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Nietzsche's social philosophy.

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Thesis

NIETZSCHE'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

by

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem of the Thesis

This thesis examines Friedrich Nietzsche's social philosophy and attempts to present it as systematically as possible. This is no easy task. Even now, after more than fifty years of exhaustive study, there is no universal agreement about what Nietzsche stands for. This is the result of several causes. Foremost among them is Nietzsche's style of writing. Oftentimes, Nietzsche overpowers and sweeps his readers along without making it entirely explicit what he is proposing. Similarly, because Nietzsche writes very disarmingly, he can be misinterpreted quite easily. Nietzsche says he enjoys hiding his real meanings under various guises. And unless the reader thoroughly concentrates, his conclusions may be quite different from what Nietzsche intended. For example, Nietzsche does this sort of writing in presenting the concept of the Will to Power and the Doctriné of the Eternal Recurrence. Nevertheless, to protect himself from being misunderstood, Nietzsche always asks his readers to study his works carefully, by noting the context as well as his earlier and later works. Nietzsche warns that if his writing is incomprehensible for anyone or is a "jar on his ears," then the fault lies within the individual. ¹ For Nietzsche assumes that one has read all

his books and has "not grudged them a certain amount of trouble."¹

Because of these facts, while paying strict attention to Nietzsche's work at hand, the reader must keep the entire gamut of Nietzsche's writings in mind if he is to see the steady progression and continuity in Nietzsche's development.

In addition, there is still another important reason why Nietzsche is misunderstood. This is due to Nietzsche's sister, Elizabeth. After Nietzsche had become mentally ill in 1889, his work began to draw notice. His sister, Elizabeth, then began to fashion the belief that Nietzsche was a German nationalist and a super-Aryan social philosopher. Having legal access to Nietzsche's unpublished writings, Nietzsche's sister blended this yet unpublished material into her interpretation of what Nietzsche meant. And nobody had the authority to challenge her interpretations because she was the guardian of the unpublished material. Every few years Elizabeth Nietzsche had an edition of her brother's collected works edited in which she often rearranged material. More critical, however, was her decision to patch together Nietzsche's notes, which he had accumulated and was working on at the time of his illness. These she published in two volumes (1895, 1901) as Nietzsche's major work. Nietzsche's sister chose the title of *The Will to Power* because there are some included aphorisms that bear this slogan. It is significant to note, though, that Nietzsche included the essence of many of these aphorisms in previous works, particularly in *The Antichrist*. This publication of *The Will to Power* as Nietzsche's final and most systematic work has been and still is a main obstacle to a coherent interpretation.

However, after enough scholars had made a study of Nietzsche's writings, they reasoned that Nietzsche's *The Will to Power* was not meant to be taken as the slogan of brute physical strength, but was intended to connote spiritual supremacy. There is ample evidence to support this conclusion from Nietzsche's writings. In one of his drafts Nietzsche says:

> The Will to Power. A book for thinking, nothing else; it belongs to those to whom thinking is a delight, nothing else. That it is written in German is at least untimely; I wished I had written it in French in order that it might not appear as a confirmation of the aspirations of the German Reich.

Thus, Nietzsche's thought is not as hopelessly ambiguous and self-contradictory as it may appear on first glance or is so widely believed.

On the other hand, while interpreters of Nietzsche grant that Nietzsche is a highly penetrating thinker, some disagree with the majority opinion about the interpretation of Nietzsche's political philosophy. Notable among the dissenters is Bäumler, the official expert on Nietzsche for the Nazis during World War II, and M. A. Mügge, a champion of White, English supremacy. These men point to statements in Nietzsche's works which, if taken out of their original context, uphold Nietzsche as their prophet. For instance, Mügge claims that

> if we follow the advice of Nietzsche we shall in some degree return to the breast of nature, and retard the descent without giving up culture.

> Such a course will be especially valuable if we look at the matter from a racial standpoint. We, the White race, by maintaining the supremacy which we have held for so long, by seeing that breed does not decay but improve, shall obviate

the advent of the time when the New Zealander is to sit on London Bridge, and when the yellow and black peril is to become more real—and thus shall retard the inevitable doom.

This writer does not believe that Nietzsche advocates this type of race supremacy.

Yet because there still remains this difference in opinion about Nietzsche's social philosophy, further exposition of Nietzsche is warranted.

2. Sources

Following are the chief primary sources and their dates of writing for this study: The Birth of Tragedy (1872), "On the Use and Abuse of History" (1873), parts of "Schopenhauer as Educator" (1874), Human, All-too-Human (1878), parts of "The Wanderer and His Shadow" (1880), The Dawn of Day (1881), The Gay Science (1882), Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-85), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Genealogy of Morals (1887), parts of The Wagner Case (1888), The Antichrist (1888), Twilight of the Idols (1888), Ecce Homo (1888), and extensive portions of The Will to Power.

Several secondary sources have been compared as a general aid to understanding Nietzsche. Among them are Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist; George Allen Morgan's What Nietzsche Means; Willard Wright's What Nietzsche Taught; and Emile Faguet's On Reading Nietzsche.

3. The Methodology of the Thesis

This thesis will be developed in five stages. First, Chapter II

begins the study by investigating Nietzsche's basic principles, the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence, and endeavors to show how they set the framework upon which Nietzsche formulates and constructs his social philosophy. These two very important concepts are probably the most misunderstood elements about Nietzsche. This writer traces the development of both concepts through Nietzsche's writings and shows how Nietzsche finally concludes that there is a monistic force constantly at war with itself in the universe. Nietzsche's cosmology sees the universe as constituting two realms, one of spirit and another of impulse. While each strives to overcome the other, Nietzsche believes both are but the manifestation of one central force, the Will to Power.

Actually, Nietzsche is interested in relating the Will to Power hypothesis to human beings. Nietzsche thinks that the psychological expression of the Will to Power, explicable in terms of intellect and spirit, is greater than its antagonistic counterpart, impulse and passion. Nietzsche then postulates that the will is diffusely spread among the human population, but is expressed best among the strong in psychical power. Through the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence Nietzsche illustrates how those who possess strong wills wish to live each moment of their lives in its entirety. It will be pointed out that Nietzsche thinks of the Eternal Recurrence as the moral imperative to which the strong willed persons will dedicate themselves in the task of becoming as perfect as they are able. When the strong souls have harmoniously organized the chaos of their passions, Nietzsche assumes they will be ready to create the beautiful and do the good.

As mentioned above, Nietzsche shows that all men possess the Will to Power, but in varying degrees. Consequently, Nietzsche constructs a
"Scale of Excellence" in which he can measure degrees of power. This is mentioned in chapter II and is taken up in more detail later. However, the important fact is that Nietzsche constitutes the idea of a dual system of morality which he believes can be defended empirically. Along similar lines of empirical explanation, Nietzsche assumes that the weak souls, those dependent upon external laws and prohibitions to regulate their conduct, have risen to the fore in modern society.

Chapter III then goes on to outline the cultural, educational and political systems of Europe as Nietzsche sees them. Nietzsche explains that because the weak in psychical power have championed their values as the sole moral code Western society has degenerated. As a result, Nietzsche maintains that there is no real culture or true education in his era. Similarly, Nietzsche acknowledges that the nationalism, so rampant on the European continent in the late Nineteenth Century, is but a sign of small power on his "Scale of Excellence."

After it is shown how Nietzsche evaluates his own age, chapter IV traces Nietzsche's explanation of why Nineteenth Century Europe has become degenerate. Nietzsche believes that the weak "barbarians," those on the bottom of the "Scale of Excellence," gained political supremacy and brought on a "slave revolt in morals" in former times. And Nietzsche thinks that the weak's acceptance of Christianity, which he sometimes classifies as a religion for degenerates, has been the pinnacle of their feeling for revenge against the strong. Chapter IV also abstracts from Nietzsche's theory of history the elements which Nietzsche uses to construct his theoretical system. It will be seen how Nietzsche concludes that the strong at the top of his "Scale of Excellence" will rise to supremacy after a "nihilistic" period in human history and will rededi-
cate humanity to a new cultural epoch.

Chapter V will deal more fully with Nietzsche's hope for this future period. This chapter explains Nietzsche's ideal society and theorizes how the best and most powerful individuals are to be propagated. By a return to the hardier virtues, such as honesty, integrity, and decisiveness, Nietzsche contends that the strong souls will break away from conventional morality by setting up and maintaining a "Master Morality" with its own system of virtues. This transformation will necessitate a dual system of ethics since the weak in the "Scale of Excellence" will still have the usual code to live by. Thus, the meaning of Nietzsche's "Revaluation of all Values" is made more clear. It assumes that there will be two systems: one for the "overman," or the strong in psychic power, and another for the masses, those at the bottom of the "Scale of Excellence."

Finally, Nietzsche's social philosophy culminates in wishing that the strong will construct a "caste-system" based on the two systems of morality. Nietzsche's aim therefore turns out to be an aristocracy where those who have learned to master their impulses can free themselves from the usual cares of daily living and be free for creating. The thesis concludes by discussing Ancient Greece as a possible quintessence of what might be exemplified as a Nietzschean ideal society.

Chapter VI evaluates Nietzsche's philosophy in the light of the merits and weaknesses which have been discerned in the study.
CHAPTER II

NIETZSCHE'S BASIC PRINCIPLES

Because Nietzsche is interested primarily in man, he centers his attention more on human than on cosmic affairs. Nevertheless, Nietzsche links man with his physical environment by proclaiming the Will to Power as the basic force underlying all activity. Nietzsche believes that this conception of the Will to Power is commanded by the conscience of logical method. Not to assume several kinds of causality, so long as the attempt to get along with a single one has not been pushed to its furthest extent. . . . The question is ultimately whether we really recognize the will as operating, whether we believe in the causality of the will; if we do so—and fundamentally our belief in this is just our belief in causality itself—we must make the attempt to posit hypothetically the causality of the will as the only causality. . . . Granted, finally, that we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one fundamental form of will—namely, the Will to Power as my thesis puts it, . . . one would thus have acquired the right to define all active force unequivocally as Will to Power.\footnote{Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: Random House, Inc., 1927), pp. 422-23.}

This conception of the Will to Power points to an emphasis on the continuity between nature and culture. Therefore, Nietzsche may explain both political and cultural achievements in terms of the Will to Power.

1. The Will to Power

On the human level Nietzsche envisages the Will to Power as psychological drives and proposes to explain all behavior in terms of
will. Nietzsche contends that this approach has not been utilized by previous philosophers.

All psychology hitherto has run aground on moral prejudice and timidities; it has not dared to launch out into the depths... It seems as if nobody had yet harboured the notion of psychology as the Morphology and Development-doctrine of the Will to Power, as I conceive of it. The Power of moral prejudices has penetrated deeply into the most intellectual world, the world apparently most indifferent and unprejudiced, and has obviously operated in an injurious, obstructive, blinding, and distorting manner.¹

This psychological consideration leads Nietzsche to suggest the possibility of showing how values can be generated out of nature. In The Dawn of Day, where Nietzsche first deals with the problem of finding a basis for relating man to the world, Nietzsche thinks that all men have the desire to feel power. But Nietzsche goes on to point out that the actual concentration of power is unequally displayed in humanity. Nietzsche talks of power and fear in psychological terms in The Dawn and considers both as aspects of the universal Will to Power. Nietzsche then explains that the majority of mankind being about equal in ability conform for their own protection. Nietzsche says nothing new here. Hobbes said it before in the Leviathan. Only Nietzsche holds that this situation is basically wrong and should be overthrown for mankind's own good.

Nietzsche next goes on to draw the implications of the Will to Power hypothesis together. In the section on "Our Striving for Distinction" in The Dawn Nietzsche reduces practically all human behavior to the simple striving for power. Nietzsche proceeds to do this in terms of a scale. At the bottom of the scale Nietzsche places the barbarian who tortures others; at the top Nietzsche enthrones the ascetic who tortures

¹. Ibid., p. 406.
Our striving after distinction urges us to keep a constant watch on the neighbor and his feelings; but the sympathy and secrecy which are essentials for the gratification of this craving are far from being harmless, compassionate or kind. On the contrary, we want to notice or to divine how we can make our neighbor suffer either externally or internally; and even if the one who is striving after distinction makes, and wishes to make a joyful elevating or cheering impression, he yet enjoys this success not inasmuch as he thereby gives pleasure to, elevates or cheers his neighbor, but inasmuch as he impresses himself on the stranger’s soul, transforming its shape and ruling over it at his own free will. The striving after distinction is the striving after ascendency over one’s neighbor, be it only a very indirect one, or one only felt or dreamt of. There are many stages in this secretly desired ascendency and a complete record of the same would be identical with a history of civilization, from the first antics of barbarism up to the caricature of over-refinement and morbid idealism. The striving after distinction entails to the neighbor—to mention only a few rungs of this long ladder—torture, blows, terror, ... and self-infliction of torture,—here, at the top of the ladder, we find the ascetic and martyr, who feels supreme satisfaction, himself obtaining as the result of his craving for distinction, the very thing which the barbarian, his antitype on the very first rung of the ladder, makes others suffer, by whom and before whom he wishes to prove his excellency.

In this section of *The Dawn of Day* Nietzsche begins to explain his social philosophy. Nietzsche reveals that it is man’s continuous wish to overwhelm, excel, and overpower his neighbor that leads to culture. Nietzsche shows that the barbarian does it by torturing his neighbor. In the light of Nietzsche’s comment he appears to possess a low degree of power, else he would not need to inflict hurt.

Toward the middle of the scale Nietzsche describes what may be called the average degrees of power. Here Nietzsche discloses that

mediocre people gain a sense of power by evoking envy and admiration from their contemporaries. And at the top of the scale Nietzsche places the ascetic. At this stage of his thinking Nietzsche believed that the greatest feeling of power resided in the ascetics. Nietzsche contends: "Indeed, happiness, conceived as the most vivid sensation of power nowhere on earth has reached a higher pitch than in the souls of the superstitious ascetics."¹

From what Nietzsche says it can be maintained that the degrees of power correspond to various forms of behavior and of culture. In The Dawn of Day and in his previous works Nietzsche considers the saint, the artist, and the philosopher as the most powerful men and the uncultured barbarian as the least powerful. Nietzsche also believes that political power is just another form of barbarism. Nietzsche expressly emphasizes this point in denying the German Reich as a source for true culture. In fact, Nietzsche thinks that chauvinistic nationalism, based on military strength, is not a sign of strength but of weakness.

Neither necessity nor desire—may, the love of power is the demon of mankind. Give them anything you like, health, food, . . . they are and will ever be unhappy and whimsical for the demon is ever on the alert and longing to be gratified. Take everything from them and gratify this craving; then they will almost be happy—as happy, at least, as men and demons can be. But why do I say this? Luther has already said it, and better than I, in the verses: "And though they take our life, goods, honour, children, wife; yet is their profit small, these things shall vanish all. The Kingdom remaineth." Ay, Ay! The Kingdom.²

While Luther probably had the Kingdom of God in mind, Nietzsche looks upon Bismarck's German Reich as a nation thrilled by its love of physical

¹. Ibid., p. 106.

². Ibid., pp. 241-42.
power. This type of power is not what Nietzsche desires.¹ And to avoid being accepted as a proponent of only physical strength Nietzsche, in The Gay Science, introduces knowledge and spirituality as integral parts of his standards in the measurement of values.

For, believe me, the secret of the greatest faithfulness and the greatest enjoyment of existence is: to live dangerously! Build your cities under Vesuvius! Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves! Be robbers and conquerors, as long as you cannot be rulers and owners, you lovers of knowledge! Soon the age will be past when you could be satisfied to live like shy deer, hidden in the woods! At last the pursuit of knowledge will reach out for its due: it will want to rule and own, and you with it!²

However, by introducing knowledge and spirituality into his value scheme Nietzsche injects other forces into his philosophy.

But with his next work, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche repudiates the antithesis between physical strength and spirituality and proclaims the Will to Power as the one and only force in the universe. Up to Thus Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche had accepted the dualism of matter and spirituality, or in other words, between power and true power. Nietzsche now overcomes this dualism by suggesting that there is only a monism of the Will to Power, in the idea that the various degrees of power might themselves be the measure of value. Thus, Nietzsche's theory of values becomes clearer. The real differences between the various modes of power are reducible to a more basic drive—the universal Will to Power. Hence, Nietzsche thinks that the degrees of power must be the measure of value.


In the chapter on "The Thousand and One Goals" in *Zarathustra*
Nietzsche speaks of "the Will to Power." In this section Nietzsche
appears to emphasize moral relativism. Nietzsche indicates that various
nations have different goals and moral codes. Yet beneath these different
goals and codes Nietzsche discerns that they have one thing in common—
the Will to Power. Nietzsche believes that the possession of the Will to
Power is the common element which makes comparative judgments of values
possible between the moral codes of various societies. It is "a tablet
of the good—which hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of
their overcomings; behold, it is the voice of their will to power."  

At this stage Nietzsche introduces the Will to Power as the will to
overcoming. Nietzsche says that the Will to Power is commensurate with a
living being. And where Nietzsche finds the living he finds the Will to
Power. This Will to Power Nietzsche describes as something "which must
always overcome itself." However, besides self-overcoming Nietzsche is
also interested in the competition between the individual and his neigh-
bor. In the discussion on the "Striving for Distinction" in *The Dawn
Nietzsche presented a scale of degrees of excellence wherein the striving
to arouse one's neighbors' fear is nearer the bottom of the scale, while
the striving to arouse admiration, or to show one's power by elevating
neighbors, is nearer the top. Nietzsche extends this conception of the
struggle between individuals to nations and suggests that in an ideal
world community each nation will try to overcome itself to such a degree

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann
2. Ibid., p. 226.
3. Ibid., p. 227.
that it will arouse its neighbors' envy. In this way all nations can vie
with and endeavor to excel each other. In so doing they may spur and
insite one another to great feats.

However, Nietzsche's theory of values cannot rely on any united world
order to see to it that moral justice prevails. Any such wish or interpre-
tation of history as a graduated success story is far from Nietzsche's
mind. Consequently, Nietzsche's problem remains the same: how to delineate
between power and true power. To escape the dilemma Nietzsche again posits
a scale and considers true power as simply the greatest amount of self-
organization in any living being.

But wherever I found the living, there I heard
also the speech on obedience. Whatever lives, obeys.
And this is the second point: he who cannot obey
himself is commanded. That is the nature of the living.¹

Hence, Nietzsche offers a solution to the earlier problem of how to
measure values in a monistic universe. Instead of assuming different
principles, such as physical strength and spirituality, Nietzsche reduces
both to the more single fundamental force: the Will to Power. Nietzsche
now explains the distinction between mere physical power and the true
power of the spirit in terms of the difference between degrees of power.

Nevertheless, the problems which Nietzsche faces when he suggests
some general plan for values are what overcoming means and how the degrees
of power in a monistic universe are to be gauged? Nietzsche does not
entirely clarify these problems. However, Nietzsche does maintain that
spiritual values are more important than physical ones. Nietzsche writes:
"And if you cannot be saints of knowledge, at least be its warriors. They
are the champions and forerunners of such sainthood."² Likewise, in the

¹. Ibid., p. 226.
². Ibid., p. 159.
chapter on "self-Overcoming" in Zarathustra Nietzsche hints that there may be a common definition of all moral codes. But before actually considering Nietzsche's conceptions of morality, it may be advisable to say something about Kant who may have influenced Nietzsche.

In The Critique of Practical Reason Kant says that moral worth is solely a function of the rationality. Any inconsistency, Kant thinks, may be made explicit by universalizing the maxim of the Categorical Imperative and determining whether its universal adoption would give rise to a situation in which it could no longer be applied.\(^1\) In this respect Kant's ethic exhibits overcoming. In like manner, Nietzsche infers that a moral code must not restrain the individual nor permit him to act solely on impulse. However, while Nietzsche assumes, as Kant does, that knowledge and critical reflection are necessary for development, Nietzsche also believes that any action which contradicts the proposition of self-overcoming is virtually immoral. This suggestion leads one to believe that Nietzsche considers self-development to be the indispensable element in the construction of any sound individual and in any healthy culture.

And life itself confided this secret to me: "Behold," it said, "I am that which must always overcome itself. Indeed, you call it a will to procreate or a drive to an end, to something higher, further, more manifold; but all this is one, and one secret."\(^2\)

Even so, Nietzsche must soon face the problem of interpreting which acts are good and which evil. Nietzsche partly answered this problem by implying that morality consists in not yielding to passion.\(^3\) Nevertheless,

3. Ibid., pp. 226-27.
before Nietzsche solves the problem of good and evil he tackles the more immediate problem of self-overcoming. Nietzsche defines the actual process of overcoming the passions as "sublimation." First using this word "sublimation" in Human, All-too-Human, Nietzsche believed that impulses can be channeled into a creative, spiritual activity instead of being fulfilled directly.\(^1\) By the word "sublimation" Nietzsche does not, however, intend to consider overcoming as self-mortification. Nietzsche makes this quite clear in The Dawn of Day.

He who can endure it and who thinks it reasonable to weaken and suppress his whole physical and spiritual organization, thereby, of course, likewise attains his purpose of weakening a single impetuous craving; as, for instance, those who like unto the ascetics, starve their sensuality but, at the same time, starve and degrade their physical strength and, not infrequently, their reason.\(^2\)

Nietzsche concludes that by sublimation he means that

We may be the gardeners of our inclinations, and—which the majority ignore—as richly and advantageous cultivate the germs of anger, pity, inquisitiveness, vanity, as we trail a beautiful fruit along the wall. We may do so with a gardener's good or bad taste, and we may also give full scope to Nature, only here and there applying some embellishment or adornment.\(^3\)

Nietzsche insists that what remains after sublimation is the essence and what is changed is accidental. Thus, Nietzsche considers the universal Will to Power which remains throughout the process as the essence, while all its manifestations are only accidental and changing attributes. In other words, so-called objectives are merely accidental attributes of a more basic striving. Anticipating Freud in one respect, Nietzsche says


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 380.
that sexuality is very important. Yet Nietzsche does not reduce the Will to Power to a mere sexual libido. Sexuality is an example of the universal basic drive of life; but it is cancelled in sublimation and cannot be considered the essence of that pulsating drive. Sexuality is merely a foreground of something else which is more basic: the Will to Power.

Nietzsche, however, considers that it is the feeling of potency which is most essential while the sexual manifestation is merely accidental. That sexuality need not be base Nietzsche emphasizes constantly. In fact, many of his polemics against Christianity are based on his opinion that Christianity has tended to consider sexuality as base. According to Nietzsche, instead of seeing that the sex-drive might be sublimated Christianity repudiated it. "The church fights passion with excision in every sense: its practice, its 'sue,' is castration... It has at all times laid the stress of discipline on extirpation."

This contrast of the repudiation and extirpation of the passions on the one side, and of their control and sublimation on the other, is an important point in Nietzsche's development. Nietzsche wonders whether modern man has become emasculated and has even the ability to do what is commonly called evil. Nietzsche declares that to be moral is to be able to overcome one's passions. But if one does not have any passions, then he cannot do the good nor create the beautiful. A man with strong passions might do "evil" because he has not learned to sublimate his passions. But if he should acquire self-control Nietzsche believes he can


3. Ibid., pp. 538-59.
achieve greatness.

The blind yielding to a passion, whether it be

generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of

the greatest evil. Greatness of character does

not consist in not possessing these passions—on

the contrary, a man should possess them to a
terrible degree; but he should lead them by the

bridle.

What Nietzsche means when he says one has to "organize the chaos" in

himself now becomes clearer. The passions originally are in a state of

chaos. The being portraying these passions thinks one way, may live in

another, and often appears still different. What Nietzsche intends is

that no man can live without bringing some order into this chaos. On the

one hand, this may be done by weakening the whole organism through the

repudiation and repression of many passions. But Nietzsche believes that

the result in this case is only a castration. On the other hand,

Nietzsche thinks that there is another way to organize—namely, by

sublimation, which allows for the achievement of an organic harmony both

in the individual and in culture.

However, the question of how sublimation is possible within the

framework of Nietzsche's monism still must be considered. It must be

pointed out that Nietzsche does not consider it legitimate to accept

unquestioned traditional beliefs. Having questioned the existence of God,

Nietzsche also questions the supra-natural origins of reason. Critics

say that empirical studies then led Nietzsche to assume that all human

behavior could be explained in terms of the Will to Power. 2 Nietzsche's

own observations, coupled with his historical studies, especially of Greek

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, in Willard Huntington Wright, 

University Press, 1941), p. 64.
culture, seems to have convinced him that "the will to power is the most fundamental fact which we can get at."¹ Hence, Nietzsche concludes that not only the passions, but also the spirit may be interpreted as an instrument of the universal Will to Power, which becomes the world-ground for Nietzsche. The result is that Nietzsche gives spirituality a unique status in his overall scheme because it cannot be cancelled in the process of sublimation, as sexuality is able. While the spirit and the sex-drive are both aspects of the Will to Power, Nietzsche considers the sex-drive as only a passion; and when one yields to it in its unsublimated form he becomes a slave to his passions. The spirit, though, allows one to gain mastery over himself. And as Nietzsche believes the Will to Power is essentially the "instinct of freedom," he concludes that the will can find fulfillment best through spiritual endeavors. For example, Nietzsche says: "He who is spiritually rich and independent is also the most powerful man in any case."²

While Nietzsche thinks that strength of will and intelligence are among man's highest faculties, he still bases his view on the power standard. Nietzsche believes that intelligence is the faculty which enables the organism to develop foresight, helps to organize the passions into a harmony, and distinguishes the higher from the lower man.³ Interestingly enough, Nietzsche's attack on "systems" is based on his objections to the irrationality he finds in their failure to question premises.⁴ Much of his attack on Christianity is similarly based on what Nietzsche takes to be the

Christian repudiation of reason and the glorification of the weak in power.¹ For instance, Nietzsche says that Christian scholars advance their conjectures as blandly as dogmas and are hardly ever honestly perplexed by the exegesis of a Biblical verse. Again and again they say, "I am right, for it is written," and the interpretation that follows is of such impudent arbitrariness that a philologist is stopped in his tracks, torn between anger and laughter, and keeps asking himself: Is it possible? Is this honest? Is it even decent?²

Thus, as a philosopher Nietzsche considers philosophy as "the most spiritual Will to Power" and proposes to measure power and weakness in terms of man's willingness to subject even his most cherished beliefs to rationality.³ Those who take refuge in dogma or systems which are based on unquestioned premises appear weak to Nietzsche. This point may be documented from Nietzsche's later works, namely, The Genealogy of Morals and The Antichrist. "The priest knows only one great danger: that is science, the sound conception of cause and effect."⁴ By science Nietzsche means the willingness to question, to submit one's expressions to experiments, and to revise one's beliefs in the light of new evidence. Nietzsche's later works are quite clear regarding his experimentalism and affirmation of criticism.⁵ Nietzsche writes: "I am too inquisitive, too skeptical, too arrogant, to let myself be satisfied with an obvious and crass solution of things."⁶ In these later works Nietzsche still regards power as the sole standard of value. But rationality and intelligence are

³. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 389.
⁵. Nietzsche, The Idols, p. 482.
valuable only insofar as they are the manifestations of true power. The result is that Nietzsche holds "the most spiritual men" to be "the strongest ones" because they possess both knowledge and intelligence with strength of will.\(^1\)

Hence, one aspect of Nietzsche's argument is that the Will to Power is neither identical with nor opposed to reason, but is potentially rational. This implication underlies the fact that the universe is not pre-planned and guided by a divinity. It does not indicate, however, that the universe is totally irrational, for Nietzsche says that there are evidences of rationality. "A little reason, to be sure, a seed of wisdom scattered from star to star—this leaven is mixed in with all things; for folly's sake, wisdom is mixed in with all things."\(^2\) Thus, when man, through his intelligence, controls his passions in the process of self-development, Nietzsche concludes that the Will to Power overcomes itself. In addition, Nietzsche sees the Will to Power as always being at war with itself. The battle between the spirit and the passions is only one of the many skirmishes. Nietzsche views all natural events, all history, and the development of every human being through such struggles. In fact, Nietzsche thinks that man can become more perfect and gain mastery over himself only through a measure of asceticism and self-denial. Attaching this conception of human morality to the universe at large, Nietzsche's philosophy takes on a cosmic setting.

Once this is done it can be maintained that Nietzsche's thought makes a full circle. In his earlier books, such as The Dawn of Day, Nietzsche explains the universe by analogy with the human psyche; it will be shown

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below, in the section on the Eternal Recurrence, that Nietzsche also explains the individual through the setting of the cosmos.

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Nietzsche is mainly concerned with the individual. In the end, Nietzsche's emphasis on individuality leads him to the conception of an order of rank based on power.

That becoming stronger brings with it arrangements which resemble a teleological design—i.e., that the apparent ends are not intended but, as soon as the supremacy over a smaller power is established and the latter works as function of the greater, an order of rank, of organization must awaken the semblance of an order of means and end.1

As Nietzsche sees it, curbing the impulses is an attempt to obtain more life and power. In this sense Nietzsche believes that most men obey the laws which others impose on them because they want power. The majority of mankind believe that this is the way to get ahead and become successful. More important, though, is Nietzsche's insistence that it is only a sign of small power to obey externally imposed laws. Nietzsche assumes that most would not obey such rules if they could disregard them. Therefore, Nietzsche asserts that only the weak need to be constrained by the rule of law because if they were not anarchy would result.2

The strong-willed man, however, is able to generate his own standards. This point is best understood in terms of Nietzsche's contention that the Will to Power is a creative force. The powerful man is the creative man who is not likely to abide by previously established norms. Since a genuinely creative act contains its own norms, Nietzsche declares that every creation becomes a creation of new norms. "Whoever must be a creator in good and evil, verily he must first be an annihilator and break

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1. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 82.

values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness; but this is creative.\(^1\) Nietzsche's attack against his age's culture and against Christianity now are clearer. It is Nietzsche's contention that established codes do not allow for new creations and stifle the initiative of the strong in power. Nietzsche expresses this point well in Beyond Good and Evil. Using a paraphrase Nietzsche writes: "Jesus said to his Jews: 'The Law was for servants;—love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!'\(^2\)

However, Nietzsche's opposition to established codes does not lead him to repudiate all discipline. Nietzsche does not have in mind a rejection of all existing rules. "It is the weak characters without power over themselves who hate the constraint of style" and "are always out to interpret themselves and their environment as free nature—wild, arbitrary, fantastic, disorderly, astonishing."\(^3\) In this same aphorism where Nietzsche pictures the weak as the wild, disorderly ones, he presents his picture of the powerful.

One thing is needful. "Giving style" to one's character—a great and rare art! It is exercised by those who see all the strength and weaknesses of their own natures and then comprehend them in an artistic plan until everything appears as art and reason and even weakness delights the eye... It will be the strong and domineering natures who enjoy their finest gaiety in such compulsion, in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own; the passion of their tremendous will relents when confronted with stylized, conquered, and serving nature; even when they have to build palaces and lay out gardens, they demure at giving nature a free hand.\(^4\)

\begin{enumerate}
\item Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 228.
\item Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 469.
\item Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 99.
\item Ibid., pp. 98-99.
\end{enumerate}
This is the height of power for Nietzsche. Nietzsche thinks the man who conquers himself shows greater power than the one who conquers others.

Furthermore, Nietzsche finds

strength where one does not look for it: in simple mild, and pleasant people, without the least desire to rule—and, conversely, the desire to rule has often appeared to me as a sign of inward weakness: they fear their own slave soul and shroud it in royal cloak.¹

Finally, Nietzsche thinks that real power consists in controlling, sublimating, and employing one's passions rather than considering them as evil and fighting them. But before man can accomplish this self-overcoming and create the beautiful he has to suffer. Nietzsche stresses the suffering which is called for in such self-perfection and insists on man's cruelty against himself. If Nietzsche's cruelty is so understood as the individual's attitude toward himself, one may grant that "almost everything that we call 'higher culture' is based upon the spiritualizing and intensifying of cruelty."² Nietzsche brings this out further in The Genealogy of Morals where he deals with the "bad conscience."

This secret self-tyranny, this cruelty of the artist, this delight in giving a form to one's self as a piece of difficult, refractory, and suffering material, in burning a will, a critique, a contradiction; this sinister and ghastly labour of love on the part of the soul, whose will is cloven in two within itself, which makes itself suffer from delight in the affliction of suffering; this wholly active bad conscience has finally . . . produced an abundance of novel and amazing beauty and affirmation, and perhaps has really been the first to give birth to beauty at all.³

So, Nietzsche concludes that the bad conscience is a necessary evil through which the creator must pass before he can be "reborn." In this

1. Nietzsche, The Dawn, in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 221,
life Nietzsche thinks that the artist and philosopher come closest to the state of being where they are able to give style to their characters and to create a world of beauty. Recognizing this fact, Nietzsche ultimately concludes, as Goethe did in the last portion of his Faust, that the Will to Power can be contained and employed to full advantage through self-perfection. In Nietzsche's estimation the perfect man is the passionate man who has mastered his impulses. In his early works Nietzsche had envisaged the artist, the ascetic, and the philosopher as the supreme triad of humanity. But by the time he had written The Antichrist, in 1888, Nietzsche evaluated them differently. The ascetic Nietzsche now pictures as the man who has extirpated his passions and has destroyed his chance of creating; the artist and philosopher, however, employ their passions in creating. Hence, Nietzsche believes that they are the most valuable men in the human race.

2. The Eternal Recurrence

Once Nietzsche's conception of the powerful man who has disciplined himself into wholesness is understood, Nietzsche's doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence becomes more explicable. The strong-willed man looks upon every moment of his life as something precious and momentous. From this perspective one "does not envisage salvation in the process but feels the world is finished in every single moment and its end attained."1 This passage suggests the infinite value of the moment and of the individual who experiences it.

The doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence can thus be construed as Nietzsche's moral doctrine by which the powerful man affirms his own being.

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Like Goethe's Faust, Nietzsche believes that the man who has organized
the chaos of his passions, and has integrated every feature of his charac-
ter, will realize how inextricably his own being is involved in the
totality of the universe.

Such a spirit who has become free stands amid
the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in
the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and
that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—he
does not negate any more.¹

In the "drunken Song" in Zarathustra Nietzsche also relates his conception
of the Eternal Recurrence to the feeling of joy, which he analyzes as the
conscious aspect of the possession of power. This is the powerful man's
faith. In saying that "joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep,
wants deep eternity," Nietzsche brings out the relation between joy and
Eternal Recurrence.²

Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my
friends, then you said Yes too; to all woe. All
things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you
wanted one thing twice, if ever you said "You please
me, happiness! Abide, moment!" then you wanted all
back. All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared,
enamored—oh, then you loved the world. Eternal ones,
love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you
say: go, but return! For all joy wants—eternity.³

This is the highest manifestation of the universal essence of being. In
this outlook the conception of Nietzsche's "overman" becomes inseparable
from that of the Eternal Recurrence.⁴

This suggestion of the Eternal Recurrence can also be thought of as
having points of contact with Kant's concept of the Categorical Imperative.

3. Ibid.
It can now be maintained that the man who believes in the recurrence will act in such a manner that he would wish his acts to recur eternally. But it is problematical whether Kant ever meant to appeal to man's psychological disposition. Kant takes hardly any concern with emotional consequences whereas the man who believes in recurrence would be deterred from certain actions by his response to their consequences.

On the other hand, Nietzsche is not so concerned with particular actions as he is with the state of being of the whole man. Those who achieve self-perfection and affirm their own being do not concern themselves about details. They want an Eternal Recurrence out of the fulness of their happiness in the moment. They "live life" as it were. Because of this experience, Nietzsche affirms the universe "for all eternity" not only to endure the necessary, "and on no account conceal it," but "to love it."\(^1\)

It is noteworthy that Nietzsche also says this feeling of joy, "amor fati," is his formula for the greatness of a human being.\(^2\) Power is still Nietzsche's standard of value; but this joy is the conscious feeling which is connected with the possession of power. "My formula for greatness in man," Nietzsche remarks, "is amor fati: that a man should wish to have nothing altered, either in the future, the past, or for all eternity."\(^3\) The man who experiences this joy is the powerful man, and he gains meaning for his life by achieving perfection. This interpretation is corroborated by an aphorism in *The Gay Science*.

\textit{Excelsior!} "You will never pray again, never adore again, never again rest in endless trust; you

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
deny yourself any stopping before ultimate wisdom, ultimate goodness, ultimate power, while un harnessing your thoughts; you have no perpetual guardian and friend for your seven solitudes; you will live without a view of mountains with snow on their peaks and fire in their hearts; . . . there is no reason any more in what happens, no love in what happens to you; no resting place is any longer open to your heart, where it has only to find and no longer to seek; you resist any ultimate peace, you want the eternal recurrence of war and peace. Man of renunciation, do you want to renounce all this? Who will give you the necessary strength? Nobody yet has had this strength." . . . Perhaps that very renunciation will also lend us the strength to bear the renunciation itself; perhaps man will rise ever higher when he once ceases to flow into a god.¹

This passage answers the problem of providing an incentive for man to raise his state of being from carnal to true humanity. It also explains why Nietzsche thinks that his Eternal Recurrence doctrine is required. Nietzsche maintains "a doctrine is required, strong enough to have the effect of breeding: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and breaking the world-weary."²

However, while one can grasp Nietzsche's conception of joy when he feels glorification in the moment, it seems that Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, as a metaphysical doctrine, does not bear testimony to Nietzsche's overall position. It must be remembered, though, that Nietzsche does not present the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence as dogma but as an expression and experience of joy that redeems and justifies life. It is doubtful if Nietzsche comprehensively thought out all the metaphysical implications of the Eternal Recurrence theory. In his notes in The Will to Power Nietzsche may have believed that this doctrine was really scientific. He describes it as "the most scientific

of all possible hypotheses."¹ As pointed out in the introduction, however, the notes in this work were merely tentative. Nietzsche might only have meant to imply that all events may be repeated endlessly, and that there is no plan nor goal to history or to life. This gives the clue that Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence does not mean primarily a cosmological theory but is a methodological device used to transform humanity.

CHAPTER III

NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF MANKIND

1. The Task of History

It is to the historical mind that Nietzsche concedes the task of establishing continuity between human beings and the universe. Because man can derive insight into history from the viewpoint of the Will to Power hypothesis, Nietzsche contends that there is a continuity between the individual and the universe. "The powers in history are doubtlessly discernible, if one strips all moral and religious teleology. They must be those powers which also operate in the entire phenomenon of organic existence."1 This link between man and the cosmos is even better illustrated in the treatise on "The Use and Abuse of History" where Nietzsche explains the task of history. First and foremost, Nietzsche believes that history must serve life because history is the means by which the individual gains solace and strength. In addition, for Nietzsche history must be critical and reveal facts as they really are. However, as in the universe, Nietzsche denies that there is comprehensive order in history. History is not the work of immanent reason; it is full of accidents. On the other hand, while denying perfect order, Nietzsche does not assert perfect chaos, The overall fact may be lawlessness, but within it "a little wisdom is possible indeed."2

1. Ibid., in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 323.

2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 278.
In "The Use and Abuse of History" Nietzsche describes the various types of history. Among the more important are: "monumental history," which is the exemplary portrayal of great men and events of the past in order to derive comfort and inspiration from the fact that man is capable of greatness; "antiquarian history," which is piety toward the past for those who come after; and critical history, which is the ordinary study of history on an intellectual level.\(^1\) Nietzsche writes both critical and monumental history. For example, his work on the Nineteenth Century and on Christianity is monumental. For individuals and nations possessing the most strength Nietzsche maintains there is a need for both critical and monumental history. Nietzsche thinks every man and nation needs certain unbiased knowledge of the past. However, a strict and critical historical sense tends to weaken a person or a nation. By itself it does not provide any uplifting force or ideal. Remembering the discussion on the Eternal Recurrence, which may be understood as a moral doctrine for the strong in psychical power, Nietzsche shows that empirically speaking the "unhistorical" and the "super-historical" mediations are two antidotes against the overpowering of life by critical history.\(^2\) Via these two methods men and nations learn how to forget and how to remember at the proper time. Furthermore, in the "super-historical" view one feels that the world is finished at every moment.\(^3\) This feeling of greatness is the individual's Will to Power working to produce that state of "amor fati" spoken of previously.

Consequently, Nietzsche envisages the need for both methods; but

2. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
3. Ibid., p. 17.
Nietzsche hopes that

history will not find its whole significance in
general propositions, and regard them as its blossom
and fruit. On the contrary, its real value lies in
inventing ingenious variations on a probably common
place theme, in raising the popular melody to a
universal symbol and showing that a world of depth,
power, and beauty exist in it.¹

Being a man of great power, the fine historian must have the task of

providing a model to his contemporaries.

Thus history is to be written by the man of experience
and character. He who has not lived through something
greater and nobler than others, will not be able to
express anything great and noble in the past. . . . If
you live yourselves back into the history of great men
you will find in it the high command to come to maturity
and leave that blighting system of cultivation offered
by your time.²

Nietzsche believed that the majority of men in his age lacked this
ability to write "real" history because the weak in the Will to Power had
triumphed over the strong. Nietzsche bases this judgment upon observation
of his own generation. Looking upon the scene both as an observer and as
a critic, Nietzsche says that humanity
does not represent a development toward something
better or stronger or higher in the sense accepted
today. "Progress" is merely a modern idea, that is, a
false idea. The European of today is vastly inferior
to the European of the Renaissance: further development
is altogether not according to any necessity in the
direction of elevation, enhancement, or strength.³

By reading about the past and comparing it with his own age, Nietzsche
infers that his generalizations on morality are valid. Before some of
these are investigated, it must be shown how Nietzsche evaluates his age

1. Ibid., p. 46.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
2. The Cultural Decline in Europe

In the section of "Our Striving for Distinction" in *The Dawn of Day*, Nietzsche explains that culture begins when the individual man wishes to excel his neighbor. Here Nietzsche suggests a scale of "degrees of excellence" where the striving to arouse a neighbor's admiration is placed very high on the scale. Nietzsche extends this suggestion in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* to include a contest between nations.

According to Nietzsche, culture is, before all things, "the unity of the artistic style in the expressions of the life of a people."\(^1\) Abundant knowledge and mechanization are not essential to culture, nor are they the signs of its existence. In fact, Nietzsche believes they may exist more harmoniously with the very opposite of culture—barbarity. And for Nietzsche the Europe he sees is a society full of barbarism because it lacks any indigenous style. Nietzsche argues that "our modern culture is not a real culture, but a kind of knowledge about culture, a complex of various thoughts and feelings about it, from which no decision as to its direction can come."\(^2\) Nietzsche sees his age as degenerate, and looking to the past, especially to Ancient Greece and the Renaissance, he indicates that mankind has been corrupted through the valuing of the like-minded more highly than the differently minded. As Nietzsche's thinking progresses, he expands this initial hostility of contemporary culture until it becomes a comprehensive criticism of modernity, by which Nietzsche fulfills the philosopher's duty to be the "bad con-

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Apart from the Ancient Greeks only the men of the Renaissance incorporated to the full Nietzsche's ideal of culture. This passage from *Twilight of the Idols* is typical of Nietzsche. "Ages must be measured by their positive strength—and then that lavishly squandering and fatal age of the Renaissance appears as the last great age."\(^1\) Nietzsche argues that everything since the Renaissance is a decline except for a temporary halt in Seventeenth Century France, where some part of the freedom of the personality was regained. However, this leads into a study of Nietzsche's theory of history in order to explain why things have gone wrong; this will be discussed later.

1. The Nation State

In Nietzsche's estimation there is an attrition to the creative genius in the human race because the European is not developing "according to any necessity in the direction of elevation, enhancement, or strength."\(^2\) Furthermore, Nietzsche thinks that the power to will is spread too diffusely among the various peoples. Nietzsche says the situation is worst and most varied where civilization has longest prevailed; it decreases according as "the barbarian" still—or again—asserts his claims under the loose drapery of Western culture... The power to will and to persist, ... is already stronger in Germany, ... in England, Spain, and Corsica, ... not to mention Italy, which is to young yet to know what it wants, and must first show whether it can exercise will; but it is strongest and most surprising of all in that immense middle Empire where Europe as it were flows back to Asia—namely in Russia. There the power to will has been long stored up and accumulated, there the will—uncertain whether to be negative or affirmative—waits threateningly to be discharged.\(^3\)

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1. Nietzsche, *The Idols*, p. 54D.
On the whole, however, Nietzsche believes that the power manifested in Nineteenth Century Europe is the lowest degree of power on the "Scale of Excellence." Nietzsche discloses that this situation is the result of the mob's ascension to power, which happened after the fall of Rome. The type of European Nietzsche describes is in the habit of admiring the values of respectable things, such as "humanity," "pity," and "sympathy." Nietzsche contends that this process is weakening the individual and his uniqueness. Moreover, since the weak in the Will to Power have gained control over the social machinery, Nietzsche shows that the logical expression of the modern State must be some sort of democracy or socialism. The aim of this type of state is not to develop the individual, nor to create beauty, but to establish a regime of mediocre happiness for most of its people. Nietzsche argues that this state with its doctrine of equality "squanders what is most precious, the spirit."

In like manner, Nietzsche envisages the modern State as suppressing all that is exceptional to the mass, for Nietzsche shows that that which is superior to the mass revolts against its authority. Nietzsche points out that the modern State exists to serve only two purposes: to engender and protect the weak-willed peoples and to maintain correct attitudes. But in so doing this State becomes the greatest foe of progress and seeks to multiply the inferior elements at the cost of the strong in power. Nietzsche illustrates his contention in Twilight of the Idols where he discusses the relationship between culture and the State.

Culture and the state—one should not deceive oneself about this—are antagonists: "Kultur-Staat" is merely a modern idea. One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what

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is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political.\textsuperscript{1}

Hence, Nietzsche believes that the design of correcting and improving the human race by beginning with the equality of all men is a falsification of the natural order. As a matter of fact, Nietzsche discloses that this is further evidence that the weak-willed people are now triumphant. These weak-willed individuals have become triumphant over the strong souls, Nietzsche says, because they are more numerous, more patient, and more cunning. Similarly, Nietzsche holds that because Democracy and Socialism entail mediocrity they must destroy the aristocratic spirit. They thereby become responsible, in large measure, for the shortage of great personnel.\textsuperscript{2}

Nietzsche argues that this consequence of depending upon the masses to govern humanity is leading to the enactment of legislative measures which are prejudicial to the well-being of all men. In summing up the effects of the State system Nietzsche writes that these effects undermine the Will to Power, they level mountains and valley, and call that morality; they mold men small, cowardly and hedonistic—everytime it is the herd animal that triumphs with them.\textsuperscript{3}

Another effect this modern State system has developed is the evolution of the professional politician who Nietzsche sees as trading on the credulity of imbeciles. Nietzsche says: "I do not consider these so-called 'first' men as human beings." "They are the excrement of mankind, the products of disease and the instinct of revenge."\textsuperscript{4} In Nietzsche's estimation the State's rulers are demagogues who deceive their followers and resort to all sorts of crooked and ingenious methods to obtain political power.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Nietzsche, \textit{The Idols}, p. 509.
\item Nietzsche, \textit{The Genealogy of Morals}, pp. 632-38.
\item Nietzsche, \textit{The Idols}, p. 541.
\item Nietzsche, \textit{Ecce Homo}, p. 852.
\end{enumerate}
The conclusion Nietzsche draws is that the democratic process has, with all its scandals, discouraged those who possess any real value, or those who are worthy and look upon the interests of man, from entering politics. Nietzsche shows that the proof of this lies in the fact that all those who in modern times have risen above humanity have either broken loose from State control, or else have used the machinery of the State to assert their powers.

Therefore, Nietzsche regards the modern State as something profoundly immoral. He argues against the "levellers," who preach peace and good will and maintain that in time man can work out his own problems if only given a reasonable sociological environment. Nietzsche insists that any form of this type of socialism is a despotism of the most reactionary sort. Nietzsche sees Socialism and Democracy as merely the methods the weak decadents use to apply remedies which only make conditions worse. 1 In fact, Nietzsche points out that because Socialism desires great state powers, and because it requires the most submissive behavior on the part of all citizens, it outdoes all the past in annihilating the individual.

Nietzsche writes what the Socialists

would fain attain with all their strength is the universal, green-meadow happiness of the herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of life for every one; their two most frequently chanted songs and doctrines are called "Equality of Rights" and "Sympathy with all Sufferers"—and suffering itself is looked upon by them as something which must be done away with. 2

Nietzsche asks, then, what is the consequence of universal suffrage, parliamentarianism, and concessions to the masses? Nietzsche answers by

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1. Ibid., pp. 941-42.

saying only a degeneracy of the intellect and war. Some of Nietzsche's
cost brilliant pages are those wherein he devotes himself to a scathing
criticism of the modern state which he classifies as a mixture of absurd
nationalism and contemptible "obsequiousness." Nietzsche writes, for
instance, that the "new Reich Germany needs enemies more than friends: in
opposition alone does it feel necessary, ... in opposition alone
does it become necessary." 1

Furthermore, Nietzsche says that the Germans do not possess any real
culture and could learn something on this score from the French. 2
Nietzsche also goes on to assail the Germans for having committed every
great crime against real culture in the last four hundred years. 3 For
example, Nietzsche holds the Germans responsible, in large measure, for
the hopeless situation which now exists in Europe. Nietzsche points out
that Luther restored Christianity the moment it lay vanquished, and that
the Germans, with their wars of independence, robbed Europe of Napoleon
when he might have welded that continent into a political and economic
unit. 4 In addition, Nietzsche is not impressed with the military power of
the German Reich. It has been shown how Nietzsche repudiates physical
power as being but a low degree of power on the "Scale of Excellence."
This is more explicit in The Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche discusses
German military strength. "Can any one interest himself in this German
Empire? Where is the new thought? It is only a new combination of power?

1. Nietzsche, The Idols, p. 408.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Clifton F. Fadiman


All the worse, if it does not know its own mind."\(^1\) And Nietzsche believes that the Germans do not know their own mind and where they are going. Finally, by accusing the Germans of having lost their breadth of vision, which would enable them to pursue more lofty goals, Nietzsche contends that they are only political and church puppets of sterile vision who are able merely "to exercise faithfulness and, for the sake of faithfulness, to risk honor and blood even for evil and dangerous objects."\(^2\)

ii. Education and Science

One important ramification of this intolerable situation which Nietzsche finds in modern society, and especially in Germany, is the fact that the professions of education and science have become completely falsified. In Nietzsche's estimation, rather than shaping liberally educated men, the modern educational process aims at producing narrow-minded specialists who are historically and aesthetically trained "babblers of old saws and new wisdom on church, state, and art."\(^3\) Nietzsche argues and claims that the type of men engendered by this modern educational process are merely emasculated specialists, "geniuses" in one particular field, who are nothing but "good clockworks." Nietzsche feels that all they can accomplish is to "indicate the hour without fail and make a modest noise."\(^4\)

Whereas these professions should serve to form the seeker after truth, Nietzsche cites how they have now become places for the procrea-

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ation of machines.\textsuperscript{1} Nietzsche holds that modern educators want to 
"prepare huge numbers of young men, with as little loss of time as possible, to become usable, abusable, in government service."\textsuperscript{2} And very astutely Nietzsche discloses that the means at hand to accomplish this purpose are boredom and duty.

Philosophy, in particular, has no place in Nietzsche's educational scheme if it is to be no more than a system of fact having no expression in action. Nietzsche likes to think of philosophies as methods of educating the mind with their one-sided demands to see things exactly so and not otherwise. Accordingly, Nietzsche speaks of having several philosophies and recommends that one live through a series of views, finally uniting all in one comprehensive vision.\textsuperscript{3} In this manner Nietzsche disparages modern teaching methods of forcing knowledge in one's head instead of gaining it through contact. Thus, the task of philosophy, science, and education, as Nietzsche sees them, is to train the individual so that he will know where he is going. But modern education, philosophy, and science do not fulfill this task for Nietzsche. They rather foster the growth of many of modern society's woes, such as Democracy, Socialism, and pacifism.\textsuperscript{4}

Consequently, the whole Nineteenth Century educational process is, to Nietzsche's mind, one of despiritualization. Nietzsche thinks that modern education, like modern culture and the modern state, is falsified because there do not seem to be individuals who can live "super-histori-

\begin{enumerate}
\item Nietzsche, \textit{The Idols}, p. 552.
\item Ibid.
\item Nietzsche, \textit{Human}, p. 93.
\item Ibid., pp. 84-91.
\end{enumerate}
cally" and create anything of value. The result is that only the weak-willed peoples' interests are served by modern education which exists only for the protection and creation of mediocrity.

If this process of degeneration continues to increase Nietzsche fears that power might fall into some despot's hands who will demand complete acquiescence and uniformity in all issues. This is aptly brought out in one of Nietzsche's earliest works, "Schopenhauer as Educator."

Now almost everything on earth is determined by the crudest and most evil forces, by the egotism of the purchasers and the military despots. The State, in the hands of the latter . . . wishes that people should lavish on it the same idolatrous cult which they have lavished on the Church.\(^1\)

Nietzsche reasons that Europe could move to this sort of society because while the "universal rights of man" were paramount, modern man wants, if possible, only to recline in the shade of the tree planted by the strong and to escape the necessity of working to discipline himself.\(^2\)

Nietzsche also contends that more than anything else continuity of development has been destroyed and that men live disconnectedly in modern times. Nietzsche's indictment against conventionalism then ends with a diagnosis in which he claims that modern civilization is stale and decadent. As Nietzsche's thought matures, he unites all accusations in a comprehensive theory of decadence, which he defines as disintegration, conflict, and maladjustment— all phases of the modern age. Viewing his era, Nietzsche says that the fundamental symptoms of degeneracy lead to "ressentiment."

To fight these consequences, Nietzsche argues, is delusory. In fact, Nietzsche points out that the means commonly employed illustrate the rule

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that decadents choose remedies which only make things worse.\(^1\)

Therefore, Nietzsche shows that the basic aim of culture, which is to promote the generation of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint, has not been accomplished in modern times because the "mob" is in power.\(^2\) Nietzsche's next problems are to ascertain why this general decline has set in and to postulate what the results may be. Once more Nietzsche must go to history to gather the material for his generalizations.

3. Nietzsche's Interpretation of the Past

Historically, Nietzsche believes that he has found the key to the whole decadence movement in Jewish history. Nietzsche blames the defeated Israelites of the "Babylonian Captivity" period for starting the unnatural process of reinterpreting natural causal relations in terms of sinful ways and transgressions. When the Jewish people were subjugated, Nietzsche asserts in order to survive they invented a system of conduct which would secure their continued existence. They realized that initiative would mean death. So they replaced their hardier virtues with the safer ones of survival. However, Nietzsche says that this system of outer conduct is a direct falsification of all natural conditions and that the Jewish people adopted it only when they had been stripped of their power. Henceforth, Nietzsche discloses how their God became a moral dictator and how their morality ceased to be an expression of life but became a condition for survival. The Jewish priesthood had to interpret history with a view to showing that all sins against God led to punishment and that all pious worship resulted in reward. Consequently,

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when a people is perishing, when it feels how its faith in the future and its hope of freedom are vanishing irrevocably, when submission begins to appear to it as the prime necessity . . . it becomes aware of the virtues of the subjugated as the conditions of self-preservation. 1

Nietzsche says this process began the great "slave rebellion in morals." The oppressed Jews took revenge on their masters by devising a means to power through the creation of a "ressentiment morality" which eventually put them at the head of all decadence moralities. Nietzsche asserts that this "revolt of the slaves" begins in "ressentiment," becomes creative, and gives birth to the values of pity, sympathy, and suffering. In the chapter "Of the Tarantulas" in Zarathustra Nietzsche describes the feeling of revenge these people have introduced. It means that the world "should be filled with the storms of . . . revenge." 2 Thus, by the time Christianity arrived Nietzsche shows how it found the ground well prepared by the supremacy of moral values and other-worldly metaphysics.

In the midst of this cauldron of ressentiment against the strong Nietzsche introduces Jesus. Nietzsche believes Jesus was an extreme decadent whose sensitiveness produced an instinctive hatred of reality, and of all forms of hostility. According to Nietzsche Jesus' essential teaching was not a theological dogma but a way of life which he practiced as a means to inward peace. 3 In The Antichrist Nietzsche says Jesus renounced all enmity and resistance to receive the "Kingdom of Heaven," which is an inward state. Now Nietzsche indicates that this state, indifferent to the priestly hierarchy with its manipulation of punishment and repentance, was

a further development of that reinterpretation of reality which had motivated the Jewish "slave rebellion." But inasmuch as Jesus championed the outcast and denied the Jewish conception of the "chosen people" he was leading an uprising against the foundations of Jewish society and the Jewish religion. Nietzsche assumes this is the reason why Jesus was killed.

However, after Jesus' death his immediate followers and the early Christian community misunderstood the character of Jesus and the meaning of his life. Nietzsche argues that Jesus could not intend anything with his death except to give publicly the strongest exhibition, the proof of his doctrine. But his disciples were far from forgiving this death—which could have been evangelic in the highest sense—or even from offering themselves for a like death in gentle and lovely repose of the heart. . . . The matter could not possibly be finished with this death: "retribution" was needed. . . . Once more the popular expectation of a Messiah came to the foreground; a historic moment was envisaged: the Kingdom of God comes as a judgment over his enemies.1

As Nietzsche views it Jesus' death on the cross was merely the supreme example of this new way of life—freedom from resentment directed outward. But the disciples could not grasp this fact; they desired revenge. So they interpreted Jesus as a warlike Messiah who would return to establish a Kingdom of Heaven for the glory of his disciples and judgment of his foes.2 St. Paul completed this initial perversion.3 Paul invented his own history of earliest Christianity. Still further; he falsified the history of Israel once more so that it might appear as the prehistory of his deed . . . . Later the Church even falsified

1. Ibid., p. 615.
2. Ibid., pp. 635-36.
the history of mankind into the prehistory of Christianity.¹

Making an arbitrary selection of a few traits from the life of Christ, Paul improvised around them the doctrines which later ruled Europe: sin, atonement, and personal immortality. Nietzsche emphasizes how Paul introduced dogma in place of the way of life and so prepared for the priesthood's restoration to power. And afterwards it is simple for Nietzsche to illustrate how the Church, linked with the State, sanctioned war and embodied the exact opposite of everything Jesus taught.

By Jesus' death Nietzsche wants to prove that all suffering is divine. Nietzsche holds that "all of us are nailed to the cross, consequently we are divine."² Jesus

died as he had lived, as he had taught—not to "redeem men" but to show how one must live. This practice is his legacy to mankind: his behavior before the judges, before the catchpoles, before the accusers and all kinds of slander and scorn—his behavior on the cross. He does not resist, he does not defend his right, he takes no step which might ward off the worst; on the contrary, he provokes it. And he begs, he suffers, he loves with those, in those, who do him evil.³

This is not Nietzsche's ideal of the passionate man who controls his impulses but is a case "of puberty being retarded."⁴ In their search for an explanation as to how God could have allowed his "son" to be executed the early "Christians" could not understand this fact and fell upon the theory that Jesus' death was a sacrifice for man's sins. Nietzsche indicates that through the years the Christian community did not have any contact with reality in the realms of morality and religion

2. Ibid., p. 634.
3. Ibid., pp. 608-09.
4. Ibid., p. 604.
and possessed only "an imaginary theology," the Kingdom of God.¹

Consequently, Nietzsche contends that as more weak decadents joined its ranks Christianity naturally became the hater of all that manifested pride, courage, and freedom of the spirit because "Christian is the hatred of the senses, of joy in the senses, of joy itself."² Finally, "all the failures, all the rebellious minded, all the less favored, the whole scum and refuse of humanity . . . were thus won over" and were swept into power with Christianity's triumph.³ When this happened Christianity triumphantly fought against every elevation of individuals and the growth of culture. "In Christianity the instincts of the subjugated and oppressed come to the fore; here the lowest classes seek their salvation."⁴

The result, Nietzsche writes, was that Christianity needed sickness because "to make sick is the true, secret purpose of the whole redemptive procedures constructed by the Church."⁵ This concomitance of "escape," "revenge," and "faith" as a way out of one's inability to overcome himself seems to be the essence of Christianity for Nietzsche.

Hence, Nietzsche can show why Christianity made such inroads when the Roman Empire was crumbling. It was the culmination of the weak-willed people's desire for power. Lacking the mental capacity for intellectual integrity, or of personal strength, these people accepted Christianity because it best seemed to express their Will to Power. During this period

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1. Ibid., p. 581.
2. Ibid., p. 589.
3. Ibid., p. 619.
4. Ibid., p. 588.
5. Ibid., p. 632.
Nietzsche points out how the priests made themselves indispensable by attributing to the will of God all those acts which they desired of the people. At the same time Nietzsche assumes the upper classes converted to Christianity and accepted the values of the "Slave Morality" because this over-cultivated class was fascinated by a movement which controlled the masses. Then the nob triumphed when the middle and lower classes advanced to positions of actual State power. After this development the "herd" justified its morality first under the form of a revelation from God and later under the form of a Kantian Categorical Imperative.

However, within this pattern Nietzsche views the epochs of the Italian Renaissance and Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century France as attempts to reinstate the hardier virtues of the strong. But each time Nietzsche sees a counter movement restoring the Christian values of the weak: first through the Reformation and then through the French Revolution. In the contrast between Voltaire and Rousseau Nietzsche sees the symbolic confrontation of the old and the new. One of the last to combine "the greatest freedom of mind and a positively unrevolutionary disposition, without being inconsistent," Nietzsche views Voltaire as the representative of aristocratic civilization, while he thinks Rousseau is a man "of ressentiment" whose "return to nature" came of a hatred for aristocratic culture and helped to destroy it.1

Nietzsche now shows why the Nineteenth Century man had been led to interpret his suffering as punishment for sinning against God. By the continuous use of fear through the ages the moralized conscience rose to its maximum in the conception of individual guilt meriting punishment. Nietzsche reasons that the conception of God became a very useful tool in

the hands of agitators who interpreted all happiness as a reward and all misfortune as sin for disobeying God. But because this moral order turns all natural concepts of cause and effect upside down Nietzsche believes "everything else that is unnatural follows." Christianity was the final culmination of this revolution. By degrading the earthly life and by maintaining that man's task was to work for salvation in the after life, Nietzsche thinks the expectation of another world has made men condone their imperfections in this world. Instead of striving to become perfect here and now, man has been taught to put his faith into the future. As a result, the doctrine of two worlds arose. According to Nietzsche there developed the Christian world where one must have faith, and there is also the terrestrial world where one cannot be perfect, but where the just have faith that their sins are forgiven by God.

In summary, it has been shown how Nietzsche views modern society as degenerate because of its incompatible ideals which are dominated by humanitarian optimism, altruism, and pity. Nietzsche sees the weak's triumph over the strong on the "Scale of Excellence" as one of the great catastrophes of history. In Nietzsche's estimation the weak are levellers of everything noble and wish only to evolve a mediocre and stable environment. Socialism and Democracy are the best expressions of the weak's productivity since these are political forms which demand equality. Furthermore, Nietzsche contends that the situation in modern Europe is becoming worse. Rather than begetting more liberal and better trained individuals, Nietzsche evaluates the educational process of his day as producing only mechanized robots specialized in one particular field. Nietzsche believes that if this process continues universal literacy will

result in mankind's being automatized. Yet Nietzsche is astute enough to realize that beneath the humble exterior shown by mankind on the surface there is a rumbling of emotional uneasiness. Nietzsche discerns this as man's desire to express his individuality. However, fearing the unique the mob must forsake natural leaders to retain group supremacy. Nietzsche discloses that this abnormal situation is bound to weaken mankind.

In history Nietzsche illustrates how this unnatural process of the weak's ascension to power began with the Jewish Captivity into Babylonia. To survive as a group these Jews had to revalue their entire moral code. So, they introduced the softer ethics of benevolence for the hardier militaristic virtues. In time their inbred ressentiment grew to such proportions that it in turn converted all the meek and downtrodden to behave in this manner. Thus, by the time Jesus had arrived Nietzsche feels the time was ripe for the Jewish revolution in morals to become the dominant moral code for the world. Finally, Nietzsche envisages the modern notion of progress, which conceives of the abolition of pain and suffering as the ultimate aim in life, the intolerable consequence of Christian morality having become the sole moral ideal.
CHAPTER IV

NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY

1. Nietzsche's Criticism of Group Morals

Nietzsche contends that the Christian values have ruled so completely that even philosophy has unconsciously worked in its service. For instance, Nietzsche says that philosophers have taken morality for granted and suppose that men know innately what is good and evil. Nietzsche points out that because criticism has long been forbidden morality has had unconditional authority. However, Nietzsche believes the foundations of morality are "merely a learned form of good faith in prevailing morality, a new means of its expression, consequently just a matter-of-fact within the sphere of definite morality." Nietzsche discloses that he is the first to see morality as a problem and to examine it objectively. He writes that "we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values is for the first time to be called into question." As a preliminary to his critique of modern morals, Nietzsche plans a descriptive study on a comprehensive scale. Thinking that the real issues emerge from a comparison of many moralities, Nietzsche gets at the problem by investigating the actual sources. Here Nietzsche's experimental atti-

1. Ibid., pp. 636-37.
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 474.
tude by means of his use of critical history is at its best. Nevertheless, Nietzsche recognizes that descriptions and explanations are one thing and that a standard of criticism is another. However, Nietzsche has established the Will to Power as his standard of measurement and shows how facts do become relevant to criticism when they reveal the amount of power which a morality expresses. Having established a standard to gauge morality, Nietzsche then calls for an inquiry.

The question, "What is the value of this or that table of 'values' and morality?" will be asked from the most varied standpoints. For instance, the question of "valuable for what" can never be analyzed with sufficient nicety.

In addition, while investigating the actual sources, Nietzsche does something quite interesting and unique. Since he believes that it is first necessary to understand what is being valued, Nietzsche uses psychological and historical facts together as relevant data in his critique of morals. As mentioned previously, Nietzsche reproaches mankind for its failure to see and question what modern morality is. Therefore, Nietzsche undertakes a natural history of morals in order to help explain the conditions and urges from which moralities arise and which they express. In so doing Nietzsche suggests that some features of morality extend down into the animal world. Likewise, Nietzsche goes on to say that man first distinguished himself from the animals when he learned to relate his actions for his well-being. Nietzsche argues that man was not a rational animal to begin with but lived in groups dominated by customs and myths.

1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 422-23.
This type of morality consisted in nothing more than blind obedience to custom, based on a superstitious fear of some vague power. In this period of man's history, which Nietzsche calls the pre-moral, individuals usually acted without thinking as individuals; instead there seemed to be a collective conscience. Nietzsche also shows that the harshness of life in this early period of man's history bred a love of cruelty which was quite opposed to anything altruistic. In summing up the characteristic moral values of pre-historic man Nietzsche writes:

Suffering was accepted as virtue, cruelty as divine, ... revenge as virtue, disavowal of reason as virtue; on the other hand well-being as a danger, inquisitiveness as danger, peace as danger, pity as danger, ... insanity as divinity, change as immorlity and potent of perdition.

Nietzsche indicates that this period of morality had several effects. For example, it made men dependable and uniform, which was the foundation subsequent moral development built upon. Furthermore, the phantastic beliefs about natural phenomena and their relation to spirits kept men from observing the real causes and effects of their actions. Men mistook the sequences of guilt and punishment for those of cause and effect. Finally, Nietzsche thinks that modern moral feelings are permeated with superstitious valuations developed from this earlier period.

Nevertheless, there are marked contrasts between the past and the present. Nietzsche indicates that moral development does not advance in a straight line. "People lack knowledge ... of what reversals the moral

2. Ibid., p. 44.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. Ibid.
judgment has already undergone and how in the most fundamental sense 'evil' has actually re-christened 'good' several times already, Nietzsche says. A major difference between the pre-moral and the moral period was the transition era with the shift of attention from consequences to origins of actions. Nietzsche seems to suggest that it represents an early attempt at self-knowledge based on the concern for the origins of action. However, Nietzsche attributes to this "moral" period far more than just the change of emphasis in moral judgments. Within it Nietzsche traces a complex number of moral types. Among these moral types are the healthy and the decadent.

Every time has, in its first measure of power, a measure showing which virtues are permissable, which forbidden. Either it has the virtues of ascending life; then it fundamentally opposes the virtues of declining life—then it also needs the virtues of decline; then it hates everything which is justified only out of abundance, out of exuberance of forces.

The declining life represents, of course, the direct antithesis of the Will to Power as a self-overcoming force, because degenerating life prefers the unhealthy values. Within it Nietzsche distinguishes two types. An example of the first is the ascetic morality which breeds self-hatred.

The need of redemption, the essence of all Christian needs ... is the most sincere form of expression of decadence; it is the most convinced, most painful assent to it in sublime symbols and practices. The Christian wants to get rid of himself.

On the other hand, Nietzsche illustrates another type of decadence

which directs resentment outward. Anarchists and Socialists who make society to blame for their misery, and Christianity, in many of its developments, are historical examples of forces which make life bearable for the weak by taking revenge upon the strong. By betraying the manly passions and virtues, such as health, happiness, and self-reliance, the weak glorify the opposite qualities. But Nietzsche says their revenge is not merely imaginary because they have succeeded in giving the healthy a "bad conscience" and in arousing their pity to the point of general disgust with life.¹

Nietzsche shows that each particular morality has been developed with reference to the interests of some limited group which lives in competition with others. The contrast between their respective codes often led to antagonisms because every group tends to think badly of what is foreign and wishes to restrain the influence of rivals. However, among all the types of group morality Nietzsche abstracts something common and calls the result "Flock Morality." By this term Nietzsche seems to mean a community in which class divisions are unimportant. Nietzsche says that the basis of flock formation is weakness and fear and that the "herd" emphasizes solidarity and equality. Nietzsche reasons that Flock Morality appeals to and tends to produce mediocrity. By extension Nietzsche then applies this term Flock Morality to the sort of values supported by those instincts which are attractive to average people, whether they live in a herd or not. Therefore, Nietzsche claims that Flock Morality includes the typical middle-class morality as engendered in his day.²

Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not conceive of Flock Morality as a

2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 552.
simple type. He shows that it has a complex character based on a duality of values. Externally, Nietzsche contends that the "herd" manifests egoism; for the sake of self-protection it esteems the warlike virtues when exercised against outer dangers. Conversely, though, the "herd" prizes harmless needs and helpfulness for its internal relations and disproves of the very qualities which it admires for external purposes. Here Nietzsche shows that the ambivalent attitude of a herd to its leader seems to reflect this double scheme of values. On the one hand, the "flock" needs a leader, for it cannot direct itself; yet the human "flock" persecutes natural leaders—especially the strong in the Will to Power.\footnote{Ibid., p. 626, and The Genealogy of Morals, pp. 635, 685 ff.}

However, Nietzsche points out that Flock Morality has changed during the course of history. When earlier times were dangerous the herd fostered warlike impulses and valued actions only with reference to group welfare. But when external dangers diminished fear turned toward other members of the herd and produced the other values. Those very impulses which had been admired in wartime seemed doubly alarming during peacetime. Nietzsche illustrates how they were branded immoral and the safe qualities, which do not arouse fear in one's neighbor, became the supreme virtues. Nietzsche believes that this is the status of "Flock Morality" today.

2. Nietzsche's Application of the Master and Slave Moralities

Whereas the Flock Moralities arise in classless societies and tend to produce them, Nietzsche says that the Master and Slave Moralities are associated with societies already divided into upper and lower strata. Nietzsche holds that the clue to this hypothesis is confirmed by the dual valuations which he expresses by contrasting the terms "good and bad" and
"good and evil." Different languages, Nietzsche maintains, show a similar development in the meaning of the words used for "good and bad" and "good and evil." Nietzsche contends that the terms first indicate membership in the upper or lower classes.¹

According to Nietzsche the values of the Master Morality come from the strong in the Will to Power themselves. Nietzsche points out that the strongest on the "Scale of Excellence" originated their values without much regard for unselfish actions. They did not calculate unbiasedly, but merely asserted their own individuality. Therefore, Master Morality, in Nietzsche's sense, means a kind of self-affirmation where the strong express themselves by their creations. Nietzsche recognizes that he is not the first to say this.

How the general judgments have shifted! Those greatest marvels of ancient morality, Epictetus, for instance, knew nothing of the glorification, so usual now, of taking thought for others, of living for others.²

The issue here is plainly one of self-affirmation versus running away from oneself. In this next aphorism Nietzsche seeks to make this explicit.

Against the pessimists he cites Kant.

Nothing less is aimed at—whether admitted or not—than thorough transformation, nay, weakening and abrogation of the individual: . . . It is hoped that everything may be managed in a cheaper, less dangerous, more uniform, and harmonious way, provided only that there are nothing but large bodies and their members. Everything which in any way corresponds to this all-productive craving and its subsidiary cravings, is considered as good—that is the moral ground-current of our age; sympathy, and social feeling play into each other's hands. (Kant is still outside this movement; he especially teaches that we ought to be callous to other people's suffering, if our beneficence is to have moral value—a precept which

Schopenhauer, as may easily be understood, angrily calls Kant's absurdity.¹

Then Nietzsche alludes to savages. "Savages feel with a moral shudder when thinking of the possibility of becoming an object of pity, which is the same to them as being of all virtue."²

Thus, Nietzsche did not think of his critique of altruism as anything new. For instance, in *The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche writes:

This exaggerated estimation in which modern philosophers have held pity, is quite a new phenomenon; up to that time philosophers were absolutely unanimous as to the worthlessness of pity. I need only mention Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant—four minds as mutually different as is possible, but united on one point; their contempt of pity.³

This exaggerated estimation in which modern philosophers have held pity is quite a new phenomenon for Nietzsche. Nietzsche thinks that almost all the great philosophers of the past have agreed that self-perfection was the goal of morality. However, Nietzsche urges that the self-perfection for the strong must be accompanied communally. Here Nietzsche takes his cue from the ancient Greeks. Nietzsche brings this point out in *The Dawn* where he discusses friendship.

Antiquity has deeply and fully experienced and excogitated friendship, and almost buried it in its own grave. . . . All great qualifications of the ancients were supported by the premise that man was standing side by side to man.⁴

In Nietzsche's next work, *The Gay Science*, he establishes a further relationship for friendship.

*If one considers, finally, that the whole rest of the world seems . . . pale and worthless to the lover*

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who is prepared to make any sacrifice, to disturb any order, and to disregard any other interest; then one may indeed marvel that this greed and its justice of love between the sexes has been so glorified and deiiled . . . Yes—that one has taken from this love the conception of love as the opposite of egoism, although it is perhaps the most candid expression of egoism. There is apparently, here and there one earth, a kind of continuation of love where this greedy desire of two persons for each other has given way to a new craving and greed, a common higher thirst for an ideal which stands above them. Its true name is friendship.¹

In Zarathustra Nietzsche finally conceives of friendship as the real relationship between the strong. "Have you ever seen your friend asleep—and found out how he looks? What is the face of your friend anyway? It is your own face in a rough and imperfect mirror."²

However, if a friend whom one loves should suffer it occurs to Nietzsche that it might be better to hide this feeling under a hard crust. "But if you have a suffering friend, be a resting place for his suffering, but a hard bed as it were, a field cot: thus you will profit him best."³ As a result, Nietzsche emphasizes that Master Morality is active and positive and calls those traits "good" which make a man respected. On the other hand, it tables those qualities which arouse contempt, such as weakness and cowardice, as degrading. Nietzsche makes this moral type more concrete by stressing that the strong temperament does not consider itself an instrument but as the end for which everything else exists. The members of this morality believe that duties exist only between equals. Moreover, the strong are ready for great responsibilities and risks and are not afraid of suffering. Their creations are gifts of the overflow of power rather than expressions of pity.

². Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 168.
Hence, Nietzsche regards the Master Morality as a discipline which the strong have to impose on themselves in order to maintain their position. Nietzsche further explains the dynamic character of the Master Morality by emphasizing the psychological tensions present in the strong; these tensions generate reverence for higher gradations of value and cultivate an urge to achieve more sublime distances.¹

Every elevation of the type "man" has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society and so it will always be—a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the pathos of distance, such as grows out of the incarnated differences of classes, ... that other more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the foundation of even higher, rarer, farther, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the elevation of the type "man," the continued "self-surmounting of man."²

Another kind of tension arises between the strong themselves; from the beginning

the strong strive away from one another with as natural a necessity as the weak toward one another; if the former unite, it happens only in the prospect of an aggressive joint-action. ... The instinct of the born "masters" ... is at bottom irritated and disquieted by organization.³

It appears, then, that Nietzsche's Master Morality endorses the principle of equality among the strong. In this respect it presents analogies to the Flock Morality. However, there is one fundamental difference—that between stagnation and tension. Nietzsche shows that herd animals are "levellers" and that their values manifest average per-

¹ Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 590.
² Ibid., p. 575.
formance. On the other hand, the creative values engendered by the Master Morality make for advancement.

In contrast to the Master Morality Nietzsche points out that there is a Slave Morality which is the creation of "ressentiment." While the Master Morality is active and spontaneous, Nietzsche says the other is reactive and degenerate. In the Slave Morality Nietzsche cites "evil" as being the primary concept because the weak man resents all expressions by the strong. When poisoned by impotence the slave's emotions vent themselves in a distorted conception of the strong, whose creative qualities, thus conceived, are called "evil." In contrast to the strong the weak call "good" the virtues of humility, obedience, and patience, qualities even the weak themselves do not possess. In like manner, Nietzsche acknowledges that the weak man is dishonest with himself and others; what he parades as the demand for "justice" is really his small manifestations of the Will to Power. And when a slave class attains power, as Nietzsche believes it has in Modern Europe, it engenders these principles even more.

3. Nietzsche's Denunciation of Absolute Morality

Nietzsche does not mean to imply that the moral types previously discussed are delineated in pure form. What Nietzsche does perceive is various ramifications of these abstract types, often compromised or confused. In fact, Nietzsche diagnoses modern morality as a hybrid of all types, including traces of the Master Morality. More obvious, though, is the fact that Nietzsche sees a relationship between the values characteristic of the Flock and Slave Moralities, and a fundamental antagonism between these and the Master Morality. Nietzsche first suggests that in

1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 418.
2. Ibid., pp. 581-82.
the course of time the herd instincts proved more powerful than the
strong's. Nietzsche points to the decay of Ancient Greece and Imperial
Rome and the rise of democratic humanitarianism to substantiate this
generalization.\(^1\) On the whole, however, Nietzsche believes that the
Flock Morality is the most important element in present morals, and that
this fact threatens stagnation for humanity. Nietzsche makes this gener­
alization more concrete in *The Genealogy of Morals* where he traces the
development of a sense of guilt. "Bad conscience," Nietzsche holds, began
from a self-torture which was produced by an inversion of the normal
predatory instincts. Nietzsche contends that this form of torture was
perfected by ascetic priests who read into the diagnosis of sin "Christian
indebtedness." And in time while man was led to interpret his suffering
as punishment for sinning against God, his will to make himself suffer
brought the conscience to its maximum.\(^2\)

Nietzsche also discovers another trend in morals. It has been seen
that through various stages morals were detached from life and made hostile
to it. Nietzsche shows that Socrates, Plato and Kant contributed to the
process by treating morals in terms of abstract ideas and investing
another world for them to inhabit. As a result, the idea of the existence
of a supernatural world order was born where sin and punishment were later
read into nature. Nietzsche also shows that morals were denaturalized by
the separation of act from agent when the belief was fashioned that actions
can be considered as good or bad in themselves, regardless of who does
them. Therefore, Nietzsche argues that morals have become an independent
entity whose nature is now considered to be as sanctrosanct as a supernatu­

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 604, and Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, pp. 1078-79.

being. It is evident that the morality Nietzsche is seeking to criticize is the one claiming absolute status, and whose imperatives are categorical and beyond criticism. Nietzsche denies that any morality can claim universality or that a simple rule pertains to all. Nietzsche contends that this type of morality is nihilistic and that its logical conclusion is the condemnation of all existence.

1. Modern Morality

Nietzsche exposes the errors on which Absolute Morality is based in order to destroy its claims; Nietzsche does this because on his view this morality expresses the desire of decadents for revenge against life. With this in mind, Nietzsche reasons that Absolute Morality is a nihilistic morality. Nietzsche holds that this morality negates life because it condemns those qualities of the Will to Power which are essential to higher life. So, Nietzsche faces the problem: "either do away with our venerations or—with yourselves!" This is Nietzsche's deepest reason for breaking with the old values. Since he diagnoses Modern Morality as mostly a blend of the Flock and Slave Moralities, he satirizes the ideal of the "good man" so manifest in his day. For Nietzsche this ideal man is either a decadent or a flock animal who is uncreative. Nietzsche exclaims:

At times I have an enormous contempt for good people— their weakness, their wanting to exercise nothing, their wanting to see nothing, their arbitrary blindness, their banal revolving in the usual and comfortable, their gratification with their good "qualities," etc.2

Essentially, Nietzsche is protesting against the unqualified valuation of benevolence and "brotherhood." In Nietzsche's sense this docile, meek

man is an ideal slave. In the Ecce Homo Nietzsche vituperates against those whose "goodness" consists in trivializing human nature.

To demand that everybody become a "good man," a gregarious animal, a blue-eyed, benevolent, "beautiful soul," or—as Herbert Spencer wished—an altruist, would mean . . . castrating mankind.

Related to this ideal of absolute benevolence is the cult of pity. Nietzsche considers it the only living religion of his day. Here again Nietzsche is protesting against the view that pity is always good. According to Nietzsche pity is bad. Moreover, Nietzsche reasons that any religion which teaches pity assumes that suffering is bad. However, Nietzsche believes that self-perfection is possible only through suffering, and that the ultimate happiness of man, who has overcome his passions and disciplined himself, does not exclude suffering. Hence, Nietzsche says to the pitying ones: "How little you know of man's happiness, you comfortable and good-natured ones!"

Furthermore, Nietzsche regards pity as bad for those who feel it.

How is it possible to stay on one's own path? Always someone crying calls us aside; our eye rarely sees a case where it does not become necessary to leave our own task immediately. . . . There is even a secret seduction in all this. . . . Just our "own path" is too hard.

Nietzsche concludes that pity is selfish and is only man's bad love of himself. There is a passage in Beyond Good and Evil which corroborates this point.

2. Ibid., p. 927.
4. Ibid., pp. 322-23.
In man creature and creator are united: . . . And . . . your sympathy for the "creature in man" applies to that which has to be fashioned, bruised, roasted, annealed, refined—to that which must necessarily suffer, and is meant to suffer. And our sympathy—do ye not understand what our reverse sympathy applies to, when it resists your sympathy as the worst of all pampering and enervation?—So it is sympathy against sympathy!¹

These lines are from the same aphorism in which Nietzsche explains how suffering "breeds" strength and depth of soul and how "spirit" and greatness are born of it.

Even so, Nietzsche recognizes that pity is not one simple motive but is a phenomenon which may involve many, among which are lust, envy, pleasure, and cruelty.² Nietzsche holds that pity is always egoistic, for the pain one seeks to relieve is not the same as the real one. In addition, Nietzsche believes that the call to pity is contagious and, what is worse, often tempts a man away from his own task in life; in Zarathustra Nietzsche meets it as his last sin. Against pity which sacrifices the future to relieve present misery, Nietzsche commands "Be hard." Behind both pity and comfort, however, Nietzsche senses the modern belief that suffering is absolutely evil and is something to be destroyed.³ Nietzsche attacks this assumption as an expression of weakness and decadence; instead, Nietzsche maintains that the strong live for purposes which may make both themselves and others suffer.

You want if possible—and there is not a more foolish "if possible"—to do away with suffering; and we?—it really seems that we would rather have it increased and made worse than it ever was! . . . The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—know ye not that it is

1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 530.
3. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 607-08.
only this discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?¹

All this does not mean that Nietzsche disregards other-regarding impulses; in The Dawn Nietzsche writes that he even experiences pity.² Nietzsche, then, is fully aware of the existence of such impulses; but he sees no moral worth whatever in such inclinations. For Nietzsche, morality means mastery over the impulses.³ Until man has achieved self-mastery and self-perfection Nietzsche believes he must be concerned with self-overcoming. Running off to help others seems like a weakness, as is giving alms to others rather than making something of oneself.

However, Nietzsche's criticism is in keeping with the philosopher's mission. He believes that ever since Socrates the greatest philosophers have always "disclosed how much hypocrisy, indolence, self-indulgence, and self-neglect . . . was concealed under the most venerated types of contemporary morality."⁴ What Nietzsche attacks, in other words, is that state of mind which frequently hides behind the respectable facade of absolute virtue. Of the motives which Nietzsche discusses in this context the one which he emphasizes most is "resentment," This is one of the key conceptions in Nietzsche's philosophy. It has been pointed out above that when one is too weak and timid he must act obligingly in order to survive. Nietzsche also mentions that such morality goes together with impotent hatred and envy for revenge. But the weak are too impotent to attain power by the usual means. "Verily, I have often laughed at the weaklings

1. Ibid., pp. 529-30.
who thought themselves good because they had no claws," Nietzsche writes.¹

On the other hand, Nietzsche thinks that those who possess strength should manifest it. Nietzsche develops this theme in Zarathustra and in the Ecce Homo.

But if you have an enemy, do not requite him evil with good, for that would put him to shame. Rather prove that he did you some good. And rather be angry than put to shame. And if you are cursed, I do not like it that you want to bless. Rather join a little in the cursing.²

It also seems to me that the rudest word, the rudest letter, is more good-natured, more honest, than silence. Those who keep silent are almost always lacking in delicacy and refinement of heart; silence is an objection; to swallow a grievance necessarily produces a bad temper.³

The difference between Nietzsche's ethics and what he himself takes to be the modern Christian ethics thus revolves around the individual's psychological state. Nietzsche's critique of ressentiment is an integral part of this philosophy. To illustrate this fact, and to elucidate further on the significance of Nietzsche's conception of ressentiment, it may be helpful to cite a long passage in The Gay Science.

Every art and every philosophy may be considered a remedy and aid in the service of growing and struggling life; they always presuppose suffering and sufferers. But there are two kinds of sufferers: first, those who suffer from the overfullness of life and want a Dionysian art . . . and those who suffer from the impoverishment of life and seek . . . redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication, convulsion, anaesthesia, and frenzy . . . . Those who suffer most and are poorest in life would need mildness, peacefulness, and goodness most . . . and if possible, also a god who would really be a god for the sake, a "savior". Thus I gradually learned to understand . . . the "Christian" who is


2. Ibid., p. 180.

essentially a romantic—and my eye became ever sharper for that most difficult *backward inference* in which the most mistakes are made—the *backward inference* from the work to the maker, from the deed to the doer, from the ideal to him who needs it, from every way of thinking and valuing to the *craving* behind it which prompts it. . . . The desire for destruction, change, and becoming can be an expression of overfull, future-pregnant strength (my term therefore is, as one knows, the word "Dionysian"); but it can also be the hatred of the misdeveloped, needy, underprivileged who destroys, who must destroy, because the existing, and *even* all existence, all-being, outrages and provokes him. To understand this feeling, one should closely examine our anarchists.1

The basic distinction which Nietzsche proposes is that between two states of being—power and impotence. Nietzsche admits that both may express themselves in seemingly similar ways, but Nietzsche judges the expressions not according to appearances, but in the light of their origins. Thus, Nietzsche believes that Christianity and Modern Morality are expressions of a deeply rooted *resentment* developed in weaklings.

From this history of morals Nietzsche concludes that criticism is needed. Nietzsche draws a similar conclusion from the fact that traditional morality depends upon the existence of a supernatural God whose righteousness establishes the moral law, who speaks through man's conscience, and who rewards obedience and punishes sin.2 But if, as Nietzsche claims, the belief in God is dead and one breaks a single link in the chain of belief, then the conscience cannot claim to be the oracle of truth. Therefore, Nietzsche contends that

today we still see the consequences: where a man's feeling is exalted, that imaginary world somehow plays a part: it is sad; but for the present all

loftier feelings must be suspicious to the scientific man, so much are they fused with delusion and nonsense.\textsuperscript{1}

Here Nietzsche believes that the conscience and the feeling of any "categorical imperative" is merely the expression of the need for obedience that the flock habit has instilled and has taught. This is Nietzsche's reason for rejecting intuitionalism and moral consciousness as valid criteria for judgment because, on his view, being self-evident, they are beyond criticism. Instead, Nietzsche regards such views as moving toward nihilism.

When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one's feet. This morality is by no means self-evident; this point has to be exhibited again and again. Christianity is a system. By breaking one concept out of it, the faith in God, one breaks the whole: nothing necessary remains in one's hands. Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know, what is good for him, what evil he believes in God, who alone knows it. Christian morality is a command; its origin is transcendent; it is beyond all criticism; all right to criticism; it has truth only if God is the truth—it stands and falls with faith in God.\textsuperscript{2}

\section*{Nietzsche's Denial of Absolute Morality}

As in other parts of his system Nietzsche uses a twofold method for criticizing morality. Nietzsche considers first those phases which are based on judgments of facts, and later applies them to judgments of value. With regard to the former he writes:

So I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that means, I deny its assumptions: but not that there have been alchemists who believed in these assumptions and acted on them.—I also deny immorality: not that countless men feel themselves immoral, but that there is a basis in truth for feeling oneself so. I do not deny—as goes without saying, supposing that I am no fool—that

\textsuperscript{1} Nietzsche, \textit{The Dawn}, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{2} Nietzsche, \textit{The Idols}, pp. 515-16.
many actions which are called immoral are to be avoided and combatted; likewise that many which are called moral are to be done and encouraged--but I mean: the one as the other on other grounds than hitherto. We have to learn differently--in order finally, perhaps very late, to attain still more: to feel differently.¹

Nietzsche sums up his position by maintaining that there are no moral phenomena but only moral interpretations of phenomena. Thereupon, Nietzsche singles out certain features of Absolute Morality, namely: free will, responsibility, and selflessness to criticize. He says that morality is based on misunderstanding and really has no claim on man. In addition, Nietzsche argues that the ideas of sin and guilt presuppose moral responsibility which, in turn, rests upon freedom of will and conscious motivation, both of which Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche seems to imply that individuals never know the real motives for their actions. Therefore, "we are learning to think less of all that is conscious: we are learning not to make ourselves responsible for our self, since we, as conscious, purposing beings, are only the smallest part of it."²

Hence, in so far as will means "conscious will" its freedom is irrelevant to the moral judgment of conduct, because consciousness is not the cause of actions. Nietzsche may deny the fact but not the feeling of freedom, however. "He who feels that the will is unfree, is psychopathic; he who denies it, is stupid."³ This means that the Will to Power might be released in any of several ways. But what Nietzsche really means is that there is no free will in the strict sense of the term; a man's nature is the resultant of all the elements which influence past and present things.⁴

3. Ibid., in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 171.
Lastly, Nietzsche asserts the egoism of the Will to Power. Life must exert its force to grow, and growth, Nietzsche feels, is at the cost of the environment. To realize, as Nietzsche does, that all actions are necessarily assertive, removes the antithesis between good and evil. Consequently, Nietzsche can affirm that good and evil are "complementary value-concepts" and not realities in conflict. Moreover, they are interdependent.

Altruistic actions are only a species of egoistic ones—and that the degree which one loves, wants oneself, is a proof of the degree of individual power and personality. In short that, in making man more evil, one makes him better—and that one is not either without the other.¹

On the other hand, Nietzsche believes that the conflicts of values in European history have had some good effects. Although the unnatural values prevented European man from growing to his full stature and caused a deep split in civilization, nevertheless, Nietzsche does point out that the fight between the two moralities has kept Europe alive and has created a "splendid tension of spirit" with which man can "shoot at the most distant goals."² Nietzsche thus acknowledges an indebtedness to the Christian heritage. While it raised the passions of the soul, sharpened man's psychological insight, and has been useful for keeping the lower classes contented with their lot, Nietzsche illustrates how it has also been a valuable discipline for classes rising to power. And as a hierarchy which gives spiritual men the highest rank and believes in the power of spirituality, Nietzsche reasons that the Church is a nobler institution than the State.³

¹ Nietzsche, Human, p. 112.
² Nietzsche, The Dawn, pp. 135-36.
Even so, the fact remains that in Nietzsche's estimation Christianity has spoiled the human race. Man naturally produces a large proportion of failures which, Nietzsche urges should be allowed to drop out for the betterment of the strong ones. Instead of realizing this fact Christianity acts as an antidote to nihilism by preventing the decadents from committing suicide and by breaking the self-confidence of the strong.

Therefore, Nietzsche categorically believes that modern society is degenerate because man has become more and more alike over the past two thousand years. Nietzsche reasons that Christianity has been the greatest triumph of the weak-willed people who came to power with the fall of the Roman Empire. Nietzsche shows that the result of their breeding has been conventional morality in all its degeneracy. However, Nietzsche thinks that this morality, based on the virtues of pity, sympathy, and equality is decaying into nihilism. And this arrival of nihilism is the hope which Nietzsche needs to show how a better individual and race may be engendered.
CHAPTER V

NIETZSCHE'S IDEAL SOCIETY

1. The Rise of Nihilism

It is within this complex of decadence and nihilism that Nietzsche bases his prediction for the next two centuries. Nietzsche says the absolute values which originally protected decadents against nihilism by giving them a compensatory faith have been collapsing since mankind no longer has faith in a supernatural God or in various secular substitutes. Nietzsche is convinced that modern decadence will result in nihilism because

the whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its "modern spirit" so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated; one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end.

Nietzsche also supports this view by adding Asiatic parallels. In India Nietzsche regards the decline of culture with a similar self-destruction of political and religious foundations. Atheism, produced by a heightened concern for truth, was followed by an attempt to make moral values supreme. Chima, Nietzsche says, had an analogous moralistic movement. And both

Correspondingly, Nietzsche predicts a similar movement for Europe. The continental economic system and the democratic movement are producing a social machine in which individuals become equal and trivial parts. Nietzsche illustrates that the final result might be the flock's dream come true: safety, comfort, and mediocrity for everybody. Apart from the remaining strong-willed souls, the future European under an industrial democracy will be an ideal slave. Here Nietzsche differs with Herbert Spencer who believes that increasing industrialism will augment civil liberties and the opportunity for a better life. Instead, Nietzsche sees the increase of communication and mobility as only the manifestation of adaptability. Nietzsche thinks that this kind of development will be held in check by nationalism in the Twentieth Century. Likewise, Socialist agitations will contribute to the same end. But when the various European nations will have fought themselves out, and when mankind will discover that it has lost its belief in God, then the whole order of contemporary society will collapse. Nietzsche holds that a profound and popular reaction against nationalism and war will arise with the evolution of a "peace party." Based on universal fraternity this movement will practice pacifism and will renounce conflict in all forms.

However, in this respect Nietzsche believes Europe is unique. Unlike the Orient, Europe has accumulated tremendous tension because of the struggle between the antithetical value systems. Therefore, the nihilistic struggle will involve more than the "passive nihilism" of any peace party. Nietzsche predicts that there will also be an "active nihilism." In this lies hope. Because of the residual strength left in the strong, Nietzsche

contends that Europe will not simply fade out in nihilism as Asia has done. The crisis will weed out the decadent elements and will compel the healthy to revalue the whole system of values. From this point of view nihilism becomes only an interlude between the death of the old and the birth of the new ideal.1

Since the value of this crisis depends upon provoking a very sharp reaction, Nietzsche wishes to make it as acute as possible. One may argue that his weapon for this purpose is the Eternal Recurrence. Nietzsche believes such a doctrine will hew out what is strong.

Which will prove themselves the strongest thereby? The most moderate, those who have need of no extreme articles of faith, those who not only admit but love a good deal of chance, senselessness. Those who can think of man with a considerable reduction of his value, without thereby becoming petty and weak: the richest in health, who are equal to the most misfortunes are therefore not so afraid of misfortune—men who are sure of their power and who represent the attained strength of man with conscious pride.2

The strong will also be stimulated to a heightened endeavor by basing their virtues on a "revaluation of values." Thus, Nietzsche thinks that the strong, in adopting ideals which will no longer condemn life, will make themselves glad to think of this world as repeated ad infinitum.

Now Nietzsche knows the outcome of this forthcoming crisis is by no means certain. Events may not at all happen the way he anticipates. Yet Nietzsche believes it is more propitious to risk destroying humanity altogether than letting it go on declining. Nietzsche does think humanity will face alternatives in the future. As seen above, Nietzsche has a strategy for meeting these alternatives. Nietzsche welcomes the social

1. Ibid., pp. 668 ff.
and economic forces which obliterate boundaries and put an end to the petty politics of nations. For the Twentieth Century Nietzsche predicts great wars which will settle the question of world dominions; he hopes that the danger will force Europe to unite and become "mistress of the earth." Then, when the world is politically and economically unified, the docility of the masses will be very easy to control. In fact, Nietzsche suggests that this increasing docility of the multitude offers a great opportunity for a daring group of men to seize control of the social machinery and make it support a new ruling caste.

A race fit to be master can spring up only from fearful and violent beginnings. Problem: where are the barbarians of the Twentieth Century? Evidently they will become visible and consolidate themselves only after enormous socialistic crises—they will be those elements which are capable of the greatest severity with themselves and can guarantee the longest will.

This is what Nietzsche wants. The first step towards cultural rebirth will be taken, Nietzsche hopes, when the newly installed revolutionaries will set up a different social structure. But Nietzsche believes that the new leaders will not rely on sheer force.

And perhaps the great day will come when a people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind."

1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 510.
2. Ibid., pp. 508-09.
Later Nietzsche hopes that ideas will become predominant. Eventually he believes that the world will fall into the hands of the wisest who will direct its destinies with philosophic foresight.¹ This expectation certainly implies the superior power of the man of knowledge who, Nietzsche insists, is a more valuable member of society than those singularly strong in muscle. In *Zarathustra* Nietzsche presents this very dramatically. Nietzsche writes: "Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values does the world revolve; it revolves inaudibly."²

Meanwhile, Nietzsche holds that it is imperative that the beginning of true culture be preserved through the time of strife until the day when men of thought shall possess the world. Therefore, the "Good Europeans" must unite and prepare for the ultimate inheritance of power by the strong.³ It seems that their task will be to become head of an international ruling class in which all nations and races will be represented. But there is much preliminary work to be done first, namely—the coming of nihilism. Then, after winning the struggle for power, the victorious "party of life" will dedicate humanity to the creation of its highest possible individuals—"overmen." This is what Nietzsche means when he says that the species man does not matter and must be overcome for the production of a higher type.⁴

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3. The "Good European" means a number of things for Nietzsche. In the sense used here it probably refers to those beings disgusted with modern society and who, possessing a positive will for power, wish to give man some aim to his life. In other ways Nietzsche uses this "Good European" idea to mean the intermarriage between different nations with a resulting mixed race of European men being produced. (Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, pp. 34, 37.)
Once this struggle for power has been won there will be a moment of supreme self-consciousness, a Great Noontide when it [humanity] will gaze both backwards and forwards, when it will emerge from the tyranny of accident and the priesthood, and for the first time pose the question of the Why and Wherefore of humanity as a whole.¹

The words "as a whole" are the important ones in the last passage because with this declaration Nietzsche reaffirms his belief in values. Nietzsche has argued that humanity is not a whole and is not automatically on the right path.

A thousand goals have there been so far, for there have been a thousand peoples. Only the yoke for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. Humanity still has no goal.

But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks a goal—is humanity itself not still lacking too?²

In Nietzsche's sense humanity becomes a living thing instead of an abstraction when it learns to give itself a purpose. And for Nietzsche the goal of humanity is to produce "overmen." The man Nietzsche sees as his ideal is one free to develop himself to the limits of his strength and capability. Here the meaning of Nietzsche's social ideal comes into focus; the highest exemplars of the human race is Nietzsche's goal. It will become more evident that Nietzsche finally thinks of the "overman" as the ideal to which men who possess great psychical strength can approximate in ever increasing numbers if only the rest of humanity does not tyrannize or prevent them.

Such is Nietzsche's final answer to nihilism. Though existentially existence may be senseless because of "the terror of absurdity of existence," man can create a meaning for it by living for a cause great enough to


justify all.¹ And Nietzsche believes that he has found the purpose which will redeem humanity.

2. The "Higher Man" as a Bridge to the "Overman"

In Nietzsche's estimation there is a connection between the ideal self towards which all men can strive and the conception of the overman. Nietzsche believes, however, that modern Europe does not possess any overmen because "both the greatest and the smallest man . . . are still all-too-similar to each other."² This, of course, goes right along with Nietzsche's whole critique of modern society. Nietzsche denounces monotheism and the idea of a categorical imperative preaching the existence of only one norm because these beliefs imply that somehow there must be a standard to which all men must conform. This is the real meaning of Nietzsche's HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN, in which he brands the carnal man. In this work Nietzsche also charges Christianity with breeding only conformity and mediocrity and with thwarting the development of single superior individuals. Nietzsche maintains throughout his discourses that the overman could never be created because the converse type was wanted, bred, and attained.³

In the mediation on history Nietzsche had already declared that "the goal of humanity cannot lie in the end but only in its highest specimens."⁴ In"Schopenhauer as Educator" Nietzsche claims that the goal of development can be found only in "single great beings" who are not the "last ones in

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¹ Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 934-35.
² Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 207.
point of time" but are "apparently scattered and accidental existences."¹ Then in Zarathustra Nietzsche first talks of the overman, the Eternal Recurrence, and the Will to Power together. In fact, Zarathustra's opening speech to the throng begins with the words: "I teach you the overman. Man is something that must be overcome."² Therefore, it is certain that Nietzsche's ideal type of man culminates in the version of the overman. Once Nietzsche has found his goal his problem is to develop the overman. Nietzsche makes it quite clear that the "Good Europeans" are to engender the overman. Nietzsche brings this theme out in Beyond Good and Evil.

With all the more profound and large-minded men of this century, the real general tendency of the mysterious labour of their souls was to prepare the way for that new synthesis and tentatively to anticipate the European of the future.³ This task of preparing for the overman is also explicit in Zarathustra. When Zarathustra experienced the instinct for pity on hearing the cry of distress in the wilderness, he finds the "higher men" in danger both from the ignorance of the populace and from the restrictions of their environment. Leading them to his cave, Zarathustra points out the course they have to take in order to hasten the arrival of the overman.⁴ In this sense the higher men lay the foundation for the overmen.

Having overcome the petty virtues and refinements of modern civilization, the higher men must not surrender to the slogan of "the 'happiness of the greatest number!'"⁵ And after these higher men begin working

¹. Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator," in Wright, What Nietzsche Taught, p. 44.
². Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 124.
³. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 572.
⁴. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 398-408.
⁵. Ibid., pp. 399-400.
toward the creation of a better man by their own self-improvement, a better race will follow. Nietzsche suggests that their striving and discipline will be an age of experimenting to find the best method for creating the overman.1

Now, one must keep in mind that Nietzsche is thinking of this experimenting as most likely taking place right after the "Great Noon" when the higher men had attained political power. Once they had succeeded in gaining control over the social machinery these higher men could deviate from the conventional moral code of the weak to remove the burden of "bad conscience" from the world. Thus, Nietzsche believes that these higher men are the ones to rededicate humanity to creativity.2 Then, Nietzsche says, the horizon will appear free for man to venture out to face any danger "the lover of knowledge" desired.3

3. The "Overman"

Nietzsche probably would accept modern biological data showing the lack of distinction between the various races of mankind; one can test this critical interpretation by looking to Nietzsche's later works. At the beginning of The Antichrist Nietzsche explains himself as follows:

The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the sequence of living beings (man is an end), but what type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, for being higher in value, worthier of life, more certain of a future.4

It has been shown in the section on history that Nietzsche repudiates

1. Ibid., p. 405.
2. Ibid., p. 432.
the modern notion of progress and says that his overman is not to be misinterpreted as meaning a different species of man. Nietzsche reiterates this in the Ecce Homo.

The word "Superman," designating a type of man whose appearance would be a piece of the greatest good fortune, a type opposed to "modern men," to "good" men, to Christian and other nihilists,—a word which in the mouth of Zarathustra, the destroyer of morality, becomes profoundly significant,—this word is understood almost everywhere, and with perfect innocence to correspond to those values of which Zarathustra is a flat repudiation—he has considered man "ideal" type, a higher kind of man, half saint, half "genius."... Other learned cattle have suspected me of Darwinism on account of this word.1

Therefore, Nietzsche's overman is not to be construed as a new species of man, nor as an individual society will fashion. Nietzsche asserts that he is valuable in himself because he embodies that state of being which all men desire. While Nietzsche says that only men can rise above the animalic mass because they possess art, religion, and philosophy, Nietzsche contends also that the great multitude of men are essentially animals without any unique development.2 Nietzsche believes that the goal of development cannot lie in the mass of specimens or in their well-being, but only in great human beings. Nietzsche holds that the overman has the


2. This triad of art, religion, and philosophy seems very similar to Hegel's realm of the Absolute Spirit. Both Hegel and Nietzsche consider art, religion, and philosophy among man's most sublime pursuits. For Hegel, however, the great turning point is from the Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Spirit. Even primitive man is included in the Philosophy of Spirit. But Nietzsche shows in The Dawn that primitive man lives in fear of animals and his gods. Thus, Nietzsche insists that instead of wanting to return man to nature man must be cultivated and improved. On the other hand, Nietzsche regards the entire realm of Hegel's Objective Spirit as still part of nature. The State is only a complicated version of the herd and as long as man conforms he remains animalic. For Nietzsche, the turning point is from the Objective to the Absolute Spirit, from the State to art, religion, and philosophy.

Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 144-1507.
only ultimate value that there is and that society harms itself insofar as it insists on conformity and impedes development of great individuals. 1

Now, what distinguishes the higher and stronger from the lower and weaker man in Nietzsche's scale of values is the individual's innermost craving and will for power.

At this stage of development Nietzsche is not arguing that all men must gauge their actions and set up a moral code based on relativism or atomism where each acts according to his wishes. Nietzsche states that the overman will have to develop control over his faculties and will have to integrate, master, and sublimate the passions, or else they will lead him to chaos. Nietzsche reasons that the powerful man is strong enough to give vent to his passions and yet is able to prevent them from overflowing and destroying life. What Nietzsche means is that the passions are intended to be manifested, but that they must be subject to the ultimate control of the reason.

Goethe and Socrates approach Nietzsche's conception of the overman closer than other men of whom Nietzsche knows. Nietzsche says Goethe overcame his animal nature, organized the chaos of his passions, sublimated his impulses, and gave style to his character. In Nietzsche's words Goethe "disciplined himself into wholeness," and became "the man of tolerance, not from weakness but from strength," a "spirit who has become free." 2 Nietzsche indicates that Goethe did not retire from life "but put himself into the midst of it" because "what he wanted was totality; he fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will." 3

2. Ibid., pp. 554-55.
3. Ibid., p. 554.
It is evident that for Nietzsche power, as exemplified in the super-historical viewpoint of glorifying each moment of existence, is what he means by self-discipline. This is one of Nietzsche's central points. Nietzsche believes that the overman knows how much his freedom over fate has "sunk right down" to his innermost depths and has become a dominating instinct.\(^1\) Nietzsche indicates that by great effort man can transcend his carnal self. In addition, Nietzsche thinks the strong-willed man will do this by first "organizing the chaos" in himself and then by "thinking" himself back to his true needs.\(^2\) These overmen will also be the most spiritual and kind souls humanity has yet produced. They will find their happiness where others find their downfall:

in the labyrinth, in hardness against themselves and others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest; asceticism becomes in them nature, need, and instinct. Difficult tasks are a privilege to them; to play with burdens which crush others, a recreation. Knowledge—a form of asceticism. They are the most venerable kind of man; that does not preclude their being the most cheerful and the kindliest. They rule not because they want to but because they are; they are not free to be second.\(^3\)

Postulating a goal for himself, the overman will realize that his higher nature demands fulfilling the loftiest visions. Therefore, his development must not be self-expressionism but will have to be a striving which is moderated by self-discipline. Nietzsche believes this learning control is necessary to meet the challenges of life because the free man "still has to face a sharp conflict between the higher self and the lower, between the ideal aspired to and the contemptibly imperfect present."\(^4\)

\(^1\) Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, p. 671.
\(^2\) Nietzsche, "The Use and Abuse of History," p. 76.
\(^3\) Nietzsche, The Antichrist, p. 645-46.
\(^4\) Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 41.
But to overcome his own limitations the overman has to generalize his ideal and seek fellowship with others who also aspire to the noble virtues. They will thereby constitute a "community of men dedicated to the generation of great individuals who shall achieve perfection." Together such a group can create the conditions in which life will be rendered tolerable. It becomes their duty to inculcate the values which give life meaning.

Similarly, Nietzsche shows that it is in order to fulfill the need for creating values that they are to be engendered. Then, when they have been freed from the masses the most select will create a different ethics for humanity.

For these reasons Nietzsche feels that because the overman alone is in possession of full and integral freedom, he should be freed from the traditional ethics of the weak. The dogma of equality is completely abhorrent to the overman. His acts must admit to no standard, save that of the Will to Power. For Nietzsche the human being who is free "spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishman, and other democrats. The free man is a warrior."

Seen from this perspective Nietzsche's overman seems to be only for those men who can be a "law unto themselves" and can emancipate themselves from conventionalism. Nietzsche writes only they "shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man beyond good and evil."  

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1. Ibid., p. 42.
4. Nietzsche's Standard of Value

Nietzsche argues that when he looks upon the modern scene he sees Christian love, with its virtues of justice and pity, as the manifestation of impotent hatred and selfishness. Nietzsche maintains that because resentment is at the core of modern morals the goodness of modern man is not virtuous and that his truths are not truthful. Since modern man's values are worthless, Nietzsche holds that his ends no longer give purpose to his life and that his pleasures do not give him happiness. Nietzsche, however, has found a goal which gives an aim to human life; his problem is whether a new sanction can be found in this world for values. Nietzsche points out that "God is dead" as an empirical cultural fact and posits the question if any values are universally valid in this godless world? Nietzsche realizes that there are many obstacles to finding some new standard of valuing because the institutions of his day, among them the ancient and venerable, are considered to rest on axiomatic truths. In addition, Nietzsche points out that conventional morality, in the guise of an absolute intimidation, has hitherto discouraged investigations. Nevertheless, all these institutions, including Absolute Morality, Nietzsche insists are only so many hindrances preventing the fulfillment of the ideal which is based on sterner forms of conduct.

After Nietzsche realizes the purpose of life—to create the highest forms of manhood—he directs all his energy toward a "revaluation of all values" as an instrument to aid in the overman's procreation.

The standard by which Nietzsche condemns the old hierarchy of values and wishes to erect his new ones is by means of life and the Will to Power. Nietzsche writes: "What are our values and tables of moral goods themselves worth? What comes of this rule? For whom? In what respect?
--Answer: for life."¹ In this respect loyalty to life is Nietzsche's basis for his demand of a revaluation of values. About the Christian good man, the supporter of the old ideals, Nietzsche concludes: "So he ends . . . by understanding nature as evil, man as depraved, being good as grace. . . . In sum: he negates life. . . . With that he should consider his ideology of good and evil refuted."² In adopting life as his standard Nietzsche intends to maintain that the highest manifestation of the Will to Power, as exemplified by the triumph of the spirit over passion, is the strongest and best form of life.³

But life exists in many forms, and Nietzsche recognizes that a further approximation to a definite standard of value is necessary. The doctrine of gradation, which Nietzsche postulates in The Dawn of Day, has been pointed out above. It now appears that this value-judgment based on the abundance and growth of life is Nietzsche's standard of value.

Nietzsche stresses this fact in Thus Spake Zarathustra when he makes the contrast between healthy and decadent, and rising and declining forms of life. Accordingly, since the feeling of the will for power distinguishes the healthy from the decadent, Nietzsche takes the fulfilment of the basic urge of all higher life for his criterion of values: "There is nothing in life that has value beside the degree of power—assuming that life itself is will to power."⁴ This means that the Will to Power dictates all value-judgments. In the second volume of The Will to Power Nietzsche brings this out even further.

² Ibid., p. 116.
³ Ibid., p. 122.
⁴ Ibid., p. 118.
All "purposes," "goals," "meanings" are only modes of expression and transformations of the lone will inherent in all happening; the will to power.

... Willing in general is nothing else but willing to become stronger, willing to grow—and also willing the means thereto.

Power is still the standard of value which Nietzsche affirms. There is just one goal in Nietzsche's scheme—nearly power; and Nietzsche measures the worth of any particular life by its amount of power. It has been mentioned that Nietzsche speaks of power in two forms: intrinsic and external power. Now Nietzsche's scorn for measuring greatness by the success of physical manipulation has already appeared. More explicitly, Nietzsche says that these same manifestations of external power "do not come into consideration; they have no value of their own, but are only useful for something better." 2

Conversely, Nietzsche finds the power he does value for its own sake quite dissociated from external power. In the discussion on the Will to Power and the overman it has been mentioned that a degree of self-organization was necessary before the individual could function at his best. Then, Nietzsche says, "when power is won over nature, ... one can use this power in order freely to develop oneself further: will to power as self-enhancement and strengthening." 3

Therefore, Nietzsche is convinced that the only self-justifying ends can be individual lives and not classes or societies of humanities.

Fundamental mistake: to place the goals in the flock and not in particular individuals! The flock is means, no more! But now people are trying to conceive the flock as an individual and ascribe a

1. Ibid., in Wright, What Nietzsche Taught, p. 310.
2. Ibid., in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 122.
3. Ibid., p. 123.
higher rank to it than to the individual--deepest misunderstanding!!!

In the overman it has been shown that strength of will consists in the integration and controlling of the urges. Such strength by integrating the passions is clearly Nietzsche's idea of the highest forms of the Will to Power. However, organization implies limitations, and here Nietzsche includes the person as an individual. Nietzsche shows that by sublimation the organism can function for the highest harmony. Nietzsche includes sublimation in his meaning of power because if power is measured by resistance overcome, those who overcome the most are strongest. Nietzsche also confirms this point by believing that the most intelligent are able to lead the hardest life--one of spiritual independence and adventure--and to do the most difficult thing: create new values.

It is the business of the very few to be independent; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it, even with the best right, but without being obliged to do so, proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring beyond measure. He enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers which life in itself already brings with it; not the least of which is that no one can see how and where he loses his way, becomes isolated, and is torn piecemeal by some minotaur of conscience.

It can now be established that the distinctions between the external and the intrinsic forms of the Will to Power are of degrees. The former is a low grade organization of power while the latter is one of a higher grade. Hence, Nietzsche concludes that the exceptional individual is richer in high grade power, true power, than the mob which usually beats him in the struggle for power. But within the individual himself Nietzsche believes that the sublimation of many passions constitutes greater power

1. Ibid.
than that of a few. Therefore, Nietzsche's conception of power can also be measured in terms of three variables: the number, the strength, and the variety of the things controlled. Nietzsche actually emphasizes all three.

The higher type presents an incomparably greater complexity—a greater sum of coordinated elements.

The highest men would have the greatest multiplicity of urges, and have them also in the relatively greatest strength which can still be borne.\(^1\)

As a result, Nietzsche holds that the highest power is power over opposites and that the greatest men are those who unite the most antagonistic traits. This tension between opposites appears to have an important place in Nietzsche's thought because Nietzsche believes tension to be the essential source of stimulation in life.

In truth a strong antagonism belongs in every-thing, in marriage, friendship, state, confederation, corporation, learned societies, religion, that something proper may grow. Resistance is the form of force—in peace as in war.\(^2\)

Consequently, Nietzsche thinks that tension is the condition of human advancement. Here again one touches Nietzsche's view that chaos is needed to offset the tendency to stagnation and that when society is tired and overcivilized it must revert to barbarism to obtain fresh energies. This is one ground for Nietzsche's justification of strife.\(^3\)

1. The Revaluation of Values

The famous revaluation of conventional morality is the formula Nietzsche provides for a different system of ethics to meet the conditions

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2. Ibid., p. 132.
of producing the overman. This has been brought up before in the section on nihilism where, after the Great Noon festival, it was shown that the lover of knowledge could venture out as far as he wished on the "open sea."¹ Nietzsche insists that the higher men must be willing to make new experiments and must retain an open mind at all times. Moreover, the superior individual must be prepared "boldly at any time to declare himself against his previous opinions."² This sense of questioning means experiencing and experimenting critically. Nietzsche says that those "who thirst for reason want to look ... experiences in the eye as severely as at a scientific experiment!"³ The failure to question seems to Nietzsche more synonymous with weakness and a lower degree of power.

Therefore, although Nietzsche does not want to deduce answers from a system whose premises are beyond question, he realizes

by far the most lack an intellectual conscience ... by far the most do not find it contemptible to believe this or that and to live according to it, without first having become conscious of the last and surest reasons pro and con, and without even taking the trouble to consider such reasons afterwards—the most gifted men and the most noble women still belong to these "by far the most."⁴

On the other hand, Nietzsche desires to consider each problem individually, because this method seems the best way to get at particular truths and to correct previous mistakes. With this experimental attitude as the basis for discovery, Nietzsche then denies "the type of man who formerly passed as the highest—the good, the benevolent, the charitable."⁵ In addition,

2. Ibid., in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 64.
3. Ibid., p. 93.
4. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
Nietzsche has indicated in the discussion on morality that "good and evil" are signs of the Slave Morality and that "good and bad" represent the qualities manifested in the Master Morality. But in Zarathustra Nietzsche astutely points out "what is good and evil no one yet knows unless it be he who creates."\(^1\) Nietzsche contends that in the strong man "good" is an essentially different thing from the "good" of the resentful man. Moreover, these two "goods" arise from different sources. The strong man's good is spontaneous, natural, and inherent in himself, while the weak man's good is manufactured and conditioned to ameliorate his existence. "Evil" and "bad," Nietzsche says, are also attributes which originate in widely separating sources. The "evil" of the weak man is any condition which works against the ideals of "goodness" and is the basis of his Slave Morality. The strong man, however, envisages "bad" out of his feeling for "good," and it has no application to other individuals. Thus, Nietzsche can enjoin the strong man to "take his stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusions of moral judgment beneath himself."\(^2\)

As indicated above, Nietzsche directly relates these ideas of good and bad back to the inheritance of the will for power the individual feels in himself. All this means that in Nietzsche's scale of values the strong man does not obey any dispassionate law because the impulse to justice "without the power of judgment" will cause more harm than good to man.\(^3\) For Nietzsche the just man is able to see all sides of a situation and can make a clear distinction; he possesses the ability to look "with a variety

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of eyes and consciences . . . from a height to any distance.”

Nietzsche believes that his proposals for measuring justice by the amount of true power present in any being are not based on abstract a priorism but are empirically grounded in natural events. Since man is unique, Nietzsche argues that he should be able to generate his own standards. If he does, Nietzsche holds that those who will be creators must follow a different code of ethics from the masses. They will need a “transvaluation of values . . . so as to bear the weight of such responsibility.”

The revaluation of values Nietzsche talks about, however, is not anything really new. Nietzsche does not discover any new tables but is merely speaking of another code of ethics built on strength, courage, honesty, and determination. Nietzsche thinks this revaluation will better meet the conditions of life. It will free modern man from the choking restrictions of conventional life and morality and will lead to more perfect individuals and a more perfect society. "It can fairly be stated that it is on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human society, the sacerdotal form, that man really becomes for the first time an interesting animal." Nietzsche assumes that only by breaking free from the stifling conditions of modern life can man create anything of value. Hence, Nietzsche concludes that the strong man must obey only the "noble" virtues of strength and determination. Whenever Nietzsche discovers this type of morality in various historical epochs, such as the Greek Classical, the Roman, and the Renaissance, he finds that the Will to Power as a

1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 514.
2. Ibid., p. 496.
principle of life and self-affirmation is distinctly present. In place of the old imperative "thou shalt" these periods seem to bring forth the conditional "I must" of the creator for Nietzsche.

Nietzsche thus makes a sharp distinction between the powerful, with whom he is especially concerned, and the weak, who are not capable of complete integration of themselves. Hardness against oneself and one's friends is essential for those who contemplate being overmen; but hardness against those who cannot stand such treatment is unpardonable. Nietzsche says

hatred against mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher; it is almost a question mark concerning his "right to philosophy." Just because he is the exception, he must protect the norm and encourage self-confidence in all the mediocre.¹

Nietzsche's point is not that the happiness of the weak should be sacrificed to that of the strong, but that the weak are incapacitated for ultimate happiness. As a result, Nietzsche makes room for higher and lower types, each capable of greater or less perfection on its own level in his scale of values.

ii. The "Caste-System"

It is to the exceptional man that Nietzsche looks for the realization of his ideal. But the mediocre, too, may lead useful and happy lives. "For the mediocre, to be mediocre is their happiness; mastery of one thing and specialization—a natural instinct."² Nietzsche regards a high culture as a pyramid which can only stand on a broad base. "Its first presupposition is a strong and soundly constructed mediocrity."³ The

¹. Nietzsche, Notes, in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 336.
³. Ibid., p. 646.
sciences, the greater part of art, and all professional activities, are
only compatible with a mediocre amount of ability and ambition, Nietzsche
thinks. There is nothing improper in this conception and Nietzsche regards
it as wrong for a "more profound spirit" to consider "a person's mediocrity
as an objection." It is just a fact to be realized.

Now it is obviously not Nietzsche's intention to have the overman
tyranize the mediocre or exploit them in any way. In Nietzsche's plan
these mediocre people are to live contented and happy lives, and nothing
is to be done to make them wretched. In the Nietzschean ideal society
there is a need for unpretentious, mediocre people.

Nietzsche is also aware that to be free is not so important as what
the individual is free for. Nietzsche believes that the new ideals and
values the strong man will create is what real freedom entails. But only
those imbued with the strongest amounts of the Will to Power can create
lasting values.

Thus, Nietzsche recognizes that the capacities and needs of some men
are very different from those of others. The attempt to ignore these
differences of nature only results in hypocrisy and an impoverishment of
life. Nietzsche argues that it is impossible to impose the same code of
conduct on all because "what is fair to one may not at all be fair to
another." The "requirements of one morality for all is really a detri-
ment to higher men" since "there is a distinction of rank between man and
man and consequently between morality and morality." The ideal state of

1. Ibid., p. 647.
3. Ibid., p. 534.
4. Ibid.
affairs would be to have one law for the overman so that he can be free
to create his own standards without fear of reprisal, and another for the
rest of humanity. Nietzsche thinks that this will benefit all men since
it will entail far greater freedom for the more creative and worthier
members of society. Therefore, Nietzsche's scale of values makes room
for many types. Nietzsche's slogan is: "Do not be virtuous beyond your
strength! And do not desire anything of yourselves against probability."

Since the ordinary man is largely dependent on the opinions and
examples of others he prefers to respect the prescribed norms. Nietzsche
recognizes the need for imposed prohibitions and codes of conduct for the
ordinary man; but Nietzsche maintains that these are only applicable to
those who want to follow a prescribed manner of life.

To ordinary men, to the majority of the people, who
exist for service and general utility, and are only
so far entitled to exist, religion gives invaluable
contentedness with their lot and condition, peace
of heart, ennoblement of obedience, additional social
happiness and sympathy.  

Consequently, Nietzsche does not wish to destroy Christianity but only to
end its tyranny of prescribing itself as the only salvation for mankind.
In his bitterest diatribes against Christianity Nietzsche's object is not
to shake the faith of the great majority of mankind but is merely to free
the strong man from the restrictions of a religion which fits only the
weaker members of society. Nietzsche sees the necessity of maintaining
Christianity. Nevertheless, if Christianity is to do useful work among
the masses it has to be restricted to those whose ideal it is. The majori-
ty of mankind find satisfaction within this religion; others, however, have

1. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 403.
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 447.
their own diametrically opposed ideal.

Hence, Nietzsche realizes that for any society to reach the highest stages of culture the rulers are to preserve the faith of the serving classes. Religion can overcome the weak's resistance to the exercise of authority since it becomes the "bond which binds rulers and subjects in common, betraying and surrendering to the former the conscience of the latter."¹

The system Nietzsche conceives might be envisaged as a triangular caste. Above all would be the superior men who create the values for all the rest. Below them would be the caste which relieves these overmen of the drudgery and detail of ordinary, but necessary work. Lastly, and at the base of this pyramid is the lowest caste which would do the everyday tasks. Nietzsche regards the order of castes as

merely the sanction of a natural order, a natural lawfulness of the first rank, over which no arbitrariness, no "modern idea" has any power. In every healthy society there are three types which condition each other and gravitate differently physiologically; each has its own hygiene, its own field of work, its own sense of perfection and mastery. Nature, not Manu, distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual ones, those who are pre-eminently strong in muscle and temperament, and those, the third type, who excel neither in one respect nor in the other, the mediocre ones—the last as the great majority, the first as the elite.²

Although this order of castes would be difficult to construct and maintain, Nietzsche demands that man do his best for the future of the human race without allowing himself to be defeated by false pity about the hardness of the task. Nietzsche urges the "higher men" to be guided by the aristocratic values of courage, strength, and sincerity. He writes that in former times those men

¹. Ibid., p. 446.

still in possession of unknown strength of will and
desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more
moral, more peaceful races, . . . or upon old mellow
civilisations . . . . At the commencement, the noble
 caste was always the barbarian caste; their superi­
ority did not consist first in their physical,
but in their psychical power—they were more complete
men . . . . The essential thing, however, in a good
and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard
itself as a function either of the kingship or the
commonwealth, but as the significance and highest
justification thereof—that it should accept with a
good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of indi­
viduals, who for its sake, must be suppressed and
reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments.
Its fundamental belief must be precisely, that society
is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as
a foundation and scaffolding by means of which a select
class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to
their higher duties, and in general to a higher
existence .1

An inspection of Nietzsche's "revaluation of values" has shown how
it is possible to accept the values of the overman without abrogating the
softer ethics of the mediocre. The two systems of morality are both
necessary for the construction and continued maintenance of the social
structure. However, Nietzsche is realistic enough to realize that two-
thousand years cannot be effaced in a day; furthermore, Nietzsche holds
no vision of an entire race of overmen as ever being produced.

Every elevation of the type "man" has hitherto been
the work of an aristocratic society and so it will
always be—a society believing in a long scale of
gradations of ranks and differences of worth among
human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or
other.2

Slavery is required because "where there is ruling there are masses; where

1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 575-77. This "psychical" power
Nietzsche talks about might be considered the attained unconscious
state of perfect mastery talked of earlier. Nietzsche considers
both the man who acts on impulse alone and the man who deliberately
counteracts his impulses inferior to the man who acts rationally on
instinct.

2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 575.
there is slavery the individuals are but few, and have the instincts and conscience of the herd opposed to them."¹ Progress consists in having the masses subjected to the rule of law, which Nietzsche designates as "slavery," for the condition of all development is "making possible a selection at the expense of the multitude."²

On the whole, however, it does not seem that Nietzsche believes in the hereditary fixation of man's place in the class system. A person's rank is chiefly determined by what he himself is, not by what his forefathers have been. In the end, it appears as if Nietzsche wants each individual to choose his own place in the system and to take the consequences of his actions. After all, the ideal of the Nietzschean overman is not a soft option, but is a severe discipline. This assumption would mean that Nietzsche believes in the free intercourse of individuals between the various social classes in the "caste-system."

Now Nietzsche has shown that the man who conquers himself possesses greater power than he who conquers others. Since Nietzsche thinks that the highest degree of power consists in self-mastery, he considers the artist and the philosopher as the most powerful of men. The power of these men consists in their ability to sublimate and organize the chaos of their passions. That the overman suffers through his attempts to synthesize new or different creations is not unjust, because it is necessary that some suffering be done in creating. As pointed out above, Nietzsche stresses that suffering is needed for gaining self-perfection and insists that the individual overman must be cruel against himself. Nietzsche brings this out quite well in The Genealogy of Morals where he

deals with "bad conscience."¹ In this work Nietzsche points out that man cannot become conscious of the beautiful without becoming conscious of the "evil." To become powerful and to gain freedom man must first develop the feeling that his impulses are evil. When man recognizes that his passions are evil he becomes aware of the contradiction between "good and evil" and is divided against himself. But eventually man can obtain ultimate power if he learns how to sublimate, control, and employ his passions, and does not fight or extirpate them.

After a period of time, Nietzsche suggests that the elite exhaust themselves. The reason why there are continuous cycles of cultural births and deaths is now more apparent. When any culture reaches its peak the Will to Power undermines itself and seeks some rest. Similarly, when the greatest individuals have created to their full capacity the age is replete and seems doomed to decay. It would appear that decline is inevitable. As decline sets in the masses obtain mastery over their former masters and inculcate what Nietzsche calls a "slave rebellion in morals." Nevertheless, even if conditions change there remains a need for creative minds. Nietzsche implies that during this hiatus stage between cultural epochs the second caste holds some semblance of power; but they are not strong enough to create enduring values. Only the "overman" can do that. So, when the struggle with the lowest caste becomes crucial and decisive someone or some group has an excellent chance to gain control over the political machinery.

On first glance it appears as if Nietzsche does not believe in a permanent ideal society which will "happily ever after." Instead, Nietzsche suggests that the "lawgivers of the future" will direct humanity through cycles

as short and as high as possible ... to bring out the form of multifariousness of man, to smash him when a variety of type has had its admiration--to be thus creating and annihilating seems to me the supreme delight that man can have.

The resulting formation of a new ruling caste will then make the characteristic beginning of another cultural cycle. Actually, what Nietzsche thinks is that once entrenched the overman's will for power is worn out through constant creations and degenerates into "barbarism." This is the reason why Nietzsche constantly demands tension and conflict. To avoid lapsing into barbarism Nietzsche hopes the greatest minds will guide humanity into the respective classes so that a real culture can consciously choose its ends and means. However, on closer inspection it can be seen that Nietzsche does not desire this recurring upheaval in cultural births and deaths. Although Nietzsche emphasizes that all great things must perish by themselves, he dislikes thinking about the inevitability of decay and hopes that the process might be spread over a long period of time.


2. It seems dubious that Nietzsche is speaking of a physical war when he writes "On War and Warriors" in Thus Spake Zarathustra. Nietzsche does speak of "loving peace as a means to new war" and "the short more than the long peace." However, Nietzsche is not speaking of war in the literal sense of the word, but is discussing the quest for knowledge. Evidently, Nietzsche believes that this quest for knowledge can be made into a contest as it was in the days of Classical Greece. Thus, when Nietzsche speaks of peace he means that the antagonists should gain some respite before further arguments. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 338-327

This conception of "war" really goes back to Nietzsche's belief that happiness is not found in complacency but in activity. The quest for knowledge and high culture then entails frequent clashes of opinions and ideas. In these cases Nietzsche believes that disagreements are beneficial. Therefore, what Nietzsche usually means by the term tension and war is the opposition to oppressive conventions and the struggle of ideas. In the section on nihilism Nietzsche holds that a real war is the cure for modern society's degeneracy, but Nietzsche does not recommend it as something good in itself. Nietzsche even shows that in time it makes the vanquished revengeful and the triumphant lazy.
Throughout this entire cultural process Nietzsche maintains that

the higher must not degrade itself to be the tool of
the lower, the pathos of distance must to all eternity
keep their missions also separate. . . . They alone
are the sureties of the future; they alone are bound
to man's future.1

Nietzsche recognizes that the ancient Greeks practiced this principle of
class separation. So, Nietzsche believes that this society can be exempli-
fied as one of the most ideal man has ever established.

5. Ancient Greece as an Ideal Society

In the course of his literary development Nietzsche manifested a
predilection for the ancient, pre-Socratic Greek culture, with its breeding
of great individuals. As a philologist Nietzsche's contact with the Greeks
gave him a clear idea of the Greek aristocratic conception and showed him
a civilization in which he thought he recognized his own ideal of life.
Nietzsche seems to discover his "real" self in contact with the Greeks;
it follows that only the existence of a race which is strong and powerful
in the will for power can afford such a justification of life.

Because of their strength, Nietzsche believes that the Greeks were able
to raise themselves above pessimism and undue optimism. Nietzsche shows
that in the beginning of their history the Greeks were in danger of being
overwhelmed by a flood of foreign forms and concepts. Nietzsche reasons
that the Greek genius was in learning to organize this chaos. Their
originality, however, did nor preclude their tremendous debt to earlier
civilizations, and to the Oriental religions in particular. Beginning
with a barbaric mixture of ideas and values, the Greeks achieved much
because they gradually learned to organize the chaos by remembering their
genuine needs.

Nietzsche points to the fact that the ancient Greeks considered tragedy, with its suffering and pain, to be a necessary factor that added to the value and beauty in life. But it is in connection with Apollo and Dionysus, the Greek art deities, that Nietzsche learns of the antithesis in Greek life. Though these heterogeneous tendencies ran parallel to each other, they constantly incited each other to new and more powerful births. The one restrained through form while the other pulsated with dynamic energy. Thus, the Dionysian and the Apollonian augmented each other and bred the Hellenic spirit. Although Nietzsche considers the Will to Power as dualistic in *The Birth of Tragedy* he still envisages it as the real basis of Greek culture and as the basic drive of all human effort. In his later writings Nietzsche fuses the opposing elements of the Will to Power into a single drive which overcomes and conquers itself.

For it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian state, that the basic fact of the Hellenic instinct finds expression—its "will to life." What was it that the Hellenic instilled himself by means of these mysteries? Eternal life.

Therefore, Nietzsche believes that the ancient Greek is the first great binder and synthesizer of everything Oriental and European. According to Nietzsche, the Greeks in their best days showed a will to pessimism which allowed them to beget strength to face the ugly and terrible aspects of existence. Similarly, Nietzsche admires the Greek religions, for they expressed gratitude to the gods rather than fear. Consequently, Nietzsche believes these Greeks justified their strongest impulses by forming and maintaining an aristocratic society. Hence, the Greeks could utilize their energies to the production of real culture and men of genius.


In the ideal society Nietzsche shows how the artists, philosophers, and those strong in the will for power convert their joy in destruction to rivalry for honor. Nietzsche regards this contest as the secret of Greek advancement. The individual in ancient Greece did all he could to excel his competitors in politics, art, and philosophy. The presence of these rivals held tyrannical impulses in check and created the highest pitch of endeavor.

Nietzsche regards the peak of Greek culture as the age of Aeschylus and the early Ionian philosophers. This was the time when Classical style reached perfection. In the early philosophers Nietzsche observes the inception of the highest types of men—the overmen. However, the Persian wars broke out and Socrates wrecked the continuity of the tradition by introducing abstract concepts and dialectics. With Socrates decline set in.

Nietzsche pictures the model philosopher as a physician who applies the knife of his thought "vivisectionally" to the virtues of his time. As an example of such a philosopher Nietzsche portrays Socrates, whom he would like to emulate, by uncovering the lack of self-discipline in contemporary morality.

Like Socrates, Nietzsche also offers a critique of his age and prepares the ground for a new value-creation. But Nietzsche further indicates that Socrates was not only the "gadfly" of Athens and the "vivisectionalist" of Athenian conceit and hypocrisy, but also the creator of characters. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche first introduces Socrates as a demigod. In this work Nietzsche describes the great dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and

1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 515.
2. Ibid.
the Euripidean attack upon them. Nietzsche says: "Euripides was, in a sense, only a mask: the deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor Apollo. It was an altogether new-born demon. And it was called Socrates." Here Nietzsche seems to think that Euripides embodies the extreme rationalism which set forth the decline in Greek culture. In this sense, Nietzsche views the rationalistic tendency as being injected into the Greek mind before Socrates and only gaining expression through him. Nietzsche finds in Socrates the turning-point and vortex of so-called universal history. For if one were to imagine the whole incalculable sum of energy which has been used by that universal tendency,—used not in the service of knowledge, but for the practice, i.e., egotistical ends of individuals and peoples—then probably the instinctive love of life would be so much weakened in general wars of destruction that thus a practical pessimism might even give rise to a horrible ethics of general slaughter out of pity.

Thus, Nietzsche considers Socratic rationalism as the force which saved Western civilization from destruction. Similar to Nietzsche's feelings in the Nineteenth Century, Socrates understood that the world needed him; only Socrates had one choice—to be rational. Hence, Nietzsche sees "Socratism," but not Socrates as decadent because it could not produce a cure. But by thwarting destruction it did make a regeneration of culture possible. Socrates himself realized this: "in the wisdom of his courage to die" he recognized that for himself death was the only cure.

In his lectures on "The pre-Platonic Philosophers" Nietzsche includes

1. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 1012.
2. Ibid., p. 1020-21.
3. Ibid., p. 1030.
Socrates as one of the purest types of the "eternally and everywhere seeking one;" in a lecture on Socrates Nietzsche shows that Socrates was "the philosopher of life" who made thought serve life.\(^1\) Nietzsche says also that Socrates wanted death to show his personal triumph over fear and weakness. In his lectures on "The Study of the Platonic Dialogues" Nietzsche writes: "Plato seems to have received the decisive thought as to how a philosopher ought to behave toward men from the Apology of Socrates: as their physician, as a gadfly on the neck of man."\(^2\)

As with Goethe, Nietzsche finds in Socrates a man who has "given style to his character" and has disciplined himself into wholeness.

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2. Ibid., p. 348.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

There is no ready made label which can properly fit Nietzsche who combines within himself the greatest versatility. Like Lucretius, Nietzsche attains that combination many strive for but few ever succeed in obtaining—a fusion of literary style and philosophy. But by this brilliance in his writing Nietzsche sacrifices an organized style, which often goes with lucidity and clear presentation. Therefore, because Nietzsche does not systematize his thought along logical lines but criss-crosses and builds up his plan from book to book, it becomes impossible to understand Nietzsche's social philosophy unless one considers all his works.

When this is done it can be seen that Nietzsche's aim is to create a new culture which is based on a class-system and a dual morality. Basing his claims on the trends which history has taken in the past, Nietzsche believes that he constructs an empirically valid social organization which is best able to meet the conditions of modern life. Among the more probable generalizations Nietzsche makes is the claim that there will be a world crisis greater than any in previous history. Nietzsche is convinced that this crisis will end in nihilism and that the decadence, so evident in the modern age, will be overcome in the struggle. This point is quite evident in The Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche says that he has no doubt that morality is going to pieces. "This is the great hundred-act play that is reserved for the next two centuries of Europe,
the most terrible, the most mysterious, and perhaps the most hopeful of all plays."

Decadence and nihilism, however, are not Nietzsche's last words about the modern age; Nietzsche believes that Europe still has tension left. "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves." Consequently, the nihilistic struggle will involve an active nihilism where the stronger men will react in an illogical rage. In this lies hope. Because the ensuing crisis will weed out the decadent elements, Nietzsche hopes that the strong men, who have overcome the decadence of modernity and have outlived nihilism, will, in the violence and confusion of the time, breed the men of strength who will not be hampered by Absolute Morality. This is the aim of Nietzsche's whole program. He wants a struggle so that the strong will revalue the whole system of ethics. From this viewpoint Nietzsche pictures nihilism as only an interlude between the death of the old and the birth of a new culture.

The increasing docility of the masses offers an unequaled opportunity, Nietzsche thinks, for a daring group of men to seize control of the social machinery and make it support a new ruling caste. Nietzsche hopes the first step will be taken when the strong will set up the new aristocracy. Nevertheless, Nietzsche believes that this new aristocracy will not remain in power by sheer physical force. Eventually the world will be governed by the wisest.

Those legislative and tyrannical minds who are able to set fast, to hold fast, an idea, men with this spiritual power of will, . . . this species of legis-

relative men has inevitably exercised the strongest influence in all ages.¹

In their hands humanity becomes a living thing and learns to give itself a purpose.

Such is Nietzsche's answer to the decadence of his era. Though existence is senseless from the existential point of view, Nietzsche believes mankind can create a meaning for itself by living for a cause great enough to justify all.² Here the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence must be accepted as the ideal which glorifies life so much that the strong should be glad to think of this worldly life repeated ad infinitum. In this respect Nietzsche's purpose aims at giving man a goal to point at. This is his contribution to humanity for the way out of the perplexity of dissolutionment.

However, although Nietzsche may be correct in showing that the individual's integrity is being usurped by modern democracies, he does have some serious difficulties in his rival conception of a caste-system based on a dual morality. Among the more glaring is a lack of sociological principles. For instance, Nietzsche insists that there are only two moralities for mankind: one vulgar and unfruitful, given up to the mob, and the other superior and productive of great things, and reserved for the elite. Now this contradicts the idea of a universal morality or of any categorical imperative concept to which all men can rationally appeal. The fact that all men have a morality does not constitute a universal morality. It merely establishes the fact that there is morality everywhere. The universality of the moral fact does not seem, in Nietzsche's sense, to be the same thing as an identity of all morality. Therefore, as it has

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been shown before, Nietzsche concludes that morality is not the same for all men. In Nietzsche's system every man feels compelled to act in accordance with the amount of force accorded him by the Will to Power. In addition, Nietzsche holds that there are no moral obligations of any kind except those that man makes for himself.

Yet this ubiquity of the two moralities seems, on closer inspection, somewhat dubious, for there can be a sliding scale anywhere along the line. Nietzsche does not say where the line to this scale must be drawn, nor does Nietzsche tell where the mob ends and the elite begins. Moreover, Nietzsche's conception of two separately distinct moralities which arbitrarily divide mankind into two rigid classes does not appear to have much empirical validation among modern sociologists. Instead, it seems that modern evidence points to an infinite number of degrees between so-called classes.

But seen from Nietzsche's point of view the dual system of morality is merely an attempt to extract more freedom and latitude for the strong and less from the weak. However, in creating such a sharp abyss between the great and small one may ask whether Nietzsche's caste-system might not paralyze any initiative that exists among the weak to become potential creators? It may be said, then, that Nietzsche's system of morality is too rigid and arbitrary. Between the strong and the weak in the Will to Power there is too much of a gap. Furthermore, Nietzsche's dual morality, if followed literally, might breed hereditary privileges and license.

What Nietzsche wishes to point out, though, is that modern morality encroaches upon and restrains the true artist and philosopher in society. Nietzsche has shown that since Socrates' day morality, under different guises, but especially in the name of Christianity, has pretended to be the only end of human actions. As a result, morality has implanted in
mankind the idea that it alone is respectable and that all other values are worthwhile only as a function of morality. Nietzsche maintains that this is an error because morality encroaches to itself the creative artist, and like all other encroachments, makes everything serve it. Looking at the history of mankind, and especially at his own age, Nietzsche asserts that morality has paralyzed human forces which have a right to existence and which have their own utility. This enslaving of the quest for truth and beauty by morality in order to serve humanity has meant their suppression. Because of this Nietzsche feels that the value of humanity itself has been shorn.

All this comes back to Nietzsche's contention that morality is not a sacrosanct and independent factor to which all else is subservient. Nietzsche holds that there are some particular moralities, indirectly related to the dual moralities, but which are not its agents. Here Nietzsche seems to be talking about something akin to the so-called ethics of various professional organizations. If one follows Nietzsche's reasoning at this juncture he must conclude that these unique moralities are more important than the moral code to which one is committed. For example, if an artist creates something which he believes is beautiful and is concerned whether it is immoral because of the possibility of its being called "bad" or "evil" then, in Nietzsche's sense, he acts "immorally." But this may be pushing Nietzsche too far. Nietzsche is not concerned so much about the formal presentation of his theory, and indeed, one may question whether Nietzsche really consciously thought out all the necessary points to his social philosophy. It is probably true that Nietzsche has not sufficiently clarified his thoughts on particular issues. Yet it is evident that Nietzsche's aims—to create a different social animal and to construct a better social organization—are more important for him than planning every
fact in detail.

Along with the problem of the dual morality there is also the question of whether the higher class of men may not become stagnant and more involved in maintaining their own vaunted positions than in creating. Nietzsche recognizes this fact but he is ambivalent about his ultimate stand. Nietzsche asserts that the overman will direct humanity through various cycles. On the other hand, Nietzsche says that he desires the overman to carefully choose his ends and goals. The thought comes through that Nietzsche realizes the inevitability of the recurring problem of aristocracy. It is a crucial problem for Nietzsche; he wants an aristocracy of capable overmen who will be free to create. Of course, this necessitates that the overman must recognize his limitations and when challenged and proven unworthy will, of his own volition, withdraw from the highest caste. Consequently, the highest class must always be flexible and moral enough to permit social fluidity. But remembering the discussion on the dual morality, and looking back upon history, it is problematical whether Nietzsche is justified empirically in claiming that the overman will relinquish power for the benefit of the race. In his investigations Nietzsche knows that even in the Greek golden age, which he greatly admires, dictators such as Pericles arose and consolidated their grip on society.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, Nietzsche does not give an entirely satisfactory account of the relationship between the "higher men" and the overman. It has been pointed out that just prior to the time when the overman will be engendered the "higher men" (Good Europeans) will direct and nurture their procreation. However, after their inception Nietzsche does not make it clear whether these higher men will continue to function as caretakers of the political arena, like Plato's guardians, or whether
they will voluntarily give up their power to the overmen. Nietzsche implies that the overmen are to have ultimate power but will not bother with the details of government: "Beyond the rulers, detached from all ties, live the highest men; and in the rulers they have their instruments."¹ One could assume that Nietzsche probably means that either there is no clear-cut distinction between the higher men and the overman, as such, and that a period of time will ensue between the nihilistic era and the coming of the first real overman, or that the overmen will leave the task of government to the "higher men."

There is one more grave problem that one may point to in Nietzsche. This concerns the meaningfulness of the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence as metaphysical and psychological facts. Nietzsche believes that there is no end nor significance in things; yet Nietzsche wishes the overman to become the goal for humanity. Likewise, nothing is really true for Nietzsche; yet Nietzsche feels that human beings find it necessary to invent true principles. This is exemplified in Nietzsche's questioning why the human beliefs about perceptions and logical abstractions are true merely because the human mind synthesizes them in this way.² Instead, Nietzsche suggests that "for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves" such judgments must be believed to be true "though they still might be false judgments!"³ Here Nietzsche is not so different from Kant.

Even more important than the epistemological controversy is the relation of the Will to Power to a universal ground. While Nietzsche

² Nietzsche, *The Idols*, pp. 482-84.
³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 393.
questions the existence of God empirically, he seems to conceive of the Will to Power as a universal feature of human construction whose fictions must at least be considered necessary for all men. Nietzsche says that all knowledge is a "footprint of my will; verily, my will to power walks on the heels of your will to truth." Like Kant's synthetic a priori judgments Nietzsche's hypothesis of the Will to Power might be one empirical interpretation of human behavior of which man is capable when he considers the evidence. At this point the obvious criticism is that it may not be true that human minds are so constituted that, when one considers phenomena and thinks about it carefully, that one must assume that the Will to Power is the basic principle of the universe. If this is the case then Nietzsche seems to acknowledge that truth and knowledge serve pragmatic functions only. Nietzsche seems to justify this assumption. In the Twilight of the Idols he writes that in meeting the struggle for existence life has to treat the changing conditions as permanent entities. As a result, one builds up categories, such as a "thing" and "substance."

Insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves somehow caught in error, compelled into error. So certain are we, on the basis of rigorous examination, that this is where the error lies.

Consequently, the problem which returns is the same one which was mentioned in chapter II, that of Nietzsche's monism. Nietzsche's monism raises the question as to how there can be any control whatever in the universe besides the Will to Power. In regard to what overcomes the Will to Power Nietzsche would have to reply that there is no other principle besides the Will to Power, and that this Will to Power must overcome it—

self. One may well question whether this conception is meaningful, however. The demand that spirit should overcome passion is comprehensible. It appears more difficult in the case of the self-overcoming of the Will to Power. Granted that when the idea of overcoming does imply two forces it is realistic, how significant is it to say that when there is but one force self-overcoming is possible? The question is whether Nietzsche's version of the Will to Power is an attempt to answer "small single questions" with an experiment or is an effort "to solve all with one stroke, with one word" and so unriddle the universe?¹

Nietzsche does not answer this criticism. Nevertheless, perhaps Nietzsche's conception of the Will to Power is not a strict metaphysical interpretation in the sense that formal philosophers attach to it. By the concept of the Will to Power Nietzsche could mean an empirical hypothesis arrived at by induction. If this is so, self-overcoming may be conceived of in psychological terms and gains new significance. In summary, Nietzsche's heritage teaches that the only rights mankind can legitimately claim are those which it has conquered. Nietzsche is not an iconoclast, nor an immoral "prophet." On the contrary, one can discern that Nietzsche's criticism is not immoral but is a confession of his devotion to true cultural ideals. Nietzsche desires a movement toward the liberation of the individual from the shackles of external authority, excessive conventionalism, and other-worldliness. With this in mind Nietzsche also maintains that philosophy must be lived and not merely learned from books. Nietzsche's object is to make man surer of himself and to ignite in him a sense of pride and daring. In this sense Nietzsche gives to philosophy the gift of personal experience as a means for criti-

cism.

Maybe humanity needs a Nietzsche and a Socrates to avoid becoming complacent. A Nietzsche may be beneficial in the long run. If one reflects on Nietzsche's teachings he becomes more tolerant to different ideas and attitudes and more democratic—a word Nietzsche despises. This is the truth. Nietzsche has said that there is no universal morality and that each man must choose for himself the code he will live by. Only the individual can decide if Nietzsche is correct when he asserts that man should not aim at the utilitarian happiness of the race but at the procreation of the best. This is the great question which rival value theories fight over.

In conclusion, Erich Fromm, a highly penetrating psychologist, maintains that people are not able to comprehend the reasons why they have such a propensity for "evil" and submission. Fromm remarks that "only a few had been aware of the rumbling of the volcano preceding the outbreak. Nietzsche had disturbed the complacent optimism of the nineteenth century." It appears from what Fromm and other psychologists, as well as philosophers of history are now saying, Nietzsche may have been acutely aware of the difficult times society is facing.

Perhaps it is worthwhile to have somebody like Nietzsche come along every so often to shake human opinions and beliefs and make men ponder and take cognizance of themselves. Nietzsche has rendered the world a great service in criticizing modern morality which, most psychologists and moral philosophers say, needs much revision and overhauling. For this intellectual courage alone Nietzsche deserves commendation.

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ABSTRACT

Friedrich Nietzsche believes that there is one basic force in the universe which he calls the Will to Power. Both organic matter and the spirit are two aspects of this force and are always at war with each other. Nietzsche thinks that the spirit is superior to brute physical power and that the greatest amounts of the Will to Power exist by harnessing the passions to the control of the intellect. However, Nietzsche is concerned most in showing how this Will to Power is related to man. By means of a "Scale of Excellence" Nietzsche shows that the will is psychically greater in some humans than in others. Moreover, Nietzsche assumes that the Will to Power is dominantly powerful in only a minority of men. Nietzsche also argues that the majority of people who do not possess a will for power are in command of the political machinery. These men, Nietzsche says, only want peace and contentment from their earthly existence. The fact remains, though, that they are unable to create and that their values reflect this inability to produce anything of value.

Nietzsche traces why the modern age has developed the conditions which he calls "barbarism." Nietzsche points out that after their most wealthy periods the ancient civilizations declined because the will for power had dried up among the greatest individuals. Nietzsche shows that as a result of the weaker-willed peoples' gaining control over the social machinery, the more worthy members of society were not able to create anything unless it conformed to the rule of Absolute Morality. But Nietzsche also shows that once the weak had expressed their resentment against the
former upper classes they settled down to a vegetative existence and wished only to sit under the shade of the tree planted by the labors of any remaining great men. Nietzsche believes this action breeds discontent and frustration and will eventually lead to nihilism.

Moreover, during this period when the weak have gained control they must subject everyone to the doctrine of equality. Those not conforming are either physically or socially ostracized by the will of the majority. Nietzsche points out how this levelling makes it impossible for those wanting to be different to express their individuality. In time, however, Nietzsche thinks that the strong-willed men can express their individuality. Because of their inability to fathom important situations and act accordingly, Nietzsche discloses that the weak-willed souls must inevitably lose their grip on the social machinery. Then, when the age is replete and ready for a change, the strong will "destroy" the old society and will cultivate a different ethics. For Nietzsche, this revolution constitutes a cultural rebirth.

Nietzsche exposes this formula to the modern age and shows that modernity has been the expression of the weak's Will to Power for over two-thousand years. Nietzsche acknowledges that Christianity and Socialism are the logical developments of the weak's Will to Power urging creation. Nietzsche argues that Christianity and Socialism only cultivate conformity and robotism.

In his plan Nietzsche urges the engendering of a different morality which will be created after a series of catastrophic wars which, by the way, he predicts for the Twentieth Century. After the strong-willed men have regained power, Nietzsche indicates that they will begin to set up a "caste-system" into which they will direct all men who, voluntarily, will seek their place in this society. This is Nietzsche's ideal society.
However, Nietzsche recognizes that it has to be created by hardship and strife. Furthermore, it has to be maintained by a code of strength and courage. The individuals who Nietzsche thinks are capable of upholding this code are "overmen." These are the individuals who have the greatest amount of passion organized into a harmonious, organic whole. These men, who will create intelligently, are the only ones able to give value to human life. Their creations will be intellectually honest and will reflect their spiritual strength.

The point Nietzsche is stressing is that in his ideal society the "overman" will be free to create; Nietzsche's argument is that in modern times the strong-willed man can not create because society, made up mostly of weak-willed people, prohibits him from creating. The result is that society as a whole is suffering.

The closest society to Nietzsche's ideal is Ancient, pre-Socratic Greece with its "free individualities." This culture had a greater number of near overmen than had any other society. Likewise, the closest any living man came to being an overman was either Socrates or Goethe, both of whom had the greatest control over their passions and had sublimely organized the chaos in themselves. What Nietzsche argues is that more men can become Goethes' and Socrates' if only society will not restrain them.