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The influence of Hegel on Marx and TH Green in the philosophy of the state

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CHAPTER I

THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

It is the purpose of this study to investigate the influence of Hegel on Marx and T. H. Green in the philosophy of the state. Only one other philosopher of the nineteenth century has had as wide an effect upon the political thinking of the world as has Hegel, and that was Marx. Hegel gave rise to schools of political ideology as different as the Fascists and the Communists. His followers have produced both individualistic and socialistic systems. His dialectical method has achieved world-wide fame and has won many significant followers.

Although many volumes have been written on the philosophy of the state of these three men, no searching study of the influence of Hegel on the latter two in this field has been made. The special significance of the present work is that it considers the influence of Hegel on Marx and Green in the philosophy of the state.

2. The Significance of the Problem

The widespread influence of Hegel on the political thinking of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been
Few philosophers have aroused such a variation of response. Men who followed him or were influenced by him developed theories as different as Marxism, on the one hand, and as Fascism on the other.

Marx has been called Hegel's greatest scholar. Hecker has asserted that Marx accepted Hegel's thesis that the consciousness of necessity is the beginning of freedom, but that while the theory suggested resignation to the status quo, Marx interpreted it dynamically as a challenge. Gramsci speaks of the "Hegelian sympathies of Marx, Engels, and Lenin." He points out that Marx's Ph.D. dissertation, led him to sympathize with Hegel. Marx was "caught by the tide of popularity accorded Hegelianism." Popenoe speaks of Hegel as Marx's "master." He calls attention to the heritage "bequeathed by Hegel." He concludes that Marx "was also a Hegelian, and he was never quite successful in divorcing himself from his master."

1. See Larcuse, RAR, passim.
2. Vogel, HG, 211.
3. Hecker, CWA, 105.
4. Gramsci, PAC, 11. See also Lenin, TI, 10.
5. Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie. In this study Marx interprets Stoicism and Epicureanism as doctrines of self-consciousness.
7. Ibid., 49.
9. Ibid., 119.
10. Ibid., 343.
Engels refers to Hegel's "epoch-making service" in showing things to be in a process of growth. 12 Marx mentioned his dependence on Hegel for the dialectic 13 but stated that he turned Hegel right side up. 14 As we shall note later, however, aside from the dialectic, Marx's relation to Hegel was more a reaction against his theories than it was an acceptance of them.

In the eyes of his biographers and followers Green, also, was a student of Hegel. Lacoue refers to Hegel's influence on Green. 15 Sabine calls attention to the fact that Green was influenced by Hegel, but that he reacted sharply to certain Hegelian principles of the state. 16 Barker speaks of the profound influence of Hegel on Green. 17 Catlin 18 says, however, that of the right wing British Hegelians, Green was the least influenced by Hegel.

Green refers to the truth in Hegel's idea of the state as a means to the realization of freedom, 19 and agrees with

12. Engels, AD, 45, 66; IF, 21, 46, 96.
14. Marx, CI, 190; CPE in SE, 25; CI, 349; CAP, I, 25.
15. Lacoue, AAA.
16. Sabine, EST, 674.
17. Barker, PST, 11, 29, 29-30, 46, 81, 56-69, 72.
18. Catlin, SPP.
19. Mettisuu, 63, II, 41.
in that modern states do contribute to the realization of freedom. But Green feels that Hegel did not adequately
acknowledge the fact that freedom cannot even be considered apart from individuals. Green agreed with Hegel that the state had
a significant part to play in the development of freedom, but he believed that Hegel slighted the individual and over-empha-
sized the state.

3. The Background of the Philosophy of the State.

The essential problem of the philosophy of the state has revolved around the relation of the individual to the state. The early Hebrews believed that their great lawgiver,
Moses, received the laws from God. It was Moses' task to bind
"together into a single political unity the various tribes." 31
In those early wilderness days the general principle was that
the unity of the tribe was more important than the wishes of
individuals. In fact, whoever broke a tribal law merited

31. See article by F. W. Robinson, "History of the Hebrew
and Jewish People," in A. J. C., 36a.
divine punishment. The Pythagoreans taught that the individual should subordinate himself to the whole. Respect for civil authority was primary. The welfare of everyone depended upon the state. Democritus maintained that a well-ordered state was the greatest safeguard to a healthy and prosperous people. An essentially blind obedience to the state was expected of everyone.

This early Greek idea of absolute subservience to the state began to change about the time of the Sophists. They emphasized the individual.

Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* relates that Socrates never tired of asking everyone he met, "What is a state?" His answer to his question is well expressed by his attitude in prison. He indicated both the worth of the individual conscience and the significance of the laws of the state.

Plato's idea of the state was basically aristocratic. Only the best minds should rule. The purpose of this was first to make a better state and secondly to make better citizens. But underneath Plato's idea of the state we see an assumption of the naturalness of slave labor. Aristotle followed Plato essentially in this. Both of them failed to sense the internationalism which we find so pertinently in Kant.

Through the centuries men have revised and re-emphasized different aspects of the philosophy of the state. Men like
Spinoza and Hobbes emphasized the supremacy of the state as the institution that saved man from a barbarous state of nature. Others like Locke, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Ricardo emphasized the individual whose welfare it was the state's business to insure. In general, they believed that this could be accomplished by a \textit{laissez-faire} attitude on the part of the state.

There is a growing sentiment today that the great productive resources of the world ought to be made to serve the needs of the masses of people. Whether this will be done through the charity of the owners in an individualistic order, or whether it will be done through the charity of the government (either aristocratic or democratic), the fact remains that it should be accomplished. Hegel, Marx and Green endeavored to make it possible for everyone to have an abundant life. Their methods of securing this life raise once again for consideration the question as to the amount of state authority that is compatible with self-realization.

3. The Method.

We shall consider each man in his chronological order. Since ethics and politics are so clearly associated, we shall investigate briefly the ethical theory of each before we consider his philosophy of the state. In their ethics we shall find their expectations for and confidence in man, what they wanted man to become, the ethical goal of human endeavor, and the criterion or criteria of a valid
ethics. We shall relate each man to the one or ones who precede him. In our concluding chapter we shall summarize our conclusions on the influence of Hegel on Marx and T.H. Green in the philosophy of the state.
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Certain of the most relevant studies on the philosophy of the state of Hegel, Marx, and Engels will be considered. There is a paucity of works on the influence of Hegel on Marx and Green in the field of the philosophy of the state, and in the few works which are pointed out, there is no searching study of the correlations.

1. Literature relating to Hegel's Philosophy of the State.

Bülow in his volume on Die Entwicklung der Hegelschen Sozialphilosophie emphasizes several features of Hegel's social philosophy. He notes: 1) the significance given to private property, 2) the emphasis on factors other than the economic in the development of man, 3) Hegel's statement against force, 4) his criticism of capitalism, 5) the emphasis on the need for one "Selbstbewusstsein" for others if full development is to take place. He concludes that in Hegel's system, "Freiheit ist dann nicht mehr die reinere Willkür, sondern das Wettbewerb an das Sittengesetz." 1

Vogel's book deals not only with Hegel's ideas of the state but with the influence of Hegel on Marx. The author concludes that Hegel's greatest student is Karl Marx. 2 Vogel endeavors to show that the ideas of Marx and Engels follow necessarily from those of

1. Bülow, MS, 113.
2. Vogel, NC, 211.
Hegel.

Reyburn has given us a splendid study of Hegel's philosophy of the state. The author deals with the commonly accepted emphases of Hegel and in addition points out the place that Hegel gave to economics. 3 Napoleon taught Hegel that the basis of the state is the nation. Reyburn points out what he considers the major weakness of Hegel's treatment of the state. He underestimated the reason of the masses and overestimated the ability of disinterested officials or the Prince to recognize the real needs of the nation.

Gray's volume on Hegel's Hellenic Ideal observes that: 1) Hegel's idea of history is founded on the principle that reason rules the world, 2) freedom is learned under the aegis of a state, 3) Hegel worked more from the viewpoint of civilizations than of individuals, 4) Hegel was attracted to the power of unifying the state which religion had, 5) the individual was determined social institutions, 6) the Christian religion erred in placing supreme value on the individual person and his claims to the detriment of the culture as a whole.

Stirling 4 finds the secret of Hegel to be that he "made explicit the concrete universal that was implicit in Kant."

Stace 5 observes that for Hegel 1) a person is an absolute end and should not be used as a means, 2) the person finds his significance in the state, "the state is the true self of the

4. Stirling, TSH, xxii.
5. Stace, PH.
individual." 6 3) the state is the supreme embodiment of freedom,
4) men have no authority over states.

Sterrett 7 concludes that Hegel 1) puts more stress on the
whole than on the individual, 2) asserts that a man cannot be a
person without a state, 3) and yet maintains that individuals merit
real concern.

Fischer in his monumental work says that Hegel maintained
that, "Der Staat dient nicht, sondern er herrscht; er ist nicht
mittel, sondern Zweck, und zwar Zweck an sich, der höchste aller
Zwecke, Selbst = und Endzweck." 8 The state is "ein sittlicher
Organismus." 9 Religion ought to help to unify the state. War
helps to unite the state, and is needed to preserve the state since
there is no arbiter save the World Spirit between states.

Hoenigswald has commented briefly on Hegel's philosophy of
the state in an article in Runes, Twentieth Century Philosophy.
He mentions the influence of Hegel on Marx in the political sphere
but he does not give any detailed explanation of it. He criticizes
Hegel for what he sees as "the permanance and absoluteness of the
Spirit in the midst of the vicissitudes of its development." 10

Flewelling, in the above Runes volume, says that Hegel "was
primarily an absolutist who could not in spite of himself get

7. Sterrett, EH.
10. Runes, TCP, 284.
entirely away from personalistic assumptions." 11

Sabine points out that "the revolutionary quality of Hegelianism is most apparent in its criticism of religion. The dialectic shows the relativism of all supposed absolute truths." 12

Rosenzweig 13 calls Hegel's political philosophy "harte und beschränkte." He indicates the influence of Napoleon on Hegel's idea of the nation-state and the consequent emphasis on patriotism toward the state. Rosenzweig portrays Hegel's system as statism and yet statism for the purpose of developing free men. He points out that Hegel's followers have embraced both ultra-conservative and radical movements.

Giese 14 considers the educational task of the state in the light of the pre-eminence of the state. He points out that the nation idea is basic to the state. The function of religion is to lend support to the idea that the state is "göttlicher Wille." "Nur durch die Kirchenspaltung hat der Staat werden können, was seine Bestimmung ist, die selbstbewusste Vernünftigkeit und Sittlichkeit." 15

Busse 16 shows the origins of Hegel's ideas of the state to be in his Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hegel had concluded in his Phänomenologie that the contemporary development of the World Spirit
is through the vehicle of the consciousness of a particular nation. Hegel traced in this book the outline of right as
1) immediate or natural mind: the family, 2) the relation of individuals to one another in a formal universality: Civil Society, 3) mind developed to an organic actuality: Political Constitution.

Aside from the men mentioned above the following have written favorably or unfavorably on Hegel's ideas: Michelet, Göschel, Erdmann, A. Ruge, Rosenkranz, D. Strauss, the Bauers, Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, T.H.Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Hobhouse, Gentile, Croce, Hastie, E.S.Haldane, W. Wallace, R. Haym, K. Küstlin, J. Klaiber, E. Caird, A. Seth, G.S.Morris, W.T.Harrim. Followers of Hegel in America include philosophers with as widely different theories as Royce and Calkins, who are absolutists, Brightman and Flewelling who are personalists, and Sydney Hook, a naturalist.

2. Literature Relating to Marx's Philosophy of the State.

Venable's book, while not on Marx's philosophy of the state, is valuable as a contribution to the understanding of Marx's ethics. Venable notes Marx's emphasis on the class struggle and yet the classless nature of his goal, 2) idea of man as "a function in a field," 17 3) confidence that human nature can be changed.

Parkes has written a critical attack on Marxist theory. 18

17. Venable, HNM, 5.
18. Parkes, MAA.
He points out that the goal of freedom, security, justice and peace toward which the Marxians strive is not compatible with the means of class warfare, revolution, and dictatorship. Parkes surveys history for evidence to support his conclusions that Marx erred in the following ways: 1) Revolutions occur not in industrialized nations, but in peasant nations. Parkes overlooks, however, Marx's recognition that such nations as the United States of America, Great Britain, and France might not need a revolution; 2) The proletariat is not and never was a revolutionary class. The proletariat is reformist. It is the group of middle class students who supply the revolutionary impetus. But Parkes overlooks Marx's recognition that while the proletariat may not be aware of its function as a revolutionary agent, it is the logical group since it has the greatest need and suffers most because of the evils of the system; 3) Russia has achieved none of Marx's ideals. Parkes affirms that Marx's kingdom of freedom is really a slave order since freedom must mean liberty to do what one chooses, a matter concerning which Hegel, Marx and Green have a word to say. The socialized economy of Marx limits personal choices, frustrates democracy, and functions inefficiently. In another field Parkes criticizes Marxism for failing to emphasize the interaction between economic and ideological factors and for assuming that everything has an economic cause. We shall answer these comments when we consider Marx's philosophy of the state.
One of the most complete books on Marx's philosophy of the state is that of S.H. Chang. It deals searchingly, sympathetically, and critically with the Marxian principles of the state.

Chamberlin in an article entitled "Karl Marx: False Prophet" deals devastatingly with most of the Marxian principles. He concludes: 1) that Marx erred in emphasizing the labor theory of value, 2) that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a "conception of preferred rights for the class of manual wage-workers," 3) that his analysis of the need for revolution was unsound and unhistorical, 4) that he overlooked the virtues of capitalism, and 5) that Marx's materialism was a one-sided interpretation of history.

Stekloff calls attention to the exceptions which Marx made to the necessity for violent revolution.

In Lenin's State and Revolution the clear statement of the principle that under the Communist society the state would be unnecessary is made. Its classic expression is, "The state will be able to wither away completely when society has realized the rule, 'From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs.'"
J. Fidler's Marx 24 points out that Marx had sought Hegel's vision of the development of human history as a portrayal of the slow arrival of self-consciousness in men. He maintains that it is a defect of the popular version of Marxism that it assumes that Marx did not care what happened to the individual.

Balz 25 in a study of Marx's value doctrine says that the Aristotelian manner of thinking pervades the Marxian analysis of value. This is not strange since most philosophers of that day were influenced by Aristotle. While Hegel's organicism was Aristotelian, his logic was an attack against Aristotle.

Barker 26 reminds us that Marx did make provision for a gradual social transformation without a violent revolution.

Easter maintains that Marx, an empiricist, was not antithetical and that Marx was supremely concerned with the individual. 27

25. Balz, ___, v.
3. Literature Relating to J. H. Green's Philosophy of the State.

Ritchie deals searchingly with Green's attitude toward the relation of the individual to the state. State action for Green is expedient only in so far as it "tends to promote freedom in the sense of self-determined action directed to the objects of reason, inexpedient in so far as it tends to interfere with this." 28 He points out the Kantianism of Green in his emphasis on the individual will. Ritchie indicates the combination of the theoretical and practical in Green.

He went straight from the declaration of the poll, when he was elected a town councillor, to lecture on the Critique of Pure Reason. He was robbed of his sleep by thinking about the Eastern question and dreading lest the country should be driven by motives "of which perhaps a diffused desire for excitement has been the most innocent," into what he regarded as an indefensible and unrighteous war. His strong opinions on the liquor traffic were in his own mind directly connected with his conception of the ethical end and the nature of rights. 29

Barker 30 points out the interest of Green in social reform, particularly education, temperance, and property. He stresses Green's emphasis on the negative function of the state as a remover of obstacles. Liberty for Green is highly personal. But he recognizes that the state must interfere at times to insure liberty for

28. Ritchie, PSI, 147.
29. Ibid., 131-132.
30. Barker, PTST.
the individual. Green believed that war was unnecessary and evil. Like Kant he believed in the possibility of brotherhood between nations.

Sabine 31 shows how Green's belief in government interference for the removal of obstacles is not incompatible with his interest in personal freedom. He concludes that Green's idea of self-realization "whose conditions a community ought to secure for its members was in the main Aristotle's idealization of Greek citizenship but with its aristocratic implications omitted." 32

Muirhead 33 suggests that Green's emphasis was humanistic in the sense that his philosophy intended to establish a working basis for human endeavor. Green conceived that the true good is both personal and social, and that the purpose of the state is to provide for the freedom that individuals need to pursue the good. Green points out that property is right only if it helps the individual to self-realization.

MacCunn 34 sees Green's interest in political activity as arising from two sources: 1) a sense of public duty, and 2) an application of his philosophy of idealism. Green's purpose was to show the basis in reason for the principles of democratic citizenship.

31. Sabine, HPT.
32. Ibid., 574.
33. Muirhead, TSS.
34. MacCunn, SRT.
He believed with Hegel that political affairs need a religious evaluation and reference if they are to be fully intelligible. McCunn points out the Kantianism of Green in his concept of duty as more fundamental than right.

Dr. Georgia Harkness\(^\text{35}\) calls attention to several major elements in Green's political theory. Society ought to develop or to allow for the development of human capabilities to their most complete realization. In this task the state is a remover of obstacles. She indicates Green's interest in social reform and calls him "a sober-minded visionary." \(^\text{36}\) She concludes that Green saw the problem of the times as that of reconciling the "conflicting claims of the modern spirit." \(^\text{37}\)

Bosanquet's theory of the "hindering of hindrances" \(^\text{38}\) is comparable to Green's plea for the removal of obstacles to personal development. He agrees with Green that rights are "that which is really necessary to the maintenance of material conditions essential to the existence and perfection of human personality." \(^\text{39}\)

Leland \(^\text{40}\) says that Green lays down principles not rules. In his dealing with education Green insists that the purpose of education is to develop personality in harmony with the principle

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35. Harkness, POG.
36. Ibid., 121.
37. Ibid., 126.
38. Bosanquet, PTS.
39. Ibid., 137.
40. Leland, ETPG.
of self-realization. The sole purpose of the state is to contribute to the good of individuals, and yet he agreed with Hegel that individuals found perspective only in society.

Other than the above mentioned the following have written on Green's philosophy: Fairbrother, R.B.C. Johnson, Sidgwick, Pringle-Pattison, and Dewey.

4. Literature Relating to the Influence of Hegel on Marx and Green.

Marcuse has written a most significant book on Hegel's influence on both Marx and Green. It deals suggestively with Hegel's dialectical philosophy, but only slightly with Marx's theories of the state. The influence of the dialectical principle on Marx is the major fact considered. Several aspects of Green's philosophy of the state are noted, but no searching study of the influence of Hegel or Marx on Green in this field is made.

Sidney Hook's volume deals with the development of political thought from Hegel to Marx. Hook maintains that Hegel was a political reactionary and that he stood for "political accommodation." The author says that Marx is "not interested in what the individual man makes or does not make. He is primarily interested in the behavior of groups or classes and in the individual only in so far as he is a member of a group or class." For Hegel the state is the condition of social life. For Marx the state is the product of social life.

41. Marcuse, RAR.
42. Hook, HTM.
43. Ibid., 19.
44. Ibid., 39.
Rebecca Cooper has written on the Logical Influence of Hegel on Marx. She considers a number of the aspects of Marx's philosophy of the state which have a supposed relation to that of Hegel. She deals with property, contract, crime, classes, and the state. But her conclusion is that the connection between Hegelianism and Marxism is "purely external and verbal rather than an integral one." 45

Sabine 46 points out the influence of Hegel's dialectic on Marx's thinking. He points out that Marx recognized the dialectic as revolutionary in its implications in spite of the fact that conservative Hegelians had used it in a reactionary fashion.

Marck 47 considers certain Hegelian and Marxian ideas of the state in their relation to each other. On the basic question as to the relation of Marx to Hegel, Marck says: "Diese Frage entscheidet sich an der Rolle der dialektischen Methode Hegels für den Marxismus." 48

Lenin's Teaching of Karl Marx deals with the role which Marx played as the man who "continued and completed the three chief ideological currents of the nineteenth century." 49 These three currents were: 1) classical German philosophy (primarily Hegel and Kant), 2) classical English political economy (Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus), and 3) French Socialism (Sismondi and Fourier). Lenin remarks that the dialectic, which Marx borrowed from Hegel, was the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy.

45. Cooper, LIHM, 178.
46. Sabine, HPT.
47. Marck, HMK.
48. Ibid., 3.
49. Lenin, TKM, 10.
This dependence of Marx on the Hegelian dialectic is emphasized further in Lenin's Cahiers sur la Dialectique de Hegel.
CHAPTER III

THE ETHICAL THEORY OF HEGEL

1. Abstract or Formal Right.

The dialectic of the ethical theory moves from abstract right, to Moralität, and finally to Sittlichkeit. Although the last stage is the most real because it is the most universal, the first stage is essential in recognizing that right may be determined or derived from pure logic. The logic in turn derives from the very nature of being. The abstract state of right is one of particularity, in that the universal is only potential. Selfhood is not yet recognized at this abstract level of ethical theory. This is the stage of pure formal categories of right. But no sooner are these formal principles established than contradictions arise. These contradictions push the dialectical movement of right to the stage of morality where right becomes personal right. But in its genesis, right is formal and essentially a product of thought.

We cannot remain on the level of formal right, because here our acts have only a negative reference to the will of others. In Moralität, however, our acts have a positive reference to the wills of others. Moralität involves the subjective or personal

1. Hegel, POR, 44.
2. Ibid., 11.
element, and, whereas the abstract right is derived from pure logic, morality includes the subjective relations of individuals and is thus a higher explication of freedom.

The ought which is the distinguishing element of morality, does not however attain to actual existence, except in concrete social relations of men. 3

The essential field of right is the will, and this is basically free. In this manner freedom "constitutes the substance and essential character of the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom." 4 The systematization of right leads irresistibly to relations. What begins as pure formal right must be developed in its relations. This brings formal right to Moralität.

2. The Relation of Will and Thought.

Hegel recognizes, as all ethicists must, the fact of freedom of choice. 5 The development of ethical theory becomes the development of the freedom of man as it relates to others as well as to the formal right. Will is basic to Moralität. The impulse of spirit is the will to freedom. Freedom is not meant to be the license to do whatever one wants to do. Freedom cannot remain a formal matter. Here again the dialectic is at work.

A will which resolves nothing is not an actual will; that which is devoid of definite character never reaches a volition. 6

3. Hegel, PHR, 168. See also Sterrett, EH, 106.
4. Ibid., 10.
5. Ibid., 13.
6. Ibid., 23.
The impetus of the dialectic necessitates the movement from formal will to subjective will, and from subjective will to objective will. The progress is in the direction of the more inclusive. Formal right considers only the bare fact of right. Subjective right considers the additional datum of self. It is not just bare right, it is my right. Objective right considers the additional datum of absoluteness or universality. This leads Hegel to the philosophy of the state. 7

Will and thought are not separated by Hegel other than as formal principles. The free will is also a thinking will. Will is essentially free or self-determining, and to fulfill its highest meaning it needs the complement of thought. "Spirit is ... intelligence." 8

Man is pure thought of himself, and only in thinking has he the power to give himself universality and to extinguish in himself all that is particular and definite. 9

As Hegel pointed out in another regard:

Reason cancels the indefiniteness that agreeable feeling has in relation to objects, rids the content of the impulses of subjectivity and contingency, and teaches in respect to the content, the knowledge of the universal and essential in what is desireworthy, and in respect to the form, or the disposition, the object or action for the sake of the fact itself. 10

Will must be treated by reasonableness, which is essentially

8. Ibid., 13.
9. Ibid., 15.
coherence. If a man is to amount to anything, he must know how to limit his will by his reason. "The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves, which have never been green." Will is the unity of two elements, "indeterminateness or generality and definiteness or particularity." In order to be complete will must be reasonable. This, however, is still on the level of formal right and formal willing.

3. The Theory of Right and Duty.

In the abstract sense right is "freedom as idea." And "every step in the development of the idea of freedom has its peculiar right, because it is the embodiment of a phase of freedom." Right is a term belonging to free persons.

In so far as everyone is recognized as a free being he is a person. The principle of the right is therefore expressed as follows: Each one shall be treated by every other person as a person.

This right of persons to be recognized and respected as free is likewise a duty. Rights and duties are commensurate and inseparable. In so far as a person is worthy of rights, he is likewise possessive of duties. Persons have duties to themselves to the family, to the state, and to other men in general.

11. Hegel, POR, 120.
12. Ibid., 17.
13. Ibid., 36.
15. Hegel, RDR, 26-29.
16. Ibid., 3.
For example, "an action that limits the freedom of another, or does not acknowledge and treat him as a free will is contrary to the right." 17 As a person worthy of being respected by others as a free being a man has the duty to respect every other person as a free being also. 18

Since Hegel aimed to get men free, he condemned slavery. He recognized that it depends on a person's will whether he will be a slave or not. Slavery, then, is not only an abrogation of duty and right for the one who oppresses but for the one who is oppressed as well. 19 There are some things that cannot be relinquished, such as, reason, morality, and religion. We are the rightful masters of these things, and even the slave must consider it not only his right but his duty to see that he is the captain of his invincible and unassailable freedom. 20 In this realm also the dialectic drives ethical theory from formal right, to personal right, and to objective right. "The notion of the right... has reality only in political society." 21


The individual right may be summed up as the command to "be a person and respect others as persons." 22 Morality is the area in which individual personality arises and develops.

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17. Hegel, KDA, 29.
18. Ibid., 3.
19. Hegel, POR, 63.
20. Ibid., 71, 105.
22. Hegel, POR, 45.
There are three factors in a moral act. First, there is the factor of purpose. We must ask, does this act accord with my purpose? It is understood that we are aware of our acts. It is this awareness that makes us morally responsible for what we do. Oedipus, who killed his father and married his mother unknowingly, was not morally guilty although his act was formally wrong. The purpose of action is a factor involving morality of action. On the level of Moralität purpose is subjective and individual, while on the level of Sittlichkeit purpose becomes objective and universal.

A second factor involved in a moral act concerns whether the act has value for the doer. Whereas the first factor was teleological, the second is axiological. As the dialectic of ethical theory progresses, the question becomes more one of value for the individual. It involves value for other individuals and social groups and finally value for the state.

The third factor is the most universal and involves the fact of universal value. This is the Good. "The good is in general the essence of the will in its substantive and universal character, the will in its truth." 23 The highest morality, then, is to desire what is universally good. Private intentions are not sufficient to

23. Hegel, POF, 125.
atone for wrong behavior. By inspiration and my feeling cannot justify a wrong act. By intention must be tested by its results on the good of the state. This sets the stage for the organic theory of the state which Hegel holds, where "When one member of a community suffers, all others suffer with him." 24 Thus the test of moral action moves from formal purpose to personal value, and finally to the universal good.

5. The Transition from Moralität to Sittlichkeit.

The person is meant to be infinite and universal. To confine the person to mere subjective Moralität is to stultify its very nature. The absolutely free will begins with abstract or formal right, moves to the sphere of morality where individuals contrast with other individuals and groups, and finally is led to the idea of the good as realized both in the will and in the world.

Hegel pointed out the function of property in the development of selfhood. Man's dealing with private property leads him to more wide-reaching morality. Contract is the next stage beyond property. In property the individual faces only himself, while in contract there are at least two will involved. The individual cannot act arbitrarily in contract. In marriage, for example, two persons give up their private rights in order to share in social

24. Hegel, POR, 216.
rights. This may seem at first like a limitation, but it is in reality the liberation of both. 25 Through the mutual dependence and co-operation involved, self-seeking is converted into other-seeking.

A further step is needed. This is the state. "The characteristic of man as rational is to live in a state; if there is no state, reason claims that one should be founded." 26 The state is no mere organ to protect property or even life. It is the realm in which the freedom of the person becomes concrete and universal. Thus the dialectic forces the transition from abstract right to Loyalität and now to Sittlichkeit.

26. Ibid., 79.
CHAPTER IV
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE

1. The State As The Realization Of the Ethical Idea.

1) The basis of the state in reason.

The ethical idea which was considered by Hegel first in its particularity or abstraction, then in its community of contract where the individual must consider the will of others finds its fulfillment in the organization of the state. The state is no mere contract of convenience in the Bodinian or Rousseauian sense. Jean Bodin had said that the state was founded on a contract which the people make with the ruler. Once this contract is made it cannot be broken. Hegel asserted that the contractual relation was a mere societal agreement and that this was not adequate upon which to found a state. The state is the necessary culmination of the absolutely free will in its progressive development. Hobbes and Hegel concurred in the principle that a state of nature would be a state of savagery. Hegel was no Thoreau. The isolation of a Walden represented both personal and political regression. Man was made for companionship and in his ethical outreach demanded a state.

As the "realized ethical idea or ethical spirit" the state

has as its foundation a basic reasonableness. It is impossible
to understand the implications of Hegel's theory of the state
unless we recognize that he considered the state to be the high-
est expression of reason. This fact is seen more clearly when
we note his appreciation of the Germanic State as the superior
state of his time. It was because he saw the Germanic countries
as possessing the most rational basis of any existing state. His
implication that the present monarchical state was the most adequate
to date rested on his conviction that it represented reason at
its present best and that it most adequately provided for freedom.
The commonly promulgated theory that Hegel was simply another
German nationalist overlooks the unceasingly advancing nature
of the dialectic, a fact that Hegel himself illustrated when he
pointed out that America may well be the great state of the
future.2

By establishing the state in reason Hegel justly deserves
the commendation of history. Yet, the tendency has been to
overlook this element of reason and to accuse Hegel of a type of
glorified Nazidom. The Hobbesian exaltation of force3 is an
alien policy to Hegel. He criticizes von Haller4 for his con-
tention that "it is the eternal unchangeable decree of God that

2. Hegel, POH, 129.
4. Hegel, POR, 244. Quoted from von Haller Restauration der
Staatswissenschaft, 342, v.1.
the more powerful rulers, must rule, and will ever rule." After developing this attack at some length Hegel summarizes, "often it is imagined that force holds the state together, but the binding cord is nothing else than the deep seated feeling of order, which is possessed by all." The ground of the state "is the power of reason realizing itself as will." Thus "the state as a completed reality is the ethical whole and the actualization of freedom. It is the absolute purpose of reason that freedom should be actualized. The state is the spirit which abides in the world and there realized itself consciously."

2. Religion in the state.

Hegel recognized the need for a reconciliation between the Church and the State. The state church seemed the best solution. It avoided the hazard of anarchical and nonco-operative sects. Hegel saw the church essentially as priestly and not as prophetic.

Nothing must be considered higher and more sacred than good will toward the State; or, if religion be looked upon as higher and more sacred, it must involve nothing really alien or opposed to the Constitution.

5. Hegel, PFR, 258.
6. Ibid., 247.
7. Ibid., 244-245.
8. Hegel, PFR, 569-560
He recognized, however, that religion is the beginning of the state inasmuch as religion is the abstract truth of which the state is the concrete expression. 9 There were qualifications in Hegel’s use of the term religion as the foundation of the state. It was religion as illustrating the highest freedom that is the foundation of the state. What this meant was that “insofar as religion is of a true sort, not displaying a negative and hostile spirit towards the state, but, rather recognizing and supporting it, it has its own special place and station.” 10 The church was, then, a pacifying influence over the revolutionary and anti-social elements in society. The church served its function when it corroborated the authority of the state. It was rightly pointed out that the church comes under the jurisdiction of the state inasmuch as it owns property and hires labor, and for this reason, depends upon the state for protection. 11

When Hegel said that the state rested on religion, we must recognize that religion represented rationality so that the statement was equivalent to saying that the state must rest on reason. 12

Since religion at its best was reasonable, Hegel recognized that it could be advocated that compulsory church relationship

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10. Ibid., 262.
11. Ibid., 263.
12. Ibid., 272.
would be the logical policy. However, Hegel did not concur in this conclusion and he said with regard to religion, "of course, with its special character, depending on inner imaginative thinking, the state cannot interfere." He even admitted that in a strong state there may be room for sects "whose credas prevent them from recognizing any direct duties to it." This thesis is held with the reservation that the state as objective and concrete rationality has the jurisdiction over religious organizations which are subjective and abstract.

Hegel concludes by saying, "thus, the doctrine that the state should be founded on religion is perverted, when it is interpreted to mean that individuals must have religion in order that their spirit, enchained by it may be the more readily oppressed by the state." Religion is intended to be free and rational in its abstract representation, and as such is desirable, but the state as illustrating concrete freedom and rationality is the more adequate and complete fulfillment of the search for completeness. Hegel had seen religion when it was "teaching what despotism wished, -- contempt of the human race, its incapacity for anything good."

13. Hegel, PHR, 262.
15. Ibid., 267
16. Ibid., 272
17. Hegel, Briefe, i, 18.
3) Certain principles of the growth of the state.

The famous dictum "history of the world is the world's court of judgment" lays the groundwork for Hegel's idea of the normative principle in the determination of the ideal state at any particular period of history. In every period of history certain nations lead the way for the rest of the world. This vast panorama is seen in the Philosophy of History. In order that we might see the full significance of the state in the Hegelian system we shall consider certain principles of the growth of the spirit as it reaches toward state participation.

(1) The meaning of "Spirit."

The very essence of spirit is freedom. Without freedom there can be no freedom as we interpret it. The bonds of slavery annihilate the possibility of spirit, for spirit's sole truth is freedom. Not only is the essence of spirit freedom, but it is "self-conscious consciousness of one's own being." Unless persons are aware of their own possibilities, there can be no spirit developed. Spirit arises when mankind aspires "to make itself actually that which it is potentially." It is the study of this growth and progress of mankind toward its potential greatness that is called "universal history." Thus the essence
of spirit in mankind is to be found in its freedom, and the begin-
ing of freedom is the self-consciousness of one's ultimate pos-
sibilities. With these prefatory statements let us consider what principles energize latent humanity to become spirit.

(2) Reason rules the world.

Undergirding the whole development of spirit is a fundamental conviction that "reason is the Sovereign of the world."\(^{22}\) This is an a priori that gives hope and courage to man as he senses the first vague stirrings of spirit within him. Without a confidence that this world in which we live is a rational world and that events occur, not according to blind chance, but according to law and order, the whole picture of life will appear to be a babel of confusion, a meaningless chaos. "To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn, presents a rational aspect."\(^{23}\) But if, on the other hand, one looks at the world as without sense or direction, then all of one's relations to the world will be seen in the same light. One would not hope to better a world lacking all reasonable significance; no more would one expect to better an idiot who lacked all the foundations of rational possibility. The first aspirations of men toward spirit find support from the confidence that "reason governs the world."\(^{24}\)

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22. Hegel, PHH, 34.
(3) The function of geography.

A second principle influencing the growth of spirit is that of the geographical environment. There is truth in the statement that man is a creature of the soil -- an expression of the geographical and climatic forces that impinge upon him. Granted that "nature should not be rated too high nor too low,"25 still the fact remains that the environment plays a great part. It is in a natural environment that consciousness takes shape. "Nature is the first standpoint from which man can gain freedom within himself, and this liberation must not be rendered difficult by natural obstructions."26

It is possible under certain conditions for the influence of nature to be disproportionate so that spiritual growth is hindered. Such a situation arises in countries of extreme temperatures. "in the extreme zones man cannot come to free movement; cold and heat are here too powerful to allow Spirit to build up a world for itself."27 Where man has to spend his major efforts protecting himself from the assaults of nature, he has no time for the development of spirit within him. In such a predicament are the Esquimaux of the North and the jungle savages of the South.

25. Hegel, PCH, 121.
27. Loc. cit.
Neither can ever quite escape from the fact of climate. Also there is recurrent fear of attack by wild beasts.

We must remember that we are not to rate nature too high. As we shall see later it is more what man does with nature than what nature does with man. Man can rise above the exigencies of nature by the factor of an organized political life.

(4) An organized political life.

The third principle guiding the growth of spirit is the presence of an organized political life. Life prior to political life is "beyond self-cognizant life." Before political life man is not even aware of himself. He is a wild creature comparable to the birds of the air or the beasts of the woods. Because he lives by himself like a hermit, he is not conscious of his kinship with humanity, nor is he aware that he ought to will to do what is for the common good. Then too, in his primitive state, man must spend all his time taking care of his bodily wants. Not until the division of labor of an organized society freed man from having to do everything for himself was he able to find time for the cultivation of the spirit. Only under organized life does man have time for the spirit.

28. Hegel, PH, 121.
It is because of this that we can call the state "the actually existing, realized moral life." Only man living in the unity of a state has the chance to develop spirit. The hermit may have a semblance of self-consciousness, but he does not have an other-consciousness, nor does he have the freedom to grow spiritually. The state is the realization of freedom and only those people who have formed states can be considered to have the freedom necessary for the growth of spirit.

This is therefore, a denial of the common philosophy that a state of nature can be a state of freedom. Man would be a barbarian in a state of nature, for he would be subject only to personal whims and would be bound by the harshness of nature. Only under the sheltering arm of the state can the brute in man be tamed, and can morality grow from mere personal fancy to an obedience to a larger whole. The social life is the only worthy life, and only in a state does man possess "spiritual reality." (5) A free political life.

A fourth principle governing the growth of spirit is that the political life be free. "A State is a realization of Spirit, such that in it the self-conscious being of Spirit -- the freedom of the will -- is realized as Law." In considering the life of the

29. Hegel, PH, 70.
30. Ibid., 71.
31. Ibid., 218.
Oriental world this is one of the principle observations, namely, that it is not a free political arrangement. "What should be internal subjective sentiment is made a matter of external arrangement." 32 Lan under a determined political life becomes spiritually stunted. Under the patriarchal rule of the Orient the individual is denied the freedom to think and act. All that he does is commanded by the emperor. Only a chosen few take part in political or social matters. The mass is in slavery to the few.

Therefore, without freedom in political life man cannot attain his place of spirit. He assumes a certain "fixedness of character," 33 that stunts and thwarts his variant possibilities. The individual does not even think of himself as such nor does he consider himself as free in his life. "In China the Universal Will immediately commands what the Individual is to do." 34 There is no thought of personal feelings, needs, or desires. The will of the state is all. The individual is nothing. This is the principle to which the "azzi state reverted. The individual under such a state cannot gain "independent and civil freedom." 35 Thus it is that "since equality prevails in China, but without any freedom, despotism is necessarily the mode of government." 36

32. Hegel, POH, 159.
33. Ibid., 163.
34. Ibid., 169.
35. Ibid., 172.
36. Ibid., 174.
Under such a despotic rule the ambitions of man are dulled and vitiated. There is no point in acting or thinking from purpose unless one is the emperor. Thus the citizens remain forever in a state of "nonage." It was the Germanic nations, spurred on by the Protestant concept of man that "were the first to attain the consciousness, that man, as man, is free."

(6) The worth of the individual.

A fifth principle underlying the growth of spirit is that each person be recognized as of worth. In China we see the lack of this idea. Individuals "in the State have as little independent personality" as they do in the Chinese family. The individual is as nothing in the Orient. His life is a form of slavery. "Everyone has the power of selling himself and his children." Personal integrity cannot exist under such rule. "If a son complains of injustice done to him by his father, or a younger brother by an elder, he receives a hundred blows with a bamboo, and is banished for three years, if he is in the right; if not, he is strangled." In the Chinese state all the citizens have an equality of degradation. This has engendered within all a common disrespect for all. Although the caste system was not an original

37. Ibid., 176.
38. It should be noted that no one nation is meant. Hegel, in PHR, speaks in the plural (45) when he condemns them for their progress. In general he includes the northern European countries (124, 125, 127, 567).
39. Ibid., 45.
40. Ibid., 170.
41. Ibid., 178.
42. Ibid., 179.
43. Ibid., 191.
part of Hinduism, the same grading concept of personality was seen in India where "the Chandals are obliged to move out of the way for their superiors, and a Brahmin may knock down any that neglect to do so." Infanticide is thus common. Mothers throw their children into the Ganges, or let them pine away under the rays of the sun." Humanity on the part of a higher caste towards an inferior one is entirely forbidden, and a Brahmin would never think of assisting a member of another caste, even when in danger. This lack of respect for the worth of persons is a fundamental element in the maintenance of a despotic society. Elaborate institutions were built for the care of animals, but throughout the land "no single institution can be found for human beings who are diseased or infirm from age." 

Early Judaism was seen as a step forward although even here the individual was not respected. It was Christianity that first put the stamp of worth upon persons as such, although nothing was done upon a political scale until the Germanic nations under the impetus of Protestantism incorporated the Christian evaluation of persons into a political and social doctrine.

(7) Moral Accountability.

A sixth element in the growth of spirit is a recognition

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44. Hegel, PH, 200.
45. Ibid., 205.
46. Ibid., 209.
47. Ibid., 216.
48. Ibid., 262.
of the moral accountability of each person. This moral accountability arises out of the concept of the freedom of persons. It is from the freedom to choose evil as well as good that man's accountability arises. "It is destiny is in his very ability to will either good or evil." 49

We see the negation of this in India where morality does not exist in right or wrong conduct consciously chosen, but consists rather in being born in a particular caste. A Brahman need not "answer for crime of any kind."50 This lack of a sense of moral accountability results in immorality and license. On the part of the submerged classes it results in a fatalism and an indifference towards matters of value or spirit. The whole Hindu religion is diffused with a vast indifference to either vice or virtue. The true bliss to which the Hindu aspires has no quality. It is a state of nothingness. In China the status of moral accountability is much the same. The individual is not expected to feel morally culpable for his deeds. All that is expected is that he comply with the external commands of the state. The punishment which the individual receives for

49. Hegel, POS, 65.
50. Ibid., 208.
failing to comply with the external commands of the state is only a matter of discipline. This discipline is only a factor to frighten the citizens into a state of obedience. In Persia, on the contrary, it is expected that man should be virtuous, and in support of this "subjective freedom is presupposed."[1]

Lack of a sense of freedom results in a belief in the absence of moral accountability. Each presupposes the other, and without either, moral development or spirit is impossible. Only when men recognize that they are to blame for their own decisions will spirit rise in them to a place of power.

(6) Independence of thought.

A seventh principle needed to promote the development of spirit is a subjective independence of thought. Each person must be a thinker in his own right. This is assumed if freedom is present, for freedom is the expression of self thinking. It is part of what Hegel means by "Passion."[52] Passion is that state of mind where the whole will is actively directed toward one single goal. In the Chinese state only the emperor had this whole-hearted interest or passion, all the rest of the people obeyed unthinkingly. In the Indian state a few thought and the

52. Ibid., 52-53.
rest of the people followed. In the Persian state there was a
great social and cultural freedom of expression, although the
political side was still determined by the few. Not until the
Germanic nations, spurred on by Protestantism, avowed that every
man is a king in his own right was there freedom in the true
sense of the term. Of course, this was freedom under the aegis
of the state. It was a freedom marked by concern for the needs
of all.

The ignorance and superstitions of the Oriental peoples
go hand in hand. The very superstitions that burden the Chinese
"arise from a want of subjective independence." In all cir-
stances of life men do not consult their own intelligence, but
conform with witch doctors and soothsayers. It is precisely
because of this lack of personal initiative in thinking that
Chinese science has never progressed beyond the state of mere
observance of the obvious. So too in the field of ethics China
has lacked the personal quality. Rather than arise from an inner
compulsion or persuasion, the ethics appears as an external code
applied by the emperor to all alike. So the Hindu "is incapable
of holding fast to an object in his mind by means of rational
predicates assigned to it, for this requires reflection."

53. Hegel,Ph., 136.
54. Ibid., 216.
The possibility of history as the story of spiritual growth "requires Understanding — the power of looking at an object in an independent objective light, and comprehending it in its rational connections with other objects. Those peoples therefore are alone capable of history, and of prose generally, who have arrived at that period of development, at which individuals comprehend their own existence as independent, i.e., as possessing self-consciousness."²⁵ "God wishes no narrow-hearted souls or empty heads for his children."²⁶

(9) Thought must find concrete expression.

The eighth principle is the natural complement of the previous one. It consists in the principle that free and independent thought must find expression in concrete fact. That which makes certain men stand out as world heroes is that they both "willed and accomplished something great; not a mere fancy, not a mere intention, but that which was the case and fell in with the needs of the age."²⁷

In contrast to this the dreaming spirit of the Hindu is an example of thought that seeks no expression in concrete fact. The dreams of these people have no necessary connection with life.

²⁵. Hegel, POH, 220.
²⁶. Ibid., 41.
²⁷. Ibid., 61.
They are lost in a haze of reverie. "These dreams are not mere fables -- a play of the imagination, in which the soul only reveled in fantastic gambols; it is lost in them; hurried to and fro by these reveries, as by something that exists really and seriously for it." The Hindu mind has lacked concern for concrete expression. "It was not given to the Asiatics to unite self-dependence, freedom and substantial view of mind, with culture, i. e., an interest for diverse pursuits and an acquaintance with the conveniences of life."

In order for spirit to become actual, the passions and the ideas of men must unite in a concrete expression. In such fashion is the state formed. Man begins with the idea of freedom; with this idea he links a passionate interest in community expression, and the result is a synthesis of spirit under the conditions of the state.

(10) Perpetual struggle and growth.

A ninth element that manifests itself is that the progress of spirit is a perpetual struggle and growth in which there is no end. An immortality is demanded in order that the mighty stirrings of spirit may emerge to reality. "The Idea advances to an infinite antithesis."

56. Hegel, PHR, 194.
58. Ibid., 252.
50. Ibid., 55.
Now there are those like the Hindus who suppose that bliss and peace are the end of man. Such a principle is held by many psychologists of today, especially those who contend that their major task is to resolve all of man's frustrations and tensions in the easiest way irrespective of moral factors. For Hegel "the History of the World is not a theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony, -- periods when the antithesis is in abeyance." The history of the world presents an eternal struggle between what is and what ought to be. Out of the give and take of this maelstrom spirit emerges. It is for this reason that the lot of those who set out to lead the world is not a happy one. They are the very vortices of whirlpools of discordant conflict. Out of their agony is born a new and nobler spirit. Thus it is that "Spirit is at war with itself." And out of this war arises a transfigured spirit. The very nature of spirit demands this antithetical striving. "Only by overcoming this antithesis is Spirit twice-born-- regenerated." A similarity with this idea is seen in the Phoenician worship of Hercules who "instead of passing his life in idleness, spends it in hardship and toil." So too, the Egyptian spirit shows

61. Hegel., 56.
62. Ibid., 61.
63. Ibid., 90
64. Ibid., 240.
65. Ibid., 258.
its likeness by its surging "rise from natural forms." The essence of the Egyptian spirit is to be seen in its antithesis of nature and spirit. "Spirit sunk in Nature, and the impulse to liberate it -- are held together harmoniously as contending elements." Still in this roar and crash of events there arises a question. "Regarding History as the slaughter-march which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized -- the question involuntarily arises -- to what principle, to what final aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered." There comes to the rescue the first principle we put forth, namely that Reason rules the world. But our thoughts are lifted to wider horizons and the Universal extends itself until it includes God.

(11) God and the human spirit.

Thus spirit is led to affirm its universality in something beyond itself. This something is still of the nature of spirit. The development of man includes and includes the ways of God. This expansion of vision is needed especially as one views the harshness and incompleteness of the world. Only through the comprehension of God can the "thinking spirit" be reconciled.

67. Hegel, 289.
68. Ibid., 49.
69. Hegel, FGO, 2.
with the fact of the existence of evil. Then too the mind sees a relationship to the whole through the "focus... of religion." Thus it can be said that "the conception of God, therefore, constitutes the general basis of a people's character." 

More than this, "the form of religion decides that of the State and its constitution. The latter actually originated in the particular religion adopted by the nation." A secular life that took cognizance only of the temporal and particular would be "relative and unauthorized." The State rests upon Religion. What this means we have already considered.

For these ten principles to form an exact picture of the development is not so important to recognize that something of this sweep of experience must be covered if spirit is to be seen to emerge in its fulness. Whether the consciousness of God is the beginning or the end of spirit, it is still evident that "freedom can exist only where Individuality is recognized as having its positive and real existence in the Divine 'Eins'."

2. The Relation of the Individual to the State.

1) Individuals find their meaning in the state. 

Hegel's recognition of the significance of the individual

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70. Hegel, Pr., 61.
71. Ibid., 83.
72. Ibid., 66.
73. Ibid., 85.
74. Loc. cit.
is illustrated by the structural plan of the Philosophy of Right. He begins with the person and with private morality. The individual, however, is truly the center of life only as he associates with others. Association must take place in the family and in other societal groups, but the full expression of the person is found in the state relationship. Since truth is universal, true persons must be universal also. This suggests that there must ultimately be a world state. In any case persons possess "truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member" of the state.  

Not only individuals but families and civic groups also find their full expression in the state. "The state is the embodiment of concrete freedom. In this concrete freedom, personal individuality and its particular interests, as found in the family and civic community, are their complete development." It is then the duty of individuals, families, and social groups to accommodate their interests with those of the state. The degree to which this accommodation takes place may vary considerably from a ruthless regimentation to a willing obedience to laws promoting the common good. Hegel has in mind an obedience to the state.

75. Hegel, Phil., 240-241.
76. Ibid., 240.
that is in harmony with the rational ends of individuals. The state has this dual aspect in that it is the external power guarding the individual, and it is likewise the integral realization of the individual. The distinction of will between self-regarding and other-regarding actions is artificial in the Hegelian politics. The two are complementary and inseparable.

2) The state is higher than the individual. Any theory of the state must account for the right of the state to demand sacrifices of its members. This philosophic question is brought to a head when recalcitrant individuals or groups are involved. Certainly for any civilized group the state is regarded as of more significance than isolated individuals or groups. If states had not been so recognized, society would long since have slipped into anarchy. "The preservation of the whole takes precedence of that of the individual;-- and all should in disposition acknowledge this." 77 When Hegel summarizes, "It is thus a higher authority, in regard to which the laws and interests of the family and community are subject and dependent," 78 no reasonable argument can be raised. However, it must be kept in mind that it does make a difference as to the kind of state that is involved. Hegel could easily have felt that certain

77. Hegel, AD, IX, 40.
78. Hegel, POR, 245.
conditions inevitably call for revolution and still he would be asserting no more than what Marx called the teaching of the "bourgeois democrats."

Bakunin, who was steeped in the study of Hegel, was called the "Father of Terrorism." He considered the two eternal enemies of man to be government and the church, and no weapon was unworthy of use which promised to expedite their complete obliteration. "The desire for destruction," said Bakunin, "is at the same time a creative desire." 79 This, however, did not exemplify the Hegelian ideal.

On the other hand we find Marx saying that "the history of all hitherto existing society," is "the history of class struggles." 80 Hegel recognized that struggle was inherent in progress, but it was not a struggle between classes or between people and government but between spirit and material obstacles. The struggle was one of individuals as they were seeking to find spiritual fulfilment. "The civic community is.... the arena for the contest of the private interests of all against all," 81 while the state is the means of unifying the many into one, and of protecting the many from each other.

79. Hunter, Vol. 27.
81. Hegel, Pol. 299.
Yet it must be recognized that Hegel did justify revolution on several occasions. He tolerated the violence of the French masses because he felt that they would directly benefit by success. Hegel of course qualified his support of revolution. Pure force did not constitute a legitimate struggle. "Material superiority in power can achieve no enduring results: Napoleon could not coerce Spain into freedom any more than Phillip II could force Holland into slavery." 82 There must be an "emancipation of conscience" 83 for there can be no revolution without a reformation.

Hegel noted that the feudal lords had such an "indomitable contempt for principle, and an utter depravity of morals," 84 that there was no other way for Machiavelli to deal with the situation than with the most reckless violence. We do well to note what Machiavelli said in The Prince and The Discourses.

"For where the very safety of the country depends upon the resolution to be taken, no consideration of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or of shame, should be allowed to prevail. But putting all other considerations aside, the only question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the country?" 85

82. Hegel, PHH, 564.
83. Loc. cit.
84. Ibid., 510.
85. Machiavelli, DIS, 528.
Again we read,

You must know, then, that there are two methods of fighting, the one by law the other by force: the first method is that of men, the second of beasts; but as the first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second.\(^{66}\)

Hegel felt that the French Revolution was an instance justifying the Machiavellian policy for he believed that a more reasonable government would be the outcome. Machiavelli felt that the situation of his day was so corrupt that a strong state could be established only by an absolute despot. Although this political structure would destroy freedom, Machiavelli thought of this as a necessary stage beyond which man could grow as he became less corrupt. Like Hegel, Machiavelli envisioned a free, independent nation in which civic rights would be respected.

Hegel says of the French Revolution, "The change was necessarily violent, because the work of transformation was not undertaken by the government."\(^{67}\) In speaking of the Paris Commune Marx said, "If the acts of the Paris workingmen were vandalism, it was the vandalism of despair."\(^{68}\)

The Hegelian position becomes clearer when we recall that reason was to rule. Hegel made room for the possibility of

\(^{66}\) Machiavelli, PHL, 64.
\(^{67}\) Hegel, PHM, 637.
\(^{68}\) Marx and Engels, 20, 425.
revolution because he felt that France was a country where the leaders were utterly unscrupulous and where the government would not reform itself. But this necessity is a rare exception and not the common rule. In Disposition Hegel found the cohesive factor in solving the problem between the monarch and the people. Disposition is the "cordial recognition of laws and the Constitution as in principle fixed and immutable, and of the supreme obligation of individuals to subject their particular will to them." Hegel criticized England in this regard as overemphasizing the particular freedom and underemphasizing the general freedom. The enlightenment and the reformation with their concept of the worth of the individual posed the problem between the individual and the state, a problem which Hegel solves in general by demanding obedience of the citizen to the state. The individual is to be viewed only in relation to the whole. "The abstract actuality or substantiality of the state consists in this, that the end pursued by the state is the general interest, which, being the substance of all particular interests, includes the preservation of them also."
3) The relation of rights to duties.

"It holds fundamentally good that he who has no rights has no duties and vice versa." No separation of rights from duties is theoretically reasonable. In so far as the citizen has and performs duties he has rights. "Hence slaves have no duties, because they have no rights."93 In the abstract, right and duty apply equally to every person. In the concrete, however, the rights and duties of all citizens are not the same. As we shall see in the following section a class division on the basis of ability is developed. It is the same division that is made between parent and child. Their rights and duties are not commensurate. But all the citizens irrespective of their status find for themselves a harmony between their rights and their duties. "The individual, who from the point of view of his duties is a subject, finds in fulfilling his civic duties, protection of person and property, satisfaction of his real self, and the consciousness and self-respect implied in his being a member of the whole."94 It is not an either-or matter between the individual and the state. As Haeckel pointed out, "Hegel was primarily an absolutist who could not in spite of himself get entirely away from personalistic assumptions."95

94. Ibid., 281
95. Runes, TCP, 333.
3. Hegel's criticism of democracy.

The root of Hegel's distrust of democracy lies in his already established principle that the true is the whole. Democracy is atomistic in that it puts a premium on the opinions of individuals many of whom are unable to see in terms of universality. As Hegel saw it, the masses do not know the absolute will. To allow every person to have an expression in the formation or execution of policy is as unwise in the state as it is in the home. Even on this score, however, Hegel's comparison with the European patriarchal family standard no longer holds as valid. There are, said Hegel, immature minds incapable of directing the destiny of themselves or others. Democracy with such people was for Hegel what it was for Plato, namely mob rule. Like Plato Hegel felt that "only where there exist simple, incorrupt moral, and a small territory can a democracy exist and maintain itself."  

People are members of classes, i.e., artisans, physicians, governors. Every person could not participate wisely in government any more than in medicine. Each person is to partake of the business for which he is prepared. Government is not

96. Hegel, POM, 16, (Lowenberg selections).
97. Hegel, POR, 310.
98. Plato, REP, 816; Hegel, POR, 317.
99. Hegel, RDR, 43.
everybody’s business. For this reason voting, which is considered
to be one of the basic democratic rights, is analyzed by Hegel
to be unsound as a means of arriving at truth in the political
sphere. Even in the rest of democracies voting by the many is
seldom if ever done. Special pressure groups do the voting and
the electing. Since this is the way that democracy works in
elections it seemed more reasonable to Hegel to have a specially
trained group of civic leaders elect the proper state officials.
Since small groups would determine policy in any case, it would
seem more reasonable to have a trained small group that was not
interested in a particular class ends, but was interested in the
welfare of all. Hegel suggested that assembly meetings should
be open to the public as the best means of educating them into
the affairs of rational state policy.

The freedom of expression of opinion was likewise seen as
needing definite qualifications. Free speech must not be inter-
preted to mean that one can advocate or develop any theory.
The reason why care needs to be taken is that all readers of the
press are not judges of the material. They do not know fact from
fantasy and are thus easily misled by false information. In
science, on the other hand, an expression of falsity would be met with contempt, because the readers of scientific journals can discriminate. In the press, however, jingoism and philosophic reasoning are not always distinguishable to the average reader. Still freedom of expression is a good safety valve and "of any reasonable end we may be sure that public opinion will ultimately be pleased with it, recognize it, and constitute it one of its prepossessions." Since the bad is the unique and particular, and the good is the absolutely universal, then it follows that that government will be bad which stresses the multiplicity and separateness of the citizens, and that government would be good which stresses the universal oneness of the state.

4. The citizen and war.

An issue of timely concern is the relation of the individual to the state in the wars which the state enters. In understanding Hegel at this point we must keep in mind several facts. First, the state is the most significant organization into which human beings may enter. It is in the state that the person finds his true place. "It is a very distorted account of the matter when the state in demanding sacrifices from the citizens is taken to be simply the civic community, whose object

100. Hegel, FOR, 325.
is merely the security of life and property." 101 Life and property cannot be preserved by sacrificing them in war. Although it is perfectly true that for some people life and property are secured in war, still the security of those things is more at stake in war than at any other time. That which the state preserves is far more than life or property. It is the full ethical life that is involved if the dissolution of the state takes place.

On the other hand, there is a difference in the ethical quality of states. "Here the conflict is between two states that are at different levels of the historic development of spirit, the solution in Hegel's development is unclear. "Sacrifice for the sake of the individuality of the state is the substantive relation of all the citizens, and it, thus, a universal duty." 102 But Angel's no clear answer to the question is to have an individual idea about whether his state is worth saving or whether it is the winner of two states. Hitler in the Balkans and Mussolini in Ethiopia both justified their actions on the basis that they represented civilized states, while the countries they attacked were barbarians.

In spite of the fact that war was in desolation and confusion, 103 Hegel still maintained that "war is not to be regarded as an absolute evil... to say war people escape the

(Next page 63. Incorrectly paged but complete.)

102. Ibid., 233.
103. Hegel, PGH, 344.
orruption which would be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace. 104 For upset the stability of the temporal by infinite occupations but give direction and purpose to the more eternal ethical drives. It is recognized also that wars may help to prevent civil disturbances by establishing a unity in order to face a common enemy. 105 Peace, too, if it lasts too long, leads to the stagnation of mankind. 106 Hegel affirms that,

"Die Gemeinschaft einer Staatsöffentlichkeit ist in der Hauptsache nicht in der Ruhe des Friedens, sondern in der Bewegung des Krieges." 107

Hegel's slight recognition in his POG and his RGT of the fallacy and destructiveness of war does not change the fact that he believed that war was, by and large, the only honorable and practical recourse. Although his recognition of war's need, is, in some aspects, no more erroneous than the views of many political leaders of today, we must add that he glorified war in an exaggerated way. Hegel's statement that "die Deutschen sind nicht eine unkrigsame Nation," 108 was a direct blow at the idealism of Kant at this point. Further investigation of Hegel's position in this regard will be considered under his international views.

105. Loc. cit.
106. Ibid., 333.
108. Ibid., 149.
The decision to go to war should not be made by the citizens for they are too easily roused to passion in this regard. The decision should be made by the leaders who can decide more impartially. The people are poor judges of universal morality, Sittlichkeit. The masses err, however, not in being too forward, as Hegel suggested, but far more in being too apathetic. What is needed is a more adequate check on the ruling groups in order that cartels and pressure groups do not prove the deciding factors. Immanuel Kant said on this score that "a republican constitution is best; for the citizens as a whole will not hastily enter into war which they will have to fight."

Thus we are brought again to the view that since the state is the organization in which the individual develops himself to be his best, that there is no greater virtue than to give one's life in the service of the state. For this reason "the military class is the class of universality." It does the universal business of protecting the state. "True bravery in civilized peoples consists in a readiness to offer up oneself in the service of the state, so that the individual counts only as one among many... not personal fearlessness, but the taking of one's

110. Hegel, PHR, 334.
place in a universal cause, is the valuable feature of it."

5. The Constitution.

The underlying confidence in the Philosophy of Right is that the Constitution of any particular state is in its essentials deducible from the nature of being by means of reason. The Constitution represents the concretization of the principles by which states are managed. Hegel is not speaking of a super Constitution that applies to all states alike. There is no such document. Constitutions are the peculiar possession of the countries in which they developed. "In a Constitution a people must embody their sense of right and reproduce their conditions." It is not a matter of abstractly creating a Constitution for a state. Such a creation would be a misfit because it would not be indigenous to the culture in which it would function. Constitutions grow through the centuries in the atmosphere of particular situations so that the Constitutions of different lands could not be expected to be at the same level of Sittlichkeit. The real existence of a Constitution as opposed to its formal existence as a written document, is in the consciousness of the people to whom it belongs. The Constitution must express the spirit of the nation.

112. Hegel, FOR, 282.
Hegel notes that a common error in thinking with regard to Constitutions is that they were instituted to combat the general hatred and ill will of man toward man. This governing power is conceived as evil though necessary. To counteract this necessary evil another institution is established to check its power, and so on ad infinitum. Government thus becomes a system of checks and balances. Hegel considered this to be a false evaluation of the meaning and purpose of the state and of the Constitution.

There are three factors in the setting up of a Constitution. First there is the legislative power which defines the universal in terms of law. This is the abstract state of law. Second there is the executive power which applies these universal laws in specific particular instances. Third there is the Prince who makes the ultimate decisions and by his position unifies the whole law system of a state.

Considering these three functions of the governmental agencies we recognize two characteristics of the law. The first characteristic of law is in its objective and initial stage when it is posited as a corpus juris. This step is made by means of logic or the speculative reason. This establishes the general
principles. These general principles are the most universal truths. This, in general, is what the Constitution is for particular states. The Constitution represents the basic principles on which the order of the state is founded. The second characteristic of law is in its subjective and secondary stage when specific application is made. While the first stage is the task of the philosopher exclusively, the second stage may be consumated by the student of history, since the specific application involves the background of the country and the preparation of the people to receive the law. The Constitution is, then, a blending of abstract reason with specific application. The goal of the Constitution is the freedom of the citizens.

It is Hegel's conviction that "every genuine law is a liberty: it contains a reasonable principle of objective mind." 113

The Constitution, then, "determines as the internal law of the State, the relation of the particular powers of the government both to the Government as their supreme centre and to one another, and the relation of the citizens thereto or their share therein." 114 And furthermore,

113. Hegel, POM, 599. Moravia gives a significant position to the relation of laws to the people. "It is necessary People's laws should be prepared for the reception of the best Laws." SL,I,314. "It is the business of the legislature to follow the spirit of the nation, when it is not contrary to the principles of government." SL,I,316. Solon, when asked if the laws he had given the Athenians were the best, replied, "I have given them the best they were able to bear." Plutarch, Life of Solon, 9, in SL,I,328.
114. Hegel, p. 16.
The guarantee of a constitution... lies in the collective spirit of the nation... The question--To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power to make a constitution? is the same as the question, Who has to make the spirit of a nation?... What is thus called 'making a constitution' is--just because of this inseparability--a thing that has never happened in history, just as little as the making of a code of laws. A constitution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development, and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alternations required by its concept. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and be it added, the history is only that spirit's history) by which constitutions have been and are made.115

There is never a time when the task of building a Constitution is completed. "The constitution is an endless progressive growth."115

6. The Prince.

1) Individuality in particularity makes absolute decision possible.

There is necessary in the universality of the state a particularity in order to provide for unity in decisions. Unity is a value to be desired regardless of the nature of the particular state. The various political philosophies follow different paths to gain this unity. All states, however, reduce the executive office to the smallest possible number in order that a unified decision will be more probable. Again, most states agree in having

115. Hegel, POM, 540.
the formal executive power in the hands of one person. Hegel believed that the republican monarchy provided for this unity in the soundest way. No majority decision either of the people or of the leaders could take the place of the decision of one authorized person. "The element which implies absolute decision is not individuality in general but one individual monarch."¹¹⁷ This is what Keyburn considers the weakness of Hegel's whole treatment of sovereignty; namely that the real unity of the state must be a single particular man.¹¹⁸

It is thus that by a monarch "the personality of the state is actualized."¹¹⁹ One of the most difficult political concepts for the layman to grasp is that which puts final authority in the state. Now the state is impersonal until it has some individual whose personal act of will can actualize the self-determining and sovereign will of the state. This does not mean that the monarch can be "wilful in his acts." The monarch is "bound to the concrete content of the advice of his counsellors, and when the constitution is established, he has often nothing to do but sign his name."¹²⁰

As Hegel pointed out in his Aesthetic,

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¹¹⁷. Hegel, POR, 286.
¹¹⁸. Keyburn, ETH, 252.
¹¹⁹. Hegel, POR, 287.
¹²⁰. Ibid., 290.
Since, "Dass eine Norm eine Staat Bildet, dazu ist "gesetzes", dass sie sich gemeinsam dicke und Staatsgewalt bildet," 122 it seemed logical to Hegel that the real unity of this State demanded an individual who could be the concretization of that unity. It is understood that the state is already in a sense a completed organization where decisions are answered by the constitution and codes of law. The monarch, then, is merely the person who signs his name on behalf of the state. "For this office is need only a man who says 'yes,' and so puts the dot upon the 'i.'" 123

"The principle of the state must be such that the private character of its occupant shall be of no significance." 124 This prince is neither the "Herr" of Nietzsche nor the "Führer" of Hitler. The prince does have considerable in common with the position of the king of England as a titular head. Even's prince does not have much work to do because of the rigid curtailment of his personal liberty. "In a well-ordered monarchy only the subjective side of his comes to hand, and to this the monarch subjoins merely the subjective 'i will.'" 125

121. Hagel, Aesthetics, 1, loc. Sen also Harris, HPS, 23.
122. Hagel,法哲学, 17.
123. Hagel, 292.
124. Loc. Cit.
125. Ibid., 293.
Hegel was opposed to the American system of checks and balances because he was so determined that unity be achieved. In trouble with the American scheme was that it sacrificed unity in the interest of atomic individuals. Instead of giving one person or one group the authority, the American system divided the power among several groups, each of which would act as a check on a spur to the other. The theory was that corruption and error would be less likely were there was a certain competition for accuracy. The difficulty was that pressure groups usurped power and made decisions, and what was meant to be a democracy actually functioned as an autocracy. Hegel felt that "the idea that the functions of government should be independent contains the fundamental error that they should check one another. But this independence is apt to usurp the unity of the state, and unity is above all things to be desired." Hegel leaned toward totalitarianism in this matter is not to be overlooked, but it must be admitted that he stresses the most commendable and least onerous aspects of a solution in politics. Thus Hegel concludes that "in its most primitive manifestations, the

126. Hegel, PGR, 292.
127. Ibid., 309.
state has at its head an individual, whether he be patriarch, chief, or what not.\textsuperscript{128} This individual gives to the otherwise abstract will of the state a personal will which executes a unified decision. Hegel did not feel that an ideal could in this unity, as it is in the United States of America for example. The unity must be a person.

This thought of Hegel grew out of the political times in which he lived to a large degree. He saw the failure of the old feudal nobility of Würzburg to free themselves from the past, and on the other hand he saw the strength of the Prussian state. He saw the chaos of the French Revolution, even under the Directory, until Napoleon appeared. Hegel had witnessed the weakness of a Holy Roman Empire where the emperor did not rule, and he contrasted this with Prussia which had an autocratic king. It was not that he took Prussia for perfection,\textsuperscript{129} but only that he saw what Prussian unity had done for Germany. For this reason the individuality of the prince made possible absolute decisions which were essential for a unified state.

2) How the prince was elected.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Hegel, POR, 329.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Hegel, POH, 536.
\end{itemize}
Popular elections for the prince were considered both impractical and unwise, for the method of popular election promotes this disunity of factions. Witness the presidential elections in the United States of America as an illustration of the chaos caused by letting the masses decide who shall be the ruler. In order to solve this problem, Hegel felt that an hereditary monarchy was necessary. "Right of birth and right of inheritance constitute the basis of legitimacy, not as regards positive right merely, but likewise in the idea. Through the self-determined or natural succession to the vacant throne all factional disputes are avoided." 130 One has only to recall, however, the Wars of the Roses in order to see the inadequacy of Hegel's defense. 131 Where the citizenry care to hold intense feeling of loyalty to an hereditary leader even greater chaos may be caused than doubt is raised as to whose legitimate successor should be. Where the citizens consider elections more in a sporting light, no profound fears are engendered regardless of the man elected. This willing acceptance of the results of popular election is

130. Hegel, PAK, 293.
131. See Ploetz, 31, 272. The Wars of the Roses of Lancaster and York lasted for the thirty years between 1455 and 1485. During this chaotic period when two families tried to assume the right of succession, England was not unified.
due partly to the confidence of the populace in the system of
checks and balances which helps to prevent misrule by any one per-
son or party.

Hegel's contention that "the monarch has his rights vested
in the very necessity of the state; not by contract, nor by the
(democratic)will of the people," 132 misses the brunt of the
distinction between his ideas and popular democratic ideas.
Monarchists and republicans agree in considering that the rights
of the leader are vested in the necessity of the state. They
differ in their beliefs on how the monarch is to be chosen.

3) The power of the monarch.

It has already been pointed out 133 that the monarch does not
have free reign. In fact, where the constitution is well estab-
lished, the will of the monarch is expressed only in the affixing
of his signature to documents. In the decision of certain cases
in an established state the monarch is not only supplied with
the rules by which cases will be tried but he is supplied with
the cases as well. It is the task of other officers to decide

132. Hegel, POR, 249.
133. Ibid., 290.
which cases merit or demand the attention of the prince. 134

"One of the highest recognitions of the majesty of spirit," 135 of the monarch is his right to pardon. "Out of the sovereignty of the monarch flows the right of pardoning criminals. Only to sovereignty belongs that realization of the power of the spirit, which consists in regarding what has happened as not having happened, and cancels crime by forgiving and forgetting." 136

Actually the major authority rests in other hands, and as in the English government, Hegel's prince is more of a figurehead providing unity than an executive leading the nation.

7. The Executive Function.

1) Qualifications of the officers.

Like Plato Hegel believed in an aristocratic government. The best people should be the rulers. Thus, in the consideration of who would be the executive leaders of the state, Hegel maintained that those who could see the universal problems and needs of the state were the best fitted to assume leadership. "There is required in them the objective element, namely, knowledge and

134. Hegel, POG, 296-299.
135. Ibid., 295.
136. Loc. cit.
proof of fitness."\textsuperscript{137} Hegel recognized that it was more important that the executive and legislative leaders be men of universal outlook than that the prince be such, for the spade work is done by the former men. They set the moral pace for the state. As Jayburn has pointed out

Hegel tended at times to underestimate the solid rationality of the populace and to overestimate the ability of disinterested officials to recognize the real tendencies and needs of the nation.\textsuperscript{138}

2) The class element in the choice of officers.

Again, in unanimity with Plato, Hegel introduced a property qualification for those who would be political leaders.\textsuperscript{139} It was his idea that the middle class represented the pillars of the state in regard to "rectitude and intelligence."\textsuperscript{140} Thus he maintained that property ownership was essential to the political leaders and ruling classes. The ownership was essential to the political or ruling classes. The ownership of property gave them a more tangible stake in the welfare of the state, and it gave them a sense of independence from want since many of the political leaders received no salaries or salaries inadequate to support them. For the same reason that senators and represent-
tives are secure from the attacks of private interests on the floor of the House of Senate in the United States of America. Hegel defended the protection of all agents of the state from the attacks of individuals "whose business is harmed by the furtherance of the universal good."141

6. The Relation of States to Each Other.

1) The implications of the dialectic.

The implication of the dialectical principle that the true is the whole, that adequacy involves completeness, is that progress cannot stop with a world of nations existing like windowless boxes. Hegel recognized that this is the logical implication from the dialectic when he said that "just as the individual person is not real unless related to others, so the state is not really individual unless related to other state."143 In spite of this recognition, Hegel strangely did not sense the possibility of a world nation or a world sovereign. Individuals could be united under one head in a state, but the possibility of unifying states under one head seemed fantastic at the present stage of world history. Hegel recognized that no authority existed to decide disputes between nations. Contingency ruled in international relations. In spite of Hegel's frank recog-

141. Hegel, Pol., 306.
143. Hegel, Pol., 357.
(1) Out of this fact and in spite of his adverse criticism of Kant's confine in an international government, the implications of Hegel's dialectic are clearly in favor of the possibility of a unified world.  

2) The recognition of international anarchy and the acceptance of war as a solution.

Hegel stated that "when the particular wills of states can come to no agreement, the controversy can be settled only by war." This was a frank recognition that there was no superior power to rule between nations. What international law there was rested "on social usage." There was a contractual relation between states.

States stand more in a natural than a legal relation to one another. There is on account of that, a continual strife going on among them.

In such a situation the only basis for Sittlichkeit must be the individual states with their particular wills. In a universal sense where the relations among states are constantly changing and there is no judge who can reconcile the differences, the only true picture can be seen from the vantage point of history. World history can portray which nation gives the more adequate expression of the absolute spirit.

144. See art., Phil. Forum, 23-25, 1944.
146. Hegel, PCM, 347.
147. Hegel, RDA, 48.
It was not strange, therefore, that given such an anarchic international situation Hegel should feel that war was the only logical recourse. Where civilized nations were endangered by barbarian nations, it was the duty of the more civilized to preserve themselves, even if they had to destroy the others. This is the clear meaning behind Hegel's statement that "civilized nations may treat as barbarians the peoples who are behind them in the essential elements of the state." 148 The strange part is, however, that Hegel did not see as did Kant the probability of a "federation of free states." 149

Although it is true that Hegel believed that war was "not to be waged against internal institutions, or the peaceful family and private life, or private persons," 150 he had no scruples about waging it against other states. War was the instrument, however horrible it seemed, through which reason worked out the advance of spirit. Wars were more blessed than peace. Love was more rational at war than at peace. Here is an area where Hegel failed to follow the implications of his own theory. Logically he should have favored internationalism. Actually he took a firm nationalist position and glorified in the prospect of wars which would preserve national sovereignty and develop man's spirit.

148. Hegel, FGA, 345.
149. Kant, PP, 14.
150. Hegel, FGA, 340.
CHAPTER V
THE ETHICAL THEORY OF MARX

1. The Class Nature of Morality.

Whereas Hegel considered ethics to be essentially logical and empirical, the development of reason, Marx considered ethics to be the outgrowth of economic conditions. Marx did not originate the thesis that economic forces aided in moulding life, but he did give economic factors a prominence that they had not previously had. 1 It was Marx's firm conviction that the history of mankind had been mainly directed by the ebb and flow of economic conditions, so it was only logical that he should consider ethical theories to be the by-products of the economic factors of his time.

Marx accepted the Greek and medieval Christian theory that economic factors were materialistic, but whereas his religious predecessors had concluded that material things were non-essential, Marx declared that they were basic. Indeed, Marx reacted not so much to the dichotomy as to the thesis that material forces were morally insignificant. Since religion had neglected so many of the bodily needs of man, Marx was intent upon putting man's physical needs in their right perspective. In doing this, he certainly swung to the other extreme. Yet, it must be seen that the material-
Materialism of Marx went beyond that of Feuerbach in the prominence that man received. Marx criticized Feuerbach for his crude materialism. Materialism for Marx was not merely a means for explaining man, but chiefly for changing him.

We shall consider the class nature of society in a later section (VI, 4, 5), but it may be said that in a class society morality will be a class affair. Marx pointed out that the various moral systems which Europe had endured had followed the changing economic organization of the various nations.

Whereas morality had been bourgeois, there was coming a "proletarische Zukunftsmoral." As regards the relative value of the two kinds of system, bourgeois and proletarian, Engels said:

Welche ist nun die wahre? Keine einzige, im Sinne absoluter Endgültigkeit; aber sicher wird diejenige Moral die meisten, Dauer versprechenden, Elemente besitzen, die in der Gegenwart die Umwälzung der Gegenwart, die Zukunft, vertritt, also die proletarische.

Thus, recognizing that morality is a class product, Engels went on to say that that morality which aids more in the redemptive revolution is the better. Marx likened class consciousness to Francis Bacon's "Idol of the Tribe." Marx and Engels noted

2. See Marx, TF in GI, 199.
4. Loc. cit.
5. Venable, HNM, 21.
that there were other factors than the economic which determined social life. For example, they thought of art as a means for the moulding of the attitudes of people. But they were most concerned that the economic factor should not be omitted.

The economic situation is the basism but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, forms of law, and then even the reflexes of all these in the minds of the combatants: political, legal, philosophical theories, religious ideas and their fuller development into systems of dogma—also exercise their influence upon the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements, in which amid all the endless hosts of accidents ... the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary... There are numerous intersecting forces which give rise to one resultant—the historical event... Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side then is due it. We had to emphasize this main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights.  

Be this as it may, the fact remains that economic forces determine these other so-called factors so that we are back essentially to a temporary economic determinism. Temporary because the revolution assumed that there was a force other than economic at work, and because the disappearance of classes assumed a freedom from economic controls.

Hegel had presented the state as being a resultant of reason. Marx presented the state as being the result of exploitative economies. Thus, while Hegel's moral theory harmonized with and aided a state, Marx's theory was that morality either aided a state founded on exploitation or provided for the dissolution of the state. Hegel's moral theory made the state essential to the full development of man. Marx's moral theory made the state a barrier to the full development of man. According to Marx ethics either was a tool aiding in the maintenance of a reactionary state, or else it was a revolutionary tool in the hands of the proletariat aiding in the overthrow of the state. In either case, it was a class means to a class ends.

In connection with this Marx condemned the morality of his day as being the legislative product of the bourgeoisie. "It is impossible," said Marx, "to create a moral power by paragraphs of law." 7 Morality is not more. Just what morality leads Marx more toward Kant than Hegel, more toward atomism than toward organicism.

2. Ethics Is Dehumanizing.

Following his conclusion that ethical systems have been products of classes, and basically the ruling classes, Marx went on to

7. Marx, ENG, 26. Hegel's position in this matter was the same. He too believed that the moral development of man was prior to the concretization of the development in law. A constitution, for example, represented the level which a culture had attained, and did not represent a moralizing force for the changing of a culture. Montesquieu (SL) presents a similar thesis.
point out the dehumanizing tendencies in bourgeois ethics. Bourgeois ethical systems have been abstract, committing the fallacy of the universal in their neglect of the basic needs of man. Ethics has served as a means of preserving the status quo, and that to the degradation of man.

Larx offers as an illustration of this, the policy of the division of labor as exercised under bourgeois economy. The division of labor separated the interests of the individual from the community as a whole, by breaking down the social intercourse.

The particular organs of a compact whole grow loose, and break off, principally owing to the exchange of commodities with foreign communities, and then isolate themselves so far, that the sole bond, still connecting the various kinds of work, is the exchange of the products of the commodities... The foundation of every division of labour that is well developed, and brought about by the exchange of commodities, is the separation between town and country.

In similar fashion the division of labor separated the intellectual from the manual and material and took the enjoyment out of work. Workers became mere commodities, means to the end of capital production. Man became enslaved by his labor.

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9. Marx, CAP, I, 502-504; Larx and Engels, CI, 22-23; Marx, CAP, I, chapter 14, sec. 4-5, chapter 15, sec. 5, 8, 9, 10.
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left no other nexus between man and man, than callous 'cash payment.' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of Philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egoistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value... The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage laborers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

Marx has been accused of slurring over the significance of individuals in his criticism of the capitalist state. Certainly in his positive program he does have more to say about the proletariat than about the individual proletarian. This was due not so much to a lack of concern for the individual as to the belief that the individual was the product of society. In his preface to the first edition of Capital Marx mentions this fact.

But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. By standpoint from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.

Still one must not disregard the fact that Marx was supremely concerned with what capitalism did to individuals. Although Marx's positive program of revolution does not present in any clear fashion what the new order will mean for persons as much as for classes, but Marx's criticism of the present order certainly recognizes the degrading effects that it has on individuals and not merely on the proletarian class, taken by itself, abstractly.

Engels pointed out the devastating effects of the manufacturing system of England upon individuals.

These Londoners have been forced to sacrifice the best qualities of their human nature... a hundred powers which slumbered within them have remained inactive, have been suppressed... The very turmoil of the streets has something repulsive, something against which human nature rebels. The hundreds and thousands of all classes and ranks crowding past each other, are they not all human beings with the same qualities and powers, and with the same interest in being happy? And still they crowd by one another as though they had nothing in common, nothing to do with one another, and their only agreement is the tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the pavement... while it occurs to no man to honour another with so much as a glance... This isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking is the fundamental principle of our society everywhere... The dissolution of mankind into monads, of which each one has a separate principle, the world of atoms, is here carried out to its utmost extreme.14

This was Hegel's criticism too, not only of capitalism, but of Kantian ethics as well.

Not only in its division of man from men, but in its false evaluation, the capitalist system has degraded mankind economically and ethically. Engels pointed out with Biblical observation,

Das Geld ist der Gott dieser Welt. Der Bourgeois nimmt dem Proletarier sein Gold und macht ihn dadurch zum praktischen Atheisten. Kein Wunder also, wenn der Proletarier seinen Atheismus beauftritt und die Heiligkeit und die Macht des irdischen Gottes nicht mehr respektiert. 15

3. The Rights of Man Are Supreme.

Whatever Marxian critics may believe with regard to the efficacy of his system, they can scarcely fail to see that he was motivated by a desire to improve the conditions of men. If Marx did lose the individual in the economic order as Hegel lost him in the absolute, still it was more through an emphasis in his positive program upon the class nature of the revolution. Marx thought in terms of classes. Lurry points out, "one of the chief of the many defects of the ordinary popular version of Marxian is the absence of any emphasis on its consequences for the individual." 16 He goes on to show that the Marxian program was fundamentally concerned with what happened to persons. One of Marx's chief criticisms of Feuerbach was that his materialism failed to

15. Engels, LAKE, in NCID, 97.
16. Lurry, BI, in MAR, 79.
include man. Marx's frequent condemnation of the capitalist system was based on his belief that the system harmed persons. We shall note later, it is true, that Marx felt that man does not become effective in society until he acts as a class member, but this does not cancel the concern which Marx had for human needs.

Marx said that in the final stage of the new order the economic principle would be, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," while in the first phase of the communist society, man would still be paid on the basis of the amount of work that he could do. Marx felt that the method of payment on the basis of work done did not take into consideration the differing abilities of men and their relatively common and incompatible needs. The payment on the basis of need is a development of Bentham's "greatest good for the greatest number," coupled with Kant's concern that persons be treated as ends and not as means. Certainly Marx is ethical in spite of the fact that he did not develop an ethical theory and in fact condemned traditional ethical systems.

17. Marx, CGP, 10. This statement occurs in the 9th edition of Louis Blanc's Organization of Labor, 72. Blanc revises a previous conclusion that wages ought to be equal, by this statement. "Equality is therefore only proportionality, and it will not truly exist unless each person--in accordance with the law in some sort written into his constitution by God himself--produces according to his abilities and consumes according to his needs." See Wagner, SR, 248.
"To be radical," said Marx, "is to grasp the matter by its root. Now the root for mankind is man himself." He continues,

The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being for mankind, and therefore with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a degraded, servile, neglected, contemptible being, conditions which cannot better be described than by the exclamation of a Frenchman on the occasion of a projected dog tax: 'Poor dogs; they want to treat you like men.'

4. Das Opium des Volkes.

One of the unfortunate emphases of Marx was his attack upon religion due primarily to his confusing the institutionalism of his day with the Christian religion as the Gospels present it. Thus Marx declared, "Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion and all morality..." Although Marx substituted communist truths and communist morality, it must be admitted that these were not eternal but purely temporal and relative to the social situation. His attack was rightly against the immoral aspects of the church of his day. He erred, however, in outlawing religion because of these defects.

In criticizing the ideology of his day in a letter to Dr. Kugelmass, Marx averred that it was "recking of the barracks, the

Church, cabbage-junkerdom and above all, of the philistine." 20

Two aspects of the church nettled Marx--its other-worldliness and its intensely worldly conservatism. Marx asserted,

_Die Religion ist der Seufzen der bedrängten Kreatur, das Gedäkt einer herzlosen Welt, wie sie der Geist geistloser Zustände ist._ 21

While the theology of the priests was transcendent, in actual practice, they were worldly prelates of the most reactionary sort. "Der Pfaffe erscheint dann nur noch als der gesalbte Spürhund der irdischen Polizei." 22 The clergy had conspired with the gendarmes to "demoralize immature masses." 23 Thus Marx concluded that if man was to be freed from the bourgeoisie, he would have to discard religion. Engels called religion "ein Mittel der Lassenverdummung." 24 Since the religious leaders "erheben das Prinzip der Ausbeutung selbst auf das Piedestal des Heiligen und Ewigen," 25 "Religion ist die grösste konterrevolutionäre Kraft." 26 Marx saw the church as a threat to the proletariat. The church like the state was a repressive agency. It was "parsonpower." 27

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22. Marx, Du Achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, in RODV, 47. See also Marx, EBB, 115.
23. Marx, EBB, 55.
25. Loc. cit.
26. Marx, CWP, 57.
The first step toward redeeming man from the repression for which the church stood was to banish the idea of a state church. Quoting from Bauer, Marx stated that "when there is no longer a privileged religion, there will no longer be a religion." 28

The individual can emancipate himself politically from religion "by banishing it from public right into private right." 29 This step, however, is intended to be only a political emancipation, "which thus neither abolishes nor seeks to abolish the real religiosity of the individual." 30 This is a remarkable concession to genuine religion. Marx goes on to say,

The so-called Christian State needs the Christian religion in order to complete itself as a state. The democratic State, the real State, does not need religion for its political completion. It can rather do without religion, because it represents the realization of the human basis of religion in a secular manner. 31

Marx thus wishes to eradicate established churches, but he does not intend to abolish personal religion. "The privilege of faith is a general right of men." 32 But religion ought to be earthy, politically practical for the individual. Thus while Marx approves the "abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people," 33

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26. Bauer, DJ, 66; Marx, JQ in SE, 47.
29. Marx, JQ in SE, 58.
30. Ibid., 59.
31. Ibid., 62.
32. Ibid., 72.
33. Marx, CHPA in SE, 12.
he is likewise pleading for a socially revolutionary religion. Marx stressed the idea that popular religion was a construct of man's immature and abstract thinking. For this reason it was the "opium of the people." 34 He hoped that man could make a transition so that "the criticism of heaven transforms itself into the criticism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of right, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics." 35

The Jewish religion received its share of condemnation. While Christianity was basically too other-worldly, Judaism was the basest of materialism. "Out of its entrails, bourgeois society continually creates Jews." 36 Judaism was the money-mad religion, and when, as it frequently did, the Christian Church became money-minded, it was becoming 'Jewish.' Marx's essay on "The Jewish Question" is heavily loaded with anti-Semitism. "Public credit," said Marx, "rests on the confidence that the state will allow itself to be exploited by the Jews of finance." 37 Marx criticized the movement on foot to liberate the Jews. He saw no reason why Jews should be emancipated when all the citizens were in the same chains. The need was not for Jewish emancipation, Marx

34. Marx, CKB in SE, 12.
35. Ibid., 13.
37. Marx, ES, 16.
contended, but for citizen emancipation. The latter demands a basic change in the structure of the state, while the former would be mere patchwork.

5. Man's Capacity for Development.

Although Marx was skeptical about the ability of religion to develop either society or individuals to be more free, he did believe that man had a definite capacity for freedom. When Darwin's Origin of Species was published, Marx wrote,

This is the book which contains the basis in natural history for our view... Darwin's book is very important and serves us as a basis in natural science for the class struggle in history. 36

Marx criticized, however, the unhistorical tabulation method of Darwin. Further, Marx suspected that the struggle for existence, especially as applied by Malthus, was too easily a bourgeois tool. The competitive system of capitalism was likewise a struggle for the survival of the fit. Thus Marx, recognizing the dialectical truth in Darwin, criticized him for limiting the evolution to biological life and for failing to see that man's struggle is economic and must eventuate in the overthrow of the present system. Although Marx introduced the economic factor into his evolution, he unfortunately eliminated or ignored many of the equally important

36. Marx, SC, 125-126 (Letters to Engels and to Lasalle).
biological factors which Darwin included in his.

Marx found an assurance that man had infinite capacities for development in the inorganic sciences—astronomy, physics, chemistry, thermodynamics and geology. Here he found implications that human life also was a "natural development from an inorganic matrix." Marx found his first assurance, however, in his study of the Hegelian dialectic. Before he was a student of Darwinian science he was a student of the Hegelian dialectic. Infinite development was part and parcel of the dialectical system.

While Hegel had seen the primary motivating factor in all change to be the unquenchable search of the human spirit for the freedom of the divine Spirit, Marx found the primary motivating force to be economic. Man was affected by his bodily needs and by the reactions of both himself and others to those basic bodily demands. The history of man portrays the changing nature of man as he seeks to free himself from economic pressures. In this sense Hegel and Marx have an element in common. The Philosophy of History of Hegel portrays the struggle of men to become free from the trammels of restrictive forces. With Hegel the forces are multi-form—culture, physical environment, customs, mores, religion,

personalities, the spiritual longings of men for ideals. But the movement of the dialectic aims at freedom or the full expression of reason. With Marx the forces are epitomized in the economic, although others are recognized. These things are basic for Marx—production, distribution, the drive for economic power or security, the impact of oppressor on the oppressed. But here too the dialectic aims at freedom— the freedom from economic inequality and the freedom for economic security. As we noted previously, Engels admitted that the overemphasis on economics had led to the assumption by Marxian students that no other factors were recognized; yet he asserted that both he and Marx discerned that there were other factors. They believed that those other factors were already stressed sufficiently, while the economic aspect had been neglected.

While Hegel aimed to show that man's slow rise to self-consciousness would be exemplified in man's awareness of his relation to the absolute Spirit, Marx aimed to show that man's rise to self-consciousness would be exemplified first in man's awareness of his relation to his class and ultimately in a realm of freedom.

40. We will consider this in the next chapter when we comment on Marx's statements in CAP, III.
where classes did not exist, because exploitation did not exist. Hegel called men to be Spirit conscious; Marx called men to be class conscious, yet only as a means to a classless society.

In their common assertion that man needed society for full development Hegel and Marx agree. Man is for Marx as Venable states, "a function in a field," a "variable in an interactive context." Marx stated,

The first premise of all human existence, and therefore of all history is that man must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history.' But life involves before anything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. Marx carries this further.

All production is appropriation of nature by the individual within and through a definite form of society. This gives rise to problems of distribution.

In society, however, the relation of the producer to his product, as soon as it is completed, is an outward one, and the return of the product to the individual depends on his relations to other individuals. He does not take immediate possession of it.

Hegel said that man does not begin to make history until a state is formed. Marx agreed that some social organization was

42. Venable, HTP, 5.
43. Marx, GI, 16.
44. Marx, Introduction to CPE, 273.
45. Ibid., 283.
46. See chapter IV, 3, (4), chapter IV, 2, 1. 
aided, but that the state was only a means for a particular type of economic system. Whereas Hegel's *Philosophy of History* showed the development of Spirit in the state, Marx's history showed the development of economic systems. In his introduction to the *Critique of Political Economy* Marx points out five types of productive systems. The Asiatic or primitive communism, the ancient slave system, the feudal system, the bourgeois capitalist system, and the socialist system are the five types mentioned. All of these economic systems develop under some form of social structure. Marx criticized Adam Smith and David Ricardo for their theory of the individualistic origins of society.

The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting point with Smith and Ricardo, belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinsonades. 46

Marx continues,

Production by isolated individuals outside of society—something which might happen as an exception to a civilized man who by accident got into the wilderness and already dynamically possessed within himself the forces of society—is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another. 49

47. Marx, CPE, preface; Engels, OE, passim.
46. Marx, CPE, 265-266. The term "Robinsonades" is not defined by Marx, but it seems to suggest the 'lone wolf' concept of Robinson Crusoe.
49. Ibid., 268.
In his ninth Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx calls such a theory a construct of bourgeois ideology. "Man is in the most literal sense of the word a *zoon politikon*, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society." 50

Marx's ethical position, if he had been willing to recognize himself as holding to a philosophic theory, was that of social hedonism or social behavioralism. He emphasized more what the environment did to man in his negative attack on capitalism, although in his positive program he indicated what man could do to environment. Like Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick, Marx aimed for the greatest good of the greatest number. The weakness of Marx's theory at this point was not that it lacked a sincere concern for man, but that it lacked a clear criterion by which to test the definition of the greatest good.

Impatient with what seemed to him to be the abstractness of Hegel's stress on reason (coherence), Marx projected a practical program of action without concerning himself sufficiently with the theory lying back of it. Like Hegel, his emphasis on system tended to slumber over the individual. Marx lost individuals in his economic theories, and yet his confidence that the members of the proletariat could mend the unhealthy economic situation certainly make him more

50. Marx, CPE, 266.
Kantian than Hegel, who lost individuals in the state. The tendency of both Marx and Hegel to emphasize system more than the members of the system indicated more their sense of the relative value of systems versus persons, and did not signify that they were completely indifferent to the fate of persons. These men had organicistic theories about society, and these theories naturally put less emphasis on individuals than they do on social wholes.
CHAPTER VI
LARX’S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE


There may be some question as to whether Vögel’s affirmation that Hegel’s "gestützter Sohn" was Karl Marx, but there can be no doubt but that Marx certainly owed a considerable debt to Hegel for certain of the basic elements of his system. The dialectic was the most significant aspect of Hegel’s system which Marx took over. Marx and Engels recognized the dialectic to be the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. In a letter to Dietzgen Marx states that "the correct laws of the Dialectic are already included in Hegel almost in mystical form." Vögel did not exaggerate the case when he said


Marx, however, felt that Hegel had been too abstract in his theory and had not come down to practical programs. In the

1. Vögel, HG, 211.
2. Engels, LF, 70; Lenin, TM, 13-14.
3. Marx to Dietzgen, 1876, quote in Hook, TM, 31.
4. Vögel, HG, 212. This is substantiated by Marx in CPZ and by Engels in LF.
instances where Hegel had instigated specific policies, they were of a reactionary nature. Speaking of Hegel and his followers Marx said, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is, to change it." When Marx said this, he did not mean that his own method was not philosophical, but that his was more fully developed. His philosophy was more completely conscious having moved on from abstract theory to concrete program. In criticism of German philosophers Marx said, "Germans have thought in politics what other people have done. Germany was their theoretical conscience." In their turn, Marx and Engels call the former philosophizing on the French revolution and especially on socialism, "the robe of speculative conceits, embroidered with flowers of rhetoric, steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment, this transcendental robe."7

In his criticism of Hegel, Marx condemns not only the crude materialism of Feuerbach but the idealism of "the Germans" particularly Hegel who "move in the realm of the 'pure spirit,'" and "make religious illusion the driving force of history."8 Engels considered Hegel to be theoretically a revolutionary but practically a political reactionary. In support of this Engels

5. Marx, CI, 199, (Thesis 11.)
8. Marx, CI, 30.
pointed out that Hegel's statement "all that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real," had been interpreted by narrow-minded liberals as a "satisfaction of things that be." Hegel meant this to mean, "all that is real in the sphere of human history becomes rational in the process of time and is therefore irrational already by its destination, is tainted beforehand with irrationality, and everything which is rational in the minds of men is destined to become real, however much it may contradict the apparent reality of existing conditions." The theory of the dialectic was certainly revolutionary and Engels admitted this:

But precisely here lay the true significance and the revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy... that it once and for all dealt the death blow to the finality of all products of human thought and action. 10

Engels saw his and Marx's agreement with Hegel at this point. Hegel had shown how stages of history are necessary and valid for a time but that these stages must decay and perish in order to give way to a new era.

Just as knowledge is unable to reach a perfected termination in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect 'State,' are things which can only exist in imagination. 11

10. Loc Cit.
11. Ibid., 22.
The difficulty as Engels saw it was that Hegel's revolutionary implications had been covered by his system, so that absolute Spirit became the goal even though the system denied an absolute. Engels was troubled with the idea of any absolute finality.  

The need which Hegel had of constructing a system made it seem to Engels as if a closed and static theory were the result. Engels pointed out that

> Whoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian system could be fairly conservative in both spheres, religion and politics; whoever regarded the dialectical method as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion.

The followers of Hegel illustrated this. The Social Democrats such as Bernstein accused Marx of having become entangled in the "snare of Hegelian dialectic." They contended that Marxism must be purged of idealistic Hegelian dialectics. The neo-Hegelians, among whom are the Fascist philosophers, claim that Marx and Hegel have no relationship and that Hegel supported the Fascist state theories. Carritt of Oxford said that dialectical materialism was the synthesis of "Hegel's absolute idea and the matter of the materialist."

In spite of the fact that some critics make Hegel a hopeless

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15. Loc cit.
reactionary. Marx recognized that Hegel's dialectical theory was revolutionary in its political implications. The dialectical theory was not robbed of its revolutionary implications by the fact that German thinkers had made "practical life... as unintellectual as intellectual life is unpractical." Both men began their systems with abstract general definitions and moved toward concrete expressions of those general principles. With Hegel these principles were interpreted primarily in the light of Spirit, although he did give recognition to the effects of economics and environment. With Marx they were interpreted primarily in the light of economics, although he admitted that there were other factors. Marx like Hegel was opposed to social atomism and sympathetic with social organization. "In both of them the dialectical process remained the central fact in spite of their differences as to the motivating force behind the dialectic.

16. Sidney Hook asserts that Hegel stands for "political accommodation," (ETH, 19). Max Eastman says "It is the relic of a religious attitude to attribute your plan for changing the world to the world itself, and endeavor to prove that the 'inner law' of this world is engaged in realizing your ideals." (Intro. to CSS, ix). Eastman criticizes the dialectic as the "German-professorial" method which is unnatural to the more "sceptical and positivistic Anglo-Saxons." German philosophers, says Eastman, have to start with the beginning of the world in order to solve the simplest problems (CSS, viii).
17. Marx, CPA in 81, 36-37.
Chapter III

1. Marx's Dialectical Materialism.

If Hegel's emphasis on intellectual factors led to the development of dialectical idealism, Marx's overemphasis on economic conditions led to dialectical materialism. If in practice, though not in theory, Hegel denied other than intellectual factors, Marx in practice though not in theory, denied other than economic factors, such as "race, religion, nationality, personality." If materialized this to Marx was board and Stills showed

What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed. 19

The movement from abstract to concrete in society is not, as Hegel said, the result of self-co-ordinating, self-absorbed, and spontaneously operating thought," 20 but is the result of multiple economic forces impinging on man and forcing him to discover the concrete. "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life." 21 Marx recognized that the philo-

21. Marx, Intro. to CFE, 11. See also Lenin, Th., 15. "If materialism explains consciousness as the outcome of existence, and not conversely, then applied to the social life of mankind, materialism must explain social consciousness as the outcome of social existence."
Sophie's tendency heightened by the Cartesian division between mind and matter had been to separate material factors from spiritual and thus fail to find an adequate synthesis. Like Kant, Marx sought to solve the "bifurcation." Kant had based the significance of the world of nature in the "practical reason" of ethical obligation. The emphasis and the result were certainly practically constructive. Marx did not face this problem, though he did suggest that man's "oughtness" should express itself in terms of material changes.

How do general historical conditions affect production and what part does it play at all in the course of history? It is evident that this question can be taken up only in connection with the discussion and analysis of production. 22

In a letter to Bloch Engels recognized that the economic factor was not the only one,

Wenn nun jemand das dahin verdreht, das Ökonomische Moment sei das einzig bestimmende, so verwandelt er jenen Satz in eine nichtssagende, abstrakte, sinnlose Phrase. Die Ökonomische Lage ist die Basis. 23

but he does suggest that it is the most fundamental one.

In the light of this economic or materialistic determinism, Marx interpreted history by the struggles between classes over economic matters. Hegel had indicated that the formation of a state, as the embodiment of a stage of reason, was basic if a man were to make history. Marx pointed out that "men must be in a position to live in order to be able to make history. But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things." Both men agreed that man had to have a minimum of freedom to develop constructively. Hegel believed that that freedom depended upon the existence of a state. Marx believed that freedom depended upon the existence of fair and adequate distribution of the material necessities. Hegel said that man was influenced by the kind of state in which he lived. Marx said that man was influenced by the kind of economic conditions that prevailed. So, out of his analysis that hitherto existing societies had been founded on economic exploitation, Marx concluded that the social products of these economic systems were likewise exploitive. Social groups from the family to the state were resultants of a slave economics. In speaking of the Paris Commune Marx said,

24. Marx, TF in GI, 18.
It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour. 25

Marx's theory is a kind of social behaviorism. Man, as well as his social relationships, is simply the product of economic conditions. As Bülow has pointed out,

Der materialistisch-utilitaristische Charakter, der ja im Grunde jeder nationalökonomie auhaftet, stiess ihn ab. Er wollte das menschliche Leben nicht durch ökonomische Kategorien bestimmt wissen. 26

Marx's analysis, then, is of economic processes, while Hegel's analysis was of Spirit processes. A fundamental aspect of the capitalistic economy of his day was the theory of surplus value. Lenin has said that "the doctrine of surplus value is the keystone of the economic theory of Marx." 27 Marx's attack upon the capitalistic economy was made at the point of surplus value. The relation of surplus value to the capitalistic system Marx illustrated by the formula \( L-C-(L+m) \). The lower case "m" is the surplus money realized over the original "L" in the process of buying and selling "C" (commodities). Under a barter system the process can be illustrated by the formula \( C-L-C \). Here a man sells one commodity which he does not need for money to purchase another which he does need.

27. Lenin, SPb, xxiv; CCh, Intro. by Lenin, xxiv.
In more primitive society the formula may be C-C. In these two formulae C-l-C and C-C, both commodities have the same commodity value although to the individuals they have different use values. Use value is the utility of a thing to the user. Commodity value is the arbitrary monetary price set on a commodity for the purposes of bartering or selling. Thus a ten-cent rattle and a ten-cent stamp have an equal commodity value to everyone, but they have different use values to a father pacin', the floor with a crying infant. Marx's critique comes at the source of "m," or the increased money over the original "L." 28

Trade should, said Marx, be based on the unlikeness of use values and the likeness of commodity values. If this were carried out, L-C-L could not produce L-C-(1+m). Surplus value is produced through a violation of commodity circulation. Instead of both parties getting equal commodity value, one party usurps part of the other man's share of the commodity value. We may illustrate this by a picture of how surplus value or capital is created in the selling of labor power for wages. Let A equal the laborer. Let X equal management. Now A has labor power worth ten dollars per day in terms of commodity value;-- but through the press of

28. Marx, CFE, 24; Lenin, TKI, 19; Marx, VPP, 40.
economic conditions X is able to buy A's labor power for eight dollars per day. The value of the commodities which A produces is still ten dollars per day so that there is an increase in value that comes to X. In a formula this could appear as \( A(10) = \frac{X(8)}{X(2)} \). There is no magic, says Marx, as to where the \( X(2) \) came from. It is a theft from the worker. Marx recognized the need for so-called running expenses for management, but he does not see the need for the additional discrepancy that accrues to the employer. Strictly speaking then it is not the whole "2" with which Marx is concerned, but, rather, that portion which is left over after running expenses are deducted. This surplus is based upon thievery, a thievery which the worker recognizes but must accept because of the pinch of economic want.

The discrepancy then, said Marx, is a matter of wages. Instead of the worker receiving the commodity value for his labor, realizing that running expenses must be deducted, he loses a portion of his rightful value to the employer who pockets it as his due. This leaves the laborer with less than the commodity purchasing power needed to live decently. Marx and Engels pointed out that:

The average price of wage labor is the minimum wage, i.e., that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the laborer in bare existence as a laborer. 29

Marx continued along this line,

A general rise in the rate of wages would result of a fall of the general rate of profit, but, broadly speaking, not affect the prices of commodities. 30

However, in an economy which aims at the accumulation of surplus value "the general tendency... is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages." 31

Following David Ricardo and Adam Smith, Marx held to the labor theory of value. This theory is an attempt to answer the question "In what does the value of a commodity consist?" Use value, being relative to the individual, cannot be the determinant of general prices. Labor, said Marx, is an element that all commodity values contain. The amount of labor that has been exerted in making a product should determine the commodity value. Marx was not thinking of the time that each individual spent, but the time spent by the society of all workers. Thus, if a machine was invented which could do the work of ten men, the labor time spent would be the same even though the number of workers had changed. Marx was endeavoring to show that since workers gave value to commodities, not only because workers made commodities but because they purchased commodities, then workers ought to be able to benefit by these commodities.

30. Marx, VPP, 62.
31. Loc. cit. See also Bellamy, LB, 127.
under a system of surplus value, great masses went without sufficient purchasing power to gain a decent standard of living. In large measure because there was so great a discrepancy between commodity values and wages.

Since economic factors, which said Marx, were necessarily inherent in surplus value, had caused the present chaos, he concluded that the economic system which tolerated surplus value had to be abolished if man and his society were to improve.

Materialistic factors were paramount, so Marx's attack came at the place where material factors were most inhumane. Lying behind his critique of capitalism was his observation of what capitalism did to persons. Although Marx had no coherent criterion by which to evaluate whether an economic system were bad or good, he did have a sincere concern for the workers at heart which Bentham and all his historic predecessors had had. The more specific reasons why he attacked capitalism follow under the next section.

2. The Dehumanizing Tendencies of Capitalist Economy.

Marx's criticism of capitalist economics was based on his observation of what that system did to persons. He wanted man to be free. The capitalist system made man a wage slave. All that Marx had to say concerning the evils of bourgeois ethics may be traced to his observation of the dehumanizing aspect of bourgeois
In the *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels contend that the bourgeoisie has given to even the most sacred relationships a monetary aspect. Everything depends upon money. Even the family has become a financial matter. Thus Marx insists that the system of capitalism has made men like Larkhar's "Han with the Hoe," "stolid and stunned, a brother to the ox." 32

Marx continues to say that the bourgeoisie has "agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands." 33 The tendency of capitalism to centralization is one that ultimately destroys the small capitalist and the system of capitalism itself. 34 "The small trades people... all these sink gradually into the proletariat." 35 The workers are incapable of matching the power of the large-scale producers. Marx expected capitalism to last longer than it did. In Russia the revolution came before capitalism had become highly developed. He had wrongly assumed that the revolution would be more likely to occur where capitalism was most fully organized and where the evils it produced were most flagrant. 36 Present world affairs indicate that communism is most likely to arise in those lands where the people

32. Marx and Engels, CCI, 324. See section on "Ethics as Dehumanizing."
33. Marx and Engels, CCM, 326.
34. See Lenin, TK, 29.
have become most class conscious, the prelude to unified discontent.

Larx wanted the worker free from economic want. He saw communism as a way to achieve this. "Communism," as distinct from capitalism, "deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation." 37 Capitalism is the kingdom of necessity because it lacks conscious deliberate planning. Communism introduces planned economy, and thus supplants the planless kingdom of necessity by the planned system of freedom. 38

4. The Class Struggle.

Hegel said that classes had been formed on the basis of the natural division of labor and that this division was still the basis of class distinctions. The division was one of occupation and product. Marx, on the other hand, agreed with Hegel that classes had been formed originally on the basis of the division of labor, but throughout most of history the division had been on the basis of ownership or non-ownership of the means of production.

37. Marx and Engels, CCL, 337.
38. Marx, CAP, III, 954; Marx, CEP, 31; Engels, AD, in HL, 298; Corres. of Larx and Engels, 477, 517; Parkes, MA, 112.
In addition to these two characteristically capitalist produced classes, owners and non-owners of the means of production, there are anachronistic remnants of previous systems. Such a remnant is the group of landowners who rent the land for others to work (the tenant system), and the group of craftsmen who own their own tools and who buy and sell their own products. These, however, are disappearing classes.

Marx's classic statement on the class struggle is in the manifesto. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." 39 "Every form of society has been based... on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes." 40 Marx recognized that the proletariat has not always been conscious of itself as a class so that in the beginning the clash was between the bourgeoisie and an incoherent mass. Later, however, the masses became increasingly aware of their class affiliation. It was the intent of the first International and of the Communist Manifesto to sharpen the awareness of the masses as to the class nature of the struggle.

Engels said that Marx was the first to discover this law of history. 41 Certainly Marx did not originate the idea of class

40. Marx and Engels, CCL, 333.
41. Engels, Pref. to BAP, 10.
conflict. He refers to Augustin Thierry as the "father of the class struggle in French historical writing." 42 The traditional economists under the influence of Ricardo, Smith and Malthus observed what they felt was a natural harmonious class conflict. They contended that in a competitive society, the employees and the employers would naturally arrive at a just balance. This led them to advocate a laissez-faire policy. Since social harmony will be a natural result of free competition, government interference will confuse and obstruct rather than aid in the process of harmony. Later, however, that social harmony would be created by legislative coercion. Mary George furthered this thesis in his Progress and Poverty (1879). The recognition of a class conflict as harmonious, however, was not the same as the recognition that this conflict was the root of the injustice and disharmony of society. Prior to Marx, class conflict was considered to be a natural and necessary part of society. Marx contended that this class conflict had to be rooted out if society were ever to become harmonious. The means of destroying classes and the conflict between them was, according to Marx, to be accomplished first by the

42. Sel. Correspondence, 71, letter to Engels, July 27, 1851.
Weakening of class differences until the majority class had displaced the minority class. Then by legislation and education, by the abolition of the economic bases of class differences, there would ultimately come a classless society.

Class antagonisms, said Marx, are fostered by the capitalist system. 43 In this capitalism is self-destructive, for it promotes the unity and solidarity of the very group that will overthrow it. Three classes are promoted by the capitalist system. Marx says, "wage laborers, capitalists and landlords, formed the three great classes of modern society resting upon the capitalist mode of production." 44 The capitalists and the landowners are united by Marx by what he calls the bourgeoisie class. They are the owners of the means of social production and the employers of wage labor. The wage laborers are the proletariat class "who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor power in order to live." 45

Since "the essential condition for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital," 46 the abolition of capital in the sense of surplus value will result in the abolition of the bourgeoisie. This

43. See Lenin, CK, 31.
44. Marx, CAP, III, 1061.
46. Ibid., 325-326.
is not mere means than he asserts that "the theory of the
Communist may be summed up in a single sentence: Abolition
of private property." 47 He is speaking of the private control
of the means of production.

In a society, then, where class antagonisms are the primary
factors, it is essential that a class which aims to be the
master should "conquer political power." 48 The
workers must organize, 49 for "every class-struggle is a poli-
tical struggle." 50 Marx continues, "The immediate aim of the
Communist is the... formation of the proletariat into a class,
overthrow of the bourgeoisie supremacy, conquest of political power
by the proletariat." 51 Marx recognizes that this usurpation of
power by the proletarian class is not complete justice. It is
"dictatorship." Still "the proletarian movement is the self-
conscious independent movement of the immense majority." 52
Thus, it is nearer justice than the dictatorship of the bour-
gesic. To point this issue Marx contends that the proletariat

47. Marx and Engels, CCL, 335.
48. Marx, FNUR, in IL, 43.
49. Lenin, TKI, 33-34; Marx, VPP, 59.
50. Marx and Engels, CCL, 330.
51. Ibid., 335.
52. Ibid., 333.
just see that the seat of all the chaos is in the bourgeoisie. "In order that one class should be the class of emancipation, par excellence, another class must contrariwise be the class of manifest subjugation." 53 Marx contends that the proletariat must see the "concentration of all the defects of society in another class." 54

Marx criticizes Utopian socialists for failing to see that the root of the latter is the class struggle. The general tenets of left wing reformists are valuable in that they criticize the status quo, but they fail to see that the struggle is essentially a class struggle and thus their attacks do not touch the root causes. 55 Marx is confident that "with the abolition of class differences all the social and political inequality arising from them would disappear." 55 Middle class historians err, says Marx, in presuming that the class struggle ended when the bourgeoisie came to power. 57 The class struggle will not end until the class of the majority comes to power and finally when the proletariat as a class disappears.

53. Marx, OMPR, in SL, 33-34.
54. Ibid., 33. See also Marx, OWE, 35.
56. Marx, CFP, 16.
Marx's Evaluation of the State.

Marx agreed with Hegel's thesis that the state arose subsequent to the appearance of class divisions promoted by the growth of agriculture. Unlike Hegel, Marx evaluated the state as means by which man became increasingly free because increasingly rational, Marx evaluated the state as the exploitive tool of the ruling class. As long as the bourgeoisie are in power, the state will be a repressive power enforcing obedience to the status quo. "The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."

Since the state started as a means of the conflict of classes, it is nothing but a class organization, and the "modern representa-
tive state is the tool of the capitalist exploiters of wage labor."50

Larck has reiterated, "Der Staat wird zum bloßen Geschäftsführer der in Klasse zu spaltenden Gesellschaft und als solcher Klassenstaat."51 In his volume on Larx Chang states Larx's position.

The purpose of the State is the protection of private property, and the function of the State is the oppression of the non-possessing by the possessing classes.62

There may be rare instances where the classes in society are relatively equal. In such cases the state may function as a mediator, but this does not occur in modern society where one or the other class is already in control of government.

Larx, then, used the term state to mean the special machinery for the suppression of one class by another. Both the capitalist society and the first phase of the communist society come under this category.63 In his evaluation of the civil war in France Larx observed,

The state power ascribed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labor, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism. After every revolution taking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the state power stands out in bold and bolder relief.64

60. Engels, OP, 209.
61. Larck, 61, 80.
62. Chang, CT, 37.
63. Larx, CAP, 104.
64. Larx, CT, 55.
"bourgeois republic legitimizes the unlimited despotism of one class over other classes." 65 Engels concurred with Marx in this conclusion in his introduction to Marx's The Civil War in France.

In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best: # will inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to top off at the earliest possible moment, until such time as a new generation, reared in new and free social conditions, will be able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap-heap. 66

Here the essential elements of Marx's views are presented - the class and thus despotic nature of the state, its necessary destruction first by a bourgeois despotism, and then by the elimination of even that despotism as the repressive elements of the state disappear completely. As it stood in the days of the Paris Commune the state was simply a -- "parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free movement of society." 67

Hegel showed how the state was a logical development from the atomism of individual self-consciousness, and the social organizations of the family and the community consciousness. As such the state represented a higher, more universal development of social living. Marx agreed that "the subject, society, 65. Marx, EP, 22.
66. Engels introduction to Marx, CWF, 22.
must constantly be kept in mind as the process from which we start," but he did not follow Hegel in considering the state as an advance over social organizations. Marx pointed out Hegel's position.

Thus while Hegel and Marx agreed as to the thesis they disagreed as to the synthesis. Marx's weakness or this score was his failure to show just what the synthesis should be, though he was certain that the synthesis should allow more freedom than the state permitted. Marx should have developed more fully than he did in *Capital* the nature of the *Reichsverfassung* which would supplant both the bourgeois and the proletarian despotic states.

In the light of their separate evaluations of the state Hegel and Marx reached different conclusions in their analyses of the main problems of the day as well as of the constituent parts of the state. Poverty according to Hegel could be solved by colonization, while for Marx it could be solved only by a socialized economy established by revolution. Hegel opposed slavery because of his idea of freedom, but he excepted wage slavery, or

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68. Marx, intro. to C.P., 289.
69. Marx, 41, 29. See page 129 f. for a further discussion of Marx's theories of the role of France.
to be more exact he did not recognize it as slavery but as man's freedom to sell his labor as he will. Social slavery will disappear as Spirit is realized. Marx on the other hand, believed that slavery was a constituent of the bourgeois state and that when slavery past the state would also go. The roots of slavery are economic so that the major task in abolishing slavery is the destruction of the economic foundations of capitalism. "For this circumstance, this slavery of single-class society, is the natural foundation upon which the modern State rests, just as the civil society of slavery was the natural foundation upon which the anti-que State rested. The existence of the State is inseparable from the existence of slavery." 70 This slavery far from expressing man's freedom to sell his labor at whatever price he wished, was an expression of the exploitative aspect of the free enterprise system.

Hegel put an "ethical halo" around private property. It was essential to the realization of individuality. The inequality of abilities naturally resulted in an inequality of possessions. This was as it ought to be. Marx, however, said that

70. Marx, SA in SC, 117.
Private property was fundamental only to the bourgeois state. “Security is the supreme social conception of bourgeois society.”

Private property stresses the rights of the individual as a sovereign person apart from the community. Thus both freedom and equality are for the bourgeois egoistic. Marx continued that the “was not freed from property; he received freedom of property, but not from the voice of industry; he received industrial freedom.”

“The existing bourgeois property relations are maintained by the State power, which the bourgeoisie has organized for the protection of its property relations. The political activity, therefore, overthrow the political power where it is already in the hands of the bourgeoisie.”

The inequalities and exploitation of the state stemmed from a false evaluation of its significance and from an exaggerated extension of its application.

One of the major causes of exploitation was the fact that the means of production were in large measure jointly and unequally owned. Property, said Marx, must be equally accessible, not as individual private possessions, but as social possessions owned by groups—not by individuals. This redistribution of ownership would be started under the First Phase of the Communist State,

71. Marx, J. in 82, 74.
72. Ibid., 82.
73. Marx, J. in 82, 116.
and would be conceived under the Second Phase. Origin out of
the concept of the legitimacy of private property is extended even
the control of the means of reproduction, "and indeed the
validity and validity of contract is an expression of man's freedom.
Marx had only access for the so-called free contract, because it
was essentially a case of following the contractual advantage
with the bourgeoisie alluring to one side.

This sphere that we are discussing, within whose bound-
aries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on,
is in fact a very large of the innate rights of man.
There alone reside Freedom, Equality, Property and " Patriotism.
Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity,
say of labour-power, are constrained only by their own
free will. They contract as free agents, and the
agreement they come to, in the form in which they
give legal expression to their common will. Equality,
because each enters into relation with the other, as
with a simple sale of commodities, and they exchange
equivalent for equivalent. Property, because such
contracts only of what is his own. And in that measure
each looks only to himself. The only force that brings
them together and puts them into relation with each
other, is the selfishness, the gain of the private
interests of all."

Hegel's treatment of crime is based on his assumption of
the identity of contract and of private property, so that all
acts against them are condemned. Marx's attitude toward contract
and property led him to say that the punishment of crime does

70. Marx, C.M., I, 185.
against the capitalist system, we would logically condemn such action as crime but called it a necessary step toward freedom. Punishment was for Marx the logical complement to crimes against property, although Marx did say that such punishment should be beneficial rather than negatively punitive. Under the capitalist state, said Marx, punishment for property crimes was a bourgeois tool for preserving the status quo. Although Marx does not deal with this, it certainly will be necessary under a communist state to exercise punishment even for property crimes. Judges and police, which for liberal are positions of trust, are for Marx but "informers" for capitalist exploiters.

Both Marx recognized the state to be a unity. Marx was concerned that the state should not be carved by the divisions of the "checks and balances" theory of government, since the unified state was the fascist state. Marx, however, sarcastically observed that the state was only superficially dismembered by the "checks and balances" theory. Actually the state was one big unified system of exploitation.
Illegible text regarding people realizing freedom and dignity primarily because they were a means of preserving the state, but also because they fought to end war.

Hegel did not condone wars between classes or wars against the state as a state. To Hegel, history would be moving out of the realms of passive interactions. Marx was opposed to wars because they were dynastic and economic. They were fought for economic ends—usually markets or colonies. Wars of this kind unified the bourgeois state, but brought only greater suffering to the masses. Wars were used by the bourgeois state not only for the acquisition of new territory or the preservation of old, but for a search out to take the minds of the proletariat away from their class consciousness. Class wars, however, were against the state and legitimate because they were beneficial to the masses. Marx portrayed the dialectic as moving under the impetus of class struggle classes.

Futurists developed anti-scientific theories of the state.

The complete development of the person was to be found in the...

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75. Marx quoted extensively in the resolution of a workingman's meeting in Brunswick, July 18, 1870; "We are won by all wars, but above all of dynastic wars." Marx, CR, 26.
76. Marx and Engels, CR, 221.
service of the individuals or classes to the larger organization. 77

Marx appealed to a national patriotism to suppress the capricious self-will and to co-operate in a larger whole-the state. Marx appealed to a class loyalty to suppress the capricious self-will and to co-operate in a larger whole-the proletariat. "The workers have no country," 78 said Marx. They have only their class. Class loyalty as superior to state loyalty was sustained by the workers during the wars between France and Germany. The German workers wrote, "We are happy to grasp the fraternal hand stretched out to us by the workers of France... we shall never forget that the workers of all countries are our friends and the interests of all countries our concern." 79

The state was always repressive, thus Marx aimed to abolish it.

IV. The Revolutionary Overthrow of the State.

It naturally results from Marx's evaluation of the state as repressive that the state had to be destroyed by revolution.

"In its struggle with the people, the party of order is compelled constantly to increase the power of the executive." 80

77. Fulon, E. S. 3.
79. Marx, TWP, 28.
80. Marx, CPP, 143. But as we point out on page 131, Marx qualified this thesis. Revolution was not an absolute.
This centralized power is not voluntarily give up its authority. The tendency is for the possessors of power to maintain their position at all costs. Eng criticized the Langallians and Bourgeois socialists for their proposition that the capitalists would not be willing to give up relinquishing their authority.\textsuperscript{61}

If the modern state wishes to abolish the impotence of its administration, it would have to abolish the present mode of living. If it wishes to abolish this mode of living, it would have to abolish itself, for it exists only in opposition to the same. No living person, however, would believe that defects in his existence are due to the vital principle of his life, but would rather attribute them to circumstances outside his life. Suicide is unnatural.\textsuperscript{62}

A revolution is necessary to clear away the material conditions which make for Bourgeois and proletarian. This is not merely a matter of juggling political parties but of abolishing economic systems.\textsuperscript{63} Revolutions of the past have merely been the shifting of power from one minority group to another.\textsuperscript{64} This is not adequate to insure freedom for the masses. The dictatorship of the proletariat does change political powers but it does not, as Marx recognized, abolish either the basic economic evils nor the state as a compulsive power. He highlighted this emphasis upon a thoroughgoing revolution in an address to the Communist League in 1910.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{61} Edward Bellamy in Le, ix, was a point in economic development, where capitalism would not be good enough even for the capitalists—possibility of which Marx did not deny.

\textsuperscript{62} Marx, DA in SE, 117.

\textsuperscript{63} Marx, 3rd in 32, 127; Marx, GSP, 119-120.

\textsuperscript{64} Engels, Introd. to GSP, 14.
The democratic parties can never satisfy the party of the proletariat. While the democratic petty bourgeoisie would like to bring the revolution to a close as soon as their demands are or have been complied with, it is in their interest to work to make the revolution permanent, to keep it going until all the ruling and possessing are deprived of power, the governmental machinery occupied by the proletariat, and the organization of the working classes is far advanced that all rivalry and competition among them alike as ceased; until the more important forces of production are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians. It is not a matter of reclaiming private property, but of abolishing it, not of pushing up the class antagonism, but of abolishing the classes, not of ameliorating the existing society, but of establishing a new one.

Marx believed that only the proletariat were revolutionary enough to effect this change. "Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class." The lower middle class is really conservative—fighting to maintain status in the status quo.

The farmers are likewise a reactionary group. Their position as land owners makes them feel a stake in the preservation of respect for private property. "The history of the last three years has however provided sufficient proof that this class of the population is capable of absolutely no revolutionary initiative." When asked whether he did not fear that the irresponsibles who might hang on the fringes of the revolution would cast disrepute on the proletariat, Marx said:

27. Marx, CCP, 104.
The "dangerous class," the social scum, that gradually rotting were thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, lay, here and there, be swept into the move- ment by a premeditated revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a trained tool of reactionary intrigue.

Time and again Marx criticized the temporary bourgeois attempts at remedying the social and economic maladjustments. The weakness of the trade union movement, he pointed out, was that "they fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it." Thus he criticized the attempts of Socialists who expect to remedy the system by legislative patchwork. "Universal sufrage, direct legislation, people's justice, a people's militia, etc. They are a mere echo of the bourgeoisie People's Party." Engels raised the same criticism of attempts to solve the housing question. The bourgeoisie does not explain the housing shortage as a natural result of an economic system of scarcity but as the result of factors outside the system. Concerning British rule in India Marx said, "the question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?" In a later article Marx answers this question.

88. Marx and Engels, CC, 332.
89. Marx, VPP, 62. ""Closer examination of the secession movement reveals that secession, Constitution (Montgomery), Congress loc. cit., etc., are all usurpations. In no place did they allow the people to vote en masse." Marx to Engels, July 1, 1861, in CWDS, 227.
90. Marx, VPP, 13.
The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society, scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie till in Great Britain itself the new ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether.

In a speech delivered to the Hague Congress of the First International in 1872 Marx said, "It is to force that in due time the workers will have to appeal if the dominion of labour is at long last to be established." Some years earlier in the first volume of Capital (1867) Marx asserted that "force is the mid-wife of every old society pregnant with a new one." In his Poverty of Philosophy he maintained that the class struggle "carried to its highest expression, is a complete revolution... Would it, moreover, be a matter for astonishment if a society, based upon the antagonism of classes, should lead ultimately to a brutal conflict, to a hand-to-hand struggle as its final document?" Again, quoting the words of George Sand, Marx said that "on the eve of every general reconstruction of society, the last word of social science will ever be:—'Le coeur ou la mort; le juste sa vengeance ou le peint. C'est

95. Marx, CAP, I, 240.
96. Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, 190.
The fruitless butcheries which have occurred since these June and October days... will convince the people that there is only one means of shortening, simplifying, and concentrating the torturing death agonies of society — only one means — revolutionary terrorism.

Marx was not advocating individual acts of terrorism, but a united class terrorism, though we shall see that he made exceptions to this need for violence. The former he believed to be atomistic anarchism; the latter was organic democracy. Recognizing that class struggle had been the source of the world's woes, he still had confidence that only a super class struggle could end the chaos of class conflict. But how will the destruction of the bourgeois eliminate classes when the destruction of feudal aristocracy did not accomplish it? Marx and Engels pointed out two differences of the present system that make success more than likely. First, production is socialized. This was prepared the way for the socialization of distribution. The high degree of organization and control in capitalist production provides the basis for a more equitable organization and control under communist leadership. Second, the multiple class distinctions of prior societies

97. Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, 191.
98. Marx and Engels, Life and Teaching of Karl Marx, 50.
have become merged into two -- the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. "Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature; it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other, bourgeoisie and proletariat." 100.

The centralization of social classes into two means that the elimination of one will leave but one alternative for society -- the Proletariat.

Engels did make some exceptions to the necessity of violent revolution. He felt that in certain countries such as Great Britain, Holland, and the United States the proletariat might achieve power through the ballot. In a letter to Kugelmann he suggested that the violent destruction of the state machinery may be necessary only on the continent. 101 In his 1872 speech at the Hague Congress of the First International he observed that in certain countries like Great Britain and America "the workers may hope to secure their ends by peaceful means." 102 Engels also recognized that violence may not be categorical.

"It (history) has also completely transformed the conditions

100. Cf. Marx and Engels, CP, II, 322; Marx, SAP, II, c. 32.
101. Blank, GWW, A WC.
102. Loc. cit.
under which the proletariat had to fight. "The mode of struggle of life is today obsolete from every point of view." 103

In democratic countries, which are the ultimate forms of state organization of capitalist society, the attack may be made from the standpoint of legislative reform. Here there will be instances where the petty bourgeoisie are also oppressed and where it will be wise for the proletariat to join forces with them in the attack. Concerning this Marx said,

In case of an attack on a common adversary no special union is necessary; in the fight with such an enemy the interests of both parties, the middle-class democrats and the working-class party, coincide for the moment, and both parties will carry on by a temporary understanding. 104

In this common attack the proletariat will have to prod their middle class partners in order that they do not compromise too easily with the capitalist class.

The measures of the democrats which in any case are not revolutionary but merely reformist, must be pressed to the point of turning them into direct attacks on private property; thus, for instance, if the petty bourgeoisie prepare to purchase the railways and factories, the workers must insist that such railways and factories, being the property of the reactionaries shall simply be confis-

cated by the State without compensation. If the democrats propose proportional taxation, the workers must demand progressive taxation. If the democrats themselves declare for a moderate progressive tax, the workers must insist on a tax so steeply graded as to cause the collapse of large capital. The demands of the workers will depend on the proposals and measures of the democrats. 105

Thus, after the help of the proletariat has won the war against the bourgeoisie, with the help of the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat must turn on the petty bourgeoisie.

In short we must no longer direct our distrust against the beaten reactionary enemy, but against our former allies, against the party who are now about to exploit the common victory for their ends only. 106

Thus, although Marx recognizes a place for reform bills, we do not consider them to be a general substitute for a revolution by force, but as additional means to make the final overthrow of the bourgeoisie more easily accomplished. 107

Marx understood that the proletariat could not usurp political power until they had become a political force. The proletariat must be organized as a political party. Ultimately this will be an international fellowship. 108 Since

capitalists are organized internationally, the class struggle "still nowhere be solved within the national walls." 109 To begin with, however, the fight is certainly a national one. "It is altogether self-evident that to be able to fight at all, the working class must be able to organize itself at one and as a class and that its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle. So far its class struggle is national." 110 Marx re-emphasized this in his "Address," "The mass can only bring their pressure to bear when an organization has gathered them together and given them an intelligent lead." 111

7. The First Phase of the Communist Society: The Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

The revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat would not usher in the full-grown ideal society. Marx's allegiance to the dialectical method precluded the possibility of his believing that there ever would be a final and unchanging stage of social organization. Although he did not believe that it was possible to envision the new Jerusalem, Marx did point the way toward two of the probable steps through which society would pass. The first of these was to

111. Marx, TS, 15.
by the dictatorship of the proletariat. In his Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx stated:

Between capitalist and communist society lies a period of revolutionary transformation from one to the other. Here corresponds also to this a political transition period during which the state can be nothing else than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.112

In this first transitional phase many of the evils of capitalist society still remain. Problems of distribution still exist because society was "just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society." 113 Marx pointed out that the economic conditioning of society is such that a just solution to the problem of giving men a share in the fruits of their labors would not be solved as yet. "Right can never be higher than the economic structure and the cultural development conditioned by it." 114 He agreed that there would still be inequality in a society in which men received in proportion to his ability to produce, for the simple reason that the ability to produce and need are not always commensurate. But this is only a temporary difficulty. In the second phase men will be expected to produce on the basis of their ability but receive

112. Marx, CCP, 44-45.
113. Ibid., 10.
114. Ibid., 31.
on the basis of their need.

Since he considered the state to be an exploitive tool, Marx contended that the dictatorship of the proletariat was likewise a repressive agent, but with the virtue of being for the masses rather than for the few. In this transitional period the state is a tool in the hands of the proletariat to crush the bourgeoisie. The repression is justified because it is in the interests of the majority. Concerning this Vogel said, "Das Proletariat hat eine heilige Mission zu erfüllen." The only hope of German emancipation, for example, Marx saw to be in a class which can represent the whole needs of humanity and can symbolize the suffering and subjugation of man. The proletariat is such a class.

But this class is not an ultimate with Marx. There was a proletariat because there was a system of inequality that produced it. "A new social order is possible," said Engels, "in which the class differences of today will have disappeared, and in which, perhaps after a short transition period, which though somewhat deficient in other respects, will in any case be very useful morally." During this period men are...

115. Marx, CGP, 105.
116. See letter of Engels to Bebel in Marx, CGP, 96. This principle was called by Chamberlin a "conception of preferred rights for the class of manual wage workers." ("HRP," Am. Herc., Jan., 1939, 64.)
118. Marx, CHPA, in 32, 37. "In my opinion, the biggest things that are happening in the world today are on the one hand the movement of the slaves in America started by the death of John Brown, and on the other the movement of the serfs in Russia." Correspondence Marx to Engels, January 11, 1860, CWUS, 221.
learning the economic habits that make freedom so that in the next phase when the state has withered away men can live without authority of the state because they are in the habit of pursuing a fair economy.

Certain aspects of the old order will be modified under the first phase. The general cost of administration other than production costs will be greatly reduced. The huge expense of competitive advertising will be reduced to a fraction. The duplication of labor by hundreds of separate organizations will be made unnecessary in the new unified and co-operative society. On the other hand, the budget for such items as promote the public good will be greatly increased. Distinctions between diminished and undiminished proceeds of labor will disappear. In the co-operative society, the workers own the means of production so that their labor is no longer a mere commodity to be sold to others. As the owners and producers the workers share naturally in whatever is produced.

Marx hastened to point out however, that too much should not be expected from this first phase, "What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it emerges from

120. Marx, CGP, 7.
capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges." 121 It is because of this that distribution is still essentially bourgeois in principle. Every man receives back just what he puts in, but with the difference that there is no surplus value left over. The payment of wages on the basis of work done fails to solve the inequality of distribution because of unequal abilities. In order to solve the inequality of distribution one would need to have an unequal basis for distribution. This is what Marx introduces in his principle—"from each according to his ability to each according to his needs." 122 This will not be put into effect, however, until the second phase is reached.

8. The Second Phase of the Communist Society: the Kingdom of Freedom.

One of the weakest aspects of Marx's philosophy of the state is his failure to develop adequately his theories about the second phase. In a significant passage in the third volume

121. Marx, CCP, 8.
122. Ibid., 10.
In fact, the realm of freedom does not commence until the point is passed where labor under the compulsion of necessity and of external utility is required. 123

Freedom in the realm of material production consists in the fact that,

Socialized man, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it under their control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power; that they accomplish their task with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it. 124

The idea of freedom as recognition of and obedience to law was a principle which Hegel had developed and which Marx had borrowed. Engels pointed out that,

Hegel was the first man to make a proper explanation of the relation of freedom and necessity. In his eyes freedom is the recognition of necessity... Freedom doesn't consist in an imaginary independence of natural laws but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility thereby derived of applying them to given ends. 125

In another work Engels speaks of a higher phase of the communist society as "the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom." 126

123. Marx, CAP, III, 954.
124. Loc. cit.
125. Engels, LSS, 147.
It was because of his recognition that capitalist economics was essentially anarchic and uncontrolled that Marx spoke of it as a kingdom of necessity. The control of economics by legislation in the interests of the masses would provide for a kingdom of freedom. This was essentially the principle involved in Hegel’s concept of freedom. It was planned control as ever against anarchic whim. Marx put his finger on a fundamental weakness of the free enterprise system, namely that it is uncontrolled. The capitalist system assures that uncontrolled and unlicensed competition will produce socially favorable consequences. Marx plea for the control of economic processes by laws which will insure justice to all. The competitive capitalist system has produced an economy which puts a premium on the lowest possible wage, and which lures the want-pressed laborer by the bait of piece work pay or bonus plans. In the higher phase of the communist society the method of distribution will be, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” 127

The dominant transitional factor between the first and second phases is undoubtedly the theory of the "withering away
of the state." Although there are the germ of this theory in his writings, Marx did not clearly state it.\textsuperscript{128} It was not just the capitalist state but the communist state also which was to disappear. In his essay on "The Poverty of Philosophy" Marx said,

The working class will substitute, in the course of its development, for the older order of civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonisms, and there will no longer be political power, properly speaking, since political power is simply the official form of the antagonism in civil society. \textsuperscript{129}

It was Marx's belief that there would be a time when no state would be needed. In the beginning, the presence of classes made the state as a pressure agency inevitable. The abolition of classes should make the state unnecessary. It would be unrealistic to expect that the capitalist state would arbitrarily choose to destroy itself, if not because of the desire for self-preservation, at least because the state finds the cause of its defects in self-administration. The capitalist state said Marx, does not dream that the trouble lies with its own essential foundation. \textsuperscript{130} Marx said that "the state

\textsuperscript{128} Cf. Chang, LTS, 127; Engels, SUS, 127-128.
\textsuperscript{129} Marx, PCC, 100.
\textsuperscript{130} Marx, SN in SE, 110-116.
classes to exist," and "it becomes possible to speak of freedom."

When the resistance of the capitalists has been broken, the capitalists have been eliminated, and there are no economic classes. 131 "The abolition of the state is only logical with the Communists as the inevitable result of the abolition of classes, for only then will there be no need for an organized power of one class to keep down the other." 132 "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." 112

The state is not as Engels believed the realization of the ethical idea but simply "a product of society at a certain stage of evolution." 134 Thus,

As soon as there is no longer any class to be held in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from these are removed, nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state is no longer necessary. 135

As Engels expressed it "The state is not 'abolished.' It dies out." 136 The expression 'dies out' has been translated by Lenin as 'withers away!' to suggest the gradual disappearance of

131. Marx, 33P, 104.
133. Marx and Engels, 55, 57.
134. Engels, 07, 207.
135. Engels, 55, 127.
136. Loc. cit. Lenin, 5A, 100. The thesis that the state will die out rests, however, on a narrow definition of the state. Certainly the disappearance of classes of exploited or exploiters will not do away with the need for government. Marx admits this in the first phase but ignores the matter of government in the second phase.
the state under the Jena formulation.

Certain features stand out in the second phase in spite of the lack of systematic development of its theory by Marx. It will be a sort of plan of anarchy where people will cooperate and work for the public good from habit. The insculcation of this habit is the educational function of the first phase. Political organization will be superseded by economic organization, for although he does believe that political organizations are no longer needed, he is not sure that man can get along without economic organization. There will be in this second phase an absence of class distinctions since everyone will be in the same class. There will thus be the abolition of the class division caused by ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. City and country will co-operate and amalgamate their interests. There will be an abundance of wealth. There will have been insculpted, through the first phase, a habit so great as to be a change in human nature. Vogel has aptly stated Marx's position:

Die kommunistische Gesellschaft ist für Marx und Engels die Idealgeseellschaft, in der die verantwortliche Tatkraft sich vollendet, in der die Freiheit sich allseitig entfaltet, in der die wahrhaftige Sittlichkeit und das richtige Recht das Tun der Menschen regeln, in der die Demokratisierung das
weltdürferlichen Humanismus die breitesten Schichten erfasst, in der sich alle Gegensätze harmonisch lösen. 137

137. Vogel, Wz, 291.
CHAPTER VII

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES: THE BASIS OF GREEN'S THOUGHT

The ethical themes of Green still form two clearly established in his Prolegomena to which. It must be recognized that the entirely nature of Green prevented his not only from completing the book but from rearranging its content as well.

The criticism of one of Green's most personal to the effect that the Prolegomena lacks clarity and order is one that initiated when he read or that had Green lived, the book would never have been published in its present state.

The vehemence of some of the critics has frequently arisen as a result of their anxiety and manifest incompleteness of the consideration of such in the major premises.

Lottleship has asserted that the strongest elements in the character of Green were "the sense of public duty and the sense of religious dependence." This strong sense of duty found expression in his deep concern for ethics and in his antipathy against materialism. Mr. George Harkness has added that Green had a care for accuracy and accuracy among philosophers of his own day.

Before we take up the ethical principles which Green espoused,

2. Lottleship, J. L., D.P., III, 70.
let us note the slice of Green's ethics with relation to the general trend of English ethics.

1. Revolt Against Traditional English Epicurism

Not all epicureans went so far as Green's approval of reducing ethics to a sociology or to what Paulsen calls "pragmatism."

The principle back of the empirical account in ethics was that the acceptance of ethical principles upon experience. Unfortunately the term experience had some (through the influence of Hume) to consider data alone. The object of consciousness was all important. The hedonist of the utilitarian felt in general that what experience supplied all the data necessary for moral knowledge. While, however, was superseded by Mill and Bentham, the former especially bringing values and consciousness into the realm of experiences to be considered.

Dewey and Tufts point out that, "morally it was almost always allied with utilitarianism, understanding by utilitarianism the theory that particular past experiences furnish the method of all ideas and beliefs." With regard to any specific role of behavior the utilitarian epicurist, Mill, said, "Social utility

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1. Paulsen, ASI, 1.
2. Dewey and Tufts, ASI, 231.
alone can dictate the preference." But Mill relinquished a rigid hedonism when he attempted to account for the choices people make for pleasure, as not consonant with the need to introduce a concept of duty as conscience.

The internal sanction of duty—whatever our standard of duty may be, to one and the same—was feeling in our own mind; a pain, a sense, attendant on violation of duty, which is properly cultivated moral sense as, in the more serious cases, into a thrilling from it as an imposibility.

Yet still attempts to show that some pleasures are intrinsically higher than others, and consequently deserving his hediastatic position. The only basis on which one pleasure can be held higher than another is to introduce some criterion other than pleasure.

The chief proponents of hedonism, or utilitarianism, were not, however, immoral as teaching the pre-eminence of sensual pleasures. Even the revered hedonist, Epicurus, taught that lasting pleasure is to be found in disciplined thinking and rich friendships. Even corn and water were all he needed to "live even with Jews in such a case." Hedonists, by and large, have not taught sensual pleasure, since the pyracids (who certainly did) but their theory gave no criterion by which the average man could know the preference of higher pleasures.

7. Ibid., 24.
8. Ibid., 6.
over sensual pleasures. Feats of the caliber of John
Leuthen's Principalities of Souls and Legislation, Chap. II;
J. Herbert Spencer's Data of Ethics, Chap. III; and Henry Sidgwick's
The Methods of Ethics can be condemned not as immoral but
as inadequate.

Samuel T. Coleridge, and Thomas Carlyle had attempted to
introduce German Idealism into England but their attempts
were crowned with major results. The pioneer of this move-
ment to establish Idealism in England and J. T. Stirling whose
book The Secret of Happiness (1869) was an attempt to introduce
German idealism into English philosophy. The most prominent
leaders in the continuation of this attempt have been 10 John
Caird, Edward Caird, F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, J. S. Mill,
Kant, A. C. Reid, and T. E. Hume.

Green attack a commonplace that pleasure or happiness could
be the criterion of value of a moral life because of the vague-
ness of the meaning of the terms happiness or pleasure. It
readily admitted that happiness or pleasure may accompany the
pursuit of the good, but that the good is something other than
pleasure, and this something other Green took to be self-real-
ization. 11

10. Falckenberg, P, Mindelhard, EOR, 630.
11. See discussion of this in Fullerton, MET, 236-238.
Hindelanger calls Green the most cogent opponent of naturalistic ethics in spite of the fact that Green and Spencer do have in common a concern for people. Dewey and Tufts also point this out as they hail Green as the one who first pointed out the fundamental fallacy of psychological hedonism, namely, that desire can be measured by the anticipation of its own satisfaction. They likewise recognize him as the first opponent of utilitarianism to recognize the practical value which utilitarianism had in promoting social and political reform. Of the worth of utilitarianism in this regard Green said,

Whatever the errors arising from its hedonistic psychology, no other theory has been available for the social or political reformer, combining so much truth with so much ready applicability. No other has offered so commanding a point of view from which to criticize the precepts and institutions presented as authoritative.

Again Green states, "The usefulness of utilitarianism has arisen from its giving a wider and more impartial range to the desire to do good, not from its stimulating that desire." But, for all this, Green opposed the basic principle of utilitarianism that pleasure was the criterion of morality. Green maintained that the social portion of utilitarianism was in spite of its theory, and that if hedonism were consistently

12. Dewey and Tufts, WEI, 269; Green PTE, 168.
13. Dewey and Tufts, WEI, 267-68; Ritchie, PSI, 143; Green PTE, 213-331.
15. Ibid., 331.
followed, is a criterion of moral development. "The greatest
possible sum of pleasures" is a meaningless criterion of
moral development. Green restates, "The spiritual progress
of mankind is thus an unmeaning phrase, unless it means a
progress of personal character and to personal character." 16

4. Metaphysics Is the Foundation of Ethics.

Green's attempt to base ethics on metaphysics is best
understood as a reaction against naturalistic ethics. His
assurance that no sound ethics could be derived from the sense
data of experience made him, they were determined to give ethics
a sound foundation. At the beginning of his Prolegomena he
says concerning anyone who anticipates establishing an ethics,

It is better that he should make it clear at the
outset why and in what sense he holds that there
is a subject matter of enquiry which does not con-
sist of matters of fact, ascertainable by experiment
and observation, and what place he assigns to morals
in this subject matter... he should begin with ex-
plaining why he holds a 'metaphysics of morals' to
be possible and necessary; the proper foundation,
though not the whole, of every system of ethics. 19

17. Rashdall, TEs, II, 24. Rashdall sharply criticized Green
for his statement that "the greatest possible sum of pleasures"
is a meaningless statement. Although Rashdall claims to be a
hedonist, he certainly defends the Hedonist principle at this
point.
18. Green, PTh, 220.
19. Ibid., 4.
The crude naturalism of Hume 20 left ethics in a hopeless morass. "It is obvious," said Green, "that to a being who is simply a result of natural forces an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning." 21 The whole concept of duty and obligation grows out of something that is not a constituent element of natural forces.

Green comes close to the over-pious conclusion which Borden reached. 22 To say that ethics has a metaphysical basis is not necessarily the same thing as to say that ethics demands a theistic premise or basis to a theistic conclusion. Green said, moreover, put considerable a basis on the place of the Eternal Self in founding ethics on sure principles. In order that a basis be metaphysical it must be other than the result of phenomenal cause and effect. Logical principles are such cases which are universal, not, not because there is a God, but because of the very nature of logic. Green finds this metaphysical principle to be self-consciousness, a fact which naturalists either ignore or explain on non-conscious principles. Ritchie has pointed out, "In this fact of self-consciousness, discovered by examination of mental phenomena, Green finds the metaphysical basis of ethics." 23 Since all experience is con-

21. Green, PEE, 11.
22. "Every theory of knowledge must reach the theistic conclusion or collapse." Wilber P. Storey, TTT, 31.
23. Ritchie, PSI, 145.
stituted in intelligible relations, the only possibility of there living any possible trends on the existence of a cor-
relating self-consciousness. This consciousness Owen designates as a spiritual principle or which not only ethics but even
nature depends.

A. S. Taylor, although an idealist, has attacked this pre-
pose of Green's on the basis that ethics is not a normative
but an empirical science. Taylor puts ethics on an evolu-
tionary basis similar to that of Darwinism for all practical
conclusions. Although it was probable that ethics furnishes
data for metaphysics and vice versa as Green claimed, this
is not to say that ethics is a physical relationship, a true
sociology of behavior. In absence of the empirical nature of
ethics Taylor maintains that there is no difference save in
degree between moral and physical sciences. Taylor has
confused the psychology of origins with the metaphysics of dis-
osition between mind and matter.

Dewey has criticized Green at this point using the term
false metaphysics in the sense that it is remote from experi-
eince rather than a useful guide to everyday conduct. 23


Green's principle in psychological theories, although not only in seeking pleasure as the sole object of man's desires but in assuming that man is essentially an animal and nothing more, does recognize the possibility that, "in the growth of our experience, in the process of our learning to know the world as animal existence, which once was history in time, gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness." 26

The problem, in the words of William Stern, is one of finding the relation between the self-conscious person and experiences. To understand this relation we must ask: What is the relation between experience and knowledge? We are dealing with a question that transcends the limits of the possible. William Stern believed it possible to arrive at a theory of knowledge and the relation between the self-conscious person and experience. This relation he saw as that of a "self-discriminating conscious mind."

The answer to the conundrum of the self and the unity of facts and the unity defined by logic, can be found most coherently on the assumption of a unifying principle. The self-conscious person is such a principle of unity in diversity. As Green perceives,

the spiritual principle in knowledge is that which is not reducible to phenomena nor conditioned by phenomena, which is the source of connected experience and makes objects and our ideas of them related.

30. William Stern calls the self an Unitas Multiplex, a unity in diversity, with the capacity of taking the multiplicity of facts and unifying them into a unity of knowledge and experience.
The spiritual principle is needed not only to understand how knowledge is possible, but to comprehend nature as well. Green continues:

From the above considerations this much at any rate would seem to follow: that a form of consciousness which we cannot explain as of natural origin, is necessary to our conceiving an order of nature, an objective world of fact from which illusion may be distinguished. 32

It is not necessary for one to become an epistemological dualist in order to solve the relation of mind and matter or to understand knowledge at all. Locke recognized 33 an antithesis between what is real (nature) and what is the work of mind. Epistemological dualism is the experience of common sense.

Green considers these possibilities in the way the relations between mind and matter or man and nature are to be considered.

1. We must deny the reality of relations altogether, and treat them as fictions of our combining intelligence.
2. Or that the relations being the product of our combining intelligence they are yet empirically real on the ground that our intelligence is a factor in the real of experience.
3. Or if we suppose them to be real otherwise than merely for us then we must posit as the condition of this reality the action of some unifying principle analogous to that of our understanding. 34

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34. Green, PTD, 35-37.
Imanuel Kant has said in line with this matter of the place of a mind or consciousness in explaining how knowledge is possible, "Ich ächt zwar der Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht." 35

Green puts considerable stress on the trans-temporal capacity of the self. It must be admitted that all the experiences of the self are in time (though not necessarily in space), but this does not imply that the mind cannot transcend the present moment of time to traverse either backward in retrospect or forward in imagination. Green referring to this concludes, "There could be no such thing as time unless there were a self-consciousness which is not in time." 36 Hastings Rashdall has averred that Green's "timeless self" provides no meaningful connection with the self in time with which ethics is concerned. 37 This confusion has arisen through a misunderstanding of the sense in which the self is both unity and multiplicity, both in time and time-transcending. A. E. Taylor also confuses this point when he claims that the actual self is not timeless but is relatively permanent in time. Consequently a timeless Eternal Self, if there be such, is completely alien

35. Green, P. E., 35-37. Sorley discovered that the quotation is not in Kant.
36. Rashdall, TSB, II, 204-205. Harkness, PCC, 357, says that Green's "repeated reference to the timeless self is doubtless intended to indicate the abiding nature of the finite self fully as much as to emphasize its relation to the eternal consciousness." She conjectures that his use of the term is confusing, but she states that Green means that the "self is not conditioned by time, rather than not capable of change." 217. Green does not satisfactorily solve the problem of the union of the timeless and the temporal elements of the finite self, however from a practical standpoint, or assumed in his ethical theory a non-realististic unity. All mind as ideal finds its true reality in the eternal consciousness, but which is not real in the self. 15.
to the circle of our conscious activity, and is only an
hypostatization of the subject-object relationship abstracted
in the epistemological process. 38 The timeless quality of
the self does not mean that the self is araith moving always
in a timeless limbo, but that the self can go either back-
ward or forward in time (in thought) from the specious present. 39

4. Freedom as Intelligence.

The point d'appui of the possibility of ethics is that
there actually be a freedom of choice, that persons be able
to choose between alternatives and thus be responsible for the
foreseeable consequences of their action. In one of his essays
Green states, "Since in all willing a man is his own object,
the will is always free. Or, more properly, a man in willing
is necessarily free, since willing constitutes freedom." 40

But sheer free choice is not adequate in itself unless in
the process of freedom some intelligence is involved. When, for
example a man wills to do that which does not promote the true
good (self-realization), his freedom is false. Real freedom
is when a man chooses correctly with regard to the true good.

38. Taylor, PoS, 75.
39. This is what is called trans-temporal reference, i.e.,
the ability of the mind to think of events which existed in
previous time, or to contemplate events which may occur in future
time.
As we shall note later, the ideal end of the state for Green is to provide for freedom in this particular sense (an end which the state only tends to approximate).

Our conclusion is that, while on the one hand consciousness is throughout empirically conditioned, in the sense that it would not be at any time it is but for a series of events, sensible or related to sensibility... On the other hand his consciousness would not be what it is, as knowing, or as a subject of intelligent experience, but for the self-realisation or reproduction in it, through processes thus empirically conditioned, of an external consciousness, not existing in time, but the condition of those being an order in time... 41

The place of motives in the function of freedom is a significant one to Green.

The world of practice--the world composed of moral or distinctively human activities, with their results--is one in which the determining causes are motives; a motive again being an idea of an end, which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise. 42

Motives are not to be considered as natural events simply because physical wants are necessary to them, unless as Green indicates, "the self-consciousness in and through which a motive arises out of the want, is itself a natural event or

41. Green, PTE, 69.
42. Ibid., 104.
series of events or of relations between events." 43 The freedom of man depends upon the freedom of his motives.

Motives are basic in all choice. If it were not for the fact that a person sought to achieve or avoid certain objects as a result of his actions, there would be, properly speaking, no act of will. 44

One sees the essential unity in personality in the impossibility for any of us of living merely for the present moment. We are inextricably associated with our past, our hopes, our future. This self-continuity makes us responsible beings because we can remember what we have been and what we hope to be. As Green observes,

There is one subject or spirit, which desires in all a man's experiences of desire, understands in all operations of his intelligence, wills in all his acts of willing; and that the essential character of his desires depends upon their all being desires of one and the same subject which also understands, the essential character of his intelligence on its being an activity of one and the same subject which also desires, the essential character of his acts of will on their proceeding from one and the same subject which also desires and understands. 45

That which sets man off from the animals is his ability to think of his life as an end, and to conceive other ends toward

43. Green, PTE, 100.
44. Ibid., 120.
45. Ibid., 136.
which he intends to strive. To promote further this essential idea of the unity of the self Green endeavors to show how desire, intellect, and will are integrated in personality. As points out that,

The real agent called Desire is the man or self or subject as desiring; the real agent called Intellect is the man as understanding, as perceiving, and conceiving; and the man that desires is identical with the man that understands.

Again he speaks to the point when he says that "a thoughtless will would be no will." 47

Green recognizes a dual nature in man, a factor which he never wants to be decisive but only explicative, but which has caused some difficulty among critics. Green sees man both as he is and as he ought to be. "The will in actuality must be the self-conscious individual as so directing himself, while the will in possibility, or as a faculty, will be the self-conscious individual as capable of so directing himself." 48

When we come to evaluate the quality of the will Green puts stress on "the specific difference of the object willed." 49

For a utilitarian a good or bad will may be evaluated solely.

47. Ibid., 176.
48. Ibid., 181.
49. Loc. cit.
on the basis of the intention of the one who is willing; i.e., what he intends to do. Goodness or badness of intention is solely decided on the basis of the pleasure or pain produced or anticipated. One sees this aspect of teleological ethics best when it is contrasted with the formalism of Kant where the good will is the highest good irrespective of the consequences endured or produced. For the hedonist nothing save pleasure is good in itself. A deed is good because of what it does. All willing is the same; only the effects differed are different. However, since the hedonists hold that all willing is directed toward pleasure, there is no such thing as a good will or a bad will.

Green has been criticized for his apparent generality in defining the status of motives and the nature of the good. Ayers claims that Green is showing cyclical reasoning. 50 He holds that the reason for this cyclical reasoning is that Green puts undue stress on motive to the exclusion of consequences. Green recognizes that motives (as he defines them; see above) do not show a man what he should do, 51 but they do show a man the general direction in which he ought to go.

50. Ayers, MCT, 7.
51. Green, PFP, 321.
This is not specific enough for Ayer who states that Green has failed to give any rule by which he can endeavor is to be guided. Green had admitted this to be true. 52 But Ayer continues that Green has not done even as little as he claims to have done. Ayer disposes of Green's ethics as a traditional acquiescence in convenient dogma. Caird criticized Green for the looseness of his system in its failure to give a positive and constructive statement of the nature of the self and of the moral ideal. 53 Sidgwick also criticizes Green's concept of freedom as being a thinly disguised determinism. 54 The antipathy of Sidgwick for Green's idealism and his ardent support of Machianism are revealed in this criticism of dependence upon principles as being deterministic.

J. S. Mackenzie, an ardent supporter of Green, 55 affirms that Green avoids circular reasoning by introducing the concept of self-realization. Certainly this concept, which has something in common with what Wright calls "the Law of the Ideal of Personality" 56 all content to the definition of the good.

52. Green, PzE, 195-196.
55. Keseball, PzE, calls Mackenzie a disciple of Green who has carried his theory too far.
56. Wright, IL, 228-229.
life, cut it not by sufficient in the main that Glan's concept of self-realization and lack of concreteness are a limitation. We see this significance in Green's affirmation that at the basis of morality, there is an "unconditional duty... of realizing an ideal which cannot be absolutely defined till it is realized." 87


Glan can easily lay claim to being in the personalistic tradition because of the integral place he gives to the self-consciousness while unifying the complexities of experience. One of his most famous sayings in this regard is his affirmation that "all other values are relative to values for, of, or in a person." 88 The ultimate standard is "an ideal of personal worth." 89 Green meets what he considers a deficiency of emphasis on the part of Hegel concerning the matter of progress. "The Spirit tends to negate and minimize the significance of the individual in the spiritual progress. Green aims to maintain the Hegelian ideal of spiritual development or evolution of mind, but in addition he emphasizes that mere "spiritual progress of mankind is... an unmeaning race unless it means a progress of personal character and to

87. Green, P.T., 332.
88. Ibid., 218.
89. Ibid. cit.
personal character." 60 From this putting individuality into Hegel's dialectical spiritualism. There is a tendency on the part of Hegel to speak as if spirit were achieved in the history of man's development apart from the individuals who comprise that historic process. Green emphasizes the fact that the evolution is one of persons. 61

It is because Green finds the ultimate good to reside in conscious life and more specifically, self-conscious life that is so akin to the personalistic movement. Involved in this process is reason, so that like Plato, the good and the rational become inseparable bedfellows. Now when Green seeks to establish the end or purpose of ethics, the supreme good, he finds it in the development and realization of the self. 62 This desire to become the best of which one is capable is in harmony with what J. S. Mill calls "The Ideal of Personality," 63 and what Green calls the "ideal of virtue, of personal goodness." 64

Self-realization or self-satisfaction seems to have something in common with hedonism, but at further investigation we see

60. Green, PTE, 230.
62. Green, PTE, 239.
63. Brightman, M., 261.
64. Green, PTE, 271.
that the difference resides in the place given to pleasure. Pleasure is no necessary aspect of self-realization. 66

And yet, according to the view of Green "since there is pleasure in all realization of capacity, the life in which such capacities should be fully realized would necessarily be a pleasant life." 66 But as Green points out numerous times pleasure is an ambiguous term. Everything is pleasurable to someone or obnoxious to someone else. Then, too, as Green affirms, the pursuit of pleasure is a futile enterprise. The only achieving and satisfying pleasure is that which comes secondarily and not as a result of calculated intent. "We're just so far as...

a calculating pursuit of pleasure becomes dominant and supersedes particular interests, the chances of pleasure are really lost." 67 Pleasure may follow the pursuit of self-realization but whether it does or not makes no difference to the validity of self-realization.

One of the sources of difficulty with Green's conception of the realized self is that it lacks the definitiveness of direction which the masses of men need. 66 We shall evaluate

65. Green, PTE, 196.
66. Ibid., 437.
67. Ibid., 190.
68. Dewey criticizes Green's categorical imperative as a theory that tells us what they ought to do something, but that it fails to tell them what they ought to do. Further, says, Dewey, the postulate that whatever we do we fall short of our objective leads either to recklessness or pessimism. "DTI," 603.
under the section on the strength and weakness of Green's 
other. In defense of his self-realization principle, Green 
says, The view for which we plead is that the quality 
of the absolutely desirable life, which renders 
it real in man's thoughts is that it shall be the 
full realization of his capacities; that, although 
pleasure was incidental to such realization, 
it is in no way distinctive of it, being equally 
incidental to any unimpeded activity, to the exercise 
of merely animal functions as less than to 
those that are properly human; that although we 
know not in detail what the final realization of 
man's capacities would be, we know well enough, 
from the evidence they have so far given of them-
selves, what a fuller development of them would be, 
and that thus, in the injunction to make life as 
full a realization as possible of human capacities, 
we have a definiteness of direction, which the in-
junction to make life as pleasant as possible does 
not supply. 69

Granted that more content is needed to make self-realization 
adequate, and yet he does suggest the proper active and ulti-
mate goal of rational moral behavior.

Green unnecessarily complicated his theory by his easy-
going analysis of the rigors of moral practice. He maintains 
that in the last analysis there is no such thing as a conflict 
of duties. That appears to be a conflict of duties is really 

69. Green. PTZ, 497.
a conflict of "powers invested by the imagination with the character of components of duty." 70 Duty is one, namely, self-preservation and perfection. From the strict vantage point of logic such a view is possible but practically duties are multiple in spite of the fact that self-realization does compass all duties. For ramifications and implications of our actions are so far-reaching that we are frequently hard-pressed to find the right choice among many possible duties.

This same oversimplification is found in his theory that "the good in the effect of the movement will really correspond to the degree of good will which has been exerted in bringing it about." 71 This would be true only under ideal circumstances. With all the hindrances and influences impinging on our actions, it is virtually impossible that the impetus of our good will can make itself felt adequately in the results willed. Too many additional factors must be considered for "the good or evil in the motive of an action" to be "exactly measured by the good or evil in its consequences." 72 We see also, then, that simple as Green makes it, the relation between self-realization and self-sacrifice is complex. Hobhouse

70. Green, PTII, 405.
71. Ibis., 363.
72. Loc. cit.
pointed out that Green gave too optimistic a solution.

We can observe the hedonistic influence on Green in the interest which he maintains for the desirable or pleasurable. 73. "In this treatise the common characteristic of the good is that it satisfies some desire." 74. But the fulfillment of this desire is in persons.

73. Green, Pts., 232.
74. Ibid., 201.
CHAPTER VIII

T. H. GREEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE

1. The Implications of Green's Ethics for His Attitude toward the State.

We have already considered the major elements of Green's ethical theory and we have discovered that although it is strongly individualistic it is also social. In the sense that Green's social interest complements his interest in individuals, he is correcting Kant with Hegel. Certainly there are significant Kantian elements in Green's ethics. Green's emphasis upon the autonomy of the will is a case in point. As we shall note, this conviction that the demands of the individual will are primary is carried throughout Green's entire attitude toward the relation of the individual to the state. By reason of the stress on personal willing Green puts responsibility primarily upon the individual and not on the state.

While Hegel's ethics became subsumed in his statism, and Marx's ethics in the class, Green attempted to explain the right of the state to exist in terms of personal responsibility and personal development. While Hegel stressed the state, and Marx the class, Green emphasized persons. Self-conscious, self-willing, rational wills were Green's aim for individuals. "So far as it
is thus in respect of his rational nature that he makes himself an object to himself, his will is autonomous." 1 Green aimed to get persons conscious of themselves as responsible individuals. 2 The sole function of the state was to aid in this process of self-realization. The whole concept of freedom was interpreted in this light. Freedom was not so much a matter of the absence of restraint as it was a matter of "expressing the condition of a man who is inwardly 'master of himself.'" 3

If Green's emphasis on the good will as the freest will 4 was Kantian, it was likewise Platonic, Pauline, and Hegelian. These men wanted persons to be reasonable, and being reasonable to be free. If Plato was correcting the error of the Pythagoreans in his assertion that only the good man is the measure of things, Green was attempting to correct the error of the hedonists by his assertion that only the good will is free. Green concluded that,

Thus to the grown man, bred to civil liberty in a society which has learnt to make nature its instrument, there is no self-enjoyment in the mere consciousness of freedom as exemption from external control, no sense of an object in which he can satisfy himself having been obtained. 5

Unlike Hegel, but like Spinoza, Kant, and Marx, Green emphasized the non-competitive nature of the good. Green regarded

1. Nettleship, WOG, II, 313.
2. Ibid., 316-317.
3. Ibid., 322.
4. Ibid., 321.
5. Ibid., 323.
the good as both social and non-competitive. Hegel had stressed the element of conflict necessary to the development of Spirit. Life was an endless struggle. Marx certainly pointed up the struggle, but he was convinced that in the Kingdom of Freedom the competitive aspect would disappear. In revolt against both Hegel and Marx, Green contended that the good life can be achieved for all without the chaos of conflict. Although Green's result was not different from that of Hegel or Marx, his method aimed to overcome the discord of the dialectical opposition.

Green followed Kant in affirming that man was more than a creature of nature. Hegel concurred in this belief. Man could not be adequately understood merely under the aspect of the pure reason, said Kant. The ethical impulse of the practical reason was needed to complete the picture. Green was criticized for puzzle-headedness and accused of making man so unique that he was not subject to the uniform laws which govern nature. Green was doing, however, just what Kant and Hegel had done in stressing the importance of man as a reasonable and ethical creature.

Green was concerned also that ends were given proper significance. He maintained that the traditional English psychologists had claimed or denied freedom for the will irrespective of the

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objects willed. 7 The end for *Green* is self-realization, and this and is compatible with good for all. "The good each a man seeks for himself is not a succession of pleasures, but objects which, when realized, are permanent contributions to a social good which thus satisfies the permanent self." 8 Liberty for Green involves the freedom of the individual will to do what it will as long as the rights of others are not harmed. 9 This was essentially the meaning of Kant's categorical imperative. "In cases of simple moral duties," said Green, "the right rule of action may best be found by asking is the result promotive of a good character? We can't know a man's inclinations, less our own; but we can judge whether the result is beneficial." 10 Green attempted to correct the indefiniteness and the social expediency of Bentham's maxim by the further criterion of self-realization.

In his analysis of the relation of rights to duties Green remained sternly Kantian, yet with certain legalistic overtones. Green recognized certain rights which men had even before they were in states, but rights whose permanence the presence of a state insured. 11 These rights as obligations are not moral duties; they are not relative to states of will. They are related merely to outward acts the performance or omission of which ought to

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9. Barker, PTST, 18-36
11. Ibid., 461. These were 1) protection of body, 2) determination by one's own will.
Natural rights, then, are distinguished from moral duties in that the former are enforceable while the latter depend upon motives and dispositions. "Legal obligations," for example, "can only be obligations to do or abstain from certain acts, not duties of acting from certain motives, or with a certain disposition." These natural rights or laws will then be those laws necessary to provide the conditions in which a disinterested or unselfish morality shall be possible. Rights are merely means than to the performance of moral duties. "A law is not good because it enforces natural rights," but because it contributes to the realization of certain ends." This certain end is the self-realization of moral duties. Thus the criterion as to which rights are legitimate or which laws justifiable is one which presupposes an idea of the "moral vocation of man." This Green concludes,

There ought to be rights, because the moral personality, -- the capacity on the part of an individual for making a common good his own, -- ought to be developed; and it is developed through rights; i. e. through the recognition of members of a society of powers in each other contributing to a common good, and the regulation of those powers by that recognition.

12. Ibid., 340.
13. Ibid., 343.
14. Ibid., 347.
15. Loc. cit.
Only those deeds, that should be matters of legal prohibition or control, the doing or omission of which affects the development of moral persons. Green’s rights are relative to morality and not to law. They are moral rights and not legal rights. They are related to morality in that they are means to attaining the moral end. Green distinguishes two concepts of persons. The one is legal in which person means “a subject of rights and nothing more.” The other is ethical and means that “rights are derived from the possession of personality as a rational will.”

They natural rights are ‘innate’ or ‘natural’ in the same sense in which according to Aristotle the state is natural; not in the sense that they actually exist when a man is born and that they have actually existed as long as the human race, but that they arise out of and are necessary for the fulfillment of, a moral capacity without which a man would not be a man.

Moral duties, however are matters of the individual will. Under compulsion they cease to have the character of moral acts.

In the light of the foregoing observations we see that Green’s emphasis on the individual and on the right of the individual to moral self-direction leads him to a definite minimizing of the place of the state as a positive force for good. As we shall consider in our next section the primary task of the state is a negative one.

18. Ibid., 352.
19. Ritchie, PSI, 147.
2. The Negative Function of the State.

"Will not force," said Green, "is the basis of the state." Hegel had stressed the idea that reason was the basis of the state. As an institution founded on reason the state had a right to exert force to insure its own existence. The use of this force did not minimize, for Hegel, the validity of the state. Marx considered the state to be an institution of sheer oppression. The state was founded on force and as such was unjust. Certainly Green was not far from 19th century contention that will ought to be the basis of living together. This insistence of Green's that will be made paramount is the natural consequence of his fundamental interest in persons. Green stated this concisely.

On the other hand, when the power by which rights are guaranteed is sovereign (as it is desirable that it should be) in the special sense of being maintained by a person or persons, and wielding coercive force not liable to control by any other human force, it is not this coercive force that is the important thing about it, or that determines the habitual obedience essential to the real maintenance of rights. That which determines this habitual obedience is a power residing in the common will and reason of men, i.e. in the will and reason of men as determined by social relations, as integrated in each other, as acting together for common ends.

In his attitude on freedom Green like Hegel believed that the state could and should provide it for everyone. Hegel had main-

21. Ibid., 409.
tained that the freedom which exemplified the growth of Spirit could be developed only in a state. Apart from a state the individual could not express all the potentialities that were in him.

Green likewise asserted that the individual needs the state relationship in order to develop adequately. The state helps the individual to develop, not so much by what it does for the individual, as by what it makes possible for the individual to do.

Hegel saw this development of freedom more in the light of the state as a state than the individual as an individual. Green was concerned always that the Kantian autonomy of the will be achieved by all. The state was valid only as it helped in this process.

In comparing his theory with that of Hegel Green remarked,

So far the state, in that full sense in which Hegel uses the term—does contribute to the realization of freedom, if by freedom we understand the autonomy of the will as its determination by rational objects, objects which help to satisfy the demand of reason, the effort after self-perfection. 22

The important thing in civil society was that there be a power to guarantee man's rights, i.e., that will make it possible for men to have freedom of action provided they do not infringe on the same freedom of others. 23

23. Ibid., 408.
In a real sense this freedom was initially a negative freedom of being left alone. State action was expedient only as it tended "to promote freedom in the sense of self-determined action directed to the objects of reason, inexpedient so far as it tends to interfere with this." The function of the state was primarily negative. Its task was to remove the obstacles to human development. The state had no moral function of making members better. Green's idea was Kantian. His goal was the free will willing itself and doing good, not because of external obligations, but because of an inner sense of self-imposed duty. The important feature of the state was not what it did for the individual, but what it made possible for the individual.

As far as most of the citizens are concerned the state is a repressive power. Most people conform to institutions which they had no part in making. It is not until men take an active part in the affairs of the state that they come to recognize that the state does exist for the common good. Most people err in supposing that the state is to do things for them, rather than to free them to do things themselves. In this Green was an ardent supporter of laissez-faire policy. It was the duty of the state

24. Ritchie, PSI, 147. There were times when Green believed that a considerable amount of state interference was necessary (see above 176, 180). The interference was not a matter of the state doing something for the citizen, but of freeing the citizen to do that something himself.
to provide the opportunity for the self-realization of persons. 25

"The self-realization whose conditions a community ought to secure for its members was in the main Aristotle's idealization of Greek citizenship but with its aristocratic implications omitted." 26 Green stated that,

The real function of government is to maintain conditions of life in which morality shall be possible, and morality consisting in the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties, 'paternal government' does its best to make it impossible by narrowing the room for the self-imposition of duties and for the play of disinterested motives. 27

Green was concerned primarily with three social reforms: education, temperance, and property. It may seem contradictory that he favored considerable state intervention to bring these reforms about, but he was only intending that the obstacles to the full development of persons be removed. If men are oppressed by ignorance, poverty, or injustice, it is the task of the state to remove these hindrances. 28 Government has the right and duty of legislating changes in the economic system or of regulating it when it fails to produce or provide for abundant living. "The value then of the institutions of civil life lies in their operation as giving reality to these capacities of will and reason, and enabling them to be really exercised." 29 Thus, "to ask why

I am to submit to the power of the state, is to ask why I am to allow my life to be regulated by that complex of institutions without which I literally should not have a life to call my own."  

Green's conception of the place of the state in the punishment of crime was naturally related to his concern that persons develop to their best. Green agreed with Marx in spirit at least, that the state had no divine right to execute punishments. This was especially true in the light of the fact that some laws protected minority interests, or at least protected something that only the few could possess. "It is not the business of the state," said Green, "to protect one order of rights specially, but all rights equally."  

The right of the state to execute punishment was based on its right and duty to remove obstacles to self-realization. If punishment can prevent such actions as interfere with the possibility of free action which contributes to the social good, then the state has a right to punish. Green concluded that "if punishment then is to be just... it must be, so far as public safety allows, reformatory."  


It should be clear now that for Green the individual is the basis of the state, and individual self-development is the end of

30. Metalship, 10, 11, 621.
31. Ibid., 499.
32. Ibid., 486.
33. Ibid., 510.
the state. As Aristotle completed his ethics by his politics, because the good life can be realized only by the citizen of the good state, so Green completed his ethics by his view of politics. "Only through society, in the sense explained, is personality actualized." 34

This actualization of personality is not a mere personal matter. It must involve a social good. 35 Self-realization included what Green called "an ideal of mutual service." 36 A true good must be one in which all can participate and which all can achieve. No exclusive values can be the good. On this basis Green criticized the "stream of unrelenting competition, in which we admit that the weaker has not a chance." 37 He continued, "the principle which it is here sought to maintain is that the perfection of human character— a perfection of individuals which is also that of society, and of society which is also that of individuals— is for all the only object of absolute or intrinsic value." 38 In this regard Green discerned the service done by utilitarianism in insisting that it is the highest good of the greatest number that is to be taken into account. 39

34. Green, PTE, 216.
35. Ibid., 279.
36. Ibid., 296.
37. Loc. cit.
38. Ibid., 301.
39. Ibid., 412.
It is the interpretation of self-realization as the realization of a common good that unites Green's ethics with his politics. "An interest in common good is the ground of political society in the sense that without it nobody of people would recognize any authority as having a claim on their common obedience." 40 The sole justification for government is that it be for the good of the people. 41 From the point of view of the individual, it must be said that, "it is only as members of a society, as recognizing common interests and objects, that individuals come to have these attributes and rights; and the power, which in political society they have to obey, is derived from the development and systematization of those institutions for the regulation of a common life without which they would have no rights at all." 42

Hegel emphasized more what the individual could do for the state, although in this process the individual found his true freedom. Marx emphasized what the state did to the class of proletarians, and therefore to the individuals of that class. It was because the state as he saw it degraded man that Marx concluded that if man were to be free, the state would have to be abolished.

41. Ibid., 385.
42. Ibid., 428.
Greon agreed with Hegel that men needed the state for complete development, but he avoided Hegel's tendency to slight individuals in the interest of the organic whole. Greon agreed with Marx that states can be repressive or paternal, but he avoided Marx's extreme conclusion that all states must be abolished. Greon contended that state power must be kept at a minimum, and that the minimum be of a negative sort of removing the obstacles to individual development.

In order that persons attain full development, Greon believed that personal property was needed. He insisted that every citizen had a right to some property. Now it would seem that Greon is Hegelian at this point, for Hegel placed great stress on an's need for property which he could call his own. Marx believed that man's greatest need was private access to public property. With Marxian analysis Greon observed that,

A man who possesses nothing but his powers of labour, and who has to sell these to a capitalist for bare daily maintenance, might as well, in respect of the ethical purposes which the possession of property should serve, be denied rights of property altogether. 43

The principle of private property is that everyone should be protected in their pursuit of getting and keeping some property, since property is a means to self-realization. Since abilities

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43. Botiloship, Nos, II, 525. It should be noted that Groen's affiliation with or antipathy to Marx was implicit and not explicit. The word Marx does not even occur in PTE or the three volume WOG.
are different, unequal possession is a natural result. For the most part Green saw no injustice in this, but he did recognize that land involved a different problem from money. The possession of a large sum of money in the hands of one person does not necessarily mean that someone else would have to have less. With land, however, the monopolization by one could not help but mean that some would have to take less or even go without. Improper use of property, then, was certainly an evil. Property, like everything else, should be administered so that self-realization for all is not obstructed. Green did not conclude with Marx that the capitalistic system was to blame for the unjust property situation. Green believed that a more adequate state control of the way in which land rights were acquired and used would solve the difficulty. In this legislative control the state was exercising its negative function as a remover of obstacles.

1. The Rights of the Individual Against the State.

Green shows a fine balance between Hegel and Marx in his attitude toward the right of individuals against the state. Green begins by the very Hegelian statement that "there can be no right to disobey the law of the state except in the interest of the state."44 Since individuals have none of the general rights

44. Bostership, 703, II, 453.
(save the right to self-preservation and the right to self-willing) apart from the state, they have no basis for their complaint that their rights are being infringed upon. Green stated that the citizen cannot have any right against the state, "in the sense of a right to act otherwise than as a member of some society, the state being for its members the society of societies, the society in which all their claims upon each other are mutually adjusted." 45 This being true, how then, asked Green, can individuals lay claim to rights against the state? Individuals ought to obey even bad laws as a general rule.

Having said this, Green repeated the question: "Has the individual no rights against enactments founded on imperfect views of social well-being?" 46 His answer was less dogmatic than his previous ones. "He has no rights against them founded on any right to do as he likes." 47 This qualifies the issue by the implicit assumption that there is some basis upon which individuals may have the right to oppose the state. This basis, Green says, is the self-realization of persons. In order to oppose the laws, the individual must be able to show that there is a public interest,
generally recognized, that is alleged. By demanding that the infringement must be generally recognized as such, Green avoids having to support a minority or ever one man crusades against the law. Laws should be obeyed— even bad laws. Man "should do all he can by legal methods to get the command cancelled, but till it is cancelled he should conform to it." 48

By demanding that the cases recognize a breach of right Green avoids the anarchy to which Marx's position leads. Marx is certainly more Kantian, or atomistic, than it comes to the right to revolt than are either Hegel or Green. If, said Green, the vast majority of people see that a law is bad, then the breaking of that law would make no "breach in the law-abiding habits of the people." 49 On the other hand, if the breaking of an evil law, such as the act of befriending a slave, leads to general anarchy, then the duty of the citizen to law as such takes precedence over the duty to insure rights for slaves. Green's intellectual position on this matter is comparable to that of Socrates in Plato's Apology and Crito. In any civil question the individual ought to act so as to contribute to the well-being of the state. 50

49. Ibid., 457.
50. Ibid., 421.
Having made this concession Green admitted that under conditions where the government is so managed that there are no legal means of obtaining the repeal of unjust laws, there may be a "duty of resistance." Any law that transgresses the common good, infringes on rights; and it may be a duty to resist such a law. The test then, as to whether resistance is right if not that the majority wills it, but that the resistance is for the common good. On this basis even a minority may be justified in resisting if their resistance does not promote anarchy. But Green goes even further in admitting that there may be times when the law is so perverted that even anarchy is not too great a price to pay.

Green's position may then be as revolutionary as that of Marx, but the qualifications are so exacting that actual revolt would rarely be justified. Yet, the possibility is provided for. Green summarizes this well in a statement in his "Principles of Political Obligation."

On the other hand, it is under the worst governments that the public spirit is most crushed; and thus in extreme cases there may be a duty of resistance in the public interest, though there is no hope of the resistance finding efficient popular support. (An instance is the Lazzianian outbreaks in Italy). Its repeated renewal and repeated failure may afford the only prospect of ultimately arousing the public spirit which is necessary for the maintenance of a government in the public interest.

51. Nettleship, WOG, II, 422.
52. Ibid., 422.
53. Ibid., 423.
As far as reform movements are concerned, Green took an active share. Although he did not enter into the actual problems of any political reforms in his lectures, he did clarify the presuppositions which were implicit in the life of the state. He did not say what kind of political organization was the best, but he did say that whatever kind there was should always exemplify the principle that "will, not force, is the basis of the State." It was in his "Principles of Political Obligation" that the speculative and practical interests which he had found a meeting place most clearly.

Kitchie has said of Green,

He went straight from the declaration of the poll, when he was elected a town councillor, to lecture on The Critique of Pure Reason. He was so good of his time by thinking about the Eastern Question and dreading lest the country should be driven by motives "of which perhaps a diffused desire for excitement has been the most innocent," into what he regarded as an indefensible and unrighteous war. His strong opinions on the liquor traffic were in his own mind directly connected with his conception of the ethical end and the nature of rights. 54

5. The Right of the State to Carry on War.

Green's position with regard to the justifiability of war is nearer to that of Halk than to that of Hegel. Hegel had assumed that the state had an unquestioned right to execute war on its behalf and to expect that the citizens would participate. Green consistently

stressed the fact that the primary task of the state was the development of persons, and unless the state aided in this process, it had no valid excuse for existence. Green said, "Hence there is no ground for holding that a state is justified in doing whatever its interests seem to require, irrespectively of the effects on other men." 55

The internationalism of Green is brought out at this point. It is not that Hegel's theory did not imply universalism, but that Hegel doubted that states could co-operate. Hegel expected that on the international stage war had to be a factor making decisions. In fact Hegel suggested that a state illustrated strength and glory in participating in a war. Green differed sharply from Hegel on this. Not only did Green establish the idea of a universal brotherhood in the relation between states to each other, but he stated positively that war is not an essential attribute of the state as such, in its proper condition; it is rather the attribute of a particular state, in an imperfect condition.

There is no such thing as an inevitable conflict between states. There is nothing in the nature of the state, given a multiplicity of states, should make the gain of the one the loss of the other. The more perfectly each one of them attains its proper object of giving free scope to the capacities of all persons living on a certain range of territory, the easier it is for others to do so; and in proportion as they all do so the danger of conflict disappears. 56

56. Ibid., 476-477.
Thus, there was no reason why war could not be abolished. In this he certainly disagreed with Hegel.

In all three of these conceptions—his internationalism, his idea that war was an evidence of an imperfect state, and his idea that war could be abolished, Green was certainly in accord with Marx. Marx’s political philosophy aimed at internationalism. He looked at the wars between states as dynastic or economic in their cause and as making no constructive contribution to the needs of the masses. Such wars could disappear with the state. Even class wars would disappear as mankind became more and more one class. Both men anticipated a warless world. Green then considered the right of persons to life with the fact that war takes away life. He believed that war was not murder although he was equally certain that the loss of life in war could not be explained as other than an abrogation of man’s right to live. But in war two factors are absent that are present in murder. These factors are: 1) the end of war is not personal gain, although it may be national gain, 2) there is a general absence of personal enmity or hatred. This is recognized generally in wars today. Thus the soldier may kill German soldiers or civilians during formal combat, but during

57. Mattesikp, 70, 12, 466-467.
the occupation after surrender, the same soldier may be tried for murder if he kills even a soldier of the enemy without certain justification.

The state may show that war helps to prevent a more serious wrong, but it cannot show thereby that there is no wrong in the death of participants. "A state of war can make the destruction of man's life by man other than a wrong, though the wrong is not always chargeable upon all the parties to a war." 58 Green concluded:

"Our conclusion then is that the destruction of life in war... is always wrong-doing, with whoever the guilt of the wrong-doing may lie; that only those parties to a war are except from a share in the guilt who can truly plead that in the war is the only means of maintaining the social conditions of the moral development of man, and that there have been very few cases in which this plea could be truly made. 59"
CHAPTER IX
THE DEPENDENCE OF MARX AND GREEN ON HEGEL FOR THEIR PHILOSOPHY
OF THE STATE

The study of the influence of Hegel on Marx and T.H. Green in the philosophy of the state has revealed more of an indirect and negative influence than a positive one. Although both Marx and Green were Hegelian students, they neither followed the letter of his law nor came to the same conclusions with regard to the validity of his principles. Marx and Green, in many aspects, interpreted Hegel alike, but they evaluated him differently.

The dominant aspects of Hegel's philosophy of the state may be summarized as follows.

1. The state represents the means through which man may realize his capacity for freedom. Only in the state relationship can man achieve this freedom. This rests in part on the thesis that the true is the whole, and that the state represents wholeness.

2. As man becomes more reasonable, more rational, the state becomes more organized, more concrete. In its primitive beginnings the state arises out of the conflict of classes.

3. Although in theory Hegel aimed at freedom for the individual, in practice he subordinated the individual in the overwhelming power of the state.
4. The unity of the state must not be marred by any checks and balances theory of government. If necessary this unity must be forced. He criticized democracy in this respect as atomistic. In order to gain this state unity, Hegel appealed to a national patriotism.

5. Classes are formed on the basis of the division of labor, thus there are as many classes as there are kinds of work.

6. Property is necessary to help man realize his individuality. An inequality of distribution is natural on the basis of the inequality of skill.

7. Slavery was opposed because of his idea of freedom. This slavery was, however, more intellectual than economic, for Hegel excepted wage slavery.

8. In line with this, Hegel tended to underestimate the possibilities of the masses and overestimate the disinterested powers of the ruling classes.

9. War was not only a necessity, but a glorious opportunity. War helped men realize their true dignity. Long periods of peace debilitated men. War was not advocated between classes nor against the state by the citizens of the state, but wars between states were inevitable and honorable, especially when waged by a more spiritually advanced state against a less spiritually advanced one.
In certain rare instances where the emancipation of spirit defended it, revolutions were justified. Hegel believed that the French Revolution was such an instance. History shows that progress is moving under the impetus of battles between the more advanced and less advanced states.

10. To these ideas must be added the driving thesis of the dialectic. Life moves in a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis fashion. When one attempts to evaluate any single fact of life, the principle of negativity as part of the dialectic demands that one consider also what has been omitted. This continues endlessly or until all facts have been considered. Thus man faces an "unendliche Aufgabe." Not until man considers the whole will he have the most adequate view of things.

The history of philosophy since Hegel's death reveals that his influence was most complex. Up to the time of his death no clear or searching criticisms had been made of his system. But when the great master died there was no one to take the lead in the battle of wits, and as a result the complexity of his system produced a multiplicity of schools. Both Marx and Green were caught in the negelian reaction. Both of them were interested students of his philosophy though they were not ardent followers of the principles of his philosophy on the state. In certain respects Marx and Green were influenced positively but more often nega-
tively by Hegel in their philosophies of the state.

The most fundamental positive influence of Hegel on both Marx and Green was in the matter of the dialectical principle. Marx testified to his dependence upon Hegel for this significant thesis of his own philosophy of the state.

However, Hegel interpreted this dialectic as involving the growth and development of spirit, while Marx interpreted the dialectic as involving primarily the development of economic conditions. It is true, however, that Hegel did consider other than spiritual factors, such as geography, cultural environment, and economic conditions, but his overwhelming emphasis was on spirit. Marx, in his turn, did emphasize other than economic factors, such as art, education, and general cultural conditions, but his overwhelming emphasis was upon the economic factors. The very root of the struggle which was inherent in Marx's system came from Hegel's principle of the dialectic. The dialectic presupposed a constant battle. In Hegel's philosophy of the state this was epitomized in wars between states. In Marx's philosophy of the state this was epitomized in the class struggle.

Green, likewise, was influenced by Hegel's dialectic. He agreed explicitly with Hegel that the purpose of the evolutionary movement of life was to promote the freedom of man.
Greer disagreed sharply with Hegel, however, on the matter of the warlike ess of the dialectic. Green contended that the good was non-competitive, and that war was not a natural or necessary element in progress.

A further instance in which Marx and Green were positively influenced by Hegel is in the matter of freedom. Hegel's primary theoretical concern was that men develop spirit or freedom. In this process Hegel believed that the state was basic. It expressed a fundamental reasonableness. In his PH and his PEA Hegel traced the development of states and showed how their advance should be measured in terms of the freedom which they provided for the citizens. Ancient states, such as China and India, were severely criticized because they held the masses in a bondage of ignorance and oppression. Later states, such as Germany, France, the United States of America, and England were praised because they developed free and rational citizens. Without the state the people could not attain this freedom of spirit.

Marx was also concerned that people become more free, but freedom for him was primarily a matter of economic liberty. Marx testified to the fact that Hegel's theories were sympathetic to the production of more freedom, but he contended that Hegel's practical application of his theories frustrated freedom. To
As far as Marx could see, there werepressive powers forcing the will of minorities on majorities. If the state, as Hegel claimed, was the organization that could maintain free, why were so many in economic bondage? That we had success more free in the war with states and in the United States of America than they were in China, Marx admitted. But he added that while the minds of some men have been liberated from ignorance and the bodies of some from disease, and while the Reformation made all men theoretically citizens of worth; still the fact remained that the vast majorities of men were still in such economic want that the freedom to pursue educational and cultural interests, the freedom to have healthy bodies and elevated minds, the freedom to be well-fed, well-dressed, and well-housed was actually denied them.

Marx's solution was still a state, at least in the First Phase of the communist society. Although the Second Phase is not clearly described, Marx's implication is that however such an organization by the free choice of citizens, it will still be a state in the sense of an organization.

Green spoke with favor concerning Hegel's concern for freedom. He agreed with Hegel that the state played a vital part in the achieving of freedom. The state protects man and provides a way
for his self-realization. It is interesting to note that Green makes no mention of Marx. Even the name does not occur in the three volume Works of Green by Pettitship.

Green criticized Hegel, however, for his statism. He maintained that Hegel actually denoted freedom to men by his overwhelming stress on the state. In Hegel’s state can become merely a means to the glorification of the state.

The influence of Hegel on Marx and Green is further seen in the matter of the function of the state. Hegel favored a free political life in principle; yet he insisted in practice that in the last analysis the state should take precedence over the individual. He was so concerned that the unity of the state be maintained that enforcement of a unified opinion was justified. Although Hegel recognized that some states may be so evil that they ought to be destroyed, still state unity ought to be preserved virtually at all costs. One of Hegel’s criticisms of the democratic state was that it was so atomistic that it weakened state unity.

While Hegel elevated the authority of the state to a position of dominance over the citizens, Marx reacted with the elevation of a planned economy to a similar dominance. As far as the First Phase was concerned Marx’s planned economy
was certainly as regimentive as Hegel's state, but the
difference, Marx affirmed, was that the latter provides for
the welfare of all, while the former provides for the welfare
of the few. Marx evaluated Hegel's *laissez-faire* attitude
in the field of economics as a symbol of bourgeois exploita-
tion. This economic anarchy left the masses at the mercy of
the barons of ownership. Hegel appealed to a national patriotism,
while Marx appealed to a class loyalty. Although Hegel decried
revolutions, Marx considered them essential to state improvement.

Greven agreed with Hegel in spirit that the *laissez-faire*
economy had meritorious aspects, but he agreed in principle
with Marx that actual events show that great masses fail to get
governed the necessities of life under such a system. Greven believed,
however, that this inequality could be solved by legislation governing
property ownership and use, and that the capitalist system as such
was not at fault. The state, said Groen, ought to function as
the remover of obstacles to self-realization. Both *laissez-faire*
and planned economy entered into his solution. The state was not
an agent that did things for people. The state provided for the
opportunity for individuals to do things for themselves. But when
individuals prevented others from self-realization, and when
obstacles were put in the way of self-development, then the
state ought to abandon a laissez-faire attitude and adopt an interventionist position. This intervention would involve, however, only the removal of barriers, and would be in spirit like Marx's Reich der Freiheit. Green believed that the state ought to be preserved from anarchy. To this end, even bad laws ought to be obeyed rather than run the risk of throwing a state into a condition of anarchy. If, however, a majority believed the law to be evil, then no harm would be done to the general belief in lawfulness if this particular one were ignored or disobeyed. As a last resort Green conceded that even a revolution may be necessary. The qualification for the need for such a revolt is that obstacles to self-realization could be removed, that they could be removed in no peaceful way, and that the result of the obstacles was so evil that the risk of anarchy would not be too great a price to pay.

Green agrees in spirit with Hegel's attitude toward crime against the state. Both Hegel and Green were persuaded that the state was essential to personal development, and therefore should be protected from the anarchy of indifference to property or contract rights. Acts against property and contract undermin the unity of the state, so it is essential that they be considered crimes and punished accordingly. Both men agree that the
punishment ought to be reformatory. Punishment, they agreed, was not intended to mete out eye for eye and tooth for tooth, retaliation but to set up obstacles to the renewal of crime and to remove obstacles to self-development.

Since Marx was no concerned that the present state continue, he was not concerned over so-called crime. Since most crimes were against property, it was natural, said Marx, that the bourgeois state be concerned. The bourgeois state, however, ought not exist. The revolt of the classes against the present property conditions was essential to the procurement of freedom for all. The result was that Marx did not consider crime in its reference to the state, although he did think of it as perpetrated by the bourgeois against the proletariat.

All three men recognized the fact of classes. They disagreed, however, as to their definition and function. Hegel had said that classes were formed on the basis of the division of labor, a fact with which Marx agreed. Hegel had continued that the division was on the basis of occupation and product. Thus there were as many different classes as there were occupations. Marx said that this analysis was superficial. Occupational distinctions were a minor matter. The significant fact was that there were two major groups: those who owned the means of production and those who did not. This distinction, said Marx pointed out that
while one group had free access to the means of production and of gaining wealth, the other group (which was by far the larger) had to depend upon the charity of the former if it were to have the means of subsistence. It is illogical to suppose that the owners of the means of production will play Santa Claus to the have-nots. There are great profits at stake for the owners and we ought not expect them to give them up voluntarily so that the masses might live decently. A usurpation by violence, if necessary, is needed to disenthrone the few and put the many in control of the means of production.

Green leaned in the direction of Hegel in his feeling that classes are not necessarily antagonists; but he agreed in spirit with Marx that the question of ownership was one that needed answering. Green, however, believed that even as the individual was of more significance than the state, so he was also more significant than the class. As Marx's class transcended individual states, Green's individual transcended classes.

Hegel and Green agreed in principle that private property was essential to the realization of the individual. Property, said Hegel, was a means whereby persons may develop their potentialities of Spirit. Green said that private property was necessary to
self-realization. Both recognized that in a system where persons could freely enterprise, the more capable would get more than the less capable. Green, however, was concerned that the free-enterprise system broke down when all the available property had been taken. Hancock found that there was no property for them. Green believed that this could be solved by a revised system of property ownership. In some cases this would mean the breakup of large estates; in others it would mean that where property embraced vital means of production, the state would take a hand in removing obstacles to the use of these means for the self-development of all.

Marx recognized that in the first phase private property would be continued since people were too accustomed to it to give it up so easily, and also because he observed that people who had property or who had the hope of getting it, had more incentive to labor. Marx said that what was needed was not a more universal distribution of private property, but a more universal access to vital property. More public property was what was needed. The economic want of the masses may be interpreted as due to a lack of personal property, but this is a superficial observation. The underlying cause is that vital means of production are already in private hands, and
the result is that the masses have no free access to them.
The solution is group ownership of the means of production. Under the First Phase this group would be the proletariat. Under the Second Phase it would be the whole body of working people.

On the subject of war the most diverse opinions are represented. Hegel's dialectic was sympathetic to the Darwinian idea of struggle and battle. Hegel believed that war helped man realize his dignity, and not only this, but that a long peace debilitated society. War was as natural and glorious to Hegel as political activity was to the cultured Greek of Plato's day. Unlike Marx, Hegel affirmed that war between nation states was inevitable. It was part of the dialectical development. In general, however, class wars and wars against the nature of the state were prohibited. In rare instances, however, Hegel justified some revolution if it aided in a spirituallyizing spirit. The French Revolution was such an example. In general Marx accepted Hegel's dialectical implication that struggle was basic. Both he and Engels congratulate Hegel on this score. Marx reacted against Hegel's attitude toward war, however. This was not because Marx was opposed to violence, but because wars between states were inimical to the best interests of the masses. Inter-state warfare was dynastic or economic in purpose. Such war was intended to strengthen the power of the
It was intended to procure new colonies or new markets, or to protect the colonies and markets already obtained.

After wars were over the lot of the masses was usually still the same. They were still the wage-slaves of corporate monopolies. Class wars, however, were necessary to remove the obstacles of the private owners of the means of production. The warfare might indeed be bloody, but it had the virtue of improving the welfare of the masses of exploited peoples. It is not only supposed that Marx were no exception to the need for violent revolution. This is not the case. Marx specifically stated that in the case of advanced countries like the United States of America and England the communist victory could come without violence being necessary. Whether it would or not was another question. Thus Marx and Hegel differed not on the matter of the legitimacy of violence, but in their ideas as to what the purpose of violence was. Wars to strengthen the state were praised by Hegel and condemned by Marx. Wars to strengthen the proletariat were praised by Marx and condemned by Hegel.

Grun explicitly criticized Hegel and implicitly Marx for slighting the individual in the matter of war. Whether the wars were for the state or for the class, the individual still suffered.
as cannot justify, said Green, the taking of life, even though we can show that the war may avoid a greater evil. We may justify the war as such if it could be shown to remove greater obstacles to self-realization. Green doubted, however, that such situations could ever arise.

The conclusion of the matter is that the influence of Hegel on Marx and Green was most significant in the basic idea of the dialectic and in the emphasis upon freedom. Further than this the influence is more negative than positive. Hegel pointed issues, while Marx and Green endeavored to correct them. The Hegel's influence on Marx and Green is in the field of basic principle of dialectic progress, while in the field of practical application both Marx and Green were objectors rather than followers.
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THE INFLUENCE OF KANT ON MAAX AND T. H. GREEN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE

Abstract of a Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

It is the purpose of this study to investigate the influence of Hegel on Marx and T. H. Green in the philosophy of the state. Since the problems of political philosophy revolve around the major issues of the relation of the individual to the state, it is necessary particularly to understand how each of these men interpreted this relation and then to see how Hegel's interpretation affected that of Marx and Green. Both Marx and Green attach to the fact of Hegel's influence upon them.

Chapter I

The literature dealing with the philosophies of the state of Hegel, Marx, and Green supports the thesis that the latter two were influenced by Hegel.

Chapter III

Although Hegel places considerable stress on the individual point of view of the dual will and on freedom of choice, the individual is but a preliminary stage to a more adequate view. Moralité (individual ethics) has to become concrete and universal as Sittlichkeit (social ethics).

Chapter IV

The following facts emerge concerning Hegel's philosophy of the state.
1. Hegel considered the state to be the means by which the ethical ideal of freedom is realized. This belief is based on his conviction that the fundamental principle of the state is reason, and that reason is the prerequisite to freedom.

2. Religion is a means of preserving state unity, but because it emphasizes the whole, i.e., God, religion is also an expression of the state at its highest development. Since religion represents wholeness, i.e., rationality, Hegel's statement that the state rests on religion is tantamount to saying that the state rests on reason.

3. The growth of the state is understood in the light of certain facts.

1) History portrays the progressive struggle of man for freedom in universality.

2) Reason rules the world.

3) Man's growth is affected by his geographical environment.

4) Man needs an organized political life if he is to become fully free.

5) The state represents for man the concretion of his perpetual struggle toward a universal spirit.
In his discussion of the relation of the individual to the state, Hegel concluded that:

1) Individuals find their meaning in the state, and apart from it, they have no spiritual development.

2) The state is, thus, higher than the individual. In any issue between individuals and the state, the need of state unity takes precedence over the need of the individuals.

3) Since the state provides for the realization of man's rights, it has a higher right to demand duties from the individual.

4) Revolution against the state is, for the most part, wrong; although Hegel notes that there is the possibility of revolution in rare instances where the leaders of the state are utterly unscrupulous and where the government cannot reform itself. In his criticism of von Haller Hegel asserts that force is not the basis of the state.

5) The state has the right to demand the services of its citizens in time of war. Since the "true is the whole," the preservation of the state as a whole is more important than the preservation of the individual as a part. Wars unify the state. Peace is stagnation. War is glory and progress.
5. The constitution of a state represents the present concretion of the principles the laws conceived by the people to be necessary to provide for that free development which leads to Spirit.

6. The prince as an individual gives to the otherwise abstract will of the state a personal will which executes a unified decision. Although the prince is essentially a figure-head, the government is in the hands of a select and reasonable few. In this thesis Hegel illustrates his lack of confidence in the masses and his over-enthusiastic assumption that the few officers of the state will promote the real needs of the nation.

7. Although the implications of Hegel's dialectic are clearly in favor of a unified world, he believed that no authority existed to decide disputes between nations. The anarchy of international relations led Hegel to conclude that where more advanced nations were endangered by less advanced nations, the former were justified in destroying or subduing the latter. Both Hitler and Mussolini justified their recent aggressions on this basis.

Chapter V

Larx considered previous and present traditional ethical systems to be exploitive tools in the hands of a bourgeois few, used against the proletarian masses. Although Larx's attitude toward ethics was primarily negative, his concern for the needs
of the oppressed and his confidence in man's capacity for development are certainly ethical.

Chapter VI

Larx's philosophy of the state may be summarized as follows.

1. Although Larx accepted Hegel's dialectical method, he believed that its abstractions needed to be corrected by a practical program of action. The revolutionary implications of the dialectic in its demand for change and growth were concealed by Hegel in the hierarchical station which he proposed for his day.

2. Larx recognized in theory other factors than the economic as conditioning, i.e., art, education, music, environment, but in practice he stressed economics in determining almost to the exclusion of these other factors.

3. Larx's first and primary allegiance lies to his class and not to social state. Progress will be brought about by a temporary intensification of class consciousness to be followed by the disappearance of classes altogether.

4. The state is the exploitive tool of the ruling or emerging class. This will be an immediately the rule of the proletariat. The final condition will be a time of freedom in which there will be no state because there are no classes to oppress.
5. In order to bring this about violent revolution may be necessary, but in certain respects, the change may well come about by peaceful means.

The most positive influence of Hegel on both Marx and Gramsci was in the matter of the dialectical principle. On this principle Marx founded his revolutionary movement. A second influence of Hegel on Marx was in the concept for freedom. Marx differed, however, in his idea as to how freedom would be brought. Hegel depended on the state for this. Marx depended on the class. In spite of Marx's aversion to the state, his solution in the First Phase was still a state, and although the Second Phase is not clearly described, his implication is that it will still be an organization. While Marx accepts the fact of war and strife in the dialectic, he tolerated only class wars and condemned inter-state wars as dynastic and imperial.

Chapter VII

The ethical theory of L. J. Green is based on the legitimacy of the principle of self-realization. Green gives an integral place to the individual.

Chapter VIII

In Green's philosophy of the state the following facts emerge.

1. His Marxist interpretation of the significance of the individual person causes him to put emphasis primarily on the
individual over against the state.

1. The state has an essentially negative function as the
   removal of obstacles to individual realization.

2. Only in so far as the state provides for the self-
   realization of its citizens are its to fulfill its function.
   The individual is the basis of the state, and the realization
   of the individual is the state's only excuse for existence.

3. Although the individual could in extreme instances
   be justified in revolting against the state, in general, the
   individual ought to obey even its laws rather than risk
   leaving the state which makes self-realization possible
   into anarchy.

The main conclusion of this dissertation on the influence
of legal and Marx upon the philosophy of the state are
as follows.

1. Although both Marx and Hegel applied science
   in their use of the dialectic, Mar neither followed the letter
   of legal nor agreed with respect to the validity of his principles.

2. Hegel's insistence that history's goal was a form
   that was accepted by both, not everyone.

3. While Hegel considered the state to be the end,
   Marx focused instead what he saw to be the
   practical though not theoretical justification which Hegel and
Hegel favored centralization of political life under a laissez-faire economy. Marx wanted a free political life under a rigid planned economy. In spirit Gram followed Marx in the matter of the free political life, while he followed Hegel in the matter of the laissez-faire economic life.

Hegel believed that dialectical progress leads to war, but war only in the interests of preserving the state. Marx, following the dialectic, agreed that violence may be necessary, but only in the interests of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, which would in turn either away. Marx said that in certain nations violent revolution might be unnecessary. Marx rebelled against the competitive nature of the dialectic as Hegel interpreted it. The destruction of individuals could not be justified either in the interests of the state or of a class, hence, he denied theoretically the right of war.

The influence of Hegel on Marx and Gram is more theoretical than practical. In matters of general theory Hegel's influence was positive; in matters of practice his influence was primarily negative.
Donald Arthur Wells was born April 17, 1917 in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He attended Saint Paul Central High School. His parents are Harry Edward Wells and Ultima Kathryn Wells. The years 1934-36 were spent in northern Minnesota with the United States Forest Service doing various types of work from timber cruising to road construction. In the fall of 1936 he entered the College of Forestry of the University of Minnesota. A growing religious experience fostered by interdenominational church youth activity and Y.M.C.A. Settlement work culminated in a change to Carline University in the spring of 1938. He accepted a rural church at Nice Lake, Minnesota and an assistantship in the department of philosophy. He graduated cum laude with an A.B. degree from Carline University in 1940, with special honors in his major field of philosophy. His minors were French and zoology.

He married June Elizabeth Hickman of Saint Paul on September 7, 1940 and they moved immediately to Boston, Massachusetts where Mr. Wells attended Boston University School of Theology. Both he and his wife worked during the first two years in the settlement of Morgan Memorial Church of All Nations. During the summer of 1941 they worked in three rural churches in Maine. In 1942 he accepted the pastorate of the Allston Methodist Church in Allston, Massachusetts. In 1943 he was graduated magna cum laude, highest in his class, was awarded the Jacob Sleeper Fellowship, and received his S.T.B. degree.

Work was begun immediately toward the Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion in the Graduate School of Boston University. In the spring of 1944 he was transferred to the West End Methodist Church in Boston, Massachusetts. In the fall of 1944 he was awarded the Kent Fellowship of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education. The same year he was appointed the Gordon Parker Howe teaching fellow in the department of philosophy of the Graduate School of Boston University. In this position he corrected student papers and did substitute teaching in philosophy in the College of Liberal Arts and the Graduate School.

Mr. and Mrs. Wells have one child, Miriam June, who is fifteen months old. Mr. Wells expects to be granted the Ph.D. degree in May, 1946 from Boston University.