An inquiry into Plato's treatment of wealth.

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AN INQUIRY INTO PLATO'S TREATMENT OF WEALTH

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. THE PROBLEM

Plato has been attacked quite often in recent years on the grounds that he creates a totalitarian social theory in his dialogues, especially the Republic. Such attacks usually concentrate on two major points and their subsidiary elements. (1) Because of the seemingly apparent similarities between the existence, duties, and power of the guardian classes of the Republic and the ruling hierarchies within modern totalitarian countries, Plato is viewed as a totalitarian opponent of the individual whom he would obliterate in the effort to defend either a closed society, or a reactionary, aristocratic, anti-mercantile society. (2) The second major objection voiced against Plato by modern detractors is that he is an enemy of democracy, upholding class rule, advocating thought control, and fostering the technique of the most vicious propaganda. Throughout both major areas of attack on Plato's social philosophy are implicit and explicit criticisms of his treatment of wealth.

In the light of problems raised by such criticisms as these, it is necessary to have a fresh study of Plato's treatment of wealth in relation to his social theory,
psychology, and ethics. It is the purpose of this study to show (1) that his treatment of wealth is inextricably interwoven with, and actually forms a part of, his psychological, ethical, and political theories; (2) that wealth must support the rule of reason in the individual; (3) that wealth is not the end of social activity, but must lend aid in the quest for the virtues; and (4) that Plato does not develop a totalitarian economic theory. When he approaches an analysis of the economic processes of his society, his primary interest is in searching out the reasons for the moral failure of the society and in appraising means by which the moral ends he describes can be achieved. Hence, it is as a subordinate issue to his search for virtue in the individual and the society that Plato touches upon the basic economic problems: by whom, for whom, and what commodities are to be produced.

II. METHOD

A few of the more important terms used in this inquiry must be mentioned briefly at this point. Wealth is used interchangeably with possessions, or material possessions, and refers to physical commodities which are necessary to the existence of the individual or the society as well as the surplus goods in the hands of individuals. Any variation which might occur will be made clear at the point of usage.
Temperance (sophrosune), courage (andreia, thumos), wisdom (sophia), and justice (dikaios, dikaiosune) will be defined in the chapter on ethics since a more complete discussion of each virtue is necessary.

The State, the city, the city-state, the commonwealth, the civic community, the community, the society, polity, or the social whole are terms used throughout this study in the attempt to show the breadth of the term politeia. The chapter on the state contains the necessary description of the term politeia. Perhaps no one term is so misunderstood by some of Plato's modern critics, since they often equate politeia with the state or government as the terms are used in modern times. A great deal of the abuse of Plato comes from a misuse of politeia.

Interpreting any author, especially an imaginative, creative thinker such as Plato, is a delicate business because of certain possible errors of interpretation. (1) There is the error of laying stress on random statements made by Plato regardless of the meaning of the context, whether the passage is a jest, is incidental, or crucial, or whether it is a statement intended to be generally valid. This is the ancient method of "proof-texting" and is used more often by the unfavorable critic, although it is not unknown to those favorably disposed. (2) More common among the interpreters of Plato is the error of abstracting more
from his thought than is actually given. By this methodological fault Plato can be led to found and support almost any iniquitous or righteous system of government, economics, or ethics. Winspear, Popper, and Fite, among others, fall victim to this mistake over and over again in their works on Plato, until he becomes the father of Nazism, Fascism, and Communism. (3) A closely allied error is that of inferring from various statements of Plato doctrines which were not formulated until later—perhaps centuries later. To be sure, "great oaks from little acorns grow," but to infer that lumber, chairs, and tables are already designed, even in miniature, within the acorn is fallacious to the extreme. Yet modern authors often assert that Plato was really a Communist, since his doctrines contain elements similar to those of the modern totalitarian states. For example, Welles claims to show

how fundamentally Plato grasped the principles of a communist state, practically and theoretically. He may claim to have established the pattern of the modern authoritarian state, and planned its institutions, although with a somewhat different intention.

Interpreters make this error of going beyond Plato's last words because they attempt to make his words fit the crime

of which they charge him. Finally, an error is committed by removing Plato, or any other author, from his cultural setting, uprooting him from his historical climate, and transplanting him completely, or bit by bit, to the current scene.

There is not the slightest possibility of identifying oneself with Plato; hence errors in interpretation creep in, as they may well do in this inquiry, although effort has been made to understand things as Plato spoke of them. To that end Plato's works have been studied closely in English translations, making comparisons to the Greek where it seemed needful. A variety of Plato's commentators have been looked into for enlightenment. The problem of wealth in Plato's thought is usually treated in a sentence or two by his interpreters, making it necessary to glean from Plato's writings the main body of this study.

III. OTHER WORKS IN THE FIELD

An inquiry into any sphere of Plato's thought involves at least two serious problems: the vast body of literature purporting to tell the truth about him, and the organic nature of his thought. The first problem will be dealt with in this section and the second in the next section.

1. For an excellent statement of the forms of misinterpretation, see Robinson, PED, 1-6.
A good share of a lifetime could be dedicated to a mere reading of the Plato literature, which is almost as diverse as the interpretations of the Bible. In the area of this inquiry a number of works make significant but insufficient contributions, usually unsupported by a thorough investigation of Plato's arguments dealing with wealth. There is, however, no other study specifically in this field.

Trevor, in his doctoral dissertation, *A History of Greek Economic Thought*, gives attention to Plato's economic thought as it fits into the larger area of Greek economic thought. He does not give due consideration to the inter-relationships of Plato's ethical, political, psychological, and economic thinking. Welles summarizes, in fourteen pages, the "Economic Background of Plato's Communism." His treatment is provocative, but inadequate, and follows the modern detractors of Plato in taking material out of context. At several points in the remainder of this study his contributions will be considered. Winspear, Popper, and Fite assume from the outset in their works on Plato.

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that anything he says is not to be trusted. They use his discussions relating to wealth in support of their contentions that Plato is an enemy of free society, the common man, and commercial enterprise. Popper and Winspear, in particular, will be considered at various points in the following discussion.

By far the best and most complete discussion of Plato's thinking about the place of wealth in the state is that of Barker: *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors.*

However, the title of his excellent work suggests its weakness. Since his interest is primarily that of relating Plato's political theory, the problem of Plato's treatment of wealth is incidental to his investigation.

**IV. THE PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION**

In the opening paragraph of the above section two problems confronting the interpreter of Plato were mentioned. The second is to be set forth here. Confronting any interpreter of Plato is the organic nature of Plato's thought. The interrelationships of the problems within his thought are so important that it is impossible to extract one without damaging it almost beyond repair. This fact of unity in Plato's thought will become more apparent in the following

chapters, since it is especially relevant to his treatment of wealth.

To Plato the place wealth occupies in the life of the individual and the social order depends upon the scale of values held by individuals and reflected in the social structure. In order to understand Plato's criticism and evaluation of existing societies and his proposals to cure the ills of the scene current in his day as well as to perpetuate the valid parts of those societies, it is necessary to examine his psychological, ethical, and social theories. This is done in Chapters Two, Three, and Four respectively. In Chapter Three the place of wealth in the life of the individual is also established. Set forth in Chapter Five is Plato's treatment of the production, ownership, and distribution of wealth in the societies he designs. In Chapter Six the place wealth assumes in the state is examined. The conclusions of the investigation are set forth in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF PLATO’S TREATMENT OF WEALTH

It is the purpose of this chapter to set forth briefly the normative psychological structure of the individual in order to determine the place of wealth in Plato's thought. It is necessary to inquire into Plato's psychology because the ethical man is the harmonious man and the ethical society is the harmonious society. In each case the good life is manifest in the control of reason over the passions and appetites. Prior to any consistently ethical action on the part of individuals or society is the harmonious psychological structure of the individual. Individuals are good because of the proper order that dwells within them. Plato is concerned with this proper order.

I. THE PARTS OF THE SOUL AND THEIR PROPER ORDER

The soul is simple, "the very likeness of the divine," immortal, intellectual, uniform, indissoluble, unchangeable, and harmonious, admitting of no degrees.\(^1\) However, to Plato the concept of the unity of the soul is a normative standard rather than an empirical description of the human personality. The soul's unity consists in the organization of all its parts, and parts of parts, into a dynamic whole.\(^2\) This unity

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1. Phaedo, 78, 80.
2. Rep., 430f, 442, 591, 443; Laws, 653; Phaedo, 93.
is the process of integration of desires, interests, and needs. It is the organization of habits and conflicting trends of personality and is essential to maturity, to genuine happiness, and to effective living. This basic psychological concept is fundamental to an understanding of Plato’s ethical and social theory.

Plato is attempting to grasp the soul as a living unity when it is ordered properly. The tripartite description of the soul is a means to this end, showing the make-up of the soul and the order inherent in it.

The soul is divided against itself, having an impulse toward and away from objects of desire, and the human being is aware of this division. The spirited element is sometimes in conflict with appetites, as if they were two distinct principles. Do we not often find a man whose desires would force him to go against his reason, reviling himself and indignant with this part of his nature which is trying to put constraint on him? It is like a struggle between two factions, in which indignation takes the side of reason. But I believe you have never observed, in yourself or anyone else, indignation make common cause with appetite in behaviour which reason decides to be wrong.

Inner check versus inner impulse is an expression of the goal-tensions in human nature. All parts of the soul express aspiration (eros), the drive or urge or impulse toward something which a man wants and does not have. Aspiration is

1. Rep., 434, 436; Soph., 228; Laws, 896.
2. Rep., 439b (Cornford).
the cause of all striving in the individual, whether reason's quest for overall harmony and the vision of true being, or appetite's blind rush for immediate and short-term pleasures. Whether the soul rises or falls depends upon the way in which reason works with aspiration, the cause of insight, and whether insight can guide aspiration toward the structure of being discernible to reason.¹ "Without the guiding activity of reason and aspiration, the 'lower' parts of life fall into confusion, and yield to the ever-present drift of physical impulse."² In the dramatic picture of the charioteer in the Phaedrus the parts of the soul vie fiercely until either the unruly element or the harmonious element wins. If the unruly steed gains his way, the soul is pulled down into the mire of niggardly ways and is infused with vulgar qualities. If the charioteer succeeds in controlling the vicious steed, then the unruly element is made to work for the good of the entire soul.³ Here is depicted the lure of the way to the ideal which guides the efforts of the rational man, and the lure of the wayside to expediency and immediate pleasure which controls the increasingly irrational efforts of the opinionated and ignorant.

¹ Phaedr., 246-255; cf. Phileb., 51; Tim., 61; Rep., 511; Gorg., 493-494.
₂ Wilt, PTM, 149.
The Rational Part. "We may call that part of the soul whereby it reflects, rational..."¹ Reason (logistikon)² is the charioteer in the myth in the Phaedrus. This part of the soul is at once reflective or theoretical and active or practical. Reason must attempt to see the realms of being as well as guide the chariot on this upward way. In the Republic also Plato argues that it is the "business of reason to rule with wisdom and forethought on behalf of the entire soul..."³ Here the roles of reason—reflection and practical activity—are pointed out as clearly as they are in the figure of the charioteer in the Phaedrus. Again, the myth of the cave offers the same kind of evidence for the theoretical and practical functioning of the rational part of the soul. The one who passes out of the cave of be-nighted mankind into the presence of the good must return into the cave to put his beatific vision to work.⁴ Finally, the philosopher-king is the epitome of the reflective and practical aspects of reason.⁵ This division of the activities of the rational element of the soul must not be construed as meaning that reason is in any way divided against

¹. Rep., 438.
². This term is most frequently used in describing the intellectual element of the soul. For various uses of the root, cf. Rep., 441c, 571c, 587d, 605b; Crito, 46b; Laws, 644d; Theaet., 186c.
itself. It is a unity, working in these two major ways: governing the entire soul and calculating in advance the moral consequences of its activity.

The rational part governs and foresees the consequences of the activity of the soul because it alone attains knowledge. Knowledge does not consist in, nor exist because of, sense perception.

If nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right... And so... we have got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—a wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux...¹

The knowledge which is necessary for genuine virtue cannot arise from the shifting mass of perception. It demands a firmer footing, unshaken by the storms moving throughout sensible perceptions. That steadiness is found in the realm of Forms, knowable only to reason.

Plato assumes that the human being has forgotten what he once knew so that "recollection is... a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention."² Genuine knowledge was lost to our consciousness at birth and returns to us by the use of the senses.³ Sense impressions have phenomenal reality and through this

¹. Theaet., 183 (Jowett). Italics mine.
². Phaedo, 73; also Symp., 208; Meno, 81-86, 98; Laws, 732; cf. Phaedr., 275; Phileb., 34.
³. Phaedo, 75-76, 92.
medium reason arrives at the genuine, higher, conceptual reality. "Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in only that, and not in any mere impression, truth and being can be attained."

The importance of the doctrine that knowledge is attained only by reason is illustrated in its application to the life of the individual and the society. Only the rational man is able to understand the order of reality and fruitfully apply this knowledge to this world. He alone is able to order the clamoring multitude of appearances so as to bring each to its highest excellence, supporting all higher values, and controlling all lower values. The striving of reason brings order and satisfaction to the individual, thence to the social order, without the increase or recurrence of chaos and dissatisfaction which attends the efforts of the lower parts of the soul. Hence, whenever an individual acts rationally, he is free; whenever he acts irrationally, he is blinded and enslaved. This fact is of utmost importance to the proper order in the individual and state and to Plato's treatment of the blind god of wealth, Plutus.

The tragedy in mankind's business affairs lies precisely in the upsetting of the rational life. Acquisition of things displaces the quest for harmony within. Striving

1. Theaet., 186. Italics mine. See also Phaedr., 250; Phaedo, 73-76.
is no longer rationally directed toward stable satisfactions and inward order. Instead, eros is limited to its expression in greed for material things and the subsequent lust which ceaselessly gnaws at the shreds of Promethean wholeness and sanity. Those men who are unable to reason by virtue of nature and training constantly confuse some level of appearance with genuine reality. Plato vigorously depicts this confusion and distortion in the deviations from the good life and the good society.¹

The Appetitive Part. Man is good by nature, loving the ideal, the realm of being, but he is also innately pleasure-loving in an undirected and often violent manner. The appetites (epithymia) represent the "unlimited" in man, the anagke, the flowing, lawless element of chance.² They form the lowest part of the soul, being farthest from reason and least controlled by it. They are guided solely by belief.³ The appetites are non-rational, unconscious, or sub-rational and beastly in essence.⁴

The appetites are attached to viscerogenic, short-term "values," not psychogenic, long-term values, as are reason and the spirited element. The appetitive element is attracted

¹. See pp. 50ff and 184ff.
². Phaedr., 254-255; Tim., 34; Rep., 437-439; Laws, 863.
by specific, tangible objects to replenish its desires.\(^1\)
Dissatisfaction follows hard upon satisfaction. Thus the
appetitive element is "led away by phantoms and visions" in
its foolishness, or dashes madly after the object of its de-
sires, berating the spirited and rational elements for their
restraining hand.\(^2\) Its rushes after pleasures lack reasoned
formulas\(^3\) and are isolated and unconscious of higher values.

This lack of discrimination is not destructive in
itself, but will serve an evil end if allowed to rule the
soul. When reason slackens or loses control of the appe-
tites, they rise up as a mob consuming the man, putting an
end to shame and judgment.\(^4\) The appetitive element is to
be found in all individuals, and against its unruliness the
good man must fortify himself by proper care of the appe-
tites, exercise of the body, and cultivation of the rational
powers.

Appetites are both necessary and unnecessary, such
as hunger and thirst as over against an inordinate love of
money or honor.

There are appetites which cannot be got rid of, and
there are those which it does us good to fulfil. Our
nature cannot help seeking to satisfy both these kinds;
so they may fairly be described as necessary. On the
other hand, 'unnecessary' would be the right name for

all appetites which can be got rid of by early training and which do us no good and in some cases do harm.1

The necessary appetites are indispensable to life, such as adequate food and drink or sleep which keep the body healthy and fit to serve the proper activities of man.2 In this way they are good because they support reason by assisting the individual to fulfil his proper function. On the other hand, the unnecessary appetites are destructive of the interests and work of the individual. They are spendthrift (weak and pleasure-loving), vagabond (lawless and destructive), and dronelike (aggressive and vicious).

The desire for a whole variety of luxuries is unnecessary. Most people can get rid of it by early discipline and education; and it is as prejudicial to intelligence and self-control as it is to bodily health... In the internal conflict they [unnecessary appetites] gain the day; modesty and self-control, dishonoured and insulted as the weakness of an unmanly fool, are thrust out into exile; and a whole crew of unprofitable desires take a hand in banishing moderation and frugality, which, as they will have it, are nothing but churlish meanness. So they take possession of the soul...3

It is easy to see that the harmful appetites turn away from reason and the useful appetites turn toward reason, while the harmless ones, if there be any, wander blindly between. The reason for this folly is the attachment of appetites to the world of not-being in a sort of brute awareness of and

1. Rep., 553-559 (Cornford).
2. Tim., 71; Rep., 571-572.
3. Rep., 559-560 (Cornford); cf. 571-573.
random search for security and stability in the things of this world of becoming. 1

The appetite-ridden person follows after the immediate, or apparently long-range pleasures, turning steadfastly away from the good and noble. 2 His soul is opposed to knowledge, right opinion, or reasonableness. The same applies to states as well as to individuals, and such persons or groups "must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though...versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity..." 3 It is quite obvious that the ignorant must submit to the rule of the wise for their own good and that of the state. 4 Since the ability to govern is "the last achievement of the highest natures," 5 any other course will result in chaos in the social order and in individuals.

The classification of the appetites as necessary and unnecessary is essential to Plato's analysis of the individual and the state. The necessary appetites are supreme in the oligarchic state and the oligarchic man. The whole end of thought and action is the accumulation of wealth in this second deviation from the ideal. 6 The unnecessary and

2. Laws, 689, 819; Rep., 535.
3. Laws, 689 (Jowett).
4. Laws, 690, passim; Rep., 590, 587, passim.
6. Rep., 550-555. The various deviations from the ideal are discussed on pp. 50ff and 184ff.
spendthrift appetites are the marks of the democratic state and individual in the third deviation from the ideal. Each desire is given its turn, but none is suffered for long. Wealth is squandered on all desires as they troop by with no effort to evaluate their worth. Finally, the unnecessary and lawless appetites, the drones with stings, consume the despotic state and individual until only the strongest master passion is served to the destruction or subjugation of all others. With the rise of these unnecessary and lawless appetites to power the individual and the state are ruined.

The Spirited Part. Plato affirms that reason is most able to rule and the appetites most in need of being ruled. These are the two extremes of the soul. The part that lies between is the spirited element. The spirited part is executive, assertive, ambitious, contentious, courageous, and when controlled, the spokesman for reason. While reason exercises authority over this assertive part of the soul, its pugnacity is very much like righteous indignation, but when led by the appetites it is a playground bully.

The spirited element is confined to the realm of opinion in human affairs, both private and social. This level of "knowing" is not knowledge but a mean between

3. Tim., 70; Rep., 440; Laws, 863.
knowledge and ignorance. Opinion is thus not identical with knowledge, since opinion may also be false as well as true—an impossible state of affairs for knowledge. The source of opinion lies in the innate or nurtured inability of the soul to view reality. Hence, the soul controlled by the spirited element turns away from the struggle to know reality and feeds upon opinion.

In the Timaeus and the Theaetetus opinion arises from the combination of sensation and thought, producing a partial view of the world. It has its roots deep in sensation, the immediate awareness of the phenomenal world. It is concerned with the world of shapes and sounds falling into the limbo of neither wholly real (being) nor wholly false (not-being). It is a dream world brighter than ignorance but darker than knowledge. Opinion is incapable of conceptual understanding, hence is partial, blundering between rationality and irrationality. It is unreliable as a final guide toward the good life, social, or individual.

Opinion is divided into two parts: false opinion and right opinion. (1) False opinion is the incorrect...
combination of sense perceptions and thought. It is an "ugly thing" since basically it is divorced from genuine knowledge. It leads the soul farther and farther from the path toward the highest virtues, substituting increasingly lesser ones. (2) Right opinion, as worthless as it is to the philosopher, has value for the mass of men because it is a correct combination of sense perception and thought. It leads the soul nearer the truth. Right opinion is not capable of grasping eternal truths, as knowledge does, but leads the person to acknowledge the judgments of wisdom. Opinion is a poorer guide to right action or to the good life than knowledge because it seeks the part in place of the whole, hence is likely to place lesser values, such as wealth, above the larger values.

The spirited part of the soul has an immediate attraction and attachment to values rationally conceived as well as traditionally accepted. The spirit is thus the natural helper of reason in controlling the body, ordering the appetites for the good of the soul, and in contacts made with other men in the social world. It is not wholly reliable, however, because it follows opinion, and unless persuaded by reason will lead the individual and state astray.

II. THE INVERSION OF THE PARTS OF THE SOUL

Imperfection comes into the soul in several ways, since "forms of evil are infinite." In the *Timaeus* the principle of plenitude requires that all degrees of perfection be established. This allows for the mixture of being and non-being which gives rise to the possibility, even probability of evil. The soul is such a mixture, compounded of the immortal and mortal parts with the latter heavily laden with *anagke*, non-being or the unlimited. Hence, a tendency toward disorder or inversion is inherent in the soul of man. The appetites, especially, are inclined from the rational toward the non-rational by virtue of the *anagke*. The souls which do not successfully behold true being "fail to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds" and fall to earth to become the souls of men. The inherent inclination to disorder in the soul is a real cause of the soul's fall into the various perversions.

Another reason for imbalance in the soul is its contact with and inclusion in a body. The body aids and abets

3. Lovejoy, GCB, 45, comments: "The not-so-good, not to say the bad, must be apprehended as derivative from the Idea of the Good, as involved in the essence of Perfection." Also on p. 51: "...It takes all kinds to make a world."
7. *Tim.*, 70; *Phaedo*, 66; *Phaedr.*, 258, 250.
the lower elements of the soul. It spreads before the appetites and passions a tempting vision of pleasures, and their opposing pains, leading them astray after false values such as love of money. Wealth is measured in terms of the accumulation of material things, appeals to the appetites, and assists in inverting the proper order in the soul of man.\(^1\) The description of the oligarchic man in the eighth book of the Republic well illustrates the effect of the soul’s turning away from the rational toward bodily pleasures, so that the individual becomes a "parsimonious money-getter," breeding offspring which continue the anti-rational trend becoming filled with superfluous desires and pleasures of all sorts.\(^2\)

The body is not to be confused with the soul or any part of the soul. Body assists in causing dissension within the soul by appealing to the lower parts of the soul. The human soul is a mixture of earthiness and heavenliness, and, upon contact with the body, the lower parts of the soul are drawn into its orbit, giving rise to a schism between the lower elements and the rational part of the soul.\(^3\) Body is essential to the existence and growth of the soul in man as

\(^{1}\) Republic, 580-581.
\(^{2}\) Republic, 555-562. The democratic man (and state) is the offspring of the oligarchic. Cf. below, pp. 58ff, 193ff.
\(^{3}\) Phaedr., 246, 248, 253-254. See also on the soul-body problem in Plato, Phileb., 35, 47; Laws, 863, 870, 891; Phaedo, 66, 81, 83; Tim., 34, 42, 86; Crat., 400.
long as he lives on earth. But this necessary dependence is in some ways both a cause and a penalty for wrong-doing.\(^1\) When the body ceases to serve the interests of the soul,\(^2\) the inversion of the parts of the soul is a certainty.

III. SUMMARY

Plato's psychology is normative. The healthy person is properly ordered within, harmonious, rational, and free. The tripartite description of the soul is an attempt to understand the soul as a living unity in the process of integrating of desires, interests and needs according to rational purposes. Only reason can guide the aspiration of each part of the soul toward the real structure of being, bringing each part of the soul to its peak of perfection, and harmony into the entire soul. Reason is reflective and practical. It views the realm of being and guides the whole man toward being a real person. Knowledge arises in the individual by reasoning about the impressions of sense, which are reports of this world of appearance.

The appetites form the lowest part of the soul, are farthest from reason, and are least controlled by reason. Appetites are attached to short-term, immediate, and rather tangible values. Plato likens appetites to a mob in that

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2. Phaedo, 80, 94; Tim., 34; Laws, 726, 892, 896, 959, 966f.
they are unreasonable and tend to be violent. Appetites are necessary and unnecessary. The former must be cared for and the latter educated away. Individuals properly integrated are few while those following the appetites are many, consequently the reasonable few must rule the less reasonable many just as reason must guide the appetites. If the unnecessary and lawless appetites are given authority, the individual and the society both are certain to fall into chaos, thence into tyranny.

The spirited part of the soul is the ally of reason in the harmonious man. If led by reason the spirited part is a zealous crusader for genuine virtue, but if enslaved by the appetites, it is only a political boss. It is not a wholly reliable guide for the soul or the society, because it follows opinion quite blindly. The spirited element of the soul must follow the persuasion of reason or lead the individual and state into the deceitful wilderness of appearances and to destruction.

The proper order of the soul may be maintained only if rational knowledge is sought and adhered to. If passion wins the day, opinion is placed upon the throne. Degeneration has thus begun and will lead to the enthronement of the appetites with their chaotic lack of direction and greed for more, whether power, pleasure, or riches. Without the guiding insight and foresight of knowledge the individual is blinded
to spiritual values and substitutes things for thought, licentiousness for love, power for poise, while his soul remains at odds with itself and at war with the world. The political, educational, and economic schemes of Plato are based upon this understanding of human nature.
CHAPTER III

THE INFLUENCE OF WEALTH ON THE ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Central to any discussion of Plato's treatment of wealth is his ethical theory. Basically, the problem of wealth is an ethical problem and must be seen against the background of the good life and the various deviations from the good life. Plato is convinced that the good will permeate all one's actions if it is truly honored and not merely paid lip service. The values which are most esteemed are built into the structure of one's thinking and acting. They offer the motivation and general pattern for the individual's life. "That which men at any time honor they practice, and that which is not honored is neglected." But, do not all men honor what they believe is good? What are the values which determine human action? What is the good life? Does it consist in possession of things or in attitudes and over-all patterns of desires? Who is the judge of genuine virtue? These are some questions which need answering, or at least "cornering," in order to gain perspective on the place of wealth in the life of the individual.

I. SCALE OF VALUES

Plato has many value-scales, and is not consistent in listing the virtues or values in any given order. Lodge suggests there are over two hundred indistinct scales of values in the dialogues and about fifty complete and distinct value-scales. One of the primary standards for sifting the value-claims of men is that of soul-body-wealth, or the proverbial "healthy, wealthy, and wise" with wealthy at the bottom of the scale. Wealth-claims are near the lowest of the self-assertive-acquisitive parts of the appetitive element of the soul.

One of the most frequently mentioned scales of goods, a scale not only current throughout the Hellenic world, but definitely accepted by Plato and emphasized as of first importance for moral living, is the scale of soul-body, or soul-body-wealth.

In general, two lists of values appear—the divine and the human. The divine "goods" are the virtues of justice, wisdom, temperance, and courage. The human values are dependent upon these, otherwise the human values turn into vices. The human "goods" are variously listed but usually contain health, beauty of form, strength and swiftness, and wealth.

1. Meno, 88; Rep., 441-443; Laws, 631; Euthyd., 279.
2. Lodge, PTE, 173, 175.
5. Rep., 489, 491, 494f, 521, 550, 591; Laws, 630f, 688f, 727, 742ff, 831, 836, 919, 716; Gorg., 457.
Of all genuine human concerns to be sought and honored wealth comes last.\(^1\)

The soul functions at three levels: the biological level which is best illustrated by the appetites; the social level which is best illustrated by the passions; the cognitive level which is best illustrated by the rational mind.

The philosopher alone knows the true joy which springs from the possession of knowledge and from the contemplation of ultimate reality. Further, he unites reason and experience; besides, only he is really familiar with the use of logic...or the art by means of which decisions are made. That pleasure which he considers the highest must, therefore, in reality be the highest. The pleasures of the warrior and the timocratic man are placed second in rank while those of the lover of money and of the man of the world rank last.\(^2\)

Wealth satisfies the desires of the biological function when controlled by and for rational purposes. Otherwise wealth only feeds the increasingly insatiable desires. Wealth is always given the ethical interpretation because of this psychological theory. It is pursuing right goals only when nurturing the higher functions of the soul. In itself wealth is amoral, but wealth never exists as a thing-in-itself. It exists only in reference to individuals and the community. Hence, its ethical implications are primary.\(^3\)

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2. Ritter, EPP, 78.
Health, or care of the body, is more essential than wealth, being necessary for the proper functioning of the intellectual processes. Soul refers to the life principle, and primarily here to the higher spirited and rational principles of life. Health and wealth are goods in so far as they operate with regard for and in rapport with the rational, so that the whole being--individual or social--is in touch with reality, partaking of all that is humanly possible of the Ideal Forms, especially the Idea of the Good.

II. THE GOOD LIFE

The ideal of the good life is essentially the life of the philosopher, the lover of wisdom. It is essentially a life of reason but not of seclusion. The rational must not be construed as coldness or narrowness of intellect. Cleverness will not do as a description of the rational life. Technical "know-how" is insufficient. Mental alacrity is too shallow, as is excellence of memory. These are all present in the rational, which is a comprehension of values as well as method. Rationality is holding the good in the fine balance of appreciation. Rationality is a type of life in which the values of the passions and the appetites coalesce with the higher ones of reason, until the whole works together in dynamic unity. They "form one body"{1} directed by reason,

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1. I Corinthians 12:12, 13.
striving toward the good. Harmony of the parts, each functioning at its best, is the exemplification of the rational life. Under the guidance of reason good habits are established in every nook and cranny of the person. Also, true beliefs allow reason to further contemplate the Good, bringing new insight to bear on the soul until it is perfect.

This ideal Plato does not conceive as established in a day, nor even a lifetime in present circumstances. But perhaps by chance, illness, exile, some other enforced solitude, or by the intervention of the divine world a philosopher will mature into this reality.1 Plato is careful to note the difficulty involved in such a life. In the Meno a man may learn if he "is strenuous and does not faint."2 In the Republic he urges that the ideal state and individual are "in the heavens" but might come into this world.3 Just as the corruption of man is not innate, so goodness in its full maturity is not inborn, but brought out through long and arduous study and exercise of the whole self.4

Wholeness is the being and goal of rationality. Inasmuch as the soul is rational it is whole. This is godlikeness: to be possessed of plenitude, ungrudging, overflowing bounty.5 The good life is the "total life" of

4. Rep., Book VII.
5. Tim., 29, 30, 31, 37, 39, 48.
magnanimity and intelligence, blessed with temperance. In the good life only do the appetites find satisfying pleasure and completion. In this life they are reconciled, no longer at war, witless, hostile, and destructive. In the good man the appetites lose themselves only to find themselves fruitfully alive. In the appetitive man the baser desires are dwarfed, thwarted, deformed, and bestial. But in the good man they are luxuriant, truly formed, full-bodied, and humane. The rational life brings pleasure to the fullest.

The good life is thus a fusion of reason with passion or spirit and with appetite. The spirited element gives rein to reason and supplies leadership to the appetites. The courageousness and adventurousness of the passions is calmed and sublimated until gentleness and self-restraint are firmly combined with them.¹ Music (the liberal arts) and gymnastics combine in education to assure this proper balance or harmony of passions and reason. Emphasis on one to the exclusion or diminution of the other brings tragic results: either brutality and cruelty break out into open violence, or repression and effeminacy smother the passions into childishness and timidity. The result of the correct combination of reason and spirit is courage.

Courage. Courage (andreia) is not brashness of the fool nor the natural, unreasoning "courage" (thymos), fearlessness, or aggressiveness of children or the beasts. It is a combination of proper fear and fearlessness. It is knowing what to fear and how to meet the feared thing. Courage is a mixture of fear and confidence. It is "presence of mind" in the midst of danger and, thus, wisdom in effective action. When appetites lay siege to the soul, promising pleasures or threatening pains, courage rescues the soul by steadying attachment to true beliefs. Courage is the maintenance of reason in the midst of serious temptations, of either failure or success. Courage belongs especially to the spirited part. It is the attitude and act of sticking firmly to the hopeful, the rational, avoiding the fearful. Against appetite courage defends with shame; against external foes with anger.

Temperance. Taken in another light, the good life is one of symmetry between body and soul. It is temperance or moderation, summed up in the saying, "Nothing too much."

2. Prot., 360; Laches, 196.
3. Laches, 195; Rep., 376, 429, 442.
5. Rep., 442.
The *Timaeus* \(^1\) pictures a soul and body badly matched, ugly, disproportioned, unable to cooperate in any joint effort, falling, sprained and bruised, into "countless evils."

Moderation also applies to the appetites and passions, which must be expressed and satisfied to the proper degree. This degree varies with individuals, but in no case is pampering or denial of appetites and passions allowed.\(^2\) Moderation is always just and right; the rapprochement of appetite and the spirited element, guided by reason.\(^3\) The appetites are to be cared for because they are given in human nature and the order or structure of the appetites is temperance. Temperance is, then, the condition or passive ground of all virtue, not the lame, crippled "virtue" paraded by the usual run of men whether in Plato's day or in ours.\(^4\) Temperance runs through the whole order, as does justice. It is the order of values viewed from the perspective of each part as determined by all that lies above it, hence being properly harmonized. Temperance results from justice, the consequence of justice in operation.\(^5\) Nor is temperance limited to the individual. It is a social virtue, necessary to proper functioning of the social whole.\(^6\)

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Wisdom. Temperance is proper care for or structuring of the lower parts of the soul as they work in rapport with reason. But what of wisdom? Must it always act moderately—never too much? In the Phaedrus Plato speaks of the frenzy of divine madness. This is the frenzy of wisdom; the ecstasy of knowing the good and the true. It is the vision that is essential to the philosopher.² "Wisdom" as used in Pericles' Funeral Oration³ is a sideline knowledge achieved by amateurs of the art. To Plato wisdom is the knowledge of the world of conceptual and essential Forms⁴ and the application of this knowledge. This world of Forms is objective, not dependent upon any human mind. As Cornford says in the introduction to Chapter Nineteen of his translation of the Republic,

Forms...are not the laws of the sequence of coexistence of phenomena, but ideals or patterns, which have a real existence independent of our minds and of which the many individual things called by their names in the world of appearances are like images or reflections. If we are disposed, with Aristotle, to deny that Platonic Forms or ideals 'exist apart from' individual things in the visible world, we should remember that the essence of the doctrine is the conviction that the differences between good and evil, right and wrong, true and false, beautiful and ugly, are absolute, not 'relative' to the customs or tastes or desires of individual men or social groups. We can know them or (as is commonly the case) not know them; they cannot change or vary from place to place or from time to time.⁵

1. Phaedr., 244, 245.
2. Rep., Book VII.
3. Thucydides, History, 2, 40.
5. Cornford, ROP, 180.
The amateur "wisdom seeker" will be sidetracked in the wilderness of appearances, opinions, and conventional usages.

Wisdom is not a divine rapture found in solitude in order to be preserved in solitude. The solitude of the contemplation of the eternal order of reality is essential to the enlightenment of the reason, but wisdom is not monastic, producing a continual stream of Simeon Stylites'. Genuine wisdom drives its lover back into contact with the "cavemen" from whom he came. It is the truly civilizing factor in human life. Wisdom is self-sufficient when it is whole, but never separate from the affairs of men. The "knower" attempts to share what he knows.1

The rational life is not opposed to desire because reason itself has a sturdy measure of the divine Eros. The love of the true and the good is the strongest of the desires2 and this is essentially the quest of reason. Wisdom brings the desires into a working whole. Wisdom establishes the scale of values within the soul, persuading the lower elements, and occasionally forcing the lower appetites into line.3 The life of reason must be one of "dialectic" not of "eristic." It must be a genuine search for truth which is convincing of a way of action.

2. Grat., 403.
Thus wisdom is not mere intellectual vacationing among ideas as sophistry is with its relativism. Against such nimble-witted play with truth and values Plato directed a good deal of his ethical thinking.\(^1\) The end of intellectual activity is moral action within the whole man and society.\(^2\) Wisdom is contemplation of and conviction about the objective, universal ideals or conceptual patterns which are above the society and the individual. Man is the measure only in so far as he can grasp the nature of the good which is the same for all men at all times.\(^3\)

When men lose touch with the rational world, they can no longer find spiritual values. Failing to recognize the real values they substitute honor, wealth, "equality," or power. By such substitution they demonstrate failure to understand that values are neither relative to their wishes nor the product of local whim or custom. Lacking knowledge they fail to see that any race or person may discover these truths for himself if he is obedient to the heavenly vision given through knowledge of real being. The rational mind knows the eternal truth and plans its application to the here and now. Lesser values, such as wealth, are seen to

\(^1\) Modern anti-Plato critics of the ethical relativist sort, such as Popper and Winspear, still miss Plato's conviction that values are grounded in the structure of the universe and must be sought out and put into action.

\(^2\) Cf. Allegory of the Cave, Rep., Book VII.

\(^3\) Wild, PME, 20, states about the same argument against Protagoras and his modern brood. Cf. Laws, 716.
be what they are—essentials in the conduct of human existence but never the supreme necessity.

Justice. Justice is the coalescing of all virtues.¹ It is private and social in that "it covers the whole field of the individual's conduct in so far as it affects others."² Justice equals all that one may expect from others and that which they may expect from him. It is truly the social virtue, the sum of all virtue. No social order could exist which did not partake of justice,³ however witlessly followed and ill-known. Furthermore, justice is good primarily for its effects. Without the cohesive power of justice the society would disintegrate and men would destroy themselves.

Several popular definitions of justice are offered in the Republic, and all of them are found wanting. Cephalus offers the definition: justice is being honest in deed and in word, of "telling the truth and paying back anything we may have received."⁴ Polemarchus picks up the shreds of that offering and insists that justice is simply helping one's friends and hurting one's enemies, "giving every man his due."⁵ The refutation of this argument is instructive

¹ Laws, 631; Rep., 433.
² Cornford,ROP, 1.
³ Laws, 937, 945, 696, 697, 709; Rep., 591; Prot., 322, 329.
⁴ Rep., 331.
⁵ Rep., 331.
in a positive way about the nature of justice, for it rests on the principle consistently employed by Plato: the goodness, virtue, or well-being of the human soul is the good in itself in the human arena. To harm enemies is not consistent with the well-being of the soul and is not justice.¹

Thrasyilmachus proposes a third definition: justice is the interest of the stronger. Might is right. Justice is the name those in power give to the laws protecting their interests.² The interest of the stronger here refers to the pleasure, wealth, and power gained by the forceful character, skillfully and successfully wielding injustice and unlimited self-seeking.³ Wisdom and moral virtue are transformed into skill and efficiency. What is commonly called justice is "the mark of a good-natured simpleton," whereas "injustice...is good policy."⁴ Plato shows that the just man recognizes the proper measure in his actions as the musician recognizes proper pitch, but the unjust man does not, hence is inferior in virtue and wisdom. Injustice, through self-assertion, is not a source of strength because it injects disharmony and dissension into the social order and into the individual soul. Justice is here presented as the principle of internal order, the harmonious unity of properly working and fully realized parts. Furthermore, only

1. Rep., 335.
justice will bring happiness because each man, and each part of society, has a particular function which will produce happiness only if correctly exercised.¹ Justice is the order of the parts of the soul, and of society, in which each part manages its own affairs, determining all that lies below it from the highest to the lowest.²

Justice is thus the "excellence of the soul"³ never in any sense mere self-assertion of the parts one against the other. Justice is the natural functioning of the soul in the fullness of its various aspects.⁴ It is not an agreement among the parts of the soul to work together in harmonious ways; nor is it an imposition of the rational powers on the non-rational powers, keeping them suppressed and subservient in the interests of one part of the soul. The reason lies in the fact that the parts of the soul are not self-sufficient or alike in their functioning.⁵ They are, on the other hand, specialized according to innate aptitudes and are interdependent. The lower appetites provide for the needs of a healthy animal existence, and as long as they carry out this function without interfering in the other areas of human existence, they are acting justly.⁶

¹ Rep., 352ff. See also Aristotle, Nic. Eth., 1.7; 11.6.
³ Rep., 353.
⁴ Rep., 335.
⁵ Cf. Wild, PME, 32.
Justice is the universal principle, that everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him...that each one should do his own proper work without interfering with others...when each order...keeps to its own proper business in the commonwealth and does its own work, that is justice and what makes a just society....Accordingly, in so far as the quality of justice is concerned, there will be no difference between a just man and a just society...the individual soul contains the same three elements and...they are affected in the same way as are the corresponding types in society.\(^1\)

This is the heart of the matter, but a few other statements will throw light on justice and the just man. In the Laws\(^2\) the "opinion of the best," even though they may sometimes be mistaken, is just. The Meno speaks of justice as a portion of virtue,\(^3\) and is identified with wisdom, at least partly.\(^4\) Justice is rated in the highest class of goods and source of true pleasure and happiness.\(^5\) Justice must be shared by all citizens, not the top few, or any other group, since it is the civilizer and preserver of mankind.\(^6\) It is no wonder that Plato returns to justice again and again in his writings, for without it the individual would be a "mob" and society would disintegrate into an inchoate rivalry--a "war of all against all." Justice is

\(^1\) Rep., 432, 433, 434 (Cornford).
\(^2\) Laws, 864.
\(^3\) Meno, 73, 79.
\(^4\) Meno, 88, 99; Rep., 351, 433; Euthyd., 281; Laws, 631.
\(^5\) Rep., 335, 336, 357, 367; Laws, 631; Euthyd., 281; Gorg., 470.
\(^6\) Prot., 322, 329; Rep., 432, 433; Laws, 768, 906, 967.
the "salt of the earth" and if it becomes insipid, mankind is good for nothing. "Justice...is not a matter of external behaviour, but of the inward self and of attending to all that is, in the fullest sense, a man's proper concern."¹

The just man is the one "who sets his house in order, by self mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself."²

When this man speaks of conduct as honorable and just "he will mean the behaviour that helps to produce and to preserve this habit of mind..."³

The understanding of the virtues is crucial to the further development of the function of wealth in the society and the individual life. Courage, wisdom, justice, and temperance are "seen" in action day by day. Wisdom issues into vision, knowing what is good for each of the parts of the soul and for all of them in common.⁴ Courage exhibits itself as the ally of reason, in the unperverted man, "when, in spite of pain or pleasure, it holds fast to the injunctions

¹. Rep., 442-443.
². Rep., 443.
³. Rep., 443; Phaedo, 82. Cf. Lodge, PTE, 173, who says: "The Platonic criterion of moral value is the ideal life; the life which expresses the living principle of the Idea of Good, the life which is a channel for pouring forth what is ultimately real, reality in its own living, the life of God. Whatever constitutes an organic portion of this, is real, significant, and morally valuable. Whatever fails to constitute an organic portion of the ideal life is so far unreal, insignificant, and morally worthless. This is the Platonic criterion of good and evil."
⁴. Rep., 441.
of reason about what he ought or ought not to be afraid of.\textsuperscript{1} Temperance expresses itself in the agreement of the appetites and the spirited element to the rule of reason, so that a moderate amount of appetites or passions are indulged and no excesses allowed.\textsuperscript{2} Justice is the rule of wisdom viewed from the top of the hierarchy of virtues. It is the habit of the soul finding expression in each part doing its proper work ordering all that is below itself.

III. THE PLACE OF WEALTH IN THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The most sacred and precious thing over which any man has even partial control is his own soul.\textsuperscript{3} The body and everything which ministers primarily to the body are therefore of less value to the individual than the goods of the soul. If anyone should honor wealth or any other benefit above the virtues, he implies by his actions that the body is of more worth than the soul.\textsuperscript{4} Whenever one is willing to profit by dishonest means, or even not openly unwilling to do so, he thereby sells his soul for a bit of gold. "Yet all the gold on earth, or under it, does not equal the price of goodness."\textsuperscript{5} The whole of one's energies throughout life.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Rep., \textsuperscript{441}.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Rep., \textsuperscript{441-442}.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Cf. Rep., 585; Theaet., 185; Laws, 726\textsuperscript{f}, 731, 743, 891\textsuperscript{f}, 896, 959, 966\textsuperscript{f}; Phaedr., 245ff, Phaedo, 78ff, 94; Gorg., 479; Soph., 248ff; Tim., 34. Also Jaeger, TGP, 73-89; Lodge, \textsuperscript{PTE}, 177.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Cf. Laws, 727-728.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Laws, 728 (Loeb).
\end{itemize}
must be devoted "to the acquisition of virtues proper to a man." 1 Whatever the profession or course of a man's life this must remain his goal, even if he must become an exile from his native land.

The search for and the acquisition of wealth is valuable only in so far as it contributes to the attainment of virtue in the individual.

He, the wise man, will not let himself be dazzled by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass of his wealth without measure, involving himself in measureless ills.... He will rather... keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul, and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth, will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be. 2

Therefore the wise man will not wait on the doorstep of the rich, seeking to emulate them, for wisdom does not result from the accumulation of wealth. 3 Whenever they become the major concern of the person, the "good things of life, as they are called, corrupt and distract the soul: beauty, wealth, strength, powerful connections." 4 Only a good and wise life brings satisfying rewards or real wealth; anything else brings starvation within the soul. 5

The good life exhibits spiritual health rather than the advantages of wealth. The desire for luxurious living

1. Laws, 770; cf. 807.
is a drag on moral development and produces a slave personality given over to the master passion for more and more wealth. Such an individual "forgets himself in the hour of success and prosperity, and presumes on his advantages of wealth or power"¹ and pushes them to the limit in his dealings with the less fortunate. Dishonesty accompanies such a spirit and with that comes evasion of the law at every twist and turn. The desire for more possessions blinds such an individual to the fact that virtue cannot be begun after "he has made enough to live on."² Plainly, Plato is saying that virtue does not depend ultimately upon one's wealth or lack thereof.

A good man, or the good in a man, does not depend upon whether he is rich or poor, great or small, but upon temperance and justice, wisdom and courage. If one is unjust he may have the wealth of Croesus without improving his character or worth as a citizen one whit. The many speak of health, beauty, and wealth as the highest goods man may possess, then tack on innumerable others as if the acquisition of things brings immortality. But if a man lives without justice and temperance, all the goods of so-called fortune are empty ciphers and the greatest evils to the possessor. Only to the good man are the possessions of this world real goods.

². Rep., 406 (Cornford).
To the unjust they are the greatest evils, drawn and bound by the cords of ambition, greed, and power over others. Insolence, pride, injustice bind the so-called goods of possessions and power to the unjust man in the worst sort of tyranny: the tyranny of base living.¹

The happiest man is he who is first in goodness and justice, namely the true king who is also king over himself; and the most miserable is that lowest example of injustice and vice, the born despot whose tyranny prevails in his own soul and also over his country.²

The "eye of the needle" is equally difficult for the poor man or the rich man who lusts for more wealth at the expense of the genuinely good life.

The production and distribution of wealth is not the evil to cope with: it is the symptom of the illness. The real evil is to be found in the "sickly constitution and intemperate habits" which make up the motives of the man who is poor in soul, even though "he might be richer than Midas."³

Wealth is worthless or dangerous in the possession of such an individual. But in the hands of a good man wealth may serve both the individual and society. Wealth is neither condemned nor praised in itself. Avarice, however, takes possession of the soul of the intemperate individual and

3. *Rep.*, 408 (Cornford); cf. 618f.
all that he may possess, since he will not discipline himself by wisdom.

Wealth in the just life must always assist in nurturing the virtues, never "interfering with the...work of providing the necessary exercise and nourishment for the body, and instruction and education for the soul." Whenever the lust for wealth feeds upon a miserable lack in education, an endless array of acquisitive, never-to-be-satisfied desires troop into the household of one's soul and assume direction of the life's activities. Wealth must never be sought for itself nor for anything which does not contribute to the welfare of the body and the soul.

The truth should be stated about wealth,—namely, that it exists for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul; so that, while the objects for which it really exists are "goods," yet wealth itself must come third, after goodness of body and of soul... the man who intends to be happy must seek not to be wealthy, but to be justly and temperately wealthy.

Plato is thoroughly convinced that wealth in itself does not make men happy or unhappy. He is equally certain that only

1. "In the Euthydemus Socrates shows that it is the way a thing is used which determines whether it is good or bad for us; even spiritual merits, such as courage and inherent stability of being, can become evil through misuse. The only unconditioned good is the insight into what is beneficial for us, since it guides us in the right use of our abilities and assures us of our possessions. The only evil is incorrigible, vain, conceit, and intellectual indolence." Ritter, EPP, 62.

2. Laws, 807, 743-744.
4. Laws, 870 (Loeb); cf. 822-823, 841, 937.
the wise use of wealth can contribute to the happiness and welfare of the individual and the community. This must be the genuine goal of all desire to possess wealth and to use wealth.¹

Because the good man's sources of income are limited to those which are honest and which develop the virtues as much as is possible, the good man has only half, or less, the income of the bad man or the man who is indifferent to the source of his income. Furthermore, the honest man's expenses are greater than the dishonest man's since the former spends his on honorable purposes, and the latter in neither honorable nor dishonorable ways. Thus the man who is indifferent to moral virtues is wealthier than the man who seeks income from honorable and just sources only and spends on like occasions. The one who saves meticulously is not always evil, but he is never a good man since his goal in life is wealth, the least of the human values. The thrifty man is not virtuous merely because he is thrifty, for he may get his income from good or bad sources indifferently. If so, he is not a good man but indifferent or bad.² The truly just man will be neither wealthy nor poor.

But very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. For they mean by 'the rich' the few who have

¹. Rep., 420.
². Laws, 743, 815; cf. 808 where thrift is urged.
the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them may quite well be a rogue. And if this is true, I can never assent to the doctrine that the rich man will be happy—he must be good as well as rich. And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be.¹

Both the gain-loving and ambitious parts of the soul and society find the truest happiness they are capable of when they accept the guidance of wisdom following "only those pleasures which reason approves."² There is no profit if a man gains the world and enslaves the best part of his nature to the vilest.³ Only when justice and temperance prevail, structuring the parts of the soul into a whole, making the man "one man instead of many," will a man really be ready to make money or carry on business transactions.⁴ On no other grounds can the individual be fitted to assume his proper place in society. The gentle prayer at the close of the Phaedrus voices the same spirit of temperance regarding the place of wealth in the life of the individual.

O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I may be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.⁵

¹. Laws, 743 (Jowett); cf. 728, 742, 831, 836, 919; cf. Rep., 521, 550f, 591.
⁴. Rep., 443.
⁵. Phaedr., 279 (Loeb).
IV. THE DEVIATIONS FROM THE GOOD LIFE

The most fundamental reason for degeneration in the character of the individual is the irrational confusion of reality and appearances caused by flaws in natural ability and poor environment. Evil is involuntary in that no one believes he is actually aiming at evil. To Plato the evildoer, the unjust man, is determined by his desires which he thinks will lead him in the right way, but lacking wisdom he does not see the pitfalls and so wallows in the mire of weakness or actual harmfulness and violence. Such a person is filled with conceit, spiritual blindness, and intellectual indolence. He is a menace if allowed any position of authority in society. The unjust man may assume one or various combinations of four major types of character, each of which is increasingly determined by the lower and more subjective elements within himself and his society instead of the higher and more objective elements, even those eternal ones in which there is no shadow of turning.

The Timocratic or Ambitious Man. The timocratic individual loves honor and courage to the exclusion of reason.

1. *Prot.*, 345f, 352, 355; *Tim.*, 86; *Meno*, 78; *Laws*, 731, 860.
2. *Apol.*, 21, 22; *Euthyd.*, 279-281.
His father tends the growth of reason in his soul, while the rest of the world is fostering the other two elements, ambition and appetite. By temperament he is not a bad man, but he has fallen into bad company, and the two contrary influences result in a compromise; he gives himself up to the control of the middle principle of high-spirited emulation and becomes an arrogant and ambitious man.¹

This first deviation results from confusion of values rising out of psychological disorder. Unable to see why the father tends reason, the son supposes that honor or the ambition to appear to be a leader is the motivating ideal of his father. Premised as it is on surface observation, the son's supposition leads him further and further from a rational analysis and appreciation of his father's virtues and educational efforts. He is controlled by the passionate element in his soul and gives himself to baser actions, having lost respect for genuine reality by turning away from the life of the mind.

In his youth he will despise money, but the older he grows the more he will care for it, because of the touch of avarice in his nature; and besides his character is not thoroughly sound, for lack of the only safeguard that can preserve it throughout life, a thoughtful and cultivated mind.²

Once appearances become the standard by which the person judges all motives, the way is opened to all the phantasies flooding the irrational man. He has no adequate norm by which to judge degrees of value. Although the irrational

¹. Rep., 549 (Cornford).
². Rep., 548 (Cornford).
man has standards (honor, wealth, liberty, power) none of them lead to harmony within or community without since harmony and community depend upon reason and persuasion. The ambitious or honor-loving man follows and respects compulsion, not persuasion. His education and his actions toward others follow this pattern.

He is self-willed, proud, opinionated, and he feels honored by the presence and attention of learned men, thus becoming a patron of the arts. Not being able to think or act creatively, the timocratic man attracts the intelligentsia to himself by "honoring" them with gifts and favors. Rational argument impresses him, but he is immediately swept away by the passion or personal ambition to excel, even at the expense of others.¹ Genuine courage falls before a persistent zeal attached to the more stable parts of the shifting human scene. Tradition displaces justice. Restraint becomes arbitrary authority in place of temperance.² With justice gone, the ambitious man is increasingly controlled by the lower drives. Temperance vanishes also amid the upsetting of rational control, and the false courage or pugnacity of children and animals is ranked as the only kind of courage.

Ambitious emulation displaces rationally controlled activity and wealth becomes a primary means of achieving the

¹. Rep., 545-549.
appearance of greatness. Reason, temperance, and mature courage are dominated and held in check by the appeal to "things as they are." Indulgence in phantasies leads to an increasing desire for physical possessions which, after all, are very concrete symbols of greatness to one who depends wholly upon the world of appearances. Wealth becomes the focus of effort because it symbolizes ability and cultural attainment to the one at sea in the storms of appearances. Wealth is valued by the ambitious man for its effect of bringing honor and satisfying the urge to outdo one's fellows. When wealth, however, is valued above other human goods as the gauge of ambition and ability and the purveyor of honor and culture, an inordinate value comes to be placed upon pugnacity. This overestimation of animal courage results because the feeling of being important is dependent upon the wealth amassed to produce the phantasy and because around the edges of this apparent grandeur there nibbles the uncertainty of keeping the riches so necessary for the facade of honor. A brute intuition hints correctly and constantly that the feeling of importance and the wealth at the disposal of the ambitious man may topple at one stroke of ill-fortune.

The timocratic man is not wholly depraved. By nature and training he avoids the fleshpots of the world. He gains his wealth by honorable means and spends it in the same manner. He desires genuine honor, but his irrational methods
lead to pseudo-honor and a frustrating sense of importance. He is probably a philanthropist, although Plato does not reveal this. However, once the spirited element usurps the place of reason, the intellect is more and more distrusted, honor is sought, the secret growth of avarice is nourished, an inordinate value is placed upon "homage," and the rise of the money-loving appetite becomes a certainty. This is but one step toward complete degeneration of the man, or more correctly, one type of degenerate man, and leads inevitably to the next level of distortion in the person because of the lack of rational control.

The Plutocratic or Money-loving Man. The Plutocratic man wants the honor which is bestowed upon the timocratic individual. He does not sense the false nature of the honor received by the ambitious man. He wrongly assumes that the timocratic man seeks wealth solely for itself and that honor comes from the mere possession of wealth. Trusting these illusions he throws himself into the struggle for riches by every apparently fair means. But the effort to gain wealth warps him until the mere accumulation and hoarding of wealth becomes his motive. The second step from the good life is evident in the one who loves material possessions more than wisdom, courage, justice, temperance, or even the ambition for honor. The spirit of eager ambition which hitherto ruled in his heart is thrust headlong from the throne. Humbled by
poverty, he turns to earning his living and, little by little, through hard work and petty savings, scrapes together a fortune. And now he will instal another spirit on the vacant throne, the money-loving spirit of sensual appetite, like an eastern monarch with diadem and golden chain and scimitar girt at his side. At its footstool...will crouch the two slaves he has forced into subjection: Reason, whose thought is now confined to calculating how money may breed more money, and Ambition, suffered to admire and value nothing but wealth and its possessors and to excell in nothing but the struggle to gain money by any and every means. There is no swifter and surer way by which an ambitious young man may be transformed into a lover of money.¹

So it is that the "money-loving spirit of sensual appetite" is installed as ruler in the soul of the plutocratic individual because the appearance of security brought by things has been substituted for the harmony of the good life, the life seeking the reality of the rational.

Tragedy has overtaken this individual in that he is dominated by the lowest parts of his soul. Reason is wrestled into slavery and limited to calculating more and better ways of gaining wealth, since his scale of values is upended by the lack of spiritual ends. Wisdom, the ruling virtue of the healthy, rational person, is degraded into a tool to satisfy the overbearing and greedy lust for riches. The spirited element is allowed no longer its natural function of urging the whole self in the paths of rational endeavor. Courage is chained in the slavery of the struggle for temporal possessions and made to fawn over those who are

¹. Rep., 553 (Cornford).
"successful." Thus the money-lover assumes a "realistic" attitude toward life, seeking control over wealth, and through wealth control of the production of wealth.

Having inverted the proper psychological order, substituting things for thought, the plutocratic person loses all interest in the search for truth and its application to the affairs of men. Hence he is subjective in his outlook and activity. Subject to this sort of wishful thinking, he is grasping, stingy, hard-headed, wholly utilitarian, and in all a miserly soul. Good is reduced to private good; gain to private gain. Social responsibility now becomes industry accompanied by the gospel of saving money and time. He is accounted a "good member" of society, but really seeks to use it for his own ends: amassing more wealth. He is thus coordinated in his desires, but wholly to a materialistic end, worshipping the blind god of wealth, Plutus, harking to his every beck and call.

Determined to amass a fortune at any and all costs, the plutocratic man becomes niggardly in character, but haunted by the desire to indulge himself in purchased pleasures. However, "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" and the hoard of things he possesses is in hand whereas an anticipated pleasure may be only a "wild goose chase." Thus he remains a "parsimonious money-getter," satisfying only his most necessary wants for fear of stirring up a
plethora of expensive desires.

He values wealth above everything...he is niggardly and a worker who satisfies only his necessary wants and will go to no further expense; his other desires he keeps in subjection as leading nowhere. There is something squalid about him, with his ways of always expecting to make a profit and add to his hoard....Further, his stinginess weakens him as a competitor for any personal success or honorable distinction. He is unwilling to spend his money in a struggle for that sort of renown, being afraid to stir up his expensive desires by calling upon them to second his ambition. So...he is usually beaten and remains a rich man.

Yet, the suggestion is that he does not always win over his desires for expensive indulgence, and the inner turmoil goes on and on.

He gives the outward appearance of honesty, but when the light of public scrutiny is darkened he is as dishonest as he can be without incurring risk.\(^2\) His apparent moderation is thus forced upon him from without since he lacks carefully nurtured wisdom and courage and temperance. The constant grasping for wealth, the fear of its loss and the consequent inner conflict keeps him from being a real person. "He presents a more decent appearance than many; but the genuine virtue of a soul in peace and harmony within itself..." is utterly beyond his reach.\(^3\)

Having lost the power to think rationally, he substitutes things for honor which has previously replaced love

1. Rep., 553-555 (Cornford).
2. Rep., 554.
of wisdom. In his confusion he believes that material possessions are the same as spiritual values, or are even better than spiritual values since they are tangible. So the money-loving individual is ignoble and lacking in magnanimity—a veritable Scrooge. He is actually at war with himself and at odds with the world, for the inner unity and harmony of the good life escape him and dwell afar.

The Democratic Man. Having disowned the rational search for truth in favor of a mere utilitarian enslavement of reason and having chained ambition to strive only for possessions, the "parsimonious money-getter" passes his poverty-stricken ideals to his son. The son, however, reared in the lap of the appetites, has no compelling desire to gain wealth. His desire is to enjoy it. Even the desire is lost to produce things for their own sake. But for the sake of satisfying the multitude of lusts within he puts up with the drudgery of work. The democratic man sees only the "pleasures" and the "freedom" wealth brings to the plutocratic man: so poverty-stricken are his ideals, so thorough his spiritual blindness! He is all for freedom and equality. He is essentially lawless, arguing that one thing is as good as the next. Tolerating any and all ideas and actions, he is unable to select because he has no standards of critical judgment,

and will allow none.\textsuperscript{1} He is insolent if it is suggested that a gradation of values exists. Such a person is prey to every passing impulse, "blown about by every wind of doctrine," or fad. "There is no order or direction in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end."\textsuperscript{2} And Plato adds ironically, "He is a manifold man stuffed with most excellent differences..."\textsuperscript{3} Of such is the "democratic man," representing the third level in the dissipation of the soul.\textsuperscript{4}

\textbf{The Tyrannical Man}. The final stage of the movement away from the ideal of the good life is the tyrannized individual. Self-assertion is his bell-cow. His ideas, personality, and goals become final and ultimate in the scale of values. Moderation of desire is missing. Lust for power or some other violent passion engulfs him. The tyrannical man seeks pleasure in power over others and wealth is the primary means to power. With riches, however gotten, the tyrant can manipulate, browbeat, or eliminate any suspected person. With riches he can buy a bodyguard for himself and a secret police to spy upon his subjects. With riches he can control the economy of every household as well

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. \textit{Isaiah} 3:4,5.  \textsuperscript{2} \textit{Rep.}, 561.  \textsuperscript{3} \textit{Rep.}, 561.  \textsuperscript{4} \textit{Rep.}, 555-562.
as the economy of the state. To the tyrant wealth becomes a means of sadistic expression of power. The savage element controls him within and attracts him without, while he "effects a gracious and gentle manner to all."¹ Honor, equality, courage, and wisdom he fawns over as long as they further his personal ambition. He is a strong personality because he is obsessed by a strong passion, an insatiable craving, and is guided solely by self-concern. He is a moral maniac, controlled only by self-interest. In this tyrannized individual the movement from objectivity to subjectivity is complete. He is farthest from the good life with its social sensitivity and concern.²

In each of the deviations from the good life wealth plays a determining role: motivating ambition in the honor-loving man; motivating the hard-headed parsimoniousness of the oligarchic individual; spurring on license and anarchy in the democratic man; finally consuming the waking moments of the tyrannized person in megalomania. The cause is to be found in the dominance of the money-loving passion rooted in the intemperate life, determined by what is below it rather than by that which lies above it. The intemperate life is the slave of the lower reaches of the individual or the society, instead of seeking fulfilment reaching toward

¹ Rep., 566.
the higher parts of the soul and the virtues. It is filled with elements of immaturity. The intemperate life has caught up with its horizons and in it the child dominates the man.

IV. THE JUDGE OF THE GOOD

Who is to judge whether rational living is more nearly the ideal than acquisition of honor, wealth, sensual pleasures, or power? Plato offers several possible answers as to who is to judge moral values. Everyone has some of the ability to make moral judgments.¹

For the majority of men, even though they be far removed from real goodness themselves, are not equally lacking in the power of judging whether others are bad or good; and even in the wicked there resides a divine and correct intuition, whereby a vast number even of the extremely wicked distinguish aright, in their speech and opinions, between the better men and the worse.²

At times the opinion of the majority is appealed to.³ To Plato the opinion of the majority follows conventional morality, which is certainly better than chaos. The common man recognizes the ability of the Philosopher-king in the Republic and the legislator in the Laws, showing at least a partial ability to recognize ethical truth.

The active students of philosophical problems, those who take part in Plato's dialogues, are capable of greater

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¹ Gorg., 481.
² Laws, 950 (Loeb); cf. Meno, 99.
³ Laws, 768.
insight into the nature of the correct standard of moral action.\(^1\) The give and take of the dialogue, the assent of the participants, and their very inquisitiveness show this ability to judge moral questions. Also, the man of considerable age and experience is called upon\(^2\) to exercise critical moral judgment simply because of his greater experience. Plato regards practical experience highly in helping formulate correct ethical decisions.\(^3\) The good man, the man of impeccable moral character is also counted as a worthy judge of values.\(^4\)

The difficulty with all these "judges" is that they operate in the realm of opinion, higher or lower in the scale. They do not grasp the intellectual, the conceptual good. They are not primarily rational in their approach to the decision about values, but come through right opinion, or solid belief. Hence the best judge of value-claims is the rational man, who is reasonable, prudent, and deliberate, considering the good of the whole self, not one part. He is the true philosopher who, with the eye of the Eternal, sees the world of principle and the relation of all things to the principles which govern the universe.\(^5\) He gathers

\(^1\) Laws, 884.
\(^2\) Rep., 539, 412; Laws, 690, 879, 785, 917, 759, 634, 715, 965, 714.
\(^3\) Rep., 535-541; Laws, 737, 746.
\(^4\) Laws, 644, 626-627; Gorg., 503; Rep., 396.
\(^5\) Rep., 484-486, passim; Phaedo, 65, 82; Phaedr., 249; Theaet., 173-176.
up all that is vital and fruitful in the lower judges of values and adds wisdom, fulfilling all the requirements of justice. He is not the monastic individual, purely speculative. His knowledge of right is put to work, and he becomes the legislator applying the eternal principles to given stages of social development. As growth is made, he or others like him make revisions in the social order in the light of specific needs and according to the Ideas.¹

V. SUMMARY

Courage, wisdom, justice, and temperance are "seen" in action day by day. Wisdom issues into vision, knowing what is good for each of the parts of the soul and for all of them in common. Courage exhibits itself as the ally of reason in the unperverted man "when, in spite of pain or pleasure, it holds fast to the injunctions of reason about what he ought or ought not to be afraid of."² Temperance expresses itself in the agreement of the appetites and the spirited element to the rule of reason, so that a moderate amount of appetites or passions are indulged and no excesses allowed. Justice is the rule of wisdom viewed from the top of the hierarchy of virtues. It is the habit of the soul

¹. Cf. Lodge, PTE, Ch. I; Demos, POP, Ch. XIX; Wild, PTM, Ch. III.
². Rep., 441.
finding expression in each part doing its proper work ordering all that is below itself.

The good life is the life of rational knowledge and application of the virtues. Its pleasures are spiritual. Material things are sought and possessed in adequate quantity to maintain health of body and soul and produce harmony within. Possessions are considered good only if they are relevant to this harmony. The saint or the philosopher fulfills this ideal most adequately.

At the level of the timocratic man pride replaces knowledge and pleasure becomes ego-satisfaction. Wealth is sought to bring honor and courage is extolled as the manly virtue. Wealth must be kept at a level adequate to insure honorable discharge of social obligations. Wealth is good as long as honor depends on it. This is the level of the egotist.

With the enthronement of the money-making appetite in the soul, greed replaces pride as the inner drive. The pleasures of the plutocrat are centered primarily about possession of things. The urge to own things compels the money-lover to accumulate possessions by any means as long as the means appears to be honest. Material things are valued for themselves, not as a means to other ends. The miser typifies the plutocratic individual.
The democratic man confuses sensuality for the genuine values of life and substitutes lusts for greed—to further the degeneration within. Sense satisfaction controls his every action. Material possessions are sought to satisfy the urge to indulge any and all appetites which ebb and flow ceaselessly. Wealth is valued as a means of buying satisfactions which lead on in an endless maze. The playboy, the debauchee, the everlasting adolescent exemplify this deviation.

The ultimate distortion of man, the tyrant, replaces the lusts with a mania for power, or some other single lust. His pleasures are found in the control and manipulation of others. Economic goods are valued as a means to power over others, hence the control of all wealth is essential, whatever the means necessary to insure control. The sadist, the tyrant, the moral maniac fulfill the requirements of this deviation.

Wealth plays an important part in each of the deviations from the good life. It motivates ambition and animal courage in the timocratic individual; hard-headed stinginess in the money-loving man; license and anarchy in the libertine; and megalomania, a sadistic mania for power, in the tyrannized individual. The cause of this degrading role of wealth is to be found in the symbolic importance wealth assumes in the irrational life. Without the guidance offered
by a cultivated, thoughtful mind, all striving in the individual comes to be dominated by the lower elements of the personality. Any person or society entrusting complete planning and control to the appetitive or spirited elements is bereft of the only safeguard for its life. It henceforth feeds upon nothing better than opinion, either true or false, and its ruin is certain.

Plato uses many value scales. The primary scale is the proverbial "healthy, wealthy, and wise" but ordered in this manner: wisdom, health, and wealth, or soul, body, and wealth. Wealth serves its proper function when supporting the higher quests of the body and soul. In itself, if it could exist as a thing in itself, wealth would be amoral. Since wealth always exists in the community, it serves a positive or negative ethical function. Wealth and health are goods in so far as they support the rational life.

The proper judge of which value-claims are most real, hence valid for human endeavor, is the rational man. He alone gathers up all that is vital and fruitful in the lower judges of value, assessing their claims in the light of wisdom. He sees and understands the overarching purposes inherent in the world order and is able to apply them in the world of practical affairs. Plato's ethics are always social ethics in that the good life is possible only in a society, never in isolation. Wealth must be viewed from this
perspective also, which makes necessary a brief investigation of Plato's political theory with a view to the place of wealth in the social order.
CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL BASIS OF PLATO'S TREATMENT OF WEALTH

In Plato's thought the status of wealth is dependent upon the psychological make-up of the individual, the good life, and the social order. It is now necessary to turn to a brief examination of the Greek city-state and Plato's political thought. It will be shown that Plato's critics are mistaken when they charge that he establishes a ruling hierarchy to subject the working class in political and economic slavery. The limitations on the production and ownership of wealth make it abundantly clear that the pursuit of wealth is denied to those who have political authority. This chapter will deal with the characteristics of the social order in Plato's thought, leaving to Chapters Five and Six a detailed treatment of the regulations concerning the production, ownership, and function of wealth in this social order.

I. THE CITY-STATE IN THE GREEK WORLD

In the Greek world there was no distinction between the state and society, either in thought or in practice. The city-state consisted of all the voluntary functions and associations as well as the legal and compulsory associations and activities. "The Greek way" was exemplified by a society
of people with common interests, social opinion, and ethics. "The state was a spiritual entity, which assimilated all the loftiest aspects of human life and gave them out as its own gifts."\(^1\) The state was the one Greek organization which contained all the citizens and embraced everything in the lives of the citizens. The city was independent, self-sufficient, self-determined,

an economic concern for the purpose of production and trade

...a cultural association for the common pursuit of beauty and truth—because it was all these things, Plato expects it, in his Republic, to formulate the true idea of God and the rules of moral behaviour, to regulate economic life, and to control all art and science by its system of education.\(^2\)

The city-state went far beyond what we think of as a state to include all of the economic and cultural activities and institutions of the city. "The freedom of the Greek lies in the fact that he subordinates himself, as one part, to the whole which is the city-state, and to its law."\(^3\)

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2. Barker, PSPT, 5. In a similar vein Professor Elliott maintains, "...the political community to a Greek mind was the source of morality... The very vitality of the civilization derived from the intensity of participation in communal life..." Elliott and MacDonald, WPH, 65. Cf. CAH, Vol. VI, 514, 520, 528; McIlwain, GPT, 4-12, 22f, 68; Jaeger, PAI, Vol. I, 323, for similar views.
II. THE NATURE OF THE STATE TO PLATO

Unity is essential to a Genuine State. It was this heritage which provided part of the ideal that Plato had in mind while working out the Republic and the Laws in the effort to realize what the city-state could become if rationally conceived and cleansed of the faults current in fourth-century Greek states. To Plato the ideal remained the civic commonwealth whose members lived a common life in so far as possible. In this community "the interest of the group taken as a whole...is...the ruling principle." This is given in the nature of things, for the "ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole..." The true art of community living and government is therefore concerned first and foremost with the common good, because it is within this area that both the welfare of the city and the private individual is served best.

2. This is not to suggest that the Republic was intended as more than a fictitious narrative to ferret out justice.
4. Lodge, PTE, 54. Cf. Demos, POP, 361. But this does not indicate the demise of the individual.
5. Laws, 903. Cf. Cassirer, MOS, 65-66, "The political cosmos is only a symbol, and the most characteristic one, of the universal cosmos."
The worst evil for a state to suffer is destruction of its unity. The misfortunes of the victims of natural catastrophes must bring feelings of distress to the entire community, causing no one to rejoice—not even members of the building trades and the contractors.\(^1\) This sense of unity must not be construed as mere efficient organization since injustice may be so organized and pursued to the destruction of all excellence in the city-state.\(^2\) Unity could be imposed, but no sense of community would be present in any such state, no matter how efficient the organization, unless sympathy tended the political art. Mere aggregations of men do not make a state, no matter how unified by boundaries or by the force or fear of an artificial law. A common bent of mind is needed to make the state real and vital.\(^3\)

The state, to Plato, is not by nature a commercial organization. Although the economic element is important,\(^4\)

\(^1\) Gorg., 481; Laws, 694, 697, 739; Rep., 461-464. Cf. Thucydides, History, II, 60-64, 42, 43. McIlwain comments to the effect that faction is not so serious in modern nations, because most do not have this sense of community so marked in the city-state; p. 6, 7, 10, esp. 23. Winspear, GPT, 228, completely misses the point regarding unity of the state in the Republic. "Such a state...is not unity in difference; it is unity achieved (as in a modern fascistic state) by ignoring or suppressing all dissident elements." On p. 226 Winspear does describe Plato's state as "a unity in difference." Demos, POP, 357ff, gives a sound argument for the Platonic city-state as a unity in diversity.

\(^2\) Gorg., 348; Rep., (argument of Thrasymachus) 336-348, and 353-354; 562-569.

\(^3\) Prot., 321-324; Laws, 740, 712-713. Cf. Barker, GPT, 130.

\(^4\) Rep., 367-373; Laws, 676f, 828; Prot., 320, 322, 325-327; Crito, 48.
it does not constitute the goal toward which a genuine state should move. Common natural needs—economic, ethical, psychological, social, and political—cause the formation of the state. A society concerned primarily with wealth or power creates an impassable barrier to temperance and justice.¹ In such states the government and laws exist for the benefit of particular classes to the exclusion of the good of the entire community. Party loyalty and benefit become the standard by which justice and the meaning of law are interpreted. Such a city would be characterized by factions held together by geography and commercial interests, not by community of spirit.² A true state does not exist because of the simple fact of contiguity or for personal or group aggrandizement, but because of mutual interests and for the pursuit of the good life. Plato criticizes the actual states of Greece because he believed that they had surrendered the moral unity found in the pursuit of the good life for an apparent unity based upon contiguity, commercial gain, class interests, or individual freedom. Such conditions were negations of the ideal city-state, since the city becomes the purveyor of immorality by thus limiting the freedom of the will-to-good through poor environment and training.³ In this way the

discipline of moral purpose in the state is lost and the real city disappears in a grasping for wealth and power disguised as freedom or the common good.

Patterned as it is after the actual ideal of the Greek city-states, as well as a good deal of their practices, the system of Plato allows for no "rights" of a group or an individual against the state. The genuine state is a spiritual organization or community in which each individual finds righteousness or justice through the fulfillment or realization of his natural social duty. If the individual serves his own genuine interests the interest of the state are being served, and vice versa. If the interests pursued by the individual are not genuine they are "false interests" for him, especially, and for the society of which he is a member. This position is made clear in the refutations of the theories of justice advanced by Thrasymachus, Adeimantus, and Glaucon. Each position is shown to end in self-denial because the interest of neither the individual nor the society is served. "Insofar as justice is concerned, there will be no difference between a just man and a just society."

1. Laws, 875, 630f, 660f.
2. "One cannot draw a distinction between the consciousness of man and the consciousness of the State. The consciousness of the State is just the consciousness of its members when thinking as members." Barker, GPT, 162.
The quality, not the existence, of society is derived from the quality of the individuals who make up the state.¹ Thus the individual is as essential to the state as the state is to his development and being. "Surely...we must admit that the same elements and characters that appear in the state must exist in every one of us; where else could they come from?"²

Do you see, then, that there must be as many types of human character as there are forms of government? Constitutions cannot come out of stocks and stones; they must result from a preponderance of certain characters which draw the rest of the community in their wake.³

The underlying problem which the critics fail to see is not the conflict between private and public interest, but the basic one of distinguishing between genuine and false interests.⁴ And, as was shown in the preceding chapter, this task can be accomplished only by the rational man. His decisions attend to both private and public interests and duties because the rational order of values is one, not many, and he alone understands this order theoretically and practically.⁵

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1. Rep., 435, 543-544, passim. It is one of the basic assumptions of the entire work, hence the importance of education. Cf. CAH, Vol. VI, 521; Barker, GPT, 2; Ritter, EPP, 74-75.
4. Elliott and MacDonald, WPH, 73. Also giving an organic interpretation of the state are Popper, OSE, Ch. 6, 79ff, 102, 111, 139, 169, 220; Winspear, GPT, 225-228, 296; CAH, Vol. VI, 519.
5. Cf. Rep., 484, 485, especially, although Plato assumes or urges this fact throughout his dialogues.
If the individual and his rights were prior and superior to the state, then a limitation on his economic activities, such as trade and commerce, would be a communistic or fascistic violation of personal rights. But it has been shown that the person and the group are born and reared together.¹ Hence, the so-called "rights of the individual" are nonexistent and the person is not serving his interests or social interests in satisfying the lust for more, even to becoming a robber. Grounded in the Greek ideal of society and his psychology and ethics, any structure which placed the society at the mercy of the whim or pleasure of the individual would lead directly, however slowly, to chaos and enslavement to the tyrant, whether the tyrant is an appetite or a man.

Factions do not Seek Public Interest. Under the direction of reason the state must educate its members in ways of justice leading the individual members, and the state, to happiness and completeness. Ignorance and injustice must be rooted out by their opposites or that "incurable cancer

¹ Rep., 368, 412, 435, 460-463, 521, 544-545, 579-591; Laws, 630f, 660f, 745-746, 807, 829; and entire educational scheme. Also, Aristotle, Politics, 1169b, 1097b; Nic. Eth., 1094b. Cf. Jaeger, PAI, Vol. I, 105, 106, 109, 157; McIlwain, GPT, 10-11; Lodge, Art. (1923). Winspear, GPT, 223, subverts Plato's ethics and politics into a "high-sounding principle" which is "a rationalization for the subordination of the interests of the ruled to the interests of the governing." Thus, to Winspear, Plato assumes the character of Thrasymachus!
of the soul," faction and inner conflict, will result to the destruction of the state and its members.1 As Barker puts it, the final and highest purpose of the state is as a "common structure of mind erected for a common purpose of good life."2

Many of Plato's detractors are a bit naive in assuming that the "people" (demos) sought the genuine interests of the city-state while the aristocratic elements thought solely of their own interests.3 Party interest often dominated Athenian political life during the democracy as well as before. The leaders were "each grasping at supremacy, and they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whim of the multitude."4 Both Thucydides and Plato object to a vote on the basis of persuasion by the demagogues dominated by self-interest,5 not to an enlightened

3. Popper, OSE, 43. Cf. Elliott and MacDonald, WPH, 72-74; Winspear, GPT, 206, 173-176, and throughout the discussion of Syracuse. Dionysius is said to be friend and leader of the demos; Plato and Dion are scolded as the party-centered aristocrats.
5. Cf. Gorg., 456-459, 487, 481ff, 501, 515ff; Crito, 47-48. Thucydides, History, III, 37-49, esp. 38 describes the Athenian voter (ca. 430-425 B.C.) as "more like the audience of a rhetorician than the council of a city." See also the scene in the Prot., 314-315, which may be given this political interpretation, and Laches, 184f.
vote, preceded by discussion aimed at an understanding of just procedure. It is a peculiar argument to insist that the individual was better served and allowed fuller expression in the Athenian democracy than in Plato's state, since the individual expressed not his judgment and needs, but followed the wiles of the demagogue. We also know the less wealthy in the courts fined the citizens of wealth to provide a better living for themselves. Such action by the Athenian courts, dominated by the "popular" party, deepened the tension between classes and was the sort of conflict Plato described in the degeneration of the state in Books Eight and Nine of the Republic.

Plato represents the moderate group, neither the democratic nor the extreme oligarchic. Throughout the Republic he insists on the most able leadership which is well educated, guided by justice, and seeking to further the interests of the entire city-state. In the model city of the Laws all of the citizens vote and take part in the courts under the guidance of written and unwritten law, so that they

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1. Isocrates, xxi, 12; Lysias, xxvii, 1; Welles, Art. (1948), 105. Cf. Elliott and MacDonald, WPH, 72-73, who make the same general point, then seem to forget it. See Cassirer, MOS, 74-75, for an excellent statement about the hunger for power as being against Plato's ideal of justice.
2. Cf. criticisms of both the extremes of Sparta and Athens in Book VIII of the Republic and elsewhere.
will not be likely to act on the whim of the moment. 1 In the
Laws, as in other dialogues, the law is self-imposed or recog-
nized by virtue of living in the city. 2 Each man chooses
whether he shall live in the city subject to its laws or re-
move himself, and this choice determines his life. 3 As
Plato explains in the Myth of Er, 4 "The blame is his who
chooses..."

The Ideal State is Monarchic or Aristocratic. The
state in the Republic may be seen as a monarchy or aristoc-
racy of educated ability, depending upon the number of guard-
dians ruling at one time. It is not a dictatorship, because
the ruler is in office by virtue of his selection as the most
able, not through a usurpation of power or through propa-
ganda. He rules with the consent of the citizenry since he
is recognized as knowing the correct way to rule for the bene-
fit of the entire city. 5 In the Laws Plato points out the

1. Laws, 711, 715; cf. Burnet, PLA, 27, 35, in support of
the "moderate" interpretation of Plato.
2. Laws, 856, 859; Crito, 50-54; cf. Greene, MOI, 246-247;
Cassirer, MOS, 61.
3. Laws, 865ff, 877ff; Crito, 48ff.
II, 241, 207, 344.
5. Popper, OSE, pp. 122f, 79f, 102, 139, and passim, ad-
vances the same sort of argument against mere popular
vote as the test of democracy. But he denies Plato a
moderate position making him into a totalitarian since
all citizens cannot by majority vote dismiss the ruler!
Bosanquet, PTS, 5-11, 208-209, also gives the totalitarian
view, as does Winspear, GPT, 221, 223, passim; Maxey,
PP, 55-57; Engelmann, edd. Geiser and Jászi, PP, 3-5;
same ideal, except that the citizens are ruled directly by codified law rather than by the superior knowledge of the ruler. Existing governments, Plato argues, are not really governments regardless of the form.

Democracy, oligarchy, tyranny... are not [governments], for none of them exercises a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects; but they may truly be called states of discord, in which while the government is voluntary, the subjects always obey against their will, and have to be coerced; and the ruler fears the subject, and will not, if he can help, allow him to become either noble, or rich, or strong, or valiant, or warlike... ¹

The Legal State. It has been seen that Plato accepted a large share of the ideals and practices of the city-states of Greece, especially of Athens.² He argued strenuously against the demagoguery that developed in Athens, especially after the death of Pericles, and against the power politics that was evident in fifth-century and fourth-century Greece. The power principle within Athens took the form of class rivalry and the making or unmaking of laws by the Assembly, lulled by the demagogues.³ The idea that law was only convention to be made or changed as the mood struck was abhorrent

¹ Dick, Art. (1950). Burnet, PLA, 27, 35, gives a non-totalitarian view. Corry, EDG, 202, argues that even though many "interests lack direct political representation" they lead to personal enrichment in an "order firmly maintained by consent." Certainly Plato's rulers rule by consent, and the citizens do not become slaves or drudges of the state as Popper would have us believe.
² Cf. pp. 68-70 of this chapter.
to Plato. He, therefore, sought to understand the nature of the state in terms of a legal entity above the changefulness of party politics and individual ambition. Here his theory of knowledge asserts itself in political theory: the vast difference between ideal truth and empirical knowledge or opinion is best seen in the difference between the true statesman and the politician. The statesman knows his art rationally and follows it in the same way, whereas the politician knows his art by surface observation, or opinion, devoid of rational understanding and control. The ideal state cannot be improved since it is pure, absolute, and eternal. The improvement is in the actual state and its members as they rationally attempt to follow the ideal. The situation here is like one's reaction to the realm of natural universal laws. Who is to improve on natural laws? One's understanding may be improved of the laws, but the laws persist unchanged.

1. Laws, 715; Crito, 51-52; Rep., 331ff gives the same idea in reference to justice.
2. Cassirer, MOS, 68-69, 74. Whether Plato intended to put this ideal into practice is debated. Cf. Shorey, PTR, xxx ff., xliii, who says the Republic is not to be applied. Taylor, Plato, 122, disagrees. Plato's practical legislation is in the Laws. See below, pp. 91ff.
The ideal law which Plato seeks is not to be conceived as the law which he announced for the model city or any actual set of laws conceived by rational minds.\(^1\) The law he desires to understand is the divine law.\(^2\)

We shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray—the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with a view to two things at once,—they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look...laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.\(^3\)

This virtue he finds reflected in those laws which aim at the common good, such as the divine goods (wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice) and the human goods (health, beauty, need no understanding of larger ends, but should proceed "piecemeal" with definite and individual needs. It remains a mystery just how one can understand the political needs of India, for example, divorced from the economic, religious, psychological, and medical needs and deal effectively with the political needs.

1. In the *Laws* Plato makes many concessions to chance and the human situation which show he does not have his model city in mind as the divine ideal. *Laws*, 691, 709, 798, 875.
strength, wealth, liberty, and community or fraternity).\(^1\)
The legal state is a higher unity in the combination of the
Dorian and the Athenian constitutions, but it is not a "gen-
eral planing down of all differences, and a resolution of
all individuality into a flabby average Greekness..."\(^2\) The
fulfillment of human nature is the goal of the city. This
good life is reached by common effort, sought out and di-
rected by reason. In order to accomplish the goal, which
is realization of the good life, Plato develops his theories
of the structure of the state.

III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE IN THE REPUBLIC

Plato does not "copy" any actual State. The struc-
ture of the state in Plato's thought is solely to provide
the means by which the nature of the individual and the com-
munity may be fulfilled or completed, since the good life is
the goal of all effort.\(^3\) Sparta does not attain the goal of
every true state because she aims at protecting the privi-
leges and honor of one class. To achieve this she stresses
the development of courage to the destruction of reason.
With the death of the only reliable guide of the soul and

1. Laws, 693, 701, 875, 715, 628, 631, 963. Cf. Morrow,
Art. (1947), 40-42, for an excellent discussion on law
48ff; Apol., 38, 39; Prot., 519, 326; Meno, 93, 95, 99;
Euthyd., 291-292.
state the appearances of this world take on additional charm, luring the Spartans into avarice and subsequent accumulation of wealth and tyranny. Athens errs in her stress on uninhibited individualism shown in the rise of the demagogues to power, in the overt influence of the citizens in determining even the affairs of state, and in the importance of commercialism. Having forsaken reason, Athens aims at only a part of virtue. Forsaking the springs of genuine wisdom, temperance and courage, she hews for herself broken cisterns that will hold no justice. If neither of the two major states of Greece affords the ideal society in which the individual may develop to his utmost, it remains for Plato to develop such an ideal society.¹ This he does most fully in the Republic and the Laws.

The fundamental principle governing the realization of the good life is that of justice or of natural diversity of function. Plato has Socrates say,

You remember we have laid down, as a universal principle, that everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him. Well, I

¹ The Republic has no precedent in antiquity. "Thus the ground of the ideal state is not in the past, but in the future." CAH, Vol. VI, 515. Also, Cassirer, MOS, 73, "To break the power of the 'eternal yesterday' became one of the first and principle tasks of Plato's political theory." Cf. Popper, OSE, 169-195, for his ingenious contention that Plato was trying to return to the tribal society of the past.
believe that that principle, or some form of it, is justice....I think that this quality which makes it possible for the three we have already considered, wisdom, courage, and temperance, to take their place in the commonwealth, and so long as it remains present secures their continuance, must be the remaining one. And we said that, when three of the four were found, the one left over would be justice.¹

Everyone should do his own work (function, ergon) without interfering with others by dabbling in their work as a "versatile busybody."² Acting upon this principle the citizens are sorted out according to their abilities into three classes,³ and the ideal state is formed.

The Folkworkers or Artisans. The rudimentary levels of the state are sketched logically, not historically, from the propositions that men need one another and that each has special skills which must be exercised to the benefit of the individual and through that to the welfare of the state. In so far as this is a complete state, justice consists in each doing his job in harmony with others. In this manner wealth is produced, upon which the functions of the well-ordered and mature state depend.⁴ The basis of the state is, therefore, the wealth-producing and professional class. This group of

2. Rep., 433 (Loeb).
citizens produces all the wealth and services of the state, except the governmental services. Without them the genu­inely cultured state could never come into being, nor exist long if they should disappear by some stroke of fate or chance.

The Athenian state applied the name of folkworkers, or demιourgoι, to the citizens regardless of their occupa­tions.1 Plato uses the same word to describe the members of the wealth-producing and services-producing class in the ideal state. The terms "working class" or "industrial class" do not interpret the meaning of the Greek term, since they drag along a host of meanings accumulated throughout the period of modern industrialism and the rise of Marxism in its many brands. The folkworkers of the Republic cannot be equated with the industrial masses of today. Employer and employee are part of the artisan group, enjoy the same poli­tical and civil privileges, and are constrained by the same laws. Except for the two ranks of the Guardians, the entire citizenry formed the Artisans, or folkworkers. They are the "whole community" of whom Plato speaks in the allegory of the metals.2 They are just as essential to the mature state as are the two groups of Guardians, and they must keep within the domain of their proper function, otherwise faction,

distress, and the death of the state occurs. They directly serve the state through the avenue of economic, professional, and "moral" support. In the Republic and Laws the mass of the citizens are bound to rulers and support their efforts to promote the good of the commonwealth through the bonds of sympathy. The everyday labor and political support of the "workers" is essential and freely given. Its importance is sympathetic rather than casual. Without this sympathetic bond the state ceases to exist, but the political actions of the citizenry at large does not cause the activity of the Guardians in the political arena. Thus temperance is their primary virtue in the hierarchy of values, while justice is exhibited in the ruling function of the Guardians of the commonwealth.

The artisans are not second-class or second-rate citizens as is often charged. The jobs of the producing class are not so rigid that no interchanges can be made. No one is bound to his particular job in serf-like servitude, although individuals cannot move indiscriminately from class to class.\(^1\)

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1. Rep., 414-418. See Jaeger, PAI, Vol. II, 254; Taylor, PMW, 275. Cf. Winspear, GPT, 157-158; Popper, OSE, Ch. 6, speaks of the artisans as human cattle (52), of the rulers as the elite (40), ruling class (50ff), Master race (52), supernaster(s) (147), "doctors...to adminis­ter lies and deception." (147).

No great harm would be done to the community by a general interchange of most forms of work, the carpenter and the cobbler exchanging their positions and their tools and taking on each other's jobs, or even the same man undertaking both.¹

Some jobs cannot be interchanged without severe injustice resulting. Each order (Tradesman, Auxiliary, Guardian) must keep to its proper business and do its work so that justice may prevail.²

The Auxiliaries. The second group of citizens in the state is the Auxiliaries, those guardians whose function it is to preserve law and order as a police force, execute the specific orders of the higher guardians, defend the city in war, and act for the government in any state of emergency.³ They must combine in themselves strength, swiftness, an indomitable spirit, and a measure of the philosophic ability and curiosity.⁴ They each must at the same time be gentle toward all the other citizens and fierce toward enemies.⁵ And they must be educated so that these natural capacities will be developed to the utmost.⁶

Excess in their education is to be avoided like the plague because it leads either to effeminacy or to cruel and ruthless degeneracy.

1. Rep., 433 (Cornford).
There are, then, these two elements in the souls, the spirited and the philosophic; and it is for their sake, as I should say, and not (except incidentally) for the sake of soul and body, that heaven has given to mankind those two branches of education. These are roughly the liberal arts and physical education. The purpose is to bring the two elements into tune with one another by adjusting the tension of each to the right pitch. So one who can apply to the soul both kinds of education blended in perfect proportion will be master of a nobler sort of musical harmony than was ever made by tuning the strings of the lyre.

The education of all the potential Guardians, both the Rulers and the Auxiliaries, proceeds as one structure and process until the candidates reach the age of twenty. Then those who have proved most capable and loyal will proceed further in education, both practical and theoretical, until they become Rulers.

The Rulers. From the age of twenty the Guardians will be separated by various tests and ordeals into two groups consisting of the Rulers and the "Auxiliaries, who enforce the decisions of the Rulers." The Guardians who constitute the ruling group are zealous for the good of the community, never willing to act against the good of the commonwealth, persistent in these characteristics, always in perfect harmony within themselves and with the community.

Whenever we find one who has come unscathed through every
test in childhood, youth, and manhood, we shall set him as a Ruler to watch over the commonwealth....All who do not reach this standard we must reject....These, then, may properly be called Guardians in the fullest sense, who will ensure that neither foes without shall have the power, nor friends within the wish, to do harm.1

The genuine ruler is known because of marked traits which are visible in all the tests from childhood throughout life. He expresses a constant desire for knowledge of reality.2 He will not tolerate falsehood in any form. Temperance is evident in all his actions. Pettiness of mind and concern for a long life will not be his. He will always be "fair-minded, gentle, and sociable." Finally, he is "endowed with measure and grace" in intellect and a good memory.3

The primary task of the Rulers is to preserve the ideal state, since Plato assumes it to be complete.4 This

of the affairs of government, should not fail to remem-
ber two of Plato's rules: first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest."

2. "The highest type of action is represented by intelligent action, that is, conduct which depends upon an insight into the connection of things and events and upon their causal relationships." Hempelmann, Enc. Brit., 14th ed., 696.
3. Rep., 484-487 (Cornford); cf. Gorg., 489-491, 500, 502, 505; Ritter, EPP, 52-54.
4. Rep., 424; cf. Cornford's comment in ROP, 115, footnote: "It seems obvious to Plato, who had not the illusion of perpetual progress, so popular in the nineteenth century, that when the best possible education has been established,
unity of the state is assured by unity within the ruling class, which in turn is continued through proper education and nurture.\(^1\) When the best of the citizens reach the age of philosophic maturity, they divide their time between philosophy and ruling as the council of elder statesmen. After reaching retirement age, civil and military duties will be discontinued and full time will be devoted to philosophy.\(^2\)

Classes are Flexible. The classes in the ideal state are flexible in that members of one class may move into another class by virtue of having the natural capacities of the latter group. Plato gives this information on the interchange any change must be for the worse." Cassirer, MOS, has a similar insight regarding the legal nature of the state, which once seen in the ideal cannot be changed save for the worse. In the practical application of the ideal state, Plato seems to allow successive changes in order to approximate the ideal. (Rep., 497 esp.; 497-502). Jaeger, PAI, Vol. I, 153, comments in a similar fashion applicable to Plato: "In this victory of the rational I over traditional authority, there is latent a force which is to triumph over the individual: the concept of Truth, a new and universal category to which every personal preference must yield." McIlwain, GPTW, 23, comments: "Our politics...are more progressive and less static than his; and largely because our changes in political form and constitutions are more superficial. We no longer conceive of them as going to the very roots of all social life as they did for the ancient world."


2. Rep., 498; cf. Laches, 195, 196, 199, where it is urged that the rule of the one who has a universal and permanent apprehension of relevant material is essential. Cf. Prot., 352, 356, 357.
that may take place among the classes in the allegory of the metals.\textsuperscript{1} Taking a page from Athenian practice, one of many such bits of dependence upon Athens, Plato urges the "noble lie" that the members of the ideal state are born from the soil and are thus blood brothers in every respect, naturally forming the commonwealth. All of the brothers thus born are of mixed constitution. Some have more gold in the mixture of characters, some more silver, and some more brass and iron. These mixtures represent the classes: the Rulers, the Auxiliaries, the Artisans.

Generally the offspring of any particular class will have the characteristics of the parents. But, "since you are all of one stock...sometimes a golden parent may have a silver child or a silver parent a golden one, and so on with all the other combinations."\textsuperscript{2} Hence, no greater concern faces the Rulers than to ascertain carefully the "mixture of metals in the souls of the children."\textsuperscript{3} In this fashion the nature of the individual determines his function and his place in the structure of the state. His function and place in the state must never be determined by his power, family tree, or

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Rep.}, 414-415; 423, 614-621; \textit{Tim.}, 19; Hesiod, \textit{Works and Days}, 109-201; cf. \textit{Laws}, 744, The citizens may continue in the same class or "pass into another in any individual case."

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Rep.}, 415 (Cornford) Italics mine. This is all remarkably close to the modern idea of placement, aptitude, and other tests or inventories of ability.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Rep.}, 415.
abundance of wealth. Under no circumstances must any other system be followed since it is deadly to the state to have men of the rougher "metals" at the helm.¹ Contrary to Plato's critics at this point, the governmental orders are not a closed corporation, but follow pretty well established data and methods in selecting candidates for the offices.

No Inversion of the Classes. Flexibility of the classes does not mean that an inversion of the natural order is ever permissible. Inversion of classes or mixing the functions of the citizens by allowing each person to choose as he will or forcing an individual or group into work for which they are unfitted, brings nothing but chaos and prevents a man or a class from performing the whole of the duties which belong to the art of being a citizen.² The graphic description of the decline of the state, because of a similar degeneration in the souls of men, shows the results of disregarding the natural abilities of each person.³ Any inversion of the natural order in the soul can only result in the ruin of both the individual and the state since constitutions

² Notice Popper's cynical remark, "The ruler must find his happiness in ruling, the warrior in warring, and, we may infer, the slave in slaving." OSE, 165. Cf. Winspear, GPT, 209, 210, 211, who makes the same kind of subversion of Plato serve his interests.
³ Rep., 543-575. See Ch. II, above, for a fuller discussion of the degeneration in the soul.
do not come out of stocks and stones; they...result from the preponderance of certain characters which draw the rest of the community in their wake. So if there are five forms of government, there must be five kinds of mental constitutions among individuals.¹

The classes in the state are not equal, except before the bar of justice. Political equality would reduce the state to anarchy² and ruin the abilities of the individual.³ The professed equality of the vote and of a voice in the assembly did not appeal to Plato. He saw that such equality was legal, in a conventional sense, but that the natural talents of certain men asserted themselves and they were the leaders simply because they could "think" more shrewdly, speak more cleverly, and by their sophistry browbeat their "equal" fellows into line.⁴ Plato refused to accept the doctrine of equality among unequals⁵ because of the difference that exists between superior and inferior minds. The men who followed Pericles were not his equal no matter what the law passed by the assembly declared. As regards the rights to speak and vote they were equals, but in the crucial area of intellect, personal magnetism, and self-mastery they were

¹ Rep., 544 (Cornford), cf. 433-434. Cf. Shorey, PTR, 379, footnote 8 which refers to Mill, Logic, vi, 7, 1; and Spencer, Autobiography, ii, 543, on the importance of the individual in determining the character of the state.
² Rep., 557.
³ Rep., 558-561.
⁵ Rep., 558.
his inferiors. Here is a distinction that no law can rub out by so much as half a line.

Having been weighed in the balance of ability, some men are found superior to others, and no one is less needed in the state because he is not fit to be a Ruler! By the same weighing the ruler is unfit to be a farmer or a craftsman. They are all citizens in the state, but each must specialize according to his abilities and by so doing assist others to specialize in their superior capacities. Critics of Plato often forget that the art of ruling is no more confined to one group than the art of farming, or cookery, or doctoring, or being a merchant. The inequality in the state works both ways, but such inequality is specialization of function and thus forms the only real equality that matters: equality in the realm of justice and the other virtues.¹

IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE IN THE LAWS

It remains to mention the structure of the state as given in the Laws. The major thesis is the same as that of the Republic: reason must rule in order that justice may be

¹. Meno, 93-100; Prot., 314-315; Rep., 493; Euthyd., 291-292; Laws, 631. Cf. Cassirer, MOS, 76; Ritter, EPP, 69-70, "The possession of wisdom alone makes true virtue possible...Virtue is knowledge....From the time that Socrates identified virtue with knowledge, his conviction seems to be that there is only ONE value which is absolute and that all other values depend on it and are conditioned by it."
effective in the affairs of men.\(^1\) But in the \textit{Laws} the Philosopher-king leaves the center of the stage in favor of laws administered by several councils and magistrates elected by the assembly of the citizens. The Auxiliaries disappear in favor of an army composed of all the citizens, well-trained and constantly renewing their training. They are on a constant alert, but never for an offensive maneuver. The rewards they seek are protection of their homes, possessions, the state, and an olive wreath\(^1\). Never any spoils\(^2\).

\textbf{Classes of Citizens.} Four classes of citizens appear in the \textit{Laws}, divided according to their wealth.\(^3\) This division of the citizens according to their wealth apparently rises from two reasons. (1) The most important reason is the fact that Plato is attempting to keep his legislation relevant to the training and customs of the Dorian settlers who are to establish this new city. They have been accustomed to such a class structure. This is one of the data the philosopher-legislator must recognize and use in forming the constitution of the colony. (2) It may be that Plato recognizes that good economic management and ability are not unrelated in the world of men.

1. \textit{Laws}, 626-628, 630, 689, 696, 733-734, 757, 693, 701, \textit{passim}. Plato makes many allowances for the people for whom the \textit{Laws} are intended. He attempts to establish the best city he can, given Dorian citizens and traditions to organize. Cf. Morrow, Art. (1954), for a similar point of view.
Attendance at the meetings of the assembly is required of the first two classes, the others may come if they can spare time from their regular duties without impairing their work. Officers are elected by an elaborate system of voting directly affected by the wealth of the citizen, as will be shown in Chapter VI. Plato denies his most basic premise in this system of election. He usually argues that reason and ability must rule. In this case, however, he allows wealth to rule through preponderance of voting power, and by limiting certain offices to members of the two upper classes.

The Assembly and Other Officials. The assembly elects the higher army officers, grants aliens the right to reside in the state beyond the fixed twenty-year limit, has oversight over public lawsuits concerning injury to the state, and must give its consent before any change in the laws can be made. The council, elected by the assembly, carries out the actual administrative details of the city's government, operating as twelve units, one for each month of the year.

1. Laws, 764.
5. Laws, 750.
7. Laws, 772.
8. Laws, 758.
These divisions of the council act with the thirty-seven magistrates, who are the actual guardians of the law with executive power and who serve for a maximum period of twenty years.¹ The guardians of the law are a safeguard against money-interests assuming control of the city by gradually interpreting laws in favor of themselves. The chief officer among the magistrates is the minister of education.² He holds his office by virtue of being the best of all the citizens in every respect. The minister of education is a practical and specific approach to the Philosopher-kings. He must be a man unswayed by the lure of gold or the things and spirit wealth symbolizes. All of the citizens participate in the courts at various levels.³ Various other petty officials are seen in administration of purely local, internal affairs.⁴

In the twelfth book of the Laws Plato returns more markedly to much of the ideal of wise rulers as in the Republic. A council of old men, the best citizens of the state, is called into being to supervise the guardians of the law. This council is elected from the best citizens, over fifty, nominated by any of their fellow citizens. The size of the council may be as large as 75. They have almost absolute power over the lesser state officials.⁵ A still higher council

¹. Laws, 755.
². Laws, 765, 766.
³. Laws, 768.
⁴. Laws, 760-764.
⁵. Laws, 945-947.
is the philosophic nocturnal council, composed of men with true grasp of the universe. It is the "directing mind of the state." Here the aim of the state, as in the Republic, is toward goodness, not liberty, wealth, or tyranny over other states.¹ The city's relations with other states, through roving ambassadors of goodwill,² and any changes in law are governed ultimately by this council. The Philosopher-kings have returned.

V. SUMMARY

In the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out that the Greek city-state was the one organization which contained all the citizens, and embraced everything in the life of each citizen. This civic commonwealth remains the ideal of Plato as he endeavors to set forth the true art of community living and government. Money-making and keeping is the result of an attitude or temperament bound to love of things, whereas community is a spiritual desire and goal. Community of interest and effort are required in the genuine state. In so far as a society fails to realize community-mindedness, it fails to capture the nature of the true state and falls into the ways of disorder, intemperance, and injustice.

¹. Laws, 951, 964, 962, 965, 968.
². Laws, 950-951.
Patterned after the actual Greek city-state, Plato's cities do not absorb and destroy the individual. Nor does the political theory of Plato allow the individual the right to disobey the law as the whim strikes. To him, the individual exists only in the civic commonwealth, and only there can he realize his capabilities. Genuine personal interest and social interest are brought into being in one act by the individual and in no other way. The actual moral quality of the individual citizens, acting as interdependent individuals, forms the concrete moral quality of the social order. In the light of the character of the Greek city and the nature of the state in Plato's theories, it is unjust to attribute to him some form of modern totalitarianism. His social order is firmly maintained by the consent of its members.

The purpose of the state in Plato's thought is to provide conditions which will develop the common good, and thus, the good for the individual. In order to realize this purpose, he outlines the structure of the state in the Republic and the Laws. Natural diversity was shown to be the governing principle in building the commonwealth. No person should be a "jack-of-all-trades," but everyone should perform only the one function he is best fitted to do. The classes in the Republic arise from this reasoning. The Artisans supply the essential wealth and professional services in the commonwealth, and freely give their consent to being governed by the Guardian
classes. The Auxiliaries carry on the executive, police, and defensive military functions of the state. The Rulers legislate for the commonwealth. They must know what is best for the community and how to establish this in the actual life of the city.

In the *Laws* the four classes of citizens stem from differences in wealth rather than differences in ability or virtue. Even so, justice in the affairs of men remains Plato's goal.

Since all the citizens of the state are of one blood, an individual member of one class may move up or down among the classes as his ability requires. Hence, there is no caste system in Plato's theory. However, the classes must remain the same in function if justice is to be practiced. The limitations on wealth which Plato proposed are dependent upon the nature of the individual, the good life, and the social order. With this sketch of the real structure and nature of the state, as Plato envisioned it, the next task is to set forth the stipulations he made concerning the production and ownership of wealth. Having these facts in hand, it will be in order to generalize about the place of wealth in the life of the state.
CHAPTER V

PRODUCTION, OWNERSHIP, AND LIMITATIONS ON WEALTH

Through misunderstanding or misrepresentation, Plato's statements regarding the production, ownership, and distribution of wealth have been subject to a great deal of unfavorable treatment. Many modern writers attack Plato on the grounds that he was a socialist, a communist, or a capitalist of the landed aristocratic variety.

Are Plato's Theories Communist? One recent book contains the statement that the Republic describes a society in which "complete communism prevailed under the all-powerful supervision of the state." However, the authors fail to give one solitary shred of evidence in support of their argument for a "complete communism" in the Republic. As will be shown in this chapter, the only common holding of property was among the Rulers and their Auxiliaries, and the only right to own or produce wealth, in the usual sense, was guaranteed to the craftsmen who formed the majority of the population as was seen in the preceding chapter.

It is interesting to note that Winspear cites Plato's relationship with the tyrant of Syracuse as evidence of Plato's anti-mercantile, anti-democratic bias. Winspear

1. Loucks and Hoot, CES, 121. Cf. Beer, SSA, 100, for the same idea expanded slightly.
2. Winspear, GPT, 190, 205.
believes that Dionysius was a democrat and Plato his enemy, whereas Maxey\(^1\) places them both in the tyrant's house as enemies of the people.

Geiser and Jaszi,\(^2\) Popper,\(^3\) Beer,\(^4\) and Welles\(^5\) offer essentially the same position, although Welles is more "lenient" when he decides that one may "call this state socialism, communism, or something else..." but its "essential similarity to certain recent and contemporary governments is apparent."\(^6\) On the basis of this inclusive designation Plato's state could be called a capitalistic democracy, since it is "something else" and is "contemporary." It is obvious that arguments such as those proposed by Plato's critics depend upon apparent similarities between his thought and that of modern times and upon the propagandist technique of unsubstantiated reiteration rather than upon a thorough study of Plato.

Most of the arguments that Plato's theories are communistic rest upon two contentions: (1) the similarity between the guardian classes and the Party in Marxist thought, and (2) the common ownership of property. The first contention is superficial in that the Marxist state denies the very

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1. Maxey, PP. 55.
3. Popper, OSE, notes 29 to Ch. 5, 30 to Ch. 4, 34ff to Ch. 6, 3 and 8 to Ch. 13, and the accompanying text to each note.
function for which the guardians were called into being: providing the society with rational leadership aimed toward the development of the good life at the highest level for each of the citizens. Marxism stifles this major goal of the Platonic state by insisting that the material welfare of the state is primary and all moral development contingent upon it. Marxism expels the Philosophers and welcomes the lowest deviation from the ideal into power. The second contention is also superficial because Plato does not suggest that property should be held in common with the exception of the Philosopher-kings and Auxiliaries. All other property is owned by the individual citizens of the third class. In the Laws all of the citizens own the property of the community. Thus, the basic principle of modern communism, that the means of production must be owned in common, is not held by Plato. Plato's thinking on the latter criticism must now be explored more fully in substantiation of the reply to the criticism.

I. PRODUCTION OF WEALTH

In both the Laws and the Republic the entire community is to be engaged, at some level, in the production of wealth. To be sure, the Guardians and the Auxiliaries of the Republic are not to occupy themselves directly in the production of wealth, but do have a hand in the process by

1. Cf. Foster, MPT, 75, for a similar position.
virtue of their ability to keep the state operating smoothly and free from internal and external intimidation or interference. Except in this overall guiding and guarding capacity, the ruling classes are to refrain from dabbling in economic matters. The community, as used here, includes not only the citizens but the slaves, resident aliens, merchants with short-term visas, and freedmen. As in Athens, Plato allows the political franchise to citizens only, but the commercial establishments, day labor, and the crafts, by and large, are entirely in the hands of the metic or slave population. This fact will be shown in more detail.

Is Plato Anti-craftsman? In some places, Plato speaks disparagingly of the arts and crafts. Some critics have cited these instances as evidence of Plato's snobbery and anti-craftsman attitude. Winspear will serve as an example of this type of critic, since he maintains that to Plato, "all work with the hands was menial and unworthy of freemen."¹ In answer to this argument (and to gain a better perspective upon Plato's alleged socialism and communism) three of Plato's comments most often cited as evidence of his misuse of the common man will be surveyed.

(1) Plato says, speaking of the forsaken area of genuine philosophy:

¹. Winspear, GPT, 27. Barker, GPT, 165, footnote, disagrees with the position of Winspear.
Naturally enough, when any poor creature who has proved his cleverness in some mechanical craft, sees here an opening for a pretentious display of high-sounding words...he is glad to break out of the prison of his paltry trade and take sanctuary in the shrine of philosophy. For as compared with other occupations, philosophy...still enjoys a higher prestige, enough to attract a multitude of stunted natures, whose souls a life of drudgery has warped and maimed no less surely than their sedentary crafts have disfigured their bodies...and...what sort of ideas and opinions will be begotten of the misalliance of Philosophy with men incapable of culture? Not any true-born child of wisdom; the only right name for them will be sophistry.

It will be noticed that the point of the entire argument is directed against an inversion of the levels of knowledge and the order of values. The clever craftsman too often forgets that he is shrewd only in the area of his craft. That area he "knows" at best through opinion, but he then assumes that this opinion is sufficient as a basis for philosophy. It is this inversion of the proper order, not the craft or the craftsman, which Plato here condemns. Further, the trade he follows is paltry only in the light of his aspiration to become a philosopher, which by nature and training he is unable to attain. The result is sophistry, not philosophy.

(2) The second passage which apparently belittles labor appears in a discussion of proper education for the Philosopher-kings. Dismissing both physical education and music as insufficient because they impart no knowledge of reality, Plato also rejects the crafts, saying, "The manual crafts, we
agreed, were all rather degrading."\textsuperscript{1} The context of the passage indicates the meaning to be given the statement. The crafts are degrading in the search for true reality since they are concerned wholly with the realm of appearances. If one is to strive to know the real, he must not suffer the limitations of a way of life dedicated to molding the world of appearances. Again, the confusion of the levels of knowledge and a consequent inversion of values indicate that sophistry has claimed the minds of Plato’s critics on this score. His argument against the crafts is simply that they are the worst kind of training for the Philosopher-kings because the crafts turn the attention of the learner to the world of appearances. Hence the crafts are excluded from the education of the Rulers, "as well as all that early education:"\textsuperscript{2} physical education and music.

(3) The third passage appears in a discussion urging that justice is profitable and that certain faults are condemned. These faults are

profligacy, because it gives too much licence to the multiform monster; self-will and ill temper, when the lion and serpent part of us is strengthened till its sinews are overstrung; luxury and effeminacy, because they relax those sinews till the heart grows faint; flattery and meanness, in that the heart’s high spirit is subordinated to the turbulent beast, and for the sake of money to gratify the creature’s insatiable greed the lion is brow-beaten and schooled from youth up to become an ape.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Rep., 522.
\textsuperscript{2} Rep., 522.
\textsuperscript{3} Rep., 590 (Cornford).
In this context the statement occurs which is often cited as evidence of Plato's misuse of the craftsman.

Why, again, is mechanical toil discredited as debasing? Is it not simply when the highest thing in a man's nature is naturally so weak that it cannot control the animal parts but can only learn how to pamper them? Toil as such is not discredited. But craftsmanship dedicated to pampering the appetites through accumulation of money is debasing to the individual and the society, because the order of values is inverted and the floodgates of disorder and chaos are opened allowing the worse elements to control the better elements in the person and the society. It is well for the critic to look further before citing these statements of Plato against the crafts as evidence of his immersion in the convictions of the landed or capitalistic aristocracy.

Citizens are to be Craftsmen (Republic). In laying the rudiments of society Plato argues that every man is fitted for one trade and one only. He then proceeds to list a large number of crafts, trades, and business enterprises which are essential to the healthy state and are carried on by its citizenry. He even goes so far as to enlist "a whole multitude of callings not ministering to any bare necessity," such as hunters, fishermen, poets, artists, actors, servants, nurses,

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1. Rep., 590 (Cornford).
2. Rep., 370. See above, Ch. IV, p. 83f, for the discussion of justice as each doing his own work.
physicians, swineherds, barbers, cooks, and "makers of all sorts of household gear, including everything for women's adornment."¹ Furthermore, it is assumed that citizens will produce wealth in all walks of economic life.² Only the guardians specifically are freed from "all manual crafts" in order to devote themselves fully to the shaping of "their country's freedom."³ The reason is obvious: no one can do the highly specialized work of governing and carry on a business enterprise which would turn his attention from the whole to the part. The crafts are not berated. It is assumed that most of the citizens will remain at work in "the manual crafts." They will do the job for which they are best fitted by nature and training and will not dabble in governing as if that crucial function of society were a side issue cared for in the remnants of one's time. Hence the citizen will be a shoemaker, a farmer, or another sort of businessman, or a soldier, or a judge, but never any combination of these.⁴

Further evidence that Plato is not belittling those who work with their hands is found in his doctrine of the flexibility of the classes. From the craftsmen and the

¹ Rep., 373 (Cornford).
⁴ Rep., 397, 412, 443, 552; cf. 441 where the mass of the citizenry is called traders or money-makers or businessmen. Cf. Laws, 846, 842, 847-848, 919, where the citizen will be a farmer and serve the community in some official capacity.
farmers Auxiliaries and Guardians can and will likely come. From the Guardians and Auxiliaries craftsmen and farmers will be born, so that a constant interchange of individuals will take place among the classes.¹ In relation to the function of ruling, the craftsmen and the farmers are second-class citizens. In like manner the Auxiliaries and the Guardians are second-class citizens as regards production of goods for consumption. "They alone of all the citizens" may not own goods privately.² The reason is not a distrust of craftsmen but a distrust of combining vested interests and the ruling power of the state in the same hands, since that would interfere with their primary loyalty to the whole community and make them into tyrants. The cobbler, potter, carpenter, or farmer may act different roles at different times, but ruin results when rulers are not genuine.³

In every instance cited in this section, it is not the metic, the freedman, or the slave, but the citizen that is referred to as the craftsman. It seems adequate evidence that Plato does not bar the citizen from any sort of work in which he can develop his natural potential to the full.

3. Rep., 420-421, 433-434. Cf. above sections on inversion of the individual, Ch. II, p. 22, Ch. III, pp. 50ff; and of the classes in the state, Ch. VI, pp. 134ff.
The Citizens are Farmers, Never Traders or Craftsmen (Laws). In the Laws, also, the citizens are to know hard labor and the peace which comes with it.\(^1\) The citizens produce goods in the model city of the Laws, but their production is limited to some form of agriculture.\(^2\) As farmers, beekeepers, and shepherds the citizens employ themselves and their servants, and the laws of the city-state provide for such occupations, but never may citizens work for wages.\(^3\) Their primary function, as in the Republic, is learning to be better citizens, hence they spend most of their time, beyond that needed to maintain production of goods, in some sort of direct service to the city-state.\(^4\) This does not imply that the citizen lolls in a paradise of ease, overseeing his servants and the free metics and living off their efforts. Let this, then, be our first principle in the state; ...but let every man in the state have one art, and get his living by that.\(^5\)

Plato also roundly condemns the Spartan and Cretan systems for this very attempt at a life of ease.\(^6\) No one, citizen or

2. Laws, 949, 842.
3. Laws, 842-850; 743, 740, 955.
4. Laws, 770-771, 758, 643-644, 949, 855, 807, 846-847. Plato rests his case, as before, (cf. Rep., 397), on the essential diversity of functions. The citizen's servant is also excluded from any craft or art. Each member of the population is required to limit himself to one art or craft or to farming.
5. Laws, 847.
metic, is to spend his time supervising other workmen so that he will make more money and be able to live a life of ease.

No one who is a smith shall also be a carpenter, and if he be a carpenter, he shall not superintend the smith's art rather than his own, under the pretext that in superintending many servants who are working for him, he is likely to superintend them better, because more revenue will accrue to him from them than from his own art. ¹

Virtue is not born in idleness or nurtured in luxury since these lead directly to chaos or tyranny within the man and the state.

The reason why retail trade, overseas commerce, and the various crafts, including teaching, ² are restricted to noncitizens is fourfold. First, Plato is legislating for a Dorian community with this sort of background—a fact of which he constantly reminds the reader. ³ Second, being a citizen is a full-time job since he is directly engaged in farming and in government at some level. Therefore,

let no citizen or servant of a citizen be occupied in handicraft arts; for he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state, has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, and does not admit of being made a secondary occupation. ⁴

Third, Plato is giving expression to a typical fourth-century Greek attitude toward specialization of function. ⁵ Fourth, and most important, Plato is always aware that the constant

¹. Laws, 846 (Jowett).
². Laws, 804.
³. Laws, 737, 745, 746, 875; cf. 739, 769, 770, 772.
⁴. Laws, 846 (Jowett); cf. Polit., 260.
⁵. Cf. Frentice, TAG, 72-75; CAH, Vol. VI, Ch. XVI.
effort to "drive hard bargains" is detrimental to the development of virtues in the soul. He is arguing simply that a man becomes like that with which he daily surrounds himself. The corruption of a man's soul through greed is a certainty if he allows the appetite for wealth the chief place in his life.

What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? /i.e., the corruption of man's soul through greed./ In the first place, they must have as few retail traders as possible; and in the second place, they must assign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state; and in the third place, they must devise some way whereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.²

In like manner, inn-keeping, piracy, brigandry, slave-trading are to be avoided as the plague; for, although they bring wealth to one's coffers, they "enter into your souls and make you cruel and lawless hunters."³ Hence the citizens must abstain from these, not because manual labor is degrading or commercial personnel are naturally evil or intrinsically bad, but for fear of injuring the individual and the state by allowing avarice an opportunity to grow and upset the rational order of values. When pursuit of wealth becomes an end in itself the good life is impossible, the irrational elements of the individual and society have triumphed and further

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1. In the Republic degeneration of the state illustrates this. Cf. above, Ch. III, pp. 50ff, and below, Ch. VI, pp. 184ff.
2. Laws, 919 (Jowett); cf. 806-807, 831-832; Soph., 223.
3. Laws, 823, 918-919, 842.
degeneration is bound to follow. Because of this Plato argues, "Let there be no retail trade for the sake of money-making...in the city or country at all."¹

**Metics.** In order to free the citizens from temptation to pursue wealth and allow them time to govern, Plato would have two classes of foreigners, other than slaves, assist in the production of goods and services in the model city of the *Laws*. One class is the merchant who comes and goes, stopping only long enough to buy and sell and set sail again. He is interested in making money for himself by supplying necessary goods to the city. Since his primary interest is concerned with himself and he has little concern for the community, he is barred from living in the community. Outside the city is a foreign quarter in which all such persons must reside and carry on their business. Beyond this the merchant of this class has no contact with the city. Men of this class are like birds of passage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea to other cities, while the season lasts; he shall be received in the market-places and harbours and public buildings, near the city but outside, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever he be, duly receives justice; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation. They shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this shall be as little as possible.²

¹ *Laws*, 847.
² *Laws*, 952; cf. 704-706. Cf. the inversion of the state, below, Ch. VI, pp. 184ff.
The trader-money-maker is regarded as bad for the city because of the inversion of the values he represents since money-making has become his goal. Hence, any innovations he might introduce would tend to lure the entire community toward this corruption of the good life.

The second class of foreigners is made up of those craftsmen and merchants who settle in the city as metics or resident aliens. They are to be scattered among the parts of the city with a view to providing services and goods for the entire population which the citizen is unable to do, being limited to agriculture as he is. The metics are allowed in the state because they benefit the husbandmen and thus assist the development of the entire state. These craftsmen and merchants are protected by law from any predatory citizen or fellow metic.1

The metic must be productive, must register as an alien, and may remain for twenty years carrying on business for himself and the community. He may work for wages for another metic, a citizen, or the state, but he must leave at the end of the twenty-year period. While he stays he is not subject to any "sojourner's tax" nor any tax upon his business—buying or selling, importing or exporting—and when he leaves the city he takes his property with him. Should he distinguish himself by benefitting the state in an outstanding way,

1. Laws, 952.
he may be granted the privilege of staying any additional time up to the whole of his life. Plato's argument parallels Athenian practice except that he advises a stipulated term after which the metic must leave, and Plato imposes no tax on the metic as Athenian law did.

The freedman is subject to laws similar to those regarding the foreign metic who came to the city of his own volition. In addition, however, he may not possess more property than the citizen of the third class and hope to remain in the country more than thirty days. If he remains in disregard of this law, he will be punished with death and his property confiscated. In his attitude toward the metic Plato goes far beyond the Cretan policy, but like the Athenian and the Cretan states, he recognizes the importance of the metic in producing wealth for the well-being of the state.

Slaves. The third producer of wealth in the model city of the Laws, and perhaps in the Republic, is the slave population. In regard to slaves Plato has an ethical end in view.

1. Laws, 816, 847, 849, 850. Cf. Thucydides, History, II, 39, for Pericles' boast that periodic deportations of metics were not practiced in Athens. Athens also granted citizenship upon metics who assisted the city in an unusual manner.
2. CAH, Vol. V, 6; Prentice, TAG, 74-75.
3. Laws, 915.
5. Laws, 920.
The slaves are to help the citizen till the soil and perform such tasks as the citizen must do, allowing him the freedom necessary to attend to his civic duties, whether or not he is in office. The economic function of slaves in the *Laws* is not spelled out in detail. The reason is that Plato is legislating for citizens, and slaves are only incidental to civic life. A slave may be employed for any lawful purpose by the one who owns him; that is, he may do the type of work which his owner may do legally. It can only be assumed that the slave occupied a place in the economic life of the city similar to that in Athens where he was employed primarily in household duties and commerce. Plato's condemnation of the Helot-system of Sparta removes that as a possible kind of treatment for slaves. But a slave must never be treated so as to make him more slavish, that is, less virtuous. Toward a slave the citizen must be just.

In view of all these facts, it is really a puzzle to know how to deal with such matters. Two means only are left for us to try—the one is, not to allow the slaves...to be all of the same nation...and the other is to accord them proper treatment, and that not only for their sakes, but still more for the sake of ourselves. Proper treatment of servants...
consists in using no violence toward them, and in hurting them even less, if possible, than our own equals.\(^1\)

Justice toward the slave is partly for the slave's benefit, but largely for the citizen's benefit in that the slave will be more useful and trustworthy and the soul of the master will be appreciably improved through the exercise of justice. The treatment of slaves shows whether a man is genuine or hypocritical in his reverence for justice and hatred of injustice. He, therefore, that in dealing with slaves proves himself, in his character and action, undefiled by what is unholy or unjust will best be able to sow a crop of goodness...\(^2\)

A person may kill his own slave, and suffer only the economic loss in the productivity and the cost of the slave. But if a man kills the slave of another person, he must pay twice the value of the slave.\(^3\) The initial cost and the productive value of a slave is recognized also in the payment to the owner for his liberation for service to the state.\(^4\) This is shown again in that collusion with a slave to obtain him from his rightful owner is forbidden under pain of a fine double the slave's worth.\(^5\)

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1. Laws, 777 (Loeb); cf., 808.
2. Laws, 777 (Loeb); cf. Rep., 549 where the timocratic man does not have "a properly trained man's consciousness of superiority to slaves..." and because of this lack will treat them harshly.
3. Laws, 865, 868.
4. Laws, 914, 929.
5. Laws, 936; cf. 886. Plato did not apply his doctrine of the universality of the good which is the same for all men at all times, for he failed to include, in an adequate way, the barbarians and slaves as capable human beings in his community where the good is brought to bear fruit in everyday community life.
The production of wealth, in the ideal city of the Republic and the model city of the Laws, is in the hands of private individuals. Contrary to the contention of many critics, as was shown, Plato never argues for an economic system which can be likened more than superficially to modern communism, or any other economic dictatorship, or to a landed aristocracy. Themetics, citizens, and the slaves of both groups are controlled only with a view to the preservation and improvement of the individual and the whole society, never in the interests of any one group or any one individual. The city-state best serves the interests and welfare of all individual members, slave or free, by making and administering just laws, through defending the city from enemies, and through education, aimed in every instance toward the increase of virtue, not possession of things.

II. OWNERSHIP

All Goods for Private Use are Privately Owned. As production is in the hands of individuals in Plato's theory, so all goods for private use are privately owned, although regulated by the society for the common good. The citizen possesses his allotment of land for cultivation, provided he uses it carefully, fruitfully, and does not try to dispose of it in any way but leaving it to a son.1 Plato anticipates the

1. Laws, 923-924. This is another principle designed to keep greed and personal aggrandizement at a minimum.
objection that such "private" ownership is not private, since
the individual cannot do with it as he pleases. Such an ob-
jector, Plato suggests, "wants to have the entire control of
all his property..."1 Putting words in the objector's mouth,
he continues, "How monstrous that I am not allowed to give,
or not to give, my own to whom I will..."2 Plato answers that
the custom of allowing the person to do as he pleased with his
real estate came into being through the fear of ancient law-
givers, but

I, as legislator, regard you and your possessions, not
as belonging to yourselves, but as belonging to your
whole family, both past and future, and yet more do I
regard both family and possessions as belonging to the
state; wherefore, if someone steals upon you with flat-
tery, when you are tossed on the sea of disease or old
age, and persuade you to dispose of your property in a
way that is not for the best, I will not, if I can help,
allow this; but I will legislate with a view to the
whole, considering what is best for the state and for the
family...3

Hence, the paternal lot and the fixtures upon it can-
not be sold or disposed of in any way except by willing it to
a son, whether one's own or one adopted for this occasion.4

Do not disparage the small and modest proportions of
the inheritances which you received in the distribution,
by buying and selling them to one another...these are
the terms upon which.../the citizen/ may or may not take
the lot...he who buys or sells the houses or lands which
he has received, may suffer the punishment which he
deserves...5

1. Laws, 922.
2. Laws, 922 (Jowett). And this was written 2250 years
   Before Inheritance Tax!
3. Laws, 923 (Jowett); cf. 740 and Rep., 556.
5. Laws, 741 (Jowett).
The remainder of his property, which may be as much as four times the value of the paternal plot, may be willed as the individual pleases to any of the family or adopted members of the family.\(^1\)

With the moral health of the state and the individual in mind, Plato allows the individual freedom to own and to dispose of property only where ethical well-being of the person and community will not be impaired. He is opposed to a laissez-faire system which allows a few individuals or families to gain control of the means of production—in this case, the land.\(^2\) The arguments advanced that Plato favored an oligarchy of the landed families are without support from his writings, as are those which contend that he favored a thorough-going communism or socialism. The good life remains Plato's goal.

**Minimum Property.** If some citizens could be dispossessed by their more wealthy neighbors the state would fall into at least two rival factions—the "haves" and the "have-nots," the rich and the poor, the luxury-ridden and the poverty-stricken. Consequently, the genuine society would no longer exist and an internecine war would prevail. In this condition the good life would be impossible. Hence, to avoid poverty and luxury and their attendant chaos, Plato

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establishes a minimum and a maximum of property which may be owned by each citizen. Along with the limitations various regulations and penalties are proposed which will help assure observance of the limitations. Every citizen family must possess its own farm and buildings. This is the minimum property a citizen may own, and no one may force him to pay debts, fines, or other assessments which will interfere with this basic property holding. However, in cases of family degeneracy over two or three generations, the individual or family may be dispossessed of the paternal farmstead.

The lands of the city-state, to which the state cannot add, are possessed in equal shares by the citizens, and by citizens only. The farms which are most fertile shall be smallest, and so on to the least fertile farms which are largest. Furthermore, each citizen shall have two sections of land in his allotment and one shall be nearer the urban area and the other further into the surrounding countryside. The number of the total allotments must equal the citizenry, plus twelve lots for the gods. The number of paternal plots must remain the same: no more or no less than 5,040. Families

1. *Laws*, 744, 855, 736, 754; cf. *Rep.*, 433. No person "shall have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own." (Cornford).
must be regulated according to this same scheme so that neither overpopulation nor underpopulation will result. 1 An unstable population would produce either poverty or opulence, both of which prey on the social order to its destruction.

Each citizen family must have its own house, as well as the land to support the family and produce an excess for the slaves, freedmen and other resident aliens. Married children are to have their own houses and not live with the parent of either partner. 3 Just how this is to be accomplished before the parents of the husband die is left unsaid. Perhaps a surplus of allotments is anticipated through deaths in childless families, or from those who lose their property rights through idleness or some crime against the community. Or Plato may have vaguely in mind more than one set of houses on the family farm. However, this seems to be one more illustration of his legislating for the entire community rather than one couple.

Registration of Property. Each citizen must register his property with the magistrates in charge of this function so that the citizen's holdings may be kept within the limitations established. The general exemption allowed in this scheme of income tax and property tax is the equal share of

2. Laws, 847-848; cf. 745 where two houses are required for each citizen family.
3. Laws, 776.
land which each citizen possesses. Further exemptions are based upon the class structure of the model city. Each citizen registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three allowed to the second, two the third, and a single mina to the fourth. ¹

Thus there are four ranks of citizens upon which the exemptions in taxation are based as well as other requirements and privileges as discussed in the previous chapter. But the inequality of wealth is not a permanent caste for the individual. He may move up or down in rank, or remain the same, depending upon his ability as an individual. ² The state cannot destroy the class distinctions based on wealth and individual initiative. ³ Plato goes much further in respect to private property and individual initiative based on ability than his critics are willing to notice. What he is suggesting throughout this classification or registration of wealth is something very near to present day capital gains and income taxes.

**Poverty and Wealth.** The enjoyment of wealth must in all cases be moderate, such as a temperate man might enjoy.

1. Laws, 745. The value of the mina is estimated variously. Jastrow, History of Babylonia and Assyria, 1914, suggests that the mina was worth about $140 in purchasing power, in 1914 dollar values.
2. Laws, 744.
A medium between deficiency and excess goods, between privilege and serfdom, between excessive economic power and helplessness must be attained by a rational understanding and application of justice.¹ Winspear sees Plato's ethical statements regarding wealth as so much flowery language to cover-up the real issue which is his anti-democratic, anti-mercantile bias.

Plato, standing as he did in the middle of a period of bitter class struggle, longed for unity within the state, for a polity which should not be two cities within one framework—the city of the rich and the city of the poor. It is a desire with which we can sympathize if unity is to be attained by removing the deep-seated antagonism between the possessors and the dispossessed; this can be done, of course, by removing the economic reasons for the antagonism as, e.g., in modern socialist theory. Plato was in no position to envisage such a solution. He was a member of the ruling and landed class in a slave-owning society; his passion for unity, therefore...took the reactionary form of a demand for subordination, the willing submission of the 'natural subordinates' to their 'natural superiors.' And instead of using the great technical advances that mercantilism had brought in its train for the general good, Plato can see nothing but the 'evils' of democracy in a class-riven society. He calls...for the abandonment of most of the progress that the world had made up to his day, for a return to more primitive economic forms, for a reduction in the standard of living of everyone, because wealth coming to the few had brought such manifold abuses.²

The truth of Winspear's position, like much of his argument, depends upon acceptance of his Marxist philosophy and very little upon his treatment of Plato. Plato saw the city of

¹. Laws, 815; Phaedr., 279; cf. Jaeger, PAI, Vol. I, 114, for Solon's attempt to settle the same problem of economic inequalities, and how he calls upon Moira to effect the change.

the rich pitted against the city of the poor and sought a solution within the framework of the situation of his day. He sought to remove the "antagonism between the possessors and the dispossessed" in the Republic and the Laws by removing political power from the control of economic interests. Unlike Winspear, Plato does not understand progress solely in terms of economics. His understanding and use of law, philosophy, the arts, and even of economics attest the fact that he does not abandon the progress made in civilization up to his time.

Plato's position on wealth cannot be severed from his ethical principle: that the development of the virtues must take precedence over all other human activity and that justice, wisdom, temperance, and courage must be carried into every sphere of action. To speak of Plato's ethical and political ideals as so much "fine language" and then condemn his economic proposals as bald injustice against those who toil is the sheerest sophistry. Furthermore, Winspear's bias and polemic against Plato is visible in his interpretation of luxury or excessive wealth as meaning simply adequate supply of goods, and he omits Plato's objection to poverty. "The assumption of Plato that comfort and an economic abundance destroy craftsmanship will seem quaint to many

1. Cf. Ch. III.
2. Cf. Winspear, GPT, 214-215, for one example of this.
readers." Only to those who forget that Plato views wealth from an ethical perspective will his position seem quaint.

Poverty and luxury are twin evils in any society; and if the city is to be united in the quest for virtue, both must be eliminated. Poverty may be "the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property." Even then poverty is an evil to be rooted out and replaced by moderation in desires as well as in possessions. Luxury, on the other hand, may cause the increase of a man's desires for more things and is to be avoided. "No Plutus either in gold or in silver should dwell enshrined within the state." Nor must poverty nag the footsteps of the citizens of any state, making them fall into quarrels over the meager supply of goods.

Now a community which has no communion with either poverty or wealth is generally the one in which the noblest characters will be formed, for in it there is no place for the growth of insolence and injustice, of rivalries and jealousies.

Poverty and luxury are evils because they create distractions, envy, and conflict within individuals and society.

Plato argues that "there can never be any real equality" without two much needed reforms—the abolition of debts

1. Winspear, GPT, 203-204.
3. Laws, 736 (Jowett).
5. Laws, 679 (Loeb).
and agrarian laws to redistribute the land.¹ Then, the law-giver must see to it that debts cannot pile up on the individual household and that the land cannot become unequally held.² Private property is essential in any actual state, Plato admits in the Laws, and in the Republic the mass of the citizens possess their own property. He understands that wealth must be generally distributed, not concentrated in the hands of the few if justice and temperance are to find their way into the social order. The favorites of fortune, rich beyond any need, surrounded by luxury and its concomitant license, degenerate, not by chance, but because of training in evil living. Whenever and wherever wealth becomes the sole requirement for social standing and positions of authority, the individual and the society involved are bound to degenerate. The life of virtue is born of justice, temperance, wisdom, and courage, never from grasping for more and more possessions.

Extremes of wealth or poverty turn the state into conflict and make "bad workmen" out of the members. If a workman becomes rich, he also tends toward idleness and carelessness in pursuing his craft. In this fashion he becomes a worse craftsman, training his apprentices to be inferior craftsmen also. Poverty has the same overall effect in

1. Laws, 684.
2. Laws, 744-745, 754, 923, 955, 855.
making the craftsman and his workers worse, because he cannot afford to have the tools he needs to do his work well or to become the best person he can be. In both cases the man is made worse and injustice is done to his soul and to society.

Luxury is the occasion for many "unholy deeds."¹ It makes the soul insolent, braggart, illiberal, and coveting property above its own health.

Therefore, I would not have anyone fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state....Let parents...bequeath to their children not a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence.²

Immoderate wealth is a reflection upon the character of the possessor, suggesting that his ethical standards are not too high else he would have given more in support of the state and would have been more careful in the methods by which he gained the wealth. The pursuit of immoderate gain gives the appetitive element in the human being too much control of one's actions and attitudes. It twists and distorts the sense of values, forming a one-sided man with reason and ambition enslaved to the appetite for excessive wealth.

Neither extreme wealth nor extreme poverty can be allowed in the well-ordered state for both have a subversive tendency.³ This subversive tendency is not only in corrupting

¹ Rep., 416-417, 422.
² Laws, 729 (Jowett); cf. 728.
³ Rep., 422; Laws 679, 705, 919.
the characters and work of the craftsmen, it also creates a
division between the wealthy and the paupers and dissension
among the rich. Class conflict inevitably follows upon the
disproportionate distribution of the wealth of the state.\(^1\)
Regardless of the alliances made within the state the allies
always outnumber the enemies, even though one class has all
the power, wealth, and controls the persons of the other
class. This action does not, however, produce a state. It
will under any such division remain in a condition of strife,
one group seeking to maintain the \textit{status quo}, another trying
to upset the balance in its favor. The unity essential to
a genuine state is lacking within a wealthy, corpulent so-
ciety, and leads to the inevitable destruction of the state.
"The passion for wealth is thus, in the end, self-destructive,
that is to say, contradictory and unreasonable."\(^2\)

Another evil attendant to poverty and luxury is war
between city-states. Lust for excessive wealth may drive a
state to war on its neighbors, as may poverty arising from
overpopulation, or a disproportionate distribution of goods
within the city.\(^3\) Beyond his analysis of the problems of
luxury and poverty and their bad effects on the individuals
and in the state, Plato proposes several measures to

\(^{1}\) \textit{Laws}, 690-691, 729, 744; \textit{Rep.}, 466, 550-555.
\textit{Phaedr.}, 68-69; \textit{Phaedo}, 68, 82; \textit{Rep.}, 423, 436, 330-
331, 550-555, 580-581.
\(^{3}\) \textit{Phaedo}, 66; \textit{Rep.}, 373-374, 422, 469, 551-552.
eliminate or minimize the occurrence and effects of these twin evils. These occur as limitations on wealth.

III. LIMITATIONS ON WEALTH IN THE REPUBLIC

The limitations on wealth among the guardians is severe and through-going, since they actually possess no wealth above the minimum necessary to perform their functions in the city-state. The guardian classes in the Republic possess no wealth as a group nor as individuals. They serve the state and receive only their food, lodging, and such simple supplies as are needed. And at the end of the fiscal period nothing is to remain in their possession. Since the Rulers receive no pay in addition to their upkeep, it follows that all wealth is in the hands of private citizens.

The Artisans, the main body of the citizens in the Republic, are vaguely limited in the amount of wealth they may possess. Neither poverty nor luxury should be theirs for fear of spoiling their incentive and abilities through either idleness or want of proper equipment and materials.

Regulations concerning business transactions, dealings between buyers and sellers, contracts with tradesmen...collection and payment

1. Rep., 416-421. Cf. 465, They "possess nothing, though all the wealth of their fellow citizens" is before them. Laws, 955, "Those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts..." Plato follows this injunction throughout the Laws, allowing no gifts beyond one's keep for government service.

of any market or harbor dues...regulations for markets ...customs houses, and all that sort of thing...1

including police powers and legal procedures in specific cases, cannot be legislated for in the constitution of the ideal state. Only the good and honorable men who make up the leadership of the state can formulate such definite rules. 2

And if they are not of good breeding they will endlessly make rules hoping to reach perfection in that way. Shorey contends that Plato is being contemptuous in this passage by mixing indiscriminately commercial, legal, police, and tax terms.3 It seems more probable that Plato is simply saying that the details of government and business are not to be marked down in the constitution of any state. General principles are in order, not minute details which good men can always discover and apply.

Business is not to be shackled by law as long as it fulfills its place in the commonwealth, making no attempt to be subversive of the interests of the whole community. Furthermore, if the guardians do their work well, the affairs of the business world will be carried on by men who have a general education in the ways of virtue so that they will follow

1. Rep., 425 (Cornford).
2. See Winspear, GPT, 206, for a distortion of Plato's idea: "It is no wonder that such men would solve the details of commercial intercourse. They would solve them presumably by a major operation involving the expeditious extermination of the patient."
the guidance of reason issuing from the Rulers. Business will be in the hands of good men, not rogues. The educational apparatus of the society will see to this. If business affairs are not led by men of character, no amount of law can correct them or truly guide their activities for long. "Fraud in business and in all those other transactions" cannot be put to an end by petty laws, although enough be enacted to girdle the globe. To offer a host of picayune laws as the remedy for ill-breeding and poor education is as ineffectual as "cutting off the heads of a hydra." It would be a process of caring for the symptoms of a disease without seeking the real cause and applying the remedy there. The results of a corrupt culture cannot be cured by grasping at every chance to make a new law. The people of such a society

wish to be saved from the mischiefs of their vices, but not from their vices. Charity would be wasted on this poor waiting on their symptoms. A wise and hardy physician will say, Come out of that, as the first condition of advice.

So Plato leaves the regulations vague concerning the amount of wealth a citizen may own except for the guardian classes who receive and possess nothing but their "board and keep."

2. Emerson, "Experience," ERWE, 265.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON WEALTH IN THE LAWS

Maximum and Minimum Property. In the model city of the Laws the possession of wealth is strictly limited, although it cannot be stated in terms of dollars. The limitations on wealth operate both as a "floor" and a "ceiling" on the holdings of an individual or a family. The parental lot usually cannot be taken from the possessor. This is the poorest a citizen may become. The wealthiest he may become beyond the family lot is four times the value of the lot, of which none is more valuable than any other. A check is kept on such holdings by required registration with the magistrates in charge of this function in the state. The resident alien is restricted to the amount of wealth which a citizen of the third class may possess, i.e., three times the value of the lot.

If any citizen comes into possession of more than the due measure of property,

whether by discovery or gift or money-making, or...by some other such piece of luck,—if he makes the surplus over to the state and the gods who keep the state, he shall be well-esteemed and free from penalty. But if anyone disobeys this law, whose wishes may get half by laying information, and the man that is convicted shall pay out an equal share of his own property, and half shall go to the gods. All the property of every man

1. Laws, 744, 754. Nor may a citizen own more than one lot. 923.
2. Laws, 744-745.
3. Laws, 955, 744, 754.
4. Laws, 915.
over and above his allotment shall be publicly written out and be in the keeping of the magistrates appointed by law, so that legal rights pertaining to all matters of property may be easy to decide and perfectly clear.

The application of this law would amount to confiscation of all that is over the due measure of property, plus a fine of an equal share from the legal portion of his goods. It is similar to, but more severe than, the penalty for income tax evasion in our own nation. The declaration of the citizen's property above the lot and the maximum allowed on other property constitutes a tax on a graduated scale.

The evaluation of the citizen's property may take two forms. The Treasury may adopt whichever it may prefer of the two existing methods of contribution, and may determine year by year whether it will require a proportion of the whole assessed value, or a proportion of the current yearly income, exclusive of the taxes paid for the common meals.

In this way the revenues of the state will not suffer during years of poor crops, and may be increased in years of plenty. Regulations on agricultural produce are designed to insure a constant supply of food with a minimum of palate-tickling non-essentials. Apiaries, orchards, vineyards for food with a very small amount for producing wine, livestock farms, and those for producing small grains are allowed. These are equivalent to the typical Greek agricultural practice of

1. Laws, 744-745 (Loeb). The same idea is expressed again at 754.
2. Laws, 955 (Loeb).
3. Laws, 647, 842-845, 847.
Plato's time. Three exceptions may be noted in Plato's restrictions. Only a minimum of wine is to be produced since the population as a whole will not be given to its consumption.\(^1\) No effort will be made to produce an extraordinarily fine grade of meats for the tables of the rich. Nor will olive oils or other foods be produced with an eye to large profits on the foreign markets. Production is for home consumption and for such surpluses as may be needed to trade for essential foreign goods.\(^2\)

Regulations on Farm Produce. With respect to the distribution of the agricultural produce of the state, Plato suggests that it be divided into twelve portions corresponding to the twelve tribes, or sections of the state, and probably corresponding to the months of the year, "according to the method of its \(\text{agricultural produce}\) consumption."\(^3\) These twelve parts include all of the fruits, grains, vegetables, and marketable animals. No one is to withhold a part of his produce to consume as he pleases. The whole of the farm crops are to be divided into the twelve portions and then into three portions corresponding to the citizens, slaves, and resident foreigners. Each group is to have an equal share of the foodstuff. The citizen is to control two of the shares, one for

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himself and one of his servants. No one may be compelled
to sell any part of these two shares of the produce. ¹ The
third share for the craftsmen, merchants, and such foreign
visitors who may be in the land, is to be put on the market.
This share must be sold to the metic or foreign visitor by
the slaves or freemen, who act as middlemen for the citizen
farmer, at specified times and always in the market-places
where the transactions may be supervised by the market-war-
dens. The wardens are to prevent damages to public property,
and oversee all sales to make sure they are legal, i.e. that
the fair-trade prices are not violated, that adulterated prod-
ucts are not foisted on the buyer, and that no blackmarket in
forbidden goods is operated. ²

Regulations on Trade and Commerce. Poverty and luxury
arise from commerce and trade, not from agriculture. But re-
tail trade is not harmful when properly pursued in order to
distribute more equally the goods and services which were un-
evenly distributed. ³ Such is the function of the merchant,
the hired servant, the innkeeper, and "some more and some less
respectable trades." Their function is to provide "men with
full satisfaction of their needs and with evenness in their
properties." ⁴

¹ Laws, 847-848.
² Laws, 849-850, 915, 920, 917.
³ Laws, 918, 919.
⁴ Laws, 918 (Loeb).
Since this is the function of trade and commerce, how did its bad reputation arise? If this can be discovered, then the parts which bring disrepute can be minimized by legislation or cut out entirely. The cause of the disrespect paid the merchant, as Plato understood it, was to be found in the nature of man. Few men are able to so order their lives that they deliberately choose moderate gains when they might make larger gains. The mass of men desire without limit and prefer to gain insatiably; and it is because of this that all the classes concerned with retail trade, commerce, and innkeeping are disparaged and subjected to violent abuse.

But if all such occupations were managed according to just principles, they would not only serve the state better but would have a good reputation.

Being what they are, men must be controlled by law. Hence, for example, adulteration or misrepresentation of goods is not to be tolerated. Two prices are not to be asked for one item, i.e., there are to be no discounts, rebates, "kick-backs," or other schemes of double-pricing an item. Profits are to be regulated with an eye to moderate gains so that trade will benefit everyone and do the least possible harm to anyone, those who practice it or those who are involved through buying and selling to the merchant. Furthermore,

some restriction must be placed upon the kinds and number of craftsmen and merchants to be allowed in the city-state. Craftsmen must practice an art helpful to the citizen farmer. They are not to be engaged in producing luxury items for which the state will have no use. Most craftsmen and merchants are forbidden to enter the city-state since the state will have no use for a multitude of them, and since they are an unsettled, tricky, and knavish breed, peddling that aspect of their lives quite as easily as they sell their goods.

Even so, the craftsman and merchant are important in Plato's scheme of things, and the officials of the state must make specific provision for their proper functioning.

The Law-wardens must meet in consultation with experts in every branch of retail trade, and at their meetings they must consider what standard of profits and expenses produces a moderate gain for the trader, and the standard of profits and expenses thus arrived at they must prescribe in writing; and this they must insist on—the market-stewards, the city-stewards, and the rural stewards, each in their own sphere.

It is interesting that Plato considers the importance of consulting with themetics about their economic interests. Far from riding roughshod over the alien, Plato brings him into the very center of the process of law making. Their knowledge and advice are of prime importance. Business interests

1. Laws, 848.
2. Laws, 705, 842, 919.
3. Laws, 920 (Loeb).
must be considered as well as rights and aims of the citizens. The "experts in every branch of retail trade" can be no other than the alien businessmen.

Winspear's comment that Plato expresses "supreme contempt for mercantile life and trade"¹ is unjustified by any unprejudiced reading of Plato's works. It can be admitted only that he does not welcome commercialism as the savior of the state. But he recognizes its importance, even in an agricultural society such as he proposes in the Laws. To observe the effects of trading on fourth-century Greek life and character is not within the area of possibility for Winspear, but was quite possible for Plato. And to assume that Plato was an incompetent observer and reporter because he was conservative is to deny any opposing point of view, past or present, the possibility of factual, intelligent reporting and analysis.

The essence of wealth—which is after all the object of all human effort—is that it has neither measure nor end in itself. Even the richest of us prove that, says Solon, for they strive to double their riches.

It is this "essence of wealth" that Plato is seeking to avoid in his city-state. His restrictions on commerce and the crafts are to be understood in that light, not as an attack on commerce as such.

¹. Winspear, GPT, 206.
Regulations on Money. In another move to limit the possession of wealth Plato proposes various regulations on money. Money is defined in the *Laws* and the *Republic* as a token of exchange to insure a more equitable distribution of goods.\(^1\) It is the connection between the product of one artisan and that of another. Barter could be carried on, but that would entail too much useless labor, e.g. transporting a pig to the weaver for cloth, and the weaver, wanting only a ham, must trade the remainder for what he needs. Or if the farmer were to trade only the ham, that may be too much or too little for the cloth he wishes. Or the farmer may have to sit idle for days while waiting to trade for the product he needs. The process is too unwieldy, hence currency takes this middle place. So goods are exchanged for money and money for the goods which the middleman keeps on hand. Any money which the farmer or the craftsman or the merchant has over and above that needed for the moment may be kept and used in future purchases. However, he may not buy and sell solely for the sake of profit, but to benefit all the citizens by distributing goods more evenly.\(^2\)

The state is to control the volume and the value of the currency used within its borders.\(^3\) This money is to have value within the state only and is to be used solely for

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domestic purposes not acceptable to the outside world.¹ But, in order to carry on commerce and to supply officials and tourists who go to other countries, a common Hellenic coin must also be available. This currency will be kept only in the state treasuries and may be purchased in exchange for the domestic coin. If the official or the traveller from the model city returns with any foreign money, it must be exchanged in return for the local coin.² The object of this dual currency and the restrictions concerning its use is to make local buying and selling easier and to control or prohibit any tendency which would upset the balance in property.

Money may not be hoarded. Any wealth, money or other kinds, beyond the legal limit of four times the value of the allotment will be confiscated. In the Republic only the artisans will possess any money at all and this only in moderate amounts.³ Hoarded wealth results in a morbidly inflamed society, full of wealth but lacking in the culture of the soul and body and becomes easy prey for anyone who desires to enrich himself at the expense of others.⁴

Certain uses of money are just and right. It may be used to provide education both physical and mental, to entertain distinguished foreign visitors, in exchange for necessary

¹. Laws, 742.
². Laws, 742.
⁴. Laws, 741.
products, or be given to the city in support of festivals in peace or for defense in time of war, and it may form part of an inheritance. It must always be used in ways designed to support the development of virtuous character, never in the opposite manner.

Regulations on Contracts, Loans, and Credit. A contract is a most holy thing, especially one made with a non-citizen. The contract is not to be broken voluntarily. If an agreement is broken, the one who fails shall pay the amount of the contract which he failed to perform and "begin again and execute them gratis in the given time." If the one who hired the work done fails to pay the craftsman at the time agreed, he must pay double the hire of the workman. If a year elapses, he must pay a monthly interest of one obol for every drachma he owes. The reason for this exorbitant interest is to control the citizen or metic who for the sake of gain is willing to upend the very foundations of the state, destroying the unity brought by temperance and justice.

This is the only kind of situation in which interest is allowed by law. Interest is not to be offered or

2. Laws, 729-730.
3. Laws, 921 (Jowett).
4. Laws, 921. The interest rate would be about 200% per year. A drachma equals 6 obols. Plato is less severe on failure to pay hired help and for contracts. Laws, 857.
collected on loans.¹ If money is loaned to anyone, the borrower is not obligated by law to repay either the capital or any interest on the capital. One should not deposit any money with another person whom he does not consider a friend.² Nor shall a person ask or give credit on purchases in the market with expectation of claiming legal protection against loss. The risk is all upon the lender's or creditor's shoulders.³

Regulations on Size of Family. Plato's ideal is that of the typical Greek city-state: self-sufficiency in the economic sphere as well as in the political and cultural areas. He understood that as long as the population was not allowed to grow beyond the limits of the 5,040 families the state could be self-supporting with neither luxury nor poverty impeding its primary aim of producing good citizens. But Plato sets no limit on the size of each family unit, presuming that a prudent fear of poverty and war will keep them from becoming too large. However, Welles contends that he limited the size of the family to exactly four children.⁴ He cites the Laws, 737e, 740a, and 741a as evidence. The most careful reading and generous interpretation of the designated passages do not substantiate the arguments.

¹ Laws, 921, 742, 849, 915; Rep., 556; cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1258b, 5ff.
² Laws, 742, 842, 743.
³ Laws, 849-850, 915.
⁴ Welles, Art., (1948), 114, footnote 17.
Plato is concerned with the problem of population. He suggests, first, that there be no additions to the 5,040 citizen families, this being "a suitable number." Second, each citizen should consider his allotment as "common property of the whole State," caring for it diligently and reverently for his benefit and that of the community. Third, should the population increase or decrease so that the 5,040 households are endangered, the magistrates must either encourage or discourage additional births to suit the situation. Should the population continue to increase, colonies must be sent out so that poverty will not envelope the city.

If the population should shrink for any reason, "we ought not to introduce new citizens...of our own free will, but 'necessity'...not even God himself can compel." The implication here is that new citizens will be invited into the city, after careful screening. This is the content of the passages Welles cites in support of his contention that there must be four children in a family. Plato speaks of families which will have no children and must adopt a son from more fecund families. At other times he mentions the one son who will receive the father's inheritance, but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the

2. Laws, 740.
law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall dis-tribute as sons to those citizens who have no children, and are disposed to receive them.¹

Plato makes a further effort to assure a continued equal distribution of wealth. No dowry is to be asked, paid, or received.² Marriage should be across class lines to keep wealth scattered among all the families instead of concentrating it in the hands of the fewer well-to-do families. This is but a suggestion, not a rule, since it is more important to seek out husbands and wives who will make happy marriage partners and who will produce children of the best disposition and ability.³

Penalties and Fines. To further the effort to minimize the occurrence of poverty or luxury are several laws which deal with the confiscation of all or part of the citizen's or the alien's property. Any disinherited citizen must leave the country, and lose any rights to the allotments within the state.⁴ A citizen who is mentally ill because of disease or age shall be kept at home and shall lose his rights to the lot.⁵ Fines up to one hundred drachmas may be assessed for

1. Laws, 740 (Jowett).
2. Laws, 742, 774.
3. Laws, 773. The genuine happiness of the citizens and production of select offspring among the guardian classes are also important in the Republic.
5. Laws, 929, 934.
disregarding this law. Such a fine would be worth the wages of approximately seventy days' work. 1

An annual tax is levied on the person, after his 35th birthday, who abstains from marriage because he hopes that this will bring him greater profit. The magistrates are to fine him so that his profits will not amount to more than is essential to his livelihood. 2 And if the annual tax is not paid, a fine of ten times the sum of the tax is to be levied and collected. 3 Here is another feature in Plato's theory for the model city that is very similar to the current tax system. Plato has in mind that no person must be allowed to profit unduly from residing in a community in which he shares little concern for the commonweal.

Other taxes, euphemistically called "contributions," are based on the registration of legal wealth. 4 As in Athens, the rich were relieved of part of their wealth by various means such as a larger share in national defense and support of various "liturgies." 5 Offerings to the temples are to be made and must be of a single block of stone or wood, both fairly expensive items, or woven work, but not more than a woman can weave in one month. If these contributions are

1. Cf. Zimmern, TGC, 169. A day's work earned about \( \frac{1}{2} \) drachmas during the first half of the fourth century.
2. Laws, 721.
3. Laws, 774.
4. Laws, 744.
not paid, the loss to the state is to be exacted, by law, through the confiscation and sale of such property as will cover the indebtedness.¹

Cases of assault and battery carry a money penalty of two or four times the loss incurred because of the injury, payable to the injured person. In addition a fine is to be paid to the state for its loss in terms of additional expenses and the service of the disabled person.² In cases of assault with intent to kill, the offender is to be exiled for the remainder of his days and he retains possession of his property other than the allotment, which passes into the care of the guardians to be cultivated for the support of the family and eventually given over to the heir. If a grown son's parent is so exiled, he shall support the parent and become possessor of the family lot.³ In cases of a family showing consistent signs of producing criminals through three generations, the remainder of the offspring shall be sent away with all their own possessions, but the city retains the lot.⁴ In isolated cases of capital punishment the family of the dead man retains title to the appointed lot.⁵

¹ Laws, 949, 955-956.
² Laws, 378.
³ Laws, 377. Jowett reads, "If their sons are grown up, they shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent..." I have followed Bury's translation since the Greek text has the sense of compulsion, not negation of son's duties, hence, "the offspring shall be compelled to support their exiled parent..."
⁴ Laws, 856.
⁵ Laws, 854-855.
any fine assessed may not impoverish a family to the point of making the lot unproductive through lack of funds. Nor may the lot be touched by debt or fines, except as mentioned immediately above. ¹ If a stranger kills anyone, whether or not he is a citizen, the killer must be exiled for life with loss of all his property, which is paid to the family of the deceased. ² In cases of disputed personal property the loser pays court costs and must give up the property in dispute. If possession of the property continues unchallenged over a period of five years, if held in secret, or one year, if openly displayed, the one who has had possession is not liable to litigation. ³

Moving boundary markers is one of the worst crimes against a neighbor. Attracting his bees, luring his animals away, damaging his crops or woodlands, and carrying off a neighbor's goods without consent are punishable by heavy fines and dishonor. ⁴

Any public official found guilty of intentionally acting against the just interests of an individual shall pay damages equal to at least one half the injury plus a fine to the public treasury. ⁵ If the wrong is perpetrated against an orphan, either by fraud or neglect, the public official shall

¹ Laws, 855.
² Laws, 866.
³ Laws, 913, 914, 915, 954.
⁴ Laws, 843, 844, 884, 913.
⁵ Laws, 767.
be fined in the amount decided by a court, and in case of fraud "let him be dismissed from his office..."¹

V. SUMMARY

The production of wealth, in the ideal city of the Republic and the model city of the Laws, is in the hands of private individuals. Contrary to the contention of many critics, as was shown, Plato never argues for an economic system which can be likened more than superficially to modern communism, or any other economic dictatorship, or to a landed aristocracy. The metics, citizens, and the slaves of both groups are controlled only with a view to the preservation and improvement of the individual and the whole society, never in the interests of any one group or any one individual. The city-state best serves the interests and welfare of all individual members, slave or free, by making and administering just laws, through defending the city from enemies, and through education, aimed in every instance toward the increase of virtue not possession of things.

All goods for private use are privately owned, although regulated for the common good by the Philosopher-kings in the Republic and by law in the Laws. Neither poverty nor luxury can be tolerated in a healthy society. These evils must be eliminated if the city is to be united in the quest for

¹ Laws, 928.
virtue which is its only reason for continuing to be. Strife and chaos come to any state where luxury and poverty dwell. In the Republic only the third class may earn and possess wealth other than adequate housing, clothing, food, and equipment to discharge one's duties. The guardian classes possess no wealth beyond this minimum.

The allotments of land in the Laws must be of the same value inasmuch as this is possible. Other wealth must never exceed four times this basic and common possession. The rights of inheritance are strictly limited with an eye to keeping possessions approximately equal in the society and reducing conflict. The number of families must be constant since the supply of land is constant and the state must not depend unduly upon outside sources for the necessities of life. If the number of families should increase, either more land and supplies would have to be made available to the citizens, or poverty would claim the state.

Gaining property of any sort by fraud, theft, or litigation is prohibited in the model city. Such restrictions assist in maintaining an approximately equal distribution of goods, avoiding either poverty or luxury, and reducing friction and chaos in the community. A sound state can be built only upon an equitable distribution of land and other

1. Laws, 737-738, 855, 740. Cf. Rep., 370f, where the opposite is maintained.
property. A spirit of kindly and moderate sharing arises from proper distribution of goods. The whole political order is built upon this basic moral and economic principle. Freedom from avarice coupled with a strong sense of justice rout any quarrels and disputes about property which would lead to disorder and the consequent destruction of the laws and the state.¹

Limitations on the possession of wealth stem from Plato's understanding of man and ethics, not from an ancient pro-Marxian economic determinism or landed aristocratic blindness. The human being left without the regulations of law is mortally in danger of following his inclination to be selfish and greedy. The limitations of law are educational overall. Without these limiting effects of law, avarice would develop in the individual and society, enveloping the higher psychic powers, and exalting the lesser goods into positions of greatest importance. The state is based on a right regulation of property. Without this the foundations of society would be endangered for the sake of gain for a few men. Only when the virtues prevail, expressed in law and molded in human character through education, can wealth assume its proper place in social life.²

¹ Laws, 736-737; cf. 729, 741, 743, 744-745, 694-697.
CHAPTER VI

THE PLACE OF WEALTH IN THE STATE

To this point it has been shown that Plato's treatment of wealth cannot be understood apart from his psychology, ethics, and political theory. Furthermore it has been demonstrated that his regulations concerning the production and ownership of wealth do not arise from any communistic theory or anti-democratic, anti-mercantile prejudice, as some of his critics claim, but from his quest for the good life for the individual and for the society. This chapter will consider the place of wealth in the life of the society. First to be considered are the reasons why certain states of Plato's day fell short of his ethical standard in regard to the place wealth should occupy in a society. Next in order are considerations of the part wealth plays in the origin, the political structure and function, and the degeneration of the state. Certain criticisms by Popper and Winspear are discussed at several points.

I. PLATO'S CRITICISM
OF THE PLACE OF WEALTH IN EXISTING STATES

Egypt and Phoenicia. The economic proposals of Plato were criticisms of existing Greek and non-Greek practices and attitudes as well as essential parts of his political and ethical theory. The Egyptians and Phoenicians allowed
appetite to overwhelm the virtues of temperance, wisdom, and justice. This one-sided approach led them continually in quest of more wealth. Their insatiable appetite colored every action and marked them, individually and in the national character, as lovers of money. This lust for more possessions created the Phoenician enterprise in commerce and trade, making them into a tribe of "sharpies." Mathematics whetted their wits, but with their bent for avarice and illiberality, they became clever instead of wise and good. The "illiberal character of their property, and their other institutions"\(^1\) turned them into a race concerned with wealth.

Plato suggested that the cause of this habitual avarice might be due to a bad legislator who initially established the constitution of the Phoenician cities. Or it might have been the result of some ill-fortune, some odd necessity laid upon them by virtue of their location or natural resources, which Plato also feared in establishing the laws for the model city.\(^2\) Still another reason for the Phoenician inclination toward avarice and its attendant emphasis on money-making, might have been the poor effects of climate upon the population. Whatever the reason, they exhibited the greed for possessions and lack of concern for the commonweal which Plato would root out of the ideal city of the Republic and the model city of the Laws.\(^3\) Plato's

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1. **Laws**, 747.
antipathy toward Phoenician and Egyptian love for money and commercialism came from his observation of their stifling the growth of the virtues by allowing the control of the soul and state to the lowest elements of both.¹ He saw that wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice could not abide within the person or state enveloped by the lusts of the appetites.

Persia. Persia, like Phoenicia, was a defective type of polity because wealth played a corrupting role, making for weak rulers and for despotism. Cyrus and Darius were able rulers, unspoiled by riches and hardened by work. But they devoted no time to educating their sons who were pampered by wealth and slavish indulgence so that the fiber of their souls was soft and illiberal. This degeneracy, caused partly by excessive wealth, resulted in a despotism, "robbing the commons unduly of their liberty and introducing despotism in excess" which "destroyed in the State the bonds of friendliness and fellowship."² Thus their policy changed from seeking the common good to maintaining themselves in power and lusting for increased wealth. To attain these lesser goals they employed mercenaries to keep the former citizens in check and to exact taxes and tribute. In this they

inevitably display their ignorance, inasmuch as by their acts they declare that the things reputed to be honorable

¹. Cf. Laws, 631. The lesser human goods, of which wealth is last, depend upon the divine goods--the virtues.
². Laws, 697 (Loeb).
and noble in a State are never anything but dross compared to silver and gold. 1

In Persia excessive wealth, luxurious living, and greed for more riches brought poor education, despotism, and slavery. The goods of the soul and those of the body were made subject to the "goods of substance and property" with the consequent destruction of the moral development of the state and the individual. So, to Plato, the Persian king and nation were neither good nor really great.

And, as our argument asserts, the cause of this does not lie in luck, but in the evil life which is usually lived by the sons of excessively rich monarchs; for such an upbringing can never produce either boy or man or greybeard of surpassing goodness. To this...the lawgiver must give heed... 2

Sparta. In the Republic and the Laws Plato criticized Sparta as a second-best state because of two things: (1) placing courage above the other virtues which, in turn, created a culture aimed primarily at war, and (2) the suppression of the Helots. 3

Spartans refrained from business, farming, and the crafts, but greed was present and wealth was furtively cherished. Possessions were secretly held and the women "live softly and waste money." 4 The income produced by others was spent upon themselves. Their own people (Messenians) were

1. Laws, 698 (Loeb).
2. Laws, 696 (Loeb); cf. 694-698, 637.
4. Laws, 806.
enslaved and kept under "watch and ward" lest they snatch away the Spartan wealth. Slaves were treated harshly in keeping with the growth of covetousness in the soul. This occurred because reason was demoted and the spirited element exalted, leaving no adequate check upon or guide for the passions and appetites.

Such a life is neither just nor honorable, nor can he who lives it fail of meeting his due; and the due reward of the fatted beast is that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by brave deeds and toil. 1

Sparta, as Phoenicia and Persia, failed to cherish the virtues which bring harmony within the soul and city and which allow the individual to develop to the fullness of his natural abilities. 2 The spirited element was allowed to usurp the place of reason, the intellect became more and more distrusted, and avarice was nourished. Consequently wealth and courage were allowed to dominate the individual and the state. 3

Athens. Plato's distrust of Athenian democracy did not rest upon antagonism toward her commercialism nor her ability to gain and control a large share of the wealth of the Greek world. Such distrust was only incidental to the

1. Laws, 807; cf. Rep., 556 for another use of this figure in the fall of the oligarchic state.
3. As was shown in Chapter III, pp. 28ff, wealth is fourth in the scale of human goods; courage is last in the scale of divine goods.
major reasons for Plato's anti-radical-democracy statements. These reasons were based on his observation of Athenian practices: (1) the anarchic tendencies of Athenian democracy; (2) the attempts to place physical well-being above the virtues; (3) the display of outward rectitude to cover up the passions for profit and pleasure and disregard for genuine law. In other words, Athenian stress on liberty as freedom from control resulted in an equality forgetful of the moral social order rooted in the responsible fulfillment of each citizen's natural function.¹ His implicit criticism of Athens in the description of the luxurious city² and the democratic corruption of the ideal state³ indicate the error of Athenian political leaders in that they identified the well-being of the city with her physical prosperity and safety.⁴ Plato understood the genuine social order as an ethical end which could be attained only through the direction of well-qualified leaders, never through exponents of physical force directed by the chaotic impulses of the appetites.

Winspear on Plato's Criticism of Athens. Winspear concedes Plato's point, that only the able and well-qualified

3. Rep., Book VIII.
persons should govern, but often deserts it in his attacks upon Plato's ethical and political theory. He regards Socrates, then Plato, as the spokesmen of the "more extreme right-wing element" opposed to the "left-wing democratic imperialists [such as Thrasymachus] ...who claimed that the state was simply the reflection of class forces" with no "transcendent principle of justice to which one could appeal."¹ The Socratic conservatism, and that of Plato, were based partly on prejudice, and prejudice of a highly aristocratic kind, the profound belief that only the expert, the specialist, could govern aright, that government demanded wisdom and insight, qualities that a democracy could never attain. Nor...was this an entirely absurd idea in the late fifth century in democratic Athens. We have already observed that Athenian democracy, and particularly the extreme democracy, led to the most predatory overseas expansion and destroyed itself by yielding to every...dream of plunder. The demand for the rule of the 'moral expert' was a not altogether irrational reaction to this extreme democratic imperialism.²

Winspear rises above his Marxian materialism for a moment to grasp a central fact of Plato's objection to the democracy of his time: the mass of men do not have the sagacity to make governmental policy directly, as was done in Athenian democracy. They might well make such policy through selected

¹ Winspear, GPT, 188, 273, 274, and elsewhere. The distinction is made that in his later years Socrates was conservative, but in his "middle years" he was a genuine democrat. (GPT, 220). This is an ingenious creation of history but with little basis in literary sources about Socrates which all come from "arch-conservatives," Plato and Xenophon.

² Winspear, GPT, 273; cf. 115, 116, 74.
representatives of the common interest who rule with the consent of the citizens, such as the guardians in the Republic.

Winspear reminds his readers that the word "tyrant" is really a conservative, aristocratic label for the "leaders of an anti-aristocratic coalition" who put themselves "at the head of the dispossessed and gave articulate, and sometimes violent, expression to their demands." Dionysius was such a democratic leader, Winspear contends. When Plato tried to wean him from his people, he was not hoodwinked and, in turn, disposed of Plato on the slave market. The Plato-Dionysius drama, and the unjust tyrant painted by Plato allegedly take their rise from the fact that Syracuse was at that time an expanding commercial empire, a successful competitor to Athens, and governed... by a leader of the popular faction whom Plato calls a tyrant. This accounts without doubt for the highly unflattering account that Plato gives of the kind of life that its citizens led.

Winspear pleads unconvincingly in the face of overwhelming evidence for a commercial democracy in Syracuse under the tyrant Dionysius, whom he likens to Pericles.

1. Winspear, GPT, 69.
6. Winspear, GPT, 177; cf. 173-174, 177. Corinth was also an allegedly commercial democracy in the sixth century. (175-176).
Plato may be criticized for not seeing beyond the limitations of the city-state, but it is unjust to criticize him for an anti-democratic bias based on distrust and hatred of Athenian commercialism and a romantic longing to return to a tribal society.¹ Consider the democratic defection from the ideal state as given in the Republic.² The democratic man and society do not seek satisfaction of the appetites solely in possessions. The greed which ruins democracy is for liberty, understood to mean disregard for any limitations on freedom. In this condition of resentment against any control, every desire and appetite in the individual is as good as any other, and every person in the state is equally capable of anything. It was this spirit of anarchy and the consequent factions and chaos in the state, not simply its affinity to commercial interests that led Plato to criticize the democracy of his day. The love of material possessions is only a symptom of the disease: the inversion of values.

Furthermore, there are no stultifying limitations on commerce in the Republic. In fact, commerce is assumed as essential to the development of a society, but not its chief end.

It will be next to impossible to plant our city in a territory where it will need no imports. So there will have

to be...a set of people, to fetch what it needs from other countries...there are these agents who are to import and export all kinds of goods—merchants, as we call them. We must have them; and...we shall need quite a number of shipowners and others who know about that branch of trading.¹

In the Laws Plato is, for the most part, under the necessity of creating a community in agreement with Cretan (Dorian) policy. The restrictions on commerce and trade which occur there must be considered with that point in mind.² The evidence from Plato does not support Winspear's contentions.

Failing to embody sufficiently either justice or temperance, none of the states Plato criticized could produce hardy specimens of the other cardinal virtues, knowledge or courage. Plato saw the forces of degeneration at work in each of them so that none could produce the philosophic ruler or an order of values congenial to the philosophic quest. Wealth looms large in this degeneration. Lust for more possessions, in Phoenicia and Egypt, stifled the virtues. Excessive wealth pampered the drone-like qualities in Persia and gave rise to slavishness, illiberality, and despotism. In Sparta covetousness brought about the overemphasis on courage, harshness, and secret passion for wealth. And in Athens love of liberty (meaning freedom from law, order, or

¹. Rep., 370–371 (Cornford). For a similar statement see the Laws, 920; cf. 848, 778.
². Laws, 842, 737, 746; cf. 919–920 and passages dealing with the model city as a "second best" form of polity, 739, 769, 770, 772.
responsibility) produced chaos in the individual and state, so that physical well-being replaced spiritual well-being as the goal, and wealth was pursued for the sake of social prestige and power over others. In the existing states the order of values had been broken, admitting various degrees of chaos into the states and the lives of the men who formed them. Wealth, improperly pursued, had played an important part in this crippling of the virtues.

Plato's criticism makes it clear that existing states could not exemplify the proper place wealth should occupy in the social order.

But is there any existing form of society...congenial to philosophy? Not one. That is precisely my complaint: no existing constitution is worthy of the philosophic nature; that is why it is perverted and loses its character. As a foreign seed sown in a different soil yields to the new influence and degenerates into the local variety, so this nature cannot now keep its proper virtue, but falls away and takes on an alien character. If it can ever find the ideal form of society, as perfect as itself, then we shall see that it is in reality something divine, while all other natures and ways of life are merely human. No doubt you will ask me next what this ideal society is.

Hence, we must turn to the states Plato would construct to find the place wealth should assume in society, after glancing at some criticism of his ideals by two of his current critics.

1. Rep., 497 (Cornford).
II. WEALTH IN DETERMINING
POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

The specialization of functions was well under way in sixth-century Greece and had developed to a marked degree by the fourth century. Plato was the first writer to enunciate clearly the actual fact in a theory.¹ Plato constantly insists upon specialization of function and division of labor in the effort to increase efficiency in all areas and exemplify justice in operation.

Specialization of Function Criticized by Winspear and Popper. Two of Plato's more vigorous modern enemies recognize the fact of specialization in the Greek world of Plato's time as well as his use of it, but they insist that specialization, to Plato, meant the right of the rulers to suppress the ruled. Winspear is inclined to suspect that Plato's 'guards' would, in practice, represent the actual economic interests of a class, and in all probability of a landed class and no mere ideal utopian governors...and the suspicion will become very much like a certainty as Plato develops his argument further.² And it must be admitted, this suspicion becomes "very much like a certainty" as Plato is skillfully pushed along. Temperance, with Winspear's help, turns out to be an "agreement between natural rulers and natural inferiors as to who

². Winspear, GPT, 204-205.
should rule and who should submit." The choice of the final word in the sentence offers the clue to Winspear's meaning, but fails to indicate the direction of Plato's intention. Further, Winspear argues,

in building the ideal state, Plato has in mind turning back the clock of social evolution and entrusting the control of the state to the landed proprietors (and all this in spite of his fine language about divorcing his 'guards' from economic rewards).

Evidently, the obvious mixing of the provisions of the Laws and the Republic is supposed to pass unnoticed. In the same cynical mood, Winspear declares:

Plato's political program is now beginning to emerge into the clear light of day. We shall have to examine later his view that the interests of the governing class and the state as a whole are fundamentally one; we shall have to face the problem of whether Plato has really succeeded in unifying his state or whether his high-sounding principle is not really a rationalization for the subordination of the interests of the ruled to the interests of the governing.

Winspear concludes that Plato does unify his state "by ignoring or suppressing all dissident elements" as in a "modern fascist state," with a "veil of pastel-colored camouflage" drawn over the "brutal realities, the subjugation of one class to another." 

1. Winspear, GPT, 209.
3. Winspear, GPT, 223.
4. Winspear, GPT, 228, 193; cf. 195, 231, 240, 247, 249, 259-262 which give further interpretations to the charge that Plato sought to perpetuate an oligarchy of the reactionary sort.
The ethical ideals which Plato gives to guide the guardians in their work are interpreted by Popper and Winspear as political propaganda thrown out to fool the unwary. Plato's admonition that rulers must possess no property nor engage in the business of making money is interpreted by Popper to mean that they must "refrain from an excessive economic exploitation of the ruled."¹ This peculiar twist to Plato's ideas offers splendid support to Popper's thesis that Plato is one of the enemies of modern democratic society, but it is scarcely what Plato said or implied. Plato thus becomes a "Machiavelli," making his rulers appear just in the act of reaping the economic harvest for their own purses while really subjugating the toiling masses.²

In summary, Popper and Winspear insist that by specialization Plato meant the subjugation of the mass of the citizenry to the ruling elite and that one cannot trust Plato since he is really Machiavellian. The criticisms of both Winspear and Popper are based on their refusal to accept any pattern of justice, or any other virtue larger than the given society to which that society must respond, and by which it must be judged. With this jaundiced eye they view Plato's ethics and social philosophy as so much double-talk to cover

¹. Popper, OSS, 53.
up the brutal consequences of Plato's doctrines. Granted their philosophical position, Plato's ethical arguments become so much frosting over poisonous political teaching. But one must begin from Plato's philosophical perspective, in which the virtues are real and commanding, unless one is ready to deny integrity to every other person save oneself and one's disciples. Needless to say, that is precisely the point of view of the authoritarian mind. So much for the basic supposition of Popper and Winspear that Plato lacks common, ordinary integrity.

As to the criticism that Plato uses the doctrine of specialization, in particular, to urge the subjugation of the mass of the citizens to the rulers, Plato offers the best answer. The following argument will show, as have the earlier chapters, that to Plato the salvation, not the exploitation, of men is the goal of the state and its rulers. The argument will proceed from Plato's theory of specialization as basic to the state, through the place of wealth in the origin of the state, in the ideal state, in the model city, and in the degeneration of the state, to the place wealth should occupy in the healthy human society. And, if we allow that Plato is not a malevolent liar, we shall see that there is no substance in his critics' charges.

**Specialization of Function is Necessary even in the Origin of the State.** In constructing the ideal state, as was
shown in Chapter Four, Plato proceeds logically, not historically, from the basic premise that no man is self-sufficient since men have various needs and differ in capacity to meet their needs.\(^1\) This assumption leads inevitably to the next: that men must live together in a "state" to find adequate expression for their abilities and have their various and sundry needs met.\(^2\) It is important to notice Plato's insight that the real state or commonwealth does not begin to assume form until a fair degree of specialization has taken place and the interdependence of occupations is realized in the exchange of products. Plato uses the fact of specialization in fourth-century Greece to establish man's "natural" need for other men whether or not those men are equals or unequals. Plato's argument recognizes human inequality in ability only to press home the point that men must live in an orderly community so that the ability each one possesses can be exercised to the fullest advantage. "So if one man gives another what he has to give in exchange for what he can get, it is because each finds that to do so is for his own advantage."\(^3\)

A hermit may make all things for himself, but the human being with even the rudiments of civilization must work for and with others in the process of supplying human needs.

1. Rep., 368, 370.
Thus, the state is not a compact formed by naturally isolated units who come together by some external force thus losing their individuality. On the contrary, the state is formed because of the social nature of man, his lack of self-sufficiency, and his innate aptitudes which require a society for expression and specialization. In short, individuals must form a society so that they may become true individuals, realizing their abilities.¹ This is the attitude in which Plato approaches the political structure, and not, as Winspear infers, to subject the inferior to the superior, as will be seen further in the next section.

Economic Needs Primary in the Rudimentary Society. The lowest level of social development is the economic which provides for the existence and development of the healthy physical specimen, not the complete human being. This level is essential but not sufficient.² It does, however, make clear the natural specialization shown in the division of labor and skills required in any cohesive human society. This is justice operating at the broadest but lowest part of the social whole.³ Without this level of social development no other genuine development could ever take place. In the Laws it is assumed that this level of society is ruled by a patriarchal

¹ Rep., 369, 370, 371.
² Rep., 371.
³ Rep., 433.
government in one of two forms: either as a family or clan with the eldest patriarch at the head, or as an aristocracy with one of the various patriarchs chosen as the chief.\(^1\) But in the Republic no particular form of government is assumed since the quest is for justice in the individual man, not in what we think of as the state.\(^2\)

**The Luxurious City is Essential to Social Development.** Plato, through Socrates, turns his attention to the state which moves beyond the primitive economic level. This society is the luxurious city in which the individual can grow to a larger realization of his potentialities than in the "idyllic" primitive state. Plato's argument is that if the individual and society are to advance beyond the rudimentary culture, there must be essential refinements: couches, tables, meats to go with the bread, sweets and pastry, incense, and "dancing-girls" or "flute-girls" for companions.\(^3\) In this whole section Plato is admitting the inability of the primitive "healthy state" to fulfill the requirements of genuine social development. A full-grown social philosophy cannot be constructed out of the idyllic pastoral community.

2. Winspea.r overlooks this goal of the Republic and terms the quest for justice in the state "absurdly abstract" and to the last degree bald and unconvincing." (GPT 202).
3. Rep., 372-373. Shorey, PTR, 160, note a, comments on the Aristophanic humor in the sudden mention of the incongruous item--the girls--which Emerson also noticed: "The love of little maids and berries."
The "luxurious state," with all its potential conflict, was, to Plato's mind, essential. The luxurious city satisfies more and higher needs than the state allowing only for the necessary wants. But it also possesses the seeds of its own destruction to a greater degree. Civilization depends upon increased economic resources in materials and in more highly specialized skills. The apparatus of civilization depends upon the city which, in its endless needs and desires, requires more economic variety than the healthy but primitive pastoral and agricultural community can provide.

Since the luxurious city has greater abundance and more forms of wealth, there must also be a more just distribution of wealth so that none will suffer from poverty or opulence. In the Laws, distributive justice is spelled out in fair detail for a work concerned with the overall ethical problems applied to the structure and function of a given society. Economic rewards are measured out to the citizens, the aliens, and the slaves of both groups so that none may suffer want. Winspear misses this provision in his haste to condemn Plato as subversive of the common citizen's interests. He

3. Winspear, GPT, 107-108. Plato and Socrates are linked together in this passage as opposed to leaders who attempted a broader distribution of wealth. Hence, to Plato, "justice has little to do with what we should call 'economic justice,' the distribution of economic goods."
also overlooks the fact that mere distribution of economic goods does not create or insure justice, even in the economic area. Reverence and justice are not created from a juxtaposition of things in a community no matter how arranged. Justice is a matter of the character of the individual expressed in all of his social relationships, not simply in the area of material possessions. "Make a law by my order, said Zeus, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he is a plague to the state."\(^1\) Reverence and justice are the ordering principles of genuine cities, and they are manifest to Plato in the economic area as well as in the individual ethical attitude.

The Guardians Come Into Existence Only in a Luxurious City. If left to operate as in the usual city, the material benefits of the luxurious city will turn the state into a swollen and sickly state, eager for more gain but unable to use wisely what goods it has. This leads to war in order to gain more territory, more markets, and unlimited wealth. From the insatiable appetites for gain beyond the essential come many of the disasters which fall upon states and individuals.\(^2\) With the probability of wars of aggrandizement, comes the necessity for well-trained soldiers, a professional

\(^1\) Prot., 322.  
\(^2\) Rep., 373, 374.
army. It is well to notice that Plato provides the guardians, not yet divided into Auxiliaries and Rulers, specifically to protect property of individuals engaged in some form of business.

This will mean a considerable addition to our community—a whole army, to go out to battle with any invader, in defence of all this property and of the citizens we have been describing.

Why so? Can't they defend themselves? Not if the principle was right, which we all accepted in framing our society. You remember we agreed that no one man can practise many trades or arts satisfactorily...

These guardians of our state, then, inasmuch as their work is the most important of all, will need the most complete freedom from other occupations and the greatest amount of skill and practice.

Of course, he also has in mind the protection of the existence of the state, but here it is the private holding of property above the minimum necessary to keep body and soul together that makes the formation of the guardian class necessary.

The Genuine Ruler Always Seeks the Welfare of the Subject. Thrasymachus supplies the description of the autocratic ruler which the above critics resurrect as Plato's ideal.

His reply to Thrasymachus, and the latter-day critics, is that the statesman never practices his art for himself but in the interest of those he governs, benefitting them but never harming them.

1. Rep., 374; Laws, 798, 804ff, 829ff, and 742 envision a citizen army, but one that is professional none-the-less.
2. Rep., 374 (Cornford).
If there could ever be a society of perfect men, there
might well be as much competition to evade office as
there now is to gain it, and it would then be clearly
seen that the genuine ruler's nature is to seek only
the advantage of the subject.¹

Furthermore, the wealth of the state is one item by which the
ruler seeks to work for the advantage of the citizens whom he
rules. Wealth is used solely to promote the welfare of the
commonwealth, never to satisfy one member or one group of
members.² The guardians—Rulers and Auxiliaries—are to live
like soldiers, not like the businessmen-rulers of the Greek
world, whom Plato likens to wolves by the argument that the
Auxiliaries are not to be wolves, devouring those whom they
are called to serve.³ The belongings of the guardians are to
be such as to keep them from maltreating the citizens who pro­
vide their livelihood, and positively, to help them become
perfect guardians.⁴ With that end in view, Plato sketches
the life and duties of these guardians of the state.

Private Property Denied the Guardians. No private
property, beyond the merest necessities, can be held by the
guardians. This is not only a restriction on the individual
guardian but also on the class as a whole. They are not to
amass wealth as a group, regardless of the motive set forth

for doing so. "Poverty" is the financial watchword for the single guardian and for the group. Poverty, in reference to the rulers, is to be taken in the sense of adequate provision with never a scarcity nor a surplus held for personal or group use, even for the "rainy day." The next rule for the guardians is that they must have no private house or storehouse, singly or as a whole, which is not open at all times to public inspection. Food and other necessities will be supplied by the other citizens in such quantities as to last for one year with nothing remaining, something like the manna from heaven given weekly to the Hebrews in the legends of their tribal wanderings.

The essentials given to the guardians are their fixed wages for services rendered to the state. Never are they to reap "the fat of the land," being men of courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice. Meals will be taken in common like the soldiers' mess, with no officers' clubs or dining halls! They can possess no money, since the acquisition of money "has been the occasion of so many unholy deeds." Notice the acquisition

1. Shorey, PTR, Vol. I, 311, footnote e, remarks, "This is precisely Aristophanes' distinction between beggary and honorable poverty, Plutus 552-553." Compare ideal of poverty but large financial holdings of some Christian monastic orders and with various Endowments or Foundations for charitable purposes whose advertising and tax-reducing value and well-paid executive personnel suggest something more earthy than charity, even while being charitable.

of money is the "occasion," not the cause, of unholy deeds. It gives the unethical soul the opportunity to express itself, but the appetites of the soul cause evil deeds. Precious metals and stones are forbidden items, utterly worthless to the guardians because they have the genuine precious metals in their souls. Since they will get no pay, they cannot travel on their own account or make presents or spend money as they please. If they should ever possess land, houses, money, or other wealth of their own they would be like other men, giving their attention to managing their economic affairs and forgetting that their proper duty is to rule the state in justice. So they would become tyrants and lead the state to its ruin, instead of being guardians of the rights of the city and its members.

The Goal of Communism Among the Rulers. The goal of Plato's communism in the ranks of the guardians is disinterestedness. These men (and women) must have the sole aim of serving the welfare of the entire state, not of any one class—even themselves. It is carelessness to insist as Winspear and Popper do, that Plato is unmindful of the welfare of the mass of the citizenry. "His aristocracy is one of social

1. Rep., 419.
service, not of selfish enjoyment of wealth and power."

The notion that the rulers really possess the state and consequently would treat themselves poorly and make themselves unhappy if they did not claim a large share of this world's goods for themselves is a misunderstanding of Plato, voiced first by Adeimantus and repeated many times since. The rulers do not possess the state, as was shown in Chapter Four, nor its wealth. They are the specialists in government and social affairs. Under their supervision, as we saw in Chapter Five, wealth and other social goods are brought into existence, distributed equitably, and used fruitfully. They no more own or control the wealth of the state than do the governments of modern democracies, although the rulers are to cite instances of illegal use of wealth, such as bribes intended to pervert justice.

To make the guardians well-to-do would make a mockery of justice, which is the harmony of all the parts working together toward a common goal. They would then be less than

1. Shorey, PTR, Vol. I, 311, footnote d; cf. pp. xxxiv and xli-xlili where he comments that the communism required insures "their freedom from what Bentham calls 'sinister interests' by taking away from them their safe-deposit vaults and their investments in corporation stock and requiring them to live on a moderate salary and a reasonable pension." Cf. Laws, 6814, 770f.

2. Shorey, PTR, Vol. I, 314, footnote a, mentions that the objection of Adeimantus is repeated by Aristotle, Spencer, Grote, and Zeller. Popper and Winspear make a similar objection as pointed out above.

guardians of the commonwealth and would eventually be reduced to tyrants.\(^1\) In biting irony he has Socrates say,

> We could quite as easily clothe our farmers in gorgeous robes, crown them with gold, and invite them to till the soil at their pleasure; or... set our potters... to work... whenever they felt so inclined.\(^2\)

But that would destroy the division of labor based on specialization of function. To do other than restrict the life and property of the guardians would be to produce a false happiness "like that of a party of peasants feasting at a fair,"\(^3\) who thus rid themselves of their lives of drudgery for a moment only to return to it poorer and no wiser than they were before the debauchery. Any one who urges the special happiness and welfare of one particular group, least of all the guardians, "has in mind something other than a civic community."\(^4\)

Likewise, anyone who urges that the guardians will try to make themselves happy by grasping the wealth of their fellow citizens is not thinking of Plato's guardians. If any of them tries to grasp the wealth of the other citizens, "he will be a guardian no longer."\(^5\) The very fact that he desires wealth more than the welfare of the community proves him

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1. Rep., 420, 417, 546. Cf. Laws, 711, 715, 875; Gorg., 505; cf. Mcllwain, GPT, 7: The citizens limited by the "art of drawing pay" soon "found themselves engrossed in their private concerns more than in their public duties."
5. Rep., 466.
worthless as a genuine Auxiliary or Ruler, although he might successfully become a tyrant.¹

Wealth Determines Class Structure in the Laws. The most vital difference between the Republic and the Laws in regard to the place of wealth in the state lies in the structure of the classes. In the Laws classes are based on a census of wealth which the colonists bring with them or which they accumulate after they arrive in the city.

It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater possessions than another...qualifications of property must be unequal, in order that offices and contributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels and disputes...there should be four different standards appointed according to the amount of property...in which the citizens will be placed...they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer.²

Plato's provision is made specifically because the colonists will not arrive with the same amount of wealth and will not exercise the same initiative in producing additional wealth after settling in the model city. This attitude of the Laws toward unequal shares of wealth is not at variance with that

2. Laws, 744 (Jowett). Note the similarity to Athenian class structure.
of the Republic. But the influence of wealth in the structure of the classes is at the opposite pole from the ideal set forth in the Republic, where ability alone determines the class of the citizens, and function only separates the classes.\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{Influence of Wealth in Structure of Government and on Voting Requirements in the Laws.} Whenever the assembly of the citizens meets, the two wealthier classes must be in attendance or face fine for showing a lack of interest in the affairs of the city. The two lower-income classes may attend if they wish except when the council notifies all citizens to be present, then they must be present and vote.\textsuperscript{2} The reason for this difference between the attendance requirements for the classes seems to indicate a recognition in Plato's mind of the greater necessity to work which faces the lower-economic groups and the greater leisure of the upper-income classes. Hence the wealthier citizens could spend time in conducting the affairs of the state with less chance of financial loss than could the poorer citizen.

Possessions are important in the structure and function of the council also. The council is composed of 360 members, ninety from each economic class of citizens. A councilman is fined if he is not present and voting provided he belongs to

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Morrow, Art, (1954), pp. 10ff. The application of the Ideal to the actual situation of imperfect men causes the major differences between the Laws and the Republic.

\textsuperscript{2} Laws, 761\textsuperscript{1}.
either of the wealthier classes. The two lower-income classes may vote or not without fines. Presumably the reason for the fine assessed against the more wealthy councilmen for absence is levied because they do not need the time to attend to their daily business since they meet only one month in twelve. The arrangement, whatever the reason, tends to make wealth more important in the affairs of the city. They have more than equal representation since the wealthier groups will most likely be smallest, although there is no mention of this in the Laws. The council is to be divided into twelve sections, each sitting but one month during the year they are elected. The reason for this arrangement is to give time for each member to care for his domestic concerns as well as the affairs of the city. Private economy is not to be upset by membership on the council.

Treasurers shall be appointed also to care for the property of the temples, "and shall have authority over the produce and the letting of..." the temple allotments. These treasurers are to be elected according to economic classes: the greater temples are to have treasurers chosen from the highest class and the lesser temple treasurers are from the less wealthy classes.

1. Laws, 756.
The election of the officers of the army proceeds according to divisions of economic class. The generals are elected by vote of all men in the army, the leaders of the cavalry only by the cavalry. Only the wealthier class can belong to the cavalry, as in ancient Greek cities. The leaders of the hoplites are chosen from and by the heavy-armed infantry who are second in the rank of wealth. The leaders of the light-armed infantry are appointed by the generals. Here the wealthier citizens have a voice through their votes in selecting the generals. Unlike any other leader in the army, the light-infantry captains are not chosen directly by those whom they lead.¹

The three wardens of the city are to be chosen from the first class, or the wealthiest class. Six are to be selected by the whole population and from the six three are chosen by lot; they then rule according to the law. The market-stewards are chosen from the first and second property-classes in the same manner as the wardens of the city.² Judges of athletic contests are also chosen from the two highest propertied classes.³

The wardens of the country are not chosen from any particular property-class, although they probably are elected from the wealthiest class, since they are copied by the wardens

2. Laws, 763.
of the city and since "it is needful that these men [I.e.,
the city-stewards] also should have both the ability and the
leisure to attend to public matters."\(^1\) This comparison be-
tween the city-stewards and the country-stewards makes it
highly probable that the wardens of the country are elected
from the highest property-class. They are to have charge of
building fortifications, roads, irrigation systems, and such
public works so as to care for the property of the citizens,
keep it productive, and safe from attack. The wardens' work
is to be done when they and the laborers whom they oversee
are not engaged in regular occupations.\(^2\) They are not to have
the servants or slaves of the city, or of others, for their
own advantage during the time they are in office. Slaves and
servants are to be used by them for "public service only."\(^3\)
If the wardens fail in their duty by reason of bribe or fix-
ing too heavy or light a punishment--such as taking the pro-
duce of the lot or the implements used to till the soil and
care for its produce, too heavy a fine, or letting an offen-
der get by with a mild chastisement, yielding to flattery--
the wardens are to be dishonored in public and fined according
to the failure in duty.\(^4\) Common meals are to be shared by
the wardens while on their two-year span of duty.\(^5\) Their
food is to be simple and humble fare, no luxuries, only the
necessities for the period of their term of office.\(^6\)

1. Laws, 763 (Loeb).
2. Laws, 760-761.
3. Laws, 763.
5. Laws, 762.
Common Tables, in the Laws, are Instituted for All Citizens. A further difference between the Republic and the Laws is the institution of common meals for all the citizens, although there seem to be lapses from this requirement. At one time they are reserved for those who are serving as wardens. Again, the laws that each family must have its private houses, one in the center and one in the country, would make the institution of common meals unwieldy. The commons appear to be restaurants scattered about the city-state for the sole convenience of the citizens and their families. Common tables are enjoined in the model city to help create and maintain the sense of community and security. They are not to be thought of as making the city into an armed camp, but for the regulation of conduct toward the above ends. Plato appears to have two things in mind in establishing the commons; the first is to meet the circumstances required by a Dorian settlement, and secondly, he is chiding them concerning this particular custom. The Cretan and Spartan are restless during the whole discourse. This appears to be Plato's dramatic warning against the very tables he is legislating into existence to meet the Dorian situation.

The major differences between the function of wealth in the Laws and the Republic lie in the structure and function

1. Laws, 762.
2. Laws, 780-783, 806, 807; cf. 626, 630-631.
of the classes and the extent of the institution of common tables. Wealth has a decided advantage in the model city of the Laws because the Laws deal with a specific set of people and their cultural patterns. It has no advantage in the ideal city of the Republic. However, wealth is not to be loved for its own sake in either the Laws or the Republic. Property, as used in classifying citizens in the Laws, is supposed to be a mark of efficiency and initiative. Nonetheless, in the model city adequate wealth is made the sole requirement in classification of citizens and for election to the various offices mentioned above. To this degree, then, Plato departs from his most constant theme that men are to have honor and positions of authority because of outstanding virtue. This aberration in the Laws may be due to the fact that he is legislating for a Cretan community in which wealth made a critical difference in social standing and political prestige.

III. THE PART WEALTH PLAYS IN THE DEGENERATION OF THE STATE

Internal dissension breaks out first in the ruling class, then permeates the state. It rises first from the natural order of things in which all things which come "into being must decay."¹ Children will be born who are not fitted to be guardians. They will neglect the training of the mind

¹ Rep., 546. Notice that even in the Republic Plato is not thinking of perfect men!
and then the body so that they will come to be poorly educated. Finally, they will divide the land, houses and other wealth of the other citizens, enslave them, and devote themselves to keeping their subjects in servitude. The ruling class, having become an armed camp, will continue to refrain from business affairs, crafts, or farming, but will control all the wealth produced by their serfs for their own advantage and pleasure.

Timocracy. The resulting form of government Plato calls timocracy because its rulers are consumed by lust for honor which is "ambition and the passion to excel." They are not openly seeking wealth, but are actually "avaricious, cherishing furtively a passionate regard for silver and gold." They possess private homes on which they lavish secret attention and wealth. Their women are not their equals but receive the lion's share of the riches forced from the citizenry. They are miserly in their quest for wealth produced by others, but at the same time prodigal in spending money of other people in order to satisfy their personal ambition and desires. "In defiance of law" they pursue their wealth in private "like truant children." Further illustrating their lack of culture, they mistreat slaves and other subjects who

are mere serfs.\textsuperscript{1} With avarice uncontrolled by a well-developed, thoughtful, and cultivated mind, the individual and the society tend more and more to care for acquisition of wealth.\textsuperscript{2} Such is the attitude of the timocratic state and individual toward wealth.

Two things must be noted in this description of the timocratic individual and state. (1) Plato's critics, who contend that he loved Sparta above all else, need to keep this section of the \textit{Republic} in mind. Not only is the timocracy a deviation from the ideal state, it is actually the cause of all other deviations from the ideal. It removes reason from its proper place, exalts the spirited element, and secretly nourishes the baser appetites which inevitably lead to the perverted states which follow. The unlawful possession of private property in the timocracy gives a boost to the passion for wealth and the unlawful use of power necessary to obtain illegitimate wealth.\textsuperscript{3} (2) The best that can be said of the timocratic state is its passion for honor. None of the other attitudes and practices are commendable or reputable. This certainly constitutes a condemnation of the Spartan way of life, as well as any other which inverts the proper order of values.

1. \textit{Rep.}, 548.
Plutocracy or Oligarchy. The second perverted constitution is the plutocracy, or as Plato calls it, oligarchy. This form of the state comes into being when power passes into the control of men for whom wealth is the sole end of all endeavor. They identify the welfare of the state with its physical well-being. The highest that can be said of the plutocratic constitution is its passion for wealth. All other desires which troop through this type of individual and state are worse. Only those who hold enough property (the amount is left unspecified) can hold office. The poor man is barred from places of power and civil liberties simply because he does not hold the required amount of wealth.¹ The secret avarice filling the timocratic constitution causes its downfall and the rise of the plutocracy.² The law is not respected in the quest for wealth, and the more money is valued the less virtue is upheld and sought. Envy, rivalry, the spirit of competition, the passion for gain, and the consequent disunity infect the plutocratic state. The poor are despised because of their poverty but kept in that condition by the greed and power of the rulers. The wealthy are honored because of their wealth, not their virtue.³ From this upending of the order of values five defects appear to the destruction of the state.

¹ Rep., 550-551.
(1) The lust for wealth is the primary defect of the plutocratic state, and at the same time, the unity brought by this strong passion is the highest consistent value in that society. On this basis the state limits the privileges of citizenship and office-holding, with no other provision for allowing the poor but intelligent man a way of access into the official circles. The ideal commonwealth sought for men of promise in all classes in order to promote them as high as their abilities would take them. Not so in the oligarchy where the reins of power are kept in the hands of as few as possible, varying in number "with the strength of the oligarchical principle." The result of this principle foisted on the state by the wealthy few is disunity and strife between the poor and the rich accompanied by an ambitious quest for more wealth so that one might rise in the social scale, be it ever so little. Thus the state becomes two: the poor and the rich, with the two classes living in the same city but plotting against each other.

(2) A second fault appears. The state, driven by the insatiable urge for wealth, is so weakened by the division and strife of the classes that it is no longer able to carry out an adequate defense in times of war. The common people must be called in to help, with no qualifications of wealth,

2. Cf. Laws, 728f, 737.
or the city falls to the enemy. If, however, the poor are called to aid the rich, they become too powerful and form a threat to the continued rule of the wealthy. The result, by Plato's earlier analysis, is weakness where the state must be strong: a sense of unity bringing about the protection of property and the higher institutions of the state.

(3) A third defect in the oligarchy is the unwillingness of the rich to pay taxes for the prosecution of the war effort, and in fact, any other effort which requires heavy expenditures. Pressed into this state of affairs the poorer class must be taxed even harder than before.

(4) A fourth defect shows itself in the oligarchy. It is the assumption of several functions by one individual or class. The division of labor was essential from the beginning to a well-ordered state, but in the oligarchy this is upset by the businessmen-rulers, who assume the functions of business, farming, and soldiering as well as the actual ruling of the state. 2

(5) "Worst of all," in the oligarchy, a man is allowed to live without working. 3 He may sell his property and live off the cash. Anyone may live in a community doing nothing for the society as a tradesman, soldier, or artisan. This evil, of having no function at all, becomes possible under the

plutocracy where nothing is done to prevent it.\(^1\) Such a person becomes a consumer only and ends as a beggar if nature has endowed him with no great ambition or spirit, or as a criminal if he is spirited by nature. Beggars and criminals abound in the state whose sole aim is the gaining of wealth, although criminals are kept down by force.\(^2\) Both groups are fostered by bad education and nurture and the "vicious form of government," greedily searching for more riches.\(^3\)

In the souls of the citizens of the plutocratic state, the "money-loving spirit of sensual appetite" is installed upon the throne. Reason is limited to calculating more and better ways of gaining wealth and the spirited element is allowed to "admire and value nothing but wealth and its possessors and to excel in nothing but the struggle to gain money by any and every means."\(^4\) The citizens satisfy only their most essential wants for fear of stirring up expensive desires.\(^5\) They become niggardly and squalid in character, expecting everything done to bring a handsome profit adding to the hoard of things they already possess.\(^6\) This state is like a "parsimonious money-getter," harking only to the call

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1. Rep., 552.
4. Rep., 553. This section of the Republic describes the plutocratic individual, but is also a sketch of an oligarchy since the state is the individual multiplied.
5. Rep., 553, 555.
of the blind god Plutus who plays the tune and calls the dance.

Lacking careful education and nurture of the mind, the passion for wealth gets the better of the citizen of the oligarchy wherever he can be "dishonest without risk." In other business relations, where he is under scrutiny, the citizen gives the appearance of honesty, but actually lives in "enforced moderation" through no great desire of his own. Fear of the loss of his fortune rigorously controls him when subject to the light of day. But in spending other's money, as long as it is unknown, his baser desire overwhelms his control. The grasping for wealth and the fear of its loss prevents the citizen of the plutocracy from being a real person, with single-minded perseverance in honesty and other virtues. "He presents a more decent appearance than many; but the genuine virtue of a soul in peace and harmony with itself will be utterly beyond his reach."¹ Hence the society has no internal structure capable of giving peace and unity, and its fall is but a matter of time.²

Since the aim of the plutocratic society is money-making and the power of the ruling order is dependent upon their wealth, the leaders of the state will not want to make laws or be morally able to enforce laws preventing men from

1. Rep., 524.
extravagance and ruin. "They will hope to lend these spend-thrifts money on their property and buy it up, so as to become richer and more influential than ever."¹ But wealth cannot be sought to the exclusion of worthier ends by a society and ever hope to "establish proper self-control in its citizens."² Hence some men are reduced to poverty while others are enriched, pitching many into the depths of debt and disfranchisement, creating unrest and hatred.³ All the while, the wealthy are intent upon finding new victims to satisfy their rapacious greed for wealth. They seem unaware of the disruptions of the social order their tactics are causing; busily planning opportunities for the "poison of their money" to breed more of its kind. Capital is increased in the hands of the few while paupers increase on the double. Their attention is consumed with money-making so that they allow anyone to do anything he desires with his riches. Loans are strictly recorded and collected, the lender risking nothing.⁴ Luxury breeds "indolence of body and mind" bringing idleness, softness, and a dearth of ideals for life.⁵

¹ Rep., 555.
² Rep., 555; cf. Laws, 695.
⁴ Rep., 555-556.
⁵ Rep., 556, cf. 405f, 435, 521; Laws, 870, 806f. Jaeger's description of Solon's warning against avarice in high offices is strikingly similar to Plato's sketch, PAI, Vol. I, 139.
Democracy. This insatiable craving for wealth which appears to bring everything worthwhile to the society assists in the transition to democracy. The physically hardened poor, in a time of war or perhaps at a festival, see the softness of the wealthy ruling class and turn upon them. Should "the poor win, the result is a democracy." Death, banishment, and confiscation of property falls upon the rich, although some are allowed to an equal share in civil rights and offices. The passion for freedom from any restraint assumes control of the society. With no standards to go by, waste is called "magnificence," thrifty instincts "unprofitable desires," moderation and frugality nothing but "churlish meanness." Time, effort, and money are spent indiscriminately on any or all desires which rush hither and yon in the democratic individual and state.

The same disease that swept timocracy and oligarchy to ruin controls the destiny of the democracy: the lack of rational control of cultivated minds. In the democracy the appetites raise their heads in the pursuit of freedom or liberty, which we would call anarchy, with no respect for any law if it seems for the moment to impede the quest for complete liberty.

But all is not as full of promise as it seems. Self-interest dominates each group in the "democracy."\(^1\) The less virtuous creatures in the society assume control of as many of the offices as they can get, making the speeches and transacting the business.\(^2\) A second group is quietly forming, bent upon making money, tending to amass wealth as great as the rulers of the oligarchy had. From this source of wealth the demagogues in the government gather their income.\(^3\) A third class is made up of the peasantry, who own few possessions, tend their farms, and keep out of political office, but exercise supreme power when assembled for a vote.\(^4\) This group, when they meet, shares in the government's income from the wealthier class, providing the demagogues retain the larger part for themselves.\(^5\) As the rich are plundered in the democracy, they are forced to defend themselves in any way they can which enables the demagogues to label the rich as "reactionary oligarchs."\(^6\) Finally, a "champion" of the people's interests arises, promising the mass of citizens cancellation of debts and redistribution of the land.\(^7\) So

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1. Cf. Speeches of Diodotus and Cleon in Thucydides, History, Bk. III. Also see Thucydides, History, Bk. I, 58-72, 79-87, where profit, security, and honor are defended as correct and controlling Athenian motives in assisting the people of Corcyra, and for the siege of Potidaea.
2. Rep., 564.
begins in the democracy a "civil war against property" in which the rich man "is charged with being not merely rich but the people's enemy."¹ And the democracy is "done in."

The ruling lust of the democracy is not merely for wealth. Democracy does allow this passion equal opportunity with many others until the divisions in the economic structure are so deep that strife and chaos result in the death of the democracy by making the oligarchical rulers soft and ineffective in anything but pursuit of financial gain. It also plays a part in the undoing of the democratic state by feeding the ambition of the demagogues until the newly rich are branded enemies of the people, and one demagogue rises to absolute power, promising widespread economic reforms and, thus, greater liberty.

_Tyranny_. Once in office the demagogue turns tyrant, usurping all power to himself by every illegal means while publicly disclaiming absolute power.² Promises are made to friends and the public-at-large. Debts are cancelled. Land is distributed to the people, especially to his collaborators. He rids himself of wealthy enemies, plunders their riches, and stirs up trouble to keep the people conscious of their need of a leader.³ At the same time he places heavy taxes

2. Rep., 567.
upon the mass of the people, impoverishing them so that they can think of nothing but "winning their daily bread."\(^1\)

Everyone who seeks freedom, wealth, or some virtue such as intelligent and courageous high-mindedness, and who will not truckle to him is considered an enemy. With the wealth he has usurped along with the power of government he hires mercenaries to fight for him and attracts sophists and actors to his court.\(^2\) When the wealth of his victims runs low, he spends the temple treasuries, takes over his parents' estates, and finally lives off the taxes imposed on the common people.\(^3\)

So the champion who "set them free from the rich" becomes their oppressor and lives like a parasite upon their meager income. Here again, wealth is simply one object toward which lust may be expressed. Wealth is desired for the many things it will bring to satisfy his bestial passions. Power is used in the same manner until he has no friends and knows no freedom. But all the riches and power in the world do not keep a tyrannical soul from being poverty-stricken, since his appetites can never be satisfied or fulfilled.\(^4\) Utter misery is the final result of the apparently innocent desire for private property among part of the ruling class in the ideal state. The combination of wealth and political power in the same hands was the beginning of the deviation from the ideal—tyranny the end.

1. Rep., 567.
2. Rep., 568, 569.
IV. SUMMARY

Wealth is essential to the origin of any state, even the most primitive. Natural specialization of function requires a variety of wealth-producing enterprises. The luxurious city and the rudiments of civilization are dependent upon the natural specialization of function in the production of material possessions. With the rise of the luxurious city, the occupations of the citizens in producing wealth are further multiplied. This greater effort at accumulating wealth also produces, for the first time, the possibility of genuine civilization.

The guardians are specifically brought into being because of the need to protect private property and, of course, the existence of the state. The guardians are to possess no wealth individually or as a group beyond that which is necessary for a healthy life. Private property is denied to the guardians. Communism among the rulers is instituted to the end that political power and private property should not be vested in the same hands. The guardians are to have in mind and work for the welfare of the civic community. Anyone who argues, as Winspear and Popper do, that Plato's guardians will make themselves happy by grabbing the wealth of their fellow citizens is not thinking of Plato's guardians. And if any of the guardians should try to gain possessions for himself, "he will be a guardian no longer."
Also we have seen several differences between Plato's attitude toward wealth in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*. In the *Laws* wealth largely determines the structure and function of the classes, the structure of government, the voting requirements, and the institution of common tables for the entire citizen body.

To Plato, wealth plays an important part in the degeneration of the state. (1) In the timocracy the ruling classes control all wealth for their own advantage in order to "purchase" honor. The lust for wealth is furtively cherished and courage is openly aimed at and developed to insure continued mastery of wealth. (2) In the oligarchy the perversion of values has progressed to the point where wealth is openly cherished for its own sake and sought for by any and all means. This striving for wealth produces a schism between the poor and the rich, weakening the city, causing internal strife, and nourishing idleness. In the oligarchy wealth is sought also for the sake of power over others. (3) In the democracy, concerned as it is with license or unrestrained freedom, time, effort, and money are spent indiscriminately on any or all desires which troop through the citizens of the state. Finally, the poorer people, led by a demagogue, charge that the wealthy are enemies of the people and a civil war begins against property-holders. (4) This, then, gives rise to tyranny in which all of the wealth of the state is
used to satisfy the despot and to keep him in power. This is the ultimate corruption of the state caused by a concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of one man, used without reference to the proper order of values.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

If a critical appreciation of Plato's economic thought is to be achieved, he must be taken seriously as an honest and creative thinker avidly interested in the affairs of his city and world. His works, also, must be approached with the sup­position that they are an honest attempt to solve the cultural problems of his day. Part of this larger set of problems was the search for material possessions which were used to represent achievement in every area or as a pragmatic substitute for the genuinely cultured mind. In the modern world, however, the voices of distrust and anger raised against Plato are legion. To these detractors Plato becomes a fascist, a Stalinist, a socialist or communist of unknown vintage, or an aristocrat sympathetic to the wealthy landholders and shrewdly anti-commercial. The charges against Plato reflect the image of evil in the critic's mind rather than Plato's position. Furthermore, these anti-Plato criticisms arise largely from misunderstandings or misinterpretations of his philosophy.

If Plato's modern detractors would cease the chorus of abuse and consider his philosophy appreciatively, they would come to a point of view similar to the following conclusions.

(1) The place wealth assumes in the life of the individual must always be that of serving and supporting the
higher interests and desires of the rational life. The primary concern of the rational individual is the understanding of the natural order of the universe applied to the ongoing process of human life. Without this rational grasp of life, to the best of the individual's ability, there is no possibility of keeping in focus the flowing things of this life, allowing proper evaluation of their claims made upon the individual. If the direction of the personality is usurped by one of the lower parts of the soul, disorder and its moral corollary, injustice, results. If these parts of the soul fail in their support of the rational element, chaos and its ethical consequence, intemperance, follows.

As an individual departs from the good life he is increasingly determined by the more subjective elements within himself and his society. At the level of the first deviation from the good life pride replaces knowledge and wealth is sought to bring honor to the individual. In order to insure a satisfying discharge of social duties wealth must be kept at a level which is more than adequate to maintain health of body and soul.

With the enthronement of the money-making appetites the second level of corruption comes into being and reason and ambition are chained to the accumulation of wealth beyond any possible use to the individual. Greed replaces pride. The accumulation of wealth for its own sake is the
heart and soul of the plutocrat's pleasures and drives him relentlessly by fair means or foul as long as the means appear to be honest.

The third deviation from the good life is the "democratic" individual who is a loosely tied bundle of appetites. He confuses sensuality with the genuine values of the good life and as the dynamic of life substitutes lusts for the greed of the money-loving man. Wealth is valued only as a means of buying satisfactions for appetites which ebb and flow ceaselessly.

The tyrant, the ultimate distortion of rational man, values material possessions as a means of manipulating other human beings and of feeding the illusion of greatness. In this stage of delusion the control of all wealth is considered essential, whatever the means necessary. In this aberration the movement from the objective life of integrity to the subjective life of conflict is completed, and the desire for material possessions plays a prominent disintegrating part in each corruption.

In so far as the individual understands the aims of life and rationally plans his activities, the function of the spirited element is to support and carry out these plans. Genuine courage persistently supports rational respect for the order of reality which transcends the horizon of such human values as wealth and health. The spirited element of
the soul must exercise adequate courage to maintain this secondary role of wealth. Should courage turn to support the appetites in the quest for wealth, it becomes confused with ambition or zeal. Thus courage is lost in the subjective ways of pride and the shifting moods of the human scene. Without rationally justifiable ends, courage is subject to the drives of the appetites. The consummation of the spirited element driven by the appetites is the tyrannized life. The consummation of the spirited element working in close cooperation with the rational element is the good life. Wealth must serve the spirited element of the soul in its support of reason and its control of the appetites. Wealth merely provides the material means for carrying out these functions of the spirited element.

The appetitive element of the soul, quite properly, is involved in the creation and use of wealth. The area of control for the appetites is the body and material possessions. The proper attitude of appetite is one of obedience to reason and the spirited element. This control over the body and material possessions (justice) and this obedience to the higher parts of the soul (temperance) serve the ends of wisdom and allow wealth its proper place. Wealth, then, must be sought as a means of assisting in the production of the good life. In adequate amounts, properly guided by reason and guarded by the spirited element, wealth assists in the
production and nurture of a healthy physical environment. Except in rare cases\(^1\) a healthy physical environment is essential to the support of the higher functions of the personal life. But wealth sought as an end in itself, for power over others, or as a means of pampering the appetitive desires, leads down the road of corruption, conflict, chaos, and slavery within the soul. The importance of wealth as the irrational symbol of all values increases in proportion to each corruption of the individual.

(2) Wealth is not the primary value, or the goal of all activity in the commonwealth. Wealth has a valid role in the state only as a support to health. It may serve teleological or disteleological ends, depending entirely upon its uses in the society.

The rudimentary function of the state is economic. It must allow for and promote economic activity in order that the higher elements of spirit and mind can have opportunity to develop. The simple society dealing only with the necessities of physical life may be the best one because there is no extra wealth to lure one man or class into competition with his fellows or with other classes or states.

\(^1\) E.g., Rep., 1496. "So...the remnant who are worthy to consort with Philosophy will be small indeed: perhaps some noble and well-nurtured character, saved by exile...or it may be a great mind born in a petty state...and, possibly, a gifted few who have turned to philosophy from some other calling....Some, again, might be held back like our friend Theages, who...has been restrained by ill health."
But such an idyllic state does not and cannot exist if civilization is to mean more to the individual than mere vegetating. It is necessary, therefore, for luxuries to appear in the state. Luxuries represent unspent wealth or wealth not needed for simple survival. Surplus wealth brings the necessity of guarding the lives and property of the individuals who form the society. This function is one of the primary duties of the state, without which the citizens will fall prey to one another or to outside raiders.

In his ethical and psychological theories Plato insists that each man must recognize his aptitudes and correctly explore them in order to realize his full potential as an individual and citizen. "So, if a state is constituted on natural principles..." only those gifted by nature and developed through an arduous educational procedure can rule.¹ The businessman is not one of this select few, although he is important to the life of the commonwealth. Trained intelligence, not accumulated wealth or business acumen, must rule in the well-ordered state. If businessmen, as businessmen, control the operations of government, it will necessarily hue to their interests and fail to realize the weal of the community. The chief virtues in the state, as in the individual, cannot be produced by business transactions aimed at amassing wealth. If the love of money grips the members of the state, the

¹ Rep., 428, cf. 431.
society will express that characteristic in its actions and will be unjust to that degree.\(^1\) This contention of Plato does not arise from antipathy toward businessmen, but because of their bowing to the more rapacious appetites and their persistent efforts to lobby for their own interests regardless of the good of the commonwealth. Temperance, applied to the business world, consists in business concentrating on supplying the community with the wealth needed to avoid poverty.\(^2\) Never must businessmen produce wealth for its own sake or for the purpose of usurping political power. Justice admits only that a "man should possess and concern himself with what properly belongs to him,"\(^3\) and this requires that wealth serve always in a role supporting the virtuous life.

In both the *Laws* and the *Republic* Plato believes that economic independence is essential to a really valuable social career. But wealth accepted as the end of all activity, or pursued for the sake of power, inevitably leads to the corruption and destruction of the society. This spiritual starvation of the citizens and the social order is best seen in the deviations from the ideal state. Wealth assumes symbolic importance in the irrational man or society. In the first step toward deterioration wealth is deemed

2. Cf. Laws, 754.
important as the symbol of the means by which honor is attained. In the second deviation wealth becomes the final end for all activity and the symbol of the ultimate good. In the third degeneration wealth is symbolic of all liberty and pleasures. In the last stage of corruption wealth becomes the symbol of power over others and fosters illusions of grandeur.

The state must function as a moral teacher, lifting the citizen constantly toward the happiness of the good life. All other functions must contribute to this end in order to arrive at the kind of state which will promote temperance, courage, knowledge, and justice, as well as the lesser goods such as health and wealth.

(3) All citizens and meticis in the Laws, and the citizens of the "third class" in the Republic work for and possess all the wealth of the state, and pay taxes to support the governmental activities. The rulers in the Republic have no personal or corporate property as the limitations on wealth in the Republic make abundantly clear. Wealth is denied to those who have political authority. The structure of the Ideal State also is designed to eliminate the dominant role of wealth in the social order. In the Laws Plato wrestles with specific problems of practical politics and allows wealth a more prominent place, although strictly controlled

by increasingly perfected laws. Plato's critics are mistaken when they charge that he establishes a ruling hierarchy to subject the working class in political and economic slavery.

(4) The limitations on the production, ownership, and uses of wealth are not designed to subjugate the individual, but are designed to further the welfare of the individual and the state and to make sure that wealth functions properly, nurturing the body and soul of man.

(5) Plato's treatment of economic problems forms a part of his ethics and political theory. He never attempts a systematic description and analysis of economic processes within the existing social framework. His economics are fragmentary since his primary interest is in searching out the reasons for moral failure of given societies and offering a political and moral remedy.

In the light of Plato's philosophy these conclusions more nearly represent his treatment of wealth than do the charges assembled by his modern enemies. (1) Plato's treatment of the problems of economics forms a part of his ethical and political theories. (2) The place of wealth in the life of the individual must be that of supporting the rule of reason in the soul so that justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance will be expressed in all actions. (3) Wealth has a valid supporting role in the state, but must never be considered
the primary social value or the end of all human activity. (4) All of the citizens and the metics possess the wealth of the society. (5) The limitations on the production, ownership, and uses of wealth are not designed to subjugate the individual, but are designed to further the welfare of the individual and the state and to make sure that wealth functions properly, nurturing the body and soul of man.
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AN INQUIRY INTO PLATO'S TREATMENT OF WEALTH

Abstract of a Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Plato's moral philosophy has come under attack in recent years on the grounds that his works lay the basis for totalitarian theories such as Marxian Communism and its offspring, Stalinism. It is also argued that Plato is a reactionary anti-democrat who detested those who carry on work with the hands or who are engaged in commerce.

In order to understand the place of wealth in Plato's thought certain points should not be overlooked. (1) Plato's treatment of the problems of economics forms a part of his ethical and political theories which must not be construed as mere totalitarian camouflages if one is to be critically honest. Throughout the dialogues references to wealth are scattered as illustrative comment on some point in a psychological, ethical, or political discussion. He develops no separate science of economics.

(2) In the life of the individual wealth must support the rule of reason in the soul so that justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance will be expressed in all actions. Material possessions are sought, kept, and used only in such quantities as contribute to the maintenance of bodily health and the attainment of virtue. Wealth exists for the sake of the body, and bodily health for the sake of harmony in the soul. Possessions are genuinely valuable only if they are relevant to this inner harmony. The lust for wealth in any form is an expression of the unnecessary appetites,
symptomatic of disorder in the soul. The good life exhibits spiritual health rather than the luxury of material possessions. Poverty of soul is to be avoided more than material poverty, but the truly just and temperate man will seek to be neither rich nor poverty-stricken.

The primary scale of values to Plato is, in descending order, wisdom, health, and wealth. In itself, if it could exist as a thing-in-itself, wealth would be amoral. But wealth exists with reference to individuals and the community and always has ethical implications. Wealth and health are goods in so far as they support the rational life.

As an individual departs from the good life he is increasingly determined by the more subjective elements within himself and his society. At the level of the first deviation from the good life pride replaces knowledge and wealth is sought to bring honor to the individual. In order to insure a satisfying discharge of social duties wealth must be kept at a level which is more than adequate to maintain health of body and soul.

With the enthronement of the money-making appetites the second level of corruption comes into being and reason and ambition are chained to the accumulation of wealth beyond any possible use to the individual. Greed replaces pride. The accumulation of wealth for its own sake is the heart and soul of the plutocrat's pleasures and drives him
relentlessly by fair means or foul as long as the means appear to be honest.

The third deviation from the good life is the "democratic" individual who is a loosely tied bundle of appetites. He confuses sensuality with the genuine values of the good life and as the dynamic of life substitutes lusts for the greed of the money-loving man. Wealth is valued only as a means of buying satisfactions for appetites which ebb and flow ceaselessly.

The tyrant, the ultimate distortion of rational man, values material possessions as a means of manipulating other human beings and of feeding the illusion of greatness. In this stage of delusion the control of all wealth is considered essential, whatever the means necessary. In this aberration the movement from the objective life of integrity to the subjective life of conflict is completed, and the desire for material possessions plays a prominent disintegrating part in each corruption.

(3) Wealth has a valid supporting role in the state but must never be considered the primary social value. The rudimentary function of the state is economic. The simple society, producing the bare necessities of life, might be the best in that there would be no possibility of the society being divided against itself, the rich versus the poor. But such a state does not exist and cannot do so if life is to
mean more than vegetating. In such a community the citizens would be the serfs of poverty. Luxuries which represent wealth not needed for simple survival must therefore appear in the state. This surplus wealth brings the leisure necessary for the cultivation of the mind. It brings about the necessity of protecting the extra wealth from enemies within and outside of the state and the guardian classes arise.

The criticisms based on the assumed likeness of the ruling classes of the Republic and modern totalitarian parties are superficial in that both the critics and the totalitarianists deny the reasons for the guardians: providing the society with genuine protection and with rational guidance toward the highest level of goodness for each citizen within the social order. Marxism, for example, denies Plato's goal by insisting that material interests dominate all activities of the state. Most of Plato's economic thought centers about his attempts to achieve economic disinterestedness within the ruling classes. To achieve this objectivity in reference to their positions and tasks Plato establishes in the Republic the common holding of property among the ruling classes. To achieve the same end in the Laws he imposes various restrictions on the pursuit of wealth, especially on commerce and the crafts. The guardians must represent the best trained intelligence rather than accumulated wealth. In both the Republic and the Laws
Plato insists on economic independence as necessary to the valuable political career. A public servant cannot be expected to be embroiled in the affairs of business and at the same time give undivided loyalty and attention to the affairs of governing.

Those who criticize Plato because of his restrictions on possessions are not adequately mindful of the ethical and psychological goals he seeks to develop. In both the Laws and the Republic Plato recognizes the crucial importance of the economic life of the city, but he refuses to welcome commercialism or any other pursuit of wealth as the measure, the savior, or the end of the state. Plato's limitations on wealth stem from a rational understanding of man, not from an aristocratic totalitarian blindness or an ancient economic determinism. The state and her leaders must be moral teachers, lifting the individual toward the happiness of the good life. Wealth, and all other human goods, must contribute to this effort or be weeded out as unnecessary. To Plato the love of material possessions is a symptom of disease: the inversion of values caused by disorder in the soul itself.

Wealth assumes symbolic importance in the irrational man or society. In the first step toward deterioration wealth is deemed important as the symbol of the means by which honor is attained. In the second deviation wealth becomes the final end for all activity and the symbol of
the ultimate good. In the third degeneration wealth is symbolic of all liberty and pleasures. In the last stage of corruption wealth becomes the symbol of power over others and fosters illusions of grandeur.

These conclusions represent the argument of this dissertation and must not be overlooked in criticizing Plato's economic thought.

(1) Plato's treatment of the problems of economics forms a part of his ethical and political theories.

(2) The place of wealth in the life of the individual must be that of supporting the rule of reason in the soul so that justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance will be expressed in all actions.

(3) Wealth has a valid supporting role in the state, but must never be considered the primary social value or the end of all human activity.

(4) All of the citizens and the metic possess the wealth of the society.

(5) The limitations on the production, ownership, and uses of wealth are not designed to subjugate the individual, but are designed to further the welfare of the individual and the state and to make sure that wealth functions properly, nurturing the body and soul of man.

(6) The modern detractors of Plato fail in their criticisms because they do not consider the unity of his
thinking, or because they dismiss his ethics, psychology, and social theory as peripheral, or because they attribute motives to Plato which rob him of normal integrity.
AUTobiography of James Vince Miller, Jr.

James Vince Miller, Jr., was born near Waynetown, Indiana, July 16, 1920. His parents are Hazel (Kirby) Miller and James Vince Miller, Sr. He attended the public schools of that area, graduating from Crawfordsville High School in 1938. In the fall of 1938 he entered Indiana Central College. His majors were philosophy and English. He was graduated with an A.B. degree in 1942. From 1942 to 1945 he attended the Bonebrake Theological Seminary (now the United Theological Seminary), Dayton, Ohio. He received the B.D. degree in May of 1945. During the winter of 1945-1946 he attended Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, as a special student. Residence work toward the Ph.D. degree was begun in the graduate school at Boston University in 1946.

In 1950 he was appointed to the Bates College faculty as an Instructor in the Department of Religion and Philosophy. He is currently in the second year as an Assistant Professor.