1959

Ideological and institutional factors in the debates on African education in Kenya and South Africa.

Kumalo, Cleopas

Boston University

http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15560

Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

IDEOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE DEBATES
ON AFRICAN EDUCATION IN KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA

BY

Cleopas Kumalo

(B.A. (S.S.), University of South Africa, 1950; Hons B. Soc. Sc.,
University of Natal, 1953; M. Soc. Sc., University of Natal, 1955)

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1959
My point is that in an age in reaction against an overestimation of the powers and status of ideas, we must be careful not to falsify the picture in the other direction by saying that which logically deprives them of all influence whatever. - Sprott.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1-3

CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM 4-44

- The Scope
- The Hypothesis
- The Design
- The Method
- The Data: Distribution of Institutional References

II THE BEECHER AND THE EISELEN REPORTS: PARALLELISM 45-90

- The Terms of Reference
- The Actor Sector
- The Means Sector
- The Ends Sector

III THE SOUTH AFRICAN IDEOLOGY: APARTHEID 91-120

- General Considerations
- The Structural Aspect
- Empirical Difficulties
- The Functional Aspect: Deception

IV THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY IN KENYA 121-146

- General Considerations
- The Doctrine of Paramountcy of African Interests
- The Doctrine of the "Dual Policy"
- The Unstated Doctrine of Paramountcy of Settler Interests
- Primary Interests: African and Settler
CHAPTER V  THE NATURE OF IDEOLOGICAL IMPACT: SOUTH AFRICA

General Role-Expectations
The Collectivity-Integrative Aim
The Individual-Integrative Aim
Ideological Impact and Institutional Ends:
  Conclusion

APPENDICES  172-182

BIBLIOGRAPHY  183-186
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Distribution of References in the Records of the Legislative Debates Among Institutional Sectors as Foci - Kenya and South Africa</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Actor Sector Topics Covered in the Legislative Debates - Kenya and South Africa</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Number and Percentage of Trained and Un-Trained African Teachers in Kenya and South Africa, 1948 and 1950 respectively</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Percentage Distribution of African Pupils According to Year of Schooling-at-which - South Africa and Kenya, 1948</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Percentage Distribution of African Pupils in Primary and High School - South Africa and Kenya, 1948</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Number and Percentage of Government, Government-Subsidised and Unsubsidised African Communal Schools - South Africa, 1950</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with the role of ideas in institutional action or, more specifically, with the role of ideas in the determination of an observed pattern of institutional preoccupations in South Africa and in Kenya. We have necessarily limited ourselves to the role of one type of idea-system - the ideological - in verbal action oriented to one type of institutional system - the African educational system in the two societies.

The empirical occasion for the study is the appointment in 1949 of the Beecher Committee in Kenya and the Eiselen Commission in South Africa to investigate, evaluate and report upon the structure and functioning of the African educational systems of the two societies, and the recorded discussions of the Reports by the Kenya and the South African Legislatures.

We use as an index of the role of ideology relative to the African educational systems in point the distribution of themes in the Legislative Debates among three institutional sectors - actor, means and ends - of the educational systems. The generalised thesis is that ideological impact tends to accentuate the normative problem of
institutional ends. South Africa is the experimental case; Kenya, the control. This thesis is shown, through a statement of its assumptions, to be in line with the voluntaristic trend in sociological theory. The relevant feature of that trend is the status accorded to subjective social categories such as systems of ideas, beliefs and other value-orientations. In it these assume an importance no less than that of such staples of sociological interpretation as the objective categories of age, sex, schooling, income, residence, sewing machine and alarm-clock in the living room.

In the first chapter we present the data that define the empirical problem of the study; that is, the distribution of themes or references in the Records of the Legislative Debates among the three institutional sectors. The quantitative data are counterbalanced, amplified and sometimes qualified with a substantial amount of qualitative data in the discussion that ensues.

In the second chapter we develop our independent variable; that is, the fact of the parallelism of the two Commission Reports in their coverage of the three institutional sectors. The Reports are thus controlled for all relevant factors - except for the presence of ideological elements in the one and their absence in the other. The Report that had ideological elements is the Eise1en Report in South Africa. In the third chapter we construct the South African ideology
from which those elements were derived. The Beecher Report in Kenya was devoid of identifiable ideological elements; and in the fourth chapter we show that not only was the Report devoid of ideological elements but the Kenya social system also had no determinate ideological system of ideas, owing to specific indeterminacies in its political arrangements.

In the final chapter we spell out the nature of ideological impact in South Africa in terms of the concept of ideological role-expectations concerning the ends that the African educational system ought to pursue. We show that its crucial role-expectations were with regard to the collectivity-integrative function of education and that this was the ideologically-charged area of Legislative debate in South Africa which swelled the number of references to the ends sector to a statistically significant level, that is, in contrast to the case of Kenya.

We conclude the study with a brief summary.
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM

1. The Scope

The over-all interest of this study is in the point of impact and the role of an external system of ideas on the structure and functioning of an institutional system. The institutional system in point is the educational; the system of ideas, the ideological. This interest is pursued with special reference to the African educational systems of two plural societies - the British Colony and Protectorate of Kenya and the Union of South Africa; and with special reference to the dominant South African political ideology plus the corresponding state of affairs in Kenya.

The time-span is that covered by two contemporaneous official Commissions of Inquiry into the structure and functioning of the

---

1 The concept of externality is discussed in Appendix A.

2 A discussion of this concept will be found in Appendix B.

3 For a brief review of this concept vide Appendix C.

4 A dominant ideology may be defined as the ideology that carries the major implications for the life-chances of individuals and groups within a society, irrespective of the numbers of persons who subscribe to it. The case in point is the Apartheid ideology.
African educational systems of the two societies and by the Debates of the Legislatures of the two societies on the Reports of the Commissions. The Commissions are the Beecher Committee in Kenya and the Eiselen Commission in South Africa. The analytical breakdown of the educational system, as an institutional system of social action, is limited to three sectors: the actor sector, the means sector and the ends sector. It is among these three theoretically possible points of ideological impact that the empirical one is being sought.

2. The Hypothesis

The working hypothesis is that: whereas social systems tend to close the normative problems of institutional ends, ideological impact tends to open and accentuate such problems, that is, the problems regarding the ends that an institutional system ought to pursue. This hypothesis derives from the voluntaristic trend in

---


sociological theory as traced by Talcott Parsons. The underlying assumptions are as follows:

(a) institutional systems are instrumentalities of social systems as a result of devolution to their ends sectors of the value-goals of social systems for specialised pursuit;

(b) institutional ends are therefore crucial points of articulation between institutional systems and the social systems of which they (institutional systems) are part - crucial, that is, for the cohesion or value-integration of social systems;

(c) in so far as a social system cannot move in all directions at once, it will tend to close the normative problems of the ends of its several institutional systems by removing their ends sectors from the area of controversy as divergent solutions in that area may set up a strain in more than one direction at once;

(d) in so far as a political ideology is a non-logical masked manifestation of the sectional sentiments of a ruling collectivity concerning the legitimate social order that is desirable or ought to be desired, it is essentially normative for the social system, that is, it prescribes value-goals;

(e) therefore, inasmuch as an institutional ends sector comprises

the delegated value-goals of a social system, ideological impact may be expected to focus on that sector and to open the problem of the ends that the institutional system ought to pursue if the ideologically conceived social order is not to be undermined.

3. The Design

The design for the empirical translation and testing of the above-stated hypothesis is experimental. The Kenya case is the control case; the South African, the experimental. The two cases are defined by their respective Commission Reports and attendant Legislative Debates. The relevant experimental canon is Mill's second, namely:

If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs and an instance in which it does not occur have every circumstance in common save one, that occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. 8

It is clear from the canon that the essence of the experimental design is control so that the two "instances" "have every circumstance in common save one." The "instances" in the present design are the two Commission Reports. However, control of them in such a

way that they have every circumstance in common save one is neither possible nor necessary. What is both possible and necessary is control or equation on every relevant circumstance, that is, every factor that may reasonably be expected to affect the results by interfering with the operation of the experimental factor. In the study the latter is: ideology. In order to meet this requirement, the design consists of the following operations:

(a) control of the two Commission Reports by equation on the following points: (i) the cognitive categories under which the observations are subsumed or are subsumable, (ii) the investigative concerns underlying the problems observed, (iii) the major solutions or those recommendations which tended to re-define the educational systems, and (iv) the terms of reference;

(b) ascertainment of the distribution of references to each of the three institutional sectors in the Records of the two Legislative Debates on the Reports;

(c) setting up the Kenya case as the control by excluding from it the role of ideology;

(d) setting up the South African case as the experiment by constructing its dominant ideology; and

(e) explanation of the difference between the two cases in the
distribution of institutional references as a function of the role of ideology in the one and the absence of ideology in the other.

Through these operations the hypothesis is translated into the following testable equations:

Let:  \( Pr_1 \) and 2 = Parallel Reports on African education in South Africa and Kenya, respectively;

\( I \) and non-\( I \) = Ideology as present and as not present in \( Pr_1 \) and 2 respectively;

\( Dr_1 \) and 2 = Distribution of references in the South African and Kenya Legislative Debates respectively, among institutional sectors;

\( Es_1 \) and 2 = Ends sector in the South African case and the Kenya case, respectively, as focus of significantly greater or less references.

Then:

(If) \( Pr_1 + I \), then \( Dr_1 = Es_1 > Es_2 \)

(If) \( Pr_2 + \) non-\( I \), then \( Dr_2 = Es_2 < Es_1 \)

Therefore \( Es_1 > Es_2 \) (f) \( I \) (and \( Es_2 < Es_1 \) (f) non-\( I \))

It is clear that \( Pr_1 \) and 2 constitute a constant or independent variable (Chapter 2); \( Es_1 \) and 2, the dependent variable (Chapter 1); \( I \), the postulated intervening variable or test-factor (Chapter 4); non-\( I \), the control for the test factor (Chapter 3); and \( Dr_1 \) and 2, is the index to the operation of \( I \) (and non-\( I \)). The index is also treated in the present chapter. Therefore all the data pertinent to the \( Dr = Es \)
portion of the above formula, that is, the data which define the empirical problem will be found in the last section of this chapter. A description of the method or research operations by which it was collated is in place at this point.

4. The Method

The data in point are the institutional references. These are "inferred entities;" or tendencies of propositions in the Records of the two Legislative Debates relative to the institutional sectors. They are summations of our judgments as to the distributive tendencies. The methodical instrument used in arriving at the judgments is content analysis, defined as "a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."  

We used what Berelson calls the "What is said" categories and with sole attention to "subject matter."

This is perhaps the most general category used in content analysis studies and it answers the most elementary question: What is the communication about? This is the basic question

---


in analyses primarily concerned with determining the relative emphases given to different topics in a body of communication content. 11

The unit of analysis selected was the theme, defined as follows:

In its most compact form, the theme is a simple sentence, i.e., subject and predicate. In other words, a theme is an assertion about a subject matter. Thus, it is a sentence (or sentence-compound), usually a summary or abstracted sentence, under which a wide range of specific formulations can be subsumed. 12

In every case, the subject-matter asserted by a theme (sentence or cluster of sentences) was defined in terms of institutional sectors. That is, the subject-matter of what is said in each theme had, according to prior delimitation of theoretical categories, to be either the actor sector, the means sector, or the ends sector of the African educational systems in point (in which case it was coded under the appropriate category) or it had to be none of these (in which case it was simply left out as irrelevant to our concerns). This operation is illustrated in Appendix D.

It is important to draw attention to certain limitations of thematic content analysis which Berelson points out and which were

11 Ibid., p. 149. (Our underlining).
12 Ibid., p. 138. (Our underlining).
encountered in the course of the research.

The theme is among the most useful units of content analysis. ... But it is at the same time among the most difficult units of analysis, from the standpoint of reliability, especially if it is at all complicated (i.e., more than just a simple sentence). Communication on almost every topic is extremely varied, and the decision as to when a particular wording should be coded as an occurrence of a general theme is not easy to make. 13

He proceeds to point out the need for "explicit instruction" to coders, although he recognises that even this device can only help to "improve reliability" but not to "guarantee it." The difficulty in actual coding imposed by this limitation was experienced many times in the pilot application of the method on the Kenya material to test the feasibility of the project using this unit of analysis. We continued to use Berelson as a guide.

"One elaborate, complex method of attacking this problem," he further counsels, "is to break the theme down into its components, to analyse by them, and then to reconstruct the theme by a 'mechanical' process." 14 This is the way adopted for coping with the problem in the present study. We have defined a theme as an institutional-sector-

13 B. Berelson, op. cit., p. 139.
14 Ibid., pp. 139-140.
reference, that is, a theme has for its subject-matter some aspect of one or the other of the three institutional sectors. Now, in view of the extensiveness of the material to be analysed, especially in the South African case, and in view of the fact that the material was not the private property of the writer\textsuperscript{15} to allow for operation on it without the impossible task of transcribing it, it was decided to anticipate the problem in point by making detailed breakdowns in the institutional sectors. This was designed to allow for the separate coding of components of a theme or institutional-sector-reference occurring in any type of context, including the occurrence, in one sentence, of references to different institutional sectors. The sets of categories that were used in the final execution of the study are presented, along with an illustration of how they were used, in an appendix.\textsuperscript{16} Once the institutional sectors had been broken down into smaller units, it was relatively easy to code each theme, at least, under the correct institutional sector as the units served as a constant reminder of what was comprised in each sector.

\textsuperscript{15} The South African material was obtained through the courtesy of the Library of Congress and could only be consulted in that Library.

\textsuperscript{16} See: Appendix D. The boxed illustration on the following page is part of the coding scheme fully presented in Appendix D.
However, as pointed out earlier, the fact that the material did not belong to us precluded any markings on its pages; and its volume, any idea of transcription. So that, in actual practice, we used stroke-notations opposite each sector component to indicate that an appropriate reference had been observed in the material. A brief illustration follows:

#3. Normative Control

(a) of expansion/registration: ////////// /// (13)
(b) of standards of achievement: ////////// // (9)

etc.

In addition to this coding scheme only such notes and direct excerpts were abstracted as would be useful for purposes of illustrating and amplifying points in the course of the presentation of the quantified data. Such qualitative data is used in the next section of this chapter as well as in subsequent chapters.

5. The Data

Thematic content analysis yielded the following data on the distribution of references in the two Legislative Debates among the three institutional sectors.
### TABLE I

Distribution of References in the Records of the Legislative Debates Among Institutional Sectors as Foci - South Africa and Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \hat{ \theta } \]
\[ z \]

A general observation that may be made on Table I is that the distribution of references to institutional sectors in the two cases shows marked disproportion at the actor and the means sectors. That is, in action terms, the discussants in South Africa were clearly much less concerned about the school teachers and their problems and were much more concerned about the aims of African education than were the discussants in the Kenya Legislative Debates.

The disproportions at these two points are attributed in this study to the role of ideology in the South African case and the absence
of a determinate ideological factor in the case of Kenya. However, the presence and absence of this factor remains to be demonstrated for each case in later chapters. Here we must turn to a description and analysis of the findings represented in Table I, sector by sector.

(a) The Actor Sector

Clearly, a difference corresponding to more than four sigmas \( (4.49) \) is strong evidence that the difference between the two cases in the distribution of references to this sector may not be attributed to chance factors but to a determinate factor. However, this finding was not anticipated in the formulation of the hypothesis. The implicit suggestion in the hypothesis is that ideological impact will have no perceptible effects on the non-ends sectors; or, in the empirical terms of this study, an expectation based on the hypothesis is that there will be no statistically significant difference between the two cases in the distribution of references to the actor and the means sectors. However, the observed statistic for the actor sector is too significant to be left unrelated, at least provisionally, to the central thesis of this study which postulates ideology as an explanatory variable.
In order to relate it to the role of ideology we must first exclude non-ideological factors as theoretically possible explanations.

One such factor is of special concern here as it bears on our methodology: that is, the treatment of this difference as a function of a possible corresponding difference in the investigative concerns of the Commissions at this sector. The factor of the Commissions' respective investigative concerns mechanically reflecting themselves in distribution of references to any institutional sector is inadmissible. Our methodology has required that the two Commissions be equated on points of coverage, including the factor of investigative concerns. This is undertaken in Chapter 2. In that chapter we show that the Reports were so parallel in their coverage of institutional sectors, sub-categories and their problems that no differences in the distribution of references to institutional sectors may legitimately be attributed to possible differences in that area. Both Commissions submitted considerable material for discussion and controversy on all sectors; so that the failure of discourse on the actor sector in South Africa to exploit the relevant material and the significantly greater exploitation of it in Kenya must be referred to some other factor.

More specifically, on the actor sector the Commissions
differed but little in their coverage or amount of attention devoted to that sector. A comparison of the absolute numbers of the paragraphs devoted to this sector along in the two Reports may serve as a crude index. Because of the difference in the lengths and total numbers of paragraphs in the Reports proportional differences would be misleading. Proportionately, the Beecher Commission devoted 14.40 per cent of its paragraphs and the Eiselen Commission only about half of that, i.e., 7.30 per cent, to the actor sector. However, the absolute figures are eighty paragraphs in the Beecher Report and seventy-seven in the Eiselen Report devoted to this sector. Considering that the seventy-seven paragraphs in the latter were part of a document twice as long as the Beecher Report, it is clear that, on the average they were lengthier and, allowing for verbosity, more pregnant with discussable material. So that the failure of the Legislative Debate in South Africa to focus on this sector may not be attributed to this source. That failure, and no longer simply the statistic which was our point of departure, then becomes the phenomenon that must be accommodated in our hypothesis.

A comparative examination of the topic-content of the Debates on this sector partly complicates the problem and partly suggests the
direction in which a tenable explanation may be sought in line with
the hypothesis of the study as a whole. What topics did the Debate
cover in Kenya which it did not cover in South Africa and vice versa?
These are given below with a tally of the number of references to each
topic in the two situations.

**TABLE II.**
Actor Sector Topics Covered in the Legislative Debates - South Africa
and Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics Covered</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Recruitment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Supply - sources</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nationality</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Qualifications</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Training - quality</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Training - costs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Remuneration:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Current salary scales</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Proposed salary scales</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conditions of Service:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Status (civil service)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Pension arrangements</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Professional regulations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Civic regulations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Professional organisations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Again, as will be shown in the next chapter, both Commissions devoted much careful attention to all these and other aspects of the actor sector. Also, the problem-content of each of these aspects was much the same in both situations: for instance, the large numbers of untrained teachers, the use of non-African (mainly White) teachers especially at secondary school levels, the practice of charging fees of teachers-in-training, etc.

The fact that the discussants in Kenya essayed to touch upon all these aspects is something that may logically be expected of a set of responsible law-makers reviewing an important document which was soon to be translated into Government policy affecting the life-chances of six million African citizens and, through them, the progress of the country as a whole. From this point of view therefore the problem, again, becomes that of explaining not why there was significantly greater concern over this sector in Kenya but why there was significantly less concern over it in South Africa.

This difference in concern is not only statistical but also sociological, that is, if the Debates be rightly considered as a verbal form of social action. This form of social action took one direction in Kenya which it failed to take in South Africa. But there is more to
the problem than difference in directionality. There was also a clear
difference in the modes of orientation of the discussants in the two
situations. In Kenya the orientation was primarily moral-evaluative;
in South Africa, primarily cognitive. A few excerpts from the speeches
of the two movers on the opposite-side\textsuperscript{17} in the two debate-situations
should clarify the point.

(i.) In Kenya:

On remuneration and student-teacher fees:

These teacher training fees combined together with the
fact that the teachers' salaries are going to be below what
they now earn, as a result of the recommendations of the
Salaries Commission, will certainly be a big blow to
African education in this country, and I entirely oppose
the proposition.\textsuperscript{18}

On teacher-shortage and teacher-training:

Under this heading I should like, first of all, to remark
again on the general principle of the importance of
teachers in the field of expansion. African education is
unable to make progress because of the lack of teachers
and while there is, in this report, some comment about
licensing the unqualified teachers ... the report ...
recommends that the present courses be lengthened (i.e.,
from one to two years - a proposal obviously unacceptable
to the mover).\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The opposite-side here means the non-governmental section
of the Legislature.
\item Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: \textit{Legislative Council Debates},
1950, p. 224.
\item Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: \textit{Legislative Council Debates},
1950, p. 213.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Or, on Service conditions:

The African teachers and the African people as a whole, Sir, are not prepared to accept that the teaching service should be run on a non-Civil Service basis. The teachers must be the employees of the State, and the State should realise that it is the wish of the African people. 20

These examples should suffice as an indication of the evaluative valour of discursive attack on recommendations affecting an institutional sector over which moral concern is definitely evinced. Such remarks as these set the cues for the opposite-side, hence the tone and level of concern over this sector in representative discourse in Kenya.

(ii) In South Africa: 21

In sharp contrast to this, the thirteen references to the arrangements for the pensioning of African teachers occurred as a result of the mover on the opposite-side "only seeking information" from the relevant Cabinet Minister on the state of affairs and the Government intention thereon. The purely cognitive orientation adopted in this case is all the more striking as less than half of the African teachers in Natal (that is, only those in Government schools) were at the time covered by a pension arrangement.

20 Ibid., p. 224.

This state of affairs, obviously known to the mover, called for a moral-evaluative orientation and an extended debate. This did not occur.

The nine references to the regulatory aspect of the actor sector occurred with reference to only three African former teachers in the entire profession. They had been suspended/dismissed from the service on charges under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. They had meantime appealed and won the case against Rex; but had neither been re-instated or back-paid or compensated. Their economic and professional status needed re-evaluation and re-definition. But when she arose, the mover only sought information again on Government intentions.

The complicating significance of this is that the difference between the Debates in Kenya and in South Africa on this sector was not only quantitative, in terms of the relative numbers of references, but also qualitative, in terms of orientations adopted towards the sector: the cognitive versus the evaluative.

The cognitive orientation is essentially illegitimate to a debate – more so on a document which, in the final analysis, is defined by its valuations, in the form of recommendations of what ought to be
desired or done in the case in point. The cognitive orientation carries with it the implicit banal irresponsibility of science or the quest of knowledge for its own sake. The relevant question therefore becomes that of why legislative discourse on the actor sector in South Africa assumed the irresponsible cognitive orientation analogous to that of pure science - the seeking of information concerning pensions and three former teachers and the furnishing of that information. In other words, why did legislative discourse abandon responsibility and significant concern for the men and women occupying the actor sector roles? Why were they thus selectively forgotten?

In reconsidering our hypothesis in the light of the statistic in point and the qualitative questions just raised, we may postulate that: ideological impact not only accentuates the normative problem of institutional ends but may also, as in the present case, tend to remove evaluative concern from the actor sector, that is, from certain problems of institutional personnel. Such removal of concern from certain areas of institutional reality may be regarded as a special case of a general tendency for an ideology to "gloss over" certain areas of empirical reality in the interests of the security system of its author or carrier collectivity or social system. Parsons remarks this general tendency with clarity.
... in the nature of the case, integration of the social system is the primary function of its common ideology. Hence, where there is an element of malintegration in the actual social structure the tendency will be for the ideology to 'gloss it over' and 'play it down.' Fully to 'face up' to the reality of the importance of conflicting elements in the value-system and in the realistic situation ... would be a threat to the stability of the society.\textsuperscript{22}

The suggestion in this lead is that an explanation for the selective forgetting of the African teacher in South African Legislative discourse may be sought in the status of the Western-educated African, as an elite social category, in the South African ideology and in the significance of that category for the security system of the White collectivity. Such selective forgetting represents failure or reluctance to "face up" to disquieting elements "in the realistic situation." As will become clear in Chapter V, this African elite is viewed in that ideology as a bastard born of cultural "miscegenation" between the White and the African collectivities. It is an unfortunate progeny of a misguided formal education in the liberal tradition of the West - misguided, that is, by missionary enthusiasm which disregarded the segregationist traditions of South Africa. The following stereotyped evaluation of this category by the Eiselen Commission is noteworthy.

\textsuperscript{22} T. Parsons, \textit{The Social System} (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 356-357. (Our underlining).
In many respects the schools, especially secondary and high schools, have joined in creating a modern and extremely undesirable phenomenon, viz., that group of people who break away too rapidly from the views and habits of their own people. Such a stray minority is readily formed where two cultures are in close contact. The individual lives in the midst of his own community, but is not of the community; he is an outcaste among his own people and can find no anchorage with people of the other culture. He does not contribute to the building up of his own people and is of no significance in the other culture. 23

In Chapter IV where this quotation occurs again we show that in this evaluation of the African elite the Commission was being true to form or stereotype. In the South African ideology, this elite is peripheral, it is a marginal category resultant upon an inadequately regulated social system and an ideologically unplanned educational system. There the real or legitimate Africans are the "Bantu" in the "Bantu Areas." The rest are a cultural freak.

Now, the African teachers who were selectively forgotten in the Debate that centered about an ideological replanning, this time, of a real "education for Natives," belonged to this peripheral, residual category. Ideologically, there is a real sense in which they are not "Bantu" or African but simply a "stray minority" or what Dr. Verwoerd

calls "synthetic Westerners." As such, it is postulated here that they could not, given this stereotyped evaluation of them in the ideology, constitute a subject of significant concern to the discussants. Rather, the concern, as we show in this study, was in the re-orientation of the ends sector of the African educational system to prevent the real legitimate "Bantu" from going the way of this "stray minority" of "synthetic Westerners."

But, again, as we show in Chapter IV, the direction in which this synthetic minority has strayed is not a matter of ideological and psychological indifference to the White collectivity. The direction has been towards what Dr. Verwoerd calls "the green pastures of European society in which they were not allowed to graze," and in this way this elite has threatened to transcend those cultural barriers which the White collectivity considers to mark its distinctiveness and to provide a rational basis for its claims to legitimate power. What is more, at the gates of those pastures this elite is vocal and in a language that the collectivity understands. Again, we may anticipate the discussion in Chapter IV:

It is ... undeniable that it is this educated minority group that is the most vociferous and the most clamorous, and who feels the restrictions placed by European overlordship
as unbearable and unjustifiable. 24

Now, the first part of our "explanatory" thesis was that the African teachers were ignored in Legislative discourse on an ideologically based document because in the ideological thought of White South Africa they do not constitute a significant or legitimate category, but a peripheral and residual one of stray synthetic westerners. The second part of the thesis is that, in the South African ideology and group psychology, they are also symbolic of that "most vociferous and most clamorous" category of Africans - the educated leadership elite - who threaten to break into the forbidden "green pastures." They are a threat-symbol, hence their being avoided by both sides to the South African Debates. Such avoidance may be regarded as functional for the security system of the White collectivity.

The third part of our "explanatory" thesis is that not only did the discussants know that the African elite were, in fact, a central category to any realistic facing-up to the social dynamics of the South African social system, but that the Government in particular also knew that the African teachers were to be central to the implementation

24 N. J. J. Olivier, "Apartheid - A Slogan or a Solution?" Race Relations, 90/53, p. 3.
and success of "the plan" it had in mind. In addition to having threatening symbolic significance for the White collectivity, the teachers had instrumental significance for the plan. The Government was clearly counting on their co-operation - voluntary or antagonistic.

But the discussants can be safely presumed not to have been unaware of how the African teachers, as actors, would react to being devalued into means. The Minister of Native Affairs cannot be said to have been announcing a new discovery when he stated in the Senate a year after the debates in point that:

The teachers, by means of resolutions taken by their associations, have expressed themselves strongly against the findings and recommendations of the Education Commission and also against the Bantu Education Act, and they have declared themselves in favour of equal education for all.25

We are therefore suggesting as a corollary to the instrumental significance of the teachers the point of strategic expediency on the part, especially, of the Government. That is, if the African teachers were to be instrumental to the plan it would have been bad politics or diplomacy to focus the debate-spotlight on them. The implicit premise here is that in so far as the two collectivities - White and African - are considered as discrete units of the social system, White

---

persons and African persons tend to act in-concert on inter-collectivity issues. That is, they act not as persons on their own behalf, but as members of their respective collectivities and on behalf of the collectivities. The South African ideology exploits and elaborates this theme; and viewed from the perspective of that ideology the African teachers may be expected not to be seen in their role as professionals but in association with an antagonistic collectivity and, especially in association with that section of the collectivity that is regarded as threatening. A useful mechanism of defense, in this case, we suggest was selective forgetting of them. The role of ideology then was to represent the African teachers in a non-professional status-role, thus making it possible not to refer to them in their professional status-role which comprises the actor sector of the educational system. It is in this sense that we suggest that one unanticipated role of ideology in the case in point was to remove institutional concerns from the actor sector of the African educational system in South Africa.

(b) The Means Sector

The insignificant difference between the two cases at this sector was theoretically anticipated. In so far as ideological impact
was hypothesised to focus attention on the ends sector, it was not expected to make any significant difference at this sector. The parallelism between the two educational systems at this sector, as outlined in the next chapter, suggested early in the research that both Legislatures would, in discussing the respective Reports, find much the same amount of work to do on the mechanics of the systems as on-going concerns. Both systems needed a measure of overhauling; but for different normative reasons. It is the reasons that were expected to make a difference in terms of the directions in which the overhauled and streamlined institutional mechanisms ought to go. This is the normative problem of ends.

(c) The Ends Sector

The highly significant difference in the distribution of institutional references between the ends sectors of the Kenya and the South African educational systems confers high probability on the hypothesis of this study.

But as in the case of the actor sector the difference at this sector is not only statistical but also sociological. In the latter respect the difference is in the relative range of discursive interest in the ends sector observable in the references made to it. In Kenya
the range tended to be narrower; discourse was virtually confined to the propositions made by the Beecher Committee in its recommendations on institutional ends. These tended to be taken at face value.

In South Africa, however, the range was clearly wider; discourse tended to transcend the face value of the Commission's recommendations. Their surface meanings tended to be taken, at best, as indices to underlying meanings, intentions or motivations of Government. There was a clear tendency towards trying "to read between the lines" - unmasking and debunking. This is characteristic of ideological universes of discourse and is another pointer to the presence of an ideological ingredient in the material that was under discussion. The ideological orientation presupposes that any given proposition conceals as much as it reveals. This was evident in the South African case and palpably lacking in the case of Kenya. A few excerpts should clarify the point.

(i) In Kenya:

The Beecher Commission had recommended as follows on the ends sector of African education:

---

26 Such action would seem to contradict our earlier assumption about implicit understandings and action-in-concert on the part of the White collectivity in inter-collectivity contexts. A determining factor is the collectivity's "definition of the situation" as crucial or otherwise for its security and stability; intra-collectivity conflict (serious or mock) is within such limits.
To state our objectives briefly, we desire to see a morally sound education, largely based on Christian principles, conducted with adequate inspection and supervision, providing courses of education each of which is purposeful and complete within itself at every level, and which is balanced in the numerical relationship between the more advanced and the elementary levels, and which lays particular emphasis on the acquisition of practical attitudes and skills.\textsuperscript{27}

Education 'for education's sake' must not be the guiding principle for any who are concerned with education. The aim must be to produce at all levels of African society morally sound and economically valuable citizens.\textsuperscript{28}

As is evident from the reference by the mover on the opposite side, this statement of aims and principles was generally acceptable at the non-ideological level of discourse which was the level in this case, inasmuch as the formulation of aims and principles in South Africa could have been acceptable at this level.

It is a fact that, although the Report is good so far as the survey of objectives and principles are concerned, its recommendations do not come anywhere near going far enough.\textsuperscript{29}

The only reference to this sector which had any tinge of ideology was made by an Asian discussant in the course of a maiden-


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 250.

\textsuperscript{29} Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Legislative Council Debates, 1950, p. 221.
speech. But even that reference can evidently be referred to the liberal tradition in educational theory rather than to political ideology. The reference was with regard to the objective of producing "economically valuable citizens."

Mr. President, what a horrible conception! It is like nothing so much as Aldous Huxley's description of the bringing up of the little black Category E's in his satire Brave New World. The loud-speakers softly singing beneath their pillows as they sleep, "It's fun to be Category E." In the schools of the Committee's dreams there is to be no place for music, for play, for wit, for beauty. The unfortunate children are to be turned into "morally sound and economically valuable citizens." Economically valuable! To whom? I am afraid it is all too clear. They are to be made valuable to their masters and there is no level of African society which is to be allowed to escape. Mr. President, this is not education for freedom; it is education for the plantation, it is education for the kitchen. 30

This attempt to scratch the calm surface of the objective of "morally sound and economically valuable citizens" could, in an ideologically charged situation, have triggered an ideological controversy involving charges, denials, and counter-charges of sinister underlying motivations in gearing African education towards this objective and its alternatives. In the Kenya situation it evoked no ideological rejoinder.

30 Ibid., p. 234.
In reply, the Member for Health and Local Government took a down-to-earth platform which was almost school-master-like if not statesmanlike.

One of the most valuable things that it (education) can do in this Colony at the present moment is to fit the people to earn their own living, to become economically valuable, if I may underline the point - to whom? - to the Colony, to the people - unless he is economically valuable to the Colony, to the people, then the man who cannot stand independently on his own feet, earning his own living by his brain or his hands, loses value to himself and the society which has created him. 31

In an ideologically-charged situation the idea of a "morally sound" orientation in education, as defined by the Committee in terms of Christian morality, could have raised many valutative problems. In Kenya it did not. This is particularly noteworthy as Kenya is not only multi-racial but also multi-religious. The discussants did not probe into the manifest and latent implications of this perspectivistic interpretation of morality, in this case, as almost exhausted by Christian morality which is only one brand. Rather, the preoccupation was with the application of the interpretation.

In moving the consideration of the Report, the Member responsible had sought to forestall any fears in this case; and those

who spoke to the issue were merely expressing gratitude for the assurances.

I am glad to hear from the hon. mover that Recommendation 1, which I was very much concerned about, is not going to be taken literally as it is in the Beecher Report. Because there are several places where not only Christian Africans or non-Christians, but there are Muslims who live in such places, and if we were to apply this recommendation such schools would be unattractive to those people, and they would go without education. 32

In the same strain an Asian discussant stated:

I am sure, Sir, that the authors did not mean that Christian instruction will be provided in all schools whether the people who went to those schools were Christians or professed other religions. I think, Sir, it cannot be denied - and I cannot lay too great an emphasis on the fact - that whatever education we give in this country must be based on sound moral and spiritual foundations. 33

Therefore, not only was the range of discursive interest narrower, but there also is evident here a considerable measure of consensus on the institutional ends that ought to be pursued. The consensus presumably accounts for the failure of Legislative discourse to penetrate farther than the surfaces of things. This consensus may itself be accounted for by the absence here of any determinate political


33 Ibid., p. 277.
ideology. For, in the final analysis, ideologies have the function not only of "glossing over" certain empirical issues but also of sharpening discourse by polarising the positions of participants in a debate-situation.

(ii) In South Africa:

In introducing the Eiselen Commission Report for consideration by the House of Assembly, the Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences had, inter alia, made the following reference to the ends sector:

The whole purpose of the Commission's approach to the problem shows that a continuous school course, which is in vogue throughout today and aims at the cultural integration of a relatively small number of Natives with the Europeans, should be abolished and replaced by a series of short rounded-off courses which would prepare the Natives for effective participation and responsibility in progress ... built on an elementary level, a more advanced level and a high level. The Commission accordingly recommends a quadrupartite educational system: (i) a four-year elementary course which in the course of time will be compulsory for everyone, (ii) a four-year primary school course, (iii) a high or technical school course, (iv) University training. 34

The mover on the opposite side immediately retorted as follows:

Now the point I want to challenge in that statement is that it suggests the substitution of a new approach for an education which, it is contended, aims at the cultural integration

with the Europeans of a relatively small minority of Natives. I don't regard this as a legitimate criticism of what has been happening among our Native population and I don't regard it as a sound approach to Native education as such. My first point is this that in my opinion it is not true that Native education as it existed up to the present time aims at the cultural integration with the Europeans of a relatively small number of Natives....

The basic ideological character of this dialogue stands out very clearly. It is not so much in the broad sweep of these statements as in a radical difference between the discussants at the cognitive level. That is, in their respective perceptions of the empirical state of affairs in African education, perceptions of "what has been happening among our Native population" with respect to education. This is not a difference in evaluation; it is a difference in cognition, through different ideological lenses.

Looking at the process of African education, the one sees incipient "cultural integration;" the other denies the validity or legitimacy of that perception and declares that "it is not true" to empirical fact "as it has existed up to the present time." The distortion of empirical reality is of the essence of ideological perception.

35 Ibid., Col. 8963. (Our underlining).
Karl Mannheim observes, that structurally ideologies resemble lies. 36

The charge in the dialogue therefore is that someone is, ideologically, lying - that is, distorting the empirical reality of "what has been happening" in the African educational system in the direction of sectional collectivity interests.

In general, I see the pattern which the Commission have put before the Government, it is this: That Native education should conform with the Native policy of the Government, of the country.... I am inevitably dubious about the proposal that the education of the Native population should conform to a pattern of Native policy. That gives me anxiety in two directions. One is the broad direction of the purpose of education. I would always, myself, Sir, be anxious about any suggestion that education should have any particular social or political pattern. 37

The intellectual operation involved in this argument is germane to an ideological context. It is the standard technique: of unmasking the opponent's "real" motivations which are ideologically concealed. It is often accompanied by the technique represented in the previous argument - i.e., debunking the opponent's perceptions of reality as


distorted by his interests. Taken together, the two represent the means for penetrating beyond verbal surfaces. The penetration, we pointed out earlier, was typical of Legislative discourse in South Africa but not in Kenya. It presupposes mask and camouflage in communication. In South Africa this was provided by the apartheid ideology.

This general intellectual approach: distorted perception, debunking of that perception, and unmasking of its alleged motivations, may be seen in a few more illustrative excerpts from representative discourse in South Africa.

From the Government-side:

The important matter in connection with Native education is this: if one looks at the position today one is struck by the absolute aimlessness of Native education. If one looks at the whole position over the past decade it can be justly said that it was "the road to nowhere". What use are the majority of the educated Natives to the Native population today? Very little. 38

We have seen that the higher and university education which the Native has received up to the present has not benefitted him. Who are the agitators; who are these people today? It is the educated Natives. I do not blame the Natives primarily. I blame the Europeans in this country who gave him an education in which he finds no self-realisation among his own people and in the community in which he lives. I

---

38 Ibid., Col. 8988.
have no intention of vilifying the Native. I do not find fault with the Native primarily, but I find fault with us Europeans in this country. 39

It is no use giving them an education which will fit them for a community to which they will not be. That after all is the position in our country. I am not going into the rights and wrongs of it; that is not the work of education; the work of education is to mould the child for the community. What that community looks like and what it should look like is for politicians, the community, but the school and the educational institutions have to prepare the child for the place he is going to take in that community. 40

From the Opposite-side:

The Commission insists that the object of education is to subserve the ends of some specific type of socio-economic development. It insists that Native education shall be related to the whole pattern of Native life, which we assume is going to be established over a number of years, the kind of society that they are going to build up for the Native population, and that only when we have decided on that pattern and begun to implement it, can we really lay down the curriculum which we are going to apply to the Native population. 41

In the first place I find myself inevitably agreeing not with the majority of the Commission, but with the one-man-minority report, the report of Prof. Andrew Murray. I cannot see education as a handmaid of a particular type of society which is all going to be worked out on a specific

39 Ibid., Col. 8971.


pattern today by a community which itself is never certain from one government to another as to what the pattern is going to be. I feel as Prof. Murray does that education is essentially a training of the individual to enable him to make the best use of his abilities in any society in which he finds himself, that education is a release of the skills in the first instance and the mental activity of the individual to enable him in the first place to accommodate himself to the society in which he finds himself, to use his ability in that society and in the end to mould society to his own ends, to his desires and in his own way. And in any case, Sir, to talk about education which in the first instance will consist of 3 to 4 years of primary education for the community as the handmaiden of a cultural advance - how do they say? "The transmission of the culture of a society from its more mature to its immature members" - seems to be an extravagant claim. 42

Educate your Native Africans to the full and you will find men among them whom you can persuade, whom you can get to submit to government. But the education of the subordinate race is fundamental. 43

This last Machiavellian statement of an objective was made on the opposite side almost with tongue-in-cheek. The immediate context was the Native Education Vote of over 8 million pounds. The relevant implication was that: Vote the money gladly and you might as well be honest about your self-interest in spending it on African education.

42 Ibid., Col. 6438.

That is, for the White collectivity it is not just charity but a (political) investment given the assumption that that educational system was to be re-aligned with a government policy which aims at ensuring continued White domination.

Finally, it is clear that the polemics over the ends sector of the African educational system in South Africa did not only involve two different ideological premises - the authoritarian and the liberal - but also two separate academic premises - the sociological and the psychological - for educational theory. The evident way in which these affected the perceptions of the two sides in the debates may be described as follows: the government side could not see the trees for the forest; the opposite side could not see the forest for the trees.

There was therefore at the centre of the debate the evaluative problem of primacy between the individual and the society or, dynamically, primacy between individual development and socio-cultural development as institutional ends of the African educational system. The positions of the two sides on the question is clear enough. The moral legitimacy of the choice that prevailed is an open question which lies beyond the scope of the present study.

Rather, in the next chapter we show that, despite the observed difference in the distribution of concerns about the ends sector in the
Legislative Debates, the two Commission Reports which were the bases of discourse were essentially parallel in the following respects: (a) the cognitive categories into which the observations were subsumed or are subsumable; (b) the investigative concerns underlying the problems that were observed; (c) the major solutions or recommendations, that is, those which tended to redefine the institutional systems; and (d) the terms of reference. The methodological necessity for showing this is to exclude, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, the theoretical possibility of the observed differences in the distribution of institutional references being attributed to possible differences in the basic categories and concerns of the Commissions themselves. That is, if our thesis, which attributes the differences in the distribution of institutional references to an ideological factor, is to hold, it must be shown that the Commissions were, in the first place, looking at the same orders of reality in the two educational systems and in much the same way, save for the role of ideology in the one case and its absence in the other. In this way, the two Commissions' Reports are reduced to the methodological status of constants or independent variables in the study.
CHAPTER II

THE BEECHER AND THE EISELEN REPORTS: PARALLELISM

I. The Terms of Reference

A convenient point of departure for a comparative examination of the two Commission Reports is their respective terms of reference. No purpose would be served here by a comparison between the two sets of terms of reference in isolation from the actual performances of the Commissions at the three institutional sectors. Rather, the terms of reference will be used here as keys to the parallelism of the actual performances and concerns.

The terms of reference were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Beecher Committee</th>
<th>The Eiselen Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To examine and report on:</td>
<td>To examine and report on:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The scope, content and methods of the African educational system;</td>
<td>a. The formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their needs under ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. the extent to which there could be or should be a variation of the accepted policy by which African Primary education is the responsibility of Local Authorities;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. the incidence of educational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
expenditure on African children as between public funds and payments by the individual parent, taking into consideration the position of parents who have to send their children to un-aided schools;

d. the present system of financial aid from the Government to Local Authorities, with special regard to African primary education;

e. the fixing and utilisation of school fees;

f. the extent to which salary scales for all African teachers should be co-ordinated and the method by which this could be achieved, examining in particular the practicability of setting up a unified service for African teachers;

g. the operation of the present grant-in-aid system; and to make recommendations.2

II. The Actor Sector

Two main categories of the personnel component of the African educational system are discernible in the two Commission Reports: (a)


the administrative personnel and (b) the professional personnel or teachers. The analytical scheme employed here requires that the former be treated not as actors but as part of the means sector of the system. Attention here will be confined to showing similarities in the categories and concerns of the Commissions relative to the professional personnel only.

The Beecher Committee had been specifically referred to this sector by term of reference #f. The Eiselen Commission, however, had no such specific injunction. But in term of reference #e it was asked to look into "such other aspects of Native education as may be related to the preceding" terms of reference. Both Commissions did investigate this sector. The main cognitive categories were: recruitment and training, service conditions and remuneration. The similar investigative concerns may now be shown briefly in each case.

1. Training and Recruitment:

Two basic concerns are always involved in this aspect of the problem of personnel: viz., the qualitative and the quantitative. In any given social situation the two tend to cross-cut and limit each other thus creating a dilemma of choice between them. That is, to
ask for a greater measure of the one is to ask for a lesser measure of the other. In the nature of the case, telic social change calls for a conscious choice between emphasis on the quality or the quantity of the personnel to be recruited for a given institutional system. In social systems undergoing rapid social change, as indexed by the emergence of transitional institutional systems requiring on short socio-temporal notice personnel of high quality and in large numbers, the dilemma of social planning becomes acute. The critical question becomes: Shall we, in recruiting, lay emphasis on high-quality personnel who must necessarily be in small numbers - thus limiting the scope of institutional services, or lay emphasis on large numbers of personnel who must necessarily be of poor quality on the average - thus jeopardising the efficiency of institutional performance?

This then was the common concern of the two Commissions in their investigation of the problem of personnel training and recruitment. That is, how to raise the level of efficiency of the African educational system through highly trained teachers and in sufficiently large numbers so as not to affect its scope of effectiveness. This concern was particularly acute in Kenya as the following figures suggest.
TABLE III

Number and Percentage of Trained and Untrained African Teachers
in Kenya and South Africa - 1948 and 1950, respectively³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Trained</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Untrained</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2748</td>
<td>49.00</td>
<td>2852</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>5600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>14080</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>3525</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>17605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the light of the relevant figures, the Beecher Committee observed that:

Still far too many teachers in African primary schools, aided and unaided, are untrained, and the majority of the untrained teachers are of doubtful value.⁴

More specifically, therefore, the common concern was how to eliminate the "untrained" category of personnel and still hold constant, or at best increase, the total number of teachers available. The Beecher Committee ranked this problem only second to that of normative control to be treated under the means-sector.

³ The figures for South Africa have been abstracted from U, G. No. 53/1951, Table XC, par. 434; and the figures for Kenya, from pars. 61 and 194 of the Report, "African Education in Kenya," (Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1949).

Having thus provided for the re-establishment of control, the Commission directed its attention to the next most urgent matter, the improvement of the quality of teacher training coupled with the need to replace untrained teachers in a system which is always expanding. These latter considerations limited the extent to which qualitative improvement could be carried out in the initial stages of the plan. The plan seeks, however, to bring about a state of affairs as soon as possible which will enable the teacher training facilities both to effect the full measure of qualitative improvement and meet the quantitative demands of an expanding system.5

In South Africa the same problem was indicated not only by the proportion of untrained teachers but also by the proportion of White to African teachers in post-Primary African schools in the ratio of 2:1. Accordingly, the Commission observed that:

All, including the Bantu, are agreed that for a considerable number of years European teachers will still be needed to assist in the development of Bantu education... The present shortage of trained Bantu teachers not only for primary schools but also for high and training schools makes it undesirable at this stage to introduce any radical reforms as this would only cause a greater shortage.6

5 Ibid., par. 371.

2. Service Conditions:

The basic concern of both Commissions in this respect centered around the idea of a unified service - a civil service status - for all African teachers. Again, the Beecher Committee had a definite instruction in the last part of term of reference #I. to "examine in particular the practicability of setting up a unified service for African teachers." Although the Eiselen Commission had not been definitely instructed to do so, it did make a parallel investigation.

In both situations the Commissions observed much "diversity in African teachers' terms of service throughout the system." In Kenya:

The Committee believe(d) that the continuance of circumstances in which African teachers are left to make the best terms and conditions that they can for themselves in the open market would not only be out of keeping with the general nature of the teaching profession, but harmful to the orderly development of the educational system.  

Accordingly, the Committee recommended:

That common terms and conditions of service be applied to all African teachers in grant-aided and publicly financed schools, according to their qualifications, whosoever their employers, and that the

---

giving and acceptance of these terms of service be a condition of grants-in-aid to the schools or other institutions in which they are employed. 8

That the teaching service be a unified service to which all teachers in approved schools belong, irrespective of their employers, on the same footing, subject to the same general rules for discipline, professional conduct, terms and conditions of service, and liability for transfer, registration, engagement, and discharge. 9

Similarly, the Eiselen Commission made a parallel recommendation in South Africa:

We recommend that uniform conditions of service be introduced, that Bantu teachers be classified as civil servants of a special category and that a pension fund be introduced. In the case of teachers paid by the State but working in aided mission schools they should be regarded as civil servants seconded to particular schools. 10

3. Remuneration:

Both Commissions investigated this problem. A significant similarity in their handling of it is that, despite the disparity in the respective national incomes of the two corporate societies, they both recognised the salary maxima operative in their African

8 Ibid., Recom. 120.

9 Ibid., Recom. 135.

educational systems and abstained from tampering with them. However, the Beecher Committee felt that the operative scale had too short a depth-range and recommended a downward extension the effect of which was to cause each teacher to start at a lower notch and take longer to reach the salary-ceiling for his grade or qualifications.

The terms and conditions of service for teachers recommended by the Salaries Commission and accepted by the Government for teachers in Government schools, in the opinion of the Commission, are based on too short a scale. We accept the maximum of each scale, in all cases, but extend each scale downwards by four amounts equal in size to the subsequent yearly increments. 11

The Eiselen Commission abstained from recommending any alteration of any part of the scale pending the working out of the rest of the programme for African development of which the reconstituted African educational system (Bantu education) was to be an essential vehicle.

Your Commission is of the opinion that to make detailed and specific recommendations concerning salaries would be unwise at this stage in view of its recommendations concerning a development plan.... Thus, for the Commission to recommend changes in the present teachers'
scales would be to consider the problem with only a fraction of the required data at its disposal. 12

III. The Means Sector;

Treatment of this sector lends itself to three cognitive categories: (a) instrumentalities, (b) scope, and (c) normative control. The instrumentalities in the Commissions' treatment were of three kinds: (a) the official administrative machinery which included departmental, managerial, supervisory and inspectorial personnel, (b) the unofficial voluntary agencies which included the Missions and the African communities, and (c) the financial arrangements. These are considered as instrumentalities of the educational system as they do not constitute it but only make it possible for it to operate as an on-going concern.

1. Instrumentalities:

a. Administrative:

No purpose would be served here by a status-by-status comparison of the administrative machinery with which the Commissions were concerned. Suffice it to point out that both dealt with large and

highly differentiated bureaucratic structures. Of course, the machinery with which the Eiselen Commission dealt was larger - so large that in the course of the Debates in the South African Legislature one discussant made this reference to it:

And then, Sir, the Commission proceeds to embark on a most comprehensive scheme for the creation of a Division of Bantu Affairs which is to become in fact practically a duplicate government in this country. 13

However, that is not quite the point here. For our purpose, we note that both administrative structures were characteristically pyramidal in shape - ranging from a one-man Directorate of (African) Education at the top to numerous supervisorships and a multiplicity of regional and local officers at the bottom.

There was also a more critical concern common to both Commissions. That is, the need for effective points of articulation between the administrative machinery and the African collectivity - general and local - to ensure or sustain the participation of that collectivity in the projected educational systems. In both cases semi-official and non-official links were indicated.

In Kenya these were to be: the District Education Boards for Primary and Intermediate schools in Native Land Units, Regional Education Boards for the same types of schools outside Native Land Units, and Boards of Governors for Girls' Intermediate Boarding Schools and all post-intermediate schools. The Committee was persuaded that:

Local Government bodies can make their best contribution at the level of Primary and Intermediate education, at which also the enthusiasm and initiative of local African communities can most effectively express themselves. School Boards of Governors and Local School Committees will also afford local African communities a field of active participation in educational progress. 14

In South Africa the Eiselen Commission similarly remarked that:

The active participation of the Bantu is required.... To achieve the active participation of the Bantu in carrying out the educational plan, your Commission suggests that Bantu Local Authorities be created. 15


Again, these were to be of three types: Bantu Local Authorities to be responsible for Lower and Higher Primary schools - rural and urban; Bantu Regional Authorities for High and Secondary schools; and Urban Communities for Nursery schools and Creches. And in true South African tradition, the Commission added: "but strict control would be exercised by the local administrative officers of the Union Government." 16

The common principle in the positions of the Commissions in this respect was that local communal participation should not be smothered under the direct full weight of the Governmental machinery at that level - hence, a preference for largely non-official local educational bodies. The Beecher Committee ruled out the use of governmental bodies in these terms:

The Committee examined the possibility of certain educational responsibilities being delegated to Local Government bodies directly and found that such delegation would be wrong in principle because it would afford little or no opportunity for an expression of the spirit of partnership in educational activity, and

little or no facility for the integration and control of
the educational system as a whole. In so far as such
degression to a local government body might in practice
result in variation of and departure from a formulated,
agreed policy for the Colony as a whole, it is similarly
to be deprecated. 17

b. Voluntary:

In both educational systems voluntary instrumentalities -
specifically missionary agencies - had historically as well as at the
time of the investigations played a most significant part in the
development and operation of African schools. Both Commissions
took their role as a major concern in view of certain problems of
social control within the African collectivity. These are indicated
under the Ends Sector.

In line with their proposed objectives for African education
and the observed breakdown of traditional African controls, both
Commissions appreciated the need for continued missionary particip-
ation in African education. They both recommended that the co-oper-
ation of these agencies be enlisted for the new plans.

In South Africa, whereas the Eiselen Commission had
recommended the administrative disenfranchisement of such
voluntary agencies in African education, yet it further recommended

17 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, "African Education in
as follows:

Your Commission's recommendation that the control of Bantu schools should gradually be transferred to Bantu Local Authorities does not imply a desire to see a reduction of the activities of religious bodies on behalf of the Bantu. On the contrary, it is the earnest desire of the Commission that this work should grow and expand, and that religious bodies should do all in their power to support and promote the work of the schools. 18

Similarly, to meet the problem of the "breakdown in moral standards in African society in recent years," The Beecher Committee recommended:

That the Government continue to work with and through those voluntary agencies which have the teaching of Christian principles as part of their intention, and that facilities for Christian instruction be provided in all schools. 19

c. Financial:

The basic concern common to both Commissions in this respect was that of finding a principle to serve as a basis for State financing from the National Revenue, in a plural society, of the educational system of one of the constituent collectivities. There


were several parallel considerations involved in both situations.

First, the collectivity in point in each case forms an integral part of the economic system producing the National Revenue; but, secondly, it does not yet directly control the profit-making instruments of production such as industries, economic farms, lending banks, etc., but is dependent on wages for income - so that differentiated taxation in this collectivity would tend to be class-taxation which would tend to depress the much-needed emerging African middle-class; thirdly, the increase in the social system's total income is by no means equitably reflected in that collectivity's income or wealth; and, finally, the collectivity in point is, in plain, just poor.

Balanced against these considerations was the need recognised by both Commissions to ensure the participation of the collectivity, _inter alia_, in the financing of its own education if it was to be regarded by the collectivity as its own institutional system rather than one maintained within the collectivity by a pseudo-benevolent government.

In brief, how was African education to be financed: (a) if mainly by the Government, without shirking its responsibility for the development of an overwhelming majority of its citizens (African) through a niggardly budget; and without discouraging African initiative in their own development through a generous budget - that is, in so far
as the claims of other governmental financial responsibilities permitted;

or, (b) if mainly by the African collectivity, then without strangulating
itself economically or failing to support an on-going educational system.

Both Commissions recommended systems of financing African
education - with the major share of the burden falling on public revenue,
but only after the estimated contribution of the African collectivity
through all forms of direct taxation had been exhausted. There should
be little point in reproducing here the proposed budgets. Suffice it to
note the evaluative considerations that underlay them.

The Eiselen Commission held this view:

Your Commission does not hold the view that the Bantu
should be solely responsible for the financing of their
education but it does feel that the Bantu should play a
direct part in finding a certain proportion of the funds
used for that purpose. 20

Similarly the Beecher Committee clarified its position on the
matter as follows; with special reference to the financing of primary
education:

In Article 26 of the Declaration (U.N. on Human Rights),
the ideal set forward is that primary education should
come to be provided without the payment of fees by
scholars or their parents. This clearly means that the

20 Union of South Africa, "Report of the Commission on Native
Printer), par. 1027(d). (Our brackets).
cost of primary education when fees are abolished will have to be borne by the general taxpayer. But the Com­
mission is of the opinion that, while the economic prosperity of the country remains at its present level, universal compulsory primary education is financially beyond our reach, and that, while it is so, it is inequit­able to place the whole burden of a limited primary educational provision on the general taxpayer. Until fully adequate primary educational provision is achieved the Committee strongly recommends that fees should con­
tinue to play an important part in school finance.

2. Scope:

Two conceptions of the scope of the means sector are discernible in the Commission Reports. First, the scope of differentiation of the African educational system in terms of the types of schools constituting it; and, second, the scope of differentiation of each school in terms of instructional material or syllabi provided for in it. Again, no purpose would be served here by a comparative listing of the types of schools and syllabi observed or recommended by the Commissions in the two situations. Rather, it is essential for our thesis to show that the Commissions' investigative concerns were in the same types of schools - primary, secondary, vocational and higher - and to draw in consider­ations of syllabi in each type of school only when they became crucial in the view of either or both Commissions.

a. **Primary:**

Here both Commissions observed two major problems:

the problem of "leakage" and the "bottle-neck" problem or retardation. Their common concern therefore came to be in the re-organisation of the educational system to meet these problems. It will be shown presently that their proposed solutions were essentially similar.

With regard to the leakage problem, the Eiselen Commission observed that:

> A serious weakness of the present system of schools is the high rate of elimination of pupils from standard to standard, or the inability of the schools to keep children at school until they have attained a reasonable standard of education.\textsuperscript{22}

The Beecher Committee remarked that:

> An examination of the statistics ... indicates that there is a marked leakage, or falling off in attendance.\textsuperscript{23}

In the following figures it will readily be noticed that the major leakage occurred at the same level in the primary school system in both situations, that is, at the end of the first two school years.


TABLE IV

Percentage Distribution of African Pupils According to Year of Schooling-at-which - South Africa and Kenya: 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Schooling</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>62.92</td>
<td>50.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>14.04</td>
<td>14.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>10.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>5.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>10.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Beecher Committee also observed that "there is a serious 'bottle-neck' in educational provision at the end of the primary course," as the tapering of the figures for Kenya above shows. This problem shows even more sharply if the figures for the 5th and 6th years are taken together as representing the end of the primary school and compared with the 2.24% who succeed in getting accommodation in post-primary schools. The same operation shows a bottle-neck problem in South Africa - albeit in somewhat milder form.

24 The figures for South Africa were obtained from U.G. No. 53/1951, Table CXXII, par. 579; and the figures for Kenya, from Table XII, par. 161 of the Report, "African Education in Kenya," (Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1949).
The Commissions devoted special attention to this problem of retardation or the over-age pupil phenomenon, ostensibly because of the sheer futility of the costs - in money and psychic energy - involved while the pupil is kept "marking-time" in a particular grade. This was no isolated problem but a generalised feature of the two educational systems.

The Beecher Committee observed that:

The age at which a pupil leaves school in present circumstances depends not only on the age of entry, but also on the length of time taken to complete the Primary school course. Evidence showed that it may take as long as eight years to complete the course between Standard I (1st year) and Standard V (5th year). 25

This would indicate retardation by three years. Unfortunately the Committee did not present figures on the extent of the problem. It is, however, to be noted that in Kenya this problem assumed the specific form of the bottle-neck to which the Committee devoted no less than 18 paragraphs in the Reports.

The Eiselen Commission indicated the extent of retardation in the sub-standards (1st and 2nd years) where it announced that

there was "a serious 'traffic jam' where congestion increases yearly and where half the school population is held up for three years and more," as follows:

a. By European standards, two-thirds of the pupils enrolled in Sub-standard A should be in Standard I.
b. Similarly four-fifths of the pupils enrolled in Sub-standard B should be in Standard II.
c. Nearly one-third of pupils now in Sub-standard A and nearly one-half the pupils now in Sub-standard B fall in the age-group 10-19 years.
d. The difference in the median age between European and Native children at the time of admission is less than two years, but at the Standard I stage the difference is already in access of three years. 26

Both Commissions recognised that the factors underlying these two problems were only partly educational. Referring to the non-educational factors, the Beecher Committee remarked that:

Some of these factors causing leakage are inevitable at present; no educational plan which ignores agricultural or pastoral requirements, or tribal pressure is realistic and capable of implementation. Other factors, notably those arising from (educational) inefficiency must be dealt with. 27

Correspondingly, the Eiselen Commission observed that:


... many of the causes of elimination are social and not educational. To improve this state of affairs it is essential for social as well as educational steps to be taken, one of the chief being the improvement of economic conditions. On the other hand, due regard must be had to the fact of early and rapid elimination, and the school system re-organised in such a way as to reduce to a minimum the number of children whose attendance is so short and irregular as to render their schooling almost of no value. 28

The principles according to which the two primary educational systems were to be reorganised to meet these problems were, again, similar. In addition to measures designed to eliminate bad teaching, unjustifiable promotions and flunkings, and the retention of "repeaters" long after they had reached their intelligence-ceiling, etc., the Commissions outlined an eight-year primary school system consisting of two four-year parts each of which was to be an educationally rounded-off whole.

We desire to see this eight-year unit planned as a whole and, in respect of its two parts, as an educational entity in such a way that pupils who leave at the end of the four years and at the end of eight years without proceeding to any further formal education, carry with them into life discipline, attitudes, and skills which will enable them to take a more effective part in the life of the community which they then enter. 29


The Eiselen Commission started from the premise that:

A child who stays at school for no longer than one or two years has learned so little of permanent value that the money spent on his education must be regarded as a total loss. 30

Accordingly, it recommended as follows:

Your Commission feels that for practical purposes a primary education which is shorter than four years is of little value and concludes that the greatest weakness of the primary schools as at present constituted is that they do not attempt to set up as a temporary goal for, say the next decade or so an intermediate goal of four years' completed primary education characterised by its having a rounded-off syllabus, useful in itself. 31

b. Secondary:

At this level both Commissions encountered the disquieting long-term effects of the leakage and bottle-neck problems observed at the primary level. That is, the small numbers that eventually reach high school as the following Table shows:

\[
\text{TABLE \ V}\]

Percentage Distribution of Pupils in Primary and High School - Kenya and South Africa - 1948 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>Senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>75.20</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>86.87</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


31 Ibid., par. 688.

32 The figures for South Africa were obtained from U. G.
The disquietude raised by these figures in the opinion of the Commissions derived from the fact that it was from this 2.51 per cent and 0.22 per cent (High School) of the school population that the vocational schools and departments of employment in South Africa and in Kenya, respectively, were to depend for quality-recruits.

The Beecher Committee listed the following, inter alia, that expected to draw on the 0.22 per cent High scholars in Kenya: Teacher training and Technical training schools, the Civil Service, Public Works, Agricultural, Veterinary, Medical, Railways, and Post Office Departments, and private enterprise. The Eiselen Commission mentioned the following among others: Teacher training, Technical and Industrial schools, Schools for Nursing, Social Work, Police, Reformatories, Adult education, Universities, and Special Schools for the handicapped.

As the Eiselen Commission put it, there was "a serious 'traffic jam'" at the lower level so that very insufficient numbers of pupils were being funnelled through to High school and thence to the numerous departments of life which awaited the benefits of the

services of quality personnel to justify the national educational outlay. On this state of affairs the Beecher Committee remarked:

... the severest criticism of the present African educational system is that a sum of the order of 700,000 per annum being payments from Central and Local Government sources, fees, and direct contributions from the African community to education, is being expended with the apparent result of producing an average of 37 passes in the School Certificate Examination over the last three years, with a corresponding entry of 23 students to Makerere College. Adding to this number those who having left school at earlier stages, took up Medical, Agricultural, Artisan or Teacher Training, so becoming useful servants of the community, the total number of valuable products of the educational system is very small. 33

To meet this problem the Committee

... strongly urged that the stage at which African education provision must be expanded is that which has hitherto been known as the Senior Secondary School. 34

Accordingly, it recommended:

That the facilities for Secondary education be expanded as rapidly as possible to provide more pupils with higher academic qualifications to take posts of responsibility in the development of the economic and social life of the Colony. 35


34 Ibid., par. 189.

35 Ibid., Recom. 8.
And also:

That an effort should be made to achieve the expansion of Senior Secondary education beyond the limit envisaged in the ten-year plan, in a shorter space of time, and that the target figures for enrollment in Forms 3 and 5 be: (960 and 480 by 1957 as against 278 and 57 respectively in 1948). 36

To ensure this an increased intake at the Primary level was also provided for. Although the Committee did not recommend a separate vocationally biased High School course alongside the regular academic course, it did suggest that: (a) at all stages considerable emphasis must be placed on the acquisition of practical skills; and (b) at three selected schools provision be made for commercial classes.

In South Africa, the Eiselen Commission proposed a broad plan which provided for:

a. roughly a doubling of the number of lower and higher primary pupils,
b. a doubling of the number of secondary pupils,
c. an increase of two and a half times the number of student teachers, and
d. a similar increase in the number of pupils for technical and industrial training. 37


And to ensure that the fall-outs at various high school stages did not become a total social waste, the Commission recommended two High School courses - an academic one for those intending to matriculate and proceed to University and the professions; and a course with a vocational bias for those who contemplated early employment.

c. Vocational

Three types of vocational schools received special attention from both Commissions: teacher-training, technical/industrial and agricultural schools. In respects essential to our thesis, the first received such attention as is necessary under the actor sector. It remains therefore to consider the last two in this section.

Vocational education represents a critical point of articulation between the educational system and the social system, or more specifically its economic sub-sector. Here the educational system may be viewed as a production system for one of the components of the economic system - i.e., skill. For that reason, it becomes subject, if it must operate realistically, to the market conditions of supply and demand for its vocationally trained products.

The common concern of the two Commissions was the articulation of each educational system with the economic sub-sector of
its social system with due regard to the equation of supply and demand for its graduates. The caution evidenced by both Commissions in their treatment of vocational education is only evidence of their awareness of the involvement here of powerful extra-educational interests.

Perhaps the Beecher Committee showed this caution more clearly than the Eiselen Commission did. First, it reported this body of evidence:

We sought for some indication of the absorptive capacity of industrial and similar undertakings at the present time and in the immediate future if suitable employees were forthcoming from any training scheme instituted for the products of the African education system. Employers supported by the Member for Commerce and Industry and the Labour Commissioner, indicated that the need for African skilled artisans is so great that no practicable scheme for training them would be too large, or the products too numerous. We were assured that the terms of service offered to such trainees would be attractive, certainly more attractive than those offered to Clerks. Emphasis was placed on the necessity for the trained man to be properly trained and to be able to work without constant supervision.\(^{38}\)

After receiving this virtually unqualified "Go Ahead and No Stopping" signal, the Committee balked and apologised for it thus:

The Committee recognises the need for caution before expanding the facilities at present existing; the employability of the products of these schools has yet to be tested and the needs of the trades, both inside the rural areas and outside them, remain to be assessed. 39

The real reasons for this conduct on the part of the Committee remain obscure in the Report itself. But two may be safely surmised. First, judging from the list in the preceding excerpt of the interests who gave the "go ahead" signal, it is evident that the latter was the voice of Capital and Management who have an inherent interest in an access of the supply of any productive form of labour over demand for it. There was still the opposite interest to be reckoned with - Organised Labour. Second, there was the Settler collectivity's anxiety about its numerical proportion to the African collectivity and its immigration policy which has had as its rationalisation the Colony's need for skilled artisans and technically trained persons. The implications of producing such personnel locally for the immigration policy as currently rationalised are clear. Another rationalisation would have to be sought elsewhere.

In any case, the Committee finally recommended:

That the present planned provision should not be expanded until the employability of the products has been tested

and the demand assessed. 40

The Eiselen Commission found itself in the same dilemma presented by the conflicting interests of Capital and Management on the one hand and Organised Labour on the other.

The need for more and better technical or industrial education was urged but the difficulty of finding employment for suitably educated Bantu was admitted. 41

In view of the fact that "the great difficulty of those seeking to provide technical and industrial education is the provision of adequate employment for the products of these schools," the Eiselen Commission concluded that:

The future of these schools depends so much on the development plan that it seems unwise to make definite recommendations.... The establishment of a body which can co-ordinate training with employment possibilities ... deserves serious consideration. 42

With regard to agricultural education, the involvement of extra-educational considerations is evidenced in a conclusion of the Eiselen Commission which is not without a note of despair:


42 Ibid., par. 952.
It seems evident that unless there is a considerable change in conditions governing the allocation of land there is little hope of the products of (Agricultural) institutions ever becoming successful farmers.\footnote{Ibid., par. 706(c). (Our underlining).}

Clearly, the extra-educational consideration involved here is a basic problem not only in the South African social system but also and more so in the Kenya social system - the present allocation of land between the White and the African collectivities. It is this problem which, while it persists unresolved, must continue to make mockery of Agricultural schools for Africans both in South Africa and in Kenya. Hence, it is understandable that the Beecher Committee must thus \textit{apologise}, on the point of agricultural training.

The Committee does not feel that there is an immediate necessity for expansion beyond the provision envisaged. The schools have not yet been able to secure enough suitable candidates to fill them, and the development to full capacity will take some time.\footnote{Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, "African Education in Kenya," (Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1949), par. 301.}

At least, the Eiselen Commission was more honest!

3. \textbf{Normative Control}:

Now, the ultimate function of both Commissions was to plot out the path for and rationalise the introduction of Central Governmental
control over all African education. Both Commissions were committed to this purpose.

It is necessary to restore adequate control to an educational system which had virtually lost those safeguards essential to the spending of large sums of public money. In the absence of centralised control, operated through an adequate inspectorial staff in the field, development was largely uncoordinated and several aspects of educational activity lacked purpose. Lack of staff and financial provision for administrative purposes in fact prevented the Director of Education from carrying out the provisions for control which the Educational Ordinances contain, and which we propose should be implemented. 45

Similarly, speaking of the necessity for Union as against Provincial control of African education, the Eiselen Commission states:

This placing of Bantu education under Union control is nothing but the logical consequence of the existing delimitation of spheres of influence, whereby all legislative authority in connection with Bantu taxation, Bantu administration and all social services, excluding education, is already vested in the Union Government. Your Commission therefore considers it essential that the control and administration of Bantu education should also fall under a Union Department. 46

The antecedents to this common position on State control were also similar in the two situations. In both, African education had


been started by non-governmental agencies - missionaries and African communities. The role of the latter is not often recognised or admitted.

I am prepared to state without any fear of any serious contradiction that there is no community in this country that has made the financial sacrifices for the education of its own children that the African population has made. 47

Initially these worked with little or no financial assistance from governmental agencies. But gradually this assistance had been forthcoming and in increasing amounts. So that by 1948 in both situations the major financial burden for African education had come to be borne by agencies of the Central Governments. Hence, the implicit suggestion in both Reports was that "he who pays the piper calls the tune."

Furthermore this control in both situations was to take much the same forms: (a) control of expansion by requiring that educational provision be more or less limited by the fiscal policy of the Central Government; (b) control of standards of achievement through prescribed syllabi and examinations, supervision and inspection by officers of the Central Government.

a. Control of Standards:

The Beecher Committee was particularly concerned about uncontrolled expansion at the base of the educational system.

There is a constant tendency for local enthusiasm and unofficial expansion of the Primary system to outstrip both financial provision and the long-term planning based on that provision. Thus, there are always more schools than can be financed under the grants-in-aid rules; there are always fewer teachers than the system requires in order to be efficient; the expansion at the bottom has been allowed to exceed the limits imposed by educational planning. 48

The state of affairs in South Africa relative to Governmental control of educational expansion may be observed in the proportion of the schools over which the State had no financial control by means of subsidies or grants, as the following Table shows:

**TABLE VI.**

Number and Percentage of Government, Government Subsidised and Unsubsidised African Communal Schools - South Africa 49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government and Aided Schools</th>
<th>Unaided Communal Schools</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>5,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage</strong></td>
<td>34.69</td>
<td>65.31</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


49 The figures are derived from U.G. No. 53/1951, Table XXVI, par. 184.
The method of extending Governmental control envisaged by both Commissions was again the same: that is, all African schools were to operate within the developmental pattern prescribed by the State. The limits of the State plan were to be set by its fiscal policy in the form of grants-in-aid to recognised and co-operating schools.

In the view of the Committee no other single factor has created so extensive a complication in the present situation as the un-aided school. 50

The object of the Committee's proposals is to make it no longer necessary for unaided schools to exist as a feature of planned education. We would appeal to all parties ... to concentrate their best efforts in the co-operative achievement of what is provided in the plan. 51

The Eiselen Commission, in parallel vein, recommended a direct absorption of unaided schools into the plan. It will be recalled that the plan called for the setting up of Bantu Regional and Local Authorities as administrative links between the Central Administration and the local community in the operation of the re-organised educational system. To effect this absorption the Commission recommended that:

51 Ibid., par. 429.
Where a Bantu Local Authority is established all existing schools hitherto conducted by religious, bodies, or tribes or communities, should be placed under its control.52

b. Control of Standards:

(i) Through Syllabi:

In Kenya a syllabus for African Primary schools had just been prescribed as of January, 1949, and another for the Junior Secondary school was in course of preparation. On this issue the Committee made no general recommendation other than:

That, having in mind the objectives which the Committee has established for the proposed Intermediate schools, a syllabus be prepared for them and textbooks prescribed or prepared for use in conjunction with it.53

But in view of the importance which the Committee attached to the plan, it may safely be assumed that syllabus-prescription for the other stages of the system could not be left uncontrolled by the Central Governmental organs that would operate the plan.

In South Africa, after recommending the creation of an entire Syllabus Branch under the Union Government, the Eiselen Commission recommended that:

---


Syllabi should be issued by a syllabus committee to the Union Board of Education which would prescribe general syllabi in broad outline. Similar committees under Regional Boards would draw up the syllabi for particular regions, taking into consideration local conditions and requirements.54

(ii) Through Examinations:

To ensure a generalised measure of standardisation of the promotion system, the Eiselen Commission recommended the establishment in the Union Department of Bantu Education of a special Examination Branch:

The Examination Branch would undertake the administrative responsibility for conducting examinations in the Union. It would work in close conjunction with the Examination Committee of the Union Board of Bantu Education.55

In Kenya the Common Entrance Examination had become dysfunctional in its operation. Accordingly, the Beecher Committee recommended:

That, a written test approved by the Director be set and marked under arrangements made by the management of the Intermediate school which the applicant seeks entry.56

Central control of standards in this case inheres in the proposal that the test be "approved by the Director," that is, the top-man in the administrative machinery for African education.


55 Ibid., par. 832.

(iii) Through Supervision and Inspection:

The Beecher Committee considered these control functions as separate. It considered that, whereas supervision might be delegated to non-governmental agencies, "the task of inspection is proper to the Education Department." As suggested earlier in this chapter, the centralisation of control in the organs of State was the primary concern of the Committee.

The first object of the Committee's recommendations is to re-establish effective control and supervision of the African educational system in all its aspects and to maintain it throughout its subsequent development.57

That this point of control was equally primary in the preoccupations of the Eiselein Commission is equally clear.

Your Commission wishes to emphasise strongly the importance of the work of the inspectors, as it has become clear to us that one of the major needs of Bantu education is such adequate supervision, guidance and inspiration as a select, well trained and enthusiastic corps of inspectors can provide.58

Both Commissions proceeded to recommend substantial increases in the inspectorial staffs of the two educational systems, the Eiselein Commission capping its proposals with a new juicy salary scale for inspectors of schools as an inducement. In both


58 Union of South Africa, U.G. No. 53/1951, par. 975.
cases, the success of the proposed plans for African education depended not only on the (antagonistic) co-operation of teachers but also and ultimately on a committed inspectorial staff - committed, that is, to the plan and its evaluative premises. This was particularly important in the South African case. In the third and fifth chapters we show that the evaluative premises there were of a special type: the ideological.

IV. The Ends Sector

The Eiselen Commission had been explicitly charged, in its first term of reference, with the task of the "formulation of principles and aims" for the African educational system - that is, to reconstitute its ends sector. The first term of reference of the Beecher Committee, however, did not include aims or objectives as one of the categories to be investigated. But the requirement was implicit in that term of reference as the Committee correctly interpreted it:

"We have interpreted this (first term of reference) as entitling us to consider the objectives of the whole system, and to relate its content and methods to the achievement of those objectives."

Each Commission enunciated two objectives. The four lend themselves to the following typology: (a) collectivity-integrative and

(b) individual-integrative - integration in each case being understood not as a static equilibrium but a dynamic one, that is, "under ever-changing social conditions." The objectives were as follows:

The Eiselen Commission

Collectivity-Integrative

1. From the viewpoint of the whole society the aim of Bantu education is the development of a modern progressive culture, with social institutions which will be in harmony with one another and with the evolving conditions of life to be met in South Africa, and with the schools which must serve as effective agents in the process of development. 60

2. We have placed considerable emphasis on the necessity for a sound moral basis for all educational activity, and we believe that, in establishing this, the Christian voluntary agencies have a large and essential part to play. 61

Individual-Integrative

3. From the viewpoint of the individual the aims of Bantu education are the development of character and intellect, and the equipping of the child for his future work and surroundings. 62

4. We further plan for the restoration of a practical bias to education appropriate to the kind of life which the great majority of the products of this expanded programme will lead; we call for the inculcation of the right attitudes to rural problems and of a preparedness for active participation in the Colony's development. 63


61 Kenya, op. cit., p. vii (par. 6).

62 Union of South Africa, op. cit., 765(b).

63 Kenya, op. cit., p. vii (par. 7).
In the formulation of these objectives it is clear that not only did the Commissions use similar cognitive categories - albeit with different degrees of explicitness - but also that they had the same investigative concern. That is, the dynamic relationships between the African educational system and the social system or, at least, its African sub-sector or collectivity. In the nature of the case, special concern was with the points of articulation of the ends sectors of these systems at both the social and the individual levels.

In both cases the investigations showed that the relationships were indeterminate and for similar reasons. On the part of the educational systems, there was in both cases a general vagueness of objectives. The Beecher Committee observed that:

... it (is) very clear that objectives need to be enunciated afresh. The minds of many are so confused about matters of much less consequence that basic principles are completely lost to sight. In the absence of any clear definition of the objectives, African educational policy has become a matter of individual interpretation, whose only end must be chaos. 64

Similarly, the Eiselen Commission reported:

A large number of witnesses gave evidence on the objectives of Bantu education and it was striking how vague their conceptions were in most cases. Often they did not go much beyond enunciating broad and

---

formal propositions concerning the universality of human developmental needs and general aims of the educational process, with no, or only a vague, conception of their formal interpretation. 65

On the part of the social system the indeterminacy of the relationships was also traceable to a common feature of the two social systems or, at least, their African sub-sectors. That is, lack of integration in their normative or cultural aspects. As a latent function of the contact-situation a strain had been introduced at this very critical point at which the African educational system as a formal mechanism of socialisation and social control has to articulate with the social system:

In Kenya:

The Committee took note of a large body of evidence which points to a breakdown in moral standards in African society in recent years and to the comparative inability of the school product to put matters right... Little or nothing is done in most homes to inculcate moral standards; the child does not in consequence acquire character in its early years which is built upon principles which alone have any relevance in modern society of which the child is to become a part. 66

In South Africa:


The increasing tempo of the migration of the Bantu to the towns and the increasing influence of the migratory labour system has brought about social conditions both in the urban areas and in the reserves which have dramatised what is commonly referred to in South Africa as 'the breakdown of tribal culture'. The schools have reflected the current uncertainty as to the future and value of Bantu culture. 67

Hence, the formulation of the collectivity-integrative objectives was a response to a challenge common to both situations: How is an African educational system whose objectives have become vague to be related to a social system characterised by "a breakdown in moral standards in African society," "the breakdown of tribal culture" and "the current uncertainty as to the future and value of (that) culture"?

Again, there was a common investigative concern underlying the formulation of the individual-integrative objectives in the two situations. The concern was with the question: What type of an individual should the educational system aim at producing that will function with maximum facility and advantage in the social system? Briefly, the Beecher Committee's vision was that of "morally sound and economically valuable citizens" with "a practical bias" and "right attitudes" towards productive work. Similarly, the Eiselen Commission asked

---

for individuals "of character and intellect" equipped for "future work and surroundings."

Notwithstanding all these points of parallelism between the two Reports, the first term of reference of the Eislein Commission contained unmistakable elements of the South African ideology which defined the legitimate frame of reference for the "formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives." These elements comprised a determinate and a priori evaluative perspective of the African collectivity from the point of view of the White collectivity. Both Commissions were to cognize their respective African collectivities; but, in addition, the Eislein Commission was instructed to evaluate its African collectivity as "an independent race" or historical-individual with a "past and present," "inherent racial qualities," "distinctive characteristics and aptitude," and special "needs under ever-changing conditions." It was only with these preconceptions, as value-premises, that the aims and principles of African education, as an institutional system, were to be re-stated in South Africa. To demonstrate the fact of ideological impact in South Africa it is necessary to demonstrate

the ideological derivation of these preconceptions with which the Eiselen Commission, unlike the Beecher Committee, approached its task at the ends sector of the African educational system. This we do in the following chapter. The underlying theme of that chapter is that these preconceptions were not ad hoc but were part of a determinate ideological system of ideas that was, through them, being brought to bear on the ends sector of the African educational system - thus raising and accentuating in the Legislative Debates the normative problem of the ends that that institutional system ought to pursue.
CHAPTER III

THE SOUTH AFRICAN IDEOLOGY: APARTHEID

I. General Considerations

Talcott Parsons' conception and treatment of ideology provides a suitable point of departure for the discussion that follows. The immediate interest is in subjecting his avowedly generalised conception of ideology to an empirical case that is in many respects unlike the societal staples of United States sociology. He defines ideology as follows:

An ideology ... is a system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity, i.e., a society, or a sub-collectivity of one - including a movement deviant from the main culture of the society - a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and of the situation in which it is placed, the process by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented, and their relation to the future course of events.\(^1\)

The nature of the South African case compels several qualifications to this formulation. First, not only in this definition but also

throughout his treatment of ideology, Parsons seems to assume that the collectivity which is the author and carrier of an ideology is necessarily also the audience of that ideology. That is, no distinction is drawn between a collectivity as subject of an ideology and a collectivity as object of one. Or, put differently, the lacking distinction is between an ideology of a collectivity and an ideology for a collectivity.

This failure may be traced immediately to Parsons' preoccupation with the problem of the value-integration of social systems and sub-systems including collectivities. Given that preoccupation, it is easy to allow the integrative-expressive significance of an ideology for the collectivity that is its author and carrier to eclipse any other. A critical significance of ideology in the case in point is the instrumental.

In South Africa the two collectivities comprising the social system, as abstracted for the present purpose, may be distinguished clearly as author and audience collectivities relative to the apartheid ideology. Whereas this ideology is "held in common" by the White collectivity, yet the "evaluative integration" that is sought through it, the "empirical nature of the situation," the "process of development," "goals," and "relation to the future course of events" to be interpreted
by it are immediately not those of the White collectivity but those of the African collectivity. The ideology is clearly that of the White collectivity but for the African collectivity.

Hence, to the White collectivity which is its author its significance is instrumental and geared to the integration and expressive channelling of the African collectivity according to its preconceptions. Only as all this is achieved with regard to the African collectivity are the same problems - integrative and expressive - calculated to become clarified for the White collectivity's internal relations. By overlooking this distinction, Parsons would seem to miss consideration of such social dynamics as ideological imposition, persuasion, deception, selective affinity, acceptance, unmasking, rejection, social paralysis, and the whole gamut of social conflict processes that may be observed between collectivities interacting at the ideological level. He is, however, not unaware of the conflict-potential in ideologies as is evidenced by the observation that:

... it is likely ... that ideologies will become the symbolic battleground of some of the principal elements of tension within a social system. ²

But our point is that on the specific problem of ideological dynamics within a social system Parsons hardly goes beyond merely

² T. Parsons, op. cit., p. 358.
indicating the stage-setting in terms of "an inherent tendency to polarisation"\(^3\) and the development of "vicious circles"\(^4\) in an ideologically charged situation. With the stage set, one would expect him to proceed to present the analytical drama in terms of processes of ideological conflict. But, again, his preoccupation with the integrative as distinct from the conflict aspects of the social system supervenes. Rather, he proceeds to observe that "this process of ideological polarisation must be subject to mechanisms of social control;"\(^5\) and mentions two, namely: "traditionalisation and authoritarian enforcement."\(^6\)

This treatment, or lack of treatment, of processes of ideological conflict is part of a general orientation to conflict that Lewis Coser\(^7\) finds to be inherent in Parsons' sociological system. That is,

\[^3\] Ibid., loc.cit.
\[^4\] Ibid., loc. cit.
\[^5\] Loc. cit. (Our underlining).
\[^6\] Loc. cit.
the tendency to avoid problems of conflict and their analysis in their own right. The tendency in that system is to treat social conflict, including ideological conflict, as basically dysfunctional to the integration of social systems. Yet, as Coser points out, that is, in line with Simmel, social conflict processes are just as inherent and just as significant in the organisation of social systems as the equilibrating processes. And, from one normative point of view, they may be regarded as equally healthy or functional for the virility of the culture of a society. This shortcoming in Parsons' system also greatly handicaps him from developing a viable theory of social change. His treatment of the problems briefly indicated above leaves the impression that the value-integration of social systems is not only a value of the systems treated but has also become a value for the sociologist treating them.

The second point of qualification to Parsons' conception of ideology is that although he rightly points out that "when we move to the consideration of ideologies we are no longer dealing with cognitive primacy," yet his operational conception of the primary

---

evaluative orientation seems to be unduly limited to "commitment."

To constitute an ideology there must exist the additional feature that there is some level of evaluative commitment to the belief system as an aspect of membership in the collectivity, subscription to the belief is institutionalised as part of the role of collectivity membership. ⁹

Again, within a social system, the evaluative orientation of commitment can only be predicated of the author or carrier collectivity. Now this may not be the only collectivity to which the ideology has relevance for social action purposes. And for any other collectivity to which the ideology may be relevant the evaluative orientation of commitment may not, at all, define the ideology as an ideology. Rather, inter alia, the very opposite orientation of alienation or self-dissociation from the ideology may be the defining orientation.

Furthermore, this evaluative orientation may be so strong as to define collectivity membership in the uncommitted or rejecting collectivity. In the South African case, again, there is a sense in which, at least among the more nationally-minded Africans, rejection of any idea of commitment to the apartheid ideology defines bona fide membership within the African collectivity. That is, whereas

⁹ Ibid., loc. cit.
The evaluative orientation to the ideology provides occasion for raising the question of confidence: Are you with us or against us? Yet the positive responses in the two collectivities presuppose diametrically opposite evaluative orientations to the ideology.

It is also important to note, for the present purpose, that the possibility of non-commitment to an ideology on the part of an audience collectivity leaves open the possibility of more than the orientation of alienation or rejection. Crucially, the ideology becomes open to evaluation according to cold cognitive standards. In this way it becomes possible for such a collectivity to unmask an ideology and thus to define it, from its point of view, as an ideology in the Mannheimian sense. For purposes of audience-collectivity definition of an ideology, the absence of prior moral commitment to it and perception of it as part of the conditions in which the collectivity is set are indispensable. This is facilitated by the fact that an ideology has as its point of reference the empirical situation.

In spite of the distortions it introduces into the mental representations of empirical reality, "an ideology has its central focus in the empirical aspects of the interpretation of the nature and situation of the collectivity." As suggested above, the immediate empirical

focus of the apartheid ideology is the African collectivity. It is the nature and relational situation of that collectivity - relational, that is, within the social system - that it seeks to interpret necessarily in conformity with the sectional interests of the White collectivity which is its author and carrier. That is, although the object-focus is empirical, the orientation is not simply cognitive but evaluative, and the operative values are those of the author collectivity.

However, before showing how this ideology interprets the nature and situation of the African collectivity, it is necessary to point out that fundamentally the ideology seeks to resolve an empirical problem that is inherent in racial-caste social systems like the South African. That is the problem of the "strain to consistency" arising from a typical discrepancy between another ideology - the equalitarian - and the typical empirical state of affairs in such social systems.

From this point of view, the apartheid ideology is only a contemporary variant, albeit virulent, of a series of ideological constructs that the White collectivity has had to devise from time to time in the history of South Africa. The entire series has had one empirical source. That is, the incompatibility of equalitarian values of social organisation with the South African racial caste social system.
which the White collectivity has created and seeks to maintain without admitting apostacy to equalitarian values. It is this situation which immediately creates a logical and moral "strain to consistency" on the part of the White collectivity. It is faced with the dilemma of (a) being democratic and, therefore, eventually non-dominant, or (b) continuing to be dominant (by force or fraud) and, therefore, confessing to apostacy to the democratic values underpinning the civilisation it, at least objectively, represents. Its ideological constructs, therefore, have developed in this context as rationalisations of, or social apologies for, the strained status quo to render it not too incompatible with equalitarian values.

a. The Fundamentalist Ideology:

This rested on the assumption of a fundamental and permanent racial or biological inferiority of the Africans. They were a sub-species of real White humanity to whom equalitarian values had no relevance. "Since democratic values had no relevance for the non-white sub-stratum of humanity, this ideology was logically consistent." It resolved the strain by merely assuming it away. But this position

could not be held long in the face of (a) objective facts on the biological evolution of man pointing to the contrary, and (b) the equalitarian texts of the New Testament - both of which placed the African collectivity within the scope of relevance of democratic values. An ideological shift was called for.

b. The Trusteeship Ideology:

Whereas the fundamentalist ideology rested on the assumption of the biological inferiority of the Africans, the Trusteeship ideology was based on the assumption of their cultural inferiority. It was therefore the moral duty of the Whites, by virtue of their assumed cultural superiority, to withhold democratic rights from the Africans, hence to dominate the social system, until the Africans were sufficiently developed culturally to participate as equals in the maintenance and advancement of a common cultural heritage. As this development must necessarily be a long-drawn process:

The liberal ideology of trusteeship ... effects a reconciliation of White dominance and democratic values by a projection of the equalitarian idea into the infinite future. ¹²

But the rapidity of socio-cultural change here, as elsewhere in Africa, necessitated a reconsideration of the question of the inclusion

of the Africans in the scope of relevance of these values sooner than had been expected in the ideology.

The commonplace assertion that Natives will require centuries of contact with Western civilisation before attaining intellectual parity with Europeans is scientifically untenable and furthermore disproved by successful careers of a number of individuals. Another common argument that Native inferiority is proved by the failure of the Bantu to emerge from savagery by their own unaided efforts would have applied with equal force to the Western people of 2,000 years ago and must therefore be dismissed as spurious. 13

The increasing acculturation of the Africans in the Western direction clearly undermined the assumption of cultural inferiority.

The ward grew too fast; and another apology for denying him the full status of adulthood had to be sought. This is currently the apartheid ideology.

II. The Apartheid Ideology:

1. The Structural Aspect

This ideology stands as an admirable piece of intellectual craftsmanship. The word "inferiority" is as taboo to it as the word "equality." Ideologically, the Africans are regarded as neither

inferior nor superior nor equal to the Whites; but simply different. And the difference is conceived as so radical that there can be no meaningful comparison between the two collectivities. Even the word "parallel" which is used in some circles does not quite fit the case as the collectivities are viewed as being on mutually independent and mutually irrelevant planes. Their single significant relation is that of difference; and any other relations that may be identified from the objective point of view are, from the ideological, essentially non-relations.

Three logically consistent concepts underly the ideology:

(i) group differences - racial, cultural, aspirational, and numerical;

(ii) group self-determination - economic, political and cultural;

(iii) group separation - territorial and/or socio-economic.

Through these and their elaborations, the ideology seeks to resolve the dilemma not through a generalisation of equalitarian values in the social system but through the idea of their realisation by each collectivity within itself. That is, as a different, self-determining and separate community. It seeks to atomise the social system and then to democratise each unit collectivity - but not the whole.
(i) The Concept of Difference:

"Apartheid rests on an absolute and timeless sacred difference."\textsuperscript{14}

Racial differences are viewed as "God-made" and their preservation as something of a sacred duty of the White collectivity, if not of all South African collectivities. These differences must not be merged and obliterated in an integrated equalitarian social system. The collectivities must move apart lest they undo, ultimately through miscegenation, what God has done. The man-made cultural differences too must be preserved - each collectivity developing "along its own lines" and the lines should not cross. There should be no aping of one group by another. Assimilation in an integrated social system is to be shunned. With regard to aspirational differences, the collectivities are viewed as nationalities with different and irreconcilable aspirations. Each collectivity, it is acknowledged, has an indisputable right to pursue and realise its aspirations - but "apart" from the others. And regarding numerical differences, to the ratio of 4:1, Olivier says:

No European community in Southern Africa would be willing to commit suicide by following a policy which would lead to their political, economic and social

subservience with eventual and ultimate extinction either by force or by assimilation. 15

(ii) The Concept of Self-Determination:

Again, Olivier has summed up the crux of the problems that the apartheid ideology seeks to resolve in the form of a dilemma:

(i) The European population has the unalterable and indomitable determination (a) to preserve its identity and continued existence as a separate and distinctive entity; and (b) to retain and exercise its right of political self-determination at all costs.
(ii) The Bantu population must be afforded the right of national self-expression in respect of politics, economics, etc.; in other words, it is impossible indefinitely to follow a policy by which the Bantu or at least the educated and civilised section of it - would be denied political rights and economic opportunities. 16

He finds "the only possible solution of these two apparently irreconcilable principles" in apartheid which "aims at the gradual and systematic disentanglement of the two groups, making it possible for each group to exercise political rights and enjoy economic opportunities within their own territory." 17 The solution is separation.


16 Ibid., p. 4.

17 Ibid., loc. cit.
(iii) The Concept of Separation:

This concept embodies the idealistic or Utopian element in apartheid. The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs' conception of apartheid, in this case, contrasts significantly with that of the South African Government's. The Bureau conceives of apartheid as:

... the territorial separation of European and Bantu, and the provision of areas which must serve as natural and political homes for the different Bantu communities and as permanent residential areas for the Bantu population or the major portion of it. 18

The idea of territorial separation of the two collectivities is the acme of White ideological idealism. It is a liberal pinnacle reached via the facile route of armchair theorisation without due appreciation of the practical obstacles involved in its implementation. Hence, in practical politics this ideal has had to be betrayed by the collectivity.

In Parliament, the former Prime Minister, Dr. Daniel Malan, repeatedly disclaimed this ideal.

The principle of apartheid ... is that we have two separate spheres, not necessarily with absolute territorial dividing lines, not separate territorial areas. 19

On another occasion he explained that:

---


... total territorial separation was impracticable under present conditions in South Africa, where our whole economic structure is to a large extent based on Native labour.... One must found one's policy on what is possible of achievement.\textsuperscript{20}

This is an unmistakable element of expediency contrasting sharply with the Bureau's idealism in the structure of the ideology.

Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen, formerly of the Bureau and now of the Government, has criticised this expedient element in the ideology:

... because it obeys the dictates of the moment, because it has on occasion lent itself to serve as handmaiden of industrial enterprise in securing quick returns. Its main defect is that it has never yet produced a genuine long-range programme.\textsuperscript{21}

What Eiselen means by "a genuine long-range programme" is presumably what Hoernle, whom he quotes with approval, means by "a long-range programme for liberals," aimed at what he calls "total separation," that is, "literally a sundering or dissocation (of the collectivities) so complete as to destroy the very possibility of effective domination."\textsuperscript{22} It is also presumably in this sense that


Kuper suggests that:

... in theory ... apartheid incorporates some elements of a liberal creed - the recognition of differences, not as a basis for subordination, but as the foundation of varying potentialities for development and self-expression. 23

But in their idealistic flight or utopian elements ideologies always run into difficulties with the empirical situation. The apartheid ideology has its share of such difficulties.

2. **Empirical Difficulties:**

The strain between the elements of expediency and idealism within the structure of an ideology suggests the probability that certain facts of the empirical situation have been overlooked.

"Glossing over" certain facts of the situation is one of the functional requisites of an ideology; that is, if it must integrate the social system. Parsons remarks this with clarity.

... in the nature of the case, integration of the social system is the primary function of its common ideology. Hence, where there is an element of malintegration in the actual social structure the tendency will be for the ideology to "gloss it over" and "play it down." Fully to "face up" to the reality of the importance of conflicting elements in the value-system and in the realistic situation ... would be a threat to the stability of the society. 24

---


The empirical facts which are "glossed over" in the apartheid ideology and yet continue to be its main source of embarrassment are those of: land, industry and the will-to-power.

a. Land:

The "Bantu Areas" comprise only 11 per cent of South African land and carry less than 50 per cent of the African population. Territorial apartheid would require that the other 50+ per cent of the African population be resettled in the "Bantu areas." Theoretically this could be done in one or both of two ways: (a) by increasing the carrying capacity of the existing "Bantu areas" to allow for economic resettlement of the entire African collectivity at its present absolute size plus its natural increase through the years; and (b) by alienating more land for the same purpose from the White collectivity (mainly reluctant Boer farmers) to the African collectivity.

The Tomlinson Commission had been appointed to inquire into the feasibility of a qualified form of the first theoretical possibility. Among many others it made the following significant observations on the present economic state of Africans in the "Bantu areas":

(i) a part of the population in Bantu areas makes a full living there. Their number is small and decreasing.
(ii) a large proportion makes a partial living in the Bantu areas but they are compelled to supplement their
incomes outside these areas. Their numbers are constantly increasing. 
(iii) some of them live in Bantu areas but are exclusively dependent on the "European" areas for their existence. Their number is also increasing. 25

The trend is clear. After examining a number of prerequisite conditions for increasing the carrying capacity of these areas anyhow, the Commission concluded as follows:

Under the conditions mentioned, the present carrying capacity cannot be raised even in terms of the present low standard of living and even with extensive supplementation from earnings by breadwinners elsewhere in the Union. 26

In pursuance of its terms of reference - almost in ideological defiance of its own observations - the Commission proceeded to recommend a programme of African development in the direction of territorial separation. The programme was characterised by (i) the multiplicity of conditional factors on which hung the chances of any hope of its success, and (ii) the prohibitiveness of the estimated costs entailed for the White taxpayer. The Government wisely adopted the Report in principle.


Regarding the second theoretical alternative, it is significant to note that it was not included in the terms of reference of the Commission as one of the practically conceivable ways of going about territorial separation. From the realpolitik point of view to ask the Boer farmers in South Africa to give up their farm-lands to "Natives" is to ask them for a plot in which to dig one's political grave. The politicians in the Government knew better.

b. Industry:

The industrial structure of South Africa rests on the White man's brain and the Black man's brawn. These form an interdependent sub-structure with increasing dependence on African labour, especially in the secondary industries.

The recent expansion of secondary industries in South Africa has led to a yet closer integration of Native and European in the economic system.27

In their state of dispossession of land, the Africans are obliged to seek work in White primary and secondary industries. And in their command of the capital resources of the country the Whites are obliged to seek, even compel, African labour. The two are interdependent.

But what is more significant for the prospects of territorial separation

is the increasing dependence of the economy on the African collectivity. Referring to the foreseeable future situation in secondary industries alone, the Tomlinson Commission drew attention to the following forecast:

According to estimates of the occupational distribution of the population in the year 2,000 ... if expectations are realised, in that year there will be 1,700,000 Bantu employed in factories, as compared with 421,500 Europeans, 416,600 Coloured persons and 95,000 Asians. 28

Furthermore, for the White collectivity which has enjoyed "white collar" economic status for three centuries in South Africa, territorial separation entails heavy sacrifices not only of economic expansion but also of the cake of privilege and prestige for the black-bread of menial toil and, initially, a lowered standard of living. And there is no indication that it is psychologically ready to make these sacrifices.

c. Will-to-power:

This is the will to dominant power. Perhaps the idea of White dominance is the main and final difficulty in the ideological path to territorial separation and self-determination of each collectivity.

With respect to the self-determination of the African collectivity, under apartheid, the former Prime Minister expressed himself in these "liberal" terms:

We want to have apartheid between European and non-European in so far as the legislative bodies of the country are concerned, not that we want to deny the non-Europeans any say or deprive them of their rights. But instead of their sitting with us in the same legislative assembly we want to build up for them their own self-governing institutions in their own territory. 29

We have drawn attention to Olivier's admission that the White collectivity has an "unalterable and indomitable determination" to preserve its racio-ethnic identity and retain control of the political machinery "at all costs." In the light of that, it is proper to inquire into the exact meaning of the envisaged self-determination, for the African collectivity, from a different point of view.

In a critical examination of this idea in apartheid, Kuper arrives at this conclusion:

What is involved in apartheid is not self-determination of nations, but the self-determination of the White group. And again, because of the interdependence of the groups, the corollary to the self-determination of the Whites is the other-determination of the non-Whites. 30

---

29 Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 2nd September, 1948, Col. 1481.

Speaking in the House of Assembly, the former Prime Minister confirmed this interpretation:

We will give them more and more self-governing powers in their own areas gradually and slowly as they achieve the ability for such powers and get the sense of responsibility they need. (But) in their own areas they will always have to stand under the guardianship and domination of the White man in South Africa.  

And again on the Bantustan logical extension of the idea of territorial apartheid:

We Nationalists believe that we must maintain White supremacy for all time. A policy of partnership must lead to Black domination.... We want the Bantu back in the reserves where they come into their own and where they will be given self-government - under White trusteeship. We cannot have independent Bantu States to threaten White South Africa.

These three empirical facts: land, industry, and will-to-power, therefore, force the ideology down, from its idealistic flight, to the level of sheer political expediency. It is the compromise of the ideology with these facts that embarrasses its more sincere and idealistic adherents. Yet these facts are so basic to the empirical situation to which the ideology refers that

---


32 Statement by a former Director of the State Information Office, quoted in L. Kuper, op. cit., p. 23. (Our underlinings).
if it fails to deal with them realistically and with logical consistency, then the question of its real function becomes immediate and crucial.

3. The Functional Aspect: Deception

The generalised function of an ideology is to assist in the integrative function of a political institution by marshalling, through persuasion, the national and moral sentiments of a population in support of the action-programme of the institutional system. Such a programme is, of course, theoretically on behalf of the social system viewed from the sectional interests of a given collectivity.

In a social system where the author or carrier and audience collectivities are different, it may be expected that the persuasive function will be directed at both collectivities - but for different reasons. Self-persuasion by a carrier or author collectivity into believing its own ideological fabrications is clearly a prerequisite for morale in confronting the other collectivity (or any other interested party) with the action-programme, which the ideology rationalises. It is functionally imperative for this purpose that the collectivity believe its own legitimation of its programme. The programme must be regarded not only as useful but also as right. This underlines Parsons' emphasis on the element of "commitment" as a necessary orientation - that is, for an author or carrier collectivity.
Other-persuasion is clearly necessary as a prerequisite for obtaining an optimum measure of consent on the part of an audience collectivity if the programme is to work out successfully. Force is normally an instrument of last resort in political systems.

Self-persuasion by the White collectivity involves three points of emphasis:

a. That its motivation is altruistic:

In practice the Native finds his freedom of movement and action severely curtailed... in his efforts to rise to a higher level he finds his progress in the economic, the social and the political field barred by the White man, who claims permanent superiority by virtue of his colour. 33

b. Its method is rationally and morally defensible:

The policy aiming at separation is the only sane, unbiased and honest policy. It is sane because it recognises the natural and not man-made differences existing between Native and European, it is unbiased because it advocates civilisation in general and not the type of civilisation which happens to be one's own and it is honest because it is constructive and encourages the Natives to seek development in a field where the European will naturally drop out as a competitor. 34

c. Its utopian goal is rationally and morally desirable:


34 Ibid., p. 11.
Just over a hundred years ago the Voortrekkers decided on a tremendous venture, they gave up home and hearth and economic security in order to achieve independence. The time has come for another momentous decision; the sands are running out fast; another Great Trek must begin, away from a caste-ridden society, which is our undoing, and towards areas of liberty.... The ultimate goal should be seen clearly namely the separation of White and Native into separate self-sufficient socio-economic units, a process which must be spread over many years.\textsuperscript{35}

Clearly, these arguments for apartheid are directed mainly at the members of the White collectivity itself. That is, to persuade them to cast their weight behind the apartheid programme. They are intended to reassure any members who may have misgivings that apartheid is well-motivated, well-pursued, and well-meant. And should the realities of the situation embarrass the progress of the programme at any point, the catch-all, face-saving argument is ready at hand: apartheid is "a process which must be spread over many years."\textsuperscript{11} Never realised but always to be realised - like the Kingdom of Heaven. This makes it possible for the members of the White collectivity to adopt a pseudo-religious attitude in this respect.

Whereas, with the White collectivity, the persuasive strategy is to appeal to altruistic motives and to make this collectivity

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 8. (Our underlining).
believe it is thus motivated - rather than by self-interest in domination; the strategy in persuading the African collectivity is to appeal to the motive of self-interest. That is, to make this collectivity believe that its interests and aspirations will be better served and promoted by its acceptance of the ideology and its attendant programme. The essential idea is to persuade this collectivity into a false belief that apartheid is a liberatory ideology - not a conservative one - by focussing its attention on the utopian aspects which must remain nebulous as "even in their own areas they will always have to stand under the guardianship and domination of the White man in South Africa." The technique involves the following postures:

a. A show of sympathy with the African collectivity:

Our present system of domination tempered with trusteeship has proved irksome to the Native community and is becoming more irritating. 36

b. An infusion of a sense of despondency in the collectivity:

It should be clearly understood that ... the Government is not prepared to grant the Bantu political equality within the European community. 37

To say "within the European community" is the elliptical South African way of saying, in an integrated social system. Perhaps


37 Former Prime Minister (Dr. D. F. Malan) in a letter to the African National Congress, dated 29th January, 1952.
Hoernle makes this interpretation clearer when he points out that:

So long as Whites and Non-Whites are united in the same socio-political structure, the former will not be keen to surrender their dominance ... It should be clear that there is no escape from White domination by way of parallelism or assimilation, but only by way of total separation. 38

Eiselen also confirms this:

Gradually it will dawn upon the Natives in general that the task of raising 8 million Natives to a higher standard of living will never be undertaken with enthusiasm in a caste-ridden society and that it would in any case be an onerous task for two million Whites to accomplish. 39

c. A glorification of the ideological utopia before the collectivity.

(The Government) is only too willing to encourage Bantu initiative, Bantu services and Bantu administration within the Bantu community, and there to allow the Bantu full scope for his potentialities. 40

d. A form of subtle persuasive flattery of the collectivity:

The Bantu too have pride of race and tradition and as soon as they see that within areas of their own they


40 Former Prime Minister (Dr. D. F. Malan) in a letter to the African National Congress, dated 29th January, 1952.
are offered more ... that trades and occupations of trust and authority which in the European towns were the monopoly of the White master, are open to them, they will not fail to respond. 41

The manifest persuasive function of apartheid here is in the biassed contrast it places before the African collectivity between integration - which can only offer them frustration (in view of the "unalterable and indomitable determination" of the White collectivity to dominate in an integrated social system), and separation - which will offer the African "full scope for his potentialities."

The deceptive nature of this persuasion is evident in the fact, admitted only at the level of expediency, that "even in their own areas they will always have to stand under the guardianship and comination of the White man in South Africa"; and the fact that, as Kuper points out:

From the point of view of White domination, the reduction of the non-Whites into a number of mutually exclusive units is a functional necessity ... for counteraction against an emergent non-White unity. 42


Regarding the efficacy of this ideological persuasion of the African collectivity, it should suffice to note Kuper's observation that:

With the development of political understanding among Africans, the rationalisations offered to them are clothed in slightly more sophisticated terms. But the process is cumulative: the increasingly subtle deceptions progressively evoke increasingly subtle analysis, and the politically oriented non-White of today shows a highly acute critical ability. Yet political statements have not kept pace with this development; there is little flesh to camouflage the real intent. 43

In contrast to this determinate and elaborately worked out ideological system in South Africa, we point out in the following chapter that the Kenya social system does not have a corresponding system of political ideas. Intents and interests in that system tend to conflict in their basic nakedness with little or no effort on the part of the contending parties to camouflage their claims and counterclaims. This state of affairs is attributable to a special indeterminacy in the political arrangements of Kenya. However, for our purposes, the fact of the absence of a determinate ideology in Kenya is more important than the reasons for the fact. The methodological necessity for demonstrating this fact is clear. That is, if the difference in the distribution of institutional references in the two situations is attributed to the role of ideology in the one, then the role of ideology must be excluded from the other. This we do in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY IN KENYA

Kenya has had doctrines or declarations of interests and counter-doctrines or declarations of opposite interests. But there is not in that social system any elaborated and coherent system of ideas which may be conceptualised as ideology. That is, a system of ideas which departs from the empirical social system through selective, therefore, distorted perception of the facts of that system for the manifest purpose of the evaluative integration of an author or carrier collectivity and the latent purpose of the deceptive persuasion of an audience collectivity towards acceptance of the state of affairs in which the sectional interests of the former are best subserved.

Nor is there, therefore, a system of ideas that may be called a counter-ideology designed to unmask a dominant ideology and to outline a transcendence of the status quo in the direction of an intellectually worked out utopia.

The absence of both ideology and counter-ideology in Kenya is only paralleled by the absence of a counter-ideology in South Africa. To be sure, in both situations there are, in these respects,
identifiable value-premises for beliefs and intellectual positions on specific interest-problems; but no elaborated and coherent system of apologetics for any one determinate moral-intellectual approach to all major interest-problems within the social system — no generalised rationalisation of perspective or world-view. Even the ideas that are associated with the word (African) nationalism do not constitute an ideology for the African collectivities. Rather, nationalism is a summation concept for assertions of uncamouflaged interests.

On the other hand, by definition, ideology is a camouflage, a rationalisation, a disguise or apology for interests. This is more than an analytical distinction. It is a concrete or empirical one, in the sense that propositions that state interests can be concretely separated from those that rationalise the stated interests. The point is that in Kenya the latter type is strikingly wanting both in the White and in the African collectivity.

Now, this observation would seem to do violence to general theoretical expectations regarding the relationships between political systems and ideologies. One such general expectation is that outside the routine or administrative sector, ideologies are a prerequisite for the operation of these institutional systems, short of
the constant use of force. That is, for normal purposes of integrative functioning, political systems must depend on a modicum of willing conformity on the part of the governed, that that consent needs a measure of engineering, and that ideologies are means of deceptive persuasion by rationalising the claims to legitimacy of political and social systems as wholes. The suggestion here, as nowhere else in this study, is not that socio-political chaos follows immediately on the unmasking or dissipation of the fog of ideology which conceals real interests in a social system. Rather, it is that no political or social system can long survive without adequate and systematic rationalisation of its pretensions to legitimacy in a manner acceptable to a sociologically significant portion of its members.

In view of these theoretical considerations, our failure to find in Kenya a system of ideas that may be called an ideology without strain to the concept as defined has compelled the raising of the question whether or not Kenya has a political institutional system with a sufficiently determinate structure to provide the necessary conditions for the fabrication of an ideology. By definition, an ideology presupposes a political system sufficiently structured (not necessarily stable) for at least one of the collectivities involved or interested in its structure and functioning to have so identified the
pursuit and realisation of its sectional interests with that political system that it is motivated to try to legitimise its indefinite continuance.

Similarly, by definition, a counter-ideology presupposes all the preceding – except that the collectivity subscribing to it considers the existing political arrangements so inimical to its interests that it wants it superseded in the direction of utopia. In brief, for ideology and counter-ideology to arise, a political system must be sufficiently determinate structurally for it to be a focal point of reference for the conflict of the interests of collectivities – one of which, at least, should have acquired a vested interest in its arrangements.

The present political arrangements in Kenya inherently lack this determinacy for either the White or the African collectivity. Neither considers them as a completed work of political craftsmanship by which it could lay stock as by a social craft that is genuine and legitimate. Rather, both recognise it for what it is – an evolving system of political arrangements, and the primary orientation to it is neither that of commitment to it (ideology) nor of radical transcendence of it (utopia).

The orientation is an un-rationalised or non-ideological tug-
of-war between collectivity-interests. It involves relatively direct claims and counter-claims on a very material or concrete level with little or no attempts at persuasion or counter-persuasion.

There is also a sense in which ideological development and sophistication is not to be expected in imperial or colonial social systems, including trust and mandated territories. That is they are refereed. The presence of a referee or "impartial arbiter" in such situations presupposes the transiency of any existing political arrangements inasmuch as the stepping out of the referee presupposes an assured determinacy of the arrangements. The former state of affairs is unfavourable to the emergence of ideology.

The indeterminacy of political arrangements in Kenya derives from a three-cornered tangle there between 1. the Settler collectivity, 2. the African collectivity - both as directly interested parties - and 3. the Metropolitan (British) collectivity as referee, a not-altogether disinterested or neutral arbiter. The essential point is that none of these collectivities has sufficient vested interests in the present political arrangements to wish to legitimise them ideologically.

First, the metropolitan collectivity cannot be said to have a vested interest in the present political arrangements in Kenya.
The correct interpretation of its role and orientation would be in terms of moral commitment to the task of preventing Kenya from going the way of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia by keeping the Settler collectivity under leash until certain requisite developments have occurred within the African collectivity to make possible and equitable allocation of economic and political power within the social system. Given this orientation, the metropolitan collectivity has to view any existing political arrangements in Kenya as but a step in a refereed process of development of the social system as a whole. None of these considerations could possibly provide conditions for the formulation of an ideology, as here defined, by this collectivity. Similarly, in its role as arbiter, this collectivity could hardly be expected to formulate an explicit utopia for Kenya as this would have the effect of accentuating the conflict of interests between the Settler and African collectivities. This accounts for the predominantly pragmatic orientation of the metropolitan collectivity to the inter-collectivity problems of Kenya – hence, the absence of ideology and utopia.

Second, from the point of view of the Settler and African collectivities, the progressive development of political arrangements under metropolitan supervision has not reached a stage where either
collectivity finds its interests and aspirations so adequately sub-
served that it finds itself motivated to apologise for the arrest of the
process of development at that stage. Only at that point could an
ideology arise - and also touch-off a counter-ideology.

Currently, for instance, neither the Settler nor the African
collectivity has sufficient vested interests in the Lyttleton constitution
stage of political arrangements to wish to formulate an ideology
rationalising the political system, as thereby structured, as a
legitimate frame of reference for the integration of the national senti-
ments and loyalties for any length of time. Both envisage further
adjustments in the near future in directions more consistent with
the pursuit and realisation of their several interests.

This anticipatory orientation to political change and in the
absence of an ideology is of critical importance for political dynamics.
In rationalising or apologising for sectional interests - including
deceptive persuasion of the opponent - political ideologies perform
a cushioning function in the conflict of interests. The conflicting
interests are not, at least immediately, apparent. They become
discoverable through critical ideological analysis. Without the
ideological sugar-coating, such as we observed in the apartheid
ideology, interests tend to conflict in their natural bitterness; that
is, the conflict is more direct and poignant. The contention here is that such is the case in the conflict of interests between the Settler and African collectivities in Kenya. Whereas in South Africa inter-collectivity conflict takes place at two levels - the ideological and the pragmatic - in Kenya it takes place at one - the pragmatic.

The articulation of the conflicting interests here has characteristically been in the form of doctrines, declarations, demands and counter-demands. Several major ones may be briefly reviewed here to clarify the point.

1. **The Doctrine of Paramountcy of African Interests:**

   Perhaps the first significant doctrine in the political history of Kenya is the Devonshire declaration of 1923 promulgated by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire, in a White Paper:

   Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail. Obviously the interests of the other communities, European, Indian or Arab, must severally be safeguarded. ¹

   This was clearly an unequivocal delineation of interest-relationships between the African and the Settler collectivities at

---

the pragmatic level. It was an articulation of the orientation of moral commitment, referred to above, of the metropolitan collectivity to the spirit of trusteeship - as the declaration further amplified:

... in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races. ²

For our present thesis, it is important to point out that in its birth this declaration was not a product of the intellectual fertility of party theoreticians but a product of a very pragmatic situation of sharp conflict of interests between the Indian and the Settler collectivities - a conflict that bordered dangerously on the brink of physical violence. ³ It was a pragmatic move on the part of the metropolitan collectivity to avert imminent catastrophe in Kenya by manipulating the rank order of collectivity interests. Accordingly, Dilley observes:

The Archbishop of Canterbury and others might proclaim the doctrine of "paramountcy" established by the Paper to be the Magna Carta of the natives, but, in reality, that statement was only the means to an end. The real objective was the establishment of some basis, other than


racial prejudice, on which to keep Indians from equal participation in the development of a Crown Colony in which they have lived for centuries. 4

Similarly, its supersession five years later was not a result of shifts in the intellectual positions of party theoreticians but was a response, pragmatic that is, to another situation of sharp conflict of interests - this time, of the Settler and Metropolitan collectivities - which again, bordered on an open physical clash between the two.

The abandonment of the principles of the Devonshire declaration actually occurred in 1928 as the result of the Hilton Young Commission which, owing to pressure from the settlers, rejected the concept of paramountcy of native interests. With this rejection the ultimate objective of African self-government for Kenya was quietly dropped. In fairness to the British government it should be pointed out that, short of landing troops in Kenya, it was powerless to affect the issue. The settlers had made it doubly clear that if necessary they would resort to arms to maintain their dominance. 5

2. The Doctrine of the "Dual Policy:"

Like the preceding this doctrine was a product of the interest-conflict situation in Kenya. This time the interests of the Settler and the African collectivities were at issue.

The doctrine of "paramountcy" was invented to secure the Europeans against the Indians; the doctrine of the "dual policy" is being used to secure them against the natives. 6

---

4 Ibid., 179-180.
This doctrine was formulated in the White Paper in 1927 which incorporated the principle of permanency of White settlement in Kenya and associated the non-African collectivities in Kenya with the Metropolitan in its role as trustee vis-a-vis the Africans. It was, in the final analysis, a reversal of the doctrine of paramountcy of African interests. That this was, from the point of view of the Settler collectivity, a functional necessity of power politics is clearly pointed out by Dilley:

The settlers afterward adopted the "dual policy" as a solution for the difficulty created by the fact that, in their zeal to defeat the Indian, they had over-reached themselves and secured the statement that native rights were paramount. This, if really fulfilled, would have proven very embarrassing to settler interests. The "dual policy" provided a means of avoiding the full effects of "paramountcy." 7

It thus attempted a two-directional adjustment of interests. Firstly, there was the adjustment of Settler and Metropolitan interests relative to trusteeship over the African collectivity. The 1923 Paper had reserved this role exclusively for the Metropolitan collectivity as un-delegatable. But owing to pressure from the Settlers, His Majesty's Government while asserting that they:

\[
\text{... adhere to the principles of the White Paper of 1923...}
\]

\[
\text{At the same time they wish to place on record their view,}
\]

that while these responsibilities of trusteeship must be for some considerable time rest mainly on the agents of the Imperial Government, they desire to associate more closely in this high and honourable task those who, as colonists or residents, have identified their interests with the prosperity of the country. 

Clearly, in view of the doctrine of paramountcy which sub-ordinated the interests of the Indian collectivity not only to those of the Settler but also to those of the African collectivity, this admission to the status of overlord over the African collectivity could not have referred to any but the Settler collectivity alone.

Secondly, there was also involved in this sub-doctrine of "closer association" between Settler and Metropolitan collectivities, the adjustment of Settler and African collectivity interests through tacit recognition of paramountcy of Settler interests. That is, in case of critical conflict of interests between the African and Settler collectivities, the latter could not always be expected to subordinate its self-interest to such altruism as is required by the spirit of trusteeship. The role-anomaly here is that the Settler collectivity became both an interested or contending party and a co-referee or impartial arbiter. As the former it could be expected to advance its own interests even to the detriment of its ward; as the latter it was expected to protect and advance the interests of its ward - in-

8 Ibid., p. 188.
cluding protecting those interests against exploitation by the Settler collectivity itself.

This role-conflict, however, becomes understandable if taken as a manifestation of an even deeper conflict between the Settler and Metropolitan collectivities. In this sense, it appears as a pragmatic, almost makeshift, plug in a tense conflict situation whose place was not presumed to be logically consistent or systematic. It was an ad hoc compromise, to contain an explosive situation, under Settler pressure.

The European demand for recognition of their position in 1927 made recognition of the "dual policy" unavoidable. This time they were not asking for protection from the Indians but for a dominant position in their Legislative Council. The Europeans were in Kenya, and in practice the Imperial authorities could not enforce paramountcy for the natives, but when the Europeans asked for domination, the Imperial Government accepted the "dual policy" and, while specifically granting to them a part in its administration, attempted to retain control. 9

The Imperial Government therefore accepted this doctrine short of openly accepting the doctrine of paramountcy of Settler interests and thereby openly repudiating the undertakings involved in the 1923 Paper. But, in effect, that was the case. The 1923 doctrine of paramountcy of African interests was, de facto, abandoned. By 1930 it had come to mean:

... no more than that the interests of the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population should not be subordinated to those of a minority belonging to another race, however important in itself. 10

This left the interests of the Settler collectivity in a clearly paramount position. They had, of course, been paramount all along but the fact had not received public or formal recognition by the Metropolitan authorities.

3. The Unstated Doctrine of Paramountcy of Settler Interests:

The de facto paramountcy of Settler interests derives from three sources: the political, the economic and the White Highlands. Economically the Settlers hold the trump card of providing the major internal source of capital, technological and entrepreneurial skills necessary to a modern economy. This is a very objective basis for paramountcy which only the Indian collectivity can so much as partly challenge at the moment.

Politically, the paramountcy of their interests is, at least for the time being, tenuously maintained through the principle of balanced or parity representation in the Legislative Council. That

10
Ibid., p. 206.
is, the "assignment to one community which is considered to have predominant claims a measure of representation equal to that accorded to all other communities taken together." 11 That such assignment is to the Settler collectivity is a de facto testament to the paramountcy of its interests.

The European leaders made the maintenance of this arrangement a condition of their acquiescence in the increase in the number of African unofficial members in the Legislature in 1951, and the principle was maintained in the Constitution of the Council of Ministers in 1953. 12

It was also maintained in the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954.

The pertinent implication of the principle is succinctly drawn out by Mboya:

The principle of European supremacy remains basically unchanged. In the Legislative Council the principle of parity has been maintained on the basis of equality between European Elected Members on the one hand, and the Non-European Members on the other... Thus the Europeans are still in a position to ensure that their interests are paramount. 13

But a more important economico-symbolic basis for their paramountcy is represented by reservation to them of the White


Highlands. The conflict of interests that rages around the Highlands in Kenya has more than economic significance. It also has crucial symbolic significance, as Mboya clearly recognises:

The White Highlands in Kenya politics have been looked upon not only as unfair economic policy but also as a symbol of European supremacy... European settlers have come to regard the White Highlands as a right, and not a privilege... So much so that when the Troup Committee revealed that more than 50 per cent of the Highlands was not fully developed, the Settlers and the Kenya Government responded by saying that it was necessary to bring in more European settlers - never an African farmer. 14

However, the essential point for our thesis in these respects is that the development of political arrangements is, for the Settler collectivity, currently at a precarious point of balance - where they cannot give in any further without going under; and that they cannot be expected to evolve an ideology legitimising the system hinged as it is dangerously on the principle of parity. Rather, they may be expected to seek or await a more comfortable readjustment first. Nor could the African collectivity be expected to do so when they control only a third of the Unofficial seats in the Legislature despite their overwhelming majority in the total population. That is, both collectivities are in a position to look forward to further adjustments

of the political machinery in ways more consistent with their respective interests. Finally, therefore, we must briefly point out the primary interests of these collectivities around which conflict takes place. They are economic and political.

**Primary Interests:**

1. **African:**

   The most compelling African interest in Kenya is economic - land.

   The extension of racial discrimination to land policy is perhaps the most bitterly resented of all discriminatory practices - and it is government policy... Many Europeans own some hundreds of thousands of acres while in some of the African areas exists land hunger and over-population, with such land as there is often being of poor and unproductive quality. This is the big bone of contention in Kenya politics.

   Similarly, the Fabian Colonial Bureau observes that:

   The crux of the problem in Kenya is the land question... What is in dispute is the system of allocating land according to race, irrespective of any other conditions which may be imposed. This system conflicts with conceptions of a democratic, free, society. It is particularly offensive to Africans... To erect a racial barrier against African settlement on the "White" Highlands is pure apartheid, and as such, indefensible.


In this context therefore the White Highlands have come to be the primary interest-focus for both collectivities. To both, they have come to acquire more than economic value. To the Settler collectivity they have come to be a symbol of racial exclusiveness and status-distinction; to the African collectivity, a symbol of usurpation and racist arrogance - if not simply an affront.

Land was the subject of a special petition to the House of Commons in 1953, the preamble to which was characteristic of the Kenya African's attitude in this respect:

The Humble Petition . . . Sheweth -

That a grievous wrong is being suffered by the People of Kenya through the alienation of 16,700 square miles of the most fertile land in Kenya and its transference to European settlers, without the consent of the people of Kenya and without compensation for the value of the land. 18

The second major interest of the African collectivity is political and has two aspects to it. Namely, a) universal human suffrage on a Common Roll for the whole social system; and b) continuance of the metropolitan referee-role pending the introduction of a). The interest in a universal franchise needs no documentation here. It is a generalised interest of all un-enfranchised awakened power-minorities. The second interest, that is, in Britain not unleashing

the power-thirsty Settlers on the African collectivity yet is fostered
by an awareness of the history of the Union of South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia where premature unleashing of the Settlers through granting of
responsible government led to irresponsible government.

Mboya has articulated this interest with elementary clarity.

Taking as his "ultimate objective - a democratic society," he points
out that:

The obstacle in the way of this development is the hope of
some Europeans that if they hold on long enough the
British Government will transfer power to them, and
thus enable them to transform Kenya into another
Southern Rhodesia. It is essential that this hope be
destroyed... If the hope of European domination is
to be effectively destroyed then the British Government
will have to intervene. It must make a declaration
that its aim is to create in Kenya a democratic govern-
ment which will give recognition to the principle of
equality of individual citizens as against racial groups.
To make clear that this is not just another empty
declaration like that of 1923, the British Government
will have to introduce immediate reforms in Kenya.
They must include the reform of the Legislative Council...

2. Settler:

The primary political interest of this collectivity is precisely
what the African collectivity seeks to avoid: devolution of metropolitan
power to them. And given the differences in the levels of economic
and political development between the two collectivities, the interest

is in consolidating white domination while this collectivity still has, at least, a head-lead. Time is of the essence as it is conceivable that beyond a certain point of socio-economic development the African collectivity will be impossible effectively to dominate.

This interest is not without historical precedent, that is, in British Colonial history. Natal and the Cape in the Union of South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia in the Central African Federation are the cases in point. Casting their eyes Southwards and observing how, through timely devolution of metropolitan power (that is, prematurely, for the African collectivity) their "blood-brothers" have been unleashed to "lap the fat of the land" unfettered by metropolitan surveillance, the Settler collectivity may be said to feel a genuine "righteous indignation" at the reluctance of the metropolitan collectivity to unleash them too.

Speaking of the Kenya Settlers' orientation to this preceded principle of devolution in British Colonial politico-historical development Lord Hailey has this to say in the pluperfect:

They had maintained that the principle of devolution culminates in full Responsible Government, which had been followed by Great Britain in her relations with other British settlements in Africa and elsewhere, was applicable also to their case. There was reasonable precedent for this claim. 21


This orientation is represented in the positions of the Kenya Empire Party and the Electors' Union. The ultimate aim of both is the transfer of political power from London to Nairobi, that is, to the Settler collectivity there. The Electors' Union is the more moderate of the two. It envisages:

...the slow creation of some kind of multi-racial society based firmly on European "leadership" - a contradiction in terms only too apparent to both Africans and Asians. 22

Rawcliffe points out that while multi-racialism may be acceptable to some Asians of moderate views, it has the disadvantage of being suspect and therefore unacceptable to Africans whether moderate or not. Declaring that "multi-racialism is no answer" in the Kenya situation, Mboya outlines the African position as follows:

The objection to multi-racialism must therefore be based on the grounds that its existence is dependent on the maintenance of racial groups, and as such it is an impediment to the establishment of democratic rights. Secondly, the present multi-racial form of government is forcing a conflict of politics based on self-preservation. Each group is fighting to accumulate gains as a group, and consequently the maximum limit to which the minorities are prepared to go is parity between each of the three races. Democracy is unacceptable because they think in terms of equating their group participation and the participation of the Africans as a group. They are still not concerned with individuals, only with races... It is perhaps necessary to point out that the current

European attitude is based on the assumption that the Colonial Office will become a passive onlooker. This would betray the Africans' remaining confidence in the British Government and strengthen the fear that the Europeans will use their powerful position to create a regime similar to that in Southern Rhodesia. 23

The Kenya Empire Party has the orientation of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, a more radical position than that of the Electors' Union. Inasmuch as it is authentically untenable to refer to the Nationalist Party in South Africa without, in the same breath, referring to Daniel Malan, it is equally untenable to refer to the Empire Party without referring to Vigar.

Vigar at one time openly declared that the Empire Party would seize political control of the country by force of arms if the British government persisted in its aims of furthering African and Asian political development. He stated that in the last resort he would be prepared to invite Malan to send South African troops to Kenya and hinted that Malan had already made an offer in this direction. 24

The second major interest of the Settler collectivity is the preservation of the sanctity of the White Highlands. We have already pointed out that the Highlands have become the focus of conflict over the allocation of land in Kenya as a whole, and also that to both contending parties it has more than economic significance. In the final analysis, it is this added non-economic significance, which

---

we called symbolic, which matters most to both parties involved. That this is the case is indicated by the fact that about 50 per cent of the Highlands is under-farmed - so that Settler tenacity cannot be exhausted by economic considerations; and that, on the other hand, even if the Highlands were opened to Arican occupation they still would not solve the problem of over-crowding in the African areas - so that, again, African insistence cannot be exhausted by economic considerations either. This double significance of the Highlands was reflected in the positions taken by the East Africa Royal Commission in 1955.

Looking at the problem from the economic point of view, the Commission held that:

It is of the greatest importance that new land anywhere should be taken up on a form of tenure which does not preclude or restrict sound use and that the occupiers of land should be subject to well devised land use rules and proper supervision. We do not advocate the holding of agricultural land in the Highlands or in the native land units or anywhere else on any other basis. 25

And looking at the problem from the extra-economic point of view which involves taking into account the sentiments that have arisen around the Highlands, the Commission cautioned:

There is no doubt that suspicion and bitterness, bred of small beginnings, has affected African minds in varying degree in all three territories; and in these circumstances, and until confidence is reestablished, it is necessary to provide control over the transfer of rights in land between persons of different races. 26

26 Ibid., p. 35 (par. 11).
This dismissal of racial criteria of land allocation through the front door and allowing them to come in through the back door is a clear indication of the involvement of more than economic considerations here. It is not essential for our purposes to go into respective arguments of the two collectivities on the issue.

The foregoing treatment of the situation in Kenya should suffice for the purpose of indicating that that situation is one of open conflict of rather rudely naked collectivity interests within an indeterminate framework of political arrangements between the Settler and African collectivities, with the Metropolitan collectivity as uneasy referee. It is this situation that it is contended here is not conducive to the emergence of ideology.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the thesis here is that the concept of ideology is not applicable to the Kenya political and social systems. That is, it has no empirical referent there partly because of the indeterminacy of political arrangements, as shown here, and partly because the several major conflicting interests are on the whole left unrationised. They are merely asserted and counter-asserted. The several doctrines sketched out in the preceding are, on examination, only assertions of interests with special reference to their rank-order or primacy. There is no logically consistent system of ideas explicitly legitimising them
or their order.

For purposes of the basic hypothesis of the study as a whole, it remains to point out that not only was ideology lacking in the Kenya social system but also that the Beecher Committee Report was, unlike the Eiselen Commission Report, lacking in ideological ingredients - hence the lesser focus on the end-sector in representative discourse there.

It will be recalled that in the South African case the technique used for identifying ideological elements in the Commission Report was: inspection of the terms of reference. These included a particular a priori conception of the African collectivity which the Commissioners were instructed to use as a plumbline in their reconstruction of the African educational system there. Now, inspection of the terms of reference for the Beecher Committee reveals no such preconceptions as to the nature, and so forth, of the African collectivity whose educational system was to be investigated. The terms of reference in Kenya defined a technical task for the Committee involving two technical areas of corporate life - the educational and the economic. They (terms of reference) are readily classifiable as either educational and economic - except for one. That is, the second, which involved evaluation of policy, viz:

The extent to which there could or should be a variation of the accepted policy by which African Primary education
is the responsibility of Local Authorities. 27

Two remarks on this are necessary. First, with regard to classifiability, it must be noted that it was educational policy to which the Committee was being referred and there is no indication in the term of reference itself of the type of educational policy which the Government preferred or hoped the Committee would recommend. Second, in relation to the thesis of this study, the optive phrase "could or should" clearly indicates that there was no preconception on the part of the Government which wrote the term of reference as to either the feasibility or advisability or desirability of change one way or the other. The Committee was left to decide on the basis of objective findings. This cognitive or investigative orientation was typical of the task and performance of the Beecher Commission in the sense that it was not typical of the Eiselen Commission. The latter was, by official command, to combine objective findings with subjective preconceptions derived from the apartheid ideology.

CHAPTER V
THE NATURE OF IDEOLOGICAL IMPACT: SOUTH AFRICA

I General Role-Expectations.

The exposition of the structure and function of the apartheid ideology was undertaken in the third chapter as of methodological necessity. That ideology is the postulated intervening variable of the study -- intervening, that is, between the parallel coverage of the two Commission Reports and the non-parallel or divergent distribution of institutional references in the two Legislative debate-situations. The explanatory thesis is that the particular distribution of institutional references observed at the ends sector in the South African case was a function of the South African ideology. Elements of that ideology have been pointed out in the first term of reference of the Eiselen Commission and their source constructed. In so far as those elements involved a re-statement of ends in the Report and preoccupation with ends in Legislative discourse, they may be conceptualised as ideological role-expectations concerning the ends that the African educational system ought to pursue. The role-expectations deriving from a dominant ideology may be regarded as defining the nature of ideological
impact in the sense that, ultimately, the collectivity which entertains them has the ability to back them up -- with force. In the present chapter we examine the role-expectations of the South African ideology more closely.

The first major indication of the role-expectations that the apartheid ideology entertained for the African educational system was in the instruction that the Commission attend to:

The formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, their needs under ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration. ¹

It is not difficult to discern here the three concepts we identified as basic to the apartheid ideology -- difference, self-determination and separation. Not only was the African educational system to be organisationally separate but also qualitatively different.

However, it is very clear in the preceding exposition that the concept of difference is, in the final analysis, tantamount to the concept of inequality; and that of self-determination, to that of subordination "always under the guardianship and domination of the White man in South Africa." In these terms, therefore, the African educational system was ideologically expected to perpetuate difference-inequality

¹ Union of South Africa, U. G. No. 53/1951, par. 1(a).
between the two collectivities by pretending to remove the basic for
cultural comparisons between them. Ideologically the African educational
system was to be on a different non-comparable plane.

To ensure this, the Commission was charged with the necessary
function of formulating principles and aims of an "education for
Natives." 2 We implied in the third chapter that the removal of
bases for comparison, ideologically at least, was a functional necessity
for the maintenance of White domination in South Africa. In this
sense, the reorganisation of the educational system involved in this
term of reference meant the manipulation and harnessing of its ends
to the service of a political system representing the sectional interests
of the other collectivity. This meant the devaluation of educational ends
to political means adjusted to the end of White domination.

The Commission accordingly proceeded to re-examine the
African educational system in the light of this generalised role-ex-
pectation. It made, inter alia, two points of criticism which are
relevant here: namely, that it was plagued with: a) a "vagueness of
objectives, "that is, the value-content of its end sector was indeterminate,
and, b) an "uncertainty as to the future development of Bantu Culture,"
that is, the articulation of its ends sector with the value-content of the
social system was also indeterminate.

---

2 This is not a neutral or value-free phrase in the South
African situation. It has the connotation of "education for Niggers."
With regard to the point of vagueness of objectives, the Commission pointed out that the educational system had functioned with disregard "as to the rightful place of the Bantu in South Africa."

A large number of Witnesses gave evidence on the objectives of Bantu education and it was striking how vague their conceptions were in most cases... This vagueness is really a reflection of the historical circumstances and the general lack of clarity that exists as to the rightful place of the Bantu in South Africa. 3

In other words, the African educational system had not been functioning to prepare the African for a predetermined "rightful place" in the South African racial caste system. It had not been designed to serve the African collectivity as "an independent race" with distinctive characteristics. It had not been different from that of the White collectivity. It had not been oriented to the objective of promoting inequality and guaranteeing the indefinite "guardianship and domination of the White man in South Africa." It continued to provide a bridge for assimilation, comparison and even competition between the two collectivities at the cultural level. It had not appreciated these clear ideological objectives; therefore it was vague in objective. It had been modelled not in the South African ideological tradition but on a universalistic liberal tradition transplanted from happier democratic

climes. The South African social climate required that African education be expected to train Africans not so much according to their potentialities as "in accordance to their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live." ⁴

Regarding the second point of criticism, the Commission first remarked that there was in the social system as a whole "two schools of thought" on the future of African culture:

Firstly, those who believe that Bantu culture is inferior and must gradually disappear; and, secondly, those who believe that while the old traditional Bantu cultures cannot cope with modern conditions, nevertheless they contain in themselves the seeds from which can develop a modern Bantu culture fully able to satisfy the aspirations of the Bantu and to deal with the conditions of the modern world. ⁵

And then that:

The schools have reflected the current uncertainty as to the future and value of Bantu culture.... No schools can be expected to play their part in the development of a culture if the community itself has no confidence in that culture. ⁶...reference to the syllabi of the primary schools (for instance) shows that the development of Bantu culture as a whole is not held up as an ideal. ⁷

That is, instead of promoting cultural differences between the collectivities and separate cultural development of the African, the educational system had "favoured the adjustment of Bantu culture to

⁴ Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, No. 10/1953, Col. 3585.
⁵ Union of South Africa, U.G. No. 53/1951, par. 565.
⁶ Ibid., par. 566.
⁷ Ibid., par. 567.
European economic and political ideals." This the Commission felt had resulted in a yearly production from such a system of:

...that group of people who break away too rapidly from the views and habits of their own people and sometimes act against their own people. Such a stray minority is readily formed where two cultures are in close contact. The individual lives in the midst of his own community; but is not of the community; he is an outcaste among his own people and is of no significance in the other culture.

The naivete of this misguided interpretation of the fact of the educated African elite in terms of marginality theory instead of reference theory is functional for the security system of the White collectivity as a case of convenient self-deception. But that is not the point here. The point is that it is a negative formulation of the role-expectation that the African educational system should reduce, if not eliminate, the situation in which the two cultures are "in close contact" by focussing each African generation on its own culture rather than on assimilating the Western - so that the educated African may "become a worthy member of the Bantu race instead of having to be a synthetic Westerner." The ultimate idea is to eliminate this "stray minority" of African synthetic Westerners by making its further production through the educational system impossible. This role-expectation too is clearly geared to assuring White domination.

---

8 Ibid., par. 564.
This inference becomes clear if we inquire into why the elimination of this stray minority should be a matter of concern and educational policy to the White collectivity. Olivier gives the clue:

It is... undeniable that it is this educated minority group that is the most vociferous and the most clamorous, and who feels the restrictions placed by European overlordship as unbearable and unjustifiable. 11

In other words, this is the articulate group, the leadership which as Kuper observed "shows a highly acute critical ability." It is the spearhead of an important crusade to salvage democratic values from the slough into which White racism and rabid nationalism have cast them in South Africa.

The majority of the educated Natives are all for integration. 12

If therefore, the ruling collectivity must maintain the power status quo and keep the social system from drifting towards integration, if the incipient democratisation of the social system must be arrested, this synthetic stray minority must be eliminated. The course of development of the African collectivity must be redirected through an ideologically planned formal education.

This involves diverting this collectivity from orientation to

11 N. J. J. Olivier, "Apartheid - A Slogan or a Solution?," Race Relations, 90/53, p. 3.

"a highly developed and progressive Western civilisation" which must be the preserve of the White collectivity and re-orienting it to idealising a disintegrating tribal "Bantu culture." In this way, it is hoped to insulate the White collectivity from cultural comparison, competition and challenge by the African collectivity - to close the question of equality and inequality, rights and claims within the social system, that is, at the ideological level.

Their education should not clash with Government policy; ...if any Native in South Africa today in any kind of school in existence is being taught that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake. 13

We must now turn from these general role-expectations implicit in the Commission's two criticisms of the educational system to the more positively-formulated role-expectations. These may be observed directly in the Commission's recommendations of the "aims and principles of education for Natives as an independent race..." It will be recalled that the Commission formulated two aims.

1. **The Collectivity-Integrative Aim:**

From the viewpoint of the whole society the aim of Bantu education is the development of a modern progressive culture, with social institutions which will be in harmony with one another and with the evolving conditions of life to be in South Africa, and with the schools which must serve as effective agents in this process of development. 14


Clearly, this is designed to ensure that the African educational system promotes institutional integration within the African collectivity and the social system; and that the educational system itself meets the requirements of such integration by standing in a determinate relationship with the other institutional systems. This makes sense sociologically.

In the six paragraphs preceding the statement of aims, the Commission takes pains to show that the African educational system had moved ahead of the other African institutional systems, such as the family, thus creating a critical problem of institutional malintegration within this collectivity.

Consequently, the modern school, unless Bantu social institutions can evolve to bridge the gap between themselves and the schools, must tend to develop persons who are compelled to reject either the school or those ideas which are basic to their own social institutions. 15

Although there is no a priori reason why harmonious structural-functional relationships between institutional systems should alone be singled out for positive evaluation as functional, 16 the concept of institutional integration is sociologically tenable. It is, for instance, implied in the concept of "complementarity" of action elements in

---

15 Ibid., par. 762.

16 Disharmonious relationships between institutional systems and their social systems, that is, a measure of institutional malintegration within a social system may be functional as a lever in social change.
Parsons' generalised theory of the integration of social systems - which is basically institutional integration. However, the tenability of its implications for educational theory may be open to question.

Its immediate implication in this respect is that education has an extra-individual function - the collectivity integrative function. This is one of the points in the main Report that drew sharp "dis-sentient remarks" from one of the Commissioners - Prof. A.H. Murray. Among others, he made the following objections from the point of view of a liberal theory of education:

(i) The conception that education has a 'social purpose', and that its function is to preserve and propagate the group's "culture", conflicts with the Christian standpoint that man is an end in himself and his institutions merely means to aid him to a better life.

(ii) Educational principles must not be mixed up with the "facts" of descriptive sociology. It is quite incorrect to say that "the function of education is to hand down the culture of the community from the more to the less mature members," although this was seemingly the case sometimes... it has often happened that education has turned against the "culture" of the group... (It is not) necessary for so-called "facts" viewed from the one-sided standpoint of a sociology leaning towards naturalism to dictate our pedagogical principles to us. 17

Alongside these may be placed several critical sociological considerations. In the application of the concept of institutional

integration (as a function of education) to the relationships of the institutional systems of a collectivity like the African - which is caught in a process of rapid social change - a crucial normative problem arises; namely, the social developmental level at which that integration must take place. This problem becomes particularly acute when telic social change is in question as this is closely related to problems of the direction and rate of change. Also the general social situation of culture-contact in which the African collectivity is placed accentuates the problem.

Taking the two situations - of contact and of change - together, we may formulate the problem as follows: Must institutional integration in the African collectivity be achieved at the lower and narrower level of cultural exclusiveness and distinctiveness, or must it be achieved on the higher and broader level of cultural synthesis and assimilation. 18

The Commission virtually recommends that the integration of African institutional systems be achieved on the lower and narrower level at which the non-educational systems have, in their lag, re-

18 The implicit value-judgment is based on the assumption, in our view tenable, of the superiority of a synthetic or hybrid culture over an isolated and "pure" culture unenriched through cross-cultural fertilisation.
mained; rather than on the higher and broader level to which the educational system has largely attained. Hence, in the practical pursuit of its suggested aims, the Commission stresses that:

...it is essential to consider the language of the pupils, their home conditions, their social and mental environment, their cultural traits and their future positions and work in South Africa. 19

All these factors are peculiar to the members of this collectivity, especially those who have not kept pace with the Westward and upward changing conditions of life of the collectivity. This section of the collectivity is largely localised in the Reserves. The implication therefore is that the pace of the collectivity as a whole must, as it were, be adjusted to that of the Africans in the Reserves.

The march of events and the staggering power and glitter of Western culture have tended to make the educated Bantu despise their culture. 20

It follows that the Reserves, being areas in which Bantu Culture functions most completely, have a special task to perform in the furtherance of the development of Bantu culture and schools. 21

Note the antithesis posed by the Commission between the cosmopolitan "Western culture" and the soil-eroded culture of the Reserves - "Bantu culture," and the attempt to weight the latter over the former. Note also the insistence on basing the so-

20 Ibid., par. 763.
21 Ibid., par. 768. (Our underlining)
called "modern progressive (Bantu) culture", which "Bantu education must promote, on the level of African cultural evolution prevailing in the Reserves.

This re-modelling of the educational system on the pattern of the Reserves may logically be expected to bear the brand of the relative inferiority of an exclusive and isolated culture. This is consistent with the apartheid ideology and can be said to aim at dividing and isolating the collectivities in order to guarantee the unrivalled "guardianship and domination of the White man in South Africa."

This interpretation is strongly supported by a number of pronouncements made by the Minister of Native Affairs in a statement of "Bantu Education Policy for the Immediate Future" delivered in the Senate on the 7th June, 1954. The statement was based on the Eiselen Report. It is firstly a critique of the African educational system as one in which "there was no co-ordination between education given in the schools and the broad national policy," and, therefore, in which the role-expectations implicit in that policy were not met; and secondly it is an exposition of "Bantu education" which is ideologically planned to meet those expectations. The ideological role-

---


23 Department of Native Affairs, Op. cit., p. 5 (Our underlining)
expectations themselves are unmistakable in the statement.

Criticising the educational system for "ignoring the segregation or apartheid policy" by not educating the African for an exclusive and isolated "Bantu community" but for an inclusive and integrated South African community, the Minister said:

By (thus) blindly producing pupils trained on a European model, the vain hope was created among Natives that they could occupy posts within the European community, despite the country's policy of apartheid. This is what is meant by the creation of unhealthy "white collar ideals" and the causation of widespread frustration among the so-called educated Natives. 24

This is the class which has learned to believe that it is above its own people and feels that its spiritual, economic and political home is among the civilised community in South Africa, i.e. the Europeans, and feels frustrated because its wishes have not been realised. 25

He exposes the ideological role-expectations implicit in the Report as follows:

My department's policy is that education should stand with both feet in the reserves and have its roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society. There Bantu education must be able to give itself complete expression, and there it will be called upon to perform its real service. The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his own community, however, all doors are open. For that reason

24 Ibid., p. 7.
25 Ibid., p. 17.
it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community, where he cannot be absorbed. Until now, he has been subject to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze. This attitude is not only uneconomic because money is spent for an education which has no specific aim but it is also dishonest to continue it... It is abundantly clear that unplanned education creates many problems, disrupting the community life of the Bantu and endangering the community life of the Europeans.

In fine, the ideological expectation here is that education shall preclude the possibility of integration of the African collectivity into the general social system - with its sinister implications for White domination.

For that reason planned "Bantu education" must be substituted for unplanned "African education." In the Native territories where the services of educated Bantu are very much needed, Bantu education can complete its full cycle; the child being taken from the community into the school, developed to its fullest extent in accordance with his aptitudes and ability, and thereafter being returned to the community to serve and enrich it. 27 - A closed cycle!

2. The Individual-Integrative Aim:

Yet in the same statement the Minister suggested that the role-expectation, in this case, was that "Bantu education" was:

---


27 Ibid., p. 24.
To provide the Bantu with an education not concentrated on the interests of the individual. 28

He castigated the Missions for having concentrated on the interests of the individual. He drew a sharp contrast between the education given in these "schools and the broad national policy" of white domination, and unequivocally rejected such an education because it was "unsympathetic to the country's policy." 29 And, in moving the Second Reading of the Bantu Education Act later, in the House of Assembly, he expressed the apartheid role-expectation, with respect to the individual, as follows:

Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live... if my department controls Native education, it will know for which type of higher profession the Native can be trained, whether he will make a living with his knowledge, instead of choosing his own path in a direction where he cannot find a sphere of activity, thus turning him into a frustrated and dissatisfied being. 30

In the light of this, the Commission's formulation of this objective becomes a half-hearted ideological concession to the liberal tradition in educational theory. In that tradition neither "culture" nor "society" nor "social development" is primary. Primacy inheres

29 Ibid., p. 7.
30 Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, No. 10/1953, Col. 3585.
in the individual and his potentialities. However, from the ideological point of view, the "development of character and intellect" is only secondary to the role-expectation of "equipping the (African) child for his future work and surroundings," in accordance with his limited "opportunities" and "sphere of activity" in a rigid racial-caste social system.

In other words, the apartheid ideological role-expectation here is that the individual shall be subordinated and accommodated to the social system. That is, only those elements of individuality which the White-dominated racio-ethnic caste system can tolerate shall be developed - and in a direction that is predetermined by the organisation of the status quo. The social system is, from this point of view, fixed, rigid and preordained. And the individual is to be pigeon-holed in it.

One way of pigeon-holing the individual, in education, is through the medium of instruction. That is, given the social pigeon-hole of the collectivity that uses the language. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the vernaculars be the media at the primary school level, and eventually at university level. The anticipated functional significance of this proposal for White domination is clear enough. However, given the pluralism of the social system, and if White domination must be effectively maintained, a minimum knowledge of an international language like English must be made available to the
African. The Commission gave the criterion for this minimum.

(And there is an unmistakable note of caution about it lest wider intellectual and cultural vistas be opened before the individual):

This should be done in such a way that the Bantu child will be able to find his way in European communities, to follow oral or written instructions; and to carry on a simple conversation with Europeans about his work and other subjects of common interest.  

From this, the basic utilitarian orientation of the Commission to the African individual, in its formulation of the individual-integrative aim, is both clear and true to ideological stereotype. In that ideology, not character and not intellect in the individual but economic utility is the value that determines significant orientation. And, given the telic tendency of apartheid, such individual utility has to be immediately perceptible or, at least, foreseeable; otherwise there is no justification in the ideology for the education of an African individual - he has no intrinsic value as an individual, but only extrinsic value as a potential economic means or utility-object.

From all the preceding, it should be clear that such a utilitarian orientation to the education of the African individual must have both a political derivation and economic implications for the African educational system. A major economic implication is that unless the economic utility of a particular African individual to be educated is

31 Union of South Africa, U.G. No.53/1951, par. 924.

(Our underlinings)
foreseeable there must be little incentive on the part of Parliament
to vote funds for his education. And, given the "White Labour Policy"
of the economic system, the economic utility of most African individuals
in schools cannot always be readily foreseen. The logical result is
a measure of reluctance on the part of the Government to invest in
African education. But

But the niggardliness of the South African Governments with
respect to the African educational budget also has a political premise
or rationale. Referring to the perennial plea of lack of funds for
African education in South Africa, the late Professor Hoernle raised
this general question. His self-answer is sociologically incontrovertible:

And why this lack of funds? At bottom, because the dominant
White community, whilst it does not actually prevent
Native education, is not willing to provide for Native
children the same educational facilities which it provides
for its own children. And the reason for this unwilling-
ness, again, is the tacit recognition that a Native population
educated to the same average level as the White population
can no longer be dominated. 32

Once more, there was implicit in the formulations of the
Eiselen Commission the conception that Bantu education was to be
an institutional means in the service of political ends. Its ends were
ideologically transformed into means. So that, in the final analysis,

---
32 R. F. Hoernle, South African Native Policy and the Liberal
(Our underlinings)
neither the African collectivity nor the African individual, in terms of
the collectivity - and the individual-integrative aims respectively,
really mattered. Rather, the plan, the ideological programme for an
African educational system geared to non-educational ends, was the
significant thing. And, in its pursuit, no sacrifice of the African
collectivity or individual could be humanistically too great. The only
sacrifice that could not be made was that of White supremacy - for
that was the goal. Professor Carter remarks the fixity and ultimacy
of this goal with some clarity:

White South Africans think of their country... as a white society
dedicated to the values of Western civilisation except for
racial equality. To most white South Africans, the fact
that four-fifths of the people who live in South Africa do not
belong to this Western white society simply creates problems
with which the whites have to wrestle, but not a need to
change either their way of life or the assumptions on which
rest their monopoly of political and economic power and
social prestige. 33

It was this orientation that focussed legislative discourse in
South Africa on the ends sector of the African educational system.
Through that sector the African educational system was being hitched
to the political band-wagon of White supremacy. An historic decision
was at stake:

Today we have come to the cross-roads as far as South
Africa is concerned. We have arrived at the historic day

33 G. M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since
1948, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 13. (Our under-
lining).
when we sincerely hope that education will be directed along another course where the fundamental idea will be that functionally the Native must fulfill a role in the community different to that of the Europeans, and in the second place that the Native has a different cultural background from the White man, and in the third place that the Native must fit into his own type of community, a different type of community to that of the European. Therefore the fundamental idea in Bantu education must be that he should be taught to develop along his own lines in all social and economic respects. That is the course to follow, so that he can form his own character and become a worthy member of the Bantu race instead of having to be a synthetic Westerner. 34

II Ideological Impact and Institutional Ends: Conclusion

In conclusion, we may briefly recapitulate the operations and findings of the present study.

1. An examination of the recorded Debates of the Kenya and the South African Legislatures on the Beecher and the Eiselen Reports, respectively, shows that there was significantly greater concern about the ends of African education and significantly less concern about the African teachers in South Africa than in Kenya.

2. An examination of the two Commission Reports shows that they were so parallel in the distribution of their investigative concerns that any lack of parallelism in the distribution of the institutional concerns of the two Legislatures must be attributed to some extraneous factor. An ideological factor is postulated.

34 Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, No. 10/1953, Col. 3613. (Our underlining)
3. An examination of the terms of reference of the Commissions reveals that definite preconceptions about the African collectivity had been built into the first term of reference of the Eiselen Commission; and no parallel preconceptions are discerned in the terms of reference of the Beecher Commission.

4. The preconceptions in the Eiselen Commission's terms of reference are shown to be part of a determinate normative system of ideas - the South African ideology of apartheid; while the absence of parallel preconceptions in the Beecher Committee's terms of reference is shown to be a reflection of a general situation in Kenya - the absence of a determinate political ideology.

5. The particular distribution of institutional concerns in South Africa is, therefore, taken to be a function of ideology operating (1) through an orientation to the Westernised African "elite" that is conducive to selective forgetting of them on the part of the White collectivity, and (2) through entertainment of specific role-expectations concerning the ends that the African educational system ought to pursue.

That ideological impact should perform the role of raising the normative problem of institutional ends is something that may be expected or predicted from certain considerations in sociological theory, that is, those considerations which deal with generalised relationships between institutional systems and normative systems.
of ideas. From that point of view, institutional ends sectors may be regarded as crucial points of articulation between such systems and the social systems of which they are part, in the sense that the contents of such sectors are delegated social values of the social systems. Institutional ends therefore may be regarded as a social trust from a social system and their pursuit by institutional systems as defining the functional or disfunctional relationships between system and sub-system. For this reason, they tend to be jealously guarded or, in other words, social systems tend to close the normative problem of their institutional systems. This is a long-standing conception in sociological theory and hardly needs documentation. Suffice it to recall Haye's definition of an institutional system as:

The idea of a set of overt activities together with a two-fold judgment lodged in the popular mind; namely, a judgment that the result which institutionalised activities attain is necessary or greatly to be desired, and that given activities are so well adapted to securing the result that they should be prized, defended, perpetuated, and, if necessary, enforced. 35

But certain external normative systems of ideas are of such potency as to threaten, on impact, to open the normative problem of institutional ends however jealously guarded the ends may be. The potency of an impinging system of ideas depends primarily on the strategic power position of the collectivity or institutional system

that is its carrier. A single institutional system that is in such a power position in modern societies is the political. It commands the last and strongest sanction - physical force. Its characteristic system of ideas for regulating the non-routine aspects of a polity is the ideological.

Short of the constant use of force, such an institutional system must depend on a modicum of willing conformity of the governed. This presupposes a measure of consensus in a social system on fundamentals of values, legitimate interests and outlook. In so far as a given political system represents these fundamentals from the perspective of one collectivity - the dominant one - it becomes a functional necessity that the dominant ideological system in which these fundamentals are couched should have a working-measure of acceptance in the social system. That is, short of resort to force, its conceptions must be generalised and impressed upon those whose social action and relationships it seeks to integrate and regulate. It is in this sense that Gerth and Mills regard certain ideas as:

... justificatory ideologies used by the ruling class and their hireling publicists, to beat their impositions into the weaker members of the polity. 36

Two points are of special significance here: a) in so far as ideologies are normative their impact on individuals, groups or their institutional systems will tend to redefine the ends that they ought to

---

pursue if they are not to undermine what is, from the point of view of the dominant collectivity, legitimate order; and b) in so far as ideologies are ultimately backed up by (potential) force, their impact will have the potency which reflects that force. In this way, the victims of ideological impact or their representatives will be forced into, at least, a defensive posture regarding the ends which their institutional systems pursue - with the result that these ends are thrown into the area of controversy. In so far as an institutional system, like a social system, cannot move in all directions at once, it was a functional necessity in the present case that the controversy over the ends sector be engaged in. That is, given the fact of ideological impact and its disequilibrating role, the ends of the African educational system had to be re-determined and their articulation with the South African social system rendered determinate by an act of choice. A choice was made, it was not the effective choice; the effective choice was not made, "it came down."
APPENDIX A

In times of institutional "stress and strain" of transition, which is the kind of time-span covered in part by the present study in the social history of Kenya and South Africa, it becomes evident that there are two types of ideas that bear on the structure and functioning of an institutional system. There are ideas that have become part of a given institutional system's conceptual content, and ideas that are not part of its conceptual content but are part of the conceptual content of the social system of which the institutional system in point is part of some other social system. The former type of ideas may be referred to as internal; the latter, as external to a given case.

Three degrees of externality may be distinguished. Firstly, ideas may be external when, from the point of reference of institutional system A they are embodied in institutional system B and/or C...Z, within the same collectivity, and are intentionally or otherwise brought to bear on institution A. Secondly, ideas may be external to institutional system A when A belongs to one exclusive collectivity and ideas embodied in institutional systems of another exclusive collectivity, within the same social system, are intentionally or otherwise brought to
bear on institutional system A. The present study deals with this degree of externality of idea-impact on the African educational system. And, thirdly, ideas may be external to institutional system A when A belongs to one social system and ideas embodied in institutional systems of another social system are brought to bear on it. This last degree of externality may be expected in imperial colonies when ideas internal to the institutional systems of the imperial or colonising societies are brought to bear on the institutional systems of the colonial collectivities.

The present study partly spills over into this degree of externality, that is, in the case of the concept of ideology and impact in the British Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. As will be shown, the case of Kenya does not quite fit into this category because of a special intervening variable there - the interests (not ideology) of the Settler collectivity. In Kenya the bearing of British institutional ideas on native institutional systems is, for the reason of the sociological significance of Settler interests, not direct and, hence, introduces an element of strain to the empirical reference of the present typology of external systems of ideas. But for the general purpose of the study as a whole the typology is useful in showing the place of the type of ideas that are crucial as an explanatory variable.
APPENDIX B

An institutional system is understood here as a relatively stable system of social action. A long tradition of sociological analysis of institutional structure has identified two persistent aspects: the perceptual and the conceptual. Sumner identified these as "the structural" and "the conceptual" aspects, respectively (Folkways, 1907, pp. 173-4, 521 ff.). Finney identified them as the "objective structural" and the "mental capital" aspects, respectively (A Sociological Philosophy of Education, 1928, p. 29). Park and Burgess had also seen institutional systems as consisting of "the structure" and "the idea," respectively. "The structure," they observed, "embodies the idea and furnishes the instrumentalities through which the idea is put into action." There is here a suggestion of the primacy of the idea over the structure. Hertzler is more explicit on the question of primacy between the two aspects:

Their (institution's) essence is ideas or other concepts, in interests, attitudes, traditions and other psychic uniformities that dominate our social behaviour. In a very real sense, institutions are really in our heads... But institutions are unavoidably also societal structures, they have an objective existence in order to operate effectively and regulate the behaviour of men. (Social Institutions, 1929, p. 35).
In line with this position on the problem of primacy, Bernard had earlier stated that "the institution has primarily a conceptual or abstract rather than a perceptual or concrete existence." (Introduction to Social Psychology, 1926, p. 566). But, as Bernard emphasises, "something in the way of structure seems to be necessary, in the sense that paper and binding are essential in a book." (Op. cit., loc. cit.). Clearly, the interest of this study is in the conceptual aspect of institutional systems and only incidentally in the structural "paper and binding." The conceptual contents of institutional systems are the operative ideas.

While recognising that systems of ideas are fundamental to the structure and functioning of institutional systems, including their role in "the definition of the situation" for institutional action, it is necessary for our purpose to draw attention to the role of ideas at the ends sectors of institutional systems. There is, of course, a generalised sociological reason for doing so. Hertzler, for instance, finds the essence of institutional systems in the ideas that define the conceptual content of the ends sectors of such systems, in general.

The real essence of an institution is the system of ideas and principles behind it... a more or less conscious recognition by the group or society of the need or some notion regarding the fulfillment of function and purpose. (Hertzler, Op. cit., 36).

Hamilton, however, points out that ordinarily the contours and
components of institutional systems are not generally perceived owing to the crust of tradition that come in time to surround the systems.

It is only as stability gives way to change that the lines of an institution stand out in sharp relief. So long as a people is able to do as its fathers did, it manifests little curiosity about the arrangements under which it lives and works... For such casual glimpses of the intricacies of institutions as men are permitted to see they are indebted to the stress and strain of transition. (W. H. Hamilton, "Institutions," in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol., VIII, pp. 87-88).

As "stability gives way to change," the normative ideas relevant to the ends sector become crucial. As indicated in Appendix A, these are of two types: 1. the internal, which define the old institutional goals, and 2. the external, which define the new goals that ought to be pursued. The impact of the latter on the former type of ideas may be expected to result in a state of conflict, or, at least, uncertainty, around that sector. In this study we explore a problem of this type.
APPENDIX  C

If systems of ideas be divided into the scientific, the unscientific, and the non-scientific, then political ideologies are of the unscientific type. They are one class of what Pareto identified as "theories" which accompany "non-logical action." They are unscientific because while they essay to be scientific, thus lending themselves to the norm of scientific validity, they characteristically fall short of it. They have a tendency to be either relatively behind the facts of a rapidly changing empirical situation or relatively ahead of the facts of an arrested situation. But, whichever is the case, they lay claim to immediate empirical reference; and in so doing depart from empirical reality by distorting it in the direction of consistency with sectional collectivity interests or sentiments as to legitimate social order. In this sense, they may be described in Pareto's terms as "manifestations of sentiments" and as "justifications" for non-logical action that is in line with the dictates of the sentiments. As the former, they may be referred to Pareto's category of "residues" - especially the "residues" of the "persistence of aggregates" - and as the latter, they may be referred to his category of "derivations." These two aspects will be shown in the structure
of the ideology in point in this study. As Pareto developed no systematic theory of ideology beyond identifying these two elements of "theories" accompanying non-logical action, we have relied for the rest of our conceptions of ideology on Karl Mannheim's analysis of it in *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).

Several emphases in Mannheim's treatment are of special importance in the present study. Firstly, there is the emphasis on the departure of ideologies from empirical reality. In this respect, he regards them as:

...the more or less conscious deceptions and disguises of human interest groups,... (and) include all those utterances the falsity of which is due to intentional or unintentional, conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious deluding of one's self or of others, taking place on a psychological level and structurally resembling lies. (Op. cit., pp. 86-87).

Secondly, there is the emphasis on their stabilising function through self-deception of a carrier group and other-deception of other groups within a social system:

There is implicit in the word "ideology" the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilises it. (p. 36).

Both these emphases are drawn upon in chapter 4 of the present study.
APPENDIX D

The Content Analysis Scheme

The Actors:

1. Recruitment:
   a. Supply - sources -
   b. Nationality -
   c. Qualifications -
   d. Training - quality -
   e. Training - costs -

2. Remuneration:
   a. Current salary scales -
   b. Proposed salary scales - (9)

3. Conditions of Service:
   a. Status (civil service) -
   b. Pension arrangements -
   c. Professional regulations -
   d. Civic regulations -
   e. Professional organisations -

The Means:

1. Instrumentalities:
   a. Administrative (i) Central -
      (ii) African Local - (4) (2)
      (iii) Voluntary - (1) (3) (5)
   b. Financial -
2. Scope:

   a. Primary Schools:
      i. Numbers -
      ii. Pupils -
      iii. Syllabi -
      iv. Performance/standards -
      v. Special problems -

   b. Secondary Schools:
      i. Numbers -
      ii. Pupils -
      iii. Syllabi -
      iv. Performance/standards -
      v. Special problems -

   c. Vocational and Higher Learning:
      i. Numbers/Types -
      ii. Pupils -
      iii. Syllabi -
      iv. Performance/standards -
      v. Guidance -
      vi. Employment opportunities -
      vii. Special problems -

3. Normative Control:

   a. of expansion/registration - (6) (8)
   b. of standards of achievement -
      i. by syllabus prescription -
      ii. by examinations -
      iii. by supervision -
      iv. by inspection -

The Ends

1. Individual-Integrative:
   a. development of potentialities -
   b. imparting knowledge and skills -
   c. individual and community -

2. Community-Integrative:
   a. status-role of the community -
b. integration of the community -
c. progress of the community - (7)

An Example

"Another point which I would like to mention is about Recommendation 87. (We welcome the recommendation of the district education boards, but we strongly oppose the composition. (1)) (The district education board should be the committee of the African district council and, as such, it should be responsible to that council. Education is one of the services which the local African Authorities must cherish, and they are very proud to have such services under their control. In my view it would be most unfortunate if the African district councils are to be deprived of these services. (2))

...........

"(Now, sir, the recommendation in this report aims at removing the control of primary education from the Africans and placing it in the control of voluntary agencies who are almost 90 per cent non-African. (3))... (Therefore I would like to see that the local native councils retain the control of the primary schools, and that the district education board be a committee of the local authority. We want to see the district commissioner there as chairman, the education officer, and the other members of the council to be African members in the committee. (4) (Members of voluntary agencies can come to the meetings to give their advice, which we value very much, but we do not think that they should be the people to control it. (5)

"(The report, sir, stresses the recommendation that expansion of education amongst the Africans should be controlled. (6)) (Sir, we aim at universal literacy, that is our aim, (7) and we view with disfavour any proposals which tend to slow down the expansion of African education. (8))
Now I come to one other point which I myself feel very strongly about and that is the proposal about teachers' salaries. We cannot accept as equitable any variation of pay due to the varied cost of living. If you want teachers to discharge their duties effectively, you must pay them reasonably...(9)." (Kenya: Legislative Council Debates, 1950, Vol. 38, Cols. 239-240)
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Sumner, G. W. Folkways. New York: Gunn, 1907.


**Articles in Compendia**


**Pamphlets**


Olivier, N. J. J. "Apartheid - A Slogan or a Solution," Race Relations, 90/53.


Official Documents

Union of South Africa. House of Assembly Debates, Vols. 75 and 76, 1951; 79, 1952; 83, 1953; and September, 1948 and April, 1950 sessions.


Whereas social systems tend to close the normative problems of institutional ends, the impact of an external ideology on an institutional system will tend to open and accentuate such problems, that is, the problems of the ends that an institutional system ought to pursue. This hypothesis rests on the following assumptions which are derivable from the voluntaristic trend in sociological theory:

(a) institutional systems are instrumentalities of social systems as a result of devolution to their ends sectors of the value-goals of social systems for specialised pursuit;

(b) as a social system cannot move in all directions at once, it will tend to close the normative problems of the ends of its several institutional systems by removing their ends sectors from the area of controversy as divergent solutions in that area may set up a strain in more than one direction at once;

(c) as a political ideology is a non-logical manifestation and disguise for the sectional sentiments of a ruling collectivity concerning legitimate social order, it is essentially normative for the social system, that is, it prescribes value-goals;
(d) therefore, as an institutional ends sector comprises delegated value-goals of a social system, ideological impact may be expected to focus on that sector and to open the problem of the ends that the institutional system which is being impinged upon ought to pursue if the ideologically conceived social order is not to be undermined.

The empirical occasion chosen for testing this hypothesis is the appointment in 1949 of the Beecher Committee in Kenya and the Eiselen Commission in South Africa to investigate, evaluate and report upon the structure and functioning of the African educational systems of the two societies, and the recorded Debates on the Reports by the Kenya and the South African Legislatures. The index of the point of impact and the role of ideology relative to the African educational systems in point is the distribution of themes or references in the Legislative Debates among three institutional sectors - actor, means and ends - of the educational systems. South Africa is the experimental case; Kenya, the control.

Thematic content analysis of the recorded Debates of the Kenya and the South African Legislatures on the Beecher and the Eiselen Reports, respectively, yielded the following results:

(a) there was a proportionally smaller number of references to the actor sector in South Africa than in Kenya;

(b) at the means sector the proportional difference between the two cases was negligible; and

(c) there was a proportionally greater number of references to the ends sector in South Africa than in Kenya.
However, a comparative examination of the two Commission Reports showed that they were so parallel in the distribution of their investigative concerns about the three sectors that the observed lack of parallelism in the distribution of the concerns of the two Legislatures had to be attributed to some other factor. An ideological factor was postulated. This factor was found to have been built into the first term of reference of the Eiselen Commission in the form of definite preconceptions about the African collectivity. These preconceptions are shown to be part of a determinate normative system of ideas - the South African ideology of apartheid. No parallel preconceptions were discerned in the terms of reference of the Beecher Committee; and their absence is shown to be a reflection of a general situation in Kenya - the absence of a determinate political ideology due to the indeterminacy of the Kenya political arrangements.

With the two Commission Reports controlled by equation on relevant points of coverage and the Kenya case controlled by exclusion of the role of ideology, the particular distribution of institutional references or concerns in the South African case is, therefore, taken to be a function of the South African ideology operating (a) through an orientation to the Westernised African "elite," of which the African teachers are part, that is conducive to selective forgetting of them on the part of the White collectivity, and (b) through entertainment of specific role expectations concerning the ends that the African educational system ought to pursue if the racio-ethnic social order which the ideology legitimises is not to be undermined.
Date of Birth: April 8, 1927

Place of Birth: Edwaleni Mission Station, Portshepstone, Natal, Union of South Africa

Nationality: South African

Ethnicity: Indigenous African of Zulu descent

Marital Status: Single

Parents' Names: Josiah and Christina Kumalo

Parents' Occupations: Father -- retired, former Instructor at Edwaleni Boys' Technical College, Natal

Mother -- housewife, former School Teacher at Glencoe, Natal

Family Persuasion: Christian Protestant

Home Address: 2071 Clermont Township, P.O. Clernerville, Durban, Natal, Union of South Africa

Personal Schooling:

1. High School:
   a. Junior Certificate (1944) (passed in the first class), Indaleni High School, Richmond, Natal
   b. Matriculation Certificate (1946) (passed in the class), Adams High School, Amanzimtoti, Natal

2. Professional:
   a. Post-Matriculation Teachers' Certificate (1948) (passed in the first class), Adams Teacher Training College, Amanzimtoti, Natal

   b. "Qualified as a Social Worker" (1950) -- official endorsement to B.A. (S.S.) diploma by the University of South Africa, Pretoria, Transvaal

   c. Certificate in Advanced Methods of Social Research (1955), Institute for Social Research, University of Natal, Durban, Natal
3. University:
   a. Undergraduate: B.A. (S.S.), (4 years), University of South Africa (External Division), Pretoria, Transvaal.
      Majors: Sociology (3 years) and Social Work (3½ years).
      Minors: Psychology, History, Economics, English, Native Administration and Zulu.
   b. Graduate: B.Soc.Sc. (Honours), (2 years) (passed with distinctions), University of Natal, Durban, Natal.
      Specialisation: Systematic Sociological Theory, Methods of Social Research, Race Relations, Special Author:
      M.Soc.Sc. (1 year: research), Thesis:

Awards (Past and Recent):
   a. Natal Education Department Merit Scholarship (1947-1948), held at Adams Teacher Training College.
   b. Jan Hofmeyr Scholarship (1953), held at University of Natal.
   c. Natal University Honours Scholarship (1954), held at University of Natal.
   e. Institute of International Education Fellowship (1955-57), held at Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
   f. African Studies and Research Program Fellowship (1955-57), held at the African Research and Studies Program, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
   g. Fulbright Travel Grant -- to (and from) the United States.

Positions Held:
   a. High School Teacher, Ohlange Institute, Durban, Natal.
   b. Research Scholar, Institute for Social Research, University of Natal, Durban.
   c. Secretary of Inanda Branch, Natal African Teachers' Union.

Publications:

Diversions:
   Music listening (operatic and classical)
   A good Book, play or movie
   Landscape painting
   Lawn Tennis