1937

(The) nature and limits of immediate knowledge

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Boston University

http://hdl.handle.net/2144/18256

Boston University
Thesis

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

by

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(Ph.B., Providence College, 1929)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

1937
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A. THE AIM OF THIS THESIS

The purpose of this thesis is three-fold: (1) to establish the fact that some human knowledge is immediate; (2) to describe the nature of that knowledge; (3) to define the limits of immediate knowledge.

1. UNITY IN REALISTIC VIEWS

An attempt will be made to show that despite vast differences in conclusions certain conflicting philosophical schools of thought are in agreement on a sufficient number of premises involved in the question of immediate knowledge to make inevitable the conclusion that the human mind has immediate knowledge of extra-mental reality.

Analysis and comparison of terminology will show that disagreement in many cases is verbal or due to differences other than those arising from the question of immediate knowledge. This fact will become most conspicuous in the discussion of New-Realism and modern scholasticism, wherein agreement on the fundamental issue of this thesis might otherwise be clouded by metaphysical and psychological differences. "The New-Scholastic solution of the epistemological problem agrees very closely with the ideas proposed in recent times by the various realist and objectivist schools." ¹

¹ Nöel, Art. 1, 137.
The unity of thought among many realists on the problem of immediate knowledge will be shown to be separable from their endless diversity of opinion on other philosophical questions which might be construed as pertinent.

2. DIFFERENCES IMPORTANT

For the sake of clarity, however, it will be necessary not only to describe similarities but also to define differences. The problem at issue and the reasons for the conclusions drawn are illumined by contrast as well as by comparison.

Therefore, it will be the purpose of this paper to present alternative views, although, naturally, no attempt will be made either to record all arguments for immediate knowledge or even perhaps a representative number of arguments presented from opposing points of view.

3. VARIETY OF VIEWS

Critical examination of the various views will be made with the assistance of the writings of the chief exponents and opponents of the respective opinions. The complete thesis may serve as a general survey of modern judgment on the problem of immediate knowledge.

4. VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE IS ISSUE

The first aim of this thesis, to prove that knowledge is immediate, serves as the fundamental tenet of a theory of valid knowledge. Consequently, the aim here is not only to seek a true theory of knowledge, but, beyond that, it is to emphasize that a true theory of knowledge means a theory of true knowledge.
"Immediate knowledge of independent reality, then, would make mediate knowledge of the same also possible; and it does not appear what else could do it."\(^2\) Hence, theories of hypothetical knowledge, however coherent, must be rejected.

It will be necessary to show that any theory which excludes immediate knowledge cannot rise above a relativism which is content with hypothetical knowledge, a relativism which would regard symbolic knowledge as a great privilege rather than as the gross deception which it actually would be.

B. COMPARATIVE METHOD

The method of comparison and contrast will be used, but not exclusively. The description of epistemological theories will have to be supplemented, in several divisions of the thesis, by application of the rules of normative science. Especially will this be necessary in presenting the main position, the position defended, the modern scholastic point of view, because of the organic interrelatedness among the various units of the whole system. This means simply that the theory of knowledge ought to conform in content to certain standards consistent with the complete modern scholastic position.

The theory of knowledge is fundamental, as Perry recognized in discussing the position of scholasticism:

> It is the scholastic theory of knowledge with its metaphysical implications, which determines its orientation among the schools of recent and contemporary philosophy.\(^3\)

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\(^2\)Mackintosh, PK, 312.
\(^3\)Perry, FRP, 204.
While no added weight will be given the proofs of the modern scholastic point of view here by showing the harmony of belief in immediate knowledge with belief in a loving God, the consistency of the two theories is indicative of the fact that immediate knowledge might be confirmed by proof of the existence of such a God.\(^4\)

1. TO CITE AUTHORITIES

A representative statement of the leading present day theories will be given with quotations from an exponent of each point of view to be considered. No claim is made that the men quoted are the best fitted to defend the school under consideration at the time, but it is likely that each philosopher will be the best authority on his own view. No one can decide finally who best represents a school of thought. A true representative would have to represent diverse opinions, with some of which he would not agree.

Lesser figures also will be studied for supplementary opinions and for confirmation of conclusions reached in this thesis from the premises of the principal thinkers quoted.

2. TYPES OF IMMEDIACY

Various types of immediacy, psychological, epistemological, logical, immaterial, and physical, will be considered. The necessity for this procedure is not alone the fact that philosophy has for its field everything that is knowable but

\(^4\)Cf. Addendum, 169.
also the fact that "pan-ism" of one form or another is an inescapable issue. "Pan-ism" is a generic term for metaphysical monisms.

3. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Negative implications of the various theories will be presented because of the exhaustive character of contradiction. Disproof of the negative implications of any strictly dualistic system, it is evident, forms the basis of comparison of the several points of view defending the concept of immediate knowledge.

i. The negative implications of any point of view can be used in support of an opposing position. Negative implications may be tested normatively.

ii. Negative implications contain a pragmatic value for investigation corresponding to the pragmatic value of the view presented. The term pragmatic is used here as a synonym for practical, or workable, or intelligible, i.e. as indicative of the consistency of the view with generally acknowledged facts.

a. Consequences, workability, intelligibility, it will be generally agreed, are sound criteria of truth. Any sane doctrine must work at least in a limited way. Even thinkers not pragmatists must admit that pragmatism offers a minimum test of truth, although something beyond workability may be needed for complete demonstration. The point here made in choosing a method of investigation is that consequences affect judgment: a theory that will not work is valueless except as a refutation of the system of which it is a stated conclusion or an inescapable
implication.

b. It is the purpose of this thesis to prove that knowledge of truth is possible only if immediate knowledge is possible. 5 Relativism, then, must be proved to be a consequence of opposing views. As was explained in the outline of purpose, assertions made without proof will not be accepted. Hence, the admission of relativism will not be accepted unless it is consistent with the premises of which it claims to be a conclusion. Likewise, any attempt to deny relativism will be subjected to the same scrutiny.

C. PRESENTATION IS OBJECTIVE

The various points of view will be presented as objectively as possible for the writer. Inasmuch as this introduction could not be written until the body of the thesis had been developed, the writer has convictions which may be reflected in the presentation.

1. NEW REALISM REJECTED

Strangely enough, however, the convictions, despite what will be said later about hypothetical knowledge, are by no means necessarily final, and the treatment may honestly be presented as an independent, rational investigation undertaken without prejudice. Actually the reason for adoption of the modern scholastic point of view was the failure of the New Realism to account for certain facts of experience not directly

5Perry, FPI, 311-313.
related to epistemology. Coherence of the scholastic view (is that not perhaps the ultimate relativistic ground?) influenced the belated change of opinion as to the most effective defense of immediate knowledge.

2. CONCLUSION DIFFICULT

The final conclusion of this thesis is: objective truth is attainable. ... It may occur to the reader that metaphysical truth concerning the question cannot be reached. It may seem that the issue is one that cannot be settled because the position chosen has to be assumed.

For example, how can a relativist be convinced of arguments about a reality which he maintains cannot be known immediately? How can any one in step with the current view that all is growing be convinced of any final truth? On the other hand, how can pan-objectivists be swayed by the operations of minds which are conceived not as subject but as aspects of objects? "And such a thing is consciousness or mind,—a cross section of the universe selected by the nervous system". 6

The final conclusion will be presented as the best, in the writer's opinion, but who is he to judge as final something which has not been compared with theories still to arise? And who will deny that there will be new theories not previously thought of? Surely no one who has seen the revival of original thinking and the development of strikingly new theories during the present century.

6Holt, Art. 1, 354.
Is there any escape from such an overwhelming and comprehensive concept as theoretical relativism and practical absolutism? It must be admitted persuasion is a better instrument than the syllogism.
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS

The title of this thesis would seem to require two unwarranted assumptions, namely, that there is immediate knowledge and that it can be studied somehow completely out of relation to other knowledge. In presenting definitions of the terms, however, neither assumption is necessary; these definitions are given in popular, rather than strictly philosophical language to suggest what it is hoped will be described and proved in the entire thesis.

The whole thesis is a definition of a theory of knowledge and that definition unfolds itself in the pages following. The title expresses merely the subject of consideration, and is a type entirely different from the contents of the thesis. In asserting immediate knowledge to consist of the direct relation of the mind to an extramental object, thus giving objective truth, this writer is not losing sight of the fact that the most absolute theory is in a certain sense hypothetical in that complete proof is impossible and the problem by its very nature transcends the power of demonstration.

It is obvious that the right to use such a title is at issue as much as any point. The question of whether any object has an independent and knowable essence is certainly at issue, and certainly no one can deny the serious implications
of an attempt even to intimate that there is a limit to knowledge of any kind.

Hence, the following definitions are made in workable, if not scientific language, and under the limitations imposed by the inadequacy of words.

A. NATURE

1. DENOTES MEANING

Nature, as used in the title, denotes meaning. This definition is chosen as the primary one because nature is synonymous with meaning in any theory of knowledge while it is also synonymous with substance and objective reality only in a limited field. The fact that in this thesis essence, or nature, will be proved to be something independent of meaning will not alter its use here. Actually the nature of immediate knowledge is subjective because knowledge is subjective, but it can be conceived as objective. Distinctions would be endless, however, if we were to consider the objectivity of immediate knowledge as such.

2. IMPLIES END

In a secondary sense, nature denotes the being related to its end; in this thesis the relation between subject and

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1 Belief in non-mental universals is necessary for belief in essences. Only in realistic theories has objective essence a meaning, while in any view essence, regarded as something in consciousness, is referred to as the "meaning" of an object.
and object and its status, i.e., as a relation of numerical identity, duality, or union.

It is under this secondary aspect that the existence of immediate knowledge must be considered. Definition of anything claimed to be actual consists in part of the assertion of real or possible existence, and requires proof at least of the possibility of a specific meaning.

By nature then is meant the meaning of what shall be tentatively assumed and later demonstrated, in other words a definition of immediate knowledge as a fact in the scheme of all reality.

3. LIMITS

1. OBJECTS CLASSIFIED

Limits here implies primarily that the types of reality which may be objects of immediate knowledge are members of a particular class. In this sense limits implies that not all knowledge is immediate, nor is all reality knowable immediately.

2. DIVISIBILITY IMPLIED

Limits has a connotation of divisibility. It is not to be maintained in this thesis that immediate knowledge occurs without reflective knowledge. The issue is restricted to the nature of the object known, its relation to the knower, and its status in extramential reality.

By limits then is meant the extent of immediate knowledge and its status in epistemological inquiry.
C. IMMEDIATE

1. DENOTES DIRECTNESS

Immediate is here used to denote directness. It denotes that the knower and the external object are in direct union, but it is not an exhaustive account of the knowledge process. Immediate is a particularizing and particular term used to restrict the investigation of knowledge to that, if any, between the knowing mind and objects not in the mind but known without the mediation of inference. It is not essential that mind and object be metaphysically one, but only that the known object and existing object be one.²

i. Immediate is used in opposition to mediate, or inferred, or indirect.

ii. The connotation of time, or lack of it, is an unimportant implicate. Presence or absence of previous similar knowledge is not considered. Memory is a process of mediation between the present and non-existent past. Anticipation is a mediate process between the present and non-existent future. The precise issue is the relation of the knower and known at each moment of knowing. Time continues.

2. KNOWLEDGE INCOMPLETE

A relation of immediacy need not give completeness of knowledge or acquaintance. This thesis seeks to prove that what is yielded to the mind by the relation, however inexhaustive, is nevertheless not false, and is sufficient to constitute

²Poland, TT, 78. Also, cf. post, 169.
direct knowledge of things outside the mind.

D. KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is something primordial, indefinable except in terms of itself. To attempt to define knowledge in terms of something else must end in defining something that is not knowledge.

1. PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

Perceptual knowledge may be defined as apprehension of the objects of sense. Sense knowledge consists in the union and co-ordination of several sensory impressions contained in one total representation which, in the true and fullest sense of the word, is the perception of an object.

2. CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

Conceptual knowledge is the mind's knowledge of its object. In this thesis the limitation of immediacy has been imposed on mind's object. The issue is whether this immediate object is an idea, a state of consciousness, or an external object.

3. FALSE KNOWLEDGE

There may be criticism of the use of such a term as erroneous knowledge on the ground that knowledge to be knowledge must be correct. The use is made for clarity. Strictly speaking all knowledge is true as distinguished from opinion, doubt, error, and faith, but language imposes limitations. Thus to say

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3 Brightman, ITP, 389.
4 Mercier, ESP, I, 189.
that 4 and 2 are 5 is incorrect addition is not accurate, strictly speaking; it is not addition at all, but addition and subtraction (of 1). Similarly the truth of knowledge may be questioned without quibbling over the use of a word. Immediate knowledge cannot be false for if it were it would not be direct knowledge. On the other hand the question of truth involves demonstration--a mediate process of judgment.

E. OUTLINE OF QUESTION

Having distinguished our definition of terms of the thesis from definition of the thesis, which constitutes the main body of this paper, it is now necessary to outline the exact question to be studied in the light of given meanings.

1. IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OCCURS

Existence of immediate knowledge, i.e. of the direct presence of the known object to the knowing mind, is the first point to be proved.

2. MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

The presence of mediate knowledge, i.e. knowledge about the object due to the psychological structure of the human mind, will be considered only incidentally. Consequently, knowledge by judgment in the formal sense is not at issue. The aim is to prove metaphysically valid such a statement as "That object is a green tree" and mean precisely that independently of mind and its creations a green tree exists and when it is known it is known directly by a mind: the essence green tree is one in mind and object, and the fact of knowledge makes no
difference in the ontological status of the tree which is the same before and after it is known.

Briefly, the objective, extra-mental validity of the definition of the mind's object is the only acceptable proof of the immediate presence of an extra-mental object to a mind.

3. PROCESS INVOLVED

The psychological process, involving as it does mediacy in the sense that knowledge is based on previous experience and immediacy in the sense that knowledge is spontaneous, is not an obstacle because it has no direct relation to the epistemological question.5

i. The irrational identification of the mind with matter will have to be considered in summary of objections to certain systems, but, as will be developed, only for the purpose of reconciling immediate knowledge with metaphysical dualism. Metaphysical dualism means simply that reality consists of mind and matter, different entities.6

a. A superficial examination of the question would indicate that metaphysical monism offers the only possible form of proof of immediacy in knowledge. Metaphysical monism implies epistemological monism. The mind and object, from a monistic point of view, are one. But this avoids the very pertinent question of which one they are.7

b. Metaphysical dualism need not be interpreted as

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5Ryan, Art. 1, 244.
6Brightman, ITF, 222-224.
7Lovejoy, Art 1, 590.
the opposite of metaphysical monism, which holds that the mind and body are composed of the same material. Dualism of mind and body need not deny the unity of body and mind, nor exclude substantial unity from man.8

ii. Metaphysical monism is rejected because of its implications; experience reveals differences between mind and matter. Freedom is unintelligible in a monistic world. Although the theory would substantiate a theory of direct knowledge, certain other facts would be unexplained. It is the spirit of this investigation to reject any evidence which fails to justify itself after investigation of its implications. Metaphysical monism does not account for differences between mind and body.9

4. RELATION STUDIED

The problem to be attacked is: In an act of knowledge, when I say "That object is a green tree," what is the relation of the knower and known? Why is it incorrect to say "That object is my idea of a green tree?"

i. The question is: Is my knowledge of the tree direct, indirect, or illusory? Do I actually take that tree into my mind? Can I validly assert I know that tree and not merely an idea, representation, or copy of it?

ii. Direct knowledge can be defended.

by proving that there is in the tree an essence which is the object of the mind. Psychological analysis, in introspection,

8Turner, HP, 358.
9Leighton, MAC, 363.
will show that many objects as individuals are not directly known by the mind. Psychological mediacy, which is caused by the time element and brain processes, makes the reference of the known essence to the particular object apparently indirect.

Nevertheless, when the act of knowledge is completed the object known is the tree-in-itself, as it is such independently of the mind knowing it. No deduction is made from the idea of the tree; rather the knowledge of the individual is just as true as the knowledge of the essence existing in every member of the class, but it occurs later.

iii. It would be absurd even to attempt to solve the question of thing-in-itself apart from mind. Consequently, it is not pertinent here to attempt a futile description of what a tree might know itself to be in some non-cognitive sort of awareness.10

iv. The aim of this thesis is to prove that knowledge of an object reveals the essence, the metaphysical status of that object in itself, as opposed to the primary use of the term nature in the title of this thesis, which has the connotation of meaning, a subjective fact. In other words, what the object means to the mind on reflection has no necessary connection with what the object is. Pragmatism, in its highest form, and theories based on rational coherence as the criterion of truth ignore the objective nature of entities. This is the root of subjectivism.

10 Drake, ITP, 29.
Objects do not have a metaphysical relation totally opposed to the mental organization of the knowledge derived from them. If such were the situation, knowledge would be impossible. But extreme epistemological dualism offers no valid explanation of the world, despite its poetic interpretation of mental life as an harmonious accompaniment to the symphony of reality.

v. Finally, no claim is made that knowledge of things is exhaustive. Whatever is known is known according to the capacity of the knower. This is not a retreat; it is the basis for use of the word "limits" in the title of the thesis.

vi. The present writer, thanks to Dr. Brightman's helpful and kindly criticism, takes this opportunity to attempt to clarify several paragraphs. Before so doing, however, he must insist that this thesis does not attempt to prove the theory of the New Realism. The present writer is not a pan-objectivist, and he does not consider knowledge simply as aspect of objects known. His view is that interaction may be "blind", that in dualistic theories it is blind, and that all the dualist claims to know is the ideas which emerge as conscious sparks of the interlocking machinery of reality. Interaction is unsatisfactory as an explanation for the reason that a completely interacting universe would not necessarily conform to the definition of the universe which MUST exist if it is to make place

---11 Dr. Brightman's report as first reader of this thesis.
for a moral order as well as for physical, economic, social, and aesthetic organization. The difference between simple interaction and direct communication is the same difference as between organized activity and intelligent cooperation. The former class in each part may be lacking intrinsic values, although necessarily possessing certain instrumental values, while the latter class in each part of the comparison requires exclusion of all intermediary data in the absorption of a direct union. The entire field of immediate objects is not known at once; neither is cooperation effected between one subject and the entire universe directly. Each phenomenon exemplifying the theory of directness, or absolutely meaningful interaction, does so in virtue of the relation of any one unit with any other, thereby affecting the whole.

In knowledge, the direct union is not far different from the "intuition" of Bergson. Man, made up of mind and body, becomes part of reality. The difference is that Bergson sees in intuition the whole truth, while the present writer regards the direct presence of the object to the mind as the first step in the metaphysic of knowledge.

In a constantly changing world, wherein change sometimes is regarded as the really fundamental reality, each thought affects the whole being of the subject.
Readers of this thesis must get the concept not so much of completely integrated experience as the ultimate reality, but of a completely integrated universe in which experience is integrated with all else. This need not mean metaphysical monism, which this writer regards as untenable, but an integration of dissimilar units into an objective, unified whole. Identity is not essential to unity, nor is similarity of essence a basis for inclusion, or necessity, of objects within the same class.

With this clear concept of a universe completely integrated, abstracting for the sake of clarity, as well as because of its irrelevance, from all thought of time, we can now proceed to the explanation of certain language used in this thesis.

a. Direct union does not imply metaphysical identity. Consciousness is a function of the soul of man, but it cannot operate except through the activity of senses.

By direct union is meant simply that the mind and object become assimilated one to the other in the sense that the essence of the object (essence being only a word to stand for that reality which is produced by the sum of the matter and form of the object) is identical with the concept (concept being a word to stand for that mental common which we characterize as knowledge.)

In every object there is a something which is what

\[\text{\textit{\textsuperscript{11}Cf. ante, 12, 14 and post, 25, 53, 68, and 76.}}\]
the object is. The "doorness" in every door is the same, although the color, size, weight, and every other property may differ from door to door. Now this "doorness" is the direct object of the mind. The properties of any door by this combination, their juxtaposition, or however else, are combined in the production of an objective reality known as door which is something more than the sum of the parts and properties. It is "door" before it is "a door." Doorness is a real being; it is the essence of the object. This essence in the thing and in the mind are the same.

In dualistic theory, the object is a term of a judgment, but the term expresses an idea. In the theory here offered, the essence experienced and immediately known is the objective essence. Since, however, knowing is actively in the subject, and to exclude all implication that the objective essence is only causally related to the subject whose idea of the object is the result of self-experience, we say that the objective essence is in the mind. This is union. We think the subject of the judgment is not an idea but an objective reality. Unless the objective essence, whose existence independently of knowing is claimed in metaphysics, is what is known directly, the theory here becomes only a form of representative idealism or personalistic idealism. Matter and form are objective realities, and essence is a product of matter and form. That essence is independent of its relatedness to anything and the relation does not modify it. As we said in our definition
of nature, essence is a word used to express meaning in any theory of knowledge, but in a realistic view meaning is not the subjective understanding of an object—that is only one aspect—meaning in the sense of essence, is what the object means to itself, its own self-integrity, regardless of its ever being known by anyone.

The word tree is not a symbol for an idea; it is a symbol for a real object which is independent of anyone's experience of it and even of the properties which make it up, except of the essential notes of matter and form. Whether it is called a tree, a sombrero, a baseball, or what-not, that word is human expression of an actual reality which is what it is independently of what we call it or whether or not we experience it. The present writer freely admits that the necessity of using language betrays the pure order in which objects and subjects are related, but at a level far below the level of language there is an intimate inter-connection of objects—and in this reality subjects are among the objects—which is the initial step in metaphysics and the last in epistemology.

To this extent then we can agree with the New Realist: "Cognition belongs to the same world as that of its objects. It has its place in the order of nature."\(^\text{12}\) We need not agree, however, that "there is nothing transcendental..... about it."\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{\text{12}}\)Holt, MR, 475
\(^{\text{13}}\)Loc. cit.
b. The assertion that "The statement that 'the essence of the green tree is one in mind and object' would be true also of the most mediate and indirect knowledge, if it were veridical" is correct, and its truth is unquestionable from the standpoint of its source. The fact of the matter is, however, that the statement expresses a dualist's conception of "veridical" which is not acceptable to any realist who shuns dualism. "Veridical" can never mean more than "workable" in a dualistic view, but "veridical" to the adherent of direct realism means absolutely, objectively, and unconditionally true.

In the first place, dualists make their first error in denying essence, except insofar as objective relativists claim the relation of an object to a subject at a particular standpoint gives essence. But even this essence is subjective, and it has no truly objective status. If the pragmatic test be taken as the ultimate, instead of as the minimum, then it is true that dualism offers a satisfactory explanation. The present writer does not believe in relativism; he believes knowledge is of absolute fact.

Secondly, while knowledge reaches beyond the content of experience, as idealists say, the type of knowledge idealists feel they have is far different from that claimed by direct realists. What reality is beyond experience for the idealists is determined entirely by inference, and the attempt

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14 Brightman's Report.
15 Loc. cit.
to prove the result of inference conforms to reality as it is a task far beyond the powers of this student; it is a task far greater than the comparatively simple explanation that what we know is known directly of reality. Unless we know directly, it seems we might as well join those who assert we know nothing beyond ourselves. And this road can lead nowhere but to solipsism.

c. Unless the mind in knowing is joined directly with its object, and unless that object is an extra-mental being independent of the knowing mind, knowledge can never get beyond self-consciousness. Philosophers may amuse themselves with highly decorated explanations, may show that there is no practical difference inasmuch as "workability" is the ultimate need of the human mind, may regard the unknown as the will of God, as the mystical cause of sensations and ideas, or may indulge in whatever other mental gymnastics may please them; but in the last analysis, and when equivocation ends, the fact remains that the dualist knows one world, his own, and lives in another, the realist's.

Dualism has meaning only insofar as it claims that we know experience from which we infer that something else exists. Liberal dualists regard the inferred existents as causally related to experience, and may go so far as to assert that what we know may resemble reality. But when it comes to explaining illusions of sense, dreams, and other unusual facts, recourse is had to the convenient doctrine that we know things
as we are, not as they are. Man is not a unit made up of matter and form having two aspects of the same being.

The dualist is not unlike the theatre-goer who reads the play but does not look at the show. His "knowledge" of what happens is indirect, although it may be close to the fact; the direct realist takes a seat and sees the play.

F. TITLE RE-STATEd

On the basis of the above definitions and explanations, the title of this thesis may now be re-stated as follows: The human mind knows objects directly, but the knowledge is incomplete because of the limitations of human nature. Further, in an act of knowing there is a union of the mind and extra-mental reality, not a union of mind and symbol, or image, or appearance.

The term union here is used to denote not a substantial unity of oneness, indivisibility, for then some form of pan-ism would be inescapable, but rather to denote unmediated by consciousness if consciousness be defined as that from which the nature of an object is inferred. This meaning is one of three possible interpretations of unity, and will be developed in detail in the chapters on the scholastic position.16

16 Cf. post, 94
CHAPTER III

SOLIPSISM

Solipsism, the hypothesis that the "I" alone exists, is the first state of the reflective mind when it has recognized the contrast between consciousness and non-conscious objects.¹

A. CONDITION OF MIND

Solipsism is best described as an attitude of the mind, not a theory of knowledge.

1. FICTITIOUS WORLD

The solipsist alone can refute his position. No amount of argument by fellow-selves, believed not to exist, can convince the solipsist that he is knowing anything other than his own personal experience.

i. Solipsism is rooted in the belief that one's own experience is all there is. To be intelligible, to render the solipsist himself a certain manner of continuing existence, his experience creates a fictitious world in which his experience becomes highly organized.

ii. Assumption of some not-self is necessary for refutation of solipsism, and this assumption can be made only by the solipsist.

2. POSITION IRREFUTABLE

The position is irrefutable. To consider all experience as one's own consciousness is a conviction which ex-

¹ Stace, TKE, 66.
plains everything that can be explained in a relatively satisfactory way.

i. Nothing that I experience can reach my consciousness except through my experience of it. I am conscious only of my own experience. Consequently, assumption of the existence of other beings may be unwarranted.

ii. Even if I were to assume the existence of other beings, conscious and non-conscious, arguments presented to the other suppos ed conscious beings concerning the existence of non-conscious beings would convince only me unless by some as yet unknown manner of knowing I could prove the existence of those other conscious beings. Otherwise, I am simply making an assumption.

Yet through it all runs the fact that all arguments, all objects, all other beings are real-to-me only as a part of my experience. I can never escape my own mind or know without it. My mind is an active agent without which I can know nothing. Therefore, everything I know is simply the content of my mind.

B. IMPLIES SOLIPSISM

Fortunately for philosophy, solipsists are few, and none lives according to his convictions. The position is discussed here because it will be found later to be a consistent implicate of any system of knowledge which denies the immediate presence of extra-mental reality to the mind.

1. CONDITION OF MIND

Although it was stated above that solipsism is a con-
dition of the mind and irrefutable, certain considerations can be advanced to remove the condition and provide a basis for the emergence of the isolated "I". Naturally the emergence must be solipsistic in form, i.e., the afflicted one must first consider that the arguments advanced may be only products of his own mind. Perhaps, indeed, will is more effective than reasoning in the emergence.

2. KNOWLEDGE FALSE

The point here, however, is that the immediate knowledge which the solipsist maintains he has is not true knowledge in the strictly philosophical sense since it does not conform to the simplest definition of truth that can be devised, namely, a true judgment is one that corresponds to reality.3

i. Certainly the solipsist will claim to have immediate knowledge because he believes nothing mediates between the mind and object. Sensations as such are mental abstractions. The body is an illusion of the type of all physical reality. Yet there is no object, strictly speaking. As Marshall says, "The now of consciousness is all that exists, whether of e or of the universe for me."4

ii. In the sense in which immediate knowledge is defined for this thesis, however, the experience has no status as such because there is no extra-mental reality.

3. DUALISM IMPLIES SOLIPSISM

Solipsism, therefore, is mentioned only because it

3Brightman, ITP, 35.
4Marshall, COII, 2.
may be shown to be a logical implicate of extreme dualism. It is irrefutable by nature because the arguments against it are to the solipsist only figments of his own experience.

Despite its unassailable position, however, solipsism is far from the goal of any philosopher worthy of the name. It is the negation of speculation, and no more eloquent refutation of a system of thought is possible than demonstration that the principles lead to solipsism, acknowledged or implied.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{5}Alpern, M.P., 196.
CHAPTER IV

MONISM AND DUALISM

The difficulties of defining the two general divisions of thought, idealism and realism, are so obvious as to make an apology here unnecessary. The numerous sub-divisions of each of the general views have in common only the fundamental implication of the title of each respective classification; idealism emphasizes mind; realism emphasizes matter.¹

Actually certain forms of idealism have more in common epistemologically with certain forms of realism than with other forms of idealism. For example, idealistic dualism (personalism) and critical realism have more in common in epistemological theory than idealistic dualism and absolute idealism. Likewise, New Realism has more in common with absolute idealism, which is its metaphysical antithesis, than with critical realism. In each case judgment must be passed not on the epistemological view so much as the metaphysical view to make a proper classification.

The four general epistemological positions are: Idealistic monism, idealistic dualism, realistic monism, realistic dualism. Since this inquiry is concerned with the question of immediate knowledge, and monism by definition implies that knowledge is immediate, we shall consider first the two forms of monism. Then we shall examine briefly the two forms of dualism,

¹Brightman, ITP, 230-231.
idealistic and realistic. The position to be defended lies somewhere between extreme dualism and extreme monism. Other theories also occupy positions not readily identifiable with extreme monism or extreme dualism. Thus, critical realism considers universals real but knowledge relative to the perceiver's standpoint. Therefore, it is better considered under the study of relativism.  

Although this thesis seeks to prove that objective reality is known directly and would seem to necessitate inclusion of this theory under realistic monism, there are sufficient differences between the view here defended and the statements of the accepted school of realistic monists (New Realism) to warrant separate treatment with a clear statement of differences.

The present writer is doing no more than has been done before in taking exception to certain phases of the neo-realistic doctrine and accepting other phases. New Realism has much in common with Scholasticism. Many of the doctrines of leading realistic schools, including besides the New Realism, Critical Realism, and the view of critical realistic monists offered by Macintosh, have much in common with the position here defended.

Hence, our first survey of the field will follow the division outlined above. This treatise will be followed by a
study of relative and a statement of the Scholastic position in detail. The points of agreement between the position defended and other views will be stated. The concluding chapter will contain a summary of the chief points proved and a clear statement of the probable nature and limits of immediate knowledge.

A. IDEALISTIC MONISM

The terminology adopted for this treatment is consistent with the definition of the view as "epistemological monism and idealism."6

The view is that the real object and the perceived object are, at the moment of perception numerically one, and the real object cannot exist at other moments independently of perception.

It would seem from study of the definition that the words in it were chosen with a care motivated by an unphilosophical purpose: the inclusion of an ambiguity consistent with the two forms of idealistic monism which actually have been advanced. At any rate the definition is ambiguous, and advocates of each of the two views therein defined can be found in prominent places in philosophical thought.

Under one interpretation a known object is a percept causally related to the concept; under the other interpretation the concept containing the knowledge is the cause of the percept.

In the former, the object of knowledge is identified

6Woodbridge, Art. 1, 793.
with the percept, while in the latter case the object is an ideal which causes the percept.

1. MYSTICAL IMPLICATION

The theory that the object is identified with the percept giving rise to an idea of it is a form of mysticism because the relation between the percept and concept is traceable to a mystical stimulation of the senses by a non-existent world.

i. The only object of the mind is a percept whose origin cannot be rationally explained.

ii. What is not in consciousness does not exist. An object known is simply the percept as it occurs in consciousness.

2. ALTERNATIVE VIEW

The alternative theory of idealistic monism, that the percept is the result of an idea, is indistinguishable from solipsism in its extremest form. Although mysticism is a necessary implicate of either view—since the origin of either idea or percept as the start of knowledge is inexplicable in rational form—the theory which describes knowledge as a relation between percept (as beginning) and idea (as end) leaves a path to an epistemological dualism which can be supported with excellent arguments. This is close to personalism which considers philosophy an interpretation of experience, knowledge being limited to self.7

i. Only the persuasion used to change the views of the solipsist can be employed effectively against the idealist

7Brightman, NL, 79.
who clings to the theory that ideas born mystically in the mind give rise to percepts.

ii. This form of idealism is closely identified with several widely held views. The emphasis is on ideas which are taken to represent reality. The dualistic concept of correspondence is rejected, however, in favor of identity. Reality is composed of the ideas known.

3. IDEALISTIC MONISM

Idealistic monism in either form faces an insurmountable obstacle in the continued existence of objects not constantly perceived. The reply that God constantly perceives them seems to demand an unwarranted stretch of imagination. That God is the cause of the continued existence of unperceived objects may be granted. That they exist because he perceives them—a sophisticatedly devised play on words which cannot be refuted in ordinary logical language—also must be admitted. But the raison d'être of objects is the will, not the experience of God.

Hence, idealistic monism must be rejected because it fails to account for the existence of a physical world. It is contrary to ordinary common sense, and perverts the purpose of philosophy by erecting a mental world which it is impossible to escape once the will has been subdued by a mind that refuses to face facts of ordinary experience. Idealistic monism makes experience everything. It lacks the vision even of extreme dualism which, while fleeing the world, nevertheless admits it
is there independently of the mind.\(^8\)

B. REALISTIC MONISM

1. SEVERAL FORMS

Realistic monism has several forms ranging from Drake's critical realism and its dualistic implications to the New Realism as propounded in the cooperative volume published twenty-four years ago. Our sketch here is far more limited than that of a great philosopher who defends another system lying between extreme dualism and extreme monism.\(^9\)

2. AMERICAN NEW REALISM

American New Realism is the type of monism to be considered here. The members of the school are not in complete agreement, and there are serious differences over the question of consciousness between the American and the British schools. The British concept of awareness as a mental act is rejected by the Americans in favor of a behavioristic explanation.\(^10\)

i. The New Realism holds firmly to the theory that in knowledge the knowing subject and the known object are numerically one, and it appears, as an answer to Lovejoy's question,\(^11\)

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\(^8\)No attempt is made here to offer an exhaustive refutation of idealistic monism. The basis of the theory is metaphysical. As in examination of other theories not defended, reasons for their rejection will be little more than suggested. Since only one theory of knowledge can be correct, proof of the scholastic position will be taken as an implicit refutation of other views.

\(^9\)Macintosh, PK, passim.

\(^10\)Rogers, EAP, 446.

\(^11\)Cf. ante, 15.
that they are the object. This unquestionably is due to the
disregard New Realists have for consciousness. "There is noth-
ing transcendent or supernatural about it." 12

ii. Knowing does not affect known objects; they are independent of being known. 13

iii. The New Realism, by eliminating consciousness as a synthesizing force and making analysis the ultimate goal of knowledge, cannot escape materialism. Analysis, it is held, reduces all complexities to neutral entities. 14

iv. There is no room in the New Realism for the notion of substance. 15 What is known is a group of qualities in time-space. 16

3. OPPOSED TO DUALISM.

New Realism is opposed to all forms of dualism, metaphysical as well as epistemological. It fails utterly to account for the evident differences between physical and mental facts. Thus we read:

As for a dualism of the ordinary kind which regards the world as made up of two ultimately separate and perfectly heterogeneous entities—objects and consciousness—it not only offers no explanation of their interaction, but by its very terms it makes of such interaction something that is miraculous, if not impossible. 17

12Holt, JR, 475, III, 2.
15Perry, Art. 1, 103
16Montague, Art. 1, 254.
17Ibid, 276.
i. New Realism denies the subjectivity of consciousness and its difference from other objects, holding that consciousness is an entity reducible like other entities to the status of a neutral being interacting with other subsistents. In thus implicitly denying the difference between mind and physical things, New Realism must be placed in the category of materialistic monism.

ii. In its ardor to escape the agnosticism of dualism, New Realism falls into the materialism of pantheism, the pluralism of neutral entities having no existential validity. Consciousness is no different in status from any other being. It is subject only to the "methode of empiricism and naturalism."18

Hence, we reject New Realism, although the rejection is made reluctantly. New Realism's chief contentions: that objects are independent of mind; that relations are external and the relation of the object to the mind does not change the object;19 that objects are directly presented; that naive realism is close to the truth; indeed, virtually all of the program and first platform are acceptable to the scholastic. As was stated in the introduction, the conclusions closely approximate those of the scholastic view, and the differences are fundamentally in metaphysical theory.

18Perry, op. cit., 147.
18Spaulding, Art. 1, 187.
But even in knowledge the difference between objects actually perceived and objects only imagined or dreamt is not made clear.  

That knowledge is fundamentally direct; that things are known before ideas of them; that a knowing process is not its own object; all these important facts are held jointly by New Realists and scholastics. The differences will be brought out as the paper progresses.

C. IDEALISTIC AND REALISTIC DUALISM.

(That branch of critical realism which considers "essences" as not mental and exemplified by Durant Brand as an advocate and Arthur E. Murphy as an interpreter will be considered at length in the chapter on the limits of immediate knowledge. Critical realism in any form is reducible to dualism, but the particular types of dualism considered here are the avowed doctrines of absolute epistemological idealists. Realists and idealists are considered jointly because the epistemological doctrines are similar, although the metaphysical implications are vastly different.)

1. Theory of Indirect Knowledge.

Dualism may be characterized as the epistemological theory that objects are not known directly, but are known by analysis of ideas. These ideas, if they are coherent or workable, correspond to reality.

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20Ryan, ITT, 199.
2. INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE ADMITTED

Dualism differs from idealistic monism in that it acknowledges that objects "can exist at other moments independently of any perception."

3. OBJECTS NOT EXPERIENCED

Whereas monism, both realistic and idealistic, maintains that the experienced object and the real object are numerically one, extreme dualism maintains that they are two, although the real object may be the cause of the experienced object.

4. FIVE REALISTIC THEORIES

There are many dualistic theories. Dualistic realism alone has gained wide acceptance in five different forms. But all agree that what we know is an idea; the mind never reaches reality directly, but learns about reality from its experiences. The idea is known first; the nature of the object is inferred. Knowledge is hypothetical, relative.

5. SPENCER'S VIEWS

Spencer's "unknowable" and objective reality are the same. There is no need for extensive references in substantiation of the assertions here made. The classification of certain epistemological dualists and their acceptance of the classification are ample proof that they confess to the belief that objective reality as it is cannot be known. Experience is subjective, and ideas are the content of experience.
6. **REJECT DUALISM.**

We therefore reject epistemological dualism, either realistic or idealistic, in our search for the nature and limits of immediate knowledge. The limitation in dualism is the self from which the dualist cannot escape, no matter how sure he is that an objective world, independent of perception, exists.

D. **MONISTIC DUALISM.**

Having rejected the ordinary forms of monism and dualism, we turn now to a study of a realistic philosophy which has rightly been called a "monistic dualism." ²⁸

1. **METAPHYSICAL DUALISM EVIDENT**

Metaphysical dualism is accepted as evident. The identity of the object known and the real object will be proved as necessary if knowledge is to be true.

2. **COMPARISON OFFERED**

Following an exposition of the main doctrines of the scholastic position, a comparison with other theories will be made.

²⁸ Walsh, Art. 1, 35.
CHAPTER V

THE LIMITS OF IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

A. EXTREMELY UNTENABLE

Idealistic monism and realistic monism are untenable theories, the former leading to solipsism or agnosticism, the latter to irrational materialism.

1. IDEALISM ERRS

Idealism, monistic or dualistic, frankly admits that the knower can never reach beyond his mental content. There can be no direct knowledge of a mind-independent reality because in one case there is none and in the other it is unknowable. As New Realism has held, interaction becomes inexplicable and, even if it occurred, it need have no meaning, direction, or end.

2. ORIGIN OF IDEAS MYSTERY

The two general forms of monistic idealism described in this paper consider knowledge either the consciousness of mysteriously received percepts or the causation of percepts by mysteriously received ideas.

i. In one form the mind is a passive faculty whose only function is to become aware of certain percepts. The individual then acts as if the percepts had an objective basis.

ii. In the other form the subject is considered as an active element in creation, a person whose mental operations actually cause objects and the laws for the activity of those objects.
3. NEUTRAL ENTITIES VAGUE

Monistic realism fails to account for self-identity and consciousness. Neutral entities are ever elusive.

B. DUALISM UNSATISFACTORY

Dualism, whether idealistic or realistic, fails to give a rational account of experienced objects. It is admitted that it explains experience, but it fails to explain the experienced. We are speaking here, of course, of epistemological dualism in its extreme form. Dualism sets up a barrier between mind and extra-mental reality by supposing that all we know is experience, as distinguished from extra-mental reality. It accounts for error—for the inaccurate knowledge of things—but it does not account for truth—the independence of objects and our knowledge of them.¹

1. OBJECTIVITY QUESTIONED

The simple syllogism proving Socrates' mortality has no metaphysical validity in any ultimately dualistic system. While it is true that dualists act contrary to the inevitable conclusions of their own premises, the reason is pragmatic, not metaphysical.

i. Logical validity cannot be a test of metaphysical structure unless metaphysical reality can be directly known. It is manifestly impossible to demonstrate the "mind-wise" structure of reality.

ii. The assumption that metaphysical truth in some

¹Montague, Art. 1,252.
manner parallels logical truth, even analogously, is unwarranted.

2. ALL DUALISM IDEALISTIC

Despite its denials realistic dualism is reducible to some form of idealism because the existence of a physical world cannot be demonstrated satisfactorily in any view which places an insurmountable barrier between the mind and physical nature.

C. THE NEW SCHOLASTIC POSITION

The New Scholastic position, which it will be the purpose of the remainder of this thesis to defend, can be stated briefly as follows: Knowledge of reality is immediate, it is not mediate or inferential.

1. IDEAS ARE MEANS

It is granted that ideas are the means to knowledge, but knowledge is not of ideas. The distinction is between the ideas as id quod and id quo.

i. The mind is united to reality by ideas, but the reality is known first (immediately) and the ideas only by reflection. That by which the mind is joined to reality is nothing more than a medium. Medium, by definition, is a conjoiner; it is not one of the terms of unity.

ii. To make the idea of the object the object of the mind is to condemn New Scholasticism to a form of representative idealism an epistemological dualism not consistent with other phases of the New Scholastic view.
To maintain—that the object of our intellect is—the idea of being which it forms in itself—is to deliver oneself bound hand and foot to skepticism.  

In this thesis, however, the simple assertions of the scholastic view will be given no more consideration than simple assertions of other views; they must be based on a relation to the premises involved.

2. IDEAS AS SIGNS

Ideas as a means to knowledge are not instruments in the ordinary sense. Such a meaning would make the ideas known before the objects known. Hence, for the sake of clarity, many scholastics substitute the term sign for instrument and make a three-fold distinction, viz., natural sign, i.e. that which by its nature is connected with something else, as smoke is with fire; arbitrary sign, i.e. that which is not connected by nature with the object of which it is the sign but which is suggestive of it, as AA suggests to mind the constitution; formal sign, i.e. that which leads to a knowledge of the thing signified without itself rising into consciousness. It is this third meaning of sign which is applied to ideas.

Thus does the modern scholastic justify the statement that an idea can be id quod (that by which) an object is known without being id quod (that which) is known directly.

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2 Maritain, ITP, 186.
3. ESSENCE KNOWN

In an act of knowledge the essence of the object known is united with the knowing mind. The essence is the nature, the objective, ultimate being of the object, the ground for the universal which can exist formally only in the mind.

i. The first proposition to be seen here is that universals have a foundation in things.

a. Universal ideas exist formally in the mind, but they have a foundation in things as the essence. Hence, while we have direct knowledge of the essence (quiddity, whatness) of the object, we know the individual object as such and in detail only after knowing the essence. This limitation of direct knowledge does not, however, render it valueless; rather the implications of the view are vital to the theory of knowledge for two reasons: (1) What is yielded in direct knowledge is the nature of the external object as it is independently of the knowing mind; (2) Knowledge of individuals is valid only if the foundation of the knowledge is due to an indestructible union of mind and object through an unconscious medium. When the individual is known, it is known indirectly from the standpoint of psychology, but directly from the point of view of epistemology. This means only that the real tree known is known as it is. Knowledge of the individual is said to be indirect, not in the dualistic sense, but in a psychological sense.

b. Although there is apparently indirectness in knowledge of individuals this does not affect the quality of the
knowledge. It is due to limitations of human nature. Knowledge
of individuals is indirect only because of the psychological
structure of the mind. The result is the direct presence of the
object as conceived by common sense to the knowing mind. It is
a general belief of all modern scholastics that "whatever is
received is received according to the mode of the receiver."

ii. The limitations of sense do not imply that what
the senses perceive is false. It means merely everything about
an object is not perceived.

4. SOME KNOWLEDGE INFERENTIAL

Objects of intellectual knowledge are contained in
objects of sensuous knowledge. Consequently it is evident that
knowledge of God, self, past, and future events, and abstract
terms is inferential. There are no subjective forms, such as
Kant believed in. Such knowledge is arrived at by inference
from known truths based on experience of sensible things, and as
complexity is ever more vulnerable than simplicity—throughout
creation—so is knowledge indirectly acquired less certain than
direct knowledge, as experience will prove.

Even the slight indirection forced upon knowledge
of individuals, because of the complexities imposed by psychol-
ogical traits of the human personality, leads to error. Such
error can be avoided, however, upon satisfaction of all the
essential conditions of valid knowledge, namely, a knowing mind,
an object, and a proper relation between the two. The explana-

3 Mercier, LSP., II, 455-456.
4 Cf. Post, 34.
tion of error is simply that it is due to absence of proper, i.e. normal conditions or sufficient presence of objects known.

i. That knowledge of God is indirect is evident from the various theories of His nature, and even concerning His existence. The root of difference lies in inference from known facts. Negation and analogy have important places in descriptions of the nature of God.

ii. The nature of God is described in analogous and negative terms, evidence that differences are based on the indirect process of inferring.

Only the ontologists and mystics hold to a direct knowledge of God's existence. The weakness of the former consists in its appeal to an innate idea or an unwarranted transition from the ideal to the real order. The weakness of the mystics' position consists in failure to recognize that the object--God--is explained as a cause of the state. This is closely related to idealism. The conclusions of both mystics and ontologists may be correct, but the premises do not warrant the conclusions. Even if the conclusions were warranted, they would be products of the mediate process of reasoning.

iii. Knowledge of self is indirect.

a. The soul fundamentally is the substantial form of the complete person, body, mind, and will. Its essence is not thought, but rather the power of uniting with the body in constituting the human being."

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Mercier, MSF, I, 261.
b. Activity of the soul in thinking is dependent upon internal or external sensible experience. Psychological processes are involved in brain and mind activity, and the mind would be inactive without physical activity. The fact of process in perception and knowledge, however, has nothing to do with the fact of knowledge and its directness.  

c. Agreement upon this point is universal, as far as the purpose of this paper is concerned. Theories of parallelism, pre-established harmony, and idealism—in the last named of which the body is a datum of the self—agree with the functional point of view except as to the nature of interaction. There are many theories of interaction between mind and body, from the extreme dualistic theory of Descartes, for whom soul and body were separate, to the Behaviorism of Watson in which soul and body are identical.

d. Without first having a body the soul would be incapable of thinking. It has the capability of thinking but requires sensible experience as a requisite for causing the progress of this capability into actuality. In other words the capability for thought does not constitute thought. Whatever determines the soul to thought about itself, and this is activity of the brain and nervous system, serves as the basis for inference of the nature of the soul. In other words, the soul is known by inference based on a study of psychological processes.

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6Ryan, Art.1, 246.
Note 1: If the soul were aware of itself, if it were possible for direct knowledge of the self as an object of self, extreme dualism would be inescapable. The soul would be no more than the content of consciousness at any given time. It is difficult to see how anything else could be proved to have reality, since the mediation of sensible processes would be unnecessary. How then could one assert that all reality was not simply an expression of the nature of self known directly and containing all reality? The distinction between such a consequence, based on belief in direct knowledge of the self, and solipsism is difficult, if at all possible, to see.

Note 2: A person is an individual composed of body and soul and endowed with reason. Since the time of Descartes, personality has been confused with self-consciousness. This theory makes the unusual demand that we consider the person either a thinking substance or a chain of thoughts. In the former case, no explanation is given of interaction with body except as a relation of parallel entities. In the latter case, interaction with the body is no more than a metaphorical term since the interaction is no more real than with any other corporeal matter. Thus in sleep personality is gone. In death, personality survives, not because the soul is not intrinsically dependent on the body and therefore not affected by the dissolution of the body, but because God continues personality in existence without a body by some mysterious means.

7Mercier, LSP, I, 312.
8Maher, PSY, 533.
Note 3: The important agreement of all but behavioristic thinkers, however, that there is physical and non-physical, i.e. at least non-spatial, activity, affords a common basis for analysis of the knowledge process.

Personality is a real thing; man is more than a machine reacting to environment, and consciousness is not simply sub-vocal mutterings, a phenomenon of certain beings. Even behaviorists regard the theory that thought is a bodily function as a convenient assumption. Even to those who lean strongly towards psychism, organism, and other theories of harmonious reality in which non-living things have non-conscious "feelings" of one another as well as of conscious things, human personality has a special place elevated by reason of consciousness which has the power of escaping the physical limitations which matter would impose on matter.

iv. Knowledge of past and future events is based on memory stimulated by experience of a recent object, by absence of attention to a present object—as in reverie—or by the subconscious aspect of the mind about whose nature, by definition, we can know nothing. The real event of the past or future, recollection of an object seen or to be seen, must be indirect since it is known only through imperfect representation. In any theory of knowledge what is not present cannot be perceived directly. The truth of the contradictory of this proposition would lead to absurd consequences, among them the greater re-

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Watson, PSB, 326.
liability of absent than present objects of thought, or at least equal status. It is not implied here that knowledge of past or future events need be false or less accurate than of present events. The point is that error may result more easily because of the process of mediation involved. The process is not epistemological but psychological. The truth of Napoleon's death is just as true as that this machine is a typewriter. The "immediate" aspect is not affected, but knowledge about the typewriter, direct and indirect knowledge, is less likely to be erroneous than knowledge about Napoleon's death. The fact that the latter did not come under my observation makes this certainly no more problem for me and my theory than for the extreme dualist who also was deprived of the experience. Actually, finding the death of Napoleon in self-experience seems to be quite an achievement.

v. Knowledge of abstract terms, e.g. love, duty, etc., as opposed to universals which are derived from things, is indirect for reasons advanced in section iii. These terms denote a temporal interpretation of given facts based on sensible objects. Universal terms as such, or rather the concepts which those terms express, constitute the matter of direct knowledge. Abstract terms meant here are those expressing the result of reasoning processes which may be highly involved and which may be based more in feeling than in intellection. This position is based on the theory that reasoning has an important role in practical knowledge, that intuition is at most an elementary prenoetic state, and that only the mediation of reason can supply the basis
of aesthetic appreciation, moral conduct, and logical judgment. Intuition as a criterion in practical or theoretical matter is inadequate. "The New-Thomist, like the New-Realist, believes that we apprehend universal values more by intellectual effort than by mystical intuition."\(^{10}\)

The universal known directly by the intellect when confronted by a sensible object is not vague. It is not a picture, but it is not vague. It is clear to the mind, a definite concept; e.g. man. On the other hand, the concept "all men" is vague because it implies knowledge about men is to be asserted. It is a universal, not in the sense that material conditions are absent, but as a quantitative extension of the basis of the type universal. For this reason, the concept man is not so vague as the concept most men. Man is a concrete, individual entity, realized in an individual object but conceivable as stripped of material conditions. The universal as such is the noumenon which Kant maintained could not be known, although in some unexplained manner the forms for interpreting it could be known and corresponded in some way to reality.\(^{11}\) The universal in re and in intellectu is identical, it is that to which the mind is joined in knowledge. It exists as a universal, that is, stripped of material conditions—in the mind, but it has its foundation and exists fundamentally in things.

\(^{10}\text{Evans, }\text{TROR, }158, 159.\)
\(^{11}\text{Aveling, }\text{CUI, }41, 42.\)
D. SIMPLE APPREHENSION GIVES IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

1. There are three acts of the mind: simple apprehension; judgment; reasoning. Judgment and reasoning are mediate processes expressed in one or more propositions. Truth of judgment and reasoning does not affect the issue of this thesis which is concerned with the nature of the terms which make up the propositions. It is our purpose to show that simple apprehension puts the mind into direct contact with the objects of simple apprehension and that this relation is direct union.

Judgment about the object follows apprehension of it. It is usual to consider truth as a quality of a proposition only, but this would leave immediate knowledge neither true nor false. It may be objected that the mind must either affirm or deny the correctness of the apprehension as related to the object, but this is to erect an insurmountable barrier of a solipsistic tinge. Judgment of the correctness of identification is a complicated process outside the simple question of the validity of the concept as an expression of the real object.

2. NOT COMPLETE TRUTH

Simple apprehension never yields complete truth. Quotations from authors not in general agreement, except on this issue, best illustrate the scholastic position:
Apprehension is the act of the mind so far as it neither affirms nor denies but merely places an object before consciousness. The object before the mind must be, of course, the object before the mind; just as what a man sees, with his eyes, that he sees, even though he should, by a mistake in inference, proceed to name it wrongly.

Note 1: An immediate objection very probably will be raised here that this proves we have real knowledge, i.e. true knowledge, only by thinking about the given and inferring its nature. This objection can be answered only recalling the conditions of valid knowledge, a knowing subject, a knowable object, and the suitable disposition of the one to the other, i.e. union.

Note 2: Simple apprehension is not divorced from judgment in any actual manner. They are closely related. Any judgment given as an identification of only one term, and that furnished by simple apprehension, is true when the conditions for valid knowledge are fulfilled. Otherwise the concept of immediate knowledge as well as the concept of simple apprehension would be meaningless. Such an elementary judgment as This object is a tree is necessarily true if the conditions under which the tree was experienced are normal. The tree is known as it is. Objective evidence is furnished the mind. Yet on a dark night, error could be made in identification, but the reason cannot be assigned to the representative nature of our knowledge, but

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12 Rickaby, Ep. 16.
13 Cr. Ante, 46.
rather to a violation of the conditions. The simple apprehen-
sion in any event is correct; assigning existence is an act of 
judgment, and to claim judgments of existence to be always 
correct would be to attempt to disprove the actual experience 
of every person. The scholastic position on simple apprehension 
stated by Rickaby is clear. The real object is as it is pre-
sented to the mind. It is assimilated by simple apprehension.

Knowledge of things when it is of the 
kind we call knowledge by acquaintance 
is essentially simpler than any knowl-
edge of truths and logically independent 
of knowledge of truths, though it would 
be rash to assume that human beings ever, 
in fact, have acquaintance with things, 
without knowing some truth about them.14

So far as things are concerned, we may 
know then or not know then, but there is 
no positive state of mind which can be 
described as erroneous knowledge of things, so 
long at any rate, as we confine ourselves 
to knowledge by acquaintance.15

E. MONISM AND DUALISM

1. MONISTIC ELEMENT

The monistic element in the scholastic position is 
limited to simple apprehension. That there are differences 
among modern scholastics, with many inclining towards represent-
ative idealism, cannot be denied, but the present writer has 
chosen to follow the traditional view based in the teachings of 
St. Thomas.

14 Russell, POP, 72.
15 Ibid. 186.
In this chapter, which has sought to set forth limits of immediate knowledge, it is well, for a re-assertion of the main position and to answer possible charges that retreat has been ordered, to quote an eminent scholastic authority at length. After refuting idealism in all forms, he continues:

Philosophers believing in some sort of an independent Material World, who maintain that the mind can only attain to a knowledge of such a world mediately as an inference from the ideas, or subjective representations, of which alone we are immediately cognizant, have been styled Representationalists, Realists, Hypothetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists, since they look on the external universe as a necessary hypothesis to account for the ideas of which we have an immediate perception. All these authors err in the one common but groundless assumption that the human mind can immediately know nothing but its own unextended states. Starting with this false hypothesis, their theories give no adequate account of our knowledge of extension, and logically lead to subjective idealism.

In complete opposition to all representationalists are to be found...all the leading scholastics...medieval and modern, and in this country during the past hundred years, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton--All these philosophers...hold that man, at all events in some cognitive acts, apprehends extended material reality....Recently some New-Scholastic writers seem disposed to abandon the fundamental scholastic position and to adopt a theory of mediate perception; whilst they would oppose idealism and justify our belief in an external world by the principle of causality.
As the whole stream of modern subjectivism has sprung from the Cartesian assumption that the mind directly knows only its own ideas, the new attempt does not seem very hopeful. Respecting its proofs of realism: (1) The principle of causality, as derived by these writers from analysis of ideas excluding all external experience, can never adequately, prove that the cause of our sensations is extra-mental. (2) Still less can it prove the validity of cognition...that our knowledge resembles, reflects, or reveals the nature of such an external cause---Representationalism can never get beyond the transfigured realism of Spencer, with its theory of symbolical knowledge involving fundamental agnosticism.16

F. THE STATUS OF THE RELATIVE

1. EXTREME VIEWS

The extreme views of the question of relativism in knowledge have affected not only the epistemological question at issue, but have led often to metaphysical conclusions which are contrary to even common sense, not to mention mature judgment. Moderate idealism or dualistic realism are reasonable, if not universally acceptable, but in many instances over- or under-emphasis of the relative has caused alarming metaphysical conclusions.

2. PHYSICAL WORLD REJECTED

On the one hand, extreme idealism has led to a rejection of the world except when perceived. Verbal denial does not alter the fact that esse is percipi means nothing more than

16Laher, PSY, 102, 103, and 124.
that to be is to be perceived. What is not perceived is not. To refer to God as the perceiver in the absence of perceiving humans is to retreat from the epistemological battleground and to seek refuge in a village under the constant fire of lack of universal faith. In the last analysis, belief in God is a matter of faith, and even for those who believe in God it must seem unreasonable that he would ask non-believers to have faith that he—presumably non-existent—sustains the world when it is not perceived.

How much more reasonable to suggest "rei i is oeci" with the provision that valid knowledge necessarily be limited to direct knowledge and the proper use of data given in direct knowledge. There appears to be no need for mysticism in ordinary life. Instead of explaining away the world, idealists and dualists would do well to attempt to bring the world to man, as a loving God presumably would.17

3. RELATIVE STRESSED

The most extreme realistic epistemological monism is the New Realism, but even in this modern development consideration has been given the relative in knowledge. Thus we find "still further reflection on the phenomena of error leads to the wise vary of the element of relativity in all knowledge."1

4. SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM SATISFYING

The position of scholasticism in modern consideration of the relative in knowledge is a key to a satisfying

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17 Cf. Annden, 170.
18 Holt, MT, 2.
philosophy.

i. Between the two extremes of New Realism and pessimistic dualism lies the scholastic theory that union of object with mind is a unique union in which the object loses nothing but gains the mind's power of becoming the object. Identity is not the same as union; identity, at least numerical identity which implies destruction of one thing in its becoming the other, destroys the concept of union in favor of an impossible unity. This is especially so in considering the identification of an immaterial mind with material objects.¹⁹

ii. On the other hand, artificial union, made only of arbitrary association of one thing with another, does not penetrate to essences and as a basis of knowledge cannot yield validity. No clearer statement of the unconvincing, opposite position has been given since the time of Spencer when he said:

If \( X \) and \( Y \) are two uniformly connected properties in some outer object, while \( X \) and \( Y \) are the effects which they produce in consciousness; the sole need is that \( X \) and \( Y \) and the relations between them shall always answer to \( X \) and \( Y \) and the relation between them.....their total dissimilarity is no disadvantage.²⁰

a. Knowledge may be relative in the sense that it is not complete, without implying that what is known is untrue.

In God alone exists perfect knowledge because then the object of

¹⁹Montague, Art. 1, 264.
²⁰Spencer, TT, 72-73.
knowledge is identical with the process. God is Pure Act; there is no potency in Him. God's ideas truly are the cause and sole determining principle of things, while our ideas are determined by things.

b. What for Spencer is unknowable is unknowable absolutely and completely, but is knowable relative to our capacity, not to our ability-to-know. How much can be known is determined only by our capacity to grasp, but whatever it is it is true of reality as it is.

c. The menace of disguised Spencerian thought in modern philosophical schools has been frequently cited. Typical is this statement:

A deeply rooted prejudice which involves the far-reaching assumption that knowledge is essentially relative, and as such essentially modifiable, has come to color all speculation on the knowledge problem even where it has not shaped our views concerning the nature of knowledge itself.21

Besides idealism, extreme epistemological dualism, pragmatism, and all other popular theories that knowledge is only a form of self experience which may not correspond essentially with reality, but only harmoniously if it corresponds at all, a new view of the problem has been given under the captivating title of Objective Relativism. Dewey recognized that monism and dualism in their usual forms do not exhaust the possibilities:22

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21Ryan, Art. 2, 19.
"If a man--wants to know something--the last thing he does is merely to contemplate-- He proceeds to **do** something, to bring some energy to bear up on the substance to see how it reacts--". Probably not being familiar with the scholastic mean, he seems to align himself with the school of objective relativists.

iii. Perhaps the most outstanding spokesman for Objective Relativism is Professor Arthur E. Murphy of Brown University. A keen student of the new physics and its philosophical implications, Professor Murphy has written at length on the relativity of the objective, basing his theory on the thoughts of Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead. He brands as invalid the traditional separation of nature from ideas, although he sees between the two the sharpest antithesis with which contemporary philosophy has to deal.23 His alternative is "a thorough-going relativity of character and existence, a duality of objects and events."24

a. Objective relativists concede to the dualists that a perceived object has the quality perceived only because it is perceived. The quality is not an extra-mental object except as it is perceived.

b. Objective relativists concede to the objectivists that the quality is objective--providing, however, that it is perceived. In other words the location of the quality--the relative element, if such there be--is objective, but only when perceived.

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23 Murphy, _ext._ 1, 193.
24 Ibid., '197.
This seeming contradiction disappears when one considers that no one maintains that qualities can be proved to be objective when not perceived; on the other hand no one maintains, at least outspokenly, that perceived qualities are not perceived in relation to something other than the mind.

This relation becomes the essence of the object known. Following the realistic inclination of modern philosophy, Objective Relativism postulates objects existing independently of mind, and then forgets them for the objects of perception—the objects relative to the mind, but somehow objective.

Now while qualities are relative to perception, since color is perceived, the only guarantee that one man's experience of color is the same as another man's experience of the same color is the objectivity of the object experienced. It is essential, to explain every day knowledge, to depart from the Spencerian relativism, in which every subject might have experiences entirely dissimilar from though harmonious arbitrarily with everyone else's, to make the qualities objective.

What we directly perceive are qualities and any such quality is timeless in the sense that—it is repeatable and so far universal. Its nature as quality is not constituted by the circumstances of its occurrence, and hence we may call it an 'eternal object.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{25}\text{Murphy, Art 1, 200.}\)
This is another statement of the view that essence is timeless; it is distinct from existence. "If the essence is truly the essence of the object, as it should be in order that knowledge may be correct, the essence given and the essence in the object are not two but one."\textsuperscript{26}

That-relative is objective may be stated thus:
The relation is an objective relation between a knowing mind and a quality, causing an objective relation possible only from the standpoint at which the perception is possible. If the quality did not exist independently of the mind, it would not be a term in a relation between mind and object, and would never become present before consciousness.

c. It is now quite clear why Objective Relativists limit the essences of the objects—that is the fundamental universal—to qualities, or adjectives. The existence of objects containing the qualities is denied, leaving a universe of integrated qualities, but no substances.

iv. It would appear that knowledge in Objective Relativism is limited to sense knowledge, and that metaphysical dualism is excluded. Yet the function imposed on the physical in perception—the experience of the abstract—would seem to endow the human personality with some sort of a self independent or at least substantial with the power of perceiving. The mind seems to be given a function not easily seen consistent with the theory of pan-objectivism or this new pan-relativism.

\textsuperscript{26}Strong, Art. 1, 241 Cf. also Drake, Art. 1, 26, 27.
v. Murphy denies the existence of substance as such in objects, although giving relations between subject and object an existence not far different from the ordinary meaning of substance. In other words, essence is conceived in relation and qualities constitute the whole of the object. Despite a distinction between the object itself and the sum of its qualities, the object remains a pseudo entity.

"The qualities are not the existent, to be sure, but they are its whole nature, and it has no other." 27

vi. Objective Relativism seems to reverse the usual Lockian relativism, that qualities are subjective, at least secondary qualities, and are given to things by the mind, by suggesting that qualities are objective and the substances, things, are projected by the mind. Qualities can be directly perceived but the subject of qualities has a unique, non-existent being.

vii. Objective Relativism is important to the scholastic because it reveals the impossibility of making the ordinary datum—quality—universal. Qualities are particular, limited by the essence in which they occur. The foundation of the universal tree may be in the green tree, but green as a universal is a distortion of thought. Green is a quality. If it were the universal we should know green without knowing the green tree, for green tree in itself would have no single nature.

27 Murphy, op. cit., 202.
viii. Recognition of the relative element in knowledge and the absurdity of endowing quality, the datum, with universality has been given by a leading realist of the school of Critical Realism:

An essence is a universal in this sense, viz., that precisely the same essence may conceivably be a datum of consciousness over and over again. It is not a universal in the sense in which the term is contrasted with a particular. We have spoken often of the data of perception as 'concrete universals.' They are just as particular, and specific, as they seem to be.28

ix. All the difficulties of other theories of direct knowledge are experienced in Objective Relativism, and the way of escape from the difficulties of erroneous knowledge is not clear. While the relative is the essence of the relation between the mind and its object—quality, it is assumed that a standpoint is taken for experiencing the object and in this standpoint some element is not relative to the percipient. Lovejoy says:

It is assumed that a standpoint is a point for viewing something external to the standpoint, and that many points of view may somehow have a common locus of reference. From my point of view the penny may appear elliptical, from yours, circular; but the phraseology implies that the same object, or at least the same region of space or space-time, is in some sense being viewed by both of us; if this were not implied, the term "point of view" would be meaningless.29

28Drake, Art. 1, 55.
29Lovejoy, RAD, 120.
a. The relativity of subjects as well as objects—in the reality of an organic unity of all creation—is treated in the metaphysically-inclined epistemological doctrine of "perspectivity." This theory is that everyone occupies a certain place in reality. This theory leads directly to idealism's goal of reconciling differences by stressing the subjective.

What you experience is true from your standpoint and to that extent is objectively true. From your point of view, the penny may be circular; then it is circular—from your point of view. To me the penny may be elliptical; this is an objective fact based in the relativity of the event. In other words what is relatively true is objectively true because the relative is objective; it is the fact.

Thus in attempting to reconcile the opposing elements in monism and dualism, Objective Relativism has dissipated the real object which is essential to valid knowledge. Whatever is objective is relative to the person knowing; yet this is all that can be attained. Therefore this relativity is the objective fact of reality. The hopelessness of such a position is readily seen.

Had the Objective Relativist based his universals in things—unchanging substances—instead of in the relative, changing qualities, the conclusions of his reasoning would have been greatly similar to if not identical with the scholastic position.

b. Extending the concept of fact to experience from
various standpoints—everyone has his own standpoint—leads to monstrous conclusions, among them that a fact today may be false tomorrow. Going beyond pragmatism, which, in the ideal sense bases its theory on the truism that what is true works, although it too has had the misfortune to judge truth solely by workability, Objective Relativism maintains that a penny is both round and circular depending upon the standpoint.

Proof of the falsity of the view is logically impossible, since the question is based on empirical data and defies reason. To assert that the penny is round would amount to no more than to say it is round from the standpoint to which it appears round, but that to the standpoint from which it appears elliptical it would appear elliptical. Any choice of a particular standpoint would be declared unfair and subjective, as distinguished from the objective nature of validity.

G. PROOF OF THE SCHOLASTIC POSITION

The fore-going rapid survey of conflicting views on the relativity of knowledge has shown that dualism and idealism are not alone in making all knowledge ultimately relative to the human mind. The reason is the evident discrepancy between data perceived and actually existing objects. The attempt of Objective Relativism to reduce the relativity to a difference in standpoint does no more than re-state the problem. That there is relativity in knowledge must be admitted. Otherwise, knowledge once acquired would be perfect. Error would be a non-entity; change in thought would always be acquisition of new ideas con-
sistent with all previous ideas. In fact, if truth is relative to a standpoint, it is difficult to see how error occurs.

1. CAPACITY OF MIND

"Quidquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur."

In this centuries-old axiom is contained the grounds for believing that knowledge is relative—but relative only to the capacity of the mind. What is received is true; but not all is received. There is a vast difference between the statement that what is known is objectively true, but not all is known, and nothing of the objective world can be known but our ideas of it.

i. Rickaby quotes St. Thomas thus: "Intellectual truth consists in the equation between mind and reality in consequence of which the mind affirms that the object really is what it is..."30

The object in this instance is the substance of the being, the direct object of the mind. But material things are made up of qualities as well as substances. These qualities constitute the particular.

ii. Direct knowledge—in the purest form approaching intuition, except that the process can be analyzed,—is of the essence of the object; it is knowledge of the universal existing formally (as a universal) in the mind and fundamentally (as an essence true of many and limited to no one of a class)

---30 Rickaby, FP, 17.
in the object. The entire material object is known indirectly by empirical examination and reflection. The process is similar to the first step in the inductive process. The indirection is of process; error is possible, but the data are in the object; they are not mental phenomena.

It is evident that complete truth will not be achieved in many instances. It is contrary to man's nature to learn all about anything. But complete truth of certain things in themselves is possible, although the relations implied must ever be only partially known since man does not live long enough to solve all the problems of the universe.31

iii. Man is able to receive only a limited part of truth, but that limited part is truth of reality as it is. Where previously we accepted knowledge as admitting of truth or error, the latter being incorrect knowledge, we now insist that the term adequation means true relation of object to the mind. False presentation of the object is clearly inadequation, and adequation between mind and object is essential to knowledge.

"It is not necessary....that thought embrace the entire object; to what extent there is conformity, to that extent is there logical truth."32

iv. Essence as it exists in the mind differs from essence which exists in the thing only in that it is stripped of material conditions. This does not affect essence as essence,
but simply bears out our axiom.

Essence in the material object is individuated, in the mind it is stripped of individuating notes and becomes immaterial.

Essence in a thing is relatively inferior to essence in the mind; and both are inferior to essence in God's mind. In each instance the relativity is due to the nature of matter which is opposed to knowledge.

a. In none of the three instances, however, is essence regarded as essence. In the object, it is regarded as substance of a material object; in the mind it is regarded as the universal stripped of material conditions but thought by a mind extrinsically dependent upon a body and, therefore, imperfect; in God's mind the essence is perfected.

b. All three instances are instances of essences in relation or essence contained in something. But always, essence as essence, is the same. It prescinds from existence. It is the same in the mind as in the object and as in God's mind. Numerical identity is of essence, though existence may alter our conception of it.

c. Essence is distinct from existence. Only in God are essence and existence identical.

d. It is because essence and existence constitute individuals that all truth is not immediately given in knowledge. Essence can be studied; a wide variety of qualities constituting
the essence can be considered without the existence of the object. On the other hand, one can say a gologosh can exist without apprehending the nature of a gologosh. The term gologosh signifies an essence. All words are arbitrary signs. We can conceive a nature not now existing and call it gologosh, and if such a being, conforming to the concept, came into existence it would truly have its own essence which we choose arbitrarily to call gologosh.

e. Thus, in knowledge of essence, that knowledge is direct. But it is not as perfect as God's knowledge. It is true, but partial. That knowledge is not partially false; it is true, but not completely extended. Parts may remain unknown; what is known is true.

f. Direct knowledge is relative to God's knowledge which is all-inclusive. It is not relative to things; the essence (object) is identical in mind and object. The mind has become the object, the former with the abstract universal nature, the latter limited to the individual. But essence qua essence is identical in one with the other. The mode of existence is distinct from the question of knowledge.

2. KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Individual objects are composed of matter and form. But matter is directly opposed to knowledge. Knowledge is of immaterial essence by an immaterial agent, at least knowledge of universals which is the basis of science and knowledge in its highest human form.

33Part, Art. 1, 23.
a. Consequently, knowledge of individuals is arrived at by the intellect after reception of the universal essence. The process is indirect. Knowledge of individuals is in the form of judgment, and judgment is the source of error. 34

b. Knowledge of matter in itself is impossible. We speak of chairs, tables, even electrons and protons, but each of these implies a form of matter. The form is the knowable aspect. Matter without form is inconceivable.

When a thing is known it is known as a form; and anything further known about it is known as dependent on this form. Form is the unit of being and of knowledge. When an object is perceived its form is in the percipient as well as in the object. Perception tells us that a piece of gold is yellow, heavy, etc. The underlying substratum in which the qualities adhere cannot be perceived. This means that matter is unknowable. But the form is knowable and the qualities belong to the form. 35

We can see now that the root of dualism is in failure to recognize the component aspects of reality, matter and form. If no form exists reality is unknowable. So also is the reason for God's more complete knowledge evident. God knows matter directly, while we cannot even infer matter although we are directly acquainted with form. We know matter exists, but lack the power to define it:

34 Cf. Ante, 55.
35 Bart, Art. 1, 23.
Whenever we state properties of a body in terms of physical quantities we are imparting knowledge of the response of various metrical indicators to pressure and nothing more. 

ii. Individuals of the same nature, or essence, exist and become objects of the mind. Direct knowledge, in psychological as well as epistemological terms, is not concerned with the individuals, but with the form which determines them beings of a certain nature.

a. Knowledge of the individual thus is relative to knowledge of the universal as contained in each individual and formally existing, stripped of individuality, in the mind alone. Thus is the individual an indirect object of the mind.

b. When an object is perceived in the distance and its nature becomes known, much remains to be known about the individual. This additional data is learned by reflection, by closer acquaintance. It will be clear that the relativity is due exclusively to the psychological structure of the mind.

c. The psychological limitations are indisputable. We have five external senses besides the internal common sense which associates the data of two or more external senses. With more senses we should know more about any object. In no case would we know more about the essence, but it would be possible for us to know more about the individual.

d. Despite the limitation, however, knowledge of

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36 Eddington, NFW, 303.
individuals, provided by the senses, like knowledge of essence, is valid as far as it goes. This naive realism is the view of common sense. It is the uncomplicated, unsophisticated view for whose rejection no reason is at once apparent.

In this sense, knowledge of the individual is direct, since that knowledge conforms to the individual; it acquaints the mind with the individual as it is and not in any dualistic symbolism. True, because of limited senses, the acquaintance is partial. Yet it is accurate as far as it goes.

In the wide and more important sense this is directness in knowledge. The fact that errors of the senses and seeming untrustworthiness of non-intellectual functions of the human personality are the cause of dualism and idealism need not deter us in defense of this doctrine of direct knowledge of essence and direct acquaintance with the individual.

Many others, not at all in sympathy with scholasticism, have defended the view: We may mention one: "To say that sense experience is partial and provisional is true enough, but need not lead to wholesale distrust of testimony of the senses."37

e. The scholastic position is that under normal conditions, the conditions of valid knowledge referred to previously,38 the senses present the material world directly to the mind. The mind, in its indirect psychologica] process, may

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37 Laird, BR, 44.
38 Cf. Ante, 46.
modify certain of the data. Thus the color blind man may not insist upon the colors he attributes to an object.

The problem of error is no more difficult for this position—which is close to if not identical with naive realism—than for any other. The hackneyed instance of the straight stick appearing bent in the water is no problem to the scholastic. The data presented by the senses are correct: the stick appears bent. The thinking human being aware of elementary scientific laws or even an intelligent observer of the phenomenon will then understand the meaning of refraction. Other senses, touch in this instance, correct the report of vision. In no case is there evidence that reality deceived all senses and the intellect.

In the instance of the straight stick in the water, the stick is the proper object of the sense of touch. Just as one would not judge the perfume of the rose by the sense of sight, neither should one depend on the sense of sight for knowledge of an object not properly related to vision.

1. Unless the senses put us into direct contact with reality as it is; unless the senses are the organs through which consciousness reaches reality, as naive realism has maintained, 39 direct knowledge is an untenable hypothesis because in the last analysis even the direct universal is abstracted from the individual, although the individual as such is known subsequently.

38 cf. ante, 56.
39 Alpern, I. P., 356.
This is well expressed by a professor of epistemology at Providence College:

Direct universal is the very nature, or whiteness of a thing, inasmuch as it is directly perceived by the intellect, abstractly considered from the principles of individuation and from all material conditions. In John, e.g., there exists the whiteness or nature by which John is a man, and there are also the principles of individuation by which John is this man. The principles of individuation are perceived by the sensitive cognitive faculties, but since simple apprehension is an act of the mind by which we know what a certain thing is, when by simple apprehension John is known, we perceive concerning him what he is, viz. his whiteness, his nature separated from the individuation. That nature perceived in this way is called the direct universal.

Father Galliher reasons that "The external senses are ordained either to the perceiving..... or sensible external objects or to nothing; but the second is absurd, erro."  

Regarding the senses:

The senses, when in their normal condition and exercised upon their proper sensible objects, are criteria of truth, under proper conditions. (The proper conditions are that the faculty be in its normal state; that the proper object be suitably disposed; that the medium between the faculty and the object be well proportioned, e.g., too much light blinds the eyes.) Errors arising from the senses are not properly attributable to the senses but to the intellect. Error is found only in judgment. But senses do not judge; therefore, the senses, properly speaking, do not deceive us. When they are diseased, or when any cause modifies or impairs the sensation, the senses cannot but receive the sensation so modified.

Galliher, II, 9.

Ibid., 50. Also, ef. post, Add. em, 169.
or so impaired, and transmit it as they receive it to the intellect. Hence, the intellect should not be precipitous in judging, and should take into account any abnormal conditions under which the sensation may be produced. 42

9. Can there be any doubt that everyone knows when his senses deceive him, at least on some occasions? Are there not many occasions on which we firmly believe the senses give accurate knowledge? One looks more closely at a picture through simple faith in the senses.

h. Another limitation of knowledge is due to failure to think. The mind immediately perceives essences, but identification of the essence is dependent upon the mind's knowledge. Just as the body needs physical food, so the mind needs mental food. Knowledge is dependent not only upon the power of the intellect but also upon its development.

3. KNOWLEDGE IS A COGNITIVE UNIT.

i. To assume that the senses are stimulated to certain responses by particular causes which are not directly experienced by the senses is to provide a fundamental dualism between sense and its object which cannot be overcome.

ii. That external qualities, differing from sensations in that sensations are the subjective expression of the qualities, cause sensible knowledge is perfectly evident. To admit, however, that from this it must follow that our senses

42 Ibid, 31, 32.
are sometimes deceived because sensations do not exist objectively is to slip into a theory of subjectivism which it is the whole purpose of this paper to refute.

a. Knowledge of individuals is indirect in the sense that the mind knows first the universal nature and secondarily the existence of that nature in an individual. At no time is the universal or individual inferred from a sensation or an idea. The sensation and idea present the object to the mind, somewhat as field glasses present distant objects to the eyes. The mind may be unaware of the glasses, just as it is unaware of the idea.

b. Sensations are related to the qualities which stimulate them in a process far different from the mind-essence union. Identical essences may have various individual qualities, and the mind in considering the qualities may need reflection. In no case, however, is the essence inferred from the qualities—it is the form of the object—although inference from the essence as formally existing in the mind may modify the percept. Percept here is used as distinguished from sensation by Brennan:
Because of the objective and subjective character implied in every sensation, the psychologist distinguishes between sensation, as such, and percept. Thus when we regard the modification of a sense organ merely as a subjective state or when we view the process simply as issuing in consciousness of an affection of the organism, we are dealing with sensation. When, on the other hand, it is the external reality given in the act of sensation that is indicated, or when the sensation is localized and consciously projected into the external world from which it originated, and associated with its appropriate object, then it is a percept with which we are treating.

Thus when I drink water after eating ice cream, by inference I realize that the sensation of warmth is not accurate. Strictly speaking a condition of knowledge—normal condition of the senses—is absent.

4. QUALITIES

1. It is clear now that qualities, primary or secondary, are here regarded as attributes of things, knowable as they are. The view presented is the direct opposite of Locke's view that "secondary qualities...are nothing in the objects themselves, but the powers to produce certain sensations in us..." 44

Locke divides qualities into primary and secondary. The primary are the mind-independent qualities such as solidity, extension, motion, etc. and the secondary, having no existence other than as the result of a power in an object to cause certain sensations. 45

43 Brennan, PSY, 32.
44 Locke, EOCLe, 94.
45 Alpern, MP, 161.
Berkeley went farther than Locke, denying the objectivity of primary as well as secondary qualities.\(^{46}\)

ii. Adhering to the Thomistic doctrine of the objectivity of qualities and the theory that knowledge is a true re-creation of reality, many modern scholastics maintain that no distinction should be made between primary and secondary qualities.

Thus we find three reasons for belief in the objectivity of primary and secondary qualities as they are experienced:

a. Because the grounds for admitting or rejecting the externality of both classes of qualities are the same:

b. Because philosophers who proceed to reject the secondary soon reject the primary also:

c. Because 'impressions' of color, sound, taste, smell, etc. demand corresponding external 'causes' just as much as extension, or the \(^{47}\) 'primary' or 'common' sense percepts.

iii. The view is not universal among scholastics,\(^{48}\) but it seems to be the only consistent view. Just as the formal essence exists in the mind as a universal and only fundamentally in the thing,\(^{49}\) so is there no distortion of reason to conceive the same quality having a different mode of existence in sensation and objective reality. Surely, sensation is not objective; neither, however, need quality be subjective. Quality can exist in potency in the object and in act in the sensation. But the quality is not thereby changed.

\(^{46}\) Aveling, CUI, 46.
\(^{47}\) Coffey, EPI, II, 108.
\(^{48}\) Ball, \(^{\text{FF}}, 1, 280.\)
\(^{49}\) Cf. ante, 45.
Candy can be sweet without possessing the sensation of sweetness. Sound need not be confused with the hearing of sound. Sound may be vibration or waves when not in sensation; it may be noise in sensation. But it is still vibration and it is still sound whether sensed or not.

5. DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

i. There is no relativity in direct intellectual knowledge of the object: essence in the mind is identical with essence outside the mind. Error may arise in judgment when knowledge goes beyond essence to existence. This is due to imperfection of the mind. Nevertheless concerning essences there is no necessary reason for error.

   a. The universal, abstracted from the material individual, is known first. This knowledge is most direct and involves only the physiological process of receiving an impression. The mind is united with the essence in the thing. The idea is born of this union, as an after-event.

   b. The individual is known indirectly from the universal, but there is no process of inference such as occurs in formal reasoning. Matter is opposed to direct knowledge which is a union of an immaterial mind and an immaterial form of a material object. The individual, therefore, strictly speaking, is known directly from the standpoint of validity, but indirectly from the standpoint of psychological process.

   c. Judgments are relative because they affirm or deny a relation. In valid judgments objective truth is asserted
and objective reality accurately known.

d. Knowledge, even direct knowledge, is not complete, and in this sense it is relative to the capacity of the mind to know.

e. Man is a substantial unit. Mind and body form the person. The functional nature of consciousness—so often confused with faculty psychology of which St. Thomas was not an exponent—imposes limitations on knowledge in all men. Differences in knowledge may be due to "individual differences" among men.

f. In all men, as distinguished from brutes and all other beings except God, an immaterial mind is directly united to an objective form made up of the essence of an actually existing being. The essence is common to all similar beings. This essence is directly present in the mind. Knowledge beyond that is relative to the operation of the mind. If the mind turns immediately to the individual, knowledge is of the directly present material being. If memory, imagination, or internal senses are the basis of intellectual action, knowledge is indirect. It has besides the partial aspect imposed on all knowledge the further disadvantage of vagueness.

ii. Concerning qualities

a. Secondary qualities are objective, but objectively they are not identical with sensations. Sensations are necessarily subjective. What is usually overlooked is that qualities as qualities are not subjective creations but corre-
spond with sensations in a manner more productive of true knowledge than would be the subjective experience of the actual objective qualities as described by physics.

Each correspondence in every detail... would practically be useless for knowledge... We'd not want to know how many billion times a second there is vibration (although our ability to know is evidence of directness of presentation, and this ability is possible only through use of senses) but what in general are the qualities of an extended thing which we wished to distinguish from some other thing. And for the purpose of distinction the 'qualities' of sensation are extremely efficient... Nor can it be said that the senses deceive us by leading us to believe that what is subjective is objective. If you asked the plain man what color is, he will reply it is a quality in the object, and that is true; for, according to the scientists, it consists in the power of the object to analyze light by absorbing some rays and reflecting others... The plain man knows that colors are objectively different... Even in regard to sensation there is a certain correspondence between it and the qualities of objects, and were it greater than what it is the value of sensation as the id quod percipitur would be lessened instead of increased. 51

b. Since direct knowledge, actual presence of the objective quality in the subject, would be a disadvantage rather than an advantage, there seems to be valid grounds for the believer in a loving God to maintain that knowledge which should be direct is direct. The purpose of conditional knowledge in the experience of qualities is evident, but correspondence as

50 Parenthetical Matter Mine.

the only basis for knowledge of other objects seems to fill no purpose. Mind and objective reality can be separate without requiring a representative form of knowledge. It is desirable in the knowledge of essences and primary qualities simply that we know them as they are. The ultimate elements of secondary qualities can be reached by science.

But this at least is clear, that a theory of perception and perceptual knowledge which is to meet the acquirements of modern science will have to have something in its general character very much like that of Thomas. It will have to combine...the two complementary positions that our knowledge of the world about our bodies is mediated in fact by highly complicated processes of a special kind and that as knowledge it is direct unmodified apprehension not of ideas or images but of actual, physical reality. 52

c. Perhaps no one has given more thought to the problem of perception in the scholastic theory of direct knowledge than has James H. Ryan. His conclusion is that epistemologists begin their study at the wrong point. Dr. Ryan minimizes the importance of a sound theory of perception. In reply to Professor Sellars' attempted refutation of natural realism, 53 Ryan says:

52 Taylor, PS, 256.
53 Sellars, PPP.
No one questions the fact that perception is an intricate process nor that sense illusions entail numerous difficulties for a realistic theory of knowledge. But the intricacies of perception and the difficulties begotten by illusions are matters for psychology to investigate and pass judgment upon. The existence of such difficulties leads no farther than the conclusion that perception is a complex affair, and every psychologist affirms as much. They do not prove that the man in the street is wrong when he asserts he has seen a red book.54

Ryan illustrates his position with the example of the stick in the water, noting that perception "is mere awareness, it gives nothing beyond the appearances of things."55 But, he continues, whether these appearances are whole or only part of the reality perceived depends on an ulterior act, that of judgment..." if there is any question about what the object is.56

d. We have been trying to bring out implicitly what will be considered in detail in the next chapter, namely, that objectively reality is dualistic in the same manner as man is dualistic. This means simply that real dualism consists in the union of subject (matter) and form (essence).

If objects are not real beings, unified dualities of matter and form, then the refutation of the natural realism straw-man is a major blow to all realistic schools.

If, however, as this writer interprets scholastic epistemology in its relation to psychology and metaphysics, particularly the latter, objects are not mere aggregations of

54 Ryan, Art. 1, 246.
55 Ibid, 251.
56 Loc. cit.
qualities, but are substantial beings with determined (material) as well as determining (formal) aspects, the fact of differences in perception under different conditions is not fundamental; it is a problem for psychology to consider, but not one for philosophy which seeks to study fundamental reality apart from accidental, or superficial, phenomena.

e. Recall and recognition of objects, commonly termed memory, constitute an act which is regarded as a death-blow to purely realistic systems, unless the system adopt the extreme objectivism of New Realism.

Professor Sellars remarks:

The similarity between the datum of perception and the datum of memory suggests that both are internal and somehow bound up with the individual who is perceiving and remembering.57

This is unquestionably true, but as Ryan points out:

Every datum when perceived is taken up into the mind and becomes mental. Manifestly, perception is impossible where the datum cannot be taken up into the mind and made one with it by mental act for nothing can be perceived until it is brought into cognitive relations with the perceiver. Assuming, however, that an object is related to a perceiving mind does not change the reality of the object, but only our perception of it... A datum need not be exclusively either internal or external, but may at one and the same time be both.58

57 Sellars, op. cit., 52.
58 Ryan, Art. 1, 256.
The problem of how we remember or even more fundamental questions of how and why we perceive seem to be unanswerable. They are given facts just as are the data which have the capacity to be objective and mental at one and the same time. This is no concession to critical realism, for in that view qualities which are determining principles determine nothing, and the escape from idealism or extreme dualism is only verbal. We regard objects as something more than the "quality-groups" of Critical Realism.

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59 Pratt, Art. 1, 91.
CHAPTER VI

THE METAPHYSICAL SITUATION

Unfortunately, St. Thomas Aquinas, whose doctrines form a consistent basis for modern scholastic position, did not consider the epistemological question of the immediacy of knowledge in any complete treatise. As a matter of fact, epistemology had not been constituted as a separate branch of philosophy in his day. Epistemological questions were included in treatments of metaphysical and logical problems. The term epistemology is believed to have been first used by J. F. Ferrier about the middle of the nineteenth century.¹

The fact that there was no formal epistemology, however, did not deter St. Thomas or even his predecessors from considering the questions involved, although solutions were spread over many pages and could be assembled only after examination of discussions of numerous other questions to which the epistemological implications were incidental.

This has led to varying interpretations of St. Thomas' position and to differences among modern scholastics who have based their teachings on the theories of the Angelic Doctor.

Besides the two idealistic and materialistic forms, immediate knowledge has been given three interpretations:

¹Rohrbaugh, MAP, 359.
Now it would seem that what is immediately present to the intellect in conception must be either the mental modification itself (from which a real extra-mental object would be somehow inferred—by a process which, according to Kant and others, never could reveal to us this extra-mental object as it really is); or else the reality itself which has its real being outside the mind, or independently of cognition, but is made present to the mind through the mental modification; or else a mentally constructed object whose ultimate constituent factors are reproductions or represent actions of extra-mental reality, and in which construction, therefore, the intellect sees, or can see, without any properly inferential process, this latter reality. These alternatives appear to be exhaustive.  

The first alternative is dualistic; the latter two are scholastic. In this thesis the writer rejects the third alternative in favor of the second:

The reality itself which has its real being outside the mind, or independently of cognition, is made present to the mind through the mental modification.  

Authority for this view is given by Coffey, who, with a majority of scholastics opposes representative realism as unprovable because the representations of reality may be inadequate. He says:

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2Coffey, EPI, I, 265.
3Loc. cit.
If this argument is intended to prove that the entity which is present to the intellect as a thought object, which has a mental presence or esse ideale there, is really other than the entity which has an esse reale, or a reality independent of thought, that the former entity is not really identical with, but is of course a faithful if inadequate representative of, the latter,—the argument does not seem to us to be proved.4

The scholastic position now is clear: the real thing is the direct object of the mind. We now proceed to an analytic study of the reasons for the position.

A. THE NATURE OF THE GIVEN

The danger of basing philosophy, especially a theory of knowledge, on insubstantial data, i.e. sense data either as objective or subjective, particular or universal, is clearly illustrated in two directly opposed views to be discussed here in introducing the exhaustive scholastic contention.

The question to be considered is the nature of the given in knowledge: Is it the object as sense data? (Russell). Is it experience based solely on response of the organism in a manner acceptable almost by solipsists?5 (Dewey). Or is it the extra-mental essence of the thing? (Scholastic).

We saw in the chapter on relativity that psychological activity is a mediate process, that judgment is complex and hence inferential. The immediacy sought for in epistemology is simply between subject and object. Judgment and reasoning,

4 Ibid., 267.
5 Rohrbaugh, NAP, 374.
memory, anticipation, abstract principles, etc., as we have stressed before, have no place. Such knowledge is mediate. It is as Russell states,\(^6\) knowledge by description, a hearsay, either from another or one's own store of knowledge without the direct presence of an object.

1. ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE

The right to call acquaintance knowledge has been questioned but in the limited sense in which it will be used here there will probably be no disagreement. Any denial of the knowledge element, of course, will not be a denial of acquaintance but of knowledge.\(^7\)

The origin of the expression knowledge by acquaintance cannot be credited to Russell, although it became common in philosophy largely through his distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. There is no objection to his statement of knowledge by description provided that what has been said about sense knowledge in our discussion of relativity in knowledge is kept in mind. The scholastic view includes intellectual knowledge based in a metaphysical dualism far different from Russell's view, but his insistence on the knowledge quality in acquaintance is in sympathy with the scholastic version here defended.\(^8\)

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\(^6\)Russell, POP, 71.
\(^7\)Brightman, ITP, 83, 98 (esp. 83n).
\(^8\)Russell, op. cit., 72, 92.
We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of my table I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table—its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are things of which I am immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching my table.9

Russell then points out that this immediate knowledge is perfect and complete acquaintance with the sense-data, and no further knowledge of them themselves, considered individually as color, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc., is even theoretically possible.10

2. DEWEY'S VIEW

Opposed to Russell's belief that acquaintance is really knowledge is the view of Dewey expressed in the first series of Paul Carus Lectures.11

Dewey, a pragmatist, finds it impossible to tell what is immediately in consciousness—not because it is concealed in mystery but "for the same reason that we cannot tell just what sweet or red immediately is: it is something had, not communicated or known."12

Whereas Russell extends immediate knowledge to universals and self-evident truths, and identifies consciousness of things with immediate knowledge of them,13

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9Ibid., 73.
10Ibid., 73, 74.
11Dewey, MAE, 18 et passim.
12Ibid., 707, cit., 171.
13Russell, of cit., 171.
Dewey, following Hegel, presses his conviction that there is no merely immediate knowledge to the conclusion that:

If an all-inclusive consciousness were to exist it would be a piece of esthetic scenery, interesting or tedious as the case might be, but having no conceivable cognitive standing.

3. RUSSELL NOT A SCHOLASTIC

It must not be deduced from these quotations that Russell is expounding scholasticism and Dewey solipsism. The scholastic tinge to Russell's theory is its claim that acquaintance gives knowledge and if union of mind and object is direct, then acquaintance gives direct knowledge.

On the other hand, Dewey is correct in stating that an all-inclusive consciousness which is idea is unintelligible. So overwhelming is such a concept that to understand it one would have to be such an all-inclusive consciousness. How else could it be experienced?

Thus from two opposing points of view we have admissions confirming the limited nature of knowledge by simple apprehension and sense experience—as admitted in the chapter on relativity in knowledge; and we have the further admission that direct knowledge is either knowledge in the proper sense (Russell) or something really "had" (Dewey). After allowing for

14 Dewey, op. cit., 322.
15 Ibid., 323.
Dewey's militant pragmatism and biological emphasis (reaction), it is clear that each might be confirming the thesis here presented.

Scholastics agree with Dewey, as far as he goes. If man is merely a thinking animal, if sense, and not intellect, is the distinctive attribute, and if the biological emphasis is correct, then the human organism seeks only its own well-being. Senses truly are ordained to pragmatic ends.

The senses respond...not so much to give us an exact picture of things as they are in themselves, but rather to give us the required data for proper manipulation of the things for guiding us properly in our environment.

B. THE COGNITIVE UNION

In our definition of knowledge, we stated that knowledge is a unique phenomenon indefinable apart from itself and its process. So in any study of the union of mind and object in knowledge, the process antecedent to the union must be considered.

While direct comparison is impossible because of the unique nature of knowledge, scholastics, aware that the immanence of the object some way in the knowing subject threatens the metaphysical dualism in the system as a whole, seek to define the cognitive union by analogy. The result is indicative of the soundness of the view, although no claim is made that the

processes considered jointly are the same.

1. ASSIMILATION

In his physical aspect man thrives through assimilation. The body assimilates food, retaining what is needed and rejecting what is not adapted for assimilation.

Similarly does the mind acquire its food—reality. Food taken in by the body comes from the outside; knowledge taken in by the mind comes from an extra-mental zone. Just as the body rejects physical matter, not food, which forms part of the material assimilated, so does the mind reject much of that with which it is confronted to derive its proper object.

i. Animals, lacking intellectual capacity, can never acquire the essences of things; can never universalize. Acquaintance with the material object is the extent of animal knowledge.

ii. Man has an intellectual as well as a physical aspect. The concrete object known through the senses is divested of its material elements by the mind, and the mind’s direct object becomes the essence of the object.

*E.g.* The wood that constitutes a tree might as well constitute a cabin. Change in the object is change in form, not in matter. Yet it is the form which determines the object to be what it is. The matter in all things ultimately is probably the same. Form is the determining characteristic.

No matter what one’s theory of knowledge may be, no one would maintain either that anything exists without form or that form is identical with matter. In the first instance, our
inability to conceive formless matter would make the assertion absurd. In the second instance, if form were identified with matter in an ultimate manner, i.e. indistinguishable from matter, a present tree could not be a future cabin.

Matter is determinable. It can receive a variety of forms. Thus an apple eaten by a man loses its own form and becomes part of the matter determined by the man's form.

In knowledge, if the union of mind and object were a material union, as in physical assimilation, the object would lose its identity and become part of the subject. Materialistic pantheism, an untenable metaphysical hypothesis, would result.

2. IMMATERIAL UNION

In order to apprehend the object, then, an immaterial union must be formed between the space-transcending forms. That mind is space-transcending is obvious from its functions; that form is space-transcending is equally clear when it is noted that increase or decrease in matter has no effect on form, provided the change is only quantitative. In fact, the theory of form is based on the indifference of matter in itself.

i. The mind in apprehending the object assimilates it by perceiving the form, i.e. by effecting in the object an existential, not essential, change; what exists as a concrete individual, essence, is perceived by the mind as a universal. That intellectual assimilation differs from physical assimilation, indicating a difference in the objects united, is clear.

\[ \text{The essence is the same in mind and object, except that in the former it is known to be applicable to many and in the latter, it is particular.} \]
When it is noted that an intellectual change in the world is existential, as distinguished from essential, leaving the object as it is, while physical change is essential. The intellect is competent to raise objects to the level of intuitional perception is indicated well in the elevation of non-living matter to the status of living matter by the body in assimilation.

ii. The same mind which knows the essence is the mind which is conscious in sensation. The sensation has as object the species sensibilis which is in the thing. In choosing this interpretation, the objectivity of sensation, we are continuing in accordance with the principles and views of Laher and Walker expounded in the chapter on the relativity of knowledge.

Laher is very specific on the point, rebutting the common conviction that scholastics believe sensation serves as a mirror of reality. He says:

Rejecting the interpretation of species as roving images, and every theory conceiving them as representations mediating between the object and the cognitive faculty, the thought embodied in the doctrine is thoroughly sound...there is not a merely arbitrary connection between the object and its apprehension. The latter is a true, though psychical expression of the former.
Parethetically he says:

It should be unnecessary to repeat that the mirror, picture, impression of the story, etc., and all physical examples are utterly inadequate to express the mind's action, and that these terms are only used figuratively. 21

The clear conclusion to this reasoning is that sense knowledge is not knowledge of a immaterial element in the object as the immaterial form is known by the mind as the species intelligibilis. It is known as the material thing. Both are in the object and immediately given to the respective cognitive processes.

a. The various interpretations placed on the term species sensibilis are due to St. Thomas' original characterization of it causing a spiritual change in the subject. Since, however, animals have sense knowledge, but no immaterial mind comparable to the soul of man, it appears St. Thomas called the change spiritual to differentiate it from natural change.

This can be illustrated in physical terms: when I drink water, the water becomes part of me. The change is a natural change, i.e., a change in matter as well as form. On the other hand when I know water, I receive the form of water but not the matter. Since it is the form which determines the essence, it is valid to say that I have the form of the water,
a non-natural change in us and not destructive of the water. The term spiritual is used to distinguish the cognitive passage of a sense and object from potency to act, an instance of change. Under this provision, animals without intelligence can be said to receive the same esse spiritual as that received by man. To consider that which is received as immaterial and to suppose that animals receive it would be to postulate in animals a mind similar to the human mind.

b. There is no real change in the object and no real change in the subject; there is cognitive union of the two which is unmediated. Knowledge results from the union, not from inferences based either on sensations or ideas. There is ample evidence that the point has been missed by many who regard the "change" as a creation of a representation of the object--its mediate possession--or as a term applicable to the physical representation of the object in the sense.

It was in answer to such theories that Lecher made the explanation just quoted above. Such interpretations have come from scholastics as well as non-scholastics. Witness: "This spiritual change is the famous species sensibilis, which is consequently nothing but a passion or affection, of the peripheral sense organs, a mode of notion..."22

22 Turner, HOP, p. 364.
3. FORM NOT SELF-EXISTENT

Although the species sensibilis, the proper object of knowledge, is the form of the object, it does not exist extramontally as form. It has the function of being the essence of certain matter.28

i. The intellect is able to grasp the form in a purely immaterial way; the senses cannot divest the object of its material conditions. The object of the mind then is the species intelligibilis, and the object of the senses is the species sensibilis. Both truly are the object. Form in itself, however, is not limited; hence intellectual knowledge is of the universal. Form in extra-mental existence is confined to matter and cannot be separated from its existence.

ii. Since knowledge is applicable to a material world, made up of individuals, knowledge of individuals is not psychologically direct. Matter is opposed to knowledge; knowledge is of form. Only in the individuals are forms limited by matter. Thus is the assertion valid that intellectual knowledge of the form—the universal—is pure and direct, approaching the commonly accepted conception of intellectual intuition. But knowledge of the individual, limited by matter, is indirect in process, although, as has been shown above, the individual object is the real object as it is.

iii. External senses, nerve processes, brain action,

28 Walker, TK, 361.
etc. are essential to knowledge of individuals. Strictly speaking, however, absence of these entities is not the precise reason why material beings do not know. The inability of material beings to assimilate forms other than their own is the basic reason. This is the supreme distinction between mind and matter. Only because of its immaterial, spiritual nature can mind assimilate other forms. The mind really becomes its object; it assimilates the form of the object; an immaterial union.

The opposition of material being to knowledge is rooted in this metaphysical fact. Knowledge of singulars includes besides sense knowledge, elements added by the intellect’s concept: in composition there is an absence of the simplicity which gives pure knowledge—intuition.

iv. Knowledge is rooted in the immaterial union of the form of the object and the mind. The form as such, as known by the mind, is divested of material constituents and is a formal universal, belonging no more to the present individual than to others in the same class. The differences within a given class are not specific; they are accidental. Each class is a class by reason of the species, different from other members of the proximate genus in which it is a member.

v. The mind in assimilating its object raises it from its material conditions to an immaterial form. Yet the dependence of a mind on body for contact with reality limits the direct object of the intellect to the form of material beings.
Hence, man's knowledge cannot be as high as God's for whom all reality can be elevated to the status of immateriality. God's knowledge is entirely intuitive because he is entirely immaterial and psycho-physical interaction is absent. In man, psycho-physical interaction is a single process, presenting the material world as it is, but the material basis of sense knowledge, in which form is perceived, renders knowledge imperfect.

vi. Matter, as such, according to this view cannot be known. The most minute analysis can only reveal the form of matter. Our sense knowledge is of material form as it occurs in individuals; intellectual knowledge is of the universal form. This, of course, is in the initial state of knowledge. There is no parallelism between mind and body. The same soul, or consciousness, or intellect and will, is the active as well as the passive organ of knowledge of the real world as it is.

vii. Centuries after scholastics had first stated the fact, the opposition of matter to knowledge was made the basis of important and powerful philosophies. Dualism results from a denial of the substantial nature of material beings—composed of matter and form; monism rests on the theory that assimilation of real forms by the mind would change the mind substantially. Thus dualism is defeated by matter, assuming it to be impenetrable by the mind; monism, on the other hand, creates a gigantic machine-world in which the gears inter-lock without interpenetrating.

The consistency of the scholastic position with the denial of the metaphysics implied by dualism and monism is
valuable as a confirmation of its internal consistency.

But most impressive perhaps is the internal consistency of the scholastic view considered with two other views, each of which has eminent defenders,—pan-psychism and organism. The scholastic theory that the root-cause of the inability of material beings to know is the inability of material beings to assimilate other forms without being substantially changed— in contrast to the human mind—is perfectly consistent with theories, in which form is scorned, holding that there is an unconscious intercourse (prehension) among the various constituents of reality. Except for regarding man as a unique being, scholasticism is consistent with any panism.

viii. It has been the purpose of this section to show that the existence of form in each material object as the determining principle of the matter is essential to direct knowledge. If objects are merely collections of qualities, the mind has no proper direct object, dualism is inevitable. Without presenting elaborate metaphysical proofs, including the transcendental properties of unity, being, and singularity and the implied constitution of singulare as consisting of a determinable (matter) and determining (form) aspect, the present writer has attempted to show that matter in itself is unknowable; it must have form. Form is the object of the mind, and it is conceived as the universal divested of individuating notes. Form as it exists in the singular is the object of the sense. In each instance, the form is known directly, i.e. as it is.
Real being is not restricted to actual being. Real being consists of actual and possible being, giving the mind latitude for speculation and recollection with directness in knowledge. Only impossible being cannot be a direct object in the sense that its essential nature can be known. Impossible being is inconceivable because it has no form, actual or potential.

ix. Our conclusion then is that the object of knowledge is the form—essence—of the thing, and it is the object known: known as it is when the immaterial union is formed.

While we cannot agree with New Realism in reducing all things ultimately to neutral entities which are neither mental nor physical, we must stress that "a datum need not be exclusively internal or external, but may at one and the same time be both."24

Thus far we have been concerned with the fundamental metaphysical situation on which a theory of immediate knowledge is founded. In the next chapter, we shall examine the actual situation in knowledge: the function of the mind and the quality of knowledge. We shall endeavor to show first that the mind is capable of immaterial union with its object and secondly that the union yields the directness freely asserted in this chapter.

24 Ryan, Art. 1, 256.
CHAPTER VII

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT

The ability of man to think is his distinguishing characteristic. Whatever the powers of so-called lower animals may be, man has a superior power of reasoning. Man is a substantial unity of body and soul, being distinguished from other animals by a power to think. The nature of the soul is spiritual, and this makes man a species apart.  

This definition of man is given without proof for the purpose of preparing the way for an examination of the nature and powers of the mind. The assertion does not militate against the notion of personality in certain of the lower animals; if such be the case the same analysis here given is applicable to those other personalities since they would then fall under the species man rather than the species irrational animal in the genus animal. Like man they would be distinguished from other animals by rationality, a specific difference which with the proximate genus would yield the definition rational animal.

How a being comes to have a mind and whether or not other beings than men have minds are not questions to be considered here. The what rather than the why or how is the object of investigation.

A. FACULTY

Perhaps no scholastic theory has been more universally condemned than the faculty theory of the soul. The general rejection of the view was based on a misunderstanding which

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1 Mercier, TSP, 1, 312.
delayed for centuries recognition of the true theory of mind as conceived by scholastics. There is justification for the statement that "psychological research within the past few decades would seem to indicate the soundness of the general concept and the actual need of the revival of the (faculty) theory."\(^2\)

1. **FACULTIES AND FUNCTIONS**

Faculties are not separate parts of the soul. They correspond to the modern concept of functions. "The proposition, 'our soul possesses different faculties', means nothing else than our soul is a substance which is an active principle capable of exerting different species of energies."\(^2\)

Faculties, or functions of the soul, enable the mind to perceive material, extended, and quality-endowed bodies and to perceive in them through action of intellect and sensation the essence which is the direct object of the mind. It is convenient to consider various functions of the mind separately and for this reason the different functions will be considered as distinct activities.

2. **MIND DIVIDED**

The mind is figuratively divided not only into sense faculties and intellectual faculties, but the intellectual faculties are also divided into active and passive. Following Aristotle and St. Thomas, all scholastics are agreed that the mind at birth is a tabula rasa. Knowledge is made possible by

\(^2\)Hart, TCTT, 136.

\(^1\)Haher, PSY, 36.
operation of the senses, external and internal.

The active intellect is that faculty which illuminates given objects and abstracts the essence which becomes identical in mind and thing, although not individuated in the mind in the same manner of being as in the singular extra-sensual reality.

Note: The psychological explanation of what happens in the process of knowing is not very clearly treated in the scholastic books consulted by this writer. Emphasis is so great on the mediating process, which does not rise into consciousness, that it would appear that what is supposed to be a direct acquaintance with an object is no more than an analysis of a sensible representation of the object in the imagination. The treatments seem to imply nothing more than a correspondence between the object as it exists in the imagination or a mysterious dual existence of the object in mind and thing as a physical being.

Maher says the schoolmen defined the active intellect as:

a certain instinctive spiritual force or energy of the mind, which acting spontaneously on the presentation of objects in the imagination, generates species intelligibles of them or an active faculty whereby the intellect modifies itself so as to represent in a spiritual or abstract manner what is concretely depicted in the phantasm.²

The difficulty seems to be rooted in the failure of

²Maher, PSY, 308.
medieval scholastics to consider the epistemological problem. Modern writers, of whom Luhar is one, have considered psychological theories as they were in the middle ages without considering the epistemological consequences. The result is that the psychological seems to refute the epistemological theory, and to make inaccessible the reality described in the metaphysical aspect.

Therefore, the present writer is making his own interpretation in modern terms, and is ignoring the heavy emphasis placed on the subjective location of the data. Scholastic psychology, taken by itself, could yield nothing more than a strictly dualistic epistemology. No doubt this was the reason for Descartes' extreme dualism which forced him into the most insistent dualism. Descartes learned a scholasticism in which epistemological problems were considered only in metaphysics, and psychology sought to prove principally the immortality of the soul and its power to know the existence and nature of God. The asserted unity of man was clouded by description of a being composed of soul and body as separate entities.

A non-scholastic, apparently recognizing the problem cited in this note and realizing that a literal interpretation of scholastic psychology would parallel Kant's view that categories of the mind classify reality, says,
A true theory of the above must treat knowing of all minds from the outset not as a process of "creating" but an adventure of discovery. We do not put "the categories" into nature; we find them there.

In other words, the things known furnish the essence, the especial intellizibilis: the classification of the components of the universals is in reality, not in the mind.

How to reconcile such a theory with the quotation from Tither above or with the one immediately following here is difficult to imagine.

An object produces an impression on a sensitive faculty. This results in a sensuous phantasm in the imagination, and here the work of the lower power ends. Since, however, in all the sensuous faculties of cognition have their source in a soul endowed with intellectual aptitudes, the latter now issue into action. The presence of the phantasm forms the condition of rational activity; and the intellect abstracts the essence; that is, by its own active and passive capabilities, that is, the concept which expresses in the abstract the essence of the object.

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Taylor, PJ, 260.
Tither, IDY, 311.

This is plain dualism, but it is a description typically psychological. It is not concerned either with the location of the data or the nature of the relation involved in knowing. It is a description in loose, careless terms of what persons believe when they accept images as "under the hat."
In maintaining that the essence is the same as the phantas. And that knowledge of reality is direct—the knowledge of the thing is in the mind—the scholastic view was to be extremely close to New Realism which holds that subject and object are numerically one. This is an instance of the close relation between New realism and scholastic realism referred to previously. This is the case, of course, assuming that the double fiction of both is in object as subject at the same time—a not inconceivable hypothesis because of the immediate basis of knowledge—it is difficult to see how direct knowledge can be claimed.

The premises lead to the inevitable conclusion that in taking the phantasy as the basis of the universal, scholastic means to identify, at least functionally from the point of view of the validity of knowledge, the object in the mind with the existent object. This is an implication not stated expressly, but it seems to be the most important issue in the thesis.

On the basis of what has been quoted and inferred from study of the position, we can fairly accept the distinction between essence and existence as substantiation of our theory that there is no essential difference between the object known and the object-in-itself. There is, however, an existential difference, or functional difference which is not ad rem here.

3. FUNCTIONS OF MIND

The faculty then is the function of the mind at certain stages of cognition. The different functions of the mind
in the process of assimilating objects in their terms are classified as faculties, but not in the sense that parts of the mind are going about their respective functions. The mind becomes the object in all its aspects, as a formal universal, as a singular, as a material being, but always the mind is directly related to its object. This is perfectly consistent with the theory that error resides in judgment, because then two objects are involved and knowledge is immediate.

The first result of mental effort is the concept. Isolated the concept is neither true nor false, but in a certain sense, neutral. In the act of judgment, the concept is related to the subject by an affirmation. Independently of the relation formulated in a judgment there is, between the terms, subject and predicate—a relation due to the character of the terms.\(^7\)

Note: To be perfectly consistent—to go the whole way—it would seem that scholastics should consider the new-realistic doctrine of the externality of relations because the problem of error seems to have frightened scholastics away from a very fundamental question. Since the mind's direct knowledge of objects so well accounts for truth—which idealistic qualism cannot do—why have not the scholastics investigated the objectivity of relations further? True categories are of reality,\(^8\) but the study of relations in reality is limited.

\(^7\) Noel, Art. 1, 142.
\(^8\) Cf., Taylor, PS, 253, 257.
B. THE POWERS OF THE INTELLECT

1. ONE OBJECT

Although the intellect regards directly the immaterial object, as contrasted with senuous knowledge of the material object, the object regarded in each case is the same. The essence of the material thing endowed with individuating traits has been raised to the status of a fundamental universal, a direct, or metaphysical, universal. The intellect does not take a different "point of view", it is only a function of the soul but it enjoys a superior capacity than the senses. In this way, from the same point of view, the essence of the object is acquired.

2. INTELLECT LIMITED

The intellect is limited because of the psycho-physical nature of man. Abstraction, while yielding immaterial knowledge, knowledge of essence, nevertheless is dependent upon the veracity of the senses. Thus is the necessity of abstraction—the elevating of the object to an immaterial form—an imperfection, and therein lies the difference between God's knowledge which is of forms always, and man's which is of things composed of matter and form. Inasmuch as man has a body, however, the power to abstract adds something and is, therefore, a perfection. Intuitionists base their view on the imperfection of abstraction.
3. PASSIVE FUNCTION

The intellect, besides functioning as the abstractive agent, intellectus agens, has a passive function. The passive function of the intellect differs from the ordinary meaning of passive, receptive, in that its passivity consists only in its inability to operate without first having the object presented to consciousness illuminated.

It is in the passive intellect that the species is intelligible. The species is present in the first act of the mind, apprehension by the passive intellect. The intellectus agens must be conceived as instinctive or blind; it is the intellectus patient which formally understands. It must be remembered, however, that these are scholastic distinctions, hair-splitting, and that the difference in faculties is really a difference of functions of the same thing.

It is possible that the theory as it stands only needs to be translated into the language of modern physiological psychology...to prove the very truth of which the epistemologist of the present moment is so anxiously in search.9

4. ESSENCE REVEALED

It is clear that simple apprehension does not yield knowledge of scientific value; the essence is known, but in the world of things individuals are related not only essentially but by unessential qualities. Particularly is this true of men.

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9Taylor, PS, 256.
Consequently, the only real purpose simple appre-
hension serves is as a philosophical hypothesis. Science must
still follow the method of induction, synthesis, and synopsis;
but in the theory here set forth, scientists can rest assured
that the objects which they are investigating are as they are
known. Mediate processes involving sense, imagination, active
and passive intellects do not destroy the direct contact with
objective reality.
CHAPTER VIII
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECT

A. COMMON MISUNDERSTANDING

A common modern error is the uncritical identification of present day scholastic philosophy with the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. While it is true that the foundation of modern scholastic thought was laid by St. Thomas, it is a mistake to suppose that he or any other medievalist fore-saw the problems which have arisen in the present day.

No one will deny that there is a delight to a scholastic in finding in St. Thomas recognition, and particularly germinal solution, of a vital modern problem, but St. Thomas did not wish to be, and certainly he is not, a last court of appeal in the study of questions which he did not explicitly expound.

More necessary than in other fields of investigation is it that epistemological problems be settled not by St. Thomas but in their own right; first, because the term epistemology was unknown to the Angelic Doctor, and, secondly, because his words on the question at issue need be taken only at their own weight and not as an infallible criterion of truth. The fact that the modern scholastic solutions, and there are several, all claim to be consistent with St. Thomas' views as revealed in his statements on other phases of knowledge, indicates only that theories of the nature and limits of immediate knowledge have little hope of early

\[1\text{Coffey, EPI, I, 265.}\]
solution, and demonstration is impossible.

The most that can be asked is that the thinker consider the theory of immediate knowledge more reasonable than the theory of representative knowledge; to attempt to prove that things and not ideas are first known is no simpler than to attempt to disprove solipsism. From the standpoint of one outside the existing universe the problem might be vital, but within the universe coherence of thought is possible from the point of view of the believer in the relativity of knowledge as well as from the point of view of the adherent of the theory of direct knowledge. This is not a retraction of our previous assertion; it is merely an admission that in itself the immediacy of knowledge cannot be demonstrated. Whether we believe the tree we see is known directly or as an experience of a self from which experience the tree's existence and nature are inferred makes no difference in one's system of thought in any practical way. The difference, of course, viewed objectively in a way not possible to human beings is a real difference, but fortunately men need not be concerned.

The problem, it is evident, is one of the most abstract and elusive in philosophical study and even though points of view are changed by persuasion rather than argument, it is one of the most interesting.

All this paper aims to show is the consistency of the view that things are known directly, that what I think about is the tree and not my idea of it, that the world in which I live is as I see it, that each object is a compound of substance and
qualities actually existing and known as they exist. In other words, the scholastic position is close to naïve realism's common sense philosophy; to New Realism's objectivism; to critical realism's essences, and to the complete realistic explanation of the objective impersonal existence of the world about us.

How scholasticism avoids the errors of other realistic views it is one of the chief purposes of this chapter to show. Scholasticism has accepted the truth of the various standpoints, but has stood fast against the errors. Despite the temptation to embrace other systems which substantially confirm the realism of scholasticism, thinkers in the latter school have refused to sacrifice vital facts to accept partial truth as the whole truth.

Before closing this historical sketch a further explanation of our debt to St. Thomas is in order. While failing to treat the problem explicitly, St. Thomas did include in his metaphysics a theory of knowledge which is consistent with the view defended here. Subsequently therefore, references to the great medievalist will constitute not a self-rebuttal of the present writer but only an incidental comparison of points raised with known views of St. Thomas on the same questions. What must be borne in mind is that the present theory is a modern development; it is regrettable to have to insist on this point, but modern prejudice against medievalists might otherwise lead to a refusal to listen.
B. THE PRIMARY FACTS

1. EARLY VIEWS

Early New Scholastics, spending most of their time within the spheres of thought outlined by St. Thomas, failed even to consider the precise problem on which modern epistemology has concentrated its attention: the nature of immediate knowledge. They accepted as one of their three first principles the veridical quality of knowledge viewed subjectively or objectively. The question of the possible relativity of knowledge to the knowing subject, the possible alteration of the object known by the act of knowing, the possible misrepresentation of the object in the idea were considered extremely unlikely when considered at all.

Hence, scholasticism was rightly excluded from the world of modern thought because the three primary truths did not approach the question occupying the thoughts of modern men. The principles, the chief basis of modern rejection of scholasticism, were first, that one's own existence could not be denied; secondly, that immediate consciousness testifies to the ability of human faculties to know; thirdly that the law of contradiction is self-evident. 2

To the modern criticism that the second principle was the one in question scholastics answered in a disjunctive which they considered complete, namely, either our knowledge is objectively true, and this appears self-evident and not needing

2Rickaby, FP, 164,182.
proof, or knowledge is impossible, and the very presentation of questions concerning the validity of knowledge is absurd. In connection with the latter point, which they rejected, it was further concluded that if the validity of knowledge could be questioned there was no solution to the problem and all thinking was vain.

It must be admitted that the present writer, as indicated above, inclines to the last view except that he feels a complete examination of the facts will give convincing, if not demonstrative, evidence of the validity of knowledge and of the direct presence of the object in the knower. In this view he is encouraged by Mercier's attempt to bridge the gap between scholastic complacence and non-scholastic criticism by rejecting the three primary truths as self evident.3

2. IMMATERIAL UNION

Having seen that basically knowledge is an immaterial union of mind and object—assimilation of the object by the mind without alteration in the form of either essentially, and having admitted a certain relativity in knowledge due to man's limited mental capacity and the opposition of matter to knowledge, opposition which can be only partly overcome, we turn now to the epistemological question in se.

C. MEANING OF SIGNUM

The use of the term signum in scholastic philosophy

3Mercier, LSP, I, 359,361.
has undoubtedly been the stumbling block to an interpretation of the position. The reason is obvious. *Signum* means *sign*, and in this day of emphasis on symbolism cursory observers have classified scholasticism as a form of representative realism or idealism.

1. **EARLY REALIST VIEW**

According to the opinion which generally prevailed among the Peripatetic Philosophers of the middle ages, our faculties of knowledge required for their activities a certain representative medium, different both from the mind itself and from the external object of thought.4

This misinterpretation is not an uncommon or unreasonable one; it denotes only a lack of familiarity with scholastic language and the restrictions placed on usage of certain words. The similarity of expression of the scholastic view and critical, naive, and new realisms, as well as the eclectic view of Russell, which seems designed to abolish the distinction between mind and matter, would lead in a casual comparison to the opinion that scholasticism is readily classifiable in any of those schools. As a matter of fact there is a close relation, but it is by no means a ground for identification.

i. Thus, most scholastics will agree with the new realist that knowledge cannot be identified with the process of knowing; conception *is id quo* (that by which) not *id quod* (that which) is known.5

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4 *eid., Works*, 952.
5 *Boft., AR*, 55.
ii. In considering essence as objective reality and content of the mind in simple apprehension, scholastics hold that the essence is neither singular nor plural but capable of being either. It is under this aspect that fundamental universality (in the thing) and formal universality (in the mind) are asserted. Essence is neither singular nor plural. It is immaterial form. It is not a thought, but object of a thought.

As content of the intellect and as the objective thing its status is not greatly different from that of neutral entities in the New Realism, and non-mental, non-physical being of Bertrand Russell. In each instance the essence, whether it be the form of the being or that in the being which is related to its universal, identical nature, is a unique singular something independent of the mind's activity and actually existing immaterially as the determinant of matter.

2. SIGNUM DEFINED

The term signum designates an unconscious process which yields knowledge. Signs are generally of four kinds, all but one of which is representative or implicative.

i. A natural sign (implicative) may be the basis of inference of knowledge about something. Thus ice on a pond implies that the pond contains frozen water. The sign and the thing are indistinguishable; hence direct knowledge of one is direct knowledge of the other.

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6 Ibid., 360, 372.
7 Russell, POP, 142, 157.
a. This may be a simple, natural sign, as in the example cited.

b. It may involve a process of reasoning the result of which is just as immediate as the principle on which the reasoning operates. Thus by the law, or principle, of cause and effect, it is known that the presence of a watch found in the woods implies the existence of someone who made it.

Ontologically natural signs yield immediate knowledge once the form of the object has been assimilated. Throughout the process, however, the sign itself is present in consciousness, and there is a certain mediacy, at least psychological which destroys the complete directness of what is known by formal signs. (See iv.)

ii. An arbitrary sign is the type ordinarily considered in symbolism. It is the type of sign which satisfies the dualist, the coherence theorist, and the skeptic. Thus, $R$ is an arbitrary sign for the term relation although it might also stand for radius, red, or any other object.

iii. An instrumental sign is one closely related to a natural sign, except that the relation is not intrinsic. Thus a pen is an instrument for writing. It is a sign of writing although it may never be used. It lacks the intrinsic connection with that which is signified, but it cannot be classified as an arbitrary sign.

Note: It will be seen that although all these are signs they are themselves objects of the mind in the knowledge
processes. They are instruments to further knowledge. They constitute the basis of inference. Knowledge of these signs is no more direct than knowledge of other objects.

Nevertheless, the errors of those who consider scholasticism a form of the copy theory of knowledge have interpreted the species intelligibles as a natural or instrumental sign. For example, a modern historian of importance says:

In their doctrine of the 'species intelligibles,' the two Realists have alike followed... the old Greek idea that in the knowing process.........copy of the latter arises, which is then apprehended and beheld by the soul. 8

As a matter of fact, scholastics discussing knowledge deliberately avoid the copy theory for two reasons: first, it is limited to so-called sense knowledge; secondly, it is incapable of proof as a theory of knowledge, although correspondence must be admitted if any scientific knowledge means anything.

This will be considered in greater detail in discussion of sense knowledge.

iv. A formal sign, exemplified by the species intelligibles, is one which reveals the thing signified without itself being a representation of the thing or a conscious medium.

It cannot be denied that in a loose sense the species intelligibles is an instrument to knowledge. It stands as the relating link between the mind and object, and it may itself come into consciousness upon reflection. It cannot come into consciousness, however, without first revealing the essence of some

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8 Windelband, HP, 325.
other object.

a. The theory seems to many either as a form of symbolism or a hodge-podge of meaningless wordage. Yet its soundness, due mainly to the "common sense" point of view, makes it easily confirmable.

When one speaks of a representative, or average, man, one is expressing a concept of an entity which exists not as an individual, but as a species. Representative is not applied to an arbitrary subject; it is not used as a guide in the search for an individual; it is not used, strictly speaking, as implying a complete set of characteristics. Rather, without any picture of the "average man" one can find the common traits of men and from them directly construct the concept of the "average man." In no way does this mean that the average man can be defined as a rational animal, although this obviously is true. It means that there is a concept, objectively grounded, which is revealed after direct acquaintance with the constituents of an average man or average men.

Perhaps a better example, one more properly illustrative of the point, is the traditional instance of the man looking through field glasses. He can know another man at whom he looks without ever being conscious of the glasses. On the other hand, by reflection, he can become aware of the glasses; but it is still the same man at which he is looking.

In this example, the glasses are not a natural sign of the man because a man need not be seen; they are not arbitrary signs because they do not arbitrarily stand for the man; they
are not instrumental signs in an epistemological sense, because the man could be seen without them and because nothing is inferred from the glasses. The relation is between the one seeing and the seen.

The nature of the object seen is not affected by a formal sign, although, naturally, it may be affected by an instrumental sign and need in no way conform to an arbitrary sign. Since it is the nature of an idea to serve as a formal sign, the true nature of the object is presented to consciousness.

b. The view is the view of common sense. To deduce from the statement of the knowledge situation that metaphysics is made dependent upon epistemology is self-refuting, since such a deduction is not based on a metaphysical view of the situation. That the epistemological theory conform to the metaphysical scheme of reality is necessary, but this does not give the epistemological theory a priority of nature. The facts of each theory are jointly true and contemporaneous, but necessarily they are consistent one with the other.

v. The pessimism of modern science, based on subjectivism, is evident in the words of its spokesmen. The common man's escape from this pessimism by justification of his own common sense experience in philosophical form is offered by the scholastic.

a. The mind is necessary to an understanding of nature and natural laws. The mind is the only being necessary in the special science of logic.

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9Marvin, Art. 1, 49,50.
b. On the other hand, however, the mind is not essential to the working of the extra-mental, physical world. The mind, by definition, is essential to knowledge of the working of the universe. That is what is meant by science, and in this sense science is of the mind. But the direct objects of scientific investigation are immediately present in consciousness.

vi. The dominance of the subjectivist thesis in modern science is evident. The status of science as science, a subjective explanation of extra-mental events by a process of reasoning, is confused with the actual occurrence of the events.

vii. The fact that the direct object is an extra-mental reality, not the mind itself as an idea, is confirmation of the thesis that the mind does not know itself directly. Knowledge of self is inferred from the activity of the mind. It consists in reflection upon ideas. If the mind were known directly, subjectivism could not be averted. Only by realizing that ideas are only formal signs, knowable by reflection, can agnostic dualism be averted.

D. ERRORS OF REALISM

While fundamentally opposed to idealism and extreme epistemological dualism, scholasticism cannot be identified with the New Realism or Critical Realism, despite the efforts of both to avoid the errors scholasticism seeks to avoid.

10 Holt, MR, 474.
1. EXTREME OBJECTIVISM

New Realism in its zeal to escape subjectivism, \(^{11}\) goes to the other extreme and becomes objectivism. As idealism had no room for distinction between mind and thing, New Realism has no room for distinction between thing and mind. The extreme monism is contrary to experience. Mind is different from things. Identification of mind and object as object, if, indeed, it can be identified as one rather than the other, \(^{12}\) fails as completely as idealism to explain the distinction between mind and object and the direct presence of object to the mind. Only by considering the problem of universals, the presence of the object's form in the mind, can the dualistic reality be explained in terms which yield objective truth.

The distinction between a knowledge process (perception and conception) and its object (the extra-mental thing), \(^{13}\) is a perfect statement of the scholastic position: A knowledge process is not its own object, but is rather the means by which some other object is known.

2. LANGUAGE AMBIGUOUS

The language of Critical Realism, in which such terms as essence and intellect and essence known to the intellect, etc., occur, would seem to indicate a close affinity to scholasticism. Critical Realism denies the dualism of form and matter, but asserts blankly:

\(^{11}\) Holt, NR, 11.

\(^{12}\) Lovejoy, RAD, 254.

\(^{13}\) Drake, ECR, 4.
"To know the thing is not to be the thing.... It is the recognized possession by the mind of the "form of the thing, that is, its position, size, structure, causal capacities, etc." Such, however, is not the case since the essence in Critical Realism never is a substantive, but rather is the term used to describe sense data.

Nevertheless, the similarity in view, and agreement of realists generally on the fundamental thesis, that the process is different from the object, is clear.13

1. The identity of the form in the mind and the form of the object is the fundamental tenet of scholasticism. Naturally, the form of the thing is in the mind only when the object is experienced. The object is in the subject knowing only in the act of knowing. The identity of the two is not absolute. It is an identity of form.

It is, therefore, true that the form in the mind is not the form directly known. That is the mental form available in the absence of the object. It is the same in nature as the object and is the explanation of memory.

14Sellers, Art. 1, 118. Cf. also, Drake, ITP, 132. 13Santayana, Art. 1, 166.
This form is not itself the object known; the object known is directly and immediately the real being. The form united to the knowing subject is an ontological reality, but a reality which is there only to make knowledge possible and to carry consciousness to the object. When Mr. Strong says that the psychic state is not itself known, but is the vehicle through which the "essence" is given, we are almost in agreement with him. But we would go a step further, and make a distinction between the material side of the psychic state and its form. The form has an esse intentionale in the subject and through it, the psychic state is united to the subject known. 16

ii. The unity of mind and object is similar to the unity of body and soul. Man has within him the "not-self" (body) which is denied in idealistic dualism. 17 The mind is a function of the soul and the same soul informs the whole man in all his conduct, voluntary and involuntary.

The same essence which exists individualized in the object exists in the mind for the purpose of knowledge. 18

E. SENSE KNOWLEDGE

The mistrust in epistemology of the same senses which are considered accurate in the study of scientific instruments will be considered in conjunction with the scholastic theory of sense knowledge.

1. SENSATIONS ACCURATE

The correspondence of sensations with certain qualities which together constitute the object of collective sense knowledge is not disputed convincingly by anyone. The objective status of such knowledge, however, has been given a wide

16 Turner, Art, 1, 145.
17 Turner, Art, 1, 335.
18 Bart, Art, 1, 23.
variety of interpretations.

2. OBJECTS GIVE DATA

Sense knowledge is awareness of qualitative and quantitative data furnished by objects through sensations.

i. Sensation, the vehicle of sense knowledge, resembles its cause. Sense knowledge, like intellectual knowledge, is effected through a medium which itself is not cognitive. Yet if the sensation itself were not like the corresponding object it could not furnish the basis of empirical investigation.

ii. Differences in sensations are due to differences in nervous impulses, which in turn are due to differences in objects. The sensation itself is that indubitably subjective state which arises from activity of nerve impulses. But differences among sensations in any individual are due to differences in the extra-mental causes. This much will be granted quite generally.

3. SENSATION SUBJECTIVE

It would be folly to speak of sensations as objective. Sensations are of the subject. We cannot have hearing in the object, but this does not mean that sound cannot be objective.

i. As far as we know, we do not hear waves; we hear sounds. The exact constituents of this subjective sound, the elements of the psychical, the conscious aspect are not analyzable as are the extra-mental phenomena.

ii. Pragmatism makes itself decidedly felt in this investigation. It is easy to join the pragmatist and assert
that we know objects of sense in a way in which they can be used. But to join the pragmatist is to beg the question; it is to accept what seems obvious and workable without questioning the validity of sense knowledge.

iii. It is true that color has been shown scientifically to be different "objectively" from what it is as experienced through the senses. To conclude from this fact that the senses are deceived, however, is to accept one dogma in place of another.

One condition of knowledge at least, proper disposition of subject and object, is missing. When the condition of knowledge is changed it is unquestionably true that what is known seems to be changed. But this does not alter the fact that the senses perceive the object as it is according to the condition. The extra-sensory object is not altered, and certainly the senses are not altered. Rational consideration of the condition—which here may be considered as a medium to direct knowledge of the thing—will yield the truth.

4. OBJECTIVE TRUTH

When an ordinary man asserts a tree is green, he is asserting an objective truth. The greenness are not the same as the sensation of green under all conditions; but under the conditions of ordinary, valid experience it is as it appears as a quality of an objective tree. What it is outside experience, no one can know, but there is no valid reason for asserting that it is different.
i. So-called scientific descriptions of green, exemplifying the appearance of green under extraordinary circumstances, do not alter the fact of the extra-mental differences among colors. Consequently, in confirmation of our contention that green objectively is the green known, we have only to recall our self-evident postulate that whatever is received is received according to the nature of the receiver. The senses seem ordained to put us in touch with extra-mental reality as it is. That they succeed is attested by the experience of everyone.

ii. Colored glasses, color-blindness, etc., do not affect the objective nature of color. That nature is the nature sensed, sensed not in a way opposed to purposeful use of it, as would be the case if color were sensed as the phenomenon of absorption and reflection of light rays. Knowledge of colors as knowledge of essence and knowledge of objective sense stimuli generally is not complete. One aspect, that knowable by the subject, is revealed.

The scholastic position has been well summarized by Laird, a non-Scholastic, in this passage: "To say that sense experience is partial and provisional is true enough, but need not lead to a wholesale distrust of the testimony of senses."\(^{19}\)

Sense knowledge needs to be tested by intellectual knowledge.

\(^{19}\)Laird, 39, 44.
5. SENSE LAS PROPER OBJECTS

Each sense has a proper object, and examples of the untrustworthiness are due to efforts to have one sense report facts for another. Thus when something "looks good to eat", one should not judge by that criterion. Rather, two other senses, smell and taste, should be employed.

In acquiring sense knowledge, the intellect is aided by an internal sense called the "common sense." It is the common sense which groups the various aspects of an object and reveals the physical nature.

6. DOGAMIC ASSERTIONS DENIED

Dogmatic assertions concerning sense knowledge are denied not only scholastics but all other philosophers because of the very nature of the problem. Disproof of naive views is in terms of other sensible evidence. The same senses which report the tree to be green, sugar to be sweet, etc. report light to be colorless rays, taste to be the result of stimulation of taste-buds, or other simple structures, by an object taken into the mouth.

7. ACCIDENTS ARE OBJECTS

Accidents (quantity, qualities, relations, etc.) are objects of sense knowledge. This knowledge is not complete or rational since it lacks the essential basis of intellectual knowledge and is like knowledge in animals.

We have seen that sensation corresponds with the stimulus, that green objectively, regardless of the material
elements composing it, has the form of green. Therefore, sense knowledge, under normal conditions, is valid. It would be of little value, cognitive or otherwise, if color were perceived as so many light waves. The form of color perceived by the senses is the same in the mind and object. The mode of being is not altered by the mode of perception, and the mode of being is as perceived.

8. SENSES DO NOT JUDGE

Throughout this section it has been readily admitted that sense knowledge is relative in its immediate status. The senses do not judge. The mind, functioning as the common sense, differentiates between normal and abnormal conditions. In no event is the objective material object taken into the senses. Nevertheless, the form on which the knowledge is based is the true form.

Sense knowledge is not essentially different from the object of sense. It is the form of the object as presented to consciousness. There is no symbolism or arbitrary representation. Sense is the avenue to truth.

No datum of consciousness is more clear and universal than its assurance of the objectivity of sense—impressions. As we are under a reign of truth, our senses must be veracious in assuring us of the existence of objects exterior to ourselves. For the same reason, the impressions received from exterior objects must be a true expression of their essential natures. This is confirmed by the analogy of our own ego, the interior acts of which are recognized to be the natural
expression of its own nature. As all phenomena are a true expression of the essential natures of noumena in which they inhere, form, color, sound, and taste are no less objective realities than weight or cohesion. The scientific explanations of the mechanism of sense-perception do not in any way throw doubt upon the objective reality of the phenomena perceived, but merely elucidate one aspect of the process by which we become cognizant of them. 20

9. QUALITIES OBJECTS OF SENSE

We conclude this section with a consideration of qualities as objects of sense experience.

i. Primary qualities are those knowable by more than one sense. Secondary qualities are those perceived by one sense only, although two senses may have the qualities as objects.

a. Size is knowable to the same extent by touch and vision.

b. Candy may be sweet-tasting and pleasing in appearance, but the knowledge derived by one sense is not the same as by another.

ii. While some philosophers have denied the reality of all qualities, others have rejected only the secondary, holding they are subjective creations. 21

We choose here, however, to follow Coffey who says both primary and secondary qualities are real and that both are direct objects of sense perception. Coffey declares that the

20 Snell, PK, 10.
21 Mackintosh, PK, 228.
objectivity of primary qualities is no more evident—and the
relation to senses no more direct—than in the case of secondary
qualities; also, that consciousness of sound, color, taste, and
smell are just as certainly due to extra-mental reality as are
impressions of extension, weight, etc.22

iii. The metaphysical concept of potency and act, so
characteristic of scholastic metaphysics is a basis for the
theory that perception is a direct perception of quality. The
unperceived quality is a potency; when perceived it is a con-
stituent of perception.

This is the justification for the assertion that
sound and color are objective qualities, although their percep-
tion is subjective. The tree is green when not perceived, just
as it is green when perceived. There can, of course, be no per-
ception without a perceiver; nor can there be perception without
a "perceived." In instances of perception, if, as scholastics
hold, it is to be true, it must be direct, not inferential or
distorted, and, in no case, arbitrary.

There is nothing contradictory in the theory that
green as experienced is objectively real in the tree. To exclude
the sensation in defining the cause of the sensation is to remove
the fundamental condition of the investigation. It would be no
different in method from taking temperatures without a thermometer.

22 Coffey, EPI, II, 108. Also, Murphy, Art.1, 201.
F. SCHOLASTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Simple denial of the identity of views between scholasticism and its theory of direct presentation of objective reality to consciousness and other monistically grounded systems cannot offset striking similarities which will be stated in the next chapter. It is well here, at the completion of the presentation of the view, to take cognizance of a philosopher whose views in part parallel those of scholasticism and whose interpretation of Thomistic doctrines is excellent.

....The union of realism and intellectualism... is seen in the doctrine of truth of the Aristotelian scholastics.... Where common sense and the influence of Aristotle prevailed...... reality and ordinary appearance tended to be identified...... The statement of Thomas Aquinas that "to know the truth is to know the agreement of knowledge with the thing known" presented no difficulties, for while the realism was not carried to any one-sided extreme (as in the case in the New Realism),23 on the other hand there was no absolute epistemological dualism to be transcended.24

23 Parenthetical matter mine.
24 Mackintosh, POK, 321.
CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A. EPISTEMOLOGY IS AN ASPECT OF METAPHYSICS

Separation of epistemology from metaphysics has been hailed as a major service to the development of modern thought. Thus we read:

Epistemology is not a logically fundamental science ... epistemology cannot furnish us with a theory of reality ... metaphysics owes logically neither its problems nor their solution to the theory of knowledge ... and though the verdict of history has not been delivered, there is strong evidence that criticism has seriously hindered as well as helped metaphysics during the past two centuries.

The present writer cannot share this opinion. Throughout the history of philosophy, thinkers have considered the questions treated in epistemology, and they have considered them not as separate problems but as aspects of the greater, the metaphysical riddle of the universe.

Epistemology cannot exist by itself. The problem of knowledge is not restricted to the nature of a particular set of phenomena existing apart from all else or even conceivable in terms of its own nature. The problem of knowledge is a three-sided indivisible problem, and upon the unity of the problem, as found in the relation between the mind and object, rests the possibility of solution.

Attempting to isolate a particular knowing, or, in fact, all knowing, from the setting of its occurrence may be interesting recreation, but the data examined are themselves involved

Marvin, Art. 1, 95.
in a unique unity of mind and data which renders consideration in isolation impossible. One might as well consider a man swallowing his own head as to consider studying knowledge in isolation.

On the other hand, there is value in studying the process called knowledge as a unifying link between mind and object; just as one might examine the space that makes possible the fitting together of gears. The mind and objects, just as all other unified parts of reality, fit together into a smoothly working whole. In studying gears, especially in designing them, the limitation of parts is to enable the gears to work. Yet, measurements, strictly speaking, are not of the material things but rather of the space outside the parts.

No engineer would admit he is dealing in empty spaces, and in the larger sense he is not. Hence, when we speak of knowledge as a separate part of reality, we are not losing sight of the fact that as an independent fact it cannot exist.

(In the metaphysical theory of this writer, consciousness, the essence of knowledge, is synonymous with knowledge but is only one characteristic of the person. The person is a being of body as well as mind, and whether or not consciousness enhances values, considered purely objectively, is a quite debatable question. It is admitted that values must be experienced, that is they must be subjective, to be meaningful, but that they are grounded objectively cannot be denied. Just as elimination of intervening space in a changing machine would have ad-
vantages so also would elimination of consciousness from the universe have its advantages. Consciousness implies free and spontaneous use of data by finite, fallible beings. A completely determined universe, directed by a Divine mind, would exclude irrational activity. It would be completely integrated and, consequently, completely coherent to an all-wise mind regarding it from outside reality. Until knowledge is used to restrict the freedom conferred by consciousness, until individuals lose their self-sufficient feeling to become rational elements in God's activity for a completely integrated universe, consciousness—the awareness of one's ability to compete against as well as to cooperate with his fellow-men—will remain the chief impediment to progress. Perhaps this is the basis of the classic denunciation of intellectualism and a plea for recognition of intuition, spontaneous action, as the really fundamental link uniting man with reality. This digression may be unjustified, but it aims to illustrate that metaphysics is the all-inclusive science, and theories purporting to be independent of the whole, even though reconcilable with it, can be objectively effective, at least first, only apart from the more important facts. Epistemological theories must be implicates of metaphysics in which they are rooted or the danger of rationalization is ever present.)

When consciousness is identified with knowledge and also with the person, there is an internality of the relation between self and object which cannot be overcome. When, however, as this writer chooses to suppose, knowledge is merely something that happens to a psychological-physical dualism, the relation is
external. It is a new fact in reality, no more determining the knower than the known. True, knowledge apart from a person and object is nothing, but, for any working or related purpose, neither is the space between gears. What we are really concerned with is the relation between two things, mind and object, and we measure the nothingness-in-itself which stands between them only by understanding the natures of mind and object.

That there is nothing between interlocking gears before they interlock, except space, possibly empty space, need not be asserted. It would add little weight to the argument because the analogy is drawn arbitrarily. Nevertheless, the principle is important to an understanding of this writer's view of reality and the function of knowledge.

Knowledge is nothing more than the fact that the human mind is united to something external to it. The mind does not begin its activity with an examination of a datum self— for then it could never get beyond itself— but rather it begins with interaction with an external object with consciousness revealing that object directly. We think trees, stones, boxes, etc. We do not think ideas.

It is true that the mind has the power to project into a setting, as yet inadequately defined, facts recalled from the past and events anticipated from the future. But is this indicative of some unexplored internal world? Rather, it would seem that these phenomena are more rightly judged to be part of the external world than part of some internal, elastic, and altogether highly mysterious mirage. It seems to this writer that his thoughts
extend far beyond any internal state, which cannot really transcend space, to the farthest outskirts of reality, although it is freely confessed that no clear knowledge is held and probably much information is lacking.

The problems of psychology, in which are included many of the riddles of epistemology, must be answered by analysis of observed data alone, since we start with a realization of our inability to collect all the data; they must be solved by the implications of sound metaphysical theory. Reality must be viewed objectively with the fallacy of ego-centric predicament clearly in mind; otherwise, speculation is worthless and solipsism must be honestly accepted.

The existence of the stick in the water as both straight and bent, which this writer by no means suggests is true, nevertheless does not seem so repulsive today as it would have some years ago. In fact, the existence of such diversity of views—and the popular notion that all views have a germ of truth—lends weight to the growing conviction that reality is sufficiently broad to allow for the correctness of all views, provided they are regarded from the proper perspectives. Our difficulty seems to be immaturity of mind which prevents conquest of the proper standpoints by one person. This, without assuming too much from the little understood field of psychology, would seem to be a limitation of man rather than a limitation of the truth of any assertion.

Our first conclusion then must be that the separation of epistemology from its setting in the metaphysic of reality is
not a service but a dis-service. It creates the danger that the process and not the terms of the process will receive most of the attention of thinkers.

1. SOUL AND BODY DISTINCT

The scholastic views the soul as distinct but not separate from the body. This constitutes the chief difference between the New Scholasticism and the New Realism: for the latter, human personality is nothing but an aspect of the objective world. All things subsist as neutral beings; there is no real difference objectively between the illusory and the real. We can accept the pluralism of New Realism and go even farther to include man as the limiting agent of consciousness and deny that consciousness is merely an aspect of things, a something which selects parts of reality in which to occur.

It is unfortunate that New Realism fell into this error because an auspicious start had been made towards the attainment of truth in the emphasis on metaphysics. Yet, a new realist reveals the source of the error to be, ironically enough, in a subjectivist misconception.

I refer to the assertions: "the true is an object of an actual or possible belief." And: "I shall use the term 'subsistent' to denominate any one of the actual and possible objects of thought."

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2 Marvin, Art.1, passim.
3 Montague, Art.1, 252.
4 Ibid., 253.
In recognizing the scholastic division of the real into actual and possible beings, the author did not see an escape from the subjectivism which would require dependence of being for its possibility on conceivability. In a rush to objectify everything as "subsistent", making actual beings no different from possible beings, the author's mind failed to grasp a fundamental scholastic distinction that conceivability depends on possibility, not vice versa. It is clear that the scholastic view implies the existence of actual being, and it should be noted that subsistence of possible being in the real order is perfectly consistent.

The author at one point seemed to recognize that the scholastic distinction between the real and actual held the only solution to the perplexing metaphysical problem:

The doctrine (New Realism) is wrong in claiming an actual external existence for every experienced object, but it is right in holding to a possible external existence for such objects, and in maintaining that, as the presupposition for such possible existence, all the objects of experience have a nature or meaning that is independent of their presence in anybody's experience.

An object is real if it exists or can exist. It is an actual being when it does exist. Hence, the only objects that are not real are impossible objects, and no impossible object is conceivable. Therefore, error is involved only in the question of existence. The existence of an object is a matter of judgment. Consequently, the immediate object, externally presented, is never the basis of false apprehension. It is, actually or possibly, as presented. Error, if any, resides in judgment.

Montague, WK, 296.
Thus far we have seen a distinction between essence and existence and between real and actual beings. We can, in the light of these distinctions, see that body and soul, while constituting one being, may yet be distinct. Possible men become actual by the union of form (soul) with matter (body) which unites also the distinct realities essence and existence.

"Finite being is constituted by two principles really distinct, essence and existence."\(^6\)

The doctrine of the distinction between possible and real beings has been exaggerated to a doctrine of separation by critical realists. Not only are possible beings separated by them from actual beings, instead of being simply distinguished from them in the real order, but possible beings are included in the same class with impossible beings.

"I may think, for example, of a round square."\(^7\)

The scholastic answer to this emphasizes the monistic epistemology. It is impossible to conceive of a round square for the simply reason that a round square is metaphysically impossible; it cannot exist or subsist. To define a round square as a geometrical figure whose sides make a square and a circle is really to give two definitions. And if a round square cannot be conceived because it is impossible, the critical realist claims to experience a given which is false. The metaphysical possibility of an object determines whether or not it can be given. And whatever

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\(^6\) McMahon, Art.1, 246.

\(^7\) Drake, Art.1, 54.
is given is verifiable as to existence. When the metaphysical scheme includes the possible in the real, leaving the question of existence as the source of error, the clear scholastic doctrine of direct presentation of the object is seen.

It is on this metaphysical rock, with man as a substantial unit in keeping with the dualistic nature of all reality, that a true theory of true knowledge must be constructed. Truth finds its support therein and error its explanation. But nothing in this interpretation leaves the way open for a dualism which requires representative idealism for its explanation.

2. MAN IS A UNIT

Man is a psycho-physical unit capable of knowing directly and indirectly. Proof of this theory is far more satisfactory than verbal agreement and actual doubt:

In veridical perception we are aware of the external thing, or some feature of it; the datum of our awareness is, identically, the very thing, or character, that exists . . . . . . What more in the way of epistemological monism could we possibly get? There is no closer relation between datum of knowledge and external thing conceivable than identity.

If this meant exactly what it seems to mean there would be no distinction between this view and that of scholastics. But unfortunately, the author is making a mental reservation that essence is subjective, or, at most, relative in the objective order. Also, his use of conceivable instead of possible is a striking illustration of the place of emphasis in his thought.

Drake, Art. 1, 54.
B. KNOWLEDGE RELATION IS REAL

Knowledge is a relation between mind and object. As we have seen, true knowledge corresponds to reality. This does not mean that an idea in the head is a copy of a thing outside. It means that the knowing subject becomes part of a unity which becomes an element in a pluralistic reality. Knowledge is the characteristic, or product, of the direct union of mind and object. Knowledge, or consciousness, is the resultant of direct union. This is intellectualism, but it is an elaboration of a more fundamental intuitionism.

1. DUALISTIC MONISM

Man, a unified dualism, stands in relation to objects unified in matter by form and known by the mind in its two functions, sensing and conceiving.

i. The knowing subject is not something apart from reality. It is a part of reality and held to it by the ties of class membership. It knows other parts of reality, in which it occurs, by the direct relation of consciousness.

Consciousness is a unique phenomenon through which the form of the known object is assimilated. Intellectual light, as it were, is cast upon the known object, but that object is in no way dependent upon the knowing subject for its existence or its knowability. It is dependent upon the subject for its being known, but not for its being, either its essence or qualities.

ii. The relation called knowledge is not subjective; it
is a manner of being, an objective fact just as truly as the collision of two automobiles is a direct external relation between two independent beings.

Hence knowledge is a manner of being, an ontological enrichment of the knowing subject, which is now what it was not before, and may become, in some measure, anything whatever... Of course the thing known is not received into the subject just as it is in itself; such intrusion would exclude knowledge. Its form is received apart from its matter.9

The point here is that a person knowing becomes something known. That is, a person who learns a multiplication table possesses the table without altering it, and thus becomes something more than before knowing it.

2. PURE MONISM

We have mentioned that man errs because he fails to identify the object experienced as the really existing one, but instead attributes existence to an object which is only possible. Further, there are mistakes in judgment in which inferential processes become complex.

It has been made clear that man is an imperfect being in whom a two-sided nature must face a dualistic world. This is a source of error.

Now if the distinctions we mentioned, such as matter and form, were eliminated, all knowledge would be direct and true. It is on these distinctions that man understands his inferiority to God.

9 Keeler, Art.1, 27.
What chiefly constitutes a Christian philosophy is precisely this: The doctrine that in God there is an identity of essence and existence, in creatures a real distinction.10

In God alone there exists complete, direct knowledge.

C. THE CASE FOR REALISM

The tendency of modern philosophers to confuse psychology with epistemology and to regard epistemology as a separate entity instead of as a science close to metaphysics, has created unnecessary doubts as to the value of knowledge.

1. SELF AND NOT-SELF

The extreme dualistic point of view, idealistic but rejecting extreme idealism, is expressed in extracts from a discussion of the given:

"......the experienced fact, whenever there is given experience, that every item of that experience belongs to the self which is the whole context......it rejects the proposition that acquaintance with my given self is knowledge of that self, for knowledge is description and is mediation, dualistic in structure.11"

i. This means simply that knowledge is of self, but the datum self does not constitute knowledge. The world is known as it is experienced, each datum self being integrated into the whole self which is made up of present and past experience.12 The coherence or incoherence of the resulting content is the measure of the value of the datum self or the rest of experience. Coherence is the criterion. This view obviously assumes a harmony

10 McMahon, Art.1, 250.
11 Brightman, Art.1, 266.
12 Brightman, ML, 79.
between conscious experience and metaphysical reality, although, just as obviously, it could not be proved.

ii. This view, however, is not without its adherents even among lukewarm realists. (In so classifying Mr. Donald C. Williams, this writer confesses to considerable confusion concerning Mr. Williams' general views. It would seem that he fits somewhere between critical realism and idealistic dualism, although his attempt to reconcile dualism and monism is expressed in words seeming to justify either view.) 13

In an admission of misunderstanding of Brightman's view which he confused with extreme idealism, Williams emphasizes that an object need not be given to be known; at least in his opinion: "The transcendence of the object would not make knowledge impossible." 14

He then, however, proceeds to refute arguments against realistic monism by replying to the principal objections to it. Using the example of a man mistaking a stump for a bear, he says:

......The monistic theory does require that the man is immediately aware of an object which is actually a stump, it does not require that the man cognitively aware that the object actually is a stump. 15

This is evidently a middle course between Brightman's dualistic idealism, which would require empirical investigation

13 Williams, Art. 2, passim.
14 Ibid., 432.
15 Ibid., 433.
and testing by coherence before knowledge could be asserted, and critical realism which is sufficiently monistic to capitalize on the phenomenal data, in the form for reactions of man under misapprehension, as evidence of the objective relativity of knowledge.

iii. Self is the subjective element in knowledge; the object is the not-self. Apart from knowledge, self is the unified being made up of body and soul; the thinking, eating, moving subject. All else constitutes the not-self.

2. THE WORLD OF OBJECTS

Inclusion in any theory of the notion of substance immediately creates in the mind of the hearer the impression of a static, stagnant philosophy. This criticism cannot be leveled at the New Scholasticism.

i. The fact of change, the formation of new substances, the transformation of other substances have been recognized by modern followers of St. Thomas Aquinas who himself held to the view of being as ens mobile.

Thus in the union of sodium and chloride, there is not only the movement of the atom or electron, but also the new phenomenon, whose production must be accounted for. And further, there is unification of the phenomena in objective perception; these make up the object, the only object we know.  

ii. Certain modern scholastics go very far indeed in step with the present day emphasis on change. Almost a modern

Walsh, Art.1, 53.
Heraclitus is a French scholastic: "It (ens) is as such eternally flowing. . . . A permanent and radical becoming actuates it."\(^{17}\)

This view is by no means universal among scholastics, many of who have failed to keep pace with modern thought, but it is clear to most new scholastics that any object known is known according to its status when known, and that subsequent reflection and abstract thinking must be concentrated on the nature of the object as it was when known and not as it might be at some subsequent time.\(^{18}\)

3. THE WORLD OF REALITY

How far down the highway to modern thought the scholastic parade has come is exemplified in the scientific outlook of the movement's spokesmen on epistemological and metaphysical questions.

This consistent system of thought, with the truths applicable in every field, is more fundamental than most philosophies because it reaches the roots of reality in contrast to empirical systems. A common current criticism that scholasticism treats problems not of general interest fails in two points: (1) It is not shown that the lack of interest is justified; (2) It reveals a lack of acquaintance with scholastic doctrines of today.

i. The fundamental reality in the universe is cooperation. It is found in every sphere of activity. It is not

\(^{17}\) Sertillanges, STA,114.

\(^{18}\) Michel, Art.1, 337.
going over to radical pan-psychism to assert that the knowledge situation—fundamental to all living—is a cooperative situation.

ii. It is such a misunderstanding that has divorced scholastic thought from that of great thinkers of the day, of whom Dewey may be cited as one. For in any system in which cooperation is basic, the pragmatic implications cannot be escaped. Similarity of thought can be illustrated in these quotations:

Knowledge is not something separate and self-sufficient, but is involved in the process by which life is sustained and evolved.19

St. Thomas points out that the intellect perceives the individual as having the common nature of the species to which it belongs, but sense perceives the individual only as an object of desire or as some kind of thing that arouses emotional activity.20

iii. The two aspects of reality in each of its phases, matter and form for material things, and soul and body for living things, is not unlike the general view of the New Realism which is, perhaps, the view closest to New Scholasticism's world view.

No matter how we take whatever it is in the universe, it has two phases. Now the scholastics say that these are two phases of one thing. Not that they have gone over completely to the New Realism; but on the very issue of mind and matter, they maintain that man is a substance composed into one being, one complete substance.21

19 Dewey, RP, 89.
Yet it is not on the material side that scholastics look for knowledge of the world. The form of the object is assimilated by the form of the subject, and then there is true knowledge.

In knowledge, the knowing subject and the known object must be one; this unity is attained by an assimilation based on immateriality.

4. THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE

Probably nothing has been more unjust to the scholastic theory than the characterizing of its doctrine of substance as a theory of an inert being much like the substance discussed by Descartes. The real scholastic view is not unlike that of many non-scholastics who regard the subject of qualities in an object as just as real as the qualities, and who regard substance as that which exercises the qualities.

"Whenever we refer to a fact of experience we refer to someone thinking something."

i. The concept of substance as made up of matter and form removes the possibility of setting up a priority of consciousness which is the chief bone of contention between idealism and realism. Scholasticism does not succumb to either side. In medio stat veritas.

The exponent of the New Realism believes that if he can show the priority of consciousness to be a false conception, the strongest argument...for internality of relations goes to the wall.

22 Schumacker, Art. 1, 156.
23 McDougall, OP, 40.
24 Evans, MRO, 40, 41.
The reason is that the New Realism does not believe epistemology is ultimate, but, like the New Scholasticism, is more concerned with a world view based on an objective pluralism and external relations which are as real as the objects themselves.\(^2^5\)

An able commentator, well acquainted with the New Realism and New Scholasticism, sees an identity in the views to a marked extent. "To the new realist, the universe is a ** totality** of all the entities of reality."\(^2^6\) This pluralism is similar to that of scholasticism.

The author quoted indicates that the concept of being in New Scholasticism is similar to that of neutral entity in New Realism. At least we may grant that the primary matter of scholasticism is similar to the neutral entity of New Realism inasmuch as primary matter is determinable and depends exclusively on form for its essence.

**iii.** The difficulty caused by the supposed relation of a non-physical mind to a physical being is really due to a misconception of physical being as purely material. Physical being is made up of matter and form.

When a thing is known it is known as a form; and anything further known about it is dependent upon this form. Form is the unit of being and of knowledge. When an object is perceived, its form is in the percipient as well as in the object.\(^2^7\)

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\(^{25}\) Walsh, Art. 1, 53 and 56.

\(^{26}\) Evans, NRO, 99.

\(^{27}\) Bart, Art. 1, 23.
a. Unless, of course, physical things are really made up of matter and form as well as of essence and existence, a real difficulty does occur. "If objects are not real but mere combinations of quality groups, the difficulty we must admit becomes a real one."\(^{28}\) Essence, the doubly located whatness of any object, then would be absent from both substance and accident; there is no essence possible except in the mind, if substance is not composed of matter and form, and an essence existing only in the mind would be determined by unknowable causes which created sensations and ideas.

b. This view finds support in the opinions of a non-scholastic:

The physical things of common sense are not merely sense data or collections of them. They are continuants in time, and sense data are fleeting, intermittent things. They preserve the same recognizable spacial contour for a considerable time....Physical things, as in, are supposed to have causal relations with other physical things. Soap dissolves in water, and it will stop a leak in a gas pipe.\(^{29}\) This language could scarcely be used of mere sense data.

c. The similarity of the views of critical realists to the position here described has often been recognized. The differences are due largely to the refusal of critical realists to accept a subject of qualities. Approval of the matter and form metaphysical theory would be a long step in reconciliation of the general views:

\(^{28}\) Ryan, Art, 1, 252.
\(^{29}\) Laird, SR, 27.
Critical Realism is on the right track when it rejects the dualism of Descartes and asserts that an existential foundation for cognition must be acknowledged. The existent which we must accept, however, is external to cognition itself; it cannot be a mere logical identity or a projection outside the mind of what goes on in the mind.

5. KNOWLEDGE OF SUBSTANCE

i. It is perhaps well to begin this final statement on knowledge of substance with the words of a non-scholastic:

Knowledge is not the recognition of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, but the direct experience of things. It arises in the interaction between a percipient organism and a thing perceived. In its simplest form, it is mere awareness of an object.

ii. The intuitive nature of sense knowledge and the non-intellectual character of direct knowledge of essence give a decidedly mystical tinge to the scholastic's realistic view. The mysticism surely is not the self experience of idealism. It is a metaphysical hypothesis, demonstrable as consistent objectively.

This character is vitally important. It is not our purpose here to prove mystical experience occurs, but it is indeed gratifying to know that knowledge is based on immaterial unity, and that mystical experience can be grounded objectively.

a. Examined coldly it would seem to imply that mystical experience is not only possible but factual if the natural theology of scholasticism is true. Thus we find "mysticism is not opposed

30 Ryan, Art. 1, 258.
31 Patrick, ITP, 353.
to scholasticism, but rather organically united and connected with it."

b. Scholastic mysticism is not different from other forms, except that the union of the mind with God is understandable and objective. It conforms well to Evelyn Underhill's view of mystical experience as the "establishment of conscious relations with the Absolute" without requiring the intervention of ideas.

c. The constant change of Bergson, in which the mind intuitively tunes itself into reality, is consistent with the scholastic concept of mind and its knowledge of objects which implies that mystical experience "is a direct contact of the soul with Transcendental Reality." The experience is rooted in a purely immaterial union which cannot be described. Since God is pure form, it is readily clear that man might experience Him if sense activity could be reduced to the vanishing point.

iii. Cartesian dualism has had a disastrous effect on all views which include the concept of substance. The separation of mind and matter and classification of objects as matter led to the extreme epistemological dualism current today. The return of scholasticism to the scene and the advent of New Realism have somewhat lessened the opposition to present theories of direct knowledge.

32 Reinhardt, Art. 1, 106.
33 Butler, WM, 3.
34 Bergson, CE, 361.
35 Butler, op. cit., 3.
"After more than three centuries of idealist speculation, we have in neo-scholasticism a neo-realism once more, a doctrine which refuses to fall in with the method foreshadowed by Descartes."

iv. Although New Scholasticism has been on the scene longer, credit for throwing light on the particular problem of this thesis must go to the school of New Realism.

The notion of immediate and direct realism was admirably restored to its rightful place in philosophical theory some years ago by the neo-realist school. When Professor Perry made public his "epistemological monism" his exposition of it might have been subject to discussion, but the notion he suggested is, in my opinion, fundamental in any realist theory.

The fact emphasized by Perry, that knowledge is direct, found a warm welcome among scholastics who intermittently for seven centuries, and rather noisily during the preceding half-century, had preached the same doctrine. The rise of idealism had ended, and minds unwilling to accept direct knowledge laid the foundation for the present school of critical realism.

A deeply-rooted prejudice which involves the far-reaching assumption that knowledge is essentially relative, and as such essentially modifiable, has come to color all speculation on the knowledge problem even where it has not shaped our views concerning the nature of knowledge itself.

v. The manner of knowing an object in itself is of primary importance although we adhere to the assertion that a

36 Gilson, SMP, 227.
37 Noûl, Art.1, 140.
38 Ryan, Art.2, 18,19.
theory of perception is not essential to solution of the epistemological problem which is concerned with what we know, not how we know it.

As far as epistemology is concerned, the starting point is all-important. We must begin with facts empirically obtained and tested. To begin with a theory, as so many epistemologists have done, is to involve oneself in heartbreaking difficulties and end in despair. 39

Or as one of our non-scholastic philosophers has said, "It is hard to see why the history of perception should be allowed to correct or to supersede the description of it." 40

Theories of perception have no place in the problem of epistemology. They should be referred to psychologists. Our explanations are given to furnish a complete view.

a. In maintaining that truth consists in a correspondence between knowledge and objective fact, we have borne in mind that this correspondence is not that of representative idealism or representative realism. We have seen that knowledge begins with a concept which is true essentially, although there may be some disharmony existentially.

The first result of mental effort is the concept. Isolated, the concept is neither true nor false, but in a certain sense neutral. In the act of judgment, the concept is related to the subject by affirmation... Independently of the relation formulated in a judgment, there is, between the terms, subject and predicate, a relation due to the character of the terms themselves. 41

39 Ryan, Art.1, 244, 245.
40 Laird, SR, 16.
41 Noé, Art., 1, 142.
b. To obtain truth, the relation, which is independent of the mind, must be formulated by the mind. Otherwise, there is error. In any judgment, for example, That object is a green tree, the subject is a primary fact; it is a given fact, while the predicate is another kind of term, something in the mind which is busy in formulating. Thus, such terms as this, that, and the like are independent of judgment, but are adequate expressions of existing entities.

No word is needed to express that object. It can as well be indicated by a nod, a pointing finger, etc., and it is evident that that object, the immediately given datum, is different from the predicate. It should be equally evident that error consists in the affirming of a wrong predicate of the given subject. The subject is clearly an extra-mental reality; it is experienced as such, and it is experienced as something decidedly different from the resulting mental process which promotes to consciousness the term green tree. There is nothing decisive about green tree; the words might be any others. The content of the this or that object, however, is unalterable; it is not an arbitrary selection of sounds; it is the object tree as it is expressed in terms of a relation to mind.

c. The subject, namely, that object, is an ontological reality not created or formulated by the mind, not a result of a reasoning or thought process, but a given, objective reality as it is; the green tree, unlike the that object, cannot be unambiguously expressed except in words; it is a result of mental process; it is a concept selected from memory. In its application
to that object lies the possibility of error as well as of

What is given, however, is the object, and error is due
to psychological processes, absence of proper conditions, or some
other cause. That the ontological object was given as it was
remains true. The object in itself, like the subject of the
judgment, is neither true nor false in itself but is given to
the mind in all its innocence from somewhere outside the mind.

vi. Critical Realism comes to the door of New
Scholasticism, but leaves without walking in.

Critical realists do not admit that the immediate
data of consciousness are real. Even from the epistemological
point of view they consider immediate realism as the result
of insufficient analysis of knowledge. Conscious data, they
say, are not the object. The object is not intuited, it is only
known beyond the data by affirmation. It is revealed by the
data, embodied or clothed by them. It is not itself directly
given, but only believed or affirmed. Data are 'essences'
not 'things.'

Noël hastens to add that New Scholasticism does not offer
a theory of intuition such as Bergson might sponsor. "While the
sense datum is given intuitively, being is given through the
sensible intuition in a way that is not intuitive." 43

vii. What the critical realist means by essence, the
scholastic means by quidditas, whatness, essence, with the
important difference that for the scholastic, essence is object-
ively in the thing regardless of any relation to any standpoint.

42 Noël, Art. 1, 142, 143.
43 Ibid., 143.
We may say that the cuidditas is referred to the real thing by way of affirmation, but the affirmation itself is founded on intuition and justified by it. There is, therefore, some immediate knowledge of the real in all human knowledge.

6. THE PROBLEM OF QUALITIES

Epistemology is an attempt to explain what we know and its workability. It is not directly concerned with psychological or metaphysical aspects of the question. The fact is, we know that object to be a green tree. Why we know it is a question too ultimate to answer. It is like asking why we know anything, why knowledge occurs. The fact is that we do know, nd we know things.

The emphasis on the subjective side of qualities has caused quite a general rejection of the theory that secondary qualities have existence in objects as they are experienced. According to scholasticism knowledge is based in the duality of objects, the form being the content of direct knowledge.

Consequently, the real existence of qualities in things implies that each has an essence. This interlocking of metaphysics and epistemology is allowed because there can be no inconsistency between the two in a coherent system of thought, although neither need be the standard by which the other is judged.

In undertaking a study of this section, which will be the closing one, it must be kept prominently in mind that the existence of psychological difficulties does not lead any farther than to the conclusion that perception is a complex affair.

Noël, Art.1, 144.
They (the difficulties) do not prove that the man in the street is wrong when he asserts he has seen a red book. It is with this simple fundamental fact of every day experience that we, as epistemologists, must start and it is to this same fact that we must return as the final criterion for judging the truth or falsehood of any theory whatsoever about the fact.45

i. That knowledge of qualities, like all knowledge, is relative in the sense that it is related to the knowing subject applies to perception only to the extent that whatever is perceived must be perceived by senses. This constitutes an analysis of the knowledge situation.

There is, however, another situation to be considered, and that is the objective content of the sensation. This, indeed, is not sensation, because sensation is, by definition, subjective. But there is an ontological status for the object of sense knowledge:

The data of perception...if viewed ontologically, are the intrinsic qualities of things, not 'merely data' which arise in the percipient organism under certain conditions. To be perceived these data must be brought into relation with the perceiving mind. This means that the data must be made one cognitively with the perceiver; it need not mean that the data must be immanent to or totally dependent on the perceiver, nor that, because of the relativity of the perceptual process, what we really know are our own sensations. Moreover, that vision is accompanied by a feeling of externality cannot be denied.46

ii. It is important that the scholastic doctrine of real essence be recognized as applicable to qualities as well as

45 Ryan, Art. 1, 246.
46 Ibid., 250.
to substances. Although quality or any other accident is dependent on substance for its existence, nevertheless, quality has an essential nature by which one quality differs from all others. Epistemologists of a dualistic turn of mind stress the variance between the accounts of qualities given by physics and sensation, but the different modes of qualities are not due to essential differences in the modes of any particular quality, but to the double aspect of things. The problem at best is one for psychology.

Quality qua quality is present in the external object; it is present there in its essence. St. Thomas does not hold that quality is merely present in the object in such a way as to be the cause of an effect altogether different from the cause.47

The essence of quality, like the essence of anything else, has a double location, one subjective, the other objective. Objectively, the essence is what the quality is; subjectively, it is what the quality means to the percipient. From either standpoint, the essence is one and the same. "The essence is the answer to the question, What is it? It is defined as id quo res id quod est.48 In a later treatise on the same subject, the writer remarks, "Every man who has been kept in blissful ignorance of modern metaphysics, or who ceases to be baffled by them, believes in the objectivity of sensible qualities."49

47 Halpin, Art.1,146.
48 Loc. cit.
49 Halpin, Art.2,244.
iii. That the mode of being of qualities, in fact of all accidents, differs from that of substance cannot be denied. Substance is independent; accident is dependent.

The fact that St. Thomas teaches that "an accident should be described as of something rather than as something" does not mean that he wishes to cast any shadow of doubt upon the reality of the being of accidents. Since accidents can be defined they must have an essence. However, their definition is incomplete for they cannot be defined unless a subject is brought in in defining them. Neither do accidents cause the primary existence of the subsisting being, but only a secondary existence, that is, by means of accidents a subject is reduced from potency to act. Nor does the union of accidents and subject produce a new substantial unit.

iv. The seeming willingness of many thinkers to accept the objective reality of primary qualities, size, shape, and the like, but to reject secondary qualities, strikes the present writer as inconsistent. As we have suggested throughout this thesis, if any of our knowledge falsifies actual things, if we do not know them as they are, then no knowledge can be called direct. But it is on the same grounds that the objectivity of primary as well as secondary qualities must stand or fall.

It has been well said by a non-scholastic: "Our knowledge of primary qualities is equally dependent upon the reaction of the organism. The primary qualities are only relatively less changeable than the secondary." Without accepting Leighton's epistemology, we can call attention to the internal truth of the statement.

50 Halpin, Art. 1, 154, 155.
51 Leighton, MAC, 188.
v. The relation in which the subject knowing and the object known stand is external. Neither depends on the other, and the knowledge resulting is direct, whether it be of qualities or of the object itself. We shall bring this paper to a close with a pithy, comprehensive quotation from one of the world's most distinguished scholastics:

An object is known when it is present in a certain way in the knowing consciousness... Knowledge does not result merely from the thing; but rather, the thing known and the knowing subject cooperate in the production of the phenomenon. This intervention of the knowing subject shows us why the scholastics rejected 'naïve realism' which disregards the action of the knowing subject, and considers the object known as projected in our minds like an image in a lifeless and passive mirror. 52

Thomas insists that this sense impression is not known directly. What is present to sense consciousness, what we attain to is the thing itself, the oak tree. The impression which it produces in men is known only by a process of reasoning. 53

52 Dewulf, EP, 8, 9.
53 Ibid., 21.
CHAPTER X

ADDENDUM

The repetition of facts and views in this thesis is due to the several approaches to each of the major conclusions, and it was feared that certain carry-over notions might otherwise have been lost. Nevertheless, this writer is aware of the tiring effect on readers of such a style, and he apologizes.

From our survey of the New Scholasticism by itself and in relation to other systems of thought, certain conclusions have been drawn. That they are consistent internally is the belief of this writer. But no theory of knowledge can stand alone or, in a strictly theocentric view, as a truth only of philosophy. To show the consistency of these views with others far more important is the chief purpose of this section.

1. Scholastic theodicy proves the existence of a loving and all-powerful God who neither deceives nor is deceived. The theory that knowledge is direct is consistent with the theory of such a God.

2. It is admitted that God does not reveal everything to the human mind; His purpose is to have man merit eternity. But those truths known to be attainable only through faith are religious truths on the attainment of which nothing really depends. They are truths of dogma, and the criterion of acceptance or rejection is the human conscience which may be justified even in error.

1 Mercier, MSP, II, 252.
2 Ibid., 262.
The existence of religious mysteries, because they do not fall within the scope of reason, can be interpreted as part of God’s purpose. The fact that there is reason to classify as mysteries certain truths accepted on faith attests to the ability of the human mind to distinguish between attainable and unattainable truths. Knowledge of the world about us does not seem to belong to the category of mysteries.

3. God gave man senses and intellect. That He made them disproportionate to their respective objects is less reasonable than the belief that He made them to give direct knowledge of things about us. There seems to be no purpose in having man live in one world and know another.

4. The prevalence of purpose is opposed to the theory of epistemological dualism. The distinction between mind and body in man is a counterpart to the distinction between form and matter and to the distinction between essence and existence in the external world. The fact that each dualism forms a composite whole strengthens the reasonableness of the theory of direct knowledge.

The process of knowledge may be complex. Consciousness does not become existentially one with the object known. Yet, New Realism is correct in asserting that what is known is existentially one with the independent reality.3

Substance exists as it is conceived, as nature of the object; qualities exist as they are perceived. By definition,

3 Holt, NR, 34.
sensation is excluded from all but subjective existence. It is an experience resulting from a direct relation with reality, a relation characterized by cognition.

The world about us is known directly. Knowledge of ideas follows knowledge of things. Certain truths are known only mediately, but the data are given from the real order. All knowledge originates in God-given and accurate senses. Knowledge above that directly gained is based on infallible and valid knowledge by acquaintance with reality. Truth, real objective truth, can be attained!
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