2014

Confrontation and engagement in relations between the DPRK and the United States, 1991-2011

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http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15260

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CONFRONTATION AND ENGAGEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES, 1991-2011

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2014
“Same bed but different dreams (同床異夢)”

- From one of the Four Character Idioms
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to my parents and parents-in-law in Korea, my husband Sung-il, and my wonderful daughter Julie.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Like many other high concentrating works, writing a dissertation requires an author to pass through a dark and long tunnel of struggles: the struggle to concentrate, the struggle to persevere, and the struggle to find oneself. During these struggles, an author feels indescribable loneliness often and is easily exhausted. Thus, without others’ encouragement and assistance, finishing a dissertation might be an impossible work.

I have been indebted to my academic advisors in Boston University during the whole period of writing this dissertation: Professor Walter Clemens Jr., Professor Thomas Berger, Professor David Mayers, Professor Michael Corgan, and Professor Sofia Perez. Professor Walter Clemens Jr., as my best friend and best academic advisor, has become a model to me with his passion and sharp intelligence both in academia and in his life. When I could not decide what to write or how to start my writing, he not only guided me in the right direction with kind and proper advice but also supported me with tremendous encouragement and trust. His suggestions, criticisms, and broad knowledge with a deep understanding of North Korean studies decisively led me to formulate ideas and arguments and to defend my arguments against possible criticism in this dissertation. I am also greatly indebted to Professor Thomas Berger. His sharp ideas and advice directly strengthened the theoretical building of this dissertation. Professor David Mayers guided me to look at my whole dissertation with fundamental questions. I especially thank him for his warm encouragement. Professor Michael Corgan reminded me of broad relations of the six parties and made my dissertation rich in its examination of diverse relations with North Kore. Professor Sofia Perez not only helped me with advice from the
beginning of this graduate program but also graciously agreed to be the chair of my dissertation defense.

I have been tremendously supported by my family members in a non-academic dimension. My parents and parents-in-law in Korea always encouraged me and with the foundation of their love, I was able to finish this long journey. My husband, Sung-il, has walked with me through this long tunnel. With incredible patience and love, he not only supported me but also helped bear the burden with me. My little girl, Julie, has brought the greatest happiness and vitality to my life and though still a baby, she understood that she had to wait when her mother was so busy. I would like to give special thanks to my family for their strong support and love.

I also would like to thank Adrien Lynch who edited this work in a prompt and accurate manner. She happily accepted my request to edit and refined my writing as a complete academic work. There is also a group of people in Boston I must thank: my church-based cell family. Through every Saturday meeting, they encouraged me and prayed for me during the whole process. Finally, I would like to thank my lord, Jesus Christ with his love and care for me. Soli Deo Gloria.
CONFRONTATION AND ENGAGEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES, 1991-2011

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ABSTRACT

In examining why the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) pursues nuclear weapons, this study focuses on Pyongyang’s consistent demand for normalization of relations with Washington. The primary aims of this study are 1) to study the significance of normalization of relations with Washington as an alternative to nuclear weapon development in the DPRK, 2) to investigate potential causal relationships between Pyongyang’s policy choices and Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington, and 3) to examine whether culturally sensitive behavior significantly influences Pyongyang’s policy decisions. To understand the significance of normalization of relations and the meaning of Pyongyang’s behavior, this study depends heavily on cultural perspectives.

In this study, two independent variables are examined for their effects on Pyongyang’s policy, 1) Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington, and 2) the alignment of Washington’s policy with Pyongyang’s cultural code. Two hypotheses emerge from these two factors: first, when Pyongyang had high expectations for normalization of relations with Washington, Pyongyang was more likely
to choose engagement policies and give less priority to pursuit of nuclear weapons; and second, the more Washington’s policies harmonized with Pyongyang’s cultural code, the more Pyongyang cooperated with Washington.

Using case studies and discourse analysis, this study examines four periods from 1991 to 2011. Interviews with North Korean defectors and with South Korean experts complement this study of expectation and cultural meaning.

The study concludes, first, that normalization of relations with Washington appeared to Pyongyang as a viable alternative to nuclear weapon development in providing a security guarantee and national dignity. Second, during most periods, Pyongyang appeared to believe that it was highly dependent on nuclear weapons for its regime survival when it could not expect the benefits of improved relations with Washington. By the same token, Pyongyang’s regime survival seemed less dependent on nuclear weapons when it could expect improved relations with Washington. At some times, however, Pyongyang practiced confrontation as a way to improve domestic stability. But usually high context diplomacy by the United States elicited positive responses.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC......................................................................................Anything but Clinton
ABM..................................................................................Antiballistic Missile
CBW..................................................................................Chemical and Biological Weapons
CIA......................................................................................Central Intelligence Agency
CRS.....................................................................................Congressional Research Service
DPRK.................................................................The Democratic People's of Republic of Korea
EU.....................................................................................European Union
HEU.....................................................................................Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA.................................................................International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO.................................................................International Aviation Organization
IMO.................................................................International Maritime Organization
INCSR..............................................................International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
JNCC.................................................................Joint Nuclear Control Committee
KCNA.................................................................Korean Central News Agency
KCTV.................................................................Korean Central Television
KEDO.................................................................Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KWP.................................................................Korean Workers' Party
LEU.....................................................................................Low Enriched Uranium
LWR.................................................................Light Water Reactor
NCND.................................................................Neither confirm nor deny
NMD.....................................................................................National Missile Defense
NPT ....................................................... Non-Proliferation Treaty
PBS ....................................................... Pyongyang Broadcasting Station
PSI ....................................................... Proliferation Security Initiative
ROK ....................................................... Republic of Korea
SST ....................................................... State-sponsored Terrorism
START ..................................................... Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TS ....................................................... Team Spirit
UFL ....................................................... Ulchi Focus Lens
UN ....................................................... United Nations
UNDHA .............................................. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC ..................................................... United Nations Security Council
US ....................................................... United States
USFK ..................................................... U.S. Forces in Korea
USSR ..................................................... Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD ..................................................... Weapons of Mass Destruction
I. INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

Washington has worked hard to advance its policy of nuclear non-proliferation. As of 2014, the U.S. government has succeeded in discouraging most countries from seeking nuclear weapons (e.g. South Korea and Japan) and even in making some give up the nuclear weapons or capability they already had (e.g. Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Libya). However, negotiations related to nuclear weapons with some countries (e.g. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) proved much more difficult than negotiations with others. Unlike operations in Iraq, a potential war on the Korean peninsula to remove nuclear facilities in North Korea could not evade immeasurable loss of life and property as Dr. Perry and his team pointed out (Perry, 1999:3). Thus, U.S. policy toward North Korea has focused more on containment or negotiation, rather than on military attack.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has seemed to many outsiders like a country that was destined to collapse. Scholars do not discuss whether it collapses or not; they discuss when and how it collapses. Policy makers focus their discussion on how to make North Korea’s collapse a “soft-landing.”

According to “the 2013 Failed State Index 2013,”¹ to much surprise, ranked as 23rd failed state in 2013, the DPRK was not included within the top 20 failed states, “the world’s most vulnerable nations” (Foreign Policy, “The 2013 Failed State Index”).² Compared to Somalia, ranked at the top of the list for its political atmosphere of

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¹To estimate the level of failure, 12 indicators were used: demography, refugees, illegitimate government, brain drain, public service, inequality, group grievance, human rights, economic decline, security forces, factionalized elites, and external intervention.
²To see the whole rank: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interactive_map
lawlessness and chaos, North Korea’s situation is not so desperate. North Korea at least maintains order and control. North Korea’s government is legitimate in the eyes of its own people, with a strong army for its security relative to its declining economy, and a strong controlling system, even while it suffers from severe economic decline, poor public service, inequality, and violent violations of human rights. North Korea has some traits of successful nations in that it “controls defined territories and population, conducts diplomatic relations with other states, and monopolizes legitimate violence within its territory”, but North Korea has failed to provide adequate social goods to its own people (Brooks, 2005: 1160). According to Brook’s definition, North Korea is not a failed state, but rather a weak or failing state (Brooks, 2005: 1161).

Under conditions including severe famine and economic decline with poor public services and social inequalities, the Kim regime has used a variety of authoritarian "tools" such as reliance on nationalism and use of force to protect itself from internal coups (Byman and Lind, 2010). Gwang-Oon Kim points out that North Korea was formed by Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese guerilla group’s struggles for autonomy while outsiders considered North Korea as a satellite or a puppet country (Kim, 2007: 17). The political structure of North Korea is the concentric power model based on personal loyalty to the Kim family and to the anti-Japanese guerilla unit, and its second generation consists of the center of the concentric circle (Kim, 2007: 34). After the suffering of Koreans under Japanese rule, defending their own country from external threats and preserving national dignity and pride became a serious goal to which both Korean peoples would risk their lives. Nuclear weapons have been considered as an effective tool both to defend
from external threats (deterrence effect) and to enhance its national dignity in Pyongyang, while Seoul found other ways such as alliances for security and economic growth to enhance its national dignity. The regime in Pyongyang has the potential to last because it at least provides its own people with those two vital interests, security and national dignity. Pyongyang achieved those two goals through its nuclear weapon program, but still longs for a less costly path toward normalization of relations with Washington.

This study explores the reasons why Pyongyang has pursued its nuclear weapon program and the significance of Pyongyang’s demand for normalization of relations with Washington which Washington has ignored over the past 20 years.

1) *Four Research Questions*

There are at least four research questions that underlie this study.

- What is North Korea’s motivation for developing nuclear weapons?
- What does normalization of relations with Washington mean to Pyongyang?
- How does Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington affect Pyongyang’s policy for either confrontation or engagement?
- Why did Washington’s policies toward Pyongyang fail to denuclearize Pyongyang?

The key to resolving these questions is to understand Pyongyang’s intentions and its views regarding the significance of normalization of relations with Washington. This understanding is possible when one observes and analyzes the meaning of Pyongyang’s
remarks and behaviors in a cultural context.

2) Focus and Goal of This Study

In examining why North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and why it has refused to give up its nuclear program, this study focuses on what Pyongyang has continuously insisted: normalization of relations with Washington. The primary purposes of this study are 1) to study the significance of Pyongyang’s demand for normalization of relations with Washington as an alternative to nuclear weapon development in the DPRK, 2) to investigate causal mechanisms between Pyongyang’s policy choices of confrontation or engagement and Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington, and 3) to examine whether culturally sensitive behavior significantly influences the other’s policy decisions. To understand the significance of normalization of relations and the meaning of certain behavior, this study mainly depends on cultural perspective.

Pyongyang has expressed its wish for normalization of relations with Washington since the early 1990s, but Washington has had difficulty in grasping Pyongyang’s real intention for conciliatory policies toward Washington. Pyongyang’s frequent threats and confrontational policies upset many agreements and negotiations, adding to Washington’s confusion over Pyongyang’s intention. To understand the other’s intention is just as important as assessing the other’s capability in security studies (Jervis, 1976: 101; Snyder, 2008: 2). However, to assess the true intention of a secretive regime such as Pyongyang, which offers scarce data, is not easy at all (Snyder, 2008: 3; Haggard and Nolan, 2011:
63). Public statements by this kind of regime do not always reflect the true intention of a certain policy because policy makers often use public statements to mislead others or to conceal the true intention (Snyder 2008: 2). However, by not only reading public statements but also observing the other’s behaviors, including the way that the other publishes these statements, can help to clarify the other’s intention. Considering the other’s policies and demands in a cultural context also helps to assess the other’s true intention.

Washington has ignored Pyongyang’s continuous demand for normalization of relations, regarding the demand as an excuse to continue advancing its nuclear weaponry. However, Pyongyang’s demand for normalization of relations with Washington needs to be examined in order to understand Pyongyang’s policy of confrontation (particularly related to its nuclear weapons and long-range missile development) and solve the negotiation stalemate between Pyongyang and Washington. Normalization of relations with Washington perhaps could serve as an alternative to nuclear weapons. In fact, normalization of relations may be more attractive to Pyongyang because it presents less of a financial burden and could positively impact relations with other countries.

3) Significance of This Study

Since North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, there have been many studies on Pyongyang’s intentions and corresponding policy recommendations for Washington. Some studies recommend hard line policies such as containment, focusing on a fixed image of North Korea as a rogue
state or troublemaker, while others recommend economic inducement based on North Korea’s strategic situation. Still others focus on North Korea’s domestic political struggle or succession issues. Most studies aim to figure out the real intentions of Pyongyang and the causes of Pyongyang’s provocative actions. This study also attempts to determine Pyongyang’s intentions and the causes of confrontation using a cultural perspective. North Korean studies based on cultural perspective have been scarce both because of the limited accessibility of North Korea and because of researchers’ lack of understanding of North Korean culture. In high context cultures like North Korea, political policy often has important cultural significance.

This study focuses on normalization of relations which Pyongyang has demanded for many years—a demand that has been easily ignored by Washington. Without a cultural understanding that in high context societies like North Korea, relations precede business and may have many meanings, it is hard for Washington to consider this demand important because it is something non-material, unlike more obvious economic rewards. This study, through its cultural perspective on Pyongyang’s demand for normalization of relations with Washington, will provide amplified explanations that other perspectives would miss. This study analyzes what policy Pyongyang chooses according to its expectation for normalization of relations with Washington. This study also provides relevant policy recommendations for Washington by explaining the meaning of normalized relations to Pyongyang, taking into account that Pyongyang has insisted that it would give up its nuclear weapons if it reaches normalized relations with Washington.
2. Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of six chapters, including this introduction chapter, which seeks to determine the significance of normalization of relations with Washington while analyzing Pyongyang’s policy choices according to varying expectations of normalization of relations with Washington.

Chapter II discusses a long tug-of-war between Pyongyang and Washington based on Raymond Cohen’s theory of cultural difference. Pyongyang, as a high context society, and Washington, as a low context society, have different views and behaviors in negotiations. These differences led to sharp conflicts on the primary issue between the two countries: denuclearization versus normalization of relations. Meanwhile, through the comparison of relations between Pyongyang and Seoul, which share a similar cultural background, with the relations Pyongyang and Washington, this study suggests the type of relationship that Pyongyang desires to establish with Washington. Based on this theoretical framework, this chapter displays the assumptions and hypotheses on Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington and the appropriateness of Washington’s policy according to North Korean cultural code. This chapter also introduces the methodology of this research: case study and discourse analysis. This chapter provides study periods and original sources that this study draws from.

To figure out how this study may contribute to current North Korean policy, the literature review in Chapter III examines current North Korean studies. This chapter points out the different arguments and policy recommendations of hard line approaches
and soft line approaches, with criticism from the international relations theoretical frame. In addition, North Korean studies focusing on domestic politics are examined for their significance and limitations. Last, this chapter introduces analysis based on the importance of cultural perspective and examines the significance of normalization of relations through cultural understanding.

Chapter IV analyzes North Korea’s national crisis in the 1990s resulting from its failed relations with its former allies, Moscow and Beijing. Without powerful allies, Pyongyang depends more on its nuclear weapons program while it pursues new relations with Washington. This chapter examines Pyongyang’s motivation in developing nuclear weapons, both for the security guarantee and the enhancement of national dignity. Economic aid is not discussed here because it can be a secondary bargaining chip for either nuclear weapons or a kind of amity after normalization of relations happens. This chapter also argues that Pyongyang’s other policy goal, normalization of relations, has similar effects to its nuclear weapons program; normalization of relations with Washington was pursued by Pyongyang for the same purposes as it pursued nuclear power. This chapter also includes the relations between Pyongyang and other neighboring countries related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Chapter V analyzes Pyongyang’s choice of policy between normalization of relations and nuclear weapons (engagement or confrontation) with regard to Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington and to Washington’s policy alignment with Pyongyang’s cultural code during four different periods from 1991 to 2011. This chapter shows a kind of pattern involving Pyongyang’s wish and increased
expectation for normalization of relations with Washington, frustration when those expectations are not met which leads to nuclear crisis, Washington’s policy aligned with Pyongyang’s cultural code and settlement, and Pyongyang’s re-expectation. After two cycles, Pyongyang had observed this pattern and concluded that Washington fundamentally does not have any real intention to coexist with Pyongyang. In the fourth period, Pyongyang seemed quick to choose confrontation. The political transition period during 1994-1998 is treated as an exceptional period for its distinct significance related to North Korea’s domestic situation.

The conclusion in Chapter VI summarizes all founding arguments in this study and proposes policy implications for Washington.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. A Long Tug-of-War between Washington and Pyongyang: Denuclearization vs. Normalization of Relations

In the long history of negotiation between Washington and Pyongyang since the 1990s, there has been a continual tug-of-war regarding which issue should take primacy in negotiations. The two parties even disagree on which matters should be resolved first. This dispute had often led two parties to deadlock or returned the ongoing progress back to the starting point again. In most negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, Washington insisted on the denuclearization of North Korea before any further engagement, while Pyongyang responded that it could not give up its nuclear weapons as self-defense without a pledge of nonaggression such as good relations with the U.S. Washington has criticized Pyongyang for gaining time to make nuclear weapons through the plausible excuse of seeking normalization of relations, while Pyongyang has been outraged by the denuclearization-first demand, insisting that Washington plans to disarm Pyongyang and overthrow the Kim regime. If the stalemate were simply rooted in discord, it might be solved with several preliminary meetings to achieve an agreement. If the disagreement resulted from deception by either of the two parties in order to exploit the other, the main issue here would be “trust” and the solution would be “trust-building” between the two, as many insist. “Trust-building” is surely important between parties in any negotiation. However, the fundamental problem here is not only based on “trust-building” but also on “understanding.” The irreconcilable disagreement regarding which issue should be addressed first, denuclearization or normalization of relations, is based on
a lack of understanding of one another’s cultural context. For Pyongyang, normalization of relations is strategically valuable because it could serve as an alternative to nuclear weapons. Normalization might be a key to resolving many problems Pyongyang faces because in high context cultures, it is believed that friendly behaviors will be followed by friendly relations; so in Pyongyang’s mind, the first step should be to establish relations, while Washington, as a low context negotiator, could not consider normalization of relations before denuclearization of North Korea.

Raymond Cohen argued that cultural factors may hinder negotiation in general although the divergent interests rather than cultural dissonance are the main factor in the failure of negotiations (Cohen, 2004: 7-8). As a low context negotiator in a results-oriented culture, Washington emphasizes immediate issues rather than the long-term relationship, and considers an agreement as a conclusion or ending. The American cultural values of individuality and equality emphasize concepts such as “due process”, fair play, reciprocity, and give-and-take in negotiation. Americans tend to separate business from friendship. American negotiators would like to express their proposal externally with an expectation for give-and-take, concluding in a reasonable compromise (Cohen, 2004: 83).

In contrast, Pyongyang, as a high context negotiator, is relationship-oriented and considers an agreement as a beginning for a future relationship. In a high context culture, negotiation is more important for cultivating relationships than for solving problems (Cohen, 2004: 69). Once a healthy relationship is established, the two parties can easily

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3 On the contrary, in a hierarchical society like Pyongyang, people are not equal in practice, even though nominally they have equal rights.
work out their differences in cooperation (Cohen, 2004: 201). In Korea (both South and North), there is a saying, “to begin is to be halfway done,” and the beginning of all business is to form relations with others. The famous “company dinner culture”\(^4\) in South Korea shows how important forming relations is in business world. The three fundamental principles and the five moral disciplines in Confucianism, which are taught to children in Korea, are all about relationships.\(^5\) Normalization of relations with Washington was not a magical solution to the problems Pyongyang faced, but Pyongyang believed that friendly policies from Washington would help in many areas.

However, negotiations on nuclear weapons between Washington and Pyongyang began suddenly in 1993 before either had an appropriate understanding of the meaning of the other’s demands. Pyongyang began the negotiation on nuclear weapons with the hope of normalization of relations with Washington, while Washington treated the negotiation with Pyongyang as purely business. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the higher the expectation for normalizing of relations with Washington is, the less the need for pursuing nuclear weapons (and the greater appeal of engagement policies for Pyongyang); the lower the expectation for normalizing relations with Washington is, the greater the need for pursuing nuclear weapons (and the greater need for confrontation policies by

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\(^4\) In South Korea, most companies have company dinners by department, bureau, or the whole company very often and most employees are encouraged to participate.

\(^5\) The contents of the three fundamental principles are 1) there is a duty to observe necessarily between king and subject; 2) there is a duty to observe necessarily between parents and children; 3) there is a duty to observe necessarily between husband and wife. The contents of five moral disciplines are 1) there should be loyalty between king and subject; 2) there should be love between parents and children; 3) there should be differentiation between husband and wife; 4) there should be order between older and younger; 5) there should be trust between friends. In Confucian countries, “order” from one to the other (grace and generosity from higher position to lower; respect and obedience from lower position to higher) is the key in human relations, while in western countries, “do to others what you would like them to do to you” has been a customary law.
Pyongyang) (Hypothesis 1).

With its foundation in collective culture, Pyongyang considers personal relationships to be important in negotiation, placing particular emphasis on personal relationships at the highest levels of government. Pyongyang’s face-saving culture hates to be disrespected, and is particularly sensitive to any perceived humiliation of its leader. Thus, when Washington has approached Pyongyang with consideration for Pyongyang’s cultural context, Pyongyang showed immediate positive response. On the contrary, when Washington touched Pyongyang’s cultural context negatively, Pyongyang expressed fury (Hypothesis 2). Thus, President Carter’s visit to Pyongyang to meet Kim Il-sung embodied Pyongyang’s cultural importance of the high-level personal relationship, allowing Washington and Pyongyang to reach the Agreed Framework in 1994. However, they were in the same bed but dreamt different dreams. Each country’s expectation and understanding of the Agreement differed from the other’s. Washington considered the agreement as an end of the nuclear issue in North Korea and expected that Pyongyang would not further develop its nuclear weapons program and would replace all nuclear weapon facilities with light water reactors for energy production. In western culture, to keep an agreement is “the foundation-stone” (Cohen, 2004: 199). But for Pyongyang, the “guarantee of full normalization of political and economic relations” was more important than keeping an agreement or receiving economic rewards such as heavy oil. Thus, Pyongyang was very disappointed by the cancellation of President Clinton’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000 and was furious when President Bush and Condoleezza Rice, then US

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6 This is not to imply that keeping agreement is unimportant in high context cultures. Rather, in a high context culture, the relationship always takes priority over anything else, including keeping agreement.
National Security Advisor, revealed hostile intentions against Pyongyang, humiliating Chairman Kim Jong-il in the early 2000s. At first, still hoping for normalization of relations with Washington, Pyongyang did not comment on Washington’s hostile remark, but soon understood that Washington had no intention of improving relations with Pyongyang. According to Jervis, decision-makers react quickly to evidence which they wish to see, but react slowly to evidence which presents an obstacle to their goal (Jervis, 1976: 140). Pyongyang has shown these behaviors.

Instead of cultivating the first sprout of agreement, both parties saw only what they wanted to see in the agreement and expected the other party to comply with their own interpretation of the terms of the agreement. As a result, the Agreed Framework became the basis for criticizing one another and left only misunderstanding and mistrust between the two. A window of opportunity opened in 2007 once more when the two countries reached another progressive agreement, but the window was soon closed in the middle of 2008. Lack of understanding of the other’s demand in a cultural context hindered the reconciliation of the two parties.

2. Comparison of the Relations between Pyongyang and Washington to the Relations between Pyongyang and Seoul Through a Cultural Perspective

Why have the negotiations between Seoul and Pyongyang been so difficult though both countries are high context, collective, hierarchical societies influenced by neo-Confucianism? How are the relations between Pyongyang and Seoul different from the relations between Pyongyang and Washington? As high context cultures, both Seoul
and Pyongyang consider long-lasting relations more important than one-time business interactions. Their interactions aim to continue their relations, rather than focusing only on the profits directly from a business agreement. However, there is a serious problem here regarding what kind of relation they pursue.

Since the tragic division of the Korean peninsula, the two regional governments have competed for legitimacy to govern the whole peninsula. They resemble brothers, but like twin brothers who compete for the position of elder brother, they compete for preoccupancy in legitimacy disputes. Each one claims its position as the elder brother who is the representative of Korean people and Korean country, deserving of respect by the younger, given precedence in every sector, and granting the younger favors.

In hierarchical and Confucian states like Korea, order of rank by age is the foundation of relationships. In ancient Korean society, the eldest inherited at least twice as much as other brothers from their parents, and has a responsibility to take care of his younger brothers after their parents pass away. When two Koreans meet for the first time, they would first want to know how old the other is. Once their ages are known, the relationship between the two is quickly established. The Elder has precedence in every sector, respected by the younger almost naturally, and boasts its power to do the younger favors.\(^7\) It looks natural that the elder has precedence. To disobey or to refuse the elder’s suggestion is considered very rude or uncomfortable. On the other hand, it is also natural that the elder helps the younger. It is still prevalent in South Korean society that the elder pays for the meal when the two have lunch or dinner together in a restaurant, although the

\(^7\)The fourth discipline of the Five Moral Discipline in Confucianism: The younger should give precedence to the elder (Elder first).
western culture of paying separately has also become acceptable in the society.

Thus, between the two Koreas, regime competition has those cultural meanings. Taking the elder’s position is highly related to national pride or dignity. Once established, the relationship would determine most other things and would not be changed easily. This is the fundamental cause of the failure of the Sunshine policy by Seoul. Pyongyang could never acknowledge the help from Seoul as beneficial though Pyongyang’s terrible economic situation necessitated receiving aid from Seoul. Seoul’s Sunshine policy was seen by Pyongyang as a possible strategy for absorbing unification (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, May 23, 1998). Thus, Pyongyang only exploited the Sunshine policy for its own interest, instead of acknowledging Seoul’s superiority. Pyongyang tried to consider Seoul’s aid as bribe to win Pyongyang’s favor (as the elder brother); Pyongyang exploited Seoul’s help rather than moving in a direction favorable to Seoul. Pyongyang often took a high tone even in negotiations on how to deliver the food from South Korea to North Korea. Seoul criticized Pyongyang for only exploiting its brother and not showing due respect to Seoul. In Pyongyang’s eyes, it should be the one that gives help or shows favor to Seoul. Considering this fundamental problem in the relationship, their similar cultures and negotiation styles did not help much: the two have shown the same “toughness,” claiming precedence, so “the toughness dilemma,” often ends in stalemate (Snyder, 1999: 98-101).

Relations between Pyongyang and Washington are different from the relations between Pyongyang and Seoul. Even though Pyongyang has insisted equivalency and reciprocity in negotiations with Washington, what Pyongyang wants is recognition as a
normal country and favor from Washington. Pyongyang and all North Korean people
know the U.S. is the superpower, and the relations between Pyongyang and Washington
would be like one between a younger brother and an elder brother. Thus, the aid from
Washington looks natural as Washington is the stronger of the two, and does not injure
Pyongyang’s pride unlike the aid from Seoul. In a hierarchical society where the
recognition of the elder has important meaning, recognition as a normal country by
Washington has great significance for Pyongyang and its people. On the other hand, to be
ignored or branded as a rogue state by Washington is terrible; to be ignored or branded as
a trouble-maker by the elder means to be seen as such by the entire community. Snyder
also pointed out the difference between two kinds of negotiations: the negotiation
between Pyongyang and Washington became “a problem-solving exercise to find the
right deal” while the negotiation between Pyongyang and Seoul had been an extended
competition for legitimacy between the two (Snyder, 1999: 107).

3. Assumptions

There are at least five assumptions that form the basis of this study.

First, regime survival has been the primary goal of the DPRK leadership. Once
Pyongyang had an ambition to unify the Korean peninsula under its leadership, but since
the 1990s, Pyongyang is more worried about absorption unification by the South.
Pyongyang has struggled to survive against a hostile international situation and domestic
instability. Thus, this study assumes that Pyongyang’s primary goal is its survival.

Second, the U.S. is the most important variable to the DPRK regime’s survival in
two dimensions: as the biggest threat and the potential greatest ally. Not only has the U.S. been the world’s superpower after the Soviet Union collapsed, but the U.S. is also still at war against the DPRK, technically speaking. The Korean War did not officially end, but has been in armistice since 1953. The U.S. has both the capability and the intention to attack North Korea if necessary. At the same time, the U.S. could be the greatest ally to the DPRK. The U.S. has the capacity to help the DPRK to overcome economic difficulty and to become a normal state.

Third, Pyongyang is a security seeker more than a security maximizer because its survival has been in hazard since the 1990s. Pyongyang has developed nuclear weapons for its self-defense rather than for offensive purposes such as to attack Seoul or Washington because Pyongyang knows well that the result of any nuclear action against Seoul or Washington will be the end of its regime with the U.S. retaliation attack. Sometimes, Pyongyang has used the threat of further development of nuclear weapons to induce Washington to talk with Pyongyang, particularly when Washington did not respond to Pyongyang’s call for normalization of relations.

Fourth, Pyongyang has pursued both normalization of relations with Washington and development of nuclear weapons to overcome national crises. As alternative policies, they may replace each other according to the situation. I will explain why normalization of relations with Washington might be an alternative policy to the nuclear weapon program in Chapter IV.

Last, relations precede results in high context cultures, while results precede relations in low context cultures. North Korea, as a high context culture, considers
relations to be the goal of negotiations, while Washington, as a low context culture, considers business or end results as the goal of negotiations. To sum up, the four assumptions are following:

1) Regime survival is the primary goal of the DPRK leadership
2) The U.S. is the most important variable to the DPRK regime survival: the biggest threat and the potential greatest ally
3) As a security seeker, Pyongyang has developed its nuclear weapon program for its security and national dignity rather than for offensive purposes such as attack on Seoul or Washington. Pyongyang has used the threat of further development of nuclear weapons to induce Washington to talk with Pyongyang.
4) Pyongyang has pursued both normalization of relations with Washington and development of nuclear weapons to overcome national crises. Normalization of relations with Washington may be an alternative policy to nuclear weapons program.
5) Relations precede results in high context cultures like North Korea, while results precede relations in low context cultures like the U.S.

4. Hypotheses

As having the same purposes and similar effects, normalization of relations with Washington and the nuclear weapons program have been two main policies by which Pyongyang has tried to overcome national crises since the 1990s. If normalization of
relations with Washington is established, Pyongyang may solve many problems related to security and national dignity based on the normalization of relations, because relations are often a key to problem-solving in high context cultures. Once relations are established, whether good or bad, people determine their behaviors according the order established by relations. Believing that normalization of relations with Washington would achieve the same goals as nuclear weapons, Pyongyang has eagerly pursued improvement of relations with Washington as its primary policy since 1990s, not only because it would cost less than nuclear weapons, but also because establishing relations first fits with its cultural code.

Thus, when Pyongyang perceives that normalization of relations with Washington is highly possible, it refrains from its confrontation including continuous development of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, when Pyongyang perceives that normalization of relations with Washington seems to be impossible, Pyongyang spurs the development of its nuclear weapon program as an alternative policy for its survival or as an inducement to Washington to talk with Pyongyang, which is perceived as confrontation in the eyes of Washington. In short, expectation for normalization of relations with Washington as an independent variable determines whether Pyongyang’s policy, as the dependent variable, will be confrontation or engagement (further development of nuclear weapons or disabling its existing nuclear weapons facilities).
Hypothesis 1. High expectation for normalization of relations with Washington leads to less need for pursuing nuclear weapons (Pyongyang chooses engagement policy); low expectation or dissatisfaction with normalization of relations with Washington leads to greater need for pursuing nuclear weapons (Pyongyang chooses confrontation).

Meanwhile, when Washington pursues policies appropriate to Pyongyang’s cultural code such as visits to Pyongyang by high-ranking officials, Pyongyang responds to Washington’s policy positively and cooperates better with Washington. Pyongyang believes that Washington’s culturally appropriate behaviors means that Washington has a better understanding of Pyongyang and will attempt to win Pyongyang’s favor to improve relations. On the other hand, when Washington seems to ignore cultural factors or pursues policies inconsistent with Pyongyang’s cultural code, such as insulting Pyongyang’s supreme leader, Pyongyang will not cooperate with Washington and instead pursues confrontation. Thus, the second hypothesis is the following:

Hypothesis 2. The more Washington’s policies align with Pyongyang’s cultural code, the better Pyongyang cooperates with Washington.

In sum, this study analyzes how Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington (or improvement of relations) and Washington’s policy alignment with Pyongyang’s cultural code determine Pyongyang’s policy choice of confrontation or engagement (further developing nuclear weapons or disabling its nuclear
weapon facilities).

![Diagram of presumed relationships in this study]

**Figure 3-1. Presumed Relationships in This Study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>&lt;Independent Variables&gt;</strong></th>
<th><strong>&lt;Dependent Variable&gt;</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington</td>
<td>Pyongyang’s policy choice of confrontation or engagement (further developing nuclear weapons or disabling its nuclear weapons facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington’s policy alignment with Pyongyang’s cultural code</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **Methodology**

*Testing the theories and hypotheses with a case study*

To study Pyongyang’s behaviors according to changes in its expectation for normalization of relations with Washington and according to Washington’s attitude, this study employs a qualitative case study methodology. The case method is suitable for this study because the situation of the North Korean nuclear crises is not a common case to be collected for large-N analysis, and inferring motives of the crises is easier with case-study than with large-N study (Van Evera, 1997: 54). In particular, this study uses “within-case” causal inferences: the “type 2 congruence: multiple within-case comparison” method (Van Evera, 1997: 56-67; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 45-46, 85-87, and 225-228; Gerring, 2007: 172-185). To discover a pattern in Pyongyang’s behaviors, the whole period (1991-2011) is divided into 4 periods according to Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington (Table 3-1). The congruence method will be used to compare the analyzed results of each period to draw a conclusion.
Table 3-1. Four Classified Periods for Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Characteristics of Each Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Period</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>Pyongyang’s Transition Period from Kim Il-sung’s death to Kim Jong-il’s completion of succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Period</td>
<td>1999-2008</td>
<td>Re-expectation of Normalization of Relations, Frustration and the Second Nuclear Crisis: Settlement and New Expectation for Normalization of Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Period</td>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>Confrontation and Stalemate Caused by Disappointment and National Ambition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To evaluate Pyongyang’s expectation and perception, this study primarily relies on “discourse analysis” using original source materials reflecting Pyongyang’s and Washington’s perceptions, intentions, or behaviors. Discourse analysis is “the qualitative and interpretive recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena” (Abdelal et al., 2009: 6). In other words, discourse analysis is to interpret the meaning of language used in a political, social, and cultural context. To interpret the context of speech or document, discourse analysis requires a researcher who has deep social knowledge, interpretative skills, and a familiarity with a body of interrelated texts. A researcher interprets the meaning of a certain social phenomenon by conducting interview or by analyzing texts such as policy statements, newspaper articles, or political leaders’ speeches (Abdelal et al., 2006: 702; 2009: 6-7).<sup>8</sup>

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This study will show that how Washington’s policy or remarks turned down Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations and brought about Pyongyang’s confrontation policy.

Content analysis, the quantitative analysis of the speech or documents, might be useful for identifying a certain pattern. However, the quantitative analysis might not appropriate to interpret the meaning of words or behavior, particularly in North Korea’s case where certain words and behaviors are done for other hidden purposes. For example, Pyongyang often uses confrontation to induce Washington’s interest or engagement. After coding North Korea’s verbal criticism and behaviors in the early 1990s, Yongho Kim concluded that North Korea’s behaviors did not correspond with its words very often (Kim, 2011: 110). Here, we need a researcher’s interpretation on this discord. Kim argues that this discord shows that Pyongyang’s real intention of its criticism was to call Washington’s concessions in negotiation (Kim, 2011: 110). This research only uses the content analysis method in limited ways such as to measure the frequency of Kim Jong-il’s official activities.

Thus, in this research, media data, policy reports, and newspaper articles from 1991-2011 are examined for the purpose of discourse analysis. The articles of the North Korean official newspaper Rodong sinmun are important not only in their reports of news but also in their editorials because these represent the views of North Korea’s leadership which controls what the media says. Statements by the DPRK Foreign Ministry represent Pyongyang’s official position on each issue. The Japan-based newspaper Choson sinbo
presents Pyongyang’s opinion from a third-party perspective when Pyongyang does not express its real motivations or intentions openly though its own public statements. These North Korean media sources reflect the government’s views due to government ownership of the media and censorship of publications in North Korea, therefore these resources offer valuable insight into Pyongyang’s perspective. The *Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea* [Korean: Wulgan (Jugan) Bukhan Donghyang] (1991-2011) published by the ROK Ministry of Unification contains useful reports not only on what happens in North Korea but also on the meaning of Pyongyang’s words or behavior. Additionally, CRS reports, hearing documents, State of the Union addresses, and official statements by the U.S. president or the State Department about North Korea are used to examine U.S. attitudes and policy toward Pyongyang. Table 3-2 shows the primary original materials investigated for this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Origin</th>
<th>Name of source</th>
<th>Source Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From North Korean sources</td>
<td><em>Rodong sinmun</em> (<em>The Worker’s Daily</em>)</td>
<td>an official newspaper for the KWP (<a href="http://www.rodong.rep.kp">www.rodong.rep.kp</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Choson sinbo</em></td>
<td>an organ of the pro-North Korean resident’s league in Japan known Choch’’ongryon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)</td>
<td>Internet news homepage (<a href="http://www.kcna.co.jp">www.kcna.co.jp</a>) operated in Japan by pro-North Korean league in Japan known Choch’ongryon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Central Television (KCTV)</td>
<td>The DPRK national broadcast for North Korean people: radio and television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pyongyang Broadcasting Station (PBS)</td>
<td>The DPRK national broadcast for broadcasting propaganda to the South or to the international community: radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td><em>Wolgan (Jugan)</em></td>
<td>An official documentary report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean sources</td>
<td><strong>Bukhan Donghyang</strong> (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea)</td>
<td>published monthly (weekly) by the South Korean Ministry of Unification, offered by Information Center on North Korea in Seoul. The Ministry of Unification of ROK creates the documents weekly and collects them in a monthly version. Most of the documents exist both in weekly and monthly versions, but some are available in only weekly versions and others in only monthly versions. Also, some are accessible online in only the weekly or monthly version (<a href="http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.do">http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.do</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main points from daily North Korean broadcast</td>
<td>Offered by The South Korean Ministry of Unification (<a href="http://www.unikorea.go.kr">www.unikorea.go.kr</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korean newspapers, reports about North Korea, and policy papers</td>
<td>Offered by Information Center on North Korea, Seoul, South Korea (<a href="http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/MA/">http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/MA/</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From The U.S. sources on the U.S. policy toward North Korea</td>
<td>CRS reports for Congress on North Korean nuclear crises</td>
<td>Offered by the Federation of American Scientists (<a href="http://www.fas.org">www.fas.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. government’s official documents on North Korean issues</td>
<td>Offered by the U.S. Department of State (<a href="http://www.state.gov">www.state.gov</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing books and special reports consisted of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to nuclear North Korea</td>
<td>Offered by Nautilus Institute (<a href="http://www.nautilus.org/">http://www.nautilus.org/</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, this study refers to testimonies from interviews during the summer of
2012 with high-ranking North Korean defectors (Kang Chol-hwan: president of the North Korea Strategy Center, imprisoned for 10 years at Yodok Concentration Camp for political prisoners since age 9 and defected to South Korea in 1992; Jang Jin-sung: president of New Focus, the former state poet, who had worked as a high-ranking propaganda official but defected to South Korea in 2004 (interview in December 2012 via emails); Kim Hyun-ho (an assumed name): a researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy (Seoul), a former North Korean student studying at Moscow State University, defected to South Korea from Moscow in 1994; Lee Yun-gul: the president of North Korea Strategic Information Service Center, an advisory committee member of Ministry of Unification, former researcher at Cheong-am-san Institute for Kim Il-sung’s longevity who defected to South Korea in 2001) and from interviews with South Korean experts on North Korea (Cheon Seong-Whun: head of the Korea Institute for National Unification; Lee Mun-hee: director of North Korean Nuclear Affairs Negotiation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROK (in 2012); Moon Chung-in: a professor of Political Science Department at Yonsei University at Seoul, the former advisor of President Kim Dae-jung and Roh, Moo-hyun and an exponent of the Sunshine Policy). This study also refers to the memoir by Hwang Jang-yop, who was a secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party and established Juche ideology (self-reliance) in North Korea but escaped in 1997. Most of these resources were written in Korean, and the interviews were conducted in Korean.  

9 There were three practical difficulties in conducting these interviews. First, there are relatively few North Korean defectors in Seoul who know or understand North Korean politics, even while most defectors can testify to their experience of hunger, human rights violations, or North Korean society. Second, the list of
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ON NORTH KOREAN STUDIES

1. Introduction

As Waltz pointed out and many scholars have affirmed, North Korea began to eagerly pursue its nuclear weapons program because it felt threatened during the unfavorable international environment of the late 1980s (Waltz, 1995: 38). For more than 20 years, Washington and international society attempted to restrict Pyongyang’s ambition for nuclear power, yet North Korea is believed to have developed a small number of nuclear weapons.

There have been conflicting opinions on Pyongyang’s reasons for not giving up its nuclear program. Some analysts assert that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapon program because it is “a rogue state.” Other scholars argue that North Korea cannot give up its nuclear program because it is insecure. According to Glaser, the motives of states can be categorized as either security maximizing or power maximizing (so-called “greedy states”) (Glaser, 2010: 35). Glaser considers a state to be a security seeker if it values security much more than expansion for non-security reasons, and he defines a greedy state as one which has non-security motives for expansion. (Glaser, 2010:

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North Korean defectors is confidential and most defectors living in South Korea do not want to be known as North Koreans for protection from North Korea’s retaliation and from discrimination in South Korean society. Thus, to reach defectors was not easy. Third, except for a few who work in national or private institutions with their names, most information-holders demand considerable compensation because they make their living from these interviews. However, the four defectors I met and conducted interviews with are all working as North Korean experts in South Korean research institutions and three South Koreans are very representative experts: Lee, Mun-hee (a representative of South Korean government; the director of North Korean Nuclear Affairs Negotiation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROK); Cheon, Seong-Whun (a representative of conservative scholars’ view; the head of Korea Institute for National Unification); and Moon, Chung-in (a representative of liberal scholars’ view on North Korean policy; a professor of Yonsei University and the former advisor of President Kim Dae-jung and Roh, Moo-hyun and an exponent of the Sunshine Policy).

10 This book ties into the IR debate over defensive versus offensive Realism
However, states can have both types of motives at the same time. Glenn H. Snyder points out that in the prisoner’s dilemma, players would choose “defection” not only because of the offensive incentive, to increase his gain, but also because of the defensive incentive, the fear of being exploited (Glenn H. Snyder, 1971: 67, 77-82).

Most scholars studying North Korea focus on whether North Korea has been intentionally deceptive in negotiation or not. For more than 20 years, Pyongyang expressed its will to denuclearize, cancelled its efforts to develop a nuclear program, called negotiations, and changed its strategy to confrontation. The matter of concern is whether Pyongyang truly intends to give up its nuclear weapons in its pursuit of negotiations with Washington. Recommended policies toward North Korea differ depending on whether North Korea is viewed as a greedy state or a security seeker. There are still others who try to identify the causes of Pyongyang’s behavior in domestic politics.

2. Hard Line Approaches: North Korea as a Dangerous and Greedy State

1) North Korea’s Ambitious Intention and the Regime’s Evil Character

Scholars and officials in Washington who recommend hard line policies toward North Korea, called “hawks,” view North Korea as a dangerous and greedy state. They have criticized North Korea for not giving up its nuclear weapons while accepting economic compensation for its promise to disable nuclear facilities. They are skeptical of Pyongyang’s conciliatory policies toward Washington. According to classical realism, the nature of the state, selfish and struggling for power, is the root of political conflicts and
this nature cannot be changed (Morgenthau, 1960: ch. 1 and ch. 3). Victor Cha insists that recent conciliatory behavior by Pyongyang reflects not a change in its nature or its intention but a change in its diplomatic tactics to secure economic aid (Cha and Kang, 2003: 14-15). In other words, North Korea is still greedy because it has the ambition to unify South Korea by military action if it gains sufficient power. Many hawk officials in Washington consider Pyongyang’s consistent demand for normalization of relations with Washington as a tactic to buy time for developing nuclear weapons. Some officials in the Bush administration firmly defined North Korea as “a rogue state” and Chairman Kim Jong-il as “a tyrant” and argued that Pyongyang must be forced to give up its nuclear weapons (even give up its regime, if possible). What the Bush administration wished for ultimately was a regime change in Pyongyang (Huntley, 2007: 463).

North Korea is also dangerous because it cannot help being a risk-acceptant state in a fragile situation where “striking first is the best and only policy” (Cha and Kang, 2003: 18). Although Pyongyang pursues nuclear weapons not because it is a rogue state, but as a result of the collapsed offense-defense balance in the East Asia in 1990s, the desire to survive will encourage the Pyongyang regime to continue confrontational policies including the pursuit of nuclear weapons, according to offensive realists’ arguments (Mearsheimer, 2001: 29-54). From this perspective, an “engagement policy” toward Pyongyang could be not only wrong but also dangerous (Cha and Kang, 2003: 15). However, Cha insists that “hawk engagement (conditional engagement)” or “containment-plus-engagement” is the optimal policy even for “hawks” in order to convince Pyongyang that confrontation or “striking first” policies are not the only option
(Cha and Kang, 2003: 17, 70-100; Cha, 2002: 43).

2) **North Korea’s Brinkmanship or Exploitative Negotiation Behavior**

Samuel Kim insisted that Pyongyang learned quickly in 1994 that its nuclear weaponry is “an all-purpose fungible instrument,” whatever its original intention was, and Pyongyang has used its brinkmanship diplomacy to get what it wants (Kim, 1995: 18-25). According to Schelling, brinkmanship is a strategy meant to create the suggestion and risk of war that will be beyond either party’s control, and the user threatens that the crisis will spiral out-of-control unless the opponent accepts certain conditions (Schelling, 1980: 200). Powell argues that the strategy of limited retaliation is more credible and effective than brinkmanship strategy (Powell, 1989). In limited retaliation, a party threatens to inflict a limited amount of punishment, such as a controlled attack on a city. North Korea’s brinksmanship has often been combined with this strategy of limited retaliation. Whenever North Korea meets an unfavorable situation in a meeting, its representatives threaten opponents with these strategies. For example, in a 1994 inter-Korean meeting, North Korean representatives said, “Seoul will become a sea of fire.” The remark was treated as a credible threat because Seoul is located within range of North Korea’s artillery. Thus, hardliners who worry about North Korea’s confrontational behavior criticize engagement policy because there is the risk of blackmail; engagement policies can unintentionally encourage North Korea’s...

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11 During the 1994 Inter-Korean meeting, Park Young-soo, a North Korean representative threatened South Korean representatives with his “Seoul to be a sea of fire” remark when he criticized South Korea’s resumption of the Team Spirit Exercise and its importation of Patriots Missiles.

12 Seoul is located within 50 km of the military demarcation line.
confrontational tactics.

After analyzing several North Korean negotiations, dating from the Armistice Agreement in 1953 to the Agreed Framework of 1994, Chuck Downs summarized North Korean negotiating patterns into three steps: agreement to the principle, reinterpretation of the agreement, and disavowal of the agreement, ultimately blaming the other parties for the breakdown (Downs, 1999: 180-199). According to Carl Ford, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, North Korea seemed to have no intention of giving up its nuclear program when it signed the Agreed Framework of 1994. Ford argues that North Korea signed the Agreed Framework to stall for time, and that the country hoped that it would recover “the competitive edge” (Downs, 1999: 247-249; Ford, 1996: 17-35).

3) Critics

For those who read the UN Human Rights Council’s report of the Commission of Inquiry on the DPRK and are shocked by severe human rights violations in North Korea, it would not be difficult to understand and agree with Nicolas Eberstadt’s insistence that “never again” must anyone help or support the brutal regime in Pyongyang, even humanitarian aid (“Time for the ‘never again’ on North Korea” The Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2014). It is also true that Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un are “tyrants” and that the regime in Pyongyang is brutal not only toward the world but also toward its own people.

However, the views of hard line approaches have several serious problems when
applied to dealings with Pyongyang.

First, as many demonstrated by officers in the Bush administration, seeing Pyongyang as “a rogue state” or “an evil state” prevents the opportunity for “an adequate understanding” and “a possible resolution” in the North Korean issue (Bleiker, 2003: 721). Rhetoric used by some in the Bush administration indicates that U.S. foreign policy remains in a “dualistic and militaristic Cold War thinking pattern” (Bleiker, 2003: 721) and “crime-and-punishment approach” (Sigal, 1999: 21). Categorizing assumptions about North Korea into “bad (an evil, rogue state),” “mad (irrational actor),” “sad (needing help from international society),” and “rational (being threatened by unfavorable international environment; assumption of defensive realism),” Hazel Smith argues that viewing North Korea as a “rational” actor has produced the most credible analyses in North Korean studies (Smith, 2000: 130). Smith argues that the “bad” or “mad” perspectives have produced poor policies; thus, policy-makers should choose “rationality and diplomatic engagement” (Smith, 2000: 132). After studying North Korea’s negotiation patterns, Scott Snyder concludes that North Korea’s negotiation style and objectives have been consistent and predictable, demonstrating “rational” behavior, though Pyongyang usually uses “brinkmanship” strategies while Washington and Seoul have shown “irrationality” in their inconsistent and sporadic attention (Snyder, 1999: 143).

Second, supporters of a hard line policy mistakenly assume that Pyongyang’s character and its policies are unchangeable. The hard line scholars and officials did not believe that Pyongyang could change its behaviors to survive. However, instead of having fixed behaviors and motivation for confrontation or conciliation, Pyongyang’s
foreign policy shifted over more than 20 years of negotiation (Huntley, 2007: 460). In national crisis since the 1990s, Pyongyang could not help changing its strategic goal from aggressive expansion such as unification by force (greedy ambition) to regime survival. As Pyongyang applied for the separate UN membership, Pyongyang had to seek co-existence with Seoul. This fixed image of North Korea limited the range of U.S. policy; even when a window of opportunity opened due to international changes and shifts in Pyongyang’s policy, Washington’s hard line approach could not take advantage of the opportunity. Thus, the fixed image of North Korea as a greedy state restricted U.S. policy.

Third, hard line scholars worry that Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear weapons because Pyongyang had reneged on its agreements with Washington. They worry that North Korea exploits Washington by accepting economic aid while not giving up its nuclear program. In many eyes, it looks like Pyongyang would not give up its nuclear weapons program even after it has received economic aid or recognition from Washington. However, when we look at history carefully, Pyongyang tried to give up its nuclear weapons programs whenever Washington approached Pyongyang with culturally aligned behaviors and showed its will to co-exist. Sigal (1998 and 2002), Cumings (1997 and 2004), and Harrison (1997 and 2005) argue that reciprocity worked in the relations between Pyongyang and Washington and that Pyongyang would give up its nuclear weapons program if Washington were committed to improving relations with Pyongyang (See arguments in detail in the Liberal Approaches section, p. 31). As this research shows in Chapter 5, Pyongyang did freeze its nuclear weapon facilities (1994-2001) and tried to disable them (2007-2009). First, Pyongyang froze its nuclear weapons facilities as agreed
with the Agreed Framework and had suspended construction of two reactors much earlier than the promised timeline in 1994. The frozen nuclear situation continued until Pyongyang announced that it would unfreeze facilities as a response to the Bush administration’s hostile policy in 2001 (See other experts and scholars’ arguments on doubt about Pyongyang’s cheating in p. 125). After visiting North Korea in 2004, Dr. Hecker testified that he could not say that Pyongyang broke the agreement first and that the suspended construction of reactors was left as it was suspended in 1994. Second, Pyongyang tried to give up its nuclear weapon program again in 2007. After several negotiations and agreements during 2007, Pyongyang took the disabling steps 8 from 11 (Table 5-4) and even destroyed its cooling tower earlier than promised to show its will to disable its nuclear weapon program. Thus, when Washington showed its intention to coexist with Pyongyang, Pyongyang halted, froze, and took steps for disabling its nuclear weapon program. Hard line scholars and officials ignore those facts and never acknowledge Pyongyang’s complying behaviors. Thus, the accusation from the hard line approach that Pyongyang has been intentionally deceptive in breaking its agreements is based more on worry than on facts.

Fourth, hard line scholars do not discriminate between Pyongyang’s confrontation against Washington and the one against Seoul. As this study explains in detail in chapter 2, Pyongyang’s strategy and goal for relations with Washington is different from the ones for Seoul. For example, when Pyongyang criticized for the resumption of the Team Spirit Exercise in 1993, most criticism was for Seoul, not for Washington because Pyongyang wanted to improve relations with Washington. Pyongyang often uses confrontation
against Seoul to show off its power both to South Koreans and to its own people. As an ally of Seoul, Washington interprets Pyongyang’s confrontation against Seoul as one against Washington. This might be a loyal behavior to protect its ally, but it hinders the interpretation of Pyongyang’s exact intention toward Washington.

Finally, hard line scholars argue that North Korea is dangerous and uses brinkmanship strategies; so they insist on “hard line policies” ranging from containment (Cha) to active regime change (Eberstadt). Eberstadt argues that Washington should prepare for the reunification with Seoul and that reunification by Seoul will not be as costly as generally assumed (Eberstadt, 1999). He might be right for the ultimate goal but discovering the path to reunification is the problem. Seoul and Washington should have a plan to prepare for reunification but they cannot pursue it actively because it is too risky. Strict containment and economic sanctions to suffocate Pyongyang could end with Pyongyang’s suicide bombing. A desperate embattled mouse could bite a cat even though the mouse will be killed by the cat in the end. According to Pollack, even Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis did not assume the worst regarding Soviet motives and behavior. Instead, Kennedy chose the blockade not to suffocate the Soviets but to give the Soviets the chance to back down without a war (“Kenneth Pollack: Kennedy showed how US can contain Iran threat.” The Newsmax, November 17, 2013). Pointing out that the acute cultural differences between Washington and Tehran might hinder the negotiation between two, Pollack still advises keeping the line of communication open. In other words, not only active regime change but also containment to suffocate Pyongyang might be risky policies. At best, the hard line policies would strengthen hard liners in
Pyongyang, leaving limited policy options for the decision-makers in Pyongyang, who would most likely continue confrontation.

3. Soft Line Approaches: North Korea as a Security Seeker

1) Defensive Realism: North Korea as a Rational Security Seeker

Defensive realists such as David Kang insist that North Korea is very weak and insecure now; that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and missiles for deterrence and defense; and that Pyongyang wishes for Washington’s security guarantee before it abandons nuclear weapons (Cha and Kang, 2003: 43, 46-54). This argument contends that it was Washington that has been hostile against Pyongyang (Cha and Kang, 2003: 56-57). Pyongyang’s motivation for nuclear development is “to salvage its economy and legitimize its government” (Wit, 2001: 82). Wit recommended that the new Bush administration continue the engagement policy from the Clinton administration, even though Pyongyang’s request for normalization could be tactical or North Korea’s domestic politics might hinder Pyongyang’s engagement efforts (Wit, 2001: 82-85). But it is clear that the Bush administration did not follow his recommendation.

2) Liberal Approaches: Emphasizing Pyongyang’s Changed Attitude

According to neoliberals, economic interdependence will lead states to define their interests in economic growth, not in military development. Democratic peace theorists would say that domestic political changes in North Korea will bring the solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. Institutionalists would say that admitting North
Korea to international organizations will lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon program in the end because by continuing “games,” institutions provide information and a framework that shapes expectations and reduces the cost from the other’s defection (Keohane, 1984). Certainly, if Pyongyang’s leadership embraced some principles of democracy or established institutions between Washington and Pyongyang, this could bring a positive change in the relations between two. In the current situation, the possibility that liberal ideas could work effectively seems to be low since domestic change in North Korea seems unlikely to happen soon and because institution-building in relations between Washington and Pyongyang has not previously been successful.

However, some scholars argue that Pyongyang changed at least its attitude toward Washington in the early 1990s (Sigal, 1998 and 2002; Cumings, 1997 and 2004; Harrison, 1997 and 2005). Leon Sigal argues that reciprocity has worked because Pyongyang was willing to freeze its nuclear weapons facilities when Washington removed economic sanctions while Pyongyang retaliated with resuming the operation of nuclear weapons facilities when Washington did not respond to Pyongyang’s proposals or used coercion against Pyongyang (Sigal, 1998). Even the IAEA did not enhance Pyongyang’s cooperation but hindered reciprocity, focusing on accusing North Korea of its past nuclear activities rather than preventing North Korea’s future nuclear activities (Sigal, 1998: 251). Bruce Cumings insists that Pyongyang has used its nuclear programs to improve relations with Washington by inducing Washington to negotiation table (Cumings, 2004). According to Harrison, contrary to the charge of the Bush administration, Pyongyang had kept its promise of freezing Yongbyon facilities until the
early 2000s (Harrison, 2005: 107). Harrison even argues that Pyongyang would be willing to give up its nuclear weapon program if Washington responded its demand for improving relations with Washington and assured security for the regime in Pyongyang (Harrison, 1997 and 2005).

Meanwhile, after analyzing how Kissinger and Zhou Enlai established relations through the cold war détente and how differently Washington and Pyongyang conducted negotiations during the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, Walter Clemens Jr. suggests that smart power based on “ideas” and “free will” can overcome material forces and unpredictable fortuna, even though material forces and fortuna set the situation and timing (Clemens, 2010: 161-174). Clemens recommends that the new Obama administration agree to talk with “the bad guys,” like previous administrations, and to broaden negotiation with North Korea beyond the current arms control negotiation (Clemens, 2010: 175-208).

3) Soft Line Policy Recommendations

Criticizing the Bush administration for depending on “worst-case scenarios” and for making the severe charge that North Korea was secretly making nuclear weapons, Selig S. Harrison concludes that “only after a relaxation of tensions with Pyongyang,” could gradual negotiations work (Harrison, 2005: 110). Opposing the hardliner’s obsolete Cold War assumptions which ignored the changed international situation facing Pyongyang, Harrison recommends that Washington pursue active soft line policies toward Pyongyang, such as the removal of economic sanctions and normalization of
relations with Washington (Harrison, 1997). According to Harrison, Washington’s economic incentive offer strengthened the pragmatists in Pyongyang and induced Pyongyang’s cooperation for the freeze of its nuclear weapons program, while Washington’s economic sanctions on Pyongyang enhanced the power of hardliners in Pyongyang who opposed the nuclear freeze (Harrison, 1997: 62). According to Leon Sigal, unlike Iraq, North Korea wanted to improve relations with Washington while the Bush administration had no interest in negotiation (Sigal, 2002: 8). Insisting that the Bush administration’s “crime-and-punishment” approach has never worked before, Sigal recommends “diplomatic give-and-take” style (Sigal, 2002: 12).

Soft-liners recommend “engagement policies” or at least some kind of negotiation because deterrence has been effective in the Korean peninsula and because Pyongyang kept its promise under the Agreed Framework (Cha and Kang, 2003: 102-116).

4) Critics

The soft line approaches to North Korea focus not on North Korea’s supposed evil intention but on the vulnerable and insecure environment in which North Korea’s struggle for its survival has led to its confrontational policy including the development of nuclear weapons. This approach recommends an “engagement” policy for Washington to mitigate North Korea’s vulnerable situation and induce North Korea to exchange its nuclear weaponry for economic or political benefits. However, this approach does not take into account why Pyongyang changed its strategy and policy after the end of the Cold War. Supporters of this approach insist that Washington’s containment policy did not work
effectively while engagement would work because Pyongyang has no choice but to respond positively to Washington’s engagement efforts in its desperate situation. This approach also ignores the significance of normalization of relations which North Korea has demanded for a long time. Pyongyang does not want equal exchanges or short-term business. Thus, misunderstanding the meaning of Pyongyang’s demands could lead policy-makers in a completely wrong direction, such as short-term economic aid.

4. Focusing on North Korea’s Domestic Politics

1) Attempts to Study North Korea’s Domestic Politics

Arguing that North Korea’s security dilemma and succession issues (two intervening variables) led to Pyongyang’s provocative behaviors, Yongho Kim emphasizes the importance of domestic issues in North Korean studies. Heavy dependence on international factors while ignoring domestic factors would lead analysts to biased conclusions (Kim, 2011: 24). There have been important attempts to study North Korea’s domestic factors despite the lack of accessible information.

To assess North Korea’s real intention and motivation, Scott Snyder attempts to analyze North Korea’s domestic situation based on Etel Solingen’s theoretical framework of internal coalition struggles within North Korea between “internationalist” and “state-nationalist” views on external globalization pressures (Snyder, 2008: 3-8). He concludes that challenges from globalization weakened North Korea’s controlling power over its economic and social sectors, rather than supposing that these globalization challenges sparked an intensified factions struggle in North Korea between “internationalists” and
“state-nationalists” (Snyder, 2008: 19). According to Snyder, “State-nationalists” continue to dominate most powers but their control has become relatively weak, particularly in provinces.

After analyzing changes in North Korea’s political and economic structure, Haggard and Nolan state that economic sanctions were ineffective in North Korea, despite their effect on North Korea’s deteriorated economy. The Bush administration’s sanctions and pressure could not deter Pyongyang’s aggressive behavior, and often served to undermine negotiations (Haggard and Nolan, 2011: 63-64).

2) Limit of Domestic Studies

No government is monolithic. Every government has struggles between factions for negotiation which influences decision-making. Even “a hermit kingdom” of North Korea\(^{13}\) might have domestic complexities, though they are not known to outsiders (or even citizens, except for small elite groups). With the spread of new technology and devices such as cell phones and radios, combined with testimonies from North Korean defectors, information on North Korea’s domestic situation has become more available than it had been in the past. However, the scarcity of information from within North Korea, particularly information on the workings of the North Korean government, has frustrated analysts studying North Korea’s domestic factors (Snyder, 2008; Noland, 1997; Haggard and Nolan, 2011; Kim, 2011: 23). The concealment of political competition within the North Korean government, along with secrecy surrounding economic and

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\(^{13}\) Western powers called “Chosun” as “Hermit Kingdom” when Chosun did not open its door to outsiders except China during 1637-1876.
social data in North Korea, makes it difficult to estimate internal conditions (Nolan, 1997: 107). One factor relieving analysts somewhat is that Chairman Kim Jong-il seemed to seize absolute power within the DPRK government without any serious internal competition between factionists (Snyder, 2008: 18). Even economic depression did not lead to uncertainty in Kim Jong-il’s leadership (Noland, 1997: 106). Thus, this estimation of North Korea’s internal situation leads analysts to focus mostly on international factors, considering Pyongyang as a unitary actor. The inaccessibility of relevant domestic factors is a limiting factor in North Korean studies.

5. Considering Cultural Factors and Significance of Normalization of Relations

1) Considering Cultural Factors

Both hard line approaches and soft line approaches focus on material factors: hard liners emphasize “economic sanctions” while soft liners emphasize “economic incentives.” However, states are moved not only by material interests but also by non-material factors such as values and ideas. From a constructivist’s view, Alexander Wendt asserts that ideas, not material forces, determine the meaning and context of power (Wendt, 1999: 309).

According to Raymond Cohen, culture is a quality of society and each individual acquires a unique cultural perspective from their society (Cohen, 2004: 11). Cultural factors may hinder negotiations, relations, or cooperation (Cohen, 2004: 8). Cultural factors may not directly cause an event, but give meaning and context to certain behaviors because culture forms meaning, structures our ideas, and shapes our actions.

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14 Many studies on cultural perspective are introduced in Appendix: Literature on Culture and Politics.
(Cohen, 2004: 13 and 219). Without an understanding of cultural meaning in a certain society, our interpretation of certain behaviors would remain at a superficial level. For example, the Korean song “Gangnam Style” by the South Korean rap artist Psy was popular not only with Koreans but also with international music fans, who just enjoyed the funny sounds and the rhythm of the song or the funny horse dance without understanding the meaning of the song, unless they knew the cultural meaning of “Gangnam.” Particularly in “value-laden” issues, cross-cultural dissonance greatly influences several kinds of discord in negotiation (Cohen, 2004: 4). Cohen identifies two distinctive cultures in negotiation: low-context culture and high-context culture. According to his explanation, low-context culture is individual, result-oriented, and egalitarian, while high-context culture is collective, relationship-oriented, and hierarchical (Cohen, 2004: 28-38). In this sense, Cumings’s argument that we have to understand and to appreciate Korea from a Korean perspective is appropriate (Cumings, 1997). In his book, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, Cumings attempts to draw out the meaning of modern history and its influence on the two Koreas, not in the eyes of outsiders, but in the eyes of Koreans (Cumings, 1997).

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15 “Gangnam” is the district in the South of Han River and also an administrative borough. To residents of Seoul, “Gangnam” refers to a new rich class that emerged suddenly in this area with rapid industrialization and urban development in the 1980s. This new rich class does not much care about traditional values and is full of confidence that it is the new center of economy and development while “Gangbuk (the district of North of Han River)” has its traditions, long history, and dignity as the center of the capital since the Chosun Dynasty, but its less developed and relatively poor. (However, the richest town in Seoul is still located in Gangbuk and the wealthiest men such as the owners of Samsung and Hyundai live in Gangbuk. Likewise, not all towns in Gangnam are rich.) Gangnam is representative of the young, rich, radical, fashionable, cool, and consumption-oriented while Gangbuk is representative of old, poor, conservative, pleasantly simple, serious, and consumption-avoiding. Thus, a man with “Gangnam style” is young, rich, quick to open his wallet, cool, passionate, and fashionable: a cool guy. The song “Gangnam-style” shows the tendency to admire this type of life frankly and confidently which is against traditional values. Most international fans are unaware of this cultural context.
Scott Snyder’s *Negotiating on the Edge* is an excellent study on North Korea’s negotiation behaviors based on historical and cultural contexts. Studying North Korea’s negotiation style, Snyder points out that neo-Confucian philosophy emphasizing loyalty and filial piety (hierarchical), and the philosophy of *juche* (self-reliance; independence and freedom of action) in opposition to *sadaejuui* (serving the great) influence North Korea’s negotiation style which demonstrates toughness (Snyder, 1999: 31-37, 54-55). This toughness often leads other parties to assume that North Korea is “very greedy” or “provocative and truculent” (Snyder, 1999: 55). Therefore, stalemate in negotiation is likely unless one can understand the real intention or meaning of the other’s behavior. Considering cultural factors provides an amplified understanding on the meaning of the other’s behaviors.

2) *Significance of Normalization of Relations*

The significance of normalization of relations with Washington has been underestimated for a long time, despite the fact that Pyongyang has expressed its wish for normalization of relations with Washington continuously since the 1990s. Washington knew Pyongyang’s wish but could not grasp the significance; Washington has focused more on rewards and sanctions. Washington, as a low-context culture, could not even consider establishing good relations with Pyongyang without first having several successful business interactions with Pyongyang. Washington believes that it can induce certain behaviors from Pyongyang by tightening or loosening the economic leash according to the situation. This strategy has been largely ineffective because it misses the
core issue. What Pyongyang wished for was not short-term economic aid, though Pyongyang does have need for it, and economic sanctions only made Pyongyang’s will to develop nuclear weapons stronger. Above all, Pyongyang has sought Washington’s long-term pledge of normalization of relations with Pyongyang and looked for indications of Washington’s sincere will to improve relations with Pyongyang.

Why is normalization of relations with Washington so important for Pyongyang? Cultural perspective can provide answers to this value-laden question. Basically, pursuing normalization of relations with Washington fits with the traditions of high context cultures like North Korea because relationship must precede business decisions in a high context culture (Cohen, 2004: 36-38).

Also, normalization of relations with Washington would bring benefits for Pyongyang in the high context cultural background. First, good relations with Washington would mean that Pyongyang no longer faces a security threat from Washington because once relations are established, it would be hard to break up the relationship from a high context culture perspective. Korean culture values faith in relations with friends,16 and breaking trust for one’s own interest would be considered inappropriate. Such actions would be shameful in a high context culture, while in a low context culture, there is no lifelong enemy or lifelong friend and countries will break up old alliances or form new alliances as needed. It is like the blood brotherhood between Pyongyang and Beijing. For Beijing to break their long relationship for economic interest would not only create refugees or security problems, but also would mean a departure

16 “Faith, should reign over the relation between friends,” from three fundamental principles and the five moral disciplines of Confucianism.
from culturally appropriate behaviors. Thus, Pyongyang trusts that Washington would not attack Pyongyang if they establish normalization of relations. Second, normalization of relations with Washington would enhance national dignity and the glory of North Korea by recognizing North Korea’s legitimacy and normality. In a hierarchical society like Pyongyang, recognition by elders or higher authority (in this case, a superpower nation) lends credibility; acknowledgement by elders has the power to settle controversy. If recognized as a legitimate and normal country, Pyongyang could not only assure North Korean people domestically but also have confidence in relations with other countries, like when the Chosun dynasty sought approval for a new successor from China as a big brother. It is worth noting that these are the same effects that Pyongyang expects from its nuclear program.

This study on relations between Pyongyang and Washington is highly based on cultural perspective and understanding. This study analyzes the significance of normalization of relations with Washington for Pyongyang as compared to the importance of nuclear weapons because Pyongyang has insisted that it would give up its nuclear weapons if it reaches normalization of relations with Washington. This study also analyzes what policy Pyongyang chooses according to its expectation for normalization of relations with Washington.

17 It was common under the tributary system in East Asia, but it is hard to see the relationship between Chosun and China as a tributary relationship because Chosun considered China to be significant in the Confucian world, rather than in military terms.
IV. DPRK NATIONAL CRISIS AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON

1. Failed Relations and National Crisis in 1990s

Although the economy of North Korea was on a steady decline because of deep contradictions in the planned economy since the 1970s,\(^{18}\) the economy of North Korea was considerably shaken by the collapse of old relations after 1991. Starting in the early 1990s, North Korea’s traditional allies, China and Russia (the successor to the Soviet Union), began to pursue new relations with North Korea based on practical interest over communist fidelity. North Korea’s economy had been supported by the Soviet Union in many sectors while Pyongyang had promulgated its Juche ideology (self-reliance) since the Sino-Soviet disputes in the 1950-60s. North Korea had imported 50-60% of indispensable raw material for industry from the Soviet Union until the 1980s\(^{19}\) and the Soviet Union had supported the construction of North Korea’s essential industries such as the Kimchaek Iron and Steel Complex, the Seung-Ri Chemical Complex, and the Bukchang thermoelectric power plant, as well as providing machine equipment, parts, raw materials, and fuel for the industries (Park 2004: 112). However, in April 1991, the Soviet Union not only abolished “friendship prices”\(^{20}\) but also demanded that North

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\(^{19}\) North Korea is rich in raw materials relative to South Korea (most raw materials are unequally distributed to North Korea; particularly more than 90% of iron ore, coal, and zinc and 100% of magnesite are abundant in North Korea. For a table comparing SK-NK main raw materials, see *Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, no. 500, August 21, 2000) but North Korea still needed to import 30-40% of required raw materials for industry from outside.

\(^{20}\) The U.S. provided raw materials to communist countries for much cheaper prices than
Korea pay with hard currency.\textsuperscript{21} North Korea, being short of hard currency, could not import any raw material from Russia (Park 2004:113). Thus, trade between North Korea and Russia, after Russia’s demand for hard currency payments, decreased 82 percent compared with the previous year. See the following Table 4-1 for North Korean trade with Russia (formerly the U.S.S.R).

Table 4-1. North Korean Trade with Russia (formerly the U.S.S.R.) from 1990-1999 (Million dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>48</td>
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North Korea’s Free Fishing Quota in the DPRK-Russia economic zone was greatly decreased largely according to the decisions of the DPRK-Russia Fisheries Committee (Table 4-2).


\textsuperscript{22} I reference \textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea} here. The Ministry of Unification of ROK created the documents weekly and collected them in a monthly version. Most of the documents exist both in weekly and monthly versions, but some are only weekly versions, and others are only monthly versions. Also, some are accessible online in only the weekly or monthly version. That is why I used both (Monthly (Weekly)) together as a source. Page numbers are not available here because they are different depending on the monthly version or weekly version and on a hard copy versus the online version. However, we can find the contents easily with dates (month and year).
Beijing followed Moscow’s example. In 1992, Beijing also abolished “friendship prices” and demanded that Pyongyang pay with hard currency. These events led to North Korea’s economic isolation for at least the next 10 years, and the North Korean economy reported negative growth rates for 9 years until 1998, the first time that the economy grew since the establishment of North Korean government. Added to all this, the severe impact of the great flood in 1995-1996 contributed to the North Korean economic crisis and led many scholars and observers to predict the collapse of the regime. Pyongyang began to seek interchanges with diverse countries in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. For example, Yeon Hyung-muk, the prime minister of North Korea, made unprecedented visits to three resource-rich Southeast Asian countries (Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia). According to Hwang Jang-yop, who was a secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party and had established Juche ideology (Self-reliance) in North Korea but escaped from North Korea in 1997, around one-half million people died due to starvation in 1995, and one million died from starvation in 1996. Hwang, Jang-yop, *Hwang Jang-yop’s Memoirs: I witnessed the truth of history*, 3rd ed. Zeitgeist: Seoul (2010): 331.

Many North Korean defectors in 1990s testified that they left North Korea to prepare for unification of the two Koreas with the conviction that North Korea would collapse within 5 years. In my interview with Kim Hyun-ho (August 2012), he said that he escaped from Moscow to Seoul in 1994 because he was certain that North Korea would collapse in 5-10 years. Hwang Jang-yop also had confidence of the regime collapse within 5 years when he decided to escape from North Korea in 1997. See Hwang, Jang-yop, *Hwang Jang-yop’s Memoirs: I witnessed the truth of history*, 3rd ed. Zeitgeist: Seoul (2010): 360.

DPRK economic delegation visited Germany in January 1991; Yeon Hyung-muk, the prime minister of North Korea, visited Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia from January 29, 1991 to February 7, 1991; Iran military delegation visited North Korea on January 11, 1993; Hwang, Jang-yop, then Secretary of the party (KWP (KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY)), visited Vietnam and Laos on March 7-17, 1994; DPRK economic delegation visited Pakistan on March 22, 1994 and so on.

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Table 4-2. The Decrease of North Korea’s Fishing Quota in the DPRK-Russia (the U.S.S.R) Economic Zone by Year (thousand tons)

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<tr>
<td>Fishing Quota</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30 each year</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22.5</td>
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Indonesia, and Malaysia) to make a breakthrough in the economic crisis since 1990, but
the success of his efforts was limited because Pyongyang had previously focused on
relations with African countries rather than with Asian countries (Hwang, 2010: 305). In
fact, there was no practical or serious cooperation with other countries except anti-
terrorism cooperation (Interview with Jang Jin-sung, December 2012). Pyongyang also
pursued normalization of relations with Japan for economic benefits but failed to achieve
its goals.26

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Source: Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=2236, accessed on August 28, 2013)

However, a bigger shock came from the political (and military) sector. Moscow
established relations with Seoul on September 30, 1991 and one year later, Beijing also
established relations with Seoul on August 24, 1992. In fact, the overture of
normalization of relations with Seoul began with the participation of the U.S.S.R and
China in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.27 When the Soviet military delegation visited

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26 In the first talk for normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan on January 30, 1991,
Pyongyang clarified that it pursued the normalization of relations with Japan for the economic benefits by
emphasizing “the compensation issues.” See ROK Ministry of Unification, Monthly (Weekly) Report on
North Korea (January 1991).
27 According to Hwang Jang-yop, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il showed their obvious displeasure on
Beijing’s participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Game. Also, North Korea was shocked by the collapse of
the Soviet Union and by the unification of Germany. See Hwang, Jang-yop, Hwang Jang-yop’s Memoirs: I
North Korea in January 1991, there had been already inner discord between the two countries even though publicly they claimed to reaffirm consolidation of their bond (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 1991). The Soviet delegation did not meet with Kim Il-sung and there was no formal meeting between military representatives. “A blood alliance” with the DPRK could not dissuade Beijing either from forming diplomatic relations with Seoul. In January 1991, Kim Yong-sun, the head of the International department of KWP (Korean Workers’ Party), visited China to ask Beijing to refrain from normalization of its relationship with Seoul, and in October 1991, Kim Il-sung himself visited Beijing for 10 days, which was a rare event. However, his visit seemed to be ineffective, despite his apparent red-carpet reception, because Beijing asserted “independent foreign policy” and “the principle of non-intervention” in regard to its establishment of relations with Seoul (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January and October 1991). The level to which Pyongyang felt betrayed by two old allies’ new relations with Seoul is apparent in many media documents from that time (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, 1991-1992). Some advisers to Chairman Kim Jong-il even proposed establishing relations with Taipei to check Beijing (Hwang 2010: 304). This sense of betrayal required at least five years for the relations with China (1992-1996) and ten years for the relations with Russia (1991-2000) to be repaired. Although visits and exchanges between the two top leaders helped to restore relations in the 2000s, the relations between the DPRK and Russia were never the same as before. The relations with Beijing did not deteriorate externally as much as the one with Moscow, thanks to Beijing’s aid to North Korea during the 1990s. However, China was a practical and
threatening neighbor, while Russia was a mere symbolic ally even after the restoration of their relationship in 2000s. According to Jang Jin-sung and Hwang Jang-yop, Chairman Kim Jong-il’s most distrusted country was China for compelling Pyongyang to follow its reform and opening.  

Due to its failed relations with the old communist regimes of Moscow and Beijing, Pyongyang was confronted with a politically serious situation. Pyongyang’s ultimate goal to be recognized as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula seemed unlikely. Since the division of the peninsula after World War II, Pyongyang, supported by Moscow, and Seoul, supported by Washington, had competed for sole legitimacy as the government of the entire Korean peninsula. After its participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Moscow’s establishment of relations with Seoul (and Beijing’s) showed that Moscow (and Beijing) would not support Pyongyang’s dominant position on the peninsula. That was why Pyongyang agreed to enter the UN separately from Seoul in 1991, an action which Pyongyang had resisted for some time, saying that having individual memberships would make the division of the peninsula a permanent one. When it became clear that Seoul would be admitted to the UN on its own, Pyongyang could not help deciding to apply for a separate membership in the UN. In the domestic sector, the economic gap between the South and the North has only increased. Far from saving its brothers in the South from the oppression of the U.S., the North has had to struggle against being absorbed into the South. See Table 4-4.

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28 Interview with Jang Jin-sung in December 2012(a North Korean defector who had worked as a high-ranking propaganda official); Hwang, 2010: 340.
Table 4-4. The South-North Comparison of Changing Nominal GNP (Billion dollars)

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>274.9</td>
<td>417.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>The South</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>251.8</td>
<td>402.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The North</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
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Pyongyang had to postpone its plan to unify Korea under its regime and so changed its direction to strategic coexistence in order to maintain control of the North. Kim Il-sung’s New Year Address in 1992 showed that Pyongyang refrained from its usual criticism of Seoul and lightened propaganda against Seoul (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, January 1992). Pyongyang seemed to change its strategic goal from unification of the Korean peninsula to co-existence with South Korea for a time.

The declining relations with Russia and China also created a serious security vacuum in North Korea. North Korea had lost its military supporters suddenly while South Korea maintained a strong alliance with its primary supporter, the U.S. Followed by the new economic treaty in April 1991, Moscow demanded the revision of the Soviet-DPRK treaty of 1961 in January 1992. Moscow wanted to abolish Article 1, which stipulated the Soviet Union’s automatic involvement in the case of a war on the Korean peninsula. This meant that Moscow would not support Pyongyang unconditionally in

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29 Igor Logachev, a special envoy of Russian Federation to North Korea, who visited North Korea on January 17-21, 1992, told Gong Ro-myung, the ROK ambassador to Russian Federation, on January 27, 1992 that the RF would inherit the Soviet-DPRK treaty of 1961 but adjusted the treaty by abolishing Russia’s automatic involvement of war in the Korean peninsula. See ROK Ministry of Unification, *Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, (January 1992). Kim Young-sam, the ROK president made a strong request to Yeltsin, the RF president in 1994 when he visited Russia. In 1995, Russia notified North Korea that Russia would not extend the same treaty and the Soviet-DPRK treaty of 1961 expired on September 10,
the event of a war, but would act depending on the cost and benefits. Moscow would be free to support Seoul instead of Pyongyang without any binding duty. The long-standing offense-defense balance in the Korean peninsula had collapsed. The fate of Pyongyang seemed desperately uncertain. Facing national crisis, Pyongyang has pursued two significant policies: spurring the development of nuclear weapons, and diversifying its foreign relations to offset those negative effects to its national system.

2. Nuclear Weapons for Security

Kim Il-sung seemed to have a desire for nuclear weapons since he had been forced to sign the Armistice Agreement under threat of US nuclear weapons in 1953. Despite limited and reluctant assistance from outside (mostly from the Soviet Union), North Korea had begun to operate its first 5 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon in 1986 with almost complete self-sufficiency, and North Korea’s explosive tests for developing nuclear weapons at its reprocessing facility at Yongbyon were detected both by US and Soviet intelligence groups in the early 1990s.\(^{30}\)

Scott Sagan proposed three models to explain why states build nuclear weapons: the security model, the domestic model, and the norms model (Sagan, 1996/1997: 55). This study does not discuss the domestic model on the interaction between individual

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1996. Even though the deteriorated relationship between two had improved in the late 1990s, the new treaty between Russia and the DPRK in 2000 clarifies that the relationship between two was no longer a military alliance but a general cooperative relationship because the Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Cooperation, replaced the old automatic military involvement to mutual consultation in crisis. See ROK Ministry of Unification, *Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, no. 474 (February 2000).

\(^{30}\) To analyze the process of North Korea’s development nuclear weapon is not the purpose of this dissertation. Instead, this dissertation focuses on the meaning of nuclear weapons to Pyongyang. For details of observations on how North Korea had developed nuclear weapons, see Clemens, *Getting to Yes in Korea*, 2010: 83-87.
actors for parochial bureaucratic or political interests here, partly because of the scarcity of internal data on those aspects of North Korean politics, and partly because the structure of the North Korean political system concentrates most power on its supreme leader. Some analysts suspect the influence of military, but it is hard to trace. This study discusses only the security model, focused on Pyongyang’s threat perception, and the norms model.

Sagan proposes that the most common and simplest reason for developing nuclear weapons is in response to external security threats (Sagan, 1996/1997: 57-61). According to Cohen, a state’s level of threat perception can be assessed by four separate indicators: decision-makers’ expression or reaction to the threat; observation by contemporary spectators; evidence of the leader’s efforts to find alternatives options; and the leader’s response to overcome the threat in action. And the convergence of these four indicators surely provides the evidence of a state’s threat perception (Cohen, 1978: 95). North Korea in early 1990s demonstrated each of these indicators of threat perception. In the early 1990s, Pyongyang seemed to be suffering from fears of external threats such as the possibility of absorbing unification. Without its old allies’ support, Pyongyang felt increasing pressure from Seoul and its ally, the U.S. The U.S. had displayed nuclear weapons in South Korea and Seoul had wished to develop its own nuclear weapons. In his 1991 New Year Address, Kim Il-sung stated that military issues between the North and the South (adoption of non-aggression announcement, suspending of the U.S.-ROK

31 Pyongyang criticized the South’s unification policy for absorbing unification policy in its mention of the collapse of East-European states and West Germany’s absorbing East Germany. (Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, “The Absorbing Unification Policy cannot help failing,” April 11-12, 1991).
team spirit exercise, signing peace treaty between Pyongyang and Washington, and withdrawal of the U.S. army in the South with its nuclear weapons) should be solved preferentially. He also stated his opposition to absorbing unification under a single system (from comparison of 1991 and 1992 New Year Address, *Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, January 1992). Following the end of the Cold War, the Gulf war in 1992 was also a big shock to Pyongyang (Kim, 2011: 106). NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Iraq war in 2003 produced a similar reaction in Pyongyang (Interview with Jang Jin-sung, December 2012). Pyongyang observed that the U.S.-led world punished altogether a U.S.-targeted country. In his 1993 New Year Address, Kim Il-sung expressed the pressures and threats Pyongyang had dealt with in 1992 by presenting the international situation of North Korea as following:

“Imperialists (the U.S.) and reactionaries (South Korea) conspired to isolate and suffocate North Korea, the last bastion of socialism, for liquidation of socialists’ achievement….It is retrogressive in this new era (for the U.S.) to repeat the policies of the Cold War which is to threaten with military force and to apply economic pressure.”

- From “estimation of 1992” in Kim Il-sung’s New Year Address in 1993

*Rodong Sinmun*, the North Korean state newspaper, shows Pyongyang’s anxiousness about potential regime collapse due to outside threats in its editorial:

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32 In the 1950s-1970s, Kim Il-sung had pursued the absorbing unification by the North.
33 *Rodong Sinmun* (January 1, 1993).
“In these days, imperialists and reactionaries are focusing on policies in politics, economy, military, and culture to eliminate our republic as the bastion of socialism completely from the earth.”

- Rodong Sinmun, “We will win” (January 18, 1993)

Kim Il-sung also expressed his threat perception in his official letter to Sarochung (North Korean Democratic Youth League) on February 22, 1993, by mentioning that the crisis North Korea faced at that time was so serious and so harsh that it was singular in history (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, February 1993). In the crisis of North Korea’s security vacuum of 1990s, Kim Il-sung visited China for 10 days and Pyongyang reduced criticism of the U.S. with the hope of improvement of relations, but Pyongyang could neither restore old allies nor achieve new ones. According to the Military Balance, North Korea increased its national defense expenditure to 5.2 billion dollars in 1990 and to 5.4 billion dollars in 1991 while it experienced negative economic growth as low as -3% in 1990 and -5% in 1991 (IISS, The Military Balance 1992-1993). In 1992, North Korea deployed 1,200 more self-propelled guns than in 1991 and increased air force by more than 22,000 with the reformation of 10 artillery brigades.34 While trying to increase its defense ability to mitigate the deteriorated security situation, Pyongyang indicated its intention to sign the Full Scope Safe Guards Agreement on June

34 In the same period, South Korea decreased land power by 117,000 soldiers, along with a decrease of 6 months in the service term, while increasing its forces by 600 armored cars, 250 SAMs, 100 air defense artilleries. (IISS, The Military Balance, 1992-1993).
1991 and proposed the Joint declaration of Korean peninsula denuclearization to Seoul through its Foreign Ministry Statement on July 30, 1991. Pyongyang’s real intent with the Joint declaration of Korean peninsula denuclearization was to remove U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, not to suspend its own development. Meanwhile, many observers predicted the coming collapse of North Korea and policy makers discussed a potential “soft-landing” for North Korea in the 1990s. Observers testified that the two Iraq wars in 1991 and in 2003 brought about acute threat perception in Pyongyang. The national crisis North Korea had faced in the early 1990s was mostly caused by external factors (the uneven offense-defense balance in the Korean peninsula and the security vacuum caused by it) while the national crisis in the middle of 1990s was mostly caused by domestic factors (political transition, floods, and economic difficulty). In the early 1990s (and later, early 2000s) Pyongyang’s threat perception was linked to the security vacuum created by the collapse of the communist bloc. In the 2000s, the early 1990s’s fear was reinforced by the Bush administration’s open hostility. Though Pyongyang announced “denuclearization” abroad, its desire to develop its own nuclear weapons was never abandoned. Without any trustful ally, Pyongyang had to pursue “self-reliance” during its sudden isolation in 1990s and 2000s.

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35 Pyongyang had refused to sign the Agreement though it joined the Nonproliferation Treaty in December 1985. Every state is supposed to sign the Full Scope Safe Guards Agreement within 18 months after joining NPT.
36 The Foreign Ministry Statement is the highest official document to express national position on a certain issue to foreign states. As a result, the two Koreas announced the Joint declaration of Korean peninsula denuclearization on February 19, 1992.
37 According to some North Korean defectors, Pyongyang was afraid of US nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. Interview with Lee Yun-gul (August 2012).
38 Interview with Jang Jin-sung (December 2012) and with Lee Yun-gul (August 2012).
39 According to Young-ho Kim, the defeat of Iraq in 1992 strengthened Pyongyang’s desire for developing nuclear weapons as the last card in the decades-long confrontation against the U.S. (Kim, 2011: 107).
3. Nuclear Weapons for National Glory

In addition to the security model, Sagan emphasizes the norms model in which countries develop nuclear weapons as symbols of state glory. According to Cohen, “what national dignity is to a nation that has suffered occupation or loss of national territory, human rights are to the U.S.” (Cohen, 2004: 60). Korea had suffered under Japanese brutal rule for 36 years in the early 20th century when the Japanese had attempted to eliminate “the Korean identity.” Just as France’s development of nuclear weapons served to return France to its historical power status and national glory, North Korea needed to develop nuclear weapons to raise its descending status and to enhance national glory (Kim, 2007: 186). By joining the prestigious “nuclear club” in which only a few states enjoy membership, Pyongyang would transform its image to a modern state with the status of military power. For Pyongyang, this enhanced status and image was more important for domestic politics than for international politics.

The collapse of the socialist bloc and the crumbling economy hurt North Korea’s national pride. On April 20, 1992, Pyongyang mobilized the socialist party representatives of 70 countries (most of them are just nominal in their countries) who participated in Kim Il-sung’s 80th birthday party event on April 15 and announced “Pyongyang Declaration” in support of socialism. The declaration claimed that some collapses of socialist countries were caused by their own misapplication of socialism to their particular domestic situation. Through this “Pyongyang Declaration,” Pyongyang misled the North Korean people to believe that there still exist many socialist countries in

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the world through the impression given by the attendance at Kim Il-sung’s birthday party and that Kim Il-sung is the leader of socialism. It shows ironically that Pyongyang was agonizing over its survival with the collapse of the socialism bloc (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, April 1992). Constitutional reform on April 9, 1992 also shows Pyongyang’s struggle for control of its people in the collapse of outside socialist countries. In the new constitution, Pyongyang deleted “the creative application of Marxism and Leninism” and “proletariats’ international principles” and emphasized “our way of socialism” by clarifying “Juche ideology” as the only ideology (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, April 1992).

Pyongyang struggled for its survival and sought to prevent regime collapse by strengthening ideology education and propaganda. Instead of letting its people see the real situation, Pyongyang strengthened its inner control. In the main editorial of Rodong Sinmun on January 18, 1993, “We will win”, they argued that “our way of socialism” would win even if the whole universe changes and they encouraged people’s confidence in their regime. This title reflected Pyongyang’s concern about the obvious fact that it was less powerful than Seoul and Pyongyang’s wish to “win” in the regime competition with Seoul. Pyongyang had denied its regime crisis to its own people while reacting strongly to international criticisms related to “North Korea’s collapse” or the “soft-landing policy.”

“The view of ‘North Korea’s collapse’ is very ridiculous because Socialism in North Korea is going toward a bright future rather than collapsing.”
Regarding the Team Spirit Exercise, Pyongyang’s concern was to control its people’s inward agitation rather than respond to it externally. US-ROK joint military exercises such as the Team Spirit Exercise have been one of the most annoying issues for Pyongyang because of both physical and psychological stress. In the unbalanced situation in which Pyongyang has limited means to respond to the Exercise with an appropriate responsive exercise, the Exercise appears really threatening. In the event that the Exercise suddenly becomes a real war, Pyongyang has no sufficient means of defense (Interview with Lee Yun-gul, Summer 2012). However, the bigger problem was its psychological effects on the North Korean people, as many defectors testified (Interview with Lee Yun-gul and Kang Chol-hwan, August 2012). That is why Pyongyang so welcomed the suspension of the Exercise in 1992 and soundly criticized the resumption of the Exercise in 1993 by saying that the Exercise was a pretense for a nuclear invasion of North Korea. We should note, however, that these criticisms were concentrated in the media for North Korean people, not for an external audience (Korean Central Television (KCTV), October 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1992).\footnote{Korean Central Television (KCTV) is for North Korean people while Korean Central News Agency is for outsiders to inform on its arguments or policy.}

In domestic politics in the mid-1990s, Pyongyang was in the middle of an important political transition, the process of succession from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il. Even though the succession had progressed slowly and Kim Jong-il had held most of the

\footnote{As an editorial in *Rodong Sinmun*, this piece was intended to instruct the North Korean people and to prevent ideological laxity (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, August 1996).}
actual power and authority since 1974 (Hwang, 2010: 206-208), the succession of power could be the most unstable factor in domestic politics. In the constitutional reform on April 9, 1992, Kim Jong-il seized all powers related to the military by integrating all functions and military authority from the national head and from the Central People’s Committee into the national defense committee where Kim Jong-il served as the head. Kim Il-sung created a poem of praise for his son, Kim Jong-il in 1992 around the same time as Kim Il-sung’s 80th birthday and Kim Jong-il’s 50th birthday (Hwang, 2010: 294). However, it was still important that Kim Il-sung held the position of the supreme leader of the country because most North Korean people had a special admiration for Kim Il-sung as a national hero while many had no opinion of Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il did not have a long list of national accomplishments—only his potential leadership qualities as the son of Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung had indisputable accomplishments, such as his role in anti-Japanese activities, even though these accomplishments were exaggerated. That is why Pyongyang announced the death of Kim Il-sung 34 hours later even to its own people and why Kim Jong-il supported the idolization of his father throughout his life. Because Kim Jong-il’s power was based on his father’s legacy, Kim Jong-il attempted to gain legitimacy of power through the integration of himself and his

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43 Since 1992, Kim Jong-il’s birthday, February 16, was considered a national holiday like Kim Il-sung’s.
44 On August 21, 1994, Korean Central Television (KCTV) asserted that North Korea could have solved the succession problem with ease under the lead of Kim Il-sung. Seoul’s analysis of this broadcast suggests that there were some uncooperative people in the elite group of Pyongyang who objected to Kim Jong-il’s succession (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, August 1994). On May 10, 1996, Rodong Sinmun asserted that the Soviet Union collapsed because of schemers and ambitious persons in its elite group who sought the highest leadership of the party and the state. Seoul also analyzed this statement as an expression of wariness against dissidents in its leadership group (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, May 1996).
father.\textsuperscript{45} Pyongyang claimed that after Kim Il-sung’s death, it was governed by the “rule from Kim Il-sung’s teaching” until 1998.\textsuperscript{46} Though he was already the most powerful official in North Korea, Kim Jong-il delayed his official succession to the leadership of North Korea for four years after his father’s death until another reform of the Constitution in 1998. In the new Constitution, Kim Il-sung’s eternal position as the supreme leader of the country was stipulated and Kim Jong-il succeeded his father’s power, not with his father’s title, but as the head of the national defense committee, which actually became the supreme position of the country.

Chairman Kim Jong-il introduced his “Sun-gun (Military First)” policy to overcome instabilities of his succession in 1998. With this Military First Policy, he suppressed public unrest and concentrated public attention on the crisis. Nuclear weaponry was the essence of his Military First policy because Pyongyang had no money to acquire up-to-date conventional weapons. Its only military strength was in the size of its army. In developing an image of strong military power and nuclear capability, Pyongyang wished to enhance its national glory and status. Nuclear weapons were seen as a way to earn prestige for Pyongyang as a militarily impregnable country with Chairman Kim Jong-il as its leader (Kim, 2011:12). That is why Pyongyang announced to his people “the temporary suspension of nuclear facilities,” a meaning much reduced from the original term of “disabling” in 2007 when the 2.13 agreement was signed (Pyongyang Broadcasting Station (PBS), February 13, 2007). Pyongyang aims to hold

\textsuperscript{45} Pyongyang Broadcasting Station announced on November 8, 1994 that the General Kim Jong-il is Kim Il-sung, our great leader (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 1994).

\textsuperscript{46} See New Year’s Joint Editorials in 1995 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 1995).
onto its prestigious status as a nuclear power particularly for its people’s pride until a better option arrives.

4. Normalization of Relations with Washington as an Alternative to Nuclear Weapons

Reacting to both internal and external factors in its national crisis, Pyongyang pursued nuclear weapons for its security and for national glory. However, Pyongyang had also pursued another solution which was often ignored or downgraded as a deceptive strategy to gain time for developing nuclear weapons: normalization of relations with the U.S. Many American outside observers asserted that Pyongyang had no serious intention to normalize relations with the U.S. but used this argument as an excuse to continue advancing its nuclear weaponry. They viewed Pyongyang as a wicked and greedy regime that seeks only to exploit the U.S. and its allies. Nevertheless, there are many indications that Pyongyang had pursued normalization of relations with Washington seriously. Pyongyang has expressed its intention for improvement of relations with Washington in several ways after the early 1990s. Pyongyang ceased its anti-American public demonstrations and the designated “Anti-American Joint Struggle Month Event” since 1992, which had been held every June 25th for one month. After decreasing its usual criticism of the U.S., Pyongyang called on the U.S. to stop its hostile policy against North Korea.

47 It was the starting date of the Korean War in 1950.
“Now it is the time for The U.S. to stop its hostile policy depending on power and change its policy toward North Korea.”

- Rodong Sinmun, “The history of disaster should not be repeated,” (June 25, 1992)

Also, Pyongyang increased personal exchanges with Americans and expressed its intention of improving relations with the U.S. through the remarks of many high ranking officers and diplomats overseas. In later analyses of this period, Seoul suggested that Pyongyang seemed to change its policy toward the U.S. from a hostile policy to an effort for the improvement of relations since 1992 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, June 1997). In the Agreed Framework with Washington in 1994, Pyongyang seemed to consider it a success that an article was included about normalization of diplomatic relations between the two states, as this was the most important goal for Pyongyang.

“As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level. (Article 2, Par. 3).”

Pyongyang confirmed recognition of its sovereignty by the U.S. in this document because diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level can be only established in the

48 For example, Kim Yong-sun, the head of international department of the KWP (KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY), met Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary of State in January 1992, Pyongyang dispatched representatives to an academic conference in Honolulu, Hawaii in May 1992, and North Korean Christian representatives visited the U.S. in June 1992.

mutual recognition of sovereignty. Kang Suk-joo, the First Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea, remarked in the press conference in the next day of the Agreement:

“I believe that this agreement will contribute to the change of the U.S. hostile policy against North Korea and to the easing of hostile relations between the U.S. and North Korea. When the Agreed Framework is implemented, the so-called nuclear issue will disappear in the end.”

What made Pyongyang change its old hostile policy against Washington and begin efforts for an improvement of relations? Improvement of relations with Washington would bring solutions for both security and internal instability. The U.S. has been the most threatening country to North Korea since the Korean War and Pyongyang had established alliances with the Soviet Union and China against the U.S. When the Soviet Union collapsed and old allies were gone suddenly, Pyongyang realized that the U.S. was the only world superpower and it could not defend itself against a possible U.S. attack. The Gulf war in 1991, the bombing of Iraq in 1998, Iraq war in 2003, and NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 brought great terror to Pyongyang. Each time, the media in Pyongyang had great interest in the U.S. bombing or attack and broadcasted unusually rapidly. Pyongyang criticized the U.S. and NATO’s bombings as a violation of sovereignty that is only in the interest of the Western states (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, December 1992, March 1999, March 2003, and April 2003). Pyongyang

50 For the full text, see Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, October 1994.
particularly considered the U.S. bombing of Iraq as a plausible potential threat against North Korea because Iraq’s confrontation with the U.S. over its WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) was similar to the situation of North Korea. Thus, Pyongyang tried to avoid military conflict with the U.S. at any cost in order to maintain Kim’s regime (Kim, 2011: 12).

Pyongyang also understood that diplomatic relations with Washington would be quite beneficial to North Korea once the normalization of relations was established. Lifting economic sanctions along with financial aid from the U.S. would provide a great opportunity to revive the North’s sagging economy. However, the most important expected benefit from the normalization of relations with Washington was the significance to North Korean people. Although they lived in a closed society, the North Korean people were aware that the U.S. was the only superpower and the most powerful country in the world. The Soviet Union had been considered the strongest country to the North Korean people once, but the U.S., their target to overthrow, emerged as the only superpower in their eyes when the Soviet Union collapsed. Being on good terms with this most powerful country would mean that North Korea is also a powerful or glorious country even if its power is not as great.\(^5\) This sense of self-esteem would be a great support for Kim’s regime. Pyongyang’s delight over President Carter’s visit in 1994 and over President Clinton’s visit in 2009, and its frustration at Clinton’s official cancellation of his visit to Pyongyang during his term in 2000, shows how important Pyongyang

\(^5\) No one can call this change of allegiance a betrayal in any sense, as it was Pyongyang that felt betrayed by the Soviet Union and China. Also, bandwagoning occurs more often in history than balancing, particularly for weaker nations (Kaufman, 1992: 417-447). Schweller also argues that bandwagoning is for profit coveted while balancing is for self-preservation (Schweller, 1994: 74).
considered its relations with Washington. When President Carter visited Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung was very pleased and made a ceaseless effort to win Carter’s favor (Hwang, 2010: 312). When President Clinton visited Pyongyang in 2009, Pyongyang released the American journalist willingly and hoped to make an opportunity to improve relations with Washington while Washington took a position that President Clinton’s visit was just personal and was not relevant to improvement of relations or to the nuclear issues. However those visits by former U.S. presidents were advertised extensively to North Korean people.

The New York Philharmonic’s performance in Pyongyang in 2008 was eagerly welcomed and Pyongyang perceived this as another opportunity to improve its relations with Washington.

““The New York Philharmonic’s performance in Pyongyang with the two governments’ attention shows the new international situation symbolized as the progress of six-party talk. . . Lorin Maazel, the conductor said that he hoped that this performance would contribute to the improvement of relations between the U.S. and North Korea in its symbolic and musical meaning.”

— “The excellent performance by American envoys of artists,” Choson sinbo (February 26, 2008)

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52 Choson sinbo on August 4, 2009 insisted that no one could deny that the opportunity to improve their relations had been prepared (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, August 2009).

53 Pyongyang reported 24 times about New York Philharmonic’s performance in Pyongyang on February 26, 2008 including introductions to the New York Philharmonic and its preparation before the actual performance. Giving several prior notices and media attention for the performance was very exceptional and it means that Pyongyang treated the performance the same as an official visit from a head of state (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, February 2008).
“The significance of the performance with the two governments’ attention is much bigger than the one of the general cultural events.”

– “Applause to Americans in Pyongyang,” Choson sinbo (February 26, 2008)

The performance was more effective in demonstrating North Korea’s enhanced status in the world to its people because unlike the president’s visit, “normal” people of Pyongyang watched the performance.54 Choson sinbo reported the response of the public with article titles such as “Long standing ovation by audiences” and “The response of people of Pyongyang: unfamiliar but good” (Choson sinbo, February 2008). However, despite Pyongyang’s hope for improved relations, Washington regarded this performance as a private art event, unrelated to government relations, and did not call the Chosun National Symphony Orchestra of North Korea to the U.S.

In short, to the North Korean leadership, which was troubled by perceived external threats and internal instability, the normalization or improvement of relations with Washington could achieve the same goals that nuclear weapons had. Normalization of relations with Washington was expected to remove external threats (mainly from Washington), to improve the economy and remove economic sanctions, and to enhance the self-esteem of the people of a great country, which would all lend support to Kim’s regime.

54 “Normal people” does not mean “just anyone” but “selected people”. However it still means non-political, ordinary public.
5. The Relations between the DPRK and its Other Neighbors Related to Nuclear Weapon Programs

The North Korean nuclear issue may be not only an issue between Pyongyang and Washington but also an issue for all related neighbors such as Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, and Seoul. This study mostly focuses on the relations between Pyongyang and Washington but it does not mean that other relations can be ignored. But this study will only mention briefly others’ relations with Pyongyang and concentrate on the relations between Pyongyang and Washington.

Like Washington, Pyongyang’s other neighbors, Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, and Seoul, are in favor of the denuclearization of North Korea, though with varying degrees of concern.

1) Relations between Pyongyang and Seoul

As relations between Pyongyang and Seoul will be compared to relations between Pyongyang and Washington in Chapter 2, it is important to note that the two Koreas have competed for the dominant position of sole legitimacy in the Korean peninsula since they were divided (Koh, 1980: 1109; Park and Lee, 1992: 429). They competed in economic

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development, military building, and political systems. After observing the two Koreas’ historical data, Eberstadt argues that both countries seem to have manipulated their national statistics such as fertility level and economic geography for political purposes in the 1970s and 1980s (Eberstadt, 1995: 3-7).

After this longstanding competition, it is clear that (contrary to propaganda in North Korea) that Seoul has won in most sectors, including the military sector with its modern technology while Pyongyang has a large but less well equipped one million-army. Nuclear weapons technology is the best option for Pyongyang to hold a dominant position in military sector in competition with Seoul. That is why Pyongyang tried to remove nuclear weapons displayed in South Korea in the early 1990s before Pyongyang had developed its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang even agreed to the 1992 Joint Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For Pyongyang, there is no other sector to win in the competition with Seoul except WMDs. They are brothers but compete for dominant position inherently like twin brothers.

2) Relations between Pyongyang and Beijing

Known as a “blood alliance” since Beijing sent its troops to help North Korea during the Korean War, Pyongyang and Beijing have maintained a close relationship for a long time. Their relations deteriorated in the early 1990s when Beijing normalized relations with Seoul in 1992 and demanded hard currency payment from Pyongyang, but with Beijing’s active economic aid during the Great Flood in North Korea, their relations slowly recovered at the end of the 1990s. During the 2000s, relations between Pyongyang
and Beijing were improved again with efforts on both sides to repair their relationship. During the six party talks, Beijing tried to influence Pyongyang. As Ikegami pointed out, “the blood alliance” between two seemed to be fully recovered when Beijing overlooked Pyongyang’s provocations such as missile-launching or the sinking of the Cheonan warship (Ikegami, 2012). However, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s interview with the Financial Times in January 2014 emphasized that the relations between Beijing and Pyongyang is one of an alliance between states, which shows Beijing’s wish to lessen its risk in the relations with Pyongyang (Financial Times, “Transcription of Interview with Wang Yi,” January 29, 2014).

Their relations could be explained in two dimensions: strategic dimension and high contextual dimension. First, their strategic relations are also known as “Sun-mang-chi-han (脣亡齒寒: if lips are gone, teeth became cold).” Thus, Beijing has supported Pyongyang and prevented regime collapse because North Korea provides a buffer zone for Chinese security (Lee, 1996). What Beijing wants is for North Korea to be neither so strong nor so weak that it cannot act as its security buffer against the U.S. or Japan. Beijing was the biggest donor during the Great Flood in North Korea. Beijing would probably prefer bordering a troublesome North Korea bound by “blood alliance,” to a unified new Korea backed by the U.S.

Second, their relations also have historical and cultural meaning. As two high context cultures, their relations are like the relations between younger and elder brothers. Beijing supports Pyongyang with economic aid and political backing while Pyongyang shows some kind of respect. For example, Kim Jong-il visited China with Kim Jong-un in
August 2010 just before Kim Jong-un appeared officially as Kim Jong-il’s heir in September 2010. This resembles the pattern when the Chosun dynasty sought approval from China for a new successor. Pyongyang did not need Beijing’s approval to decide its heir, but it shows respect to introduce the heir before his official debut. As a big brother as well as the most salient regional player, Beijing wants to have North Korea under its influence. Practically, it is also well known that “the complex and difficult” and even relations between Pyongyang and Beijing including border conflicts (Liu, 2003: 347). Pyongyang does not like the pressure for economic reformation from Beijing while Beijing does not like trouble from an uncontrolled Pyongyang. However, as high context cultures that consider relations important, they do not break their relations and have tried to maintain the relations despite constant conflicts between them.

Beijing’s fundamental policy toward Korea is to maintain stability and peace on the Korean peninsula as long as possible (Liu, 2003: 349). Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapon challenges Beijing’s policy because Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons may well bring an arms race in East Asia and destabilizes this area (Savage, 2003: 31). A nuclear North Korea could easily step out of Beijing’s control (Liu, 2003: 358-359).

3) Relations between Pyongyang and Moscow

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57 For their relations in historical details, see Alexander Zhebin, “Russia and North Korea: an Emerging,
Relations between Pyongyang and Moscow deteriorated when Moscow abolished its “friendship prices” and normalized relations with Seoul in the early 1990s. (See the detail in Chapter 4-1). With efforts from both sides, relations were partially restored in the early 2000s, but the recovered relationship has some differences from their earlier ties. (See the detail, p. 115-116).

Moscow has pursued two policy goals in its relations with Pyongyang: denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintaining influence on the Korean peninsula to balance the U.S. and Japan (Buszynski, 2009: 810-812). Moscow was opposed to Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons and refused Pyongyang’s demand to share its nuclear technology during the 1970s-80s (Clemens, 2010: 70-87). Moscow wants a non-nuclear Korea, but has little influence on Pyongyang now. Their relations are more focused on the economic sector as Moscow tries to balance its relations with Seoul and with Pyongyang.

4) Relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo

Tokyo has considered Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons as the most destabilizing factor in East Asia and argued for Japan’s remilitarization to prepare for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons (Hagström and Söderberg, 2006: 374; Eberstadt, 1997: 91). Pyongyang’s missile launches have threatened the Japanese people. Also, Fouse points out that Tokyo has attempted to increase its influence on the Korean peninsula like Beijing and Moscow in the post-Cold War era (Fouse, 2004: 102). On the other hand,
Pyongyang’s interest in Japan is mostly focused on economic relations, although Pyongyang has also noted the threat of Japan’s remilitarization (Interview with Jang, Jinsung, with Lee, Yun-gul, with Kim, Hyun-ho, and with Kang, Chol-hwan in 2012). According to Yongho Kim, Japan could be the most important external actor in North Korea’s economic recovery (Kim, 2011: 165-167).

After the Koizumi-Kim Jong-il summit and the Pyongyang Declaration in 2002, relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo seemed to improve, but a stalemate soon resulted. Pyongyang wants to normalize relations with Japan for economic interests including economic compensation for the Japanese rule of Korea (1910-1945) but “the abductees’ issue” and related Japanese objection to normalization of relations has hindered the improvement of relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo (Hagström and Söderberg, 2006: 383).
V. NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS?:
PYONGYANG’S CHOICES WITH REGARD TO EXPECTATION
FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AND TO
WASHINGTON’S CULTURALLY APPROPRIATE APPROACHES

1. The First Period: Pyongyang’s Wish for Normalization of Relations,

Frustration and the First Nuclear Crisis, Settlement and New Expectation

1) Pyongyang’s New Policy to Improve Relations with Washington and

Washington’s Response

It is true that Pyongyang has made use of both confrontation and engagement policies according to the situation in order to achieve its political purpose of regime survival (interview with Jang Jin-sung, December 2012). On the one hand, Pyongyang refrained from confrontation when the expectation for normalization of relations with Washington was raised, while Pyongyang has employed confrontational tactics when the expectation for normalization of relations with Washington decreased. Sometimes, Pyongyang chose confrontation for the purpose of inducing engagement from Washington.

In fact, when Pyongyang faced national crises in the early 1990s, the first policy pursued by Pyongyang for a solution to the crises was the cessation of hostilities and the improvement of relations with Washington. Pyongyang clearly expressed its will to improve relations with Washington since 1992 while refraining from holding massive anti-American rallies or events related to the Korean War Memorial Day (June 25th). On

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Source</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee, Sam-ro, an advisor of institution of disarmament and peace at Honolulu conference (June 23-25, 1992)</td>
<td>The relations between Pyongyang and Washington and between Pyongyang and Tokyo should be improved soon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rodong Sinmun</em> Editorial, “The history of disaster should not be repeated” (June 25, 1992)</td>
<td>Washington’s withdrawal of its hostile policy against Pyongyang accords with the interests of both countries and the world. If Washington withdraws from unreasonable conditions and chooses improvement of relations with Pyongyang, Pyongyang would try to improve relations with Washington without looking back at the past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyun, Jun-geuk, the chief editor of Rodong Sinmun, interview with <em>Yomiuri newspaper</em> during a visit to Japan (June 27, 1992)</td>
<td>If Washington withdraws its hostile policy against Pyongyang, there will be an improvement in relations between Washington and Pyongyang. There are several meetings between Washington and Pyongyang in Beijing now and those meetings might lead to some qualitative changes in relations between the two.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huh, Jong, DPRK vice ambassador to UN, interviewed (June 29, 1992)</td>
<td>There were friendly gestures of exchange in politics, economics, diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang last year. Pyongyang is ready to cooperate with</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58 June is a significant month to criticize the U.S. because it marks the beginning month of the Korean War. Pyongyang has held several anti-American rallies intensively all over the country every June.
Washington in many ways and is waiting for Washington’s sincere response.

Joo, Chang-jun, DPRK ambassador to PRC, interviewed (June 29, 1992)
The recent meeting between Washington and Pyongyang was a good thing. There is no wish to be feuding with each other; Pyongyang wishes to normalize relations with Washington.


Pyongyang had also increased personal exchanges with Washington in 1992. When Kim Yong-sun, the head of the international department of KWP, met Arnold Kanter, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, he said that Pyongyang would allow the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) which is a big change in its policy because Pyongyang had been opposed to the USFK station for a long time (*Yonhap News*, “Chairman Kim sent his approval of USFK’s staying in South Korea to The U.S.,” February 20, 2001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Significant Personal Exchanges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1992</td>
<td>Kim, Yong-sun, the head of international department (KWP), met Arnold Kanter, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1988 – June 1992</td>
<td>24 separate Councilor-level meetings in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1992</td>
<td>Repatriation of the remains of 30 US soldiers from the Korean War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1992</td>
<td>DPRK representatives’ participation in US academic conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1992</td>
<td>American scholars and former high level officials visit Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1992</td>
<td>DPRK Christian representatives visit the U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to a Defense Nuclear Agency report in 1992, Washington estimated North Korea’s nuclear ability as follows (Defense Nuclear Agency: i and 3):

- One operating reactor (5 MWth) believed to be capable of producing enough plutonium (8kg) for one first-generation nuclear weapon annually if it has been operated during full year (but it is said to be operated intermittently because of energy shortages)

- Two additional reactors under construction, projected for completion in 1995 and 1996, one each at Yongbyon (50 MWth) and Taechon (200 MWth); if completed, the first one at Yongbyon is expected to produce seven weapons’ worth of plutonium each year

- A plant to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel (known as a reprocessing facility)

- Also, North Korea was considered to have pursued uranium enrichment capabilities

From Washington’s perspective, Pyongyang’s goals for developing nuclear weapons were clear: survival, saving face, and reunification (Defense Nuclear Agency, 1992: 16). The reason for Pyongyang’s recently changed attitude was also clear. What was still unclear to Washington was Pyongyang’s private intention hidden in its conciliatory gestures. Were Pyongyang’s recent conciliatory gestures merely a deception in order to continue the development of nuclear weapons, or did it come from real changes in its perspective, reflected in its strategy and policies?
Without resolving this fundamental uncertainty and anxiety, the Bush administration began to respond positively to the changed attitude of Pyongyang for a time. In September 1991, President George H. W. Bush decided to remove all tactical nuclear weapons placed abroad, followed by the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization on December 31, 1991. In January 1992, President Bush remarked in Seoul that Washington could improve relations with Pyongyang if Pyongyang promised to resolve nuclear issues (The New York Times, “U.S.-North Korea Talks Planned On State of Nuclear Development,” January 15, 1992). It was a quite favorable offer for Washington to provide, despite its doubts about Pyongyang’s intention. However, it still showed Washington’s basic point: denuclearize first, and then we will consider improvement of relations with you. Of course, to Pyongyang’s understanding, this basic point was reinterpreted as “disarm first, and then we will see whether we will improve or not relations with you.” Expecting improvement of relations, Pyongyang responded to Washington by signing on the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguard agreement on January 30, 1992 which stipulated that North Korea would accept IAEA inspection over all nuclear facilities in North Korea. On April 12, 1992, the North Korean national assembly approved the IAEA safeguard accord and Pyongyang refrained from holding anti-American rallies and from criticism of the U.S. during June 1992. On July 2, 1992, Washington made the unusual public announcement that the U.S. government had removed all tactical nuclear weapons displayed abroad including in South Korea. Pyongyang welcomed this announcement with increased hope for improved relations.

59 It was 6 years and 1 month after Pyongyang joined NPT on December 1985 although all NPT members should also join IAEA safeguard agreement within 18 months.

However, those initial positive exchanges were suspended shortly thereafter when Washington decided to induce Pyongyang’s cooperation through threats. With uncertainty about Pyongyang’s intention, Washington decided to follow recommendations by the Defense Nuclear Agency to increase pressure on Pyongyang, although the Agency’s report proposed both rewards, such as extending the moratorium of the Team Spirit Exercise, and punishments, such as the deployment of Patriot Missile in South Korea. The Agency recommended a three-track approach for the U.S. government: (1) planning for a special inspection request to the IAEA; (2) planning for subsequent UN Security Council consideration; and (3) initiating bilateral US-ROK planning for Team Spirit exercise in early 1993 (%28Defense Nuclear Agency%3A 17%29). When Pyongyang refused to meet the South on June 30, 1992 for the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) and would not allow IAEA inspection in two suspicious facilities on August 1992, saying that these were military facilities, Washington escalated the situation by resuming the Team Spirit Exercise in October 1992.%2860%29 Pyongyang was upset by the continuation of the Exercise and began to show hostility again.%2861%29 Finally, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from NPT in March 1993. Other retributions from Washington followed, such as the demand of IAEA special inspection, the UNSC resolution (No. 825, May 11, 1993), and the deployment of Patriot Missiles in South Korea.

60 The U.S. and South Korea had agreed to resume US-ROK Team Spirit Exercise in 1993 unless there was significant progress in the South-North nuclear negotiation in the 24th US-ROK annual security consultative meeting (SCM) at Washington on October 7-8, 1992.
61 See Kim Il-sung’s New Year’s Address on January 1, 1993 and Rodong-sinmun Editorial, “We will win” on January 18, 1993.
2) Pyongyang’s Frustration and the 1st Nuclear Crisis

Beginning with fierce resistance to the decision to resume the U.S.-ROK Team Spirit Exercise, Pyongyang refused to cooperate in many of the following negotiations, including the South-North nuclear negotiation; continued to rebuff IAEA’s demands for special inspection; had a cooperative military meeting with Iran (January 11, 1993); and encouraged North Korean people to criticize the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Pyongyang announced a quasi-state of war to the entire nation when the Exercise began again and caused the First Nuclear Crisis by issuing an official statement on its withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 12, 1993. Until President Carter visited Kim Il-sung in June 1994, which led to Washington and Pyongyang’s acceptance of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, Pyongyang remained stubborn on nuclear matters, and Washington responded with deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea. Washington considered all options, including surgical attack at Yongbyon, the well-known nuclear facility area in North Korea.62

According to Donald P. Gregg, the former US ambassador to South Korea from 1989 to 1993, it was certain that Pyongyang had seriously pursued improvement of relations with Washington. Gregg maintains that Pyongyang had indicated to him that it would give up the nuclear program if it had confidence of Washington’s commitment to improving relations (The Washington Post, “Talking to the North Koreans is the only way

But why did Pyongyang turn its attitude from conciliation to hostility?

First, the apparent reason asserted by Pyongyang in North Korean media was the U.S.’s confrontational action of resuming the Team Spirit Exercise with Seoul in 1993. Pyongyang demanded the cancellation of the Exercise plan by November and refused to cooperate in the South-North nuclear negotiation on October 22, 1992. Pyongyang criticized the Exercise and claimed that it was in preparation for nuclear war against North Korea (Korean Central Television (KCTV), October 19, 20, 21, and 23, 1992 and Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, October 22, 1992). When Seoul announced the Exercise plan on January 26, 1993, Pyongyang responded that the North would not negotiate with the South and criticized the resumption of the Exercise through several media outlets and official statements including the Foreign Ministry Statement, the highest official document, on January 27, 1993 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 1993). During the Exercise in March, Pyongyang responded with the announcement of a quasi-state of war and of its withdrawal from the NPT.

Why did Pyongyang oppose the Exercise so fiercely? Some North Korean defectors testified that Pyongyang tried to impede the Exercise because Pyongyang did not have the capability to hold a comparable exercise to boost the morale of the North Korean people (interviews with Jang Jin-sung, December 2012 and with Lee Yun-gul, August 2012). The Exercise against North Korea, without any comparable exercise by North Korea in response, could be an apparent threat not only to Pyongyang’s security

63 See the following link for the full article: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/talking-to-the-north-koreans-is-the-only-way-forward/2013/12/15/414fcbd6-6415-11e3-aff0d-4bb80d704888_story.html
but also to the national glory of the DPRK. Though North Korea had begun the year with expectations for improving relations with Washington, this Exercise was apparent evidence that Washington had no real intention to improve relations with Pyongyang. Frustration, the emotional factor, made Pyongyang’s criticism much fiercer in 1993 than in previous years. Seoul analyzed that Pyongyang’s response to the Exercise in 1993 was much more intensive and tougher than previous years (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, March 1993). For example, Kim Jong-il ordered a “quasi-state of war” (declared once before in 1983) and “combat-ready status” to the Korean People’s Army at the same time on March 8, 1993. Also, Pyongyang held larger rallies than in previous years, with the purpose of criticizing the Exercise. Around 100,000 people gathered for the rally at Kim Il-sung Square on March 9, 1993, while 10,000 people gathered for the rally at the Pyongyang gym on February 28, 1991.

Second, Seoul pointed out that Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT to avoid additional IAEA inspections (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, March 1993). Pyongyang had been stressed by the pressure of the special inspection by the IAEA. After 6 inspections from May 1992 to February 1993, the IAEA adopted a resolution demanding that Pyongyang accept IAEA special inspection because of discrepancies between the initial report North Korea submitted and the inspection results from the IAEA, and also because Pyongyang refused to allow IAEA inspection in two suspicious facilities at Yongbyon. Pyongyang insisted that the discrepancies came from differences of calculation or measurement and that Pyongyang would not permit the IAEA to inspect the two facilities because of their military contents. Thus, Pyongyang withdrew from the
NPT to remove IAEA control, demonstrating Pyongyang’s will to develop nuclear weapons, according to Seoul.

There is a third factor that we should not ignore: Pyongyang’s frustration and anxiety about the expectation for improving relations with Washington. We can read this frustration and anxiety through a careful examination of Pyongyang’s words and behavior in its media outlets. Again, Pyongyang’s purpose for cooperation with several nuclear negotiations with the South and with IAEA inspections was not to become a non-nuclear state, but to attain Washington’s favor for improvement of relations. Pyongyang’s fury about the decision of the resumption of the Exercise showed its frustration about the failed effort for normalization of relations with Washington. As Washington recognized, the Exercise was considered by Pyongyang to be a provocation (Defense Nuclear Agency: 1). This is why Pyongyang greatly welcomed the moratorium of the Exercise in 1992 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 1992). In North Korean media reports, we can observe the goal on which Pyongyang had focused: the expectation for normalization of relations. During its criticism of the resumption of the Exercise, North Korea directed its hostility against Seoul, not Washington. Instead of criticism, Pyongyang proposed negotiations toward Washington. For example, after withdrawal from the NPT, Pyongyang continuously insisted that the nuclear issues can only be resolved between Pyongyang and Washington.⁶⁴ On March 29, 1993, Pyongyang asked for US-DPRK direct negotiations via a statement by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman and via an editorial in Rodong sinmun, “Washington cannot walk away from the

⁶⁴ Son Sung-pil, the DPRK ambassador to Russia, stated at a press conference on March 20, 1993 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, March 1993).
"responsibility" on the same day (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, March 1993). On April 5, 1993 when the nuclear issue was submitted to the UN Security Council, Pyongyang offered criticism, insisting that the essence of nuclear issues could only be resolved between Pyongyang and Washington (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, April 1993). When the UN Security Council passed resolution No. 825 requesting North Korea’s cancellation of withdrawal from NPT and observation of NPT clauses on May 11, 1993, Pyongyang criticized the resolution, asserting that the issues were not related to the problem discussed in the UN Security Council, but between Pyongyang and Washington (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, May 1993). Seoul analyzed that Pyongyang’s criticism was tied to its hope to resolve this issue by negotiation with Washington, despite its critical tone (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, May 1993). And finally, Pyongyang deterred its withdrawal from the NPT on June 11, 1993, one day before the withdrawal was activated, and only after Pyongyang had four high-level meetings with Washington. Seoul maintained that Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT aimed for direct talks between Pyongyang and Washington (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, March 1993).

North Korean nuclear issues seemed to be a problem between Pyongyang and the IAEA, not between Pyongyang and Washington, since the second half of 1992. Washington in its transition period had less interest in Pyongyang, and only offered limited punitive reactions to Pyongyang’s non-cooperative attitude such as the resumption of the Team Spirit Exercise. Pyongyang did not wish to negotiate with the IAEA or others and felt disrespected and wronged by Washington’s alternating neglect.
and hostile policies against Pyongyang. By withdrawing from the NPT, Pyongyang caught Washington’s attention. For the first time, the Clinton administration considered the North Korean nuclear issue seriously.\(^{65}\)

Since Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT on March 1993, relations between Pyongyang and Washington worsened over the course of a year, with negative tit-for-tat responses until President Carter visited Kim Il-sung on June, 1994. Washington had decided to send the latest Patriot Missile to South Korea (March 21, 1994) and considered not only economic sanctions but also surgical attack at Yongbyon. R. James Woolsey, then head of the Central Intelligence Agency, mentioned combat readiness for the possibility of war in the Korean peninsula on November 30, 1993 (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, November 1993). Pyongyang criticized Washington’s unfavorable policies toward Pyongyang fiercely, yet continuously looked for a positive response from Washington. On November 11, 1993, Kang Suk-joo, then Vice Foreign Minister, demanded the package deal which would exchange nuclear weapons for a security guarantee of Pyongyang’s regime, but Washington would not address Pyongyang’s demands until Pyongyang agreed to accept the IAEA special inspection (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, November 1993).

3) \textit{Settlement with the Agreed Framework of 1994 and Pyongyang’s New Expectation For Normalization of Relations}

President Carter’s visit to Kim Il-sung was considered as a sudden favorable

\(^{65}\) President Clinton did not mention North Korean nuclear issues until March 1993, even though he wrote his office days in detail. (Clinton, 2005: 591).
gesture and President Carter was very welcomed in North Korea (Hwang, 2010: 312). As a result of the following three months of US-DPRK negotiations, the Agreed Framework was created as a tool to resolve the nuclear crisis on October 21, 1994. It was established just 3 months after Kim Il-sung, the supreme leader of the DPRK, died, and before Kim Jong-il succeeded his father’s position officially. Pyongyang did not miss this opportunity to improve its relations with Washington even during this period of domestic instability. In fact, the agreement with Washington would bring better status to Chairman Kim Jong-il (as a tribute to national glory) who was less admired than his recently deceased father in North Korea. Moreover, the letter from President Clinton, with the honorific title of “His Excellency” to Chairman Kim Jong-il, confirming Washington’s intent to uphold the agreement, was enough to provide Pyongyang with conviction on Washington’s conciliatory policies toward Pyongyang. Pyongyang had reason to increase its expectation for improvement of relations in the near future.

This agreement included both demands: the U.S.’s requirement that North Korea freeze its nuclear facilities, and North Korea’s requirement of economic aid and improvement of relations between Pyongyang and Washington. Table 5-3 shows the summary of the Agreed Framework of 1994.

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66 It is a kind of GRIT (Graduated Reciprocity in Tension-reduction). On the meaning of GRIT in detail and comparison to TFT, see Clemens, 2010: 90-97.
67 For the full version of the letter, see http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/011th_issue/97100112.htm (Retrieved on December 21, 2013).
Table 5-3. The Main Points of Agreed Framework of 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Freeze of all present and future nuclear facilities in Pyongyang and their replacement with LWRs</th>
<th>Pyongyang is supposed to freeze all nuclear facilities and dismantle them eventually. The freezing targets are 5 MWth operating reactor, two reactors (50 MWth and 200 MWth) under construction, the reprocessing facility, and a plant of fuel rods.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instead of those facilities’ expected production of energy, Washington as the leader of international coalition is supposed to provide Pyongyang with two 1,000 MWth Light Water Reactors (LWRs) by 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>During the period of construction, Washington provides Pyongyang with 500,000 tons of heavy oil per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Improvement of relations</td>
<td>Within 3 months, both are supposed to release trade and investment restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both establish liaison office and upgrade it to the level of ambassador according to the improvement of relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Efforts for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula</td>
<td>Washington guarantees not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and not to threaten North Korea with nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pyongyang implements its actions for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula including reopening of the North-South talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Efforts for non-proliferation</td>
<td>Pyongyang stays within the NPT and fulfills IAEA nuclear safeguard agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pyongyang accepts IAEA temporary and general inspection for non-freezing nuclear facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pyongyang fulfills all IAEA safeguard agreements before the key components of LWR are delivered to North Korea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Ambassador Robert Gallucci testified in the Senate Hearing, the Agreed Framework froze all present and future nuclear facilities in North Korea with the exchange of LWRs and heavy oil as alternate energy sources beyond the binding range of previous NPT or IAEA provisions (US Senate, 1994). The agreement was structured for

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step-by-step implementation by each side; if both complied with the Agreed Framework, both would receive the benefits, but if either one failed to comply, the expected benefits would no longer apply. According to Ambassador Gallucci, Washington (also Pyongyang) would not be disadvantaged unilaterally under the Agreed Framework. It was Washington that was unwilling to make this document a legally binding one such as a treaty. Ambassador Gallucci emphasized that the Agreed Framework was not an agreement in “lawyer’s terms” but “a political agreement” in the Hearing (U.S. Senate, 1994: 20-21). According to Gallucci, “the Agreed Framework is not based upon trust” (U.S. Senate, 1994: 12). In other words, the Agreed Framework froze the nuclear crisis and laid the groundwork for future stability and complete resolution of nuclear issues in North Korea, and was in good faith for each side which would benefit from their fulfillment of the agreement. This less binding agreement was a lower risk for both countries who did not trust each other, but eventually the agreement’s lack of enforceability would become a problem.

However, at the time of signing the Agreed Framework, Washington was relieved and Pyongyang was delighted. In a press conference after signing the Agreed Framework, Kang Suk-joo, the DPRK Vice Foreign Minister and chief delegate of DPRK, emphasized that the North Korean nuclear crisis was caused by the hostile relations between Washington and Pyongyang and expressed Pyongyang’s strong expectation that this agreement would change Washington’s hostile policy against Pyongyang and contribute to the improvement of relations between Washington and Pyongyang. These themes were repeated throughout his long statement and converged on those two
arguments. It shows what Pyongyang had focused on with the nuclear issues and emphasized as Pyongyang’s political goals. On November 1, 1994, ten days after signing the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang announced via a Foreign Ministry spokesman that it had begun to freeze the 5MWth reactor and other nuclear-related facilities, and that it had suspended construction of two reactors. There are two notable points here. First, this first action laid out in the Agreed Framework was done promptly within 10 days though it was supposed to be done within one month after signing the Agreed Framework. Second, this action was done unilaterally without demanding Washington’s comparable action, unlike previous actions (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 1994). Even when Republicans voiced unfavorable remarks related to the Agreed Framework after they won the election on November 8, 1994, Pyongyang regarded them as the voice of one faction and criticized not Washington, but the small conservative force (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 1995). Through the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang gained diplomatic recognition as a negotiator, which it had much desired, and anticipated the installation of liaison offices with the expectation for upgrading relations to the ambassador level. Pyongyang was also promised economic aid in the form of LWRs and heavy oil, but the improvement of relations was the real prize. This international

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69 In the letter to Kim Jong-il, President Clinton promised that he would use “the full powers of his office” to finance the construction of LWRs and for heavy oil to North Korea. For the full version of this statement, see Ministry of Unification, Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, (October 1994).

70 Jesse Helms, then nominee for chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that the Congress would review all treaties and would cease the implementation of any harmful treaties to America (November 14, 1994); Bob Dole, the majority leader of the Senate Republicans, said in his CBS interview that the Republicans should review the nuclear negotiation with North Korea again (November 16, 1994); Charles Robb, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, announced that Congress would hold a hearing related to North Korean nuclear negotiation on November 30, 1994 (November 22, 1994).
recognition, economic aid, and improvement of relations with Washington were used to honor the achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. For Pyongyang, the improvement of relations was most important because it was the first key to negotiating other practical benefits.

While Pyongyang welcomed the Agreed Framework as an opening for better relations with Washington, Washington’s focus was on the economic costs it should cover. Washington seemed have little interest in the improvement of relations with Pyongyang. During the Hearing on implications of the U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Agreement on December 1, 1994, Senators focused on how much Washington could trust Pyongyang and on whether the deal for North Korea’s freezing of its nuclear program and Washington’s promise of LWRs and heavy oil was to Washington’s disadvantage or not, in a cost-benefit analysis. The Senate gave little mention to the provision on improvement of relations, and Ambassador Gallucci did not need to make a great effort to explain this part.  

Senator Murkowski questioned this section once, saying that “it seemed like a very fast pace” with a country which Washington had “no history of good faith negotiations” (U.S. Senate, 1994: 7). For Washington, as a low context negotiator, relation-building issues are things to consider after some amount of business has been conducted successfully, and it would come as a surprise to consider relations as a priority in initial dealings without any history of good faith.

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4) Summary

In the early 1990s, Pyongyang saw a serious national crisis resulting from a security vacuum, economic difficulty, and a weakened national identity as a communist country due to failed relations with Russia and China. Under the crisis, Pyongyang changed its strategy toward Washington and began to pursue improvement of relations with Washington, because as a high context country, Pyongyang believed that normalization of relations with Washington would bring Pyongyang security, economic aid, and higher national status. So, normalization of relations with Washington was the first policy goal for Pyongyang. The administration of George H. W. Bush responded positively to Pyongyang’s conciliation policy toward Washington in the beginning, though it had uncertainty about Pyongyang’s intention. However, as a low context country, Washington’s basic position was always that North Korea must first abandon hostile policies such as its nuclear weapons program before the U.S. could consider the improvement of relations. Regardless of Washington’s basic position, Pyongyang welcomed Washington’s positive responses. As Pyongyang’s expectation for improvement of relations with Washington increased, Pyongyang refrained from all criticism or confrontation (June 1992).

However, with Washington’s decision to resume the Team Spirit Exercise of 1993, and with Washington’s neglect of North Korea during the U.S. government’s transition, Pyongyang’s expectation for improving relations with Washington decreased. To avoid IAEA inspections, which did not guarantee the improvement of relations with Washington, and to gain Washington’s attention, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal
from the NPT (March 1993). Pyongyang used confrontational tactics to bring Washington to negotiations. Pyongyang succeeded in creating concern in Washington, but relations between them worsened during 1993 and first half of 1994.

President Carter’s visit to Kim Il-sung broke the spiral of antagonism, and President Carter easily secured Kim Il-sung’s immediate promise not to develop nuclear weapons, because a meeting between high-level government officials conveys a level of trust in a high context country. In other words, his visit was accorded in Pyongyang’s cultural code. After his visit and three months of bilateral talks, Pyongyang and Washington signed the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang welcomed the Agreed Framework because it would be the first step toward improving relations with Washington, while Washington was relieved because Pyongyang promised to freeze its nuclear facilities in exchange for LWRs and some economic aid in the form of heavy oil. With raised expectations for the normalization of relations in the near future (Kang’s interview after signing Agreed Framework), Pyongyang announced its freeze of all nuclear facilities earlier than the due date. However, Washington did not concern itself much about the matter of improvement of relations with Pyongyang at that time, and instead focused on Pyongyang’s possible intention of exploitation of the Agreed Framework and on the cost of the construction of LWRs and heavy oil which Washington promised to Pyongyang.

In short, during the first nuclear crisis, Pyongyang increased confrontational policies such as its withdrawal from the NPT when its expectation for normalization of relations with Washington decreased. Pyongyang was highly dependent on nuclear weapons for its regime survival when it could not expect the benefits of improvement of
relations with Washington. On the contrary, Pyongyang refrained from confrontational policies when its expectation for normalization of relations with Washington increased. Pyongyang’s regime survival was less dependent on nuclear weapons when it could expect similar benefits through the improvement of relations with Washington.


North Korea went through a domestic political crisis during the period after the death of Kim Il-sung on July 8, 1994 until the Kim Jong-il regime was established in 1998. As expected, Kim Jong-il, the son of Kim Il-sung, succeeded his father’s position as the leader of the country. Even though outsiders who wished for the collapse of the North Korean regime were disappointed that Kim Jong-il succeeded his father’s position successfully, it was not an easy succession for Kim Jong-il. North Korea as a whole had been through serious domestic political crisis during these four years which will be referred to here as the transition period. North Korea’s domestic crisis resulted from three factors: political transition, a devastating food shortage exacerbated by natural disaster, and public unrest caused by the previous two. The relations between Pyongyang and Washington went back and forth without any assertive position, though both were able to uphold the Agreed Framework.

1) Political Transition of North Korea

Even though Kim Jong-il was nominated as the successor of Kim Il-sung in
February 1974 when he was elected by the KWP (Korean Workers’ Party) as a political commissar in the party conference (Hwang, 2010: 208)\textsuperscript{72} and held all real powers by 1986 (Hwang, 2010: 276),\textsuperscript{73} his official succession did not come easily or immediately after Kim Il-sung died. He needed time to build loyalty. He was appointed as a general-secretary of the KWP in October 1997 and finished his succession on September 5, 1998 when he was re-appointed as a chairman of national defense in the 10\textsuperscript{th} Supreme People’s Assembly.\textsuperscript{74} He officially began his rule on September 9, 1998, the 50\textsuperscript{th} year of the establishment of North Korean government, with grand events (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 399, September 1998). Kim Jong-il’s qualification as the successor was highly dependent on the fact that he was the son of Kim Il-sung. Thus, he could not help depending on his father’s fame and popularity. Kim Il-sung was considered a national hero during the Japanese control period, and most North Korean people greatly admired him, even though many of his achievements were overestimated.\textsuperscript{75} Kim Jong-il did not have such a reputation. North Korea was the country of Kim Il-sung. Because of the level of idolization of Kim Il-sung, North Korea seemed not to exist without him. That is why his death was announced on the next day, 34 hours after he died. His sudden death was very shocking not only to the North Korean people but also to political elites, though Kim Jong-il had controlled the country for 20 years as the successor.

\textsuperscript{72} Pyongyang announced Kim Jong-il’s nomination as a successor of Kim Il-sung to the public in the 6\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress in 1980, 6 years after the conference.
\textsuperscript{73} Many flattered Kim Jong-il since he became the successor and Kim Il-sung himself was told to flatter his son in 1992 (Hwang, 2010: 294).
\textsuperscript{74} With his re-appointment, many personnel changes were done at the conference. For example, 24 among 31 people in the Cabinet were new faces (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 398, September 1998).
\textsuperscript{75} Most innocent people of North Korea including Hwang’s wife and children cried mournfully when they heard of the death of the Great leader (Hwang, 2010: 313).
Because his power was based on his heritage, Kim Jong-il concentrated on strengthening his father’s status, and then identified himself with his father. He did not succeed his father’s official position as “President” and named his father “the Eternal President” of North Korea through the constitutional reform in 1998. Instead, Kim Jong-il’s status as the chairman of national defense became the highest status in the country with extended power under the reformed constitution (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 398, September 1998). Also, he concentrated most of the country’s national resources on the idolization of his father (and even his mother, Kim Jong-suk). Finally, the Pyongyang Broadcasting Station announced repeatedly that Kim Jong-il is the very Kim Il-sung, our Great Leader (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 8, 1994; April 15, 1998).

Despite public propaganda, there is some evidence to show that his succession was challenging. First, Chairman Kim Jong-il extended the planned three years of national mourning for one more year. For full three years from 1994 to 1997, Kim Jong-il controlled North Korea without using his own name as the source of authority; instead, he ruled with “the dying instructions of Kim Il-sung” (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January, 1995). Kim Il-sung’s New Year’s Address was replaced with the joint

76 As a successor, Kim Jong-il was expected to succeed his father’s two positions: general-secretary of the party and president of the DPRK (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, July 1994).
77 According to South Korean records, 81% of construction during the second half of 1997 was related to political purpose, idolization. And Kim Jong-il held unprecedented celebrations for his deceased mother’s 80th birthday on December 24, 1997 (Weekly Report on North Korea, no. 362, September 1997: 2-9).
78 Kim Jong-un is known to have had plastic surgery 6 times to more closely resemble his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. North Korea seems to remain the country of Kim Il-sung.
79 To respect and remember parents’ love and to offer filial piety, traditionally people have three years of mourning period after their parents die in Korea because Korean people believe that parents should be honored for their work to raise babies particularly during the first three years of life, including the pregnancy period (until two years after birth). Usually people come out of mourning in the third year after two years of full mourning.
editorial contributed by the party, the military, and the youth organs since 1995. Even in 1995 and in 1997, Kim Il-sung’s New Year’s Address of 1994 was rebroadcast with the joint editorial (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January, 1995). The three years of mourning might contribute to the enhancement of Kim Jong-il’s image as the son that admired his father, but more importantly this period was about Kim Jong-il’s struggle for power, and the extended year from 1996 to 1997 suggests that his struggle was not easy. Korean Central Television (KCTV) emphasized that North Korea had solved the succession issue according to Kim Il-sung’s will, and South Korean analysts concluded that Pyongyang had difficulties on that matter of succession due to the opposition of forces among elite groups (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, August 21, 1994). On August 19, 1994, many flyers of “overthrow Kim Jong-il” were spread about the foreign embassies in Pyongyang (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, August 21, 1994). According to Hwang, Kim Jong-il’s secret police were searching for dissidents and shot them with or without announcements in 1995 (Hwang, 2010: 325). On May 10, 1996, Rodong sinmun expressed wariness against opposite forces among elite groups by asserting that the Soviet Union had collapsed because of power struggles among elite groups.

Second, massive escapes by North Korean elite groups during this period also show Pyongyang’s unrest during the first years under Chairman Kim Jong-il. The first defectors which brought about Pyongyang’s fury were the Sung Hye-rim family which included Kim Jong-il’s first love and Kim Jong-nam’s mother. They disappeared from Moscow in February 1996. Pyongyang considered the report of the fact to be a direct
insult to Chairman Kim Jong-il and expressed extreme fury to foreign newspapers via news agencies which North Korean people cannot access (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, February 16, 1995*). The second shock to Pyongyang was the asylum of Hwang, Jang-yop (and Kim, Duk-hong) in Seoul on February 12, 1997. A well-known intellectual, Hwang created and established the Juche ideology and was one of the highest-ranking personnel in North Korea. Hwang’s escape was a painful loss for Pyongyang but more importantly, it shows the frustration and distrust for the Kim Jong-il regime which was apparent even among elite groups. At first, Pyongyang asserted that Hwang had not escaped from North Korea but was kidnapped by South Koreans. 5 days after his asylum, Pyongyang admitted his escape and characterized him as a betrayer. The third noteworthy escape was the asylum in the U.S. of DPRK diplomats including the Jang Seong-gil family (the DPRK ambassador to Egypt), the Jang Seong-ho family (the DPRK councilor to Paris) on August 27, 1997, and the Kim Kyung-pil family (the DPRK diplomat to Berlin) in January 1998. Pyongyang asserted that their asylum was a plot by the CIA and criticized Washington.

The third indication of his difficulties in securing his succession is that Chairman Kim Jong-il chose “Sun-gun Politics (Military First)” as his main policy. “Sun-gun Politics” means to concentrate primary national resources on the military and to spread military spirit among citizens to pursue the socialist revolution (*Korean Central Television (KCTV), October 20, 1998*). Chairman Kim Jong-il depended on his support

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80 Lee Han-young (real name: Lee Il-nam), a nephew of Sung Hye-rim was killed in Seoul for publishing a book on North Korea’s royal family on February 15, 1997.

81 *Rodong sinmun* and the *Worker’s* joint Editorial, “Our Sun-gun Politics is victory and invincibility”
from the military because he had been the chairman of national defense since 1990, while he had less support within the party (See Figure 5-1). During this transition period (1994-1998), the majority of his official appointments were military-related affairs such as visiting troops.\textsuperscript{82}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Chairman Kim Jong-il’s Official Activities (Relative Ratio)}\textsuperscript{83}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{82} His military-related affairs among all official affairs were 57\% (1995), 67\% (1996), 68\% (1997), and 62\% (1999). I extracted and arranged the statistics from (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, 1995-1999).

\textsuperscript{83} I created this chart based on the data from Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, 1994-2011. Only military related visits were expressed during 1994-1997 because of lack of data.

insisted that if the military collapses, the fate of country (a far-sighted national policy) would also collapse, while the economy can recover again after a decline. This is very unlike priorities in other socialist counties in which the workers, as the main driving force for socialist revolution, are ahead of other classes (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 439, June 16, 1999).
Food was sent primarily to the military even during the “massive death of hunger” period.\textsuperscript{84} His focus on the military showed that his power base was weak and unstable.\textsuperscript{85} The Military First Policy had two effects: preparedness for outside threats during this unstable transition period, and the unification of North Korean people despite economic difficulty and dissatisfaction.

\textit{2) Food Shortage Exacerbated by Natural Disaster}

North Korea’s food shortage was exacerbated by the devastating flood in 1995. 500,000 starved to death in 1995 and one million died in 1996 (Hwang, 2010: 342). Despite the people’s hardships, Chairman Kim Jong-il used national resources primarily for the idolization of his father and for military purposes, because these would strengthen his power bases. Pyongyang presented new slogan of “March for hardship”\textsuperscript{86} and forced its people to endure without food rationing in 1995. This slogan was extended until 1998. From 1995 to 1998, North Korea went through the period of the “massive death of hunger.” Here is a poem related to North Korea’s horrendous reality.

\begin{quote}
I Am Selling My Daughter for 100 Won
By Jang, Jin-sung\textsuperscript{87}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} North Korean people had to submit their last food supplies for 3 months to the military because the military was short of food in the end of 1996 (Hwang, 2010: 341).
\textsuperscript{85} The Perry Report pointed out the North Korean regime was “wrapped in an overriding sense of vulnerability” (Perry, 1999: 5).
\textsuperscript{86} The slogan came from a story about Kim Il-sung leading partisans on a march for 100 days while suffering from bitter coldness and starvation to avoid the Japanese suppression operation at Manchuria in 1938-39.
\textsuperscript{87} Jang, Jin-sung was a North Korean defector who had worked as a high-ranking propaganda official. He escaped from North Korea in 2004 and published a poetry book, \textit{I am selling my daughter for 100 won}, in 2008 (Publisher: Jogapje.com, Seoul). This poem was based on one of his worst memories in North Korea. 100 won in North Korea is valued at 1,000 won in South Korea, which is equivalent of US $1.00. Poem
She was desolate.
‘I Am Selling My Daughter for 100 Won.’
With that placard on her neck
with her daughter by her side
the woman standing in the market place –
she was mute.
People looked at the daughter being sold
and the mother who was selling.
The people cast their curses at them
but keeping her eyes downcast
she was tearless.
Even when the daughter
wrapped herself
in her mother’s skirt
shouting, screaming
that her mother was dying
the woman kept her lips
tight and trembled –
she did not know how to be grateful.
‘I’m not buying the daughter
I want to buy the motherhood.’
That soldier came by
with a 100 won note in his hand.
The woman who ran off with the money,
she was a mother.
With the money
she got for her daughter
she bought a loaf of bread
and put a chunk of bread
in her daughter’s mouth
as they said goodbye.
‘Forgive me,’ she cried.
She was desolate.

The public sentiment worsened as the hunger grew. Many were caught selling
human flesh not only in the provinces but also in Pyongyang (Hwang, 2010: 349).

Morality and conscience were ridiculed by the public. There was a saying widely used in

(retrieved on January 30, 2013).
North Korea at that time: “the most conscientious man (the most foolish man) died for hunger in 1995; the second conscientious man (the second foolish man) died for hunger in 1996; the third conscientious man (the third foolish man) may die for hunger in 1997; then, only tricksters will survive (Hwang, 2010: 349).” Stealing and robbery were commonplace.

Pyongyang was left with no option but to ask for international aid. At one point, Pyongyang demanded to stop the appeals for international aid at the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) (February 2, 1996) because main providers, including the U.S., expressed officially their will to provide aid conditional with Pyongyang’s opening. However, Pyongyang soon cancelled its demand to cease the appeals at UNDHA and asked for additional international aid at UNDHA via Lee Chul, then DPRK ambassador to Geneva, on March 29, 1996. On August 7, 1996, the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman announced officially for the first time that the flood damage during July 1996 had reached $1.7 billion and that the country expected international aid. On May 22, 1997, to assure against the possibility of North Korea’s provocation of war, the Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized its own efforts to find a solution and pursue peace, saying that “even military troops had been assigned to work at farming” instead of its previous aggressive responses (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, May 22, 1997). In the second preliminary conference for 4-party talks, Pyongyang seemed primarily focused on securing food aid (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, May 22, 1997).

88 For example, James Laney, then US ambassador to South Korea, said in an interview with KBS, Seoul on January 21, 1996 that the U.S. wanted to use the aid as bait for North Korea’s openness.

89 Pyongyang responded with aggressive attitude, saying “war is a matter of time” to Washington’s warning of breaking war.
Extreme poverty in North Korea from 1995 to 1998 contributed to the improvement of relations with Beijing. The relations between Pyongyang and Beijing had deteriorated after Beijing normalized its relations with Seoul in 1992, but when Beijing announced its economic aid to North Korea just after Kim Il-sung died, the estranged relations between two were restored somewhat. However, relations soon became estranged again when Premier Li Peng visited Seoul in November 1994. Pyongyang took the side of Taiwan on the matter of venue for the 2002 Asian Games in 1995 and Beijing expelled Rodong sinmun correspondents in Beijing. However, personnel exchanges increased since Chinese high-level delegations of the party and the government visited Pyongyang on June 7, 1995. During September 1995, the Chinese delegation’s visits increased; its visits to Pyongyang were twice that of North Korean visits to Beijing (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, September 20, 1995). On July 11, 1996, in celebration of the 35th year of the Sino-DPRK treaty of friendship, both high-level personnel and top leaders exchanged congratulatory telegrams. Pyongyang held big events including Chinese naval vessels’ entering a North Korean port and Beijing announced that it would provide North Korea with 100,000 tons of food for free. In July 1996, Beijing donated a standing statue of Kim Il-sung to Pyongyang. Beijing wished to restore relations with Pyongyang and its influence in Pyongyang, while it wished to check the increased influence of Washington and Tokyo.

90 There had been 33 Chinese visits to Pyongyang by September 1995, when there had only been 14 by September 1994 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, September 20, 1995).
91 Since 1992 when Seoul and Beijing normalized relations, Pyongyang had held only a celebratory party for each anniversary (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, July 11, 1996).
To secure food aid from Japan, Pyongyang permitted Japanese wives living in North Korea to visit their hometowns in Japan.\textsuperscript{92} Even in January 1998 Chairman Kim Jong-il sent a New Year’s card to Mori Yoshiro, then Chairman of the Liberal Democratic party of Japan, wishing for improved relations with Tokyo. As a result of Pyongyang’s efforts, Tokyo sent 9,000 tons of brown rice to North Korea in February 1998 and planned to provide 67,000 tons of rice over the next few months.

3) \textit{Subsequent Public Unrest}

During this unstable period, there had been predictions of the regime collapse, both inside and outside of North Korea. Because of political and economic instability, outsiders predicted that there might be a coup d’état by unsatisfied political elites or a national revolution by the common people because of extreme starvation. Moreover, worries of regime collapse created concern about the potential effects that a sudden collapse of the regime would have on East Asia and the Korean Peninsula, along with the concern that Pyongyang might declare preemptive war on South Korea before it collapsed.\textsuperscript{93} Here is a part of CIA testimony to the U.S. Senate on the “North Korean threat:”

\textsuperscript{92} They married Korean men during the Japanese rule and followed their husbands to North Korea after 1945. The project was suspended when Pyongyang and Tokyo had conflicts about some missing persons in North Korea in June 1998.
\textsuperscript{93} Joseph Nye, then US assistant deputy minister of defense, pointed out that the situation of the Korean peninsula was unstable because North Korea had 1.1 million armed forces (\textit{The Washington Post}, “US presence: Oxygen for Asia,” A27, December 8, 1995); John Shalikashvili, then US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mentioned that North Korea had the 8\textsuperscript{th} special corps of 80,000 capable of infiltrating South Korea, threatening the U.S.-ROK military facility, and disrupting the peace in South Korea (\textit{The Washington Post}, December 1995).
“…This briefing addressed questions on the status of North Korea’s military preparedness and an evaluation of the Intelligence Community’s warning capability. The witnesses provided both a short- and medium-term overview of the likely evolution of the North Korean political and economic situation, and of the regional political and economic context in which it will take place. The deteriorating economic situation, with the possibility of severe food shortages, adds to an already unstable environment and the Committee will continue to monitor the situation closely.”

- “Senate Report 105-1: Special Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence” (January 22, 1997)

The prediction of the regime collapse was also prevalent among North Korean intellectuals. Unlike the common people who escaped from North Korea in order to survive, many intellectuals (particularly those living in foreign countries, such as diplomats and international students) escaped from North Korea to prepare for unification in the near future. Hwang believed in 1997 that North Korean regime would collapse within 5 years and decided to go to South Korea to help remove the Kim regime in the North (Hwang, 2010: 360). As predicted by outsiders, Pyongyang with its instability

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95 According to Kim, Hyun-ho, then an international student in Moscow and defector in 1994, there had been perception among high-level figures that North Korea would collapse within years (interview with Kim Hyun-ho, August 2012).

96 His expectation was changed to disappointment when he came to the South. South Korea and the U.S.
and extreme poverty was preparing for war. According to Hwang, North Korean military leaders asserted that they should start a war immediately because the situation would only worsen (Hwang, 2010: 350). Even Hwang himself, like other North Korean people, was so frustrated that he longed for war as some kind of resolution to North Korea’s terrible situation (Hwang, 2010: 331).

Pyongyang responded to mentions of the potential “North Korean collapse” and “North Korean threats” with bitter recrimination.97 Pyongyang strongly denied its national crisis and criticized this view via its news agencies. However, preventing the North Korean people from hearing such views was more important. On August 7, 1996, a Rodong sinmun Editorial, “our style of Socialism and our people’s promising future,” insisted that the view of a possible “North Korean collapse” was a very foolish idea and that their style of socialism was not collapsing but promising. This insistence was intended to discourage the North Korean people from those views and to prevent them from ideological laxity because Rodong sinmun is a media for its own people. This also shows Pyongyang’s worries about the endemic public unrest as a result of extreme poverty during the new Kim Jong-il regime. Pyongyang attempted to overcome its crisis by forcing its people to sacrifice themselves for their country with “revolutionary spirit” under the slogan of “March of hardship.”98 In this period, Pyongyang was unstable and practiced confrontation very often, despite the admonishments of outsiders (US Senate,
1998: 14). Most of Pyongyang’s confrontational actions were against Seoul because of the fear of absorbing unification.

4) Relations between Pyongyang and Washington

These unstable years were the same 4-5 years after the Agreed Framework, from which both Pyongyang and Washington expected to achieve results. As expected, the implementation of the agreement was more difficult than the signing of the agreement, and each step took more time and energy. After the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang allowed IAEA inspections three times by 1995 (November 1994; January 1995; September 1995) but limited the inspection to only the seal of spent fuel rods, the installation of monitoring cameras, and visual inspections. In the IAEA inspection on January 31, 1996, Pyongyang restricted IAEA agents’ access to three small facilities and prohibited their access to other main facilities (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 174, January 1996). During those years, relations between Pyongyang and Washington had been back and forth, but continuous meetings and talks took place. Despite criticism and difficulties of the process, heavy oil was kept in supply, talks between Pyongyang and Washington continued, and the agreement was maintained with slow but steady progress because of Pyongyang’s wish for improvement of relations with Washington and because of Washington’s plan for the “Soft-landing” policy toward Pyongyang.

Despite a Republican majority’s continuous outspoken critics demanding a
revision of the Agreed Framework\textsuperscript{99} and despite Pyongyang’s unstable situation, Washington kept up talks with Pyongyang and relaxed some sanctions against North Korea while remaining on its guard for a sudden state of emergency in the Korean peninsula. The U.S.-ROK Team Spirit Exercise and the U.S.-ROK Foal Eagle Exercise were part of Washington’s preparedness plan. Washington’s basic policy toward North Korea was the “soft-landing” policy\textsuperscript{100} which assumed its collapse as an inevitability and would try to manage its collapse as smoothly as possible so that East Asia felt minimal effects.

Pyongyang responded furiously to Republican critics and attempts to connect a dialogue between North and South with the Agreed Framework and US-ROK Joint Exercises, but still tried for an opportunity to improve relations with Washington. North Korea’s criticism of anti-Agreed Framework views in Congress were focused on “some factionist forces” rather than Washington, and its criticism of the U.S.-ROK Joint Exercises was more focused on Seoul rather than Washington (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 162, January 10, 1995; no. 174, January 14-17, 1996). What Pyongyang tried to avoid most in the KEDO negotiation was the acceptance of the Korean model of Light Water Reactors. Pyongyang even threatened that it would cancel the agreement and the release of frozen nuclear facilities whenever the talks on LWRs

\textsuperscript{99} Majority leader Senator Robert Dole, Senator John McCain, Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senator Frank Murkowski, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources had criticized for the Agreed Framework. “A joint resolution expressing the sense of Congress with respect to North-South dialogue on the Korean Peninsula and the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework (S. J. Res. 29 (104\textsuperscript{th}) for Senate and H.CON.RES.19 for House)” was introduced both in the Senate (led by Senator Frank Murkowski) and the House (led by Representative Scott McInnis) on January 25, 1995. These bills were passed in the House on September 1995 and in the Senate on November 1995.

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 369, February, 1998
reached deadlock because of the Korean model of LWRs.\textsuperscript{101} Pyongyang could not accept the Korean model of LWRs because it would strike a fatal blow to its pretended superiority and would create concern about future subordination to Seoul technically (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 162, January 1995).\textsuperscript{102} However, Pyongyang accepted the Korean model on June 12, 1995 and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and Pyongyang reached “the agreement on supply of a light-water-reactor project” on December 15, 1995. On January 10, 1997, KEDO and Pyongyang signed the last two protocols and the preparation for building LWRs was finished. Pyongyang had pursued a peace treaty with Washington several times\textsuperscript{103} and proposed a tentative agreement with Washington, excluding Seoul, but Washington did not respond to it.\textsuperscript{104} Pyongyang also concentrated on the agreement for the excavation and repatriation of the remains of U.S. soldiers who died in the Korean War\textsuperscript{105} and reached an agreement with Washington on May 9, 1996. When relations between Pyongyang and Washington deteriorated seriously during the end of 1996 and early 1997,\textsuperscript{106} Pyongyang attempted to relax relations by approaching the repatriation of

\textsuperscript{101}March 7, 1995; April 22, 1995; September 28, 1995.

\textsuperscript{102}With the unstable political situation and fear of absorbing unification, Pyongyang’s confrontation against Seoul became severe in this period in which there were several trials of spies charged with submarine espionage. (September 18, 1996; June 25, 1998; July 12, 1998; November 20, 1998; December 18, 1998).

\textsuperscript{103}The Foreign Minister Spokesman stated “the person directly involved in the peace treaty with Pyongyang is Washington” as a response to the U.S. State’s announcement that a peace treaty should be signed between the North and the South (February 24, 1995); \textit{Rodong sinmun} Editorial insisted on peace treaty with Washington to implement the Agreed Framework (April 13, 1995); The Foreign Minister Spokesman emphasized a peace treaty with Washington (May 12, 1995).

\textsuperscript{104}R. Nicholas Burns, then spokesman of the department of State, confirmed that Washington did not consider any agreement with Pyongyang which would exclude Seoul (February 22, 1996).

\textsuperscript{105}According to South Korean analysts, Pyongyang had used the issue to escape from international isolation and to approach Washington (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 172, November 1995).

\textsuperscript{106}The relations between the two was particularly worsened during this time due to several events: the

The year of 1998 was a period in which dissatisfaction accumulated in both North Korea and the U.S., and as a result the implementation of the Agreed Framework burst into flame. On March 7, 1998, Korean Central Television (KCTV) expressed serious worries about Washington’s insincere attitude in implementing the agreement and asserted that Washington should demonstrate its sincerity. Pyongyang had been disappointed by slow steps including Washington’s limited release of economic sanctions without cancelling the freezing of American assets in North Korea (January 1995); the slow construction of LWRs; and continuous disputes on the cost of heavy oil supplements to North Korea among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, no. 372, March 7, 1998). Pyongyang worried about the future delivery of heavy oil because Washington seemed to shift the responsibility, and Seoul and Tokyo responded passively (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, no. 381, May 7, 1998).107 After Kim Jong-il subdued opposition forces and seized all power of the country formally (declared general-secretary of the KWP on October 8, 1997; re-elected as the chairman of national defense on September 9, 1998), he reviewed the implementation of the agreement. And the result of the review was disappointing and even threatening. Washington seemed to slow the implementation without the release of economic sanctions under the “soft-landing policy,” waiting for Pyongyang’s collapse. Due to fear

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107 The spokesman of Foreign Minister expressed Pyongyang’s dissatisfaction with the U.S.’s slow implementation of the agreement and threatened that Pyongyang would open the frozen nuclear facilities and suspend storing spent fuel rods (May 7, 1998).
that Washington might cancel the agreement because of deteriorated public opinion on North Korea,\(^\text{108}\) Pyongyang’s criticism of Washington became severe.\(^\text{109}\) In Pyongyang’s eyes, Washington was “watching for a chance to harm Pyongyang with a hidden sword inside.”\(^\text{110}\) When the spokesman of the Foreign Minister of the DPRK threatened that they would cancel the agreement, mentioning discontent with the increased numbers of hard liners in Washington, Seoul analyzed that Pyongyang threatened to cancel the agreement because of its fear that Washington would slow the steps of agreement \((\text{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 404, October 13, 1998})\). Pyongyang took the initiative by accusing Washington of cancelling the agreement by delaying the release of economic sanctions,\(^\text{111}\) but what Pyongyang wanted most was the improvement of relations with Washington through the agreement. That is why Pyongyang responded quickly and positively to Washington’s call in 1999.

On the other hand, Washington seemed as though it did not understand

\(^{108}\) Public opinion on North Korea had deteriorated because of North Korea’s missile launch (September 1998; Pyongyang insisted that it was a launch of satellite) and the suspicion of an underground nuclear facility at Kumchongri (November 1998).

\(^{109}\) Rodong sinmun Editorial, “We are the winner,” criticized Washington’s sanctions on North Korea, asserting that it was Washington’s intention to isolate and destroy the North Korean regime (November 7, 1998). The spokesman of the general staff department of the KPA criticized “the U.S.-ROK operation plan 5027” as a declaration of war against North Korea and threatened that KPA would respond with blows for annihilation \((\text{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 411, December 2, 1998})\). During the anti-American campaigns and assemblies on December 4-11, 1998, Pyongyang resumed its extreme criticism against Washington from which it had refrained since 1994 and encouraged people to feel enmity toward the U.S. \((\text{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 412, December 2, 1998})\). When Kim Jong-il visited a general officer command (GOCOM) on December 18, 1998, he referred officers to Washington’s new war plan for North Korea and encouraged them to strengthen fighting power. On the same day, the Korean news agency criticized the U.S. attack on Iraq. Pyongyang felt the potential threat of US attack after the Iraq events because Bagdad’s conflict with Washington on WMD was the same as the conflict between Pyongyang and Washington \((\text{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 413, December 18, 1998})\). The Rodong sinmun Editorial on December 21, 1998 threatened that Pyongyang would cancel if Washington wished for cancellation of the agreement without release of economic sanctions.

\(^{110}\) From a comment by the spokesman of Foreign Minister criticizing the reinforcement of USFK equipments \((\text{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 373, March 12, 1998})\).

\(^{111}\) Rodong sinmun Editorial, “the unfair sanctions should be released” (December 21, 1998).
Pyongyang’s dissatisfaction and fear. In the Senate Hearing on KEDO and the Agreed Framework on July 14, 1998, the main issue was about the KEDO’s debt of $38 million and future funding, and Washington’s concerns focused on the non-fulfillment on the U.S. side, not on the North Korean side. Asked about the reason for Pyongyang’s criticism of Washington’s slow implementation, Deming, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, answered that in his opinion it was because North Korea was always looking for leverage, and Ambassador Gallucci answered that it was because North Korea might want more than the U.S. could provide (US Senate, 1998: 15 and 24). In fact, they “just don’t know why” (U.S. Senate, 1998: 14). Despite many provocations and threats from Pyongyang that it would break the agreement, Deming, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and Anderson, the executive director of KEDO, testified that North Korea has kept its nuclear nonproliferation commitments under the Agreed Framework in the Hearing (U.S. Senate, 1998: 4, 7, 13 and 18). As Senator John Kerry mentioned, Washington supported the idea that “the U.S. must guarantee that the Framework is upheld” (U.S. Senate, 1998: 3).\footnote{112 Also, it was only Senator Kerry who mentioned “the relations between Pyongyang and Washington” through the Agreed Framework (US Senate, 1998: 9).}

However, the skeptical and critical voices had increased in Washington in 1998.\footnote{113 The reduced budget for aid to North Korea for the following year by US House of Representatives (September 17, 1998); The Republicans’ introduction of a bill assigning strict conditions to food aid to North Korea (September 28, 1998); Council on Foreign Relations’ proposal to re-consider the policy on North Korea (October 7, 1998) and so on.} The criticism was much more severe particularly after Pyongyang launched a missile ("satellite" in Pyongyang’s insistence) in September 1998, along with suspicions raised in
November 1998 of underground nuclear facilities at Kumchangri. Finally, President Clinton instructed William Perry, special advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, to review the whole policy toward North Korea in November 1998.

5) Summary

North Korea’s domestic crisis during its transition period, 1994-1998, resulted from three factors: political transition, a devastating food shortage exacerbated by natural disaster, and public unrest caused by the previous two. The relations between Pyongyang and Washington went back and forth without any assertive position, though both were able to uphold the Agreed Framework. During this unstable period, there had been predictions of the regime collapse, both inside and outside of North Korea. Washington seemed to slow its efforts for implementation without the release of economic sanctions under the “soft-landing policy,” waiting for Pyongyang’s collapse. Due to its fear that Washington might cancel the agreement because of deteriorated U.S. public opinion on North Korea, Pyongyang’s criticism of Washington became severe. In this period, Pyongyang was unstable and practiced confrontation very often. Most of Pyongyang’s confrontational actions were against Seoul because of the fear of absorbing unification.

3. The Third Period: Re-expectation for Normalization of Relations, Frustration and the Second Nuclear Crisis, Settlement and New Expectation

\footnote{This suspicion was resolved when Rubin, the spokesman for the State department, notified the investigation results that the underground facilities at Kumchangri was a suspicious large empty tunnel but there was nothing to conclude that Pyongyang violated the Agreed Framework (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 440, June 23, 1999).}
for Normalization of Relations (1999-2008)

1) Increased Expectation during the End of the Clinton Administration

During the transition period of Pyongyang, Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang had two sides: Washington kept performing joint military exercises with Seoul to be ready to restore order in the event of North Korea’s sudden collapse and to prevent war against South Korea, while Washington provided Pyongyang with promised heavy oil and food. There were continuous disputes in Washington about its level of trust in North Korea, and Washington could not determine its policy clearly. Washington aimed to maintain the status quo while waiting for the collapse of North Korea, but it wished to make the collapse as painless as possible (“Soft-landing”).

“The Perry Report”\textsuperscript{115} changed Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang at the end of Clinton administration. After almost 10 months of research, interviews with experts inside and outside the U.S., and visits to Pyongyang, Dr. Perry and his research team concluded that the urgent U.S. policy toward Pyongyang must be to end North Korea’s nuclear program and long-range missile program, and for these purpose, it was essential to preserve the Agreed Framework (Perry, 1999: 4-6, 8). Deterrence of war on the Korean peninsula is important to both countries because it provides Pyongyang and Washington with stability and conditions to pursue a permanent peace (Perry, 1999: 3). Perry and his review team considered 4 policies but rejected the following: 1) Status quo (strong deterrence with limited engagement with the DPRK) was rejected because it was not sustainable; 2) Undermining the DPRK (seeking the demise of Kim Jong-il regime) was rejected because it was not sustainable.

rejected because it risked a destructive war and might harm the North Korean people more than the DPRK government already had; 3) Reforming North Korea (Promoting the accelerated political and economic reform of the DPRK) was rejected because Pyongyang would strongly resist such reform; 4) Buying our objectives (compensate nuclear weapons or missile programs) was also rejected because it encourages Pyongyang and others to continue such behaviors (Perry, 1999: 7-8). What Dr. Perry and his team suggested was a two-path strategy: first, pursue the reduction of the threat or tension perceived by Pyongyang and proceed with normalization of relations with Pyongyang if Pyongyang eliminates its nuclear weapons; second, if Pyongyang rejects the first suggestion, take other steps to contain the North Korean threat (Perry, 1999: 8-9).

“…in a step-by-step and reciprocal fashion, move to reduce pressure on the DPRK that it perceives as threatening. The reduction of perceived threat would in turn give the DPRK regime the confidence that it could coexist peacefully with US and its neighbors and pursue its own economic and social development. If the DPRK moved to eliminate its nuclear and long-range missile threat, the U.S. would normalize relations with the DPRK, relax sanctions that have long constrained trade with the DPRK and take other positive steps that would provide opportunities for the DPRK.” (Perry, 1999: 8)

The most distinctive recommendation of “the Perry Report” is that it urges Washington to create a favorable environment including active tension reduction with Pyongyang to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program with the assumption of
coexisting with Pyongyang. Although the report still insists on the pursuit of the normalization of relations with Pyongyang only after Pyongyang gives up all nuclear weapons-related activities, it also advises active efforts by Washington to produce the conditions and atmosphere in which Pyongyang can eliminate its nuclear weapon program without perceived threats.

“The Perry Report” gave Washington confidence to pursue a more active engagement policy toward Pyongyang. Washington provided the promised 500,000 tons of heavy oil to Pyongyang by November 6, 1999, concluded the contract for main construction of LWRs on December 15 which had been delayed since the site construction in 1997, and continued high-level talks with Pyongyang (talks between Kim Kye-gwan and Cartman: January 22, 2000; March 7, 2000; May 24, 2000; July 19, 2000; August 9, 2000; September 27, 2000).

Pyongyang responded carefully to Washington’s conciliating gestures while it began to expect the improvement of relations with Washington again.116 Washington’s relaxation of economic sanctions on North Korea on June 19, 2000 was very welcomed by Pyongyang. Unlike the first relaxation of economic sanctions in 1995, which had only symbolic meaning, this time Washington’s relaxation of sanctions was much more practical as it released many restrictions on finance, investment, and trade (although the sanctions related to weapons or terror were excluded from the released list) (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 491, June 19, 2000). Pyongyang responded to the release of sanctions with the reconfirmation of its moratorium on long-range missile

116 Rodong Sinmun Editorial, “We will watch Washington’s attitude” (January 12, 2000).
testing in accordance with its desire to pursue improvement of relations with Washington.\textsuperscript{117} The exchange visits between Jo Myoung-rok, the Vice Marshal of the DPRK, and Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of the State of the U.S., in October 2000 made great progress in relations. The U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué announced after Jo’s visit to Washington that both parties would pursue the fundamental improvement of relations.\textsuperscript{118} Albright was very welcomed by Pyongyang and North Korean media gave prominent coverage of her visit.\textsuperscript{119} She met Chairman Kim Jong-il twice\textsuperscript{120} along with other high-ranking people. The purpose of her visit was to discuss the issues on North Korean missiles and the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism before President Clinton would visit. Pyongyang anticipated the visit of President Clinton so much that the North Korean media used the phrases “invitation” or “related to the visit of President Clinton” very often (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 510, October 23-25, 2000). The visit of President Clinton would give great stability to the Kim Jong-il regime through its recognition of North Korea as an independent state, which greatly enhanced national pride.\textsuperscript{121} Encouraged by the conciliating atmosphere between Washington and Pyongyang, many EU countries

\textsuperscript{117} Korean Central Television (KCTV)’s announcement (June 21, 2000).
\textsuperscript{118} Pyongyang Broadcasting Station and Korean Central Television (KCTV) announced the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué (October 12, 2000).
\textsuperscript{119} It is notable that she received such attention by North Korean media though her visiting period was shorter than the visit of Chi Haotian, the Chinese Defense Minister who visited Pyongyang at the same time as Albright (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 510, October 23-25, 2000).
\textsuperscript{120} To meet Kim Jong-il is considered very special; in North Korea, the person who has an experience of meeting Kim Jong-il receives a special status of “a person of audience” (interview with Jang Jin-sung, December 2012). Thus, the fact that Secretary Albright met Kim Jong-il twice in her short visit to Pyongyang means that Kim Jong-il considered her visit very important.
\textsuperscript{121} Encouraged by Albright’s visit to Pyongyang and new relations with many European countries in 2000, the New Year’s Joint Editorial mentioned that their international status had never been enhanced as high as in 2000 during the 5000 years of history of Korean people. (The New Year’s Joint Editorial, “Let’s open the new era of advancing with the spirit of victory from “the march for hardship” (January 1, 2001)).
expressed their will to normalize relations with Pyongyang. In turn, Pyongyang, due to confidence in the improvement of relations with Washington, began to pursue improvement of relations with other European states.\textsuperscript{122}

As the expectation for improvement of relations with Washington increased, Pyongyang restrained its confrontational tactics. Pyongyang agreed to maintain its moratorium on long-range missile testing and participated in several talks on North Korean long-range missiles with Washington. More importantly, Chairman Kim Jong-il’s official visits to military troops were reduced significantly during 2000 (See Figure 5-1).\textsuperscript{123} Combined with Washington’s hope to achieve some improvement of relations with Pyongyang before the Clinton term ended, and with Pyongyang’s wish to seize the opportunity for better relations with Washington, the atmosphere of conciliation increased. Trust began to grow and both Washington and Pyongyang were set to achieve a new level of trust-building. With confidence in the development of better relations with Washington, Pyongyang began to prepare for transition in its policies including economic reforms.\textsuperscript{124}

2) \textit{Frustration from Hostile Policies of the Incoming Bush Administration and the 2nd Nuclear Crisis}

\textsuperscript{122} Pyongyang established full diplomatic ties with Italy (January 4, 2000); with the United Kingdom (December 12, 2000); with the Netherlands (January 16, 2001); with Belgium (January 24, 2001); with Canada February 6, 2001); with Spain (February 7, 2001); with Germany (March 1, 2001) and agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Luxembourg, Greece, and Brazil on March 5, 8, and 9, 2001.

\textsuperscript{123} Kim Jong-il visited military troops 21 times during 2000 among all 73 of his official affairs (28\%) while his visits of military troops during 1999 were 41 among all 69 of his official affairs (59\%) (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 519, January 2001).

\textsuperscript{124} Led by the New Year’s Joint Editorial, Pyongyang announced several editorials on ‘new thinking’, ‘farewell to the past’, and ‘renew’ and those arguments were announced as “Kim Jong-il’s remark” which had high possibility to be chosen as the official policy of Pyongyang (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 520, January 4, 2001).
The conciliatory mood between Washington and Pyongyang was broken soon after the new government under President George W. Bush was established in the U.S. As Pyongyang wished to continue its conciliating gestures with Washington, it remained cautious and broadcasted only the fact that George W. Bush was elected as the new President of the U.S. without any comments (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 517, December 17, 2000). Pyongyang refrained from criticism for a while even when the Bush administration expressed that its policy would be unlike Clinton’s (ABC policy: Anything But Clinton) and that it would review the existing U.S. policy toward Pyongyang. On February 21, 2001, Pyongyang announced its first official position on the Bush administration’s hostile remarks against Pyongyang: Pyongyang still would not accept the hostile remarks of the new government in Washington as the official policy of the U.S., but warned Washington against it becoming so. Seoul analyzed at that time that there was little possibility that Pyongyang would change its policy from conciliation to hostility because Pyongyang expressed its wish to improve relations with Washington several times in the announcement (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 527, February 21, 2001). On March 3, 2001, Pyongyang urged Washington to implement the Agreed Framework and emphasized the principle of “talk for talk; confrontation for confrontation.” (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 528, March 3, 2001). With its expectation for improvement of relations with Washington, Pyongyang had not yet decided its policy direction and attempted to influence to Washington’s policy before it took action.

125 Choson sinbo, “The hostile policies of Bush administration are caused by its unpreparedness to make a policy within the administration” (March 13, 2001).
However, Pyongyang recognized soon that Washington’s remarks would be Washington’s official position. Pyongyang changed its strategy to respond to Washington’s new policy toward Pyongyang: Pyongyang began to criticize Washington violently for its continuous hostile policies against Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{126} Pyongyang’s criticism of Washington increased significantly after March 14, 2001.\textsuperscript{127} This time, Pyongyang poured out raw criticism including personal attacks against President Bush\textsuperscript{128} indicating that Pyongyang responded to Washington emotionally (out of frustration and a sense of betrayal). Seoul analyzed that this criticism showed Pyongyang’s dissatisfaction first as a warning sign because Pyongyang’s criticism was limited to remarks made by its media (not by its officers such as the spokesman of Foreign Ministry) and because Pyongyang often expressed that it still wished for the improvement of relations with Washington (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 530, March 2001).\textsuperscript{129}

Despite Pyongyang’s wish, the situation in Washington continued to become unfavorable toward Pyongyang: The Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) mentioned the possibility of Pyongyang’s drug

\textsuperscript{126} Rodong Sinmun, “Persistent hegemonic ambition” (March 23, 2001); Rodong Sinmun, “The current US government is a hawkish and a Cold-war-oriented government” (March 27, 2001); Korean Central Television (KCTV), “The imperialist US is a vicious peace-breaker” (March 27, 2001); Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, “Unacceptable aggressive behaviors by American imperialists” (March 28, 2001); Rodong Sinmun, “The imperialist US does not want the unification of the Korean peninsula” (March 28, 2001); Korean Central Television (KCTV), “If the imperialist US broke an aggressive war on the Korean peninsula, the enemies could not go back to their land alive” March 29, 2001) and so on.

\textsuperscript{127} According to Seoul’s analysis, Pyongyang’s criticized Washington twice per day on January, 2001; 5 times in February 2001: 1-2 times per day by March 2001, but the criticism was increased to 6 per day on March 13, 2001; 44 on March 14, 2001; 45 on March 15, 2001; 22 on March 16, 2001. (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 530, March 2001).

\textsuperscript{128} “a cultist of war”, “a dictator”, “an enemy”, “a governor of death”, “aggressor” and so on (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 530-532, March 2001).

\textsuperscript{129} Rodong Sinmun, “What we want is to resolve the confrontation between Pyongyang and Washington and to proceed with the improvement of relations between two” (March 19, 2001).
production and distribution on March 6, 2001, and the State department announced the annual report on terrorism on April 30, 2001 which included North Korea again in the list of terrorism-sponsoring countries with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, and Sudan.\textsuperscript{130} As the removal of North Korea from the list was a priority for Pyongyang and the Clinton administration had replied to Pyongyang positively, Pyongyang felt great disappointment and frustration at the Bush administration’s policy. On June 6, 2001, President Bush announced the result of Washington’s North Korean policy review by his team and confirmed Washington’s position toward Pyongyang.

“…We have now completed our review. I have directed my national security team to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda to include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture…”

- George W. Bush, “Statement on Completion of the North Korea Policy Review” on June 6, 2001\textsuperscript{131}

The review recommended the same policy toward Pyongyang as the Perry report recommended: focus on eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons and long-range missile and use negotiation first. However, the fundamental views toward Pyongyang

\textsuperscript{130} It was the 14\textsuperscript{th} designation for North Korea since its first designation in 1988. Pyongyang had difficulty in its financing efforts with international monetary organizations because of the list (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 536, April 30, 2001).

\textsuperscript{131} For the full text of the announcement, see the American Presidency Project website: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45819 (retrieved on December 29, 2014).
were different: the Bush team began with the view not to reward bad behaviors, to await verification of actions by North Korea before acting, and to demand unilateral concession from Pyongyang first, while the Perry team urged Washington to create the atmosphere of conciliation before making demands. Perry and the Clinton administration developed those policy recommendations after long years of experience of failure, distrust and misunderstanding. But the Bush administration’s policy toward Pyongyang ignored many important admonitions by Perry and his team: preserve the Agreed Framework, create a favorable environment for negotiation (reduce threat Pyongyang felt), and coordinate U.S. policy with that of ROK.132 The Bush administration refused to sustain what the Clinton administration established, and sought to begin negotiations anew. Both delegates met in New York to discuss the issues between the two on June 13, 2001 but both only confirmed each one’s firm position. On June 18, 2001, 12 days later, Pyongyang announced its position on Washington’s review and its policy toward Pyongyang:

“...Washington’s suggestions are to demilitarize us: these are unilateral, pre-conditional, and hostile...The fundamental problem between Pyongyang and Washington is Washington’s hostile policy which is a threat to us...”

- The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on June 18, 2001133

Disappointed by Washington’s position, Pyongyang held large anti-American

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132 With President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” and with the beginning of the tour project of Kumgangsan in 2000, the South was engaging with the North at that time.
133 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 544, June 18, 2001).
rallies throughout the whole country for the commemoration of the Korean War (around June 25) at a similar level of criticism as the period of 1959-1991 when anti-American sentiment was at its peak. However, according to Seoul, Pyongyang still hoped to talk with Washington rather than begin any confrontation, evidenced by the fact that there were no significant military personnel participating in the rallies (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 545, June 25, 2001). Pyongyang wished Washington would revise its policy direction and return to the attitude demonstrated by the Clinton administration, and continued to criticize Washington’s hostile policy against Pyongyang.\(^{134}\)

Washington’s hostile policy had two kinds of influence on Pyongyang’s perception: as a security threat and as a risk to national dignity.\(^{135}\) It was not only the U.S.-ROK joint exercise such as Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL, August 2001), but also Washington’s antiballistic missile tests (ABM) (July 14, 2001), the National Missile Defense (NMD) plan, and Tokyo’s rocket launches (August 29, 2001; February 4, 2002) with the connivance of Washington which seemed to be targeted at Pyongyang.\(^{136}\) Unlike the Clinton administration which planned for a “soft-landing” even in the unstable situation of North Korea, the new Bush administration in Washington seemed to search for any cause or excuse to punish North Korea.

Pyongyang’s reassertion for the withdrawal of USFK in August, 2001 shows

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\(^{134}\) Rodong Sinmun Editorial emphasized that Washington’s changed attitude should be shown before talks begin (“The U.S. should know our principle exactly,” July 9, 2001).

\(^{135}\) Food aid from the U.S. had been continued since 1995. The U.S. sent around 300,000 tons of food every year and decided to send additional 100,000 tons of food in June 2002 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 595, June 2002).

\(^{136}\) “Washington pointed to us as the most dangerous country but it is we who were threatened by Washington” (Rodong Sinmun Editorial, February 22, 2001).
Pyongyang’s distrust in Washington and concern about USFK as a security threat again. Responding to increased threats from Washington, Pyongyang attempted to build its own security in other ways without nuclear weapons. First, Pyongyang attempted to restore old relations with Beijing and Moscow. Relations between Pyongyang and Beijing had been restored in some ways thanks to Beijing’s food aid during the mid-1990s but both became much more active in restoring their relations in 2001. On July 11, 2001, in the 40th celebration of the Sino-DPRK mutual aid and cooperation friendship treaty, Pyongyang and Beijing emphasized their “blood alliance” and restored the old custom of exchanging visits of their leaders in 2001 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 547, July 2001; no. 555, September 2001). Pyongyang’s effort to restore relations with Moscow was more impressive. To return the visit of President Putin in July 2000, Chairman Kim Jong-il visited Russia officially in July 2001 and had a summit meeting with President Putin on August 4, 2001. It had been 15 years since the DPRK top leader had visited Russia—Kim Il-sung last visited Russia in October 1986. Andrei Karlov, the new Russian ambassador to Pyongyang, met with several high ranking DPRK officers in his first month at Pyongyang (October 2001), had lunch with Chairman Kim Jong-il on December 15, 2001, and was granted a visit by Chairman Kim Jong-il to the Russian embassy where they dined together on January 6, 2002, which were all very unusual to North Korean diplomatic style (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 559, 137 The Sino-DPRK mutual aid and cooperation friendship treaty was signed by Kim Il-sung and Zhou Enlai on July 11, 1961. The essential parts are “automatic military intervention (Article 2)” and “extension indefinitely unless there is no objection (Article 7).” 138 Kim Jong-il visited Beijing twice in May 2000 and in January 2001 and Jiang Zemin visited Pyongyang in September 2001. There had been increased high ranking officer’s exchange visits between Pyongyang and Beijing since September 1995.
October 2001; no. 568, December 2001; no. 573, January 2002). Through the restoration of old relations, Pyongyang tried to check Washington’s hostile policy against Pyongyang while Beijing and Moscow sought to check Washington’s influence in Pyongyang. In fact, Pyongyang increased criticism for Washington after the summit meeting between Chairman Kim Jong-il and President Putin (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 551, August 2001). In a second attempt to achieve security in response to threats from Washington, Chairman Kim Jong-il emphasized the importance of the military again. From the first week of May 2001, Chairman Kim Jong-il’s visits to military troops began to increase (See Figure 5-1) (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 538-540, May 10, 2001). After Washington’s attack on Afghanistan on October 8, 2001, “Sun-gun (military first)” policy was much more emphasized in North Korean media (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 563, October 28, 2001).

On the other hand, Washington’s severe criticism for Kim Jong-il’s regime brought another type of damage to Pyongyang. Pyongyang had tried to enhance national prestige when the Kim Jong-il era began. For example, Pyongyang put an advertisement of Chairman Kim Jong-il in the New York Times, Russia News, and Russian National Television in December 1997 because Pyongyang believed that this kind of advertisement worked for improving the image of Chairman Kim Jong-il in the U.S. and

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139 Kim Jong-il visited the Russian embassy on January 6, 2002 for the first time as supreme leader of DPRK. He visited the Chinese embassy twice (March 2000 and July 2001) after the relation with Beijing was restored (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 573, January 2002).

140 Kim Jong-il visited military troops 11 times among 17 official affairs (64%) in May 2001 and 6 times among 6 (100%) in June, 2001 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 537-544, May and June 2001). The frequency of his visits to military troops was high from 2003 to 2006, reflecting Kim’s threat perception with the low expectation for improving relations with Washington: 2003 (68%); 2004 (65%); 2005 (51%); 2006 (70%). When the expectation increased in 2007, his visits to military troops decreased to 43%. Each statistics was extracted from Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, 2003-2007.
international community (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, no. 364, January 1998). With its improved image from the development of relations with Washington, Pyongyang was extending its diplomatic relations with many other European states in early 2000s. However, the Bush administration dashed cold water over Pyongyang’s hopes and plans by dishonoring Pyongyang with its criticism, which high context cultures hate most (Cohen 2004: 31-32). The new Bush administration announced the Annual Human Rights Report on February 26, 2001, the International Narcotic Control Strategy Report (INCSR) on March 6, 2001, and the Country Report on Terrorism on April 30, 2001 in which North Korea was labeled again as a terrorism-supporting country which severely violated human rights and was suspected of producing and smuggling narcotics. More importantly, President Bush and his high-ranking officers’ negative remarks on Chairman Kim Jong-il and his regime damaged North Korean national dignity.  

Pyongyang considered those criticisms of Chairman Kim Jong-il as insults to North Korea which wounded national pride because Chairman Kim Jong-il was the supreme leader and as such was a symbol of North Korea. This sense of insult to Chairman Kim Jong-il and national pride gave Pyongyang a great distrust in the Bush administration and resentment which lasted for a long time.

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141 “I have skepticism about the North Korean leader” in the U.S.-ROK Summit meeting at Washington (March 7, 2001); “I must tell you that I've been disappointed in (North Korean leader) Kim Jong Il not rising to the occasion, being so suspicious, so secretive” in an interview with Asian editors (October 17, 2001). After the 9.11 terrorist attack, President Bush’s negative remarks about Kim Jong-il and his regime became much more severe: “axis of evil” (January 30, 2001); “Pygmy (for Kim Jong-il)” (May 2002); “a failed leader” and “outlaw regimes” (January 2003); “tyranny” (April 2005; November 2005); “a dangerous man” (April 2005); Secretary Rice referred to North Korea as “outposts of tyranny” when she was appointed Secretary of State (January 18, 2005). Pyongyang commented that Rice’s remark was like the second “axis of evil” remark (*Tong-il Sinbo*, January 29, 2005).

142 “We cannot bear that the Bush administration has spoken ill of our leader” (the spokesman of Foreign Ministry interview with Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), August 8, 2001).
For all this, Pyongyang restrained its official responses to the Bush administration’s hostile attitude for a while and opened the possibility of the talks with Washington (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 562, October 23, 2001). Pyongyang continuously asked Washington to change its hostile attitude and agree to talk with Pyongyang (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 531-553, March-August 2001). Pyongyang wished that Washington’s policy would return to the level of conciliation shown at the end of the Clinton administration. Though Washington did not trust Pyongyang, the Bush administration tried to begin relations with Pyongyang through talks.

However, the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S. and Washington’s subsequent war on terrorism deteriorated the precarious relations between Pyongyang and Washington. Fearing association with any terrorist activities, Pyongyang announced its position against terrorism on September 12, 2001, the day after the 9/11 terrorist attack but Washington’s response was chilly: President Bush included North Korea in his “axis of evil” group and branded North Korea not only as the enemy of the U.S. but also as the enemy of international community.

“. . .Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening

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143 Lee Hyung Chul, the DPRK ambassador to the UN, emphasized in the 56th UN general assembly on November 13, 2001 that Pyongyang would talk with Washington when Washington’s position toward Pyongyang reaches the level of the position of Clinton administration (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 565, November 13, 2001).

144 Pyongyang and Washington had the first working group meeting at New York on June 13, 2001.

145 The spokesman of Foreign Ministry interview with KCNA (September 12, 2001); also the spokesman of Foreign Ministry announced Pyongyang decided to join “International Convention for the suppression of terrorism financing” and “International Convention against the Taking of Hostages” (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 564, November 3, 2001).
America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th, but we know their true nature.

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.

. . . States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

. . . We'll be deliberate; yet, time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. . .”

- George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (January 29, 2002)\(^\text{146}\)

President Bush’s address sabotaged Pyongyang’s long efforts not to be related to any terrorist activities\(^\text{147}\) with a single punch and directly pointed to North Korea as an enemy of the U.S. in the war on terrorism. It was to be expected that Pyongyang


\(^{147}\) Pyongyang has expressed its position against terrorism several times since Pyongyang announced in 1995 that Pyongyang opposes all kinds of terrorism or support of terrorism. For example, Pyongyang announced a statement of regret in August 1998 when the U.S. embassy in Tanzania was attacked by terrorists; Joint Communiqué on terrorism between the U.S. and the DPRK (October 2000); Moscow Declaration (August 4, 2001) and so on.
responded furiously to this address and felt a great security threat from Washington. Now Pyongyang understood that it would be difficult not only to improve relations with Washington under the current Bush administration but also to survive under pressure of this security threat.

“. . . There has been no such outspoken threat to our country, an independent sovereignty, by the U.S. president in his policy address in the recent history of relations between Pyongyang and Washington. This is nothing more or less than a declaration of war against us. . . The thoughtless words of President Bush show the real intention of Washington, which proposed talks with us just recently, and also show clearly why the current administration threw away the possible solution to nuclear weapons and missile issues which the previous administration had established.”

- An announcement of spokesman of Foreign Ministry (January 31, 2001)\textsuperscript{148}

With this announcement, the frequency of Chairman Kim Jong-il’s visits to military troops increased from February 2001 (See Figure 5-1) (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 576, February 2002). The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) announced on March 9, 2002 assured Pyongyang of the threat. Pyongyang began to consider self-help again by reviving its nuclear weapons program and warned Washington not to go further.

\textsuperscript{148} (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 576, February 2002); Pyongyang explained the progress of improving relations between Pyongyang and Washington under the Clinton administration in detail and criticized the Bush administration for spoiling all these improvements and the Agreed Framework in the broadcasting of three special lectures by Kim Il-sung Open University (\textit{Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea}, no. 579, February 21-22, 2002).
“We would not be restrained by the Agreed Framework unilaterally under the condition that Washington attempts to annul the Agreed Framework and would go our way.”


“. . . According to recent reports from the U.S., the Bush administration designated seven countries including Syria and us as targets of nuclear attack and decided to develop nuclear grapeshot for limited nuclear attack on those countries. . . In this situation, we cannot help reviewing all agreements with Washington.”

- A statement of spokesman of Foreign Ministry (March 14, 2002) on the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR, 2002)\(^\text{149}\)

“. . .The foundation of talks between Pyongyang and Washington collapsed because the Bush administration rejected our regime. . .”

- Rodong Sinmun Editorial (March 18, 2002)

However, Pyongyang seemed hesitant to abolish the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang expressed its will to observe its part of the Agreed Framework through the Korean Central Television (KCTV) Editorial on March 29, 2002. Pyongyang resumed

\(^{149}\) (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 582, March 14, 2002)
negotiation with the KEDO on April 3, 2002; Paek Nam-sun, the DPRK Foreign Minister officially visited Russia for the first time in 15 years (May 20-23, 2002) just before the U.S.-Russia summit (May 24, 2002) and Seoul analyzed that one of the purposes of this visit was to send a message about Pyongyang’s willingness to talk with Washington through Russia; Pyongyang restrained extreme criticism for the re-designation of North Korea as a terrorism-supporting country in the annual report on terrorism by the U.S. Department of State on May 24, 2002 with the hope for improving relations (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 592, May 2002); and Pyongyang expressed its will to talk with Washington by saying that Pyongyang would welcome a US special envoy to North Korea (Korean Central Television (KCTV) and Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, July 25-26, 2002).150

“This is our principle: we will talk with Washington to remove Washington’s security worries if Washington shows a willingness to drop its hostile policy against us.”

- The spokesman of Foreign Ministry at a press conference after a remark by Bolton, the Under Secretary of State for arms control in Seoul (August 29, 2002)151

150 James Kelly was supposed to be sent as a US special envoy to North Korea on July 10, 2002 but the process was stopped because Pyongyang did not reply in time and because of the Naval conflict in the West Sea between the North and the South on June 29, 2002 (The spokesman Richard Boucher’s regular briefing, July 3, 2002, retrieved on January 16, 2014 from http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/11620.htm).

The visit of James A. Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, on October 3-5, 2002 and Pyongyang’s “confession” was considered to be a trigger for the 2nd nuclear crisis. When Kelly told Kang Suk-joo that Washington had evidence of a uranium-enrichment program in North Korea which Washington had worried about for a while, Kang “admitted” the existence of the program according to Washington (The New York Times, “North Korea says it has a program on nuclear arms,” October 17, 2002).152 Washington accused Pyongyang of annulling the Agreed Framework (US House of Representative, 2003: 34) and decided to cease the supply of heavy oil to North Korea for December on November 14, 2002. In response, Pyongyang announced its release of frozen nuclear facilities and the reopening of the facilities on December 12, 2002. Pyongyang sent a letter to IAEA to demand the release of the seals on nuclear facilities and the removal of monitoring cameras on the same day (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 617A and no. 621, November and December 2002) and announced a government statement that Pyongyang would withdraw from NPT on January 10, 2003. This is the well-known story of the outbreak of the 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis.

However, instead of following Washington’s lead and jumping at the worst case scenario conclusion, some scholars and politicians raised questions on Washington’s accusation of North Korean secret nuclear activities (Sigal, 2002; Harrison, 2005). First, it is unclear whether Pyongyang really “admitted” its secret HEU (highly enriched uranium) program or not. When Kelly pressed Pyongyang for an answer of the HEU

program, Pyongyang angrily denied the existence of the program first but in the next day, Kang told Kelly “Pyongyang is entitled to have such a program or an even more powerful one to deter a pre-emptive US attack” which was still an ambiguous statement (Harrison, 2005: 101). With this remark, Kelly and Washington believed that Pyongyang had admitted its enriched uranium program (US House of Representative, 2003: 35). However, when examined more carefully, this conclusion might be too hasty. Pyongyang’s first answer came out unexpectedly without any preparation but its second answer came after one day of preparation. So, it is more reasonable to conclude that Pyongyang did not have the program, even if it asserted its right to such a program. Pyongyang’s second answer was very strategic: NCND (neither confirm nor deny). There is high possibility that Pyongyang used “NCND” strategy both to enhance North Korea’s national glory and to broaden its future policy options which could include throwing away its plan to developing the program actively, according to Washington’s attitude. Later, the DPRK officers said the DPRK did not have any HEU program.\footnote{Lee Yong Ho, the DPRK ambassador to the United Kingdom, said in seminars in 2004 that the DPRK does not have an enrichment program (Harrison, 2005: 106); Kim Gye Gwan, the Vice Foreign Minister, said the same thing to Dr. Hecker’s team in January 2004 (US Senate, 2004: 10).} Second, it was difficult to conclude that North Korea had an HEU program at that time based on the slight evidence Washington had. According to U.S. Intelligence, Pyongyang had “recently” begun constructing a centrifuge plant to enrich uranium but it was not enough evidence to say that Pyongyang had a HEU program (Harrison, 2005: 102-106; Sigal, 2002: 11). It was also very unlikely that Pyongyang could have acquired key high technology parts for the HEU facility (Harrison, 2005: 104-105). Even a CIA report
submitted to Congress in November 2002 admitted that there was no operational enrichment facility in North Korea (Harrison, 2005: 102). Third, it was also unclear whether Pyongyang broke the Agreed Framework or not. Pyongyang was free to develop enriched uranium program but LEU (Low Enriched Uranium, usually for civil use), not HEU (for weapons) and it would not violate the NPT regulations or the Agreed Framework (Harrison, 2005: 107). Dr. Hecker testified that he saw the 5MWth nuclear facility was operating in January 2004 as Pyongyang insisted on restarting the facility after February 2003 but could not say about the past of the facility; he confirmed that the suspended construction of 50 MWth reactor was left as it was suspended in 1994 (U.S. Senate, 2004: 4-5). Strictly speaking, Pyongyang’s refusal to accept Washington’s earlier demands for inspections in 2002 did not violate the Agreed Framework because Pyongyang was supposed to accept the inspection before all key components of LWRs were delivered to North Korea according to the Agreed Framework (Sigal, 2002: 10). Washington’s accusations that Pyongyang had deceived Washington by developing nuclear programs (therefore nullifying the Agreed Framework) were very severe, considering the questionable evidence.

Pyongyang, judging that there was little expectation for better relations with Washington, opted to employ confrontation, while Washington, convinced of its original doubts, decided to adopt a hard-line policy toward Pyongyang. Both criticized each other for breaking the Agreed Framework.

“The Bush administration stopped the delivery of heavy fuel oil to us and even
suspended the construction of LWRs because of the enriched uranium issue which does not exist at all. Now we recognize that the Bush administration abandoned the Agreed Framework unilaterally. . . We cannot trust in Washington who threw away so easily the official document which the president signed. We will deal with Washington only under the principle of simultaneous actions.”

- Interview with the spokesman of Foreign Ministry (Korean Central Television (KCTV), June 4, 2004)

“. . . I would be the first to say that North Korea is a terrible regime in terms of the treatment of its people, the starvation that they experienced, the prison labor camps that are there. And we are going to shine on that. This president is never going to stop speaking out about the conditions of people who are trapped in grave circumstances or about the need for reform. . . Well, we've had an experience of bilateral discussions with the North Koreans, in 1994. And what happened was the North Koreans signed an agreement with us, and then they went about violating it practically before the ink was dry. So there's no need to go back down that road.”

- Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, interview in CNN Larry King Live (May 11, 2005)154

Pyongyang removed all IAEA seals and monitoring cameras from its nuclear facilities in response to Washington’s suspension of fuel shipments in December

Pyongyang announced that it reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon facility (July 15, 2003) and threatened to carry out a nuclear test (August 27, 2003). Washington responded with the decision to suspend the construction of LWRs (November 6, 2003). The six-party talks began on August 27, 2003 but they were rarely fruitful because Washington demanded that Pyongyang abandon its nuclear program first before any other negotiations could be discussed and Pyongyang demanded that first Washington abandon its hostile policy against Pyongyang. After two years of confrontation with each other, Pyongyang concluded that it would pursue self-help because Washington did not have any will to coexist with Pyongyang (Korean Central Television (KCTV) and Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, December 20, 2004).

With the re-election of President Bush in 2004, Pyongyang expected a change in Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang, at least some relaxation of its hostile policy. Pyongyang postponed its official statements on the re-election of Bush (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 716, November 9, 2004) and the spokesman of Foreign Ministry announced statement that Pyongyang would watch and respond to the policy toward Pyongyang of the second Bush administration (Korean Central Television (KCTV), January 9, 2005). However, what waited for Pyongyang was the unchanged or even more hostile attitude of the second Bush administration. “The great objective of ending tyranny” in the Inaugural Address of President Bush on January 20, 2005,155 “the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” in his State of the Union address on

February 2, 2005, and the labeling of North Korea as one of the “outposts of tyranny” in an Opening remark by Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, in the Confirmation Hearing before Senate on January 18, 2005 all showed that Washington would fight for ending tyrannies in the world, including North Korea as one of the targets. On February 10, 2005, the spokesman of Foreign Ministry announced a statement that Pyongyang would postpone the six-party talks indefinitely and pursue nuclear weapon development because Washington had a completely negative attitude toward Pyongyang (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 729, February 10, 2005). When the “ADVANCE Democracy Act” was introduced both in the Senate (S.516, 109th Congress) and the House of Representatives (H.R. 1133, 109th Congress) on March 3, 2005, Pyongyang pointed out that this bill would justify intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries to the point of overthrowing other regimes “for the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world” (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 732, March 7, 2005). When Secretary Rice mentioned the possibility of UN sanctions against North Korea (interview with Fox TV, April 21, 2005), the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry replied that UN sanctions would be considered as “declaration of war” (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 739, April 25, 2005). Pyongyang was very disappointed and frustrated again when Bush referred to Kim Jong-il as “a dangerous man,” a “tyrant,” and “a man who starves his people” in the News Conference by the President (for his 100

158 The bill was to advance and strengthen democracy globally and to assist foreign countries to implement democracy through US support and funding.
days of office) on April 28, 2005.\(^{159}\)

“Look, Kim Chong-il (Kim Jong-il) is a dangerous person. He's a man who starves his people. He's got huge concentration camps. And, as David accurately noted, there is concern about his capacity to deliver a nuclear weapon. We don't know if he can or not, but I think it's best when you're dealing with a tyrant like Kim Chong-il to assume he can.”

- The News Conference by the President, April 28, 2005

“We waited for 4 years after President Bush took office but we cannot wait any more for the policy changes. Now we will go the way we choose immediately.”

- The spokesman of Foreign Ministry, April 29, 2005 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 739, April 2005)

On May 11, 2005, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry announced that Pyongyang withdrew all 8,000 spent fuel rods from the 5MWth nuclear reactor at Yongbyon for reprocessing (Korean Central Television (KCTV), Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, and Korean Central News Agency, May 11, 2005). Under deep frustration and dissatisfaction, Pyongyang used its nuclear weapons program as a threat to induce changes in Washington’s policy.

However, President Bush referred to him as “Mr. Kim Jong-il” in his News

Conference on May 31, 2005, a gesture that Pyongyang welcomed.

“And so it's a matter of continuing to send a message to Mr. Kim Chong-il that if you want to be accepted by the neighborhood and be a part of the—of those who are viewed with respect in the world, work with us to get rid of your nuclear weapons program.”


Pyongyang responded that it would pay attention to the use of the title “Mr.” (Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, June 3, 2005). Pyongyang again expected a relaxation of Washington’s hostile policy and restrained its criticism for Washington despite its wariness of discord within Washington.\footnote{Dick Cheney, the Vice President, mentioned Kim Jong-il as “one of the world’s more irresponsible leaders” and criticized his controlling style of North Korea through police and military coercion on CNN Larry King Live (May 30, 2005). See the full text from http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0505/30/lkl.01.html (Retrieved on January 21, 2014); Also, Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Defense, criticized the Kim Jong-il regime and mentioned the possibility of sending this issue to UN Security Council (The New York Times, June 6, 2005).} The scale of anti-American rallies related to the Korean War celebration on June 25, 2005 was decreased from 1,000,000 of people in 2003 and in 2004 to at most 20,000 people in 2005 and there was no live report on the event. Anti-American rallies in the countries were restrained (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 748, June 25, 2005). According to Seoul, Pyongyang reduced criticism for Washington significantly since June 2005, referring to President Bush as “the head of the White House (June 20, 2005)” or “the person in power of the U.S.” (July 5, 2005) (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 749, July 2005). Pushed by
Beijing, this slight start toward conciliation was followed by the Joint Communiqué on September 19, 2005, but deepened antagonism and distrust would not disappear with this fragile gesture of conciliation and clarification of principles. The Bush administration was still hostile against Pyongyang and Pyongyang responded with confrontation. In the same month, the U.S. announced that the DPRK had laundered black money through the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao and so the U.S. imposed omni-directional financial sanctions. The U.S. Treasury’s announcement on BDA’s money laundering for North Korea (September 16, 2005) ignited another flame and Pyongyang criticized that Washington seemed not have any will to implement the Joint Communiqué (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, no. 762, October 18, 2005). Pyongyang threatened Washington that it would consider any sanction as a declaration of war. Pyongyang was furious and claimed it would never forgive when President Bush called Chairman Kim Jong-il a “tyrant” again in a meeting with Brazilian entrepreneurs on November 6, 2005 (KCNA, November 8, 2005). Pyongyang declared that the U.S. Treasury’s freezing of assets of North Korean businesses was against international law because it violated the principle of sovereignty and any sanction or containment would be considered as a declaration of war (Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, November 20, 2005). KEDO terminated the suspended construction of LWRs on November 21, 2005 and Pyongyang concluded that Washington had completely ended the Agreed Framework (Monthly

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162 The main contents of the Joint Communiqué were North Korea’s abandoning all existing nuclear weapon programs and returning to the NPT and IAEA Safeguard for the others’ compensation to North Korea’s energy loss and improving relations with North Korea. For full document, see http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/JointStatement091905.pdf (Retrieved on January 21, 2014).
163 The U.S. Treasury identified 11 North Korean businesses for sanctions on charges of proliferating WMDs according to the Executive Order 13382 on Nonproliferation of WMD on June 29, 2005 and on October 21, 2005.

“Unlike our expectation, Washington is extending its offensive policies against us after the Joint Communiqué, which impedes the advance of the six-party talks and the implementation of the Joint Communiqué.”

- The News Conference of spokesman of Foreign Ministry (Korean Central Television (KCTV), December 2, 2005)

The CIA’s confidential report on the Korean Endgame in 1998 reported by South Korea’s national broadcast, KBS, angered Pyongyang again because the report predicted that North Korea would collapse within 5 years and the CIA conducted simulations in preparation for sudden collapse of North Korea (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 24, 2006). Washington’s financial sanctions had squeezed North Korea’s economy.

“Concession leads to our destruction in the confrontation between Washington and us; we will respond with good faith to good faith but super hawk to hawk.”

- (Korean Central News Agency, January 27, 2006).

164 “A Trojan Horse strategy to disturb the internal atmosphere of North Korea”
Finally, Pyongyang announced the resumption of suspended construction for bigger nuclear facilities (December 19, 2005), launched 7 missiles (July 4-5, 2006), and carried out its underground nuclear test at Punggye-ri (October 9, 2006). According to Siefried Hecker, North Korea used approximately 6 kg of plutonium for the test (Nikitin, 2009: 10). The Daepo-Dong-2 failed its launch on July 2006 but it could be the device to deliver nuclear weapons to the U.S. territory. The UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1718 which called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons in a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.”

3) Settlement and New Expectation for Normalization of Relations

After the BDA money laundering affair, followed by financial sanctions and Pyongyang’s missile launches and nuclear test, relations between Washington and Pyongyang seemed to be beyond repair. However, on February 13, 2007, the six parties reached an agreement regarding the “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (the February 13th agreement),” followed by two bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang. This agreement seemed sudden and surprising, but in fact it was made possible after Washington and Pyongyang employed several deliberate steps. The first action came from Washington. On May 18, 2006, The New York Times reported

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165 The date of July 4th (Independence Day in the U.S.) shows that Pyongyang launched missiles to warn Washington that Pyongyang would respond to Washington’s hostile policy with hostile policy and the nuclear test was done before the U.S. middle election on November 7, 2006 to influence U.S. policy toward Pyongyang. Also, note that the frequency of Kim Jong-il’s visits to military troops was the highest in his official life in 2006 (70%) which shows that Pyongyang really decided to take confrontation against Washington.
that Washington began to consider a “new approach on North Korea” that included the negotiation of a peace treaty (The New York Times, “U.S. said to weigh a new approach on North Korea,” May 18, 2006). Facing increasing criticism regarding the situation in Iraq, the U.S. regarded containment and diplomatic deterrence policies as the best approaches to North Korea (The Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006: 48). These policies negatively impacted North Korea’s economic, social and international positioning, but they were not persuasive enough for North Korea to give up its nuclear program. With only two remaining years in power, the Bush administration wanted to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem before the end of its term. Thus, it seems natural that engagement became the most attractive and appropriate policy regarding North Korea, even for the militant “hawks” (Cha and Kang, 2003: 161-168).

Pyongyang’s missile launches and nuclear test seemed to sound the alarm for Washington to try a different tactic.

On July 10th in 2006, Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks, mentioned in his discussion with South Korean officials that the U.S. was looking for a diplomatic solution to the problem of North Korea, a country that only five days before had launched seven missiles. He even indicated his willingness to meet with North Korean delegates “on the sidelines of six-party talks” (The New York Times, “U.S. Wants North Korea to Return to Talks,” July 10, 2006). This remark reflects a change in Washington’s attitude.

166 In QDR 2006, the U.S. had announced that they would gain victory in more than two areas at the same time, but this resolution seemed doubtful as the situation in Iraq began to worsen.
167 The two scholars have different views on strategy toward Pyongyang but both believe that “engagement” is the optimal policy.
Only a few months ago in April 2006, Hill announced that he had no plans to meet with North Korea when the top negotiators of the six-party talks next met in Tokyo (*The New York Times*, “Key Diplomats Together Again, But Not Meeting on North Korea,” April 11, 2006).

On October 9, 2006 when North Korea claimed that it had conducted a nuclear test, Washington criticized the test and lamented the strained relations, but did not directly criticize Pyongyang itself. In November 2006, during the U.S.-ROK summit talks, President Bush mentioned the possibility that the United States might convert the 1953 armistice into a peace treaty, thereby ending the Korean War, in exchange for North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear program (*The New York Times*, “U.S. Signals New Incentives for North Korea,” November 19, 2006). This implies that the U.S. would not be a threat against the DPRK. At the same time, Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, said that the DPRK might someday be allowed to join the Asian-Pacific Economic Forum (*The New York Times*, “U.S. Signals New Incentives for North Korea,” November 19, 2006). In December 2006, Christopher Hill was appointed to the post of Policy Coordinator for North Korea, a position that carried full policy-making power regarding North Korea. This change meant that a State Department officer who often emphasized solutions based on negotiations held real power in the Bush administration’s North Korean policy. Previously, this position had been dominated by neo-conservatives, who had insisted on hard-line policies.

In his 2007 State of the Union Address, President Bush emphasized “intensive diplomacy to achieve a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons” without any remarks
blaming North Korea. High-ranking officers, including Secretary of State Rice, had also refrained from critical rhetoric towards North Korea. Before the six-party talks in February 2007, Washington and Pyongyang had two bilateral talks (in Berlin and Beijing). During those talks, Washington proposed many concessions, including the improvement of relations between the two countries, the provision of economic aid, and the relaxation of a number of sanctions in place against North Korea, such as the release of about $25 million in BDA funds (The New York Times, “U.S. and North Korean envoys hold talks,” January 17, 2007).

Such conciliatory actions informed Pyongyang that Washington wished to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and that it would rather negotiate North Korea’s nuclear program than risk a preemptive war. In abandoning the “no compensation policy,” this new approach proposed a peace treaty with North Korea in exchange for North Korea’s abandonment of its policy of hostility (The Washington Post, “The plan that moved Pyongyang,” February 20, 2007). Washington’s proposals were effective enough to re-engage Pyongyang in the six-party talks, and ultimately led to the signing of the February 13th agreement. This series of conciliatory actions was able to draw Pyongyang to negotiations because most of the concessions had long been demanded by Pyongyang, but were not dangerous or threatening to U.S. interests (The Washington Post, “The plan that moved Pyongyang,” February 20, 2007).

169 Philip Zelikow, former counselor of the State Department, was known as the writer of the report about Washington’s “new approach” to Pyongyang.
In the 2.13 agreement, there are several devices to encourage North Korea’s fulfillment of the agreement. First, the agreement refers to initial action for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 2005, which means that North Korea would receive more compensation through a continuous negotiation process toward the eventual abandonment of its nuclear facilities. North Korea would receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from South Korea if it shut down and sealed its Yongbyon nuclear facilities and invited IAEA officers to verify the dismantling.\(^\text{171}\) When North Korea reached the point of “a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities,” it would receive up to 1,000,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from five other countries (the U.S., the ROK, Russia, China, and Japan), including the initial 50,000 tons from South Korea.\(^\text{172}\) In addition, the United States would free North Korea from its designation as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” and from of its restrictions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The United States even agreed to release North Korea’s money in the BDA even though the agreement did not stipulate such a condition. A multilateral agreement was better than a bilateral one for binding the DPRK because non-fulfillment of an agreement with many parties would present a more challenging burden. The parties not only emphasized the principle of “action for action” but also adopted the same period of 60 days for mutual initial implementation.\(^\text{173}\)

However, after signing the agreement, the implementation processes were not

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\(^{171}\) See Article II Clause 1 and 5 of “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (Final),” February 13, 2007. “Disabling” indicated a physical difficulty for Pyongyang to restart operation of its nuclear facilities and it would require a full year to resume the facilities’ operation (Nikitin, 2009: 12).

\(^{172}\) See Article IV of “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (Final),” February 13, 2007.

\(^{173}\) Before the agreement, both the United States and the DPRK had insisted that the other party make the first move toward resolution.
easy. Pyongyang would not go forward before it verified Washington’s real intention and its will to improve relations with Pyongyang beyond the give-and-take of denuclearization and economic compensation. For Pyongyang, the BDA fund release was the first sign of Washington’s will to improve relations. In the 2.13 agreement, political compensations like the normalization of the relations (Clauses 3 and 4) are stressed more than economic compensations like heavy fuel oil (HFO). This emphasis demonstrates that North Korea wanted to protect itself from any hostile policy more than it wanted to gain one-time economic aid. Pyongyang expressed its intention via the supposed third voice, *Choson sinbo*, while all official media in Pyongyang were silent on the U.S.-DPRK meetings after February 13, 2007.

“When the enemy is not changed, Chosun (Pyongyang) is not likely to make an error to give up its nuclear facilities, the matrix of producing deterrence of war, only for 1,000,000 tons of heavy oil... Washington should remove all hostile laws and systems against Chosun to coexist with Chosun.”

*Choson sinbo*, “Economy is not the motive of Chosun” (March 20, 2007)

“The BDA issue is not just the problem of getting back the money. Chosun might consider the issue as a touchstone of guessing Washington’s position and attitude on the implementation of the 9.19 Joint Communiqué and the 2.13 agreement.”

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174 It is an organ of pro-North Korean resident’ league in Japan but it is also controlled by Pyongyang and expressed Pyongyang’s voice.
175 Chosun is the old name of last kingdom of Korea. Koreans who were forced to live in Japan during Japanese rule are called as “Chosening” which means “Chosunian (Chosun people)” in degradation.
This time, it seemed that Washington sincerely wished to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue before the end of the Bush administration. Washington expressed clearly that its delays were technical, not political. Additionally, Washington tolerated and accommodated Pyongyang’s inaction during North Korea’s biggest festival on April 15 (the birthday of Kim Il-sung). Both of these were good faith efforts to maintain peaceful relations. When Assistant Undersecretary Christopher Hill visited Kim Jong-il on June 21-22, 2007, to discuss implementation after the release of BDA fund, Pyongyang showed substantial action and willingness to fulfill the agreement. Hill’s visit seems to have helped to build trust between Pyongyang and Washington. Just after Hill’s visit, on June 26-30, 2007, IAEA representatives visited Pyongyang in response to Pyongyang’s invitation (June 16, 2007) and expressed satisfaction with the cooperation of Pyongyang. According to Seoul, during the first half of 2007, the frequency of Chairman Kim Jong-il’s visits to military troops decreased significantly, showing that Pyongyang began to perceive less of a threat and to expect improvement of relations with Washington again. On July 15, 2007,

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176 Tony Snow, the spokesman of the White House, stated this to reporters on March 22, 2007 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, March 2007).
177 Also, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry stated in the interview with KCNA on May 16, 2007 that Pyongyang would suspend the nuclear facilities immediately after the BDA issue was solved and would invite IAEA people for inspection (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, May 16, 2007).
178 During the first half of 2007, Kim Jong-il visited military troops 12 times while he visited military troops 52 times during the first half of 2006. Even so, visiting military troops was his most frequent activity (41%) among his official activities in 2007 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, June 2007).
Pyongyang announced officially that it shut down the Yongbyon facilities (KCNA, July 15, 2007). Pyongyang insisted that Washington should remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and stop applying the Trading with the Enemy Act to North Korea after the disabling of North Korean nuclear facilities (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, July 15, 2007; August 2, 2007).

The conciliatory atmosphere continued for a while until early 2008. On October 3, 2007, the six-party announced “the second-phase action for implementation of the Joint Statement (the 10.3 Agreement)” which planned to complete the disabling of North Korean nuclear facilities. North Korean Taekwondo delegation began its American tour (October 4-17) as the first North Korean sports team’s visit to America. The U.S. team of nuclear experts visited Pyongyang and discussed the details for disabling processes on October 11-18, 2007. In the end of October of 2007, the six parties met again to discuss compensation for 950,000 tons of heavy oil according to North Korea’s disabling efforts. Pyongyang expected again that relations with Washington would improve after disabling nuclear plants. When the U.S. navy rescued the North Korean cargo ship [Daeheungdan] in waters off Somalia, Pyongyang expressed its gratitude to Washington along with its anti-terrorism stance. Pyongyang attached great significance to this event for the cooperation between Washington and Pyongyang, while Washington announced that it was a common duty according to the regulations of piracy and rescue missions (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 8, 2007). On November 1, 2007, the U.S. team for nuclear disabling visited North Korea again and began to disable the three

nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.\textsuperscript{180} The U.S.-DPRK finance meeting was held in New York on November 19-20, 2007 to discuss the normalization of the U.S.-DPRK financial relations while the release of other sanctions including the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism was being discussed in Washington. Pyongyang again announced its will to disable through the Choson sinbo editorial on November 26, 2007 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 26, 2007). The representatives and experts of the six-party states visited Yongbyon facilities and confirmed that the disabling processes were going well on November 27-29, 2007. Seoul analyzed that Pyongyang showed its strong will for disabling because Pyongyang even permitted the representatives of South Korea and Japan to visit the Yongbyon facilities (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 27, 2007).

“The disabling is the action that can be taken when Chosun decides that it has reached the condition that it does not need to have nuclear weapons capacity because of Washington’s changed policy from hostile to friendly toward Chosun.”

- Choson sinbo (September 26, 2007)

Although the “hawk” voices were loud in the U.S. Congress,\textsuperscript{181} the Bush

\textsuperscript{180} The disabling would be done according to 11 steps and the level of disabling would be the level that it would take at least 1 year to re-operate the facilities. The removed components from the Yongbyon facilities would be controlled by IAEA or six-parties (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 11, 2007).

\textsuperscript{181} For example, Samuel Brownback, the U.S. senator, introduced the bill S.Res. 399 (110th): A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that certain benchmarks must be met before certain restrictions against the Government of North Korea are lifted, and that the United States Government should not provide any financial aid as of December 10, 2007. See https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/sres399 (Retrieved
administration continued with the conciliation policies. When Christopher Hill visited North Korea again on December 3-5, 2007, he delivered a letter from President Bush to Chairman Kim Jong-il. Seoul analyzed that the letter showed the positive state of relations between the two countries because letters from U.S. presidents to Chairman Kim Jong-il were usually delivered in periods of improving relations and because Pyongyang announced the letter very quickly (KCNA, December 6, 2007) (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, December 6, 2007). When Pyongyang could not meet the time limit for disabling its nuclear facilities at the end of 2007, Washington announced that the delay had been caused by technical problems, and avoided overt criticism of Pyongyang. Washington sent North Korea 54,000 tons of heavy oil, originally meant as compensation for the disabling of the nuclear program, even though the dismantling had not been completed. With the confidence of improving relations with Washington and a stable domestic situation, Pyongyang announced that the new year (2008, the 60th year since the DPRK government was established) would be a year of historical change during which North Korea would open the door to becoming “a strong and prosperous country,” 2012 (Kim II-sung’s 100th birthday) (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 1, 2008).

In contrast to Pyongyang’s delight, Washington seemed to struggle against
increased “hawk” opinions outside of the government and against doubt about Pyongyang’s true intentions. In the State of the Union address of 2008 (January 28, 2008), President Bush did not even mention North Korea and ongoing disabling work which showed Washington’s increased doubt about Pyongyang and Washington’s undecided North Korean policy for 2008.\textsuperscript{182} Being aware of Washington’s silence and hesitation, Pyongyang tried to use the New York Philharmonic’s performance in Pyongyang on February 26, 2008 to maintain the conciliatory mood between Pyongyang and Washington\textsuperscript{183} while Washington clarified that it was not relevant to the U.S. government’s policy toward North Korea. Despite increased doubt, Washington and Pyongyang had meetings about fulfillment in Geneva on March 13, 2008 and in Singapore on April 8, 2008 and each country confirmed the other’s continued willingness to fulfill the agreement, while recognizing that the processes would be long and complicated.

4) Back and Forth Disabling Process with Disputes on Verification (2008)

The verification problem was a huge obstacle while the disabling process was ongoing during 2008. Each side disputed the satisfactory conditions for verification of disabling. On January 4, 2008, the DPRK Foreign Ministry insisted that North Korea had

\textsuperscript{182} Sean McCormack, the spokesman of State Department, confirmed that Pyongyang had been continuously carrying out disabling processes but that Washington was waiting for Pyongyang’s final declaration. For the full text, see http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/jan/98445.htm (Retrieved on January 23, 2014).

submitted its declaration to Beijing in November 2007 but the other parties did not fulfill their commitment, citing delays in heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Pyongyang slowed the disablement process (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 4, 2008). However, Washington did not agree with Pyongyang’s insistence and demanded that Pyongyang submit a “complete and correct” declaration. Pyongyang declared 30 kg of separated plutonium, which was a lower number than the one Washington had estimated. Additionally, other nuclear issues including the HEU program, nuclear proliferation, and warhead information were not declared (Nikitin, 2009: 15). In the Singapore meeting (April 2008), Pyongyang and Washington reached an agreement on what should be included in the declaration and they agreed that enrichment and nonproliferation issues would be dealt separately (Nikitin, 2009: 15).

On May 8, 2008, Pyongyang handed approximately 19,000 pages of documentation on its nuclear program to Sung Kim, the Korean Affairs Director of State department. Announcing Washington’s decision for food aid to North Korea, Pyongyang urged Washington to make a strategic determination such as the removal of North Korea from the list of States Sponsoring Terrorism (Choson sinbo, May 14, 2008). Pyongyang expressed its expectation for improvement of relations with Washington through Choson

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184 Sean McCormack, the spokesman of State Department, said that “… the fact is they haven't turned in a final declaration yet. They're going to turn that in to the Chinese as chair, convener of the six-party meetings and we don't have that yet. We look forward to a full and complete declaration. We also look forward to their completing the disablement phase up at Yongbyon. That is moving forward and there is good progress on that” on January 4, 2008 in the daily briefing. See http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/jan/98445.htm (Retrieved on January 23, 2014); Also Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State, said in the Joint Press in Japan on January 7, 2008 that “… But the issue is that the declaration needs to be complete and correct, and they have not provided a complete and correct declaration. By that I mean they have not included all of the nuclear programs that they've had. They've not included all of the nuclear facilities that they've had. … The problem is that it is not complete. And so we need it complete. We don't need a 90% declaration. We need a 100% declaration.” See http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rs/2008/01/98756.htm (Retrieved on January 23, 2014).
sinbo’s editorial.

“There will be bigger progress in relations between Pyongyang and Washington after the completion of the agreement if Washington pursues the denuclearization of North Korea through the removal of its hostile relations. . . The terms of “trust-building” and “understanding” in this editorial show the expectation of the new relations between the two enemy states.”

- Choson sinbo, “Pyongyang’s prompt announcement of food aid from Washington, and the political term, “trust-building” (May 23, 2008)

In Washington, new suspicion was raised because U.S. scientists had found traces of highly-enriched uranium from the document and the sample aluminum tubing (brought in 2007) (Nikitin, 2009: 9).\(^\text{185}\) This doubt was decreased in part on June 26, 2008 when Pyongyang submitted a declaration of its nuclear programs to Beijing. In this 60-page declaration, Pyongyang reported 37kg of plutonium (Nikitin, 2009: 16). Christopher Hill testified to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on July 31, 2008 that the “declaration package” included North Korea’s plutonium program and acknowledged Washington’s concerns about North Korea’s uranium enrichment program and nuclear proliferation activities. Hill also confirmed that the second phase of implementing the September 2005 Joint statement was complete and North Korea had completed eight out of 11 agreed disabling processes while discharging more than half of the 8,000 spent fuel...

\(^{185}\) Pyongyang had insisted that the aluminum tubes imported years ago were for conventional weapons systems.
rods from its 5MW(e) reactor. On the highly-enriched uranium program, Dr. Hecker assessed that North Korea had researched and tried to develop highly-enriched uranium program but seemed not to have reached the industrial stage (Nikitin, 2009: 9). On the proliferation of weapons to Syria, Pyongyang took the NCND attitude but promised not to engage in future nuclear proliferation at the Singapore meeting (Nikitin, 2009: 15). On June 26, 2008, President Bush announced the changed status of North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act and notified Congress of his intent to remove North Korea from the list of States Sponsoring Terrorism within the next 45 days. To show its continuous will for denuclearization, Pyongyang destroyed its cooling tower in front of international media on June 27, 2008.

“The purpose of Pyongyang’s nuclear diplomacy is not a short-sighted concept such as ‘regime survival’ or ‘economic aid’ but revolution; we will not need any nuclear weapons when we trust Washington completely and perceive no threat from Washington. . . Pyongyang’s declaration of nuclear program, Washington’s removal of North Korea from the list of State-Sponsored Terrorism (SST), and Pyongyang’s destruction of its cooling tower were accomplished in the continuous process which is the fulfillment of the principle of concurrent behavior.”

- The spokesman of Foreign Ministry (KCNA and Chosun-sinbo, June 27, 2008)

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Pyongyang urged Washington to remove North Korea from the SST list because 80% of denuclearization was complete including Pyongyang’s declaration and dissolution of the cooling tower (Foreign Ministry statement, July 4, 2008).\textsuperscript{188}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-4. Disablement Steps at Yongbyon, DPRK (by April 2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharge of 8,000 spent fuel rods to the spent fuel pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of control rod drive mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of reactor cooling loop and wooden cooling tower interior structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disablement of fresh fuel rods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal and storage of 3 uranium ore concentrate dissolver tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal and storage of 7 uranium conversion furnaces, including storage of refractory bricks and mortar sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal and storage of both metal casting furnaces and vacuum system, and removal and storage of 8 machining lathes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut cable and remove drive mechanism associated with the receiving hot cell door</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut two of four steam lines into</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{188} According to Seoul, 8 out of 11 steps were completed but the insistence of 80% of completion was overstated because only 3,800 spent fuel rods were discharged at that time (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, July 4, 2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reprocessing facility</th>
<th>Removal of drive mechanisms for the fuel cladding shearing and slitting machines</th>
<th>Reprocessing facility</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Removal of crane and door actuators that permit spent fuel rods to enter the reprocessing facility</td>
<td>Reprocessing facility</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The six parties agreed to the principles for a “verification mechanism” on July 12, 2008 but Pyongyang refused to allow samples from its nuclear facilities (Nikitin, 2009: 17-18). The 45th day after President Bush announced its will to remove North Korea from SST list was August 11, 2008, but the Bush administration did not take immediate action. On August 12, 2008, Pyongyang criticized Washington’s identification of North Korea as a rogue state in its National Defense Strategy (US department of Defense, 2008: 8) and Seoul analyzed that this showed Pyongyang’s dissatisfaction with the delay of the removal of North Korea from the SST list (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, August 12, 2008). On August 26, 2008, the DPRK Foreign Ministry stated that Washington’s delay of lifting the SST label from North Korea was a violation of agreements between Pyongyang and Washington. Pyongyang suspended the disabling process from August 14, 2008, and would subsequently restore nuclear facilities on September 19, 2008 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, August 26, 2008). On September 22, 2008, Pyongyang asked the IAEA inspectors to remove the seals and surveillance equipment from Yongbyon facilities. On October 2-3, 2008, Christopher Hill visited Pyongyang again and Pyongyang and Washington agreed on denuclearization
verification measures. This agreement included “the U.S. taking samples out of country for review, visits to all declared sites and to undeclared sites by mutual consent, participation of Seoul and Tokyo in verification, and a consultative role for the IAEA” according to Washington (Nikitin, 2009; 18). Washington removed North Korea from the SST list on October 11, 2008\(^{189}\) and Pyongyang welcomed it by announcing its resumption of the denuclearization process (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, October 12, 2008). However, on November 12, 2008, Pyongyang announced that taking samples from its nuclear facilities would not be permitted and slowed down the disabling process due to dissatisfaction with the delay of economic compensation from the 5 parties (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 2008).\(^{190}\) The disabling process reached deadlock.

5) Summary

When Washington showed its will to improve relations with Pyongyang, Pyongyang restrained confrontation and criticism and cooperated in disabling its nuclear facilities actively according to its expectation for normalization of relations with Washington: when the Clinton administration pursued a conciliation policy toward Pyongyang according to “the Perry report” and when the second Bush administration attempted a “new approach,” Pyongyang believed that Washington had the will to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem and that it would negotiate North Korea’s nuclear


\(^{190}\) By July 2008, the DPRK had received 420,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from the 5 parties according to Hill’s testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on July 31, 2008.
program rather than risk a preventive war. And in both cases, high ranking officers’ exchange visits or demonstrations of respect toward Chairman Kim Jong-il as the supreme leader of North Korea were very welcomed and induced Pyongyang’s active engagement because recognizing the other with respect is a highly valued conciliatory behavior in a high context culture.

On the other hand, Pyongyang showed a series of confrontational tactics such as its resumption of the suspended construction of bigger nuclear facilities (December 19, 2005), 7 missile launches (July 4-5, 2006), and its underground nuclear test at Punggye-ri (October 9, 2006). Pyongyang pursued self-help when it saw that Washington did not have any will to coexist with Pyongyang. In other words, Pyongyang chose confrontation when its expectation for improving relations decreased: when the new Bush administration showed hostile policies against Pyongyang and when the second Bush administration did not respond to Pyongyang’s request for improved relations and continued its hostile policy. The Bush administration’s hostile remarks toward North Korea and Chairman Kim Jong-il, which made Pyongyang lose face, also brought about Pyongyang's fury, making negotiation for Pyongyang’s cooperation in giving up its nuclear weapon program much more difficult.


1) Confrontation and Stalemate in Denuclearization Process

On April 5, 2009, Pyongyang launched its three-stage Unha-2 rocket, which is
believed to be a modified version of its long range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile. The reason why Pyongyang launched the rocket, claiming that it was for a satellite, is not clear. Whatever Pyongyang’s intention was, the rocket-launch brought negative responses from Washington and the international community. The UN Security Council gave a presidential statement on April 14, 2009, criticizing North Korea’s rocket-launch as a violation of UNSC Resolution 1718. Pyongyang reacted strongly through its Foreign Ministry statement, saying that Pyongyang would disregard the UNSC presidential statement, break away from the Six-party talks, and suspend the denuclearization process (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, April 14, 2009). Pyongyang also showed very tough responses to other states. It threatened Seoul, saying Seoul is only within 50km from the military demarcation line, and criticized Seoul’s decision to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In addition, Chairman Kim Jong-il did not meet Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister when he visited Pyongyang on April 23-24, 2009, which was unusual. Pyongyang announced that it began the reprocessing work of the spent fuel rods on April 25, 2009 and insisted that it would become a nuclear weapons state and conduct nuclear tests without an apology from the UN Security council for giving sanctions to three North Korean companies (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, April 25, 2009). On May 25, 2009, Pyongyang carried out its 2nd nuclear test. Resisting the UNSC Resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009, Pyongyang insisted that it succeeded in weaponizing plutonium and in carrying out the test of HEU (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, September 4-5, 2009). On November 3, 2009, Pyongyang announced that it completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods and
caused a naval battle with South Korea near Daechung Island in the West Sea. On May 14, 2010, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from NPT again and its success with nuclear fusion reaction on May 12, 2010.

During 2010, relations between the North and the South became worse because Pyongyang sank the South Korean Cheonan warship on March 26, 2010191 and attacked South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in the West Sea on November 23, 2010. Both of these actions were a shock to South Koreans, who considered the North Korean people as their brothers rather than enemies after 10 years of the Sunshine Policy.

It is not clear why Pyongyang increased confrontations from early 2009, though it had followed denuclearization processes step by step during 2007-2008 and it had great expectations for the Obama administration. There are two proposed causes of these confrontations and the stalemate of denuclearization: disappointment with the Obama administration and Pyongyang’s pursuit for national ambition for 2012. This fourth period in North Korean policy analysis is not yet finished. After this period is completed, we will need to reexamine policy again.

2) Expectation for the Obama Administration and Disappointment

Pyongyang had announced its preference for Obama, the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party, to McCain of the Republican Party from June 2008 (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, June 6 and 9, 2008). When Mr. Obama was elected as

191 Pyongyang is believed to have provoked this attack in revenge for its defeat in the Daechung naval skirmish in November 2009 and to gain popular domestic support for Kim Jong-un (The Washington Post, “Analysis: North Korea tests U.S. policy of ‘strategic patience,’ May 27, 2010).
the next president of the U.S. on November 2008, Pyongyang’s expectation for improving relations with Washington increased because Mr. Obama criticized the hostile policy of the Bush administration against North Korea and announced that he would meet Chairman Kim Jong-il without any condition within one year of his term during his election campaign (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 2008). Pyongyang was so optimistic that it warned Seoul and Tokyo to be on their guard because of improved relations between Pyongyang and Washington during Obama’s term of the office (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, November 2008). On January 13, 2009, the DPRK Foreign Ministry stated that the denuclearization should be completed through normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Washington and that Pyongyang could not give up its nuclear weapons unless the nuclear threat from Washington disappears (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, January 13, 2009). When Barack Obama was inaugurated as the U.S. President, Pyongyang urged the new Obama administration to pursue a different policy toward Pyongyang from the neo-conservative policy of the Bush administration (Choson sinbo, “Obama diplomacy starting from the lesson of the Bush administration” January 27, 2009). Pyongyang seemed to assume the Obama administration would be friendly to Pyongyang only because it believed that Mr. Obama was the opposite of President Bush, and because the Democratic Party was connected to President Clinton. Hillary Clinton’s nomination as Secretary of State increased Pyongyang’s expectation for a new policy similar to the

192 Since the Lee Myong-bak administration, relations between the two Koreas had deteriorated. The tour project of Mt. Kumgang was suspended since one South Korean was killed on July 11, 2008, Pyongyang blocked all overland transportation between the North and the South on November 12, 2008, and restricted the number of South Koreans in Gaesung Industrial Complex on November 24, 2008.
Clinton administration’s.

What was Washington’s response to Pyongyang’s expectation? Silence. In the 2009 State of the Union Address, President Obama did not even mention North Korea. High-ranking officials in the Obama administration refrained from discussing North Korea. Compared to the hostile remarks and policies of the Bush administration, the “silence” of the Obama administration did not bring immediate opposition from Pyongyang but this long silence also was not what Pyongyang expected or hoped for. For Washington, the silence might come from some kind of prudence. For Pyongyang, the Obama administration’s silence was enough to bring two kinds of suspicion: 1) Washington would pursue the same hostile policy against Pyongyang as the Bush administration, wearing a different mask, or 2) Washington was indifferent to Pyongyang. Known as “strategic patience” later, the Obama administration strengthened allies around North Korea (Seoul and Tokyo particularly) to put pressure on North Korea while it refrained from apparent hostile policies. Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, clarified the Obama administration’s policy on North Korea as following:

“Thwarting the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran is critical to shoring up

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193 President Obama did not mention North Korea at all in his 2009, 2012, and 2014 State of the Union Address and emphasized international pressure on North Korea in his 2010, 2011, and 2013 Address. “That's why North Korea now faces increased isolation and stronger sanctions, sanctions that are being vigorously enforced. That's why the international community is more united. (2010 Address)”; “we stand with our ally South Korea and insist that North Korea keeps its commitment to abandon nuclear weapons.” (2011 Address); “The regime in North Korea must know they will only achieve security and prosperity by meeting their international obligations. Provocations of the sort we saw last night will only further isolate them, as we stand by our allies, strengthen our own missile defense, and lead the world in taking firm action in response to these threats.” (2013 Address).

194 Kessler defined strategic patience as a resolve that Pyongyang has to make the first move to reengage and that it won't be granted any concessions. (The Washington Post, May 27, 2010).
the nonproliferation regime. Within the framework of the six-party talks, we are prepared to meet bilaterally with North Korea, but North Korea’s return to the negotiating table is not enough. Current sanctions will not be relaxed until Pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps toward complete denuclearization. Its leaders should be under no illusion that the United States will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nuclear armed North Korea. . . We are under no illusions that the START agreement will persuade Iran and North Korea to end their illicit nuclear activities. But it will demonstrate that the United States is living up to its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligation to work toward nuclear disarmament. In doing so, it will help convince the rest of the international community to strengthen nonproliferation controls and tighten the screws on states that flout that their nonproliferation commitments.”

- Hillary Clinton, at the United States Institute of Peace (October 21, 2009)\textsuperscript{195}

In short, Washington is saying to Pyongyang: move first (show us some certain proof of your efforts for denuclearization; joining the talks is not enough), and then we will consider whether we can improve relations or not. This position again maintained that denuclearization should come first, followed by normalization of relations, but in a more strict form. This strategy had principles for dealing with North Korea, and Seoul and Washington strengthened their alliance with the same strategic concepts related to North Korea: do not give in to Pyongyang’s provocation or deception.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{195} For the full text, see \url{http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/10/130806.htm} (Retrieved on January 31, 2014).

\textsuperscript{196} “We’re very confident in the South Korean leadership, and their decision about how and when to move
understanding was intensified when Pyongyang sunk the South Korean warship, Cheonan, and attacked Yeonpyeong Island. However, “strategic patience” would not bring any progress in relations with Pyongyang and was even estimated as “tantamount to doing nothing.”  

As Susan Shirk pointed out, “the problem is that North Korea won't let you put them on a back burner” (The Washington Post, “Analysis: North Korea tests U.S. policy of ‘strategic patience,’” May 27, 2010). Fearing its demotion on the U.S. priority list, Pyongyang seemed to try to recapture Washington’s concern. Pyongyang mentioned its preparation for the satellite from February 24, 2009 and even reported its plan to launch to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Seoul analyzed that Pyongyang had tried to attract Washington’s attention to North Korea by increasing tension on the Korean peninsula (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, February 24, 2009). Pyongyang might try to urge Washington, still conducting its review of North Korean policy, to act for bilateral talks or for improving relations with Pyongyang. Pyongyang would be disappointed by the plans of the U.S.-ROK Joint Exercise such as Key Resolve and Foal Eagle (March 2009). Pyongyang criticized the Obama administration for its hostile policy against Pyongyang.

“...
administration took the office; there has no change of hostile policy against North Korea. The essence of the U.S. hostile policy against North Korea is to end the ideology and system that North Korean people have chosen.”

- The spokesman of Foreign Ministry (KCNA, May 8, 2009)

“Pyongyang has an insight into one of the purposes of the Obama administration’s ‘Strategic patience’: to suffocate North Korea economically with sanctions; thus, it is natural that Pyongyang builds LWRs by itself with economic sovereignty.”

- Choson sinbo, “Stalemate and Pyongyang’s building LWRs” (November 18, 2010)

Whether Pyongyang was right or not, Pyongyang’s confrontational actions tightened the Obama administration’s firm position (Washington would not talk with Pyongyang until Pyongyang abandoned its nuclear weapon program) and strengthened alliances. Pyongyang still expressed its will to denuclearize from time to time but Washington did not move.\(^{199}\)

When the Obama administration’s first Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 announced that the “negative security assurance” principle does not apply to violators of non-proliferation obligations, pointing out North Korea and Iran as the violators, Pyongyang was assured that the new administration in Washington was no different from

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\(^{199}\)Pyongyang criticized Washington’s refusal to talk with Pyongyang and insisted that Pyongyang would not beg for the talks though it supports all kinds of talks with Washington including the Six-party talks (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, December 16, 2010).
the previous administration and insisted that it would increase its number of nuclear weapons and modernize them (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, April 9, 2010).

“In the case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations – there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the U.S. or its allies and partners.”


When the U.S.-led UN peacekeeping forces attacked the Qadhafi regime of Libya, which used military force to suppress anti-government demonstrators on March 20, 2011, Pyongyang got a shock because it saw itself in the same position as the Qadhafi regime.

“The current Libya situation gave a serious lesson to the international society: Washington’s ‘Libyan way of giving up nuclear weapon’ eventually means to invade militarily after disarming the other with sweet talk of security guarantees and improvement of relations. . .So it is clear that one can establish peace when it has its own power in the world of forces.”

Now the distrust between Pyongyang and Washington was deepened. This distrust and stalemate were not caused only by one party. Both Washington and Pyongyang were tired of the other’s non-fulfillment and were determined not to be fooled by the other’s false promise again. Washington was weary of Pyongyang’s repeated threat to pursue nuclear weapons and confrontation, while Pyongyang was disappointed by fluctuations in Washington’s policy according to the administration and was sure that Washington’s ultimate goal was to squeeze North Korea to death, whatever superficial differences there were in various U.S. administrations—it seemed there was no possibility of co-existence.

3) North Korea’s National Ambition for 2012

Pyongyang’s frequent confrontation policy since 2009 might be rooted in its domestic ambition and instability. Pyongyang announced “a strong and prosperous country for 2012” in the New Year’s common editorial of 2008 and spurred its economic development. 2012 was the 100th year of Kim Il-sung’s birth and Pyongyang wished to make a breakthrough domestically for survival. In Pyongyang’s announcement, “strong” means military power, and “prosperous” means economic power, but this slogan seemed to focus on the economic sector more than the military sector. This slogan was also important in its political meaning. To encourage economic development, Chairman Kim Jong-il visited economic fields at the highest frequency of his ruling period in 2009-2011.

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200 The frequency of Kim Jong-il’s visits to economic sectors during 2009-2011 was highest in all of his ruling years, surpassing military visits. 43% (2009); 40% (2010); 39% (2011). (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, 2009-2011).
(See Figure 5-1). In 2009, Pyongyang set up slogans such as “combat for 150 days” (from April 20, 2009 to September 16, 2009) and “combat for 100 days” (from September 23, 2009 to December 31, 2009) to press the North Korean people to produce more food, and to control domestic life including markets. These slogans and domestic control intensified as international sanctions increased after North Korea’s missile-launch and nuclear test.

Disappointed by Washington and with less expectation for improving relations, Pyongyang announced it would resume its nuclear weapons program for self-help. However, becoming a nuclear state was also important for national glory. In Washington’s cessation of direct hostile remarks and threatening policies, and even in its policy of ignoring North Korea, Pyongyang might perceive less of an impending threat despite its disappointment in Washington’s ambivalent attitude because in the late 2000s, Pyongyang had recovered relations with Beijing and Moscow in many sectors (though the relations were not like the one before 1990s). Due to these recovered relations, its economic situation was somewhat improved; thus, Kim Jong-il’s visits to military troops decreased during this period (See Figure 5-1). To emphasize Chairman Kim Jong-il’s achievement for national glory was important for restraining internal dissatisfaction and for maintaining its regime. The launch of Unha-2 was announced as the achievement of Chairman Kim Jong-il. The name of Satellite, “Gwangmyongsung (a shining star),” means Chairman Kim Jong-il in North Korea. That is why Pyongyang announced to its

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201 His visits to economic fields was recorded as 43% (2009); 40% (2010); and 39% (2011) which are three highest amounts in his ruling period (usually 10-20%) and which were higher than military visits during these 3 years. The percentages were extracted from *Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, 2009-2011.
people that the launch was successful while Washington and others estimated that it failed.

The efforts to enhance Chairman Kim Jong-il’s status and power were intensified after the rumor of Chairman Kim Jong-il’s deteriorating health condition was spread in 2008. Chairman Kim Jong-il is believed to have suffered a stroke during the period from August to October 2008 when there was no record of his official activities for 51 days (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, October 4, 2008). After that, Pyongyang was overly eager to announce Chairman Kim Jong-il’s official activities with his photo several times to demonstrate his good health. On March 8, 2009, Pyongyang held the election for the 12th representatives and opened the 3rd administration of Kim Jong-il with the Constitution reform in the supreme people’s assembly on April 9, 2009. In the reformed Constitution, the position of chairman of national defense (Kim Jong-il’s official title) was promoted to supreme leader, which is the same status of Premier Kim Il-sung (Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea, April 9, 2009).

Preparing a successor became important. Kim Jong-un was chosen as the successor of Kim Jong-il in early 2007 but after Chairman Kim Jong-il’s stroke, preparing him as the successor became an urgent task. Kim Jong-un was introduced to the public when he was named as a general of the Korean People’s Army on September 27, 2010 (despite having no field experience in the military at all) and as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the KWP on September 28, 2010. On October 9, 2010, in the celebration of the 65th anniversary of the formation of the KWP, Pyongyang

\[202\] Unlike many other media insisting that Kim Jong-un was chosen to be the successor after Kim Jong-il’s stroke in 2008, Asia Today reported that the decision was made earlier in 2007 with many domestic evidence by citing the argument of the Open Radio for North Korea. (The Asia Today, October 4, 2010).
announced Kim Jong-un as the supreme leader’s successor and advertised Beijing’s support of this choice (*Monthly (Weekly) Report on North Korea*, October 9-11, 2010). After this, Kim Jong-un accompanied Kim Jong-il for most of his official activities. The attack on Yeonpyeong Island led by Kim Jong-un on November 23, 2010 was considered to be a deliberate military provocation to enhance his image as a strong future leader who would enhance North Korea’s national status, while carrying out an impressive achievement to North Korean people (*The New York Times*, “Low profiles of an heir reinforces mystery,” January 7, 2011). Despite his short preparation period for succession, Kim Jong-un became the North Korean leader suddenly when Chairman Kim Jong-il died on December 17, 2011. Pyongyang announced Chairman Kim Jong-il’s death 51 hours and 30 minutes later which was a longer delay than with the announcement of Kim Il-sung’s death (34 hours later). It means that Pyongyang was less ready for its leader’s sudden death and sudden succession process in 2011 than it had been in 1994. This time, the heir, Kim Jong-un, was much younger and had less achievements than his father at the time of succession. Expected domestic instability was realized within North Korea and predictions of Pyongyang’s actions became much more difficult due to domestic turbulence.

4) **Summary**

On April 5, 2009, Pyongyang launched its three-stage Unha-2 rocket, which brought the UN Security Council’s criticism for this missile launch. With strong resistance to the international criticism, Pyongyang increased confrontational tactics
particularly against Seoul (sinking South Korean warship, Cheonan, and attacking Yeonpyeong Island), which tightened the Obama administration’s firm position (Washington would not talk with Pyongyang before Pyongyang abandoned its nuclear weapon program) and strengthened ties between the U.S. and its Asian allies. Pyongyang still expressed its will to denuclearize from time to time but Washington did not move. The ongoing negotiations and disabling processes were stuck in stalemate.

There are two conjectures on why Pyongyang chose confrontation in 2009: Pyongyang’s disappointment over “silence” from the Obama administration and Pyongyang’s domestic ambition. First, Pyongyang expressed its preference of Obama to McCain during election campaign and urged the new Obama administration to improve relations with Pyongyang continuously. However, the Obama administration did not respond to Pyongyang’s demand and Pyongyang seemed to suspect Washington’s “silence” meant one of two things: 1) either Washington would pursue the same hostile policy against Pyongyang as the Bush administration did wearing a different mask, or 2) Washington was indifferent to Pyongyang. Known as “strategic patience” later, the Obama administration strengthened allies around North Korea (Seoul and Tokyo particularly) to put pressure on North Korea while it refrained from apparent hostile policies. Fearing its demotion on the U.S.’s priority list, Pyongyang seemed to try to recapture Washington’s concern by launching missiles and increasing confrontation when the Obama administration criticized Pyongyang. Washington was tired of Pyongyang’s repeated threat to pursue nuclear weapons and confrontation while Pyongyang was disappointed by fluctuations in Washington’s policy according to the administration and
was sure that Washington’s ultimate goal was to squeeze North Korea to death, whatever
superficial differences there were in various U.S. administrations (no possibility to co-
exist).

Pyongyang announced “a strong and prosperous country for 2012” in the New
Year’s common editorial of 2008 and has spurred its efforts at economic development. To
emphasize Chairman Kim Jong-il’s achievement for national glory was important for
restraining dissatisfaction and for maintaining the regime. Preparing a successor was also
an urgent work after Chairman Kim Jong-il’s stroke in 2008. As a young and
inexperienced leader without any significant achievements, Kim Jong-un needed
opportunities to enhance his image as a strong future leader who would enhance North
Korea’s national status while building an impressive reputation with the North Korean
people.

Whatever Pyongyang’s intention was, the whole denuclearization process has
been stuck in deep stalemate since 2009, a process not made easier by Pyongyang’s
unexpected transition period at the end of 2011. Pyongyang’s domestic instability could
bring confrontation to the outside world.
VI. CONCLUSION

1. Summary of Arguments

Facing a serious national crisis in the early 1990s deepened by deteriorating relations with Moscow and Beijing, Pyongyang has pursued two significant policies: spurring the development of nuclear weapons and pursuing improved relations with Washington. Despite Washington’s doubts about Pyongyang’s real intentions, Pyongyang seemed to pursue improved relations with Washington seriously. In a high context cultural perspective in which relationships precede business and become an open door to solve many problems, improvement of relations with Washington would bring Pyongyang similar effects to what nuclear weapons could bring: a security guarantee, economic aid (followed naturally as a result of improved relations but Pyongyang would need to bargain if using nuclear weapons), and enhancement of national dignity.

Thus, during most periods analyzed here (1991-1994; 1999-2008; 2009-2011), Pyongyang refrained from confrontation and cooperated with the denuclearization process when its expectation for normalization of relations with Washington increased (summer 1994; 1999-2000; 2007-2008). On the other hand, Pyongyang threatened to resume nuclear facilities, conducted nuclear tests, and launched missiles when its expectation of normalization of relations with Washington decreased (1993; 2001-2006; 2009-2011). In other words, Pyongyang was highly dependent on nuclear weapons for its regime survival when it could not expect the benefits of improved relations with Washington. By the same token, Pyongyang’s regime survival was less dependent on nuclear weapons when it could expect similar benefits through the improvement of
relations with Washington. With Pyongyang had reason to hope for improved relations with Washington, Pyongyang sometimes held back, refraining from confrontation at first even when Washington directed hostile remarks and policies against Pyongyang (2001), or expressed its expectations frankly, as when Mr. Obama was elected as the new president of the U.S. (2008-2009). The last period of 2009-2011 is still ongoing and the situation will need to be examined periodically for policy recommendations.

However, during its domestic political transition period (1994-1998), Pyongyang practiced confrontation very often regardless of its expectation for improved relations with Washington because Pyongyang needed any immediate achievement rather than expectation for a vague future to unify its own people with crisis consciousness and with enhanced national dignity. It is important to note that most of the confrontation in this period was directed against Seoul rather than Washington. Pyongyang issued many provocative actions against Seoul in its attempt to enhance its dignity and overcome its vulnerable domestic situation as compared to Seoul, but this is not a topic in this dissertation. Pyongyang practiced confrontation against Washington according to its decreased expectation of normalized relations with Washington. The relations of Pyongyang with Seoul and with Washington are different in nature and scholars who study Pyongyang’s behavior need to consider this difference.

Meanwhile, even in deteriorated relations between Pyongyang and Washington, Washington’s respectful behaviors toward Pyongyang such as exchanges of high-ranking officers and using respectful titles for Chairman Kim Jong-il brought Pyongyang’s positive responses immediately because Pyongyang believes that Washington’s culturally
aligned behaviors indicate Washington’s better understanding of Pyongyang and its will to improve relations with Pyongyang. On the contrary, Pyongyang expressed fury and chose confrontation when Washington seemed to ignore Pyongyang (Obama administration’s “strategic patience”) or insulted North Korea and its supreme leader (Bush administration’s “axis of evil”). Particularly, the Bush administration’s hostile remarks made Pyongyang lose face, which high context cultures hate most.

2. Policy Implications

Washington has spent years since the early 1990s debating the true intention of Pyongyang’s demand for normalization of relations with Washington. On the one hand, having prudence in policy making was important particularly in dealing with “an enemy state” to reduce risk. On the other hand, Washington’s doubt and reluctance probably caused it to miss several windows of opportunity. In fact, normalization of relations with Pyongyang might actually ease conditions for Washington. Once a relationship is established, it would be hard to break, both because of increased interdependence and because of Pyongyang’s relations-first culture. In the high context cultural view, good relations might solve security concerns between the two parties and enhance the weaker’s dignity, both outcomes which Pyongyang had aimed to achieve through nuclear weapons.

Over 20 years, Pyongyang had played two cards, nuclear weapons development and improvement of relations, according to Washington’s attitude and policy. For the most part, Washington implemented a containment policy, waiting for Pyongyang’s self-destruction or Pyongyang’s surrender, which proved ineffective. Washington and
Pyongyang resumed negotiations from time to time even during periods of deteriorated relations, but they were unable to agree on the primary concerns in negotiation: Washington insisted on Pyongyang’s denuclearization first before discussing any other issues, while Pyongyang insisted Washington should remove its hostile policy before denuclearization. In a rare event, the windows of opportunity opened for a possible resolution when Washington pursued engagement policy toward Pyongyang actively (1994; 1999; 2007). However, Washington could not continue its engagement policy when Pyongyang’s expectation for normalization of relations with Washington began to increase. Based on these understandings, several policy implications can be produced:

1) Washington’s engagement policy toward Pyongyang should be consistent from one administration to another unless it plans to attack Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities or to remove Pyongyang’s regime by military force.

2) Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang should not focus on economic rewards or economic sanctions. To induce Pyongyang’s cooperation, Washington needs to understand the meaning of Pyongyang’s behavior in a cultural context and to respond to Pyongyang’s demands sensitively. Washington should aim not to give Pyongyang a short-term economic incentive but to give Pyongyang credibility of Washington’s will to co-exist with Pyongyang.

3) With careful and culturally aligned behaviors, Washington can signal Pyongyang
that Washington wants to coexist peacefully and help Pyongyang to become a modern country without nuclear weapons. To break the spiral of deepened distrust between Pyongyang and Washington, culturally aligned behaviors such as visits by high ranking officers to Pyongyang would help.

4) Meanwhile, Washington should observe Pyongyang’s domestic political stability carefully. When Pyongyang’s domestic political situation is seriously unstable, particularly during transition periods, Washington’s active engagement might be perceived as a threat to encourage domestic instability, or Pyongyang might use Washington’s conciliatory actions for flaunting its enhanced dignity. However, Washington should not give up its engagement policy and practice discernment in interpreting Pyongyang’s confrontations against Seoul versus against Washington.

3. Comprehensive Conclusion

This dissertation does not argue that North Korea’s confrontations with its neighbors are caused by its cultural context. Whether between high context cultures or between low context cultures, conflicts exist when different interests exist. The core point is not that high context negotiators always agree but that high context negotiators consider “relationships” the most important thing. High context negotiators can fight or have conflicts because of different interests. However, they try not to break their relations even if they have severe discord within the relations. For example, Pyongyang and Beijing as both high context negotiators have many conflicts and they hate each other at
times, but they don’t break their “blood relations” easily. The relation between Pyongyang and Seoul is not yet established and the two Koreas are still competing for the dominant position on the peninsula (the elder position). In a low context culture, it is natural that “there is neither eternal friend nor eternal enemy” while in a high context culture, relations are “sealed in fresh blood.”

The execution of Jang Sung-taek, Kim Jong-un’s uncle, came as a shock. Greed and power played a role in this event and it looks weird in the high context culture in which “age” means a kind of “authority”. But this kind of action is not so unusual because in high context cultures in which “authority” from “order” or “status” is more important than “age.” Usually age decides “status” or “order” in normal cases or when there are no other special factors to decide. However, once the order or status is established, the age issue comes next. In the old kingdom such as Chosun, a king had absolute authority even when he was much younger than his subjects. For example, Danjong (period of reign: 1452-1455) was 11 years old when he became king and most subjects were much older than he. His uncle, Sooyang, took the throne by force, though many did not support him. In fact, many subjects were killed by Sooyang for their loyalty to the young king. In the new “kingdom” of North Korea, young nephew Kim Jong-un killed his elder uncle Jang Sung-taek to maintain his status and to show himself as the highest authority to the North Korean people, particularly to those who thought Kim Jong-un was only a young leader backed by his aunt and uncle. Thus, this event shows that power struggle happens in North Korea even though “young” nephew stands against his “old” uncle whatever the official charge was.
Instead of causation between culture and confrontation, first, this dissertation argues that in high context cultures such as North Korea, relations might have much more important significance than low context cultures can imagine. So, when negotiating with North Korea, understanding the significance of normalization of relations and dealing with it will work better than using only economic aid or sanctions, unlike the arguments of hard line scholars and soft line scholars. Second, Pyongyang chose confrontation related to nuclear weapon programs both to achieve security and national glory and to induce Washington’s attention when it could not expect benefits from improved relations with Washington. Third, when Washington’s conciliatory gestures aligned with the high context cultural code, this always induced Pyongyang’s positive response (1994; 1999) even though Washington sometimes could not use the positive effect strategically (New York Philharmonic Orchestra performance in Pyongyang in 2008).

Pyongyang has chosen confrontation not because the government is irrational or because the government is so bad that it attempted to exploit Washington, nor because the government is only a victim of Washington’s hostile policy. First, many scholars argue that Pyongyang is not irrational (Cha and Kang, 2003; Smith, 2000; Snyder, 1999). Second, Pyongyang did not gain benefits from its confrontation policy and instead brought on Washington’s and the UN Security Council’s sanctions (1993; 2001-2006; 2009-2011). Also, Pyongyang waited for changes in Washington’s attitude for a while before it chose confrontation because only Washington’s engagement policy gave Pyongyang benefits (2001). If Pyongyang had only wanted to exploit from Washington, it did not need to wait for Washington’s changed attitude from hostility to conciliatory. Last,
Pyongyang chose confrontation and sped to develop nuclear weapons not only when Washington expressed its explicit aversion to Pyongyang or obvious hostile policies against Pyongyang (2001-2006) but also when Washington ignored Pyongyang or had shown less interest in Pyongyang (1993; 2009-2011). It shows that Pyongyang’s concern was not only in response to Washington’s hostile policy; Pyongyang wanted to improve relations with Washington beyond just changing Washington’s hostile policy. In other words, Pyongyang depended on nuclear weapons and missiles when Washington did not care about what Pyongyang demanded; when Washington did not show its will to co-exist with Pyongyang; when Pyongyang could not expect improved relations with Washington (1993; 2001-2006; 2009-2011). Pyongyang used the threat of nuclear weapons not only to enhance its security and national glory but also to induce Washington’s attention and policy changes. To keep Washington’s attention, to make Washington consider normalization of relations with Pyongyang, to gain security from external threats, to enhance national dignity, and to reduce internal dissatisfaction were the main objectives of Pyongyang’s policy toward Washington for the past 21 years.
Appendix: Literature on Culture and Politics

Political culture as a variable in policy decisions began to emerge in 1960s but its development as a field of study has fluctuated due to disagreements among scholars who study political culture and challenges from critics. As Welch pointed out, disagreements on the definition of culture and the lack of scientific methods for the study of culture have been the center of issue in the field of cultural perspective, though most scholars acknowledge the role of political culture in the study of politics (Welch, 2013: 4-5).

However, cultural explanations emerged again at the center of the debate in the early 1990s. By raising a question on Fukuyama’s argument that there would be a gradual spread of liberal democracy because liberal democracy satisfies the different needs more completely than any other competing models (Fukuyama, 1992), Huntington sparked interest in cultural differences as fundamental causes of international conflict (Huntington, 1993; 1996). Huntington pointed out that “the dominant” Western concepts of “individualism, liberalism, equality, liberty, the rule of law, human rights, democracy, free markets, constitutionalism, and the separation of church and state” are fundamentally different from the concepts in the rest of the world such as Islamic and Confucian cultures (Huntington, 1993: 40). Huntington ends his argument with the conclusion that in this world of different perspectives, everyone should learn to coexist with others (Huntington, 1993: 49). Puchala also pointed out that non-western perspectives are different from the western perspective in international relations concepts such as state, power and wealth, though most western-centered international relations theory assumes that the western analytical concepts are universally accepted. (Puchala, 1997: 130).
Puchala argues that non-western states consider western hegemony to be ongoing and their core interest is “emancipation” from “westernization” (Puchala, 1997: 131). The United States Institution of Peace Press has many books on the culture of negotiations: Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer analyzed Pakistan negotiating style with the U.S. in cross-cultural study (Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, 2011); John W. Limbert with his knowledge of the Persian language, history, and customs wrote about how to negotiate with Iran based on understanding Iran and Iranian culture (Limbert, 2009); Daniel Brumberg with other contributors studied on conflicts between Muslim and the West based on Muslim identity and culture (Brumberg and Shehata, 2009); and Solomon and Quinney studied on American cross-cultural negotiating style (Solomon and Quinney, 2010). Walter Clemens also wrote many articles on North Korea in cultural perspective. Mazarr also recognized that cultural factors have an important impact in international relations (Mazaar, 1996). Harshe demonstrates the emergence of cultural perspective in the explanation of the nature of international relations in the post-Cold war period, though the term is not easily defined (Harshe, 2006: 3945). In The Return of Culture and Identity in IR theory (Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. 1996), contributors from each international relations theory sector debate aspects of cultural perspective studies such as the level of analysis. The contributors may differ in their methodology for measuring cultural perspective, but they agree on the significance of

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cultural perspective in the international relations discipline and on the idea that culture and identity are socially construed.

The cultural perspective challenges neorealist perspective which is based on structure and rationality, and was considered to be incompatible with the neorealist perspective. However, by combining culture and foreign policy analysis, Hudson argues that cultural analysis and power politics analysis are not rivals and that culture explains how power is formed and used (Hudson, ed. 1997). Bringing comparative diversity back in international relations, she opposes macro-level terms such as “clash of civilizations” which presume that culture is static (Hudson, ed. 1997). Pye appreciated Hudson’s views for bringing culture back into international relations theory, which had previously only focused on power politics and power structure while ignoring cultural factors (Pye, 1998). In his investigation of scholarly works based on rationality and its challenges during 20th century, Kahler concludes that norm and identity analysis from psychological perspectives need not be incompatible with the rationalist model. Cultural explanations serve to enrich the rationalist model rather than overturn it, though the nature of culture is not the result of individual interactions. Too much dependence on cultural explanations leaves little room for rationalism (Kahler, 1998: 934). Along with the mainstream model based on rational, state-centric theory, there have been many other attempts to study non-rational factors: misperception (Jervis, 1976), cognitive style (Tetlock and Lebow, 2001), cultural approach (Kier, 1995), collective ideas (Legro, 1995), norm matter (Legro, 1997).

As a growing field of study, many attempted to establish cultural perspective as

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204 For more literature on political culture, George Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture: State-Formation after the
a theoretical analytical frame. Hank Johnston and Klandermans tried to establish cultural perspective as a theoretical discipline by providing a common framework (frame analysis)

in social movements (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995). Johnston argues that with a microfocus on discourse and with a microanalysis of frame, cultural analysis can be more conceptually specific and systematic, though microanalysis demands a lot of labor (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995: 219 and 229). Abdelal, Herrera, AI Johnston, and McDemott attempt to figure out the meaning of collective identity as a variable of social science by introducing diverse methodological options on identity: discourse analysis, surveys, content analysis, experiment, agent-based modeling, and cognitive mapping (Abdelal et al., 2006; 2009). In his article on “strategic culture,” after assessing previous studies on strategic culture both in conceptual and methodological dimensions, AI Johnston concludes that the explanation based on strategic culture fundamentally challenges the explanation based on structure though the predictions from both are similar (AI Johnston, 1995a). In his book published in the same year, AI Johnston attempts to figure out “strategic culture” in Chinese history (AI Johnston, 1995b). First, he introduces the common view that Chinese strategic culture is based on Confucian-Mencian Philosophy which represents defensive posture. And then, he studies Seven Military Classics in China and discovers “parabellum paradigm,” the offensive posture. After a case study on the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) in a war against the Mongols, he concludes that during the Ming dynasty, “parabellum paradigm” was dominant while the Confucian-Mencian philosophy was symbolic and also concludes that operative Chinese strategic culture was not much different from the Western “realpolitik” (AI Johnston, 1995b: 262).

Since the area of cultural perspective appears nascent in scholarly writings
(Harshe, 2006: 3951) and cultural analysis can mean different things according to scholars (Hudson, 1997), international relations studies based on cultural perspective are not developed enough to provide many theoretical frames.

To establish “an adequate theory of political culture,” Welch examines previous cultural studies and critics and then provides the methodology to study culture in a scientific way (Welch 2013). According to Welch, the two traditional methodologies of cultural studies, positivism (particularly behaviouralism) and interpretivism have failed to generalize though they provides causal explanations (Welch, 2013: 203; ch. 1 and 2). Thus, cultural studies have been challenged by materialists, particularly rational choice theory and Marxism, but Welch points out that in fact, there is a considerable overlap between rational choice and political cultural explanations and that “discursivism” as a branch of Marxist theory made cultural interpretation relevant in Marxist criticism (Welch, 2013: 205; ch. 3 and 4). Welch argues that by studying political culture in terms of practice and discourse, one can better understand causal mechanism that explains the dynamic of political culture (Welch, 2013: 210).
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Cheon, Seong-Whun: the head of Korea Institute for National Unification

Jang, Jin-sung: the president of New Focus (internet NK news website for NK defectors. [http://www.newfocus.co.kr](http://www.newfocus.co.kr)), the former state poet, who had worked as a high-ranking propaganda official but defected to South Korea in 2004. Graduated from Kim Il Sung University and from the Music and Dance University in Pyongyang.

Kim, Hyun-ho (an assumed name): a researcher of Institute for National Security Strategy (Seoul), the former North Korean student studying at Moscow State University at DPRK government expense who defected to South Korea from Moscow in 1994.
Lee, Mun-hee: the director of North Korean Nuclear Affairs Negotiation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROK (in 2012).


Moon, Chung-in: a professor of Political Science Department at Yonsei University at Seoul, Ph. D. degree from University of Maryland (U.S.), the former advisor of President Kim Dae-jung and Roh, Moo-hyun and an exponent of the Sunshine Policy.
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