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The failure of the League of Nations to provide collective security in the Italo-Ethiopian war, 1935-1936

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Boston University

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The Failure of the League of Nations to Provide Collective Security in the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-36

by

Jane Knowles Webb
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THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO PROVIDE COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR, 1935-36

BY

Jane Knowles Webb

(B.S. in Ed., Boston University, 1945)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 1946
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APPROVED BY

First Reader  
Professor of Government

Second Reader  
Instructor

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MAPS
The purpose of this study is to evaluate an experiment in the prevention of aggression of war.

The Italian aggression on Abyssinia in 1935 provided the League with another opportunity after the aggression of Japan on Manchuria in 1932 to test the effectiveness of collective security established in the League Covenant. The League had already failed to prevent Italy from using the League Covenant, which was declared void in 1935 by Italy. In May 1938, also, Italy had been allowed to incorporate Abyssinia into the Italian Empire.

Collective security is a relatively new concept in the theory of the Western state system. If it is a concept that is beneficial to nations in dealing with other nations, why didn't it work? This is the core of the investigation.

The League of Nations attempted to substitute security, as used to work by all, in place of the pre-World War I system of defensive alliances and balance of power system which had proved incapable of suppressing war. By entering the League, a sovereign state theoretically denounced the right to go to war to settle its affairs with other nations on the grounds that peace is indivisible.

In analyzing the reasons why the League of Nations failed to stop aggression in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, one question will be studied: (1) Was the League machinery...
The purpose of this study is to evaluate an experiment in the prevention and suppression of war.

The Italian aggression in Abyssinia in 1935 provided the League with another opportunity after the aggression of Japan into Manchuria in 1931 to test the effectiveness of collective security embodied in the League Covenant. The Geneva machinery failed to meet this test. In May 1936, Mussolini had accomplished his aim of incorporating Abyssinia into the Italian Empire.

Collective security is a relatively new concept in the history of the Western State System. If it is a concept that is beneficial to nations in their affairs with other nations, why didn't it work? This is the core of the investigation. The League of Nations attempted to substitute security,1 assured to each by all, in place of the pre-World War I system of defensive alliances and balance of power system which had proved incapable of suppressing wars. By entering the League, a sovereign state theoretically denounced the right to go to war to settle its affairs with other nations on the premise that peace is indivisible.

In analyzing the reasons why the League of Nations failed to stop aggression in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, two questions will be studied: (1) Was the League machinery

1. By "security" is meant the assurance to each state of its political independence and territorial integrity.
alone inadequate to cope with a "law-breaker", or (2) could the failure of the League in this case be attributed to those member states who were unwilling to allow the machinery available to be used effectively?

The Covenant was by no means perfect. As long as the principle of national sovereignty left each State unhampered in its capacity to pursue its own international policies, (however detrimental to its neighbors) to commit acts of aggression, to build up powerful war machines, an international organization was shorn of sufficient power to restrain its strong and protect its weakest members. As one writer aptly put the way in which national sovereignty limits the effectiveness of a world organization:

"It is as reasonable to expect billiard balls to coalesce into a unit when they collide on the table as it is to expect sovereign states to follow a policy that involves structural joint action in making and enforcing world law."  

Another factor which hindered the League was that, as an international organization, it was not universal in membership. One of the big questions marks during the dispute was what policy the more powerful non-member States, and particularly America, would pursue in the event an embargo was put on Italian trade.

Despite these drawbacks, the League showed itself capable, at a moment's notice, when hostilities had begun, to improvise

---

1. Scott Nearing, United World. p. 121
machinery for the Application of Article 16 (viz. the imposition of economic sanctions.) The political decisions facing the powerful members of the League in maintaining the European balance of power by keeping Italy as a potential ally, seemed more insuperable than organizing machinery to work out a plan to punish an aggressor.

Unfortunately, Great Britain and France, by the lack of active support to the Geneva machine, failed to punish the violator of the Covenant, thereby exposing their own weakness. But in their attempt to placate Italy in order to maintain in tact Italian friendship for a potential ally against Germany, they also failed miserably. For Italy was sufficiently antagonized by the imposition of sanctions to be driven into the Axis camp. Abyssinia did not remain a victim in an isolated war. Great Britain and France, themselves, became victims of their own unfortunate methods of saving the balance of power in Europe.

The crisis of the '30s, which began in Manchuria in 1931, spread to Abyssinia and later to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and finally the whole continent, was indicative of only one thing: The League and its members were incapable of preventing world conflagration because they failed to give their whole-hearted support and effort to force the "Caesars" of the 20th Century to abide by their covenanted obligations.

The importance of this study lies in the fact that the same choice confronts the world in 1946 as it did in 1935.
Will the world society be warless or lawless? The choice may mean the survival or annihilation of civilization.

The sincere thanks of the author are gratefully acknowledged for the help and guidance which Dr. Robert P. Benedict, has given in this work.

Jane Knowles Webb
PART I

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
Ethiopia owed its area twice as large as France, with a population of from four to ten million people. The 330,000 square miles are entirely surrounded by the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Italy. On the north it is bounded by Eritrea, on the west by Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and on the east by French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Fenced in on all sides by European colonies, Ethiopia has no outlet to any of the surrounding bodies of water.

Ethiopia has managed to remain an independent state in Africa, although it has continued to be a backward, partially uncivilized country. CHAPTER I Idness may, in part, be attributed to the fact that, at the time of its colonized position within the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Italy. Various other factors must be mentioned, however, to explain more fully the reasons for Ethiopia's continued backwardness. The communications and transport system are very poor, there being a single railway system from Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, to Djibouti in French Somaliland. The rainy season, which lasts from June to September, makes travel almost impossible during this period.

The internal conditions of the country also have done much to hinder its self-development. The people may be divided into three main groups: the Amhara, the ruling warrior class; the Gallo, who are peasants; and the Semien, tribes who occupy the eastern region, particularly Benish
Ethiopia covers an area twice as large as France with a population of from four to ten million people. Its 350,000 square miles are entirely surrounded by the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Italy. On the north it is bounded by Eritrea, on the West by Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and on the East by French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Hemmed in on all sides by European colonies, Ethiopia has no outlet to any of the surrounding bodies of water.

Ethiopia has managed to remain an independent state in Africa, although it has continued to be a backward, partially uncivilized country. Its backwardness may, in part, be attributed to the first point; that of its enclosed position within the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Italy. Various other factors must be mentioned, however, to explain more fully the reasons for Ethiopia's continued backwardness. The communications and transport system are very poor, there being a single railway system from Djibuti in French Somaliland to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. The rainy season, which lasts from June to September, makes travel almost impossible during this period.

The internal conditions of the country also have done much to retard its self-development. The population may be divided into three main groups: the Amharas, the ruling warrior class; the Gallas who are peasants, and the Nomadic tribes who occupy the outlying regions, particularly Danakil
The document appears to be a page of text discussing various topics, possibly related to policy or governance. The text is somewhat difficult to read due to the handwriting and condition of the paper. It seems to be a page from a document or a report, with several paragraphs discussing different points.

Due to the quality of the image, it's challenging to transcribe the full content accurately. The text likely involves discussions on topics such as policies, governance, and possibly economic or social issues. The exact details and context would require further clarification from the original source.
and Ogaden. The Amharic race consists primarily of Rases, or feudal barons, whose decentralized power in reality made Ethiopia a group of autonomous provinces controlled by local chiefs. The three pillars on which their power rested were the feudal system, the slave trade and the Coptic church. The church maintained great authority over the masses and had considerable influence with the ruling class.

Although the Ethiopian plateau is the best climate in Equatorial Africa, (a rich agricultural country yielding two or three crops a year, with an unknown quantity of resources), economic progress has hardly touched the country. Ethiopia, emerging from medievalism, remains a country largely disunited, experiencing few advantages of modern industrialism.

To complete a discussion of the factors which have retarded progress, it is imperative to include the continual threat of foreign control. Internal conditions alone have not retarded Ethiopia's progress. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the country's development has been the constant danger of attack from without. The problem then has been two-fold: to stave off external aggression and to eradicate its internal weaknesses.

Menelik II, the first strong Emperor of Ethiopia, and an outstanding figure in African history, achieved unprecedented success in coping with this two-fold problem. Due to his dominant personality and prestige with the local Rases, he united its two separate kingdoms and succeeded in limiting
the control of the Rases by organizing a strong centralized administration. His prestige was strengthened even further with the crushing of the Italian army in the Battle of Adowa in 1896 when the country put up a 'common front' against the enemy.

Menelik died in 1913 and the country returned to the anarchy of decentralized rule by the Rases.

In 1923, France sponsored the admittance of Ethiopia into the League of Nations. French motives are indicated by the speech of M. De Jouvenel when he said, "Was not the best means of strengthening the government of Abyssinia to admit it to the League?"¹ England opposed this action, possibly because the protection Ethiopia would receive under the Covenant would hinder British and Italian policy. One observer² feels that French motives were not as altruistic as they appeared, but were, instead, of a political nature. The foreign policy of France, he suggests was interested primarily in "putting a spoke in the wheel of Italian policy" by affording Abyssinia the protection of the League.

Ethiopia was not admitted unconditionally to the League,

¹. League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 13, p. 125. (Hereafter referred to as Official Journal.)
². G. Martelli, Italy Against the World, p. 23
The events of 1914 and the subsequent trench warfare in France.

In 1915, the war dragged on, and the importance of trench warfare became evident.

The trench warfare was characterized by the prolonged fighting in narrow, deep trenches. The soldiers lived and fought in these trenches, which were often under constant bombardment from artillery. The lack of mobility and limited visibility made it difficult for the soldiers to engage in combat effectively. The trenches provided some protection from enemy fire, but they also trapped the soldiers, making them vulnerable to surprise attacks.

The war in the trenches was not only a battle of attrition but also a battle of morale. The soldiers had to endure long periods of inactivity, while the enemy continued to bombard them with shells and machine gun fire. The constant noise and fear of death took a toll on the soldiers' mental health.

The trench warfare was a turning point in the history of warfare, as it marked the end of the traditional warfare and the beginning of modern warfare. The use of trench warfare became a common tactic in subsequent wars, and it continues to be used in modern conflicts.

The end of the war in 1918 brought a sense of relief and hope for the future, but it also left a lasting impact on the world, shaping the course of history for generations to come.
some reservations being attached to her entrance.\(^1\) The major European powers were anxious to control the trade in arms to less civilized communities. It was, therefore, made one of the conditions of Abyssinia's entrance into the League that she agree to conform to the Regulations of the importation of arms and ammunition as stipulated in the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye.

Not until October 7, 1920, when Hailie Selassie ascended to the throne was there again a semblance of any form of centralized government. The problems confronting him were essentially the same that had confronted Menelik II, viz., the unification of Ethiopia by substituting a strong central administrative system for the feudal regime of the Rases and at the same time keeping the country from falling under foreign control.

His task was Herculean, for his position was constantly endangered by the conspiracy of various Rases to overthrow him.\(^2\)

In 1931, a Constitution was presented to the country. This was the beginning of political reforms. The Constitution established a consultative body of two chambers, the members of the upper house to be nominated by the Emperor,

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2. A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, p. 116
The effort October 1, 1943, made to define the specific requirements and technical data in the contract for the construction of the ballistics' range and the necessary adjustments of the system and equipment as stipulated in the contract.

In short, a combination of the maximum use of existing facilities and the minimum investment necessary to achieve the desired results.
and the members of the lower house to be nominated by the local Rases. The ministers were ultimately responsible to the Emperor. In viewing this Constitution one can readily see that it did not afford any measure of self-government, but rather provided an elaborate advisory body to the Emperor. These efforts of Selassie were considered to be largely "window dressing" to meet the approval of foreign powers.¹

The Constitution, however, restrictive, had achieved certain results in that there had been a spread of knowledge of administrative machinery by changing the local representatives in both Senate and Chamber every three months.²

These reforms must be judged with the realization that they were in their incipient stages. However, it cannot be denied that very wild conditions still prevailed in parts of Abyssinia.

At any rate, if the country had been allowed to develop freely under the new emperor's progressive reforms, (from which a beginning had been made in 1931), undoubtedly, Abyssinia might have, over a period of time, been transformed from a feudal kingdom into a modern state governed according to constitutional principles. Selassie's characteristics, have been described as "combining antique virtue with enlightened modernism."

¹ New York Times, April 4, 1931
² Royal Institute of International Affairs. Inf. Dept. Papers Abyssinia and Italy, p. 19
I.

The organization, because of its size and complexity, is necessarily

structured in a way that minimizes its impact on the

individual members. It is therefore necessary to find a way to

reduce its size and complexity and realign its mission.

In order to do this, the organization must be restructured

in a way that maximizes its efficiency and effectiveness.

This restructuring must be guided by a clear and

articulate statement of its goals and objectives.

B.

The organizational structure must be

flexible and adaptable to changes in the

environment. This flexibility will allow the

organization to respond to new challenges,

while maintaining its core values and mission.

C.

The organization must focus on

improving its internal processes and

systems. This will require significant

efforts to streamline operations and

reduce waste.

D.

The organization must also

strengthen its external relationships,

including with customers, suppliers,

and partners. This will require active

engagement and effective communication.

E.

Finally, the organization must

invest in its people. This includes

providing training and development,

as well as creating a culture of

inclusion and respect.

The restructuring process will be

challenging, but if successful, it will

position the organization for future

success.
The last vestige of independence on the African continent disappeared in 1936, when Abyssinia was officially proclaimed part of the Kingdom of Italy after its conquest.
the inter association of industries as the interest of commerce. Growth and change in industrial organization have brought about a new pattern of economic adjustment.
Africa is often referred to as the 'forgotten continent'. The European powers have carved up its vast expanse into spheres of influence over most of the dark continent, so that little of its population has escaped the colonial domination of the imperialist powers of Europe. To North-East Africa, Ethiopia until 1950, remained the single independent state.

Nevertheless, Ethiopia had been constantly threatened by nationalism and also by attempts at political infiltration on the part of the three great powers of Europe: Britain, France and Italy.

CHAPTER II

INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR EUROPEAN POWERS IN EAST AFRICA

The power of one imperial power, Rome, perhaps, more than any other, had played a crucial role in shaping decisions regarding North-East Africa. David Livingstone's dream of a railroad from 'Cairo to Capetown' expressed in 1852 met the desires of Great Britain in Africa. The British Empire was the strongest foothold on the African continent of either of her two other rivals (or partners) in empire-building.

Ethiopia is strategically important for any nation controlling Egypt, Sudan, and especially the Suez Canal. Britain, gaining control of the Suez Canal in 1882, realized that no other European power dominated the Upper Nile. As time went on, British control extended from the Nile and Britain drew her sphere of influence by various agreements down to
Africa is often referred to as the 'forgotten continent'. The European Powers have carved for themselves extensive empires and spheres of influence over most of the dark continent, so that little of its population has escaped the colonial domination of the imperialist powers of Europe. In North East Africa, Ethiopia, until 1935, remained the single independent state. Nevertheless, Ethiopia had been constantly threatened by annexationist aims or efforts at economic infiltration on the part of the three great powers of Europe- Britain, France and Italy.

**Great Britain**

The British, due to their importance as an imperial power, have, perhaps, been the most instrumental nation in shaping decisions regarding North East Africa. Cecil Rhodes' dream of a railroad from "Cairo to Capetown" expresses in three words the desires of Great Britain in Africa. The British Empire has the strongest foothold on the African continent of either of her two other rivals (or partners) in empire-building.

Ethiopia is strategically important for any nation controlling Egypt, Sudan, and especially the Suez Canal. Britain, gaining control of the Suez Canal in 1882, insisted that no other European power dominate the Upper Nile. As time went on, British control extended down the Nile and Britain drew her sphere of influence by various agreements down to
the Blue Nile, a tributary of the Nile, into the North Western part of Ethiopia in the Lake Tana region.¹

Britain's most challenging rival in this sphere was France due to the later's dominance in French West Africa, Equatorial Africa and French Somaliland. It was necessary, therefore, to force France into a "back seat" in the conquest of empires in North East Africa, if Britain's position was to remain secure. This Britain did in three ways. In 1891, Britain chose Italy as the candidate to control the East African regions against the French by employing the familiar balance of power methods: using a weaker power as a bulwark against the stronger. This was implemented by the Anglo-Italian Protocols of March 15 and April 24, 1891, which, by delimiting the spheres of influence of Italy and Great Britain, assured to Italy 'the predominant interest' over Ethiopia and the whole of North East Africa except French and British Somaliland.²

The second step taken by Great Britain was in 1896, when

2. British and Foreign State Papers, 1890-1891, Vol. 83, pp 19-21. Continued British support was given in 1892 when certain ports were yielded to Italy on the Benadir coast, (Ibid, 1891-92, Vol. 84, pp. 630-635) and by an Agreement signed at Rome on May 5, 1894 the two powers define their spheres of active Empirical aims.
The page seems to contain a mixture of text and numbers, possibly related to dates or places, but the content is not clearly legible due to the handwriting or print quality. It appears to be a page from a document, possibly a report or a letter, but the specific details are not discernible from the image provided.
Britain ordered the reconquest of the Sudan region. In 1898 the superior strength of Kitchener's army forced the withdrawal of French troops from Equatorial Africa, which had reached Fashoda on the upper Nile. The third step was to consolidate the results of this policy of forcible expansion, i.e., consolidating her position by diplomatic arrangements. The success of this measure was reassured by the Anglo-French agreement which reasserted British dominance of the Upper Nile.

Having taken the necessary steps to secure a foothold in the Sudan Region, the British then proceeded to maneuver for a favorable position in regard to concessions in Ethiopia. This was achieved in 1902 when the British signed a treaty with the Negus Menelik whereby the British were granted (1) the right to build a section of the aforementioned railroad from Capetown to Cairo through Ethiopian territory, (2) a trading station on the Sudan Ethiopian Border, (3) the Sudan boundary line was to be redrawn to include both banks of the Blue Nile.

In 1904, the French and British negotiated the Entente Cordiale, and the conclusion was drawn from this action that

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1. Probably after the defeat of Italy at Adowa, March 1, 1896, Britain could no longer rely on Italy as a bulwark against France (in French Somaliland), for on March 12, 1896 Britain took matters into her own hands—only 12 days later.
2. William V. Koren, Italian Ethiopian Dispute, V. 6 No. 4 1935
4. Ibid., 1901-02, Vol. 95, pp. 467-69
France and Britain had composed their differences. In December 1906, the Tripartite treaty between Great Britain, France, and Italy was signed. Of the international agreements negotiated by the foreign powers with regard to their interests in East Africa, this is perhaps the most important, because it provides the cornerstone of the three powers policy in this area up to the outbreak of the conflict. Under this instrument they went on record to maintain the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia, and, in any case, agreed to act in concert to safeguard each others interests. A more detailed discussion of this treaty and its importance may be found in a later section. The significance with regard to the position of Great Britain was that she undertook to underwrite the validity of the Anglo-Italian protocols of 1891 in recognizing Italian influence over practically the whole of modern Abyssinia.

It is to be remembered that Italy renounced any designs on Ethiopia as a protectorate in the Treaty of 1896 following her defeat at Adowa. But, with the "official" backing of the British Empire on her interests in East Africa, Italy felt her claims in this area considerably strengthened.

In 1915, the treaty of London was signed in which Italy proposed that the two powers should act together. The Allies made generous promises at the expense of the enemy-Germany and

---

In December 1939, the President of the Council of Ministers of the French Republic decided to send a mission to the United States for the purpose of exchanging information on the situation and the policies of the two countries. The mission was charged with the task of presenting the French point of view to the American public and to the American authorities.

This mission was composed of three members: Charles de Gaulle, Jean Paulhac, and Pierre Laval. The mission was given the task of gathering information on the American economy, industry, agriculture, and other aspects of American life. The mission was also to report on the American attitude towards France and the French position in the world.

The mission visited various cities in the United States, including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. They met with American officials and visited factories and agricultural areas. The mission's report was sent to the French government, and it was published in France. The report highlighted the importance of American economic and industrial strength in the world, and it emphasized the need for France to modernize its economy to compete with the United States.

The mission also emphasized the importance of maintaining strong relations with the United States, particularly in the field of defense. The report stated that France needed to invest in its own defense capabilities to protect itself against potential threats from Germany. The mission's report was widely read in France and helped to shape the French government's policies towards the United States and defense.
economic exploitation of Eastern Abyssinia. At that time, the British were unwilling to cooperate, and rejected the Italian proposals.

Six years later, however, in 1924, after Italy had failed to receive any compensations from the Treaty of London, the Versailles Treaty, or the negotiations with the British in 1919, the whole question of Italian and British zones of influence was reintroduced on British initiative in 1924.

On the surface, this would appear to be a reversal of previous British policy. An examination of British motives will explain the reasons behind the action.

The British had undertaken direct negotiations with the Regent of Ethiopia with respect to the Tana dam project and they had proved unsuccessful. Therefore, in December 1925, Britain accepted the Italian proposals of 1919 which had been previously rejected. It was particularly specified in the exchange of notes that the concession granted to Great Britain was to be made within the Italian zone of influence. Britain further agreed that, if the concession of the dam was granted at Lake Tana, she would 'recognize an exclusive Italian economic influence in the West of Abyssinia and in the whole territory to be crossed by the above mentioned railway' and... would 'further promise to support..., all Italian requests for

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economic concessions in the above zone.' 1

When the agreements were aired in public, France protested that they were a violation of the 1906 Treaty. Abyssinia's fears were stated to the League in the following words: "We cannot but realize that economic influence and political influences are very closely bound up together." 2

Assurances and explanations were sent by both Italy and Great Britain to the Secretary-General of the League and to the Abyssinian Government disavowing any intentions of economic exclusiveness. France and Abyssinia were not the only critics of the exchange of notes in 1925; Leonard Woolf, a Britisher writing on the Italian-Ethiopian crisis in 1935, mentions in retrospect, the incongruity of these 1925 agreements with Britain's obligations to the League. He voices the complaint that these agreements were a distinct violation of the spirit of the Covenant in the following passage:

"When the Government at the end of 1934 was faced with the truculent determination of Signor Mussolini to ignore the League, and make war upon Abyssinia, they (British Government) entered the League Council metaphorically encumbered with a whole necklace of albatrosses.

"Our obligations to Italy, implied in these documents (1906 Treaty and the Exchange of Notes in 1925) are incompatible with our obligations to Abyssinia under the League Covenant. It is true, that these obligations and understandings, insofar as they are in-

2. 19 June 1926, Note to Sec. Gen. of the League. (Cited in M. MacCartney, Italian Colonial and Foreign Policy, p. 292.)
consistent with the terms of the Covenant, are by Article 20 the Covenant declared to be abrogated; but our Government has never publicly or openly admitted this or taken steps to procure its release from such obligations... On the contrary, up to October of this year (1935) in negotiations with Italy it showed that it still considered itself to be bound by these agreements, eg. in September the British Foreign Minister informed the Committee of five, "that his government was prepared to recognize a special Italian interest in the economic development of Ethiopia." 1

Returning to the immediate effects of the 1925 Anglo-Italian notes, the unmistakable result was to illustrate the true aims of Italy, and to demonstrate the willingness of the British Government to play a role sympathetic to Italian expansion in East Africa.

The policy of giving a 'helping hand' to Italy's colonial adventures is of the utmost importance in the understanding of British policy with regard to the treatment of Italy by the League.

Britain entered the system of collective security, embodied in the League Covenant, with these past commitments to Italy. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Italy, when undertaking the Abyssinian campaign, should consider such expansion a 'right', the validity of which had been recognized by the most powerful member of the League.

In a preliminary manner, a general statement of British policy, rather of the 'British Dilemma', is well expressed by Leonard Woolf.

1. Leonard Woolf, "The League and Abyssinia", (Day to Day Pamphlets) p.13
"For here was a test case for the League System a series of obligations binding Italy and this country to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Abyssinia, to settle all disputes without resort to war, and to apply sanctions to any state, which violated these obligations. On the other hand, there were a series of obligations binding this country to violate the independence and territorial integrity of Abyssinia into pieces and give most of them to Italy.

"For months the Italian government made open preparedness... All that time the British Government never made clear either to itself or to Mussolini or to the rest of the world which series of obligations it proposed to stand by, whether in fact, it was going to stand by the League... or whether it was going to stand by its agreements with Italy and give that country political and economic control over abyssinia... And the facts prove that at best, the Government's foreign policy was muddled, vacillating, inconsistent, paying lip-service to the League and its system, but continually in practice repudiating the obligations—the fulfillment of which alone could give reality to the League system of peace, disarmament and collective security."  

(The emphasis is the author's.)

The official British policy, as developed by this outline, has been favorable to Italian expansion; but with the advent of the League, Britain was forced to reconcile, however impossible, these commitments to Italy with an outward observance to the League. One of the vital reasons which forced Britain to become a protagonist of the League against Italy was public opinion at home. Popular opinion in Britain was displayed in the outcome of the Peace Ballot.  


and the British statesmen were forced to keep their eye constantly on the political complexion of their constituents with the approaching elections in 1935.

Thus, although the politics of 10 Downing Street showed a definite reluctance to punish Italy, British public opinion was undoubtedly a vital force which pushed the British delegates to go as far as they did in supporting the Geneva machinery.

British policy, immediately preceding and during the actual conflict, will be woven into the account of the action taken by the League in dealing with the transgressions of Mussolini.

In 1935, Great Britain and France exchanged their historic roles with respect to their attitude toward the League: Britain in theory, acting the protagonist, and France, the appeaser.

FRANCE

From the inception of the League to 1934, France had been a champion of the League and the system of collective security, for very realistic reasons.

At the peace table, France had championed specific interpretations of the Covenant, and had been the main nation to advocate the insertion of the sanctions clause.

What were the interests of France north east in Africa and how do they affect the French policy toward Mussolini's efforts at expansion in this area?
The development of education in the years following the end of World War II had a significant impact on the educational landscape and the role of education in society. The post-war period saw the establishment of new educational institutions, the expansion of existing ones, and a shift towards more comprehensive curricula. This era was marked by the rise of the so-called 'new' education, which emphasized critical thinking, democratic values, and international cooperation.

The growing importance of education in the post-war world was reflected in the increased investment in educational infrastructure and the expansion of the educational workforce. Governments and international organizations played a crucial role in this process, with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) playing a leading role in promoting the importance of education and coordinating international efforts in this area.

In the context of the United States, the period saw the emergence of new educational movements, such as the Bragg's Plan, which aimed to modernize the educational system and make it more responsive to the needs of a changing society. The Civil Rights Movement also played a significant role in the development of education, as it brought to light the glaring disparities in educational opportunities and outcomes for different groups of students.

The adaptation to new circumstances of the past

In the context of the current situation, the importance of education cannot be overstated. It is not only a means of personal development but also a cornerstone of social progress and economic growth. In the face of the challenges posed by globalization, technological advances, and climate change, education is more critical than ever before. It is essential to ensure that education remains accessible and equitable for all, allowing individuals to realize their full potential and contribute to the betterment of society as a whole.

This chapter aims to provide an overview of the developments in education during the post-war period, focusing on key trends, issues, and actors. It will also explore the implications of these developments for contemporary education and the future of learning.
The north east African possessions of France primarily center around French Somaliland, a barren, hardly inhabitable strip of land on the coast of the Red Sea. Her main interest there has been the Djibuti-Addis Ababa Railway, the concession for which was granted by Menelik in 1896. After the failure of French efforts to control the Upper Nile, the only preoccupation of the French in this area has been to prevent British financial interests from gaining control of the French company owning the Railway concession. This was assured in the Tripartite Treaty of 1906.

In 1908 the railway company was liquidated and a new one formed with the acceptance of Menelik, and the railway line was completed to Addis Ababa. The new company carried over 75% of Ethiopia's foreign trade. Its lucrative rewards were attested by its annual dividends which paid 125 francs a share since 1929, and profits on each ton of merchandise carried the length of the railroad in 1933 exceeded 200 francs.

France had opposed Great Britain's support of Italy's predominance over Ethiopia as a natural threat to her own interests. This was clearly expressed by her protests of the Anglo-Italian exchange of notes in 1925.

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2. **Loc. Cit.**
The report was written and distributed to the Department of Finance and Economy. It included a detailed examination of the economic policies and strategic advantages of the region. The report highlighted the importance of fostering economic growth and development, emphasizing the need for a coordinated approach to address the challenges faced by the region. The recommendations included initiatives aimed at improving infrastructure, enhancing education, and promoting entrepreneurship. The report was presented to the relevant authorities for consideration and implementation.
With the rebirth of German nationalism, France considered her interests in East Africa infinitesimal compared to the threat to her homeland. The obsession with the fear of the German danger was the primary motivating factor of the French policy toward the League against taking any action against Italy. From the first, France was interested in the Covenant exclusively insofar as it could be employed as a bulwark of French security, hence, the reason for a strong League. And, in 1935, in helping to undermine the League, she correspondingly helped to undermine her own security, paving the way for her own downfall.

French scepticism as to the extent to which British aid could be relied upon was no doubt one of the most important factors forcing France to see Abyssinia for Italian friendship.

ITALY

Italy's colonial expansion in north east Africa was not a Fascist innovation, incubated in the mind of Mussolini; it had been the desire of Italian statesmen for almost a century before him to carve a colonial empire in this area. The aspirations for an African colonial empire were in the embryonic stages in 1857 when Christoforo Negri made an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a treaty of friendship with the most powerful of the Amharic monarchies in Abyssinia. The first successful step in the building of an African empire was in 1869 when Guiseppe Sapeto and an Italian Naval
Commander landed at Assab, (a port on the Red Sea), and obtained a small piece of territory there. From this beginning, the colony of Eritrea was established. The period of the Risorgimento and the development of national unity at home, took precedence, however, over imperialistic aims, and therefore, African aspirations were subjugated to these more pressing domestic problems. In 1882, colonial efforts were resumed, and Assab was claimed as an Italian colony. 1

The opening of the Suez Canal gave the Red Sea more strategic importance as a link between the European and African continent. The wave of Imperialism, at high tide at the end of the 19th century with its glory-gold-gospel theme song, had its affect on Italy. Under the Crispi regime, 1887-1896, the colonial aspirations of Italy received renewed impetus.

The first direct relations between Abyssinia and Italy date from the negotiations between Italy and the new ruler Menelik in 1889 which culminated in the Treaty of Ucciali. This instrument established, as far as the Italians were concerned, a virtual protectorate over Ethiopia. A difference of interpretations arose, however, due to language

1. "The activity of travellers and explorers became intense and were feverish about 1880. . . . The Italian Geographical Society had been founder in 1867; there followed the Society for Geographical and Colonial Studies in Florence, and more especially the African Society at Naples, which aimed at making known the best channels of commercial communication with Africa. The activity of the Government was gradually concentrated upon the shores of the Red Sea. (and) in 1881 the Bay of Assab was acquired . . . and in 1882 this acquisition was confirmed and extended through an agreement with England." Benedetto Croce, History of Italy, p. 124-125.
difficulties, and Menelik rejected the Italian claim that he had signed away his country's independence.

In 1889 and 1890 respectively, Somaliland and Eritrea were drawn officially into the fold of the Italian east African empire. In 1890 Menelik allowed Italy to represent Ethiopia at an anti-slavery conference held at Eritrea.

With these accomplishments paving the way for further expansion, Crispi fervently made efforts to consolidate his country's claims to an Italian protectorate over Ethiopia. Since direct negotiations had failed, an accord was reached with Great Britain in 1891 by the Protocols of March and April which stated that Great Britain "recognized as a sphere of influence reserved to Italy---the whole of what is at present Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somaliland."

With Italian claims supported by the greatest colonial power on the globe by the Anglo-Italian Protocols, Italy unflinchingly pursued her policy of colonial expansion. Crispi, having pledged himself to the Abyssinian adventure, attacked the Tigre region of Abyssinia in 1895. The military action was successful and the region was temporarily annexed. Due partially to lack of support by Parliament in supplying the necessary appropriations, the war policy of Crispi was

1. Benedetto Croce, History of Italy p. 175
2. British Foreign & State Papers, 1890-1891, Vol. 83 pp. 1921
or affiliation, and therefore unnecessary. The latter alone cannot be
justified with the background information.

In 1940 and 1950, professional and administrative officials
made common reference to the fact that the latter case
would lead to an economic disaster. It is obvious that the
situation was an acute social-political crisis of proportion.

If these economists' views were justified, the war will be
lost. Economic, military, and political aspects of an economic
situation are of particular importance. In 1950, the proportion of
military and economic aspects in the war began to increase. We
should therefore advise the government to take the necessary
measures to prevent the economic disaster.
subsequently frustrated by the debacle ensuing at the Battle of Adowa on March 1, 1896, in which the Italian army was utterly defeated.

"Crispi's final and decisive fall, however, was brought about...by the African adventure. He was led hither by his love of the grandiose, by the vision of glory which he dreamed that military triumphs would bestow on himself and Italy..... but in December, the Negus Menelik, who had long been preparing, collected all his Rases around him and descended upon the Italians with a large army, which destroyed Toselli's force at Amba Alaja and laid seige to the fort of Makelle. Confronted by a wave of national grief and indignation, Crispi could not even attempt to defend himself, and sent in his resignation." 1

The Treaty of Addis Ababa signed on the 26th of October 1896, following the defeat of the Italians at Adowa, annulled the Treaty of Ucciali. Italy pledged herself by this document to recognize and respect the independence and sovereignty of the Ethiopian Empire. When Crispi was forced to resign, the national pride of Italy was sorely wounded by the humiliation suffered at Adowa. 2

From this time on, Italy was forced to act in concert with either Great Britain or France, or both powers, to regain any measure of economic or political control in this area, until 1928 when a unilateral policy was renewed.

The Tripartite Treaty of 1906, mentioned previously, 3 provided the cornerstone of Italy's 'rights' in Ethiopia.

2. Mussolini's attempt to heal this wound can be said to be one of the important motives for reviving Ethiopian campaign in 1935.
3. Cf. ante. p. 16
null
One of the reasons the treaty was precipitated in 1906 may be found in the entrance of Germany on the scene as a growing colonial power in east Africa. This threat to the status quo revealed itself at the Algeciras conference when Germany stated intentions of establishing claims in north east Africa, plus the fact that in 1906 she signed a commercial treaty with Ethiopia.

The three powers, already well entrenched in Africa, were not desirous of sharing their spoils with a fourth power. Consequently, this agreement in 1906 was negotiated to prevent any German encroachments on the status quo. By this instrument they received assurances from each other that their special interests would not be disturbed by one another. The ruler of Ethiopia, Menelik, who was not a party to the Treaty, approved it, after some hesitation, in December of that same year. The treaty in general delimited each power's sphere of influence, giving Italy the lion's share—if she could get it.

The document defines the powers' interests as follows:

(a) the interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin, more especially as it regards the waters of that river and its tributaries, without prejudice to Italian interests mentioned in (b)

(b) the interests of Italy in Ethiopia as regards Eritrea and Somaliland (including the Benadir), more especially with reference to the hinterland of her possessions and the territorial connection between them to the west of Addis Ababa.

1. K. MacCartney, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937, p. 238. p.239, "The Tripartite Agreement is considered by many international experts as a classic example of a diplomatic instrument formally drawn up for the safeguarding of a state but really aiming at its destruction." Loc. cit.
(c) the interests of France in Ethiopia as regards the French protectorate of the Somal coast, the hinterland of her protectorate, and the zone necessary for the construction and working of the railway from Djibuti to Addis Ababa."

This treaty gave Italy new hopes for an Italian protectorate over Ethiopia and from this time on, all agreements, as much as was possible, gave Italy a "green light" in north east Africa.

The Secret Agreement of 1915 reiterated again Italy's imperialist desires in this sphere. Due to the unsuccessful outcome of this agreement and the peace treaties of 1919 for Italy, the consensus of opinion was that Great Britain was (due to the above factors) sympathetic to Italy's need for expansion.

It was rumored in 1925 that the British were anxious to maintain the status quo in Africa. They, therefore, suggested that Mussolini seek "pacific penetration" in Albania rather than taking action against Abyssinia at this time. The Christian Science Monitor published a report giving evidence of this proposal:

"In a confidential memorandum published on the 2nd of October, 1925, and based on information said to come from "unimpeachable sources" disclosed that Signor Mussolini contemplated action against Abyssinia in 1925. Information from a good source would indicate that he wanted to face this (the Ethiopian) problem after having subdued the rebel tribes in Somaliland and reconquered the whole country, or rather simultaneously with this colonial

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police action. This was after the Anglo-Italian accord concerning the respective spheres of influence in Ethiopia at the end of 1925 and before the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship with Ethiopia in 1928. From the activity that Italy had then displayed along the Red Seacoast, the British might well have become aware of Signor Mussolini's intentions. They did not like the Duce's idea and are reported to have told Signor Mussolini in effect, in a friendly way: "Instead of wasting so much effort and money in a country so distant from Italy, and where you might easily encounter diplomatic difficulties with the two countries which have interests in Ethiopia, why don't you seek pacific penetration much nearer at hand? What about Albania? The British government would leave Italy a free hand to consolidate her position in Albania, provided that she did not seek to change the status quo in the Red Sea area."

From this source, it can be surmised that any colonial adventure incubating in Mussolini's brain at this time was postponed (on British advice), to be hatched at a more propitious moment.

In 1928, Italian policy changed, and Mussolini decided on action without the support of his European powers. The Pact of Friendship was thus negotiated between Italy and Ethiopia, and was signed on August 2nd, 1928, by Ras Tafari Makonnen for Ethiopia and Signor Cora, the Italian Minister to Abyssinia. The Treaty of Friendship consisted of an exchange of courtesies for the purpose of promoting trade for the advantages of each of the signatories. Both countries pledged themselves by this instrument to respect the independence of the other and to settle all differences arising

between them by arbitration.

In reality, Italy hoped to foster a development of inland trade by offering in a supplementary convention, the use of the Port of Assab in Eritrea to Ethiopia. Italy hoped also, that the transit of products in this manner would give Italian nationals an opportunity to exploit the natural resources of Ethiopia.¹

Due to the fact that the economic agreements in the Treaty were largely unfulfilled by Ethiopia, it is interesting to make a more careful examination of its text.

"Article 1. There shall be constant peace and perpetual friendship between the Kingdom of Italy and the Abyssinian Empire.
Article 2. Each government undertakes not to engage, under any pretext, in action calculated to injure or prejudice the independence of the other, and the two governments undertake to safeguard the interests of their respective countries.
Article 3. Both governments undertake to submit to a procedure of conciliation and arbitration disputes which may arise between them and which it may not have been possible to settle by ordinary diplomatic methods without having recourse to arms."²

The results of the treaty were largely disappointing to Italy and this constituted one of her most substantial grievances against Ethiopia. From this treaty, Italy felt she had acquired a right to expect economic advantages and concessions.

Why Ethiopia signed it—her first treaty with any European

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power—has never been explained. Undoubtedly, she feared 'friendly' economic penetration by her past experiences with Italy in attempt to establish a protectorate over Ethiopia. Nevertheless, after signing the treaty, Ethiopia adopted an obstructionist policy, obviously placing as many obstacles to Italian cooperation as possible.

Ethiopia made not use of Assab, while the Italians built their road agreed upon from Assab to the Ethiopian frontier 'without undue delay'\(^1\), but the Ethiopians never fulfilled their part of the agreement at all.

In the Italian memorandum to the League on the section on Treaty Infringements,\(^2\) Italy stated that hindrances were placed in the way of Italo-Abyssinian trade development, and that 'although Italy had not missed an opportunity in offering Ethiopia counsel,' Abyssinia had barred all doors to Italian cooperation. In solving her internal problems, Ethiopia had appointed advisors of many other nationalities, so that Italy 'in practice found herself in a position of inferiority compared with the other powers.'\(^3\) Although Article 3 was nullified by the Abyssinians, and the instrument became a useless tool of Italian policy, Abyssinia did invoke

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1. Toynbee, op. cit. p. 128
3. Between 1928 and 1935, an Englishman was appointed to advise on internal administration, a Swiss on judicial questions, an American on educational and financial questions, Belgians and Swedes on military questions, a Russian on Public works, Germans on aviation, Frenchmen on Foreign Policy, etc. During this period only one Italian expert was appointed in an advisory capacity. Toynbee, Op. Cit. p 128
Article 5 at a later date.

This treaty dates the steady deterioration of relations culminating in war between the two countries.

The impossibility of peaceful economic infiltration in Abyssinia, led the Italians to attempt more hostile methods.

It is obvious from this brief picture of Italo-Ethiopian relations that, Italy, up to 1935, had been dissatisfied with her lot in north east Africa, and that her attempts at empire building had been much less successful than those of her other two partners. Before analyzing the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, it will be necessary to investigate more particularly, the other causes, domestic and international, which have resulted in Italy's claim for a 'place in the African sun.'
ITALY'S ROLE IN REALPOLITIK

Italy was never destined to play a leading role in power politics because geographical and topographical factors had given her an inferior share in the world's raw materials. Italy is conspicuously deficient in these resources, viz., coal, iron, and especially oil, which are essential for industrial development.

While Italy is forced by nature to be more agricultural than industrial, her agricultural activities are not sufficient on the whole to meet her needs. For example, she has to import 30 percent of her food. While 150,000 square miles is roughly the size of Italy, a poor country, partly due to its natural and partly due to the class structure, where many of industrial workers in the north and the peasants of the south experience a low level of income well being. For these reasons, Italy has been forced to play a limited role in power politics. It is not surprising then that Italy has been more adopt at "assisting only the small and weak, malting those already mortally wounded, or snatching bones from the great carcasses."

The contributing factors in the rise of Fascism, then, were: The great disappointment in the small share of spoils of World War I, the discredit of Italian statesmen among others.

1. R. C. S. 15 Oct., p. 668
RISE OF FASCISM

Italy was never destined to play a leading role in power politics because geographical and topographical factors had given her an inferior share in the world's raw materials. Italy is conspicuously deficient in those resources, viz, coal, iron, and especially oil, which are essential for industrial development.

While Italy is forced by nature to be more agricultural than industrial, her agricultural activities are not sufficient so she must rely on imports of some staples. For example, wheat has to be imported to feed its population, as one-third of her 120,000 square miles is uncultivable. Italy is a poor country, partly due to nature's "stinginess" and partly due to the class structure where masses of industrial workers in the north and the peasantry of the south experience a low level of economic well being. For these reasons, Italy has been forced to play a limited role in power politics. It is not surprising then, that Italy has been more adept at "attacking only the small and weak, mauling those already mortally wounded, or snatching bones from the great carnivores." ¹

The contributing factors in the rise of fascism, then, were: The great disappointment in the small share of spoils of World War I, the discrediting of Italian statesmen among their

¹ F. Schuman, Op. Cit. p 535
people by a feeling that they had won the war but the statesmen had lost the peace, and the impoverishment of the masses. Thus, the frustration of Italy's patriotic ambitions, and the adverse economic conditions of the people, were instrumental in aiding Mussolini's ascendance to leadership.

In his creation of the myth of Fascism, Mussolini asserted, as its fundamental principle, the power of the nation and its subsequent 'ethical' expansion. In order to clarify the Italian action in Ethiopia, a few salient points will be considered in the succeeding pages to describe the practical implications in the philosophy of Fascism to colonial conquest.

The Fascist movement received strong support from the soldiers both prior to Italy's entrance to the war and in 1919. Membership in the fascio di combattimento were comprised primarily from this group. The clever propaganda of the Fascist leaders played effectively upon the low morale of a people whose psychological mood was that of a defeated nation.

The militaristic patriotism and promises of war and glory, with the Duce playing the leading role as imperator and conqueror were incorporated as fundamentals in Fascist doctrine. Democracy was criticized as a static form of organization, while the Fascist state made claims of being a dynamic, virile, ever-expanding movement. As Mussolini himself explained,

"The Fascist State is a will to power and an Empire. The Roman tradition is the idea of force. In the Fascist doctrine, the imperial idea is not only a territorial, military and mercantile expression, but
also one of spiritual and moral expression. For Fascism, the tendency to the imperial idea means expansion of the nation and is a manifestation of vitality.  

According to the tenets of Fascism, the expansion of the nation is an 'ideal'; and its antipode, a sign of decadence. Pathological nationalism was an invisible motive for the Italo-Ethiopian aggression, which proved to be an important factor regardless of any economic considerations.

Leadership and the elite principle are the foundations upon which a totalitarian system rests. A leader, such as Mussolini, with a de facto incipience, necessarily bases his continued existence in power on his ability to mystify the people under his control, manipulating their minds by crowd psychology, symbolism and mass indoctrination.

This is the 'precariousness' upon which the Mussolini regime rested. Did Mussolini fear that support of the masses was waning? Was he afraid that the colorful role of 'duce' which he had created was becoming colorless under the pressing burdens which the Italian people had to bear? Was Ethiopia merely a manufactured opportunity for Mussolini to revitalize his popularity, by recreating the spirit of the Risorgimento with the Duce emulating its great leader? It would provide a chance for increasing the prestige of the new-born fascist

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1. Popolo d'Italia, August 5, 1932 (Cited in G. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 768)
2. G. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 769
state, both in the eyes of foreign countries as well as at home.
It is logical to conclude, therefore, that, had Ethiopia been
offered Mussolini on a "silver platter" he might not have
accepted it. If an exhibition of the military prowess of the
Fascist state reaffirm Mussolini's popularity and bolster up
the morale of the Italian masses, all would be lost if Ethiopia
were handed to Italy in diplomatic negotiations.

A colonial adventure might be a convenient means of
diverting the thoughts of the overburdened taxpayer from his
economic distresses to the glory of military conquest.

The campaign achieved this objective. The army absorbed
many of the unemployed. War plants caused a diminution in
unemployment, and the Italian people were led to believe they
were on the road to fulfilling their 'manifest destiny.'

1 In the Laval-Hoare Peace Plans of Dec., 1935, the major
part of Abyssinia was offered to Italy by Great Britain
and France. cf. post pp.
ITALY'S NEED FOR COLONIAL EXPANSION

The Italian discontent over the outcome of the peace settlement at Versailles is partly an expression of an unsatisfied 'have-not' nation. Some adjustment must be made between 'haves' and 'have-nots' if friction over the inequality in the distribution of material resources among nations is to be eradicated.

It is obvious that a country, like the United States, with abundant resources and potential reserves is less likely to be an 'aggressor' than a nation which is unable to support its people through lack of sufficient resources, in times of high tariffs and contracting world free trade.

Signor Tittoni expresses Italy's plight in this respect and offers a plea to the League members:

"To those privileged states which enjoy a monopoly with regard to raw materials and to those whose wealth has permitted them to acquire a monopoly outside their territories, I say: do not wait to be appealed to by the poorer states which are at the mercy of your economic policy, but come forward spontaneously and declare yourselves to this Assembly that you renounce all selfish aims and before the bar of the League of Nations declare yourselves ready to support the cause of international solidarity."

Very little of a constructive nature was forthcoming from the League members in making fundamental adjustments in world economic policy. The victors of World War I, not only divided

The letter acknowledges the importance of the charity to the community and
its continued support, emphasizing the positive impact of their efforts. The
recipient expresses gratitude for the donation and looks forward to the
future with hope. The letter concludes with a positive outlook on the
relationship and future collaborations.

In conclusion, the letter highlights the significance of the charity and its
continued efforts. The recipient expresses gratitude for the donation and
seeks to maintain a strong relationship with the charity.
the defeated enemy's spoils but managed to maintain the status quo, preventing any future encroachment. Mussolini capitalized on Italy's plight and played for the sympathy of the world rather than making any sincere attempt at internal reorganization to raise the standard of living of the Italian people.

His foreign minister, Signor Grandi, on June 4, 1932, explained Italy's problem in the following words:

"Italy must also place a problem before the world... It is a vital problem which is directly connected with our future, a problem of undisturbed peace and of the work of a nation of forty-two millions, which will amount to 50 millions in fifteen years. How could these millions of people live and continue to develop if they are compressed into a territory half the size of France, Spain or Germany, with no supplies of raw materials and no possibility of renewing their stocks, confined and held captive within a closed sea, the routes and mouths of which are used by several countries while others control the entrances which form the Caudine Forks of Italian freedom, security and supply?... This problem, the vital problem of Italy, arises of itself and must form part of the great problem of international reconstruction... We cannot tolerate that the recognition of Italy as a colonial power should be overlooked..."

Italy was thus determined to expand in the only direction remaining to her—southward. Mussolini in his 2nd Quinquennial Assembly address on the 18th of March 1934 described the direction of Italy's expansion and the cadre of a colonial policy which has as its goal, a 'natural expansion which ought to lead to a collaboration between Italy and the peoples of Africa.'

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1. Cited in MacCartney, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy* p. 284
...different models and changes and rules...
Stating in no uncertain terms that Italy would not tolerate any efforts to impede the attainment of her objectives, Mussolini said:

"We demand no privileges or monopolies, but we require and wish those who are satiated and wholly desire to retain their possessions to refrain from blocking the cultural, political and economic expansion of Italy."\(^1\)

"Legitimate" colonial expansion, as expressed by the preceding statement, was considered on an entirely different plane of ethics from provoking war among "civilized" nations. It is interesting to note the "double standard" Mussolini applied to his colonial warfare, and no doubt, expected that the League would think of his adventure in Ethiopia in a similar fashion. As he put it,

"Was the League to be the tribunal before which the Negroes, the backward peoples and savages of the world could arraign the great nations which had revolutionized and transformed humanity?"\(^2\)

In other words, colonial expansion since the beginning of the Western State System had been included in the rules of 'fair play'. Had not Britain in the Twentieth Century engaged in similar adventures? Should Italy, arriving late in the race for colonies, be denied the remaining meager crumbs not previously devoured by the already satiated empire builders?

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felt that if she were to be called on the carpet for this incident, she could readily manage to embarrass the other members for similar behavior.

"Perhaps the moment has also come to open up the entire problem of colonies in all its complexity. This is in the interest of all civilized states, and especially of those who were unjustly deprived of their share in the exploitation of the riches of the world."

ITALY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Italy's problems, as has been intimated, although not insuperable, were not enviable. Her plight consisted of, not only a deficiency in the necessary raw material for basic industries, but also the problem of supporting a population of 42 million on an area half the size of France, one third of which was unfit for cultivation.

The period following the war had sent Italy staggering to her knees with a completely dislocated economy. The disintegration of any stability was, in part, the cause of the Fascist rise to power, when in 1922 Mussolini rode to power on a wave of economic and political difficulties.

While the Fascist Labour Charter stated that private enterprise was to be maintained as an effective instrument of the national economy, the State subordinated private interests by the Corporate System. An analysis of Italy's economic development under this system is pertinent to this study, in order to show the relationship between economic distresses and the

1. Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Department Papers, No. 15, Economic and Financial Position of Italy for more detailed information on this subject.
I was only able to report on the subject we have covered.

I propose to outline the various steps that have been taken to date in the development of the project. It is important to note that these steps have been taken in consultation with the relevant authorities.

As far as I am aware, the project has been well received by the community. However, it is important to keep in mind that there are still a number of challenges that need to be addressed.

In conclusion, I believe that the project has the potential to make a significant impact on the community. It is important that we continue to work together to ensure its success.
adventure in Ethiopia.

A separation of domestic and international economic problems is an artificial division, and the interrelationship between the two is, other than academically, inseparable. But for the sake of simplification, this division is made in analyzing the picture of Italian economy.

The most prominent domestic problems of concern here consist of unemployment, the standard of living, the budget, and the national debt. An analysis of these factors with a corresponding discussion of Fascist policy in meeting them, will give a general picture of the situation in which Italy found itself in 1935.

The World depression in the '30s further complicated the Italian economy, resulting in an increase of unemployment, a decrease in her 'invisible' export tourist trade, and a contraction of foreign markets in general. These factors had their inevitable repurcussions on the standard of living. A period of deflation characterized the early thirties with prices of all foodstuffs cut, rents lowered and wages reduced. A writer in the Economist estimates the cumulative reductions of wages at between 20 and 40% since the beginning of the depression.

"....To secure an index of real earnings from which to judge the general standard of well-being, it would be necessary to adjust these figures in order to take into account a 320% in unemployment." 1

These facts demonstrate how the world depression adversely affected the Italian population.

1. Loc. Cit.
A discussion of recent trends in the field of information technology.

Recent advancements in computer science and data management have led to the development of new technologies that are changing the way we interact with information. The rapid growth of the internet and the increasing use of social media platforms have further accelerated these changes.

The importance of understanding these trends cannot be overstated. With the amount of data being generated on a daily basis, it is crucial that we have the tools and knowledge to effectively manage and utilize this information.

In conclusion, the field of information technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace. It is important for us to keep abreast of these changes in order to stay competitive in the global marketplace.
Increased spending in public works, forms of insurance to workers, and subsidies to industries comprised the major measures that were employed to mitigate the rising trend in unemployment.¹

The pressures of deflation and rising unemployment, depresses the standard of living further. Far from being eased by Fascist policies of spending, they were affected detrimentally by a policy which encouraged and stimulated an increase in the population and restricted emigration.²

To mitigate the social affects of the depression, extensive public works and programs for land reclamation were undertaken, however, with the rapidly rising needs of the Fascist state, a heavy drain was put on the taxpayer. Signor Mussolini told the Chamber of Deputies on May 25, 1934 that,

"I am the first to declare that the pressure of taxation has attained the limit, and that the Italian taxpayer must be given a breathing spell of absolute tranquility; if possible, his burden must be lightened." ³

Unfortunately, the increase in expenditures was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in revenue for the valid

¹ Royal Institute of Int. Affairs, Op. Cit p.52, "further analysis of the items covered by the official headings shows that the rise in expenditures during the years of the depression is primarily due to four factors: (1) expansion of subsidies, (2) extraordinary treasury expenses (3) state assistance to local government finances (4) increased military expenditures.


³ Royal Institute of International Affairs, No.15, Op. Cit, p.51
The question of satisfaction and peace of mind is often taken as a criterion for the evaluation of many actions and decisions. However, the concept of satisfaction is subjective and can vary greatly from one individual to another. It is important to consider the perspectives of all parties involved.

In the context of a policy, the implementation of measures that ensure satisfaction and tranquility is crucial. A well-implemented policy can lead to a positive impact on the community, whereas a poorly executed one can cause significant distress.

I have long been a proponent of the idea that policies should be transparent and inclusive. This approach ensures that everyone's voice is heard and that the decisions made are in the best interest of the community.

Ultimately, the success of any policy depends on its implementation and the ability to address the concerns of all stakeholders.
reasons explained above by Mussolini. The extent of the divergence between revenue and expenditure is described in the following:

"Since 1930-1 there has been a steady decline in revenue which is shown both in the fall of the index of 'real' revenue from 135 to-in 1930-1 to 118 in 1932-3 and 1933-4. This decline has persisted in spite of the increase taxation and tariffs. This is only natural in view of the shrinkage of business during the world depression, exaggerated by the maintenance of the lira at the 1927 parity."

The obvious consequence of increased expenditures and declining revenues is an unbalanced budget. The budget deficits incurred between 1930-1934 amounted to a total of 14,697,000 lire and this total showed no signs of abating in 1935, as the debt had risen by a further 2,382,000 lire in seven months.

The budget deficits were partly met by floating domestic loans rather than incurring foreign indebtedness, thereby keeping the burden primarily within Italy. The following charts demonstrate the extent of the budget deficits and the amounts of the internal debt:

The trend shown by these figures reflects the repercussions ensuing from the overvaluation of the lira, the decline in experts, and the contraction of foreign markets which generally accompanied the world crisis.

In the succeeding pages, a discussion of each of these factors in their relation to Italy's foreign trade will complete the picture of the economic and financial position in which she

1. Loc. Cit.
found herself in 1935.

**Italy's International Economic Relations**

The policy of "autarchy" underlies the major actions taken by the Fascists in their commercial relations with the rest of the world. This drive for self-sufficiency in the early '30s had behind it strategic motives as well as economic, perhaps, with a view toward the necessity for self-reliance in the event of a colonial campaign. Whether Mussolini was far-sighted enough to consider the difficulties that might be encountered with a hostile League and the possibility of Art. 16 being invoked, is debatable. Nevertheless, even in pre-crisis days wide efforts were made to free the country from the dependence on importation of food stuffs. "The battle of the wheat did not succeed in making Italy self-supporting," 1 "but she had come close to independence of such imports, for her import surplus of wheat had been reduced from 18,500,000 quintals in 1925-6 to 2,300,000 quintals in 1933-4."2

The futility of complete self-sufficiency is evident in a country which lacks such essential raw materials as coal, oil, cotton, iron, steel, copper, etc. in any great quantity. 3 "For rubber, tin, nickel, tungsten, mica and chromium, Italy is

2. Loc. Cit.
3. Cf. Table IV
The history of "Supreme" Manhattan and other takeover plays.

In the prosecution of stockholder protection and control, one

sees often the role of the takeover action as well as the defensive
defense of a company's position. These positions are of
equal importance in maintaining the individual's merit and the
continuity of the company's position. The takeover action, there

fore, is not only a defensive measure to protect the company's
interests, but also an offensive move to take the company into
the hands of the management.'

The takeover action, therefore, is not only a defensive measure
to protect the company's interests, but also an offensive
move to take the company into the hands of the management.

Furthermore, it is important to maintain the company's
terms of reference to ensure the integrity of the takeover
action. As the terms of reference are met, the takeover
action is considered successful.

Another important aspect of the takeover action is

the protection of the company's interests. This is especially
true for companies that have a significant market
share. In such cases, the takeover action may

result in a loss of control for the company.

However, under certain conditions, a

takeover action may prove beneficial.

It is important to note that, in general,

the benefits of a takeover action can

only be achieved if the terms of reference

are met. Otherwise, the takeover action

may result in a loss of control for the

company.
completely dependent on foreign supplies.\textsuperscript{1}

The contraction of foreign trade resulted, not only from a consciously developed drive for self-sufficiency, but also from the trade restrictions and tariff walls built around practically every country after the world economic crisis. Despite Italian policy to stabilize the lire, its financial position in international exchange became more desperate, and had its effect in the contraction of Italy's foreign trade.

The lire had been stabilized officially in December, 1927, at a rate of 19 to the dollar. Having been 25 and 26 in previous years, it was obviously overvalued. The position of the lire in successive years continued to degenerate, and, in May 1934, Mussolini made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies to the effect that he anticipated a budget deficit of 4,000 million lire and emphasized the dangerous condition of the balance of international payments, and the ominous efflux of gold.\textsuperscript{2}

Stringent decrees in 1934 and 1935 were issued for the purpose of marshalling every penny of exportable funds to defend her exchange. All foreign exchange operations were prohibited except for genuine industrial or commercial trade requirements; banks and businesses were required to declare their


\textsuperscript{2} Ibid, p
foreign balances to the Bank of Italy. Banks and citizens were forbidden to purchase securities abroad; and in December 1934 all banks, companies, etc. were ordered to cede their foreign credits within ten days to the National Exchange Institute at the current rate of exchange. In May 1935, a decree ordered the surrender of privately held foreign investments. In August of that year, these were compulsorily converted into Italian Government Securities. The attempt to check the outflow of gold, however, was unsuccessful, and the loss of gold continued, at an accelerated pace.

"The reserves fell from 7,397,000,000 lire at the end of 1933 to 5,883,000,000 at the end of 1934," and the decree of July 1927 fixing the minimum gold reserves at 40% was suspended. In effect, the lire was no longer on the international gold standard."

The overvaluation of the lire naturally affected the exporter in Italy, adversely resulting in contracted markets. Not only did exports fall off, but a conscious effort to decrease imports was made in the Corporate State's distinctly protectionist policies. The disastrous result of an internal policy of augmented spending and a further contraction of foreign trade necessitated further protection of domestic industries in order to defend the adverse balance of inter-

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2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, No. 15 Op. Cit., p. 41
(No text present on the page)
national payments. By 1935 Italy had one of the highest tariffs in the world. The decline in exports, resulting from the strain placed on the exporter by the overvaluation of the lira, and the consciously developed curtailment of imports, eg. wheat, had their inevitable repercussions on the Italian standard of living. Not only did unemployment increase, but the cost of living was raised by the high tariffs and subsidies to industries. To give just one practical example, as a result of the wheat tariffs, the Italian consumer paid about $75 a ton for wheat, which would have, under ordinary circumstances, cost $45 a ton.

Due to the precariousness of the lira, the disintegration of the whole Italian economy was taking place before Mussolini's eyes, despite all efforts in the contrary direction.

Every instrument available to the state was used in a frenzied effort to preclude disaster: the manipulation of the currency, subsidies, higher and higher tariffs, etc. Rather than relieving Italy's difficulties, however, these measures proved only to aggravate the conflicts. Was a war the only solution to the country's swiftly degenerating economic position? Evidently, Mussolini answered yes to this question.

1. Cf. Tables V and VI
2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, No. 15 Op. Cit., p. 35
Rather than face a mass uprising, it was possibly easier to promise the population glory and laurels in an African campaign. The militia could absorb many of the unemployed, a rise in industrial production would result from the exigencies of war productivity, and thus a general absorption of the potentially rebellious segments of the population could be achieved.

Politically and psychologically, the precipitation of a war of conquest was a shrewd maneuver. Economically, however, most wars are unprofitable and unsound, for the people will ultimately have to pay for them. They are usually profitable for only a small element of the population. As a result of war preparations, the already overburdened taxpayer was forced to carry an even heavier load.

"A notable increase of expenditures on military defense occurred in 1930-1, when there was a jump of 637,000,000 lire. The East African expedition is causing a far larger rise. By the end of April (1935), it had directly cost 620,000,000 lire. In the month of July, an additional 385,000,000 lire was expended."1

Economically, in the sense that the campaign was disproportionately expensive to the gains accrued from the enterprise, the whole project can be pronounced unwise. Regardless of the possible gains Italy hoped to make, the country did not have a wealth of exportable surplus capital for

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, No. 15, Op. Cit., p. 54
We refer you to a recent article on the potential of the new technology to revolutionize our approach to the production of biological materials. The significance of this innovation cannot be overstated, as it promises to bring about a paradigm shift in the way we manufacture goods. The implications for industry are profound, offering not only efficiency gains but also the potential for new markets and applications. This technology is likely to disrupt existing practices, requiring companies to adapt quickly to maintain their competitive edge. The implications for society are equally far-reaching, with the prospect of more sustainable and environmentally friendly products.

However, the widespread adoption of this technology is dependent on overcoming several challenges. The integration of new processes into existing infrastructures is a significant hurdle, requiring extensive planning and investment. Moreover, the ethical considerations surrounding the use of this technology must be carefully addressed to ensure its responsible deployment. Public support and acceptance will be crucial in facilitating the transition to this new era of production. The collaboration between industry, academia, and regulatory bodies will be essential in navigating the complexities of this transformative shift.

In conclusion, the potential of this new technology is enormous, offering unprecedented opportunities for innovation and growth. However, the successful implementation of this technology will require a concerted effort to address the associated challenges. By seizing this opportunity, we can expect to witness a profound transformation in the way we create and consume goods, leading to a more sustainable and resilient future.
investment in colonies. The British Foreign Office had already declared that Ethiopia would be a bad risk for economic development. In a report, they stated:

"It has not been demonstrated that the extraction of Ethiopia's mineral resources for export could be profitably undertaken. The investigations made of the economic resources of the country do not appear to have resulted in any dramatic discovery of potential reserves."  

Mussolini led his people through a labyrinth of economic difficulties to a solution of unknown rewards which entailed inevitably enormous material cost and human suffering.

Accepting Mussolini's argument that colonies in Africa would be Italy's salvation, it should be logically considered just "what" Ethiopia offered. Theoretically, according to Italian leadership, untapped resources were awaiting Italian exploitation in Ethiopia.

The soil and climate were not only good for European colonization on the plateau, but were excellently suited for agricultural development also due to the fact that two to three crops could be grown a year. Mineral resources, however, were considered negligible—at least by British authorities.

"Abyssinia is more or less self-supporting and her trade figures are therefore no guide to the richness of the country. The soil is excellent in many parts of the highlands, and fertile agricultural crops can be raised in products ranging at the different altitudes, from wheat and barley to rubber, bananas and cotton. But agriculture and

Raising, which are the main occupations, are still conducted on primitive lines; at present, the only foreign agricultural enterprises are some minor Belgian coffee-growing concessions. The country thus offers great opportunities for development. There is no reliable survey of the subsoil, however, and its mineral wealth can only be guessed at. Potash, mica, gold and platinum have been developed commercially, but the known deposits are small and difficult in accessibility. There are rumors of the presence of copper, tin, oil and coal.\(^1\)

The preceding passage demonstrates that although Abyssinia had possibilities of being an untapped warehouse, thus far this information was vague and based largely on conjecture.

If Ethiopia were another Garden of Eden, could Italy afford the luxury of imperialism? Italian colonization had formerly been a "proletarian" movement, in contrast to the British Empire's, in which huge profits from investments in colonial enterprises of a globe girdling nature were made.

In 1935, Italy found her trade relations with the rest of the world unstable. If, by conquering Ethiopia, she would gain the animosity of the rest of the world, would not trade relations become even less favorable perhaps? At any rate, the advantages afforded by Ethiopia were nebulous, as no "proven" potential wealth of any great quantity had been exploited by other powers.

The Duce, despite such small economic stakes, was determined to play his hand. He proved to be a good gambler—but at the expense of the Italian people.

\(^{1}\) Royal Institute of International Affairs, No. 16 Abyssinia and Italy, p. 62
Although Italy was one of the original thirty-two signatories of the Covenant, her attitude had been consistently 'lukewarm' toward active participation and cooperation in the League and, on certain occasions, was outspokenly hostile.

What were the causes behind this apathy toward the League? The unfulfilled promises of the Treaty of London were still open wounds to Italian pride. These 'gross injustices' and the inequities later perpetrated at Versailles were continual aggravations. As Italy received no share in the division of the German colonies, and D'Annunzio's march on Fiume was thwarted by Wilson's idealism, Italy felt that the League personified an alliance of the victors, for the purpose of maintaining their empires and territories in tact.

In this setting of ideas and thoughts, Italy came to look upon the League as an obstacle to her 'legitimate' aspirations.

With the advent of Fascism, it became increasingly evident to many that the tenets of nationalism in Fascist philosophy were incompatible with the ideas of internationalism embodied in the Geneva machine.

Collective security was considered a subjective emotion, not a political ideal, by Italian spokesmen. Speaking in retrospect in 1935, Professor Coppola at the International
The text on this page is not clearly legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a page from a document discussing legal or procedural matters, possibly related to government or administrative processes. However, the text is too indistinct to provide a coherent transcription.
Studies Conference analyzes this concept as,

"this myth of security, this vaguely outlined nightmare, which has disturbed and distorted political intelligence throughout the world and especially in Europe; that it is a paralysing burden on European politics, and that it thus constitutes one of the greatest obstacles to the establishment of... a veritable peace." 1

An excellent example of incompatibility of Fascist doctrines and world organization in terms of practical applications is explained by him in the following:

"It is perfectly conceivable that at a given moment of its history, a people, a nation, a state, may feel that it is not secure and that it may become conscious of a powerful, fundamental necessity to feel itself secure. That is its right; but it is also its own concern. By what means, how and when, this state will feel itself secure involves a judgment which is eminently subjective, which is its exclusively own affair; but which for that very reason, cannot be the object of a fixed rule and still less of a universal guaranty or of a universal law." 2

The precedence of a national policy over an international system of collective security meant in terms of practical politics that Italy's 'legitimate' and 'natural' rights should not be subjected to scrutiny by other nations. Rather, by developing its own force, its own military policy, its own special alliances, etc. Italy could secure this satisfaction by employing methods and means to her own liking. This unilateral system of resolving a country's affairs without regard for

2. Ibid. p. 145
The importance of a security policy can be illustrated by the following example:

A company's information security policy needs to balance the need for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The policy should be comprehensive, covering all aspects of information security, from the physical security of data centers to the security of data transmitted over the internet. The policy should be regularly reviewed and updated to address new threats and vulnerabilities. The policy should also be communicated to all employees, and regular training should be provided to ensure that everyone understands their role in maintaining the security of the company's information assets.

In practice, implementing a comprehensive security policy can be challenging. It requires a dedicated team of security professionals, as well as a significant investment in technology and training. However, the benefits of a strong security policy are clear: it helps to protect the company's valuable information assets, and it can help to prevent data breaches and other security incidents.

In conclusion, a strong security policy is essential for any organization that relies on information technology. By following the guidelines outlined in this example, companies can help to ensure the security of their information assets and protect their reputation and financial well-being.
another state has frequently resulted in conflict.

The Corfu Incident in 1923 exemplified this policy. Mussolini, in attempting to carry out 'manifest destiny' in the 20's took a definite stand against Geneva. In his own words, Mussolini expressed his country's intransigent position.

"In my opinion, the Corfu episode is of the very greatest importance in the history of Italy, because it has put the problem of the League before the public of Italy in a way which no number of books could have done. Italians have never been very much interested in the League of Nations; they believed that it was a lifeless academic organization of no importance... In point of fact, the League is an Anglo-French duet. The problem may be stated in these terms: Should Italy leave the League of Nations? Speaking generally, I prefer to be inside than out."

The hostile attitude of Mussolini to the League as early as 1923 is well illustrated in this passage. Italy, having seized the Greek Island of Corfu on August 31 and defied the League to act against her by the truculent words in the above speech, soon after evacuated the island under pressure of the British. The incident was not pressed by Italy at the time due to the preoccupation of the Fascist regime in consolidating their position. Nevertheless, Corfu, demonstrated to Italian leaders, that even meagre crumbs were denied her through the emcumbrance of this 'academic organization';-- the League of Nations.

Having well entrenched himself in power after thirteen years, Mussolini would no longer be bullied by the 'Anglo-

I. (Cited in M. MacCartney, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy)
The care and management of young livestock is essential, especially in areas with tick-borne diseases. The setting up of a tick-free zone is crucial in preventing the spread of these diseases. The importance of systematic examination and testing cannot be overstated. In the absence of regular examinations, the early detection of ticks and their vectors becomes difficult.

The potential consequences of failing to inspect and test are severe. The spread of tick-borne diseases can have significant impacts on livestock health and productivity. Therefore, it is imperative to implement comprehensive monitoring and control strategies. The use of modern technology and genetic tools can be instrumental in managing tick infestations effectively.

In conclusion, the care and management of young livestock, especially in tick-prone areas, require a concerted effort. Regular examinations, prompt treatment, and effective monitoring strategies are essential to prevent the spread of tick-borne diseases and protect the health of livestock populations.
French duet in the '30s. When both Great Britain and France made compensations to Italy in Libya to rectify the Treaty of London, Mussolini could hardly be satisfied as a 'collector of deserts'.

Mussolini was determined to have more than deserts. In his 2nd quinquennial address on 18 March 1934 he said:

'Italy could above all civilize Africa, and her position in the Mediterranean gave her this right and imposed this duty upon her...(Italy) did not want earlier arrivals to block her spiritual, political, and economic expansion.'

The conclusions to be drawn from this brief sketch of Italy's general role in real politics is that manifold motives were behind the Ethiopian campaign.

Whether she would play a diffident role and succumb to the pressures of the more powerful members of the League as she had with regard to Corfu, or act out the intransigent role in Africa,—with Geneva, without Geneva or against Geneva, was difficult to determine in 1934. But by the end of 1935 the leading statesmen at Geneva received the answer—in actions.
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On the fifth of December 1934, an apparently minor boundary incident occurred between the Italian Empire and the Italian Somaliland. The Walwal Incident was the spark that later ignited a much larger conflagration, but it received little publicity at the time. It was an occurrence which had as its result the precipitation of all the latent hostilities between the two countries. The incident, taking place eight months before the actual invasion of Ethiopia, will be treated as a separate unit, although chronologically it is intertwined with measures taken to coure on the larger issues involved between the two disputants. This is done primarily because the partial arbitration of the dispute was handled apart from the army and while the articles of the covenant were invoked due to this incident, the army was not involved in dealing with it and not under the arbitration clause of the 1890 Treaty of Friendship. Under this clause a commission of conciliation and arbitration was created.

The arbitration of this dispute will be discussed under four sections: (1) the immediate origins of the dispute, (2) the submission of arbitration and the actual arbitration, (3) the award of the arbitrators, and (4) comments and conclusions.

Walwal itself is a barren country inhabited largely by nomadic tribes, where are no known resources in the area of any particular value that could cause a jealous neighbor to choose it as a target for conquest. The clash at Walwal and
On the fifth of December 1934, an apparently minor border incident occurred between the Ethiopian Empire and the Italian Somaliland. The Walwal Incident was the match that later ignited a much larger conflagration, but it received little publicity at the time. It was an occurrence which had as its result the precipitation of all the latent hostilities between the two countries. The incident, taking place eight months before the actual invasion of Ethiopia, will be treated as a separate unit, although chronologically it is intertwined with measures taken at Geneva on the larger issues involved between the two disputants. This is done primarily because the procedural arbitration of the dispute was handled apart from the League machinery and while the Articles of the Covenant were invoked due to this incident, the machinery used for dealing with it was set up under the Arbitration Clause of the 1928 Treaty of Friendship. Under this Clause a Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration was created.

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As the Editor of Knowledge, I see it as my responsibility to ensure that the information presented is accurate and up-to-date. The subject matter is complex, and it is crucial to provide a clear and comprehensive understanding.

The following points are essential in understanding the topic:

1. The fundamental concepts of knowledge management are critical.
2. The integration of technology and human expertise is necessary.
3. Continuous learning and adaptation are key.

In order to achieve this, we must:

- Conduct thorough research on the subject.
- Collaborate with experts in the field.
- Stay updated with the latest developments.

Failure to do so could lead to misinterpretation and misinformation. It is crucial to approach this topic with seriousness and dedication.

The implications of knowledge management are far-reaching, affecting various sectors of society. It is our responsibility to ensure that we provide the best possible guidance and support.

In conclusion, knowledge management is a complex and ever-evolving field. By working together, we can ensure that our efforts contribute to the advancement of knowledge and understanding.
classified solely as a frontier incident. It, however, proved to be the hinge upon which rested Italy's pretext to swing open the door to later extensive troop movements in East Africa which ultimately led to the conquest of Ethiopia.

The boundary between Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia had never been clearly demarcated. The actual boundary was established by an Italo-Ethiopian Commission in 1910 after it had been fixed on paper in the treaty of 1908. However, the work was suspended and not resumed by this Commission.

Mutual hostility had developed in the intervening years between the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1928 and 1934. Italian forces had penetrated into Walwal and surrounding areas since 1928 and attempted to exercise some control over the Nomadic tribes in the area. The Ethiopian government had not officially recognized the Italian occupation of this area, but up to 1934 had taken no action to expel the Italian forces.

The immediate suspicions arose on November 22, 1934 when 600 Abyssinians\(^1\) arrived at Walwal. The reason for this action was supposedly to provide a military escort for the Anglo-Ethiopian commission which was called in on demarcating and surveying available land for pasturage. The economic exploitation of the country and the settlement of the boundary carried on by Ethiopia in conjunction with another foreign power, quite likely caused Italian hostilities, as this action could be interpreted to be a breach of the 1928 treaty. Conjectures have

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\(^1\) A. J. Toynbee, Op. cit., p 136. The number is questionable but it is suggested as approximately 1000 by Pitman Potter in Walwal arbitration.
the commercial concern. It is necessary that the technical requirements and specifications be

done soon enough to avoid waste. This is particularly important at the present time of

1949 when it is

decided that the major in the future of the future. However, the need

are essential and may not be waiting to take care in this

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During the years of 1948 the activity of the control of the

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been made and supported by documentary evidence on both sides as to the actual events which took place immediately and during the outbreak of hostilities. With an Italian demonstration of force, the Anglo-Ethiopian commission suspended its work. With reinforcements on both sides, a precipitation of hostilities was inevitable. Neither party claimed responsibility for firing the first shot.

It appeared that, from Nov. 23, 1934, onwards, incidents had occurred in the Walwal area after the arrival of the Anglo-Ethiopian Joint Commission for the delimitation of the frontier, between British Somaliland and Ethiopia. This commission which had instructions to make a survey of the grazing grounds, in the Ethiopian province of Ogaden, and which from Ado onwards, was accompanied by a strong Ethiopian escort had found Walwal occupied by an Italian native force. Following various incidents the commission had withdrawn on November 25 without an escort. After its departure an engagement took place on December 5 between the Italian and Ethiopian troops. Other incidents followed. Each of the two governments protested to the other, holding it responsible.

After the fighting was over there were approximately 30 Italian dead and 100 wounded. Italy's pride being sorely wounded, apologies were demanded from Ethiopia. Not only a diplomatic apology was requested, but in an Italian memorandum on December 11 to the Ethiopian government, additional requests were made, consisting of an indemnity to be paid for Italian

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losses, and compensation in the form of compulsory salute to the Italian flag. Arbitration was called for by the Ethiopians by invoking Article 5 of the aforementioned treaty of 1928. Both governments sent extensive documentary data to Geneva to substantiate their position. When the case of Italy against Ethiopia is discussed a more detailed analysis will be made of Italy's grievances.

Italy disclaimed any intentions of submitting the dispute to arbitration procedure, her case resting on the argument that submission would admit that Italy was on equal terms with Ethiopia and that the incident was a clear-out attack by Ethiopian troops without justification. When an attempt was made to put the case on the agenda at Geneva, Italy contended that the League had no jurisdiction in the dispute. For reasons of expediency, Italy, with Anglo-French accord, decided on the course of keeping the dispute out of the council by submitting it to arbitration under the 1928 treaty. On January 3, 1935 the Ethiopian government notified Geneva that Italian troops were massed before Gerlogubi and had committed acts of aggression on the twenty-eighth of December. Britain and France desiring no serious rupture with Italy persuaded the Italians to settle peacefully the dispute in order to obviate the

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necessity of action by the Council. On January 9, as a result of these combined pressures, an exchange of notes between the Abyssinian and Italian ministers announced that both parties were ready to undertake direct negotiations. The Council, therefore, postponed discussion to allow direct negotiations to take place. After two months of negligible work on the negotiations, the only constructive suggestion being that a neutral zone be declared in Ogaden region until a settlement had taken place, Ethiopia notified the League on March 16th that prospects for a settlement had broken down and demanded that an Arbitration Commission be set up as soon as possible, as provided for in the Treaty of 1928, and invoked Article 15 of the Covenant. On March 22nd, Italy replying in a note to the Secretary-General of the League, justified Italian troop movements in the area by the fact that there was an increasing threat to her colonies from 'barbarous' Ethiopian tribesmen. The applicability of Article 15 to this case was also denied by the Italian delegate. Italy professed willingness to negotiate in the following words:

"The Italian government, although not considering, for its part, the phase of direct negotiations to be at an end...declares, nevertheless, that it has not, and has never had, any intention of evading the procedure laid down in Art.5 of the Treaty of 1928...."

Following these exchanges of notes, the Ethiopian government

proposed that a thirty day time limit be fixed for the appointment of arbitrators.

In conjunction with a memorandum issued at the Stresa Conference, the Italian government announced its readiness to appoint arbitrators, and if a deadlock arose, the willingness to settle the dispute by the appointment of a 5th arbitrator was stated.

The Ethiopian delegate failed at this time, however, to have his government's plea accepted by the Council, viz., that Italy should at least be asked to give assurances that no further military preparations would be undertaken during the arbitral procedure.¹

In spite of Italian readiness to submit the dispute to an Arbitration Commission, they repudiated the Ethiopian proposal in the latter's memoranda to the League, and opposed any submission of the boundary question to an Arbitration Commission. The only point on which arbitration was to be undertaken

"...was the question of responsibility for the fight at Walwal on the 5th of December and the subsequent incidents... while the determination of the Italo-Ethiopian frontier must be effected in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship of 1928...after the present dispute had been settled."²

After some discussion of the questions over which the

¹ A. J. Toynbee, Op. Cit., p. 49
² Official Journal, June (1935) p. 273-4
In accordance with the Supreme Order, the Secretary of the Interior, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to act in the capacity of a Superintendent of a Department of the Interior.

The Secretary of the Interior's brother, as well as the Governor of the Interior, was named to act in the capacity of a Superintendent of a Department of the Interior.

To act in the capacity of a Superintendent of a Department of the Interior.

[Signature]
[Date: 19XX]
Commission should have jurisdiction, the arbitrators were appointed.\textsuperscript{1} Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti and Signor Raffaele Montagna were chosen by Italy and Professor Pitman B. Potter and Monsieur Albert De Geoffre de la Pradelle were Ethiopia's selections. The Italians claimed that by choosing non-nationals, the Ethiopians were giving proof that they did not have the juridical talent available within their own country to deal with such matters. The Ethiopians, however, retorted that by appointing non-nationals, they were demonstrating their willingness to accept an impartial verdict.

Up to this time, Italian diplomacy had been successful in keeping the Walwal incident off the Council Agenda, but by May 11, the anxieties of the Ethiopian Government over the influx of Italian troops into East Africa reached such a peak that a dispatch was sent to Geneva urging the Council to act without further adieu.\textsuperscript{2}

On May 25th, the Council passed two resolutions which stated that if an understanding was not reached in the Commission by July 25th, the Council would meet on August 25th to 'examine the situation'. This could be, of course, regarded as a further diplomatic victory for Italy, by obtaining a few more months grace in keeping the dispute out of the Council's hands.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} New York Times, May 15, 1935.
\textsuperscript{2} Text of Note in Official Journal, May (1935) p. 572.
\textsuperscript{3} Cf. Post "ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE LEAGUE COUNCIL," CHAPTER V.
Comprehensively expand upon participation, the interaction more...
Thus seven months had passed before any arbitration machinery had been set into motion. The actual examination of the incident by the Commission took place at Milan on June 6th and the first meeting was devoted entirely to procedure and jurisdiction. 1

On June 25th, the meetings were again convened, this time in Scheveningen in the Netherlands. MM. Jeze and Lessona were appointed as agents to aid the arbitrators. The proceedings all seemed to be running smoothly until July 5th when M. Jeze, the Ethiopian aide, claimed that Walwal was within the territory of Ethiopia. The Italian delegates promptly declared that they would withdraw from the meetings if the Ethiopian allegation was accepted as a basis for further negotiations. In supporting this stand, Italy denied that the Arbitration commission had the authority to decide whether its jurisdiction extended to this matter. Whereupon the Commission adjourned on July 9, having delivered two separate opinions. 2

The impasse reached over the Italo-Ethiopian imbroglio was again considered by the Council, acting on the bases of its May 25th resolutions, convened in Special Session on July 31st. On August 3rd, the Council issued a resolution which stated that the frontier question did not fall within the province of said

Commission. In other words, the Commission could not debate this matter (the sovereignty of Walwal) and must concern itself solely with elements in the dispute other than territorial sovereignty.

It is difficult to interpret any such action as this other than as favorable to Italy's position. When a fundamental question bearing on the outcome of a justiciable award is barred from consideration, arbitration becomes a farce.

In the final meetings of the Commission, Ethiopia yielded to Italian threats that refusal to arbitrate would lead to the scrapping of the whole machinery by Italy, which in turn might lead to further conflicts. So, although Ethiopia was dissatisfied with the Council's resolution of August 3rd and its effect upon the work of the Arbitration Commission, they agreed to the appointment of M. Politis, Minister of Greece in Paris, as the 5th arbitrator, and on August 23rd a unanimous award was written, which was signed by all five members on September 3rd. Fixing the responsibility of the incident on neither disputant, the decision read as follows:

"...The Commission is inclined to think that this incident was due to an unfortunate chain of circumstances, the first shot might have been accidental, like the numerous and frequent shots that preceded it. It is quite comprehensible that, in the nervous, excited

Abstract: In order to understand the communication process, one must first understand the nature of the message and its context.

In this context, the sender's intention is communicated to the receiver through various channels, which may include verbal and non-verbal cues. The effectiveness of the communication depends on the clarity and relevance of the message.

From the sender's perspective, the goal is to ensure that the message is accurately conveyed. However, the receiver's interpretation may be influenced by their own biases and preconceptions, which can affect the understanding of the message.

In conclusion, effective communication requires a clear understanding of the message, the context in which it is communicated, and the potential for misinterpretation. By being mindful of these factors, one can improve the likelihood of successful communication.
and suspicious state of mind of the opposing troops, who had for weeks been placed in a dangerous neighborhood, this shot led to the regrettable results which ensued.

Consequently,

(1) that neither the Italian Government nor its agents on the spot can be held responsible in any way for the actual Walwal incident; the allegations brought against them by the Ethiopian Government are disproved in particular by the many precautions taken by them to prevent any incident on the occasion of the assembly at Walwal of Ethiopian regular and irregular troops and also by the absence of any interest on their part in provoking the engagement of December 5th, and

(2) that, although the Ethiopian Government had no reasonable interest in provoking the engagement, its local authorities, by their attitude and particularly by the concentration and maintenance of numerous troops in the proximity of the Italian line at Walwal, may have given the impression that they had aggressive intentions, which would seem to render the Italian version plausible, but that nevertheless, it had not been shown that they can be held responsible for the actual incident of December 5th.

Even the impartial award, which laid the responsibility to no one, showed signs of partiality in such phrases as "which would seem to make the Italian version plausible", thereby absolving the Italian Government to a greater degree than the Ethiopian Government.

Many criticisms are forthcoming of the arbitration of this dispute from the preceding resume of its most important aspects. Pitman Potter had made an illuminating analysis

A national and international organization can take the initiative to bring the nation's interests together and to act as an intermediary between the various groups and the government. The organization can also serve as a useful forum for the expression of public opinion and for the discussion of issues of common concern. It can also help to promote social harmony and to prevent conflicts from arising. It can also help to promote the development of the country by providing a platform for the exchange of ideas and information. It can also help to promote international cooperation and to foster diplomatic relations. It can also help to promote the advancement of knowledge and the spread of culture. It can also help to promote the development of the arts and sciences. It can also help to promote the development of the economy and the improvement of the living standards of the people. It can also help to promote the development of the environment and to protect the natural resources. It can also help to promote the development of the society and to protect the human rights of the people.
of the implications of the work of the Commission on which he served as a member.  

It may be generally agreed that the results of the Commission ended in failure, in the sense that an award of any consequence was not made. The causes for failure may be partially ascribed to the defects of the Arbitration Clause of the Treaty of 1928. Rather than clarifying, it created confusion over the type of action and jurisdiction in which such a Commission should engage. The fact that a formal compromise was not required by the treaty, resulted in a lack of agreement on jurisdiction matters as well on fundamental issues.

Closely related to this factor, is the confusion arising from the Treaty over the type of activity the arbitrators were to engage in. Were they to be partisan, diplomatic representatives of the two disputing parties, or were they to be impartial judges, relying on the documentary evidence only to arrive at a judicious settlement?

The Ethiopian Government interpreted the Treaty in the latter frame of reference, by appointing non-nationals. The Italian Government, however, in many press releases, referred to the members appointed by them to serve on the Commission as 'Italian representatives,' thereby connoting something quite different from an impartial judge.

The Ethiopian-appointed members were vociferous in underlining their status. 'They repeated this statement of position -- that they did not regard themselves as diplomatic representatives appointed by the Ethiopian Government...'

The crux of the problem lies in the interpretation of the meaning of arbitration. Obviously, a prerequisite to a common understanding of the interpretation of arbitration, must be universally accepted standards. It seems impossible to believe that arbitration can be successful if arbitrators are merely diplomatic representatives for the parties involved in the case.

Perhaps, the 'political' mistakes of the Council members did more to hinder arbitration than anything else. The council, by not allowing the Commission to consider the juridical status of the disputed territory, indicated its desire to emasculate any power which the Commission might have held. Because of a desire to deal with Italy 'delicately', the Council "never developed the courage or the power, for political or personal reasons..to deal effectively with the issues." By not only failing to shoulder its responsibility, but in addition hindering the machinery of arbitration, the Council made one more display of its political feebleness by not taking the bull by the horns.

Mr. Potter himself declares that the solution, after a

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careful examination of the documentary evidence, was perfectly clear, viz. that the Ethiopian Government was sovereign over Walwal.

"All the documentary evidence available at the time, indicated that the frontier between Ethiopian and Italian Somaliland in this region lay one hundred or more kilometres east of Walwal."

The Italian request that this question of the territorial sovereignty of Walwal be omitted from the discussions of the Council, only substantiates the Ethiopian position.

The decision of the Commission, therefore, was of little significance in that the award admitted of doubletalk. Due to Anglo-French pressure, in the Council Arbitration Commission was forced to refrain from pronouncing judgment on Italy, even though the documentary evidence showed Italy to be responsible for aggravating the conflict.

In this case, it appears logical to assume that the Arbitration machinery was accepted by one disputant only for the purpose of delaying the case in coming before the League Council, while it was invoked by Ethiopia in a bona fide attempt to settle the dispute. Had the Council members not wished to indulge in procrastination, the case would have come normally on the Council agenda much earlier. But the arbitration Commission was an effective means of allowing Italy more time in which to engage in her preparations, while demonstrating outwardly to the League and the world the active part she was

1. F. Potter, Loc. Cit.
taking in peace-making.

This was indeed a clever manoeuvre, and wittingly or unwittingly, the great powers in the Council became accomplices in Premier Mussolini's scheme.
The new saying is never underestimate my ability to
surprise you! The latest trend in the creative process
seemingly is to turn everything into a meme.

If meme culture is your favorite, please,

which seems to be the case.
PART II

Prelude to War

(January to September 1938)
CHAPTER V

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE LEAGUE COUNCIL

On January 3, 1935, after the Italian Government had refused to submit the Italian demand for repatriation the Ethiopian Government sent a delegate to Geneva regarding an Italian aggression against an Ethiopian garrison near the line troops were meant before Addis Ababa, and requested the application of Article II of the Covenant, that every measure should be taken to safeguard peace. 1

During the intervening period before the Council met on January 10, Anglo-French pressure was put on the Ethiopian delegate M. Yosef Cassabane, to achieve a settlement by direct negotiations with Italy.

The Ethiopian Government agreed to this; however, pursuant to their request on January 10, they submitted a memorandum to the League stating the Ethiopian grievances and reasons for

The match that had been lit at Walwal in the waning days of 1934 was fanned into a hot flame by early autumn of 1935. It is a corollary that it is comparatively easy to put out a fire in one room, but it becomes increasingly difficult as the fire spreads to all parts of the house.

This is the dilemma which those at Geneva found themselves in 1935. As it was Ethiopia that felt the greatest heat from the smoking embers, it felt the necessity of calling the attention of the League to the danger.

On January 3, 1935 (after the Italian Government had refused to submit the Walwal dispute to arbitration) the Ethiopian Government sent a telegram to Geneva reporting an Italian aggression against an Ethiopian garrison where Italian troops were massed before Gerlogubi, and requested 'in application of Article 11 of the Covenant', that every measure should be taken to safeguard peace. 1

During the intervening period before the Council met on January 19, Anglo-French pressure was put on the Abyssinian delegate M. Tecle Hawaraithe, to achieve a settlement by direct negotiations with Italy.

The Ethiopian Government agreed to this; however, pursuant to their request on January 3d, they submitted a memorandum 2 to the League stating the Ethiopian grievances and 'reasons for

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which they had asked the application of Article 11 in full, and also discussed in Memorandum the feasibility of having the dispute placed on the Agenda.

The Italian Government, desirous of keeping the dispute out of the Council, proposed that "since direct negotiations had not broken off that the Ethiopian request be postponed." 1

The Italian delegate, Baron Aloisi, declared that:

"The Royal Government conscious of its good right and prepared as it is and always has been to seek in conjunction with the Ethiopian Government for a satisfactory solution of the question—which for its part does not regard as likely to affect the peaceful relations between the two countries—considers that the discussion of the Abyssinian Request could not facilitate in any way the continuance of the direct negotiations with a view to an understanding." 2

Italy then proceeded to submit the dispute to the Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration under the Treaty of 1928. A careful analysis of Aloisi's statement shows that his words do not coincide entirely with the facts. Originally, the Italians had demanded reparations and apologies. They had refused to submit the dispute to any arbitration, which does not describe Italy's actions as always having been favorable to seeking a pacific settlement by Arbitral procedure. Nevertheless, agreeing on January 19th to submit to arbitration was much more expedient than allowing the Council to consider the question immediately. By doing this, Premier

1. Ibid., pp. 1607-1608
2. Ibid., pp. 1605
The Japanese government's interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles includes the principle of national solidarity and the defense of national honor.

The treaty, signed on June 28, 1919, by the Allied Powers and Japan, established Japan's status as a战胜国 and provided for reparations and military restrictions. Japan attended the Paris Peace Conference, where the treaty was negotiated, but it was not a signatory to the treaty until it was imposed on it by the Allies.

Despite its participation in the conference, Japan was not fully satisfied with the terms of the treaty. The treaty placed restrictions on Japan's military and required it to pay reparations, which Japan considered unfair. Japan's interpretation of the treaty has been shaped by its nationalist sentiments and its desire to maintain its sovereignty and military capabilities.

The treaty's provisions for the demilitarization of the Shōwa period and the postwar period have been a source of controversy for Japan. Japan's military expansion during the Shōwa period and its participation in wars and conflicts has been seen as a violation of the treaty's provisions.

The interpretation of the treaty by Japan's government has been a subject of debate, with some arguing that Japan's actions during the Shōwa period were justified by the treaty's provisions for national solidarity and defense.

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Mussolini received six months' grace with which to prepare his country in fulfilling his manifest destiny, with little or no interference from Geneva, and without having to so much as tie his hands by any proposal to cease his war preparations until a pacific settlement had been reached.

Thus, the first Italian victory took place in January, when the Council took note of the Ethiopian request for application of Article 11 and decided to postpone its discussion of the dispute until the next session. At the time, however, it appeared that this decision had been the result of a compromise on the part of both the Abyssinians—by not pressing the matter to be placed on the Council Agenda—and by the Italians—by agreeing to arbitration. The two facts that (1) feverish war preparations by Italy beginning in February and continuing, and (2) the continued refusal of Italy to abandon the original intransigent stand on Walwal showed the transparence of Italian sincerity.

Only one achievement resulted from these early diplomatic measures, viz. a neutral zone was established in the Walwal area in order to prevent further clashes. On March 13 the zone was demarcated, but it proved extremely advantageous to Italy since it extended roughly along the front of the positions held by the Italian forces in the quadrilateral Gerlougu-bi-Ado-Walwal-Afdub, leaving all the posts which had

1. Ibid., p. 1607
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been occupied by the Italians in their possession. 1

Meanwhile, before any arbitration machinery could be set in motion, constant troop movements and warlike measures were reported in Italy with one of the most important Fascist Soldiers, General de Bono, having been appointed High Commissioner for Eritrea and Somaliland. The Italian strategy was to defer any action of arbitration by relying upon direct negotiations. 2

Italy had, in reality secured satisfactory assurances that Abyssinia would not precipitate further Council action for at least a month. This strategy was in a large measure successful, for, from January 19th until March 16th, Geneva received no communications from either of the disputants.

On March 16th, Ethiopia became alarmed at "the continual despatch of troops and war material" to the Italian colonies of East Africa and regarded unofficially the Italian refusal to arbitrate as another means to gain more time to continue the military preparations.

In a communication to the Secy. General, 3 Ethiopia stated that direct negotiations had broken down and claimed that Italy

2. On the 8th of March Abyssinia suggested the initiation of arbitration procedure as urgent in the face of the complete divergency of views to which the Italian Government replied on the 18th of March that the 1928 treaty provided for resot to the procedure of arbitration, and conciliation only when ordinary diplomatic methods were exhausted and that in their opinion ordinary diplomatic methods could not be said to be exhausted.
had declined the offices of a third power, and while Ethiopia had made a solemn declaration to accept any arbitral award of the commission, Italy had persisted in the demands for reparations. Ethiopia, although not unwilling to accept arbitral procedure, was desirous in having the dispute laid down before the Council for a full investigation (as provided for in Article 15.) and was also anxious that the League take any measures necessary to guarantee her 'rights' under the Covenant (Art 10) of territorial integrity and political independence. Italy retorted with the argument that such preparations as had been made were necessary for the defense of her colonies. In passing, this argument although often repeated by Italy (up to the actual outbreak of hostilities) has little validity when one considers that it was possible for the other two limitrophe powers, Great Britain and France, to live peacefully with Abyssinia for a half century without finding her a serious threat to their colonial possessions as Italy now did.

Italy, although claiming that her war preparations in East Africa had been only dictated by the necessity of providing for the safety of her colonies, expressed a partial willingness to compromise in allowing the procedure under Article 5 of the Treaty of 1928 to come into play.

1. Note to Secretary General of League, March 22, Official Journal, May (1935) p.574
Ethiopia, anxious to make any proposals to speed the machinery of the law and order, which she hoped would preserve the integrity of her nation, attempted to force Italian Duce to play his hand rather than continue this game of evasion through an Italian acceptance of the following agreements: (1) A time limit of 30 days be placed on the appointment of arbitrators, inviting the Council to appoint arbitrators to fix the procedure, to define the questions to be settled, and in particular, the question of the Italo-Ethiopian frontier in accordance with existing treaties and (2) that all military preparations be suspended during the period of arbitration.

The Council, in the extraordinary session of April 15th, was then confronted with the concrete problem of having to make the decision whether the Italo-Ethiopian dispute should be placed on the limited agenda of that session or remain on the agenda of the ordinary session in May. Another Italian diplomatic victory ensued when "After an exchange of views, the Council decided that the question should remain on the agenda of its ordinary session in May." 1 The Council members thus indulged in another period of procrastination. This time, however, the urgency of the European situation called them to Stresa to deal with Germany, which was threatening again to destroy the European balance. Britain and France were more interested in placating Italy than Abyssinia in view of the

European situation, viz., to prevent the break up on the Stresa front created in April. Therefore the two Ethiopian proposals came to naught, and Italian military preparations continued throughout April and May with unabated vigor.

Before the Council was to meet in its ordinary session in May, the arbitration procedure made little headway. It was impossible for the two parties to agree upon a basic compromise. Italy barred from the discussion the (1) interpretation of the Treaty of 1906 (delimiting the frontier) and (2) the ownership of Walwal. Other procedural problems arose such as the nomination of arbitrators. Having made little headway the disputants confronted the League with precisely the same problems as in the extraordinary session in April. On May 20th before the opening of the Council session, Ethiopia sent a communication to Geneva denouncing Italian military preparations on the Ethiopian frontier and again asked the Council to make full inquiry and examination on the basis of Article 15 of the Covenant.

After four requests for action on the part of the Abyssinian Government since January the Council finally passed two resolutions which did little more than request Italy to settle the dispute in accordance with the Treaty of 1928.

They were as follows:

First Resolution:

(1) Whereas at the meeting of the Council in January 1935, the Italian Government and the Ethiopian Government agreed to settle the dispute which has arisen between them as the result of the incident at Walwal on the 5th of December 1934, in conformity with Article 5 of the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of the 2nd of August 1928.

(2) Whereas direct negotiations through diplomatic channels having been exhausted, the two parties have nominated their arbitrators as provided for in Article 5 of the above mentioned treaty;

(3) Whereas since the 5th of December, 1934 other incidents have taken place on the Italo-Ethiopian frontier and the two Governments are in agreement in entrusting the settlement of these incidents to the same arbitrators in accordance with Article 5 of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty;

(4) Whereas the Italian Government, in view of the request which has been made to it, makes no objection regarding the nationality of the arbitrators nominated by the Ethiopian Government;

(5) Whereas the two Governments agree to fix the 25th of August next as the date on which the procedure of arbitration and conciliation shall be concluded;

The Council, Requests the Secretary General of the League of Nations to communicate in the meantime to the members of the Council all information which may reach him from the two parties, in particular regarding the development of the arbitrators' work.

Although the Italian Government waived its objection concerning the nationality of the arbitrators appointed by the Ethiopian Government, the concession was a meagre one, for the

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Ethiopian request that the Italian Government should abstain from sending to East Africa additional troops and munitions or additional specialists was not acceptable to Italy. The Italian Delegates' (Baron Aloisi) replied that no such restriction on his country's sovereign rights could be tolerated and that such a request implied Italy's unwillingness or 'Bad Faith' in complying with the Arbitration procedure which they had already expressed they would abide by.

So that, Italy by accepting the first resolution, gave the impression that arbitration machinery could now be set in motion; however, Rome reported that mobilization of men and despatch of troops to East Africa would continue.

Therefore, the Italian delegate, in making conciliatory gestures appeared to actwardly to accept the olive branch instead of a rifle to settle the dispute. Actually, the rainy season was beginning which would preclude any military action that might be taken anway in a campaign, and Mussolini still did not have his hands tied by agreeing to any proposal to suspend troop movements to East Africa.

The proposal to conclude the arbitration by August 25th was liberal in its time limit as arbitration had begun in January having already allowed Mussolini a half year's grace in which to prepare for any eventualities in East Africa.

By the second Resolution the council delayed taking any action for two more months and left the two partied with full liberty to settle the dispute in accordance with the
The important issues that the government should address are:

1. Health care reform
2. Education system
3. Environmental protection
4. Economic growth
5. International relations

In order to address these issues, the government must work closely with the private sector and international organizations. Collaboration is key to finding solutions that benefit all parties involved.
Arbitration machinery set up in the Treaty of 1928.

The Council decided in this second Resolution:

"to meet if, in default of agreement between the four arbitrators for the settlement of the dispute, and understanding should not have been reached by July 25th between these arbitrators as to the selection of the fifth arbitrator (unless the four arbitrators agreed to the extension of this period); Council also decides to meet to examine the situation if on August 25th the settlement by means of conciliation and arbitration should not have taken place."¹

Certainly neither of these resolutions could be considered as satisfactory in a solution of the dispute, the Council once again evaded squarely facing the responsibilities. It was at this time 'before the horse had escaped from the barn' that discussion of preventive measure should have taken place in the Council. Could the Council close the Suez Canal? Could the Machinery of collective security be applied before a conflagration broke out? These problems were not even discussed inside the League, but the great powers continued to offer morsels to Italy over the diplomatic bargain counters outside the League. Specific measures taken by the Council will be reconstructed in the following pages to complete the story of attempts at settlement within the League machinery, but important diplomatic negotiations outside the League will be dealt with separately in which some of the factors mentioned above will be discussed in less of a cursory manner than at this time.

¹. Official Journal XVI June (1935) p. 640
Can it be said that the Council, then, in omitting such pertinent considerations, failed to fulfill its obligations, implied and written, in the spirit and the letter of the Covenant? In the first place, Abyssinia was given no guarantee that it would not be open to an attack after the rainy season had ended, nor was promise exacted from Italy to stop or even curtail her military preparations. By accepting arbitration procedure, Italy cloaked herself with assurances of not having to fear any discussion in the Council on such hostile proportions as closing the Suez Canal.

Far from requiring Italy to refrain from the use of force, England and France offered proposals to placate their bellicose neighbor. The Council even failed to force Italy to show her hand or defying her aims. Nevertheless, in June, British proposals were sent to Mussolini whereby Ethiopia would cede territory to Italy and would then be duly compensated with an outlet to the sea by a corridor through British Somaliland. Certainly, if the imperialist British were willing to make such concessions as giving away territory in their empire, they could undoubtedly be pressed even further. If they were willing to buy Italy off, why should Italy not 'jack up the price'? Or so Italy's reasoning might have been. For, how could the British have been aware of what Italy would be willing to settle for in the absence of any definite information as to the scope and extent of Italian aims in Ethiopia.
The problem of determining the fairest share under the principles of equity has been addressed in various court cases. In the landmark case of *Marbury v. Madison*, the Supreme Court established the principle of judicial review, whereby the Court can declare an act of Congress or a presidential action unconstitutional. This decision has had a profound impact on the balance of power between the executive and judicial branches of government.

In *Brown v. Board of Education*, the Court ruled that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal, thus paving the way for desegregation in schools and challenging systemic racism.

Equity is not merely a matter of law; it is also a matter of morality and social justice. The principles of equity are designed to ensure that justice is not blind but that it is guided by reason and compassion. In cases where the letter of the law is insufficient to address the essence of the matter, equity allows the Court to consider the broader implications of its decisions.
Such 'ultra vires' actions as these were undoubtedly part of the reasons why forceful measures in bringing Italy "on the carpet" in the Council were undermined. How could any country contemplating aggression believe in the sincerity of the member states of the League who carried a big stick at Geneva, and who, outside the League offered them bribes and peace offerings to show that the big stick really was only a hoax?

On May 15th, before the Council had passed the aforementioned resolutions, Premier Mussolini said before the Italian Senate, 'Italy is the sole judge of what measures are necessary (in Ethiopia) and she will tolerate no interference, no matter by whom!' This should have been an adequate cue to any Member State who professed an adherence to a system of collective security that here was a country threatening to throw overboard the obligations of such a system. Although the May 25th resolutions were entirely inadequate, they were at least an ostensible demonstration that the Council had 'considered' the dispute with some seriousness and had set a definite date when the Council would take action--late as that date might be in view of the seriousness of the situation. In spite of the conciliatory attitude of London toward Rome, Italy rebuffed them and the Council Resolutions in actuality, by the continued dispatch of troops

The passage reads:

"...and yet I should not press too far into the subject. For the present, I mean, we should confine ourselves to the mere facts. The fact is, I have reason to believe that...

The context suggests a detailed discussion on a particular topic, possibly related to historical or scientific matters. However, the text is cut off, making it difficult to conclude its exact nature or purpose.

The document appears to be a formal or academic piece, possibly from a historical or literary work."
into the disputed area during June.

On June 19th the Ethiopian government having already put the fate of its country into Council hands, became increasingly alarmed when little or nothing had been done by this body to check the continuous influx of troops into Italy's colonies in East Africa. Consequently in a communiqué from Addis Ababa dated June 19th, they pointed out that the 'Italian Government had not ceased to send troops and munitions of war in large quantities into East Africa.' The Ethiopian Government proposed that the Council should immediately appoint neutral observers to proceed to Ethiopia and inspect the frontier districts. These observers would make an inquiry into all alleged or real incidents and would report to the Council direct.

Certainly, such an offer demonstrated the good faith of the Ethiopian Government and at the same time undermined the validity of the Italian argument that these frontier incidents had been provoked by Ethiopian bandits.

As might have been expected, arbitration had reached a deadlock by July 25th due to the continued refusal of Italy to include in the basis for negotiation the question of 'ownership of Walwal', The Council convened in Special Session on July 31st in accordance with the resolutions of May 25th.

Having reached an impasse in the Arbitration Commission,

The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a paragraph of text, possibly a historical or legal document, but the content cannot be accurately transcribed.
the Council, it was hoped, would deal with the situation thoroughly and effectively in order to avert a serious crisis which involved not only the political and territorial integrity of Abyssinia but threatened to undermine the whole system of collective security. If the League for a second time failed to restrain an aggressor, and thereby condone an act of aggression, its prestige could not help but disintegrate in the face of such circumstances. A prerequisite to the restraint required to prevent an aggressor would seem to be a common front of the Member States within the League, so that any concerted action would be effective. This unfortunately, was not the case. Previously to the Summer of 1935 the British had shown a greater willingness to placate the tempestuous feelings of Italy. (Even in July the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, had reiterated the Government policy as sympathetic to Italian Expansion.) But Italian press became vociferously Anglophobe in character as the Summer took its course and this had no small effect on the British population who in turn made their impression on the British Foreign office. The British, therefore, felt compelled to accede to the repeated requests of Ethiopia to examine and take action on the situation. The French, however, were reluctant to make any move which would sever the cord of friendship with Rome, (the cord which had been tied on January 7, 1935 in Rome by M. Laval and Premier Mussolini.)

1. Debate in House of Commons July 11, 1935
4

To: Mr. Smith

Subject: Application for Employment

Dear Mr. Smith,

I am writing to express my interest in a position at your company. I have recently completed my degree in Computer Science and I am eager to apply my skills in a professional setting.

I have attached my resume for your consideration. I believe my qualifications and experience make me a strong candidate for the position.

Thank you for considering my application. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

[Your Name]
The Council session beginning July 31st had these varied viewpoints in the background as if they were on a palette.

After a three day deliberation within the Council, another Italian victory was forthcoming, this victory clearly emasculated the Arbitration Commission's jurisdiction over sovereignty of Walwal and made the whole Arbitration machinery nothing more than a mockery. Although Walwal in itself was unimportant as a frontier incident, the fact that capitulation to Italian demands by the great Powers was so forthcoming must have even surprised Italy!

The Council, in depriving the Arbitration Commission of any power, stated "that the two parties (Italy and Ethiopia) had not agreed that the Commission should examine frontier questions or give a legal interpretation of the agreement and treatise concerning the frontier.

As soon as the Commission was deprived of deciding the important issue involved, it soon was able to make the arbitral award which put the responsibility on neither party. On August 8th, the fifth arbitrator was appointed and the unanimous award of the Commission was rendered.

Undoubtedly, by the strange logic of power politics the 'Big Two', England and France, felt that by giving in on this trivial point as they had done by their decision of August 3, they would keep the avenue clear for friendly bargaining with Italy in the forthcoming Three Power Conference. Once again the olive branch was presented to Mussolini when he was invited
The Committee on Federal Policy and Finance

The Committee on Federal Policy and Finance is responsible to the Board for the development and implementation of policies and programs related to the financial management of the Committee. The Committee is composed of representatives from various departments within the organization and meets regularly to discuss the financial implications of various policies and programs. The Committee works closely with the Board to ensure that financial policies and programs are aligned with the overall strategic objectives of the organization.

The Committee's primary responsibilities include:

1. Developing and reviewing financial policies and programs
2. Monitoring the implementation of financial policies and programs
3. Providing financial advice and recommendations to the Board
4. Preparing financial reports and statements
5. Conducting financial planning and forecasting

The Committee also works closely with the organization's external auditors to ensure that financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The Committee is committed to ensuring that the organization's financial management practices are transparent and accountable to its stakeholders.
to Paris to confer with Mr. Laval, Mr. Eden and Baron Aloisi. The three powers assembled around the bargaining table on the hot summer day of August 15th. One wonders if a judicial settlement of the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia was the purpose of the meeting, why Ethiopia, also vitally interested and inexorably implicated, was not even invited. On the contrary, it was unofficially released in the press on the morning of the conference that the "British are ready to let Italy take land in Ethiopia."  

The small powers in the League who looked for guidance to England and France for some firm handling of transgressors of the Covenant, certainly, found little to emulate in such peace-making enterprises as had been perpetrated on Ethiopia, the victim of such aggression. Should these who failed to observe their obligations receive compensations for doing so, while those who put their case and their fate before an international tribunal be punished by sacrifices asked of them for such action?

This bargaining outside the League did little to strengthen the Covenant or to aid the enforcement of obligations of a state who opposed them.

During the latter part of August and into the fall the talk of an impending threat of a 'European conflagration' was in the air. The Italian press became increasingly hostile towards

It is only fair to state that I am not a law expert and have not had the opportunity to read the entire argument submitted by counsel. However, I believe that the arguments presented are reasonable and well-supported. The issues raised are complex and require careful consideration. I am confident that a fair and just decision will be reached that is in the best interests of all parties involved.
Britain, warning that Italy's plans were not to be hindered by any other power. The British meanwhile, were reinforcing their fleet in the Mediterranean while the French were trying simultaneously to placate both London and Rome in order to keep the seams of Stresa front from splitting wide open.

The Council after its infamous decision of August 3, was waiting to examine the situation in general at its Session in September. The settlement of the Walwal incident did little, however to quell the rising tension generated by the dispute before a discussion of the phase of the dispute immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities in October.

An examination of the policies in Britain and France in retrospective analysis will clarify the part each played in particular in their relationship to the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy; and in turn, how British and French policy molded the action taken at Geneva.
BRITISH AND FRENCH POLICIES TOWARD ITALY


FRENCH POLICY

Returning from Geneva to Paris and London, the capitals of the two nations who played the most important roles and exerted the greatest influence on the working of the Geneva machinery, one is faced with a few obvious facts. Here are two sovereign states, which, because of the power they wield in proportion to the other members of the League, can render its action effective or impotent. Those that created the League, fashioned it to function successfully only if the nations participating wished it to do so. It is necessary to see how the policies of the Quai d'Orsay and the British Foreign Office affected the Geneva Machinery.

The pattern of French diplomacy in the Ethiopian question, unlike the British, was relatively simple. All the actions of M. Laval made at Geneva were to put a brake in the effective working of its machinery. The motive behind the French effort to slow down any measures to hinder the Italian aggressor in his military adventure can be found traced back to the Italo-French talks of January 7th in Rome when negotiations took place in the Palazzo Venezia, 'for the purpose of reestablishing complete harmony between Italy and France."

Ostensibly, the conference resulted in the following:

"The Colonial demands made by Italy have been partly accepted by France, which has ceded to Italy

1 New York Times, January 6, 1935
The topic of your text is not clearly visible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a page from a document discussing a subject, possibly related to science or technical matters, given the dense text and structure. However, without clearer visibility, it's challenging to provide a meaningful transcription or interpretation.
a tract of 44,500 square miles south of Italy's Libyan colony. At the same time, France ceded to Italy a small strip along the coast south of the Italian colony of Eritrea facing the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.

Another agreement included a provision that Italy should have a share in the ownership of the Railway from Addis Ababa to Jibuti, French Somaliland, 1

But it was assumed in almost every diplomatic circle that between the lines of this agreement M. Laval had reached a tacit understanding with Il Duce whereby Italy's friendship could be counted on in the event of the German threat, and in return, M. Laval would give Mussolini a free hand in Abyssinia. Mussolini's chief bargaining point was waving before the French the possibility of an Italo-German Alliance against France, which needed no fuel to add to the already flaming pathological obsession the French had with regard to the German danger. The French also felt obliged to bargain Ethiopia for Italian friendship because of the uncertainty of British support in the event of trouble on the continent. Various diatribes had appeared in the French press accusing Britain of hypocrisy and isolationism when it came to making any genuine commitments which would support France in the hour of danger. And the fact that when German conscription was reintroduced, when Germany was allowed to rebuild her Navy by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and when Hitler tore up the Locarno agreement, only proved the logic of the French argument.

Despite the French Anglophobia, the two powers managed to develop as well-concerted policy, which produced an almost identical effect throughout the whole dispute. Although the motives of each were different, the results proved to be the same, for both powers intended to placate Italy as much as was possible without outwardly flaunting the League, but for different reasons.

Signor Mussolini realized the French were inhibited by fear of their historic enemy, and he thus capitalized on the disintegrating effect upon French morale which he knew German conscription would have. With the Franco-Italian reapproachment as the basis for the 'script' for M. Laval's role at Geneva, France's position in the League resembled 'the posture of the rabbit which crouches, paralyzed by terror, under the malignant spell of the advancing stoat.'

Some observers find it impossible to ascribe the whole motive behind the French position to the German danger.

"There was...in 1935 a powerful body of opinion in France which blessed M. Laval's good understanding with Signor Mussolini not so much on account of any military value which it might be expected to have for France in a future war with Germany but rather on account of its expected effect in a struggle on the French home front. For there were Frenchmen who hoped that the Franco-Italian entente would give "The Leagues" the victory in their competition with the 'Front Populaire' and would thereby bring France over from the Parliamentary-Democratic into the Dictatorial-Fascist camp."

It is difficult to speak of a British policy toward the Italo-Ethiopian conflict without running the risk of generalizing to the extent that no account is taken of the various factors within the country which actually created a dual policy throughout the affair. The Government had one, fairly stabilized policy toward Italian expansion in East Africa which had been the result of a consistent evolutionary development. The Foreign Office had been trained to put imperial interests first, and therefore, the British policy had been shaped toward Italy with this in mind.

In a political democracy, however, public opinion is (or should be) an effective weapon in guiding the tiller of the ship of state. And it may be accredited to British public opinion that a formidable change in the earlier Government policy, from condoning Italian expansion in East Africa to a harsher policy of attempting to restrain Italy, was made.

It was evident from the results of the British Peace Ballot, taken immediately preceding the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in England, that the effects of the first world war did much to impress on the mass of Britishers that they would do well to hitch their fate to the League bandwagon, rather than to approve of imperialist adventures which might again result in a general European conflagration, even though such an adventure might not be an immediate threat to British imperial interests.
The pro-League and the anti-League advocates in Britain had many problems to solve of a theoretical nature, which sooner or later made them take a definite stand on the Italo-Ethiopian situation. Was the legitimate security of the British Empire contradictory to a system of international law and order? The question, of course, can be answered emphatically in the negative, for, if the security of the world society is assured, certainly the British Empire would also benefit from the reign of law established. On the other hand, if Britain put all her weight behind the fulfillment of the Covenant, it is reasonable to assume that it would be the British navy that would be called upon to make the greatest sacrifices if the Covenant were challenged. And it was precisely this consideration that made 10 Downing Street anxious to avoid the risk of entangling the Empire into war. Theoretically, the League would punish an aggressor, but practically, it would be Great Britain’s responsibility to carry out most of the punishing. Was the British Empire, in the absence of an adequate international police force, in a position to defend the peace and security of the world, militarily? One astute observer of international relations has this comment on the ‘state’ of the United Kingdom in 1935.

"...In 1935 the British Empire was only one of three principal naval powers in the post-war world, and both of the other two—the United States and Japan—lay outside Europe in strategic positions from which they could take the British Empire in the event of a conflict...At the same time, the conquest of the air had robbed Great Britain herself of the
The U.S. Marine Corps is the only military service to cover the entire range of traditional and non-traditional Marine Corps missions. These missions include: combat support, combat service support, combat logistics, and combat development.

The Marine Corps' primary mission is to provide a rapid, flexible, and effective means of deploying forces to any part of the world. This mission is accomplished through the use of ground, naval, and airborne forces. The Marine Corps also has a secondary mission of providing a mobile force for the defense of the United States.

The Marine Corps' emphasis on rapid deployment has led to the development of a variety of specialized vehicles and equipment. These include: amphibious assault vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and light attack aircraft.

The Marine Corps has a long history of participation in combat operations around the world. This includes: World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War. The Marine Corps has also been involved in a number of peacekeeping operations, including: the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cambodia, and the NATO Implementation Force in Yugoslavia.

The Marine Corps' success in these operations has been due to the dedication and training of its personnel. The Marine Corps is known for its high standards of discipline and professionalism. This is reflected in the training that is provided to each Marine, which includes physical fitness, marksmanship, and tactical training.

In conclusion, the Marine Corps is a unique and vital part of the U.S. Armed Forces. Its mission of providing a mobile force for the defense of the United States, and its ability to deploy forces quickly to any part of the world, make it an essential component of the nation's defense strategy.
immemorially old strategic insularity. Nor was the
delicacy of the British Empire's condition at this
date merely external and strategic. The Empire was
also in the throes of an immense internal metamor-
phosis through which it was changing itself from a
collection of colonies, dependencies, and protectorates
of the United Kingdom into a Commonwealth of Nations
freely associated on a footing of equality. When
this transformation was complete, the Empire-turned-
Commonwealth might look forward to becoming stronger
than ever before. But so long as the process lasted--
and it was bound to be slow--it manifestly rendered
the whole organism peculiarly vulnerable.\[1\]

Despite the fact that Britain might be expected to contribute
the greatest amount of military strength in the event of a
conflict, and despite the fact that British sea power was be-
coming increasingly vulnerable to air power, the results of
the Peace Ballot clearly showed that public opinion was over-
whelmingly in favor of throwing all the British power and
prestige into making the League a strong, workable organism.
The Peace Ballot was sponsored by a private organization, the
League of Nations Union, and was carried out by this group
with the aid of many other groups forming a National Declara-
tion Committee.

The questions on the ballot were:

1. Should Great Britain remain a member of the League
   of Nations?

2. Are you in favor of an all-round reduction in
   armaments by international agreement?

3. Are you in favor of an all-round abolition of nation-
   al military and naval aircraft by international
   agreement?

\[1\] A. J. Toynbee, Op. Cit. p. 45
4. Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit be prohibited by international agreement?

5. Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by.
   (a) Economic and non-military measures?
   (b) If necessary, military measures?

On June 28, 1935 the results of the Peace Ballot were published in the London Times with statements by prominent British leaders including the Archbishop of Canterbury, who said that

"the results of the ballot were most remarkable and they would do well to press upon the gov't., upon their M.P.'s and upon their fellow citizens that twelve million people had recorded that decisive vote... The result was primarily a great declaration of faith in the League of Nations..............

To the question whether if necessary, military measures should be taken against an aggressor, more than six million people replied in the affirmative. Without some such assurance as this, it was really impossible to insist upon the carrying out of what was called the collective system."

The following figures show in percentage the record of the vote.

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Total vote cast: 11,677,765

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Note: The table above shows the conversion of units for different trade sizes.
"The total number of votes cast represented more than 37.9 per cent. of the total number of voters over the age of eighteen in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and perhaps fifty percent of the voters who had actually been canvassed. These were astonishing figures for a private enterprise which had been carried out without either the official organization or the artificially stimulated excitement of a general election."  

The government, therefore, from the impressiveness of these figures, realized that their future policy must rest upon strong support for the League and sanctions, if the members were to be returned to their seats by the same electorate who had overwhelmingly shown their colors in the Peace Ballot. As the Italo-Ethiopian conflict grew in proportions, in the succeeding days of 1935, the populace who had expressed themselves in the Peace Ballot, continued to create a current of feeling in support of Geneva which 'swelled into a flood which swept away both the die-Hard and the Pacifist opposition.'  

The Foreign Office continued 'business-as-usual', and yet, while not receiving the publicity that such 'impressive' events as the Peace Ballot obtained, were engaging in many activities which were to become later no less sensational in importance.

The supposition is not fantastic that the Government was aware of Mussolini's intentions as early as January 1935. It will be remembered that Italy had become a colonial power in East Africa partly because Britain had actually encouraged

1. Ibid.
2. A. J. Toynbee, op. cit. p. 46
and supported Italy's aims in this area, and backed them up with the prestige and power of the British Empire. It was reasonable to assume at this time that the United Kingdom would look with no less favor on Italian intentions in Abyssinia than they had done in the past, unless it would involve any risks of war. Not only had this been the consistent policy of Britain, but the fact that the British appeared favorable to the Pact of Friendship signed in Rome between M. Laval and M. Mussolini on January 7, 1935, seemed to indicate that the British Government did not intend to oppose Mussolini. One observer is even willing to go so far as to say that:

"Sir Sidney Barton, the British Minister in Addis Ababa, knew all about Mussolini's plans and the acquiescence in them of M. Laval, (on Jan. 7), and passed his knowledge on to London early in January."

The Italians knew that in order to clear the way for any plans to crystallize in Abyssinia, that diplomatic negotiations with both Great Britain and France must take place first for the purpose of securing assurances that they would disinterest themselves in Italian activities. In this plan, Mussolini was successful with regard to France by the agreement in Rome on January 7th, and he cleverly took the opportunity when he communicated this agreement to the British to make similar overtures to Britain. When the Italian Ambassador disclosed the text of the Franco-Italian Agreement to the Foreign Office.

1. G. Martelli, Italy Against the World, p. 67
on Jan. 29th, he also intimated that they would be glad to exchange views with the United Kingdom concerning the mutual and harmonious development of British and Italian Interests in Abyssinia.  

As a result of this overture, an investigation committee was set up to consider the 'harmonious interests' which the Italian Ambassador mentioned. Sir John Maffey, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Colonies, was the Chairman of the Investigation Committee. Some months later, when the Maffey Report was published, it proved to be quite startling for the reason that it was drawn up with the allegation of a possible Italian conquest of Abyssinia. According to the Italian publication, the most important of the nine conclusions of the Maffey Committee read as follows:

> There are no vital British Interests in Abyssinia or adjoining countries such as to necessitate British resistance to an Italian conquest of Abyssinia. Italian control of Abyssinia would on some grounds be advantageous, on others disadvantageous. In general, as far as local British interests are concerned, it would be a matter of indifference whether Abyssinia remained independent or was absorbed by Italy.

From the standpoint of Imperial defense, an independent Abyssinia would be preferable to a an Italian Abyssinia, but the threat to British interest appears distant and would depend only on a war against Italy which for the moment appears improbable.

2. "In the Giornale d'Italia of the 20th of February, 1936, Signor Gayda published—partly verbatim and partly in the form of a precis—the contents of a confidential British State Paper which had fallen into Italian hands. The British Secretary of State did not deny the authenticity of the Document and he admitted that it had come into the hands of Signor Gayda by "theft or disappearance," through an indiscretion or a deliberate breach of confidence."
This was the best and only assurance, (if it may be called that) that the British would give Italy a free hand in Abyssinia. With British past policy, their apparent pleasure of the new found friendship between Paris and Rome, and now the apparent lack of British interest in Abyssinia as displayed in the Maffey Report, it was reasonable for the Italians to assume that the road to conquest had been adequately prepared by diplomatic maneuvers. When the British later became the protagonists of a 'sanctionist policy' in the League, Italy was naturally taken by surprise by this reversal of policy. It is well to note here that the statements of the Maffey Report refute the later accusations of Italian critics, viz., that British motives in supporting a strong League policy were entirely selfish. They alleged that Britain's reasons for thwarting Italy's expansion in East Africa was due to a desire to retain exclusive control in Lake Tsana area and to maintain in tact British control over the Red Sea. The findings of the Maffey report indicated British indifference in this area.

Although the Government's policy changed little, as early as February 1935, the Foreign Office was well aware of the temper of the British electorate as indicated by the Peace Ballot. And they well knew that such indifference to an 'imperialist adventure' as shown in the Maffey report was already quickly becoming anachronistic. Knowing this,
It is a matter of great importance that the measures taken to ensure the safety and security of the institution should be comprehensive and effective. It is essential that all personnel are aware of the importance of their role in maintaining a secure environment. In addition, it is crucial that the institution has a well-defined emergency response plan in place. This plan should be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure its effectiveness. It is also important that all employees are trained to respond appropriately to any incidents that may occur. By taking these steps, the institution can create a culture of safety and security that will help to prevent incidents and mitigate their impact.
Sir Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador in Rome, warned Mussolini,

"...of possible reactions of Italian policy on British public opinion and on Anglo-Italian relations."

Not anxious to precipitate a situation, however, Sir Eric's warning was softened by Sir John Simon when he assured the House of Commons that Italian mobilization was purely precautionary.

Even after two appeals to Geneva from Ethiopia to investigate the conflict, Britain:

"had no interest in opposing the Italian plan and several good reasons for not hindering it. It would bring order and progress to a backward part of Africa and go a long way to meeting Italy's colonial grievances, which now prevented her from collaborating with Britain and France. With an Empire of her own, she would enter definitely into the group of satisfied powers."

Partly because Germany was again becoming a threat to European security by reintroducing conscription, Mussolini's intentions seemed comparatively less threatening to the British in the early days of April 1935. Consequently, when a three power conference was planned to be held at Stresa at the instigation of France, Sir John Simon declined to reply when he was asked in the House of Commons whether he would question Mussolini concerning his intentions in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. It was the French protest against German conscription that was number one on the Stresa Agenda, and it was unlikely whether they would even bother 'embarrassing' their
colleague, over Mussolini, such a minor matter at Stresa, as Abyssinia!

It was Mussolini who played host to the British and French delegations in Rome. The very fact that they were both willing to visit Mussolini, evidenced that it was they who sought out the friendship of Il Duce. The meetings were held in an atmosphere of cordiality between the three powers. Because the British delegates did not take the opportunity to question Mussolini regarding his aims in Ethiopia at Stresa, it was felt that they had left themselves open to blame in failing to interrogate the Italian delegation. It could be argued, on the other hand, that the reason they did not do so, was because it was the British and French who were seeking to secure the partnership of Italy as an ally in the political Maginot line against Germany. They were, therefore, in none too favorable a position to bargain with Mussolini, for it was they who were asking favors. It would be natural to presume, however, that Italy had as much to gain from a 'peaceful' Europe--which the Stresa front was supposed to establish--as the British and French. If this be so, it could be assumed that Mussolini might have been approachable on the Abyssinian question.

When the Parliamentary opposition debated in April 1936 the British Government's failure to interrogate Mussolini on the Ethiopian conflict at Stresa, they brought forth the point that...
"Signor Mussolini had said since...that he was prepared at the Stresa conference to reopen the question of the rectification of Italy's position in Abyssinia." 1

Mussolini at the time, however, had stated his reluctance to discuss the matter in the League. The British, therefore, should have taken the opportunity to discuss it at Stresa.

"Signor Mussolini had announced at Stresa that he would not send a representative to attend the meeting of the Council if the dispute with Abyssinia were placed on the Agenda." 2

When the later course of events showed the weaknesses of British and French policy, the Opposition wasted no words in arranging the British Government's share in the responsibility of having missed a valuable opportunity at Stresa to attempt to find out Mussolini's intentions.

"It has been admitted (said Mr. Attlee) that they (the delegates to the Stresa Conference) never mentioned Abyssinia throughout the whole course of these discussions. That was one of the most criminal blunders in the whole course of British diplomacy in these disastrous years, because evidently Signor Mussolini was expecting that this subject would be raised...Was Signor Mussolini to blame for having assumed that, if this opportunity for a straight talk about Abyssinia was let pass that was as good a hint that the British Government would not take too seriously a subsequent demand to do what he wanted to do in Abyssinia?" 3

The Ethiopian question, conspicuous by its absence on the Stresa agenda, was thus laid aside for the more pressing

3. Ibid., p. 148 n.
problems of European security. Unfortunately, the whole problem of European security was unmistakably linked up with the manner in which Britain and France demonstrated to the more aggressive powers how they would be dealt with if they contemplated a breach of their obligations.

Stresa failed to be an effective 'Front' against Germany; it proved only to be a conciliatory gesture to Italy, which, in turn weakened the Western Powers' position with regard to Germany.

When Italo-Ethiopian relations grew increasingly ominous as each month passed, it was evident that no metamorphosis in British policy was going to occur. Regardless of how loudly the opposition in Parliament or other unofficial groups in Britain cried out against appeasement, the Government continued—right down to the ignominious Laval-Hoare Peace Proposals in December 1935—to bribe Italy with various morsels, all of which Mussolini found completely unsatisfying and untempting.

Rather than make any attempts to threaten Mussolini with sanctions unless Mussolini ceased his war mobilization, Mr. Eden visited Rome carrying an olive branch in his brief case. It was on June 24th that the British proposal was officially announced. It consisted of ceding outright to Italy a portion of Ethiopian in the Ogaden region, and in turn, Britain would cede to Ethiopia an outlet to the sea through British Somaliland. It was no less a generous offer than a
improving the general health of the population, and an increased awareness of rest and relaxation.

In the absence of specific medical evidence, these statements remain purely speculative. The nature of the problem and the means to address it are not yet fully understood. It is clear, however, that addressing the issue requires a comprehensive approach that involves not only medical professionals but also social workers, psychologists, and community leaders.

The importance of education and awareness campaigns cannot be overstated. This is particularly crucial in areas where health literacy is low. By empowering individuals with the knowledge to make informed decisions about their health, we can significantly reduce the incidence of chronic diseases.

In conclusion, the need for a holistic approach to health care, which includes prevention, early detection, and effective treatment, cannot be overstated. Our society must work together to address these challenges, ensuring that no one is left behind in the quest for health and well-being.
nefarious one. This endeavor—inspired no doubt by British noblesse oblige—was rejected by Italy with contempt.

This policy of conciliating the 'bluffer par excellence' was forcing the Government into a very trying dilemma. It consisted of trying to maintain in tact the friendship of Italy in order to avoid any risk of war between Great Britain and Italy, while also trying to placate the vociferous British public opinion which was demanding that British prestige be used to strengthen the League in this supreme test. The French were forced into a similar dilemma, but for a different reason than the British. From the French point of view it was necessary to maintain the friendship of Italy as an ally against the resurgent power of Germany which for a second time threatened to upset the European balance of power, the French felt that even more than ever they would not repudiate Italian friendship, since only a few days before on June 13th, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement had been concluded, which in reality condoned Hitler's repudiation of disarmament.

In June, which was the best time to have thwarted Il Duce's plans for conquest, the situation could still be kept in hand due to the fact that Mussolini could not have moved a soldier anyway once the rainy season had started. There were members in Parliament who recorded themselves for immediate action in regard to thwarting Italian aspirations. Mr. Attlee brought to light the following preventive suggestions which might be taken to halt further Italian troop movements.
"The vital point in this matter is the control of the Suez Canal, and Italy ought to be told quite plainly that, in that event (of an aggression) she would not have the use of the Suez Canal. This matter ought to be decided at once."

"the matter had already drifted too far, (he said), the League of Nations would be destroyed altogether if within the circle of the League Powers, (states) were enabled to carry out military filibustering enterprises." 2

He also stressed that the most important act which the British should make,

"...was to convey to the Italian government, either publicly or privately that we regarded this matter as one of national honor and vital necessity, and that we intended to see the Covenant upheld." 3

Nevertheless, in the best Palmerston tradition, Mr. Eden replied to Mr. Attlee's statements with the following justification of the Government's policy.

"...Nor have we been animated by any desire to oppose Italian influence in Ethiopia. Our rights in that country are already amply protected by treaties. In fact, there is no reason whatever why British and Italian interests should not be mutually and harmoniously developed side by side, for neither do they, or need they conflict." 4

If the contents of the Maffey report were not assurances enough to Mussolini that Britain would disinterest herself, certainly these practically identical words of Mr. Eden's in June, (after FOUR appeals from the Ethiopian government to consider the dispute,) were a sufficient guarantee that Britain

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
would make little trouble for Italy.

In July, the British Government's policy in dealing with Italy took on a distinctly sympathetic hue when Sir Samuel Hoare stated in the House of Commons that

"We have always understood and well understand Italy's desire for overseas expansion. Indeed, we have in the past done our best to show our sympathy with Italian aspirations in a practical way. In 1925 we ceded Jubaland to Italy, and in the present negotiations we showed our willingness to endeavor to ensure for Italy some territorial satisfaction by a reasonable and legitimate arrangement with Abyssinia." ¹

Not only was the Abyssinian Government faced with the inertia of the League, but by the decision of the British Government on July 25th, they were forced to abandon the hope of any material aid in warding off the advances of its rapacious neighbor.

"Sir Samuel Hoare announced the Government's decision to withhold for the present licenses for the export of arms to either Abyssinia or Italy, though the transit of consignments to Abyssinia across British or British protected territory would be permitted, in accordance with the terms of the 1930 treaty." ²

The British, by this order, made no distinction between victim and aggressor, and took an extremely "cautious" position.

At the League Council's session of July 31st to August 3rd, it was generally agreed that the more important issues would be taken care of outside the League framework in another conference in August. Conversations opened in Paris on the 15th with the following headlines appearing in the press on that day:

2. The Treaty of 1930 had been signed by Italy, France, Great Britain and Ethiopia. Its object was to supervise the trade in arms and munitions in Ethiopia and in the adjacent territories.
"British are Ready to Let Italy Take Lane in Ethiopia." 1
Speculations on the Conference consisted of reports that Britain had suggested a series of economic concessions with some grant of territory, 'which it is obvious in advance the Italian dictator would refuse.' 2 Despite such rumours, Baron Aloisi, the Italian delegate in a press interview on the opening day of the conference, made his position plain by stating that '...the only satisfactory guarantee (for economic concessions) would be political ascendancy plus military occupation.' 3

The basis for negotiations at Paris seemed to rest on a compromise whereby Ethiopia would not be high-pressured to relinquish her sovereignty while Italy's grievances by some economic advantages in that area would be redressed. The fact that the Italian delegate came without plenary powers, and that 'Baron Aloisi's instructions appeared to debar him from making any detailed statement of Italy's demands,' 4 the British and French set about the work of making a settlement which would be satisfactory to Ethiopia, to Italy, and within the framework of the Covenant. This was a most difficult task. In a report to the Council after the Conversations broke down on August 18th, Mr. Eden discussed the nature of the Anglo-French Proposals:

2. Loc. Cit.
3. Loc. Cit.
4. Loc. Cit.
"While not failing to recognize that the situation of Ethiopia might call for extensive reforms, it seemed to us that these reforms should be freely assented to by Ethiopia in the fullness of her sovereignty and without anything being imposed on her contrary to her independence her integrity. As a member of the League of Nations, Ethiopia might appeal to the League for the collaboration and assistance necessary to assure the economic development and administrative reorganization of the country. France, the United Kingdom and Italy, as limitrophe Powers, would be particularly well qualified to lend this collective assistance, whether a mission for this purpose were entrusted to them by the Council with the assent of Ethiopia or whether the Council of the League of Nations were to be invited to give its approval to a treaty concluded between the three Powers and the Ethiopian Government.

The work of reorganization was to have extended to the most varied fields of national life, such as economic, financial, commercial, and constructional development; foreign settlement; modernization of administrative services; anti-slavery measures and frontier and other police services. The free activity of foreigners in the economic sphere would have been respected.

On the other hand, the collective character of the assistance would not have prevented particular account being taken of the special interests of Italy, without prejudice to the recognized rights of France and the United Kingdom.

Finally, we did not examine, but we did not in any way exclude, the possibility of territorial adjustments to which Italy and Ethiopia might agree."

This speech merely read as an obituary of the meeting after the news that "the end came suddenly and unexpectedly when Premier Mussolini of Italy sent a flat rejection of the

(Anglo-French) proposals. 1

The British and French could hardly acquiesce in Italian plans if they had, as they apparently did, envisage the cession to Italy of all of the Lowlands of Abyssinia, and the establishment of a military protectorate over the remainder of the territory, coupled with the rights of Italians to settle and develop economically as they saw fit. 2

The impasse reached at the August Conference seemed to indicate that the last hope of averting the crisis outside of Geneva had disintegrated. If Britain and France further capitulated to Mussolini, it could only weaken the structure of the League itself so much so as to disrobe it of even the least vestige of moral authority which it might retain at this -- the 11th hour.

2. V. H. Dean, The League and the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, (Geneva Studies Conference VI, No.3.) p.2
CHAPTER XII

ITALIAN POLICIES AND WAR MOBILIZATION

Franco’s plan for an African empire, which included in it Abyssinia, showed the internal weakness of one of the most ambitious and militaristic dictators in Europe. Digger Mussolini, before he wished his name immortalized officially known in the world, he noted the sale at a president, and when such pretence as to seem to our like necessary, he abandoned that role the imperialist parties once.

Another Italian interest plan included utilizing the Italian incident to gain control of the surrounding region, to unblock and thereby justifying his increasingly ambitious mobilization, the only parameter. As any such on the resolution over this situation grow, it becomes evident that such larger forces were at stake, and Italy was pushed into the background as a minor incident.

It is historical that when after Mussolini secured his position diplomatically with the two most important league powers in January 1936, early moves began in early February toward the direction of East Africa. He was very judicious that Italy’s diplomatic and military support in Europe would still be a premium to France and Britain in the event of German resurgence. Italy may have also figured that these two powers would necessarily, in the light of such developments, be forced to capitulate to his demands in a colonial campaign. When Mussolini saw the tide in favor of conquest by force, he took the long position that Britain and France would not frustrate his Afrikan designs. He used the weapons to preclude any
Premier Mussolini's plan for an African empire, which included in it Abyssinia, showed the careful forethought of one of the most assiduous and audacious dictators in Europe. Signor Mussolini, before he wished, his exact intentions officially known by the world, he acted the role of a peacemaker, and when such pretense as he made became less necessary, he abandoned that role for a more truculent performance.

Whether his foresighted plan included utilizing the Walwal incident to demonstrate the later necessity of sending troops to Ethiopia and thereby justifying his increasingly intensive mobilization, can only be speculation. At any rate, as the tension over the situation grew, it became evident that much larger issues were at stake, and Walwal was pushed into the background as a minor incident.

It is historical fact that after Mussolini secured his position diplomatically with the two most important league powers in January 1935, troop movements began in early February toward the direction of east Africa. He may have judged that Italy's diplomatic and military support in Europe would sell at a premium to France and Britain in the event of German resurgence. Italy must have also figured that these two powers would necessarily, in the light of such developments, be forced to capitulate to his demands of a colonial campaign. When Mussolini cast the die in favor of conquest by force he took the long chance that Britain and France would not frustrate his African designs. He used two weapons to preclude any
hindrance of the development of his African adventure; the first, which lasted (arbitrarily) until June, consisted of assuring the League, and especially Britain and France, that his intentions were purely peaceful. The argument was used over and over that Ethiopia was a bad neighbor and therefore that the troops sent to East Africa were only to protect Italian colonies. The Walwal incident may have been manufactured to demonstrate the validity of this position.

The second method used to prevent a possible frustration of Italian plans were threats. Mussolini played upon the fear which haunted Britain most—being drawn into a war with Italy. In the summer of 1935, when a firmer League policy was being talked of, especially by the British, Italy declared that sanctions would be considered an 'unfriendly act' which would mean war! At just what moment Mussolini decided to transform his bluffing game into one of earnest it is unknown. If the British attitude toward the German breach of its international obligations was any cue to the way Italy might be treated, under similar circumstances Mussolini could have made up his mind then.

The first indication in the press that the Italian boot was clicking its heel in a military cadence, was on February 11.

The importance of the observation of the Victoria Association for the study of the development of Virginia's educational system was not underestimated. The association was instrumental in shaping the educational policies and practices in the state. The records of the meetings and discussions reveal a keen interest in educational improvement and development.

Their efforts led to the establishment of several educational institutions and the refinement of teaching methods. The association's work contributed significantly to the growth of education in Virginia.
when extensive troop movements were reported within Italy. 1

Even at this early stage of the dispute, speculations, based on information from 'well-informed circles', which later proved entirely valid, were made that

"These movements have colonial ends in view. A call has gone out, it is said, for volunteer reserve officers to be pressed into active service and sent to Italian Somaliland and Eritrea, to assume charge of the training of native troops.

And not to be forgotten were the weapons of war also included on Mussolini's carefully drawn up list.

"It is said in official quarters that large quantities of ammunition and war materials of all kinds either have been delivered or are on the way to Eritrea and Somaliland.

It was evident from such reported and other equally ominous headlines as 'Italians Mobilize Army of 35,000 in Abyssinia Crisis' that the decision had been made to start Il Duce's war machine rolling without further loss of time. It took no great insight to conclude that

"Premier Mussolini undoubtedly had decided on mobilization partly because of the clarification of the European situation as a result of the Franco-Italian accord and the Italo-British accord in London.

Italian war preparations began nine months before the opening of hostilities in October. It was in this early period of

...
preparations that Italy attempted to mask its warlike intentions and to silence Abyssinia's efforts to make the world aware of the danger that threatened. And until the last moment Italy was successful in frustrating Abyssinia's efforts, while Italy continued to gain more time to mobilize all her resources, without having her hands tied once by any agreement or decision by the League to force Italy to cease the warlike activity.

On February 23rd, the first notice as to the destiny of the troops which had been mobilizing in Italy for sometime appeared in the following headlines:

BIG EMBARKATION STATION SET UP AS TROOPS LEAVE FOR DUTY IN AFRICAN COLONIES.

The Vulcania, a 24,000 ton ship sailed from Naples with nearly 2,000 men on that date, and at Geneva, 1,300 more men sailed for Africa. The lid was off. The stream of men and supplies to East Africa has begun.

If one was willing to read between the lines, the signs of the times looked ominous, and it appeared that Mussolini's efforts were planned on a large scale.

"At Naples, the centre of Premier Mussolini's Concentration of troops it was estimated that 25,000 men had arrived, ready to embark at a moment's notice. The flow of troops had been almost continuous since January 29, when an Ethiopian-Italian clash took place at the border of Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia."  

1. New York Times, February 23, 5:1
2. Ibid.
On February 24th, another sign presaging the possible type of warfare which might follow in the months of 1935. It was reported that

"thirty thousand barrels of aviation gasoline have been unloaded at the Eritrean port of Massawa." 1

And one who wished to attach significance to these reports did not even have to read between the lines to discover that

"the Italian Government is proceeding with undiminished vigor with its military preparations." 2

But the British or the French did not become alarmed by such news. Through the official eyes of the Foreign Office, such events were viewed as "rattling the sabre" mere 'bluffing' which would in time straighten itself out and be forgotten.

On February 15th, the House of Commons was assured by the Secretary of State, Sir John Simon that

"His Majesty's Government had been informed that the precautionary measures taken by Italy, notably the mobilization of two divisions, in no way imply that it is the intention of the Italian Government to abandon their endeavors to seek an amicable settlement of their differences with Ethiopia....." 3

Italy had planned on little opposition from the French when it was reported that General de Bono had said upon his departure

3. Quoted in G. Martinelli, Italy Against the World, pp. 67-68.
for East Africa to take up his duties as High Commissioner that
"there would be no opposition on the part of France to our eventual operations out there." 1

It is hardly tenable that the British and French lack of concern over Mussolini's intentions was such naive assumptions which Sir John Simon stated to the members of Parliament on February 25th.

The pathetic target of Mussolini's bullying protested earnestly against Italy's growing bellicosity. M. Yesus, the Abyssinian charge in Rome read a 'solemn declaration' on February 28th in which he

"swore on his country's honor and his Empire's honor that Abyssinia had never attacked and would never attack Italian colonies..... M. Yesus ended with the solemn declaration that Abyssinia wished to live in peace with her neighboring colonies belonging to three great powers." 2

This avowal of peace seemed tragic and a bit ridiculous in terms of the power relationships of the two countries involved. Italy's army was organized on a modern, mechanized basis; Abyssinia's could scarcely emulate Mussolini's military machine.

During the initial period of the embarkation of Italian troops to East Africa, Abyssinia received little assurance from the League that the dispute would even be put on the

Agenda. Furthermore, Abyssinia could have hardly been encouraged by the 'Big Three' at Stresa in an atmosphere of the utmost cordiality, in which Italy was not even questioned on Italo-Ethiopian relations.

Few other nations felt the urgency of the hour, before it would be too late to act, as Abyssinia did when in May she made the appeal to the League,

"At this critical hour in history the Ethiopian Government earnestly appeals to the Council to see that the territorial integrity and political independence of Ethiopian, a member of the League of Nations are respected and preserved against aggression." 1

As a retort, on the following day that Ethiopian's appeal was published by the press, Mussolini warned the powers to leave Ethiopia's fate to Italy in a speech to the Italian senate. This speech could be interpreted in no other way than exemplifying Mussolini's intentions to flout the principles of the Covenant and take matters into his own hands.

If the statesmen of Europe were willing to believe Mussolini's actions were only sabre-rattling, here were his own words to support his actions. It is impossible and unnecessary to render an account of all Mussolini's statements of policy bearing on the dispute. It shall be sufficient to demonstrate the general trend of Italian policy by typical, representatives speeches. It was in this speech of May 15th

to the Italian Senate which perhaps more than any other accurately presaged the future attitude of Italy, toward the League, toward the other powers, and toward Abyssinia. It is the beginning of Mussolini in his truculent role, toward the rest of the world.

"Italy is the sole judge of what measures are necessary and she will tolerate no interference no matter by whom."

In continuing, he assures the Senate that no hostile measures or a coalition against Italy is probable now, or in the future.

"But one rumor abroad in some foreign circles is to be denied formally, that is, of Franco-English diplomatic steps in Rome. The very word 'step' is extremely distasteful, and although some persons beyond our frontiers would have wished it, the truth is that no step has been taken up to now."

In averring a bit ostentatiously to the reason that Italy need not fear any 'steps' in the future, he continued:

"owing to the Italo-Franco-British relations, it is most probable that there will not be any (steps), even in the future." 1

Speaking of the critics of recent Italian war mobilization he states that

"it is precisely because we wish to be tranquilly secure in Europe that we intend to be well guarded in Africa." 2

Waving his sovereign rights in the League's face, he asserts

"I wish to add in the most explicit manner that we will send out all the soldiers we believe necessary. And no one can take upon himself

2. Ibid.
"the intolerable presumption to dictate to us concerning the character and volume of our precautionary measures. (Enthusiastic applause) No one can judge this most delicate matter except Italy who has in her history a dramatic, sanguinary and not forgotten experience in this regard. I prefer to be removed tomorrow for doing too much rather than too little when it is a question of the safety of our colonies."

Then demonstrating Italy's 'ardent' efforts at peacemaking, he refers to the progress of the Commission of Arbitration and Conciliation which was considering the Walwal incident.

"With regard to the diplomatic development of the controversy, it is known that we have not refused to confer with representatives of the Ethiopian Government... We have already for sometime communicated with Addis Ababa that we were disposed on our side to name two representatives for Italy on the Conciliation Committee.

And then, in a note of warning,

"But it is our duty not to harbor any dangerous illusions, in view of the noteworthy Ethiopian armaments and the advanced preparations for Ethiopian mobilization.

Referring specifically to the nature of Italian mobilization to date, he continued his speech with the following pertinent material.

"Idesire to reconfirm to the Senate that we will maintain under arms for all the time necessary the three classes of 1911, 1913, and 1914. I believe that a total of 800,000 to 900,000 soldiers is sufficient to guarantee our security. They are men perfectly trained, with morale that is 'superb'. They are equipped with the most modern weapons made in our war industries, which--I am revealing no secret--have been working full time for some months."
The information presented in this document is not legible due to poor image quality. It appears to be a page from a book or a text-based document, but the text content is not discernible.
"Relying on this gathering of forces on land, sea, and sky, we will continue to practice a policy that will be full of decisive and concrete cooperation with all European powers, large or small... Our military machine threatens no one, but assures peace."

In other words, Mussolini made it clear that Italy was determined to see his 'colonial adventure' through, and they were prepared to go to all lengths to secure their aims in East Africa. It must be noted, however, that from his words in the concluding paragraph his speech, he was still anxious to assure the great powers that it would not threaten their interests in the area, nor did he wish his military expedition to be raised above the level of a colonial campaign. As is true of all great imperial powers, the critical or plane of ethics of a war of colonial conquest was always quite different from a war between two equal powers. Mussolini attempting to explain Italy's plane of ethics in this fashion to assure the other powers that he was not interested in provoking a European conflagration. This speech seems to mark the end of one stage of Italy's diplomatic maneuvering to secure his aims. His stalling measured as a shield for military preparations no longer was necessary. Italy was casting off the mantle of peace, and avowing her true aims to the world.

This was due to the fact that May is the beginning of the rainy season in East Africa which makes field operations of any sort extremely unfavorable. The summer
rains make the terrain impassable for any considerable body of troops. Mussolini knew that no 'coup' could be planned before September anyway. He, therefore, could afford to make his position clearer.

The fact that Italy refused the British offer of June 24th, 1935, added reality to the crystallization of Mussolini's intransigent position. One observer describes Mussolini's position on the offer by saying:

"The proposals were rejected by Mussolini with contempt. His attitude, indeed, suggested that it was insulting of Britain to send a junior minister like Mr. Eden with such a miserable offer. 'You can imagine my reply,' he wrote to DeBono."

The August conference held in Paris on the 15th, evidenced that the British Government had not abandoned the naive hope that Mussolini would still compromise for a peaceful settlement, even though Baron Aloiisi had made it plain that military occupation was the sine qua non of a successful agreement. On August 19th, Mussolini again showed his intransigent position to Britain and France when Mussolini gave a flat No to the Anglo-French proposals.

"The end came suddenly and unexpectedly when Premier Mussolini sent a flat rejection of the proposal put to him by the British and the French, offering

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The problem, however, lies in the fact that no one is really sure how to approach the issue of student involvement in government. There is a general sentiment that students should be more involved, but the question is how to achieve this involvement. The student government faces many obstacles, including limited resources, lack of time, and the need to balance academic and extracurricular responsibilities.

In order to improve student involvement in government, it is essential to have a clear vision and goals. This means that the student government needs to communicate effectively with the student body to understand their needs and desires. It also requires the support of faculty and staff to ensure that the goals are realistic and achievable. Additionally, the student government must be flexible and open to feedback in order to adapt to changing circumstances.

To summarize, increasing student involvement in government requires a strategic approach that takes into account the challenges and limitations faced by the student government. By working together and communicating effectively, we can create a more engaged and active student body that truly reflects the diversity and needs of our community.
"what they deemed the most favorable basis
of a discussion short of granting in ad-
vance his maximum demands for political
dominance of Ethiopia." 1

These were not favorable omens that it was to be an
easy job ahead to deter Mussolini from his intended pursuits.

British public opinion was crystallizing into a growing
hostility in the summer of 1935 against any such aggression
as Mussolini might plan against Abyssinia. In retaliatory
measure, a anti-British campaign was launched in the Italian
press against the growing hostility in Britain toward Italy.
Mussolini himself began the diatribes against the former ally
and friend with the following speech which he delivered in
Sardinia to review troops sailing for East Africa:

"We have old and new accounts to settle; we
will settle them. We shall take no account
of what may be said beyond our frontiers,
because we ourselves, we alone and ex-
clusively, are the judges of our interests
and the guarantors of our future. We will
imitate to the letter those who are lecturing
us. They have shown that when it was a
question of creating an Empire, or of defending
it, they never took any account at all of
the opinion of the World." 2

Such stinging words were aimed at laying bare the
British hypocrisy in the Italo-Ethiopian situation. Who
are they, the biggest Empire-builders in the World, to scold
another, who is about to commit only a minor offense?

A study of comprehensive care in the United Kingdom shows that psychiatric hospitalization is often prolonged due to the lack of community-based services. The effectiveness of community care in reducing hospitalization rates has been demonstrated in several studies. However, the implementation of community care policies has been hindered by various challenges, including funding, staffing, and policy constraints.

In the United States, the Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) have been a major source of community care. CMHCs provide a range of services, including prevention, treatment, and support, to improve the mental health of the community. Despite their importance, the funding of CMHCs has been a contentious issue, with debates over the allocation of resources and the effectiveness of these centers.

The role of community care in the management of mental health disorders is crucial. It not only reduces the burden on hospitals but also improves the quality of life for individuals with mental health issues. The challenge lies in balancing the needs of individuals with the constraints of the current healthcare system.
So went the Italian reasoning.

The Italian "verbal drumfire of invective" against Great Britain became almost equal to Italy's diatribes against Abyssinia. World opinion in August found it difficult to distinguish whether the real issue was Italy vs. Abyssinia or Italy vs. United Kingdom.

The motives behind this press campaign can be found in the explanation that Italy was exploiting Britain's fears of being drawn into war by threats. Italy well knew that the areas which the British Empire controlled viz., Suez Canal were of vital necessity to the Italian East African campaign. It was necessary for success to frighten the British by threats of reprisals if obstacles of a strategic nature were precipitated.

In August, such headlines as these appeared in the press: "MUSSOLINI SAYS SANCTIONS MEANS WAR." In an interview with the press, Mussolini stated

"It should be realized without the possibility of misunderstanding, that whoever applies sanctions as against Italy will be met by the armed hostility of our country.

J. *J:\*

The establishment of a "National Council on Occupations for Women" is recommended, as it is believed that this will help to provide better career opportunities for women. It is hoped that this will lead to an increase in the number of women entering the workforce.

In summary, the establishment of a "National Council on Occupations for Women" is seen as a positive step towards providing better career opportunities for women.
"If sanctions are voted against Italy at Geneva, Italy will at once leave the League of Nations." 1

A press interviewer, asking his advice to other European nations in maintaining peace, received the following answer, which was not too complimentary to the United States:

"Other nations should follow the example of the United States and leave us alone to fulfill our mission." 2

Mussolini made the following statement before his War Cabinet Council on August 29th, in which he appealed to British interest self.

"Britain has nothing to fear from Italy's policy toward Ethiopia. Italy does not threaten, either directly or indirectly British imperial interests. It has a quarrel with Ethiopia, but she neither has, nor wishes, to have one with Britain, with whom during the World war, later in Locarno and recently in Stresa, she has realized collaboration of undoubted value for the stability of Europe.

And turning in a more admonishing tone:

"To speak of sanctions... cannot but lead to the most serious complications. As for sanctions of a military character are concerned, the necessary provisions and measures have been taken to resist them. 3

He then assured his War Council, that if Economic sanctions were voted upon by the League, that every precautionary measure had been taken in advance to see that the Italian population and the soldiers in the campaign would not suffer.

1. New York Times, August 26, 1935
2. Ibid.
The combination of air and water in a lake or
reservoir provides unique opportunities for
development of specific habitat requirements and
management strategies. This report outlines the
following aspects:

1. Thelake's ecological balance and
management strategies for maintaining
these balances.
2. The impact of human activities on the lake's
ecosystem and potential

In conclusion, the lake's ecological balance is a
critical aspect of its management. To ensure its
sustainability, ongoing efforts are necessary to
mitigate human activities and promote
environmental conservation. This report aims to
highlight the importance of these measures and
recommendations for future actions.

Prepared by: [Author's Name]
[Date]
It was evident that Mussolini meant to keep his world when he described the course Italy intended to pursue as "with Geneva, without Geneva, or against Geneva."  

It is necessary that some means be found to make an
understanding between the various departments of the
organization to ensure that the service is provided in a
manner that satisfies the needs of the employees.
WORLD TRADE WITH ITALY

During the months immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, from August to October 1935, Italy was carrying on a world-wide business transaction in war supplies to feed her war machine. This commercial traffic at the 11th hour of the dispute, played no small part in upholding Mussolini’s preparations and firm and defy all means that might be used to frustrate Italy by the application of any sanctions by the League.

CHAPTER XIII

THE IMMEDIATE THREAT OF WAR

(September and October 1935)

Because no action was taken by the League to stop Mussolini, Italy was able to acquire stocks and supplies which allowed her to carry on a war despite the later economic boycott imposed on her by a vote in the League assembly.

The trade with states not members of the League, the United States being the most important, became a difficult problem to solve than it came to applying an economic boycott. The League’s inability to control the trade of non-member states with the aggressor was considered one of the important weaknesses, and also an unknown factor upon which hinged the effectiveness of sanctions.

It is, therefore, necessary to investigate Italy’s trade with all nations who in an indirect sense were contributing to Il Duce’s inquisitive plans by supplying him with the instruments of war.
WORLD TRADE WITH ITALY

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THE FIRST WELSH CHURCH

In the case of some translations, the number of words in each line may vary slightly, but the overall meaning remains the same.
More especially, it is important to consider at this point the part of the United States played, as the most important non-member state who traded with Italy.

Italy found many businessmen in the United States willing to supply her with necessary supplies for her adventure in East Africa. The flow of war profits into American business houses stimulated their sadly depleted condition due to the aftermath of the depression.

It was no secret to anyone what these materials were to be used for. If the British and the French were still unaware of Italy's intentions, they could have learned much from observations made in the financial section of the Times in August that

"Italy, has prepared her offensive against Ethiopia, has been buying far more extensively in the United States than is generally supposed." 1

At that time, however, it was difficult to ascertain and confirm exact statistics on the extent of Italian buying because of "the reluctance of the majority of companies to discuss such transactions." 2 Could the businessmen have gotten a guilt complex over their sordid trading? Could they have felt themselves implicated as accomplices of Il Duce in committing his aggression against a primitive and relatively defenceless African country, and were therefore

2. Ibid.
reluctant to have such deeds publicized? Regardless of such an interpretation, Italy was successful in securing the necessary supplies needed such as

"large quantities of oil, steel billets for use in the production of shell cases, copper, iron and steel scrap, cotton, trucks, machine tools and a variety of foodstuffs..."

It was reported that Italian representatives were anxious to secure commodities on suitable credit terms from American firms in return for special marketing arrangements, in the Italian home market. For the Abyssinian affair, it is believed, however, that most of Italian trading was done by payment in cash in gold. Although war costs sent Italian financial conditions deeper and deeper into debt, Il Duce managed to obtain the purchasing power for the commodities in this world wide transaction from an already impoverished population.

Most of the figures which were later made available on Italian Purchasing, compared United States exports to Italy in 1935 to the corresponding period in 1934, which in itself cannot give the whole picture, because 1934 was not an entirely normal year, it was above average.

In order to demonstrate how the fluctuations in one item reflected Italy's preparations for the projected campaign in Ethiopia, iron and steel scrap purchases will be used as an

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. The Official National Debt as Reported in August was Nine Billion.
In the scenario where Italian measures are expanded, the

It is important to note how current legislation

In conclusion, it is clear that any recent

...acceptance of such a treaty or testament.

This is significant for the protection of current

In order to ensure that all the necessary

...read the document as if you were reading it naturally.
example. According to the Commerce Department figures, our purchases of this item "have more than doubled during July (1935) as compared with June (1935). "The value of the shipments jumped from $240,367 in June to $610,161 in July." Taking the consignments month by month, the tremendous buying that Italy was engaging in during these few months of 'grace' which still remained, was clearly reflected in the example of metal scrap.

To show the importance of United States trade with Italy, the words of the Department of Commerce trade experts are very significant who disclosed from official figures that

"that the United States had been supplying a major part of a large increase in Italian imports of four classes of products easily made into munitions. Italy's foreign trade figures, not available beyond mid-years, show that purchases of American cotton waste, iron and steel scrap, copper, benzol, toluol, xylol in the first half of the year were doubled to quadruple the volume for the first six months of 1934. In every instance, the increase in Italian purchases was greater for the U. S. than all other countries combined."

Likewise, in an even more vital commodity, oil, the U. S. took the lead in supplying Italy. On November 6, 1935 it was reported that

"Shipments of oil to Italy increased roughly 600% in volume in August and September 1935 as compared with the same two months in 1934, Commerce Department officials reported today."

To emphasize the importance of utilizing these terms appropriately in the terms of the Foreign Aid Act, it is important to clarify that the terms "aid" and "grant" have specific meanings. Aid refers to financial assistance provided by a government to another country, whereas a grant is a specific type of financial assistance, often with conditions attached. It is crucial to distinguish between these terms to ensure proper legal and financial implications.
"Four full loads of various grades of oil left by tanker for specific Italian ports during the two month period mentioned." 1

The fury of this traffic had no signs of abating in the United States, even after the sanctions were invoked by the League in November.

"Statistics showed that Italian-Ethiopian hostilities were booming the business of American cotton growers and British textile factories." 2

And the most strategic item with regard to the whole dispute, oil, was flowing readily from American gulf ports into Italian tanks and machines.

"With a cargo of 50,000 barrels of crude oil, the Italian tanker, Americana arrived at Corpus Christi to take on an addition 30,000 barrels well destined for Italy." 3

The United States, however, was not the only country that was benefiting from Italian orders for material. To give a brief glimpse of the extent and nature of world commercial relations with Italy, a few pertinent examples will suffice.

"In Kenya, the business community... scraped together and despatched to Mogadiscio every kind of portable goods on which it was possible to lay hands: gasoline, kerosene, motor trucks, beer, condensed milk, soap, lamps, railway material, tires, tubes, galvanized iron." 4

1. Ibid. November 6, 1935.
It is in the interest of the economy to ensure that the necessary skills and knowledge are developed and maintained. This is particularly important in the context of emerging technologies and changing job markets. It is essential to invest in education and training programs to prepare individuals for the future workforce.

The decision to focus on certain areas and industries is crucial for the long-term sustainability of the economy. It is important to identify and support sectors that have the potential for growth and innovation. This includes investments in research and development, as well as encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises to thrive.

In addition, it is critical to ensure that the workforce has access to ongoing training and development opportunities. This can help individuals keep up with the latest technologies and practices, and stay competitive in their fields.

Overall, a well-educated and skilled workforce is key to maintaining a strong and dynamic economy. It is important for policymakers and businesses to work together to ensure that education and training programs are effective and that the workforce is prepared for the challenges of the future.
Italy had placed a large order for shoes in England, it was reported. Reports were made of shipments to Italy of cereals, coal, oil and timber from Russia and Turkey. Czechoslovakia and Austria were adding their supplies by sending Italy coal, iron and machinery.

These random illustrations show that Italy was taking no chances in being unprepared in case a boycott should be voted in Geneva. Italy knew that many markets would be opened to her by the desire for war profits. In fact, Canada was outspoken about it, as the government did nothing to hinder business.

"Canada is not anxious to bind itself to neutrality as the U. S. has done. The Government is not disposed to shut itself off from any market that offers (large opportunities.)"

The United States did make some effort to stop this traffic by neutrality legislation, but the efforts were far from adequate. In August a joint resolution was passed in Congress which provided for an arms embargo, until February 1936, upon the exportation of arms and munitions of war. The President was required to draw up a list of the commodities to be placed on an embargo.

Such commodities as oil, cotton and scrap iron, however, were not on the arms list, but were nevertheless used for

the carrying on of war, without being munitions in the strict sense. And it proved to be these items, and particularly oil, which Italy was most interested in obtaining from the United States, and which proved to be the essential instrument in Italy's conduct of her campaign.

The President, realizing the serious implications of the rise in the volume of exports to Italy of these commodities, rebuked the American businessmen by these words:

"This class of trade is directly contrary to the policy of the Government as announced in official statements by the President and the Secretary of State, as also is it contrary to the general spirit of the recent neutrality act."

Great Britain was unavoidably entangled in the Italo-Ethiopian situation, if for no other reason than the British Empire's geographical position in the Mediterranean. All Italian troops and supplies flowed through the Suez Canal from various ports in Italy to the Italian colonies in East Africa. Not only did Great Britain control the very door through which Italy had to pass in order to conquer Abyssinia, but the maintenance in tact of the British Empire rested on British control of the Mediterranean for security of its life line. British possessions, therefore, were scattered widely between Gibraltar on the West and the Suez on the East. Malta,

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Aden, Cyprus, Egypt, British Somaliland and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan were also strategically located watch towers from which the British could view Italian military movements in this area.

At the same time, Italy's position in the Mediterranean, with possessions on both the European and African side, could effectively challenge the British, by virtue of Italian proximity to British locations in Libya, and the Dodecanese. Italy if so desiring, could put the British in a particularly vulnerable position. Italian aircraft and submarine operating in the Mediterranean waters would make British warships extremely unwelcome there.

It is difficult to calculate the exact strength of the British forces in 1935, as no statistics are available to the general public. Various estimates were made, nevertheless, by competent observers who had been acquainted with Britain's military power for many years. Mr. Toynbee surmises that:

"As for the state of the British fighting forces in the autumn of 1935, it seems that they were seriously unprepared—perhaps not so seriously as was believed abroad—but seriously enough in the light of what was known in Downing Street about German rearmament and German intentions. As regards the prospects in the event of an Anglo-Italian war, the United Kingdom Government appears to have believed that it would cost the British Navy the loss of six or seven warships to bring Italy to her knees. In Downing Street it was held—whether rightly or wrongly—would never be known—that naval losses of this magnitude in a war incurred in
At the same time, I believe, a strong need exists for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to the investigation and development of the potentialities of the acoustical environment of the theatre, to which we may return later. The objective of this approach should be to create a more favorable environment in which the performers and audiences can function more effectively, thereby enhancing the overall quality of the performance. This approach should be based on a thorough understanding of the acoustical properties of the space, including the absorption, reflection, and transmission of sound. The design of the theatre should take into account these properties to achieve the desired acoustic effects. The use of appropriate materials and techniques can help to achieve this goal, and the acoustical engineering of the theatre should be considered as an integral part of the overall design process.
fulfillment of British obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations would be taken extremely badly by public opinion in England. It was also held that an exaggerated estimate of the extent of British losses would gain currency abroad, and that such a situation would expose both Germany and Japan to a temptation which might perhaps prove irresistible—to fish in troubled waters. 1

This display of strength of British Naval Power seemed to be the extent to which British officialdom was willing to go, in the hopes that Mussolini could be forced to retreat from his Abyssinian plans, by such a gesture. But Mussolini was not to be fooled by gestures which had no actions behind them. Mussolini later called the British bluff and, going ahead with the plans of conquest, showed the world that Britain was not willing to "stick its neck out".

Mussolini must have been aware of this British attitude, for time and again he appealed to British self-interest, saying

"Italian policy did not endanger the present European equilibrium...and that it constituted no threat to local British interests..." 2

Nevertheless, Mussolini must also have feared that Downing Street, pushed by British public opinion, might be forced on the other hand to crusade for the enforcement of the Covenant, which would include the application of sanctions and possibly even military action.

Mussolini, therefore, continually warned that reprisals

IT HAPPENS OFTEN TO FIELD OFFICERS TO BE LATE IN ORDER TO GET TO THE FIELD WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME. THIS SITUATION HAS OCCURRED IN THE PAST AND IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE FIELD OFFICER'S DELIVERY. THE PLANNING SHOWN ON THE ATTACHED SCHEMATIC WILL BE IMPLEMENTED TO ASSURE THE PROMPT DELIVERY.

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN ACCORDING TO THE METHOD SHOWN ON THE ATTACHED SCHEMATIC WILL BE PUT INTO EFFECT.

IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REORGANIZE THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MATERIALS TO BE DELIVERED.

THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE OF DELIVERY TIMES WILL BE FOLLOWED EXACTLY.

IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE PROPER DELIVERY OF MATERIALS, THE FIELD OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO ...

...
would be forthcoming to any member of the League who engaged in sanctions to thwart Italy. This, of course, would mean that Britain would bear the brunt of any 'riprisals' which Italy might care to engage in. Why the British decided to display their naval power in the Mediterranean immediately preceding the possibility that sanctions might be voted at Geneva, is not known. If they did not intend to carry through this gesture, it was of little value. The British could argue that if French cooperation had been forthcoming with regard to mutual assistance in that area, the British navy would have gone ahead with enforcing the Covenant against an aggressor. It seems strange nevertheless, that Britain did not seek diplomatic harmony on this point with France before engaging in this unilateral action.

At any rate, the British went ahead with their Mediterranean plans. The first indications that Britain intended to be prepared for any event that might take place at Geneva, was in the middle of September "when it became known that the Mediterranean fleet had been joined by a large part of the Home Fleet. 1 On October 7th, two more warships joined the Fleet in the Levantine waters from the Far East. 2

By this British display of naval strength, Mussolini in return threatened to reinforce their Libyan land forces and possibly through this territory attack Egypt. 3

money to be forthcoming to such extent as to the passage of the
money in the manner of which we have already spoken. Of course, money may
in some cases of grave injury, also be forthcoming from other sources, and
especially from the large contributions made by the wealthiest families.

As a result of these contributions, the government is able to
secure the necessary funds for the maintenance of the army.

It is essential to secure the necessary funds for the maintenance of the army,
and it is only by this means that the government is able to
secure the necessary funds for the maintenance of the army.

If adequate contributions are not forthcoming, the government must
secure the necessary funds for the maintenance of the army.

In the meantime, the government may also apply to other
sources, and it is only by this means that the government is able to
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sources, and it is only by this means that the government is able to
secure the necessary funds for the maintenance of the army.

If adequate contributions are not forthcoming, the government must
secure the necessary funds for the maintenance of the army.
The Purpose of the British was to deter the Italians from participating in an Italo-British war. The Italians, not easily scared, on the other hand had as their purpose to conduct the Abyssinian war without interference; and this could be achieved most successfully if they could get the British to agree on a symmetrical reduction in Naval strength in the Levantine waters.

The effects of the British reinforcement of the British fleet in the Mediterranean and the counter-reinforcement of Italian land forces in Libya started a long chain of diplomatic negotiations between the two powers, in order to secure assurances from each regarding their intentions. Italy suggested that the basis for an understanding should be

"The symmetrical cancellation of the naval and military measures which the two governments had respectively taken in the Mediterranean." 1

Italy had previously assured the British that Italy had "no aims, immediate or concealed which could be damaging to the interests of Great Britain." 2

And the British in turn had done likewise,

"Sir Samuel Hoare sought to allay Italian apprehensions and personally assured Mussolini....that British naval measures.

"were motivated solely by the violent tone of the Italian press, and were purely precautionary in character, and implied no aggressive intention against Italy." 1

With such assurance, Italy felt that logically the British would accept Italian proposal mentioned above. And as the situation developed, Italy found herself on the winning side of all her deals with the United Kingdom. For British spokesmen reiterated in the ensuing months of the dispute, in various forms, although the substance was always the same, that, Italy might rest assured that no action would be taken by Great Britain against Italy. The British Ambassador to Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, was cast for the part of carrying this news to the Italian Government.

Prime Minister Baldwin, on October 19th, made it clear also that Great Britain would take no isolated action against Italy. 2 This could have been reference to nothing but the British fleet in the Mediterranean.

It became evident by these utterances that Italy could rest assured that it was very unlikely that the British navy would be used to frustrate Italy’s north African campaign. Thus, even if the League condemned Italy, what could the Geneva machinery do to stop Italy, without the wholehearted support of the British military forces?

If these conciliatory gestures on the part of the British

Prime Minister and the British Ambassador in Rome were indicative of the British position, as they turned out to be--Mussolini, in October, knew full well that he could carry out the Abyssinian campaign to his liking, without the interference of the British navy, and despite Geneva. As it later came to pass, the British never used their warships to blockade the Suez Canal in an attempt to enforce the decisions of the League Assembly. The Suez Canal, upon which Italy depended upon almost wholly to send troops and supplies to the fighting area, was Italy's achilles heal. If thus use had been denied the aggressor, General De Bono himself stated the consequences: millions of Italian soldiers would have starved in Africa due to lack of supplies, and Italy would have had to abandon the Abyssinian adventure.¹

THE QUESTION OF CLOSING THE SUEZ CANAL.

The strategic consideration of whether the Canal should have been closed to an aggressor who had violated its treaty obligations laid down in the Covenant, hinged on two political questions. (1) Did the British Government have legal jurisdiction over the Canal, and (2) Does the League Covenant supersede the Convention internationalizing the Canal insofar as the two are incompatible?

The British, well entrenched in Egypt by de facto control, were in a precarious legal position.

Due to the occurrence of the parent substance & its effect on the cell, the abnormal conditions have developed. The parent substance has caused a disruption in the cell's normal function, leading to the observed abnormalities.

The phenomenon has been observed in various cell types and conditions. It is believed that the substance interacts with specific cellular components, leading to the observed effects.

Further studies are required to understand the exact mechanism and to develop strategies to mitigate the impact of the parent substance on cell function.
"Great Britain had been in military occupation and in partial political control of Egypt for no less than fifty-four years, while she had been conducting the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan for thirty-seven years, she had not yet succeeded in acquiring any regular title to her de facto position in either of these two portions of the Nile Basin, but had allowed her desultory endeavors to place her relations with Egypt on a comprehensive treaty-basis to peter out, time and again...."

In regard to the Suez Canal in particular, it was operated by an private Egyptian company, in which the British owned the largest bloc of shares, although a minority—viz. 353,004 out of 800,000. The Convention of 1888, established that the Canal shall be always open and free, in time of peace and in war to all. However, would not the application of Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant override the Convention of Constantinople? Can not Article 20 of the Covenant annul or abrogate any previous treaty or convention which proves incompatible with the carrying out of the Covenant. Thus it may be argued that the basis of the Convention of Constantinople in establishing rules and regulations to cover all cases may be modified by the League Covenant.

The next problem is found in the question whether the British Government had a legal right to protect the Canal. From a juridical point of view, it could be argued that, Egypt, formerly a British protectorate, and now sovereign over the

canal, had not acceded to the Convention of 1888. Egypt had made no treaty recognizing the British claim to defend the canal. From a realistic point of view, it may be argued that in 1914 the British Government found it necessary and, therefore juridically possible, to close the canal to hostile warships. If in time of stress, as the World War was considered, it could be closed, why not in 1935, when the threat of war between two members of the League was equally imminent?

Anglo-French Discussions during September and October 1935

If ever a common front was needed, here was the golden opportunity for the French and British to show their unity of purpose.

On September 10th, when M. Laval, Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden were gathered at Geneva for the meetings of the League Council, an 'interchange of views' took place which shaped the whole manner of the way Italy would be dealt with in the event Italy committed an act of aggression. These conversations are of vital importance to the real key behind the British and French actions in the ensuing months of the dispute, which finally ended in disaster.

There were two problems to be discussed of primary importance, and the first hinged on the outcome of the second. The first was whether or not military sanctions would be taken.

and October 1948

I have a general idea that we must face the problem of
obtaining the necessary data and getting them to

In the meantime, I have made every effort to

I have not yet received the reports of the

Accurately, we must take into consideration that

I have attended a number of the

More work and preparation are needed to

I have been unable to obtain the necessary

I have been unable to obtain the necessary

I have been unable to obtain the necessary

I have been unable to obtain the necessary
against Italy. The second was the problem of reciprocal assistance in the Mediterranean. The British didn’t want hostilities between the United Kingdom and the Italian forces to break out without the protection and aid of French ports and land forces. France, however, as has been demonstrated, was unwilling to lose the friendship of Italy over Abyssinia unless British would come to France’s aid in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Europe. M. Laval was willing to demonstrate France’s fidelity to the Covenant in doing so it would not mean weakening the bond of friendship with Italy which had been sealed in Rome on January 7th. The British naval movements in the Mediterranean made French policy of conciliation difficult, however, as the two cohorts were simultaneously waving an olive branch and a big stick. The British spokesmen felt, and probably justifiably do, that if the British fleet was to be used as the naval guarantee behind the enforcement of sanctions, certainly, the French Government could be expected to share in the responsibility of supporting the Covenant by similar measures. The French, anxious to secure satisfactory agreements with Britain regarding Germany and not being successful, carried the negotiations to great lengths over the character and nature of "mutual support".

The 11th hour, by November 1935, had passed, and it was evident that Britain and France had muffed the bail. It was also evident that the British lion’s tail was in no position
The recent war and the decree of restoration make
necessary the resignation of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the
Interior. The new Minister of Finance will be Mr. de la Roche, and the
Minister of the Interior will be Mr. de la Fontaine. The new Cabinet will take
office on the 1st of January, 1920, and be under the direct control of
Mr. de la Fontaine. Mr. de la Roche will be in charge of the Ministry of
Finance.

The Minister of Finance will be Mr. de la Roche, and the Minister of the
Interior will be Mr. de la Fontaine. The new Cabinet will take
office on the 1st of January, 1920, and be under the direct control of
Mr. de la Fontaine. Mr. de la Roche will be in charge of the Ministry of
Finance.
to be twisted, because it was safely tucked between its legs. ¹

Returning to the conversations of the three spokesmen in
Geneva on September 10th, it at once becomes clear why the
French and British Governments decided to retire behind the
lines of fire, not allowing their own forces to be contaminated
with the gunpowder of another war which did not concern them
directly.

The Laval-Hoare understanding of September, a prelude as
well as the foundations to the abortive Laval-Hoare peace plan
that was placed before the world only four months later, con-
sisted of an agreement to rule out any form of military
sanctions against Italy. At the time, these agreements were
not divulged. It was not until December when M. Laval reported
to the Chambre des Deputes that the world became aware of these
private agreements to emasculate the General machinery before
it was even set in motion. In his own words he explained this
understanding between himself and Sir Samuel in the following
words.

"We were convinced that our first effort at
conciliation had failed and that hostilities
were going to begin almost immediately. We
turned all our attention to the question of
how the mechanism of collective security should
be put into operation. Without waiting for the
official meeting of the Council, we discussed
and examined—in that spirit of close cooperation
which ought always to animate French and British
statesmen—the grave situation with which the

To be effective, policies must satisfy several critical goals. In addition to the comprehensive and comprehensive nature of the plan, the policies must be flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances. The policies must also be supported by clear and concise guidance and objectives. This means that the policies must be easily understood by all stakeholders and must be easily implemented. The policies must also be designed to be effective in the long term, and must be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure that they remain relevant and effective. Finally, the policies must be designed to be easily enforceable, and must be backed by strong legal and regulatory frameworks.
"World was going to be confronted by the Italo-Ethiopian War. We found ourselves instantly in agreement upon filling out military sanctions, not adopting any measure of naval blockade, never contemplating the closure of the Suez Canal—in a word ruling out everything that might lead to war." 1

If these conversations had been aired openly at the time, those listening to the speeches of Sir Samuel and M. Laval on September 11th, the following day, at Geneva before the League Council might have interpreted their words in a different light.

But their ignominious double talk consisted of bluffing the world into thinking that something, along the lines of concrete action, might be expected of both. The British and the French in dealing with Italy. For as Sir Samuel himself said

"...His Majesty's Government and the British people maintain their support of the League and its ideals as the most effective way of ensuring peace, and secondly, that this belief in the necessity for preserving the League is our sole interest in the present controversy. No selfish or imperialist motives enter into our minds at all. It is not, however, sufficient to state one's belief and paint one's idea. It is necessary not only to hold a belief but to consider how it can be applied. It is necessary not only to have an ideal but to consider what are the best measures of achieving it...."

2. The word "Bluffing" is used in the sense that while British and French Spokesmen promised wholehearted and active support to the League, actually they did not intend to do the utmost if it were necessary. ie, they were not willing to risk going to war with Italy and enforcing military sanctions to bring Italy to her knees, which Article 16, actually required the States members, for the effective fulfillment of this Article.
"finally, to complete the system, there is an obligation to take collective action to bring the war to an end in the event of any resort to war in disregard of Covenant obligations. These are the conditions in which we find ourselves. The obligations of the Covenant remain. Their burden upon us has been increased many fold. But one thing is certain. If the burden is to be borne it must be borne collectively. If risks for peace are to be run, they must be run by all. The security of the many cannot be insured solely by the efforts of a few, however powerful they may be."

The next phrase which Sir Samuel uttered gave perhaps the most cause for the proponents of the League to rejoice in hoping that the British Government would lend all its force in the backing of the Covenant:

On behalf of the British Government I can say that they will be second to none in their intention of to fulfill to the measure of their capacity the obligations which the Covenant lays upon them. The ideas enshrined in the Covenant, particularly the aspiration to establish the rule of law in international affairs, have appealed with growing force to the string idealism which has its place in our national character and they have become a part of our national conscience.

Sir Samuel Hoare, however, throughout his speech at Geneva made no illusion that the League was really a more powerful body than it actually was. He carefully brought out the spheres of limitations of the League which would hinder its effectiveness. First of all, the League, was no world government and its decision, therefore, did not have the force of law as he brought out by the following words:

"It (the League) is not a super-State, nor even a separate entity existing of itself, independent of or transcending
The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image.
"the States which make up its membership. The member States have not abandoned the sovereignty that resides in each of them, nor does the Covenant require that they should without their consent in any matter touching their sovereignty accept decisions of other members of the League. ...They (members) do not act at the bidding of the League, but in virtue of agreements to which they themselves are parties or in pursuance of policies to which they themselves assent.

Plus the fact that national sovereignty allows each state to act according to its own dictates, the League also has an important limitation the lack of world-wide support.

"This lack of universality inevitably introduces the element of uncertainty as to how far we can count on world-wide support in the work of organizing and maintaining peace.

In the closing words of his speech, he again underlined Britain's willingness to meet its obligations.

"The attitude of the British Government has been one of unwavering fidelity to the League and all that stands for, and the case now before us is no exception, but, on the contrary, the continuance of that rule. The recent response of public opinion shows how completely the nation supports the government in full acceptance of the obligations of League membership, which is the oft-proclaimed keynote of foreign policy. 1

In an address delivered before the Assembly also two days later on September 13, Premier Laval backed the League's authority—in words, by affirming the words of the British Secretary of State. He nevertheless modified the strength of Sir Samuel's words by leaving open the door of 'conciliation"
The President's speech was to be delivered on the occasion of the annual conference of the American Bar Association at Washington, D.C., on the 15th of September. The President, Mr. Smith, was to address the gathering on the subject of "The Future of the Legal Profession". The speech was expected to focus on the role of the bar in society and the importance of legal education. The audience was anticipated to be composed of legal professionals, law students, and law faculty from across the country.
through which Britain and France might escape when their roles
were brought out in their true iniquitous light.

"I conserve the hope that Council will
be able within a short space of time
to succeed in its role of conciliation."

He also took the opportunity to affirm again the friendship of
France with Italy which had been 'definitely settled' on January
7, 1935.

The collaboration of the British and French on the lines
of the discussions which took place between Sir Samuel and
Premier Laval on September 10th and 11th at Geneva was the
beginning of the pattern which emerged in its final form as
the Laval-Hoare Peace Plan in December. Sir Samuel's words
were so true that

"the support which the Governments
of the member States depends on the
amount of support those Governments
receive from their peoples. If this
national support is strong, the League
will be strong."

Unfortunately for Sir Samuel Hoare, the national support
for the League in Britain was strong, but the Government did
not heed this mandate from the people. This was so obvious to
the Government in December when the abortive Laval-Hoare Peace
Plan came to light, that Sir Samuel was made the scapegoat of
the Government's policy and was forced to resign, because he,
as spokesman for the United Kingdom, failed to exercise the
will and power to apply the principles of the Covenant. The
people of Britain, who had elected the Government primarily on
this issue, had instructed him, as representative, to do so.
The cooperation of the police and civic agencies on the streets

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PART III

OUTBREAK OF WAR

THE LEAGUE AND THE DISPUTE
CHAPTER IX

THE LEAGUE AND THE DISPUTE

Italy's Case in Presented to the League Council

When the Council met on September 4th, it was in accordance with its own decision of last August 3rd when it had been agreed that the Council should

"meet in any event on the 4th of September to undertake the general examination in the various aspects of the relations between Italy and Ethiopia."

At the first sitting, Baron Aldai, Italian representative at Genoa, took the opportunity to present a voluminous report setting forth the Italian case against Ethiopia.

CHAPTER IX

In brief, the Italian charges were four: (1) the infringement of treaties by Abyssinia; (2) Abyssinia represented a danger to the safety of the Italian colonies in Africa; (3) there was chronic disorder in that country; (4) it was a mistake that Abyssinia had been admitted to the League. From these charges, the Italian representative drew the following conclusions:

"All this clearly shows that although Abyssinia is a member of the League of Nations which requires the respect of existing treaties and of the principle of international law, that Government has systematically violated the treaties they have signed and have shown that they do not possess the degree of governmental organization which is essential to membership in the community of civilized nations."
Italy's Case is Presented to the League Council

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The use of the Committee by the House Committee

The Committee shall be responsible for the preparation and for the adoption of the resolutions of the House Committee, for the formulation of the regulations and for the provision of the necessary facilities for the conduct of its activities.

The Committee shall be composed of representatives from the Secretariat, the Committee on Legislation, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Education.

The Committee shall hold its meetings at least once a month and shall make its reports to the House Committee.

The Committee shall be responsible for the preparation of the draft budget and for the approval of the budget submitted by the Secretariat.

The Committee shall have the power to make recommendations to the House Committee on matters of policy and to make recommendations to the Secretariat on matters of administration.
Italy was taking the offensive. It was Abyssinia that should be punished. Perhaps the Italian policy makers felt that it would be only a matter of time before some chieftain would allow another border incident to occur, which could be used by Italy as a pretext for starting their campaign.

COMMITTEE OF FIVE

On September 5th, another attempt at 'conciliation,' (known in other than diplomatic circles as 'appeasement,') was made, this time by the League itself. The French and British governments never seemed to lose hope that it would be possible to reconcile Italy's intransigent aims with the independence of Abyssinia, without completely emasculating the Covenant. For this purpose, A Committee of Five was appointed by the Council on September 6th to "make a general examination of Italo-Ethiopian relations and to seek for a pacific settlement." Those members of the Council appointed to serve on the committee consisted of the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Turkey, and Spain. Senor De Madariaga, Spanish representative, was appointed Chairman.

CONFIRMATION OF RANK

The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of the notification

and hereby affirms the rank of...

(To be filled in)

I, [Name], hereby confirm that...

(To be filled in)

Date: [Date]

Signature:

Chaplains Department
From September 7th to September 24th eleven meetings were held. The Committee studied documentary material. They expressed no opinions on the documents furnished them, however, by the two parties, because

"As an organ of conciliation, the Committee was not called upon to deliver judgment, but to consider a situation and to seek to devise a means of remedying it." 1

In its report, the Committee came to the conclusion that it was Ethiopia, and not Italy, that needed a mending of its ways! Italy was not chastised for the intensive mobilization and military preparations that had been carried on for months. No, it was Ethiopia that needed modernizing! In reality, the Committee actually found itself in accord with the Italian memorandum and, therefore, logically agreed with the Italian conclusion.

The proposals, though more comprehensive than the Anglo-French proposals offered to Italy in mid-August, 2 were essentially the same. They consisted of an extensive plan for modernization of Ethiopian administration plus the possibility of territorial sacrifices on the part of France and the United Kingdom in order to compensate Italy.

"They also agreed to recognize a special Italian interest in the economic development of Ethiopia." 3
On September 22nd., the Italian delegate informed the Chairman of the Committee of Five that the Italian Government had rejected the Committee's proposals. The Communique stated that:

"The Council of Ministers has taken note of the proposals contained in the report of the Committee of Five. It had examined them carefully. The Council of Ministers, while appreciating the attempt made by the Committee, had decided to consider these proposals as unacceptable inasmuch as they did not offer a minimum basis sufficient for conclusive realizations which would finally and effectively take into account the rights and vital interests of Italy."

This latest proposal for 'buying-off Italy' ended as all the rest had—on the scrap heap. This new scheme seemed to Il Duce as untempting and unattractive as had all the rest. Italy's bellicose attitude could not now be easily cast aside. The situation was precipitating, and rapidly. It appeared that, by rejecting these proposals, Mussolini was willing at this point of the game to take the initiative in starting hostilities. The French and British suggestions that Italy be compensated with the Danakil and Ogaden Region, became merely a laughing matter to Il Duce now. It was on this occasion that he informed the 'appeasers' that he was out for bigger stakes and, consequently, was not 'a collector of deserts.'

The Government of the United States, in recognizing the importance of
the control of the campaign of the opposing powers, have
determined to use their best endeavors to bring about a
peaceful settlement of the differences between the nations.
This is the policy of the United States, and we
trust that it will be accepted by all who are
interested in the peace of the world.
Despite the fact that the Abyssinian Government accepted the proposals as a basis for negotiation, the Committee of Five was forced to report to the Council on September 26th that they had failed to reach a settlement acceptable to both parties. Admitting of failure, the Chairman sent this message to the Council meeting:

"Nevertheless, I cannot believe that the part of conciliation is finally closed... I would remind you that conciliation is always possible until the Council's report under paragraph four, Article 15 of the Covenant, is definitely adopted. The time has come for us to contemplate preparation of that report. The procedure under Article 15 which Ethiopia had asked should be put into operation...."

Also discussed at the Council meeting was a telegram which had been sent by Ethiopia urgently reminding the Council that the situation was grave.

"Several months ago we gave orders to our troops along our frontiers to withdraw thirty kilometres from the frontier and to remain there to avoid any incidents that might serve the Italians as a pretext for aggression. The orders have been carried out in full. We remind you of a previous request for the despatch of impartial observers to establish the facts in regard to any aggression or other incident that might occur in order to fix the responsibility therefor. We further ask the Council to take any other precautionary measures that it may think advisable."

2. Ibid.
COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN

With the failure of the Committee of Five, it ceased to function. Whereupon, the Chairman of the Council suggested that, as Article 15 had become applicable, a committee of all the members should be established to draft its report under Article 15. This proposal was unanimously adopted and the Committee of Thirteen began its work in accordance with Article 15.

Their report was made ready on October 5th,¹ and in it had been recorded all the circumstances and events leading to the crisis. A general examination was made of each of the successive failures of attempts at a pacific settlement. Before the report was finished, however, Mussolini sent Italian troops on October 3rd over the Rover Mareb advancing into Ethiopian territory.² Thus, the events of the day had caught up with, and had overtaken, the League’s handling of the dispute.

On that very day when Mussolini embarked upon his war of aggression a telegram was sent to the Secretary General by Italy stating that the general mobilization order of September 28th proclaimed by Ethiopia was the final cue demonstrating “Ethiopia’s warlike and aggressive spirit.”³

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[Signature]
Issuing Authority
On October 2nd, the Ethiopian Government had informed the Secretary General of the outbreak of hostilities.

Telegram from Emperor Haile Selassie to the Secretary General

We inform you for communication to the Council and States members that Italian troops have violated Ethiopian frontier in region south of Mount Moussa Alli Province of Aussa between that mountain and the frontier of Ethiopia and French Somaliland and have established themselves in Ethiopian territory preparing base for extensive attack. Proximity to sea in this region and its easy access through territory of French Somaliland make it possible for Council either to send observers or to obtain confirmation of this violation of Ethiopian territory through the Government of French Somaliland.

(signed)
Emperor Haile Selassie

On the 3rd of October, the Ethiopian again contacted the Secretary General of the League to inform the Council that Italian military aeroplanes had bombarded Adowa and AddiGrat.

THE COMMITTEE OF SIX

This situation having occurred, it was necessary that the Council act without further delay. And so, on the meeting of October 5th, the Committee of Thirteen’s report was accepted and the Committee added to the right to make recommendations in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant. The Committee of Thirteen then appointed a Committee of Six to draw up a report.

2. Ibid.
to submit to the Council not later than October 7th - two days later. During the sessions of this Committee, the Ethiopian Government firmly asked the Council to declare "(1) that these indisputable facts constitute a resort to war by Italy within the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant; (2) that this resort to war has, ipso facto, brought about the consequences laid down in Article 16, paragraph 1." 1

The finding of the Committee of Six condemned Italy as an aggressor, in violation of its obligations under the Pact of Paris, 1928, and the Covenant. The momentous decision was recorded in the following words:

"After an examination of the facts stated above, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the Italian Government has resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 16 of the League of Nations." 2

On October 7th, the Council of the League of Nations in the words above, had declared one of the 'big' powers an aggressor, and thereby would follow the obligation of all member states to apply Article 16. Following this action in the Council, a public session of the League Assembly was held on the 9th of October.

2. Ibid.
the national government and the local government. The

local government is responsible for the implementation of national policies. The national government provides financial assistance and guidance to the local government.

The national government also has the power to intervene in local government affairs if necessary.
Dr. Beres, the President of the Assembly, reminded the member-state that the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy was still under consideration by the Council, and that the Assembly would not override the jurisdiction of the Council, but would supplement its action. He then invited the members of the Assembly to express their opinion on the Council's Report after the report was approved brief discussion, in which the President then proposed that a coordinating body be set up. To deal with "measures to be taken under Article 16."
The Italian delegate, Baron Aloisi argued that Italy was being treated unfairly, in the sense that other 'aggressors' had not been brought to trial so swiftly for their actions.

"How is it that on other occasions, when a state of actual war existed between two original members of the League (Japan and China), the procedure which led to the approval of the report of the Council on the basis of Article 15, lasted not less than seventeen months? And on the Chaco dispute about two years? Whereas this time a single month, from September 4th to October 7th was sufficient for an immediate award and a decision to refer the matter to the Assembly."

It was unfair that other culprits had been allowed to go free and Italy might have to pay the price for its acts. Baron Aloisi continued his discussion by saying that the League owed much to Italy, by that country's collaboration in the Locarno undertakings, Disarmament Conference, etc. But Abyssinia on the other hand is an uncivilized state and should never have been admitted. He belittled Abyssinia's

1. 87th Meeting of the Assembly, October-9 11 (Official Journal XVI)
To compare all necessary to plan larger activities to organize and plan activities that bring community members together. The organizing committee plans and plans activities that bring community members together. To organize and plan activities that bring community members together.

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contributions to the Geneva machinery. Aloisi then placed his country in the position of the underdog, its colonies not being safe in proximity to the aggressive and warlike neighbor, Abyssinia. He told the Assembly that Italy could no longer count on the League to protect and afford her country the necessary security and therefore, Italy, "had found herself in the necessity of relying exclusively on her own resources to face the danger which revealed itself ever more grave and more imminent." 1

After the hypocrisy of Italian policy was fully aired by Baron Aloisi, the President proceeded to sum up the discussions of the member States which had followed Aloisi's speech.

"Of the fifty-four members present at the Assembly, three states expressed a contrary opinion; a fourth, this morning, has spoken against the application of sanctions, and fifty states members of the League have expressed an opinion in accordance with that of the fourteen states members of the Council, by conveying, either explicitly by their declarations or tacitly, their Government's acquiescence in the report and documents in question." 2

Later that same day, at a plenary meeting of the Assembly, the following resolution was drafted to provide for the co-ordinations of measures which were to be taken under Article 16,

1. Ibid.
2. 87th Meeting of the Assembly, October 9-11, 1935, XVI.
now that it had come into effect.

The resolution 'invited' members of the League Assembly or the Council to form a committee, composed of one delegate for each member for the fulfillment of the states' obligations under Article 16.

"The Assembly having taken cognizance of the opinions expressed by the members of the Council at the Council's meeting of the 7th October, 1935. Taking into consideration the obligations which rest upon the members of the League in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant and the desirability of coordination of the measures which they may severally contemplate: Invites the members of the League (other than the parties) to set up a committee, composed of one delegate, assisted by experts, for each member, to consider and facilitate the coordination of such measures and, if necessary draw the attention of the Council or the Council or the Assembly to situations requiring to be examined by them."

1. Loc. Cit.
CHAPTER X

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 16

OF THE COVENANT TO ITALY

As a result of the Assembly decision of October 1919, naming Italy a Covenant-breaker, a great power abode excommunicated for the first time in the history of the League of Nations, Article 16 of the Covenant provided that the decision of the Assembly caused the machinery of collective action to become operative automatically according to paragraph one of Article 16, which read:

"Should any member of the League except to war in disregard of its covenant, it shall forthwith be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League."

Any nation that signed the Covenant was to take action against Italy.

The provisions of Article 16 included various measures to be taken to punish an aggressor. Embodied in this Article 16 was the principle that international law should be fortified by the enactment of penalties (i.e., sanctions) to ensure observance by law.

The measures to repress an aggressor stipulated in Article 16 were as follows:

1) Financial, economic and other measures to isolate an aggressor (in paragraph 1)

"...the members undertake immediately to subject it (the aggressor) to the severance of all trade and financial relations, the sequestration of all property belonging to its nationals and the nationals of the Covenant—"
The Nature of Sanctions: Analysis of Article 16

As a result of the Assembly decision of October 11th, naming Italy a Covenant-breaker, a great power stood convicted for the first time in the history of the League of committing an act of aggression in violation of its covenanted obligations. The decision of the Assembly caused the machinery of collective action to become operative automatically according to paragraph one of Article 16, which read:

"Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII or XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League."

Any nation that signed the Covenant was thus bound to take action against Italy.

The provisions of Article 16 included various measures to be taken to punish an aggressor. Embodied in this Article was the principle that international law should be fortified by the enactment of penalties, (viz. sanctions,) to secure obedience to law.

The measures to repress an aggressor stipulated in Article 16 were as follows:

(1) Financial, economic and other measures to isolate an aggressor (in paragraph 1)

"...(the members) undertake immediately to subject it (the aggressor) to the severance of all trade and financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-
"breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a Member of the League or not."

"(2) Military measures (in paragraph 2) It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League of Nations shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

Article 16 also provided for mutual support to maintain the loss engendered in applying this article: (in paragraph 3.)

"The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at some of their number by the Covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League."

Article 16, contains, then, provisions for complete isolation of an aggressor by a financial and economic boycott and by cutting off all intercourse between the Covenant-breaker and the rest of the world. If this pressure was not sufficient to halt an aggressor, military force was also provided for in this Article. The threat of expulsion (paragraph 4) was a final penalty written in Article 16. In brief, these are the measures which comprise what is known as sanctions.

In the beginning stages of this discussion of sanctions,
The concept of "moneymaking or any increment of financial advantage for oneself through the use of political influence, power, and resources to alter the economic conditions of others" generates a number of interpretations of the term "increment." These interpretations vary widely, from the idea of increasing personal wealth to the enhancement of public welfare. In the context of political influence, the term "increment" is often used to describe the process of altering economic conditions to benefit oneself or others. This can take many forms, including the use of political power to alter market conditions, the manipulation of economic policies, or the use of resources to alter the economic outcomes of others. The concept of "increment" is not limited to politics, as it can also be applied to other areas of life, such as business or personal finance. In these contexts, "increment" refers to any increase in wealth or financial advantage that is achieved through strategic actions. The concept of "increment" is important in understanding the dynamics of political influence and the ways in which power is used to alter economic outcomes. It highlights the need for transparency and accountability in the use of political power and resources, as well as the importance of considering the broader economic impacts of such actions.
it shall be helpful to differentiate national and international practice in dealing with law-breakers. The Covenant makes no provisions for penalties in order to prevent war. State laws, however, are able to prosecute persons "loitering with the intent to commit a felony". In practice, in the international community, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how sanctions could be applied against a state which had not violated any of its covenanted obligations. The problems resolves itself into a question of (1) preventive and (2) repressive measures which could be taken to stop aggression.

It must be clearly understood that Article 16, only becomes operative after a resort to war and, therefore, is a repressive measure and not preventive. The only preventive steps which the Covenant suggests are in Article XI which states that the League should discuss and deal with any "threat of war".

The difficulties for the League in applying preventive sanctions were that (1) there was no obligation upon states to refrain from concentrating troops on the frontiers of its neighbors, and (2) states could claim that its military preparedness was for "precautionary measures", intended only to safeguard their own country. It is therefore difficult to see how sanctions could be applied against a state, merely on the assumption that a state might commit an illegal act in the future.

It is necessary to note how far the originators of Article
The difficulties for the larger, less expensive and less sophisticated equipment may be minimized by careful planning and by the use of techniques that are not dependent on sophisticated electronic equipment. The difficulties may also be reduced by careful selection of the equipment to be used and by the use of techniques that are not dependent on sophisticated electronic equipment.
16 intended that the Members should go in fulfilling their obligations. Sanctions were to be applied with increasing severity. The mildest sanction would be severing diplomatic relations. The effect of this measure might show in a concrete way the disapproval of the Member States by their departure en masse from the aggressor's capital.

The severance of trade relations, and especially the cutting off of materials needed for war, would, be more effective than breaking diplomatic relations.

Military sanctions were intended by the writers of the Covenant to be used as a last resort in forcing a violator to cease its illegal acts. Enforcing states would have to be prepared to accept the risks that go with the application of military sanctions. The existence of a threat to use force should have been an effective weapon with which to support less severe sanctions.

The clause in Article 16, which provided for military sanctions was modified in 1923 when a resolution was adopted in which the Member states agreed to:

"...cooperate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant...to an extent which is compatible with their military situation and takes their geographical position into account."

The area of study is required to be filled.

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The area of study is required to be filled.
Despite this modification, the Member states were still bound to take military action if necessary. The Covenant stated that collective force by the members was to be employed to bring to an end the private use of force by an individual state.

In discussing the use of military sanctions, three problems will be considered: (1) for what purposes military action could be used, (2) how military action could be organized within the League in the event of an aggression, and (3), the difficulties involved in applying military sanctions?

Possible actions that could be taken against an aggressor might include: (1) seizing strategic points necessary to the aggressor (in this dispute, the Suez Canal), (2) seizing strategic territory in the victim's territory to prevent an aggressor from conquering it, (3) using military force to isolate the aggressor's land or naval forces, (4) reinforcing embargoes and blockades imposed, with military action.

Military action could be implemented in three ways: (1) by a national force, (2) by contingents from the Member-States, and (3) by a permanent international force. Each of these methods have obstacles and drawbacks.

In the first case, it seldom happens that one state is willing or able to bear the whole burden of maintaining the rule of law. Great Britain, in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, demonstrated a greater willingness than any other state to
take action by reinforcing their fleet in the Levantine waters; but, as Sir Samuel Hoare said at Geneva on September 11th, Britain would not be willing to take the risks alone -- the "burden must be borne collectively."

In the second case, the technical difficulties involved in coordinating the activities of various national units make this method almost impossible.

Both these methods have as their chief drawback the uncertainty of the amount of force at the disposal of the international authority. The Covenant, while binding the Members to employ military force, made no provisions stating the manner in which Article 16 was to be implemented. This uncertainty could be eliminated by a permanent international force but the obstacles to this method are that they threaten to limit sovereignty of each state. In the modern world sovereignty is a cherished possession, not readily relinquished. This last method, however, does not concern us, as the League, while providing for military sanctions in the manner described above did not make provisions specifically for a permanent international force.

Although two of the Members of the League had prearranged outside the League to rule out military sanctions, it was nevertheless important to clarify in this discussion the nature of military sanctions. In the following pages, concrete examples of the employment of economic and financial sanctions will be described in detail.
For the convenience of the reader, the names of the members of the Commission cited in the text are given in the following order:

- John Doe
- Jane Smith
- Robert Brown
The Coordination of Measures under Article XVI

Both the Council and the Assembly had overwhelmingly cast their vote in favor of approving the Committee of Thirteen's report that a breach of the Covenant had been committed.

The problem immediately arising out of this decision consisted of finding ways of means of implementing and facilitating Article 16. In a resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1921 on the Economic weapon, the basis for a technical committee to carry out this work as created:

"7. For the purpose of assisting it to enforce Article 15, the Council may, if it thinks fit, be assisted by a technical Committee. This Committee, which will remain in permanent session as soon as the action decided on is taken, may include, if desirable, representatives of the states especially affected."

This was necessitated by the fact that Article 16 itself made no provision for any machinery to apply the measures which it prescribed.

Thus, to implement the imposition of sanctions, an Assembly Resolution created the "Coordination Committee" which in reality, was neither an organ of the League Council nor the Assembly, but was rather a "conference of states members meeting to consult together with a view to implement the provisions of Article 16."

THE PROVISIONS OF THE PENSION PROVING

In order to ensure the security and well-being of the pensioners, the government has enacted certain measures. These provisions aim to guarantee that the pensioners receive the necessary support and benefits.

The pension system is structured to provide a monthly income for retired individuals, ensuring a dignified old age. The government has established a committee to oversee the implementation and enforcement of these provisions.

The committee is composed of representatives from various sectors, including government officials, social workers, and pensioners themselves. Their primary role is to ensure that the pensioners' needs are met and that the system operates efficiently.

In 1969, the government announced a new pension policy, which included increases in benefits and improvements to the administrative process. These changes were aimed at enhancing the quality of life for pensioners and ensuring their financial security.

It is essential to note that the implementation of these measures requires cooperation and support from all stakeholders. The government is committed to working with the pensioners' representatives to address any concerns and to continuously improve the pension system.

In conclusion, the provisions for pensioners are designed to provide a dignified retirement, and the government remains dedicated to ensuring their continued effectiveness and adequacy.
The first act of the Coordination Committee was to appoint an ad hoc Committee to make more detailed proposals. This sub-committee of the Coordination Committee was called the Committee of Eighteen and ultimately drafted the five proposals to implement Article 16.

The discretionary powers determining the scope of the work of the Committee of Eighteen was conferred on it by the following resolution of the Coordination Committee:

"The Coordination Committee requests the Committee of Eighteen to continue in session in order to follow the execution of the proposals already submitted to Governments, and to put such new proposals as it may think advisable to make before the Coordination Committee or the Governments represented thereon. To this end, the Committee of Eighteen shall appoint such sub-committee, technical or other, as it may deem fit among its own members or from those of the Coordination Committee."

With this mandate, the Committee of Eighteen began the work of drafting proposals on October 11th, 1935.

The five proposals suggested by the Committee included an Arms embargo, financial measures, prohibition of imports of Italian goods and an embargo on certain exports to Italy, and guarantee of mutual support to member States taking part in economic sanctions.

The first proposal, the arms embargo, had as its purpose the closing off of all supplies of munitions to Italy, and also even those contracts, which were in process of execution.

The first step of the Coordination Committee was to set up the Committee of Expertise in order to establish a Co-ordination Committee.

The Co-ordination Committee is responsible for directing and coordinating the work of the Coordination Committee and its various working groups.

The Co-ordination Committee's role is to ensure that all activities are coordinated and that there is effective communication between all stakeholders.

The Co-ordination Committee meets on a regular basis to discuss progress and make decisions.

The Committee of Expertise is a group of experts who provide technical advice and support to the Co-ordination Committee.

The Co-ordination Committee is supported by a number of working groups, each responsible for a specific area of activity.

The Co-ordination Committee is accountable to the General Assembly and is responsible for promoting and coordinating the implementation of the Coordinating Plan of Action.

The Co-ordination Committee is also responsible for reporting regularly to the General Assembly on its work and achievements.

The Co-ordination Committee is an important part of the UN system and plays a crucial role in ensuring that the actions of the UN are coordinated and effective.
The embargo, embodied in Proposal I, was swiftly adopted and sent to the Governments. This was perhaps carried out with greater effectiveness than any of the other proposals.

"The Arms Embargo was suggested after 3 p.m. on Friday, October 11th, and was on its way to the various Governments soon after six o'clock that same day." 1

The arms embargo list was practically identical to the list which President Roosevelt had drafted only a few days previously. 2

The second proposal was started on its way by a special sub-committee consisting of experts "to study the essentially technical question of financial measures." 3 The purpose of the second proposal was to prevent further financial resources being placed at Italy's disposal.

The object of the third and fourth proposal, regarding the economic boycott of Italian goods, was to deprive Italy of the purchasing power by limiting her export trade. It was pointed out that this measure should be relatively effective "since about 70% of Italian exports were to States applying sanctions." 4

With regard to an embargo on exports, more difficulties confronted the Committee due to the fact that it was necessary

1. A. E. Higley, The First Sanctions Experiment, p. 2
2. Official Journal, Special Supplement, pp. 319-20. (Of. APPENDIX III, for more detailed reference of items included on the list.)
3. Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 145, p. 30-34
any necessary, I do not object to being put into operation. I have had some experience in the field of aerodynamics, and I believe I could be of some assistance to the aeronautical engineers.

The aerobatic aspects of the problem are of particular interest to me, as I have always been fascinated by the skill and daring of the airmen who perform these daring feats.

I am confident that with the right guidance and support, I could contribute significantly to the success of this project.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]
to reach an agreement on the particular classes of products to be placed upon the list of supplies. The most important undertaking was the drafting of a list of the materials which Italy depended upon for the carrying on of the war.

For this purpose, another Committee was proposed by Mr. Eden to deal with this problem.

"The Committee of Eighteen decides to undertake an immediate study of the application of measures concerning the embargo on raw materials and products essential to Italy for the continuance of hostilities, and concerning the cessation of Italian exports to countries Members of the League." 

The main task of the Economic Committee which had been created by the above resolution, was to deal with an expert embargo, thus distinguishing the work from the importation proposal. To facilitate the application of this study, Mr. Eden suggested that (1) each State would supply the Secretariat with lists of products which it considered essential to prohibit (2) the Secretariat would compile a composite list complete with relevant statistics; and (3) by a general discussion the Committee of Eighteen would decide on the contents of the ultimate proposal. The fifth proposal drafted consisted of an agreement whereby the Members of the League would mutually support one another in the measures

1. Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 145, p. 38
2. Ibid., p. 58-59
3. Ibid., pp. 20-21
to known on progression on the following scheme of procedure:

1. The main objective.
2. The main objective.
3. The main objective.
4. The main objective.

It is important to note the following in order to conduct the necessary work.

In order to conduct the necessary work, the following must be conducted:

- The committee on "Recognition of the Incidence of Disease"
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proposed "in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures." 1 Means of executing the provisions of mutual support in financial and economic measures to be taken under Article 15, were not so simple as they at first appeared. It was extremely difficult to calculate in Dollars and Cents how much loss or inconvenience each member suffered as a result of a restriction of its trade with Italy. The aim to equalize the inconveniences suffered by the participating States was not realized by any explicit agreement with regard to giving one State any special aid. The only agreement reached consisted of assuring to States who suffered particularly serious losses owing to the "suspension by Italy of the payment of debts," the "the mutual support provided for by paragraph 3 of Article 15 would be special given in order to make good such losses by all appropriate measures." 2

Before this proposal could be affected, however, some means of measuring losses had to be found. Various plans were suggested of a technical nature to mitigate the effects of the other four proposals.

It is not possible in an investigation of this length, to review in detail, the intricate, technical problems confronting the sub-committees working on the application of these

2. Ibid., No. 146, p. 34
proposals. It will be sufficient to explain the essence of the measure proposed, and the manner in which they were applied, extended, and supervised.

In passing, it is worthwhile, to note that the proposals above mentioned, were drafted and presented to each Member State in ten days after it began its work. This fact, in itself cannot be minimized, and due credit should be given to those who worked out the problems in this untrammeled field. Sanctions, it will be remembered, had never been applied before in any dispute. These serving on these committees had no precedents to guide them; no lessons of history to show them pitfalls, errors, and to guide them as a rule of thumb. The members of these committees had accomplished the task of setting up the whole machinery to deal with sanctions -- in a few hours' notice, and working under the high pressure of knowing that each hour lost meant that much less prestige for the League in attempting to stop a law-breaker. The realization that if the League was allowed to collapse, which meant the whole system of collective security would go with it, was an excellent stimulus to the several committees and sub-committees to finish their work in drafting their proposals without delay. After the Proposals had been adopted by the Coordination Committee, all that remained was the notifications of the particular Governments regarding the measures which they had taken, as individual States, to implement these Proposals.

These replies were counted and summarized in a draft
In conclusion, it is imperative to note that the progress made in the field of heart research has led to significant advancements in treatment and prevention methods. This fact is of great importance in light of the ongoing struggle to find effective ways to combat cardiovascular diseases.

Moreover, the establishment of new collaborations has paved the way for innovative research and has contributed to the overall advancement of the field. It is evident that the efforts of all involved in this crucial area of study are instrumental in addressing the challenges faced by patients and practitioners alike.

As we continue to explore the complexities of heart disease, it is essential to remain dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge and the development of novel therapeutic approaches. By working together, we can make meaningful strides in improving the lives of those affected by cardiovascular disorders.

In light of these considerations, it is crucial that we continue to invest in research, healthcare, and education to ensure the well-being of our communities, both present and future. Together, we can work towards a future where heart disease is no longer a significant threat to human health.
resolution of the Coordination Committee.

"Taking note of the facts:

(1) That forty-three Governments of States Members of the League have already expressed their willingness to accept Proposal III and forty-four Proposal IV adopted by the Committee on October 19th, and that six others, which, owing to their distance from the seat of the League, did not immediately receive the full text of these proposals have expressed their readiness to consider them favorably;

(2) That nearly all these Governments have declared themselves ready to put the proposed measures into force by the middle of November or by such date as may be fixed by the Coordination Committee;

Decides to fix November 18th as the date for the entry into force of all these measures; Invites all Governments of the Members of the League to take the necessary steps so that these measures may be effectively applied throughout their territories by November 18th; Requests each Government to inform the Committee through the Secretary-General of the League, within the shortest possible time, of the measures which it has taken in conformity with the above provisions.

This Resolution, which delayed the application of Article 16, for sixteen more days, can be laid to the fact that the British and French ministers, MM. Laval and Hoare, desired to delay as long as possible the actual enforcement of this Article.

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research on the problem of the future

(1) The problem of the future is not limited to the problem of the post-war period. It also involves the problem of the peace period and the problem of the pre-war period. These problems are interrelated. The study of the problem of the future must therefore take into account the entire history of the country.

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The problem of the future, however, should not be limited to the history of the country. It should also be considered in terms of the development of the country. The future of the country depends on the development of the country. The development of the country is not only determined by the development of the economy, but also by the development of the society. The development of the society is not only determined by the development of the culture, but also by the development of the politics.

In order to solve the problem of the future, it is necessary to understand the development of the country. The study of the development of the country should be based on the study of the history of the country. The study of the history of the country should be based on the study of the culture of the country. The study of the culture of the country should be based on the study of the politics of the country.

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Oil Sanctions and the Hoare-Laval Peace Plan

Thus, while the Coordinating Committee was laboring over satisfactory methods of frustrating Italian aggression, the policy of the powers continued in the line they had previously adopted, viz., a settlement of the dispute by arbitration. It is obvious to anyone who ventured to analyze these two policies which were being adopted by similar methods, that they were incompatible. These two divergent policies resulted in the failure of both, and the absence of making any coordinated effort to save Italy, now Italy’s acceptance of the later Coordinating Peace Plan Proposal was achieved.

CHAPTER XI

Oil Sanctions and the Hoare-Laval Peace Proposal

It became increasingly obvious that Italy was frantically securing all possible means, including and especially the United States, that it was in this anxiety which was the key to the successful prosecution of her Association campaign.

For an example of Italy’s buying of this key-product in the United States, the papers during the week of November carried reports almost every day of Italian success in oil.

On November 1st, on the front page of the New York Times, a memorandum (dispatched by the Treasury Department to the State Department) “showed considerable increase in American exports of cotton and oil to Italy this month.”

Oil Sanctions and the Laval-Hoare Peace Plans

Thus, while the Coordination Committee was laboring over satisfactory methods of frustrating Italian aggression, the policy of the powers continued in the line they had previously tended, viz. a settlement of the dispute by conciliation. It is obvious to anyone who ventures to analyze these two policies which were being carried out simultaneously, that they were incompatible. These two divergent policies resulted in the failure of both, and the success of neither a strong coordinated effort to stop Italy, nor Italy's acceptance of the later Laval-Hoare Peace Plan Proposals, was achieved.

It became increasingly evident, by the way Italy was frantically securing all the oil from many countries, and especially the United States, that it was this commodity which was the key to the successful prosecution of her Abyssinian campaign.

For an example of Italy's buying of this key-product in the United States, the papers during the month of November carried reports almost every day of Italian commerce in oil.

On November 1st, on the front page of the New York Times, a communiqué transmitted by the Treasury Department to the State Department "showed considerable increases in American exports of cotton and oil to Italy this month."

supply the equipment and materials necessary to make the production of the project feasible. The project requires the use of specialized equipment and materials that are not readily available. The production team must ensure that all necessary equipment and materials are in place before the shooting begins.

The project will film on location in several different locations throughout the country. The production team must ensure that all necessary permits are obtained and that all locations are properly secured and prepared for filming. The project will require the use of large crews and equipment, and the production team must ensure that all safety procedures are followed.

The project will be shot over the course of several months. The production team must ensure that all necessary funding is in place and that the project remains on schedule. The project will require the use of large crews and equipment, and the production team must ensure that all safety procedures are followed.

The project will be shot on location in several different locations throughout the country. The production team must ensure that all necessary permits are obtained and that all locations are properly secured and prepared for filming. The project will require the use of large crews and equipment, and the production team must ensure that all safety procedures are followed.
On November 5th, an editorial by Clarence Streit appeared in the same newspaper, in which he stated that it had been reported to him from "well-informed circles in Italy" that Italy, by various economies could scrape through if assured her normal supply of oil from the United States. The British, of course, were troubled by American oil policy, as it was still an unknown factor at Geneva. The United States, on the other hand, was perhaps waiting for some decisive action at Geneva, before following suit in complying with an oil embargo. In a news item on November 8th, the British position was clarified:

"It is pointed out that oil is vital to Italy—far more important than the cotton and other goods she is buying in the United States—and that the closing of the American oil market to her would be a great and possibly decisive aid for the League of Nations effort to shorten the war by economic pressure." 2

The fact remained, that while each power was waiting for someone else to act, and Geneva was still pondering through proposals in sub-committees, technical committees, etc., Italy was using every moment to her advantage to drain United States oil wells to meet her needs. On November 6th,

"Four full loads of various grades of oil left by tanker for specific Italian ports during the two month period mentioned as against less than one tanker for the same period of 1934. These shipments totaled 334,437 barrels in 1935 for the first nine months,

2. Ibid., November 8, 1935
On November 20, an order of the above date appeared in the

In the same manner. It should be noted that the "final

It is approved by the Board of Control under the authority of

For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this

It may be noted that in this letter of October 1932, the

officers and officials of the

... the matter and any...
"as compared with 65,478 in 1934. As
Against no crude oil bought during this
period in 1934, 150,364 barrels were
bought in 1935." 1

Italy, throughout the fall of 1935, not only continued
being supplied with oil by the United States, but she was
also supplied by the Anglo-Persian Company and from Russia
and Rumania! 2

In a debate in the Committee of Eighteen on October 19,
the realization that if the Italian Government were to be
stopped, oil must be added on the embargo list. While dis-
cussing Proposal No. 4, "Embargo on Exports, Senor de
Madaraiga opened the debate by stating that it was illogical
to include such items as iron ore and scrap iron on the
embargo list, while the finished products were not.

Mr. Riddell, the Canadian delegate, then came to the support
of Senor de Madariaga, the Spanish delegate, by saying that
any plan of economic sanctions, if they were to accomplish
their purpose must be comprehensive. 3

Mr. Riddell then took the opportunity to put forward a
concrete proposal with regard to extending the embargo on
exports to petroleum and its derivatives as well as iron and
steel. It ran as follows:

"It is expedient to adopt the principle of
the extension of the measures of embargo
provided for in the said Proposal to the
following products: Petroleum and its
derivatives, Coal, Iron, cast iron and steel." 4

1. Ibid., November 6, 1935.
2. Ibid. November 24, 1935.
3. Official Journal, Special Supplement, 145,p.90
4. Ibid., 148,p.38
5. Ibid., 148,p.48
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note, that after Mr. Riddell had made this proposal, the Canadian Government would not stand behind him and support him. 1 At the Minutes of the Second Session of the Committee of Eighteen on the seventh meeting, Mr. Riddell's proposal, which had been sent to an Economic sub-committee for re-drafting, was presented as Proposal 4 (a), in the following form:

"In the execution of the mission entrusted to it under the last paragraph of Proposal No. 4, the Committee submits to Governments the following proposal:

It is expedient that the measures of embargo provided for in Proposal No. 4 should be extended to the following articles as soon as the conditions necessary to render this extension effective have been realized:

- Petroleum and its derivations, by-products, and residues;
- Pig iron; iron and steel (including alloy steels), cast, forged, rolled, drawn, stamped or pressed;
- Coal (including anthracite and lignite), coke and their agglomerates, as well as fules derived therefrom.

If the replied received by the Committee to the present proposal and the information at its disposal warrant it, the Committee of Eighteen will propose to Governments a date for bringing into force the measures mentioned above.

On the 7th of November, this proposal was communicated to Governments of the League through the Secretary-General.

   "On the first of December the Canadian Premier declared that Mr. Riddell's proposal merely represented his personal opinion and that the Canadian Government had not taken the initiative in any such action." A few days later he was appointed a delegate to the Pan American conference.

But this vital proposal was conveniently shelved until December 12th, when the Committee of Eighteen convened in its third session. One may well ask what was happening to this proposal between November 7th and December 12th. When time was at a premium, it could not help but appear wasteful to allow a whole month to elapse before acting on such a vital measure.

It was during this period that M. Laval gave his most effective help to Signor Mussolini. For by the French Premier's actions, Proposal No. 4 (a) was not only denied the support from the two big powers but it was actually hindered by the maneuvers and acts of political sabotage by M. Laval.

This help consisted primarily of postponing, if only for a few days at a time, the consideration of this Proposal. On the 19th of November, M. Laval had succeeded in reaching an agreement with Senor de Vasconcellos, chairman of the Committee of Eighteen to postpone the meeting until a later date. The date agreed upon was the 29th of the same month. On November 29th, M. Laval, again succeeded in hindering the Geneva machinery by securing a few more days for Il Duce. M. Laval's plan of procrastination in order to obstruct the Committee of Eighteen's work, was successful, for it was not until December 12th that

1. By December 12th, ten States had sent replies stating their willingness to place an embargo on the above items. They were as follows: Argentina, India, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Rumania, Siam, and the U.S.S.R.
the Committee reconvened for its third session. 1

This breathing period between November 29th and December 12th, which M. Laval had secured for Italy, also gave Britain and France time to converse and draft their "peace" proposals. In this manner of subterfuge, Laval was to use this golden opportunity to change the whole course of events from the application of sanctions to another, final attempt at conciliation—or appeasement. M. Laval realized he must work quickly if he wished to secure a 'settlement by diplomatic negotiation,' before impending sanctions were applied. On November 30th, Laval met with the Italian Ambassador, Signor Cerruti, in Paris; and at the time it was speculated that the actual genesis of the Peace Plan was incubated. Laval undoubtedly attempted to sound out the Italian spokesman as to just what the minimum demands that were acceptable to Italy were.

Armed with this 'information', M. Laval invited Sir Samuel Hoare, on his way to Geneva, to stop at Paris and discuss the problems confronting the two powers and the League. The opinion has been voiced that, on this occasion, Laval "bombarded Hoare into unconditional surrender," when he conveyed the message to Sir Samuel of the conversation

between Cerruti and himself to the effect that, if on December 12th an embargo on oil was recommended and approved, Mussolini would retort with an attack on the British fleet in the Mediterranean. Also going back on his word previously, Laval seems to have backed down from his agreements of mutual assistance in October, by now saying that the French ports could not aid British warships because of their size. 1

A nefarious bribe was then prepared by the British and French technical experts in order to sell Italy the idea of stopping the war, and thereby, diminishing any chances of an attack on the British fleet. The plan itself was more generous than any previous Anglo-French proposals. It cut three big slices off the extremities of the Ethiopian empire and gave them to Italy outright. 2 It also contained a clause in which Italy was allowed to have exclusive economic rights, known in International law as a "sphere of influence", (in this diplomatic deal it was titled "Zone of Economic Expansion and Settlement.") These proposals were submitted to the Italian Government and the Ethiopian government, on the 11th and 12th of December respectively, (only a matter of hours before the Committee of Eighteen was to meet to decide on an oil embargo, had its effect on this group.) The Laval-Hoare peace plan had its intended effect upon this Committee, viz:

"It was as if the elaborately erected scenery of Geneva had suddenly collapsed, revealing the two League Powers sitting at a table with Italy and calmly arranging the partitioning of Abyssinia."

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It may be of the appropriate sequence of events or series for an effective solution to the present problem. It is a table with figures and graphs illustrating the application of principles.
PART IV

FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE TO FORCE ITALY TO STOP MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST ABYSSINIA
CHAPTER XII

ULTIMATE BREAKDOWN OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

In the quest for enduring peace, British and French sponsors justified the League-Soviet peace proposals on the ground that a "negotiated" peace would prove less disastrous for the world than the complete collapse of one or the other belligerent. The London Times on December 19th, expressed upon the reaction of the world to these proposals:

"These proposals are the negation and the abandonment of the principle upon which the League of Nations is founded. A settlement on the lines of these proposals would place a premium upon aggression and upon the violation of international agreements."

Both the French and British knew full well and agreed that the real fear was that a "negotiated" peace of this sort. Their alliance was every accessory made by League Powers to end the dispute and thereby see Italy back into the European council, purely convinced the basis and maintain that aggression would bring substantial rewards.

The failure of these proposals to be accepted by either party left the League states no alternative but to continue with the application of sanctions. The Resolution which had been adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on December 19, showed that fifty-two governments had accepted Proposal I, and fifty of them had entered them into force. Fifty-two governments had also accepted Proposal II and forty-seven had entered them into force. On Proposal III, fifty governments had accepted them, and forty-three had begun its application. On Proposal
XXX RETRANSMISSION OF RECEIVED LETTERS
In the quest for Ethiopian peace, British and French sponsors justified the Laval-Hoare peace proposals on the ground that a "negotiated" peace would prove less disastrous for the world than the complete collapse of one or the other belligerent. The London Times on December 17th, expressed aptly the reaction of the world to these proposals:

"These proposals are the negation and the abandonment of the principles upon which the League of Nations is founded. A settlement on the lines of these proposals would place a premium upon aggression and upon the violation of international engagements."

Both the French and British knew full well and agreed that the real foe of European peace was not Italy, but Germany. It was for this reason that they were willing to seek a "negotiated" peace of this sort. Their dilemma was that every concession made by League Powers to end the dispute and thereby draw Italy back into the European concert, merely convinced the Nazis and Fascists that aggression would bring substantial rewards.

The failure of these proposals to be accepted by either party left the League states no alternative but to continue with the application of sanctions. The Resolution which had been adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on December 13, showed that fifty-two governments had accepted Proposal I, and fifty of them had entered them into force. Fifty-two Governments had also accepted Proposal II and forty-seven had entered them into force. On Proposal III, fifty governments had accepted them, and forty-three had begun its application. On Proposal
In the current economic and political environment, the promotion of free trade agreements and the liberalization of trade and investment policies have become increasingly important. These initiatives aim to reduce barriers to trade and enhance economic opportunities for all countries involved. The benefits of such agreements include increased market access, enhanced competitiveness, and the stimulation of economic growth. However, it is crucial to ensure that these agreements are implemented in a manner that respects the economic interests of all parties involved.

The importance of establishing robust and transparent mechanisms for resolving disputes and ensuring compliance with the terms of the agreements cannot be overstated. Effective dispute resolution mechanisms are essential to maintaining the integrity of the agreements and fostering a level playing field for all participants. Furthermore, it is imperative to consider the impact of these agreements on domestic industries and to provide adequate measures to mitigate any potential negative effects.

The adoption of comprehensive and balanced economic policies, in conjunction with the implementation of free trade agreements, has the potential to significantly enhance economic development and welfare. It is important to carefully evaluate the potential benefits and drawbacks of such policies and to ensure that they are designed to maximize economic growth while safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders.
IV, fifty-one governments had accepted it and forty-five governments had entered them into force. Forty-six governments had accepted Proposal VI.

This clearly showed that the great majority of the Member states of the League showed a willingness to act upon the economic sanctions proposed by the coordination Committee. There were only four states who stated they did not wish to take any action. They were: Albania, Austria, Hungary, and Paraguay. Another state, Switzerland declared its neutrality.

Proposal IV (a) had not yet been acted upon when the Laval-Hoare proposals were confronted to the disputants. It was, therefore, evident by the presentation of these peace proposals, that in December 1935 France and Britain were not prepared to adopt the alternative of more drastic sanctions like an oil embargo. As each month passed, the application of an oil embargo on Italy would have less effect. Italy, it will be remembered had been frantically buying surpluses in the period between August and November. And after sanctions came into force in November, Italy campaigned to save and conserve all the country's resources. The government encouraged the substitution of synthetic alcohol for gasoline, for example. In this way, even if an oil embargo had been applied by the first of the year in 1936, it is doubtful how greatly it would have hindered Italy's ability to carry out its military program.

In the fourth session of the committee of Eighteen, which
In the field of transportation, the cooperation of the various transportation agencies is essential. This coordination not only enhances efficiency but also ensures the smooth flow of goods and services. The cooperation is achieved through various mechanisms and agreements. The key to effective coordination lies in clear communication and mutual trust among the agencies.

The transportation agencies often face challenges due to differing objectives and priorities. To overcome these challenges, it is crucial to establish clear guidelines and protocols. One effective approach is to form regional transportation committees. These committees bring together representatives from different agencies and facilitate discussions on common issues. They work towards establishing a common goal and strategies to achieve it.

In the context of rail transportation, the cooperation of the various rail agencies is particularly important. The rail systems need to be interconnected to ensure seamless transit. The cooperation allows for the efficient movement of goods and passengers across different regions. It also helps in the development of new routes and the expansion of existing ones.

In summary, the cooperation of the transportation agencies is crucial for the effective functioning of the transportation system. It requires clear communication, mutual trust, and the establishment of appropriate coordination mechanisms.
was held on January 22, 1936, the Committee, rather than acting upon Proposal IV A, made the

"appointment of a committee of experts to conduct a technical examination of the conditions governing the trade in and transport of petroleum and its derivatives, by-products and residues, with a view to submitting an early report to the Committee of Eighteen on the effectiveness of the extension of measures of embargo to the above-mentioned commodities." 1

The Expert's report on oil was not made ready until February 12. This report dealt with questions of imports, consumption, stocks and sources of supply.

The Committee summarized its findings under the following seven heads:

(1) The figures given above with reference to consumption, to stocks, and to supplies which might be on route at the moment of the imposition of an embargo on the export of petroleum and petroleum products make it possible to estimate roughly the period which would have to elapse before such an embargo, were it to be universally applied, would become fully effective. In the conditions prevailing at the moment of its session, the committee is of opinion that this period may be taken to be about three and half months.

(2) In the event of such an embargo being applied by all states members of the Coordination Committee, it would be effective if the United States of America was to limit its exports to Italy to the normal level of its exports prior to 1935.

(3) If such an embargo were applied by the states members of the coordination committee alone, the only effect which it could have on Italy would be to render the purchase of petroleum more difficult and expensive.

(4) In view of the possibility of substitutes being

2. Report of the Committee of Experts for the Technical Examination of the conditions governing the trade in, and Transport of Petroleum and its Derivatives, By-Products and Residues.
"used to some extent for petrol, an embargo on the export of petroleum and petroleum products would be strengthened were it extended to cover industrial alcohol and benzol.

(5) The effectiveness of an embargo imposed by states members of the Coordination Committee on the transport of oil to Italy is subject to the same limitations as an embargo on exports. Were these states alone to prohibit the use of tankers for the transport of oil to Italy, it would be able to satisfy its needs up to about 50%, from its own resources, and the rest by means of vessels of other states, but with greater difficulty and greater expense.

For such a sanction to be effective, the Committee reported, that the United States, by necessity, would have to restrict its export of oil to Italy to the 'normal' level.

"for an embargo on transport of oil to Italy to be effective, measures of control would, therefore, require to be taken by countries not members of the League of Nations." 1

This report showed clearly that the imposition of an oil embargo could not have any direct effect before "three to three and half months elapsed, which would mean May if it had been voted upon. And it was in May that the Abyssinian resistance collapsed and the Italian victory was realized. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the oil embargo if voted on in February would have had no deterrent effect to the Italian war machine.

The findings of the report indicated, however, that the

1. "It seems clear that with the application of an embargo, with restrictions from the U.S. supply of export to 'normal' peace time supply, Italy would have been left with only 13 to 15 weeks' supply of oil." Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Sanctions, p. 70.
oil sanction could have effectively frustrated Italy's attempt
to conquer Abyssinia if it had been imposed before the end
of November 1935, that is, five months before the Italians
actually succeeded in bringing the war to an end without this
handicap.

Italian hostility was aroused by the consideration of
the oil embargo to such an extent that Mussolini in a speech
before the Chamber of Deputies on December 6th, stated that
Italy would regard the oil embargo as a military sanction or
an act involving war against her.

On the other hand, he assured the League that the oil
embargo would not worry Italy in the least, nor deter her
from its course. It is undeniable that an embargo on oil,
imposed at the proper time, might have successfully frustrated
Italian war aims, and unquestionably would have put a great
strain on her economic system in general.

On the first of February Mussolini made it clear to the
world, and especially to Geneva that

"Europe is sliding down the ever more steeply
inclined plane of sanctions, at the bottom
of which lies, ineluctably, war. At a certain
moment, the embargo will end in a blockade; and
the blockade will mean war--no longer a limited
operation of colonial security, but a war of
extermination in Europe; war on the Alps and
on the various European rivers....
It will be the students of Paris, Brussels
and the other great European cities who, to-
gether with the country people, will have to march
into the burning fiery furnace." 1

Mussolini's terrifyinh words that he would see to it that African conflagration would spread to Europe, frightened the new French Foreign Minister, M. Flandin sufficiently so that he further asked Mr. Eden to agree to postpone the oil sanction when they met on March 2nd at Geneva.

M. Flandin suggested that he and Mr. Eden make another attempt to mediate between the two belligerents, and

"Mr. Eden appears to have asked and obtained over the telephone Mr. Baldwin's consent to his falling in with M. Flandin's wishes." 2

Thus, in achieving again the success of not having the oil sanction imposed, M. Flandin's victory, although not as timely, was equally as efficient as M. Laval's in December.

Between March 2nd and March the 12th, when this discussion of the oil sanction was taking place and a decision had not yet been made, Hitler took this opportune period, on March the 7th to re-militarize Rhinelands.

At this point, the African question, however serious, was necessarily put into the background. Germany's gesture had shaken the foundations of European peace and obviously the consequences were much more serious to the cause of peace than the African adventure. Mussolini's forecast that the dispute would "no longer be a limited operation of colonial security, but a war of extermination" was to come true.

1. Loc. Cit.
2. Ibid.
It was even more difficult for the British and French to antagonize Italy at this time. The oil sanction could hardly be thought of seriously for fear of losing Italy as an ally.

On the 15th of April, when it appeared evident that Italian forces would overcome, the Abyssinians, Baron Aloisi reappeared at Geneva with proposals for negotiations of an armistice. The Italian proposals were communicated to the Ethiopian delegation and were rejected by it.

There was little more action that the League could take, when Mussolini's fait accompli was announced on May 9th in a decree annexing Abyssinia to Italy and investing the King of Italy with the title of Emperor:

"Here is the law, O Italians, which closes one period of our history and opens up another like a vast passageway on all the possibilities of the future:"

(1) The territories and the peoples that belonged to the Empire of Abyssinia are placed under the full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. 1

The first sanctions experiment had failed!

On July 6th, the League gave the sanctions a burial with the following words

"The Assembly,
Recommends that the Coordination Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 16." 2

In the posthumous discussions which ensued on sanctions, the Chairman reviewed the work done.

"The Coordination Committee was set up by a recommendation approved by the Assembly on October 10, 1935, and began work on October 11, 1935. It was in effect a conference of delegates of sovereign states which met to study the coordination of the measures to be taken in reference to a state regarded by the other members of the Council as having violated its obligations under the Covenant.

"From the outset, political (diplomatic) and military sanctions were eliminated.

"In view of the fact that the League of Nations was not universal, it was obvious from the first that the system of sanctions to be applied under Article 16 could not be complete.

Apart from military sanctions, the proposals worked out by the Coordination Committee did not purport to be a complete system of sanctions. The economic and financial measures proposed in the Covenant were not applied in their entirety." 1

In a word about the results that sanctions actually achieved, it was stated that

"Imports from Italy to countries for which figures were available to the end of April...showed a reduction of nearly 50%.

Another indication of the aggregate affect of Proposals II and III was to be found in the figures showing Italy's loss of Gold, viz., a total loss in six months and ten days of 2091 million lire or half the original reserve." 2

In view of these facts, a general evaluation of the first sanctions experiment may now be made.

1. Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 49, p.56-57
2. Loc. Cit.
In the presence of witnesses, with power of examination, the

Commissioner's...
In the first place, the application of sanctions did not prevent Italy from conquering Ethiopia. As the Coordination Committee chairman stated, Article XVI was never fully applied. Despite the fact that the work of the Coordination Committee showed a definite desire to expedite the application of measures, it was inevitable that time was required to get sanctions into motion. Actually, it took from October 11th to November 13th. During this period a lot of goods in transit were allowed to go through, which modified the effect of sanctions. The British had made it clear that sanctions would not be pressed to their whole length. This fact, coupled with the inadequate measures that were only partially applied, caused the downfall of sanctions.

The measures that were applied were only partially fulfilled. There was never a question of cutting Italy off from all communication and intercourse with the rest of the world. Tourists from League states continued to visit Italy. Diplomatic representatives never left Rome. Nationals of League States were free to travel on Italian vessels. Italy was not isolated by any measures of this sort whatsoever.

The embargo on exports were also inadequate. The export of aluminum to Italy was prohibited although aluminum was one of the metals which Italy was able to provide herself from domestic sources.

The boycott on Italian imports were also imperfect
In the first place, the communication of information to the commanders, offi- 
cers, and personnel of the various units and divisions, is of the utmost importance. Any 
error or delay in the transmission of this information may have fatal effects on the 
outcome of the battle. It is therefore of utmost importance that the information be transmitted 
as quickly and accurately as possible.

The success of any operation also depends on the accuracy and speed of the 
communication. Any error or delay in the transmission of information may lead to 
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as quickly and accurately as possible.
Argentina imported more during the sanctions period than during the corresponding previous year.¹

The fact that sanctions were not universally applied also caused sanctions to be less effective. The United States, Germany, Brazil and Japan were not in the League. Austria, Hungary, Albania disassociated themselves from sanctions and Switzerland did not apply Proposal III.

In regard to mutual support, an attempt to provide guarantees to states suffering losses were exceedingly meagre. The fact that so little was done to give effect to paragraph 3 of Article 16 might have proven to be of importance had the question arisen again.

The League applied less stringent sanctions than were needed; and it fell far short of the universal League envisaged by the sponsors of Article XVI. The failure of the League of Nations to stop Italy's aggression against Abyssinia may be ascribed to the preceding reasons and facts on the results of the application of sanctions.

¹Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 145, p. 108
CONCLUSIONS

The result of this study has proven that the member of the League failed to meet the test of either (1) preventing a "veto" before it was submitted, or (2) checking an aggressor's aims after destruction had broken out.

Britain and France were the most powerful and influential members of the League and it was to them that the other nations looked for leadership in this dispute. Britain and France failed to give the needed leadership. If they could have seen the disastrous results of their policy, why was it pursued? The motives behind their actions were plausible in the light of international politics at that time. France was faced with the menace of Germany with no great hope of British help east of the Rhine. France's population was self-stabilized itself at forty million people, while Germany's was increasing upward to eighty million. This in itself was a very real threat. French spokesmen, therefore, felt that circumstances forced them to agree to the Abyssinian adventure for their own security in Europe. It was for this reason that France applied a continual brake to either preventive or offensive action against Italy. Britain, on the other hand, was criticized for falling in with France's rule, and for giving entire support with British warships to stop Italy. It is understandable that any unilateral action which Britain might have taken in the Mediterranean would have exposed her to grave risks of being involved in a
The result of this study has proven that the members of the League failed to meet the test of either (1) preventing a "crime" before it was committed, or (2) thwarting an aggressor's aims after hostilities had broken out.

Britain and France were the most powerful and influential members of the League and it was to them that the other nations looked for leadership in this dispute. Britain and France failed to give the needed leadership. If they could have seen the disastrous results of their policy, why was it pursued? The motives behind their actions were plausible in the light of international developments at that time. France was faced with the menace of Germany with no great hope of British help east of the Rhine. France's population was swiftly stabilized itself at forty million people, while Germany's was increasing upward to eighty million. This in itself was a very real threat. French spokesmen, therefore, felt that circumstances forced them to agree to the Abyssinian adventure for their own security in Europe. It was for this reason that France applied a continual brake to either preventative or coercive action against Italy. Britain, on the other hand, was criticized for falling in with France's role, and not giving active support with British warships to stop Italy. It is understandable that any unilateral action which Britain might have taken in the Mediterranean would have exposed her to grave risks of being involved in a
ARGUING

The theory of life which we have now developed and presented as
the foundation of this Section was first of all put forward by
(a) "The Origin of Species" by Charles Darwin, and
(b) "The Evolution of Life" by Ralph Waldo Emerson.

It is important to note that these two theories are
in opposition to each other in certain respects. Darwin's
theory is based on the idea that life evolved gradually
over millions of years through natural selection and
mutations. Emerson, on the other hand, argues that
all life is interconnected and that the individual
organisms interact within a larger ecological system.

In conclusion, while both Darwin and Emerson
make valuable contributions to our understanding
of life, their theories do not necessarily complement
each other. It is up to us to reconcile these differences
and develop a more comprehensive understanding
of the natural world.
war, which in turn might have exposed her to other nations who wished to "fish in troubled waters." More important to Britain than having her action endorsed by fifty nations who could do little in a material sense, Britain wanted French accord and aid in the Mediterranean. Because France was unwilling to give the aid asked for, the British Foreign Office must have come to the conclusion that the League was a feeble reed upon which to lean. Britain naturally counted on Italy to carry through with its threats that if oil sanctions were applied, reprisals would definitely have been made.

In criticizing the British, it is necessary to ask the question, was Britain to be the only guardian of the Covenant? The other members of the League should have offered airplanes as a cover for the British fleet in the Mediterranean. Were Russia, Turkey, Rumania, Greece, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc., fulfilling their duty too? Where was the oil, the men, and the airplanes, needed to supplement the British fleet? The British felt that they were the one Member state that had moved a man by the middle of November. Sir Samuel Hoare expressed the British position in Geneva on September 11th, that if the burden is to be borne, it must be borne collectively.

Nevertheless, it was unfair of the British and French spokesmen to profess continually loyalty to the Covenant without intending to give active support to it.
If they were unwilling to take the risks involved in a strong League policy, this should have been brought out clearly at Geneva and before the world. It was this "bluffing" and insincerity which they engaged in, which comprised the essence of their dilemma. Throughout the dispute, they wanted to keep Italy as a potential ally in the European concert. If they had wished to follow this policy through systematically, it was folly to antagonized Italy by any sanctions at all. If however, they wished to deal with Italy as an aggressor, as a Law-breaker, they should have carried sanctions to their logical conclusion and frustrated Italy's aggression. By attempting to follow both policies, that is, both appeasement and punishment, they were successful in neither.

It was Britain and France who calculated the motives of Mussolini from the beginning incorrectly. Bribe after bribe was offered Mussolini, and none seemed to even what his appetite. In retrospect, it is evident that the Abyssinian adventure was based less on a need for an empire, and more on a need for Mussolini to bolster up his regime with a military display. Time and again Abyssinia was offered Mussolini on a silver platter and he refused. The victory of a conquest by military force was more valuable to Mussolini at that time, than any diplomatic victory over the bargaining table.

The British and French, in the author's opinion and the future peace of the world on maintaining the European balance
It is clear that attention to the development of effective teaching practices and the creation of a supportive learning environment are crucial. Teachers must be trained in the latest pedagogical strategies to help students achieve their full potential. It is important to foster a positive classroom atmosphere where students feel safe and encouraged to express their thoughts and ideas. This can be achieved through active listening, encouraging questions, and creating a non-judgmental environment. Moreover, the use of technology in the classroom can enhance the learning experience and make it more engaging for students. It is also important to recognize the diverse needs of students and adapt teaching methods accordingly. This may involve using visual aids, interactive activities, and differentiated instruction to cater to different learning styles. By focusing on these strategies, we can improve the overall quality of education and prepare students for success in the future.
of power, rather than demonstrating to the would-be conquerors that, through the League, they would challenge, with force if necessary, any contemplated aggression.

The French fell into the false hope that the war in Abyssinia would be of little consequence to the peace in Europe. Unfortunately, this war in East Africa could not be isolated; it was a well-staged dress rehearsal for the benefit of the dictators, and it demonstrated all the glaring weaknesses of the two greatest powers in the League.

If preventive measures had been taken, it would have been a simple matter to arrest Mussolini. General de Bono himself, stated that if the use of the Suez Canal had been denied Italian troops, the feeding of Italian soldiers would have become "more than problematical," and the Abyssinian adventure would have had to be abandoned. If the British Government saw fit to close the canal during the First world war, certainly, legal arguments and other impediments could have been overcome. In considering what measures could have been taken for "an ounce of prevention," during the early stages of the dispute, the Italian military preparedness should have been investigated in the early stages. The Italians made no secret of it. The newspapers from February 1935 on carried articles almost daily about Italian mobilization and troop movements. The prerequisite to preventive action is the principle that the international community, if it would apply force or coercion for the maintenance as well
as restoration of order, must reach some conclusion as to guilt before using either economic or military pressure.

Provisions in the Covenant for the responsibilities in maintenance of peace and security and on the other hand the restoration of peace were two very distant set of obligations. Although recognition of the need for preventive action was not overlooked, the Covenant did not lay any specific obligations on individual Members to join in preventing aggression, although each state under Article 16 was bound to join in sanctions when aggression had actually began. An attempt to rectify this omission was made in 1927 when the Council and Assembly drew up a program of steps for preventive action, viz., severance of diplomatic and economic relations, blockades, etc. The duty of the Member States in cases of a threat to the peace were otherwise couched in general terms, based on the obligations laid down in Article II, paragraph 1, (League was to) "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." It is generally agreed that one purpose of sanctions is preventive. Yet under the Covenant the duty to apply sanctions arose, only, in the case of a resort to war by a Member of the League, in disregard of its obligations under the Covenant. The experience of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute had directed attention to the possibility and necessity of creating
to contribute to the economy and lower some unnecessary expenditures.

In conclusion, it is crucial to support the economy and act on economic policies and financial measures that contribute to reducing unnecessary expenditures. It is important to contribute to the economy and lower some unnecessary expenditures.

In conclusion, it is crucial to support the economy and act on economic policies and financial measures that contribute to reducing unnecessary expenditures. It is important to contribute to the economy and lower some unnecessary expenditures.
responsibilities of taking action intended to prevent the commission of an illegal act.

The three most vital preventive measures which should have been taken were: (1) investigating and determining the intent of Italian military preparations, (2) the world-wide eve-of-the-war traffic in the means of war should have been halted by collective means and (3) as a last and ultimate measure of precaution, the Suez Canal should have been closed to Italian troops.

Let us now turn to a critical evaluation of the repressive measures which were taken after a resort to war in breach of the Covenant had taken place.

The terms of Article 16 of the Covenant actually required and pledged the Members of the League to use military action, if necessary, for the effective fulfillment of this article.

It will be remembered that in the conversations of September 10th and 11th between M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare, military sanctions were definitely ruled out. At that time, secretly, they stated their intentions not to resort to any measures of military force.

That is why Albert E. Highley, in evaluating the success of measures taken under Article 16, comes to the conclusion that

"The obstacles which caused the most trouble and which in the end destroyed the system were predominately political in nature." 1

The law does not apply in cases where the wages paid to the employee are in excess of the minimum wage fixed by the government. It is the responsibility of the employer to ensure that the wages paid to the employee are at least equal to the minimum wage. The employer must also provide a safe working environment to prevent accidents and injuries. In case of an accident, the employee is entitled to compensation for medical expenses and lost wages. The employer is required to report any injuries or accidents to the authorities within a specified time frame. If an employer fails to comply with these regulations, they may face legal action and fines.
On the whole, the machinery set up to coordinate sanctions functioned efficiently. "Political considerations" forced much of the delay which occurred between meetings of the committees, and finally caused the abandonment of the oil sanction. Because of the political decision to introduce the iniquitous Laval-Hoare peace proposals only a few days before the Coordination Committee was to meet to vote upon Proposal No. IV A, (placing an embargo an oil to Italy) all chances for the success of the sanctions proposals were ruined. The most apparent defect in the application of Article 16 was that the sanctions were subordinated to conciliation in such a way that all efforts to increase pressure were thwarted.

The real key to a successful application of Article 16 would have been: (1) vigorous and loyal leadership by Britain and France in a determined effort to make it succeed. (2) a known willingness on the part of these two powers, to supplement, if necessary, economic sanctions by military sanctions.

The thesis has attempted to show the reasons, political and structural, why the League failed to suppress an aggressor, who resorted to war in violation of the Covenant. An outline of the preventive measures and the repressive measured which ought to have been taken, were given in each case.

No intelligent person can fail to see that the survival of civilization depends upon the ability of nations to erect laws and enforce them on a world-wide basis.
APPENDIX A

(ANNEX OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS (RELEVANT ARTICLES))

Article XII. The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article XIII. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and expedient to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League APPENDICES to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any interference whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article XIV. 1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the report of the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report of the Council.

2. In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators or the judicial settlement shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article XV. 1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize as unavoidable for settlement by arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.

2. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against any Member of the League that complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
APPENDIX I

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (RELEVANT ARTICLES)

Article X.--The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article XI.-- 1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article XII.-- 1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council and they agree on no case to resort to war until three months after the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators or the judicial settlement shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article XIII.-- 1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subjectmatter to arbitration or judicial settlement....

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against any Member of the League that complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
Article XV.-- 1. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article XIII, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided
that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article XII relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Article XVI.-- 1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the Covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenants of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League, by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.
Article XVII.---1. In the event of a dispute between a Member and a state which is not a Member of the League, or between states not Members of the League, the state or states not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provision of Articles XII to XVI inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as against the state taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

Article XIX.---The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.
AGREEMENTS OF TERRITORIES

The Governments of Great Britain and France agree to recommend to His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia the acceptance of the following exchanges of territory between Ethiopia and Italy:

(a) herbs--Camera to Italy of Eastern Tigre approximately limited on the south by the river Orea and on the west by a line running from north to south, passing between Aba (on the Ethiopian side) and Asasa (on the Italian side).

(b) Rectification of Frontier between the Somaliland coast and Pahra--Leaving the boundary line as it is and the extent of interest necessary to give Ethiopia an outlet to the sea as defined below.

(c) Rectification of Frontier between the Ogaden and Italian Somaliland--Starting from the tri-junction point between the frontiers of Ethiopia, Kenya and Italian Somaliland, the new Italian-Somalian frontier would follow a general northeasterly direction, passing the Nebba Amball at Gailla, leaving Garhi to the north, Derendeh to the west and meeting the frontier of British Somaliland where it intersects the 45th meridian. The rights of the treaties of British Somaliland to the use of the grazing areas and wells situated in the territories granted to Italy by delimitation should be guaranteed.

(d) Ethiopia will receive an outlet to the sea with full sovereignty rights. It seems that this outlet should be formed preferably by a mission to which Italy would agree on the part of Assab and of a strip of territory giving access to this port along the frontier of French Somaliland.

The United Kingdom and French Governments will endeavour to obtain from the Ethiopian Government guarantees for the fulfilment of the obligations which devolve upon them regarding alien and arms traffic in the territories acquired by them.

[APPENDIX II]

VI.--ZONE OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND SETTLEMENT

The United Kingdom and French Governments will use their influence at Addis Ababa and at Geneva to the end that the formation in Southern Ethiopia of a zone of economic expansion and settlement reserved to Italy should be accepted by His Majesty the Emperor and approved by the League of Nations.

The limits of this zone would be: On the east, the rectified frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland; on the
TEXT OF THE HOARE-LAVAL PROPOSALS

I.—Exchange of Territories

The Governments of Great Britain and France agree to recommend to his Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia the acceptance of the following exchanges of territory between Ethiopia and Italy:

(a) Tigre.—Cession to Italy of Eastern Tigre approximately limited on the south by the river Gheva and on the west by a line running from north to south, passing between Aksum (on the Ethiopian side) and Adowa (on the Italian side.)

(b) Rectification of Frontiers between the Danakil country and Eritrea, leaving to the south of the boundary line Aussa and the extent of Eritrean territory necessary to give Ethiopia an outlet to the sea to be defined below.

(c) Rectification of Frontiers between the Ogaden and Italian Somaliland.—Starting from the tri-junction point between the frontiers of Ethiopia, Kenya and Italian Somaliland, the new Italo-Ethiopian frontier would follow a general north-easterly direction, cutting the Webbe Shibeli at Iddidole, leaving Gorahai to the east, Warandab to the west and meeting the frontier of British Somaliland where it intersects the 45th meridian. The rights of the tribes of British Somaliland to the use of the grazing areas and wells situated in the territories granted to Italy by delimitation should be guaranteed.

(d) Ethiopia will receive an outlet to the sea with full sovereign rights.—It seems that this outlet should be formed preferably by a cession to which Italy would agree, of the port of Assab and of a strip of territory giving access to this port along the frontier of French Somaliland.

The United Kingdom and French Governments will endeavour to obtain from the Ethiopian Government guarantees for the fulfilment of the obligations which devolve upon them regarding slavery and arms traffic in the territories acquired by them.

II.—Zone of Economic Expansion and Settlement

The United Kingdom and French Governments will use their influence at Addis Ababa and at Geneva to the end that the formation in Southern Ethiopia of a zone of economic expansion and settlement reserved to Italy should be accepted by his Majesty the Emperor and approved by the League of Nations.

The limits of this zone would be: On the east, the rectified frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland; on the
north, the 8th parallel, on the west, the 35th meridian; on the south the frontier between Ethiopia and Kenya.

Within this zone, which would form an integral part of Ethiopia, Italy would enjoy exclusive economic rights which might be administered by a privileged company or by any other like organization, to which would be recognized—subject to the acquired rights of natives and foreigners—the rights of ownership of unoccupied territories, the monopoly of the exploitation of mines, forests, etc. This organization would be obliged to contribute to the economic equipment of the country, and to devote a portion of its revenue to expenditure of a social character for the benefit of the native population.

The control of the Ethiopian administration in the zone would be exercised, under the sovereignty of the Emperor, by the services of the scheme of assistance drawn up by the League of Nations. Italy would take a preponderating, but not an exclusive, share in these services, which would be under the direct control of one of the principal advisers attached to the Central Government. The principal adviser in question, who might be of Italian nationality, would be the assistant, for the affairs in question, of the chief adviser delegated by the League of Nations to assist the Emperor. The chief adviser would not be a subject of one of the Powers bordering on Ethiopia.

The services of the scheme of assistance, in the capital as well as in the reserve zone, would regard it as one of their essential duties to ensure the safety of Italian subjects and the free development of their enterprises.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the French Government will willingly endeavour to ensure that this organization, the details of which must be elaborated by the League of Nations, fully safeguards the interests of Italy in this region.

**Modifications in the text as communicated to Abyssinia:**

The first paragraph of Section II is drafted as follows:

The United Kingdom and French Governments recommend his Majesty the Emperor to accept, and will use their influence to secure the approval of the League of Nations of, the formation in Southern Ethiopia of a zone of economic expansion and settlement reserved to Italy.

A few words have been added to the end of the first sentence of the fourth paragraph of Section II. These are as follows:

The control of the Ethiopian administration in the zone would be exercised, under the sovereignty of the Emperor, by the services of the scheme of assistance drawn up by the League of Nations and already accepted by the Emperor as extending over the whole area of Abyssinian administration.
Letter accompanying the proposals when sent to the League:

Since the failure of the efforts undertaken by the League of Nations to find a peaceful solution to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, the desire has been expressed on several occasions, both in the Council and the Assembly, to see the conflict brought to an end by an agreed settlement as soon as possible.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have worked out together, bearing in mind the deliberations of the Committee of Five, the bases of a settlement of this nature, and instructed their representatives at Rome and Addis Ababa on December 10 to lay before the Italian and Ethiopian Governments certain suggestions in this sense.

We have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of this document, which we should be glad if you would communicate to the members of the Council. We shall not fail to transmit to you, in the same way, the replies of the interested Governments as soon as they have been received.
PROPOSALS I-V OF THE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

Proposal I

Export of Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War

With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations the execution of the obligations under Article VII of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken forthwith:

(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations which are enforcing at the present moment to prohibit or restrict the exportation, re-exportation or transit of arms, munitions and implements of war in Ethiopia will amend these measures immediately;

(2) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will prohibit immediately the exportation, re-exportation or transit to Italy or Italian possessions of arms, munitions and implements of war enumerated in the attached list;

(3) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will take such steps as may be necessary to assure that arms, munitions and implements of war, enumerated in the attached list, exported to countries other than Italy will not be re-exported directly or indirectly to Italy or to Italian possessions;

(4) The measures provided for in paragraphs (2) and (3) are to apply to contracts in process of execution.

Each Government is requested to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the League, within the shortest possible time of the measures which it has taken in conformity with the above provisions.
PROPOSALS I-V OF THE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

Proposal I

Export of Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War

With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken forthwith:

(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations which are enforcing at the moment measures to prohibit or restrict the exportation, re-exportation or transit of arms, munitions and implements of war to Ethiopia will annul these measures immediately;

(2) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will prohibit immediately the exportation, re-exportation or transit to Italy or Italian possessions of arms, munitions and implements of war enumerated in the attached list;

(3) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will take such steps as may be necessary to secure that arms, munitions and implements of war, enumerated in the attached list, exported to countries other than Italy will not be re-exported directly or indirectly to Italy or to Italian possessions;

(4) The measures provided for in paragraphs (2) and (3) are to apply to contracts in process of execution.

Each Government is requested to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the League, within the shortest possible time of the measures which it has taken in conformity with the above provisions.
PROPOSALS FOR THE CO-OPERATION OF COMMUNITIES

Preamble

Proposals for the co-operation of the Government and the communities are important for the development of the nation. The following proposals are submitted for the consideration of the Committee:

1. The establishment of the Board of the Reserve

2. The proposal for the appointment of the Secretary of State

3. The proposal for the appointment of the Under-Secretary

4. The proposal for the appointment of the Inspector-General

These proposals are submitted in accordance with the Act of Parliament.
Annexe

Geneva, October 11th,

Articles considered as Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War

Category I.

1. Rifles and carbines using ammunition in excess of calibre 26.5 and their barrels.


3. Guns, howitzers and mortars of all calibres, their mountings and barrels.

4. Ammunition for the arms under 1 and 2 above--i.e. high-power steel-jacketed ammunition in excess of calibre 26.5; filled and unfilled projectiles, and propellants with a web thickness of 0.015 inch or greater for the projectiles of the arms enumerated under 3 above.

5. Grenades, bombs, torpedoes and mines, filled or unfilled, and apparatus for their use or discharge.

6. Tanks, military armoured vehicles and armoured trains.

Category II.

Vessels of war of all kinds, including aircraft-carriers and submarines.

Category III.

1. Aircraft, assembled or dismantled, both heavier and lighter than air, which are designed, adapted and intended for aerial combat by the use of machine-guns or of artillery, or for the carrying and dropping of bombs, or which are equipped with, or which by reason of design or construction are prepared for, any of the appliances referred to in paragraph 2 below.

2. Aerial-gun mounts and frames, bomb-racks, torpedo-carriers, and bomb or torpedo release mechanisms.
Category IV.

Revolvers and automatic pistols of a weight in excess of 1 lb. 6 oz. (630 grammes) using ammunition in excess of calibre 26.5 and ammunition therefor.

Category V.

1. Aircraft assembled or dismantled, both heavier and lighter than air, other than those included in Category III.

2. Aircraft engines.

Category VI.

1. Livens projectors and flame-throwers.


3. Powder and explosives.

The Governments will take all measures necessary to render illegal the transactions mentioned in paragraphs (1) to (4), whether affected directly or through intermediaries of whatever nationality.

The Governments are invited to put in operation at once such of the measures recommended as can be enforced without fresh legislation, and to take all practicable steps to assure that the measures recommended are completely put into operation by October 31st, 1938. Any governments which find it impossible to secure the requisite legislation by that date are requested to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General, of the League, within the date by which they expect to be able to do so.

Each Government is requested to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the League, within the shortest possible time of the measures which it has taken in conformity...
Proposal II

With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken forthwith:

The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will forthwith take all measures necessary to render impossible the following operations:

(1) All loans to or for the Italian Government and all subscriptions to loans issued in Italy or elsewhere by or for the Italian Government;

(2) All banking or other credits to or for the Italian Government and any further execution by advance, overdraft or otherwise of existing contracts to lend directly or indirectly to the Italian Government;

(3) All loans to or for any public authority, person or corporation in Italian territory and all subscriptions to such loans issued in Italy or elsewhere;

(4) All banking or other credits to or for any public authority, person or corporation in Italian territory and any further execution by advance, overdraft or otherwise of existing contracts to lend directly or indirectly to such authority, person or corporation;

(5) All issues of shares or other capital flotations for any public authority, person or corporation in Italian territory and all subscriptions to such issues of shares of capital flotations in Italy or elsewhere;

(6) The Governments will take all measures necessary to render impossible the transactions mentioned in paragraphs (1) to (5), whether effected directly or through intermediaries of whatsoever nationality.

The Governments are invited to put in operation at once such of the measures recommended as can be enforced without fresh legislation, and to take all practicable steps to secure that the measures recommended are completely put into operation by October 31st, 1935. Any Governments which find it impossible to secure the requisite legislation by that date are requested to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General, of the League, within the date by which they expect to be able to do so. Each Government is requested to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the League within the shortest possible time of the measures which it has taken in conformity...
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Proposal III

With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken:

(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will prohibit the importation into their territories of all goods (other than gold or silver bullion and coin) consigned from or grown, produced or manufactured in Italy or Italian possessions, from whatever place arriving;

(2) Goods grown or produced in Italy or Italian possessions which have been subjected to some process in another country, and goods manufactured partly in Italy or Italian possessions and partly in another country will be considered as falling within the scope of the prohibition unless 25 per cent. or more of the value of the goods at the time when they left the place from which they were last consigned is attributable to processes undergone since the goods last left Italy or Italian possessions;

(3) Goods the subject of existing contracts will not be excepted from the prohibition;

(4) Goods en route at the time of imposition of the prohibition will be excepted from its operation. In giving effect to this provision, Governments may, for convenience of administration, fix an appropriate date, having regard to the normal time necessary for transport from Italy, after which goods will become subject to the prohibition;

(5) Personal belongings of travellers from Italy or Italian possessions may also be excepted from its operation.

Proposal IV

With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken:

(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will extend the application of paragraph (2) of Proposal I of the Coordination Committee to the following articles as regards their exportation and reexportation to Italy and Italian possessions, which will accordingly be prohibited:

(a) Horses, mules, donkeys, camels and all other transport animals;

(b) Rubber;

(c) Bauxite, aluminum and alumina (aluminum oxide), iron-ore and scrap-iron;
The Government of the Province of British Columbia, through its various departments and agencies, has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve public service delivery. These initiatives include the implementation of modern technologies, the enhancement of communication channels, and the establishment of performance metrics. The government's focus on transparency and accountability has led to the development of comprehensive reporting mechanisms, ensuring that citizens have access to up-to-date information about government operations.

In 2019, the province launched the "Open Data" initiative, making a vast amount of data available to the public, businesses, and researchers. This initiative has not only improved access to information but has also encouraged innovation and collaboration among various stakeholders. The data includes information on health, education, transportation, and economic development, among other areas.

The government has also invested in the development of digital platforms, such as the "Government Website," which serves as a central hub for information and services. The website features intuitive search functionalities, multilingual support, and real-time updates on important issues. Additionally, the government has launched "Government on the Go," an app that allows citizens to access services on their mobile devices, further enhancing accessibility and convenience.

To ensure the effectiveness of these initiatives, the government regularly conducts performance reviews and solicits feedback from citizens. This approach helps identify areas for improvement and ensures continuous enhancement of public service delivery. The government's commitment to openness and transparency is evident in its efforts to make information accessible and understandable to the public.
Chromium, manganese, nickel, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, their ores and ferro-alloys (and also ferro-molybdenum, ferro-silicon, ferro-silico-manganese);

tin and tin-ore.

List [c] above includes all crude forms of the minerals and metals mentioned and their ores, scrap and alloys;

(2) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will take such steps as may be necessary to secure that the articles mentioned in paragraph (1) above exported to countries other than Italy or Italian possessions will not be re-exported, directly or indirectly, to Italy or to Italian possessions;

(3) The measures provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) above are to apply to contracts in course of execution;

(4) Goods en route at the time of imposition of the prohibition will be excepted from its operation. In giving effect to this provision, Governments may, for convenience of administration, fix an appropriate date, having regard to the normal time necessary for transport to Italy or Italian possessions, after which goods will become subject to the prohibition.

Having regard to the importance of collective and, so far as possible, simultaneous action in regard to the measures recommended, each Government is requested to inform the Co-ordination Committee, through the Secretary-General of the League, as soon as possible, and not later than October 28th, of the date on which it could be ready to bring these measures into operation. The Committee of Co-ordination will meet on October 31st for the purpose of fixing, in the light of the replies received, the date of the coming into force of the said measures.

The attention of the Co-ordination Committee has been drawn to the possible extension of the above proposal to a certain number of other articles. It entrusts the Committee of Eighteen with the task of making any suitable proposals to Governments on this subject.

Proposal V

The Co-ordination Committee draws the special attention of all Governments to their obligations under paragraph 3 of Art. XVI of the Covenant, according to which the Members of the League undertake mutually to support one another in the application of the economic and financial measures taken under this article.

L. With a view to carrying these obligations into effect, the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will:
(a) Adopt immediately measures to assure that no action taken as a result of Article XVI will deprive any country applying sanctions of such advantages as the commercial agreements concluded by the participating states with Italy afforded it through the operation of the most-favored-nation clause;

(b) Take appropriate steps with a view to replacing, within the limits of the requirements of their respective countries, imports from Italy by the import of similar products from the participating states;

(c) Be willing, after the application of economic sanctions, to enter into negotiations with any participating country which has sustained a loss with a view to increasing the sale of goods so as to offset any loss of Italian markets which the application of sanctions may have involved;

(d) In cases in which they have suffered no loss in respect of any given commodity, abstain from demanding the application of any most-favored-nation clause in the case of any privileges granted under paragraphs (b) and (c) in respect to that commodity.

II. With the above objects, the Governments will, if necessary, with the assistance of the Committee of Eighteen, study, in particular, the possibility of adopting, within the limits of their existing obligations, and taking into consideration the annexed opinion of the Legal Sub-Committee of the Co-ordination Committee, the following measures:

(1) The increase by all appropriate measures of their imports in favour of such countries as may have suffered loss of Italian markets on account of the application of sanctions;

(2) In order to facilitate this increase, the taking into consideration of the obligations of mutual support and of the advantages which the trade of certain States Members of the League of Nations, not participating in the sanctions, would obtain from the application of those sanctions, in order to reduce by every appropriate means and to an equitable degree imports coming from these countries;

(3) The promotion, by all means in their power, of business relations between firms interested in the sale of goods in Italian markets which have been lost owing to the application of sanctions and firms normally importing such goods;

(4) Assistance generally in the organisation of the international marketing of goods with a view to offsetting any loss of Italian markets which the application of sanctions may have involved.

They will also examine, under the same conditions, the possibility of financial or other measures to supplement the commercial measures, insofar as these latter may not ensure sufficient international mutual support.


For a record of meetings of the following Council Committees: Committee of Thirteen, set up on September 18, 1935; Committee of Six, set up on October 6, 1935; Coordinating Committee and the Committee of Eighteen established on October 11, 1935 to coordinate the application of Articles 14 of the Covenant, per Sec. 13, para. 2, of the League of Nations Covenant, 1919-1928, pp. 728-737, (Columbia University Press, 1938).

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