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The Portuguese in Angola, 1836-1891: a study in expansion and administration.

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Dissertation

THE PORTUGUESE IN ANGOLA
1836-1891
A STUDY IN EXPANSION AND ADMINISTRATION

by
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This study has been made as a contribution to knowledge and analysis of Portuguese activity in Portuguese West Africa or Angola. Generally the bulk of the material presented falls within the 19th century. The years from approximately 1836 to 1891 have been chosen for special emphasis, first, because these years coincide with one general theme of territorial expansion, and secondly, because in the realm of treaties and laws this is a distinct era in the history of Angola. As Dr. James Duffy writes, this age was "the transition from one colonial age to another in Angola and Mozambique, from the traditional to the modern."¹

Although my chief concern has been activity in Angola, I have wandered from this theme to explain another relevant force: Portuguese colonial thought and theory in the 19th century. Without knowledge of Portuguese history in this era, in the same way, one theme will be a stranger to the other. In some ways this study is an analysis and survey of the important literature in the field. If this is true, it is due to the relative lack of English material on the subject.

Many English-speaking authors when dealing with Portuguese activity in Africa have done so with certain assumptions about why Portugal did not gain more territory, or indeed, why she gained as much as she did. Such statements assume that Portugal was too weak in finance, development, initiative, and population to make the outcome any different. Others state that Portugal's colonial efforts were significant only after 1870 in Angola and Mozambique. Too often it has been assumed that Portuguese administration in Angola a century ago was a shallow and formless pattern of activity. In current knowledge about colonial administrations in the 19th century, the Portuguese personalities have remained mute. It is the task of this study to attempt to revise these assumptions with the aid of unpublished documents and literature from Portuguese archives and libraries.

As a survey of conditions, administration, and expansion in the entire territory of Angola, this study cannot hope to treat any one region in depth. Perhaps more attention has been paid the area north of the


Cuanza because of the available documentation, and the utmost importance of the Congo and the region in the hinterland of the capital of Luanda.

Without the appearance of Dr. Duffy's Portuguese Africa in 1959 this study might not have been attempted. His is the pioneering effort for which all students must be grateful. Nevertheless, the student in surveying new material has somewhat inevitably come to differ with his "teacher" in certain conclusions.

My sincere gratitude is due to the United States Government which made possible the grants and funds under which much of this material was gathered and organized. To thank all my friends, colleagues, and helpers in Boston, Lisbon, Oporto and London would mean too long a list. My most immediate thanks go to the Fulbright Commission in Lisbon, and Dr. Alberto Iria, Director of the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino of Lisbon for their aid and permission in reading the documents. My excellent typist has been Mrs. Shirley Backstrom.

All of the translations from Portuguese are my own. In many cases they have been free translations.
Abbreviations Used in the Footnotes

A.H.U. Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon
B.M.P.P. Biblioteca Municipal Publica do Porto, Oporto
B.N. Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon
B.S.G.L. Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa
C.U. Conselho Ultramarino (1851-1868, Overseas Council)
J.C. Junta Consultiva (1868-1888, new name for Conselho Ultramarino)
G.E.P.eB. Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa e Brasileira (Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro, 1926-1956)

A Note on Spellings

The reader will note that the Portuguese spellings vary. In 1911 a spelling reform, and another change in 1945, altered certain vowel and consonant spellings. I have kept the original titles of books published before 1911. Some geographical terms here have been kept with the old 19th century spellings, such as Mossamedes and Bihe.
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Map 3, scale and distances from "Carta de Angola," issued by the Junta das Missoes Geograficas e De Investigacoes do Ultramar, Ministerio do Ultramar. 1956, Lisbon.

Map 5, photocopy of map, Rocha Martins, Historia das Colonias Portuguesas (Lisbon, 1933), pp. 204-205.
CHAPTER I

PORTUGAL AND THE EMPIRE

The Portuguese people, as the Gallician, have fame for being a resigned and suffered people who endure all without protest and without passion.... The anger of the gentle is the most terrible.

-Miguel de Unamuno
Por Tierras de Espana y Portugal (Madrid, 1914), p. 41
CHAPTER I

PORTUGAL, THE ANCIENT ALLIANCE AND
THE EMPIRE: BACKGROUND

A. Portugal and the Empire to 1836

An understanding of Portuguese activity in Angola during the 19th century requires some knowledge of Portugal and her empire, already centuries-old, before 1836. Both Portugal and the empire were affected in the early 19th century by two major events: the independence of Brazil in 1822 and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Portugal after 1826. Both of these factors with their many ramifications were as important in encouraging change in Angola as was the decree of 1836 calling for the abolition of the slave trade.

The prelude to these momentous events was the disastrous French invasion of Portugal beginning in 1807. The Portuguese royal family, along with the court and the Government, left Lisbon, the capital, with British naval aid, and were taken to reside in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1808. The King of Portugal remained in Brazil until 1821. In the year of his arrival, the ports of Brazil were opened to British commerce for the first time and the long-standing Portuguese monopoly
was broken. British interests engineered this revolution; and a Portuguese writer later claimed that Brazil had ceased to be a colony of Portugal the very day the trade monopoly ceased. ¹

The French invasion was a disaster for Portugal. Recovery was not accomplished for several decades. ² Portuguese industry, as weak as it was, lay prostrate after the departure of the French. Agriculture was ruined and the population uprooted by famine and disease. A British loan in 1809 led to the Treaty of Commerce and Alliance in 1810, giving new trade relations to Brazil and Britain at the expense of Portuguese commerce. In short, Portugal was in ruin by 1815 when general peace had returned to Europe.

The course of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in the 19th century certainly was not smooth. On the one hand Britain supported Portugal against threats from neighboring Spain with loans, naval protection, military aid, and diplomatic support. On the other hand, the alliance was nearly broken several times during the

¹Almeida Garrett, Portugal na Balança da Europa (Lisbon, 1830), p. 328.


period because of the Portuguese empire. Portugal frequently accused Britain of trying to carve up her empire and conspiring to gain possession of parts of it, or ruining other parts she did not want for herself. Although there were times when Britain evinced interest in actual territorial possession, for the most part British interests were concerned with maintaining two cardinal policies: free trade on the coasts between European powers, and the abolition of slave trade and slavery in Africa.

In the 19th century, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was both a curse and a blessing for Portugal. Without British aid, Portugal would surely have fallen prey to the aggressions of Napoleon and Spain during the first three-quarters of the century. But when Portuguese leaders took a hard look at the empire in Africa, they found much evidence that Britain was conspiring to destroy it.

The Treaty of Commerce and Alliance of May 1810 was the first object of Portuguese grievance after the opening of Brazilian ports in 1808. Portugal had agreed to cede Bissau and Cacheu in Portuguese Guinea for fifty years, if she recovered the frontier province of Olivença with British aid. British goods were given more preference than before, and Portuguese merchants'

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interests complained that Britain took advantage of Portugal because of the war-time crisis. At the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, Portuguese delegates succeeded in annulling the 1810 Treaty, thus retaining the territory in Guinea. The Portuguese struck back at Britain later, and in 1822 Portugal put a new customs import duty of 15% on English woolens.

Conflict over the Portuguese empire increased during the early 19th century. British forces, in order to safeguard India, had occupied Portuguese India from 1801 to 1815. Portugal then protested and suspected British designs on the territory. Again in the 1830's and 1840's, Britain tried to buy Portugal's possessions on the coast of India but with no success. The Portuguese were convinced that "perfidious Albion" was after their Asian empire, or what was left of it, as well as her African empire.

Britain's role in the independence of Brazil is well known. British commercial interests supported a complete break between Portugal and Brazil. Statesmen

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6 Livermore, History, p. 402.
7 Ibid., p. 413.
8 Pinheiro Chagas, As Colónias Portuguezas (Lisbon, 1891), p. 114.
9 Ibid., pp. 10-35.
like Lord Canning were sympathetic towards Brazilian aspirations.\(^\text{10}\) Portuguese colonial thinkers later blamed Britain for the loss of Brazil in 1822, for Brazil held supreme importance in the Portuguese empire since the 17th century.\(^\text{11}\) The Portuguese ambassador in London, the Count of Lavradio, wrote in 1856 that the present Portuguese Minister of Overseas had to stop

the English, who already have stolen from us all we possessed in Asia, who were also the principal authors of the separation of Brazil, from robbing us by indirect means of what we still possess in Africa.\(^\text{12}\)

Besides contributing to a long-standing Portuguese inferiority complex,\(^\text{13}\) the independence of Brazil caused still more loss to the already dislocated economy. Moreover, a good portion of the Portuguese navy was retained or crippled by Brazil after the abortive campaigns following the declaration of independence in 1822. A veteran of those campaigns, in a letter from Angola, referred to these campaigns as "shameful" for Portugal.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{10}\) C. K. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America, (London, 1938) 2 vols.)


\(^{12}\) Conde do Lavradio, Memórias do Conde do Lavradio (8 vols., 1937-42, Lisbon), VI, p. 166.

\(^{13}\) Raymond Cantel, Prophétisme et Messianisme Dans L'Oeuvre D'António Vieira (Paris, 1960, Ediciones Hispano-Americanas), p. 157. In mid-17th century, Vieira said the Portuguese were known as "the Kaffirs of Europe."

The reparations from France under the Treaty of Vienna were very inadequate in comparison with the damage done by French forces. British aid made up for the loss of Brazilian trade only in part. Altogether the picture was depressing for finance and this situation in fact worsened during the remainder of the century.

Politics convulsed the nation for the first half of the century. In 1820 a liberal revolution broke out and Portugal was given a Constitution. In 1821 King John VI was obliged to return from Brazil to take his place in a new Government, and he swore to uphold the new constitution. Reaction and counter-reaction followed after the various disruptive events such as the loss of Brazil and the consequent loss of power, the loss of privileges by the nobility, and the appearance in 1823 of French troops in Spain to support the absolutist regime.

The younger son of King John VI, Prince Miguel, rose as an absolutist leader in 1824, and for ten years Portugal suffered under civil war and political anarchy. King John died in 1826 and his sons, Miguel, the absolutist, and Pedro, the liberal and former Emperor of Brazil (1822-1831), fought over the throne after Pedro returned to uphold the liberal charter (or Constitution) of 1826.

15 Livermore, History, p. 403.
16 Ibid., p. 413.
Both liberals and absolutists were divided in their programs, but they consolidated forces to fight a civil war which ended in 1834 with the defeat of Dom Miguel and the triumph of the party of Dom Pedro. Pedro had saved the throne for Maria da Gloria, his daughter, but he soon succumbed to fatigue and disease, leaving his fifteen-year-old daughter a legacy of political confusion and economic ruin.  

In 1834 Portugal was already weighed down with heavy debt to pay for the civil wars and numerous outbreaks of violence. These "Miguelite Wars" weakened Portugal further so that plans for development at home or overseas always met serious obstacles in the advocates of a balanced budget. The public debt increased during the rest of the century, for there was no apparent solution between two extremes: increasingly heavy loans, or economies and reductions in the public programs and services.

Politics remained turbulent until about 1851 and the so-called "Regeneration Movement". Radicals and moderates fought their battles on financial or patriotic issues, and the lack of means of most Governments to enforce legislation led right back to the basic problem of finance. Even the program of "Regeneration", which


18 Livermore, A History, p. 424; Trend, Portugal, p. 179.
from 1851 to 1856 attempted to combine economic development with reform, had to continue contracting foreign loans, mainly in London and Paris, to pay for railroad and road constructions. 19

Looking back from the vantage point of 1836, or even at the end of the century, Portuguese believed two factors had seriously affected colonial effort overseas: one, the independence of Brazil, and the other, "the exclusive preoccupation with the material development of the metropolis." 20 Hence programs for the sale or mortgage of the African possessions were quite common during the 19th century. As early as 1836 there was a plan, though it never materialized, whereby the King of Belgium would have taken the African colonies in return for military aid to the Queen of Portugal. 21 And throughout the century, there were various negotiations by creditors in Britain, France, and Germany to use the African colonies as security for loans. 22

B. The Portuguese Colonial Movement

In spite of economic weakness and political division, Portugal had a significant colonial movement

19Fuschini, Augusto, O Presente e O Futuro de Portugal (Lisbon, 1899), Chapters V, VI. Herbert Feis, Europe, The World's Banker, 1870-1914 (New York, 1930), Chapter XI.

20Pinheiro Chagas, As Colonias, p. 49.


directing activity in Africa. Portugal in the late 1830's and 1840's began a colonial movement which was perhaps the earliest of its kind in Europe in the 19th century. Writers, soldiers, and political leaders declared that Africa could replace Brazil as Portugal's major empire and could help Portugal recover in Europe. The adversity of the early decades drove some men to seek imperial answers to the problems of the metropolis. More nationalistic than strictly economic, this imperialistic movement met opponents who questioned its rationale from both national and economic arguments. At its deepest level, the motivation of the movement was fear of Spain and a natural Portuguese anxiety for the preservation of national independence and prestige.23

This colonial movement had two distinct phases in Portugal during the 19th century. The first one began about 1836 and lasted until 1875. The second began about 1875 and, running through the treaties of partition, became part of the general movement to develop the colonies in Africa. The earlier phase coincided with the public life of the Marquis Sá da Bandeira (1835-1875), a liberal soldier and statesman who embodied an intense interest and knowledge about Portuguese Africa. In

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posts as Foreign Minister or Minister of Navy and Overseas, Sá da Bandeira led a genuine reform movement beginning with his term as Minister of Navy and Overseas in 1835. 24

Both the early and the late phases of the colonial movement had similar characteristics. The ultimate aim of the movement was patriotic: the renovation of Portuguese wealth and prestige in the European situation. In 1879 a Portuguese thinker expressed the yearnings of the early and late phases alike:

In the Council of Nations, Portugal should be principally esteemed a colonial power. Only the colonies can give us in Europe the influence and position which otherwise would be denied us so justifiably because of the narrow boundaries of the Metropolis, and its situation in the Peninsula. 25

Brazil was lost as a colony, or so it seemed in the 1820's, and Africa became the focus of imperial thinkers. Since Portugal was weak economically, however, the colonial movement had to justify its program for spending in Africa with appeals to predictions of profit from the tropical regions. Recalling the traditional "civilizing mission" of Portugal was little more than rhetoric for this movement, for the basic problem

24 Lourenço Cayolla, Sá da Bandeira (No. 5, Pelo Imperio Series, Lisbon, 1936), p. 28. The standard full biography is Simão Luz Soriano, Vida do Marquez de Sá da Bandeira (Lisbon, 1887-1888, 2 vols.).

25 Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, As Conferencias e o Itinerario do Viajante Serpa Pinto (Lisbon, 1879), p. 754.
of Portugal was finance, and no amount of oration in Parliament could convince the anti-imperialists that spending in Africa was reasonable when the homeland was a shambles. This important debate lasted throughout the century and continues in Portugal to some extent today. Other great thinkers like the writer Almeida Garrett were convinced that Portugal, beginning in the 1820's, had to concentrate on reform at home and that improvement overseas was only a marginal problem.26

Those groups interested in foreign affairs tended to disagree and desired to give priority to programs of overseas action. Military officers, ambassadors, and certain politicians felt that Portugal could find long-lost power in Africa. During the years 1835 to 1875, Sá da Bandeira led the movement; his great prestige and power in Portugal was manifest at the end of his life. In 1876 the historian Alexandre Herculano wrote that this one-armed patriot was "the most illustrious Portuguese of our century."27 Foreign diplomats had a

26 See Garrett, Portugal na Balança; J. P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal Contemporânea (2 vols., Lisbon 1881), p. 400. Alexandre Herculano, Carta à Sociedade Real de Agricultura, annotated by Dr. José R. de Mattos, (Lisbon, 1874), p. 24. The commentator noted: "It is not economical to colonize Africa, thus sacrificing the Metropolis, since it is better to work in one's own field than in a neighbor's field." (1874).

high regard for his integrity. Yet others, as Oliveira Martins, an advocate of republicanism in Portugal, were convinced that colonies had a very dubious role in renovating the Portuguese economy; Martins remarked that Sá da Bandeira had a "mania" for colonies.

The year 1836 was important as a watershed for the colonial movement since the Government then decreed the abolition of the slave-trade in all Portuguese dominions, submitted a report to the Queen on colonial problems in general, and changed the administrative structure of Angola from that of a Captaincy-General to a Government-General in order to stress civil as opposed to military administration. 1836, therefore, has been chosen as the beginning point of this study on Angola.

Sá da Bandeira became Foreign Minister in November 1836 and led through Parliament the abolition decree published at Lisbon on December 10th, together with a report or Relatório to Queen Maria II which contained the program of the first colonial movement of the century. The basic problems of Portuguese endeavor were laid out; the slave-trade both in Angola and in Mozambique had to end before


30 Francisco Castelbranco, História de Angola (Lisbon, 1932), p. 100.
both colonies could achieve any measure of development. Although Brazil had been for Portugal "the most natural field of labors," it stated reminiscently, Africa was now to be the new empire, with a traditional basis since the 15th century. Portugal could profit from this change.31

This 1836 Relatório began by declaring Portugal's mission of "civilizing." Beneath the statements of confidence, however, ran the fear and resentment of foreign criticism and intervention. Threats from Britain especially preoccupied Portugal, and some motive of idealism became a reaction to these complications in the end. The report stated:

And yet, there is not one document in all the first epoch of our discoveries that does not prove that the principal and almost only motive of the Portuguese Government was the Civilization of the Natives by means of the Faith. Commerce was secondary, since it was entirely a civilizing medium, and the subjugation was a consequent necessity, and not an object. The errors of religious doctrine, and the vices of political means were of the century, not of the men. 32

Nevertheless, when it came down to the hard facts and realities of policy on the spot in Africa, high officials as, for example, the Governor of Angola in 1838, would spare no words in exposing the real motives behind some of the idealistic programs of the colonial movement.

31 Documentos Oficiaes Relativos a Abolição, (Lisbon, 1839), Imprensa Nacional, p. 75.

32 Documentos, p. 76.
Sá da Bandeira was sincere, but the slave-trade in Africa was too well-entrenched to agree with the declaration in far-away Lisbon that "Civilization of the Natives" was the prime motive for being in Africa. In actual fact, interest and power politics called the tunes in Angola in 1838 as they did later on. Governor Noronha wrote in 1838 to Lisbon that the continuation of the slave trade was impossible without exposing those Provinces to the insults of the English cruisers, and giving them pretexts for negotiating directly with the neighboring Potentates of the Coast, as Commodore Owen did in 1825 (if I remember correctly) in the Bay of Marques, thus making doubtful and precarious in law, and scorning the fact of, Portuguese sovereignty in those Regions. 33

Despite the strong opposition to abolition of the slave-trade, and later of slavery, abolitionists found a "Portuguese Wilberforce" in Sá da Bandeira. This man's plans for reform had the support of some liberal leaders in Portugal, but in Africa itself, Portuguese, from the small bush trader to the Lisbon importer, continued to fight for the traditional system. 34


34 James Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 76, 144 ff; Sá da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural e Administração Colonial (Lisbon, 1873), this work was written by the statesman in a last effort to fight for abolition of slavery in Angola and Mozambique. Opposition by Lisbon merchants openly declaring against his decrees, brought him to speak out a last time for liberalism.
Sá da Bandeira's death in 1876 marked the passing of the early phase of the Portuguese colonial movement. In 1875 the Society of Geography was founded in Lisbon by a group of scientific and military figures. Their motivation for activity was basically that of Sá da Bandeira: that Portugal could be propped up by colonial reform in Africa. Yet there was one significant difference in the activity of the later movement: led by Luciano Cordeiro in the 1870's, this group was more interested in strategic considerations and tended to sacrifice liberal ideas for advantages in the race for African territory and a late bid for the contra-costa dream.35 After 1875, reformers of colonial traditions were opposed in the later phase by growing elements on the Left within Portugal. Fear of losing territory, heightened by a severe financial crisis, obscured the ideas of Sá da Bandeira and his school. During both phases of the movement, it ran repeatedly into the inevitable dilemma of colonial administration: the ideals and plans of Lisbon or even of Luanda, the colonial capital, rarely were executed well on the spot.36 The battle for a free

35"contra-costa" was the 19th century term for the plan to hold and occupy the territory between Angola and Mozambique, meaning "the opposite coast," or one might say "coast-to-coast."

trade system, and free enterprise in the African colonies, was eventually lost by both phases of the colonial movement.

A liberal element disappeared with the death of Sá da Bandeira. But ministers like Andrade Corvo, himself a younger version of the deceased Marquis, took up the battle for colonial reform and development with essentially the same principles of free labor and free trade. In the end, liberal solutions to ancient malaises were snowed under by tradition and vested interest, at home and in the colonies.

C. Literature of the Early Colonial Movement: Debate and Disunity

From 1825 to 1877, a number of Portuguese works appeared discussing the problems of the empire. In the beginning these studies were written in reaction to the independence of Brazil and expressed feelings that the African empire would gain new importance. Such books include those of Feo Cardozo (1825 publication), Das Neves (1830), Carvalho e Menezes (1834 and 1848), Botelho (1835 and 1840), Lopes de Lima (1844-46), Valdez (1861 and 1864), and José de Lacerda (1867). 37

Generally these authors urged Portugal to reform the colonies, or Angola, as one specific colony, and to get profit out of them for Portugal. Resources in Southern Africa were described in glowing terms, and it was believed African regions could be economically

37 See the bibliography for full titles of these.
self-sufficient and thus attract more Portuguese colonists from the traditional migratory route to Brazil.\textsuperscript{38}

Feo Cardozo urged Portugal to look to a brilliant future for the "very useful establishment of Angola and Benguella," since it was rich in potential wealth. He felt, however, that the slave-trade was a bad foundation for Angola's economy, and he advocated a plan of abolition.\textsuperscript{39}

Jose das Neves, a distinguished economist-writer of the early 19th century in Portugal, felt that Portuguese Africa should end its dependence upon Brazil. Referring to British and French colonial activity in Africa at that time, he urged that Portugal execute a plan for colonial development. His reasoning for doing so was typical of the ideology of his day, for he felt that the loss of Brazil and the disasters of 1807 to 1830 had seriously altered the Portuguese situation. Now Portugal could not afford to abandon or neglect the colonies in Africa as before:

\begin{quote}
All is changed; and in the very moment Portugal loses her colonies, she will lose all that remains to her of her former appearance and greatness.... When the Metropolis suffers, then the colonies must also suffer; and the evils that afflict the colonies must affect the Metropolis.
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{38} See Appendix XI for the emigration figures on Portugal in the late 19th century.

\textsuperscript{39} Feo Cardozo, \textit{Memórias}...(Paris, 1825), Preface, p. xi, pp. 215, 370.

\textsuperscript{40} Das Neves, \textit{Considerações Politicas e Commerciaes} (Lisbon, 1830), pp. 349-50.
\end{footnotes}
For Das Neves, Angola could be "a second Brazil," but the territory in fact was in ruin. The slave-trade dominated all activity of the Portuguese, and its abolition immediately threatened to ruin the scanty revenue from this dubious foundation.41

Books of this period on the colonies sought to revive interest in Africa. Brazil had diverted attention from Africa in the past two centuries before 1822, but the ultimate object was a resorgimento of the homeland itself. Most authors were convinced that reform overseas would aid reform at home. Sebastião Xavier Botelho, a Governor of Mozambique in the 1820's, in his Escravatura, benefícios que podem provir as nossas Possessões d'Africa da proibição daquelle Trafico (Lisbon, 1840) indicates the opinion of liberals on the causal relationship between abolition and economic renovation, and this reform was envisioned as especially nationalistic. The very economic fragility of Portugal forbade colonial thought in terms of private enterprise on a significant scale.

The key issues of the 19th century in Portugal are discussed in the literature of the early colonial movement. There are common themes, as, slave trade and slavery, monopoly or free trade economy, centralized or decentralized colonial government. In spite of the ideals

41 Ibid., pp. 229-230. Das Neves was also concerned with industry at home in Portugal. See his Memória sobre os Meios de Melhorar a Industria (Lisbon, 1822).
of Portuguese colonialists in Europe, conditions in Portugal and in Africa thwarted many plans. Change was doubly hard, due to division among Portuguese in Portugal. An eternal debate between liberals and conservatives at home was reflected in colonial legislation overseas.

Involved with the strictly political debate was the question of the Roman Catholic Church in Portugal and its role in Africa. Early liberal governments were fired with extreme anti-clericalism. A vital plank of any party platform in this century and later was a stand on the religious question. Legislation in the 1830's (as well as later, during the Republic of 1910-26) severely cut down the power of the Church.

Leaders of the later colonial movement severely criticized the liberals of the 1830's for the passing of the decree of May 30, 1834, abolishing missions in Angola and Mozambique. Accusations that liberal legislation had permanently crippled missionary (hence colonial) effort in this era were in fact quite irrelevant. The history of Portugal and Portuguese Africa could prove that over-all Portuguese weakness, not liberal legislation, was responsible for a slow process of reform.

Father António Barroso, writing in 1890, scorned the Minister Aguiar who had passed this 1834 law against missions in Angola and he misplaced much of the blame.

He killed our colonial influence, he killed our agriculture, and he killed our
colonies, which have vegetated in a sea of misery. 42

In fact, Portuguese missions and missionary activity in Africa in 1834 were in a sorry state, and had been so since 1700 or before.43

Each party in Portugal blamed the other for the conditions in Portugal following the French invasion of 1807. The deficit, the increasing foreign debts and consequent loans, and the political instability of governments under a shaky parliamentary system, combined to weaken any united colonial movement. There was a fatal interdependence between politics and economics in Portugal. A vicious circle was inevitable under the circumstances of no financial reserves for Portugal. Das Neves in the 1830's came to assert this very fact as inescapable.44

Some writers became more desperate in their conclusions by the 1880's. Ferreira Lobos believed that "economizing" the budget in Portugal lay at the basis of all the problems. Perhaps he went too far in his condemnation of "economy," for apparently he has no solution for escaping from the labyrinth of Portuguese finance:


43Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 120. Ralph Delgado, História de Angola (Lisbon, 1955), Vol. IV, p. 419. Delgado shows how missionaries were scarce in the early 18th century or before.

44Das Neves, Considerações, p. 350. Das Neves hoped for a return of public security to Portugal to bring in more foreign investment. Portuguese currency in 1830 was so worthless that administrators going to Africa knew their scanty pay was only an invitation to earn more by trading, p. 352.
The economies are all as old as the deficit.... Sad economy is this; however, even sadder still is another, that few eyes see--the economy of all that should and could be done for the aggrandizement and prosperity of the Fatherland: education that is not improved, the arts and the industries are not improved, the civilization that does not deepen, the roads that are not built, the army that is not complete, the navy that does not develop, the colonies that do not progress. Our backwardness is an homage to economy;--the economy is the idol to which we sacrifice ourselves.... the economies (cutting down spending) have resulted in the complete ruination of all services: what it tries to do is to spend less, if it spends well or poorly doesn’t matter. 45

Portugal in the 19th century realized that colonial activity in Africa would be a difficult battle since other European powers were opposing Portugal’s advance. The coasts of Africa had become the scene of much activity. Portugal was forced to recall the conflicts of the 17th and 18th centuries on the Western coasts at Congo and Angola, where French and Dutch forces struck at will.

Before Livingstone drew the attention of Europe to Central Africa beginning in 1857, and to the Portuguese territories in Southern Africa, the Portuguese authorities knew the tenuous condition of their African empire. Since the independence of Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique had been directly threatened by foreign influences. Strong competition in coastal trade foreshadowed the later struggle for territorial control in

45 Ferreira Lobbs, As Confissões dos Ministros de Portugal... (Lisbon, 1874), p. 17.
the era of Livingstone. Portuguese observers were convinced that Britain, as the most powerful nation on the sea, was out to ruin their maritime empire. Again the Ambassador in London wrote in 1856:

The British Government must find pretenses to defend the petulance of her agents and to profit from this to achieve their goals, which, as far as I am concerned, are to act as the protector and de facto master of peoples who inhabit the coasts of Africa, and, with time, to come to establish an Empire in Africa like that which she established in India, also at the cost of Portugal, who has been a frequent victim of England for centuries. 46

Portugal's colonial efforts were based on fear, pride, and self-interest, to be sure. But the liberal principles in her 19th century effort were no less important. General weakness, isolation, and the weight of tradition obscured the favorable side of the movement in the years from 1836 to 1877. But even the keenest British observers underestimated Portuguese endurance. The ups and downs of accomplishment could not be discerned by outsiders, overpowered by the obvious ruins. Only a survey of the condition of her most important African territory, Angola, can reveal why, in 1877, there was no "second Brazil" in the empire.

The condition of Angola will reveal only one concern in the entire history of Portugal and the empire in the 19th century. Another factor consistently bothering the leaders of the nation was the question of the English

At mid-century, all the English aid for Portugal in Europe seemed to be outweighed by British interference in the African empire. Both nations were pledged to obligations, but now it seemed Britain was trying to emancipate another territory, this time in Africa. The difficulties convinced Portuguese who had a European perspective that perhaps the traditional course of Alliance and Empire was wrong. In 1860 young King Pedro V wrote to a Minister about the crisis in Angola. Although his words were never meant to be read by the Portuguese or British public, their very ring is proof that Portugal has tried to revolt against her history and failed.

England should realize the benefits of not souring her relations with a nation forced to be faithful to her obligations, but who some fine day may be tempted to revolt against her history. Many of our misfortunes in Angola clearly originate in the policy of expansion, which the Overseas Council began, and which today we find ourselves obliged to continue because of circumstances. To follow this policy, it is necessary to accept all the consequences, and these are the weakening of the Metropolis in favor of the Colonies. These are matters not discussed in public, but better left thought out in private. We are moving to destroy the special civilization of the natives—that is to say, their absolute liberty—but we cannot substitute ours, since they cannot accept it, and because they do not know it or understand it.

47 See Marques Guedes, A Aliança Inglês (Lisbon, 1943).
CHAPTER II

ANGOLA TO 1836: BACKGROUND

Without Rum, Geribita, the negroes refuse to finish their trading; it is indeed fortunate for the trades of Brazil and Africa that the desires of its inhabitants are in their favor.... The Masses drain in an instant the cargo of a small vessel from Brazil; but instead of producing energies for some more active trade, it makes them like a multitude of ants, who in one day devour large leaves on a tree, and when each has disposed quickly of his own supply, all vanishes with the brutal kick of a foot.

-Elias Silva Corrêa
História de Angola, II, p. 40
Written between 1782 and 1799
CHAPTER II

ANGOLA TO 1836: BACKGROUND

A. Climate and Geography of Angola

From his throne he casts upon us
with cruel and bloody war,
with the power of the land,
and pestilence,
Hot and malignant fever
which, from three days to seven
places beneath the earth,
the most robust.

(Anonymous 17th century poem)\(^1\)

The Portuguese who came to Angola before the 19th century were often obsessed with fear of death. Angola had a reputation for being no different from the "White man's grave" of Guinea. The nameless European poet who composed the lines above wrote of the coastal region of northern Angola in the latter half of the 17th century. This poem is included in the work of Antonio de Cadornega, a soldier, *História Geral Das Guerras Angolanas*, 1680-81. Cadornega wrote about the northern areas of what is now Angola and described campaigns along the lower Cuanza river. He says that "the climate was an enemy for him [the Portuguese] since the interior was very sickly, so that many died and others sickened in pure misery."\(^2\)

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\(^2\) Ibid., I, p. 33.
White strangers came to the land and soon were sickened or cut down (or so it seemed) by the air and water around them. All observers discussed climate because at the time it was the most important factor. The coast was unhealthy, but men stayed to make a living by sending the native peoples across the sea. Outcasts from cities in Portugal and Brazil came to trade.

Climate seemed to dominate all on the face of the land. It is characteristic that the first known piece of literature written in Angola, the anonymous 17th century poem, is not an epic of glory to the conquistadores of Africa; rather it is a drama of adversity in which climate plays the main role.

The Brazilian-born soldier, Elias Alexandre da Silva Corrêa observed conditions in Angola between 1782 and 1799. Spending most of his time in the region of Luanda, he spoke of the great heat and aridity of the coast, the misery of disease and fever, and the numerous deaths caused by the "pestilence." The first matter he mentions in his introductory statement is "the cruel blows of the climate." Angular was a land of exiles, and for all normal men, the land was a hell and purgatory put together.

Yet the climate of Angola like all territories in Africa is varied. Both Cadornega and Silva Corrêa

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had limited experience in penetrating the interior or traveling south; their chronicles survey conditions in the northern region. What is more, both men lived several decades in Angola and lived to tell the tale. A more comprehensive approach is needed to understand the physical being of Angola.

Angola is situated in West Central Africa, south of the Equator between 5 degrees and 18 degrees South Latitude, and between 12 degrees and 24 degrees Longitude east of Greenwich. It is a transitional region in climate, vegetation, and relief.

Angola's relief can be divided generally into three zones. First, a coastal lowland, at its widest little more than one hundred miles, extends from the extreme south to near the mouth of the Congo River in the north. Next, a narrow subplateau step rises from 1000 to 3500 feet. Finally, the true plateau, or planalto, then rises in a series of tablelands, from 4000 to 7000 feet, falling away in the east. These three zones are merely relief zones oriented in relation to the hinterland.

The coast of Angola below the mouth of the Congo was the first view the Portuguese had of the land. It is a dry and parched lowland. The cool Benguela current

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flows northward past Southwest Africa and contributes to the dryness from 18 degrees to 2 degrees, South Latitude. Although desert and semi-desert conditions prevail along this coast, it had a high relative humidity.  

Except for the eastern half of the vast territory of 480,000 square miles, Angola is essentially an Atlantic territory. The eastern part of the upland plateau belongs to Central Africa, and the Congo-Kasai, and Zambesi basins. But the western area of Angola, that region which is most developed and highly populated, is Atlantic-oriented. Facing Brazil, this region's major rivers drain into the Atlantic: the Congo, the Cuanza, and the Cunene Rivers. Angola's major ports of the last century, Luanda and Benguela, are South-Atlantic counterparts of the Brazilian ports in the same latitudes, of Pernambuco, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro. Both Brazil and Angola have highland plateaus behind the low and often unhealthy coastal strip. The two territories have been called comparable geographically, but there is yet another analogy between them: both lands' subsistence foods have been the same since the 16th century. Manioc, maize, and sweet potato are used by the great mass of the population of Angola; all three staple subsistence foods

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6 José Ribeiro da Cruz, *Geografia de Angola* (Lisbon, 1940), p. 49.
crops were introduced by the Portuguese from Brazil in the 16th century. Spreading over Central Africa from the old Congo Kingdom where they were introduced, these American crops have made Angola more of a sister of Brazil than before.

In order to describe regions of Angola in more detail, it is best to divide the area into "Geographical Provinces," that is, provinces which historically as well as geographically have become more or less distinct units. The Portuguese expansion in Angola was affected by relief of the land as well as by the climate; this scheme of division, as suggested by an American geographer of this century, fits well the historical pattern of penetration and colonization described in this study.

There are six "Geographical Provinces" of Angola. They are:

1. Luanda
2. Congo Border
3. Benguela
4. Mossamádes
5. Upper Zambesia
6. Kalahari-Desert Border

Luanda, Benguela, and Mossamedes provinces in this scheme are nuclear provinces stretching inland from the coast. Traditionally these areas, each with its capital on the coast, were jump-off points for penetration into the

serrão, or hinterland, and they remain to this day the most developed and with the highest density of population. The three "marginal provinces," the Congo border, Upper Zambesia, and Kalahari-Desert border, are areas of sparse population, little economic activity, except in isolated places, and less desirable climate.⁹

Luanda region was the first area of Portuguese activity in Angola after the "Congo experiment" of the 16th century. The coastal lowland is desolate. The soil near the city of Luanda, founded in 1575, is poor; Luanda must look to the north, to the fertile Bengo river valley, for its food, water, and salt supplies. Historically this "looking to the north" for even basic supplies, influenced the expansion policy of the Portuguese.

Luanda region is favored with the Cuanza River, the largest river in Angola except for the Congo. The Cuanza opened the interior of the Luanda serrão to commerce and colonization. From the beginning, the river acted as a highway for the Portuguese and favored the north often to the detriment of the south. The river had the effect of concentrating European effort north of it in the Golungo Alto and Cazengo districts, which long remained the richest areas in the entire territory.¹⁰

⁹Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 126.
¹⁰Ibid., p. 122.
The Cuanza is navigable for about 120 miles, being impassable after the falls at Cambambe. Along this early route into the interior many of the first Portuguese settlements were placed very close to the river, or slightly above it on the plateau.

The upland region of the Luanda province is reached by gradual steps, with some very broken country; yet the plateau is more easily reached, and is of more moderate elevation than the plateaus to the south in Angola.\(^{11}\) The accessibility of the Luanda plateau was a key factor in determining the pattern of penetration and colonization; the southern plateaus were more difficult of access, and as such they remained untouched by European administration and expansion for a longer period. Within less than a century of the founding of the port town of Luanda, Portuguese settlements were reaching over 180 miles into the backland.\(^{12}\)

Benguela Province has been termed "the core of the region" of Angola by its central position and its importance as a population region. Benguela's coastal lowland was considered very unhealthy for

\(^{11}\) Whittlesey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 122.

\(^{12}\) The European settlement furthest inland on the plateau, founded in 1671, was Pungo Andongo. This fortress remained a frontier town and post for over a century. Although there were trading "fairs" further inland, as that of Cassange, Pungo Andongo remained the furthest eastern European settlement.
centuries; yet it compares favorably with that of Luanda and is richer in soil than that of Mossamedes. The highland of Benguela has much of the land most highly prized as suitable for European settlement today. Yet its sub-plateau is more broken, and difficult of access from the coast than that of Luanda; the highest mountains in the territory are in this western region and rise to 8000 feet. On the true plateau, the climate is healthy and suitable for European settlement. Like most of the series of southern plateaus in Angola, the climate is drier than the north and more like climates in Portugal. Not until the middle of the 18th century, was there a concerted attempt to take advantage of this plateau; penetration up the Cuanza River diverted the Portuguese from moving onto the southern uplands. Moreover the Benguela plateau has problems of internal transportation since it is crossed by "countless streams" which in the rainy season are often impassable.  

Although the Benguela upland is generally healthy, it has a deceiving reputation. Until recently in the 20th century, most Europeans living there permanently have been affected by fever; many settlers probably

14 Ibid., Alexandre Malheiro, *Chronicas do Bihe* (Lisbon, 1903), pp. 212-215. Malheiro was a Portuguese official in Bihe in 1900-1901; after a short stay on the plateau, he became so ill with fever, he had to retire to the coast.
carried malaria with them on their ascent to the "healthy" plateau. Like so many so-called healthy areas in the history of Angola, accounts varied about fever, or malaria. One must conclude that even areas on the higher plateaus had fever until recently because of the unsanitary conditions and because of the mobility of Europeans who caught malaria on the coastal lowland.

The Mossamedes region is the last to be colonized with permanent white settlements. From a dry, desert-like coast, the plateau rises very sharply to the east; access to the upland is made difficult by mountain ranges like the Chella range which was a major obstacle between the coast and the sertão. In the coastal lowland, rain is very scarce; although the Mossamedes coast is the healthiest of the regional coasts in Angola, the back country is also the driest and rivers are not navigable. The Cunene is useless as a route to the interior since a sandbar blocks its mouth and there are falls a few miles up river.

Much of the area south and east of Mossamedes is too dry to be useful to the European without extensive irrigation. The Chella range prevented early colonization since there are few good passes and even the railroad has been obliged to skirt the edge of it on its ascent to the plateau. The "Kalahari-Desert Border" region is generally a worthless area and is more a transition to Southwest Africa than it is part of Angola.
The Portuguese entered the "Congo Border" region in the late 15th century. Its climate, location, and resources soon discouraged them. More a part of the Congo basin, this area contains heavy forestation, generally low relief, and a "debilitating climate" for the European. After the 16th century, few Portuguese lived there permanently; until the last decade, the European population in Congo district has been very sparse.

The capital of São Salvador is on a low plateau, in a relatively isolated position 100 miles from the nearest point on the Congo, and 200 miles from the western coast. Climate and location have continued to prove disadvantageous for the development of the area. The Luanda region, beginning with the founding of Luanda in 1575, soon took the place of Congo as the focal point of Portuguese activity and expansion into the sertão.

The Cabinda enclave north of the Congo River is today part of the Congo district of Angola. It is an unhealthy region about 2,800 square miles in size. Mainly a coastline with a few good ports, the sertão is "miles of steaming, tangled, equatorial rain forest."  

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16 Van Dongen, op. cit.; Ribeiro da Cruz, op. cit., p. 62; a survey taken before 1940, found that Cabinda had an average annual relative humidity of 88.4%; next to the high humidity of the coastal town of Novo Redondo, this is the highest in Angola.
The last marginal region in Angola to be described is the "Upper Zambesia" province in the east. This region is a part of Central Africa, and represents the watershed for the upper Zambesi and the Kasai rivers; much of it is deserted plateau falling toward the east into marshy, malarial basins. This region has never had permanent white settlement because of the isolation from the coast, the tsetse fly activity, and the undesirable climate. As on the Benguela plateau, many rivers cross the land, flood during much of the year, and make road and bridge-building very difficult.

Although the European population in Angola has tended to concentrate in Luanda, it has expanded southwards in the last two centuries to reach the area with the highest African population density. Benguela province has evolved as a central region; the plateau is over 3,500 feet above sea level and there is a low relative humidity compared with other areas. European colonization schemes are favored in this region. And it is clear that the original pattern of expansion from the focal centers of Luanda and Benguela continues to this day. Until the 20th century, the settlements furthest east were on the Luanda plateau, that is, the most accessible upland.

The seasons of Angolan climate have affected the history of the land. There is a rainy season beginning in September and lasting to the first of May. The dry
season, or cacimbo, lasts from May to late August. Both May and September are transitional months. \textsuperscript{17} Cacimbo season, named after the typical morning fog of the dry months, is historically the time when the Portuguese undertook expeditions and military campaigns. And the shortness of the season of dependable weather certainly limited activity far from settlements in the sertão. The rainy season was the time of the year when the dreaded yearly epidemic of carneirado visited the settlements. \textsuperscript{18}

Portuguese settled on the coast had reports of a healthier plateau to the south. They found the monotony of the temperature and the aridity on the coast unbearable. Governor General Sousa Coutinho in 1769 wrote to Lisbon of the Southern uplands:

> These lands are as healthy as are those of Europe; rainfall is never lacking there during the proper seasons; they have the same frost, hail, and clouds as Portugal. \textsuperscript{19}

The Luanda plateau was not so healthy as that of Benguela. But it had the Cuanza River as an entrance and the Portuguese traders would brave malaria and other diseases in order to use the convenient outlet to the Atlantic. Again, the land's western region remained

\textsuperscript{17} Ribeiro da Cruz, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{18} Whittlesey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 115. This epidemic was probably a form of malaria.

\textsuperscript{19} Ribeiro da Cruz, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 78.
faithful to its Atlantic orientation. 20

In conclusion, the geography of Angola should be analyzed in terms of the needs of the Portuguese who came to settle. Finding sickly and humid country in the Congo kingdom, and along the coast, they sought higher and more open country in cooler climates. In the region directly east south-east of Luanda they concentrated efforts of development. Nevertheless, this plateau region cut by many rivers, was and is, in some ways, a very unhealthy place.

A modern study concluded that malaria in Angola was "of primary importance" in most of the province. It is "hyperendemic" on the coastal plain from the Congo to the Cuanza and in most river valleys of the north, and from 50-70,000 annual cases were reported mainly in Luanda province. In the higher areas, malaria outbreaks occurred with periods of heavy rainfall. Sleeping sickness, trypanosomiasis, is endemic north of 12 degrees south latitude. Yellow fever has not been reported in the ports of Angola since 1900, but it is liable to occur in all warm humid regions. There was a slight epidemic of smallpox in 1931 with some 1,408 cases reported. 21


As a place of European settlement, Angola began depending upon the Atlantic and with an inland orientation to the region north of the Cuanza River. European control tended to remain in areas with endemic malaria, and only in the 19th century was there a serious effort to settle the healthier places on the plateaus. Until the 20th century, only the "Geographic Provinces" of Luanda, Benguela, and Mossamedes received considerable white colonization.

Early travelers to Angola feared the climate as much as men who visited the Guinea coast. After 1845 the use of sulphate of quinine became frequent in the territory. Endemic malaria, nevertheless, remained a problem for Europeans well past 1900, and at the beginning of the century, an authority believed that three major obstacles to development persisted: "malaria, alcoholism, and the climate."

Some observers dismissed the horror and fear existing in life in Angola. For some, who forgot the misery of the great majority of inhabitants, that land was a scene of inspiration. The geologist Joaquim John Monteiro referred to Angola as "this wonderful and beautiful country." For many others, however, their impressions were quite

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different. Later in the 20th century, one nickname for Angola was "the hunger country." 25

B. Trade and Conquest in the Early Period

The navigator Diogo Cão discovered the mouth of the Congo River in late 1482 or early 1483. He returned to Portugal before April 1484, and carried with him four Congolese whom he wished to teach Portuguese for later contact. 26 Along the coast of what is now Angola, Cão had come into contact with groups of the Ba-kongo speaking peoples owing allegiance to a supreme leader, the Manicongo. With his capital at Mbanza, later named by the Portuguese, São Salvador, this Manicongo enjoyed fruitful relations with the Portuguese for nearly 80 years. Early Portuguese policy in the Congo hoped to create a religious and commercial community without occupation or conquest. Unfortunately, the slave trader accompanied the Catholic priest, and by the late 16th century, the power and prestige of the Congo kingdom was on the wane. 27 As inter-tribal rivalries began to sap the power of the supreme King of Congo, the Portuguese shifted their attention to the south in search of good ports and an entrance to the interior.

25 Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 115.

26 Edgar Prestage, The Portuguese Pioneers (London, Black, 1933), pp. 206-8. There is still a question as to the exact date of Cao's first voyage.

In 1571 the King of Portugal granted a proprietorship of land on the Angolan coast to a soldier, Paulo Dias de Novais. Set out in the tradition of donatários of Brazil, the grant gave the soldier exclusive ownership for life of the coast between the Dande and Cuanza Rivers, and as far inland as he could possess. Dias' major obligation by contract was to "plant" 100 European couples in this area within the space of six years.\(^{28}\)

A magnificent bay and natural harbor attracted the commercially-minded Portuguese to the area north of the outlet of the Cuanza. In 1575, Dias de Novais founded the city of "St. Paul of the Assumption of Loanda" (Hereafter as Luanda). Trading with the interior began years before the founding of the first settlement; itinerant Portuguese traders, so important in the history of Angola, were already on Luanda Island bartering with nearby natives.\(^{29}\)

European colonization in Angola got off to a false start from the beginning. The original conquistador, Dias de Novais, failed to fulfill the conditions of his contract with the King: he could not manage to settle 100 couples within the allotted time.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{28}\) Ralph Delgado, História de Angola (Lobito, 1961), I, pp. 258-262. Originally the crown grant was called "a donatária de Angola" but it was a "Captaincy" similar to those in Brazil. Dias was grandson of the discoverer of the Cape of Good Hope, Bartholomew Dias. Delgado, op. cit., p. 256.

\(^{29}\) Duffy, op. cit., p. 55.

commitment elsewhere, and the hostility of the natives contributed to this failure. Yet the soldier Dias was an intrepid campaigner, and his penetrations of the sertão and sallies up the Cuanza River set the pattern for Portuguese expansion during the first century and a half of occupation. A series of fortresses or presidios\textsuperscript{31} were built inland from the coast and southeast from the port of Luanda. At the time of Dias's death in 1589, nearly half a dozen forts were built on or near the Cuanza or Lucalla Rivers.\textsuperscript{32} Military expansion had succeeded, but civil colonization or the settling of European farmers in sufficient numbers had not progressed. This was to be the pattern for centuries.

From the beginning, the territory of Angola was, in Portuguese legal terminology, a Conquista or "Conquest."\textsuperscript{33} Originating in Roman and then in Spanish and Portuguese law, this term implied the existence of "heathen" populations or infidels. The structure of Portuguese administration in 16th century Angola was peculiarly

\textsuperscript{31}"Presidio" means "fortress, military prison;" Maria Teixeira de Oliveira, \textit{Dicionario Moderno Portugues-Ingles} (Lisbon, 1954), yet in Spanish the word also has the meaning of the penal settlements on the North Coast of Africa.

\textsuperscript{32}See the map for the expansion of Portuguese control.

\textsuperscript{33}Note the use of Conquista in the writing of Cadornega, \textit{op. cit.} and Silva Correa, \textit{op. cit.}; in the 18th century, the word took on a more permanent meaning as "kingdom" or "domain."
Iberian and medieval in many senses. The Portuguese who founded the interior fortresses, as in the reconquista against the Arabs in Spain, were a military caste, penetrating infidel territory by a series of conquistas, or islands of control. The society was a military society which traded in slaves, ivory, and wax. Using the concept of "vassalage," the Portuguese recognized the status and influence of native chiefs, or sobas (sova, 18th century variation), in exchange for alliance or "vassalage" with the Portuguese authorities and merchants.

Variations of this system of vassalagem remained part of Angolan politics until the early 20th century. In theory, the soba who signed treaties or made verbal agreements was obligated to aid the Portuguese in various ways, with men or trade goods. Portuguese conquistadores, so few in number, in order to trade successfully and create the atmosphere in which trade could flourish, were in turn obliged to give the sobas credit for their power in a military system. In practice, often the Portuguese could not make sobas vassals, but allies; still, the name vassal persisted in the terminology for centuries. "That mass of heathen" or "such an immensity of heathen" constituted the reason the Portuguese had to employ such a policy.  

^{34} Cadornega, História Geral, I, pp. 33-38. One is reminded by reading this account of the letters of Cortes to Charles V.
Portuguese traders meddled in native politics more out of necessity than out of cruelty or spite. If trade was to be had, protection had to accompany it. Native warfare and distinct political systems existed before the Portuguese came to Angola, so that gathering African levies for war and trade was merely a more organized variation of an old theme. In some cases, sobas paid the Portuguese a tax, or religious tithe, dizimo ("Tenth") in way of tribute. Other times sobas paid both dizimo and gave porters or slaves for war and trade. Vassalagem was often formalized by a treaty or "Act" of Vassalage.35

Troops, given to the Portuguese by sobas or forcibly raised, became organized in large units, often called guerra preta.36 By the early 17th century, the guerra preta was an established institution in Angola. Cadornega lists a certain "António Dias Muzungo," a native of Angola, as the first Captain-Major of guerra preta that he knew; this man held the post from 1620 to 1630.37 Most of the leaders of this corps were Negroes.

The Portuguese created a frontier based on their system of vassals. The territory inland was divided very simply into the area with vassal chiefs and the area outside, of non-vassal chiefs. Often the European

35See Chapter III for discussion of an "Act of Vassalage" of 1838.

36Guerra Preta means, literally, "black war."

control went no further than a cannon shot beyond the most distant *presidio*; but theoretically, outlying territory was friendly if the *sona*, or *seba* in 19th century orthography, had a previous agreement with the authorities.

The *conquista* of the interior progressed under the *presidio* system. When a fortress was built, Portuguese settlers, or *moradores*, set up their homes nearby. Each establishment of the Captaincy had the following personnel living in the fort: Captain-Major, Chaplain-priest, Lieutenant of Militia, Clerk, Treasurer, and a Constable, or law officer.38 Theoretically, garrisons which were closest to the *sertão*, or the frontier with non-vassalized tribes, had a larger contingent of troops.39

On the death of Paulo Dias his grant of land and his conquests in the interior reverted to the Crown of Portugal, and became a "Kingdom," and "Captaincy-General."40 The forts of Calumbo, Massangano, and Golungo Alto had been founded by 1589. Muxima was founded in 1599 south

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40 Delgado, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 323-325. Dias died at Massangano, after 14 years of campaigning and a futile search for reported mines of silver up the Cuanza. Massangano had been founded in 1583 and named "Our Lady of the Victory of Massangano," commemorating his defeat of native forces.
of the Cuanza, the highway to the interior so lyrically praised by Cadornega. Shortly after, in 1604, a presidio was built at the falls of Gambambe, marking the limit of navigation on the river. Portuguese traders preceded the military occupation of the presidio, and, in the early phase of expansion in the region between the Dande and Cuanza as in the later phases, constantly ambulant traders paved the way for Portuguese control.

The Lucalla River, an affluent of the Cuanza, was another path to the interior north of the main line of settlements. In 1614 Portuguese forces founded a presidio at Ambaca on the Lucalla; the Lucalla was less navigable than the Cuanza, and only small rafts were useful for movement.41

It was in the 17th century that the Portuguese encountered the first serious trouble from foreign powers in Angola. Dutch fleets had attacked sporadically most of the Portuguese empire in the early years of the century. But after 1630 these attacks threatened to expel the Portuguese from Brazil and Angola as well. Dutch forces occupied Angola from 1641 to 1648 and were expelled by a fleet and army from Brazil.

Dutch occupation of Luanda, Benguela, and some of the sertão near the Cuanza had a definite effect on

41 Cadornega, op. cit., III, p. 163.
Portuguese relations with the natives.\textsuperscript{42} After the Dutch left, the Portuguese had to reoccupy a great deal of territory, and remake alliances, often forcibly, with native powers. The King of Congo and the Queen of Matamba had openly rebelled against Portuguese rule and had allied with the Dutch forces. At one point the Portuguese held only the fortress of Massangano. The Dutch did not tax the native chiefs, and this memory bore bitter fruit for the Portuguese authorities when they began to reassert their influence after 1648. As a result, the Portuguese began a campaign to break the power of the major native polities. By 1671 their work was nearly completed.

In short succession, forces of Congo, Matamba, and Dongo were defeated in the field by Portuguese armies, heavily supported by guerra preta from loyal groups north of the Cuanza. The full extent of military occupation was achieved in 1671 with the capture of the hill fortress of the King of Dongo, theoretically a vassal of the King of Congo, and a former vassal of Portugal. Dongo had rebelled in 1670 and had attacked the presidio of Ambaca, after he observed a Portuguese defeat in Sonho province of Congo. Dongo had a reputedly invincible

\textsuperscript{42} Alberto de Lemos, História de Angola (Lisbon, 1932), pp. 200-209; Duffy, op. cit., pp. 65-68. For the expulsion of the Dutch from Angola see Charles R. Boxer, Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686 (London, 1952).
stronghold at Pedras de Mapungo, some ten miles north of the Cuanza. A three month siege reduced the native garrison and the Portuguese founded a new presidio there, after another reinforcement from Brazil.\textsuperscript{43}

In this campaign, again, guerra preta played a decisive part in enabling the Portuguese to break a native power. In the field of logistics, the native vassal sovas provided carriers for the campaigning army.\textsuperscript{44} Chronicler Cadornega remarked that this campaign against the powerful Dongo King was like a "Civil War," since black men were fighting mainly black men with only "a few Portuguese," and the native kingdom was so very powerful.\textsuperscript{45}

The presidio furthest east from Luanda was the converted native fortress, renamed Pungo Andongo after the defeated potentate. There were a number of Portuguese trading feiras or market-fairs in the sertão which stretched perhaps another 120 miles inland. The fair of Cassange, a market of Portuguese traders, and mestícos at the court of the King of Cassange, was located west of the Cuango River, some 300 miles from Luanda. Cadornega mentions Cassange as a trading post since traders reached

\textsuperscript{43}Cadornega, \textit{op. cit.}, II, pp. 298-358.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., II, p. 302. Porters were then called "gente de carruagem," in the 17th century; in the 19th century, the term used in most cases was "carregadores."

\textsuperscript{45}Cadornega, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 303.
the town on a regular route from the presidio of Ambaca. Cassange was visited by Portuguese from Ambaca and Pungo Andongo before the last half of the 17th century. But Pungo Andongo remained, until the 19th century, the frontier post of Portuguese military occupation in eastern Angola.

In expanding to the south, the Portuguese moved along the coast past the Ouanza River mouth, looking for ports. In 1617 Benguela was established and a new "kingdom" was created with a more or less separate administration for several decades. Portuguese officers anxious to escape the control of Luanda, set up a trading town which acted as a base for penetration into the sertao. Yet it was not until 1685 that presidios were founded on the plateau at Caconda and Quilengues. These small stations, with only a handful of military personnel, were eventually abandoned because of their unhealthy locations. Even on the Benguela plateau, expansion was hampered by climate; together with climate

46 Ibid., III, p. 220.

47 Henrique Dias de Carvalho in his O Jaga de Cassange (Lisbon, 1898) says the "Fair" at Cassange was not founded until 1807 (p. 114). Yet it is clear from other records that the Post of "Director of the Fair of Cassange" was recognized as a post by the Governor General in the 18th century. Such an appointment appeared in 1790. See Archivos de Angola, Vol. III (1918), No. 15, pp. 116-121.

48 Das Neves, Considerações (1830), p. 200. Das Neves in 1830 considered Pungo Andongo as the eastern frontier of Angola.
and difficulty of access from Benguela, this region had distinct disadvantages until the 18th century, when Portuguese expansion moved southward with more effectiveness. 49

The first century of Portuguese expansion was decidedly military in character. Although traders preceded the presidios, a distinct military group ruled the "Kingdom and Captaincy-General of Angola" long after the death of the first conquistador in 1589. Expansion was based on Luanda at first; and the port city grew in importance as the outlet for main trade routes bringing "some slaves, some ivory and a great deal of wax," 50 for export to Brazil and Portugal.

Expansion to the east came to a standstill in the late 17th century, and the territory settled down to build a commercial kingdom. Wars with native groups continued sporadically, but the Portuguese in Angola came to concentrate on trade and preserving conditions conducive to business security. The 18th century was in many ways as much a century of war as the 17th, yet


50 Cadornega, op. cit., III, 167. Cadornega’s account would lead one to believe that ivory and wax were as important in producing revenue in 17th century Angola as were slaves. By the time of Silva Correa, however, there is no question but that slaves were the major item of receipts.
the difference was an augury for the future: Portuguese policy shifted from inland penetration to controlling, or attempting to control, trade along the coast. The attempt to monopolize the coastal trade, exclude foreign vessels from trading with natives in the territory, and the fear of further foreign invasion, drove the Portuguese to direct more attention to the coasts than had been true in the 17th century.

After losing control of the Mina coast in Guinea by 1642, the Portuguese put more energy into controlling the coast of Angola and Benguela. Yet the naval power of the Portuguese, and their economic situation, were very weak by the end of the 17th century. Portuguese merchants could not compete with French, Dutch and English traders. What had been true on the Guinea coast would be true on the Angolan coast; as Bosman wrote in 1698 about the Portuguese at Mina: native middlemen outdid the Portuguese since the latter "are loaded with such sorry goods, that they can scarcely get slaves anywhere else." 51 In Angola, at the beginning of the 18th century, the Portuguese found their monopoly of trade gravely threatened; their control of the territory was likewise in danger. 52

52 Nogueira, op. cit., pp. 47-52.
C. 18th Century Angola

1. Struggle for the Coast

From the late 17th century until the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885, Portuguese authorities in Angola attempted to assert control over the coast from the Cunene River in the south to as far north as present-day Gabon Republic. Foreign vessels were trading in what the Portuguese considered their sovereign territory. After the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil and Angola, the plantation economy of Brazil required full cooperation from Angola: more slaves than ever were needed. All foreign attempts to get slaves or any trade near Angolan settlements constituted a threat to the revenue of both Angola and Brazil. In this way Angola became a dependency of Brazil.53

Later troubles were foreshadowed in the 17th century. About 1670 the Dutch built a factory at Loango, north of Cabinda, and shipped slaves to the West Indies. Portuguese intelligence also learned that the Dutch were getting slaves right from under their nose at Pinda, near the Congo river mouth. In order to safeguard Luanda's monopoly over the slaves exported from Congo, a plan

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53 Nogueira, op. cit., pp. 22-23. Jose H. Rodrigues, Africa e Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1961), pp. 17-28. Angola, "the black mother," became subordinated to the interests of Brazil. At one time the military commands in Angola were under the authority of the Governor-General in Bahia, Brazil. Brazil absorbed all the trade and navigation of Angola.
was made to urge the vassalizing of the Chief of Sonho, near Pinda town, by way of permitting the King of Congo to invade the territory and also crush the Dutch trade on the coast. Yet apparently the Dutch continued to trade there and it is likely the plan was never carried out.

The French in the 18th century attacked Angola and Brazil and began to oppose Portuguese monopoly of trade on the Congo coast. In 1707, Benguela town was sacked by French pirates. In order to control trade further north, King John V of Portugal in 1723 ordered the construction of fortresses at Cabinda and at Molembo; French opposition to this plan was enough to destroy it. In 1758 another plan proposed the building of forts at Cabinda and Loango to oppose French trade with the natives. Yet nothing was done decisively until 1759, when the Portuguese in Angola built a new presidio in the interior at Encoge, or Pedras de Encoge. This fort was situated on a trade route from the east to the Congo coast in the hope that the Portuguese could control native trade before it reached the coastal ports north of Luanda. Encoge became the northernmost station in Angola until the 19th century, but it did little to prevent

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54 Cadornega, op. cit., II, p. 545.


56 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 46.
French and English traders from trading with natives on the coast. 57

As the 18th century wore on, the Portuguese became preoccupied with foreign vessels landing south of Luanda and avoiding Portuguese customs houses at the main settlements. Governor Francisco Sousa Coutinho (1764-1772) was determined to cripple foreign "contraband" by building a coastal presidio at Novo Redondo. Besides preventing the landing of English vessels, which had previously threatened Portuguese control at Cabinda as well, the founding of Novo Redondo was designed to ease overland communication between Luanda and Benguela. 58 The Portuguese used Novo Redondo as a base to enter the sertão of Quissama, a wild, "unvassalized" territory, southwest of the presidio of Muxima. As in so many other moves for expansion of control in Angola, the Portuguese at Novo Redondo aimed to retrieve many escaped slaves from the Luanda and lower Cuanza regions.

Portuguese economic policy with regard to Angola was criticized by the more illustrious of the Governors-General in the 18th as well as the 19th centuries. In 1775, after returning to Portugal, Governor Sousa

57 Das Neves, op. cit., pp. 200-201. Encoge before 1830 was growing coffee and sent it to Luanda and other ports. Sarmento, Alexandre, Os Sertões d'África (Lisbon, 1880), p. 39.

Coutinho finished his report on Angola with a scathing denunciation of metropolitan budgeting.

It is best to spend money as events dictate, and attract trade; experience shows my view is correct.... What good is a sordid economizing policy in a State? What good are ruined towns? or Soldiers' pay in arrears, the creditors of the Royal Treasury in continual debt and subject to the miserable formalities which make the Governing even worse? 59

Governor Sousa Coutinho had an idée fixe in regard to Portuguese expansion and foreign competition. He was a precursor of the Brazilian explorer Lacerda who feared Dutch and English expansion into the interior north of Cape Colony. 60 For Sousa Coutinho, the kingdom of Angola would not prosper until a route could be secured across Africa to Mozambique in order to tap what he considered "the stream of gold" from the Sena region. Portugal must expand into Central Africa to prevent the Dutch from extending their settlements up to the Zambesi River. 61

With this idea in mind the Governor, known to many historians of Angola as the most enlightened and energetic governor of four centuries, encouraged expansion


60 Duffy, op. cit., pp. 190-191; Jose Maria de Lacerda, "Observações sobre a viagem da costa d'Angola a costa de Mocambique," Annaes Maritimos e Coloniaes, Parte Não Official, No. 5, 1844, pp. 188-205. Lacerda noted the English threat in 1795.

61 Biblioteca Municipal Público de Porto, Manuscript, Codice 337, Memorias ... de Sousa Coutinho (Lisbon, 1773), p. 41.
onto the Benguela uplands. New stations at Caconda and Quilengues were renovated and at least half a dozen fairs were established in the sertão east of Caconda; it is likely that the first official Portuguese authorities were sent to Bailundo and Bihé kingdoms by the end of the term of Sousa Coutinho in 1772.62

Despite Sousa Coutinho's encouragement of industry and agriculture, and a lessening of slave trade in Angola, his plans of development and of expansion fell short of success. The Portuguese still were unable to control the coast north of Luanda up to the Congo River, and French and English vessels traded at will and continued to make a mockery of Portuguese decrees ordering the end of foreign contraband. Portuguese customs duties were heavy even for national vessels. The ports of Angola and Brazil were in theory closed to foreign navigation, but, at times, due to the profits to be made from trade with English and French merchants, the ports were opened. Portuguese merchants had poor quality goods to trade with the natives for slaves; Brazilian merchants did not pay as well for slaves as did their English and French competitors in the West Indies. Thus, Portuguese fazenda, or trade cloth, was consistently rejected by natives who

62 Alfredo de Albuquerque Felner, Angola ...
I, see Documents No. 8, 9, and 10, pp. 177-207. Delgado, Ralph, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela (Lisbon, 1940), pp. 9-16.
knew the foreign cloth's higher value.63

Driven by pressure from Brazilian slave-owners who needed a greater supply of slaves, and by the detrimental effects of foreign trade on the commerce of Luanda and Benguela, Portuguese leaders planned to renew the schemes of King John V and to build fortresses and stations along the coast north of the Congo River.64 Although attempts were apparently made to construct forts further north, the Portuguese decided on Cabinda as the key point to be occupied.65 In 1783 an expedition of about 1100 troops, including engineers, led by Lt. Luis Pinheiro Furtado, landed at Cabinda port and built a fortress. The climate was so unhealthy that over one-half of the Europeans died of fever in a few months. The French considered Cabinda important enough for their supply of slaves to the West Indies that they sent a fleet under Captain Bernard Marigny to end the Portuguese occupation. Furtado, seeing his garrison half-dead from the humid climate and bad supplies, capitulated and destroyed the

63 Jose Maria de Lacerda, "Memória," Annaes Maritimos, p. 194.

64 Felner, Angola, I, Doc. No. 10, pp. 199-201; Archivos das Colónias, III, No. 14 (1918), p. 81; letter, Baron of Mossamedes to Secretario in Lisbon, 18 Jan. 1786; "My attempts on the Princeship of Sonho have not had the least effect for the good of commerce, because the advantages of the price of the French, quality, cheapness of their Fazendas, exclude all other nations from competition." 28 June, 1786, p. 261.

65 Rodrigues, África e Brasil, pp. 27-34.
fortress in June 1784. Portugal protested this action and negotiations proceeded which ended in the Convention of Madrid, signed on the 30th of January 1786. 66

By the convention, Portugal was obliged to recognize north of the Congo freedom of slave traffic for all European nations. France, in return, promised not to extend commercial activity to Angolan ports south of the Congo. This clause also stated that no other nations, such as England, were allowed south of the Congo. In effect, the Convention of Madrid, not protested by England, blocked Portugal's move to expand north of the Congo in the slave trade, and diverted Portuguese attention to the southern coast. The abortive attempt to take Cabinda weakened Portuguese prestige on the coast and established a fatal precedent. Portuguese sovereignty had been rejected by a major European power in an important commercial region. 67 The failure left Portugal a frustrated ambition to ponder for the future, and increased European and native hostility would appear when Portugal tried to reassert power on the "north coast." 68

The failure at Cabinda turned the Government's attention to the area south of Benguela. The Baron of

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67 Sá da Bandeira, Factos e Considerações, pp. 10-30.

68 Sousa Dias, op. cit., p. 252.
Mossamedes, Governor from 1784 to 1790, considered the Cabinda area as out of his reach. Historian Elias Silva Correa realistically noted that native enmity in the north country had increased since 1784. Portuguese expeditions by land and sea explored the arid region south of Cape Santa Marta in 1785-86. The bay near the mouth of the Bero River was named Mossamedes after the sponsoring Governor. Although the village of Mossamedes was not founded until early 1840, the initial expeditions found traders bartering with the natives. Expansion to the south was foreshadowed, for Mossamedes was reportedly the most healthy region for European settlement in the area of Portuguese influence; moreover, the port was superior to that of Benguela.

English competition north of Luanda presented two grave dangers to Portuguese power at the end of the century. These foreign vessels sold arms and powder to natives near the Congo mouth and they traded persistently in slaves. In attempting to gain allegiance from native leaders north of Luanda, the Portuguese became involved in a serious campaign.


71 Sousa Dias, Os Portugueses, p. 295; B.M.P.P., ms. Codice 764, Baron of Mossamedes report on Angola.
The Marques of Mossul, or Maniquitungo, was the native ruler controlling both banks of the lower Logé River, or Quitungo. The port of Quitungo was later called Ambriz. The Maniquitungo in the late 1780's was carrying on a prosperous trade with English and French vessels, and receiving slaves from a major trade route overland from as far east as Pungo Andongo (See Map). A Portuguese embassy of 1785 was rejected by the ruler. In 1788 another group, this time a small army, was defeated and sent back to Luanda in disgrace, thus terrifying the capital into preparing for a general invasion. The native forces reacted by invading the European farms down to the Bengo River. Merchants in Luanda had long pressed the Government to move upon the Marques of Mossul. In late 1790, finally, the Portuguese cornered the native leader, who took refuge aboard an English vessel in the port of Ambriz. At the same time, a small fortress, called the fortress of Our Lady of Nazaré and St. John of the Logé, was built on the left bank of the river close to the port. Shortly afterwards, the Marques submitted and offered "vassalage" at Luanda, in a treaty of April 25, 1792.\(^7\) Later, in the 19th century program to reoccupy this region, the Portuguese used the facts of this fortress construction and the

\(^7\)Sousa Dias, Os Portugueses, p. 298.
vassalage treaty to their advantage. 73

The English Minister in Lisbon, Walpole, pro-
tested the building of the fort after complaints from
English naval captains. The French supported the complaint.
The Portuguese Government claimed that her rights to the
coast were still intact, yet in a dispatch to the governor
of Angola on August 12, 1791, the Government was obliged
to order the destruction of the fort at Ambriz. 74

An interesting sideline to the incident had a
parallel with the international conflict of the 1850's
and 1860's. One of the Princes of Mossul captured by
the Portuguese, a certain Jorge Mangolfe, escaped from
his captors and fled to England on a vessel in the
Ambriz harbor. Apparently his supplications had a
degree of influence upon the English pressure to cut off
Portuguese occupation. In early 1860 another Prince
with a European name, Nicolas, would also attempt to
escape on an English vessel near Ambriz.

2. Social and Economic Preludes for the 19th Century

Angola was truly a fugitive society. By fugitive
is meant the transitory character of the inhabitants,
their occupations and their accomplishments in a hostile

73 Sá da Bandeira, Factos e Considerações (1855). For the text of this treaty of vassalage see a polemical
work similar to that of Sa da Bandeira's appearing at
the time of the Portuguese occupation of Ambriz: Visconde
de Santarem, Demonstração dos Direitos que Tem a Coroa
e Portugal.... (Lisbon, 1855), pp. 36-40.

74 Sousa Dias, op. cit., p. 299.
and wretched land. Few Europeans came to Angola of their own choice. Many who came hoped to return to Brazil or Portugal with a small fortune. Moreover, Angola was a land of exile for both Portugal and Brazil. All manner of political exiles, criminals, unruly soldiers, and even gypsies ended up on her shores. The conquistador Paulo Dias in the 16th century searched the jails of Lisbon for many of his recruits, and later, as Brazil grew to have an important population, many of her outcasts were sent to Angola.75

Luanda became the home of what Silva Correia called "the monsters of iniquity."76 The army, police, petty merchant class, artisans, and tavern-keepers were all degredados. These rootless men added to the already implanted instability of the white population, and their relations with natives complicated the situation. Many convicts there were recruited for service in the army or the obras reaes (royal works), that is, roads, canals, and galleys.77

Governors with foresight deplored the imbalance of males to females in the European groups and urged the sending of females. Yet few white women came, partly

because of the climate. Sousa Coutinho recommended that all Europeans should marry "white women or almost white women." 78

This fugitive society was difficult to control. Stern measures seemed the only solution since jails were full to capacity. Native groups reacted violently to the men who came as outcasts. Most of the degredados traded in the bush, or became service-people in the towns after their service was up or they received pardons. Disdaining the life of farming, so difficult under the circumstances of Angola, these men often succeeded in escaping Portuguese territory by boarding foreign vessels. 79 Sousa Coutinho was thinking of the calamitous group of degredados under his charge when he wrote to his successor in 1772:

The public good was never looked after here, and I believe that the Country was ruined more by its lack of order, than by even its climate. 80

Few reliable statistics exist for Angola in the 18th century, but one rare exception is in the report of Governor António Lencastré in 1778: 81

79 Ibid., I, pp. 199-200. See B.M.P.P., ms., Codice 674 supra.
80 Felner, Angola, I, p. 199.
81 Archivos de Angola, III (1918), No. 3, pp. 30-32.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Mestíjos</th>
<th>Negroes</th>
<th>Total for Angola</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>3,546</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>474,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>3,874</td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>487,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mestíjos or pardos, in Angola at the time, outnumbered whites by over 2 to 1. Many of the lower echelons in the administration were filled with pardos. All the shades of color were said to drink heavily. Brazilian rum, or geribita, was a staple export; Silva Corrêa's accounts picture the native caravans' addiction to rum as habitual and long-standing. White society died off as much through over-drinking as through climate.\(^{82}\)

The Portuguese native policy followed an old path. Vassal chiefs were liable to castigo, or punishment, through the sending of punitive expeditions from presídios, if they refused to give the Captain-major porters to carry goods to the fair at Cassange. The Portuguese were determined to maintain their "bush prestige"; and time and again in the flux of native politics, military force was called upon to make the native powers fear reprisals.\(^{83}\) The fugitive society, with very little religious or educational influences to soften it, was based on militarism and the most conservative form of mercantilism. Change, as more stable and settled societies knew it, was long in coming.


The Portuguese managed to collect taxes in trade goods or in currency later in the form of the dizimo. Some form of tax had been levied on all conquered regions since the second decade of the 17th century. In the late 1780's the following towns and presidios in Angola paid the dizimo, listed by districts. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Dizimo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>Golungo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambaca</td>
<td>Dande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muxima</td>
<td>Cuanza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massangano</td>
<td>Encoje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>Cambambe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iccolo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Certain sobas paid the dizimo in a yearly tribute to Luanda in slaves, ivory or other trade goods, or satisfied the obligation by contributing porters or guerra preta forces in time of war.

By the late 18th century, most writers agreed that Angola was in a state of economic decadence. The slave-trade continued and annually between 1785 and 1795 up to 8,000 slaves were officially exported to Brazil from each of the main ports of Luanda and Benguêla.

The pursuit of more slaves and better ivory led to an expansion of the commercial control of the Portuguese in the interior of Angola. The flag followed trade,

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84 Silva Corrêa, Vol. I, p. 167. "Dizimo" meant originally, "tithe" but the religious motivation behind such a tax quickly disappeared in Angola. Silva Correa severely criticized the tax collectors' robberies among the natives, and adding to his anti-clerical bias, he poured scorn on the religious connotation of dizimo. See pp. 163-167, I.

since after the establishment of a fair outside the jurisdiction of the frontier presidios, incidents between the merchants and natives often brought Portuguese military intervention and subsequent occupation on a small scale. Trade routes from the east of Luanda were especially guarded; and the traveling of European or mestico pombeiros tended to extend Portuguese responsibility for territory far outside the last fortress on the Cuanza River.

There were several basic weaknesses in the economic system of pre-19th century Angola. Until the 18th century, all public officials, as the Governors and Captain-majors, were allowed to trade to supplement their meager salaries. Secondly, after many complaints from officials and native leaders, all Portuguese merchants were forbidden to personally trade in the interior outside the presidios. Thirdly, there was the monopoly system of revenue: all sales of slaves, salt, and ivory were strictly controlled by the Government at Luanda.

86 Ibid., I, p. 44. Silva Correa lists as the 7th cause of the ruin of Commerce in Angola, "the deceits, insults, and violences applied to the natives by the Traders." Henrique Galvao and Carlos Salvagem, O Imperio Ultramarino Portugueses (Lisbon, 1953), III, "Angola," p. 86. Mestico meant mulatto or half-caste. A pombeiro was an agent, usually a native slave or freeman, working for a merchant.

87 Nogueira, J. A., op. cit., pp. 22-23. See also the excellent article on this subject for the years before 1750. Ralph Delgado, "Factores de Atrofiamento economico e financeiro de Angola, relativos aos primeiros 182 anos de exploracao do territorio," in Actividade Economica de Angola (No. 33, 1959, Luanda).
Various measures during the 18th century lifted the prohibitions on trading in the interior by Portuguese merchants, yet it remained a great issue and a problem into the 19th century. Such were the complaints and disorders over merchant activities that often only mesticos and natives were allowed to trade outside the presidios into "unvassalized territory."

The early centuries of history in Angola handed down the principle of mercantilist economy. Portugal's imperial system was based on the ideal that only Portuguese vessels could trade with her dominions; this pacto colonial lasted in Angola well into the 19th century. The merchants of Luanda formed the most powerful economic pressure group in the territory; their interests were shortsighted and frankly opportunistic. They urged the Government to undertake military expeditions to control more regions for commerce. On the other hand, if the administration of Angola had possessed sufficient means of power, this situation might never have arisen; as it turned out, Portuguese trade was continually ravaged by foreigners and natives alike, and the effect was to entrench mercantilistic principles.

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88 B.M.P.P., manuscript, Codice 674, letter 12 June 1791, Benguela Governor to Baron of Mossamedes; Silva Correa, op. cit., I, author warned against listening to the advice of merchants in Angola in very strong terms.
Agriculture, fishing, and cattle raising had little or no foundation in 18th century Angola. Native cultivators supplied much of the food for Portuguese settlements, and the majority of Portuguese traded in slaves and ivory. Dependence upon Brazil was one certain cause for lack of agriculture and industry; preoccupation with exporting slaves to Brazil diverted activity from settled occupations. Brazilian supplies of timber, rum, brandy, flour, and meats were imported to Luanda; indeed Brazil since the middle of the 17th century had provided Angola with men, money, and equipment.

The economy of Angola lived on the exportation of slaves across the Atlantic. Conditions in Brazil were very important for the economy of Angola. In the last quarter of the 18th century, fewer slaves were demanded from Angola in Brazil, because of the decline of the gold and diamond mines. Moreover, as Silva Corrêa argued, Angola had no need to expand to new slave territories, as Cabinda, until a new receiving port in Brazil was opened. Hence even expansion in

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90 Das Neves, op. cit., p. 230; Cadornega, op. cit., II, pp. 300-301.
91 Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, pp. 86-92.
Angola could be geared to the interests of Brazil.

After the end of the American War of Independence, French and British vessels increased their searches for slaves. These vessels were anxious to push aside the Portuguese, as did the French at Cabinda in 1784. Portuguese authorities feared the loss of ports, however, even within Angola.93

Various voices among the Portuguese recommended a change in the export slave trade, although none advocated the end of slavery. Silva Corrêa resented the misery caused the African peoples, but he was not an all-out enemy of the trade, and proposed reforms to improve its role in the economy.94 Feo Cardoso, in Angola in the second decade of the 19th century, deplored the effect of the trade on the labor potential of the Negro; the loss of population meant the dearth of workers for farming, fishing, and mining.95

All writers agreed that Angola was in a terrible condition. The territory was as economically dependent upon Brazil, as it was politically dependent upon Portugal, and with the various disasters that befell

93 B.M.P.P., ms., Codice 674, Baron of Mossamedes' reports.

94 See Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 73, for a different interpretation of Silva Correia's view of the trade. The Brazilian soldier was a cynic who had little love for the African, with whom he had spent many a campaign in the bush.

95 Feo Cardoso, op. cit., p. 336.
Portugal after 1807, the territory proved a greater burden. There was no secure foundation beneath society or the economy; the white population as well as the black was nearly impossible to control with the poor forces Portugal had in the area. With a fugitive society interested only in quickly making a fortune and in escaping the deadly climate, the string of settlements outside Luanda and Benguela could hardly be called collectively a "colony."

Angola was a "commercial-military factory," but with a special qualification. Tiny settlements of European traders penetrated inland over two hundred miles, as in Mozambique and in South Africa. But in Angola there was a gradual expansion going on in the 18th century, which was lacking in Mozambique. "The extension of the Conquest increases day by day encouraged by Trade," said the soldier, Silva Corrêa. Angola was a conquista and the military system of allies and guerra preta made it more than an "ill-defined trading preserve"; time and time again in the years before the 19th century the Portuguese raised guerra preta forces in the thousands. The vassalage system, as precarious

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96 Galvão and Selvagem, op. cit., pp. 84-88.
and mythical as it proved at times, was a reality in Angola more than in any other African territory of Portugal.

Angola could not be considered a colony as of 1822. But the military-commercial caste system, established in the 17th century, made it more than a land of convicts. The administration was impotent to bring to Angola white colonists to settle and remain as a unified society. Small numbers and poor quality of settlers combined to undermine such a program and the Portuguese could barely manage to hold the allegiance of some of the sobas near the presidios. Doggedly the Portuguese encouraged a tradition of miscegenation and assimilation whether through inclination or expediency. A mulatto group in early 19th century Angola outnumbered the whites by over 2 to 1 (see above p. 62). Certainly this mixed group aided Portuguese influence in the bush.99

Administration as well as society existed on ephemeral and tenuous lines. Governors usually served terms of three years. A few served in Angola as long as eight years.100 Yet normally there was no continuity to law-making or its execution. This "lack of continuity" in administration was a fatal legacy for the 19th century. For vested interests, lack of discipline, and poverty

99Mulattoes in Angola were often called "pardos" or "fuscos."

100Nogueira, J. A., O Governo, p. 31.
ruined the best plans of the best administrators, and most of these weaknesses were based upon a false start in the art of government. 101

The beginnings of profound change in Angola could be seen at the end of the 18th century. The independence of Brazil was the vital watershed for the history of the Portuguese in that area. It underlined the great need for reform plans in Lisbon, and illuminated the scathing descriptions of Silva Corrêa, who was convinced that fugitive society was not fit for men with a conscience. 102

101 Sousa Coutinho served in Angola eight years.
102 Silva Correa, História, I, p. 15.
CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE,
1822-1846

(If England patrolled Ambriz port) ... it would restore to us part of the ivory trade flourishing there equal to the decrease in vessels calling at Ambriz. This port is particularly damaging to us by the facility with which canoes and long boats can elude the vigilance of the Government by sneaking there to sell the ivory that is the exclusive trade of the Government here in this City.

- Governor and Captain-General of Angola to Secretary of the Navy, 1825, Letter, A.H.U., Angola, Caixa 70, No. 49.
CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE: 1822-1846

Profound change faced the Portuguese of Angola in the first decades of the century. Portuguese control in Angola was seriously threatened by a weakening of the mother country, the ending of dependence on Brazil, and the British campaign for abolition of the slave trade. With the defeat of France in the Napoleonic Wars, Britain became Portugal's major competitor for the coastal trade of Angola. For the first time, the basic revenue of that territory was hopelessly crippled and marked for destruction; the slave trade could no longer act as the underpinning of Portuguese West Africa.

Yet the changes had a curious effect on Portuguese policy. Instead of permanently undermining Portuguese administration and expansion in Angola, they in fact encouraged improvement. A new colonial policy arose in Lisbon; a legitimate economy, as pictured by men like Sá da Bandeira, had to be built to replace the banned export of Africans across the Atlantic. A new economy in itself implied greater control of trade on the coasts of Angola and the control of interior markets. Thus abolition of the slave trade indirectly encouraged
expansion of Portuguese power.¹

The events from 1807 to 1822 gave Portugal a new but desperate perspective. Brazil was restless and Africa, poor and desolate, remained a burden and responsibility. From 1822 to 1846 the Portuguese in Angola were in transition from the old to the new for Brazilian men, arms, and food supplies inevitably began to dwindle in their flow to Angola. Portuguese administration and economy were set on their own in this era. Brazilians began to compete instead of cooperating, and the Portuguese learned how great had been their links with Brazil in Angola. Administration remained much the same, as Governors went out to fight the slave-trade and also to extend Portuguese jurisdiction and control. It was the beginning of a trial and error period for Portuguese expansion.

A. Slave-Trade and Turbulence

In treaties signed with Britain in 1810, 1815 and 1817, Portugal promised to limit the slave-trade and gradually abolish it in all her African dominions. The Treaty of 1815 limited the trade by Portuguese vessels to south of the Equator.² The slave trade in Angola had

¹See Sá da Bandeira’s Trabalho Rural e Administração Colonial (Lisbon, 1873) for a continuation and enlargement of liberal arguments for ending the slave trade and servitude in Portuguese Africa. Also, Sebastião Xavier Botelho, Escravatura, benefícios ... da proibição daquele Tráfico (Lisbon, 1840).

²Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 144.
shown signs of decrease since the last quarter of the
18th century, but by the years 1822-1836 it declined even
more. Politics and British pressure did the most to put
the writing on the wall for Portuguese negreiros (slavers).

In February 1822 a revolt shook Luanda when an
infantry regiment mutinied against the liberal govern-
ment. This was the first important sign that events in
Portugal would have repercussions in Angola. The revolt
was crushed but many more followed in the 19th century.
In 1823, Benguela, always a home for separatist sympa-
thizers in Angola, rebelled and voted to join Brazil,
newly independent, in a so-called Confederação Brazílica. 3
Luanda promptly called for reinforcements and crushed this
attempt.

After Brazil had declared its independence in
September 1822, Portugal for several years refused to
recognize its independence and fought an unofficial war
in Brazil and on the seas. King John VI as late as 1824
retained his traditional title; in theory at least, he
was, "King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil,
and of Algarves, of this side and beyond the Sea, in
Africa, Lord of Guinea, and of the Conquest, Navigation,
and Trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and of India." 4

3 Galvão and Selvagem, III, pp. 94-96; Pinheiro
Chagas, As Colônias, pp. 46-47.

4 Archivo Nacional do Torre do Tombo, Lisbon,
Dom Joao VI Chancelleria, Livro 44, folha 45; Carta
Regia for Surgeon General of the Royal Navy Hospital,
Luanda, 1824.
Portuguese expeditionary forces were sent to Angola to guard against a Brazilian invasion or an uprising among the whites over politics. Merchant correspondence from Rio de Janeiro informed the Governor of Angola that a Brazilian fleet, after capturing Pernambuco from Portuguese forces in early 1825, was going to attack Luanda. It was rumored the shrewd Lord Cochrane, English mercenary, would lead the attack; Portugal sent forces and the Governor tightened the defenses of Luanda.

Britain in 1825 negotiated a treaty with Brazil whereby for diplomatic recognition and trade, Brazil would agree to reduce gradually her slave imports from Africa, especially Angola. In Angola, certain Brazilian merchants became frightened and some left the colony beginning in that year. The Governor of Angola wrote that most of the merchants there had their headquarters and credit in Brazil.

According to the reports of Silva Corrêa, the slave trade from Angola showed signs of decreasing in the late 18th century. This Brazilian soldier deplored

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5 A.H.U., Angola, Caixa 70, Letter of 23 February 1825, Governor to Overseas Ministry. (Hereafter all correspondence of this type will be designated simply "Gov. Gen." since the majority of letters cited are correspondence from Luanda to Lisbon.)

6 Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 144.

the cruelty of the trade and misery of the Africans in Angola, but he was by no means an enemy of Portuguese slave trade at the time. He foresaw a humanitarian movement, but he also recommended that Brazil open a new port and market to improve that trade in Angola. 8

Many traders in Angola in the 1780's were deeply in debt. The aviados, or agents sent into the backlands, were so poor and in debt to the merchants on the coast that cheating and robbery were inevitable in their travels. The slave trade, as Silva Corrêa saw it, was crippled in Angola by the vicious circle of Portuguese poverty. 9

In 1825 another account of the trade added perspective to the decadence portrayed by Silva Corrêa. The British traveler, Commander William Owen, visited Luanda in 1825 and wrote that the usual export of from 18,000 to 20,000 Africans a year had decreased lately. He was told by the irate merchants on the coast that the supply had considerably decreased on account of the severe losses incurred by the merchants from the dishonesty of their black agents in the country, who had fallen into the practice of converting to their own use the goods furnished to them by their principals for the purchase of slaves. 10

8 Silva Corrêa, História, II, pp. 61-65.
9 Ibid., I, pp. 30-35.
10 William Owen, Narrative of Voyages... (London, 1832, 2 vols.), I, pp. 277-78.
Clearly the trade began to fall off at least at Luanda, long before the abolition decree of 1836 issued at Lisbon. For the events in Brazil, due to British pressure, were equally important in causing a depression in Luanda. Other causes were quickly discerned by the Governor of Angola.

Brazilians were no longer under the authority of Portuguese navigation laws after 1822 and often refused to call at Luanda unless necessary. They frequented ports immediately to the north of Luanda and added their number to British, French, and American merchants avoiding the Portuguese customs at ports to the south. A Portuguese fort had been built at the mouth of the Logé River, at Ambriz in 1792 to guard against the foreigners' trade near Luanda, but it had been destroyed by order of Queen Maria I under pressure from the English.\footnote{A.H.U., 23 February 1825, letter cited above; Sá da Bandeira, \textit{Factos e Considerações}, pp. 10-15.} Portuguese merchants continually complained that Luanda's business was ruined by the lack of government control to the north.

Noting the Brazilian exodus to the northern part of the coast, the Governor of Angola proposed to Lisbon that Portugal should occupy Ambriz town and kill two birds with one stone. By capturing a well-known slaving depot, the Portuguese would gratify the British authorities on the coast, and at the same time gain the control
of trade and relieve Luanda of the pressure of foreign trade in ivory and slaves. In this document of 1825 began a new phase of the long conflict for the control of the coast north of Luanda; Britain and Portugal would disagree over the solution until the settlement at Berlin in 1884-1885.12

Nothing came of the proposal of the Governor of Angola, since Portugal was far too occupied in home affairs, and since her power had been considerably weakened by the independence of Brazil and the wars in Europe.13

For several decades after the separation of Brazil and Portugal, Brazilian capital and traders dominated business in Angola. In 1830 there was only one Portuguese merchant of any importance in Angola who had a branch firm in Portugal; all the other major business leaders were Brazilian.14 Indeed, Brazil well into the 19th century, despite a profusion of Portuguese laws, took up all the navigation and trade of Angola, so that by the late 18th century, Luanda imported from Rio de Janeiro more goods than any single

12In effect, Britain had replaced France as the power most concerned with the extension of free trade on the coast north of Luanda. France had opposed the extension of Portuguese occupation in the 18th century in this area between Ambriz and Gabon, and now Britain would continue to oppose Portuguese occupation in the 19th century.

13Pinheiro Chagas, As Colónias, pp. 45-47.

14Das Neves, Considerações, pp. 239-240.
city of Brazil.\textsuperscript{15} Angola was in fact "a colony of Brazil."\textsuperscript{16}

The threat of a Brazilian invasion did not materialize.\textsuperscript{17} Angola remained safe for the time being from outside aggression, but native and white discontent was growing. Rumors of the eventual abolition of the slave trade brought a violent reaction from Negroes and whites alike; with many Brazilians still in Angola, new ideas of independence circulated. The army in Angola was reinforced and governors-general called for more help; as usual the climate played its deadly role in reducing the European elements of the militias. African sobas feared the end of slave trade and began to protest. They remained reluctant to believe that the traditional traffic was ending. Thus a crescendo of discontent arose in the interior. By 1830, however, many African chiefs close to Portuguese posts knew that the British vessels had made export of slaves very difficult. Governor Castellobranco wrote in that year that certain sobas felt the King of Portugal, or maniputo as they called him, wished to punish the


\textsuperscript{17}A.H.U., Angola, Caixa 73, 1829-30, Letter, 26 August 1829, Gov. Gen. Abreu e Castelbranco to Lisbon asked for a Portuguese vessel of war to remain to guard Luanda, fearing an attack of Brazilian vessels.
Africans and was cutting down the trade in return for "the violences and robberies they [the Africans] had done to the whites, yet that the trade would shortly increase again." Caravans entered Luanda but were often obliged to return to the sertão with few goods.

Yet the general trade continued while trade at certain well-patrolled places, like the capital Luanda, was periodically reduced. Only after 1844 did the general slave trade decline significantly. In 1839, for example, one report said that some 39 slavers called in the port of Luanda alone. Since British vessels often re-victualled at Luanda, the majority of Brazilian slavers avoided that port as a point of slave embarkation, and concentrated further to the north toward the Congo River. Smaller ports to the south were also used for slave embarkation for Brazil.

On December 10, 1836, the Portuguese Government published a royal decree abolishing all slave trade in Portuguese vessels in her African possessions. As stated above, the trade in certain localities had declined since 1825; but the decree of 1836 put the official stamp of royal approval upon the abolition movement led by Great Britain. Protests from all quarters in Angola and


20 Pinheiro Chagas, As Colónias, pp. 58-60.
Mozambique, and even from Lisbon, were fully expected. In Africa the trade did not receive its death blow from the decree of 1836. For as late as 1844, about two-thirds of the annual revenue of Angola still derived from the traditional slave trade duties imposed at ports. Yet by 1847, the trade and its revenue were virtually finished as the economic basis of the budget.

Portugal feared the effects of the 1836 decree. Native reactions proved very dangerous in certain areas of Angola. From 1830-1834 rebellions broke out in southern Angola, near Benguela and the Government was obliged to reinforce garrisons in the area besides building stronger fortifications around the town of Benguela. The basis of the native agitation was a reaction against the curtailment of the slave trade.

Portuguese statesmen negotiated with Britain in order to obtain certain guarantees of aid in case of a general insurrection in Angola and Mozambique. In 1838 there was a short term agreement, to last only a few years, whereby Britain promised to aid Portugal if the abolition of slave trade in Africa caused such a revolt among the whites as well as among the Africans.

21 Iliádio Amaral, Povoamento Branco de Angola (Lisbon, 1960), p. 15.
23 Documentos Oficiais Relativos à Negociação do Tratado entre Portugal e a Gran Bretanha Para a Supressão do Trafico da Escravatura (Lisbon, 1839, Imprensa Nacional).
Already the Governors of Angola had warned that to publish the 1836 decree in the interior of Angola would have been foolish until the discontent leveled off.

The next step in the abolition campaign was to declare that the slave trade in Portuguese vessels would be considered piracy at sea and penalized accordingly. The Ministry of Palmerston in 1838 pressured Portugal to incorporate the piracy penalty in the 1836 slave trade decree. Yet this measure had to wait four years until the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of July, 1842. Besides instituting the piracy penalty, the treaty provided for the establishment of a Mixed Commission and Court of Arbitration for the slave trade in Angola. The Court sat at Luanda and consisted of six officials in three categories of Commissioner, Arbitrator and Secretary; there was a British and Portuguese member for each office. The Court judged vessels captured by the Anti-Slave Trade Squadrons and there was no appeal when the vessel was judged a slaver. Slaves captured on board vessels were declared free and were liberated under the charge of the Junta de Superintendencia dos Negros Libertos.24

When Sá da Bandeira was in power he pledged himself to expand Portuguese control in Angola as well as end the slave trade. However, slave trade interests

24 Pinheiro Chagas, As Colónias, p. 85; Francisco Travassos Valdez, Six Years of a Traveller's Life in Western Africa (2 vols., London, 1861, Hurst and Blackett), II, p. 114.
in Portugal were powerful. Many argued the end of slave trade would cause the loss of the colonies. Sá da Bandeira proceeded cautiously, yet in 1838 ordered the annexation and occupation of the ports of Ambriz, Cabinda, São João Baptista de Ajudá (Dahomey), and a few others. 25

From 1843 onwards, British and Portuguese Commissioners sat at Luanda and examined cases. The traffic near Luanda had received its death blow. But from 1843 to 1865 official government correspondence from Luanda to Lisbon indicates that slave export continued on a small scale, especially from the Congo mouth and from small ports close to Benguela. Brazilian vessels flying United States flags were often the culprits. 26 Portuguese expansion became a reality in this period. The British naval officers on the western coast were fully aware, that the Portuguese were expanding their control, but, if so, many remained skeptical and incredulous. Throughout the years 1845-1860, when the Congo or "north question" reached a crisis, British authorities underestimated Portuguese efforts and achievements in expansion.

In 1838 a Portuguese expedition "vassalized" and annexed to Angola the district of Duque de Bragança,

25 Pinheiro Chagas, As Colónias, p. 86.

about 50 miles east of Ambaca. This additional district was the first significant expansion since the exploratory moves of the Baron of Mossamedes in 1783-86, south of Benguela. Also in 1838 a company for the exploitation of petroleum east of Luanda was founded, but it quickly collapsed after its head, the Swiss Doctor Lang, succumbed to the climate. An expedition to the Bay of Mossamedes sent by Governor Noronha in 1839 found Portuguese traders along the shore bartering with natives, and in the next year a small settlement was founded. Lt. João Francisco Garcia explored the plateau behind Mossamedes, building the foundations for the settlements of Huila, Jau, Bumbo, Gambos, and Humbe, which were receiving small numbers of settlers by 1845-46. By 1845, Mossamedes had a garrison of 50 "praças" and 70 settlers to boast of, and in the next year began a small exportation of dried fish. In 1849 the Governor-General visited Mossamedes and found a small but rugged colony, beginning to spread out into the interior, and complaining of native attacks.

In 1849, Mossamedes was made a "vila" by decree, and showed signs of importance partly because of the privileges granted to colonists willing to settle there. Colonists were given free passage, often from Brazil,

29 Felner, Ibid., p. 23.
free lands, material for building homes, food for six
months, no taxes for ten years and libertos or slaves,
provided by the Government. Mossamedes was called
the "African Sintra" for its more healthy climate.
Nevertheless, the first decades in Mossamedes were full
of hardship due to constant native attacks upon the town. The
first year of the settlement seemed plagued with mis-
fortune, yet perhaps not altogether without humor.
Lieutenant João Garcia left Benguela in a merchant vessel
to definitely establish the town, but the vessel was
apprehended by an English cruiser at sea, and captured
upon suspicion of being a slaver. The British hauled
the ship to Sierra Leone, but were kind enough to dis-
embark the chagrined Garcia on the way at Benguela.
Eventually Garcia accomplished his mission in the cor-
vette Israel Maria, and Mossamedes was off to a delayed
but determined start.

In 1844 the ports of Luanda and Benguela were
opened to the trade of all nations. But differential
customs duties in these ports discouraged foreign
vessels from calling often. Customs on foreign imports
ranged from 6% to 25% depending upon conditions. Foreigners

31 Ibid., I, pp. 25-30. Sintra, noted for its cool
climate, is about 20 miles northwest of Lisbon, Portugal.
32 Ibid., I, p. 10.
complained of these oppressive duties, and in 1860 the diplomat Charles Vogel called for reform:

The greatest obstacle to the development of the relations of the colony Angola with foreign ports, is the system of differential customs.... One cannot help applaud the idea of a very desirable reform, in the interest of the colony itself. 33

B. Slavery and Portuguese Control

In the period following the decree of 1836, there were two serious rebellions in Portuguese-controlled territory. One uprising in Dembos district, not far from Luanda, was further evidence of the traditional hostility of that region toward Portuguese rule. The other revolt, to the south near Benguela, took a more original but equally serious form.

In 1841 a Prince of Congo, Dom Aleixo de Agua Rosada, a member of the dynastic line accepted and favored by the Portuguese administration, raised revolt among the Dembos people by persuading them to disobey the Chefe of the region, and to refuse payment of the dizimo. Dom Aleixo was captured by an expedition, imprisoned in Luanda, and ordered to exile in the Cape Verde or Sao Tome islands. Yet he remained in prison in Luanda until about 1856, and died a few years after

33 Vogel, Le Portugal et Ses Colonies, p. 555.
Perhaps a more serious threat to Portuguese power, originating in native discontent over the approaching end of the slave trade, occurred in the rebellion of the brothers Ferreira Gomes. In 1835 a Benguela Negro, Ferreira Gomes was sent to prison in Lisbon for rebellion. Later he returned and joined two other Negroes, with his brother, one mulatto, and a white in killing a white woman in 1845, burning Portuguese factories, and murdering a merchant. There was a plan to gather loyal Negroes near Catumbella, march to Benguela, and drive out the Europeans. This surge of racial hatred included the murder of natives who refused to take a part. The Portuguese effectively crushed the rebellion.35

According to documents from the Government of Benguela, now published, the Benguela area in the years 1830 to 1846 was more endangered by native unrest than the regions to the north.36 Except for the Bailundo peoples, who by 1860 had a reputation as important recruits in guerra preta armies fighting north of the

34Castelbranco, História, pp. 195-96; A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 8, No. 371D, 3 October 1845, Gov. Gen.; Valdez, Six Years, II, p. 100. Valdez visited Luanda in 1852 and noted that in the Fortress of Penedo there was a "dungeon with five secret cells, in one of which an African prince was incarcerated." This was probably an allusion to Prince Aleixo.


Guanza River, the other peoples of the southern districts were virtually non-recruitable for the Portuguese system. One significant reason for Portuguese weakness in Benguela district after the 1830's was the fact that militia garrisons had been withdrawn or disbanded upon the triumph of the liberal regime in Portugal. 37 In fact, Portuguese fighting strength was greater in Bihe in 1790 or 1800 than it was in 1840. 38

With a dwindling of forces, and a tradition of using the omnipresent degredados for all services in Angola, these exiled men were recruited by Governor Vidal. He felt degredados were as useful as the empacaceiros, negro auxiliaries in 2nd or 3rd line army units. Usually included in levies of guerra preta from friendly sobas, some 20,000 of these soldiers were in theory the reserve of the provincial army. 39 They were useful for porterage, message-sending, recapturing deserters, policing and regular fighting. As the Governor-Generaloptimistically wrote:

37 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela (Lisbon, 1940), p. 110.

38 Henrique Galvão and Carlos Selvagem, O Império Ultramarino Português, III, pp. 97-100. Lopes de Lima noted, Ensaio, III, p. 53, that in Bihe in 1834 some four companies of militia existed, in 1845 only one officer with no military force behind him.

...they have been of very great use in our
d pokemon six of the Negroes of the Sertao; it
is a type of Militia, who earn a little
something when employed, and who blindly
obey the authority of the Governor. 40

A native raid upon Ambaca presidio in 1837 by
forces of Soba Quilange Quissane began a Portuguese
pacification campaign that ended in expansion of control.
This soba had been nominally a "vassal" but rebelled
hoping to find the Portuguese weak. Quite the contrary,
in early 1838 an expedition with several thousand guerra
preta was recruited and marched with artillery to Ambaca
to punish the rebels. This army was ordered to "extend
rule as much as possible on that side of the Portuguese
dominions."41

More important to officials in Luanda at the time,
however, was the issue of abolition of the traffic.
Governor Vidal noted with alarm stirrings of revolt at
Cambambe and Muxima on the Cuanza, traditional entrepots
of a slave trade route from eastern Angola. Agents from
Luanda, sent by white merchants were spreading the nearly
incredible news that the slave trade would be ended. A
"revolutionary spirit" was in the air.

Agents of the City and friends of the insurgents, never cease to work, but I will do
all I can to suppress this revolutionary spirit. As I said to you already, there
will be no result if Your Excellency pub-
lishes the Law of Slavery in its entirety.

40 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2, No. 433, Feb. 24,
1838, Gov. Gen.

41 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2, No. 433, Feb. 24,
1838, Gov. Gen.
since one cannot end this Trade with mere papers. I greatly fear the moment may come when Portugal may lose all this portion of her Dominions for it is at least necessary to send funds to deal with expenses here. 42

In spite of the uproar over the trade, a new presidio had been added to the list in eastern Angola, and Duque de Braganza became the fortress furthest inland in 1838. Pungo Andongo had held the dubious honor up to the pacification of Soba Quilange. This hapless soba was made to sign a treaty or "Act of Vassalage" with Luanda. It is worthwhile listing in detail the stipulations of this treaty. 1) To swear vassalage and obedience to the Queen of Portugal, Maria II, [1834-1853], to defend the Portuguese from enemy peoples in wartime, and to fly the flag openly. 2) To pay the royal tax on all houses and cattle. 3) To receive kindly all missionaries and to aid Portuguese officers. 4) To capture or drive away all deserter soldiers and escaped slaves who cannot show passports or documents. 5) To contribute to the state porterage service (o serviço de Carregadores), for trade, royal public works, and iron mines. 6) To aid and respect Portuguese traders and help them with porters. 7) "It shall henceforth be the custom for all native sobas, either conquered or who voluntarily come to do homage and vassalize themselves, to be branded with the Royal Mark on the left breast so their people

will respect them, obey and recognize them as vassals of Her Portuguese Majesty."43

This treaty of vassalage in 1838 may serve as a standard model, with few variations, which was used in regions where the Portuguese had more bargaining power and control. Such extensive demands rarely were complied with, however.

The Treaty of 1842 had established on paper the Mixed Commission or Prize Court at Luanda, but in fact it was officially established by decree only by September 14, 1844.44 In spite of the energetic Governor Da Cunha (1845-48), slave trade continued from ports in southern Angola such as Novo Redondo, Quicumbo, Bay of Farta, Egito and further south. Yet even more important than slave trade matters was the issue of Portuguese sovereignty in the territory north of 8 degrees south latitude. As shown above, the question was first officially recognized by the Portuguese in 1825 with an allusion to a possible occupation of Ambriz. Trade was increasing in that district and British competition was stronger than ever before. Later, in 1846, the questions of slave trade came to confuse the issue of free trade on the coast. This will be the subject of Section 4D of this chapter.

43 Mensário Administrativo, 1948, No. 7 (Luanda), "Tratado de Vassalagem de 1838 de Angola."

44 Castelbranco, História, pp. 196-7.
C. In the Interests of Revenue

Silva Corrêa wrote that trade was gradually expanding the rule of the Portuguese in Angola. By this he did not necessarily mean formal administration or even military control. Much "expansion" in the sertão, given the trading nature of the Portuguese population, was informal and produced modifications in the native society but rarely absorbed very many natives into European society. The concelhos (councils) at Golungo Alto, Cazengo, and Ambaca, by reason of their proximity to the largest concentration of Portuguese in the territory at Luanda, were affected by European customs. A chefe of the presidio at Cazengo in 1847 noted changes over a decade among the natives in his area:

Already one sees today many civilized blacks who speak Portuguese, are dressed and shod, and who know, however poorly, how to read and to write; however, there is still not one who deserves the name of settler. The best class of people are the pretos de tanga (blacks with cloth). 45

In Cazengo the dizimo tax was paid in currency, not fazenda (trade cloth), and natives took advantage of status as "whites" to avoid such duties of the "native" status as labor, porterage, and army service. This chefe in Cazengo recommended combating the influence of the sobas by sending in Portuguese priests to organize freguesias (parish districts).

Ambaca became known as the home of the negro auxiliary, or *empacaceiro*. In the 17th century, the Portuguese brought a number of Ambaca *sobas* into the vassalage system, distributed land areas and appointed officers in the *guerra preta*, called *quilambas*. By the 19th century, however, only four major *quilambas* remained in Ambaca. Certain chiefs sent men to hunt game for the Portuguese settlers. These hunters, seeking the Angolan buffalo, or *empaca*, later were named the *empacaceiros*, and their descendants served as auxiliaries in *guerra preta*. In 1847 the officer at Ambaca wrote that relatives of these servicemen were avoiding military service by bribing the captain-majores. Others avoided service by "putting on shoes," as whites, and hence claimed exemption. 46 Most *empacaceiros* were *forros*, or freemen with some small subsidy from their employer. If Lopes de Lima's estimate was correct, in Angola at this time the ratio of slaves to freemen was about 12 to 40. 47

46 Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, II, Aug. 1860, Ambaca report of 15 February 1848 by Oliveira Chaves. An estimate of 1855 taken from Lopes de Lima's earlier estimate, noted that Ambaca *presidio* contained more *sobas* vassalized in the Portuguese system than any other single area in Angola. The society of Ambaca experienced a great deal of European influence which probably tended to multiply petty chieftaincies. Out of 340 vassal *sobas* listed north of the Cuanza, some 130 were in Ambaca. See José de Aldama Ayala, *Compensio Geografico-Estatistico de Portugal y sus Posesiones Ultramarinas*. (Madrid, 1855), pp. 450-51.

Rum was imported into Angola from Brazil perhaps as early as the 17th century. Silva Correa noted the effect upon the population.\textsuperscript{48} Governor Pedro da Cunha in 1846 commented that alcoholism was prevalent in Portuguese territory.\textsuperscript{49} The effect of alcohol is far more visibly defined in our conquests, than in those of the surrounding sertões, where one observes in the stature and vigor of men a certain evidence that this poison there is rarer and more expensive.... The manufacture of rum, which will occur in this Colony, is very prejudicial to the well-being and morality of these populations, and, as a result, such an industry does not merit the protection of the Government.... Otherwise who will be able to rule this people or obtain from it any worthwhile service?

Unfortunately the good intentions of Da Cunha were not executed completely in his time, nor in the time of his successors. For rum importation and rum manufacture, first in northern Angola and later in Mossamedes district, continued and increased in the 19th century.\textsuperscript{50}

As shown above, \textit{dízimo} collection at various times had caused rebellions among the natives. The Dembão rising of 1841-44, led at first by Dom Aleixo of Agua Rosada, was sparked when the Portuguese told the Dembos they had to register on the regular \textit{dízimo}

\textsuperscript{48}Silva Corrêa, \textit{História}, II, p. 40. See also the quotation at the beginning of Chapter II of the dissertation.


\textsuperscript{50}Felner, \textit{Angola}, I, pp. 55-97. Malheiro, Alex., \textit{Crónicas}, pp. 84, 160.
list, with so many houses per district, and pay currency or trade goods instead of an annual tribute of slaves.\(^51\)

Taxation was increasing in the later 1830's and 1840's, due partly to the abolition of slave trade. The Government needed more revenue, and direct taxation on vassalized districts provided one source. Too often extortions and trouble originated in an official selling positions as tax collector to natives and then letting the natives go from village to village collecting in his district.\(^52\)

The administration at Luanda realized that this tax extortion occurred in places like Pungo Andongo. For in the early 17th century, laws were passed preventing whites, pardos, and negros calçados from passing beyond presidios to trade in the bush. By 1720, however, this law was abolished and the aviados, or agents, pushed inland and established fairs far to the east and abandoned old fairs near Portuguese settlements.\(^53\) Lopes de Lima in 1845 believed the old law needed reinstatement in order to avoid trouble with native powers.\(^53\)


\(^{52}\) Annaes Marítimos e Coloniaes, (Serie 6, No. 4, for 1846), Parte Nao Official, "Memoria Sobre o Presidio de Pungo Andongo" by Fracisco de Salles Ferreira, pp. 105-119.

\(^{53}\) Lopes de Lima, Ensaio, III, pp. 63-64. "Calçado" means wears shoes.
But trade was such a powerful impulse, and was so quickly transferred to the natives, that merchants and their agents were likely to appear anywhere in Central Africa. Salles Ferreira, as chefe of Pungo Andongo, about 1838-40, observed and encouraged the expansion of military control in his region toward the east. He recommended expeditions to Quissama and Libolo, south of the Cuanza and hoped to achieve a line of communication with Cacunda presidio, which he described as "very populous and abundant in ivory." In 1841 Salles Ferreira "vassalized," he says, some fourteen sobas in the Pungo Andongo region with 200 auxiliaries and one artillery piece. He proposed opening direct communications with the Kazembe, through Lunda, and with the lands of Lovar or Lobale, today in the area of Mexico and Barotseland. This would not be so difficult as thought at Luanda, since sertanejos with all their "oppressive actions," had long traded in this section east of the Cuango River. Shortly afterwards, Joaquim Rodrigues Graça reached Lunda kingdom on a trade mission for the Portuguese Government. Although nothing was formally decided in terms of a trade treaty, individual traders consistently visited these areas.

Benguela was separated from Luanda by 300 miles. Travel and communication between the two governments

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were safer and more certain by sea, since the land route passed through independent sobados south of the Cuanza. In the early 1840's Benguela was prospering from a new ivory and wax route which reached to the upper Zambesi. This trade route became more regular when many black agents from Benguela and Bihe merchants traveled to the east. Long before officials arrived to administrate a place, traders were there establishing new channels. Jean Douville, a French traveler in Angola in 1827-29 observed factories in the Bay of Mossamedes, over a decade before the establishment of a town or official settlement.55

Even unlikely events influenced the direction of trade. For in 1839, at Luanda the Governor received a letter sent from Kazembe by Captain Monteiro and Gamitto in 1832. New trade relations were begun with Lunda partly as a result of the passage of this letter into Angola.56

But trade was more than obsession in a vacuum. It spread like a disease to the native population. Trade dominated the mentality of the Portuguese, whether

55 See Jean Douville, Voyage au Congo et Dans L'Intérieur de L'Afrique Équinoxiale (Paris, 1832, 3 vols.).

it was in slaves or in any legitimate commodity, until all other considerations seemed unimportant. The native population soon became plus royale que le roi and outbid the European. Those convicts who were dumped in Angola caught the bug as well as other colonists.

The Portuguese colonist was plastic, humanitarian, and at the same time, fond of native civilization; but, with this tendency, he was also the scourge of the black population for the sake of trade. 57

A modern historian of Angola thus described the colonist who would "go native" and change his dress and speech in order to obtain a better trading advantage over an opponent in the bush. Later in the 19th century, reformers of Angola, as Henrique de Carvalho, pointed to this trait as most unfortunate. 58

Silva Porto was such a trader. Nevertheless, his energy and ambition for Portuguese expansion must place him several marks above the ordinary sertanejo. He was born in Oporto, Portugal, in 1817 and emigrated to Angola; he died in Bihé in 1890. His entire adult life was spent in trade and travel. Settling at Bihé about 1842, with a base at Benguela, he sent agents into Central Africa. But by 1845 slaves were no longer accepted as payment for debts at Benguela by order of Governor Da Cunha. Many traders lost fortunes as a

58 Carvalho, EthnographiaesHistória Tradicional dos Povos da Lunda (Lisbon, 1890), p. 49.
result and accumulations of slaves were sold back into
the interior in this period.59

With the enforcement of the 1836 decree, and
the energetic administration of Pedro de Cunha (1845-48),
a shift of emphasis was inevitable in Benguela. Traders
still obtained slaves but sold them in interior markets,
in exchange for ivory, wax and other valuable goods.
Slaves were brought down from the plateau after 1845 to
work on plantations, which were increasing in number,
in Benguela and Mossamedes districts. These fazendas,
as they were generally known in southern Angola, or
arimos in northern Angola, clustered along the river
valleys upon the litoral. Major stations and trade
entrepots between Benguela and Mossamedes included tiny
forts at Caconda, Huila, and Quilengues. Black slave
agents or pombeiros traveled from these points into the
eastern bush districts for ivory. Few if any Europeans
or "assimilated" natives traveled there. As for the
tradition of mixing the races, Lopes de Lima wrote that
this policy was "necessary in those dominions" because
of the sheer numbers of the natives.60

59 Silva Porto, Viagens e apontamentos de um
Portuense em Africa, I, pp. 304-309, ms. in B.M.P.P.,
Codice 1235. The term sertanejo means one who lives in
the interior of Angola, and usually applied to European
traders. For an excellent study of trade in 19th century
central Angola see Gladwyn Childs, Umbundu Kinship and
Character (London, Oxford University Press, 1949),

60 Lopes de Lima, Ensaio, III, pp. 49-53.
In the period, 1842-45 a regular trade route between Bihe and Luanda was discontinued. Several factors were responsible for this. First there was the growth in importance of the Benguela market. Secondly, abolition of slave trade at Luanda made payment for Luanda merchandise more difficult. Thirdly, because Benguela merchants were deeply in debt to large trading houses in Luanda, as that of Dona Joaquina dos Santos Silva. Journeys to Luanda were longer and more expensive than a straighter route to Benguela by way of Bailundo. Later in 1854 David Livingstone observed that the Bihe to Luanda route was still used for trade, however.

To illustrate the powerful character of certain Luanda merchants, it is useful to cite the case of Dona Anna Joaquina dos Santos Silva, mentioned above by Silva Porto. This wealthy lady was also known as the "Baroness of Bungo," or in the interior, as "Dembo Ualala." During the period of 1840 to about 1855, her agents and enterprises were spread over much of Angola. In about 1846 or 1847 Dona Anna was a trade partner of Joaquim Graca, the explorer of Lunda, and apparently had a hand in preventing Graca's passing beyond Lunda to cross Africa.

61 Silva Porto, Viagens e apontamentos, XI, April 5, 1885, pp. 53-61.
63 Valdez, Six Years, II, p. 175.
In late 1850, it was noted Dona Anna possessed a large fishing and trading factory at Mossamedes. Later in 1852 Valdez noted she had established a sugar manufacturing project in the Bengo region. It seems Dona Anna was every bit as influential as the Brazilian merchant, Francisco Antonio Flores, who will appear later in Chapter IV.

In spite of native revolts, lack of European population, an empty treasury and the abolition of slave trade, by 1845 Angola was gradually changing. The administration of Pedro Da Cunha marks a dividing line. For he convinced at least a section of the merchants in Angola that the Atlantic slave trade was over. With Da Cunha began a series of fairly active Governors-General, who visited the interior of the territory, and attempted some measure of central control. In 1850, while passing through Alto Dande district (see map), Governor Silveira Pinto observed some prospering farms along the Dande. Along the way, Pinto had interviews with tribes and held some hearings. Like the proverbial district officer, described in later English accounts, this Portuguese Governor sat at native courts

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65 Valdez, Six Years, II, p. 277.

and decided some litigation. 67

Lisbon read with interest the volume of Lopes de Lima on Angola. The writer put forth three major conclusions which applied in his time, and which would be true in later decades. The revenue of Angola, he proved, was not less than it had been during the slave trade era before 1836, as writers were wont to assert. Moreover Angola had always been "a feedbag" to enrich a few men to the detriment of the nation. And lastly, Portugal must pay her colonial officials better, for Angola could triple her revenue if well-administered. The military and naval expense in the budget was far too great. 68 His conclusions were correct. Angola in 1845 had new opportunities to expand, but good administration was far more necessary and urgent. With limited means, and a tradition of poor administration, the territory could expand only at the expense of development. Yet if expansion obtained greater revenue, administration could wait. The resolution of this dilemma in the next few decades was a key problem for the Portuguese, and one which was often made more difficult by British activity along the coasts of western Africa.


D. Mr. Palmerston Makes a Policy

The question of Portuguese claims to the western coast lay dormant during the first four decades of the century. When the issue was reopened, the mainsprings of dispute were the slave-trade and Portuguese expansion. Treaties made in 1815 and 1817 were considered at the time of signing to be consistent with the known occupation of Portuguese territory. Yet by 1846 when the question of Britain's recognition of Portuguese claims arose over an incident in the anti-slave campaign, the so-called "Additional Convention of 1817" bore special significance for Portuguese claims.

It is worthwhile quoting the relevant sections of this treaty:


(English version)

Art. II. The territories in which the traffic in slaves continues to be permitted under the Treaty of the 22nd January, 1815, to the subjects of His Most Faithful Majesty, are the following:

Portuguese Possessions ... and upon the western coast, all that which is situated from the 8th to the 18th degree of south latitude.

Portuguese Claims. Molembo and Cabinda.

2. Those territories on the coast of Africa to the south of the Equator, over which His Most

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Faithful Majesty has declared that he has retained his rights, namely—
The territories of Molembo and Cabinda upon the eastern [should be western] coast of Africa, from 5°12' to 8° south latitude. 70

The Portuguese claimed this set of clauses was tantamount to British recognition of her claims to the Congo. Britain maintained this was not true, but it is clear that when the Portuguese came to assert rights of expansion in Angola, the ambiguous nature of clause 2 invited disagreement and controversy.

In 1838 Sá da Bandeira ordered the reoccupation of places on the coast north of Luanda, and therefore the reassertion of de facto Portuguese sovereignty in those regions. In the years 1838-1846 interior stations in the north and south were taken. Next in line was the region of the coast at Ambriz and north. Portuguese vessels cruised north of Luanda searching for slavers along with the vessels of the British squadron; the trade to be had in ports near the Congo mouth was increasing and Portuguese reports emphasized the need to take action.71

Lopes de Lima took up a campaign in Portugal to assert new sovereignty over the Congo region in 1845.  

70 This mistake was rectified in 1819 by mutual agreement.

71 See A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2, No. 798, Relatório, 1838 of Governor Noronha to Lisbon. The Ministry of Overseas in 1838 ordered a reconnaissance of the Congo mouth, and construction of a fortress on the northern bank in order to use the river as a highway to the interior.
In an article in a daily of Lisbon, upon the occasion of the visit to Lisbon of a young Prince of Congo, this writer claimed Portugal owned the coast from the mouth of the Congo to Cape Negro (see map). Moreover, he tried to prove that the King of Congo was a vassal of the King of Portugal. By discovery, conquest and "outright grant" from native powers, he added, Portugal had rights to move again into the Congo. The reward for ruling the Congo would be:

the advantage of a commercial monopoly, which all the Protectionist Nations have a right to maintain in countries dependent upon them, as well as Patronage.  

Other writers supported Lopes de Lima in 1845. A re-assertion of control of the northern region would help the economy of Angola. In an article of December of this same year, the writer deplored the abandonment of Ambriz after 1792 since now foreigners were trading so well close to Luanda. Ambriz should have a fort and, of course, a customs house. Naturally the current Minister for the Navy and Overseas, Joaquim Falcão came under direct fire for supposedly doing nothing about all this. 

Yet in fact Falcão did do something about it. For at that very moment in Lisbon was young Prince

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72 Diário de Lisboa, 25 November, 1845; 31 October, 1845.

73 Revolução de Setembro, 31 December, 1845; O Patriota of Lisbon, No. 737 of 1845; A Revolução, 7 November 1845.
Nicolas, son of King Henry II of Congo (1842-1857). Nicolas had been brought to Portugal to "visit" Queen Maria II and get some education at the expense and urging of Falcao's Ministry. Although this act of Falcao's was later severely criticized by a former official of Angola as a waste of state funds, it is clear the visit of Prince Nicolas marked the initiation of a new policy of direct action in the Congo.74

The British reaction to Portuguese moves to take up an occupation policy at Ambriz and further north was very much the same reaction as that of 1792 when English pressure prevented occupation of the small fort on the river Loge. But several new factors entered the situation. Trade at Ambriz increased in importance after the 1830's and a number of influential British houses were established there. The next factor was the slave trade. Portuguese and Brazilians leagued together to export slaves despite British surveillance. A table of African slaves imported by Brazil indicates the continuing

74 See the work of J. Carvalho de Menezes, Memoria ... (Rio de Janeiro, 1848). This work was banned in Portugal, and had to be printed in Brazil because of the criticism and libel against certain persons contained in its pages. Menezes lambasted Falcao and criticized several officials in Angola for atrocities against the Africans.
trade and the date of abolition. 75

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>1840</th>
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<td>1848</td>
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<td>1843</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1844</td>
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<td>1845</td>
<td>19,453</td>
<td>1851</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of these slaves originated in Angola and Congo.

Lord Palmerston believed Portugal was an important ally and base to use strategically in international affairs. Before 1830, he was new in dealing with Portugal and far more sympathetic.

Why, Sir, do what we will, there is a fatality which draws us, like the moth into the candle, to entangle ourselves in the internal affairs of Portugal; and so it must be, for no man can deny that England is deeply interested in the tranquility and happiness of Portugal. 76

But by 1838, having failed to make Portugal declare slave-trade piracy in her own vessels, and hearing of continual Portuguese slaving, he changed his tune. And in 1839 he obtained from Parliament an act to allow, unilaterally, British cruisers to search and seize suspected or known slavers with the flag of Portugal. The Tories opposed this Whig act, but remarked significantly for the time: that neither Palmerston nor his colleagues were "quite accountable for his actions where


the Black Man was concerned."77 Portugal protested and asked for guarantees of her African territories from possible revolts following the abolition. No treaty in Portugal was possible, for political reasons until 1842, on July 28 when the long-awaited agreement was signed, declaring slave-trade in Portuguese vessels piracy, and opening opportunities for British merchants to invest and work in Angola.78

The issue of the slave-trade, however, was as much a political issue for the Portuguese as it was a humanitarian issue for the British. For the ghost of Captain Owen lingered on in the official mind of the Governors at Luanda. As Governor Noronha wrote in 1838, the traffic was no longer feasible

...without exposing those Provinces to the insults of the English cruisers, and giving them pretexts for negotiating directly with the neighboring Potentates of the Coast, as Commodore Owen did then in 1825 (if I remember correctly) in the Bay of Marques [Delagoa Bay], thus endangering and making precarious in law, and scorning the fact of Portuguese sovereignty in those Regions, since the Treaty made by the Commodore is a tacit (if not express) recognition of the independence of the Soba of that Bay, who had always considered himself a vassal of the Portuguese Crown. 79

If the issue on the western coast at Congo and Angola had been simply that of slave-trade, or even free trade,

77 Bell, Lord Palmerston, I, p. 234.
78 Pinheiro Chagas, As Colónias, pp. 82-86.
the Portuguese would not have been so anxious to expand their occupation and formal control north of 8 degrees. But British naval officers created such suspicion and ill-will among Portuguese officials that the administration at Luanda fear a serious loss of territory. Perhaps they thought Angola might become "another Brazil", and be "emancipated" by British aid.

Within the Portuguese sphere of influence upon the eastern coast at Mozambique, British activity also fomented great disputes over territory. What began with Captain William Owen, reached a peak in the 1860's, and was decided in arbitration by Marshall MacMahon of France in 1875 in favor of the Portuguese claim. Yet until the 1870's when international arbitration became more feasible for African territorial disputes, the Portuguese believed Britain would take all she wanted. In Angola, the mounting fear of direct British intervention or annexation often became an obsession.

As shown above, Governor-General Da Cunha tried to the best of his ability to enforce the Treaty of 1842. It was during his conscientious administration that the British policy toward Portuguese coastal claims became clearly defined. Fittingly this occurred under the


81 Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 76.
aegis of the magnificent chauvinist Palmerston. The entire affair was triggered when a Portuguese cruiser, doing its duty, captured a Brazilian slaver north of Ambriz.

In 1846 the Brazilian brig, *Boa União* ("Good Union") was captured at 7 degrees 36 minutes, close to shore by a cruiser. Condemned by the Portuguese Commissioners at Luanda for slaving, this vessel was declared to have been captured in waters of Portuguese territory. This decision implied, therefore, that Portugal owned the territory between 8 degrees and 5 degrees 12 minutes. British Commissioners at Luanda, however, protested this decision, saying they would have delivered the same verdict as to the guilt of the slaver, but that enforcement of Portuguese sovereignty in this territory (where established British merchants had houses) would prejudice free trade there; and besides this formal occupation

...would interfere with the intercourse between British merchants and the natives, who at present carry on their trade without payment of any duties to the Portuguese Government. 82

Palmerston soon learned of the incident and felt that if the decision went unnoticed Portugal might move in and occupy the area. In reviewing the matter, he had to admit that Portugal was finally fulfilling

82 *Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, Africa, 1883, "Correspondence,"* pp. 10-11.
her Treaty obligations. But now this seemed immaterial, for an even more important issue was at stake in his mind. "In the interests of commerce," was the phrase he used to convey to the Portuguese his decision that Britain henceforth did not recognize as Portuguese territory, this area north of 8 degrees and that the natives of that section were considered to be independent not Portuguese. This policy was outlined in a note of October, 1846, but later on November 30, 1846, Palmerston wrote personally to Baron Moncorvo, Portuguese Minister in London, relaying the same information. (See Appendix II for the verbatim text of this letter).

Palmerston's motivation is clear but his legal basis was less than respectable. Free trade, of course, was his cardinal principle. Merchants were protected and encouraged by British policy on the coast for the essential weapons were "Diplomats with gunboats in the offing." Extending British influence and power in empire, however, was often more "informal" than

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83 For opinions that Portugal was honestly pursuing anti-slave trade obligations, see Wilbur D. Jones, "The Origins and Passage of Lord Aberdeen's Act," (1845). Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII, 1962, No. 4, pp. 502-520.

84 See also P.R.O., F.0. 63/114, Nov. 30, 1846, Palmerston to Moncorvo.

formal, as shown recently by modern historians. "Free Trade" was not merely a principle of liberal economics, it was in fact a weapon. Few nations felt the edge of it more than the Portuguese in Angola. In the case of this territorial dispute with Britain and Portugal, free trade put the issue of slave-trade into shadow. For the future, the high-blown humanitarian statements of men about the Congo included denunciations of Portugal. They argued that Portugal was a slaver and a severe protectionist nation and was incapable of "effective occupation" on the Congo coasts.

How ironic it was that Portugal wished to make good a pledge of "effectual occupation" in 1846, but was told that free trade for British vested interests was more important than slave trade abolition. Indeed, 1846 was a turning point in the relations between Britain and Portugal. As British power waxed, Portuguese power waned in Europe and in Africa. More important for the study of Portuguese expansion in Angola, this bit of British bullying and double-dealing had such a decided effect upon the external policy of the administration at Luanda that other aggravating factors were rendered less important. Luanda increasingly paid more attention to the question of the north coast. Instead of discouraging Portuguese expansion along the coast, the

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British complicated Portuguese policy and made the unattainable all the more desirable. The interior was less important partly as a result of the policy of Palmerston begun in 1846 and carried on, with few exceptions, until the late 1870's. British colonial thinkers forgot that the reason Portugal did not occupy Ambriz years before 1855, or other areas, was partly because of naval threats.

British authorities had a realistic view, however, of the Portuguese power to expand. They knew of the material weakness of Angola and of the rationale behind the proposed occupation of Ambriz. But forgotten were the occupations and establishments of Mossamedes district from 1840 to 1850, and the pushing eastward of the frontier toward the Cuango valley. A Consul wrote in 1851:

Thus it is that they can hardly keep what they have much less make new establishments; if, however, Ambriz is not occupied, Victor Hugo's language ceci tuera cela may be applied to Loanda. An expedition must come from Lisbon, but the results will well pay the expenses.... If the war of Cassange represented ivory and wax, and consequently, abundance and wealth, in the market, the occupation of Ambriz means increases of public revenue. 87

The reasons could not have been better expressed by the Governor-General himself. Ambriz became a question of national honor to the Portuguese. Just as the Brazilians

87 P.R.O., F.O., 63/1112, Brand to F.O. 1851, (See Chapter IV for the "Cassange War"), enclosed in No. 15, Pakenham to Palmerston, 18 Oct. 1851.
made a question of honor British slave trade legislation, so the Portuguese took up the battle against the prosperous free traders. Ambriz might well have become a casus belli between Britain and Portugal, in spite of the traditions of the "Oldest Alliance."  

Palmerston's government was committed to a policy of non-recognition of Portuguese claims to the coast including the mouth of the Congo. In effect, the vague clause of the Treaty of 1817, which recognized the Portuguese had a claim to the coast, was unilaterally nullified by the British note of 1846. Thus 1846 was a vital year for Angola and for the shape of the future territory. In this year began the situation and the clear issue which eventually lead to the Berlin West African Conference. Portugal had a fair legal case throughout this entire dispute with Britain, but the decisive factor was not legality of argument, but power and prosperity. Portugal possessed none of the prerequisites for international influence, and hence was rather helpless.


90 *Accounts and Papers, Africa, 1883*, Vol. XLVIII, "Correspondence," Andrade Corvo to Lord Derby, 1875-76, pp. 66-71. Corvo noted the year 1846 as a crucial turning point in the claims dispute.
Yet that helplessness was relative to the situation. For on the coasts of Angola, the Portuguese had considerable influence. In the long run, the British underestimated Portuguese staying power and activity. The pace of Portuguese activity in Angola definitely took a more active turn after 1845 in exploration, pacification, trade, and occupation. On the other hand, the Portuguese for their part tended to overestimate British pretensions to ownership of territory in Africa. Out of a reaction of fear, the Portuguese favored the "forbidden coast," kept out of their reach by Palmerston, and paid less attention to other possible areas of expansion.

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91 In 1845 the Government began printing a weekly official gazette containing news, official announcements, and some private articles. This was the Boletim Official do Governo Geral de Angola, which is to this day printed in Luanda. Mozambique was behind Angola, and began her gazette in 1854. See A. X. da Silva Pereira, O Jornalismo Portuguez (Lisbon, 1896). The appearance of these gazettes marks a general upswing of European activity.
A. One More Challenge

The Portuguese in Angola had received a challenge from Palmerston's decision to oppose occupation by refusing to recognize Portugal's rights to the territory between 5°12' and 8° south latitude. The stakes were essentially the same as they were in the 18th century: control of the trade along the coast to the north and south of the Congo. Palmerston felt confident in view of reports on the situation in Portugal and in Angola that Portugal had neither the power nor the justification to expand.

Events in Portugal cast a shadow upon Portuguese effort in Africa at the end of 1846. Spain was threatening, and a revolution in Oporto had been mercilessly crushed by the Queen Maria II. British observers in Lisbon considered the country had reached a low point.

The country found itself without commerce, without arts, without agriculture, without authority, without property, without peace, without order, without means, without credit, shedding its own blood, losing lives, piling upon itself a number of misfortunes, and without the facility to get out of the dilemma whose duration even more increased those calamities. 1

Early in 1847, the Portuguese monarchy fell once more into the bad graces of English humanitarians in connection with Angola. Prisoners, captured at the battle of Torres Vedras of 1846, were deported to Angola without charges or a jury trial. The British charge in Lisbon, Mr. Southern, appealed in vain for the amnesty of some 40 political prisoners, including Former Overseas Minister, the Count of Bomfim.\(^2\)

To a contemporary, it must have seemed unlikely that Portuguese forces would be able to extend their rule deeper into Angola. British observers on the spot were skeptical of plans for expansion.\(^3\) Among the Portuguese themselves, Governor-General Silveira Pinto in 1850 wrote that certain tribes in the interior were superior to the Portuguese troops in marksmanship. Expansion to the south seemed to be languishing. In a visit to the newly-created "Vila" of Mossamedes in July 1849, Pinto found the garrison in "complete abandon, and without form or discipline."\(^4\) Portuguese prestige everywhere seemed low.

There was a slight surge in the slave trade from Angola during 1849 to 1850. Slaves were exported from several ports to the south of Luanda, such as Novo

\(^2\)Ibid., III, pp. 235-37.
\(^3\)P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, letter Consul Brand to F.O., 1851.
Redondo, Quiçombo, Lobito, Bahia Farta, and some even south of Mossamedes. In January 1850 a Brazilian slaver was captured at Quiçombo, where there was a Portuguese resident official. British officers again warned the Governor-General to keep his word and enforce the Treaty of 1842. A last peak of Brazilian demand helped this surge, but by 1852 the Brazilian traffic was virtually finished.5

British cruisers did not always stick to the rules themselves. At this period it was quite common for the Portuguese merchants to transport domestic slaves by sea from Luanda to Benguela or Mossamedes, since overland travel through Quissama country was out of the question.6 Overzealous British officers often captured and summarily confiscated these legally owned domestic slaves not meant for trans-Atlantic export. The Portuguese protested often to little avail. Legitimate plantation activity in southern Angola was thus hampered by British activity.7

Some of the slaves freed during this surge of traffic were slightly unlikely candidates for export

5Rodrigues, África e Brasil, pp. 162-64.
6George Tams, Visita às Possessões Portuguesas... (Porto, 1850), II, pp. 53-54.
slaves. One report from an officer noted the Luanda origin of the captured slaves.

We found many of the slaves on board her speaking the Portuguese language, who stated that they had been household slaves at Luanda.\(^8\)

Only a sporadic trade with Cuba continued after 1852. In 1853 the Governor-General reported that negreiros (slave-traders) had agencies in both Europe and in America. In that year some Lisbon merchants sent the brig Rosa to ports south of Benguela in order to ship slaves to Havana.

British cruisers, with some Portuguese aid, could not patrol the coast of Angola and effectively end the trade, and in the end, it was the termination of Brazilian demand that brought the humanitarian dream. David Livingstone in his visit to Luanda in 1854 remarked that the British cruisers had done the job,\(^9\) but in fact, if the Brazilians had not legally ended the importation in 1850, after much pressure and British captures within Brazilian territorial waters, a steady trade would have continued. Portuguese leaders tended to agree that the demand had to be squelched. Sá da Bandeira in his Factos e Considerações (1855) and the Governor-General of Angola believed the British cruisers were, in fact, helpless against the thrust of Brazilian enterprise. As

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\(^8\) See Note 3, Ibid.

Governor Silveira Pinto wrote to Lisbon in January 1850:

The complete extinction of the traffic will take place, in my opinion, when Brazil does not allow its importation. 10

By 1855, when Sá da Bandeira wrote his short tract, the export trade went mainly to Cuba and Porto Rico. This statesman felt Britain should have spent more on "making sure Spain completely extinguishes those same markets" than on coastal squadrons.11 Nevertheless, the trade from the coast of Angola continued sporadically into the 1860's and perhaps later. Monteiro claimed that the last shipments of slaves took place in 1861-63 south of Benguela at Bahia Farta for Cuba or "the Brazils."

At this time there was such a great demand for domestic slaves for the cotton plantations at Benguela and Mossamedes that only a small portion of the slaves were shipped. The "last shipments," Monteiro felt, reached Cuba in vain since the Spanish authorities were then in full cooperation with the British.12

Evidence in archives of Lisbon indicates a certain amount of official complicity with the slave trade. Although the Governor Generals were rarely involved, certain lesser officials' activities nearly caused scandal in the 1860's. Examination of the papers of


11Sá Da Bandeira, Factos e Considerações, p. 36.

a deceased Portuguese merchant at Ambriz revealed in 1863 that Major Joaquim Olavo Gamboa, former Governor of Ambriz had taken part in slave-trading. Apparently the matter was quietly shelved before it reached final consideration by the Overseas Council of Lisbon. In some cases, however, it seems the accusation of slave-trading against an official in Angola at mid-19th century was a sign not of his guilt but that he had bitter enemies. The Viscount Pinheiro, Governor-General of Angola in 1854, submitted a report dated August 10, 1854, to the Overseas Council and denied categorically the slander found in several journals in Lisbon. This Governor-General had been exonerated of such accusations by a petition of Luanda citizens, with some 3868 signatures. Pinheiro's plight, and his very short term of office in 1854, were typical of the dilemma of the average Governor-General of Angola: no matter what the situation, his reputation and his length of service were often given short shrift. Personal feuds dominated administrative cares as much as the lack of means to execute well-intentioned plans.

After a decrease in the trade about 1854, there was a definite increase in 1857. British officers on the coast noted the increase, reasserted their refusal

13 A.H.U., Conselho Ultramarino, Pasta for 1863.

14 A.H.U., Conselho Ultramarino, 1854, Relatório, Visconde do Pinheiro, No. 704. Pinheiro was Governor until June 19, 1854.
to allow Portuguese occupation of north of the River Loge, and lamented the deteriorated relations between Britain and Portugal. Slave-trading continued along the lower Congo, where Portuguese factories were involved. Vessels with American flags cruised the coast, and the Governor of Angola in a letter of 1857 to Lisbon noted: "One could say that the flag of that nation is the only one protecting such a vile traffic." Yet more startling than American slave-trading in 1857 was that of the French from Gabon colony. Along the Congo coast French slavers, some of them steamers, collected negroes near the mouth of the Congo with the consent of the French authorities in Africa. Portuguese correspondence about this spate of French activity in 1857 clearly condemned the practice but with mixed motives.

Governor Amaral in Luanda wrote that the French called this slaving, the collection of "contract labor" for French colonies, and said the Negroes were to be liberated after a "certain number of years" of, as he termed it, "forced labor." Besides abusing the Portuguese attempts to end the trade in Angola, the French were also

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defying Portuguese claims of sovereignty to the disputed section of coast. However, the French had not formally come out against these claims as had the British. Upon every instance of French slaving near the Congo in 1857 and at other times, the Portuguese reintroduced the question of sovereignty and rule north of Ambriz. After occupying Ambriz in 1855, the Governor-General of Angola had orders to use every measure short of "permanent occupation" to gain control of the coast to the north.18

B. The Overseas Council and Administration

The Government-General of Angola replaced the old Captaincy-General in 1836 and was put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for the Navy and Overseas. Among other changes made in the Portuguese Regeneração (Regeneration) Movement beginning in 1851 was the re-establishment under Sá da Bandeira of the Conselho Ultramarino which began in 1640 and was discontinued in 1834. Receiving an annual stipend from the Monarchy, this Council consisted of a President, six members (Vogais), and a secretary. It met regularly in Lisbon. Members were chosen from a cadre of high officials with previous service overseas, such as former governors-general.

The Council's function was to study the needs and administration of the colonies and suggest reforms. A monthly journal, containing official and non-official material, was published as the Boletim e Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino.¹⁹

This decision-making body worked closely with the Ministry for Navy and Overseas, and, especially during the most active phase of expansion in Angola, 1851-1861, the members' opinions were instrumental in making such decisions as the occupation and annexation of Ambriz in 1855. By 1868, however, when the title of that body was changed to the Junta Consultiva, its power had decreased and more executive decisions were made within the Ministry itself.²⁰

The Governor-General usually was chosen from the armed forces. Angola was, in fact, two overseas provinces of Angola and Benguela in one during much of the era before 1869 when Angola was officially made a "united province" in a decree of administrative centralization. Although there were alterations at different periods in territorial divisions, for our purposes it is useful to consider that Angola from 1855 to 1885 was

¹⁹Vogel, Le Portugal, pp. 537-548.

²⁰Information obtained from the staff of the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon, and by personal research. By 1864 it seems the Conselho Ultramarino was very weak in power, and a newspaper editorial assailed it for impotence, adding that the King and Ministers were not consulting it. Jornal do Commercio, 1 February 1865.
composed of five main districts: Ambriz, Luanda, Golongo Alto, Benguela, and Mossamedes. In 1885 the Congo district was created. Within each district were various presidios, concelhos, (councils), vilas (towns), etc. Each district was headed by a governor, and a secretary, advised by a Council, all subordinate to the Governor-General residing at Luanda.

Administration before 1836 was largely in the hands of one military official, the Captain-General. An Auditor-General (Ouvidor Geral) was appointed by Lisbon to check that official’s powers, but only rivalry and dispute resulted. Revolts against the Captain-General, especially during the 18th century, were often the result of tyrannies and rivalries.

In 1836 the liberal regime in Portugal established a Cabinet or Conselho do Governo to check the powers of the Governor-General. This cabinet was made up of all the high officials in Angola, usually with two elected members from the settlers. Two other important ruling bodies were the Junta da Justiça (Board of Justice) and the Junta da Fazenda (Treasury or Exchequer). Unfortunately the powers of each group were poorly defined in law. Further disagreement and dispute resulted.\footnote{Vogel, 
{Le Portugal}, pp. 549-551.}

Above all, the administration was military in character. All officials were either army or navy
officers. Districts were organized along military lines and the Governor-General was commander of all armed forces. Under him was the Commander of the Naval Station at Luanda. The Governor-General was bothered with far too many insignificant details and duties which otherwise should have been done by Secretaries. His immediate subordinate was the Secretary-General. 22 After 1836 the Governor had no power in judicial matters as before. And one result was a great rivalry between the different judges with the Governor taking one side or the other. 23

Piles of dusty petitions, letters, and voluminous reports in Lisbon archives attest to the energy, time, and thought consumed in the fire of personal invective and dispute within the Luanda administration. Disunity seemed to be rife among officials on all levels, and certainly the climate, poor pay, and generally adverse conditions added to the already highly sensitive natures of the administrators. At times it seemed all the Portuguese were their own worst enemies. The administration lacked not only honesty but also cohesion and self-respect. Petty argument and intrigue too often

22 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 37, Nos. 15, 198, 1867-68, Gov. Gen. Governors-General were obliged to attend to masses of petitions for pardons or reprieve from degredados. Pasta 38, No. 270, 27 July 1870, Gov. Gen.

23 Valdez, Six Years, II, p. 117.
obscured good ideas for reform and improvement.24

O. The Occupation of Ambriz and Its Consequences

Ambriz had been the apple of the eye of Portuguese expansion plans for over two decades in the century before it was taken in May 1855. The small port was an important strategic point close to Luanda, the capital and heart of the province, and was also the entrepot of a very flourishing trade, as yet untouched by the Portuguese customs system. Merchants of Luanda, officials, and colonial thinkers in Portugal were united in their assertion that Ambriz had to be captured to end the mockery of Portuguese control that was practiced by the foreign merchants, especially British and American, only a few miles from Luanda.25

The note of Palmerston complicated the conflicts of the coast in late 1846. For the first time, the British stated that the suppression of the slave trade was not the only cardinal point of their policy; the other, and equally vital point, was the maintenance of free trade with the coastal peoples of Africa. Sporadically, British authorities moved near Ambriz to end the trade. For example, in 1848 and 1849, Ambriz was raided

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24 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 32, No. 267, 1874, letter of Presidente da Relação (Court) complaining of another judge; Pasta 37, see bundles for 1868, Pasta 45, No. 252, Pasta 32, No. 190.

and several slave baracoons were razed. But the fact remained, British merchants there remained, with the trade in slaves and copper ore continuing around them if not in their own hands.

By 1846 Ambriz was known as a key place of trade. Great cargoes of ivory, wax, and gum, and even copper ore crudely mined by natives, came down to Ambriz from the interior. Most of the caravans by-passed Portuguese stations to the northeast of Luanda. The plans of the Governor-General of Angola in 1825 to take Ambriz were based partly on the need to tap the trade from the interior to the coast north of Luanda. Native traders, learning of the prices offered by Brazilians, Americans, British, and Dutch avoided Luanda and sold their goods in Ambriz without paying any duties. Copper ore was mined by natives in the hills of Bembe some one hundred miles east of Ambriz, and was carried by porters to the coast. Goods sold or exchanged in Ambriz, as hardware, arms, and luxuries were distributed sub rosa to Portuguese settlements, including Luanda. Portuguese authorities watched this contraband trade with experienced

26 Sa da Bandeira, Factos e Considerações, p. 27.

27 Ibid., p. 35; A.H.U., Angola, Pastas for 1846-55; Roger T. Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the Nineteenth Century (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962), pp. 21-23. In the 1840's a number of Liverpool firms moved into Ambriz, attracted by the trade and possibility of exploitation of copper deposits at Bembe, northeast of Ambriz. Gradually a British scheme to work the mines was developed.
eyes and realized Ambriz was the distributing point to be eliminated in the program for the renovation of Angola's economy.

There were Cortes debates on the issue during 1852-53, and the debate over Ambriz reached a fever-pitch in the 1850's. British arguments were stated in private diplomatic correspondence with the Portuguese but the Portuguese wrote articles in the newspapers of Lisbon, in the Boletim Oficial do Governo Geral de Angola, in diplomatic correspondence and in pamphlets translated into several languages from Portuguese. In the year of the occupation of Ambriz, 1855, two important pamphlets on the subject appeared in Lisbon. The Marquis of Sá da Bandeira wrote his Factos e Considerações and the Viscount of Santarem, an historical researcher living in Paris, had his Demonstração dos Direitos Que Tem a Coroa de Portugal published in Lisbon the same year (see bibliography for full titles) by the National Press.

In the formal statements by the Portuguese, Ambriz was claimed for two main reasons: one, that it was a center of slave trade and had to be cleaned out, and two, that it was not a secure place for trade nor a place of "free and unrestricted intercourse," quoting 28 P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, Slave Trade No. 15, Pakenham to Palmerston, 18 October 1851. Enclosure of a Portuguese journal, Revolução.
the exact wording of the Palmerston note of November 30, 1846. Sa da Bandeira effectively argued that the "independent Africans at Ambriz forced European traders to pay heavy tribute or taxes, that anarchy prevailed there, and that there was little personal or property security for Portuguese or British alike. 29

According to Sa da Bandeira and others, in 1855 there were eleven factories at Ambriz. Of these eleven, some six were Portuguese, two English, two American, and one French. He claimed that the Portuguese owned the most important factory, with the Americans in second place. The American Commercial Agent at Luanda, John G. Willis, wrote that the Portuguese were correct in blaming disorder at Ambriz upon the African "king" in 1855; Willis feared for American lives and property upon the Portuguese occupation, but his official instructions kept him to a strictly neutral policy and he made no protest to the Angolan authorities. 30

The British authorities, however, beginning about 1843 opposed the Portuguese plan to occupy Ambriz. Correspondence from that date to 1855 stressed the desire to keep free trade, which, in effect, meant British paramountcy over inferior Portuguese trading goods. British diplomacy was steadfast in upholding their traders' supremacy north of

29 Sa da Bandeira, Factos e Consideracoes, pp. 46-47.

Luanda and claimed that the tribes living between 5°12' and 8° south latitude were "in reality independent" and not Portuguese at all. Also, they claimed that the Portuguese ancient rights of discovery and conquest in intervening centuries had lapsed.\(^3\)

Besides using words, British leaders used naval power to back up their policy. The activities of Captain Wilmot in 1853 and 1854 sufficiently frightened the Portuguese into seeing the British policy's strength, but, on the other hand, as was true in the entire history of the Portuguese expansion in Angola, this foreign threat actually encouraged rather than discouraged expansion of control. Captain Wilmot, in effect, provided the necessary last push to motivate Portuguese occupation of Ambriz and other places in Angola.

In 1853 Wilmot as commander of the H.M.S. Harlequin, cruised the coasts of Cabinda and Ambriz signing anti-slave trade treaties with the native powers. In February 1854 Wilmot succeeded in getting the "x" signatures of chiefs at the port of Porto Rico, Cabinda. Sá da Bandeira and others claimed Portuguese rights had been infringed upon by Wilmot and others like him, but that these Cabinda chiefs later sent a statement of Portuguese loyalty to Luanda in 1854.\(^3\)

\(^3\)P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, Foreign Office to Count Lavradio, Portuguese Ambassador, 26 November 1853.

\(^3\)Sá da Bandeira, Factos e Considerações, p. 33.
Marquis also used material from the Parliamentary papers to show that in 1854 slaving flourished in spite of the energetic if dangerous Wilmot.33

Wilmot's treaties were composed in such a way so as to insure that the signing chief or chiefs were independent leaders, not owing allegiance to the Portuguese. These clauses in the treaties provided the disagreement between the two nations. Moreover, the Portuguese ambassador in London, the tenacious Count Lavradio, was continually claiming territory and protesting the sending of arms and powder by British merchants in the trade with the western coast of Africa. Ambriz was an important point for the exchange of powder and guns to the natives, without a doubt, and all European national traders knew that such hardware fetched good ivory and copper ore. Moreover, as Lavradio wrote, Portuguese "national honor" was at stake.34

Wilmot's treaty-signing and cruising infuriated the Portuguese, and reminiscent of the fear caused by Captain Owen in the 1820's, his bold actions urged them to take positive action. Vessels in early 1854 were sent north to Cabinda and Ambriz, the council of

33 Ibid., p. 35.

Government, including the Governor-General of Angola, sat more frequently in Luanda, and in Lisbon by December, 1854, the order for the occupation of Ambriz had been issued to the Governor. The Overseas Council sat and decided Ambriz would be taken by a military expedition. A further spur to Portuguese action was the fact that Britain had entered the Crimean War in March, 1854.35

Sá da Bandeira and Santarém argued that the Additional Convention of 1817 recognized their present claim. Moreover, Portuguese claims for Ambriz and the coast to 5012' south latitude were based on five main points. 1) Priority of discovery, 2) possession for centuries, 3) introduction of civilization by conversion of the native peoples of that coast, 4) conquest by arms of many areas, 5) chiefs' recognition that they and their successors were and are "Feudatories and Tributaries of the Portuguese Crown." The Viscount of Santarém reflected the feeling among Portuguese that there was a general conspiracy of foreigners against Portuguese power overseas,36 and he based his important argument on the production of the treaty of vassalage signed by the Marquis of Mossul, a Mussorongo chief, in 1792, trying to prove that this native leader owned

35P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, No. 4, 23 March 1853, Consul Brand in Luanda to William Smith at Lisbon; Letter, Foreign Office to Pakenham, 6 April 1855, predicted the occupation of Ambriz.

36Santarém, Demonstração, p. 3, 24.
Ambriz and region, and his subjugation in 1792 signified Portuguese right to occupy it in 1855.  

The major reason for the Portuguese occupation of Ambriz was almost entirely practical and economic. Although slave trade did take place there, the Portuguese purpose was less humanitarian than economic. The capture of Ambriz was to bring new revenue to the increasingly expensive administration and expansion after the occupation of Mossamedes, Huila, other southern stations and the drive in the east which ended at Cassange fair in 1850.

In 1854 Major Salles Ferreira, the conqueror of Cassange, reported on journeys he made northeast of Luanda. He urged the Government in December, 1854, to capture Ambriz in order to better control the region around the presidio of Encoge. Roads had to be controlled, he felt, and a new fort was needed which was situated close to Encoge; new roads had to be built from Ambriz into Dembos country. Ferreira found that the Dembo or Soba Namboangongo was not the vassal of Portugal he appeared to be on paper, but was a chief who taxed his villages heavily and who used the excuse the taxes were for the King of Portugal. But he then paid Luanda

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37 Ibid., pp. 36-40 for this "Termo de undamento, sujeicao, e vassalagem."
only one slave per year. Salles Ferreira urged expansion to the north, and revealed that Namboangongo's town "has many roads to Ambriz where goods of trade are carried from dealing in the ports of the North." Later the Portuguese applied the knowledge learned from this officer in their occupation of Bembe. They hoped this way to cut off the contraband trade from the north. It was reported in 1861 that there was at least one military post in Dembos country, but it is not clear exactly where.

In early May, 1855, Governor-General Amaral found a ready excuse to finally occupy Ambriz. The "King of Ambriz" had been terrorizing European traders and paralyzing trade in the town with taxes and violence; moreover, this paramount chief refused to become a Portuguese vassal and submit. On May 15, 1855, a small Portuguese force, at first mainly naval personnel, led by the Governor-General himself, landed at Ambriz. Fighting broke out after a larger Portuguese force arrived on vessels from Luanda, but Ambriz quickly fell to the Governor. The "King of Ambriz" fled to the bush, and by June 1855 the Portuguese were in control of

38 This same region during March, 1961, was the first scene of African rebellion against Portuguese rule in Angola. See Hélio Felgas, Guerra em Angola (Lisbon, 1961), pp. 25-34.

outlying villages. At this small port, supposedly protected by British cruisers, slave baracoons were found to contain over 150 slaves ready for embarkation.40

Perhaps the Portuguese expected stiff British resistance to this de facto occupation after decades of disagreement over the place. Immediately upon annexation the Portuguese declared that customs duties would be waived for at least one year in Ambriz. According to one report, British merchants at Ambriz were involved in the slave trade by having

... received hard cash in Spanish gold, at a profit of 2-300% for the goods of pious Manchester and Liverpool, with which almost every one of the thousands of slaves shipped were bought. 41

This revelation weakened the British case a good deal. British authorities concluded that not only necessity moved the Portuguese to take Ambriz. Portuguese pamphlets and articles justified the occupation and tried to allay British fears of oppressive customs duties. There was "great concern" but little actual intention to use naval force and strike back. Britain warned Portugal that Ambriz could not remain Portuguese as of August, 1855. Sir Richard Pakenham in Lisbon learned from the Foreign Office that a vessel of war would be sent to

40 Castelbranco, História de Angola, p. 244; Valdez, Six Years, II, p. 93.
41 Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo (1875), II, pp. 184-85.
Ambriz to protect British interests. 42

British officers on the coast in 1851 scoffed at the possibility of Portuguese expansion. Yet Ambriz was occupied, and Britain did nothing directly to hinder further Portuguese expansion in the interior. In 1856 Lord Clarendon reiterated Palmerston's policy and declared that any occupation north of Ambriz would be opposed by British naval forces. 43 This policy stymied the Portuguese for decades until a new set of circumstances changed the situation and brought Britain and Portugal closer together.

In 1857 an alfandega, or customs house, was erected at Ambriz. With this act, the fears of the foreign merchants were confirmed. But the Portuguese were true to their word and did not apply duties during the "free year" from May 26, 1855, until May 26, 1856. On June 4, 1857, the Marquis of Sá da Bandeira decided that the English merchandise entering Ambriz would pay 6% ad valorem duty. 44

42 P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, F.O. to Pakenham, 29 August 1855; Ward to Clarendon, "Slave Trade, No. 12," 8 August 1855; Clarendon to Pakenham, 17 August, 1855.

43 P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, Clarendon to Moncorvo, 12 October 1856.

The occupation of Ambriz was but the first step in a plan to expand northwards that lasted about six years to 1860. In the first month of his administration, Governor Amaral proposed occupying the Congo and Cabinda regions as part of a new program for "strong Government" in Luanda and Angola. Amaral later claimed that the Mussorongos or "pirates" were constantly raiding shipping in the Congo river. That proposal to take the Congo mouth was really a long frustrated desire of the Portuguese, and was based upon legitimate reasons. Governor Amaral reflected the ideas of Sa da Bandeira when he wrote to Lisbon in 1857:

An occupation of the Zaire[Congo] is called for because of the security of trade. Is not this alone sufficient to justify it, independent of the question of sovereignty? That area also is the focus of slaving businesses which still flourish. This is another reason for such an occupation. 46

Ambriz was a beach-head for future military operations in the Congo region. Within four years of its taking, Ambriz was the supply depot for Portuguese expeditions to new stations at Quiballa, Bembe, and the capital of the Old Congo Kingdom, Sao Salvador. Roads were built from the coast into the interior, and copper mines near Bembe received steam engines for exploitation. The ore that was mined was exported


through the port of Ambriz. Ambriz became a logical development of a policy begun in 1845 to reassert new authority over the Congo.47

A fortress was constructed at Ambriz for protection against African hostility. Although the Governor said it was the foreigners who stirred the Africans to revolt, it is clear that Portuguese expansion in itself created trouble. Thus after March, 1857, a "grave insurrection" broke out east of Ambriz, and north of the river Logé. The Governor advocated building more forts to the north not only for security's sake but for "vigilance against the clandestine introduction of merchandise."48

New revenue was the goal of the expansion. Yet military lines were over-extended, and positions were exposed to new dangers. Portuguese policy had been to "let sleeping dogs lie" except when it was absolutely necessary to take action in the field. With so few reliable troops, with new fortresses to be maintained in the north and south, a military campaign would be disastrous for the system of security for Europeans. Native powers were supposed to fear Portuguese power, but if the Portuguese sustained a defeat, it was likely

47 1845 marked the visit of Prince Nicolas of Congo to Lisbon.

to be a disastrous blow to the military security. As Livingstone wrote, about his observations in eastern Angola in 1855:

The negro character in these parts, and in Angola, is essentially cowardly, except when influenced by success. A partial triumph over any body of men would induce the whole country to rise in arms, and this is the chief danger to be feared. 49

Enterprises undertaken north of Luanda beginning in 1855 committed Portuguese power to new risks. Within five years, Angola was involved in the most serious war of mid-19th century. Leaders who wanted the trade of the northern coast and the Congo tended to forget that expansion of Portuguese control in eastern and southern Angola had also created serious new burdens for the public revenue.

D. The Drive for Control and Revenue, 1857-1861

In the eastern region of Angola, Portuguese traders and their agents had for centuries traveled to the Cuango River and sometimes east of it, in the quest for slaves and ivory. Beginning in the 17th century, the fair of Cassange by mid-19th century was the eastern terminus of the most important regular trade route in northern and central Angola. The major routes north of the Cuanza were from Luanda to Golungo Alto, Golungo Alto to Malange, and from Malange to Cassange. Less important

routes included those from Luanda to Ambaca, and to Pungo Andongo. The haul of ivory, wax, and other goods from Cassange to Luanda, and to Golungo Alto required the greatest number of porters, or carregadores. In the month of June 1860 alone, according to Government statistics, some 5,037 porters carried on the route from Luanda to Golungo Alto.\textsuperscript{50}

By the 1840's Cassange was the trading place of several dozen Portuguese merchants. Later in 1859, after Cassange was formally "pacified" and made part of "the Province of Angola," experts on Angola believed that until the traders of Cassange could be guaranteed better transportation, and security for their trade goods coming to Luanda, the entire balance of finances in Angola would be upset. A road from Luanda to Cassange could be financed by Portugal through the institution of a toll-road tax.\textsuperscript{51} The importance of Cassange and its contribution to the economy of Angola can be studied in the attention given the problem by Dr. David Livingstone in his series of articles written in 1854 while recovering from his journeys in Luanda.\textsuperscript{52} Livingstone, in the third part of these "Apontamentos" for the Boletim Official (Angola), 1860, Sept. 1.

\textsuperscript{50} Jornal do Commercio, 26 August 1859, p. 1, "Angola."

\textsuperscript{51} Jornal do Commercio, 26 August 1859, p. 1, "Angola."

made several key suggestions for improvement of Angola's economy: 1) the use of animal transport instead of negro porters, 2) concentration of Angolan enterprise in agriculture and mining, 3) the building of a carriage road, and in the future a railroad from Luanda to Cassange. Livingstone had passed through Lunda on his way through Cassange to Luanda, and he realized the size of the trade dominated by the Mbangala peoples acting as middle-men between the Lunda and the Portuguese settlements.

If this road was built and extended in the direction of Matiamvo, it would be the best means of stopping the robberies of the neighboring tribes, who keep the commerce of the country to themselves. I speak of Matiamvo, because according to what I hear, he is the most powerful Chief in that direction, and if the Government can be assured of his cooperation, it would be easy to put my proposal into effect. If it would be announced that the road belongs to the Muene puto (Portuguese), making it known that since the road is free for all, it would be considered a great crime to trouble any person travelling on it. This would be followed by some examples of punishments for crimes, and would give a basis for that scheme, making it permanent.53

Livingstone himself had considerable trouble in passing freely between Luanda and Lunda in 1854-55, and this in itself indicated the insecurity of the country, and the tenuous position of the Portuguese at Cassange even after the punitive expedition of 1850.

53 Ibid., p. 36.
In the late 1840's, Portuguese merchants at Cassange met increasing hostility in their dealings. After several Europeans were killed by native forays in 1850, the Government sent a military expedition under Francisco de Salles Ferreira, "conquered" the town and area of Cassange fair. African leaders aided Portuguese forces in this expedition. The soba, Dembo Caboco Camilho, D. Francisco André Fernandes Torres, from the Cambambe region, aided with his forces in the conquest of Duque de Bragança in 1838, and in the expedition to Cassange in 1850. Named a "General of Guerra Preta" by the King of Portugal, he also lent support for the occupations of Ambriz and Bembe. Dembo Caboco Camilho died in 1860 after a long life of service within the system of Portuguese vassalage.54

The fair at Cassange originated when the Portuguese began to travel there for trade in ivory which came from Lunda to the east. The "Jagas," or Mbangalas, permitted the Portuguese to establish a fair at Cassange, but rarely were they allowed to pass beyond the Quango River to reach Lunda. After two Portuguese merchants were murdered in 1850, and the ex-Jaga, or soba, "Bumba" rebelled against the Portuguese, a regular expedition moved eastward to insure this vital life-line of trade.

54 Boletim Official, Angola, No. 778, 1 September 1860, p. 5. This Dembo is said to have been born in 1784, the son of a sargeant of Guerra Preta, in 1828, he was made Dembo Caboco Camilho on the death of his father.
for Angola. Apparently, the road to Lunda beyond the Cuango, even after 1850's conquest, remained dangerous and largely unknown. Salles Ferreira referred to the way to Lunda as "the hidden road." 55

Portuguese striking power was at least nominally extended eastward to Cassange in 1850, but actual occupation or military garrisoning were not possible for that isolated and unhealthy place. 56 Livingstone noted there was a settlement of Portuguese traders, mainly half-caste Ambacases, east of Cassange, at Cabango on the Chihombo River, a dwelling place of one of Matiamvo's subordinate chiefs. This village consisted in 1855 of about two hundred huts and "ten or twelve square houses ... the latter are occupied by half-caste Portuguese from Ambaca, agents of the Cassange traders." 57 Cabango was placed at 9°31' south latitude and longitude, 20°31' east. These Ambaca traders had an arrangement, albeit an informal one, with Matiamvo in order to reside so near to Lunda. The fact of their residence in the country east of the Cuango denotes some improvement of Portuguese influence and power in eastern Angola over


56 Livingstone, Missionary Travels, 1858 edition, p. 473.

57 Ibid., p. 493. He noted Cabango was part of Lunda kingdom of Matiamvo, situated about 132 miles east of the capital. May, 1855.
the situation in the 18th century. A century before a Portuguese expedition had been turned back at the Cuango by the Mbangala forces.58

Livingstone noted that Cassange valley, east of the Talla-mugongo range, was rather unhealthy for Europeans. Yet the area was not so unhealthy that the Ambacas, or Ambakistas, did not frequent the trade routes across the Cuango River. The explorer found the town of Ambaca poor and nearly deserted in 1854, but the Africans of the town ranged far to the east and south for ivory and wax.59

The Portuguese had long questioned the wisdom of giving rapacious traders permission to travel deep into the eastern region past their settlements. Laws regulating penetration into the sertão had been created and forgotten, but in 1855 Livingstone noted a continual trend in policy with regard to the east.

... no European resides beyond the Quango; indeed it is contrary to the policy of the government of Angola to allow their subjects to penetrate further into the interior. 60

Cassange fair was the frontier post of the territory of Angola. In times of war and crisis Portuguese merchants had no security since Cassange was never a

59Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 426, 476.
60Ibid., p. 473.
presidio or military post. There was a resident chefe at Cassange after 1850, but apparently the dizimo tax taken at Talla-mugongo post was not collected at Cassange, since this town doesn't appear on the tax lists of 1858. The Mabangala waged war on the Portuguese in the region from 1859 to 1863 and afterwards official Portuguese representation at Cassange was withdrawn until about 1882. The policy and conflicts which shook the rest of Angola at mid-century, unsettled Cassange and the surrounding peoples. A long and costly war was the result. In spite of this war, trading proceeded in eastern Angola and there is record of at least one large trading expedition which in 1862 reached well east of Cassange to perhaps Lunda. Returning with some 850 pombeiros, seven European Portuguese and two Brazilian traders brought from Lunda a lot of ivory and wax. Although most of Cassange country was in rebellion, the Chefe at Malange could report this large expeditions' arrival from journeys east of the Cuango after a march of 41 days. The motto of "business as usual" was true to the commercial-military character of the European settlements. The penetration of this 1862 expedition


indicates Portuguese influence in Central Africa but cannot prove territorial ambition.

If penetration of Portuguese influence to the east was primarily for purposes of gaining more trade for the major settlements of Angola, the plan for expansion to the north from Luanda, was for trade, and for preventing the entrance of contraband goods, and to exploit minerals. The capture of Ambriz was the starting gun. Governor-General José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral, a former Governor of Benguela (1851-1854) and a soldier, planned a line of fortresses, copper mining operations, more customs houses and agricultural development for the hinterland of Luanda. When Portuguese forces occupied Bembe and Congo from 1856-59, it appeared that Portuguese power was in the ascendant. A contemporary of Governor Coelho later lamented the current belief of the Portuguese in Luanda:

... the advantages resulting from the occupation of Bembe and of Congo can be easily understood, because, linking these points to the jurisdiction of S. José de Encoge, and increasing in such a vast extension of territory our interior frontiers, incalculable agricultural and mineral riches were included and they unquestionably represented a very valuable source of revenue for the province of Angola.

All this, however, was no more than a seductive mirage, for the semblance of the deceiving affair, had hardly an ephemeral duration.

So now, with regret we can say that that unfortunate attempt cost great sums of money, and no small number of lives. 63

63 Alfredo de Sarmento, Os Sertões D'África (Lisbon, 1880), pp. 156-7.
At mid-century, Portuguese plans for Angola were no longer exclusively defensive in nature. Encoge had been founded in 1759 to "defend" the northern frontier,\textsuperscript{64} but its proximity to a well-known ivory trade route from the Congo was another motive. Duque de Bragança was founded in 1838 "for the defense of the territory," after a native raid.\textsuperscript{65} But now in 1855, 1856 and 1859, Portuguese stations were established with an eye toward surplus revenue and the development of facilities lost to Portugal with the independence of Brazil. New enterprises in the economic exploitation of the territory encouraged leaders to look to a better day, instead of merely a defensive status quo within the traditional frontiers. Portuguese and Brazilian merchants, with some capital and the example of activity in British and Dutch territories or colonies, began to support more agricultural and mineral enterprises. The most important schemes, however, all had foundations in past activity in Angola.

During the period of intense activity of expansion, 1855 to 1860, the most favored enterprises were the cultivation of cotton and sugar, the building of roads, and the mining of copper. The Civil War in the United States encouraged the cultivation of cotton

\textsuperscript{64}Sousa Monteiro, José, Diccionario Geographico (Lisbon, 1850), p. 247.

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., p. 245.
in Africa, and Angola was no exception. Steam navigation companies on the Cuanza River began in the 1860's, and were encouraged by the establishment of a regular steam line connecting Lisbon and Luanda. Livingstone had observed in 1854-55 that Angola had the elements of the traditional slave economy together with the new legitimate enterprises in minerals and agriculture. He noted, "The Portuguese are now in a state of transition from illicit to licit commerce."66

As in the entire Portuguese system of administration, which showed a chronic "lack of continuity," the economy of Angola was forever in the throes of transition. The ideals of statesmen in Lisbon rarely were reconcilable with the hard facts of Portuguese impoverishment in African territories.67 The administration of Governor-General Coelho do Amaral (1855 to August 1860) was pledged to execute two key decrees: the decree of 1856, abolishing the servarento, or forced porter system, and the decree of 1858, abolishing slavery over a period of twenty years under the liberta system. Both decrees, upheld and encouraged by the Marquis of Sá da Bandeira, were designed for the economy's "transition." These laws suffered the common fate of measures imposed upon vested interest


groups who could not afford to carry them out. Even with sufficient compensation from the Portuguese Government, individual Europeans in Angola would have been reluctant to comply with change, for change in Angola had never been easy.

Transition problems were eternal in Angola because the choice of alternatives was limited to changes without solution of one basic problem: the poverty of Portugal and Portuguese in Angola. Governor Amaral's correspondence with Lisbon abounds with proof of the basic weakness of his administration: lack of means to execute plans. \(^{68}\) Beneath many failures lay pitiful salaries for public servants, and poor pay for the armed forces in a sickly land where Luanda was more expensive living than Lisbon. \(^{69}\) Governor Pinheiro in 1854 noted the types of Portuguese who came out to colonial service in Angola. There were two types: first, the few regular army men in Portugal willing to sign up for six years in a deadly climate, and who returned to Lisbon broken in health; secondly, there were the "bastard sons" with no place in Europe or

\(^{68}\) A.H.U., Angola, Papeis de Sá da Bandeira, Maco 1, Letter, Amaral to Sá da Bandeira, 25 April 1860; Pasta 23, No. 30, 1858, December 12, 1857.

\(^{69}\) Lacerda, José de, Exame das Viagens do Doutor David Livingstone (Lisbon, 1867), p. 239; Vogel, Le Portugal, pp. 549-550, 607.
opportunity in the regular army who came to Angola as a last resort.\textsuperscript{70}

Abolition of slave trade helped bring changes in the drive for new revenue and control. Since the export traffic was almost finished by 1845, in that very year the Government established the \textit{carreto} system. This was a system of semi-forced porterage. \textit{Carregadores} in each district were registered as porters; each merchant who needed goods carried for trade had to pay the Government 1000 reis to the Government and 50 reis each day to each porter as pay.\textsuperscript{71} Livingstone noted that Golungo Alto district had over 5000 of these "carriers," and that it was really a veiled system of slavery. Later apologists, as José de Lacerda, defended the \textit{carreto} system as a necessary expedient since if the porters were freemen, they would not work, and then commerce would stagnate. He argued trade in Angola would decline if porters got real wages since the profits would be cut and most Negroes would never seek wage-employment.\textsuperscript{72} Lacerda came to be supported in this contention by Governors of Angola in this era who repeated his belief that the African population had to be strictly

\textsuperscript{70}A.H.U., Angola, Conselho Ultramarino, 1855, Relatório, 1854, Visconde do Pinheiro.

\textsuperscript{71}Livingstone, \textit{Missionary Travels}, pp. 434-35.

controlled in a porterage system since there were no
draft animals to speak of north of the Cuanza, and since
otherwise the people would not work. 73

Sá da Bandeira, however, believed that the
decrees of 1856 and 1858, abolishing carreto and beginning
the emancipation of slaves, would establish a tradition
of a wage economy for the Africans in Portuguese areas.
Settlers always complained of a continual shortage of
labor for agriculture as well as for porterage. Well-
formed leaders knew that "forced porterage" within the
old vassalage system had been systematized in the 17th
century, but under the guise of various names and cir-
cumstances. But in the 19th century, the Government had
seen fit to regularize recruitment of porters for trade
routes through the officials of presidios and sobas. In
1856 Lisbon decreed the end of forced service in the
carreto, or porterage, and declared that henceforth
all porters would be paid wages by Europeans. Since
there was no immediate source of revenue to "compensate"
merchants for hitherto "free" service, the Government
of Angola raised the native tax, or dizimo, several times
to provide new revenue. Later in 1858, the abolition
of slavery decree was issued to reform agricultural labor
practices. Taken altogether, these measures and the
expansion program of Governor Amaral represented crisis
and conflict for Angola.

73 See references to reports of Governors Amaral
and Calheiros below.
In effect, the raising of the dizimo in 1856 dissatisfied the native groups who had to pay it, and the decrees of 1856 and 1858 infuriated the settlers and officials who profited from the slave and forced labor systems. The Government sought new revenue in development of copper mines, new crops, and small manufacture for the long run; but in the short run, new revenue had to offset the decrees. Certainly Portugal could not produce more than a small annual subsidy for Angola beginning about 1854. The expense of maintaining the new establishments of Ambriz district and Mossamedes district required new sources of revenue in addition to the reform of the economy.\textsuperscript{74}

In 1857 Governor Amaral wrote a letter to Dembo Caboco Cambilho of Cambambe,\textsuperscript{75} explaining the measures decreed in 1856 including the dizimo.\textsuperscript{76} He explained to the native leader, a General of Guerra Preta, that his Government would not tolerate idleness in his people. Natives without their own land should seek porter service. The inaction of native peoples, he asserted, was "harmful for the State," and its economy's development. Dembo Caboco should dispel the impression that

\textsuperscript{74}Jornal do Commercio, 26 August 1859; 13 January 1864.

\textsuperscript{75}See material on Dembo Caboco (1784-1860) above on p. 142.

\textsuperscript{76}Boletim Official (Angola), 1857, No. 612, 20 June 1857.
the decree brought an "absolute rest" for the people. The main burden of the increased tax would fall on the concelhos of Golungo Alto and Ambaca, which he referred to as "the most developed and rich" in Angola. But Cambambe would be taxed as the rest of Angola, and only the very old, or young, and the sick would escape payment.

In this letter of June 16, 1857, Amaral indicated the forceful urge toward expansion and development that characterizes his administration. He was determined to preserve a carreto system without forced labor. Yet even before the 1856 decree, it was known that Negroes avoided porterage service in various ways. In Ambaca district in 1846 a traveler noted that the Ambaquistas, often half-caste literate natives, enlisted in the army to avoid porterage. By claiming descent from Europeans, natives of Ambaca called Camundelles, also avoided military service and porterage. Sons of settlers were exempted from service with conveniently-placed bribes in the pockets of Chefes.

In Ambaca, Camundelles were Negroes considered as whites. Certain sobas were known to have many of them in their jurisdiction. Ambaca was the most notorious region for this, so that a large percentage of the population was exempt from service, since so many claimed

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77 Livingstone's opinion of Ambaca as a town disagrees with Amaral's opinion. See Missionary Travels, (1858 edition), p. 413.
descent from an empacaceiro, or native mercenary soldier. In the carreto system sobas annually gave levies of porters twice to the province. Levies were to be in proportion to the population. Many paid dizimo real, or the royal tax, besides giving porters. Dembo Caboco of Cambambe, mentioned above, was known in 1846 as the only soba to get enough porters because he did not allow these Camundelles into his kingdom. Cambambe had only one "noble family," and all the rest were considered Negroes. In Ambaca, however, noble families with Portuguese names, as the Fragosos, Mendes and Regelles remained to claim exemption from all carreto or military service. 

The far-ranging peoples of Ambaca were considered by the Portuguese and by foreigners who observed them as the most "civilized" in Angola. It is significant that Ambaca is in northern-eastern region of the hinterland of Luanda. This was a region settled and cultivated since the 17th century campaigns of conquest up the Cuanza River. 

An explosion was produced in Angola in the years 1855 to 1861, when various decrees, expansions and conflicts coincided. Governor Amaral was perhaps the

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78 The account of Ambaca and the carreto is from Manoel Castro Francina, "Itinerario De uma Jornada de Loanda ao Districto de Ambaca, na Provincia de Angola," Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, Serie I, Feb., 1854, pp. 3-15.

most ambitious military mind to run the administration in the 19th century. His "line of fortresses" scheme was both defensive and offensive but most of his activity was military. The rise of Portuguese activity aroused native hostility and schemes of colonization failed because settlers were constantly defending themselves or were causing violence in imitation of the native wars. At Huila a military colony was a flop even with Government backing since the colonists were continually "distracted by military operations, and the colony dispersed."80 Portugal's plans for a peaceful transition of the economy of Angola broke down after 1857, and the result was a series of costly and exhausting wars in northern, southern and eastern Angola.

E. Warfare and Migration to 1863

As stated above, the society and administration of Angola for centuries had been militarily oriented. The majority of officials on the coast or in interior stations were either regular army officers or naval officers of Portugal or were enlisted in the provincial army of Angola. Often the degredados sent to the African territories were deserters or malactors from the army in Portugal. Yet the law made a distinction between exile in African regions, and it was considered more

80 Sá da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural Africano (Lisbon, 1873), p. 149.
serious a penalty to be sent to Mozambique than to Angola in the 19th century. Sá da Bandeira was an influence to try to bring about more civilian colonization in Africa, but he was up against an old military tradition in Angola.

With a scarcity of regular European troops in Angola, the administration was obliged to recruit any available material. Runaway Negro slaves were drafted into the army in Luanda, and others in the interior "volunteered" to avoid labor in porterage or agriculture. Monteiro observed that few Negroes or mulattos achieved secondary posts in Angola, but that he recalled a certain Captain Dias who was Captain of Barra do Bengo (see map, north of Luanda) and who succeeded as a prosperous trader, in the period from 1858 to 1875.

Portuguese authority was based on military lines and it was subject to the ills common to militarism. Native leaders, from the obscure to the important, were given military titles and posts in the reserve of the army of Angola. The Guerra Preta force was considered part of the "Second Line" of the army and was estimated on paper to consist of 15,000 to 20,000 empacaçeiros in time of war. By creating a native military elite

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81 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
82 Ibid., pp. 148-151.
among the sobas and empacaceiros the Portuguese provided protection but also the possibility that these units might be used against Europeans in time of crisis. It has been shown how native groups avoided service with the Portuguese by becoming in fact "assimilated." It is clear that desertion rates were very high among native recruits in the army of Angola, and these deserters fled to the bush with arms and knowledge to be used later against further European encroachments.

1. Trouble in the East

The war of Cassange, 1860-1863 is useful as a study of the Portuguese policy in a frontier region. Cassange had been at least nominally pacified in 1850, but European power there was to remain tenuous until after the Berlin West African Conference.

Authorities seem to agree that the hostilities that broke out between the Portuguese and the Mbangala of the Cassange Valley were due to Portuguese errors. Portuguese merchants traditionally were characterized as "greedy," but in this case, Portuguese officials started the trouble by demanding the dizimo tax of the traditionally independent Jaga of Cassange. Winwood Reade characterized the warfare of Cassange as "strikingly illustrative of Portuguese misrule." 86

85 Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa e Brasileira, VI, pp. 148-149, "Cassange" article.
86 Winwood Reade, Savage Africa, p. 264. Reade was traveling in Angola in 1862.
The Jaga or King of Cassange before 1860-62 had paid no \textit{dizimo} tax but an annual tribute of ten porters, or \textit{carregadores}, to Luanda. Living some 300 miles east of the coast, this monarch had the advantage of distance and barriers to discourage actual Portuguese military occupation. Minor disputes were continually breaking out between Portuguese merchants, or \textit{feirantes} of the trade fair, \textit{feira}. But it was not until the Commander of Cassange, a certain Carvalho, asked for an annual "tenth" tax that the Jaga rebelled and took to the field. True to the "divide and rule" tradition in their native policy, the Portuguese supported a usurper leader and de-throned the powerful Jaga Bumba (Ambumbu a Quinguri) for a short period. Then the usurper died and Bumba returned. The Portuguese official in Cassange then tried to appoint a puppet minister to the Jaga, and the Jaga refused. A vendetta began when the Portuguese official was killed after ordering the death of a native leader.\footnote{Reade, \textit{Savage Africa}, p. 265.} In the meantime the Jaga was told he must pay \textit{dizimo} for the first time against the custom of his ancestors.\footnote{A.H.U., Angola, \textit{Pasta 32}, 1863, No. 380, Letter 2 October 1863, enclosed is original letter from Jaga of Cassange to either the King of Portugal or the Governor-General of Angola.}

The Portuguese took the worst of it in the beginning and were obliged to retreat to Malange.
Disaster after disaster followed for Portuguese arms near Cassange as late as 1862, and there were many changes of personnel until the native rebellion, later called a "civil war" was finally quelled. Governor Calheiros e Menezes brought reinforcements from the coast to Malange and Sanza, but he could do little. But by August 1863 the forces of the Jaga of Cassange were defeated and weary, and peace was made at Malange. 89

On August 29, 1863, the Jaga, his Portuguese name given was Dom Pascoal Raiz Machado, signed an "Act of Submission" along with his main chiefs and captains at Malange. Pardon of the King of Portugal was asked in the "civil war" after the surrender to Colonel Teotonio Maria Coelho Borges. The conditions of the "Act" were as follows: 1) The Jaga remained subject to the Portuguese Crown and laws, and to re-establish Portuguese authorities in Cassange. 2) Restore all prisoners of last war and slaves of Europeans held. 3) Recompensate the province and traders' expenses of war and destruction. 4) Guarantee the payment of Portuguese merchants by the subjects of the Jaga in outstanding debts. Wax and ivory were to be payments by the native leader to symbolize peace terms.

89 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 32, 1863, same, copy of "Auto da Submissão" with signatures of chiefs.
The Jaga Bumba lived another decade to 1873, but he wanted Portuguese friendship and trade in spite of hostility. An embassy of peace was sent to Luanda and arrived in October 1863. A letter of complaints against the Portuguese arrived with it. The Jaga Bumba had been educated in Ambaca to read and write Portuguese and apparently he composed it himself. The entire letter reflects the spirit of autonomy and independence that the Jaga wished to exercise. He knew prosperity in trade before, and dizimo taxation would have meant an end to it. The Jaga explained carefully the history of the war, mentioning Portuguese merchants by name in blaming them for stealing from him. He wished to maintain trade with the Portuguese and not to emigrate from Angola as it was rumored he would.

The Portuguese abandoned Cassange in the realm of formal rule after 1862 and the Treaty of 1863 remained largely a dead letter. Malange remained the furthest eastward frontier post and armed station. It is not

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90 Boletim Official (Angola), No. 52, p. 352, of 9 August 1873.
91 Carvalho, Henrique, Etnographia e História Tradicional, p. 83.
clear whether the dizimo for Cassange was official policy of the Government-General, for tax lists up to 1859 omit Cassange but include Talla-mugongo. The well-known sensitiveness of the Mbangalas to European encroachment and the importance of the trade route to Lunda through Cassange put together perhaps made such a tax policy impolitic. But it is known that a regular caravan route between Ambaca and Cassange was begun in 1857 in the hope of greater trade for Luanda. Moreover, taxes in other regions of Angola rose after the 1856 decree, and it is quite possible Cassange at times was listed on taxes rolls in an attempt to gain more badly needed revenue.

The war of Cassange weakened Portuguese power in the field, but more important it crippled that vital necessity of the European surrounded by hostility: "moral force" or prestige. Governor-General Andrade writing in 1863 knew the Portuguese had been at fault in the wars of Cassange, and said as much to Lisbon. Later in 1867, a Governor-General commended that Portuguese rule in Cassange had always been "tenuous and

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95 See above page 100 and see Appendix III.

very limited." As in the entire interior of Angola, only "moral force" could sustain sovereignty in the face of weakness. The "excesses" of merchants and officials consistently destroyed this prestige. Cassange was too far inland to control formally at that time. But even so, the trade from Cassange to Golungo Alto to the northern coast continued to increase in volume in 1867. 97

A Portuguese official may have been accepted by the Jaga of Cassange after the treaty of 1863, or "Act", but it was not until early 1883 that the Portuguese formally raised the flag of rule at the remote fair so important to the economy of Angola. In 1882 Talla-Mugongo had been occupied by a Captain with a "Second-Line" force. Portuguese merchants at Malange had doggedly called for reoccupation of Cassange after 1862 but to no avail. After 1862, the Mbangala refused Portuguese authorities' regulation of the fair of Cassange. Later authorities in Luanda put the blame on Portuguese merchants who, if they had "used their sense," might not have fomented the wars of 1860-63. 98

In spite of the wars in eastern Angola, trade continued throughout the insecurity and expeditions

regularly reached Lunda through Cassange. The above-mentioned expedition of 1862 which returned to Malange was one example. Lunda kingdom continued to offer wax and ivory to Portuguese merchants or their agents. Although Cassange remained a thorn in their path, Portuguese merchants, as the Luso-African Lourenço Bezerra, traded at Lunda court between 1865 and 1890, and some amassed fortunes in ivory. Malange was the last frontier station fully under Portuguese control, and, as such, it became a great entrepot and warehouse for expeditions of the far-ranging Ambaquistas and Malanjes traders.

The risk of robbery or death at the hands of the Mbangalas of the Cassange Valley, a natural obstacle between Lunda and Angola, remained until after pacification in the 1890's. But even this danger could not hold back the trading impulse of the Portuguese rarely discouraged by insecurity. It was that trading tendency which found and held the best routes of commerce. Cassange remained a key component of Angola's economy even though it was not militarily occupied. In this respect it was like Bihe to the south (see map).

2. Taxation Equals Migration

The taxation law of 1856, raising the native house tax from 200 reis to 1600 reis was a key factor in causing

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native migration from the major areas of Portuguese control. Monteiro made a journey from September 1859 to 1860 from Luanda through Bengo to Cambambe and found sections of the country deserted where large populations had been before. He ascribed the desertions to "the rapine of their Portuguese rulers."100 In this case, the rapine was the collecting of the higher taxes after 1856.

Governor-General Amaral came to realize that such an extreme rise of eight times would not work, so he proposed a so-called "progressive tax," in order not to alienate the people. The most unfortunate natives should have to pay 400 reis, not 1600 reis. He added;

I have already said that I greatly fear the emigration of the peoples: ... the increase of the tax this year 1857 is small, but only in the most prepared areas can they support it. Thus I feel that my very same fear will be verified. 101

In a letter dated 30 May 1857 the Dembo Caboco of Cambambe wrote the Governor-General complaining that his people had nothing to sell or buy and were migrating because they weren't able to pay the new tax. The Governor then sent instructions to the official heading the District of Golungo Alto (including Cambambe) to convince native leaders that the natives had to continue


working hard, serving in the carreto (forced labor was legally ended by 1856 as developed above) and that the Portuguese would see to it they were justly paid and protected from violences. ¹⁰²

Amaral, however, had little control over his subordinates in the bush and his ideas on softening the effects of the increased dizimo tax after 1856 could not contend with the general impoverishment of Portuguese revenue in the province. For public revenue after the establishment of the new districts of Mossamedes and Ambriz, both of which were not paying one-sixth of their way throughout Amaral's or Calheiro's terms of office, ¹⁰³ it was a choice between increased taxes on the people or increased customs revenue. The debate as to which was appropriate continued until the early 1870's when it was decided the direct tax should be abolished in favor of increased customs taxes. ¹⁰⁴

Governor Amaral in October 15, 1857, wrote Sá da Bandeira in Lisbon that the collection of dizimos in Golungo Alto that year had been fair. This section of Angola, however, was by no means typical and was,


¹⁰⁴ See Chapter V above.
in fact, the richest region of agriculture at the time. Sa da Bandeira publicly declared that the newly increased taxes on Africans in Angola were not unreasonable compared with taxation of natives in Natal (the equivalent of 2475 reis fortes to Angola's 1200 reis fortes) and in Zanzibar where the tax per head was the equivalent of 1920 reis fortes to Angola's 1200 reis fortes. Unfortunately Sa da Bandeira miscalculated the situation for Golungo Alto was the most fortunate region in Angola and soon it was loathe to pay the dizimo other regions paid little or nothing of the new tax. To compare Natal or Zanzibar with Angola in 1857 was hardly fair since the ruling elite of Angola was more impoverished than the English of Natal or the Arab traders of Zanzibar or Muscat.

Certain favored regions of Angola were exempted from the dizimo: these were in 1859, Mossamedes, Ambriú

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105 *Diario de Lisboa* (Lisbon daily), 1 January 1858. In Francisco Valdez's *Six Years*, Vol. II, p. 153, we find an evaluation of Portuguese currency between 1852 and 1861 when 100 Angolan reis equaled 62½ Portuguese reis. Each currency, both provincial and metropolitan, had a regular specie, reis fortes (strong reis), and a devaluated specie, reis fracos (weak reis). One English pound sterling equaled about 4,500 reis fortes Portuguese. Livingstone said 1 milreis equaled about 3 shillings. *Missionary Travels* (1858), p. 474.

106 As Amaral wrote later in this year, the province was very poor and without means. A.H.U., Pasta 23, No. 242, 11 April 1857.
and Bembe (then called after the King of Portugal, D. Pedro V). Taxes were laid on houses (fogos), farms, (arimos), cattle (gado), and hunting (caza), and sometimes on fishing (mesca). Migration or desertion of natives can be measured to some extent by the record of the collection from 1857 to 1860 which indicates that the number of houses collected from decreased considerably in those years. The 1859 collection value was nearly one-fifth lower than that of 1858.107 (See Appendix V for places taxed in the interior.)

The raising of the dizimo caused unrest and tension. One gauge of this can be found in the letters cited above from the Dembo Caboco of Cambambe. Other indications are in the numerous rebellions and skirmishes after 1856. Portuguese occupation of new stations coincided with the raising of the tax and the natives responded with fear of domination.

There was a rebellion at Huila, in the hinterland of Mossamedes in 1857. Raids on the newly-settled Europeans there discouraged the Governor-General who wrote he had no troops from Luanda to spare for protection of southern Angola. The impulse of expansion was being carried on with little chance of ending well. As Amaral wrote in December, 1857:

It would be necessary to have some thousands of good soldiers to be able to continue resolutely on the set path of conquests.... I want to reserve for myself justification for a very probable reverse, if we continue in this system of building without a foundation. 108

In his plan for expansion, Amaral had a bias with a practical basis. He favored the north of Angola to other areas. Failing to pacify and conquer the region south of Muxima presidio, the wild Quissama country, Amaral justified this with his lack of means and with the history of invincibility of Quissama, well-known to Europeans in Angola. When it came to expanding further in the south, he believed the trade was too poor to bother with, and the Negroes too backward to warrant the expenditure of forces needed in the Congo region. For example, the only engineer possessed by the Government of Angola in 1857 was working in Bembe at the copper mines. 109

Native migration, or emigration, in areas near the Portuguese settlements in the northern half of the province, was one certain gauge of Portuguese prestige. When there was a great deal of emigration away from Portuguese-controlled regions, it meant policy had broken down. Every adverse event acted on the native population as a call for exodus. Portuguese authorities


carefully noted all signs of emigration in monthly reports to the Government. During war, famine, epidemic or increased taxation or labor recruitment in late 1860, for example, heavy emigration was observed. 3

3. Crisis in Northern Angola

The article on "Angola" in the standard Brazilian-Portuguese dictionary, 111 has named the era 1836 to 1878 in Angolan history as "Abolition of Slave Trade and Slavery," and characterizes the epoch as one of "great tranquility." Documents, however, indicate Angola underwent during the decade 1855-65 the most serious general crisis up to that time in the century.

In the late 1850's, discontent brewed to boiling point in Angola. Reminiscent of the ferment of the 1830's during the transition from abolition of the slave trade to Brazil, Angolan whites as well as Negroes nursed ideas of independence. A contemporary Portuguese living in Luanda confirmed at least a hazy outline of such a movement about 1860:

At that time in Luanda, some utopian ideas of independence fermented so that some radical natives tried to liberate the mother country, as they called it, from Portuguese rule. They talked of a republic, preferring Brazilian nationality, and there were even those who thought of making a present of the beloved country to the republic of the United States of America. 112

110 Boletim Official (Angola), No. 793, Dec. 15, 1860.
112 Sarmento, Os Sertões d'África, p. 67.
The master and slave relationship seemed to reach a peak of distrust and suspicion, especially near the larger settlements. In the years 1860 to 1862 a number of slaves carried out premeditated murders upon their masters in Luanda and Benguela. The murder of a Brazilian resident of Luanda on September 29, 1860, was counted as the fourth such slave murder in four months in Luanda.\textsuperscript{113} Fear gripped the white society again in 1862 when a certain "John Cook" took a knife and killed his master in his sleep. The judge wrote Lisbon that this slave had to be made an example of in order to insure the safety of the whites.\textsuperscript{114}

Livingstone had noted a general atmosphere of suspicion in settlements in Angola during his stay in 1854 to 1855. Everyone knew that Portuguese power was "firmly seated only between the rivers Dande and Coanza."\textsuperscript{115} Tribes outside this limited region were quite independent. Later the traveller Winwood Reade firmly believed the Angolan slaves intimidated their masters and were very bold during his stay in 1862 in the region of Luanda and its hinterland.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Boletim Official, No. 783, October 6, 1860, p. 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 31, July 4, 1862, No. 688, Gov. Gen.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Livingstone, Missionary Travels, (1858 edition), p. 466.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Reade, Savage Africa, p. 317.
\end{itemize}
attitude of Angolan slaves was brutal and like that of many Portuguese settlers according to the 1854 report of Governor-General Pinheiro. The bitterness created by such cruelty had its outlet in the murders during the years 1860-62 when slaves rose to kill or to escape their bondage. Pinheiro's report noted that Portuguese masters were beating their slaves during meals in order to make their food "more tasteful."

Coinciding with new stresses in the master and slave relationship were the stresses created by the Congo policy of the Government-General. Ambriz had been occupied in May 1855. Quiballa and Bembe had been occupied with small garrisons in 1856 under the plan to work the mines of malachite (copper) ore in the hills east of Bembe. A chartered company, "The Western Africa Malachite Copper Mines Company Limited," with Brazilian and British capital, developed the mines beginning in 1856. With the permission of the Portuguese Government, some English miners aided operations. But British resistance to the Portuguese claim to the mouth of the Congo and the coast between 5°15' and 8° south latitude in 1857 drove the Portuguese to strike at two points in the disputed region. A British naval officer, Commander Hickley, landed a force at Quissembo in that year to stop the Portuguese from interfering

117 A.H.U., Conselho Ultramarino, 1855, Relatório, 1854 August, Visconde do Pinheiro.
with the building of a new British factory. Later in 1857, Hickley deployed his force and caused an occupying Portuguese military force to leave the river town of Punta da Lenha (on the Congo) where it had landed.  

Governor-General Amaral had proposed the occupation of the Congo in February 1857 to control trade and to eliminate slave traffic. Britain's justification for opposing Portuguese expansion in this period and before was composed of essentially the same points. The difference was that British naval power held British paramountcy, however informal, and Portugal did not have the power to compete or to carry out the humanitarian dreams.  

The Portuguese after the failures of 1857 sought to move overland to assert sovereignty and to control trade to the "north coast." In 1859 a Portuguese vessel planted a traditional padrão, or stone marker for navigators, on Cape or Point Padron, claiming sovereignty and reinvokeing the muse of history and the memory of Diogo Cao. British reports paid this ceremonial event little heed, except as part of the Portuguese expansion plan.

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119 See Roger Anstey, Britain and the Congo, for diplomatic background up to 1876, pp. 1-56. See above p. 137.  
120 From the Portuguese Punto Padrão.  
121 F.O. 63/1114, 1859, No. 10, Gabriel to Russell, 29 September 1859.
Of vital importance to the Portuguese attempt to outflank the obstacle of diplomacy placed in their path of expansion, was greater control over the Congo kingdom after 1858. In that year the Marquis of Catendi, heir to the throne of Congo, came to Bembe, the newly-established Portuguese *concelho*, named for King Dom Pedro V of Portugal. Portuguese and Congolese negotiations followed this visit. Soon Portuguese armed forces supported this candidate to the throne after the death of King Henry II in late 1857.122

Rebellions at Bembe and Ambriz in 1857 were put down. The legitimate heir to the Congo throne, nephew of the deceased king, was accompanied to his coronation by Portuguese authorities at São Salvador, the capital. Later Portuguese forces were expelled by an army under a rebel claimant to the throne, Dom Álvaro Dongo, apparently a minor chief with military ability. After asking for and receiving Portuguese aid, the Marquis of Catendi was crowned Dom Pedro V, after the name of Bembe *concelho*, and the King of Portugal (1855-1861).

Portuguese forces in June 1859 drove the rebel Dongo from Sao Salvador. These forces under J. Baptista de Andrade, later two-time Governor-General of Angola, were supported by African auxiliaries, *guerra preta*, and

they occupied São Salvador. Yet native forces were in rebellion against the Portuguese all over Angola at this time. "A grave insurrection" broke out at Ambriz and Bembe again in late 1859. The province was threatened from "all sides."

In the meantime, Portugal found her new Congo policy challenged by an educated native leader, Dom Nicolas of Agua Rosada. Born the son of King Henry II, but ineligible for the throne of Congo under the rules of succession that the king's nephew was eligible only, Nicolas had been educated in Lisbon (a visit of 1845-46), and in Luanda. Later employed in Luanda and in Ambriz as a Government clerk, he came in contact with foreign groups, such as the British and the Brazilians. Nicolas was a part of the Luanda "independence" movement described by Alfredo de Sarmento, and there is evidence he was sympathetic to Brazilian ideas for Angolan independence.

In September 1859 Prince Nicolas wrote a letter of protest to Lisbon journals claiming he was best qualified in education for the throne of Congo and that the Portuguese had no legal or historical right to

123 Jornal do Commercio (Lisbon), 19 January 1860.
124 Jornal do Commercio, 13 June 1860.
"vassalize" the Congo Kingdom and rule it; as Portuguese policy had been to support D. Pedro V as King, and to place a garrison at the capital for the first time in centuries, Nicolas claimed precedent that the King of Congo was traditionally an "ally and friend" and not a "vassal" of the Portuguese in Angola. This letter was published at Lisbon at least once, on December 1, 1859.126

This protest letter was read by the Governor of Angola and considered "ridiculous" in its audacity, yet such discontent was not out of context in 1859-60 Angola. When the Portuguese forces were driven out of Ambriz and besieged in the fortress at Bembe in late November 1859, the Governor realized it was a crucial moment to act.127

Immediately the British were suspected and charged as giving the rebel Alvaro Dongo arms and powder at the coast. The Governor called for aid from Portugal when he learned that the southern Portuguese settlements, as Huila, were again under native attack.128 In February 1860 communications north of Luanda were cut and the Portuguese in Bembe were still besieged. Rebels

126 Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Jornal do Commercio, 1 December 1859.
nearly starved it out before reinforcements arrived after April 1860.129 Guerra Preta auxiliaries from Golungo Alto concelho were ordered to Ambriz by the Governor; in the summer of 1860 a force of 300 empacaceiros was ordered to Ambriz under the Honorary Colonel of Guerra Preta the Soba Bango-Aquitamba.130

Meanwhile in February 1860 Prince Nicolas had left Luanda, and, after he was ordered to work at Mossamedes, traveled to Ambriz, then Quissembo, where he was killed by natives who claimed he was a traitor to the white man. Ironically, the man accused of "selling" Ambriz to Portugal and presently, the Congo, was accused by Portuguese as a traitor for his protest letter.131 There is evidence that the British and Brazilian consuls in Luanda were intriguing with Nicolas with regard to the Prince's future and the Congo Kingdom. What ever the origin of the plan, after Nicolas was to board an English vessel of war at Quissembo, the goal is not clear.132 Nicolas left Ambriz perhaps in fear of his life, but the extent of foreign involvement is not clear. Portuguese at Luanda doubted that the

130 Boletim Official, September 15, 1860, No. 780, p. 4.
131 Jornal do Commercio, 13 June 1860.
famous protest letter was written by Nicolas himself.133

The Governor of Angola gathered an expedition to "avenge" the death of Nicolas, well-known in white society, and also to reassert by force the claim to the coast north of 80 south latitude. Crossing the river Logé, his force was turned back. Because of poor supplies and bad leadership, it was put into full retreat to Ambriz. Another Portuguese attempt on Quíssembo had failed.134

The general ferment in Angola included certain Europeans who wished Angola independent of Portugal.135 Portuguese prestige and power were at such a low ebb that an expeditionary army from Portugal was sent to Luanda in several contingents, arriving in June, August and September 1860. This force consisted of about 700 European recruits and officers. This "fire-fighting brigade" of 1860 was unlike a similar brigade sent to Mozambique in 1869 in that a distinguished royal personage accompanied one contingent. For about fifteen days the brother of King D. Pedro V, the Duke of Oporto (and later in 1861 King Luiz I of Portugal) visited

134Jornal do Commercio, 13 June 1860.
Luanda on a naval training exercise.\textsuperscript{136} The expeditionary force remained as a fighting unit in northern Angola, mainly at Ambriz, Bembe, and São Salvador until late 1861, when the weakened remnants were shipped back to Lisbon. Yellow fever and malaria took a heavier toll than native spears or bullets. The hospitals were crowded with the unacclimatized, and 304 recruits, and 12 officers remained in graves upcountry.\textsuperscript{137} Later Portuguese officials referred to this fiasco as proof that the African troops should be exclusively employed in Angolan campaigns.

Governor Amaral found his reputation ruined by the failure at Quissembo and the general state of insecurity. Assailed by irate Portuguese settlers as a tyrant and a failure,\textsuperscript{138} this bold expansionist was replaced by Governor Carlos Franco in August 1860. Before he left Angola, Amaral gave a final statement reviewing the achievements of his administration.\textsuperscript{139}

Our flag reappeared in the Congo, and was, for the first time raised upon the banks of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Jornal do Commercio, 25 October 1860; Vogel, \textit{Le Portugal}, p. 536.
\item A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 31, No. 748, 1 July 1862, "Relacão Mortuaria;" Imprensa Nacional, Relatórios sobre a Epidemia da Febre Amarela no anno de 1860 (Lisbon, 1861).
\item Boletim Official, Supplemento, No. 74, 9 August 1860.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the Cunene. Then there arose difficulties in maintaining such distant conquests. It was the necessary and predictable consequence of the lack of proportion between our ends and our means... the work of pacification in the country remains to be completed.

Indeed "pacification," if that was the fitting word, was still only a plan that would lay unaccomplished for five decades thereafter. Amaral's ambition had overleapt itself. In bad health after one of the longest terms as Governor in the history of Angola, Amaral left the province in warfare but with a series of forts and stations, and a tradition of meeting British "informal expansion," with determined if ineffective resistance in the Congo. The sertanejo, Antonio da Silva Porto disagreed with Amaral's enemies and praised his expansion plans and his standing up to British diplomatic and naval power. The administration of Angola was shot through with personal feuds, and expansion was no doubt hindered. Silva Porto deplored the sending of the European expedition to Congo, since he believed that natives should fight natives in Angola. He believed Amaral was not to blame for the disasters.

... as if he were responsible for such events! It would be better for those minds to fight the reprehensible leadership of England in all affairs acting as if Portugal were a colony of England. Contrary to this, they berate the man whose greatest defect is to seek the aggrandizement of his fatherland. 141

140 I use the term of Anstey in Britain and the Congo, cf. p. 229.

The north country was pacified by late 1862, but the war of Cassange dragged on until the summer of 1863. If roads and towns north of Luanda were safer and more secure for trade than during the war, the country was pillaged and, as before, tribes migrated away from Portuguese settlements. Portuguese armed force was crippled by the campaigns, and in 1862, in order to escape service in the war of Cassange, entire companies of the "Second Line" or guerra preta deserted or became unreliable. The wars created a fund of discontent and physical debility among the native peoples.142

Governor Andrade, who personally played an important role in campaigns in 1858 to 1865, looked back to that time when Governor again in 1874 and attributed the impotence of armed force in Angola to the disastrous events of this war. The programs for expansion and genuine white colonization, or even moving an army, were stymied by difficulty of finding porters or empacaceiros to aid expeditions. Travel in the interior had always been difficult for troops, but after 1864, and the epidemic of small pox, few auxiliary Negroes were available for service in campaigns.143

142 Imprensa Nacional, "Relatórios dos Governadores, Jose B. de Andrade, Report for 1872-74 (Lisbon, 1875), p. 84.
143 Andrade, Relatórios, p. 84.
F. Beginnings of a New Policy

The challenge had met a weak response. The wars virtually ended hopes of controlling the Congo country and of thereby deriving profit from the trade reaching foreign factories on the coast from Quiss emissbo to Punta da Lenha. Nevertheless, Portuguese claims for this territory were reasserted in 1860, in 1862, in 1867, and later. Yet British policy remained steadfast. Wylde, the British minister in Lisbon, had been considering in 1858 Portuguese claims might be granted by Britain if Portugal would comply with British conditions of low tariffs and no slave-trade on the Congo. Although he doubted that Portuguese power could effect reforms in 1858, still he was willing to experiment. By 1867, when Wylde wrote another "Minute" on this, however, he was convinced that Portugal was in no position to uphold British conditions as a buffer power. The wars and campaigns in intervening years condemned Portugal's position in northern Angola. With no prestige in the field or security at home, Portuguese expansion generally came to a standstill by 1863. In 1860, Amaral had even feared a successful slave revolt, when he wrote to Sa da Bandeira in Lisbon.

144Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 52.
145Ibid., p. 53. Refers to P.R.O., F.O. 63/1115, Wylde, 10 August 1867 Minute.
Our real power here is insufficient....
The failure of the enterprise undertaken has
broken our prestige.... It is necessary to
not lose sight of the lessons of history.
The island of Santo Domingo was no more
advanced in 1802, than is Angola presently.\textsuperscript{146}

In the report of Governor Calheiros e Menezes
dated 1861, but printed at Lisbon in 1867, a Portuguese
policy of withdrawal and consolidation is outlined and
contrasted with the crisis of former years. This suc-
cessor of Amaral recommended a regulated native labor
code and policy for Angola as well as a policy of con-
centrating administration and expenditure in northern
and central Africa, and eventually abandoning Mossamedes
district. Calheiros considered Golungo Alto to be the
heart of the province, but he also valued Congo and
recommended renovation of Portuguese paramountcy at
Sao Salvador and on the banks of the Congo River in
order to eventually establish a road between São
Sâlvador and the bank near Nokki.\textsuperscript{147} (See map).

The report of Calheiros, a very military-minded
Governor, as were Amaral or Andrade, was essentially a
plea to leave the interior to the care of a skeleton
administration, centralize power on the coast, and
develop Angola as an economic unit principally by means

\textsuperscript{146}\textit{A.H.U., Angola, Papeis de Sá da Bandeira,
Maço 1, Amaral to Sá da Bandeira, April 1860.}

\textsuperscript{147}\textit{Calheiros e Menezes, Sebastião, Relatórios
dos Governadores de Angola, Imprensa Nacional, Lisbon,
1867. Copy in Library of Society of Geography, Lisbon.}
of economizing and adopting a rigorous native labor code. Although Calheiros in his term of office in 1861 had founded two white convict colonies at Bumbo and Capangombe, stations on the plateau above Mossamedes, he had little faith in the future development of southern Angola. Finding most administrators "absolutely incapable," and Mossamedes and Ambraz scarcely contributing to the annual deficit of the colony, he considered the Portuguese had to settle down in the area between the Bengo and the Cuanza Rivers, bounded on the east by the Lucalla River. Indeed, Livingstone had noted this was the most comfortable seat of Portuguese power. 148

The frontier provinces were unproductive and wasteful to Portuguese power, rarely collecting dizimo and always under native attack because of the pitiful number of available troops. Calheiros lambasted the liberal legislation of Sá da Bandeira and proposed a labor code, treated in the next chapter, which was in effect the basis for much Portuguese legislation in the future.

... nor do I also believe that the small and changing European population, which inhabits Angola, and the small native population, considered civilized in Luanda or Benguela, appreciate these institutions or know how to make use of them. 149

149 Calheiros, Relatório.
The warfare, loss of life and failures of the preceding few years and the disheartening experience of Calheiros in pursuing the long Cassange campaign in 1861 brought a watershed to the history of expansion. The Governor ordered the construction of forts at Malange, Sanza, Talla-Mugongo and Cassange in 1861 to little avail since the native auxiliaries hitherto more cooperative were now unreliable. Hostility increased against the Portuguese everywhere, and in the south, near Gambos, Humbe and Huila, there seemed to be no respite from raids and attacks by the "Nanos."

Calheiros hoped that many more natives might be "civilized" by teaching them to read and write Portuguese under a "patriarchal organization," perhaps an early formulation into policy of the 20th century assimilacao concept.\textsuperscript{150} This report of the Governor of Angola spared no words or recriminations, and mentioned that the new dizimo tax raises had caused much emigration in northern Angola. The carreto service, a traditional native scourge, was also mentioned for causing native emigration away from Portuguese settlements toward "unvassalized" country.

Although Calheiros felt that the Congo was an important part of the development policy that should have been maintained, there were voices of disagreement

\textsuperscript{150}Calheiros, \textit{Relatório}, p. 84.
in 1861, and some said the area had to be abandoned. Silva Porto, writing from his home in Bihé, reiterated his expansionist principles. He cried out against "the blasphemy of saying we should restrict ourselves to the coast, and abandon the interior..." He pointed to the continual English threat, in another warning of future loss in the interior.

Yet in spite of the protests of men like Silva Porto and the expansionist colonial thinkers in Portugal, Portuguese policy of military expansion reached a turning point by 1861-63. The correspondence of Governor José B. d'Andrade in 1862 indicates the exhaustion of the armed force in northern Angola, and the inability of the outlying posts to offer any resistance to native armies. Garrisons at Huila and Humbe in 1863 were withdrawn and posts abandoned after continuous native attacks on the settlers and their cattle. Humbe and Gambos were deserted until about 1880. Several decades ago, a writer characterized this common occurrence of posts being abandoned for years, by saying, "the lack of continuity in the plans of the government, and in their execution, have been one of the evils of our overseas administration."152

151 Silva Porto, Viagem e reflexões sobre a exploração do interior de Angola, ms., B.M.P.P., Vol. II, 11 August 1861, p. 206. Near this entry, he also recommends the occupation and pacification of the Bihe plateau by Portuguese forces, and produces a petition to the Government written in 1850 on the occasion of the Cassange pacification. II, pp. 207-211.

152 Alberto de Almeida Teixeira, Roçadas, Na Occupação do Sul de Angola (Pelo Imperio Series, Lisbon, 1932), p. 15.
It is clear that armed forces in southern Angola languished, and were decimated after the first third of the 19th century. For before 1834 there were militia companies and officers living at Bihé and Bailundo. In 1861, another writer, echoing Silva Porto's wishes, called for the occupation of these southern points to build up defenses for white colonies on the healthy plateaus.¹⁵³

Yet Portuguese expansion stopped the effect of the wars after 1859. Quissama country remained unpacified and hostile. Contraband trade continued to and from the north coast and it was known by the Governor that the coffee exports of Encoge instead of going to Dande and Luanda were falling into foreign hands at Quissambo or Ambrizette. Dembos country and small pockets at Pungo Andongo, Ambaca, and Duque de Bragança harbored escaped slaves, degredados and generally caused trouble for Portuguese communication and trade.

The British policy of refusing to recognize Portuguese claims to the Congo region, especially the coast north of Ambriz, remained steadfast and galling to the Portuguese. In 1860 bitter diplomatic notes

¹⁵³Revista Militar (Lisbon), Nos. 13-15, 15 July - 31 July 1861, and issue of 14 June 1861. These articles by a former Governor of Mossamedes called for expansion in southern Angola, and a militarization of all activity.
were exchanged between London, Lisbon and Luanda. The Portuguese ambassador Count Lavradio in London accused the British of "abuse of power and oppression towards a faithful ally" in regard to the Prince Nicolas affair, British activity in selling arms and powder to natives at Quissembo and Ambrizette, and for consistently opposing by diplomacy or by naval power Portuguese occupation north of Ambriz.\textsuperscript{154} On August 13, 1860, Lavradio wrote to Lord Russell, foreign minister, quoting Lord Canning's statement that Portugal was for Britain the most vital place of support in Europe.\textsuperscript{155} In spite of this retort, Lord Russell wrote back reasserting the traditional policy begun by Palmerston, and carried on by Clarendon in 1855 and 1856. Moreover, his letter to Lavradio shows the British concern over the Portuguese campaigns in northern Angola. He constructed a telling argument against expansion, which, in part, was similar to ideas in the reports of Governors Calheiros and Andrade in 1861 and 1862. The last paragraph of his note of October 13, 1860 read:

\begin{quote}
The undersigned, in conclusion, has the honour to state that he must repudiate the charge of abuse of power and oppression towards
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{154} For Lavradio's correspondence on Angola, see especially Volumes IV, V, VI, and VII of his Memorias (Lisbon, 1937-42).

\textsuperscript{155} Accounts and Papers, 1883, O3531, XLVIII, Correspondence, 1845-1877, p. 61.
a faithful ally which Count Lavradio brings against Her Majesty, on account of their refusal to acknowledge what her Majesty's Government consider the unfounded territorial claims of Portugal on the West Coast of Africa; and he cannot help adding that ... the interests of Portugal would be far better consulted by developing the resources of the vast territories which she already possesses in Africa, than by seeking to extend a barren sovereignty over further tracts of country on that Continent, which can only be acquired by violence and bloodshed. 156

Britain's policy dug deep into the mentality of the Portuguese leaders in Angola at this time, but fear of British power and competition in trade had been present on the coast since the 1830's. Resistance to the Portuguese occupation of Ambriz had accustomed the opponents to an "informal" warfare along the coasts and in the channels of diplomacy. If Britain's policy toward Portugal was "of arguable legality," 157 it also was pragmatic and effective. The expansion program under Governor Amaral had foundered on British obstinacy, and Portuguese weaknesses. A turning point was reached when informed authorities decided that the dizimo policy, new frontier occupations, and the army organization and expenditure policies, as well as the vital labor problem had to be re-examined in the hard light of the final "failure of the enterprise undertaken." 158

156 Ibid., Russell to Lavradio, 13 October 1860, p. 63.

157 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 229.

158 Referring to the words of Gov. Amaral in April 1860 of the cited letter to Sa da Bandeira. Specifically he refers to the failure of his expedition to reach and control Quissembo, but this can stand for his entire policy of expansion in the north.
Dr. Duffy, in his history of Portuguese Africa, says that Angola was at a turning point in 1858 when the compromise decree abolishing slavery was issued at Lisbon. "The legal abolition of slavery severed the major link with a discredited past, and Angola turned to a new and perhaps more difficult era." Ending the chapter "Angola to 1858," he also adds that the appearance of Dr. Livingstone in Angola in 1854 was another important influence on changing Angola "from the past into the present." An examination of Portuguese policy and official correspondence at the time, however, indicates that both of these factors were of relatively little importance when it came to Portuguese policy and experience in Angola. The turning point at mid-century came in the years 1859-1863, as a result of the wars begun initially because of Portuguese policy in taxation, porterage, and military occupation. The plan to renovate Angola's economy after the abolition of the slave trade was behind it all, since the expansion called for needed new revenue. The need for new revenue coincided with new occupations in the north and in the south. British policy on the coast of Africa, far more than the travels or writings of Livingstone after 1854, stirred Portuguese ambition and national honor and provided a school of hard knocks for Portuguese expansion.

159 James Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 77-78.
160 Ibid., p. 175, especially paragraph beginning, "One of the results ..."
Governor-General Andrade, after experience on campaigns in the north, wrote Lisbon in 1862:

This Government finds itself today in most critical circumstances because of all these very distant occupations ... without possessing any force to support them in the midst of more or less constantly hostile natives. 161

Andrade in this same letter to the Overseas Ministry recommended the abandonment of the southern posts of Gambos, Bumbo and in the future, perhaps the abandonment of even Bembe and Congo, which were very costly operations. The guerra preta system had in effect been ruined by the wars after 1859.

The decree of 1858 was merely one more law on paper even though it aroused great opposition among the settlers. What was more important to the history of this period, and to the daily life of the economy, was the carreto system, begun in 1845, and legally abolished in 1856. This caused a furor that ended in the report of Calheiros and the labor code of 1875. The entire abolition of slavery issue was obscured during the campaigns from Ambriz to Cassange, and in the south, because forced native service was actually further entrenched during the crisis.

Livingstone brought to the Portuguese news of the interior of Africa, and reinforced fear of British

161 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 30, No. 768, Andrade to Lisbon, 1 July 1862.
ambitions and activity especially on the eastern coast. But in Angola his influence was obscured at the time by the crisis and upheavals that lasted through 1864 and the small-pox epidemic. The Government of Angola, after Livingstone, continued interest and plans to tap trade or minerals in the interior. There is little or no mention of the intrepid explorer in the official provincial correspondence, except perhaps with regard to the establishment of one British commercial house in Angola in 1860. 162

The Portuguese realized that the chronic problems of the colony had only been worsened by the attempt to expand. Angola went into a dormant period after the peace with Cassange in 1863, and the major developed section, the Cuanza River region, and a few other regions, developed a very modest prosperity in trade. Sao Salvador was abandoned in 1870, and Bembe several years later. The remote stations east of Mossamedes fell into disrepair. The Governors of Angola were occupied with traditional problems after 1863, but not until the late 1870's was there the impetus to expand Portuguese control again into the hostile and impoverished interior. 163

162 Livingstone's speeches and writings encouraged only a handful of British entrepreneurs to attempt a start at Luanda. A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 26, 1860-61, Gov. Gen.

163 Alphonse de Figueiredo, Le Portugal (Lisbon, 1873) "Angola." The correspondence of Count Lavradio from London, however, constantly after 1855 called for Portuguese expansion into the interior. Like Silva Porto, he disagreed with the policy of restricting occupation to the coast.
For the practical administrator on the coast at Luanda or Benguela, serious interest in the interior, and serious policy were two different matters. British naval activity and commercial pressure on the coast north of Ambriz centered Portuguese attention on the north coast. Fear of losing the Congo region dominated the attention of the central government, and at one moment in 1862 Governor Andrade feared a British occupation of Ambrizette and Quissembo. Plans for controlling this north coast originated in the 18th century interior stations established to try to prevent foreign activity on the coast from the interior.

Although this Portuguese strategy of dominating Congo kingdom to later dominate the coast seemed to have failed, the idea was implicit in the official mind that the interior was useful only in so far as it aided control and prosperity on the coast. Indeed, Amaral's administration was an example of this tradition. In his second term as Governor of Angola for a short period in 1869 to 1870, Amaral reiterated his tactics in explaining why he went into the Congo after 1857. It was: "The object we really had in mind was "to achieve the domination of the coast, by the occupation of the interior." 

165 Lacerda, Exame das Viagens, p. 215.
CHAPTER V

CENTRALIZATION AND RECOVERY, 1863-1877

Without the complete abolition of forced labor, it will not be possible to establish in our colonies, a durable system, to bring them to prosperity.


I don't consider the black sufficiently educated now to receive complete freedom.... The free black, save for a few exceptions, does not work, because he sees no need for this, and I have for this proof in the incredible number of thousands of free vagabond-blacks who live in the city of Luanda, of whom none presents himself for labor in the Public Works.

CHAPTER V

CENTRALIZATION AND RECOVERY, 1863-1877

A. Climax in the Labor Problem

If the Government General at Luanda in 1862 considered that its lines of control and communication were over-extended, it also felt that the legislation of 1854, 1856, and 1858, obscured by the wars and rebellions of 1857-62, had proved unsatisfactory. The Negro’s status had not been altered for the good, but had, in fact, been worsened by the raising of the hut tax, a violent European settler reaction, and the many uprisings. The old carreto system was still in use, and although slaves were now (since the decree of December 1854) registered by many masters with the Government, the new name liberto had no basis in truth. Labor was more scarce after the Cassange war ended in 1863 than before. Migration and mortality complicated the labor problem in Angola at a crucial moment in liberal execution of the laws.

Governor-General Sebastião Calheiros included in his Relatório published in 1867 his observations and convictions about the labor issue. His conclusions represented the naked reality of what happened in Angola
in decades to come. He felt forced labor was the only solution to the problem of a chronically weak agriculture and general undevelopment. The Portuguese were obliged by necessity, he believed, to show little mercy to those who did not follow their example.

Agriculture of the whites in Angola, in colonial products, can be called impossible without forced labor.... Free labor of the blacks, given to the whites for payment, as permitted by the respective product of tropical agriculture, is, at least for now, a dream. ¹

Oalheiros felt that the growing number of libertos was as much a burden upon the public budget as was the large community of degredados concentrated near the coast. A liberto was an African slave, often branded with an "L" by the Government, who was registered for emancipation within twenty years. By the decree of December 1854 Portugal declared the slave inhabitants of Angola, below a certain age, as libertos. Portuguese masters were supposed to register their slaves in Government records. By the end of 1863, over 30,000 were on the official lists at Luanda. Yet the actual numbers of slaves, who remained unregistered, were probably considerable; in any event, it was difficult to keep track of masters and slaves in the sertão. ²

¹Sebastiao Lopes de Oalheiros, Relatório do Governador Geral da Provincia de Angola (Lisbon, 1867), pp. 66-67.

Portuguese administration developed a definite system of control for the Negro population. All slaves were obliged to carry *bilhetes*, or passports signed by their masters. Even *pretos livres*, or free blacks, carried passports near settlements, and if found without them, were punished. The *empacaceiros*, or auxiliary servicemen were regarded as a step above the ordinary freeman; it is clear they regarded themselves as a privileged elite, enjoying special favors from the Portuguese who hired them.

Governor Calheiros, especially after observing the devastating events before 1861, proposed that forced labor was vital for the economy. Governors-General in this era well realized the effect of *dizimo* taxation, and porterage service upon the African population. Migration was an inevitable result, and a consequent loss of labor and revenue. Governor Andrade as well as Governor Calheiros realized the deplorable effects of recent events upon the population near settlements. Andrade had to admit at the onset of his first term of office:

> The Black is, and will continue to be for many years, the only means the government and commerce can use for the transport

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3 *Boletim Official*, 1861, Nos. 828-829.
4 Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, pp. 445-46. On *Empacaceiros*: "They are very trustworthy, and, when on active service, form the best native troops the Portuguese possess."
of supplies, war material, baggage, and merchandise. 5

So great was the turmoil and movement in Angola of the 1860's that the Negro population experienced little mercy from Europeans or from their own traditional leaders. Inter-group warfare was common on the Angolan plateau, but the exact recording of it would be monotonous and perhaps fruitless. Portuguese apologists claimed that slavery under Europeans was merciful compared to certain death as a prisoner of war in the sertão. Although the term resgate was falsified and at times misused, it cannot be wholly dismissed as being without a profound historical basis. Portuguese traders in effect did resgatar or ransom prisoners and criminals from sobas a famous example being from the Matiamvo of Lunda. Such prisoners of war, or criminals in the traditional penal systems of the African societies were destined for death by a variety of methods. Trial by poison was one custom.

Slavery's influence remained unaltered in the sertão. There is a parallel with the past of Dahomey in the words of Garrido in 1867:

Slavery will continue in places where we do not rule, subject to chiefs and rulers so absolute and despotic that, when they cannot

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sell their prisoners, they turn to the expedient of killing them.

Portuguese slavery in Angola was perhaps more harsh for the slave than life in Brazil, but Angolan slavery found some defenders among foreign observers in the 19th century. Bringing the Negro to the coast from the warfare of the interior in many cases must have had some similarity to the concept of resgate.

Governor Garrido believed as many governors of Angola that the emancipation of the Negro was very distant, and that Sá da Bandeira's date of freedom, 1878, was reasonable. Angola must develop before the emancipation, not merely after it.

The idea of forced labor repels me also; I recognize, however, that it is a necessity for this province.

6 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 37, No. 232, 10 March 1867, Gov. Gen. For a complaint of the Matiamvo of Lunda against the suppression of export slave-trade about 1845 see the following. Matiamvo said the end of slave-trade would mean he would have no outlet for his criminals and prisoners of war. Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, Vol. I, 1854, "Viagem a Lunda," by Joaquim Rodrigues Graça.

7 Winwood Reade questioned the effects of "abolition" in Angola, and felt the slaves were well-treated. Savages Africa, p. 257. J. Monteiro, Angola, 1876 edition, pp. 88-90. "Slaves as a rule are very well treated in Angola by the Portuguese, and cases of neglect or ill-usage are rare."

8 Dr. Duffy says resgate had "no reality in the African trade," Portuguese Africa, p. 140.

As stated above, shortage of labor in Angola was pressing after the "time of troubles," 1857-63. Every event seemed to take Negro population away from Portuguese settlements or agricultural regions. The Portuguese themselves, however, by their transport system of labor were responsible for drawing away more population to the islands of Sao Thome and Principe. This system had continued since the 1840's in one form or another, and was, of course, noted and protested by British authorities at Luanda.\textsuperscript{10} The system seems to have continued steadily throughout the 19th century, especially the second half.

An early example of labor transfer to the islands is found in a petition to the Portuguese Government in Lisbon by a merchant of São Thomé wishing to ship "up to 200 black libertos" from a port in southern Angola. Permission was granted,\textsuperscript{11} and later published in the \textit{Diario do Governo} of 2 October 1855. Such transportation of Angolan negroes to the islands, rarely followed by repatriation, continued steadily throughout the century. In 1875 Cameron learned near Benguela that such vessels, for an undisclosed destination, regularly left Benguela and Mossamedes.\textsuperscript{12} At one period, however,

\textsuperscript{10}Duffy, \textit{Portuguese Africa}, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{11}A.H.U., Conselho Ultramarino (C.U.), 1855, No. 433, August 1855.

\textsuperscript{12}Cameron, V. L., \textit{Across Africa} (London, 1885), pp. 470-471.
the Governor-General gave evidence and accused the British cruisers of taking the captured slaves near Angola and carrying them to British colonies in labor "contracts."\(^{13}\)

As for the shortage of labor in Angola, Sá da Bandeira in 1873 asserted that the settlers' claim of "shortage" was often false. If Africans received decent payment, they would work. The hut tax of 1856 had been increased to encourage the native to work in agriculture. The Portuguese statesman was certain that the amount of the tax was reasonable, since a similar native tax in Natal was twice the amount.\(^ {14}\) Yet, in the meantime, critical events had made payment of this tax impossible. Governor Andrade in 1862, supported by the Conselho do Governo (Cabinet) and the Junta da Fazenda (Exchequer) in Luanda, moved to reduce the tax.\(^ {15}\)

Later in 1873 the dizimo, which in this case was a hut tax, on interior concelhos was abolished altogether, not only because it had caused native emigration, but because it fomented wars as, for example, the Dembos War, 1871-73.


\(^{14}\)Sá da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural Africano, pp. 62-64.

\(^{15}\)A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 31, No. 57, 1862.
Settler opposition to the liberal program for free labor and for eventual emancipation by 1878 was extremely powerful in Angola. Complicating factors which caused labor shortages in certain areas have been mentioned. Clearly, mining operations and the cultivation of cotton, sugar cane, and coffee were increasing in extent and in profitableness in Angola after 1861 when the American Civil War began. Steam navigation on the Cuanza River encouraged the employment of more African labor, whether for porterage to warehouses on that river or for agriculture. 16

As the date of planned emancipation approached, the Associação Commercial de Lisboa, with interests in Angola, petitioned the Government in 1872 to extend forced labor past 1878. The aged Sá da Bandeira reacted to compose a final plea and rationale for reform in the colonies in his Trabalho Rural Africano e Administracao Colonial (1873). This was his last statement of the liberal principles he hoped to perpetuate in Angola and Mozambique, and a plea for a program of equal rights for the entire Portuguese empire. Angola received the largest share of space in this work, which was dedicated to the memory of Dom Pedro V (1853-61).

16 J. Monteiro, Angola, 1876 edition, pp. 60-70, 179-180. Monteiro noticed a definite increase in trade and prosperity in Angola after 1866 and the beginning of steam navigation in Angola.
It asserted that the Portuguese must pay for negro labor but that the state, "on some exceptional occasions," has the right to force "a temporary service." 17

Yet unless Africans received education equal to Europeans, the future had little hope. Silva Porto, a veteran settler who farmed near Catumbella for nearly ten years, believed that religious education and stern treatment would solve the problem of labor shortage. Although he was generally popular among the peoples of Bihe, he was no different from other farmers in that his workers continually deserted him without notice. 18

The law did not provide for the gap in understanding between the Portuguese and the Africans who labored for them. Even Silva Porto felt that the term liberto was a sham word for escravo that the administration perpetuated from the highest to the lowest echelons. Silva Porto feared that Portugal would become the Poland of southern Europe, but he also wished Sá da Bandeira would limit his liberal ideas to that portion of the world.

In 1878 the labor code entitled Regulamento para os contratos de servicaís e colonos was put into effect with a vagrancy clause which insured the continuation of forced labor. 19 This code had its origin in

17 Sá da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural, p. 69.
18 Silva Porto, Ibagens de Apontamentos, V, VI, p. 415, 26 June 1872.
the rationale of Governor Calheiros in his 1861 Relatório, published six years later. Calheiros more than any other administrator of the era put the thinking of the vested European interests in Angola into shape for future labor codes of later generations. The year 1878 was no watershed for the labor problem except on paper, although 20th century liberal apologists point to the date as the time when slavery was officially replaced by forced labor.20 The Portuguese in Angola at the time, however, had the example of Brazil ever before their eyes.

B. The Congo Question Continued

The Portuguese north of Ambriz, true to the predictions of Lord Russell, continued to exercise a "barren sovereignty" after their sudden expansion. In spite of the exhaustion of the army system, the devastating small-pox epidemic of 1864-65, and the obstinate policy of Britain, Portuguese leaders at Luanda still envisioned occupying permanently the coast and much hinterland between Ambriz and Cabinda, including the Congo River mouth. Portuguese control and jurisdiction were tenuous beyond the guns of the tiny forts at Ambriz, Quiballa, Bembe, and S. Salvador. And after 1863, these stations settled down to a grim battle in

vain against climate, hostile natives, no reinforcements, little pay, and wretched communications. By 1870 what sovereignty and effective occupation Governors Amaral and Calheiros once possessed had faded away to nothing beyond the port of Ambriz.21

Luanda counted on the copper mines at Bembe for revenue and a foothold near trade routes to the coast north of Ambriz. Bembe proved a mirage on all counts. Although ore was exported in some quantity until about 1865 by the Western Africa Malachite Copper Mines Company Limited," by 1868 the mines were in ruin, and the last European supervisor had succumbed to the climate.22 With English capital, this company gained the concession in 1859 from a former slave-trading merchant, the Brazilian capitalist, Francisco A. Flores. The Government had promised to garrison and occupy Bembe, about 120 miles inland from Ambriz, in return for road-building and fort-construction by the company. Bembe remained poor and isolated, and in 1872 Governor Andrade recalled to Ambriz the last garrison of forty soldiers.23


23 Andrade, Relatórios Dos Governadores (1875), Angola, pp. 3-94.
British naval activity in the Congo River continued to incite Portuguese merchants in Luanda to visions of British colonies north of Ambriz. The contraband problem remained a thorn in the side of Portuguese trade for tariffs at Ambriz and Luanda discouraged most foreign traders from settling in Angola. Matters reached a crisis in 1865, and Lisbon received and considered various proposals to occupy and finally annex the Congo River.

The ubiquitous Commodore Wilmot appeared again, to Portuguese chagrin, and about 1865 attempted to lay out a cemetery for English personnel at Loango and construct a factory at São António do Zaire (near Point Padron). Again the King of Congo wrote the Governor-General that British arms and powder were held by partisans of the deceased Álvaro Dongo, who threatened to unseat the King from Sao Salvador.24

Reacting to these new threats, later in 1865, some five Luanda merchants drew up a petition to the Minister of Navy and Overseas proposing a veritable colonial "deal" with France in order to secure the Congo for Portugal. In exchange for Portuguese Guinea, which French influence had already surrounded, these merchants proposed that France support Portugal’s claims to the Congo and its occupation against British policy.

Supporting this proposal, which was in the spirit of the later partition era, was the profound belief that the Congo, and the coast north of Ambriz, represented the "Eldorado" for the revenue of Angola.\textsuperscript{25} Again with this proposal came the explicit Portuguese conviction that the coast was a \textit{sine qua non} for prosperity, and that the interior was unimportant for Portuguese power in Angola. These Luanda merchants echoed a tendency several centuries old, especially in Angola, north of the Cuanza River. As long as foreign trade passed so near to the capital, Portuguese commerce would never rest until competition was laden with custom duties.

\begin{quote}
From Molembo to the mouth of the river Cunene will be a very vast and rich empire. We won't have to conquer anything toward the interior, it is sufficient to occupy the principal places of the Coast. All the Commerce of the interior natives will un-failingly come there to be exchanged for by the foreigners of Europe.... This very important occupation will cost us merely a small cession whereas enormous advantages will redound to us.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

What became of this curious idea in the channels of Franco-Portuguese diplomacy is not known. But a note jotted on the 1865 letter from Governor Andrade on the

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\textsuperscript{25}A.H.U., Pasta 34, No. 638, 30 December 1865, Letter to Overseas Ministry signed by "L. J. Affonso, Joao Tavares, T. P. Falcão, Pinto, and Redrige. Luanda."
\textsuperscript{26}A.H.U., Pasta 34, December 30, 1865, Letter, No. 638.
\end{flushright}
subject of the Congo gives a clue that the proposal received a conservative reception. A Foreign Office official remarked that the extension of Portuguese rule up to the Congo should be accomplished by negotiating with native powers for "vassalage," working with the King of Congo, and use force only "in exceptional circumstances." He suggested following the lines of approach using Ambriz, Bembe and São Salvador, as before. In short, though this cautious policy from Lisbon in 1865 probably reflected the lack of resources in Angola to implement a policy of "force," perhaps a bold stroke at this early date upon the Congo would have met with less British resistance than ten years later.

Portugal again raised the question of claim to the Congo in 1867 following another incident involving native piracy. The British steamer Antelope in February 1867 was attacked by "Mussorongo pirates" (Bakongo-speaking peoples) at Mangue Grande, a trade settlement north of Ambrizette. The British retaliated by landing, attacking villages, and in the process burning and damaging Portuguese factories there. Portuguese authorities immediately claimed the incident

27 Scribbled in margin of No. 194A, Pasta 34, 15 April 1865, Letter Andrade to Lisbon. There were (6) proposals by this anonymous official; only a few were legible for this writer.

28 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 53.
occurred in their territory and demanded extensive damages.\textsuperscript{29} Little came of it, however, and British policy continued to quote the traditional "non-recognition" policy begun by Palmerston in 1846.

Although most British diplomats until 1876 were adamant in refusing negotiation on the Congo, Portuguese diplomats continued to plan ways to appease Britain. The customs duties at Ambriz on foreign articles were somewhat lowered in the early 1870's.\textsuperscript{30} But more important than this was the idea proposed by Sá da Bandeira in 1873 in his last book. He stressed the need of the Congo or part of it for Angola's future, and the long-standing dispute had to end. Mussorongo piracy, fully admitted by the British as a reality, could be combatted by Portugal, and Sá da Bandeira was willing to guarantee complete freedom of trade and navigation on the Congo. The left bank of the Congo was "indispensable" for the Portuguese, and "in order to obtain its indisputable acquisition, it would be politic to forego the right we have to a portion of the coast north of the same river."\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29}P.R.O., F.0. 63/1115, March 1867, Vredenburg to Russell, No. 4.

\textsuperscript{30}João de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as Provincias Ultramarinas (Lisbon, 1883), I, pp. 150-60.

\textsuperscript{31}Sá da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural, pp. 160-2, 210-14.
Whether or not this reasonable proposal by the elder Portuguese statesman was ever noticed or expressed in diplomatic conversations is not clear. But Portuguese claims and demands for both banks of the Congo were supposed by most British authorities to be the steadfast line from the beginning, and if Sá da Bandeira had been in power and active in 1873, his conciliating terms would have met a kind reception from men like Robert Morier. As it was, Sá da Bandeira was dead and gone when Morier arrived in Lisbon in 1877, and the north bank of Congo was lost to Portugal through the pressure of other powers.  

Sá da Bandeira in 1873 sought a "deal" with Britain partly in fear of "ill-winds" from Spain. The short-lived Spanish Republic and rumors of an "Iberian Union" of Spain and Portugal prompted him at this time to seek protection of the Portuguese monarchy from an old ally. Whatever the proposals and easier terms the Portuguese offered in the 1870's, the chance was lost, in effect, by the early 1880's when powers more important than Manchester and Liverpool merchants viewed the Congo with intense interests.

32 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, Chapter V, pp. 84-112.

33 Sá da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural, pp. 210-214. The newspapers of the period 1869-74 indicate the importance of "Iberian Union."
Portuguese relations with the King of Congo steadily declined to mutual recrimination and neglect. Nothing was done about the plan to control the southern bank of the Congo from a road out of Sao Salvador southward to Bembe, then westward to Ambriz; and apparently only tiny garrisons of less than fifty soldiers represented Portuguese influence until 1870 when the last detachment was pulled back to the coast.34

Letters from Pedro V, the King of Congo, in 1867 asking for wine supplies, food, and a Portuguese priest met with scorn and ridicule from the governor-general. Various governors proposed in 1868-69 new plans to occupy the Congo region and the Junta Consultiva (title of the old Conselho Ultramarino after 1868) was asked about such an occupation and interference in tribal politics as in 1859-60. The Junta waited for the opinion of José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral, the former Governor who executed the first occupation, and who was on his way out to begin a second term in Angola.35 But a tentative conservative policy was put forth by Lisbon in 1869 which complemented the general "centralization" and withdrawal policy of the era.


35 A.H.U., Junta Consultiva, 1870, 22 February 1869, No. 431, "Parecer" or "Decision."
The Government of Portugal should abstain as much as possible from interfering in internal tribal questions and kingdoms giving us no homage in African territory, and more particularly, from supporting obnoxious leaders, hateful to the peoples, as it seems is the one who presently rules the Congo, from what the Governor of Angola says. 36

Amaral was also of the opinion that Congo was of no political or economic importance for Angola. 37 Moreover, his idea of out-flanking British trade through Sao Salvador proved a failure. King Pedro V, according to a report of 1872 by a certain Padre Nunes who visited Sao Salvador, was weak, dissipated, and with "little moral authority" over the peoples around his capital. His secretary, and relative, D. Garcia d'Agua Rosada was perhaps more important and had great influence upon the old King. Nunes, however, urged the reoccupation of the Congo kingdom, and the establishment of army and officials with European law to instill in the Congolese "love of family and of labor." 38 But clearly in order to reach the capital of Congo at this time, the Portuguese would begin a major campaign since the roads were held by hostile "independent" natives who stopped or turned back all European travellers. For later in 1877, when

36 Ibid., "Parecer."

37 "Congo," in official Portuguese correspondence, meant the Congo kingdom, of the south bank. "Zaire" meant the entire Congo River, both banks and some of the coast to the north.

38 Boletim Official, 1872, No. 51, December 21.
another priest tried the road to Bembe, he was told at Ambriz that his chances for safe travel were poor.39 Monteiro noted in 1875 Portuguese could not pass from Boma, on the Congo, to São Salvador because of native fear "of the example of the occupation of Ambriz and Bembe mines by the Portuguese."40

Amaral when he reviewed the situation in 1869 counseled a cautious plan with regard to the Congo; to oppose with force British policy, he felt, would be "the greatest of imprudences." But it was true that the plan to intercept trade by intervening in the Congo kingdom "did not have any effect."41 Indeed, interfering in tribal politics in the interior had been only an expedient, not an end of policy as far as he was concerned. "Independent tribes" in isolated and unhealthy regions were to be left alone. But on the Congo coast it was a different situation.

Lisbon sent more vessels to cruise the Congo coast after 1869. Captain José Maria de Telles Basto, of the Infante Dom Henrique corvette, surveyed conditions in the Congo mouth in 1870 and submitted his long report to the Governor-General in February 1871. Out of five factories at Banana, one was Portuguese. Porto da Lenha

had two English factories, one Spanish factory, and four Portuguese factories, and one Dutch branch house. Reporting that piracy continued uncontrolled, and that incidents on the river were mocking Portuguese jurisdiction, he urged a vessel of war be sent to "occupy" the Congo mouth, and use Porto da Lenha as a base to command the river. \(^{42}\)

Later accounts on the trade of the Congo mouth during 1870 to 1877 are divided over whether English or Dutch factories had the upper hand. Lord Mayo and Anstey claim the English were uppermost, but the Belgian Delcommun was certain that the Dutch, especially at Boma, were predominant. Most of the Portuguese in Boma in 1876, for example, were managing Dutch houses. Nevertheless, he noted that Portuguese trade competition was very strong, and in his words, "even ferocious." \(^{43}\)

Portugal continued to harbor the faint hope that Britain would be obliged to relax her grip on "non-recognition" of rights to the Congo. Yet the Portuguese persisted in policies, however ephemeral, which hoped to educate African elites who lived in territories strategic to the great river.

\(^{42}\)A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 42, No. 61, 15 February 1871, Basto to Governor-General enclosed.

Portugal's policy in Cabinda before 1885 was similar to that used with the Congo dynasty. A major traditional leader was supported against his rival and given special privileges to bring him into the Portuguese party. Manuel Jose Puna (or "Poonah," as the English called him) was chief of Porto Rico in Cabinda, and was sent to Brazil some years before 1822 at Portuguese expense in order to receive an education. Later in 1866 he made a visit to Portugal, was baptized as a godson of King Luiz I, and in 1871 was made "Baron of Cabinda," a hereditary title of nobility. Manuel Puna remained friendly to the Portuguese and corresponded with the governors of Angola. His eldest sons in 1868 were taken to Luanda for primary education and later were sent to a school in Lisbon. Whatever the importance of Puna in Cabinda, it is clear he had been offered education by English naval officers, and refused. His native rival, Francisco Franque, controlled a port a few miles north and was more friendly to the English.

Governor Andrade in his report of October 1873 to Lisbon asked the pertinent question of actually where were the boundaries of Angola? He reflected the concern felt by Sa da Bandeira about the claim dispute with

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Britain, and naturally connected the issue with the budget of the province. He claimed that Portugal had all the rights to the coast from 5 degrees 12 minutes to 18 degrees (Cape Frio), and he based the claim on treaties negotiated with native powers. Angola, he admitted, was not colonized. His point was well taken when he produced an impressive, if inaccurate, ratio of populations: there were "four or five thousand Portuguese to three million Africans." The old themes of too many degredados and so much undeveloped wealth recurred. Portuguese emigration to Angola was vitally necessary.

Despite the patient attempts of diplomat Robert Morier, a suitable and acceptable treaty on claims to the Congo was not made in time before other powers became too interested to allow Portugal to have the mouth of the Congo. Portugal was not risking use of force on the Congo and, indeed, had little opportunity to wield it. Proposals for early colonial "deals" to make Britain drop her guard before 1875 had not received due consideration or energetic execution by Portuguese statesmen.


47 Most of the Portuguese emigration in the 19th century, over 75%, went to Brazil. J. P. Oliveira Martins, Brasil e as Colónias Portuguesas (Lisbon, 1880), pp. 159, 229.

48 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 84-140.
The new colonial movement in Portugal rising with the establishment of the Society of Geography in 1875 and the Central Permanent Geographical Commission in 1876 kept the Congo in mind. The great expedition which it raised at the beginning of 1877, and which left Lisbon in July of that year, was intended for exploration up the Congo to trace its course.\(^49\) Another expedition, led by Henry Morton Stanley and backed by Anglo-American funds, reached Boma in August 1877, having left the East African coast nearly three years earlier and traced the entire Congo River course, thus altering the destination of the expedition from Lisbon. Moreover, Stanley's feat and his subsequent information on the Congo interested enough powerful groups to exclude all possibility of Portuguese monopoly of the river from that time on.\(^50\)

A new period of our study begins with the arrival of Stanley at the Congo mouth and with the beginning of the Portuguese expedition to explore southern Africa in 1877. The interior of Angola would be more important to the Portuguese than ever before in the 19th century.

C. The Dembos Rising and End of Dizimo Taxation

Dembos country lies on the plateau northwest of Luanda. Mountains and deep valleys compose this broken

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\(^{50}\) Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, pp. 169-70.
country, which even in the time of Cadornega had provided the native forces with natural stone fortresses against European intruders.51 Dembos as a region symbolized the uneven character of Portuguese occupation as close as it was to the coast and major developed regions as Golungo Alto. For centuries passage through Dembos followed a dangerous and uncertain path up the Dande River to Encoge, or a path directly north from Ambaca or Golungo Alto. Always a pocket of resistance for Portuguese control, allowing little settlement by Europeans, and hence very few slaves or libertos, the Dembos people were fierce warriors. Dembos became an independent concelho in 1810, separated from Golungo Alto by order of the Governor Oliveira Barbosa.52

Governor Amaral in 1856 had proposed creating "one or two" new presídios in Dembos region, since Dembos had been hostile to the occupation of Bembe and was actually cutting off the coffee and other exports on the road from Encoge, Cazengo, and Golungo to Ambriz. Yet Amaral was too busy elsewhere to pacify the difficult country.53 Luanda, however, persisted in sending expeditions to appease the Dembos chiefs by gifts to

52 Sarmento, Os Sertões, p. 159.
make them open the trade road to Bembe. One such expedition in 1862 was accompanied by a priest and offered a "deal" to Dembo Namboangongo: no imposition of Portuguese *dizimo* if the Dembos offered *carreto* service to carry trade.54

But Dembos remained hostile. Only a small Portuguese garrison remained at Encoge. Unlike other "vassalized" sobas within the Portuguese system in northern Angola, the Dembos retained their native names and took no Portuguese titles as a rule. The chief Dembo, or Captain-Chief, was Caculo Cacahenda who in 1880 was said to have 13,000 people under his rule.55 Like the Ambaca peoples, the Dembos were said to be able to count many of their number as literate in Portuguese, made possible by handing down the information from father to son.56

A modern historian with experience in Angola called the pacification of Dembos in the early 20th century "the most difficult and toughtest of all those in Angola."57 But in the 19th century an attempt to conquer Dembos was perhaps more difficult because of

the small number of troops available to the Portuguese. Sarmento deplored the outcome of the so-called "Dembos War" of 1872-73, a low point in prestige and activity.

And, let us tell the truth, what can one do in all the vast province of Angola, with a garrison composed of two thousand men, or little more?

How is it possible to make the Portuguese name respected, and to punish severely those who either rebel and insult us or rob and steal, as happens in the interior? 58

In Luanda the people were told that the Dembos campaigns had been victorious for the Portuguese and that a favorable peace treaty was signed. What began as a revolt in Dembos against dizimo taxation and the capture of a Dembo became a general rising in Dande, Golungo Alto, Ambaca, and elsewhere. Portuguese settlers fled to the coast for their lives in 1872, and trade was "paralyzed."59 The upshot of his war, however, was more important than loss of lives and prestige for the administration: it caused a reappraisal and a temporary end to the direct taxation on interior districts.

What were the causes of the Dembos War? In June 1872, after the war was several months old, a Portuguese settler, Silva Oliveira, wrote a complaining letter to Luanda saying Portugal was to blame for the

58 Sarmento, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
59 G.E.P.eB., Vol. 8, p. 532, "Dembos."
rebellion and war since Dembos took example from the rebels of Cassange a decade before. "That shameful" peace of Cassange (1863), he added, gave spirit to other African rebels to take advantage of European merchants and property. Portugal should have conquered Cassange.60

Although the general "independent" nature of tribes like the Mbangala of Cassange reflected badly upon the Government, Dembos had a reputation for rebellion long before 1863. The old scourge of the colonial administration, the dizimo or hut tax on interior districts, caused rebellions in the 1840's. At that time a Prince of Congo, Dom Aleixo, played upon this grievance of the Dembos.61 It seems more correct, therefore, to say that taxation sparked the 1872 rising west of Encoge. For after the dizimo was abolished officially at the end of November 1872, an explanation for the Government approval of the measure appeared in the Boletim Official. The abolition of "dizimos impostos" was decreed,

... since according to the general opinion it is the most logical corrective to these movements of brutal reaction of which the Dembos have been the ancient and the modern example. 62

60Boletim Official, 1872, No. 25, 22 June 1872, pp. 274-5.
62Boletim Official, 1873, No. 1, January 4, "Parte Nao Official."
The Government abolished three types of direct taxation on the natives in the interior concelhos: "dizimos dos concelhos," toll charges over rivers, and fishing taxes. In a long memorandum of November 1872 explaining the measure, the Minister for Navy and Overseas, Jayme de Freitas Moniz wrote that the dizimo constituted a great danger for Angola. Early house or hut taxes, like the decima predial (floor tax) of 1808, had not taxed natives' huts of straw and sticks. But the dizimo tax on huts in the interior destroyed the very thing the administration sought: peace and security.

The small population of Angola can be thus explained, and shows the causation of abandonment of territory that took place there after the increase of the hut tax (dizimo por fogo). Still today, almost ten years after the reduction of the tax by a punitive quota system, all the colored people who emigrated during the most oppressive period of the tax have not returned to the province. It is sad to have to say it, but it seems that many found better favor in the lands of the bush natives than in the concelhos subject to the Portuguese government. As a result, this direct tax, centuries old in Angola, was replaced by a 1% customs duty to be applied to exports and imports ad valorem at Luanda, Benguela, and Mossamedes.

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63 B.O., Supplemento ao No. 1, 1873, January 7.
65 B.O., 1873, Supplemento ao No. 1, January 7. It is noteworthy that the customs house of Ambriz was not included in the new duty. The Government was trying to attract foreign capital and hence decided to reduce duties.
Relations between the Portuguese and Dembos were bad in 1871 but actual hostilities did not break out until early 1872. Two major attacks by Portuguese expeditions in April and in July of that year failed to defeat the major Dembos, although a "neutral," Dembos Quibaixe, submitted. In September, after many Portuguese sallies to burn villages and open the trade routes, Dembos Caculo Cacahenda finally submitted. When Portuguese forces returned from the war in October 1872, Luanda gave them a royal welcome. Yet, in fact, the return of the forces was a sign of defeat and the abandonment of Dembos by Portuguese authority. For Governor Andrade admitted that the area was abandoned with no military force existing there after 1872.

Unrest continued in Ambaca and Golungo Alto as a result of Dembos until March, 1873. Portuguese casualties in the affair were considerable in terms of the weakened state of the army and guerra preta system. One inflammatory journal in Luanda, suspected of Republican sentiments and treachery, o Mercantil, had revealed more casualties than the Government would admit, and asserted that the Dembos leaders actually were in contract with a European merchant in Luanda. The Dembos

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66 Castelbranco, História de Angola, p. 244.
67 Andrade, Relatórios dos Governadores, Angola, pp. 84=85.
"secretaries" could read and write Portuguese. Moreover, Lisbon later learned that a detachment of one Lieutenant and 37 soldiers was missing in Dembos and given up for dead.

Dembos was abandoned and taxes were no longer collected there. Although there were hopes of re-occupying it at an opportune moment, the region was entered again only in 1890, and was finally pacified and administered only after 1910. Dembos left a reputation for guerilla warfare, with ambushes, inexplicable escapes, and feats of endurance. A revealing letter from a settler toward the end of the "official" campaign gave total casualties for the European side as "200 soldiers wounded and dead, 3 officers killed and 3 wounded."

Dembos was no longer mentioned in monthly reports to the Government General from the interior after mid-1873. Trade with regions passing near Dembos was not adversely affected for long. For an important wax and ivory caravan from Cassange reached Luanda in July 1872 at the height of the campaigns.

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68 Boletim Official, 1872, No. 41, October 12, Letter of 26 September 1872, from Sebastiao Nunes da Matta.

69 Andrade, Relatórios, supra.

70 Boletim Official, 1873, No. 41, October 11; Jornal do Commercio, 19 November 1872, p. 2, "Africa Occidental."

71 Boletim Official, 1872; Jornal do Commercio, 4 September 1872.
open some of the trade routes through their country, the area remained a pocket of independence, northeast of the capital. Apart from loss of prestige, the affair of 1872 made the authorities in Lisbon and in Luanda withdraw an old, outmoded and largely ineffective, measure of control for the interior: the dizimo. It was one more move of the post-1863 trend of policy to concentrate on the coasts of the province.

D. Eastern and Southern Angola

In eastern Angola, or from Duque de Braganza to Cassange, steady trade between the Mbangala middlemen and the Portuguese continued with or without official Portuguese representation. After the establishment of a regular steamer service on the Cuanza about 1866, trade with this section of the province was given new encouragement to come west toward settlements north of the river. Portuguese merchants generally criticized the withdrawal of a force and a chefe from Cassange after 1863, since the Mbangala held the trade with an iron grip and had little mercy on settlers. Yet the Government wanted no responsibility for merchants who ventured or settled as far inland as Cassange. Governor Andrade had asserted this policy. In his first term, and later Governor Garrido in 1867 supported him. As he wrote Lisbon, "It is best for us to voluntarily

72 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 30, No. 768, 1 July 1862, Gov. Gen.
retire from the indicated places [Humbe and Gambos in the south] and instead to raise our flag where it can fly freely and safely."73

Garrido believed in a withdrawal policy, and no more insecure footholds in the east and south. There was no useful purpose to wasting the scanty funds and lives. Governor Amaral, toward the end of his term, in a letter of April 1860 quoted by Garrido, had contradicted this idea:

I repeat that the security of this province calls for the most serious attention of the Government of his Majesty, above all, to desire the conservation of the recently occupied distant places. 74

Garrido said this was changed now, and that prestige with the chiefs of the interior was not possible with the weak resources at hand in Angola. In 1868 Garrido argued the same policy with regard to the Congo kingdom, languishing and impoverished, and supported by a garrison of only ninety soldiers. The King, Pedro V, would be killed, he added, the moment the Portuguese forces left his isolated capital and stopped wasting funds in maintaining a "chefe" without "the least compensation" in trade.75

74 Ibid., quotation by Garrido in his letter to Lisbon.
The rationale for maintaining other distant stations in Angola can be read in Garrido's discussion of the Congo. For he believed that only the coast was worthwhile and productive for revenue. Even so, his suggestion that merely 150 men could capture Quissembo for the administration was not acted upon.76

Malange garrison was apparently abandoned after a serious rebellion of 1863 when military degredados nose. Governor Garrido supported this abandonment as well as that of Cassange, and the Government in Lisbon agreed.77 A new force of soldiers was placed at Malange in 1871, however, by Governor Ponte e Horta.78 Malange's situation was similar to the problems of other interior districts. Critical pens wrote Lisbon that the major instigators of native rebellions were the "judges, officers, chefes of concelhos, tax collectors, etc."79

The soldiers representing Portugal in the interior, as at Malange, were mainly negro recruits. Their desertions were frequent. During the Bonga rebellions in Mozambique, the Governor of Angola was asked to raise a native army to help in those campaigns. In 1869 Garrido replied that the natives would not serve in

76Ibid.
77Jornal do Commercio, 4 September 1872, "Angola."
78Guilherme Capello, Relatorio do Governador (1887), p. 4.
79Jornal do Commercio, 10 March 1864.
Mozambique except by force and they would desert if they heard of service in East Africa. The raising of a battalion at that moment was "impossible," he believed, and would endanger the territory. Hard pressed to raise some force, he decided that certain interior districts in eastern Angola might produce soldiers. 80

In training native soldiers for several months, the main problems were to prevent desertion and to teach them Portuguese. The Eastern regions, the Governor added, were not so warlike as districts to the south, near Benguela and Mossamedes, where the natives were the Bailundo, Bihe, and Nano. But since these groups were not "vassalized," he could not attempt their recruitment "without risking the invasions and destruction of the districts of Benguela and Mossamedes." 81

It is not clear if an expeditionary battalion was actually raised in Angola in 1869. But the problem, once brought up, revealed the weakness and undependability of the army. In 1876 Governor Albuquerque found the armed force in the same state. After two months as Governor, he placed absolutely no trust in the soldiers.

81 Ibid., An attempt was made to raise a force in six or eight months.
Echoing the words of Governor Sousa Coutinho in the 18th century, Albuquerque said that these soldiers "did not deserve the name of troops" but were a turbulent collection of criminals and deserters. The equipment of the Government at Luanda was little better than the soldiers since the Governor found it nearly impossible to raise vessels and transports to carry troops from Luanda to Mossamedes for a campaign against the Nanos.

Meanwhile in Mozambique, Portuguese efforts were concentrated from 1868 to 1875 in campaigns against rebels in Zambezia region. Attention to Angola suffered in this period. Moreover, several of Angola's most active and outstanding expansionist Governors, Amaral and Costa Leal, were enlisted to administer Mozambique and end the unrest. Both veterans of campaigns in Angola succumbed to the deadly climate of the Eastern Coast. Portugal's colonial elite were not spared the rigors of several posts of adversity.

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83 Filipe Almeida de Eça, História das Guerras no Zambeze, 1807-1888 (Lisbon, 1954, 2 vols.), II, pp. 442-491. Colonel Fernando da Costa Leal, former Governor of Mossamedes, died as Governor of Mozambique in 1869. Costa Leal lead campaigns for expansion in Southern Angola. General José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral (1808-1873) was Minister of Navy and Overseas for six months in 1868. After a year as Governor of Angola, he went to Mozambique as Governor for three years (1870-1873), where he died.
The health of Governors-General of Angola was rarely good, whether residing in Luanda or traveling in the bush. But relatively few men succumbed in office in comparison with administrators in Mozambique. Amaral had two terms as Governor of Angola, and once was Governor of Benguela over a period of twenty years. Andrade was recalled to service a second time in 1872 for the Dembos campaign but by 1875 complained to Lisbon of deteriorating health. Much of his service in Angola was spent "in the most unhealthy places of Africa as Ambriz, Bembe, Encoge and S. Salvador of Congo." He resigned, but lived to a ripe old age, dying in Portugal in 1902.

The problem of climate, together with certain diseases and epidemics common in the territory, had a definite influence upon Portuguese activity and upon their native charges. One of the more important reasons for the abandonment of Bembe, Encoge and S. Salvador by 1870 was the effect of the deadly climate upon the garrisons. In 1873 the Government officially abolished the "Concelho do D. Pedro V," created in 1856 with hopes of rejuvenating the budget of Angola. This capped an effort whose failure was in part due to the traditional deadly climate of Congo.

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86 Hélio Felgas, História do Congo Português (Carmona, 1958), p. 113, Felgas fails to mention the climate factor as a motive.
The smallpox epidemic of 1864-1865 had an important and terrible impact upon the native population of Angola. To this scourge may be attributed the weakening of the Portuguese armed mobility in the field for several decades thereafter, and also the general complication of the problem of labor shortage. Although Castelbranco estimated that 25,000 natives died, and an incomplete estimate this writer made from contemporary reports was a little over 25,000, this number is undoubtedly far short of the truth. A list of European mortality in these smallpox years, 1864-65, indicates a significant increase, yet how many died of smallpox is not known.

Smallpox appeared first in this epidemic at Ambrizette in February 1864 transferred by a vessel from Europe. It spread down the coast by vessels, and by June 1864 had reached such a critical stage that the Government-General issued in the Boletim Official a "General Instructions" for all persons, including natives, containing methods for combating bexigas or variola (smallpox). Spreading to eastern Angola with the frequent trade caravans, the disease wiped out entire villages and made others migrate in fear of the scourge. Trade was paralyzed and, as in all epidemics

87 Castelbranco. História de Angola, p. 117. See details in Appendix IV.
88 Boletim Official, 1864; Jornal do Commercio, 2 September 1864.
in agricultural regions, a famine followed since farmers abandoned their fields.\textsuperscript{89} A great famine gripped Angola for the latter half of 1864 and the early months of 1865. Reportedly, Golungo Alto district, in closest contact with Europeans in number, suffered the greatest number of deaths from the epidemic. Negroes suffered the worst, \textit{pardos} or mulattoes not so much, and whites hardly at all.\textsuperscript{90}

By mid-1865 the epidemic had died out but had passed on further south to Southwest Africa, and to Sao Thome island among other places.\textsuperscript{91} Clearly smallpox remained endemic in some areas, and occasionally as in 1873-75 broke out again in Angola in epidemic form. Certain authorities like Bastos attributed to smallpox the beginning of the real diminution of the native population, later aided by sleeping sickness.\textsuperscript{92} Monteiro said Bembe was deserted in the early 1870's due to "several epidemics of small-pox."\textsuperscript{93}

The native population of Angola, the true economic support of the European minority, had been

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Jornal do Commercio}, 4 September 1864.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Boletim Official}, 1865, No. 4, January 21.
\textsuperscript{91} Heinrich Vedder, \textit{South West Africa in Early Times} (London, Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 150.
\textsuperscript{93} Monteiro, \textit{Angola}, 1876 edition, p. 108.
decimated by smallpox for centuries. Inevitably epidemic caused migration, and the Portuguese monthly official reports from interior districts were careful to include on their forms information on native emigration, and the causes.

Estimates of the population of the Portuguese-controlled regions called "Angola" are inexact and differ.94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Mulattoes</th>
<th>Negroes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1845 estimate</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>5,770</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855 (Livingstone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855 estimate for S. Angola (Ladislau Magyar)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,880,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856 census</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869 estimate</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td></td>
<td>430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869-70 estimate of Gov. Amaral</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873 estimate of Gov. Andrade</td>
<td>4-5,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The European population showed a steady increase in Angola only after 1870. It is difficult to figure into the native population regions later taken under Portuguese

94 Also see Appendix IV. The 1845 estimate is from the Estatística of Joaquim Lopes de Lima, quoted in Gerardo Pery, Geographia e Estatística Geral (Lisbon, 1875), pp. 356-7, along with the 1869 figure from the report of the Navy and Overseas Ministry by Corvo. Livingstone's estimate can be found in a letter to England in 1855, in Isaac Schapera, Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence, 1841-1856 (London, 1961), p. 296. Ladislau and Magyars estimate of 1855. The 1856 census is in Vogel, Le Portugal, p. 542. Governor Amaral's estimate is found in his letters, A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 40, November, December, 1869. Gov. Andrade's rather arbitrary figures are in his 1873 report in Relatórios dos Governadores (Lisbon, 1875), p. 84, "Angola."
control after 1890. But considering the high rate of mortality among natives near Portuguese settlements, whether from epidemic, alcoholism, or other European importations, it would seem the native population remained stationary in numbers, if it held its own.

The region and town of Mossamedes, first colonized in 1840, enjoyed some measure of progress after the first few difficult years. Considered as almost an exclusively agricultural region, as opposed to a great volume of trade north of the Cuanza, Mossamedes built up a small European colony along the lines of a plantation system. In 1849 and 1850 two boatloads from Brazil added about 300 settlers.95 In 1854 the population was estimated at 256 whites, 29 mulattoes and 481 slaves. In 1857 a small German colony of about thirty arrived at Huila on the plateau and was constantly attacked by the Mondombes, or the Nanos as the Portuguese called them.96 Several other groups from Brazil arrived at Mossamedes in the next decade. By 1866 there were about 756 whites, 48 mulattoes, and 2,345 slaves and libertos in the district of Mossamedes created by law in 1856. Since the area was more healthy than regions to the north, considerable numbers of women accompanied the colonies, and there were fewer mulatto offspring. The white

95 Felner, Angola, I, p. 20.
96 Felner, Ibid., III, Document No. 12, p. 50.
population had tripled since 1854 but the slave population, significantly, had quintupled.\textsuperscript{97}

The farms and stations on the plateau above Mossamedes, such as Bumbo, Huila, Gambos, Jau, Capangombe, and Humbe, and tiny isolated farms, led ephemeral existences after 1860 due to periodic severe draughts, native raids, and little continuous aid from coastal authorities. There was little or no Portuguese armed influence and the Nanos raided at will. Although certain cotton and sugar crops continued to hold their own, the area suffered from poor transport facilities for carrying goods down to the coast. Nevertheless in Mossamedes district from an early date the Portuguese employed many draft oxen, \textit{bois cavallos}, for carrying merchandise. North of the Ouanza the climate did not allow the survival of so many oxen as in the south. South of Mossamedes along the coast a modest fishing industry flourished under the tutelage of Algarvian fishermen.\textsuperscript{98}

Expansion in southern Angola was in part conditioned by the proximity of English traders and settlers on the coast of Southwest Africa near Walfish Bay. Especially after 1850, reports reached the Portuguese of English activity near the unmarked southern frontier. The border was usually considered at 18 degrees south

\textsuperscript{97}Gerardo Pery, \textit{Geographia}, p. 357.

\textsuperscript{98}Felner, \textit{Angola}, I, pp. 20-25; III, Doc. No. 23, pp. 74-77.
latitude, or near Cape Frio. Alfredo Duprat, the Portuguese Consul-General and Commissioner at Cape Town was a key expansionist and informant about British activity in southern Africa. His reports urged expansion from both coasts into Central Africa, north of Transvaal, and also into the hinterland of Angola.99

When in 1868, however, Duprat made a suggestion about a possible expansion south of Mossamedes on the coast, the Governor of Benguela decided to expand control within the regular lines of communication, and to end once and for all raids from Seles territory directly east of Egito. The scattered Portuguese settlers at Benguela, Egito and Novo Redondo had long been harassed by such raids, and by the successful escape of their slaves into this "no man's land."

Although the Governor-General disapproved of the independent action of his colleague at Benguela, he was pleased with the results. An expedition from Benguela, aided by detachments of guerra preta under the Sova of Galangue went into Seles and "vassalized" the most important chiefs who had raided farms on the rivers north of Lobito.100 The Governor-General at Luanda praised this bit of internal expansion between Luanda


100Ralph Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, pp. 226-7.
and Benguela, and his reasoning gave away the tendency in the official mind of the administration to favor the coast at the expense of the interior. As he wrote about Seles in 1868:

> Considering that sertão is of great fertility and importance, principally because it extends down to the coast, it should therefore be kept occupied and established there, as the de facto dominion belonging to the Portuguese crown, in order to become, as necessarily it will become, a new source of wealth for the province. 101

Centralization of administration and more control from Lisbon became the rules of policy in this period. Angola was referred to in official correspondence as a "Province" as it was in the Constitutional Charter of Portugal. But on the books of law, the name was still "the kingdoms of Angola and Benguela," a term from the 17th century. By a decree of December 1869, the "Kingdoms" were united into one province with districts and conceelhos (councils or sub-divisions). In fact, administration had worked this way for decades, and this 1869 law signified merely a traditional lag in Portuguese law-making. 102 But the trend for centralization and concentration on the coasts were prime tenets of an established policy.

The Government's attitude to expansion beyond the coasts of Angola and Mozambique can be illustrated

102 Delgado, Benguela, p. 231.
by the decisions of the Junta Consultiva in Lisbon, the policy-making council within the Ministry for the Navy and Overseas,\textsuperscript{103} with regard to Mozambique particularly. In 1869 the Governor of Quelimane, Mozambique, proposed to Lisbon the creation of a new interior district by an occupying force of 120 men. The Governor feared eventual English encroachment in this region, nominally Portuguese. The Junta Consultiva vetoed the suggestion since there was a campaign proceeding at the time in the Zambezia region, and since there were no men nor resources to spare to pacify the reputedly powerful tribes in what is now Southern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{104}

Alfredo Duprat in the period from 1870 to 1875 also made proposals about expansion similar to that made by the Governor of Quelimane. Generally, his ideas met a negative response from Lisbon. Although a treaty between Portugal and the Transvaal Republic in 1869 had left the boundaries of each party undetermined in Central Africa, the Junta decided that expansion at the moment was completely impractical and impossible to carry out.

The boundaries proposed by the Consul General are situated in territory very isolated from the points of our effective occupation in the province of Mozambique,

\textsuperscript{103}The Junta Consultiva was the name of the Conselho Ultramarino after 1868.

\textsuperscript{104}A.H.U., Junta Consultiva (J. C.), Pasta 207, 1870, No. 395.
and they even include a very great portion of lands never occupied by us. 105

In 1872 Duprat's idea for a personal land concession was also turned down, and he was told to mind land concessions he already possessed in Angola. The Junta made a definite distinction between nominal control and effective control as regards the interior, and considered the coast near Lourenço Marques as the valuable region to protect and develop for revenue from Transvaal trade. A Company proposing establishment of steam navigation on the Zambesi met the same disapproval in Lisbon for reasons of lack of capital to make even the initial engineering surveys. 106 In effect, the Lisbon policy was for concentration on both coasts, with a particular emphasis upon developing main ports for customs revenue. The interior was considered out of reach and impractical for the present.

Until the rise to power in the Ministry for Navy and Overseas of João Andrade Corvo, a staunch expansionist, schemes for interior expansion fell upon deaf ears. When Corvo came to power during 1875-76 and later, however, he found many officials in Portugal and in Africa who stuck to the coastal policy formulated after 1863. Governor Garrido in Angola in 1867-68 had

won his argument with Lisbon and had abandoned "for good" isolated stations as Humbe, Gambos, and Cassange, feeling that the waste of means on maintaining prestige in the interior was no substitute for security on the coasts in the more developed districts. 107

The interior seemed a secondary issue compared to the coast of Congo and available trade north of Luanda. Those who held to concentration on the coasts could point to the significant increase in the trade in Angola from 1869 to 1875, which increased by some 25% in that short time. Indeed the revenue from customs, the largest item on the budget, in the decade 1863-1873 had tripled from 133 contos to 390 contos. Reports on increases in business and trade after 1865 were generally favorable to a policy of keeping the status quo and not bothering the interior, but bringing more fiscal control to bear upon the coasts. 108 Governor Garrido had speculated for Lisbon that to capture the thriving port of Quisembo would take only 150 men. 109 Nothing, however, came of this suggestion.

Petitions of private persons as Alfredo Duprat or Silva Porto, or interested geographical groups met little response from Lisbon until after 1876. Yet even

107 Jornal do Commercia, 4 September 1872.
in Africa, officials to a very late period felt attempts to move into the bush with authority were useless. In 1875 the resident chefe at Quilengues south of Benguela reported native attacks on his fortress, in which Portuguese settlers participated to gain cattle. He concluded that to remain in that isolated place was a useless waste of men and money for the administration.\footnote{A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 45, 15 December 1875, No. 58.}

Governor General Alexandre Albuquerque (1876-79) represented an excellent example of the tendency to prefer the coast to the interior for very practical reasons. In his first month of administration he reported that "the Treasury is completely exhausted."\footnote{A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 46, No. 317, 22 June 1876.}

This drawback plus his conviction that the entire administration needed an overhauling led him to assert the policy of his predecessors in Luanda. Angola could never control its own territory until the coast of Congo, from 5 degrees 12 to 8 degrees south latitude was completely occupied and controlled. The interior was merely the feeder of trade for the coastal ports.

On the contrary, following my illustrious predecessors I will tell your Excellency that the expansion \textit{[internamento]} of the province into the interior is an evil without compensation ... for the major settlements are like so many other islands drowned in a limitless
native ocean;... then it is sadly necessary to confess it, our empire in the interior is imaginary. 112

Albuquerque knew that all rights or pretensions to the interior or eastern Angola would not be given up, but he felt past campaigns in Dembos and Cassange, disastrous in result, precluded the benefits of interior occupation. Other Governors before him had withdrawn isolated garrisons. Perhaps attempts to expand into the hostile bush with a bankrupt treasury and a provincial army led mainly by convicts and deserters would end in the complete loss of Angola in the future. He constantly deplored,

... the heavy sums consumed in disastrous wars we have fought, we would do better to develop a certain strip of the coast where we can exercise secure real influence. 113

The old golden fleece, the "northern coast," remained in his mind the reward to be captured to save Angola's future.

Albuquerque, when he wrote this report in October 1877, had already visited with Henry Morton Stanley after his successful tracing of the Congo River. Stanley had spent time with the Portuguese officials discussing the potential of the Congo River


as a highway into Central Africa and a trade center. Yet the Governor interpreted Stanley's information to mean that the Congo mouth would be all the more valuable in Portugal's possession. Ideas of getting further into the interior did not occur to him, and those who attempted it, as the members of the 1877 expedition to explore southern Africa, found little aid from Luanda and almost complete anarchy and native paramountcy in the interior of Angola. The policy of the administrators with a coastal perspective bore fruit when Serpa Pinto, Capelo, and Ivens made their hapless way onto the Benguela plateau in 1877. The results of their journeys, and of others before them who crossed Angola, would rouse the administration to a realization that more responsibility for the interior would have to be taken in the future.

E. The Colonial Movement, New Style, and After 1875

It is difficult to date the exact beginning of the second phase of the colonial movement begun in the 1830's by Sá da Bandeira. But the founding of the Society of Geography of Lisbon in 1875 by Luciano Cordeiro and his friends is a useful watershed. At this same time, Andrade Corvo was Minister for Overseas and

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114 Diario de Noticias (Lisbon daily); reports on Stanley's reception in Luanda on September 16, 1877, appeared in the press in Lisbon, November 1-2, and were highly complimentary and favorable to the explorer.
was encouraging new schemes to develop the Portuguese territories in Africa, with a special emphasis upon Angola.115 Equally important in placing the beginning of the new surge of interest in Africa, was the upshot of the travels, writings and speeches of Verney Lovett Cameron, an English naval officer.

Cameron crossed Africa from Tanganyika to Angola, passing in 1874-75 through central Angola and emerging at Benguela. What Livingstone had feared about the route from Central Africa to Benguela in 1853-54 was strongly confirmed by the observations and writings of Cameron.116 Cameron met a number of mulatto traders as Lourenco de Souza Coimbra, in Barotseland, trading for slaves and raiding outlying territory. With considerable difficulty and hardship he managed to contract a mulatto guide for the route to Benguela. Shocked by the condition of the Bihe plateau, and the complete freedom of lawless traders, he exclaimed: "The Government of Portugal cannot be cognisant of the atrocities committed by men claiming to be her subjects."117

115Corvo's special interest and activity with regard to Angola, in contrast to Mozambique, can be discerned in the greater material on Angola in his important magnum opus of 1883, Estudos sobre As Províncias Ultramarinas.


Naturally the Bihe' middlemen resented his presence in the country and said he would cause the area to be opened up to foreign traders and competition.\(^{118}\) Finding no evidence of Portuguese authority whatsoever on the plateau before Benguela, the English explorer was somewhat soothed by the hospitality he received when he fell ill and recuperated in Benguela and in Luanda. Cameron in his book, written after he returned to England, exposed what he termed "a vast amount of internal slave-trade" in Angola and in Central Africa.\(^{119}\) His writings and speeches after 1875 represented another edition of the writings of Livingstone in the 1860's, and it is clear Cameron had an immediate effect upon Portuguese opinion and the press. Later in 1877, when Stanley first emerged from the Congo, the Lisbon press in November 1st and 2nd articles, contained a series called "Cameron and Stanley," in which Stanley's exploration was praised at the expense of Cameron. Moreover, the articles made clear that Stanley's first pronouncements upon Portuguese activity in the Congo region in September 1877 were generally favorable.\(^{120}\) Later, after he left Luanda, his letters to the English press had a different tone.\(^{121}\)

\(^{118}\) Ibid., p. 472.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., pp. 528-9.

\(^{120}\) Diario de Noticias, 1-2 November 1877.

Other events caused Portugal to renew public interest in the African territories. The International Geographical Conference of Brussels was called by King Leopold II of Belgium in September 1876 to consider the opening up of Central Africa. Portugal did not receive an invitation. It is not clear whether Leopold's meetings with Cameron in England, a few months before the Conference, determined his action. But the British representative in Lisbon, Robert Morier, noticed an immediate effect of this "unintentional slight," as he termed it, upon Portuguese public opinion, and noted that the Government was planning two exploration schemes for Central Africa.

Two expeditions were to start, one on each coast, and they were to meet in the region between Angola and Mozambique. Another, better equipped expedition, was to survey the Congo River and try to discover the sources. Stanley did not appear until six months after this dispatch of February 1877. In the meantime, Morier also noted the effect of Cameron's speeches upon the Portuguese Parliament, some of whose members early in 1877 criticized the "language" of the explorer.

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122 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 57-8.
123 P.R.O., F.O. 63/1117, 26 February 1877, Morier to F.O.
124 P.R.O., F.O. 63/1117, 13 February 1877, Morier to Beaconsfield.
The Portuguese were stirred also by news of German explorers in Angola. In 1874 a Dr. Guessfeldt sought porters at Novo Redondo for an expedition based at Landana. Guessfeldt's great difficulties of hiring carriers made it imperative he "buy" the services of Portuguese libertos.\textsuperscript{125} The Government at Luanda was no less embarrassed and uncomfortable to find the plight of several other German explorers in 1875-76: porters were not available and, when hired, as in the case of Dr. Falkenstein at Novo Redondo, they deserted their leaders. Dr. Alexander Von Homeyer traveled from Luanda to Malange on a scientific expedition in mid-1875, but his difficulties, together with suspicion as to his intentions, showed the Portuguese they needed to send their own expedition to explore Angola.\textsuperscript{126} Moreover, the sad condition of the country gave men like Andrade Corvo and Luciano Cordeiro cause to cry for reform in Lisbon.

By the end of 1874, Angola was recovering from a severe two-year drought which adversely affected all trade. Yet Portuguese trade was increasing as evidenced by the establishment of the first substantial Portuguese factory at Ambrizette in August 1874, in spite of the

\textsuperscript{125}A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 44, 18 September 1874, No. 400, Gov. Gen.

feeling of native hostility towards the Portuguese in that area.\textsuperscript{127}

In Lisbon, Andrade Corvo was encouraging projects to reform activity in Africa. In 1876, in conjunction with the exploring expeditions planned, a "Public Works Commission" was organized to direct expeditions to Angola and Mozambique and the islands and to construct railroads, bridges, roads, and telegraph lines. Loans were obtained for expeditions to both Angola and Mozambique in 1876-77, and by June 1877 the first Public Works group had arrived in Luanda to begin work on a railroad.\textsuperscript{128}

The idea of sending a Portuguese expedition to Angola was not new in 1876 when Andrade Corvo created the Comissão Central Permanente de Geographia to work with the Society of Geography of Lisbon. Sa' da Bandeira held the idea several years before. Silva Porto had written of it as early as 1868 in his journal.\textsuperscript{129} It is clear the first conception of the goal of the exploration was to cover the territory between both coasts, and to "link" the two Portuguese provinces. A public subscription fund was organized to help finance it, and later the Government gave a subsidy.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{127} P.R.O., F.O. 63/1115, 1 September 1874, Hawkins to Stanley.

\textsuperscript{128} Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 28-34.


from the beginning, although public opinion was aroused to an unusual extent over the project, there was disagreement as to the purpose of the expedition. Three persons with experience in Africa were chosen: Serpa Pinto, an army officer, and Capelo and Ivens, two naval officers. The disagreement between these men over the course of exploration from Angola symbolized the rift between those Portuguese who wanted to develop only coastal regions and those who wanted to drive deep into Central Africa. 131

Serpa Pinto felt that a cross-continental march was the best goal for the group after it arrived in Angola. Capelo and Ivens believed a thorough investigation of Angola was best. Nevertheless, when the expedition left Lisbon on July 7, 1877, there was little hint that disagreement would eventually break up the group. 132

The group arrived at Luanda in August 1877, and shortly thereafter Stanley appeared at Boma, having traced the entire course of the Congo. One assignment of the Portuguese expedition was cancelled when they learned of Stanley's triumph, but the Portuguese explorers were in fact inspired and encouraged by Stanley's advice and information about traveling in the

131 Ibid., p. 403.
132 Diario de Noticias, 9 July 1877.
interior. Now the expedition was to explore the Cunene and Cubango Rivers and it was conjectured that the Cunene might be an affluent of the Zambesi and that this would enable them to reach Mozambique. The destination of the three Portuguese explorers became the town of Quelimane.

This expedition of 1877 was doomed to ultimate failure in terms of exploring extensively the region between Angola and Mozambique. For within five months of arrival in Angola, after many long delays and cursing of the meager resources and equipment provided by the Lisbon Government, the explorers split up and went their different ways: Serpa Pinto striking out alone, and Capelo and Ivens together on their own.

By 1877, although the first foot of railway would not be laid for another decade, there were definite signs that Angola's economy enjoyed moderate prosperity. There was an upward trend within half a dozen years of the end of the costly wars north of the Cuanza. Agriculture increased production, and trade movement improved. Joaquim Monteiro who knew Angola well during the years 1858 to 1875 wrote that trade and

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133 Numerous references to advice and information from Stanley appear in the books by the explorers who met him in August and September, 1877. Their works testify to his influence.


135 See the figures in Appendix XII.
light industry had increased significantly in his time. The province no longer needed an annual subsidy from Portugal to pay its way after 1866. Steam navigation on the Cuanza made Dondo into a small boom town for at least a decade and a half after the steamers began in 1866. But activity was only important within one hundred miles of the coast. Portuguese trade influence was uneven. Only a vital instrument of change could alter the pattern of river transportation: that would be the task of the railways.

The year 1877 was an important dividing point in the history of Angola. For the first time national expeditions composed of active men reached the territory outside the Government of Angola. Although their activities did not measure up to the original plans, their later writings had a profound effect upon the decision of the Lisbon Government to take up more activity and responsibility for the sertão on the plateaus of Angola.

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... that fearful tariff-loving nation, the Portuguese.

-Henry Morton Stanley to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce (1884).
A. The Expedition of 1877-79 and New Colonial Effort

The nationally sponsored expedition arrived in Luanda in August 1877 with several counts already against it. There was a growing disagreement in Lisbon and among the explorers themselves as to the exact destination of the expedition. Secondly, the highest official in Angola to aid the explorers, who were virtual strangers to the interior of the territory, was the anti-expansionist, Governor, Alexandre Albuquerque. And thirdly, to the knowledge of the best informed, conditions of security and travel were deplorable.

Officially sponsored exploration in Angola had a long history, but the last important attempt to cross Central Africa and reach Mozambique had been that of the sertanejo Silva Porto in 1853-54. Chosen to lead a caravan to Mozambique following the footsteps of an Arab expedition which had reached Benguela from the other coast, Silva Porto was appointed "Captain of

\[^{1}\text{Sertanejo means, literally, one who lives in the hinterland. But in 19th century Angola, it meant also trader, merchant.}\]
Passages" by the Governor of Benguela, and instructed to carry correspondence to and from Mozambique and to compose an itinerary of the journey. The hardy explorer, already with sixteen years experience in the interior, reached the upper Zambesi but was obliged by illness and native hostility to turn back. His men, however, reached Ibo, Mozambique, in August 1854.

Other Portuguese exploration, especially in the 1840's and 1850's, reached as far east as the Lunda kingdom, east of the Kasai River, and perhaps a few trading caravans had reached the great lakes by 1860. Graça, Ladislau Magyar (a Hungarian citizen), Bernardino Brochado, and Fernando Costa Leal were some of the more famous explorers in central-southern Angola up to 1865. But over a decade had passed when, in 1877, the inaugurators of the new phase of the colonial movement landed at Luanda.

After meeting and conferring with Stanley in August and September, the explorers traveled to Benguela to engage porters for the expedition. The exploration of the Congo River itself had been taken from them by Stanley's feat, and the Cubango and Cunene Rivers became the initial goals, with Mozambique the final

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2 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, pp. 197-8.
3 Gastão Sousa Dias, Silva Porto e a Travessia do Continente Africano (Lisbon, 1938).
destination. After four to five months of delays, desertions of porters, insufficient supplies, and little reaction from Lisbon, the explorers reached the Bihe' plateau. It was here that Serpa Pinto decided to set out on his own and attempt to reach Quelimane. Capelo and Ivens stayed together, apparently not interested in, nor determined to reach the other coast, and planned to explore to the northeast of Bihe.4

Serpa Pinto, in explaining the separation of the expedition in his later book, pretended that Capelo and Ivens had deserted him for no reason and left him with insufficient supplies.5 In fact, he had made the decision to strike out alone in the tradition and example of his friend Stanley, doing so from a disagreement about direction of exploration, and from his own ambitions.6

Serpa Pinto, after receiving aid from Silva Porto in Bihe', set out across eastern Angola and reached Barotseland, or "Lui." Experiencing severe illnesses,

4Francisco d'Assis d'Oliveira Martins, *Hermenegildo Capelo e Roberto Ivens* (Lisbon, 1951-52, 2 vols.), these volumes contain important correspondence regarding the expedition.


6Eduardo de Noronha, *O Explorador Serpa Pinto* (Lisbon, 1936), p. 17. This interpretation of the vital influence of Stanley upon Serpa Pinto's decision to separate the expedition is the result of my research, based on letters in manuscript in the Society of Geography in Lisbon. See references.
desertions of porters, and brushes with numerous half-caste slavers, he remained determined by 1878 to "open a road" to Zumbo, the last station of the Portuguese on the Zambesi, and continue to the coast. In Barotseland, he barely failed to persuade the chief to aid his expedition to Zumbo, and was told to return to Bihe. He turned south, and came upon the settlement of the Missionary François Coillard and his wife, where he was nursed back to health. But Coillard did not have sufficient supplies to enable Serpa Pinto to reach Zumbo either. And after a short trip to Victoria Falls, where he met a number of Englishmen, he decided to give up the idea of descending the Zambesi River. Instead, Serpa Pinto traveled to Shoshong, Bechuanaland, on to Pretoria, Transvaal, and then Durban, Natal, by 1879.

The results of Serpa Pinto's journey were not very important for geography, and in fact began disputes

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8Ibid., pp. 242-266.
9Serpa Pinto was convinced traveling alone would help him reach Mozambique. As he wrote from Cacunda in 1878 to the Governor of Benguela: "Cameron, Stanley, and Livingstone crossed Africa because they went alone, if they had had companions, nothing would have been done..." Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, Res. 1, Pasta F-5, *Cartas Particulares do Explorador Serpa Pinto ao entao Governador de Benguela... de 7 December 1877 a 1 de December 1879*, Letter No. 5, 26 January 1878, Serpa Pinto to Pereira de Mello.
among Portuguese colonialists. But the political implications were significant. The Government at Lisbon after 1877 did practically nothing to aid the explorer. In fact, Englishmen and Frenchmen upon several occasions in Central Africa saved the life of the traveler. Serpa Pinto failed to reach Portuguese territory on the eastern coast for exactly the same reasons that stopped Silva Porto in 1853: illnesses, native hostility and complete native control of the country beyond Zumbo, and scanty Government aid. It was symbolic of Portuguese impotency in the interior, that Serpa Pinto had to head through English territory to safely reach the coast, instead of proceeding through Mozambique. The ideal of establishing a "commercial road" through Central Africa was not yet a reality, and the problem of the watershed of Congo-Zambesi still lay unsolved. Later the founder of the Society of Geography, Luaiano Cordeiro, lamented the pitiful aid given the explorers by the Portuguese Government.

Compared with aid given to later expeditions, the help offered the 1877 expedition was slight. Only in the 1880's did Portugal manage to equip efficient

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10 For much of the literature on the conferences, lectures and discussions on Serpa Pinto's exploration see Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, As Conferencias (de Serpa Pinto), (Lisbon, 1879).

expeditions. In 1886 the "Pinheiro Chagas Expedition," which explored from Ibo Mozambique to Blantyre, Nyasaland, was very well-provided for. The British Consul reported to London that "no expense" had been spared to equip the expedition of Lieutenant Cardoso. 12

Serpa Pinto returned to Portugal in 1879 and began to write his book. Apparently he modeled the title on the famous best-seller of his idol Stanley, How I Found Livingstone (London, 1872). 13 In dealing with the dangerous and unsettled conditions of the Angolan plateau, Serpa Pinto supported Cameron's criticisms of the internal slave trade carried on by Portuguese at Caconda, Bihe, and further east. Moreover, he lamented the lack of security in interior Angola, and the obvious absence of Portuguese control. 14 Privately, he wrote friends about the "true slavery" he saw on the plateau. 15

Experiences in Bihe convinced him that Portugal had to take responsibility for the interior, or suffer foreign encroachment and continual native independence.

12 P.R.O., F.O. 63/1188, No. 13, 28 June 1886, O'Neill to Salisbury.

13 Serpa Pinto was in London when he finished his book called How I Crossed Africa (London, 1881) or Omeu Atravessei a Africa.

14 Serpa Pinto, Ibid., pp. 240-260.

15 Sociedade de Geographia, Cartas Particulares do Explorador Serpa Pinto..., Letter No. 5, 6, 1878.
He encouraged a "secret" plan to "buy" the Bihe region from Silva Porto, who he thought really owned it, and to occupy the region as the center of Angola's economy. He considered Bihe the "primary strategic place of Western Africa." Criticizing Government neglect and inertia, his ideas for post-1880 were reasonable.

The occupation of Bihe is the certainty of having the primary strategic place of Western Africa, it is the security of trade in the interior, it is the autonomy of the province of Benguela, and it is the Portuguese monopoly of trade in Southern tropical Africa.... Belgium and England, within a few years, will divert the interior trade of our colonies to the great routes they are opening to the Congo, and to the south, Walwich Bay [sic], thus annihilating the province of Angola, destined to die isolated.... The Treaty of Lourenço Marques would be very advantageous for us if, within it, the boundaries of our eastern colonies are demarcated, and if Lourenço Marques would be made a free Port; for without these two clauses, it will be the death of Mozambique. 17

It is significant that the ideas of Serpa Pinto in 1880, after returning from Central Africa, contained no specific plan for fulfilling the original goal of the "Expedição Africo-Portugueza" of 1877. That plan had been to achieve the "road to the other coast" by passing through Bihe, to Lake Bangweulu, across Lake Nyasa and on to the coast of Mozambique. 18

16 Sociedade de Geographia, Cartas de Serpa Pinto ao Secretario Perpetuo da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, 1876-84, Letter No. 54, 5 May 1880, Serpa Pinto to Cordeiro, "Confidencial."

17 Ibid.

18 Diario de Notícias, 29 October 1877; 21 November, 20 December 1877.
envisioned no plan to reach the central region beyond Bihe, and in fact, Bihe was the sole object of his thoughts. The writings of Silva Porto, a longtime resident of Bihe, who had called for the occupation of Bihe in 1850, influenced the young explorer.\(^\text{19}\) His predictions of Belgian activity in Central Africa were farsighted. Apparently, he had no illusions about the Treaty of Lourenço Marques with Britain, but he erred in believing England was going to harm the Portuguese in Angola with activity in southwest Africa.\(^\text{20}\)

Capelo and Ivens had no specific plans for occupations by Portugal. Their journey began at Benguela, passed through Bihe, up the Cuango valley and to Cassange fair. That Capelo and Ivens did not reach Mozambique in this, the first of their expeditions was due to their own attitude of wanting to explore only the Cuango and the hostile attitude of the Mbangalas near Cassange.\(^\text{21}\)

\(^{19}\)Diario de Notícias, 29 October 1877. Silva Porto immediately volunteered his services to the expedition and supplied porters and equipment at his own expense. It seemed his dream had come true—an actual scientific expedition arrived after his years of calling for action from the Government.

\(^{20}\)Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 89, for the contents of the Treaty of Lourenço Marques, which was negotiated between 1878 and 1882, never agreed upon or ratified. Essentially it provided for a more liberal tariff policy in the port.

\(^{21}\)Capelo and Ivens, De Benguela àas Terras de Iacca, II, pp. 23-4.
At one point the explorers contemplated passing east of
the Cuango, but the difficult situation changed their
minds. They met many of the same things encountered by
Serpa Pinto: Native hostility, illness, absence of
Portuguese authority and slave trade. Turning back at
Cassange, the two explorers traveled back to Luanda by
way of Duque de Braganza and the Cuanza River.

In their two volume work, De Benguella às Terras
de Iacca (Lisbon, 1881), Capelo and Ivens confirmed
many accusations of Cameron except about the northern
section of the territory. Slavery and internal slave
trade continued in central and northeastern Angola,
partly influenced by Arabs. 22 Angola was changing now,
with missions appearing in the interior, but life for
the European on the plateaus would be difficult if not
impossible. They indicated no specific region for
colonization, but most importantly they stressed that
the Portuguese had to leave the sickly coast and move
to the plateau. "To the plateau, therefore, is our
path." 23

We must escape, we repeat, from the
costal region, and if we try to live there,
we will die, for the great continent is
condemned by that truth to the immobility
in which we find it today. 24

23 Ibid., II, p. 262.
24 Ibid., II, p. 267.
The explorers were not liberal thinkers for their day about the African since they wrote that the *liberto* did not merit freedom in 1881 but needed a great deal of preparation. But they expressed an attitude which symbolized at least a modification in Portuguese opinion. Like Livingstone, they publically stood up for the future progress and consideration of the Negro and in doing so, directly condemned the effects they observed of Portuguese administration in Angola. "Certainly, they wrote, he is not to blame [the Negro], but the one who rules him."  

The expedition of Capelo and Ivens provided Portugal with a thorough geographic survey, and climatological study of the plateau out by the Cuango valley; but despite the new knowledge of interior Angola, Arichesa, learned that German explorers had penetrated even further east before their own expedition. Lt. A. E. Lux, a military instructor at Eisenstadt, traveled during 1875-76 from Luanda to Dondo to Sanza, past Cassange to Kimbundu, nearly 100 miles further east than Capelo and Ivens. His survey with excellent maps appeared in 1880 as *Von Luanda Nach Kimbundu*. Together with a

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27 Lux, *Von Luanda Nach Kimbundu* (Wien, 1880); Lux accompanied Dr. Pogge and other Germans on this expedition to Angola. See Pogge's work, *Im Reiche des Muata Jamvo* (Berlin, 1880).
host of other enterprising and thorough German explorers in central and northern Angola, Lux represented a threat to Portuguese sovereignty. In the 1880's when Portugal wanted to occupy east of Cassange, the "German threat" became more serious. 28

The work of Capelo, Ivens, and Serpa Pinto spurred expansion plans in Portugal. Minister of Navy and Overseas Andrade Corvo used the information of Capelo and Ivens when he temporarily placed the eastern frontiers of Angola at the Cuango River up to where it joined the Congo. 29 Serpa Pinto was conferring with the Overseas Ministry after his return to Portugal in 1879, and his plan for occupying Bihe must have been considered...

But in the meantime, Júlio de Vilhena (see Appendix) worked out a plan for establishing "civilizing stations" in the interior of Angola in 1881. The first station was to be located at Nokki, on the left bank of the Congo. Wooden buildings and supplies were shipped out from Lisbon for this future station in 1882. 30 As Minister for Navy and Overseas, Júlio de Vilhena began public subscription funds for building the stations he planned to put in Angola and Mozambique. Later, long after this


29 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, p. 62.

method of finance had failed miserably, he laid the blame for the loss of the band across Africa to the rabid politicians who had made Portuguese Government so unstable and ephemeral. 31

In 1880 and 1881 important works appeared in Lisbon which decried Government neglect of Angola and criticized the attitude of the public toward Africa. Antonio J. Seixas, a writer and former official with long experience in Angola, 32 wrote in A Questão Colonial that warfare with natives had crippled Angola and Mozambique, and that, true to the revelations of the explorers on the expedition of 1877, the interior was in a wretched condition. Angola, he felt, was more valuable than Mozambique, but both colonies had been wrongly considered "Eldorados." Alfredo de Sarmento, as well, criticized Portuguese colonization in Os Sertões d'Africa (1880). He urged immediate occupation in Angola, for what Cameron and Livingstone had written was true: Portuguese sovereignty was limited to recognition by "some Chiefs in the vicinity of the presidios or settlements." 33

31 Vilhena, Júlio, Antes Da República, I, pp. 73-78.

32 See articles on Angola in Jornal do Commercio, 1860, 1864 et. al. by Seixas.

33 Seixas, A Questão Colonial, pp. 75-77; See also Alfredo de Sarmento, Os Sertões D'Africa (Lisbon, 1880), pp. 220-25.
In the meantime, new developments were taking place in the diplomatic world. Toward the end of the 1870's Britain and Portugal came closer than ever before or after in the 19th century to cooperation over colonial affairs. In 1877 the British diplomat Robert Morier came to Lisbon, and by working with Andrade Corvo, Morier hoped to create for the future...

...a "grand design" for the opening up of Portuguese Africa, present and future, and for a new era of Anglo-Portuguese colonial cooperation possessing possibilities of the most fruitful kind. 34

Essentially, this plan involved a drastic lowering of Portuguese tariffs or customs on both the eastern and western coasts and a military cooperation between the two nations with regard to Transvaal. Portugal would allow free trade on the great rivers in Africa, in return for protection and aid from Britain. The chance for the success of such a plan was won and lost during 1879-81 and the dilemma centered mainly around Portugal's Congo claim. This latter problem will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

Diplomat Morier found a nearly kindred spirit in João Andrade Corvo, Minister several times during Morier's stay in Lisbon. Corvo35 was an Anglophile with

34 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 229.
35 Anstey, Ibid., pp. 85-87, 90, 95. Morier remarked that Corvo was in and out of power due to the unstable politics, but that only with him in office could he hope to engineer a liberal design for the Portuguese colonies.
a rationalist tinge and he realized that Portugal could do no better for her claims to colonial territory in Africa than to ally closely with England and erase the enmity of the past half century. In 1883 he published his magnum opus on the colonial problem, Estudos Sobre as Provincias Ultramarinas. In these volumes we may read the program of the Anglophile party.

Corvo represented a younger version of the liberal Sá da Bandeira in that he worked for free labor policies and free trade in Africa. The monopoly trade system in Angola was based on a "false principle," ruining the economy.36 Using many of the same arguments as were used in his mentor's Trabalho Rural Africano, written a decade before, he asserted that unless free labor was established in Angola, the future was black indeed.37

To Andrade Corvo's Estudos politicians could look for a plea for patching up the Ancient Alliance as the natural answer to fear of territorial loss or decay. Alliance with England for developing Portuguese Africa could include the proposed settlement of the Congo claim and treaties over Lourenço Marques.38 Without cooperation with England in lowering custom

36 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 160-162.
37 Ibid., I, p. 17.
duties in Angola and in maintaining free trade on rivers, Portugal would not achieve her territorial claims north of Luanda, and without this territory, Angola could never control her territory or develop as a unit. 39

The contra-costa idea was not explicit in Andrade Corvo's work. He considered that the major problem was transportation from the plateau down to the coasts in Africa. For Angola the most important matter to conclude was the treaty for the Congo area. 40 So far, petty politicians had undermined negotiations in Portugal by virtue of their personal greed and factious attitudes.

Plans for Angola followed the work begun with the arrival of the Commission of Public Works at Luanda in June 1877. Corvo outlined their activities, such as the laying of some 344 kilometers of telegraph line from Luanda toward Dongo, the key entrepot on the Cuanza. After 1877 some 168 kilometers of road were built under the Commission, and surveying for a forthcoming railway was progressing. Up to 1877 steam navigation on the Cuanza was deemed sufficient for the needs of the province, but engineers were now planning a railway from Luanda to Calumbo according to a very dusty and pigeon-holed plan of 1862-64 under Minister Mendes Leal. 41

39 Ibid., I, pp. 41-42.
40 Ibid., I, p. 157.
41 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 228-241.
Andrade Corvo's *Estudos* were an eloquent polemic to convince anti-colonialists in Portugal, and anti-expansionists in Africa, that foreign powers would gobble up what they had so long neglected. Africa had to be developed. "For the Ministry today that does not pay attention to the colonies cannot survive." That this kind of statement was necessary for a nation so long involved in activity overseas can only be explained by the political situation in Portugal in the 1870's and 1880's. In the main, the enemies of empire were the growing party of Republicans in Lisbon and Oporto. Identifying their cause with extreme reform in the metropolis, Republicans criticized the Monarchy for favoring colonial effort at the expense of the lower classes.

Republican opposition to colonial effort grew apace after the first strike in Portugal in 1872. This opposition remained intact throughout the 1880's, thriving on writings by Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins (1845-94), socialist economist. Curiously, the founder of the colonial movement of 1875, Luciano Cordeiro, had in 1868 written a socialist pamphlet advocating the sale

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43 For literature with this attitude see Oliveira Martins, *Brazil e as Colónias Portuguezas* (Lisbon, 1880), *Portugal Contemporânea* (Lisbon, 1881, 2 vols.), *Política e Economia Nacional* (Oporto, 1885), Bazilio Telles, *Do Ultimatum ao 31 de Janeiro*, (Oporto, 1905).
of the colonies. Contrary to Cordeiro who turned a volte face, Oliveira Martins remained convinced, before the "Ultimatum" of 1890 united the nation in an African policy temporarily, that colonies were ruinous for a poor nation like Portugal. "Brazil is a better colony for us than Africa; however, the best of all our colonies would be our own kingdom," he wrote in 1880.

The pleas of Andrade Corvo for unity over Africa in 1883 become clearer against the background of anti-colonialism. Republican programs opposed colonial effort from a financial rationale, when Republicans in France were doing the same and when finance was in Portugal by far the most important question. Until 1890, when the temporary unity brought by the "Ultimatum" shook the Monarchy to its roots, large public support was nebulous for positive action in Africa. At that time, even Oliveira Martins changed his tune to the tempo of the day and supported a program for colonization overseas.

Portugal, therefore, was deeply divided at a crucial moment for effort in Africa. Both mechanical

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44 Oliveira Martins, F. A., Oliveira Martins, p. 34.
45 Oliveira Martins, J. P., Brazil e as Colónias, p. 229.
46 See new opinion in his Portugal em África (Oporto, 1891), p. 219.
47 Marques do Lavradio, Portugal em África depois de 1851, p. 170.
and ideological difficulties undermined liberal solutions
to the lack of development in Angola. The turbulence of
politics marred progress. Corvo wrote: "The invertebrate
Parliamentary political administration failed to fix a
constant African policy."\(^{48}\) Moreover, the upheaval of
socialism came late to Portugal compared with other
European nations, and when it arrived, it became con­
founded with a hyper-sensitive nationalism and a severe
financial problem.

Andrade Corvo's work of 1883 contained intelligent
proposals for the future of Angola. Yet again, the coast
was considered perhaps more important than the interior,
especially in the Mossamedes district.\(^{49}\) A road had
to be constructed from Mossamedes to Huila to develop
the region, which was in a sorry state. Epidemics, as
well as the habitual slave trade, had devastated the
native populations of Ouroca. Both scourges caused
unfortunate native migrations.\(^{50}\) This southern district,
however, was envisioned as the most important agricul­
tural district in Angola because of the healthy climate
and good soil. Most important, Mossamedes needed
European colonists and in a hurry.

In sum, the *Estudos* represented a liberal state­
ment worthy of the school of Sa da Bandeira. Shorn of

\(^{48}\) Andrade Corvo, *Estudos*, I, p. 47.


\(^{50}\) Ibid., I, pp. 288-91.
impossible demands and incredible dreams, the expansion ideas were reasonable and based upon traditional activity in Angola. Above all, the author said that Portugal, in order to survive in Africa, had to come out of the 17th and 18th centuries, and try to change with the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{51}

B. The Boers in Southern Angola

In Southern Angola transportation facilities, Portuguese administration, and public security were suffering from the inertia of a small and stagnant population. Few if any European colonists by 1880 were emigrating to Angola, and those who remained tended to stay on the coast as traders, or close to the coast on plantations of sugar and cotton. Traders in the interior of Mossamedes as well as Benguela had a tendency to succumb to "Tradism," or the subordination of one's cultural background for the sake of obtaining trade with natives.\textsuperscript{52} The southern districts of Angola had even less military protection in 1880 than those near Luanda, the capital. If Mossamedes had in garrison more military units, perhaps the administration could have stopped those settlers Nat Humbe and Gambos from "going native" and adopting native dress to call on the Guanahama peoples.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ibid.}, I, pp. 35-37.

\textsuperscript{52}This term, describing a Portuguese trait, will be explained in more detail in the conclusion, Chapter VIII.

\textsuperscript{53}Felner, \textit{Angola}, I, p. 64.
Public security on roads and trade routes was nil at this time, and few communications were secure. Anarchy dominated the bush. Escaped libertos took easy refuge in the trackless wilderness east of the coast.54 The few stations that remained after the occupations under Governors Amaral and Costa Leal, were in decay and near abandonment. The officer at Quilengues recommended abandonment of his post in a discouraged letter of 1875.55

Lack of Portuguese control of the region combined with new rumors and fears of English activity to the south. The French missionary Padre Duparquet was active in Mossamedes after 1870, and his travels beyond the Cunene ended in the founding of a mission near Huila. Rumors flew in Mossamedes that Duparquet was an English agent ready to spread English rule and influence. That Cassandra of Portuguese expansion, Alfredo Duprat, reported articles from the Cape Times of 1877 to the effect that the English merchants and officials were moving north of Cape Frio up to the Cunene River. Realizing the delicate state of Portuguese administration in this district, Duprat warned Portugal of the dangers of leaving southern Angola unprotected.56

54 Ibid., I, pp. 74-82.
56 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta I-1, No. 108, 4 December 1877, Consul Duprat in London to Costa e Silva, Lisbon.
In this region the administration of Luanda felt that Humbe, near the Cunene, was too valuable a station to lose to English encroachment. The southern boundary of Angola was usually considered to be 18 degrees south latitude. This was nearly one degree south of the mouth of the Cunene. Given the limited power of the Portuguese armed force, it was reasonable to think that some new force or bulwark was needed in this section. The river valley of Cunene was a natural place for settlement, since it was normally devoid of the droughts which periodically ruined sections further north.

The Governor of Mossamedes in December 1879 received a strange letter from a settler at Curoca. Mistakenly, observers reported that "English" had attacked a band of natives there, and that these natives were fleeing into Angola. Soon an English gunboat in the port of Mossamedes corrected the report by saying that this was a case of a group of trekking Boers attacking natives on their move across the Cunene into Angola.

Thus the famous "Thirstland Trekkers" made their first appearance in Angola at a time when Portugal needed aid from native and English threats. It seemed that the


58 Felner, Angola, I, pp. 74-77. For material on Duparquet see Felner, I, pp. 87-90, and Duparquet's Voyage en Cimbebasie (Lyons, 1881).

Boers were the answer to the problem of security, for their fighting prowess against the African was famous. They could easily forget the severe criticism of the Boers’ treatment of natives set forth by Dr. Livingstone in his articles of 1854 and later books.60

The Boer groups that crossed the Cunene had been traveling off and on for over five years from Transvaal on a quest for better lands and more freedom from administration. Settling for a while in regions of Southwest Africa, most of them packed up and left when they suspected more English interference.61 Angola was to be the next promised land for the 400 who survived the 1400 mile trek from the south. Some groups left in 1875, others in 1877 upon the annexation of the Transvaal Republic. Nearly half the men, women, and children died on the trek, but they found that at first the Portuguese were very happy to see them. Those who knew about the reception of the Boers under Louis Trichard in 1838 at Delagoa Bay, Mozambique,62 might well have expected traditional Portuguese hospitality in Angola.

60 Boletim Official (Angola), 1854, No. 483, December 30, Supplement, "Apontamentos," Part I. The Boers are called "The Dutch."

61 Lawrence Green, Lords of the Last Frontier, pp. 110-116.

62 Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations, p. 110.
The leader of the Boers when they entered Angola was Jacobus Frederick Botha, whose daughter later was to marry one of the most famous of the conquistadores of southern Angola, Artur de Paiva. His trekkers, when south of Mossamedes, found themselves harrassed by native hordes described in irate Portuguese news articles in 1879 as Mondombes. That "barely nominal" sovereignty of the administration away from the coast was discovered well by the first Boer families, and quickly they achieved a reputation for always winning, but with a taste of cruelty that even the desperate Portuguese would despise.

The precedent for land concessions and foreign settlement in southern Angola was promising for the newly-arrived Boers. In June 1868 the Governor-General learned of several English families who fled to Mossamedes after escaping Hottentot attacks near Walfish Bay. The Governor gave them permission to settle, giving them residence papers, bilhetes de rezidencia, and his rationale for the concession was his hope for more trade with Englishmen on the island of St. Helena. Landholding by foreigners thus had one clear precedent before 1880.

63 Jornal do Commercio, 13 August, 20 August 1879, signed articles by A. F. Nogueira called "Mossamedes."

In 1880 a delegation of leading Boers entered Mossamedes to negotiate with the Portuguese for a place to settle. Landa near Humpata on the plateau was chosen for the first Boer homes and by 1881 most of the original group were settled and beginning an irrigation canal for their town. This land was considered by the Portuguese to be choice; about 7500 acres were given to a group of over 400 settlers. To the north and east, other families spread out in isolated places.

An agreement between Jacobus Botha and the Governor of Mossamedes was signed in September 1880 and the "Colony of São Januario" was officially underway. Privileges given the Boer families were impressive, for each family was offered two hectares (about five acres) free with opportunity for more. Certain "freedoms" were given the colonists: freedom of religion, freedom from taxation for the first ten years of residence in Angola, freedom to use own language, in return for obeying the laws of the territory. The Boers could elect their own representative for the local town.

The Boers, with their great carts and a considerable amount of cattle which they brought in with

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65 Felner, Angola, I, pp. 90-95; Green, Lords, p. 118.

them, proceeded to bring about a minor transportation revolution near Mossamedes. They began building roads from the plateau down to the coast, and aided the settlement of a new group of colonists from the Madeira islands. By 1900 Boer carts were running regular transport routes for merchandise from Mossamedes to Huila to Caconda and on to Bihe, taking the place of the traditional porters.67 The Portuguese were impressed with "this indefatigable race" who never seemed tired of travel.

Perhaps the most important trait admired by the Portuguese was their ability in bush warfare against the African. In their first three decades of residence, Boers played an important role in pacification campaigns south and east of the Cuanza.68 Accompanying Portuguese and guerra preta units, Boer commandos fought in Bihe, Bailundo, and far east of the Cuanza in Ganguelas. Native raids on Mossamedes were virtually ended by the Boers.69

Artur de Paiva, son-in-law of the original Boer leader, Botha, was appointed Intendante for the Boer Colony at Humpata. His writings provide a balanced view of Boer character at the time, but seem to favor them against the Portuguese criticism which rapidly accumulated.

68 Felner, Angola, I, p. 92.
Paiva claimed that after 1880 exports and consequently customs revenue increased significantly at Mossamedes due to the Boers' work in transport. He was a close witness of their guerilla tactics in the field. Although the Boers by 1890 had shown signs of discontent, and some groups had already left Angola, Paiva believed the Portuguese government could eventually integrate them into the colonial society. His hopes were continued in the policy of Henrique de Paiva Couceiro during 1907-1909.

The Boers were made citizens (nationalized en masse) in a ceremony at Humpata in 1882, but soon the Portuguese observed flaws in their new "saviors." Natives reported the Boers raided and robbed their cattle. The Portuguese noticed that the game was fast disappearing due to the fact the Boers rarely missed and depended upon hunting more than farming for their livelihood. By 1884, the Portuguese authorities were extremely suspicious of the new element in their midst, for in that year the first Boer families trekked back into Southwest Africa complaining that their cattle had contracted diseases at Humpata. The Portuguese officials, however, dismissed this reason and claimed that the Boers were naturally nomadic and really wanted to return to South Africa.

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72 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, Nos. 328, 739, 8 April, 12 September 1884, Gov. Gen. to Lisbon.
fully the Portuguese language was anathema.

In order to achieve a neutralization of the Boers, in 1884 the Portuguese Government decided to accept the settlement of a group of "Bastaards," or persons with Boer fathers and Hottentot mothers, from South Africa who migrated to Angola following the Boers. The Governor-General Ferreira do Amaral continued the time-honored policy of "divide and rule," a Roman precept admired by the Portuguese. In allowing the "Bastaards" to settle near the Boers at Humpata, he reasoned:

Enemies of the Boers, their presence in Mossamedes is permitted by the Portuguese authority ... this will have the advantage of keeping the absorbent tendencies of the Boer colony in balance ... and, therefore, I feel that besides the advantages there are for the colonization of the southern plateau by a race superior to the natives here, it is a good policy to have present that element as an obstacle to Boer pretensions. 77

Although the "Bastaards" and Boers squabbled at times, this idea did not materialize. For in 1909 a report confirmed that the two groups were often together and in some harmony. 78

Relations between the Boers and Portuguese became more and more strained. In 1910, 1911, and 1928 several thousand Boers trekked back to South Africa. Those remaining were impoverished and regressive in

78 Paiva Gouceiro, Angola, pp. 179-80.
character. Mainly hunters, they stayed as poor as, or poorer than, the Portuguese settlers increasing around them.79

A modern historian confessed the prevalent feeling among Portuguese in Mossamedes in 1940.80

Seldom in our long colonial experience have we been so unfortunate as we were in the acceptance and exaltation of the Boers' colony, which produced nothing, took over the best lands, and kept them almost completely uncultivated.

Portuguese assimilation policy failed in the case of the Boers. Disdaining Portuguese culture and contact, they nevertheless supported one important region of Angola for several decades. Remaining Boers in the Huila district in 1957 were described by a Portuguese as "regressive" in character and, in fact, a poor white class.81 To the Portuguese the Boers owed their lands and homes beginning in 1880, but when their hosts desired their independence, it was too much to abide. The first Portuguese priest sent to Humpata to "convert" the Boers to Catholicism in 1881 (at the order of Lisbon) was bound for frustration.82 Over the two generations that followed, the Portuguese changed far more than the Boer colony, a law unto themselves.

79Ernesto Machado, No Sul de Angola (Lisbon, 1956).
80Felner, Angola, I, p. 95.
C. Native Policy is Reappraised

According to the letters of the Governors-General to Lisbon, and official publications in Luanda, the old vassalage system with the sobas was maintained throughout the period of this study. Through various means of persuasion, the Portuguese built alliances with native powers for reasons of security, revenue, and labor. Formal treaties of tribute and vassalage were drawn up for the occasion of an agreement between a Portuguese officer, representing the Governor-General, and theoretically the King of Portugal, and the paramount soba. Some of these treaties were very demanding of the native leaders. An example in the "Act of Homage and Vassalage" of 1838 by a Soba in the Duque de Braganza region (see Chapter III) indicates the comprehensive nature of the alliance and the Portuguese demands. In order to compare policy in 1838 and in this period, it is worthwhile examining in detail a treaty of Vassalage signed in the Pungo Andongo region in August 1874.

Soba Cabanga, D. António Francisco Brenardo of the "Pedras Division" of the Concelho of Pungo Andongo promised to the Portuguese: 1) To respect Portuguese law and make his people do likewise. 2) To aid all merchants in the region and receive Portuguese peacefully. 3) To oblige his people to pursue agriculture and industry. 4) To keep out of his Sobado (Chieftancy) all deserters and escaped slaves. 5) To develop in his people European
religious feelings, and forbid the native custom of trial by poison, long prohibited in Portuguese law in Angola. 83 6) "Not to emigrate to another concelho or to native territory," without authorization or consent from Portuguese authorities. 7) To avoid all conflicts and wars with other sobas. 8) To give auxiliary troops to the Portuguese in times of war. 9) "To treat well your nobles and peoples, promoting among them a harmony, and giving them patriarchal justice as a good head of a family." 84

Two distinct differences may be noted between the treaties of 1838 and 1874. First of all the later treaty does not stipulate that direct taxes must be paid to the Portuguese. Secondly, the sixth term of the treaty of 1874, prohibiting unauthorized emigration, is not contained in the treaty of 1838. Both sobas in these treaties ruled areas within reasonable Portuguese control, north of the Cuanza. Portuguese experience with the effects of direct taxation upon natives, especially after 1856 (see Chapter IV) and after the Dembos War in 1872-73, brought about an official policy of abolishing this tax. Such collections required commitment and strength in the interior, but in the

83 The traditional custom of drinking a poison liquid to test the guilt or innocence of a native in court was often referred to in Angola as "juramento de indua." The Portuguese prohibited it whenever possible in areas they controlled.

84 Treaty is reproduced in Boletim Official, 1874, No. 34, 22 August 1874, pp. 411-12.
period 1861-78 withdrawal and coastal concentration constituted the mere general policy at Luanda. 85

Portuguese native policy was founded on the "vassalage system," as I call it. If the taxation policy in interior districts changed several times between 1838 and 1880, the traditional alliance system with sobas remained the same with few variations. Vital to the entire power structure of European rule in Angola, the loyal sobas in effect enabled the Portuguese to survive centuries of adversity. Andrade Corvo wrote simply, "Our alliance with the native chiefs is the principal power of our rule." 86 This can be applied especially to the case of Angola where the Portuguese were able to command the loyalty of larger numbers of Africans for a longer period in the interior than was possible in Mozambique.

The vassalage system was formalized usually in written treaties. Later in the 19th century, these treaties were sworn by the sobas on the Portuguese flag, or on a Bible. 87 The form of these agreements depended upon the power of the Portuguese in the soba's region and upon the history of that soba. If the soba was

85 See Chapter V, and Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 175-178.
86 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, III, pp. 387-93.
87 Boletim Oficial, 1893, No. 38, 23 September, p. 559. "Auto de vassalagem do Soba Cacongo ... do concelho do Duque de Bragança."
powerful and newly subjugated, the Portuguese dared not ask for taxes in the treaty. If the soba or his ancestors had submitted before, the demands of the Portuguese were likely to be considerable. Treaties far in the interior, with more or less independent chiefs, contained terms for increasing trade with the Portuguese but rarely asked for taxes, native auxiliary units, or laborers. In this case, the Portuguese formally asked for only a nominal yearly tribute as several slaves, in the pre-1845 period, and later, cattle or ivory. 88

Portuguese tax policy was a crucial element in native policy. In 1872 the traditional dizimo was abolished. But by 1880, and the arrival of expansionist Governors-General and the new phase of the colonial movement in Portugal, a new tax policy emerged. Dizimo was replaced by Decima or Contribuição. 89 Decima was a hut tax collected effectively only after 1883, because of the general native dislike of direct taxation. Angola's revenue policy was returning to the pre-1872 rationale that if expansion was increasing in the plateau regions, and on the north coast, then revenue had to support it. Nevertheless, direct force was often necessary to collect the hut tax, and this expedient was incompatible

88 Boletim Official, 1885, No. 37, September 14, pp. 732-33.
89 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 775, Gov. Gen. 1884; Boletim Official, 1885, No. 11, 16 March, p. 221.
with the idealistic Lisbon hope of Andrade Corvo that native policy should be conducted by peaceful means, not by threats or warfare. 90

Most important in maintaining a native policy in Angola was the granting of titles, privileges, army ranks, pensions, and educational opportunities to sobas and their families. The Portuguese began in the Congo Kingdom with this practice, and throughout the 19th century continued to educate at Luanda or Lisbon, various "Princes" of Congo. Small pensions were occasionally granted to these individuals in the 1870's and later. 91 Occasionally sons or relatives of the Jaga of Cassange entered European society at Luanda for some kind of instruction, and later were living in or near regular settlements. 92 Silva Porto in 1854 considered sending a relative of Sekeletu to Lisbon for education to win the allegiance of the tribe, but Borollo, the rival of Sekeletu, vetoed the "revolutionary" proposition of the settler. 93

Vassalized sobas took or were given Portuguese names and ranks in the Portuguese army of Angola, usually

90 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, III, pp. 387-94.
91 A.R.U., Angola, Pasta 47, 1876-77, Junta da Fazenda, No. 1151, 1876.
92 Carvalho, Etnographia e História, pp. 700-705.
93 Silva Porto, Viagens, III, 3 May 1864, p. 133.
in "Second Line," or guerre preta. Perhaps this phase of the policy tended to backfire on the Portuguese at times for sobas ambitions and warlike tendencies within their own societies were not softened by their membership in the Portuguese military elite. Disputes between native leaders were adjudicated by Luanda. For example in 1880, near Cambambe, a Chefe was replaced by the administration for failing to stop a native war between two sobas, and a special commission was appointed to adjudicate. The Governor General's remark about assimilating loyal vassal sobas into the Portuguese community can characterize much of native policy: "I believe this is not only logical but convenience advises it."94

Native policy, therefore, was conducted by the administration in order to create a true native elite. This idea became more concrete after the publication of Sá da Bandeira's Trabalho Rural in 1873.95 For in this volume came the suggestion for a special school for colonial administrators as well as for the sobas and their families. In Cabinda and Congo, the Portuguese accomplished a similar policy in this respect, but only to a limited extent. Governor Vasco Guedes (1879-80) created a short-lived "Professional School" in Luanda


for native leaders to learn artisan trades. Telegraph operators were trained in this manner for a while, but the hopes of this vigorous Governor were destroyed after he left due to the traditional tendency for "lack of continuity." 96

In 1885 Governor Ferreira do Amaral suggested Lisbon pay for sending certain sobas to Lisbon schools for one year, as a part of military recruitment for service in Mozambique, Guinea, and the islands. He noted the great resistance displayed by the chiefs. "Gradual absorption" was his term for assimilation in Angola, and he believed that very powerful sobas who resisted vassalage or assimilation should be removed from the areas of their power to neutralize them in a strange place. 97

The Junta Consultiva was rather shocked by the Governor's Machiavellian plans and recommended in 1885 that the recruitment policy of sobas remain the same, since a change might cause costly rebellions as that of Dembos in 1872. If the Governor wanted to find sufficient personnel for the army, first or second line, he was accommodated thereafter by a decree of 1885, recruiting Europeans for service between 18 and 35 years of age. The guerra preta as "second line" remained in

96 Castelbranco, História de Angola, pp. 248-9.

97 A.H.U., Junta Consultiva, No. 752, 14 October 1885, Gov. Gen. Ferreira do Amaral to Minister of Navy and Overseas, enclosed in No. 3059, 3 December 1885, "Parecer."
Angola "the principal basis of the most important provincial force," and theoretically was capable of being mobilized rapidly.98

After 1880 the pace of treaty-signing, pacification, and the first stages of "assimilation" quickened with the increase in missionary activity. The Portuguese official in the interior, usually the chefe of a concelho, was not always in a position to get close to the masses. He was primarily a link between the soba and the administration on the coast. But the missionary was sent out to both "civilize and Christianize" en masse. Governor Ferreira do Amaral despised the quantity and quality of missionary he had to send into the sertão. By 1878 foreign Protestant missionaries were moving into the Congo district, and onto the Benguela plateau.99 But Lisbon could produce only a handful of timid and lackadaisical priests who feigned illness to avoid being stationed in the interior away from Luanda.100

Sá da Bandeira had written in 1873 that Portugal should carry out a "civilize now, then Christianize" doctrine in Angola. But a new school of thought emerged


in the 1880's led by Father António Barroso, missionary to the Congo district after 1881.\(^{101}\)

Barroso traveled and worked as a missionary at São Salvador and Bembe from 1881 to 1887. After returning for a period to Lisbon, he gave a long paper in 1889 to the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, called *O Congo, Seu Passado, Presente e Futuro*.\(^{102}\) Contradicting Governors-General who felt missionaries should keep out of politics, Barroso aggressively asserted that the Portuguese missionary must be the bush agent *par excellence* for the Luanda administration.\(^{103}\) Barroso felt Portugal must Christianize the native first, then "civilization" will follow, for only missions could combat "foreign propaganda" and establish prestige in the interior.

The report of Barroso indicates the charged political atmosphere of the external expansion policy in Angola in the 1880's. Moreover, native policy for the first time the Portuguese were obliged to consider to a degree the future of the nameless "peoples" under the native *sofa* elite. There was a great shortage


\(^{103}\) *Ibid.*, p. 11, 68.
of chefes to administer concelhos, and unhealthy posts consumed more than their share of minor officials. Much of southern Angola was completely independent during the term of Ferreira do Amaral, and expediency dictated the rule that the native power structure had to be preserved until a later date. Was it possible to replace the sobas?104

It is neither practical nor convenient. It is not practical because the people would not consent, neither do we have the force to persuade the sobas to drop their traditional power. In general, the soba is less submissive to superior authority, but the Commander of the Division is less respected by the people. The first is more respected, the second is more feared.

In this report for the year 1882-83, Governor Ferreira do Amaral praised Father Barroso as a missionary superior to the majority in Angola, and indicated that he intended to continue the "elite" system of vassalage.105 By corresponding regularly with the King of Congo, old Pedro V, appointing his son Prince Dom Álvaro as "Professor" of a primary school, and sending gifts and missionaries, he satisfied the traditional demands of the King of that unhealthy kingdom.106 His special attention to the interior of the north coast betrayed

105 Ibid., Caderno, No. 2.
106 Barroso, O Congo, p. 74. He considered climate in Congo very bad.
his vital concern for the future of Portugal's Congo claims in international chancelleries.

There was no money to finance the building of churches, or the sending of many missionaries. A true native policy was being undermined by the situation of the treasury at Luanda, for the governor in 1887 reported in this regard, concluding that he was at a loss to know "where we should begin." 107 Barroso pleaded with the Society of Geography in Lisbon to help finance missions and priests in Angola, since only a handful of self-sacrificing men were willing to come out. 108

It was clear by 1889 that the school of "labor and religion" was bound to triumph for native policy in Angola. Barroso's experience taught him that the priest had to precede the soldier, and that, if the native did not learn to work, religion had failed in its purpose. 109 Portuguese officials as Capelo admired the French, English, and American missionaries in Angola after they proved their mettle in the 1880's. Portuguese missions, on the other hand, were few and plagued by lack of missionaries to come into the interior. In 1887 there were an estimated twelve missionaries

107 Capelo, Relatório do Governador, p. 85.
108 Barroso, O Congo, pp. 69-72.
109 Ibid., p. 75.
working for Portugal in all Angola, seven of them
Goanese priests. The most important missions were in
the Congo district, created in 1885 after the Conference
on West Africa at Berlin. Clearly Governor Capelo was
ashamed of the two Portuguese missionaries in Bihé and
Bailundo. 110

Although the Portuguese missionary effort was
slow to start, what began in the 1880's was far superior
to the earlier neglect and abandonment. Thinkers in
Lisbon realized the role which missions would play in
spreading Portuguese control on the plateaus, and some
harked back to the time when the first Captain-Major
of Bihé in 1790 worked with an Italian Capuchin to
baptize "Europeans, Brazilians, and natives." 111 Two
missionaries on the Benguela plateau worked from 1886-90,
but retired with the revolt of 1890. A mission was re­
established at Belmonte again only in 1910. 112

In considering native policy after 1880, the
Portuguese were influenced by the rising interest in
Africa on the part of the more prosperous European
nations. Books by foreigners concerning Angola must
have had some influence upon the direction of official

110 Capelo, Relatório do Governador, pp. 82-84.
111 Alfredo Keiling, Quarenta Anos de Africa
(Braga, 1934), pp. 24-26.
112 Belmonte, Bihe, was the town and headquarters
for the trader Silva Porto. There are several towns in Portugal by the same name.
thought. Labor shortage was a key problem discussed by such works, but their solutions to a traditional problem in Angola were by no means orthodox. In 1864 traveler Winwood Reade suggested Angola solve her labor problem by importing "black emigrants" from North America. Joaquim Monteiro in 1875 recommended the importation of Chinese coolies into Africa to replace the "useless" negroes. Apparently the Portuguese never seriously considered these ideas. By 1890, and the emergence of Africanists like Father Barroso, the Capelo brothers, Henrique Carvalho and A. F. Nogueira, Negroes were thought of in a new light of hope and future progress. If Barroso was discouraged with what he saw in Congo, he was also confident that the Negro was changing and that Portugal was beginning a new phase of activity.

As much as the official mind at Luanda desired the education of the native, it could not dismiss the past failures. In 1884 the soba of Bihé asked the Portuguese to educate two of his sons in Europe at Portugal's expense. The Governor agreed this might cement an alliance or an eventual vassalage, but he recalled for the Ministry in Lisbon, the examples of

113 Reade, Savage Africa, p. 452.
115 Barroso, O Congo, p. 67.
Prince Nicolas of Congo, and other princes, and the sons of Manuel Puna of Cabinda who received such educations as to make of them "some useless visionaries, others detestable clerks." Such products were rarely fit to rule because they had learned only "fanciful concepts."

Many factors brought Portugal's administration to reappraise native policy after 1880. Portuguese settlers and colonists were not coming to Angola in any significant number. The colonization plans might well collapse. Yearly thousands of Portuguese immigrants, mainly from northern Portugal and the islands, entered Brazil. Throughout the entire 19th century, Brazil took over 75% of Portugal's immigrants, and Africa remained unpeopled. Only after 1888 did more than one thousand Portuguese annually emigrate to Portuguese Africa. Native policy was often overshadowed by an emigration and colonization program. On the other hand, native policy deserved attention because the few Portuguese in Angola were in danger of being absorbed. Therefore, the eventual policy, given the failure of white colonization, was to "absorb or be absorbed" by several million Africans.


117 Oliveira Martins, Brazil e as Colónias, pp. 159-60; Fernando E. da Silva, Emigração Portuguesa (Lisbon, 1917), p. 192.

118 Sarmento, A., Os Sertões, pp. 220-225.
"Portugal has a great social problem to resolve," wrote Andrade Corvo.\textsuperscript{119} A vast population awaited education. Nevertheless, Portugal's means were too scanty to effect a rapid change. Since the traditional system was based upon a native elite of sobas, empacaçeiros, macotas and their families, this privileged group would have to aid the transition. A larger segment of the elite needed education, and privilege in order to begin governing through municipal councils in the bush. Native emigration to outlying country was a well-known fact of life in Angola, and the native elite could help prevent it.\textsuperscript{120}

The sobas would be supported in their positions and power as long as they adhered to the Portuguese definition of what was "civilization."\textsuperscript{121} Essentially, what they envisioned, if not always accomplished, was a form of indirect rule. Their deprived bases of power and authority, and a tendency to favor the coasts to the interior administration led to a conservative reluctance to administer directly. Except for a few isolated cases, when native communities existed close to

\textsuperscript{119} Andrade Corvo, \textit{Estudos}, III, p. 393.

\textsuperscript{120} Capelo e Ivens, \textit{De Benguella}, II, pp. 235, 251.

\textsuperscript{121} A similarity may be noted between Portuguese practice and British practice in tropical colonies before 1900, or later. See Raymond Leslie Buell, \textit{The Native Problem in Africa} (New York, MacMillan, 1928), 2 vols.
the ports and larger European settlements, the Portuguese were satisfied with and indeed only capable of ruling through the local sobas. In unhealthy areas as in the Congo district, true European colonization was considered by many as impossible in the 1880's. Instead of official direct rule, a native elite, and native constabulary could do the job.\footnote{122}

The theory rarely coincided with the practice of bush politics. If men in Lisbon wished for "peaceful" expansion, and native administration, those in Angola saw themselves driven to violence and often desperate action. The sheer force of the native polities in southern Angola, for example, caused the administration to renew the traditional deportation policy for rebellious sobas.\footnote{123} Sobas causing trouble in an area under Portuguese control were shipped off for army service to the Cape Verdes, Azores islands or to Mozambique.

Native policy was not carried out by officials motivated by a sense of "civilizing mission" but by a sense of expediency. When the administration examined the records they learned that tradition was also based on expediency. Few European nations could match the

\footnote{122 Barroso, \textit{O Congo}, pp. 37-50.}

\footnote{123 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta I-1, 1879, September 20, No. 302; Junta Consultiva, 14 October 1884, letter from Gov. Gen. Ferreira do Amaral. For example, Soba Cauquandade in 1879 was given fifteen years exile to Mozambique.}
Portuguese record in Angola for keeping a delicate balance between their own weakness and the overwhelming native resources. To do it, every possible maneuver was needed. The most important maneuver, however, was the vassalage system for it enabled them to raise small armies, raise labor forces, institute direct taxation, and control each region as a traditional unit. The policy broke down when Europeans discredited the administration in the eyes of the native elite. Those hordes of degredados and bush peddlers who roamed the sertão were straining the already tense situation. In the same regard, those natives who "became" Portuguese in the 19th century sowed discord among the Europeans by their very character. Due to the general atmosphere of insecurity and racial hatreds that flared in areas near the European settlements, the expediency of racial mixing on a small scale, undermined the balance between both races.  

Native policy, therefore, became a social problem since miscegenation in Angola was not extensive except for a few exceptional periods before 1850.  

\[124\] A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 775, 16 September 1884, Gov. Gen. A case in point is that of Colonel Victor of Ambaca, a native evoque, who in 1884 was accused by settlers of Dondo of "racial hatred," and robbery, and stationing European soldiers in the most unhealthy places in order to see them succumb.  

\[125\] See Chapter II, p. for statistics on mestíços out-numbering whites, and Chapter V for 1845 estimate. More white women arrived in the late 19th century, and their presence caused a general decrease in mestíço
had another fact to show that Angola by 1880 was not a "second Brazil." The vassalage system was far more successful than the assimilation policy. The attempt to "absorb or be absorbed" was, true to other policies, too little and too late.

D. Farewell to the Congo Question

This study is not concerned with the details of diplomatic negotiations leading to the General Act of Berlin of 1885. Only insofar as the diplomacy affected Portuguese expansion will a discussion be offered.

Portugal's long-standing claim to the territory on the coast from 5 degrees 12 minutes to 8 degrees south latitude lay in the Foreign Office at London since 1846. If recognized, this would have put both sides of the Congo River mouth, from just north of Cabinda to just south of Ambriz, clearly under the Portuguese flag. British policy remained consistently hostile to Portuguese occupation north of Ambriz in spite of numerous Portuguese diplomatic and naval sallies to turn the tide. Nearly every year between 1846 and the re-opening of negotiations in 1876, some incident on the Congo coast prompted Portugal to renew the claim.126 But Britain was obstinately firm.

offspring. Much the same phenomenon occurred after 1930 in Angolan demography. See Ilídio de Amaral, Aspectos do Povoamento Branco de Angola (Lisbon, 1960, No. 74 of Estudos by the Junta de Investigações do Ultramar).

126 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 53.
The traveler Cameron, besides stirring Portuguese imagination and national honor over the condition of Angola, had in December 1874 declared a British protectorate over the Congo Basin and signed treaties with Chiefs.\(^\text{127}\) This idea was rejected by the Foreign Office. Portugal, however, had learned one more fact to urge action without delay. When Robert Morier arrived as Minister for Britain in Lisbon, he found the Congo question the most important issue of the day. Andrade Corvo was perhaps Portugal's most pro-British negotiator, but he was a victim of the turbulence of Lisbon politics, in office for several months and then out of power. He was Minister for the Navy and Overseas, Foreign Minister for short durations during 1866-7, 1871-2, 1875-6 and 1878-9.\(^\text{128}\)

Andrade Corvo's policy was distinctly liberal and Anglophile. Yet his visions concentrated on territorial acquisition and delimitation in a treaty with Britain alone. If Angola did not have the coast from Ambriz to the Congo within a few years, greedy newcomers would grab it. As he wrote in 1883:

> The occupation of these territories, whose rights the Crown of Portugal has reserved in treaties, is still not accomplished; but when

\(^{127}\text{Ibid., p. 54; Here the Portuguese learned of another British naval officer, like Captain William Owen, signing treaties for territory.}\)

\(^{128}\text{Almada, José de, A Política Colonial de João de Andrade Corvo (Lisbon, 1944), pp. 102-103.}\)
different nations, especially the United States, place their feet there firmly, then that occupation will be impossible. The English Government has shown and shows an inclination to negotiate which assures us of the possession of the very extensive territories from Ambriz up to the Congo, and that convention will be one of the most important results of a loyal policy of cooperation.... The Treaty of Congo will be a glory for whoever celebrates it: not one of these ephemeral glories with a short popularity, but one of those glories that will remain in history, never to be erased from the memory of a people. 129

From 1877 until 1884 it seemed possible that Britain and Portugal might come to a settlement over the Congo. Negotiations, however, became increasingly difficult. Two powerful forces stood against Portuguese occupation of the mouth of the Congo: the British Manchester and Liverpool merchants established on the coast and the International Association. France opposed Portuguese claims north of the Congo River.

The earliest and most consistent enemies of Portuguese occupation of the coast north of Ambriz were the British merchant interests. 130 Their hostility increased with their prosperity. By 1884 British trade on this disputed coast was worth about £2,000,000 sterling.

129 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 41-42, 157. The statesman, as I have shown above, believed Angola would be dependent upon at least the southern bank of the Congo River.

130 See Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 139-167 for a survey of British merchant pressure on the Government.
and was comparable with the Niger trade of Britain. The British dominated the trading groups, outcompeting the Dutch, in second place, then the French, and lastly, the Portuguese.131

The greatest issue at stake was not simply that of free trade merchants' interests innocently battling protectionist Portuguese administration from Angola. The real question was which power could maneuver well enough to convince the other interested powers that after the disputed territory was formally taken a minimum of differential duties would be charged on trade.132

If the Congo question by 1884 was a question of "secondary importance" to Britain's Foreign Office, quite the opposite was true for the Foreign Ministry in Lisbon.133 Portugal noted in 1878 that a considerable expedition of English missionaries had successfully established themselves at the capital of the Congo kingdom, São Salvador. This event alone, placing a threat in a place so potentially strategic to the southern bank of the Congo River, encouraged immediate action. In


133 Crowe, Ibid., p. 208.
the Congo kingdom itself, however, the old King Pedro V, as impotent as ever, remained a faithful Portuguese vassal and asked Luanda for permission to let the mission settle near his town. 134 This aged Negro consistently wrote Luanda for more troops and priests to occupy his capital, deserted by the last garrison about 1870. 135 In 1883 he wrote the Governor-General again in the same vein requesting a detachment of fifty men and supplies. At that delicate moment in Anglo-Portuguese negotiations, however, the Governor felt it impolitic to occupy the capital with a force. A Portuguese Catholic mission under Father António Barroso had been established there since 1881, nevertheless. 136

In 1880-1881 the Foreign Ministry received a confidential report from Lieutenant Jaime Serpa Pimental, who had conducted a survey of the ports and settlements near the Congo mouth. 137 In this pessimistic report, the Portuguese learned of Stanley's activities in "empire-building" for the International Association,

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136 See above, pp. 289-291.

137 Jaime Serpa Pimental should not be confused with Antonio de Serpa Pimental, delegate to the Berlin West African Conference.
and clearly Stanley was suspected of founding the bases for a gigantic state monopoly for Belgium. What this report revealed was not breathed by the Portuguese at the later Berlin Conference for essentially the observer admitted:

The Congo, I repeat, is lost. Holland today dominates there in trade; after her, England and France. We ruled it when, instead of ground nuts and palm oil, human beings were gathered! Today we are the sales agents for the foreigners! 138

"Within a few years," he wrote, "there will be an English colony in São Salvador." With French and English missions going up at Landana, Boma, and Vivi besides, this naval observer reflected the consternation of his superiors when they saw their own occupation of the coveted region in such ruins.139

A Portuguese "civilizing station" was placed at Nokki (Noqui in modern Portuguese) about 1882, under the plan of Minister Júlio de Vilhena. Later another was placed in 1884 at Landana north of Cabinda.140 Serpa Pimental stressed in his report that trade was increasing in the Congo, and that although the area was virtually lost, Portugal should still attempt an occupation.141

139 Ibid., p. 275.
141 Serpa Pimental, supra, p. 280.
Later, during the Berlin Conference, Portugal decided to make a last desperate try and follow up his suggestion.

But for the moment, in Portugal, there was a struggle between the English party and the anti-English party. The issue of free trade or monopoly for Portuguese Africa was debated vigorously in the press while Andrade Corvo tried to convince his countrymen that their best interests lay in cooperation with England.142 The English party professed more reasonable terms for a settlement, and the basis of these terms originated with the work of Sá da Bandeira in 1873, his Trabalho Rural Africano.143 In this tract he urged Portugal to settle the Congo dispute by allowing free trade on the Congo River, and giving up claims to territory north of the Congo, but retaining the vital southern bank. In 1883 Andrade Corvo's Estudos suggested more reasonable terms of settlement with Britain than those asked by the six Portuguese delegates at the Berlin Conference. He advocated free trade for the Congo River, and holding out for the southern bank and maintaining, in vague terms, rights to the northern bank.144


144 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 41-42, 157.
 İlúiano Cordeiro, the soul of the Sociedade de Geographia, wrote the case for the Portuguese side at Berlin in his 1883 pamphlet distributed to most European Ministries, *A Questão do Zaire*. Here Cordeiro, for public and political standing was obliged to bid high for all the territory that could be possibly claimed by Portugal between $5^\circ\,12'/2^\circ$ S. Clearly the Portuguese delegates, in private, did not expect to get what they asked for.

The Anglo-Portuguese negotiations in the period from 1877 to 1884 began well but became increasingly difficult. Robert Morier's plans for 1879-81 involved a comprehensive scheme for Anglo-Portuguese partnership in Southern Africa, including both coasts. This "grand design," however well-intentioned, was ruined first by hostility in Portugal toward the free trade terms and cooperation with "Perfidious Albion," and secondly, by rising pressure from British merchant interests. The Lourenço Marques Treaty was not ratified by early 1881 and it stood as a *quid pro quo* for the evolving Congo treaty. What was more, pro-Portuguese Morier was

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transferred from Lisbon to Madrid in July 1881, ending a short "honeymoon" period. As the French, using de Brazza's exploration and treaty-signing, moved into action in the Congo region, Britain reconsidered Portugal's claims, and negotiations reopened again in late 1881. Like Portugal's, Britain's policy was a "coastal policy," pledged to safeguarding coasts and mouths of rivers so as to prevent foreign powers from getting in behind this maritime fringe.149 Up until mid-1882 a reasonable Congo treaty between Britain and Portugal might have been concluded, and also probably accepted by the Powers. By late 1882, Portugal's magnificent dream was, in fact, at the beginning of the end.150

Eventually, however, Britain and Portugal signed a treaty in February 1884. There were two stages to the negotiations. The first, from December 1882 to April 1883, encountered some opposition in England, followed by raising of the terms by the Foreign Office. The second stage, from April 1883 until February 1884, saw the free trade terms for Portugal rise considerably, delaying the final signing. The final treaty gave Portugal the coast so long desired, and control of the mouth of the Congo.151 Portugal ratified the treaty,

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149 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 102.
150 Ibid., pp. 102-105.
151 See Anstey, Appendix A, for the verbatim text of the 26 February 1884 treaty; also in Accounts and Papers, 1884, c 3886, LVI, p. 45.
but Britain, after the hail of abuse and opposition poured on the treaty by France, Germany, the International Association, and the British merchants, scrapped the agreement. By May 1884, Portuguese representatives approached the European powers for a general conference to decide the claims. 152

Fear of French designs on the Congo mouth caused the Foreign Office for a period to consider using Portugal as a "front-man" for her trade domination, since annexation was out of the question. French opposition was decisive in bringing Britain to this view. 153 Portugal felt betrayed in early 1884 when Britain failed to ratify the long-awaited "dream treaty," and could hardly be blamed for running to the other European powers in May 1884 for a public conference one day after suggesting secretly a Conference to Britain. 154 After all, Portugal had considered public airings of the claims' dispute for several decades and time was running out. 155

Before discussing the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, it will be useful to describe Portuguese plans and activities in the disputed region north of Luanda. Portuguese power and influence in the region was rising after 1881.


154 Crowe, Berlin Conference, p. 207. Refers to Portugal's move as "double-dealing" in May 1884.

155 Crowe, Ibid., Appendix II, pp. 197-201, "Portuguese Claims on the Congo." Author Crowe, without benefit
Father Barroso, on his journey up the Congo mouth to Noqui and overland to São Salvador, acted as an observer and semi-official political agent, sending to Luanda frequent and informative letters from the north. Barroso was more optimistic than Lt. Serpa Pimentel and urged energetic measures to plant stations on the coast and inland. 156

If communications were smooth between agents in the Congo and officials at Luanda, there was no such harmony between Lisbon and Luanda. Governor-General Ferreira do Amaral, in charge during the Congo crisis and throughout the Berlin Conference, complained of few briefings on the European situation from the Ministry in Lisbon. 157 In his report of September 1883, the north coast overshadowed all other considerations. For this governor the renovation of the Ancient Alliance could result in benefits for Portugal, since Britain was so powerful in industry and capital. Yet the character of British naval officers soured his personal contact with such a connection, for he thought them

of Portuguese material, has greatly underestimated Portuguese activity in the Congo region interior, 1859-70, and on the coasts north of Ambriz. Moreover, her interpretation of British motives on the coasts after 1846, have been revised by Anstey's new work to put more emphasis on the "informal" empire motive of free trade.

156 A.H.U., Angola, Pastas 3, 4, 7, 1882-84, enclosed letters of Barroso to the Governor-General.

haughty and impulsive. Ferreira do Amaral was planning to revive the 1856-60 plans of his namesake, former Governor Amaral. Bembe, São Salvador, and eventually the southern bank of the Congo would be occupied, with Ambriz as the base point. His sights were on the left bank of the Congo, above all, and like Amaral before him, he believed the trade from interior of the Congo ending at Ambrizette could be cut and diverted to Ambriz.

Trade was the coveted concomitant of controlling the coast. Portuguese expansion theory had come the full circle with this Governor, since he forgot the lesson learned by his predecessor: that the interior approach to dominate the coast was useless. Besides the trade motive, the prestige factor moved him since he doubted much revenue would come from the area.

The King of Congo wrote Luanda on June 3, 1883, requesting a Portuguese garrison be stationed in his town. His people were unmanageable and he knew the Portuguese wanted to renew their power in his region. His dependence upon Luanda was manifest when he wrote of the proposed force: "Its presence and moral influence will suffice to bring about the complete pacification of all these peoples." The Governor wrote back that

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158 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, 4 Cadernos, No. 331, 1883.
159 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, Caderno 2, Sala 12, No. 331, Gov. Gen.
he would send troops later, but now he had to send some Angolan recruits to Guinea. At this time and later, he questioned the reliability of native troops and was ready to use European marines for the delicate Congo operations.  

Portuguese intelligence reported H. M. Stanley's work on the Upper Congo in late 1883, and the Governor at Luanda dreaded the possibility that Stanley might come down to the coast below Vivi. Implicit in his fears was the official tendency to dismiss the interior Congo in favor of the coast and mouth of the river. Amaral felt he had to accomplish something beyond his orders to keep the status quo on the coast during the diplomatic negotiations in Europe.  

In October 1883 a Portuguese vessel, A Rainha de Portugal, formally annexed the port towns of Cacongo and Massabi, north of Cabinda. Massabi was actually north of the line of 5° 12'. News of this naval maneuver stirred Luanda to jubilation. Treaties of loyalty were signed with the Chiefs of the region in late September and were published in the Boletim Official on October 29, 1883.  

Considering this a "historic moment" for  

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161 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, Sala 12, No. 331, Caderno 3, 1883.  
Portugal, Governor Ferreira do Amaral was inflated with pride in his letter to the Minister in Lisbon and complimented the Portuguese merchant, João José Rodrigues Leitão, for his role in dealing with the potentates north of Cabinda port. Ferreira do Amaral, however, expressed some misgivings about pursuing

... our prestige in Africa, which will cost us dearly, since it is proven that one of the most expensive luxuries a nation can have is colonies, as long as they are not ready to be emancipated, as was Brazil. 164

This Portuguese blow was very close to French stations at Loango. It is not clear just what effect this had upon France's attitude toward the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty signed a few months later on February 26, 1884. Nevertheless, the Cacongo-Massabi affair gave impetus to new Portuguese plans finally to occupy the Congo mouth. Stanley's activity increasingly worried officials at Luanda and they suspected, before many more naive observers on the spot and in Europe, that Stanley was out to create a sovereign state under another guise. 165 Although Amaral realized his puny resources and the fact that "all the nations" seemed to be against Portugal at the time, he did not discern any difference in the treatment of natives by Stanley or the


Portuguese and he reported to Lisbon that Stanley's railway workers above Vivi were in chains. 166

Emerging from the occupation of two ports north of Cabinda, the Portuguese laid plans to begin occupying gradually ports at the mouth of the Congo. Luanda knew the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty was about to be signed in February, but thirteen days before it was signed and the news was telegraphed from Lisbon, a Portuguese agent, Dr. Ignacio Caetano Xavier, was sent to the strategic port of Banana. 167 Xavier went with instructions dated 13 February 1884 as observer and "political agent," as he was called, to watch activities of a large Dutch trading house at Banana, and to prepare the way for "our forthcoming occupation." Xavier was ordered also to keep watch on Cabinda and a newly established French mission at São António do Zaire, as well as to survey the mouth for placing "future custom ports."

The Portuguese, according to correspondence of the governor-general with Lisbon, expected to occupy the mouth ports during March, April, and May of 1884, and agent Xavier was sent ahead. Whatever the fate of this hapless observer, Portugal learned 168 on March 13 that

France protested the February treaty allowing the occupation. Britain, on the other hand, had not yet ratified the treaty; therefore it was not legally in force, and in April the treaty had very slim chances in the British Parliament. Germany's protest note, delivered on June 14, finished all hope for the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. 169 Nothing daunted, the Governor at Luanda continued acting as if the treaty were in force, and in October 1884 ordered the building of stations at Landana, where competition with French missions was strong. 170

The Berlin West African Conference was in session from November 15, 1884, through February 26, 1885. Major political issues obscured humanitarian questions of slavery and the liquor traffic, and essentially the Conference was an organized parade of what Bismarck called "nullity and charlatanism." 171

Only the territorial negotiations concern this study, since the questions of free trade and free navigation of the Congo were treated and then largely ignored in practice later. 172

169 Crowe, Berlin Conference, pp. 25-29. Britain learned at this time that France and Portugal had held secret talks in July and August 1883 but that little had come out of them.

170 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, No. 822, 14 October 1884. The Governor decided to use European marines for this, not native recruits, perhaps indicating his fear that Europeans would oppose him.

171 Crowe, op. cit., quoted in Preface.

172 Ibid., p. 3.
Portugal, of all the nations at the Conference, desired a settling of these questions and a delimitation of boundaries. Andrade Corvo wrote in 1883 that a vague "vacuum" of no frontiers north of Ambroz would be fatal for Angola.173 The six Portuguese delegates, led by Luciano Cordeiro, António de Serpa Pimentel, and the Marquis of Penafiel, presented in essence the pamphlet "A Questão do Zaire" for their claims. One of their strongest arguments was an incident in the Congo mouth in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian War. Portugal claimed that Germany had recognized her sovereignty over the Congo mouth and coast by protesting to Portuguese officials the French capture of a German vessel near Banana.174

Portugal's claims, however, were whittled down during the Conference. France and Portugal drew closer together seeing their interests in a moderate protectionist system the same. Portugal promised free trade in the disputed regions if, in return, her claims were recognized as valid. Completely alienated from Britain during most of 1884, Portugal sought to revive a "deal"

173 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, p. 157, Corvo sought the Congo as the "frontier of effective occupation," p. 62, I.

with France to get her claims.\textsuperscript{175} The southern limit of the "Conventional Basin" of the Congo was placed at the mouth of the river Logé in Angola. Germany proceeded to back the International Association of Leopold almost to the hilt; the eventual territorial settlement was, in fact, a triumph for that organization, and Portugal received less than she would have from the 1884 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty.\textsuperscript{176}

The final negotiations were heated and difficult. For the International Association, with new-found power and support in Germany and in British interests,\textsuperscript{177} wanted to limit Portugal to the southern bank of the Congo up to Noqui, thus depriving her of her establishments at Cabinda, Cacongo, and Massabi. Portugal, with French backing, refused to accept this settlement in December 1884. Hence a "Triple Partition" was inevitable. Portugal stuck to her guns for the entire right or north bank up to Boma, including the port of Banana, where apparently her agent Xavier was hopefully waiting.

When France went into negotiation for a "deal" with the International Association, the Portuguese delegates knew the game was up, but had to present a strong last front for the public at home, now deeply stirred by the dispute.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{175}See Chapter V for the 1865 proposed "deal" with France.

\textsuperscript{176}Crowe, Berlin Conference, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{177}Ibid., p. 160.

\textsuperscript{178}See Jornal do Commercio, November 1884 to February 1885.
Yet France settled with the Association by early February 1885, and was prepared, after receiving concessions on the left bank, to urge Portugal to compromise on her claims. 179

The Governor Ferreira do Amaral made a last desperate attempt to capture the coveted Congo mouth, considered the key to the economy of Angola, and ordered naval vessels to move on Boma and Banana about February 3rd. His moves were frustrated by cooperation between French and British men-of-war. 180 A week later Portuguese delegates, hoping this last stand had an effect on the Powers, refused the Powers' demands, and claimed the port of Banana, the Cabinda enclave, and the left bank of the Congo up to Vivi, instead of Noqui. 181

The events on the Congo caused three of the Powers (Britain, France, and Germany) to hand Portugal an ultimatum on February 13th. Either Portugal complied with the settlement of getting the Cabinda enclave and the left bank to Noqui, or recognition to all her rights in the disputed area would be withdrawn. Portugal capitulated two days later and signed a convention with the International Association. In the partition treaty and General Act of Berlin of 26 February 1885, Portugal


180Ibid., pp. 172-3. The documents in the A.H.U., Lisbon, for Angola, Government-General run out at the end of 1884.

received the Cabinda enclave, from Cape Lombo to Massabi and inland some 35 miles, as well as the left bank of the Congo up to and including Noqui port. From Noqui inland she received the territory along the latitude of Noqui (about 6°) to the Cuango River, "whose southern course was to form the boundary with the Congo Free State."182

Portugal's claims at Berlin were based largely upon the legal case published by Sá da Bandeira and Santarém in 1855. Since at the last moment in late 1884 both banks of the lower Congo seemed at last within her grasp, Portugal did not, despite the judgment of Crowe, feel she had "profited handsomely" from the settlement.183 The ports of Cacongo and Massabi were legally occupied at the end of 1883, and the International Association attempt to take these away during the Conference was as false as the Portuguese promise to maintain "free trade," if her full claims were recognized. There was a gap in communication between Lisbon and Luanda, and the Governor-General had ideas of his own about forcing a virtually impossible issue at the last moment.

Portuguese public opinion was enraged by the "ultimatum" handed the nation in February 1885. But the


183 Crowe, op. cit., p. 156.
wiser among them realized that the end of the dispute had the effect of freeing the nation for a drive across Africa. The district of Ambriz and Congo proved to be less than an "eldorado" for revenue, and several exploring expeditions were preparing to cross Angola.184

Ironically, the 1885 "ultimatum" handed Portugal at Berlin was only a slight foreshadowing of the later "ultimatum" of 1890 from Britain over a similarly last desperate move made by Portugal in Eastern Africa. The first "ultimatum" freed the Portuguese to pursue long-neglected or rejected schemes for moving into Central Africa. Modern historians who see the partition of Congo in 1885 as unfavorable for Portugal should consider in the light of the coastal mania of Angolan history, that, if Portugal had received more coast at Berlin, her officials would have been tempted to be satisfied with less interior plateau.185 In effect, the Berlin West African Conference provided new perspective. At


185 See Hélio Felgas, História do Congo Português, p. 113. Felgas feels that, if Portugal had kept Bembe and S. Salvador occupied consistently, partition would have been more generous. Yet evidence points to the tendency of the Portuguese to want more coast at the expense of the interior, and their naval power could not compete with competitors who really wanted to keep the Congo mouth out of Portuguese jurisdiction. A secret report to Luanda, of September 8, 1881, reasoned: "We urgently need the piece of territory from the Congo to Loango, not only because all the future trade of Stanley will have to pass through there, but mainly
last it seemed as if the Portuguese were going to over-
come coastal inertia and actively follow Capelo and
Ivens' call "To the Plateau!" 186

186 Capelo e Ivens, De Benguela, II, p. 262.
CHAPTER VII

PACIFICATION, OCCUPATION, AND PARTITION

1885-1891

Small or large, good or bad, Angola is our house.

—J. P. de Oliveira Martins, 1891
CHAPTER VII

PACIFICATION, OCCUPATION, AND PARTITION, 1885-1891

A. The Drive for Central Africa

Plans for extending Portuguese rule and control of trade from Angola to the contra-costa were drawn up formally in 1881 by a group in the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa. The scheme was an outgrowth of the "civilizing station" plan for interior expansion of the Minister Júlio de Vilhena.¹ These plans were influenced by the expeditions of Capelo, Ivens and Serpa Pinto, since these men advocated Portuguese expansion onto the great plateaus east of the coast. Another equally important factor, however, was German exploration and activity in northern Angola after 1875.

Governor-General Ferreira do Amaral, who showed himself to be a staunch expansionist in the Congo crisis, explained to Lisbon in 1884 why a drive into Central Africa would be difficult.

One of the reasons why our rule today in the interior is weak is because the concelhos of the east were abandoned, and everyone knew why this was ordered: it was because the expense they incurred could not be covered by ordinary

means, and we had to choose awaiting the natives on the coast rather than proceeding to civilize them in the interior. Following this policy, came the foreign explorations and designs obliging us to change our tactics, and now it is imperative that we move toward the east and reconquer what we possessed. 2

The treasury was empty and stations in the extreme north and south were in great danger unless reinforced. The old facts of life of Angolan administration, lack of men and money, were important, but when German activity increased in the region north of the Cuanza, it seemed that Portuguese fears would triumph over adversity.

Portuguese officials and small garrisons re-entered Talla-Mugongo and Cassange during 1882 and 1883. Except for a few obscure exceptions during the 1860's when an official or two were allowed to reside in Cassange, no authority was exercised effectively beyond the region of Malange until after 1882. The war of 1861-63 put an end to the Portuguese status observed by Livingstone during 1854 and 1855. 3 Only half-caste traders and a few Europeans represented an informal influence upon the Jaga. The Treaty of 1863, mentioned in Chapter IV, was in fact a sham. Portuguese bad conduct was partly responsible. The Governor in 1884 deplored the fact that

2 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 335, 9 April 1884, Gov. Gen. to Lisbon; see also Pasta 3, No. 331, September, 1883 Relatorio of the Governor-General to Overseas Ministry.

his administration had so little control over officials in the eastern region.

To them Portuguese officers are due many of the difficulties faced by the public administration such as wars in the bush, where they provoke disorder among the natives, from whom they take outrageous extortions, and in those places they exercise an authority the law does not permit them. 4

The Portuguese watched the election of the Jaga of Cassange with traditional interest. A new Jaga was elected by his court in August 1883 and he subsequently dispatched an embassy with gifts to Luanda. The Governor then secured a "Plea of Homage" from the new Jaga, incorporating Cassange into the newly-created concelho of Talla-Mugongo. 5

But where was the official border of eastern Angola? In 1883 Andrade Corvo felt that the frontier was the Cuango River. 6 At the Berlin West African Conference, Portuguese delegates admitted that the Cuango was the southern limit of the newly created Congo Free State. The Cuango had long marked the eastern frontier. Expansionists, however, desired an extension of eastern Angola to the Kasai River, including the capital of the


5 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 750, 14 September 1884, Gov. Gen.; enclosed is report of Chefe for July 26, 1884; Doc. No. 2 is "Plea of Homage" of the Jaga of Cassange.

Lunda kingdom beyond, a traditional trading partner with Portuguese settlements. 7

A major force behind Portuguese activity was the fear of German designs on eastern Angola after 1875. Possessing excellent equipment, numerous German explorers crossed the northern third of Angola studying the river systems of the Cuango, Kasai, and upper Zambesi. The Governor-General in 1884 especially distrusted these expeditions and ordered officers not to go out of their way to help the foreign explorers, as Von Wissmann and Pogge. 8 Von Wissmann, however, was well-treated and given free passage through customs. He, as most of the other German explorers, was very critical of Portuguese rule. 9 Since the Portuguese had always placed a high value upon the Lunda-Cassange-Malange trade, German movements worried the treasury.

In December 1886 the Portuguese and Germans signed a Convention drawing the frontier between Angola and Southwest Africa. 10 Besides agreeing on this frontier, Portugal and Germany gave each other a free hand to pursue

7Quirino de Jesus, "A Delimitação Effectiva de Angola," Portugal em África (1894), p. 38.


9See the accounts as Heinrich Von Wissmann, Im Innern Afrikas (Leipzig, 1888); Paul Pogge, Im Reiche des Muata Jamvo (Berlin, 1880); A. E. Lux, Von Loanda Nach Kimbundu (Wien, 1880).

10Francisco A. Pinto, Angola e Congo (Lisbon, 1888), pp. 401-2.
Central African empires, Portugal, theoretically, getting the territory between Angola and Mozambique. Yet in 1887 a map published in Germany showed Cassange not as Portuguese but as part of the "free basin" of the Congo. Alarmed by this new development, some felt there might be a German colony in Lunda within a few years. German trade cloth was better and cheaper than the Portuguese fazenda and the natives east of Cassange were attracted by German trade. Great reserves of ivory and rubber were to be had in this region.\(^{11}\)

A well-equipped scientific and political expedition was sent from Portugal in 1884 when the threat seemed greatest. It was led by the army officer Henrique Dias de Carvalho (1843-1909), who had experience in East Africa and Asia. Carvalho proceeded to carry out plans for the most politically and economically successful expedition to date in Angola. As a result of his expedition to Lunda beyond the Kasai during 1884-87, Angolan territory increased by nearly one-sixth the previous size of the entire province.\(^{12}\)

Carvalho accomplished what every other Portuguese explorer before him could have accomplished with the proper direction. He simply adhered to the 1881 scheme of Júlio de Vilhena for establishing stations in the


\(^{12}\) G.E.P.eB., "Carvalho," Vol. 6, pp. 75-76.
interior, and planted thirteen "civilizing stations" between Malange and Mussumba, the capital of Lunda; he also succeeded in marking out a safer trade route to the east. Later Carvalho pointed out that the ultimate frustration of the contra-costa dream was due to the failure to apply Vilhena's plan.13

Carvalho conducted a highly exact geographical and climatological survey between Malange and the Kasai, but his major assignment was to reach Lunda, sign a treaty, and improve Portuguese trade with that region. Secondarily, he was to establish either a political or a religious mission in Lunda. The subordination of these interests to trade indicates that in 1884 there was little expectation on the part of the Portuguese that Lunda would become a part of the Angolan administration. The economic mission to counteract German influence was most important.14 The commerce from Luanda to Lunda had decreased lately. The instructions of the African Commission of the Society of Geography also told Carvalho to survey conditions for extending the planned railroad past Ambaca.

The Portuguese feared that either Germans or Englishmen would cut off the interior trade to the Angolan coast. Serpa Pinto held the same fear.

13 Carvalho, Meteorologia, Climologia E Colonisação (Lisbon, 1892), Preface; also his Descrição Da Viagem, A Mussumba do Muatianvua (Lisbon, 1890), Vol. I.

Carvalho's advisers, fearing incidents among the hostile tribes east of Cassange, explicitly forbade many Europeans to accompany the expedition's leader; only a Portuguese priest was allowed to come along. The advisers considered that it would be best to keep peace with the tribes, and thus lay a more secure foundation for opposing foreign influences. 15

Carvalho reached Malange in July 1884 and met Germans there. After building twelve stations or huts along the way, he crossed the Kasai in August 1886 and entered the Lunda kingdom. On January 18, 1887, Carvalho signed a treaty with the Matiamvo Mucanza and his court. 16 Germans, like Lieutenant Otto Schutt, had already reached Lunda and met the Matiamvo, as early as 1879. 17 Carvalho was successful in signing a treaty of trade and friendship which was essentially non-political. Though Lunda was considered outside the regular administration of Angola at this time, an embassy was prompted by the work of Carvalho to travel from Lunda to Luanda in 1888 and apparently asked for

15 Silva Porto advocated the policy of sending few Europeans along on expeditions into Central Africa. His rationale was largely practical: more Europeans meant more expense from tributes along the way. "The journey of the Head [European] doubles the expenses of the journey of his agents." Viagens e Apontamentos, (B.M.P.P., Codice 1235), II, p. 296, entry for 1 May 1862.

16 General Ferreira Martins, Figuras e Factos da Colonização Portuguesa (Lisbon, 1944), pp. 94-96.

a garrison of from 200 to 300 Portuguese soldiers to protect Lunda. A nephew of the Matiamvo accompanied the embassy but the Governor was not impressed with the presents of these ambassadors, and stated that he could not spare troops for an area outside the formally administered region. Later he wrote to Lisbon asking for permission to extend rule into Lunda, and this was granted.

In the meantime Lunda was invaded by African groups from the east and from the southwest. The powerful Chokwes were driving northeast on a rampage of conquest after 1885; with arms bought from Portuguese sertanejos and their ubiquitous agents, they overpowered the Lunda. From the east expanded the forces of Msiri. The Lunda were obliged to build make-shift forts and fortified villages on all sides. Their plight grew especially desperate after 1887 when their capital was attacked by the Chokwe armies, and they then sought Portuguese help. Carvalho found Lunda empty of much of the fabled ivory, wax, and rubber formerly taken to Cassange fair. The Chokwes were winning the struggle.

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18 Archivos de Angola, 1940, Doc. XXX, pp. 283-86, 290; the text of the treaty is in Descripção da Viagem, Vol. IV, Lisbon, 1895, pp. 269-71. By the Berlin Act of 1885, the Cuango River was to be the dividing frontier between Angola and Congo Free State.

for supremacy in Lunda and the best trade routes now followed the Kasai northward. Since the Chokwe obtained more Portuguese arms, being closer to the Ovimbundu and Portuguese traders in Bibé, they held the advantage. 20 Portuguese influence east of the Kasai was largely represented by Malange and Ambaca half-caste traders; but clearly there were more Germans in Lunda than Portuguese before 1890. 21 No Portuguese forces arrived before 1895.

The Congo Free State was expanding and sought to take all of Lunda; the Portuguese nearly lost the region between the Cuango and the Kasai to ambitious King Leopold. When Carvalho returned to Portugal in 1888 he campaigned by writing a tract, A Lunda, trying to prove the validity of Portuguese sovereignty in the area he had explored. Negotiations between the two powers ensued and on May 25, 1891, the frontier was drawn, making the Kasai the eastern border of Angola. Thus much of the Lunda district was added to the province, and in 1895 Henrique Carvalho returned as Governor of the District, which he almost single-handedly acquired for


21 Carvalho, Ethnographia, pp. 715-722.
Portugal. Nevertheless, Carvalho was disappointed that Portugal had lost the capital and part of the Lunda kingdom to the Congo Free State in 1891, for he well knew how he had established his 13th station from Malange, "Estação Pinheiro Chagas" nearly sixty miles east of the Kasai river in 1887 at 8° 21'/ south latitude and 23° 11'/ east of Greenwich. Nevertheless, the famous "mapa cór de rosa" of 1886, which had been presented to the Portuguese Cortes in 1887, did not claim Lunda district even so far as the Kasai but left a large blank area. The Portuguese were fortunate to acquire a vast district, and trade to Luanda from this region increased considerably for at least a decade thereafter.

Portugal expanded into Central Africa from the coast of Angola along two axes of advance. The first, used by Carvalho, to Lunda from Malange was further north than the traditional Malange to Cassange trade

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22 See Carvalho, A Lunda (Lisbon, 1890); Imprensa Nacional, Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, A Questão da Lunda (Lisbon, 1891), Livro Branco (White Book paper); Ferreira Martins, Figuras e Factos, p. 96.

23 Carvalho, Meteorologia, p. 49.

24 See the Government White Book, Negociacoens relativas à delimitação das possessões portuguesas e francesas na Africa Occidental (Lisbon, 1887, Imprensa Nacional) Map in back.

route. The second was begun first at Mossamedes extending in two directions: one went east across the Chella mountains to the plateau of Huila and then northeast to Caconda and Bihé, while the other went southeast along the Cunene and Cubango valleys. Pacification campaigns began in earnest in southern Angola about 1885 but were not meant to reach Central Africa, only to occupy and control restricted regions and build forts.\textsuperscript{26}

The axis of advance that eventually developed into a route to reach Barotseland, and then Mozambique, was started at Caconda and ended at Belmonte, Bihé, the home of the old sertanejo, Silva Porto. True to the predictions of Silva Porto in several decades of pleading with Benguela and Luanda, and to the plan of Serpa Pinto in 1880, Bihé proved to be the pivot for expansion into the region of the upper Zambesi.\textsuperscript{27} Unfortunately for Portugal's aspirations of ruling a Portuguese Barotseland, this axis of advance was taken too late and with too little force or determination.

American missionaries reached Bihé before the first two Portuguese missionaries who arrived about 1885.\textsuperscript{28} The Portuguese appointed Silva Porto, the

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., pp. 569-571.
\textsuperscript{27}See Chapter VI.
\textsuperscript{28}Capelo, \textit{Relatório do Governador}, pp. 80-86.
owner of Belmonte town, as Capitão-Mór, or resident, but he was given no force of troops or direct administrative authority over Bihe. In 1886, one year after Silva Porto received his appointment, the paramount soba of Bihe died "after a fierce drinking bout." Before his violent and unpredictable successor ascended the throne, anarchy ruled the region. Long before this, Silva Porto established a regular route of trade from Bihe to Barotseland across the Zambesi. When the English missionary Frederick Stanley Arnot met Silva Porto in Barotseland in 1884, he noted that the Portuguese traded for ivory.

After 1886 matters grew critical in Bihe, since the new soba, Chindunduma, was neither as tractable nor as reliable as the old soba. Silva Porto found he was able to do less with the new potentate. Meanwhile in Europe, Portuguese aspirations for a band of territory between Angola and Mozambique reached their culmination during the Ministry of Henrique de Barros Gomes (1843-1898). Barros Gomes in his Ministry of 1886-90 was pledged to fulfill the contra-costa dream and he began by negotiating frontier treaties with France and Germany in 1886 which supposedly, without considering British interests, gave Portugal carte blanche for advance across


30Ibid., pp. 92-93.
the Central African highlands. In 1887 Barros Gomes presented a map to the Cortes in which the territory between the two colonies of Angola and Mozambique was colored a bright pink, or "côr de rosa."31

The Foreign Office in London soon learned of this map and its implications for the future. In August 1887 a formal protest was lodged by Great Britain against the political significance of this swath of Portuguese territory, not yet occupied or administered by any power, or even partitioned by treaty.32

Silva Porto in the meantime was writing letters to Luanda and Benguela warning Portugal of the increasing number of English traders and pioneers in the upper Zambesi region.33 In early 1888 he recommended that a scientific expedition be sent from Bihe down the Kasai River to the Congo and then down to its mouth. He hoped to follow up the work of Carvalho, but apparently had no idea that such an expedition would not gain Portugal new territory. There is considerable evidence that by 1888 the old trader was somewhat senile.34

31 Lavradio, Portugal em África Depois de 1851 (Lisbon, 1937).
32 Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations, p. 3.
33 Silva Porto, Viagens e Apontamentos, B.M.P.P., ms., Vol. XII, p. 109, January 28-30, 1888; p. 28, August 30, 1887.
34 The last volumes of Silva Porto's Viagens indicate his last few years were difficult in health and in mental attitude. Depressed and more melancholy than usual, the old trader had little hope that his region would be occupied. His schemes for a renaissance of Portuguese influence in his region became more and more fantastic. Vols. XI, XII, B.M.P.P. ms., Codice 1235.
Despite the British protest, Portugal proceeded both in east and in west Africa to go ahead with plans to have two expeditions meet in Central Africa after starting from opposite coasts. This was believed tantamount to securing the strip of coveted highlands.\textsuperscript{35} Several important expeditions were sent to Mozambique after 1884 to secure the Lake Nyasa region, and in 1888 the famous Serpa Pinto and several other officers arrived to carry out the long-awaited plan.

The expedition of Serpa Pinto which headed up the Zambesi in 1889 was certainly larger and more important than its counterpart in central Angola. In late 1889, Captain Henrique de Paiva Couceiro left Benguela and reached Bailundo with a mission to enter Barotseland, build a fort, and plant the Portuguese flag in cooperation with the expedition from Mozambique.\textsuperscript{36} Paiva Couceiro was also accompanied by Lieutenant Teixeira da Silva. After a short rest in Bailundo and a levy of porters, Paiva Couceiro went on to Bihe, met Silva Porto, and asked for porters to go on to Barotseland. His expedition was quite small, with no more than forty Negro recruits. Before this, Silva Porto had been on fairly good terms with the soba of Bihe,

\textsuperscript{35}Duffy, \textit{Portuguese Africa}, p. 218.

Chindunduma, but after Paiva Couceiro arrived, the chief was informed by an unknown European that the newly arrived force planned to build a fort in Bihe. 37 Alarmed, the chief declared war, told Paiva Couceiro to return to the coast, and slapped and insulted old Silva Porto. Early the next day, March 31, 1890, Silva Porto ignited kegs of gunpowder and blew himself up. Officers and missionaries from nearby could not save his life, although one report stated that his wounds were not physically mortal. 38

After half of his detachment deserted, Paiva Couceiro retreated before the army of Chindunduma. Pursued into the Bailundo region, he wrote Benguela for help. Artur de Paiva, an officer at Humpata, proceeded from Caconda uncertain of victory over the enraged Bihenos; Paiva felt he could not trust the auxiliary aid of the Bailundos. Within a few months, however, Paiva routed the forces of Chindunduma, and eventually in December of 1890 captured the leader himself through the aid of American missionaries. 39 Somewhat disappointed in the fighting prowess of the Bihenos, he later recalled


38 Sousa Dias (ed.), Paiva, I, p. 166, the April 1, 1890 report of Captain-Major Teixeira da Silva reported this. It is still a question whether Silva Porto killed himself merely out of despondency or out of fear of death from the hostile Bihenos.

candidly: "My adversaries were neither Spartans nor were they Zulus."\textsuperscript{40}

Silva Porto had pleaded for the pacification and occupation of Bihe since 1850. Artur de Paiva was in command of an expedition of Boer auxiliaries, Portuguese, and African recruits. The plan to occupy Barotseland at the last moment was poorly planned and provided for; the force which was to start from Angola was weaker than that supposed to set out from Mozambique. Paiva Couceiro was hampered before he reached Bihe.

While Paiva Couceiro approached Bihe, however, a profound crisis threatened Portuguese power in Mozambique. The expedition of Serpa Pinto reached the Shire highlands in December 1889 and advanced to Lake Nyasa in the hope of perhaps annexing the region. After the Portuguese repelled a Makololo attack and caused the tribe heavy losses, Britain protested; finally, on January 11, 1890, an \textit{Ultimatum} was dispatched to Portugal telling her to retire her forces from Nyasaland and Manicaland without delay or suffer the consequences of a break in diplomatic relations. Certain British naval units were alerted and mobilized in the Indian Ocean and at Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} Artur de Paiva, \textit{Artur de Paiva}, I, p. 192.

The British "Ultimatum," or Ultimatum as it is termed in the Portuguese literature, shook Portugal so badly that observers feared for the Monarchy. British capitalist and missionary interests were being backed to the limit in this case. The Portuguese attempt to take the highlands of Shire, already partly occupied by Scottish missions, was doomed to the fate of the desperate Portuguese try to get the Congo mouth in February 1885. Both threatening notes brought capitulations from Portugal and the eventual partition of the disputed territory.\textsuperscript{42}

B. Crisis, Partition, and Consolidation

The Portuguese drive for Central Africa was cut off. For all practical purposes it ended on the morning of January 11, 1890, when Sir George Petre, British Minister in Lisbon, delivered his note to the Foreign Ministry. Within one day, the Barros Gomes Ministry capitulated to the demands of the note and then resigned. The Governor of Mozambique received a wire from Lisbon to withdraw all Portuguese armed forces from the Shire and Manicaland regions.\textsuperscript{43}

Portugal reacted quite violently to the 1890 Ultimatum, thus delaying negotiations for partition of

\textsuperscript{42}See Chapter VI, Section "D''.

\textsuperscript{43}Harry H. Johnston, British Central Africa (London, 1906 edition), pp. 88-89; before the Ultimatum, the Governor-General of Mozambique confidently issued a special number of the Boletim Official to the effect that the Shire region had been annexed by Portugal.
territory and nearly breaking the last ties of the
Ancient Alliance. King Carlos I (1889-1908) feared for
his throne, and on January 31, 1890, a Republican
revolution broke out in Oporto.\textsuperscript{44} Portugal had surrendered
her bid for Central Africa, and as a result of the
heated atmosphere of the era, the normally anti-colonial
Republicans used this sensational reverse against the
Monarchy. Patriotic expeditions of Portuguese filibusterers
from Brazil and Lisbon headed for Mozambique to try
to retrieve lost prestige, but ended in only embarrassing
their Governments.\textsuperscript{45} Never before in the 19th century
was the Portuguese Monarchy so near to complete collapse.

Bankrupt several times during 1890 to 1892 when
she needed support for colonial enterprises, Portugal
was in ruins. German interests and the British South
Africa Company had designs upon the important and
strategic ports of Mozambique, and only after British
aid, and the British and French capitalization of several
large colonial companies, was Portugal's Mozambique
empire safeguarded.\textsuperscript{46} Three chartered companies were

\textsuperscript{44}Charles E. Nowell, \textit{A History of Portugal}
Centuries}, pp. 189-205.

\textsuperscript{45}The \textit{London Times}, 13-14 January 1890; 12 November
1890, 17 December, 1890, 14 February 1891.

\textsuperscript{46}Warhurst, \textit{Anglo-Portuguese Relations}, pp. 109-
128, 144-149.
established in Mozambique, since the Government was in no position to administer and finance operations at that time. Only after 1894 did Portugal see fit to send expeditions and reinforcements from the metropolis to "pacify" tribes in the interior.\textsuperscript{47}

In Angola, the pacification of Bihe was at least superficially concluded by January 1891. But the country from Bihe to Benguela remained dangerous and insecure territory until well after the turn of the century; Portugal was occupied with operations in Mozambique and was very badly in need of revenue. For its defense and security, Bihe depended on small forts garrisoned by African recruits and a handful of white officers. In 1900, the administrator of Bihe, Alexandre Malheiro, was nearly killed in the region between Bailundo and Benguela due to the lack of military protection. Later he criticized the Government's neglect:

This and other occurrences, all identical, are a sad consequence of the lack of military occupation of the province of Angola so that, between the fort of Bailundo and the town of Catumbella, in a space of 300 kilometers, and, in spite of the urgency, we do not possess one single military command.\textsuperscript{48}

The forts were practically without soldiers on much of the plateau of Angola until after 1910. Occupation was purely skeletal.

\textsuperscript{47}Rocha Martins, \textit{História das Colónias Portuguesas} (Lisbon, 1933), pp. 544-60.

After long and tedious negotiations, and numerous Portuguese delays and maneuvers by Cecil Rhodes, a treaty of partition was signed on June 11, 1891. By this treaty, the highlands of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland became British territory, while Portugal received about one-half of Manicaland. The Barotse kingdom of King Lewanika, the destination of the hapless Paiva Couçeiro, remained in British territory but the exact frontiers were still to be determined by an Anglo-Portuguese Commission. The western frontier of Barotseland therefore was theoretically flexible. Oliveira Martins, nevertheless, felt that Angola was completely partitioned by June, 1891; he confidently wrote then in the Jornal do Commercio of Rio de Janeiro: "Small or large, good or bad, Angola is our house."50

The Portuguese Minister in London, Senhor Barjona de Freitas, proposed a "common neutral zone" in Central Africa to give Portugal free transit through Barotseland to Mozambique. This idea failed to survive British objections. Moreover, Lewanika after 1891 continued to raid and invade Angolan territory, especially the land of the Balovale (Lobale in Portuguese), and he proceeded to "vassalize" several dozen sobas.


In the meantime, the Portuguese were pushing a line of forts further east along the route from Bihé to the upper Zambesi. Treaties of vassalage were signed with Chiefs, and penal colonies were established at Mexico, or modern Vila Iuso. In addition, in about 1895 a fort was built as far east as Nacandundo (modern Cavungo) at 11° 50' south latitude, 23° longitude east of Greenwich. The wretched quality of these tiny outposts and their rulers is sufficiently well documented in other accounts.

Portugal and Britain could not agree as to the limits of the Kingdom of Barotse, or the division between their spheres of influence. The Joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission appointed an umpire, the King of Italy, by a convention of August 12, 1903, to determine the western boundary of the Barotse kingdom. On May 30, 1905, King Victor Emmanuel III delivered an award which was favorable to Portugal, since he did not credit Lewanika with his conquests after June 11, 1891; the King heard expert evidence from local missionaries who told of the raids of the Barotse ruler. Thus the

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51 Boletim Official, No. 20, 1895, May 18, pp. 273-4; No. 41, October 12, Luena River, Mexico, "Autos de Vassalagem."

frontier remained stable. Lewanika had rapidly conquered sections of the Balovale, Mambundas, and Mabungi but these conquests were judged as happening after the June 11, 1891, treaty came into effect. The exceedingly straight line of the frontier was justified by the King of Italy, since there was no natural geographical division in the area, and since the political and social state of the tribes at the time was in such a flux.

By this award, Angola was completely bounded by treaty frontiers. A great deal of internal consolidation remained to be done. Railroad building began in Angola on October 31, 1886, when construction started on the Luanda to Ambaca line. Loans were floated in Britain, France, and Belgium for the Ambaca line, and at the same time plans were made for a railroad from Mossamedes to the Huila plateau. It was clear to Portugal that, if basic development of utilities was to follow in her favored colony after 1885, foreign capital was vitally necessary. Britain was paramount in the Angolan import economy and imported into Angola in 1887 about four times the value of Portuguese imports. Custom duties on Portuguese vessels was 3% ad valorem, on foreign vessels, 5% ad valorem.


55 Joseph Rippon, "The Portuguese Possessions of the Southwest Coast of Africa," Journal of the Manchester
The Ambaca line, for some dreamers in Portugal, was likely to make the region north of the Cuanza a new Sao Paulo, Brazil. By 1892 the line was completed and construction began to Malange. Theoretically, the Ambaca line was to be a "Trans-African" railroad. Nevertheless, out of the three money-making lines from the coast into the interior, all of them following what I have called the historical axes of advance in Angola, the Luanda to Malange line is not the most successful. The next line to the south, the Benguela Railway, was founded by an English capitalist and engineer, Sir Robert Williams; construction of this famous and strategic line began in March 1903. True to the predictions of Serpa Pinto and of Silva Porto before him, the Bihe plateau, on the line following from Benguela through the town of Belmonte, was the key to Central Africa from the western coast. Bihe was and is a pivot which controls the tableland in the heart.

At the date of writing, the Luanda to Malange line has not been extended to the Cuango River as

Geographical Society, V, 1889, pp. 362-64.

56 A. F. Nogueira, A Ilha de S. Thomé, A Questão Bancaria no Ultramar e o nosso problema colonial (Lisbon, 1892), pp. 2-4.

envisioned by Livingstone and others as early as 1854. 58 The northern third of Angola, in spite of its production of diamonds in the Lunda district, and coffee in Cuanza district, has not proved the economic asset hoped for by colonialists in the 19th century. Indeed, the area last pacified and occupied, the Benguela to Zambesi axis of advance, bears the most potential. 59 To the Benguela railway this region owes much of its development and future. Only this central axis has a railroad into the center of the continent, indicating that the economic planning of the 19th century was limited to hopes for using the Congo or Cunene as great natural outlets and entrances to the hinterland. In 1885, therefore, Angola's Congo orientation was effectively concluded, and Portuguese thinking realized that a land route to the heartland was the only alternative. Having lost what they considered to be the Delagoa Bay of West Central Africa, the Portuguese were obliged to look more seriously to land routes.

As shown above, the partition treaties gave Portugal a vast territory. In 1891 perhaps less than one-tenth of the 481,000 square miles was under effective and direct Portuguese control. In 1875 a survey estimated

59 See words of Serpa Pinto on Bihé's potential importance in Chapter VI, p. 182.
that Portuguese territory in Angola was about 60,000 square miles. Later, in July 1882, Henry Morton Stanley recorded a liberal estimate of Angolan territory under "direct authority" from Portuguese officials at Luanda as "about 300,000 square miles." Some nine years later, Portugal possessed by the partition treaties only a little less than the present 481,000 square miles. But how much of this territory was effectively controlled? An estimate of 1896 stated that Portugal effectively occupied only a meager 3,800 square miles. The discrepancies between these figures, all given within twenty years of each other, shows the tentative nature of Portuguese administration over much of Angola.

The region was so vast that the Portuguese themselves had little conception of the actual extent of certain frontiers; moreover, it seemed that the Portuguese conception of distance on land was somewhat affected by their maritime traditions. Land empires that stretched far past the coast were comparatively rare phenomena for Portugal. The Luanda Government was so located that over three-quarters of the province was to the south; the Congo region and the Atlantic Ocean remained too often the preponderant considerations of Luanda's policy.

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60 Gerardo Pery, Geographia e Estatistica, p. 350.
Until after 1910 much of the interior was left to the sertanejo trader and the Africans. The only sign of Portuguese sovereignty beyond 150 miles from the coast was a thin line of small forts and penal colonies stretching toward the upper Zambesi. Between 1895 and 1897 small Portuguese detachments of less than fifty soldiers traveled in trade caravans to Mexico district (then called Lobale). By 1897 there were about half a dozen make-shift forts in the region west of the frontier with Barotseland. In the main, these stations were placed on trade routes, or near foreign missions, and were garrisoned by Negro recruits. There were penal colonies at Mexico. 63 Just as the Portuguese hurried out to put up a line of forts to protect against the incursions of aggressive King Lewanika, King of Barotse, so they feared Belgian intrusions near Lake Dilolo; in 1903 the Portuguese established a fort on the frontier at Dilolo.

Until after the First World War, the Portuguese were pitifully weak on the eastern section of the Angolan plateau. A report of the 1920's commented about the good old days on the frontier:

The commanders of these forts had no authority over native politics, and evidently they did not collect the hut taxes either; they limited themselves to defending their forts in case of attack, and nothing more. 64

64 Ibid., I, p. 488.
An entirely new epoch of pacification and occupation followed upon the heels of the tiny columns that went out to plant a shaky authority on the frontier. Those in Portugal might have believed that Angola was now their "house," but the year 1891 was little more than the year when Angola's frontiers became complete. Frontier officers knew the precarious nature of the "occupation" better than Lisbon writers. On the other hand, only men with the advantages of a Lisbon perspective could tell the bush-bound Portuguese that in order to win Angola as their ancestors won Brazil, the less savory traditions of the 19th century had to be abandoned. Yet very little really altered in the year of partition, 1891, for Portuguese policy remained largely the same as before, and Angola was still empty of men and money.

C. For the Future: an Angola or a Brazil?

In the decade following partition, it seemed possible and even probable to observers that Angola could become a prosperous territory with a stable and mixed society. Emigration from Portugal to Angola from 1890 to 1900 increased to an average of slightly over 1,000 a year.65 The revenue of the province was increased by participation in the great rubber boom; great caravans brought rubber to the coast from the eastern regions.

65 Silva, Emigração Portuguesa, p. 192.
Overall trade movement in Angola increased in value from 45,923,500 francs in 1890 to 80,775,000 francs in 1898. Benguela district from 1883 to 1893 experienced an increase in custom receipts of approximately 160%.

An old problem of the Angolan economy continued. Just as in 1770 or 1870, Portuguese territory was flooded with contraband, that is, cheaper and better quality foreign manufactures which reached markets in Angola without paying tariff. The delicate nature of the Portuguese economy remained largely unaltered, and with it the Portuguese policy: heavy tariff protection. A Belgian observer of Angola remarked in this regard about 1896:

Angola, although still behind other European colonies, is now really progressing, and may expect a brilliant future if not hampered by the policy of the motherland.

Unlike Mozambique, which was divided among several chartered companies after 1892, Angola remained relatively free of chartered company rule and administration after partition. One exception to this rule occurred in the least productive area of the province: Mossamedes. During 1893 and 1894 the Mossamedes Company was founded and


capitalized under the direction of Dr. José Pereira de Nascimento. Unlike the three major companies in Mozambique, this company was entirely economic in purpose, and had no political or administrative duties. It was mainly conceived as a vehicle to develop a difficult region and was given rights to run a fishing industry and explore mining resources in an area of about 57 million acres, that stretched to the Upper Zambesi.

The Mossamedes Company, however, was only nominally Portuguese. A few Portuguese statesmen sat on the Board of Directors, but the majority of the shares of the Company were held by the so-called "Rhodes Group" of capitalists, consisting of the South African magnates, Cecil Rhodes, Wernher, and Beit. The Company owned the railroad rights in southern Angola except for a strip of ten kilometers along the coast. For a decade, German interests fought the capital interests of Rhodes and attempted to obtain railroad concessions in southern Angola, as well as the control of the Mossamedes company. In the end, by 1903 and the Benguela Railway concession, the British-South African capitalists had triumphed over German designs in southern Angola.

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72 Drechsler, "Germany," pp. 55-68.
Portuguese found it difficult to forget the German attempts to take Tiger Bay (Baía dos Tigres) for one railroad outlet of Southwest Africa. The stubborn nature of the Portuguese Government in Lisbon, which refused to grant concessions to the Germans, and Rhodes' capital, effectively safeguarded the integrity of southern Angola.

Another monopolistic company in Angola was the Banco Ultramarino de Lisboa; a branch of this company was established at Luanda in 1864. This group owned plantations in Angola and in São Tomé, and during the 1890's was responsible for some development and investment north of the Cuanza. Nevertheless, the Banco Ultramarino was consistently criticized by settlers and officials alike for its ultra-conservative and tight-fisted economic policy during the period after 1864.

Traditionally, desire for fast fortunes by Angolan settlers had conflicted with some of the more liberal principles of Portuguese administration. A case in point in the 1890's was the sugarcane alcohol industry; a similar problem arose during the 1845 administration of Governor-General Pedro Alexandrino da Cunha.

73 A. F. Nogueira, A Ilha de São Tomé, p. 114; for criticism of the Banco Ultramarino see A.H.U., Angola, Pastas 37-45, 1866-1871, Governor-General.

74 Negreiros, Angola, pp. 8-10.

75 See Chapter III on Governor da Cunha.
Mary Kingsley remarked about her 1893 visit to Angola that many small traders in the country had only one ambition: to get enough money to set up an establishment for the manufacture of rum. The industry was quite profitable, but the Governor-General disapproved of the effects upon the African population. When the Government passed and enforced laws against such an alcohol industry in the sugar cane districts as Dande, Bengo, or elsewhere, much settler discontent was aroused.

During Mary Kingsley's short visit to Angola, observers noted a definite impulse of improvement. For Miss Kingsley, Luanda was "the only city in West Africa," and its newly installed street lights added to its obscure prestige. The railroad was changing the face of the territory north of the Cuanza, and was extended by then to Cazengo district. Dondo, formerly the great entrepot of the immense porters' caravans from the north and east, was now stagnant and nearly deserted. The author quoted an English businessman with experience in Angola who declared that Portuguese capital was not given the proper encouragement to enter the territory:

> Generally the colony exists for the benefit of a few manufacturers in Portugal, who reap all the profit ... the merchants are much too highly taxed, a good fourth part of their


capital is paid out in duties, with no certainty when it will be realised again. Angola, with plenty of capital, moderate taxes, and low duties, might in a few years become a most flourishing colony. 78

The Portuguese colonial thinkers themselves, however, were far more optimistic about the future. Debate on the great issues of the newly partitioned African empire became sharper and more clearly defined. Angola was considered the most prosperous and fortunate of the colonies. Three generations of dreams seemed to be coming true; perhaps a new Brazil was only around the corner. A Portuguese writer observed in 1901:

One could say that the province of Angola is today the Portuguese Brazil. Rule, activity, patriotism are the sacred trilogy leading this great movement of material and moral regeneration which characterize an epoch of renaissance. 79

But how was Angola to become another Brazil? The old policies remained in force. Portugal shipped convicts and criminals to Angola during the entire period of boom, from 1890 to 1900. Other tropical colonies were given laws which prohibited convict transportation to their territories. In 1882 the Cape Verde islands and São Tomé received such a law, and Mozambique got the same in 1885. 80 Yet Angola received a regular stream of degredados

79 Negreiros, Angola, p. 8.
who far outnumbered the peasant immigrants until after 1930. The transportation policy with regard to Angola was reinforcing the unfortunate reputation of the territory in the eyes of the people of Portugal. In the territory itself, this policy encouraged what Governor-General Vasco Guedes in 1878 eloquently referred to as "the moral deficit." Colonial thinkers, as António Francisco Nogueira, Henrique de Carvalho, Pereira do Nascimento, and Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro believed that emigration from Portugal and Brazil would enable Portugal to create a true mixed society and assimilate many Africans into Portuguese society and culture. They believed that only white colonization on a large scale could overcome the ruins of the past. In the period before the cataclysm of the fall of the Monarchy in 1910, Portuguese emigration was a key topic of conversation and political discussion. The Society of Geography of Lisbon set up a special "Emigration Commission" which hoped to divert all emigration from Brazil and North America to the African colonies, especially Angola.

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82 Castelbranco, História de Angola, p. 248.

Until the year 1906, when about 2200 Portuguese emigrated from Portugal and the islands to Africa, many felt that the program was bearing some fruit. But in 1907 the number dropped to 636 and reached an incredible low of nine emigrants in the year 1909. The impetus to emigrate to Angola was finished for several decades.84 How then could Angola become another Brazil, when the majority of hard-working emigrants went instead to Brazil? Up until recent times this problem has remained. From 1950 to 1956, out of 149,498 Portuguese who emigrated, some 127,244 went to Brazil, and some more to North America.85 Some could still claim, as the Governors in the 18th century, that indirectly Brazil was ruining Angola's future.

If enough Europeans could not be brought into Angola, what was to be done to create another Brazil? Here was where certain Portuguese colonial thinkers disagreed. This disunity was symbolic of the lack of a continuous African policy in the 19th century. In 1893 Nogueira published his major work on the colonial problem, concentrating on the island of São Tomé, where he had served as an employee of the Banco Ultramarino. Twenty years before this, however, he was a settler and official in Mossamedes, Angola. The Republican Oliveira

84 See Appendix XI.

85 Armando Candido, Emigração e Povoamento do Ultramar (Lisbon, 1958), p. 33.
Martins wrote a preface to this book and disagreed in principle with nearly everything that Nogueira wrote in it! 86

Oliveira Martins opposed a monopoly economy for the colonies, he disapproved of Portuguese emigration overseas except under special circumstances, and he was pessimistic about the future of the Negro in Africa. He represented the party which advocated non-equality, and the "separate streams" society for Angola. 87 On the other hand, Nogueira, the author, advocated monopolistic economies for Angola with heavy tariff protection, and a merging of the whites and blacks through education and equality. 88 Oliveira Martins was enough of an anthropologist of his era to create a theory for the inferiority of the Negroid race, but his friend Nogueira pioneered in Portugal with a book in 1880 entitled: "The Negro Race from the Point of View of the Civilization of Africa ... and the Portuguese Colonies." 89 Here Nogueira called for a Darwinian treatment of the Negro; the Negro needed a great deal of education, better treatment

86 Antonio F. Nogueira, A Ilha de S. Thome, A Questao Bancaria no Ultramar, e o nosso problema Colonial (Lisbon, 1892).
87 Nogueira, A Ilha de S. Thome, Preface.
89 Nogueira, A Raça Negra sob o ponto de Vista da Civilização da Africa ... e As Colónias Portuguezas (Lisbon, 1880).
and encouragement to bring him up to the "social" level of the whites in Africa. Unlike the more reactionary anthropologist Oliveira Martins, Nogueira was supported in his liberal view by Carvalho, as well as by Capelo and Ivens. 

In Henrique Dias de Carvalho, Portugal found an early Negrophile and historian of the Lunda peoples. Carvalho did not believe in miscegenation, but he felt that the Portuguese should educate and help the Negro, and then encourage separate development in Angola. He distrusted those around him who felt that miscegenation represented a "utopia" and a facile duplication of an African Brazil. Perhaps he realized that such a policy would prove too little and too late. In reconstructing the history of the Lunda peoples in Central Africa, Carvalho's work remained unequalled for three generations in Europe. He was a pioneer in the use of oral tradition and glottochronology. As he wrote in 1890:

The proto-history of these peoples, taken from their common traditions and the history of each tribe by itself, can be reconstructed with a real knowledge of their dialects ... it is the persistent study of these two important elements, the historical and the glottological, and that of ethnics ... for we must get on with the study of these races,

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90 See Chapter VI and comments of Capelo and Ivens on the Negro.

91 Carvalho, *Meteorologia, Climalogia* (1892), pp. 8, 586.
which, in the language of men of science, is still entirely to be done in this continent. 92

Carvalho campaigned for heavy Portuguese emigration to Angola, and for a policy of educating the Negro; the Negroes had to improve and find themselves in their own element, not as part of a mixed society, as in Brazil. Starting with himself as an example, Carvalho adopted several Negro youths in Angola, and took them back with him to Portugal.

In 1891, colonial thinkers had another crucial problem on their minds besides that of the races: this was climate. Carvalho, Nogueira, Nascimento and Ferreira Ribeiro produced many tomes on how the Portuguese settlers could best adapt themselves to the atmosphere of tropical Angola. 93 In the main, their suggestions followed the lines of modern hygiene and tropical medicine. Angola's climate, even at this late date, continued to have a very bad reputation in Portugal; much effort was produced by these thinkers to try to erase this threat to the future of Angola.

The debate on the colonies was never-ending.

With the increasing power of the Republican party before

92Carvalho, Ethnographia e História Tradicional, preface.

93Pereira do Nascimento, Questões-Médico-Coloniais Relativas a Colonização do Plantaito de Mossamedes (Lisbon, 1899); Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, A Província de São Thomé (Lisbon, 1877); Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, Principes Elementares de higiene colonial (Lisbon, 1890).
the 1910 Revolution, colonialists wrote feverishly to convince wavering partisans. An important question was whether or not the empire was too large for Portugal. Significantly, although many suggestions came forth for selling Mozambique, India, or the Cape Verdes, relatively few came for selling Angola.\(^4\) Nogueira himself believed that the empire should have been cut down to a more manageable size for Portugal. Angola and Sao Tomé, he believed, should be retained as the heart of the empire. For him, Mozambique was in effect a foreign colony controlled by great companies and likely to be eventually sold or taken away by foreign capital.\(^5\)

A strong advocate of Portuguese emigration to Angola was former Minister for the Navy and Overseas, Júlio de Vilhena. He believed with one school of thought that emigration to Brazil was tantamount to a kind of slavery, or indentured service in a foreign land; he had figures to prove the poverty of the Portuguese residing there.\(^6\) In his memoirs, Vilhena bitterly recounted the fact that his station-founding scheme during the Scramble had been followed by too few leaders in Angola.

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\(^6\)Vilhena, *Antes da República*, I, pp. 73-76.
A more serious and long range criticism than this was one of Vilhena's which penetrated to a persistent trend in 19th century policy: the unfortunate economic policy of the leading interests in Portugal. Just as the Associação Commercial de Lisboa opposed Sá da Bandeira's emancipation acts in 1872, so this group opposed in 1881 Vilhena's decree to drop the heavy tariffs from the coasting trade between the overseas provinces and encourage free trade. The traffic had always been too heavily protected and hindered by tariffs; but the Association in Lisbon held the monopoly on a number of manufactures and they held tightly to protection.

Vilhena went on to lament the loss of certain coveted parts of Central Africa:

If upon my leaving the Ministry, the construction of stations had not been abandoned, then nine years later, we would have offered opposition to the greed of England.  

In May, 1888, Vilhena rose in the Chamber of Deputies in Lisbon and added to his reputation as one of the most formidable orators of his generation. He blamed the enemies of empire for what happened at the Berlin Conference three years before, and, recalling the loss of the mouth of the Congo, he ended his speech with a

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97 Vilhena, Antes da República, I, p. 74.  
98 Ibid., I, p. 77.
damning sentence: "Portuguese financial interests hold a great deal of the blame for what has happened to our colonial empire." 99

Indeed this might have been Governor Sousa Coutinho, or the economist Ferreira Lobos, or even Silva Porto. The accusation was partly true. And it was repeated by those who came to Angola in the 1890's to make their fortunes and try to create another Brazil. Yet the base of the empire was to remain very much the same. Unchanging, deep-rooted forces at home continued to keep their power over the empire. Other traditional forces in tropical Africa contributed age-old influences to the populations of Angola. The largely invisible physical forces of disease continued to decimate the Angolan population. As High Commissioner Norton de Matos wisely wrote in the 1920's:

One should attribute the small population of Tropical Africa to two great scourges: - disease and the exploitation of man by man. 100

Despite all the poverty, deprivation, adversity, and bitter memories present in Angola in the late 19th century, some hopeful men still believed that "it might have been different and it may be different." Angola, however slowly for those who knew it, was changing.

99 Ibid., I, p. 79.
100 Norton de Matos, A Provincia de Angola (Lisbon, 1926), p. 227.
The economy was gradually improving, and the Portuguese were spreading out onto the great plateaus. The expansion of control was never-ending partly because so little had been done before. Whatever progress there was, was considered significant; the wretched past tended to distort the present.

Within the continent of Africa, Angola remained isolated. Changes elsewhere had always occurred with little effect upon Angola. But even before the partition, statesmen like Andrade Corvo warned Portugal that the world as well as Africa were passing through "an enormous transformation."\(^{101}\) Tropical Africa was changing perceptibly, but still Angola, for the outside world, remained enshrouded in a cloak of secrecy and ignorance. There seemed to be no certain answers to the traditional problems—only more traditional questions. The most important one of all, like an old echo, asked: How long, would Portugal believe in the "old illusions"?\(^{102}\)


\(^{102}\) Ibid., this phrase is from Andrade Corvo; Charles Vogel employed a similar phrase in 1860: "The great illusions" of Portugal could go on no longer. Vogel, *Le Portugal*, p. 463.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

In History there are no ephemeral actions. As in the physical world, phenomena are linked together by strict relations of causality, and in that prison of enmeshed nets there are no values, no matter how insignificant, that do not have their own effects.

-Gastão Sousa Dias

Os Portugueses em Angola, p. 328
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Portuguese expansion of control in Angola may be divided into three major periods within the scope of this study. There was the first period of initial expansion, coinciding with a gradual abolition of the slave trade, from 1836 to 1861; the second period of comparative withdrawal and coastal concentration, from 1861 to about 1877; and the third period of expansion to the plateaus from 1877 to 1891, which roughly falls within the era of the Scramble and Partition in tropical Africa.

A. The First Period, 1836 to 1861

The original incentive to expand Portuguese control beyond what it was in the 18th century was the direct result of the abolition of slave trade; in order to gain revenue for a "reformed" Angola, the Portuguese needed to raise native taxes and expand their fiscal or customs control of the coast. Behind the desire to end the slave traffic stood the fear of the British navy. The British wished the Portuguese to put down the slave-trade, but not to expand their control over the small ports north of Luanda.
The first period begins with the conquest of the presidio of Duque de Braganca in 1838 and ends with the administration of Governor-General Calheiros e Menezes in 1861. Portuguese formal control was pushed further to the east, reaching its eastern-most point with the Cassange campaign during 1850 and 1851. A trading and agricultural colony was planted at Mossamedes Bay on the southern coast in 1840.¹

The capital of the territory or province was at Luanda. The power of expansion tended to concentrate at Luanda, and the most developed agricultural region lay in the vicinity of the lower Cuanza River and the Luanda hinterland. To the north, the Congo coast promised to provide a valuable source of revenue.

Led by the work of the Minister Sá da Bandeira, the Conselho Ultramarino, and the expansionist Governor-General José Coelho do Amaral, the Portuguese embarked upon a scheme to dominate by customs control the trade from Ambriz to Cabinda. Four key villages were occupied by armed forces: Ambriz (1855), Quiballa (1856), Bembe (1856), and São Salvador, capital of the Congo Kingdom (1859 and 1860). In vain the Portuguese tried to occupy other key trade ports at Quissembo and at Punta da Lenha. For a short active period, the Government pursued mining operations at copper deposits near

¹See Chapter III.
Bembe, dispatched army expeditions, and fought campaigns with African powers to achieve supremacy in the lower Congo region, and to try to enrich Angola.\textsuperscript{2}

The administration of Governor Amaral, 1855 to 1860, represents a crucial turning point during the century. Lacking a strong navy or merchant marine to subordinate coastal African powers, or neutralize the British naval units, Amaral tried to capture trade routes by controlling the immediate interior behind the coastal ports. The policy of the British Foreign Office and Admiralty was to refuse recognition of Portuguese claims to the coast north of Ambriz, and to physically prevent any formal Portuguese occupation or establishment; their object was to end slave-trade as well as to preserve British trade and naval supremacy along the coast near the Congo mouth. Amaral's administration failed to accomplish the occupation of the Congo mouth, and Portuguese land power failed to suppress African hostility. Whatever slight sovereignty was exercised over the region north and northeast of Ambriz from about 1855 to 1865 was soon destroyed by climate, terrain, and African enmity. The Amaral scheme was ultimately more expensive than it was worth. In 1869 Amaral returned for a second term to Angola and admitted his error. As he wrote then: "The object we really had in mind was to achieve the

\textsuperscript{2}See Chapters III and IV.
domination of the coast by the occupation of the interior.  

Shaken and impoverished further by wars, migration, expenses, and epidemics, Angola emerged weakened from the first phase of Portuguese expansion in the century. The search for revenue through increased native taxation and fiscal expansion proved almost self-destructive. As yet the Portuguese were too weak to command the interior. Financial cares and basic economic development programs in Portugal helped determine the next policy trend for Angola; a policy of coastal concentration, centralization, and withdrawal followed the administration of Governor Calheiros in 1861.

B. The Second Period, 1861 to 1877

The report of Governor Calheiros of 1861, published in 1867, laid the basis for expansion and labor policy in the next decade. Frontier garrisons were gradually withdrawn to cut expenses, and a Government policy tantamount to forced labor was recommended and established by Calheiros and his successors. The policy of withdrawing from the interior held true until


4 The London Times, 10 November 1890, "The Finance of Portugal." The Finance Minister of Portugal recalled in 1890 that since 1860 internal home development had been favored to the exclusion of colonial investment or expense.
after the arrival of the Portuguese exploration party of Capelo, Ivens, and Serpa Pinto in 1877.5

The second period was an era of economic recovery, increasing agriculture, and decreasing military power in the interior. The formerly powerful units of guerra preta, African auxiliary units, were decimated and dispersed by smallpox and desertion after the wars accompanying Portuguese expansion up to 1861. Large populations migrated away from the Portuguese settlements. Yet in spite of this, Angolan exports of tropical produce increased gradually.

Great Britain and Portugal continued to disagree over Portuguese claims to the north coast up to Cabinda. For the Luanda administration, the Congo represented a chance to achieve the prosperity of Angola. But British policy remained firm.

Meanwhile, the districts to the south, Benguela and Mossamedes, were left to shift for themselves; expansion onto the central and southern plateaus suffered due to the Congo obsession of Luanda and the capital's very location in the northern quarter of the long coastline. Overland travel between settlements was hazardous and often impossible; communication was safest by sea, since great pockets of African independent groups stood

5See Chapters IV, V, and VI.
in the way of smooth trade and travel. 6

Trade and the maintenance of favorable trade conditions were the chief concerns of Portuguese internal policy during the century. The collection of tariff or custom duties upon that trade was equally important. In this way agriculture too often took a weak second place. Trade or commercio preoccupied the mentalities of all from the Governor to the sertanejo and chefe.

The abortive attempt to conquer the Congo region aroused the countryside against the Portuguese: "the example of the occupation of Ambriz and Bembe mines" created a renewed hostility north of Luanda. 7 But this also preserved the conviction of the administration that the conquest had to be completed in the future.

C. The Third Period, 1877 to 1891

The second phase of the colonial movement in Portugal took up an active program in Angola after 1877 and based its hopes upon geographical discovery in the interior and expansion of Portuguese political and economic control along the coasts. Men like Luciano

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6 See Ian Cunnison, "Kazembe and the Portuguese, 1798-1832," The Journal of African History (II, No. 1, 1961), p. 63 for a map showing "Areas of Portuguese Control." The wrong impression is gained from this map since it shows control to be solid between Luanda and Benguela; in fact, it was broken and riddled with pockets. See Maps at end of this study.

Cordeiro and Andrade Corvo urged the Government to begin spending more on the colonies, and to modify its "economizing" program.

European activity increased in the Congo area and Portugal continued to press her claims to the coast. Never really interested in the great basin and interior of the Congo, the Government declared in its diplomatic note of 1883: "What Portugal claims is on the coast." Indeed, the coastal orientation of the rulers of Angola persisted and colored all efforts to gain ascendancy on the plateaus. The plan to found stations inland was generally not followed by Portuguese leaders or explorers; difficulties in lack of manpower, climate, and the African control of the country usually forbade the establishing of stations. Yet the Portuguese explorers performed a service for the future by echoing many of the same criticisms of weakness made known by Livingstone and Cameron; a new awareness was created that the plateaus invited colonization, and that the Negro populations had to be cared for.

At the Berlin Conference and during the 1890 crisis of the Ultimatum, Portugal attempted last-minute strokes which failed to move the European powers. Portuguese policy was as much to blame as was Portuguese weakness; four centuries of coastal concentration and an

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all-encompassing exclusivist economy precluded the possibility that Portugal could easily open up Central Africa.

A constant spur to Portuguese activity had been the fear and resentment felt toward British activity. Yet during the struggle for territory after 1880, Portuguese claims remained very much the same with regard to the coast. The key report of Calheiros in 1861 claimed the coast from $5^\circ 12'\text{ to } 18^\circ$ south latitude.\(^9\) After partition, the coastal limits of Angola were from $5^\circ$ to $17^\circ 25'$ south latitude. Throughout the entire imbroglio with Britain, the issue on the coast was less humanitarian than it was economic and nationalistic. To the mind of the Portuguese, the British were obstructing the progress of Angola as well as affronting the national honor.

D. Angola in the 19th Century

The administration of Angola from 1845 and the progressive term of Pedro da Cunha, to 1891 and the active term of Capelo, was in fact a crude and limited form of a "young colonial administration."\(^{10}\) If we accept the definition of Fage and Oliver for such an administration as authority and the power to tax, then

\(^9\)Calheiros, *Relatório* (1867), pp. 5, 75-78.

Angola must qualify. Portuguese taxation policy and its effects were surveyed in Chapter IV of this study. The rulers of Angola knew only too well the effects of *dizimo* upon the Africans; and, like most administrations, this one sought to preserve ideally good conditions for trade, security for its citizens, and to retrieve escaped slaves and labor whenever possible. Considering the vassalage system and the recruitment of *guerra preta* and *empacageiros* before the wars ending in 1863, it is clear that Angola was more of a "colony," with a larger white population, than Mozambique in the same period. Up to 1890, Mozambique, more than Angola, was what Fage and Oliver term "an extended trading preserve."\(^1\) The distinction between the two colonies has to be made more perfect.

In outlining the decisive watersheds in Angolan history, Dr. Duffy has placed too great an emphasis upon the 1858 decree for abolishing slavery.\(^2\) The crucial events, as shown in Chapter IV, were the occupation of Ambriz, the abolition of *carreto*, and the accompanying raise in native taxation; thus during 1855 and 1856 the stage was set for the dislocation and withdrawal phase of administration which made later expansion more difficult. The 1858 decree did not initiate the *liberto* system, and

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was in fact nullified by the 1861 report of Governor Calheiros, who admitted that free labor would be impossible for decades to come.

The influence of Dr. Livingstone upon the course of Angolan history has been exaggerated.\textsuperscript{13} His importance is more manifest in Mozambique than in Angola. The Governors-General were shaken chiefly by concern for the north coast question, the activity of the British navy, and the rejection of Portuguese claims. If any one factor stirred the Portuguese to the realization of world opinion and competition, it was the struggle for the coastal trade north of Ambriz which in fact had its origin in the 17th century.\textsuperscript{14}

Portuguese emigration to Brazil in the last half of the 19th century provided the reason why, racially, Angola could never become a "second Brazil" as dreamed by colonialists from Das Neves to Carvalho. Although Portuguese population between 1845 and 1891 increased perhaps six times, such miscegenation as there was, came too late. The ratio of mulattoes to whites in the territory steadily decreased after Partition.

Personality and administrative feuds make up a great deal of the history of the territory. Too often the commonweal suffered because of individual egotism.

\textsuperscript{13}Duffy, \textit{Portuguese Africa}, pp. 78, 179.
\textsuperscript{14}See Chapters I, II, IV.
What held true for the Portuguese in the Iberian Peninsula in part conditioned their action in Africa. As Américo Castro wrote, the Spanish and Portuguese both participate in "an anxious movement through the moral region of the ought-to-be."\textsuperscript{15} Because they dislike the true history of Angola, certain writers have felt justified in writing an idealized version based on what should have occurred; this tendency points to the fact that the Portuguese are as yet in chronic disagreement over basic values and principles in their own society. Yet this does not prevent some savants from describing reality. As Ralph Delgado wrote of the history of the Angolan bush:

The Portuguese colonist was plastic, humanitarian, and at the same time fond of native culture; however, he was also a devastator of the black populations just for the sake of trade.\textsuperscript{16}

The future of Angola was safeguarded for Portugal with the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of 1899. In effect, the two nations were reconciled after a century of conflict over Africa, and the German hopes for southern Angola were finished. Portugal decided to adhere to two old traditions which seemed so close to annihilation during the crisis of 1890 and shortly afterwards, the British Alliance and the African empire.


\textsuperscript{16} Delgado, História de Angola, IV, p. 419.
Nevertheless, two major weaknesses remained: economic poverty and politico-religious disunity. Angola was the scene of conflict between liberals and conservatives, the investors and the economizers, and the Church and the anti-clericals. One extreme solution led to another in the modern history of Portuguese activity. Portuguese interests at home rarely coincided with interests of settlers or Africana in Angola. To favor economic interests at home was to hurt Angola. With its own disunity and factionalism, Portugal could not hope to unify the many African tribes and weld them into one.

Too late and in too small a measure came the attempt to win the hearts and minds of Africans; indeed, young King Pedro V in his wisdom wrote that the Portuguese could not force their culture upon the Africans. For him this was unnatural. Throughout the last six decades of the 19th century, the Luanda administration was deeply concerned with the stirrings of African political aspirations for independence to the north and northeast. The rebel Congo princes with European educations, Aleixo and Nicolas, long reminded the Portuguese of the power of African political consciousness. Such movements were as yet weak, disunified, and sporadic.

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17 See Chapter I, p. 23.
But the presence of Dom Aleixo in the dungeons of Fort Penedo and the 1859 letter of Prince Nicolas symbolized the continuing African desire to remain apart.  

Norton de Matos and others have lamented that Portugal failed to attain the old dream of a **contra-costa** empire. Matos blamed the Portuguese themselves for not adhering to what he called "the **hinterlands** principle." Remarkably, he connected this error with the status of Portugal in the 20th century: if Portugal had gained more of Central Africa, "Then our situation in the world today would be very different from what it is." Whether or not his conclusion is acceptable, it is clear that his placing of the blame is highly significant for this study. By his notion, Portugal (and the policies of the Governors of Angola, as documented in this study) made the choice to concentrate on the coast; the decision to move into the **sertões** came too late. Thus, the failure to get more of the plateaus and to occupy the Congo mouth as well was due as much to the character and policies of the officials in Angola as to the lack of men and money. On the other

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18 Dom Aleixo was imprisoned in Fort Penedo, Luanda from 1841 to about 1856. For an account of his history see Chapter III and Tams, *Visita as Possessões Portuguezas*, II, pp. 17-19.

hand, more than foreign competition in the interior, African military prowess and climate opposed further Portuguese penetration and occupation.

Portuguese capital was more readily available for investment in Angola than is generally realized; policy in Lisbon, however, made less available for overseas. Those who emphasize poverty as the key to Portuguese failures have overlooked the revealing complaints of Sousa Coutinho, Ferreira Lobos, Julio de Vilhena and others.

Finally, it has been shown that Portuguese policy, motives, and activity were neither simple nor one-sided. Portuguese knowledge about African society could be both profound and realistic. Despite adverse conditions, the Portuguese at times displayed an extraordinary endurance. After briefly surveying one century, the writer is tempted to trace the origins of problems to their beginnings in the 16th century. To say, as did certain Portuguese administrators, that "the trouble is very old", is to broadly describe the essential unity of Angolan history. That simple Portuguese verdict is therefore a fitting conclusion to this study of a complicated problem.

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20 Refer to the quotations in the text of this study.

21 My free translation of the common phrase, "o mal vinha de longe" is "the trouble is very old." This phrase was used by officials in the 19th century correspondence from Luanda to Lisbon.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

There is no adequate modern history of Angola in English. Dr. Duffy's Portuguese Africa surveys the entire history of the territory, yet he concentrates on the era after 1875, and uses mainly secondary sources. Gladwyn Childs' Umbundu Kinship and Character (London, 1949) has a valuable historical section dealing with the 19th century trade history of central and southern Angola, but with little consideration of expansion or administration in other areas. F. C. C. Egerton's Angola in Perspective (London, 1957) is more of a wandering travelogue than a history, but occasionally he presents 19th century material not present in Duffy or Childs. Numerous articles present fragments of the 19th century story. Among these are Ian Cunnison's "Kazembe and the Portuguese, 1798-1832," in the Journal of African History (1961), Charles E. Nowell's "Portugal and the Partition of Africa," Journal of Modern History (1947), Roger Anstey's "British Trade and Policy in West Central Africa Between 1816 and the early 1880's," Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana (1957).

A very important contemporary account, invaluable for some aspects of the history 1855-1875 is Joaquim John Monteiro's Angola and the River Congo (London, 1875).
Of more limited time scope yet perhaps more acute observation is, of course, David Livingston's *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa* (London, 1857).

In the realm of bibliography Angola is less fortunate than Mozambique. To my knowledge only one specific bibliography exists in Paul Borchardt's *La Bibliographie de Angola, 1500-1910* (Brussels, 1912). Other modern and more up-to-date guides for material that is appearing in Portuguese and other languages are: the *Guía Bibliografía histórica portuguesa* (Vol. I, 1959-61- ), published by the Academia Portuguesa da Historia; the *Boletim Internacional de Bibliografía Luso-Brasileira* (Vol. I, 1960, No. 1- ), published by the Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisbon. A general guide to Portuguese archives is the volume of Daniel H. Thomas and Lynn M. Case, editors, *Guide to the Diplomatic Archives of Western Europe* (Philadelphia, 1959, University of Pennsylvania Press); see in this volume, "Portugal" by Manoel Cardozo.

There are many histories of Angola in Portuguese. Unfortunately the majority of the material is not objective and usually treats the era before 1800. Gastao Sousa Dias has many volumes on fragments of 19th century history as listed in this bibliography, yet only in his posthumous *Os Portugueses em Angola* (Lisbon, 1959) do we find the first three decades of the century well covered after a brilliant essay on the 18th century.
Ralph Delgado in his large *História de Angola* (Lisbon, Benguela, 1948-55, 4 vols.) has reached the 18th century and in his volumes of documents and narrative on southern Angola, chiefly Benguela district, we have a base of documentation missing in northern Angola. Most important are Delgado's *Ao Sul do Cuanza* (Lisbon, 1940, 2 vols.) and *A Famosa e Histórica Benguella, 1779-1940* (Lisbon, 1940).

Concentrating on the southern plateaus in the 19th century, A. A. Felner wrote *Angola. Apontamentos Sobre a Colonização Dos Planaltos e Litoral Do Sul de Angola. Documentos.* (3 vols., Lisbon, 1940). Little in the way of documentation or analysis has appeared in Portuguese for 19th century Angola, north of the Cuanza. One exception is the work of Hélio E. Felgas in the Congo district. His work, however, is uneven and not as heavily documented nor as critical as the sweeping treatments of Delgado. Felgas has to his credit to date: *História do Congo Português* (Carmona, 1958) and *Populações Nativas do Congo Português* (Carmona, 1960).

Francisco Castelbranco's *História de Angola* (Lisbon, 1942) has considerable material on the 19th century, but as Felgas is uneven and largely undocumented. Rocha Martins, *História das Colónias Portuguesas* (Lisbon, 1933) has a wealth of material on Angola in this era, but it is unfortunately undocumented and therefore difficult to use except in support of better-known aspects.
The História da Expansão dos Portugueses no Mundo in Volume III, the section of 1833-1885, "The Implanting of Liberalism to the Berlin Conference," is largely a patriotic account which over-emphasizes external forces of causation and neglects conflicts among the Portuguese themselves. For biographical data on colonial figures or material on colonial institutions, the Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Braileira (1924-1956, Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro) is useful but the reader should be cautioned against frequent mistakes on dates and titles, and inexplicable omissions.

Primary material in the form of published documents is very plentiful in Portuguese. These documents tend to fall within the period before 1800 or after 1880, however. Such published material as Governor-General Reports, and officials' reports is found in publications as Archivos de Angola (Luanda, 1933-48, 9 volumes), Archivos das Colónias, Portugal em África, Anais do Conselho Ultramarino (1854-1864, 4 vols.), Anais Coloniais e Marítimos (1840-50), Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa (1877- ), Boletim Official do Governo Geral de Angola (1845-1891 or to the present), Mensário Administrativo (Luanda) and others.

Portuguese daily papers or journals contain a great deal of material on Angola in the 19th century.
Mainly I have consulted for the 1850's and 1860's, "O Jornal de Commercio" (Lisbon) or the "Diario de Noticias". A useful military journal published fortnightly in the era was the *Revista Militar*.

Works in French are second only to Portuguese for studying Angola in this era. Perhaps the most valuable contemporary survey of the entire empire and Portugal is Charles Vogel's brilliant *Le Portugal et Ses Colonies* (Paris, 1860). There are a number of modern accounts in French of Angola, most notable is the work of Portuguese M. Almada Negreiros in a series called *Les Colonies Portugaises* published at Paris from 1901 to 1910. Numerous geographical accounts of Angola have only fragments of history.

I have listed in the notes and bibliography some important German works and explorers' accounts. Without these, a total picture of European opinions on Angola would be impossible.

One basis for the hypotheses presented in this study comes from unpublished documents deposited in the *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino* of Lisbon, deposit of the Overseas Ministry. I have used mainly reports and letters from the Governors-General between 1825 and 1884, when the documents of Angola run out. Voluminous Treasury Department material under *Junta da Fazenda* was not consulted for lack of time. Other valuable 19th century material was consulted at Oporto in the
original manuscript diaries of Antonio da Silva Porto, settler in Bihe and letters from the explorers of Angola to the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa in Lisbon. Several weeks in the Public Record Office in London were spent consulting the correspondence of Luanda consuls with the Foreign Office. Some of this correspondence is published in white books or volumes listed in the bibliography.

Another source of published documents in Portuguese is the work of the National Press of Portugal, the Imprensa Nacional which throughout the century published important material.

This is by no means a definitive bibliography that follows. Yet an attempt has been made to provide a more comprehensive bibliography for the modern history of Angola than usually is available for English-speaking students.
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José Bressane Leite 1842-1844
Lourenço Germak Possollo 1844-1845
Pedro Alexandrino da Cunha 1845-1848
Adrião da Silveira Pinto 1848-1851
António Sergio de Sousa 1851-1853
Visconde de Pinheiro 1853-1854
José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral Oct. 1854-Aug. 1860
Carlos Augusto Franco 1860-1861
Sebastião Lopes de Calheiros e Menezes 1861-1862
José Baptista de Andrade 1862-1865
Francisco António Gonçalves Cardozo (Garrido) 1866-1869
José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral Apr. 1869-June 1870
José Maria da Ponte e Horta 1870-1873
José Baptista de Andrade 1873-1875
Alexandre de Almeida e Albuquerque 1875-1879
Vasco Guedes 1879-1880
António Eleuterio Dantes 1880-1882
Francisco Ferreira do Amaral 1882-1885
Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo 1885-1893

*This list does not include certain "interino" or temporary acting Governors-General. Source: Archivo Historico Ultramarino, Library.
APPENDIX II

1846: PALMERSTON'S LETTER TO MONCORVO:

NEW INTERPRETATION*

Foreign Office, November 30, 1846

M. le Baron,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 10th instant, in which you state that, according to information received by your Government from Loanda, the British member of the Mixed Commission there intends to inquire of Her Majesty's Government whether they recognize the ports of Cabinda and Ambriz as Portuguese possessions, and whereupon you observe that, although both you and your Government are quite sure that no doubt can be entertained on this subject by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, yet it is your duty to call my attention to the II Article of the Additional Convention (signed the 28th July, 1817) to the Treaty of the 22nd July, 1815, whereby Great Britain acknowledges the reservation of the rights which Portugal has to the points south of the Equator, comprehending the territories of Molemba and Cabinda, on the western coast of Africa, in which Ambriz is included; and also to a note from Lord Aberdeen to yourself, dated the 20th September, 1845; and you request that the inquiry of the Loanda Commissioners may be answered in conformity with the tenour thereof.

Presuming that your present representation had its origin in the case of the Brazilian brig "Boa União," which was lately captured on the West Coast of Africa by a Portuguese cruiser in latitude 7°36' south, and longitude 12°53' east, and was condemned by the Portuguese Tribunal at Loanda on a charge of being engaged in the Slave Trade within Portuguese jurisdiction, I beg leave to state to you the following particulars:—

The British Commissioners, in reporting to Her Majesty's Government the case of the "Boa União," observed that a similar Judgement would no doubt be given in the case of any slave-vessel captured by a


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Portuguese cruiser off any port of the coast from Molembo in 5°12' south down to Ambriz in 8° south, and they stated their apprehension that if Portugal enforced sovereign rights over this territory it would interfere with the intercourse between British merchants and the natives, who at present carry on their trade without payment of any duties to the Portuguese Government.

Now, according to the Treaty of 1817, Molembo, as you are aware, is the extreme northern point of the Portuguese claim to sovereignty not actually recognized by Great Britain, but to which Portugal declares that she retains her rights, and Ambriz is the extreme northern point recognized by Great Britain. Upon the receipt, therefore, of the communication from Her Majesty's Commissioners, Her Majesty's Government were not wholly without apprehension that, if allowed to pass without notice, the sentence of the Portuguese Court at Loanda, which involves a claim of exclusive territorial possession, might prejudice the right, which it is important, in the interests of commerce, for Her Majesty's Government to maintain, to unrestricted intercourse with that part of the West Coast of Africa which lies between 5°12' south latitude and 8° south latitude.

I therefore instructed Lord Howard de Walden and Seaford to represent to the Portuguese Government, with reference to the condemnation of the "Boa Uniao," that, while Her Majesty's Government received with satisfaction the renewed proof which the capture of that vessel afforded of the diligence of the Portuguese authorities in the suppression of the Slave Trade, they did not admit the claim of Portugal to a right of sovereignty from 5°12' to 8° south latitude, and would not permit a British vessel captured off that part of the West Coast by a Portuguese cruiser, on suspicion of being a slaver, to be adjudicated by any Portuguese Court, but would require that she should be dealt with according to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1842.

As it is to be inferred from your note that at the time of writing it you were not cognizant of this instruction to Lord Howard de Walden and Seaford, I have thought that I could not better answer your representation than by thus repeating to you the substance of that instruction, as conveying the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government upon the matter to which you have drawn my attention.

I have, etc.

PALMERSTON
(signed)
APPENDIX III

RESUME OF CONCEILOS IN INTERIOR ANGOLA, 1858-59, PAYING DIZIMO OR TAX ON HOUSES, FARMS, CATTLE, AND HUNTING*

Alto Dande  Novo Redondo  Tallamugongo
Barra do Bengo  Cambambe  Caconda
Barra do Dande  Cazengo  Catumbella
Calumbo  Demba (Dembo)  Dombe Grande
Icollo e Bengo  Duque de Bragança  Egito
Libongo  Golungo Alto  Quilengues
Muxima  Malange
Encoge  Massangano
Zenga do Golonzo  Pungo Andongo
Ambaca

CONCEILOS EXEMPTED FROM DIZIMO IN SAME YEAR

Ambriz
D. Pedro V (Bembe)
Mossamedes

APPENDIX IV

DEATH LIST FOR EUROPEANS IN ANGOLA: 1861-1874*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Settlers</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESTIMATES OF EUROPEAN POPULATION IN ANGOLA
1778-1898**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>1,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>2,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>12,285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source of this incomplete list, A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 44, Maço 1, Relatório, 1875.

APPENDIX V*

Distribution of libertos (slaves to be freed in time) in Angola, registered with the Government General, from years 1854, Dec., to 1863, Dec. Under law decree of 14 Dec. 1854.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Libertos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambriz</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loanda</td>
<td>6,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>1,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mossamedes</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golunco</td>
<td>21,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum Total</td>
<td>30,259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Libertos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loanda</td>
<td>1,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novo Redondo</td>
<td>3,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Within District of Golungo Alto):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golungo Alto</td>
<td>7,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dembos</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambaca</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malange</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talla-Mugongo</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duque de Braganza</td>
<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pungo Andongo</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cazengo</td>
<td>2,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambambe</td>
<td>3,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massangano</td>
<td>2,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Golungo Alto District</td>
<td>21,182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX VI.

EXPORT OF COPPER (MALACHITE) ORE FROM AMBRIZ 1858-63*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Approximate Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>5,000 arrobas (about 80 tons)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>10,000 &quot; (160 tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>3,000 &quot; (45 tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>14,000 &quot; (230 tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>17,000 &quot; (275 tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>10,000 &quot; (160 tons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximate Total 950 tons

APPROXIMATE TONNAGE OF COPPER EXTRACTED FROM BEMBE 1857-1867***

1,095 tons

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*Boletim Official (Angola), 1864, Jan. 23, No. 4, p. 23, "Export of Copper Ore from Ambriz."

**A Portuguese arroba is about 32 lbs.

APPENDIX VII

PUBLIC DEBTS AND DEFICITS OF PORTUGAL, 1835-1861*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Debt of Portugal (in contos)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>55,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td>82,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>71,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>77,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>93,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>131,575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deficits by Year (in milreis)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850-51</td>
<td>2,330,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853-54</td>
<td>204,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854-55</td>
<td>11,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855-56</td>
<td>496,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856-57</td>
<td>721,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857-58</td>
<td>1,412,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858-59</td>
<td>849,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859-60</td>
<td>1,365,188**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-61</td>
<td>2,114,271**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Estimated and provisional deficits.
### APPENDIX VIII

**EXPORTATION OF COFFEE FROM ANGOLA (NORTH OF OUANZA)**

1832-1894*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount in Kilograms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>76,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>913,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>891,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>1,226,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>2,418,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>4,177,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This chart combines figures from tables in Gerardo A. Pery, Geografia e Estatistica Geral de Portugal e Coloniais (Lisbon, 1875, Imprensa Nacional), p. 358, and Ernesto de Vasconcellos, As Coloniais Portuguesas (Lisbon, 1921 edition), p. 162. Pery writes about the coffee production in Angola that the prohibition of slave trade encouraged an agricultural revolution, on a small scale, where before 1840 only manioc, beans, and millet had been extensively cultivated by the natives. In 1838 most of the coffee consumed in Angola was imported from Brazil. Coffee production increased more steadily and spectacularly than cotton, or sugar cane. The rubber boom of 1870 to 1900, was eventually passed by coffee, which remains today the most important agricultural product in the territory.*
APPENDIX IX

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON KEY COLONIAL FIGURES*

1. José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral (1808-1873)

Trained as an Army officer in Lisbon, he was sent to France in 1844 to study military teaching. In 1851 was appointed Governor of Benguela District. Governor of Angola from 1854 to 1860, he was a staunch expansionist. Upon return to Lisbon was made a Member of the decision-making body, the Conselho Ultramarino. From January to July 22, 1868, he was Minister for Navy and Overseas. Named Governor of Angola later in the year, where he served until 1870. He died in Mozambique on campaign. His obituary in the Diario Illustrado of Lisbon in 1874 remarked he was not appreciated in Portugal as one of "the few men who dedicate themselves sincerely to inglorious and treacherous service in our colonies."

2. Francisco Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral (1844-1923)

Trained as a naval officer, he was early in career Governor of S. Tomé and Mossamedes in 1878-79. His zealous discipline among settlers caused his dismissal. Named Governor of Angola in 1882, he created the Congo district in 1885. In 1886 was named Governor of India and later a President of the Society of Geography of Lisbon.

3. José Baptista de Andrade (1819-1902)

Trained as a naval officer, he saw service on cruisers in the Congo River and coast before 1854. In 1855 made the first Governor of Ambriz, he led armies to the interior mines and towns. In 1859 and 1860 he went to Bembe and S. Salvador. Named Governor of Angola in 1862, he served until 1865. The Dembos campaign was responsible for his recalling to Angola as Governor to 1875. He rose to full Admiral of the Navy by 1896 retirement.

4. João de Andrade Corvo (1824-1890)

Foreign Minister in 1871 and Minister for Navy and Overseas during 1875-76, he helped begin the second

*The majority of this material on colonial figures is from the respective biographies in the G.E.P.eB. and a few random notes.
phase of the colonial movement. A younger version of Sa da Bandeira in his principles, he engineered the idea of the first national exploration of Angola.

5. Henrique de Barros Gomes (1843-1898)

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chancellor, 1886-90, he was head of the Progressista Party. His Government fell shortly after the delivery of the "Ultimatum" of 1890. Offered the Presidency of the powerful Society of Geography several years later, with typical flourish, he refused the honor.

6. Hermenegildo Carlos de Brito Capelo (1841-1917)

Leader of two scientific expeditions to Africa, 1877-85, with Roberto Ivens, he distinguished himself in European exploration circles. Widely known as a geographer and astronomer, he was Portuguese delegate to the Brussels Conference of 1890. His exact surveys of Angola laid the basis for the modern map surveys.

7. Luciano Cordeiro (1844-1900)

Founder and Permanent Secretary of the Society of Geography of Lisbon in 1875, writer and historian, his researches into the early history of the Portuguese discoveries and empire made him a younger version of the Viscount of Santarem. For several years from 1875-85 the Society of Geography was like a special Ministry of Overseas, for all the colonial men corresponded with its members.

8. Fernando da Costa Leal (1825-69)

Trained as an army officer, he first went to Africa as an aide to the Governor-General of Angola in 1853. Explorations of the Cunene river valley and the mouth of the river in 1854 made him famous in Lisbon. Working with Sa da Bandeira on maps of Angola, he returned in 1864 to be Governor of Mossamedes. An active Governor who built roads and traveled widely in the interior, he resigned in 1866 after disputes in his administration. Made Governor of Mozambique in August, 1869, he succumbed to the climate within four months.

9. Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro (1839-1917)

An Army medical doctor, he urged reform of medical services on S. Tome and Principe. Working at Ambacca on railway constructions, he also taught in Lisbon at the Escola Superior Colonial created after 1906. Writer of tracts on medical prevention of malaria, he also composed volumes on exploration.
10. Manuel Joaquim Pinheiro Chagas (1842-1895)

Minister for Navy and Overseas during a crucial period, 1883-86, he led a movement for reform. Considered by some as "one of the greatest Portuguese figures of the past century," his basic reforms in administration went largely unnoticed beneath more spectacular military antics in Africa.

11. Luís Augusto Rebello da Silva (1822-1871)

One of the most original writers and novelists of the 19th century, he was also a great orator in Parliament, first elected in 1848. His contact with Overseas affairs was short but decisive. Minister of Navy and Overseas from August 1869 to May 1870 under the Duke of Loulé's Ministry, he resigned due to illness; but he left a mark on overseas spending and effort from 1870-75 by recommending in his Relatório do Ministro da Marinha e Ultramar (Lisbon, 1870) a severe cutback on all spending on African territory, and a budgeting at home. His opinion coincided with a low point in finance, and a withdrawal from the interior in Angola.

12. Bernardo de Sá Nogueira de Figueiredo, later Baron, Viscount, and Marques de Sá da Bandeira (1795-1876)

Studied at Coimbra and visited England in 1823 as an army officer and was impressed with what he saw. Oliveira Martins remarked of his colonial interests. "In this he showed his romanticism. His colonial preoccupation passed to be a mania and soon became that."* Appointed Minister of Navy in 1835, he made a pioneering report to the Queen in 1836 seeking a renovation in overseas effort. A staunch liberal during the Civil Wars, he lost his arm before 1834 but became known as a brilliant strategist even off the battlefield. His plans for the defense of Lisbon in the 1860's, in case of an attack from Spain or France, were basically accepted.

13. Viscount of Santarém (1791-1856)

Began historical research in 1808 in Brazil with the Royal Family in exile. Minister by 1826, he was Minister for Navy and Overseas for a short while to 1834, leaving Portugal thereafter for political reasons (he was an Absolutist or partisan of Miguel), he settled in Paris in perpetual exile. His patriotism for Portugal, however, transcended his disagreement in political

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APPENDIX IX

principles, and his historical works from 1839-1856 encouraged the early phase of the colonial movement. His Demonstracao (1855) was translated into English for the use of the Foreign Office. Begged to return to Portugal by Kings and Ministers, he remained in Paris to the end.

14. António de Serpa Pimentel (1825-1900)

Professor of Mathematics, writer and diplomat, he was a close colleague of Luciano Cordeiro with whom he represented Portugal at the Berlin West African Conference, 1884-85.

15. Alexandre Alberto Rocha de Serpa Pinto (1846-1900)

In many ways a Portuguese version of Henry M. Stanley, Serpa Pinto was trained as an army officer with experience in the disastrous Bonga campaign in Mozambique in 1869. The fourth European to cross Africa from coast to coast after Livingstone, Stanley, and Cameron, he was a popular figure in Portugal. Admirer and friend of Stanley, he was highly ambitious for himself and to his ambition may be attributed a major factor for dividing the expedition of 1877-79. Spending much of his time in East Africa after 1882, he ended his career as Governor of the Cape Verdes, an exhausting post of four years to 1898. Like Stanley, old African illnesses overtook him shortly afterwards. François Coillard in 1878 called him "a true friend of Africa."

The Monarchs of Portugal, 1777-1910

Queen Maria I (insane after 1792) 1777-1816
Prince-Regent João 1792-1816
João VI 1816-1826
Miguel (younger son of João VI) 1826-1834
Pedro IV (elder son of João VI) 1834
Queen Maria II (daughter of Pedro IV) 1834-1853
Ferdinand, Prince-Regent 1853-1855
Pedro V (son of Ferdinand and Maria) 1855-1861
Luiz I (younger son of Ferdinand and Maria) 1861-1889
Carlos I (assassinated) 1889-1908
Manuel II (last King of Portugal, deposed by Republic) 1908-1910

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APPENDIX X

FINAL YEARLY DEFICITS OF PORTUGAL, 1843-1872*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Deficits in Milreis</th>
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<td>1849-50</td>
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<tr>
<td>1871-72</td>
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*Source: Ferreira Lobos, As Confissões dos Ministros de Portugal, p. 45.
### APPENDIX XI

**GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION**

*1872-1910*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Europe</th>
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<th>Brazil</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>14,546</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10,722</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9,566</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>29</td>
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APPENDIX XII

TRADE MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA, 1868-1898*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In Francs**</th>
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<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>18,450,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>18,625,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>18,680,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>19,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>15,430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>20,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>19,880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>24,795,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>21,335,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>19,260,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>1879</td>
<td>16,610,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
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<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>18,990,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>21,244,595</td>
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<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>23,910,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1885</td>
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<tr>
<td>1886</td>
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<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>23,929,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1888</td>
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<td>47,584,500</td>
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<td>1893</td>
<td>62,278,500</td>
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<td>1894</td>
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<td>1895</td>
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<td>1897</td>
<td>71,532,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>80,775,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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*A. D'Almada Negreiros, Angola (Paris, 1901), p. 34.

**One franc = 200 reis.
Angola in 1830.

- Forts and towns (presidios)
- Line of Portuguese control and trade

Scale: 1:00,000,000

- Cabinda
- Zaire
- Congo
- Sonho S. Salvador
- Lueda
- Benguela
- Novo Redondo
- Qui Combo
- Benguela Velha
- Mossoré
- Lé River
- Ambé
- Libongo Rivière
- Golungo Ángola
- Cabumbe
- Bengua Antongo
- Cambambe
- Quissanga
- Lucilia
- Cassange
- Cassange Fain

Lands of Humbe

*Newn Porl
Bay of Mossamedes

Desert
Angola in 1891.
- towns, factories
- missions
- lines of control
- Portuguese
- railroad
THE PORTUGUESE IN ANGOLA, 1836-1891:
A STUDY IN EXPANSION AND ADMINISTRATION.
(Library of Congress No. Mic. 63)

Douglas Lanphier Wheeler, Ph. D.
Boston University Graduate School, 1963

Major Professor: William B. Norton, Professor of History

Relying chiefly upon official correspondence between the Government-General in Portuguese West Africa, or Angola, and the Overseas Ministry in Lisbon as well as works of the period, this study outlines Portuguese activity and policy in 19th century Angola. For the first time, key policy statements from these unpublished documents have been translated into English and analyzed. A hitherto little known phase of Portuguese activity has been brought to light.

Portuguese activity in Angola can be divided into three major periods. In the first period, from the publication of the 1836 decree abolishing the slave-trade from Angola, to 1861, and the end of one phase of expansion, considerable military and commercial expansion occurred along the coasts and east to the Cuango river. Consequently, even before the scramble for Africa, Portuguese control in Angola doubled and spread as a military power resting largely upon African auxiliaries. That expansion, however, caused revolts among independent African tribes. Next from 1861 to 1877, and the arrival of the first Portuguese national exploration expedition, came an era of withdrawal from frontier posts, while increasing agriculture offset a progressive weakening
of Portuguese power in the interior. The third period, from 1877 to 1891, and the treaty of partition, saw military and missionary expansion onto the plataaus.

Many forces motivated the Portuguese to extend control and to improve their administration. The independence of Brazil encouraged activity and the impulse to make Angola economically self-supporting. From 1836 to 1861, as frontiers were expanded to the east and south, abolition of the slave-trade encouraged the search for new supplies of tropical produce, and for additional revenues by taxing Africans as well as the trade of Europeans.

To the administration at Luanda, the capital, one remedy for the poverty of Angola was the annexation of the Congo coast and mouth and the collection of customs there to augment the revenue of the colony. Yet this attempted expansion came to a halt because of the lack of transport facilities, unhealthy climate, feeble armed forces, and African opposition. Governor Amaral (1854-1860), an outstanding but forgotten expansionist, learned that it was useless to try to dominate the coast from the hostile interior.

British free trade policy opposed formal Portuguese expansion north of Ambriz, and African forces opposed interior expansion. After costly wars and epidemics, the Governors decided to cut expenses and to administer little but the coast. This policy, together with an economizing policy in Portugal, and a monopoly economy in Angola, greatly
weakened Portugal's position in the later scramble.

The condition of Angola in 1891, generally ascribed to the weakness of Portugal alone, derived as much from Portuguese character and policy. Too often the coast was favored and the interior plateaus deliberately neglected. Portuguese emigrants preferred Brazil to Africa; thus the absence of a good-sized Portuguese population frustrated colonialist dreams of large-scale white colonization and African assimilation.

After the settlement of the Congo frontiers at the Berlin Conference in 1885, Portuguese attention shifted more to Central Africa. The race southeastward to the upper Zambesi was lost. The explorer Carvalho, however, succeeded in winning the Lunda region eastward to the Kasai. By the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of partition (1891), Portugal possessed a region of 481,000 square miles. As yet the Portuguese were not the true masters of Angola, for effective control and occupation covered less than one tenth of that territory.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY