1955

A comparison of the value theories of E.S. Brightman and A.N. Whitehead.

Mullen, Wilbur Handley
Boston University

http://hdl.handle.net/2144/14199

Boston University
Dissertation

A COMPARISON OF THE VALUE THEORIES
OF E. S. BRIGHTMAN AND A. N. WHITEHEAD

by

Wilbur Handley Mullen

(A. B., Eastern Nazarene College, 1942)
(Th. B., Eastern Nazarene College, 1947)
(A. M., Boston University, 1948)

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1955
Ph.D
1955
mu
Copy 2

Approved
by

First Reader...Richard M. Millard
Professor of Philosophy

Second Reader...Peter A. Proctor
Professor of Philosophy
A COMPARISON OF THE VALUE THEORIES
OF E. S. BRIGHTMAN AND A. N. WHITEHEAD

INTRODUCTION

1. Problem

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to compare some of the basic axiological concepts in the thought of E. S. Brightman and A. N. Whitehead. A subordinate purpose is fulfilled in a final comparative evaluation and a brief estimate of the relevancy of their axiological insights for contemporary society.

2. Method

3. Previous Literature

   a. Writings on Brightman's Value Theory
   b. Writings on Whitehead's Value Theory

I. CONCERN OF BRIGHTMAN AND WHITEHEAD WITH VALUE PROBLEMS

   A. Brightman

      1. Survey of Writings as Related to Value
      2. Influence of Value Considerations in his Thought as a Whole

         a. Ethics
         b. Religion
         c. Metaphysics

   B. Whitehead

      1. Survey of Writings as Related to Value
      2. Influence of Value Considerations in his Thought as a Whole

C. Comparative Summary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF VALUE</th>
<th>46</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Brightman</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Basic Characteristics</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Table of Values</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Criteria of Values</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Coherence</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Principle of Respect for Personality</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Whitehead</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Basic Characteristics of Value</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Preliminary Definition</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Actual Entities</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Events</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Limitation</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Values and Persons</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Coordination</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Criteria</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Intensity</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Harmony</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Stability</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Comparative Summary</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. THE FUNCTION OF GOD IN VALUE STRUCTURE 109

A. Brightman                        109

1. Personal God as Source       109

2. God as Conserver of Value     113

3. Immortality Necessary to the Conservation of Values 116
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Metaphysical Status of Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Whitehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. God as Principle of Concretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The &quot;Home&quot; of all Potentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Lure for Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. God as Principle of Ordering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Teleology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Persuasive Agency of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. God the &quot;Poet&quot; of Reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. God as Savior and Eternal Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Comparative Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. DISVALUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Brightman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Experience as a Revealer of Disvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nature of Disvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Types of Disvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Incoherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ignorance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Maladjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Incompetence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Dysteleological Surd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sources of Disvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Human Wills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Other Attempted Solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. God's Nonrational Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Whitehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Nature of Disvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Physical Wasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Aesthetic Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Disvalue as Instrumental Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Source of Disvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Comparative Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION OF VALUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Brightman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Inseparability of Value and Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Definitions of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Descriptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Religious Values and Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Religious Versus Logical Certitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Reason as Guide to Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Contributions of Religion to Human Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Creative Values of Worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Whitehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Meaning of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Religion and Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Religion and Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Is Whitehead's God &quot;Available&quot;?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Comparative Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. EVALUATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Brightman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Major Areas of Criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Disvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Personality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Contemporary Relevancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Whitehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Major Areas of Criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Terminology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Autonomy or Divine Causation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Personality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Stress on Humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Eternal Objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Value Emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Contemporary Relevancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Final Comparative Summary and Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

1. Problem.

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to compare some of the basic axiological concepts in the thought of E. S. Brightman and A. N. Whitehead. A subordinate purpose is fulfilled in a final comparative evaluation and a brief estimate of the relevancy of their axiological insights for contemporary society.


In fulfilling the aim of the dissertation it is recognized that there are no exact equivalents in the thought of the two men. If such were the case, comparison could go little beyond the stated fact of such similarity. Fruitful comparison depends on the juxtaposition of ideas which represent different proposed solutions to the same problems. The method, therefore, is to bring together from each man the most significant data which are pertinent to the five general areas selected for comparison, viz., (1) their concern for value problems as seen both in the quantitative and internal aspects of their thought, (2) the nature and criteria of value, (3) the function of God in their value structure, (4) their views on the meaning and sources of disvalue, and (5) the religious expression of values. Although some critical
comments and comparative evaluations are offered regularly throughout the dissertation, the "Comparative Summary" in each of the first five chapters will serve to point up similarities and differences. The final chapter is more broadly evaluative, containing (1) a survey of some of the major criticisms brought against the thought of the two men, (2) a statement of the possible relevancy of their value theories, and (3) a final section summarizing the conclusions and comparative values revealed in the whole study.

3. Previous Literature.

The previous literature dealing with the specific topic of this dissertation is practically non-existent. The only exceptions lie in the occasional and mostly isolated references which may indicate some point of similarity in the thought of the two men. For examples, D. D. Williams lists Brightman and Whitehead among some other "Christian philosophers who have developed on rational and experimental grounds the meaning of God's suffering."¹ W. P. McEwen has brought Brightman and Whitehead together in several meaningful comparisons especially in his exposition of self-consciousness as a creative synthesis. He says:

That self-consciousness is such a unique complex unity of given experience is a fundamental

¹ Williams, WPTT, 114.
principle of the organic pluralism advocated by Brightman and Whitehead.¹

Taken separately there is still not an over-abundance of literature specifically concerned with the value theory (or closely related topics) of either man. There is less material on Brightman than on Whitehead. The basic writings pertinent to the topic of the dissertation are noted below.

a. Writings on Brightman's Value Theory.

Several recent doctoral dissertations throw some light on various aspects of Brightman's thought. George Stratton finds that

Brightman's is a vigorous and courageous attempt to deal realistically with the problem of evil at its most acute spot—the gurd, unnecessary evils of physical process.²

His conclusions, however, show some misunderstanding of Brightman's doctrine of The Given. He says, for instance, that "Brightman splits the personality of God in such a way that the outcome is not coherent."³

In a comparison of some conceptions of personality in Bowne and Brightman, M. B. Queen observes that Brightman's chief contributions to a methodology of practical judgment are:

The supremacy of the criterion of coherence as applicable to all judgments and especially

¹. McEwen, ES, 257. Cf. also 238, 239-240, 255. See a review of ES by Millard, Art. (1950), in which the possibility of a synthesis between the two men is indicated at this point.
². Stratton, BPG, 100.
³. Ibid., 101.
to philosophical judgments; the central function of personality in all judgments; and the power of freely persuaded, agreeing persons alone to establish values.¹

The problem of disvalue receives some attention in a study of Brightman's view of God by A. P. Gleason.² The value of his critique is greatly lessened by a somewhat careless statement of Brightman's position. Gleason feels that the notion of The Given "makes God two separate beings—one God the other Satanic like."³ Very contradictory to the findings of this present dissertation is Gleason's conclusion that the "solution offered [by Brightman] for the problem of evil is of no religious or philosophic value."⁴

More pertinent to Brightman's theory of value is one of the most recent doctoral dissertations, by J. R. Gardner.⁵ He finds merit in Brightman's values in that "they connote a genuine relation with existential reality and thus preserve the seeker for values from frustration and disappointment."⁶ His chief criticisms of Brightman are summarized in the following:

Brightman exhibits weakness (1) in his view of the 'Supreme Source' of value, (2) in his tendency toward circularity, (3) in his assertion that 'mind is the only datum,' and (4) in his disproportionate emphasis upon reason.

¹. Queen, PPJ, 150.
². Gleason, CGTB.
³. Ibid., 258.
⁴. Ibid., 260-261.
⁵. Gardner, REV. See especially Chap. IV where he reviews Brightman's value theory.
⁶. Ibid., 105-106.
⁷. Ibid., 2.
Gardner's work has its primary significance in bringing together the thought of Brightman and C. I. Lewis.

Some helpful evaluations of Brightman's thought are found in the reviews of his books. Among the more representative are the following:

In a review of *Nature and Values*, J. H. Howson says:

> The argument is a searching critique of the superficialities of much contemporary philosophizing that claims for its conclusions the certainty associated with the reasoning of exact science.¹

Reviewing the same book, James Gutman reflects a less favorable reaction when he says of Brightman's use of certain terms that "confusion can be hardly worse confounded."²

B. C. Holtzclaw in a review of *A Philosophy of Ideals* says that "the volume sums up admirably the arguments for personalistic idealism and is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of values."³

The high value of Brightman's *The Spiritual Life* is brought out by A. C. Knudson,⁴ and A. G. Widgery.⁵

Two reviews of *The Problem of God* represent different opinions. A. S. Woodburne is not unfavorable, but he raised this question:

> What we have to decide is whether the concept of infinity is really one of religious value

---

1. Howson, *Art.* (1946), 381.
which we cannot abandon, and more ultimately whether there is evidence for an infinite Being behind this finite universe.¹

Unusually critical is the view of G. W. Beiswanger that "the Problem of God belongs to the Ptolemaic era in the philosophy of religion."² He accuses Brightman of not understanding what is being done about the idea of God in other fields, e.g., psychology, sociology. "It is almost inconceivable," he says, "that any person could so utterly misunderstand what his own age is doing."³

P. A. Bertocci has given a helpful and fairly extensive analysis in a review of A Philosophy of Religion.⁴ Some other reviews are by A. E. Avey,⁵ A. E. Garvie,⁶ W. G. Muehler,⁷ H. L. Searles,⁸ M. G. Otto.⁹

Articles having particular relevancy for Brightman's doctrine of God are by D. C. Macintosh,¹⁰ Andrew Banning,¹¹ Roland Stahl.¹² P. A. Bertocci discusses the interrelation of the self, person, and the body.¹³ P. E. Johnson,¹⁴ and

¹. Woodburne, Art.(1931), 275. See also Woodburne's reviews of FG, Art.(1932), and ML, Art.(1933).
². Beiswanger, Art.(1931), 446.
³. Ibid., 446-447.
⁴. Bertocci, Art.(1941).
⁵. Avey, Art.(1941).
⁷. Muehler, Art.(1945).
⁸. Searles, Art.(1934).
Cornelius Krusé show the place of Brightman in contemporary philosophy. W. G. Muelder has written on Brightman's social philosophy. 2

Many contemporary books in the field of philosophy and religion give more or less attention to personalistic idealism as represented by Brightman. Opinions and criticisms from many of these are represented in the subsequent discussion.

b. Writings on Whitehead’s Value Theory.

For a treatment of Whitehead’s philosophy as a whole, Dorothy Emmet's work on *Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism* (1932) is helpful in providing summary and clarification of his main ideas. A. H. Johnson, one of the most prolific commentators on Whitehead has written recently on *Whitehead's Theory of Reality* (1952). A French author, Felix Cesselin, has also prepared a general survey of Whitehead’s main concepts in *La Philosophie Organique de Whitehead* (1950).


On the religious aspect of Whitehead’s thought, S. L. Ely’s monograph on *The Religious Availability of Whitehead’s God* is a negative critique.

If the book be taken as a whole, *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (1941), edited by P. A. Schilpp, is quite indispensable for a broad survey of Whitehead's thought. In this volume the articles by Lowe, G. G. Cheen, Bixler, and Hartshorne are particularly helpful for their insights into Whitehead's value theory and relevant problems.

The works of Charles Hartshorne, particularly *Man's Vision of God* (1941), and *The Divine Relativity* (1948), provide occasional commentary and elaboration of Whitehead's ideas.

In *Enduring Satisfaction* (1949), W. P. McEwen goes primarily to Whitehead for a metaphysical basis for his concept of the spiritual growth of the individual.

Some doctoral dissertations have contributed considerably to the Whitehead literature.

E. J. Pols has explored the idea of freedom in Whitehead's thought. Roland Stahl has traced some of the possible influences of Bergson on Whitehead, including several axiological insights. A. H. Kauffman has selected and discussed the analogous concepts of *élan vital*, *nisus*, and creativity from the thought of Bergson, Alexander, and Whitehead. W. P. McEwen has explored the meaning and growth of

1. Lowe, Art. (1941).
5. Pols, IFMW.
7. Kauffman, ENC.
individual personality in terms of Whitehead's metaphysics.¹

More pertinent to Whitehead's specific value theory
are recent dissertations by W. H. Leue,² and R. M. Millard.³

Leue finds the following "strengths" in Whitehead's notion of value:

1. His theory points to a possible way out of the
   impasse into which the study of the theory of value has drifted.

2. His notion of value has an expanded universality, extending the discussion of values
to fields from which it was formerly often excluded.

3. His theory shows at least the promise of adequacy to deal with fundamental value
   problems.

4. His theory seems to be superior to most in adaptability to changing concrete value
   situations, without resorting to complete relativism.⁴

Leue picks the following as the main "weaknesses" of Whitehead's value theory:

1. It is based on vague, subjective and irrational standards.

2. It is one-sided, giving a disproportionate amount of weight to esthetic experience.

3. It does not provide a firm basis for our enlightened ethical principles.⁵

Millard's work probably contains the most sustained account of Whitehead's theory of value so far written. Its

---

¹ McEwen, WMI.
² Leue, MFTV.
³ Millard, PVWT.
⁴ Leue, MFTV, 442.
⁵ Ibid., 446.
chief value lies not only in the careful attention he gives to the development of Whitehead's axiology but in elucidating the metaphysical presuppositions which make a value structure possible. The primary motif of the dissertation lies in the contention that it is inaccurate to speak of Whitehead as holding to a single theory of value. Rather he tends to move from a conception of intrinsic value as individual, experiential, meaningful, teleological, active, structured, feeling synthesis—the concept dominant throughout his major works—to a conception of a realm of objective, subsistent, eternal, and unchanging Platonic values in which the infinite flux of feeling of the world of fact merely participates—the concept dominant in his last published works.¹

The periodical literature on Whitehead is fairly extensive, not all of it pertinent to his axiology. For discussion of general or specific aspects of his thought, the following are helpful:

A. H. Johnson, "The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy,"² constitutes a reply to Urban's claim that there are unintelligible elements in Whitehead.³ His article on "'Truth, Beauty and Goodness' in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead"⁴ clears up some difficulties raised by others in regard to these concepts in Whitehead. The long article on "Whitehead's Theory of Actual Entities: Defence

¹ Millard, PVWT, 485.
² Johnson, Art.(1943).
³ See Urban, Art.(1938), and Art.(1941).
⁴ Johnson, Art.(1944).
and Criticism,"1 also by Johnson, is a good introduction to Whitehead's thought.

Charles Hartshorne's article, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy,"2 discusses several pertinent problems suggested by Whitehead's metaphysics, particularly the question of inclusiveness of prehensions. That he does not succeed is the contention of John Blyth, who replies to Hartshorne in the article, "On Mr. Hartshorne's Understanding of Whitehead's Philosophy."3

Everett Hall raises an interesting point of discussion in "Of What Use are Whitehead's Eternal Objects?"4 His answer is that they are of little or no use. George Gentry under a similar topic, "Eternal Objects and the Philosophy of Organism," contends on the other hand, that "the theory of actual entities provides no basis for the explanation of the emergence of novel things."5 Gentry is also critical of Whitehead's doctrine of experience in "The Subject in Whitehead's Philosophy."6 R. M. Millard contends in his article, "The Ghost of Eternalism in Whitehead's Theory of Value," that Whitehead changes from a temporalist to an eternalist.7

5. Gentry, Art. (1946), 252.
Other representative articles, variously related to Whitehead's thought, are by Vlastos, Hooper, Ushenko, Stebbing, Forsyth, Dunham, Laurence.

Key reviews of the books from Whitehead's metaphysical and value period are given by Swabey, Wright, Stebbing, Aaron, Ritchie, Lee.

More closely related to the problems associated with value are the following:


5. Forsyth, Art.(1932).
10. Stebbing, Art.(1930).
15. Goheen, Art.(1941).
In regard to the relevancy of Whitehead's thought for the contemporary world, one of the all too infrequent appraisals is the article by A. H. Johnson on "The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead." R. N. Bender has also written an article entitled "Whitehead's Implied Social Ethics." The articles by Lowe, Hartshorne, and Johnson which constitute the small book, Whitehead and the Modern World, give some further insights into the relation of Whitehead's thought to contemporary science and civilization.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCERN OF BRIGHTMAN AND WHITEHEAD WITH VALUE PROBLEMS

A. Brightman.

1. Survey of Writings as Related to Value.

Brightman’s interest in the problem of value goes back to one of the earliest philosophical articles he wrote entitled "The Lisbon Earthquake: A Study in Religious Value" (1919).\(^1\) In this article he shows how the great catastrophe of 1755 affected the thinking of Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, and Wesley. Particularly significant for this chapter and as anticipative of his later emphasis on coherence as a criterion of both truth and value is his declaration that "it is impossible to separate one’s judgments of value from one’s total system of ideas, and understand them in isolation ... Value-judgments are judgments of the whole personal life."\(^2\)

The next year, 1920, three major articles appeared, all of which are characterized by a strong emphasis on the significance of values. In the first, "Philosophy in American Education",\(^3\) which he contributed to the first issue of The Personalist, he declares that the very aim of philosophy should be to stimulate student initiative towards the finding

---

2. Ibid., 316.
of man intelligent working hypothesis as to the total meaning of life and its values." He adds that if a philosophy department does not somehow do this "it fails to serve as a unifying and idealizing force in education; it loses the greatest opportunity open to any department of an American college."¹

In the second article, "The Personalistic Method in Philosophy"² Brightman closely identifies person, and values. It is one of his conclusions that "personalistic method may... be regarded as the proper instrument for a philosophy of life and value."³ From this conclusion Brightman never varied, as his subsequent writings show.

The third article of that year was titled "Modern Idealism",⁴ which later became the basis of Chapter VI in his A Philosophy of Ideals and was called there "Idealism as a Contemporary Philosophy."⁵ In that chapter he lists four characteristics of modern idealism, the last being its "emphasis on the problem of values."⁶

Equally rich for their value content were three articles written in 1921, each of which became the substantial basis for later book chapters. "The Tasks Confronting a

---

1. Brightman, Art. (1920)¹, 20.
2. Brightman, Art. (1920)².
3. Ibid., 374.
6. Brightman defines contemporary idealism as the "period from 1810 to the present," i.e., 1920, the year of PI; but personalistic idealism's concern with values in 1955 is not lessened. See PI, 160 and 190.
Personalistic Philosophy" became "Tasks Confronting Contemporary Idealism" in A Philosophy of Ideals. In the article he says that "perhaps the most important" task facing philosophy today is "a personalistic philosophy of value." In the chapter he says of value that "of all the problems of philosophy none is closer to the heart of life than this; indeed, it is the very problem of the heart of life." The other two articles, "The More-than-Human Values of Religion" and "Religious Values and Recent Philosophy", became Chapters VII and VI respectively in Religious Values, with no change in title and no substantial alteration of text. These chapters (especially the former) furnish considerable material for later discussion of Brightman's religious values.

In 1922 two major articles deal specifically with value. Except for very minor changes, the first, entitled "Truth and Value in Religion", appeared later in Religious Values as Chapter III under the same title. The main problems of the article are three: 1. Are values subject to logical investigation? 2. Does the value of religion demonstrate its truth?

3. How may true value be distinguished from apparent value?

This chapter has considerable significance for any discussion of the norms of religious values. The second article appeared in Wilm (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and Theology, under the title, "Neo-realistic Theories of Value." Of prime importance here is Brightman's criticism of the value-theories of Spaulding and Perry.

Except for a review, the only two major articles which Brightman wrote in 1924 were deeply concerned with values. The one entitled "The Contribution of Philosophy to the Theory of Religious Education" became the last chapter in Religious Values, there called "Philosophy and Religious Education." The strength of this chapter is Brightman's insistence that religious education must be "rooted in a coherent view of religious values." The other, "The Meaning of Obligation", was retitled "The Moral Basis of Religious Values" and included as Chapter II of Religious Values. The conclusion of his article-chapter is that "religious values...rest on a moral basis."

---

1. Brightman, Art.(1922)
2. Brightman, Art.(1924)
3. Brightman, RV, 241. This chapter and Brightman's Art.(1920) constitute a sound basis for consideration of Brightman's educational theory. Except for scattered references in his later writings he does not elaborate his views, but every course he taught was a demonstration of the inseparability of education and value.
4. Brightman, Art.(1924)
5. See Brightman, RV, 14.
6. Ibid., 68.
Brightman's Religious Values, five chapters of which have already been noted, appeared in 1926. This was one of his first books with a philosophical emphasis. Published in the same year was his *Introduction to Philosophy*, Brightman's first systematic approach to the philosophical problems of thought and experience. The large place given to value in this book is again indicative of his concern with axiological problems. Even greater emphasis is accorded to value in the revised edition of the same work published twenty-six years later.

The period just described, from 1919 to 1925, represents a mountain peak of interest in value considerations. From 1925 to 1932 there are no major articles or books with value as the main theme. *A Philosophy of Ideals* appeared in 1928, with only scattered references to values, the most important of which have already been noted above. In *The Problem of God* (1930) two facts are worthy of note: First, Brightman uses the concept of value as an argument for God, and second, the difficulty in the attainment of value is indicative of God's limitation. In *The Finding of God* (1931), a companion book to the former, Brightman makes the search for God "a search for the purpose of life and for an unfailling source of eternal value." The next year, *Is God a Person* (1932), was

1. In 1918 he collated considerable material in a work called *The Sources of the Hexateuch*. This was his first book.
4. Ibid., 23.
published. The most pertinent statement for the theory of value is his definition of God as "one who works—whether with us or in spite of us—to attain the highest values and the most perfect love."²

The second peak of interest in value as revealed by Brightman's writings is with the appearance of Moral Laws (1933). As will be shown in the next section, this book, although a work on ethics, is axiological throughout. That the problem of ethics is one of the major problems of axiology, or vice versa, is implied in his view that the task of ethics is to "reveal what value (good) ought (duty) to be obtained."³

From 1934 through 1940 the publication with most significance for Brightman's value theory was his article, "An Empirical Approach to God",⁴ in which he shows the interrelation between God, value, persons, and metaphysics.

Beginning with the printing of A Philosophy of Religion (1940) until 1945, another mountain range of interest in value is attained. Brightman's concern for value in his religious thought is considered in the next section and will not be anticipated here. The same year, and quite important for an understanding of Brightman's social thought, is his article,

---

1. This little book first appeared as a short series of lectures delivered before the Y. M. C. A. in Nashville, Tenn. See IGP, vi.
2. Brightman, IGP, 46-47.
"Freedom, Purpose, and Value." His emphatic presentation there is that "freedom-purpose-value" is the "presupposition of all social structure and of all communication. They are the social a priori."²

In 1942 Brightman provided the entry on "Axiology"³ in Runes (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy. It is one of the longer contributions, with more than two columns of text. In the article he gives a brief historical sketch and then discusses the nature, types, criterion, and metaphysical status of value.

That same year his book, The Spiritual Life, was published. What he says about the relationship of spirit and values should not be overlooked in assessing his total contribution to value literature. Theoretical treatment of axiology per se occupies no more than a score of pages, but what is important is Brightman's concept of the spiritual life as a special dimension of value experience. "The life of value as a whole is the spiritual life."⁴

Also printed⁵ in 1942 was Brightman's contribution to the Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion. His paper, "The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments", as the title suggests, deals with a very important aspect of value theory.

2. Ibid., 504.
Two articles in 1943 and 1944 are important. "Values, Ideals, Norms, and Existence"\(^1\) adds fresh insights, and reveals a more relaxed approach, to the paper and problem mentioned immediately above. A paper entitled "Philosophical Ideas and Enduring Peace"\(^2\) which he contributed to the Fourth Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion contains valuable statements on the relation of values and persons.

The productive period from 1940 to 1945 was climaxed by the most intensive account of value theory in Brightman's writings, viz., Nature and Values. The book is significant on two counts: First, it appeared in the year that World War II came to a close, when a value theme was very pertinent to the task of reconstruction; and second, by its emphasis on personalism and theism it offered a clear-cut alternative to impersonalism, dialectical materialism, and naturalism. Based on his Fondren Lectures delivered at Southern Methodist University, the book elaborates Brightman's belief that "the spiritual conflict underlying the social turmoils of our age can best be understood in the light of a philosophy of personalism."\(^3\)

In that same year he wrote one major article pertinent to value-theory entitled "A Personalistic View of Human Nature."\(^4\) Significant for this discussion is the relationship which he

---

shows between value and choice. Also in 1945 are the very brief entries, "Axiology" and "Value" in Ferm (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion*.

From 1945 to 1951 the only fact pertinent to the problem of axiology was the prominent place given to values in the revised edition of his *Introduction to Philosophy*.

Brightman's University Lecture, *Persons and Values*, in 1952, marks not only another high peak of his axiological writings, but it is the last, and perhaps the most important, statement on values since the publication of *Nature and Values*. It is fitting that this lecture should be, in a very literal sense, the last major public statement of his own philosophy.

A study of the published monograph shows that it contains, in highly concentrated form, the best that Brightman had been saying about persons and values since 1920.

In the above sketch of Brightman's value writings, four distinct peaks of interest are observable. First, is the earliest period of activity culminating in the publication of *Religious Values* and *Introduction to Philosophy* in 1925. The second peak is the appearance of *Moral Laws* in 1933. The highest point is reached at the end of the third period, 1940-1945, with *Nature and Values*. The final peak is *Persons and Values*, the University Lecture of 1952.

---

2. Afterwards printed in booklet form as PV.
3. At this time and until he died in February, 1953, his activities were limited to a very small teaching load and a greatly reduced writing schedule.
2. Influence of Value Considerations in his Thought as a Whole.

The Seminar in "History of the Problem of Value" which Brightman taught at Boston University was more than a historical survey of axiology as treated by the great philosophers; it was, per se, a significant value experience for every member of the class. It is one thing to read about a philosopher's value theory; it is another thing to have that theory propounded in person by one whose own life and thought were motivated and guided by an intense devotion to the deepest axiological norms. No single fact discovered in research and properly embodied in a scholarly critique could convey so well the truth that this section would communicate, viz., that Brightman's value theory is the key not only to his life, but to his whole thought. If fact rather than feeling is necessary at this point, then one of Brightman's own statements is ample evidence of the opinion expressed. He said in one Seminar session, "Knowledge of value is the North Star by which I steer."\(^2\)

As seen above, the sheer quantity of Brightman's writings on value implies the importance which axiological considerations had in his thinking. As related internally to his thought structure, his philosophical expositions proceeded from one basic assumption, that persons and their values (and dis-values) are the only real things in the world. This is not to

---
1. The school year, 1948-49.
shift the problem away from values to persons, for the two cannot be separated. "All...persons are values,\(^1\) and values, in turn, exist only in persons. "It is unthinkable that any value should exist anywhere or anyhow save in and for a personal consciousness.\(^2\) No philosophical theory, therefore, can escape the axio-personal implications of experience.

"Every problem of existence centers about the nature of persons and their values," said Brightman in his University Lecture.\(^3\) All of the major philosophical issues with which Brightman wrestled demonstrate this point of view. His main interests were ethics, religion, and metaphysics. The following data show how in each of these areas "knowledge of value" was indeed his guiding star:

a. Ethics.

Up until 1933, Brightman had written five books and many articles, but beyond two or three reviews and isolated references throughout his writings, it cannot be shown that Brightman had more than a passing interest in ethics as an area for research and study. It is somewhat significant, therefore, that when he did produce a major work on ethics in *Moral Laws* (1933) that the basic motif should be axiological.\(^4\)

---

1. Brightman, PV, 18. See also NV, 18: "In personality is the only truly intrinsic value we know or can conceive."
2. Brightman, SL, 112.
3. Brightman, PV, 3.
4. See Brightman, ML, 89, where a preliminary synopsis of the entire system is given.
Of the eleven moral laws which he enunciates, six are classified under the section which he calls "The Axiological Laws," while two of the three propositions listed under "The Personalistic Laws" are in terms of values. Brightman says of his own presentation that "it develops from abstract formalism, i.e., "The Formal Laws" to concrete value and still more concrete personality." The Axiological Laws express the value principles which a good will should embody, while the Personalistic Laws show what conduct ought to follow from "the fact that value is always an experience of persons." A brief, cursory summary of these laws will be sufficient to substantiate the view that Brightman's ethical theory is primarily axiological:

All persons should be consistent in willing ends which are not contradictory. In acknowledging ends or ideals, obligation to obey is at once established. These more formal aspects pass into the axiological in the actual implementation of the willed ideals, where, it follows, (1) that only harmonious values should be achieved, (2) that the consequences of such choices be considered, (3) that in every given situation the highest value should not only be selected, but (4) values relevant to that situation should be developed, (5) that the widest range of values be realized, and (6) that

2. Brightman, ML, 90.
3. Ibid., 90.
all lesser values be controlled by the higher values. As applied to persons, these laws mean that each individual is not only responsible for developing the maximum values in his own life, but must recognize the intrinsic value of other persons and the possibility of cooperative effort in the production and increase of values not possible for the individual alone. The ultimate guide to the selection and attainment of value ought to be the ideal conception of what a person can become as an individual and as a member of society.

This preponderantly axio-centric statement of ethical theory carries out in public print what Brightman emphatically expressed in the classroom, viz., the opinion that "ethics ought to be derived from values. The theory of value is larger than ethics."¹

b. Religion.

It is part of the avowed purpose of this paper to show that religious values form a major part of Brightman's general value theory,² hence only a few preliminary remarks need be made here to indicate his "concern" for value in the religious aspect of his thought. It is Brightman's opinion that "our experience consists of our entire conscious life"³ including the experience of religion. It is an empirical fact that men are religious, but what is religion? "The survey of the facts

¹. Class notes, "History of the Problem of Value", Boston University, 1948-49.
². Primarily Chapter V.
³. Brightman, PCR, 1.
of religion...has revealed the fundamental fact that every religious experience is an experience of value...Religion is a choice of value, a commitment to it.¹ Like all other values religion is subject to critical examination and is not exempt from the necessity of conforming to the laws of reason and coherence. Because of its function, however, as an expression of devotion to some value that is considered supreme, it assumes somewhat of a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. This is Brightman's position, although not in the sense that religious values have any greater intrinsic importance than some of the others. It is impossible, says Brightman, to group the "higher values in a scale of increasing excellence,"² but it is still probable that religious values have not only a greater inclusiveness, but imply a more basic adjustment to the totality of the universe. This seems to be what Brightman is saying when he declares that "the whole enterprise of religion is based on the faith that what is truly valuable is also real and eternal."³ This puts the appreciation of cosmic values into the heart of religious experience. "Religion is an experience of value...It is also a faith in the friendliness of the universe to value."⁴

1. Brightman, POR, 85. This quotation is not meant to imply that this is Brightman's full definition of religion. Cf. POR, 17. But whatever else religion is, it is, according to Brightman, an experience of value.
2. Ibid., 97. In ITP, 148, he does have such a scale with religion as the highest.
4. Brightman, POR, 86.
As in his ethical theory, so in his religious outlook, axiology is seen to be his basic motif. His whole work, *Religious Values*, is the outstanding elaboration of what religion means in an axiological context. Not quite so specific in the development of this relationship is his *The Spiritual Life*, but he is insistent that "spirit is a system of personal values." Even more strongly is his statement that "the life of value as a whole is the spiritual life." The axiological expression of religion is dominant in his *Philosophy of Religion*. There value appears as an argument for God, for immortality, while the very worth of religious experience itself is established only as it coalesces with other values into a living whole. Many of his articles show no less interest in the relation and interdependence of values and religion.


In his University Lecture Brightman gave the epitome of his philosophy when he, without any qualification, said that "every problem of existence centers about the nature of persons and their values." Brightman's own philosophical expositions adequately demonstrate the axio-personal axiom. It is a rare chapter or article that does not refer directly or by implication

---

1. Brightman, SL, 64.
2. Ibid., 65.
3. Brightman, POR, 199.
4. Ibid., 401.
5. Ibid., 113, 105.
6. Besides those early articles which later became book chapters, see such articles as Art. (1926), Art. (1932)."3
7. Brightman, PV, 3.
to the experiencing self as the starting point of all knowledge and the locus of all value experience. The problems of metaphysics, which at first glance might seem to be more detached from persons and values, are no less involved in the axio-personal Weltanschauung. Values and metaphysics involve each other. If one thinks about the status of values in the universe, he cannot escape metaphysics. On the other hand, a metaphysical inquiry must eventually be related to persons and their values.

If we wish to think truly about value, we must seek to think truly about reality as a whole. Our human values not only interpenetrate each other, but value and all reality also mutually interpenetrate.1

The evidence for the virtual identification of the problems of value and metaphysics in Brightman's thought is by no means difficult to evince. It is his personalistic metaphysics that makes both nature and values parts of the area of experience which is open to metaphysical investigation. Values are rooted deep in existence, therefore metaphysical methods and norms may be applied in the investigation of their status in the universe. Value judgments must have an objective reference which makes possible the correcting of erroneous claims, or value experience is chaos. Such objectivity is found in the Supreme Mind who knows all truth and has appreciative experiences of value norms. In brief, it is more coherent to say that value judgments refer

1. Brightman, ITP, 150.
to objective claims which reality makes than to explain them away psychologically. Metaphysics and values are inseparable because they refer to the same world. According to personalism, the only environment we have is other personality. What we call nature is part of the divine experience which also includes values of the spirit. This is not to make nature and values exactly coextensive, as value experience is probably on a higher level than that aspect of the divine consciousness which is expressed as nature. But in bringing them together in the mind of God the world is preserved from a hopeless bifurcation which would eliminate all seeming possibility of collaboration between the world of nature and the world of spirit. 

Personalism says there is one world. Brightman's whole book, Nature and Values, is dedicated to that proposition. "What I want to know more than anything else," he says, "is whether the world of nature and the world of persons are on the side of life's highest values or are ruthlessly indifferent to them." Only a personalistic metaphysics, Brightman believes, gives the knowledge he seeks, viz., a universe indifferent neither to the claims of nature nor to values, but a world of cooperative effort where the realization of the highest values

1. See Brightman's arguments for the objectivity of values, ITF, 156 ff., also PI, 86, ff.
3. Ibid., 114, 122, 123.
4. Ibid., 126.
5. Ibid., 120.
6. Ibid., 90.
are possible, not in spite of, but because of the friendly and compatible environment which nature affords.

B. Whitehead.

1. Survey of Writings as Related to Value.

Since Whitehead has no systematic treatment of value as such in either books or articles, there can be no recounting of his value writings quite comparable to the preceding survey of Brightman's works. The material which follows consists of a brief survey of some particular value passages, along with a statement of the books most significant for an exposition of Whitehead's value theory.

The notion of value as a major concept in Whitehead's philosophy emerges at the beginning of what is known as the metaphysical period of his life, i. e. from 1925 on.¹ Before that year two passages are worthy of note. Both come in the first of his Tanner Lectures which later were published as The Concept of Nature (1920). The first passage indicates, perhaps, Whitehead's dawning dissatisfaction with the ability of science to explain the totality of experience. What is needed in a philosophy of the sciences, he says, "is the attainment of some unifying concept which will set in assigned relationships within itself all that there is for knowledge, for feeling, and for emotion."² The second passage, which he

---
¹ See Victor Lowe's survey of Whitehead's philosophical development, Art. (1941).
² Whitehead, CN, 2.
seems to drop in almost as an aside from his main thought, is more explicitly anticipative of his organic philosophy:

"The values of nature are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence." 1

With the publication of Science and the Modern World (1925) the concept of value begins to assume an increasingly significant place in Whitehead's writings. Most important for axiology is Chapter V, "The Romantic Reaction," which he describes as "a protest on behalf of value." 2 It is also in this chapter that Whitehead's most frequently quoted definition of value appears, viz.: "Value is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event." 3

The very next year after Science and the Modern World Whitehead delivered four lectures on religion 4 which were published as Religion in the Making. He says of these lectures that the same method which was applied to science in the former work "is here applied to religion." 5 This book is probably the key source for insights into the relation of values and religion in Whitehead's thought.

In chronological sequence the next book significant for

1. Whitehead, CW, 5.
2. Whitehead, SMW, 96.
3. Ibid., 95. There are other very important value passages, especially 23, 110, 162, 178.
4. The Lowell Lectures delivered in King's Chapel, Boston, February 1926. See Preface, RM.
5. Preface, RM.
Whitehead's axiology is, of course, his *Process and Reality* (1929).¹ Victor Lowe says that "PR must always remain the indispensable book."² There is no doubting of Lowe's estimate as applied to any aspect of Whitehead's thought, but nowhere is *Process and Reality* more indispensable than in the formulation of Whitehead's value theory. Only in this work is there found an adequate delineation of the metaphysical system which makes his value structure possible. The following chapters of this dissertation show how important this book is.

The *Function of Reason*, a little book also appearing in 1929, has some insights valuable for this study of Whitehead's axiology. Reminiscent of his early statement in the *Concept of Nature* is his repeated emphasis here that "we shall never elaborate an explanatory metaphysics unless we abolish this notion of valueless, vacuous existence."³

It is Lowe's opinion that after *Process and Reality* "no novel departures occur in Whitehead's system of philosophy."⁴ *Adventures of Ideas*, which came in 1933, does not invalidate Lowe's estimate, but here for the first time is a sustained effort by Whitehead to apply to history and civilization some of the metaphysical concepts worked out in his earlier writings.

---

1. SYM, which came out in 1927, has little or nothing to say about value *per se*, but it is very valuable as a background to PR, especially the notions of "causal efficacy" and "presentational immediacy."
2. Lowe, Art. (1941), 118.
4. Lowe, Art. (1941), 118.
particularly Science and the Modern World and Process and Reality. The last part of Adventures might be called, not inaptly, the axiological section of the book. Here is his most fascinating, and one might say poetic, analysis of the aesthetic character of reality, including his controversial subordination of the truth relationship to the aesthetic.

Nature and Life (1934) emphasizes the dynamic, organic character of nature essential to the kind of value structure which Whitehead proposes. Its two short lectures or chapters are later incorporated in Modes of Thought (1938), but probably the best value passage of the whole larger volume is from the smaller work:

A dead nature can give no reasons. All ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value. A dead nature aims at nothing. It is the essence of life that it exists for its own sake, as the intrinsic reaping of values.

Besides the specific value passages of Modes of Thought, Whitehead's notion of "importance", especially in the early part of the book, has some significance for his value theory.

Between Nature and Life and Modes of Thought one article

1. These two books, i. e., SMW and PR, along with AI, form a sort of dominating triumvirate among his works. Whitehead says that "each book can be read separately; but they supplement each other's omissions or compressions." See AI, vii.
2. Ibid., Part IV.
3. Ibid., 344.
4. Lectures I and II of NL became Chapters VII and VIII respectively in MT.
5. Whitehead, MT, 184; NL, 9.
is especially worthy of note. It is entitled simply "Remarks", and is important for the present study because of Whitehead's emphasis on aesthetics as the starting place for his philosophy. He says:

"My own belief is that at present the most fruitful, because the most neglected, starting point of philosophy is that section of value-theory which we term aesthetics. Our enjoyment of the values of human art, or natural beauty, our horror at the obvious vulgarities and defacements which force themselves upon us—all these modes of experience are sufficiently abstracted to be relatively obvious. And yet evidently they disclose the very meaning of things."

The last of Whitehead's writings with significance for axiology are two lectures delivered at Harvard University. They are "Mathematics and the Good" delivered first in 1939, and "Immortality" given in 1941, the latter being his quite famous Ingersoll Lecture. What these lectures mean for his axiology are shown in the body of the subsequent study.

Of the above writings which cover the metaphysical period of Whitehead's thought, it is apparent that the eight or nine year span from 1925 to 1933 is the most distinctly axiological.

3. Whitehead, Art. (1941). This lecture was given originally at Harvard, December 15, 1939. See Schilpp, PANW, 771.
4. Whitehead, Art. (1941). This lecture was given at Harvard, April 22, 1941. See Schilpp, PANW, 771.
Remove this short period of time and it would be very difficult to show that Whitehead had more than a passing interest in value theory.

2. Influence of Value Considerations in His Thought as a Whole.

As seen in the brief sketch above, Whitehead's concept of value does not have any special significance or place in his thought structure until the publication of *Science and the Modern World* (1925). His statement five years earlier in *The Concept of Nature* that "the values of nature are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence" ¹ proves that he was already thinking of an axiocentric universe, although it is not until *Process and Reality* (1929) that value in terms of aesthetic harmony is fully revealed. Whitehead's cosmological scheme and value are there seen to be inseparable in that the very metaphysical structure of the universe is a teleological process with value as the resultant emergent.

It is easy, perhaps, to go beyond actual evidence in stating a thesis that one wants to defend; nevertheless, it does not seem an over-statement to suggest that value considerations dominate Whitehead's whole metaphysical schema.² Much of *Process and Reality*, for instance, a difficult book even with

---

¹ Whitehead, CN, 5.
² The "place" of value in Whitehead's philosophy has already been adequately shown by Millard, PWWT. It is his opinion that value considerations occupy the central place in Whitehead's metaphysical development.
the best aids available, does become more intelligible when read with value in mind.

Most of Whitehead's reasons for his axiological emphasis arise from his own method and his own estimate of the nature of reality, but doubtless one major external consideration gave him added incentive toward the development of an axiocentric metaphysics. This was his very obvious dissatisfaction with "the narrow and efficient scheme of scientific concepts"\(^1\) which dominated much of the philosophy of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Science had reduced nature to a mechanism so complete that man was helpless to cooperate with God in the production of any values whatsoever. Whitehead referred to such mechanisms as "the monstrous issues of limited metaphysics and clear logical intellect."\(^2\) Mechanism, in his view, did not adequately account for all aspects of experience, particularly organisms. He refers to an unsolved problem of 17th century science as follows: "Given configurations of matter with locomotion in space as assigned by physical laws, to account for living organisms."\(^3\) The major task of philosophy during these centuries was to get mind, human suffering, life, back into nature. Berkeley helped much, says Whitehead, by his insistence that mind is the only reality. "He contends that what constitutes the realization of natural entities is the being perceived within

---

1. Whitehead, SMW, 75.
2. Ibid., 76.
3. Ibid., 41-42.
the unity of mind."¹ For Berkeley's mind, Whitehead substituted "a process of prehensive unification"² which could account for both mechanism and organism.³

Somewhat paradoxically, however, it was literature rather than philosophy which gave expression to the full "concrete outlook of humanity."⁴ The poets, particularly Wordsworth,⁵ put back into nature what had been disastrously omitted, "the haunting presences",⁶ the feeling of earth and sky and hills and trees. Strict scientific analysis⁷ failed because its method did not allow for feelings and values. When Whitehead came to build his metaphysical system he saw that what the poets had discovered or expressed was as much a part of life as the "objects" and "motions" and "laws" of science. He became convinced that the very aim of metaphysical process was aesthetic realization or the attainment of value. His whole metaphysical scheme therefore becomes

¹. Whitehead, SMW, 71.
². Ibid., 71.
³. Referring to SMW Whitehead says: "I would term the doctrine of these lectures, the theory of organic mechanism," SMW, 81.
⁴. Ibid., 76.
⁵. In Art. (1941), 118, Lowe says: "Some of those who know Whitehead wonder if William Wordsworth did not influence him more than any other man."
⁶. Whitehead, SMW, 85.
⁷. Whitehead's attitude to science is a story in itself. With the conceptions of classic science he could never agree, e. g., fixed space, static substance, "simple location", independent existents. These concepts still haunt science, although they are fast becoming obsolete. It is significant that the philosophers have often led the way from "the notion of static stuff" to "the notion of fluent energy." See SMW, 50 ff., and PR, 470, 471. Note also MT, 204.
"a protest against the exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact."

Value concepts are interwoven through his whole thought structure, not as a demand of a preconceived philosophical method, but because that is the way nature is. "Value is an element which permeates through and through the poetic view of nature." Where there is aesthetic realization there is value. All else is abstraction. Value is realization, i.e., actuality, and actuality is value. Value is concrete fact; it is Activity. Value and the real world are inseparable.

In religion as well as metaphysics, value is the key word for Whitehead. This is because religion is dependent on metaphysics, which is to say that in understanding the universe certain intensities of experience emerge which have a special dimension expressible only as worship or kinship or dependence. These are value experiences. "The peculiar character of religious truth is that it explicitly deals with values." But religion is devoid of value if it be not grounded in metaphysics. Religion is an experience based on the recognition of permanences in "the universe which we can care for. It thereby provides a meaning, in terms of value,

---
1. Whitehead, SMW, 96.
2. Ibid., 95.
3. Ibid., 108.
5. See Whitehead, RN, 83 ff.
6. Ibid., 124.
for our own existence, a meaning which flows from the nature of things."¹

Again, value is the clue to Whitehead's doctrine of immortality, a doctrine full of promise in Process and Reality and coming to full bloom in his Ingersoll Lecture. Precisely in what immortality consists in Whitehead's thought is not always apparent, i. e., whether the perpetuation of persons or ideals or aesthetic patterns, but in any case value is the sine qua non of any type of immortality. Immortality attaches to the value realized in the world of fact. The presence of value assures the continued existence of actual occasions of which "personality is the extreme example of sustained realization."²

As will be shown later, the primary function of God in the universe is both the initiation of value possibilities and the conservation of the values actually realized in the experience of actual entities. "His purpose in the world is quality of attainment."³

Insofar as Whitehead has any ethical theory, it is based on value considerations. "Goodness is a qualification belonging to the constitution of reality" which, in his thought, is good only when it is beautiful.⁴ Among persons

¹. Whitehead, RM, 124. Italics added.
². Whitehead, Art. (1941)², 690.
³. Whitehead, RM, 158-159.
⁴. Whitehead, AI, 345.
ethics is a matter of value relationships. A key passage which reveals his axiologically based ethical theory is worth noting:

We have no right to deface the value-experience which is the very essence of the universe. Existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value-intensity. Also no unit can separate itself from the others, and from the whole. And yet each unit exists in its own right. It upholds value-intensity for itself, and this involves sharing value-intensity with the universe.

In the first sentence of this passage is also a clue to his doctrine of evil, which he explains in terms of aesthetic destruction.

Whitehead's thought throughout adequately demonstrates his own thesis that value-theory is the most fruitful perspective from which to develop a philosophy.

G. Comparative summary.

Value considerations have a dominating rôle in the thought of both Brightman and Whitehead. Brightman's value writings cover the whole span of his literary career, a period of over thirty years, i.e., from 1919 to 1952, whereas the bulk of Whitehead's value writings extend only from 1925 to 1933.

The relatively short axiological period for Whitehead does not indicate any less intense devotion to value considerations; it may, on the contrary, suggest that values had a

more intrinsic relationship to his metaphysical scheme which was largely developed over the same years. It is true that the metaphysical presuppositions of Whitehead's axiology are constantly, if not somewhat overwhelmingly, more in evidence than in Brightman's thought.¹ Brightman does go to metaphysics to find coherent explanation for value norms, but values for him are always the experiences of persons. In Whitehead, on the other hand, values find their highest exemplification in a sustained route of occasions, i. e., a person, but values are not limited to the experience of entities with personal order. Value is the realization in actuality of any aesthetic pattern, whether of a low or high grade organism. This, in effect, puts some value on a relatively impersonal metaphysical plane, an hypothesis with which Brightman could never agree.

In thinking again of the relative lengths of their axiological development, two or three observations seem to be pertinent. First, one is greatly impressed by Brightman's constant and insistent emphasis, over such a long period, on the importance of values for metaphysics, religion, ethics, and society. That his interest in and commitment to the highest values never waned is a character trait of the highest order. On the other hand, the exposition of his value theory

¹ Brightman was preparing his only book devoted wholly to metaphysics when he died. The real stature of his metaphysical thought must be left to future evaluation.
suffers from a certain sameness of pattern both in matters of emphasis and terminology. With one or two exceptions which are indicated in a later chapter, there are very few modifications of theory or style. Of course, there may have been no reason to change his theory, but the force of his arguments would have been more compelling if there had been greater variety and freshness in his literary style. Of all his books, The Spiritual Life (1942) is probably the greatest departure from his usual style in the direction of novel emphases. In this case the subject matter may have supplied the inspiration. It is regrettable that he did not use this very rich setting for more value exposition. What he does say is vigorous and stimulating.

As for Whitehead, the comparatively short period in which his value writings emerged did not provide much opportunity for debilitating repetition; hence his exposition abounds with the vigor of original discovery. Whether or not after thirty years his literary expression of value would have remained as fresh is open to question. There is both advantage and disadvantage in Whitehead's method. He achieves freshness, but what he gains in vividness he often loses in clarity. The reverse is true for Brightman. His terminology is simple and his meaning almost invariably clear, but many times at the expense of originality and spontaneity.

Although differing quite radically in style, the two men demonstrate a remarkable similarity in their concern
for values in the various ramifications of their thought. Both men subordinate ethics to axiology, Whitehead probably more rigorously than Brightman. The latter would not go so far as to say that goodness is a matter of beauty, for there are times when the path of rightness or duty may involve the ugly and the unpleasant; but he does hold that axiology is more inclusive than the ethical and therefore exercises a certain priority in the determination of ethical laws. For Whitehead morality as well as truth is always a function of value as expressed in aesthetic pattern. Morality exists only because of value and not vice versa.

In the realm of religion, both Brightman and Whitehead find its highest expression in terms of value experience. Brightman's whole work, *Religious Values*, and his repeated description of religion as a faith in the friendliness of the universe to value indicate the axio-religious partnership and the dependence of both on metaphysical structure. Whitehead describes religion as a relationship to the universe revelatory of value meanings which flow from the very nature of things. Each man in his own way insists on the inseparability of religion and values from metaphysics. Only with such objectivity is religious value saved from chaotic subjectivism which makes critical investigation impossible. All norms, rational and axiological, stand or fall by the strength of the metaphysical structure which supports them.
Their greatest concern with value is revealed in their common emphasis on the axiological function of God, who originates, conserves, and increases values in the universe. Value in its persisting quality is also the chief clue to their doctrines of immortality.

Sufficient has been said in this chapter to suggest the great concern of both Brightman and Whitehead with value considerations in their total thought. Brightman's extensive writings constitute a quite obvious demonstration of his axiological emphasis, while in the case of both Brightman and Whitehead the internal structure of their thought is inextricably interwoven with value implications. What value means and how it relates in greater detail to some of the major areas of their thought is the purpose of the following chapters.
Chapter Two

THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF VALUE

A. Brightman.

1. Basic Characteristics.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish as clearly as possible what Brightman and Whitehead propose as the basic meaning and criteria of value. All subsequent discussion will presuppose this chapter; therefore clear definitions are necessary. Perry points out\(^1\) that no matter how loosely the more technical terminology of specialized fields is used, the special investigator guards certain terms with great care. The term "value" itself is often used very loosely, but for the theorist of value, the word must be precisely defined. Value "is his careful word," says Perry.\(^2\)

Brightman, more than Whitehead, delineates critically and carefully what he means by value. Most of his books contain some account of values with definitions and descriptions. The following representative statements are given in their chronological order. In Religious Values he says that everyone will doubtless agree that by a value he means something that he prizes, something worthwhile, precious, desirable; something that meets our need, something that fulfills our

---

1. Perry, RV, 2.
2. Ibid., 2.
ideal of what ought to be.\textsuperscript{1}
In his \textit{Philosophy of Religion}, he defines a value as "whatever is actually liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed by anyone at any time."\textsuperscript{2} In \textit{The Spiritual Life}, "a value is the experienced fulfillment of our liking, the achieving of our desire."\textsuperscript{3} In \textit{Nature and Values} he describes it in terms of "satisfactions", "purposes fulfilled", and "order";\textsuperscript{4} while in his \textit{Introduction} he repeats the psychological terms used heretofore such as "liked", "prized", "desired", but increases the scope of his definition by including "whatever is...acknowledged as interesting, important, or worthy of approval."\textsuperscript{5}

Beyond his basic definitions, Brightman makes several important distinctions which illuminate and open up the heart of his meaning. First there are the differences among "value", "valuation", and "evaluation." Value is in terms

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Brightman, RV, 81.
\item 2. Brightman, PR, 88.
\item 3. Brightman, SL, 64.
\item 4. Brightman, NV, 83.
\item 5. Brightman, ITP, 141. This definition is broader than the one given in the original edition of ITP. His use of the term "interesting" suggests the famous definition of Perry as "any object of any interest", GIV, Chapter V. Perry elaborates the same view in his work RV, where his definition reads: "A thing--any thing--has value or is valuable, in the original and generic sense when it is the object of an interest--any interest. Or, whatever is object of interest is ipso facto valuable," RV, 2-3. For Brightman's critique of Perry (and others) see his chapter, "Neo-Realistic Theories of Value," Art. (1922)\textsuperscript{2}, 22-64.
\item Brightman's term "important" suggests Whitehead's use of "importance" as a value term, particularly MT, Chapter I.
\end{itemize}
of what is liked or prized; valuation, on the other hand, is the "experience of ascribing intrinsic value to an experience, or the mere feeling of the value." Valuation is the action of the mind in the presence of what is considered valuable. But valuation must not be confused with evaluation, which involves the "application of ideals or norms to values." The former is a liking but uncritical process, whether the object of desire is Brahms's First Symphony or tapioca, while the latter is a process of critical judgment on the acceptability of value-claims.

Again, whenever Brightman discusses value at any length he makes the distinction between "intrinsic" and "instrumental" values. "Intrinsic value is prized for its own sake—it is inherent in the value itself; instrumental value is prized as a means or a cause...of intrinsic value." For illustration, he calls music an intrinsic value, while money is instrumental. The distinction, of course, is not absolute, since a numismatist may think of money as an end in itself, while a musician may earn his living by his music; but in thinking of the distinction it is the "end" which determines the status of the value. Money, _per se_, except for Scrooge or Silas Marner, does not satisfy any inherent need, while "music

1. Brightman, _ITP_, 142.
2. Brightman, _POR_, 91.
3. Brightman, _ITP_, 141, 147. Also _RV_, 81; _ML_, 132-139; _POR_, 89; _NV_, 69.
inspires and elevates character, thought, and religious devotion.\(^1\) Whether value is instrumental or intrinsic, therefore, depends upon a point of view. It should also be noted that intrinsic values may themselves be instrumental to the discovery and enjoyment of other values; but whatever the ultimate appraisal, "the fundamental meaning of value is to be found in its intrinsic aspect."\(^2\)

In his *Philosophy of Religion*, he differentiates between a "potential" and an "actual" value.\(^3\) A value must always be the experience of a person, hence what is desired but not yet experienced is a potential value. The value becomes actual in the act of experiencing. For instance, one might hear of the Mona Lisa and wish to see it. The painting exists only as a potential value until seen and appreciated.

There should also be discrimination among "empirical" values, "value-claims", and "apparent" values.\(^4\) An empirical value is the value as a fact of experience. People do have values. With every value, however, is a conscious claim that the value now being experienced is a true value. This claim of course must be tested, and until tested it has the status of an apparent value which may or may not turn out to be a true value.

This leads to what Brightman calls "the most difficult"

---

1. Brightman, NV, 70.
2. Ibid., 70.
4. Ibid., 91.
of all his value terminology, viz., "true value" or "real value."¹ What is a true value? That, of course, is the question which Brightman and other axiologists recognize as the crux of the whole matter. Some, e. g., the logical positivists, discount the possibility of arriving at any standard at all, simply because of the unverifiability of the "unempirical" value-claims; but Brightman joins himself with those who think that it is possible to test values and to arrive at some concept of a "true" value.²

Two other distinctions are made in his Introduction to Philosophy.³ First, there is the difference between "permanent" and "transient" values. Some values, e. g., health, wealth, are greatly prized either as intrinsic or instrumental, but they have no guaranteed permanency and may vanish in an epidemic or the crash of the stock market. On the other hand, "nothing," says Brightman, "save my own disloyalty, need ever separate me from truth and goodness, beauty and religion."⁴

The other distinction made here is between the "catholic" and the "exclusive" values. Some values by their very nature cannot be shared and are limited in their application. They are exclusive. "Such are all values that depend on the possession of material things."⁵ Other values are not exhausted

---

¹ Brightman, PQR, 92.
² His basic criteria will be shown later.
³ Brightman, ITP, 147.
⁴ Ibid., 147.
⁵ Ibid., 147-148.
by such restricted appreciation, but may be shared. These are the catholic or universal values. "It is significant," Brightman adds, "that the same values that we found to be permanent are also catholic." 1

So far Brightman's analysis of values adds up to this: Besides the original differentiation between valuation and evaluation, he classifies values as intrinsic, instrumental, potential, actual, empirical, as claims, apparent, true, permanent, transient, catholic, and exclusive.

One other classification involves a scale of the basic types of intrinsic values, but that is given separate consideration in the next section.

2. Table of Values.

Brightman recognizes the problem of classifying values according to a scale of higher and lower, but he feels that "the attempt can scarcely be abandoned by one who desires a philosophical survey of value experience." 2 Doubtless complete agreement on any comparative scale would be unlikely, even if an exact scale could be worked out; 3 but there is value in preparing a table, especially as it shows what appears to be revealed in experience, viz., the inescapable dependence of values on one another. According to W. G. Everett, who was Brightman's teacher and whose influence

2. Brightman, POR, 94.
3. Such a scale Brightman holds to be impossible, ML, 134.
Brightman acknowledges,\(^1\) values are not separate and independent, but interpenetrating in the whole organic structure of experience.\(^2\) Sorley enunciates the same principle in his discussion of moral values when he says that "any moral judgment which is valid must be coherent with all other moral judgments; at least it cannot be inconsistent with any."\(^3\)

Brightman summarizes both Everett and Sorley when he reports Sorley's view that "values form a system rather than a scale."\(^4\)

Brightman frankly shows his dependence on Everett's Table, which he refers to as "the standard basis in recent American literature"\(^5\) of value classification. It will be helpful to include Everett's list here, if for no other reason than to show the major source of Brightman's own Table. His "classification of human values in eight groups" is as follows:\(^6\)

I. Economic Values.

II. Bodily Values.

III. Values of Recreation.

IV. Values of Association.

V. Character Values.

VI. Aesthetic Values.

---

1. Brightman, ITF, 148; PDR, 94-95.
2. Everett, MV, 182.
5. Ibid., 132.
VII. Intellectual Values.

VIII. Religious Values.

Brightman's Table includes all of Everett's, the only variation being in the order. Brightman has two lists, both of which are given below for comparative purposes. In the Philosophy of Religion he classifies values in this order:¹

- Purely Instrumental Values.
  - a. Natural values.
  - b. Economic values.
- The Lower Intrinsic Values.
  - a. Bodily values.
  - b. Recreational values.
  - c. Work values.
- The Higher Intrinsic Values.
  - a. Social values.
  - b. Character values.
  - c. Aesthetic values.
  - d. Intellectual values.
  - e. Religious values.

In An Introduction to Philosophy he classifies the intrinsic values as follows:²

- Lower intrinsic values.
  - Recreational (play).
  - Bodily (health).

¹ Brightman, PER, 95-100.
² Brightman, ITP, 148.
Social (association).
Labor (economic and other).
Higher intrinsic values.
Intellectual (knowledge, truth).
Esthetic (beauty).¹
Character (goodness).
Religious (holiness).

The slight differences between Brightman's classification and Everett's is apparent, as well as the variations between his own two lists. It should be pointed out that the latter list had his latest attention, although it remains the same as in the first edition of his Introduction, with the exception of "Labor", which he adds here among the lower intrinsic values. The inclusion of labor seems to indicate a rethinking of the problem. In An Introduction to Philosophy (1925), he includes neither labor nor work. In Philosophy of Religion (1940), he lists economic values, but emphatically denies them any intrinsic standing. "One who regards economic values as intrinsic is a miser," he says, although Brightman is quick to point out that "the abundance or deficiency of economic wealth has a profound effect on both the quantity and quality of realizable intrinsic values."² Eleven years

¹ There is no reason for the spelling "esthetie" in this list, and "aesthetic" in the former, except, perhaps, a publisher's preference.
² Brightman, FCR, 95.
later in his revised *Introduction* (1951), labor, including the economic, is among the intrinsic values! There is no specific evidence accounting for the change in emphasis, but the change itself is mildly eloquent of a greater appreciation for the significance and implications of human labor.¹

It is also significant to note that although social values had a brief elevation among the higher intrinsic values in the former list, they are back in the lower division of the second list. To find the proper spot for the social values evidently gave him more difficulty than the others. He allows them a temporary first division berth with much hesitancy, explaining that they are still "the lowest of the higher values, because mere association with others is almost utterly devoid of worth unless some other value besides the social is being sought." Nevertheless, "every true value is enhanced when experienced as a social value."² In the *Introduction* list, Brightman suspects that his treatment of the social values will raise the chief objections, and makes a special point of clarifying why he includes them where he does. Association itself, he says, is not sufficient to guarantee that value shall be present.

The reason for placing social values relatively low in the scale is that the value of association is dependent on the presence of the higher values. It is questionable whether there is

---

1. See Brightman, *ITP*, 149.
any intrinsic value whatever in social relations from which truth, beauty, goodness, and religion are lacking.¹

The other changes, e. g., the transposing of the bodily and recreational values in the lower classification, and character and intellectual values in the higher group, have not come in for any special justification. His placing of religion as the highest value remains constant.

With this last fact the significance of Brightman's table really emerges. Following as he does Everett's view of the interpenetration of all values and the dependence of the lower on the higher, one is not surprised to find in Brightman a treatment of values in which the special insights of religion not only appear regularly but serve as a pervasive and uniting factor for his whole axiological structure.

Before considering the problem of criteria, it will be helpful to review in a brief compass what Brightman means by value. These major points emerge:

Values are the preferred objects of interest and desire as experienced. These are the empirical values. Which values ought to be selected for enjoyment is the problem of evaluation involving criteria and norms. After critical examination and testing, an empirical value may emerge as a true value. Some values have little or no intrinsic worth

¹ Brightman, ITP, 149.
but serve as instruments to other values. All values exist only as potentials until achieved in the experience of persons. All values interpenetrate, and because some values depend on others the need for a scale is empirically grounded, although the relative importance of values is difficult to determine. The need for a discussion of the criteria of values is at once apparent.

3. Criteria of Values.

Before considering Brightman's criteria, something must be said of the need for axiological standards. It is a fact that people have likes, aversions, and desires. Brightman calls such experiences "empirical values." They are what people do value, whether right or wrong, aesthetic or unaesthetic, worthy or unworthy. Best-seller lists, Hooper ratings, election results, are public evidence that people have preferences. There is no philosophical problem involved in the matter of public preference as a fact; that is more a problem of observation and statistical recording. Preferences become a problem of philosophy when the question is asked, Is one experience more valuable than another? or, What is truly valuable? Obviously, all possible experiences cannot have my attention; therefore, choices have to be made. Furthermore, many claims are made for this or that alternative.

1. Brightman, HL, 129. See also Art. (1942)^2, 3.
all of which cannot be "right" or "true", especially when contradictory assertions are proposed.

As Brightman sees it, the major problems which arise in any consistent philosophy of values may be summarized as follows: ¹

1. The psychology of valuation.
2. The identification and classification of values.
3. The criteria of values.
4. The relation of "is" and "ought."
5. The subjectivity and objectivity of values.
6. Value and personality.

Brightman treats the first problem under a brief discussion of the more or less classic psychological accounts of valuation, viz., the hedonistic, voluntaristic, formalistic, intuitive, and synoptic (or personalistic).² He acknowledges the element of truth in each of these theories, yet he feels that each is only a partial picture.

Hedonism attaches worth to feeling alone; voluntarism to realization of desire alone; formalism to rational will alone; intuitionism to immediate insight alone. Each neglects or underemphasizes actual aspects of the experience of value in its special interest in one aspect.

It is Brightman's view that the synoptic, or personalistic, theories of valuation do more justice to the total facts of

¹ Brightman, ITF, 143.
² Ibid., 143.
³ Ibid., 145.
experience—including consideration for the worth of all
the previous theories. Only a theory capable of embracing
the totality of a man's experience is axiologically satis-
factory, in Brightman's opinion. What such a theory implies
is brought out in subsequent discussion.

Of the problems which a discussion of axiology raises,
probably the most pragmatically pertinent has to do with
selection of ideals. The effort to discover criteria is
not merely an arbitrary exercise in philosophical exegesis;
it grows out of the need of meeting life's choices with some
guide, not only in the decisions which must be made but in
the voluntary election of values which will contribute to a
well-ordered life.¹

The necessity of finding some criterion for judging
values is made more acute when it is realized that the val-
ues which men hold determine the kind of life that they
live. Life and its ideal cannot be separated. There is
the continual conflict of ideals, "high and low, spiritual
and sensual, clear and vague, rational and irrational,"
all of which "seem to strive for the mastery of man's mind."²
To determine what ideals are true and good is not an easy
task, but if values are to be tested at all, Brightman

¹. In ML, 76, Brightman points out that acts of will re-
  flect both necessity and freedom. There is a certain
  "givenness" in most situations which makes a choice
  necessary, yet the choice of alternatives from the
  given situation reveals genuine freedom.
². Brightman, PI, 64.
enunciates two major principles of judgment without which there would be only axiological chaos. These two principles are coherence and respect for personality. They do not, of course, exhaust every possible aspect of value criteria, as Brightman's Moral Laws shows, but no other workable combination summarizes so well his over-all view of the bases of value judgment. These are the main pillars in his axiological structure.

a. Coherence.

Brightman defines coherence as "inclusive systematic consistency." It should be emphasized that by coherence he means more than any narrow syllogistic or formal type of reasoning. Its chief characteristics are inclusiveness and togetherness. While it is correct that true propositions must be consistent, consistency is not enough. Propositions may be consistent and be false. He says, therefore, that "any proposition is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently connected with our system of propositions as a whole."

As applied to axiology, a true value is one that coheres with the rest of experience. Just because a value is a value does not grant it immunity from the test of rational

1. To state the full ethical and axiological implications of his criteria would be to reproduce ML.
2. Brightman, ITP, 68. This is the sense in which he uses it throughout his writings. See also his lexicon definition, ITP, 323.
3. Ibid., 69.
wholeness. Values as well as any other area of experience must be tested by the most rigorous norms available. "Undefined and uncriticized values are no more valid than are undefined and uncriticized sense data."¹ The experience of the senses is notoriously misleading. Just as the data of sense must be continuously tested and corrected by the mind, so must values be harmoniously related to the criterion of truth itself. Nothing less will do than testing by all the facts available. The true value emerges only after judging "morally, scientifically, esthetically, religiously, rationally—in the light of our whole mind, our whole experience."² Each state in the republic of values may have certain autonomy, but "each state is subject to the federal constitution of reason."³

Whatever violates the norms of reason surely cannot be among the highest values, if a value at all, for it is the very nature of reason to want to see things in connection. "Reason is harmony, unity, order, wholeness, whenever it expresses itself, and through whatever medium."⁴ Reason is the synoptic vision of the mind. All facts, from whatever area of experience they emerge, must be seen in their relationship to the whole, or they are distorted, abstract,

¹ Brightman, Art. (1943), 221.
² Brightman, PI, 31.
⁴ Ibid., 122.
and untrue. Truth is a matter of maximum concreteness. That is why Brightman insists that "all truth claims regarding facts or values must be referred to the supreme court of reason, which alone has jurisdiction in cases of truth."\(^1\) If, after examination and criticism by the widest range of facts possible, a value-claim proves to be harmoniously related to the rest of experience,

then we treat it as a true value, just as we treat a scientific or philosophical hypothesis as true for the same reason; namely, that the conditions of coherence are fulfilled.\(^2\)

b. Principle of Respect for Personality.

As already shown in the previous chapter, Brightman's own works have gone a long way in supplying the lack of a personalistic axiology. Probably no other representative of modern personalism has done more to put value theory on the only sound basis possible, that is, empirical self-experience. Two principles reappear continuously throughout his value exposition, first, that all experience is self-experience and second, that values exist only in the experience of persons. These two propositions are succinctly described by Brightman himself in the following two statements. The first appears in a discussion of the "datum-self:"

The entire present self... is the present datum. The whole datum of any moment's concrete experience is the self of that moment, although

---

usually some aspects are selected from the
whole for special attention. This datum-self,
this present experience, is the only indubit-
able fact we have.\(^1\)

This might be well summarized in his saying that "the
person is what he experiences himself to be."\(^2\) The second
proposition, i. e., the indissoluble relation of person
and value, is expressed in Brightman's categorical opinion
that "where there is a person enjoying a preferred experi-
ence, there is a value; where there is no enjoying person
there is no value."\(^3\) In brief, no person, no value.

The definition of the empirical person and the neces-
sary axio-personal relationship are brought together in a
single impressive passage in his contribution to the co-
operative work, Freedom: Its Meaning, edited by Ruth
Anshen. He says:

The primary fact, from which all facts are
derived, which all theories interpret, and
from which all free action emanates, is the
fact of the total conscious situation which

---

1. Brightman, Art. (1929), 560-561. See also PI, Chapter I,
and his Art. (1950) for his full analysis of self. See
Max Otto, Art. (1929) for criticism of Brightman's datum
self. Otto says there that "anyone who claims that the
sole datum is individual mind faces the problem of solips-
sism," 499.

2. Brightman, PV, 15. This was an oft-repeated saying of his
in classroom lectures on the nature of the self. It never
failed to evoke considerable discussion, if not opposition.
He found that the notion of self in terms of "soul sub-
stance" rather than self-experience was a deeply embedded
belief and most difficult to eradicate from the minds of
students.

3. Brightman, Art. (1943), 220. See also PR, 17; SL, 44, 60,
165; Art. (1946), 371, where person is defined in terms
of ability to experience values.
is a person's present experience. In that experience, vision, insight, and synopsis are functions of the will to purpose values.

Even more specific is his statement that "the actual facts of experience, out of which all knowledge and belief arise, consist of personal consciousness including personal values." This view disassociates true value from any impersonal stuff. If there are values they exist in persons. Quantitatively speaking, this means that where there are more persons there are more values. Brightman allows full recognition to this possibility, saying that it is superficial not to recognize it. "A universe with more persons in it—and a principle of value at the heart of it—is more valuable than one with fewer persons in it." Persons are values; values are personal. "To approve or respect any value is to approve or respect persons in whom alone the values exist... All persons, then, are values." Here Brightman's criterion of respect for personality appears.

If "personality is the only intrinsic value we know or can conceive," as he contends, then it follows that the highest values are those which contribute the "most to the coherent functioning and organization of personality as

1. Brightman, Art. (1940), 492.
2. Brightman, PV, 25.
3. Brightman, FG, 189-190. Gordon H. Clark uses this position of Brightman's as a basis of attack on Brightman's doctrine of God. See CVMT.
4. Brightman, PV, 18.
a whole."1 This is the heart of personalism as Brightman understands it. "Personalism," he says, "is the belief that conscious personality is both the supreme value and the supreme reality in the universe."2 None of Brightman's works fail to exemplify the significance of this principle. It probably is the most oft-recurring theme in his articles, lectures, and private conversations. It is remarkable that regardless of the theme assigned to Brightman, whether contribution to a book, journal, or symposium, he managed to make persons and values central to his discussion. For example, in his University Lecture, Brightman points out that in the annual Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, although its participants differ on many things, there is "one principle on which there has been uniform agreement—the principle of respect for personality."3 Brightman's own major contributions to several of the annual symposia were in support of that principle. In his first paper, "The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments," he reiterates the point made above that "where persons are absent, value is absent."4 In his second paper, "Philosophical Ideas and Enduring Peace,"5 he makes respect for personality the key to peace and international under-

1. Brightman, ITP, 147.
2. Brightman, NV, 114.
standing. The following are his six major points:

1. Personality is the seat of value.
2. Personality idealizes.
3. Personality is free.
4. Personality is social.
5. Personality is growth through dialectical tensions.
6. Religious personality is rational love.

In his very powerful paper, "Autonomy and Theonomy," prepared for the Twelfth Symposium, as late as 1953, he makes the following his two basic postulates:

1. The relations of freedom and authority are functions of beliefs about values.

2. Theism is true.

In elaboration he combines the two postulates in the statement that "value experience...implies that one purpose of God—perhaps His basic intrinsic purpose—is the development of respect for persons."

Here one might ask, not disrespectfully, "What of it?" Brightman's own answer is that persons and values, whether recognized or not, constitute the basic "presuppositions of and evidences for science, and art, morality and religion."

---

3. Ibid., 475.
4. Ibid., 474.
5. Ibid., 476.
6. Brightman himself uses this question as the heading for the last section of his University Lecture, PY, 24.
This is a large claim to make, but how can it be controverted? Not even science, with its rigorous insistence on observation and measurement, can escape the personal equation without discrediting at the same time "its own observations, methods, and applications."¹ This is because the "personal reality is the only verifiable being"² in the universe; hence, to get away from it is to sacrifice basic empirical fact for less concrete data. The aim of all science, religion, philosophy, therefore should be directed toward the growth and preservation of personal values in the universe. Whatever does not so contribute, whether it be a naturalistic philosophy or dialectical materialism, is unworthy of human effort. "Civilization needs a philosophy of full and free and reasonable personality"³ for in personal experience is not only "the very stuff of which all value consists," but "also the criterion for all cultural achievements."⁴

Brightman's two basic criteria of value, i. e., coherence and the principle of respect for personality, have now been set forth. It remains to specify more directly what value means in the light of these standards. The two principles are forcefully united in Brightman's statement that "value is, in any given situation, the highest which

¹. Brightman, PV, 24.
². Ibid., 25.
⁴. Ibid., 26.
contributes most to the coherent functioning and organization of personality as a whole."1 Brightman would be quick to add that "this does not mean that we are to approve of every person as he is."2 If the principle did mean respect for personality, without qualification, then one would be obligated to respect the criminal as well as the district attorney. That would be a violation of the other principle, viz., coherence. The principle of respect does involve, nevertheless, a duty toward an incoherent personality. "It means to love him, not for what he is, but for what he may be, or even to love him as he is in order that he may become better."3 This introduces the social dimension. Coherent respect means active effort in the increase and conservation of those values in society which will contribute the most to all concerned. United, the two principles become a balanced and all-inclusive guide not only for the individual person in his quest for a principle of private judgment but in his total community relationships. In more religious language one might say that coherence and respect for personality become logos and agape, or united once more, rational love.4

2. Brightman, NV, 149.
3. Ibid., 149.
4. See Brightman, NV, 72, 137, 150.
B. Whitehead.

1. Basic Characteristics of Value.

The attempt to establish Whitehead's specific meaning of value is a problem in itself, involving more than a perfunctory reference to his definition, which could then be set up as a fixed guide-post to the more involved relationships of his value theory. If he had been careful to define, the purpose of this section would have been simply fulfilled, as in the case of Brightman, by a careful stating of his definition; but unfortunately this is not the case. Probably the best that can be done in lieu of specific definition is to set forth some of the basic characteristics of his concept, and then proceed to some of the distinctions that he makes. This is not to imply that an exercise in Whitehead's value theory is a forced enterprise; to set forth any aspect of Whiteheadian doctrine calls for a high measure of selectivity and discrimination, and probably to a special degree in the axiological phase of his thought.

a. Preliminary Definition.

The nearest that Whitehead comes to giving a specific definition is found in his _Science and the Modern World_, where he says: "Value is the word I use for the
intrinsic reality of an event." What this statement fully means involves the whole of his metaphysical thought, the exposition of which is not within the proposed limits of this study. In lieu of such elaboration, the next best alternative is a survey of his doctrine of actual entities. To understand their function is to understand his cosmology. Some statement of their meaning is necessary at this point, not only as a basis for explaining the more inclusive term "event" in relation to value, but as a needed introduction to much of the subsequent exposition.

b. Actual Entities.

Two of Whitehead's definitions suggest the function of actual entities:

First, "'actual entities'—also termed 'actual occasions'—are the final real things of which the world is made up."  

Second, "each actual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data."  

The first definition shows the relation of actual entities to Whitehead's metaphysical system. Beyond actual

---

1. Whitehead, SMW, 95. Shahan calls this and the connecting passage Whitehead's first reference to value. See his WTE, 71. If he means it literally, then he overlooks scattered references, e.g., 18, 26, and especially Whitehead's inclusion of value as one of the six notions with which a philosophy of organism must be concerned, 89. There is also the key value passage in BN, 5, written five or six years earlier.
2. Whitehead, PR, 27.
3. Ibid., 65.
entities there is nothing; they constitute the ultimate reality. Even "God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space."¹

The second definition becomes more explicit with Whitehead's explanation that the "essence of an actual entity consists solely in the fact that it is a prehending thing."² To prehend is to feel. The reality of an actual entity consists in its feeling of the data that are there for it, and those data are other actual entities. An actual entity does not exist by itself, as a stuff or a substance;³ it arises "out of data", i.e., it gets what it "wants" from the various elements in its environment, all of which form a unity which is the actual entity.

Whitehead's metaphysical system is revealed at once as a vast "relational complex"⁴ of mutually prehending entities. It is an organism consisting of "entwined prehensive unities,"⁵

Some of the key terms associated with actual entities are concrecence, prehension, eternal objects, satisfaction, subject-superject, perishing, and objectivity. What each

---

¹. Whitehead, PR, 28.
². Ibid., 65.
³. Whitehead repudiates the traditional doctrine of substance explainable in terms of subject-predicate, PR, viii.
⁴. Whitehead, PR, 321.
⁵. Ibid., 163.
⁶. Whitehead, SMW, 85. Of his SMW Whitehead said: "I would term the doctrine of these lectures, the history of organic mechanism." 81.
of these means will be treated briefly.

**Concrecence.** This is the term applied to the coming together of the elements which make up the actual entity. The whole metaphysical ongoing of the universe is a continuous process of building up "novel togetherness" by prehensions of the many data. Everything in the universe is a possible element in a new concrecence, i.e., "it is a potential for every 'becoming'."² How an item from data becomes a part of the new unity has, potentially, many possible forms, but what it becomes is determined by the concrecence itself. Whitehead speaks of the "mode of implication."³ Until the item is received into the concrecence its "mode" is indeterminate, but "the indetermination /is/ rendered determinate in the real concrecence."⁴ When the building-up reaches its full determination or culmination the concrecence is then complete and takes the name of an actual entity.⁵ "'Actuality' means nothing else

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 32.
2. Ibid., 33.
3. Ibid., 33. One pauses to wonder how an actual entity can exercise such prerogatives as it seems to do in the process of concrecence, when the actual entity emerges from the concrecence. How an actual entity can have feeling when it arises out of feeling, has bothered several commentators on Whitehead. See Urban, Art. (1941), 316; and Johnson, Art. (1945), 292.
4. Whitehead, PR, 34.
5. Literally, the terms concrecence and actual entity are not synonymous, since the former refers more to the developmental and the latter to the satisfaction stage of the concrecence, which then becomes a datum for a new concrecence. The full concrecence, however, is the actual entity, and Whitehead identifies them in at least one place, PR, 321.
than this ultimate entry into the concrete."¹

**Prehension.** "Actual entities involve each other by reason of their prehensions of each other."² Prehensions are feelings, but not in the sense of the experience of sensation or emotion. A feeling is the affective response of a concrescence to other entities. What another entity is, is a positive feeling in the first entity.³ That is to say that the only content of any prehensive unity or actual entity consists in elements from other entities—and these are feelings. In brief, prehension is the feeling of other feelings.⁴ It follows that where there is no feeling there is no actual entity. What has been said does not rule out negative prehensions, which refer to the feeling of exclusion aroused by not being a positive element in a concrescence.⁵ An actual entity, therefore, feels every other entity in the universe, either positively or negatively. "There is no irrelevance."⁶ Prehensions are also physical and conceptual,⁷ or bipolar.⁸ When an actual entity prehends an eternal object,⁹ the feeling for that eternal object is said to be conceptual.¹⁰

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 321.
2. Ibid., 29.
3. Ibid., 66.
4. Ibid., 322.
5. Ibid., 66.
7. Whitehead, PR, 35.
8. Ibid., 165.
9. Eternal objects are described immediately below.
entities are felt, the feeling is said to be physical.¹

Eternal objects. Whitehead calls an eternal object a "pure potential for the specific determination of fact,"² a definition which is given some elucidation by saying that "any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an 'eternal object'."³ This is tantamount to saying that they do not exist, since only actual entities are real. Nevertheless, they are, since "everything must be somewhere,"⁴ and the "somewhere" for eternal objects is "the non-temporal actual entity,"⁵ i. e., God, who continually envisages the realm of eternal objects.⁶ As potentials, eternal objects are indeterminate possibilities waiting for actualization in some concretizing process, e. g., round, blue, sweet. "Blue" is only a potential until there is a blue pen, a blue sky. Eternal objects are said to "ingress" actual entities or to become actualized in them by "ingression."⁷ The chief function of an eternal

1. Whitehead, PR, 35. The feeling of eternal objects by actual entities seems to go against the view that only other actual entities are felt. For an excellent review of this and related problems, see Hall's article, "Of What Use are Whitehead's Eternal Objects?", Art. (1930).
2. Whitehead, PR, 32.
3. Ibid., 70. Cf. Whitehead's discussion on "vector character", PR, 38, 133.
4. Ibid., 73.
5. Ibid., 73. See also RM, 90.
6. Ibid., 70. These eternal objects are closely related to the Platonic forms or ideas, but Whitehead chooses rather to use his own terms to avoid "misleading suggestions," PR, 70.
7. Ibid., 39.
object lies in its capacity as a "conceptual lure for feeling." Interpreted, this means that "what an actual entity might be" is held out in front as a goal in guiding the process of concrescence. An eternal object is the bait held out by God to induce new actualities. Here lies the secret of process and progress in Whitehead's cosmological scheme. God envisages infinite potentialities for process which in his "plan" he wishes to have actualized in the order of nature. The taking of the lure by an actual entity constitutes the beginning of a new concrescence, which will make one more step forward in the teleological process.

Satisfaction. In describing the process of concrescence the meaning of satisfaction could not but be implied. Satisfaction "is the final phase in the process of concrescence, constituting an actual entity." The final phase is reached when there "is one complex, fully determined feeling." How the process begins and what determines the satisfaction are the major problems here. To state them briefly, the actual entity is initiated by God, but after

1. Whitehead, PR, 131.
2. Closely related is the notion of appetition, which Whitehead describes as an element of unrest or urge within an actual entity towards "realization of what is not and may be," PR, 47, 48. In PR, 26, he says that "the connection of immediate fact with the future resides in its appetition."
3. Whitehead, PR, 39.
4. Ibid., 38.
5. Ibid., 374.
"creation" it is "responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency." What the satisfaction is which determines the end of the process is more difficult. Whitehead points out that "there is a succession of phases" in the concrescent process, in which new feelings are added to the already existing "integration of prehensions." These are absorbed, or made a part of the process which continues "till all the prehensions are components in the one determinate integral satisfaction." This statement is elaborated in later discussion to mean that the culmination of the process comes only when there is established "a completely determinate bond with every item in the universe." This means that when feelings of all other actual entities are felt in a prehensive unity, either positively or negatively, then the concrescence reaches satisfaction and stops. Satisfaction "closes up the entity."

Subject-Superject. The distinction must be made between an actual entity as the "subject" or feelings and the consequent entity which exists at the point of satisfaction. An actual entity is a subject in that it feels. The

1. Whitehead, PR, 135. Concrescences as causa sui yet initiated by God pose a genuine antinomy for resolution, a problem recognized and discussed in a later chapter.
2. Ibid., 39.
3. Ibid., 39.
4. Ibid., 71.
5. Ibid., 129.
6. Ibid., 35, 89.
principle by which feelings are directed toward satisfaction is the "subjective aim" of the entity. It is "the subject itself determining its own self-creation as one creature."¹ The manner in which, or "how that subjectprehends" a datum is known as the subjective form of the entity.² Johnson calls it the "attitude" which is taken toward a datum.³ Whiteshead uses such terms as "emotions, valuations, purposes, aversions, consciousness,"⁴ as examples of subjective form.

By using the term subject, however, Whiteshead does not wish to imply a substance which has feelings.⁵ The subject is the integration of feelings itself, and has no other existence. The concept of "an actual entity as the un-changing subject of change is completely abandoned."⁶ The subject is the unity at whatever stage the concrescence or actual entity is. But the "actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences."⁷ That is, as a unity it serves as the home base for other feelings, but when all the runs are in, it is the total score, the reality of all the runs in one concrescence, the

¹. Whiteshead, PR, 108.
². Ibid., 35.
⁴. Whiteshead, PR, 35.
⁵. See Whiteshead's list of repudiations, including the "subject-predicate form of expression," PR, viii. See also SMW, 54, where he says that "substance and quality afford another instance of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness."
⁶. Whiteshead, PR, 43.
⁷. Ibid., 43.
superject. As the resultant unity of its own feelings, the actual entity "has become a being" and joins the world of other actualities to become itself a new potential for other becomings, while its own subjective existence is no more.

Whitehead contrasts his subject-superject concept with the method of Kant. For the latter, the external world was a construct of the mind, "the world emerges from the subject"; for the philosophy of organism the world supplies the data for the growth of actual entities, "the subject emerges from the world." In brief, for Kant the world proceeds from subjectivity to objectivity; for Whitehead from objectivity to subjectivity.

Perishing. What is the status of an actual entity once it achieves its satisfaction? It is Whitehead's view that actual entities are "perpetually perishing." The point at which they perish is the ultimate moment of satisfaction. "In the organic philosophy an actual entity has 'perished' when it is complete." When the actual entity has made determinate, or actual, all its potential feelings for every other item in the universe, then, like the dying Frenchman who lived only long enough to see Paris, it perishes.

1. Whitehead, PR, 71.
2. Ibid., 135.
3. Ibid., 136.
4. Ibid., 43. He borrowed the term from Locke.
5. Ibid., 138.
**Objectivity.** Paradoxically, perishing does not mean that the feelings which, in unity, constitute the actual entity have gone out of existence. The actual entity perishes in that it loses its own immediacy as *that* actual entity,¹ but it passes over into the prehensions of other entities, thus achieving what Whitehead calls "objectivity." Objectification "refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual entity."² It gains not only objectivity but immortality. "The creature perishes and is immortal."³ Objectivity is the reverse of prehension. The transition from subjectivity to objectivity involves the doctrine of inheritance.⁴ Actual entities inherit from one another. What actual entity A loses by perishing, i.e., through objectification, actual entity B includes subjectively. The process is more than a temporal sequence, however, since all inheritance is predicated upon a basic interrelatedness among all actual entities. Where there is "a single line of inheritance" maintained from "generation to generation" it is known as an "enduring object,"⁵ which may take the form of "personal order."⁶ Whitehead also speaks of "an enduring personality in the temporal world" which he

1. Whitehead, PR, 130. "Completion is the perishing of immediacy: 'It never really is.'³
2. Ibid., 35.
3. Ibid., 126.
4. See Ibid., 51, 373.
5. Ibid., 51.
6. Ibid., 50, 163.
defines as "a route of occasions in which the successors with some peculiar completeness sum up their predecessors." 1

To give the whole "case history" of an actual entity is practically to reproduce Process and Reality. Only enough has been given to illuminate further discussion. To summarize: Actual entities are the basic realities of the universe. They come together in prehensive unities known as concrescences, which, when they have reached satisfaction, perish; but in perishing they become objectified in other entities which perpetuate what has been already attained. An actual entity is a subject, but it becomes a superject when it transcends its own experiences. Progress in the world is traceable to eternal objects which are lures for feeling.

c. Events.

The description, now, of an event is made possible. Event is more inclusive than the term actual entity, which Whitehead describes as a "limiting type of an event with only one member." 2 An event, on the other hand, usually refers to a "nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum." 3 An event is "the grasping into unity of a pattern of aspects." 4 It is Whitehead's substitute for the term "thing", which

1. Whitehead, PR, 531.
2. Ibid., 115.
3. Ibid., 115. See also 352.
4. Whitehead, SMW, 121.
in the commonly understood sense does not exist for him. There are only events, or assemblages of ingredients in a apatic-temporal unity; but an event is not a mere assemblage: 1 it is a unity of data into one pattern. 2 Reality consists in events and nothing else. But reality is a process. Events are born, live, and pass on.

Nature is a process of expansive development, necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension. What is achieved is thereby passed beyond, but it is also retained as having aspects of itself present to prehensions which lie beyond it. 3 Each event has a history, present, past, and future. It relates to the present in that it reflects "the modes of its contemporaries;" the past in that it preserves in its own structure the "modes of its predecessors"; and it "anticipates" the future in the sense that "an event mirrors within itself such aspects as the future throws back on to the present." 4 In the language of Process and Reality, an

1. Whitehead, SMW, 74.
2. In discussion Whitehead sometimes equates event with actual occasion, actual entity, or concrescence. In SMW for exposition purposes he makes prehension synonymous with event, but minimizes "the awkward term prehension" in favor of event, 74. In later writing, however, particularly PR, event is used very little, while prehension is the favored term. When he does use event in PR, it usually is as defined above.
3. Whitehead, SMW, 73, 74. The doctrine of objectification or immortality is most fully developed in PR. For all Whitehead's confessed ignorance of Hegel, does not this bear close resemblance to Hegel's concept of aufgehoben? See Whitehead's "Autobiographical Notes" in Schilpp, PANW, 7.
event is "a definite fact with a date."\(^1\) It may be thought of as an occurrence, or maybe as a pulse beat of reality having a definite locale in time and space. Now value is the inherent or intrinsic reality of such an event as already quoted at the beginning of the discussion. "Event" is not quite strong enough to express exactly what the full reality of the patterned unity is in its realization. The poets have shown that reality is poetic.\(^2\) There must be something, therefore, to give fuller expression to the "element which permeates through and through the poetic view of nature."\(^3\) Whitehead calls it value.

Remembering the poetic rendering of our concrete experience, we see at once that the element of value, of being valuable, of having value, of being an end in itself, of being something which is for its own sake, must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual something.\(^4\)

In the above quotation from Science and the Modern World, value is seen as the most concrete actual something. The full force of what he means emerges a few sentences later when he says: "Realization...is in itself the attainment of value." Passing to Process and Reality, where

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 352.
2. See Whitehead's chapter, "The Romantic Reaction", SMW, 75-96. Whitehead's theme is "that the nature-poetry of the romantic revival was a protest on behalf of the organic view of nature, and also a protest against the exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact," SMW, 96.
3. Whitehead, SMW, 95.
4. Ibid., 95.
the term prehension, as noted above, replaces Whitehead’s use of event, Whitehead retains his emphasis on the locus of value in the self-realization of actual occasions. It is the coming to fulfillment or the "attainment of the private ideal which is the final cause of the concrescence."¹

Value is actuality, but it is private experience. In the process of prehensive unification "the many feelings, derivatively felt as alien, are transformed into a unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately felt as private."²

Or more emphatically identifying the meaning of actuality, "self-realization is the ultimate fact of facts. An actuality is self-realizing, and whatever is self-realizing is an actuality."³

R. M. Millard states succinctly what Whitehead means by value in the following:

The attainment of intrinsic value is the attainment of an integrated unity of feeling ...

²Intrinsic value for Whitehead could well be described as the attainment or self-realization of an ideal, divine in origin, in an integrated complex feeling unity which in its very attainment is self-transcending.⁴

This is undoubtedly the basic meaning which Whitehead attaches to the term value during the period of the systematic elaboration of his metaphysics of value, embraced,

---
¹ Whitehead, PR, 323.
² Ibid., 323.
³ Ibid., 340.
⁴ Millard, PVWT, 242.
primarily, by *Process and Reality*. It is the meaning which is assumed in all subsequent discussion in this dissertation, although a late development in Whitehead's thought must be taken into consideration.

Millard has made a strong case for a secondary theory of value in the last phase of Whitehead's thought, basically in "Mathematics and the Good," and "Immortality." He shows that Whitehead's emphasis moves away from the identification of fact and value in *Process and Reality* to a world of subsistent, Platonic forms which tend to become the locus of value instead of the world of actual entities or events.

In a sense Whitehead's value theory has completely reversed itself in this final phase. No longer can it be said that for Whitehead no bifurcation exists between fact and value. Not only are fact and value bifurcated, they tend to stand in extreme polar opposition.

Millard bases his interpretation on such passages as the following:

Creativity involves the production of value-experience, by the inflow from the infinite into the finite.

The World which emphasizes Persistence is the World of Value. Value is in its nature

2. Ibid., especially Chapter VI, "The Final Phase."
timeless and immoxtatel. The immediacy of some mortal circumstance is only valuable because it shares in the immortality of some value. 1

In these passages, and others throughout, Whitehead has at least added ambiguity to his concept of value. It is to be regretted that the last and most sustained account of value—although comparatively brief—in Whitehead's writings should also be the occasion for a change in emphasis, especially as his famous Ingersoll Lecture might well be only an over-emphasis on what appears to be a Platonic predilection throughout the whole of his metaphysical writings.

Granted that Whitehead has bifurcated fact and value in the sense that he sees a World of Value above the world of events, occasions, prehensions, concrescences, i.e., the world of fact or value in Science and the Modern World and Process and Reality—granting this, Whitehead still insists on the essential meaninglessness of the World of Value without the World of Fact.

The value inherent in the Universe has an essential independence of any moment of time; and yet it loses its meaning apart from its necessary reference to the World of passing fact. Value refers to Fact, and Fact refers to Value. 2

Whitehead is very Platonic when he says that "value is in

2. Ibid., 684.
its nature timeless and immortal \(^1\) but he soon departs from the Platonic axiom when he insists that "Value refers to Fact, and Fact refers to Value." \(^2\) It is doubtful if Whitehead altogether intends to remove value from its locus in the world of fact, although he does put an exaggerated emphasis on the "subsistent, unchanging, eternal, static objectivity of values" \(^3\) in his Ingersoll Lecture. It could be, nevertheless, that by his World of Value in the Lecture he still means to refer only to what is possible for actualization. And even possibility must be somewhere, which for Whitehead can mean only another actual entity, in this case God. \(^4\) In the light of the increased Platonic emphasis, however, it will be necessary to keep clearly in mind what Whitehead's primary value emphasis is, viz., that value consists in the self-realization of actual occasions. In his axio-metaphysical writings this is the paramount meaning assigned to value, both implicit and explicit. A few other aspects of value should be noted briefly before passing to the problem of criteria.

d. Limitation.

The concept of limitation adds to the meaning of value. Every event per se is the realization of value, \(^5\) "but there

---

1. Whitehead, Art. (1941) \(^2\), 684.
2. Ibid. At this point the editor of PANW has added in brackets: "This statement is a direct contradiction to Plato, and the theological tradition derived from him."
5. But this does not mean that every event is good.
is no such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of limitation."¹ This is to say that "an event has value because it has a finite structure."² An actual entity represents a selection of data from the environment to form a harmonious togetherness. Without the limitation of selection there would be only indefinite homogeneity. To exist at all is to be limited, or to possess pattern, whether God or a value.³ "All value," says Whitehead in "Mathematics and the Good," "is the gift of finitude which is the necessary condition for activity."⁴ But form or pattern, although one of the most basic conditions of value in Whitehead's thought, is not in itself the value. The "emphasis on the rôle of pattern as a condition of value," says Goheen, "must be corrected by reference to the concrete event."⁵ This brings the discussion back to the oft-repeated assertion that value is in the experience of realization, or, as Goheen says, in the "activity" of an event pattern. Value, therefore, must fulfill at least two "general ontological conditions,"⁶ i. e., pattern, without which there would be vague boundlessness, and

¹ Whitehead, SMW, 95. In RM, 103, he says it this way: "There is no such thing as bare value. There is always a specific value, which is the created unit of feeling arising out of the specific mode of concretion of the diverse elements."
² Goheen, Art. (1941), 438.
³ Whitehead, RM, 183. Also AI, 375.
⁴ Whitehead, Art. (1941)¹, 674.
⁵ Goheen, Art. (1941), 439.
⁶ Ibid., 439.
activity, or realization. "Infinitude in itself is meaningless and valueless. It acquires meaning and value by its embodiment of finite entities."

e. Values and Persons.

Again, there is the fuller realization of values in personal identity. Whitehead expresses variously his meaning of person and personality. He says that "a living nexus...may support a thread of personal order along some historical route of its members;" again, that "the enduring personality is the historic route of living occasions which are severally dominant in the body at successive instants;" or more briefly and simply, he speaks of "enduring objects with personalorder." The person is Whitehead's answer to the question, "Can we find any general character of the World of Fact which expresses its adjustment for the embodiment of Value?" It is the characteristic of person that it retains in its present immediacy a self-identity with its own past.

The one individual is that coordinated stream of personal experiences, which is my thread.

1. Whitehead, Art. (1941)1, 674.
2. See the middle sections of the Ingersoll Lecture. The relation of personality and value is treated later, but it is mentioned here as contributory to the delineation of value meaning.
3. Whitehead, PR, 163.
4. Ibid., 162.
5. Ibid., 244.
6. Whitehead, Art. (1941)2, 688. He is using "Value" here in his later, Platonic sense; but still it has meaning only by its embodiment in finite entities. Cf. above and Art. (1941)1, 674.
of life or your thread of life. It is that succession of self-realization, each occasion with its direct memory of its past and with its anticipation of the future. That claim to enduring self-identity is our self-assertion of personal identity.¹

With such strong emphasis on "enduring self-identity" it is readily seen how the person becomes the key to the realization and continuance of certain achieved values in the actual world.

Some of the vital relationships between persons and values are brought out by McEwen in his study of "the meaning and growth of a human individual" in the light of Whitehead's metaphysics.² The problem as he sees it is whether or not

such empirical capacities as memory of the past, ideal-value realizations in the present, and reflective anticipations of the future exhibit a purposive integration of given emotional experiences into an achieved organic whole.³

On the lower organic levels of experience there is response to environment, but it is unreflective, not having achieved the conscious cooperation with God which appears to be the sine qua non for the purposive growth of a human person. That McEwen does find a "purposive integration" on the conscious level adds strength to the view of this paper that

1. Whitehead, MT, 221-222.
2. McEwen, WMI. Cf. also, ES.
3. McEwen, ES, 215. Cf. also, WMI, 102, where he defines the "concrete growth of a human individual."
value realization comes to its highest expression in the personal order of existence. The rôle of values in the process of self-determination is indicated in the following:

The creative synthesis of self-determination is attained through the purposive realization of ideal values. By virtue of this self-creation the present experience of a human individual is causally independent of the interconnection of his existential environment.¹

How the person grows and becomes a partner with God in the production of value is brought out in the following:

God...is not a transcendent creator, since he does not produce the creative process itself. Nevertheless, no human individual could come into being by virtue of its self-causation were it not for God's integrating activity with regard to eternal objects. In this cooperative process of creation, a human self is being created at every moment of his temporal growth; for self-causation interacts with and derives its content from the wisdom of God's immanent purpose, 'which is the attainment of value in the temporal world.'²

Here McEwen pays his respects to the problem which emerges throughout Whitehead's writings, particularly Process and Reality, viz., the relationship between the divine causality and the self-creation of individuals. The simple answer is that it is a cooperative effort as McEwen states. The important thing is that there is a process which does attain to conscious self-identity through "the purposive realization of ideal values."³

¹ McEwen, WMI, 283.
² Ibid., 177-178. See also Whitehead, RIM, 100.
³ McEwen, WMI, 283.
f. Coordination.

Once more, and without doing violence to his own language, Whitehead, like Brightman, emphasizes the inter-penetration of values. One would expect this from his metaphysics. There are no isolated facts in Whitehead's universe, least of all independent and unrelated values. Where Sorley refers to "comprehensiveness", Laird to "commingling", Everett and Brightman to "interpenetration" of values, Whitehead speaks of "coordination."

He speaks of peace as a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of "some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet momentous in its coordination of values."

Millard says that "no intrinsic values and thus no occasion can be considered apart from the community of which it forms a part." This suggests an interrelation of or community of values which find their highest realization only in conjunction with other values. In isolation there is evil, or at least failure to contribute to the harmonious grouping of occasions which make up the totality of existence.

In brief summary, values are seen to be the intrinsic realizations of actual entities; limitation or pattern constitutes a basic condition for value, otherwise there is

---

1. Sorley, MVID, 100.
2. Laird, IV, 362.
3. Everett, MV, 183; Brightman, ITP, 183.
meaningless infinitude. In persons there is fuller realization of values, and stabilization. There is a community of values.

2. Criteria.

In Whitehead's thought the standards by which the presence of value is determined are somewhat different from Brightman's criteria. A true value for Brightman is a preferred liking after being judged by norms of thought and personality. For Whitehead value is a condition or function of an integrated unity of feelings at their moment of realization. "Realization...is in itself the attainment of value."¹ Criteria, therefore, find more application in determining the kind and how of realization than in an estimation of worth. Three terms seem to gather up most of the material relevant to the measurement or determination of value, viz., intensity, harmony, stability.²

A necessary introduction to these three concepts lies in some elaboration of Whitehead's use of "valuation" as a function of organisms. He defines valuation as "the subjective

---

¹ Whitehead, SMW, 95.
² Whitehead uses quite a variety of terminology in making qualitative statements about axiology, e.g., adaptation, unity, emphasis, importance, relevance, et al., but these are all related to the concepts selected above. See Millard's list of the "categories of importance", PVWT, 175.
form of a conceptual feeling,"\(^1\) while a conceptual feeling is the prehension of an eternal object.\(^2\) An eternal object is a potential for realization in actual entities.\(^3\) When an actual entity prehends conceptually there is always awakened a contrast between the present status of the subject and what it can be.\(^4\) Valuation is how the actual entity feels about the potentiality implied in the eternal object as a possibility for realization. A subject may be favorable or unfavorable toward the conceptual feeling, or it may eliminate it entirely from consideration.\(^5\) The function of valuation is the introduction into the world of "creative purpose."\(^6\) Here the rôle of God in valuation is implied. He alone has "complete envisagement of eternal objects,"\(^7\) which he holds out as lures to actual entities according to his own conceptual valuation of the relevance for that particular entity or society of entities. It is the function of God to effect the conjunction of "barren... abstract potentialities" with "ideal realization."\(^8\)

He is the actual entity in virtue of which the entire multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its graded relevance to each stage of concrescence.

2. Ibid., 40.
3. Ibid., 70.
4. Ibid., 367.
5. "Actualities have to be felt, while the pure potentials can be dismissed," PR, 366.
6. Ibid., 380.
7. Ibid., 70.
8. Ibid., 64. In RM, 150, he says: "The purpose of God is the attainment of value in the temporal world."
Apart from God, there could be no relevant novelty. Whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision, arises first conceptually, and is transmuted into the physical world.¹

There is no doubt in such passages that the origination of the aim of actual entities is God's prerogative, but the rôle of the subject as "autonomous master of its own concrescence"² must always be kept in mind. God grades the relevance of potentialities for various types of organisms, but there is no value until potentials are realized in actual events.

"The actuality is the value."³ Now how is value measured? The answer lies in the three terms suggested above.

a. Intensity.

In the formation or prehensive union of the feelings which make up an actual entity, how eternal objects—in this case value potentials—are received into the datum indicates the relative importance of that potential for the new concrescence.⁴ Each component of the concrescence will have

---

2. Ibid., 374. Ever-present in Whitehead is the antinomy between God's monopoly of origination and the autonomous subject. This problem is considered later and a solution offered.
4. The values which contribute to the concrescent process of an actual entity may be viewed as instrumental as over against the intrinsic reality of the event itself. Millard says: "The nature of instrumental value follows from the consideration of intrinsic value. Anything contributing to the becoming of an event is an instrumental value. Thus the whole realm of possibility or ideality has instrumental but not intrinsic value. But so also do all other events have instrumental value to the becoming of any one event," PVWT, 164.
its subjective form or "attitude" to every potential that is presented for ingestion, but it is the conceptual pole of the "integrated datum...with its pattern of intensiveness"\(^1\) which ultimately places an evaluation upon every element in the datum.

According as the valuation of the conceptual feeling is a 'valuation up' or a 'valuation down', the importance of the eternal object as felt in the integrated feeling is enhanced or attenuated. Thus the valuation is both qualitative, determining how the eternal object is to be utilized, and is also intensive, determining what importance that utilization is to assume.\(^2\)

The intensity of feeling generated in a concrescence by the presence of any component is thus seen to be an indicator of the evaluation or relative importance of that datum.

Here is where actual entities exercise supreme dominion. They may receive value possibilities with intense feelings or they may show no "enthusiasm" at all, in which case the force of the potential is attenuated or eliminated altogether.\(^3\)

One might reasonably wonder at this point what it is that regulates the intensity of the subjective form. Is it arbitrary aversion or adversion?\(^4\) If the answer were yes, there could be no consistent relevance. "The ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 368.
2. Ibid., 368.
3. Ibid., 366.
4. Aversion is "valuation downward." Adversion is "valuation upward." See PR, 368.
which creative order depends" would be impossible. The right answer is that valuation is "the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determining what it is itself integrally to be." The aim determines what potentials shall be admitted to efficiency, but the intensity of feeling in the subject is the actual clue to the measure of relevancy and importance for that concrescence. Aversions and adversions are decisions; decisions are judgments. By such judgments irrelevant data are excluded and relative data brought together. "Judgment is a process of unification. It involves the necessary relevance of values to each other." A more inclusive guide is thereby suggested.

b. Harmony.

Intensity of subjective form is indicative of valuation in the earlier stages of unification of entities. What the final concrescence becomes is a product of both aim and intensity. "The objective datum is the perspective of the initial datum." This is to say that the importance of any feeling in the concrescence is revealed only by the total perspective of the becoming subject, the end of which is harmony. The concrescent process towards satisfaction is a series of adjustments, both in the internal structure of

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 48.
2. Ibid., 369.
3. Ibid., 388.
5. Whitehead, PR, 338.
the subject and in relation to its environment in the
direction of "harmonious compatibility."¹ This is the
nearest that Whitehead comes to a value criterion based
on coherence, which applies, however, only in the cases of
the higher organisms. In his view it is a sign of growing
consciousness when coherent adjustments take place. Ad-
version and aversion are definite indications of a height-
ened intellectuality.

It is the mark of a high-grade organism to
eliminate, by negative prehension, the ir-
relevant accidents in its environment, and
to elicit massive attention to every variety
of systematic order.²

Whitehead adds that "for this purpose, the category of
transmutation is the master-principle."³ Transmutation is
the feeling of community based on the recognition of anal-
egous elements in the conjoining entities of a nexus.⁴
Where this feeling exists there is harmony, a concept which
Whitehead makes one of his nine categorial obligations.⁵
By this category "the conceptual feelings are mutually de-
termined by their adaptation to be joint elements in a
satisfaction aimed at by the subject."⁶ Closely related
to harmony is the notion of balance, which he defines as

¹. Whitehead, PR, 362.
². Ibid., 483. See also 389, 399. For Whitehead's use of
    coherence as a criterion of truth, see where he speaks
    of the coherent relation of a proposition with its nexus.
    "This coherence is its truth," PR, 414.
³. Ibid., 483.
⁴. See Whitehead, PR, 383, 384, 388.
⁵. Ibid., 40.
⁶. Ibid., 389.
"the adjustment of identities for the introduction of contrast with the avoidance of inhibitions by incompatibilities."1 Harmony and balance are thus seen to be the chief attributes of aesthetic fact. Harmony is not necessarily sameness; it is, rather, compatibility which allows for contrast. Balance is the feeling of harmonic contrast with the inhibiting influence of actual incompatibility eliminated. Growing from his view of harmony is his fascinating account of beauty, which he defines as "the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience,"2 or again as "the perfection of Harmony."3 The latter expression he describes "in terms of the perfection of Subjective Form in detail and in final synthesis."4 The aesthetic harmony achieved is at once the locus and measure of value. On this basis is the fulfillment of purpose in total experience to be judged, and it entails the notion of moral responsibility.5

c. Stability.

Whitehead's system must provide for a mode of existence by or through which certain values can be achieved and maintained, or his theory fails at a crucial point. Some

1. Whitehead, PR, 425. The notion of evil is suggested here. How incompatibilities and inhibitions are treated receives full attention in the chapter on disvalue.
2. Whitehead, AI, 324.
3. Ibid., 325.
4. Ibid., 325.
5. Whitehead, PR, 389, 390.
structured societies of occasions, i. e., "crystals, rocks, planets, and suns" maintain an identity through thousands of years, never arriving at the levels of organic life where higher types of value—levels beyond mere repetition—are realized. The answer to fuller realization lies in the enhanced intensity of feeling arising from contrast between inheritance and novel effect...It has the weight of repetition, the intensity of contrast, and the balance between the two factors of the contrast.  

It is in Personal Identity that values find their outstanding exemplification of realization and constancy. How stability is achieved is seen in the following:  

A whole sequence of actual occasions, each with its own present immediacy, is such that each occasion embodies in its own being the antecedent members of that sequence with an emphatic experience of the self-identity of the past in the immediacy of the present. This is the realization of personal identity.  

The worlds of permanence and activity, repetition and novelty, find synthesis in this identity which is a form of emphasis amid the endless detail of the world of passing fact. "The confusion of variety is transformed into the coördinated unity of a dominant character." Whitehead calls

1. Whitehead, PR, 155.  
2. Ibid., 426.  
3. See previous discussion above in section e on persons and values. See also PR, 163, 164.  
5. Ibid., 690.
this achievement "the essence of art and moral purpose." 1
Without the emphasis or dominance or unity achieved by personal identity "the World of Fact would dissolve into the nothingness of confusion." 2 Art, morality, the whole social structure, civil law, are all based upon it, even though the notion of personal identity is difficult as he admits. But we cannot dismiss it, he adds, "without dismissing the whole of human thought as expressed in every language." 3

To summarize briefly: Value is recognized by the intensity of the feeling of a subject for the components in its own concrecence judged according to the perspective or subjective aim of the growing subject. A more inclusive test is found in the harmony of entities not only in the internal structure of a given nexus but with the total environment. The highest test of value lies in its ability to achieve stabilization. There are "grades of dominance and grades of recessiveness" 4 but "the extreme example of the sustained realization of a type of value" is personality. 5 Some further amplification of these concepts is made in the following discussion on the possibility of a table of values.

1. Whitehead, Art. (1941) 2, 690.
2. Ibid., 690.
3. Ibid.; 690.
4. Ibid.; 691.
5. Ibid.; 690. There can be little doubt that Whitehead means personal identity as exemplified by human persons. He uses terms like "man" and "human beings" and his illustration of identity through change is a human situation. See ibid., 689, 690. Whether or not God is another example of personality is discussed in a later chapter.
In the light of the criteria whether or not a table of values, comparable to Brightman's scale, can be constructed from Whitehead's thought is a problem which receives little attention in the literature.\textsuperscript{1} The chief reason for the lack is due, primarily, to Whitehead's own failure to make explicit the principles on which such a table could be formulated. It is probable, however, that in the discussion above we have the best clue to a possible scale. In keeping with Whitehead's central exposition of value, values are individual realizations, but it does no violence to his view to suggest that there are levels of realization. His chapter on "the higher phases of experience" seems to make that clear.\textsuperscript{2} There, it is the element of consciousness—which is the ability to distinguish between theory and fact, or the ability to contrast what is with what might be\textsuperscript{3}—which makes a fuller type of realization possible. Only in the higher organisms does consciousness appear. At best it is erratic. "Consciousness flickers,"\textsuperscript{4} and although in Whitehead's somewhat singular view

\textsuperscript{1} Millard has provided the most concentrated and helpful study of this problem. Speaking of the period from Process and Reality through Modes of Thought, Millard says that "the emergence of a table of types of intrinsic values is the most significant addition to Whitehead's value theory during this period of elaboration," PVWT, 374.

\textsuperscript{2} Whitehead, PR, Part III, Chapter V.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 286, 372, 399, 407, 409.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 408.
consciousness is not the "necessary base" of experience; it is "the crown of experience."[1] In enduring objects with personal order consciousness reaches its triumph. At this level there is not only "the weight of repetition," but there is the added weight of "intensity of contrast."[2] Here are the conditions for higher value realizations.

The nearest we have to an elaboration of value types comes primarily in Adventures of Ideas, where Whitehead says that "a society is to be termed civilized whose members participate in the five qualities—Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace."[3] It is not beyond doubt that Whitehead intended these five basic types of value to constitute a hierarchy in an exact ascending scale, yet he does make some of the values subordinate to the others. For instance, Truth and Beauty should go together in successful art, for the "perfection of art has only one end, which is Truthful Beauty;"[4] yet it appears that it is more serious to have Truth without Beauty than Beauty without Truth. "Truth matters because of Beauty."[5] The same goes for morality. "The real world is good when it is beautiful."[6] Beauty is more important than either truth or morality. But it is not enough to have mere concern for the fine arts, which

1. Whitehead, PR, 408. Italics added.
2. Ibid., 426.
4. Ibid., 344.
5. Ibid., 344.
6. Ibid., 345.
may be dissipated into a matter of preservation in "museums and studios."\(^1\) Through it all there must be Adventure, without which "civilization is in full decay."\(^2\) Civilization finds its completion in Peace, which has nothing to do with political relations, but is, rather, "a quality of mind steady in its reliance that fine action is treasured in the nature of things."\(^3\) Whitehead calls it the "Harmony of Harmonies which calms destructive turbulence and completes civilization."\(^4\) He finds Peace very difficult to define, but it seems to be very similar to the mystic vision of the nature of reality, or may be akin to the Buddhistic sense of oneness. "It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet momentous in its coordination of values."\(^5\)

Besides the five basic criteria of civilization which Whitehead enumerates, Millard brings together some other types to form a more extended table. He recognizes the difficulty of forming such a scale, but he suggests that values achieved can roughly be classified in Whitehead's thought in the following ascending order: (1) minor beauty, (2) survival, (3) freedom, (4) moral goodness, (5) understanding, (6) holiness, (7) truth, (8) major beauty, (9) adventure, (10) civilization, (11) peace.\(^6\)

---

1. Whitehead, AI, 352.
2. Ibid., 360.
3. Ibid., 353.
4. Ibid., 367.
5. Ibid., 367.
The first two, Millard classified as the lower intrinsic values; numbers three to six as the higher intrinsic values, and the last five as the highest intrinsic values.\(^1\) Very significant is Millard's statement which follows the above list, calling attention to the personal nature of these values. He says: "It will be evident that on first glance that with the exception of the first two all of these types are fully realizable only in human personalities and above."\(^2\) This not only adds strength to the view suggested in the sections above, viz., that stability of certain types of realization is possible only in personal identity, but reemphasizes a strong point of similarity with Brightman's insistence on values as forms of personal experience.

C. Comparative Summary.

Brightman's axiology is characterized by clarity and simplicity, although he does make many distinctions in his delineation of the nature of values. Values are intrinsic, instrumental, potential, actual, empirical, apparent, permanent, transient, catholic, and exclusive. The crux of his axiology is his definition of \textit{true} values. A true value is any liking or preference that is found to be coherent after testing by the widest range of experience. All other

\begin{flushleft}
1. See Millard, PVWT, 375.
2. Ibid., 321-322.
\end{flushleft}
values are only claims.

Whitehead's axiology is more complex. His concept of value must be understood in relation to the function of actual entities. Value is the experience of individual self-realization. Value refers to fact. A more Platonic emphasis, away from the world of actuality, is a late development, but Whitehead's major emphasis appears to be as defined. The value concept is enriched by the notion of limitation which conditions the realization of value. Without pattern there is meaningless infinitude.

In regard to the basic nature of value, it might be argued that for Brightman values are set forth more often in psychological terms or merely as the functions of persons, whereas for Whitehead value is more closely related to the metaphysical structure of the universe. But this broad distinction is more apparent than real. Later discussion will show that the conditions for value in Brightman's thought are rooted deep in the nature of the universe. On the other hand, while Whitehead's axiology is in one sense more closely related to the physical structure of the universe, value as experience is fundamental to his thought. In either case the reality of value consists in its actualization. Brightman reiterates his claim that values to be values must be embodied in the life of some person, human or divine, while one of the most clearly enunciated dicta in Whitehead's thought is that value refers to fact.
For both, values are only possibilities or potentials until realized either in personal life or in the patterned societies of actual entities. In Whitehead's language, the realization of value for both men must be in accordance with the "ontological principle" which decrees that "everything must be somewhere; and here 'somewhere' means 'some actual entity.'"¹ Value is the experience of self-realization of actual entities on whatever level they exist.

In Brightman's thought the basic criteria for the judging of values are coherence and the principle of respect for personality. For Whitehead the supreme tests are intensity, harmony, and stability. Brightman has nothing that corresponds exactly with Whitehead's notion of intensity, but in coherence and harmony there is close similarity. Coherence for one is "inclusive systematic consistency,"² while for the other harmony is the result of elimination by a high-grade organism of "the irrelevant accidents in its environment" and of giving "massive attention to every variety of systematic order."³ Incoherencies, incompatibilities, irrelevancies thus fall by the way as having no intrinsic worth or they may be positive disvalues.⁴ In either case, their lack of value is recognized by failure to fit a coherent whole.

¹. Whitehead, PR, 73.
². Brightman, ITF, 68.
³. Whitehead, PR, 483.
⁴. See Chapter IV for the discussion on disvalue.
For both men the relation of value to personality is the supreme test of value. This is because personality exhibits the highest type of experience of which selves are capable. Brightman says that "personal reality is the only verifiable being"\(^1\) in the universe, while Whitehead speaks of "our indubitable self the foundation of our present existence."\(^2\) Values are realized on every level, but persons have the advantage of novelty and contrast beyond mere repetition. For Brightman the measure in which experience contributes to the coherent functioning of the total personality is the determinative principle of value judgment. For Whitehead, personality is the key to the stabilization of value. His system provides no alternative for the persistence of the significant values in the world of fact except in an historic route of entities with personal order.

Values in the thought of each man are never isolated phenomena. The highest values are those which exemplify the maximum concreteness. The interpenetration and coherent interconnectedness of all values is an axiom with Brightman, while for Whitehead "there is a systematic framework permeating all relevant fact."\(^3\) It is by reference to this framework that the "variant, various, vagrant, evanescent

---

1. Brightman, PV, 25.
3. Whitehead, PR, 499.
details of the abundant world\textsuperscript{1} can be measured. Brightman speaks of the interpenetration of values, Whitehead of the coordination.

For both men the production and applicability of values are at once the end and measure of social organization. In the ongoing of civilization values receive their greatest empirical testing. It is Whitehead's opinion that "the notion of a purely abstract self-enjoyment of values apart from any reference to effectiveness in action was the fundamental error prevalent in Greek philosophy."\textsuperscript{2} In Brightman's thought, values not only must be tested in the social situation, but society itself is the medium through which some of the highest values are produced. "The great values of life can be realized in their fullest and richest forms only by a cooperating community."\textsuperscript{3} Values for both Brightman and Whitehead are more than intellectual constructs; they are guides for rational living.

\textsuperscript{1} Whitehead, PR, 499.
\textsuperscript{2} Whitehead, Art. (1941)\textsuperscript{2}, 686.
\textsuperscript{3} Brightman, RV, 55.
CHAPTER THREE

THE FUNCTION OF GOD IN VALUE STRUCTURE

A. Brightman.

1. Personal God as Source.

Brightman says that everyone who would be honest in his dealings with religion must sometime "come to the point where he must state plainly his conception of God."\(^1\) Whitehead echoes the same thought when he declares that "today there is but one religious dogma in debate: What do you mean by 'God'?"\(^2\) The problem is no less acute for metaphysics, and is particularly pertinent to axiology. In any systematic attempt to account for the whole range of human experience, what is meant by God and the function he fills becomes the determinative factor in the pattern of the total thought structure. In both Brightman and Whitehead their value systems are what they are because God is what he is. Such an observation becomes more than a truism when seen in the light of attempts to build value theory without him.

Brightman's theory of values rests on the axiom that God is personal, and that ultimate values are his normative appreciations. What could any value be, he would ask, that

---

is not an experience of some mind, human or divine? "It
is unthinkable," he says, "that any value should exist any-
where or anyhow save in and for a personal consciousness."¹

Brightman, in taking this strong position, is a follower
of Bowne, the founder of personalism in America. For Bowne
all attempts at metaphysical explanation "on the impersonal
plane" are failures.² His reasons for the rejection of im-
personalism throw considerable light on the need for person-
ality as the only adequate axiological principle. First,
if there be intelligence at all in the universe it must be
conscious and personal, since unconscious intelligence cannot
work to ends. Hence the phrase "unconscious intelligence"³
is a contradiction. Second, any accusation of anthropomor-
phism is a complete misunderstanding of what is meant by
saying God is personal. Personality must always be distin-
guished from corporeality.⁴ Third, a rejection of God as
personal on the grounds that he is absolute and infinite is
also a misunderstanding of what these terms mean. God is
not less absolute by existing in relation, "provided these
relations are freely posited by itself, and are not forced
on it from without."⁵ Similarly, to be the ground of the
finite is not to sacrifice the attribute of infinity, unless

¹ Brightman, SL, 112.
² See for concise statement of his case, Bowne, THE,
150 ff., also 323.
³ Ibid., 158, 160.
⁴ Ibid., 161. Anthropomorphism is one of the favorite
charges hurled at personalism.
⁵ Bowns, THE, 164.
God be "bound" to the finite. Fourth, "the law of sufficient reason" demands a personal intelligence\(^1\) for only there can one stop in his thinking. To ask the source of intelligence is a fallacy and only commits one to the infinite regress. "When we have reached intelligence the regress must end...Logic forbids us to ask a sufficient reason for a sufficient reason."\(^2\) Fifth, only in conscious thought can change and identity be reconciled. Without the personal, reality is a diverse unintelligibility where all experience is meaningless; the categories of thought vanish. Personality assures order and meaning; and for Brightman in particular, grounds the only possibility of value. "All this we may hold with firm conviction," says Bowne.\(^3\)

Brightman builds his axiological structure squarely on the personal nature of the universe. In brief, without minds to appreciate, there are no metaphysical grounds, on any level, for the existence of values. That is why Brightman calls the question of a personal God "the most central one for a philosophy of religion."\(^4\) Whitehead agrees again that the chief issue in attempting to describe the nature of the ultimate is whether or not it is personal. Here "the great cleavages of religious thought arise."\(^5\)

\(^1\) Bowne, *THE*, 168.
\(^2\) Ibid., 168-169.
\(^3\) Ibid., 169.
\(^4\) Brightman, *ITP*, 172.
On the human level valuation is a personal experience; it can be no other kind. It is impossible to conceive cosmic values except after the same analogy. Mere analogy does not prove, of course, but as the only data we have are the experiences of finite minds, the coherent accounting of possible universal values must be based firmly on the facts as given. No other solution is tenable if rationality is to be maintained. Brightman's contribution to the Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in New York brought the criticism from Maximilian Beck of Yale that Brightman's emphasis on personality as the key to value theory made man "the origin and measure of value." Brightman's reply was that he had not made man the measure, but had insisted on the objectivity of value, which is independent of man, but which may be realized in his personal consciousness. There is a temptation, of course, to make man the measure as well as the starting point; but to imply that Brightman is a follower of the Prethagorean homo mensura tenet is to do violence to his thought. It may be put down, therefore, as the main cornerstone of Brightman's value system that "if we start by examining the full evidence of human personality, it may be that clear thinking will compel

3. Reply to criticism, SPR, 8.
us to arrive at a conception of divine personality."\(^1\)

From this conclusion there seems to be no escape. Values are personal on the human level, but they are neither originated nor exhausted in human experience alone. The facts of finite human minds point to a source of values beyond the human self and society. It is his conclusion that there is a Cosmic Being who "is the ground of all existence and value."\(^2\) True, "he is more than is ever disclosed in our experience,"\(^3\) but whether we realize it or not, he is present for human fellowship "both as sustainer of our existence and as source of what is given to us from beyond ourselves."\(^4\)

2. God as Conserver of Value.

But God is more than the originator of values; he is also their conserver. Brightman affirms Höfding's famous "axiom of the conservation of value" without agreeing with his impersonal universe. That Höfding could coherently hold to both his axiom and impersonal ground of reality

---

1. Brightman, PG, 58. Brightman's dependence on Sorley's argument for theism from moral values is very evident here. He says in PI "that...the most valuable contribution that has been made \(\text{to value theory}\) is that in Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God which is the most satisfactory argument for the objectivity of moral values and the dependence of all value upon personality that I have seen," PI, 211. See also his short analysis of Sorley's argument in RV, 168-170.

2. Brightman, RV, 28.

3. Ibid., 158.

4. Ibid., 158.
Brightman denies. The Danish philosopher sees no need for going beyond the realm of nature to explain any aspect of value; but his over-reverence for science has brought him to what Brightman calls "theophobia."¹ To grant the need for the conservation of value but to deny both personal God and immortality, as Höffding does, is "like granting," says Brightman, "both premises of a syllogism and refusing to draw the conclusion."²

Höffding discusses the whole question of "personal beings in whom men believe" as having little or no value.³ His major reasons furnish some critical insights into the personalistic position. First, he says that the concept of personality is ambiguous. Personality as commonly understood "strives and struggles, asserting itself in the face of opposition;"⁴ but without that struggle the concept of personality is but an abstraction, or at best an analogy. This objection is sound as an argument against absolutism, but it does not hold in the case of Brightman since his theistic finitism provides the very element which Höffding says is necessary.⁵ Second, he thinks that personality becomes less applicable to God the more he is conceived as absolute,⁶ a view which has merit, although not altogether

¹ Brightman, PG, 61.
² Ibid., 41.
³ Höffding, POR, 248.
⁴ Ibid., 83.
⁵ See Brightman's summarizing description of God, PG, 113.
⁶ Höffding, POR, 84.
valid since absolutism and personalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive.1 Again, he says that personality just "cannot express the inexhaustible principle which comes to light in the very fact of the existence of this world."2 Strange as it seems, HöfLEing avers that pantheism—of which his own critical monism is a type—does not reject personality because "it is too high but because it is too low a determination of the deity. The deity must be more than a person if it is the principle which unites together the whole of being."3 A fourth objection to the concept of God as personal arises from the possibility of persons "falling" into sin and error. He says that if "to fall" is an essential part of personality, then this possibility must exist at the very heart of the universe, a situation which certainly causes "diminution of value."4 Both this and the former objection fail in the light of Brightman's constantly growing God whose will is ever good but whose efforts are constantly impeded, though not permanently frustrated, by conditions which he does not create.

Before leaving this section it may be pointed out that despite his impersonalism, HöfLEing goes beyond his axiom of conservation of value and declares that values must be

1. For instance, Royce's system is absolutistic but God is conscious and personal.
2. HöfLEing, FOR, 34.
3. Ibid., 34.
4. Ibid., 34.
increased in order to be conserved.\textsuperscript{1} With this Brightman heartily agrees. It is impossible, he argues, that there should be preservation without increase. A universe maintaining only the \textit{status quo} is death. "Value requires both repetition and variety."\textsuperscript{2} Brightman, not overly-given to the coining of new philosophical terminology, does contribute two words to the growing nomenclature of axiology. He proposes the word "axiosoteria" to express the concept of the conservation of values, and "axiogenesis" as expressive of the increase of values. Using the new terminology, then, as illustrative of the relationship between the preservation and increase of values, the point is summarized by Brightman himself in the formula, "no axiosoteria without axiogenesis."\textsuperscript{3}

3. \textbf{Immortality Necessary to the Conservation of Human Values.}

Brightman is of the opinion that Höftding's dismissal of the axic-personal relationship is a too-easy disposal of the problem. He feels that personality, both human and divine, comes nearer to validating Höftding's own axiom than any other possibility. The continuance\textsuperscript{4} of values must be

---

3. Ibid., 168.
4. The term favored by P. A. Bertocci rather than conservation. He also warns against "the glib use of the preservation of values to cover the wholesale preservation of values we cannot specify concretely," EAG, 165-166.
predicated upon continuance of persons. Hence the view that
persons are the only beings capable of achieving and convey-
ing ideal values in the universe makes the problem of immor-
tality central to Brightman's view of the conservation of value.

The question is: How are the achieved values conserved?
Brightman's answer is in the continuation of personality be-
yond physical death. He is everywhere opposed to any dog-
matic approach to the very difficult problem of immortality,
and he is very conscious of the disservice done to the doc-
trine by the too zealous advocacy of weak arguments for it.
On the other hand, he does not see the need of abandoning
the notion of immortality on the basis of many arguments
against it. 1 "The only really strong argument against im-
mortality," he says, "is that based on a materialistic inter-
pretation of physiological psychology." 2 This is the view
that consciousness is inseparable from the physical brain.
It is very difficult, as almost anyone would admit—Bright-
man first of all—to deny the force of this position. "We
have here a crucial argument." 3

In attempting to answer the argument Brightman feels
that the solution, one way or the other, depends entirely
on the validity of the premises. If materialism is an ade-
quate explanatory principle for all the facts of experience,

1. See Brightman, POR, 387-410, for his most extensive
treatment of immortality.
2. Ibid., 385.
3. Ibid., 395.
then there is no case for continuation of consciousness beyond the death of the body. But Brightman holds that the facts do not make an alternative view impossible. Apart from the very "empirical fact that sensations are not physical but mental in character,"¹ it may be that consciousness itself affords a better clue to the nature of reality, and avoids the necessity of explaining "personal identity, unity, memory"² in terms of a materialistic or positivistic principle. The dependence of mind on body is not to be denied. The question really demands a consideration by the philosopher of "the nature and the cosmic relations of the reality that appears as his body."³ What is the body?

If the body is viewed as materialistic postulates require, death is final. But if the body is interpreted on theistic postulates, the destiny of personal consciousness in the world will not be determined by the laws of matter but rather by the purpose and will of the God whose activity is very incompletely revealed in the object we call the human body.⁴

Here are some grounds for continuation of consciousness, but the crucial argument for immortality involves more consideration of the relation of personality to values.

It has already been shown⁵ that Brightman holds not only to the inseparability of values and persons, but to "the principle of respect for personality" as one of the

---

¹. Brightman, POR, 309.
². Ibid., 399.
³. Ibid., 400.
⁴. Ibid., 400.
⁵. Chapter II, A.
basic criteria for value judgment. With such an intimate association of values and persons it is natural to expect that Brightman's view of the conservation of values would somehow entail the continuation of persons. His case for the interdependence of values and persons need not be repeated here, except to point out his insistence on the view that "where there is no enjoying person there is no value," and his equally emphatic doctrine that "in personality is the only truly intrinsic value we know or can conceive." Brightman's doctrine of immortality hinges on one big question: Can God be the conserver of values and not be the conserver of persons? It is Brightman's opinion that "God, the conserver of values, must be God, the conserver of persons." Brightman does not consider the possibility that maybe God is unable, due to some restriction within his own experience, to preserve persons after disassociation from the body, but in so far as God is able, Brightman holds that his goodness makes it incumbent upon him to preserve persons and their values.

If there is a God—a supreme, creative, cosmic person—then there is an infinitely good being committed to the eternal conservation of values. This is what Brightman refers to as "the crucial argument

1. Brightman, Art. (1943), 220. See also Art. (1946), 371; PR, 17; SL, 60; PV, 14.
2. Brightman, NV, 62.
4. This concept is discussed in Chapter IV.
5. Brightman, FOR, 401.
for immortality: the goodness of God.\textsuperscript{1}

It does not follow, of course, that every human being will automatically be preserved by God. In Brightman's view every person is a candidate for immortality, but "only those persons are immortal whom God judges to be capable of developing worthily at any time in their future existence."\textsuperscript{2} He refers to this hypothesis as "conditional immortality."\textsuperscript{3}

Brightman's doctrine of immortality appears to be coherently grounded in his own system. The strictly empirical observation that values do have their locus in persons constitutes reason for the extrapolation of an analogous association beyond physical death, while the interest of God in the conservation of persons and values is an hypothesis that gives added meaning to life as well as a coherent accounting for the increase and preservation of values in the universe. In what further sense God conserves all values and the interrelation of divine and human values is further elaborated in the next section.


Grounded as it is in the naturalistic order, Höffding's value theory fails in refusing to find any need for transcendent reference. Brightman's theory, on the other hand,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. Brightman, PQR, 400.
  \item 2. Ibid., 408.
  \item 3. Ibid., 408.
\end{itemize}
not only makes a full analysis of empirical values but grounds them in the kind of a metaphysical order which guarantees their preservation and increase. No axiology is adequate until it does this; but here is the inherent weakness, not only of Höffding but of more modern philosophers like Ernest Nagel, Y. H. Krikorian, and John Dewey, all of whom seek to find place for values and mind within the natural order of the universe, excluding, of course, the possibility of any kind of data except the data revealed by sense and the scientific method. "For naturalism as a philosophy the universal applicability of the experimental method is a basic belief."  

Brightman grounds his values in metaphysics, but the radical difference between the personalist and the naturalist is in the kind of universe each postulates. Naturalism is the view, according to Krikorian, "that nature is the whole of reality," and by nature he "means what empirical science finds it to be and what a completed empirical science would find it to be."  

Personalism, on the other hand, says "that the energy which physicists describe is God's will in action, and that there is no wholly unconscious or impersonal being."  

On this view physical nature is only one part of the experience of a

2. Ibid., 242-243. See also Randall on the nature of naturalism, Art. (1944).
Supreme Person whose experience also includes "memories, its purposes, its values, its powers, its activities, and its experienced interactions with its environment." ¹ Here is adequate ground for declaring the metaphysical status of values. Naturalism suffers from too much reductionism. ² In restricting data to sense data, values either have to be denied or reduced to some phenomenal expression of spatial properties. On the other hand, "personalism is more inclusive than naturalism," ³ boldly avowing the reality of some values not dependent on the physical order.

What is, then, the metaphysical status of values in the universe? It has already been shown that values are meaningless apart from personal experience, human or divine. It is not wrong, therefore, to say that all value is subjective. ⁴ But the subjective experience does not tell the whole story. Every experience is an experience of something. What is it, then, that when experienced becomes a subjective value? In other words, what is an objective value? Whatever it is, if it lay any claim to being a part of the rational universe, it must fulfill at least two requirements.

¹ Brightman, NV, 56.
² See Brightman's whole NV for his definitive treatment of nature and values, especially "the challenge of personalism to naturalism," NV, 115-126.
³ Ibid., 116.
⁴ This is not, as Brightman points out, to reduce values to individualistic subjectivism or a "social solipsism" with no objective reference, ITP, 152. See ITP, 151-165 for the whole discussion of objectivity vs. subjectivity.
First, it must be something that all reasonable minds would acknowledge; and second, it must be valid not only for human minds but for ultimate reality.1 This kind of value Brightman calls a norm. A norm is an objective value whose ontological reality consists in the experience of God in thinking what the value ought to be. The norm is in God's mind, for all reality must be in a mind, but to keep the distinction clear between norms and values Brightman says that "it would perhaps be more accurate to speak of the metaphysical objectivity of norms, and the subjective existence of values in the persons who experience them."2 This represents a clarification, if not a real change, in Brightman's treatment of the objectivity of values. This statement puts more emphasis on the objectivity of norms rather than values, somewhat of a shift from his emphases in previous literature.3

With this distinction in mind, i.e., the subjectivity of values and the objectivity of norms, one can synthesize by saying that human persons may experience subjectively the values which have a metaphysical status outside of human experience, but which are for God his own subjective appreciations of universal norms.

Values, it may be concluded, are grounded in the ultimate cosmic order as part of God's experience; and because that cosmic order is personal and rational the permanence of

---

3. See the first edition of ITP, 149-169.
value truths is not only assured, but the communication and appreciation of value-norms is made a possibility for all rational minds in the universe. All other arguments considered, the most logical explanation for the presence of values consists in the view that value-norms are the "objective claims that reality makes, rather than as our merely subjective demand for pleasure or satisfaction."

Brightman in describing subjective appreciation of objective norms speaks of the universe as being "friendly" to values, but he believes that only a personalistic metaphysics makes it possible. The extra-mental world of the realist or the worth-free universe of the naturalist makes values either inexplicable or a miracle. Where all of reality, nature, and values constitute a personal order, then the physical universe itself, although in appearance intractable and stubborn, is "on the side" of value growth. The objection that if the world is friendly to value all reality is now perfect and incentive destroyed is based on the assumption that the universe is static. The objection disappears when it is pointed out that the "perfection" of the universe does not consist in fixed, changeless ultimacy but in its perfectibility. "A living universe...is more perfect than a perfected universe that can grow no more."

2. Ibid., 267.
3. Ibid., 266.
With God and his experience, including nature and values, conceived of as infinitely perfectible, there surely is no inhibition of human incentive.

Some very helpful material correlative to Brightman's views on the objectivity of values is found in his article, "The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments."¹ A brief summary is given here for reference and comparison. He sets forth the following as his fundamental theses:

a. Value experience is an empirical fact.

b. Value is an experience of person. "Where persons are absent, value is absent."²

c. Every value experience has ineffable qualities, but the non-rational elements constitute no bar to rational investigation of their relations, meanings, and norms.⁴

d. There is need of a fuller knowledge of the meaning of value. "Democracy can survive only if it becomes more coherent and objective about its values."⁵

e. Truth about values is not arrived at by experiment, or particular facts, but by rational wholeness and adequate

¹ Brightman, Art. (1942). Brightman either participated in directly, or contributed papers to the third, fourth, sixth, and twelfth Symposia on Science, Philosophy, and Religion held in New York. His contributions are valuable for some insights into his views on social values which he has not treated systematically in his writings.
² Ibid., 3.
³ Ibid., 3.
⁴ Ibid., 4.
⁵ Ibid., 4.
coherence. 1

f. Science itself presupposes objective validity of ideal values insofar as it engages in an honest search for truth.2

g. Society and democracy depend on rational validity of values.3

h. The relation of what "is" to "what ought to be" is a problem of metaphysics.4

Next he lists his arguments for the objectivity of normative value judgments. They are objective because they refer:

a. To psychological and social facts.5

b. To the coherent and critical organization of these facts.

c. To hypotheses about ideal norms.

d. To relationships between value experience and the physical world.

e. To an objective source of value experience.

f. They presuppose and require a free, rational inquiry into the nature and conditions of the highest value experience.

The addition of other axiological material from Brightman would be mostly repetition. The one conclusion possible

2. Ibid., 5.
3. Ibid., 5.
4. Ibid., 6.
5. This and remaining points are all found on p. 6.
from all the evidence presented above is that, for Brightman, this is a value universe. The eyes of common sense see only the physical world, a world which no idealist denies, but sense data are not the only data. Experience reveals value facts which belong as much to the universe as so-called physical facts, and the two are not incompatible. Both are aspects of God's activity which in turn becomes the source of data for human experience.

As this chapter section begins, so it ends, that God is the key to the axiological structure of any system which attempts to describe coherently the universe we live in. God as Person is source and preserver of all ultimate values. All reality being a part of his personal experience, the universe is friendly to value development, and because God's experience is expanding, there is infinite challenge for effort and achievement. God himself is the guarantor that values will be maintained.

B. Whitehead.


For Whitehead, perhaps even more than for Brightman, his whole cosmology and particularly his axiology is a reflection of the kind of God postulated. Many roads lead to the heart of Whitehead's doctrine of God. One could begin with either the concept of the primordial and consequent
natures of God, or more empirically with the "drops of experience" which soon lead back to the only "non-temporal actual entity", God. For purposes of this section, which is to show how God relates to the value structure of Whitehead's thought, the principle of concretion seems to be the most accessible entrance to the axiological schemata.

It might seem that Whitehead's account, whatever it is, of cosmic creation would be more basic than the principle of concretion. In one sense it is, in that "creativity is the ultimate behind all forms" or "the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact" but it is soon discovered that creativity is not an activity of God, but a foundational principle to which God himself is subject. God is its "primordial accident", he is "the outcome of creativity", while both God and the world "are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty." In this Whitehead repudiates any notion of God as "an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent being, and whose imposed will it obeys" and at the same time disavows the concept of "the temporal world...as a

1. Whitehead, PR, 28. This is Whitehead's descriptive phrase for an actual entity.
2. Whitehead, RM, 90. Cf. PR, 73, for further elaboration of God as non-temporal.
3. Whitehead, PR, 50. See also PR, 10-11.
4. Ibid., 31.
5. Ibid., 11.
6. Ibid., 135.
7. Ibid., 529.
self-sufficient completion of the creative act."\(^1\) Better think of God as "not before all creation, but with all creation;"\(^2\) but creativity itself appears to be aimless generality until some specificity is produced from the whole. Here is where God appears in his primal role, which is to bring differentiation and order from the undifferentiated on-going of the creative advance. Whitehead refers to God in this capacity as "the principle of concretion--the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity."\(^3\)

This concept of concretion appears in embryo in *Science and the Modern World*, where he sets it off against Aristotle's Prime Mover, which he repudiates, but he realizes the need in his own system of an analogous agency and substitutes his "Principle of Concretion."\(^4\) It is God's function to bring things together in a patterned connectedness. A synonym for concretion is limitation, so that God is "the ultimate limitation" or the "supreme ground for limitation."\(^5\) In *Religion in the Making* Whitehead says that "apart from him there could be no world, because there could be no adjustment of individuality."\(^6\) In *Process and Reality* God in this

---

2. Ibid., 521.
3. Ibid., 521.
role appears to be more active to the extent that he appears to assume some of the "eminently real" characteristics which Whitehead deprived him of. As principle of concretion God "is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts."¹

Without taking up the difficulty involved here,² this definition suggests that all concretions or concrescences receive something directly from God. The next step toward God's major rôle in value structure is thus indicated.

a. The "Home" of all Potentials.

The principle of concretion reveals how "diverse elements come together into a real unity."³ What that particular concrescence or unity becomes depends on the selection of potentials which are there for it. "Actuality is the decision amid 'potentiality',"⁴ All potentiality resides in the primordial nature of God, which Whitehead sees as the realm of unlimited possibility. This is God's conceptual or mental pole,⁵ which consists in the "direct vision...of some possibility as to how actualities may be definite."⁶

---

2. The problem is the reconciliation of Whitehead's insistence that actual entities are causa sui (see PR, 131, 135, 339) and autonomous (see PR, 379, 374) with God's initiation of the basic aim of each concrescence.
3. Whitehead, RM, 93.
4. Whitehead, PR, 68.
5. Whitehead says: "Any instance of experience is dipolar, whether that instance be God or an actual occasion of the world," PR, 54.
6. Ibid., 50.
Possibilities, potentialities, conceptual prehensions, are all synonyms for Whitehead's more general term, "eternal objects." He describes an eternal object as "any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world." More simply, eternal objects are "pure potentials for the specific determination of fact." All eternal objects exist in the primordial nature of God, which is either specifically equivalent to or has a function analogous to Plato's realm of ideas. An actuality, e.g., an actual entity, becomes real and determinate by selecting from these potentials or ideas the possibilities which are compatible with its own subjective aim. Eternal objects are then said to "ingress" into actual existence. "The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal." God is thus seen to be the "home" of all potentials for actuality. His own primordial nature, while devoid of actuality, consists in the "complete envisagement

1. Whitehead said that if the term "eternal objects" were not liked, he would settle for "potentials" (PR, 226).
2. Whitehead, PR, 70. Cf. also SMW, 159.
3. Ibid., 32.
4. He seems to identify them when he says: "Eternal objects, as in God's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas," PR, 73. Cf. one function of Brightman's "Controller of The Given": "God's will is eternally seeking new forms of embodiment of the good," POR, 338.
5. "The functioning of an eternal object in the self-creation of an actual entity is the 'ingression' of the eternal object in the actual entity," PR, 39.
6. Ibid., 63.
of eternal objects," which he "desires," by an appetite in his own nature to become concrete fact in the life of actual entities. This suggests the next point, which sees God in his rôle as a "lure for feeling."

b. The Lure for Feeling.

Each actual entity may be conceived of as having its own mental pole oriented toward God. What it becomes is subject to its own decision, but "it derives from God its basic conceptual aim." God and actual entities "face" each other, therefore, the one whose function is to be "the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire," and the other to be the agent of actualization. Neither can exist without the other, except for purposes of thought. "Eternal objects cannot demonstrate what they are except in some given fact," and actual entities are all expressions of potentials in God. Because he is the "unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality" he "longs" to inject into the order of actuality the great possibilities there are for it.

1. Whitehead, PR, 70.
2. Ibid., 343.
3. Ibid., 522.
4. Ibid., 395.
5. Ibid., 521.
6. A term not out of place in a terminology which includes such descriptive expressions as "feeling" and "appetition."
7. Bixler says it this way: "God tries to persuade the world at each occasion to such perfection as is possible for it," Art., (1941), 499.

B | 152
In this capacity God is the "organ of novelty" in that he constantly strives for the realization of new potentials in the order of actuality. The "growing edge" exists, of course, only in the birth and becoming of actual entities. "The actual entity is the real concrescence of many potentials." When an actual entity, which is causa sui, prehends other data so as to bring into its own concrescence unique elements, the ultimate satisfaction is diverse from all other entities and hence is a new creature.

Each concrescence is novel, simply because the data from which it draws can never be the same for any other entity. Every actual entity, therefore, represents "passage into novelty," but, as shall be seen in a later section, "its passage is not its death."

In brief summary of the above, God is seen as the principle of concrescence in that he infuses into general creativity the limitations of particularity. All possibilities of what particular "things" can be are in God as potentials which, by ingestion, become actual in the satisfaction of actual entities. God is "the lure for feeling" or the "organ of novelty" in that he is the "eternal urge of desire" toward "passage into novelty."

1. Whitehead, PR, 104.
2. Ibid., 33.
3. Ibid., 339.
4. Ibid., 33-34.
5. Ibid., 330.
6. Ibid., 330.
2. God as Principle of Ordering.

a. Teleology.

That the total actual world is the "becoming of actual entities" is an axiom of Whitehead's cosmology. The whole becoming of the actual world Whitehead refers to as the "extensive continuum" which is "one relational complex in which all potential objectifications find their niche."

One might illustrate the situation by a vast organic structure in which every part brought to the new concrescence of elements will find a place not out of accord with the purpose of the total structure or its own individual nature. The question whether the part was made for the whole or the whole for the part is as irrelevant as the problem of whether God or the world is prior. Suffice it that when an actual entity is "born" it finds itself at home in the universe.

That there are no strangers in this great kingdom of reality is due to the teleological structure of the extensive continuum itself. Novelty is continuously being introduced, but it would be completely "meaningless and inconceivable" unless

1. Whitehead, PR, 33.
2. Ibid., 103.
3. The illustration does not do justice to the process nature of Whitehead's cosmology, but it is very difficult to think process. Cf. Bergson. Whitehead himself speaks of "the universe as a solidarity of many actual entities," PR, 65.
4. Whitehead, PR, 103.
5. Ibid., 528.
7. Whitehead, PR, 64.
it already had the stamp on it of the universe into which it appeared. But this stamp is inevitable because an actual entity not only emerges into its environment; it grows out of its environment. It can bring into its world only what it received from its past, plus an appetition for realization in its mental pole. Complete 1 disjunction is therefore impossible. That there shall be order is the sternest aspect of the universe and where Whitehead comes the nearest to having an "eminently real" God whose will shall be obeyed. God is the ordering principle. It is the "divine element" in the world. 2 "This function of God is analogous to the remorseless working of things in Greek and in Buddhist thought...What is inexorable in God, is valuation as an aim towards 'order'." 3

It will help to make clear how this order is effected in the universe by reviewing Whitehead's analysis of the views concerning the laws of nature. 4 He suggests four main types of laws:

1. Law as immanent. This is but to say that nature is expressive of its own essence. 5 It follows from this view that: first, the scientist seeks for explanations rather than descriptions; second, "exact conformation of

1. Rom has to be left for the elements of dysteleology which do appear.
2. Whitehead, PR, 64.
3. Ibid., 373.
4. For the whole discussion, AI, 142-151; 173-177.
nature to any law is not to be expected;\(^1\) third, laws change as the universe changes; fourth, inductions become more trustworthy; fifth, the universe has some coherent system of interconnection; and sixth, the doctrine is rationalistic in that it provides a basis for the possibility of understanding nature.

(2) **Law as imposed from without on things.** This is the transcendent view of deism. It is the assumption behind the notion of substance in Descartes and the physics of Galileo and Newton.

(3) **Law as description.** This is the doctrine of positivism which says that the laws of nature are only persisting patterns of phenomena. "All science bases itself on this procedure."\(^2\) This view really explains nothing, for it is only tautology.

(4) **Law as conventional interpretation.** Modern speculation, dialectics, and mathematics illustrate this type, whose method is to "elaborate a system of ideas, in detachment from any direct, detailed matter of fact."\(^3\) For example, distance is measured in terms of some conventional standard, e. g., inches, although there are no "particular entities"\(^4\) corresponding to inches.

\(^1\) Whitehead, AI, 143.
\(^2\) Ibid., 149. Whitehead's negative attitude to the rigid empiricism of scientific analysis is an interesting and well-known aspect of his thought.
\(^3\) Ibid., 173.
\(^4\) Ibid., 174.
Of these four interpretations of law Whitehead rejects the last three. It is his view that the immanence of God in nature affords the only ground for "belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible."¹ God's immanence is the "metaphysical stability"² of the universe and is the guarantee that there will be harmony throughout the extensive continuum, "past, present and future."³ In what sense God is immanent in the world is worthy of note if Whitehead's system itself be not reduced to chaos. The common philosophical use of the term is not far removed from its etymological sense, in, in, and maneo, remain. As applied to the God-world relationship it means that God is in the world, the conformation of physical matter being an expression of God's presence within it. Extreme views of God as immanent amount to pantheism, e. g., Spinoza. For others, God is regarded as immanent in the sense that the universe is part of God's activity, e. g., Bowle; but here God is not limited to the universe; he also transcends it. Whitehead, in many respects, is nearer to the latter view, although some of his statements seem to exclude that conclusion. He speaks, for instance, of the mutual immanence of God and the world in one of his own summarizing antinomies: "It is as true to say that the world is immanent in God, as that God

¹ Whitehead, PR, 169.
² Ibid., 64.
³ Whitehead, PR, 103.
is in the world." Admittedly it is very difficult to separate this view from Spinozistic pantheism, but on the other hand, it must be remembered that Whitehead's cosmological structure is a system in which all action, progress, change, relationships are possible only through prehensions. The universe is a society of prehending entities and nothing else. When one actual entity prehends another, it feels it within its own being; what the other entity is becomes an element in the concrescent process of the original entity. It can be said accurately, according to Whitehead's system, that "an actual entity is present in other actual entities." This point is very important for Whitehead in that "the philosophy of organism is mainly devoted to the task of making clear the notion of 'being present in another entity'." From this evidence it can be seen that Whitehead uses the term immanence not in its traditional philosophical sense. Rather, immanence is in prehension. God and the world are in one another, therefore, insofar as they prehend one another. God is truly immanent, but there seems to be no conclusive evidence for saying that God is the world in the sense that the two are coextensive in all respects. If God

1. Whitehead, PR, 103.
2. Ibid., 27.
3. Ibid., 79. Whitehead italicized "is" to place his view in opposition to "Aristotle's dictum, "(A substance) is not present in a subject!" PR, 79. By "is", however, he means no more than "is felt by."
4. Ibid., 79-80.
and the world are coextensive in all respects, then Whitehead's emphatic insistence on the private experience of self-determining actual entities is automatically nullified. There is both "public fact and private experience" through-out Whitehead's cosmological exposition. Some elements, he explains, can be understood only by reference to a world beyond a given fact, while there are other elements which refer only to the "private, personal individuality of the fact in question." Whitehead says that "the former elements express the publicity of the world; the latter elements express the privacy of the individual." There is no doubt that this privacy is genuine in the sense that God does not interfere in the "internal life" of actual entities. God feels what other actual entities are, of course, but he does not decide what elements shall be admitted into their congrescent processes. The decisions of actual entities do not belong to God. Therefore it is not true that "God is all there is."

On the other hand, God himself is not an exception to the principle of privacy. He is an actual entity and therefore has private experience. In so far as God has functions peculiar to himself he has an identity all his own.

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 493.
2. Ibid., 443.
3. Ibid., 443. Cf. also 444, 272.
4. See Whitehead, PR, 521.
5. Ibid., 28.
Certainly the initiative toward novelty and the ordering of nature imply a certain transcendent priority. It is a transcendence not of apartness from the world, but of an all-inclusive feeling for the universe while still retaining certain prerogatives which belong to God alone.¹

One further problem arises in connection with God's teleological function. There appears to be no reason why "givenness", if that is equivalent to totality, should be in the nature of a teleological structure rather than dys-teleological. Whitehead sees this problem and allows for it. He says:

'Order' means more than 'givenness', though it presupposes 'givenness' 'disorder' is also 'given.' Each actual entity requires a totality of 'givenness', and each totality of 'givenness' attains its measure of 'order.'²

The priority of the principle of ordering is seen, however, in his clarifying remark that "'order' in the actual world is differentiated from mere 'givenness' by introduction of adaptation for the attainment of an end."³ Hartshorne observes that the presence of order "is perhaps Whitehead's favorite argument" for God's role in the universe.⁴

b. Persuasive Agency of God.

Although the approach from order to God may sound suspiciously like the traditional cosmological argument, Whitehead

---

¹ For example, God as a "persuasive agency" discussed in the next section.
² Whitehead, PR, 127.
³ Ibid., 127. Italics added.
⁴ Hartshorne, Art. (1941), 538.
differs from this traditional view by rejecting the notion of a compulsive ordering from without. The doctrine of Imposed Law but resurrects, among other fallacies, the view that things are their own reasons for existing, as, e. g., in Descartes, Newton, and all forms of Deism. Among Whitehead's famous repudiations no doctrine is more thoroughly rejected than the notion of self-existing substance. Furthermore, the idea of imposed law compromises the character of God, whose will becomes ruthless and arbitrary. "The Laws of Nature will be exactly obeyed." In this view, God becomes too much like Caesar for Whitehead. He prefers to find in God a little more of the Galilean humility, which has little in common with a God after the manner of Roman Imperialism, Hebrew Moralism, or Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. God knows how to order the universe, but he does it not by divine decree but by wisdom and love. That "the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency" Whitehead calls "one of the greatest intellectual discoveries in the history of religion." That is "The New Reformation" indeed! God is eternally relevant "to each creative act as it arises."

1. Whitehead, AI, 144-147. See above.
2. Ibid., 145.
3. Whitehead, PR, 519.
4. Ibid., 520.
5. Whitehead, AI, 213.
6. Ibid., 205-221.
7. Whitehead, PR, 522.
presiding over it with "tender patience, leading it by
his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness."\(^1\)

In keeping with the discussion of the previous sec-
tion, it might be pointed out that God as a persuasive
agency gives further support to the view that, in Whitehead's
thought, God has some characteristics which make it reason-
able to attribute to him some transcendent functions. In a
thorough-going pantheism there is no room either for per-
suasion—all things must follow—or for genuine recalcitrancy.

b. God the "Poet" of Reality.

Whitehead's philosophy comes the nearest to exhibiting
aesthetic quality per se where he is expounding his cosmology
in terms of aesthetic process. Where his writing escapes
the somewhat ponderous style is precisely in conjunction with
the elaboration of the great concepts which seem to appear
regularly out of his terminological obfuscation, as if the
very writing of the ideas put beauty and warmth into his
pen. The closing chapter in _Process and Reality_, "God and
the World," and the last section in _Religion and the Making,
"The Nature of God," are probably the most "inspired" por-
tions of his writings. The concept of God as "the poet of
the world"\(^2\) is a philosophical and literary summit of rare
beauty. In this capacity

God's role is not the combat of productive
force with productive force, of destructive

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 526.
2. Ibid., 526.
force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the over-powering rationality of his conceptual harmonization.1

God is seen as presiding over a world of a multiplicity of entities all in a process of becoming. Because of the unlimited conceptualization of possibilities, i. e., knowing what is best for each entity in accordance with the harmony of the whole, he directs that entity, not by force but by tender persuasiveness to the kind of concrescence which will produce the maximum harmony.

God is a poet. He knows how the disjunctive elements of the world should be brought together into one conjunctive unity with balance, order, and beauty. "The teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty."2 Without God there is no relevancy of parts to whole. He represents the standard of relevancy before the actualization occurs. "There cannot be value without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of activity."3 In accordance with God's own eternal perspective he gives to each occasion its initial aim,4 "an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God."5 Although the aim

1. Whitehead, PR, 526.
2. Whitehead, AI, 341.
4. Whitehead, PR, 374.
5. Ibid., 373.
which God gives is the best for that situation, the subject, being autonomous, does not have to cooperate, but if its own decisions are in accordance with God's conceptual evaluation, then harmonic and stable values emerge in the world of actuality. Whitehead summarizes the process by saying that "whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision, arises first conceptually, and is transmuted into the physical world." 

To carry out Whitehead's figure, God grades the relevance of each word to his poem and admits it to participation in the whole according to his own standard of judgment. God's end is an aesthetic production. Since every element included in the poem is a result of purposeful selectivity, God's choice is thus a judgment on it. God selects only the beautiful, and the world is good because it is beautiful. Because of this subordination of the moral to the aesthetic, Ely is quite strong in his contention that Whitehead's God himself is not good. God wills the aesthetic but not the good. Whitehead does say, "The real world is good when it is beautiful," but as usual Ely makes the case stronger than necessary. Almost any student of Whitehead will admit

1. Here is the source of evil.
2. Whitehead, PR, 243.
3. Ibid., 46, 243. The possibility of evil is discussed in the next chapter.
4. Ely, RAWG, 52.
5. Whitehead, AI, 345.
the scant place given to morality per se in his thought, but is not Whitehead only trying to say that true morality cannot be ugly, and that true beauty must be good? Ely probably has not considered such passages as this: An "actual entity, in a state of process during which it is not fully definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the whole point of moral responsibility."\(^2\)

In keeping with the rest of Whitehead's thought it seems that the good choice is an harmonious choice. To choose to be out of conformity is evil. In other words, the good is a selection of compatible elements; hence, every choice is a limitation. The same is true of God himself. Whitehead has a very clarifying passage on the relation of goodness and God's limitation:

The limitation of God is his goodness. He gains his depth of actuality by his harmony of valuation. It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good. Also this unlimited fusion of evil with good would mean mere nothingness. He is something decided and is thereby limited.

In *Science in the Modern World* Whitehead had already pointed out the fallacy of making God the "foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity."\(^4\) There is no escape here from the necessity of ascribing to God the

---

1. For one of the most recent treatments of this problem, see Millard, PVWT, 426-451.
2. Whitehead, PR, 390.
origin of evil as well as good. On the contrary, "if He be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme'."  

At this point if one asks *unde malum* or if it be pointed out that God's poem is not entirely free from evil elements, Whitehead replies that the good does not actually dwell in isolation from the evil, but that the good is continually overcoming the evil by meeting every element of disvalue by what is of worth.

God has in his nature the knowledge of evil, of pain, and of degradation, but it is there as overcome with what is good. Every fact is what it is, a fact of pleasure, of joy, of pain, or of suffering. In its union with God that fact is not a total loss, but on its finer side is an element to be woven immortally into the rhythm of mortal things.

With this quotation the role of God has passed almost imperceptibly from his function as the source of all potentiality and appetition and the poet of the becoming process to his further function as the recipient of all actuality through his all-inclusive prehensive experience. This is God in his consequent nature or as Savior of the World.


God does not destroy the world; he saves it. Whitehead himself is the justification for this somewhat

2. Whitehead, RM, 155.
soteriological terminology. We have already seen that "each actuality has its present life and its immediate passage into novelty; but its passage is not its death."¹ It is one of the great strengths of Whitehead's doctrine that he adequately provides for the continuation of values beyond their primary expression, i. e., values do not perish with the original experience of them. As primordial God is the "home" of unlimited potentiality, but he is "deficiently actual",² which means that his feelings are only conceptual with no physical realization. In this state God is infinite, complete, eternal, and unconscious.³ In terms of value he is the urge or appetite towards value, but his primordial nature is axiologically deficient. As consequent, however, God is "determined, incomplete, consequent, 'ever-lasting', fully actual, and conscious."⁴ God's primordial nature becomes consequent as a result of the "reaction of the world"⁵ upon him. But this reaction is a continuous process, by which every occasion becomes "'everlasting' by its objective immortality in God."⁶ God "shares with every new creation its actual world."⁷ In other words, God's prehensive experience includes, by its effect on him, every other actual entity which becomes a novel element in his nature, but remains there as part of God's

¹ Whitehead, PR, 530. Italics added.
² Ibid., 521.
³ Ibid., 524.
⁴ Ibid., 524.
⁵ Ibid., 523.
⁶ Ibid., 527.
⁷ Ibid., 523.
continuous existence. There is no loss. "The consequent nature of God is his judgment on the world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life."¹

In him all experience, all gains, all values are preserved. God is indeed Savior. He is "the storehouse of achieved value," says Ely.²

In this possibility of preserved value in God lies the justification for optimism. There is little enthusiasm for the axiological task if at the end the achieved gains are rendered nil by their relapse into vacuity; but if the universe provides the kind of moral or axiological arena where values can not only be produced but preserved, then there is challenge for activity and work. That values are not lost gives stimulus to effort and encouragement in struggle. One might even say religious comfort.³ Ely's objection that the laying up of value "in heaven for God's eternal contemplation and enjoyment...does not help me"⁴ fails to take into consideration not only the truly creative urge of all entities, especially those with "personal order",⁵ but the possibility, though very faint in Whitehead's thought, of the continuation of that personal order at another level of existence. One might say that immortality is the one

1. Whitehead, PR, 525.
2. Ely, RAWG, 40.
3. The religious aspects of Whitehead's axiology will receive fuller treatment later.
4. Ely, RAWG, 2.
5. Whitehead, PR, 244.
thing needful to give final justification for an otherwise irrational striving. Both personal identity and value find ultimate meaning only in the "World Which emphasizes Persistence...the World of Value."¹

The effective realization of value in the World of Change should find its counterpart in the World of Value;—this means that temporal personality in one world involves immortal personality in the other.²

There is some evidence in Whitehead for the view that by "temporal personality" he means a "conscious self", but whether or not "immortal personality" in another epoch is analogous is a desideratum. Hartshorne and Reese say that the possibility of a "prolongation of our present personality, is apparently ignored by Whitehead."³ Nevertheless, the faint possibility of the continuation of personal identity lies in the evidence deduced previously for the stability of values.⁴ There it was shown that values find their greatest stability in personal identity. It may be more than petitio principii to suggest—still on the basis of Whitehead's thought—two things in support of the immortality of personal identity:

First, if value (some at least) in the "World of Change" is achieved through personal identity then it is attenuating the concept, if not the content, of value to disassociate

---

¹. Whitehead, Art. (1941)², 684.
². Ibid., 693.
⁴. Chapter II.
personal identity from the value.

Second, the experience of personal identity in the present epoch is a high value. Could that value be conserved in another epoch or level of existence without personal identity? In the light of the privacy of experience and God's "tender care that nothing be lost," there seems to be no way to answer the question in the affirmative.

Whether or not continued personal identity is a feature of Whitehead's doctrine of immortality, God's function as the immortal conserver of achieved values is still a rich and meaningful doctrine. Because of his unlimited perspective he sees and unites all values into a harmonious togetherness. He gathers up in himself all value achievements in the world and orders them in such a fashion as to produce the maximum aesthetic result. To this ultimate picture all actual entities contribute their values. "Your labor is not in vain in the Lord."²

As seen above, it is not doing violence to Whitehead's thought to think of God in soteriological terms. But this concept must not be construed to mean that the permanency of values implies a static condition in God. The heading of this section calls for process as well as permanency. The kind of cosmology Whitehead proclaims needs both. Permanency is needed for stability. Something must abide.

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 525.
2. I Cor. 15: 58.
But permanency is not enough. There must be process or there is no progress.

Ideals fashion themselves round these two notions, permanence and flux. In the in-escapable flux, there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence, there is an element that escapes into flux. 1

If these "ideal opposites" are separated, then there is no understanding of the actual world, neither is there progress. Both God as primordial (permanency) and the world as concrete (flux) are agents for the fertilization or fulfilment of the other. God is infinite mentality seeking diversity or multiplicity which it finds in the world, whereas the world is a multiplicity of actuality seeking unity which it finds in God. This means that every potential in the mind of God becomes a lure for feeling or a possibility for actualization, while every feeling adds novelty to the "massive inheritance from bygone system." 2 This dialectic between God and the world is eternal and dynamic; it is the growing edge of reality.

First, it is a potentiality in the mind of God, then an actualization in the physical world; next it passes back into God to become objectified in God's consequent nature, and finally God passes it back as perfected actuality to become itself a fact of experience for each temporal actuality.

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 613.
2. Ibid., 515.
Whitehead calls this fourth phase "the love of God", the action of which he describes in this beautiful, and it might be said, religious language:  

What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion—the fellow sufferer who understands.  

Here is exciting possibility, and progress unlimited. In that process lies the perpetuation and eternal increase of values in the universe. "No static maintenance of perfection is possible. This axiom is rooted in the nature of things."  

C. Comparative Summary.  

Brightman's view of the function of God in value structure is summarized in the following words:  

The idea of God symbolizes a unity or harmony between existence and value; coherence between structure and function of persons and the structure and function of things; an end for human and for cosmic endeavor, individual and social; a synthesis of mechanism and purpose.  

A comparable summary of Whitehead's position is also found in his own words;  

1. Just previously Whitehead had referred to the theme of cosmology as "the basis of all religions," PR, 529-530.  
2. Ibid., 532.  
The power by which God sustains the world is the power of himself as the ideal... Apart from God, there would be no actual world; and apart from the actual world with its creativity, there would be no rational explanation of the ideal vision which constitutes God... He is the binding element in the world... He is not the world, but the valuation of the world... Apart from it, there could be no definite determination of limitation required for attainment.¹

For both men what God is, is the clue to their interpretation of values. Brightman's theory of values rests on the axiom that God is personal, and that ultimate values are his normative appreciations. Because "mind can recognize mind," other persons in the universe are able to appreciate in their own experience the values which are discoverable in the universe. In this manner the universe is seen as a fellowship of persons. It is not an instance of men against the world, but a society of perceiving minds able to enter into communion with one another. Persons are neither strangers in the universe nor is there an "infinite qualitative difference" between finite human minds and the Supreme Mind. Personalistic idealism as represented by Brightman confronts experience with the faith "that the small segment of the universe which we call ourselves is truly a sample of what the whole universe is."²

Here is ground for effort and achievement. An impersonal

¹. Whitehead, RM, 156, 157, 158, 159.
². Brightman, PR, 83.
world "uninterested" in the attainment and conservation of values is not a very conducive environment in which to make the effort nor is it an adequate framework in which to build value theory.

Whitehead's view of God and the world also affords to individuals the highest incentive for value striving. He eternally confronts the world with the ideal vision of what it can become. "He is the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness." Every feeble effort toward value is met with God's solicitude that each achievement might not only be maintained but that progress shall continue. As the principle of concretion God "longs" to bring differentiation and order, i.e., value, out of the otherwise homogeneous on-going of the creative advance. The comparable notion in Brightman's thought is God as "Controller of The Given" which signifies his effort "to impose ever new combinations of given rational form on the given nonrational content."

In "control" and "concretion" God's teleological function is revealed. He is the reason in the universe why there is order. For Brightman, nowhere is the failure of impersonalism any more apparent than in the attempt to account for purpose. For Whitehead a feeling-less, materialistic world with certain configurations of matter in space

1. Whitehead, RM, 155.
2. Brightman, PGR, 235.
and time is equally a failure in accounting for meaning-
ful organic relationships. For one the aim of God is the
"embodiment of the good,"¹ while for the other the aim is
"aesthetic harmony."²

In neither man are order and value inexorably imposed
from without. It is the immanence of God which preserves
the world from chaos. Brightman's personalistic pluralism
is far from pantheism, yet it is because the universe is
part of God's rational experience that it reveals a pattern
of law and order. Whitehead's cosmology, although difficult
to disassociate from pantheism, is saved from that traditional
classic position by the mild transcendence implied by God's
persuasive function. In both, the private experience of
human persons and actual entities make it impossible to say
that God is all there is.

A high point of similarity between the two men is seen
in their orientation toward the future. It is a great
strength of both that their doctrine adequately provides
for the continuation of values beyond their present expres-
sion. God is the guarantor that values shall be maintained.
Both use soteriological language in referring to the con-
servation of values. Brightman coins the expression

¹. Brightman, POR, 338.
³. It is not foreign for some commentators to plant the
   opposite suggestion. See Clark, CVMT, 262.
"axiosoteria" while Whitehead refers to God as "savior."

Whether or not the continuation of values involves the continuation of persons is a problem not easily settled. Brightman's position is less subject to the criticism of indeterminateness. Whether he is right or wrong he does suggest the high probability that God will continue to preserve the existence of finite human persons after the death of the physical organism. His argument rests on the failure of physiological psychology to demonstrate the absolute dependence of consciousness on the brain and the even more potent argument from the goodness of God who, Brightman feels, is under a certain divine obligation to preserve all persons whom he considers capable of continued development.

One of the most significant comparative values to emerge from the juxtaposition of Brightman's and Whitehead's views of God in relation to their axiology is the over-all feeling that Brightman's personalism and Whitehead's "panpsychistic personalism"¹ provide a solid metaphysical foundation for their value structure. The importance of metaphysical adequacy is seen not only as an internal necessity of their systems but as a constant source of strength for the would-be expositor of their value theories. In other words, value notions do not have to be brought to their systems and forced

¹. See Brightman, Art. (1950), 344.
into a framework not meant for them. There is no doubt that Brightman has an axiology and that it is integral to his system. Most reviewers would not question the view that Whitehead's axiology is an essential part of his system, although Leue does begin his study, *Metaphysical Foundations for a Theory of Value in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead*, with a paradox. "The paradox is that Whitehead does not have a theory of value." There may be some truth in Leue's statement if the emphasis is put on *theory*, but values are still there rooted deep in his organic system and the nature of God. Any consistent effort to expound either Whitehead's view of God or value without consideration of both concepts is due to fail.

Grounded as they are in a strong theistic metaphysics, it might not be too hazardous to prophesy that a careful, studied synthesis of Brightman's and Whitehead's major axiological insights would result in an axiology fortified by the strong points of both and minus the weakness of each. Such a synthesis might begin by a re-evaluation of their ideas of God. Brightman's concept of individual personality as applied to God would be

---

1. Leue, MFTV, I.
2. This present dissertation is not in any sense such an attempt, but it might provide the basis for some further consideration of the possibility of a synthesis.
enriched by Whitehead's view of God's organic relatedness to the world. On the other hand, Whitehead's concept of God, attended as it is with certain metaphysical vagaries, would be clarified by Brightman's clear-cut theism.
CHAPTER FOUR

DISVALUE

A. Brightman.

It is Brightman's belief that disvalue or evil is the major problem in any systematic theory of values. The problem is not such that it can be arbitrarily selected or excluded as a mere matter of editorial or thematic policy, according to the expected reader interest. Rather, it is one that forces itself on any person who would wish to be coherent about his philosophy of life. If there is rational participation in life, then evil is a problem.

1. Experience as a Revealer of Disvalue.

All knowledge comes in the form of self-experience, the good as well as the bad. Any attempt to blink this fact is the extreme kind of optimism, if not outright moral blindness. Whether or not there is any satisfactory

---

1. Brightman uses the terms disvalue and evil interchangeably. In RV, 81, he says that "the term used to denote the contrary of value is disvalue or evil." In POR, 89, he says: "The opposite of value is disvalue or evil or worthlessness." See also POR, 241 n.

2. Brightman, POR, 240.

3. See one of the most recent critiques of the view that in self-experience knowledge has "its securest foothold", in Perry, RV, 448.
solution to the problem of evil, or even before there is any attempt to solve it, one of the most poignant and evident facts of experience is that evil comes mixed with good. "All experience is in the form of opposition and struggle,"¹ Brightman says in The Problem of God. In A Philosophy of Religion he says that "experience contains both teleological and dysteleological factors."² Every creative experience seems to be subject to the discreate,³ every harmony with disharmony, beauty with the ugly. Brightman says that "evil is a problem only because there is some good which we are not now attaining and which the evil prevents our attaining;"⁴ but it is also true that goodness is a problem because there is evil. Disvalue is not mere negativity. It is the most harshly real aspect of experience. "He who lives truly sees that experience is mingled comedy and tragedy,"⁵ but for many people it is mostly tragedy. To see only the good is over-optimistic and visionary; to see only the evil is rank pessimism and morbid despair. The rational attitude involves not only the recognition of both as inescapable facts of experience, but the serious attempt to find some coherent explanation.

1. Brightman, PG, 177.
2. Brightman, PQR, 392. Note the very personal autobiographical references to experiences of evil, in Brightman, Art., (1932), 75.
3. Cf. Lewis, CA.
for the co-existence of both good and evil.

It is a sign of the intensity with which Brightman seeks to expound a coherent philosophy that he has given such a large place to the dysteleological facts. In fact, his theory of value is unintelligible without his treatment of evil. That the two aspects cannot be separated is seen in Brightman's statement that we "confront, not the problem of good or the problem of evil, but the compound problem of good-and-evil."1 It is difficult to understand how any proposed axiological system could avoid the problem, if the writer had any intention at all of being empirical and systematic. One is reluctant to criticize as great a work as Urban's Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, but one could read its more than 425 pages and hardly be aware that there were any other kinds of axiological data but experiences of positive worth and goodness. The situation is all the more amazing in the light of Urban's statement in the Preface:

Without laying claim to comprehensiveness or completeness, it may be said, I think, that there is no significant form of worth experience which is not adequately enough treated to show its relation to the general system of values.2

The omission of disvalue may be part of the incompleteness, but in the light of the omission, the rest of his

2. Urban, VNL, x.
claim is very difficult to understand.

For Brightman disvalue is a problem because it is a fact of the universe. It is not merely a psychological experience to be explained away by transient feelings of discord and suffering, but it is in the very warp and woof of the universe, dark and ominous. Experience reflects what is there. The ray of hope in the picture is that evil is not the ultimate universal fact. The problem of evil is not entirely solved, but it is tremendously relieved by the knowledge that "the deepest reality is good." ¹


It has been shown that experience reveals evil as well as good facts. The problem of this brief section is to show how, according to Brightman, evil is revealed; or to put it in interrogatory form, what can be inferred about the nature of evil from its presence in experience?

First, Brightman sees evil as a "deviation from the good." It is the good that is "basic and normative."² A genuine difficulty presents itself here. One could question the cognitive grounds for his somewhat a priori assertion that the good is the norm. That the good is the norm is readily granted; but it could be argued that

¹ Brightman, RV, 134.
² Ibid., 138.
Brightman is going beyond any experience in making this claim.¹ That the good should be the normative rather than the evil appears to be a non-empirical judgment wholly separated from any criterion except the moral intuition that the good is prior. Brightman's reply to the difficulty is that "morality is rational;"² hence, morality must be granted priority if we appeal to reason. Otherwise we would have as much reason for doing wrong as for doing right, and there would be no ground at all for ethical judgment. But granting rationality, one grants the priority of rightness at the same time. Further support for the view of evil as deviation is found in Brightman's belief that one can know his experience as evil only because he knows the good.

The nature of good or value may be defined without any reference to evil, or without implying that anyone ever fails to attain the highest good. On the other hand, you cannot define what you mean by evil without reference to the good.³

The position which Brightman takes on this in later writings reveals somewhat of a shifting emphasis. In his article in Contemporary American Theology he elaborates the theme that "one must experience 'the dark night of the soul' in some form, before one fully appreciates the day,"⁴

¹ See Clark, CVMT, 275, for a similar criticism.
² Brightman, ML, 95.
³ Brightman, RV, 133.
⁴ Brightman, Art. (1932), 75.
although in still later works he reverts back to his original emphasis, but with more sympathy for the value of the actual good-evil contrast. "The enjoyment of a good apple does not require logically the experience of rotten apples," he says, but he does concede that "the theory of contrast-effect is not wholly false, for the contrasts of experience often do stimulate the good." What Brightman finds basically wrong with the necessity of positing evil as a differential for goodness is the overabundance of the evil. Much less would be sufficient to indicate the contrast.

Second, evil is "inconsistency." Here Brightman is, in effect, affirming the view already mentioned that the good is the rational; and while not affirming that consistency is equivalent to rationality, he is denying that inconsistency is good. Evil is irrational. Only the good can be rational. It follows therefore that "the only ultimate evil would be whatever contradicts or prevents the realization of the rational whole of good." It is the nature of evil that it does not contribute to a coherent whole; it is isolation.

1. Brightman, NV, 83. The same analogy appears in POR, 266. The expression was a stock classroom illustration.
2. Brightman, POR, 266.
4. Brightman, POR, 244.
Third, evil is "disharmony."¹ This is the nearest that Brightman comes to using the language of aesthetics to describe the moral situation.

Fourth, he defines evil in axiological terminology as "whatever is unworthy, or hinders the attainment of what is worthwhile."²

Fifth, he sees in "purposeless experience"³ one of the a-theistic elements in the world.

One might summarize these five aspects of evil by pointing out that they are violations of moral, rational, aesthetic, axiological, and teleological norms. Brightman would probably like to add that these five types of norms could all be coherently subsumed under his one principle of rationality, which, in his view, is the arbiter of all norms. In such an event, any kind of evil is seen as a departure from the rational norm.

Two further differentiations should be indicated before closing the discussion on the nature of evil. First, as in his analysis of values, Brightman makes a strong distinction between intrinsic and instrumental disvalues. Just as an intrinsic value is inherent, apart from any use or disuse of it, so an intrinsic disvalue or evil is inherently bad. Intrinsic evils "are disvalues in themselves

¹. Brightman, RV, 133.
². Ibid., 31.
³. Brightman, POR, 199.
and nothing can make them into intrinsic values.\textsuperscript{1} He lists truth and worship as examples of intrinsic good, and error and blasphemy as examples of intrinsic evil. Brightman rejects the view that "intrinsic evils are either essential parts of the complete intrinsic good or are necessary and perfect means to the perfect end of intrinsic good,"\textsuperscript{2} but he does allow for the possibility that intrinsic evil may be instrumental to good. This latter position represents a modification of his thought. In the earlier printings of \textit{A Philosophy of Religion} he declared that "if there be any truly surd evil, then it is not in any sense an instrumental good; good comes in spite of it, not because of it."\textsuperscript{3} In the last printing of the book (1960) the word "instrumental" is changed to "intrinsic" and he revises the latter part of the quotation to say that "good comes in opposing it, not in enjoying it."\textsuperscript{4} Brightman was led to make his modification after criticism by L. H. DeWolf.\textsuperscript{5} In admitting the extremity of the original view, Brightman says:

\begin{quote}
Here I went altogether too far. No matter how evil evil is, it may be instrumental to courage, to patience, and even to love. I should have said that 'surd evil is not in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1} Brightman, POR, 248.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 242. See also POR, 269.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 246, in any edition up through the sixth.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 246.
\textsuperscript{5} DeWolf, RRAR, 171-172.
any sense an intrinsic good,' and am instructing my publisher to revise accordingly.¹

Intrinsic evil, then, can never be transformed into intrinsic good, but it may be instrumental for the production of other values. Instrumental evils are "relative to circumstances, and the same instrument may serve either good or evil ends."² He further defines instrumental evil as "any experience, process, or entity which contributes to producing an intrinsic evil or to averting an intrinsic good."³

The second differentiation worthy of note is the one he makes between voluntary and involuntary evils. "Voluntary evils are those which result from choice, involuntary evils are those which arise without, or in spite of, human choice."⁴ The former evils are usually referred to as moral evils, and the latter as natural evils.⁵ It is impossible that moral evil could exist apart from human volition while all natural evils are independent of any human will.⁶ When men choose to do wrong deliberately, evil lies in their willingness to destroy or avoid value. "It is impossible to do moral wrong unintentionally."⁷

---

³. Ibid., 242.
⁴. Brightman, NV, 84.
⁵. But Brightman prefers "voluntary" and "involuntary" to "moral" and "natural." See POR, 243; NV, 84-85.
⁶. Brightman, POR, 243.
⁷. Brightman, NV, 84. See also ML, 99, 100.
Many disvalues, however, do not have the concurrence of
the will, such as error, ignorance, disease, and all those
experiences which "seem to arise from the nature of things." To summarize the nature of evil thus far, it has been
shown as deviation from the good, inconsistency, disharmony,
whatever is unworthy, purposeless experience. It is fur­
ther analyzed into intrinsic and instrumental, and volun­
tary and involuntary. Brightman also classifies evil into
five broad types, which are indicated in the next section.

3. Types of Disvalue.
The types of evil presented in this section are not
strictly of a different order from the characteristics of
evil already presented. The previous section represented
some of the more general aspects of the nature of evil as
found in isolated discussion, while the following is Bright­
man's own analysis. Where there is overlapping, only brief
comment will be sufficient.

a. Incoherence.
The most rational person at times will experience
"a will that is more or less incoherent" which consists
in a certain hesitancy in choosing among values, in the
breaking of contracts, or willing ends that are at cross

1. "Involuntary error is an intellectual evil; voluntary
    error is a moral evil," FOR, 242 n.
2. Brightman, NV, 84.
3. Brightman, FOR, 244-246.
4. Ibid., 244.
purposes. This incoherent will appears to be both voluntary and involuntary, involving, possibly, deliberate disregard of coherent action; but also, due to the weakness of flesh and impact of the evils in the nature of things, an involuntary concession to incoherent actions or ideals.

b. Ignorance.

Brightman refers to this as an "intellectual evil."\(^1\) It is a moral evil when knowledge has been available and no attempt has been made to appropriate it;\(^2\) it is a natural evil when the ignorance has no concurrence of the will. It is interesting that he not only considers ignorance to be intrinsic evil but that the most prevalent, and "perhaps the worst" of all, is "ignorance of the highest intrinsic values."\(^3\) Seen in the light of Brightman's "moral laws", wilful ignorance is a violation of the Law of the Best Possible, which says that "all persons ought to will the best possible values in every situation; hence, if possible, to improve every situation."\(^4\)

c. Maladjustment.

Brightman does not specify what kind of maladjustment he means, except to say that "social maladjustment is one

---

2. Cf. the distinction made in theological or ethical discussion between sins of omission and commission. James said: "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." (4: 17).
4. Brightman, ML, 156.
of the worst evils of this type."¹ It may be assumed that he means any kind of personal, moral, or natural (physical) disarrangement of the part in relation to the whole.²

d. Incompetence.

He describes incompetence as "the lack of ability in any individual to do what he undertakes to do."³ It is a definite disvalue, although the sheer inability to "hit the mark" is not a voluntary deviation from some worthy end, nor the sign of an incoherent ideal. Nevertheless, Brightman considers it a disvalue on the grounds that an unskillful person may actually experience his lack as an evil.

e. Dysteleological Surd.⁴

The type of evil which Brightman refers to as "dysteleological surd" is the most destructive evil which he finds in experience. It is distinct and unique in that all the other types described are capable of alleviation or correction by the application of laws of improvement, but it is characteristic of the dysteleological surd that

---

¹ Brightman, FOR, 245.
² Maladjustment may well be viewed as a corollary of the disharmony mentioned earlier.
³ Brightman, FOR, 245.
⁴ This type of evil is sometimes implied in Brightman's other writings, but his use of "surd" as descriptive is limited almost entirely to his FOR. In RV he says, "The presence of a surd does not invalidate the objectivity of a system," RV, 134.
it is "inherently and irreducibly evil and contains within itself no principle of development or improvement." Brightman borrows the term "surd" from mathematics, where it means an irrational quantity. In its axiological application, it refers to "an evil that is not expressible in terms of good, no matter what operations are performed on it." At the beginning of his argument, Brightman acknowledges that the existence of such surds is debatable, and suggests that the most acute problem for axiology is whether or not there is surd evil; but in all subsequent references he expresses no doubts and assumes the reality of the irrational evils without any attempt to establish that they are irreducibly valueless. He illustrates this type by imbecility, which, if incurable, has within it "the intrinsic worthlessness of the imbecile's existence and the suffering which his existence imposes on others."

Not even God can convert such an evil into a good. It has no redeeming quality. The only "solution" in the presence of evil surds lies in control and opposition, to the end that other values will not be destroyed and the possibility that some instrumental value might be derived.

---

1. Brightman, POR, 245-246.
2. Ibid., 245 n. Cf. also the lexicon, POR, 538. It has already been shown above that although nothing intrinsically good can be brought from a surd evil, it may be an instrumental value.
4. Note 3, e. g., POR, 276.
5. Ibid., 246.
6. Ibid., 246; 338.
4. Sources of Disvalue.

The crux of any discussion of disvalue lies in the theory postulated as to the sources (or source) of evil. Experience may indicate local and immediate causes, but any theory of ultimate origins lies beyond experiential evidence. The best that can be done is to postulate the kind of causes or sources that would account for evil in the way that it appears in experience. This seems like a truism, but the neglect of this axiom has permitted the development of many theories of disvalue and evil far removed from the facts as revealed. It is the strength of Brightman's position that he begins with experience in the light of which he formulates an hypothesis which, as he sees it, coherently accounts for the dysteleological factors in the universe. If such an hypothesis demands readjustment of the traditional views of God, then Brightman boldly expounds a theism that will fit the totality of data. As in the case of Whitehead, he considers that not even God should "be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles...He is their chief exemplification!"1 His "solution" to the problem of disvalue does involve God, and in such a way that it becomes the central issue in his exposition of disvalue. Nels Ferré is correct in saying of the view that "the solution of our finite problem of

1. Whitehead, PR, 521.
is raised into ultimate status by making it the solution of the problem of God, "1 although he objects to elevating the problem of evil to "ultimate status." It is Brightman's opinion that no adequate explanation of disvalue can be given that omits God.

This section, therefore, will give special attention to his theistic finitism as the only alternative in a rational accounting of evil. Because he allows for finite human selves as possible subsidiary sources of evil, it will be necessary to consider the part of human wills, but only briefly.

a. Human Wills.

Much of the older theology finds in human sin the cause of the major evils of the world. A. H. Strong, for instance, says that "but for the fact of man's sin, it [death] would not have existed."2 But the theologians are not alone in attributing to human wills the major causes of disvalue. The philosopher Bowne says: "The chief ills under which man suffers are the results of his own doing."3 Bowne recognizes full well the terrific evils of the natural order, 4 and although some are beyond any possible human

1. Ferré, CUG, 26.
2. Strong, ST, 658. His answer to the objection that death must have existed before the "fall" of man is amazing: "We may believe that God arranged even the geological history to correspond with the foreseen fact of human apostasy," ST, 658.
4. Ibid., 274, 275.
causal relationship, he does see in man himself the solution to the ethical, social, and even metaphysical problems entailed thereby. He says:

All that stands in the way of this consummation is man himself. There is no inherent intractability in the nature of things which forbids it. The difficulty lies solely in human nature.¹

With most of this Brightman disagrees. He sees the human will, because of its measure of freedom, as the source of some evil,² particularly moral evil. And he could agree with Bowne's emphasis on the pedagogical value of evil,³ but the evident marks of dysteleology in the universe go deeper than any possible human cause. "The evils—that is, hindrances to value—cannot without absurdity all be ascribed to human sin or human finiteness."⁴

There are many dysteleological aspects of the physical universe which have no apparent connection at all with human agency, e.g., tornadoes, volcanoes, cancer.⁵ In the social and psychological context there are terrific pressures and forces which cannot be attributed to any voluntary human will.

Is it just to ascribe all of the sins and vices of poverty-stricken refugees or unemployed families to their own freedom, or

3. See Bowne, THE, 276: "The imperfection of the physical world in itself is its perfection, considered as an instrument for the upbuilding of man."
5. These were favorite classroom illustrations.
even to all human freedom put together?... |
Freedom, we repeat, explains much of moral |
evil, but it does not explain either the |
force of temptation or the degrading conse-
quenses of moral evil.4 |
 |
b. Other Attempted Solutions. |

Besides human freedom, which Brightman rejects as |
a complete solution to the totality of evil in the uni-
verse, he surveys eight other attempted solutions, all of |
which he rejects as being inadequate, although some may |
have a germ of truth. It is not the purpose to discuss |
them fully here. They are listed below with a highly con-
densed summary of Brightman's objections, as evidence of |
his thorough investigation of the problem, and for their |
comparative value in relation to Brightman's own solution |
and to Whitehead's discussion later. The other attempted |
solutions are:2 |

(1) Non-moral evils come as punishment for moral |
evils.3 |

Objection: This view does not accord with the high-
est ethical ideals or the love of God. |

(2) Non-moral evils are disciplinary. 

2. Ibid., 261-272 for all the following points in this |
   section. |
3. See, for example, Gustave Oehler, who says that "moral |
   and physical evil were not originally in the world. The |
latter was penally ordained (Gen. iii. 17ff.) after the |
former had entered the world by the free act of man, and |
from this time forward both form an element of the di-
vine order of the world," TOT, 122.
Objection: If for discipline they are often out of proportion to the "crime", and it is doubtful if they are the best means for producing the values desired.

(3) Evil is incomplete good.

Objection: This argument holds only if it is known what the whole is, and that it is good.

(4) Evil is needed as a contrast to good.

Objection: More evil is present than is necessary for the contrast.

(5) Evils for man may be instrumental goods for other beings in the universe.

Objection: There is absolutely no evidence for this, but if it were possible it does not answer why humanity needs to suffer to serve another order of beings.

(6) All evils serve an unknown good.

Objection: This view makes the present distinction between good and evil impossible, and ignorance of what is ultimately good is no ground for saying that an experience of evil is partially good. That is the fallacy of ignotum per ignotius.

(7) Evil is unreal.

Objection: If evil is illusion then the good also may be illusion, but the error of thinking it real is just as

---

1. It has already been noted that Brightman varied some in his opinion on the necessity of evil as contrast to good. Of course here he is only saying that there is more evil than necessary to suggest the contrast.
harmful as if it were; furthermore, this theory does not account for the error in an otherwise perfect universe.

(8) Evil and good are found only in conscious experience, which becomes, then, only a matter of adjustment to axiologically neutral processes.

Objection: Ultimate axiological distinctions become impossible, and values are only disillusionsments.¹

(3) God's Nonrational Given.

It is not necessary for purposes of this section to review or analyze the whole doctrine of theistic finitism as propounded by Brightman.² It will be sufficient to consider (1) in what sense he finds the source of disvalue in God, (2) his arguments in support of this position, and (3) some objections to the doctrine.

(1) Brightman says that

if there are causal processes in nature which, apart from human intervention, lead to dysteleological results, then it is impossible to avoid the question of God's responsibility for evil.³

As shown above, Brightman rejects the human possibility along with some other attempted solutions which cannot be accorded coherent defence. The whole welter of possible solutions to evil may be reduced to two alternatives:

¹ This "solution," Brightman says, "is the least coherent of all interpretations of good-and-evil," POR, 272.
² For a brief and very recent exposition, see Stahl, Art. (1954).
³ Brightman, POR, 247.
a Manichaean dualism or God himself. He boldly chooses the latter horn of the dilemma, feeling that in spite of all its attendant difficulties, it is the only explanation that can consistently keep "one world" and still account for the dysteleological facts. In attributing disvalue to God, Brightman faces the real issue: how can evil be attributed to a good God? Brightman's answer is the heart of his theistic finitism: God "is limited by eternal and uncreated restraints within his own nature."

His name for this aspect of God is The Given. He also refers to it variously as a "cosmic drag", "retarding

1. Brightman, Art. (1932), 76.
2. Brightman is perfectly willing for the problem of evil to be raised to "ultimate status" and be made the problem of God, provided, of course, that the theory which does so remains coherent.
3. Brightman, Art. (1932), 76. For Brightman's own brief summaries of the whole theory, see FG, 113; FG, 174-177; POR, 336-337.
4. It is possible to demonstrate some changing emphasis in Brightman's use of the term. In his first extensive account he sees it "in addition" to God's "reason and his active creative will." (FG, 113); but later he describes it as applying to "the total complex of eternal factors in the divine nature" (FG, 174). In POR he says that "The Given consists in the eternal, uncreated laws of reason and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness" (POR, 337). It is always necessary to distinguish the rational from the nonrational Given, but in common use Brightman usually meant the nonrational "cosmic drag" when he referred, without qualification, to The Given. Some ambiguity is caused by his failure to make clear whether The Given (as nonrational) is passive or active. See, e. g., FG, 113, and FG, 174, 175.
5. Brightman, Art. (1932), 76.
power", or "retarding factor." This recalcitrant factor in God's nature enters his conscious activity "as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him." He does not will it, and he controls it, but it is this nonrational, unwilled, and eternal Given in God which makes evil possible in the world. It should be emphasized that Brightman establishes very clearly the causal relationship between The Given and evil. In succinct summary: the source of evil is God's nonrational Given. Surds may be traced to God as source, but he does not will them. His goodness, therefore, is preserved at the expense of his power. Strictly speaking, and Brightman is careful to point this out, it is more correct to "speak of a God whose will is finite rather than a finite God."

(2) What does Brightman offer by way of argument for this position? Negatively, his five objections to theistic absolutism may be transposed as arguments for finitism.

2. Ibid., 192.
3. Ibid., 185.
4. Ibid., 113.
6. In Art. (1932), he says: "The presence of The Given in God accounts for the otherwise meaninglessly tragic sufferings and delays of life." In P.G. 113, he says that "the evils of life and the delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice."
8. Ibid., 309.
Stated positively, they can stand on their own feet as evidence for his position. Briefly summarized, his theistic finitism rests on the following considerations:

First, the data of evolution. Evolution in its total aspect shows progress and teleology, but there are also signs of waste and struggle, which argue against both absolutism and atheism. The struggle shows both life and temporary failure; therefore, a finite God. In this view the facts are accepted and interpreted for what they are, instead of being explained in terms of ignorance or the unknown.

Second, it gives a coherent account of surd evil. To attribute evils to God's will is altogether incoherent in the light of his goodness. To hold that God is in all respects infinite necessitates the attributing of evil to him. But "there is no evidence that power is infinite." If God is finite in power, then surd evils can be accounted for.

Third, it allows for the superiority of goodness over power. Goodness, not power, is worthy of worship. "God is the goodness in the universe." Both the goodness and the power cannot be maintained.

1. Brightman, FOR, 314 ff.
2. Although Calvin's God could predestine sin and still maintain his goodness.
4. Ibid., 319.
Fourth, experience reveals activity, rational form and brute fact. Every experience involves activity of some kind, operating in accordance with certain laws which are not themselves the result of an activity. But more than activity and form there is also revealed the content of brute fact—"the ultimate qualities (or qualia) of experience, the sense qualities, the pleasures and pains, the desires and impulses of experience." Finitism is postulated as a rational and coherent alternative to the necessity of attributing to God's rational creative will this brute fact content of experience. To do the latter is to make him evil. Finitism both accounts for the total structure of experience and preserves God's good will.

Fifth, theistic finitism is empirically adequate. This has already been implied throughout, but Brightman's emphasis is not over-done, and his continued insistence on the empirical adequacy forces debate to the level of experience where Brightman's case is the strongest. No theory is adequate which makes a priori judgments in regard to what God ought to be. It might be asked at this point, "Is not Brightman's frequent declaration that God is good, pure a priori? Might not he actually be evil as some facts seem to indicate?" Brightman's reply to this criticism lies in his conviction that "the deepest reality is good."

1. Brightman, POF, 320.
2. Brightman, RV, 134.
His evidence lies in the experience and recognition of the love of God, his creatorship, his providence, his immanence in all things, his wisdom, and the signs of his purpose in nature.¹

All these are indicators that good is dominant despite the evil. On the human level values can be achieved in the face of the greatest obstacles which experience presents. There is struggle but there is also value realization. What is true on the divine level can only be postulated the basis of facts on the human level. It is Brightman's opinion that theistic finitism is the only hypothesis that does justice to all experience.

If God is an eternal person, whose will is limited by the eternal laws of reason and the eternal brute facts of his experience, then the observed empirical nature of the world we experience can be understood. All of its features are explained by reference to the eternal ground of all human experience—namely the divine experience.

(2) Although the last chapter of this dissertation is reserved for critique, some representative objections to his theistic finitism may, with profit, be mentioned here. In general, it may be said that most of the criticisms of Brightman's view of a finite God fall under two main categories, religious and metaphysical.² As examples of the

2. Brightman, FCR, 321.
3. A brief survey of ten criticisms under these two major categories is contained in Mullen, Art.,(1964). Some of the material presented here is adapted from this paper.
former type, the following objections seem to be fairly representative.

Alfred E. Garvie in his work, *The Christian Belief in God*, does not enlarge upon his objection, but he says that it were indeed a strange, even startling paradox, if in His nature as God there were this given, which bewilders, benumbs, and baffles His 'self-knowledge, self-reverence, and self-control.'

Garvie admits the merit of placing the limitation—if there is one—within God rather than in an external power, but his conclusion is that "faith cannot acquiesce in a finite God." Brightman would reject Garvie's appeal as being based on emotional rather than experiential considerations, and, as such, too narrow. Faith may not wish to acknowledge less than an absolute God, but one cannot escape the totality of experience which reveals the tragic as well as the good. "Finitism... is based on the truly empirical motive of giving a complete and a rational account of all of the experiences of man."

Edwin Lewis, probably one of the most outspoken of Brightman's critics, says:

The introduction of a conflict into the very bosom of God such as Brightman proposes will hardly win our philosophical atheists... it will

---

1. Garvie, CBG, 421-422.
2. Ibid., 482.
not help the difficulties of the great host
of perplexed and earnest seekers.

Lewis feels that Brightman's view takes away the meta-
physical basis for religious adequacy. What it amounts
to, Lewis contends, is "modern Manichaism," but it has
"all the drawbacks and none of the advantages of Zoroas-
trian dualism." Conflict in God not only reduces the
appeal of theism, says Lewis, but the concept of God as
"growing in wisdom, power, and goodness" cannot be main-
tained.

It is very helpful to have Brightman's own reply to
some of his critics in his article, "The Given and its
Critics." The charge that his view is really dualism
Brightman denies. He says:

Why describe a view as Manichaean merely be-
cause it asserts that God did not actually
create his own being, but finds within himself
elements which call for action?

As for the charge of introducing conflict and change in
God, Brightman answers Lewis by saying: "My view is a
plea for a dynamic instead of a static universe, a suffer-
ing and creative, instead of an impassive and impassible
God." Furthermore, it is of the very nature of personality

---
1. Lewis, 60, 13.
2. Ibid., 55.
3. Ibid., 13-14.
4. Ibid., 80.
6. Ibid., 140.
7. Brightman, Art. (1932) 2, 143. For a very good study of
the impassibility of God, see Mozley, IG.
to change. "Is not personality always a concrete synthesis of change and identity? How could God be a person if change were utterly foreign to him?"

Eugene W. Lyman also rejects Brightman's theistic finitism on the grounds of its religious inadequacy. That God has a dark, irrational aspect cuts the nerve of worship which can only be based, he contends, on a super-rational awareness of God's superior wisdom and goodness. Brightman's reply to this criticism is his well-defended belief that "it is not at all evident that the worshipful attitude is contingent upon any belief in omnipotence whatever."  

On more metaphysical grounds the following are some typical criticisms of Brightman's theistic finitism. In God and History, Sherwood Eddy shows great sympathy with Brightman's view, declaring that he would "be quite willing to go the whole way" if logic or experience led in that direction, but he does not find it necessary to assume that the limitations of God are due to some internal impotence.

"The whole structure of the universe in every atom, as shown by the atomic bomb, bears evidence of incalculable and

2. Lyman, MTR, 428.
3. Brightman, FG, 187. It has already been shown above that Brightman not only repudiates the view that theistic finitism excludes true worship, but contends instead that meaningful worship is enhanced by the notion of a limited, suffering, but sympathetic God.
4. Eddy, GH, 266.
inconceivable power.\textsuperscript{1} The evidence indicates that God may be infinite in power as well as love, hence adequate for any situation.

Eddy has a strong point in appealing to the horribly real presence of power in the physical universe, and if matter is God's will in action, as Brightman says, then there is empirical evidence for divine potency such as has never been imagined. But the weakness in Eddy's position is that he would find in physical power axiological efficiency. There is little reason to assume that the kind of power released in an atomic or hydrogen explosion is adequate for bringing moral beauty or love to fruition. Value by force accords neither with Brightman's nor Whitehead's God. Even though God's "physical power" may be the most potent force in the universe, it does not change the experienced fact that values do come only through great effort and pain, and without coercion. Therefore, there must be something internal to God's nature which makes struggle necessary to axiological achievement.

Nels Ferré has made some very perspicacious criticisms. He says that Brightman has raised the finite problem of evil to "ultimate status\textsuperscript{2}" by making it the problem of God, and in so doing has actually reduced the concept of God to terms of limited human experience. This is too much like making

\begin{enumerate}
\item Eddy, GH, 266.
\item Ferré, CUG, 26.
\end{enumerate}
man the measure. It makes the "present process" the measure of God, whereas "God towers majestically over our finite difficulties with which we try to limit Him."¹ A further criticism is that if God actually is growing "from deficiency into perfection, He should have done so long before now within infinite time."²

Ferré's criticisms may be answered by reference to many passages in Brightman's works. Few things are more clear in Brightman's argument for a finite God than his insistence on beginning with the facts. That it is not sound thinking to explain God in terms of human experience is met by Brightman's strong counterclaim that only as we interpret God in terms of what we know are we on adequate philosophical ground. It may be that the more nearly correct view of God is a synthesis of Ferré's desire to preserve the transcendent majesty of God and Brightman's insistence on a concept of God which does not cut him off from finite existence. Actually, such a synthesis, i. e., a view which preserves both the divine dignity and empirical adequacy, is precisely the position which Brightman takes. He says that "any empirical philosophy of religion must recognize both the divine dignity and human suffering...both a Mighty God and a Suffering Servant."³ Brightman is willing to

1. Ferré, CUG, 105.
2. Ibid., 28.
grant that some of the functions of the Supreme Being are "high and lifted up" provided that it does not make him totaliter aliter.

As for the second criticism that in infinite time God should have grown "from deficiency into perfection," i. e., eliminated the nonrational Given from his nature, it does not reflect any claim by Brightman that God will outgrow The Given. Brightman always thought of The Given as eternal. Instead of elimination

there is more ground to hope that it may be raised to higher and higher levels and that it may enter into increasingly beautiful and holy creations as the endless future advances.¹

He believes that the possibility of God's arriving at some stage of development where there is no further development "is so remote from the facts of experience as to be incoherent...with them."² Perfection is not static completion but "inexhaustible perfectibility."³

Another objection, on metaphysical grounds, to Brightman's doctrine comes from Eugene Lyman, who questions Brightman's contention that The Given in no way makes a "dualism either of stuff or of ultimate principle in the universe."⁴ Lyman feels that by ascribing to God "suffering eternally present...because of an eternal element in

¹ Brightman, FG, 176.
² Brightman, POR, 340.
³ Ibid., 340.
⁴ Brightman, FG, 185.
his nature\(^1\) is to make more than a "dualism of process.\(^2\)
A better and more empirical alternative, he holds, is to
ascribe to the whole universe elements of "spontaneity and
contingency" which can adequately account for both evil
and divine limitation in creative effort, but which do not
in any way inject limitation into the nature of God himself.

Brightman rejects both the charge of dualism\(^3\) and Ly-
man's solution to the problem of evil. That God would be
relieved of responsibility from the world by granting free-
dom to other parts of the universe (assuming, of course,
that God is ultimate cause) Brightman disallows. In reply-
ing to D. O. Macintosh, whose solution to the problem of
evil is very similar to Lyman's,\(^4\) Brightman contends that
in creating at all God must be held responsible for the con-
sequences,\(^5\) hence to attribute to nature "a certain measure
of free determination\(^6\) is not to absolve God of all respon-
sibility.

1. Lyman, MTR, 430.
2. Brightman allows this much of a dualism, PG, 185.
3. This was one of the most common objections to Brightman's
view of The Given. It has been made by Clark, CUMT, 280;
Lewis, GC, 15, 14; Banning, Art. (1934), 154. Knudsen, DR,
204. Also by his associates, students, and other profes-
sional philosophers. The frequency and persistence of the
charge, in the face of Brightman's repeated disavowal of
it, must be due to a certain lack of preciseness in his de-
lination of The Given. His answer to it has already been
given.
4. Cf. also Garnett, RPR, 297, 293; Rall, CHR, 321, for al-
most identical views. Whitehead's solution might be in-
cluded in this same classification.
5. See Brightman's reply to Macintosh, Art. (1932)\(^3\). Note
also "The Law of Consequences," ML, 142 ff.
Two others, who have had the advantage of close personal association with Brightman, have provided some cogent criticism of several aspects of Brightman's thought associated with his theistic finitism. They are P. A. Bertocchi and L. H. DeWolf.

Bertocchi's primary objection concerns the formal aspect of The Given. Brightman is strongly insistent on the presence of the "eternal factors in the divine nature which he did not create and with which he always has to deal." These factors, including reason, moral law, and an eternal subject-matter, are eternal necessities with which God must reckon when he acts. Bertocchi feels that in holding the divine necessity of submitting to the uncreated laws of reason or morality, Brightman is going beyond the "empirical evidence." That God is reasonable is a conceivable concept, argues Bertocchi, but he can "see no reason for holding that God must be reasonable whether he wants to or not." Bertocchi contends that God is free, as are other persons, "to do good or evil. His moral goodness, like ours, cannot be automatic." It is possible that God cannot do better than he is doing with

2. Ibid., 175.
4. Ibid., 279.
5. Bertocchi, IPR, 482.
the material he has at hand, but he might have adopted an alternate plan and created a universe without other persons. God was free to create or not to create.

In regard to his goodness the question might be asked, "Why could not God be only partly good, i.e., partly evil?" The answer lies in the view that God is assuredly doing his utmost to bring value out of the chaotic aspects of experience which are there as a Given both in his own nature and in human persons. To believe other than this, in both Brightman's and Bertocci's views, is to reduce experience to pure chaos. Unless God is wholly on the side of good, whether he is able to achieve his full purpose or not, moral experience would seem to be without meaning. If, however, God be seen as finite with limitations, but always willing the good, "then the observed empirical nature of the world we experience can be understood."¹

Bertocci points out that, although God is not necessarily good, it is still best for him, even as God, to work for the increase of value in the world. In other words, God will, and probably does, do his best for the increase and preservation of value. He is responsible for helping his own creation. If he does not, then the most satisfying thing that can be said about God is that

¹. Brightman, POR, 321.
he would but he cannot. Bertocci concludes his discussion of this very delicate problem with this important insight:

Even God cannot destroy value and be the better for it. The religious conviction that God is good—the conviction that love, binding all persons and things together in creative union, is central to the universe—is thus reasonably justified. To suppose that the highest Intelligence we know would find some sort of delight or self-fulfillment in allowing unnecessary human suffering, or animal pain, if he could do something about it, is to reject everything we know about the nature of wisdom.

In the above statement Bertocci has made more explicit what is implicit in Brightman's thought. Where Bertocci differs more radically with Brightman is in the use of the term The Given. Bertocci would prefer that the term be restricted as an appellation for the irrational rather than the rational element in the experience of God. Such a modification would not only allow for the self-imposition of moral and rational norms by God himself, but would be more in keeping with a temporal view of God who is in actual process of development.

1. See Bertocci, EAG, 275.
2. Bertocci, IPR, 423.
Bertocci's suggestion that The Given should be limited "to the chaotic, retarding factor in God's experience"1 is further evidence for the opinion expressed earlier that Brightman's delineation of The Given reveals somewhat of a changing emphasis. In the Problem of God, where his theistic finitism receives its first extensive treatment, The Given is in addition to God's reason and his will,2 whereas in The Finding of God and all later descriptions The Given seems to refer to "the total complex of eternal factors in the divine nature."3 Much confusion in the interpretation of Brightman's thought would have been avoided if he had not made the term all-inclusive and restricted it, as Bertocci suggests, to the non-rational elements in God's nature.

DeWolf, in criticizing Brightman's finitism, admits an "advantage in intelligibility" over the views of Plato and Tillich, but like Ferré he is hesitant to declare a solution to the problem of evil by "moving the problematic situation from man's consciousness to God's where it is in principle insoluble since there is no further being to whom we may look for explanation."4

The force of DeWolf's objection is most evident in his comment that it is impossible to show any "meaningful relation" of the nonrational Given to the rational, since all

1. Bertocci, HAG, 279.
2. Brightman, FG, 113.
meaningful relations can be attributed only to the rational element in God's nature. DeWolf concludes that not only is belief in such an extrarational kind of ultimate being a barren hypothesis from which nothing can be inferred, but it postulates gratuitously a new self-contradictory relationship at the very source of being.

Some other critiques of Brightman not treated specifically here are Gordon H. Clark, D. G. Macintosh, R. E. Baker, Andrew Banning, Vergilius Ferm, Georgia Harkness, and Arthur Munk.

This section is very well summarized by three observations. First, one is impressed over again that there are no easy answers to the problem of disvalue, despite Lewis's opinion that in contrast to men like Bowne and Knudson, Brightman took the easy way out of the problem. The sheer quantitative aspect of the criticism of Brightman's position

1. DeWolf, TLC, 134.
2. Clark, CVMT, 231-281. Clark's criticism is determined largely by certain theological presuppositions which make an impartial critique impossible. His language is harsh and his discussion superficial.
4. Baker, OLG, 139-178. Brightman says of this work: "Reviewers generally have pointed out its lack of objectivity," POR, 324 n. The reviewers' findings are sustained. For an example of how she missed an obvious point on the analogy of The Given to the content of sense experience, see OLG, 156. Cf. Brightman's reply to her in Art.(1932)3.
7. Harkness, RI, 162.
9. Lewis, GO, 150.
and his courage in meeting all objections refute the notion that the way was easy. Second, Brightman was convinced beyond a doubt that his doctrine of The Given was the only solution that squares with the facts. Whatever other defects his view might have, it cannot be claimed that he refused to acknowledge the data revealed in experience. Third, many of the objections to Brightman's theistic finitism seem to be based on too superficial aspects of the doctrine. His "resultant idea of God"\(^1\) compares favorably with other expositions of God which do not have the "disadvantage" of a somewhat unusual aspect of God to explain. Brightman's God is no less adequate for life and worship.

While it is true that much, if not most, of cosmic disvalue is traceable to unwilled elements in God's nature, this chapter has shown that God is also the ultimate source of value and himself the guarantee that values and persons shall be conserved.

B. Whitehead.

1. The Nature of Disvalue.

Whitehead's view of disvalue\(^2\) can be understood only in the light of his concept of value which has already been defined in terms of aesthetic harmony. "'Value' is the word

---

2. Whitehead does not use the term "disvalue." The word is used here as a general synonym to Whitehead's varied and colorful phrases descriptive of the discordant elements in the world.
I use for the intrinsic reality of an event. Value is an element which permeates through and through the poetic view of nature. 1 God's role in the universe may be summarized in the statement that God is "the poet of the world." 2 Disvalue, then, is anything which introduces a disruptive or deterring element into the realization of harmonic structure in the universe.

Whitehead uses a wide variety of words and phrases to express the discordant elements in the world, e. g., mutual inhibition, 3 mutual destructiveness, 4 divergent tonalities, 5 discordant feeling, 6 incompatibility, 7 destructive turbulence, 8 incompatible alternatives, 9 discordance. 10

The first question to be raised here is whether or not metaphysical evil is in any sense intrinsic or is, instead, only a certain way of looking at the facts in the light of aesthetic purpose. The latter seems to be the more correct interpretation of Whitehead's emphasis. In this view evil, or disvalue, is better seen as partiality or temporary incompatibility rather than as an intrinsically destructive factor. Even in the views which follow, i. e., evil as "physical

---

1. Whitehead, SMW, 95.
2. Whitehead, PR, 526.
3. Whitehead, AI, 324.
4. Ibid., 329.
5. Ibid., 333.
6. Ibid., 330.
7. Ibid., 334.
8. Ibid., 367.
10. Ibid., 386.
wasting" and "mutual obstruction", what on the surface appears to be disvalue per se is actually not an evil when put in proper context.

a. Physical Wasting.

Whitehead views the ongoing of the universe as an adventure "upwards and downwards."¹ Whatever does not rise starts to decay by passing to subsequent occasions an attenuated feeling of the good.

It decays by transmitting its nature to slighter occasions of actuality, by reason of the failure of the new forms to fertilize the perceptive achievements which constitute its past history.²

This failure reveals one aspect of the universe as "physically wasting", while the other aspect is seen as "spiritually ascending."³ Whatever is evil in the world therefore may be viewed as a physical wasting. It is negative in that it does not respond creatively to possibility, but it is positive in the sense that it acts as a deterring element in the life of other actual entities. Bixler's opinion on this point that "evil is a brute motive force on its own account"⁴ is too strong, in that it seems to emphasize some inherent malignant quality. The contextual nature of evil must continually be

1. Whitehead, RM, 159.
2. Ibid., 160.
3. Ibid., 160. Cf. the descending quality of matter and the upward impulse of life in Bergson, GE, 245 and pas sim. For a study of the influence of Bergson on Whitehead see Stahl, IBW.
kept in mind.

Evil, triumphant in its enjoyment, is so far good in itself; but beyond itself it is evil in its character of a destructive agent among things greater than itself. Evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative.1

This is to say that a factor is evil when it operates in relation to things more advanced than itself. Value as the achieved satisfaction of any individual concrecence is discovered only in nexus. Any notion of intrinsic evil seems to be repudiated.

Evil is a wasting in that it does not add to the harmony of the universe. What does not grow must needs die. It is "in its own nature unstable"2 and because unstable it achieves its own destruction. It sinks "toward nothingness"3 by its own failure to become a part of the creative advance. What does not contribute to progress falls back under its own weight.

It decays by transmitting its nature to slighter occasions of actuality, by reason of the failure of the new forms to fertilize the perceptive achievements which constitute its past history.4

The effect of evil becomes more tenuous as the "past fades"5 until it achieves its "final degradation."6 What the status

2. Ibid., 96.
3. Ibid., 96.
4. Ibid., 160.
5. Whitehead, PR, 517.
of this final and self-eliminating stage is, Whitehead does not explain too well, but the evil of it consists "in the comparison of what is with what might have been."¹ To make the point clear, Whitehead gives one of his too infrequent illustrations. A hog is not evil, he says, and a man who is actually reduced to hog level is still not evil. The tragedy lies in what the man might have been. Possibility is thus seen to be a judgment on actuality. Evil is the loss or wasting of elements which could have contributed to the creative advance. That the future is not irremediably harmed thereby "lies in the fact that the past fades,"² and the evil is eliminated. Herein lies at least part of Whitehead's solution to the problem of evil.

b. Aesthetic Destruction.

The idea of lack or physical wasting, however, does not say quite enough.

In the temporal world, it is the empirical fact that process entails loss; the past is present under an abstraction. But there is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why this should be the whole story. The nature of evil is that the characters of things are mutually obstructive.³

Things in this case are "obstructive," which does not necessarily imply destructiveness in character. Good things may

¹: Whitehead, RM, 97.
²: Whitehead, PR, 517.
³: Ibid., 517.
obstruct one another. In his discussion of beauty Whitehead describes this situation under the notion of inhibitions. There he speaks of "component feelings which mutually inhibit each other so that neither rises to the strength proper to it."\(^2\) Inhibitions may be of two kinds, only one of which "involves a derogation from perfection." The other kind of inhibition produces an "anaesthesia" which results from the total exclusion of the inhibition as a positive component in subjective form. The inhibition in this case is negatively apprehended. On the other hand, where two or more feelings are positive components, there may be a "clash of vivid feelings" or "the violence of strength against strength."\(^3\) This clash as apprehended involves the third feeling of "mutual destructiveness."\(^4\) Here the evil lies in the teleological failure to achieve a feeling of aesthetic harmony in the subjective form of the totality of components. Mutual obstruction thus becomes "aesthetic destruction,"\(^5\) the opposite of beauty. "Beauty is the internal conformation of the various items of experience with each other for the production of maximum effectiveness."\(^6\) Mutual obstructiveness spoils the picture that could have been, hence evil.

---

2. Ibid., 329.
3. Ibid., 356.
4. Ibid., 329.
5. Ibid., 330.
6. Ibid., 341.
c. Disvalue as Instrumental Good.

Disvalue as physical wasting and as mutual obstruction has already been discussed. Greater insight into the nature of disvalue can be achieved by considering further what has already been anticipated, viz., that evil is not only relative to context but actually may become an instrument for good.

Whitehead appears to be tremendously impressed by the "aesthetic value of discords."¹ His idea recurs in many contexts. In the ongoing of civilization, the arrival at some perfected ideal is the death of advance. "Staleness sets in. And this fatigue is nothing other than the creeping growth of anaesthesia, whereby that social group is gradually sinking toward nothingness."² The only hope for progress lies in surprise and spontaneity which may bring confusion, but they also add freshness to the boredom of static perfection. The ideal as ideal is the "lure for feeling"³ for all actual entities, but when achieved its repetition means only death. It is not enough to hunt for the best that has been said and thought in history. "Back to the Greeks," some might say, but it is Whitehead's opinion that "the most un-Greek thing that we can do, is to copy

¹. Whitehead, PR, 531.
². Whitehead, AI, 363.
³. See Whitehead, PR, 37, 130, 281, 522.
the Greeks, for the tremendous power and creativity of the Helenic civilization lay in speculative dissatisfactions of the Greek mind. Every phase of the Greek life reflected the boundless energy stimulated by the lure of an ideal, but with the attainment of perfection the inspiration ceased. Hellenism passed into "the Hellenistic epoch in which genius was stifled by repetition," a beautiful duplication of the niceties of Greek civilization but only as a fading echo.

In the moral life the attainment of an ideal can be as disastrous to progress as in civilization. There is always the tendency to cease striving when a goal is reached. Morality exists because there are discords among the concordant elements of nature. The morality lies in the selectivity of the good, hence "selection is at once the measure of evil, and the process of its evasion. It means the discarding the element of obstructiveness in fact. No element in fact is ineffectual." It is the function of morality to be a continuous judgment on the present, though always oriented toward the future. "The effect of the present on the future is the business of morals." Present deficiencies, discords, unfulfilled potentials, are all disvalues as experienced in the present but are all prophecies of a better tomorrow.

1. Whitehead, AI, 353.
2. Ibid., 331.
They belong to the "essence of Creative Advance," as instruments to higher levels of achieved value. Tragedy is real but it must be seen "as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal." With such evidence, it appears that in Whitehead's thought no disvalue is evil per se. What are called evils, e.g., decay, transition, loss, displacement, all serve as teleological function in the production of a greater aesthetic harmony.

2. The Source of Disvalue.

Although the empirical fact of evil has been delineated in terms of physical wasting, aesthetic destruction, and as an instrument of progress, the situation which makes discordant elements possible has not yet been described. This is the problem of the source of disvalue. Even though aesthetic disharmony is but a temporary tragedy ready to give birth to an ideal, how account for the present discord? In reading Whitehead and especially in attempting to interpret his thought, one must continually remind himself that the reason for anything must be traced back to one or more actual entities, for nothing else exists but actual entities and their

1. Whitehead, AI, 369.
2. Ibid., 369.
3. Ibid., 369.
functions. "Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity." The source of evil must be, then, unequivocally, in actual entities. In a brief preliminary statement, evil arises as a result of the measure of self-determinacy among the multiplicity of elements which constitute the universe. How this is possible is not so easily answered in view of Whitehead's somewhat ambiguous exposition of the relation between the autonomy of entities and the directive influence of God. The reconciliation of these two antinomies constitutes one of the major problems in his thought.

On the one hand Whitehead makes a strong case for the freedom of actual entities. They are causa sui, which means that the process of concrescence is its own reason for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency. The freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this element of self-causation.

On the other hand, each actual entity, although causa sui, emerges from a background which determines at least partially what that entity shall be. Several key passages illustrate this. "The initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God." In this sense God is "the creator of each temporal

1. Whitehead, PR, 373. See also 27, 37.
2. Ibid., 135. Other passages are PR, 131, 339.
3. Ibid., 373.
actual entity."\(^1\) Even more specific is the statement that God "is that actual entity from which each temporal concrecence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts."\(^2\) This seems to take away at least some of the freedom which was granted to actual entities in describing them as \textit{causa sui}. Apparently they are self-caused only in the sense that they fulfill the potential which God gives them, as explained in Whitehead's denial of absolute freedom. "Every actual entity possesses only such freedom as is inherent in the primary phase 'given' by its standpoint of relativity to its actual universe."\(^3\) Yet this does not yet quite do justice to the paradox that each entity receives its initial aim from God, yet is self-caused. The solution of the antinomy probably rests in a combination of the two notions as expressed in the clarifying statement that each temporal entity "derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions."\(^4\) In another passage the synthesis is effected by saying that "the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject."\(^5\)

To summarize, each actual entity emerges from the relational complex or background which puts its inevitable stamp on the

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 343.
2. Ibid., 374. See also PR, 104, 248, 344, 522.
3. Ibid., 202.
4. Ibid., 345.
5. Ibid., 373. Italics added.
new-born creature, but having been born, the entity has the freedom of choosing what feelings shall be admitted into its own further development. Here is both determination and liberty. God in giving the initial aim is inexorable in his desire for order, but his relation to the subsequent life of entities is persuasive rather than coercive.

It is God's function—one might say desire—to bring the diverse elements of the universe into a harmonious whole, each part contributing its share to the totality of existence but yet retaining within itself its own individuality. This of course is the ideal situation. But actual entities may "derogue from" as well as "contribute to...the common value of the total community." It is precisely at this point that evil arises. Evil is possible because actual entities are free to "derogue from" the patterned whole. The essence of evil is disharmony and incompatibility. "The teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty." When actual entities do not cooperate with one another and God, the dysteleological impulses result in ugliness and vulgarity. The aesthetic whole is marred whenever "the concerns of the actual world are deflected from harmony of feeling by the divergent tonalities introduced from the mental poles."

1. Whitehead, PR, 373.
2. Whitehead, AI, 213.
5. Ibid., 533.
One specific way in which discord may be introduced is by "insistence on birth at the wrong season."¹ In using the birth analogy Whitehead evidently does not refer to the exact beginning of an entity's existence but to its activity in relation to a new community or society. Insistence, prematurely, on becoming a part of the nascent pattern does make plain how "a new actuality may appear in the wrong society, amid which its claims to efficacy are mainly as inhibitions."² Such precipitant action imposes on the creative function the weary task of removing the inhibitory feelings released. This is accomplished by other and higher creations which can harmoniously include the once clamorous and impetuous entity. Unwelcome novelty does make for delay and frustration,³ but "the advance, when it does arrive, will be richer in content, more fully conditioned, and more stable."⁴ It must be remembered that the reason for the frustration consists in the particular content of the new entity, which, although temporarily out of place, offers an immediate challenge for greater inclusiveness.

From the latter view several significant facts emerge: First, dysteleological facts are never final. The categorical determinations of existence provide the conditions which make evil possible, but as Whitehead shows, "they are also the

1. Whitehead, PR, 341.
2. Ibid., 341.
reasons why, in the advance of the world, particular evil facts are finally transcended. 1 Second, the dysteleological elements injected by actual entities not only prevent a barren tautology, but make creativity an ever-expanding and eternal adventure in the production of aesthetic harmony. Paradoxically, it is better to have some imperfections than totality of perfection.

In Discord there is always a frustration. But even Discord may be preferable to a feeling of slow relapse into general anaesthesia, or into tameness which is its prelude. Perfection at a low level ranks below Imperfection with higher aim.

Both this and the previous point may be summarized in Whitehead's beautiful statement in Religion in the Making.

Every fact is what it is, a fact of pleasure, of joy, of pain, or of suffering. In its union with God that fact is not a total loss, but on its finer side is an element to be woven immortally into the rhythm of mortal things. Its very evil becomes a stepping stone in the all-embracing ideals of God.

A third fact has very special significance for Whitehead's doctrine of God. He shares the view that God is limited and good, but it is the very limitation that makes for his goodness. "It is not true that God is in all respects

1. Whitehead, PR, 341.
2. Whitehead, AI, 336. On one occasion Brightman referred to this quotation as "one of the most illuminating passages in the book." Cf. Hartshorne's discussion on the possibility of the superiority of "the perfect—and-the-imperfect" to "the perfect 'alons'." DR, 19.
infinite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good.\textsuperscript{1}

This suggests very forcibly what has already been implied above, viz., that not all the decisions in the world are God's decisions,\textsuperscript{2} which means that God can be spared the attribution to him of evil.

If the theory of complete determinism, by reason of the necessity of conformation with the nature of God, holds true, then the evil in the world is in conformity with the nature of God,\textsuperscript{3}

but there is not complete determinism. Actual entities make some decisions according to their own aim, which, in relation to larger societies of entities are incompatible and therefore evil. Hartshorne calls this solution to the problem of evil

the oldest of all (cf. the Book of Genesis), except for the fact that scarcely anyone before Whitehead ever made an adequate and honest place for it in a comprehensive metaphysical system (Varisco, Ward, and Fechner are perhaps exceptions to this statement).\textsuperscript{4}

4. Hartshorne, Art. (1940), 527. But is not this "solution" but a metaphysical version of the very familiar explanation offered by some theologians since the days of St. Paul? Of course, Whitehead's "free agents" extend all the way through nature, including the so-called inanimate objects, whereas the theological account has been limited to "free moral agents," i. e., persons. But the result is the same; in so far as there is evil in the world it is due to the free actions of entities other than God. Another recent philosopher whose view is similar to Whitehead's is D. C. Macintosh who, in making a realistic division of the universe, i. e., into God and his "body," finds the source of evil in the "certain measure of free determination" in the physical world, or God's body. See Macintosh, Art. (1932), 306, and PRK, 377-378.
Hartshorne also points out this solution raises the problem of how responsibility for evil can be passed to the decisions of creatures if "all the wealth of actuality" be ascribed to God. "To do this we must have general metaphysical principles whereby actualities can be contained in other actualities yet retain their own self-decisions." Whitehead's metaphysics provides for that exactly, but not to the extent that actual entities lose their self-determinacy. Hartshorne is probably too extreme when he says that "the unqualified inclusiveness of prehension... is required by Whitehead's system as a whole" in order to constitute the world as a real whole. John Blyth gives a very forceful answer to Hartshorne's contention by showing how an unqualified inclusiveness not only robs actual entities of their individual perspectives but reduces the many parts of the universe to a single individual monad. By insisting on "unqualified inclusiveness" Hartshorne has possibly revealed more of his own type of panpsychism than the one he criticizes. Whitehead's system adequately provides for mutual immanence by prehensive experience, but as the evidence has shown, not to the exclusion of individual self-decision.

In brief summary of the meaning of disvalue in Whitehead's thought, the first thing noticeable is the somewhat

peripheral place he gives to the problem. It is in no sense central to any aspect of his metaphysical exposition, except, perhaps, as a teleological device for the production of greater aesthetic harmony. It is obvious that evil is not a matter of morality. If "the real world is good when it is beautiful," then good and evil are aesthetic and not moral categories. It is the nature of disvalue that it is a deterrent to aesthetic harmony. Its source lies in the self-determinacy of temporal actual entities. His "answer" to the problem is threefold: First, evil is unstable and in process of time effects its own elimination by its lack of positive creativity. Second, elements which are evil by virtue of their untimeliness or discordant character not only serve as stimuli to progress but may live to become incorporated in more inclusive relationships where the discords are resolved into harmony. Third, the freedom accorded actual entities may cause disharmony, but in that freedom is the only basis for the creativity which will overcome the evil by what is good.

G. Comparative Summary.

No axiological theory is adequate unless it allows room for the problem of disvalue. It is the strength of both Brightman and Whitehead that the facts of evil are not evaded. Neither man may have the complete answer to the

problem, but such is their devotion to the revelations of experience that they are bravely true to the facts even at the risk of weakening metaphysical theories supported by appeals to the coherent and aesthetic nature of the universe. The attitude of both may be well expressed in the concluding words of one of Whitehead's Tarnet Lectures:

Things are what they are; and it is useless to disguise the fact that "what things are" is often very difficult for our intellects to follow. It is a mere evasion of the ultimate problems to shirk such obstacles.

That Whitehead sees in evil less of a menace to the growth of value than Brightman does not detract from the opinion that he was devoted to the facts. In other words, the somewhat subordinate place that disvalue has in his thought system is not due to evasion but to his estimate of the importance of the problem. On the other hand, Brightman has raised the problem of evil into "ultimate status" by making it the problem of God. Maybe the proper emphasis lies somewhere in between the two extremes.

In describing the nature of evil Brightman uses such terms as deviation, inconsistency, disharmony, incoherence, ignorance, maladjustment, incompetence; while Whitehead speaks of mutual inhibition, mutual destructiveness, divergent tonalities, incompatibility, discordance. Some of these terms could be interchanged without damage to the import of

1. Whitehead, ON, 119.
2. Ferré, CUO, 26.
the views of either man, but a major divergence between the two men appears in their final analysis of what evil is. For Brightman some evils are "evil" only in the sense that they are instrumental to deeper disvalues; but these do not constitute the real problem. "The problem of evil in its most acute form is the question whether there is surd evil and, if so, what its relation to value is." The existence of such surds is debatable, Brightman admits, but in his own opinion there are elements revealed in experience which are "inherently and irreducibly evil." There is nothing comparable to this in Whitehead. In his view no fact in the universe, whether pleasure, pain, or suffering, is a total loss.

It has been shown in the first part of the chapter that Brightman altered his view somewhat on the possibility of surd evils serving as instrumental goods. He denied the possibility at first, but later held that "no matter how evil evil is, it may be instrumental to courage, to patience, and even to love." Granting the possibility, however, that

1. Brightman, FOR, 242: "An instrumental evil is any experience, process, or entity which contributes to producing an intrinsic evil or to averting an intrinsic good."
2. Brightman, FOR, 246.
3. Ibid., 246.
4. Ibid., 245-246. See also 318.
5. Whitehead, RM, 155.
6. Brightman, Art., 923. This latter view is most difficult to reconcile with his explanation of surd evil above, and his continued use of surd in the sense that he defined it, viz.: "A surd in the realm of value experience is an evil that is not expressible in terms of good, no matter what operations are performed on it." FOR, 246 n., italics added.
intrinsic evil may be an instrumental good in Brightman's thought, he makes little or nothing of it, whereas Whitehead lays more emphasis on the significance of evil as a function in the origin and increase of universal value. Discords prevent anaesthesia, staleness, boredom. A present disvalue is a prophecy of a higher synthesis of achieved harmony. The hope of civilization lies in the fact that "no epoch is homogeneous;" there will always be men "who exhibit themselves as antagonistic to the tone of their age."¹ Therein is progress. Because the world is as it is there will be evil, but dysteleological facts are never final; they will be transcended. Maybe the difference between the two men on the function of evil in relation to value may be indicated by saying that for Whitehead, although God is opposed to evil, all evil is instrumental, while for Brightman at least some aspects of surd evil fulfil no axiological function; if there is any value associated with surd evil, the "good comes in opposing it."²

As for the source, or sources, of disvalue, Whitehead traces the ultimate reasons for evil back to the self-determining action of the many entities which make up the universe. Evil arises when entities refuse to respond creatively to the persuasive agency of God. In so doing they

¹. Whitehead, SMW, 67.
². Brightman, POR, 246. By definition this seems to be impossible.
introduce a discordant element into the total aesthetic pattern prehended by God, but God feels that evil only temporarily, since it is there either overcome by what is good, or it effects its own elimination by its lack of creative response. On the other hand, entities which continue to assert themselves and do not "face" may inhibit or obstruct other entities which already have been aesthetically united; but again the disharmony is temporary. The disjunctive element may be the "faint discordant light of the dawn of another age" in which, ultimately, the harmonic incongruity will be resolved into a more inclusive pattern.

Brightman admits that the starting place of some evil may lie in the free acts of human persons—the nearest analogue to Whitehead's actual entities; but human freedom does not explain all evil, particularly the elements either in the external world, or within the biological organism associated with the personality. The reason for evil, he thinks, lies deeper in the metaphysical structure of the universe, even in the nature of God himself whose willed expression the universe is. This is not to say that God deliberately wills the evil elements, for his will is unlimited in goodness and love; but God in acting cannot escape the nonrational, unwilled elements which exist in his nature.

1. Whitehead, PR, 517.
2. Ibid., 515.
as an eternal Given, the "inevitable ingredient" in every act, and an ever-present obstacle to the divine willing. ¹

The Given in God is the source of surd evil in the universe. It follows that God is finite in his power, although infinite in love and existence. Whitehead shares the notion of God's limitation, a necessity not only of Whitehead's metaphysical structure but of the function which he assigns to God; but it is an interesting point of comparison that Whitehead excludes from God's nature the evil, which, if included with all the other elements, would make him infinite, ² whereas for Brightman it is precisely because God has not achieved complete control of the "restrictions within his own nature" that God is finite.

How do Brightman and Whitehead compare in their "answer" to the problem of evil? Are surds, discords, purposeless processes, dysteleological elements continuously recurring parts of the metaphysical structure of the universe? It seems that the answer is "yes" in both cases. Brightman usually describes "The Given" as eternal. He says in The Problem of God that "there seems little ground...to believe that it will be entirely eliminated."³ In Whitehead's

---

¹ See Brightman's abbreviated statement of the doctrine of The Given, POR, 336-339.
² Whitehead, RM, 153: "The limitation of God is his goodness...It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good."
³ Brightman, FG, 176. Cf. POR, 405.
thought God never "arrives" at any ultimate perfection; if he did, creative advance would cease. Both God and the world continually "advance into novelty," which means that discords will always be present. Increase in goodness and values in the universe depends on the continued freedom of entities, but therein lies the constant possibility of evil. Is there, then, no "answer?" Whitehead's answer is in the teleological possibilities of every evil element. Brightman's answer is in the increasing control of The Given by God. "Many problems of The Given may be permanently solved," but there will always be frustrations and blind alleys. There is hope, however, in that God will always find ways to use The Given "in the cosmic creation of new values."

1. Whitehead, PR, 529.
4. Ibid., 538.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION OF VALUE

A. Brightman.

1. The Inseparability of Value and Religion.

It is possible to discuss values without consideration of God or religion, but to do so is to give an incomplete picture of both religion and values. Nothing is judged correctly until it is seen in its proper context and in its best form. Religious expression without value considerations limits religion to pure and undifferentiated feeling, unexamined and meaningless; value without religion is uninspiring. "A true value," says Brightman, must be judged "in the light of our whole experience and our highest ideals."²

Personalists, including Brightman,³ have been accused of being too religious or theological to be thoroughgoing philosophers, with the implication that the rigor of their philosophy has been thereby attenuated. Brightman vigorously

---

1. For example, Hall, WV; Laird, IV; Lepley, WV. Brightman says that the omission of religious values from such writing is "the specialist's fallacy at work," ITP, 164.
2. Brightman, RV, 15.
3. For instance, Northrop in commenting on Brightman's paper, Art. (1944), thought that Brightman's emphasis on the personal gave "expression to provincial modern Protestant values." See Bryson et al. (eds.), AWP, 565.
repudiated any suggestion that he was a theologian,¹ but he never minimized the implications of religion in his thought. He could not have espoused coherence as his criterion of truth if he had.²

Nowhere does the importance of religion become so evident as in his discussion of values. It is Brightman’s opinion that value and religion are inseparable. Not all values are religious, of course, but all religious experience implies a conscious or unconscious value-claim. Religion, like every other aspect of existence, needs examination, and not all values are at the top of the scale; but devotion to some religion implies a certain amount of selectivity or value-orientation. "Religion is a choice of value, a commitment to it. It is a basic orienting of oneself to what is considered to be the best, and that involves inescapable value-judgments."³

But not only is religion a choice of value: it is "a faith in the friendliness of the universe to value."⁴ This faith grounds the source of both religion and value

---

1. See a very spicy disavowal of the suggestion in Art. (1932), 53.
2. "The supersensuous cannot be excluded by a coherent philosophy," says Brightman, ITP, 170.
4. See McCracken, TV, 3, for a forceful statement of the cognitive aspect of valuation. He feels that the "separation of thinking and valuing, whether its motive be religious or empiricist, is fundamentally erroneous and fatal in philosophy."
5. Brightman, POR, 86.
in the metaphysical structure of reality, a fact which makes
religion all the more amenable to axiological considerations.

When one gives up faith in an objective con-
servation of value, one has given up religion; and it is only verbalism to deny this fact.
I find it impossible to account for the exis-
tence of ideals and values in human experience
unless there is in the universe beyond man
something that creates ideals and values and
is worthy of worship.¹

There is no need to make the case stronger than Brightman
himself makes it.

In the light of his thought up to this point, a sep-
oration of religion and values would do at least three
things. It would:

(1) Make a dichotomy ("bifurcation", Whitehead would
say) which experience does not warrant. Some of the highest
values are invariably connected with religious experience.
(2) Imply that the highest values are non-religious.
(3) Rob value theory of insight, e.g., suffering love,
faith, worship, which are basically religious in character.

2. Definitions of Religion.

Before further discussion is possible, it is necessary
to establish exactly what Brightman means by religion. He
is very careful in differentiating between what religion is
and what it ought to be. A definition of the former he calls
"descriptive" while the other he refers to as "normative."

a. Descriptive.

A descriptive definition is the attempt to say what religion is in terms of observable facts. It is objective and contains no opinion as to whether it is "right" or "wrong", "good" or "bad." There are many types of religious expression with a great variety of beliefs and ceremonies. A good definition, therefore, would have to include the basic common constituents of them all. This Brightman tries to do in his somewhat elaborate descriptive statement in *A Philosophy of Religion*, as follows:

Religion is concern about experiences which are regarded as of supreme value; devotion toward a power or powers believed to originate, increase, and conserve these values; and some suitable expression of this concern and devotion, whether through symbolic rites or through other individual and social conduct.

This definition includes concern, devotion, and expression, the major elements which Brightman feels are in all religions.

b. Normative.

But it is not enough to describe religion. The facts show that religion may be expressed in manners as varied as human sacrifice and the high spiritual worship of a Quaker; and unless religion is the one thing in the world that has a right to remain unexamined, there are some characteristics that ought to be associated with religious experience and

1. Brightman, POR, 17. See also ITP, 169, for another descriptive definition.
expression if it is to be worthy of respect. In enunciating his normative definition Brightman emphasizes that it is not an arbitrary standard or a "subjective whim" that he is proposing, but one "tested by experience coherently viewed" and open for rational criticism.¹ His definition is as follows:

Religion ought to be characterized by the feeling of dependence on a personal God and dominated by the will to co-operate with God in the conservation and increase of values.²

The key elements here are ought, dependence, co-operation, God, and values.

Two observations should be made about these definitions:

First, the normative definition, taken from the second edition of An Introduction to Philosophy (1951), is exactly the same as appeared in the original edition of 1925. This is significant in that his Introduction was subject to a thorough revision and was his last published book.

Second, both definitions involve values, but the normative definition sees the dominant purpose of religion in terms of the production of values, thus lending further support to the opinion that religion and value cannot be separated in Brightman's thought.

¹ Brightman, ITP, 169.
² Ibid., 169. In POR, 435, he says that "religion, when conscious of its own destiny, is best defined as cooperation with God and man for the realization of individual and shared values."

Setting up as he does the view that "the working test of truth is our maximum coherent system of propositions as a whole,"¹ is religion subject to the same test as any other truth claim? Does one or the other have any priority of certitude?

a. Religious Versus Logical Certitude.

Brightman's treatment of the relationship of religion and reason does not follow the conventional pattern. His is no attempt to "prove" the superiority of one or the other. Religion is as much part of experience as any other aspect of life. The task, therefore, is one of seeing the proper relationship between the two. The first question that may be asked is whether or not reason is a way to God. Brightman calls this not only an important question, but a "tragically important" question,² for the answer to it divides the religious world into the debunkers of reason³ and those who say religion is impossible without it.⁴ Brightman feels that the position of the former group is itself irrational on the grounds that God himself must be a God of reason, hence approachable by reason.⁵ To deny the rational approach

¹. Brightman, ITP, 69.
². Brightman, FG, 54.
³. For a treatment of the negative attitude toward reason among the neo-orthodox theologians see DeWolf, RRAR.
⁴. See Casserley, GR, for a very recent and sensible statement of the place of reason in religious life and thought.
⁵. Brightman, FG, 55.
on the grounds that

human reason is inferior to divine reason...is equally good ground for rejecting every human approach to God on the ground that every human experience is inferior to divine experience.¹

But assuming that reason is a necessary adjunct to religious experience, do either or both bring certainty? On this question Brightman is mildly agnostic. He has declared himself a follower of both Carneades' dictum that probability is the guide of life,² and the belief of Karl Groos that only relative certainty on any subject is ever attainable.³ Brightman's epistemic dualism makes cognitive certainty impossible. Every case of "knowledge" involves only a knowledge-claim, since it is obviously impossible to experience the whole of an object whether physical or conceptual. Every cognitive experience in referring beyond itself can only postulate what is probably true about that particular situation. It is Brightman's "situation believed-in."⁴ The highest cognitive certainty, therefore, involves some element which is not strictly logical, but it is accepted as knowledge on the grounds of the relevant data which make that item of knowledge highly probable. The only sense in which ultimate certainty applies is in the actual

¹ Brightman, FG, 55.
² Ibid., 69, also RV, 31, and ITF, 80.
³ Ibid., 69, also POR, 130, 194.
⁴ See his POR, 347-349, for the whole discussion of "Situations Experienced" and "Situations Believed-in."
experience of a given situation. This is Brightman's "situation experienced." Only the experience itself is absolutely certain. To doubt that is to doubt the conscious self, the only basis, in Brightman's view, for knowledge. To disclaim absolute certainty here is not a compromise with either skepticism or "rampant irrationalism which is now eating away the very marrow of our civilization;" it is, rather, a rebuke to the dogmatism which thinks it has all the truth, and on the other hand, a corrective to the unreasonable claims made for reason itself. "Dogmatism is the cessation of reason" while "final proof is accessible only to him who knows Absolute Truth." Reason can never exhaust God, therefore rational finality is impossible.

What is said about logical certainty is also true of religious certainty. Nothing, including religion, is demonstrable beyond all doubt. "Incompleteness and uncertainty attaches to all knowledge." There is, however, a legitimate certainty in religion which Brightman allows for. He declares in Religious Values that

religious certainty does not mean that any religious dogmas are absolutely proved by logical reasoning. It means, rather, that religion is a committing of the life to what is absolutely real, to a cause that cannot fail.

2. Brightman, FG, 89.
3. Brightman, ITP, 80; see also FG, 70.
5. Brightman, RV, 115. There is an existentialistic strain in both Brightman and Whitehead.
He reaffirms this position in *A Philosophy of Religion*:

> The work of thought is never done and revision and further growth are always in prospect. Yet it is the faith of religion that in all the changes that may come, certain constants of value will abide.¹

This is the steadfastness of faith.² It is the consciousness which comes to every religious believer that the "more-than-human reality which his faith is seeking"³ is the real God, the ultimately real. This, again, is the "situation experienced" in a religious context. It is similar to the epistemological immediacy of the mystic who claims that his experience has a noetic quality. Only to this experience is any final certainty attached. It cannot be doubted. Uncertainty arises in the claims made for this experience or in the description of the reality to which the experience is supposed to refer. If there is any error it must be in the situation believed-in.

With propositions, logical or religious, as only high probabilities, what is the value of knowledge? Brightman's reply is that even though "final proof, complete demonstration...can never be reached by human skill on any matter whatever,"⁴ coherent hypotheses at least serve to take us in the direction of truth and God. Hypotheses and propositions

---

2. James Arminius said the only kind of certainty God required was a "certainty of faith," *Works*, I, 122.
about all experience are "not certain, but they are heuristic."¹


The only priority that reason has over religion is functional, i.e., in its role as guide and interpreter of religious data. "Reason always works with material that it does not create by mere reason."² Religion is what one experiences in the presence of certain values which are held to be supreme and which elicit his response in some manifestation of devotion. It is probable that no rational person is devoid of some experiences which may be rightly called religious, whether it is the numinous experience described by Otto or the feeling of dependence of Schleiermacher. Religion is a fact of experience, but like any other experience it needs interpreting. Without the guidance of some rational norm, religion is as chaotic and undifferentiated as sensation; it can go from extreme to extreme and like Stephen Leacock's horseman, can ride off in all directions at once. Just because an experience is religious does not constitute grounds for asserting that it is an untouchable and self-validating autonomy. "No value has sovereignty in its national territory; only the league of values is sovereign."³ True, religious feeling is one response to life

¹. Brightman, POR, 194.
which is that and no other, but religion does not carry
with it its own built-in explanatory apparatus. What re-
ligion means must be seen in totality, and for Brightman
the only way to synoptic vision is through systematic reason.
This means that reason itself contributes something to the
total religious experience. It is the binding factor, but
it is more, when the full significance of reason is allowed
for.

Reason—concrete and inclusively empirical,
not merely abstract and formal—is the supreme
source of religious insight, the supreme way
of knowing about God, whether he is, or whether
he is not.¹

Reason and religion, therefore, are coordinates.
Brightman does not vary in this insistence, from his ear-
liest works to his latest, except perhaps in the direction
of a virtual identification of the two. In Religious Val-
ues (1925) he says that "religious faith should be grounded
in a coherent whole of truth, not in the haphazard likes
and dislikes of the moment."² In The Problem of God (1930)
he declares that "the cause of reason and the cause of re-
ligion are inextricably bound up together."³ The same idea
is reaffirmed in The Finding of God (1931) where he says that
"the cause of reason and the cause of religion stand or fall
together."⁴ Later, in A Philosophy of Religion (1940) he

¹ Brightman, FOR, 192.
² Brightman, RV, 75.
³ Brightman, FG, 105.
⁴ Brightman, FG, 56.
asserts that "if we are to know...God, coherent reason is the way of knowing most suited to the problem."\(^1\) Stronger still is the statement in *Nature and Values* (1945) that "to appeal to reason is to appeal to God."\(^2\) This is equivalent to saying that to be religious is to be rational.

By making such a strong case for the interdependence of religion, reason, and God, Brightman probably does not mean to imply that all religion is necessarily dependent on reason and/or belief in God. Some religions are anti-rational in the extreme, and it is possible that a non-theist may have religious feelings. What he probably means to say is that normative religion is impossible without the rational, while reason, i. e., as "concrete and inclusively empirical," is the only objective means for the determination of God's existence. Brightman acknowledges other ways of knowing God, e. g., "immediate experience, revelation, and faith,"\(^3\) but all of these must be tested by the maximum relationships of experience. "To assert God is to assert cosmic purpose... If we are to know such a God, coherent reason is the way of knowing most suited to the problem."\(^4\)

To make reason the guide to religion is to insist that

2. Brightman, NV, 137.
4. Ibid., 191.
it be kept consistent and coherent. Religion is not an exception to the rule—that all experience must be tested and seen in the light of a rational whole. Nothing is properly tested until examined by the most inclusive range of facts. All religion, therefore, which cannot measure up to "the supreme court of reason which alone has jurisdiction in cases of truth" is to be repudiated as of insignificant value and unworthy of respect. Here reason is seen in its further role as the arbiter among religious claims. All values have to come to this test. Without some such guide all religious and value-claims are reduced to an axiological relativism, and the possibility of norms is excluded, for on no other ground can norms be established. 3


It has been shown that religion is a value that needs to be tested like all other data of experience. Religion unexamined, to paraphrase Socrates, is not worthy of living.

1. Both consistency and coherence are necessary to reason. Consistency demands freedom from internal contradiction, while coherence relates to the totality of experience. Cf. the original discussion of coherence in Chapter II.

2. Brightman, NV, 69. Also NV, 106, where he says that reason is "the supreme court of the mind." Brightman also uses the phrase in NV, 23, 25, where he capitalizes the initial letters. In FG, 11, he says that God is "the Supreme Reason, and hostility to reason is one form of hostility to the divine."

3. See Brightman's discussion on the inadequacy of other religious criteria, FOR, 123-129; also his treatment of the criteria of truth, ITP, 46-75.
What religious values actually do contribute to the coherent ordering of life is the problem of this section.¹

Human life is not a compartmentalization into mutually exclusive kinds of experience, e.g., intellectual, aesthetic, or religious. Life is experienced as a complex unity of interpenetrating values. The attempt to isolate religion from life and values is due either to a too-narrow naturalism or a misguided belief that religion is a matter of creeds and dogmas intended only for use on certain days of the week. Both attempts are due to a false notion of religion. Brightman says that "religion may be challenged only in so far as it can be shown that value experience is non-existent or that it lacks 'cosmic support.'"² Or as was said of Tillich's idea of the holy, "the holy...is a dimension in everything real, and not a section within reality."³ What does religion contribute to the rest of human experience? The following represent the major contributions as seen by Brightman:⁴

First, religion helps meet the ills of life. No one

---

¹. It is not necessary to establish that Brightman did believe that religion had much to contribute to life. The offering of his data is sufficient proof of this.
². Brightman, PQR, 86.
³. Theodor Siegfried, in Kregley and Bretall, TPT, 69.
⁴. The major part of the data for this section comes from Brightman's chapter on "Human Values", 73-101, in RV, one of the earliest of Brightman's books. Careful checking reveals no substantial modifications in the later writings. Wherever there is significant change the fact will be noted.
can escape involvement in the disvalues which are common to the human race. The problem is not the fact of involvement but how the ills of life are met. Religion helps positively in all the following ills:

(1) Suffering. Suffering, whether mental or physical, is universal. Many palliative and almost sentimental solutions are offered, and none actually provides an answer. In so far as religion does, Brightman says that this is the meaning:

Suffering is not the brute mystery that it seems to be; it serves some purpose, even though we know not what; it will be overcome, even though we know not how. Religion, then, meets the suffering of the individual with faith...What other resource than this in the face of suffering is not presently exhausted and baffled?

(2) Death. Death seems to make all values impossible. Two solutions are possible here, one which says that somehow goodness will persist even though the body dies, and the other which declares the possibility of continued existence beyond physical death. Brightman inclines strongly to the latter opinion as the best religious answer to death.

Faith in immortal life is an all but universal trait of religions. In the higher forms it is an expression of the belief that all personality must survive because it is the most valuable

---

1. Brightman, RV, 91. This is one point that Brightman has modified. That suffering serves some purpose even though it is not known sounds very much like the appeal to ignorance which he soundly rejects later as a solution to the problem of evil. See POR, 309-310; 269.
fact in the universe on which the real existence of all other values depends.¹

(3) Moral Evil. This is a problem, says Brightman, because moral evil is against the very values that religion would build up. The role of religion here is to make a violator of the moral laws conscious of the division which he has injected into the universe by his sin. "Religion views sin as a cosmic tragedy,"² but it offers the violator "by sacrifice or penance or repentance, or by some combination of these or other means,"³ the opportunity to help in repairing the damage that has been done both to himself and to the universe. It is passages like this, particularly in his earlier writings, that stimulates opinions similar to the one noticed above that Brightman is too theological for a philosopher.

(4) Ignorance. Although religion may have at times helped to foster or condone ignorance, religion when fulfilling its true role does not offer opposition to any branch of knowledge. Its answer to ignorance is twofold. First, "it offers objects of faith which lie beyond demonstrable knowledge,"⁴ and second, it proclaims a faith in the meaning

¹. Brightman, FOR, 93. Brightman does not modify this point of view, except to strengthen it. In fact, his major argument for immortality is an appeal to the goodness of God on the grounds that a good God is "committed to the eternal conservation of values," FOR, 401.
². Ibid., 94.
³. Ibid., 94.
⁴. Ibid., 95.
of all things, even though that meaning is not known. Brightman calls this "one of the most potent values which religion imparts to human life."\(^1\) In *The Spiritual Life* he defines faith in Divine Spirit as "faith that no event of any kind, physical or personal, will ever destroy Divine Spirit or its purpose of loyalty to the ideal ends and aims of existence."\(^2\) If faith really does this, as experience seems to testify, then Brightman could very well reaffirm with added emphasis that faith in God is "one of the most potent values which religion imparts to human life."\(^3\)

(5) Limitation. This point is more or less summary of the previous four, for it includes all the weaknesses which man is heir to. Man all by himself in the universe is a pitiable spectacle. There is nothing in Brightman to suggest sympathy with a religion or philosophy of life based only on humanistic tenets. Any religion cognizant of the facts will recognize the finiteness of man, but it does not leave him alone to his own resources; it seeks, rather, to teach him that the universe is friendly to him and puts its spiritual

---

1. Brightman, *POR*, 96. As already noted, Brightman modified any views he once asserted which appealed to the unknown as solutions to problems, but he does not in the least minimize the place of faith in religious expression and worship. He does orient it more in the direction of experience, which justifies his faith. Cf. *POR*, 417.
4. Brightman doubts if such a position would be called a religion at all, *RV*, 219.
resources at his disposal. "Thus does religion meet this ill too."\(^1\)

Besides supplying an answer to these common human ills, religion also fills as nothing else can, three of the basic human needs: unity, purpose, and permanency.

(1) **Unity.** Whether he realizes it or not, each man will organize his life and experience around some ideal. It is basic to human personality that some type of unity be found. Religion can claim some priority here, for it "is all-inclusive; it sets all our thoughts, feelings, and volitions in their relation to God."\(^2\) Religion in order to be true to experience will include all valid interests. Therefore, it can serve as the unifying principle of human personality.\(^3\)

(2) **Purpose.** But just to have unity is not enough. A further need is for some ideal end. Religion, if it is in terms of loyalty and devotion to God, is at once a unifying force and a purpose for which to live. "Only the purpose to serve God is in the long run inclusive enough adequately to sustain the server or to benefit the served."\(^4\)

---

2. Ibid., 97.
3. Cf. ITP, 173. "Belief in God, in a word, seems to be the one unifying principle that can make of our chaotic human life a harmonious whole of thought and feeling and action."
4. Brightman, RV, 98.
(3) Permanency. Men also desire permanency, something that will remain constant in the midst of transient experience. So much of life is effervescent and superficial. Once again "it is religion that points man to the eternal in the world of change and gives him a solid anchorage."¹

That religion does contribute in some measure all these values to human experience is a matter of observation. No attempt has been made here, either by Brightman or by the author of the dissertation, to say that a certain kind of religious experience is the only one that is valid. It seems that any impartial student of the philosophy or history of religion would agree that religion has contributed these and many other values, whatever may be said about the dis-values which some religions have undoubtedly brought into the world. Religion does not solve all problems, and it does not claim to furnish answers for science or economics, but as Tillich suggests, religion is a dimension of all life. "The religious spirit, when true to itself, is the soul of every undertaking...It creates the vision of a divine plan in life."² Such is its purpose and actual fulfilment. It does not set the task, but it provides the inspiration and motivation without which the task would be drudgery.

¹ Brightman, RV, 99.
² Ibid., 97.
5. Creative Values of Worship.

Worship is part of religion; indeed, it is the very "heart of religious experience." It is therefore given separate treatment here. Any justification necessary for the special emphasis is found in Brightman himself. In Religious Values he devotes three full chapters out of ten to a consideration of the issues and values involved. Furthermore, in his enunciation of "the first principles of a personalistic philosophy of life" he gives a comparatively large place to worship in the first principle which he lays down, viz., respect for personality.

Brightman selects what he considers to be the four major aspects of worship for discussion.4

(1) Contemplation. This is the most elementary form of worship, but it should become for every religious person a regular practice. By it is meant "the fullest possible concentration of reverent attention" on God, a practice which will "bring calm and unity to the divided soul."6

(2) Revelation. Contemplation often leads to a higher experience where the soul receives a revelation of God's

1. Brightman, RV, 78.
2. Brightman, NV, 149 ff.
3. The other two: Nature as a revelation of Divine Personality, and spiritual liberty.
4. The same selection appears in both RV and NV. For discussion here, greater consideration is given to NV as the more recent, but both are accorded full attention.
presence and his love. This is the Quaker "inner light" and the mystic "illumination". Brightman feels that many worshipers have sacrificed valuable insights by not cultivating more "the highest mystical revelation." But he gives two warnings: first, that all revelation still needs to be tested both by the understanding and its consequences; and second, that in the high moments of illumination there is the temptation to yield to "the emotional pantheistic impulse." The solution to this possible pantheistic urge appears in the next aspect of worship.

(3) Communion. Any tendency to identify the self with God in worship is overcome by the realization that true worship is communion, not union. "This is a co-operative experience." It is a fellowship between persons. If God is not responsive to prayer, then God may as well not exist so far as the worshiper is concerned. True worship must be predicated on the possibility of mutual response. "Communion is the profound sense of membership in God's universe and of participation in God's plan." The possibilities of progress here are tremendous.

The limits of communion with God in prayer and in life cannot be set by any formula. A field of spiritual experiment and adventure is open to those who are willing to pay the price of

1. Brightman, NV, 155.
2. Ibid., 156.
3. Ibid., 156.
4. Ibid., 156.
the intellectual, moral, and religious disciplines which are required.¹

This great sense of adventure suggests the next aspect.

(4) **Fruition.** This is the stage of worship where the more internal aspects of worship emerge into life. The end here is "not the ecstasy of mystic communion but the fruit of the spirit."² Here is the great realm of actual participation in creative venture. Without productivity worship is sterile. Brightman's whole chapter on "Worship as Creativity"³ is not only an amplification of worship in terms of fruition, but it reflects Brightman's orientation toward possibility and progress, comparable in many respects, as will be shown later, to Whitehead's dynamic approach to the future. Creativity is the most important of worship values, since it is in creativity that the existence of true worship itself is maintained. Worship must reflect the kind of God there is in the universe—a God who himself is capable of new experience and growth. "A God who can change nothing, bring nothing into being, create no new life, is a pitiable thing—scarcely a God at all."⁴ Religion as existing in relation to a God who himself is capable of new experience furnishes probably the deepest insight into the meaning of

¹ Brightman, RV, 186.
² Brightman, RV, 183.
³ Ibid., 205-237.
⁴ Ibid., 206.
a dynamic universe. The God of deism means death not only to religion but to cosmic progress.

In what sense is worship creative? What values does it create? Brightman lists four fruits of worship for special consideration.

First, perspective. Worship enables man to think beyond his own immediate needs and circumstances. In some measure, at least, it enables him to see life from the standpoint of God and the ultimate purposes of life. Such a perspective throws a new light on the role of man himself in the ongoing of the universe. He sees himself as a part, not in the sense of identification with Brahman, but as a contributing factor to the fulfilling of purpose in the total cosmic scheme. This sense of identification is life-giving. "It gives man what he most needs, namely, the combination of a sense of his personal worth with a sense of personal subordination." This is not the subordination of a fawning politician, nor does it rob a man of his own proper dignity. It is, instead, the trustful poise of a knowledge that God is greater than he and is somehow in control of things.

1. Thus showing again the necessity of relating religion and metaphysics. Brightman observes that "philosophy of religion is a branch of metaphysics and that its problems are intertwined with most metaphysical ones...A study of metaphysics should be to precede and follow a study of philosophy of religion," FOR, 398 n.

2. Brightman, RV, 214.
Personal worth and personal subordination thus fuse in the worshiper's experience. Out of this tension of opposites is born religious personality with its peculiar qualities—a poise that, while worship lives, can never become apathy, a peace that cannot become mere passivity, a joy that cannot become frivolity, a confidence that cannot become overconfidence.

Second, a spiritual ideal. Worship stimulates ideals of the spirit, the process of which psychology may explain, but the source of the ideal is recognized by the worshiper as God working in his mind, the form of which is explainable only by the experience of worship. But worship not only creates a vision; it also implants a desire for its attainment. "In the nature of this spiritual ideal," says Brightman, "lies its peculiar creativity." The ideal is inexhaustible and therefore it will need an eternity to explore what this value means. Here is the heart of religion. It is liberation of the spirit, unbound by creedal formulations, into the realm of great adventure with God.

Third, power. Brightman used to say that he was more interested in goodness than in power. The kind of power suggested here, however, is not the kind of power that he

2. This is very similar to Whitehead's conception of the function of God in initiating the subjective aim of actual entities. See PR, 164.
4. One feels that Brightman's whole book, The Spiritual Life, is but an elaboration of this basic theme. He takes as his major premise "that only spirit is eternal, only spirit is truly real, only spirit is the goal of life," SV, 6.
would repudiate. He was not interested in coercive power of any kind, whether in individual men, governments, or God. He was interested in the power of the spirit, which is the real meaning of his term here. It is that desire for means to implement what he feels about the ideal. The vision and even the desire to fulfill the divine ideals are of little import unless a measure of spiritual energy is present. Brightman feels that this power comes as another contribution of worship. It makes possible the transformation of the future, by the control of the inner life; but maybe more remarkable still is the possibility of changing the past, not by removing the facts that are there, unchangeable, but by seeing them with new meaning, a power which religion gives.

Communion with God means freedom from bondage to the past, to the environing world, to the future; a freedom that comes from commerce with reality itself...Religious power, then, is freedom; and its freedom is power.1

Fourth, is a community of love, comparable to Royce's "beloved community." Brightman considers this to be the "supreme consummation of worship"2 foreshadowing the very goal and purpose of the universe. In one sense worship is personal and private, but even in worship an individual is still part of the race. Worship reveals the value and worth

---

1. Brightman, RV, 221.
2. Ibid., 221.
of other souls, but there are additional values which emerge only in the corporate situation.

Experience shows that when individuals come together and become a worshiping community, new spiritual levels are reached, new values created, new powers released.¹

Worship makes the experience of God more vivid, and adds a new depth to the meaning of society. For religion to do less than that is to rob religion of its greatest possible and most potent contribution to the well-being of society, viz., the sense of mutual responsibility and respect.

"Worship...is necessarily social at its highest point."²

Brightman further elaborates his chapter on creative worship by a consideration of the factors which contribute to creativity itself. After stressing the need of inner preparation, he points out the value of conflict, silent self-possession, the vision of God, and the will in the creative process.

"Not all conflict leads to God," says Brightman, but there is a special kind of spiritual conflict which finds in the inner tensions of the soul the stimulation to preserve the values of all and to reconcile them at higher levels of meaning. Worship does not seek to destroy the conflicts, but to use them.

The worship of God is the only human experience large enough in its scope to be able to speak

¹. Brightman, RV, 222.
². Ibid., 223.
the word of creative control to all the impulses in man's breast; worship alone is the experience in which every conflict becomes creative power."

Worship not only reconciles other conflicts, but it creates conflicts of its own. In worship tensions between knowledge and mystery, activity and passivity, intimacy and awe, are set up, but these are the conditions out of which creativity thrives. Silent self-possession is Brightman's way of emphasizing the need and power of concentration. "The spiritual life is the single mind, unified by concentration on one supreme purpose...Concentration always leads to new vision or new life."^2

If is in the experience of God himself that all worship values have their unity, for God is the ultimate source of creativity. "To see God is to confront reality,"^3 and in that vision one is able to view the whole meaning of things. Worship thus creates breadth of view and the possibility of purpose in the total picture. More than that, worship reveals God himself, who is hidden to sense, feeling, and thought, but who reveals himself in the spiritual experience of worship.

The vision of God will not be complete, of course, but the vision is most complete in the life of one who actively

1. Brightman, RV, 227. Note the phrase "creative control." This is before Brightman had attempted any formulation of his concept of theistic finitism.
2. Ibid., 228.
3. Ibid., 230.
cooperates with God. Worship must involve the will and the whole personality. It is the whole self that must find proper orientation to God and the universe, but it is the will which is the directing agency of the personality in aligning the self with the creative power of the Supreme Mind. It "is the key to the vision of God and to the ingress of the creative Spirit of God into human life."  

Brightman concludes with "a few words about the God revealed in worship."  

In Religious Values, which contains most of the axio-religious data for this discussion, Brightman does not yet espouse his later views of theistic finitism, hence the particular values associated with that doctrine have not yet been mentioned. God's basic role in Brightman's value theory has already been appraised, but a brief statement of how religious values are enhanced by the finistic concept will serve as conclusion and summary for this part of the chapter.

Not all are agreed that finitism is religiously fertile, as Brightman readily admits, and as indicated in a previous chapter. But in the face of many objections Brightman offers five "specific religious values in the idea of a finite God who is potent, but not omnipotent."

---

2. Ibid., 236.
3. Brightman, FOR, 326, 327.
4. Ibid., 327–328 for this and following points.
First, finitism implies greater assurance of divine sympathy and love. It requires more faith, he holds, to believe in a God who wants to help amid the tragedies of life and cannot, than in one who can and does not.

Second, there is mystical value in the concept of the divine struggle. That God is locked in eternal combat with forces which he did not create, but over which he continuously seeks control, elicits "the profoundest religious emotions of reverence, gratitude and faith."

Third, finitism provides more incentive for cooperation with God. Absolutism implies a completeness which does not evoke the same sense of need for cooperative endeavor.

Fourth, a God who is not absolute suggests room for cosmic advance and progress. "Inexhaustible perfectibility" adds meaning to immortality and makes possible a more religious attitude toward the future.

Fifth, a finite God is probably more moved by prayers than an Absolute God whose decrees are already determined.

In brief, Brightman feels that the traditional notion of God who is timeless and already complete does not provide the basis for creative religion. His thought points up the axiom, worthy of repeating, that the kind of God posited determines the content of one's worship and religious expression. Infinite possibility of progress gives to initiative its highest stimulant; ultimate perfection, on the other
hand, meaning *ne plus ultra*, results in stagnation and a too easily satisfied attainment. "Meliorism," which is Brightman's term for the possibility of endless perfectibility, enhances initiative, provides variety and makes religion an exciting venture. To work with the Eternal Spirit who is "eternally creative" is a religious value of the highest order. This means that the possibilities of truth, beauty, and goodness are infinite in their application to personal and social relations. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be," but every level of the religious life is both fulfilment and promise. "Every stage is precious and adds something that must never be lost; yet no stage exhausts the possibilities of spiritual growth... Existence is never finished."

B. Whitehead.

1. The Meaning of Religion.

To include some of Whitehead's religious views as part of his general value theory is not a tour de force. One of Whitehead's keenest interpreters, Charles Hartshorne, says:

The idea that the religious content of Whitehead's system is dragged in, and that what his system requires is some 'impersonal' force or

3. Ibid., 169. The chapter, "Spirit as Developing," SL, 142-176, is especially pertinent for the whole discussion.
function having no essential connection with love, is in my opinion a thorough misunderstanding.¹

By training and temperament Whitehead was religious. He was the son of a clergyman² and was surrounded by a liberal but devotional atmosphere.³ The profoundly spiritual mood permeating his metaphysical works is probably one of the attractive and almost subtle elements which draw readers to his writings. Felix Frankfurter observes that "for all who came within the range of his infectious personality, and professionalism was quickened into exhilarating meaning and the universe expanded."⁴

It is not too much to say that his basic attitude to the universe was religious, and that even his metaphysics, as will be shown later, is a religious enterprise. Bixler says that "scientific as it is, and notable in its contributions to logic, his philosophy can yet be said to face in the religious direction."⁵ To neglect the religious, therefore, in even a partial account of Whitehead's theory of values is to give a distorted picture, for religion itself is in terms of value, not indeed as a value among others,

¹ Hartshorne, MVG, 50. Emmet has something similar when she says that "the last section of Process and Reality /the most religious part of the book/ is not an addendum irrelevant to the rest of the book. It is an integral part of it," WFO, 247.
² As was Brightman.
³ See his "Autobiographical Notes" in Schilpp, PANW, 3-14.
⁴ In a forward for Mentor edition of Whitehead's AE.
⁵ Bixler, Art.(1941), 490.
but as being of the very essence of value. Religion begins in self-valuation and is founded on the value of individuals for themselves, on individuals as values for one another, and on the values of the objective community, which is an extension of the relations among individuals. "The peculiar character of religious truth is that it explicitly deals with values." 3

Whitehead's most frequently quoted definition of religion is: "Religion is what the individual does with his solitariness." Not so often given is his own explanation of the concept of solitariness. He points out that the great rational religions are the outcome of a universal consciousness as opposed to the local or tribal. Being universal, religion divorces itself from the immediate so that it might embrace the wider aspects and meanings of existence; not being tied to anything particular it thus becomes, so to speak, solitary in the great universe. Without the solitariness there is no religion, for it is only in the separation from the particular that the universal is found; but the separation is not ultimate for it is in the discovery of the larger aspects that the details are seen in their proper

2. Ibid., 59.
3. Ibid., 124.
4. Ibid., 47. Cf. 16, 58.
5. Ibid., 47.
6. Ibid., 17.
relationships. "Religion is an ultimate craving to infuse into the insistent particularity of emotion that non-temporal generality which primarily belongs to conceptual thought alone."¹ Whitehead's description throughout is very similar to the mystic "paradox of poverty," where the seeking soul refuses to become tied to any particular thing in order that he might possess all things.

The solitariness, then, is the reaction of a worshiper in the search for ultimate principles. It is not merely a reaction to the social expression of religion; it is the individual alone in the presence of God,² an experience prerequisite to the understanding of religion as rational and social. Brightman, in criticizing this position, is afraid that Whitehead goes too far in emphasizing the solitariness. He says:

Spiritual liberty cannot be achieved alone. Alfred North Whitehead's famous saying that 'religion is what a man does with his solitariness' remains true as an acid test of sincerity and as an emphatic statement that religion is, first and foremost, traffic between the soul and God. Yet solitariness is itself the achievement and the need of a social being... Spiritual liberty can be won only through co-operative toil.³

But Whitehead himself guards against interpreting this solitary stage of religion as being the final form of

¹. Whitehead, PR, 23.
². Note the striking similarity here to Kierkegaard's solitary individual before God.
³. Brightman, NV, 164.
religious expression. He says that "religion is still a thoroughly social phenomenon."¹ The individual must first discover that solitariness constitutes "the heart of religious importance,"² but the moment he expresses his religion in some form it becomes social.

Expression, and in particular expression by dogma, is the return from solitariness to society. There is no such thing as absolute solitariness. Each entity requires its environment. Thus man cannot seclude himself from society.³

The highly personal and experiential character of religion as seen by Whitehead emerges in his further definition of religion as "the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things."⁴ This is Whitehead's way of expressing the existential nature of religion. Religion is a character or quality of personal existence. It is more than a form of action or assent to a belief. Bixler says again that "Whitehead is more sympathetic than many to the view that our religiously significant experiences include more than can be conveyed by our formal statements."⁵ The difference is brought out in Whitehead's statement that "you use arithmetic, but you are religious."⁶

¹. Whitehead, RM, 27.
². Ibid., 19.
³. Ibid., 137.
⁴. Ibid., 16.
⁵. Bixler, Art. (1941), 490.
⁶. Whitehead, RM, 15.
Religion is the affective tone of the individual in the presence of universal values. Out of this situation grows character which develops in accordance with one's faith. "This is the primary religious truth from which no one can escape," says Whitehead. "Religion is force of belief cleansing the inward parts." Here belief and experience are united, but it is only as beliefs are "vividly apprehended" that they are meaningful. This is as strong an emphasis on the significance of the internal and subjective aspect of religion as anything in Kierkegaard. Whitehead makes this constant emphasis to avoid the fatal lapse of religion into mere dogma. Religion is nothing if it is not a personal "set" of the soul. To make it equivalent to a creed or a pattern of action is to destroy it. Religion is "an adventure of the spirit;" it is a "commanding vision;" but "the insistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour." Dogmatic finality is the enemy of religion as well as science and metaphysics. Whitehead illustrates this point beautifully:

A system of dogmas may be the ark within which the Church floats safely down the flood-tide of

---
2. Ibid., 15.
3. "Only the truth which edifies is truth for you," are Kierkegaard's concluding words in his Either/Or, II, 294.
5. Ibid., 192.
6. Ibid., 191.
7. Whitehead, AI, 208.
history. But the Church will perish unless it opens its window and lets out the dove to search for an olive branch. Sometimes even it will do well to disembark on Mount Ararat and build a new altar to the divine Spirit—an altar neither in Mount Gerizim nor yet at Jerusalem.1

In delineating religion in this fashion, Whitehead wants to present it as a movement of the spirit, not as patterned formula. Religion is the free expression of the soul; hence it must begin in solitariness. But it is the nature of all meaningful expression that it use the media that are there for it. Religion thus becomes inescapably social, representing the deepest and profoundest outreach of finite entities for satisfaction and ultimate immortality in God.

2. Religion and Metaphysics.

Whitehead pictures Christianity as "a religion seeking a metaphysic, in contrast to Buddhism, which is a metaphysic generating a religion."2 For Whitehead religion will be successful only as it finds its metaphysic.3 The main reason for this is found in the tremendous inner desire for

1. Whitehead, RM, 145-146.
2. Ibid., 50.
3. Contrast Whitehead with men like Kierkegaard and Barth, who would discuss these two concepts together only to show that they are mutually exclusive. On the other hand, philosophers like Bowne, Brightman, Bertocci, and philosophical theologians like Ferré, Lewis, Tillich, have all seen the need of a consistent metaphysic as a prerequisite to a consistent religion.
togetherness in the universe. It is the nature of mind to want to find some sort of unity. It may be theologically stimulating to dogmatize on "the infinite qualitative difference" between God and man, but it will not satisfy the religious spirit. "Religion is the longing of the spirit that the facts of existence should find their justification in the nature of existence." In Process and Reality religion is more than a "longing"; it is "an ultimate craving" to discover some generality which may be infused "into the insistent particularity of emotion." Until that discovery is made and effected there is no religious value, for values are the product of the metaphysical process. "Religious consciousness starts from self-valuation," but it expands to include the universe through a process of adjustment to all other values until the ultimate aesthetic satisfaction. A meaningful religion, therefore, is predicated on a satisfying metaphysic.

Besides the need for togetherness, religion must be grounded in something objective, due to the very nature of the religious consciousness. Religion is emotive, and although "emotions are evidence of some vivid experience... they are a very poor guarantee for its correct interpretation."  

---
1. Whitehead, RM, 85.
2. Whitehead, PR, 23.
3. Whitehead, RM, 143-144.
4. Ibid., 59.
5. Ibid., 83.
Religion can be examined and criticized only as its dogmas are based in the rational structure of the universe. Relativism and confusion are the only alternatives. Claims of direct and individualistic intuition of some religious truth make agreement on the meaning of religion impossible. It is at least part of the role of reason in religion to safeguard its objectivity and only in so far as it is objective is it capable of public examination and evaluation.

Again, a metaphysic is needed before an historical appreciation of religion is possible. All interpretation is limited to the present; therefore any historical extrapolation must be based on principle deduced from a former immediacy. At best, the reconstruction of the past depends on memory which exists only in the present, but in any case a consistent metaphysic is the sine qua non for any interpretation at all.

Some further implications of the inter-relation between religion and metaphysics are brought out also in the next section.

3. Religion and Reason.

Religion and reason come together, in Whitehead's metaphysics. It is interesting, if not significant, that this combination is set forth with deliberate care in *Process and

1. Whitehead, RM, 64.
2. Ibid., 84.
Reality, the book usually considered the most metaphysical of all Whitehead's works. The task of reason, he says there, is to find general principles in the universe which will illuminate the particular facts of existence. That such a venture will always be attended by success is the "hope of rationalism" rather than any demonstrable certainty. The hope, however, becomes a real "faith which forms the motive for the pursuit of all sciences alike, including metaphysics." Paradoxically this seems almost to equate reason and faith, for reason always points beyond the world of fact to the world of generalities, laws, first principles. Whitehead implies that the quest for the rationality of things might waver, but it is at this point that metaphysics assumes a dimension which can only be called religious. If faith in the ultimate reality of things be preserved, it must be grounded on

an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action—that it should embody the adventure of hope. Such an intuition marks the point where metaphysics—and indeed every science—gain assurance from religion and pass over into religion.3

This sudden passing of metaphysics into religion is a startling and daring proclamation, but it does not represent

1. Whitehead, PR, 67.
2. Ibid., 67. Whitehead defines metaphysics as "nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice," PR, 19. Cf. RM, 84 n.
3. Ibid., 67, italics added.
the abandonment of the philosophical quest. It opens up instead a use of reason and religion which expands the meanings of both and makes the study of metaphysics a warm and moving enterprise. Instead of being a departure from reason, however, Whitehead says that in so far as we accept the doctrine of faith—not, indeed, as a metaphysical axiom but as an ideal wanting satisfaction—that "we are rationalists!"\(^1\) There is no conflict there between faith and reason. "The ages of faith are the ages of rationalism," he says in another place.

Religion, then, is an attempt to find the wholes which give meaning to the parts; it is an attitude toward the universe. Religion is the seeing of the world as "a mutually adjusted disposition of things issuing in value for its own sake."\(^3\) The same situation gives rise to the notion of morality. Whitehead calls it moral because it relates the individual to the universal "to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity."\(^4\) The clash of general and particular can be resolved only as the individual sees that "its interest is the general good"\(^5\) and that its own concessions to generality will yield only "a wider sweep of interest."\(^6\) The

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 67.
2. Whitehead, RM, 64.
3. Ibid., 143.
4. Whitehead, PR, 23.
5. Ibid., 23.
6. Ibid., 23.
full notion of morality is revealed in the responsibility of the free individual in determining what its own realization shall be in accordance with its possibilities and environment. He says:

The actual entity, in a state of process during which it is not fully definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the whole point of moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned by the limits of the data, and by the categorical conditions of concrescence.¹

Religion is rational; the rational is religious. Both are ways of looking at reality. Conjoined into "rational religion", they become the key to metaphysical understanding, or to change the figure, the eye for seeing into reality. "Rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special occasions, and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions."² Such a religion opens up the world, revealing a metaphysics otherwise unknown. "The doctrines of rational religion aim at being that metaphysics which can be derived from the supernormal experience of

¹ Whitehead, PR, 390. Though Whitehead does not emphasize the moral, and some see in the omission a weakness, e.g., Millard, FWWT, 426-427, there seems to be some ground here for the working out of a fairly adequate basis for morality. See Schilpp, Art. (1941), 608, for another opinion on the place of morality in Whitehead's thought.
² Whitehead, RM, 32.
mankind in its moments of finest insight."¹ This is no attempt to remove religion from life, nor to reduce such high concepts to dogmatic creeds. No one more than Whitehead has portrayed so forcefully the withering effects of formularized religion. His objection to "cold" religion is revealed in his somewhat ironic remark that in the eighteenth century "God made his first appearance in religion under the frigid title of the First Cause, and was appropriately worshipped in white-washed churches."² Whitehead would make religion free. Religion is a moving of the spirit. Its total relation to metaphysics can well be summarized in Whitehead's statement that "religion is world loyalty."³

At this point in the discussion it has already become apparent that the close affiliation of reason and religion has modified both. Religion is more than the emotional response to a ritual or worship situation, and reason is more than a process of ratiocination. On the one hand, religion is a metaphysical disposition. "The final principle of religion," says Whitehead, "is that there is a wisdom in the nature of things, from which flow our

1. Whitehead, RM, 32. This statement could almost come from the mystics who, in the illumination stage of "the mystic way", proclaim an enhanced mental awareness of the true nature of reality. See Underhill, MYS, 254-265.
3. Whitehead, RM, 80.
direction of practice, and our possibility of the theoretical analysis of fact." On the other hand, reason becomes a principle of ordering. That means that Whitehead has abandoned the notion that reason is only a matter of premises and conclusions. One might say that The Function of Reason is his declaration of independence from the bondage of formal logic. There Whitehead says that "the function of Reason is to promote the art of life." Reason is an instrument of adjustment to environment, the ever-present urge to novelty and improvement, the answer to Fatigue, Reason is pragmatic. "Reason is the practical embodiment of the urge to transform mere existence into the good existence, and to transform the good existence into the better existence." More briefly, the threefold urge of reason is: "To live, to live well, to live better." Here are values

1. Whitehead, RM, 143. One seems to feel that Whitehead has almost a sacramental view of the universe—through metaphysics to ethics and the inner virtues of the soul. The same concept is even stronger in Brightman, who sees in nature a "revelation of Divine Personality," a view which "leads to a sacramental view of nature," NV, 160-161.


3. Whitehead, FR, 2. The influence of Dewey and Bergson is patent. Note above that Whitehead defines religion as "the art and the theory of the internal life." Religion and reason thus become the internal and external means for the harmonious adjustment to the universe.

4. Ibid., 5.
5. Ibid., 15.
6. Ibid., 18.
7. Ibid., 23.
8. Ibid., 14.
again, the production of which, in Whitehead's thought, is the end of all metaphysics and rational religion. Reason, religion, and values are the great "emergents" from Whitehead's metaphysics. They all come beautifully together in the following quotation, which will serve as summary for this section:

Religion starts from the generalization of final truths first perceived as exemplified in particular instances. These truths are amplified into a coherent system and applied to the interpretation of life. They stand or fall--like other truths--by their success in this interpretation. The peculiar character of religious truth is that it explicitly deals with values. It brings into our consciousness that permanent side of the universe which we can care for. It thereby provides a meaning, in terms of value, for our own existence, a meaning which flows from the nature of things.¹

4. Is Whitehead's God "Available"?

That Brightman's theism involves worship there can be no doubt.² His God is personal, and it has been shown that one of the chief sources of creativity is found in fellowship and communion with this personal God. The matter is not so easily settled in the case of Whitehead. Whether or not his God is "available"³ for worship and interaction with finite persons as persons depends entirely on the nature of God. A previous section⁴ has shown the function of God in

---

¹. Whitehead, RM, 124.
². As shown above.
³. Making use of Ely's term in his RAWG.
⁴. Chapter IV, B.
the universe, particularly as related to value structure, but very little was said or implied about the nature of God. If this part of the discussion is to be meaningful, certainly before any concept of theistic worship can be established, some attempt must be made to say whether or not Whitehead's God is the kind that is available for interpersonal relationship.

Is Whitehead's God available? The answer to this question depends, to some extent, on the answer to another question: Is Whitehead's God personal? This is not to deny the religious values of other views of God, even the opposite extreme of personalism, viz., pantheism. Some of the great pantheists have been very devout, e.g., Spinoza, while some of the most fervent religious mystics, e.g., Meister Eckhart, have espoused a cosmology not far removed from the historic pantheistic view of the universe. Many of the mystics, while not thorough-going pantheists, have used the language of immanence to express their mystical experiences. The problem for discussion here is not whether pantheism is religiously available, but whether a God who is in some sense personal is not the only kind of God that is capable, so to speak, of entering into the kind of relationships

---

1. The position adopted here is that Brightman, Bowne, and other personalists have generally established their case. Bowne's chapter on "The Failure of Impersonalism" (PER, 217-267), is very effective in revealing the inadequacy of all attempts to construct an impersonal metaphysics.
which Whitehead describes in his religious sections. If God is "a principle of ordering" and no more than that, it will be most difficult to establish from Whitehead's thought the notion of worship in any ordinary sense; but if God is a Person, albeit divine as opposed to human, then creative and meaningful worship is a rational possibility.

At best, a clear-cut concept of the character of Whitehead's God is very much a desideratum. One can agree easily with Hartshorne's comment that Whitehead's "idea of God is... an intentional departure from most of the philosophical past." His is certainly not the God of Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, or what is loosely known as the Christian God. No historical or conventional label will do. Whitehead's own testimony on one occasion put him in the camp of the pantheists, but there has been little or no serious attempt to make that classification stick. Brightman says categorically that "Whitehead is clearly not a pantheist." Whitehead's emphasis on the immanence of God does not lessen the value of Brightman's opinion when it is recalled that to be "in" another actual entity means to prehend or feel what that other entity sadfereit. This is the only sense in which

2. In a written comment to the writer, Brightman said: "Privately Whitehead has said (to Ferré) that he was really a pantheist." Brightman added, very interestingly, "I can't reconcile this with atomicity of occasions."
"God is immanent in the World" or "the World is immanent in God."\(^1\) Furthermore, the "superjective nature of God\(^2\) seems to make it practically impossible to label Whitehead's doctrine of God as pantheistic.

To deny pantheism is not to assert personalism, of course,\(^3\) and the following is not an attempt to force a point of view that is unwarranted. Frankly, the assertion that God is personal for Whitehead must be supported more by inferential evidence than stated fact; nevertheless, it is the purpose of this section to show that the implications of Whitehead's scheme of ideas favor the view that God is not completely void of those characteristics which make personal relationships possible. That Brightman himself classifies Whitehead among the personalists adds a certain impulse to the effort of substantiating the view with some evidential data. In his chapter in Form (ed.), A History of Philosophical Systems, Brightman says:

The greatest Anglo-American philosopher of recent times, A. N. Whitehead (1861-1947), came from a realistic tradition, but his doctrines of creativity, actual occasions, prehensions, subjective aim, and God all point to panpsychistic personalism.\(^4\)

Later in the same chapter Brightman includes Whitehead in

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 528.
2. Ibid., 135.
3. See the great variety of opinions about God in Hartshorne and Reese, PSG.
a list of "personalists who...affirm the finiteness of God."\textsuperscript{1}

Whitehead uses the terms "person" and "personal", but with extreme caution, the former term under considerable qualifications, and the latter as the distinctive mark of a certain type of serial order. The ordinary meaning of person unfortunately suggests, says Whitehead, "the notion of consciousness, so that its use would lead to misunderstanding."\textsuperscript{2}

Occasionally, however, in moments of less intense attention to his highly restricted terminology, Whitehead lapses back into the more ordinary, and one might add, more empirical mode of expression, as when he wishes to distinguish between vegetative and personal life.

In the case of single cells, of vegetation, and of the lower forms of animal life, we have no ground for conjecturing living personality. But in the case of the higher animals there is central direction, which suggests that in their case each animal body harbours a living person, or living persons. Our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of ourselves as such persons.\textsuperscript{3}

The last sentence of this passage is as empirically grounded as any proposition about persons in Brightman's thought, and lends some support to the view here set forth that there are sufficient personalistic elements in Whitehead's thought to warrant the comparative analysis.

\textsuperscript{1} Brightman, Art. (1950), 349. In Art. (1950), 290, Brightman said: "Even Whitehead is essentially personalistic."
\textsuperscript{2} Whitehead, PR, 52. See PR, 245, 372, for his unique view of the meaning of consciousness.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 163-164. Italics added.
As for the application of the term person to God, there must also be great care, for his primordial nature is not conscious. But here is the first major inference in support of a personal God. If consciousness, even in Whitehead's exclusive sense, implies a person, then God is a person, for his consequent nature is conscious. Furthermore, God fulfills the requirements necessary for personal order. He "sustains a character" through change, he is his own reason for existing, and something constant is supported along an "historical route." Having these qualifications Whitehead says that "such an enduring entity is a 'living person'." God being an actual entity, therefore, there is no reason to treat him "as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification." What constitutes "enduring personality in the temporal world" finds its correlate in God's nature to an enhanced degree. There it "is an even more complete unity of life in a chain of elements for which succession does not mean loss of immediate unison."

Less specific but equally strong evidence is Whitehead's constant use of personalistic terminology to describe the

1. Whitehead, PR, 524.
2. Ibid., 524.
3. Ibid., 52.
4. Ibid., 137.
5. Ibid., 163.
6. Ibid., 163.
7. Ibid., 521.
8. Ibid., 531.
divine activity. God feels, he is tender towards actual occasions, he grades the relevance of eternal objects held out to actual entities, he shares experiences with the world, he judges, he saves the world, and he is patient. All these activities are personal.

Whitehead comes the nearest to a deliberate identification of God with personality in his discussion of immortality in his Ingersoll Lecture at Harvard. There he shows the need of enduring personality to account for the persistence of value. How personality makes this possible is seen in his description of the nature of Personal Identity:

A whole sequence of actual occasions, each with its own present immediacy, is such that each occasion embodies in its own being the antecedent members of that sequence with an emphatic experience of the self-identity of the past in the immediacy of the present.

The application here is to human personalities, but even more is there need for some persisting order on the cosmic level. Here is where God is needed to give coherence to the multiplicity of values.

The World of Value exhibits the essential unification of the Universe. Thus while it exhibits the immortal side of the many persons, it also involves the unification of personality. This is the concept of God.

1. Whitehead, PR, 134.
2. Ibid., 161.
3. Ibid., 248.
4. Ibid., 523.
5. Ibid., 525.
6. Ibid., 526.
7. Ibid., 526.
9. Ibid., 694.
Whitehead is quite superlative in the expression of his views as to the axio-personal relationship, in the following statements:

Personality is the extreme example of the sustained realization of a type of value... We cannot dismiss Personal Identity without dismissing the whole of human thought as expressed in every language... Apart from some mode of personality there is trivialization of value.2

In the face of such evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that significant value is possible only on the personal level, the highest personal level being God, who in himself gathers up the diverse values of the world.

God is the unifying personality of the world of values, but Whitehead would modify the concept somewhat by saying that

it is not the God of the learned tradition of Christian Theology, nor is it the diffused God of Hindu Buddhistic tradition. The concept lies somewhere between the two.4

It is noticeable throughout this whole discussion of God's relation to the world that Whitehead makes this same careful modification of the concept of God. In this Whitehead seeks to avoid on the one hand an "eminently real"5 God, and on

1. Whitehead, Art. (1941)2, 690.
2. Ibid., 693.
3. See Chapter II, C.
5. Whitehead, PR, 519.
the other a God who is so much everywhere that he is nowhere. His God is neither "wholly other" nor undifferentiated Brahman. What Whitehead feels is necessary is a God who is unoriginated and sufficiently transcendent to initiate and direct other entities, but not so "high and lifted up" that he is indifferent to, or separate from, the world which he eternally creates. Personality as applied to God means that he "is not neutral to relationships," as Hartshorne expresses it.¹

With some care and qualification, then, it is not going beyond the facts to infer that Whitehead's God is in some sense personal. This not only opens the way for greater availability, but it suggests a whole new area of possibility. There can be no doubt of interaction between entities, whether on the lowest level or on the highest with personal order. The question is whether or not the prehending relationship between the temporal actual entities with personal order, i. e., human beings, and the "non-temporal actual entity,"² God, is a situation that can be referred to as worship. Does Whitehead's God inspire worship?

---

¹ Hartshorne, DR, 145. See Hartshorne's whole discussion of divine personality, which, although he is a close follower of Whitehead, he is not averse to ascribing to God, DR, 142-147. Cf. Hartshorne, MVG, 249-250.
² Whitehead, RM, 90.
5. Worship.

True worship involves reciprocity between God and man. A one way relationship, whether an arbitrary bestowal of grace from above or a mechanical chanting of religious formulae from below, is not worship. Religion without interaction, or in more religious language, communion, is nothing but blind devotion on the part of man and certainly cannot result in an enhanced appreciation of values, or a transfigured grasp of life and its problems. Worship provides a channel between God and man by which God's love and understanding flow out in response to the outreach of man's spirit and devotion. Does God as delineated by Whitehead inspire devotion in a questful spirit? In other words, would the religious impulse which springs from the heart of mankind find repose in the God of, say, Process and Reality?

Now it cannot be claimed at all that Whitehead's abstruse terminology is the language of devotion; but neither can it be said that the beautiful language of the Prayer Book or the Psalter gives us an adequate understanding of God's nature or his relation to the world. To hear of God as primordial, consequent, or superjective, does not particularly stimulate one to worship, but if these terms, when understood, convey a more meaningful insight into God's nature, is not the way then opened for a more intelligent

1. Whitehead, PR, 532.
worship?

When I see thee as thou art
I'll praise thee as I ought.

Worship is never helped by ignorance, as Paul reminded his hearers on Mars' Hill.

Many aspects of Whitehead's thought of God are religiously fruitful, but the following three are the most impressive:

a. That God is in constant interaction with the universe is an inspiring and reassuring item of knowledge. Deus absconditus, or God who is totaliter aliter may stimulate a certain majestic awe, but not the reassurance of meaningful worship. God never was apart from creation, nor will he be; he is "with all creation"¹ in his eternal capacity as the "lure for feeling", ² exercising a "tender patience"³ in offering possibilities of "truth, beauty, and goodness"⁴ to all actual entities.

b. Worship reaches its highest peak in the realization that communion not only increases values, but God himself is the guarantor that those values shall be conserved. Höfdding may talk more about the "axiom of the conservation of value,"⁵ but he, with his impersonal order of nature, fails

---
¹ Whitehead, PR, 521.
² Ibid., 522.
³ Ibid., 526.
⁴ Ibid., 526.
⁵ Höfdding, POR.
to give adequate metaphysical ground for such an elevated view. No philosopher surpasses Whitehead in the conviction that these values shall persist. God's whole consequent nature is the "home" of all values originating in the world, but which, upon their perishing, find "objective immortality in God." That God needs these values is at once an inspiring and astounding revelation. "We are workers together with God." Here is the secret of an expanding and constantly enriched God. God is ever giving out—his love flows into the world—but he receives back into his own experience the enhanced, intensified feelings of the multitude of autonomous entities which he originated. His "pound hath gained ten pounds." God is vitally concerned that value shall be conserved. "The image under which this operative growth of God's nature is best conceived, is that of a tender care that nothing be lost." Here, indeed, is ground for religious faith of the highest order—the assurance that all worthwhile effort, every acquisition of value, shall find immortality in the permanence of God. "Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature."2

c. Perhaps the most inspiring element of worship in Whitehead's view of God is the notion of God's identification of himself with the suffering of the world. This opens

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 527.
2. Ibid., 525.
3. Ibid., 531.
again the whole problem of evil, which has already been treated. It remains only to indicate some of the religious implications of the problem.

From the earlier discussion, it might appear that evil is not too deeply involved in the metaphysical structure of reality. On occasion it even appears as an instrument of good, for it serves to show the difference between what an actual entity is, and what it might be. Whitehead calls that situation "fortunate" for without the disparity "actuality would consist in a cycle of repetition, realizing only a fine group of possibilities." On the surface, this view of evil appears not too serious, and for some thinkers it might not go deep enough; but it does take on more somber portent when it is remembered that God "shares with every creation its actual world." But even more than a fellowship with the world, God's consequent nature itself is the "reaction of the temporal world on the [primordial] nature of God," or "the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts." This is to say that God's nature is inextricably and eternally bound up with the physical world. "He is not before all creation, but with all creation." It

1. Whitehead, AI, 333.
2. Ibid., 333, 354.
3. Whitehead, PR, 523.
4. Ibid., 19.
5. Ibid., 524.
follows then that the suffering of the world is God's suffering; its pain his pain; the world's frustration his frustration. Out of this fact emerges the religious value that God is "the fellow-sufferer who understands."\(^1\) God is not one who so transcends his world, à la Karl Barth, that he can look on indifferently while his creatures suffer. God shares with the world in that he "gives to suffering its swift insight into values which can issue from it. He is the ideal companion who transmutes what has been lost into a living fact within his own nature."\(^2\)

Ely, who has given a rigorous, but at times unwarranted, criticism of the religious values in Whitehead's metaphysics, admits that there is considerable value in the awareness of a Being who understands and "to whose consciousness all valuable happenings are immediately present."\(^3\) But he argues that the knowledge means little or nothing to the individual worshiper. "We can find, at best, only a vicarious joy in our sufferings and our tragedies."\(^4\) God does receive in his own nature the experiences, good or evil, of all valuing beings; but Ely thinks that God is interested only in conserving and producing values that he alone can enjoy. No matter how evil—that is, how ugly—the world is, God somehow manages to utilize it as an aspect of

---

1. Whitehead, PR, 532.  
3. Ely, RAWG, 40.  
4. Ibid., 50.
the beautiful picture he is eternally painting for himself. This proves him a divinely skilful painter, but it does not exhibit either human or superhuman benevolence.

To this objection it might be replied that it still remains a higher value to know that God is working with the world striving to overcome its sorrows and evil than to feel that experiences of disvalue are total losses in the universe. Furthermore, Ely fails to consider that the values which are transmuted, enhanced, or harmonized in God are passed back into the world, in accordance with God's own conceptual aim, so that they are enjoyed as transmuted. In this way Whitehead provides for the mutual enrichment of God and the world. Ely might well be reminded that God and the world are mutually immanent, so that the situation which he deplores does not exist.

In addition to the three major religious aspects of Whitehead's thought, that is, God's interaction with the world, his co-operation in the increase and preservation of values, his "fellowship of suffering", there might be added many random expressions and isolated thoughts which reflect profound religious feeling. His constant use of the word "tender" as descriptive of God's activity is more than cold metaphysics. ² His last of the four creative phases of

1. Ely, RAWG, 50-51.
2. One is reminded again of Whitehead's allusion to the worship of the First Cause in white-washed churches.
actuality\(^1\) might well have been taken from a book of religious devotion:

The action of the fourth phase is the love of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands.\(^2\)

Again, in seeking to express the actuality of God in relation to the multiplicity of elements in the world, Whitehead adopts the New Testament phrase "the kingdom of heaven."\(^3\)

Many other instances of religious terminology could be mentioned.

In summary, it is sufficient to point out that evidence is abundant in Whitehead, even in the most metaphysical of his works, *Process and Reality*, for a personal, loving, interested God, one who shares the world's sorrow and strives to increase its joys.

C. Comparative Summary.

The data presented in this chapter show that religion is integrally related to the philosophical systems of both Brightman and Whitehead, and in particular to their axiology. For the one, "religion is a choice of value,"\(^1\) while for the other, "the peculiar character of religious truth is that it

---

1. Brightman, POR, 85.
explicitly deals with values." It is a fact that both men may have had a predilection toward religion as a result of early training, but the admission of the fact does not necessarily entail the assumption that their systems reflect, automatically and uncritically, a religious bias. Their avowal of religion as a dominant expression of value experience must stand or fall by the consistency of its inclusion in their systems as a whole. The previous material shows that in the case of neither is the inclusion a forced enterprise. The great place given to religion is but a demonstration in both of the belief that a coherent philosophy must include all the data of experience.

For Brightman, religion is a value-orientation. One not only worships what he considers to be of supreme value, but he orders his life in accordance with the values implied by the object of his devotion. To be religious, therefore, is to be vitally concerned about the highest values. Brightman's "concern about experiences which are regarded as of supreme value" is matched by Whitehead's "ultimate craving to infuse into the insistent particularity of emotion that non-temporal generality which primarily belongs to conceptual thought alone." Religion in either case begins with an evaluation by the individual worshiper in the presence of his

2. See Brightman's definition, POR, 17, or above.
3. Whitehead, PR, 23.
supreme value. All values, as indeed all types of experience, must begin in the conscious self of the individual. Brightman's datum-self\(^1\) finds its analogue in Whitehead's prehending entity, but in the case of each the private experience of the individual always refers to something beyond the self. Religion is an outreaching dimension.

Just as sense impressions in us give us clews to the objective order of nature, so do religious experiences in us give us clews to the objective order of value in a reality deeper than nature.\(^2\)

For Brightman here is the point where faith is vital to religious value; faith is an expression of confidence that the ultimately real is God, the personal originator and sustainer of all values. For Whitehead, religion is solitariness, but it is a solitude of discovery; it is the temporary but essential prerequisite to an awareness of the larger meanings and values in the total structure of the universe.

Both systems reveal an existential strain. This is particularly true in the case of Whitehead, who emphasizes solitariness, self-valuation, and the strongly internal character of religious experience. But where religious existentialism cannot escape its own highly subjectivistic, if not solipsistic, predication, Brightman and Whitehead

---

1. See Art. (1929), 560-561.
ground their religious axiology in a thoroughly objective metaphysic. Religion is what it is because the universe is what it is. Such a statement is more than a truism when seen in the light of the hopeless attempts of non-metaphysical religions to provide some rationale for their beliefs.

Religion without a rational, metaphysical basis becomes the constant victim of subjective whim and pseudo-revelation claims. The only hope for rationality, consistency, and communicability lies in the objective foundation of the subjective experience. It is worthy of special note that Brightman and Whitehead, although approaching the problem from different perspectives, agree in their insistence on this necessity of a metaphysical basis for religion. That religion in leading man to "the eternal in the world of change gives him a solid anchorage,"\(^1\) is Brightman's way of expressing the relationship. Rational religion leads to metaphysics and finds permanency. Furthermore, the world is "friendly" to the value quest. Whitehead finds religion growing out of "the nature of things."\(^2\) For him, metaphysics gives to religion a sense of harmony with the rest of reality, the parallel of Brightman's friendly universe. It also provides a constant corrective to the inescapably emotive character.

---

2. Whitehead, RM, 143.
of religion; and finally, the metaphysical is necessary for historical interpretation and communication.

It is precisely because of its metaphysical foundation that religion, for both of the men in this study, is not incompatible with reason. Religion and reason come together in their metaphysics. It is reason which discovers in the universe a coherent ordering; hence, religion itself, if metaphysically grounded, will reflect the kind of universe with which it interacts. Brightman can go so far as to say that "the cause of reason and the cause of religion stand or fall together."1 Rational religion in Whitehead's thought is the discovery of principles which give meaning to particularity. The notion of morality arises here in the relation of the individual to totality. It is "the function of reason" to help the individual make harmonious adjustments to the universe. The highest values come only as proper adjustment is made. This function of reason is comparable to Brightman's view that religion must always be subject to the guiding hand of reason, although Brightman does not ascribe to the claims of reason anything approaching to infallible certainty. Reason is a heuristic principle for safe-guarding religion from inconsistency and incoherence. If there is any "supreme court" of judgment, then it must be reason, but in the case of both Brightman and Whitehead

1. Brightman, FG, 56.
it has for its data the whole range of experience which prevents any narrow, one-sided appraisal.

Although Whitehead is quite pragmatic in his description of the function of religion, he does not enumerate its values with the same specificity as does Brightman. The latter shows how religion contributes to human values in providing strength and illumination in the presence of suffering, death, moral evil, ignorance, and limitation. Religion also fulfills the human desire for unity, purpose, and permanency. That religion does contribute these values to human experience is a matter of objective observation, and in providing such help in every dimension of life, religion fulfills its proper function. It does not solve mathematical or economic problems, but it fortifies humanity to meet with strength and courage the ills that are common to experience.

But while Whitehead may not offer his own list of the contributions of religion to life, there is no less reason for ascribing to his God the characteristics which make the worship of him meaningful and creative. Whitehead's God is "available" or his system fails to exemplify at this point the mutuality ofprehending entities which constitute the total framework of reality. Some evidence has been adduced above to show that it is not extreme to refer to Whitehead's God as personal. A strictly impersonal universe
could not produce the kind of experiences which he sets forth as possible. There may be reciprocation among elements in a non-personal universe, but it is very difficult to contend for meaningful reciprocation. Despite the terminological barrier to the worship of Whitehead's God, the divine-human relationship set forth can only be described as religious. There is great value in the knowledge that God is with all creation, exercising in that relationship a care and tenderness that nourishes every feeble flicker of life and hope.  

The bruised reed he will not break  
But strengthen and sustain.  

God conserves and increases all values, but despite the contention of Ely, he does not do it in isolated indifference, or for egoistic self-advantage.  

What God strives for is the maximum concreteness and harmony in the universe in which all actual entities find their proper place according to "God's all-embracing conceptual valuations." This is Whitehead's doctrine of teleology. In aiming at order as the end of all cooperative effort between God and the world, God is always persuasive rather than coercive. He determines what are the "optimal limits" of free actions which he weights in the

1. Well-known lines from Whittier's The Eternal Goodness.  
2. Whitehead, PR, 374.  
3. See ibid., 127.  
4. Hartshorne, DR, 142.
direction of the maximum good. But whatever the response in the world of action, good or evil, God shares it. Where there is opposition he is still there to meet it with goodness. Hartshorne richly illuminates this aspect of Whitehead's thought in the following:

God conflicts...only with what he also participates in through his sensitivity or 'tenderness.' If Whitehead said less than this, it is the logic of his system that would collapse, and not merely its religious applicability.

To know that God shares all experience with such understanding is productive of the highest inspiration. Here is cooperation, fellowship, creativity, salvation. God is truly "available."

Brightman's discussion of religious values comes to a moving climax in his discussion of the creative values of worship. Worship as contemplation brings calmness and poise; as an illuminative experience it opens up spiritual insights otherwise unattainable; as communion the worshiper feels through mutual response that he is part of the creative process of the universe, and as fruition the life is enriched and made productive. Furthermore, worship throws a new perspective on the purposes of life, revealing at once the limitless possibilities of progress in the spiritual realm coupled with the power, in cooperative effort with God,

1. Hartshorne, MVG, 51.
to achieve the transformation of the individual life and the community of which he is a part.

In Brightman, as well as Whitehead, it is in the limitation of God that his goodness is revealed. Finiteness, suffering, incompleteness, struggle, assure sympathetic understanding and elicit cooperative effort as no theistic absolutism will do. Omnipotent power, besides raising an insurmountable problem of apparent divine inactivity in the face of evil, is not necessary for religious worship. What is necessary is a Power who will not cease in the conflict of creativity with non-creativity. There is mystical value in the knowledge that God is contending with but always able to control the recalcitrant elements which make the origination, increase, and conservation of values in the universe an eternal struggle. The constant effort, instead of suggesting failure, opens the possibility of eternal progress, of which this life is probably only the beginning of a continuously enriched and creative existence beyond physical death.

Brightman and Whitehead are both optimistically oriented toward the future. Religion is an experience of hope, a dimension of spirit reaching toward ever new creative possibilities. It is an adventure in the creation of values. Without the progress and the adventure there is
nothing new; there is only deadening repetition. Religious faith is the assurance that tomorrow can be better than today.
CHAPTER SIX
EVALUATION

The purpose of this chapter is primarily evaluative. Several points from the thought of each man will be selected as the bases for critical appraisal of their strengths and weaknesses. Some consideration will be given to the question of the relevancy of their value theories for the contemporary scene. The chapter will conclude with a final comparative estimate of the two men.

A. Brightman.

1. Major Areas of Criticism.

Both the strength and the weakness of Brightman's axiological theory center around three fundamental concepts in his thought, viz., God, disvalue, and personality. Although these concepts have already been discussed in previous chapters, it is the purpose now to evaluate them in a wider perspective.

a. God.

The quantity of criticism aimed at a man's general thought may or may not be greatly significant, but some significance is revealed when the bulk of comment, by far, centers around one particular aspect. The overwhelming attention accorded to Brightman's doctrine of God suggests that it is
unique enough to attract notice and sufficiently meritorious to warrant both philosophical acclaim and disapproval. One might also deduce that Brightman's doctrine of God is his major contribution to philosophy. L. H. DeWolf in a very recent article declares that "the principal innovation of Brightman's metaphysics and philosophy of religion was his theistic finitism."¹ The first sentence of another article says: "Among the many contributions to religious thought made by Edgar Sheffield Brightman, the most famous and most controversial was his attempt to solve the problem of evil."² Brightman's solution, of course, rests in his theistic finitism.

The charge of dualism is the major metaphysical objection made to Brightman's view of God, a criticism which he by no means accepts as being valid. From the religious and axiological perspective, the major objection consists in the claim that theistic finitism is an inadequate principle on which to build a foundation of faith and values.

It probably is a fact that the faith of many people "cannot acquiesce in a finite God," as Garvie says.³ The questions asked at Brightman's public lectures, the letters of protest, the criticisms in religious books reveal a great sensitivity in regard to the character and power of God.

¹ DeWolf, Art. (1954), 50.
² Stahl, Art. (1954), 537.
³ Garvie, OBG, 422.
Whether or not thinkers, both emotively religious\(^1\) and rigorously philosophical,\(^2\) ought to hold to one particular view of God, finite or absolute, is not the question. A God whose nature or will reveals some aspects of finitude may very well be the kind of God that exists; on the other hand, a God who is absolute in self-sufficiency but who may enter into meaningful relationships may be the real God. In making evaluation of the criticism the question is whether or not the objection can be sustained. An answer either way involves difficulties. In some minds an absolute God is necessary to assure the permanence of values and religious hope, therefore the answer must be yes. A finite God would and does damage faith. But the affirmative reply is made at the expense of a satisfactory accounting of disvalue. If the answer is no, then it is necessary for advocates of the view to show that theistic finitism provides the ground for religious faith and survival of values. Brightman undertakes that task with great vigor and succeeds in presenting a view which, for many thinkers, gives more ground for faith than the traditional absolutism.

How diametrically opposed men can be on the answer to the question of the adequacy of theistic finitism is revealed in the views of two men selected almost at random. The first is that of G. C. Cell, who sees in the doctrine a menace to

---

1. For example, Gordon H. Clark, CVMT.
2. For example, B. P. Bowne, NET, or THE.
practical religion and faith. In analyzing some of the views antagonistic to traditional Christianity he says:

The net result for practical religion and the general effect on the life-principle of the Christian faith is all one whether God is banished from the universe as in deism or is lost in the universe as in recent pantheism and in the confusion is represented as stricken with finitude, impotently, hopelessly sharing in its processes of good and evil."

On the other side is the opinion of Joshua Liebman, who says:

At first it seems daring, if not heretical, for us to say that God is not omnipotent—that He, too, is limited. We ask in amazement, 'How can God be limited? If He is not all-powerful—able to do anything that He wills—then surely He cannot be God!' I deny this conclusion. If I did not believe that God is limited by the very nature of the world He created, then I would have to surrender my faith.

Such opinions show the impossibility of declaring with assurance that either side of the debate is "right." If theistic finitism is religiously inadequate for some, it is also the only adequate view for others. Therein is both weakness and strength. Brightman realized that he could not enunciate a doctrine of God equally satisfactory to all. Nor did he try. "More is lost than is gained," he says, "by insisting on an idea of God which shall please everyone." But whatever Brightman may have intended, his doctrine of God has been evaluated more by theological

criteria and practical religious experience than by strictly philosophical categories. But that is not necessarily a disadvantageous consequence for one who deliberately attempted to supply a coherent philosophical framework for religious faith and values. He holds that it is useless to discuss the great values of religion with impossible axioms. It is Brightman's position that only a satisfactory view of God will allow for a satisfactory view of religion. The great strength of Brightman's theistic finitism for value theory lies in its empirical adequacy. Experience shows that values are achieved in struggle and pain. Close observation of society and the very physical universe reveals the same struggle there for the achievement of lasting values. In Brightman's view the notion that God is sharing in that struggle is a religious value of the highest order. Not finitism but absolutism leaves religion cold and tense.

By starting with all the facts of experience, good and evil, Brightman has given to religion a firm basis in "the nature of things" thereby doing much not only toward the restoration of religion as a topic well worthy of philosophical consideration, but he has shown to religionists themselves that philosophy may well be an ally rather than an enemy. James may speak of the "shallowing effect" of the intellect in his somewhat ironic appeal to "see how the ancient spirit of Methodism evaporates under those wonderfully
able rationalistic booklets (which every one should read) of a philosopher like Professor Bowne;¹ but whatever truth there may have been in James's opinion, Brightman has helped allay many of the suspicions that somehow metaphysics and religion are mutually exclusive.

Brightman and Whitehead both show that only by reference to the unity, permanency, and stability of the universe can religion itself hope to achieve stability and rationality. The very "emotive" nature of religion is its own worst enemy, especially in the effort to establish a normative definition. This is not meant to imply that Brightman or Whitehead sought to eliminate feeling from religion. Very much to the contrary. But as Whitehead says, "its authority is endangered by the intensity of the emotions which it generates."²

Theistic finitism may not be the ultimate answer to the "problem of God", but it has the advantage of rigorous agreement with the facts of experience. Paul E. Johnson says:

However one may agree or disagree with Brightman's view of God, one must admit that he is realistic enough to face the problems and exigencies of life honestly and rigorously, without glossing over the evil in evasive optimism or yielding to despair in supine or defiant pessimism.

---

¹ James, VRE, 492, n. 2.
² Whitehead, RM, 83.
b. Disvalue.

There are two basic approaches to the problem of disvalue: first, one might deal with it strictly as one of the more or less classic problems of metaphysics, or he might be motivated toward it by the insistent demands of experience. With the first motive Brightman has very little in common. Hartshorne and Reese say that Brightman is inclined to treat the problem of God "pragmatically."\(^1\) His theory of evil, which entails his view of theistic finitism (or vice versa), is not the mere juggling of ideas, but an intellectual and emotional conviction growing out of the raw facts of experience.

There is no question but that Brightman has expressed the feelings of a multitude of people who have found in his frank treatment of evil a release from the terrific tensions aroused by the unresolved antinomy haunting their minds of a thoroughly good God and the tragic revelations of life.\(^2\) In an age when the "vain speculations" of philosophy are viewed with disdain by hard-bitten "realists", the practical implications of Brightman's disvalue theory should help alleviate the criticism of other-worldliness.

Practical as Brightman's theory of evil is, it is somewhat paradoxical that it should be raised to "ultimate status", as Ferré says, by making it the problem of God.\(^3\)

---

1. Hartshorne and Reese, PSG, 364.
This may not amount to laying rough hands of the greatest concept of all thought, but it may be an unnecessary reduc-
tion of that concept to terms of limited experience and possibility. Ferré is quite reluctant to accept a theory which makes God pay for the lack in man's own intellectual purse. Better allow for ignorance on the human side than finitude on the divine. It may be, Ferré argues, that an unpleasant fact which cannot be readily fitted into the cosmic pattern does have some value which cannot now be appreciated but will be apparent later.

Ferré's attitude is one of caution. He evidently thinks it is better to be without a theory which "solves" the problem than to proclaim a view of God which is "too closely tied down to a finite cosmic epoch and is not sufficiently anchored in the metaphysical analysis of ultimate being as such."

The criticism offered by Ferré is forceful. It is his opinion that despite the need for solution to the problem of evil the concept of a finite God does not do justice to the notion of "ultimate self-being." Brightman's obvious reply would be that Ferré's position is too near an argumentum ad ignorantiam—the most popular device among absolutists

2. Ferré, CGG, 105.
3. Ibid., 26.
4. Ibid., 105.
who want to avoid ascribing evil to God. Brightman is not averse to the view that God is in some sense transcendent, but care must be taken not to posit a God who is out of touch with reason and experience. The only basis we have for knowledge of anything, human or divine, is in experience. To go beyond the facts, even in a theory of God, is unempirical.

It is to Brightman's credit that his willingness to meet facts head on does not rob him of his positive orientation toward the future. Paradoxically, it is because God is finite and the struggle real that he sees hope for tomorrow. To Brightman's mind the effort, the pain, even the failure, are all evidence that the good is not vanquished and quiescent. The facts suggest that not all is well with the world, but experience also reveals a wealth of goodness and faith. Whatever else might be said about God, Brightman never doubts his goodness or his constant devotion to the eternal task of bringing order and meaning out of The Given.

In view of Brightman's care never to compromise the character of God, it is difficult to see how critics can charge him with making God evil. Brightman takes great pains to distinguish between the elements in God's nature which limit his will, and God's good will itself. The former

1. See, e. g., Brightman, PG, 189.
elements are the occasion of evil in the world, but God's will is never evil. His will is limited in power but never in goodness or love. 1

It is not impossible that a critic like Gordon H. Clark could miss the point, for his aim seems always to be refutation rather than understanding. He acknowledges that the will of Brightman's "god" 2 is good, but he goes on to say:

Let God's will be good; God's nature or character is evil, and the totality of these two parts of God, his will plus his essence, forms a schizophrenic personality. 3

An analysis of this sort is very far from the facts and spirit of Brightman's own interpretation.

Not so easily excusable is the comment offered by W. H. Sheldon in a discussion of the concept of divine limitation:

If the limitation of His power comes from a refractory element in His own make-up, as Brightman urges, then certainly He is not even perfect in intention, since part of His very self tends to thwart His will-to-good. 4

Not incorrect is Sheldon's interpretation that God's will is thwarted, but how this can be construed to reflect on the integrity of God's intention is difficult to see. There is not the slightest evidence in Brightman's thought to

1. Brightman, POR, 337.
2. When discussing what Brightman means by God, Clark is rudely uncomplimentary by his refusal to capitalize "god." See examples in CVMT, 277, 278.
3. Ibid., 280. Note also passim.
suggest that God's highest and fullest intention is anything but perfectly good.

Also confused is the very able team of critics, Hartshorne and Reese. The avowed purpose of their excellent anthology and commentary, *Philosophers Speak of God*, is "to aid readers in estimating the validity" of the views of God contained therein, but whether they achieve their aim in all respects, in regard to Brightman is open to question. At least one comment does not seem to agree with the facts. They say of his doctrine of The Given: "It is God's abstract purpose which is wholly good, and it is elements of his concrete experience which are evil." In the light of Brightman's insistence that God is "a conscious Person of perfect good will," it is doubtful if he would allow the criticism to go unchallenged that it is only God's abstract purpose that is good. God's goodness sounds very concrete as the experience of a Cosmic Person. "Goodness and all other values are meaningless except as conscious experiences ...Goodness that is nobody's goodness is no goodness at all." Maybe if Hartshorne and Reese had not limited themselves so exclusively to *The Problem of God* they would have seen that for Brightman goodness is the very heart of God's concrete

---

2. Ibid., 364.
4. Ibid., 120-121.
activity. Only with a consistently good God could Brightman, or anybody, build a theory of values which has its ground and strength in the metaphysical structure of the universe. If God, although finding in his own nature elements which make effort necessary, is capricious and irresolute in enlisting his will on the side of values, then a theory of disvalue is the only empirically sound position. But Brightman is surely right in his conviction that the evidence of experience reveals more goodness than evil in the world, and God is eternally on the side of good. "Whatever the origin of evil may be, and however awful it may be, God is the one who is never baffled by any evil." Here is Brightman's "solution" to the problem of disvalue.

2. Personality

The concept of personality, as applied to both human beings and God, is the third major center around which Brightman's theory of value turns. There is no need to duplicate all the evidence here which Brightman sets forth as the basis for his view that personality is the only adequate axiological principle. Three summarizing quotations will serve to review Brightman's position and orient the following evaluative discussion.

From his article, "Freedom, Purpose, and Value":

The primary fact, from which all facts are derived, which all theories interpret, and

from which all free action emanates, is the fact of the total conscious situation which is a person's present experience. In that experience, vision, insight, and synopsis are functions of the will to purpose values.

From *Nature and Values*:

Personalism will be taken to mean the belief that the universe is a society of conscious beings, that the energy which physicists describe is God's will in action, and that there is no wholly unconscious or impersonal being.

Also from *Nature and Values*:

In the broadest sense, personalism is the belief that conscious personality is both the supreme value and the supreme reality in the universe.

The substance of these three passages is that the metaphysical universe and values are both forms of personal experience. The main question for evaluation is whether or not Brightman's personalism is an adequate axiological principle.

Three types of criticisms are offered against the concept of personality as the "ultimate category of identity" and the locus of value facts:

- On the human level, the first objection is that it elevates persons beyond their true importance. A modern naturalist, J. H. Randall, Jr., for example, sees a collapse

1. Brightman, Art. (1940), 492.
2. Brightman, NV, 114.
3. Ibid., 118.
4. The phrase is Ferré's, CUG, 50.
of philosophic idealism with the passing away of "the problem to which philosophic idealism was a solution,"\(^1\) i.e., man's place in the universe. "How can man's interests and values be given a cosmic significance," he asks, "in the face of a science steadily undermining the traditional Hebrew-Christian guarantee of man's central place in the cosmos?"\(^2\) Beyond doubt there is a certain danger of pride or narrowness in an exaggerated anthropocentrism, but it is possible that Randall is guilty of the quantitative fallacy which tends to measure values in terms of size or data derived from the experimental method.\(^3\) Apparently man's place in the universe is of little account if the vast reaches of space be the standard, but what are the realms of space and time if there are no sentient beings capable of value and thought? Brightman says:

The place of personality in the realm of ends is not to be determined by the space that man's body occupies or by the time that elapsed before he was born, but rather by the values that he is capable of realizing.\(^4\)

The tendency on the part of naturalism to reduce the status of human personality in the face of science omits the very factor which has elevated science to the noble position which it has achieved, viz., zealous, purposeful human personality.

\(^1\) Randall, Art. (1944), 368.
\(^2\) Ibid., 368.
\(^3\) See Krikorian, Art. (1944), 242.
\(^4\) Brightman, ITF, 258.
On the divine level, a second type of criticism is the very common charge of anthropomorphism. "God," the objection goes, "is made too much after the manner of human personality."¹ One of the most recent of such appraisals is given by Hartshorne and Reese, who say that in making personality applicable to God Brightman's "procedure leads to a conception similar in many respects to a very great human being."² Both philosophical and religious theism have had to contend with this criticism, which has many forms. In an axiological context the objection is raised against the argument that because "only persons appreciate values, therefore there must be a transcendent person who creates and guarantees them."³ A critic like McCracken contends further that

there is no logical reason why values should not emerge from an impersonal Being: and even if the argument for personality in the Creator is granted, it does not guarantee his value or 'goodness.'⁴

McCracken is not objecting to the goodness of God, as his subsequent discussion shows, but he is opposed to the inference that God is personal and good on the grounds that human persons have experiences of value.

Brightman's reply to this type of objection is that

---

¹ One person in conversation with the writer said that to make God personal is to set up an idol.
² Hartshorne and Reese, PSG, 363.
³ McCracken, TV, 14-15.
⁴ Ibid., 15.
there is obvious need of some sort of cosmic organizational principle, and divine personality is the only adequate hypothesis which can give meaning to the totality of the universe, including the metaphysical structure of the world and human experience. The aim of philosophy is to make experience intelligible. The part cannot be separated from the whole. Therefore it is not incoherent to say that my experiences of value indicate the type of system in which values are present, not by reason of toleration, but because of the genuine "hospitality" accorded to them by the universe.

Without a synoptic logic of coherence, and the hypothesis that the universe is friendly to our ideals, the ideal of truth, as well as the ideals of goodness and beauty and holiness, become subjective fictions, and thought is impotent to grasp reality.¹

For Brightman,² nothing less than a supreme, conscious Person can adequately satisfy the demand for a unifying principle in which both nature and values are at home and adequately accounted for. The axiological relationship of the supreme and human minds is succinctly rendered in the short summarizing statement of Brightman that "universals are the thought-stuff of a supreme mind; values the normative appreciations of a supreme mind that ought to be known and appreciated by human minds."³

The third major type of criticism is that personality

1. Brightman, ITP, 268.
2. And the author of this dissertation.
is too narrow a concept, either on the human or divine levels. Perry expresses this point of view when he says that

there is more to a person than his personality. There are necessary conditions of personality, such as habit and temperament—but which do not make him a person.

Perry's objection is largely semantical, involving whatever difference there is between "person" and "personality." Certainly by "personality" Brightman does not mean any light and airy thing apart from the total experience of what a human being is. "Personality is not a fixed and complete entity that can be labeled and preserved in a museum," says Brightman. But a person does include "all its experiences—its memories, its purposes, its values, its powers, its activities, and its experienced interaction with its environment."

Höffding in his Philosophy of Religion sets forth some reasons why he thinks personality is unacceptable as applied to God. Personality as we understand it, he argues, "strives and struggles, asserting itself in the face of opposition;" but without that struggle the concept of personality is but an abstraction, or at best an analogy. Brightman's own theistic finitism is the best answer to

1. Perry, RV, 62.
2. Brightman, NV, 52.
3. Ibid., 56.
4. Höffding, POR, 83.
this objection. It is precisely because of the struggle and similar traits that Brightman calls God personal.

Höffding's second criticism of the concept of divine personality is that personality becomes less applicable to God the more he is conceived as absolute. On this point Höffding is probably nearer to truth than in his first criticism. It is difficult to think of the God of Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas as being personal, although thinkers like Royce, Calkins, and maybe Hegel have something approaching a personal absolute. But Höffding's criticism is still somewhat abstract, for not too many hold to Aristotle's actus purus. Where God is seen as limited, it is neither presumptive nor injudicious to apply the concept of personality to God.

Höffding's third major reason for a rejection of divine personality is not because "it is too high but because it is too low a determination of the deity." Höffding feels that personality just "cannot express the inexhaustible principle which comes to light in the very fact of the existence of this world." Höffding calls his own conception of God Critical Monism, in reality a modified pantheism with close affinities to naturalism. He rejects, however, the type of pantheism which makes God immanent in the world

1. Höffding, POR, 84.
2. Ibid., 84.
3. Ibid., 84.
4. Ibid., 87.
process, whether God is conceived as person or not.\footnote{This view, says Höffding, makes Lotze as much a pantheist as Spinoza, POR, 85.}

The objection that personality is too low a concept to apply to God is met by Brightman’s comment that

instead of taking personality to be too human a category to apply to God, it would really be more logical to take it as too divine a category to apply to man.\footnote{Brightman, IGF, 53. Cf. Ferré, CUG, 40.}

God, instead of human beings, is the standard of personality. But what man is is the best clue to what God is.

On the basis of human experience of God, what is known of him is personal in character. Impersonalism cannot explain the wealth of religious, ethical, and axiological insights which come as the result of treating God as a person capable of entering into reciprocal relations with other persons.

The importance of the concept of an understanding, feeling God, capable of sharing the values and sufferings of the world, cannot be overestimated. The price paid for such a view is the charge of humanizing God, and while an anthropomorphic view is not intended, it is worth the price if God is made available to man in terms which give meaning to his religious worship and value effort.

The only God worth believing in...in the light of the evidence, is a God in living relation to the facts of cosmic and human history. He is a God into whose very being time enters; we need a temporalistic rather than a purely eternalistic view of God. God is one who works; one to whom the passage...
of time means something; to whom the events of a progressive creative evolution are significant; for whom change is profoundly important—such changes as occur in human character, as well as those more sublime changes in his revelation of himself to man in the course of history.

Hartshorne and Reese suggest possible "equivocation" in Brightman's attempt to find a "categorical mean" between the eternal-temporal, infinite-finite poles of God's being, but they admit the value of the method which establishes "an identity between the ultimate poles of all meaning and the being of religious worth." Brightman would consider this last statement a high compliment on his efforts to delineate the kind of God who, as personal, is a loving God capable of acting "eternally and creatively towards the highest ends," and always available to human persons in their struggle for the achievement of values.

2. Contemporary Relevance.

In the preceding general evaluation, what Brightman's value theory could mean for the present time has already been anticipated. It remains only to make more explicit the major sense wherein his thought is currently relevant.

A philosophy is relevant when it intelligently and coherently relates persons to one another, to the physical

2. Hartshorne and Reese, PSC, 364.
universe, and to God. Only a philosophy with no particular ax to grind is capable of enunciating first principles broad enough to include all the facts. A strictly anthropocentric, metaphysical, or theistic Weltanschauung may be actually abstract because of its failure to relate man to the totality of his experience.

To say that personalism, as represented by Brightman, has brought God, man, and the world into the most coherent focus is a high claim, yet it may not be a begging of the question to suggest the view that under Brightman's rigorous scholarship and his constant attention to the findings of science and other fields that his personalistic axiology is a philosophy capable of meeting the demands of professional scholars and laymen alike.

Cornelius Krusé, estimating Brightman's contribution to philosophy, says:

> Edgar Sheffield Brightman's position in the history of American philosophy is assured. Wherever a complete account of American philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century will be given, reference will without question be made to Professor Brightman as a continuator, vigorous and creative, of the philosophy of personalism.

Besides Brightman's emphasis on reason, experience, personalism, and theistic finitism, Krusé points out that in both Americas Professor Brightman has become recognized as a leading scholar in the field of axiology. In a period when value

---

theory is coming more to the front, Brightman is "among those who greatly stimulated discussion and furthered the study of values in general theory and in their application in the moral and religious fields."\(^1\)

It is on this latter point that the relevancy of Brightman's axiology for the contemporary scene is most meaningfully evident. Consciously or unconsciously men operate according to some "philosophy of life", but often-times an inadequate principle of action is accepted for the sole reason that no better philosophy is available to fill the ethical or religious vacuum. Moral and axiological relativism, nihilism, religious skepticism, are less the expression of reasoned conclusions than the irrational and negative reactions to the unsatisfying attempts of the professional theorists to give an ordered picture of life in its total environment. Half-truths may be pleasant for the moment but under the impact of total living they are soon revealed for what they are. "No philosophy which does not satisfy his whole mind will permanently satisfy man."\(^2\)

The great strength of Brightman's philosophy lies in its adequacy for both theory and practice. It is logically rigorous and at the same time it finds man where he is, giving him something to live by and for. In the delineation

\(^1\) Kruse, Art. (1953), 598. See also Johnson, Art. (1954) for a survey of Brightman's contributions to personalism.

\(^2\) Brightman, NV, 141.
of his "resultant philosophy of life"\textsuperscript{1} Brightman has set forth three "first principles" which may very well form the platform for a vigorous and healthy way of life:\textsuperscript{2}

The first principle is respect for personality. This principle shows the meaning of respect not only for the self but for others and God. Entailed here are implications for society and worship.

The second principle, which sees nature as a revelation of Divine Personality, gives a coherent basis for relating man and nature. An impersonal world is abolished. Such a view not only suggests a way to unite the truths of science and religion, but nature itself becomes a source of mystical insight and spiritual values.

The third principle is spiritual liberty. This is probably the highest value that can be achieved; but it is also difficult due to the many debilitating influences which seek to rob men of both spirit and liberty. There are four levels of spiritual liberty, the materialistic, the miraculous, the level of the inner life, and the level of cooperation. It is only on this final level, says Brightman, that the other levels come to their fullest development; and, we might add, the previous two principles likewise. It is only when men see the values in each other through common devotion to God that true spiritual liberty is attained. \textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{1} Brightman, Chapter VII, NV.
    \item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 149-166.
\end{itemize}
the kingdom of God in which all races and creeds can meet, learn, and respect each other in religious liberty."¹

In Brightman's personalistic axiology all the great existence and intellectual values find their proper place—religion, ethics, reason, metaphysics, theism. Brightman would be the last person to suggest that his views are the final answer. But he is second to none in advocating loyalty to the widest possible range of truth and the highest values. He himself says that "one of the acutest problems of modern civilization is how to combine emotional power with critical intelligence."² His own critical method provides just such a synthesis in a value theory which sacrifices neither warmth nor intellectual vigor.

B. Whitehead.

1. Major Areas of Criticism.

The literature reveals a great variety of criticism of Whitehead's philosophy. Not all of it has close application to his axiology except as it may show up the weaknesses of the metaphysical structure which provides the foundation for his axiological theory. In the following discussion the criticisms which have both general and special relevancy for axiology are considered.

¹. Brightman, NV, 165.
². Ibid., 146.
a. Terminology.

The occasion for the most frequently offered objection to Whitehead's philosophy is his original and highly abstruse nomenclature. The objection is probably the most general one that can be made since it applies about equally as well to any aspect of his thought. Many writers have passed their opinion on his terminology. E. A. Burtt calls Process and Reality "one of the most difficult philosophical books ever written."¹ D. S. Robinson points out the difficulty of the concept of "event" and concludes that "it is even doubtful whether he [Whitehead] himself knows fully what he intends it to convey."² William Swabey in a review of Science and the Modern World says that "the theory of Abstraction is no doubt important--could one understand it."³ Susan Stebbing refers to Process and Reality as the "product of thinking that is essentially unclear."⁴ She finds "whole sections unintelligible."⁵

W. M. Urban seems to be particularly distressed by Whitehead's terminology. In his article, "Elements of Unintelligibility in Whitehead's Metaphysics: The Problem of Language in Process and Reality," he calls the latter book

1. Burtt, IRF, 423.
5. Ibid., 467.
"almost the most unintelligible essay in philosophy ever written."¹ In another article he says of Whitehead: "His metaphysics, as a whole, turns at crucial points on his philosophy of language. I for one have felt this difficulty most acutely."² A. H. Johnson, always the defender of Whitehead, thinks that Urban has over-stated his case.³

If there is any reply to the criticism of "unintelligibility"—an objection partly valid—it lies in the suggestion that understanding comes only with the persistent re-reading of Whitehead's material aided by frequent comparisons with his other writings. Very often an exposition in one book will illuminate his thought in another. For instance, Lowe points out that although Whitehead's basic metaphysical concepts appear in Science and the Modern World, the best introduction to their metaphysical relationships occur in Religion in the Making.⁴ Whitehead's value exposition, which is certainly no less free from certain verbal obfuscations, must be understood in the light of many passages. Many of the terms, e.g., subjective form, intensity, harmony, reveal their full meaning only by continued cross-reference to parallel discussion. Whitehead's most frequently quoted definition of value,⁵ for instance,

2. Urban, Art.(1941), 303.
4. Lowe, Art.(1941), 298.
5. "Value is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event," SMW, 95.
is itself quite meaningless until seen in its total context.1

The great problem of understanding Whitehead might well raise the question in some minds of the worth of the enterprise. As a small part of the total evaluative picture, the counter-opinion is offered that no one who has really "discovered" Whitehead is skeptical as to the value of the effort. Still true for Whitehead as for Spinoza are the concluding words of Spinoza's Ethics: "All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."

b. Autonomy or Divine Causation.

Exactly where the "balance of power" lies in the growth and satisfaction of actual entities is another one of the most perplexing problems in Whitehead's thought. If value consists in the intrinsic reality of an event, it is important to establish the source of the aim or telos which makes possible the gathering of the data into harmonic togetherness. Is patterned realization the "responsibility" of individual entities, or is that God's sole prerogative? To answer either way does injustice to the facts, which seem to suggest the other horn of the dilemma. If actual entities are indeed genuinely

1. As Chapter II above has already shown. Also with due allowance for Whitehead's later shift in emphasis from value as intrinsic realization to a more Platonic World of Value, although he does not eliminate the former view.
causa sui then an ordered universe seems impossible; on
the other hand, an unrelieved theonomy leaves unexplained
the obstructive elements which appear in the actual world.

D. J. Moxley is not quite satisfied with any solution
which equally divides the initiative between God and other
actual entities. It is his opinion that the preponderance
of initiative and efficacy lie in God. In summary of the
problem he says:

Although Whitehead repeatedly insists that an
actual occasion is self-creative and causa sui
and that its contribution to the future, in
virtue of its 'objective immortality,' is there-
fore an original, and individual contribution,
those elements in the process of concrescence
which are attributed to the 'final' causation
of the actual occasion itself reduce in fact,
so far as I can see, to the 'efficient causa-
tion of God.'

Hartshorne also weights the balances in the favor of
God. He says:

The radical difference between God and us
implies that our influence upon him is slight,
while his influence upon us is predominant.
We are an absolutely inessential (but not in-
consequential) object for him; he is the es-
ential object for us. Hence God can set
narrow limits to our freedom; for the more
important the object to the subject, the more
important is its effect upon the range of
possible responses.

Both Moxley and Hartshorne are impressed, maybe too
much so, with Whitehead's assertion of "the overpowering

1. Moxley, Art. (1934), 177.
2. Hartshorne, DR, 141-142.
rationality of his God's conceptual harmonization. 1
Equally emphatic in Whitehead's exposition is the axiom that an actual entity "is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency." 2 God in his rôle of creator does not force his will on the world. Instead, "all actual entities share with God this characteristic of self-causation." 3 In this sense each actual entity transcends all other actual entities. Only because of the autonomous, self-creativity of actual entities can the dystelesological facts in the universe be accounted for. The view which assigns to God a preponderantly dominant function is put under increasingly urgent obligation to account for disvalue. Furthermore it comes too near to violating the principle "that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency." 4 All criticisms or appraisals of Whitehead's view of the divine efficacy must be seen in the light of that principle. Probably the best resolution of the antimony is the one suggested earlier in Whitehead's own words: "The initial stage of the aim of an actual entity is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject." 5

1. Whitehead, PR, 526.
2. Ibid., 136.
3. Ibid., 339.
5. Whitehead, PR, 373.
c. Personality.

Another criticism arises from the ambiguity of the terms "person" and "personal." This paper has shown the importance of the concept of person in Whitehead's thought, particularly as related to the stability and persistence of values, and as applied to God. One of the major difficulties of such an interpretation is the ever-present uncertainty as to how much Whitehead intended the terms to convey. Not that he was going beyond his privilege in adapting common terminology to his own purposes; that was his right. But he was under some obligation to be consistent in his use.

The position taken in previous discussion is that Whitehead meant to use "person" and "personal" in a sense not far removed, if any, from Brightman's definition of person as "a self (complex unity of self-experience) that is able to develop reason and values." Where Brightman allowed for the fragmentary character of the self whose identity is maintained by the time-transcending character of self-experience, Whitehead has "an historic route of actual occasions which in a marked degree...inherit from each other" This is his description of "the life of man!" In the same connection Whitehead illustrates order by "that complex character in virtue of which a man is considered to be

1. Brightman, IFF, 334.
2. Ibid., 204.
3. Whitehead, PR, 137.
4. Ibid., 137.
the same enduring person from birth to death."¹ By persons both Brightman and Whitehead mean human persons, and neither excludes the concept from certain applicability to God. But the point of the criticism here is that Whitehead weakens his otherwise good case for the importance of persons by his shifting application of the term.

He does agree that "any philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal identity,"² and his own philosophy supplies the doctrine in a much more rigorous manner than some would allow. Percy Hughes, for instance, says that for Whitehead "to reduce a person to a series of acts makes nonsense not only of biography but of civil law, of ethics, of art, of religion, of friendship, and of love."³ Although the concept of person as a "series of acts" is certainly not Whiteheadian terminology, Whitehead would be the first to agree with the rest of Hughes's statement! Whitehead admits that difficulty involved in the notion of personal identity, but he himself says that "it is dominant in human experience: the notions of civil law are based upon it."⁴ Hartshorne and Reese say that they doubt if anyone can really, or other than verbally, mean by a 'person' more than what Whitehead means by a 'personally ordered' sequence of experiences with certain defining characteristics or personality traits.⁵

¹ Whitehead, PR, 137, italics added. See also AI, 240.
² Whitehead, AI, 240.
³ Hughes, Art. (1941), 298.
⁴ Whitehead, Art. (1941)², 690.
⁵ Hartshorne and Reese, PSG, 274.
In spite of Whitehead's occasional explicit and empirical use of personality, however, his failure to enunciate the principle of personality consistently throughout results in the loss of the very concept which would have unified many of the diverse elements of his thought. More dependence on the empirical starting point suggested in his reference to "our indubitable self, the foundation of our present existence" would have prevented the too-frequent classification of his system as pantheism. Pantheism does not thrive where there is steady insistence on the "incurable atomicity" of occasions, especially occasions with personal order, "each with its own present immediacy." In Brightman's thought it is the metaphysical reality of persons with their error and ignorance which makes it impossible to confuse his thought with pantheism. For similar reasons "God is not in all respects infinite" in Whitehead's thought. The exclusion from God of evil, due to the maladjustment and divergent tonalities of actual entities, makes it equally difficult to maintain that Whitehead's system is actually pantheistic. More explicit exposition of the latent personalistic strain in his thinking would have saved him from any such classification.

2. Whitehead, PR, 359. Cf. also PR, 53.
4. See Brightman, POR, 219.
d. Stress on Humanities.

Victor Lowe is of the opinion that Whitehead put so much emphasis on the humanities, e.g., theology, political history, that he missed the rare opportunity of providing some much needed unification among the sciences.

This man had the ability to produce a new synthesis of the sciences, a new concept of the world, and to work it out enough to ensure some actual shaping effect on the progress of the sciences and the creation of new sciences.¹

Lowe also joins with those critics who call Whitehead's piety toward the great philosophers "excessive." There is, for instance, "the raising of John Locke to divinity" and too much space devoted to both Locke and Descartes.²

In another place³ Lowe repeats the objection alluded to above that Whitehead's emphasis is too theological. "As I see it," says Lowe, "Whitehead's preconceptions were largely Platonic and religious. The weakest part of his theory of induction is his addition, in Process and Reality, of an appeal to a theological ground."⁴

There are some who disagree, and rightly so, with Lowe's criticism. In referring to the most religious part of Process and Reality, Emmet observes that it "is not an addendum irrelevant to the rest of the book. It is an

¹. Lowe, Art. (1941), 116.
². Ibid., 117.
⁴. Ibid., 22.
integral part of it."\(^1\) Hartshorne shares Emmet's view in saying that "the idea that the religious content of Whitehead's system is dragged in" is "a thorough misunderstanding."\(^2\) Again, in answering some specific criticisms of Whitehead's use of the religious term "God", Hartshorne replies with his usual candor that Whitehead's being accused of using the religious term with impropriety, is, I say, somewhat amusing. For consider. Putting God, the eternal, in time gives back the ancient conception of a 'living God', one who can pursue purposes, i. e., as yet unrealized values.\(^3\)

Lowe's criticism maybe reveals a touch of what Brightman refers to as "theophobia."\(^4\) It is doubtful if Process and Reality would have been aesthetically or logically complete without the conclusion that it does have. Whitehead's moving discussion of the relation between God and the world exemplifies a fortiori what he has been trying to show all along, that there is no "vacuous actuality", i. e., no non-feeling reality, and that all entities involve one another. That the relation between the one non-temporal actual entity, God, and all other entities should be expressed in religious and soteriological terms but illustrates the failure of ordinary language to convey the prehensive intensity of that relationship.

---

1. Emmet, WPO, 247.
2. Hartshorne, MVG, 50.
5. Whitehead, PR, 43.
e. Eternal Objects.

The superfluity of eternal objects in Whitehead's philosophy is raised by Hall. He discusses the purpose of eternal objects whose function Whitehead defines as "pure potentials for the specific determination of fact," but Hall goes on to show that "all the characteristics supposedly peculiar to eternal objects are shared by actual occasions." For instance, the notions of identity, permanence, universality, abstractness, and possibility which are usually associated with eternal objects are found equally well among the actual entities themselves. On such grounds he feels that eternal objects might well be eliminated from Whitehead's thought structure. Such is Hall's contention.

There is little merit in the criticism except that it does point up the danger of looking for actuality anywhere but in the feelings of actual entities. To eliminate eternal objects, however, is to do more than cut off a "superficial" aspect of an otherwise metaphysically sound system.

Apart from 'potentiality' and 'givenness', there can be no nexus of actual things in a process of supersession by novel actual things. The alternative is a static monistic universe, without unrealized potentialities.

2. Whitehead, PR, 32.
3. Hall, Art. (1930), 36.
4. This is Hall's list, ibid., 36.
5. Whitehead, PR, 78.
The exclusion of eternal objects is the death of value, for only in the potentials held out to the world of actuality is there any appetition toward realization. They are the eternal lures for every becoming. Value potential and value realization without each other are only abstractions.¹

f. Value Emphasis.

In assessing the strength of Whitehead's thought, the type of criticisms as given thus far do not seriously diminish the worth and vitality of his value theory. Despite Urban's contention that Whitehead has "so redesigned the notion of value as practically to redesign it away,"² the material set forth in the preceding chapters warrants the opinion that it is precisely his emphasis on value that gives strength and coherence to his metaphysical thought. Millard, for example, refers to "the function of value as an integrating factor for his general metaphysical position."³ Morgan reveals a similar opinion when he says:

It is a feature of Whitehead's theory of value that it is part of a general reconstruction of categories, not an isolated argument thriving on suppressed metaphysical premises...His philosophy includes values from the start and does not have to bring them in later as an apologetic afterthought.²

The accuracy of these observations is seen by the attempt to

¹ See Whitehead, Art. (1941)², 684-687.
² Urban, Art. (1941), 326.
³ Millard, PWVT, 478.
⁴ Morgan, Art. (1937), 308.
understand Whitehead's thought without due consideration given to his value emphases.

Urban's criticism grows out of his opinion that there is an unresolved dichotomy in Whitehead's thought between an idealistic and naturalistic interpretation of reality with a decided preference for the latter. Urban thinks that although "the spirit of his entire philosophy is in a sense idealistic,"¹

his first love is really the impersonal ideal of intelligibility that has been developed in science and mathematics, and that his acceptance of the traditional ideal of intelligibility, with his reference to value, has never been more than half-hearted.²

Such an appraisal of Whitehead's view of value does not do justice to the stated facts nor to the implications of his organic philosophy. A great number of specific statements could be repeated here to show that Whitehead himself considered value to be the key to his organic view of nature, e. g., such statements as the following:

The values of nature are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence³...All ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value⁴...Realization...is in itself the attainment of value⁵...An organism is the realization of a definite shape of value⁶...Value is inherent

2. Ibid., 324.
3. Whitehead, CN, 5.
4. Whitehead, NL, 9; also MT, 184.
5. Whitehead, SMW, 95.
6. Ibid., 193.
in actuality\textsuperscript{1}\ldots Creation aims at Value\textsuperscript{2}\ldots The purpose of God is the attainment of value in the temporal world.\textsuperscript{3}

Instead of attenuating the meaning of value as Urban suggests, Whitehead gives it a depth and significance probably unparalleled in any other philosophy. A. H. Johnson denies Urban's claims in strong terms. He thinks that Urban is inaccurate in his interpretation and has criticized only an "imaginary Whitehead."\textsuperscript{4} To minimize value in favor of naturalism, as Urban does, is to miss the very emphasis that brings lucidity and life to Whitehead's thought. The facts do not show that Whitehead's axiology is subservient to, nor less intelligible than the "non-value categories"\textsuperscript{5} of his metaphysical scheme. \textit{Science and the Modern World} is Whitehead's repudiation of a senseless, valueless, purposeless" and "irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations."\textsuperscript{6} It is his persistent and consistent aim to restore to nature the characteristics of mind, feeling, and value which a thoroughgoing scientific naturalism omits.\textsuperscript{7} In a chapter on "Science and

\textsuperscript{1} Whitehead, RM, 100.\
\textsuperscript{2} Whitehead, Art. (1941)\textsuperscript{2}, 686.\
\textsuperscript{3} Whitehead, RM, 100.\
\textsuperscript{4} Johnson, Art. (1943), 53, 55. His whole article constitutes an answer to the criticisms in Urban, Art. (1941). See also Johnson, Art. (1945), where he gives an extended treatment of actual entities and considers some objections.\
\textsuperscript{5} Urban, Art. (1941), 327.\
\textsuperscript{6} Whitehead, SW, 18.\
\textsuperscript{7} In assessing the values of Whitehead's religious philosophy Bixler says that "it furnishes religion with a much needed defense against the attacks of a scientific positivism," Art. (1941), 506.
Philosophy" Whitehead concludes by saying that it should be the task of the philosophical schools of this century to bring together the organic and scientific views of nature "and thereby end the divorce of science from the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences." It is the great strength of Whitehead's whole metaphysical scheme that it restores some unity to the world, thus ending the bifurcation which has always haunted cosmology. In Whitehead's system physics and axiology refer to the same world. There are neither bare facts, nor values divorced from actuality. Facts are values and values facts. His philosophy has given us "one world."

In restoring mind and value to nature, Whitehead's philosophy makes it possible to accord to human beings their rightful place in the cosmological scheme. In philosophy as well as religion it is often the fashion to assign persons a very secondary position with respect to the inexorable, relentless, and impersonal process of the universe. Whitehead does not fall into the quantitative fallacy nor does he, as Kierkegaard said of Hegel, construct a beautiful metaphysical mansion and then live, himself, in a shack by the road. In Whitehead's axio-centric cosmology individual persons are at home. They are sentient subjects, prehending and being prehended, bipolar in their orientation to the

world of permanence and flux, mental and physical, perish-
ing and becoming immortal. They are not "pilgrims and
strangers" but citizens.

It is a fake dichotomy to think of Nature
and Man. Mankind is that factor in Nature
which exhibits in its most intense form
the plasticity of nature.  

It was a significant point in history, Whitehead says,
when the dignity of man became recognized. No longer was
he to be regarded as a tool subject to the imposed wishes
of tyrannous rulers. There slowly crept into society the
dawning consciousness of the worth of men as men and the
preciousness of human life. Whitehead calls this "the human-
itarian spirit, gradually emerging in the slow sunrise of a
thousand years."  

It is at once the triumph of the human
spirit over the heartless and brutal forces of unenlightened
society and the mechanistic philosophy which sees man as
product of a mindless and valueless nature. It is "the vic-
tory of persuasion over force. The worth of men consists
in their liability to persuasion."  

A society in which men
are moved by value ideals is the highest society. Motiva-
tion arises by the recognition of constant possibilities of
growth and social improvement. Where there is recourse to
force the failure of that civilization is disclosed.

2. Ibid., 105.
3. Ibid., 105.
4. Ibid., 105.
Whitehead's keen sensitivity to the humanitarian ideals invalidates whatever tendency there is among critics to brand his philosophy as out of touch with life. It would be paradox indeed if Whitehead's philosophy turned out to be abstract. Organism is maximum concreteness. Whitehead's emphasis on the meaning of life and society provides the open door to some further discussion of his relevancy for contemporary civilization.

2. Contemporary Relevancy.

Whitehead's concern for human dignity and the social ideal might very well form the basis for contemporary social reconstruction. Whitehead is not often cast in the role of social philosopher, probably to the detriment of both society and philosophy. A. H. Johnson in one article tries to make up the lack by saying that

it is at least interesting to discover that an outstanding philosopher seems to say that certain democratic ideals ('liberty,' 'equality,' self-development') are inescapably involved in the nature of reality.

The strength of a sociological theory based on Whiteheadian concepts would lie in the great wealth of general principles which his thought system explicates. Society is surely ready for a glimpse of his ideal of "the bond of sympathy."

---

1. Johnson, Art. (1943)², 269.
This bond is the growth of reverence for that power in virtue of which nature harbours ideal ends, and produces individual beings capable of conscious discrimination of such ends. This reverence is the foundation of the respect for man as man.¹

The hope of society lies in its ability to glimpse universal ideals. Sometimes the vision is only a "dim apprehension of notions too general for its existing language,"² and progress is slow. Whitehead says that "the growth of generality of apprehension is the slowest of all evolutionary changes,"³ but the awareness when it does arrive is unbelievably potent.

A general idea is always a danger to the existing order. The whole bundle of its conceivable special embodiments in various usages of society constitutes a program of reform. At any moment the smouldering unhappiness of mankind may seize on some such program and initiate a period of rapid change guided by the light of its doctrines.⁴

Whitehead is no doctrinaire sociologist, but in his efforts to make known the eternal greatness of the humanitarian ideals "incarnate in the passage of temporal fact"⁵ he has established a sound basis for social progress and peace.

Otis Lee may say that the greatest gap in the philosophy of Whitehead is his lack of a "real philosophy of action."⁶

---

1. Whitehead, Al, 109. Cf. ibid., 89: "The importance of man as the supreme example of a living organism is beyond question."
2. Ibid., 89.
3. Ibid., 50.
4. Ibid., 17.
5. Ibid., 41.
but such an evaluation must proceed from Lee's own failure to consider the potential energy of *Adventures of Ideas*. Whitehead offers no formal program for social action, but he suggests the ideals from which healthy action must spring. Whitehead's tender regard for the worth and dignity of man, his emphasis on freedom, his zest for adventure, are ideas pregnant with intellectual power and social dynamism.

The theoretical possibilities of Whitehead's thought and its current relevancy are illustrated in an excellent monograph by Elizabeth K. Nottingham, *Religion and Society*. She describes four "prevalent types of adjustment to the problem of personality integration in modern industrial societies."¹ The first type is the integration achieved on the basis of the exclusive values of a particular religious organization to which the person belongs. The second is a compartmentalized type of integration with a dual set of values, one religious and the other secular. The third kind of adjustment is exclusively secular. Of the fourth type she says:

Finally, some people, probably a minority, outstanding among whom are Albert Schweitzer and Alfred North Whitehead, achieve integration in terms of ultimate religious values which they reinterpret and reevaluate in the light of modern philosophy and science. By means of this reinterpretation they bring religious values into what for them (and the author) is a meaningful relationship with modern industrialized societies.²

---

¹. Nottingham, RS, 25.
². Ibid., 25.
This appraisal is a testimony to the fruitfulnes of Whitehead's axiology as applied to our technological era and suggests the view that there is not the slightest tendency in Whitehead to separate values from any aspect of life. Compartmentalization is due not to any inherent inapplicability of values to the whole of existence but to lack of insight and a too-narrow appreciation of general theory. Doubtless if all members of society could be endowed with sufficient vision of generality the prevalent ills of our highly mechanized and materialistic society could be alleviated if not abolished.

But prophets are usually impatient. The tempo of progress towards social sensitivity is slow, and the grasping of the permanent values which would elucidate both the ills and the remedies for suffering humanity is limited to those with insight and foresight. It is at this point that Whitehead sees the fulfilment of the basic function of philosophy. "Philosophy is not a mere collection of noble sentiments," he says, and "it is not--or, at least, should not be--a ferocious debate between irritable professors." He assigns to it instead the very noblest of functions:

It is a survey of possibilities and their comparison with actualities. In philosophy, the

1. See the specific application of this concept to commerce, AI, 110-126.
2. Ibid., 126.
fact, the theory, the alternatives, and the ideal, are weighed together. Its gifts are insight and foresight, and a sense of the worth of life, in short, that sense of importance which nerves all civilized effort.

Whether or not philosophy always rises to the high ideal which Whitehead sets for it is a question that should be pondered by all philosophers, especially at this critical juncture in civilization. But it is the task of all men, philosophers and laymen alike, to help implement in society the ideals not now realized in actuality.

It is our business—philosophers, students, and practical men—to re-create and reenact a vision of the world, including those elements of reverence and order without which society lapses into riot, and penetrated through and through with unflinching rationality.

Whitehead's own philosophy comes very near demonstrating the philosophical ideals which he enunciates. Great thoughts do have great consequences. It may be that Whitehead's axiological insights will have an increasing efficacy in the sociological, biological, aesthetic, and religious reconstruction of our times. Hartshorne thinks that Whitehead in his philosophy has given to the disciplines just enumerated

an intellectual integration such as only a thousand or ten thousand years of further reflection and inquiry seem likely to exhaust or adequately evaluate, but whose wide

1. Whitehead, AI, 125.
2. Ibid., 126.
relevance and in many respects at least comparative accuracy some of us think can already be discerned.¹

Hartshorne in his somewhat exaggerated predilection toward Whitehead is evidently preparing the philosophical world for another Plato, but one need not go the whole way with the statement in order to agree with another and somewhat more restrained prophecy of Hartshorne:

If upon the wreckage of Newtonian materialism a new worldview is to arise, then Whitehead's system is the most important single indication of what the worldview is to be.²

The fruitfulness of Whitehead's Weltanschauung embraced in his philosophy of organism is further exemplified by the creative impulse given to the philosophical enterprise. Soon after the publication of Process and Reality, A. D. Ritchie ventured "to prophesy that the publication of this book will mark one of the turning points of the history of philosophy."³ His prophesy is already being fulfilled as the great wealth of Whiteheadian literature testifies. In the light of organism, it is very difficult, to say the least, to insist with assurance that nature is rent with an unhealable bifurcation. He has shown with great strength "the genuinely organic parts of our experience,"⁴ an insight now being tested in current metaphysics and religion.

¹ Hartshorne, Art. (1950), 41.
² Hartshorne, Art. (1935), 344.
³ Ritchie, Art. (1931), 102.
⁴ Vlastos, Art. (1937), 262.
Charles Hartshorne is probably the outstanding contemporary philosopher whose thought represents a continuation of Whitehead's organic philosophy. His dependence on Whitehead is revealed not only in specific acknowledgement but in the very close similarity of terminology and emphases.

Ferré has done much to explore what Whitehead's philosophy means for religion. "We have worked for years," Ferré says, "in an attempt to understand how the Christian and the Whiteheadian points of view coincide or contrast."²

H. N. Wieman, another contemporary theologian, has done much to explore what Whitehead's philosophy means for religion and axiology. Wieman is "so profoundly indebted" to Whitehead, according to his own statement, that he offers a warning to his readers not to confuse the thoughts of the two men.³ D. D. Williams, in assessing the relation of Hartshorne and Wieman to Whitehead, says:

The development in the theological faculty at the University of Chicago led by Henry N. Wieman and developed on the philosophical side by Charles Hartshorne is an attempt to work out a Christian theology through a positive use of Whitehead's doctrine that process rather than timeless being is the ultimate metaphysical truth.⁴

1. See Hartshorne, DR, x.
3. Wieman, SHG, 193 n.
4. Williams, WPTT, 58.
In concluding this evaluation, it is fitting that the opinions of Brightman should be used to summarize the man with whom he is compared in this dissertation. Brightman has no sustained appraisal of Whitehead's philosophy, but the following isolated comments reveal his opinion of Whitehead's philosophical stature:

Whitehead is a "profound and impartial thinker."  
Brightman refers to "his dark and difficult, but profound Gifford Lectures."  
He has "enabled us to see the new spirit in science."  
"A. N. Whitehead's Gifford Lectures, Process and Reality (1929), offer a profound interpretation of God in the light of modern developments of science and philosophy."

Brightman lists him among "five distinguished modern theists."

"The greatest Anglo-American philosopher of the present time, Alfred North Whitehead...is in a sense a modern Plato."

C. Final Comparative Summary and Conclusions.

The main points of comparison in the value theories of Brightman and Whitehead may be summarized in the following statements.

1. It is regrettable that we do not have any statements from Whitehead on his opinion of Brightman.
2. Brightman, PI, 34.
5. Brightman, POR, 28.
6. Ibid., 159.
1. Brightman's personalism and Whitehead's panpsychism each provides a fruitful metaphysical ground for the development of a rich and commendable theory of values.

2. Value considerations constitute an integrally significant part of their total thought structure.

3. Brightman's axiological period covers the span of years from 1919 to 1952. Whitehead's works with major axiological import come between the years 1926 and 1941.

4. The basic criteria of value in Brightman's thought are coherence and the principle of respect for personality. For Whitehead the supreme tests are intensity, harmony, stability. The highest values are those which exemplify the maximum concreteness.

5. Their greatest concern with value is revealed in their common emphasis on the axiological function of God, who originates, conserves, and increases values in the universe.

6. The "principle of concretion" in Whitehead's thought has its analogue in Brightman's view of God as "Controller of The Given."

7. Brightman's theory of value rests on the axiom that God is personal and that although he enjoys values in his own experience, values are objective in the metaphysical structure of the universe as his normative appreciations. In Whitehead's thought God eternally confronts the world with
the ideal vision of what it can become. As principle of concretion, God infuses into general creativity the limitations of particularity. Only in metaphysical limitation is there pattern and value.

8. For both men values are only possibilities or potentials until realized either in personal life or in the con-crescence of actual entities.

9. In the possibility of the continuation of values lies the chief clue to their doctrines of immortality.

10. In the realm of religion both men find its highest expression in terms of value experience. Brightman speaks of religion as an expression of faith in the friendliness of the universe, while Whitehead describes religion as a relationship to the universe revelatory of value meanings which flow from the very nature of things.

11. Although there is an underlying existential strain in both men, a strong emphasis on the rational and metaphysical aspects of religion provide adequate corrective to the inescapably subjective and emotive nature of religious experience.

12. Both men subordinate ethics to axiology, Whitehead probably more rigorously than Brightman.

13. While Brightman traces the prime source of disvalue to a retarding factor in God's experience, Whitehead is logically able to exclude the source of disvalue from God
by attributing to the freedom of actual entities the causes of aesthetic destruction and incompatibility in the universe. Whiteshead puts more emphasis than Brightman on the axiological function of all dysteleological factors.

14. God as described by Brightman is definitely "available" for worship, while the God of Whitehead is possibly more available than is usually allowed.

15. A fruitful synthesis of the thought of the two men might begin by more emphasis on organic relatedness in Brightman's personalistic pluralism, while Whitehead's concept of God could move profitably in the direction of Brightman's clear-cut theism. Perhaps also more equality of emphasis on the aesthetic would enrich Brightman's axiology and lessen what is considered to be an excessive concern in Whitehead's thought.

16. The relevancy of their thought is evidenced both by the impulse which their basic philosophical principles have given to the speculative cause of personalism on the one hand, and the philosophy of organism on the other, and in the practical application of their thought to religious and social situations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aaron, R. I.--Art.(1930)
Rev. of Whitehead, FR(1929).
Mind, 39(1930), 488-492.

Ansheen, Ruth Nanda (ed.).--FIM
Freedom Its Meaning.

Avey, Albert E.--Art.(1941)
Rev. of Brightman, POR(1940).
Phil. Rev., 50(1941), 451-452.

Baker, Rannie Belle.--CLG
The Concept of a Limited God.

Banning, Andrew.--Art.(1934)
"Professor Brightman's Theory of a Limited God.
A Criticism."

Beiswanger, George W.--Art.(1931)
Rev. of Brightman, PG(1930).
Jrn. Phil., 28(1931), 443-447.

Bender, R. N.--Art.(1952)
"Whitehead's Implied Social Ethics."
Phil. Forum, 10(1952), 22-31.

Bergson, Henri.--CE
Creative Evolution (tr. Arthur Mitchell).

Bertoceci, Peter A.--EAG
The Empirical Argument for God in Late British
Thought.

-----------------------------------IPR
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.

-----------------------------------Art.(1941)
Rev. of Brightman, POR(1940).
Rev. of Rel., 5(1941), 223-230.

-----------------------------------Art.(1950)
"Brightman's View of the Self, the Person and the Body."


------------------------IGP

------------------------IPKI

------------------------ITP

------------------------ML

------------------------NV

------------------------PG

------------------------PI

------------------------POR

------------------------PR

------------------------PV
Religious Values.

The Spiritual Life.

"The Lisbon Earthquake: A Study in Religious Valuation."

"Philosophy in American Education."

"The Personalistic Method in Philosophy."
Meth. Rev., 103(1920), 368-380.

"Modern Idealism."

"Tasks Confronting a Personalistic Philosophy."
Personalist, 2(July 1921), 162-171; 2(Oct. 1921), 254-266.

"The More-Than-Human Values of Religion."

"Religious Values and Recent Philosophy."
Boston Univ. Bull., 10(Aug. 1, 1921)

"Truth and Value in Religion."
Meth. Rev., 105(1922), 42-47.

"Neo-Realistic Theories of Value."
In Wilm (ed.), SPT, 22-64.

"The Contribution of Philosophy to the Theory of Religious Education."
Boston Univ. Bull., 13(July 15), 1924.

"The Meaning of Obligation."
What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion."
Jrn. Phil., 6(1926), 250-258.

"The Dialectic of Religious Experience."

"Religion as Truth."
In Firk (ed.), CTA, 55-81.

"The Given and its Critics."
Rel. in Life, 1(1932), 134-145.

"Professor Macintosh on Personalism."
Rel. in Life, 3(1933), 461-463.

"A Temporalist View of God."
Jrn. Rel., 12(1933), 544-556.

"An Empirical Approach to God."
Phil. Rev., 46(1937), 147-169.

"Freedom, Purpose, and Value."
In Anshen (ed.), FIM, 485-508.

"Axiology."
In Runes (ed.), DP, 32-33.

"The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments."
In Bryson and Finkelstein (eds.), SPR, 1-6.

"Values, Ideals, Norms, and Existence."

"Philosophical Ideas and Enduring Peace."
In Bryson and others (eds.), AWF, 542-556.
ART, (1945)
"A Personalistic View of Human Nature."
Rel. in Life, 14(1945), 216-227.

-----------------------ART, (1946)
"Definitions for Personalists."
Personalist, 27(1946), 365-373.

-----------------------ART, (1949)
"Shall We Be Reasonable?"
Zion's Herald, 187(1949), 915, 923.

-----------------------ART, (1950)
"Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self: Its Distinctive Characteristics."
In Inge (ed.), RCP, 287-303.

-----------------------ART, (1953)
"Autonomy and Theonomy."
In Bryson and others (eds.), FAT, 473-478.

Bowen, Borden P.--MET
Metaphysics (rev.).

-----------------------PER
Personalism.

-----------------------THE
Theism.

Bryson, Lyman, and others (eds.).--AWP
Approaches to World Peace.

-----------------------FAT
Freedom and Authority in our Time.

Bryson, Lyman and Louis Finkelstein (eds.).--SPR
Science, Philosophy and Religion.

Burtt, E. A.--TRP
Types of Religious Philosophy.
Casserley, J. V. L. -- GR
Graceful Reason.

Cesselin, Felix. -- PO
La Philosophie Organique de Whitehead.

Clark, Gordon H. -- GVMT
A Christian View of Men and Things.

DeWolf, L. Harold. -- RRAR
The Religious Revolt Against Reason.

--------------- TLC
A Theology of the Living Church.

--------------- Art. (1954)
"Personalism in the History of Western Philosophy."

Dunham, Albert M. -- Art. (1932)
"Animism and Materialism in Whitehead's Organic Philosophy."
Jrn. Phil., 29(1932), 41-47.

Eddy, Sherwood. -- GH
God in History.

Ely, Stephen L. -- RAWG
The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God.
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942.

Emmet, Dorothy M. -- WPO
Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism.

Everett, W. G. -- MV
Moral Values.

Fern, Vergilius (ed.). -- CAT
Contemporary American Theology.
A History of Philosophical Systems.

Ferre, Nels F. S.--CS
Christianity and Society.

The Christian Understanding of God.

Forsyth, T. M.--Art.(1932)
"The New Cosmology in its Historical Aspect: Plate, Newton, Whitehead."
Philosophy, 7(1932), 54-61.

Gardner, James R.--REV
The Role of Experience and Value in Naturalistic and Personalistic Thought as Represented by the Philosophies of Clarence Irving Lewis and Edgar Sheffield Brightman (unpublished doctoral dissertation).
Urbana: University of Illinois, 1953.

Garnett, A. C.--RPR
A Realistic Philosophy of Religion.
Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1942.

Garvie, Alfred R.--CEG
The Christian Belief in God.

Rev. of Brightman, PG(1930).
Philosophy, 6(1931), 124-126.

Gentry, George.--Art.(1944)
"The Subject in Whitehead's Philosophy."

"Eternal Objects and the Philosophy of Organism."
Phil. Science, 15(1946), 252-260.

Glessen, Arthur P.--GGTB
Chicago: Northern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1950.
Goheen, John.—Art. (1941)
"Whitehead’s Theory of Value."
In Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 437-459.

Green, T. H.—PE
Prolegomena to Ethics.

Gross, Mason W.—Art. (1943)
Rev. of Schilpp (ed.), PANW (1941).
Jrn. Phil., 40 (1943), 271-274.

Gutman, James.—Art. (1947-48)
Rev. of Brightman, NV (1945).

Hall, Everett W.—WV
What is Value?

Harkness, Georgia.—RI
The Recovery of Ideals.
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937.

Hartshorne, Charles.—DR
The Divine Relativity.

Man’s Vision of God.

On Some Criticisms of Whitehead’s Philosophy.”

Whitehead’s Idea of God.”
In Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 1941.

Whitehead’s Metaphysics.”
In Lewis, and others, WMW, 25-41.

Philosophers Speak of God.
Hocking, W. E.--MGHE
The Meaning of God in Human Experience.

Höffding, Harold.--POR
The Philosophy of Religion (tr. B. F. Meyer).

Holtzelaw, B. C., Jr.--Art. (1930)
Rev. of Brightman, PI(1929).
Phil. Rev., 39(1930), 525-527.

Hooper, Sydney.--Art. (1943)
"Whitehead's Philosophy: Space, Time and Things."
Philosophy, 18(April 1943), 204-230.

Howson, J. Howard.--Art. (1946)
Rev. of Brightman, NW(1945).
Crozer. Quart., 23(1946), 391.

Hughes, Percy.--Art. (1941)
"Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate?"
In Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 1941.

Inge, W. R. and others.--RCSP
Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy.

Johnson, A. H.--WTR
Whitehead's Theory of Reality.

------------------Art. (1943)1
"The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy."
Phil. Science, 10(1943), 47-55.

------------------Art. (1943)2
"The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead."

------------------Art. (1944)
"'Truth, Beauty and Goodness' in the Philosophy of
A. N. Whitehead."

------------------Art. (1945)
"Whitehead's Theory of Actual Entities: Defence and
Criticism."
Johnson, Paul E.--Art. (1954)
"Brightman's Contribution to Personalism."

Kauffmann, Alvin H.--ENC
Evan Vital, Misus, and Creativity as Treated in the
Thought of H. Bergson, S. Alexander, and A. N.
Boston: Boston University, 1952.

Kegley, Charles W. and Robert W. Bresall (eds.)--TPT
The Theology of Paul Tillich.

Knudson, Albert C.--DR
The Doctrine of Redemption.

-----------------------------Art. (1943)
Rev. of Brightman, XL (1942).
Phil. Forum, 1 (1943), 32-34.

Krishnian, Yervant H.--1944
Naturalism and the Human Spirit.

-----------------------------Art. (1944)
"A Naturalistic View of Mind."
In Krishnian, NSS, 242-269.

Krusé, Cornelius.--Art. (1953)
"Edgar S. Brightman's Contribution to American
Philosophy."
Rel. in Life, 22 (1953), 594-603.

Leaird, John.--IV
The Idea of Value.
Cambridge: At the University Press, 1929.

Lawrence, Nathaniel.--Art. (1950)
"Locke and Whitehead on Individual Entities."

Lee, Odis.--Art. (1943)
Rev. of Schilpp (ed.), PANW (1941).

Lepley, Ray.--VV
Verifiability of Value.
Leue, William H.--MFTP
Metaphysical Foundations for a Theory of Value in
the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead (unpublished
doctoral dissertation).
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1952.

Lewis, Edwin.--CA
The Creator and the Adversary.

-------------GO
God and Ourselves.

Liebman, Joshua L.--PM
Peace of Mind.

Lowe, Victor and others.--WMW
Whitehead and the Modern World.

-------------Art.(1941)
"The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy."
In Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 1941.

Lyman, Eugene W.--MTR
The Meaning and Truth of Religion.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, (1933)1941.

Macintosh, D. C.--PRK
The Problem of Religious Knowledge.

-------------Art.(1932)
"What has Professor Brightman Done to Personalism?"
Rel. in Life, 1(1932), 304-307.

McCracken, D. J.--TV
Thinking and Valuing.

McEwen, William P.--ES
Enduring Satisfaction.

-------------WMI
Whitehead's Metaphysical Interpretation of the
Meaning and Growth of a Human Individual (unpublished
doctoral dissertation).
Boston: Boston University, 1940.
Millard, R. M., Jr.--PVWT
Boston: Boston University, 1950.

-------------------------Art. (1950)
Rev. of McEwen, ES(1949).
Phil. Forum, 8(1950), 40-41.

-------------------------Art. (1951)
"The Ghost of Eternalism in Whitehead's Theory of Value."
Phil. Forum, 9(1951), 16-22.

Morgan, George.--Art. (1937)
"Whitehead's Theory of Value."

Moxley, D. J.--Art. (1934)
"The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Whitehead."
In PAS, 54(1934), 157-186.

Muelder, Walter G.--Art. (1946)
Rev. of Brightman, NV(1945).

-------------------------Art. (1950)
"The Social Philosophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightman."
Phil. Forum, 8(1950), 9-14.

Mullen, W. H.--Art. (1954)
"A Survey and Evaluation of some Criticisms of Brightman's View of a Finite God" (unpublished research paper submitted in Dept. of Philosophy).
Boston: Boston University, 1954.

Munk, Arthur W.--HG
History and God.

Murphy, Arthur E.--Art. (1941)
"Whitehead and the Method of Speculative Philosophy."
In Schilpp (ed.), PAMW, 355-380.

Nottingham, Elizabeth K.--RS
Religion and Society.

Oehler, Gustave Friedrich.--TGT
Theology of the Old Testament.
Otto, M. C.--Art. (1929)
Rev. of Brightman, PI (1929).

Perry, Ralph B.--CTV
General Theory of Value.

-------------RV
Realms of Value.

Polis, Edward J., Jr.--IFMW
The Idea of Freedom in the Metaphysics of Whitehead,

Queen, Merritt B.--PPJ
Personalism and Practical Judgment: A Critique of
Conceptions of Personality Held by Borden Parker
Bowen and Edgar Sheffield Brightman (unpublished
doctoral dissertation).
New York: Columbia University, 1951.

Randall, J. H., Jr.--Art. (1944)
"The Nature of Naturalism."
In Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 354-362.

Ritchie, A. D.--Art. (1931)
Rev. of Whitehead, PR (1929).
Philosophy, 6 (1931), 102-106.

Robinson, D. S.--ILP
An Introduction to Living Philosophy.

Runes, Dagobert (ed.)--DP
Dictionary of Philosophy.

Schilpp, P. A. (ed.)--PANW
The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (2nd ed.).

-------------Art. (1941).
"Whitehead's Moral Philosophy."
In Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 565-618.

Searles, Herbert L.--Art. (1934)
Rev. of Brightman, ML (1933).
Personalist, 15 (1934), 368-369.
Shahan, Ewing, P.--WTE
Whitehead's Theory of Experience.

Sheldon, W. R.--GP
God and Polarity.

Siegfried, Theodor.--Art.(1952)
"The Significance of Paul Tillich's Theology for the
German Situation."
In Kegley and Brettall (eds.), TPT, 68-83.

Sorley, W. R.--MVID
Moral Values and the Idea of God (2nd ed.).

Stahl, Roland.--IBW
The Influence of Bergson on Whitehead. (unpublished
doctoral dissertation).
Boston: Boston University, 1950.

Stebbing, L. Susan.--Art.(1926)
"Professor Whitehead's 'Perceptual Object'."
Jrn. Phil., 23(1926), 197-213.

Straton, George D.--BPG
Belief in the Personality of God: A Study of Theistic
Personalism in Reaction to Non-theistic Idealisms

Strong, A. H.--ST
Systematic Theology (rev.).

Swabey, William C.--Art.(1926)
Rev. of Whitehead, SMW(1925).
Phil. Rev., 35(1926), 272-279.

Underhill, Evelyn.--MYS
Mysticism (12th ed.).
Urban, W. M.--VNL

-----------Art.(1938)
"Elements of Unintelligibility in Whitehead's
Metaphysics."

-----------Art.(1941)
"Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and its Relation
to his Metaphysics."
In Schilpp (ed.), PAND, 303-327.

Ushenko, A. P.--Art.(1937)
"Negative Prehension."

Vlastos, Gregory.--Art.(1937)
"Organic Categories in Whitehead."

Wells, Harry K.--PU
Process and Unreality.

Whitehead, Alfred North.--AI
Advances of Ideas.

------------------------CN
The Concept of Nature.

------------------------FR
The Function of Reason.

------------------------MT
Modes of Thought.

------------------------NL
Nature and Life.

------------------------PR
Process and Reality.
Religion in the Making.

Science and the Modern World.
(Mentor Books, M 28).

Symbolism.

"Objects and Subjects."
Phil. Rev., 41(1932), 130-146.

"Remarks."
Phil. Rev., 46(1937), 173-186.

"Mathematics and the Good."
In Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 666-681.

"Immortality."
In Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 682-700.

Widgery, Alban G. --Art. (1945)
Rev. of Brightman, SL(1945).
Grozer Quart., 20(1945), 68.

Wieman, Henry N. --SHG
The Source of Human Good.

Williams, Daniel D. --WPTT
What Present-Day Theologians are Thinking.

Wilm, E. C. (ed.) --SPT
Studies in Philosophy and Theology.

Woodburne, A. S. --Art. (1931)
Rev. of Brightman, PG(1931).
Grozer Quart., 8(1931), 273-275.
-----------------Art.(1932)
Rev. of Brightman, FG(1931).
  Crozer Quart., 9(1932), 97-99.

-----------------Art.(1933)
Rev. of Brightman, ML(1933).
  Crozer Quart., 10(1933), 370-371.

Wright, William K.--Art.(1927)
Rev. of Whitehead, RM(1926).
  Phil. Rev., 36(1927), 503-504.
ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to compare some of the basic axiological concepts in the thought of E. S. Brightman and A. N. Whitehead. A subordinate purpose lies in a comparative evaluation and a brief estimate of the relevancy of their axiological insights for contemporary society.

The comparative study is developed in five special areas: (1) Brightman's and Whitehead's concern for value problems as indicated by the proportionate amount of writing devoted to value problems in each thinker and as called for by the internal aspects of their thought, (2) the nature and criteria of value according to each, (3) the function of God in their value structures, (4) their views as to the meaning and sources of disvalue, and (5) their conceptions of the religious expression of values.

Brightman's concern for values is indicated both by the quantity of his writings and his constant and insistent emphasis on the integral relation of values to religion, metaphysics, ethics, and society. His value writings extend from the first published article with an axiological motif in 1919, "The Lisbon Earthquake: A Study in Religious Evaluation," to his University Lecture, Persons and Values, in 1952.

The axiological period of Whitehead's thought covers a briefer compass of time, extending, approximately, from Science and the Modern World (1925) through his Ingersoll
Lecture on "Immortality" (1941). However, as early as 1919 he had insisted that values may hold the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence and in the period indicated he attempted to formulate such a metaphysical value synthesis.

In considering the nature of value, Brightman's exposition is characterized by clarity and simplicity. Values are described as intrinsic, instrumental, potential, actual, empirical, apparent, permanent, transient, catholic, and exclusive. The crux of his axiology is his definition of true values. A true value is any liking or preference that is found to be coherent after testing by the widest range of experience.

Whitehead's axiology is more complex. His concept of value must be understood in relation to the nature and function of actual entities. Value is the intrinsic reality achieved by an integration of entities into a harmonious unity of feeling. The attainment of such self-realization is the value. This is the basic meaning of value utilized in this dissertation, although Whitehead's later over-emphasis on the world of subsistent values is recognized.

Very significant for immediate comparison is the similar emphasis in each man on the locus of values. Brightman reiterates his claim that values, to be values, must be embodied in the life of some person, human or divine, while one of the most clearly enunciated dicta in Whitehead's thought is that value refers to fact. For both, values are only possibilities or potentials until realized either in personal life or in the
concrecence of actual entities.

The basic criteria of value in Brightman's thought are coherence and the principle of respect for personality. For Whitehead the supreme tests are intensity, harmony, stability. For both men the highest values are those which exemplify the maximum concreteness. Brightman speaks of the interpenetration of values, Whitehead of the coordination of values. The two agree that the production and applicability of values are at once the end and measure of social organization.

For Brightman, values are grounded in the ultimate cosmic order as part of God's experience; and because that cosmic order is personal and rational, the permanence of value truths is not only assured, but the communication and appreciation of value-norms is made a possibility for all rational minds in the universe.

In Whitehead's thought God is the "organ of novelty" in that he constantly strives for the realization of new potentials in the world of actuality. He eternally confronts the world with the ideal vision of what it can become. He is the lure for feeling. Every feeble effort toward value is met with God's solicitude that each achievement might not only be maintained but that progress shall continue. As principle of concretion, God brings differentiation and order, i.e., value, out of the otherwise homogeneous on-going of the creative advance. The comparable function in Brightman's thought is God as "Controller of The Given." In "concretion" and "control"
God's teleological function is revealed.

Brightman and Whitehead recognize that value theory is incomplete without a consideration of disvalues. Brightman turns to none of the traditional and, in his view, unsatisfactory, solutions to the problem of evil. There is more evil in the world than is traceable to human agencies, and any view which finds the solution by attributing evil to the will of God cannot be coherently maintained in the light of the evidence for a rational, teleological, and good universe. Brightman's alternative is finitistic theism, which finds in God a limiting factor that he does not will but which is present in his experience as a hindering, chaotic irrationality, the source of the dysteleological and value-less elements in the world.

Whitehead uses a variety of words and phrases to express his concept of disvalue, e.g., mutual inhibition, mutual destructiveness, divergent tonalities, discordant feeling, incompatibility, destructive turbulence, incompatible alternatives, discordance. Dysteleological facts in Whitehead's thought, however, are not final; they will be transcended. They may even serve a teleological function in the prevention of anaesthesia, staleness, and boredom. A present disvalue is a prophecy of a higher synthesis of achieved harmony.

The difference between the two men on the function of evil in relation to value may be indicated by saying that, although Brightman grants the possibility that intrinsic
evil may be an instrumental good, he makes little or nothing of it, whereas Whitehead ascribes to evil a significant, if not necessary, function in the origin and increase of universal value.

Religion is one of the dominant expressions of value experience in the thought of both Brightman and Whitehead. Religion is an out-reaching dimension. Brightman's datum-self and Whitehead's prehending entity enjoy their experiences privately, but they refer to something beyond the self. Here is the occasion for religious faith. For Brightman faith is an expression of confidence that the ultimately real is God, the personal originator and sustainer of all values; for Whitehead religious faith begins in solitariness, but only as the prerequisite to an awareness of the larger meanings and values in the total structure of the universe.

In Brightman's thought, to be religious is to be vitally concerned about the origination, increase, and conservation of values. Religion is a value, as demonstrated by the answers it provides to the facts of suffering, death, moral evil, ignorance, limitation. It also helps give unity, purpose, permanency to the values of experience. Rational worship is always creative.

Although there is an underlying existential strain in both men, a strong emphasis on the rational and metaphysical aspects of religion provides adequate stability to the
inescapably subjective and emotive nature of religious experience.

On the basis of this study, the following conclusions seem warranted:

1. Brightman's personalism and Whitehead's panpsychism each provides a fruitful metaphysical ground for the development of a rich and commendable theory of values. Brightman's axiology is emphatically explicit, while Whitehead's is less clearly delineated but is everywhere implicit in his metaphysical and religious thought.

2. Brightman and Whitehead are equally empirical in their insistence that the only locus for the actualization, realization, or appreciation of values is in the experience of persons or actual entities. There is no "vacuous actuality."

3. Although Whitehead cannot, without some modification, be classified as a personalist, his similarity to Brightman in fixing the locus of values in the concrescent experience of actual entities, and his stress on the realization and stabilization of the higher types of values in personal order suggest a stronger personalistic emphasis than is usually attributed to him.

4. Brightman's emphasis on "axiosoteria" and Whitehead's concept of God as "savior" provide not only for the origination, increase, and continuation of values, but suggest the integral and sympathetic relation which God sustains to the
effort and struggle of the world to achieve values.

5. Both men subordinate ethics to axiology, Whitehead probably more rigorously than Brightman.

6. While Brightman traces the source of disvalue to a retarding factor in God's experience, Whitehead is logically able to exclude the source of disvalue from God by attributing to the freedom of actual entities the source of aesthetic destruction and incompatibility in the universe. Brightman holds that some evils are surds in that they have no intrinsic value, but they may have instrumental value. Whitehead puts more emphasis on the axiological instrumentality of all dys-teleological factors.

7. Both men give a large place to the religious expression of value. They agree in their insistence on the necessity of a metaphysical basis for religion. Whitehead finds religion growing out of "the nature of things." For him, metaphysics gives to religion a sense of harmony with the rest of reality, the parallel of Brightman's friendly universe.

8. A fruitful synthesis of the thought of the two men might begin by more emphasis on organic relatedness in Brightman's personalistic pluralism, while Whitehead's concept of God could move profitably in the direction of Brightman's clear-cut theism. Perhaps also more equality of emphasis on the aesthetic would enrich Brightman's axiology and lessen what is considered to be an excessive concern in
Whitehead's thought.

9. The objection that the thought of both Brightman and Whitehead is out of touch with life is based on an exaggerated concern with the peripheral elements of their method and style. The relevancy of their thought is evidenced both by the impulse which their basic philosophical principles have given to the speculative cause of personalism and the philosophy of organism, and by the practical application of their thought to religious and social situations.
Wilbur Handley Mullen was born in North Head, New Brunswick, Canada, February 19, 1919, the son of Rev. Handley G. Mullen, minister of the Reformed Baptist Alliance of Canada. He attended public schools in Maine, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. In 1935 he graduated from high school and that same year entered Eastern Nazarene College, Wollaston, Massachusetts.

At the end of one year he was temporarily unable to continue his college work, but after two years in Canada he returned to Eastern Nazarene College. He graduated in 1942 with the degree of Bachelor of Arts, sum laude, and was elected to Phi Delta Lambda.

From 1942 to 1945 he was engaged in church and pastoral work in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. In 1944 he was ordained to the ministry of the Reformed Baptist Alliance of Canada.

In 1945 he returned to Eastern Nazarene College to study for his Bachelor of Theology degree, which he received in 1947. During that period he was employed as a teacher in the Academy associated with the College. He then enrolled at Boston University, receiving his Master of Arts degree in philosophy in 1948. During the first semester of the school year 1947-48 he was an assistant in the
Department of Philosophy at the latter institution.

In the fall of 1948 he was appointed an instructor in theology and Biblical literature at Eastern Nazarene College. For the years 1948 to 1950 he also served as Dean of Men. In 1950 he was promoted to Assistant Professor in the Division of Philosophy and Religion, in which capacity he has served to the present.

He continued his studies toward a doctorate at Boston University in the Department of Philosophy, majoring in the philosophy of religion. For the school year 1952-53 he was Borden Parker Bowne Fellow.

Married in 1943, his wife was the former Jean Shrader, of Wollaston. They have two daughters, age seven and three.

From November 1954 to the present he has been pastoring the Clarendon Congregational Church in Hyde Park, Massachusetts.

His publications include two reviews in *The Philosophical Forum* and three articles in *The Christian Scholar*, official organ of Eastern Nazarene College.