Indications for ethics in the concepts of guilt and shame in certain psychiatric theories.

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INDICATIONS FOR ETHICS
IN THE CONCEPTS OF GUILT AND SHAME
IN CERTAIN PSYCHIATRIC THEORIES

by

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PREFACE

The study of guilt and shame encompassed by this dissertation grew out of the author's experience in the pastoral ministry. It was prompted by the need to understand the motivations and emotions surrounding moral conflict and crisis. A minister's role in the community both as counselor and as moral guarantor leads many persons to seek his counsel and guidance when their guilt can no longer be ignored or dealt with by their own resources alone. For this reason, a minister who seeks to become deeply involved in the care and counsel of his parishioners finds that he must deal constantly with problems of guilt and shame.

The dissertation is a study in ethics. It is, however, limited to an investigation of the motivations and evaluative processes which relate to the moral struggle. The dissertation does not develop a positive theory of ethics, since it is a study in guilt, although hints for such a theory emerge. It relies heavily upon the theoretical work of psychotherapists, in part because of the author's need to develop skills in the counseling arts, and in part because of the author's conviction that philosophical ethics has not yet fully appropriated insights stemming from the
psychiatric disciplines. For these reasons the author de­
cided not to deal directly with the many rich insights on
the nature of guilt found in literature and theology, such
as in the perceptive work of existentialist writers.

Questions such as the following emerged from the
author's pastoral experience, and helped to stimulate the
present study:

1. Questions are raised by the problem of disguised
guilt. It is not unusual in counseling to discover that an
undeclared sense of guilt lurks beneath a person's chronic
exhaustion, depressed moods, distorted perception of others
as hostile and vindictive, or even a cynical rejection of
family or communal standards of conduct. This guilt often
relates to a clandestine pattern of behavior which on the
surface has been thoroughly rationalized. The disguised
guilt indicates that a person has held an internal inquisi­
tion and found himself guilty in spite of his avowed ethical
commitments.

What is the source of this inner, hidden judgment?
Why may it be apparently more perceptive of one's actual
value situation than one's conscious deliberations may be?
It is an often held assumption in ethics that subconscious
impulses and feelings are irrational, and that clarity of
thinking about moral aims leads to coherent order among these impulses, and facilitates moral achievement. Can it be that subconscious impulses and feelings contain the seeds of their own immanent order, or are subject to some type of subconscious reasoning or valuing process?

2. A guilty person feels threatened. He expects punishment, even though his situation may protect him from legal or social sanctions. He talks of being unable to sleep nights, of a haunting sense of impending disaster, of profound fears which he cannot explain.

What is the meaning of this anxiety? Is it always a neurotic revival of childhood emotions? What is the meaning of a guilty person's profound sense of alienation from God? Thoughts of punishment or rejection by God or neighbor appear sometimes to be intellectualizations, reasons found for anxiety already present, rather than the primary causes of anxiety. What is the source of this anxiety?

3. Some persons appear to be led into moral dilemmas, not by too little, but by too intense guilt. The uncontrollable drinking of the alcoholic and the compulsive sexual preoccupation of the philanderer illustrate this phenomenon. These persons tend to be driven by shame and guilt into dependence upon the very behavior patterns which produce
shame and guilt. Under what circumstances is moral confronta-
tion possible without reinforcing cynicism, despair, and
guilt-driven sin?

4. The above problem leads to another: Protestant
Churches have traditionally sought to assure conformity to
moral law by moralistic-authoritarian means. It is commonly
thought that reiteration of certain ethical norms and exhort-
ation to reach those norms, accompanied by subtly veiled
threats as to the consequences if they are not met will lead
to internalization of standards. Is this effective moral
strategy?

To reinforce the guilt of those who sin compulsively
may feed a pattern of cynicism and self-rejection which hinders
their moral quest. For instance, there is much talk in theo-
logical circles about human pride as the basis of sin. Is
it then effective strategy to condemn pride? Suppose pride
roots in a problem, not of too much self-regard, but of too
little self-regard? Pride is then a neurotic defense; to
attack it merely heightens the person's desperate attachment
to it. Similarly, if materialistic status-seeking in our
culture is motivated by esteem needs, is it not more import-
ant to understand and support the victim of our vertically
stratified culture, rather than to condemn his materialism?
Will the support of a community of love diminish the esteem needs and hence allow a greater range of freedom from materialistic preoccupation?

5. The capacity to verbalize ethical norms appears to be only loosely related to actual moral achievement. It is a common assumption of philosophical ethics that clear verbalization of an ideal helps persons to define the moral goal, and hence aids in the quest of moral excellence. While this may point to a worthy objective, it appears to run counter to much actual experience. Compulsive behavior, as we have indicated, does not bend to verbal clarification. Encouraging persons to identify moral excellence with effective ethical verbalization may not be effective strategy. It may even encourage persons to stratify interpersonal relationships in terms of verbal stereotypes, rather than developing a sensitive grasp of infinitely variable, real situations. Similarly, a person may come to talk one moral language and live another. Language may be isolated from hidden and disguised motivations, and may even become a tool of escape from emotional honesty.

Another dimension to this dilemma is that many persons do an admirably effective job of creating value and developing personal integrity, but aren't able to verbalize
the principles used. Does ethical thinking then relate to moral valuing? If so, the relationship is surely much more complex than is often reflected in ethical theory.

Is it a function of ethics to study moral motivation, and to develop strategies for moral education? Has ethics ever divorced itself fully from the Greek presumption that knowledge leads to correct action?

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The above questions indicate the author's initial impulse to engage in this study. The dissertation itself does not fully deal with these questions. It is limited to an investigation of psychiatric and ethical theories which may shed some light upon the moral struggle. It hopefully indicates ways in which future ethical dialogue might take cognizance of the realities of human experience in the midst of moral conflict.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The central focus of this study is suggested by the question: Is conscience cognitive? The problem to be investigated is the extent to which the experience of obligation or "oughting" is coherently related to cognition.

In the early days of modern philosophy conscience was conceived as a special faculty offering intuitive awareness of moral right. Thus Kant identified conscience with the "categorical imperative", or sense of duty. Conscience is not the product of experience, but an inherited or original capacity of the soul, and is related to the law of duty. The view of Bishop Butler was somewhat similar, in that conscience was seen as a unique capacity which affords an intuitive grasp of duty:

There is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove of their own actions...This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience.¹

While Bishop Butler saw this function as reflective, and one which exercises critical evaluation of passions and

¹Butler, Sermons i, as quoted in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. IV, p. 31.
purposes in the light of human nature, his view coincides with Kant's in that conscience is a unique faculty of moral cognition. This somewhat paralleled the assumption in some theological circles that conscience is the "voice of God" which speaks with authority in the hearts of man.

It is somewhat more the fashion in recent years to regard conscience as of no valid moral authority. Thus T.V. Smith examined various grounds of validation of the claims of conscience, and refuted each in its turn.1 Freud is often given credit for having vanquished once and for all any illusions about the rational validity of conscience. Thus Crane Brinton says that those who see the individual sense of moral responsibility disappearing in the Western world usually blame, in part, "belief in Freudian psychology", which is belief "in the irrationality of guilt feelings."2 Similarly, Thomas Hill points to Freud as a major source of modern ethical skepticism. Conscience originated in primitive totemic practices, according to Freud, and has never outgrown its origins. Hill describes Freud's view as follows:


Being rooted in emotional reaction against primitive patricide and incest and in childhood wishes to re-enact those acts, it could in any case scarcely be expected to be rational; and further analysis of it reveals that it is for the most part definitely irrational. Conscience is a major part of the activity of the super-ego, which is a turning of the death instinct, which originally prompted the killing of the father, upon one's self.¹

I. Thesis and Preliminary Assumptions.

The thesis which will be defended in this study is that a further reading in Freudian psychoanalysis and later psychiatric theories will reveal conscience to be cognitive. Conscience, however, is not a unique cognitive capacity, as Kant and Butler conceived it, but is rather a complex experience coordinated with the cognitive function which is to be found at work in every task demanding intellectual activity. In this sense, conscience is *functionally* cognitive, or serves within the personality to stimulate and guide cognitive assessment of one's total situation with reference to obligation and duty.

1. One preliminary assumption is that obligation is a complex experience which includes anticipation of guilt. The statement "I will feel guilty if I do this" is ordinarily

accepted as valid evidence that one feels an obligation to do otherwise. There is no richer source of insight into the phenomenology of guilt than Freud's work. If his view of guilt is a major rationalization for ethical skepticism, it appears that a theory of obligation must be preceded by a study of Freudian theory.

An added dimension is confronted, however, by the fact that guilt is closely related to problems of self-esteem and feelings of inferiority and shame. The statement "I would feel ashamed of myself if I did this" is accepted as valid evidence of a sense of obligation. Conscience now appears as anticipation of shame as well as guilt. As one turns from Freud to more recent psychiatric theory, one notes a shift from an exclusive concentration on guilt to consideration of self-esteem problems. Thus in modern psychoanalysis guilt is seen as issuing in self-hatred and disgust with oneself. ¹ Moving even further afield from Freud, one notes that psychiatrists who emphasize the interpersonal and cultural aspects of behavior find feelings related to self-esteem of much greater importance than

guilt. Any study of obligation must surely take cognizance of the thought of such thinkers as Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan, who see the insecurities related to self-evaluation as of central importance to mental health. The every-day use of the term "obligation" includes references to an evaluation of self, or an assessment of anticipated anxieties and self-negation following failure or neglect in value-achievement.

With this in mind, a study of various psychiatric theories will be made, with special reference to the phenomena surrounding feelings of guilt and shame. A recent clinical distinction between guilt and shame, made by Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, will provide an initial definition:

Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary (set by the Super-ego) is touched or transgressed, shame occurs when a goal (presented by the Ego-Ideal) is not being reached. It thus indicates a real "shortcoming." Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression; shame, failure.1

This distinction between guilt- and shame-anxiety will be followed throughout the dissertation.

1 Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study (Springfield: Chardes C. Thomas, 1953), p. 11.
2. A second preliminary assumption is that conscience has some relation to the evaluative function, and is thus in some sense functionally cognitive. The term "evaluative function" will be used throughout the dissertation as roughly synonymous with "cognitive function", in the sense in which the cognitive psychologists use the term.

The cognitive psychologists point out that cognition is present in the simplest perceptual experience. Thus, "it takes the form of phenomenal organization which is centrally interposed between the source of stimulation and the behavioral response."¹ Such cognitive factors as organization, causal reference, schematization, mapping, anticipation, and concentration are all involved even in the simplest perception. The further conclusion is drawn, that "any experience or act of valuing presupposes a cognitive-emotional-motivational matrix."² This association of valuing with cognition is a promising lead which will be investigated in this study.

From the standpoint of epistemology, the work of Brand Blanshard is important in this connection. He sees


²Ibid., p. 122.
that the most rudimentary mental event involves judgmental factors. "The simplest form of thought is, by general admission, judgment; and perception in turn is the simplest form of this." Sensations become perceptions only after a major task of construction has taken place. Sensations are evaluated with reference to their intensity, their relations, their "affective meaning" or interest to us, and the frequency of their repetition. A form of implicit inference is present in all perception, since all perception of objects involves not only sensory perception of what is given, but belief in which is not given, but only assumed. Thus "any perception is a starting-point from which others may leap, like a knight in chess, in many different directions; and the direction of the leap is determined by interest." Here is evidence that evaluative processes of extreme complexity, including not only the weighing of sensory intensity, but the meaning of sensations in terms of interest, and the screening of sensations in terms of concentration and attention, are at work below the level of awareness. Indeed,

2Cf. Ibid., pp. 66–76. 3Cf. Ibid., pp. 80–120.
consciousness is "like the office of a Tammany politician after his election, with an ante-room full of applicants, and places for very few."\(^1\) From the vast welter of sensory material which enters experience, only a small part is selected for specific self-conscious examination; but this selection presupposes a selective factor at work at a subconscious level.

C.I. Lewis speaks to this association of valuation and cognition. The purpose of cognition is to guide action, he says, and "action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation."\(^2\) Cognition always includes belief in or assertion of something which lies outside cognition itself.\(^3\) In this sense, the content of cognition has value and meaning for the person concerned. It includes symbolic reference to the broad range of experience. Lewis concludes that valuation is a form of empirical knowledge.\(^4\)

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the thesis that the experience of obligation coordinates coherently with cognition. By "cognition" is meant not intellective activity in the narrow sense of logico-verbal

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 193.


\(^3\)Cf. Ibid., p. 27.  \(^4\)Cf. Ibid., p. 365.
thought, as the philosopher typically employs the term. Rather, we will be concerned with cognition in the broader sense of the selective ordering and structuring of experience which takes place throughout all intrapsychic activity.

We will use the term "evaluative function" for three reasons: i. To indicate that cognition at every level involves evaluative comparisons, the weighing of the intensity and meaning of experiential elements, and the ordering of those elements into objects and ideas which facilitate action. This means that a central valuational focus is present in all cognition; namely the intent of the person cognizing. ii. To express the preliminary assumption of this dissertation that moral evaluation and cognition involve one and the same function, and that to deny cognitive validity to moral evaluation is to deny that any truth is possible, in the physical sciences or elsewhere. iii. To block identification of conscience with cognition as immediate awareness of objective moral truth, and to indicate the provisional possibility that conscience may relate to the creative and constructive aspects of the knowing function.

3. A third preliminary assumption is that psychotherapists may have important things to say to philosophical ethics. It may be equally valid to indicate that philosophers
have important things to say to psychotherapists. It could no doubt be demonstrated that when psychotherapists theorize they make extensive philosophical and metaphysical assumptions, many of which are common to the Weltanschauung of the culture in which they live. Recent research revealing that patients tend unconsciously to assimilate the value-assumptions of their therapists offers graphic illustration of this fact. Certainly no one would doubt that psychiatric theories could be subjected to searching epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical scrutiny, with value to all concerned.

This dissertation is limited, however, to a critical examination of certain ethical systems following a careful look at psychiatric insights and clinical assumptions, especially as the latter might bear on problems of guilt, shame, obligation, and the evaluative function. In this sense it will represent an attempt to enrich ethical thinking with the insights of depth psychologists, or at least to set up a dialogue between the two fields of disciplined thinking. In theology the work of Paul Tillich, Albert Outler, Carroll Wise, Paul Johnson, Seward Hiltner, and others indicates that fruitful cross-fertilization between such related fields is a hopeful possibility. Similarly, recent theorists have
taken a closer look at the place of values in human life following the impact of psychoanalytic thinking.\(^1\)

Philosophers build ethical systems upon certain assumptions about human nature, motivation, the relation of affective to cognitive aspects of consciousness, and the psychological consequences of various ways of acting. There is not always evidence that these have been founded on a thoroughly empirical investigation of the creature "man", however. This dissertation is based upon the assumption that the true subject of ethics is man, his valuing, his wants and interests, his hidden motivations and apparent goals. The subject of ethics is man, and psychotherapists may be assumed to be intimately acquainted with this subject. Countless hours of skilled listening to the most intimate concerns of men must offer a rich vein of data.

II. Previous Relevant Research.

A search was made of American Dissertations Accepted by American Universities\(^2\), from the year 1945 to the present.


Two dissertations appeared to bear directly upon the subject under consideration, and were carefully read:


Wassmer finds that the following qualities characterize guilt, some of which clearly reflect the Roman Catholic perspective from which he writes: i. Self-condemnation; ii. Indelibility or indestructibility, in that guilt is a macula, an irreversible injury to the soul; iii. Recognition of sanction, or punishment; iv. Recognition of defilement, of pollution and desecration.

Some investigation of Freudian thought is made, characterizing Freud's view of guilt as self-directed aggression related to the death-instinct, and as disproportionately severe in relation to man's real misdeeds. No study of other psychiatric thought was included.

2. Otis A. Maxfield wrote a Ph.D. dissertation at Boston University in 1954 which closely parallels some of the
thinking of the present study, under the title of "The Psychological Nature of Conscience in Freudian Theory". His purpose is to examine the psychological nature of conscience in Freudian theory, and to evaluate it in the light of certain neo-Freudians and non-Freudians. Erich Fromm and Karen Horney are studied as neo-Freudians, and Gordon Allport, 0. Hobart Mowrer, and Rollo May as non-Freudians.

The author makes an excellent study of the differences between "immature and mature" conscience. The following characteristics are indicated for immature conscience:

i. It rests upon a basic authoritarian orientation, Freud's voice of internalized authority; ii. It is repressive and negative, prohibiting expression of sexual and aggressive needs; iii. It is characterized by a disproportionate sense of guilt; iv. The unconscious elements achieve precedence over conscious elements; v. It gives unlimited power to an idealized image of perfection, thus neglecting the real self; vi. It is characterized by a "tyranny of the shoulds" (Horney), in complete disregard for feasibility; vii. It maintains a pseudo-ideal, and hence is compulsive and coercive; viii. It lacks an integrative capacity, functioning in terms of opportunistic goals.

He characterizes the "mature", or "creative conscience" as follows: i. It is an agent of expression, not
repression; it reflects one's own adequate self-image and values; ii. It shifts from obedience to individual responsibility; iii. It is characterized by growth; iv. It increases tension as long-range goals frustrate immediate satisfactions; v. It relates tradition to present experience; vi. It enables the person to organize behavior around a central, self-chosen goal; vii. It includes religious elements; viii. It is a function of the total self, rather than a single faculty; ix. It arises out of self-recognition which creates a sense of oughtness; x. It is characterized by individuality; one is not ruled by unconscious impulses and desires, but by conscious, self-chosen goals.

While the views expressed here are very similar to the thesis of this study that conscience is functionally rational, these differences between the two studies may be noted: i. The Maxfield study does not include a critical examination of theoretical ethics; ii. The phenomenology of guilt, shame, and anxiety do not come in for the intensive scrutiny which this study will give them; iii. The Freudian ethical perspective is identified with super-ego guilt, whereas this study will point to hidden assumptions of Freud which would support a view of the rational conscience;
iv. The author equates unconscious phenomena with irrational and irresponsible drives, and identifies conscience with conscious, voluntary goals only. This study will conclude that conscience is creatively coordinated with unconscious processes, which are not necessarily irrational, but are, in fact, immanently rational. The identification of morality with conscious, voluntary choices only is too narrow in perspective, and does in fact falsify the organismic scope of judgmental and evaluative processes.

III. The Plan of This Study.

The study will center first upon an investigation of various psychiatric theories, tracing through their work strains of thought which promise to illuminate the nature of guilt, shame, and the evaluative function. Second, three contemporary ethical theories will be examined and evaluated as to whether their conceptions of obligation adequately account for the phenomenological data from psychiatry.

Chapter II will include a detailed study of Freudian psychoanalysis, first with reference to guilt, and then in terms of the evaluative function. Freud's own work will occupy the center of attention, but the contemporary psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann will receive some consideration. Hartmann is sometimes given credit for leading Freudian
psychoanalysis toward a more creative conception of guilt and valuation. The chapter will begin with an examination of guilt in *Civilization and its Discontents*. Then the "structural hypothesis" of Freud will be scrutinized to discover the relationship of the super-ego to the other psychic functions. Finally, certain implications of Freud's work on the intellective functioning of the ego, or unconscious dream-work, and the meaning of wit, will be used to demonstrate that Freud assumed a close functional relationship between guilt and the evaluative function.

Chapter III will be devoted to an examination of three psychiatric theories which have come more directly under the influence of social and cultural studies of recent years. Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan appear to be the most creative theoretical innovators among this group, who may be called generally "interpersonal" or "social" psychiatrists. In this chapter the anxieties accompanying self-esteem problems, which correlate generally with the Piers definition of shame, will be examined. Certain conceptions which shed some light upon unconscious evaluative processes will be investigated to discover their relationship to shame-anxiety.
Chapter IV will offer a comparative summary of the psychiatric theories as they seem to suggest a coherent view of the nature of obligation. The functional relationship between evaluation and guilt- and shame-anxieties will be defended.

Chapter V will comprise a study of the ethical views of H.A. Prichard, C.L. Stevenson, and Brand Blanshard, who represent three divergent conceptions of the nature of obligation. The first two are chosen because they represent two leading fields of thought which challenge the thesis of the dissertation. Ethics is essentially noncognitive in the views of these two thinkers. Brand Blanshard has made a significant and recent statement which reflects the major issues in contemporary ethical dialogue.

Chapter VI will offer a critique of the three ethical theories based upon the view of obligation developed in Chapter IV. The cogency of the psychological interpretation of obligation in relating to contemporary ethical discussions will thus be tested.

Chapter VII will contain the major findings of the dissertation.
CHAPTER II

GUILT AND THE EVALUATIVE FUNCTION IN FREUDIAN THOUGHT

The purpose to which this chapter is directed is that of tracing the concept of guilt through the Freudian writings, to discover what Freud affirmed about the evaluative function, and to see what relationships he observed between guilt and evaluation. Some consideration will also be given to the contemporary psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann.

_Civilization and its Discontents_ will be examined first, followed by a study of the "structural hypothesis" which leads into consideration of the Super-ego and the Oedipal relationship. As guilt emerges in Freud's thought as a form of anxiety, it becomes necessary to study the ego-defenses which he saw as _prima facie_ evidence of subconscious anxiety.

Freud's pioneering work upon subconscious evaluative processes is revealed especially in the _Interpretation of Dreams_ and in _Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious_. These works will be used to explore the nature of "primary process" thinking.

The central thesis of this chapter is that Freud affirms conscience to be irrational, but assumes its rationality.
I. Guilt in *Civilization and Its Discontents*.

Probably Freud's most comprehensive statement of the meaning and place of guilt in human experience is found in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. This work, written at the apex of Freud's career, has been described as "the most distinctive statement in the philosophy of existence and civilization which has been produced in the present century."¹ Whether or not such enthusiasm is justified, the work is valuable for our purposes, since guilt is therein discussed from the dual perspective of its role in individual experience and in culture. In addition, we find in this discussion the fruit of Freud's unique genius, the capacity to observe and to analyze experiential phenomena with unusual decisiveness and to interpret this complex data by means of a fabric of imaginative theory.

A. Freud defines the purpose of human life in terms of the pleasure-principle. The most basic characterization of men is that they "seek happiness, they want to become happy and to remain so."² This means the elimination of


pain and discomfort and the experiencing of pleasure. Freud the biologist is here speaking; the pleasure which relates to instinctual gratification, especially following some deprivation, is the primal goal of human activity.

The purpose of culture is to assure human survival through cooperative work, and human pleasure through sex-related activities.

The life of human beings in common...had a twofold foundation, i.e. the compulsion to work, created by external necessity, and the power of love, causing the male to wish to keep his sexual object, the female, near him, and the female to keep near her that part of herself which has become detached from her, her child. Eros and Ananke were the parents of human culture, too. ¹

As seen above, culture enables men to live by protecting them from the harsher aspects of nature, and gives them a reason for living by assuring the close proximity of love objects. Fortunately, the work men do also discharges many of their libidinal impulses, and spares them the discomfort of ungratified erotic needs. ²

B. There is an unfortunate irony inherent in human culture, however. Culture is necessary to assure libidinal fulfillment, but at the same time it is the great source

¹Ibid., p. 68. ²Ibid., p. 34.
of repression and deprivation. Cooperative living is an absolute necessity, but the order it entails tends to make it the enemy of its own inherent purpose. Thus:

It is impossible to ignore the extent to which civilization is built up on renunciation of instinctual gratifications, the degree to which the existence of civilization presupposes the non-gratification (suppression, repression or something else?) of powerful instinctual urgencies. This 'cultural privation' dominates the whole field of social relations between human beings; we know already that it is the cause of the antagonism against which all civilization has to fight.¹

As culture evolves, direct sexual expression suffers the most severe restrictions. Society acts toward sexual relations as an entrenched power group might act toward the population which it exploits. It absolutely forbids the use of sex as a source of enjoyment, and barely tolerates it as the only means to multiply the human race. This cultural enmity toward sex takes its toll, Freud concludes. The sexual life of civilized man is "seriously disabled", and sometimes gives the impression of being "in process of becoming atrophied, just as organs like our teeth and our hair seem to be."²

¹Ibid., p. 63.
Freud explains this phenomenon by referring to the law of psychic energy. Culture requires mental energy for its own purpose, and hence is jealous of its being expended in sexual pursuits. The higher mental operations, such as scientific, artistic, and ideological activities, play an important part in civilized life, and depend for their energy upon the sublimated sexual drive.\(^1\)

A basic weakness in Freud's cultural analysis reveals itself at this point. On the basis of his theoretical formulation, it would be impossible to explain the evolution of these "higher types of mental activity." The goal of human life is libidinal gratification. Culture evolves to assure survival and erotic fulfillment. Scientific and artistic pursuits certainly do not secure the latter goal, since they are in jealous competition for the psychic energies involved. While a case might be made for the utility of scientific pursuits as assuring survival by wresting the initiative away from nature, a similar case cannot be made for aesthetic pursuits, which have little survival value.\(^2\) Such pursuits might become a substitute for sexual

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\(^1\)Freud, *Civilization...*, p. 63.

expression for the fortunate few who can sublimate their energies in this way,¹ but the aesthetic interests of this élite come at the cost of depriving the vast majority of libidinal gratification. Of course, on the basis of the pleasure-principle we cannot understand how beauty can become a substitute for sexuality. What value can its indulgence offer which can take the place of sex? This is the classic dilemma of hedonism. Its defense leads one to defend pleasure on a qualitative basis, but this puts pleasure under a standard of judgment which is more than pleasure.

Freud can only conclude that for some reason which he never elaborates (except for passing blows at Christianity, which he seems to blame for this and many other ills), culture has evolved into an unfortunate dilemma of staggering magnitude. An élite few enjoy their sublimated "higher mental operations" only through the serious deprivation of the masses, and this through a jealous surveillance of their sexual life. Who this élite might be Freud never elaborates; he usually hypostatizes "culture" and blames it as a collective entity. Certainly one aspect of Freud's therapeutic aim

is the championing of the individual's instinctual needs against "culture", which inhibits them and diverts them to purposes foreign to the individual's true interests.

G. Now, the result of the above impasse between a hypothetical élite and the deprived masses is precisely what one might expect. Culture is eternally threatened with imminent revolt.

Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through the primary hostility of men towards one another....Culture has to call up every possible reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of men and hold their manifestations in check by reaction-formations in men's minds.¹

The primary task of culture, then, is to deal with aggression. Its survival depends on it. What is the source of this aggression? Freud carries two mutually incompatible theories along at the same time, in what amounts to an internal contradiction.

1. The Death Instinct: In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud had concluded that in addition to the life instinct, eros or libido, which he had formerly thought to comprise the whole of the instinctual energies, he must affirm the universality of the death instinct. He

¹Ibid., p. 86.
apparently arrived at this conclusion for two reasons, one biological and the other psychological. He felt that in addition to the instinct to preserve biological life there must be an opposing one which aims at the return to the antecedent inorganic state. This he had to affirm, since it was his conviction that every biological need or goal had its psychic components, and in one important sense the goal of biological life is death and dissolution. More important, however, Freud affirmed the death wish in order to explain the clinical observation that sexuality is closely related to sadism, the need to destroy the beloved, and masochism, the need to destroy oneself. Sexual impulses often seem to convert into aggressive aims. If the life-impulse, or libido, is essentially sexual, then the aggressive impulses which relate to sex would lead one logically to affirm the death-impulse, since the life impulse is here bent on destruction of life.

Whatever its genesis, the concept of the death wish led Freud to regard aggression as instinctual. Thus:

In all that follows I take up the standpoint that the tendency to aggression is an innate, independent, instinctual disposition in man, and I come back now to the statement that it constitutes the most powerful obstacle to culture.¹

¹Ibid., p. 102.
This instinct of aggression is the derivative and main representative of the death instinct we have found alongside of Eros, sharing his rule over the earth. And now, it seems to me, the meaning of the evolution of culture is no longer a riddle to me. It must present to us the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instincts of life and the instincts of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species.1

Freud agrees with Hobbes: Homo Homini Lupus. Man is to man a wolf. This eternal struggle of the individual with culture is for Freud a manifestation of the eternal struggle of man with himself. He needs to die and destroy as basically as he needs to live and love. This is the irremediable curse of his existence.

2. Aggression as Reactive: The second view of aggression, which Freud holds in indiscriminating tension with the first, is that aggression results when libido needs are thwarted. Aggression is a reaction against all deprivation which is not self-imposed. This view is the one expressed on page 21 above. Civilization presupposes non-gratification of many of our instinctual energies, and this cultural deprivation results in antagonism. Certainly this viewpoint would render more coherent Freud's analysis of culture as hostility-producing. It is this viewpoint, too,

1Ibid., p. 103.
which Freud relates most closely to guilt, as we shall see below. When the infant was first deprived of gratifications by the adult environment, aggressive impulses resulted; it is this reactive aggression which causes the ambivalence related to the Oedipal situation, and results ultimately in the self-directed hostilities of the guilt situation. ¹

Now, the choice of one of these theories of aggression over the others holds the most far-reaching implications for ethics. If aggression is a part of the congenital structure of the human personality, then a certain despairing pessimism enters our ethics, and we are led to build a repressive and authoritarian system to guard man from himself. If, on the other hand, aggression is a natural reaction to deprivation, we are led in the direction of a realistic optimism, and the building of a life-fulfilling climate wherein men are enabled and encouraged to seek the goals of their congenital tendencies.

At this point, however, it is important to relate this discussion to Freud's theories of guilt.

D. Whether aggression is a congenital inheritance or a reaction to deprivation, culture has to deal with it.

¹Ibid., pp. 114-ff.
If people were allowed to express it openly the civilization would degenerate, and men could no longer live to love. Civilization employs an ingenious means to control aggression.

The aggressiveness is introjected, 'internalized'; in fact, it is sent back where it came from, i.e. directed against the ego. It is there taken over by a part of the ego that distinguishes itself from the rest as a superego, and now, in the form of 'conscience', exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would have liked to enjoy against others. The tension between the strict super-ego and the subordinate ego we call the sense of guilt; it manifests itself as the need for punishment. Civilization therefore obtains the mastery over the dangerous love of aggression in individuals by enfeebling and disarming it and setting up an institution within their minds to keep watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.¹

Now, the process of introjecting aggressive tendencies, and the development of "conscience" or a sense of guilt has two phases:

1. There is no natural sense of good and evil; in fact, evil is most often that which would give the ego pleasure. We forego these pleasures because we fear the loss of love. Man is absolutely dependent on others, so the dread of losing love is a primal source of anxiety. Conscience in early stages, then, is social anxiety.

¹Ibid., p. 105.
Fear of loss of love is also fear of the aggressiveness of authority, since love is a protection against this aggressiveness. Very early in life, we learn to give up instinctual gratifications, to identify with authority, and hence to avert the threat of aggression. At this level of development renunciation diminishes threat.

2. Freud noted clinically, however, that in the guilt situations found in adult life deprivation does not diminish self-aggression. Those who are the most righteous in their instinctual renunciations are usually the most guilt-ridden. Similarly, when things go well with a man, conscience is lenient, but "when some calamity falls, he holds an inquisition within, discovers his sin, heightens the standards of his conscience, imposes abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances."\(^1\) Adverse circumstances is apparently a substitute for parental punishment, or so it appears to the clinician who observes the guilty person's reactions.

Now the situation is reversed; renunciation does not decrease guilt, but rather increases it. Freud describes this situation as that of a "strict super-ego"; the person-

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 110.
ality is attacking itself with aggression apparently generated from within. To explain this, Freud once again has recourse to two different theories, which he holds simultaneously.

a). When the infant was first restrained from gratifying its instinctual needs, severe aggressive impulses were generated by this thwarting. This aggression could not be exercised against the parents, its true object, for fear of a loss of love and reciprocal aggression. The result is that the aggression is forced back upon itself, and becomes a part of the personality, the super-ego. The super-ego attacks the ego, not because it deserves attack, but because it identifies with the parental figure, sides with it, and assumes its role. It is in its role as authority-surrogative that the ego is attacked. These passages illustrate this:

When authority prevented the child from enjoying the first but most important gratifications of all, aggressive impulses of considerable intensity must have been evoked in it,...By the process of identification it absorbs into itself the invulnerable authority, which then becomes the super-ego and comes into possession of all the aggressiveness which the child would gladly have exercised against it.¹

¹Ibid., p. 115.
The effect of instinctual renunciation on conscience then operated as follows: every impulse of aggression which we omit to gratify is taken over by the super-ego and goes to heighten its aggressiveness (against the ego.)

Here we see that Freud's theory of aggression as reaction is employed to explain guilt. The sequence would be as follows:

(1) Authority prevents instinctual gratifications, giving rise to aggressive impulses in the infant.

(2) These aggressive impulses cannot be vented on authority for fear of loss of love and reciprocal aggression.

(3) The infant identifies with authority, and in the role of authority-figure curbs its own gratifications. (The nature of this identification is not explained at this point.)

(4) The aggressive impulses are directed against the ego, but in its role as authority-surrogate.

b). Freud's second theory sees guilt as originating in the Oedipus complex, which means that it "was acquired when the father was killed by the association of the brothers." This Oedipal situation presupposes an inherent or

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1Ibid., p. 114. 2Ibid., p. 118.
primal will to destroy the father, source of ultimate authority and aggression from without, and to marry the mother, source of ultimate love. The prospect of killing the father, however, sets up remorse, which must root somewhere in the instinctoid structure of the personality:

This remorse was the result of the very earliest primal ambivalence of feelings towards the father: the sons hated him, but they loved him too; after their hate against him had been satisfied by their aggressive acts, their love came to expression in their remorse about the deed, set up the super-ego by identification with the father, gave it the father's power to punish as he would have done the aggression they had performed, and created the restrictions which should prevent a repetition of the deed.¹

At this point...we can last clearly perceive the part played by love in the origin of conscience and the fatal inevitableness of the sense of guilt. It is not really a decisive matter whether one has killed one's father or abstained from the deed; one must feel guilty in either case, for guilt is the expression of the conflict of ambivalence, the eternal struggle between Eros and the destructive or death instinct.²

Here the doctrine of aggression as instinctive has returned. In this case, the guilt sequence is as follows:

(1) The death instinct drives one to plot aggression against the father, ultimate source of external aggression.

¹Ibid., p. 120. ²Ibid., p. 121
The love instinct causes remorse at the thought, identification with the hated father, and the turning of aggression against oneself for threatening the love object.

Guilt remains as the eternal inner conflict between Eros and the death instinct, the mark of our tragic human fate.

E. It remains to point to two other aspects of guilt which Freud describes in his major social analysis. We have seen that guilt relates to aggression, which Freud says "civilization" turns back upon the individual in order to protect the social fabric. That aggression may relate either to instinctual deprivation or to the primal death wish. It becomes guilt as the individual identifies with the authority figure, introjects the role of authority, and directs the aggression against himself as authority-surrogate.

Now it is important to lift up two other aspects:

Guilt is a type of anxiety, and is largely unconscious.

At bottom the sense of guilt is nothing but a topographical variety of anxiety, and...in its later phases it coincides completely with the dread of the super-ego....Somewhere or other there is always anxiety hidden behind all symptoms....Consequently it is very likely that the sense of guilt produced by culture is not perceived as such and remains to a great extent unconscious, or comes to express-
ion as a sort of uneasiness or discontent for which other motivations are sought.¹

Here we see the nucleus of two insights which have become virtual axioms in counseling psychology: (1). Guilt is a species of anxiety. (2). We may suffer the effects of guilt without being consciously guilty, or even recognizing that guilt is in any way related to our anxiety. Both of these findings hold deep significance for ethics. If guilt is a form of anxiety, why does a person who feels guilty suffer from a self-initiated fear? What is the significance of this? If guilt is mainly unconscious, yet may be clearly seen by the skilled psychotherapist to affect the entire life style of the person, what does this say about conscience? May it be a more universal phenomenon than we would believe from merely verbal testimony? Does careful clinical analysis point to a universal base of values in terms of which persons may suffer guilt-anxiety? Even though guilt may be disguised and preconscious, might it not in many instances indicate that a person has made a judgment of his moral situation, which may be truer to reality than he can bring himself to admit verbally?

¹Ibid., p. 126.
These issues will be explored in succeeding chapters. Here it is important for us to look at the so-called "structural hypothesis", which will allow a closer scrutiny of the terms "super-ego", "anxiety", "identification", and "Oedipus complex", all of which have been associated with guilt in the discussion above.

II. The Structural Hypothesis.

To assist him in his clinical work among neurotics, Freud made three attempts to construct a model of the psychic mechanisms.¹ The first of these was an analogy only, and was abandoned. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud compared the mind to an optical instrument, with different functional parts reacting to sensory stimuli, producing consciousness, storing and reproducing memories, and other functions. Psychic energy flowed among these, energizing them as required, something as a nerve impulse is energized.

The second model was the famous division of mental functions in relation to consciousness. He distinguished three mental systems, Ucs. (unconscious), Pcs. (preconscious), and Cs. (conscious). Preconscious mental contents are those

which can be recalled by an effort of attention, and are forgotten when attention is withdrawn. Unconscious mental contents and processes are actively barred from consciousness by some force within the mind itself, and cannot be recalled at will. This theory is sometimes spoken of as the "topographic hypothesis."

The third model of the mind was fully formulated and described by Freud as The Ego and the Id, in 1923. This "structural hypothesis" was proposed to distinguish three groups of mental processes, which were functionally related to each other, but at the same time in some way functionally autonomous. Certain mental processes appeared to Freud to function together as a unity, sometimes in cooperation with others, and sometimes in opposition to them. He distinguished three such functional categories, and called them the id, the ego, and the super-ego. These must be explicated in some detail, for they allow us to understand the precise nature of Freud's impact on ethical attitudes today, and will provide the framework for our critique of his ethical posture.

A. The Id.

The id may be defined as the psychic representations or counterpart of somatic drives; those most primitive psychic functionings which are in direct contact with the
inherited biological functions of the human body. Freud summarized it as follows:

You must not expect me to tell you much that is new about the id, except its name. It is the obscure inaccessible part of our personality; the little we know about it we have learnt from the study of dream-work and the formation of neurotic symptoms, and most of that is of a negative character, and can only be described as being all that the ego is not. We can come nearer to the id with images, and call it a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement. We suppose that it is somewhere in direct contact with somatic processes, and takes over from them instinctual needs and gives them mental expression... These instincts fill it with energy, but it has no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle. The laws of logic--above all, the law of contradiction--do not hold for processes in the id. Contradictory impulses exist side by side without neutralizing each other or drawing apart; at most they combine in compromise formations under the overpowering economic pressures towards discharging their energy... In the id there is nothing corresponding to the idea of time, no recognition of the passage of time, and... no alteration of mental processes by the passage of time.... Naturally, the id knows no values, no good and evil, no morality... Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge,--that, in our view, is all that the id contains.¹

The above statement speaks for itself, but it remains for us to explicate two central ideas, first the "plea-

sure-principle", and then the prelogical means of id functioning, which Freud calls elsewhere the "primary process." ¹

1. The **pleasure-principle** is the principle operative in all id functions. When the tension level of the organism is raised, that tension is discharged immediately, if possible. Tension is uncomfortable--release is pleasurable. The one goal of the primitive organism is escape from the uncomfortable tensions of somatic need.

2. The **primary process** has come to have a dual meaning in contemporary psychoanalysis.² It may refer to what is called "primary process thinking", which is the type of thinking characteristic of the infant or one whose ego is immature, or a person who has regressed under emotional strain. This is prelogical, picture or image thinking, using symbols and analogies. We shall discuss this in fuller detail later.

This development of the term apparently grew from Freud's original usage, building on his dream work. As it relates to the id, the term "primary process" referred to the manner in which the id may affect pleasurable release in the

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absence of the desired object. It hallucinates the desired object, and wishes for it. A wish is the ideational representation of a somatic impulse.¹ This process enables the primitive organism to "know" what it is seeking, to initiate activity toward it, and to recognize it when it is found. Before the development of the capacity to postpone instinctive needs, it may serve temporarily to allay discomfort. That is, the hallucination itself may suffice until tension reaches a certain level and seeking activity is made urgent.

B. The Ego.

A full discussion of the ego would involve us in virtually the entire Freudian system. Here we are content to characterize it generally, and to point to distinctive concepts which relate to its functioning. It will be discussed later, as we discuss the evaluative function generally, and in our critical comments below. We point to these quotations as typical:

We...recognize in man a psychical organization which is interpolated between his sensory stimuli and perception of his bodily needs on the one hand, and his motor activity on the other; and which mediates between them with a certain purpose. We call this organization his "I" (Ego).²


The Ego was developed out of the cortical layer of the id, which being adapted for the reception and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact with the external world. Its psychological function consists in raising the processes in the id to a higher dynamic level (perhaps by transforming freely mobile into bound energy, such as corresponds to the preconscious condition); its constructive function consists in interposing, between the demand made by an instinct and the action that satisfies it, an intellective activity which, after considering the present state of things and weighing up earlier experiences, endeavors by means of experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the proposed line of conduct.¹

The ego, then, is the organized, executive aspect of the mind. It is a part of the id; it seeks to forward the pleasurable energy releases of the id; it utilizes the energy of the id; and it is never fully independent of the id. It seeks to fulfill id-requirements by mediating between these "truly private" psychic needs and external reality, and as we shall see later, between these needs and super-ego demands.

¹Secondary process: Originally, this term, as contrasted to the "primary process", referred to the binding and mobilization of psychic energy, or the process by which freely mobile energy, as it is often called in psychoanalysis, is converted into "bound" energy. The tendency of the id, in fact its only capacity, taken in the abstract, is to

¹Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary..., p. 64.
discharge the "cathexis" or energy quantum as it arises. This immediate gratification may, of course, prove dangerous to the organism; survival depends upon the capacity to delay discharge until a suitable object comes along.

The ego, according to Freud, utilizes and diverts id energy (libido) for the purpose of control. All libido is "narcissistic" at first, or is withdrawn by the ego from the primitive instinct-system, and is invested in, or "cathects" external objects only after much evaluation. The id is so controlled as the ego utilizes this energy against it, or "reality testing" is made possible. Given time and energy, the ego formulates a plan to satisfy a need, and tests it by action to see if it will work. It tests the "wishes" or hallucinatory images suggested by the primary process, to see whether in fact an object exists in nature which can fulfill the wish, and whether this is the most propitious time and place to do so. In contemporary psychoanalysis, when this skill is adequate, the person is said to have a "good sense of reality."\(^1\) One aspect of this is the capacity to know precisely where "self" and "not self" shade into one another, or to have "firm ego boundaries."

\(^1\)Cf. Ibid., pp. 54-ff.
It is important to note that virtually every functional aspect of the person's existence is conceived by Freud to be an ego function. The id is the psychic counterpart for the somatic system, which in one sense is the instrument of the ego, or the resisting and facilitating medium for its organizing activities. Thus motor control, sensory perception, memory, affects, and creative thought are all ego functions, and are all employed to test reality in order to gauge its pleasure-affording possibilities.¹

We note especially that all affects, or the entire emotional life is an ego function. Their dynamic force comes from the id, but their qualitative form registers on the ego. The term "libido", then, or the basic id-energy, must be regarded as a high abstraction. Freud continued to speak of it in sexual terms, even after affirming its extra-sexual nature. Certainly if all emotions are ego functions, the associations of tender love or violent lust which surround the term "libido" have to be abandoned. Similarly, if we follow Freud's later theory and affirm the "death wish", then the aggressive emotions he read into it must be carefully abstracted. Another implication of this is that anxiety

¹Cf. Ibid., pp. 59, 63-81.
becomes an emotion which is intimately related to the creative, synthesizing thought functions. This will be developed below as a central criticism of Freud's moral position. One wonders, too, how much meaning is still retained in the "pleasure principle" as a primary process or id function. Discharge of an energy quantum is said to give pleasure, but this pleasure is an affect, and cannot even be recognized as such or evaluated for its quality and intensity apart from the organizing thought functions of the ego. Any reference to the "pleasure principle" which is used to make Freud a hedonist must certainly be modified by this qualification. When Freud says, "The power of the id expresses the true purpose of the individual organism's life,"¹ we must read it to mean not that pleasure is the goal of living, but that discharge of energy is the goal of living. Freud continues throughout his writings to read more affect into the id than he is consistently allowed to do.

2. Ego defenses: Reality never affords the organism sufficient opportunities for energy discharge. For this reason, the ego is constantly in the position of being beset by more id energy than it knows how to handle. It cannot

¹Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary..., p. 91.
neutralize it all. It has to defend itself, at the cost of energies which might have been used in more productive causes.

Freud discussed several means of defense which the ego employs, and Anna Freud systematized these in her classic work, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*. It is important for us to discuss these here, first because they permeate every school of psychotherapy, and second because they relate to anxiety, and guilt is a form of anxiety. In addition, they enable us to observe the complex range of evaluative ego functions which occur below the level of awareness and conscious control. Freud thought of these defensive devices as pathological. The ego ideally tests, judges, and evaluates reality in order to meet the id wishes; when it is on the defensive, however, it distorts reality.

Before discussing individual defensive devices, it is important to see how they relate to anxiety. The ego is not defending itself against a threat from the outside world, but against anxiety arising from the threat of id-impulses. According to Brenner, Freud developed two theories of anxiety. His original theory was that it was a "damming up and inade-

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quate discharge of libido.\textsuperscript{1} Whenever libido accumulated, because external circumstances or personal inhibitions prevented its discharge, this quantum of energy became transformed into anxiety. Freud's second theory of anxiety appeared in his monograph entitled \textit{The Problem of Anxiety}, in 1926. Here he proposed that anxiety be conceived as related to traumatic situations, or situations in which "the psyche is overwhelmed by an influx of stimuli which is too great for it either to master or to discharge."\textsuperscript{2} For the infant, whose ego is not sufficiently developed to hold the drive-related wishes in abeyance, anxiety is a constant threat, since these wishes may at any time overwhelm the infant psyche with a flood of stimuli. While traumatic situations may arise from the environment (such as the birth experience, for instance), the real problem is the pressing demand of the id. Now, there is a \textit{second} part to this theory which is important to us. The child learns to anticipate a traumatic situation, and to react to it with what Freud called "signal anxiety." The ego \textit{produces} this anxiety in order to mobilize its forces to defend against an overwhelm-

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 76. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 78.
ing flood of uncontrollable stimuli from the id. We will see below some of the implications of this theory for ethics. If guilt is a type of signal anxiety, which functions to warn the person of a situation which is evaluated as threatening, and threatening precisely because it may overwhelm the judgmental capacity, then guilt is cognitive through and through. This hints at the possibility of developing an ethic of the rational conscience.

A second preliminary consideration of some interest is this: Ego defenses function below the level of awareness. A person is rarely conscious either of having adjudged his situation as threatening, or of choosing a defensive device to guard against the resulting anxiety. In fact, the anxiety itself may be felt only if the defense is in serious danger of collapse. This means, then, that highly complex evaluations are made continually without conscious control, but which are nevertheless cognitive in nature, in the sense that they include a direct acquaintance with the hidden data of one's psyche, and a weighing of the strength of opposing inner forces. They include a complex evaluation of the interpersonal situation, too, since it is in terms of the expectations of others that the threatened controls are exercised. This line of reasoning will continue to be the
major theme of this dissertation, and will lead us to affirm that the presence of signal anxiety in the form of guilt and shame indicates that the person is aware at an organismic level of a threat situation which is moral in nature.

We need here only briefly to mention and define the various defense mechanisms. The significance of these for ethics will become more apparent later, especially after the discussion of Sullivan's thought. The fact that the presence of anxiety, including guilt-anxiety, may be revealed only by the presence of these defensive reactions, holds interesting implications for an ethic of conscience.

a) Repression: Repression is the most general means of defense; in fact, some writers use it as a synonym for all of the defense mechanisms, or point out that all defense presupposes repression. Repression is an ego activity which bars from consciousness an unwanted id impulse, or a memory, emotion, or desire relating to it. It is important to see this as a dynamic act of the ego, or an "anticathexis", and that the repressed material often retains a cathexis of drive energy. Another distinction will become important to us, too: repression involves not only a barring from consciousness, but a barring from the ego, as well. Freud wrote that undue repression diminishes the ego, reduces its strength and
effectiveness, and may even violate its integrity. He continued, however, to speak of repression as a forced forgetting only, as though resistance to awareness were the decisive feature of repression. White shows that repression entails the attempted isolation of the unwanted material from evaluation of any kind, conscious or unconscious, and reveals the way in which this isolation leads to "incubation", or the exaggerated significance which comes to be placed on the isolated material.¹ This is an important distinction for us. Since most evaluation takes place below the threshold of awareness, the repression which is most significant is that which bars material from ego consideration as a whole.

b) Reaction Formation and Projection: Hall and Lindzey discuss these together,² because in the former the object of a repressed feeling remains the same while the affective state changes, and in the latter the affective state remains constant but the object of the feeling is shifted.


In reaction formation one of a pair of ambivalent attitudes, such as love-hate, is repressed, while the other is overemphasized. Thus love may appear to be replaced by hate—"I love you" becomes "I hate you", or if, more typically, hatred is the anxiety-producing feeling, it may be repressed and love be expressed. Whenever an attitude seems to be unrealistic and excessive, the therapist may suspect that it is a defense against its opposite. Brenner points out that identification, which we saw plays an important role in the introjection of guilt, may be related to reaction formation. Thus when a two-year-old is told to "love baby", when he really hates baby, he "loves baby" in a special way. "He acts as though he himself were the mother and imitates her in his actions and attitude toward baby. In other words, he unconsciously identifies with mother." ¹ As we discuss the super-ego, we may note that Freud could be right—that moral standards which are introjected on the basis of identification with an authority figure may be in some sense pathological when carried over into adult life. They may be noted for their rigid and brittle quality; they are not correlated dynamically to the adult situation.

¹Ibid., p. 97.
Now, where reaction formation fails, projection may be a second-layer defense. The unwanted impulse or wish may be attributed to someone else, or even to a physical object. The person seeks to "disown" it, by distorting reality in such a way that he perceives its presence in others in an exaggerated manner. Extensive projection is regarded as a serious matter in psychotherapy precisely for this reason: to the extent that he projects the person loses the capacity to test reality adequately, and thus to correct his condition.

c) Isolation: Freud defined a mechanism which he called "isolation of affect,"\(^1\) or the separation of an anxiety-laden situation from the emotions which might be expected to accompany it. The situation may be recalled, but the emotion is repressed. This may relate to the "un-real" feelings which anxiety-laden persons often mention. They suffer from a generalized dissociation of events from the fine shadings of emotion which normally accompany them.

Another kind of isolation Freud discussed in The Problem of Anxiety.\(^2\) This is isolation of a thought from

\(^1\) Cf. Ibid., p. 98.

\(^2\) Cf. Ibid., p. 99; also Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary... p. 102.
the associational connections within the mind. An anxiety-laden thought is isolated from the depth evaluative processes, because of the possibility that an attempt to integrate it into those processes may flood the personality with panic. White defines neurosis in these terms, and in doing so throws the evaluative process into sharp focus. Thus he says:

The nuclear neurotic process takes its start when serious threat is present and when conditions are just right to freeze some of the defenses. Because they are staving off anxiety these defenses cannot be relaxed, but they prevent reappraisal of the threat and new action in regard to it.1

Normally, following an anxiety-laden experience, one may find some way to renew contact with the threat under controlled conditions, reappraise its character, and take new action to cope with it. All of this involves new learning. If anxiety is too high, however, it may block or distort the learning process by repressing the functions which relate to adaptation. This isolation of a situation from the evaluative processes does not pacify the anxiety, however; in fact, "incubation" may set in, or the isolation itself may cause the person to distort its significance, to experience new anxiety, and to build new layers of defense

1White, Abnormal Personality..., p. 234.
against it. Neurotic breakdown comes when these successive layers of defense begin to crack. Therapy involves the building of a relationship which will allow the person to reevaluate, under more favorable conditions, the emotional situations he could not handle in childhood. While isolation may begin in adulthood, neuroses typically spring from deeply buried childhood situations.

d) Denial and Undoing: In the mechanism of denial, an external situation which gives rise to anxiety is distorted in character, or its anxiety-creating aspects are denied. Perception is distorted by selective attention to the more benign aspects of the situation; or the person reacts to a fantasy which he formulates to take the place of the reality situation. In formulating this fantasy he distorts the real situation only to the extent of falsifying the significance of its specifically anxiety-carrying details.

Undoing involves a similar process, except that here the person engages in compulsive or obsessional activities to remake the situation which arouses anxiety. In this case a person feels that his wishes, such as sexual or hostile ones, for instance, have caused harm or damaged a relationship to others, or perhaps even caused measurable harm to
another person. The situation undergoes a distortion simi-
lar to that of denial--one "reads into" it the harm he
imagines he has caused. Hence his repeated efforts to
rectify the situation are always just out of focus, and
appear to be irrational to one looking on. They are out
of focus precisely because they are directed toward one's
distorted perceptual formulation of the actual situation.

The significance of these mechanisms in building a
self-system will become apparent when we discuss Sullivan's
work.

e) **Self-aggression:** The "turning against oneself"
which was seen as a vital aspect of guilt-related behavior
is in essence a defense mechanism. As Brenner shows, it
relates closely to identification, introjection, and incor-
poration, all terms which refer to a shifting of roles in
fantasy. A person who wishes to aggress against another
may identify with the object, and direct the aggression
against himself in the fantasied role of the object. Accord-
ing to Freud, as we will see in the discussion of the super-
ego, guilt always involves self-aggression, following identi-

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1 Cf. p. 28 above.

fication with an authority-figure.

C. The Super-Ego.

In the light of this discussion of ego defenses, we can now view Freud's theory of the super-ego as it relates to the id and the ego. Apparently the term "conscience", and indeed the entire area of morality, was subsumed under the super-ego in Freud's writings. The contemporary psychoanalyst, Edward Bergler, refers to an early Freudian theory of the ego ideal, which he says was submerged in the later theory of the super-ego.\(^1\) Our own study has failed to turn up any such theory of the ego-ideal. Fodor and Gaynor in their Dictionary of Freudian Terms list the term "Ego Ideal", but refer the reader to "Super-ego"; but none of the references under the latter heading make further mention of the ego ideal.\(^2\) Apparently Freud used the term "ego-ideal" in The Ego and the Id, but abandoned it in later writings.\(^3\)

For Bergler, the term "Ego Ideal" does not have the connotations it has come to have in recent psychotherapy. For him it is the "internalized educator". In order to


\(^2\) Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary..., pp. 68 and 179-81.

retain childlike megalomania and exaggerated narcissism, the child introjects the educator, or authority-figure, and hence takes to himself the fancied omnipotence of this external power. The ego ideal is "an unconscious glorified picture" of oneself. It retains elements of megalomania, introjected parental demands, projected aggressiveness, and narcissism. This is far different from the ego ideal as a creative construct, an immanent organismic conception of one's potential, which undergoes evaluative revision as self-insight increases and situations change, which conception remains foreign to Freud's thought. We will discuss it later in the sections on the work of the interpersonal psychiatrists. In Bergler's theory, and in orthodox psychoanalysis generally, "ego ideal" is virtually synonymous with the Freudian super-ego. Bergler adds to Freud's super-ego only the concept of the "Daimonion", which is the death wish as it functions in a guilt situation to attack the ego masochistically. In so far as Bergler is representative, it appears that orthodox psychoanalysis remains today precisely where Freud left it, and the analysis of Freud's super-ego is sufficient for an understanding of guilt in contemporary psychoanalysis.

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1 Bergler, The Battle of Conscience..., pp. 2-3.
1. The Oedipus Complex: It was noted above that in Freud's theory the super-ego and the Oedipus complex are closely related. Freud makes the statement: "The super-ego is in fact the heir to the Oedipus complex and only arises after that complex has been disposed of."\(^1\) It is well known that Freud believed the period of life from about two to six years, the so-called Oedipal phase, to be crucial for personality development. He noted clinically that neurotic patients revealed fantasies of incest with the parent of the opposite sex and jealousy and rage toward the parent of the same sex, stemming from this period of early development.

Brenner shows that these early concepts of Freud have been broadened somewhat in contemporary psychoanalysis to include the entire range of ambivalent feelings toward the love objects within the child's family. Inverse, or negative Oedipal wishes have been noted, which include "fantasies of incest with the parent of the same sex and murderous wishes toward the parent of the opposite sex."\(^2\) Hence, the Oedipus complex involved ambivalent attitudes of

\(^1\)Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary..., p. 181.

love and hate toward both parents, and even toward siblings. This development in psychoanalysis would seem to open the door to the broader interpretations of Horney, wherein the sexual fantasies are seen as symbolic of the broad range of love, and the murderous fantasies as expressions of the jealousies which accompany rivalry.

It is apparent that the intense feelings of love and hate, possession and jealousy, which accompany the child's early experiences within the family, will be hard to live with. The hostile feelings will conflict with the child's own need to love and be loved, and to depend upon the parent. Expression of these hostile feelings, the child soon learns, leads to retaliation and possible loss of love. Freud was convinced that castration is a major fear for boys, and the primary motivation for abandoning the Oedipus situation.¹ To love the mother and hate the father is to risk the father's wrath, and he might retaliate by emasculating his son, or removing his penis. Freud felt that for the girl penis envy, or the jealous feelings of inferiority which she feels at realization of her lack of a penis, lead her into the Oedipal situation, and the will to take her mother's place with her

¹ Cf. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, as quoted in Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary..., p. 131.
father. He apparently felt that girls abandon the Oedipal situation only late in life, and that "the formation of the super-ego must suffer in these circumstances."\(^1\) Freud apparently questioned the strength of a woman's conscience. This would not be surprising in the light of his general attitude toward the inferior qualities of women. Contemporary psychoanalysis more typically points to fear of genital injury and penetration by the father, which leads the girl to abandon the strong feelings associated with the Oedipal situation.

2. **Identification:** The super-ego is formed as the Oedipal situation is abandoned, and inherits its primitive strength and its specific content. The key word for Freud was "anti-cathexis", as Freud saw it. Delay in discharge, then, to allow evaluation, is effected at the cost of energy; the ego-process is one aspect of a thoroughly dynamic system. Secondary process opposes primary process in never-ending tension.

Freud would explain repression and ego resistance as he confronted them in therapy in terms of this energy system. The ego bars from consciousness, or allows only in disguised

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 131.
form, the instinctive energy-quantum which demands release. The primary purpose here is to allow more propitious discharge later, but a related purpose may be to bar completely all instinctual impulses which absolutely endanger the person, such as incest and sibling destruction, for instance.

One aspect of this process Freud called "neutralization of drive energy." Drive energy which would ordinarily discharge immediately becomes available for the purpose of the ego. Its original character as sexual energy, or aggressive energy, is altered radically. In contemporary psychoanalysis this is spoken of as "desexualization." Neurosis or psychosis always involves regression, and the "deneutralization" of this energy. In this sense, the capacity to bind energy, or the "tension-binding" capacity, is required for all evaluative processes. This process actually results, according to Freud, in the diminishing or the weakening of the id. Drive energy is lost with the development of the ego.

3. **The Reality Principle:** To the extent that the secondary process is successful, and the ego "cathects" sufficient id energy to operate adequately, the reality principle comes into effect, or "reality identification." Thus:

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The super-ego arises...from an identification with the father regarded as a model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even a sublimation.¹

The child abandons and represses the incestuous and murderous wishes toward his parents, in part by identifying with them, or internalizing them. The internalized images of the moral and prohibitive aspects of his parents becomes the child's defense against his sexual and aggressive impulses.

It is important to understand the nature of this identification. Freud thought of it as a primitive function, characteristic of the early stages of ego development. It is pathological in adult life, and signals a maldevelopment. The "as if" personalities, or those who change their personalities like a chameleon to conform to the character of those with whom they happen to identify, illustrate this abnormality. To identify with a loved object is to become like him, or to internalize an unresolved or unevaluated image of the other person. In this sense, the introjected image remains in a real sense foreign to the personality, an unassimilated body of material which influences the rest of

¹Freud, The Ego and the Id..., p. 80.
the personality, but is cut off from the evaluative processes of reality testing.

The essence of the super-ego remains the Oedipal situation. Conscience is always out of touch with reality in Freud's theory. It rules the ego from a foreign base. It reflects an obsolete situation which for the most part is no longer relevant. For this reason guilt is always somewhat irrational. It creates anxieties which are out of all proportion to the actual offense, and which have very little to do with one's present situation. Remnants of childish omnipotence cling to it; we punish ourselves for thought as well as deed, in a childish way which confuses the two. The introjected parental image never undergoes modification or reevaluation; it has been internalized by a primitive process very similar to that which operates in mob psychology. Freud's work on the subrational identifications with authority images which result in mob action illustrates very clearly that he conceived conscience to be a pre-rational process. The major thrust of our criticism of Freud's work will be directed at this aspect of his thought.

4. **Id and Super-ego:** The subrationality of conscience as Freud views it is further illustrated by his comparison of the id to the super-ego. Freud means to affirm that the
super-ego is as primitive in function as the id.

In spite of their fundamental difference, the id and the superego have one thing in common: they both represent the influences of the past (the id the influence of heredity, the superego essentially the influence of what is taken over from other people), whereas the ego is principally determined by the individual's own experience, that is to say, by accidental and current events.¹

We should note that the parental images which are introjected to form the child's super-ego are the *super-egos* of the parents. The super-ego of the parent, in turn, was introjected from that of the grandparent. This would mean, then, that the super-ego as a body of moral demands is a racial inheritance, as the id-impulses constitute a biological inheritance. If we take seriously Freud's statements that the id-impulses define the purpose of living, and if we note that his therapeutic goal with neurotics was to aid in their liberation from the strictures of the super-ego, then the object of life is to be sufficiently free of one part of the nonrational given to allow indulgence of the other part.

The rational processes of the ego are defensive and constructive tools to gain this end. Looked at from this perspective, morality appears to have been something of an evolutionary

blunder, similar to the heavy armor of the dinosaur. We would be able to fulfill the libidinal purpose of life far more happily without it.

This is even more apparent if we consider the violent charge of emotion which continues to accompany this racial baggage, transmitted from generation to generation via the Oedipal situation. Freud often said that the super-ego had its roots in the id. He meant by this that the aggressive energies which are self-directed in the guilt experience derive from the primitive death wish, or from the deprivation-hostilities aroused as one parent becomes a rival for the love of the other parent, whichever of these two Freudian view-points we consider normative. The object-cathexes, or the libidinal energies driving the incestuous wishes of the child, are diverted following the breakdown of the Oedipal situation. They search for new objects, but finding none they return to the ego, becoming narcissistic energies, and driving the identification process of the super-ego. The aggressive energies become self-directed with this same introjection, and are now poised to attack the ego in the name of the introjected parental image. The

greater the severity of the child's original hatred of his parents or siblings, the greater the self-aggression of his later conscience, except in the case of the psychopath.

To Freud, and to contemporary psychoanalysis, if Bergler is representative, guilt is always associated with the sadistic-masochistic phenomena. Freud noted the exaggerated need for expiation and self-punishment which characterize neurotic persons, and in his analysis of criminal character as well. The "fate-neurosis", or the proneness of some persons to accidents and calamities is explained by him in terms of the super-ego. The violence of the self-directed aggression is out of all proportion to any actual offense. It is in no sense a reasonable correlate to present experience, but is rather the hatred which the child would have vented on the parental rivals during the Oedipal situation.

Both in content and in affect, then, the super-ego is irrational. It has a profound effect upon the ego, observing, criticizing, and prohibiting its aims, but the ego has no effect upon it. It is completely isolated from the evaluative or thought functions of the mature personality, and unaffected by the learning processes of experience. In content it is a part of the primitive history of the race,
and in affect it is the violent emotion surrounding sexual conquest and hatred of the rival.

III. The Evaluative Function.

One strong trend in recent psychoanalysis has been an increasing emphasis upon the evaluative functions. This is often spoken of in the literature as a trend toward ego theory, or ego psychology. Perception and cognition have been central to the studies of academic psychologists, but foreign to psychoanalytic thinking. Freud thought of the ego as subordinate to the id, and characteristically in a defensive role in relation to the id.

Hall and Lindzey describe the recent trend, and give us some of the important names in this development:

The direction is away from studies of the defensive functions of the ego to studies of the synthetic (Nunberg, 1931), integrative (French, 1952), organizing (Hartmann, 1950), mastering (Hendrick, 1943), and multiple (Waelder, 1936) functions of the ego.¹

Included in this movement is the trend toward thinking of the ego as functionally autonomous, and conceiving its function as a constructive, adjustive, rational one rather

than primarily a defensive one. For Freud defense always in some sense distorts the real situation, or relates to an obsolete one, and therefore is less than rational. It is interesting to note that Freud could not have made this judgment without assuming a working criterion of rationality, effective at least in his own thinking.

Else Frenkel-Brunswik states that it was Hartmann's work which first established the relative independence of perception, learning, and thinking from the instinctual processes.1 Hartmann called upon psychoanalysts to recognize the "secondary autonomy" of ego functions. The ego, having developed functions such as objectivation, anticipation, thought, and action, has "achieved a more or less reliable synthesis, or integration, or organization, of its own functions and of the whole of psychic personality."2 Ego interests and achievements may exert an "appeal" or "attraction" to its genetic or id determinants. To the extent that the personality is relatively free of ego-id con-

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flicts, or sexual and aggressive threats to personal autonomy, the ego functions with a great deal of independence.

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to trace this development further. It is informative to see, though, that Hartmann excludes consideration of super-ego functions from his discussion.\(^1\) In the Freud Anniversary Lecture Series at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in 1960, however, Hartmann applies some of this same reasoning to moral functions. He reaffirms Freud's position that "ontogenetically early tendencies survive in the superego" in varying proportions, and that "regressive trends force individual morality on the way of sexualization, back to the object relations of the oedipal phase, out of which they originated," as in masochism, for instance.\(^2\) However, morality may relate to social reality; one task of therapy is to discover the relative "autonomy" of morality, or the extent to which it relates dependably to the social scene, rather than to inner pressures.

Hartmann agrees that there is a long development of moral values, or a "transvaluation" which takes place in the


individual. On the long road from internalization of parental demands following the Oedipal breakdown, to the moral codes of the adult, a new process becomes decisive. What is this process? "That is a process of generalization, of formalization, and of integration of moral values."¹ This, he says, is not a super-ego function, but an ego function. Every system of moral values contains elements which correspond to the pressures from the super-ego, and other elements which "are in constant interaction with the social structure and cultural values in which the individual lives."² The adaptive and integrative functions of the ego work to maintain a balanced and dynamic effectiveness of moral valuation. Superego restrictions still play a part, but they are correlated to ego functions.

In addition to moral pretenses, then, there may be moral motivations which are independent or autonomous functions in the personality. Moral aims may be an integral part of oneself, a way of "being at one with oneself" in moral action. "One comes to realize that self-knowledge includes not only the recognition of one's own person as a valuating agent, but also of imperatives as one's own."³ In addition to the instinctual drives and their aims in the id, and the

¹Ibid., p. 30. ²Ibid., p. 31. ³Ibid., p. 41.
aims and functions of the ego, Hartmann is ready to admit that there may be moral imperatives, or acts of moral valuation of imperial character which are "dynamically relevant, often decisive, aspects of personality." If these codes become fixed ends, they may be adjudged to be super-ego functions, but if they are correlated with our critical faculties, they are dynamically significant in our personalities. While we have no means to judge a moral value "true" or "false", Hartmann says, there may be said to be an "authentic" quality in moral values, in so far as they express the integrated dynamics of the moral personality. Integration involves a continuing scrutiny, or value testing, which Hartmann says must be a function of the ego.

So far as this writer can discover, Hartmann's recent work is the lone chink in the armor of contemporary psychoanalysis. Aside from this, psychoanalysts have followed Freud's lead in excluding the super-ego from an interactive relationship with the evaluative ego, and in denying that there is any moral content to the personality apart from the super-ego. Money-Kyrle differentiates a conscience of love from a conscience of Oedipal fears, but reaffirms Freud's

1Ibid., p. 41. 2Ibid., p. 51.
stand that all true guilt is conflict with an introjected parental figure. Conscience remains, then, in contemporary psychoanalysis a genetically-determined structure which diverts the ego, but over which the ego has only a defensive control. Guilt is in no sense a correlate of the creative processes of reality-testing. Unless we can find a way to answer the psychoanalysts at this point, we are barred from developing an ethic of the rational conscience.

We shall, therefore, attempt in this section to show that evaluative functions play a larger role in Freud's theory than he was willing to admit, and that on his own terms he should have seen guilt as a functional correlate to reality-testing. These conclusions will be developed even more fully in the critical comments which conclude this chapter.

A. The Ego as Evaluative.

The basal function of the ego is that of evaluation. This becomes fully apparent in the terms which Freud uses to describe the function of the ego in the personality:

The ego is an organization; it is dependent on the free intercommunication of, and the possibility of reciprocal interplay between, all its constituent

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elements; its desexualized energy still gives evidence of its origin in its striving for union and unification, and this compulsion to synthesis increases in direct proportion to the strength which the ego attains.¹

The ego, then, is an "organization" characterized by "free intercommunication" among its elements, and by a "striving for union." It is a "compulsion to synthesis."

In other places he speaks of the ego as fulfilling its task of self-preservation by "avoiding excessive stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation), and, finally, by learning to bring about appropriate modifications in the external world to its own advantage."²

The words "adaptation" and "appropriate" indicate the essentially cognitive nature of the functions which Freud is describing.

The ego-id relations reveal the same cognitive nature of the ego functions. The ego weighs the external situation to discover the most favorable and appropriate occasions for the expression of id-impulses. Here very clearly the id-

¹Freud, The Problem of Anxiety, as quoted in Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary..., p. 62.

²Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary..., p. 63.
impulses are an instrumentality for the well-being of the entire organism, and their suppression or expression is correlated to extremely complex evaluative judgments as to the nature of the environment and the strength of the instinctual drives. Thus, Freud says that the ego's "constructive function consists in interposing, between the demands made by an instinct and the action that satisfies it, an intellective activity."\(^1\) How does this intellective activity work? It "considers the present state of things and weighing up earlier experiences, endeavors by means of experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the proposed line of conduct."\(^2\) Is it too much to suggest here that the ego as described is the seat of morality, rather than the super-ego? So far as morality is utilitarian in nature this would certainly be true. Even this concession on Freud's part would allow him to affirm a morality with more adaptive flexibility than the compulsively rigid super-ego.

We note in this connection that signal anxiety is closely correlated with this "intelective" function.\(^3\) Anxiety signals the presence of a situation which demands cognitive attention; but it can do so only if cognition has already

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 64. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 64.  
done sufficient work to recognize a possible threat when it sees one. It is our contention that guilt-anxiety relates closely to the reality-testing or evaluative ego functions; in this sense conscience is functionally rational.

Freud was never willing to speak of the ego-functions as rational. He assumed the rationalist definition of rationality, in which reason is confined to conscious deliberations of an unimpassioned sort. Freud wanted to show that these evaluative processes are mainly unconscious, and that they are thoroughly dynamic. Thought involves the entire energy-system of the organism, and is intimately related to conation, or the aims and strivings of the total person. We can point this out most clearly as we discuss Freud's work in dreams and wit.

B. Dreams as Evaluative.

Freud himself felt that his most important work was The Interpretation of Dreams. He commented in the foreword to Brill's translation of this work that the most valuable of all his discoveries were contained here.\(^1\) His major insight in this work was that the manifest content of dreams disguises the latent content. This manifest content is a

psychic fiction which seeks to bar the latent content from entering awareness and disturbing sleep. The latent content is composed of unfulfilled wishes which the self has repressed because of their immoral or shameful meaning. This transformation of latent to manifest content indicates that a great deal of unconscious mental work has been going on. Freud called this dream work. It is on the nature of this unconscious psychic functioning that we dwell here.

Freud warns us that the interpretation of dreams confronts us with an "entirely novel task", since "the dream-content appears to us as a translation of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, whose symbols and laws of composition we must learn by comparing the original with the translation."¹ The dream confronts us with the task of translating into the ordinary language of logical syntax the dream-symbols, which have been rearranged along the order of another type of logic. Dream work does not proceed along the lines of secondary process thinking, but of primary process thinking.² This means that visual symbols rather than verbal symbols become the primary mode of expression. The usual time relationships, before and after, past, present,

¹Freud, Interpretation of Dreams..., p. 319.
²cf. p. 38 above.
and future, are ignored. Opposites coexist beside each other, and negatives may represent positives. Freud says that the dream's use of abnormality, of contradiction, and of representation through the opposite, has "cost it the dignity of a psychic product", and has caused us to assume the determinants in dream-formation are "collapse of mental activity, cessation of criticism, morality, and logic."¹ Such is not the case, however—an intellective activity is revealed at work in dreams. (It is instructive to note that in the statement above Freud slipped, and spoke of morality as though it were related to logic.) Freud describes some characteristic methods employed in dream construction:

1. **Condensation:** Freud comments that a dream which can be written in half a page requires "six, eight, twelve times as much space" to analyze.² The elements, or dream-thoughts with which the formative function works, are put together in an order wherein "those elements that receive the strongest and completest support stand out in relief."³ Freud likens this to election by scrutin du liste. This means that

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³ Ibid., p. 324.
some function has considered a complex welter of repressed wishes, or dream thoughts, has evaluated them according to an immanent purpose, and has condensed, reshaped, and ordered them, discarding some, and working the remainder into a dramatic scene.

The construction of composite persons is a characteristic method of condensation. Several persons may be portrayed by one person, or one person may become a collective image with contradictory features. Words may undergo the same transposing process, being recombined into bizarre formations, as a child will do in play. Words are treated as objects and arranged in artificial syntaxes.

What are the marks of this process? "We perceive, as peculiarities of the condensing process, a selection of those elements which occur several times over in the dream-content, the formation of new unities, and...the production of common means."\(^1\) Here we see at work the evaluative function as we have defined it in the first chapter of this dissertation. We note (1) the employment of value-charged symbols, visual or verbal, (2) the evaluation of those symbols according to their meanings (psychic value) for the self,

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 330.
and (3) the creative arrangement of those symbols into new constructs which allow the portrayal of meanings in their dynamic or dramatic context. Freud concentrates only on the defensive aspect of this process, as we shall see later. If he had stressed also the positive aspect of this function, and correlated it with guilt-anxiety in one dynamic system, he would have formed the theoretical framework for an ethic of the rational conscience.

2. Displacement: One defensive device is to distort the dream thoughts by rearranging, or displacing psychic intensity. Here we find in Freud's work a concept of the greatest significance to ethical theory. He says that in the normal process of life, when we note that a particular emphasis is given to an idea in our consciousness, "we are wont to regard this as proof that a peculiar psychic value (a certain degree of interest) attaches to the victorious idea."¹ We note that psychic intensity here reveals the measure of psychic value given to a symbol or an idea. By psychic value Freud clearly intends the meaning or significance of an idea to the person. An idea which is evaluated as broadly significant is invested with a great deal of

¹Ibid., p. 337.
psychic intensity, which attracts continuing or repeated attention and a top priority rating in intrapsychic discourse. It is this psychic intensity which is displaced or transferred in the dream, if it is of such strength as to threaten the ego. Thus a person may dream of an event which in waking life would arouse horror. The dream is complete in detail, but the horror is not felt.

The preconscious thought processes, then, are at work in dreams and in waking life, assigning relative value to symbolic content, whether sensory or intrapsychic. Interest follows significance, according to Freud, and this significance is defined by evaluative functionings. What is the implied criterion of evaluation here? The self, its survival and fulfillment, is the implied core which defines the scale of values. Perhaps this is what Freud means when he says: "Dreams are absolutely egoistic."\(^1\) Whether this type of egoism is compatible with altruism and community we will discuss in another chapter.

3. **Regard for Representability**: By this third method Freud means the exchange of verbal symbols for pictorial ones in the dream work. "Displacement usually occurs in such a

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 349.
way that a colourless and abstract expression of the dream-
thought is exchanged for one that is pictorial and concrete.¹
He does not look upon this as a means to express the inex-
pressible, but as a defensive device to escape censorship.
For this reason he calls it a displacement.

Freud describes this work as very similar to the
creative activity of the poet. There is a "distributive and
selective influence" at work.² Visual images here function
as concepts; hence cutting a cake with a knife can substitute
for "getting to the bottom of things." Freud likens this
process to that employed in the pun, in proverbs, and in
myths and legends. It is important to see here that when a
visual image is substituted for an abstract concept, the
evaluative complexity of the concept is not lost. Rather,
the opposite may be the case; at least this is our intent
when we accompany a concept with gestures and facial express-
ions in conversation.

Freud inherits the rationalistic tendency to depre-
ciate the worth of the visual symbol as an expressive device,
at least as compared with the verbal concept in a logical
syntax. For this reason defense rather than expression is

¹Ibid., p. 361. ²Ibid., p. 362.
the only function he will allow the visual image to play in dreams. Such pictorial representation is regarded as a regression from secondary-process thinking. It never occurred to Freud that perhaps the visual image is used in dreams because it is a far superior medium than the word to portray a complex situation to the inner psyche. We might ponder whether the visual image of a dramatic situation is not a more basic and far superior means of expression than the abstract concept. It is certainly more plastic, and can express much finer nuances and shades of meaning. Even more important, its elements are portrayed with their dynamic interrelationships still intact.

Perhaps in interpersonal relationships the artistic-dramatic form of expression is alone adequate to portray the complexities of varying situations. If we accept this view, then logical syntax and verbal concepts are a specialized tool to perform certain highly differentiated tasks, especially those relating to the manipulation of physical objects and communication in the context of object-relations. Words are supportive, and play a secondary role. The more basic and more extensive means of intra- and interpersonal communication is that of aesthetics—the unifying of content into artistic-dramatic portrayals, which are largely preverbal.
4. **Secondary Elaboration:** Here we see the other side of Freud coming to the fore—a *suspicion* of secondary, or logico-verbal processes, and a probing for the truer situation in the preverbal milieu. Whenever he sees a dream which is faultlessly logical and correct, Freud says, he suspects a second-level elaboration, which may be internally consistent, but which probably falsifies the entire intent of the original dream-thought. In a sense, the dream has already been interpreted before we awaken. The whole dream may be discredited, as a last-ditch defense against too frank a portrayal of one's hidden wishes. Thus we say, "After all, it's only a dream," and this robs it of its cognitive authority.

Freud suspects that *all* logical relationships among the elements of a dream are a defensive cover-up. In interpreting a dream, then, the analyst must first break it into its simple elements, the individual symbols which it contains, and then rearrange them into a new coherence which more adequately portrays the latent situation. Only the material content, not the formal arrangement of a dream is of interest to the analyst.

C. Wit as Evaluative.

Before discussing the implications of Freud's dream
analysis and developing the critical trend we hinted above, it might be well to integrate his work on wit. In the formation of wit, Freud sees at work the same process of condensation and displacement of psychic accent. The purpose of wit, however, is not solely ego-defense, as is the case with the dream. Wit has two purposes, which reduce finally to one, the gaining of pleasure. The pleasure gained is of two types, however--gratification of id-impulses and the pleasure of the intellective activity itself. This makes a large chink in Freud's biological determinism, as well as in his hedonism. In wit we can see pleasure being taken in the evaluative functions themselves--ego needs may motivate activity as well as id needs. Contemporary psychoanalysts have scarcely begun to assimilate the implications of this.

1. **Tendency Wit:** Freud classifies obscene wit and cynical wit under the general title of tendency wit. The purpose of such wit is to gratify id-impulses, whether sexual (eros), or hostile (thanatos). "It makes possible the gratification of a craving (lewd or hostile) despite a hindrance which stands in the way; it eludes the hindrance, and so derives pleasure from a source that has been inaccessible."1

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What is the nature of this hindrance? A high degree of culture and education which decreases our tolerance of unveiled sexual matters or hostile expression.

Cynical wit is of the type which reproaches "our system of morality for knowing only how to make claims upon us without reimbursing us."¹ Thus cynical wit attacks the moral precepts surrounding the family, since "no demand is more personal than that made upon sexual freedom, and nowhere has civilization attempted to exert a more stringent suppression than in the realm of sexuality."²

We note here that the intent of wit is to outwit the censor. Who is the censor? The self-conception, or ego-ideal. Freud everywhere assumes this, but nowhere mentions it. This is seen especially in Freud's statement that wit was used in one instance as a weapon of disguised aggression because "a man of culture could not defend himself in the same manner as a common, ill-bred person would have done and as his inner feelings must have prompted him to do."³ What is the censor's weapon? Guilt-anxiety. We seek to avoid the anxiety which would accompany an "out of character" activity by expressing sexual or hostile wishes in character.

¹Ibid., p. 703. ²Ibid., p. 704. ³Ibid., p. 699.
Here guilt-anxiety is seen as accompanying an intrapersonal threat to the ego-ideal. This ego-ideal is so intimately involved with the evaluative processes that it requires a device of unusual creative ingenuity to trespass upon it without paying the price of guilt-anxiety. Wit is such an ingenious device. In using it, a person who might have been condemned for his crudity is admired for his brilliant repartee, or at least may admire himself.

When Freud is talking about wit, he integrates guilt-anxiety, the evaluative function, and ego-ideal into one dynamic or functional system, which is precisely the thesis which this paper defends. Freud even allows himself to speak of this as related to morality, as we saw in the quotations immediately above.

2. Harmless Wit: Freud calls wit harmless if its pleasure is gained from the evaluative functioning itself. He accounts for this by the concept of "economy of psychic expenditure."¹ In witticisms we direct the psychic focus upon the sound instead of the sense of the word, giving it a meaning it does not have in its ordinary relations to reality. This relieves us from some psychic work, he says, since we

¹Ibid., p. 713.
usually assign meanings to words at the cost of a great deal of exertion to discover their relations to reality. Thus, he says:

It is quite obvious that it is easier and more convenient to turn away from a definite trend of thought than to stick to it; it is easier to mix up different things than to distinguish them; and it is particularly easier to travel over modes of reasoning unsanctioned by logic; finally in connecting words or thoughts it is especially easy to overlook the fact that such connections should result in sense.¹

Wit gives us pleasure, then, because it saves us a lot of work. One wonders whether Freud did not hint at a much more satisfactory explanation when he says "Aristotle recognized in the joy of rediscovery the basis of artistic pleasure."² Here the pleasure we receive from wit is the delight we take in a work of art. The "economy" admired here is the capacity to portray highly complex relationships in the simplest of forms. The pleasure one takes in the harmony and poetic economy of an art-form is not in the work it saves us, but in recognition of a Gestalt. There is relief in a cognitive task portrayed as completed. Delight is taken in art and wit because the creator has portrayed a complex situation so simply that we grasp its aesthetic form,

¹Ibid., p. 717. ²Ibid., p. 714.
and this conveys the meaning or essence of the situation. Relief from effort does not provide the pleasure, but makes possible, or allows the pleasure. The ordinary citizen can "see at a glance" the essence expressed and take delight in it, whereas the same "moment of truth" portrayed in abstract concepts might have required a logician to appreciate it. The sudden apprehension of a meaning seems to afford us pleasure, whether we understand all of its implications or not.

Freud says: "The most conspicuous factor in the jest is the gratification it affords by making possible that which reason forbids."¹ We would point out that it is reason, or creative evaluation in its functional sense, rather than its formal sense as a system of conventional logic, which affords the pleasure of a witticism. In wit we circumvent the logico-verbal strictures on reason to enjoy an artistic Gestalt created by reason as evaluative function, or else we take delight in a facile or ingenious display of this evaluative function itself.

Here we see in Freud hints of Maslow's later insights. Cognition itself is a source of high value in human life.

¹Ibid., p. 720.
The universal need for cognitive completion offers real pleasure when fulfilled. On the negative side, we may discover that failure to achieve a unified life style of artistic excellence or cognitive worth may be a major source of guilt-and shame-anxiety among mature persons. The restlessness and even despair which follow a poor vocational choice would be a case in point.

D. Some Implications of the Above Discussion.

There are implications in Freud's work on dreams and wit which may prove to be of the highest significance for theoretical ethics, and perhaps for epistemology generally. We are indebted to Philip Rieff for pointing up some of these issues.¹

1. According to Freud, creative imagination is the typical functional mode of preconscious evaluation. Freud likened dream work to the work of a poet or an artist. In fact, the only difference between a dream and a work of art is that a work of art is a system of shareable meanings, whereas the dream resists communication with others. The purpose of the artist is to communicate, the dreamer to distort and conceal for defensive purposes. Dreams are distortions, then,

or forgeries. Both art and dreams are creative productions, and in that sense fictions for Freud.

Aside from this difference in communicative intent, dreams and works of art are similar. What is the distinctive aspect of both art on the one hand, and dreams and wit on the other?

The dream, even though...not designed to be understood, has a purposiveness and complexity which indicate a degree of immanent meaning not contained in the nonsense word or accidental number; the work of art carries such immanent meaning to an even higher degree; although in no case is the aesthetic production completely meaningful without the capstone of interpretation.¹

There is coherence with an immanent meaning involved in all preconscious evaluation, as in all art. Behind the contradictory elements of the dream Freud always sought to find the immanent meaning which had been distorted or disguised. It is interesting to contrast two types of reasoning, and Freud's uses of them: 1. First, Freud was always suspicious of intellective, or consistent logico-verbal reasoning in his patients. He saw in the famous case of Dora, for instance, the manner in which brilliant logic could be employed by a patient to distort the real nature of a situation. As Rieff puts it, Freud "by-passed the patient's

¹Ibid., p. 124.
insights into her environment as part of the misleading obvious; he suspected her reasonableness as an ideological instrument of her neurosis."¹ Logical reasoning may take the form of "intellectual opposition" to the deeper coherence which is the truth of one's real situation, as a brilliant lawyer might use logic to confirm a lie. ii. Second, Freud sought to discover in dreams and in free association hints as to the deeper and more coherent self-evaluations which the patients' logic might be distorting. Freud always assumed the fullest possible coherence among all psychic events. Here is reason behind reason, and Freud believed the patient to be fully rational—that in some sense the patient already knew his true condition, and could disguise it to avoid anxiety, or communicate it when, through dreaming or free associations, the defensive restrictions were relaxed. iii. Third, in therapy Freud felt it important to interpret for the patient in logico-verbal structure what the patient already knew at the deeper organismic levels. This is what Freud means when he says the dream is "only a substitute for a rational process of thought"; it must always be "interpreted—that is to say, translated into a rational

¹Ibid., p. 82.
process."¹ Here he equates reason with logico-verbal discourse, exclusive of the deeper evaluative processes. The logical reasoning which he suspected in others he made the tool of therapy when used by himself. It was not logic which Freud opposed so much as premature logic, and defensive logic. Logic used as a device to avoid awareness of those hidden streams of evaluation Freud opposed; but logic used to clarify and enhance awareness of the deeper currents he espoused. Dora's skilled ratiocinations were a clear case of preemption of the logical ideal, or the premature ordering of psychic clues into conventional logico-verbal syntax, in such a way as to hide rather than to reveal the coherent truth of her preconscious evaluations. Freud the artist had to reconstruct the deeper truth which Dora the artist already knew—then Freud the logician had to communicate that deeper truth which Dora the logician had disguised from herself.

2. The meaning of any mental process is defined in terms of "the intention which it serves and its place in a mental sequence."² Thus, we interpret a psychic event as

¹ In Ibid., p. 126.

² Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, as quoted in Ibid., p. 127.
we would interpret a statement in a dramatic production—its meaning includes not only the logical relations among its terms, but the intent of the statement within the dynamic development of the drama. For Freud, even an act of forgetting or a mistake in speaking is the final term in a series, or in a pattern of emotional antagonism and development. We must grasp the nature of this dramatic struggle before we can understand the true meaning of the psychic act.

Freud sometimes carried this principle out to an apparent absurdity. He always assumed the maximum purposiveness in every mental act. He presumed that everything mental can be explained in terms of the utility which motivates it. He allowed no room for accident, fallibility, or, as Rieff says, for "default of motive" in mental acts. His famous interpretation of numbers chosen by chance, and the way in which any such random choice could be analyzed into hidden motives, is an illustration of this. Freud was a thorough-going determinist in this sense. He assumed, not a physical determinism, but a psychic determinism of dynamic teleological interaction, which excluded all chance in the realm of the mental.

Whether or not we push it to the extreme which Freud
did, his conviction that we do not have the meaning of a communication until we have its intent and motivational context has become a working principle in psychotherapy today, and is of high importance to ethics. Rieff expresses it in this way:

Thought is notoriously richer, more various, less distinct than words—especially those mental experiences most highly prized by psychoanalysis, the recollection of dreams and of the events of early childhood.¹

As Freud saw, any verbal statement however consistent logically, may convey a complexity of meaning which a purely logical analysis will miss. (1) Its manifest meaning may contradict its intentional meaning. "I respect you" may actually convey the meaning "I despise you, but am afraid to admit it." "I do not feel guilty" may be a verbal screen to disguise the presence of guilt. (2) Every verbal communication represents a decision, and bears the marks of the process leading to decision. What we do communicate remains dynamically related to what we decided not to communicate. This will be made more clear as we discuss point 3 below. (3) Every verbal communication is accompanied by shadings of tone, by facial expressions, body posture, and gestures

¹Tbid., p. 77.
which convey a wealth of meaning far more complex than verbal analysis would reveal. These expressive media may enhance and amplify the verbal meaning, or may distort or even contradict it, as we saw above. At any rate, the central point is clear—we do not have the meaning of any communication, whether it is interpersonal or intrapersonal, unless we understand its motivational intent. Conation is inseparable from cognition.

Related to this is Freud's insight that affective intensity varies with psychic value. Interest, as revealed by the recurring appearance of a psychic theme in a dream or in unstructured conversation, or in the place of eminence given a symbol in a psychic construct, follows the significance for the person which such a theme or symbol holds. Feeling always has its reasons. To Freud, bizarre or unusual psychic intensity attached to an idea indicates an intrapsychic realm of value within which this feeling-idea relationship has coherent meaning. The attachment of feeling to a proposition is never a purely arbitrary matter, then, as the emotivists would contend in their ethical theories. It relates to a complex evaluative process, and is presumed to be coherent within a system of value-judgments, however difficult it may be to discover the nature of that system.
At any rate, the meaning of a feeling, as well as the meaning of an idea, is its functional significance within a self-system.

3. Thought is thoroughly dynamic, and abstraction of an idea from this dynamic context distorts its full meaning. As Rieff says, Freud employs a "dramaturgic" interpretation of all psychic events. Every idea comes to the surface of consciousness bearing the marks of its creation. It was shaped in the crucible of climax and crisis, of antagonism and tension.

Primary process thinking holds opposites in dynamic tension, in the same way in which primitive languages use the same word for opposites, such as weak-strong, young-old. Every word, then, and every idea, has a dual emotional valence. It communicates not only itself, but the fact that its complementary other has been suppressed. What is on the surface both reveals and disguises the total developmental process. Every denial masks an affirmation, which has either disappointed the expectation of its truth, or if true is adjudged to be better left unsaid.

Thus, Freud knew that "sexual distaste, like other forms of rejection, may be a dishonest emotion, a defensive
tactic of conscience against desire.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 80.} What Freud apparently did not realize is that the opposite may also be true—that sexual preoccupation and expression may cover deep feelings of sexual inadequacy. Boastful statements of sexual exploits would convey to the trained therapist sexual weakness, rather than sexual strength.

Now, we may react to the manifest logico-verbal content of a statement, or to its hidden motivation as revealed in its feeling-tone. While it may be true of logic or mathematics that the manifest content of the symbols is decisive, in \textit{morality} we cannot even begin to understand what is communicated unless we also understand the deeper motivational nuances conveyed. This would be true of all interpersonal relationships. Whether or not conation and cognition always go together, they certainly do here. When we convey an idea, we always communicate ourselves, in a positive or negative sense—in what the idea reveals about us or conceals about us. Any idea, however universal its manifest or conventional meaning, must have been worked into the fabric of inner meanings which makes up our psychic life, before it can be communicated to others.
IV. Critical Comments.

These critical comments will express our conviction that the genius of Freud pointed to the major elements in an adequate theory of the rational conscience, but that his own failure to understand what he had done led psychoanalysis along an unfortunate path.

A. First, Freud did not correlate guilt with the evaluative processes, even though so many aspects of his thought assumed such a correlation. The Freudian system leads logically to the affirmation that guilt is a functional correlate to evaluation, yet it defines guilt as a nonrational given. Freud affirmed a one-way correlation between guilt and evaluation. Guilt is a primitive given which distorts evaluation. We wish to affirm that guilt presupposes evaluation, varies with subtle changes in evaluative activities, and stimulates evaluation. The rigid super-ego and the resulting ego-defense are a special class of the same activities, only now operating under specific handicaps, just as limping is a type of walking. There are several facets to this critical comment:

1. Identification presupposes evaluation. We saw above that the super-ego is formed as the Oedipal situation
is abandoned.¹ The process involved is identification, or the introjection of the parental super-ego. An internalized image of the prohibitive aspects of the parental character functions in the child's personality both as a model and as a restrictive factor. Brenner pointed out that reaction formation is involved, or the suppression of one pole of an ambivalent attitude, and the intensification of the pole which closely approximates the parental attitude. The child, then, "loves baby" as if he were the mother, imitating the love-related behavior of the mother. Similarly, he slaps his hands to punish himself for a transgression precisely as the parents might have done if they had been present.

This involves, then, a shifting of roles; the child reacts with self-directed hostility in his role as authority-surrogate. Freud thought of this process as a nonrational, intuitive grasping, almost akin to a digestive assimilation. Contemporary psychoanalysts often associate it with the child's oral wish to bite and ingest the parent, as in breast-feeding. We would point out that even intuitive activity involves complex evaluative formulations, on Freud's own terms. It would include the formation of fantasies, or symbolic sub-

¹Cf. p. 1 above.
stitutes for the significant objects. These would be corre-
related to perceptual memories of past parental behavior,
as they in turn are correlated to memories of one's own
reactions to that behavior. These would lead to the con-
struction of role-conceptions, which however intuitively
they may be grasped are yet highly complex cognitive con-
structs. Only after this process is relatively complete
is the child in a position to shift roles, first in fantasy
and then in behavior. The child-hates-baby role is per-
ceived to be dangerous; the capacity to play a child-loves-
baby role, is actuated by imitation of the parent-loves-baby-
role, with its appropriate attitudes and action-patterns.
We would point out that the parent-loves-baby role is itself
a cognitive construct of the child, more or less accurate,
depending upon his perceptual and imaginative capacity.
Freud himself pointed out that it is the parent as the child
sees him who is imitated.

We see that identification involves several dimen-
sions of evaluation: (1) The judgment that it is expedient
to change roles presupposes the child's very realistic analy-
sis of his situation. His shifting of roles indicates that
he has decided under the circumstances to change his ways
by the best means available. Here is the point: At the
time he shifts roles it is a very reasonable thing to do;
only the carrying of this new role beyond its applicable limits, into late adolescence, for instance, is unreasonable. Even that, paradoxically, must have its reasons.

(2) Defining and adopting a parental role requires the complex assessment of typical parental attitudes and reactions under specific situations. We assume that this parental image ordinarily undergoes continuing experiential variation and enrichment. If, however, the parent is too intensely feared by the child, or does not communicate adequately, either because of indifference, absence, or emotional disturbance, then growth in evaluation becomes impossible. The child must employ the best parental image he can formulate under the circumstances. His imaginative formulation of the parental image continues, but without the corrective influence of perceptual reorientation. The distorted parental image which the child develops under conditions of poor communication does not indicate a distortion of his imaginative capacity, but the continuation of that capacity without adequate perceptual reference. (3) The parental reactions must be adjudged to be more fitting or at least more expedient than the child's own, in certain circumstances. This judgment presupposes a careful weighing of the only experiential alternatives the child has,
his own typical reactions and his parents' typical reactions. Other possible alternatives will be integrated into this evaluative hierarchy as the child's experience broadens and his imaginative capacity grows.

2. Guilt is an ego-function. Freud saw guilt as a form of anxiety; but anxiety is an affect, and all affects are ego-functions, at least in their qualitative form, and the essential characteristic of the ego is evaluation. Freud sometimes speaks of "id anxiety", but the meaning of this was simply that the flood of stimuli which threatens to overwhelm the psyche originates in the id. The felt anxiety caused by these threatening stimuli has its locus in the ego.

As we saw, Freud correlated emotions to ego-functions. Every emotion, including anxiety, has its reasons. If Freud perceived an emotion to be exaggerated and unrealistic, he sought a coherent system in the psyche which would explain this exaggeration. Freud assumed that all emotion is reasonable; we need only discover the motivational system within which it is a fitting expression. In fact, a major goal of Freud's motivational analyses was the discovery of the meaning of feelings which his patients expressed. Freud was never content until he could discover "Why do you feel this way?"
Also, Freud often made the statement that guilt is the major factor in all neuroses. Therapy was mainly the discovery of good and sufficient reasons for this guilt, or explanation and communication to the patient of the motivational system within which guilt of this type and intensity has coherent meaning. In therapy Freud assumed that guilt is a functional correlate of evaluation.

It is important to see, too, that signal anxiety is produced by the ego because of its judgment of internal threat. Such a judgment would involve: (1) Recognition that internal stimuli are reaching a point of intensity which may force a certain activity. This involves experiential factors, or memories of past situations of a similar nature. It would also involve imaginative fantasy-building, or the anticipatory extension of a perceived trend in impulse intensity, as one might extend the curve on a graph. (2) Recognition that activity which may be forced is threatening to the personality. It may be seen to endanger interpersonal relationships, and this involves a careful analysis and understanding of those relationships. It may threaten the coherent organization of the personality, which Adler calls the "life style"; but recognition of this involves judgments of extreme complexity. Freud bears testimony to
this in his work on tendency wit, as we saw above. A person disguises the crude intent of his communication because it does not fit his ego-image of himself as a cultured person. (3) The formulation of defensive devices which will be adequate to the task at hand. This will involve imaginative fantasy-building, either in dreaming or day-dreaming, or the inner portrayal of dramatic scenes which will allow the careful assessment of alternative possibilities. It may involve tentative experimental actions, guided in process by clues to the reactions of others and the rise and fall of inner anxiety.

It is easy to see here that signal anxiety is produced by the anticipatory evaluations of the ego, fluctuates in intensity with the adjudged immediacy and extent of the threat, stimulates the evaluative processes, and guides evaluation as defensive activities are formulated. Guilt is signal anxiety, as Freud defined it. This means, then, that guilt is a dynamic correlate to evaluation.

3. Ego-defenses presuppose evaluation. This was demonstrated above, when we saw that identification and reaction formation involve cognitive assessment of one's total situation and its meaning. Introjection of the parental role is in no sense an arbitrary or fortuitous move--Freud saw it
as the only reasonable alternative the child has available to replace the violent involvements surrounding the Oedipal situation. Now we should direct attention to two other ego-defenses which are closely related to guilt: self-aggression and repression.

a) Self-aggression: "Turning against oneself" is an ego-defense, as Brenner showed.¹ We should point out first that all aggression is an affect, and hence an ego-function. Aggression defined as thanatos, or the Death Wish, is not widely accepted in current psychoanalysis. We saw above that if Freud is consistent in assigning all affect to the ego, then libido reduces to the need to discharge energy.² In the same way, thanatos would reduce to the need to discharge energy; any further qualification would involve reading into it qualitative distinctions which presuppose complex evaluations. Freud's second theory, that hostility is reactive, is widely supported today, especially by researches in social psychology. Studies by Miller and others of the frustration-aggression hypothesis reveal this.³

² Gf.p. 42 above.
Aggression seen as a congenital inheritance reduces to the universal capacity to react aggressively to the frustration of one's self-expression—or, we may add, to potential frustration as anticipated by the hostile gestures of others. Aggression is a response to need frustration, then, rather than a need.

It is important to see that exercise of that capacity involves evaluative activity. Sibling and parental jealousies presuppose complex judgments as to the realities of one's family situation. It is for this reason alone that abnormalities in early family relationships can take their toll on later adjustment, as Freud well knew. The child knows far more about the reality of his interpersonal situation than he can say. It is a truism in family counseling that a child's emotional disturbance may reflect parental attitudes of which the parents themselves are not aware. The child "knows" organismically that he is involved in a family situation within which defensive hostility is a fitting expression, even though only a trained counselor may be able to understand consciously the interpersonal factors which warrant the child's aggression. Now, if conditions are such that these early family hostilities cannot undergo developmental reconstruction, a sadistic-masochistic regress-
ion may occur in later life. The adult may react to his associates as though he were trying compulsively to relive and resolve the early family scene, and his reactions will appear unrealistic. In the setting wherein they were originally developed, however, they were fully realistic, and demonstrated evaluative adequacy which only a trained counselor might be able fully to appreciate. It is in the light of its primal intent that we should judge a function, not in the darkness of a pathological distortion of it.

Now, how do these hostilities come to be directed against the self, as in the typical guilt situation? As we saw above, Freud explained all self-directed hostility as an identification, or introjection of the role of the disciplinarian. We noted in the first critical comment above that even such a shift of roles presupposes complex evaluative activities, since a role is a cognitive construct, and choice of one over the other must involve a judgment of their relative value-standing.

We might advance here a possible alternative theory. If hostility is a reaction to frustration, might not self-hostility be a reaction to myself as thwarting agent? Freud's earlier theory of guilt as fear of loss of love might relate here. I evaluate my situation as one wherein I may cause
loss of the loved objects' support and approval. My hosti­
ility is then a reaction to my own role as possible agent of
deprivation, rather than an introjection of the parental
role. In the same way, we may be angry with ourselves be­
cause of our inadequacy to handle a specific situation.
Thus we say: "What a fool I am" after making a mistake
which might have been avoided by more careful attention to
the cognitive requirements of our task. The judgment might
be justified, and the self-hostility accompanying it nothing
but fitting. Here the chain of events leading to guilt
would be: Self-perception of my cognitive inadequacy--
self-directed hostility toward myself as thwarting agent--
guilt-anxiety a reaction both to self-hostility and to fear
of my inadequacy (shame-anxiety, as we will see later.)

b) Repression: We saw above, in discussing ego-
defenses, that the ego is defending itself against anxiety,
and the source of this anxiety is one's own id-impulses.
That is, anticipatory fantasy gives rise to signal anxiety,
as one perceives himself becoming enticed by objects which
if taken will involve him in a situation of threat, in which
the full flood of panic might be released upon him. Repress-
ion is a defensive device whereby the forbidden impulse is
not allowed entry into the network of evaluative associations.
One might speculate that it is denied this involvement because its psychic value, or the intensity of interest which it commands is so great that if one allowed it to enter the realm of anticipatory fantasy it would divert behavior into forbidden channels. "I don't dare to think about that too much" would be the verbal counterpart.

Now, what is the nature of the repressed material? Why does it threaten? Freud revealed in his discussion of dreams that guilt-related material is most likely to be repressed. His theory of guilt restricts this material to the residual remains of the Oedipal situation. It has undergone little change since age six, and hence is a nonrational given which continually threatens to elude the censor and regress the person's interpersonal behavior to that which is appropriate to a six-year-old. When Freud discusses wit, however, he very clearly assumes that a self-system or ego-ideal is involved in guilt. This ego-ideal is related to one's contemporary situation, including the expectations of others and the self-conceived role one plays among them. Hence, one allows himself to feel hostility, and to express hostility, only in a manner which befits one of his position. Material which cannot be worked into this schema is repressed, or disowned by some other defensive
means—failure to do so results in guilt-anxiety. This clearly shows that guilt-anxiety is anxiety arising from a threatened disruption of one's self-conception, or style of life. The self-hostility arising in conjunction with it would relate to dissatisfaction with one's cognitive or adjusive incapacity.

Freud's interpretation of art shows even more clearly that repression and guilt relate to the evaluative processes. Art is confessional for Freud. It is a "secondary mode of confession, or psychic unburdening."¹ All intellective activity which is not rigidly restricted by logico-mathematical requirements is dynamically correlated with guilt. That is, wherever a person is allowed to think imaginatively, whether in dreams, wit, or art, his constructs reveal an intimate and sensitive correlation with his own self-evaluations, and these evaluations in turn are closely correlated to his contemporary situation. We begin to see that whenever a person feels free to express himself, or reveal himself—whether in free associations, dreams, wit, or art—he appears as a self-evaluating creature of marked moral sensi-

¹Rieff, Freud: The Mind..., p. 132.
his attitudes and actions in the light of his own potential and the expectations of others, is evaluating himself, and struggling within himself, with guilt-anxiety to guide him on the left and the cognitive requirements of his ideal self on the right.

B. Second, Freud distorts the functional significance of the preconscious evaluative processes, or "primary process" thinking. He thinks of it as a wholly defensive function, which distorts and falsifies reality.

1. One reason for this is that "reality" to Freud is no more than id impulses seeking gratification, and challenged in their quest by the vagaries of environment and the restrictions of the super-ego. Evaluative processes must be seen, then, as means to outwit either the unpredictable environment or the cunning censor. The ego has one motive only—to find a way for id-gratification. Sometimes that quest leads directly into action, but at other times it must take the tortuous route of defensive diplomacy. Creativity, whether in art or dreaming, is always defensive. It distorts the reality of id-needs in order to pacify the reality of super-ego anxieties.

Freud's basic principle that the meaning of any mental act must be discovered in its motivational intent may
stand. The difficulty here is his genetic reductionism. He finds that the vast richness of all symbolism is motivated by very few instinctual needs: sex, death, parental relations. Only in his discussion of wit does he see that one may be motivated to find pleasure in the evaluative process itself, and its creative fruits. Freud portrayed the dramatic struggle which ensues with marked intensity at the deeper levels of the human spirit, but failed to see that the artistic expression and witnessing of this drama may itself be a motive. The way in which youth are drawn like moths to the place of dramatic intensity should convince us of this. A popular balladeer, a rock-and-roll artist, a modern playwright who can express the climax and crisis, the tragedy and comedy of youth's love-related dilemmas, will find a ready audience. Such fantasy has a pull precisely because it expresses reality—the reality of our deeper struggles. Here fantasy is expressive, and we are motivated to enjoy and to express the essences portrayed in drama.

2. Second, Freud was ambivalent toward the role of fantasy in life. The core function of the primary process is to create psychic representatives of the objects which could gratify id-impulses. A wish is the psychic counterpart
of a somatic need, and this includes a hallucination, or a symbol of the object longed for. It is this primal fantasy which sustains seeking activity in the absence of the object, offers psychic clues as to where it may be found, and allows recognition of the object when it is discovered. The intent of fantasy here is clearly positive, or constructive. It is a necessary correlate to coping activities. Its function is to aid in accomplishment of a task, and this task is permeated with cognitive requirements. It may not be too much to suggest that such a fantasy is a cognitive construct, and will be influenced by perceptual memories, which in turn are correlated to gratification-memories. It would seem that all anticipatory activity would require the imaginative creation of fantasy-symbols which are psychic coordinates to perceptual objects.

Now, when we reach the level of dreams, wit, and art, Freud has forgotten this functional intent of symbolism. To the work of the imagination at its complex levels Freud applies the terms "distortion", "projection", "displacement", "condensation", to show that the imagination distorts reality and conceals its true content. Might not the ultimate purpose of this complex fantasy be similar to that of the simpler wish-fantasies, however? Ruth Berkeley hints at this when
she describes the work of Theodor Reik on the defining of sex roles:

Reik confirms for me that fantasy is the bridge--between personalities of such opposite qualities as the masculine and the feminine--which permits passage from a condition of aloneness to sharing-in-love. He describes the daydream of a young man as anticipatory fantasies of the woman's surrender and images of how she will behave....It is less the image of the desired body than the words and gestures, the behavior of the loved woman, which these excited fantasies call up.¹

The function of such fantasy is to prepare for potential future activity. It is constructive in its intent. This is important, too: it correlates with the past experience and present situation of the daydreamer. The sexual fantasies of a girl in her early teens may not include intercourse, which is beyond her experience and outside the realm of her realistic hopes. The imaginative self-portrayal of interpersonal situations, then, is a means to effective interpersonal functioning, and is dynamically interrelated with it. It is evaluative through and through. By means of it a person is able to turn a situation over and over in his mind, weigh its significant elements and discover

its hidden facets, and thus spare himself the cognitive confusion of unexpected situations. Here fantasy has, in addition to the expressive function, a coping, or reality testing function.
CHAPTER III
SHAME AND THE EVALUATIVE FUNCTION IN CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

This chapter will be given to the study of the work of Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan, three psychotherapists who have been variously described as "social" or "interpersonal" psychiatrists. Freud's conceptual model is ordinarily the person in troubled isolation; these thinkers study persons as they struggle with the demands made upon them by others and as their character is shaped by cultural influences.

In this context guilt ceases to be a primary subject of inquiry, and various problems with "inferiority feelings" or anxieties surrounding the threat of humiliation in the sight of other persons, or loss of personal integrity in a repressive environment, come into prominence. These anxieties are seen to be closely related to Piers's definition of shame.

The thesis defended in this chapter is that shame-anxiety is systemically coordinated with a self-system which is defined and maintained by means of subconscious evaluative processes, with an immanent standard of self-perfection or self-realization which is also defined in part by depth evaluation, and with an inherent need for productive interpersonal relationships.
I. Alfred Adler.

A. Shame-Anxiety and Inferiority Feelings.

The term "inferiority feelings" occurs again and again in Adler's writings. The question arises whether inferiority feelings can be equated with shame-anxiety. Gerhart Piers says that Franz Alexander was the first psychoanalyst who differentiated clearly between guilt- and shame-anxiety, and he called the latter "inferiority feelings."² If this equation can be drawn, then there is reason to believe that Adler's influence in psychology is a primary source of insight into shame-anxiety. The defenses against shame which Alexander says we employ; that is, increased hostile aggression, depreciative competition, and fantasies of superiority, strongly suggest Adler's influence.² Since Freud confuses guilt and shame, and equates shame with sexual aversion arising from repressive toilet training, Adler is surely one of the early pioneers in studying the phenomena associated with shame-anxiety.


²Ibid., p. 8.
This is true, that is, provided that Adler's term "inferiority feelings" is analogous to "shame-anxiety". To determine this it is important to recall the definition of shame-anxiety with which we began in the Introduction, as Piers defines it.

1. Gerhart Piers accepts an essentially Freudian view of guilt. Guilt is generated by the Super-Ego, or the punitive parent image. Its source of dread is fear of castration, and its law of operation the primitive Law of Talion. Guilt arises out of a conflict between Ego and Super-Ego. **Shame**, on the other hand, arises from a conflict between Ego and Ego-Ideal. This real difference is described thus:

Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary (set by the Super-Ego) is touched or transgressed, shame occurs when a goal (presented by the Ego-Ideal) is not being reached. It thus indicates a real 'shortcoming'. Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression; shame, failure.¹

This Ego-Ideal relates in part to the social role which a person assumes in relation to his peer group and sibling group. In addition, it reflects an "unconscious and conscious awareness of the Ego's potentialities."² The fear behind shame is not fear of hatred and mutilation, as

¹**Ibid.**, p. 11.   ²**Ibid.**, p. 15.
in guilt, but fear of contempt, which on a deeper level of the unconscious "spells fear of abandonment, the death of emotional starvation."¹ The parent who uses humiliation as an educative device, and who often walks away in disgust from this tiny creature who is beneath his notice, is setting the stage for later anxiety. This illustrates, too, that the early fear of loss of love, or separation anxiety, which Freud saw related to guilt, is also related here. The intensity of the adult fears of ostracism or social expulsion reflects the same relationship.

Now, a sense of inferiority is a concomitant to shame-anxiety. Sibling rivalry in the early family, which involves comparison and fear of inadequacy, and parental expectations and capacities which illuminate the child's weakness and incompetence, provide a fertile field for the development of anxiety. All fears of inadequacy develop in a field of comparative evaluation, both between self and personal potential, and between self and interpersonal expectations. Piers shows this decisively in his study of pathological male exhibitionism, and of envy and jealousy.²

¹Ibid., p. 16. ²Gf. Ibid., pp. 21, 22.
Turning to Adler, we see that his interest in "inferiority feelings" is the springboard of his entire psychology. The way in which a sense of weakness and inferiority acts as a motive force in life is the theme of his writing. Some biographers have said this interest roots in Adler's own childhood illness, a bad case of rickets which slowed his physical development and made him a poor second to his elder brother in all childhood activities. We see here the basis for the two types of inferiority feelings he later described: those stemming from organ weakness, and those resulting from relationships within the family constellation.¹

Darwin's theory was also a stimulus to Adler's thought. His early theories of compensation and organ inferiority were aided by Darwin's evolutionary doctrine. Homo Sapiens is a weak species physically, and compensates for this organ inferiority by developing mental abilities and social life. Inferiority has thus acted on man "as a stimulus to the discovery of a better way and a finer

technique in adapting himself to nature."¹ In his later thought, Adler largely abandoned this evolutionary argument. An extrinsic comparison between man and his immanent potential is the primary source of inferiority feelings. Homo Sapiens as he means to be, rather than Homo Sapiens the weak species, is the immanent standard of comparison to which inferiority feelings relate.

With this as background, what relationship can be discovered between Piers' "shame anxiety" and Adler's "inferiority feelings"? Several factors indicate that they are roughly analogous:

a) Adler describes inferiority feelings as "emotional states of mind which we know as anxiety, sorrow, despair, shame, shyness, embarrassment, and disgust."² Their relief at the time of goal-satisfaction is accompanied by a "feeling of rest, of value, of happiness."³ We will see later that Adler does not develop a carefully defined


³ Ibid., p. 116.
conception of anxiety--but the complex of emotions which he describes as inferiority feelings points to shame-anxiety.

b) Second, Adler says that in a child, especially one who is burdened with some constitutional weakness, "a self-evaluation develops which produces the feelings of inferiority." Inferiority feelings, like shame-anxiety, root in self-evaluation.

c) While this self-evaluation is in part relative to a competitive social field, such as sibling rivalry, it relates in essence to a "fictional final goal", or ideal of self. The sense of inferiority is a "craving for significance." Adler's early term, "masculine protest", or the striving to be strong and powerful, must be seen as an innocent need to fulfill one's sex-role, or ideal self in relationship to the socially-biologically determined ideal of manhood. In place of Freud's backward-looking hedonism, we see here a teleological finalism. The "guiding self-ideal" initiates feelings of inferiority, stimulates compensatory activity, and works to mitigate those inferiority feelings. We see that comparative evaluations such as sibling rivalry are really only a dramatization for the child,

1Ibid., p. 116. 2Ibid., p. 67.
or an occasion for the deeper need to fulfill and perfect self.

d) Now, these inferiority feelings function as Freud's "signal anxiety" does (cf. above, p. 46) to stimulate action. Persons "cannot endure" these feelings for long, and are thus stimulated to "movement and action." 1 Adler often speaks as though the goal of life is produced by the feelings of inferiority. More consistently, however, he sees a dialectical relationship between the two. An immanent self-ideal or implicit goal of self-perfection is the universal motivational need. Exposed by situations wherein a person's relative worth is in question, this immanent goal creates anxiety and this anxiety in turn motivates the person to formulate specific steps which may be achieved on the long road toward self-fulfillment. Shame-anxiety is here seen as a negative component to the positive thrust of self-fulfillment, a result of its non-achievement, and a stimulus to its achievement. It is a "quasi-need", or a "tension system affected by a purpose" as Lewin would say. 2

In this discussion we have seen that the term "shame anxiety" as Piers defines it is similar to the Adlerian term

1Ibid., p. 173. 2Ibid., p. 115.
"inferiority feelings". Both represent anxiety which is correlated with the immanent goal of the ideal self; comparative self-evaluation in a social field is usually the occasion which triggers this fear of failing one's ideal self; avoidance of this anxiety as it signals its painful proximity is a major stimulant to coping activity. Adler does not correlate the fear of abandonment with this. It is important here to show the implications for personality theory in the phenomenon of shame-anxiety. Adler's work points decisively to some of these implications.¹

2. Shame-anxiety implies the functional unity of the personality. Ansbacher shows that Adler's earliest concept of compensation presupposes the unity of the compensating personality.² When an inferior organ threatens the survival and functioning of an organism, compensation takes place which strengthens the inferior organ, compensates through another organ or through the "psychological superstructure", or overcompensates in one of the areas. Adler shows that this phenomenon means an "equilib-

¹The term "shame-anxiety" may be preferable to "inferiority feelings", in that "feelings" connotes arbitrary and unpredictable affective states, whereas "anxiety" connotes a specific reaction of predictable order.

²Ansbacher in Ibid., p. 30.
rium" must be "assumed to govern the economy of the individual organ or the whole organism."\(^1\) It is the disturbance of this equilibrium which causes compensatory growth or activity. Ansbacher suggests that compensation is similar to the idea of "homeostasis" which Walter B. Cannon presented twenty-five years later.\(^2\)

Ansbacher shows that this term suggests a closed system of function, but that Adler later developed an open system, with his emphasis upon the striving for self-perfection. The maintenance of internal stability must be placed beside the need to grow into new excellence; at times these may be in opposition to one another. Neurosis may often represent a situation in which the desperate need to maintain homeostasis frustrates the need to grow toward self-perfection. Many of the case studies in Fromm's works, and much of Jung's analysis highlight this possible conflict between the need for order and the need for growth. Whether guilt-anxiety relates to the need for internal order, and shame-anxiety the need for upward advance, we will have to explore later.

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 25.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 23.
At any rate, the point is clear that shame-anxiety presupposes the unity of the personality. This is seen even more clearly when "inferiority feelings" replace Adler's early biographical preoccupation with inferior organs. A subjective attitude relating to self-evaluation is here at work. An inferior physical capacity may be only a symbol of one's dread of lost self-esteem, or in unhappy competition with one's peers it may be thought to be the cause of one's humiliation. The point is that the total self, not the offending organ, is threatened. Compensation for a weak organ presupposes that its weakness has been interpreted as a threat to the total self. That threat is the occasion for shame-anxiety, or inferiority feelings.

In his early theory, Adler felt that the aggression drive is the major compensatory force. This was later replaced by "masculine protest", and finally by "striving for perfection" as the unifying dynamic principle.¹ Freud recognized that even the early aggression drive threatened to subordinate the primary drives to a unified personality force. He at first rejected it for this reason. When Freud later accepted the theory, it took the form of the death instinct, or the need for dissolving of the organism, rather than the

¹Cf. Ibid., p. 34.
enhancement of the self, as Adler meant it to express.

After Freud accepted this aggression drive, Adler abandoned it, and saw aggressive behavior as an abnormal distortion of the need for overcoming, or self-perfection.

It is interesting to note that Adler's study of organ inferiority, compensation, and inferiority feelings led him immediately to conceptions which Freud could see reinstated the unified self in psychology. Shame-anxiety cannot be understood apart from some such conception. Perhaps Freud's analytical bent and his antipathy toward self-conceptions explains his failure even to distinguish shame-anxiety. Aside from one or two isolated references, we find no discussion of inferiority feelings in Freud's works. Some of the references, however, contained flashes of real insight. Freud saw that guilt caused a lessening of self-esteem. Self-aggression had an effect upon one's sense of worth. This would mean, then, that guilt-anxiety increases shame-anxiety. This relationship will be discussed in a later section. Here it is enough to see that shame-anxiety presupposes the unity of the self.

3. Shame-anxiety reveals the quest for self-perfection. Adler was led to this conclusion by two factors:
a) First, his early interest in organ inferiority and compensation led him to the conviction that feelings of inferiority are always relative. That is, a feeling of inferiority reveals one's acquaintance with a relevant excellence not yet achieved. He gives credit to Pierre Janet for clarifying for him the sentiment d'incompletude, but criticizes Janet for failing to see that a feeling of incompleteness always interacts with striving toward a goal.¹

b) Second, his early work both on organ inferiority and drive confluence convinced him that the self must be seen as a functional unit. Such unity would require a prepotent dynamic force which subordinates the segmental drives, or primary needs. He postulated first the aggression drive, then later the masculine protest, and finally the guiding self-ideal as this dynamic force. When he generalized from his work with neurotics, Adler saw the aggressive drive for superiority as basic. Later the enhancement or safeguarding of self-esteem through striving for masculine dominion and power was seen as the central drive. When he began to develop a criterion for normality in his later career, Adler saw that overcoming (of external barriers), com-

¹Gf. Ibid., p. 115.
pletion (of a task), perfection (of potential self) will alone explain inferiority feelings. The first two presuppose the last, and are specific situational aspects of its functioning.

A sense of inferiority or incompleteness, then, presupposes a drive toward completeness. The unity of the self points to a prepotent dynamic force which is the self-system striving to become what it is meant to be. What can be said about this drive toward self-perfection?

(1) First, it is innate. "The striving for perfection is innate in the sense that it is a part of life, a striving, an urge, a something without which life would be unthinkable." It is not innate in the sense that a segmental drive is innate -- it is an intrinsic aspect of life itself or inherent in the definition of living as human beings live.

(2) Second, self-perfection involves self-evaluation. This evaluation is in part comparative. Thus, the feeling of inferiority in a child is "always preceded by a matching, a comparing of himself with others, at first with

1 For a fuller discussion see Ansbacher in Ibid., pp. 100-103.

2 Ibid., p. 104.
the father -- at times with the brothers and sisters, later with every person whom the patient meets."¹ These appraisals are usually keen and accurate. This evaluation is dramaturgic in method. Freud saw that dream life is organized like a good drama. Adler saw that all of life is so organized. The root of the unity of personality is its "individuality", or its goal governing as a causa finalis. "In other words, the psychological life of a person is oriented toward the final act, like that of a character created by a good dramatist."² The same thought is even more clearly expressed here:

The individual is . . . both the picture and the artist. He is the artist of his own personality, but as an artist he is neither an infallible worker nor a person with complete understanding of mind and body; he is rather a weak, extremely fallible, and imperfect human being.³

This means, then, that the goal of self-perfection functions as a factor to interpret the significance of each situation in terms of that goal. As in Freud's dreams, there is an evaluating, creative, and selective function at work in building a self. All environmental influences and experiences are "perceived, assimilated, digested, and answered

¹Ibid., p. 119. ²Ibid., p. 94. ³Ibid., p. 177.
by a living and striving being, striving for a successful achievement in his view.\textsuperscript{1} Comparative evaluations take their toll only as they are interpreted to be relevant to the \textit{dramaturgic} evaluations. Extrinsic demands cut deeply only when they are important to intrinsic demands.

Third, this self-evaluation is largely \textit{unconscious}. The "fictional goal" of self-perfection is "in accord with the unconscious technique of our thinking apparatus."\textsuperscript{2} This final goal is hence "blurred and pliable; it cannot be measured; it has been constructed with inadequate and definitely ungifted powers."\textsuperscript{3} Here we see Freud's view of unconscious evaluative activity as inferior to logico-verbal evaluations, at least when the latter were employed by himself. Adler assigned to unconscious evaluations an almost unbelievable task -- the interpretation and selection from all the universe of experience the precise factors required to build a self -- and then he called it an inferior function.

From the above we can see Adler's unique contribution. The evaluative function which Freud saw at work in dreams and wit, and interpreted as distortive and defensive, Adler discovered to be at work in all of life, and to be reason-

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 178. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 93. \textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
able and effective. He continued to describe this function as "fictional" in relation to an assumed material universe, but he had no doubt that it was reasonable internally, and applicable to that universe.

(3) Neurotic "self-enhancement" is a protective form of the striving for self-perfection. When anxiety over one's self-esteem becomes too great, one develops various devices for protecting the self-esteem from outside threats.1 "Safe-guarding tendencies" set in, or "self-enhancement" with its "self-boundedness."2 Fearful, self-bound persons lose their interest in cooperative interaction with others, and concentrate on preserving their own threatened self-integrity. Aggression, the "will to conquer", the goal of "domineering over others", and of "leaning on others", represent defensive means to preserve some limping hope for self-perfection, under difficult circumstances.

Here we see for the first time in psychiatry a view of neurosis which points toward a criterion of normality. A person is normal to the extent that he develops "social interest", and seeks self-perfection through cooperative living.

1Cf. Ibid., p. 265. 2Ibid., p. 112.
(4) Now, what is the relationship between shame-anxiety and the striving for self-perfection? We may note the following relationships:

(a) First, it must be seen that shame-anxiety is the negative aspect of a positive teleology. The fear of abandonment, or inadequacy, or insignificance, or as Rollo May and the existential psychoanalysts later call it, "nothingness" -- is the shadow-side of the positive thrust toward self-perfection. Dread of being nobody presupposes the need to be somebody. It is the light of our "fictional final goal" which casts the shadow of our fear of failing to achieve that goal. The presence of shame-anxiety indicates a self-evaluation which reveals a great deal of personal growth still to be undertaken.

(b) Shame-anxiety of moderate intensity stimulates us to undertake the measures indicated to achieve personal fulfillment. Persons cannot endure feelings of inferiority, and so initiate compensating activity to strengthen the points of personal weakness. Concrete goals of overcoming are set up by the creative imagination. Grief at the death of a loved one may lead a person to set medicine as his vocational goal, in order to find a way to avert such tragic experience. The specific form such goals take
depends upon the "strange melody" of each person's creative bent, and the meaning he gives to life.¹

Moderate amounts of shame-anxiety hence act as "signal anxiety" (Freud), stimulating us to take positive action. In a sense, this moderate anxiety is a precursor to a possible flooding of the system with paralyzing panic. Adler does not draw this distinction clearly, as Freud does. Some such distinction must be drawn, however, since there is a vast difference between anxiety as it stimulates cognition and action, and anxiety as it distorts cognition and paralyzes action. Mild anxiety may be seen as stimulating anticipatory imagination, which in turn projects the curve of rising intensity to its normal culmination in panic, and stimulates evasive action. Moderate shame-anxiety, then, is a dynamic correlate with evaluation, as the progress of self-development is assessed.

(c) Under extreme conditions, however, shame-anxiety indicates a defensive, clinging operation, as we saw above. "Self-enhancing", or protective devices are employed. It is important to note that the fluctuating intensity of shame-anxiety, varying as it does with the evaluation of one's likelihood of achieving the inherent

¹_Ibid._, pp. 180-81.
requirements of self-hood, functions to determine the nature of coping activities. A higher intensity of shame-anxiety indicates a greater situational threat to the self, and stimulates grasping, clinging, defensive activity. One loses the courage to battle the real issues, and employs his energy to preserve himself.

Adler's therapeutic goals in therapy with children are very much to the point: "(1) to join with the child and give him the experience of a trustworthy fellow man, and (2) to increase and spread the social interest and thus to strengthen independence and courage."\(^1\) The revival of courage works to reduce anxiety to the level whereby the positive aspects of striving can be substituted for defensive self-enhancement and aggression.

We note here that shame-anxiety functions in one dynamic system with self-evaluation -- this coherent unity of function is affirmed by Adler. The same coherence between guilt-anxiety and evaluation was assumed by Freud, as we noted in Chapter II above. The relationship between the two types of anxiety must be discussed later.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 119; cf. also p. 341. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 99.
(d) One more dimension should be noted to this interaction between shame-anxiety and the goal of self-perfection: The goal itself may be compensation. Postulation of a concrete goal reduces anxiety to its "lowest possible, albeit apparently causal amount."\textsuperscript{1} Imaginative projection of future successes gives one the courage to undertake remedial action. The emotions and feelings of success are imaginatively entertained as one fantasizes the future goal, and this reduces anxiety to a creative intensity, rather than a paralyzing one.

4. A fourth implication should be noted: Shame-anxiety presupposes \textit{field theory}. The term "field theory" does not mean simply that shame-anxiety relates to a social setting, as though the setting were peripheral. The setting is \textit{organically related}; it is involved essentially. Ansbacher shows that Adler's earliest work on organ inferiority established him as a field theorist.\textsuperscript{2} An organ is adjudged inferior in relation to the total range of environmental and interpersonal demands, as well as the more personal need for significance and fulfillment. Later, when

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 99. \textsuperscript{2}cf. Ansbacher in \textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.
he posited the aggression drive as the prepotent dynamic force in human living, Adler found it necessary to postulate a counter-drive, as a mask of respectability for aggression. Thus, we humiliate with our virtue, attack with passivity, hurt with our own suffering, and make ourselves small to appear big.¹

This is very close to Freud's doctrine that social interest is a reaction-formation, a way of masking narcissistic self-love in order to achieve by indirection what we cannot achieve by direct conflict. Even here, however, Adler was very much aware that aggression and affection relate from the beginning to the social field. Whereas Freud studied the individual in abstraction from society, and looked upon social relationships as intrinsically and necessarily repressive, Adler saw that person and society are correlative terms.

By 1930, Adler had developed "social interest" as the criterion for normality. He noted in his work with neurotics that self-esteem, or striving for superiority, and self-enhancement, or self-bound striving are symptoms of illness. The normal person strives for the perfection "which benefits all", and works within the structure of "the

¹Cf. Ansbacher in Ibid., p. 144.
immanent demands of human society."\(^1\) Influenced in part by his early co-worker, Carl Furtmüller, Adler came to see that the ease with which socialization and interiorization of social demands takes place points to an innate predisposition toward social cooperation. The extent to which this "social interest" is developed is "the barometer of the child's normality."\(^2\) This social interest is more than a feeling. Adler calls it a Lebensform or an "evaluative attitude toward life."\(^3\) Now, how does this social interest relate to shame-anxiety?

a) First, the only "true and inevitable compensation for all the natural weaknesses of individual human beings" is social interest.\(^4\) If shame-anxiety is not too great, the child will come to strive on the "commonly useful side" of life. Even though each person defines his own success in uniquely individual terms, the feeling of self-worth and value is achieved as we acquiesce, "in the common advantages and drawbacks of our lot."\(^5\) Thus:

The individual feels at home in life and feels his existence to be worthwhile just so far as he is

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 114. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 154. \(^3\)Ibid., p. 135. \(^4\)Ibid., p. 154. \(^5\)Ibid., p. 155.
useful to others and is overcoming common, instead of private, feelings of inferiority.¹

Constructive identification with the hopes and sorrows of human life provides the "only salvation" from nagging shame-anxiety. It is interesting to note that "identification" as Adler defines it is very close to the relationship which is often termed "empathy". There is sympathetic interest involved rather than unreasoning ingestion of a feared person's Super-Ego, as Freud saw it.

b) Second, the ideal image of self is created as one relates himself to "the logic of man's communal life."² The organizational structure, the "inherent rules" of one's social setting provide the tasks and the cognitive orientation in terms of which one evaluates himself. The quest for perfection which functions in dynamic mutuality with shame-anxiety is correlated with the tasks and roles defined by society. The specific means, then, or concrete goals in terms of which one will evaluate his life are provided by the cultural matrix. Shame-anxiety functions coherently with an evaluative process which has a dual reference -- self and social role. It is important to see even here, however,

¹Ibid., p. 155. ²Ibid., p. 128.
that it is a social role as the individual interprets it which counts. The final arbiter remains the creative imagination of the individual, which may be distorted by his own limitations or emotional barriers.

The cultural matrix provides alternatives which one weighs and interprets, and from which he selects.

c) Third, as we saw above, too great an intensity of shame-anxiety leads one to lose his courage, to become self-bound and aggressive, to depreciate others, and hence never to develop his normal capacity for social interest. Choice of a "socially useless goal . . . is conditioned by a lack of courage." 1 Fear of defeat on the socially useful side leads one into the degenerative cycle of ultimate failure. As we will see later, the evaluative processes themselves are distorted by this unhappy condition. To safeguard security, one dogmatizes a neat conceptual system which stratifies the normally flexible interchange within the logic of community. He lives in this private world rather than to risk himself to the give and take of communal identification. Therapy consists of providing an interpersonal setting within which one can develop confidence. It

1Ibid., p. 140.
is important to see here that the functional intent of shame-anxiety even at these extreme levels is to preserve conditions which will allow at least minimal fulfillment of self. A strategic retreat implies the hope of future victory.

d) Fourth, shame-anxiety relates not only to one's immediate interpersonal milieu, but also to an immanent ideal of community, the "final fictional goal the perfection of mankind."\(^1\) Man lives his life, as Spinoza says, sub-specie aeternitatis, under the aspect of eternity. Shame-anxiety stimulates one to endless search for better adaptation, for overcoming, for self-perfection.

This goal of perfection must bear within it the goal of an ideal community, because all that we value in life, all that endures and continues to endure, is eternally the product of social interest.\(^2\)

Adler sees the idea of God as the concrete expression of this immanent goal of self-perfection in ideal community; God's voice is then innate in all human striving. Even the distorted and defensive depreciation of life is testimony to the innate potentiality to lift one's head to higher hope. Nor is this potentiality a passive capacity -- it represents

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 106.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 107.
the supreme motive in all striving, coloring and shaping
the meaning of every limited objective.

B. The Evaluative Function.

In the discussion of shame-anxiety and self-perfection
above, it became apparent that the quest for self-
perfection which is implied in the phenomena of shame-anxiety
reveals a great deal about the evaluative function. We
evaluate ourselves in the light of a final cause, or im-
manent ideal of self. In this process, the characteristics
of evaluation which Freud described in dream-work and wit
are seen to be as big as life itself. His analytical and
reductionist bias kept Freud from integrating these pro-
cesses into his personality theory, but even then they were
assumed in all of his work on neurosis, anxiety, guilt, and
ego-defenses, and even in his therapeutic method.

In Adler's writings all that Freud assumed about the
evaluative function is openly affirmed, and made the very
heart of his personality theory. This may best be revealed
by discussing the following insights drawn from Adler's work:

1. The ideal self-system is an evaluative construct.
We saw above that this ideal self guides evaluation and
stimulates evaluation through shame-anxiety. It is a tacit
point of reference in assigning meaning and significance to every aspect of experience. Here we may see that this ideal self is a product of evaluation. It is a cognitive construct, a coherent functional system achieved through creative ratiocination. Once achieved, it exerts a selective influence on all further experience. The question "Who am I meant to be?" cries out for an answer, and finding some provisional answer, lives as best it can in its light.

This may be brought out clearly by showing what Adler means by his term "fictional final goal." The term "fictional" is taken from the work of Hans Vaihinger, who influenced Adler decisively in his early years. "Fictions" are ideas and unconscious notions which have no counterpart in reality, but help us to deal with reality, according to Vaihinger. They form an auxiliary construct, or a scaffolding. Thus:

*Fictio* means . . . an activity of fingere, that is to say, of constructing, forming, giving shape, elaborating, presenting, artistically fashioning, conceiving, thinking, imagining, assuming, planning, devising, inventing. Secondly, it refers to the product of these activities, the fictional assumption, fabrication, creation, the imagined case.

Thus, fictions are imaginative constructs of the creative

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mind, which are functionally real and necessary, but are objectively unreal, in terms of an implied materialistic metaphysics. They form the "as if" world of values, religion, and scientific constructs. The term "as if" shows that all such constructs derive from comparative apperception. These fictions may be abstractive (neglective) such as in the arbitrary determinations of science; symbolic (analogical) as in logical concepts; heuristic in the sense of facilitating discovery, such as the principle of causation, for instance; practical (ethical) in order to allow responsible activity; or aesthetic. Aesthetic fictions, or "figments" as Adler called them, have an artistic function. Dreams function in this way, according to Adler -- they arouse the emotions we need in order to solve our problems.¹

In this we observe the constructive work of fantasy, as Freud would call it. We also find here a possible theoretical framework for unifying the evaluative activities as they function in science, logic, ethics, and aesthetics. We see that the creative process is of one cloth, wherever it is revealed at work. Verification of an hypothesis is also justification of the conceptual scaffolding which entered into its formation. Such verification takes place when a

¹Cf. Ibid., p. 82.
conceptual world coincides with the predicted perceptual world.

Now, the ideal of self-perfection is for Adler a "fictional final goal", or a personal frame of reference. As Ansbacher says, this concept enables Adler to develop a teleological view of personality and still avoid the teleological dilemma.¹ The "future" or guiding ideal, as the Gestaltists would say, is an aspect of the present phenomenal field. The goal of life, itself a creative fabrication, acts as an ever-present framework which guides future activity. Now Adler can affirm that causes, instincts, experiences, sexual mechanisms cannot yield an explanation, but the perspective in which they are regarded, the individual way of seeing them, which subordinates all life to the final goal, can do so.²

It is important to see that this evaluative process, like Freud's dream-work, is mainly unconscious. The individual is largely unaware of the true nature of his goal, and the processes by which he formulates that goal are inaccessible to consciousness.

Second, we must see that this process is dramaturgic in method, as Freud's dream-work is so described. Experien-

¹ Ansbacher, in Ibid., p. 89. ² Ibid., p. 92.
tial elements are selected, evaluated, and organized toward an end like the characters in a drama. The standard of significance in this organizational process is the ideal of self. Adler insisted that we do not have the meaning of any act until we can relate it to this goal. "What is he trying to do?" is explicated in terms of "Who is he trying to be?"

2. In creating his "fictional final goal" the person employs "schema of apperception". He orients himself to the psychological equivalent of meridians and parallels, in order to find his way through the flux of events. Every person relates to the world via a framework of subjective meanings, created in imaginative projection. This framework of schema is "the way in which man looks at himself and the external world."¹ Experiences are assimilated and utilized in terms of this schema, and to deny this relationship "is like taking single notes out of a melody to examine them for their value and meaning."²

Now, ideally, this fabric of schema is correlated with the structural requirements of the social scene. Adler brings this out clearly in his discussion of "intelligence"

¹Ibid., p. 182. ²Ibid., p. 183.
and "common sense". The neurotic undergoes an "ideational shift" toward a rigid dogmatism. He creates a private frame of reference, his own "private map", and strives on the "commonly useless side" precisely because his personal cognitive orientation does not correlate creatively with the requirements of the social environment. Desperately afraid of losing his self-esteem, he schematizes sharply and abstractly, living in a neat system and becoming "estranged from concrete reality, where psychological elasticity is needed rather than rigidity." Reasonable schematization of a situation, on the other hand, is based upon "common sense", or the kind of solutions which make sense in terms of group living. Identifying with others, one will grasp schematically the kinds of relationships which prevail among them. He will structure his life according to their needs and interests and so define his role in their midst. His own private orientation will be sensitively intertwined with the subtle changes and patterns of the interpersonal environment. Social feeling allows adequacy of evaluation.

3. There is a third step to this evaluative process: Formulating an ideal self-system in interaction with his

1Ibid., p. 248.
apperception of social requirements, a person develops his "style of life". The style of life is one's coherent, uniquely individual way of acting and reacting. It is the "strange melody of his own creation."

It is important to see "style of life" as the most general concept by which Adler describes the individual. We see three elements involved in it:

a) The goal of self-perfection and one's opinion of oneself in relation to that goal.

b) The schema of apperception; or one's private picture of the world as it relates to him, more or less accurate depending upon his courage, his social interest, and his imaginative capacity.

c) A person's own unique style of striving, relating in part to his constitutional make-up, and in part to the degree of his activity.

This style of life, then, is a coherent individuality, formulated in evaluation. It is, in a sense, a living cognitive system. It is an "intermediate psychological metabolism" assimilating, digesting, and defining the significance and meaning of experiential situations. What does not

\[1\] Ibid., p. 181.
fit the style of life is excluded, or altered to fit. Ans- 
bacher suggests that this is very similar to the work of 
Krech and Crutchfield, in Theory and Problems of Social 
Psychology.¹ Combining insight from Gestalt theory, field 
theory, and purposive behaviorism, these authors show that 
beliefs and attitudes which are coherent with the life style 
are maintained "through the devices of selectivity in per-
ception and memory, cognitive constancy, and of withdrawal."²

Adler's psychology of "use" is very similar to this 
conception. He draws the distinction between psychology of 
use and the psychology of possession. Those who stress 
possession trace all symptoms to peripheral or environmental 
influences. The psychology of use: "emphasizes the creative 
appropriation and exploitation of all these influences."³

One relates to the outside world in relation to his own 
interpretation of himself in the social structure. He uses 
heredity and experiences as "bricks" in constructing his 
own life.

¹David Krech and R.S. Crutchfield, Theory and Pro-
Company, 1948).

²Adler, loc. cit., p. 193. ³Ibid., p. 205.
This has vast implications for ethics, as will be readily noted. Adler points this out in his discussion of the opposite meaning which two persons will give to the same childhood experience. We cannot know the meaning of an act or an experience unless we can place it in the context of a person's total life style. Why he has done it, and hence a large part of its significance, must await some understanding of the person himself.

Now, it is important to see the relationship between "life style" and cognitive processes. Adler undertakes a systematic exposition of this:

1. a) **Perception**: Perception is influenced by *readiness*; "selectivity, acuteness, and effect are determined by the goal." Man perceives what he can use in some way.

2. b) **Hallucination**: The meaning and significance of an hallucination is found in the individual as a whole unit.

3. c) **Learning**: Learning will be accepted only as it relates to the individual's style of life. It must focus on the interest, activity, spontaneity, and creativity of the learner. This conception suggests something about commitment as it relates to moral decision. One may be encouraged

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to commit himself to a course of action only to the extent that it is coherent with his own interpretation of ideal-self-in-society.

d) **Memory:** Memory is an artistic ability, reshaping experiences so as to assimilate what can be used and reject what is not palatable. **Forgetfulness** is a narrowing of attention to shape things according to one's schematic orientation. It will be noted that Freud's concept of repression assumes the same sort of selective self-system, although he did not recognize this fact.

3) **Fantasy:** Fantasy has a coping function, since we employ it to discover the directions we should take to solve a problem, and an artistic function, since it affords us the expectant feelings and emotions needed to make the effort.

Equally important for our purposes in addition to this discussion of life style and cognition, is the relationship between feelings and life style. Feelings are never in contradiction with one's style of life, Adler says. To explain anxiety we must look to the end and purpose it serves within the self-system. **Shame-anxiety** is always intimately correlated with the coherent self which seeks perfection in the world of other persons. The entire range of cognition,
from perception to creative anticipation is influenced by
this system, and at the same time influences this system.

II. Erich Fromm.

A. Conscience and the Productive Orientation.

1. Authoritarian and Humanistic Conscience.

a) In *Man for Himself* Fromm makes a primary dis-
tinction between the "authoritarian" and the "humanistic"
conscience. The authoritarian conscience he describes as
roughly analogous to Freud's "Super-ego." Authorities
such as the parents, the church, the state, or public opin-
ion become internalized, and one feels responsible "to
something inside, to one's conscience." Conscience, even
though internalized, remains in a real sense external, since
one is ruled not by one's own value judgments, but by the
norms given by authority. Obedience, then, is the highest
virtue, and rebellion against authority the greatest offense.

Humanistic conscience is, on the other hand, "the
expression of man's self-interest and integrity." Those

1 Cf. Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself* (New York: Holt,

2 Cf. Ibid., p. 144. 3 Ibid., p. 144.

4 Ibid., p. 159.
actions, thoughts, and feelings which further one's total well-being give a feeling of inner approval, and those which injure one's total personality produce a feeling of discomfort, or a "guilty conscience."

Conscience is thus a re-action of ourselves to ourselves. It is the voice of our true selves which summons us back to ourselves, to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously—that is, to become what we potentially are.

Humanistic conscience is a knowing function. It judges our "success or failure in the art of living." It is in touch with the state of our inner being, both its inner order, or integrity, and its relative growth, or expansiveness. This knowing function, however, has an affective quality, and does much of its work below the level of awareness. We may be influenced by its truth without even being aware of it. A feeling of tiredness or listlessness, or a vague feeling of uneasiness may be our only conscious reaction.

These two types of conscience are often in conflict with each other. The authoritarian conscience arouses guilt when one is expressing his "strength, independence, product-

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1Ibid., p. 159. 2Ibid., p. 158. 3Cf. Ibid., p. 162.
iveness, and pride,"1 while the humanistic conscience arouses guilt if these fail to find expression.

The paradoxical result is that the (authoritarian) guilty conscience becomes the basis for a "good" conscience, while the good conscience, if one should have it, ought to create a feeling of guilt.2

Fromm illustrates this complex interrelatedness by telling of the man who wanted to become a musician but became instead a businessman to satisfy his father.3 His efficiency in business gradually began to decline as he became increasingly depressed. Under analysis, he discovered that his depression was caused by his guilt feelings for having disappointed his father. Further analysis reveals a deeper layer of guilt, related not to his failure to please his father, but to his obedience to his father and failure to satisfy himself. Authoritarian guilt may be a rationalization for a deeper guilt arising from the humanistic conscience.

b) What is the relationship between these two types of conscience and guilt- and shame-anxiety? Fromm does not differentiate between guilt and shame, but uses

1 Ibid., p. 150. 2 Ibid., p. 150.
3 Cf. Ibid., pp. 155-6.
"guilt" to encompass all of the related phenomena.

(1) The person who violates the authoritarian conscience suffers from guilt-anxiety. There is a complement of self-directed hostility involved here. Authority has been internalized; one has taken over the role of the authority "by treating himself with the same strictness and cruelty."\(^1\) The standards before which one stands condemned are relatively external. They are not fully one's own, or have not been integrated into the organismic whole of one's personality. They retain a "must" quality, since they are relatively alien to one's need for autonomous self-fulfillment.

(2) The person who violates the humanistic conscience suffers from shame-anxiety as we have defined it. The inner question is not "Have I transgressed?" but "Am I acceptable?" Fromm alludes to this when he associates the humanistic conscience with the craving for self-approval.\(^2\) He considers this craving for self-approval to be the "expression of the all-pervasive though unconscious guilt feeling."\(^3\) It is a major thesis of this paper that

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 151.  \(^2\)Cf. Ibid., p. 164.  \(^3\)Ibid., p. 164.
this all-pervasive craving for self-approval should be carefully distinguished from the more peripheral craving for the approval of authority-figures. Fromm's analysis would perhaps be strengthened by the use of the term "shame" for the former, and "guilt" for the latter. The fact that these may function in contradistinction to one another emphasizes the importance of sharp differentiation.

(3) A third level of anxiety is revealed when we ask how a person comes to adopt an authoritarian conscience. An authoritarian conscience is one aspect of an authoritarian character. The authoritarian character "has found inner security by becoming, symbiotically, part of an authority felt to be greater and more powerful than himself,"1 He depends on this symbiotic relationship, because to lose it is to "be thrown into a void, to face the horror of nothingness."2

In Escape From Freedom Fromm clearly shows that the authoritarian character is a mechanism of escape. Escape mechanisms result from the "insecurity of the isolated individual."3 In order to avoid an "unbearable state of

powerlessness and aloneness" a person may either progress to a "positive freedom", expressing in love and work the fullness of an autonomous personality, or he can fall back into a symbiotic, authoritarian orientation. This escape exacts a terrible price.

This course of escape...is characterized by its compulsive character, like every escape from threatening panic; it is also characterized by the more or less complete surrender of individuality and the integrity of the self.1

Here is a more basic anxiety--fear of isolation, aloneness, nothingness. We might term this anxiety grief-anxiety, since it springs from fear of abandonment, or separation. Freud's initial definition of guilt as fear of loss of love, and hence abandonment of an infant by his parents is closely related. The fact that one will risk shame-anxiety and loss of personal integrity in order to avoid the panic of aloneness indicates that grief-anxiety may function at a deeper level than shame-anxiety.

The person who adopts the authoritarian character is faced with a double-bind situation. If he obeys the authoritarian rules he violates his own integrity. His life takes on a rigid, compulsive aspect, growing out of a

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1 Ibid., p. 140.
deep awareness that he is not truly himself, and precipitated by shame-anxiety at this violation of himself. On the other hand, if he breaks the authoritarian rule, he suffers from guilt-anxiety. This guilt-anxiety brings a charge of self-directed hostility, which results in a lessened self-esteem and new shame-anxiety. This new fear of lost integrity sends him back to the authority-figures for reassurance, and makes him even more dependent upon them. If he keeps the rule he suffers shame-anxiety, and if he breaks the rule he suffers shame-anxiety from another direction. "You're damned if you do and you're damned if you don't" expresses this kind of a double-bind situation. The depression which the aspiring musician suffered resulted, not from the guilt, as Freud would say, but from the hopelessness of a double-bind situation.

The fact that one will persist in such an authoritarian escape indicates the primal nature of the anxiety which one seeks to avoid by it--grief-anxiety, or fear of separation and aloneness.

(4) This analysis of Fromm's doctrine of conscience suggests an anxiety-continuum roughly as follows:

\[\text{Cf. Fromm, Man for Himself...}, \text{p. 165.}\]
(a) Fear--one may control his actions out of expediency, from fear of punishment or hope of reward.\footnote{1} Here the object of threat is obviously external.

(b) Guilt-anxiety--one may internalize authority, assume or introject the role of authority, and direct hostility against himself. This is more pervasive than fear, since it is a part of one's personality. It is still peripheral, however. The relationships with which it correlates remain external in essence. The internalized valuesystem is still not one's own. In intrapsychic functioning it continues to be relatively an autonomous syndrome.

(c) Shame-anxiety--the voice of the humanistic conscience, or restlessness in the presence of continuing violation of inner integrity. More pervasive than guilt, it taps the deep need to retain internal coherence and to achieve personal expansion.

(d) Grief-anxiety--the primal level of anxiety, fear of aloneness, powerlessness, nothingness. Why the fear of aloneness should be associated with powerlessness and nothingness, as Fromm observes, awaits further study.

Here it is important to see that each of these levels of anxiety may function relatively autonomously,

\footnote{1Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 144.}
although in mutual interrelation with the others. This must be affirmed in order to understand the way in which the more peripheral may be chosen as a defense against the more penetrating. One may choose a guilty act in order to avoid the deeper threat of humiliation. The motivational character of such an act, and its moral implications, will not be understood apart from this awareness.

This has far-reaching consequences. Thus a young man who is deeply anxious about his masculine adequacy (shame-anxiety) may "act out" sexually in order to prove himself. He risks guilt-anxiety to avoid shame-anxiety. Now, to censure him in terms of a moral code which appeals to the "shameful" nature of sex-related behavior is to complicate his problem by exaggerating the shame-anxiety which is a part of it.

This picture becomes even more complex if we consider the deeper layer of grief-anxiety. We have seen the way in which one may choose to suffer shame-anxiety in order to avert grief-anxiety. A system of moral sanctions which enforces the prescribed conduct by (1) shaming devices, and (2) threats of ostracism and abandonment by beloved persons, involves its victims in a serious dilemma. Thus, a young man who has subconsciously chosen to "disown" his sexuality
by isolating it from intrapsychic communication has sought to spare himself the threat of loss of the significant persons from his life (grief-anxiety) by emasculating himself psychically at the cost of shame-anxiety. His fear of loss of love is not assuaged by this defensive technique, but is rather exaggerated. He now needs sexual conduct desperately, in order (1) to secure another source of affection, and (2) to reassert his "disowned" manhood. Any "acting out", however, involves him in forbidden acts which (1) threaten the imposition of sanctions as he evaluates his situation in relation to them, hence (2) create guilt-anxiety, with its attack upon his self-esteem and increased dependence upon the authority figures for reassurance and approval, which amplifies the deeper anxieties motivating the guilt-related behavior in the first place.

Surely ethical references to "oughtness", or the simplicity of obligation, will be inadequate unless they include an understanding of this qualitative complexity. Similarly, one who develops a system of ideal norms, or the ethical criticisms of systems of prescriptions and sanctions, must be aware of this interrelationship.

2. Conscience Interacts With a Criterion of Self-realization.
(1) The concept of "self-perfection" in Adler becomes "productive orientation" in Fromm's *Man for Himself*. Fromm says this term "productive orientation" is an expansion of the term "spontaneity" in his earlier work *Escape From Freedom*. In this earlier work the distinction is made between "freedom from" and "freedom to". Life has "an inherent tendency to grow, to expand, to express potentialities." Freedom from the primary social and family ties prior to individuation may not necessarily mean freedom to grow into full expression of one's potentialities. One may lose courage in the face of separation from those primary ties, may give up his individuality, and may settle for escape back into some sort of symbiotic relationship. There is, however, a productive way to face the isolation and doubt which freedom brings, "that of spontaneous relationship to man and nature." This freedom man attains only by being himself, and realizing himself. "Positive freedom...is identical with the full realization of the

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individual's potentialities, together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously."¹

The term "spontaneity" retains its connotation of self-realization as it is expanded into "productive orientation", but becomes more clearly defined. By "orientation" Fromm means a syndrome which results from a particular organization of character. It is a channeling of energy into a certain style of relating to the world. Once developed, this character orientation tends to perpetuate itself, so that one acts "true to character."² We should note especially that an orientation is a mode of relatedness. Thus:

The "productive orientation" of personality refers to a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all realms of human experience. It covers mental, emotional, and sensory responses to others, to oneself, and to things. Productiveness is man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities in him.³

Man realizes himself, then, to the extent that he becomes able to relate to the world productively. To live in the productive attitude and character orientation is to achieve

¹Ibid., p. 270.
²Cf. Fromm, Man for Himself..., pp. 57- and 59.
³Ibid., p. 84.
self-realization. Here we see self-realization functionally defined, in contrast to the mystic goal of self-perfection in Adler. It is a style of living and relating to others.

Fromm contrasts the productive orientation with the various nonproductive orientations, the receptive (accepting), the exploitative (taking), the hoarding (preserving), and the marketing (exchanging) orientation. These orientations are only relatively non-productive. In every character there is a blending of these orientations in various social relationships. The degree of productivity or nonproductivity varies in each orientation along the lines of a continuum, and changes the quality of the behavior in relation to it. Thus, the quality of generosity in the marketing orientation may take on the negative quality of wastefulness in the nonproductive personality. Or, to use another illustration, "rational systematic orderliness...may be found when productiveness is high, while, with decreasing productiveness, it degenerates more and more into irrational, pedantic impulsive 'orderliness'."¹ Thus virtue is not in honesty, but in honesty in a certain character context.

¹Ibid., p. 116.
b) In the section on Adler, we saw that self-perfection and shame-anxiety are closely related. What is the relationship between anxiety and Fromm's "productive orientation"? Fromm observes for the most part only the negative function of anxiety. Reaction to anxiety is "a common type of nonproductive activity", whether that anxiety is "acute or chronic." Man gives up his spontaneity and escapes into an authoritarian relationship for fear of being "alone, isolated, threatened from all sides." It is "insecurity", or, in our terms, grief-anxiety which leads one to abandon the quest for the productive orientation.

Fromm speaks of the restlessness and depression which may result from failure to realize self. He does not see that anxiety of moderate intensity may stimulate the measures necessary for self-fulfillment.

c) In Adler, self-perfection is a "prepotent dynamic force." The ideal self is an imaginative construct of the creative mind, which functions teleologically as an immanent motivating force. Does the "productive orientation" of Fromm function as a causa finalis in this way?

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1 Ibid., p. 86.

2 Fromm, Escape From Freedom..., p. 62.
Fromm speaks of it as man's virtue, in the same sense in which Aristotle uses the term. Virtue, or excellence, is operative in actuating the capacities and potentialities peculiar to one's nature. This suggests a teleological conception.

The humanistic conscience is described as "the guardian of man's true self-interest", the "voice of our loving care of ourselves." To live productively is to become what we potentially are, and our conscience does not give us peace when we fall short. This suggests that conscience is the ideal self operating as a motivational force. If ignored, it exerts itself in restlessness, exhaustion, or depression. Psychoanalytic therapy relies on the strength and tenacity of the forces striving for health. A psychoanalyst usually is impressed with the fact that "most of his patients would long since have given up the fight were they not impelled by an impulse to achieve psychic health and happiness."

Even more interesting in this connection is Fromm's affirmation that the potential self never ceases to exert

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1 Cf. Ibid., pp. 26 and 92.

2 Ibid., pp. 150 and 159. 3 Ibid., p. 223.
itself even though it may be suppressed. Thus, when a child's individuality is compromised by submission to authority, "the basic contradiction between the authority and the child who submits to it is never eliminated."\(^1\) The integrity of the self is asserted through hostility and rebelliousness, or repression of these with a second-layer damage to the self and increasing dependence upon authority. The innate need to live spontaneously is "driven by the logic of its own dynamism", and "threatens to change into its opposite."\(^2\) Spontaneity, or the productive orientation, even when repressed from awareness, "does not cease to exist as a potentiality, and indicates its existence by the conscious or unconscious hatred by which such suppression is always accompanied."\(^3\) Man's potentiality, or his true nature, then, has a "dynamism of its own"\(^4\) which may either come to be expressed as productiveness, or may be expressed in its opposite, sadistic hatred.

Here is a conception of the utmost importance to ethics. Destructive hatred is seen as a confirmation of the

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 270.  \(^3\) Ibid., p. 288.  \(^4\) Ibid., p. 289.
inherent moral intent of human personality. The intrinsic need to fulfill and to expand one's unique potentiality through productiveness is implied even in its very opposite. The functional intent, or meaning of an aggressive act is positive—hatred would be love if it could.

3. Conscience Presupposes Field Theory.

In Fromm's theory conscience is understood only if we see its significance in a social setting.

a) We have seen that man's character is defined by Fromm in terms of his relatedness. Self-actualization lies in the achievement of a certain mode of relating to others and to the culture as a whole. The immanent ideal of self-realization, or the "productive orientation" is an ideal way of relating to the world and to others. The interpersonal is of one cloth with personal self-fulfillment.

Here we can point out a major advance over Adler's theory. Adler's "social feeling" remains a vague social instinct theory, reminding one of Butler's concept of the instinct for benevolent action. Adler justified it mainly in biological terms in his early theories, but gradually began to identify self-realization with social interest. Adler saw that social interest increases with self-actualization, but did not define this as an intrinsic relationship.
Fromm sees that self-actualization and social involvement are of a piece.

One difficulty in Fromm's theory is that the self tends to evaporate into its relationships. The self is realized in certain customary modes of social interaction, but it is not clear as to the content of the self which is interacting. Fromm's concept of socially patterned defects, or defects which are structured into the life of a culture, seems to imply that there is a criterion of self-actualization more basic than that of the productive orientation.\(^1\) That is, one may be productively oriented to others in a culture which is defective and still be crippled in his character development. Apparently what is lacking in Fromm is some concept similar to Maslow's hierarchy of pre-potent needs. Self-actualization must be defined not only in terms of relationship, but also of need-fulfillment.

b) Humanistic conscience is interpersonal. The humanistic conscience has developed, like speech and thought, in a cultural matrix.

The human race...has formulated ethical norms in its religious and philosophical systems toward which the conscience of every indivi-\(^1\)

\(^{1}\text{Cf. Ibid., p. 221.}\)
dual must be orientated, if he is not to start from the beginning.\(^1\)

c) Grief- and shame-anxiety are involved in our interpersonal relationships. They are experienced not only in early family relationships, but in the contemporary relationships of adult life as well.

When man loses genuine relatedness, such as he does under an authoritarian system, he "feels powerless and extremely insecure."\(^2\) In order to escape this insecurity, which Fromm describes as the fear of separation and alone-ness, man may be willing to give up his spontaneity and individuality, living the life of an emotional invalid. As we described it above, man avoids grief-anxiety by suffering shame-anxiety, and secondarily the crippling defenses which must be marshalled to endure a chronic sensi-tivity to shame-anxiety.

Similarly, shame-anxiety relates to our interpersonal or cultural role. If in a marketing culture "one's value is determined by success on a competitive market, one's self-esteem is bound to be shaky and in constant need of confirmation by others."\(^3\) Here we see that security in interpersonal

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 172.  \(^2\)Fromm, Escape From Freedom..., p. 253.  
\(^3\)Fromm, Man for Himself..., p. 72.
relationships is the only basis on which we can build a self-system which is relatively free from anxiety.

From the above we can see, too, that anxiety relates to the \textit{structural} characteristics of the interpersonal environment, or the prevailing patterns within the culture. Thus, in a Calvinistic society guilt and shame are vastly enhanced. It is a socially patterned defect in such a society that its members suffer from anxiety.

d) The major characteristic of the productive orientation is love. Fromm equates love with spontaneity in \textit{Escape From Freedom}, and defines love as the "spontaneous affirmation of others", and the "union of the individual with others on the basis of the preservation of the individual self."\footnote{Fromm, \textit{Escape From Freedom}..., p. 261.} Similarly, in \textit{The Art of Loving}, love is defined as "an \textit{orientation of character} which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole."\footnote{Erich Fromm, \textit{The Art of Loving} (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956), p. 46.} The productive orientation and love are specifically correlated in this statement: "Genuine love is an expression of productiveness and implies care, respect, responsibility and
B. The Evaluative Function.

Fromm develops several conceptions which shed light upon the evaluative function and its relationship to ethics.

1. Intelligence and Reason.

One distinction made by Fromm is that between "intelligence" and "reason." Intelligence is the tool for manipulating physical things. For practical reasons we must often concentrate upon the quantitative and external characteristics of things. The greater significance and internal qualities of things may not be important to the manipulative task, and intelligence may ignore them. Intelligence, however, may be irrational from a larger perspective. The preoccupation of the paranoid person with superficial perceptual clues, in order to bend their meaning to his psychosis, is an extreme illustration.

Reason, on the other hand, has the dimension of depth which "reaches to the essence of things and processes." It is concerned for all of the dimensions of a thing, especially as they illuminate its meaning. Man comprehends the

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1 Ibid., p. 59. 2 Fromm, Man for Himself..., p. 103.
world in two ways—through reason and through love. Reason enables him to relate to objects by penetrating through their surface and grasping their essence. Love helps him to relate to other persons.

To be irrational, then, is to miss the significant or essential aspects of the world by concentrating narrowly upon their surface aspects. Fromm uses "irrational" in another connection, too. "Irrational faith" is "the belief in a person, idea, or symbol which does not result from one's experience of thought or feeling, but which is based on one's emotional submission to irrational authority."¹ "Irrational authority", in turn, is authority which roots in manipulative power, rather than in competence.² "Irrational doubt" is doubt which stems from unconscious emotional conflict, and is a compulsive irrationa- lization of inner despair and isolation.³

What do these definitions of irrational have in common? They all relate to thought or behavior which may be internally consistent, but which is circumscribed by the demands of a narrowly confined task. The task may be that

¹Ibid., p. 201.  ²Cf. Ibid., p. 9.
³Cf. Ibid., 199-201.
of manipulating things, or that of ruling or submitting to others within a power syndrome, or that of finding a tolerable basis for enduring one's neuroses. In every case the ratiocination required to accomplish such a task is "irrational" in a larger context. In the light of one's total well-being it is seen as distortive and incoherent.

2. Productive Thinking.

Fromm sheds further light on this in his discussion of reason and character. He says: "The mature, productive, rational person will choose a system which permits him to be mature, productive and rational."\(^1\) One's system of ideas will reflect his character. Thinking is a product of character; one tends to distort the significance of reality according to his character orientation. Thus the exploitative person will use intelligence to appropriate things and to justify that appropriation. Our typical Western "marketing" orientation puts a premium upon the kind of thinking which enables us most easily to grasp and hoard things, and to grade and degrade people.

Productive character, then, results in productive thinking. The productive person relates to the objects of

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 49.
thought in the same way that he relates to other persons in love. He cares about the object, which arouses his interest precisely because it is "relevant from the standpoint of his individual life or that of human existence."\(^1\) He responds to his object, and respects it, or is content to allow it to retain its own unique configuration. Objectivity is possible only to the mature, productive person who sees "the object as it is and not as he wishes it to be."\(^2\)

Rational thinking, then, is thinking which issues from the fullness of the productive orientation. It issues from the coherent integrity of a mature personality, and defends and supports that which leads to mature personality in others. Whether or not a particular act is "rational" is defined in terms of its total meaning within the context of one's life.

We should note here that for Fromm that which is moral, or right, or good, is identical with the rational. A sadistic person will distort any virtue, however subtly, to force it to serve his need to dominate and to hurt. Similarly, the feeling of obligation, or "oughtness" may

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 103.  \(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 104.
serve the interests of irrational authority-figures. Any act or expression which relates to a nonproductive personality orientation is both immoral and irrational, and for the same reasons. It is an aspect of a total situation which does not lead to personal wholeness. Any act or thought is validated contextually. One must discover its meaning in the personal-social milieu in which it occurs, and not apart from that milieu. If an act or thought is valid morally, it is also rationally valid, since the same criterion applies in either case. The moral is the reasonable; the reasonable is the moral.

3. Frames of Orientation.

Why does character relate so intimately to rationality? The answer to this question is found in the genesis and function of rational systems. Rational systems are imaginative constructs. Fromm uses the term "frames of orientation and devotion."¹ This is roughly equivalent to Adler's "schema of apperception." A person lives in the world by

constructing an all-inclusive mental picture of the world which serves as a frame of reference from which he can derive an answer

¹Ibid., p. 48.
to the question of where he stands and what he ought to do.\(^1\)

What is the motivation for this imaginative development? Man's own imaginative capacity is in part responsible. It is his curse as well as his blessing. Because man has self-awareness, he knows his powerlessness, his physical nature, and his impending death. He is out of harmony with nature because he is able to stand aloof from it. This means that he must give his own meaning to his existence, or live in boredom and discomfort. Man must "create a world of his own in which he can feel at home with himself and his fellow men."\(^2\) "He must give account to himself of himself, and of the meaning of his existence."\(^3\) Man cannot be himself and realize himself except as he relates to others within a fabric of meaning. Thus "moral aloneness", or a lack of relatedness to "values, symbols, patterns"\(^4\) is an intolerable situation, which he will avoid at all cost. The need to find meaning, or to grasp the decisive structural patterns which define the essence of situations and facilitate fulfillment in productive love, is at the heart of all cognition. Here we see that the need

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 47. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 41. \(^3\)Ibid., p. 41.  
to find meaning is intimately related to grief-anxiety. The desperate fear of being alone prods us to the cognitive assessment of the relationships which assure companionship.

This quest for meaning may be a matter of spiritual life or death. Our very identity as persons may be at stake. In an instrumentalized, materialistic culture, for instance, genuine relatedness may be threatened. Persons may relate to each other only via the narrow channel of tasks defined by the market. Competition makes real love difficult. Under such conditions, persons may suffer extreme insecurity. What is the source of this insecurity? "A profound doubt of one's own identity."1 We know who we are only as we relate to each other and to life through a coherent, adequate framework of values and norms. Any threat to that system is a threat to our identity, and hence to our psychic existence.

Must each man create his own system of values? Fromm assumes this to be true. Each person does not create in a vacuum, however. The culture in which he lives defines the limitations and the setting within which he will find

1Ibid., p. 254.
his place. For the most part Fromm stresses the limiting aspects of culture. In one passage, however, he stresses the enabling aspect of culture:

The human race, in the last five or six thousand years of its cultural development, has formulated ethical norms in its religious and philosophical systems toward which the conscience of every individual must be orientated, if he is not to start from the beginning.¹

Fromm notes that among thinkers in all ages and cultures "whose aim was the growth and happiness of man"² there has been an amazing degree of agreement in these values and norms.

Such systems are called "frames of orientation and devotion" because religious systems have this function of enabling self-fulfillment by relating persons meaningfully to others and to the universe. A neurosis, then, can be described as "a particular form of religion,"³ since it is a private orienting system.

We can point here to one apparent difficulty in Fromm's system. For him, obedience, self-sacrifice, and duty are terms which belong to an authoritarian ethic.⁴

¹Fromm, Man for Himself..., p. 172.
²Ibid., p. 172 ³Ibid., p. 49.
⁴Cf. especially Ibid., pp. 12 and following.
They are part and parcel with a crippling power system which does not trust men to choose rationally. Is it not true that duty and obedience may also relate to a humanistic ethic? The valid norms of a mature culture must still be assimilated by those within it who are growing into maturity. At some stages in their personality development the valid system will appear to be external and unwelcome. Perhaps no person ever becomes so productively oriented that some unreasonable and segmental desires do not occasionally tempt him.
III. Harry Stack Sullivan.

A. Anxiety and the Self-system.

1. The Meaning of Anxiety.

Harry Stack Sullivan ordinarily defines anxiety as it is experienced in its extreme manifestation. He terms it "uncanny emotion."\(^1\) Words such as dread, horror, loathing, and awe can be associated with it. It has "a sort of shuddering, not-of-this-earth component which is, I believe, a curious revival from very early emotional experience."\(^2\) Later we will see that Sullivan speaks of an anxiety gradient, which in various levels of intensity has different effects upon behavior. Like Freud's "signal anxiety", however, even minor twinges of uneasiness threaten to expose one to the full-dress horror of primitive "uncanny emotion." Only in infancy is the full, blazing intensity of this emotion felt; layers of defense and avoiding behavior-patterns are soon developed to protect the personality from this assault. In the organismic depths of our being, however, we never forget the pain of anxiety

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\(^2\) Ibid., p. 10.
at its worst, and the avoiding of anxiety becomes the major motive in all interpersonal relationships.

What is the source of anxiety? Anxiety is brought about by disturbance in interpersonal relationships. In earliest infancy, the anxious mother induces anxiety in her baby. Some emotional disturbance in the mind of a significant person in an infant's life disturbs the relationship of empathy, and the baby feels threatened.\(^1\) Sullivan considers empathy to be indefinable, but ordinarily identifies it with a relationship of tenderness.

Sullivan contrasts fear with anxiety. Fear is the "felt aspect of tension arising from danger to the existence or biological integrity of the organism."\(^2\) Fear can be diminished by satisfaction of physico-chemical needs. Anxiety, on the other hand, cannot be managed so easily. Anxiety comes by induction from another person, and hence cannot be released.\(^3\) We can differentiate needs and take appropriate action for their satisfaction, but "it is hard to get experience of anxiety in the past to fit into interpreting present instances of it, and anxiety can almost be said to cut off foresight."\(^1\) Anxiety is a paralyzing

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\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 9, 41.  \(^2\) Ibid., p. 50.  
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 43.  \(^4\) Ibid., p. 44.
emotion, something like a "blow on the head." It not only blocks further need satisfaction, it blocks comprehension of its own significance.

Sullivan differentiates three tension-systems which are the basic motivations ruling human life:

1. The first is the need for satisfaction of physico-chemical needs. (2) The second is the need for interpersonal security, which is expressed in anxiety. This is likely to be prepotent, in the sense that anxiety interferes with all other tensions. (3) The third is the need for sleep, or the phasic aspect of living which alternates with awareness. Unsatisfied needs and anxiety both tend to interfere with the need for sleep. Sullivan does not relate this to the cognitive awareness which an incompletely tension-system demands. Sleep is difficult for a neurotic person precisely because an uncompleted cognitive task continues to require alertness.

2. Guilt-anxiety.

It appears to be characteristic of interpersonal psychiatrists generally to ignore the phenomena of guilt.

1Ibid., pp. 314, 160.
It is ordinarily true that those theories which emphasize personality as a creative process of self-discovery and self-fulfillment within a social field are unlikely to think of guilt as the powerful factor Freud conceived it to be.

In *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* Sullivan makes only three references to guilt, each time simply listing it with shame, embarrassment, humiliation, and the like. He speaks of the "inculcation of guilt" as a factor in influencing the child to adopt the proper sex-role.¹ Again, punishment at the hands of the parents by which "the complex anxiety derivatives of shame and guilt are inculcated" is seen as the source of the deception which leads to covert thought.² Anxiety, he says, appears not only as awareness of itself, but also in the experience of "complex" emotions such as "embarrassment, shame, humiliation, guilt, and chagrin."³ These emotions result from past training and socialization, especially of a restrictive and punitive nature. To defend ourselves against them, we develop security operations designed to disparage others by imputing to them, or provoking in them, the same feelings.

¹Ibid., p. 219. ²Ibid., p. 345. ³Ibid., p. 379.
Thus all disparaging feelings root in anxiety, and re­
represent an attempt to expand one's own self-esteem in
relation to others.¹

Sullivan does discuss the hostility or rage 
components which Freud assigned to guilt. He shows that
"rage behavior" arises in the infant when "certain types 
of physical restraints" are imposed, especially those 
which threaten the oxygen supply and involve fear, or 
terror.² In the infant, this rage is likely to result 
when intense crying interferes with breathing. What is 
the situation most likely to lead to this? When both the
"danger of need and infantile anxiety induced by the
mother's anxiety" pose a double threat to the communal 
existence of the infant.³ In later childhood, we learn 
from angry parents the "peculiar utility of anger", and 
we express anger toward our toys and companions. Most 
people come to use anger frequently, especially as a sub­
stitute for anxiety. Mild anxiety calls out anger.

There may take place a further, unfortunate develop­
ment to this trend. Anger expressed against authority 
figures leads to punishment, usually accompanied by

¹Gf. Ibid., p. 379. ²Ibid., p. 211.
³Ibid., p. 54.
induction of parental anxiety. Here the peculiar combination of fear (threat of pain and other physico-chemical discomfort) and anxiety (threat arising from induction of an anxious feeling-tone from the interpersonal environment) provokes an angry reaction which only aggravates the situation by calling out more fear and anxiety. Anger learns to go underground. Resentment is called out, or the "felt aspect of rather complex processes which if expressed more directly, would have led to the repressive use of authority." Resentment must by its nature be concealed, and it is this concealed resentment, cut off from evaluative re-appraisal, which may eventually result in psychosomatic and other difficulties. It is important to see here that physical threat may or may not be accompanied by anxiety in the punishing parents. The anxious parent arouses more rage and is most anxious when the child expresses that rage.

Sullivan shows that anxiety and rage are closely linked to the evaluative processes which he calls "personification". In place of Freud's view that the infant ingests a foreign image of the angry parent, Sullivan

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 213.
develops the concept of "bad-me". In an interpersonal setting involving strong components of fear, anxiety, rage, and covert resentment, the child may develop the "rudimentary personification" of "bad-me". This is not an ingested image, but rather the child's own personification of himself, developed in an imaginative appraisal of his place in the interpersonal setting. As we will see, Sullivan regards this personification as a "dissociated system", along with "good-me" and "bad-me". In this way, he accounts for the relative autonomy of these components within the self, but not in Freud's terms of primitive ingestion, but rather in terms of intrapsychic evaluative processes.

Sullivan does not speak of guilt as self-directed hostility. Freud would see covert rage and resentment as being directed against the self. Presumably the epithet "bad-me" carries some of the same connotations. This would be indicated by Sullivan's linking resentment with psychosomatic difficulties, although even here he probably would not stress self-attack so much as a general disruption of physiological processes caused by chronic rage-reactions.

\[1\textit{Ibid.}, \text{pp. } 162, 206, 316.\]

Sullivan's ordinary use of the term "anxiety" is similar to our working definition of shame-anxiety. Anxiety arises in one system with one's prehended, perceived, or imagined significance or role in the interpersonal environment.

a) We saw above that the infant first knows anxiety as he prehends an anxious feeling-tone in his interpersonal environment.\(^1\) The primary source of this anxiety is the mother, or whoever relates to the infant in a mothering role. Why may the mother be anxious? Her social responsibility to turn her infant into an acceptable human being may be threatened by the child's behavior. His crying or restlessness may cast doubt upon her competence as a mother; her esteem in her mothering role is at stake. Similarly, if he plays with his genitals or indulges in similar shocking behavior, as he may very naturally do, her mothering role is immediately threatened. She will feel humiliated, thinking that surely a worthy mother should have a more chaste child, and this humiliation cuts deeply into her identity as a mother. This real

or presumed disapproval of herself as a mother creates her anxiety in relation to her baby. This will disturb her empathic relationship with him and change the qualitative tone of the interpersonal field in such a way that the baby experiences anxiety. In this connection, Sullivan summarizes:

Unless...I have very considerable and well-founded esteem for something that I do, another person's criticism of what I do, or even the suspicion that the other person feels critical toward me for what I do, is tantamount to my being anxious.¹

The circular way in which anxiety may be reinforced in an interpersonal field may be illustrated here. The mother being anxious about her role tends to make the baby more restless, which seems to justify the mother's disparagement of herself, to increase her anxiety, and to set up the sort of emotional cycle which so often leads to later difficulty.

b) The above discussion reveals the way in which anxiety relates to one's self-evaluation. This self-evaluation is relative to one's role in society. A further point is made by Sullivan: the self is created to avoid anxiety.

¹Ibid., p. 114.
Sullivan says that the infant very soon learns to personify three phases of himself—good-me, bad-me, and not-me. Good-me is the personification resulting from rewarding experiences of need-satisfaction and interpersonal tenderness. Bad-me, as we saw above, results from experiences of anxiety. Thus: "The essential desirability of being good-me is just another way of commenting on the essential undesirability of being anxious."¹ Now, warned by "slight forbidding", or "slight anxiety", a "secondary dynamism" is formed, which is the self-system.² The self-system is a dynamism employed to enable one to live with significant other persons.

The self-system thus is an organization of educative experience called into being by the necessity to avoid or to minimize incidents of anxiety.³

How is the self-system formed? Sullivan specifically contrasts the process of personification with Freud's "introjection", which he terms a "rather reckless oversimplification."⁴ Our rudimentary personifications of ourself lead to personification of the significant people

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¹Ibid., p. 165. ²Ibid., p. 164 and following. ³Ibid., p. 165. ⁴Ibid., p. 166.
who are separated from us visually and audibly. This process is an extremely complex one, and cannot be conceived as an ingestion of the values of another. We organize, creatively and imaginatively, both our conceptions of ourselves, and those of others.

The relation of personifications to that which is personified is always complex and sometimes multiple; and personifications are not adequate descriptions of that which is personified.¹

This personification of others utilizes visual cues of functional significance, such as forbidding gestures on the part of the mother.² It is always complex, in the sense that our image of "mother" never quite grows beyond the infantile multiple concepts of good-mother and bad-mother.³ It takes place through the organizing of signs and symbols, which are assessed in terms of their possible usefulness in integrating situations which will secure satisfaction and minimize anxiety.⁴ The process Sullivan describes is the evaluative function as we have described it. A personification is a "conceptual structure."⁵

¹Ibid., p. 167. ²Ibid., p. 118. ³Ibid., p. 188. ⁴Ibid., p. 119. ⁵Ibid., p. 361.
We have seen that Sullivan describes the self-system as a dynamism. What is implied in this term? Sullivan refers to Alfred North Whitehead and his concept of the universe as an organism. The ultimate reality in the universe is energy, the organismic structuring of which may be called a dynamism. Any living organism is a particular dynamism made up of subdynamisms. A dynamism is the smallest useful abstraction which can be employed to study an organism. It is

the relatively enduring pattern of energy transformations which recurrently characterize the organism in its duration as a living organism.\(^1\)

The psychiatrist is especially interested in the enduring patterns which "recurrently characterize the interpersonal relations...which make up the distinctively human sort of being."\(^2\) What are those patterns? "The functional interplay of persons and personifications, personal signs, personal abstractions, and personal attributions."\(^3\)

The self-system, then, is a cognitive construct created by organizing the interpersonal milieu relative to its significance for meeting needs, but especially

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 103. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 103. \(^3\)Ibid., p. 103.
for escaping anxieties. Sullivan usually speaks of this as an unfortunate development. Once formed, the self-system "is the principle stumbling block to favorable changes in personality", although mercifully "also the principle influence that stands in the way of unfavorable changes in the personality."¹ The self-system is formed primarily to avoid anxiety by protecting our self-esteem. It is "involved in all inadequate and inappropriate living and is quite central to the whole problem of personality disorder and its remedy."²

Sullivan does not share the insight of Adler and Fromm at this point. Anxiety may stimulate one into formulating a wholesome self-system. Crippling and excessive anxiety is ordinarily the source of the rigid self-system described by Sullivan. Adler and Fromm would view as pathological the compulsive self whose only goal is security and physico-chemical satisfaction.

c) We have seen that anxiety is induced in the infant in an interpersonal field where the relationship of empathy has been disturbed. The infant feels threatened,
and is stimulated to undertake the evaluative formulation of self-systems. These systems are cognitive constructs which are perpetuated tenaciously as a means to achieve interpersonal security. This may be a self-defeating development. Under certain conditions, a person may come to suffer from low self-esteem. "Feelings of inferiority", Sullivan says, should be described as low self-esteem, in which "the person's personification of himself is not very estimable by comparison with his personifications of significant other people." The process of self-evaluation and personification taking place in an interpersonal field which is anxiety-ridden may lead to a chronic condition of low self-esteem.

We should note here the way in which the process may be circular, although Sullivan does not specifically relate this. Shame-anxiety leads to the personification of oneself as inferior; this gives some relief to anxiety by lowering one's expectations. At least then the "good-me" personification does not demand a great deal. An inferior rating of self also helps to explain the anxiety; that is, the anxiety is lessened somewhat if it can be

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1Ibid., p. 350.
given a justifiable meaning. This is a trap, however. A low self-esteem makes one more sensitive to possible shame-provoking situations, and tends to isolate one socially, which only aggravates the anxiety problem it was designed to solve.

B. Anxiety and the Interpersonal Field.

Sullivan considered psychiatry to be closely related to social psychology. The field of psychiatry is "the field of interpersonal relations."¹ The psychiatrist does not treat an individual in isolation. He is "a participant observer interacting with his patients in the context of life as it has to be lived."² That which is immutably private in each individual can never be the object of scientific study, and in fact is "invariably much less significant in the person's living than he has been taught to believe."³

One does not study an isolated individual in psychiatry, then. He studies an interpersonal situation. In fact, Sullivan defines personality as "the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations

²Ibid., p. vi. ³Ibid., p. vii.
which characterize a human life."¹ This does not mean that the person is only a passive recipient of environmental realities. Sullivan often speaks in such a way as to suggest a doctrine of the vacuous self. He means that to study a person is to study his situation, or "the action which indicates the situation and the character of its integration."² The person is active in affecting that integration, or in some cases disintegration.

1. We have already observed that anxiety is interpersonal in character. Anxiety can be expressed as the "need for interpersonal security."³ It is a disturbance of "empathy", which is described as a "peculiar emotional linkage" of any person with significant others; it is "emotional contagion or communion."⁴ More specifically, anxiety is the empathized feeling-tone of an interpersonal situation in which the significant other is disapproving of one's worth or behavior. Disapproval by others may or may not be real; it may be a misreading of cues by one who is predisposed to find disapproval because his personification of himself or others renders

¹Ibid., p. vi. ²Patrick Mullahy, in Ibid., p. 123.
³Ibid., p. 43.
⁴Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern..., p. 8.
him chronically supersensitive. Here we see that anxiety is a sensitive meter to one's fluctuating evaluation of himself-in-situation. Another word for this complex conceptual image is role. We saw above that it is in terms of her role as mother that a woman is anxious in the presence of her baby.\(^1\)

2. Some reference was made above to the person's activity in integrating his situation. It is important to understand what Sullivan means by "integrating tendencies".

It can generally be said that Sullivan lacks any conception of self-realization as a "prepotent dynamic force", to use Adler's term. Persons are motivated, not by a teleological impulse to realize self, but by the need to satisfy the biochemical demands necessary to sustain life, and the need for interpersonal security. In this connection we may examine Sullivan's conception of "power motive". He speaks of the "experiences of unexpected powerlessness" which come to the baby upon the interruption of an accustomed process.\(^2\) Ordinarily when

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 70-72.
the baby cries the mother's nipple appears; but the baby soon learns to his chagrin that crying does not always produce the nipple. His illusions of "magical potency" have been punctured, and he doubts the utility of his vocal apparatus.

This feeling of powerlessness represents a rather disturbing development in an infant's life, and very quickly stimulates the rudimentary cognitive processes which lead to foresight and recall.¹ The infant feels the need to understand cause-and-effect relationships in order to improve the instruments he uses to secure his biochemical needs. The "power motive" is here seen at work. Sullivan agrees with Adler that a "power drive" as dominance over others is a pathological development. The power motive is the activity whereby the person satisfies his needs and expands and maintains himself in his environment. It is the will to reach out and to interact effectively with widening circles of the environment.²

The need for interpersonal security is subordinate to the power motive, and arises from early feelings of

¹Cf. Ibid., pp. 38 and 71-72.
²Cf. Patrick Mullahy, in Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern..., p. 121.
helplessness. In the interests of survival, the infant must integrate his situation. The earliest illustration of this is that of the infant's lips and the mother's nipple. Even this relatively simple operation requires integration of "sundry interpersonal infant-mother situations."¹ As the infant matures, we note increasing "development of the appropriate dynamisms for integrating and maintaining situations", and the choice of "appropriate and adequate energy transformations or activities for the achievement of the resolution of the situation."² Integration involves a great deal of interpersonal cooperation. We can think of the power motive as an "integrating tendency", or an innate tendency to create and maintain a situation.³

How does anxiety relate to the integrating tendency? To see this we must speak of the need for tenderness. "Need!" for Sullivan, always refers to peripheral or biochemical desires. We do not often see the Gestalt concept of need as a tension-system in presence of a goal, or the concept of ego-needs as Hartmann devel-

¹Sullivan, Interpersonal Theory..., p. 93.
²Ibid., p. 151. ³Gf. Ibid., p. 96.
oped it. Biochemical need may, however, be spoken of functionally as "integrating tendency", and secondarily as the "need for tenderness." That is, satisfaction of all needs requires the "tender cooperation of another." All needs may then "be considered as implying, at the interpersonal level, a need for tenderness." ¹

How does anxiety relate to tenderness? Anxiety interferes with this relationship of tenderness, and hence is a direct threat to the existence of the organism.

Anxiety is a disjunctive or disintegrative tendency in interpersonal relations, which opposes the manifestation of any integrative tendency in the work of creating and maintaining an interpersonal situation. ²

Not only does anxiety interfere with the relationship of tenderness, it is the result of such interference. In the infant, the mother's anxiety blocks her expression of tenderness, and arouses anxiety in turn in her infant. This takes a more complex form in childhood:

A child may discover that manifesting the need for tenderness toward the potent figures around him leads frequently to being disadvantaged, being made anxious, being made fun of, and so on, so that, according to the locution used, he is hurt, or in some cases he is literally hurt. ³

¹Ibid., p. 99. ²Ibid., p. 95. ³Ibid., p. 214.
Consistent rebuff of tenderness, then, leads to shame-anxiety, which in turn blocks further expression of tenderness and of integrating tendencies generally. This is especially true when rebuff of the tenderness causes one to personify himself as inferior. A low self-esteem is a serious handicap to the manifestation of "conjunctive motivations." The leading conjunctive motivation is love, which "has its great root tendencies in the many impulses which make up the need for intimacy." We see evidenced here a degenerative cycle:

a) Rebuff of tenderness leads to anxiety, which results in:

b) Low self-esteem, and consequent exposure to further anxiety, which in turn leads to:

c) Social isolation and disjunctive motivations, secondary defenses which result in further deprivation of tenderness, and finally chronic anxiety.

Similarly, the expression of tenderness when it is not rebuffed allows the development of love, or the experience of intimacy. This experience "permits validation of all components of personal worth." This facilitates develop-

\[1\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 350. \ 2\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 351. \ 3\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 246.\]
ment of mutuality in interpersonal striving, or the sense of team spirit. A reward structure of prestige and status may develop in which persons may be relatively free from anxiety.

We see here the basic insight we noted in both Adler and Fromm. Anxiety is a phenomenon which interacts within one dynamic system with the need for fulfillment in love. This leads Sullivan to express a criterion of maturity very similar to that of Adler and Fromm. In maturity anxiety will be decreased as the need for intimacy is fulfilled. Mature persons

will be quite sympathetically understanding of the limitations, interests, possibilities, anxieties, and so on of those among whom they move or with whom they deal.\(^1\)

3. We may now return to the distinction we made in the Fromm section between shame-anxiety and grief-anxiety. This can be done most clearly in the light of Sullivan's rubric "loneliness." He says:

The fact that loneliness will lead to integrations in the face of severe anxiety automatically means that loneliness in itself is more terrible than anxiety.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 310. \quad ^{2}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 262.\)
We might take loneliness to be a situation characterized by a great deal of grief-anxiety, or personal threat growing out of deprivation of love. As a person attempts to seek love by expressing tenderness, he may be "taken advantage of", humiliated, and embarrassed, especially if his self-esteem level is low. This humiliation is shame-anxiety, or threat to the self-esteem. To Sullivan grief-anxiety is more intolerable than shame-anxiety. Sullivan also shows us that shame-anxiety is derivative of grief-anxiety, at least in the sense that as the person seeks to overcome loneliness he is often met with humiliation. The self-system was initiated in the first place as a means of averting the helplessness of abandonment; once it is formed it exposes us not only to the primordial fear of abandonment, but now also to the fear of self-dissolution.

4. It is in this context that we must examine Sullivan's term "malevolent transformation." When children find that the expression of tenderness often leads to being made fun of or put at a disadvantage, "the development course changes to the point that the perceived need for tenderness brings a foresight of anxiety and pain."¹ Under

¹Ibid., p. 214.
these circumstances the youngster begins to personify other persons as enemies, and the environment generally as a place of danger. This trend often starts a vicious circle, since it prompts behavior which brings angry retaliation and confirms its own suspicions. The child begins to think: "Once upon a time everything was lovely, but that was before I had to deal with people."¹

Since shame-anxiety is the source of the malevolent transformation, we see another cyclical development. A great deal of shame-anxiety leads to chronic low self-esteem. This combined with the personification of others as enemies may lead to disparagement, which Sullivan characterizes as one of the most unfortunate trends in personal development. Disparagement is the maintenance of self-esteem by pulling down the standing of others. Sullivan expresses it as "the doctrine that if you are a molehill, then, by God, there shall be no more mountains."²

This trend is tragic, because it purports to build security by striking at the roots of the interpersonal relations which might allow security. It distorts evaluation of personal worth by destroying valid standards.

¹Ibid., p. 216. ²Ibid., p. 309.
of excellence. It reinforces the disjunctive motivation of hate. Worse, it tends to lead to social isolation, to concealment of one's feelings, and hence it blocks the important relearning opportunities of adolescence which could facilitate a reflective re-appraisal of one's own worth. We will see this as we discuss the importance of "consensual validation."

Here we have noted that hatred and disparagement are distorted personality developments. They result when a person is prevented from growing into love by an excess of anxiety. Hatred, as Sullivan says, is "a derivation of anxiety." ¹

C. Anxiety and the Evaluative Function.

1. Modes of Experience.

Corresponding roughly to Freud's distinction between primary and secondary process, Sullivan defines various modes of experience. By experience he means the "'inner' elaboration of events." ² It becomes apparent that this elaboration of events is the assessing of their meaning or significance to the person, and the organizing of those meanings into coherent cognitive structures which

¹Ibid., p. 351. ²Ibid., p. 29.
facilitate and guide action. Use of the term "mode" indicates that Sullivan is discussing methods of functioning. We are talking about the evaluative function.

Sullivan differentiates three modes of functioning, the prototaxic, the parataxic, and the syntaxic. Freud's term "primary process" encompasses the first two, and "secondary process" the third. Freud's classification of "unconscious", "preconscious", and "conscious" is suggested here—but Freud's language is static, and his classification suggests a structural truncation of the self.

a) Prototaxic mode.

The prototaxic mode is "the simplest, the earliest, and possibly the most abundant mode of experience."¹ In the earliest stages of life it is very close to the type of experience which is usually termed sentience. The prototaxic mode of experience is the simple prehension of "the discrete series of momentary states of the sensitive organism, with special reference to the zones of interaction with the environment."²

Sullivan is careful to affirm that prototaxic experience is experience, not simply biological behavior.

¹Ibid., p. 29. ²Ibid., p. 29; cf. also p. 75.
alone. Representation is involved. Further, the entire organism-environment complex is organized and elaborated in each moment of this experience.¹ One aspect of this organization is the tensional history of the organism. Tension, or "potentiality for action"² is a felt discomfort in the prototaxic mode which soon begins to be differentiated in terms of "direction toward its relief, which amounts to increasingly clear foresight of relief by appropriate action."³ These tensions include both physico-chemical need and anxiety. We note here a concept of gradient anxiety which both stimulates rudimentary cognition and is a feeling tone concomitant with it. Sullivan specifically identifies anxiety at this point with goal-tension, and refers to Kurt Lewin's theory of tensions.⁴

We mentioned the representative nature of prototaxic experience. Sullivan utilizes three terms in this connection: signs, signals, and symbols. A sign is:

A particular pattern in the experience of events which is differentiated from or within the general flux of experience

¹Gf. Ibid., pp. 75-ff. ²Ibid., p. 35. ³Ibid., p. 38. ⁴Gf. Ibid., p. 35.
(at this stage of life prototaxic experience); and their differentiation occurs in terms of recall and foresight.\(^1\)

The complex organization of experience which includes the tactile and thermal sentience of the mother's nipple in the mouth comes to "mean foreseen satisfaction,"\(^2\) and hence is a sign that satisfaction will follow. This total experiential unit with its "meaning" or anticipatory cue to immanent satisfaction is also a \textit{signal}, in that it signals or triggers off nursing reactions. This experience comes to be elaborated according to its significance into good and satisfactory nipple which satisfies hunger and signals nursing activity; good and unsatisfactory nipple which gives milk the infant does not want, and signals rejection; the wrong nipple-in-lips which gives no milk and signals rejection; and the evil nipple of the anxious mother which arouses painful anxiety and signals avoidance.

We observe here an important variant from Freud's theory of early symbol-formation. Freud assumed a dichotomy to exist between early somatic sensations and the symbols constructed by the psyche to make reference to them. The model here is that of aesthetics, or the construction of symbols. Sullivan sees the early pre-

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 77.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 76.
hension to be a complex organismic integration of an entire state of the organism-in-environment, together with the feeling-tone which qualifies it as a referent to appropriate activity and the processes of recall and foresight. The model here is not the aesthetic construction of symbols which apply to somatic states, but rather the cognitive apprehension of a complex organismic state the feeling-tone of which defines its significance.

As visual and auditory capacities mature sufficiently to allow distance perception, symbols are discriminated. Symbols are "signs of signs", or "signs of categories of signs."\(^1\) Specifically, the infant experiences certain organismic states which include discrimination of vocal tones, gestures, and facial expressions on the part of the mother. These are prehended in one complex unity with their feeling-tone of anxiety. Thus a motion may be apprehended as a "forbidding gesture"; it means anxiety which requires avoiding activities of one kind or another.\(^2\)

At the most rudimentary levels of perception, percepts carry symbolic meaning with reference to their

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 87.  \(^2\)Gf. Ibid., p. 86.
value in satisfying needs or their disvalue in triggering anxiety.

From the very beginning the potent influence of anxiety permits the organization of experience, prevents the organization of experience, or gradually shoos the direction of experience into approved channels. Thus it is quite obvious that a great deal of what goes on by the time one is a year old, even if it is inborn, is very highly symbolic.

b) Parataxic Mode.

Patrick Mullahy describes Sullivan’s concept of parataxic mode as the level of maturation in which "the original undifferentiated wholeness of experience is broken." The discrete parts of experience, or states of the organism, are not related or connected logically. They simply occur in serial order with no sense of temporal connection or logical order. "The child cannot yet relate them to one another or make logical distinctions among them." This description of the parataxic mode does not entirely do justice to Sullivan’s own descriptions. While it may be true that parataxic experience is not

1 Ibid., p. 186. 2 Mullahy, in Ibid., p. 28. 3 Ibid., p. 28.
characterized by logico-verbal distinctions, its contents do have coherent order achieved by a creative process, as we shall see.

Parataxic experience may be described first of all as covert rather than overt experience. This term "covert" substitutes for Freud's "unconscious." It may express Freud's intent better than the Freudian term does, since it has more dynamic connotations. It describes a mode of functioning rather than a simple dearth of awareness. It implies that active forces may be at work to prevent its coming into awareness. Thus Sullivan says that symbol operations connected with lust are most often conducted in the parataxic mode, because "the culture is so hard" on verbal communication relative to lust.¹

Elsewhere Sullivan describes this experience as autistic. "Autistic" is an adjective by which we indicate a primary, unsocialized, unacculturated state of symbol activity, and later states pertaining more to this primary condition than to the conspicuously effective consensually validated symbol activities of more mature personality.²

¹Gf. Ibid., p. 286.
²Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern..., p. 17.
Autistic experience is the private use of symbols, including verbal symbols learned from other persons. What is the significance of autistic thinking? It is "sub-limitory reformulation of patterns of behavior and covert process."¹ That is, in early childhood it is learned that certain social values or ethical judgments of worth as expressed in moral tales will be a source of shame-anxiety for the child. They will be surrounded by expressions of disapproval of him, and repressive measures to control his conduct. He learns the contrast between what can be expressed or revealed and "what goes on but must be treated as if it did not," or which "must remain covert in the presence of authority figures."² The child wants more information on these considerations, but experiences anxiety in expressing them, so asks apparently pointless questions to conceal what is being inquired about. If he suddenly finds that he has revealed himself, and perhaps suffers indignity or punishment because of it, he may even come to the conviction that adults are capable of reading his mind.

¹Sullivan, Interpersonal Theory..., p. 234.
²Ibid., p. 220.
Under certain circumstances a great deal of this sublimatory evaluation goes on. If the child has a very active imagination, and is lonely, he has a "very rich fantasy life." He may have no audience or significant participation with others, so "makes up for the real deficiencies by multiplying the so-called imaginary personifications" which preoccupy him. He may not be able to distinguish these fantasies from "reality", and as he attempts to relate to other people may be humiliated by exposure of material which is repelling to them. This process may become circular.

Already the child has had to develop a very rich fantasy life to make up for the lack of audience and of participation by the authority figures, and from this lack the child is apt to be relatively undeveloped in the very quick discrimination of what is his private fantasy and what may be sensually validated; that in turn exposes the juvenile to ridicule, punishment, and what not, and so tends to give the feeling of risk in life.

We can see here the close connection between these covert imaginative or referential processes and fear of humiliation, or shame-anxiety. Anxious about areas of his life which bring disapproval to him, but afraid to discuss them

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1Ibid., p. 223. 2Ibid., p. 223. 3Ibid., p. 225.
openly, the child attempts to interpret them by his own private fantasy. Low self-esteem, or a low personification of himself relative to others may tend to make him avoid them except on the level of insignificant or external contact, which now stimulates fantasy as a means of giving himself someone to talk to. Fantasy in both cases plays a positive and important role in the protection and, hopefully, the eventual fulfillment of his personality.

What is the functional methodology, or operating mode of such fantasy?

In his discussion of the covert and overt symbolic processes associated with lust, Sullivan describes the way in which the parataxic evaluation of events takes place.\(^1\) We may integrate in this graphic description other statements which amplify various facets of it:

(1) **Observation and identification** of experience with reference to several factors:

(a) The felt aspects of the inner tendency, in this case the tendency toward expression of lust. Presumably this involves identification, and the assessment of both its relative intensity and the rising or falling trend of that intensity.

(b) The interpersonal situation as including an "object", or a fitting subject with whom a lustful situation may be integrated. If the interpersonal environment is evaluated as bereft of a fitting object, some satisfaction may be obtained by the personification of an object in fantasy. Personification in itself is a highly complex process, as we noted above. There is more than personification involved here, however. In such fantasy there is the dramaturgic construction of an interpersonal situation peopled with the appropriate characters. This imaginary scene functions as a means both to provide substitute satisfaction and to define and clarify the steps which are required to achieve more permanent satisfaction. Elsewhere Sullivan points out that learning proceeds mainly by education, or the "pulling out of relations."\(^1\) We might better say the creative construction of relations which are more or less veridical.

(c) The interpersonal situation as to its total suitability for satisfaction of lust. A fitting object may be present, but integration may be inappropriate under certain circumstances. Anxiety relates directly to situations where "incongruity and inappropriateness are about

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 156.
to become evident," Sullivan says elsewhere.\(^1\) "Interpersonal environment" here is a cognitive construct, or a private perspective which may be more or less valid as it is projected upon the real situation. Anxiety relates to cognitive inappropriateness.

(d) The interpersonal situation as characterized with respect to anxiety. This involves, as Sullivan says elsewhere, "the old game of getting hotter or colder", or the charting of behavior with an inner eye to the rising and falling intensities of gradient anxiety. The inner assessment of this trend is taken as a signal that contemplated behavior is inappropriate, and adjustments are made where possible. Gradient anxiety, then, does permit the realization of the situation in which it occurs, by stimulating more careful attention to the cognitive requirements of the situation and by inhibiting incongruous behavior under threat of intense and disabling panic. Thus Sullivan says that of outstanding importance to our coming to be human beings acceptable to our society

\[\text{is learning on the basis of the anxiety gradient}--\text{that is, learning to discriminate increasing from diminishing anxiety}\]

\(^{1}\)\text{iibid., p. 300.}
and to alter activity in the direction of the latter.¹

(2) In addition to observation and identification, foresight may be an aspect of parataxic experience. Foresight can be described as the imaginative projection of what might be expected to occur in the immediate future. Such projection is an extension of the conceived trends in the gradients of anxiety and need as they interact with the creative anticipation of trends in the total situation. Sullivan points out that projection is really foresight. Such anticipation of future experience is inadequate only if it is distorted by some exaggerated emotional need.²

(3) Activity in pursuit of avoidance of a goal is accompanied by many covert referential processes which represent an in-process assessment of progress and the prospect of satisfying culmination.

(4) Finally, witting and unwitting retrospective and prospective analysis takes place to evaluate the total meaning of the experience recently completed. There is always "some review and prospective analysis, with the idea of improving one's capacity for achieving contentment and success in this field of life."³

¹Ibid., p. 152. ²Cf. Ibid., p. 359. ³Ibid., p. 287.
This assimilation of an experience, Sullivan further says, is influenced by the personality warp of other persons in the integrated situation.

(5) We must add another aspect to this para-
taxic experiencing, which Sullivan does not integrate with the above schema, but discusses in reference to experience in the syntactic mode. Many complex covert processes are going on which channel aspects of a situation into "focal awareness" (consciousness) and exclude others from such awareness. Components of an experience may be unrepresented in focal awareness "due to selective inattention, to masking processes, to misinterpretation, or to the manifestation of a dissociative process in the self."¹ We customarily ignore aspects of an experience which are of little moment or significance to us. We may ordinarily make this complex judgment of an event's insignificance and the steps needed to ignore it without being in any sense aware that we have done so. More important, we may forcibly ignore aspects of an event which are of the highest importance, because the anxiety surrounding them is too great.² In a real sense, they are of such great signifi-

¹Ibid., p. 288. ²Gf. Ibid., p. 233.
cance that we do not trust ourselves to face them. A dissociative system is an entire range of experience which is assigned to a "not-me" personification to avoid the pain of facing its overwhelming significance and massive threat.¹

As anxiety blocks some events from awareness, it also thrusts others into awareness. Thus:

Effective manifestations of awareness are sternly shepherded by anxiety to be more or less in the syntactic mode—the mode of experience which offers some possibility of predicting the novel, and some possibility of real interpersonal communication.

One's personification of his "good-me" or ideal self is employed as a frame of reference to evaluate the potential worth of an event. Events forboding massive threat are dissociated or disowned; events of little significance are ignored; events of significance which can be used effectively are guided into focal awareness. Dissociated systems, unfortunately, do not go away. Being unresolved, they tend to divert interest to themselves. Apparently minor signs of a dissociated system become the subject of intense pre-occupation.³ Intra-psychic attention is diverted to the

place of greatest significance, even as the eye tends to focus on the point of brightest light. Interest and attention always reflect judgments of value.¹

c) Syntaxic Mode.

The syntaxic mode of experience is that which utilizes symbols which have been "consensually validated." A symbol has been consensually validated when "a consensus can be established with someone else."² Under the appropriate circumstances such symbols "work quite precisely with other people."³ Consciousness, or "focal awareness" centers around them precisely because they are so valuable for interpersonal communication. Ordinarily such symbols are words, although gestures and facial expressions may evoke predictable, dependable meanings.⁴

What is the functional significance of symbols in the syntaxic mode? For the small child words are used "as pictures might be used in a book; they decorate, concentrate, or illuminate referential processes which are not verbal."⁵ Even for adults, "most of living goes on" by means of "nonverbal referential processes" or wordless

¹See also Sullivan's conception of "fascination," Ibid., p. 322.
²Ibid., p. 224. ³Ibid., p. 224. ⁴Cf. Ibid., p. 183.
thinking.\textsuperscript{1} The major function of syntaxic symbols is to facilitate dependable communication with others. This communication is crucial for many reasons:

First, it allows gratification of the intimacy needs which are so important to self-fulfillment.\textsuperscript{2} Second, it allows "validation of personal worth."\textsuperscript{3} Distorted personifications of the self which are formulated in imagination may be re-evaluated and corrected by dependable knowledge of others. Third, it allows the wider range of experience "which is needed for the correct appraisal of the situation with respect to its significance."\textsuperscript{4} Not only one's own worth, but the total environment may be more adequately evaluated through dependable communication with others. Fourth, wherever communication with others can take place in a protective atmosphere of love and respect, there is the possibility that dissociated systems can re-enter intrapsychic communication and be assimilated into the total personality.\textsuperscript{5} Sullivan sees adolescent friendships and psychotherapy as instances of this kind of redemptive fellowship.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 185.  \textsuperscript{2}Cf. Ibid., p. 246.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 246.  \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 262.

\textsuperscript{5}Cf. Ibid., p. 327.
CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL INDICATIONS FOR A VIEW OF OBLIGATION

Having surveyed various psychiatric theories in their treatment of guilt, shame, and evaluation, we now seek to develop a coherent view of obligation based upon those theories.

Four conclusions will be drawn in this chapter. The first two are offered in support of the thesis that conscience is functionally cognitive. Conscience is identified with obligation, which is seen to be a complex experience of shame, guilt, and interest. It is noted that the experience of obligation is intimately correlated with evaluation. Where there is an apparent break or discontinuity between them, as in neurotic guilt, continuity is discovered at a deeper level of intrapsychic discourse.

The second two conclusions go beyond the form of obligation to indicate its content. The central core of all evaluation is the inherent ideal of self-actualization in harmony with social requirements.

In general, the work of Freud and that of the interpersonal psychiatrists will be summarized and comparisons made between them. Where the argument is strengthened or
the major ideas enriched by the introduction of other relevant psychological material, such material is employed. Thus reference is made to Helen Lynd, Robert White, A. H. Maslow, Peter A. Bertocci, and Theodore R. Sarbin, among others.
I. Obligation as a Complex Anxiety-Interest Experience.

Obligation is a complex experience which encompasses the vague threat of anxiety on the one hand, and organismic engrossment in an uncompleted task, or interest, on the other.

A. Guilt, Shame, and Gradient Anxiety.

In the introduction to this study reference was made to the distinction which Gerhart Piers made between guilt and shame. Of all the forms of intrapsychic tension, he says, those resulting in feelings of guilt and shame are most important. He points to the necessity for drawing a sharp distinction between the two.

Following this provisional distinction, we studied guilt and shame in Freudian theory and the interpersonal theories of Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan. We noted that Freud was primarily interested in guilt-related phenomena to the neglect of shame, whereas the interpersonal psychiatrists saw shame as the most decisive determinant of behavior, and either followed Freud's definition of guilt or used the term as a synonym for shame.

1. Guilt. Freud's pioneering genius is responsible for the major concepts and assumptions about guilt in modern psychotherapy. We may point to the following conclusions
drawn from our study of his work:

(a) Guilt is a species of anxiety. Freud's earliest view was that guilt is social anxiety, or fear of loss of love, and hence the threat of abandonment. Later, he defined guilt as a variety of anxiety, to a great extent unconscious.

(b) Guilt involves self-directed hostility. Freud saw this hostility in two ways, corresponding to his two theories of aggression. First, it is the introjected condemnation which is integrally related to the punitive parental image, and hence a self-attack in the role of authority-surrogate. Second, he sees it as the eternal death-instinct, originally directed against the father, but turned back on oneself because of remorse at the thought of the Oedipal murder of the father. We suggested the possibility that this self-directed hostility may relate to the reactive theory of aggression, which sees hostility as a normal reaction to the thwarting of a conative drive. In a guilt-related experience I react with hostility to my own role as thwarting agent. Sullivan lends some weight to this possibility with his conception of the "bad-me" personification. In an interpersonal setting involving strong components of fear, anxiety, rage, and resentment, the child comes to conceive of himself as worthy of punishment, and hence the
object of his own anger. At any rate, Freud noted that a large measure of the anxiety related to guilt stems from one's hostile attack upon his own ego, either in the adopted role of righteous authority, or the self-defined role of agent of deprivation.

(c) Super-ego guilt of the rigid, sadistic-masochistic type relates to unresolved childhood dilemmas, especially those surrounding the violent love-hate feelings which the growing child experiences within the family circle. This concept of the super-ego as introjected authority is considered to be normative in orthodox psychoanalysis, and is often identified with the entire range of morality. Morality, according to this view, is an irrational element in human nature, characterized by megalomania and exaggerated narcissism. The formation of the super-ego is a defense mechanism to protect against anxiety engendered in violation of a parental norm or law.

(d) Freud points beyond his own system to guilt as an ego-function, or anxiety arising from a contemporary moral dilemma. In his discussion of ego defenses, for instance, we see the defenses are reactions to subconscious signal-anxiety. His illustrative material shows the source of this anxiety to be mainly the transgression of interpersonal rules, either in
reality or in imaginative anticipation. Freud's discussion of dreams and wit reveals the same process. The creative formulations which are made in dreams are an attempt to resolve the personal dilemma surrounding a forbidden wish. Similarly, tendency wit is an attempt to avoid the guilt-anxiety which would be engendered in a naked expression of some forbidden wish.

2. Shame. Freud's statement that guilt attacks and diminishes the ego, causing more intense anxiety, points toward a deeper layer of psychic functioning which is threatened by a guilt-related situation. Not only the relationship between the ego and external norms is at stake, but the inner integrity of the ego itself is in danger. Gerhart Piers and Helen Lynd identify this deeper anxiety as shame.

Adler showed that shame-anxiety relates to self-evaluation; it is threat to the comparative worth of the self, not only in relation to others, but in relation to one's own ideal of self. Evaluations which compare oneself with others, such as we see in sibling rivalry, are only the occasion for challenge or confirmation of one's own drive toward self-perfection.

Fromm speaks of the craving for self-approval which gives rise to anxiety. This anxiety is the voice of the
humanistic conscience, which roots in the need to retain internal integrity and personal fulfillment.

Similarly, Sullivan's ordinary use of the term "anxiety" corresponds to this schema. Anxiety is "need for interpersonal security", which first stimulates creation of the self-system in order to organize experience into some manageable form, and which thereafter fluctuates with one's evaluation of one's performance in the role chosen.

Helen Lynd offers a rich description of the painful experiences which enter into the complex experience of shame. The first has to do with unexpected exposure, particularly of the "peculiarly sensitive, intimate, vulnerable aspects of the self." Exposure to others of an ugly or awkward aspect of oneself is humiliating, but the unexpected uncovering to one's own eyes of an incongruous aspect of the self is even more painful. Shame also follows the inappropriateness of an act which exposes the inadequacy of our image of self; we discover that our "assumption of being one kind of person living in one kind of surroundings" is false, and we are suddenly left without personal orientation. A threat to trust is involved; the "coherence,

1 Helen Lynd, On Shame..., p. 27. 2 Ibid., p. 35.
continuity, and dependability" of the world which defines one's personal identity within it can no longer be depended upon. "Thus shame, an experience of violation of trust in oneself and in the world, may go deeper than guilt for a specific act."\(^1\) Shame is an experience which involves threat to one's entire self, one's inner integrity, the congruity of one's achievement with this ideal self-image, one's assumed worth and competence among other persons, and even one's cognitive bearings.

Robert White stresses the threat to competence which is involved in the experience of shame. He accepts the definition of Piers and Singer, that shame implies short-coming, whereas guilt implies transgression of a moral boundary.

In my own words I should say that shame is always connected with incompetence. It occurs when we cannot do something that either we or an audience thinks we should be able to do.\ldots\, It means belittlement and loss of respect. In contrast, guilt does not imply that one is unable to do something; it signifies that one had done, or is thinking of doing, something within one's powers that is forbidden.\(^2\)

Shame, then, is a lowering of self-respect following a diminished sense of competence.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 47.

3. Guilt-Shame Cycles. Gerhart Piers points to the cyclical manner in which guilt and shame may tend to become mutually reinforced in a type of self-aggravating syndrome. He traces this phenomenon through two types of clinical situation.¹ Sexual impulses often cause a young man to feel guilty, for instance, since their expression appears to contradict established rules of conduct. To counter the guilt, he represses or inhibits sexuality. This, however, puts him in conflict with the male sex-role expected of him by his peers, and creates deep feelings of shame and inadequacy. To counter the shame he over-compensates by acting out in guilt-ridden behavior. The resulting guilt may call out further defensive inhibition of his sexuality, and hence new shame. Similarly, hostility may take such a cyclical form. Aggressive acts cause guilt, resulting in their inhibition. This inhibition spreads to all forms of assertive activities, causing passivity with resulting shame-anxiety. Shame activates overcompensatory aggressive fantasies or behavior, creating new guilt. In both sexuality and aggression, the sequence appears to result: act-

Fromm pointed to the conflict between the "authoritarian" and "humanistic" conscience, which might illustrate this same cyclical process as it grows out of a concrete social situation. A person caught in a family structure, or perhaps any interpersonal situation which demands his passive dependence upon an authority figure may become the victim of a guilt-shame cycle. Passivity takes its toll in shame-anxiety, but self-assertion creates guilt, which being a painful experience, discourages further activity and dooms one to sink back into the dependency relationship.

Neither Piers nor Fromm, as we will see later, pays sufficient attention to the self-evaluative activities which are involved in these cycles. They tend only to see the avoiding activity called out to reduce the load of guilt, rather than the self-esteem crises which the guilty activities themselves may create. Here it is important to see that the guilt-shame cycle is testimony both to the need to distinguish shame from guilt, and to the close inter-relationships between them.

4. Gradient Anxiety. It remains in this section to recall the nature of anxiety as a gradient phenomenon.
While Freud typically conceived anxiety to be a destructive factor in human life, he developed the concept of "signal-anxiety," which has the positive function of prodding one to take preventive action. Freud felt that the ego produces mild forms of anxiety as it anticipates imminent threat, and guides behavior into defensive action if necessary to avoid flooding the psychic system with stimuli too intense to handle.

Similarly, Sullivan typically refers to anxiety as a paralyzing and disruptive emotion blocking all cognition and any effective coping activity, but at the same time speaks of learning on the basis of the anxiety gradient. In all interpersonal relationships we play "the old game of getting hotter and colder" as we guide our activities with an inner eye upon the rising intensity of anxiety, in this case shame-anxiety.

Adler, too, indicates that shame-anxiety of moderate intensity stimulates positive measures which lead to self-fulfillment. Such mild anxiety stimulates anticipatory imagination, which in turn projects the curve of anxiety, assesses its meaning, and takes measures to alleviate the threat. Under extreme conditions, of course, anxiety calls out the defensive "self-enhancing" activities
which may lead to a crippling of personality. Adler's therapeutic goal was the reduction of anxiety to the point where more constructive ways of living become possible.

One would suspect that mild twinges of anxiety, whether guilt-anxiety as Freud ordinarily conceived it or shame-anxiety as Adler and Sullivan used the term, are the experiences which most people identify with "ought", or obligation. Anticipation of an anxiety-producing situation, whether one foresees vague threats of retaliation, loss of self-esteem, or disrupted interpersonal relations, tends to make an alternative course of action seem more inviting. That obligation may mean signal-anxiety is attested by such common expressions as "I'd feel terrible if I did that", presumably referring to a sense of obligation to do otherwise.

B. The Interest Gradient.

The way in which mild anxiety functions as a tension-system prodding action might invite us to identify the experience of obligation with anxiety alone. This conclusion would seem doubly enticing when we see that when Freud uses the term "anxiety" he invariably refers to the threat of forbidden wishes. While he identifies guilt as a species of anxiety, anxiety appears mainly to be identified with guilt-related situations in his writings.
We noted that all three of the interpersonal psychiatrists we consulted used "anxiety" and "inferiority feelings" in a way to suggest the threat to personal identity, self-esteem, and competence we have associated with shame. Seen in this light, obligation would appear to be nothing more than the vague threat of exposure to the more intense and painful pole of the anxiety gradient.

1. Voices have been raised recently to call into question such an identification of obligation with anxiety. Peter A. Bertocci, for instance, defends the unique nature of the experience of "oughting". He describes it as "an experience which seems ultimate, or sui generis, in that it has to be taken on its own terms."¹ Similarly, guilt is different from anxiety. They do not feel the same. "Guilt stems from disobedience to one's felt duty; anxiety from insecurity, be it as a consequence of feeling guilt or not."² Guilt may cause anxiety but they are not the same experience.

In a more recent article in The Review of Metaphysics Dr. Bertocci makes a similar appeal to introspection, inviting the reader to note the different feel of guilt, anxiety,


²Ibid., p. 52.
"oughting", and willing.\(^1\) Faced with a conflict in value, one decides that A is better than B.

The moment he decides that A is better than B, he feels the obligation to do A.\(\ldots\) The making of the decision and the enacting of it involves initiatory will-agency.\(^2\)

As the experience of willing differs from that of "oughting" so the experience of guilt cannot be identified with that of anxiety. The subjective feel of broken obligation is qualitatively different from the insecurities which stem from many affective-conative sources.

It is surely very much to the point to distinguish the qualitative feeling-tone of guilt from that of anxiety. We have seen that anxiety varies phenomenologically according to its referential meaning. Guilt-anxiety is a different experience from shame-anxiety. Perhaps we may also identify the unique experience of grief-anxiety, as we have suggested in discussing Fromm's work. It may also be true that a form of existential anxiety underlies all these as thinkers such as Paul Tillich and Rollo May have been suggesting.\(^3\) This


\(^2\) Ibid., p. 387.

would seem to be born out by A.H. Maslow's distinction between esteem needs and safety needs.\(^1\) Threat to esteem needs would presumably give rise to shame-anxiety, and threat to safety needs a generalized sense of insecurity such as that attending hunger or economic crisis.

In addition to the anxiety component of obligation, Dr. Bertocci points out, there is, as the word implies, an obligatory component. Having decided the best course of action, one feels obligated, not to avoid anxiety, but to will the best he knows at the time.\(^2\) The feeling of "ought", then, is experienced as "a unique kind of authority."\(^3\) So strong is this authority that one may choose death rather than violate the inner integrity its imperative implies.

What is the nature of this obligating component? H.L. Hollingworth hints at a possible answer when he shows that "ought" always points to some requirements within a functional system. It is an imperative laid upon us by the need to come to a correct logical or mathematical conclusion,


\(^2\) Cf. Peter A. Bertocci, *Free Will...*, p. 49.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 382.
or to complete a pattern or organized whole.¹

Freud noted that when we observe a special attention being given to an object "we are wont to regard this as proof that a peculiar psychic value (a certain degree of interest) attaches to the victorious idea."² Here we see interest as psychic intensity, or energy invested in an object because of its assessed value. A situation or idea which is evaluated as broadly significant to one's well-being is given psychic intensity, and attracts continuing attention and a priority place in intrapsychic discourse.

In the phenomenon of displacement in dream-work it is this psychic value which is transferred. In such a case the logic of unfulfilled needs assigns value to an object, but guilt-anxiety is aroused by this interest, since the more inclusive logic of one's role in the interpersonal milieu forbids such interest. In dreams we can see the struggle to redirect segmental interests in order to protect holistic interests. Anxiety attends the threat of disruption of one's identity which a forbidden interest symbolizes. The experience of obligation would presumably


²Freud, Interpretation of Dreams..., p. 337.
include the investment of interest in a course which strengthens and perfects one's total life, under pain of anticipated anxiety.

3. Sullivan discussed the place of interest in pathology. Dissociated systems, cut off from intraphysic discourse because of the anxiety they portend, remain unresolved. Seemingly trivial signs of such a dissociated system, he saw, become the subject of intense preoccupation. Sullivan chose the word "fascination" to describe the hypnotic appeal of a dissociated impulse, which will cause one at times to walk "with one's eyes shut" into a situation where expression of the impulse would be appropriate.

Robert White's concept of "incubation" is suggested here. A neurotic nucleus, he says, is formed when a terrifying experience in childhood is fraught with such anxiety that defensive mechanisms are employed. Because of defensive inhibitions, the situation is forcibly forgotten and reappraisal is made impossible. Under such conditions the fear does not diminish, but rather increases,


2Ibid., p. 322.

forcing the formation of second and third layers of defense to contain it. An aura of "compulsive intensity" comes to surround a neurotic core of that type.

Our suggestion would be that psychic intensity is invested in situations according to their significance for the economy of one's life. It is the negative value of massive proportions attending a terrifying experience which demands its dissociation. It is this same horrible significance of the dissociated system, and its character of being "unfinished business" which continually pulls attention toward it, even to the point of hypnotic trance. This would indicate that the compulsive interest found in pathological conditions is on a continuum with the more benign interests of normal life.

The possible dimensions of the interest continuum are suggested by Theodore R. Sarbin, in his description of role enactment. He points to the "organismic dimension" of role enactment. A role may be enacted with varying degrees of "organismic involvement", or psychic intensity. At the low end of the scale, the self and the role are

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minimally in contact, in casual relationships like going to the supermarket, for instance. A more intense involvement is illustrated by the role of a dramatic actor; if he "lives his role" he may become even more deeply involved, even to the point of feeling the appropriate emotions. Hypnotized subjects, hysterical seizures, conditions of ecstasy, and even the extreme moribund involvement seen in voodoo death, all illustrate the extreme intensities of organismic involvement.\(^1\)

It is this variable of organismic involvement which we have termed the interest gradient. Presumably the almost compulsive quality which may attend an experience of obligation illustrates the varying levels of organismic involvement which may accompany a duty, depending upon the scope and depth of its significance to one's total well-being. Compulsive guilt would then be seen as a chronic, tragic investment of attention and energy in a situation which is both deeply significant, and at the same time irresolvable, either because of its character as a dissociated system,

\(^1\text{Cf. also Morton Deutsch, "Field Theory in Social Psychology", in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook..., Vol. I, pp. 202-203, for experimental evidence of the power of task-completion needs. Thus, when a child is frustrated in attempting to complete a task, regression results.}\)
or, as we will suggest later, because it is a "double-bind" interpersonal relationship which knows no immediate solution.

C. Conclusion.

If our argument is sound, the experience of obligation accompanies apprehension of a situation as requiring completion or resolution in some coherent and satisfying way. The thinly veiled penalty for failure is exposure to the ravages of guilt- or shame-anxiety, or worse, perhaps to some chronic syndrome involving both, in mutual reinforcement. Goldstein's work with brain-damaged patients reveals the ultimate, disabling panic which signal-anxiety portends. He labels the result "catastrophic behavior."¹ Sullivan feels that we probably had one such experience in infancy, which as long as we have our faculties intact we will never repeat, even at the cost of schizophrenia.

On the positive side, obligation is restlessness in the presence of an unresolved situation which has significance either for damage to the self, or enrichment and expansion of the self. This interest impelling task-

completion may involve the imaginative projection of feelings of competence, mastery, and relief attendant upon a successful outcome. Robert White points to the motivating force of such a "sense of competence", relating it not only to successful employment of the external environment, but to effective social relations as well.¹ We do commonly refer a feeling of obligation either to fear of consequences or the requirements of some interest to us. We feel either a negative or positive statement to be legitimate in answer to the question "Why do you feel you ought to do this?" but commonly give the superior place to the positive.

II. Obligation Coordinates With Creative Evaluation.

A. Freud Assumed Guilt and Evaluation are Correlated.

Freud affirmed a one-way correlation between guilt and subconscious evaluation. He saw guilt as a primitive "given" which distorts evaluation. Reading Freud between the lines, however, brings us to the conclusion that even his conception of the super-ego as the introjected image of the prohibitive parental role would have to be predicated upon extensive preconscious evaluation. In his work on dreams and wit we have one of the first detailed descriptions

in print of the dramaturgic method of the evaluative capacities, and we note that guilt-anxiety is intimately correlated with them.

1. Freud's conception of the super-ego is ordinarily identified with irrational guilt. Conscience is an intuitive, even primitive introjection of the punitive parental role. We saw that even this definition presupposes many dimensions of evaluation, of the type which psychoanalysts call "reality testing", and hence presumably down-to-earth and reasonable in its context. The process of introjection would involve: i. Recognition that guilt-anxiety is increasing in intensity, and imaginative extension of its curve; ii. Symbolic reference of this rising anxiety to the interpersonal family situation as threatening; iii. Formation of an image of the parental role; iv. Judgment that it is expedient to shift roles.¹

The reader is directed to Sullivan's concept of "personification" as it is discussed in this dissertation for an appreciation of the complex evaluative processes involved in the defining and shifting of roles. Similar conclusions may be drawn from the work of role psychologists.

¹Cf. above, pp. 98-ff.
In Sarbin's work the self appears as a cognitive structure, defined in part by the even more complex cognitive construct which one's role image represents. ¹

This discussion would lead us to see that "irrational" guilt may not be the product of distorted evaluation, but rather the realistic evaluation of an unfortunate interpersonal situation. Even guilt which is clearly neurotic need not reflect its isolation from reasonable evaluation; one may be doing the best he can with a parental image which cannot be perceptually reappraised, either because the parent is not available or his presence produces such anxiety as to block effective relearning. It is interesting to note that Freud's therapeutic goals presuppose that guilt is always rational; that is, that adequate analysis will reveal an intrapsychic system within which the patient's guilt is understandable.

2. In his analysis of dreams, and his description of the hidden psychic forces at work in wit and art, Freud showed us that creative imagination is the typical functional mode of preconscious evaluation, and that guilt-anxiety is organismically coordinated with it.

¹ Cf. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory"..., p. 251.
Freud defined "cynical wit" as that which attacks the claims of morality, but under a disguised form. Barbed wit may mask aggression, to allow a person to avoid the anxiety of an expression which violates his self-ideal. Here we see guilt-anxiety, partially subconscious reformulation of a verbal expression to disguise its intention, and the personification of oneself in a certain character, all integrated into one functional system.

Similarly, in dream-work the creative imagination is functioning under the impetus of guilt-anxiety, both constructing images of problem situations, and restructuring them in order to keep anxiety within manageable limits. Psychic symbols are, in dream-work, typically arranged dramaturgically, or coherently with reference to an immanent meaning.

Unfortunately, Freud stressed the defensive, distortive aspects of this unconscious evaluative activity. Only when he speaks of dreams in terms of wish-fulfillment does he see that they have a coping function. When he speaks of other types of fantasy, he sees their positive intent to be the facilitation of effective action. Of course, Freud assumed that the distortive processes of dream-work had the ultimate intent of allowing some positive value-achievement,
whether by means of substitute-gratification, or keeping the anxiety level down to prevent its blocking further evaluation of a problem situation, or providing a way to avoid dealing with it at all if it were too much of a threat to one's well-being.

B. Adler and Sullivan Correlate Shame with Evaluation.

In the thought of Adler and Sullivan we observe that shame-anxiety has the same close relationship to subconscious evaluation which Freud assumed to be true of guilt-anxiety.

Adler saw that the ideal self-system by which he explained "feelings of inferiority", or shame-anxiety, is itself an evaluative construct. The self not only guides evaluation and stimulates evaluation through shame-anxiety—it is also a product of evaluation. The purpose inherent in one's "style of life" is an imaginative construct, just as the life style itself is a living cognitive system maintained in part by selective perception. Adler was as convinced as Freud that the evaluative process is largely unconscious and dramaturgic. We are not usually aware of the goal of our own lives, and the processes which formulate that goal are even more thoroughly inaccessible to consciousness. Once the core of one's life style is established,
experience is selected, evaluated, and organized with the immanent meaning of that style as the key to the entire plot. The experiential elements in one's life have the same kind of meaning as that of a single note in a melody.¹

Sullivan, too, sees one's personification of himself as an evaluative construct which is formed in a context of gradient shame-anxiety. Much autistic experience centers on the situations in a person's life which are shameful. Anxious about areas of one's life which bring censure from other persons, and too anxious to face them openly, one builds his own interpretation of them in private fantasy, of which he is only partially aware. He is both constructing and employing multip[e] personifications of himself throughout this process of assessing his place among others.

Sullivan sees that very complex processes go on beneath the level of awareness. Gradient anxiety is perceived and given symbolic reference to some interpersonal situation. Inner needs and goal-tendencies are weighed and evaluated. Foresight, or the imaginative projection of one's probable future, and retrospective analysis to improve performance is undertaken. Personifications of one's own identity

and that of others are made. A complex screening process decides which aspects of experience may enter into awareness and blocks others from awareness, excludes certain threat-systems from intrapsychic discourse and signals the impending collapse of the defensive devices which keep them isolated.

C. Interest Correlates with Evaluation.

We have seen that both guilt and shame are coordinates of evaluation, and that this evaluation is dramaturgic in form. What can be said of the second variable in obligation, the interest gradient? Does one's preoccupation with an event vary with its significance?

It is surely a working principle for Freud that psychic intensity, the investment of energy, and attention in intrapsychic discourse varied with the significance of an experience to one's well-being. Freud always assumed that every communication had some reasonable meaning, and that the feeling-tone and level of preoccupation accompanying it was a key aspect of that meaning. Feeling follows significance for Freud, and is symptomatic of some hidden value-system which justifies it. While Freud affirmed that only the libido needs of the id define one's interest in an object, it is apparent that he know the importance which
interpersonal relationships have in one's life. Certainly he described as few thinkers have the intense anxieties which attend the temptation to jeopardize those relationships to accommodate the id. In addition, he saw in his analysis of art and wit that one may become preoccupied with and take pleasure in the aesthetic and cognitive Gestalts represented in an artistic production or the facile turn of a phrase. The direct embodiment of imaginative competence could become an object of interest.

Adler and Fromm indicated that the ultimate interests expressed by the terms "fictional final goal" and the "productive orientation" are defined by a fabric of meaning created in imagination. One's experience tends to be steered into certain channels, and his life to take on a certain orientation, by the selective screening of impulses and perceptions. Literally, one's obligation, or the unique definition of his identity and role which circumscribe the field of his interests and the focus of his anxieties, is a product of evaluation. Of the therapists whose theory was investigated, only Fromm identifies evaluation with verbal systems only.

Sullivan, too, revealed the extent to which selective inattention, masking processes, interpretations and misinter-
pretations, cause us to ignore experiences of lesser moment to us, to block those of too great a negative significance, and to focus our attention and interest upon those of most importance. He revealed that even pathological preoccupations such as those represented in schizophrenia and paranoia, are a continuation of the same interest gradient. A dissociated system may demand absolute attention precisely because it has been evaluated as of absolute significance.

D. Conclusion.

If the above analysis is justified, an anxiety-interest experience, or sense of obligation, is *prima facie* evidence of a creative judgment having been made following extensive subconscious evaluation.

We can go even further and say that the devices a person may employ to defend himself against guilt-anxiety, or to disguise its significance, are evidences of such a subliminal moral judgment. Thus, Freud's ego-defenses all presuppose extensive evaluation. The ego-defenses he most closely associated with guilt, such as identification, self-aggression, and repression, he assumed to be dependable symptoms of guilt-anxiety which had legitimate meaning in some intrapsychic context. Repression, too, was evidence that an experience had been denied a hearing because of its
psychic value, or intensity of interest testifying to its nature as an ultimate concern.

The same affirmation can be made about pathological guilt. We saw that Freud's super-ego or neurotic guilt presupposed an amazingly astute analysis of his actual situation on the part of a child who introjects the parental role, and that the process of introjection itself involved extremely intricate cognitive processes, and that the carrying over into adult life of the introjected parental role has its own legitimate reasons which can be discovered in therapy.

Looking again at the guilt-shame cycles which Piers and Fromm defined, we can see that much that we think of as pathological guilt is involvement in such a cycle. Neither Piers nor Fromm adequately perceive the role of self-evaluation in such cycles. They see only that in a situation which demands passive dependency, either by the denial of a segmental impulse such as sexuality, or the holistic impulse to affirm self, actuation of the impulse causes painful guilt, and the pain of further action reinforces the passivity. In this case the guilt of activity feeds into the shame of passivity. We can see another dimension to this, expressed in a phrase like: "I will hate myself if I do this." A guilty act is typically taken as a symbol
of diminished worth, feeding the shame which attends a low self-evaluation. Here it is important to see that the processes of evaluation are deeply involved in the pathological guilt which is a chronic guilt-shame cycle.¹

Chronic guilt, we seem to be saying, reveals penetrating insight into one's actual situation, either 1) as the guilty one is deeply involved in an interpersonal situation which denies legitimate expression of a wide range of self-validating behavior, or 2) as he clings for reasons of safety to an inappropriate role formulated in his early childhood. Intense and unexplained anxiety, or the deep self-preoccupation or self-directed interest we observe in obsessive-compulsive behavior, are indications of a crisis in obligation. This crisis need not relate to some overt guilty act, as Hobart Mowrer says, but may accompany an imaginative assessment of one's wishes as dangerously forbidden, or a dissociated system relating to a neurotic nucleus carried over from childhood, or the double-bind situation

¹The reader is referred to the book by Howard J. Clinebell, Understanding and Counseling the Alcoholic (New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 48-53, for a concrete illustration of the self-evaluations involved in guilt-shame cycles. Here we see evidence that a guilt-shame cycle is often escaped by formation of a guilt-perfectionism cycle which is doubly unfortunate.
represented by a guilt-shame cycle.¹ In such a cycle one is literally obligated by shame-related anxieties and interests to do one thing, and by guilt-related anxieties and interests to do the opposite. Whatever happens, he loses, unless a change of situation or a therapeutic relationship helps him to escape the vicious cycle.

We have chosen to refer to this organismic relationship between the anxiety and interest gradients and the evaluative function as the doctrine of the rational conscience. The term "rational" includes the inner logic of dramaturgic, subconscious evaluations as well as the narrower logic of verbal syntax.

III. Obligation Relates to Self-actualization.

The evaluative processes which are stimulated, guided by, and at the same time productive of the anxiety and interest gradients are a functional tool of a person seeking actualization. Obligation grows out of the needs and interest of persons.

A. Freud Assumed the Self as Center of Evaluation.

It has often been noted that Freud's functional

hypothesis tends to compromise and obscure the unity of the self. The terms "id", "ego", and "super-ego" tend to become hypostatized and assigned to discrete entities. When ever Freud portrays the imaginative work of the evaluative function, however, whether in dreams, wit, ego-defenses, or art, he sees that it is sensitively correlated with one's self-evaluation. The unified self is seen as the agent of evaluation, and the ideal self the standard of evaluation.

1. Freud makes evaluation in dream-work defensive, therefore distortive. That is, the function of the creative imagination is to disguise guilt-ridden dream contents. What Freud does not see clearly is that when one constructs a dream-image the self which is being defended is a unity achieved by the constructive and positive work of evaluation. The self, a cognitive achievement which is maintained by selective inattention to unworthy or guilt-producing impulses, is threatened with panic as discarded or repressed elements seek attention. Reacting to advance warnings of signal-anxiety, one is stimulated to take some defensive action.

1Cf. Otto Fenchel, The Psychoanalytic Theory..., pp. 102-13 and 397-400, to observe the way in which contemporary psychoanalytic theorists hypostatize the super-ego and make it an explanatory principle.
In dreams especially we see that defensive evaluation presupposes positive evaluation, and both presuppose the self as a functional unity; a) A self-system has been constructed under the guidance of an immanent ideal, largely by the exclusion of unassimilable impulses. In dream-work, all material must "avoid the censor." The censor here is clearly the need to protect the self from more reality or insight than it can bear, and to suppress the guilt-related impulses which threaten its coherence. b) Second, this self-system has evaluated its condition as one of threat, guided in part by the rising intensity of anxiety. c) Third, highly creative distortive work is done on the dream content, but with the positive intent of allowing revelation of as wide a range of truth about one's total situation as is possible without causing panic. The functional intent of all defensive activity is the well-being of the self.

2. In his work on tendency with Freud sees guilt as a type of signal-anxiety which stimulates the reformulation of a verbal communication to allow expression of a forbidden motive in disguised form. Here, very clearly, a person is seen at work judging himself in the light of his role-

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conception, as determined in part by the expectations of others, and in part by his own ideal of self.

3. Freud's conception of "psychic value" assumes an immanent center of value which is the focus of evaluation. The inherent rationality of the self is a hidden Freudian assumption, and interest and evaluation are coherent with this rational self.

Thus, prior to the scrambling process which dream-formation inflicts upon them, dream-thoughts and their hierarchy of value as expressed in interest-levels form one coherent system. Anxiety arises out of this coherent order and is presumably of one fabric with it. The task of the censor is to protect this logical coherence from the threat of its own internal truth by shuffling the elements into an image a little easier to bear. Interestingly enough, before the dreamer awakens a "first interpretation" is made of the new image to make it presentable to waking thought, since "it is natural to our waking thought to create order in such material, to construct relations, and to subject it to the requirements of an intelligible coherence."¹ Here Freud assumes that unconscious thought is acquainted with the

¹Ibid., p. 463.
logical requirements of reflective consciousness, as well as
the deeper truth of one's coherent self.

In Freud's dream-work we have seen preconscious
evaluation, guilt-anxiety, and interest, all ordered into
the coherent self, both expressing and protecting the well-
being of the self as it faces, not only the burdens placed
upon it by neurotic trends, but its contemporary tasks as
well. This seems to support our conclusion that obligation
is a complex anxiety-interest experience indicating some gap
in the coherence of the self.

B. Interpersonal Theory and Self-actualization.

Many of the hidden assumptions of Freud become ex-
plicit affirmations in Adler's thought. Adler saw that
"inferiority feelings" led to "compensation", and that both
revealed the functional unity of the self.

More important, it becomes clear as we read Adler
that shame-anxiety is the negative side of a positive
teleology of self-actualization. Dramaturgic self-evaluation
is a constant concomitant of the "sentiment d'incomplétude"
which urges the self toward greater achievement and orders
experience into a value-system centered on the goal of per-
fection. In the light of our "fictional final goal" we
experience anxiety at our failures, and this anxiety stimulates
us to new endeavors, or under unfortunate handicaps diverts us to neurotic protective devices. The anxiety pole of obligation, then, is a concomitant of an inner thrust toward self-completion.

Adler is one of the early theorists to note that the ideal self-system is a cognitive construct. The "fictional final goal" which becomes the valuational criterion to order all experience is itself an imaginative construct of the creative mind. The formulation of this goal and the ordering of experience takes place mainly below the level of awareness. Here we see shame-anxiety, the ordering of experience around a self-ideal, and subconscious cognition in one coherent functional system.

Erich Fromm uses the term "the productive orientation" in a way to suggest Adler's "fictional final goal." The inherent need to function productively in the world is seen as a teleological force, in that the "non-productive orientations" are always pathological distortions of the one prepotent force. The character of evil imbibes the strength of potential goodness. Similarly, the "humanistic conscience" is the "expression of man's self-interest and integrity."\(^1\) It is the assertion of our hidden potentiality.

\(^1\)Cf. above, pp. 150-ff.
Here conscience interacts with a criterion of self-realization.

Of all the thinkers we have studied, Sullivan saw most clearly that anxiety plays both a formative and a protective rôle in relation to the self, and that the self-system is a cognitive construct. He sees "personification" as a subconscious cognitive functioning interacting with anxiety to organize experience into a "secondary dynamism", the self-system. The self, once formed, is a complex image which continues to structure experience through "selective inattention" and defensive devices, Sullivan saw that the self as a single dynamism assesses its worth in various self-esteem problems and in the devastating experiences of humiliation. Subdynamisms may be formed, such as "bad-me", "good-me", and "not-me" personifications, to express various aspects of self-evaluation.

Like Freud, Sullivan affirms only a defensive function for the self-system, but assumes a positive function for the self which is thus defended.

3. Conclusion.

We appear to be led by the study of guilt- and shame-anxiety and "organismic involvement" into some type of self-

1Cf. above, pp. 188-ff.
actualization theory. The self is a cognitive system, formed and protected by certain screening activities, ordering and limiting the broad range of experience in light of an immanent purpose. Several affirmations might be made of the self:

1. The self is an organismic unity, organized in Gestalt form, not by the primitive ingestion of an alien role, but by dramaturgic evaluation. Sub-systems may be given relative degrees of autonomy, but a dissociated system is always a festering sore in the side of the self.

2. Adler's conception of "compensation" and Goldstein's conception of "homeostasis" must always be supplemented by a growth principle, or thrust toward actualization and expansion of an inherent ideal. Adler had to alter his original conception of the self as a closed system to allow the teleological pull of the "fictional final goal", which is open to continual reformulation as experience grows.

3. Fromm's self tends to evaporate into its relationships. Sullivan, too, comes dangerously close to the doctrine of the vacuous self, a functional dynamism with no unique identity of its own. It appears that the vague conception of

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self-actualization must be explicated in terms of specific, innate needs which require fulfillment. This points toward the Gestalt view of universal structures, to which persons instinctually respond. It indicates that some conception similar to Maslow's "instinctoid needs" must be seen as prepotent in the formation of value.¹ We noted above that Fromm's conception of "socially structured defects" presupposes some such system of universal human needs.²

4. Freud and Sullivan express only the defensive aspects of the self, although they assume the underlying reality of the self which is defended, and perhaps better than any other theorists describe the amazing creative processes it employs in its defense. Maslow's work with "self-actualizing persons" points toward an elaboration of the more positive and constructive endeavors of persons.³ Robert White shows that shame-anxiety relates to "effectance motivation", the need to master both the social and the physical environment, "which has its immediate satisfaction in a feeling of efficacy and its adaptive significance in the growth of

¹Cf. Ibid., Chapters 6, 7, and 8.
²Cf. above, p. 167.  
³Ibid., Chapters 12-15.
competence.¹ These psychological incursions upon the realm of normal persons tend to correct the biases born of the psychiatric clinic.

IV. Obligation Relates to the Social Field.

The self is defined and perfected in dynamic interaction within a social field, not alone in interaction with other persons, but also with the molar structures which define the social field.

A. Freud Related Guilt to Interpersonal Situations.

While Freud's typical conceptual model portrays the person as a closed energy-system, Freud was the great pioneer in observing the deep emotional dependence everyone has upon significant other persons, especially in the early days of childhood. Indeed, Freud has been criticized by Fromm, Sullivan, and others for overemphasizing the ultimate emotional impact of the family constellation in the first five years of life. We observed that Freud's conception of separation-anxiety remained an integral aspect of guilt. Threat of abandonment by the introjected parental image is a major source of anxiety in super-ego guilt, and is an emotional carry-over

from infantile fears of loss of the beloved parents.\textsuperscript{1} While Freud tended to conceive it along sexual lines, fear of loss of the love-object is an important motivating force in all adult life, and the leading factor in the formation of culture.

In addition, Freud felt that personality development was deeply influenced by certain innate images expressing universal interpersonal structures. The Oedipal situation is one such universal pattern. We observed that the super-ego approximates a racial inheritance, since my ingested image of my father does not include his total character, but his super-ego, which presumably he ingested from his father before him.

More important, we have repeatedly noted that when Freud turned his back upon his view of the super-ego and concentrated on the living situations expressed in dreams and wit he assumed that guilt grew out of contemporary dilemmas. Not only this, but we feel guilty in a situation because of our depth understanding that we are about to threaten the social fabric which affords our love-objects and defines our life. The purpose of dreams and wry humor is to restructure this scene in order to render the anxiety somewhat more tolerable. Freud's inveterate suspicion of all culture, and his

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Otto Fenichel, \textit{The Psychoanalytic Theory...}, p. 105.
messianic urge to salvage persons from a repressive social environment, prevented him from seeing the more positive values of interpersonal relationships.

B. Self-actualization and the Social Field.

All three of the interpersonal psychiatrists studied expressed some conception of love as a primal goal immanent in all motivated activity. Adler felt that "social feeling", or constructive identification with the human cause, is the "only salvation" from chronic shame-anxiety. The "fictional final goal" of perfection is an immanent ideal of community. Fromm felt that the "productive orientation" is most decisively characterized as love which exercises care, which is responsible, respectful of the autonomy of others, and understanding of their deeper needs. Self-realization is of one cloth with a relationship of productive love. Sullivan felt that anxiety is the "need for interpersonal security" which fulfills "tenderness needs." Unlike Fromm, Sullivan always put the need to love in the passive voice, except that there are indications of active self-giving in his term "integrating tendencies."

It is important to observe that in all three of these positions the need for self-realization is indissolubly bound up with the need for constructive relationships with others.
Love is a vital aspect of the immanent goal of all living. Even the evaluative function is at its mercy, in that cognition is distorted by the inability to love and receive love. We will love if anxiety does not cripple us. Hostility and chronic resentment are distortions of love under conditions of severe anxiety. In Aristotelian terms, the essence of man now emerges as the creature who dares to love. The more one grows in love the more he will reason coherently.

Adler and Fromm observed the importance of some cognitive map or orienting schema in defining one's identity. Ideally, this cognitive map corresponds to the actual structural requirements of the social scene. Thus Adler saw that personality develops along the lines of "schema of apperception" formulated in creative imagination. Ideally, the social structure and the "schema of apperception" coincide. Fromm talks of "frames of orientation and devotion." Man cannot realize himself unless he relates to others within a fabric of meaning which he himself creates imaginatively, but which may nevertheless grasp the essence of his social existence.

This insight opens the possibility that moral norms and laws form an accepted frame of reference, which serves to express the molar characteristics of the social organization necessary to sustain human value. To the extent that personal
identity is achieved in terms of such orienting schema, any threat to the fabric of norms is a threat to the internal coherence of the self. This puts the threat of guilt-anxiety and the imperious demands of obligation in the strongest possible light. Obligation defends personal integrity, and in extreme cases takes on the character of spiritual life or death. Violation of the fabric of trust is violation of self. The loss of identity which guilt-ridden persons often express in therapy is explicated by this. The deeper shame-anxiety which guilt signals speaks of threat to one's cognitive confidence, since he has violated the cognitive map which he himself created, and which defines his life. Intimations of incompetence assail a person who by the "wild fact" of his guilty acts cuts a destructive swath across his own identity. To what extent extreme depression could be identified with cognitive despair would make an interesting subject for study.

Sullivan was most deeply aware of the social roots of personality. Personification takes place in an atmosphere of interpersonal evaluation. The feeling-tone of the interpersonal environment is prehended in its character either of empathy or of anxiety. The quality of the interpersonal field as one conceives it defines the entire attitudinal structure
of the personality. Failure to integrate a social situation, with its attendant loneliness, will be avoided even at the cost of humiliation. To be trapped in one's autistic fantasies without the corrective influence of an intimate relationship is the worst of fates.

Perhaps Sullivan should be read in conjunction with Robert White's article on "competence." The need to integrate situations, which Sullivan symbolizes by the baby at the breast, should be supplemented by the "battle of autonomy", expressed in the "competence model" and "represented by the child's exploratory play."¹ Freedom of self-expression is as important as freedom from isolation.

Fromm noted that shame-anxiety may relate, not to incompetent striving but to parental smothering. Howard Clinebell offers a concrete clinical illustration of this. Repressive control by rigid, puritanical parents often leads to the self-esteem crises which may be expressed in alcoholism.² In fighting for personal autonomy one is not seeking isolation, however. He is seeking interpersonal relationships which are characterized by mutual respect, as Fromm indicated.

¹ Robert White, "Competence and Psychosexual Stages..." p. 112.
Probably certain conceptions from the field-theorists and role psychologists illustrate even more graphically the organic relationship between personal identity and interpersonal orientation. Lewin's conception of "life space", where "person and environment are viewed as one constellation of interdependent factors" is important here.\footnote{Morton Deutsch, "Field Theory in Social Psychology", in Gardner Lindzey, \textit{Handbook of Social Psychology...}, Vol. I, p. 185.} Perhaps even more interesting is the concept of role as employed by Sarbin and others. Here we see that the self is a cognitive structure, but it is formulated in interaction with role-conceptions, which are even more complex cognitive structures defining one's identity relative to the social scene, and for that matter, the universe.\footnote{Cf. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory...", pp. 248-55.}

A strong case could be made for saying that a complex role conception would include various sub-systems, including at least the following: i. The image of one's identity, formulated in retrospective evaluation and imaginative projection within a social field; ii. The image of one's ideal self, with overtones of reference to "What any man ought to be", or a universal human pattern; iii. A working conception
of the interpersonal environment as a whole, including its significance in terms of threat, redemption, and value-fulfillment, with overtones of a social ideal; iv. A rule-of-thumb understanding of the technical requirements of the universe, including reference to specific manipulative tasks to be mastered; v. A vague personal cosmology, perhaps articulated to some extent in religious or philosophical systems, as expressed in such questions as "What does God want me to do?"
CHAPTER V
THREE ETHICAL THEORIES

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ethical thinking of three contemporary philosophers, especially as it relates to their view of obligation, to set the stage for a later critique based upon the view of obligation which was developed in the chapter above.

The philosophers chosen, H.A. Prichard, C.L. Stevenson, and Brand Blanshard, represent three distinctive positions on the nature of obligation.

I. A Deontologist: H.A. Prichard.

The school of ethical thinkers which came to be called deontologists was responsible for stimulating much of the recent philosophical interest in obligation. Harold Arthur Prichard, then Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University, wrote the article which defined the direction of this interest. In 1912 his article "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" appeared in the journal Mind.¹

Mainly written to challenge the central assumptions of utilitarian ethics, the form it takes shows the influence of G.E. Moore. Seven years earlier Moore had written *Principia Ethica*, in which he discussed the intrinsic meaning of the word "good". In his analysis he referred to the many variant meanings of good. Some hold that ethics concerns good or bad conduct, he pointed out. Others say it is a feeling toward a thing. All of these definitions fail to tell us what property it is which makes all good things good. His answer was that "good" is indefinable. It is a non-natural property which cannot be analyzed. His famous conclusion was: "'Good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion."\(^1\) Being a simple notion, it is apprehended only intuitively, as one might perceive the color yellow. All good things, then, have this simple non-natural property which we apprehend and denote by the term "good". To define "good" in terms of any natural object in which it is perceived to exist is to commit the "naturalistic fallacy."\(^2\)


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 9-ff.
Where does the experience of obligation fit into this theory? Moore said that the intuition "good" also includes the connotation "ought to exist." Thus, when a person says a thing "ought to exist" he is evidencing a subjective reaction to the intuition in the object of "the unique property of things, which I mean by 'good'." Now, when we ask what we ought to do, or what conduct is right, we must make an empirical investigation to discover what will produce the most good. "All moral laws...are merely statements that certain kinds of actions will have good effects." No moral laws, then, are self-evident. What is good in itself is self-evident, and the proposition that this good "ought to be" is self-evident, being implied in the very intuition of good. There is, however, no self-evident experience of my duty. "No sufficient reason has ever yet been found for considering one action more right or more wrong than another." The experience of obligation, then, is definable only in utilitarian terms; it is relative to production of good. This is the proposition which Prichard denies, even as he continues the intuitional bent of Moore's philosophy.

1Ibid., p. 17. 2Ibid., p. 151. 3Ibid., p. 152.
A. "Ought" as an Intuition.

The thesis which Prichard defends is that moral philosophy rests upon a mistake. By "moral philosophy" he means not only utilitarian thought but Moore's intuitionism as well. What is the mistake? That of "supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking."¹ What does this mean?

Moral philosophers, he says, invariably answer the question "Why should we do so and so?" with the answer that the doing will lead to something we want, or the act itself, when we appreciate its full nature, is something we want or should take. The question then becomes: "Why should we keep our engagements at our own loss?"² The utilitarian answer is always inadequate. In can do no more even at best than to make us want to keep our engagements, and wanting is different from the sense of obligation.

In answer to Moore, Prichard says that all contentions that if something is good we ought to act for its procurement "presupposes an intermediate link, viz. the

¹H.A. Prichard, in Sellars and Hospers, Readings...", p. 162.

²Ibid., p. 151.
further thesis that what is good ought to be. An 'ought', if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another 'ought'.¹ Moore's indissoluble intuition that "good" also "ought to be" is illegitimate. We cannot move from talk about "good" to statements about "ought" without building some sort of bridge between them. The sense that we ought to tell the truth or pay our debts does not arise from the recognition that we will be originating something good.

If the motive in respect of which we think an action good is the sense of obligation, then so far from the sense that we ought to do it being derived from our apprehension of its goodness, our apprehension of its goodness will presuppose the sense that we ought to do it.²

The real question, then, is not what is good, but what is the nature of the apprehension or appreciation of right, or moral obligation? Here Prichard rejects Moore's property of goodness, but retains his intuitionism. Thus: "The sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate."³ In this sense we cannot say that an obligation

needs proof from outside its sphere; it is self-evident. In the same sense, we cannot speak as though an obligated act had an "end" or "purpose". It has a motive, namely that of a sense of obligation, but it has no purpose. If an act is motivated by the wish to bring goodness into the world, the desire for goodness is its end, not a sense of obligation. Such an act may be praiseworthy, but it is not strictly a morally good action. Any morally good action must be "done because it is right, i.e. from a sense of obligation."

B. Intuition in Prichard and Moore.

So far, Prichard's discussion of obligation as an immediate, self-evident experience parallels Moore's faith in the apprehension of goodness. We soon note an important difference, however. When Prichard uses the term "immediate" he does not build upon the model of perceptual simplicity which Moore employs. This can be seen as we attend to the following observations:

1. First, we may legitimately ask "Why should we do this supposedly obligatory act?" The person asking this question is not blind to "oughtness", as Moore might say he were blind to "goodness". Rather, he has not been shown the

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 157.}\]
complete nature of the act in question; the "preliminaries to appreciating the obligation" are incompletely stated.\(^1\) Now we see that "owing to a lack of thoughtfulness" a person may fail to appreciate or to apprehend an obligation.\(^2\) The appreciation of obligation depends upon a thoughtful perusal of the Gestalt to which obligation belongs, or the total meaning of the situation in question. For this reason, it is possible to differ on matters of obligation. Some moral capacity is required to appreciate an obligation. "The appreciation of an obligation is...only possible for a developed moral being, and...different degrees of development are possible."\(^3\)

2. What is the nature of this capacity for thoughtful consideration of a situation which may enable us to appreciate its obligatory character? This passage illuminates decisively the difference between the intuitionism of Moore and that of Prichard:

The sense that we ought to do certain things arises in our unreflective consciousness, being an activity of moral thinking occasioned by the various situations in which we find ourselves.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 155.  \(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 156.  \\
\(^{3}\)Ibid., p. 156.  \(^{4}\)Ibid., p. 161.
The terms "unreflective consciousness" and "moral thinking" are decisive here. It is evident that for Prichard the immediate apprehension of obligation depends upon some preliminary cognitive process. In a real sense, the sudden grasp of an obligation is a creative insight.

3. We note, too, that obligation is seen as we consider the full meaning of a situation. This leads to a further point. The obligation to speak the truth, for instance,

involves a relation consisting in the fact that others are trusting us to speak the truth, a relation the apprehension of which gives rise to the sense that communication of the truth is something owing by us to them.\(^1\)

Here we see that a sense of obligation depends not upon the perception on some non-natural, simple quality, but upon the insightful awareness of the significance of an interpersonal relationship.

When Prichard says no reason can be given for an obligation, and no purpose assigned to it, he means no reason or purpose extrinsic to the complex relationship involved. A sense of obligation has its reasons, but they are intrinsic to the nature of the obligating situation and

\(^1\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 155.}\)
the "unreflective moral thinking" of the person who is evaluating it. This leaves open the possibility that a "self-evident" intuition of "ought" may be explicated in terms of the evaluative function. If so, a sense of obligation is not so much "self-evident" as it is "evident to a self." It is not the apprehension of a simple quality, but the achievement of a rich insight.

4. The above possibility seems even more hopeful if we consider the following passage in Prichard's article. What is to be done, he asks, in the event that we forget why an obligation is to be kept?

The only remedy lies in actually getting into a situation which occasions the obligation, or—if our imagination be strong enough—in imagining ourselves in that situation and then letting our moral capacities do their work.\(^1\)

Here creative imagination is made the seat of moral obligation. If this proposition can be defended, the thesis which this dissertation defends merits serious consideration.

II. An Emotivist: C.L. Stevenson.

A.C. Garnett describes the way in which the intuition—

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 162.
ism of G.E. Moore led into emotivism. Moore denied that ethical terms can be defined with reference to "the greatest good for the greatest number", or any other naturalistic form of reference. "Good" is a non-natural property which one intuits much as he perceives the quality "yellow". This intuition of goodness contains the implication that the perceived goodness "ought to be", and obligation is simply the subjective feeling that one has toward the goodness which "ought to be". Prichard denied this intuition of "ought to be", limiting "ought" to voluntary action and affirming that "ought" is the direct intuition of a morally qualified "unreflective" thinker, which has no reasons beyond itself. Deontologists generally agreed that ethics can be justified only in terms of a unique, non-natural property which one apprehends in direct awareness:

Thus a whole generation of British philosophers ...was trained to look for this elusive, intuitable, non-natural property or relation and to regard it as the only proper basis of any possible assertion that anything is either right or wrong.2


2 Ibid., p. 297.
The scene was set for those who denied they had any such elusive intuition, and who thus denied that ethics has a cognitive base of any sort. Thinkers such as A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson, who studied under Moore, utilized the new discipline of semantics to press home their critique. Semanticists had seen that language may have the function of expressing our feelings and prescribing modes of action, as well as describing facts. Why not say, then, that an ethical statement refers to no non-natural property; indeed, that it has no factual meaning, but is either expressive or prescriptive? This possibility was reinforced by the epistemology of logical positivists, who asserted that the meaning of any factual statement is defined in terms of the observable operations used to verify or discredit it. Since a direct intuition of "right" or "good" cannot be verified by any empirical operation, statements including such ethical terms are factually meaningless. Their only possible meaning is their usefulness in expressing feelings or prescribing a course of action.

A. Ethical Terms Have Emotive Meaning.

Stevenson describes his ethics as a type of interest theory. It differs from traditional interest theories, however, which hold that ethical statements are primarily
Ethical terms "recommend an interest in an object, rather than state that the interest already exists." Their primary function is to "create an interest", to "change or intensify" interests. How does one use ethical terms to change interests? Not by employing them in a logical argument which persuades by its cogency of reasoning, but by "a quasi-imperative force...operating through suggestion, and intensified by...tone of voice." Ethical terms are instruments in the complicated interplay of human interests, chosen for their utility in playing on the suggestible nature of human beings. The primary meaning of ethical terms is emotive, rather than cognitive. "The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of a word, arising from the history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective responses in people." When we say "X is good", then, we really mean to say "We like X." The expression "X is good" contains the
descriptive meaning of indicating the speaker's interest, but it also contains the hidden meaning of assuming the listener must surely agree. In this way it carries a subtle kind of suggestion, which has the "quasi-interjectory, dynamic function" of encouraging the listener's compliance. Similarly, to ask "Is X good?" is to ask "Do you approve of X and shall I?" In this expression "the phrase 'Shall I?' is a request for influence and can roughly be compared to a request to be commanded."¹ Ethics depends, then, primarily upon "nonrational methods", such as persuasion. It depends upon "the sheer, direct emotional impact of words."² This is true not only of the term "good", which because of its "pleasing emotive meaning" is particularly fitted to suggest a favorable attitude. It is also true of terms such as "duty", "ought", and "moral obligation."³ To say something is "good" and then to add "it is your duty to do it" is simply to create a more powerfully cumulative emotional effect by bringing up stronger ammunition.

B. Two Important Qualifications.

1. Stevenson does recognize a peculiar force to terms referring to moral approval. "X is good" ordinarily means

²Ibid., p. 139. ³Cf. Ibid., p. 141.
"I like X", plus the subtle suggestion that everyone else surely does, too. Moral uses of "good", though, refer to "a different kind of interest. Instead of being about what the hearer and speaker like, it is about a stronger kind of approval."¹ We are "shocked" when we do not approve of a moral action.

2. There are some factual considerations in ethical discussions, Stevenson admits. First, as we have seen, a statement "X is good" is surely a factual statement about the present state of the speaker's interests. Second, while ethics is primarily concerned with disagreements in interests, as we can see from its use of emotionally-charged terms of persuasion—such disagreements in interests may root in a disagreement in belief. "That is to say, people who disagree in interest would often cease to do so if they knew the precise nature and consequences of the object of their interest."² The empirical method applies to ethics, then, in that ethical judgments may require supporting reasons. When a person expresses a moral imperative, the hearer may always ask "Why is this good?", to which a cogent reason may be given.

¹C.A. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning...", p. 425.
²Ibid., p. 427.
The reason, supporting the imperative, locates a possible source of disagreement in belief; and if the latter is settled, then, since beliefs and attitudes stand in intimate causal relationship, the disagreement in attitude may be caused to vanish in a way that makes the imperative willingly obeyed.¹

Stevenson thus admits that matters of belief, with which science has to deal, have some applicability to ethics. He is careful to state, however, that rational defenses of ethical statements are not validating reasons, but only "substitute proofs", mere emotional persuasions. Here it almost appears that Stevenson is searching for a criterion of absolute certainty in ethics, and finding none concludes that ethics is noncognitive.

III. A Rationalist: Brand Blanshard.

Brand Blanshard, in an article in The Philosophical Forum, described the "impasse in ethics" created first by the deontological denial that right has any significance in relation to good, followed by the emotivist insistence that goodness is not a knowable quality at all, and the naturalistic contention that ethics reduces to natural science. Blanshard answers the deontologists by showing

¹C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language..., p. 28.
that such obligations as the keeping of engagements, the
telling of truth, and the doing of justice do derive from
the good; their betrayal would "tear a huge hole in the
network of relations that makes society possible."¹ He
speaks to emotivism by showing that it makes all statements
about past and future judgments impossible, and all our
attitudes arbitrary and groundless.

Blanshard concludes that good is rooted deeply in
human nature. Goodness relates to satisfaction, or intrin-
sic value, and to the fulfillment of a human faculty. "To
fulfill and satisfy what nature prompts is not only good;
it is what goodness means."² Duty, then, is the "impera-
tive of our own reason, telling us that if our central
strivings and those of others...are to be fulfilled, we
must act thus and not otherwise."³

For a fuller exposition of these ideas we must turn
to Blanshard's recent book Reason and Goodness.

A. Goodness.

Blanshard points out that the term "good" has no
single referent; hence it is not subject to simple verbal

¹Brand Blanshard, "The Impasse in Ethics...", p. 8.
²Ibid., p. 22. ³Ibid., p. 22.
analysis. "Good" is a term like "life", "feeling", or "thought", which "carry a vague cloud of cognitive and other meanings."¹ Goodness is relative to the human process of seeking, which is a set of activities beginning in impulse, maturing into desire, and directed toward ends of varying degrees of explicitness. Thus:

Value is so fundamental in human life that its true character can be seen only against the background of human nature....I am convinced that if we find certain things good, it is not merely because they fulfill needs; such fulfillment enters into the very meaning of goodness. A sound theory of value can be developed only from an understanding of the soil or setting in which value arises. ²

Blanshard develops his conception of goodness in a series of propositions, which can perhaps be condensed into four without doing violence to their meaning:

a. "Desire grows out of the experience of satisfaction and is limited by it."³

The experience of things done with satisfying results, motivated initially by impulse, defines our desires. The Gestaltists have shown us, however, that the form of our impulses is defined congenitally, at least in the sense

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²Ibid., p. 293. ³Ibid., p. 295.
that some patterns appear to be inherently appealing to all persons. Our ideas of what is desirable also stem from the satisfactions we experience. Satisfaction is an intrinsic value which enables us to define the valuable.

b. "Our major goods answer to the main types of impulse-desires."¹

Thus, for instance, instinctive curiosity develops into the desire for understanding. We normally want to understand the connections among facts which make them intelligible. The implicit aim of the theoretic impulse is consistency and interdependence of a broad range of facts and relations within an intelligible whole. Every advance in this task gives satisfaction, but satisfaction is not the goal. The goal is fulfillment of the cognitive impulse. "This double service of fulfilling and of satisfying is what makes knowledge good. It is also what makes anything good."²

In the same way, beauty relates to aesthetic impulse-desires as one way in which some things are good. Two independent variables define goodness: i. fulfillment of an impulse, drive or need, with ii. the satisfaction which

¹Ibid., p. 301. ²Ibid., p. 301.
accompanies any experience of fulfillment. The goal of any activity is mainly fulfillment of some universally human impulse, and only secondarily the satisfaction which results. Blanshard thus agrees with the hedonists that satisfaction is an intrinsic human good, but denies that it is the primary motive of behavior.

c. "The good or desirable always outruns the desires."¹

This is true, first, because the realization of the good is teleological in nature; our aim is dimly conceived and defines itself in the course of its realization. An impulse "carries its compass and criterion within itself."²

In addition, it is an empirical fact that the best men are usually the most discontented with their achievements. Growing maturity invariably brings a redefinition of values and an enlarging of the horizons of value-possibility.

d. "The good, in the sense of the ethical end, is the most comprehensive possible fulfillment and satisfaction of impulse-desires."³

If impulse-desires conflict, a person must consider his good as a whole. He will assess his aptitudes, interests,
and abilities, and give prior reign to some impulse-desires among others. The ethical end, then, or *summum bonum*, is wise choice among impulse-desires which allows the broadest range of *satisfactoriness*, or satisfaction in union with fulfillment.

B. Obligation.

Blanshard defines the right as that action which tends to bring into being the most good. All goods are ethical goods, in that when values compete a decision must be made as to the right course of action.

a. How do we answer the deontologist's conviction that right has nothing to do with goodness? Deontologists often argue that the keeping of a promise is obligatory though the utilitarian rule of the greatest good for the greatest number is violated. In fact, they argue that the keeping of promises adds no intrinsic goodness to any community or person, and is not even motivated by that possibility. Blanshard disagrees. The keeping of a promise, he says, is bound up with the order of life itself, and the undermining of the fabric of duty which it illustrates would lead to far-reaching and disastrous consequences. Without confidence in the entire system of commitments we could not count on other persons, and chaos would result.
Thus, the keeping of an obligation does contribute to goodness, since the social order and human life itself depend upon it.¹

b. Duty is a categorical imperative, in that the impulse-desires to which it relates are integral to human nature. The theoretical impulse, for example, cannot be carved out of man "without annihilating him as man."² The same is true of the other impulse-desires. They define human nature. For this reason deontologists are correct in saying that duty has a certain inherent compelling quality which ideal utilitarianism has not accounted for.

c. "The ethical ought is like the logical ought; indeed the logical ought is a special case of the ethical."³ In this statement Blanshard builds a bridge between the theoretical impulse, the rational teleology which defines the goal of every impulse, and the imperative nature of obligation. Duty is the imperative, prescribed by human nature itself, as it seeks its good, the fulfillment of its inherent impulses and the satisfaction which fulfillment affords.

²Ibid., p. 330. ³Ibid., p. 332.
d. Duty, while defining the logical requirements of good, is itself an intrinsic good. All of the impulse-desires may be aimed at perfecting the moral mechanism. It is entirely correct to say that a person may take an interest in his own moral achievement. A healthy moral interest, however, should be centered upon the goods to be achieved. The Kantian duty is a vacuous good, with only itself to aim at. "Moral goodness is one of those priceless things, of which culture is another, that tend to wither away when placed in too bring a light."

C. Thought and Desire.

What part does reason play in the moral life? Reason's place in the moral life is very similar to the role it plays in theoretical life. "Reason is in neither case a form imposed from without on a content alien to it. It is already working immanently in desire just as it is at work in perception." Thought is closely related to desire, which plays so large a part in the moral life. In fact, thought and desire are means to the same end, the "removal of a maladjustment between idea and fact."  

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{Cf. Ibid., pp. 332-33.  \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 334.  \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 343.  \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 347.}\]
attempts to modify the idea in conformity with fact; desire to modify fact in conformity with idea. In this sense we can say: "Thought is the architect of the good." \(^1\)

Blanshard notes the following functions of reason as it influences desires:

a. Reason gives impulse an object by creating desires. Just as it turns sensation into perception, it turns impulse into desire. \(^2\) Impulse is blind until it is guided by an imaginative thought of its own completion. A desire, then, is a construct of creative thought, the expectancy born of experience and imaginative projection that an impulse may be fulfilled by certain types of activities and objects.

b. Reason operates between desires to exclude incompatible ones and bring coherence among them. Intelligence duly notes that desires contradict each other, and that priorities must be established.

c. Desires carry broad implications which reason must illuminate. The satisfaction of a desire is not an


isolated event; it has repurcussions which reason must predict.

d. Most important of all, reason is constitutive as well as regulative of impulse. A "rudimentary intelligence works through the domain of instinct" far down the evolutionary scale.¹ As Gordon Allport has pointed out by research on "the functional autonomy of motives", interests and motives are defined by experience.² Similarly, Freud showed that ideas operate subconsciously to define motives.³ One reason that the desirable always outruns the desired is that we recognize that our interests do not exhaust the potentialities, and that as knowledge increases, interests change.

Value is defined, as we saw, by two independent variables—satisfaction and fulfillment. Fulfillment is organic to the impulse, endowing it with its special character, and...is itself so plastic to intelligence, so shaped and reshaped by it, so susceptible to its excisions and corrections and enlargements, that one may almost say it is constituted by intelligence. Human good is a rational good.⁴

¹Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness..., p. 352.
²Ibid., p. 363. ³Cf. Ibid., p. 363.
⁴Ibid., p. 366.
Human good is never wholly rational, however. With experience our values are continually improved, both in scope and in internal order.
CHAPTER VI
CRITIQUE OF ETHICAL THEORIES

In this, the last substantive chapter in this study, we take up the critical task of commenting upon the ethical theories above, drawing upon the view of obligation which was developed in Chapter IV.

The value to ethics of any such theoretical formulation of obligation must be demonstrated in its usefulness in shedding light upon problems in ethical dialogue, and to indicate the directions in which such dialogue might fruitfully move in the near future. The critical comments which follow have the dual purpose of strengthening the central thesis of this dissertation, and suggesting directions for future ethical thinking.

I. Comments on Prichard's Deontology.

We have concluded that the experience of obligation, like many other qualitatively unique experiences (such as jealousy, for instance) is a complex one. It includes components of anxiety, which is itself a complex experience, with the anxiety qualified by the feeling-tone we call guilt shading over into the more deeply threatening and more intensely painful feelings of shame and incompetence,
with perhaps elements of grief and basic existential dread blended into the whole. Components of interest, or organismic involvement impelling completion of an unfinished Gestalt of experience, which we feel as the logical or moral "ought" are involved. We not only do our duty because we are afraid not to, but because it is "to our interest" to do so. We saw that the very presence of such anxiety-interest feelings, or even the defenses which disguise their silent influence, are indications of evaluation, though it be mainly unconscious. We concluded that even pathological guilt is not isolated from evaluation; it is nothing but fitting in some intrapsychic or interpersonal contexts which are rapidly becoming known to psychotherapists.

What indications can we find in this analysis for the ethical philosophy of H.A. Prichard? We can see worth in Prichard's conviction that obligation is an experience which is "appreciated" following certain "preliminaries."¹ We would agree with him that these "preliminaries" include thoughtful consideration of a situation in "unreflective consciousness,...an activity of moral thinking."² This

²Ibid., p. 161.
moral thinking involves imaginative projection of ourselves into the problem situation in question, in order that we may see it in holistic balance.\(^1\) It presupposes the "moral capacity" of a "developed moral being", which is subject to considerable variation.\(^2\) Certain qualifications are in order:

A. Moral Thinking Not a Unique Cognitive Function.

"Moral thinking" is not a unique cognitive function, but the evaluative function which we employ in all defensive, coping, and expressive activity.

We observed that Freud preferred to restrict subconscious evaluation to defensive activities, which distort and falsify reality to protect a person from guilt. We noted also that the intent of such defensive cognition is to enable one to cope with the real situation, and involves very astute and realistic analyses of that situation. Evaluation thus serves a coping function, and defensive devices are simply a strategic method facilitating it. Freud saw, too, that evaluation serves expressive interests, in art and wit, for instance. It appears here that the function Freud associated so closely with guilt and interest (psychic intensity) is the same function we employ in all cognitive activity.

Similarly, Sullivan's three "modes of experience", which he observed to be organismically correlated with gradient shame-anxiety are the verbal and perverbal cognitive processes which are involved in every aspect of life.

It would appear that Sarbin is correct when he identifies the "moral dilemma" with conflicts between broader and narrower self-roles, which are themselves "cognitive structures."\(^1\) Robert White leads us in the same direction when he connects shame with incompetence, and the urge toward competence with the cognitive sphere of life.\(^2\) He denies that shame relates to moral violation, but this is because he narrows morality to guilt-related situations only. We are following Fromm's lead in identifying morality with the broad range of human value.

We disagree, then, when Prichard identifies with a Butlerian view of moral cognition as a separate function.

B. Intuition a Creative Insight.

Our analysis would indicate that an intuition is a creative insight. We might liken it to the appreciation

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\(^1\) Cf. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory"..., p. 251.

of the essence, or artistic pattern of an experiential Gestalt, following subconscious evaluation of a dramaturgic type. It is the enjoyment of the apex, the decisive moment in a movement of thought, which defines the unique meaning of the entire movement.

When Prichard says obligation is "absolutely underivative and immediate" he tends to falsify this process. The complexity of subconscious evaluations underlying any experience which comes to us with a sense of immediacy is amply demonstrated by psychotherapists. To say that obligation is an intuition would not make it self-evident in any analytic sense, then. Its meaning must be explicated in terms of the evaluative processes which precede it. Prichard bore testimony to this when he abandoned Moore's perceptual model and spoke of "unreflective thinking."

If an intuition is a creative insight, it remains at the mercy of the perceptual opportunities, the imaginative capacities, and the rational maturity of the person who is making the evaluation. Prichard would be hard pressed to explain why the maturity of the moral being would make a difference if moral intuition is self-explanatory. We can explain this fact if we see, as Adler and Fromm concluded,
that all cognition varies in predictable ways with a person's total history and orientation. Cognition reflects character.\(^1\)

C. Obligation Relates to Goodness.

We have seen that an intuition is not its own explanation. Further, when we seek an explanation of an experience of obligation we will find it indissolubly bound up with evaluation, and evaluation presupposes a value-system.

Prichard says no reason can be given for an obligation, and no purpose assigned to it. We can agree that no reasons not intrinsic to the obligating situation and the "unreflective moral thinking" which accompanies it can be given for an experience of obligation. This does not mean, however, that obligation has nothing to do with goodness, nor that the assigning of goodness to an object presupposes an obligation to produce it, as Prichard says. We should rather say that one feels obligated in a situation because he has assessed its complex meaning with reference to its value-producing or value-threatening possibilities. A sense of obligation may be the only motive for a moral act, as Prichard says, but the obligation involves a value-judgment. We do anticipate guilt- and shame-anxiety, and hence

\(^1\)Cf. Fromm's concept of "productive thinking", on p. 161 above.
experience signal-anxiety, when we observe that a course of action will threaten the personal or interpersonal coherence which is our very existence. Similarly, we invest interest in an object in relation to its assessed significance for the enrichment of our way of life. Obligation is the drive to integrate a significant (either in terms of value or disvalue) "wild fact" into the cognitive requirements of the value-system which defines our life, and the anxious concern for that value-system.

This would lead us to both a positive and negative statement about Prichard's view:

i. He does well to stress the prime importance of obligation in morality. It is plain that the sense of binding urgency which accompanies a duty is not adequately explained by the ideal utilitarians. There is more involved here than the weighing of consequences to discover which course of action offers "the greatest good for the greatest number." There is rather the eduction of a fabric of relationships which carry an imperative quality, an inherent logic which is binding in nature. One's very identity as a person is at stake. This is clearly illustrated in the moral crises psychotherapists so often face with their patients, where anxiety is so great as to demand a complete
disowning of the internal imagery of a situation, and yet the organismic involvement with that dissociated image is so intense as to reach hypnotic proportions.

ii. The immediate, imperative quality of an obligation does not require us to divorce it from goodness, as the deontologists indicate. We do not see this separation of right from value as explicitly stated in the work of Prichard as we do in the later work of David Ross. Ross defined the directions of deontology by emphasizing the self-evident nature of an experience of obligation. While Prichard held a similar view, he qualified it by making obligation dependent upon the imaginative capacities of a qualified moral being, which opens the door to value-considerations. Ross went so far as to state that there is no intrinsic worth in keeping an obligation, nor is there an increase in "the intrinsic goodness of a community merely because promises are kept in it."¹ We are further told that even if the keeping of an obligation made the world worse than before in all ways, it is still our duty to keep it.

We have indicated that obligation may be analytically described as an anxiety-interest complex. We have further indicated that guilt-anxiety is aroused when one threatens the fabric of law and trust which defines interpersonal relationships, and shame-anxiety attends the judgment of personal incompetence when such relationships are threatened. Beyond this we have affirmed that interest is invested in a situation and attention given to it as some action is needed to integrate it constructively into one's life. We have concluded that these anxiety and interest gradients are systemically coordinated with evaluation, and that an intuition is a creative insight. This would indicate that the right depends upon the good; that an experience of obligation carries a judgment of value. In fact, a judgment of right ties directly to the value-system which defines the distinctive organization which is one's life. Furthermore, the keeping of a promise would have intrinsic value, as an example of the competent evaluation and resolution of a situation.

II. Comments on the Emotivist Theory.

A. Feeling Follows Significance.

A.C. Garnett criticizes Stevenson in terms of a criterion of "broad agreement". The great ethical religions
of the world, he says, have gradually discovered that there is an objective, universal, and factual factor in moral life. Morality does not root in "anything so subjective and variable as mere emotion." In the light of our view of obligation as an anxiety-interest complex systemically correlated with evaluation, our own criticism of Stevenson would have to take the opposite tack. We would agree with Stevenson that ethical terms are distinguished by their emotive meanings, but deny the implication that emotive meanings are arbitrary and insubstantial.

Freud showed us that emotion varies with significance. Irrational feeling is feeling which has a rational meaning in the context of some covert intrapsychic pattern. It makes sense in terms of the total task a person is facing, once we know all the hidden dimensions of that task. Kurt Goldstein expresses the same conviction:

If the patient does not seem to react in a satisfactory way, it is in situations in which he also fails to comprehend the essentials to which a definite feeling attaches...His reaction seems inappropriate to us because we regard the whole situation and not merely a part of it.


2 Kurt Goldstein, Human Nature..., p. 23.
Maslow adds an additional dimension to this when he points out that some behavior is relatively "purposeless", or "unmotivated."¹ Much emotion is expressive, not of an inner problem or task, but of one's aesthetic appreciation, or his unique style of life, or simply relaxed play. Whether emotion is a concomitant of problem-solving, or of expressive behavior, it is reasonable within the context of a given psychic system and its history.

Stevenson says "this is wrong" means "I disapprove", expressed in emotionally-toned language to manipulate the hearer's interest in the direction of conformity. Such a statement is not a factual, but a prescriptive statement, Stevenson says. Can we not reply that it is a prescriptive statement because it is also a statement of fact or belief, and that a prescriptive statement always expresses a judgment? We would wish to agree with Stevenson that many ethical statements express varying degrees of interest, as their prescriptive form reveals. We would also wish to say that interest presupposes evaluation, and that every ethical statement which is prescriptive is therefore cognitive as well. A prescriptive statement means to indicate a person's

¹A.H. Maslow, Motivation..., pp. 291-ff.
conviction that a complex pattern of experience is such that this prescription is justified. An expression of moral attitude means to express a moral belief.

We have observed that one becomes "organismically involved" in a situation to the extent that it has some significance to the pattern of his life. The greater the significance, the more intense the interest, reaching hypnotic proportions in situations of massive threat. The total meaning of moral terms, which it is Stevenson's intent to reveal, will be discovered only in their functional setting within the hierarchy of value which defines the inner logic of a person's life.

It appears that two admissions by Stevenson constitute chinks in the armor of emotivism:

a) Stevenson admitted that "I like X" expresses a different kind of interest from that expressed in "I disapprove of X." Garnett points out that this admission opens the door to "the assertion of some difference in judgments about X which underlie and determine the difference in feeling-tone." We have seen that the qualitative

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2 A.C. Garnett, Ethics..., p. 308.
differences in feeling-tone experienced between, for instance, guilt and shame, are symptomatic of two different judgments, expressed roughly by such sentences as "I have transgressed", as distinguished from "I am incompetent."

b) Second, Stevenson admitted that some differences in attitude may be cogently defended by calling attention to the considerations which support the underlying beliefs. The attitude will be presumably more acceptable to the listener if the beliefs are defensible.\(^1\) Persons with the same beliefs will often differ in attitude, Stevenson says, calling for the use of emotionally-toned words to add additional force to one's argument. We would feel that a difference in attitude is always indicative of a difference in belief. The "phenomenal field" of one person who favors a moral statement is different from that of another who opposes it. The more objective aspects of the situation may be agreed upon by both parties, but its symbolic meaning is not the same to both. The use of feeling-tone language in moral argument may be effective strategy, not because people wish to be "commanded", as Stevenson says, but because such language changes the phenomenal field more readily than the cold language of logic. We have observed that evaluation

\(^{1}\)Cf. C.L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*..., p. 29.
is mainly dramaturgic, with its decisive roots extending below the surface of logico-verbal discourse. The language of persuasion changes attitude, not because people are irrational, as Stevenson implies, but because they are moved by the deeper rationality of dramaturgic evaluation. Such evaluation finds effective use of the value-charged imagery which emotionally-toned words convey. In fact, the deeper layers of evaluation have a greater "regard for representation" than the narrower logic of verbal discourse has.¹

B. The Functional Meaning of Verbal Expressions.

Stevenson shares the major weakness of the logical positivists. Positivists refuse to bless anything with the title "knowledge" unless it takes the form of syntactic statements describing an operation of the type found in the physical sciences. This means that by the arbitrary fiat of definition all expressions of the subtle shades of meaning found in prescriptive statements, or any other uniquely private psychic events, are termed noncognitive. People may argue with rational cogency about the facts of

a case, but attitudes or interests can be influenced only by semi-hypnotic suggestion or subtle appeals to irrational authority.

We can observe from our study of Freud and Sullivan that a verbal expression is a decision, which bears the marks of its birth in subconscious evaluation. We do not use a word unless we intend either to express or disguise some significant truth about our total life situation or some part of it. We can say with Brand Blanshard that "words are used very much as checks are used, to transfer accumulated stores."\(^1\)

This is true not only of words used in a logical syntax, but as we saw above, of words which bear primary fruit in an emotive realm. Far more revolutionary from the positivist standpoint is the psychiatric assumption that nonverbal communications such as gestures and facial expressions, as well as the mainly preverbal communications found in dreams, daydreams, insight, and artistic imagery, reveal the relatively predictable and inherently rational nature of subconscious processes. This may turn out to be

the major epistemological contribution of the psychotherapists in our time.

Edward S. Tauber and Maurice R. Green have done a constructive job of assimilating the insights of Freud, Sullivan, and others at this point.¹ They term unconscious evaluative processes "prelogical experience". The term "preverbal experience", which is also in current use, may be more adequate, since as Tauber and Green observe, these forms of experience are not extra-logical, but inherently logical, in a Hegelian or dramaturgic sense. Thus dreams employ absurdities, contradictions, and space-time transpositions, but they evidence a basic "regard for intelligibility" in the way in which fragments of experience and memories of events are creatively arranged in intelligible synthesis.² Myths and dreams have a logic of their own.

Far from denying truth to emotionally-charged expression, the typical psychotherapist observes a more broadly significant truth underlying them. Creative hunches, then, though they arise outside the logico-verbal context:

²Ibid., p. 13.
come to a person in a particular symbolic form pregnant with a sense of value, interest, and excitement. The strongly felt hunch puts one in touch with the deeper emotional content of the creative unconscious.¹

The purpose of logico-verbal syntax is to facilitate, to communicate, or perhaps to disguise the depth evaluative processes. The preverbal modes of experience, then, i. have an internal logic which can be discovered by depth analysis, and ii. this deeper meaning can be explained, clarified, and communicated in syntactical form. In interpersonal relationships, with which ethics is primarily concerned, syntactical expressions lose validity to the extent that they become isolated from or distortive of the deeper truth of preverbal modes of experience. Dishonesty in feeling-tone expression, as illustrated, for instance, in the typical "Dale Carnegie" approach in interpersonal relationships comes under suspicion in this context.

Stevenson assumes that anything which is not asked in the form of discursive logic and answered by reference to a physical operation is not truth. Feeling, formless desires, interests, and immediate experience are outside the realm of truth. The whole weight of modern psychotherapy leads one to question this positivistic bias.

¹Ibid., p. 3.
C. Ethics as External.

Precisely because Stevenson is committed to the denial of rational validity to preverbal evaluative processes, he externalizes ethics. The model of ethical discourse he assumes limits ethics to the persuasive statements of a moral judge. He does not see that such statements presuppose the judge as moral thinker. Ethics is reduced to that of irrational authority, so decisively criticized by Fromm in *Man for Himself*.

This may be the fate of any ethic which denies the rationality of obligation. Stevenson can see nothing in obligation beyond the expression of personal taste other than the peculiar force of emotion which attends the former. He sees that taste may relate to rational appraisal, but emotion is purely arbitrary.

We would observe in this connection that the experience of obligation roots in an evaluation of an interpersonal situation as it relates to the coherent structure of one's life. My imputing obligation to another carries the meaning that I judge his situation to be such that he will avoid a prescribed course of action only at the peril of guilt- or shame-anxiety or the various consequences of broken commitment. In commending moral behavior to a person
I pay him the compliment of supposing his own evaluative capacities to be intact. My evaluations may, of course, be marred by my excessive need to dominate the other party, or by my own compulsive rigidities, in which case I may employ Stevenson's ethical tactics. The relationships which Stevenson considers normative for ethics would be regarded as pathological by psychotherapists, except for some of the orthodox psychoanalysts, who see sadistic overtones in all morality.

III. Comments on Blanshard's Theory.

It is the judgment of this author that the thought of Brand Blanshard rests generally upon solid psychological and ethical ground. We have concluded that obligation is a complex anxiety-interest experience, growing out of an underlying evaluative process, and relating organismically to the tasks required for actualization of a coherent self within a social field. Blanshard leads ethical dialogue in a direction which would promise to make full use of a perspective of this type.

A. Good Related to Satisfaction.

The concept of "good" is rescued from the impasse in which G.E. Moore mired it. "Good" is recognized, not as a simple, non-natural quality open to immediate experience,
but as a rich concept with varied connotations. Goodness is rooted once again in the human quest, and given meaning in terms of human interests and desires. The tendency of the traditional interest theories to equate the desired with the desirable is avoided by showing that desires undergo critical examination as experience and maturity are gained.\(^1\) The desirable grows out of experience with the desired, but "ought to be" is not limited to what "is". A.H. Maslow and others have insisted that certain "instinctoid needs" have an imperative quality in human nature, asserting themselves in distorted form under conditions of deprivation, but never disappearing entirely. This lends credence to Blanshard's view that goodness may be identified with the realization of certain inherent impulses. The criterion of goodness is not limited to satisfying feeling alone, but to "satisfactoriness" or satisfaction in union with fulfillment. The steady, persistent pursuit of immanent human goals, enriched by moments of satisfaction, becomes the source of goodness.

B. Obligation Related to Good.

The concept of "ought" and the experience of obligation are once again seen as integral aspects of the

\(^1\)For a critical study of interest theories in ethics, see Thomas E. Hill, *Contemporary Ethical Theories...*, Chapter XIV.
human quest for good. The deontologists were led by their wish to salvage the imperative flavor of "ought" to insist that it had nothing to do with value. Blanshard answers their arguments effectively, and yet agrees that obligation is a categorical imperative.

As we have done in this paper, he explicates that imperative in terms of the logic of human nature as it takes form within a social structure. The logical "ought" is a form of the ethical "ought". While logical-ethical excellence may be admired for its intrinsic worth, and may become a central goal of living in its own right, the true function of logic and ethical obligation is to order human experience so as to facilitate the achievement of value.

C. Cognition and Conation Interrelate.

Cognition and conation are seen as concomitants. Not only does reason legislate among desires, it is inherent in the very formation of desires. Impulses have their own implicit logic; rudimentary intelligence is at work at the very base of human striving. Imaginative anticipation and retrospective evaluation give eyes and understanding to desire. Reason for Blanshard always has a teleological cast suggestive of Freud's dramaturgic dream-work. While his language suggests the rationalistic identification of reasoning
with logical-verbal discourse, unconscious mental processes are immanently rational. In all knowing, understanding grows through a process in which the "germinal becomes the mature, the potential the actual; in which I become what I had it in me to become." Immanent purpose is at work from the rudimentary first steps of perception. "This identical and continuous element has been working in darkness, freeing itself from irrelevancy, organizing its matter, enlarging its scope, until it is fully formed and ripe." The immanent end of this subconscious dramaturgic reasoning is "to achieve a state of insight that will bring the theoretic impulse to rest." Until that state is reached, the cognitive impulse is restless under the obligation to complete its task. It is this immanent purpose, not only to know but to realize the goal of its being, which we have expanded to encompass the entire self and identified with ethical obligation, apparently with the implied blessing of certain psychotherapists. Anxiety expressed the peculiar urgency of that task when the issue is in doubt.

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2 Ibid., p. 483. 3 Ibid., p. 489.
D. Concept of Self-actualization Required.

While Blanshard sees goodness, obligation, and evaluation as they relate to the fulfillment of impulses, he apparently offers no conception of self-actualization. He defines the *summum-bonum* as "the most comprehensive fulfillment and satisfaction of impulse-desire."\(^1\) His view of obligation would lead him to see the ethical end, not as the greatest possible fulfillment of impulse-desires, but of the coherent life as realized through fulfillment of impulse-desires. His view of the final ideal, however, suggests atomistic impulse-satisfactions.

Blanshard says that desires carry broad implications, and it is the work of intelligence to apprehend these. Thus:

> The intelligence at work within desire, starting from the end of a single impulse, widens and modifies the prospect so that the final election is by the massed votes of many independent impulse-desires....When election time comes, the impulses vote in blocks.\(^2\)

This conceptual model suggests a democracy of atomistic impulse-desires, loosely ordered by one among their number, the epistemic impulse. Several questions can be raised about

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\(^1\)Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Goodness*..., p. 311.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 351.
this:  
i. Desires carry broad implications which reason apprehends. Implications for whom? Reason is a function of a person, defining the implications of all experiences for the person, and judging among impulses in an organismic context. Blanshard tends to hypostatize reason as Freud hypostatized the three elements of the tripartite self. ii. Does not the logical nature of obligation point to one center by which all value is defined? Blanshard often says that the immanent end of each impulse defines its goal. Thus the end of the epistemic impulse is to achieve understanding, the end of the aesthetic impulse to find beauty. Goodness and obligation are completely relative to fulfillment of these impulses and attendant satisfactions. Let us suppose, however, that these impulses belong to a highly intelligent and sensitive boy in an agricultural community where intellectual and aesthetic interests are identified with the feminine sex-role, and therefore must be carefully hidden under pain of humiliation. It becomes apparent that the impulse-desires will take their meaning from the total context of a person's life. We do not seek satisfaction-fulfillment alone, but a Gestalt of experience which includes them in some unity satisfactory to the self as a whole. iii. Do impulse-desires "vote in clusters" or does a person vote for
or against the fulfillment of certain impulse-desires, perhaps at the expense of another, or even at the expense of suffering the deprivation symptoms? Blanshard often speaks of this sort of conflict, in which the person must carefully weigh his interests and talents, and vote to major in one thing and minor in another. He does not fully see that one's total life may take on the nature of an impulse, defined in complex self-role imagery. Adler's "use" psychology speaks to the manner in which all aspects of experience become assimilated, selected, and ordered as though they were in the hire of the person to which they belong. Similarly, Goldstein, Maslow and others have demonstrated beyond question the organismic character of the self, which takes shape as much by the process of exclusion of impulsive aims as inclusion of them. The important point is that the logic inherent in each impulse does not define obligation; rather the logic inherent in the impulse for self-actualization so defines it. As satisfaction bows before fulfillment in Blanshard's system, so fulfillment must bow before the higher court of self-actualization. Fulfillment of any impulse is in some sense fulfillment of a self, or it is no fulfillment at all.
E. The Self is Defined Within a Social Field.

Blanshard affirms that duties relate to the requirements necessary to maintain the social order. The imperative quality of obligation is a reflection of the imperative need to maintain society. Why must society be maintained? It is necessary to sustain human life, Blanshard might reply. Why is society necessary to sustain human life? Because a dependable social order is required for the achievement of impulse-desires. Does this explain the intensity of guilt, shame, and obligation?

We must see that the coherent structure of the self is defined in relation to an interpersonal field. A person's entire cognitive set is oriented in terms of "schema of apperception" (Adler), "frames of orientation and devotion" (Fromm), which relate more or less veridically to the actual molar structure of social and cosmic reality. A person becomes a person and knows who and where he is as he formulates his role, or his identity with reference to his place in a world of persons and relations. From this we can see that the threat of guilt-anxiety strikes at the very heart of personal existence; that it is further complicated by the deeper threat of lost confidence in one's capacity to define his life at all. Add to this picture the danger of
the serious surgery which may be inflicted upon the soul with the alienation of loved ones, and we can understand why the imperative of obligation becomes categorical in a way Kant barely dreamed. Now the rules of interpersonal relations take on a mien, not of a game, as Blanshard pictures it, but a drama of life or death. Perhaps the imperial nature of obligation is never fully appreciated until we place it beside the black pit of Sullivan's anxiety.

The ideal person in Blanshard's thought is the serene rationalist, moving sagely through the world, achieving satisfying fulfillment of his rational and aesthetic impulse-desires. Why, in this view, is it not always more rational to satisfy my impulse-desires, and advance my well-being, though at the expense of my neighbor? I dare not violate the logic of community, Blanshard might reply. But what is the ground of that communal structure? Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan, and Freud in spite of himself, would affirm that the inner logic of personal fulfillment commits us to the correlative logic of communal order. Social interest (Adler), productive love (Fromm), intimacy needs (Sullivan), belongingness and love needs (Maslow), are not optionals in human living. Self-fulfillment is fullness of love. It is the investment of one's powers creatively and constructively
in the world of persons. It is, further, the imaginative projection of all that such a world ought to be to sustain the lives of those who live and move within it.

F. Evil Roots in Goodness.

Goodness and obligation are integral to human nature, and defined by that nature, Blanshard says. The question then becomes, which human nature? Hatred and indigence are common enough to human beings, and may be said to constitute human nature. Freud, as we noted, postulated the "death wish" as a vital aspect of human nature, and thus often spoke of guilt, the death wish turned back upon self, as the tragic mark of our human fate, stemming not from our inherent good, but rather from our inherent evil. Why should we not say, with Kluckhohn, that every society is characterized by "free-floating aggression", an impulse-desire which must find an outlet?¹ Blanshard's rational impulse may as legitimately be employed for hostile as for benevolent purposes, then. His aesthetic impulse may find legitimate appreciation in the objects of sadistic desires, as the "beast of Buchenwald" admired lamp-shades made of human skin.

Blanshard defines evil as failure of impulse-desire, either to reach fulfillment, or to achieve satisfaction, or both. Such failure is attributed to weakness, ignorance, or some other incapacity. He further defines evil as the cutting off of good, through "disproportion between inner power and outer circumstance."¹ Presumably, then, it would be evil for free-floating aggression to remain unfulfilled or frustrated.

It becomes apparent that if goodness and obligation are to be grounded in human nature, we must find some good reason for evil impulse. That is, we must demonstrate that evil impulse would be good if it could. There is ample clinical evidence that such is the case. Hostility is not an impulse, but the distortion of an impulse.² Thus, Maslow says that we know

nasty aggression is reactive rather than basic, effect rather than cause, because as a nasty person gets healthier in psychotherapy, he gets less vicious; and as a healthier person gets more sick, he changes in the direction of more hostility, more venom, and more viciousness.³

¹Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness..., p. 338.
³A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 346.
Similarly, Adler's "striving on the commonly useless side", Fromm's "nonproductive orientation", and Sullivan's "malevolent transformation" afford ample clinical evidence that evil impulse is the tragic distortion of an inherent goodness.

G. Constructive Identification With Moral Struggle.

Blanshard defines the ideal in its end-terms.¹ In Blanshard's chapter on "The Rational Temper" we see a picture of the serene intellectual, who, among other characteristics, would be "clever in the manipulation of logico-mathematical symbols."² One wonders whether the classic charge against Spinoza's ethics might also be leveled at Blanshard--only a philosopher can be virtuous.

Do we not need a view of rationality which allows room for the average person? Cannot we admire the reasonableness of a plumber's life, or that of the typical housewife? Even more important is the insight coming from psychotherapy that a neurotic or psychotic person may in his own handicapped way evidence amazing courage and insight, and even more startling, that his emotional disturbances may be

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¹ Cf. A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality..., Chapters 12 and 13, for a psychological parallel.

² Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness..., p. 412.
tragic testimony to the tenacious persistence of all that is good in human life.

One wonders whether a major task of ethics might not always remain that of constructive identification with persons who are involved in the struggle for the achievement of value, always in some degree under conditions of deprivation. If reason is dramaturgic in nature, there would be added power to an ethic which meshes into the unfinished drama of human living. The nature of guilt-shame cycles indicates that unless it is characterized by a therapeutic dimension the facile verbalization of the ideal may increase despair and thus be of negative moral value. In this sense, we see more positive moral value in the methodology of the psychotherapist and the social psychologist than we do in Blanshard's counsels of perfection.

To moralize is not necessarily to be relevant, effective, or even moral. Understanding a situation existentially is important to being ethically perceptive about it.¹

These considerations offer some evidence that the task-orientation of philosophical ethics might undergo a

major shift. We can only hint at the directions such a movement might well take. Surely ethics must speak to the meaning of guilt, anxiety, and despair, even as it speaks of "self-actualizing persons" and "the rational temper". This is supported by the plain clinical fact that escape from the myriad guilt and anxiety traps into which one may become enmeshed is possible only as the victim is enabled first to understand and accept himself.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has involved a study of the experience of obligation, "oughting", or conscience. It has sought an answer to the question: to what extent and in what sense may conscience be said to be cognitive? On the preliminary assumption that conscience is related to guilt and shame, a search was made through the writings of certain psychotherapists to see what empirical data could be discovered about these experiences. The cognitive function was investigated, in the broad sense in which the cognitive psychologists use the term to refer to the conscious and unconscious referential processes by which experience is selectively ordered and schematized into meaningful patterns. The writings of psychotherapists were found to be a fertile source of stimulating suggestion on this subject.

It is important to note here that the criterion employed in arriving at the conclusions in this chapter is not conformity to psychiatric theory. A critique of psychiatric theory itself is offered from time to time. The criterion is rather that of empirical coherence. The problem is to arrive at a view of obligation which is coherent with the
actual experience of obligation. The observations and reflections of psychotherapists are searched for light they may shed on the nature of this complex experience.

Where the nature of obligation is concerned it is the judgment of this writer that the testimony of psychotherapists is of unique evidential value, for the following reasons: 1). The most abundant data on the anxieties and feelings which arise from the struggle of persons to create value in their lives is found in the psychiatric literature. By and large, theologians and psychotherapists have dominated discussions of guilt and shame in the past few decades. Many of the theologians, such as Albert Outler and Paul Tillich, for instance, have been strongly influenced by the psychiatric viewpoint. 2). The data from psychotherapy have been amassed after untold hours of the most rigorous kind of introspection, engaged in by countless numbers of persons undergoing therapy. 3). Psychiatric observations based upon this introspection have been subject to the scrutiny of numerous consultations among professional persons who have been extensively trained in the fine art of grasping subtle shades of meaning in verbal communication, and in detecting behind the words people use the hidden truth conveyed in visceral reactions, symbolic acts, and tone of voice. 4). The
situation in therapy is unique in that it encourages the utmost attention to the patient's total situation in provisional isolation from conventional commitments, even including logical commitments to philosophical or theological ideologies. In therapy rationalizations may be exposed, defenses lose their coping value, distortion of reality by repression or projection may be mitigated, and deep insight achieved.

This is not to imply, however, that a neatly coherent view of obligation is to be found in psychiatric theory. Certain common elements appeared to emerge as the study moved from Freud to Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan, however. It is instructive that so many explicit conclusions made by Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan were assumed by Freud in spite of his theoretical commitments. This may give evidence of the steady, stubborn emergence of a coherent view which is prefigured in the data themselves.

The first four in the series of conclusions which follow represent elements in a view of obligation which seemed indicated by the psychological study. The fifth conclusion is a summary statement of the major thesis of the dissertation. The remaining conclusions represent a critique of the ethical positions of Prichard, Sullivan, and Blanshard.
1. Obligation is a complex experience with a negative pole of anxiety and a positive pole of interest, or organismic involvement with an uncompleted task.

Freud identified guilt with anxiety; in fact, in Freud's writings anxiety is invariably the threat arising from guilty desires. Freud perceived that guilt includes a component of self-directed hostility, and that this hostility attacks the ego, giving rise to deeper layers of anxiety. Piers, Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan identify this deeper anxiety as threat which grows out of the need for self-esteem and self-realization. These two levels of anxiety, which we have termed guilt and shame, must be carefully distinguished. Guilt is anxiety arising from actual or desired transgression of a moral norm; shame is anxiety springing from a threat to the inner coherence and competence of the self. That they are distinct phenomena is born out by the guilt-shame cycles described by Piers and Fromm, in which guilt and shame are reciprocally reinforced in a self-perpetuating syndrome. A sense of obligation includes anticipation of guilt- or shame-anxiety or a combination of the two, and may be identified with mild twinges of signal-anxiety.

In addition to anxiety, however, we concluded that obligation includes a component of interest. Peter A. Bertocci
points to the qualitative difference between feelings of anxiety and feelings of guilt, and to the presence of an obligatory or impelling component to guilt. It may be suggested that a sense of obligation always points to the imperative to complete a functional system. Turning to Freud's work, we discover the concept of interest, or "psychic value" which is invested in ideas according to their significance to the self. He saw that guilt-anxiety is aroused when a segmental interest threatens to overwhelm one's total range of interests. Sullivan discussed the "fascination" which surrounds a dissociated psychic system, and Robert White utilized the term "incubation" to express the way in which compulsive engrossment in a repressed experience may intensify as time ensues. Theodore Sarbin reveals that this pathological interest is on a continuum with more benign interests. He points to degrees of "organismic involvement" attending the enacting of a role, which may range from a mild playfulness to a hysterically-induced death. Since a role is, from the subjective standpoint, a complex, coherent system of images referent to the self and its integration with the interpersonal environment, we can see that interest expresses a restless search for completion of a life pattern.
2. The anxiety-interest complex described as obligation is organismically coherent with creative evaluation, which is in large measure preverbal in character and dramaturgic in form.

Freud thought of guilt as a primitive "given" which distorts evaluation; we demonstrated, however, that even this "irrational" guilt presupposes extensive preconscious evaluation. Freud's therapeutic goal was to reveal the intrapsychic system within which guilt is invariably reasonable. Freud revealed that the preconscious evaluative activity of dream-work is dramaturgic in form, similar to the creative work of a poet or an artist. In fact, the term "dramaturgic", which comes from Phillip Rieff, suggests the task of creating a drama. Freud saw that guilt-anxiety stimulates this depth evaluation, which while its immediate purpose is to avoid guilt, its ultimate purpose is value-achievement.

Adler and Sullivan saw shame-anxiety as relating closely to depth evaluation. The self-system is constructed by unconscious evaluative activity, and once constructed continues to function as the central core in terms of which all experience is ordered. Gradient anxiety is an intimate component of this evaluative activity, both prodding it to
function and shepherding it into one mode or another. Anxiety is described as "gradient" to express the manner in which mild intensities stimulate depth evaluation as we anticipate its rising trend, or initiate psychic defense if it becomes too threatening.

Similarly, interest fluctuates with the assessed value of a situation. Freud always assumed that the feeling-tone and level of preoccupation accompanying an experience is reasonably correlated with a hidden value-system which defines its meaning. Adler and Fromm described the way in which immanent values associated with self-realization are served by the cognitive ordering of all experience. Sullivan showed that attention varies with significance.

We conclude that the experience of obligation, or even the presence of ego-defenses which reveal a hidden guilt, are adequate evidence that creative, in-process judgments are being made through a complex process of subconscious evaluation. Even pathological or chronic guilt reveals penetrating insight into one's actual situation, either as it is defined by unfortunate interpersonal relations or by the inappropriate retention of a childhood role in the interests of security. Similarly, the pathological interest associated with obsessive-compulsive behavior indicates a realistic crisis in obligation.
This organismic relationship between the experience of obligation and depth evaluation appears to justify our thesis that conscience is functionally cognitive, in the broader integrative sense of the term. A sense of obligation is always reasonable within some coherent context, although it may require a depth analysis to discover what that context might be.

3. The evaluative processes which interact with the anxiety and interest gradients are a functional tool of a self in its struggle for actualization and expansion.

Freud took the position that guilt is irrational, that primary process thinking is distortive of reality, and that the self is tripartite in nature. In his work on dreams, however, Freud assumed that evaluation, guilt-anxiety, and interest are coordinated functions of a coherent self, as it faces not only the unreasonable tasks posed by a neurotic trend, but the contemporary tasks of normal life as well.

Adler helped us to see that shame-anxiety is the negative side of a positive teleology of self-actualization. He was the first theorist to observe clearly that the unified self is a cognitive construct, and that the ego-ideal which guides self-evaluation is itself an imaginative projection of creative thought, even though that thought is largely pre-
conscious. Fromm, too, saw conscience as a concomitant of
the imperious urging of our hidden potentiality. Sullivan,
similarly, saw the self as a product of "personification",
which is an unconscious process of creative evaluation,
guided in part by the fluctuating intensity of shame-anxiety.

Our investigation appears to lead toward a view of
self-actualization. These characteristics must be affirmed
of the self; 1) It is an organismic unity formed by a pro­
cess of dramaturgic evaluation. 2) A positive growth prin­
ciple, or the actualization and expansion of an inherent
self-ideal, must supplement the closed biological systems
of Freud, Adler, and Goldstein. 3) The vacuous self of
Fromm and Sullivan must be supplemented by some conception
of inherent structure and need, such as we see in Maslow and
the Gestaltists. 4) The defensive self of Freud and Sullivan
must be seen as presupposing a more positive conception of the
self such as may be illustrated by Maslow's "self-actualizing
person" or Robert White's "effectance motivation". The de­
fensive self presupposes the self which is defended, and the
self which plots the defense.

4. The self is actualized in dynamic interaction with
a social field, with other persons, but also with the molar
structures which define the social field.
Freud assumed in his treatment of dreams that we experience guilt because of our depth understanding that we are tempted to threaten the social fabric which affords our love objects and defines our life. All three of the social psychiatrists developed some conception of love as an immanent goal of all striving. Adler saw "social feeling" as the "only salvation" from chronic shame-anxiety. Fromm's "productive orientation", which is the hidden standard implicit in conscience, is best characterized as mature love. Sullivan termed anxiety the "need for interpersonal security", which provides for "tenderness needs". The experience of obligation, then, in-so-far as it is anticipation of guilt or shame, points to the requirements of self-fulfillment in love.

There is more involved in obligation than the need for rewarding interpersonal relationships, however. Adler and Fromm saw that personality is shaped along the lines of some cognitive map or orienting schema, which corresponds ideally to a perceptive eduction of the molar characteristics of the interpersonal and cosmic environment. When anxiety prevents one from interacting openly and freely with his environment, "private schema" are formulated. The role psychologists see that one's personal identity is of one fabric with one's working conception of the interpersonal
environment. Personal identity, then, is defined in terms of the molar structure which characterizes the social organization necessary to sustain human life. Guilt- and shame-anxiety signal some threat to this structure and hence to one's personal identity. Organismic involvement (attention, interest) relates to the tasks required to sustain the Gestalt of one's role, or personal identity as it is defined in an interpersonal and cosmic environment. Obligation, then, has an imperious quality precisely because it roots deeply in the primal conditions of psychic life.

5. Conscience is rational, in the sense that it is empirically coherent with the most inclusive human need, that of realizing and expanding self in community, and empirically coherent with the unconscious inferential processes which accompany that quest.

Conscience is often identified with conscious guilt. This identification is no doubt responsible for much of the discrediting of conscience as a moral index. There are many reasons why a person may choose to disguise his guilt as grief, hostility, or something else. The ingenious rationalizations, projections, and transpositions by which persons discredit their own guilty conscience were well known even in ancient times. In this dissertation guilt has not been
limited to the subjective experience qualified by the feeling we ordinarily term guilt. It has been expanded, following the psychoanalytic lead, to encompass the anxieties which arise from the violation of a norm or law or the wish for such a violation. The presence of defensive devices against anxiety, if they relate to forbidden wishes, are taken as evidence of guilt, whether guilt is subjectively felt or not.

One's understanding of obligation changes drastically when one expands the meaning of guilt to its use in psychiatric theory. If one is willing to concede that the term "conscience" is roughly synonymous with a sense of obligation, the expansion of the latter term puts a different light upon the rationality of conscience. Conscience has so often been discredited as a reliable moral index largely because it has been associated exclusively with conscious guilt, and hence deemed unreliable because of its vulnerability to distortion by arbitrary motives and affects.

When one sees conscience as a sense of obligation expressing a very complex organismic state, the picture changes. A guilty person's conscience may then be revealed indirectly through anxiety defenses. Even further, we have said it may be revealed through a sense of humiliation, or grief, or a chronic depression. We have said, too, that an investment of
interest in a task is evidence that one is, literally, obligated by it, or obliged to deal with it in some way.

Looking at the psychic context of such complex phenomena, we seem to see a coherent pattern. We observe that at the heart of obligation is the deep need for persons to become fully themselves. The inner demand to live, to realize one's capabilities, to fulfill one's instinctoid needs, to expand one's horizons, and above all to order one's life into a harmonious and somewhat stable unity is expressed positively in organismic involvements, and negatively in fears of defeat and failure.

This would seem to leave us with nothing in hand but an ethic of enlightened self-interest, until we begin to take seriously the work of interpersonal psychiatrists and the field theorists. A growing body of research by these men has tended to dramatize the internal relationship between the organization of personality and the interpersonal environment. Self-realization and self-expansion demand predictable, creative, and fruitful interaction between oneself and significant others, within a dependably ordered pattern of social expectations. The peculiar force of obligations which relate to the essential structure of community is mute testimony of this. The intuitionists and others who have striven against
the utilitarians in ethics have been attempting to explicate the tenacious and even self-defeating way in which one may hold to such an obligation in spite of all utilitarian indications. In psychiatry Sullivan reveals the painful consequences of secret, devious, and subjectively arbitrary acts and intentions. They represent serious personal threat because of our deep perception that they threaten the psychological tendrils by which we hold to a meaningful place in society, and the fabric of trust within which we are esteemed and thus can esteem ourselves. Such a pattern of trust tends to be clarified and specified as needed by a complex network of spoken and unspoken norms, expectations, and laws.

To the extent that human needs are universal, as Maslow and others have argued, they tend to define a universal ethic. Though it may be poorly verbalized and even widely violated this immanent ethic makes its presence known through the sufferings and triumphs of men.

There is a type of rationality which is expressed in conscience, then, which may be deeper and more pervasive than the logic we use to explain conscience away. It is the immanent logic of the type expressed in the teleology of all living things, the organismic ordering of discrete elements into complex unities defined by the needs and nature of the parti-
cular organism. Dramaturgic representation, or referential processes closely related to organic functions, accompany and guide the integration of life among men. Conventional systems of symbolic and verbal logic have evolved to facilitate this dramaturgic representation by sharply defining and relating objects and events, and by refining the art of interpersonal communication.

The contribution which logico-verbal systems have made to human life is of indescribable immensity. They have freed man from confinement to the narrow bounds of his own private world, and enabled him to transcend time and place by dreaming himself into the experience of myriad others of many generations. Such formal systems of logic are not without their handicaps, however, as Freud revealed. While our explicit logical inferences are ideally coherent with the unconscious evaluations they purport to clarify, such may not be the case in actual practice. Thus an exaggerated need for autonomy, arising from a threatening situation or one's attraction to unintegrated and forbidden wishes, may lead one to employ the ingenuities of logic to distort and disguise one's deeper reasonings, even from oneself. In addition, intensive absorption in theoretical tasks can render a person a stranger to his own inner self. Alienation by verbalization, if the
truth were known, might be found to be an escape from reality far more prevalent than alcoholism.

Now, ethical reasoning may be the loyal servant of the referential processes of depth, or it may abandon its servitude and set off on its own private quest. It may occupy itself only with the logical problems left over from our philosophical heritage, in which case it runs the risk of diverting attention to cognitive tasks which are peripheral in relation to more pressing moral problems. Or, if its goal becomes that of strict logical consistency or precise definition of terms, it may tend to block imaginative moral insight. Worse, its closely structured logic may tend to falsify the moral processes it might have illuminated. Value-achievement is not logically neat; it is filled with subtle vaguaries, dramatic surprises, false starts and agonizing reappraisals.

One primary task of ethical thinking, if it is to assist moral valuation, would seem to be that of clarifying and expediting the evaluative processes. It might turn to the history of ethics for the sharp delineation of recurrent problems, for immersion in a rich source of moral insight, and for the expansion of one's usable store of ethical concepts. It might turn to psychology for a deeper understanding of motivation, of universal human needs, of guilt and anxiety,
and of the emotional forces which may distort evaluation or restrict freedom. It might find in the social sciences the technical data required for wise decisions. To simplify its complex task, it might center upon the major contemporary dilemmas with which men struggle, bringing all its resources to bear upon these problems.

6. The thought of H.A. Prichard appears to be sound when he points to the unique experience of obligation as of central importance to ethics, and when he says that obligation is "appreciated" following thoughtful consideration of a situation in "unreflective consciousness." These qualifications are indicated:

1). "Unreflective consciousness" or "moral thinking" should not be seen as a separate cognitive function, as Prichard assumes, but rather as the evaluative function which we employ in every aspect of life.

2). Prichard's view of obligation as "absolutely underivative and immediate" falsifies the complex subconscious evaluation which precedes any intuitive experience. An intuition is a creative insight.

3). While a sense of obligation may be the only motivation for an act, Prichard says, yet obligation cannot be divorced from the good as the ethical deontologists generally
attempt to do. An experience of obligation is a value-judgment, in that it is an expression of interest and an anticipation of anxiety in reference to the coherent value-system which defines one's very existence as a person.

7. The emotivism of C.L. Stevenson is justified in its assertion that ethical statements are not primarily statements of fact, but express interest and emotion and prescribe a course of action. This critique of Stevenson's thought is offered, however:

1). Stevenson appears to be in error when he asserts that prescriptive statements are noncognitive, in that they express no fact or belief. Psychiatric theorists reveal that interest and emotion vary with the assessed significance of an experience for one's total well-being. A statement of interest is a value-judgment, and hence is a cognitive ordering of experience. A prescriptive statement influences conduct, not because it is a form of irrational suggestion, as Stevenson says, but because dramaturgic evaluation is particularly sensitive to the complex imagery of value-charged terms.

2). The positivistic limitation of truth to logico-verbal discourse validated by a physical operation, which Stevenson accepts, appears to be invalid in the light of
modern psychiatric theory. Thus Tauber and Green, reviewing the field, conclude that creative hunches, dreams, myths, and value-charged expressions, though preverbal in form, evidence an internal logic, and express a deep and rich truth which syntactical expressions may or may not communicate.

Our study of the evaluative function indicates that feeling-tone expressions may be a typical and a valid medium of ethical communication. From the time of Freud we have known that words and neatly consistent logical systems may conceal as much truth as they reveal, depending upon the needs and purposes of those who employ them.

3). Stevenson externalizes ethics, failing to see that when a person imputes obligation to another, he reveals his own extensive acquaintance with the inner experience of obligation, he makes an imaginative assessment of another's situation as one in which an experience of obligation would be justified, and he assumes the other person will experience obligation if he sees that it is relevant to do so.

8. Of the philosophers whose work was studied, Brand Blanshard seems most fully to have expressed the type of ethical perspective indicated by the clinical observations and theoretical formulations of psychotherapists.

1). The concept of "good" is rooted in the values
defined by immanent human goals, and given rich meaning in terms of man's interests and desires.

2) The imperative nature of obligation is salvaged, but obligation is seen as a concomitant of value-seeking. In contradistinction to the theories of the intuitionists and noncognitivists, obligation is coherent with goodness.

3) Cognition and conation are seen as intimately related; reason for Blanshard is largely subconscious and dramaturgic, and is inherent in the very formation of desires.

9. While Blanshard sees goodness, obligation, and evaluation as coherently related to each other and to the fulfillment of impulse-desires, his theoretical system appears to require supplementation in several respects:

1). Blanshard defines the *summum bonum* as the fulfillment of atomistic impulse-desires, together with the accompanying satisfaction. He does not see that the total realization of one's life has the character of an impulse-desire, and that the meaning of individual impulses is defined by the holistic goal of self-actualization.

2). Blanshard does not adequately account for the organismic relatedness between personal fulfillment and the
social field. He relates obligation to the logic of community, but does not see that the inner logic of self-actualization is of one cloth with the outer logic of community.

3). Blanshard roots goodness and obligation in human nature, but we must turn to the clinical insights of psychologists such as Adler, Fromm, Sullivan, and Maslow to find strong evidence that the malevolent traits in human nature are tragic, limping manifestations of the more basic benevolent impulses.

4). Blanshard defines ethics in its end-terms, identifying the ethical ideal of personality with an image of the serene intellectual. The focus of ethical dialogue might well shift from such counsels of perfection in the direction of a constructive identification with those who are involved in moral struggle, the interpretation of guilt and anxiety, and the work of redemption.
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ABSTRACT

The problem of the dissertation is the relationship between conscience and cognition. The plan of the work is to study guilt, shame, and the evaluative function in psychiatric theory, to define a view of obligation, and to offer a critique of certain ethical theories. The term "evaluative function" refers to the processes by which experience is ordered into meaningful symbols and patterns. The distinction made by Gerhart Piers between shame and guilt is employed.

The first part of the dissertation is a study of guilt and the evaluative function in Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud defined Super-ego guilt as the introjection of the punitive aspects of the parental image. In his work on dreams and wit, however, Freud assumed that guilt stimulates unconscious evaluation to facilitate value-achievement. Similarly, Freud's therapeutic goals were based on the assumption that even pathological guilt is intelligible within some intrapsychic context.

The second part of the work is an investigation of the thought of Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan. These socially oriented psychotherapists deal
extensively with self-esteem anxieties. They see the self as a product of the selective ordering of experience by creative processes which extend below the level of awareness. They affirm an immanent teleology of self-fulfillment in community. The anxieties defined in the dissertation as shame are seen as a correlate of the need for self-fulfillment. Shame is coherently related to value-achievement; pathological shame is an intelligible response to some self-esteem crisis.

In the third part of the work a view of obligation indicated by the psychological study is utilized to develop a critique of three divergent ethical positions, those of H. A. Prichard, a deontologist; C. L. Stevenson, a noncognitivist; Brand Blanshard, a rationalist.

The conclusions are: 1). Obligation is a complex experience of signal-anxiety and interest. Interest is defined as organismic involvement with an unfinished task. 2). Obligation is coherently ordered with creative evaluation, which arises on the preverbal level and is dramaturgic in form; obligation is thus functionally cognitive, in the broad, integrative sense. 3). The evaluative function is an integrative tool of a self struggling for actualization. 4). The self is actualized in dynamic interaction with a
social field. 5). Conscience, or the experience of obligation, is therefore rational, in that it is coherent with the immanent organismic logic of self-fulfillment in community. 6). H. A. Prichard makes obligation a separate cognitive function. He overlooks the depth evaluation which leads to an intuition of obligation. He divorces obligation from goodness, failing to see that obligation implies a value-judgment. 7). C. L. Stevenson fails to see that an emotive statement of interest follows evaluation, and is therefore cognitive. His positivistic limitation of truth is called into question by the insight that preverbal forms of expression have meaning as well as logico-verbal expressions. His externalistic ethic of imputation presupposes an inner ethic of obligation. 8). Brand Blanshard most fully expresses the ethical perspective suggested by the dissertation, rooting goodness in human interests, showing that obligation is a concomitant of value-seeking, and relating conation to depth evaluation. 9). Blanshard does not fully develop an ethic of self-realization, nor does he adequately explicate the correlative relationship between the logic of community and the logic of self-fulfillment.
BIographiesKETCH

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