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Borden P Bowne's teaching concerning the speculative significance of freedom

Hildebrand, Carroll DeWitt
Boston University

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BORDEN P. BOWNE'S DOCTRINE OF

THE SPECULATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREEDOM

by

Carroll DeWitt Hildebrand

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Introduction

Freedom is the philosophical problem par excellence. Fundamental to every human problem and interest is the persistent question: "Are we free agents or are we bound, not only hand and foot but nerve and muscle, feeling and thinking, fated by our make-up to folly or wisdom, vice or virtue, mood and outlook, type and temperament and career?"¹ The interest we have in seeking an answer to this question is both theoretical or scientific and practical or moral. In the last analysis these two interests cannot be divorced. The truth and the utility of freedom enter intimately into both what personality is and what personality is able to do. If it be objected, after the fashion of many minds, that "the emphasis which has been put upon the formation of choice in connection with freedom will appear an evasion, a trifling with metaphysical futilities"² in comparison with that form of freedom which holds that "The ideal of freedom is the holy grail of

social progress, it may well be pointed out that "The debt of the special sciences to metaphysical discussion could not easily be overestimated." And "the foundations of almost every department of knowledge and action can be traced to metaphysical analysis." Coherent thinking with respect to the nature of freedom will prove to be no exception to this truth.

The examination of experience reveals the problem properly described as that of freedom. It must be shown how this problem emerges. Preliminary to this, it is necessary to examine the assertion that freedom is a datum of immediate experience or immediate consciousness. Should it turn out that freedom is a universal fact of immediate experience, it is hard to see how any problem concerning its reality could arise. In the strict and literal scientific sense of the word, our knowledge of freedom, whatever its true status may be, is not that of immediate perception. "The necessity of freedom and purpose, however, is not given in direct intuition, or in simple inspection of our consciousness: it is a deduced necessity." The validity of this position must be examined.

3. ibid., p. 598.  
The origin or emergence in spontaneous thought of the idea that volitional activity must always be regarded as free is two-fold. On this point Bowe is in substantial agreement with the general consensus of scholarship.1

"This arises partly from the peculiar consciousness we have in such activity of being the cause and source of the activity. In conducting, for example, a train of thought, we have a very clear conviction that it depends upon our volition whether it shall go on or not, and that the volition depends on us. So with other activity which falls within volitional limits; we are clearly conscious that we can begin, continue, or end it, and that without compulsion of any sort, internal or external. The conviction of freedom arises also, and especially, from the ethical sense of responsibility. Under normal circumstances, and when unabashed by speculation, no one can help regarding himself and his neighbors as responsible for voluntary action; and, under the same circumstances, no one can regard any one as responsible who, by natural or external necessity, is shut up to a single course of action. The great form of excuse for wrong-doing is, I could not help it. These two facts lead us to refer our acts to ourselves as their responsible, that is, as their free cause."2

The point at issue is whether or not the testimony of naïve or spontaneous thought is scientific in affirming immediate consciousness of freedom as a fact. It is true enough that when we are conscious of directing conscious purposes we experience the self as a creative subject. And again, it is likewise true that one who is capable of experiencing the feeling of duty, ought, rather, regret, responsibility and the like feels that he knows himself to be beyond the bounds of necessity.

For these two facts of experience are of such a character that personality readily and intuitively discriminates between passive objects and active subjects. But is it being directly conscious of freedom that we know when we describe these experiences? In any case it must be admitted that we know or are conscious of only the facts and, when I choose between alternatives, the truth is that, until the choice has been made, the fact does not appear so that I am immediately aware of only that which I chose and not of that which I did not choose. That I might have chosen differently and possess the power to have selected another alternative is, therefore, not a direct perception but turns out to be grounded in my native conviction or belief that such is the case. We formulate this situation more exactly by calling attention to the fact that the thought of freedom in uncriticized reflection carried with it the thought of alternatives or dual possibilities and not the fact but the assumption that in choosing the will is not determined by anything other than itself. It seems, however, to be permissible to say that this situation in experience gives rise to a well-nigh universal belief in freedom against which evidence is lacking. Yet this work-a-day language must be distinguished from that precise and scientific account of experience which differentiates our knowledge of fact from our strong feelings, beliefs and convictions about what facts are. It is the determination of experience on this point that
precisely constitutes the problem of freedom and marks the point of its emergence for philosophy. We are not, then, immediately conscious of freedom as a fact, but of facts which we interpret as being free. The question as to whether or not freedom is the best assumption or hypothesis to make for the explanation of the facts involved characterizes the problem of freedom.

The fact that no amount of experience reveals the fact of freedom as such forces us to a change of venue and to carry the problem from the common sense level into the realms of science and philosophy where rational and coherent criticism undertakes to attack the problem with accredited methods of investigation far removed from the criteria of feeling and opinion. Here the problem becomes that of discovering how to harmonize the practical assumptions of life, among which freedom is certainly one of the most conspicuous, with the theoretical demands of reason. The paradox consists in trying to harmonize the freedom of the will with our scientific view of the nature of man and his world. Certain assumptions made by the special sciences constitute an ideal of explanation which has been so surprisingly successful in both the mental and physical realms of nature that misgiving tends to arise concerning what appears to be one of the most patent facts of experience. The mechanical conception of nature as a theoretical source of this felt conflict between life and logic is only equalled by another theoretical difficulty to be found in a certain conception of
God. Just as nature has laid bare the structure of large areas of her gigantic system of causes and effects until the machine has become the model of scientific explanation, so from an entirely different angle the will of God has been conceived from such an absolute point of view that finite wills find it impossible to function significantly as other than modal determinations of the one all-inclusive purpose which finds its minutest details determined by the Cosmic Mind. In order to show just where the problem lies, we may state without anticipating the argument that both freedom and determinism are in the last analysis postulates of rationality, ideals of explanation whose validity must be tested by an adequate criterion for truth so far as philosophy has been able to assist us in arriving at truthful propositions. In writing of the importance of the free-will controversy, James says,

"I know of no subject less worn out, or in which inventive genius has a better chance of breaking open new ground,—not, perhaps, of forcing a conclusion or of coercing assent, but of deepening our sense of what the issue between the two parties really is, of what the ideas of fate and of free-will imply."

The problem of freedom, then, emerges as a result of the following antinomies which it presents to thought as its logical implications are thought out in terms of categories applicable to the universe as a whole. First, freedom or the power to

select between alternatives free from both internal and external determinations appears to violate certain fundamental scientific assumptions about nature. It seems to violate the concept of lex continui. It would further appear to endanger the doctrine of the conservation of force. Not only does the notion of freedom appear to contradict these laws of nature but, secondly, it seems to violate the most fundamental laws of thought, namely the laws of causality and of sufficient reason which condition the unity of thought. And, finally, the idea of freedom appears to conflict with certain of the divine attributes such as foreknowledge in such a way that it must be surrendered. In spite of these theoretical demands of reason, freedom is the postulate underlying the entire practical life of the human race as the precondition of any meaning in such problems as those pertaining to political liberty, industrial freedom, intellectual freedom, religious freedom, moral and rational freedom and their related notions of justice, equality, veracity, reward and punishment, and rights and duties.

Notwithstanding the point of view of many great philosophers who have disclaimed openly all pretensions to prove that the freedom of the will is true, freedom remains no less real and no less significant a problem. Professor Macintosh well says, "no philosopher will ever succeed in driving mystery out of the processes of life and consciousness, or from
any other phase of real existence; the best we can hope to
do is to get the mystery properly cornered, correctly located.\(^1\)
This, after all, is a very great achievement with the nature
of things revealed as they are and some of life's greatest
problems require no further solution than this. If by a solu-
tion of the problem of freedom is meant insight into how freedom
is made and is possible, we are foredoomed to failure for we
have \textbf{neither} the method nor condition under which a mastery of
this problem is possible.\(^2\) If, on the other hand, we encounter
freedom as a paradox or an antinomy of thought and seek the
removal of the antinomy by more coherent interpretation of the
facts pertaining to it, this is not an unreasonable hope how-
ever incomplete the solution may prove to be. Then, too,
however unyielding a problem may have proven to be from the
point of view of science and philosophy, there is always the
possibility of the discovery of a more fruitful hypothesis.
Freedom is, therefore, a formidable problem having withstood
all historical attempts at a solution. Nor does it yet appear
that a solution of the order of a mathematical problem is
possible. It may even appear that the nature of the problem

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2. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
presented forever precludes a solution in which case it would be a substantial contribution to human knowledge to establish the fact. At any rate, the classic historical efforts to apprehend freedom in its fullest meaning have led to more precise statement and understanding of its implications.

From the historical point of view, we may classify the attitudes which have been taken toward the problem of freedom as follows: first, those theories which have regarded freedom as a significant speculative postulate of thought; second, those theories which have regarded freedom as an unfruitful principle of philosophical procedure; and, third, those theories which have regarded the problem of freedom and its solution as a matter of indifference. The metamorphosis of the problem of freedom in western thought has passed through four phases. The ancient world, while it was perhaps groping as concerns the discovery of the real difficulties of the problem, nevertheless, as with most of the major philosophical problems, succeeded in stating it. The problem then passed from the soil of Hellenic-Roman speculation under the influence of Christianity into the form of a theological controversy which constitutes the second stage of its development. Here it took the form of reconciling freedom with the attribute of the divine omnipotence. During

1. Wright, W. K., *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, p. 397. "Psychologists admit that it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to devise experiments that will absolutely settle this question."
this period the Humanist thinkers espoused the cause of freedom while the authoritative expression of religion inclined toward determinism. Generally speaking, the philosophically educated Greek Fathers defended freedom as opposed to the semi-cultured Africans and Westerns who inclined toward predestination. This status of the problem continued until the opening of the modern period when the venue of the problem again shifted from the court of theology to that of metaphysics. The character of the problem took the form of the attempt to reconcile moral freedom with the categories of causality and universality of law. From Hobbes to Kant the skeptical intellect inclined for the most part to determinism while the defenders of morality and religion, as opposed to the preceding period, were the defenders of freedom. Contemporary thought, both proximate and present, has seen the rise of still another form of the discussion of freedom under the tremendous incentive of modern empirical science as opposed to the method of apriori metaphysics despite the fact that this method and the problems raised by it still continue. The application of experimental method to the study of personality on the assumption of the truth of the theory of evolution has revealed a series of mechanisms in consciousness an intimate acquaintance with which has disclosed the influence of heredity and environment to be so great that the ideal in certain quarters has become that of
assuming the deterministic ideal of explanation as the only fruitful principle of interpretation.\footnote{1}

While it was Anaxagoras who, among the ancient Greek philosophers, first introduced rational causality as a principle of causal explanation into his cosmology, it was not until the time of Aristotle that we have formulated the doctrine that events are caused in three ways, as the result of the action of efficient causes (external compulsion), as the result of final causes (internal nature), and without cause (absolute chance). This last point is now generally recognised as "of the immost essence of Aristotelianism. . . . . The freedom of the will, too, was admitted by both Aristotle and by Epicurus.\footnote{2} Aristotle had no Greek word for free-will and never expressed this idea. It was only in later Greek philosophy and theology that the word \textit{αυτοκριτών} was invented for this purpose.\footnote{3} Aristotle rejected the thesis of Socrates and Plato\footnote{4} that virtue determines the will by the knowledge of the good and, in its place, affirmed that freedom is constituted in an intelligent and sensitive being whose actions are neither necessarily determined by his ideas nor

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his desires. The free man has the power to attain happiness by directing his own deliberations and by exercising the power of choice in his actions. This proof of freedom he bases upon psychological analysis. "Our particular acts are contingent and depend on our choices." In addition to this indirect proof, responsibility implies freedom in Aristotle's teaching.

"And so the saying, 'none would be wicked, none would be blessed,' seems partly false and partly true; no one indeed is blessed against his will, but vice is voluntary. If we deny this we must dispute the statements made just now, and must contend that man is not the originator and the parent of his actions, as of his children."^2

There is, therefore, a fortuitous element in Aristotle's world. Freedom is real and man constitutes the possibility of introjecting spontaneous acts into the sequence of phenomena.

Illogical as it may seem, Epicurus taught a doctrine of freedom in substantial agreement with the free-will doctrine of Aristotle. This he did by revising the atomic theory of Democritus in adding the Clinamen or the notion of the power of the atoms to change their courses from the straight lines in which fate or necessity has coerced them. This element of spontaneous chance he applied also to the problem of freedom in man and, hence, like Aristotle, confers upon the theory of atomism life and entelechy. The unique character of Epicurus' teaching lies in the fact that he seems to have been the first

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to expound freedom to mean uncaused event by blind mechanism which divorced freedom and purpose. Human freedom must find its place within the laws of nature as a form of universal contingency and spontaneous power constitutional to atoms.¹

Both the doctrines of logical and physical determinism are denied since, like Aristotle, he recognizes that the theory of contradictory propositions respecting future events carries no necessity respecting their truth when taken individually. Moral determinism is denied in the interest of responsibility which must not be sacrificed.²

It is apparent that Epicurus' teaching about freedom is inconsistent with his fundamental philosophical theory and that the identification of freedom with blind mechanism is a statement of the problem revealing the fact that he was unconscious of the real difficulties involved in it, a condition characteristic of Greek speculation down through the entire Stoic and Epicurean periods. It is necessary here to distinguish the uncritical point of view which has sometimes argued as though the freedom which libertarians contend for must be absolute and unlimited from the more critical and discriminating point of

1. "That the mind itself does not feel an internal necessity in all its actions, and is not as it were overmastered and impelled to bear and put up with this, is caused by a minute swerving of first beginnings, at no fixed part of space and no fixed time" (Lucr., II, 292-3). "We change the direction of our motions neither at a fixed time or fixed place, but when and where the mind itself has prompted" (Ibid. 256). Janet and Séailles, A History of the Problems of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 323.

2. "Necessity is an irresponsible power, and fortune is unstable, while our will is free; and this freedom constitutes, in our case, a responsibility which makes us encounter blame and praise." (D. L., x, 133). ibid., p. 323.
view which advocates only a limited freedom. It may be true that, during the history of the discussion of freedom, its advocates took little pains to correct the assumption either deliberate or naïve on the part of determinists that absolute freedom was the point at issue. The position which argues that every act is equally free and undetermined is one which is today and perhaps was in the past never seriously advocated by any person competent to pass judgment upon human experience. The freedom of indifference or extreme libertarianism would impinge upon caprice as its central principle. It demands that the future be absolutely ambiguous in the sense that an arbitrary will determines whatever choices are made. It should be pointed out that the position of absolute freedom when carried to its logical conclusion is not fundamentally different in consequence from that of the opposite extreme of determinism, a hypothesis which presents us with a will that wills nothing, while in the case of extreme freedom we are presented with a will that wills nothing. In either case, the will is nullified. The most which the libertarian finds it necessary to prove is that there are acts of choice which are undetermined by anything other than the will acting as its own cause.

"Ninety-nine hundredths (so to speak) of a man's life might be due to heredity, education, environment, and original constitution; but provided there were a hundredth part referable only to undetermined acts of choice, that would be enough to satisfy the postulate of Freedom. . . . . This point of view was paradoxically expressed by an able advocate
of Indeterminism—the late Professor Chandler of Oxford—when he said that it was enough that one act of a man's life should be free. But in truth it is not necessary that even an isolated act should be referable wholly to the free will. It would be enough that it should enter as a factor into the determination of a man's acts or some of them, that a man's acts and matured character should be referable not to two factors but to three—birth-character, environment, undetermined choice.

Libertarians do not insist that everything we do is free but merely call attention to the fact that not everything we do is determined.

The great majority of indeterminists have sought to defend some sort of limited freedom. It is sufficient to show that,

"could it be proved that once since the universe began a single being had on some occasion brought another influence to bear upon his conduct besides sequential causation, he would have established libertarianism. . . . . One instance to the contrary will destroy the doctrine as effectually as ten thousand." ¹

Among the numerous varieties of freedom may be mentioned that which confines choice to an alternative between two organized causal necessities. One of these necessities may be described as sequential causation or the causation of forces. The other type of necessity is that of antesequential causation or the causation of reason. We are presented with two types of determined orders which completely exclude any and all possibility of

absolute freedom for either rational causation or physical causation must necessarily be invoked to explain phenomena since human actions are no more independent of causes than are physical forces. On this view it is possible for one to cease to be a person, that is to say, one is not determined to act antsequentially and, insofar as he chooses to surrender his rationality, he is invaded by the order of sequential causation which is to that extent the surrender of freedom.¹

**Another interpretation** of freedom is that which may be described as the freedom of self-determination. Persons are described as autonomous or self-directing while things on the other hand are viewed as heteronomous. Persons have the power to form ideals and purposes toward which they have the capacity to work unimpeded from any external influence. Freedom implies that,

"that is free which is not coerced or impelled from without; or that is free which unfolds without hindrance its own nature. At the same time this freedom may be absolutely determined by some internal necessity. But when this inner necessity is extended to the entire activity, we have nothing of freedom left but the name; and it would tend to clearness if this were dropped."²

This confers upon persons a type of individuality which is indeed unique in that it is the permanent guarantee of creative activity.

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1. Palmer, G. H., *The Problem of Freedom*, is a defense of this point of view of freedom.
Duns Scotus, *teacher* of the Franciscan Order, became the worthy protagonist of freedom as opposed to Aquinas. This mediaeval doctor taught a modified Augustianism which formulated itself into *Voluntas est superior intellectu*. Freedom of the will, human and divine, became its central principle. Freedom is not alone centered in God as Augustine had urged but the human will can freely cooperate with the grace and will of God. In man the freedom of the will is both formal and practical in that he can choose to will or not to will as well as what to will within limits. When finite wills will what God wills this is accounted to them as meritorious. The world as a whole is contingent and absolute predestination as taught by Augustine must belie the facts. The notion of free causes which may or may not act is a fundamental principle of Duns Scotus' system. Real self-determination is accorded persons on this hypothesis.\(^1\)

Another notion of freedom introduced into English thought by John Locke is known as the freedom of action. It is the ability to do or not to do that which is willed. From this point of view freedom has nothing to do with the creation of purpose but refers entirely to the execution of purpose in conduct. While the theory stresses conduct rather than the nature of volition, Locke viewed both the nature of volition and the execution

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of what is willed as sequentially determined. Locke's position is freedom in name only and he rejects freedom on psychological grounds. The will is determined by desire.

"The motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change is always some uneasiness. A constant succession of uneasinesses, out of that stock which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns; and no sooner is one action despatched, which by such a determination of the will we are set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work." Locke's contribution, in spite of his indifference to free will, was made at the point where he distinguished between will and desire. There are exceptions to the law that the greatest uneasiness always determines the will because "we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will and engaging us in action." Man is free to the extent that his desires may be considered and their consequences weighed in which case the judgment of good or evil determines the will. Knowledge regulates our choices and we are free in the degree that we regulate our choices by reason. Freedom implies reflection in preference to impulse in assisting us to achieve true happiness.

A doctrine which has had a long, useful and dignified career in the history of philosophy from the ancient Greeks to

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1. Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. 21, par. 29.
2. ibid., Book II, Ch. 21, par. 45.
3. Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. 21, par. 50.
the present is that of rational freedom, rational causation, or it is sometimes called idealistic determinism. Anaxagoras may be accredited with having first developed the hypothesis of a universal Mind as an efficient cause, thereby opening the way for a teleological explanation of nature. Following this principle of rational causation, "For Plato, as for Socrates, virtue is therefore the determination of the will by the knowledge of the good; it is true freedom, true happiness; the wicked man is ignorant, unhappy, and a slave."\(^1\) Plato, in the Republic,\(^2\) makes this appeal,

"Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn, \(^3\) and may find some one who will make him able to learn and to discern between good and evil, so as to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity."

The Stoic's denial of freedom grew out of his pantheism and his conception of rational causation educed physical, logical and ethical proofs for determinism.\(^3\) The logical proof consisted in showing that, of two contradictory propositions, one is necessarily true and therefore, when it is affirmed, the possibility of its contradictory is at that moment excluded. The physical

\(^2\) ibid., p. 318.
\(^3\) The Stoic doctrine of the \(\lambda \gamma \omega \sigma \) was a return to that of Heraclitus before freedom had even become a problem of thought.
argument for determinism was based on the laws of nature as the principle of causality. The fortuitous element, that of some chance power like free will, gave way to a seamless universe whose unity is expressed in a universal providential design according to law. In this respect the Stoic restored the principle of Democritus which had been attacked by both Aristotle and Epicurus. To the Stoic, rational causation denies both revelation and foreknowledge since it is because nothing is left to chance that the divine mind can foreknow everything and foreknowledge implies determinism. To accept free will on this theory severs man's relations with the Determiner of Destiny in which case divine succor is cut off. Finally, ethical considerations will show that determinism does not produce inertia. Character determines the way we move. This is only a sort of determinism by character, however, rather than by things. The teaching of St. Augustine concerning freedom is not unambiguous. He breaks with Platonism in stressing the priority of the will over the intellect as the innermost characteristic of personality. "All our mental states are formed under the direction of the purposes of the will."\(^1\) Will and intellect are not separate faculties but rather a unity of soul-substance. From the point of view of theory, freedom of the will is vigorously defended

in the interests of justice and responsibility. The will is free to resist inclination and sensuous nature but practically and actually freedom of choice is impossible. Since only the good-will is free, it is in reality the Good which determines it. This conclusion is genuinely if not actually Platonic.

In Thomas of Aquino we find St. Augustine’s absolute predestination challenged. The intellect is superior to the will as a mental faculty.

"God knows all things, not only those which actually exist, but also those which either He Himself or any creature can bring forth. Thus all future contingent things as they are in themselves and according to their actual condition are known to Him all at once and infallibly... Eternity exists as a whole, and embraces all time; whence it is clear that contingent things are infallibly known to God in so far as they are present before the divine vision, and that at the same time contingent things are future when compared with their immediate causes."

Aquinas felt the force of both freedom and necessity in our acts. This dilemma is met with his theory of physical premotion.

On this view God has foreknowledge and can both foresee and predetermine our acts. This is tantamount to affirming that God wills finite actions to be both free and determined. For God has not only predetermined me but he has also predetermined me to act freely. That this does not affirm the identity of contradictions is not easily made apparent. The explanation is clearly

one which feels the problem involved in God's foreknowledge and the solution is fundamentally grounded in Aristotle at the point of making intellect prior to will. This conception of rational freedom will be continued under Bowne's relation to modern philosophy.

A final attitude toward the problem of freedom as a speculative postulate of great significance is that of tychism appearing in the contemporary philosophy of Bergson and James. Professor Henri Bergson makes the concept of freedom fundamental in his doctrine of evolution. It is however a very different meaning that attaches to freedom in his thinking from that which the notion ordinarily signifies in critical thought.

"Free-will, in the usual meaning of the term, implies the equal possibility of two contraries, and on my theory we cannot formulate, or even conceive in this case the thesis of the equal possibility of the two contraries, without falling into grave error about the nature of time."

For Professor Bergson the process of evolution is creative. While the past is in a very real sense conserved and transmitted there is also the fact of creation. Freedom is therefore the power to produce the new, the novel, the emergence of that which cannot be read back into the cause because it contains what is not in the cause. The category of teleology is denied the élan vital as a causal agent whether it be the finite or the infinite.

aspect which is under consideration. Freedom understood to mean the power of contrary choice or a selective or deliberative choice between two or more alternatives he regards as incoherent in his scheme of l'évolution créatrice. The life and entelechy with which evolution is endowed is equivalent to an indeterminism of chance or at least a large fortuitous element. It is the notion that even a capricious universe is preferable to a determined one if only it be dynamic and creative.¹

Probably one of the most compelling exponents of tychism was William James. Taken together with his doctrines of pluralism and meliorism it constitutes one of his most fundamental conten-
tions. James preferred the term chance to convey his notion since both libertarians and determinists have each declared at times to be the true freedomists. Chance "is a purely negative and relative term, giving us no information about that of which it is predicated, except that it happens to be disconnected with something else,-- not controlled, secured, or necessitated by other things in advance of its own actual presence."² This view is nowhere in the writings of James given any clearer expression than in the following quotation: "Our sense of 'freedom' supposes that some things at least are decided here and now, that the passing moment may contain some

¹. Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, p. 248.
novelty, be an original starting point of events, and not merely transmit a push from something else."¹ This notion of freedom was applied equally to personality human and divine. While the doctrine of tychism was never fully worked out by James, he was careful to point out that, "'Free-will' does not say that everything that is physically conceivable is also morally possible. It merely says that of alternatives that really tempt our will more than one is really possible."² Here lies the obvious difference between Bergson and James. Chance is equally affirmed by both, but for Bergson it is not remotely unlike what Epicurus' doctrine was revealed to be, while James' view is consonant with that of freedom as it pertains to the will. It is in the interest of freedom that he refused to accept monism and so tenaciously clung to pluralism. The indeterminism and free-will which James urged "gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to a mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever unacceptable."³ It is unmistakably clear that such a philosophy as this takes itself seriously both on logical and aesthetic grounds with the result that freedom is made a metaphysical first principle of the first magnitude.

1. James, William, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 139.
2. James, William, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, p. 157n.
3. ibid., p. 177.
Opposed to this result is that of mechanistic reasoning forever holding freedom to be in the very nature of the case an incoherent hypothesis. Historically the doctrine has taken two forms, that of necessity and that of determinism. In general it is that type of explanation which views every event both physical and psychical as the only possible outcome of other preceding events which require one and only one result and this result is mechanically produced.

"The proposition in question is that the state of things existing at any time, together with certain immutable laws, completely determine the state of things at every other time (for a limitation to future time is indefensible). Thus given the state of the universe in the original nebula, and given the laws of mechanics, a sufficiently powerful mind could produce from these data the precise form of every curlicue of every letter I am now writing."

This is of course thorough-going and absolute necessity.

"Whoever holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the mind is under the rigid governance of a necessity co-ordinated with that of the physical world, will logically be carried to the proposition that minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws of mechanics determine everything that happens according to immutable attractions and repulsions."

The constitution of things is rigid and fixed so that nothing which transpires falls outside immutable and inexorable mechanical law. Its influence on religion is called predestination while

2. ibid., p. 181.
in philosophy it is called fate. Fixity and uniformity of mechanical causal sequence are indisputable.

Democritus seems to have been the first among the Greeks to view the world as under the universal reign of mechanical law. Mechanical cause is behind every event both physical and spiritual. Animistic, hylozoistic and primitive adumbrations of teleological explanation of every sort are frankly eliminated by Democritus. But freedom is excluded not only by atomism as Democritus taught it but it is equally impossible for Eleatic pantheism. Parmenides no less than Democritus urged necessity as a universal principle. While Heraclitus and Diogenes Apollonius taught intelligence to be a first principle, they did not provide for freedom in its operation. The Pythagoreans taught a doctrine of responsibility based on merit and demerit, yet even here freedom is at best only implied and has to be read into the doctrine of transmigration of souls. Early Greek thought did not therefore deal with free-will as a problem because it had not emerged in the philosophic mind. The teleological explanation of Plato and Aristotle did much to limit the hard determinism of Democritus since their day. Nevertheless materialists throughout the history of philosophy have championed it with enthusiasm and vigor.

Attention has been called to the inconsequential way in which Epicurus, having accepted Democritean materialism, still tried

to retain freedom in his world-view. The Stoics likewise, revert-
ing to type, interpreted rational causality in terms of the 
Heraclitean \textit{logos} or fire, itself in the last analysis a material 
first principle. Freedom among the Stoics was in the last analysis 
nominal rather than a logical consequence based on the demands of 
their system. The New Academy under the leadership of Carneades 
led a strong opposition to the determinism of the Stoics. Carneades 
was equally relentless in opposing the Epicurean doctrine. He 
anticipated if he did not actually state the psychological argument 
of Reid, Victor Cousin, and Jouffroy. The principle of causality 
is not violated by the freedom of the will since freedom is itself 
a cause whose nature is to be free. Carneades argued,

"For in saying 'without cause', we mean without 
antecedent external cause, not without any cause whatever. 
. . . . So when we say that our soul is moved without 
cause, we mean without antecedent extrinsic cause, not 
independent of all cause whatever. . . . . Therefore, 
not to expose ourselves to the ridicule of the material 
philosophies by asserting that anything happens without a 
cause, we must distinctly propound that the nature of an 
atom is such that it may be moved by its own specific 
gravity, and that its intrinsic nature is the very cause 
of its motion. And in the same manner we need not seek 
for an external cause for the voluntary motions of the mind. 
For such is the nature of voluntary motion, that it must 
needs be in our own power and depend on ourselves, other-
wise it is not voluntary. And yet we cannot say that the 
motion of our free-will is an effect without a cause, for 
its proper nature is the cause of this effect" (Cic. De Fato). 1

While the Neo-Platonists incorporated the freedom of the 
will into their thinking, they failed to make it consistent with

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1. Janet & Séailles, \textit{A History of the Problems of 
Philosophy}, Vol. 1, p. 324.
their speculative, psychological and religious teachings. Plotinus urged that without freedom punishment and reward are meaningless and Iamblichus affirmed both free will and determinism. In saying that a thing is uncertain and at the same time that it can be foreseen with certainty there is presented an antinomy that was never solved. The adjudication of the claims of free and mechanical causality had not been made at the time of the opening of modern philosophy. While Descartes defended free will, the empiricists, sensationalists, materialists, Locke and Hobbes sought to explain both the mental and physical in terms of the laws governing external phenomena and their relations. Modern determinism finds a most rugged protagonist in Thomas Hobbes. According to him, everything including the human will is finally explicable as the movement of material atoms determined by the laws of necessity. Desire and will are identical in the last analysis and so-called deliberation is merely desire, appetite or fear in a succession of these experiences.¹

Thus we have seen that the doctrine of necessity implying fatalism and predestination which renders the individual and his conduct but the impotent product of a purposeless whole has been held by materialistic thinkers from ancient philosophy even down to within modern thought. It remained for John Stuart Mill,

prompted by Hume and Jonathan Edwards, to substitute the doctrine of determinism often described as soft determinism for the rigorous hard determinism of historic necessitarianism.\footnote{Palmer, H. S., \textit{The Problem of Freedom}, pp. 46-47.} According to Mill, conduct is a product of circumstance and character so that, if the facts concerning one's heredity, history, habits, powers, defects and peculiarities were completely known and his environment were known equally well, conduct could be predicted with absolute certainty. In general Mill's view of determinism required that the grounds of conduct be conditioned by the past character and the circumstances of the agent. The question still rises regarding soft determinism as to whether or not necessitarianism still remains in principle though slightly modified in form. The locus of the problem hinges on whether or not new events ever occur in a world like ours. If personality as an expression of will is not its own cause but is determined by something other than itself whether it be according to circumstances implicit in the star-dust or whether it be determined by the past character and circumstances of the individual, real ambiguity is equally eliminated as respects the future of the will. In both cases freedom is denied in preference for a world of sequential causality. Man is not free where his future is wholly and precisely predetermined by his past character, habits and environment. If character is rigid, immutable and determined in

structure, then there can be no freedom of the will. "Every act of genuine freedom means a novel and unique event in the history of the world." It is just this possibility for which determinism of the Millean type can find no more satisfactory explanation than can its older form called necessitarianism.

In the work of Henry Sidgwick, we encounter a still different attitude toward the problem of freedom. The results of his investigation are two-fold. In his opinion, attention must be centered upon the insoluble character of the problem of freedom and the relative practical unimportance of the problem. The first of these contentions he posits on the ground that demonstrable evidence is forthcoming for the truth of both determinism and libertarianism. The weakness of each point of view is to be found in the truth of its opposite. In his opinion the review of the evidence to be educed on each side of the free-will controversy affords no ground for a solution or conclusion regarding the relative correctness of these theories. Sidgwick concludes that when voluntary action is thoroughly understood in connection with the free-will controversy, the cumulative argument for determinism is overwhelming while at the same time he insists that in action it is impossible not to regard oneself as free to do what he judges to be reasonable. "Voluntary action is distinguished as

'conscious' from actions or movements of the human organism which are 'unconscious' or 'mechanical'. 1

"The belief that events are determinately related to the state of things immediately preceding them is now held by all competent thinkers in respect of all kinds of occurrences except human volition. . . . . Step by step in successive departments of fact conflicting modes of thought have receded and faded, until at length they have vanished everywhere, except from the mysterious citadel of Will. Everywhere else the belief is so firmly established that some declare its opposite to be inconceivable: others even maintain that it always was so. Every scientific procedure assumes it; each success of science confirms it.

. . . . but also that the different modes of determination of different kinds of events are fundamentally identical and mutually dependent: and naturally, with the increasing conviction of the essential unity of the cognizable universe, increases the indisposition to allow the exceptional character claimed by Libertarians for the department of human action." 2

Further, when we direct attention to human action itself, we discover that a large part of it is likewise determined by physical causes involving great difficulty at points to show the difference between such determined acts and those which are conscious and voluntary. In fact, a large part of human action believed to be free is illusory.

"Though Libertarians contend that it is possible for us at any moment to act in a manner opposed to our acquired tendencies and previous customs,—still, they and Determinists alike teach that it is much less easy than men commonly imagine to break the subtle unfelt trammels of habit." 3

2. ibid., pp. 62-63.
3. ibid., p. 65.
Sidgwick now proceeds to show that it is possible to set over against the cumulative evidence offered for Determinism the immediate testimony of consciousness that it is free in the moment of deliberative action. If I possess a "distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive,--supposing that there is no obstacle to my doing it other than the conditions of my desires and voluntary habits,--however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclinations in the past."¹

It is possible that the conviction of free choice may be illusory and that further knowledge of personality might reveal a constitution requiring determinism as its most coherent interpretation. Nevertheless the fact is that the mechanistic assumption, in view of what facts are now known, requires a fundamental alteration of experienced self-action which violates the notion of the self or the active mind to which they are referred. Due to the present incomplete state of human knowledge respecting the nature of personality there obtains conflict of argument resulting in widely different views on the part of many competent thinkers respecting the freedom of the will. This fact obviously served as the basis for Sidgwick's saying "I do not myself wish at present to pronounce any decision on it."²

2. ibid., p. 66.
Not only is freedom of the will at present insoluble but Sidgwick held it was practically inconsequential. He regarded "it possible and useful to show that the ethical importance of deciding it one way or another is liable to be exaggerated; and that any one who will consider the matter soberly and carefully will find this importance to be of a strictly limited kind."¹ The metaphysical question of free will is not regarded as important, theology excepted, for systematic ethics generally. On this view determinism is not held, except in certain exceptional circumstances or on certain theological assumptions to appreciably modify one's view of what he ought to do or the reasons why he ought to do it. It is argued that happiness, excellence, remorse, oughtness, merit, demerit and responsibility will be met by the determinists practically the same as by the libertarians and that the promotion of virtue and social well-being are equally well promoted on either view. The power of the will extends to the control of certain muscular contractions, the control to some extent of our thoughts and feelings, and, finally, the alteration of future action and conduct, all of which have practical importance in showing the extent of the power of the will, but which are so limited that any lingering doubt which the argument may have

left in the reader's mind concerning the practical importance of the free-will controversy is dispelled. These views of Sidgwick have by no means been universally accepted and competent scholarship generally agrees that momentous consequences attach to each theory. While it is true that at best much inconsistency infests our thinking, this does not warrant the conclusion that our belief about freedom does not change practical endeavor in addition to much else. The view here expressed is an interesting alternative in the history of speculative thought but it fails to do justice to either fact or theory.

Lastly, the view of freedom as an überwundener Standpunkt teaches that freedom is a notion which the mind has outgrown. It is undoubtedly due to the success of the natural sciences that this point of view has been advanced. This implies that experience as a whole can be explained under the category of sequential causality. Inasmuch as both mechanism and freedom are ideals of explanation rather than demonstrable facts, freedom is certainly not an obsolete point of view. The present status of human knowledge does not warrant the dogma of universal mechanism. Whatever science may reveal about the mechanisms of consciousness, there certainly exists a body of data unable to be forced into any such Procrustean bed.

"In origin Mechanism is an abstract quality corresponding to the concrete thing machine; that is to say, it is a quality, not of any object existing in Nature, but of certain artificial constructions made by man. Hence to
apply the conception to Nature in anything like its original sense is to be guilty of anthropomorphism in a double degree."

Freedom is therefore not disproven but, on the contrary, still maintains in human thought a position identical with the place accorded it by Immanuel Kant who regarded freedom as the keystone in the arch of his two Critiques. The evidences supporting the postulate of freedom will constitute a significant part of this study. Here we merely set forward the claim that freedom is not an Überwundener Standpunkt.

Bowne's attitude toward the historical approach to the problem of freedom is instructive for our purpose. In his criticism of Chauncey Wright as a philosopher, Bowne expresses his own view toward the value of the history of philosophy as follows. "It is too late in the development of thought for any one to attempt independence. A large study of the history of philosophy is absolutely necessary to prevent one from wasting his strength on exploded errors." With this discriminative appreciation of the history of philosophic thought Bowne nevertheless felt that "the traditional arguments for both freedom and necessity have generally been short-sighted and superficial."  

2. Bowne, B.P., "Chauncey Wright as a Philosopher," New Englander, 37 (1878), 603. For a less friendly appreciation of the history of philosophy in Bowne's later thought, see Personalism, pp. 15-17.
Too often in the past speculators have confined themselves to the problem of our executive activities in the outer world at the expense of the significance of freedom in the thought life which has been commonly overlooked. This error was primarily due to the creating of a psychological distinction between will and intelligence as a real distinction instead of recognizing them as aspects of one thing. On this false distinction the will and its activity were identified with unintelligent and unmotivated willing over against which stood the intellect as complete in itself. It was not seen that will and intellect were both abstractions and the one concrete reality is the willing and knowing self. Thus willing may be intelligent volition on the one hand while knowing, on the other hand, is attained only through the will to know which is basic to all knowledge. It is at this point that Bowne gave expression to his classic conviction which characterized the distinctive contribution which he made to the problem of freedom. "I am persuaded, therefore, that one wishing to find his way into this problem of freedom will do well to consider, first of all, the question of freedom in intelligence itself and the collapse of rationality involved in the system of necessity."2

1. Bowne, E. P., Principles of Ethics, p. 165. "It is one of the traditional imbecilities of this discussion, that freedom of thought, which involves all the difficulties of the general problem, is practically admitted by everyone, and the discussion is limited to our executive activity."

Not only did Bowne object to the old faculty psychology as has just been pointed out but he clearly showed that historical discussions of freedom have usually centered about the field of ethics and that we here encounter a tangle of arguments concerning motives in the determination of the will.¹ Traditionally the question of the weightier motive and the stronger impulse in determining conduct has led to the conclusion that volition springs from desire and the accompanying impulse to action and that volition is therefore to be identified with desire a confusion which we have already pointed out in the thought of Thomas Hobbes. Desire is the basis of all activity and when single automatically passes into action. In case the mental state is complex, a conflict of desires and motor impulses ensues in consciousness which is called reflection and deliberation. The strongest competitor among the desires finally decides action and we call this act volitional whereas it is purely mechanical. The fact is we are rarely aware of all the impulses operating in us and we therefore imagine that we control our wills or that we decide between conflicting motives, a situation which gives rise to the illusion of freedom in willing. Thus what we call freedom has been thought of as desires and impulses

¹ Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics: a Study in First Principles, p. 169. "It is one of the misfortunes of the doctrine of freedom that it has commonly been considered with reference to moral action only. In this field, interests, passions, and the various selfish sentiments are very prominent, and obscure the real nature of the question."
conflicting in the form of motives as constitutional elements the strongest of which prevails under the form of volition. The fact is that a special act of volition appears to be necessary in order to realize the strongest motive. Bowne, therefore, recoiled against this historical notion of volitional activity as reducible to a complex mechanical activity and viewed it as "an incongruous mixture of freedom and necessity" which reduced "action to a series of occurrences within us, according to the laws of causation."\(^1\) In the field of ethics, therefore, "there is always room for speaking of the weight of motives, of the stronger impulse, etc.; and thus we fail to get the clear illustration of freedom involved in the passionless operations of thought itself."\(^2\) Such confusion in the history of thought can only be traced to the failure to differentiate volition from its psychological attendants.

Further, there is a necessary distinction between volition and judgment upon which we must insist. The two are different both in their psychological nature and in their direction. While volition may be, and often is, based on judgment it does not follow that insight into one course of action as preferable to another carries with it the willing of the wiser course of action. In life we often judge intelligently where the will is never enlisted to legislate thought into action.

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and conversely volition often enough flies in the face of reason.

Moreover, a general conviction has prevailed in certain quarters of speculative thought that "the belief in freedom is an offense to reason." We hold it out of deference to morality but with no inconsiderable compromise to the intellect. Contrary to this opinion, Bowne urges his contention that this view is an oversight of the facts involved in the problem of freedom, that it rests upon a most superficial understanding of the categories employed in constructing the speculative difficulties in the conception of freedom.

Finally, much theological debate has urged for dogmatic reasons a distinction between freedom of choice and freedom of willing. Our choices were regarded as determined by our natures or by our characters yet we were free in the execution of our choices. The fact is that in life we find the notion of freedom of choice far less troublesome than the realization of our choices. Traditional theology has failed to see that our problem lies in the weakness of executive ability rather than in any lack of power to choose. Hence, the notion of moral inability and natural ability is a matter of

1. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics, rev. ed., p. 405. Three years earlier, Bowne wrote in the present tense as follows: "There is a very general conviction in speculative circles that the notion of freedom is an offense to reason." "The Speculative Significance of Freedom," Methodist Review, 77 (1895), p. 683.
speculation rather than of experience. From these observations we readily conclude that Bowne found the critico-historical approach to the problem of freedom both instructive and productive although a large part of speculation in this field has been negative in its import. It has been necessary to re-examine the psychological, logical, ethical, religious and speculative grounds of the problem of freedom.

The method of investigation which will be followed throughout this study may be outlined as follows. It will first be necessary to examine Bowne's sources relative to his doctrine of freedom. This will reveal the extent of his historical indebtedness to modern philosophical thought. Within this circle of influence we must examine the philosophical investigations of G. W. Leibnitz, George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, G. F. W. Hegel, Hermann Lotze, J. F. Herbart, Charles Renouvier, Hermann Ulrici, Henri Bergson and William James insofar as their investigations directly or indirectly contribute to the exact appreciation of Bowne's doctrine of freedom. In addition to Bowne's estimate of the history of philosophy in general, there is evidence that he was influenced either at times or throughout the construction of his philosophy of personalism by many of the eminent thinkers to whom we have just referred.

The question of the philosophical orientation of Bowne's thought respecting freedom once determined, the way for a critical and systematic exposition of his particular teaching
is made clear. In addition to the question of Bowne's historical indebtedness, careful attention will be directed to the metamorphosis of his own thinking. It will also be our purpose to reveal the structural and functional positions of freedom in Bowne's system of thought.

Finally, an examination and reconstruction of the problem of freedom in the light of present insight are required for the purpose of determining the relative value of Bowne's teaching in the light of contemporary types of philosophical thinking. This critical analysis includes a wide range of brilliant contemporary influence among which names are those of Henri Bergson, William James, Josiah Royce, William McDougall, E.G.Spaulding, Hans Driesch, Louis Arnaud Reid, W.E.Johnson, Charles Peirce and W.E.Hocking. In this way, it will be possible to examine the validity of Bowne's thought as well as to fix the degree of novelty and standard contribution made by him looking forward to the solution of the problem of freedom.

The object of the dissertation is to examine critically Bowne's teaching that the postulate of freedom is of deep speculative significance. The deep speculative significance of freedom easily constitutes one of the major motifs in the writings of Bowne. It will be our purpose to discover whether or not he overestimated the value of this contention.
Bowne's Relation to Modern Philosophical Thought

In the Preface to his *Metaphysics: a Study in First Principles*, Bowne says of G. W. Leibnitz (1646-1716) that "Leibnitz furnishes the starting point" for his metaphysical investigation. The sense in which Leibnitz serves as the point of departure for Bowne's metaphysics becomes clear when we understand the Leibnitzian *Monadology* with respect to its teachings about the categories of substance and causality. As respects substance, Leibnitz posits simple substances without parts or extension or figure or divisibility which constitute the elements of things and which are imperishable. These he calls monads. It is the principle of individuality so constructively extended for which Leibnitz’s teaching is noteworthy for our purpose. His monads may properly be described as selves though the most integrated ones are properly described as persons. His simple substances are dynamic and active rather than passive and extended. Descartes' notion of substance is therefore rejected and the essential nature of matter is force but force and motion are not derived from extension. He arrived at the conception of matter in terms of force by an analysis of the mind on the ground that

it is "a living mirror of the universe" and reflects as well as determines the nature of things.

Logically thought is expressed through the judgment in which a predicate is asserted of the subject. While a subject in one context may become the predicate of another, there is a unique kind of subject of which many predicates may be asserted, but it, itself, can never become the predicate of another subject. This subject is substance defined by Leibnitz as the subject of all its various predicates but itself the predicate of no subject. This conception of substance is perfectly identified with the notion of the self underlying all mental states. I am always the subject and cannot become the predicate to any subject, I have immediate self-knowledge not gained through external reference to any other object. The notion of substance is analogous to that of the soul or self-substance which is a force center. Such monads are self energizing and there are many such independent substances as opposed to the dualism of Descartes and the monism of Spinoza. In character, the monad is a unit of substance each being unique or a world in itself, each is active preserving unity through change and identity in difference. But "The Monads have no windows through which anything can enter or go forth." Since

the monads suffer no external connections or interactions which affect one another, there is required an internal principle of activity efficiently motivated described by Leibnitz as pre-established harmony.¹ That is, God has so adjusted his creation that all entelechies or created monads have their interaction explained through this principle.

"Thus God alone is the primitive unity, or the original simple substance of which all the created or derived Monads are the products; and they are generated so to speak, by continual fulgurations of the Divinity, from moment to moment, bounded by the receptivity of the creature, of whose existence limitation is an essential condition."²

Elsewhere Leibnitz says:

"God at first so created the soul or any other real unity, that everything must arise in it from its own inner nature, with a perfect spontaneity as regards itself, and yet with a perfect conformity to things outside of it. . . . . And accordingly, since each of these substances accurately represents the whole universe in its own way and from a certain view, and the perception or expression of external things come into the soul at their appropriate time, in virtue of its own laws, as in a world by itself, and as if there existed nothing but God and the soul. . . . there will be a perfect agreement between all these substances, which will have the same result as if they had communication with one another by a transmission of species or qualities, such as the mass of ordinary philosophers suppose."³

If we substitute Bowne's theory of interaction for Leibnitz's theory of pre-established harmony as has just been described,

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the result is personalistic theism all but the name.¹ Leibnitz taught a spiritual pluralism of individual selves having a certain completeness, perfection, and sufficiency "which makes them the sources of their own internal actions, and, as it were, incorporeal automata."²

With this insight into Leibnitz's category of substance, we now examine his category of causality. It will instruct us here to indicate the historical background of his thought.

Leibnitz rejected the teachings of Descartes and Duns Scotus, both of whom taught that there is in God absolute indifference or the liberty of indifference and that man's will is free. On the other hand, he rejected the logical fatalism of Spinoza who identified the possible, the real and the necessary which viewed all phenomena as the necessary consequences of the one eternal principle or Substance, God himself. Substance is the vortex which perpetually swallows finite personality and Spinoza's psychology philosophically denied true metaphysical freedom to finite persons. Leibnitz undertakes to steer a middle course probably best described as that of moral necessity, inclinat non


necessitat.¹ He finds absolute freedom contradictory to the divine foreknowledge, the laws of nature and also those of reason for the will requires by the principle of sufficient reason in order to act not only force but a goal or the good which is the only necessity. As opposed to Spinoza's logical fatalism which identifies the real as the necessary, Leibnitz urged that what does not imply contradiction is possible which permits that the contrary of all phenomena in the world is possible and contingency is true of reality. In spite of this we do live in the best possible of worlds which God deliberately chose for this very reason but in which all phenomena are predetermined, foreseen and causally arranged by him. "All things are certain and predetermined in man as in everything else, and the human soul is a kind of spiritual automaton."² Or again

"the mind is a force which endeavors to act in many directions, but does so only where it finds most facility and least resistance. . . . Thus it is that the inclinations of the mind move towards all the goods that present themselves; these are the antecedent volitions: but the consequent volition, which is the result of them, is determined towards that by which it is most strongly affected."³

Freedom in man implies intelligence,⁴ spontaneity⁵ and contin-

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¹ Leibnitz, G. W., New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, p. 206. "... the prevalence of perceived good inclines without necessitating, although considered as a whole, this inclination is determinate and never fails to produce its effect."


³ ibid., pp. 341-342.

⁴ Leibnitz, G. W., New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, p. 182.

⁵ ibid., p. 180.
Intelligence is the power to choose and deliberate on the best alternative of action but, being finite, man cannot exercise a perfect use of reason. "Agents which have absolutely neither thought nor volition are in all respects necessary agents." Spontaneity is a monad's power of acting and of being at the same time the principle of its own action. "But Aristotle has already well remarked that to call acts free, we demand not only that they be spontaneous, but further that they be deliberate."

But since these spiritual monads have no direct or reciprocal action among themselves, their independent acts are made to agree with one another through a harmony pre-established by God. As respects contingency, "volitions are contingent," that is everything which is not contradictory or absolutely impossible is contingent including all phenomena together with human actions. However, "Freedom, which is only a power, belongs only to agents and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is itself nothing else than a power." In urging the determination of the will by reason, Leibnitz has Philalethes argue as follows:

"To be determined by the reason to the best, is to be the freest. Who would wish to be foolish for the reason that a fool is less determined by wise reflections than a man of good sense? If freedom consists in throwing off the yoke of reason, fools and madmen will be the only free-men; but I do not believe that for love of such freedom any one would wish to be a fool save he who is one already."

1. Leibnitz, G. W., New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, p. 133.
2. Ibid., p. 194.
3. Ibid., p. 260.
Nor did Leibnitz hesitate to urge that God himself is determined to choose the best and that his freedom does not hinder him from being determined by the good any more than our freedom hinders us. While Leibnitz concludes with a moral necessity, his determinism, even though its psychological consequences were equivalent to the logical fatalism of Spinoza, is inspired by a decidedly different motive and aim. In Leibnitz's conception of the universe as a substance of spiritual monads, in his notion of concrete individuality and in his conception of rational determinism and a dynamic universe, it becomes clear in what sense "Leibnitz furnishes the starting point" for Bowne's metaphysics. Bowne rejected the power of action as synonymous with freedom as applied to both persons and atoms. "This power of action, however, must not be confounded with freedom. . . . Whenever it does act, it is the source of the action; yet the atom is not free." This type of philosophical determinism recognizes the soul as a true subject but affirms that its activity is determined from within by its own nature. The soul may be the source of action but under a given circumstance it can act in only one way so that only the alleged consciousness that we might have acted otherwise is denied. Bowne held that "Leibnitz, who, with Spinoza, is the founder of determinism,

3. Ibid., p. 396.
also asserted in the strongest manner the spontaneity and reality of the soul. Both writers repudiated the notion of an external compulsion of any kind. "1 But the manner in which Leibnitz viewed the inner life was a violation of Bowne's notion that reasoning implies freedom. In Leibnitz's system we have a succession of mental states which we cannot interrupt. One belief determines us as much as another. His view makes truth and error alike necessary. Such inner determinism overthrows knowledge completely. On this ground Bowne rejected the theory of pre-established harmony as incompatible with science and philosophy because it denies freedom and ends in fatalism. 2 In other respects Bowne accepted certain features of Leibnitz's doctrine of pre-established harmony in the interest of his theory of interaction.

Bowne at one time described his system as a Kantianized Berkeleianism. 3 By this he acknowledged his metaphysics to be in its main outline essentially that of Berkeley (1635-1753). Much of both the form and content of Bowne's philosophy is Berkeleian and there is evidence pointing toward the primacy of Berkeleian influence above that of either Kant or Lotze. 4 The

relation of Berkeley to Malebranche (1638-1715) and Leibnitz clearly indicates the direction of his thought. The absolute idealism of Malebranche destroys finite freedom in the interest of doing justice to God. "Whatever effort of the mind I may make, I can find no strength, or efficiency, or power outside the will of the infinitely perfect Being." Volition is described as a natural impulse toward the good in general which is indeterminate for it is God who irresistibly impels us toward the good in general. But while God is the real cause of all volitions of finite minds, he is not the author of sin. At this point, Malebranche destroys human freedom and the divine activity for his definition of sin as nothing and the sinner as doing nothing requires the cessation of God's original impulse and logically calls for a human volition. While he affirms that "Man is a free agent," his theory of freedom is in reality subsidiary to his more general theory of occasional causes. While Berkeley felt a mental kinship to Malebranche, he employs freedom as a metaphysical first principle which provides finite spirits with real metaphysical freedom.

Berkeley's thought is similar to Leibnitz's. He taught a complete immateriality of substance which he regarded as

spiritual. Reality is a society of spirits human and divine. He says "A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being—as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will."\(^1\)

The mind of a spiritual being is active in making and unmaking ideas and in this is constituted its willing and volitional power. My freedom of willing ideas in my mind at pleasure is limited for the power of control over my thoughts does not extend to the ideas actually perceived by sense for these are independent of my will. But, since I am not the volitional cause of these sensuous ideas as creatures of my will, there must therefore be some other will or spirit which produces and impresses them upon my mind.

"The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in regular train or series—the admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author."\(^2\)

Further the rules by which the mind presents ideas of sense constitute the laws of nature thereby giving to nature uniformity and dependability. These laws of nature express the goodness of the supreme will. Finite spiritual beings are therefore both active and passive. With respect to their limited activity

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they are in possession of limited freedom while with respect to their ideas of sense they are passive and insofar determined. Insofar as the mind is active, it has the power to choose, while ideas which are caused in me by the action of the cosmic spirit are not products of my volition. The former are called ideas or images of things and, being excited in our imagination are less regular, vivid and constant, while the latter are called real things and are more vivid, strong, orderly and coherent since they depend upon the cosmic spirit rather than upon our own. This distinction in personality between freedom and necessity lies at the heart of Bowne's doctrine of limited freedom which will appear in our analysis of his teaching on this point.¹ Berkeley, in fact, makes freedom a metaphysical first principle in his interpretation of reality whether in finite spiritual or the infinite spiritual being.

"That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favor their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body on another - all this is very natural. And, on the other

¹ Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 232-234.
hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it; methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, and become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.4

We encounter, in the spiritual pluralism of Berkeley, personal idealism which is in its own respect a unique contribution to the history of philosophical thought.2

The indebtedness of Bowne to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is very great. In Bowne's reference to his own thought as a Kantianized-Berkeleianism to which reference has already been made, he meant to describe his epistemology as essentially Kantian apriorism. Bowne's system so far as his logic, epistemology and ethics are concerned is in many respects Kantian although Bowne greatly extended those ideas of Kant which he found congenial to his own thought while he critically rejected aspects of the Kantian epistemology which were of a debatable and less permanent character. For our purpose, we shall therefore limit our survey of Kant's Critical Philosophy to those aspects of knowledge and personality which contributed

2. The intimacy of the philosophical points of view of Berkeley and Bowne is revealed by the fact that, at the time of his death, Bowne was planning to write a volume on Berkeley. I am indebted for this information to Dean Albert C. Knudson of Boston University School of Theology.
directly to Bowne's doctrine of freedom. What Kant had to say about the reason, the will and morality with respect to their individual natures and interdependencies will constitute our inquiry insofar as they involve his postulate of freedom. Kant postulated freedom as the key-stone in the arch of his critiques, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, 2d rev. ed., 1787) and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788). In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant discusses the idea of freedom from the point of view of a possibility in a world where the universal law of necessity has been affirmed and he attempts to show how the idea of freedom as a cosmic concept correlates with the general necessity of nature. Kant admits two kinds of causality as conceivable to explain events, that of nature and that of freedom. Kant defines freedom as follows:

"Dagegen verstehe ich unter Freiheit, im kosmologischen Verstande, das Vermögen, einen Zustand von selbst anzu- fangen, deren Kausalität also nicht nach dem Naturgesetze wiederum unter einer anderen Ursache steht, welche sie der Zeit nach bestimmt."^2

Freedom, therefore, is a type of causality independent of any other cause by which it is determined in time. It is an idea of reason and there is in man a self-determination independent of the necessity of sensuous impulses. If it were not so, the will would in turn be determined as all natural events which

would destroy transcendental freedom as well as practical freedom. But,

"obgleich etwas nicht geschehen ist, es doch habe geschehen sollen und seine Ursache in der Erscheinung also nicht so bestimmmt war, dass nicht in unserer Willkurf eine Kausalität liege, unabhängig von jenen Naturursachen und selbst wider ihre Gewalt und Einfluss etwas hervorzubringen, was in der Zeitordnung nach empirischen Gesetzen bestimmt ist, mithin eine Reihe von Begebenheiten ganz von selbst anzugangen."

On this hypothesis, Kant proposes the idea that every effect in the world must arise not either from nature or from freedom but that nature and freedom co-exist in the same event in different relations. This is possible since phenomena are not things in themselves for in that case freedom would be impossible, but, because they are representations only, united according to firmly established natural laws, they are in need of non-phenomenal causes such as rational, spontaneous causes which lie outside the phenomenal series but whose effects are discoverable in the series of empirical phenomena. On this view an effect may have its intelligible cause considered as free while, with reference to phenomena, the effect is at the same time a necessity of nature. Otherwise the antinomy of nature and freedom is insoluble.

"So würde denn Freiheit und Natur, jedes in seiner vollständigen Bedeutung, bei ebendenselben Handlungen, nachdem

Kant, therefore, holds that the antinomy of nature and freedom rests on mere illusion. Man belongs to the noumenal and phenomenal orders. As a member of the former, *homo noumenon*, reason is the condition of all free actions by which man takes his place in the phenomenal world. As a member of the latter, *homo phenomenon*, his will has an empirical character which causes all his actions. Freedom is not contradictory to natural necessity in one and the same action for the law of each constitutes different relations to the same effect so that each may exist independent of and undisturbed by the other. Having distinguished the category of causality as a concept of natural necessity from the category of causality as a concept of freedom, he concludes "Hieraus wird der Leser ersehen, dass, da ich Freiheit als das Vermögen, eine Begebenheit von selbst anzufangen erklärte, ich genau den Begriff traf, der das Problem der Metaphysik ist."  

In addition to his epistemological and metaphysical doctrine of freedom where he showed its possibility, but did not prove it, Kant taught explicitly the necessity of freedom

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2. ibid., S. 619.
in his moral philosophy.¹ The central idea of his moral philosophy is freedom which he identifies with rational spontaneity. Not only does morality depend upon freedom but his conception of society as a kingdom of ends and his republican theory of government rest upon the same doctrine. In religion, the true church is constituted of free beings who worship God freely while, in education, the same principle of freedom constitutes the basic principle of growth. In fact, "Ethics is a system of the pure rational laws of freedom."² However, freedom is a postulate the basis of which is the unconditioned moral law not revealed by the theoretical reason. An unconditioned will is free and, when the will is based upon reason, it becomes self-conditioning and, hence, is free. The moral law within us demands freedom for its exercise for the ought implies the power to do. We have no knowledge of freedom since the scientific use of the reason reveals only causal necessity. Nevertheless, we feel the mandate of the moral reason which implies freedom even though this postulate which we are required to make can never become an object of knowledge and therefore prove it to the understanding. On this account, the practical reason takes priority over the pure reason due to the fact that it reveals to us what the understanding can never demonstrate.

¹ Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1783. Also, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785.
² Cushman, H. E., A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 278,
Contrary to Hume, Kant found the category of causality to be a transcendental idea because reason creates it independently of experience. Causality, therefore, like space and time is an antinomy arising out of the attempt of reason to think the world as a true *ding-an-sich*. Both thesis and antithesis of the antinomy are conceivable but, of course, cannot both be true. Kant's solution consists in allowing the antithesis to hold for the phenomenal world while the thesis is true for the noumenal world. The phenomenal world implies sequential causality and, as such, is a mechanism ad infinitum. The noumenal world embodies antesequential causality. Transcendental freedom is a creation of reason which conditions the possibility of "ought" in addition to the "is" which the scientific reason reveals. Freedom is a function of reason and conditions all voluntary action. All real causes are, therefore, due to reason.

In addition to Kant's discussion of Freedom in connection with the category of causality, there is one further significant aspect of Kant's doctrine of experience which has an important bearing on Bowne's doctrine of freedom, namely his classic doctrine of the constitutive activity of the mind. Concerning it, Bowne says "This is the abiding and imperishable element in Kant's system and constitutes his immortal merit.

No critical weapon formed against the view has prospered, and it stands invincible.\(^1\) Bowne's phrasing of Kant's doctrine took the form "that experience is possible only through the constructive action of the mind according to principles immanent in it; and thus we see that knowledge in general is possible only in the same way.\(^2\) While Bowne accepted the rational mind as active, constructive and constitutive, he rejected Kant's psychology and his agnosticism. It is on this assumption of the mind as a rational activity that Bowne passed easily as did Kant to the identification of its nature as also spontaneous and free.

Kant regarded freedom as the third antinomy of pure reason encountered when the reason deals with rational cosmology.\(^3\) Here the reason falls into contradiction with itself which creates a serious difficulty. In dealing with the metaphysical idea of causality, Bowne regarded Kant's argument against freedom to be arbitrary and fictitious. The proof of the antithesis of freedom and that everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature involves great confusion, for Bowne held that the notion "that freedom is opposed to the law of causality and represents such a connection of successive states of effective


\(^2\) Bowne, B. P., *Kant and Spencer, a Critical Exposition*, p. 16.

\(^3\) Kant, Immanuel, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, S. 530-539.
causes that no unity of experience is possible with it,¹ is sheer extravagance.¹ Such a view is an abstract and fictitious conception of the meaning of freedom. Further, where Kant regards freedom as the abnegation of procedure according to rules and likens nature to lawful procedure and freedom to that of lawlessness,² we have a gratuitous conception. Bowne's criticism of Kant at this point so instructively reveals his own position concerning freedom that we are required to state it here.

"Now, all that is necessary for experience and science is simply a certain uniformity within experience itself. This uniformity as such is altogether independent of the metaphysics of its possibility. If we suppose it to rest on necessity or to rest upon freedom, science and experience are equally possible. We find as a matter of fact that there are certain uniformities of experience, and science states these as far as it can, and by means of the knowledge thus gained seeks to control life. But, as said, the question of freedom or necessity is entirely independent of this uniformity. Freedom violates no law of nature and no law of mind. The believer in freedom would be as good a psychologist or physicist as the believer in necessity. It is only as we pass from this practical science to some kind of basal doctrine which regards the universe as something absolutely determined from everlasting to everlasting, and seeks to bind all events together in one scheme of necessity, that any difficulty arises; but this notion is a sheer fiction of the dogmatic intelligence. We do not know the world to be any such scheme, and Kant himself held that the world was no such scheme. We simply know that there are certain uniformities on which we can practically rely for the

¹ Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer, a Critical Exposition, p. 192.
² Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 539.

"Denn es lässt sich stehen einem solchen gesetzlosen Vermögen der Freiheit, kaum mehr Natur denken; weil die Gesetze der letzteren durch die einflüsse der ersteren, unaufhörlich abgeändert, und das Spiel der Erscheinungen, welches nach der blossen Natur regelmässig und gleichförmig sein würde, dadurch verwirrt und unzusammenhängend gemacht wird."
guidance of life within the range of experience. Anything beyond this is dogmatic assertion or some species of fate.\textsuperscript{11}

Further, Kant misunderstood the nature of causality in Bowne's opinion. Instead of viewing causality back of the cosmos as a temporally first dynamic impulse which began the series of events in time, causality must be regarded rather as the "continuous productivity, by which the things that were and the things that are alike have been produced; which worked and works and will work forevermore."\textsuperscript{2} This is an idea of volitional causality which Bowne stressed in his first published work\textsuperscript{3} and which runs as a thread throughout the entire course of his thought. Kant's argument that the denial of freedom would relieve the antinomy of pure reason is shown by Bowne to be fatal as this would be the one condition rendering nature capricious, groundless, arbitrary and kaleidoscopic. It is not necessity that secures regularity in nature for nature changes, a fact in the midst of which we have no explanation unless we reconcile change and identity by trust in the uniformity of nature as administered by "free intelligence".

"Such intelligence can choose ends to be reached and the means for reaching them, and can direct itself to their realization. It is, therefore, in the highest degree mistaken to declare that there could be no orderly

2. ibid., p. 195.
system and no unity of experience if we grant the notion of freedom."

Moreover, Kant's solution of the antinomy of freedom is, in Bowne's opinion, a conclusion to be reached in a far simpler and more satisfactory way. In the first place, to account man as a member of two worlds, he violates his doctrine of the subjectivity of the categories teaching a transcendental causality of freedom for man considered as noumenon which frankly applies the categories not only to think about noumena but actually to know noumenal objects. In their conclusions, Kant and Bowne eventually tend to coincide respecting the place of freedom in any satisfactory conception of reality. Bowne's view of the solution of the Kantian antinomy of reason is as follows:

"The only thing that really meets the demand for causality in the conception of a living, active intelligence which is imminent in all its deeds, and which is equally present to all of them, to the last as well as the first. With this understanding we see the Kantian antinomy disappearing."  

What Bowne learned from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) concerning the doctrine of freedom was both positive and negative, but, if we may judge Bowne's appreciation from

1. Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer, a Critical Exposition, p. 196.
2. ibid., p. 198. In this quotation, imminent is probably a typographical error and should be read immanent.
his writings, we find the negative influence given priority over the positive influence. What Bowne could receive from Hegel's teaching on this point was held in common with Kant. The close association of pantheism and even of atheism appearing in such a system as that of Spinoza and a similar fallacy which in Bowne's opinion vitiated a large part of Hegel's works laid the latter's philosophy under the interdict of Bowne's pen. Yet, in Hegel is to be found a doctrine of freedom revealing much with which Bowne could and did agree.

"The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and its more definite place and origin is the will, which is free. This freedom constitutes the substance and essential character of the will and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom. It is the world of spirit, which is produced out of itself, and is a second nature."¹

In Hegel's opinion, freedom is a structural phase of will as weight is essential to bodies. In fact, that which is free is the will for, apart from freedom, the will is meaningless, and, without the will as subject, freedom is no reality. The psychological distinction of mind into a duality of faculties which separates reason and will is a vain discrimination.²

Continuing the discussion, Hegel argues that

"The will contains the element of pure indeterminateness, i. e., the pure doubling of the I back in thought

¹ Hegel, G. W. F., Philosophy of Right, Rand, B., The Classical Moralists, p. 587.
upon itself. In this process every limit or content, present though it be directly by way of nature, as in want, appetite, or impulse, or given in any specific way, is dissolved. Thus we have the limitless infinitude of absolute abstraction, or universality, the pure thought of itself."

This is Hegel's description of the negative side of freedom which he describes as freedom of the void which has risen to be an actual shape and passion. The notion conceived as absolute and also as self-determination is implicated in the idea of substance which presupposes that the notion has a nature which creates the difficulty that, after all, Hegel's conception of freedom is equivalent merely to that of spiritual mechanism and determinism except that it is of a more refined sort. This logical problem in Hegel's conception of the notion as absolute renders the principle of free thought precarious. Hegel's thought falls under the fallacy of the universal, a pantheistic tendency wherein "the individual is merged in the class term, and this soon passes for the universal and all-embracing being. Thus a harmless logical subordination becomes a fatal ontological implication."\(^2\)

In this same connection, Bowne describes Hegelianism as a form of impersonalism which arises through the fallacy of the abstract, that is, all concrete reality including intelligence

is derived from ultimate reality which is impersonal in character by some logical process or implication. Such an idealistic impersonalism, while in origin antipodal to naturalism, is in outcome often identical with it. Strauss held that the difference between Hegelian idealism and materialism is only one of words and Bowne affirms that this is true of the left wing Hegelians urging that such impersonalistic metaphysics is the perennial source of atheistic reasoning.\(^1\)

In the preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel affirms "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational."\(^2\) It is from this point of view that Hegel derives his spiritual universe as the natural. This conception of absolute spirit would apparently infringe upon freedom and spontaneity and, therefore, leaves no room to explain the facts of sin and error. But it is just this infinity of the mind which constitutes its freedom because freedom not only implies absence of restraint but active self-determination as well. The self is, therefore, free because it deals with what is ideal and is an independence which comes to reality through self-control. The natural is to be regarded as


essential to freedom. In all this, Hegel makes the claim to absolute autonomy for the bonds of mind are nothing other than spiritual forces. But there is no way to prevent our asking whether the impelling force which we call spiritual rather than corporeal substance may not be quite as thorough-going a determinism. In spite of this, Hegel's free mind claims to possess the springs of its own action within it and that it is striving for an end postulated by its own rational being. To summarize briefly, Hegel's view is that the "Mind is inherently universal, self-contained, all-inclusive, infinite, self-revealing, and free."¹ The difficulty with Hegel's view is the way in which the principle of individuality from the point of view of the freedom of finite persons is conceived. If finite persons are not metaphysically discrete units with a higher degree of impenetrability than Hegel's absolute idealism will allow, they become eventually enveloped by the category of necessity which makes all reality one self-contained and complete experience wherein finite persons are but modal expressions of the one self-realizing absolute mind in its onward march through history. Against this Hegelian conception of freedom, Bowne would urge two primary objections. First, the notion of the self is pauperized and emptied of its

¹ Reyburn, H. A., The Ethical Theory of Hegel, a Study of the Philosophy of Right, p. 89.
uniqueness in such a way as to be relatively worthless.
Secondly, the problems of sin and error become opaque.
The denial of personality and freedom as set forth by Hegelian-
ism does injustice according to Bowne to both the cognitive
and volitional aspects of human experience. The fundamental
objection of Bowne to Hegel's doctrine of freedom lies in its
sacrifice of finite freedom to cosmic freedom. The result is
that the notions of finite freedom, responsibility, sin and
error find no solution on the plane of impersonal pantheism.

At this point, Bowne would accept the point of view
of Renouvier who regarded freedom to be the necessary pre-
supposition of both the rational and moral life apart from which
knowledge, duty, responsibility and guilt are meaningless.
Indeed it is hard to see just how any absolute idealism can
save finite persons from becoming at best more than spiritual
automata which point of view eventuates in determinism and
pantheism. Bowne's defense of the freedom and individuality
of the finite person in contrast with Hegelian absolutism is
well formulated by Robert Browning, Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day,
where the personal God

"whose pleasure brought
Man into being, stands away
As it were a handbreadth off, to give
Room for the newly made to live,
And look at him from a place apart,
And use his gifts of brain and heart,
Given, indeed, but to keep forever."

2. Cited by Dean A. C. Knudson, The Philosophy of
   Personalism, p. 34.
Among the acknowledgements which Bowne made respecting the historical connections of his thought is a reference to Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841). He attributes to Herbart the credit for having supplied the method which he employed in writing his metaphysics.¹ Herbart defined philosophy as the elaboration of conceptions: logic aims at clearness in conceptions while metaphysics undertakes the correction of conceptions.² Among the formal conceptions furnished by experience which contain contradictions are the following: the conception of inherence which is the notion of a thing with several attributes implying that one is many; the conception of causality; the conception of change; and the conception of an Ego regarded as the primary source of our manifold ideas. The task of metaphysics is to bring experience under the law of contradiction and thus to render it consistent and comprehensible. This metaphysics seeks to do through what Herbart called the method of relations.³ Notwithstanding the fact that it has been competently doubted that the contradictions affirmed by Herbart are really contained in the formal conceptions forced upon us by experience,⁴ this need not necessarily invalidate the Herbartian method.

4. ibid., p. 279.
The reconstruction of the concepts of experience consists in seeking out the necessary complementary conceptions, or points of relation through which the contradictions contained in the concepts of experience are resolved. It is this method which Bowne followed closely throughout the development of his metaphysics. Bowne, too, defined philosophy as a rational undertaking. The philosophical ideal is

"a rational and systematic comprehension of reality. Or, since experience is the fundamental fact in all theorizing, and since reality can be known only in experience, in the largest sense of that word, we may say that philosophy aims at a rational and systematic comprehension and interpretation of experience."¹

Herbart divided metaphysics into methodology (the doctrine of principles and methods), being, inherence, ontology (change), synechology (the constant), and eidology (phenomena). He further united with general metaphysics as its applications both philosophy and psychology. Bowne substantially followed this procedure throughout his epistemology and metaphysics. In the metaphysics, Bowne begins with the following categories.

"There are certain general conceptions which make up at once the framework of knowledge and the framework of existence. Such are the categories of being and cause, change and identity, space and time; and our knowledge of particular things will depend on the conception we form of these basal categories."²

Following this initial task of reconstructing and correcting

1. Bowne, B.P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 3.
these common sense categories is that of developing a critical and coherent view of the concepts of experience.

Bowen refused to accept Herbart's ideal that psychology could be erected into a science parallel to physical mechanics which would explain everything in terms of motion. He could accept Herbart's rejection of the old faculty psychology but Herbart's attempt to explain all psychic life mechanically in terms of the movements of ideas, action and reaction, according to formulated mathematical relations existing between them reducing mental life to the mere complication of ideas, feelings, strivings and impulses as modified ideas Bowen found useful only in part. The notion that there can be no free will since the entire content of the mind follows fixed laws and all psychical processes are capable of mathematical determination is a point of view considered by Bowen to be erroneous and incoherent.¹ Herbart's determinism reduced the ego from a principle to a product while Bowen considered it a metaphysical first principle. Herbart did, however, admit an idea of inner freedom by which he understood the agreement of the individual's will with his convictions. His mechanical conception of the mental life when carried into his theory of education, the field in which he wielded the greatest influence, explains his stress upon instruction, interest and apperception. All of this presupposes volition and freedom for which he finds no place.

The realistic element is pronounced in both Herbart's and Bowne's work. Professor G. A. Coe says of Bowne:

"He was probably quite aware of the fundamentally empirical quality of his own primary procedures. His dialectic was consciously secondary and defensive -- one might say disinfecting. It did not profess to discover or demonstrate the real, but only to remove obstacles from the real and from the perception of it as real. We are to find and know reality by action and interaction, by giving play to our sense of need, by contemplating historical developments and judging values; by revising thought and conduct and trying again."\(^2\)

And again,

"Who among his students and readers can have failed to be impressed by his almost constant warnings against 'merely verbal thinking', the 'fallacy of the universal', 'logomachies' or 'logic-chopping', and 'taking the order of thought for the order of reality'? He who never tired of dialectical contests nevertheless made 'the field of life and action' his supreme court of appeal as against 'the arid wastes of formal logic.'\(^3\)

Both Herbart and Bowne appropriated the realistic element in Kantian idealism.

Finally, Bowne acknowledged a debt to the thought of Hermann Lotze (1817-1881).\(^4\) Respecting the conclusions of his metaphysics, Bowne says "the conclusions reached are essentially those of Lotze. I have reached them,

3. ibid., pp. 18-19.
for the most part, by strictly independent research; but, so far as their character is concerned, there would be no great misrepresentation in calling them Lotzean."¹ The Lotzean doctrine of freedom involves an examination of the types of causality with respect to freedom and necessity. His point of departure is an examination of the characteristics by which psychic life may be most unquestionably differentiated from the whole course of nature. Of all these characteristics, namely three, Lotze regards freedom as ordinarily the most significant. He refers to it as the "Freedom of internal Self-determination, of which we think we have in ourselves direct and indubitable experience, in contrast to the unbroken chain of necessity with which the states of unorganized matter are evolved out of one another."² The dignity and worth of personality and all its activities root in the notion of freedom from mechanical causation in both the organic and inorganic realms of existence. We are unable to directly observe freedom as a fact of our inner life even though introspection reveals no determining motive for our actions, for actions regarded as free self-determination may, in the last analysis, reveal the fact of determination.

¹ Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics, a Study in First Principles, 1882, Preface, vii. Bowne dedicated this work "in grateful recollection to the memory of my friend and former teacher Hermann Lotze."

Due to the incalculable character of human conduct and the incommensurability of the data of conduct when compared with the stimuli received, we are convinced of the erroneous nature of all reasoning which affirms absolute determinism of mental life. But lacking invariable proof for freedom, it may be regarded wise to retain it as the necessary condition of ethics and the imperative condition of the fulfillment of moral obligations.

Lotze argues from the outset for a limited freedom which does not extend to the inner life generally "but of a Freedom of Will in particular,"¹ which invades the prevalence of universal law which constitutes not only the order of the outer but also the greater part of our inner life. No philosophy has been able to withdraw the association of ideas, feelings and desires from the domain of mechanical necessity so that at best if there be any freedom we need to affirm the union of freedom and necessity as the truth about the soul. The presence of universal law apparent throughout the greater part of our inner life and the presence of a patent interaction or concomitant variation between our bodily states and our volitions which is thought to be a proof that everything in mind can be explained in terms of the properties of matter with which it interacts.

"arbitrarily and erroneously interpret a familiar fact."\(^1\) For even though the highest phenomena of mental life show historical development under the influence of mechanical sequences, such facts do not prove that these changes "are the single and sufficient cause from which, in virtue of its own energy and without the co-operation of a quite different principle, the manifold variety of psychic life is exclusively evolved."\(^2\) Therefore, it behooves us, in the light of our present scientific investigation, to insist upon "distinct grounds of explanation for phenomena that cannot be compared."\(^3\)

In addition to ideation and feeling, therefore, volition represents a unique element of mental activity non-derivable from ideation and feeling yet dependent on them as occasions of its activity, functions and emergence in conscious life. The extent to which we **identify much of our mental life with volition and effort** is usually unjustifiable since ideation and feeling well express their meanings and to which the soul is related not as active being but merely as spectator. That is to say, the general mechanisms of consciousness are experienced by us as energies of our own resolutions or as energies of the will. This is erroneous. Philosophers have always recognized these mechanisms of the inner life and these

2. ibid., pp. 147-148.
3. ibid., p. 149.
furnish the perennial locus of hope of science in many quarters that the whole of personality may be eventually explained on this mechanical model. But the fact that a large area of psychic life is so constituted is not the least validation of the contention that it is unreasonable to suppose any other ground of explanation than that of mechanical causality for the entire consciousness. To be sure our sense impulses and the greater part of what we describe as our actions together with the association of ideas and a great number of the more complex actions of life which appear in consciousness constitute a blending of feelings, muscular co-ordinations and the like which are explicable as the mechanical necessity of sequence in human life. In the case of lower animals, these phenomena are never thought of otherwise.

The criterion of an act of will offered by Lotze consists in our conviction that

"the impulses urging to action are apprehended in distinct consciousness, where, moreover, the decision whether they shall be followed or not is deliberated upon and is left to be determined by free choice of the mind which is unswayed by these pressing motives, and not by the force of these motives themselves."1

The connection between the notion of freedom and that of volition is very intimate for it is the capacity of the will

to make decisions which constitutes the will the unique thing it is. The will is limited with respect to the content or subject matter supplied by the involuntary and mechanical aspects of consciousness but it does have unrestricted freedom of choice between the objects thus presented. We cannot deny the reality of volition but it is a mistake to confuse unlimited freedom of volition with what Lotze calls "exhaustless capacity of performance" against which life repeatedly warns us. Scientific investigation has often committed this error by affirming that the will implies more than volition, even the capacity of performance. This prejudice against the conviction of freedom is based upon the fear that it would destroy the whole order of nature and the universe would result in chaos because the denial of the uniformity of law makes it impossible to bring the result of free resolve into harmony with nature in a dependable way.

But Lotze points out as did Bowne that

"This was to forget within how narrow limits the power of a finite creature would be confined even if its will not only were free, but also had the bodily organization absolutely at its disposal as the instrumentality of its resolutions. It was to forget that every effect, however free and arbitrary may have been its motive, as soon as it happens as an effect, takes its place once more in the circle of calculable events subject to universal laws, and that no freedom is allowed wider room for exercise than falls to it by right in the undisturbed order of things. . . . . Finally, to indulge the fear that nevertheless the processes introduced by the animated will at its choice into the actual course of Nature might, as they gradually accumulated,
diffuse themselves in opposition to the plan of Nature, was further to overlook the fact that even the uninterrupted and unfree sequence of all states in psychic life would not lessen this danger."

The consideration basic to this inquiry is the character of the assumed universal law of causality requiring that every effect have a sufficient cause revealing a universe of an endless chain of blind effects. This assumption of the universal character of the law of causality constitutes a problem of science which is today still far from an adequate solution and is therefore subject at certain points to ever-renewed examination. Lotze's examination of freedom in connection with the law of causality is a procedure which Bowne himself adopted throughout his analysis of the problem of freedom and it is well to point out that neither of them regard for a moment the possibility of thinking uncaused events. The real question was, what kind of a cause is required to serve as the proper ground of interpretation of different classes of events? Suppose the causal law correct in requiring us to seek a cause for every effect, this in no wise requires us to regard every event as an effect any more than to look upon every discovered cause as itself the invariable effect of still another cause. For, says Lotze,

"What constitutes the absolute authority of the causal law is not that every part of the finite sum of things actual must in the finite sphere be produced by fixed causes, according to universal laws, but that each constituent once introduced into this actual course continues to act according to these laws."

The thing to which our attention is called usually consists in affirming that every effect has its cause while, as a matter of fact, chief stress should be laid on that term of the proposition which affirms that "every cause infallibly has its effect." The meaning of this is that in both nature and personality the universal course of things lies open momentarily to the possibility of innumerable beginnings whose origins lie outside them but when once they are originated must continue within them. This provides for contingency in the world and, therefore, precludes foreknowledge of when and where new points of departure are to be found. And even though experience would seem to indicate that the events of external nature are effects rooting in antecedent facts, there still remains the possibility that the inner mental life is free from being throughout an absolute mechanism bound by necessity and that in connection with unlimited freedom of will there goes also "a limited power of absolute commencement." Thus, for example, the soul evolves from itself decisions and resolu-

tions which constitute self-originated, self-commenced activities none of which were determined by previous bodily phenomena yet upon the occasion of the self-origination of any act the same at once flows into and becomes subject to the laws of causality working out its consequences under the limiting conditions of these established laws of universal being. This is a conclusion of Lotze which comes into substantial agreement with a favorite affirmation of Bowne to the effect that "Freedom may choose the seed but it can neither determine nor escape the harvest."^1

The thesis of Lotze's discussion of freedom and necessity consists in the conviction through an examination of the data involved that there is an essential distinction between the constitution of the inner life and the peculiar course of external nature. We are therefore compelled to resort to at least two different types of causality. And while we have become accustomed to look upon the assumptions of natural science as universally applicable means of investigation, we are, at the same time, compelled to acknowledge that with respect to the inner psychic life we have entered into an entirely unique and wholly different sphere which requires a method and point of view applicable to it. The conclusion of the Lotzean argument states

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the case of causality in relation to freedom and necessity so classically that I quote it here in full.

"It would be a mistake to suppose this demand to be made in opposition merely to Materialism, which, denying as it does the independent nature of the mental being, must also in consistency decline the obligation to seek new modes of considering the subject which it does not recognize to be new; the tendency with which we find fault extends far more widely, even among those who, like us, base their views on the independent origin of spirit. We are so used in Nature to indirect effects and to their being explained by the consideration of single constituents, so used to find momentous differences in properties traced back to trifling alterations in the amount and mode of combination of homogeneous elements, that at last we lose all understanding of anything immediate, and unconsciously become possessed by a passion for construing everything, assigning to everything a complicated machinery as the means of its origination and operation. We would then fain assert that even within us there is nothing but an exterior concatenation of events, resembling the communication of movement by which, in the outer world, we see one element come into collision with another; and all else that we find within—consciousness, feeling, and effort—we would be almost tempted to regard as only a kind of accidental reflection in us of that real action, unless indeed we see that there must be something for which and in which this reflection arises. That something there is; every several expression of our consciousness, every stirring of our feelings, every dawning resolution, calls aloud that processes, not to be measured by the standard of physical notions, do indeed take place, with unconquerable and undeniable reality. So long as we have this experience, Materialism may prolong its existence and celebrate its triumphs within the schools, where so many ideas estranged from life find shelter, but its own professors will belie their false creed in their living action. For they will all continue to love and hate, to hope and fear, to dream and study, and they will in vain seek to persuade us that this very exercise of mental energies, which even deliberate denial of the supersensible cannot destroy, is a product of their bodily organization, or that the love of truth exhibited by some, the sensitive vanity betrayed by others, has its origin in their
cerebral fibres. Among all the errors of the human mind it has always seemed to me the strangest that it could come to doubt its own existence, of which alone it has direct experience, or to take it at second hand as the product of an external Nature which we know only indirectly, only by means of the knowledge of the very mind to which we would fain deny existence."

While Lotze recognized the fact of freedom and while Bowne found himself in substantial agreement with the conclusions to which Lotze came as we have outlined them above, Bowne did not feel that Lotze had exhausted the metaphysical implications of freedom or that he made freedom constitutive of knowledge which Bowne himself stressed as a most fundamental phase of the deep speculative significance of freedom. Into Lotze's conception of reality as independent and self-existent, Bowne introduced the thought of free self-activity not only as an essential but as the controlling factor.  

Hermann Ulrici (1806-1884), a philosopher of religion, was professor of philosophy in Halle at the time when Bowne studied under him. Ulrici, originally a Hegelian, finally broke completely with Hegel taking up the theistic position of I. H. Fichte. "Gott war ihm der schöpferische Urheber der Natur und die absolute Voraussetzung der Naturwissenschaft selbst."  

This position of Ulrici Bowne accepted as the entire truth of theism and worked it out as a basic principle of his speculative philosophy. The first mention of Ulrici to be found in Bowne’s works appears in an article published in The Independent while Bowne was studying abroad. In this pessimistic review of German philosophy, Bowne shows that "Germany is materialistic, not from stress of argument but from choice; and if ever it recovers from the dreadful slough into which it has fallen, it will not be by the power of Logic, but through the grace of God." He concludes that a few philosophers including Professor Ulrici "are making heroic efforts to recall philosophy to the facts of life and consciousness; but in general the German mind, . . . . has resigned itself to a materialistic and Epicurean philosophy. . . . . Nowhere this side of China is there such widespread materialism as here in idealistic Germany." In addition to the above references to Ulrici, Bowne has given us his critical estimate of two of Ulrici's works, Compendium der Logik, zweite neu bearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage, Leipzig, T. D. Weigel, 1872, and Gott und die Natur zweite Auflage, Leipzig, T. D. Weigel, 1866. While Ulrici was the

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1. "Philosophy in Germany," The Independent, 26 (1874), (Jan. 22, 1874), pp. 4-5.
2. ibid., p. 5.
3. ibid., p. 4.
author of other notable works, there is no direct reference
to these in the writings of Bowne and how much he owed to
Ulrici in addition to the latter's logic, psychology and
philosophy of religion is hard to say.

What Bowne found in Ulrici's logic, he sums up
as follows:

"We reach definite knowledge only through a
process of differentiation. But this process implies
laws and norms. The laws are those of identity and
contradiction and of causation. The norms are the funda-
mental logical categories. Only through the application
of these can we gain any definite idea, thought, perception. With this proof the sensational philosophy is
remanded to silence or dogmatism. But these laws
and norms compel us to recognize an outer world which
is also subject to thought-law and forms; and this is
intelligible only as the work of a Rational Mind. With
this proof, atheism is driven out of philosophy to
take irrational shelter in the arbitrary assumptions
of unreasoning prejudice. This manifoldness of the
external world, again, can only be viewed as originated,
and hence as postulating an originator. With this
proof, pantheism ceases to have any rational ground,
and sinks to the level of an illogical heresy. Finally,
these laws and forms, being expressions of the essential
nature, of the mind, are necessary and universal in
human thought. Hence whatever knowledge flows from them
is universally valid."¹

Ulrici denied the categories as innate ideas since the notion
of innate ideas in general is fallacious. The primary
categories, being, activity and act, space, time, and the
categories of simple nature, quantity and quality, admittedly
apply to both thought and things as the conditions of know-
ledge in general. The classes of categories, those of relation

and those of order, are essentially those of scientific knowledge.

"Whatever may be possible to absolute science, human science becomes possible only through differentiating the indefinite multitude of things and powers into kinds and classes, only by subjecting them to the reign of law, and making them the expressions of a purpose; and attains its final, highest unity, only by gathering up all these lower purposes into the harmony and unity of an all-controlling purpose, thought, idea, in which all else finds its explanation, and towards which the whole creation moves. Because of this necessity of our thought, the author makes the idea the last and highest of the logical categories; it is the category which we must apply in our attempts to reach the highest unity of knowledge."

Ulrici rejects Kant's agnosticism by affirming that the categories reveal rather than mask reality. Thus, both the lower and the higher categories correspond to objective nature. Throughout the study, Bowne repeatedly affirms his wholehearted agreement with Ulrici, both when he agrees and disagrees with Kant. Ulrici accepts Kant's doctrine of the active mind along with which goes freedom as both an implicit and explicit assumption.

What Bowne learned from Professor Ulrici's philosophy of religion, may be summed up as follows:

"Science assumes that matter is composed of atoms, but no one is able to tell us what these atoms are. They are next endowed with forces, but no one can tell us what these forces are. The relation of the atom to these forces is also a subject on which we seek in vain for information. After the atoms set to

work, they give a very unsatisfactory account of the facts. The attempt to make mechanically intelligible the simplest chemical change, is an utter failure; while the claim that all this talk of poles and powers, molecules and atoms, explains the harmony and order of the universe, is simply to mistake intolerable subjective confusion for an objective solution of the problem. In our own opinion, science has succeeded in discovering some of the laws of phenomena, and has made more clear the universal order; while its claim to have explained anything whatever, is utterly without foundation.\(^1\)

The conclusion reached is that in addition to the conditioned forces of nature we are compelled to assume a force which is immaterial, omnipotent and intelligent in order that nature may be properly co-ordinated and all its specific determinations accounted for.\(^2\) Ulrici held that "We are forced to conceive it as intelligent, self-conscious, and personal."\(^3\) This view harmonizes with theism and the divine immanence as opposed to pantheism and deism. Thus Bowne and Ulrici reject the Absolute of Hegel for an inductive procedure. Insofar as Ulrici accepted the Absolute,

"This Absolute, then, must be conceived as working according to the methods of a rational mind, as proposing ends and adapting means to their realization; that is, it must be conceived as intelligent, free, self-conscious, personal. Free because absolute; intelligent because it works intelligently; self-conscious because it has plans and aims; and personal because these notions are the root-factors of personality."\(^4\)

\(^2\) ibid., p. 647.
\(^3\) ibid., p. 654.
\(^4\) ibid., p. 645.
Ulrici proves that science must postulate God not only as free and intelligent but also as possessing an ethical nature. In discussing the relation of God to humanity and the old problem of evil and its bearing upon God's power and goodness, the vexatious question of freedom is discussed. It is to be regretted that Bowne recognized Ulrici's doctrine of freedom but that he did not analyze it. We know, however, that the latter did teach a doctrine of freedom which had not only moral but epistemological significance. In a letter dated June 11, 1882, which Ulrici wrote to Bowne after the publication of the latter's Metaphysics, he called attention to several points in which he regarded Bowne as standing closer to himself than to Lotze. First, he starts as does Bowne from the Leibnitzian idea that being consists purely in activity or power. Secondly, freedom has epistemological as well as moral significance. Thirdly, mechanical necessity is not the exclusive principle of natural occurrence, and Lotze contradicts himself when he denies that this is a vital power distinct from the mechanically active powers. Fourthly, he as well as Bowne opposes pantheism in every form and seeks to overthrow it. Ulrici concludes his letter: "Es wäre mir natürlich sehr angenehm gewesen, wenn Sie in Ihrem Werke auf diese Übereinstimmung zwischen uns gelegentlich hingewiesen hätten."

1. I am indebted to Dean A. C. Knudson of Boston University School of Theology for the information here cited from the letter which Ulrici wrote to Bowne concerning their philosophical agreement. Cf. McConnell, Bishop F. J., Borden Parker Bowne, His Life and His Philosophy, p. 37.
In the second point of agreement between himself and Bowne, Ulrici explicitly directs attention to the fact that he himself laid stress on the epistemological as well as the moral significance of freedom which is certainly sufficient evidence of the fact that Bowne found historical precedent for this notion to which he gave systematic and more or less thorough elaboration. It is also apparent that Ulrici saw the metaphysical significance of freedom as we have clearly revealed in Bowne's critical analysis of the two works from which we have summarized his conclusions.

The eminent French idealist, Charles Renouvier (1818-1903), expounds a doctrine of freedom constituting the same point of view as that defended by Bowne. Renouvier's confession of his indebtedness to his esteemed friend, Jules Lequier (1814-1862), is, in the opinion of some appraisers of his philosophical thought, an indebtedness which he greatly overestimated due to his high regard for Lequier as an original and profound thinker.\(^1\) In his classic definition of determinism he says,

"L'enchaînement universel invariable des phénomènes est l'hypothèse d'une loi de leur succession en vertu de laquelle, à un état antédérent donné des choses de toute nature dans le monde, un seul et même conséquent

\(^1\) Renouvier, Charles, Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique mure, p. 170.
peut ou a jamais pu répondre, dans toute la suite des temps; c'est celui qui se produit ou qui s'est produit en effet; en sorte que chaque phénomène, pris en particulier, est à chaque instant l'unique dont la production ait été possible dans ses circonstances, et qu'il n'y a jamais de possible en toutes choses que le nécessaire. Cette loi du devenir est le pur et parfait déterminisme.  

On the other hand he defines freedom as

"L'hypothèse opposée à ce déterminisme admet l'existence des contingents et des accidents, quelle qu'en soit la nature ou l'origine; ce sont des phénomènes à propre-ment parler possibles, non nécessaires, dont le caractère est de n'exclure leurs contradictoires qu'après l'événement, tandis que, en qualité de futurs, ils étaient indéterminés à l'être, au même titre que leurs contraires. Il existe, suivent cette hypothèse, une part d'indéterminisme dans les rapports des phénomènes successifs, et des agents naturels ont le pouvoir de produire certains actes, ou des actes différents, et des actes contraires, dans les mêmes circonstances données."  

Renouvier presents his doctrine of freedom as an explanation of principles laid down by Lequier respecting

"Le dilemme du déterminisme quant au connaître" and "Le dilemme du déterminisme quant à l'être."  

He regarded Lequier as the first to establish the nature of belief by a very novel analysis of each of the two theses, necessity and freedom. Lequier also made it apparent that knowledge in the philosophical sense of the word is wholly conditioned by the degree to which

2. ibid., pp. 126-127.
3. ibid., pp. 172-183.
one chooses between necessity and freedom and, at the same
time, it yields the option of the moral and metaphysical
dilemmas with a force of striking alternative that Renouvier
regarded to be one of the most beautiful inventions of this
order which has ever been capable of disclosing to philosophy
avenues hitherto unknown.\footnote{Renouvier, Charles, Les Dilemmes de la
Méthaphysique pure, pp. 171-172.} Both Lequier and Renouvier make
freedom the condition of knowledge and, therefore, the founda-
tion of epistemology.\footnote{ibid., p. 176. "La liberté est la condition de la
connaissance." Also Histoire et Solution des problèmes
Métaphysiques, p. 460.}

The reality of possible contraries in our deliberate
acts was applied in principle by Renouvier to show how the
problem of truth and error can find no solution in epistemology
except on the assumption of freedom. Unless the will is free
to choose or reject the evidence, the distinction between truth
and error is opaque.\footnote{Renouvier, Charles, Essais de Critique générale:
Traité de Psychologie Rationnelle d'après les Principes du
Criticisme, Vol. 11, pp. 96-97.} On the necessarian scheme of things,
both truth and error are equally effects of antecedents which
would reduce truth to believing that necessary error is truth
as well as is truth itself. The mind is in fact characterized
by an ideal search for reality which requires the power to
weigh evidence and to weed out the contradictions in thought
as well as hasty and superficial generalization. Except our
will be free, both belief and the sense of moral oughtness are
reduced to illusion. While freedom is a postulate incapable of absolute demonstration, it is nevertheless a necessary postulate of both knowledge and morality which in the nature of things may be accepted. In fact, all knowledge is practical in the sense that the will is involved in its free adoption or rejection making knowledge and morality both implications of freedom. While knowledge fundamentally rests on the will, Renouvier frankly repudiated freedom to mean caprice. Both will and intellect are responsible to each other and reasonableness is in no wise excluded by free will. The demands of the total personality constitute the criterion for the exercise of freedom.¹

The period 1886-1903 was devoted by Renouvier to the revision, restatement and development of his thought in the construction of a personalistic metaphysics. He converted his "neo-criticism" or his phenomenism which was inspired by Kant into a metaphysics. Phenomena or the metaphysical realities are products of thought or better still reality is creative thought plus the laws governing its activity. In this metaphysical doctrine, the nature of causality was raised to the level of volitional or free personality as respects the

cause of the world, the personal creator, and the finite person's direct acquaintance with himself as a free voluntary activity. He showed "Le dilemme du déterminisme quant à l'être" to consist in the conception of causality respecting its origin as two-fold. He describes universal and absolute determinism as an invariable sequence of phenomena whose series is without a beginning while contingency, accident, freedom and chance are possible where the phenomenal series is originated but where the first cause has not itself been the effect of any of the other causes preceding it in the order of time.¹

It is therefore apparent that Renouvier regarded freedom as having both epistemological and metaphysical significance. First, freedom is the condition of knowledge. Secondly, freedom is the only condition of rational explanation when we undertake to think through the problems of pure metaphysics unless we are to encounter insoluble dilemmas. Thirdly, his elevation of the category of causality from the impersonal mechanistic plane to that of personal volitional causality marks out the most productive point of view for the discussion of the problem of freedom, one which Bowne made central in his study of freedom.

¹ Renouvier, Charles, Les Dilemnes de la Métaphysique pure, pp. 177–183.
In a letter dated August 17, 1908, written to Bowne by William James (1842-1910), we have a direct statement of the relation existing between the philosophical points of view of these two men as James understood it. In evaluating Bowne's Personalism, James says,

"It seems to me that you and I are now aiming at exactly the same end, though, owing to our different past, from which each retains special verbal habits, we often express ourselves so differently. It seemed to me over and over again that you were planting your feet identically in footprints which my feet were accustomed to--quite independently, of course, of my example, which was what made the coincidences so gratifying."  

Both were opposed to absolute idealism which they considered to be a form of dogmatic abstractionism. Both undertook to reinstate a nominalistic logic providing concrete personality with an independence and individuality of its own. In their interpretation of consciousness, Bowne's position of "transcendental empiricism" which is decidedly Kantian is opposed to James' "radical empiricism" which is of course closely related to that of J. S. Mill. James explicitly affirms that he has been tremendously confirmed in his radical empiricism and emancipated by Bergson. James argues that the differences between himself and Bowne are not so essential as is the fact that their emphatic footsteps fall on the same spot.

We have elsewhere\(^1\) in this study outlined James' doctrine of freedom and noted its position in his thought as a whole and it only remains here for us to indicate that his stress upon the doctrine dealt primarily with ethical\(^2\) and cosmic freedom. He did not, even though influenced by Renouvier, stress the epistemological as well as the ethical significance of freedom. In this respect, he also differed from Bowne. Even in the case of cosmic freedom, the grounds on which James postulated it are exactly opposite those on which Bowne rested his doctrine of freedom. James argued that his theory of freedom is desirable on the ground that

"It gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to a mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever unacceptable. A friend with such a mind once told me that the thought of my universe made him sick, like the sight of the horrible motion of a mass of maggots in their carrion bed.

But while I freely admit that the pluralism and the restlessness are repugnant and irrational in a certain way, I find that every alternative to them is irrational in a deeper way. The indeterminism with its maggots, if you please to speak so about it, offends only the native absolutism of my intellect,—an absolutism which, after all, perhaps, deserves to be smubbed and kept in check."\(^3\)

On the other hand, Bowne argues that free intelligence is the only solution to the demand for unity. He argues that a

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1. In the Introduction.
3. ibid., p. 177.
fundamental pluralism is "altogether abominable" and that the fundamental demands for monism can only be gratified by free intelligence. On the basis of freedom a concrete unity can be discovered. "Reason, indeed, calls loudly for unity but it has no means of integrating a plurality into a true unity or of differentiating a unitary necessity into a plurality. Here is another deadlock for the speculative reason, and the only way out of it lies in the notion of free intelligence." It would then appear that, while there is much in common in the philosophical demand for freedom from the ethical and cosmical point of view of its significance as taught by James and Bowne, the doctrines were worked out very largely independently. And as has already been indicated, Bowne attached an epistemological significance to freedom which James did not seem to have found necessary to his understanding of the problem of knowledge.

After examining the available data, it appears that Bowne was very little influenced by the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859– ) relative to his teaching about freedom, however much there may be in common otherwise between Bergson and personal idealism. Light is thrown indirectly on this matter in a letter which Bowne wrote to Professor G. M. Duncan of Yale University.

2. Flewelling, R. T., Bergson and Personal Idealism.
3. McConnell, Bishop F. J., Borden Parker Bowne, His Life and His Philosophy, pp. 277-278. Prof. J.C.Wilson's letter serves also to define Bowne's relation to Bergson.
"I meant to mention to you a work which you may have seen and which I think will prove to be interesting. It is by Bergson and has the title L'Evolution Créatrice. I have not come upon it myself as yet, but I have seen notices of it, especially one by Father Tyrrell, the Modernist who has been banned by the Roman Church. It seems that Bergson in this book sets forth very strongly the complete failure of the mechanical doctrine of evolution and on essentially the same grounds which are familiar to us, namely, that logical equivalence of cause and effect in the impersonal scheme reduces every such scheme to mere tautology and endless regress. How much he makes out of the creative idea or how he conceives it, I do not know. Of course nothing can be done with it except on the plane of personality, but in any case it is progress to have the mechanical idea shown in its logical emptiness."^1

Freedom for Bergson is the point where psychology and metaphysics intersect and the doctrine of freedom which ensues constitutes one of the central achievements of his philosophy.

It is freedom through which we come to know the meaning of very being and in it converge the main lines of Bergsonian research. In telling what we mean by freedom, Bergson denies that psychological freedom is an appearance, it is a reality grasped by intuition, a reality which can only be verified, not constructed. "We are free when our acts proceed from our entire personality, when they express it, when they exhibit that indefinable resemblance to it which we find occasionally between the artist and his work."^2 On this view, action depends

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upon the individual and is insofar free. Freedom is rare in personality and is never achieved by many persons. It exists in degrees and is constituted in our capacity for the inner life which is capable of exercising it. Bergson establishes negatively his proof for freedom by showing that mechanism is not demonstrated but is rather a hypothesis awaiting demonstration. Nor is the hypothesis self-sufficient. "With man consciousness breaks the chain. In man and in man only it obtains its freedom."¹

Bergson develops his conception of freedom intermediate between what has been called by philosophers moral freedom and free will. By free will he does not mean the power of contrary choice since this in his opinion involves grave error with respect to the nature of time for it is in duration that we are free and not in spacialized time which many determinists erroneously suppose when the conception of freedom is being discussed. "Liberty, such as I understand it, is situated between these two terms, but not at equal distance from both. If I were obliged to blend it with one of the two I should select 'free-will.'"² Nevertheless, Bergson argues that personal life as a creative process is not wholly determined by the deeds of the past so that, in the moment of the present, the self may become the sole condition

¹ Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, p. 264.
of the future. But while Bergson grants indeterminism and therefore novelty in consciousness as a part of his evolutionary theory, he conceives the *élan vital* as a process where self-consciousness has been *very* partially achieved. This half-blind and capricious indeterminism is not by any means Bowne's notion of personal autonomy which is conditioned by freedom. Bowne therefore differs fundamentally from Bergson at two points in that he first insists upon freedom as the power of deliberative choice between alternatives and further that it implies autonomy or self-direction and self-control even though such powers be strictly limited.

In view of Bowne's teaching about freedom, he would have agreed with Bergson's teleological and free universe as opposed to all forms of dysteleology and determinism. But he would doubtlessly have considered Bergson's notion of freedom as standing in need of supplementation and extension. The prophetic words which he wrote concerning Bergson's *L'Évolution Créatrice* to the effect that nothing can be made out of the notion until it is elevated to the personal plane is just what is required to elevate Bergson's freedom to the meaning which Bowne gave the notion. And it is precisely here in the fact that there is this difference between their teachings that we

\[1\] This point of view is developed in Henri Bergson's *Time and Free Will*. 
discern wherein Bowne's personal free intelligence goes beyond the freedom advocated by Bergson. It is very probable, from the study of Bowne's writings, that he made no special study of Bergson and that such agreement as does exist between their views on freedom grows out of a common philosophical inheritance developed into a quite independent teaching on the part of each. Attention should be directed to a fundamental difference in their views about freedom with respect to time. M. Bergson protests that

"since free-will, in the usual meaning of the term implies the equal possibility of two contraries, and on my theory we cannot formulate, or even conceive in this case the thesis of the equal possibilities of the two contraries, without falling into grave error about the nature of time."¹

Bowne, on the other hand, argues that the question of freedom has been very much misunderstood by most speculators who have discussed it "from the standpoint of the reality of time."² He felt that the "great time-phantom" served merely to mislead and confuse the whole matter of freedom since, of course, the discussion is naturally carried on upon the impersonal plane. There is every possibility that Bowne may have been acquainted with M. Bergson's metaphysics of time and his objection to freedom on the ground of his inability to think through the categories of time and freedom. If the reference in Bowne's

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Personalism just cited does include a criticism of Bergsonian freedom, it throws light upon the relative merits of their views.

In bringing to a close a survey of Bowne's relation to modern philosophical thought with special reference to his doctrine of freedom, we may summarize briefly our results.

"Bowne's relation to previous thinkers in the history of modern philosophy is not a matter of doubt to anyone conversant with the course of nineteenth century speculation. He belongs to that large school of thinkers broadly classed together under the head of post-Kantian idealism. Leibnitz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Herbart, Green, Lotze—these names suggest the philosophic tradition to whose influence he owes the main direction of his own thought. Although as said, he set small store by the merely historical study of philosophy, and made scanty reference to other philosophers in his own writings, he has himself clearly indicated his historical affiliations. . . ."1

While there is much to commend the truth of this statement in the result which our study has revealed, it needs to be supplemented and extended. Our study has shown that the names Hermann Ulrici and Charles Renouvier ought to be added to this list especially with respect to Bowne's doctrine of the epistemological significance of freedom. If we permit Bowne to speak for himself on the question of the historical affiliation of his thought, he says

"It is hard to classify me with accuracy. I am a theistic idealist, a Personalist, a transcendental

empiricist, an idealistic realist, and a realistic idealist; but all these phrases need to be interpreted. They cannot well be made out from the dictionary. Neither can I well be called a disciple of anyone. I largely agree with Lotze, but I transcend him. I hold half of Kant's system, but sharply dissent from the rest. There is a strong smack of Berkeley's philosophy, with a complete rejection of his theory of knowledge. I am a Personalist, the first of the clan in any thorough-going sense.\(^1\)

The whole matter is well summed up in the words of one of Bowne's able students.

"That Bowne owed much to those who had gone before him should be gladly conceded. No one would have been more ready to acknowledge the debt than Bowne himself. He received much undoubtedly from Lotze, though he was never the faint shadow of Lotze that some would make him. Lotze was weak in his metaphysics and in his metaphysics Bowne was strong. Lotze's system lacked grounding and Bowne was conscious of the fundamental nature of this lack. This may have led him to incur the charge of ingratitude toward Lotze. To suffer the misunderstanding was certainly more noble than to point to fatal discrepancies in one to whom he felt so deep a debt of obligation. Bowne's debt to Kant and others can be acknowledged without in any way invalidating his independence."\(^2\)

While Bowne drew heavily upon the philosophical resources of modern thought, he made these materials thoroughly his own and employed them to rethink and to solve the problems of thought in a way that justifies the claim to both originality and clearness and not the least of Bowne's philosophical gifts is clearness.


With this purview of the doctrine of freedom in its historical orientation clearly before us, we may advance to Bowne's doctrine of the speculative significance of freedom. It is well to begin with his conception of the nature of freedom. This requires a careful examination of the various definitions formulated by Bowne throughout his writings. In the first edition of the Metaphysics, he says "Now by freedom is meant, not a power of acting without or apart from motives, but simply a power of choosing an end or law, and governing one's self accordingly."¹ In the Introduction to Psychological Theory, Bowne says in discussing volition,

"In short, we may sum the conception of will as it exists for spontaneous thought before any theories have been formed about it in the notion of a power of self-control. The will is the power which the soul has of controlling itself within certain limits, and a volition is an act of such control. Within these limits the soul can elicit or guide, intensify or repress, its activities, according to a preconceived rule, or for the realization of a preconceived end."²

In the same work, he further defines freedom as follows: "The conception of freedom in spontaneous thought always involves the thought of a possible alternative. This view has the ad-
vantage of being intelligible and valuable.\(^1\) Freedom is thought of as "self-determination"\(^2\) and, again, freedom is developed in conjunction with causality. "The law of causation says simply, For every event seek a cause. In this sense a free act has a cause as much as any other. Its cause is the free spirit."\(^3\) In an article devoted entirely to the problem of freedom, Bowne's opening words are as follows:

"By freedom I mean the power of self-control and self-direction in an intelligent being. More specifically, it is the power to form plans, purposes, ideals and to work for their realization. Or it is the power to choose between competing or conflicting possibilities and to realize the one chosen. Wherever this power is present we call the agent free. To unsophisticated thought men are manifestly free in this sense. Their freedom is, indeed, not unlimited and lawless, for it exists only on the basis of fixity provided by human nature and the nature of things. But, within the limits set by our constitution and the physical environment, men have a power of self-direction. They are able to form plans, purposes, ideals and to devote themselves to their realization. Moreover, this power seems to be involved in the very thought of a personal and rational life."\(^4\)

Elsewhere in the same article, we read "Now, it is clear that freedom, which I defined as the power of self-direction in an intelligent being, is not to be taken to mean absolute and lawless arbitrariness. . . . Freedom, except on a basis of uniformity and fixity, is valueless and fatal to rationality."\(^5\)

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In the revised edition of the *Metaphysics*, we have the following definition:

"By freedom in our human life we mean the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to work for their realization. We do not mean an abstract freedom existing by itself, but this power of self-direction in living men and women. Abstract freedom exists as little as abstract necessity. Actual freedom is realized only as one aspect of actual life; and it must always be discussed in its concrete significance."

In relation to the category of causality, Bowne says "By definition, a free act is an absolute beginning, and as such is not represented by anything before its occurrence. We trace it to a specific volition, and beyond that it has neither existence nor representation." Elsewhere in the same work, we read "We find also a certain element of self-determination, and this is our idea of freedom." 

In calling attention to the fundamental characteristics of Bowne's definition of freedom, we point out as a prior task, three controversial aspects of the nature of freedom as he defined it. The first is largely a misunderstanding due to the use of language rather than to fundamental difference of opinion. The soft determinists and certain libertarians strenuously object to the use of "self-determination", a term hit upon by Bowne to precisely convey the idea of freedom. Professor Palmer regarded

the liberty of self-determination to be largely fictitious on the ground that freedom means more than "unimpeded internal constitution." It is not absence of alien influence merely or a question of whether causation "comes from within or without, but what is its character and whether it expresses a closed past or an open future." Kant showed that self-determination can never be an adequate statement of freedom which is something more than this. Bowne answered this objection by declaring that those who attempt to include necessity in their definition certainly do obscure the issue and deny freedom. It is obvious that he himself never intended that self-determination, the power of self-control and self-direction in an intelligent being, should be so construed as to imply determinism although his definition may be too narrow and even ambiguous at this point. Fortunately Bowne has left himself unmistakably clear with respect to what he meant by freedom even though linguistic expression might prove to be confusing.

"Many attempts have been made to define freedom so as to include necessity. Thus, that is free which is not coerced or impelled from without; or that is free which unfolds without hindrance its own nature. At the same time this freedom may be absolutely determined by some internal necessity. But when this inner necessity is extended to the entire activity, we have nothing of freedom left but the name; and it would tend to clearness if this were dropped."

2. ibid., p. 191.
A further preliminary consideration hinges upon what Bowne included in his definition of freedom. He insisted that freedom is not only "the power to choose between competing or conflicting possibilities"¹ but he further insisted that it include the power "to realize the one chosen."² This additional demand would mean that freedom implies the power to realize one's chosen plans, purposes and ideals as well as the power to choose them.³ Either this constitutes looseness in Bowne's use of language or a structural defect in his definition since the power to work for the realization of a freely chosen procedure is certainly not the same as the power to realize the one chosen and he insisted upon both of these points in his definition. Freedom does not seem reasonably to demand that we be not only free to choose but also to realize the choice. Our human experience literally teems with choices to which heredity and environment deny fulfillment. There is not the least reason why the will cannot exercise choice and continue to will a choice in circumstances which render the achievement of the choice forever impossible. The definition, therefore, is too inclusive in that it loads the notion of freedom more heavily than the facts warrant even

³ ibid., p. 681.
from the point of view of a synoptic consideration of Bowne's teaching on the subject of freedom.

A third objection to Bowne's definition of freedom pertains to the inadequate way in which freedom is related to the self. True enough, he argues

"If anything is free it is not the will, but the knowing and feeling soul; and this soul determines itself, not in the dark of ignorance or in the indifference of emotionless and valueless life, but in the light of knowledge and with experience of life's values." ¹

The thing which we find lacking in this deliverance and which, to our way of thinking, guarantees the one unique condition under which the self attains to freedom, is when it functions as an organic whole not unambiguously determined by the past, or by the present environment. The truth about freedom is probably best discovered through the synoptic use of the reason rather than through its scientific or analytic employment. Bowne's own philosophy travelled in the direction of hostility toward the analytic method of studying consciousness and toward the organicity of function which exercises freedom as one of its fundamental characteristics when the self is an integrated whole. Although Bowne implicitly assumed synoptic methodology and coherence in expounding the

problems of philosophy, he did not explicitly show in his 
doctrine of freedom how freedom can be discovered and achieved 
only as an attribute of personality functioning as an organic 
whole. There is nothing in his teaching, however, to prevent 
such a conclusion and, if anyone chooses to perfect the argu-
ment, it only strengthens his philosophy. 1

Apart from the controversial aspects of Bowne's 
definition of freedom the correction of which by no means 
requires a fundamental reconstruction of his point of view, 
he has made a positive contribution to the nature of freedom 
through his careful analysis of it. This is first seen in 
the inductive character of his definitions. Throughout the 
study of freedom, he was careful to discriminate between the 
value of the results which were purely formal in character and 
the value of the results of his study which were practical 
in character. He always emphasized the empirical element. 
"We shall always have to resort to experience to learn both 
the purposes of the system and the method of their realization." 2
One of the most outstanding contentions of Bowne's definitions 
of freedom consisted in its limitation to a rational agent.

1. Brightman, E. S., An Introduction to Philosophy, 
pp. 22-25, 27-29, 140-142. Also "Personalistic Method in Philos-
ophy," Methodist Review, 103 (1920), pp. 368-380. The philosophical 
contribution of Professor Brightman to Personalistic Idealism 
constitutes one of the most significant extensions of this point 
of view since Bowne's death.

2. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics: a Study in First 
Principles, p. 172.
"It may still occur to us that the affirmation of intelligence is compatible with automatism; and hence it becomes necessary to point out that intelligence and the belief in freedom stand or fall together."¹ And elsewhere he insists that "Proper rationality is possible only to freedom; . . . ."² Throughout Bowne's philosophical writings the relation between freedom and intelligence is expounded from every point of view in order to convey with unmistakable clearness a fact which to him appeared to be of the greatest significance. It seemed to him that freedom was involved "in the very thought of a personal and rational life."³ It is of the greatest importance to point out that Bowne also felt a close relationship between freedom and the category of purpose. Purpose he regarded as the final and highest category which would be impossible in its most significant implications on any other assumption than that of freedom.⁴ He also stressed freedom as a condition of our ability to choose and work for the realization of ideals.⁵ More than this, his definitions signify the originating and creative aspect of freedom which is of great importance to the doctrine

2. Bowne, B. P., Theism, pp. 125, 126, 197, 212.
of progress, a development which in recent philosophy has become identified with creative and emergent evolution.\(^1\)

Again, his definitions of freedom are conservative in pointing out that human freedom is "not unlimited and lawless, for it exists only on the basis of fixity provided by human nature and the nature of things."\(^2\) Freedom is related to the notion of causal uniformity rather than to tychism or any form of capriciousness, arbitrariness or any other view that would tend to introduce the notion of chaos and thereby set the world adrift.\(^3\) It is important also to note that he stresses freedom of the will as limited to the power of contrary choice or choice between possible alternatives\(^4\) but interprets the will as a function of the entire personality described as the soul.

It remains to point out that, however satisfactory may be the analysis of the nature of freedom on the part of a philosopher, this part of his work is entirely independent of the question as to whether any such thing as freedom really

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4. ibid., p. 223.
exists. Agreement upon what we mean by the concept of freedom is no proof of its reality. The reality of freedom therefore remains as a problem still to be considered. We are therefore required to examine Bowne's method of investigating the problem of freedom for the two-fold purpose of better understanding his final conclusions and of evaluating the grounds for affirming the reality of freedom.

Bowne's method of investigating the problem of freedom is instructive. In the first place he stressed the necessity for an empirico-inductive approach to the study. For him, freedom is not a postulate from which universal the concrete facts of human experience are deduced. He rather developed his argument by reading freedom as a universal out of particular facts admitted by all. Given the facts of experience, an interpretation is necessary before they have meaning. The method is to show that the only hypothesis available to rationalize these facts is freedom. Thus, freedom, instead of being viewed as an intuition or as a proposition based upon a direct appeal to consciousness, becomes a deduced necessity to be sure but it is an inference from the facts of experience resting upon its coherence as an explanation of an area of personality which remains unintelligible on any other hypothesis. This does not change the fact in the least that if freedom is the fact about human life we will never experience it any more profoundly than we actually do. "The argument,
then, must be somewhat apagogical, that is, it must consist, not so much in direct appeal to consciousness, as in showing that freedom is involved in facts which all admit. ¹ Nowhere does Bowne's transcendental empiricism exhibit itself more clearly than at this point, where he refuses to try to explain the explanation. Into how freedom is made or how it is possible, Bowne does not pretend to probe. It was a fundamental contention of his that it is not incumbent upon the philosopher to tell how reality is made but to interpret reality reasonably within the grasp of finite intelligence. At no point does Bowne reveal himself more of a Herbartian than at this point.

The purpose is, then, not to demonstrate a theorem but to solve a problem. "For all that we can absolutely prove to the contrary, there may be no such thing as freedom."² But when it comes to choosing between the world as a chaos and the world as a cosmos, a case can pretty clearly be made out to demonstrate reasonably that chaos, contrary to the opinion of those who hold it for the very opposite reason, is the only logical conclusion of determinism. If the facts of experience can be more reasonably and intelligibly explained by assuming freedom to be true, then freedom may be held as the solution

³ Gunn, J. A., Modern French Philosophy, p. 142. "From a strictly demonstrative point of view Renouvier thinks it is impossible to prove freedom as a fact."
of the problem. "We may not view it as absolutely proved; yet it is certainly a necessary postulate of reason and conscience and as such we hold it." Freedom, therefore, is a necessary postulate of rational existence whose origin as a problem of creation lies beyond our scope of inquiry but as an idea of reason required to regulate and fill out our notion of the world as a whole is indispensable. The procedure of the study of freedom, therefore, consists in an examination of the pertinent and patent facts of experience which pertain to conscious life for whose interpretation freedom would appear an unconditioned presupposition.

This now requires us to point out what Bowne included under the speculative significance of freedom. It is primarily a study of the epistemological significance of freedom. Bowne's formulation of the problem is as follows. "I am persuaded, therefore that one wishing to find his way into the problem of freedom will do well to consider, first of all, the question of freedom in intelligence itself and the collapse of rationality involved in the system of necessity." Nevertheless, Bowne

admitted that, if one were looking for the most important field of freedom, he should certainly find it in the moral realm. But recognizing this fact he nevertheless insisted that "if we were seeking the purest illustration of freedom we should find it in the operation of pure thought." The doctrine of the speculative significance of freedom shifts the venue of the problem from ethics to a study of freedom from the point of view of its implications for the rational life and in so doing Bowne insisted that certain advantages are made apparent over the traditional treatment which historically attaches itself to discussions of ethical freedom. The first advantage of the study of freedom in connection with reason is to be found in the avoidance of the tangle of discussion concerning motives in the determination of the will. Secondly, it calls attention to freedom and its significance for the inner thought life rather than associating it with executive activities in the outer world. Thirdly, freedom in thought is practically admitted by everyone and, therefore, escapes much of the ambiguity which attaches to it in historical ethics. Finally, it is implied in the nature of debate and argumentation where its significance can be made apparent.

2. ibid., p. 687. Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 227.
3. ibid., p. 686.
4. ibid., p. 686.
5. ibid., p. 686.
6. ibid., p. 687.
With these advantages in mind, it becomes apparent that a unique approach is designed for a restudy of the nature of freedom in a field where the facts are less likely to be confused with old theories of their interpretation so often themselves mistaken for facts.

The scope of application of the speculative significance of freedom wherein the doctrine has permanent significance is two-fold. The first movement of Bowne's thought is in the direction of the microcosmic aspect of freedom. The second movement of his thought is embodied in the macrocosmic aspect.

"In considering the possibilities of rational knowledge, two points have to be considered, (1) the nature of the fundamental being, and (2) the nature of the finite knower. Our conclusion is that we must view both as free and intelligent."¹ An understanding of the notion of freedom from the point of view of the finite subject requires a knowledge of Bowne's doctrine of the self. This understood, the epistemological argument for freedom becomes intelligible. The main argument consists in showing that the denial of freedom involves the collapse of reason. And since this is true, freedom becomes the analytically necessary precondition of any and all rational science whatsoever.²

The theoretical or scientific interest is a function of rationality

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¹ Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics: a Study in First Principles, p. 172.
² ibid., pp. 171-172.
conditioned by the possibility of freedom. But the theoretical or scientific interest does not exhaust the speculative implication of freedom. There is the ethical or practical interest where freedom has the greatest significance for life itself.

"The great time-phantom has lent its misleading suggestions further to confuse the matter, and so it has come to be an accepted dogma with many that freedom itself is a considerable affront to reason, so much so that the pure reason left to itself is always deterministic; and belief in freedom, if held at all, is maintained only for moral or sentimental reasons. This, however, is a fundamental misconception, as we have seen and shall further see. Freedom itself has the deepest speculative significance for reason and science, as well as for morals and religion." 1

There is no more profound and clear statement of Bowne's contention throughout his writings than this brief outline statement in which he has expressed his conviction of the deep speculative significance of freedom.

The macrocosmic aspect of freedom Bowne considered of equal importance. The speculative demand for freedom in his writings as a basic postulate not only of all scientific knowledge but likewise of all philosophic knowledge is stressed time and time again.

"The speculative significance of theism and of freedom has been especially emphasized in these pages. Of late years, the impression has widely prevailed that the belief in God and freedom exists only by suffrane, so that if logic were allowed to have its way, this belief would soon be beyond the reach of hope and mercy.

Not sharing this conviction, although it is said to have the fullest endorsement of the spirit of the times, I have rather sought to show that the truth of this belief is a matter of life and death to all philosophy and rational science. This has been done, however, from a purely speculative interest, and not with reference to the ethical and religious bearings of the question. These must be considered by themselves.

Bowne insisted that the possibility of rational knowledge requires us to affirm the nature of fundamental being as free and intelligent. It is a unique stress of his that freedom and intelligence rise and fall together, a fact of tremendous importance for his metaphysics in its macrocosmic implications. Bowne, therefore, contends that philosophy as well as science is impossible where freedom is denied. Freedom is, therefore, a speculative demand of reason.

Even though Bowne insisted upon the necessity of a purely speculative investigation of the bearing of freedom upon reason and philosophy, he by no means excluded from the general doctrine of the speculative significance of freedom the ethical and religious bearings of the question. We therefore call attention to the significance of freedom for theology or the satisfaction of the religious interest in behalf of which Bowne speaks eloquently.

"But while speculative discussions must not be confused by irrelevant practical issues, I may add, even at the risk of another disagreement with the spirit of the times, that neither reflection nor observation enables me to regard an indifference to moral and religious

interests as the supreme proof of mental power or even of philosophic impartiality. 'Gallio cared for none of those things,' and was not the most just of judges after all."^1

The problem of religion insofar as its problems are thought through is implicated in freedom which we shall later show.

The scope of freedom, then, includes both a micro-cosmic and a macrocosmic aspect and is affirmed to be basal to both epistemology and metaphysics. In fact, Bowne's doctrine of the speculative significance of freedom consists in showing that rational ideals are impossible without freedom. Our cognitive, moral, religious, philosophical and scientific ideals all depend upon it and cannot be realized apart from it. In view of the field of freedom in relation to human problems as herein set forth, we are now prepared to enter into an analysis of Bowne's doctrine. The study must hinge about the nature of the self which must first detain us for a short examination.

The self is a central doctrine in Bowne's philosophy, so much so that he called his system Personalism.2 He made personality the key to reality since it constitutes the solution of all the other difficult problems of philosophy. It is itself a mystery but one which throws light upon all others

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1. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics; a Study in First Principles, Preface viii.
2. Bowne, B. P., "A≠A", The Independent, 41 (1899), p. 788. Personality is defined as "self-hood, self-knowledge and self-control and, this is the only sense of personality that any theist would care to maintain."
and therefore constitutes bed-rock in philosophical thinking and the master-light of all our philosophical seeing. He defended the self as ultimate reality on the one hand against materialism and all forms of empiricism which denied its proper unity and identity, and on the other hand he defended it against all forms of impersonal absolutism which ended in the denial of the integrity and proper individuality of the self. The fundamental problems of his psychology, logic, epistemology and metaphysics all find their solution through the principle of personality. This is the teaching of his transcendental empiricism that we have a knowledge of the existence of the self which is deeper than the mind's categories and explains them rather than being explained by them.

In his psychology, Bowne ably refutes the empiricism of the associationalists. As opposed to the sensational school which reduces all mental movement to an occurrence in the mind and affirms that the mental life can be reduced to physiological processes and that all ideas are deducible from the empirical data of the sensibility, he leans toward the rational school which denies that our entire thought activity is reducible to sense experience and insists upon an independent mental life which conditions all articulate experience, finding the origin of certain of our ideas existing in the mind as immanent laws or constitutive principles prior to all experience although experience is the condition of their activity.¹ The burden

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¹ Bowne, E. P., Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 115-117.
of the teaching of Bowne's psychology is the defense of consciousness as it embodies the mental life as a sui generis term. It is neither definable nor deducible. It cannot be resolved into anything else and the reality of the mental life as an independent order of existence is to be recognized as over against the physical order of existence. The self and its conscious life represent both mechanism and freedom. The mechanisms of consciousness are spontaneous and automatic while another aspect is reflective and volitional, thus a part of our mental life proceeds by the laws of psychological necessity and is insofar passive while another part is active and proceeds on the self-conscious plane of self-directing volition and freedom.

The principle of self-hood and the independent character of the mental life is not only conserved in Bowne's psychology but becomes thoroughly explicit in his analysis of our thought life as set forth in his logic. The most important truth taught in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge is Kant's classic doctrine of the constitutive activity of the mind. Bowne greatly extended this doctrine which Kant had concluded by way of a criticism of British empiricism and continental rationalism. Kant had shown, as opposed to Hume's

sensationalism on the one hand and the barren formalism of rationalism as developed by Leibnitz's disciples on the other, that "Experience is possible only through a certain constitutive mental activity, according to principles immanent in the understanding."¹ Bowne considered this contribution of Kant his greatest gift to philosophy which remains triumphant against all hostile criticism as an enduring possession of reflective thought.² In answer to the question, How is experience possible?, Bowne accepted Kant's theory that the raw materials of the sensibility which are nothing intelligible of themselves can be built into a rational world of experience and knowledge only through the ordering and interpreting function of the mind itself.³ Therefore, Bowne shows that the conditions of thought must imply the unity and identity of the thinking self. The unity of the self conditions the subjective or psychological aspect of thought while the law of identity constitutes its logical aspect. Thus the unity and identity of the self are involved in thought which means that the self is the analytically necessary pre-condition of any and all experience whatsoever.⁴ Apart from it, judging is impossible so that, in the last analysis, neither psychology

¹ Bowne, B. P., Personalism, p. 55. Kant and Spencer, pp. 10-17.
² Bowne, B. P., Studies in Theism, pp. 120-121.
⁴ Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 22.
nor logic can dispense with this unifying abiding self. Thought and knowledge consist in judging but, apart from the unity and identity of the self, judging is impossible. It is the unpicturable and sensuously non-presentable self which provides consciousness of states as opposed to mere states of consciousness and furnishes the conditions of embracing the subject and predicate of every proposition into a union otherwise impossible.¹

In his epistemology, Bowne discovers the nature of knowledge to be involved in a necessary dualism so far as finite knowing is concerned. Throughout the argument, the knowing mind is defended as an independent order of reality as opposed to all forms of monism which tend on the one hand to eradicate finite personality and, on the other, to destroy the extra-mental order of reality.

"The argument from epistemology is essentially this: that nothing whatever can be known except mind and its products, and hence that if mind is knowable by us it must be essentially a rational work, the expression of thought which in turn presupposes a thinker at the other end."² But if it be true and, it is as a matter of fact, that Bowne defended psycholog-

¹ Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 23.
ical freedom\(^1\) and that in his logic he made freedom the condition of the solution of both the problem of thought\(^2\) and that of error,\(^3\) when we come to the problem of knowledge as he interpreted it, he made freedom the one condition of its possibility.\(^4\) It therefore appears that the self becomes the central doctrine of Bowne's personalism and one of its most fundamental attributes is its freedom.

In his metaphysics, Bowne accepted the Leibnitzian doctrine of reality as dynamic and active. He finds personality the one thing which fulfills the requirements for true causal agency. He thus affirms the reality and substantiality of the self since personality alone meets the requirements of reality. The reality of the self consists in the power to act, to think and to feel and is insofar given to us immediately in experience. Its identity consists in its power of intelligence. But here again it is not only the self as an agent with the power to act but it is rather the self as an intelligent free agent that constitutes personality the only solution of the metaphysical problems of change and identity, unity and plurality, space and time, as well as causality and explanation.\(^5\) Only personal

3. *ibid.*, pp. 239-244.
freedom will suffice to solve the problems of thought and explain reality. In order to summarize Bowne's doctrine of self in this connection, we call attention to the analysis of Bishop McConnell.

"In the fifteen years in which I knew Dr. Bowne I heard him talk his way through from objective idealism to personalism. It will be remembered that when Bowne first published his Metaphysics he was an idealist of the type of his old friend and teacher, Hermann Lotze. The idealism was from the first of the objective type rather than of the subjective, or Berkeleyan type, though Bowne of course had unmitigated contempt for crass criticism of Berkeley... Bowne's idealism was directed at an explanation of the reality of the external world—not a denial of that reality—an idealism which maintained that only the active could be real, and that only a spiritual agent could be active. There could be no lump stuff existing in itself and by its own right. The only reals are selves.

"From that idealism Bowne advanced more and more to emphasis on the supremacy of the self, or of selves—finite selves and God. Not only did he seek to free the self from bondage to any inert stuff. He also sought to free it from anything impersonal—like categories, or natures, or laws. That is to say, he sought to make a spiritual agent, or rather, The Spiritual Agent, the fundamental reality back of categories and laws. This view Bowne called transcendental empiricism, the empiricism which seeks for truth in the movement of a spiritual agent working through categories, rather than the lower empiricism which too often gets things reversed and misses the self in the study of assumedly self-existent laws. He talked the whole problem out to me as he found his way along, and one day in the summer of 1905, I think it was, he told me that he was going to change the name of his system from objective idealism to personalism. I remarked that I feared that would minimize the idealistic feature, and asked why he did..."
not call it personal idealism. He replied that he wanted the emphasis kept unmistakably on the personal element."

But the self of which Bowne spoke combines freedom and intelligence in such a way that freedom becomes the regulative idea in personality. This fact is adequately recognized in the definition of personalism given by Dean A. C. Knudson who says, personalism is

"that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience and which finds in the conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality the key to the nature of reality and the solution of the ultimate problems of philosophy."

In stating Bowne's theory of the self we have not assumed that an argument has been given for freedom but have merely called attention to the fact that freedom as postulated by Bowne can neither be understood nor appreciated if studied out of connection with the self. Whoever would understand Bowne's doctrine of freedom must be content to study it in connection with the self for on the impersonal plane where freedom and intelligence are divorced there can

1. McConnell, Bishop F. J., "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 105 (1922), p. 342. Charles Renouvier published his Le Personalisme, 1902, a work which Bowne had in his library and which may have influenced Bowne to call his system personalism since Renouvier's work contains an idealistic metaphysics similar to the Leibnitzian monadology stressing the two characteristic features, pluralism and personalism.

2. Knudson, Dean A. C., The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 87.
be no such thing as freedom as he expounds the concept. From this vantage point, we enter more intelligently into the analysis of his teaching about freedom.

The relation of freedom and reason constitutes the starting point for Bowne's investigation of the problem of freedom. He formulated his thesis by pointing out that

"in the field of thought proper everyone, in spite of himself, assumes that reason is a self-controlling force. Freedom of thought cannot be rationally disputed without assuming it. . . . . Here we have a self-directing activity, which proceeds according to laws inherent in itself and to ideals generated by itself."¹

Bowne defined thought as "that form of mental activity whose aim is truth or knowledge."² By knowledge, Bowne meant

"the certainty that our conceptions correspond to reality or to truth. By reality, we mean any matter of fact, whether of the outer or inner world. By truth, we mean rational principles. By certainty, it is plain that we cannot mean any thoughtless assurance, but only that which results from the necessity of the admission."³

It can now be shown that in the processes of reasoning there can be no proper distinction made between truth and error if freedom is denied. The argument has, first, a negative character but permits, in the second place, of a positive

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character so that it is strengthened by the fact that it takes both the defensive and the offensive form.

Negatively stated, the argument for freedom takes its point of departure from the problem created by the dilemma of determinism. This dilemma arises in connection with the problem of error. It is perfectly obvious that rationality requires the essential trustworthiness of our rational faculties or the essential trustworthiness of reason. Notwithstanding this postulate, it is a patent fact that a large part of human thought and belief finds itself involved in error. The antinomy which emerges turns about the possibility of reconciling the fact of error in finite thought with the necessary faith in the reliability of reason. Proceeding negatively, we are impressed with the incompetence of the hypothesis of necessity to deal with this antinomy of thought. According to this view, universal law and necessary causation of the mechanical type invade completely the personal as well as the impersonal world. On such a scheme of things everything is equally determined and both true and false ideas are equally effects of their antecedents, in which case the distinction between truth and

error is meaningless.

"For in such a system every thought, belief, conviction, whether truth or superstition, arises with equal necessity with every other. The belief in freedom is as necessary as the belief in necessity. Theism and atheism, spiritualism and materialism, freedom and necessity, consistency and caprice are alike necessarily produced in thought. Thoughts and beliefs become effects; and to speak of true and false thoughts seems like speaking of true or false chemical action or true or false blood. On this plane of necessary effect the actual is all, and the ideal distinctions of true and false have as little meaning as they would have on the plane of mechanical forces."

Obviously there is a necessity for a standard, norm or criterion for judging between false and true ideas for we have already defined knowledge such that true thoughts correspond to reality while erroneous ones do not. But the possibility of achieving such a criterion on the necessitarian plane is hopeless. If all our thoughts, both true and false alike, are produced with equal necessity, it is hard to see in what a criterion for truth would consist for if we make necessity itself the criterion of true ideas while its opposite serves as the norm in the light of which to judge erroneous ones, we face disloyalty to the tryst we keep with mechanism which demands that all ideas are equally necessary effects. The strange situation is then encountered that the belief in freedom is just as necessary

as the belief \textit{necessity} and \textit{vice versa}. If, however, the mechanists with superabundant confidence try again by way of the psychological route affirming that true ideas are normal while false ones are abnormal, we are confronted with the same difficulty, namely, the discovery of a norm by which to judge normality. If, next, an appeal were made to \textit{consensus gentium}, the anomalous situation arises wherein it is necessary to be demonstrated that there is a fundamental connection between majorities and the notion of truth. Finally, the embarrassment is accented by life itself which, expressed in terms of the unsophisticated mind, seems to carry on by freedom which notion is far more spontaneous and universal than that of necessity.

Finally, however imperative the necessity for a standard by which to discriminate between ideas of truth and error, and however remote the chance of discovering it, granted that it were possible, the application of such a criterion for truth would, in Bowne's opinion, be impossible.

"The thought of a standard implies a power to control our thoughts, to compare them with the standard, to reserve our decision, to think twice, to go over the ground again and again, until the transparent order of reason has been reached. But on this theory there is no such power. Thoughts come and thoughts go. Some are displaced by others, not because of any superior rationality, but because the new conditions have produced new conceptions.

"Thought as thought counts for nothing. The underlying dynamic conditions determine the rational movement without being determined by it. When, in a chemical molecule, one element displaces another the new combination is not truer but stronger than the old. So when a mental grouping is broken up and displaced by another it is not a question of truth or rationality, but of change in the
underlying dynamic relations. There is, then, not only no standard of truth, but no power to use it if we had it. Thus all beliefs sink into effects, and one is as good as another as long as it lasts."

Freedom therefore enters intimately into the structure of reason itself and any denial of this fact is equivalent to the denial of the possibility of knowledge. Bowne never tired of the refutation of Herbert Spencer's nescience which grew out of Spencer's necessitarianism. The insolubility of the problem of error on every necessitarian scheme consists in the fact that error becomes cosmic in character and therefore constitutional to reality. The objection of Spencer to freedom was that science in assuming the uniformity of law compels us to deny freedom because freedom allows the possibility of a different result under like circumstances which scientific causality precisely denies. But as Bowne has established his thesis, freedom is the very condition of reason and it is a necessitarian system which destroys the possibility of science. Thus the antinomy which Spencer encountered proves to be illusory since the facts require the opposite interpretation from that to which he come. If every system of necessity destroys freedom and the admission of freedom destroys science, the antinomy becomes unmanageable, but clearly if the one

fundamental condition of science is reason, then the suicidal or self-destructive character of every conception of science which undermines that very reason which conditions its life and existence forces us to assume free reason as the only condition of science.

"There is no solution of the problem of human error except in the fact of human freedom, at least none which does not overthrow reason itself. A rational activity must be a free activity—not a lawless or capricious one, indeed, but one which directs and controls itself from within according to its own inner light and law. When this is not the case, reason sinks into a mental mechanism, for which the ideal distinctions of truth and error have neither meaning nor application. In that case error is not a human, but a cosmic fact."¹

Thus Spencer's ultimate reality, the Unknown Cause, produces truth and error alike indifferent to rational distinctions forcing us to conclude that both reason and unreason are cosmic in character. Bowne's able successor in Boston University, evaluating Bowne's work at this point, says "Bowne has pointed out more clearly than anyone else the fact that without freedom the possibility of arriving at any distinction between truth and error is blotted out."² Bowne himself felt that this matter had never been suffi-

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2. Brightman, E. S., A Philosophy of Ideals, p. 84.
ciently recognized by philosophers in general and by
necessitarians in particular. They have taken knowledge for
granted on any philosophical theory thus ignoring the obliga-
tion of every philosophical system to construct its epistemology
out of principles to which it is entitled and those only. It
was Bowne's special merit that he more clearly than anyone
else pointed out the suicidal and fatal character of philosop-
hal theories such as materialism, necessitarianism and all
related points of view which shattered confidence in reason
itself. On all such views where error is made cosmic and
necessary, skepticism inevitably follows. Such a view makes
the foibles, blunders, caprices and errors of men merely the
product of the universal unreason working itself out through
human minds. Thus every man, be he prophet or seer, philosopher
or poet, politician or religionist, savant or fool, stands
equally as a determined effect of fundamental reality. In this

1. Descartes, René, Meditations on the First
Philosophy, Meditation IV. Philosophical Classics Religion of
Science Library, No. 51, p. 69. Descartes attributed both error
and sin to the freedom of the will. "Whence, then, spring my
errors? They arise from this cause alone, that I do not restrain
the will, which is of much wider range than the understanding,
within the same limits, but extend it even to things I do not
understand, and as the will is of itself indifferent to such, it
readily falls into error and sin by choosing the false in room
of the true, and evil instead of good." Augustine, De vera
religione, pp. 33, 61; De Trinitate, xi, pp. 10, 17, also ascribed
error to the freedom of the will. Brochard, V., De l'Erreur,
(1879), p. 47. In this work this point of view is developed.
case all their ideas are alike necessary and equally important and those of the genius and the fool must have equal sanction and authorization.¹

"I know of no philosopher who has so ably and so persistently insisted upon the impossibility of basing a theory of knowledge on any necessitarian system, materialistic or pantheistic, any system, that is, that robs the finite person of essential freedom. Bowne never tires of insisting that proper rationality is possible only to free agents, persons, and that on the plane of freedom alone truth and error first acquire significance. There are passages in practically every one of his books that ought to be regarded as classical on this point. The effective use that he makes of this position is admirably illustrated in his criticism of Spencer."²

The positive side of the argument for freedom contains Bowne's own solution of the problem and his constructive statement. He starts from the postulate that "the trustworthiness of reason and the validity of knowledge are the presupposition of all science and philosophy,"³ and that "The general trustworthiness of reason presupposes that thought is a free activity based on rational insight."⁴ The constitution of reason is only partially automatically conditioned. In our rational life we find the basis of uniformity and law as well as the basis of freedom. These laws of thought and the fixed connections

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of our ideas lie beyond our power to make or unmake so that there are mechanisms in consciousness through which the reason functions analogous to the uniformities in external nature. But these uniformities of consciousness as the laws of thought and the fixed connections or association of ideas, even though they lie securely beyond our power to create or destroy, nevertheless fall into error and do not of themselves unerringly make for truth. If they did, there would be no such thing as error. It therefore appears that in addition to the fixed nature of rationality there is required, in order to correct the careless use of these mechanisms of thought, an act of ratification and self-control of the operation of thought according to an ideal of truth. This requires freedom. The power of self-control in thought implies the ability to weed out contradictions in thinking due to habit, association, prejudice and the like in view of arriving at judgments wherein objective and logical connections of thought have replaced the merely psychological laws of association. On the basis of necessitarianism and materialism, logic should be relatively insignificant yet such thinkers attempt to reflect and, insofar as they succeed, they transcend the order of necessity and not only assume but attribute freedom. Yet, who would for a moment impute to machines and mechanical forces praise for reaching truthful conclusions and demerit for grinding out erroneous ones? Manifestly a free rational life in self-possession and
acting under self-control is essential to truth.

"The attainment of truth implies the existence of a standard of truth in the mind, and the possibility of directing our rational activity accordingly. The one thing which the truth-seeker must be on his guard against is the tendency to conclude hastily. He must, then, test his facts, criticize his processes, repeat his arguments, tear asunder the misleading conjunctions of association, and reserve his assent until the crystalline and necessary conjunctions of reason are reached. When this cannot be done, there is no proper rationality, but only a psychological succession of mental states. . . . . Freedom is no less necessary to rational action than it is to moral action. Indeed, the purest illustration we have of self-determination is in the case of thinking. We direct and maintain attention, we criticize every step, and look before and after, until we reach the rational conclusion."¹

Where rationality and freedom are united, a criterion for truth is not only possible but it can be used. It is on this condition alone that truth and error acquire meaning. The mind is free to control its states and regulate its ideas. It becomes self-conscious of the part which such mechanisms as those of habit, instinct and related associations of an irrational character play and it is therefore able to interpose a demurrer in the interest of attaining logical connections in reasoning. On such a theory the finite mind may be considered a real source of error which relieves cosmic responsibility. All beliefs tested by the law of contradiction are not true,

which would argue for the fact of error, but, if the admission of error in our finite knowing means the destruction of the trustworthiness of reason, then the possibility of truth is denied. The only way out of the dilemma into which we are forced by the universal trust in reason on the one hand and the fact of error on the other lies in our appeal to freedom. On this view our faculties of reason are considered to be truthful but, through carelessness, willfulness and the refusal to accept responsibility for thinking, error may arise. We cannot explain truth and error on any other assumption than freedom because necessity, we have seen, destroys confidence in reason itself and makes knowledge impossible. But making this claim the vindication of reason herein set forth is not equivalent to saying that we can by volition or freedom exercise power to alter the truth and thereby make things true or false at will. The mechanisms of consciousness and nature lie beyond interference so that premises and conclusions logically follow and, were it not for this fact, the mind, running foul into lawlessness, would result in the collapse of reason no less certainly than it does on any necessitarian system. At this point we encounter Bowne's alleged discovery of the unity of freedom and uniformity in rationality. "And this leads to a discovery. Freedom and uniformity must be united in rationality, and neither can dispense with the other."1

This affirms that freedom is as fatal to rationality as is necessity except for the fact that in our rational life we find the uniformity of the laws of thought and the mechanical associations of ideas. With these considerations in mind, Bowne makes the arresting assertion that "Here, then, in freedom is the source of both truth and error in knowledge."¹ This conclusion we shall find occasion to examine critically when we estimate Bowne's analysis of the problem of freedom and rationality.

Bowne's allusion to the argument for freedom as revealed in the logical character of debate where the self-abnegating character of determinism becomes explicit is well worth our attention. It was his contention that "the logical character of a debate in which the point denied has to be assumed to save the discussion from becoming farcical"² argues for the necessity of freedom. For if the object be to convince a libertarian of the validity of determinism, the determinist is forced to assume the truth of the point denied in order to save the discussion from becoming ridiculous. If this can be shown, the determinist is inconsistent to argue at all for if he succeeds in his argument, he has proven freedom and not

². ibid., p. 687.
determinism. For either the libertarian is or is not free to change his mind. This truth and that of a similar kind led Bowne to the discovery that the purest illustration of freedom to be had is in the operation of pure thought. While he implied this point in connection with the logic of debate, he did not sufficiently develop it.\(^1\) In pointing out that a mechanical doctrine of mind reduces all mental activity to passive occurrence in consciousness, Bowne showed that the power of reaching any conclusion is canceled. The denial of the independent activity of the mind reduces it to a form of physical mechanism whose judgments are the resultants of antecedent mental states conceived as forces of a physical character rather than the resultants of reason. Out of mere physical mental states (however contradictory this phrase, it is nevertheless what determinism affirms) are supposed to flow logical thought while in fact we have no right to expect any one thing any more than any other since all effects are equally

\(^1\) Spaulding, E.G., *What Am I?*, pp. 33-69. Professor Spaulding has developed in a most convincing way the necessity for indeterminism or freedom as the sole condition of argumentation, showing by a more extended argument the brief analysis which we have made of Bowne's statement concerning freedom as the ground of logical argumentation. McConnell, Bishop F.J., *Is God Limited?*, pp. 115-116. Here the same argument appears. "Even those who strenuously deny freedom as strenuously call upon the rest of us to deny it, thereby assuming the force they are denying." p. 120. "Argument is out of place in a deterministic system, for all utterances stand alike on the same plane as to causality, and all talk of choosing between them is folly, whatever folly means on such basis."
determined. Obviously, reason at this point vanishes and epistemological skepticism or nescience takes possession of the field. Any theory of mind which reduces all its products to the mechanical level of effects whereby it is affirmed that all beliefs are equally authoritative while they last independent of the implications of reason destroys the distinction between truth and error. Where the mind is not free to tear asunder the mechanical conjunctions which appear as states of consciousness and reunite them according to its own logical ideal, nothing like knowledge will ever appear and reflective thinking is but a spectre of the imagination. It is just here that one of the most significant conclusions of this research emerges: freedom is a significant speculative postulate of thought which has not received in contemporary philosophical thought recognition commensurate with its importance.

The significance of freedom for knowledge which is here brought to light is of the greatest importance for education, a field into which Bowne carried it by implication rather than by explicit teaching and professional interest. In his utterance on education, he made it clear that "The materialistic psychologist has really not the slightest occasion for going out of his science; but I never knew one who was not perpetually making the most naive onslaughts on the soul or free-will." At no point does

Bowne came into stronger clash of opinion with Herbart than over this point of educational psychology which presupposes a deterministic theory of mind. It was not Bowne's aim to do more with the speculative significance of freedom than to show the principles involved in the nature of rationality itself at this point and he left it for educators who did not wish their philosophy drawn too mild to see the implication of his work for their practical programs. A hint at such application in the hands of a competent interpreter is to be found in a work like that of Professor J. A. Leighton.¹

Bowne urges with Lotzean perspective "that our freedom is far from absolute"² and in so doing secured for his teaching a modesty and scientific sanction which saves the entire point of view from collapse on the one hand and secures for it a deferential hearing on the other. While freedom may to some extent pervade all our mental functions, at the same time certain factors of the mental life lie forever beyond all interference from our volition. To the latter, Bowne referred as constitutional activities of the mind which lie beyond our power to control. He included among these the following: (1) the laws of thought, (2) the forms of experience, (3) the categories of thought, (4) the laws of association of ideas, (5) little or no direct control over

¹ Individuality and Education.  
² Bowne, E. P., Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 234.
the feelings, (6) the judgments of conscience lie outside volitional modification.

"Thus the essential nature of the susceptibilities and the constitutional activities is independent of volition. The laws of mental procedure and of mental change and combination also admit of no volitional control. Such are the interactions of thought and feeling, the laws of formal thought, and the judgments of conscience. These are forever secure from volitional modification."^1

Not only are we limited by our mental and physical constitution but in addition "by the intensity of the desires and impulses which it has to control."^2 Uniformity is therefore always allied with freedom however narrow or wide our power of freedom and this in the absolute being as well as in the finite person so that freedom in Bowne's doctrine is never to be interpreted as a synonym for caprice, lawlessness, arbitrariness and chaos. In answer to those thinkers who are intolerant of freedom, either on account of prejudice, ignorance or because of reasons however illogical, who argue that indeterminism sets the world adrift, he says

"In truth, this objection, so far as it is anything but cant, rests on confusing the abstract notion of freedom with the real freedom which we possess. If the creature's freedom were utter arbitrariness backed by infinite power, the objection would be relevant; as it is, it is only a home-made goblin. The limits of our freedom are very narrow at best. Even the order of our thoughts is largely

2. ibid., p. 234.
beyond our control. The existence and order of our feelings is still more independent. The laws of our own nature and of external nature are quite independent. The field for choice is small, and our choice consists almost entirely in deciding to do or not to do. The result is, that the great outlines of life and history are drawn by a power which we cannot control. We can originate no new and unforeseen possibilities. The law of our nature cannot be escaped. Rebellion is possible, but defeat is sure. The universe is going our way and will help us along if we choose; but he who will not be led shall certainly be dragged. Thus on every side our freedom is hedged in by massive necessities which we cannot escape.

Within these circumscribed limits accorded to freedom by Bowne, it has its scope but it is well to add here that he further insists that within these limits even freedom is not fixed and for the reason that volition crystallizes into the mechanisms of character in such a way that "the soul" may securely bind itself by its own freedom of choices which can never be rescinded. At this point both the sublime and tragic aspects of freedom appear. Here we come upon one of the strange paradoxes of personality which seems to say that the more one exercises his freedom, the more his character becomes determined, and the more determined his character becomes, the less freedom he has; and yet it is unlikely that one in a world like ours would ever exhaust all of the possibilities for free choice. If this were possible and each chosen action upon the occasion of the choice flowed immediately into an

order of law as it does taking its place in the order of
causal uniformity, it might appear that mechanism would one
day swallow all the freedom of which one were capable.
This difficulty is, however, abstract and speculative and, on
the concrete and practical demands of life, it tends to partially
if not wholly disappear.

The validity of Bowne's teaching concerning the
relation of freedom and reason has both a negative and
positive aspect. We call attention first to the points of
correction and extension required in the argument. It was
Bowne's contention that mechanism can produce no criterion
for truth.¹ This is not as self-evident as Bowne seemed to
think. There is nothing in his argument to preclude the
conceivability of a necessitarian scheme's producing a
standard for truth. The irrefutable aspect of Bowne's
argument is encountered when it is declared that a criterion
would be useless on the hypothesis of necessity if it were to
emerge. If all ideas are equally necessary effects, a crite-
raison for truth is useless. True enough the logic of necessity
does not naturally suggest the achievement of a criterion for
truth nor the need of one, yet in the nature of the concept
there is no apriori reason why the notion of a standard is

¹ Bowne, E.P., Theism, p. 126.
excluded. Further, the criterion might exist without any universal knowledge of it but our sorry plight consists in our inability to make use of it even where knowledge of it exists.

Bowne's conclusion that freedom is the source of both truth and error in knowledge is open to criticism on the ground either of ambiguity of language or of misstatement of fact.¹ In the first objection, it might be urged that some insight into truth results from such involuntary mechanisms as the subconscious. Yet our knowledge between truth so obtained and the mechanisms of the subconscious which mediate it for consciousness may be and probably, in the greatest number of cases, are mechanical products of previous volitional activity. It is certain that, if freedom is real, then on the occasion of the free choice the act which passes into the realm of sequential causation may through subconscious mechanisms assist in the attainment of truth under conditions where freedom seems to be at the time negligible. So it would appear that the involuntary mechanisms of the subconscious might conceivably account for some truth since the explanation offered is insufficient entirely to deny the affirmation of necessity. The chief difficulty with Bowne's contention that

freedom is the source of both truth and error lies in its violation of the principle which affirms that origins do not determine validity which is as true when applied to freedom as the source of truth and error as when applied elsewhere. It is not origins which determine validity. Freedom is therefore not the source of truth and error in knowledge but it is rather the only dependable or trustworthy condition of the discovery of truth and error, or the sole dependable or trustworthy means by which truth and error may be discovered. Freedom makes possible judgments of both truth and error, to be sure, yet this is quite different from considering it as the origin of truth and error. It is just at this point where the real relation of freedom to truth and error becomes clear and this consists in showing that freedom is the sole condition under which any criterion for truth can be applied after such a criterion has been discovered.

The essential correctness of Bowne's argument nevertheless remains and its significance is hard to gainsay. The insight that freedom and uniformity must be united in rationality and that neither can dispense with the other is the only productive point of view for a synoptic interpretation of experience. His claim to originality with respect to this insight where he argues that his analysis of freedom leads to a discovery\(^1\) raises

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a question. This idea was certainly an explicit part of Kant's discussion of freedom in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* and it certainly is explicitly formulated as a part of Lotze's analysis of the concept of freedom as has previously been established in this study. The value of this method of formulating the case for freedom is that it provides for indisputable facts of experience which call for explanation but provides in the explanation against tychism or any form of absolute freedom on the one hand and it provides equally against the notion of universal necessitarianism on the other.

Again, the thesis that proper rationality is possible only to freedom\(^1\) is given the equivalent of a logical demonstration which, though it will not carry the conviction of absolute demonstration to all minds, certainly approximates the ideal of coherence more nearly than any other. When it can be shown that the presuppositions of knowledge require that freedom and reason are organically and functionally interrelated, there is no error in concluding that a high degree of logical verification and probability has been achieved. In brief, we conclude that freedom and reason rise or fall together.

Attention should also be called to the fact that freedom, which implies reason, also implies the highest category,

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that of purpose. The fact is, according to Bowne, that rational purpose\(^1\) is the only way out of the unstable equilibrium into which thought falls when it tries to steer a middle course between the Scylla of necessity and the Charybdis of absolute freedom. It is an important part of Bowne's teaching about freedom to see clearly the position which purpose occupies in the union and stabilization of freedom and uniformity. This problem will be developed under the cosmic aspect of Bowne's doctrine and needs merely to be cited here as one of the significant characteristics of his exposition of freedom involved in the career of reason.

The hypothesis of rational freedom also offers the only explanation of any depth for the ability of groups of persons widely separated and with different heredity and environment to independently arrive at the same truth, such as the principles of morality and those of mathematics. In this way free intelligence is able to establish universals of a transcendental character which are characteristic of the human mind wherever it has not lost confidence in itself. And as long as the reason is free, it never more than occasionally, due to a materialistic gust and its accompanying skepticism, loses confidence in itself to universalize. In fact, it is only free intelligence that is competent to discover universals. Wherever rationality chooses to think it is free to distinguish truth from error to the extent that certain

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universals emerge but which could not be accounted for on any other ground than that of free intelligence. It is therefore free rationality rather than empiricism that gives us the best historical insight into the nature of many of our ideas or concepts whose genesis otherwise remains opaque and mysterious.

The general character of the problem of freedom and reason is now before us and it next remains to show the kinds of knowledge which are fundamentally conditioned by freedom. It was not enough for Bowne to show that freedom is the presupposition of knowledge in general but he showed very clearly how the various epistemological ideals are conditioned by it in science, morality, philosophy and religion. In fact, he made freedom the condition of the realization of any and all rational ideals whatsoever.

The work of freedom in relation to science Bowne stated as follows. "Science itself is one of the great achievements of human freedom." It is by this time apparent that both the truths of reason and those of physical science are independent of our volition. This fact, which points toward an order of reality which lies beyond our power to make and unmake at will and which constitutes an extra-mental order of truth, in no wise guarantees

our knowledge of it. The world which the mind knows is not given in the form of ready-made knowledge as a finished product previously adapted to perfectly fitting into the receptacle of mind. The truths of both reason and nature do not possess the power of self-communication and self-revelation. The "given" element in experience is a task or challenge to the mind which signifies the objective condition or possibility of knowledge. Our minds as active instruments are required to build up their worlds. In many respects this constitutes an infinite task or an ideal of science. That is, we come to know the reality of the external world and the truths of reason through the pains-taking, laborious and persistent research of the active mind. Science is no accident. It is the product of the will to know. It is volition which directs the processes of reason according to a rational ideal of truth coupled with diligent application through long centuries which has resulted in the body of knowledge captioned science. It is all too obvious that spontaneous thought is without depth-effect, superficial and inclined to be dogmatic, vague and self-contradictory.¹ Science demands that knowledge be profound and exact and when reflective thinking of this sort is indulged we have passed beyond the mechanical movement of association to the work of

¹ Russell, Bertrand, Philosophy, p. 1.
freedom. Science, as all the higher forms of knowledge, therefore, is a product of free achievement rather than of mechanism. The scientific ideal is implicit in a free mind devoted to truth. This is the only explanation of the higher forms of knowledge.

The contention that freedom is the condition of any rational science whatsoever has not been universally conceded and the converse argument that freedom annuls any and all rational science has its advocates. The truth of this claim is based upon certain postulates of science thought to be fundamentally antithetical to freedom. The first of these is the notion of the uniformity of law. Under such a scheme freedom can only be an illusion for a universal reign of law includes human action as certainly as it does the action of the physical universe.¹

This scientific postulate has gained wide currency on the basis of its pragmatic verifiability in the physical sciences and within the field of psychology as well during the course of the last half century. Thus it is argued that certainly freedom as a fact is unthinkable and is fast becoming unthinkable even as an idea. The mechanical model of the world which requires a physical scheme of things, it is said, is a "perfectly clear and self-evident notion,"² "while freedom is the difficult notion."³

The uniformity of law by such thinkers is no longer looked upon as an idea but as a fact objectively and empirically verified so that the whole mechanical scheme is thought to have been shifted from the abstract, speculative and transcendental realm to that of concrete science while freedom is regarded as abstract speculation which in the nature of the case lies beyond all concrete empirical comprehension.

In addition to the uniformity of law, science regards the mechanical conception of causality to be the only clear and fruitful construction to place upon the notion of this category. Every event or occurrence is looked upon as the invariable consequence of an invariable antecedent which is its necessary cause so that the conception of a causal nexus running throughout nature forever precludes the possibility of freedom just as though the conception of freedom implied the possibility of causeless events. At any rate, it is unmistakably clear that necessary causation means to affirm the impossibility of uncaused events and further that the nature of causality is that of physical determinism of such a character that every act described as mental or physical is equally determined by something other than itself due to necessity.

From this the conclusion is thought logically to follow (despite the fact that necessitarianism denies the possibility of logic) that every event is therefore physically determined and that if it were not, so that freedom is true, science would be impossible.

The doctrine of necessity is often defended on the ground of its clearness and demonstrable character but closer examination fails to reveal grounds for this conviction. In the first place rational necessity or that which attaches to relations between ideas of a logical or mathematical character constitute the only clear conception of necessity which we possess. But rational necessity is not objectively experienced within or without and the whole order of the elements of experience are, as far as connections go, contingent. There is no way of our passing from the logical notion of causality to cosmic reality by deduction of the latter from the former. If necessity exists it must then be metaphysical, a notion of which a positive conception cannot be had for it evades both rational and sensuous apprehension. The fact of observation merely reveals the fact that a certain kind of event appears with certain conditions. We are in the habit of relating such events with these conditions under the category of necessity but this is not directly observed, it is an added interpretation. It is uniformity only which we observe and for aught we know may be administered by freedom as easily as by necessity. Here
a fact appears which is overlooked by superficial thinking which is namely that "The freedom and the necessity are no part of the observation, but theories offered for its explanation."\(^1\) If we suppose that necessity is true and that events are brought about by the compulsion of certain antecedents, how shall we think of the power of these antecedents to produce their events? First, remember the event is not actual until it has occurred. But what and where is the event before it becomes a fact? On David Hume's hypothesis, all events succeed one another without any inner ground or connection so that both necessity and reason perish. But if we stay with the doctrine of necessity we are compelled to affirm that somehow events are determined by their antecedents and are in some sense contained in them. Scientists have often appealed to potentiality as the explanation. What this necessary metaphysical potentiality consists in constitutes our problem. It must possess some actuality because it is held to modify actuality, and yet, if it is regarded as an actual actuality, it antedates itself. We are then required to say that potential actuality and actual actuality are facts but we are in the dark respecting the proper distinction between them. It was this difficulty which J. S. Mill felt so strongly that he proposed either to abolish the notion of a necessary metaphysical causality or to substitute the notion with a strictly positivistic and empirical notion of uniformity.

Necessitarian causality to him lacked the proof of any corresponding fact and was in addition an obscure notion.

If we elevate causal explanation from this impersonal to the volitional plane, are we able to explain causation more coherently? Instead of a necessitarian metaphysical potentiality, let us substitute a free metaphysical potentiality which makes the ontological ground not a system of obscure physical forces but the self-determination of the free spirit. Freedom is the ground of progress and connection between events. Such freedom determines the order of events according to what we describe as a system of law and is responsible for what we mean by necessity in things. It is only a scientific misapprehension of causality and the postulates based thereon that seem to preclude volitional causality as the truly real causal agency. Furthermore, volitional causality has the additional advantage of possessing an analogue in experience and therefore constitutes the only kind of causal agency concerning which we have any direct or immediate insight. Mechanical causality on the other hand talks about ultimate physical forces which are pure postulates of explanation concerning which we have not even the remotest hint in life and experience.

Bowne, following in the footsteps of Lotze¹ and, like him, recognizing that this problem of science which involves a

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universal law of causality which necessarily converts the universe into an endless chain of blind effects is far from a happy solution, proceeds to subject certain aspects of this common conviction to renewed examination. The thesis which Bowne urges against the so-called postulates of science, uniformity of law and mechanical causality, is that freedom and causality and freedom and law are not incompatible. Finite volition continually plays into an order of law and there is no reason in the nature of the case why cosmic freedom does not also have this capacity which, on a fuller understanding of our problem, is just what the facts demand.  

Freedom is no barrier, therefore, to the uniformity of law, nor is law in the least a concept hostile to freedom. The laws of nature are at best contingent and equivalent to statistical approximations.  

Freedom and uniformity are not antithetical but correlative terms which unite in rationality. Instead of the erroneous assumption that freedom and lawlessness are synonyms which is borne out neither by the facts of life and experience nor by profound reflection but which is merely the product of verbal intimidation or abstract speculation, Bowne urges that

"Freedom everywhere presupposes a basis of fixity or uniformity to give it any meaning. An absolute freedom,

3. McConnell, Bishop F. J., Borden Parker Bowne, His Life and His Philosophy, p. 142.
unconditioned by any law whatever, is simply our old friend pure being, and cancels itself. Even for the absolute being, we must affirm a fixed nature as the condition of freedom; and without this, thought perishes."1

The difficulty which grows out of the notion that there is but one kind of causality and that is necessity of the mechanical sort lies in the notion of abstract freedom and abstract necessity neither of which exist. The contradiction is immediately removed when the concrete facts appear. When the facts of experience replace abstract notions we find both a measure of self-control and an order of uniformity and these facts constitute the only concrete notions of freedom and necessity which we possess. Nowhere else does Bowne's empiricism and nominalism emerge with greater emphasis. Experience is made the test of both reality and possibility and, since both facts of freedom and necessity are given in experience, we must start with it. Further, they appear in such connection that experience becomes articulate only on the ground that both are true which requires us to cut the theory to fit the facts rather than to torture the facts into our abstract imaginings. There is no call for the denial of freedom except where academic discussions usurp the field, for in our concrete intellectual life we find freedom and uniformity united so that reality presents both aspects not as compounded of these notions as pre-existing.

elements but merely as antithetical aspects under which reality expresses itself. It is therefore only hypothetical and abstract rather than concrete science which suffers the objection that freedom cancels science.

Attention has already been called to the contingent character of the laws of nature. There is not a clearer chapter in Bowne's philosophy than that in which he shows how the debate between the schools of empiricism and apriorism is unable to prove that experience can be predicated and depended upon.¹ J. S. Mill, W. K. Clifford, Josiah Royce, Émile Boutroux, K. Pearson and H. S. Jennings have all called attention to the contingency of the laws of nature. Bowne regarded this point of view as "really the sum of wisdom in the case."² Our science is held for its practical service to human life and is therefore relative to our practical needs; that is, Bowne insisted that our faith is practical rather than speculative which demands that life by the right of eminent domain takes precedence over abstract speculation concerning the nature of universal necessity. The contingency of natural laws is perfectly expressed in the idea that "Laws of nature I believe to be ideal constructions

formulated by man for his convenience and with little reality if parted from intelligent ends.\(^1\) At this point Bowne comes into substantial agreement with G. H. Palmer who esteemed Bowne very highly.\(^2\) Professor Palmer says "I doubt if there is any sequential causation without antesequential, and am sure there is no antesequential without sequential."\(^3\) Here it is affirmed that two kinds of causation are observable at work in our world, at least the facts appear to demand both mechanical and volitional causation. In personality "we have a self-directing activity which proceeds according to laws inherent in itself and to ideals generated by itself."\(^4\) But, however much the category of causality is a necessity of thought, Bowne was discriminating enough to point out that it does not determine what events shall be caused or the method of causation. The law of causation requires us only to seek an agent for every act while the nature of such an agent is left undetermined so far as the law goes. Free or volitional causation is as possible as is mechanical or determined causation or any other variety in the nature of things if the facts of experience demand it. So far as experience goes, it is questionable whether we have contact

with any other cause so intimately and directly as that of a free intelligent agent, the self. Therefore, "such self-directing activity does not violate the law of causation."\(^1\) Instead of freedom and uniformity standing antithetically in our experience, we now see that it is not only possible for them to unite in rationality but that it is absolutely necessary that they so unite in reason in order to provide the ground for scientific knowledge.

Whatever else freedom may mean, Bowne intended that it can never be equivalent to lawlessness\(^2\) and, when uniformity is not united with freedom, the result is no less chaotic in the absolute being than it is in the finite subject although such a union of freedom and necessity by no means precludes the fact that uniformity becomes regnant through freedom and in no other way.\(^3\) Nor does the objection that the weightiest motives determine volitional action in the light of which freedom is an illusion carry conviction. For freedom, as has been seen, never involves the least intention of asserting uncaused events but only that volitional causality is a free activity. The point at issue respecting freedom is not a denial that motives influence conduct but whether or not the will is free to choose from among

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motives. Finally, the determinist may point out that freedom means, what a self can do, that it must do. Such a notion of freedom would exactly cancel the meaning of freedom. Freedom does not imply that all the possibilities of choice must be exhausted in the interest of self-realization. As Professor Hocking points out, "A self is a hope."¹ As such, the self is selective and preferential which means that, to be a person, discrimination is exercised between alternatives in the interest of realizing certain ends. This means that volition requires the exclusion of certain possibilities in the light of the ideal as a conscious act while it implies the conscious choice of others. The notion, then, that what a self can do, that it must do is not a real problem of freedom and cannot be urged against it. The notion of self-control and self-direction and the power to choose is just what we mean by freedom and that a self must do what it can do constitutes a determinism which cancels this power.²

It is now clear, and in what sense if any, whether freedom invalidates science. The arguments are mainly irrelevant when the problems involved are understood. Confusion in thought

² Bone, B. F., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 103. "Possibility is another of the doubtful categories. Its only clear meaning is based upon the self-determination of a free agent; apart from this it is metaphysically nothing." Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 251.
was usually found to consist in confounding abstract with concrete points of view respecting freedom. When the field of science and that of philosophy are properly defined and their problems stated, the antithesis which is thought to exist between freedom and necessity disappears.

"Concrete science, as we have so often said, concerns itself solely with the modes of being and happening among things and events, or with the uniformities of coexistence and sequence to be found in experience. This work is entirely independent of the question of freedom."

The work of science, in order to be profound, rather presupposes freedom so that none of the special sciences are hindered by it because, as has been pointed out previously, it is freedom which requires law and uniformity as the very condition of its existence. The fact that law is an instrument of rational utility by no means makes any special science impossible, unless it be assumed that the method of science which is based on causal uniformity is erected into a scheme of universal necessity. Such a notion of science is an abstraction and not a concrete experience. There is no more ground on which to predict the future on the basis of necessity than on any other point of view except to say that what happens is necessary and is all that will ever happen. The only science to which freedom is opposed.

then, is that which abstractly assumes universal, mechanical causation which, from the point of view of experience, "so far from being science, is only inconsistent and illiterate dogmatism, a pseudo-science and an enemy of humanity."¹ From Bowne's point of view the reason for the uniformity and order of things is to be grounded in the will and plan of God ultimately rather than in any metaphysical necessity of an abstract and impersonal sort. It would thus appear that the kind of law which satisfies the scientist is no barrier to freedom and certainly freedom implies uniformity as the condition of its executive activity. With the ideality of space and time, mechanical causality of the metaphysical type which is required neither by experience nor logic vanishes. Such a notion is no fact of experience for "Experience certifies only volitional causality as real and our thought of causality must be either that or nothing."² Science, then, studies the uniformities to be found in the physical, mental and social worlds, knowledge of which laws is of the greatest practical value. "But these uniformities do not touch the question of freedom and purpose at all. The laws of physics are fixed; and this very fact fits them to be our servant. The laws of mind are equally fixed; but freedom works through them."³

¹ Bowne, B. P., Personalism, p. 209.
² ibid., p. 215.
Bowne further points out that

"The fancy that physical science is overthrown if we allow the continuity of physical movement to be affected by anything beyond the physical series, is a piece of intelligible, but not intelligent, scientific prudery. Along with this must be placed the fancy that mental science is overthrown if we allow any freedom of will. The continuity which a sane science demands is simply a community of law for all events, old and new alike."¹

This discussion of freedom and science would be incomplete if we did not cite Bowne's most classic summary of this point of view which he states as follows:

"Now, the objection to freedom in the interest of science is mainly a closet difficulty. It may be formidable in closet speculation and academic theorizing, but it has no real weight. It is, indeed, irrelevant to the true conception of both freedom and science. It tacitly assumes that freedom means pure lawlessness, whereas freedom itself presupposes the order of law as its condition. Freedom uses this order, and science studies this order. Science concerns itself with the modes of being and happening among things and events, and their existence and nature are in no way affected by the question of freedom. The forms and laws of sensibility, the laws and categories of intelligence are not involved in freedom; and, whether we affirm or deny freedom, these laws and forms exist as the proper subject of psychological study. The belief in freedom vacates the science of psychology just as much and just as little as it vacates the science of physics or chemistry. In both mental and physical realms the believer in freedom finds an agent acting in accordance with an order of law and, by means of that order, freely realizing his own aims. Freedom, then, is not opposed to physics or chemistry or psychology or any other modest science which studies the laws of things and events, but only to 'science'—that is, that speculative dream which aims to bind up all things in a scheme of necessity; and thus, so far from being science, is simply one of those uncritical dreams of which the dogmatic intellect has ever been so prolific."²

We next investigate freedom and life, or the ethical or practical interest. Bovme considered that, while freedom received its purest illustration in the realm of pure thought, its ethical implications certainly constitute "the most important field of freedom."¹ In the notion of morality, he pointed out that

"the notion of freedom is implicit. As the study of the world of physical changes leads to the assumption of the law of causation, so the study of the world of moral action leads to the assumption of freedom, as the law and condition of the same. An order of mechanical beneficence or maleficence is indeed possible without freedom, but it would have no more moral quality than the sunshine and storm."²

Ethics offers no proof of the fact of freedom which must be sought in psychology and metaphysics. It is merely a postulate of the moral consciousness rather than a product of speculative reason. But where it is denied, notions of responsibility, duty, merit and demerit are cancelled. All fatalistic schemes of ethics are a direct product of its denial.³ Despite the impossibility of any apriori demonstration of freedom and in the absence of every form of apodeictic certainty, the moral consciousness of the human race clings tenaciously to freedom as a moral conviction apart from which life must collapse in one of

its most significant human enterprises. By the recognition of freedom as a postulate, morality would not ignore the assistance which speculative reflection may render in educing the idea into a clear consciousness and in rendering it consistent while at the same time indicating the inconsistent character of moral necessitarianism. On this point, Bowne registered his conviction "that the metaphysics of necessity, while more plausible, is vastly more difficult than the metaphysics of freedom."¹ But the appeal here made is not primarily to the theoretical reason but to life itself, or the practical reason. In this respect, Bowne was greatly influenced by Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason and he too permitted in this doctrine a content which he felt inaccessible to the scientific reason. He further recognized the pragmatic character of this point of view.

"The intellect, considered by itself as a purely speculative faculty, is not contradictory, but it is limited, and it is not able to reach a great many of those truths in which nevertheless we steadfastly believe. But while it cannot positively reach them, it can overturn the arguments against them, and thus, as Kant said, it may at once destroy knowledge and make room for rational belief. Now, assuming the legitimacy of life and of our human instincts, we may ask ourselves what life implicitly implies; and Kant says it implies God, freedom, and immortality, as postulates without which the mind would fall into discord with itself and life would lose itself in inner contradiction. We may, then, hold these postulates, not as something given by the speculative reason but as something rooted in life; and then we may work them out into the great and ever-growing conquest of science and into the progress of humanity in civilization and morals and religion."²

¹ Bowne, B. P., Principles of Ethics, p. 165.
² Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer, pp. 212-213.
But while freedom cannot be proved by the speculative reason, the postulate is something rooted in life itself as the precondition of any and all morality whatsoever. The nature of the practical basis of belief requires us to regard our human beliefs as facts.

"The great catholic beliefs of the race are no products of human invention, or adventitious accretions, from without. They, like man himself, are a part and product of the system. Reflective speculation has something to do in bringing them out into clear consciousness, and in securing their mutual consistency, but their roots lie deep in life itself. The power not ourselves is evolving a moral and religious race."¹

The reason for accepting our beliefs as facts is that the great catholic interests and tendencies of the race are held to reveal the fundamental structure and needs of the mind and therefore, as any great cosmic product, they carry logical weight. In a very real sense they transcend us because they are made for us and their denial plunges the whole system of knowledge into ruin. In any evolutionary theory of knowledge, these beliefs, organized interests and emotions are of primary significance. Theistically viewed, they argue teleologically.² Such beliefs are largely independent of logical processes and are far more the product of life and history resulting from the interaction of man and nature. These beliefs are lines of least resistance followed by life and

constitute the nature of things just as surely as do the physical laws of nature. Such beliefs of which God, freedom and immortality are primary constitute the truths men live by and apart from which their best life cannot be achieved. It was Bowne's conviction that "There is no surer test of reality than this,"¹ a point of view deserving of the most discriminating analysis to which we shall return a little later. This doctrine stresses the notion that our beliefs are made both for us and by us through life and action rather than through speculation. They are natural cosmic products of a supra-individual character² implying the lines along which the mental universe is moving. Such beliefs rise above individual peculiarities or accident and become organic to the nature of things. Yet in all this Bowne was not conscious of having contradicted any logical test or evaluation of experience.

He still maintained that human freedom is the explanation in principle of the aberrations of thought but to recognize this in no way discredited the "great catholic beliefs and tendencies of humanity without involving the whole system of knowledge in disaster. Their universality and necessity in human life are the best of grounds for belief."³ It appears that Bowne was attempting to bring to a belief like that in freedom, through

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³. ibid., p. 377.
its history and origin, a reinforcement of a universal and transcendent character. This is a supplement to the logic of the individual.

To deny freedom as a universal belief of the race, apart from which life falls into discord with itself and fails as a consequence to realize its highest and best life because of inner contradiction, is therefore unthinkable. The method of rigor and vigor is irrelevant in testing our faith in freedom since the true function of logic is regulative, not constitutive, and life itself is deeper than logic.\(^1\) What, then, life demands must, in the absence of absolute proof to the contrary, be allowed\(^2\) and in this instance life requires the belief in freedom in support of which it brings, on the subjective basis of belief, a somewhat positive consciousness.\(^3\) In addition we find it also implied in the principles by which men and societies live.\(^4\) And, finally, the experience of freedom in human consciousness could not be any clearer if proven true than it actually is.\(^5\) In the face of all this mechanism appears as the sophisticated product of an ideal of reflection which falls of sheer absurdity when invoked to explain personal life.\(^6\)

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5. Eucken, Rudolf, Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, p. 147.

6. Ibid., p. 682.
For necessity destroys not only faith in the cognitive reason as such but also in the moral or practical reason as well. While we cannot therefore absolutely prove freedom, it is undisputably clear that it is a necessary postulate of reason as has already been shown and that it is no less a necessary postulate of conscience as we are here attempting to show and on such grounds it must be held. 1 The speculative objections urged against freedom are products of a theoretical, academic and abstract character which carry no weight against real freedom which is a demand of life itself. Thus freedom becomes an autonomous validity which stands in its own right. 2

Bowne's attempt to employ life as a category for the validation of the demands of the moral life carries significant conclusions with it; hence an inquiry into the validity of the argument that freedom is true because it is a postulate of practical necessity. Negatively considered, life as the criterion for truth is an unclear notion and this along with other objections which may be urged makes it extremely difficult to apply the doctrine. The exact relation between history, evolution, psychology and logic in discussing the origin, development and validation of our ideas is at least in Bowne's thought not the object of his central philosophical interest and the introduc-

tion of it into his system does not on all points appear self-evident. First Bowne was accustomed at least toward the last half of his philosophical career to speak of "life" as if it were a well-defined category. The demands of life are said to be autonomous but just what it is that is meant by this statement is not always clear. Sometimes life is stressed as opposed to logic and at other times life is brought under the principle of contradiction in such a way that nothing is foreign to logic. Bowne probably meant by the notion of life as its own justification to stress the practical or moral interests of its career. Thus human freedom is said to be a catholic conviction of the human mind, while mechanism is a sheer absurdity. But a mechanist might reply that many absurdities in history have turned out to be nearer the truth than their orthodox rivals. Heliocentric astronomy, bacteria and evolution were once considered absurdities. Mechanism, on the other hand, is not absolutely absurd and, in a large realm, is even a reasonable type of explanation. As such it has been extremely productive perhaps equally as productive as the notion of freedom. Then, too, freedom as a catholic belief of the race admits of no proof. The fact, if it be admitted, would lie beyond the power of scientific investigation for no inductive evidence of a complete character can be deduced. The notion is a deduction based on a limited observation of the race even when its utmost scientific boundaries are included. Consciousness is in
a sense individual and private and that freedom is a universal belief or a necessary belief admits of no proof. If, by the notion, Bowne means freedom as an ideal ought to be universal, that is quite a different question.

Again freedom, as a catholic belief of the race, is a fallacy of abstraction of the type against which Bowne elsewhere argued when discussing the problem of freedom. His notion that such beliefs as freedom are to be regarded as possessing a supra-individual character and that they are an indication of the purposes of a universe of mind would seem to view freedom as an abstract rather than concreta experience. There is no such thing as freedom existing apart from our experience of it and a race experience from the point of view of Bowne's own nominalistic position is no less a fiction than that of Herbert Spencer. Freedom can only be the experience of a concrete personal experience and how a supra-empirical universe of mind makes the belief for us is hard to see except as we make the belief for ourselves through participation in individual experience. What a universe of mind may call for in particular is an inference on our part and no direct product of observation. Bowne himself, on speculative grounds, strongly warns against this academic procedure of assuming what abstract freedom might be.

Then, too, freedom, as a catholic belief of the race, seems to imply consensus mentalis as a criterion for truth. Suppose the expression of the life of the race should turn out to favor
freedom. The belief might still be false. Majorities are too often confused with judging principles to be true or false in a democratic age, but logic fails to show any real connection between them. Actually, ideas and beliefs which have persisted throughout the length and breadth of civilization so far as our knowledge of them goes have been shown to be false and even after their falsity has been capable of demonstration they have persisted indefinitely. This alogical element in human nature Bowne recognized in his criticism of German materialists as a state of culture in the nineteenth century where he points out that, although educated Germans admitted that it was based on principles of bad logic, they nevertheless read and believed the more. Bowne concludes that "There are conditions of the moral atmosphere in which clouds of unbelief form incessantly and necessarily, and argument is entirely powerless against them."1 The fact that a belief may be catholic or universal is no guarantee of its validity.

Again, it is said that freedom could be no clearer in consciousness if it were a demonstrated fact, which is probably true; but the clearness of the notion in consciousness or its vividness as opposed to vague and obscure notions fails to convince us that we have struck a criterion for validity.2 True ideas are

2. Bowne, B. P., "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zion's Herald, 56 (1979), p. 72. "For, in the first place, a true act of free will is a rare occurrence in our daily life; and, in the second place, we have no proper certainty in the case."
not necessarily clear in consciousness and more often must be deduced into bold relief by great effort in thought. On the other hand, some of the clearest impressions in consciousness may be psychologically explained as illusions or hallucinations.

In this connection, Bowne called attention to the validity of the subjective basis of belief.¹ He regarded feeling as a cosmic fact and, therefore, insisted that our feelings, emotions and organized interests and beliefs are not to be taken lightly. As true as this is, when we leave the plane of individual whim and fancy and face the more permanent of the feelings of the race, this is far from any proof that our feeling mediates the reality of freedom. If dignified feeling constrains us to postulate feeling, it at the same time warns us that feeling is an extra-logical ground wherein we stand. The emotions, especially when considered racially as in this connection, constitute a chapter of experience so varied and chaotic that one hesitates to predict which beliefs find justification in it and which do not, for most beliefs have evoked almost every emotion at different times or even at the same time. Without rational control feelings may be worthy of consideration but are not likely to prove productive in the guidance of life.

In justification of life as deeper than logic, it is argued that logic is regulative, not creative, but this very

conclusion is meaningless apart from reason to which it is clear and if life at any time asserts itself outside the law of contradiction, we can make nothing of it. Briefly, reason cannot be denied without at the same time being affirmed and certainly it cannot be denied without denying life insofar as it is a part of life. The only reasonable meaning which life as larger than logic can convey is that through the use of the reason as moral, we have revealed an insight into reality which the use of the reason as theoretical cognition denies us. Life is not larger than logic but it certainly is larger than logic-chopping. Bowne himself accepted, at least in his *Studies in Theism*, the Hegelian formula that the rational and the real are one as a necessary postulate of scientific knowledge. But while rational beliefs require rational grounds and while "logic must try the beliefs as well as the spirit," Bowne nevertheless transcended this notion of validity and frankly affirmed the supreme test of reality to consist in the effects of our belief on life. This is essentially pragmatic and at least raises the question as to whether he did not surrender a superior for an inferior criterion for truth.

When our attention is called to the debate between necessity and freedom as a drawn battle so far as speculation

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is concerned and therefore life is called upon to decide in favor of its organized interests, feelings, and emotions in favor of freedom, have we not on this point surrendered to still another criterion for the truth of freedom, namely that of intuition? But this is not Bonne's intention for he calls attention to the fact that freedom is not an intuition but a deduced necessity. If nothing is foreign to the law of contradiction, life's intuitions must also be subjected to it and reduced to coherence. Even though reason could not be surrendered and even though it was shown to be inadequate, as a standard for truth, this would not be the slightest cause for reasoning less efficiently than is absolutely necessary in the attempt to make experience coherent. And this would mean that moral judgments be logically treated just as all other classes of judgments must be logically criticized. At any rate the fact that the debate between necessity and freedom can end in no more than a drawn battle is an argument which impresses us by its looseness of thinking. Certainly where it has been affirmed that rational principles constitute our knowledge of reality both of these arguments cannot be of equal value. Freedom must be truer than necessity or vice versa or they must both be true or they are both false; in any case, whatever the truth is, it must be

a truth of reason. We are not helped far in the direction of
a solution of the problem of freedom to know that reason is
entirely impotent in the matter especially when the main thesis
of Bowne's speculative significance for freedom consists in
showing that reason, when united with freedom, is the condition
of knowledge. The object of this point is not an invalidation
of Bowne's main contention so much as it is an effort on our
part to point out that there is no objection to uniting the
theoretical or scientific and the practical or moral reason as
functions of the same reason, a conclusion to which Kant himself
was forced to come in the interest of the integrity of our mental
life. A view which makes it possible to reach a more satisfactory
solution of the problem of freedom would be to show that the
logical absurdity of mechanism is to be sure no proof of freedom
and no disproof of mechanism but that when all the facts of
experience are evaluated, freedom is a far more coherent view
than mechanism or that both are facts within limits. Such a
conclusion would be the equivalent of logical demonstration as
far as such demonstration is possible and for those to whom
reasonableness appeals as the ground for believing anything, it
affords a solution to the problem. To show that freedom is the
analytically necessary presupposition for the explanation of certain

1. Kant, Immanuel, Theory of Ethics, tr. by T. K. Abbott,
p. 261.
important facts amounts to a degree of logical demonstration which cannot be lightly set aside except where problems are surrendered to prejudice and passion for their solution.

Bowne apparently did not feel the force of the necessity of a criterion for truth, and, if one were necessary, he directs unfavorable criticism against the possibility of ever attaining it. The problem of truth was nevertheless a central problem in his epistemology, but his thinking, due to this attitude, was necessarily of an eclectic character when viewed synoptically. One characteristic attitude which Bowne took toward the question of what it is to know was that

"We learn that we can walk by walking, and in the same way we learn that we can know by knowing. Academic discussions of the standard of certainty or of the criterion of truth are barren of any valuable result. There is no general standard which the mind can mechanically apply. The standard is the mind itself, dealing with particular and concrete cases; and any given item of knowledge must stand or fall, not because it agrees or disagrees with some assumed standard, but because of the evidence with which it presents itself to the living mind in contact with the facts." ¹

Just as explicit is his assertion that "A universal standard of certitude is a chimera; but certitude is possible for persons."² Bowne accepted the rationalistic conception of truth in arguing that the mind's ideal is to bring all experience under the laws of thought. The cognitive ideal demands that all reality is

¹ Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 293.
² Bowne, B. P., Studies in Theism, p. 58.
rational, an assumption which admits of no proof but rests upon faith of the mind in itself as an ideal toward which it approximates indefinitely. The native over self-confidence of the human mind is best corrected by the world, another way of affirming that life is a balance to reason.¹ In his article on "What Is Truth?² Bowne stated no definitive position except to indicate that it scientifically equals matters of fact while it may also embody the projection of our nature upon the world of reality. But elsewhere, Bowne restricts the meaning and says "By truth, we mean rational principles. . . . . Rational truth is seen to be valid everywhere and always; and as the result of this insight, it is said to be necessary and universal."³ But while Bowne insists that a test for truth is concretely necessary in each case of knowing, he does not agree that the test is always the same. For, while he affirms that by truth we mean rational principles necessary and universal which apply to a reality assumed to be rational in structure, he does not hesitate to affirm that there is no surer test of reality² than life itself whose beliefs are validated in the light of their practical necessity in assisting man to live his best life. Here the criterion of coherence is frankly exchanged for pragmatism as a superior test for truth.⁵

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In addition to these two higher criteria of a philosophical order, he also unites the philosophical criteria of intuition and empiricism. The result is that Bowne uses these criteria in more or less varied form throughout his work leaving the problem of finding a criterion for truth unsettled and the entire problem in unstable equilibrium. In this respect, he is not in his conclusion, at least in spirit, dissimilar to the conclusion reached by Professor William P. Montague,¹ who takes an eclectic attitude toward the problem of a criterion for truth wherein he provides for all the ways of knowing.

Positively considered, Bowne's discussion of freedom and life is instructive in that the precedence of concrete life over formal logic is stressed. Then, too, the fact that freedom has evolved as one of the higher forms of mental evolution, as an act of faith, is certainly significant. And, finally, the utility of freedom or its necessary assumption by life as the principle by which men and societies live is apparent. The recognition and assumption of duty and responsibility is the very condition of social intercourse and, whatever may be said of the criterion by which freedom is derived as the precondition of ethics, these facts remain unchanged.

To this point, the significance of freedom in relation to the finite subject has occupied our attention. In the two

remaining fields in which Bowne examined the speculative significance of freedom, metaphysics and religion, we encounter the macrocosmic aspect of his doctrine. The contention is that freedom is the condition of all philosophy\(^1\) and therefore the speculative demand of reason is no less significant here than its necessity was seen to be as the foundation of the ideals of science and ethics. The formulation of the thesis for this part of the argument is that "without assuming a free cause as the source of the outer world the mind is unable to satisfy its own rational nature or to bring any line of thought to an end."\(^2\) It is of the utmost importance that we indicate that Bowne regarded this passage as the conclusion of his entire metaphysical research which furnishes us incontestable evidence of the fact that the postulate of freedom was a salient, pivotal and fundamental doctrine for his system of thought as it was for Kant who regarded free causality as the identical problem of metaphysics.\(^3\) There are four problems in this field for which freedom is demanded as the only intelligent solution and which, if they remain unsolved, constitute the utter collapse of reason and hopelessly and utterly defeat the mind's ideal to know reality. The first of these is the mind's desire for explanation and the insight that freedom is

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the condition of any real explanation. Secondly, free intelligence is the only possible solution of the problem involved in the categories of change and identity. Thirdly, freedom is the condition of the fulfillment of the speculative demand for unity. Fourthly, freedom is the condition of "the unification of the system of things in a common source" into a plan of purposeful activity.

We examine the demand for explanation first. By explanation is meant the mental effort to unite the things and events of experience according to the demands of the mind's own nature in the hope of accounting for them. The motive grows out of the rational demand for systematic connection and totality for the system of experience. At no point are the implications of freedom more apparent than in the meaning of explanation. Of the three main types of explanation, the explanation of classification, scientific explanation and metaphysical explanation of which there are two main types, that of the explanation of mechanism and that of explanation by free intelligence, it is the last only which furnishes the ground for any ultimate and satisfactory explanation. Explanation by classification is the assembling of similar facts together with other known facts whereby a sort of systematic connection is obtained as a result of the isolated objects of experience having been brought together. This lowest

type of explanation does not carry us far for "The nature of a given fact is in no way revealed by the discovery that there are many other facts of the same kind."\(^1\) In brief, it establishes no identity and abolishes no differences. Scientific explanation is a higher type than mere classification of objects and attempts to connect the phenomenal or physical universe by cause and effect according to empirical laws. Inasmuch as phenomena and their laws are what they are apart from any view of reality, this explanation is largely independent of metaphysics. Therefore no insight into ultimate causes can be gained for it is proximate and not remote causes that are sought. Moreover the discovery of the phenomenal connection of things and events affords no speculative insight, that is it reaches nothing final.

\"The study, then, of the connections of phenomena, while practically of the utmost importance, leads to no speculative insight, and reaches nothing in which thought may rest. Its explanations only carry the problem one step backward and leave us as badly off as ever.\"\(^2\)

This method of explanation is forced to presuppose the order of phenomena and their laws and merely succeeds in showing how the things and events in this system cohere. The real problem of explanation begins where this leaves off, namely insight into the order which implies things and events and their laws. The mere tracing out of the relations in an order which is given cannot

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be accepted as ultimate explanation. For the system which implies the coexistence and sequence between the facts and their laws is found itself to be without any explanation. In dealing with mechanisms, analysis and synthesis work very well but "In organic and rational wholes the elements do not explain the wholes but are explained by them." Thus scientific explanation fails as anything final since it merely explains the connection of events in the empirical order or series but leaves insight into how the order or series itself is caused an opaque fact which means that its explanation merely moves in a circle when anything final is attempted. Such explanation remains on the surface of things and is limited to the purposes of scientific method.

Metaphysical explanation of a mechanical type is an extension of scientific explanation in that the attempt is made to infer from phenomena not only their coexistences and sequences and their phenomenal antecedents, but in addition their ontological grounds. But a metaphysics of forces and laws must presuppose an invisible, dynamic system in order to account for the effects we perceive. Given only atoms and the void we must assume an external mover or internal forces operating under laws of the structure of matter but, as before pointed out, such a principle will apply fairly well in the analysis and synthesis of numerical

and inorganic wholes but are incompetent to deal with organic and rational wholes. But the assumption of internal forces to explain interaction is not a phenomenal but a hidden dynamism of a metaphysical order. A spatial interaction can be pictured while volitional causality can be experienced. "But what that is which is less than the latter and more than the former is an exceedingly difficult problem."¹ For spatial change is among things while inherent forces constitute a hidden dynamism of a metaphysical nature which is a change in things. Moreover we are not only lodged in mystery but the logical difficulties in explanation by such inferred causes are insuperable for the reason that wherever these causes lie outside experience or beyond the analogy of experience so that they can no longer be used to extend knowledge, the circular and unprogressive character attaching to all systems of mechanical or physical explanation appears to infer causes from effects and then explain the effects by the causes. The sense in which mechanical explanation cannot satisfy the demands of rationality appears in the fact that it can bring no line of thought to an end.

Retracing our steps, immediate perception reveals phenomena only. Their causes, together with the nature of those causes, constitute the problem of thought and not of sensation. Attempted mechanical explanation furnishes no insight into the

¹ Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 229.
nature of causes other than to assume that like cause, like effect, and like effect, like cause, deducing causes from effects and *vice versa* without anything more simple being reached. The present is read into the past which in turn implies the present in such a way that as far back as we go with our explanation the problem with all its complexity still remains. No simplicity is achieved when we read the present backward and no progress is made by reading the identical equation forward for

"In a necessary system the antecedents which are to explain anything must already imply that thing to its minutest details. If they do not imply it they cannot produce it; and if they do not imply it our thought moves in a circle. The net result is that things are as they are, and no more can be said about the matter."\(^1\)

Two reasons keep thought from seeing the stultifying and suicidal character of such explanation. Practical needs are usually gratified by proximate causes and hence ultimate reasons and causes may become habitually ignored. Thus the practical interests of life unconsciously obscure the speculative demands of reason and real explanation is either ignored or confused with empirical causality. Or, and this is true of the majority of popular understanding, we fail to see that all explanation of a necessitarian type overlooks the simplification of words for that of things. Thus the previous types of explanation either singly or collectively commit the error of identifying the logical order of thought with

an order of reality which results in hypostasizing the system into "Nature" or "the Universe" or "the Cosmos" as a self-sufficient organism needing no further account or explanation. The same thing is done with respect to the use of such terms as "matter" and "force". All attempts to explain the whole merely by the action of its parts or the resultant of its parts constitute no final explanation. The difficulties of erecting metaphysical explanation of a mechanical type into our final explanation of things are four-fold. The notion can only lapse into a groundless becoming. It involves an infinite regress. Evolution and progress are rendered exceedingly superficial if not denied outright by the infinite regress in one direction and the unprogressive character of explanation in the other direction and the circular reasoning of the explanation as a whole. Finally, the whole conception of mechanical explanation as the ontological ground of things ignores the fact of the contingency of the laws of nature to which we have already called attention. That these laws represent the activities of fundamental being may be allowed but that the order of law may itself be erected into an ontology is not clear.

In order to escape the collapse of reason and to bring any form of explanation to finality, we must have recourse to the category of purpose or final cause.¹ "As we need the con-

¹ Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 233.
ception of freedom in man for the solution of the problem of error, so we also need the conception of freedom at the foundation of the cosmos to make it amenable to the demands of our intelligence.¹ And in particular we cite freedom as the only means of escape from the contradiction which infests the notion of necessity as a metaphysical or universal category. Free intelligence is here as everywhere else the only real explanation of anything. We may then conclude that much which passes for explanation in uncritical circles of thought is imperfect and unsatisfactory in character while explanation by the conception of free intelligence is the only ultimate and satisfactory explanation to be had. The advantages of such explanation are to be found in the fact that any line of thought can be brought to an end, that we may escape a groundless becoming and an infinite regress. Actual progress can be made in thinking and the phenomenal world together with its problems becomes intelligible on no other grounds.

In the same way free intelligence is the only possible solution of the problem involved in the categories of change and identity. The problem of change on the impersonal plane arises in the following way. The abstract notion of change would imply

simply a departure from the present order of things in a lawless and chaotic way in any direction whatsoever. Science and philosophy reject this notion of change which makes it a lawless and groundless sequence in which case all knowledge including the fields just mentioned would be annulled. Change according to causal continuity is its only legitimate meaning. According to Heraclitus everything is involved in the process of change so that only phenomenal identities are possible. The inherent defects of the Heraclitean position are met by popular thought by just reversing the doctrine so that substance may be viewed as a changeless thing with changing states but the problem of change would vanish at this point for if the thing does not change then the ground for its changing states vanishes. Being must be brought into change and change into being if change does occur and only a changing thing can possess changing states. Nor is the matter improved by saying that the relations between the units of structure like the atoms change while things remain the same. There emerges at this point what appears to be an ultimate antinomy in thought for the two categorical principles of the mind, change and identity seem to be inherently in conflict. In addition, the difficulty of distinguishing a changing thing from a series of different things becomes well-nigh impossible since what we call a changing thing is really a series of different things which are inter-controvertible. On the impersonal plane the fact of change is an unmanageable datum for we have on the
part of intelligence an equally strong fundamental demand for identity. By identity we mean the concrete law of action of a thing, not changelessness of substance, so that a thing's identity is constituted in "the continuity and constancy of this law." If absolute sameness were urged on the impersonal plane, one would encounter the Eleatic form of identity which reduces all change to illusion just as it appeared that change, if granted, reduces all identity to illusion. Identity may mean logical identity or the law of fixity of the idea or it may mean phenomenal identity or the continuity of equivalent appearance or, as we use it here, metaphysical identity or the equivalent of reality behind the appearances. The meaning of identity on the impersonal plane is untenable as is also the Eleatic notion of changelessness. As equivalent to continuity and constancy of law, on the other hand, it comes into an apparent irreconcilable conflict with change. On the impersonal plane change clashes just as certainly with identity.

The only solution of the apparent inherent ultimate antinomy between the two principles of reason, change and identity, is possible on the personal plane. On the impersonal plane the antinomy arises out of the inability to conceive how things can

remain the same and yet change or how changing things may still retain their identity. It is well to remember in this connection that in identity no core of material being is demanded for identity but only the inherent law of a thing's action. The removal of this abstract antinomy on the personal plane is self-conscious intelligence. In experience we have a union of identity and change. The self persists as a concrete changing thing which preserves its identity throughout its change. Yet, self-identity is no rigid and unchanging substance. The self is rather a changing reality whose identity and continuity are constituted through memory. It is true that the union of change and identity in self-conscious experience is in character inexplicable. Bowne's transcendental empiricism reveals personality and intelligence as ultimate facts and here the mind is seen to be deeper than its categories and explains them rather than being explained by them.\(^1\) Hence change and identity are categories explained on the personal plane in free intelligence whereas on the impersonal plane they remain an irreconcilable contradiction of two of the most patent facts of experience. The free self may thus exercise the power of self-identity through the experience of self-change which is mysterious enough we admit but nevertheless a fact of self-experience which can not be gainsaid. It is the only insight

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which we possess into a rational explanation of this antinomy which makes it possible for thought to achieve any satisfactory or final resting place. It is only in thought on the plane of personality in free intelligence that we find the source of both change and identity and an understanding of how their apparent contradiction is to be removed.¹

"Metaphysics further shows that if we insist upon having some abiding and identical principle superior to change and constant in change, it can be found only in personality. And here it does not consist in any rigid core of being, but rather in the extraordinary power of self-consciousness, whereby the being distinguishes itself from its states, and constitutes itself identical and abiding. Where this is lacking, there may be a continuity of process, but nothing more. The unchangeability is purely formal, as when a given note is constantly produced."²

We encounter the same problem in the consideration of freedom and the speculative demand for unity. On the necessitarian plane it is impossible to achieve more than a merely formal, conceptual or verbal unity. The ideal of unity or systematic totality is a legitimate demand of reason.³ The speculative problem is to discover a concrete unity which has real as well as conceptual existence since most of the unities of experience are purely formal. Mechanical explanation as an ideal of speculative unity can never succeed in escaping a groundless plurality. The plurality of the universe can never be united into a uni-verse if plurality is the

2. Bowne, B. P., Philosophy of Theism, pp. 146-147, 143.
fact from which we start; and, if unity is the fact from which we start, mechanism is just as impotent to pass to a plurality of cosmic manifestations. "If we start with a plurality we never get behind it; and if we start with a unity it refuses to move at all."¹ In what unity and plurality consist in mechanical explanation we can never experience other than to note the interacting states of things. This presents another antinomy for thought.

"Reason, indeed, calls loudly for unity, but it has no means of integrating a plurality into a true unity or ofdifferentiating a unitary necessity into a plurality. Here is another deadlock for the speculative reason, and the only way out of it lies in the notion of free intelligence. This is the one thing that can be manifold without being many, that can posit plurality over against itself and maintain its own unity, and that can bind the many together in the unity of plan and purposeful activity."²

On any theory which condemns the world to an ultimate plurality and has only a formal unity in our thought, we must either encounter an endless regress or surmount necessity to the notion of free mind as that on which the cosmos depends and by which it exists. Freedom, therefore, becomes the condition of a unification of a system of things into a systematic connection and also the condition of passing from unity to a plurality of cosmic manifestation without the collapse of reason. The speculative demands of reason insist upon the integrity of the categories of unity and plurality but on every mechanical scheme there is no

². ibid., p. 692. Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 105.
way of deducing one from the other or of telling in what either consists.

"This puzzle can be solved only by leaving the mechanical realm for that of free intellect. The free and conscious self is the only real unity of which we have any knowledge, and reflection shows that it is the only thing which can be a true unity. All other unities are formal, and have only a mental existence. But free intelligence, by its originating activity, can posit plurality distinct from its own unity, and by its self-consciousness, can maintain its unity and identity over against the changing plurality. Here the one is manifold without being many. Here unity gives birth to plurality without destroying itself. Here the identical changes and yet abides. But this perennial wonder is possible only on the plane of free and self-conscious intelligence. For mechanical thinking the problem admits only of verbal solutions."\[1\]

Free and conscious selfhood constitutes the only unity we know and reflective thought insists that it is the only unity which is real. Our conclusion is that until we elevate the categories of unity and plurality from the impersonal to the personal plane of existence where we have available free intelligence for the understanding of our problem there is no solution for these two fundamental demands of the mind which otherwise constitute a hopeless antinomy of reason.

The speculative demand of reason which requires freedom as the condition of the unification of a system of things in a common source into a plan of purposeful activity remains to be considered. What is the relation between freedom and purpose?

Purpose, defined as Bowne accepted the term, is as follows:

"Conscious purpose represents the future in the present, foresees, transcends time, and thus possesses properties that are clearly foreign to the principle of mechanism. Unconscious purpose is a concept from which almost everything that is significant has been stripped. It cannot foresee the future, it does not transcend time, it gropes blindly toward its goal. The difference between unconscious purpose and mechanism is negligible."^1

Does, then, purpose include freedom? Bowne recognized difficulties in the empirical, teleological argument.² Teleology cannot be based on experience much of which reveals no purpose. To argue that that which appears purposeless belongs to an unseen plan is a matter of belief, not experience. Then, too, where purpose is discernible in the operation of natural agents, the end rarely appears of sufficient value to sacrifice for its attainment. Since we cannot prove that nature's agencies are designed to produce ends, it is argued that we must conclude that wherever ends are realized in nature, they are but the necessary results and outcome of natural agencies. Bowne's counter argument consists in showing that teleology is not demonstrable from experience to be sure but as a necessary assumption to every theory of knowledge it is indispensable. Then, too, all natural science is based on the assumption of a rational universe, and denial of this postulate is as suicidal to science as it is to teleology.

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The assumptions which underlie the anti-teleological argument must be understood in evaluating it. The two basic assumptions of the determinist against purpose are the principle of continuity and the assumption that physical agents include all being. On these grounds it is said that natural laws are universally uniform and everything has its physical antecedents which are sufficient explanation. Again, the anti-design argument assumes that mind must be observed in nature in order to be proved and that this is the most perfect world and order of atoms is merely an assumption. In the fourth place it assumes that the physical agents of the universe which are the true causes are endowed with whatever is necessary to explain their activities so that mechanism, therefore, explains nothing but assumes everything. Finally, the mechanist argues that the present is the necessary and only possible result of the past.

Certain subtle fallacies infest these arguments of the determinist which require careful examination. In the first place, the uniformity and continuity of law do not preclude the fact that such law may be the very fulfillment of purpose. "It does not follow, therefore, that because natural causes are working necessarily and in accordance with their own laws, that they are not also working for the fulfillment of purpose." It is an

unwarranted assumption that originally the atoms held such indeterminate relations among themselves that with an infinity of directions possible to them all possible arrangements which have ever appeared may well be the result of such determinations. To assume that the present is the only possible result of the past is illegitimate as a conclusion because mechanism assumes that disorder preceded order in cosmic procedure, itself a hypothesis devoid of proof. It assumes that everything had a beginning and that disorder preceded order whereas, on the other hand, every system including science is required to posit something eternal and, so far as order goes, there is no cogent reason for denying that order was first. Moreover, the teleologist does not rest his case on the empirical observation of mind in nature and freely admits the difficulty involved in the problem created by the facts of dysteleology as revealed in the orders of lower life.

The argument for purpose can not only be stated negatively but can also be stated positively. It is true that to say design proves a designer is a question-begging statement. The real question is, How do we know that an adaptation is a work of design, intentioned order and purpose? Certainly design would prove a designer but the problem of experience is how to know that design and not chance produced the effect or adaptation observed. Bowne's solution of this problem consists in pointing to the complexity and prolificness of adaptations which render
chance a far less reasonable hypothesis to explain these adaptations than is design. Therefore the universe is better explained on the reality of a designer described as Self-determining Force, or Free Mind. Bowne held that he was able to show that the universe is possible only on the reality of "a Self-determining Force, or Free Mind, a spiritual Being; an Ever-Living Will."¹ Volitional causality as free and purpose are here united. Bowne may have been influenced at this point by the insight of Dr. Thomas Brown. In the history of metaphysics, the argument which reduces all force to a dependence upon will is in principle identical with that of Hume against physical causation. Hume's argument was for a long time regarded as atheistic and Hume himself thought so. Dr. Brown showed, however, that it is the only theistic one,² and, when physical causation is denied, the only alternative consists in that of moral or volitional causation of which we are already conscious. It is the erroneous notion that we are shut up to physical causation or none that smacks of atheism and is repugnant to the laws of thought. This is Bowne's argument for the fact that purpose, which is the highest of the logical categories and which we must apply in our attempts to reach the highest order of knowledge, includes freedom. Free purpose is the only

² ibid., p. 467.
solution of the relation between freedom and mechanism or
freedom and law.

"The only way out lies in the notion of rational purpose, or of a Creator who is working a rational work in accordance with a rational plan. In this plan everything will have its place and function and will be comprehended in an all-embracing purpose. In this work we shall have no unintelligible metaphysical necessities called laws, but rather uniformities of procedure, freely chosen with reference to the plan. At the same time we shall have no lawless and chance events, as all will arise in accordance with the purpose of the whole."¹

Bowne was also influenced by Ulrici in this conclusion. Ulrici had regarded human science possible only where nature is brought under the reign of law but where its things and powers are conceived as expressions of a purpose. The final and highest unity consists in including all lower purposes into the harmony and unity of an all-controlling purpose, thought or idea which explains everything else and toward which the whole creation moves. This is the highest demand of our reason and this highest category conditions the highest reach and unity of knowledge.² Ulrici describes his ontology as omnipotent, intelligent, self-conscious and personal and above all as free.³ That Bowne, like Ulrici, united purpose of the highest type at least with freedom is incontestably clear.

Purpose is never regarded by Bowne as causal but only as the norm according to which the agent, capable of creating it, is able to direct itself.¹ Purpose here appears not as the condition of freedom but as its expression.² It is from experience that we learn those purposes which a free system is capable of expressing and which could appear on no other ground than as the work of freedom. Whether there is any purpose which can be explained without freedom is a problem still remaining untouched. Bowne does however conceive freedom as a type of causality and one of its fundamental forms of causal activity is purpose.

"The causality of freedom means self-determination. This is a causality which looks to the future and is not driven by the past. It is a causality which forms ideals and plans, and devotes itself to their realization. Instead of being shoved out of the past, it is self-moving into the future. It may posit an order and maintain it. It may conceive purposes and realize them. Our experience of such causality is limited to the inner life, but it is in fact the only form of proper causality of which we have any experience whatever. And there are reasons for thinking that, instead of being a special case of causation, it is really the typical form to which all cases of real causation must be assimilated."³

There is still another idea in this connection which characterizes the thoroughness with which Bowne grounded purpose in freedom. This is to be found in his stress upon freedom as a means in the nature of things and not as an end. Unless through freedom there

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be some ethical objective toward which the whole creation moves that is to be realized, a free world would be no more desirable than a necessary one. The mere facts of freedom and necessity apart from the objective of creation which is mediated through some rational meaning leave no ground for choice. One scheme is as little to be desired as the other but where rational purpose contributes the law by which personal activity is guided and this is the meaning of things, freedom becomes the one condition of the fulfillment of purpose.  

Attention should be directed to several features in Bowne's argument where correction and extension of his thought are needed. The counter argument of the teleologist that if we deny a free rational mind in nature science as well as teleology vanishes, at least appears to leave the argument just where it was. To create a deadlock where the problems are difficult may stay the fearful consequences temporarily but sooner or later conclusions will follow and the sooner the problem can be pushed through to a decisive victory the sooner thought can advance to higher ground. Drawn battles were too often favored conclusions with Bowne when dealing with the antinomies of thought and which furnished the occasion for "life" to decide in favor of its

1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 316. "To escape the fatalism of the purely logical reason we have to appeal to freedom, and to escape the abyss of chance and arbitrariness we have to unite the fixity of the intellect with the freedom of volition in the notion of purpose, itself fixed and determined by the notion of the good." Theism, p. 213.
own interests. Bowne's statement that mechanism explains nothing is a criticism which he urges against every system of necessity. "The system which the anti-teleologist has outlined for us really explains nothing, but tacitly assumes everything—as, indeed, all mechanical systems must do, whether they adopt the atomic conception or any other." But it is conceivable that mechanism is competent within a limited field to offer some explanation, a fact which Bowne himself admits when he points out that it is only when scientific explanation seeks to become all-embracing that it is empty or self-stultifying. The matter is considerably cleared up for us where he affirms that freedom is the only condition of any real explanation. What is meant is that the scientific hypothesis constructs causes with which physical agents are endowed in order to explain certain activity. Such procedure uses teleology as the model of explanation and then proceeds to deny teleology. Thus imponderability, attraction, repulsion, and the like are attributed to atoms and ether in such a way that everything is assumed to provide an explanation within the limits of physical agency. To this Bowne rightfully objects and had he always been clear in his statement of it by insisting

3. ibid., pp. 244, 233.
upon ultimate, final or real explanation as his meaning, it would serve to modify the sweeping and misleading emphasis that mechanism can explain nothing when as a matter of fact there is a scientific explanation of all facts as far as it goes and it is even conceivable that some adaptations might be and probably are accounted for by mechanism. A noticeable development in Bowne's writings in this direction is traceable. The conclusion is then that, while it is conceivable and possible that mechanism and chance do explain a few adaptations there are many which they do not explain.

The further question arises as to whether we are justified in assuming that freedom and purpose are coincident throughout nature. It is a fact that we find ends continually being attained in nature without foreknowledge of them, that is, where we are not free to foresee consequences. It is also true that ends may be foreseen in nature but not chosen. Finally, ends may be both foreseen and chosen. From this it is plain that we are not entitled to the conclusion that all types of purpose are the same. There are different kinds of purpose and only the highest type of purpose involves freedom. It here appears that mechanical explanation may therefore explain instinctive purpose and such related kinds of experience while

a more complete type of explanation, the metaphysical, is required where freedom, value and purpose are involved.

The elements of enduring value in Bowne's argument are two. First, mechanism is an incoherent hypothesis if posited as final or complete explanation. It is one type of explanation perfectly legitimate when dealing with the phenomenal categories, the space-time world. It is not therefore the universal or metaphysical type of explanation which involves the fundamental or metaphysical categories. In view of this incomplete gratification of the legitimate mental demand for unity and systematic totality, we must transcend mechanism and find a place for explanation by free intelligence.\(^1\) Secondly, within the limits which we have shown, purpose does include freedom and it is only through free intelligence that the notion of an all-inclusive purpose providing the ground for systematic totality is thinkable.

It is now apparent in what sense purpose includes freedom and likewise in what sense freedom includes purpose. It is logical to say that freedom includes the notion of purpose and that purpose of the highest type involves freedom. The nature of freedom demands the power of contrary choice in the light of purpose which leads to the significant conclusion that freedom in reason, therefore, is always teleological in character.

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This, as we have pointed out, is the one condition on which a free world is preferable to a world of necessity. The mechanist's contention that the solution of the problem of freedom confines us to the alternatives of absolute freedom or absolute mechanism is impertinent. For a more coherent solution is found in the conclusion which we have already established and which consists in the notion of an all-embracing rational purpose. Metaphysical necessity is required to give way before uniformity administered by freedom for the attainment of the rational goals of history. In our final conclusion we point out that while a world might conceivably reveal a purpose without freedom the facts about the actual world which we know at least require us to conclude that the highest type of purpose only reveals freedom but that freedom must include purpose and from the point of view of the Supreme Person it is more than likely that freedom conditions the entire world in every aspect of its activity and realization.

This brings to a close that part of our research devoted to the task of showing that freedom is the condition of all philosophy and therefore has a deep speculative significance. Our conclusion has consisted in showing the futility of attempting to solve the speculative problems of philosophy on the plane of impersonal existence. The mind is lost in hopeless antinomies and reason is doomed to utter collapse. No explanation of an ultimate character is possible because of the infinite regress past which we cannot go. Then, too, we encounter the antinomy
of change and identity which philosophy has often ignored and which is unintelligible on any impersonal plane of existence. Nor do we fare any better with the categories of unity and plurality and finally with the problem of purpose until we recognize that all impersonal non-intelligent and mechanical conceptions of ultimate causality are strictly speaking doomed to speculative failure. In view of the legitimate speculative demands of reason which require a solution of these problems we are forced to postulate personality as their ultimate solution and to carry the whole problem of causality up to the plane of free intelligence.\(^1\) Here it is obvious that

"Metaphysics shows that the metaphysical categories elude any real apprehension or presentation, except in terms of personal experience, and this is especially the case with the category of causality. When we do not conceive it under the volitional type we have the bare form of ground without any possibility of representing our meaning.\(^2\)

But in accepting Bowne's claim that such transcendental empiricism is alone competent "to transform the opaque data of experience into the transparent order of reason\(^3\) we meet the objection that explanation by intelligence is open to all the objections that have been urged against mechanism. Personality is itself a mystery and we have offered a solution of our lesser mysteries by merging them into a greater one so that confusion has been worse confounded. The reply to all this is not that of

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dismay but it must be pointed out that in the nature of the case volitional causality though unpicturable to the senses nevertheless finds its analogue in our experience. In fact, it is the only notion of causal agency concerning which we have any direct experience or insight which is much more than can be said of mechanical metaphysical forces which have been urged as the ontological ground of all reality. In the nature of the case, then, any ultimate fact must be mysterious insofar as it cannot be deduced from anything else or reduced to anything else. In the case of personality we have a rock-bottom fact revealed to thought beyond which we cannot go. We can only admit the fact that mind is deeper than its categories and explains them. It exists but it exists as a deep mystery. At this point Bowne's philosophy reaches one of its sublimest insights. But there is a choice between mysteries.

"Some mysteries make other things clear, and some leave things as dark and impenetrable as ever. The former is the case with the mystery of intelligence. It makes possible the comprehension of everything but itself. In the mechanical scheme we are compelled to use the formal categories of possibility, potentiality, necessity, and causation, of which the concrete significance absolutely eludes all conception. . . . . In truth, we can find concrete illustration of these categories only in our inner experience. They remain illusive abstractions until they are interpreted in forms of the inner life."

Bowne's analysis of the relation between freedom and speculation lacks nothing of clearness and the substantial con-

clusions of his philosophy are available in no field to a
greater extent than for a study of the metaphysics of religion.
The philosophical basis of religion, or the theological aspects
of philosophy depending upon one's method and interest, brings
us face to face with freedom and theology, or the religious
problem. Here, too, freedom is necessary to explain the religious
cosmos just as we have shown it to be involved in the problems of
a general metaphysical character. The approach to Bowne's
doctrine of freedom in relation to religion hinges upon the
problem of personality or the principle of individuality both
human and divine. There are four aspects of the problem of freedom
and religion to which attention is given. These are (1), just
as freedom was the only solution of the persistent problem of
error to save reason from collapse, so freedom is necessary in
religion as the only solution of the equally persistent problem
of evil. The persistent problems of error and evil are un-
deniable facts of human experience and they are the treacherous
problems over which scores of philosophies and theologies have
been dashed to pieces. Evil is to theology what the problem
of error is to philosophy. (2), The divine foreknowledge is no
barrier to finite freedom. (3), The category of possibility as
the meaning of omniscience is not equivalent to chance. (4),
Freedom is the only solution of the divine omnipotence.

It was Bowne's contention that free creation is the
only solution of the problem of religion. From this point of
departure we first examine the problem of evil on the basis of
the pantheistic hypothesis which on examination is revealed to
be a form of absolutism and is therefore the denial of free
creation. The essence of pantheism is the affirmation that the
Divine Nature implies the system and all that belongs to it.
Thorough-going pantheism affirms "one uncreated substance, and
nothing else. This substance assumes various modes, but remains
all and in all." More descriptively defined, Bowne says it is
"The view that the world is a part of God is the common
factor in all theories of emanation, ancient and modern. As
the waves are a part of the ocean, or, better still, as each
finite space or time is a part of the one infinite space or
time, so each finite thing is a part or phase of the one
infinite existence. In each of these views God is
regarded as world-substance rather than first cause; and this
substance is conceived as a kind of plastic stuff or raw
material which, like clay, can be variously fashioned, and
which is at least partly exhausted in its products." 1

The two main types of pantheism are, first, the view that the
world is a part of God or a mode of God and, secondly, the view
that the world is a necessary consequence of the divine nature.

With respect to the first,
"We cannot, without annihilating self-contradiction, speak
of the one as dividing itself into the many, for thereby we
deny that it is the one. It is still worse when we speak
of it as remaining the one after the division, for thereby
we deny the division. Most pantheistic systems break down
at this point." 2

The second type divides into two forms described as static and
dynamic pantheism. Logical or static pantheism views the world

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as the implied conclusion of God the all-conditioning premise
while dynamic pantheism describes God as the all-conditioning
causality necessarily manifesting itself in the world of things.
Of these two forms, dynamic pantheism is the least objectionable.
Static pantheism is about equivalent to Eleaticism and was
largely basic to Spinoza's system. It ends in an unprogressive
and changeless conception of the universe and therefore every-
thing which exists is necessary and eternal. On the other
hand a dynamic pantheism is equally revealed to be a necessi-
tarian doctrine which denies self-determination and affirms a
universal metaphysical determinism into whose nature we have no
insight whatsoever. On the view of pantheism in any form, the
relation of God to the world is conceived to be such that finite
individuality is denied all independence, substantiality and
activity becomes merely a modal manifestation of the universal
activity of the absolute. Thus persons and things are but
products of the absolute energizing under fixed and immutable
laws. It is perfectly obvious what the status of the problem
of evil and error in this necessitarian scheme of things must be. In any event they become necessary and eternal for, even
on the view of dynamic pantheism, the dynamism remains
unintelligible except on the plane of free rational activity.
Then, too, self-determinism being denied, the unity of the absolute
is gone for only through the free and conscious self is real unity

2. Bowne, B. P., Theism, pp. 212, 265. Pantheism is
intrinsically related to determinism, fatalism, pessimism and
the denial of free creation while theism is intrinsically related
to purpose, plan, freedom, optimism and a free creation.
possible. Finally, metaphysical necessity of the mechanical type is an unclear and opaque notion which dethrones reason and, until freedom is restored as an implication of rationality, thought is impossible and then the universe becomes contingent rather than necessary. The bearing of pantheism upon the impersonal world of things is not so inhospitable to reason even though little can be made of the doctrine even here. But its bearing on the personal world, or the consequences of the pantheistic doctrine of man, is intolerable to reason. This is largely due to the fact that pantheistic theory is unable to escape mechanism and necessity.

"For self-determination being denied, we must find some ground for the changing activity of the infinite, and this can be found only in some metaphysical mechanism in the infinite whereby its states interact and determine outcome and directions. By this time the unity of the infinite has disappeared altogether; at all events, however much we might speak of its unity we should be quite unable to tell in what the unity consists. Finally the universal determinism involved in the theory would make the problem of evil and error unmanageable. This problem is not over transparent on the theistic theory; but theism does succeed in keeping evil and error out of God. Pantheism on the other hand, must carry them bodily into God. They are not the outcome of finite folly and frailty, but have their source and justification in the divine. Thus along with reason and righteousness in the infinite we have to posit unreason and unrighteousness, both alike necessary, and, for all we can see, both alike eternal. Whatever is foolish, irrational, base, and infamous in human thought and conduct, is rooted in the divine; and all the unsavory characters who have disgraced humanity are to be looked upon as setting forth and expressing the divine nature. Thus reason and conscience both perish as authoritative, and remain only as psychological facts along with other psychological facts, any one of which is as necessary as any other. The collapse is hopeless... Perhaps no philosophy is possible on any basis; it certainly is not possible on a pantheistic one."

Bowne's personalism thus had a two-fold motive. It was directed equally against pantheism and materialism. His thorough-going stress upon the free, self-determining activity of persons, the sacred and inviolable individuality of finite personality as over against the absolute in one direction and over against other finite persons in the other direction, made it forever impossible for the all-engulfing maw of the absolute to turn creation into "a vast dead sea occupied by God alone." He rejected pantheism as untenable in every form on the ground that its doctrines both of God and of man are incoherent and that the whole notion of reducing God to necessity means the utter collapse of reason on the problems of truth and error while man is but a mere appearance but no reality apart from his identity as a cosmic function.

On the theistic hypothesis of the relation of God to the world, the matter is fundamentally different. While for pantheism the world is either a part of God or a necessary consequence of the divine nature "Theism holds that the world is a free act and creation by God." It is the affirmation that a conscious and free intelligence better explains the facts than a blind automatic power. Instead of the world's being God or a part of God in outright identification, the world is posited or created by God and depends upon the divine will. At least four types of theism may be distinguished. Deism conceives the world

2. ibid., p. 218.
as created by God and thereafter existing independently of God for the most part. Theistic Idealism, or Personalism, holds "that the world is essentially a going forth of the divine causality under the forms of space and time, and in accordance with a rational plan."¹ The phenomenal world is spatially neither outside nor inside of God but in a non-presentable fashion depends upon the divine will just as our thoughts are neither spatially in or outside our minds but depend on the mind as their cause and subject. With respect to finite persons they have, just as the world, a measure both of dependence and independence with respect to the divine will but in any case they have substantial reality. Theistic Realism posits God as creator and in addition holds to a divine activity of conservation distinct from the creative act. Both persons and the world are objectively real. Absolute Theistic Idealism is a vergence on Pantheism denying all substantiality to the world and persons in the sense that they are a perpetual recreation.

The theistic doctrine of free creation points out a distinction between God and his creation which is of great importance in rendering our experience intelligible. On the one hand, finite persons experience a measure of self-control, volition and independent thought. On the other hand, this is only a relative dependence and

our life is not self-sufficient. This is demanded by the facts and to deny either independence or dependence does not stress the entire truth. "It is no doubt fine, and in some sense it is correct to say that God is in all things; but when it comes to saying that God is all things and that all forms of thought and feeling and conduct are his, then reason simply commits suicide."

The only harmonization of the two enduring facts of experience cited above is on the view of a free creation through which God provides a measure of finite freedom as well as a measure of finite dependence in personality. For it appears that freedom and reason are no less divorced in the solution of the problem of knowledge as such where it is shown clearly that both finite and infinite freedom must be maintained in order to make clear what is involved in knowing as well as in what is known. And it is only when religion is linked up with a satisfactory theory of knowledge that free reason can do anything at all with the problems of error and evil for which pantheism has only the merest verbal solution.

We are compelled to recognize a necessary and ineradicable dualism in our finite knowing. The problem created by this necessary dualism is to show how our ideas refer to their objects and to make clear if possible whether objective reference in thought inheres in any or a part or all of our ideas. In the knowing process it appears that minds and their objects are numerically and qualitatively distinct

and separate and that our ideas therefore mean to refer to something other than themselves. How this is possible constitutes a problem. The monistic epistemologies which have attempted a solution of this problem by affirming the numerical and qualitative identity of minds and their objects in the moment of knowing have usually proved to be empty verbalisms rather than real solutions of the problems involved in what it means to know. These unproductive attempts may be roughly classed as materialistic and idealistic with monisms ranging between these extremes partaking of one or the other points of view in indefinite degree. It is to be kept in mind that these monisms have usually gone down in their attempts to solve the problem of error. For whether minds be reduced to matter or matter be reduced to spirit in which case we have pan-objectivism or pan-subjectivism respectively, there is no way of explaining the problem of error for both true and false ideas are equally real and the mind is not free to exercise itself in the use of a criterion to differentiate between them. In the case of a materialistic epistemological monism, matter is made the true cause of personality or thinking substance which correctly grasps the extra-mental world. But materialism is a necessitarian system on which basis, as we have pointed out already, there is no ground for solving the problem of error for both truth and error are caused alike as effects. The newest advocates of material mind,
the neo-realists, at least in part, facing the implications of an epistemological monism, have boldly advocated the theory of the objectivity of error. Where perceiver and perception or idea and object are identical, both truth and error become objective which is equivalent to denying error for our ideas of errors cannot be erroneous. But an explanation of error which cancels reason by directing its powers against itself in explaining the facts of experience is hardly adequate. Nor is the case improved with the monism of pragmatic epistemology wherein the whole epistemological problem is solved by virtually ignoring it. On the other hand the monism of absolute idealistic epistemology is, like neo-realism, unable to solve the problem of error, for like it, error receives an objective status except that in this case it belongs to the experience of the Absolute. Furthermore, absolutism encounters the problem of evil for all experience belongs to the Infinite thus reading back into the character of God both reason and unreason and righteousness and unrighteousness alike. How truth and error and good and evil are to be reconciled coherently in the same experience constitutes a problem before which the human reason is impotent. The vulnerable point of every monistic epistemology is to be found in the problems of error and evil. A spiritual necessitarianism is in consequences identical


2. Spinoza, Hegel, Royce, Bradley and Bosanquet present systems in which the problems of evil and error reveal the difficulty encountered by absolute idealism.

3. Flewelling, R. T., Creative Personality, p. 131.
with a materialistic one.

The productive solution of the dualism in finite knowing Bowne discovered in positing a theistic monism which calls for an application of his doctrine of free creation. "The dualism of the human subject and the cosmic object is at once transcended and explained in the unity of the absolute subject." While we are committed to hold this conclusion with clear insight and conviction, Bowne admits that a great depth of mystery surrounds personality at this point. It has the advantage, however, of not ruling personality out of the universe as pan-objectivism does. Free creation is the only solution which harmonizes thought and thing. Knowledge is impossible where the cosmic object and the absolute subject are separated by distinctions of independent being. This is admitted. But if they are united to render knowledge possible it is then impossible to separate them again. Free creation cuts the Gordian knot. Since the absolute subject produces the cosmic object and the cosmic object is so related to the human subject that each in a sense exists for the other, the problem of knowledge at least becomes intelligible. How free creation is possible is not the philosopher’s problem because it lies beyond his ken. It is rather his duty to evaluate and interpret experience as far as possible. Nevertheless in the notion of free creation there is

1. Flewelling, R.T., Creative Personality, pp. 132-133.
involved no contradiction. The answer to the questions 
How is creation possible? How can the fundamental reality create 
its own objects or become its own subjects? or, What is the 
structure of the infinite reason implying the possibility of 
the finite system? can only be found on the view that the 
category of possibility is conditioned by a free rational 
nature guided by rational purpose of sufficient dignity to 
justify itself. Since, therefore, all verbal monisms shatter 
themselves on the problem of error, "Every theory of knowledge 
must reach the theistic conclusion or suffer collapse."

Free creation not only transcends the dualism of finite 
knowing thereby maintaining the integrity of knowledge, but it also 
preserves finite as well as infinite freedom. This is necessary in 
order to prevent the collapse of reason since, as we have seen, it is 
the most reasonable solution of the problem of error, and free 
creation is equally necessary in order to prevent ethical or moral 
collapse because it affords the most reasonable solution of the 
problem of evil. Finite freedom accounts for much that is 
fallible in experience for it is possible that reason makes errors 
in judging and it also places certain aspects of the problem of 
evil upon individual persons who are responsible for it. Unless 
freedom is a fact we cannot keep either error or evil from becoming 
entirely cosmic on which ground we must reconcile all contradictions

2. Flewelling, R.T., Creative Personality, p. 133.
in the nature and character of God. At this point reason as we have seen suffers collapse.

Our discussion of freedom and creation up to this point has been largely in connection with the ultimate reality and its activities. We now consider the possibility of freedom and creativity in finite persons. One of the purest illustrations of freedom we have discovered to be revealed in the operation of pure thought as a self-directing activity which proceeds according to laws inherent in itself and to ideals generated by itself. We can only understand creative activity from the analogy of our own experience according to which we first form conceptions and then realize them. The creativity of the human mind does not always imply freedom. The creative activity of thought requires that our knowledge of nature result from the operation of the forms and categories and the laws of thought. Thus the mind is active and creative only in the sense that it furnishes the laws or fixities according to which experience is possible. Freedom is not involved in such mechanisms and uniformities as these. Nor must we regard the will as the creator of ideals always generated by itself. External authority in various forms presents ideas which we may, true enough, freely reject or appropriate but which in no sense have been freely created by us. The question of whether or not we must be free in order to realize these ideals is a question

1. Bowne, B. P., Theism, p. 130.
which we shall later show involves fundamentally the notion of freedom. If the finite person has any free creative activity it is extremely limited since our choices in respect to creation are but the conditions of the operation of universal creation.

The nature of our difficulty at this point lies in the insoluble character of the structure of the divine reason which makes creation possible. We are under the necessity of positing a rational nature upon which all possibility depends including that of creation but the necessity of freedom in such a rational creation is evident in order to escape the fatalism of the purely logical reason. Also in order to escape the abyss of chance and arbitrariness we must seek the union of the uniformities of the mind with the freedom of volition in the notion of purpose, which itself is determined by the notion of the good. While this constitutes our idea of free creation, it is far from insight into what the purpose is or its relations to the supreme good. The mystery which surrounds this theory of speculation commends itself on its freedom from contradictions. We require that ultimate reality be constituted of free, purposive, ethical and rational intelligence even though the inter-relations of these are not absolutely known. This, then, is the only view which renders knowledge possible. To what extent freedom and creativity are needed from the infinite point of view is relatively clear in view of the demands of speculative reason. How far such a notion is

applicable to the finite subject requires cautious procedure to determine. At any rate where the choices of finite wills account for moral evil, the problem is greatly lessened even though the question of natural evil remains very difficult on any point of view even that of theism. The creative activity of which finite persons are capable insofar as freedom is concerned is largely limited to that of choice. This notion is not uncommon in contemporary thought.

"That the human mind, in its highest flights, creates new things, thinks in ways that have never been thought before, seem undeniable in face of any of the great works of genius... Why should we doubt that organic evolution is a creative process and that Mind is the creative agency?"  

Again, "the self is the cause of its own actions; and each action, although connected with the past, is yet a true choice determined by itself, a new creation." The notions of purpose, freedom and creativity are brought together in such a way that the possibility of creative choice is involved in free intelligence. On the part of finite beings therefore we do not postulate creation other than in an ideal sense remotely analogous to that of the infinite creativity. Here freedom of choice is accompanied by a power to act which is uniquely different from anything which we know, yet is a fact which in terms of personality we can only partially appreciate. But the creative activity for which freedom is thought to call by many recent writers must be scrutinized with the utmost
"The freedom is not the freedom of such outright creative power as some of the pluralists have clamored for. It is the freedom to choose among and use the forces of the world. . . . Men cannot indeed create, in the outright sense, but they can produce, and production is but slightly inferior to outright creation."

Thus the scientist creates no chemical or physical powers but he can take the relations existing between things in space and time and employ them in such a way that changes are produced not only in the subject matter of the special sciences but also in that of the humanitarian sciences. Now, finite freedom, continually playing into this order of law, may produce changes through the manipulation of relations and laws in two directions. By taking advantage of known laws, finite choices can produce changes and results little less than outright creation and, on the other hand, finite choices may put energies to such use that the changes resulting are virtually equivalent to outright destruction. Although finite freedom continually plays into an order of law and does not in this sense violate the doctrine of the conservation of energy but produces effects which are equivalent to production or destruction, creation or annihilation, man is not in any complete and absolute sense of the word either a creator or a destroyer.

In reviewing the effects produced by man in both his physical and spiritual heredity and environment, it appears that human freedom

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2. Bowne, B. P., Theism, p. 232. "Cosmogenies . . . relate only to the transforming and combining of given material, and say nothing concerning its origination."
however limited constitutes a possibility of such magnitude in a world like ours that no adequate comprehension of the idea can be formed. Freedom thus becomes the locus of a possibility with infinite consequences both physical and spiritual even though the actual amount of freedom be very little. Yet, despite our cautious discrimination between free creation in God and free creation in man, no less a thinker than Professor W. E. Hocking, stating the significance of the active mind, says,

"It is the locus of freedom; for it is the self's determination of its own degree of being. In the free action of mind there is a genuine addition to being. If the world of the possible were that alleged eternal and infinite reservoir of essences, there could be no genuine creation or novelty: action would be limited to marking out certain preexistent ideas as candidates for being. But when we see that the genuinely possible is only what is conceived possible, every hitherto unthought-of possibility appears as an absolute creation. The mind adds to the actual by first adding to the possible. In this view of things, art acquires a new importance for the constitution of the future world; -- it is one of the major avenues of metaphysical birth."  

At this point, much water has flowed under the bridge since Bowne's day but the notion of freedom and creativity is obviously an extension of Bowne's system which is perfectly legitimate and which does not do violence to the substructure of his thought. Care to differentiate between human and divine volition is the one thing needful to save an otherwise valuable concept from shipwreck.

The extension of Bowne's doctrine of freedom and creativity is especially stressed in the works of two of his

students, R. T. Flewelling and G. A. Wilson. Professor Wilson finds the intimacy between these two notions so pronounced that where we find the one we are practically certain to find the other. This is true because a truly free act is just what is meant by the creative in that what was before ideal is now made to exist. "Practically, then, if not also logically, freedom means creativity and creativity means freedom." It is important to note that the dependence of the finite person upon the supreme person does not invalidate this claim. Finite creativity is not merely a refashioning of a preexisting raw material nor is it the creation of the forms of existence out of pure emptiness, but the new creation, whatever it is, results as a free cooperation between finite persons and the Supreme Person. In a sense all experience involves such a cooperation and one of the most significant forms of creative activity by the self consists in the apprehension of other selves. We may distinguish between the creativity of finite selves and the creative activity of God but the distinction affords no insight into how any sort of creation in an ultimate sense is possible. It is nevertheless undeniable, it seems, that contingency is the sole condition of the production of the novel and unique.

The problem of finite freedom and the divine foreknowledge constitutes one of the oldest and most difficult of the

1. Creative Personality.
2. The Self and Its World.
3. ibid., p. 346.
speculative problems of philosophy and theology. That the last word has not been said on the subject of freedom is nowhere more apparent than at this point although there may be other places where wise words spoken on the subject of freedom are of greater practical value. The problem involved is, briefly, How is foreknowledge of a free act possible? Is it possible that the divine knowledge of those independent forms of finite experience not ascribed to the infinite is a fact and, if so, does this not cancel human freedom? Respecting the solution of this problem, Bowne felt that "To press this difficulty would make an impassable gulf between the finite and the Infinite; and to solve it is beyond us, except in a formal way." Further, he argued that "A foreknowledge of freedom cannot be proved to be a contradiction; and on the other hand it cannot be construed in its possibility." At best we can only understand what the question means as it is felt by the reason as a problem requiring a solution. This, like many others of the persistent problems of philosophy, merely shows that the solution of the problem of freedom in certain of its aspects at least consists mainly in getting the problem properly stated and understood. While foreknowledge of a free act has never been proved a contradiction and it has likewise never been proved that the inability to foresee a free choice would seriously impede the divine economy, the problem of freedom and

1. Bowne, B.F., Theism, p. 188.
foreknowledge is not to be lightly dismissed.

"The problem here is not lightly to be pushed to one side. It profoundly disturbs multitudes of earnest believers, anxious to provide for the dignity of man on the one hand and for the sovereignty of God on the other. We are here largely in a realm where our personal preferences will decide our choices. If any sacrifice has to be made, I personally should prefer the sacrifice of the divine omniscience rather than human freedom."¹

Perhaps the strongest argument for the divine nescience of future finite free acts of the last generation was presented by Lorenzo ² Dow McCabe whose position was that freedom and foreknowledge are incompatible. But there is freedom. Hence, a foreknowledge of free acts is impossible.

Foreknowledge of a free act must at the outset be distinguished from the cognate themes, fore-ordination and pre-destination. It was the confusion of these problems with that of foreknowledge to which Bowne objected on the ground that the problem is cancelled thereby and that its data are destroyed. Historically, three theories of the solution of freedom and the divine foreknowledge have been developed. Foreknowledge has been asserted while freedom has been denied. Freedom has been asserted while foreknowledge has been denied. And, finally, both freedom and foreknowledge have been affirmed. Bowne's contention was that the problem can be intelligently discussed only in connection with

² The Knowledge of God and Cognate Themes, Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden, 1878.
⁴ Bowne, B.F., Philosophy of Theism, p. 158. Theism, p. 189.
the category of time, itself a most difficult and intricate problem on any philosophical point of view which deals seriously with the problem. We first consider the doctrine of foreknowledge as applied to freedom where time is considered as objective and real. The untenable and contradictory character of foreknowledge of a truly free act becomes apparent on the realistic view of time when we recall our definition of freedom.

"By definition a free act is an absolute beginning, and as such is not represented by anything before its occurrence. We trace it to a specific volition, and beyond that it has neither existence nor representation."

Now by omniscience is meant "a knowledge of all things and of all events, past, present, and future, necessary and free alike."

But how can a free act as an absolute beginning be known as a future event where there are no present grounds for knowing? The knowledge of a future event always supposes present grounds for knowing. But in the case of a free act there are no such grounds which means that foreknowledge of free acts would have to be possible without any grounds of knowing so far as we can tell.

The only possible solution of this problem on the realistic view of time would be to assume that God's modes of knowing are incomprehensible to us. On the realistic view of time for God as well as for man, foreknowledge of a free act appears to be a contra-

2. ibid., p. 187.
diction unless we say that God's ways of knowing future events are not conditioned by existing grounds while ours are which is tantamount to saying that we give up the problem as insoluble. If we say that the future is present with God we say what is not true if time is real and such a knowledge could only be an hallucination. In fact, a true act of free will rarely occurs in daily life, and when it does, we have no grounds of certainty but only a varying degree of probability in foretelling what persons will do. No one knows better than the good man himself whose character appears so dependable from without, that is, to be determined by the good, how easy it is for him to choose something else. To say that our foreknowledge is conditioned by present grounds of knowing while God's is of another sort is merely to admit the inconceivability of foreknowledge of freedom. On the realistic conception of time, the future cannot be present with God, hence to say that the future is present to God violates the point of view. Two alternatives of the argument are open at this point of the discussion. One may conclude that foreknowledge of free acts is incomprehensible but nevertheless accept it. Or, one may accept the point of view that because foreknowledge of free acts is incomprehensible, it must therefore be denied.

We must next examine the category of possibility as the meaning of the divine foreknowledge. No one has ever thought of excluding from this question more than the possible exception of

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the free choices and acts of finite persons. This exception granted, the divine knowledge would still be virtually omniscient. The question grows, not out of our inability to conceive the past and the present as open to omniscience, but out of our inability to picture the possible as fully known as the equivalent of foreknowledge of freedom. Or, as Bowne tersely puts it, "The difficulty with foreknowledge of free acts, is, therefore, not that it destroys freedom, but that the notion is essentially absurd and contradictory."  

The objection to limiting the divine omniscience to the category of possibility Bowne indicates as resting upon two errors, first, the habit of substituting etymology for logic which, in the case of omniscience, consists in affirming essentially absurd and contradictory interpretations of it based on dictionary definitions instead of interpreting it as a logical philosophical concept; secondly, the imaginary demand for reverence which too is based upon sheer thoughtlessness and which, instead of receiving philosophical correction and instruction, falls back upon the imaginary demands of reverence. According to the demands of logic, foreknowledge of all the acts of free beings are possible but not certain since by definition these acts are contingent and hence unknowable until enacted.

"The possible, therefore, cannot become the certain in the divine mind until the free will has transferred it from the realm of the possible to the realm of fact. Apart from this view, the doctrine of divine guidance in the affairs of men is without meaning."  

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2. Ibid., p. 73.
On this point of view, omniscience is a conception of knowledge which embraces all reality in all its aspects and possibilities including not only what is but what is implied in what is and all which can ever develop from what is. Thus from the beginning all the possible acts and their consequences of free creatures will be known as possible but they cannot be known as certain because by definition free acts are contingent. Thus they are truly known only when they become real and, prior to that, they are in fact only possibilities and can only be knowledge in that sense. Bowne contended that the interpretation of foreknowledge in terms of the category of possibility is a limitation more apparent than real due to our habit of reasoning prejudicially rather than logically.

It now remains to consider the objections urged against the limitation of God's foreknowledge to the category of possibility. It is said that such a conception requires us to postulate God's knowledge as growing and changing. Here again the difficulty in our thought can be removed by learning to unthink some old ways of thinking in the interest of accommodating our theories to the facts of experience. If time and change are true categories, a corresponding change in the divine knowledge is inescapable. To the argument that God's purpose is from everlasting and that the notion of God's eternal thought denies change and time may be replied that such knowledge reveals only the end of creation and denies the changing process whereby thought is realized. Remaining true to what is meant
by the free as foreknown, we must insist that the free be known as free and contingent and that it is only when the overt act appears that contingency disappears. Free acts flow into an order of law and can never cease to be so that God's experience of those acts as possible and contingent is not the same as his knowledge of them as facts. The divine foreknowledge consists in knowing the possibilities of the created will so that everything which happens God has foreseen as possible but which he has never before seen as actual. The passage from the possible to the actual is by means of the free will of the finite person. Therefore a free act on account of its contingent nature is not proper knowledge as certain before it becomes a fact and is to be described as a possibility if we hold true to what we mean by knowledge and if we hold true to what the facts demand. That God's foreknowledge of freedom must be known as free and contingent as we have defined the category of possibility as opposed to fact and reality and, as such, is derogatory to the divine character is no essential part of the conclusion to which we have come.

There remains a point of criticism with respect to Bowne's summary dismissal of the problem of the divine foreknowledge in connection with the category of time.

"All this on the supposition of a single, all-conditioning time. On our own view of the ideality and relativity of time the problem vanishes in its traditional form, and nothing remains but the general mystery which shrouds for us the epistemology of the Infinite and the existence of the finite."

While Bowne accepted the doctrine of the ideality of time, he considerably modified its conventional form. This appears in his own argument for it has been noted how, on the reality of time, he abandons the problem and yet his own doctrine of time provides for real change and for real time under which change becomes intelligible. He argues that free choices involve changes of the sort in which all cannot be foreseen. This, he contends, extends to the divine foreknowledge which requires that, however this be construed in terms of the divine knowing, it is a lack of foreknowledge on the part of God to the extent already stated. Just how to harmonize his contention that foreknowledge of free acts cannot be proven contradictory but on the other hand cannot be construed in its possibility with what he wrote eight years previously to the effect that foreknowledge of free acts does not destroy freedom but that the notion is essentially absurd and contradictory is not clear except that his own thought had changed in the meantime. His suggestion that God's ways of knowing must be inscrutable to us on the theory that time is real is modified to mean on his conception of the ideality of time to retain a sufficiently realistic view of time to make time and change facts which condition in some sense the knowledge of God even though Bowne admitted that the nature of the divine volition or the psychology of the absolute remains somewhat obscure.

One aspect of the category of possibility remains to be examined, that is that the meaning which we have attached to omniscience is not equivalent to that of chance. The identification of the category of possibility with chance is an outcome of confusing the abstract notion of freedom with real freedom. Here as elsewhere, in his characteristic fashion, Bowne calls attention to the extremely narrow limits of freedom. Bowne points out that the order of our own thoughts is largely beyond our control as well as are the existence and order of our feelings which are still more mechanical. The laws of our own nature are determined as well as are the laws of external nature. Therefore, since we can originate no new and unforeseen possibilities, to limit divine foreknowledge does not reduce the universe to chaos. "It is, then, sheer cant or thoughtlessness, to claim that to limit foreknowledge is to endanger the universe." Nor does God's foreknowledge of the possible only as possible mean that God has no foreknowledge of any kind. Here, as elsewhere, real or concrete freedom and uniformity unite in rationality, and, therefore, chance is not implied in freedom as we have expounded it in relation to free acts which are foreknown. And our conclusion is that some modified form of the ideality of time is the only condition of the tenability of the doctrine of foreknowledge as related to the problem of freedom.

Freedom and the divine omnipotence constitute a

problem about which the changed temper of our own age has required extensive reconstruction. One of the strongest arguments for the illusory character of freedom is to be found in the defense of a certain type of belief about the divine omnipotence on the ground that freedom constitutes a finite power which would endanger the divine sovereignty and upset the plans of the universe. In view of this it is necessary to state in what a fully philosophically instructed definition of omnipotence is to consist. On the one hand common sense has tended, through dictionary appeal, to inflate omnipotence to the point of including the power to do not only the possible and the impossible but the consistent and the absurd with equal facility. On the other hand we find the notion that God has the power to do what can be done but that he cannot transcend the limitation of certain necessities which are likely self-existent and eternal. Dissatisfied with what is here thought to be an untenable subordination of God, the tendency to swing back to the opposite view whereby God transcends all limitations enabling him to do anything and everything. But this view means the utter annihilation of reason itself. We have already pointed out that the category

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of possibility and the category of necessity constitute not only doubtful categories but become unclear and unmanageable theses excepting when conceived as based upon the self-determination of a free agent and when the necessity is conceived as rational in character. If limitation is imposed upon the divine power, its meaning can consist only in the necessities of reason described as eternal truths. By these God is conditioned and these impose a limitation on all power, human or divine. This is the meaning of omnipotence which we now examine in conjunction with freedom. Our conclusion that the world ground is a unity excludes pluralism in fundamental being which furnishes the basis for the further conclusion that rational necessity and eternal truth are united in the unitary nature of fundamental being in such a way that rational principles or fundamental laws of the divine activity constitute the fixed modes of its procedure. A rational nature conceived under the form of a fixed law of activity or mode of manifestation involves no limitation of God.

"But a nature in the sense of a fixed law of activity or mode of manifestation involves no such limitation. This is best seen in a concrete case. Thinking, we say, is governed by the laws of thought. But these laws are not anything either out of the mind or in the mind. We feel them neither as an external yoke nor as an internal limitation. The reason is that they are essentially only modes of thought activity, and are reached as formal laws by abstraction from the process of thinking. The basal fact is a thought activity, and reflection shows that this has certain forms. These are next erected into laws and imposed on the mind; and then the fancy
arises that they are limitations and hindrances to knowledge. In fact, however, they do not rule intellect, but only express what intellect is. Nor is the mind ever so conscious of itself as self-guiding and self-controlled as when conducting a clear process of thought. It would be a strange proposition to free the mind and enlarge knowledge by annulling the laws of thought."¹

The laws of intelligence are therefore only expressions of its nature, not hindrances to knowledge and the laws of thought are no barrier to thought which is conscious of itself as self-guided and self-controlled.

We can do nothing with the notion of divine omnipotence on the basis of the abstract manipulation of the categories of possibility and necessity. And, when the problem is made concrete according to the way in which we build up our finite experience of power, just as was seen in the case of our notion of omniscience, we discover that the principles of freedom and necessity must unite in the rationality of the divine omnipotence. The notion of divine omnipotence independent of uniformity reduces to pure arbitrariness and the virtual destruction of reason itself. On the other hand, when we try to think this notion independently of freedom, the universe reduces to pure necessity which is equally the destruction of reason. Freedom and necessity appear to be contradictory and mutually exclusive as determinations of being only when considered as abstractions or as etymological deductions and in

both these cases these have nothing to do necessarily with their logical implications. Finite experience reveals the only ideas of necessity and self-determination that we know. The personal as real reveals, therefore, these formally opposite ideas united in actual experience. Buttressing spontaneous thought there follows reflective thought which confirms the testimony of experience that rational existence is conditioned by both ideas. We are not, however, to conclude because reason is shown to be possible only through the union of fixity and freedom, that these ideas are preexistent factors out of which the rational life is constituted. The fundamental reality is the rational life itself and freedom and necessity are aspects of it which, when viewed as antithetical, are only apparently so to uncritical thought but are in reality united and transparent to the order of reason.

"Here, as elsewhere, we must avoid abstractions and must fall back on experience for the concrete meaning of our terms. If we consult the dictionary only, we may easily persuade ourselves that fixity and freedom are incompatible; but if we consult experience, we shall find that we cannot dispense with either. To give freedom any significance it must be based on uniformity or fixity; and to give this fixity any value it must be allied with freedom. Pure necessity cancels reason. Pure arbitrariness cancels reason. It is only in the union of fixity and freedom that the rational life is possible; or rather it is only as the rational life has these opposite aspects that it exists. They are not preexistent factors out of which the rational life is made; they are only antithetical aspects of the rational life; and this is

the essential and only reality in the case."

Bowne concludes that what is true for finite persons in a limited sense is absolutely true for God. This requires us to summarize briefly the result to which we have come in regard to the rational finite person in whom the meaning of the union of freedom and necessity has been made clear. Volition cannot overthrow or reverse the fixed, secure, absolute, inviolable laws of thought in the nature of reason. Notwithstanding this fact, these laws do not function automatically in the attainment of truth. Therefore, in addition to the laws of reason, a ratifying act of corresponding self-determination by the free spirit is required to make a rational soul. We do not in the least weaken this conclusion by admitting that the possibility of the union of freedom and necessity in finite rational life, by means of which act the free spirit constitutes himself a rational soul, is inconstruable. This mystery is nevertheless a fact of experience which is always the last court of appeal in the sense that the data of the problem are always to be discovered here whether that experience be referred to in its ordinary connotation or as transcendental empiricism.

If we now carry this conclusion into our conception of the rational Infinite or Supreme Person, we conclude that

2. ibid., p. 198. This is one of the most unequivocal of Bowne's statements that the personal is the truly real. "What is true for ourselves in a limited degree, we may regard as absolutely true for God."
the presence of the free absolute will of God is likewise necessary in order to validate and to reify the otherwise powerless necessities of the divine being. God is thus absolute will, self-caused, absolute agent forever self-determining according to the necessities of rational and eternal principles, the perfect union of freedom and necessity. This is our idea of personality in its perfection.

Two criticisms may be brought against Bowne's teaching about freedom and the divine power. We call attention to the too inclusive character of the argument that what is true for finite persons in a limited degree is absolutely true for God. In the first place, unless the whole of Bowne's system is critically brought before the mind in its entirety at this point, it might appear that the argument cancels theism and again returns to pantheism. That is, if "what" (note the universal form of the proposition as Bowne stated it) is true of finite beings in a limited degree may be regarded as absolutely true for God, it is equivalent to saying just the opposite of what Bowne's entire philosophy was designed to achieve. But Bowne would not have us infect the divine character with all our finite limitations. In the second place such a notion violates our ideal of the divine etiquette. We may correct the matter by calling attention to Bowne's distinction between the use of crass and spiritual anthropomorphism and also between human and
divine volition. If we keep ethics and reason closely linked together, there is no objection to the study of personality human and divine as herein set forth. We finally call attention to the question of the cogency of an analogical argument of the sort here employed. Aristotle used analogy (ἦναίγνωσις) as a form of inference and discovery and since his day it has become almost universal in the realm of human inquiry. "It has always played an especially significant rôle in theology." While this method of reasoning may commit the fallacies of false analogy and of falling into hasty generalization, it cannot be gainsaid that it nevertheless lies at the very basis of deductive and inductive procedure and is one of the most fruitful methods of inquiry for suggesting hypotheses in science and philosophy and religion. The cogency of the hypothesis here set forth which requires the union of freedom and necessity in ethical personality rests upon its ability not to explain all problems for which it is proposed as an explanation, much less does it aim to be an explanation of the explanation, but it is advanced as the most coherent interpretation of most of the difficult problems of philosophy. If the divine omnipotence is under the control of an absolutely ethical and rational will, freedom is the one condition under which we can think the world as creative and in the highest sense of the word purposive.

In order to unify the career of reason in connection with freedom as its analytically necessary precondition and apart from which it must collapse, we call attention directly to the relation between freedom and rational ideals. The argument thus far shows conclusively how rational ideals are fundamentally conditioned by the truth of reason. Free activity is the condition of the formation of any rational ideal. This must be so because freedom has been shown to be the sole condition of the possibility of discovering any distinction between truth and error. In the face of the nature of the evidence which has been educed in favor of this point, we can no longer argue with one who refuses to recognize the grounds of both life and reason as having any imperative claims worthy of consideration. Any rational ideal requires that the distinction between truth and error be made apparent, otherwise the ideal loses its significance entirely. Then, too, freedom not only conditions the power to form rational ideals but is the condition of the appropriation of any rational ideal. To refuse to think annuls the entire problem for the rational ideal is a product of choosing to think and the assumption of the responsibility for consistent thinking. But thinking becomes enigmatic and puerile apart from freedom. The ideal is not possessed by persons apart from a free act of

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1. Brightman, E.S., A Philosophy of Ideals, p. 84.
ratification and acknowledgment of it as belonging to them. The individual finds that he must be free to accept the ideal as his and to recognize it as such before responsibility can be attached. Then, finally, freedom enters as the condition of the realization of ideals. The execution of the ideal requires the selection of that action which conforms to the adopted pattern. This means that an ideal, in order to be realized, implies a freely chosen purpose which is freely sustained and this in turn requires the free choice of the means necessary to its achievement. Unless the will is free to accept and reject in every stage of the attainment of the ideal that which does or does not conform respectively to the purpose in the light of the chosen ideal, there can be no such thing as knowledge of any sort whether our ideal be that of scientific knowledge or of moral knowledge or of philosophical knowledge or of religious knowledge. We have therefore shown that freedom is basic to the ideals of reason and that the career of reason in science, morality, philosophy and religion respectively and, in fact, in all rational ideals is involved in the fact of freedom.

Reconstruction of the Problem of Freedom

In the Light of Present Insight.

The fundamental conclusions reached concerning the

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deep speculative significance of freedom may be summarized as follows. We call attention first to four significant conclusions which show its deep speculative significance for epistemology. First, the essential trustworthiness of reason presupposes that thought is a free activity based on rational insight and on no other condition can the reason be considered trustworthy. Secondly, the necessary epistemological dualism involved in our finite knowing finds its only possible solution in the metaphysical notion of a free creator. Thirdly, the primacy of the moral or practical reason requires freedom to prevent life from falling into collapse due to inner contradiction. Fourthly, the creative activity of thought is conditioned by both freedom and necessity but the active mind as free is the condition of the production, emergence, novelty and change in the world which is little less than outright creation. We secondly call attention to the deep speculative significance of freedom for metaphysics. First, freedom is the condition of any real explanation. Secondly, in personality we find the only union of the categories of change and identity. That is, free creative intelligence, through self-consciousness, can maintain its identity through change. Thirdly, the rational demand for unity is conditioned upon freedom for free conscious self-hood is the only real unity which we know and reason reveals it to be the only individual and concrete reality capable of a
true unity. Here we find in free intelligence the source of both unity and plurality and capable, through self-consciousness, of maintaining its unity as over against plurality. Fourthly, the notion of causation ends in infinite regress and self-contradiction unless elevated to the personal and volitional plane. Fifthly, the highest type of purpose, that of rational intelligence, involves freedom. Sixthly, creation implies freedom in the structure of the divine reason which makes creation possible. Seventhly, the doubtful categories of possibility and necessity are meaningless and unmanageable theses and find no clear meaning except when based upon the self-determination of a free agent and rational necessity.

Free personality is the key to reality, or free self-activity is a basic postulate of Bowne's metaphysical system. He made freedom equal in importance with self-consciousness. Further, he made freedom the fundamental presupposition of epistemology. He also made freedom the fundamental presupposition of metaphysics for only the free is the truly real. These three conclusions following as a result of the nature of personality are sufficient to constitute personalism a unique doctrine in connection with its bearing upon the postulate of freedom.

Freedom as a principle for extending any rational knowledge is indispensable. The permanent significance of any rational science is conditioned by a free rational ideal apart
from which the mind loses its integrity not only for science but for any field of knowledge whatsoever. And this leads to the insight that freedom has a permanent significance for all philosophy. Nor is this the whole truth for freedom as a Gedankenmethode is not capable of adequate appreciation. "The factor introduced by human freedom, then, is one of whose possibilities we can form no adequate ideal." It is not unreasonable to say that freedom is the condition of indefinite progress or the extension of rational knowledge in any and all directions and apart from which the career of reason is terminated. Mental evolution especially must be grounded in freedom and can continue only so long as it is so conditioned. Instead of freedom being enfant terrible of science, it is finally revealed to be the Siamese twin of its soul. All valid science is a product of thought and it is in thinking that we discover the purest illustration of freedom. "We direct and maintain attention, we criticize the successive steps of the argument, we look before and after, we think twice and reserve our decisions. The process goes on within reason itself, reason supplying the motive, the norm, and the driving force."

1. McConnell, Bishop F.J., Is God Limited? p. 118. Bowne, B.P., Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 229. "Since, then, the very nature of explanation refers us to facts and processes outside of itself as its own foundation, we need not be concerned at finding in freedom a fact which admits of no deduction or comprehension, -- a fact to be recognized and admitted, not deduced or comprehended." Metaphysics, rev. ed., pp. 416-417.

It is only as the free and active mind is able to posit a rational ideal and then control the condition of its realization that knowledge is extended.

With these conclusions before us the case for freedom can be more adequately formulated than Bowne's conclusion which argues that the contradictory of freedom can lead at best to no more than a drawn battle. It is true enough that freedom and necessity are both improved hypotheses or ideals of explanation neither of which in the nature of the case can be absolutely proven. But if there be no better argument for freedom than to say that its contradictory is unable to demonstrate the falsity of freedom the ground for freedom itself is in danger. For the disproof of mechanism does not necessarily prove the truth of freedom, nor does the truth of mechanism within limits disprove the fact of freedom. On the other hand, freedom if considered to be proved need not disprove the truth of mechanism. If freedom is true it must be true for good reasons and this is equally binding upon the argument for necessity. Even though it is an assumption that reality is rational and even though this is an ideal which can only be partially achieved, the relative coherence of freedom as an hypothesis can be shown to explain the relevant facts far more satisfactorily than on any other view.

With the scope and content of Bowne's doctrine

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1. Royce, Josiah, Studies of Good and Evil, pp. 128, 136-137.
before us we may now direct our study to the question of the superiority of Bowne's doctrine of freedom when compared with leading contemporary theories. Despite the fact that the last word, even today, remains unsaid concerning the problem of freedom and further that it is frankly recognized that we lack an actual test by which a problem such as this can be solved, we at the same time recognize that "The problem of freedom, both in its narrow sphere of personal free-will and in its larger social significance, is one which has merited the attention of all peoples in history." The attitude of modern philosophy toward the problem of freedom is well stated by A. Fouillée: "The problem which we are going to discuss is not only a philosophical problem; it is, par excellence, the problem for philosophy. All the other questions are bound up with this." The manner in which Fouillée here speaks characterizes not only modern French philosophy in which freedom is the central problem but also to a very large extent German, English and American philosophy during the same period. Two factors contributed to the re-opening of the problem of freedom in modern and contemporary philosophical thought. First, the scientific dogmatism which affirmed determinism, in such a way that personality as respects man's actions, beliefs and morals

1. Brightman, E.S., A Philosophy of Ideals, p. 199.
2. Carr, H.W., Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics, p. 100.
became intolerable, inevitably led to a restudy of the problem of freedom. Secondly, the unsatisfactory solution of the problem as philosophers inherited it from Kant required the attempt at a more satisfactory solution of the problem of freedom. The extent to which the problem of freedom has become the central problem in modern philosophy may be seen in the following list of defenders of the doctrine in one form or another. Practically all the great modern thinkers in France have made freedom the central problem in their philosophy: Cournot, Renouvier, Ravaission, Lachelier, Fouillée, Boutroux, Blondel, Brochard and Henri Bergson have produced powerful dialectic in its defense. In Germany, Hans Driesch, Müller-Freienfels, Jung, Lotze, Nicolai Hartmann and N. Lossky defend in their writings some form of freedom. In England, W. R. Boyce Gibson, J. S. Mackenzie, Louis Arnaud Reid, Martineau, C. A. Richardson, James Seth, W. E. Johnson, William Brown, and W. R. Sorley defend in their writings the doctrine of freedom. In America, James, Royce, M. W. Calkins, Bowne, and the personalistic school, Peirce, E. G. Spaulding, William McDougall and W. E. Hocking have all defended freedom in their writings. From this imposing array of modern and contemporary scholarship, it will serve our purpose to select only a few whose positions serve by way of comparison and contrast with that of Bowne to

evaluate the latter's teaching about freedom.

In the writings of M. Bergson, we find an outstanding contemporary statement of the problem of freedom as it has developed through the work of many of his colleagues yet modified in several important respects by his own point of view. Freedom is described largely in terms of spontaneity, hazard, chance and an ambiguous future in its cosmic implications. "The portals of the future stand wide open, the future is being made." This means that there is a place for creative evolution, development, novelty and real beginnings. But at this point M. Bergson breaks with a doctrine of freedom like that of Renouvier and prefers to follow Guyau in the denial of the doctrine of Providence and prevision, holding that his tychism implies only nouveauté in the universe. He denies outright the position of determinism and affirms a doctrine of contingency in both nature and personality. But in his supreme stress upon the reality of freedom, unlike Boutroux, M. Bergson completely excludes all question of teleology. He argues that freedom is not a datum of experience either directly or indirectly since it is a power anterior to acts. The view of freedom which he expounds is largely independent of all religious implications. The solution of the problem cannot be understood apart from his view of the notion of change, or la durée. The liberating objective of M. Bergson's freedom is the attempt to provide a place for the

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freedom of the human will as a creative activity in the universe which delivers us from the physical determinism of the natural sciences and consequently necessity and fatalism and from the psychological determinism of associationalistic or atomistic psychology. We are indeterminate creative spirits with great power of creation but M. Bergson is careful to deny in free creativity all finalism and teleology which he regards as merely a reversed mechanism. M. Bergson teaches absolute contingency in his evolution of the world, but, nevertheless, his anti-teleological conception of the world has opened his system to the charge of pessimism however freedom and the notion of progress, possibility and development also make for optimism.

There is little to add to James' doctrine of freedom after that of M. Bergson has been understood except to point out that James did not accept such a thorough-going doctrine of indeterminism or absolute contingency as that expounded by M. Bergson who so greatly influenced him. Nevertheless James' doctrine of freedom is characterized by placing determinism and freedom in antithesis "whereas the true antithesis is between determinism and indeterminism."

Bowne's historical connection with M. Bergson and James was stated in the section on his relation to modern philosophy. We reserved for this section of the study a

critical comparison of their ideas about freedom. M. Bergson and James represent largely anti-intellectualistic revolts against naturalism on the one hand and absolute idealism on the other. Bowne, in his attempt to unite rationalism and empiricism counteracted these voluntaristic doctrines of freedom by introducing reason into the problem of freedom and determinism. He further recognized that the true antithesis lies not between freedom and determinism but rather between determinism and indeterminism. Bowne never meant to affirm by freedom the doctrine of uncaused events which absolute contingency or the unconditioned will would seem to imply. His great discovery was the union of freedom and uniformity in rationality as the only solution of the problem of freedom. Then, too, Bowne showed how the category of teleology or purpose is involved in the nature of free intelligence. Final causality is purposive and must be interpreted as will informed by an intelligent purpose. It therefore appears that, while freedom is the central problem in W. Bergson's philosophy, he does not use the term in the sense of the power of contrary choice between alternatives inasmuch as it conflicts with his metaphysical notion of change and time. Further, his extraordinary definition of freedom as expressed in terms of absolute contingency, while it provides for novelty, progress and development, leaves much to be desired. The vital urge or

3. Cf. James, William, Principles of Psychology, Vol.2. p. 572. "My belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds."
indeterminism in the cosmos is equivalent to saying that nature realizes undesigned results. This evolutionary hypothesis of M. Bergson is the embodiment of an élan vital which, while a psychical entity, appears capricious and independable. This leaves the world of both nature and personality without rational autonomy. "Believing that personal autonomy, a power of deliberative choice between alternatives, is indispensable to a worthy conception of freedom, we can award only a limited appreciation to Bergson's treatment of the subject." Moreover, Bowne's view of freedom has, among other interests, a strongly religious presupposition. The extent to which M. Bergson has affirmed the power of creativity to finite spirits which is a characteristic of many recent pluralisms is a demand with which Bowne's notion of freedom does not fully accord. Free creative activity is for Bowne entailed in God's activity but, in human life, activity is only remotely analogous to it. At this point Bowne's doctrine has, I think, been legitimately extended by conservative thinkers. The charge of pessimism brought against M. Bergson's conception of an anti-teleological universe is supplemented by Bowne's notion of freedom as related to purposive intelligence and this provides for optimism and progress in the light of a rational goal of history. Finally, neither James nor M. Bergson discuss freedom in any other than

McDougall, William, Outline of Psychology, p. 447.
its ethical and metaphysical implications, including the notion of progress and creative evolution. Bowne, on the other hand, recognized the ethical, historical and metaphysical implications of freedom but he stressed as these men did not freedom as the foundation of epistemology, that is, its relation to reason. From the point of view of personal freedom, M. Bergson affirmed his objective to consist in the discovery of a theory of freedom intermediate between ethical and psychological freedom, not equidistant from both but slightly nearer the notion of free will.

In the main, M. Bergson's theory and solution of the problem of freedom are ambiguous. With respect to clearness and intelligibility and to inclusiveness, the use which Bowne makes of freedom affords a fundamental satisfaction of the demands of rational explanation in a way in which M. Bergson's does not.

The doctrine of freedom defended by Josiah Royce represents the attempt to harmonize freedom with personal absolutism. His interest in freedom was primarily ethical and metaphysical although he also affirmed psychological freedom. Royce himself recognized that

"No accusation is more frequent than that an Idealism which has once learned to view the world as a rational whole, present in its actuality to the unity of a single consciousness, has then no room either for finite individuality, or for freedom of ethical action."

It was this charge which Royce felt that he could satisfactorily meet by removing the objection that absolute idealism is but a form of spiritual determinism. He undertook to show that both God's will and our finite will get consciously expressed in the world without any contradiction on the hypothesis of absolutism. Can finite lives retain any individuality and freedom in the face of the unity of the whole divine life? Royce argued that "you are in God; but you are not lost in God." The finite will is an expression of the divine will by virtue of which it is an expression of its own will so far as it acts with definite intent.

"Therefore are you in action Free and Individual, just because the unity of the divine life, when taken together with the uniqueness of this life, implies in every finite being just such essential originality of meaning as that of which you are conscious." Nevertheless Royce denied the self all independent being although the self is a life and not an abstract law. It does however have individuality through its relation to God in whom it dwells as an individual and of whose purpose it is the unique expression. "This world that we live in is, in its wholeness, the expression of one determinate and absolute purpose, the fulfilment of the divine will." Finite freedom is extremely limited due to heredity and environment but, insofar as it attempts to uniquely express the divine will, it is free. Man,

2. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 470.
as an object of the world of description, is determined, but, as an object of the world of apprehension or meaning, he is free. And yet how we can affirm the will and individuality of the self as free while at the same time affirming the unity of the world and of the divine plan upon which the whole depends is still problematic. For where there are no independent beings, how can there be any free beings? Freedom lies in my reciprocity with all else in the universe. My choices effect the whole world of Being just as a change in Being changes me. Royce here affirmed a universal teleology which is the opposite extreme of M. Bergson's denial of teleology. He admitted the legitimacy of novelty and progress as resulting from freedom and agrees that "One now has to talk (although such speech is, by hypothesis, but illusory) of progress, which means novel good entering a world that has thus far lacked its presence. One has to treat nature as if she could be made better." We have previously shown how the pluralistic personalism of Leibnitz was essentially deterministic but how the human self can be free to choose where the universe is conceived as an organic whole of interrelated and active selves is a point where the absolutist usually becomes strained in his argument. The absolutist argues that each self is in reality but a mode or phase or one way of the Absolute's experiencing, hence every self is but the expres-

2. Royce, Josiah, Studies of Good and Evil, p. 135.
sion of the purpose of the absolute and can express no free purpose of its own. The possibility therefore of a finite will's choosing any purpose opposed to the divine will is a contradiction in Being since every self forms an identical part of the absolute self. To say that the Absolute wills the finite individual's choices or volitions but in a different way from that in which the finite self wills them constitutes the method by which the absolutist attempts to cut the Gordian knot. In this sense Royce argued that God wills our finite volitions even when they are sinful in a way that they are already "atoned for" by the universe.

"Thus, the rebellious purpose of the finite self, though indeed experienced and even willed by the Absolute, differs from the Absolute's purpose by the essential difference between part and whole; and the Absolute's will differs from the human self's will merely, but significantly, by transcending it."

Royce has insisted that the self has individuality in the Absolute but no independence, nevertheless he argued for the freedom of choice in finite selves.

From Bowne's point of view, Royce's conception of freedom is more apparent than real, that is, his solution of the problem of freedom is largely a verbal solution. Both would affirm the doctrines of creation and teleology but the freedom affirmed by Bowne demands that finite persons

are created not only with individuality but with a degree of independence and impenetrability which Royce would not allow. Bowne of course affirmed that ontologically everything depends on God but that free creation gives man a measure both of independence and dependence upon God. Both Royce and Bowne were interested in freedom because of its ethical and religious implications but here again Royce, like James and Bergson, did not, as Bowne did, find in freedom the foundation of epistemology and the condition of any and all rationality whatsoever. Then, too, as we showed in Bowne's application of freedom to the problem of religion, the problem of evil becomes all but insoluble on any pantheistic absolutistic scheme. In the same way, the problem of error becomes equally difficult, for absolute idealism, try as it will, can scarcely avoid everything's becoming enveloped by the maw of the Absolute.

"Undermine finite personality, as personalism conceives it, and you open the dyke that lets in the pantheistic flood that turns creation into 'a vast dead sea occupied by God alone.' Here it is that Bowne's form of personalism diverges sharply from the numerically monistic personalism, or absolute idealism, of so many of his eminent contemporaries, that of the late Professor Royce, for example."

In the last analysis, absolute idealism constitutes a spiritual determinism which, at least as Royce expounded it, sacrifices

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the individual finite person to the absolute person. It is correct to say that there are some problems that neither the hypothesis of personal absolutism nor personal idealism can solve but, in view of the facts of experience as we know them, we seem to have both a measure of self-control and a measure of determinism in personality in view of which it would appear that Bowne's doctrine of freedom does better justice by the greater number of facts involved than does that of Royce.

We now turn to the consideration of some contemporary doctrines of freedom more nearly in accord with the fundamental burden of Bowne's teaching about freedom. It has been pointed out that the doctrines of freedom as set forth by M. Bergson, James and Royce made no use of freedom as an epistemological foundation. The relation between freedom and reason was shown in Bowne's teaching about freedom to reveal not only the clearest illustration of freedom which we possess but it revealed in addition the fact that the career of reason must end in disillusionment and collapse where freedom is denied. We saw how both Ulrici and Renouvier have in recent philosophy stressed this teaching with which Bowne was certainly acquainted. At the present time there are, in the philosophical writings of W. E. Johnson, Louis Arnaud Reid, E. G. Spaulding

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1. Royce's most distinguished disciple in America, Miss M.W. Calkins, insists that a distinction should be made between those absolute idealists who do not and those who do sacrifice the individuality and independence of finite persons to the absolute person.
and E. S. Brightman, to be found interpretations of the relation between freedom and reason identical in character with the point of view set forth by Bowne. Professor Reid shows that reason "may even be the real condition of freedom." For him, "Reasonable choice, ... is in some sense free choice."

He rejects, as did Bowne, freedom in the sense of indeterminism which means unmotivated choice and hence leaves the nature of choice a mystery. It is only when reflective thinking is achieved that man becomes to some extent free. It is in the process of reflection that we are capable of facing a choice between two or more alternatives and are free to rise above the mechanisms of consciousness in order to contemplate other courses of action. The element of delay characteristic of reflection helps us to discover the locus of freedom in experience. In this pause is to be found the real explanation of all voluntary conduct. "The development, then, of the power of reasoning reflection makes possible the revelation to our mental eye of an ever increasingly wide range of both quantity and quality of choices from which we may select." If we deny the freedom of theoretical thinking, all science and theory become a farce including

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2. ibid., p. 530.
4. ibid., p. 534.
the theory that judges them to be farcical. Freedom alone
saves reason from Protagorean relativity. In considering
the relation of reflection to choice it is well to point
out that the mental life is both free and determined.

"Evolution, heredity, environment, education, etc.,
have elevated us to a condition in which we are able
to reflect; reflection, though conditioned by
instinctive propensities, such as curiosity, is
yet free from our own impulses in the sense that
we are able to step back as it were, to contemplate
them and the ends they subserve, and, further, to
value various alternatives by a reference to some
wider and more ultimate end."^1

It is not in choice that we are free but in the process of
choosing; it is while we pause that we are mentally free
for there is before us perhaps a series of alternatives from
which reflection may undertake to choose action which in-
volves more or less worthy ends. The overt act or choice
once made, we are then determined according to the laws
governing the consequences of our action. "Choosing is
freedom from impulse and the revelation of a wide range of
possibilities; and when we freely choose, we freely choose
to be determined by one end or another." 2 Both Professor
Reid and Bowne find freedom in reflective choosing rather
than in choice which is always determined and at this point
offer a criticism of Professor James' problem of will:

1. Reid, L.A., "Reason and Freedom," The Monist,
2. ibid., p. 536.
"Ideal impulse plus X > instinctive propensity. ..
"As a matter of fact, James desires this formula to appear paradoxical because he himself finds the problem of freedom insoluble, and thinks of that which determines the will as some kind of magic entity. His whole view, like that of many other defenders of freedom, seems to be invalidated by a desire to discover freedom in the wrong place, i.e., in choice itself. But choice is always determined, as we saw. Choosing, on the other hand, is free, and is the only thing free."

In the doctrine of freedom set forth by Professor W. E. Hocking, the relation between freedom and reason is also clearly brought out when he says that "causes are not reasons, and reasons are not causes." In this way it is shown that mental process is in part rational and therefore the causes discovered by physical-psychology are not equivalent to mind. Here we have a recognition of two types of events, one purely causal and the other partially rational and which are neither parallel nor congruent with each other. The meaning of saying that reasons are not causes lies in pointing out that causes are identifiable with forces but reason represents another type of causation. In this sense it is not affirmed that events are uncaused but that the conditions of their appearance as found in freedom are different from those which are grounded in physical causality. It is a merit of Bowne's work that he discussed the whole problem of freedom in connection with the category of causality. Again, Professor

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Hocking's stress on freedom to the effect that "The degrees of our freedom are the degrees of our own reality. . . . We may say, if we like, that we are free in proportion as we are rational and reflective;" Bowne made this distinction the very heart of his teaching about freedom. The free only is the truly real for him. Another interesting parallel between Bowne and Professor Hocking as regards their notions of freedom lies in the relation of free personality to immortality.

Professor Hocking well sums up their positions when he says that

"Unless in the use of freedom a self has freely resigned freedom and made itself 'a part of nature and not something in contrast to nature' there is no presumption, scientific or otherwise, that this nature must circumscribe its destiny."

Then, too, their doctrines are alike in affirming a literally indeterminate future in order to provide for the kind of freedom which they assert. This does not mean that freedom and necessity are antithetical but that there is, if freedom be true, a not altogether unambiguous future. The contingency of the laws of nature makes it possible for freedom, defined as a limited indeterminism, to be true without abrogation of and interference with physical laws.

A similar position to that just stated is to be

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found in the writings of Professor W. E. Johnson who also discusses freedom in its connections with reason and causality.

"By direct introspection, I feel assured that I can assign the cause of any one of my acts of will; but it is only with considerable doubt that I would venture to formulate rules in accordance with which I invariably act. In virtue of this assurance I maintain that, in willing, I am both free and determined: determined, because my volition is not uncaused; free, because the immediate causal determinants of my volition are within my own consciousness."¹

Causal determination of the will is not deducible from observed uniformity of behavior in oneself, other persons or the race, or in animals. It is further pointed out that this introspected freedom which furnishes a somewhat direct knowledge of the immediate causes of volition should not lead us to reject determinism in this sense as being materialistic nor should we with J. S. Mill assume that freedom makes the claim that the effects of volition are knowable apriori without recourse to experience. I do experience desire and cognition upon introspection and these factors appear as causes of volition. But I am far more intimately acquainted with these psychical processes than with the physiological processes which reveal the physical effects of any act of will. Then, too, Professor Johnson strikes a decidedly Bownean strain when he points out that to recognize determinism

within consciousness does not mean that the will has been assigned a kind of causality borrowed from and like unto the mechanical type of causation obtaining in physical phenomena. Quite the contrary is true, for, as history reveals the truth, it is causation of the type experienced in human volitions that science has borrowed and falsely applied to physical phenomena. Causal volition constitutes a problem for investigation concerning which science, here as in other psychological branches, is supremely ignorant. The postulate of freedom is, then, as we have shown, the central problem in modern and contemporary philosophy, but nowhere have we found it more clearly and systematically expounded in connection with the career of reason than in the philosophy of Borden P. Bowne. Nowhere do we find its epistemological significance worked out in connection with reason as such or in the fields of human enterprise, science, philosophy, religion and morality in more thorough-going and painstaking manner.

Conclusions

The conclusions, then, to which this research in Bowne's doctrine of the deep speculative significance of freedom leads may be stated as follows:

1. Freedom and uniformity must unite in rationality and neither can dispense with the other. That is, absolute
freedom and absolute determinism are both incoherent concepts.

2. Freedom has a deep speculative significance for epistemology in that it constitutes the source of our discovery of truth and error.

3. The speculative significance of freedom for metaphysics is revealed in the fact that "without assuming a free cause as the source of the outer world the mind is unable to satisfy its own rational nature or to bring any line of thought to an end." (Bowne, B.P., *Metaphysics*, rev. ed., p. 408)

Explanation, the rational demand for unity, the solution of the antinomies supplied by the categories of monism and pluralism and change and identity all demand freedom.

4. Freedom is required in order to solve the problem of religion as one of the most valuable attributes of personality human or divine. The problems of creation, evil, omniscience and omnipotence all require freedom for their solution.

5. All rational ideals, e.g., those of science, philosophy and religion, demand freedom as the condition of their formation, appropriation and realization.

6. The status of freedom is that of an improved hypothesis, basic to mental life apart from which reason cannot function significantly, which, although incapable of perfect deduction, is shown to be the most reasonable
explanation of all the relevant facts.

7. The deep speculative significance of freedom constitutes a factor in experience whose possibilities are infinite.

Summary

The integrity of the study of the deep speculative significance of freedom lies in having shown that freedom is a problem in the proper sense and that its solution, while not admitting of a perfect deduction, is nevertheless a necessary postulate or idea of reason. Freedom has at times been regarded as a significant speculative postulate of thought, at others as an incoherent hypothesis, and finally it has even been regarded as an *Überwundener Standpunkt*. While Bowne recognized the value of the history of philosophy to prevent needless repetition of the errors of thought, he also recognized a positive contribution to his doctrine made especially by modern philosophies. From the determinism of Leibnitz, the concept of noumenal freedom as expounded by Kant, the absolutist doctrine of Hegelian freedom and the determinism of Herbart, he found little more than negative instruction. From Berkeley, Lotze and, more in particular from Ulrici and Renouvier, he found much in accordance with a sound doctrine of freedom in general, and a direct contribution to his own doctrine of the deep speculative significance
of freedom. Neither of them made the doctrine fundamental to their systems in the way in which Bowne stressed it.

The nature of freedom lies in a new beginning, hence a free act is not represented prior to its occurrence by anything that must lead to it. This problem is inductively investigated with no purpose of demonstrating a theorem but rather of solving a problem which requires as its solution no explanation of how freedom is made or is possible but only to show that it is a necessary postulate of the rational life apart from which the career of reason collapses. This conclusion is not the result of immediate insight or intuition but it is a deduced necessity. Freedom is approached in connection with the category of causality and the self in such a way that personality as dynamic or volitional causality is the constitutive notion of the truly real.

Hence it is shown that freedom is the condition of any and all science and philosophy since every necessitarian scheme destroys reason, the distinction between truth and error. For all rational ideals, including those of science, morality, philosophy and religion, freedom has a deep speculative significance in that it conditions their formation, appropriation and realization. The question of freedom enters intimately into the very structure of reason and proves to be
the source of the discovery of both truth and error in knowledge. The relation of freedom to science reveals the latter to be one of the great achievements of human freedom. While the clearest illustration of freedom is to be found in reason, the most significant field of freedom is to be found in the moral realm. The relation of freedom to philosophy shows that freedom is necessary not only for the solution of the problem of error but is required at the very foundation of the cosmos inasmuch as freedom is the only condition of any real explanation, the only possible solution of the problem involved in thinking the categories of change and identity, the only ground for the achieving of the rational demand for unity and at the same time providing for the pluralistic aspect of experience, and finally the condition of the unification of a system of things with a common source into a plan or purposeful activity. When we turn to the ideal of religion, free creation offers the only solution of the problems of good and evil, foreknowledge, omniscience and omnipotence. We find the notions of freedom and creativity implying each other. It is the notion of freedom and not that of necessity of which we can form any clear idea. Without freedom, the categories of thought and being are plunged into insoluble antinomies before which the reason is impotent.

A study of this rational epistemic significance of
freedom in recent contemporary thought shows that Bowne's doctrine exhibits superior insight in formulating the problem of freedom in such a way that the antithesis is presented between determinism and indeterminism rather than between determinism and freedom. It is also revealed in its superior insight that the clearest illustration of freedom lies in the process of thought itself where freedom and intelligence prove to be inseparable and therefore stand or fall together. Freedom and uniformity are united in rationality likewise and one cannot exist without the other. The epistemological significance of freedom is not developed in the works of James, Royce and M. Bergson. In those present writers such as W.E.Hocking, Louis Arnaud Reid, E. G. Spaulding and W. E. Johnson, excepting Bowne's disciples where the doctrine has been taken largely for granted, we do not find the relation between freedom and reason recognized by philosophers in general to the extent it deserves in view of its significance as a philosophical principle of investigation. Nevertheless, freedom as such has become the central problem of philosophy.

Finally, the root notion of Bowne's doctrine of freedom consists in showing that it is the condition of the essential trustworthiness of reason, that it is a necessary postulate, basic to mental life, apart from which reason cannot function significantly but with which, ground is provided for
the unlimited extension of human knowledge. In short, freedom is one of the most valuable attributes of personality human or divine.
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Autobiography

I was born at Benson, Illinois, March 14, 1897. My parents are Mary Frances (McCue) Hildebrand and Jacob M. Hildebrand (deceased). I first attended the Benson Public Schools and on removing with my parents to Nebraska, completed my elementary education there, graduating from Hastings High School. I was graduated from Nebraska Wesleyan University with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1919, and from Boston University School of Theology with the degree of Bachelor of Sacred Theology in 1922. I then registered in the Graduate School of Boston University for work leading to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The year 1922-1923 I spent in study in Boston University Graduate School and Harvard University. 1923-1924 I spent in study abroad as a fully immatriculated student in the University of Berlin and also listened to lectures in the University of Leipzig. I returned to the United States of America and accepted a position as acting head of the department of philosophy in the University of Denver during 1924-1925. On the return of the regular head of the department there, I continued in the department, teaching philosophy and religion during the year 1925-1926. Since 1926, I have been teaching philosophy and religion in DePauw University as an assistant professor.
FOR REFERENCE

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ideal

Double Reversible

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