ulil's condemnation reflects the bad relationship between Islamists and moderate Muslim groups in Indonesia (Anwar 2009: 349-379).

The Shiites and the Ahmadis are also the subjects of Salafi condemnation. Salafis regard Shiites as *kafir* on the basis that they defame the Companions. Shiites have

⁴⁴ “Ketua PBNU: Waspada! Gerakan Wahabi,” *Republika Online*, December 3, 2011, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/11/12/03/lvmhu5-ketua-pbnu-waspada-gerakan-wahabi>. Accessed August, 18, 2012.

defamed all the Companions except Ali ibn Abi Thalib and his followers. At a higher level, this issue is not only about the relation between Salafis and Shiites, but also about Sunnites versus Shiites. It is about the dispute on the issue of authority after the Prophet Muhammad's death. From this historical polemic, conflicts spilled over to politics. Throughout history, there has been a long list of conflicts between both groups. Salafis nowadays accuse Shiites from masterminding many political conflicts in the Middle East where a great number of Sunnites have been killed. On their turn, Shiites accuse Sunnites of being the puppets of Middle Eastern authoritarian rulers. Finally, Salafis also regard the Ahmadiyah as a non-Muslim sect and accuse Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, its founder, of being a fake prophet. Together with other Islamist groups, Salafis demand that the Ahmadiyah should proclaim itself as a non-Islamic sect (Burhani 2013).

It is clear that *bid'ah* issues easily move from the religious domain to social and political ones. It disturbs religious harmony and majority-minority relations. It also spurs the rise of radical movements. Hate speeches against minority groups such as the Ahmadis and the Shiites may provoke ordinary Muslims to resort to violence. On the other hand, it interrupts the reproduction of a strong Islamic discourse. However, the question is, why Salafis easily use the term *kafir* against their opponents and under what circumstances did term came to be used?

Kafir and Shirk

Salafis have used the terms *kafir* and *shirk* for centuries, and more than any other book, *Kitab al-Tawhid* written by the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-

Wahhab, is the most important work that deals with these issues. In Saudi Arabia, the book has been used as the main reference for religious teachings, shaping the Salafi ideological formulation. Through the alumni from Saudi Arabia who took it home with them, this book was further introduced to other parts of the Muslim world. The book is used in Salafi schools throughout Indonesia. Many sources have been replaced by new ones, but this book has been maintained for decades. It is almost impossible to replace it as it contains Salafi teachings' most fundamental principles. Its great feature rests in its simplicity. Each chapter and subchapter are written in a very systematic way, very much like pointers, and completed with verses from the Holy Qur'an and the *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad, and a glossary of difficult words.

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's thoughts were very much shaped by the conditions under which he lived. He was born in Uyainah, a rural area in central Arabia (Al-Rasheed 2002: 14-38) and where he lived, Islamic practices were mixed with mystical elements and mystical associations, which strongly contaminated the purity of *tawhid*. People sought a sheikh's blessings, and he gave them talismans and amulets. The graves of saints had become objects of worship. The way Islam was practiced was so badly polluted that it made him write the *Kitab al-Tawhid*, dedicated to cleanse *tawhid* from *shirk*, the association of another godly beings apart from God. In the pre-Islamic period, *shirk* was symbolized by the presence of idolatrous deities and in later times it transformed into various other forms such as the use of amulets and magic words. In relation to this Ibn Abd al-Wahhab explains in his book:

“From Mu'adz ibn Jabal he said: I was bringing the Prophet Muhammad on my

donkey. He said to me: Oh, Mu'adz. Do you know the right of God from his servant? In addition, what is the right of servant for his God? I replied: God and His messenger know best. He said: the right of God from His servant is that servant should worship Him and not make any associate with Him. The right of servant from God is that God will never punish those who never make associate with Him.”⁴⁵

“... From Imran ibn Husain, he said that Prophet Muhammad saw a man and there was an amulet on his hand. The Prophet asked him: What is this? The man replied: This is the amulet from a witch. The Prophet said: Take it off, take it off. It will never give you anything except anxiety and fear. If you die, that's still on your body, you will become a loser.”⁴⁶

“From Ibn Mas'ud he said: I heard the Prophet Muhammad pbuh saying: *Talasim*⁴⁷ and *tamimah*⁴⁸ are *shirk*.” (Narrated by Ahmad and Abu Dawud).”

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was particularly concerned with practices that potentially might harm the purity of *tawhid*. He strongly opposed philosophy because it uses logic, and mysticism and mystical brotherhoods were rejected as they employ the notion of intermediacy; adepts develop their mystical or spiritual experience through the intermediacy of a *sheikh*. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab found these practices unacceptable. Spiritual experiences can be attained through performing standard rituals such as prayer and not through mystical speculation. The revivalist Wahhabi have taken up the themes of *kafir* and *shirk* in their lectures and they repeatedly discuss them to remind all Salafi members of their dangers. On many occasions, Salafi preachers pick up these themes in front of large Muslim audiences, and from the pulpit, the words *kafir* and *mushrik* flow

⁴⁵ Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, *Kitab al-Tawhid*, p. 53

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 56

⁴⁷ *Talasim* are amulets in unreadable script written by charlatans to invite jinn (spirits).

⁴⁸ *Tamimah* are amulets that use Qur'anic verses. Salafis consider *tamimah* as *shirk* as it causes believers to deviate from the purity of the faith.

easily from their mouths. If there is hate speech in the Islamic discourses in Indonesia, Salafis may have contributed to its existence. They have been using these words so often against other Muslim groups that a so-called *Salafi Takfiri* has emerged. Bin Baz, a contemporary Salafi scholar and the great *mufti* of Saudi Arabia believes that Ahmadis are *kafir*:

“Qadianis are *kafir* because they believe that Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet and in possession of a revelation. This is against Islamic principles. They oppose Allah and His Messenger. They are *kafir* even though they fast, pray, and believe that they are Muslims.”⁴⁹

Qadianis is a group of Ahmadis who allegedly believe in the continuation of the prophetic revelation after the Prophet Muhammad. Their presence has raised controversy among Muslims. In 1982, the World Muslim League (MWL) issued a *fatwa*, inspired by Bin Baz’s opinion, that the Ahmadiyah is not an Islamic sect but it nonetheless had great influence in the majority of the Sunni Muslim countries, which were MWL members. Over the last decades, violence against Ahmadis has escalated in Indonesia and they have become the target of religious radicalism. This escalation was prompted, among others, by Salafis who had revitalized the *fatwa*.

Not all Salafi groups agree with the persecution of the Ahmadis. Some even argue that the use of the term *kafir* is the prerogative of God as only God knows about people’s *iman* (faith). They agree that Ahmadis deviate from the true path of Islam but that it does not mean that they should be prosecuted. The Wahdah Islamiyah, a Salafi organization in Makassar, believes that Ahmadis should be advised to return to the right path of Islam

⁴⁹ *Majmu’atu Fatawa Bin Baz*, Vol. 3, p. 39.

true wise and regular *da'wah*. At the same time, the Wahdah reminds all Muslim groups to maintain good relations not only with Ahmadis, but also with other Muslim groups including Shiites.

Hasyim, a Wahdah Islamiyah Salafi preacher described a conference he recently attended in Makassar. He and his group were involved in fierce debates with Shiites. The conference was organized by the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) in Makassar, and it had invited Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a Shiite figure and intellectual who had founded the Shiite IJABI (*Ikatan Jama'ah Ahlul Bait Indonesia—Indonesia Ahl al-Bait* Congregation). During the discussion, a Wahdah student criticized Ustadz Jalal, as he is popularly called, of putting his trust in the Shiite version of scholarship on the Companions and that he had ignored Sunnite sources. It is important to note that compared with the Sunnites most Shiite scholarship on the Companions was written much later. “Why do you not mention a single Sunnite source on the Companions?” Ustadz Jalal was quiet and seemed unable to answer the question but he promised that he would learn much more about Sunnite sources. Despite this criticism, the discussion was successful and nothing unseemly took place.

Many Salafi groups, Hasyim further says, believe that Shiites are *kafir* because they have defamed the Companions. The Wahdah responded to this issue in a very cautious manner.

We don't use the term [*kafir*]. Never. We try to promote *da'wah* the way the Prophet Muhammad did it. The Qur'an says that *da'wah* should be done with wisdom, which means offering advice, giving good examples, and with argumentation when necessary. This is what we have been doing so far. This does not at all mean that we are weak. Frankly speaking, the Wahdah has been

criticized by other Salafi groups. They say that we are not Salafis but Sururi, etc. We have never responded to their criticism. It is useless. (Interview with Hasyim Sanusi, Jakarta, March, 15, 2013)

The Wahdah is a group that can be categorized as reformist Salafi as opposed to the revivalist Wahhabis. While having emphasis on the authentic form of Islam, the Wahdah refrains from using bitterly contested terms such as *kafir*, which is unproductive for the continuation of their *da'wah*. They believe in the guidelines of the Salafi teachings called *manhaj salafi*. But they also emphasize the unity of Muslim *ummah*. According to Islam, it is prohibited to accuse other Muslim groups of being *kafir* or *shirk*. In one of the *hadith*, the Prophet Muhammad says: “Any person who calls his brother: O Unbeliever! (then the truth of this label) would return to him. If it is true, (then it is) as he asserted, (but if it is not true), then it returns to him” (and thus the person who made the accusation is an Unbeliever) (narrated by Muslim). Based on this *hadith*, the Wahdah advises preachers not to play with this word while being engaged in their *da'wah* as it is extremely dangerous.

Purification versus Capitalization

Salafis perceive *bid'ah* as an absolute concept. Piety is achieved through performing standard religious rituals such as praying, fasting, and reading the Qur'an. This is so-called Sharia's piety as opposed to traditionalist Muslims' mystical piety (Woodward 1989; 2010). Salafis totally reject rituals like *tahlil*, *ziarah kubur*, and the celebration of religious festivals. Salafis who forcibly attend rituals organized by traditionalists, as frequently happens in neighborhoods where Salafis and the

traditionalist Muslims live side by side, would be quiet during the entire proceedings. They would refuse to recite a single prayer up to the end of the ritual. The absence of these rituals among Salafis has major implications. Compared to traditionalists, Salafis have more funds, as I argued earlier, that they can use for different purposes. This fact, in some part, helps us to understand the survival of the Salafi groups over the last decades when financial support from Middle Eastern countries had significantly decreased. Driven by piety, the available funds are thus geared towards the establishment of educational and social institutions, and for other programs deemed useful for their members. Nevertheless, their abstinence in performing collective rituals, on the other hand, impoverishes social engagements among them because, as we will soon see, collective rituals serve as a means to produce social network and empower civic networking.

Quite contrary to the Salafis, the rituals among the traditionalists are fluid. In doing so, they tend to link rituals to larger social and political problems, from which they derive benefit. This is what I call the capitalization of ritual. *Tahlil*, for instance, is a collective ritual. It consists of reading Surah Yasin and uttering various prayers and it lasts only around thirty minutes. In practice, this simple ritual can turn into an effective means of social engineering. The elders and the village officials are always present among the attendants. Young people attend the rituals for other reasons. This is even more so as big meals called *kenduri* are served (Geertz 1969; Bowen 1993: 229-250; Hefner 1985: 104-125; Muhaimin 1995).

After the ritual has finished, the attendants turn their attention to something else,

and they preferably discuss social and political issues.⁵⁰ It is clear that people participate in the ritual not only for religious reasons. They also use it as an excellent way of socialization. New ideas are usually shared during these conversations. Elders with much experience and knowledge would begin the conversation by talking about particular issues pertinent to the interests of the villagers and they may relate to the weather and the late rainy seasons leading to drought across the village. Other attendants respond to these issues by saying that experts have warned about global warming and the greenhouse effect, etc. On other occasions, the conversation may be related to local politics and that the incumbent village chief (*pak lurah*) will run for another election, but he seems to have been challenged by a new, young contender. Along with the conversation, jokes are heard. The conversation would likely end when an elder stands up signaling to the rest that the host needs take a rest. This informal conversation seems trivial, but various studies have indicated that the institution of *tahlil* has contributed to a solid civic culture among the traditionalists (Mujani 2003).

Besides *tahlil*, the commemoration of *haul* has also become an effective means for social and political mobilization. This is even more so when the ritual is held to celebrate local saints or prominent leaders. The *haul* of the late former President and prominent of Nahdhatul *Ulama* (NU) leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, which takes place in late December, has turned into an occasion for social and political mobilization.

Thousands of people come to his residence in Ciganjur, South Jakarta and they include

⁵⁰ Surveys PPIM 2000-5 indicate that *tahlil* has a positive correlation with civic engagement. The participants of a *tahlil* tend to have intra-personal trust, social engagement, and tolerance towards other groups.

ordinary Muslims, bureaucrats, politicians, and businessmen. Approaching the general election of 2014, during the last haul in 2013 politicians seemed to compete to win the votes of traditionalists Muslim groups that reached around 50 million people around the country. Furthermore, provided that Abdurrahman Wahid was concerned with the Chinese, their representatives were also invited to attend the ritual.

When I was still in a *pesantren* in Cirebon, West Java, the commemoration of the *haul* of the founders of the *pesantren* attracted thousands of visitors. Students, alumni, and members of the local population were invited to the *pesantren*. Bureaucrats, politicians, and celebrities were also present. Approaching the event, the *pesantren* was decorated, and some renovations were made to celebrate this big event. A large stage was erected in front of the Grand Mosque where guest speakers would deliver their speeches. Meanwhile, along the road to the *pesantren*, vendors had set up their stands offering various goods to the visitors. During the proceedings of the *haul*, which was usually held after the Friday sermon, all the attendants visited the graves of the founders of the *pesantren* to pray for one hour. Afterwards many visitors stayed in the *pesantren* because they wanted to see the kyai and ask him all sorts of questions on religious matters. Others used the event to visit old friends who had previously studied in the *pesantren* and who now had become successful people. The conversation varied greatly, ranging from family matters and jobs, to a proposal of establishing a *madrassa*. At a higher level, talks could relate to political support and the economic crisis.

The Politics of Ritual

Politics of ritual refers to holding a ritual in a given context where actors use the occasion as a means to negotiate with, and exert power over, other groups (Peacock 1978; Hefner 1985; Bowen 1993). To better understand the actors' motives, it is not enough to look at the formal form of the ritual. Rather we should look deeper at the historical background and the social structures where the rituals are held. In relation to this, Hefner writes:

“To comprehend a people's understanding of a myth or ritual, therefore, it is not enough to look at the symbolism neatly formalized within the medium itself, as if its significance were something it carried in a prepackaged fashion. The ‘vehicular’ image of symbolism employed in some interpretive definitions of culture oversimplifies the role of real actors in making sense of their world.” (Hefner 1989: 20)

Some rituals are deeply embedded in the history of the ethnic groups who hold them, while others are newly imported. The Gayo ethnic group in Aceh would argue that healing or harvesting rituals are specific to its society, which makes any conversation that challenges their legitimacy highly unlikely (Bowen 1993: 229). Meanwhile the Hui Muslim ethnic group in China developed its nationality through rituals, which debunks the homogenous notion of China-ness (Gladney 1998). In Java, the politicization of rituals has taken place over centuries. Social grouping is made along ritual practices.

Clifford Geertz divided Javanese society into three different variants: the *santri*, the *abangan*, and the *priyayi*. *Santri* are basically pious Muslims associated with Javanese trading activities. The connection between Islam and trade has a long history. It goes back to the process of the Islamization of the archipelagos in which Muslim traders

obviously played important roles. Many rich traders managed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and to set up religious institutions such as mosques and *madrassa*. So the main social institutions of the *santri*, besides the markets, were also mosques, *pesantren* and *madrassa*, and by these institutions the *santri* developed rituals based on those of the *abangan*.

Abangan are basically of rural origin, peasants, mostly illiterate, and relatively poor compared to *santri*. The main social institutions of the *abangan* are households, rice fields, and villages. Over time they managed to preserve various animistic aspects of Javanese syncretism that were broadly related to peasant elements. The *abangan* are Muslims. However, since they belong to different social institutions, they do not put too much emphasis on Islamic rituals. Their number significantly decreased over the last decades as a result of intensive Islamization (PPIM Survey, 2003). The *priyayi* stem from the Javanese hereditary aristocracy. In the colonial period, they served as salaried civil servants. They preserved a lifestyle that was close to that of mystic synthesis, a mix between Sufism and Javanese monism and pantheism.

In Indonesia, traditionalists, modernists, and Salafis have all been involved in the politicization of rituals as they are part of their identity markers. In previous times, it was easy to find out if someone was a modernist or traditionalist by asking questions like: Does he read the *qunut* or not⁵¹? Does he hold *tahlil* or not? Does he visit the graves or

⁵¹ *Qunut* is an additional prayer read in the second cycle of the Morning Prayer. It is highly venerated among traditionalists. They read this prayer by raising their hands and saying 'Amin' along with the prayer.

not? If the answers were “yes,” it could be ascertained that he was a traditionalist.⁵² In previous times, traditionalists performed the *tarawih* consisting of 23 raka’at (cycles, 20 raka’at *tarawih* plus 3 raka’at *witr*), while modernists performed 11 raka’at (8 raka’at *tarawih* plus 3 raka’at *witr*). The issue of *tarawih* raised fierce debates and even caused conflicts between the two groups. Around the 1980s, many traditionalist Muslims started to perform the *tarawih* with 11 raka’at. This does not at all mean that they became modernists; they remained traditionalists. To support their arguments, they proposed the idea that Muslim scholars had set out reliable argumentations for both traditions (23 raka’at and 11 raka’at).

During the month of Ramadhan, when salat *tarawih* are performed during the entire month, religious groupings between traditionalists and modernists unescapably take place. Modernists will perform the *salat* in modernist mosques, and traditionalists in traditionalist mosques, etc. In areas where religious denomination is not so important, such as on campuses, mosques will allow the performance of the *salat* in two different ways to allow both groups to accomplish their service. Therefore, after completing 11 raka’at, modernists will stand up and leave the mosque, while traditionalists remain in the mosques until they have finished 23 raka’at. This phenomenon is hardly ever found outside campuses as each mosque is controlled by either modernists or traditionalists.

While the people’s perception on some rituals has changed, their perception on other rituals has remained the same. This holds true for traditionalists with regard to *tahlil*

⁵² Some surveys conducted by the PPIM found that *tahlil* and *ziarah kubur* are the most important variables among traditionalist. More than 50 percent of them perform these rituals, while modernists are least likely to perform them.

and *ziarah kubur*. Traditionalist Muslims keep practicing these rituals until today, while modernists categorically refuse to practice them. *Tahlil* is the most important variable that distinguishes traditionalists from modernists. Conversely, the use of *hisab* in determining the coming of the months of Ramadhan and Shawwal for celebrating Idul Fitri, has been the trademark of the modernists, while the traditionalists use *rukyat* in these matters. Modernists, particularly Muhammadiyah members still employ this method. It often happens that Muhammadiyah followers, applying *hisab*, celebrate Idul Fitri one day earlier than the majority of the Muslim population who follow the stipulations of MORA (Ministry of Religious Affairs), a government institution that is authorized to decide on the end of the fasting month. However, when the post of Minister is occupied by a Muhammadiyah cadre, the Muhammadiyah and the government celebrate Idul Fitri on the same day.

The controversy on rituals re-emerged with the arrival of the Salafis. The obvious political reason behind this move is that through rituals, the Salafis not only define themselves but also extend their power over others. The politicization of ritual largely occurs during collective rituals that have public effects. More than any other rituals, *Salat Jum'at* (Friday Prayer) is the most effective opportunity to exert influence as it is held weekly and involves a large segment of the Muslim population. It is important to note that mosques are places of worship as well as symbols of unity that link individuals with the community.

Salat Jum'at (Friday prayer) is a collective ritual in which various symbols are highly contested such as the first *adzan* (call for prayer). Some Muslim groups make the

call while others consider it *bid'ah*. It is relevant to note that the origin of the first *adzan* is not based on a *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad, but rather on a decision made by Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (the second caliph). Given the fact that the Muslim community had grown larger and had become dispersed over a large area during his reign, the second *adzan*, the original one, made when the *khatib* (preacher) was about to deliver his sermon, was considered not effective enough as a call to summon the people. The caliph proposed the idea of turning the first *adzan* into an early call, so that the Muslim population had enough time to prepare and go to the mosque to be on time for the prayer. When he expressed this idea, everybody agreed. Ever since, the second *adzan* had been institutionalized. When the modernists were on the rise in the beginning of the twentieth century, they dropped the first *adzan* because the Friday prayers are always held around 12 PM. In every modernist mosque in Indonesia this rule has been maintained signaling to the congregants that the mosques belong to the modernists. Conversely, the traditionalist NU (Nahdhatul *Ulama*) do not only call the first *adzan*, they also use a *bedug*, a drum made from buffalo or goat skin, to signal praying time. Although the modernist attacked the use of this instrument, it has become one of the symbols of traditional Islam, which has survived to this day.

The contestation over symbols in Salafi mosques is even more intense. There is no first *adzan*, nor is it marked by sounding the *bedug* as they consider both as *bid'ah*. An hour before prayer time, all activities are dropped. Around 12.00 PM, a *muadzin* (caller for prayer) arises and he sounds the *adzan*. Afterwards a preacher stands up ready to deliver his sermon. Salafi preachers can be distinguished from traditionalist and

modernist ones by their physical appearance. They sport a beard and often have a black forehead. Many of them wear a Saudi *thawb* and a *turban*. The most important hallmark of a Salafi sermon takes place in its introduction.

All thanks and praise is due to Allah, Whom we thank, seek for help and invoke for forgiveness. We seek refuge with Allah from the evils within ourselves. Those whom Allah guides will never be misled and those whom He misguides will never find one to guide him. I bear witness that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah and that Muhammad is His servant and Messenger. The best words are the words of Allah, and the best guidance is the guidance of Muhammad. Of all matters, the worst are innovations; and everything new is an innovation, and every innovation is a deviation, and every deviation leads to Hell-fire.

This is the common introduction of a Friday sermon in Salafi mosques. The preachers call upon the congregants to stick to the book of Allah and to the guidance of the Prophet Muhammad. While this introduction can be found also in traditionalist mosques, the warning against all forms of *bid'ah* is a typical Salafi feature, which they took from the sermon of the Prophet and the Companions. This form is almost never found in traditionalist mosques. The introduction of the sermons in traditionalist and non-Salafi mosques varies greatly and the preachers use various sources to make their sermons interesting.

Salafi preachers begin their sermon by praising God and by reading the *salawat* (prayer to the Prophet Muhammad). They do not use the word “sayyidina” (our leader) before the Prophet’s name. Using “sayyidina” is also one of the differences between Salafis and traditionalist Muslims. They further continue their sermon by saying that Muslim believers should fear Allah wherever they are as Allah witnesses what they are doing. Unlike traditionalist Muslims who seek to interpret the sacred books, allowing

them to add explanations to the texts, Salafis, putting much emphasis on these texts, do not. Throughout his sermons, the preacher quotes the Qur'an, the *hadith*, and the opinions of Salafi *ulama*.

Contrary to followers of the Shafi'i *madhhab*, to which the majority of Indonesian Muslim adhere and who read the *basmalah* (the shortened form of the phrase *Bismilliahi al-Rahmani al-Rahim*) aloud when they read the Fatihah, Salafis, who are much closer to the Hanbali *madhhab*, do not. They read it in a soft voice and they also do not read it when they read the *Surah* (chapter). Many congregants put their hands up above their chests to the left, the location of the heart, spread their feet and turn their face right to the spot of the *sujud* (bowing). It seems that Salafis bow much longer and push their heads even harder to the floor than traditionalist Muslims. This causes a blackening of two spots on their forehead.⁵³ Non-Salafi tease them about this saying that that black spots on their forehead does not necessarily guarantee their quality of faith. Traditionalist argue that these traces of *sujud* (QS 48:29) point to the believers in the Hereafter when their faces will light up due to their happiness because they encounter God. They argue that Salafis hit their forehead on the prayer rug during their prostration on purpose to blacken it whereas Salafis defend themselves by saying that, referring to the prayer of the Prophet Muhammad, prolonged prostration is highly recommended.

Salafis make their *shaf* (line) really tight and straight until their feet touch and they even step on the feet of the others. Some *imam* (prayer leader) would even inspect

⁵³ In relation to the prayer, the Salafis use Bin Baz's *Kaifiyatu Solat al-Nabi* (The Procedures of the Prayer of the Prophet Muhammad).

the lines and correct them before the prayers begin. Curved line-ups mean disunity and Satan would fill the empty spaces. It is said that the Muslim ummah is like “a firmly joined structure” (QS: 61:4). Salafis will not start their prayers until all the attendants are in the right position. “Straighten your line, for it is essential for making the prayers correctly.” (narrated by Bukhari)

Unlike traditionalist NU that has institutionalized *wirid* (chanting and litanies) after collective prayers, Salafis do not. One by one, the attendants stand up and leave. It is said in the Qur’an that when the prayers have been made, the people should spread out on earth and seek the bounty of Allah (QS 62:10). In addition, they do not shake hands after prayer. Some even make a signal with their hand as if they want to say “please do not shake my hand” when an outsider joins their rituals. While shaking hands is considered *sunnah* (recommended), shaking hands right after prayers it is considered *bid’ah*. They say that there is no *hadith* that states that the Prophet shook hands after prayer. In many Salafi mosques, there is even a list of things considered *bid’ah* hanging on the wall, one of which is shaking hands after prayers.

Embattling Mosques

Realizing the strategic roles mosques may have, in the late 1990s, Salafis began to build their own mosques. In the beginning, mosque construction was made possible by Middle Eastern donations, most of which were reportedly intended for mosque building purposes. This fits with the Prophet Muhammad’s words that “Whosoever creates a mosque in this world, God will create a house for him or her in Heaven” (narrated by Ibn

Majah). For this matter, Salafi groups create a section within their organization, which specifically administers the donations for mosque construction. The amount of money needed varies between 40 million rupiah (about 4,000 US dollars), which is enough for a small mosque, and 200 million rupiah (about 20,000 US dollars), which is sufficient to build a medium-sized mosque.

The construction of a mosque, however, is not necessarily as easy as one may think because of the role of mosques as symbols of unity of the Muslim community. The presence of a mosque in a given settlement is important to enable Muslim men to perform their obligatory Friday prayers. When there are 40 male Muslims in a given settlement, they are obliged to perform the Friday prayers in their own settlement. This means that when this number is reached, a mosque needs to be constructed. When there are less than 40 Muslim men, they should perform their prayers in a mosque in an adjacent settlement. With this requirement, a new mosque is hardly ever constructed as long as it is able to accommodate the number of the congregants in the area or as long as there is only one Muslim settlement. Instead of creating new mosques, Muslims are more likely to renovate and enlarge already existing ones (See al-Makassary and Gaus 2010: 317-357).

In order to be able to create their own mosques, Salafis tend to create new settlements relatively separated from the other local Muslim population. As I argued earlier (Chapter 4), Salafis set up their own enclaves where they create their own institutions such as schools and boarding schools. In this way they are able to avoid tension or even conflict with the local Muslim population. They also require Muslim groups who seek their donations for the construction of a mosque to at least build it 1

kilometer away from the neighboring one. This distance slightly varies from one place to place depending upon the density of the population. In most part of Java, particularly in densely populated urban areas, the construction of mosques is relatively easy and each Muslim group can create its own mosque. This is particularly true for new housing and apartment areas that arise in many urban areas, which indeed have their own mosque. Outside Java, this may be different. In Aceh, for instance, the regulation of one mosque for one settlement is still maintained and this prevents Salafis from penetrating into urban areas (Sabirin 2009).

In general, Salafi mosques are different from the mosques of other Muslim groups. They emphasize function over structure. One unfamiliar with Salafis would assume that their emphasis on functional features is due to limited budgets but this seems not to be the case. In many areas, where Salafi groups have stronger financial resources, these features are still maintained. The construction of the mosque of the Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar started in 2005 and it is still unfinished. It is made in a simple architectural style. This two-floor mosque can accommodate 1000 congregants. The first floor is used for offices and a studying room, while the second floor is for praying. Doors and windows remain uncarved and are painted in one or two bright colors. The walls and the ceramic tiles are also in bright colors to give an impression of peace and tranquility. There is only one square flat space inside the mosque and no calligraphic ornaments. Salafis consider ornaments *bid'ah* that might disturb the people's concentration during their prayers. A wall clock is put up close to a simple niche to indicate the five prayer times.

Salafi mosques are mostly named after their main donors and thus often carry Arabic names, for instance, the Zaid bin Hammad Mosque and the Muna al-Farsi Mosque. Some mosques are named after Salafi scholars such as the Jamil al-Rahman Mosque. While these names work well within Salafi settlements, they may not work for mosques in non-Salafi settlements. The names of non-Salafi mosques are mostly taken from *al-Asma al-Husna* (The Most Beautiful Names of God) such as *Bait al-Rahman* (the House of Beneficent), *al-Nur* (the Light), and *Bait al-Rahim* (the House of the Merciful). Given that Salafis provide the funds for mosque construction, as happens in some cases, they adorn the mosques with Salafi names. This raises criticism from non-Salafi groups who also use the mosque. This conflict may be resolved by putting the names of the donors in an inscription in the corner of a wall, while the official name of the mosque is taken from *al-Asma al-Husna*.

Salafis would claim the mosques they fund as Salafi mosques even though the local Muslim population around it are not Salafis. As a result, they regularly send their preachers to these mosques to instruct the local population about “true” Islam. These preachers prioritize lessons in *tawhid* and they combine their instruction with *hadith* especially those related to the everyday practices of the faith. By using this strategy, Salafis actually seek to reorient the religious perspective of the local population and to rid it of alien practices. When the people have been sufficiently introduced to *tawhid*, the next step is that the Salafis invite their audience to discuss *bid'ah* issues. This is hard and sometimes leads to misunderstanding. The local population may oppose this teaching especially when they think that it is offensive to its own religious practices. Ustadz

Hasyim of Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar admits that he has been working in a local mosque for more than fifteen years. Initially his audience consisted of only few people but now his lectures are attended by hundreds of Muslims.

Ritual and Social Practices

John Bowen describes that during his fieldwork in Aceh he had to attend many rituals (Bowen 1993: 230). The frequent performance of rituals has financial consequences, which influences many social and political aspects of the community. Robert W. Hefner asserts that the Tengger community in East Java performs rituals to distribute wealth over all the villagers and to maintain the high status of the performers (Hefner 1985). Both scholars argue that the celebration of rituals is closely connected with social practices. In the following section, I want to take a look at this issue in a different way by comparing Salafi and traditionalist approaches to rituals and their impact on social practices. This aspect is very interesting as it offers a more reasonable explanation of what lies behind the conception of *bid'ah*.

Because of their strict regulations, Salafis do not have other ways to express their rituals except through *salat*, the most important ritual in Islam. Salafis have turned prayers as the only means to express their mood and mode of spirituality. The mood spirituality refers to the disposition of the prayer, while the mode of spirituality refers to the ways of expressing the spiritual need. As a result, they intensify their prayers. The intensification is made by amplifying each phase of the ritual, the number of *raka'at*, and the quantity of the prayers. Many Salafi members reportedly perform *salat malam* (night

prayer, which has no limitation, in the high performance). They fast during the day and read the Qur'an in their free time. They bring a pocket-size Qur'an wherever they go, something traditionalist Muslims hardly ever do. This is not to say that traditionalists are less spiritual or less pious than Salafis. Traditionalists have their own spirituality that comprises of, besides the standardized rituals, *wirid* (chanting), *salawat* (praise to the Prophet of Muhammad) and, more importantly, they are often members of a mystical brotherhood who practice a set of ritual Salafis categorize as *bid'ah*.

The intensification of ritual has led, as it were, to the accumulation of spiritual energy within Salafis circles, which they show in their physical appearance. Compared with ordinary Muslims, Salafis are generally quiet, but vigilant in terms of the performance of their religious obligations. The question is more about how Salafis release this energy. Salafis are likely to express their energy through certain practices, among others, charity either in the form of money or as precious properties and they can do this because they spent less money on rituals. Contrarily, the practice of charity among the traditionalist is relatively poor as they spend more on rituals. The more rituals a religious group holds, the less they spend on charity and the other way around. In the following section, I will offer two different stories taken from my fieldwork on how highly ritual affects charity practices.

Uthman Soleh is a Salafi *ustadz* and the leader of a Salafi *madrassa* in Depok, West Java. I visited him several times during my fieldwork. One day, while I visited him, he showed me some parts of his mosque, which needed renovation. He estimated that the cost for the renovating was about 5 million rupiah (US\$ 450). He then contacted his

students and other Salafi members through BBM (Blackberry Messenger). There were about a thousand contacts in his phone including myself. In his message, he set out the details for which he needed the money and the materials he needed to buy complete with their prices. At the end of the message, he prayed to God for the donation they would give and he expressed his hope that God would give them a big reward for their donation in the Hereafter. The message was closed with *salam* (a shortened from *assalamu 'alaikum*—peace be upon you), his account number and his name. Not long afterwards, his BB beeped and several messages were coming in. They began their replies with *Insha Allah* (If God's willing) and pledged to give a certain amount of money for the renovation.

After some months I visited him again. From a distance I saw that he was standing close to the construction site, talking to someone who was in fact the person who did the renovation. The renovation was about to be finished. I suspected that a big donor was responsible for this renovation. However, I was wrong.

The renovation was made possible by the donation from the members of the *pengajian minggu* [weekly gathering] in which I teach. They gave an amount of *sadaqa* [donation] based on how much money they could spare. Some gave five hundred [thousand], other three hundred, yet others one hundred. Some offered their labor instead of money, and women gave for food for the workers. We have trained so long about this [donation]. People seem to compete for it. (Interview with Uthman Soleh, Depok, July, 25, 2013).

The swift mobilization of the funds as I found in Uthman Soleh's case was very interesting. How could this be explained? Based on Uthman's information, I discovered that the majority of the donors were ordinary Muslims from all kinds of professions ranging from small traders to blue-collar labors. Some were professionals like engineers

and businessmen, who may have given larger donations than others. However, the underlying attitude was that they co-operated in a very systematic way. Usman Soleh told me that each member saved part of their incomes to fund their regular activities such as religious gatherings and for emergency situations. The renovation of the mosques was considered an emergency as it upset their activities including their weekly gatherings. According to Uthman Soleh, there were always two or three extra donation events each year, and Salafi members seem to be prepared for these events.

Salafis usually abstain from celebrating Islamic holidays. They do not celebrate *Mawlid Nabi* (the birth of the Prophet Muhammad), or *Isra Mi'raj* (The Night Journey and the Ascension), the two major religious ceremonies traditionalist Muslims celebrate. The costs of these rituals are relatively high and may exhaust the financial resources of traditionalist Muslim groups. Almost every mosque and *madrasa* celebrates *Mawlid* and *Isra Mi'raj* during the months of Rabi'ul Awwal and Rajab. A *musalla* in the neighborhood where I live always celebrates these events. The committees usually go around the village with an estimate of the costs, around 5 million rupiah (US\$ 450) and they expect villagers to donate. The village mosque always celebrates these festivals in an ever more sophisticated manner making the costs much higher, between 10 to 15 million rupiah (US\$ 950 to US\$1400). Most of the costs are spent on guest speakers, food and drinks, and various competitions (Qur'anic recitation or memorization) held for children.

Figure 6

The average cost of rituals in Ciputat (in US\$)

Isra Mi'raj	1000
Mawlid Nabi	1000
Tahlil	500
Circumcision	1200
Marriage	2000
Baby Shower	500
Hajj Departure	1000

Traditionalists highly value death rituals, especially *tahlil* which is a must. A family who just lost a family member would even lend money to hold this ritual rather than lose face. Failing to hold the ritual would raise public concern that they do not know how to respect their deceased. It is believed that holding this ritual is considered the very last good deed members of a family can do for their passing parents or relatives. Many people perform *tahlil* for seven nights, starting from the first until the seventh night. For some reason, some perform *tahlil* only for three nights. On odd nights, the rituals are larger than on even nights and more attendants will come while food and drinks are served. The last night, the processions are even larger, signifying the end of the ritual. The costs of holding a *tahlil* highly vary, but a modest *tahlil* in my neighborhood costs around 5 million rupiah (US\$ 500). Many people would moreover continue this ritual on the fortieth, hundredth, and thousandth day, with varying scales and budgets.

From our discussion it is obvious that the patterns of social reproduction within the traditionalist Muslim groups are made in and around public rituals. Rituals and social

reproduction are integrated into one and serve as powerful discursive knowledge. Financial and human resources are mobilized to perform rituals through which the traditionalists maintain their identities and exert power over other Muslim groups. These patterns also allow traditionalists to achieve piety by performing standard and non-standard rituals. Based on my observation, many traditionalist villagers claim that by performing *tahlil* and *haul* for their diseased relatives, they achieve benefit and become pious Muslims. Furthermore, as part of this social reproduction, the traditionalists actively engage in shaping public discourses that contribute to their civic culture. Rituals are thus turned into a medium that produces trust, networking, and political participation. The emphasis of traditionalist Muslim groups on performing public rituals, however, also has serious consequences. Because of their extensive and expensive rituals, the traditionalists do not have enough money, so to speak, to renovate and rebuild their *madrasa* and mosques. It is generally believed that those who belong to traditionalist Muslim groups are less organized than Salafis and, even more, than modernists.

Chapter Six - Reframing the “Prophet’s Medicine” in the Indonesian Competitive Market

As soon as I started my research on Salafism in Jakarta in 2010, Mursan, one of my colleagues at the State Islamic University of Jakarta, suggested that I pay attention to the practice of Islamic medicine. Suffering from migraine over the years, he had gone back and forth to the University clinic. But his illness remained incurable. One day, on his way to his office, he saw a placard in a shop written in Latin and Arabic scripts offering treatment for all sorts of diseases. While attempting to get information about this shop, some of his colleagues told him that they had already been there several times. He then decided to visit Abu Syifa, the Salafi healer and shop owner, and he was cupped, a process I describe below, and given several herbs to eat.

Mursan shared a great deal of information on the Prophet’s medicine. He is the first informant who revealed the “secrets” of this medicine to me. Not only did it make his migraine disappear, his sexual drive also improved. He further described why many people used this medicine. For an average person, like himself, who was just a civil servant, proper medical treatment in Indonesia is relatively expensive. As a result, he visited the campus clinic every time his migraine returned. He was treated so frequently that he had memorized each diagnose the doctor had ever made as well as the prescription he should pick up at the pharmacist. One day, after taking his medicine, he became terribly dizzy and he had a seizure. It was later discovered that he had been taking the wrong medicine. He complained to the clinic and he petitioned to the

University to fire its officials. The University and the clinic agreed to improve their service. In early 2000, he gradually shifted to herbal medicine. He regularly drank milk and ate honey and he also planted various therapeutic plants in his back yard. Because of the combination of a change in his dietary habits and after adopting a healthy lifestyle, his migraine abated. His quest for a healthy life eventually took him to the Prophet's medicine, which he defined as simple and natural.

My interest in Islamic medicine was also driven by my previous experience as a *santri*. Having spent my early education at an Islamic boarding school in Java, I was familiar with the Prophet's medicine, which is a special chapter in many *hadith* books called *Al-Tibb al-Nabawi* (The Medicine of the Prophet). This chapter deals primarily with various medical practices claimed to have been developed by the Prophet Muhammad for himself and for his Companions. Every year, during the month of Ramadhan, *santri* welcome the coming of the holy month by reading *hadith* books, and each year they return to *bekam* (Eng. cupping, Ar. *hujama*), a word hardly ever heard in daily life. Cupping is done by cutting the surface of the skin with tiny incisions, usually on the head and the back, and using cups on the skin to create a vacuum to remove dirty blood. While listening to a *pengajian* (religious lecture), I was confronted with the question of the relevance of reading this chapter given the fact that most people hardly ever practice it. However, my *kyai* (teacher and leader of the *pesantren*) sometimes called a cupper who lived near the *pesantren*, to cure an acute headache. With conventional tools, the cupper would begin by cutting the skin of the head of the *kyai* to remove his dirty blood. Apart from cupping, my *kyai* also took various herbal medicines, which he

bought in the local market. He took curcuma and ginger combined with bitter roots and leaves. He said it was a traditional recipe, which he had inherited from his family.

Before my *kyai* passed away in the late 1980s, he was hospitalized for weeks. Like many members of the old generation, he was somewhat reluctant to visit the doctor for a regular checkup. However, his smoking habit combined with an unbalanced food intake was the cause of his high blood pressure and his heart attack that lead to his death. He died before he was fifty years old. I was, again, confronted with the questions of life and death and the effectiveness of cupping. If cupping was a cure, how effective was it? At the time, I concluded that many people such as my *kyai* took cupping for devotional reasons. I believed that as soon as people became more educated, they would shift to modern medicine and the century-old cupping would disappear. But my conclusion seemed too premature as more than a decade later I witnessed a group of people reviving this treatment.

The changing of regime in Indonesia in 1998 allowed for the diversification of medical knowledge. This was prompted by the fact that the quality of public healthcare was totally substandard and only wealthy individuals could afford proper health treatment. This period witnessed the efflorescence of non-mainstream types of medical treatment such as Chinese *chi kung*, Indian *yoga*, and the Prophet's medicine which offered alternative medicine and health treatment to the public. The Prophet's medicine, which previously found itself in a marginal position, gradually moved to the center and it attracted a particular segment of the Muslim community. This development started with the Salafis who, in the late 1980s, had read various treatises on medicine, in particular *al-*

Tibb al-Nabawi (The Prophet's Medicine), one of the most important sources on Islamic medicine written by the Muslim scholar Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350).

The rediscovery of the "Prophet's medicine" by the Salafis was made possible due to the Indonesian changing political structures, which had profound implications to the social and political landscapes of the country. As a different current of medicine, the Prophet's medicine started to flourish and became more publicly known, offering its superiority over conventional medicine, while at the same time creating financial benefits to its practitioners. So there is an interface between knowledge and politics. Furthermore, Salafis and other Muslim groups in general have long suspected that conventional medicine contains dangerous chemical elements and impure elements such as pig gelatin. These issues were a wake-up call to perceived threats to the identities of Muslims and other consumers who have every right to be protected. All these factors were taken as a good reason for them to shift to the Prophet's medicine because it is deemed pure and safe.

When Doctors Can't Do Anything

Hasyim was one of the most prominent *raqi* (exorcist) in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Many people in the city knew him as he hosted various programs on local radio stations about Islamic medicine. My encounter with him began when, in 2011, I, together with a Japanese Embassy aide were selecting candidates to be sent to Tokyo. Since 2000, the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta, where I have worked as researcher for the last fifteen years, and the

Japanese Embassy in Jakarta, execute a program to send religious teachers and scholars to Japan for two-week study tours and excursions. Hasyim, the Secretary of Wahdah Islamiyah, the largest Salafi organization in the Eastern part of Indonesia, was selected. The idea was that the program would contribute positively to the relation between Japan and Indonesian Islam, not only for the members of the organization but also for Muslim communities across the region. We arrived at his office in Makassar to meet him. The receptionist at the front desk said that he was being interviewed on the local radio on Islamic medicine. We were asked to wait for a moment. Thirty minutes later, a man of about fifty approached us in the guest room. He introduced himself as Hasyim Sanusi. We talked about many things, from the organization itself to local Islamic activities in Makassar. After the interview, I told my Japanese colleague that I would like to stay a little longer because I wanted to learn more about this man's profession as an exorcist.

Hasyim's encounter with the Prophet's medicine came about by accident. He is the son of a local Muhammadiyah scholar. Many decades ago, his father, a modernist Muslim, denounced all forms of exorcism because he considered them *bid'ah*. Although it has spiritual power, his father argued, the Qur'an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad not as a book for exorcism. Instead it is the book in which Muslim believers find the principles of life in this world. In the mid-1980s, Hasyim married a member of the *halaqa*, and not long after his marriage he experienced one of the most defining moments that changed his entire life. His wife was extremely ill. As usual, he took her to the doctor and after some time she was getting better. But then she fell ill again. They went to the doctor several times with no result. He eventually concluded that something

else was wrong with his wife and her sickness had nothing to do with the doctor. He arrived at this conclusion after he had a closer look at her. At night, she would scream with her eyes wildly staring at him, and when he read the Qur'an, she would scramble against him as if she did not like it. Initially, he had no idea what was happening to her but a traditionalist Muslim teacher told him that his wife might have been struck by black magic. At that moment he had only sighed. After a while he wondered why he had not listened to him and he started to read about black magic.

Initially, he read *al-Tibb al-Nabawi* by al-Jawziyya. After having finished reading the book, he concluded that black magic (Ar. *sahr*) indeed exists and he discovered that the Prophet Muhammad practiced exorcism to drive out evil spirits. He learned *ruqya* (exorcism) himself with the express intention to cure his wife. He carefully read the *hadith* in which the Prophet Muhammad practiced exorcism as well as the manual and instructions other Salafi *ulama* had written. At first, he was not quite sure whether his experiment would succeed but after some time he saw the impact of the Qur'an's spiritual power. His wife started to recover. He further explained that exorcism or *ruqya* is part of Islamic teaching. After having had this experience, he convinced his colleagues that black magic exists, an idea his late father as well as his colleagues would hardly have accepted. Being modernists, many Wahdah members in the late 1980s were not especially interested in magical practices such as casting spells, charms, sorcery, astrology, and ancient prophecies.

In the mid-1990s, when Wahdah cadres returned from their studies at Saudi Arabian universities, his inclination toward exorcism found justification. Many of them

brought books that dealt with Salafi scholarship on exorcism⁵⁴ and he started to study exorcism more seriously as well as to promote it as a part of Salafi *da'wah*. He even wrote about exorcism for his master degree at the local university. In the late 1990s, his career as a professional healer took off when a local radio station invited him to give regular talks on exorcism and black magic. Initially, he was not quite sure whether the public would be interested in his talks, but to his surprise, his talks continued for four years as the public loved them. At the same time, he began to open his clinic in downtown Makassar.

The belief that there is a cure for every disease changed the life of Desi Estianti, an Islamic medicine practitioner in Ciputat, Tangerang. My encounter with her was totally serendipitous. In 2011, MORA had given me a grant to do research on Islamic medicine, which was spurred by the phenomenon of Islamic medicine outlets in Ciputat and neighboring areas such as Pamulang and Bintaro. On the way to my office, I saw young men and women who were guarding their outlets who offered various kinds of medicine that, it was said, could cure all diseases. Their placards were adorned with various quotes taken from the *hadith* to convince their patients of the authenticity of their medicines. I was curious and wanted to find out under what circumstances they had

⁵⁴ *Al-Tibb al-Nabawi* (the Prophet's Medicine) is the name of a chapter that can be found in many hadith books. It explains various hadith regarding the medical treatment of the Prophet Muhammad. The presence of these hadith has encouraged many Muslim scholars to develop a literary genre on Islamic medicine. Various Muslim scholars have written works on medicine, including, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziya, *Medicine of the Prophet*, transl. Penelope Johnstone (Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 1998); Jalal al-Din 'Abd-Rahman ibn Abu Bakar al-Suyuti, *Traditional Medicine of the Prophet*, transl. Cyril Elgood (Istanbul, Dar al-Fikr, 1999). These works have become main references for the Salafis in their development of present-day Islamic medicine.

developed and how. After some surveying, I got a list of the outlets I needed to visit and they were located near my home. One by one my assistants, Abdul Basit, visited them and, where possible, asked for an interview. We discovered that some of the websites were outdated and some outlets had already moved to unknown locations or had been shut down. One on the list of outlets that were still active was that of Desi Estianti, located about ten kilometers from my house. Another outlet was Bengkel Rohani (Spiritual Workshop), where I also made some observations.

Figure 7

Service and Price at *Pondok Attib al-Nabawi* Ciputat (in US\$)

Cupping with Tissue	4.5/spot
Cupping with Muslin	1/spot
Ear Candle	3.5
Nuga Best Chiropractic	1.5
Heat Mat	1
Yumeiho Therapy	1
Gurah	2.5
Diabetic Test	1.5
Uric Test	2
Cholesterol Test	5.5

On the day we had agreed upon, I visited Desi's outlet. The front part of her outlet was used as a store while the back part consisted of several rooms that were used for treatment. Next to her outlet was her house where she and her family lived. During my interview, she then told me of her journey that had taken her to this activity, which she

defined as *amal saleh* (good deed). Before becoming a healer, she had worked as a legal expert in a private financial institution in Jakarta where she earned a good salary. During that time, she constantly suffered from a variety of diseases. Her endless visits to doctors and hospital and spending millions of rupiah to get her health back, proved without any promising results. On the contrary, she felt she only became more ill. One day, after consulting a Salafi *ustadz*, she concluded that a real cure cannot be obtained from without but that it should be come from within. She abandoned her career, which she admitted she had just to earn money and to enjoy a worldly life, and she became more and more interested in religious learning. She also performed all her religious obligations and she became committed to turn herself into a better Muslim. Hoping that she would ultimately find her cure, she read the *hadith* about the Prophet's medicine. She found that God's curing can only be achieved through changing one's lifestyle and habits, and by becoming pure of heart. A disease is not only a physical thing but is related to one's inner life, one's spiritual being. Practicing the prophetic prescription, she made good progress and eventually she totally recovered. Now she dedicates her life to practicing and promoting Islamic medication. For her, Islamic medication is good news for everybody who expects to be cured and healthy. Having recovered from her illness, she became a reborn Muslim. She changed her name to Ummu Hanifah al-Hajjam (the Exorcist) although initially she was not really comfortable with the name. Nevertheless, she felt that by using it she answered a heavenly message. In addition, by using that name many patients come to her for help. She has built a clinic named *Pondok Attibb al-Nabawi* (The House of the Prophet's Medicine) in Ciputat, Tangerang in which she employs 5 to 10

assistants and where she offers *ruqya*, cupping, and medicine that uses herbal and other natural ingredients. She also published books on Islamic medication while she attends seminars and workshop.⁵⁵

The “Prophet’s Medicine”

Islam has greatly contributed to the development of medicine. It has even contributed to the formulation of modern Western medicine (Rahman 1998; Bakhtiar 2007: 153-174; Pormann & Savage-Smith 2007; Athar 1993, Hayes 1983). In the early period of Islam, medicine was one of the most important issues and a number of the Qur’anic verses urge Muslim believers to accept the benefits of the bounties of Allah in nature that are beneficial to human health (QS 16: 66; 6: 99;). Many *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad discuss health, medical treatment, and therapeutic ingredients. Black caraway, fig, olives, dates, milk, honey are all believed to benefit human health. The Prophet regularly consumed milk and honey and he used black caraway to treat a variety of diseases, and he was cupped when he was ill. *Hadith* collectors have recorded his dietary habits *hadith* under the title *al-Tibb al-Nabawi* and together they make up the origin of the Prophet’s medicine.

Two important points need to be explained in relation to the term “Prophet’s medicine.” First, not all Muslim scholars, as we will see soon, have the same understanding of it. Their definitions vary greatly from one scholar to another. One group argues that so-called Islamic medicine consists of the methods and the practices of the

⁵⁵ Interview with Dewi Estianti, Ciputat, October, 2012.

Prophet Muhammad as embedded in a number of books of the *al-Tibb al-Nabawi* genre. This opinion was held by Muslim scholars, among others, Ibn al-Qoyyim al-Jawziyya. The second group argues that Islam had added various rational and ethical foundations to the medical practice. According to Fazlur Rahman, one of the most noted neo-modernist thinkers, Islam added ethical and philosophical foundations to the medicine practice, which contributed to the development of Islamic medicine. These foundations encouraged Muslim scholars to develop medical methods and technics and to incorporate the legacies of pre-Islamic civilizations, particularly from Greece and Persia. This opinion is held by, among others, the Muslim sociologist Ibn al-Khaldun. Rahman further wrote that Islam views health as a totality and that it is not only related to physical aspects but is an amalgam of spiritual, psychological, and moral aspects. The Islamic perspective on health and medicine is based on the principle that human beings consist of a soul, which is the spirit of God, and body, their physical aspect. Islam recognizes the importance of both and rejects any concept, which favors one over the other. The recognition of these two fundamental aspects distinguishes Islamic medicine from modern Western medicine which, based on Cartesian dualism, merely recognizes physical aspects (Rahman 1998: 11-38).

While Fazlur Rahman argues for the Islamic contribution to modern medicine, following Ibn Khaldun, he is pessimistic about “the Prophet’s medicine” (Rahman 1998: 41-55). He believes that the called ‘Prophet’s medicine’ is no more than a collection of medicinal knowledge developed by Bedouins, and that this knowledge has been transferred from one generation to the next until it came to the early Muslim generations

(cf. Pormann & Savage-Smith 2007: 6-40). In relation to this, Rahman further says:

“What can be said, then about its origin and the causes of its growth within Islam? What led the Muslims to create this genre of literature, running into almost a score of works, alongside the scientific traditions of medicine in Islam? One answer ... is that the Islamic orthodoxy wanted thereby to challenge the medical authority of a ‘pagan Galen’ on behalf of the Prophet’s authority. A second answer could be that it was an attempt of the part of certain theological authorities to make available to the average Muslim a kind of handbook, a “medicine made easy” for the sake of benefitting as many people as possible.” (Rahman, 1998: 42)

In relation to the Islamic body of medical scholarship, such as the work of al-Jawziyya, Rahman proposes some suggestions. The first is related to attempts made by later Muslim scholars to cleanse Islamic medicine from Galenian elements, which, being influenced by Aristotle, recognize that soul and body are two different and separate entities. The second is that this body may have been put together to form practical manuals to meet the great demand for health treatment in medieval Islam. In addition, it may be possible that there was competition between Aristotelian Muslim doctors such as Avicenna and Averroes, who were more empirical in their methods, and Muslim medicine men such as al-Jawziyya, who sought to lift the discipline to a more spiritual level. Regardless of this scholarly debate, the Prophet’s medicine in the Jawziyyan perspective, survived and became an important element in Islamic medicine.

Based on my observation, Islamic medicine in Indonesia, as Salafi practice, comprises of three elements: herbal, cupping, and *ruqya*. Herbal refers to the use of natural ingredients believed to be beneficial to human health. The use of olive oil, honey, and milk for cures, for instance, has been shared widely among many great civilizations and is not necessarily a Bedouin phenomenon, thus challenging Khaldunian perspectives

(Heymeyer and Schonig 2007; Pormann and Savage-Smith 2007). These natural ingredients have been spiritually endorsed by the Sharia as many verses in the Qur'an and the *hadith* explain their effectiveness. Meanwhile cupping has been widely known as a curing method. Thus, Islamic medicine was not necessarily invented by the Prophet; rather it is a collection of human knowledge on medicine taken from different sources, passed down in Prophetic scriptures, and further justified by Islamic ethics.

As it is spiritual, *ruqya* is a totally different entity. Exorcism as an aspect of magic existed in pre-modern cultures, discussed by Frazer and Malinowski early on within the field of anthropology. Frazer argues that magic, various practices designed to gain control over the supernatural, is a form of primitive science developed by ancient civilizations (Frazer 1922 [2009]). Malinowski, however, proposes the idea that “magic is to be expected and generally to be found whenever man comes to an unbridgeable gap, a hiatus of his knowledge or in his power of practical control and yet has to continue in his pursuit” (Thomas 1971: 647). In anthropological studies, the term magic refers to various practices such as the use of charms, spells, sorcery, witchcraft, divination, astrology, and belief in ancient prophecies. This practice has continuously been under attack since the Renaissance in Medieval Europe. European rationalist thinkers such as Reginal Scot, a British sixteenth century anti-witchcraft figure, deemed magic unintelligent practices (Thomas 1971: 579). Science and technology, the most important inventions of the Renaissance, had made magic redundant. Notwithstanding this attack, magic still survives in many civilizations even until the modern period.

As a civilization heavily influenced by Babylonian and Mesopotamian elements,

where astronomy and astrology were deemed the most valuable sciences, Islam inherited these two sciences and developed them for its own purposes (Pormann and Savage-Smith 2007: 6-37). While Islam uses astronomy for practical purposes such as the determination of the direction of the *ka'aba* and prayer times, astrology (called *ilmu nujum*) has been used for forecasting (*ilmu ramal*). This science was combined with other forms of magic, charms, and divination. *Shams al-Ma'arif wa Lataif al-Awarif* by Ahmad al-Buni (d. 1225) has become one of the most important sources for the practice of magic in the Muslim world. It is widely used in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general and has been translated into a locally simple version called *mujarrabat* (a collection of prayers believed to be endowed with spiritual power) (Geertz 1960: 103-104; Bowen 1991: 39-76; Muhaimin 1995).

Medicine, *Jamu*, and Herbal Potions

To understand the discussion on Islamic herbal potions in contemporary Indonesia, three terms need to be explained: medicine, *jamu*, and herbal (Geertz 1960: 92-93; Van der Geest & Whyte 1988; Van Asterik 2008). In most cases, the term medicine refers to Western medicine, which uses chemical compounds in its production. Medicine is translated into the Indonesian language as *obat* even though the term may include all forms of medicine. The use of modern medicine started in the early twentieth century (Afdhal & Welsch 1988: 149-172). However, the campaign for the use of modern medicine only attracted a specific segment of the population, particularly people attached to the colonial bureaucracy. The majority of the population did not use modern medicine

but used local ingredients for remedies or the people visited traditional healers called *dukun*. The introduction of public schools and the establishment of health institutions such as hospitals and faculties of medicine made medicine more popular and marginalized the “heterodox” heirloom of the ancestors. As a part of this indigenous cultural repertoire, the use of *jamu* (traditional or folk medicine) gradually declined and it only lived on as a rudimentary leftover in the lives of the indigenous population.

Jamu survives thanks to the royal courts, ordinary families and merchants. *Jamu* is believed to be made following indigenous recipes whose origin can be traced back to the royal literati (Afdhal & Welsch 1988: 153). *Jamu* belongs not only to the Javanese ethnic group, the largest ethnic group who successfully developed a large variety of *jamu* products in the current Indonesian market. It also belongs to many other ethnic groups in Indonesia. A great deal of knowledge about *jamu* is shared among various Indonesian ethnic groups and it is public knowledge among the respective communities. Its main ingredients are roots, tree trunk, leaves, and flowers of certain plants believed to have therapeutic qualities to cure a variety of human diseases. The abundant use of these natural ingredients makes the *jamu* extremely bitter and its color murky and thus children and youths do not particularly like it. To attract consumers especially youths and children, the *jamu* manufacturers add materials such as honey to improve the taste. Apart from having strictly curative qualities, people have additional beliefs about *jamu* such as that it improves sexual prowess, maintains beauty, lengthens life expectancy or even has supernatural powers (Jordaan 1985). Many traditional healers use *jamu* to cure people who are possessed by evil spirits or sorcery. After the Japanese occupation, because of

the economic embargo by the Western countries leading to the depletion of stocks of medicine, *jamu* became more popular and was seen as a potential substitute for Western medicine. As it contained authentic Indonesian ingredients, in the early 1960s, the government legalized *jamu* because of which modernization, business expansion, marketing, and promotion of *jamu* industries took place and the *jamu* industry moved from home to modern factories attracting new businessmen to invest their money (Afdhal and Welsch 1988: 153-155).

The use of herbals in Indonesia and Southeast Asia is extensive (Afdhal 1981; Leslie 1976) and it is part of folk medicine (Jordaan, 1985). Indonesian health practitioners who had previously studied abroad such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists were the first persons to popularize the term. Because they were both problematic, they refrained from using the terms “*jamu*” or “*obat*” to indicate natural ingredients that were beneficial to people’s health. While *jamu* was associated with the local and traditional packages, *obat*, as I said above, is associated with chemical elements. Instead, they used the term “herbal” which is neutral and modern at the same time. At about the same time, self-awareness and pride of their own culture emerged among young educated Indonesians. This self-awareness led to the diversity of knowledge on medicine.

Indonesia has so far become one of the largest herbal markets in the world.⁵⁶ Its major consumers are urban Muslims who define themselves as modern on the one hand, and yet faithful believers on the other. They want to make sure that anything they

⁵⁶ “Traditional Islamic medicine takes off in Indonesia,” *Associated Press*, September, 27, 2011, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/asia-pacific/traditional-islamic-medicine-takes-off-in-indonesia>. Accessed March, 15, 2012.

consume - food, drinks, and medicine - meets Sharia injunctions. In the following section, I will describe Afiafit, an Islamic herbal producer in Yogyakarta who has successfully developed a number of herbal products based on the Islamic medicine tradition.

Afiafit, a Yogyakarta-Based Herbal Brand

About fifteen kilometers from downtown Yogyakarta in the direction of Bantul is Wirokerten, the village that became my fieldwork site. It is a part of the Banguntapan sub-district (*kecamatan*). My decision to conduct my research in there was made after I had a conversation with a man who was shopping in an herbal mini market. I asked him for the address of a *pesantren* which I had obtained from my colleague who previously had done research there five years ago. When I came to the location the man had pointed out, the local people said that the *pesantren* had closed down about two years ago and that its teacher had already moved to Yemen. On my way to my lodgings, I saw a man whom I thought might be able to give me some information I needed. Looking at his physical appearance and his style of dress, I was convinced that he was a Salafi. He was warm and smiled as I greeted him and we shook hands. I introduced myself and explained that I was doing research on the reproduction of knowledge among Salafis. He responded that if I was interested in Salafism, Wirokerten might be the right place to visit.

The Salafi community in Wirokerten is concentrated in many enclaves and Glondongan is the largest. It has 700 inhabitants, fifty percent of whom are Salafis. It is a typical Javanese rural community, separated from other villages by fields, rivers, woods, and bamboo bushes, although the city is only thirty minutes away by motorcycle. From a distance, I saw an antenna and a high green building. While approaching the location, I noticed that the antenna was used to transmit radio programs using short waves that can be heard from miles away, and the high green building was a mosque where learning and other religious activities were held. Glondongan has a school, a dorm, an office and a clinic. The rest are houses made from bricks. There were no interesting buildings here apart from the mosque. The inscription on the front wall of the mosque stated that it was a gift from an anonymous Meccan philanthropist. The mosque was called Jamil al-Rahman Mosque, a name taken from Sheikh Jamil al-Rahman al-Kunari (1939-1991), an Afghan Salafi *ulama*.

The origin of this enclave goes back to the 1980s when a number of Salafi people were looking to create their own settlement. This village was selected because the local population had already for generations grown all kinds of herbal plants such as turmeric and ginger, the two main ingredients of *jamu* and they sold them in the local markets. Due to conventional technics and lack of financial support, this business did not offer them any financial benefits.⁵⁷ The Salafis came to this village with the intention of reviving this agricultural business, working side by side with the local population, which happily supported the idea. They even rented their land to the Salafis and received their

⁵⁷ Interview with Abu Suhaira, Yogyakarta, January, 2013.

payments after harvests. The cooperation between the Salafis and the local population was very positive and boosted the business. Because the prospects of this herbal industry were promising, in the early 2000s, some Salafi investors were ready to expand the business. They erected a factory not far from the Glondongan enclave. Realizing that they would be unable to compete with traditional *jamu*, they decided to create their own brand as an Islamic herbal industry, one of the first companies to explicitly do so.

Figure 8
One of the products of Afiakit



Unlike *jamu*, which mostly uses traditional Javanese names, Islamic herbal understandably uses Islamic terms. Offering medicine believed to be rooted in the Islamic tradition, Islamic herbal should assure its consumers that it is indeed Islamic and meets all Islamic regulations. Information regarding its ingredients, its means of production, as well as its effectiveness is written on each package and includes various quotes from Qur'anic verses and the *hadith*. The messages on these packages are so important that eventually the people were willing to purchase these products. Many consumers I met in various Islamic herbal outlets said that they bought the products because of their Islamic qualities. They were convinced that the products would cure them from their ailments.

Furthermore it is clearly stated that the products are made in accordance with the *halal* regulation of the MUI (Majlis *Ulama* Indonesia -- Indonesian Council of the *Ulama*), an institution that authorizes *halal* labeling in Indonesia.

Afiafit consists of two words: *afia* (Ar. meaning ‘healthy’) and *fit* (Eng. likewise meaning healthy). While demonstrating its Islamic qualities, Afiafit seeks to grab a new segment of the market that is different from *jamu* consumers who are mostly ordinary Indonesian people. Islamic herbal seems not to compete with *jamu*, which has an extremely good reputation among Indonesian consumers but it also does not want to compete with Western medicine which controls most of the medicine market in Indonesia. Abu Suhaira, the Afiafit production manager, told the story.

We use ‘Afiafit’ as our brand name. As you know, a good brand name is really important in business. A wrong brand name could deliver a wrong message to consumers. We decided to use this name because it is easy to remember. It also reveals the idea that Islam prioritizes health. We don’t want to compete with traditional *jamu*. It is impossible to compete with *jamu* as it is part of Indonesian culture. At the same time, we don’t want to compete with conventional medicine as supported by multinational companies. No, we don’t do that. We just do business. At the same time we also want to promote Islamic medicine. People should understand that there are so many ways to stay healthy, and there are so many traditions in medicine. So far, *alhamdulillah*, if you go downtown, you will see many outlets that sell our products. This business has a good prospect. (Interview with Abu Suhaira, Yogyakarta, January, 13, 2011).

Afiafit is a private company and its owners are members of the Salafi community. They established the company for two reasons: because of the availability of skilled workers and experts within the community and for economic gain. It is worth noting that many Salafi members have degrees in pharmacy and medicine. They combine their modern knowledge with that of the Islamic tradition. Most of the workers are Salafis who

live around Glondongan. It is worth noting also that finding a new job is extremely difficult, especially for Salafis because of various constraints. For instance, Salafis attempt to pray on time and they want to apply gender segregation, two things that can hardly ever be achieved in a non-Salafi environment. For this reason, Salafis tend to create their own businesses to guarantee their own privacy. It therefore makes sense that Afiakit rather employs workers from its own internal Salafi circles.

Apart from helping friends and colleagues, Afiakit is determined to empower local communities, especially farmers. Local farmers supply most of the herbal ingredients and they benefit greatly from Afiakit's presence. In the 1970s, most of the farmers in the neighborhood planted rice once or twice a year depending upon the volume of rainfall. In the late 1980s, because of poor agriculture infrastructure and due to urbanization, many farmers abandoned their rice fields and went to the cities to improve their economic situation. Those who stayed behind in the village sought to survive by planting rice, potatoes and yams for their own consumption. Due to poverty, some of them even sold their land and migrated to the cities. Since Afiakit's establishment in the late 1990s, however, changes occurred.⁵⁸ In the post-harvest season, the villagers can now use their land by planting the various herbs Afiakit needs and thus they gain extra income.

Afiakit never fails to accept the crops of the local farmers as long as they are organic. Instead of using chemical fertilizers, Afiakit warns the farmers only to use natural or organic fertilizers, which are also cheaper. Initially, it was difficult to teach the farmers not to use chemical fertilizers because they had been heavily dependent upon

⁵⁸ Interview with Abu Suhaira, Yogyakarta, January 13, 2013.

them for so long. During the New Order, the farmers were politically mobilized to create food independency (Ind. *swasembada pangan*), and they used chemical fertilizers to have better harvests. After some training by Afiat officials, working with the university and local authorities, the farmers began to notice the benefits of organic fertilizers. The harvests became bigger, the land did not deteriorate as quickly as before. Because of these good results, Afiat and the farmers started a campaign to use organic fertilizers not only among the farmers in the neighborhood but also among the local communities in general.

Because of this cooperation, the Salafi group in Glondongan does not have any problem promoting its teachings. Many local farmers have now turned into Salafi members and they regularly attend the religious lectures the Salafis offer. This can be seen in the Salafi Friday congregations and during other religious public lectures where villagers also participate. In neighborhood forums such as *Posyandu* (Pos Pelayanan Terpadu—Integrated Health Service Post), a government-community health service, many Salafi women are active and also many ordinary women participated. The cooperation between the Salafis and the local populations has made the intrusion of Salafi *da'wah* even more profound. Many farmers support Salafi programs especially those on education and social activities. Many farmers give crops during harvest season to the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) such as rice, potatoes, yams, and bananas. At the same time, they offer free labor for mosque and *madrassa* constructions, to which they eventually will send their children. One morning, Amin, who is a village chief, explained the cooperation between the Salafis and the local communities. He further described.

We created sustainable development. We know this is so since many of us studied at the faculty of agriculture. Therefore, we know for sure what the benefits of using organic fertilizers are. We no longer use more *urea* (brand of chemical fertilizer). We advise our farmers to use safe ones, safe for the product, safe for the land, and safe for the people. That's the idea behind sustainable development. It takes time. People seem impatient, as they really want to grab the windfall. This [sustainable development] also fits in with Islamic teachings that we people don't have the right to exploit Mother Nature. Disasters are occurring in our present-day world because of our greedy and improper ways of manipulating nature. We here, the people of Glondongan fully realize that major shifts have to be made. These [he pointed at some potatoes and yams on the tables] are organic. Local farmers are coming here to offer their crops after harvest season. (Interview with Amin Murkantor, Yogyakarta, February, 15, 2011)

According to the production manager, Abu Suhaira, this company so far has 30 workers. It pays all the workers in accordance with the provincial minimum payment regulation (UMR), which was around IDR 1.250.000 (US\$ 85) per month. Apart from this, the company also provides its worker with various other benefits (education aids, childbirth insurance). Furthermore, all workers were given one bottle of Afiakit— multi-vitamin—every month to keep up their stamina. Although the company was not yet at its peak, the workers and the management remained optimistic about the business's future. Abu Suhaira previously studied economics at university. Instead of returning to his hometown in Lampung, Sumatra, he joined the Salafi group with which he had become acquainted during his studies. Having a degree in economics, he was appointed marketing manager. His main task is to enhance the worker's productivity.

The Efficacy of Black Caraway

Black caraway (Ar. *al-habbat al-sawdaa*; Ind. *jinten hitam*; Latin *Nigella sativa*) is the most important ingredient in Islamic herbal medicine. Some *hadith* narrates that the

Prophet used this ingredient to cure his illness. Prior to the coming of Islam, the efficacy of black caraway had already been widely recognized. It had been used particularly in the Middle East and in the Southeast Asian countries to treat ailments. It is used for inflammatory diseases, to increase milk production in nursing mothers, to promote digestion, and to fight parasitic infections. In traditional societies, it is used to cure non-acute diseases such as fever, flu, headache and asthma (Heymeyer & Schonig 2012).

Black caraway has also been known in Indonesia. It was called *jintan hitam*. However, its use for therapeutic remedies has been relatively limited until recently, which might be related to its scarcity as it is not a plant native to Indonesia (Astawan 2009: 63; Ong 2008: 23; Gray 2013: 80). Black caraway sparked Indonesian public attention at the end of the 1990s when many Salafi groups used it for their herbal medicinal products. Containing amino, calcium, sodium, and iron, it has become a major ingredient for Islamic medicine. So far, Afiafit has imported this plant from Pakistan and Nigeria, two countries that have become black caraway's main producers. If regularly consumed, it can improve the workings of the kidneys, blood circulation and reduce blood sugar levels. For men it can improve strength and cure impotence, for women, it cures menstruation disorders and reduces cancer risks. Using this ingredient, Afiafit produces various capsules, pills, and powders and the prices of each product (packaged in a bottle containing 50 capsules) range between IDR 40.000 (US\$ 35) to IDR 80.000 (US\$ 7) (the total produce per month is 10.000 bottles).

Figure 9

Afifat Products and Its Prices (in US\$)

Afiafit	2.5
Dietary Honey	2
Health Propolis Melia	25
Beauty Melon	7
Women's Bandage	2.5
Pure Hazelnut Oil	3
Bioactiva	10
Ben Ca Lang Herbamed	13
Ace Max Juice	13
Xamthose Plus Juice	17
Omega Fish Oil	12
Oleska Tasnim	11
Obahama	36

What is more interesting for our discussion is that Afiafit promotes its products not simply based on the Islamic tradition. Its products are also made in accordance with the Javanese *jamu* prescription. On each package is written: “*Dibuat sesuai dengan konsep kesehatan Nabi dengan ramuan asli tradisional Indonesia*” (It is based on the Prophet’s concept of health combined with the indigenous Indonesian tradition). This announcement conveys the message that Afiafit does not only want to grab the Muslim consumers but also seeks to promote its products beyond religious boundaries. In light of the anthropology of knowledge, this claim exposes the idea that Islamic medicine, as understood by the Salafis, is open knowledge. It constantly changes and absorbs local

elements to make it fit with current conditions.

Afiafit's promotion of Islamic medicine, according to Abu Suhaira, is an attempt to prove that such a thing really exists. People need to know that Islam has developed its own medical tradition, which differs from other traditions. Islamic medicine need not to be confronted with Western or Chinese medicine. All medical traditions have their own merits, strengths and weaknesses. In the context of globalization, each tradition moves to the center and this process leads to the diversity of medicine. He further asserts that this is only the beginning. It should not end with the mere introduction of black caraway capsules. This diversity can only be achieved if Afiafit is able to enter into cooperation with others.

Standardization and Cooperation

There are at least two institutions that have the authority to regulate traditional medicine in Indonesia. The first is BPOM (Food and Drug Authority), the second is the MUI. The former is authorized to regulate traditional medicine such as *jamu* and herbal medicines and to ensure that they are safe for public consumption. The second has the authority to decide whether the production of medicine complies with Sharia stipulations and thereby enabling it to determine its *halal* or *haram* status. So far, Afiafit has met all the requirements as set down by BPOM and MUI. Each product has a warranty that the product has been validated by the BPOM and MUI. Due to recent violations by traditional pharmaceutical companies sometimes leading to poisoning and death, the government has tightened its regulations and has raised its standards by launching the

OHT (*Obat Herbal Tersandar* -- Standardized Herbal Medicine) and CPOTB (*Cara Pembuatan Obat Tradisional Yang Baik* -- The Procedures of the Production of Traditional Herbal Medicine). With this policy, all traditional herbal companies need to modernize their equipment and have to have met all research procedures before their products may be released onto the market.

In the aftermath of the implementation of this policy, many small industries collapsed due their inability to purchase new equipment. Some merged with others and now go under new brand names. In response to this, Afiafit and other companies, which are members of the association of Islamic herbal companies, tried to negotiate the policy by offering a gradual replacement of machine equipment. Both parties agreed that the replacement should be made gradually as to give the companies more opportunities to find new investors or creditors. While the association agrees that the policy has positive implications, some businessmen are concerned that big companies may have used these policies to threaten their competitors. Multi-national herbal companies and *jamu* manufactures have gradually felt that in the end, the rapid increase of traditional medicine in Indonesia over the last decades might turn into a real threat. For this reason, the former may have used the authorities to enforce certain regulations in order to slow down the pace of the latter. In relation to this, Abu Suhaira explained:

Well, business is business. It is about competition. In business, big companies kill small ones. We know what you do even if you don't say it. The licenses [OTB and CPOTB] might have been the case. If you ask [about this competition], nobody will tell you. But, if you are running a business, you know exactly what's happening. The Invisible Hands. I know that [it was said by Adam Smith) because I studied economics. [He smiled and laughed]. So far, we don't have the license. It costs one billion rupiah [US\$108,873]. But, we will get there. We also have

strategies. I am not saying that *kita menghalalkan segala cara* [we go to every means to make our products *halal*]. No. We have to be smart. We should mobilize our resources in order to survive. We regularly hold meetings with our stakeholders. Many people are reportedly interested in investing their money. That's important. So we have fresh money to expand our business. (Interview with Abu Suhaira, Yogyakarta, January, 15, 2011).

The implementation of this policy meant that all traditional medicine companies regularly have to register their products complete with their laboratory analyses to the BPOM. To ensure the companies' compliance, the BPOM will regularly send inspectors, sometimes teamed up with MUI officials, to the production location and report on it.⁵⁹ Companies that pass the inspection will be allowed to run their production, while those who fail will be suspended from operation. In practice, however, the visitations provide some room for "negotiation." More frequent than not, inspectors, who are mostly sent from Jakarta, are well-treated during their visitations. They are booked in luxurious hotels, picked up from, and taken back to, their hotels and they receive gifts before they return to Jakarta. Having been treated so nicely, not to say downright bribed which is hard to prove, the inspectors usually check the entry "pass" for the company.

Apart from hearsay around competition and inspection, traditional medicine companies seem keen to cooperate with other institutions. Afiafit has so far entered into cooperation with universities and research centers in Yogyakarta and Solo, the two main cities in Central Java where the major universities are located. From the placards hanging on the wall of the company, it is clear that Afiafit cooperates with the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta (UMS), and LIPI (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* --

⁵⁹ Interview with Arief Suhandi, Jakarta, January, 2013.

Indonesia's Science Foundation). The UMS fully supports the scientific research on herbal medicine and it even promotes the use of herbal medicine in order to support Indonesia's biodiversity and to empower local communities. Because of this cooperation, Abu Suhaira said, some hospitals in Yogyakarta and Solo prescribe herbal medicines although still in a limited way. He further explained that the Gadjah Mada University (UGM), the main campus in Yogyakarta, opened up a specialization on herbal medicine.

It is relevant to note that research on traditional medicine is still limited (Dewoto 2007). Government interest in herbal medicine only started in the 1990s when many traditional medicine companies sprung up across the country. Although experts and herbal practitioners point out the efficacy of herbal medicine, until today, the working components of herbal medicine are hard to determine. Many herbal medicines on the market are consumed based on the assumption that they are good for human health. This presumption is frequently accompanied by various beliefs that these medicines have been used for centuries and have been made according to the recipes of the ancestors, etc. Nevertheless, these claims are hardly ever confirmed. Unlike modern medicines whose components are fixed and determined, the components of traditional medicine vary depending on internal and external factors. The internal factors concern environmental conditions where the herbs grow which influence the contents of the medicines. The external factors are the various processes they have to go through before they are sold on the market.

In general, companies do not have enough budget to fund such research. Abu Ubaidah, the director of Afiafit laboratory research unit, said that so far the company

undertook toxic examinations to ensure that the products do not contain components that endanger human health. While many other things need to be done, Abu Ubaidah was convinced that Afiafit will be able to survive. “*Kita penuhi semua persyaratan sambil jalan.*” (We fulfill all the requirements as we go). He further said.

We are pretty sure that we can resolve all these problems. The potential of the *ummah* is so big. So, we invite them to get involved in our business. We have good human resources. That’s the most important thing. Many pharmacy graduates want to join our company, which is really good for the future of our business. We also have a network with various institutions such as universities and research centers. In the near future, *insha Allah*, our business will be just as strong as *jamu* companies. (Interview with Abu Ubaidah, Yogyakarta, January, 13, 2011)

Attempts to promote Islamic medicine are also made by the establishment of APHMI (*Asosiasi Pengusaha Herbal Muslim Indonesia* -- Muslim Herbal Businessmen Association). This association is to share information and knowledge on Islamic medicine, enabling various corporations to upgrade their positions. Moreover, the association is also responsible for improving herbal companies’ bargaining positions in response to various government policies and threats posed by large and multi-national companies. Abu Ubaidah said that in the competitive market, Islamic herbal medicine companies need to cooperate. Indonesia is blessed with an extremely rich bio-diversity, the second largest after Brazil, and this has to be used for the sake of the people. He further said that China, which does not have a rich bio-diversity, has been able to standardize its herbal medicine. So should Indonesia, in the view of Afiafit. With the members of the association, Afiafit seeks to negotiate with the government to make it more concerned with this business sector and there is no reason for the government not to support it.

Hujama and Ruqya

It is almost impossible to discuss Islamic herbal medicine without also mentioning *hujama* and *ruqya*. Although they are separate entities, many herbal outlets offer *hujama*, and many *hujama* clinics offer *ruqya* in order to cleanse their patients' souls before they are cupped and given herbal prescriptions for their treatment. Herbal medicine, cupping, and exorcism are thus one-package products which are important from the point of view of marketing strategies. An exorcist or cupper who works individually and get his orders by telephone, would automatically recommend the closest herbal outlets where his patients can purchase the best herbal medicine in town.

Cupping is the detoxification of the blood by removing it from of the patient's body with the use of a cup-like device. This method is believed to be able to cure various diseases such as high cholesterol, diabetes, strokes, heart attacks, and kidney disorders. The blood that is removed from the body is believed to be dirty and to contain a residue of dead cells that may interfere and even endanger the body's metabolism and its organs. In former times, cupping was performed by traditional healers or native doctors (Ind. *dukun*) who combined their medicinal knowledge with spiritual power (Geertz 1960: 86-111; Hefner 1989: 189-196; Suparlan 1991; Woodward 2011: 69-112, Muhaimin 1995). They used very modest devices such as knives, bandages, and they used betel leaves as an antibiotic. Nowadays, cupping is a profession anybody can do who has gone through the necessary training and education and who has the proper knowledge of medicine. The cupping instruments are now made in a sophisticated way and consist of small needles, knives, cups, pumps, antibiotics, olive oil, cotton, tissues, and sphygmometers. While

some are made at home, most of the cupping instruments are imported from China, which has successfully developed its traditional medicine.

Before cupping begins, the cupper and the cuppee pray to God to seek His protection, at least they read the *basmalah*. Some cuppers even offer *ruqya* to their patients to purify their souls and to evict evil spirits that might interfere with the cupping process. The cupper then measures the patient's blood pressure and heart beat. If they are normal, the cupping will be continued. The cupper may also ask whether the patient has a headache or if he is nauseous. If yes, the cupping will not be continued because it may have a negative impact. The cupping begins by sterilizing the surface of the skin where the cupping is going to take place. Some cuppers prefer to use olive oil rather than regular antibiotics (QS 95:1). The reason for this is clear, antibiotics contain alcohol, while the use of olive oil has spiritual connotations as the Qur'an mentions its efficacy. The cup is then put on the sterilized areas and the cupper will decompress the cup. Because of this decompression, the cuppee will feel that his blood pressure moves to that area. The decompression lasts 5 to 10 minutes to ensure that all the dirty blood is concentrated under the cupping spot. Afterwards, the cupper will shoot the surface of the skin with a small needle, and the dirty blood will come out. It is said that the quantity of the blood indicates the acuteness of the disease. The more blood, the more acute the disease. When everything is done, the shooting areas will be cleaned with antibiotics or olive oil and the entire process takes about one hour.

Figure 10
Cupping



Some patients reportedly feel drowsy and weak after the cupping. It is therefore recommended that they should sit for a while and have a sweet drink to recover. After cupping, driving a car and operating machines are strictly prohibited. The aftereffects of the cupping will clear up after a few days. The body will be relieved, pain and fatigue will have disappeared. During my fieldwork I was cupped several times, not only for medical treatment, but also to experience this aspect of the Prophet's medicine. It helped. My headache and back pain disappeared. Within weeks or months, however, they came back. After consulting my cupper, he stated that my life style, food consumption, and exercise affected my metabolism. He said I could compare it with a car that needs a regular change of oil after having been used for hundreds of miles. It was similar with the human's body, it needs regular repairs. For this reason, it is recommended to take cupping regularly. For healthy people, cupping may be taken every two months. For the ill, it can be done every two weeks. During one cupping session, one may be cupped in several spots, between 6 to 12, depending on the disease and the patient's complaints. All parts of the body can be cupped but people usually take cupping on the neck, back, waist,

pelvis, buttocks, up to the coccyx. Other places may include the feet, thigh, shank, heel, waist, and hands. Some people take cupping for health reasons, while others want to enhance their sexual drive and fertility.

Most of the Salafi cuppers in Jakarta use the cupping anatomy chart made by the Salafi figure and senior cupper from Jakarta, Ustadz Kathur Suhardi, (See picture below). His anatomy chart helps cuppers to exactly determine those parts of the human's body that are safe and effective for cupping. He is one of the cupping masters has practiced cupping since the 1990s, and has trained thousands of cupper across the country. He is credited for having revived cupping and for reframing it in order to meet contemporary conditions. Besides his anatomy chart, he also created the standardized operation procedures (SOP) for cupping and for teaching these procedures to new cuppers during training sessions. According to Pak Saiful, my cupper, Suhardi's popularity is well recognized, not only by cuppers, but also by other health practitioners. Saiful further asserted that each training session included some participants who were doctors and nurses. He said that many doctors use cupping. One medical doctor who uses cupping is Zaidul Akbar, who shifted to the Prophet's medicine in 2008. Not only does Akbar promote cupping, he also asks his colleagues to return to the Prophet's medicine, which is simple and natural. To promote this method, he joined ABI (*Asosiasi Bekam Indonesia*—Association of the Oxidant Drainage Therapy of Indonesia) and he was elected its president in 2012.

While cupping has been well-known in Indonesia long before the coming of the Salafi groups, the Salafis claim that their cupping has been authenticated according to the Sharia. Apart from Muslim consumers, non-Muslims also take cupping. Data on this issue are scarce but based on some information, non-Muslims visit cupping clinics to cure the diseases they suffer from much like Muslims. Concerning this, it is interesting how cupping as a method initially developed by Salafis has gradually attracted larger segments of the population regardless of their religious, social, and economic backgrounds. According to Pak Saiful, who claims to have cupped non-Muslims, the fact that non-Muslim take cupping is not surprising as it is because they also seek health and wellness.

Human beings are all the same. They want a healthy life regardless whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. I once cupped non-Muslims. I told them that cupping was just a method of treatment recommended by the Prophet Muhammad. This by no means belongs to Muslims only. Having said this, I cannot reject patients simply because they are non-Muslims. Some participants in the training sessions were also non-Muslims. The purpose of the training was to share knowledge. And with this knowledge, human beings regardless of their faiths can come together. (Interview, Saiful, Ciputat, August 25, 2013).

Although public enthusiasm about cupping is relatively high, there are still many problems to solve. The biggest problem is that as a profession, cupping has yet to attain legal status from the authorities. This aspect is extremely important as to give a sense of security not only to the cuppers themselves but also to their patients. In the long run, having legal status will provide cuppers with a good career, much like other careers like doctors and nurses. To this end, cuppers, most of whom belong to Salafi groups, established ABI in 2007. The goal of this association is to standardize cupping and to

upgrade the cupper's bargaining position in relation to government's policies. At the same time, it was also established to share information and knowledge with other cuppers. Nevertheless, the road to success is not an easy one. According to Arief Suhandi, one of the observers of Islamic medicine, some high-ranking officials at IDI (*Ikatan Dokter Indonesia*—Indonesian Medical Doctor Association) are very pessimistic about cupping. Notwithstanding this, he is convinced that Islamic medicine has good prospects for the future.

Ruqya Shar'iyya

Ruqya means magical words, spells, or charms to control—and usually dispel or contain—supernatural spirit. The practice of *ruqya* is almost universal. Many societies believe that diseases are caused by jin, evil spirits, and black magic. Many diseases or ailments can be cured by *ruqya* especially evil possession (Ar. *al-shar'u*, Ind. *kesurupan*) and mental disorders. Spiritual and mental disorders usually start when a person starts dreaming of encountering a wild animal, a black jackal or meeting a man with an ugly face. The dream is followed by convulsion, hysteria, and extreme anxiety. These phenomena can hardly be explained by modern medical science. Jin harm people by entering their brain and thus disturb their consciousness. This kind of illness cannot be cured by conventional doctors, but by native medicine men or traditional healers. In pre-modern society, magicians enjoyed a high reputation in society and they had a great deal of prestige. After the arrival of modernity, their roles gradually declined and magic was

replaced by science and technology. Notwithstanding the domination of science within modern societies, magic has not entirely disappeared.

In the early of Islamic history, the Prophet Muhammad prohibited all kinds of *ruqya* as they potentially caused *shirk*. The Prophet was concerned with safeguarding the Muslim community's faith and he did not want the *ummah* to return to pre-Islamic traditions. However, when the faith of the *ummah* had been firmly established, he allowed *ruqya*. The main reason for this was that the Qur'an itself contains passages concerned with magical power. The Prophet's Companion, Auf ibn Malik, once asked the Prophet Muhammad about *ruqya*. The Prophet replied: "Show me your *ruqya*. There is nothing wrong with *ruqya* as long as it does not contain polytheism" (narrated by Bukhari and Muslim). In the course of history, the Muslim population has practiced *ruqya* aimed at spiritual healing and evicting evil spirits.

Ruqya made its comeback in Indonesian religious discourse thanks to the Salafi groups who promote it. The Salafis revived *ruqya* as a form of medical treatment for the ill. As I argued earlier, this method is often combined with herbal medicine and cupping. As far as Salafis are concerned, *ruqya* is the invocation of Qur'anic verses in front of sick people in order to cure them. "And, we send down from the Qur'an that which is healing and provides mercy for the believers, but it does not increase the wrongdoers except in loss" (QS 17:82). According to Hasyim, Salafis are really concerned with *ruqya* as it is part of Islamic teachings. For this reason, they have been trying to re-enter *ruqya* into the Sharia. *Ruqya shar'iyah* can be characterized as follows: The *ruqya* specialist is committed to uphold the Sharia and he or she performs his religious obligations such as

performing prayers and fasting. Furthermore, *ruqya* should be stated in clear and understandable language, most preferably Arabic but using a vernacular language with a clear meaning is justifiable. Bearing this in mind, vague words like spells or charms are prohibited as they may invoke the involvement of the jin and thus polytheistic powers. Moreover, Hasyim explains that the use of certain media such as incense, offerings, and daggers, are strictly prohibited. Their presence may interfere with the consciousness of both the exorcist and the exorcee aimed to request the help of God and God alone. The only justified means is water through which the spiritual power of the prayers is transferred, and subsequently scrubbed on or drunk by the sick.

During my fieldwork, I had *ruqya* once at the Bengkel Rohani clinic in Ciputat. My plan was actually to interview some exorcists who worked in the clinic to find out how they did *ruqya*, but since they were really busy with their customers, the only possible way was that I had to have *ruqya* myself. A young exorcist came to me and asked me if I needed *ruqya*, to which I said “yes”. Despite the fact that I grew up with a highly traditional Islamic background, and where *ruqya* is widely practiced, I had never had *ruqya* before. So it was the first time for me to get a sense of this kind of spiritual healing. The young exorcist asked me to take an ablution after which I was asked to lay down in a bath and to close my eyes but not to fall asleep. Then I heard that he invoked some prayers taken from the Qur’an (QS 1: 1-7; 2: 1-5; 2: 102; 2: 163-164; 2: 255).

Figure 12

Ruqya Shar'iyah



Along with the growing popularity of *ruqya*, some *ruqya* entrepreneurs offer spiritual healing to the public. The way they market their services is rather provocative and some of them have an eccentric physical appearance such as wearing black clothes, sporting long hair, and a wearing a canine necklace, to convince their patients that they have spiritual power. They charge prime airtime on TV stations to attract customers and claim that they are able to cure any kind of disease. Many people come to them to be cured although they have to pay a huge amount of money. According to Hasyim, even though they practice *ruqya* and use various prayers taken from the *Qur'an*, their *ruqya* is totally against the Sharia. Instead of requesting God's help, they in fact invoke the jin's assistance. Hasyim asserts that seeking help from the jin is very common as the latter attempt to lead the former astray from the right path of God. This phenomenon is in fact a form of modern magic practice (Ind. *perdukunan modern*), which Islam strictly prohibits.

Over the last decades, we witnessed a revival of *perdukunan*. People don't really care whether they come to a *dukun* (magician), who seeks help from the jin, or to

a *raqi*, who seeks God's help. As long as they recover they would do anything. We have to do something about this. As a *raqi* (exorcist), I am concerned with the fact that many people misuse *ruqya*. Salafis have been trying to put *ruqya* on the right track. We hold training for new *raqi*. We teach them how to perform *ruqya* in accordance with the Sharia, and we hope they inform and teach the *ummah* about the proper *ruqya*. I can tell you the basic principle of *ruqya Shariah*. In *ruqya shar'iyah*, there are no elements whatsoever which may lead to vagueness. I know some people who use that even though they say that they don't use it as a means to intermedate. Still, to the ordinary people, it means something. And that's the danger of *shirk*. (Interview with Hasyim Sanusi, Makassar, June, 15 2011)

Although Hasyim has practiced *ruqya* for the last two decades, he never has a fixed price. He told me many stories that in earlier times, many pious *ulama* practiced *ruqya* without accepting any payment from their patients. They simply did it to help people and not to for look for money. Local patrons or the community where he lived usually took care of a *raqi*'s needs. He further said that there is a *hadith* that clearly prohibits accepting money for *ruqya* as it would prejudice the good intentions of the *raqi*. This does not mean that he never accepts anything from his patients. Instead, he would be happy to accept gifts, donations, or even money. He just did not want to have to state a fixed price in advance. In this way, not only could he guarantee the effectiveness of his treatment, having to fix his price would disturb his concentration and profane his intention. He just put a box in his clinic in Makassar where patients can donate their money, usually anonymous, in sealed envelopes. Despite this anonymity, he is hardly ever underpaid. In general, patients know the payment he deserves. Apart from this, when patients have fully recovered he usually gets extra payment and gifts including food and fruits.

People's appreciation of a healer is sometimes beyond modern calculation. In Tangerang, where a native doctor named Abah Atma opened his clinic, a former patient gave him a new permanent building designed with Javanese architecture. It was told that the patient, a Javanese businessman, was extremely grateful when he was fully recovered after having been treated in his clinic. As a result, he dedicated this building to his healer so that the latter could treat more patients. Like Hasyim, Abah Atma never fixed his rates. He just put a big box inside his room where patient leave their envelopes before leaving so that they can give the amount of money they can afford to spend. A thyroid patient from Ciputat told me that he put one million rupiah (around US\$ 90) inside the envelope.

Hasyim was silent when I asked him how he could survive as a healer without fixed prices. He just shook his head. "That's commercialization," he said. He said that while payment is inevitable in all human business, commercialization might jeopardize his business. He said that if people measure everything from the aspect of money, *baraka* (blessing) will get lost. He was not sure whether his profession will survive. He was just concerned with the fact that he can help others. In addition, when they know that they were helped and well treated, they will give something in return. That is how his profession will survive. At the end of the interview, he quoted the Qur'anic verse (36:21): "Follow those who do not ask [payment] and they are rightly guided." He said that this verse deals with the Messengers of God, from Adam to Muhammad. They never asked for payment from their people as God will reward them in the Hereafter.

Chapter Seven - “Marry a woman for her faith, otherwise your hands will be smeared with dust”⁶⁰

The original idea for this chapter came to me after I attended a seminar held by the Wahdah, a Salafi organization in Makassar, South Sulawesi, in 2011. It had invited scholars from home and abroad - all of whom were men - to deliver talks about Islam. The seminar had been organized to celebrate the anniversary of the organization. It started with a general lecture by a Saudi Arabian *sheikh*. He gave a talk about the truth and the roles of Islam in human civilization. He spoke in Arabic for few sentences and then gave an interpreter time to translate it into Indonesian. When the talk was over, there was a question and answer session. Many people raised their hands to ask a question and the moderator allowed seven slots, five for men and, at the very end, two for woman. It is important to mention that the seminar room was divided into two sections and men and women sat separated from each other with a high black curtain between them. One by one the questioners stood up and walked to the front to take up a microphone. After briefly introducing themselves, they asked their questions. All the questions and comments were standard and unsurprising. No one argued let alone challenged any of the speaker’s opinions. But I impatiently waited for something else: the final slot, questions by women, which would be the most interesting one. But, where were they? I did not see

⁶⁰ The title is derived from one of the Prophet’s *hadith* that runs as follows. “A woman may be married for four reasons: for her property, her status, her beauty, and her faith. Marry a woman for her faith, otherwise your hands will be smeared with dust” (narrated by Muslim). Many *ulama* interpret the expression ‘your hands be smeared with dust’ as a metaphore for poverty, loss, or impoverishment.

any women, nor did I hear any of their voices. Had I miss them? I eventually discovered that they had written down their questions and given them to the moderator.

This chapter addresses the often-invisible presence of women in public life of Salafis, and particularly the role of marriage in Salafi intra-group politics. Women are indeed present in many public activities (as well as private matters of the home) among the Salafis, and they are quite influential, yet to outside observers they often seem to remain concealed in many ways. It is to demonstrate that Salafi women are in fact “active” and “independent” while maintaining their *murū’ah* (dignity and honor) as women.

Women in Islam

Does Islam "opposes" women? Looking at the Qur’an, one finds it difficult not to assume that a number of verses have strong gender-biased overtones. It is stated that leadership is exclusively in the hands of men; it is men who lead over women (QS 4:34). It is also stated that women inherit only half a portion while men inherit a full portion (QS 4: 11). Also women's testimony should be based on at least two persons, while one man's testimony will be fully accepted (QS 2: 282). The most controversial issue regarding the man-woman relationship is the justification for a man to have more than one wife. According to Islam, a man can be polygamous if he can meet all the requirements (QS 4: 3).

In the narratives of the Prophet, women are depicted more poorly than men (Ahmed 1992; Stowasser 1994; Hasyim 2006). It is stated that women were created from

men's (Adam's) bent rib. Many interpret this allegory as implying that women are difficult to straighten. According to the exegesis of the Qur'an, it was Eve who seduced Adam into tasting the forbidden fruit, resulting in both of them being banished from Paradise. A similar story is that of Joseph and Zulaikha, where Zulaikha tried to seduce Joseph to enter into an illicit relationship (QS 12: 23). Based on these, women are perceived as emotional and men, rational. Women are also supposed to be beautiful, soft, impulsive, and patient but they lack intelligence. On the other hand, men are supposed to be powerful, alert, and clever but they lack patience. It is assumed that these qualities of men and women were created so that they complement each other. "They are your clothes, you are their clothes," (QS 2:187). *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) is very much influenced by this seemingly biased perspective where women are subordinate to men and this is often seen as the most biased gender aspect of Islam. It is believed that men's hegemony over women has been systematically created. First, it began with the sacred texts. Second, from these sacred texts, *fiqh* expounded on the concepts of devotion, marriage, leadership, inheritance, wifhood and motherhood, and thus maintained the patriarchal system.

The implementation of gender segregation requires the separation of men and women while they engage in social activities (Hassan 2003; Mernissi 1987; Von Doorn-Harder 2006). As a consequence of this rule, women are unable to attend public meetings including schools when marriageable men are present. This is due to the fact that women's bodies and voices are *aurat* (parts of human body that have to be covered in ordinary public setting). In the context of religious life, it is necessary to mention a

classical Islamic text entitled *Uqud al-Lujain fi Haqqi Zaujain* (Transactions of Couples on the Rights of Husband and Wives), written by the nineteenth century Indonesian *ulama*, Muhammad Nawawi (1813-1897). This work is believed to have played an important role in preserving patriarchy among traditional Muslims (Van Doorn-Harder 2006: 165-202; Rumadi, 2006: 141). According to Nawawi's narrative, when a wife turns down her husband's desire to make love, all the Angels in Heaven will condemn her until dawn breaks.

Muslim jurists have in fact made their own interpretations of Islamic rulings regarding women. With regard to the 'inequality' in inheritance, for instance, Muslim jurists argue that the women's share, which is one portion, was an *ad hoc* matter and not meant as a regular ordinance. On the contrary the verse should be read as part of the Qur'anic spirit to improve the position of women. Some scholars believe that because of this stipulation the position of women is much better compared to their plight during the pre-Islamic period, when women were not only unable to inherit, they were also inheritable. Having said that, Munawir Sjadzali, a noted Indonesian Muslim scholar and former Minister of Religious Affairs, said that the principle that women inherit one portion, while men two portions, does not do justice to the existing social and economic condition where both men and women are working. Having said that, he further admitted that he would treat his daughters and his sons equally in his legacy (Sjadzali 1988).

Calls for reform of patriarchy in Muslim societies have increased in modern, but face still resistance. Many argue that scriptures in fact do not suggest that Islam tolerates discrimination against women. "Religion," writes Husein Muhammad, "has never

tolerated any form of discrimination. The best solution to this is to reconstruct and reinterpret the sacred texts and adapt them to the current situation." (Muhammad 2001: 27). According to progressive ideas, Islam was not revealed in a vacuum. If this proposition is understood correctly, some parts of Islamic teachings, including those on man-woman relationships, have been laid down on the basis of local and contemporary needs. It means that what is important is not what was literally revealed to the Prophet, but rather the spirit underlying the revelation (Esack 1999). This spirit is perceived by most Muslim scholars as the spirit of change.

Women within the Salafi Community

Women have highly ambivalent roles in Salafi communities. On the one hand, they are subordinated to men. On the other, they have to be independent. While men are responsible for earning *nafqah* (livelihood), women stay at home, take care of their children and do all sorts of domestic jobs. Due to gender segregation, where no marriageable men are allowed to be present at their homes, women are expected to manage to accomplish their tasks on their own, including those jobs men usually do. In other words, gender segregation does not keep women from doing things beyond their conventional roles. While maintaining their dignity, women are urged to support the family income. They are also encouraged to create careers for themselves suitable to their nature.

According to Islam, men and women were created from the soul of God. "God then proportioned him and breathed into him from His soul and made for you hearing and

vision and hearts; little are you grateful” (Q.S. 32:9). Based on this verse, men and women have dignity and honor as they are in possession of the qualities of God, and these qualities should be protected from being polluted by no matter what sins. In Islam, the concept of *aurat* in fact comes down to the protection God’s qualities (Hassan 2003: 150-175). The *aurat* of men is between navel and the knees, while that of women includes all parts of their bodies except their faces and hands and therefore women are obliged to veil themselves.

The obligation for women to cover their *aurat* is founded on Qur’anic verses that assert that women are required “to bring down over themselves [part] of their outer garments” (33:59) and on the *hadiths* that says that the *aurat* includes all but the face and the hands. Despite this argumentation, the veiling of women is less enforced. Before the introduction of the so-called *jilbab* or *hijab*, traditionalist Muslim women in Indonesia used to wear a *kerudung*, a triangle-shaped shawl to cover their heads, which was knotted under their chin (Geertz 1976: 57; Smith-Hefner 2007: 389-420). In modern times, women’s veiling has been subject of, sometimes heated, criticism. Many scholars believe that the practice is a form of women’s subordination to men’s domination. Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan-born feminist, has argued that the veiling and the seclusion of women as practiced in many Muslim communities is socially constructed and are reminiscent of the patriarchal pre-Islamic Arabian culture in which power and power-relations were centered in hands of men (Mernissi 1987: 25-86; Stowasser 1994: 92-93). This culture was transformed in the body of Islamic knowledge, particularly the *hadith*,

whose collection did not start until the second century AH/ eight century CE. Because this collection occurred only later on, hadith and its authority have been questioned.

The Salafi understanding of veiling and women's seclusion not only rejects this Mernissian progressive approach towards women's position in Islam, it even restores their "submissive" behavior. To support their arguments, Salafis use various sources even if their qualities are weak. As for the obligation to wear a *niqab* and gloves, Salafis use a *hadith* narrated by Abdullah ibn Umar. It is said that the Prophet Muhammad reportedly prohibited women during the Hajj and Umrah to wear a *niqab* and gloves. Salafis interpret this *hadith* as meaning that in their normal life, women did wear a *niqab* and gloves. Many *ulama* have denounced this *hadith* as its sources are weak. But Salafis, referring to their *ulama* including Ibn Taymiyya, support this opinion as they believe it is safer for women to wear a *niqab* and gloves. As a result, most, if not all, Salafi women do.

The Salafi discourse on women stems from the idea that a woman's body in its entirety including her voice is *aurat* and, as a consequence, should be covered at all times. This conception has led to various consequences: women's seclusion, veiling, and the division of labor between men and women (Hassan 2003). Since early ages, women are trained to stay at home and to cover their bodies. At nine, girls are separated from boys and the other regulations are enforced when girls become fully grown-up after their first menstruation, which marks their adolescence. This means that girls are subject to religious obligations (Ar. *taklif*) such as praying and fasting. Leaving the house, especially for education, is permitted after it has been ascertained that it is safe. If it is

not, they have to be accompanied by a *mahram* (unmarriageable family members). Women usually stay with their parents who act as their guides and after marriage, this guidance is taken over by their husbands.

These are the major principles of the Salafi discourse on women, which constitutes women's *muru'ah* (honor or dignity). Over the last two decades, Salafis have actively promoted this discourse and, simultaneously, challenged other discourses regarding women. Salafis believe that many aspects of the existing discourse on marriage deviate from religious guidance. Many non-Sharia cultural treats, usually termed *adat* (customs or traditional norms) have made weddings expensive, which led to serious implications as marriage-aged Muslims tended to postpone their weddings (Abdullah 1985; Muhaimin 2006: 144-149). For this reason, Salafis sought to deconstruct the existing discourse and to change it in accordance with the Sharia.

Previous Studies on Marriage

A number of scholars have focused their attention on marriage and its relation with social stability (Heaton 1984; Heaton and Pratt 1990; Chinitz and Brown 2011). Some of them focused on marriage and divorce within the Muslim mainstream community (Bowen 2003; Nurmila 2011; O'Shaughnessy 2009). Smith-Hefner studied the practice of veiling among Javanese women and concluded that it could hamper their careers and marriage opportunities (Smith-Hefner, 2007: 389-420). So far, scholarly studies on marriage within the Islamist groups are relatively few. Nisa (2011) focused on the marriage arrangements among veiling Muslim women called *cadari* (women wearing

the *niqab*) and she uncovered valuable information on the issue. She argues that many women join Islamist groups not merely to learn about Islam; they also seek help from their mentors to arrange a marriage for them.

In the following sections, I will describe the Salafi discourse on marriage as opposed to the existing discourse among the general Muslim community. In doing so, I will start with the story of my late foster father and my wife's family. Afterwards, I will continue with an exposition of my ethnographic material consisting of various sketches taken from different sources in different places on the practice of marriage among Salafis. I hope that, by doing so, I will be able to present the differences between Salafi and non-Salafi marriages.

Living with the family of my foster father for almost two decades, I learned how to deal with marriage. He is the father of eight children and five of them are women. Every time one of his daughters was about to get married, he would explain his ideas. He would invite all his children, including myself, and he asked all of us to organize the wedding in a rather simple way. He was more concerned with the idea that the wedding should be in accordance with Sharia commands rather than to follow *adat* rules, which tended to make things complicated. As usual, there were disputes between him and my foster mother, who had more sophisticated ideas. She would discuss her plans in great detail: the dress, the apparel, the wedding platform, the photo session, the procession, food and drinks, and all other preparations to be made before the actual wedding took place.

My wife also provided me with valuable information on how weddings were organized among the Betawi ethnic group of non-Salafis that does not see a wedding as a mere religious ritual. Wedding processions are held to strengthen family solidarity and to maintain its prestigious status in the overall social structures. Approaching the time of a wedding, the elders of the family meet to discuss this important event and all the family members surely understand the importance of this meeting; they should offer their contributions to the event themselves in money, food, or labor. In most cases, the family's contributions are symbolic and do not cover the wedding costs. If members refuse to comply with the decision of the big family the fact will surely be noticed: they will get a similar treatment in their turn, and may even be excluded from the community. As result, among the Betawi ethnic groups a wedding is relatively expensive. It often happens that in the aftermath of the party, the host, in most cases the parents of the bride, will suffer huge debts.

Ahmed Hifni criticized the high cost of weddings among the Betawi ethnic group. He is a Betawi Muslim who was introduced to Salafi teachings through his teachers in high school. He urged his colleagues to return to the Sharia injunctions on marriage and not to pay too much attention to the *adat*, literally norms or tradition. This move marked an important shift among Muslim students who studied and got married at the same time. They sought to show other Muslim students that marriage and study were not only a good combination but also complemented each other.

Marriage and Divorce

Ahmad Hifni is a member of one of the first Indonesian Salafi generations. He came into contact with Salafism in the early 1980s. After some years, he was appointed as *murabbi* (mentor). In the mid-1980s, he married a woman who was a *mutarabbi* (adept) of his *halaqa*. The process leading up to their wedding was complicated. At first, his future parents-in-law rejected his marriage proposal. They argued that they were not ready to accept his sudden proposal and that their daughter needed to finish her degree first, and afterwards needed to find a proper job before getting married. Hifni assumed that because he and she came from different social classes, her parents would marry her off to a man from the same social class. He was the son of a local Muslim teacher while she came from a highly educated middle class family. Faced with this rejection, he asked her to reject their plan, and should her parents insist, she could “threaten” them by saying that she would refuse to marry at all!

Within Salafi groups, the *murabbi* have more powerful roles than parents (Nisa 2011; Machmudi 2008; Damanik 2002). The *murabbi* arranges their members’ weddings, rather than the fathers or grandfathers who may serve as *wali mujbir* (enforcing guardians). According to classical Shafi’i *fiqh*, fathers and grandfathers have the authority to force their daughters/granddaughters to marry even when they are unwilling. Having this authority, *wali mujbir* force their daughters to marry and by so doing turn them into full members of the community because they will have new families and children. Widows are exempted from this regulation. They are free to decide on their own marriages. In former times, this practice raised many problems especially for women

whose future was dedicated to their parents. This practice has been criticized in the modern period especially by women activists.

The high authority of the *murabbi* has been created for ideological reasons because, while the relationship between parents and their children is biological, the relationship between *murabbi* and *mutarabbi* is ideological. Parents are the cause of someone's life in this world, while a *murabbi* offers knowledge on Islam and cherished the spiritual needs of his members. This doctrine is emphasized when a new member joins the *halaqa*. In relation to this, Hifni says:

We have different methods and techniques to force parents to accept a marriage. I know of the concept *wali mujbir* in Islam where fathers or grandfathers have the authority to force a marriage upon their daughters or granddaughters. I know this since this is the implementation of *wali*, which means guardian or possessor. However, in reality, this is no longer practiced. Education and social mobilization has made it even more difficult to realize. Nowadays marriages are more likely to be decided by the partners themselves. In this context, we as *murabbi* visit parents to propose our ideas, which is to guard our solidarity as a group. How can we survive if we cannot arrange our members' marriages? What is more important to say is that marriages are seen as a means to create an idealized community. Through marriages we expect our new-born young Muslim generations to continue our movement. (Interview with Ahmad Hifni, April, 26, 2013)

During his career as a *murabbi*, Hifni arranged dozens of marriages for his members. In one of my interviews he told me of the marriage of Mahfudz, one of his members, which he described as the most unplanned one. Mahfudz had long fallen in love with Zainab. At the same time, Zainab also loved him. He had come to her house several times using an approach called *ta'aruf*.⁶¹ But so far, given the fact that her parents had not given the green light, he just kept his feelings to himself. One day he expressed

⁶¹ *Ta'aruf* is the process of the introduction of a man to the family of a woman. It should be made in the presence of a third party e.g. parents, sister or brother.

his feelings to Hifni. “Ok. Tomorrow we will go to her house. We are going to propose to her.” The next day, Hifni and Mahfudz went to Zainab’s house. They only brought a small amount of money plus cakes and fruits. Arriving at Zainab’s house, Hifni stated the objective of their visit to her parents. Hifni told them that a good Muslim man was ready to propose to their daughter. Her parents, who knew Hifni very well, proposed the idea of hastening the marriage, which was then arranged on that same day in a very modest manner. Only Zainab’s family, Hifni, and some seniors from the neighborhood were invited to witness the wedding proceedings:

Why do people make marriage so difficult? I don’t quite understand. It just makes young people like Mahfudz and Zainab suffer. We are certainly against the practice of *adat istiadat* rules [customs] among our community. Many arrange marriages in a very luxurious manner. No, we do not. Islam urges young people to marriage when they have the *al-ba’ah* [eligibility].⁶² We make it simple. That’s all. Simple is by no means irresponsible. Simple means that we act according to our capacity. (Interview with Ahmad Hifni, April, 26, 2013)

While he successfully arranged his members’ marriages, his own marriage proved to be a failure. In 1999, his wife wanted a divorce. Contrary to previous studies that link divorce to social norms (Cohen and Savaya 1997), or lack of affection (Gigy and Kelly 1992), the cause of divorce among Salafis is mostly related to ideological issues (Nisa, 2011). At that time, his wife was pregnant with their third child. All began when he started to become disoriented. He admitted that his feelings were the result of the Salafi stress on the *halal-haram* approach, which he viewed as too simplistic and lacking in theological richness. He then started reading about Shiism, which he thought gave him

⁶² Most of the *ulama* interpret *al-ba’ah* as the eligibility for marriage, which includes biological, psychological, and economic factors.

more mystical and philosophical openings. He read the works of Ali Shariati (1933-1977) and Murteza Mutahhari (1919-1979), two contemporary Shia intellectuals. It is relevant to note that in 1990s Shiism had become popular among youths. Hifni never expected that his reading habit would eventually take him to another phase in his life. Other Salafi members often warned him to be careful with what he was reading. However, he did not pay attention to them as he believed that God's knowledge permeates ideological boundaries. Nevertheless, when his wife discovered the book of the Prayer of Kumayl, the most venerated Shia prayer, in his pocket, she lost her temper. She reported her discovery to the Salafi group and asked them to take the necessary action. They decided that there was nothing they could do except to ask him to repent and return to the right path of Islam. He was given three days to think. On the third day, he was put on trial and offered to repent or otherwise to be severely punished. He refused. His wife, who was present during the trial, screamed and demanded triple divorces (Ar. *talaq* – repudiation of a wife by a husband),⁶³ a form of divorce that implicates the prohibition of a remarriage until another man had married her first and then divorced her as well. He categorically refused to divorce her. He responded that should he have a thousand divorces, he would have given all to her. After the trial, he actually attempted to save his marriage. Her family supported him and agreed that the marriage and the family should be maintained. Still his wife was adamant to have her divorce. Concerning her pregnancy, it was rumored that Salafi senior members, given the fact that Hifni was converting to

⁶³ *Talaq* occurs when a man initiates divorce to his wife by saying “I divorce you”. Triple *talaq* occurs when a man says “I divorce you” three times.

Shiism, had hinted at the possibility of an abortion. However, the suggestion was rejected as many of them still considered him a Muslim. The baby was eventually born and named Abu Bakar Siddiq after the first caliph, a name Shiites hardly ever use (Enayat 2005: 52-68).

Among Salafis, a divorce for ideological reasons has far-reaching consequences. This happened to Hifni. After the divorce, he experienced various hardships. He was fired from the Abu Dhabi Welfare Foundation, which paid him 2 million rupiah (in 1990 1 US\$ was around IDR 2300). His project with IIRO, a Saudi humanitarian aid organization, was also terminated with no clear reason provided. During my fieldwork, I frequently visited him in Depok, West Java, about twenty kilometers from my office in Ciputat. He rented a small house in a slum area only accessible by motorbike. He had lived there for eight years. There was little furniture inside the house apart from a cupboard filled with books and magazines, which he used as separator between the front room where we were talking, and the space in the back he used for eating and cooking. He was married to another woman who had given him two children. Meanwhile his ex-wife had taken away all the children from his previous marriage. He hardly ever met them because of his ex-wife's tight control over them. When I asked him whether she married again, he said that according to the organization's regulation, a male *multazim* (executive member or permanent official of the organization) can either marry off a female *multazim*, to a *muayyid* (non-permanent official or part-time worker), or to a *muhibbin* (sympathizer) in the same position or lower. Meanwhile a female *multazim*, who his ex-wife was, can only marry someone in the same position as *multazim*. She

cannot marry a *muayyid* or a *muhibbin*, who were in lower positions. The idea is that women should usually be under the domination of men. It risks of harming the top-secret information of the organization. So she did not marry another person due to the organization's hierarchy.

Marriage Mediation

Marriage is seen as the continuation of Salafi *da'wah* instilled within the *halaqa* institution (Damanik 2002; Hasan 2007; Nisa 270). It is a strategic means to create an idealized *ummah* and to produce the next Muslim generations. This fact is important in order to understand the Salafi groups overall structure of and the distribution of labor among the membership. There is a continuous relationship between *halaqa*, from which a nascent Salafi community originates, marriage, and the creation of an *ummah*. Bearing this in mind, Salafis practice endogamous marriages.

The Prophet urged Muslims who are eligible to marry (*al-ba'ah*) to promptly do so as it is safer for their gazes and desires. Muslim who do not eligible are recommended to fast extensively. Many Salafi students fast especially on Mondays and Thursdays as a recommended ritual in order to keep their souls pure and to reduce their sexual desires. Under egalitarian circumstances, where all members can express whatever they want, it frequent happens that male members publicly state that they are no longer able to fast, or that they have not sleep well recently. This kind of statement may seem irrelevant to outsiders, but for Salafis, it reveals that they are ready to marry.

Female members are treated differently. This kind of conversation never takes place in public. Public disclosure may lead to humiliation and thus to desertion. Senior female members, usually also *murabbi*, will help to solve the problem. To do so, they would start a conversation by probing such questions as ‘Are you ready to practice the Sunnah of the Prophet?’ or ‘Are you interested in obtaining life’s blessing?’ The outcome of the conversation will be reported to a male *murabbi*. If potential candidates can be found within the group, attempts will be made to match them. If there are no potential candidates within the group, a *murabbi* will discuss the issue in a higher forum consisting of all the *murabbi*. During the matchmaking period, all the candidates are presented anonymously. This is to save them from matchmaking failures. Public disclosure is not only against the candidates’ integrity but also may jeopardize their chances to find someone else. In a more organized Salafi community, a marriage and family affairs commission administers matchmaking issues. Having the necessary organizational networks, this commission is able to mediate marriages not only within intra-circle members covering villages and sub-districts but it can also match couples from different provinces and even countries.

The question of ‘who marries who’ is the most difficult one. This is because marriage is not only related to the criteria outlined by the Sharia but also involves the *murabbi*’s political interests. On the one hand, according to the Sharia, marriages should be made based on wealth, lineage, beauty, and faith. On the other hand, it also emphasizes the importance of the *kafa’ah* of the couples; a marriage should be entered into by taking the socio-economic status of the couples into consideration and thus, a

middle class woman can only be taken as a wife by a middle class man, and a low class woman by a low class man, etc. In practice, this is hard to achieve since human capital is unevenly distributed among the population. To achieve *kafa'ah* and to achieve marriageability status, an exchange of human capital is inevitable.

Within the Wahdah, a Salafi organization in Makassar, the most valuable criteria for a marriage exchange is having knowledge of the Sharia, being a *hafidz*, or being a Saudi Arabian University graduate. In theory, men matching these criteria will be coupled with Salafi women that match the same criteria. However, since there are only few learned female Salafis, men will be coupled with the women who have qualities deemed equivalent to having knowledge, such as being a member of the nobility or having wealth. The marriage of Baharuddin, a high-ranking Wahdah Islamiyah scholar, who in fact comes from an upper low class Muslim background, to Andi Rasdiana, a noble woman and daughter of a local mayor is a case in point. Baharuddin joined a Salafi group when he was a student. After finishing his degree in his hometown, he advanced his study in Saudi Arabia until he graduated in the 2000s. He is a *hafidz*. He also memorized thousands of *hadith* complete with their *sanad* (chain of transmission). Returning to his hometown in the early 2000s, he was active in the organization and joined its *da'wah* program and on occasion he was sent to remote islands to promote Salafism among the local communities, which is the most important task one has to perform before one can create a career within the organization. His combination of knowledge, piety, experience, and activism elevated his status and added to his marriage credentials.

Matchmaking and marriage arrangements proved more complicated than expected because, as I said earlier, *murabbi* have political interests. A *murabbi* in fact enjoys various privileges and derives various advantages from matching and marrying off their members. The successful marriage of Baharuddin-Rasdiana was by no means free from political interest. Its success cannot be understood without taking the role of Hasyim, Baharuddin's relative and senior, into consideration who actively approached the families of both sides. Hasyim was of the opinion that this marriage could be compared to that between the Prophet Muhammad and Khadijah, a Meccan merchant widow, who, with her wealth and influence, was able to support the Islamic *da'wah*. Likewise, the marriage of Baharuddin and Rasdiana would pave the way for Salafi *da'wah* in the Sinjai district, about 250 kilometers from Makassar, Rasdiana's hometown.

Hifni confirms the fact that *murabbi* have personal interests in the marriages of their members. During my interview, Hifni said that to support his activities, he took various benefits from his members which varied from holding training sessions in a member's bungalow located in a resort destination to arranging business deals. He got some money from each *daurah* (training) he did but the amount depended on the donation of the members. This is his privilege as a *murabbi*, and nobody in the group would offer any objection. Therefore, when a female member of his group was about to marry a man from another group, he needed to make sure that he did not lose anything, but rather to make sure to get something in return.

Membership in a Salafi group is thus a kind of asset by which *murabbi* exert their power. The larger his number of members, the more powerful the *murabbi*. Competition

between *murabbi* is thus inevitable. It frequently happens that one *murabbi* is considered more learned than the others and this often leads to an exodus of the members of the other *murabbi*. However, cooperation between *murabbi* is also common. The *murabbi* exchange their resources to benefit from each other. Asked by other *murabbi*, Hifni sometimes mobilized his followers for a particular reason. In return he was offered various projects. In the mid-1990s, approaching the founding of the PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*—Welfare and Justice Party), an Islamist-based political party in Indonesia established in 1998, his colleagues contacted him to ask him to send his best cadres to participate in the party. In return, they gave him position on the board of various charity organizations.

Furthermore, according to Hifni, exchange not only relates to social and political cooperation, it may also include personal matters such as polygamy (Nurmila 2009). Salafi organization restricts polygamy and it allows only those members who meet the requirements to do so. In many cases, polygamy is made by a *murabbi* by marrying a woman of another group. It is extremely rare to see a *murabbi* in a polygamous marriage with a member of his own group as it could jeopardize his reputation.

Sometimes it happens that when two *murabbi* talk to each other suddenly the conversation turns to personal matters. It begins by a hint such as ‘I want to practice the Sunnah of the Prophet.’ ‘Do you have an *ukhti* (sister) with whom I can practice the Sunnah of the Prophet?’ This indicates that he wants you help him find another wife for him. That is the way polygamy is arranged. (Interview with Ahmad Hifni, April, 26, 2013).

The patron-client relationship between *murabbi* and *mutarabbi* may explain why the practice of polygamy within the Salafis and Islamist in general is so enormous. It

contributes to alliances between the groups, and thus is permitted for *murrabi*. Statistics are hardly ever available due to the fact that polygamous marriages are never registered with the authorities.

The Pattern of *Ta'aruf*

In general, Muslim communities practice arranged marriages. Parents begin to discuss marriage for their daughters after they have completed their education. They will seek marriage candidates for their daughters by communicating the issue to their relatives, friends, and colleagues. When a potential candidate is found, they will talk to their daughters and probe the possibility of a marriage. If the daughter agrees with the parent's candidate, the marriage is conducted. Conversely, some parents leave the issue to their daughter to seek their own candidates through a form of relation called *pacaran*, meaning 'intimate courtship'.

Salafis do not recognize *pacaran* (Nisa 2011; Machmudi 2008, Damanik 2002). It is strictly prohibited. In spite of this prohibition, many Muslim youths claim that *pacaran* is permitted as long as it does not cross the boundaries (Geertz 1960: 53-54; Smith-Hefner 2007). Instead of *pacaran*, Salafis urge those ready for marriage to engage in *ta'aruf*. *Ta'aruf* literally means 'to get to know each other'. It is part of the Islamic teachings and believed to be a safe and secure path where both parties learn enough about each other before they make any decision on getting married. It begins with the visit of a potential husband to the house of a woman. This visit has previously been announced so that the woman's parent can welcome the special guest. In most cases, a *murabbi* joins a

visit to reassure the parents about the potential son-in-law and to counter a possible negative response. The woman may join the conversation but her presence does not in any way mean acceptance. During a visit following a stricter procedure as practiced by some Salafi groups, the woman does not appear at all during the *ta'aruf* to prevent a direct encounter with a non-*muhrim* man. Instead, she would sit behind a curtain and would only say something when necessary. When everything is ready, the *murabbi* would start the conversation by saying:

Praise be to Allah for welcoming us. We visit all of you with good intentions. This is to create *silaturrahim* [social relations] among Muslims as well as to introduce my friend who is also an active member of the *halaqa*. He has almost finished his study and will become an engineer soon. Insha Allah. We bring some gifts for you. We hope you can accept them wholeheartedly.

This is a common statement made during a *ta'aruf*. The host will respond by expressing his gratitude to the *murabbi* for raising and educating their daughter. After this introduction, they would chat about anything else. Family, health, and education are the most preferable topics. Jobs and money matters are the least preferable. The rest of the *ta'aruf* is usually filled with a discussion on general topics in Islam, local politics, and the economic situation. Snacks and drinks will be served during the conversation. A meal will also be served when it comes to mealtime. The presence of all family members especially the father and the mother and the extent of the courtesy given are good measures to indicate whether the *ta'aruf* has been successful or not.

After the *ta'aruf* the woman is given the opportunity to think things over and to make her decision. In this process, she is urged to pray, read the Qur'an, perform other spiritual obligations, and make a decision. Any decision should immediately be reported

to the *murabbi* so that he may normalize the situation as soon as possible and ensure the accordance of all the members of the group. According to Hifni, the chance of success of a *ta'aruf* leading to a marriage is fifty-fifty and failure may be caused by both sides. The common cause is the poor organization of the *ta'aruf* such as bad timing, lack of information about both sides, and not yet being ready to marry.

Men's competition over women within Salafi groups is inevitable. Some women resort to the "wait and see" strategy by considering various men as their future spouses. This makes the mediation process not work well. Hifni warns his members that *ta'aruf* is a pre-marriage procedure. It takes sincerity from both sides, without which it is meaningless. He further explained that the success of a *ta'aruf* does not rest in the thing itself, but rather on the intensive contact between the man, the matchmaker, and the woman. A number of Salafi scholars in Makassar admitted that they did not busy themselves with *ta'aruf*. Instead, they entrust marriage issues to the most reliable matchmaker.

The success of the marriage of Yasin and Muti'ah, both members of the Wahdah in Makassar, was made possible through the mediation of Nurhayati, Yasin's sister, who is also a *halaqa* member. Before leaving for the Middle East to advance his study at the Islamic University of Medina, Yasin told Nurhayati that he really wanted to marry. He said that there was an *ukhti* within the group who he really liked, but so far there had been no opportunity to express his intentions to her. He asked her sister to approach her and, if possible, arrange a marriage for him. Nurhayati then approached Muti'ah and expressed her brother's intention. At first Muti'ah did not say anything, given the fact

that she did not have any idea about him. Nurhayati then asked Yasin to send his pictures and his CV. Looking at his education as well as his *da'wah* experiences within the organization, Muti'ah started to think about accepting him. Over the following months, because of intensive communication, she became convinced that Yasin was important and that he was the right person to become her husband. An immediate distance-marriage was then arranged between both to prevent the decision from changing. In the following year, Yasin returned to his hometown to pick up his wife and he took her to Saudi Arabia.

Many people join Salafi groups for marriage mediation. Bearing this in mind, becoming a Salafi member means that people need no longer worry about their future spouses as the issue is mediated by their *murabbi*. The fact that men are supposed to “search” while women “wait” reveals much about the traditional norms in the organizations. The problem becomes complicated when a waiting woman does not have a good bargaining position. For many women, joining a Salafi group is like a shortcut to get a husband. Alina, a Salafi woman from Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, stated:

Before becoming a Salafi, I was always worried about my future. I was not really confident about ever getting married. One day, my friend asked me to join her to the *halaqa*. The discussion was about marriage. It was very interesting. The *murabbi* were responsible for finding spouses for their members. I joined the Salafi group not so much because I wanted to get married, but because I wanted to learn about Islam. But it was wonderful that my *murabbi* was willing to find me a good husband. Thank God. I was blessed with a good loving husband. (Interview with Alina, Yogyakarta, January 18, 2011)

The Salafi introduced their discourse on marriage with its emphasis on making things easy simultaneously with disclaiming many traditions surrounding marriage and they do so among others through publications in order to reach a wider audience. It is

relevant to note here that around the 2000s, Salafi publishing houses started to dominate the book market in the country (Bubalo and Fealy 2007). At every Islamic book fair held in Jakarta, stands of Islamic books dominate the exhibition halls, eclipsing moderate Muslim publishing houses. And women's issues are one of the themes which attracts wide attention which in its turn significantly further shaped the women's discourse in the country.

Unveiling the Myth

In 2002, the Indonesian Muslim audience cheered the publication of *Indahnya Perkawinan Dini* (The Beauty of Early Marriage), a book written by the Salafi author Muhammad Fauzil Adhim. It was a bestseller that attracted much attention not only in Indonesia, but also in Malaysia. What is important about the book is that it is one of the first books to unveil the myths and misunderstandings around early marriages that haunt the minds of many young Muslims. It soon became the primary source for young Muslims who were caught in limbo between two seemingly contradictory choices: marriage or study/career. With his book, Adhim sought to assure young Muslims not to postpone their marriages, and to convince them that marriage and study/career can be achieved simultaneously. In many Muslim communities in Indonesia, people enter a marriage when they have reached emotional maturity and financial assurance. For men, this means when they have steady jobs so that they can meet the needs of their families. The more established and wealthy men are, the higher their marriage chances.

In general, a wedding is rather expensive in Indonesia because marriages also function to cement family ties and to maintain status. Weddings involve not only nuclear families, but extended families as well. All family members are expected to attend and take up their share by giving contributions. A wedding without the involvement of family and extended family members leads to isolation. At weddings, food and drinks are served to all in attendance. A wedding among particular ethnic groups may involve as many as 300 to 500 people at the minimum. Assuming that each person brings one or two others (usually spouses and children), it means that the host should provide food and drinks for at least 900 to 1,500 persons. The average marriage among the Betawi ethnic group could cost around US\$ 5,000, a huge sum for the average person. Middle and high-class weddings can cost much more. The high costs of a wedding caused many youths to postpone their marriages. When they had not yet assembled their marriage requirements, they waited until they had become financially established. These facts cause social problems.

How can marriages in Indonesia be understood? Marriages in Indonesia are combinations of faith and *adat* (Geertz 1960: 53-67; Muhaimin 2006). While faith authorizes couples to live together and produce offspring, *adat* refers to a set of customs and norms in the communities. *Adat* rules are still observed for political reasons such as maintaining family solidarity and their prestigious position in the community. This is the reason why weddings are so expensive. Salafis consider the high costs of weddings as *mubadzir* (excessive) as it causes youths and society to suffer. It is no longer a secret that

after a wedding, the bride's family that usually hosts the wedding has spent a huge amount of money and is in debt because of the high costs.

Over the last decades, Salafis have launched campaigns to end expensive weddings. They published a number of books and held conferences and training sessions targeting marriage-aged youths where they offer them information about the way the early Muslim generations, the Prophet and the Companions, and the pious Salafi *ulama* view marriage. In the *hadith*, the Prophet Muhammad advises young men to marry whenever they have *al-ba'ah*, which means that they have achieved some degree of learning and status. It is told that when Ali ibn Abi Thalib married Fatimah, the Prophet asked him to sell his armor to get some dirhams to use as her *mahar* (dowry). Furthermore, Salafis assert that a dowry can also consist of non-material assets rather than precious gifts such as gold and silver. Many *ulama* permit the skill of reading the Qur'an as a dowry for marriage. Challenging the existing discourse on marriage, many Salafi men began to offer sets of praying clothes (Ind. *seperangkat alat solat*), veils (Ind. *jilbab*), or a copy of the Holy Qur'an as dowry, which symbolize piety and modesty.

In general, Salafi understandings on marriage do not differ much of those of the majority Muslim population. The difference only lies in the fact that they oppose a role for the *adat* during weddings. Salafis seek to return marriage to its pristine sources: the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, which offer simplicity and modesty. This is a typical Salafi program quite similar to that on ritual purification. Salafis are very much against any form of *bid'ah* in ritual, and in marriage matters they reject all forms of *adat*. Thus, Salafi marriages neither involve large numbers of people nor do they care about

financial assurance. In most Salafi wedding proceedings, only few people consisting of relatives and friends are present. As a result, Salafis do not spend much money on foods and drinks, which make up the bulk of the wedding costs.

Hifni told me that during his wedding ceremony only a few people were present consisting of his parents, his parents-in-laws, his wife's sisters and brothers, and friends who were mostly members of his *halaqa*. It was a modest party. There were no fireworks or any musical performance. He heard that many people were disappointed. In social settings where collective values are still important, the absence of these cultural traditions is totally unacceptable. While fireworks publicly announce the party, music is performed to make everybody happy. During many ordinary marriages, people even sing and dance. At his wedding, men and women sat in different places and a high curtain was put up to separate the sexes; men with men, and women with women. As a result, there was no chance to meet and greet the bride and the bridegroom or to make pictures. The party was over in about two hours and one after the other, the attendants rose and left.

After his marriage, in order to survive, Hifni worked even harder as a private teacher in order to earn money while his wife sold women's garments. In the following years, his book on a method to learn Arabic was published. He invented an easy way to learn Arabic which made him famous and earned him many projects. He was invited to deliver talks at seminars in Indonesia and abroad. What is important to learn from Hifni's story is that, as Salafis frequently say, marriage does not bring people to poverty. Rather the opposite, it opens the door for God's bounties and His blessings. Many of his friends offered him jobs. After his wedding, he became more aware of his relationship with the

Salafi community, which he described as one big family, close and strong. This fact may be invisible to non-married members. For married members, especially those who have children, the Salafi connection is real.

For me, my marriage opened new possibilities. I have new families and friends. They offer many chances. The most important thing within the Salafi group is that, when members are married, the organization will never abandon them. We work together because we are one big family. If you don't have money, please let us know. If you don't have a job, please let us know. We will solve the problems together. (Interview with Ahmad Hifni, April, 26, 2013).

Solahuddin, a member of the Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar told me of his experience, which was similar. Before he got married, he worked in a local motorcycle shop. His salary was small but he earned bonuses from every motorcycle he sold. At that time, in Makassar, like in any other Indonesian city, selling motorcycles was booming business. Because of the poor public infrastructures, people started to change from having a car to owning a motorcycle. Even though he had much money, he was never satisfied. Each weekend with his friends he visited amusement centers to have fun. One day, he came to the mosque in the neighborhood and met a member of a Salafi group and they started a long conversation. After several meetings, he expressed his willingness to join the Salafi group, which eventually led to his frequent absence from his office. As a result he was fired but his Salafi teacher advised him not to worry. Instead, he matched him with one of the Salafi women in the group. After their marriage, he began to understand the secret of life that money was not everything. Although his income was much less, he was happy working as a driver for the organization's officials. The *murabbi*'s role continued after marriage. Solah said that his *murabbi* was very helpful when he was

unemployed. He lent him some money with no interest and he was allowed to pay it back when he got a job. Furthermore, the *murabbi* also sought to mediate in the conflicts Solah had with his wife.

The Wahdah does not only campaigns for easy and early marriages for its members. It also holds mass marriages events (Ind. *nikah massal*) for the ordinary Muslim population. These events have taken place for more than a decade and target people who live in slum areas. The Wahdah discovered that many couples in the slum areas were not yet married according to the Sharia and therefore the events are meant to legalize their marriages and prevent them from committing adultery. Over the years, participation in these mass marriages has constantly increased. Last year, the Wahdah married twenty-five couples at once from across the region. To promote mass marriage, the Wahdah held the events in a meeting hall and made it a rather luxurious event. An acapella group consisting of Wahdah youth sang songs for the audience⁶⁴ while the local authorities who supposedly funded the programs were also invited to attend the event. The participants, mostly consisting of beggars and the homeless, are given clothes and money. It is expected that they will be able to develop into healthy and happy families (Ind. *keluarga sakinah*) and to produce members of the next young Muslim generation.

⁶⁴ Salafis do not use musical instruments, which they consider *haram*. Their melodies are modest and melancholic.

The Division of Labor

The division of labor within Salafi communities is based on the principle that women stay at home, take care of the children, and protect the properties of their husbands while they are looking for *nafqah*. I found this to be the general pattern among Salafi women during my research in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. Their tasks and responsibilities as wives and mothers are bringing up the children, cooking, washing, everything related to household activities. Sometimes they leave the house to drop off at or pick up their children from school or even to go to the market to shop. Living as a nuclear family (father, mother, and children) in a relatively separated enclave, Salafi women are urged to be skillful and independent. Gender enforcement, which rejects the presence of *ghairu muhrim* (marriageable men) in the house alone with them, forces them to develop all sorts of skills which not only include the ability to operate motorcycles or cars, but also to fix household appliances. Some Salafi women admit that they can fix broken tiles or a leaking faucet, skills hardly ever met among non-Salafi Muslim women who are sometimes dependent on household assistant or driver.

It is relevant to note that driving is still considered a male job in Indonesia. This remains true in small cities and even more in rural areas. But this perception is hardly ever applicable within the Salafi communities. Since gender mix is strictly prohibited, men and women are forced to be able to do their tasks on their own. This means that women should drive. I was told that the daughter of a local mayor in South Sulawesi, who was a Salafi member, was a long-distant driver. She drove her car from Sinjai to Makassar, about 225 kilometers, to train new adepts. During my fieldwork in

Banguntapan and Kaliurang, two main Salafi enclaves in Yogyakarta, I saw women in dark veil who skillfully drove their motorcycles with their children at the back.

No matter how independent and educated these women are, the Salafi still think that the best place for women is at home. This fundamental teaching has systematically been indoctrinated into Salafi women ever since they joined the group. As a result, although many Salafi women I met in Yogyakarta hold a degree, they are not interested in developing a career. They believe that they can attain their *muru'ah* by becoming wives and the mothers of their children. However, the problem is more problematic than expected. There is some kind ambivalence about this. On the one hand, Salafis tend to make their wives stay at home and take care of the children but, on the other, they support them to have a career outside the house to support the family. The main reason for this is that their husbands' incomes are not sufficient to meet the families' needs.

Nurhayati, a Salafi woman in Kaliurang says:

I was working in a bakery before I became a Salafi. It was really fun. Then I married one of my coworkers who sported a beard and looked so calm. I eventually realized that he was a Salafi. I quit working and dedicated my life to my family. So, I stay home and take care of my children. My husband told me to take care of the family while he is looking for money so that we can live. I enjoy having become a wife and the mother of my children. That's the best one. But life is not that easy. Sometimes one's husband's income is not enough to cover family needs. What can we as women do about that? We cannot simply say "women should stay at home." For this reason, I support career women as long as they are safe. (Interview with Nurhayati, Yogyakarta, January, 20, 2011)

Having a background as a former worker, Nurhayati supports women to have a career outside their homes under two conditions. First, they should be able to protect themselves. Second, it is to support the family e.g. to augment a husband's insufficient

income. If they do not meet these requirements, she urges women to stay at home. She further asserted that there is no reason for women to go outside if their husbands are able to meet the family's needs. Nurhayati believed that broken homes, juvenile delinquency, and other social problems can be solved by putting women in the right place, which is as wives and mothers.

Generating Family Income

Although most of the Salafi women stay at home, this does not at all mean they are passive. On the contrary, they are very active in creating homemade industries. Various Salafi women in Kaliurang and Banguntapan admit that they help their husbands by making *kue kering* (dry cookies) and by selling bread, snacks, peanuts, and all kinds of cakes that have been made without coconut milk. The main reason for taking up this kind of business is that, unlike *kue basah* (wet cookies made with coconut milk that thus have to be sold quickly), *kue kering* stays well for over a week and when they are not sold out can be taken home for home consumption. Having experience in the bread industry, Nurhayati and her husband, Slamet, opened a business in homemade bread after they had moved to Yogyakarta in 2000. Starting from selling bread to Salafi members in the neighborhood, they now have become a small business that sells its products in the local market. They do all activities together. Nurhayati is responsible for administration and finance, while Slamet is responsible for production and marketing. Sometimes she is also involved in production when they have big orders during the holiday season or for wedding celebrations.

Nurhayati said that the business not only benefits them economically but that it also provided jobs for other Salafi members. So far, they have three employees, all men, charged with purchasing ingredients, preparing bread dough, baking, and packaging. At around 2 AM, Slamet goes to the local market to sell his bread. His customers are mostly small food and street vendors. At around 6 AM in the morning when all the bread has been sold out he goes home and arrives there before 7 AM to meet and hug their children before they go to school. At a price of IDR 800 (US\$ 0.07) for each bread, and a total production of between 800 to 1000 loaves, Slamet earns between IDR 640,000 (US\$ 55) to IDR 800,000 (US\$ 68) daily which is a relatively large amount of money.

Many Salafi women work outside the house and they are involved in all sorts of business sectors particularly in garment and food retail. During my fieldwork, I discovered a number of Salafi business centers between Yogyakarta and Kaliurang. They usually consist of five to seven shops. Some shops also include living quarters (Ind. *ruko*) and sometimes a Salafi couple lives there with their children. They sell products such as food (rice, flour, bread, peanuts, biscuits, cereals, cakes, milk, sugar, juice, mineral water); fruits (dates, grapes, oranges, apples); garments (headscarves, veils, clothes for all age and groups, caps, shoes, sandals); herbals (honey, olive oil, black caraway, food supplements, vitamins); cosmetics, perfumes, tooth paste, Islamic books, CD, and cassettes. Looking at the design of the centers and the things they offer, it is clear that Salafis use the one-stop shopping concept and the owners expect Salafi families living across the region to come there regularly, once in a week or every other week. Almost every good is available so that they do not need to go to other stores. Compared to other

stores, Salafi stores are less crowded but they have regular customers consisting of Salafi communities' members around Yogyakarta. Each month they have to supply food to their *madrassa*.

Some stores are run by women, while others are run by men. Garments are usually women's business, while food is men's business. By placing male and female staffs in different stores, the Salafi seek to abide to gender segregation. This rule enables Salafi women to work outside their houses while protecting their *muru'ah* in the public sphere. The idea of honor protection is even more apparent in some shops where "Khusus Akhawat" (Female Section Only) signs have been put up to maintain gender boundaries and to prevent shoppers from losing their way. It is highly unlikely that customers who do not comply with these regulations will not be served. In some cases, due to gender segregation enforcement, husband and wife work together in the same shop and he serves male customers while she serves the female ones.

During my fieldwork in Banda Aceh, Aceh Province, I met a Salafi couple who owns the Lan Taburo (You Will Never Lose) shop selling a similar variation of products as I described above. They lived in their shop with their children while they used the second floor to sleep. During rush hours, between 2-5 PM, or during the weekend, when they had more customers, they worked together to attend to their customers. Other than that, they would divide the jobs in such a way that all customers could be served. Sharing tasks and responsibilities in running their businesses as I found among Salafi groups reminded me of traditional Chinese families who run their shops alternately. This family management does not only offer each family member a sense of business, it also brings

wage expenditure to a minimum level. To this, Taufik, the owner of Lan Taburo shop said:

We run our business because we want to make a profit. In order to do so we have to cut unnecessary expenses. We hire assistants only when necessary. In this way we can use the profit [instead of paying assistants] to extend our business. (Interview with Taufik, Banda Aceh, June, 2012)

Education is part of the public domain where Salafi women feel completely at ease in their efforts to create their careers. This is hardly surprising given to fact that by becoming teachers, Salafi women are involved in situations where contacts with marriageable men are minimal. Thus, they can maintain their dignity in the public sphere. They become teachers especially in kindergarten and in elementary schools where students have not yet reached puberty.⁶⁵ In many Salafi schools, gender segregation begins at the middle school levels where boys and girls are put in separated classes. Many Salafi schools permit female teachers to teach male students at the middle and high school levels under certain conditions. At some Salafi schools where gender mix is totally unacceptable, female teachers teach male students through the use of CCTV.

The fact that Salafi women become educators is not surprising. This re-emphasizes their traditional roles as educators. At home, besides doing their household tasks, women are charged with teaching their children how to read the Qur'an and how to do their prayers. This applies for the Salafis as well as non-Salafis. Women are first and foremost the teachers of the young Muslim generations. In Indonesia, the origin of

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women teachers goes back to the early twentieth century when many women activists erected schools for girls to boost education among women.

The high demand for education-related careers urges Salafi organizations to create teacher colleges, which attract Salafi and non-Salafi women. Their graduates further supply the need for teachers within the Islamic schools that have mushroomed across the country over the last few decades (Hefner, 2009: 55-104; Burhanudin and Afrianty, 2006). Many Muslim parents believe that teachers with a highly Islamic appearance offer a positive example to the students. This is one of the reasons why Salafi female teachers manage to develop their career in private as well as in public schools.

The health service is another part of the public sphere where Salafi women often develop their careers. Many Salafi organizations offer education or training for paramedics and nurses to take care of their health needs. Apart from that, the development of Islamic health institutions has a political dimension. Over the last decades, Christian groups have good hospitals and clinics and they provide health service for anyone including Muslims. The idea of Islamic hospitals or clinics emerged for the first time among modernists. They asserted that Muslims too should have proper health institutions. In the later development, other Muslim groups including Salafis also participated in this service.

It is relevant to note that jobs in the health profession have been in high demand over the last decades following a government policy which allow the public to participate in providing healthcare to the public. The Bin Baz Foundation, a Salafi group in Yogya, established a school for public health. Many Salafi and non-Salafi students study at this

institute. Furthermore, the Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar has so far established a number of hospitals for mothers and children (Ind. *Rumah Sakit Ibu dan Anak*). With these institutions, they provide health services for Salafi as well as non-Salafi women. The reason for this establishment is clear. Although showing their *aurat* for medical treatment is permitted, most Muslim women prefer to be handled paramedics of their same gender and religion.

Chapter Eight – Conclusion: The Diversity of Salafi Knowledge

The transformation of Indonesian Salafism has been very dynamic over the last decades. This is a result of the country's vibrant atmosphere where Salafis currently engage in shaping, and in turn are shaped by, the existing Islamic discourse. Salafis are forced to share a great deal of Islamic knowledge with other Muslim groups, especially the traditionalists and the modernists, which in turn influence their understandings of Salafism. Over the time, Salafism has been interpreted and reinterpreted to meet existing conditions totally different from Saudi Arabia, its place of origin. In particular, the changing of the Indonesian regime in 1998 has been the critical juncture through which Salafis evolved in a new democratic system, allowing them to benefit from and fairly compete with other Muslim groups over social, political, and economic resources. As a result, the reproduction of Salafi knowledge in contemporary Indonesia is marked by its great diversity.

The fact that Indonesian Salafi groups were inspired largely by Saudi Arabia's geo-politics does not mean that they succumb to their Saudi patrons. There have been some disagreements between Indonesian Salafi groups and their spiritual clerics in Saudi Arabia. While maintaining relationships with their Saudi patrons through whom Salafis obtained educational aid, Indonesian Salafi groups are pushed to face an open and vibrant environment of the country. They face the diversity of Indonesian Islam. This is even more so considering the fact that, instead of isolating them, the Indonesian state policies seek to integrate Salafi groups with wider Muslim communities. State policies treat Salafi

groups indiscriminately. Like schools of other Muslim groups, Salafi schools also received educational aids, and Salafi students are allowed to attend public universities. These integrative policies are responded by the Salafi schools by, besides Sharia and other Islamic knowledge, providing “secular” sciences such as math and physics for their students.

In addition, Salafi groups are shaped by their integration with Indonesian society. Salafis received various benefits from the middle class Muslims who, yearning for spiritual needs, join the Salafi groups, and they become the Salafi’s main donors when Saudi Arabia charities, as a result of the tightening law enforcements following the terror attacks in the country in the early 2000s, experienced a serious decline. Despite that Salafis and traditionalist Muslim groups have been engaged in controversies on a number of issues, both groups have in fact shared a great deal of similarities. Both are parts of the Sunni sect and share Islamic knowledge, particularly on the *hadith* and to a lesser extent *tafsir* scholarship, enabling individuals to move between them and enrich the existing Islamic discourses.

One of the processes of social integrations between Salafis, the modernists, and traditionalist Muslim groups occurs within the Ma’had, the most strategic Saudi institution in Indonesia that promotes Salafism. Within the Ma’had, Salafis, traditionalists, and modernists students shared a great deal of Islamic knowledge. This has occurred despite claims of the authority to control the reproduction of students’ knowledge by the Wahhabi-minded *syekhhs*. This control largely has failed as students have wide socializations and overlapping social settings. The encounters between Salafis,

modernists, and traditionalists create a robust Islamic discourse within the Ma'had, which further impacts their life and practice of Islam post-graduation. Unlike previous studies that viewed the Ma'had as the agent of Wahhabism, this study demonstrates that the Ma'had produces Salafi scholars who have wide spectrum of knowledge, ranging from Islamic modernism to Islamic revivalism. This can be seen in the profiles of the two Ma'had students who shape Indonesian Salafism.

Ja'far Umar Thalib and Zaitun Rasmin are two types of students who have different understandings of Salafism. Ja'far is a revivalist Salafi, while Rasmin is a reformist one. After having finished his studies at the Ma'had, Ja'far continued his study at the Al-Mawdudi Institute in Pakistan. He crossed the Pakistani-Afghan border and joined the Salafi factions to combat Soviet communists. Returning home for a short period, he taught at the Salafi *madrassa* in Tengaran, Central Java after which he flew to Yemen to study with Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i, a Salafi scholar who was expelled from Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. Al-Wadi'i returned home to Dammaj, Yemen, where he faced the secular regime of Yemen, the Shiite al-Houthi, and extremist groups. The combination of these circumstances shaped Ja'far's understanding of Salafism and caused him to create the Muslim paramilitary group, Laskar Jihad, and to send its soldiers to Ambon and Poso, two areas which experienced Christian-Muslim conflicts in the country.

After studying at the Ma'had, Rasmin continued his study in Medina, Saudi Arabia. In Medina, he not only studied but he also developed contacts with Saudi elites. After completing his study, he worked at various Saudi international organizations and

linked the Wahdah Islamiyah, his organization at home, with the international Muslim community. Having connections with charity organizations, he obtained scholarships for his young cadres and he sent them to Saudi Arabia to pursue their advanced studies. In 1998, to reach wider support from the Muslim community, he changed the status of his organization from foundation to that of mass organization. This decision was a breakthrough that further shaped his organization's subsequent development. Coming from a modernist background, Rasmin added the notion of Islamic modernism to his organization. The Wahdah is so far one of the most active Islamic organizations in Makassar, South Sulawesi, and the Muslim community in the region widely supports it. While maintaining the principles of Salafism within the organization, the Wahdah has so far built *madrasa* and mosques, the two most strategic institutions to promote Salafism.

Charities are the most important financial sources for the Salafi. Through its international bodies, Saudi Arabia channels charity funds to other Muslim countries including Indonesia. This distribution, however, cannot be separated from politics. The politicization of charity is inevitable as the actors distribute charities in certain ways deemed pertinent to their interests. Charity is thus used to extend the political influence of the donors. With charities, Salafis are able to build *madrasa* and mosques, two strategic institutions through which Salafis reach wider audience, build their authority as new religious establishments, and challenge the old ones. This fact raises social and political problems within the Muslim communities. Yet the financial influence of foreign Saudi Salafism should not be seen as having a uniform effect, and the ideological

confrontations between Salafis and others more often than not result in compromise positions rather than unilateral spread of Wahabism in Indonesia.

One of the key issues that affects the reproduction of Islamic discourses in Indonesia is the controversy of *bid'ah*. This issue is raised by Salafi groups to extend their influence over other Muslim groups, particularly the traditionalist Muslims who, Salafi believe, keep practicing certain *bid'ah*. The issue of *bid'ah*, which previously created a deep divide between the modernists and the traditionalists, reemerges into public discourses. It is clear that by manipulating *bid'ah* issues, Salafi scholars are trying to enhance their authority and to challenge the religious establishment of traditionalist *ulama*. As a result, the Salafi discourse, which basically should be concerned with upholding the principles of Salafi teachings, has turned into a discussion around *bid'ah*.

Furthermore, the fixity of *bid'ah* among Salafis and its fluidity among the traditionalists have far implications to the social practices of both groups. Refraining from practicing *bid'ah*, Salafis are able to save their financial resources that can be used for other purposes, among others, improving their institutions. On the contrary, the extensive performance of public rituals among the traditionalists exhausts their financial resources. As a result, the traditionalist Muslims groups lack of financial resources to improve their institutions. On the other hand, the traditionalists take various social benefits from performing public rituals leading to the rise of civic engagement among them. Apart from *bid'ah*, Salafis also manipulate the issue of *shirk* to attack the traditionalist Muslims who perform certain rituals such as visiting the grave and seeking

blessings. As a result, Islamic discourse in Indonesia is characterized by contest between both groups.

Contestations between Salafis and the traditionalist Muslim groups further spill over into mosques. The position of the mosques is a politicized one given the fact that Sunni Muslims do not usually officially affiliate mosques by “denominations” so that each group – the Salafis, the traditionalists, and the modernists – seek to control mosques. With strong financial supports from Saudi Arabia, Salafis are able to build their mosques separated from the existing mosques that belong to the other groups. Mosques thus become “the battlefield” where Salafis, the traditionalists, and the modernists used rituals as a tool to influence and exert power over other groups. Salafis would claim mosques they fund as Salafi mosques. On the contrary, local Muslim populations who are non-Salafi would claim mosques in the neighborhood as their mosques. To prevent conflict with other Muslim groups over mosques, Salafis required that new mosques they fund should be relatively distant from the local mosques. Thus conflict can be kept to a minimum. Salafis would grant the erecting of a new mosque when there is an on-site Salafi preachers thus enabling them to control the mosques.

Over the last two decades, the Salafis have developed and popularized a narrative about “Prophet’s Medicine” which is based on methods and practices claimed to have been developed by the Prophet Muhammad. The definition of Prophet’s Medicine varies widely among Muslim scholars, so that in Indonesia Salafis have had the latitude to re-frame local forms of herbal medicine and curative ritual as “Islamic medicine” even when the practices are still exactly the same as those rooted in other Indonesian

traditions. Salafi promotion of Prophet Medicine cannot be separated from the poor public health services in Indonesia where only wealthy people can afford proper health treatment. Many people even suspect that conventional drugs contain dangerous elements for human health and impure ingredients such as the pig gelatin. These aspects have become the reason for Salafis to promote their brand of medicine. Prophet medicine attracts a particular segment of the Muslim community who believes that this form of medicine is healthy and pure. Equally important is that, the practice of Prophet Medicine also opens new economic prospects. It gives jobs for Salafi members as well as other Muslim people who get involved in this activity.

The conceptualization of Prophet's Medicine among Salafis demonstrates that this medical knowledge is open and able to absorb elements from different medical backgrounds as long as they are compatible with Islamic ethics. It is evident that Prophet's Medicine is a mixture of traditional Javanese *jamu* and Chinese and Western traditions. Salafis also enter into cooperation with other institutions such as universities to make their products fully accepted by the wider Indonesian community. This fact, once again, proves that Indonesian Salafi groups actively participate in shaping the existing religious and social discourses in the country, even as the knowledge they spread as "Islamic" also is shaped by these discourses. The phenomenon of the Prophet medicine is extremely interesting and yet largely neglected by scholars. Many scholars still focus on the political dimension of Salafi groups and seem to overlook these critical aspects of their cultural reproduction of themselves as Salafi. As a result, studies on Salafism have not been able to look beyond the bitterly contested dichotomies as apoliticism vs

jihadism, muslim vs *kafir*, etc. which Salafis utilize in their polemics, but which actually conceal a more complex underlying reality.

Salafis also contribute to the reproduction of the discourses on women and this begins with marriage. Salafis arrange marriages in such a way that they strengthen their identity and extend their influence over other Muslim groups. Salafis practice endogamous marriages in the sense that Salafi men marry Salafi women. Since dating or intimate courtship is prohibited, Salafis resort to *ta'aruf*. In this tradition, a Salafi man comes to the house of a Salafi woman with the intention of proposing a marriage. The role of a *murabbi* in arranging marriages for their members is so important that they may even bypass the authority of the parents. Through the way they organize their weddings, Salafis seek to do away with the traditions and customs surrounding marriages that make them expensive and difficult. Unlike traditionalist Muslims, Salafis perform marriages in a very simple way and only few people are invited and there is no expensive party to celebrate it.

However, Salafi discourse on women contains a paradoxical encouragement of women's independence as well as seclusion in public and submission to men. Salafi discourses on women stem from the idea that the dignity of women lays in their service to all members of their family. Women belong to the family or to home where they are charged with taking care of their children and protecting their husbands' properties while they are away. Becoming wives and mothers are the best positions for women; they are responsible for preparing the new Muslim generations. Salafis enforce gender segregation in a very strict way in all forms of social life. As a result, women are urged to be able to

do their jobs on their own. Based on my observation, Salafi women are relatively more independent than non-Salafi women. Furthermore, Salafi women are also pushed to help to solve the family's financial problems and they create economic activities at home. Thus, totally different from feminist theorists who point their finger at Islamists "submissive" behavior, Salafi women are relatively "independent." This aspect is relatively neglected by scholars who view women's subordination within Salafi groups.

It is evident that Salafi knowledge swings around between revivalism and reformism. As I argued earlier, revivalism and reformism are two ideological streams of Salafism that emerge in the modern periods as a result of its encounter with modernity. While stressing on the need for the return to the authentic form of Islam as exemplified by the Prophet and his Companions, both have different emphasis. Revivalism stresses on the need for building Muslim community as a distinct religious and political entity thus requiring them to seize power from the existing regimes, be democratic or authoritarian. Meanwhile reformism urges Muslims to build modern institutions especially on education and promote civilizational dialogue with the West. Revivalism further meets Islamic fundamentalism, while reformism meets Islamic modernism.

The mainstream Indonesian Salafi groups are moving toward the pole of Islamic reformism. This is due to the fact that Salafi currently face the vibrant atmosphere of Indonesian Islam and the effective role of the state. The state is actively present sustaining social orders. The belligerent Ja'far Umar Thalib, who previously deployed his military groups to the conflict areas, is now even active in promoting a counter-terrorism agenda. The existing social structures enable all the Muslim groups including the Salafi

to actively engage in shaping social and religious discourses and to fairly compete over social, political, and economic structures, which eventually leads to the diversity of Salafi knowledge.

Appendix 1

List of courses and the primary sources at the LIPIA Jakarta

No.	Subject	Books	Author	Madhhab	Account
1	Al-Qur'an	8 chapter			
2	<i>Fiqh</i> (Islamic Jurisprudence)	1. <i>Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtashid</i> 2. <i>Mukhtashar Abi Suja' Matan Ghayah Taqrib</i>	Ibnu Rusyd (1126-1198) Abu Syuja' (1138-1197)	Maliki Syafii	Both books shared by the traditionalists.
3	<i>Hadith</i>	<i>Subul al-Salam Sharh Bulug al-Maram</i>	Al-San'ani (740-813)	Previously Zaidi moved to Zahiri	Shared by the traditionalists
4	<i>Musthalah Hadith</i>	<i>Taysir Musthalah al-Hadith</i>	Mahmoud al-Tahhan (b. 1935)	Salafi	
5	<i>Tafsir</i> (Exegesis)	<i>Fath al-Qadir al-Jami bayna Fanni Riwayah wa al-Dirayah</i>	Al-Syawkani (1759-1989)	Previously Zaidi moved to Salafi	Shared by the traditionalists
6	Nahwu (Arabic Grammar)	1. <i>Syarh Ibn Aqil li Alfiyah ibn Malik</i> 2. <i>Awdhah al-Masalik li Alfiyah ibn Malik</i>	Ibn Aqil (1294-1367) Ibn Hisham (1309-1360)	Shafi'i Shafi'i	Both shared by the traditionalists
7	<i>Ushul Fiqh/Qawaid Fiqhiyah</i> (Islamic legal jurisprudence)	1. <i>Raudhat al-Nadhir Wa Jannat al-Munadhir</i> 2. <i>Al-Mumta' fi al-Qawaid al-Fiqhiyah</i>	Ibn Qudamah (1147-1223) Dr. Musallam al-Dawsi	Hanbali Salafi	Shared by the traditionalists
8	<i>Tawhid</i> (Theology)	1. <i>Al-Qaul al-Mufid ala Kitab al-Tawhid</i> 2. <i>Syarh al-Aqidah al-Thahawiyah</i> 3. <i>Al-Aqidah</i>	Muhammad al-Uthaimin (1925-2001) Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dimashqi Shalih bin Fauzan (b. 1933)	Salafi Salafi	
9	<i>Mawaris</i> (Inheritance)	<i>Attahqiqat al-Mardhiyah fil Mabahis al-Fardhiyah</i>	Shalih bin Fauzan	Salafi	
10	<i>Tsaqafah al-Islamiyah</i> (Islamic Culture)	<i>Al-Kutub al-Mukhtalifah</i>	Dr. Rashid al-Rajjal	Salafi	

Appendix 2

The number of Salafi *pesantren* and students per province

Province	Scools	Students
Aceh	4	388
North Sumatra	3	390
West Sumatra	2	120
Riau	8	129
Jambi	1	39
Lampung	3	850
South Sumatra	1	200
Jakarta	12	3533
West Java	19	7080
Banten	5	1435
Central Java	22	6744
Yogyakarta	12	2911
East Java	18	5997
East Kalimantan	5	950
West Kalimantan	1	230
South Kalimantan	1	150
Central Kalimantan	1	50
South Sulawesi	6	1880
Central Sulawesi	2	580
Southeast Sulawesi	2	200
Maluku	1	35
West Nusa Tenggara	5	695
Papua	2	360
Total	136	36,112

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