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Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison's conception of personality

Cunningham, Frank
Boston University

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Thesis
ANDREW SETH PRINGLE-PATerson'S
CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY

by
Frank Cunningham
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by

First Reader  Edgar S. Bingham
Professor of Philosophy.

Second Reader  Carl Marlah
Professor of Religious Education and the Philosophy of Literature.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Statement of the Problem.

The aim of this thesis is the exposition of Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison's conception of personality. The nature of the problem will necessitate a survey of his criticisms of other philosophical systems which have any bearing on the problem of personality. Pringle-Pattison's method in all his writings was to build up his philosophical system, if he may be said to have had a philosophical system, through constructive criticism.

B. The Method of Procedure.

The nature of the problem makes it necessary to devote a part of the study to a survey of other views of personality. The first chapter has to do with introductory material. In the second chapter there is given a survey of the life and thought of Pringle-Pattison. This chapter serves as a proper background for a better understanding of his own view of personality.

Chapter three is primarily historical. Here an attempt is made to bring together the main points treated by Pringle-
Pattison with regard to the development of the idea of the soul. Most of the material in this chapter is taken from Pringle-Pattison's latest book, The Idea of Immortality. This work, which embodies the 1922 Gifford lectures in the University of Edinburgh, shows a slight change of viewpoint from that expressed in Hegelianism and Personality regarding the relation of the self to the Absolute. However, it is best suited for giving a historical background for the study of any conception of personality. His first important work, Hegelianism and Personality, is devoted almost exclusively to a criticism of the Hegelian conception of personality. Consequently there is little in this work which can be used as historical background for the study.

Chapters four, five, and six are devoted more specifically to the various aspects of Pringle-Pattison's own conception of personality.

C. Sources of Data.

The material incorporated in this thesis is taken from all the available writings of Pringle-Pattison which bear at all on the problem of personality. For the most part, therefore, the sources are primary. The main primary sources are Pringle-Pattison's Gifford lectures at the University of

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¹ For a fuller discussion see p. 80 f.
Edinburgh. The first group of lectures were given in 1912 and 1913 and were published in 1917 under the title of *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*. The second group of lectures were given in 1922 and published the same year under the title of *The Idea of Immortality*. In some cases, use is made of other sources. Ernest Northcroft Herrington has given a short but helpful discussion of Pringle-Pattison's view of personality in his book, *The Problem of Personality*. Many valuable suggestions also were gotten from Peter Anthony Bertocci's book, *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought*. Reviews of Pringle-Pattison's books in several philosophical journals have been helpful in showing the importance of the problem of personality in his philosophy.

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2 This book is based on a dissertation in Boston University.
CHAPTER II

A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LIFE AND THOUGHT
OF PRINGLE-PATTISON

Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison is important in any study of nineteenth century thought, not because of any particular system which he propounded, but rather because of his insistence upon certain philosophical truths and his logical expositions and criticisms of various philosophical systems. He has wielded great influence upon recent thought and has commended his views to many minds through his vindication of basic principles of common-sense and sound reason.\(^1\)

He was born in Edinburgh on December 20, 1856. That was the year in which Sir William Hamilton died. He had held the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh which Pringle-Pattison was destined to hold fifty years later. Pringle-Pattison was the eldest of seven children, of whom one, James Seth, was also to achieve philosophical eminence, occupying the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh at about the same time that his elder brother, Andrew, occupied the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics.\(^2\)

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1 Merrington, POP, 130.
Pringle-Pattison's childhood and years of preparation for his ultimate life-work coincided with Alexander Campbell Fraser's occupancy of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics which had been left vacant by Hamilton. There was to be a very close relationship between these two men. Pringle-Pattison, passing from the Royal High School of Edinburgh, went on to study under Campbell Fraser. He took first honours in both philosophy and the classics at his graduation in the spring of 1878. He became a Hibbert Travelling Fellow and spent two years in Germany. Returning to Edinburgh in the early eighties, he became an assistant to Fraser. The idealistic influence of this former teacher was discernible in Pringle-Pattison's own later philosophizing as a corrective of a native tendency towards an extreme realistic interpretation of experience. This enabled him to retain a steady hold upon an ultimate metaphysical idealism while rejecting both subjective and epistemological idealism. 3

After successively holding the Chair of Logic and Philosophy at the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire at Cardiff, and the Chair of Logic, Rhetoric, and Metaphysics at St. Andrews, Pringle-Pattison was appointed the successor of Campbell Fraser at Edinburgh in 1891, exactly thirty-five years after Fraser's own election, and

3 Ibid., p. 138.
fifty-five years after that of Sir William Hamilton. From this time to his death, he maintained his Edinburgh citizenship. He has been called an Edinburgh man by birth, by training, by residence the greater part of his life, and also by temperament and native bias. He seemed to be the very incarnation of the spirit of Edinburgh. He was a man of broad and deep culture, scholarly reserve, and intellectual piety, similar in some ways to the sceptical attitude and distaste for enthusiasm which was characteristic of that other great Edinburgh philosopher whose monument adorns Calton Hill. Although he was shy and reticent, his comments on men and scenes gave expression to his deep responsiveness to nature in its formal grandeur and sublimity, his recognition of intellectual integrity in persons, and his appreciation of formal dignity of social manner and institution.4

His home life was one which gave him deep and quiet contentment. In 1884, he had returned to Berlin for his marriage with Fraulein Eva Stropp, to whom he had become deeply attached during his student days in Germany. She became completely devoted to him and the country of her adoption. They became the parents of four sons and two daughters. One son was killed in the battle of the Somme in 1916; Mrs. Pringle-Pattison died in 1929. Three sons and the two

daughters are still living.  

Pringle-Pattison possessed a very striking figure. He is said to have had the head of an Olympian and the physique of a Viking. His mind was well-fitted to his physical dignity. He possessed a characteristic balance of intellectual probity and confidence, with unfaltering certainty as to the philosophical significance of moral, religious, and aesthetic values, which was an element of great strength in impelling him to reject philosophies that too easily reached their intellectual goal by a convenient underestimation of refractory elements and objects of experience. His mind was broadly critical rather than laboriously scholastic, on the one hand, or naively speculative, on the other. This does not mean that his method was destructive rather than constructive; nor does it mean that it was eclectic rather than original. He describes his method as being critical and constructive.  

Among the earliest published works of Pringle-Pattison are to be found the Hibbert Fellowship volume on The Development from Kant to Hegel with Chapters on the Philosophy of Religion, published in 1882 by the Hibbert Trustees, and the first essay of the volume of Essays in Philosophical Criticism, published under joint editorship with R. B. 

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5 Ibid., p. 138.
6 Pringle-Pattison, IOC, vi-vii.
Haldane in 1883. There are to be seen in these early works some of the qualities for which he became notable in later years: a peculiar lucidity, simplicity, and dignity of philosophical style. His style has been described as being as strong and as nimble as steel; free from weight of detail and the labor of setting forth implications and presuppositions. It was free also from technical jargon and those quaint attempts at clearness by the neologisms and formulas which have become characteristic of some modern schools of thought. His early bent for literature never left him, and he had a firm belief in the possibility of expressing the greater part of philosophical ideas clearly, succinctly, and pointedly by the use of ordinary literary English. Yet his thought will sustain analysis and critical inquiry to a high degree. The secret of his wider appeal was his ready assumption that his reader sufficiently interested and cultivated to supply the minor detail out of his own knowledge. He would not labor his points. In this way each reader could supply what was required for his own understanding, without being distressed by the real or fancied need to grasp what was beyond his capacity. ⁷

Pringle-Pattison's first polemical excursion, which became the basis of his wider and more general philosophical

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⁷ Hallet, Art. in Mind, 42 (1933), 147.
fame, was the second course of "Balfour Philosophical Lectures" on Hegelianism and Personality. These courses of lectures were founded by Mr. A. S. Balfour to enable Pringle-Pattison to produce original work in philosophical literature. Three courses were given -- in 1885, 1887, and in 1891. The first of these was devoted to Scottish Philosophy. In this series, he traced the development of thought from the implicit subjectivism of the Cartesian starting point to the philosophical scepticism of Hume. This gave him a basis for a critical account of Thomas Reid's doctrine of "natural judgments," and a comparison of this with the more thorough-going and more famous anti-Human arguments of Kant. In these lectures, Pringle-Pattison firmly rejects epistemological relativity and refuses to regard either Hume or Hamilton as typical of the Scottish mind. On the basis that Scottish philosophy is anti-phenomenalistic, he prefers Hegelianism to the phenomenalism of Kant. 8

However, in the second series of lectures, Hegelianism and Personality, Pringle-Pattison made clear his thought of the Hegelian system. Here he seized, on the one hand, upon what is a matter of great moment of ethical religion, the independent existence of finite selves, and, on the other hand, upon what is a matter of vigorous belief among plain

8 Ibid., p. 140.
men, the independent existence of the external world of nature. The term "independent" as applied to selves and nature is to be understood in the context of Pringle-Pattison's rejection of the Hegelian system in which both individual selves and nature are identified with the Absolute. Pringle-Pattison holds that although the self and nature are parts of the absolute, they are formally distinct and independent. 9

The realistic consequences of the general argument were elaborated in the third course of lectures delivered in 1891 and published in 1892 in the Philosophical Review. These lectures were published under the title Psychology, Epistemology and Metaphysics. Here the matter was less finished and conclusive, and perhaps for this reason was never published in book form by the author. It should be noted, however, that Pringle-Pattison never receded from the position laid down in these writings. Much of his later writings are attempts to clarify and expound these original doctrines of his philosophy. 10

From 1887 to 1907, Pringle-Pattison was occupied in making clear the relation of his own philosophy with outstanding contemporary and historical theories, ranging from Kant and Hegel, Lotze and Nietzsche, to Huxley, Balfour, Bradley,

9 IOG, 267.
10 Hallet, Art. in Mind, 42 (1933), 141.
Fraser, Martineau, Spencer, Dewey, Kidd, and McTaggart. Much of the writing was confined to periodicals. Some were collected under the titles of *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, *Two Lectures on Theism*, and *The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays*.

This period saw also his dignity as a university professor enhanced by the acquisition of an estate. Pringle-Pattison's name was originally Andrew Seth. In 1898, he inherited "The Haining," the estate of the Pringles at Selkirk, from his friend, Mrs. Pringle-Pattison, a distant relative of the Seths by marriage. A change of his name, which was a necessary part of the transaction, has given many foreign writers ground for confusion and has caused some of his earlier works to be attributed to his philosopher-brother, James Seth.\(^{11}\)

In the years 1912 and 1913, Pringle-Pattison was Gifford Lecturer in the University of Aberdeen. It was in these lectures that he really gave a comprehensive view of the philosophical situation in relation to the great problems of God, nature, and man. In 1917, these lectures were published in a volume entitled *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*. In 1922, the volume entitled *The Idea of Immortality* was published. This volume embodied the 1922

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 143.
Gifford lectures in the University of Edinburgh. These last named volumes give Pringle-Pattison's mature and detailed philosophical system. That the system makes no claim to completeness takes nothing from its profound interest and value. Its author was by nature sceptical of systems of thought making claims to finality. This was true of him not because he doubted the unitary character of the Real, but rather because of his recognition of man's insufficiency in the presence of ultimate problems. He did not doubt the intrinsic intelligibility of the world.12

Pringle-Pattison received many academic honours, although he earned no degree beyond the Master of Arts. Honorary degrees were conferred on him by St. Andrews in 1892, by Durham in 1902, and by Edinburgh, together with the title Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, upon the resignation of his Chair in 1919. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1904.

He died on the first of September in 1931.

12 Ibid., p. 143.
CHAPTER III

MAIN POINTS TREATED BY PRINGLE-PATISON WITH REGARD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF THE SOUL

The problem which is being dealt with is the exposition of Pringle-Pattison's conception of personality. As already noted, Pringle-Pattison did not develop any logical system relative to the nature and meaning of personality, but sets forth his own views indirectly through a historical analysis and criticism of other conceptions. His views, therefore, will be somewhat clarified if some attention is paid to the traditional conceptions of personality. This is the aim of the present chapter.

The traditional conception of the soul is of ancient origin. It goes back to the period when primitive man began to seek an explanation of certain aspects of his experience which could not be accounted for from observation. Anthropologists have shown that the phenomena of sleep and dreams were important in this connection. In sleep, the body seems lifeless and without sense or motion. On awaking, a human being can recall dreams which he has had in the interval. In the dream he has travelled great distances and met old friends whom he has not seen for many years or who are perhaps dead. As the body has remained motionless in the same
place, the primitive man came to the conclusion that these expeditions were undertaken by a second self or double which could leave the body and return to it again. These early ideas of the soul were vague and varied, but it was thought to be some form of matter.\(^1\)

The first real advance in the development of the conception of the soul was due to Plato, to whom we owe the idea of its immateriality. Its primacy is emphasized throughout his dialogues. He conceived the soul as being of heavenly origin and immortal because of its kinship with the ideal. Although many of Plato's arguments on the problem of the soul are unsound, there are two which are of value because of their relation to the later development of the idea. The first is his argument for the unity of the soul and the second is the doctrine of transmigration of the soul or rebirth.\(^2\)

Aristotle's conception of the soul is different from that of Plato's. Instead of thinking of the soul as being separable from the body, he conceived it to be a part of it. It was thought to be the functioning of the body. Aristotle distinguished the different levels of psychical function. The basic function was that of assimilating nutriment and regulating growth and decay of the organism. Then in a

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1 Pringle-Pattison, IOI, 8. All references in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, are to works of Pringle-Pattison.
2 IOI, 44.
gradually ascending level came the sensitive soul as seen in animals. The rational soul of man was held to be the highest psychical function.

Although for the most part, Aristotle maintained that there was essential co-relativity and inseparability of the body and soul, he made exception for the reason. This he did by distinguishing between the Active Reason and the Passive Reason. The Active Reason was thought to be a separate and active principle which made possible the function and actuality of the soul. It was the Nous of intelligence which had activity as its essential nature and was therefore "separable and impassive and unmixed." In its highest and truest form, activity was thought to be the characteristic of God. The life of God was considered similar to the highest kind of activity with us, but whereas it is possible with us only for a short time, it is eternal with God.

Aristotle's arguments regarding the nature of the soul had much influence upon the Scholastic philosophers in shaping Christian Dogma. They took the argument further by asserting that the soul was not so much an impersonal function of thought as an individual substance made from nothing by the creative act of God and introduced into the organism. The medieval philosophers held that the soul is not derived, like

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3 I01, 66.
4 I01, 69.
the body, from the parents. It was held to be "intrinsically independent" from the body but "extrinsically dependent." This view was held because the soul was believed to enter into relation with the body and certain of its activities correlated with brain states, and in that sense dependent on the instrumentality of the organism. What happens, according to the Scholastics, is that the soul "unfolds its native capacities, as the development of the brain and nervous system furnishes opportunity. The body is simply a medium of communication."  

The conception of the soul as intrinsically independent of the body and only brought into relation with it, takes philosophical form in the assertion of the substantiality of the soul. Substance, in this connection means "a concretely existent thing as distinguished from qualities or attributes which are conceived... as the attributes or activities of some real being." The soul is defined as an immaterial or spiritual substance in order to preclude the possibility of thinking of mental phenomena as the activities or attributes of the body. The argument advanced to substantiate this view is that a subject of all our mental experience is always assumed.  

The substantial view of the soul implies an "ultimate

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5 IOI, 72.
6 IOI, 72.
core of reality" which does not change as does the more superficial states or qualities. The soul-substance is something absolutely self-identical in spite of the flux and change of mental experience. "It is something to which these experiences are attached or referred . . . something which supports them, so to speak, in existence." The Scholastics and their successors, thus conceiving the soul-substance to be a changeless unit, went on to argue that it was therefore indestructible and immortal. They maintained that the soul was an atom . . . an ultimate and indivisible particle . . . and, therefore could not be destroyed. 7

Pringle-Pattison thinks that the origin of the belief in a substantial soul represents a survival of the primitive animistic idea of a ghostly double which leaves the body at death and enables us to think of the life of the dead man as continued in some fashion after the dissolution of the bodily frame. 8

He thinks that philosophers, as well as ordinary men, cling tenaciously to the idea for this particular reason. This is especially true of the Scholastic philosophers, Descartes, and the long line of thinkers, including the late Dr. McDougall, the most recent champion of the doctrine. 9

John Locke approaches the problem differently in a chapter on "Identity and Diversity" which he added to the

7 IOI, 73.
8 IOI, 74.
9 IOI, 74.
second edition of his Essay. He argued that identity did not depend on any underlying soul-substance but on consciousness, "the consciousness which accompanies every present experience." This consciousness, as Locke goes on to say, can refer backwards to past action of thought. He says, 
as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is self to itself now, and can extend to actions past or to come.10

This substance, which was supposed necessary for identity, is now shown to be superfluous.

While Locke showed the superfluity of any immaterial substance, Lotze revised the idea with regard to a material substance. He showed the emptiness of the popular notion that there is at the center of everything we call real, a kernel or grain of reality-stuff" which communicates "to the properties gathered about it the fixedness and consistency of a thing."11 The term "real" is applied to anything which behaves in a particular way but still remains identical with itself to a certain extent. The reality of a thing is not some kind of material unit, but

simply the law according to which the changeable states of the thing are connected with one another--the formula, so to speak, in which its life his-

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10 Locke, EOU, Bk. IV, 3: Cf. Pringle-Pattison, 101, 75.
11 IOI, 77.
tory or its modes of behavior are summarized. The term "law" should not be taken in a general or abstract sense but as pertaining to a particular thing. To clarify this point, Lotze makes a comparison between the essence of a thing and a melody. In a melody there is a particular law which determines the successive sounds in such a way as to produce an aesthetic effect. Just as this is true of any musical instrument, so it is that the "real thing is nothing but the individual law of its behavior; the essence is not a dead point behind its activity, but identical with it."\(^{12}\)

In following this line of reasoning with regard to the soul, Lotze concludes that "the fact of the unity of consciousness is eo ipso at once the fact of the existence of a substance." He rejects the idea of some underlying unified substance as being necessary for identity.

But after reaching this conclusion, Lotze seems to restate the problem in its traditional form. He speaks in another place that the unity of consciousness is "our sufficient ground for conceiving an indivisible soul." Similarly, in some of his other works there are statements in which he unquestionably expresses a substantial view of the soul.\(^{13}\)

\(^{12}\) I01, 77.

\(^{13}\) I01, 79, 81. Pringle-Pattison states that the reason for such views is "that the real attraction of soul-substance for the imagination appears to be the satisfaction it yields to the ingrained materialism of our ordinary thinking."
Lotze cannot see how a physical event can give rise to a feeling unless the "sum of its motions" come into contact with a subject which its own nature is capable of producing feelings itself. Since one motion only produces another motion and one physical event can only produce another event, Lotze says that there must be "a special ground of explanation for psychic life."\(^\text{14}\)

Passing rapidly over the older materialistic conception of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Pringle-Pattison examines the theory of epiphenomenalism enunciated by Thomas Huxley. In its practical consequences, there is little difference between Huxley's view and that of the materialism which was discarded. Huxley agreed with the Occasionalists in that they both held that it is impossible for the physical to become mental or vice versa in spite of their obvious correlation. Consequently, Huxley extended the Cartesian doctrine of animal automatism so as to make it cover the whole area of man's conscious life. There is consciousness, Huxley admitted, but it has absolutely no effect upon the organism. It is merely a "collateral product" of the workings of the body. It has been compared as Pringle-Pattison points out "to a shadow which runs alongside the pedestrian without in any way influencing his steps."\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{14}\) I01, 80.  
\(^{15}\) I01, 85.
The doctrine of epiphenomenalism has given way, for reasons which will be given later, to a more carefully stated doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism. This doctrine seeks to keep equilibrium between the mental and the physical. The maxim of those advocating the parallelistic theories is that there is "no psychosis without neurosis." To clarify the theory, Pringle-Pattison gives the following illustration. He says we can get a clearer view of the problem if we use the letter A to symbolize a particular neurosis and the Greek letter Φ to symbolize the accompanying psychosis, A and Φ are inseparable elements of a single fact A Φ; and if we symbolize the next stage in the causal series as B Φ, we have no right to say that the result was due to A alone, as epiphenomenalism says, or to Φ, as common sense might say, meaning by some conscious desire or volition. The volition may be truly spoken of as a cause, but it cannot operate save in conjugation with the corresponding neurosis. If we are to think and talk correctly, we must say that it is the total fact A Φ which is the cause of the subsequent fact B.

This theory of parallelism, thus understood has been, and still is widely held, according to Pringle-Pattison. 16

Pringle-Pattison is critical of all these views. He thinks that all these theories—the traditional or substantial view, epiphenomenalism, and parallelism—are based upon a false assumption. This assumption is that the final truth about the material world is the account which physics gives of it as a self-contained system of movements which are

16 IOI, 86.
mechanically determined. This "mechanistic dogma" leaves no room for teleological or purposive activity in the world. Such a theory completely ignores the fact of life. Descartes is driven to deny that animals are alive while the Epiphenomenalists deny that anyone is really alive.

Pringle-Pattison rejects these conclusions. No one can deny the fundamental difference between a living being and that which we call dead or inanimate matter. For example, although the parts of an organism are outside of one another spatially, there is a unity in it that cannot be duplicated in any inorganic thing. An organism constitutes itself as an active whole. It is a natural unity and an inorganic thing is an "artificial" unity. The organism acts as a whole. It is self-assertive, self-preservative, and self-recuperative. Its actions are selective in the interest of the whole. Biology is based upon the assumption of a creature which is able to reproduce and preserve itself in a changing environment. Pringle-Pattison goes on to say:

Terms like stimulus, response, behavior, all imply the notion of selection, the power of adaptation to environmental change, by which the organism maintains and develops its own characteristic being.\(^\text{17}\)

Physics does not deal with any such organisms. It is concerned only with a "continuous transmutation of energy."

When the physicist seeks "to treat the living being simply

\(^{17}\) IOI, 89.
as a network of pathways through which the energy of external nature takes its course," he has gotten completely out of his field for "such a conception does not fit the facts even in the case of the humblest organism."18

When the difference between the living and non-living became clear, an older generation of physiologists propounded a theory of a "vital force present in the organism, directing the mechanical agencies at work, and so accounting for the purposive character of the resultant movements."19 However, this theory was soon set aside by a later group of physiologists for the simple reason that this unverifiable entity paralyzed research. From a scientific standpoint, they could deal only with known physical and chemical forces. As a method, this mechanistic ideal was of great importance. Unfortunately, however, this rule of method soon hardened into a dogma, "while the larger considerations which had prompted the vitalist hypothesis were simply left on the side."20

During the latter part of the last century, vitalism re-asserted itself. A body of trained physiologists and active thinkers challenged the mechanistic explanation, contending that vital processes, no matter how simple, could be adequately stated in physical terms. Pringle-Pattison thinks

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18 IOL, 89.
19 IOL, 90.
20 IOL, 90.
that this neo-vitalism is inclined to err, as did the older vitalism, in that it seemed to place the central control of the nervous processes in a separate entity, which by some kind of interference ab extra, modifies and directs a course of events which is otherwise conceived as proceeding on purely mechanical principles. The criticism here is that this idea cancels all the good in the new conception of the organism. Nothing happens inorganically in a living organism. Pringle-Pattison maintains that the only way to evade the impasse is to avoid trying to explain how an organism comes to behave as it does. Rather we should accept life as an ultimate fact which must be accepted.

When the fact of life and its nature is realized, the "hopeless dualism between pure spirit on the one side and a dead world of physical forces on the other" ceases to be a problem. The living body is the concrete reality with which we have to deal, and we come to a recognition that the scheme of mass-points and forces to which the physicist reduces the world, so far from representing the ultimate reality of things, is no more than an abstract construction for his own immediate purposes.

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21 IOI, 91.
22 IOI, 91.
CHAPTER IV

THE ORIGIN OF THE SELF

A. The Meaning of Creation.

As stated in the previous chapter, the scholastics maintained that the substantial soul was produced by the creative act of God and introduced bodily into the organism. It was seen to be "intrinsically independent" of the body, but "extrinsically dependent" in that it enters into relations with the body, and certain of its activities are correlated with brain states. In that sense, the soul was held to be dependent on the instrumentality of the organism, although it neither grows nor decays with the body.\(^1\)

Pringle-Pattison does not entirely reject this explanation but thinks that the necessary qualification for the acceptance of it, makes it nugatory. He thinks that the soul or self gradually unfolds its native capacities as the development of the brain and nervous system furnishes the opportunity. The body is considered only an instrument and a means of communication.\(^2\)

If the theory of the scholastics is accepted even partially, the pressing question is raised as to how much

\(^1\) I01, 69.
\(^2\) I01, 69.
of the soul or self is actually created and incorporated into the organic conditions. Pringle-Pattison maintains that no soul is ready made in the sense suggested. It is thought to be a transparent absurdity which makes the whole process of experience superfluous. A self-conscious being can only make itself. 3 It is not to be compared to the manufacture of an article, which remains throughout something separate from its maker, and which is dismissed, when finished, to do the specific work for which the designer fitted it. 4 The special creation of a rational soul to meet the given circumstances, means for Pringle-Pattison, no more than that the human embryo is born with the potentiality of reason, and that the human body is the means appointed for its realization. The coming into being of the rational soul or a self-conscious spirit is, he thinks, justly regarded as the "main miracle" of the universe and that it has the appearance of being the goal of a divine purpose. He believes that the origination and development of such spirits may appropriately be spoken of as a creation; "for it is the emergence of something new, something which cannot be explained or understood from the conditions out of which it arises, if we think of these conditions as they appear in themselves." 5

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3 IOI, 70.
4 IOG, 255.
5 IOI, 70.
The origin of selves, says Pringle-Pattison, is perhaps the only fact to which we can properly ascribe the term creation, because they necessarily import into the universe an element of relative independence and separateness which is not involved in the notion of externality as such. The understanding of such a process of creation, Pringle-Pattison thinks is necessarily beyond us. Even where we seek to describe its phases, we become tangled in contradictions. At times the self appears to be a product of the general system of things; at other times it appears to be self-created by its own action, to presuppose its own existence at every stage of its progress." So we may say, he thinks, that there is no first moment of self-consciousness, but only a second. ⁶

B. The Importance of the Fact of Evolution

So far as the origin of the self is concerned, Pringle-Pattison thinks that the process of creative evolution is important. He points out that Aristotle believed the soul to be the entelechy or fulfilment, the complete account of the living body. But since Aristotle looked upon the body as so much space-occupying matter and nothing else, his conception would give the soul no relation at all to the living experience which is its ultimate expression. Instead of

⁶ IOG, 286.
saying that the soul weaves itself a body, Pringle-Pattison would rather say that the body grows itself a soul. To state the matter more concretely, he would say that the physical organism in commerce with the environment is the medium in which the soul comes into existence. And since the organism is a natural body derived from parents, all the influences summarized under the head of heredity are represented in its spiritual product, namely the soul or self.

In viewing the importance of the process of evolution and its bearing on the understanding of the origin of the self, Pringle-Pattison follows out Aristotle's conception of the relation of soul and body consistently to the end, applying it to the rational soul no less than to the lower levels of soul-life. He shows that the evolutionary process is the fundamental and distinctive conception in Aristotle's philosophy in spite of the fact that at certain critical points Aristotle unexpectedly drops the clue that has served him so far. It is at these points, Pringle-Pattison argues, that the larger scope of modern science enables us to be truer to Aristotle's principle than he was himself. He quotes James Ward to the effect that

but for certain physiological errors into which he fell, Aristotle would doubtless have found the connexion between the organism and the soul as intel-

7 IOI, 70.
8 IOI, 71.
lectual, more direct, and more definite than he supposéd: through sensation, phantasy, memory, we advanced to recollection, conception, intellecti- 

Pringle-Pattison believes that the scientific history of the globe and of the race shows that man attained the faculty of conceptual reason by infinitely gradual steps. ¹⁰

In evolution, Pringle-Pattison thinks that the "retro-
spective" method of the explanation of the origin of the life or consciousness is unsatisfactory. By "retrospective" method, he means the method of explaining facts exclusively by reference to their antecedents. Such a method may be unim-
peachable in a science like mechanics or molar physics, where the facts which are dealt with are all of the same order-- transformations of matter and motion. This is possible be-
cause there is no gain in the process. Although there is change, there is no advance, no new emergence, and everything remains on the same level. ¹¹ But where there is real evolu-
tion, this method omits from its account of causation the very feature which distinguishes this mode of change from the dead-level equivalences of physics. The method of inter-
preting the more developed by the less developed is logically tantamount, Pringle-Pattison maintains, to a reduction of the more to the less, and, therefore, is nothing more than a

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⁹ I0I, 71.
¹⁰ I0I, 71.
¹¹ I0G, 93.
denial of the very fact to be explained. The fallacy involved in this method can be seen when passing from one order of facts to another, as for example, from inorganic nature to the facts of life, or from animal sentience to the conceptual reason and self-consciousness of man. It appears, continues Pringle-Pattison, that both life and self-consciousness emerge from antecedent conditions in which these distinctive qualities cannot be detected. But to insist on treating them as no more than the inorganic or non-rational phenomena which form their antecedents is not a legitimate explanation, in the genuine scientific sense of reducing a fact to simpler terms and thereby bringing it into line with other facts. In this case, the simplification is brought about by a process of abstraction which omits the characteristic features of the concrete fact which is supposed to be explained. Pringle-Pattison thinks that this is a progressive abstraction and not a causal explanation and that such a process leads us "to imagine ourselves obliged to look on the moving particles of physical science as the ultimate reality out of which all other phenomena are woven by cunning compensation."\textsuperscript{12}

Pringle-Pattison contends that this fallacious method of explanation has been held to by some outstanding scientists

\textsuperscript{12} IOG, 95.
because of their unwillingness to recognize in vital phenomena a range of facts with distinctive characteristics of their own and the resultant idea that such acknowledgement would constitute a breach in the continuity of nature. 13

C. The Rise of Consciousness

Pringle-Pattison maintains that both the origin of life and of consciousness is to be explained by the transition from one order of facts to another, or from one plane of experience to another. In the case of the origin of consciousness, he means the passage from the merely animal life of semi-passive perception and association to the distinctively human level of the active conceptual reason. 14 In both instances, the philosophical question is the difference of nature between the two orders of fact, not the question of historical emergence—how or when the one arose from the other or came to be added to it. The fact is that there are different planes or levels of existence, qualitatively different and, through that difference, opening up a new range of possibilities to the creatures which they include. 15

With regard to the rise of consciousness, Pringle-Pattison quotes John Locke to the effect that "the having of

13 IOG, 94.
14 IOG, 100.
15 IOG, 97.
general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to." Pringle-Pattison defends Locke's position against the charges of the evolutionists who would maintain that this passage in Locke is a piece of antiquated theological prejudice. The evolutionist contends that there is no qualitative distinction between human reason and the lower ranges of animal intelligence. The whole thing, they would say, is a question of degree—of advance by insensible gradations, with nowhere any hint of a difference of kind.

Pringle-Pattison states that an animal perceives objects, and is aware of the differences between the objects it perceives: it distinguishes one object from another. But the whole process is semi-passive; the differences impress themselves upon the mind as upon some sensitive plate. Differences and resemblances between objects are sensed or felt as part of the total unanalyzed perception of the objects. Pringle-Pattison goes on to say that the feeling of the differences or resemblances is sufficient to determine the animal's action this way or that; but it does not drive an animal, as it does man, "to cast about," as Locke points out, "and consider in what circumstances" the objects differ

16 IOG, 100.
from or resemble one another. By this deliberative act of comparison, man defines to himself the precise points of agreement or difference. To state it differently, Pringle-Pattison says that man isolates these points of agreement or difference from the general context of the objects as sensed or perceived—in short, man forms a concept, a general or abstract idea. He maintains that Locke rightly saw the differentia of human intelligence when he pointed out this power of abstraction or conceptual reason by which he meant the grasping of the mind of an idea which does not exist as an object of sense at all. 17

Pringle-Pattison thinks that this idea of causal connection lies at the basis of our scientific knowledge. He takes exception to Hume who explains this idea as a habit of expectation generated by the repeated sequence of two events in the past. Pringle-Pattison goes on to say that what Hume says is the length we may suppose the animal mind to do—automatic association of two events through their repeated conjunction in the past. It is thus possible to guide a whole life by the habits of expectation thus generated. But the animal does not possess the idea of cause in the strict sense at all—the general idea of connectedness or the independence of one event upon another. To realize that

17 IOG, 101.
idea is to form the first conception of an independent world—and independent system of definitely connected facts. The birth of reason in the individual, continues Pringle-Pattison, is just the moment when repeated conjunctions suggest to the mind this idea of connectedness, the interdependence, of the two phenomena. Frequent repetition of events to the mind that remains on the animal plane, produces a firm association between two facts or firm habits of expectation. But if the usual sequence should be interfered with, if expectation should be unrealized, then the animal mind would have only a feeling of discomfort. If such disappointments occur frequently, the automatically generated habit of expectation will as automatically tend to disappear. On the contrary, the incipient human intelligence or the mind that has once grasped the general idea of causal dependence, the non-occurrence of an expected effect sets the mind at once actively to work, to find out the reason of the non-occurrence, to find out what counteracting cause has been present to defeat expectation in this particular case. Pringle-Pattison states that it is obvious that such minds move on quite different levels. 18

18 IGC, 102.
D. The Continuity of Consciousness

Pringle-Pattison admits that there is a difficult question as to where precisely association ends and reason begins--as to whether there may not be instances of conscious process in the lower animals which deserve the name reason in the full sense. The animal mind and the human mind, he points out, are to be taken as types, ideal stages of mental development. He does not think it is necessary to minimize in the least the continuity of the process by which one seems to pass, almost at a touch, into the other. Continuity of process and the emergence of real differences are "the twin aspects of cosmic history" and neither aspect should obscure the other. Pringle-Pattison points out that at one time the magnitude of the differences led to static or typical conceptions of separate species, but more recently the evolulational study of intervening forms and the accumulation of minute differences has made us realize "the extremely gradual steps by which nature engineers her advances." He argues that this continuity of process may be inconsistent with "breaks," if a "break" is defined as a "chasm" or "an alien influx into nature."\(^{19}\) He holds that if we take the facts as they stand, without importing a theory into the word, we may agree with Professor Wallace in his Prolegomena

\(^{19}\) IOG, 103.
to Hegel's Logic that "all development is by breaks and yet makes for continuity." Pringle-Pattison means that the emergence of real differences in the course of the process, or in other words the actual "increments" or "lifts" in the process is that quantity may be said to pass into quality, difference of degree into difference of kind. Such crises, he thinks, are "greater in their implications than in actual moment"; they are points after which everything seems to "move in a new dimension." He does not think that these points can be assigned definite dates in historical sequence since the very nature of time forbids the translation of philosophical analysis into literal history.20

Pringle-Pattison takes issue with those who argue that consciousness can never be inexplicable from its natural conditions. He thinks that such a position is tenable only if these natural conditions are "substantiated as self-existent in their purely physical aspect." Each new fact, he goes on to say, is unintelligible if we take our stand at the stage below, and if, in the last resort, we treat "the mechanics of the atom" as the ultimately self-existing fact, out of which everything else is somehow to be conjectured and so explained.21

In his insistence upon holding to the continuity of

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20 IOG, 104.
21 IOG, 105.
nature in the evolutionary process, Pringle-Pattison states that we must endow matter with "the potency and promise" of all that crown the process. This does not mean that there are characteristics, which although not exhibited by the atoms and molecules of the physicist, that are potentially present in these particles as such. Pringle-Pattison thinks that to insist in this way on regarding the later stages as existing preformed, so to speak, in the bare beginning is to ignore the true nature of the evolutionary process, as characterized by the emergence of real differences and the attainment of results which transcend the apparent starting-point. He says that it is only in so far as we connect the physical with the vital and the conscious, as stages of a single process, that we can speak, even with a show of intelligibility, of the physical as containing the potentiality of all that is to follow.

In connection with this aspect of Pringle-Pattison's thought the word potentiality has a very definite meaning. By it, he means the insight that, in the interpretation of any process, it is the process as a whole that has to be considered, if we wish to know the nature of the reality revealed in it. To state it otherwise, it means that every evolutionary process must be read in the light of its last term. He states

All explanation of the higher by the lower is philosophically a hysteron-proteron. The ante-
cedents assigned are not the causes of the consequents, for by antecedents the naturalistic theories mean the antecedents in abstraction from their consequents—the antecedents taken as they appear in themselves, or as we might suppose them to be if no such consequents had ever issued from them. So conceived, however, the antecedents (matter and energy, for example), have no real existence—they are mere entia rationis, abstract aspects of the one concrete fact which we call the universe. All ultimate or philosophical explanation must look to the end. If we are in earnest with the doctrine that the universe is one, we have to read back the nature of the latest consequent into the remotest antecedent. Only then is the one, in any true sense, the cause of the other.

In conclusion, Pringle-Pattison maintains that there is no occasion to contest the conclusion suggested by the scientific history of the globe and of the race, that man became a self, or a being capable of conceptual reason, by infinitely gradual steps. The qualitative difference between the mind of an animal and that of a man capable of conceptual reason may be profound, and its consequences infinite; yet, Pringle-Pattison states that in the historical process we seem to pass almost insensibly from one to the other, just as, in traversing a mountain-pass, we may often be someway down the farther slope before the welcome trickle of a stream assumes us that we have already crossed the watershed.

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22 *NPG*, 11-12.
23 *TOL*, 72.
CHAPTER V

THE UNITY OF THE SELF

The self which comes into existence through the human body has unity. This unity is probably the most important aspect of the self and is a problem which has caused a great deal of misunderstanding. Pringle-Pattison states that if we start with an adequate conception of the organism, we shall be on the way to a better understanding of the kind of unity which can really belong to the soul or self.¹

A. Traditional Reasons for Belief in Unity of the Soul

Pringle-Pattison points out that many philosophers have laid stress on the unity of the soul because they felt it essential to a belief in immortality. Many philosophers have followed Plato in contrasting the unity and simplicity of the soul with the multiplex and composite character of the body. It is a very common thing, as Pringle-Pattison shows, for some of these thinkers to point out that the brain, extended as it is in space, and consisting of many parts, furnishes no analogue to the unity of consciousness, and consequently offers no foundation for it. Even if we suppose

¹ IOI, 92.
the various items of our experience—the objective data furnished by the senses—to be correlated with the functioning of different parts of the brain, Pringle-Pattison points out that we cannot suppose the unitary act in which they are apprehended to be, as one writer states it, "distributed over an aggregate of separate atoms." "The unity of consciousness," Pringle-Pattison quotes this same writer as saying, "is incompatible with a multiplicity of elements of whatever kind." However, this argument concludes that to explain the unity of an act or thought, we are forced to assume an ego or soul, or in other words, an invisible immaterial being—as the real subject of our experience. Pringle-Pattison rejoins that such a line of argument ignores the fact that, although the parts of an organism, if regarded physically, are certainly external to one another, it is the very nature of an organism, if regarded functionally or as an organism, to transcend this mutual exclusiveness. The parts of an organism are so much members one of another and of the whole which they constitute—they are so interpenetrative in their action—that it is hardly a paradox to say that the organism qua organism is not in space at all. Part and whole, continues Pringle-Pattison, acquire here a meaning unknown to physics, a meaning in which the necessary correlation of the terms is for the first time apparent.2

2 101, 93.
The organism, as Pringle-Pattison states, is the first real whole, the first natural unity. It exhibits a unity far more impressive and far more important than the punctual unity of the hypothetical atom. It is pointed out that in this unity and mutual implication of whole and parts we have the best analogue of the kind of unity which we may expect to find, still more intimately realized, in the self-conscious being. Pringle-Pattison thinks it unfortunate that philosophers have too generally found their exemplar in the solid singleness of the atom or the abstract identity of the mathematical point. The false ideal in the doctrine of the soul-substance has been shown to be closely allied to this point of view. But Pringle-Pattison goes on to state that even in those quarters where soul-substance is disavowed or at least held in the background, the idea of an unchanging unit still persists. He points out that Lotze, Reid, and McDougall hold to the idea that the unity is not the conscious unity reached in experience, but an "element of peculiar nature," as McDougall calls it, existing somehow outside of the process, a Subject whose experiences are set as a static unity over against the flux of psychical content, and remaining identical with itself through all the changes of that content.3

3 IOI, 95.
B. The Nature of the Unity of the Self

Pringle-Pattison goes on to state that similar expressions in regard to the unity of consciousness occur in Kant and Green, perhaps because they are difficult to avoid. But in Kant and in Green Pringle-Pattison maintains that these expressions are put forward in the course of a logical inquiry into the conditions of knowledge. The "I think," the unity of apperception which Kant "deduces" as the supreme condition of the possibility of experience, is, as Pringle-Pattison points out, expressly stated by him to be the "logically simple subject"—which is "the form of every judgment as such," or again "the possibility of the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thinking"—this unity of the self which for Kant is indistinguishable from the unity of the object, from "the necessary connexion which we mean by nature"—has nothing to do, Pringle-Pattison quotes Kant as insisting, with the substantiality or simplicity of the individual thinking subject. To suppose that it has, Pringle-Pattison goes on to show, is just the paralogism of the old rational psychology—the argument from the unity of the soul to its indestructibility—which Kant conclusively exposed. As Pringle-Pattison states, Kant repeatedly tells us that this "single self-consciousness," "this I or he or it which thinks is in itself a perfectly empty and contentless idea," "a transcendental Subject which we may represent
as X," no more than "the form of experience in general." Pringle-Pattison does not think it necessary to subscribe to any of Hume's specific doctrines to recognize the truth on which he insists in such passages—that, when we isolate the subject as a purely formal activity or function of thought, and set it, so to speak, over against all its specific experiences, it becomes completely empty or contentless. He thinks that such is the abstract idea of function or activity in general, and there is nothing in it to distinguish one individual self from another. It is, he says, almost un-meaning to talk of such a self as continuing to exist and maintaining its self-identity through the succession of its experiences, because it has no quality by which it is recognizable apart from its experiences, no existence except in those experiences. So conceived, it is not to be looked on as a concrete reality at all. He agrees with Hume in calling it a logical abstraction.

Pringle-Pattison maintains that Hume's famous analysis of the self contains far more truth than is commonly conceded to it. He thinks that it has suffered from the paradoxical form in which it is presented, and because it is put forward in the context of a purely sceptical theory. But Hume's criticism of a self which is distinct from all its states and

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4 IOT, 95.
5 IOT, 96.
which remains the same through all their changes is, for
Pringle-Pattison, unanswerable; and his well known description
of the mind as "nothing but a bundle of collection of differ-
ent perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" is
defective, Pringle-Pattison contends, only because of the
psychological atomism on which his whole theory is based. By
psychological atomism, Pringle-Pattison means the twin prin-
ciples which Hume signalizes as the axiomatic presuppositions
of his thinking, "that all our distinct perceptions are direct
existences" and "that the mind never perceives any real con-
nection among existences." Pringle-Pattison, however, points
out that Hume proceeding on these assumptions, falls into
the opposite error to that which he attacks. Hume ends by
substantiating particular "perceptions" as independently
existing facts without any principle of organic connexion
between them: and the mind appears consequently as a casual
"collection" or "bundle" of associated items. This defect,
Pringle-Pattison holds to be fatal because, as he maintains,
mere succession is no more adequate as an account of the
mind than abstract identity. In spite of this error,
Pringle-Pattison holds that it need not blind us to the
truth of Hume's statement, "they are the successive percep-

6 IOI, 96.
tions only that constitute the mind," if we take that statement simply as a negative criticism of the traditional doctrine of the simple identical self.  

Pringle-Pattison also believes that the same relative truth is expressed in a paradoxical and challenging form in William James' dictum that "the passing thought is the only thinker." He believes that James, in this statement, seeks to give us the truth of Hume's contention, relieved of the psychological atomism which invalidates it in Hume and in the Associationists who followed him. James sees clearly, Pringle-Pattison states, that if we start with detached feelings, expressly defined as "distinct existences" with no "real connexion" observable between them—or as James expresses it himself, "Simple feelings, non-cognitive, non-transcendent of themselves, ideas, each separate, each ignorant of its mate"—it is pure mythology to imagine them "gumming themselves together on their own account." For Pringle-Pattison, two similar ideas cannot yield an idea of similarity, nor two successive ideas an idea of succession, except to a knower who transcends and in some way includes the separate items. "One cannot beg memory," James is quoted as saying. That "later feelings are aware of those that went before is no theory of the phenomena," James con-

7 IOI, 97.
8 IOI, 97.
tends, "but a simple statement of them."  

"The present passing thought" is, therefore, Pringle-Pattison points out in James' account, the "psychic integer" from which we start; it is to be taken, Pringle-Pattison contends, not as a self-contained unit knowing only itself, but, as we really find it in life, appropriately to itself all the thoughts or states that went before. He continues by saying that this present thought or state, which James calls the judging thought is the final heir and owner of all its predecessors. It knows them and appropriates their content to itself. It is, says Pringle-Pattison in the words of James,

the hook from which the chain of past selves dangle, planted firmly in the present . . . anon the hook itself will drop into the past with all it carries, and then be treated as an object and appropriated by a new Thought in the new present, which will serve as a living hook in turn.10

The appropriation of past states of mind depends on the feeling of warmth and intimacy which accompanies them. That "annual warmth," James is quoted as saying, depending as it doubtless does to a large extent on the vague mass of organic feelings which is the continuous background of our more explicit consciousness, is the profound characteristic of any present conscious experience; and it is some degree of the same warmth which causes us to appropriate past experience

9 IOI, 97.
10 IOI, 98. (Quoted from James, POP, I, 340-1.)
as ours. Pringle-Pattison holds that if we add to this feeling of continuity between such past experiences and the present—a continuity realized, of course, not without gaps, but clearly enough marked through certain remembered stretches of time, and most vividly, as is natural, in the way our most recent experiences melt by slow degrees into the self of the present moment—we have, in these two elements of resemblance and continuity, the fundamental factors in our sense of personal identity.

Pringle-Pattison accepts James' conception of the present consciousness as inheritor of all its past, the "final receptacle" and at the same time the living points of further growth—as itself, so long as it exists, the actual self. He thinks that this is an infinitely truer way of representing the march of our conscious life than the conventional idea of an unchanging self or Ego outside of the succession altogether, as supposed, by its "relating activity," to bring connexion and unity into a series of otherwise unrelated and disconnected items. The self, he insists, must be constituted by its experiences and there is no other stuff of which it can be woven. He says that Hume was right in saying that the self does not possess the perfect simplicity and identity of an atomic unit; it is rather a very complex structure. Hume's

11 101, 98.
error, Pringle-Pattison holds, lay in denying that there was any real unity or connexion in the structure at all. Hume's description is an explicit denial of such attributes. In such terms as "bundle" and "collection," Hume implies a mere aggregate of separate items which just happen to be swept together into that particular heap or collection.12

In the course of the section on "Personal Identity" Hume, as Pringle-Pattison points out, does use a phrase or two which seem more adequate. For example, it is pointed out that Hume says that: "The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect;" or again in the same context:

I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts.13

Pringle-Pattison thinks that the second metaphor is somewhat vague, but that the idea of system or of unity in multiplicity which characterizes a state or an organism supplies just what was lacking in his original account of the soul. For Pringle-Pattison, soul means nothing more than the systematic unity of the conscious experiences of a particular individual center— the individual center being defined or

12 IOI, 99.
determined at the outset by the bodily organism.\textsuperscript{14}

That the mind or self does exist as such a system—a system of memories and associations, of preferences and dislikes, desires and purposes—is, Pringle-Pattison maintains, a fact of which we have each of us direct experience every day of our lives. Introspection, continues Pringle-Pattison, does not reveal to us at any given moment the whole system, but it discloses the general structure and such particular elements as are connected with the present interests which prompt our review. He points out that we know, with other promptings, that we might continue the process of explanation indefinitely in other directions. We know the kind of thing the self is, the nature of the existence which it enjoys, and the kind of unity and continuity which it actually possesses. This coherent unity of experience is the self, mind, or soul in the only intelligible sense of these words, contends Pringle-Pattison, and no fact can be better attested than the actuality of such selves, minds, or souls. Pringle-Pattison asserts that it is important to bear the above fact in mind; for if, as he has been arguing, it is wrong to think of the self as a unitary something apart from and over against its states or experiences, it is no less illegitimate to think of the states as so many evanescent facts. This, as

\textsuperscript{14} 101, 100.
he shows, was the error in Hume's account and it is, he says, a mistake into which we are constantly apt to fall when we are thinking of the relation of body and mind.  

Pringle-Pattison does not think that conscious states should be conceived as existing independently in an objective fashion. The statement of William James, "the bold fact is just that when the brain acts a thought occurs"—Pringle-Pattison holds to be true as a reaction against the soul-substance. He believes, however, that it is open to criticism as suggesting that the relation between the bodily and the mental is to be understood simply as point-to-point correspondence of a passing thought with a passing brain state.

So conceiving the matter, Pringle-Pattison argues that we easily lapse into thinking of the brain as the enduring reality, and the successive conscious states as sparks struck by the working of the machine, a series of flashes which break upon the eye and pass away. Pringle-Pattison repudiates such a materialistic conception. He contends that no psychology can dispense with the conception of a subject. We must recognize, he says, that there is not merely mental states or processes but a mind. The would-be-neutral term "states of consciousness" is, he thinks, an unsuccessful attempt to evade the acknowledgment that every conscious or

15 I0I, 100.
mental state is the state or experience of a conscious individual. He quotes James to the effect that "the universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thoughts exist', but 'I think' and 'I feel'."\(^\text{16}\)

So understood, Pringle-Pattison believes that the unity of the subject is "germinally present in the simplest sensations." In other words, what we have is not a feeling, but a self feeling in a certain way. Therefore, he argues that the self is definable at the outset only in terms of its primitive sense-experiences; it is not, Pringle-Pattison goes on to state that the complex self of later life, the self of so many memories and interests and hopes—which is so much more than any passing experience—owes its complexity, its whole structure and character, to the consolidated experience of which it is the organized unity. We cannot describe, he thinks, mental facts at all without assuming an individual subject in this sense since they take from the beginning this personal form.\(^\text{17}\) Therefore from the beginning, each experience is an element in a growing self-integrating whole.

Pringle-Pattison contends that the conditions which determine the individual unity of such a whole—the closed nature of the individual self, which prevents the experiences of Paul from straying into Peter's mind, like cattle into a neighbor's

\(^{16}\) IOI, 101.

\(^{17}\) IOI, 101.
compound--are obviously of an organic nature. Thus every soul that we know is an embodied soul: it is the bodily conditions which, in the words of Tennyson "strike its being into bounds." The body is, in this sense, the medium through which the soul comes into existence, so that Pringle-Pattison acknowledges that the genesis of consciousness in connexion with organic processes is something which it is ridiculous to suppose we could ever understand, in the sense of explaining it from the organic conditions themselves. He believes that the nature of conscious experience is simple and ultimate; that it can be understood from within, but that it cannot be mechanically put together. 18

Pringle-Pattison takes issue with McDougall, the latest champion of the animistic soul. He believes that neither the original emergence of a rudimentary feeling subject nor the consolidation of subsequent experiences into the systematic unity of the mature self is explained or made in any way more easy of comprehension, except for the imagination, by locating the successive thought or feelings in the empty focus of an immaterial substance or an unchanging ego. He takes exception to McDougall's stress on "the numerical distinctness of streams of consciousness" and "the individual unity of the separate streams." Pringle-Pattison thinks

18 101, 102.
that McDougall is correct when he says that "the hanging together of a multiplicity of conscious processes in a numerically distinct or individual stream is the very essence of soul or spirit," and constitutes "a fundamental fact with which every psychological theory and every metaphysical system must deal." Without this unity and coherence, as Pringle-Pattison continues to follow the thought of McDougall, "there would be nothing that could be called spirit or mind, but rather a chaos of mind-stuff."¹⁹

Pringle-Pattison states that the problem over which McDougall puzzles himself is "'What holds consciousness together?'"²⁰ McDougall invokes the soul as the causal agent to effect the desired result. But Pringle-Pattison thinks that this is an instance of the fruitless and essentially absurd desire to know "how being is made." For him the unity and coherence of the conscious experience is, as McDougall says "the very essence of soul or spirit." It constitutes the existence of a soul. To seek to explain that real fact by saying that it is due to the presence and agency of a soul is, argues Pringle-Pattison, simply to restate the characteristic nature of the fact, and hypostatize it as a causal prius of its own existence. He asks what explanation can be given to a fact like the ultimate nature of conscious-

¹⁹ I01, 103.
²⁰ I01, 103.
ness. He wants to know if we are really to think of the constituent items flying loose and of a soul or spirit as some kind of apparatus which supervenes to grip and hold them together. To these questions, Pringle-Pattison thinks that Paulsen's attitude is the most reasonable. Paulsen says, that the processes of the inner life do not occur in isolation, and that each is lived with the consciousness of belonging to the unitary whole of this undivided life. How this can happen I do not pretend to say, any more than I can say how consciousness itself is possible.\footnote{McDougall, BAN, 164.}

Pringle-Pattison thinks that it is necessary to dismiss the idea of the substantial soul as some sort of supernatural mechanism to hold the conscious experiences together. He says that if we must indulge our imagination with the picture of some bearer of conscious life, we should be satisfied with the body, in which that life is certainly rooted in a very real sense. For, continues Pringle-Pattison, although we no longer identify ourselves with the body, it remains for each of us, throughout life, the center from which we speak and act and look out upon the universe. He points out that not even the most abstract philosopher can escape from this pictorial way of thinking. Common sense, Pringle-Pattison says, does not feel that, in yielding to this natural tendency, it is committing itself to any banal materialistic view of consciousness as not more than a function
or attribute of the body.\textsuperscript{22}

He says that the ordinary man feels instinctively that such a view precisely inverts the true proportion between the bodily facts and the conscious life. In this inner life the ordinary man is aware of a coherent selfhood, constituted by memories of all that he has done and suffered, of the friends that he has known and loved, the causes for which he has fought, as well as memories—intensest of all in their personal significance—of wrong done, of bitter remorse or repentance unto life, and, together with all these memories, his manifold present interests, his plans and purposes for himself or for others, and the ultimate aspirations which are the spirit of life. This conscious self, shaped by all its experiences, and resuming them in an intense and characteristic unity, gives to man, Pringle-Pattison states, a feeling of the possession of a reality to which the facts of the animal life on which it is reared appear merely accessory. He says that man is ready to agree with Socrates and Plato that this is his "true self," not the body which he carries about with him.\textsuperscript{23}

Pringle-Pattison concludes by saying that a man's self is the coherent mind and character which is the result of the discipline of time, not some substantial unit or identical

\textsuperscript{22} I01, 104.

\textsuperscript{23} I01, 104.
subject present in his body all along. He holds that, where such an evolution has been achieved, the self-conscious life is the pre-eminent reality which the body in its structure and organization exists to actualize. As a result of this evolution, the center of gravity has been, Pringle-Pattison contends, completely shifted. The man, the concrete individual self, can be adequately or properly described only in terms of personality or character--by reference to his dispositions and affections, his interests and ideals. Beside these, Pringle-Pattison asserts that the bodily facts, as such, sink into insignificance, dear and familiar as they are as elements in the whole. Instead of being an intermittent and evanescent accompaniment of organic processes, the spiritual self, created through the bodily medium, is seen to achieve a unity and identity more complete and more permanent than can belong to any non-self-conscious being.24

To summarize Pringle-Pattison's ideas on the problem of personality, the two following facts may be noted. In the first place, the origin or creation of finite selves is the main work of the universe. However, the process by which selves come into existence cannot be understood. Creation consequently means the coming into the world of a being which exists in any degree for itself as a conscious subject with

24 101, 105.
a measure of "apartness" and independent action.

In the second place, the unity of the self is not the unity of the ego or soul which is supposed to be the subject of our experience. The self is the unity of consciousness. Such unity is realized in multiplicity or complexity by the self-conscious individual. All experiences—remembering, willing, feeling—are realized as the experiences of a self-conscious individual. The self is the coherent unity of experience.

Pringle-Pattison has empirical evidence for his explanation of the unity of the self. However, not as much can be said regarding his explanation of the origin of the self. At times he seems to believe that the self is brought into existence through the medium of the human organism; at other times he seems to state that they are bits of experience broken off the absolute. He speaks of this process as individuation. As he himself admits, he is dealing here with an aspect of the self which cannot be understood.

25 IOI, 70, et passim.
26 IOG, 285, 295, 297.
CHAPTER VI

THE RELATION OF THE SELF TO THE ABSOLUTE

A. The Universe and the Individual

The self does not exist absolutely independently of other aspects of reality. Pringle-Pattison thinks that it can exist only in vital relation to an objective system of reason and an objective world of ethical observance from which it receives its content, and of which it is, as it were, the focus and depositary. Apart from question of origin, he thinks that it is only by a convenient abstraction that we can discuss the nature and conduct of the individual apart from the social whole in which he is, as it were, imbedded, and of which he appears to be the product. As the individual is organic to society, so in still larger philosophical reference the individual is organic to a universal life or world, of which he is similarly a focus, an organ of expression. Pringle-Pattison goes on to state that the individual cannot possibly be regarded as self-contained in relation to that life, for such self-containedness would mean sheer emptiness. He thinks that it is absurd to talk of the individual as self-subsistent or existing in his own right. Rather the individual exists as an organ of the universe or
of the Absolute, the one Being, the source of the rational and spiritual content.¹

Pringle-Pattison agrees with Professor Bosanquet when the latter states that "the finite self, like everything in the universe, is now and here beyond escape an element in the Absolute."² In other words, the individual self does not exist "strong in solid singleness," like a Lucretian atom. The current of the divine life course through it; it is open to all the influences of the universe. Pringle-Pattison cannot see how we can explain the fact of progress, if not by this indwelling in a larger life—this continuity with what is more and greater than ourselves. It is, he thinks, from the fact that the finite individual is thus rooted in a wider life, to whose influences it remains throughout accessible. Pringle-Pattison believes this fact to be of religious significance. He holds that those visitings of grace, of which the religious consciousness testifies, become most easily intelligible—as well as those more violent upheavals of the personality, in which, as religion says, the man is born again and becomes a new creature. Therefore, so long as it exists every self remains in principle thus accessible, the possibility of such regeneration remains open to the most abandoned or degraded.³

¹ IOG, 259.
² Bosanquet, VAD, 257; also Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 259.
³ IOG, 259.
Pringle-Pattison maintains that to realize the presence of the universal in the individual (or the life of the individual in the universal, according as we choose to express the organic or inherent relation which unites them), it is not necessary to go to the absolutistic point of view. The value of a self lies in its content and this depends on the extent to which it appropriates a common heritage of ideas and interests. The life of the finite individual, as it builds up its true self, is thus a continual process of self-transcendence; its true personality or individuality, Pringle-Pattison states, does not lie in unshareable feelings, but in the richness and variety of its thoughts and interests. It is not an abstract point of particularity; it is, or rather, it makes itself, a little world, a microcosm. But Pringle-Pattison holds that the contents of the self are essentially shareable. In social interests and purposes the individual becomes one with his fellows; and in science and philosophy, religion and art, he shares those universal interests which are the common heritage of humanity—which, in the most literal sense according to Pringle-Pattison, makes us men. 4 It is obvious, he continues, that there must be an identity of content in all selves, and that the extent of this identity may vary indefinitely as between different selves. Pringle-

4 I0G, 263.
Pattison thinks that although this identity of content may "overlap" indefinitely in finite centers, they cannot overlap at all in existence for their very raison d'etre is to be distinct and, in that sense, separate and exclusive focalizations of a common universe. 5

Pringle-Pattison does not disagree with the absolutist, such as Bosanquet, at every point. He thinks that great supra-individual creations impress us all with a sense of permanent, or at least, of age-long reality. The structure of a national civilization and the traditions which constitute a nation's life seem real in a sense which transcends and overshadows the reality of any individual citizen of today, or any of the nameless generations of the past, of whose lives it is, as it were the abiding product. Pringle-Pattison believes that the time has gone by when it was possible to speak of such things as mere abstractions: it is the individual who is apt to appear an abstraction when set over against them. But Pringle-Pattison warns that if we are not to forget the fundamental structure of the world, the counter-stroke must also be delivered. He states that the universal is no less an abstraction, if it is taken as real, or as possessing substantive existence, independently of the individuals whose living tissue it is. They realize

5 IQG, 264.
themselves through it; it realizes itself through them.\textsuperscript{6} Thus, continues Pringle-Pattison, a social whole, which is the sustaining life of its individual members, melts into thin air if we try to treat it as an entity apart from them. Exclusive emphasis on the one side or the other is the explanations of the perennial duel between individualistic and organic theories of society or between nominalism and realism, pluralism and monism, in the wider field of philosophy.\textsuperscript{7}

In trying to reconcile the idea of the distinctness of individual selves with the idea of the relation of the finite self with the divine, Pringle-Pattison gets into some difficulties. In Hegelianism and Personality, he makes an attempt to expose the "radical error both of Hegelianism and of the allied English doctrine," which consisted in the "identification of the human and divine self-consciousness."\textsuperscript{8} He goes so far in denying "one universal self in all so-called thinkers" as to say "—that each Self as Self is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious, if I may so speak, to other selves—impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue."\textsuperscript{9} However, his stress on the fact that the self "resists invasion" and "refuses to admit another self within itself," on its being

\textsuperscript{6} IOG, 265.  
\textsuperscript{7} IOG, 266.  
\textsuperscript{8} HP, 226.  
\textsuperscript{9} HP, 216.
"the very apex of separation and differentiation," and "in existence or metaphysically a principle of isolation," was misinterpreted. Because of this misinterpretation, Pringle-Pattison regretted the use of the word "impervious." He therefore grants in the Idea of God that: "the exclusiveness of the self, especially in its relation to the divine was — too strongly emphasized in my argument."¹⁰

Pringle-Pattison points out that although the self is a part of the absolute, they are yet formally distinct. In speaking of individual form, he says that form is not like an empty case into which a certain content may be put: it is rather the structure and organization of the content itself. Individuals are formally distinct, he thinks not because a more or less identical content has been thrust into so many empty cases which have afterwards had a numerical label, or a proper name, attached to them for convenience or reference. Individuals of a species are not comparable to articles turned out by a machine, each of which appears to be an exact repetition of its predecessors. Pringle-Pattison states that "they are formally distinct, because they are really different." He accepts the principle of the identity of indiscernibles as necessarily true of all real existences; that things are distinguished by their natures; and that

¹⁰ IOC, footnote 2, page 389.
they are different wholes of content. He maintains that if we even make space and time the princiinium individuationis and try to reduce the formal distinctness of individuals to difference of position in the spatio-temporal series, such difference of position means a changed relation to the rest of the universe, an exposure to different influences and a consequent difference in the resulting nature. Thus he thinks that space and time may be regarded ultimately as only a mode of expressing the general fact of individuation—the fact that there are finite centers at all. It follows, contends Pringle-Pattison, that every individual is a unique nature, a little world of content which, as to its ingredients, the tempering of the elements and the systematic structure of the whole, constitutes an expression or focalization of the universe which is nowhere exactly repeated. He thinks that appearances to the contrary are due to superficial observation and want of interest in the object observed.

Certain aspects of Pringle-Pattison's view regarding the relation of the self to the absolute can best be brought out in his criticism of Bosanquet's view. Although Bosanquet frequently speaks of the "contribution" made by the finite self to ultimate reality, he seems constantly to imply that this is to be conceived as the contribution of an "element"

11 I03, 267.
12 I03, 267.
or quality, some flavor or tang, to a universal experience--
not as consisting in its own total living reality as a 
specific incarnation, a center into which the Absolute has 
poured its own being. Bosanquet is quoted as saying that 
"the finite self, like everything else in the universe, is 
now and here beyond escape an element in the Absolute" to 
which is the footnote: "I do not say a member of the Abso-
lute. Such an expression might imply that it is, separately 
and with relative independence, a standing differentiation 
of the Absolute."  

The too exclusive monism of Bosanquet's system, Pringle-
Pattison asserts, depends on a defective idea of what is 
meant by a self or by the fact of individuation in general. 
He thinks that Bosanquet's theory does not contain the idea 
of self at all: the world is dissolved into a collection of 
qualities or adjectives which are ultimately housed in the 
Absolute. Because of the failure to appreciate the meaning 
of finite selfhood, Pringle-Pattison believes that it is 
difficult to say whether even the Absolute is to be regarded 
as a self or not--that is to say, whether what is called the 
absolute experience possesses the centrality or focalized 
unity which is the essential characteristic of a self, and 
in its degree, of everything that is real.  

13 IOG, 257. See also Bosanquet, VAD, 257
14 IOG, 271.
Pringle-Pattison maintains that the idea of Bosanquet, namely, that the finite self "is adjectival on what is beyond itself" is untenable. The word adjectival, he goes on to say, though intelligible is none the less metaphorical. He says that things are not adjectives of one another. For example, a shoe is not an attribute of a foot, and a son is not an attribute of his father, though in both cases the one fact transcends itself, and carries you to the other. Pringle-Pattison states that if reduced to plain prose and ordinary English usage, the "adjectival" theory of the finite is simply the denial of unrelated reals, then he can accept it. If no finite fact can either exist or be understood by itself, Pringle-Pattison holds that the true view of Reality must be that which conceives the universe as an inclusive system of interrelated facts which, as so included and interrelated, are to be regarded as constituent members of a single whole.\textsuperscript{15} This fact is true and important from the side of the Absolute as from the point of view of the finite beings themselves. The differentiation or creation, according to Pringle-Pattison, constitutes the very essence and open secret of the Absolute life.\textsuperscript{16} This expression is a contradiction of the absolutistic view set forth by Bradley that the individual existence of finite selves is illusion or mere appearance.

\textsuperscript{15} IOC, 275.
\textsuperscript{16} IOC, 277.
Pringle-Pattison contends, on the other hand, that individual existence of finite selves constitutes the very texture of reality.

Pringle-Pattison believes that the idea of "contribution" so prominent in the writings of Bosanquet, is true if rightly understood. But what, asks Pringle-Pattison, of our contribution to the Absolute just lay in being ourselves, our particular, imperfect, but developing self, the unique individual whom it has taken such pains to fashion? He states that the contribution cannot lie in any of the qualities of the individual taken separately, for these are all universals, and as such must be already fully represented in the perfect experience of the Absolute. Because of this fact, Pringle-Pattison objects to such terms, used by Bradley as "merged," "blended," "fused," and "dissolved into a higher unity."¹⁷

Pringle-Pattison contends that the whole conception of blending and merging, as applied to finite individuals, depends on the failure to recognize that every real individual must possess a substantive existence in the Aristotelian sense. He states that both Bradley and Bosanquet insist on taking the individual as an adjective, thereby reducing it to a conflux of universals or qualities. But Pringle-Pattison states that it is a trite observation that no number of

¹⁷ IOG, 281.
abstract universals flocking together can give a concretely existing individual. To exist means to be subject of qualities, to have or possess a nature. This, he states, is recognized in the corrent distinction between existence and content, between the "that" and the "what." By the "that" of a thing, the substantive in it, is not meant a solid core of being, a grain of reality-stuff, to which as a support, the qualities are attached. It cannot be taken out and exhibited as something over and the qualities.\(^{18}\)

Pringle-Pattison believes, however, that a reaction against this conception leads to an exclusive stress on the content or nature as constituting and differentiating the individuals. Individuals, he argues, are ultimately differentiated by their nature, that is to say, by their specific content, including the peculiar arrangement or make-up of the content--what is called its peculiar organization or system. But Pringle-Pattison thinks that this way of stating the case is true only so long as it does not obscure the fact that what is dealt with, in each case, is a concrete existent. There is, he states, a subtle danger in the term content--a suggestion that the individual is simply a very complex of universals. But if, he goes on to say, the individual is not to be regarded as put together out of the abstract

\[^{18}\text{JOC, 283.}\]
universal, in the shape of so many qualities, and the abstract particular in the shape of a point of existence, neither can it be regarded as simply an intricately mingled group of universals—a highly complex adjective. So to think of it is to confound the abstractions of knowledge with the concrete texture of reality; it is entirely to overlook the unity and centrality which is the characteristic of concrete existence. This is what Pringle-Pattison means by individuation. 19

Pringle-Pattison thinks that the way the self "separates itself from the common foundation of all things," constitutes a mystery. He points out that monistic writers are too apt to obliterate or explain away the characteristic feature of the relation. He maintains that if the individuals are simply pipes through which the Absolute pours itself, jets, as it were, of one fountain, there is no creation, no real differentiation, and, therefore, in a sense, no mystery. A self which is merely the channel or mouthpiece of another is not a self. It is of the very nature of a self that it thinks and acts and views the world from its own center: each of us, he states, dichotomizes the universe in a different place. Thus no supposed result of speculative theory can override a certainty based on direct experience—the

19 IGC, 283.
certainty, namely, that it is we who act and we who think. We are not simply an ideal point through which the forces or idea of the universe cross and pass. This primary conviction is not inspired by the ulterior motive of introducing pure contingency and overthrowing the idea of law and system. No doubt it excludes a fatalistic determinism a tergo, which simply the denial of selfhood altogether; but, thinks Pringle-Pattison it forces itself upon us apart from any outlook upon consequences. It is, he thinks, a direct certainty, but that it is based on an insight into the contradictory nature of any counter-hypothesis.

Pringle-Pattison contends that the relation of the Absolute to finite individuals cannot be properly stated in terms of the old metaphysic of substance. He thinks that the essential feature of the Christian conception of the world, in contrast to the Hellenic is, it may be said to be that it regards the person and the relations of persons to one another as the essence of reality, whereas Greek thought conceived of personality, however spiritual, as a restrictive characteristic of the finite—a transitory product of a life which as a whole is impersonal. Modern absolutism seem, he thinks, to revert to the pre-Christian mode of conception, and to repeat also the too exclusively intellectualistic attitude, which characterizes Greek thought in the main.20 Pringle-

20 IOG, 292.
Pattison argues that no solution of the problem of God and man can be reached from a consideration of man as merely a cognitive being. Bare will is an abstraction; but so is knowledge, he states, if it is not regarded as the moving and determining force in a personality, shaping its attitude to the world and all the action which is the outcome of that attitude. In this sense, it is held to be the character, of spiritual will, that is the concrete personality. It is as such a will that man is thought to be independent.21

B. The Freedom of the Individual

Pringle-Pattison holds that to be a self is to be a formed will, originating its own actions and accepting ultimate responsibility for them. For in all questions of moral causation the person is necessarily, for Pringle-Pattison, a *terminus ad quem* or a *terminus a quo*. The person is held to be the source of the action for we cannot go behind him and treat him as a thoroughfare through which certain forces operate and contrive to produce a particular result. The person is not to be thought of as a fixed and changeable unit. Such a person is open to moral education and spiritual regeneration: he may change so much, thinks Pringle-Pattison, as to become a new creature. But although

21 I0G, 292.
he is thus open to all the influences of the universe, these
do not act on him like forces ab extra. They make their
appeal to him, but he must give the response. He cannot be
driven; he must be drawn. Pringle-Pattison continues by
saying that the process of transformation is always, in a
real aspect of it, the person’s own act, his deliberate
choice. Thus we may believe in the ultimately constraining
power of the Good, but realize that a moral being cannot be
commandeered; he must be persuaded, and the process may be
long. By this, Pringle-Pattison simply means that the self-
conscious being is free. This freedom is held to be the
fundamental condition of the ethical life; "without it we
should have a world of automata." 22

Pringle-Pattison believes that the creation of beings
who are really selves, with this measure of "apartness" and
independent action, is the "main miracle" of the universe.
He thinks that it is, in the very nature of the case, impos-
sible that we should understand the relation between a
creative Spirit and its creatures, whether as regards the
independence conferred or the mode in which the life-history
of the finite being still remains part of the infinite ex-
perience. Finite beings know one another from the outside,
he maintains, the knower being ipso facto excluded from the

22 IOG, 232.
immediate experience of any other center. But there can be no such barrier, states Pringle-Pattison, between the finite consciousness and the Being in which its existence is rooted. It must remain open and accessible—it must enter into the divine experience in a way for which our mode of knowing hardly furnishes us an analogy. It is, Pringle-Pattison believes, in the nature of the case, impossible that we should understand, and be able to construct for ourselves, the relation in question; "for to do so would be to transcend the conditions of our individuality," to get, as it were, behind the conditions of finite existence and actually repeat the process of creation and realize the absolute experience. Thus Pringle-Pattison concludes that when we do try to schematize the characteristics of selfhood by making the individual a vehicle of transmission or on the other hand, we lose hold of the creative unity altogether by treating the individuals as independent, self-existent units. 23 He goes on to state that because such in the inevitable fate of any attempt to describe the fact in terms devised to express the relation of one finite fact to another, and only there appropriate, it by no means follows that such creation is impossible for the Absolute. He holds that no theoretical difficulties in conceiving how we can be free should prevent

23 IOG, 293.
us from recognizing that we are free. In asserting freedom we are not asserting anything additional or extraneous about our experience, Pringle-Pattison states. He contends that we are simply describing its nature, as we know it from within. Pringle-Pattison is applying in this supreme instance, the principle which has guided him throughout, the principle of the reality of appearances.  

C. The Self From the Side of the Absolute

So far as Pringle-Pattison is concerned, individuation, in the sense explained, appears to represent the fundamental method of creation, or, in other words, the fundamental structure of the actual world. He thinks that this same fact is emphasized "from the side of the Absolute." He thinks that Bosanquet is correct in the following statement:

We are finite, which means incomplete, and not fitted to be absolute ends. . . . We must have something greater than our finite selves to contemplate. We want something above us, something to make us dare and do and hope to be.  

Or again, "The unit looks from itself and not to itself and asks nothing better than to be lost in the whole."  

Pringle-Pattison believes the statements by Bosanquet are true for they bring out the familiar paradox of the ethical and religious life, dying to live, self-realization

24 IOG, 394.
through self-sacrifice, self-development through absorption in objective interests and in the currents of the universal life. He believes that the individual who would find his end in the culture of his own personality, whether a moral work of art or in the wider fields of literature and taste, suffers the same defeat as the voluptuary who pursues pleasure for pleasure's sake. But Pringle-Pattison hold that although the individual may not make himself his own End, the world of finite individuals may well constitute the End of the Absolute. Pringle-Pattison does not believe that we can ascribe to the Absolute the self-centered life, the contemplation of His own glory, which spells moral death to the creature. He thinks that the infinite reality reflects itself in the finite nature, and that, in the conditions of mortal perfection, "our souls have sight of that immortal sea which brought us hither"—repeating in the process of their own experience the flux and reflux of the cosmic life.²⁷

The idea of end or purpose may not be literally applicable in such sphere, but Pringle-Pattison thinks that we may at least say that just "from the side of the Absolute" the meaning of the finite process must lie in the creation of a world of individual spirits; for to such alone can He reveal himself, and from them receive the answering of love.

²⁷ IOG, 296.
and adoration. The coming into being of such internalities means "eliciting" out of the common fund of externality a new world of appreciation, of mutual recognition and spiritual communion, to which the former now assume a merely instrumental function, "a circuit made by the Absolute towards the formation of being capable of spiritual response, which enrich thereby the life from which they spring." He thinks that only for and in such being does the Absolute take on the character of God. He conceives this world of self-conscious personalities to be the Civitas Dei, described by St. Augustine and by Leibnitz or the kingdom of the Spirit of which theologians speak as the great consummation. Pringle-Pattison believes that the yearning of the divine for fellowship is best brought out in the following line of Schiller with which Hegel closes his Phenomenology:

Friendless was the mighty Lord of Worlds,
Felt defect — therefore created spirits,
Blessed mirrors of his blessedness —
From the chalice of the world of souls
Foams for him now infinitude. 28

Pringle-Pattison states finally that if we project our imagination thus into the vacancy before the world was, before God was truly God, we must remember that we are merely translating into terms of time, as in a Platonic myth, the eternal fact of the divine nature, as a self-communicating

28 IOG, 296.
life. The divine Eremite, as a pre-existent Creator, is a figure, he thinks, of the logical imagination: it indicates what God is not, it does not tell us what He once was.\textsuperscript{29}

This chapter has dealt with Pringle-Pattison's view of the relation of the self to the Absolute. He concludes that the finite self is not an absolutely independent and subsistent entity. Each self is free-originating its own actions and assuming responsibility for them. The self is open to the influences of the universe; it enters into relations with other selves. From the point of view of the Absolute, the existence or realization of finite selves give meaning and purpose to the universe.

Two points may be mentioned concerning Pringle-Pattison's views on this phase of the subject. The first is that after criticizing various other views, he finally concludes that it is "impossible that we should understand, and be able to construct for ourselves, the relation\textsuperscript{30} between finite beings and the Absolute.

The second point is that a slight change of emphasis is noted. In Hegelianism and Personality, he speaks of the self as being "impervious" to other selves.\textsuperscript{31} In a later book, the Idea of God, he expresses regret in the use of the term

\textsuperscript{29} ICC, 296.
\textsuperscript{30} ICC, 293.
\textsuperscript{31} HP, 227.
"impervious." By it, he means that each self resists invasion; that it refuses to admit another self within itself. In other words, it means that there can be no coincidence or literal identification of several selves.

The only change of emphasis is that in Hegelianism and Personality, Pringle-Pattison feels that he overemphasized the exclusiveness of the in his reaction against the Hegelian view. He states: "The exclusiveness of the self, especially in its relation to the divine, was, I have little doubt, too strongly emphasized in my argument." But he adds that "apart from crudity of expression this still seems to me obvious and may be considered to underlie the argument in several of the preceding lectures."

Therefore the self possesses freedom, is open to the influences of the Absolute, cannot be identified with any other self but can enter into relations with other selves.

32 HP, 227.
33 HP, Footnote, p. 389-90.
34 Ibid.
CHAPTER VII

COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST OF THE THESIS

In the light of the foregoing survey of Pringle-Pattison's conception of personality, it is possible to set down some of the conclusions which may be drawn from such a study.

In the first place, the problem of personality occupies a dominant place in the philosophical thought of Pringle-Pattison. It was the central theme of his second series of "Balfour Philosophical Lectures" which were published in 1887 under the title of Hegelianism and Personality. Because certain statements in these lectures lent themselves to easy misinterpretation, Pringle-Pattison devoted a good part of his first Gifford lectures, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, to correcting these misinterpretations. Probably his best treatment of the problem of personality is given in his second set of Gifford lectures on the Idea of Immortality.

In the second place, it may be said that Pringle-Pattison built up his philosophical system, especially his view on the nature of personality, through a critical analysis of other views on the subject. For this reason, he treats the subject largely from a historical point of view. Beginning with the most primitive ideas of the nature of the soul, he
traces the development of the conception down to modern times. Through the empirical approach to the study of personality, Pringle-Pattison is forced to reject the traditional conception of the soul.

In the third place, through his critical evaluation of the traditional conception of the soul and the absolutistic view of Hegel and his followers, certain definite aspect of Pringle-Pattison's view is brought out. He believes that the creation of finite spirits or selves is, in the words of Hales, the "main miracle" of the universe. Selves are the ends of the universe and everything else becomes the means to these ends. The body, for example, is only a means or instrument for the realization of selves through conscious experience.

As a fundamental monist, Pringle-Pattison emphasizes the fact that just as life emerges through infinite degrees from the inorganic to the organic, so consciousness emerges when there is passage from merely animal life of semi-passive perception and association to the distinctively human level of the active conceptual reason. The fact of evolution is held to be important in this connection, but Pringle-Pattison seriously objects to the methods of those who insist on explaining the higher order of being from the lower order of being or the consequents by the antecedents.
Another aspect of Pringle-Pattison's conception of the self is that it is a unique conscious unity. This unity does not consist of any kind of unchanging substantial unit, but is rather a coherent selfhood shaped by its experiences. The self is the systematic unity of the conscious experiences of a particular individual center—the individual center being the bodily organism. This fact of unity is directly experienced.

The self is conceived by Pringle-Pattison as possessing freedom of will and relative independence from other selves and God, though the limitations of finite relationships are somehow transcended by God. Freedom is fundamental to the ethical life. However, Pringle-Pattison does not believe that it is possible to show how this freedom of the finite self is compatible with the ontological connection between the finite self and the Absolute. This, he thinks, we must accept even though we cannot empirically verify it.

In conclusion, a word may be said of Pringle-Pattison's emphasis on the ethical and religious significance of personality. The self or mind which comes into existence through the medium of the body, has the potentiality of such infinite worth, that Pringle-Pattison believes that when the body ceases, the true self will continue its immortal pilgrimage under new and appropriate conditions. From another point of view, Pringle-Pattison believes that the finite
individual is of such importance in the world that they may well constitute the End of the Absolute.

Such a conception as that of Pringle-Pattison leads one to the conclusion that the nature of God and the meaning of the existence of the universe must be determined from the ends sought—the creation and realization of personality.
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