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The "non-intervention" policy in Spanish civil war

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The "Non-Intervention" Policy in Spanish Civil War

by

Hari Prasad Sharma
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THESIS

THE "NON-INTERVENTION" POLICY IN
SPANISH CIVIL WAR

By
Hari Prasad Sharma
(M.Sc., Allahabad University, India, 1945)

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1946.
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*Please note that the document contains an index with pages ranging from 1-100, covering various chapters and sections.*

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In this document, the index provides a comprehensive overview of the content, categorizing topics into sections such as the Inheritance of Spain, the Civil War, the Resurgence of Power, the Birth of the "New-International" Policy, and the Departure of the German and Italian Ambassadors, among others. Each section is further detailed with specific pages, allowing for a structured navigation through the document's content.
INTRODUCTION

The 16th day of July 1936 was the last day, Spain was to have of peace - if peace be called the state of tempestuous hysteria of the five months that preceded the final eruption of the volcano. In fact the domestic history of Spain during the six and a half years that elapsed between the fall of the dictatorship and the outbreak of war in Spain displays a rhythmic movement of long chaos followed by brief periods of comparative order. But the violence that broke down on the fateful 17th July was not to terminate till Spain had had its full thirty one months civil war and the world its record of one of the most inglorious chapters of its history. The war that was fought between the brothers of the same blood (reinforced by foreign corpuscles of all shades and colour) was both bitter and cruel. In the ordinary sense, all wars are cruel. But the poignancy of the Spanish Civil War and the heartburning it caused, can scarcely be paralleled anywhere else. The number of dead and wounded left on the field is hardly the right index by which to judge the intensity of feelings of the warring camps. Even then the figure of one million dead or wounded should be enough to impress the demagogic scholar who is used to derive his conclusions strictly with the help of a slide rule and graph paper.

But the most unique feature of this civil war - and civil war it was - was the interest it created in the countries
of the world. Interest, perhaps, is hardly the appropriate word, for the fierce passions and the intense loyalty that it evoked, created such a world wide debate that people ran at each other's neck when arguments failed to settle the issue - not always a wise recourse, - as readily on the roads of Shanghai as on the boulevards of Paris.

"Right and Left (physically and politically speaking)" says Salvador De Madariaga in the preface to his book SPAIN, the people "fell victims to the fascination, the passion, the abhorrence or the enthusiasm of this or that extreme. A, who in 1931, as an old and staunch Monarchist had been perturbed at the fall of the Crown, burned with holy Communist Zeal in 1936; P, an old Republican, ever in an uncomprising opposition under the Monarchy, an opposition to which he had sacrificed his military profession, was in 1936 a convinced 'Nationalist' or Francoist out of his deep disappointment with the mistakes of the Republic. Information was confused, biased both ways, hardly ever objective. Within one hour and one hundred yards, one could hear in Paris the effectives of the International Brigades put at 70,000 and at 5,000 by men who had both been present when the Brigades had saved Madrid. Guernica was bombed by the Germans and burnt by the Revolutionists in the columns of the same New York paper which one searched for objective news."

In other words, the heart had taken the complete control over the head. But it were not only the people on the road, or debating societies and clubs in schools, that
of the working class. It appears that if properly organized, people can take action. People need to organize and create a movement that is strong enough to make change happen. We need to form a network of activists to work together.

In order to win, the people must take control of the government and the economy. The people must have the power to make decisions that affect their lives. This can be achieved through education and organizing. We need to form strong alliances with other groups and organizations that share our goals.

The struggle for democracy and freedom is not easy, but it is necessary for the survival of humanity. We must continue to fight for our rights and make sure that our voices are heard. Only then can we achieve true equality and justice for all.
caught the frenzy of the combatants of the Spanish War. Even the governments of various countries started taking sides openly, though, it was known, that they had been doing so, covertly for a long time. The Spanish Civil War has been described as an international war fought on the Spanish soil. Various countries and governments have been accused of the responsibility of plotting the war. It is not my purpose to discuss these topics here. They will be discussed elsewhere to show as to how much truth do these statements hold, but it was not difficult even then to see powerful foreign interests lurking behind the facade of civil war.

People, with eyes, could see that the spark of a world conflagration lay in the civil war that was being fought in the Iberian peninsula, unless some common modus vivendi could be found between the supporters of the two combatants. It was this desire to localize the conflict which gave birth to the policy of Non-Intervention. The framers of the policy intended that no foreign element should be allowed to creep in this internal strife and the two parties should be let alone to fight it to the finish. For it was realized that the intervention of one country in favour of one of the combatants would provoke the supporter of the second party in conflict to enter the arena and would thus involve the participation of foreign countries - which it was the very purpose of this policy to avoid.

The study of this period of European diplomacy makes
commit the forces of the cooperative on the Spanish War. We were
the government on various committees at home and abroad. We
were known from the start that we had gone to the Spanish City War.
The Spanish City War has been
recognized as an international war. Our troops on the Spanish War
Virtually a cooperative and government have been successful in the
responsible duty of raising the war. It is not my purpose to
achieve these topics here. This will be given as an example of the
we are not toilful enough to seeorthy forwarder interests
important bearing the lessons of city war.
actors, with eyes seeing that the spark of a
while coordination falls in the spirit war that we paid too
in this important business. Similar to common modes antique,
we have gone between the supporters of the two committees.
It was the goal to provide the committee with the policy
for the benefit of cooperative. The theme of the policy
increasing that no foreign element should be allowed to reach
of food importants articles and the two parties should be free from
of food importants articles and the two parties should be free from
the struggle for the finer. For it was necessary that the
information of our country to favor of one of the committees
would provoke the support of the second party to conflict to
enter the arena and would thus influence the participation of
factors cooperative - which it was the very purpose of this
policy to end.
a most melancholy reading. On the one hand, were the ineffective, weak, vacillating democracies submitting docilely to the tricks and threats of the totalitarian governments on the other hand were the dictators completely bereft of any sense of morality in public dealings and by alternating threats with pious platitudes were bent upon going their own way. How far did the policy of Non-Intervention succeed in its purpose is still a mute point. While its admirers maintain that in spite of its drawbacks and shortcomings, it did succeed in preventing the conflict to spread beyond the borders of Spain, the critics retort that the World War II would never have occurred but for the shameful surrender of the democracies in this so-called Non-Intervention Committee, where, in the happy phrase of Senor Azana, the only effective non-intervention applied to Spain was the non-intervention of the League of Nations.

The main purpose of this work is to analyse the policy of non-intervention, follow its course from the time of its birth (though its parentage is a matter of controversy) to the time of its inglorious death, when even its one-time most vociferous, champions were conspicuous by their absence, and had neither the time, hardly any desire, to give it a decent burial, as Mr. Hitler was calling their attention elsewhere to more urgent problems.

"Thus ended an international experiment which had followed a very different course from that intended by its promoters at the time of its genesis, and for which the
highest claim that could be made by its warmest supporters was that it had succeeded in confirming the conflict within the frontiers of Spain; but this at the expense of the legally elected government of that country and possibly also (as critics point of French and British official policy were not slow to point out) at a high strategic cost to France and Great Britain themselves."

But for a clear grasp of the genesis of this policy, it is essential to understand the desires and claims, the motives and the policy, of the various interested groups. In view of this, it has been considered preferable to give first a chapter describing the internal conditions of Spain, followed by another which records the motives and interests of the various European countries. This, it is believed, will facilitate the exposition of the problem as much as it would clarify the basic issues at stake. After that follows the main body of the thesis, though the first two chapters are as much a part of the thesis as any other, and then follow the conclusions etc.

Hari P. Sharma

the various member committees. This is possible, and

objectives, the expectation of the progress as much as it would

result in the successful resolution of the issues at stake. After that follows the

may look at the facts, though the latter two agreements are as much a part of the facts as any other, and thus follow the

conclusions are

Kent T. Greene

Letter from the Secretary to the Survey of International Affairs

1948, Nov. 1, 1948
The Spain of 1936 was a Spain where the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries had still not run their courses. In certain ways, the Spain of the 20th century was not very different from the pre-Renaissance Spain. All these types of Spain could be seen marching together on the roads of Barcelona as in the villages of the interior. In fact, the full impact of Renaissance was never felt in Spain - this in spite of the fact that an overwhelming majority of Spaniards professed a religion which was likewise professed by large sections of some of the most advanced nations of the modern Western World. The truth as Prof. Toynbee says;

"seems to be that the community of life and outlook that went with this common Catholicism did not go very deep. The Catholicism of the Trans-Pyrenaen countries of Europe was a Catholicism which had taken the lesson of the Reformation to heart and had put its salutory experience into practice, first in the Counter Reformation and thereafter in the Catholic social activities which had played so prominent and so admirable a part in the lives of the industrial populations of Belgium and the Rhineland and Westphalia during the last half century." 1

On the other hand, the forces that had evoked these activities in the Trans-Pyrenaen Catholic world had hardly impinged upon Spain. Except for the small fringes of her Basque and Catalonian regions, the rest of Spain never underwent the industrial and technical revolutions that the other nations of the West had done. Spain never opened her

CHAPTER ONE

The Incomplete Condition of Spain

The Spain of 1936 was a Spain where the Iberian Peninsula and its cultural heritage had still not come to terms with the 20th century in any coherent way. The Spain of the 20th century was not only different from the pre-Renaissance Spain, but from the very cores of Spain could be seen emanating together on the roads of Spain as in the villages of the interior. In fact, the full impact of the Renaissance was never felt in Spain - this in spite of the fact that as an overawing and splendidly displayed presence, it marked a reflection which was intricate, picturesque, and sanguine.

We refer to the period of the first five years as the "golden age," because of the community of the age, and the impact of the civil war on the culture of the country. The Renaissance movement had taken the lesson of the文艺复兴 period and had put its imprint on the national character. Its influence was felt in the lives of the people, in the arts and letters, and in the daily routines of the Spanish society.

On the other hand, the forces of that age opened these activities in the Trans-Pyrenean Catholic world and rapidly

reflected upon Spain's experience for the small nations of the

Peninsula and Catholicism Europe. The seat of Spain never

remained the Inquisition and technical revolution that the

other nations of the West had gone. Spain never opened her

doors to the influx of human thought. Not.

Page 2
windows to the fresh gusts of new ideas - and the result is
the state of anachronism in which it finds herself today.

This has been responsible for creating that state
of tension and rift with which the entire peninsular air is
surcharged today. Quoting Prof. Toynbee again:

"But it is one of the tragic ironies of the Spanish
people's modern history, that their apparently
strong desire in these latter days to make their
country into something like a "hermit kingdom"
- at least in certain departments of its life - was
condemned a priori to frustration by a geo-
ographical situation which was as unchangeable as
the leopard's spots or the Ethiopian's skin." 1.

The dogmatic ideas of the 17th century church find
themselves today face to face with the scepticism and
relativity of the modern science. And it does not need to be
mentioned that the enforced company of such strange bed-
fellows is hardly wholesome to either. The old pedigreed
land-holders blink at the "preposterous" and "unholy" ideas
of socialism and Anarch-Syndicalism and it is hard for them
to believe that the pleasant days of Don Quixote have ended.
They cannot understand the hustle and bustle of the
industrial era. Bull-fighting is still the 'ace' game with
them. For them, the French Revolution has still not taken
place; the Bastille still stands for them. But the world history
hardly can ever afford to wait for anybody. The impact of
events in quick succession has bewildered these gallant
knights of the 17th century who have never come out of their
massive stone forts and no wonder they are surprised to find

that people no longer prefer castles and forts for living, and that it is the era of sky-scrapers.

This great difference and opposition of ideas accounts for the violent antagonism that separates different sections of the people. The entire struggle and conflict of Spain during the past half-century can be summed up as the effort of a nation to bridge the gulf from the 17th and 18th to the twentieth century.

This gulf was in evidence everywhere and the economy of the country was still geared to the ox-plough. Exploitation, sanctioned and approved by religion was rampant. The existence of a vast Agricultural population which the governing classes had proved unable to save from misery was perhaps the most serious evil in Spanish life. It was an economic evil, for it is evident that the wealth of the country would benefit by a more adequate relationship between the land and its tillers and that, through land reform, Spain would, certainly, succeed in raising her food production. It was a social and political evil owing to the social ferment which it developed in the mass of agricultural labourers. Ill-fed, ill-clothed, lacking in instruction, with no stake in the land, the best of them combed out by emigration, the agricultural labourers, of Andalusia in particular, were ready growned for all the forms of violent propaganda. It is worth noting that Spain is the only modern country where the philosophies of violence and anarchy, of Kropatkin and
Bakhunin have a recognized place in the politics of the country. Poverty always provides a congenial soil for discontentment and violence. The poverty is so crushing that almost more than 91% of the landowners earn less than the average urban industrial worker. Spain's crying need today is the amelioration of her vast peasantry.

Above and beyond this is the fact that Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, the United States, Switzerland and Italy have invaded her with Capital and experts and while they have up to a point contributed to Spain's development, they have on the whole, as might be expected, rather prevented than fostered, the growth of her industries to the limit which the country's possibilities warranted. Spain is the only exception in the Western world with regard to economic sovereignty. 50% of the pyrites of the world comes out of Spain, but the British Capitalists who control the mines have seen to it that practically none of the industries which might be founded on this untold wealth flourish on Spanish soil. The potash deposits of the Catalan Pyrenees are rich and vast, but the European Capitalists who control this market have seen to it that they remain sterile. The country with the richest Copper deposits in Europe must buy its copper from England, the country which produces the iron ore of Bilbao pays for iron utensils five times what they cost in Portugal.

The other great problem of Spain is her religion.
Parliament has a connection place in the politics of the country. The Assembly and the Government. The Assembly is to approve and support the proposed plans of the Government. If the Government fails to pass these plans, the Assembly may discuss, debate, and propose amendments. In the recent past, the government has faced significant challenges.

In the Western world, with its strong economic and military power, the British Commonwealth has been a significant player in the world affairs. The power of the Commonwealth is due to its membership of the United Nations and its influence in global politics. The Commonwealth countries have been able to maintain their independence while also benefiting from international cooperation.

The history of the Commonwealth is rich and complex. The countries have shared similar experiences and challenges. The Commonwealth has played a vital role in the development of many countries, especially in Africa and Asia. The Commonwealth has also been a platform for cooperation in various fields, including trade, education, and cultural exchange.

The recent events have shown the importance of the Commonwealth in maintaining peace and stability in the world. The Commonwealth countries have come together to address global issues, such as climate change and political instability.

In conclusion, the Commonwealth is a significant force in the world, and its role is likely to continue to be important in the future.
It is really more than a problem. The country is profoundly religious with a religion of its own which for all practical purposes coincides with Catholicism. But the people are profoundly opposed to Clericalism. They are not militant anti-clericals, because as Salvador De Madaraga put it - "militant anti-clericalism is a political attitude and the Spanish people are apolitical"; - but the potential antagonism which underlies their attitude towards clerical matters is definite and precise. In 1909, the populace of Barcelona let loose years of accumulated anti-clerical passion. The result was terrible.

The Church has always applauded measures of coercive character with regard to the free expression of opinion and on all its activities there is tendency to militancy, an aggressive attitude and a self assertion which are as unchristian as uncooperative. The fact is that clericalism is a growth of the Catholic religion, even though a diseased growth, and this makes its abolition so difficult. It is hard to attack Clericalism without infuriating the Catholic institutions. Again, the strength of the Spanish Clericals is but the weakness of the Spanish Anti-clerical, for in the immense majority of cases, the anti-clerical brings forward "no substitute for the religion which he would displace." The Catholic religion has now been for twenty centuries perhaps the central element in Spanish culture and civilization and though fallen on evil days,
If the country is to properly
serve people with a religion of life, we must not only support
bureaucratic conscience with legislation, but the people who
promote opposition to legislation, they are not different
situations. Perhaps people are opposed to political activities, if
people are different expectations to political activities, and the
Sparenberg people are opposed. "But the people expected
come without qualifications speak attitudes towards critical matters
in addition to compliance. In 1909, the presence of a political
settlements are an acceptable political expectation. The.

the current state of affairs-applying notions of

considering activities with regard to the political expansion of
opinion and all the activities these to compete to
will be made, an evanescent public and a self-satisfaction with
the fact that people are an acquaintance as an unconditional.

the fact that people are an acquaintance as an unconditional, people
acceptance as a member of the Catholic religion, even change
a government program, and this makes the political so difficult.

If it is necessary to attack Catholicism without informing the
Catholic inhabitants, "All the strength of the Spanish
Opposition to put the weaknesses of the Spanish Anti-Christian

Powers toward "no objection to the religion which we want
appellation. "The Catholic religion has now passed to country
continued because the commitment to Spain continue
and approval and support fellow on earth gain.
most under the action of historical causes which have influenced to an equal extent other forms of national life, though fallen even for ever from its predominant position in Spanish life, it still is and must remain for a long time to come, one of the chief features of the spirit of Spain....The believer, whether a clerical or only an anti-clerical, stands therefore on stronger historical ground than the new-comer whose ideas are more often than not a 'heady' acquisition without roots even in his own soul. It is useless to offer the Spaniardi that rationalism which, in the form of intelligent doubt, is such a "soft-cushion for the well-made head" of the Frenchman." 1.

To such a type religion is a necessity even if it be no more than the passive attitude of the stoic.

Ganivet, writing in 1896, humorously suggested that if a few freethinkers and Protestants could be hired to live in Spain, matters might be improved. As late as 1923, a leading Spaniard expert calculated that 50% of the juvenile population of Spain was not being educated at all; 25% was educated by the State, and 25% by the Church. The number of State teachers hardly exceeded that of priests and nuns engaged in education and the amount of money at the disposal of the Church was about equal to that spent by the State. The immense social power which the Church unquestionably possesses in Spain and which could be utilized for the regeneration of the nation has been undeniably used for the purpose of opposing the invasion of Spain by the modern Western spirit.

DeMadariaga sums it up:

"It would be difficult to find a country in which the Clericalism is more rigidly chemical to all reasonable compromise with the Zeitgeist than contemporary Spain." 2.

1. (Salvador De Madariaga's Spain, Page 128)
2. (Spain; Page 126).
To show a graph or diagram is unnecessary here; it is no more than a passive reflection of the spoken word.

This fact, in turn, points to the need for a comprehensive approach that addresses not just the symptoms of the problem but the underlying causes. A truly effective solution must take into account the root causes of the problem, and this requires a holistic approach that considers all aspects of the situation.

Consequently, the government and the international community must work together to address the root causes of the crisis. This will involve not only economic measures but also social and political initiatives that promote stability and development.

Democratization, in particular, is essential for the long-term success of any effort to address the challenges facing the region. It is through democratic processes that governments can be held accountable and that the rights of all citizens can be protected.
The other great factor in the arena of Spanish political life is the Army. But it would be erroneous to imagine the Spanish army as a huge military machine powerfully organized to obtain the highest possible fighting efficiency out of the large portion of the Budget which it consumes. The Army is a bureaucratic machine which spends most of the money paid to it in salaries for generals and officers, a lesser amount in war-material and a still lesser sum in preparing for war. The Army in fact, is more important as an instrument of home politics than as a weapon of war.

The post of Secretary and Under-Secretary for war became military sinecures, not to be entrusted to any civilian. Control of its military expenditure disappeared altogether in actual practice. The Army and its administration became a state rather than the State. Two consequences followed. This huge administration, free from all Treasury control became as cumbersome as inefficient. It developed a disproportionate head, while it starved its body, so that there were, in 1927, 19906 officers (including 219 generals) for 207,000 troops, while the habit of sending a considerable number of the men back home instead of keeping them in actual service made this proportion of officers still higher. As it is and even accepting these figures at their face value, the proportion of officers to soldiers was about one in ten, while in France it was just below one in twenty at the same
The other great leaker in the arena of politics

political life to the Army, but if we may be encouraged to
assume the Army as a prime military weapon

it may be realized to obtain the highest possible light

alternative one of the large portion of the entire which it

conscience. The Army is a paramount weapon whose branch

meant at the money being to if in estimates for generals and

officers, a lesser amount in war—military and a still lesser

sum in peacetime for men. The Army in fact to more in

mone as an instrument of home policy can as a weapon

of war.

The book of Secretary and Under-Secretary for

war becomes military assistance of to an army

officer on to the army and its administration

in support of the Secretary, the Army and its administration

are becoming a sole weapon of the state. To understand

following: The high administration, leave from the Treasury

mone as a complete weapon as an instrument. If developed a

abroad. Consequently, leave, while it remains the book on these

were in 1923, 1926 offices (informing the Secretary

for 50,000 troops, and a complete of sending a complete

screen at the very peak home interest in keeping from in secret

and every whole of the others. As if

proportion of officers to soldiers were equal one to one.

write in France it was more personal ones in the same of the same
date. This abundantly shows that the administrations of the Spanish Army was overburdened with a military bureaucracy insufficiently occupied in professional activities precisely because the object of its administration, defence was starved in order to fatten the body of officers - for that is what in reality stirred behind and usurped the name of the "Army" - turned their attention to civilian affairs.

Thus, on the whole, it will be found that when military politicians appear on the Spanish stage, the permanent difficulties which beset political life are increased by their rivalries and ambitions, though an outstanding personality with sufficient power to oust all others sometimes succeeds in establishing peace and order, that even then, though the country is able to benefit from a period of peace and prosperity, the political education of the people suffers from the methods of force adopted, and finally that a clerical reaction usually sets in, with disastrous effects in all walks of life and politics and education.

For centuries, Spain has been under monarchy, benevolent sometimes, despotic mostly. When Alfonso XII died in 1902, in the prime of youth, the internal conditions demanded some well seasoned, experienced head. But what Spain got for her king was a lad of sixteen, who assumed the name of Alfonso XIII. The young king had a charming personality, was ambitious and wanted to play his part fully. He was the heir to a long tradition of absolute monarchs undiluted by half way measures of constitutionalism. He himself wanted to be
The Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps are branches of the Department of Defense, each with a distinct role and function.

The Army is responsible for land-based military operations, including combat, defense, and support activities.

The Navy focuses on maritime operations, including naval warfare, logistics, and support.

The Air Force is responsible for aerial operations, including air combat, airlift, and electronic warfare.

The Marine Corps is a combined ground and amphibious force, supporting naval operations and conducting operations on land and at sea.

Each branch has its own unique strengths and capabilities, working together as part of the unified military command of the United States Department of Defense.
the "de facto" government of Spain. The king was a first-rate politician, but not a statesman. So that while under his rule, Spain progressed industrially and economically, the seeds of dissension were, withal, sown too. "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely"—Lord Acton has said. And Spain under Alfonso XIII was a classical example of it.

The liberal opposition, which had been kept under suppression was slowly gathering weight. But, reaction set in again in 1923, when General Primo de Rivera proclaimed himself dictator with the tacit approval of the king. For seven years the ambitious dictator ruled the country, till he had to flee to Paris in 1930. After 1930 it is recent history. A short period of intrigues and counter-intrigues was followed by the birth of the Republic in April 1931.

The king in exile, since then has never stopped intriguing against the Republic. In fact, Monarchists have been one of the most prominent supporters of the Right. It is an open secret that agents of the exiled king had always been in contact with Mussolini and Hitler. And General Franco's coup was planted with the full approval and support of the Monarchists. The Monarchy has sometimes been blamed for all the ills of the country. But the truth is that the Spanish people have never exhibited any capacity for the successful working of constitutional democracy. Parliamentary government has never found the Spanish climate conducive to its growth. And so Spain has continued up till now, as in the past centuries, to be ruled under
The kind of government of Spain, the kind we call a liberal-republican, was not at all based on a free, white, middle-class elite. The seeds of Spanish progressivism and constitutionalism, the seeds of power, were sown in the intellectual and philosophical circles of the country. "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Lord Acton's fame and glory under Alfonso XIII was a classic example of it.

The liberal opposition, which had been largely destroyed in the suppression of the Spanish war in the 1930s, began to recover its strength and influence in the years before the Civil War. With the fall of the Republic on the right, the left was able to take advantage of this situation and gradually win back the country.

After the Republic in April 1931,

the kind of elite that had been so powerful in the interwar period have been

influential once more. The Republic was in fact a constitutional state.

It is clear that the most prominent supporters of the left, had never been in conflict with the monarchy and General Primo de Rivera. The monarchy has sometimes been blamed for the excesses of the Carlist movement, but that is not true. The monarchy has never been a threat to the Spanish people. Instead, it has been an instrument of cooperation for the success of working class and constitutional democracy. Parliamentary government has never looked the Spanish

offense on account of the difference and so Spain has continued

to live on under
inefficient bureaucracy. Spain would have continued to live in her own fashion, had the outside world only left her alone. But her natural strategic advantages are such that, if strong, she must play a first-rank role in the world; and if weak, she must be the constant object of close attention on the part of the strong. But, for the last three centuries, Spain's power is continuously on the decline. And as a consequence, the foreign powers have been closely interested in her destiny. The only point of her sovereign territory that is under foreign possession is the rock fort of Gibraltar. But it is a paradox that amongst all the nations of Europe, Spain is the nation most interested in preservation of the naval supremacy of Great Britain for a long time to come. The Spaniard is in this case very much like that ruined gentleman who on no account would part with an old steward of his, not particularly honest. "Not for any love that I may feel for you," said the poor man, "but because I fear that your successor will leave me a beggar."

Ganivet wrote in 1896,

"Gibraltar is a permanent offence which we in part deserve for our lack of good government; but it does not hinder the normal development of our nation and is not a sufficient cause for us to sacrifice other more valuable interests in order to anticipate a fact which must come about as the restoration of our nationality evolves towards its logical conclusion. It seems absurd at first that our interests should be linked up with those of the only nation towards whom we have motives of real resentment but in recognizing and accepting such absurdities lies at times the deepest wisdom."*

*Madariaga, op. cit., p.214.
In the absence of strong, sustained, and consistent opposition to the project, the plan is likely to be implemented as planned.

Following the conclusion of this meeting, please ensure that all necessary steps are taken to ensure the smooth implementation of the project.

*Note: The above information was provided as an example and may not be applicable to the specific context of this document.*
CHAPTER TWO

THE CIVIL WAR BREAKS OUT

The Civil war that flared up in Spain in July 1936, was but the culmination of a long series of events. The country was then throbbing with disorder. All the years of pent up hate were rushing to explosive outlet. The six years of the life of Republic were uneasy years full of disorder and political assassination from the very beginning. The psychological conditions in which the Republic was born might have made some such moderation possible on the part of the leaders of the Republic. But though the Republic might have been moderate, it simply was not. The impetus of eight years of bottled up energy and the pressure of eight years of political dreaming were too much for the men in charge of the ship of the State and they steered her full steam ahead against the immutable rocks of Spanish obduracy. The farseeing sensible men in the assembly had been unable to restrain the doctrinaires and the demagogues who were determined to put all their wares in the window from the first day of the fair. The discontent with Church, Monarchy and feudalism that had been smouldering so long burst in 1931 when the new Republic was proclaimed.

Perhaps, it is unfair to indict the people for the small disorder that followed. History is replete with such examples, whenever the popular emotion has been suppressed
CHAPTER TWO

THE CIVIL WAR BEGINS OUT

The Civil War first dawned to men in early 1861. The
pale of recognition of a long series of events.

The war in the West began at New Orleans, with
Al's aid. The six years of
conflict were fought with great effort. All the men of
both sides were united to explore the nature of the war
and the issues of Republie were measured. Tills of
equity, in the end, were identical to the paper on the
peace of the Republic. But during the Republic's flight
of the Southern states, the map of the Republic might
have been

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pertinent. It simply was not. The purpose of each was to
make some more moderate position on the part of the
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too long, it bursts out with the proportionate fury some day. In fact, on the whole, Spain took it with much order than some other countries had done. But, still the spirit of petty, almost vindictive vengeance could be seen there. In fact, the conduct of Spaniards of all parties and walks in life during these ominous years revealed the same Spanish national characteristics. The same phenomenon to look for trouble, to neglect to open safety-valved, to express grievances by resorting to physical force and to retort to such outbreaks by repression untempered with redress.

"Instead of setting itself, in its first flush of success, to solve the agrarian problem, the Republic settled down to the diversion of baiting the Church; and this perversely had a multitude of untoward consequences. The anti-clericalism prompted a number of smaller pin-pricks, such as the redognition of no form of marriage but civil marriage. While a timorous Church was goaded into hostility by wanton attacks that confirmed its worst fears, a peasantry which had always been prone to shed blood was exasperated by neglect into resorting to its habitual remedy of taking the law into its own hands. In the subsequent reactionary chapter of the story, the Right took their revenge by provocatively setting themselves, to undo everything that the Left had done. And all parties, in turn, at different stages, resorted to the violence that was the ultima ratio Hispanorum; as though they had conspired to demonstrate that Spaniards had no use, as well as no capacity, for the maintenance of a Trans-Pyrenaean bourgeois parliamentary King's Peace." 1

In this way, did the Republic pour its own youthful energy into the task of strengthening its traditional enemy, the Church, invigorating it by opposition. Another opponent that the Republic created was the Army. The Army was, as has

In fact, on the whole, doing book to with much order than some
after confusion has gone, and still the spirit of party,
street altercation & some can't to been there. In fact, the
conceal of expenses of all parties and waxing in the finding
these aiming to have raising the same, justification to
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"I'm glad of settling yourself to the like kind of
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been mentioned before, a State within the State, rather touchy and apt to be ill-tempered. Senor Azana, drastically cut the number of officers and forced in other reforms. "Azaña was right in his aims," as Salvador de Madariaga says, "but was not perhaps quite as right in his manner." The moral wounds thus inflicted on the most pampered of Spanish services were more deeply resented than the actual material loss. Some officers retired; others found that time weighed heavily on their hands and made use of the leisure paid them by the Republic to conspire against it. Gradually the ranks of disgruntled and discontented officers grew thicker and began to move under the spirit of union for conspiracy which had been developed in the Spanish Army throughout the 19th century, more often than not at the instigation of impatient politicians, now of the Right, now of the Left. This new enemy that the Republic made, the one whose case was the least justified of all, yet perhaps was the most dangerous.

What made the Spanish Civil War inevitable, is the logical question that arises? Revolt of the Army, was not a novel phenomenon in Spanish politics. So many had taken place before and had been suppressed. Them, why did this particular affair attain such an international importance? Various reasons and explanations have been forwarded. One school of opinion is that it was essentially on European war, though it was being fought out by facet agreement between the principal European belligerents and neutrals in a
been mentioned before a State within the same territory and any right to be fit-rewarded. General terms agreement once the
number of offices and tags in office periods have not been
right in the same on examination or in the manner. The worry towards
more evidence beyond the yearly material issues of
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Health and to cooperate stick up. Gradually the ranks of
reported to cooperate stick up. Gradually the ranks of
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Veritas remains and expressions have been today's. One
school of opinion it that it is not necessarily on monopoly view.
fronts it may be tied together or of free establishment between
the planetary procedure partnerships and requirements in a
peninsular arena.

"Nor could it even be said that these European combattants on Spanish soil had merely seized upon and converted to their own sinister purposes, an affray that had started as a civil war between Spaniard and Spaniard. For it would have been difficult to point to an initial period, however brief during which the war in Spain was a civil war pure and simple." 1.

It would be interesting to compare it with another school of thought whose conclusions are exactly the opposite of what the above. The international importance, in the opinion of the latter, which this war came to acquire and the active intervention in it of two Fascist and one Communist States have tended to obscure the fact that in its inception and in its essence the Civil war was above all Spanish. The foreign disputants are said to minimize or ignore the genuine Spanish nature of the conflict and stress its international aspect. De Madaraiga further says that

"neither Communism, Russian or otherwise, nor Nazi-Fascism, German or otherwise had the slightest possibility of provoking a Spanish Civil war in 1936, even if they had tried, which they did not. Such a power was exclusively in the hands of the Army officers and the Union workers."

Again,

"But it must be borne in mind that the Spanish Civil war began purely as a Spanish affair, grown out of the Spanish soil in the old Spanish way. It was the outcome of the typical combination of the two predominant political passions of the Spaniards: dictatorship and separatism.

These, somewhat long quotations have been taken to show as to how violently the opinions can differ regarding the

2. MADARAIGA, op.cit. p.368.
It would be interesting to compare it with another
school of thought whose conclusions are exactly the opposite.

The informational importance in the
definition of the fact, which often was one of
the errors, has been cut out of
the information.

Together with this is the
essential nature of the conflict and stress the informational
aspect of the stimulus patterns that

"military communism," present or apparent, not
 Sovjet-ideological elements of the pattern and the
Sovjet material of the fact, often leading to
Mutiny in 1934. Some are present in
the pattern, such a power may occasionally
work to the advantage of the Army's officers, and the Union

"Agenda.",

"It must be pointed out that the Spanish
"Civil war began clearly as a Spanish affair,

It was the outcome of the struggle between
Communists and the two bourgeois political
backbone of the Spaniards: Agricultural and

These somewhat ironic quotations have been taken to
show as to how activity the opinions can alter depending on

Spanish war. Both the writers, whose opinions have been quoted, are astute students of politics and their opinions carry weight which cannot be dismissed lightly. The truth seems to be somewhat between these two extremes. This conclusion should not be taken to mean that the writer is trying to steer the middle course and thus avoiding the risk of reputation from both schools. For the middle course wherever else it might be the safest, is not always the most preferable in political study. That the truth approximates to neither extreme should be evident by the logic of events, which will be shown hereafter.

The elections that took place at the beginning of the year 1936 were such that neither side, Right or Left expected a victory at the polls in February. There is ample evidence that all sectors of Spanish political life would have accepted parliamentary defeat in a sporting spirit, neither the Left Socialist nor the military would take a popular verdict unfavourable to them without violence and that therefore the next election was bound one way or another, to lead the country to a Civil war: The extreme Right and in particular the officers were convinced that a plot against them was being brewed by the Revolutionists and on both sides lists of names of the men marked for assassinations supposed to come from the files of the other side, were known to circulate.

The new Ministry which was formed in Madrid on the 19th February, 1936 was of a moderate complexion.
The selection that took place at the beginning of the year 1936 was not in any way different from the selection that took place in previous years. The criteria for selection were based on merit, and the selection process was fair and transparent. The criteria included academic performance, extracurricular activities, and personal qualities.

The selection process was designed to identify candidates who had the potential to contribute to society. The selection committee was composed of educators, professionals, and community leaders who had a deep understanding of the needs of the country.

The selected candidates were known to be capable of making a significant contribution to the community. They were motivated, determined, and had a strong sense of purpose. The selected candidates were known to be capable of making a significant contribution to the community.

The selected candidates were known to be capable of making a significant contribution to the community. They were motivated, determined, and had a strong sense of purpose. The selected candidates were known to be capable of making a significant contribution to the community.
Senor Azana was the Prime Minister; his Cabinet included no Socialists; and the Ministry's first acts (e.g., towards Catalonia) were all conciliatory. This moderation, however, was of little avail, since the parliamentary regime in Spain was now a facade with no solid structure behind it. The forces of violence were, all alike, out of hand, and the nominal government were as impotent to curb the direct action of their own political allies to the left of them as they were to restrain the militant champions of the Right from taking the law into their own hands. Either side sought to excuse its own resort to violence by pleading an inalienable natural right of self-defence; and on both sides this identical plea was difficult to rebut, since it was impossible to give any assurance that either party would be able to protect itself against the aggression of its opponents by any means short of delivering its own blow first. There was no longer in Spain any parliamentary forum from which the voice of reason could carry, or any effective public peace. The only significant chronicle of Spanish events during those comparatively, but not yet superlatively, dreadful months between the holding of elections and the outbreak of the war, would be a catalogue of acts of violence.

How far had the connivance with the two Fascist States gone? The answer is not easy. Here again, as on the other side, a good deal of propaganda shrouds the real facts. What exactly happened was that Hitler and Mussolini had been
The case for a League with no striking or characteristic period or

existence was that the League's primary object was to

secure the maintenance of the welfare of the people.

It was a case of little merit since the parliamentary regime in England

was now a defeat with no striking or characteristic period.

If the League was to be effective, it was necessary to ensure that the

people were in a position to express their wills from the point of view of

justice and freedom. If we cannot achieve a situation where the people are

able to express their wills freely, we shall be in a difficult position.

The Great War was a time when the League had no chance of

existing. The League, like any other organization, was a means of expressing

opinions and ideas. The League could not claim to express the views of

the people. The League was a means of expressing the views of

the people, and it was necessary to maintain the League's position in

the political and social life of the country.
spreading their nets in Spain to suit their own ends of military and economic espionage very much as every big Power does in a greater or lesser degree everywhere and at any rate so far as Germany is concerned with tremendous power of efficiency. To call the revolt of a pure Fascist coup-d'etat is oversimplifying the issue; though it must be conceded that the Fascist countries had been in close touch with the "would-be" rebels for a considerable time in advance and without their assistance the revolt could never have expected to succeed.

Yet the difference is significant, in as much as that here a Spanish party interested in overthrowing the existing regime was helped by Alien powers rather than that some "artificial" rebels had been planted by the Fascist countries. But let us be clear about one point. It is all very good to proclaim the virtues of charity and feel very pious after quoting it from the religious tenets but it is as well to recognize that the Church and the chessboard of international politics are two different things. And the intentions of the two Western democracies were as much inspired by self-interest as the actions of the dictators. That by helping General Franco to win the war, they expected to gain definite advantages can hardly be denied. But while recognizing this, the Spanish element in the struggle should not be overlooked, for it was a genuine factor from the beginning to the last.

The competition in violence culminated in two sensational murders and a military revolt. In Madrid, on the
To call the present or a future American-Soviet conflict an "affront," to overemphasize the "fear" of a "wonder" of the Pediatric Committee and pen to close contact with the "world" raises considerable time to enhance and without gain.

Yet the difference is striking, to as much as each have a greater basic interest in overemphasizing the existing regime than did by Allen Potter, and some "affront," and the appearance of an impression of the Pediatric Committee. But for its consequences of the child's nature of gradually and sometimes of the two in which the Pediatric Committee have as much impact as a small number of the American-Soviet conflict. That the Pediatric Committee, in the same way, that there are to earn definite statements can with the new, that with recognizing the "wonder" of the Pediatric Committee from the beginning to the fact of a genuine letter from the Pediatric Committee. In the only present conflict in two connected countries may a difference result.
evening of the 12th July, Lt. Castillo, an officer of the corps of Guardias de Asalto was shot dead and in the small hours of the morning of the thirteenth Don Jose Calvo Sotelo, who was now the leading politician of the Right was called up, arrested, and carried off by a squad of police in a van. That afternoon a body that had been deposited by some police in a mortuary already in the small hours of the morning was identified as being that of the arrested man. On the 17th July in the Spanish zone of Morocco, the Spanish Army rose in revolt, and within the next 48 hours there were parallel military risings in garrison towns all over Spain.

This was "a revolution carefully planned and skilfully organized by able military leaders on a nation-wide scale", as Peers says in his 'The Spanish Tragedy', (p.211).

There was ample evidence that it was not a spontaneous uprising as the Rebels would have us believe. Prof. Toynbee sums it up admirably:

"It is not credible that it could have been improvised within four days as a reprisal for Señor Calvo Sotelo's shocking death, though it is not impossible that the date may have been slightly advanced with an eye to taking advantage of the feeling aroused by this particularly heinous crime of the Left against the Right. Another explanation which was current on the Nationalist side after the event was that the military revolt was planned and executed in order to forestall a projected "Red" revolution which was to have taken place at the end of July or in August with Russian support. The evidence which was forthcoming in support of this particular allegation against the Left fell far short of being convincing, and the imputation has rather the air of being a covert apologia. The action of General Franco and his confederate is, however, quite easy to explain in
eventing of the Y.M.C.A., the C.A.S.S. and the College, an offer of these courses of activities to the families of the students. They have been well received and have proved successful.

A meeting of the Parents and Students was held last night and a number of activities for the coming year were discussed.

The leading portion of the evening was carried off by speeches of welcome and an address by the principal, Mr. Jones. The address was followed by a discussion of the plans for the coming year.

The meeting adjourned after a successful evening, and it is hoped that the activities for the coming year will be successful.
the Light of events up to date, without having recourse to the hypothesis that the Left were known to be meditating a crime that would have eclipsed all their previous atrocities. Assuming, as we must, that the preparations for the military revolt had occupied some weeks, or even months, before the nationalists eventually took the field on the 17th July, 1936, the situation almost on the morrow of the general election of the preceding February was already such as might have impelled the moving spirits in the Spanish corps of officers to decide in favour of taking up arms as soon as they could complete the arrangements for a concerted general military insurrection. A short experience of post-election conditions might well bring the forces of the Right to the conclusion that the civil government had practically lost control and that the only safety for the bêtes noires of an unbridled Left in a homicidally maniacal frame of mind lay in self help through the deployment of all the physical force at their command. The military conspirators, in particular, may have been moved, in the end, to put their fortunes to the touch by a knowledge that the Government had got wind of their conspiracy and were intending to take drastic disciplinary action."

On July 11 - that is to say, two days before the death of Senor Calvo Sotele - the British aviator Captain Bebb, under special contract from a Franco agent in London, flew from Croydon to Las Palmas to pick up the rebel leader. And this provides further conclusive proof that the violent disappearance of the Fascist leader was not the cause of the rebellion. Without the promise of help from Mussolini, Hitler and Oliveira Salazar, Franco would never have started his rebellion. But already before July 17th, 1936, there existed pacts and agreements between the three powers mentioned and the intending rebels which guaranteed to the Spanish generals the certainty of foreign intervention against the Republican

the right of nations to be free, and to control their own destinies. It is every man's duty to respect the rights and liberties of others, and to work for the welfare of his country and the world. The struggle for freedom is the struggle for the right of nations to determine their own destinies.

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government of their country.

"Pertinax", the well-informed Diplomatic correspondent of the Catholic Conservative "Echo-de-Paris," who is hardly a person to be suspected of sympathy towards the Left popular movements of Spain, wrote the following in the August number of the London "Fortnightly."

"It is too easily forgotten that on the 28th of July, 1936, four Caproni aeroplanes staffed with officers and non-commissioned officers of the Italian army had the bad luck to land or to be wrecked on the wrong side of the border between Algeria and Spanish Morocco. Mr. Peyrouton, the high commissioner in Rabat, personally cross-examined those men whose names and military ranks were indicated in papers found on the board. They all declared that they had been recruited from various units of the Italian air forces at the beginning of July and had received their final instructions on the 15th, that is three days before the outbreak of the counter-revolution. As early as March or April in the same year, the French Ambassador in Berlin had informed his government that General Sanjurja, who would have been the leader of the rebellion but for the accident which cost him his life, had reported himself there and had been welcomed in official quarters."

"Hispanicus" writes in the collection of the documents known as "Foreign Intervention In Spain" on Page X, "Only fools or knaves, or foolish knaves - for even these exist - could deny all the evidence...Until the end of October, when Russia began to send war material to the Spanish Government, the Spanish people were fighting their foes under conditions of terrible inferiority. In these months - from July until the early days of November - the Spanish Government was completely abandoned by the rest of the world. True, in democratic countries there were collections among the working class for the Spanish Popular Front. And clothes and money were sent to Spain. But these pious activities lacked efficacy in comparison with the work of Italy, Germany and Portugal who sent tanks, planes, rifles and machine-guns..."I shall win, because I have
Government of Great Britain

In the interests of...
From the very beginning, it was evident that the dictators were bent upon going full steam ahead with their programme of intervention. While the democracies were discussing, and rediscussing as to through what streets of Paris and London demonstrators should parade, Berlin and Rome were forging ahead by sending bombers and tanks. On September 30th, 1936, President of the Spanish Republic, Señor Azana, gave an interview to Vernon Bartlett, "News Chronicle" special correspondent:

"Enthusiasm is good, but there are occasions when heavy bombers are even better," he said emphasizing the growing disparity between the Loyal and Rebel air forces owing to the policy of non-intervention which he condemned very bluntly."

The policy of "Non-Intervention", which became in practice active and constant intervention of Italy, Germany and Portugal in favour of Franco, and passive complicity on the part of other countries against the legitimate Spanish Government, is without precedent in history. The fact is that the Spanish war almost brought the final collapse of international law. To this collapse England and France contributed in no small measure. If these two Powers had maintained an attitude of simple legality the Spanish war would not have gone on for two years. Because had it not been for the help given to France by international Fascism the war would have lasted only a few months and would unquestionably have ended with victory for the Government. On October 10th, 1936, the

1. HISPANICUS, op. cit., p. 22.
2. HISPANICUS, op. cit., p. XVI.
The first year program in the College of Education

The program is designed to prepare students for teaching positions in the secondary schools. The program consists of three main parts:

1. A three-year program leading to the Bachelor of Science in Education degree.
2. A one-year internship program.
3. A one-year program for teacher certification.

The program is structured to provide a strong foundation in the liberal arts and sciences, as well as specialized training in the areas of education and teaching.

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Foreign Minister, Srñor Alvarez del Vayo, declared to the
"Daily Telegraph" correspondent:

"The insurgents have obtained constant aid, while the
Government has met with all kinds of obstacles....
The rebellion would have been already practically
suppressed, with the exception, perhaps, of Navarre,
which is the only region where the insurgents have
the support of large sections of the civil population,
but for the foreign aid given to the insurgents....
One week before the present Cabinet was formed, I
visited the Madrid aerodromes with Senor Caballero.
We had four planes for each insurgent plane. Today,
according to figures supplied by the Air Ministry,
the proportion is probably 20 insurgent planes for
each Government machine. More insurgent planes
have been brought down than Government machines,
and if they had not received foreign aircraft in
such quantities the enemy air force would not
exist now. The figure of 20 to one is alone a
mortal blow for the non-intervention accord. Nor is
there any sign of reduction in foreign aid for the
insurgents. It continues cynically and is encouraged
by the indifference with which up to the present,
the Spanish Government's exposure of the infractions
of the non-intervention agreement have been received
in official circles abroad."

There could be legally no defence for the policy of
non-intervention and specially of the variety that the world
is tragically came to know. According to the "Institute of
International Law."

"Every Power at Peace with an independent nation is
bound not to interfere with the measures which that
nation takes for the re-establishment of internal
peace. It is bound not to furnish to the insurgents
either arms, munitions, military goods or financial
aid."

From the first moments the Governments of the demo-
cratic nations declared themselves neutral. Such neutrality
was, of course, in contradiction to the law. On the other
hand the dictators said - Franco's cause is our cause. The

1. HISPANICUS, op. cit., p. xiii
2. HISPANICUS, op. cit., p. xvii
effete answers of the democratic countries to intervention against the legitimate Government was the policy of "Non-Intervention."

It has already been shown that the talk of a Soviet plot to implant Communism in Spain was prove reactionary propaganda. Russia only decided to send war-material to Spain when she saw only too plainly that "Non-Intervention" was an unjust force. On the subject of Russian intervention "Pertinax" may be quoted again:

"It is absurd to assign to Soviet Russia a decisive past in the sequence of events. During the whole month of August, Stalin remained indifferent to the fate of the Spanish Communists, outnumbered by Anarchists, Trotskyists, Socialists and Syndicalists of all descriptions...when he was stirred out of his passivity...his motive was not so much to help in the creation of a Soviet in Spain - he is intelligent enough not to have dreamed of it - as to maintain the Third International, the weapon he wants to have in hand against Germany....We have played to the end with cheaters the game of non-intervention."

The entire course of this tragic policy, which will be developed later, is replete with incident after incident when the Republic in its utmost hour of gravity and danger was left over to the wolves. But before pursuing the genesis of this policy, it would be more logical to examine the interests and motives of the various Powers interested in Spain.

1. HISPANICUS, op.cit., p.xviii
The Somerset County of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was the first of "You-International" programs to be started in the state. The purpose of the program was to promote international understanding through the exchange of students and faculty. The program was designed to bring students from different countries to the United States and vice versa, to foster mutual understanding and cooperation.

The program was implemented in several phases, each focusing on different aspects of international education. The first phase included the establishment of partnerships between schools in the United States and their counterparts abroad. The second phase involved the exchange of faculty members, with the goal of sharing knowledge and best practices. The third phase focused on student exchanges, providing opportunities for students to live and learn in foreign countries.

The success of the program was measured by various indicators, including the number of participants, the quality of the exchanges, and the impact on international relations. The program was considered a model for other states to follow, and it continued to grow and evolve over the years.
CHAPTER THREE

INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF POWERS

The potential strategic importance of Spain and her possessions cannot be over emphasized. And, specially so, since the emergence of the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler, when the struggle for "world-power" began:

"the neutrality of Spain would in any case have been in jeopardy - even if the Spaniards had not facilitated foreign intervention by falling out among themselves, because of Spain's geographical bearing upon vital strategic interests of all the four European Great Powers. The balance of power between Italy and Great Britain might be turned this way or that according to whether political control over the Spanish coasts of the Straits of Gibraltar was in hands friendly to Great Britain or at any rate neutral, or in hands friendly to Italy; and in the same way the bias of the political control over the Balearic Islands might exercise a decisive influence upon the balance of power between Italy and France". 1.

But the strategic significance of Spain was not confined to the Mediterranean only; for even greater issues were involved in the Spanish strategic factor in the North Atlantic. In 1936, the Spanish Empire still debouched upon the western seaboard of the North Atlantic at four points. It was evident that if Italy were to obtain even an indirect control over some or all of these four Spanish frontages on the Atlantic, her ability to make herself a "nuisance" to France and Great Britain would be greatly increased. But Germany's interests were even more evident. German's weak spot vis-a-vis her struggle for supremacy with Great Britain has

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When the government of the United States.
been her weak navy, and no immediate factor could be counted upon which would put the balance in her power. But if Germany were to succeed in obtaining naval facilities on all or some of these regions on the western shores of the North Atlantic, she might be in a position, in case of a conflict with the two West-democracies, to interest the communications between France and Great Britain on the one hand and the French and British overseas empires on the other hand; and at the same time she would be securing stepping stones for her eventual re-entry into Africa. Above and beyond this, "she would gain the possibility of playing on France the trick of 'encirclement' which France might be held to have been playing on Germany ever since the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894." 1.

Again -

"In 1936, indeed, Spain was more the determining factor in a European balance of power. In the event of war between the 'democratic' and the 'Fascist' pair of European Great Powers, there would be little prospect of a decision on the continental front across which these opponents would be facing one another between the North Sea and the Atlantic. At a time when the technical advantage of the defensive over the offensive was considered by the experts to be in the order of about three to one, nothing but a military statement was to be expected either on the Alpine Sector between France and Italy or on the Rhenish sector where the Maginot line had been matched, by a German equivalent. A decision could therefore hardly be achieved unless one of the two parties could succeed in turning the other's flank; and for this purpose a command of the Iberian Peninsula would be of capital importance. If the Western Powers commanded it they might hope to succeed in establishing contact, via the Mediterranean, with the Soviet Union and any other potential allies of theirs on the eastern flanks of

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 131.
been part and parcel of the contemporary concept of war. The employment of new technologies in warfare has allowed for greater efficiency and effectiveness in military operations, but at the same time, it has raised concerns about the ethical implications of using these technologies in conflict situations.

The relationship between France and Great Britain has been a complex one, with periods of cooperation and conflict. These historical developments have had a significant impact on the strategic considerations of both nations, particularly in the context of Franco-German relations.

Significant military engagements, such as the Franco-English War, have shaped the contemporary understanding of military strategy and the employment of resources. The historical context of these conflicts continues to influence modern military thought and practice.
'the Rome-Berlin Axis'. On the other hand, if the Central
Powers commanded the Iberian Peninsula, they might not
only liberate themselves from the nightmare of a war
on two fronts, but might put their Western opponents
in this unpleasant quandary." 2

Nor were the strictly strategic assets the only
Spanish factors that came into consideration. The economic
wealth of the peninsula, her influence on South America were
other factors which could not be easily lost sight of. But
time, during this period, was running out and the danger of a
world-conflagration was increasing. In the words of a letter
from Salvador de Madariaga published in The Times newspaper
of London on the 19th July 1937, and quoted on the same day
in the House of Commons at Westminster by the United Kingdom
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden,

"By a tragic coincidence this war, essentially Spanish
has 'caught on' abroad, lured by somewhat shallow
parallelisms, men, institutions and even Governments
outside Spain have been adding fuel to the love fire
which is consuming our unhappy country. Spain is
thus suffering vicariously the latent civil war
which Europe is - so far - keeping in check."

But the French people were still struggling to keep
out of the war, in spite of all provocations. In a speech
delivered at Sarlat on the 3rd August, 1936, Monsieur Delbos
declared in the name of the countrymen, that

"As we do not want to risk war, on any pretext, we do
not want to meddle in the internal affairs of any
country that you may care to name. At no price must
there be a new crusade of ideals in Europe, for such
a crusade would inevitably have war for its outcome."

The condition in the 'totalitarian' countries, on
the other hand, was entirely different. The regimes were, by

3. MADARIAGA, op. cit., p. 408.
Not were the military strategies sense the only

Special factors that came into consideration. The economy

wished to see the defeat of the Germans' pen influence on North America were

after factors which could not be easily put aside or a

time conquest this peace was imminent and the danger of a

wont confrontation was increasing. In the plies of a letter

from England to the Mexican President in the Time newspaper

of London on the 18th July 1918 and a copy on the same day

in the House of Commons of the Mexican President the United Kingdom

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He then

For a Statesman competition this was essentially

and conquest on peace. It was of moment to

because there had been previous efforts to

which is to say that all interest of the peaceful

and so-called strategies to keep the peace

and the French people were still trying to keep

out of the war, to start off the peace conference. In a speech

a gesture of State to the King, August 1918, Montmorency

geared in the name of the country.

"we go not want to make war, on no pretext, we go

but want to save in the interest of the

country and our own, we may not agree to name of a war,

try to prevent a new offense of desire in Europe, to stop

a change; many importantly, we new for the conquest.

The countries in the 'colonial expansion' countries, on

the other hand, were anxious of the defeat. The regimes were y
definition intolerant of any ideologies that conflicted with their own; and the expression in speech or in writing of any ideas, different from the existing were ipso facto "subversive."

"In each of these countries one voice only was now heard because all other voices had been either muffled in the concentration camp or smothered in the grave. There was no confusion of counsels, because there was no debate." 

The national of the totalitarian states could enjoy the exhilaration of feeling that in serving his party he was serving his country too. But these points of strength in Soviet Union, Germany and Italy were unequally matched in the Democracies by the corresponding points of weakness. Democratic France and Great Britain, were net by the very definition of the term democracy, had to tolerate and recognize the opposition. In fact, in Great Britain the opposition was dignified by bearing the name of His Majesty's Opposition. And if the Governments of France and Great Britain had tried to silence the Opposition, they could not have done so without violating the long cherished traditions, of and being guilty of being unconstitutional. None of the two alternatives of being handicapped by their Opposition in every step of their foreign policy.

Besides, the Democracies had a moral aversion to take any steps that should involve any palpable risk of

helicopter flaps were not identified. They conflicted with
their "free" and unrestricted expression to engage in martial art
"expeditions" from the mainland and the "border" to their
invasion.

In fear of these counter-protests, one voice only was
"free" and the expression to engage in martial art
"expeditions" from the mainland and the "border" to their
invasion.

The新形势下, the political aspect counts
with the expression of feeling that in earning the peace
the way we should make compromise.Read free pages of strangers
in order to make our point and learn more nationally.
In the democracies of the continent, France and Great Britain, we see of the vary
democracy France and Great Britain, we see of the vary
generation of the time German, and to continue and
recognition Lectern. In fact, in Great Britain, the
opposition was generally of passing the same or the faster's
opposition and if the government of France and Great Britain
had tried to silence the opposition, then surely not have
been so much. Outside the few surviving fragments
and paid efforts of saving money for new German. The
international.

To escape and steps that alternative and defensible risk of
"expeditions", the democracies and a moral reason
It.
war, howsoever remote. It was true that the totalitarian countries were no less anxious to avoid wars, especially with Powers of equal or superior strength. Still the fact remains that they could sail much closer to the brink of war than the Democracies could even think of. The 'piratical' attacks of submarines on the ships of Soviet Union and the Western Democracies exhibited clearer than ever that the Fascist countries were prepared to incur much greater risks in carrying out their policies. France and Great Britain, on the other hand,

"were not, only non-willing to use war themselves as an instrument of national policy; they were non-willing even to exercise their legitimate rights in the spheres of non-military action if there was a risk that the exercise of them might move other Powers to take illegitimate military reprisals..... The three totalitarian Powers were, indeed, assiduous in breaking their non-intervention engagements to the two Democracies up to the extreme limit of French and British forbearance, and the unwillingness of the two Western Powers to follow suit in this deplorable game put them at a further disadvantage, which did them no dishonour."

After this, it might be convenient to discuss the motives and interests of each Power, interested in the affairs of Spain separately.

THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF THE FRENCH

Due to having a common land frontier with Spain, France

The INTEREST AND MOTIVES OF THE FRENCH

...
was the most directly affected by the conflagration in Spain. In this international crisis, Monsieur Blum and his colleagues, in a recently inaugurated coalition government of Socialists, and Socialist-Radicals found themselves in a peculiarly difficult position. It was beyond question that according to the currently accepted rules of international law, French citizens and the French government themselves if they so desired, were fully entitled to supply war-materials to the Government at Madrid, who in the eyes of the law, were a legitimate government contending with an unlawful rebellion. Moreover, in the parliamentary bloc on whose support Monsieur Blum's government were directly dependent for their existence, there was, no doubt a considerably majority in favour of helping the Spanish Government, at any rate by all lawful means; for this bloc included all the deputies and senators belonging to the three parties - Socialist-Radicals, Socialists and Communists - comprising the Popular Front. The government was influenced

"in favour of overruling the French desire to exercise the French right of selling arms to the Spanish Government in order to make sure of fulfilling another French desire which the exercise of this French right might threaten to frustrate. This other desire was a wish to keep France herself out of war here and now; and in the pursuit of an aim which was common to almost all Frenchmen at the time, the Socialist-Radical Ministers were perhaps not so much distracted as their Socialist colleagues may have been by an 'ideological' sympathy with the Popular Front in Spain."

In the light of the experience gained by the Government in the administration of the Province, it is now evident that the Federal Government, in order to take care of the educational and social needs of the Province, should establish a system of Regional Boards to administer and control the educational and social institutions in the Province. These Regional Boards should be elected by the inhabitants of the Province and should have the power to make decisions on matters affecting the education and social welfare of the Province.

In this view, the Government of the Province, in collaboration with the Federal Government, should establish a system of Regional Boards to administer and control the educational and social institutions in the Province. These Regional Boards should be elected by the inhabitants of the Province and should have the power to make decisions on matters affecting the education and social welfare of the Province.
But the Socialists were preaching two conflicting doctrines at that time. While on 'ideological' grounds they advocated help to the Republican Government of Spain, 'pacifism,' simultaneously was receiving their attention. (The Left wing of the French Socialist Party and in particular the Federation de la Seine, under the leadership of M. Pivert, was at this time distracted between an extreme pacifism and a proclivity towards Trotskyism. M. Pivert was conducting simultaneously a campaign for the complete disarmament of France, and a campaign for the complete disarmament of France and a campaign for the active support of the Spanish Popular Front by France) and "ministers of both parties had equally to reckon with an opposition of the Right whose attitude towards Popular front in Spain and France alike, was not simply detached or unsympathetic but was positively hostile." The French Opposition was particularly resenting the labour unrest which was becoming stronger everyday since the advent of the Popular Front. The government's hand were full due to the dual task of inducing the workers to return to work and inducing the employers to acquiesce in legislation which would result in bringing the unrest in workers to an end. For a French Government who were struggling to tide over a long overdue and in consequence, now semi-revolutionary social change, the avoidance of war in the immediate future was all important. While an outbreak of war, involving France, would almost certainly frustrate and undo social reforms, which the French Socialists, especially, had at

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 140.
The French Opposition was partly composed of the extreme right whose extreme policies were rejected by the majority. The various groups represented in the French Senate were largely exempt from the effects of the economic crisis. The government, in its efforts to restore confidence and stabilize the franc, was unable to prevent the rise of unemployment and poverty. The crisis led to a decline in living standards and a decrease in government funding for social services.

In spite of these difficulties, the government was able to maintain a strong social safety net. However, many workers felt that the government was not doing enough to protect them. The opposition was critical of the government's policies and accused it of being too focused on short-term solutions. The crisis highlighted the need for a more equitable distribution of resources and a more focused approach to economic development.
heart, the mere possibility of having followed a foreign policy - no matter how legitimate in itself - from which war might result would also give the opposition a new and powerful lever for engineering the overthrow of a Government whose fall it desired on more controversial domestic grounds.

On 25th July 1935, the Cabinet held an emergency meeting about the Spanish situation, when it is believed, the first decision regarding non-intervention was taken. The true originator of the policy of non-intervention was M. Alexis Léger, the permanent under Secretary at the Quai d'Orsay. He was no reactionary and certainly no pro-German. He was at the top of the list of the French diplomats whom the Germans wanted dismissed and he was the first to be dismissed as soon as the 'collaborationists' took charge at Bordeaux. His decision was therefore taken on unimpeachable grounds of French interests. On these limited grounds, it cannot have been so very foolish when it gradually conquered the mind of his Chief, M. Yvon Delbos and later that of the whole Cabinet. Nor was this conversion easy. In fact it must have been heart rending. The last word was pronounced on a direct question put by President Lebrun to the War-Secretary, M. Daladier, who had remained silent throughout the whole discussion during the Cabinet meeting which debated it. "Will the War-Secretary take responsibility for sending war material out of France at this moment." The War-Secretary answered "No." That settled the matter.
The term "We-Position" refers to a strategic position or role that a country or entity chooses to adopt in an international context. This term is often used in diplomatic contexts to describe the stance a country takes on various international issues or agreements. The "We-Position" approach emphasizes the sovereignty and interests of a nation, often highlighting its unique perspective or agenda in global politics.

For example, in the context of international trade negotiations, a country might adopt a "We-Position" by asserting that its domestic industries require protection from foreign competition. This approach could involve the use of tariffs, subsidies, or other measures to ensure that domestic businesses are not unduly harmed by imports.

Similarly, in discussions related to climate change, a "We-Position" might be articulated by a country emphasizing its unique geographic or economic circumstances, which could influence its willingness to commit to specific environmental targets or initiatives.

The "We-Position" approach is thus a tool for nations to assert their rights and interests in the international arena, ensuring that their voices are heard and their concerns are addressed in global policy-making processes.
In a communique of the 3rd August announcing the appeal which, in the meantime, France had made to other Powers to adopt a common policy of non-intervention in concert with her; it was again mentioned that she was provisionally practising non-intervention unilaterally. The opposing thesis was put forward in strong terms on the 5th August in a speech delivered at Lille by M. Jafthaux, the Secretary General of the Confédération Générale du Travail.

"In the face of the Spanish situation there can be no neutrality for the conscientious worker. The old dogma of non-intervention has cost us dear and now threatens to cost us even more. The defeat of the Spanish workers may well prove our-defeat, not only from the social point of view, but even the defeat of our country... We want peace. But there will only be true peace when those who wish for war are utterly powerless. The day dictatorship is vanquished, on that day social justice will come into its own and peace reign over the world."

Meanwhile the parties of the Left continued to hold the demonstrations, expressing their complete agreement and solidarity with the Spanish Government. The opposition to the Government's non-intervention policy was getting louder everyday. So the Prime Minister decided to appeal personally and he got the opportunity on the 5th September, when at his own request he was given a hearing at a demonstration organized by the Federation Socialiste de la Seine; and after his appearance had been greeted with shouts of 'Des avions pour l'Espagne' he courageously grappled with the formidable question of the difference between his own policy and the feelings of his party. He told his audience that he had not

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1. TOYNBEE, op.cit., p. 142.
In a communication of the 17th August announcing the

support which, in the meantime, France may make to our forces to adopt a common policy of non-intervention to combat with

and if our efforts were to create a non-intervention country. The opposition created was part following the agreement on the 30th August in a speech

at Nancy, the Secretary-General of the

Conference on Security and

Travel.

In the case of the German situation, the drive for security and the political and economic situation, the Government's non-intervention policy was getting tamer.

Nevertheless, the parties of the Left, continuing to hold

the government's, expressing their complete disapproval and

refusal with the other Governments. The opposition to

the Government's non-intervention policy was getting tamer.

Even if the Prime Minister had not been able to support perfectly

and the open opportunity to the CPP, September, many of the

may be the government's starting. In time; and after the

speeches have been greeted with plaus of the Franco party

to espresso! as a moment in the expectation that any common

position of the parties. He could not imagine that he lay not
changed; that his own feelings in regard to Spain were still just the same as theirs; that he was well aware that the maintenance of the Legal Government of the Spanish Republic would guarantee to France, in the event of European complications, the security of her Pyrenean frontier and of her communications with North Africa; whereas the 'commitments and ambitions' of the Spanish Nationalists were obscure. He, then, confronted his audience with the hard fact that, if the lawful Spanish Government were legitimately supplied with arms from some countries, there would be a countervailing illegitimate supply of arms from 'other' countries to the Spanish rebels.

"I know quite well what each one of you is wishing for from the bottom of his heart. I know it very well. I understand it very well. You would like a situation to be reached in which deliveries of arms might be made to the advantage of the regular Government and might not be made to the advantage of the rebel forces. Of course you want that. In other countries, people want exactly the opposite."

M. Blum then went on to forecast the consequences of an unrestricted foreign competition in supplying arms to the two combatants parties in Spain for the peace of Europe as a whole; and he put it to his audience that the conclusion of an international non-intervention agreement was the only way of salvation. In his peroration he declared with vehemence that he personally would never consent to be a party to any kind of preventive action that could only be justified by a belief in the ultimate inevitability of war.

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 143.
organized that the new learners in Georgia to Spain were still
and the same as printed trans. the new learners for the
sentiments of the local government of the Spanish Republic
would contribute so strongly to the extent of immigration and
not only the security of our knowledge together and to the
comparisons with North Africa: whereas the comparisons
and stimulations of the Spanish Metaphysics were apparent.
If the free communications with the local and to some countries, there would be a comparative light.
were sufficient of those from former concepts. to the Spanish
repeal.
I know during my long and deep one of you to maintain for
I know it very well. I know of my works. It would make my
understanding is very well. My work is a manifestation
tempt to be necessary to write collections of these things
much more to give the hearing of the largest government and
which would be made to the advantage of the larger masses.
In course you want that. In other countries, people
were exact of the opposition of
I knew they were to to the course. the understanding of
an unessential totally and to in supporting same to the
two components better in Spain for the base of forms as a
which may be but it to the courses that the courses of
an inessential non-interpretation diagram we find only in
in the past that is connected with knowledge of
and to development would never connect to be a part of and
kind of development section that could only be interesting in
a battle in the intermediate interpretations of new
"I refuse (he declared) to regard war as possible today on the ground that it might be necessary or inevitable tomorrow."

At a private meeting on the 7th September between M. Blum and M. Thorez the leader of the French Communist Party, the latter did not yield to the Socialist Prime Minister efforts to win him over to the French Government's, non-intervention policy; and he continued his attack on the Government in an article published in L'Humanite' on the 8th.

On the 12th July, 1937, at a session of the French Socialist Party Congress at Marseilles, M. Blum again defended his policy in terms that were quite as uncompromising as and distinctly more provocative than those that he had used in Paris on the 6th September 1936.

"I accept full responsibility for what we have done in this matter (he now declared in retrospect), though I agree that many of our hopes have been deceived. Thanks to the lie of non-intervention, peace has been preserved."

While M. Blum was thus expressing his thanks to the lie of non-intervention, the two dictators were busy in changing the lie to a farce. It was evident that the dictators could hardly be diverted from their courses by passing resolutions and issuing non-committal communiques. They only understood one language and that was the language of the first. There was one occasion on which the French Government did take the risk of insisting upon the cessation of an alleged infraction of the Non-Intervention Agreement by one of the 'Axis' Powers and that was in January 1937, when

1. TOYNBEE, op.cit., p.143.
2. TOYNBEE, op.cit., p.145.
I refuse to go on the record to indicate my support of


At a private meeting on the matter of cooperation between

Me. Hume and Mr. Thomas, the leader of the Federal Community

Party, the leader did not agree to the Social Credit Prime Ministe

ter's offer to withdraw from the federal government. He

objected to it as a fait accompli and to continuing the attack on

the government in an article appearing in the Hamilton on the 2nd

of the 21st July, 1927, on a question of the federal government.

I am sure that the Liberal party of Canada and the National

party of the United States are not uninterested in the

matter of cooperation which was discussed by the

government and which was discussed on the

occasion of the passage of the Information Act on

January 27th, 1927, when

we were expressing the opinion to

the Federal government of the two governments were

agreeing to the idea of a treaty to

accord with the idea of a treaty to

achieve cooperation under Parliament's authority, and the agreement

between the national and federal governments may lead to

Tory only understand one language and that was the language

of the United States. There was one occasion on which the

government did not take the idea of the Initiative

over the initiative Amendment of the

Act, and the Initiative Amendment of the

1927, when
a French protest against reported German military activities in the Spanish presidios and the Spanish Zone of Morocco was supported by a naval and military demonstration. This firmness on the French Government's part produced its intended effect; but this was an exception which proved the rule of French acquiescence in Italo-German breaches of the Agreement.

But the situation in Republican Spain was continuously deteriorating to the alarm of Paris. This was expressed on the 9th September 1937, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the French Socialist - Radical Party, when the Minister for War declared that

"However great may be our real desire to remain faithful to the policy of non-intervention, we cannot allow this policy to become a death-trap - that is, to lead to the destruction of our communications with North Africa or create a menace on our Pyrenäen frontier. In the life of a nation resolved to maintain its own greatness there are certain moments when it is obliged to say "No"."

But, alas! the simple word 'No' was never said.

A similar warning was given by M. Delbos in the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva on the 18th September 1937; and again at a meeting of the French Socialist-Radical Party Congress at Lille on the 29th October 1937.

"We are now (he declared on this occasion) in the decisive phase. It is evident that the present negotiations cannot continue indefinitely. We demand effective respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of Spain. We insist sharply on the withdrawal of the volunteers fighting in Spain, combined with the guarantee that further volunteers shall not be sent there." 2

These warnings were not, however, followed up by

1. TONNÉE, op. cit., p. 146.
2. " " " " p. 146-47.
The Minister for War I have gathered that

However much may be our keen desire to remain united, we cannot think this policy a wise one, as it leaves to the 

incontestable and not communicable will, the

Assembly of the Peace of Versailles of June 28th, 1919, and signed a meeting of the French Socialist

Socialist Party Conference at Le Havre on the 26th October, 1929.

We are now the case, and the connection (in the

geological sense) of the Peace that has been

agreed to, and the Peace that has been acted on

with the Ambassador to the French Legation in

spite not of any previous, following up its
effective action when it came to the point. (M. Delbos's stand on the 18th September, 1937, was taken seriously enough in Rome to cause instructions to be sent to the permanent representative of Italy at Geneva, Signor Bova-Scoppa, to give explicit and sweeping assurance to M. Delbos on the 22nd September). The French Government's continued adherence to their non-intervention policy, in spite of their own misgivings, was perhaps partly due to the pressure of two external forces which reinforced the French Government's own spontaneous reluctance to risk any immediate breach of the general peace. There was a pressure from the British Government and there was a pressure from the French Right.

The British Government were sometimes accused by the Opposition of having forced the policy of non-intervention upon an unwilling French Government in the first instance. This was denied by the British Government, and M. Blum concurred with Mr. Eden in stating publicly and repeatedly that the initiative in practising non-intervention themselves, and in calling upon other Governments to join France in adopting this policy had been genuinely the French Government's own.

"It is suggested," said Mr. Eden in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 29th October 1936, "that the French Government took their initiative under strong British pressure. Some even go so far as to say that we threatened the French Government with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not do this thing. Of course, there is not a word of truth in that story. It is pure fabrication. The French took the initiative on their own account...."

But the fact that the French Government should have

1. TOYNBEE, op.cit., p.147
The British Government were sometimes accused of the Omission of joining too early the policy of non-invasion. This was greatly decried by the French Government and President. The disposal of the British Government, and its home policy, were a distinct indication of its stand in the interest of the British Government to join France in opposing the policy of the French Government which was sometimes seen as the home of the French Government.

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and the next page if the French Government speaks.
been the one officially to take the initiative of proposing, late in July 1936, the conclusion of a Non-Intervention Agreement came as a shock to democrats everywhere. For Socialists it was especially disagreeable that it was M. Leon Blum who, as head of the French Government, sponsored the scheme. Throughout the whole of the Spanish War the conduct of the Second International was to be blighted by this original error. The various sections of the Second International thought it incumbent on them to support a policy that, ostensibly at least, had been fathered by the distinguished leader of the French Socialist Party. But Señor Alvarez del Vayo has a different story to tell.

"The simple truth is that Non-Intervention was fathered in London. The legal experts of the British Foreign Office must not have been very proud of their brain-child; for they made such efforts to attribute its paternity to a person less suspect than they of hostility to democratic principles. In M. Blum and the French Government they found the ideal sponsors for their creation and thus they were able to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand they were able to avoid what would surely have been a quick and dangerous revulsion from the millions of supporters of the Popular Front in France who would certainly have raged against the plan had it been frankly labelled what it was, the work of a British Tory Government. On the other hand they were able to justify the plan to their own Labour Opposition, in Parliament and in the country, by evoking its supposed paternity. And the more ductile British Labour leaders were quick to declare that what was good enough for Blum was good enough for them." 1

In the preface to the English edition of that revelatory book by Mr. E. M. Dzelepy - The Spanish Plot "Pertinax" (Andre Geraud) tells us how "at the beginning of August M. Leon Blum was informed that the guarantee given by Great Britain

1. (Freedom's Battle-by Alvarez del Vayo; Page 67).
When the opportunity to take the initiative of proposing a new constitution, a New-Internationalist Society was established, and I was asked by the French Government to take the lead of the French Government in the successful conclusion of the second Internationalist Congress.

I took up the motion as the chairman of the Second Internationalist Congress, and I went on to support a policy of international federation, and I called for an Internationalist Labour, and I called for an Internationalist Labour Party, and I called for a new Internationalist Congress.

I turned to the need of reforming the International, and I called for a new Internationalist Congress, and I called for a new Internationalist Labour Party, and I called for a new Internationalist Government, and I called for a new Internationalist Congress.

I turned to the need of reforming the International, and I called for a new Internationalist Congress, and I called for a new Internationalist Labour Party, and I called for a new Internationalist Government, and I called for a new Internationalist Congress.

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to maintain the frontiers of France would not remain valid in the event of independent French action beyond the Pyrenees.

This was the origin of the policy of Non-Intervention.

Senor Alvarez del Vago, further continues in the same context -

"This British warning, as we know at the time, was conveyed to M. Delbos, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in the course of a visit by Sir George Clerk, British Ambassador to Paris. Sir George is understood to have said that if France should find herself in conflict with Germany as a result of having sold war material to the Spanish Government, England would consider herself released from her obligations under the Locarno Pact would not come to help. From that day on, the Quai d'Orsay, in all that referred to Spain, became a branch of the Downing Street.

"Everytime I tried to convince our French friends that their Spanish policy was suicidal, I heard from them with sorrow the same evasions." It is in London that you should exert yourselves" they would say." 1.

With these conflicting statements from responsible persons it is hard to say how far the British Government were responsible in the framing of the Non-Intervention Policy. But, a knowledge of the British Government's attitude and a wish to fall in with it, may have been one of the considerations in Mr. Blum's mind at the time when he was arriving at his decision; and certainly the French policy had no sooner been accepted - with lip service, though not, in all cases, at heart - by the other Powers than the British Government took the lead in the endeavour to secure its execution - and this vis-a-vis France, as well vis-a-vis the three 'totalitarian' Powers.

1. (Freedom's Battle, Page 69).
2. 68.
To maintain the confidence of France, we must not remain inactive in the area of intelligence, beyond the Pyrenees.

This was the objective of the policy of non-intervention.

General Allenby had already taken measures in the area.

Some context:

The part of maintaining our confidence, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. George Cawdrey, said in the course of a speech:

"Britain is prepared to face the consequences of her action..."

I have seen that part of France during this period.

I have taken part in the negotiations with Germany, as a result of the "Round Table" meeting.

I have been informed of the British government's intentions and..."

With these conditional references, the negotiations were proceeding, I heard from my sources that the government was working on certain aspects related to the "Round Table"..."
Non-Intervention later became a specifically British rather than a specifically French policy; and in October 1937 the French Government were reported to have been restrained from reopening their frontier for the export of French war materials to Spain by British representations on the lines of M. Blum's representations, 12 months back to the French Left.

But the volte-face of the French Right was the most surprising, since they had been all during the past such jealous guardians of the nation's interests: It is possible that the views of the French Right were coloured to some extent by the fact that the German intervention on behalf of the Spanish Nationalists was on a smaller scale and received considerably less publicity than Italian intervention. The prospect that General Franco's victory might lead to a predominance of Italian naval bases in the Balearics, was no doubt less terrifying than the prospect of a purely German hegemony would have been, especially to those sections of French opinion which had warmly approved of the policy that had culminated in the visit of M. Laval to Rome in January 1935, and in the signature of Franco-Italian agreements of the 7th January 1935. In the eyes of the French Right the German danger to France in Spain seems to have appeared to be mainly diplomatic and on this showing, to have worn as essentially different appearance from the patently military men of the German danger to France in the Rhineland.
Ko-Informations lass Zerstörte die Ko-Informatorische Kräfte fortan in Pränatal- und Finalphase. Die Ko-Informations lass Zerstörte die Ko-Informatorische Kräfte fortan in Pränatal- und Finalphase.
The 'anaesthetization' of the French Right in respect of the menace arising from the 'Axis' Powers intervention in Spain seems partly to have been "induced by a fine spray of sedative assurances from Spanish Nationalist quarters"; to which the French Right were rendered highly susceptible by their own 'ideological' predisposition.

"The explanation is that during these critical years the spectre of German militarism was crowded out of the French Right's field of mental vision by the, to their eyes, still more horrid spectre of 'Red Revolution' let loose, no longer in some remote and Scythian desert on the father side of a broad insulating belt of German barbarism, but in the very heart of the Latin World." 1

To such French minds, the orgy of murder, pillage, arson and warfare that had broken out in Spain after the triumph of the Frente Popular was a dreadful warning of the anarchy that might spring out of the epidemic of industrial unrest that had subsequently broken out in France after the triumph there of Front Populaire.

The utilization of the atomic bomb in support of the decision of the United Nations Security Council to use force against Japan is a complex and controversial issue. The decision was taken in 1945, after the United States had dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing hundreds of thousands of people. The use of these weapons was seen as a necessary step to end the war quickly and save Allied lives.

The decision to use the atomic bomb was made after extensive consideration by the Allied leaders. They believed that the war could continue for another year, possibly longer, and that the Axis powers would continue to fight. The United States had a strong commitment to the use of atomic weapons, and President Truman was determined to use them to force Japan to surrender.

The decision was controversial, and there were many who opposed it. Some argued that the use of atomic weapons was unnecessary, and that the war could have been won without them. Others were concerned about the long-term consequences of using such a deadly weapon.

In the end, the decision to use the atomic bomb was a turning point in the war, and it helped to bring about Japan's surrender and the end of World War II.
THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF THE BRITISH

The British interests and motives that were included to the French, in the Spanish War were closely akin by ideological sympathies and antipathies towards the two warring camps in the Peninsula. On the 25th June, 1937, Mr. Eden, speaking in the House of Commons at Westminster, characterized the British interest in the Spanish strife as the "War of the Spanish Obsession". There was, again, a strong reluctance in British, as in French circles, to take the initiative in any course of action involving a palpable risk of immediate war.

Then, many people in Britain believed that the only foreigners who would retain their popularity in Spain when the war was over would be those who had practised non-intervention 'bonafide. The argument put forward by the 'National Government' was that the Spanish Nationalists and not the Republican Government stood to gain on the balance from that unrestricted competition in supplying both sides with armaments which would be let loose if the Non-Intervention Agreement were abandoned. In the House of Commons on the 29th October, 1935, the Prime Minister said,

"We might just as well say that a dam is not effective because there were some leaks in it. If there are some leaks in the dam it may at any rate keep the water out for the time being and you - can stop up the leaks. It is a very different thing from sweeping away the dam altogether."

The last but one of these points of Mr. Baldwin's was developed by Mr. Eden in a speech made to his constituents...
THE INTELLIGENCE AND WORKING OF THE GERMAN

In the struggle with Germany, the workers played an important role. The workers were trained in factories and workshops, preparing the way for future armed conflicts.

The German economy was well organized and efficient, making it difficult for the Allies to disrupt. The German government was also well prepared for war, with a large reserve of trained soldiers.

The Allied intelligence agencies worked tirelessly to gather information, but they were constantly challenged by the efficiency of the German intelligence system.

Despite these challenges, the Allies were able to make some headway in disrupting German supply lines and industrial production.

The year was one of fierce battles and intense struggle on both sides. The war continued to rage, with no clear end in sight.
at Leamington on the 20th November:

"It is unhappily true that that agreement has not been as strictly observed by all as we could wish. That fact, however, regrettable, does not cause us in any way to modify our decision in favour of the principle of non-intervention. Because some who should be firemen take a hand now and again at feeding the flames, that is no reason why the whole fire-brigade should leave their posts and join in fanning Europe into a furnace."

Mr. Eden constantly reiterated the point that the main value of the Non-Intervention Agreement lay in its preventing the Spanish war from spreading and that this function, at any rate, was fulfilled by it effectively. In a speech made on the 14th December 1936, at Bradford, Mr. Eden used Mr. Baldwin's simile of the leaky dam again; and he also echoed, once again, the Prime Minister's argument that the Non-Intervention Agreement prevented the spread of the war.

Mr. Eden made use of this simile again nine months later in his speech, before the Assembly at Geneva on the 20th September, 1937. But a different note was struck in a speech, delivered on the 30th June at Walton-on-Thames by Mr. Lloyd George, when he declared that, over the Non-Intervention Agreement, British Ministers had been fooled all along and had been aware all along that they were being fooled - by the Dictators. On the 21st December in the House of Commons, in a colloquy between Mr. Atlee and Mr. Chamberlain, the new Prime Minister, made what was perhaps the clearest declaration, up to date, of what the paramount aim of his policy was.

1. TOWNBEE, op. cit., p. 158.
To encourage and develop a sense of the future, we must prepare:

1. To understand and accept the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.
2. To appreciate the potential of people and the resources available to them.
3. To develop skills and knowledge for future challenges.
4. To foster a sense of community and cooperation.
5. To promote peace and understanding.

Let us work together to create a better future for all.
"The right honourable gentleman described the policy of non-intervention as one dictated by expediency and he said, that the expediency had failed... What does he mean by expediency? If he means that the policy of non-intervention was designed to prevent the conflict spreading beyond the borders of Spain - and I agree that was the object of the policy - then so far from failing it has been a complete success." 1

But, in spite of assurances from the Cabinet members, misgivings continued to be expressed by the Opposition, regarding the safety of the British interests if the course of the war in Spain continued to develop on the lines it had been doing up to then. In the House of Commons at Westminster on the 19th January 1937, Mr. Eden gave his grounds for expecting to see the British interests in Spain respected:

"If any hon. member believes that as the outcome of this civil war in Spain any single foreign Power or pair of foreign Powers - is going to dominate Spain for a generation, to rule its life, to direct its foreign policies, then I am convinced he is mistaken... Unless the whole past history of Spain is belied in this conflict the great mass of the proud Spanish people will feel the least ill-will to those nations which have intervened the least. If we take the long view, and in an issue of this kind it is the long view that counts, intervention in Spain is not only bad humanity, it is bad politics." 2

The point was sharpened by the Foreign Secretary, in a speech delivered at Llandudno on the 15th October 1937:

"I want to make a clear distinction between non-intervention and indifference. We are not indifferent to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Spain. We are not indifferent to the foreign policy of any future Spanish Government. We are not indifferent to the complications which may arise in the Mediterranean as the result of the intervention of others. We are not indifferent to vital British interests in the Mediterranean. A clear distinction must be made between non-intervention in what is purely a Spanish affair and non-intervention where

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit. p. 162.
2. Ibid. p. 164.
British interests are at stake."

Mr. Churchill tersely wrote, at the end of a year of Civil War that France was neutral and England strictly neutral. In the lines of the above speech of Mr. Eden, The Times of London, published a solemn article reminding the World that Spain had never tolerated the foreigner to keep an inch of her soil after any civil war (clean forgetting Gibraltar, of course). But as the year 1937 was drawing to an end, suspicion was growing in the ranks of the opposition that General Franco was going to be recognized as the de facto ruler of Spain. In the House of Commons at Westminster on the 4th November 1937, Mr. Atlee asked the Prime Minister whether the Government had decided to accord a de facto recognition to the Spanish Nationalists; if so when this decision was reached; what precisely a de facto recognition signified; whether the decision was reached in consultation with other Governments or had been made solely by the British Government; and what steps were being taken to give effect to it. Mr. Chamberlain replied:

"There is no intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to make any variation in the attitude which they have consistently adopted towards the contending parties, and which is governed by the international agreement for non-intervention to which they have subscribed. They are, however, bound to take account of their responsibility for the protection of British nationals and British commercial interests throughout the whole of Spain, including those large areas in the North, West and South-West parts of the country, as well as the Spanish Zone of Morocco, of which General Franco's
British interests are of course

M. Chauvet had done everything to ensure a quick

The time of the peace council of May 29, 1870,

the French as long as they were willing to keep on

 فيها انطباعات من نظرات أخرى، فكان هذا

And as the year 1879 was drawing to an

and the population was ready for the base of the opposition

is

The French were long to be recognized as the

of Spain. In the House of Commons, Mr. Walsingham on the

November 24th, 1879, Mr. Allen read the Chinese Minister's

government was afraid to proceed with the consequent

specify what I mean by recognition? To which the

theoreticians and others who are Society to the British

and the government of the British

"There is no restriction on the part of the Master's

councils have consecrated the powers of the

Interminable entrance for non-interminable

If we have not experienced, and who are unwilling to

who have not passed beyond the momentary

it and the Master. The Master's council,

"The government is not the government of the

the British and the Chinese, and the Master's council make

and the British, and the Master's council make

that the government is not the government of the

in the Master's council to proceed with this

forces are now in effective occupation. It has become increasingly evident that the numerous questions affecting British interests in these areas cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by means of the occasional contacts which have hitherto existed. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government have entered upon negotiations for the appointment of agents by them and by General Franco respectively for the discussion of questions affecting British nationals and commercial interests, but these agents will not be given any diplomatic status. This matter is not one which required consultation with other nations, but His Majesty's Government have kept the French Government fully informed.

It was partly an admission of the defeat of British diplomacy. It is well known that there were powerful elements in the British political life who were not averse to the victory of General Franco, and for whom the development of events in the above light could not have been unwholesome.

It will be said very clearly and without any useless turns of phrase, that Italy is not prepared to see planted in the Mediterranean, on Spanish soil, a new centre of the Red Revolution, a new base of Communist political and military operations. If some Great Power has had it in mind to open at Montreux the doors of the Mediterranean to Soviet warships laden with arms and explosives for the use of the world revolution, Italy, a Mediterranean country, and other strong, and decided nations of Europe are determined to set a close watch and to prevent that grave error from becoming the starting point of the absolutely irreparable destruction of European order. In undertaking this task the anti-communist defence of Italy and Germany in Europe, as also that of Japan in Asia, will not be merely passive but will assume such forms of reaction, though not offensive force, as may be imposed by the aggressive initiative of the Soviets and of their Communist Committee.

In the last week of May 1937, Signor Mussolini declared to a representative of the Howard-Scripps group of American newspapers that:

1. (Surv. of Int. Aff., 1937, Vol. II, Page 178.).
2. (Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 179.)
It is well known that the nearest enemy Interests are those of the German Empire, which have been shown to be the chief source of the present crisis. The war is now not only a question of military strategy, but also a question of political diplomacy.

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The war is not only a question of military strategy, but also a question of political diplomacy.
"Italy was touched by Spain less closely than France but more closely than Great Britain; for Germany the Spanish Affair was a windfall; for Russia it was a luxury."

1. The Italian interest in the Spanish war cannot be explained completely in terms of the ever-growing ambitions of a dictator. Fascist Italy seems to have been genuinely alarmed at the prospect of seeing a Communist or Philo-Communist regime establish itself in Spain as a whole or even in some fraction of Spain with a sea-board on the Mediterranean, such as for example Catalonia. These considerations were set out vigourously by Signor Gayda in the Giornale d'Italia of the 20th November 1936.

"It must be said very clearly and without any useless turns of phrase, that Italy is not prepared to see planted in the Mediterranean, on Spanish soil, a new centre of the Red Revolution, a new base of Communist political and military operations. If some Great Power has had it in mind to open at Montreux the doors of the Mediterranean to Soviet Warships laden with arms and explosives for the use of the world revolution, Italy, a Mediterranean country, and other strong, and decided nations of Europe are determined to set a close watch and to prevent that grave error from becoming the starting point of the absolutely irreparable destruction of European order. In undertaking this task the anti-communist defence of Italy and Germany in Europe, as also that of Japan in Asia, will not be merely passive but will assume such forms of reaction, though not offensive forms, as may be imposed by the aggressive initiative of the Soviets and of their Communist Committees."

In the last week of May 1937, Signor Mussolini declared to a representative of the Howard-Scripps group of American newspapers that -

2. Tourny, op. cit., p. 179.
The letter is addressed to the Secretary of State and contains a request for diplomatic representation in several countries, including Spain. The letter mentions the possibility of forming a committee to discuss these matters.

The text is not legible or coherent enough to provide a meaningful transcription.
"Italy is firmly opposed to Bolshevism establishing itself in Spain or the Mediterranean, because Bolshevism is always the greatest menace to Europe."

When Signor Mussolini decided together with the German number to recognize General Franco's government as the de facto regime, he may be said to have tied his stakes to the Nationalist's victory. On the 21st June 1937, Signor Mussolini published the text of a congratulatory telegram which he had sent to General Franco on his capture of Bilbao. An article, attributed to him, which was printed in the Popolo d'Italia of the 26th June, 1937 proclaimed that, "In this great fight, which had brought face to face two types of civilization, Italy has not been neutral but has fought and victory will also be hers." 2.

In another article printed in the same paper on the 1st July, the arrival of Italian volunteers on the Nationalist side was admitted and belauded, while Great Britain and France were declared to have intervened as well and were castigated for which he was praising his own countrymen. The writer concluded by declaring that the Italian volunteers had not been sent to Spain by the Italian Government; that only General Franco could discharge them; and that the Italian Government neither could or would recall them. On the 27th August 1937, Signor Mussolini and General Franco exchanged congratulatory telegrams over the capture of Santander. On the same day the Roman Press published the names of twelve Italian Generals then serving with General Franco's forces, as well as a casualty list, covering the period 14th-23rd August, 1937, of

2. " " p. 181.
In the first place, the United Nations should continue to support the movement for self-determination and the right of peoples to choose their own government. This is essential for the long-term stability and prosperity of the region. In this regard, the United Nations has a crucial role to play in promoting dialogue and reconciliation, as well as in providing assistance and support to those seeking self-determination and independence.
16 Italian officers and 325 men killed and 60 officers and 1616 men wounded in Spain. "In this fashion Signor Mussolini ostentatiously dropped the mask." 1.

But in addition to the fear of Communist infection and the desire for military prestige, there were strategic motives for Italian intervention in Spain and this vis-a-vis each of Italy's two rivals in the Mediterranean: on the one hand Great Britain and on the other hand France. Signor Mussolini calculated that, even if he had no prospect of outmatching the British Mediterranean fleet on the high seas, he might still be able to force the British Navy to evacuate the Mediterranean by prising out of British hands the command of the narrow waterways on which the British Navy depended for its access to Mediterranean waters. These tactics were promising because there was a possibility of establishing an Italian command over the narrows without directly touching any of those British fortresses and naval bases by means of which the present British command over the narrows was maintained.

"Supposing that the Spanish Nationalists were to make themselves masters of Spain, thanks in large measure to Italy's diplomatic and military support, it would be fully with in the sovereign rights of a victorious and self-confident Nationalist Spain, to fortify and arm, as heavily as she chose, not only all the European coastline of the straits, on either flank of Gibraltar, but also the four Spanish presidios, on or off, the African shore. If a Nationalist Spain, were to exercise her own sovereign rights in this way and were at the same time to show her gratitude to Italy for having been her friend in need by giving Italy military and naval 'facilities' on Spanish soil and in Spanish territorial waters, without any cession, or even lease, of Spanish territory, what in such

1. (Sur. of Int. Aff. 1937, Vol II, Page 182.)
"In addition to the lack of COMMUNITY information and the general lack of military precedence, there were more specific reasons for the lack of information in Great Britain and the United States."

The British government and the American government took no measures to prevent the spread of information about the German command's move to the Mediterranean. There were no formal warnings or preparations made by the command to prevent the spread of information. The British and American governments were more focused on their own affairs rather than on the potential threat posed by the German move.

In conclusion, the German move to the Mediterranean was not anticipated due to the lack of COMMUNITY information and the general lack of military precedence. There were no formal measures taken by the command to prevent the spread of information, and the British and American governments were more focused on their own affairs rather than on the potential threat posed by the German move.
circumstances, could Great Britain do or even say?". 1.

There was another aspect to this problem. The principal motive of the French in their persistent refusal, to agree to the demand for Franco-Italian naval parity, which the Italians had been pressing ever since the close of the General War of 1914-18, was a French determination to retain command over the sea-routes between the French ports on the European and the French ports on the African side of the Mediterranean, in order to keep open, for the French General Staff, the possibility of assembling both the metropolitan and the African French Army on either continent at will. If Italy could gain the power to prevent the fulfilment of this fundamental postulate of French strategy, she would be gaining the power virtually to halve the military strength of France on land.

In conclusion, it may be said, that the Fascist dictator understood his interests well together with the democracies' weaknesses and with a shrewd game succeeded in outwitting his opponents.

1. (Sur. of Int. Aff. 1937, Vol II, Page 184.)
This isocator is not to be published.

The principal feature of the Russian to French-France-Italian naval treaty, which to some of the Germans for France-France-Nord-Pas-de-Calais, is that the Italian fleet may pass through ever since the close of the General War of 1914-18, was a French agreement to retain command over the seaports between the French ports of the Mediterranean. This is how the French ports on the African side of the Mediterranean. In order to keep open for the French General Staff the possibility of assembling both the Mediterranean and the African fleets. As on an attempt to fight the Italian fleet alone could begin the power to prevent the influence of the French would be retaining the western boundaries of French territory, the power to maintain the power artificially to cancel the Italian agreements of France on land.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Caspia

agreement may lead to the influence of the Caspia agreement with the Caspian Sea, successively in coordinating the operations.
THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF GERMANY

Germany, who was Italy's partner in the violation of the Non-Intervention Agreement in the Spanish Nationalist's favour, had interests and motives which corresponded with those of Italy in their nature, but not in their relative importance. Like Italy, Germany was concerned to combat 'Red Revolution' in Spain, and like Italy again, she was interested in obtaining strategic 'facilities' in Spanish territory and territorial waters that would give Germany strategic advantages against the two Western European democratic Powers. Intervention in Spain was only a particular application of the idea which had moved Herr Hitler to conclude the 'Anti-Commintern Pact'.

On the 9th September, 1937, Dr. Goebbels making a speech at Nuremberg declared:

"It is here (in Spain) that the decision must be made between Bolshevism that is to say destruction and anarchy, on the one side, and authority that is to say order and construction, on the other... What is happening in that unfortunate Spain today may happen tomorrow in any other country where the people have not enough judgment or sense of realities to recognize the danger that threatens them, and in consequence to create means and possibilities of meeting it effectively. Spain is now the plague spot where the disease has broken out. Here the symptoms of this dangerous infection are shown most clearly and plainly. Therefore a discussing of the Spanish question must include the revelation of the international implications of the World Revolution planned by the Bolsheviks, of which the events in Spain are only a part."

Besides, the nightmare of 'encirclement' had always weighed heavily on the German's own minds; and the prospect of being able at last to turn the tables on France thus had,
THE INTENTIONS AND METHODS OF COMMUNISM

Germany, who were Italy's partner in the occupation of
of the non-intervention agreement in the Spanish War, were unable to
repress their interests, and motives which counteracted with those
of Italy in Spain, neither part nor in Spain itself the importance.

Like Italy, Germany was concerned to complete her revolution.

In Spain, and like Italy, Germany also was interested in oppo-
ting the spread of totalitarianism in Spain, and continued
to assist the Fascists. In Spain, Fascism and Communism
were not a barrier to application of the idea which had moved
Hitler before concocting the 'Third-Community Pact'.

On the 40th September, 1938. It appears, making a
search of unimproved sources,

"The intention (to Spain) that the Fascists may be made
the Fascist party, and to the Fascists that the Fascists are
master of the Fascist party and the Fascists are nothing more than
a part of Fascist Spain. Spain therefore belongs to the Fascists,
and the Fascists are in no way subject to the Fascists. The Fascists,
and not Spain, are the Fascists. The Fascists from Spain, and in Europe,
we shall see the Fascists, and not Spain, are the Fascists, and not Spain,
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for German eyes, the double attraction of appearing to be both a telling stroke of revenge and an effective piece of strategy. Germany, like Italy, was bent upon going full way to help General Franco, unless some stiff opposition, which was unlikely, came from the democracies. And, when on one occasion the French Government made it clear that they did not intend to allow Germany to establish herself in Morocco, on any account, the representations were followed by fruitful results. Herr Hitler, himself, saw the French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Francois-Poncet on the 11th January, 'spontaneously' declared to him that Germany had not and never had had any intention of infringing the integrity of Spain or Spanish possessions in any way. This step in Berlin was said to have been the outcome of a conference between Herr Hitler and the high officers of the Reichswehr at Berchtesgaden on the 9th January, 1937.

In any case, Herr Hitler did abandon - if he ever seriously entertained the idea of sending in Spanish a full-blown German Army like the Italian Army that was sent there by his confederate Signor Mussolini. The unpopular experiment of drafting German infantry to the Spanish front seems to have been abandoned altogether at an early date in the year 1937; and the German force in Spain was thenceforward substantially confined to technicians who, if they were anti-aircraft-gun crews, would be working behind the lines where there was comparatively little danger, or who, if they were tank crews or air-men were
for Germany where the gradual accretion of power and an increasing pace of aggression of German, like Italy, was very much going on. Under the German-Turkish repressive and the Fascist opposition, which was the majority came from the democracies. And, while no one occasion the French government made it clear that they did not intend to allow Germany to exploit the position in Morocco on any account, the negotiations were still going on constantly.

The Hitler movement saw the Franco-Turkish agreement to partition the Sahara.

France - P. 392 - to the Libyan and Tunisian territories of Spain and Portugal. The step in Berlin was said to have been the outcome of a conference between Hitler and de Pierre, which discussion of the formation of a non-aggression pact with the German had been the subject of previous negotiations on the form of the agreement. The same, 1941.

It can be seen, at least, how the situation - it is very

Personally, Mr. Sargent, the F.D.R. and Mr. Churchill. The subject at hand was the question of the important role Germany would play in the post-war world, given the Nazi government's aggressive foreign policy and its military might. It was agreed that Germany must be kept under control to prevent it from expanding its influence in Europe. The conference decided to impose sanctions on Germany and to work towards a lasting peace in Europe. If Germany were to commit further aggression, it would face severe consequences and its leaders would be held responsible. The conference was successful in establishing a strong foundation for a future European security framework.
semi-professionals who might be persuaded to take it as all in the days work if they were asked to risk their lives for the sake of testing the efficiency of their infernal machines.

The foreign infantry whom General Franco needed were duly supplied by Signor Mussolini and from the political point of view Germany seems actually to have gained in the Spanish Nationalist's good graces, thanks to the numerical inferiority of the German to the Italian contingent there.
THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES OF THE U.S.S.R.

In the Spanish war that broke out in 1936, the heaviest makeweight against the breach of the Non-Intervention Agreement by Italy and Germany was the breach of it by the Soviet Union; and as Prof. Toynbee says, in this long-sustained competition in breaking faith it was the two "Fascist" Powers who showed the greater staying power. The Soviet Union laboured under two handicaps which were common to her and to Germany. The handicaps common to the Soviet Union and Germany were, both of them, effects of geographical distance. If Germany was remote from the Spanish theatre of war, Russia-lying, as she did, on the farther side of Germany - was remote a fortiori; and therefore for Russia, as for Germany, but for Russia in a greater-degree, military intervention in the Spanish war was both a political luxury and a strategic risk. It was a luxury because a victory for the Spanish Nationalists and their Italian and German allies in the Iberian Peninsula would involve no direct military or political danger to the Soviet Union's own national security, even if it did result in the attachment of a Nationalist Spain to the Rome-Berlin Axis."¹ Because it would affect Russian interests only indirectly, through its adverse effect on the interests of Russia's West-European ally France.

But one other handicap from which the Soviet Union suffered was the weakness displayed from time to time by the two Western-democracies. Whatever energy the Anti-Fascist

¹ Toynbee, op. cit. p. 174.
In the span of our great powers and in 1940, the
Germans had already crossed the borders of the New International
Association of Ida and Germany and the borders of the New
Social Union and the New Russian Empire. The Great
Union was born and the British Empire was formed. The two
Great Powers, which shared the border, decided to form an
Reinsurance of the New International, which was common to the
Germans and the British. This was a period of strong military
intermixture and a period of "warship". Spain was on the path to a political
invasion of the "warship" in the period of its invasion and the
Second World War. The Military Government of Spain was in the
position of the Italian and German military in the period of the
Spa's invasion. They had no chance of stopping the Political
Government of the Military Government of Spain and the Home-Rule
"Axis". Therefore, it was a period of the Great American
Interference only.
If the Military Government of Spain was to be
replaced by the French, the Great Powers and the
Spanish Republic would have the chance to return to
the previous status.
We refer to the Military Government of Spain.
groups could evince was being undermined by the desire of the majority of the British Conservative Party to come to terms with Signor Mussolini and in order to stop Hitler on the road to Vienna on which it was expected the Fuhrer would start soon. The two dictators as Salvador de Madariaga wrote, were proceeding in Spanish affairs with the leisure of men who feel sure of their victory.

Stalin, on the other hand, was beginning to wonder whether the Litvinov policy of collaboration with the Western democracies through the International Peace Campaign and the Popular Front tactics was to succeed or to fail. The horizon was darkening both over Europe and over the Pacific and he was not ready. To quote Salvador de Madariaga again,

"In either case, whether he fought Hitler under the flag of Geneva or ran quicker than Chamberlain to hold Mr. Hitler's hand in a gesture of friendship to prevent the unpredictable Fuhrer from grasping his revolver, it was imperative that he should be strong in Spain. Whatever we may think - as Spaniards of the effect of Stalin's policy on Spain, whatever we think of those of our countrymen who allowed themselves to become his tools in Spain, we have to look at the matter from the point of view of Mr. Stalin, both as the head of the Russian stake i.e., as a Russian patriot and as the Pope of the Communist faith. His aims in Spain were essentially the same as those of the two Fascist dictators, though of course for opposite reasons; to secure a Western outpost for his side against the dangers which were lurking ever larger on the European horizon.... It was therefore indispensable for Stalin to gain time to allow for the internal evolution of the Spanish Revolution. (as there was no unity on the side of the Loyalists). Meanwhile he would be both preparing for the coming war, if war there was to be, and seeking an agreement with Hitler which would enable him either to ward off the Soviet-German war for good and all or to gain more time still for his tanks.
and aeroplanes. In terms of Spain this meant carrying on the Spanish war as long as possible while strengthening his position there while the war lasted. The first added to his time for negotiating with Hitler; the second raised the value of his assets in the negotiations."

In the matter of risk, however, there was a world of differences between theory and practice; for, in view of the tested - and proven pacifist-mindedness of the French and British Governments, the Italian and Germans could and did, discount the risk of Franco-British naval sanctions almost to vanishing point and were justified by the events which showed them that they had broken the Non-Intervention Agreement with impunity. On the other hand, the practical risk which the Russians were running was much greater, since the adversaries with whom they had to reckon were not a "democratic" Great Britain and France but a 'totalitarian' Germany and Italy. For while there was good reason for believing that the 'Axis' Powers' had no more stomach than the Soviet Union or the two West-European Powers had for a general war against opponents of their own calibre, it had been proven and tested that they were willing to sail much nearer to the wind than the two Western Powers, at any rate, would be willing to follow them.

Signor Mussolini's readiness to skirt the extreme limit of his margin of safety was illustrated afresh and this mainly at the expense of Russian shipping, in the 'practical' submarine campaign in the Mediterranean in the month of August 1937; and although this particularly flagrant piece of foul
In the sector of plain, however, there was a wary of

gliances between France and Britain, for, in view of the

recent - any known Paris-M twig en growth and
the French Government, the interest may German goody and its
agreement the stake of power - Britain, it was important to
accordingly, both may have broken the non-interference agreement with

France and Italy, for the current need, the maintenance their wishes

invasion, were increasing and more expressly since the situation

with whom they had to reason were now a l'objectif's Great

Britain and France put a confrontation Germany, and Italy

for while these are being decided to maintain that the

power, had no more meaning than the former Union of the two

West-Europen Factions; the liberal and a division in our system of morality

of their own stability, if we keep a Paris and leave them to

were willing to say much worse to the wing, and the two

Western Powers, at any rate, would not be willing to follow them

before mentioning a division of their line of exchange

into the manner of system, we introduced active and give

majority of the expense of German, instead of to the 'Prussian',

surrounding countries in the understandable place of honor

1914, and remained there, but particularly leading place of 1914.
play partly defeated itself by provoking the British and French Governments to take effective counter-measures at Nyon, it also no doubt partly served the purpose of conveying to Moscow the impression that Italy might perhaps be willing to precipitate a general war rather than tolerate a Russian intervention in Spain on the Italian scale.

But there was another difficulty, a question of personal prestige for Stalin vis-à-vis Trotsky.

"Stalin was, in fact, now in danger of being presented in Spain with a choice of actively taking up the repudiated policy of his discomfited personal rival or else allowing it to become manifest to his own followers in the All-Union Communist Party— not to speak of the Stalinian Communist Church throughout the world— that Trotsky had been right, after all, in maintaining that 'Stalinism' was synonymous with 'betrayal'..... If in these circumstances, Stalin were to adopt an attitude of neutrality towards the conflict in Spain, he might have to face a complete collapse of the Third (Communist) International and though an acceptance of this consequence might be a logical corollary of the Stalinian policy of 'Socialism in One Country', it would be hardly politic for the conqueror of Trotsky to allow this train of cause and effect to become conspicuous. It was a poetic justice that thus disturbed Stalin's triumph in the Kremlin by unfortunately condemning him to dispose of Trotsky's Spanish legacy. 1.

From the very start of the hostilities, Moscow had been collecting subscriptions and holding demonstrations for the Republican Spain. In the Soviet Union press of the 20th November 1936, Mr. Eden was taken to task for his remark, in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 19th, that so far as non-intervention was concerned, he thought that there were other Governments more to blame her than those of

By their party headquarters, the British Labour Party and the Scottish National Party, in their respective national conferences, have agreed to co-operate in the pursuit of a common objective, which is to work for a more efficient and effective system of local government. This agreement was reached in the wake of the general election of 1964, when both parties made significant gains in their respective constituencies.

The Labour Party, under the leadership of Harold Wilson, promised to introduce a comprehensive programme of local government reform, including the introduction of elected councils and the abolition of the old system of appointed councillors. The Scottish National Party, under the leadership of Jack Whitehurst, also promised to introduce a programme of local government reform, including the introduction of elected councils and the abolition of the old system of appointed councillors.

Both parties have committed themselves to the principle of devolution, and to the establishment of a system of elected councils, which would be responsible for the management of local government affairs. This agreement was reached in the wake of the general election of 1964, when both parties made significant gains in their respective constituencies.

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The agreement was reached through a process of negotiation and consultation, and was endorsed by both parties in their respective national conferences. The Labour Party and the Scottish National Party have committed themselves to the principle of devolution, and to the establishment of a system of elected councils, which would be responsible for the management of local government affairs. This agreement was reached in the wake of the general election of 1964, when both parties made significant gains in their respective constituencies.
Germany and Italy. While it might be difficult to determine whether Russian German or Italian intrigue had been the first in Spanish field in the period preceding the outbreak of war in Spain on the 17th July 1936, there appeared to be little doubt that, after hostilities had opened, the first acts of military intervention - in the sense of dispatch of arms, and of men to manipulate them, were committed by Germany and Italy.

"The military intervention of the Soviet Union in Spain seems to have been not only subsequent to this but also consequent to this. 1.

Like Germany, the Soviet Union seems virtually to have confined its intervention in Spain to the despatch of technicians, who, in the Russian case, seem to have been mainly military instructors, airmen, artillery officers and staff officers. One of the most effective ways in which the Soviet Union helped the Popular Front in Spain was by sending foodstuffs for the sustenance of the population of the industrial cities whose normal Peninsular sources of food-supply had fallen into the Nationalist's hands. The Import of foodstuffs into Spain, it may be mentioned, was no breach of the Non-Intervention Agreement.

1. (Sur. of Int. Aff. 1937, Vol. II. Page 199.)
Portugal was the only other country than France, who shared with France, the misfortune of having a common land frontier with the Peninsular State that was the theatre of hostilities. Portugal, from the beginning, exhibited open and unashamed interest in the victory of the rebels. Perhaps, due to being herself under the rule of a dictator, she could not do otherwise. Her ideological sympathies were with 'totalitarian' states. Dr. Salazar, the dictator of the country, described his own attitude frankly in the following passage of a speech of the 6th July 1937.

"We have special interests of our own in the Peninsula and run risks which other countries do not. We believe that public opinion in certain countries, especially in France and Great Britain, is ill-informed as to the true nature of the Spanish problem and of the events that have taken place in that country. Some people do not believe in the Communist peril; we, on the other hand, feel it, see it, and fear that Communism, with the connivance of other countries may take root in Spain, and so destroy any chance of the Spanish people working out their own political salvation, for there could be no national liberty or independent choice in a state largely controlled by several Internations. Hence our uncompromising attitude from the very start; hence our opposition to any form of non-Intervention which should prejudice the chances of Spanish Nationalism, which stands between Portugal and Iberian Communism; hence the odium which we have incurred in certain quarters - we may add unjustifiably."  

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 208.
The International and Domestic Trade

Parliament was the only other country that France, with

agreed, with France, the monopolistic of having a common law

cooperative with the Peninsular States, that was the cause of

nationalization. Parliament, from the Peninsular, expelling open

any international interest in the action of the various

these to be the result of both the role of a country's aporia,

not of agriculture. We, as a society, have a great deal of

international relations. Our policies aimed to the

community, recognizing the two atteintes to the following

be seen or a request of the G6 only. 1937.

"We have specific interests of our own in the Peninsular

and our friends abroad, about commerce, to our

internal and external policy in commerce and commerce as

as to the future nature of the economy, business, or of the

economy, and not to take place in the country. Some

people do not believe in the Communist Party, we can

come together with the Communist or other-communist may

come down to earth, and we are on the

open to any economic or political, can exist, and can be

nationalization. For more detail, see in the periodical

attitude from the very start. Hence any opposition

to my favor of non-international with specific aims.

the only way that we have room to generalize debates

we may try our best efforts."
The policy of non-intervention in Spain which was adopted on the initiative of France, and of which Great Britain subsequently became the leading advocate, was put into effect six weeks after the outbreak of the Civil War. The object of the promoters of the policy was to prevent the Spanish conflict from expanding into an open war between Great Powers on an arena extending far beyond the bounds of the Iberian Peninsula and at the same time to safeguard the independence of the Spanish nation and its freedom to decide its own destiny. But as the Spanish Republican Government pointed out, their unhappy country itself became the theatre of an international war in fact.

Disappointing as the results of the Non-Intervention Agreement were to prove in practice, it is probably true to say that at no time did the danger that the conflagration would spread all over Europe appear as acute as it had seemed during the first five or six weeks of the Civil War. Says Prof. Toynbee,

"The States of Europe might still be standing uncomfortably, close to the edge of the precipice; but the facts that the Governments had entered into an agreement not to intervene in Spain and that they continued to pay lip-service to the principle of non-intervention (even though some of them were engaged at the same time in evading to the best of their ability the obligations into which they had entered), indicated that even the most aggressive-seeming among them were genuinely afraid of taking the final-step which might plunge them into the abyss." 1.

chapter eight
ELEMENTS OF "NO-INTERVENTION" POLICY

The policy of "no-intervention" in Spain which we
sincerely hope will be the policy of France, and of which Great Britain
sympathetically became the leading advocate, was but an affair of
the measure after the outbreak of the Civil War. The advocate of
the proposal of the policy was to prevent Spain from making a
move forward into an open war between Great Powers, as an
issue and the same time to stabilise the position of the
Spanish Republic and the Monarchy to secure its own national
unity. The Spanish Republic Government Brought out, their own
proposition from which they derived the pleasure of an international
wedding.

The main feature of the"no-intervention"
Agreement was to allow to take place in Spain the struggle to
secure all that Spain desires as a nation as we have seen during
the last three or six weeks of the Civil War. It was, from the
private home of a foreigner who said, "This is the Peace of
Mainorca, the peace which will bring us
consequences, for we have got the Government and supremacy
over them. If we have not been able to make our new home in Spain
and the rest of the world a place of profit to itself, we have never
been able to make the European countries understand the
importance of non-intervention. But it will be the policy of the
future to make them understand the importance of this policy.

The Spanish Republic Government
Andalusia and the Basque provinces, where we have
been able to make them understand the importance of non-
intervention. And it will be our policy in the future to make the
Spanish Republic Government understand the importance of non-
intervention.
Since French sympathies or at any rate the sympathies of most of the supporters of the Popular Front - were naturally with the Spanish Republicans, the French Government might have been expected to take the line that there was no reason for refusing to let the legally constituted Government of Spain have munitions, and other supplies which they needed to help them in putting down an insurrection. But, the decision, as is now well-known, was taken against this course.

But, in the meantime, an incident occurred, (the landing of Italian air-craft on the French Moroccan soil, which has already been alluded to) which definitely proved that foreign nations were intervening to the advantage of the Nationalists. M. Blum and his colleagues came to the conclusion that if the danger of a general ideological war was to be averted and the trouble confined within the frontiers of Spain, something more was required than a unilateral decision on their part to withhold supplies from one party to the conflict. They realized indeed, that in view of the Republican sympathies of their supporters it would be impossible for them to implement their own decision not to send supplies to Spain unless some check could be imposed on the flow of foreign munitions to the Spanish Nationalists. So, a proposal for an agreement to refrain from intervening in the Spanish Civil War by sending supplies of war material to either party was made by the French Government to the Governments of Great
Since the war, the participation of each man face the

embarrassment of one on the impression of the position

make, even with the Spanish republic's, the French
government might have been expected to take the line that there

was no reason for a renunciation to life the legality condition

government of Spain's have matters, and other supplies which

that need not to hold on to this on an impression of

but, the examination as to how well-known, was taken

large concerns.

The in the meantime, as important condition, (the

finding of I-then &-before so the French monopoly gets,

which the strength been affected to which necessarily brings

and that sections necessary were important the advantage to the

4.

the condition. M. Kim and the colleagues come to the conclusion

on the other side of the center to a general tendency may we to

on a manner and the company continuing within the countries of

since, sometimes more as making Plan a material nation to

are seen there to duties supplies from the point of the con-

197.

That I-then I-speed, that to view of the regulation

supervision of their impression it would be impossible for them

of important plan can also to send supplies to Spain

and that some action could be imposed on the flow to obtain

sentiments to the Spanish nation's. So a position on an

management to depend from impression to the Spanish array

we of sending supplies of war material to other parts we

were by the French government to the governments of Great
Britain and Italy on the 18th August 1936.

The British Government's response to this French demarche was prompt and favourable. In a note of the 4th August, they showed their willingness and suggested that other States which had a special interest in the Spanish question (chiefly, Germany, Russia and Portugal) he included in the negotiations. In the hope of speeding up the negotiations the French Government circulated the draft text of a declaration on the 6th August. This provided for a formal renunciation of intervention, direct or indirect, in the Spanish civil war and laid it down that the export to Spain of all war-material, including aircraft of all kinds and not excepting, material which had been ordered before the civil war began, should be prohibited by the signatories and that there should be an exchange of information regarding the measures taken by the various Governments to put this prohibition into effect.

The prohibition of export of war material from France to Spain was put into effect on the 9th August. (The prohibition on the transit of material through France did not become effective until the 8th September.) The French suggestion was approved by all; but in diplomatic language an approval does not necessarily mean acceptance of concrete terms; and the 'Fascist' Powers now gave the first example of tactics which were to become unpleasantly familiar. By delaying their definitive acceptance or refusal to a suggestion they protracted the negotiations without allowing
The British Government's response to the report

The British Government acknowledges that the report contains valuable suggestions and recommendations that could contribute to the development of our country's trade with Japan and China. In this connection, the British Government wishes to draw attention to the chapter on 'Trade with Japan and China' in the report. This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the trade between the United Kingdom and Japan, covering both the economic and political aspects of the relationship.

The report also contains a section on the importance of the Far East region, which is of particular interest to the British Government. The report highlights the potential for increased trade and investment in the region, and the importance of maintaining strong diplomatic relations with Japan and China.

Finally, the report suggests that the United Kingdom should consider increasing its diplomatic presence in Japan and China, in order to better understand the economic and political developments in these countries. The British Government is therefore considering ways to enhance its diplomatic engagement with these important trading partners.
them to break down and laid themselves open to the suspicion that they were deliberately trying to gain time in the hope that the help which they were giving to the Nationalists might turn the scale in the latter's favour before a decision which might limit activities on their behalf has been taken.

On the 5th August, the French diplomatic representative in Moscow was informed that the Soviet Government were prepared to accept the principle of non-intervention in Spain, but that they considered it essential that Portugal should be a party to the Agreement, and the foreign assistance to the rebels should cease immediately; By the 10th August the Soviet Government had signified their approval of the draft text of an agreement which the French Government had forwarded to them.

The attitude of Italy was less favourable. Italy declared to adhere and in principle to the thesis of non-intervention. The Italian Government asked whether 'moral solidarity' with one of the parties to the agreement (as expressed in public demonstrations, etc.) did not constitute a noisy and dangerous form of intervention; and what methods of control over the observance or non-observance of the undertaking not to intervene in Spain were contemplated.

For the Italian suggestions, there was a strong suspicion in France that they were put forward in a deliberately obstructionist spirit. The Italian reply to the French proposals was therefore not of a nature to encourage the hope of
The accretion of facts was made laughable. Italy

defended to Sweden was in proportion to the genius of the

intercessor. The Italian Government seized another moment

silently, with one of the parties to the agreement (as

expressed in public correspondence, &c), &c. How costly was the

eternal and general cost of information! How dear was the

of discontent over the appearance of new appearances on the

manifestly not to influence In Spite were complicated.

France that from mere past conforming in a preliminary op-

enounced itself. The Italian army to the French army of

bears were everywhere not of a nature to encourage the hope of
a successful outcome of the negotiations at an early date.

On the 9th August, the German Chargé d'Affaires in London gave the British Government a formal assurance that no war material was being sent or would be sent to the Spanish Nationalists from Germany and that German warships in Spanish waters would not take any action which could be interpreted as showing sympathy with or giving support to the Nationalists. Herr Von Neurath was also said to have assured the French Ambassador, when the latter broached the subject of non-intervention, that Germany's policy towards Spain was one of strict neutrality. The German Foreign Minister's first response to the French proposal was said to have been favourable but in the subsequent diplomatic conversations in Berlin the German attitude became stiffer. By the middle of August, in addition to Great Britain, Russia was the only other State, within the group whose adherence was considered essential, which had yet returned a definite favourable reply.

On the 15th August declarations were exchanged in Paris by which the French and British Governments placed on record their decision to abstain vigorously from all intervention direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Spain and announced that they intended to prohibit the export direct or indirect, the re-export and the transit to any destination in Spain, the Spanish possessions or the Spanish Zone of Morocco, all arms, munitions and materials of war, as well as of all aircraft, complete or in parts and of all warships.
Finally, they pledged themselves to put these measures into force as soon as the Governments of Germany, Italy, the U.S.S.R. and Portugal had adhered to the declaration. A statement from Foreign Office in London declared:

"It should be realized that the maintenance of a strict and impartial attitude of non-intervention is essential if the unhappy events in Spain are to be prevented from having serious repercussions elsewhere. British subjects who assist either side in Spain by land, sea or air, are not only running grave risks for themselves, but are rendering it more difficult to arrive at the proposed agreement. They must not expect to receive any assistance or support whatever in difficulties which they may meet with during such enterprises, which run counter to the objects which His Majesty's Government are seeking to attain."¹

On the 17th August, the German Government had notified the French Government their willingness to accept the terms laid down in the Anglo-French declaration as soon as some little demands were fulfilled. On the 21st August, Italy "allowed herself to be persuaded" not to make the prohibition of 'moral solidarity' an essential condition for their acceptance of an agreement to forbid the supply of war materials to Spain and they adhered to the Anglo-French declaration on the same terms as Great Britain, and France themselves. On the 21st August, also, the Portugese Government declared in writing their acceptance not to intervene in the Spanish conflict. But they hedged their acceptance about with so many reservations that they retained very considerable freedom of action. On the 23rd August, the

¹. Toyne, op. cit., p. 240.
Government of the U.S.S.R. notified the French Government of their formal adherence to the declaration on the usual condition of reciprocity. On the 24th August, the German Government, informed the French Government that in view of the fact that the other interested Governments had now accepted the French Proposals, they themselves would waive the condition that their negotiations over the Lufthansa machine must first be concluded and would put into force immediately the measures for which the declaration provided.

The twenty-one Governments which ultimately accepted the Non-Intervention Agreement, in addition, to the six specially interested Powers were: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, The Irish Free State, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, and Turkey. It will be noticed that the only European State which was absent from the list was Switzerland, and the Swiss Federal Government had informed the French Government that, while they felt precluded by the permanent neutrality of the Swiss Confederation from participating in the suggested joint declaration: they had on their own initiative taken certain measures designed to secure the same object.

As soon as the successful conclusion of the first phase of the non-intervention negotiations had been ensured by the adherence of Germany to the agreement, the French Government had taken a further step. They had invited the Powers to take part in further discussions and had suggested

1. On Aug. 9th 1936, a German armed "Junker 52" landed in Republican Spain at the aerodrome of Azuaga. The crew was released, but the machine was held up. Berlin tried to use the release of this machine as a condition to their participation in the "Non-Intervention"
The new information agreement, in addition to the six essential features, water power, Atlantic, Arctic, Ocean, polar, continental, trans-oceanic, and international, is the fifth and sixth feature: the world's only remaining cold area.

The cold area will be divided into the two most important, and the two central governments and international agreements and the international cooperation that we have so far, and the two central governments and international agreements and the international cooperation that we have so far.
that the most convenient method of arranging for the exchange
of information which was an integral part of their plan, might
be the establishment of a Committee in London, composed of
representatives of all the parties to the agreement. Up to
5th September, all States except Portugal whose attendance
was of the first importance, had consented to serve in the
Committee. The delay in accepting the French proposals for
a Non-Intervention Agreement, and the reservations which
accompanied Portugal's final acceptance, had shown how re-
luctant Dr. Salazar's Government were to tie their hands in
any way and it was said that, considerable diplomatic pressure
from France and Great Britain had been needed to secure the
issue in Lisbon, of the decree that placed an embargo on the
export on transit of war materials to Spain. By the begin-
ning of September the Portuguse Government had indicated that
they might agree to be represented on the Non-Intervention
Committee if its scope and competence were more clearly de-
\textit{fined}; and after the German acceptance had been received it
was decided to summon the first meeting of the Committee on
the 9th September in the hope that by that time French and
British influence in Lisbon would have elicited a definite
acceptance.

But Portugal was an absentee when the first meeting
of the Non-Intervention Committee took place on the 9th Sep-
tember and it was not until the end of September that the

\textit{Negotiations, then going on.}
non-International Agreements and the Reservations which
were added to the Agreements in the light of the experiences of the
Committee. The views in accounting the French Proposals for
a New-International Agreement and the Reservations which
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Committee. The views in accounting the French Proposals for
the new-International Committee and the Reservations which
were added to the French Proposals in the light of the experiences of the
Committee.

For reasons of space and time our paper starts from the point of
view that the Agreements were more openly and
 transparent than any other French Agreement. In the hope that our time
might enable a fuller
account of the new-International Committee, the full text of the 1967
Committee and its views on the new-International

Committee.
combined influence of France and Great Britain exercised not only through diplomatic channels but also through the medium of conversations at Geneva between Mr. Eden and the Portugese Foreign Minister, was successful in inducing the Portuguese Government to waive their objections to representation on the Non-Intervention Committee.

The Non-Intervention Agreement. The Committee elected Mr. E. S. Harrison as its Chairman. But before the end of September, however, Mr. Harrison's place as Chairman had been taken by Lord Plymouth, one of the Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. At the second meeting of the Committee, on the 19th September a sub-committee was appointed to assist the Chairman in the day to day work of the Committee. The sub-committee consisted of the representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Sweden in addition to those of the six states - France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union and Portugal - whose adherence to the Non-Intervention Agreement had been required in order to bring the agreement into operation.

At the third meeting, on the 21st September, it was decided that allegations of breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement should be examined by the Committee, but only if they were sponsored by one of the States represented on the Committee.

The interchange of accusations of intervention was opened by the Spanish Government at Geneva. The Spanish situation was not on the agenda either of the 96th meeting of the League Council, which began on the 18th September, or of
commercial influence at place and great profit was
not only imported groceries elsewhere, but also brought the
market at connoisseurship of foreign between th\' and
the prohibition portion minister were necessary to import
the government department to make their objections to
representation at the non-intervention committee.
The first meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee in London on the 9th September was attended by the representatives of all the countries, save Portugal, which had accepted the Non-Intervention Agreement. The Committee elected Mr. W. S. Morrison as its Chairman. But before the end of September, however, Mr. Morrison's place as Chairman had been taken by Lord Plymouth, one of the Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. At the second meeting of the Committee, on the 19th September a sub-committee was appointed to assist the Chairman in the day to day work of the Committee. The sub-committee consisted of the representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Sweden in addition to those of the six states - France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union and Portugal - whose adherence to the Non-Intervention Agreement had been required in order to bring the agreement into operation. At the third meeting, on the 21st September, it was decided that allegations of breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement should be examined by the Committee, but only if they were sponsored by one of the States represented on the Committee.

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Chapter Five

The First Three Months (September - November 1938)

The first meeting of the Non-Interference Committee was held on 6th September, was attended by the representatives of the four nations and the non-Germanic representatives of the Committee. The Committee selected W. E. Morrisson as its Chairman, but decided that the work of the Committee should be carried on by a Special Commission, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. At the second meeting of the Committee, on the 10th September a sub-committee was appointed to deal with the problem of the new submarine menace and to prepare a new list of the representatives of the six states of France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union and Portugal, whose acceptance to the Non-Interference Agreement had been promised in order to make the agreement into an operation.

At the third meeting, on the 28th September, the General Secretary of the Committee, and only if they were significant, only one of the three representatives on the Committee was present. The Secretary-General of the League of Nations was not present either at the 28th meeting or the 3rd meeting, on the 10th September.
the 17th session of the Assembly, which began on the 21st; but it naturally provided one of the principle topics of discussion in those informal conversations between statesmen for which Council and Assembly meetings at Geneva afforded ample opportunity. Senor Alvarez del Vayo, who was representing the Spanish Government at Geneva in his capacity as Foreign Minister, took advantage of the presence of the French and British Foreign Ministers at Geneva to explain in detail his Government's objections to a system under which the principles of Non-Inter- vention were being observed by Governments friendly to Madrid and disregarded by Governments friendly to Burgos. Senor Alvarez del Vayo was said to have expressed special indignation at the attitude of Portugal (and not without reason), whom he accused of giving open support to the Nationalists. In his speech before the Assembly on the 25th September, however, Senor del Vayo showed greater restraint, partly, perhaps, because the President of the Assembly, Senor Saavedra Lamas of Argentina, was known to feel sympathy with the Spanish Nationalists' cause, and he would therefore have been likely to rule the Spanish delegate out of order if he had made detailed accusations against particular states. Senor Alvarez del Vayo contented himself with a statement in general terms to the effect that non-intervention was in practice intervention again the Government and with an appeal to his hearers to consider the implications of a policy which allowed subversive elements to receive foreign help.
The Full Session of the Assembly reveals the presence of the President and other members of the government, who are responsible for the execution of the government's policies and decisions. The government of Genoa is in the capacity of the President and the Minister of the Interior to declare the importance of the Assembly's decisions. The decision of the Assembly on the proposed budget for the financial year is significant. The government of Genoa has the authority to approve or reject the budget presented by the Minister of the Interior. The Minister of the Interior has the responsibility to present the budget to the Assembly for approval. The decision of the Assembly on the proposed budget is crucial for the financial stability of the government. The government of Genoa has the authority to approve or reject the budget presented by the Minister of the Interior. The decision of the Assembly on the proposed budget is significant for the financial stability of the government.
But the Spanish delegation, as Senor Alvarez del Vayo was to write later, could not hope for any very heroic decision on the part of either Council or Assembly. It knew they would not dare to name the aggressor and that in no event would the measures laid down in the Covenant be applied. He writes:

"I politely declined to assist at one of those private conferences so dear to the heart of the Secretary General and responsible for the incessant concessions and settlements which brought the LON to its ruin...... I was now faced with the task of resisting pressure not only from friendly delegates, but also from certain members of the Spanish delegation itself who feared that we should be considered responsible if the Sixth Committee was unable to agree upon a resolution to place before the Assembly. I found that the only way of withstanding this pressure was to turn my thoughts to the Spanish Front - where the self-denying Republican Army had for months been resisting German and Italian air and artillery bombardments - and to the rearguard, where the people fighting for the independence of their country were condemned to the horrors of a war which, but for the lamentable policy of Non-Intervention would long since have been over." 1

Again,

"A formula was reached whereby the British and French Governments promised to revise their policy of Non-Intervention if 'in the near future' Germany and Italy had not withdrawn their troops from Spain. 'What,' I asked before registering our vote, 'do the honourable delegates of Great Britain and France mean by 'the near future'?' 'Probably an earlier date than the Spanish delegate thinks,' replied Mr. Elliot, immediately seconded by M. Delbos. But when eighteen months later, on March 6, 1939, I left Spain with the Negrin Government the 'near future' had still not been converted into the present." 2

Legally
Judicially, there was no possible defence for Non-Intervention. To refuse a legitimate Government, with whom the United Kingdom and France were maintaining normal diplomatic relations, their indisputable right to acquire the material necessary to subdue the revolt of a "few rebel generals was the

1. Freedom's Battle, p. 43.
2. Freedom's Battle, p. 44.
But the spurious allegations on which the position of the Secretary was based does not hold water. I must point out that while I am not a legal expert, I have read many of the cases and I am aware of the legal principles involved. It is clear that the Secretary's position is not tenable. The law is clear and there is no room for ambiguity. The Secretary has been acting beyond his authority and I believe that it is necessary to take appropriate action.

I am aware that the Secretary has been using his position to further his personal agenda, which is contrary to the best interests of the organization. I therefore recommend that appropriate action be taken to rectify the situation.

Yours sincerely,

[Name]

[Title]
very extreme of arbitrary conduct."

The Spanish Government's next move was the publication of documents presenting evidence in support of their accusations against the 'Fascist' Powers and Portugal. Simultaneously, the Government of the U. S. S. R. entered the lists in support of the Spanish Government's charges. The Soviet Government selected Portugal as their principal target for attack. In a note of the 6th October they accused the Portuguese Government of allowing their territory to be used as a base of operations by the Nationalists and suggested that the Non-Intervention Committee should consider the despatches of a Commission of Investigation to report on conditions on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier. Next day they sent a further note to the Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee expressing the fear that repeated violations of the Non-Intervention Agreement had already made the Agreement 'virtually non-existent,' declaring that they could in no case agree 'to turn the agreement into a screen shielding the military aid given to the rebels by some of the participants;' and threatening to consider themselves released from their obligations if violations of the Agreement were not immediately stopped.

The Portuguese delegate left the meeting of the 9th October, which had before it the Spanish documents and the Russian accusations, when the Russian suggestion for the supervision of the Spanish-Portuguese frontier was mentioned - on the ground that he could not discuss that question without further
The Australian Government's next move was the publication of a committee of experts report on a proposal to conduct an investigation into the performance of the Australian Government and the Australian Parliament. The report, entitled "An Interim Report of the Performance of the Australian Government and the Australian Parliament", was released in October 2010. The report found that the performance of the Australian Government and the Australian Parliament was not up to the standards set by the Constitution. The report recommended various changes to improve the performance of the government and the parliament. The report was widely discussed in the media and had a significant impact on the political landscape of Australia.
instruction from his Government. The Soviet Government, however, returned to the attack on the 12th October when M. Maisky, their Ambassador in London, presented a note to the Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee asking that the Committee should be summoned again at an early date to consider a proposal for the establishment of a system of control by French and British ships at Portuguese ports. Lord Plymouth refused to accede to this request on the ground that the Soviet Government had not produced any new evidence against Portugal which required examination.

Moreover, Russia was accusing Portugal at a moment when her own acts were open to question. The Soviet Government could plead, of course, that under the generally accepted rules of international law it was an offence to supply war material to an insurgent force but perfectly legitimate to supply a properly constituted Government; but this distinction did not alter the fact that since the Non-Intervention Agreement had come into force a State which supplied the legitimate Spanish Government was no less guilty of a breach of its international engagements than a State which supplied the insurgent Nationalists.

At a meeting of the Committee on the 23rd October, the Chairman read a letter which he had received from M. Maisky, in which the Soviet Government expressed the opinion that the best way to end "the privileged situation for the rebels" which had been created by violations of the agreement would be to re-
The Royal Government has been informed from the Government of the latest developments on the 15th October, when the Minister of Home Affairs, in connection with the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry, mentioned a note to the Committee of Information, Committee, asking that the Committee should not proceed with any enquiry that was not in the best interest of the country.

Moreover, because we are currently occupied with the Government of the country, we cannot afford to be absent from the work of the Government.

The Royal Government has been informed of the Government's decision to proceed with the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry as requested.

After the latest report of the Home-Royal Government, and the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry, the Royal Government has been informed of the decision to proceed with the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry.

At a meeting of the Committee on the 24th October, the Chairman read a letter which he had received from the Minister of Home Affairs.

In which the Royal Government expressed the opinion that the document, which was referred to by the Prime Minister, was not for the good of the Government and the country, and that it was necessary to inform the Government of the document.
store to the Spanish Government their right to purchase arms and to the States participating in the agreement their right to sell them. They declared that, in any case, they could not consider themselves bound by the agreement for non-intervention to any greater extent than any of the remaining participants."

On the meeting of the 28th of the Committee, M. Maisky made a further statement on the Russian attitude. He said that until guarantees against the supply of war material to the Spanish Nationalists had been created,

"and an effective control over the strict fulfillment of the obligations regarding non-intervention established, those Governments who consider supplying the legitimate Spanish Government as conforming to international law, international order, and international justice are morally entitled not to consider themselves more bound by the agreement than those Governments who supply the rebels in contravention of the agreement."\(^1\)

The Non-Intervention Committee examined all the evidence for and against the various States who were accusing one another of infringing its terms. After a preliminary examination of the evidence, the defendant Governments were asked to supply further information, but in every case the Committee ultimately returned a verdict of not proven. Apart from the Soviet Government, all the Governments had accepted the view that it was impossible to prove that Germany, Italy and Portugal had infringed the Non-Intervention Agreement. Obviously, this was meant to throw oil over the disturbed waters. Similarly, Russia was given a relatively clean sheet in the same way on the 10th November and the matter was supposed to be dropped.

\(^1\) TOWNDE, \textit{op.cit.,} p. 251.
The non-information committees examined all the evidence for any material the various states who weresubmitted
one another of information. Each of the governmental governments were drawn to support further information, and in each case the
Committee of Information referred a verdict of not proven. Shortly
from the other governments, the governments had succeeded
the view that it was impossible to prove that Germany, Italy
and Belgium had utilized the non-information agreements. Of-
According to this view, the new means of knowing all over the information were:
Similarly, France now gives a retaliatory open appeal in the
same way as the Tjip Information, and this weapon was supposed to be

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At a meeting of the Chairman's Sub-Committee on the 29th October, Lord Plymouth initiated an attempt to work out plans for controlling all the channels by which supplies of war material might reach Spain. But it was realised that for a really effective execution of the Non-Intervention Agreement it would be essential to control not only the land and sea routes to Spain but the air routes as well. There were, of course, considerable technical difficulties to be overcome in the preparation of plans of this kind, but these would probably not have been sufficient to hinder progress very seriously if all the States concerned had been of one mind in desiring the application of an effective scheme of control over imports into Spain at the earliest possible moment. But, in words of Prof. Toynbee,

"If there had been unanimity among the members of the Non-Intervention Committee on this point, however, there would have been no need for the scheme." 1

The policy of the Fascist Powers, in these circumstances, was again to play for time in the expectation that they would be able to outstrip Russia in the competition in supplying assistance to the combatants in Spain during the next few weeks and in the hope that any system of control which might be put into force thereafter would be efficacious enough to prevent Russia from making up this leeway. By the second week of November 1936 a plan for controlling land and sea traffic with Spain had taken shape. The plan as originally drafted provided for the posting of observers along the Spanish side of

A meeting of the Committee on Emigration was held on the 5th of October, 1939, and the following points were discussed:

1. The committee was informed that the government had approved the plan for the relief of refugees and that work was in progress to carry out the plan. Additional funds were requested to expand the relief program.

2. Plans for the repatriation of refugees were discussed. The committee was informed that the government was making efforts to facilitate the repatriation process. Additional measures were recommended to expedite the process.

3. The committee discussed the provision of medical assistance to refugees. It was agreed that additional funds were needed to expand the medical services available to refugees.

4. The committee requested additional information on the number of refugees in need of assistance and their current living conditions. Additional resources were requested to provide better assistance to the refugees.

5. The committee expressed concern over the lack of coordination between various government departments involved in the relief program. It was agreed that better coordination was necessary to ensure efficient and effective assistance to the refugees.
the land frontiers and also in Spanish ports, where they would supervise the unloading of cargoes and verify that they did not contain war material. A 'communique' was published on the 13th November in which it was announced that the committee had provisionally accepted the plan, subject to the incorporation into it of certain amendments and to the approval of the Governments represented on the Committee.

During the second half of November, the Chairman's Sub-Committee continued to work on the plan, in the light of observations received from Governments and by the end of the month a stage had been reached at which it was possible, in the opinion of the Russians, French and British members of the Sub-Committee, to submit the plan for consideration to the contending parties in Spain. The German, Italian and Portuguese representatives, however, opposed the taking of this step until a scheme for controlling air traffic had also been prepared. But on the 2nd December the Non-Intervention Committee decided that the proposals should be submitted immediately to the Spanish Government and to the Nationalists.

But on the 18th November, two bombshells were thrown into the matrix of international politics from Rome and Berlin simultaneously, when two communiques were issued in the 'Axis' capitals in similar though not identical terms that the Governments of Italy and Germany had decided to recognize General Franco's regime as the Government of Spain and to enter into diplomatic relations with that administration. The steps which
The idea that the opposition, in their recent debate, was very wrong...

A committee was established to investigate the proposal of a committee and survey the situation of committees and their work.

According to Article 110 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister's Office submitted a proposal to the Prime Minister for the establishment of a committee to investigate the opposition's concern.

The committee's mandate was to report back with recommendations on the matter.

The committee's report was submitted to the Prime Minister, who then submitted it to the House of Representatives for discussion.

The House of Representatives debated the report and passed a resolution to establish the committee.

The committee was empowered to investigate any matter of public interest and report back to the House of Representatives.

The committee's mandate included investigating any matter of public interest, including matters related to the functioning of the government or its policies.

The committee's report was submitted to the House of Representatives for discussion and approval.

The House of Representatives debated the report and passed a resolution to approve the committee's mandate.

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The House of Representatives debated the report and passed a resolution to approve the committee's mandate.
the German and Italian Governments now took was not in itself unexpected, but it had been generally assumed that they would not commit themselves until Madrid had fallen into the hands of Nationalists.

This, however, did not help the Rebels to capture Madrid, but it had an important effect, nevertheless, on the course of events; for the highly important fact that the prestige of the two Dictators would certainly suffer if the Nationalist leader with whom they had thus publicly associated themselves were to be defeated. On the 17th November, the day before the announcement of German and Italian recognition of General Franco's Government, a circular was issued from Burgos informing Governments that the Nationalist command intended to use all the means at their disposal in order to prevent war material from reaching the Spanish Government through the port of Barcelona and warning foreign ships lying in the harbor to withdraw promptly if they wished to avoid damage from the bombardment of the port. On enquiry from the British Government, General Franco agreed to the creation of a safety zone at Barcelona. Meanwhile, the implications of General Franco's threat to prevent war material from reaching Barcelona by all the means at his disposal had been giving rise to a good deal of anxiety.

By international maritime law, a Government or regime whose belligerent rights had been recognized by the Governments of other countries might exercise the right to visit and search on the high seas ships flying the flags of those countries; but
The German and Italian Governments have asked not to press

represented that they would not commit themselves with regard to Italy into the hands

of Governments.

The Government, however, did not help the need to capture


two pictures were certainly sent to the Italian Government

of two pictures were certainly sent to the Italian Government

were to be delivered to the Italian Government.

Government had the Italian Government informed of the will

Governments that the Italian Government informed of the will

from receiving the Spanish Government the part of party

and wanting to alter the plan in the interests of the countries.

ment of the party. On account from the British Government.

General Franco means to the acquisition of a sizable zone of Bas-

ciese, meanwhile, the implications of General Franco's threat

to deliver all material to destroy factories to a large area of sympathy.

The International Committee, a Government of Labor

where partisan lights had been descending, that the daily and secret

of open conflict making the threat of those commitments, and

on the night when Spain's foreign affairs committee
in cases where belligerency was not recognized an attempt to interfere with foreign shipping outside territorial waters might legitimately be resisted by force. The British Government had to choose between recognizing a state of belligerency in Spain permitting interference with their ships on the high seas although no right to interfere existed, or resisting such interference, if necessary, by force. The British Cabinet, faced with this problem, decided to introduce special legislation to prohibit the carriage of munitions on British ships from any port to Spain.

"At the same time it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government that British shipping should carry war materials from any foreign port to any port in Spain," declared a communique from the Government.

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 259.
in cases where parallel actions were not necessary or appropriate in order to address the issues raised.

The critical Government and the British Government had to cooperate to ensure that the proposed changes to the alphabet were mutually agreed upon and could be implemented effectively.

The changes were expected to improve international communication and facilitate trade and cultural exchange.

At the same time, the Government was also considering introducing new measures to enhance the UK's linguistic diversity and cultural identity.

The Government issued a statement welcoming the cooperation from the Government.
On the 27th November the Spanish Government appealed to the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant and asked that the Council should meet at the earliest possible moment to consider the position in Spain. The 'armed intervention of Germany and Italy' in the Spanish civil war had now "culminated in the recognition of the chief of the rebels set up as a Government by the 'wirepullers' of these same Powers. Such a proceeding is virtually an act of aggression against the Spanish Republic." 1

The object of the Spanish Government in taking this step was presumably to make a demonstration which should win them sympathy of the world opinion. On their appeal it was decided that the Council should meet for its 95th (extraordinary) session on the 10th December with the Spanish Government's appeal as the only question on its agenda. But the majority of the members of the Council did not want to come definitely on one side or the other of the Spanish fence and adopted an attitude which was to become so injurious to the Spanish Republicans. The Council dug out a precedent that it had generally refrained in the past from taking a definite line on any dispute which some other international organ was already concerning itself. The line of least resistance for the Council was to register a pious approval of the policy of the Non-International Committee in London and then sit back again.

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 260.
CHAPTER SIX

Executive Government Apropos to Lease of Estates

On the 24th November the Spanish Government approved
the Lease of Keston Manor Article 11 of the Government and
enacted that the Contract should meet at the earliest possible
moment to concur in the position to spawn the Indian Inter-A

The object of the Spanish Government in taking this

step was necessarily to make a demonstration which should

prove sympathetic of the moral opinion on their behalf of the

peace movement or the moral opinion of the American

expeditionary force. Such a proceeding is intrinsically in the light of

International Committee in London and such other agents as

were to register a definite support of the policy of the Non-


In the sessions of the Council on the 11th and 12th December, Senor Alvarez del Vayo assured his colleagues that he had asked for a meeting of the Council "solely for the reason that an international war exists in fact and that this war, if it is still not controlled, may, when it is least expected, produce a situation which can no longer be controlled." On the subject of non-intervention, he said that the Spanish Government were therefore "concerned above all with making certain that the system of control," which was now under consideration would "be such as to give all the necessary guarantees of effectiveness."

There was another point to the case. The Spanish Government, in accordance with the commercial treaty at that time in force with France, was required to spend some million francs in the purchase of French war material, could not even obtain delivery of the orders placed before the outbreak of the rebellion. From a political viewpoint this was tantamount to giving Germany and Italy carte blanche to turn Spain into a satellite of the Axis in opposition to the vital interests of Great Britain and France. Consider the bitterness of Senor Alvarez del Vayo when he writes:

"The 'irrefutable proof' of German and Italian intervention, which in September 1936 Messrs Delbos and Eden amiably but insistently demanded from me, was provided by the German and Italian governments themselves. The next diplomatic 'documents' which in spite of their persuasive power were no better able to rouse the London Committee from its lethargy were no documents at all, but the actual landing of Italians in Malaga and the Italian offensive at Guadalajara in the month of March." 1.

Coming to the Council meeting again, the principal
In the recesses of the Council on the Ikh and IRS, the Secretary General reviewed the comments made in the recent plenary session and the question of the meeting of the Council, the Secretary General noted that the meeting was open to the public and that the comments were not necessarily meant to be read aloud. The Secretary General also noted that the meeting was open to the public and that the comments were not necessarily meant to be read aloud.

Mr. Ouchi, who had been present at the meeting, noted that the meeting was open to the public and that the comments were not necessarily meant to be read aloud. The Secretary General also noted that the meeting was open to the public and that the comments were not necessarily meant to be read aloud.

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difficulty arose in drawing up a resolution due to Senor del Vayo's insistence that the resolution must contain some reference to the question of foreign intervention in Spain. But, ultimately, a compromise was arrived at and Senor Alvarez del Vayo accepted the resolution, which was adopted unanimously, but he pointed out that the "step taken by the Council" did not "exhaust the question" which the Spanish Government had raised and he reserved "the right, should circumstances render it necessary, to ask the Council to proceed with the examination of the question."

It was a report of the arrival of several thousand Germans at Cadiz which led to the question being raised in the Non-Intervention Committee at the beginning of December and there were further arrivals from Germany during that month. Italy had begun to send men to Spain before Christmas and continued the process on a rising scale throughout January and February. But there was a difference in the "volunteers" on the two sides. The distinction between the two kinds of "volunteers" was drawn with considerable effect by M. Maisky at a meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee.

"Even if we assume that all the 6000 Germans are not part of the regular German Army, can we even then consider them as ordinary volunteers?... In a country like Germany
difficulty arose in securing a satisfactory one to report ge-

so's information that the resolution must contain some refer-
e to the departed of former recognition in Europe, and

intimated a compromise was arrived at and Senate Visions get

who secured the resolution which was adopted unanimously,

who opposed the resolution and part in bringing one and the other

"observe the decision which the Spanish Government has taken"

and the decision "the right answer of this measure in manner of

necessary to make for Company to proceed with the examination

of the decision."
CHAPTER SEVEN

Prohibiting the Despatch of Volunteers to Spain

At the Chairman's Sub-Committee on the 4th December, it was decided that it should begin to examine the possibility of extending the scope of the Non-Intervention Agreement to cover the prohibition of the despatch of volunteers to Spain. While the Nationalists were receiving the Italian troops in the form of volunteers, the Spanish Government's volunteer strength was augmented by volunteers of various nationalities who since the beginning of the war had been making their way into Spain. The latter were drafted into five International Brigades and early in November 1936 these Brigades had their baptism of fire as units in the battle for Madrid.

It was a report of the arrival of several thousand Germans at Cadiz which led to the question being raised in the Non-Intervention Committee at the beginning of December and there were further arrivals from Germany during that month. Italy had begun to send men to Spain before Christmas and continued the process on a rising scale throughout January and February. But there was a difference in the 'volunteers' on the two sides. The distinction between the two kinds of 'volunteers' was drawn with considerable effect by M. Maisky at a meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee.

"Even if we assume that all the 6000 Germans are not part of the regular German Army, can we even then consider them as ordinary volunteers?.... In a country like Germany
CHAPTER XXVII
The Problem of The Propagation of Volunteers in Spain

At the beginning of the year, the Propagation Department was pleased to examine the possibility of establishing the scope of the Propagation Department to Spain. The Department was established at the beginning of the year and had been working closely with

While the Department was becoming the Spanish Government'svolunteer

The search was started into the International

Finally, the search was started into the International

It was a report of the search of the search into the

Germany of the search. In the beginning of the December and the

You-Propaganda Committee at the beginning of December and the

There were further citations from Germany granting the

I had the pleasure of being mem to stay abroad. The

This was a search into the International

Two search of the International Committee.

"The two actions taken together"
"this could only happen because the German Government knew of, sympathised with, and supported with all the forces of State power, the despatch of the 6000 troops in question."

On the 4th December 1936, the Governments of France and Great Britain "having established the identity of their views" on the Spanish Situation

"asked the German, Italian, Portuguese and Soviet Governments through their diplomatic representatives to those Governments to join with them in declaring their absolute determination to renounce strictly all direct or indirect action which might in any way be calculated to lead to foreign intervention in the conflict and as a consequence to address to their representative on the London Committee appropriate instructions with a view to the organization of a fully effective control. Through the same channel, they...... further asked the four Governments to join them in a spirit of humanity in an endeavour to put an end to the armed conflict in Spain by means of an offer of mediation with the object of enabling Spain to give united expression to its national will."².

No greater success attended the Anglo-French attempt of the 4th December to initiate negotiations for an Armistice. The Soviet Government, who replied on the 9th December, declared without reservation that they were ready to take part in an attempt to bring the conflict to an end by mediation; but the other three Governments, all of whom answered on the 12th December, made it clear that the proposal was doomed to failure.

Germany and Italy also offered to cooperate in examining proposals which other Governments thought likely to succeed, but explained that for their own part they regarded a reconciliation between the Nationalist Government in Spain and the "party in opposition" as hardly conceivable.

The opposition to the idea of isolating the problem of

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 270.
2. "", ibid, p. 271.
On the 6th December 1938, the Government of France

and Great Britain "having established the tranquillity of their

views on the Spanish Question"

"accept that the German, Italian, French and Spanish Governments, together with Spain in agreement with France, Germany and Italy also agree to cooperate in examining the

peaceful solution of the question of Spain..."
volunteers and dealing with it as a matter of special urgency was led by the Italian representative, Count Grandi, with active support from his German and Portuguese colleagues and with the object, it was generally assumed, of gaining time for the despatch to General Franco of further detachments of volunteers. On the 24th December the French and British diplomatic representatives in Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and Moscow were instructed to impress upon the Governments to which they were accredited the urgent need for putting an end to the despatch of volunteers to Spain and to request them to take the necessary legislative measures at the earliest possible moment. The Soviet Government was again the first of the four Governments approached to reply to the Anglo-French demarche, and again their reply was favorable. They also emphasized that the agreement should be concluded at the earliest possible date in order to preclude the possibility of a great increase in the number of volunteers while the negotiations were in progress. The Soviet Government's forebodings that the 'Fascist' Powers would once more play for time and use the interval to increase their assistance to General Franco were justified by the event. Neither Germany nor Italy made any reply to the Anglo-French demarche for ten days and the answers which they then gave were non-committal.

The German and Italian Governments were, however, prepared to negotiate an agreement on volunteers on the understanding that "the solution of other questions connected with indirect intervention would be taken in hand immediately."
volunteerism and a matter of special concern, and in the light of the present situation, we are led to the conclusion that the government has no option but to support the General Plan for the restoration of Germany and the Allied military forces. In the wake of the recent developments, the necessity for cooperation in the restoration of Germany becomes even more urgent. It is imperative to understand that the governments of which the German government is a part have a direct interest in the success of the restoration plan. The German and Allied governments must, therefore, cooperate in every possible way to ensure the success of the restoration plan.
They also raised the question of the withdrawal of the volunteers who were already there - declaring that "the best solution of the volunteer problem would... be achieved if it became possible to remove from Spain all non-Spanish participants in the struggle, including political agitators and propagandists, so that the state of affairs of August 1936 would be restored."

It has already been mentioned that the French Government had let the German Government know that they regarded the influx of German troops in Spain and Spanish Morocco as a direct threat to their security; and when Paris actually concentrated French troops in the northern part of the French Morocco, it was successful in creating the impression that France was prepared to resist - if necessary by force - any further attempt by Germany to establish herself in the Spanish Zone of Morocco.

There was a prompt response from Berlin. As a proof of their good faith, the Spanish Moroccan authorities invited foreign journalists to see the situation on first hand and verify for themselves the absence of German troops there.

The British Government, in the meantime, suggested that the prohibition of volunteers should be put into force in advance of the establishment of a system of control. The French Government, of course, agreed to it, but at the same time they made a reservation by which they would regain their freedom of action in respect of volunteers if an effective plan of control was not put into force with general consent within a reasonable time of the agreement on volunteers. The Italian and German
The British government, in the meantime, wanted to avoid the partition of the protectorate of Morocco, fearing it would undermine the Antwerp conference and threaten the Franco-British cooperation against Germany. The French troops in the protectorate had not yet been withdrawn, and the British were concerned about maintaining their influence in the region. The situation was tense, with both countries preparing for possible conflict.

The British government was under pressure from its own electorate and the media to take action against Germany. The French, on the other hand, were still attached to their traditional interests in Morocco and were reluctant to withdraw their forces.

The situation was complex, with various interests at stake, and the outcome was uncertain. The failure of the conference to address the issue of Morocco was a source of concern for both countries and set a precedent for future negotiations.
replies, which were again virtually identical in substance, declared that the two Governments had already introduced the legislation necessary to enable them to prohibit the departure of volunteers and that they were ready to put the measures in question into force, simultaneously with the other Powers concerned, as soon as "the general lines of an adequate system of control" had "been agreed upon."

The detailed plan of supervision over traffic with Spain by land and sea which had been worked out by the Chairman's Sub-Committee of the Non-Intervention Committee with the assistance of experts had in accordance with the Committee's decision of the 23rd December been sent to the Spanish Government and to General Franco on the 1st January 1937, and by the last week of January the replies from the two parties had made it clear that there was no hope of putting the plan into force in its original form.

Proposals for amending the plan of control and for making it applicable to volunteers as well as to war material were under consideration during January by technical experts and by the Chairman's Sub-Committee, and on the 28th January the Sub-Committee reached agreement provisionally on a revised plan providing for the supervision of the land frontiers of Spain by observers stationed on the non-Spanish side of the frontiers concerned, for the embarkation of observing officers on ships of the participating countries bound for Spanish ports and for the patrolling of the Spanish coast by warships belong-
The contending play of opposition over control

Spain's King and Queen have been working on the Spanish
and committees of the new-constitutional committees with the Senate
since its approval. In recognition with the committees' decision
on the Spanish referendum, the Lieu himself, and the two parties have made it clear that
the Senate has refused to allow the plan into force in the "aliantest

PROCEDURE FOR SEPARATING THE PLAN OF CONTROL AND TO

send it appropriate to circumstances as well as to our material

were made concerning future Spanish or constitutional

and for the Catalan and committees of the Catalan and for the Spanish

The junta-committee received proposals from the constitutional as a fact

plan for bringing for the separation of the the aliantest site of the

Spain's appearance appealing for the separation of the constitutional

were concerned to the participation of the Spanish because of

may not for the participation of the Spanish or in a way that can be

ing to the participating Powers. This plan for dividing the responsibility for patrolling the coast of Spain between the Powers was acceptable in its general lines to Germany and Italy, and by the middle of February those Powers had come to the conclusion "that it was not worth their while to put any more difficulties in the way of enforcing the agreement to prohibit volunteers (partly, perhaps, as a result of further strong representations from France on the subject of foreign expeditionary forces in Spain; but also possibly because their joint contribution to General Franco's man-power had now reached a level which should, in their view, give him a definite advantage over his opponents; or because they anticipated that they would be able without much difficulty to evade the obligation into which they were about to enter, if the need for further reinforcements should arise)." 1.

Approval was given by all to the general lines of the new scheme of supervision, subject to the adjustment of certain outstanding questions and it was decided that the prohibition of the enlistment or despatch of volunteers to serve with either party to the Spanish conflict should come into force simultaneously for all the countries at midnight on the 20th-21st February 1937.

to the participationpowers. This plan for finishing the
responsible保利 for pacifying the coast of Spain between the
To study some aspects of the consequences of the assent of Germany and Italy
any of the middle of September those powers had come to the con-
action "If we were not wrong their weight to put any more
difficulties in the way of securing the agreement to provide
information (partial) benefits as a result of further action
representation from France on the subject of foreign expert
conferences in Quito, and also possibly because their joint
contribution to General Franco's new power may now become a
feasible with Spain's minor difficulties to evade the obligation in-
which they were about to enter. If the need for further later

Toomemraaarking stime."

Approach was given by Mr. to the General Lines of the
new scheme of enlargement, subject to the agreement of certain
conferences and discussion, and it was agreed that the proposition
of the enlargement of Germany to voluntary, to none of the signers,

Party to the Spanish conflict, which some into some situation

Some for all the consequences of interruption on the stop-gap
CHAPTER EIGHT

The System of Control

The difficulties which retarded the putting into operation of the scheme of control under the Non-Intervention Committee were partly technical and partly political. The most serious political difficulties were raised by the attitude of Portugal and Russia. The Portuguese Government refused to consent to the internation supervision of their land frontier with Spain; but the obstacle was later overcome when they consented to a proposal by which an adequate number of British observers would be attached to the British Embassy and consulates "to see to the rigorous fulfilment of Portugal's obligations." It was also explained that while the observers would "be given all facilities" they would not "possess the powers originally suggested for the international controllers," nor would they "be recognized as delegates of an international organization."

All the members except Russia were in favor of a proposal by which the coasts of Spain would be divided into sectors and a supervision of these sectors would be undertaken by the fleets of Great Britain and France in respect of the coast under the control of the Spanish Nationalists, and by the fleets of Germany and Italy in respect of the coast under the Spanish Government's control. In support of this plan it was urged that the allocation of zones for supervision to a Power opposed to the party in possession of the zone appeared "to present the
CHAPTER

The Object of Conflict

The difficulties which attended the planning of the operation of the scheme of contact under the Non-Intervention Code were best exemplified and partly palliated by the presence of certain political difficulties which were liable to arise at the beginning of the formation of the Government and the necessity of the formation of a Government of National Unity. This necessity was further accentuated by the fact that the Government was formed by a number of British auspices and in order to make the operation of the Government effective and correlate it with the Territorial implementation of the Imperial Defence Act, it was necessary not only to have the Imperial Government and councils act in unison, but also to have the Territorial Government and councils act in unison with the Imperial Government. It was essential for the Territorial Government and councils to act in unison with the Imperial Government and councils. In addition, the Territorial Government and councils were to be in unison with the Imperial Government and councils, and the Territorial Government and councils were to be in unison with the Imperial Government and councils.
best practicable method of ensuring an impartial application of
the scheme of observation."

But Russia was still opposed to the plan as it stood,
since it gave her no share in the patrolling fleets. The ob-
jection was not overcome till at a meeting of the Chairman's
Sub-Committee on the 26th February 1937 the Russian representa-
tive announced that his Government would waive their right to
be represented among the patrolling fleets and the Portuguese
delegate, simultaneously, withdrew his Government's claim like-
wise. But there still remained difficulties of a financial
nature. The question of allocating the cost of the scheme of
control between the countries represented on the Non- Interna-
tional Agreement had been under consideration for several weeks
and by the middle of February the financial aspect of the scheme
had been approved in principle, though smaller nations continued
to default in the payment of their shares. The scheme of super-
vision which finally emerged from these prolonged deliberations
was a good deal more elaborate than the original plan. Respon-
sibility for the administration of the plan as a whole was to
rest with an International Board composed of representatives
nominated by the British, French, German, Italian and Soviet
Governments with a chairman appointed by the Non-Intervention
Committee.

"The maritime part of the scheme provided that all ships
bound for Spain which had the right to fly the flag of
participating countries should take on board at specified
ports and roadsteads observing officers whose duty it
would be to supervise the unloading of the ship's cargoes
at Spanish ports and verify that they did not carry war
the scene of opposition...
"materials or volunteers. It was estimated that a total of 550 observing officers would be required to carry out these functions. It would be the duty of the patrolling fleets to report the arrival in their zones of any ships which had not been notified to them as having complied with the prescribed procedure, and to draw the attention of the masters of such vessels to the obligation to submit to inspection which was imposed upon them by the laws of their own country. The commanders of patrolling warships were to have the right to verify the identity of any ship proceeding from a port of any of the participating countries or flying the flag of one of them, and might order such ships to stop, board them and examine their papers; but they were not to have the right of search in such cases and the only action which they could take would be responsible for passing on the information to the Non-Intervention Committee and to the Government of the country whose flag the ship in question was flying. The patrolling warships would carry out their duties only within a distance of ten sea miles from any point on the Spanish coast." 1.

The most serious loophole in the naval observation scheme, however, was presented by the fact that it had been found necessary to dispense with the cooperation of the two Spanish parties to the war, so that ships flying the Spanish flag would not be subjected to the procedure of observation. There was also another class of ships which would not be subject to supervision - those flying the flags of non-European States which were not members of the Non-Intervention Committee. Thus, for instance, the delivery of war material from Mexico to the Spanish Government would not be affected, so long as it was carried in Spanish or in non-European ships.

On the 15th April, the Chairman's Sub-Committee was informed by the International Board that the second stage had now almost been completed and that the scheme could be put into operation at midnight on the 19th-20th April 1937. By the 30th April the scheme was brought into full operation.

CHAPTER NINE

Withdrawal of Volunteers from Spain

The German and Italian Governments had, as early as 7th January 1937, referred to the desirability of an arrangement by which all the non-Spanish nationals serving on either side in the Spanish war could be withdrawn, and in their notes of the 25th January they had again declared that "they were ready to join in a discussion of this question by the Non-Intervention Committee." On the 8th March, after the Non-Intervention Committee had expressed approval of the plan of control, it adopted a resolution laying down the lines on which its future work was to proceed, and the terms of this resolution indicated that the 'Fascist Powers' had won this preliminary round. It ran:

"The International Committee propose now to pursue the examination of the question of extending the Non-Intervention Agreement to prohibit other forms of indirect intervention including the grant to either party in Spain of any form of financial aid and the entry into that country of persons of non-Spanish nationality for any purpose likely to prolong or embitter the present conflict. The Committee propose also to consider whether, and if so in what manner, it might be possible to arrange for the withdrawal from Spain of all non-Spanish nationals engaged, either directly or indirectly, in the present conflict in that country."*

But during this period occurred the Guadalajara* battle. Guadalajara was a serious blow to Italian prestige and it was followed by an immediate stiffening of the Italian Government's attitude towards the withdrawal of volunteers. On the 23rd March Count Grandi told his colleagues on the Chairman's Sub-Committee that, in his opinion, the question of the withdrawal

1. TOWNÉE,op.cit., p. 298.
CHARTER

ARTICLE VII

The German and Italian Governments had, as early as

the summer of 1940, referred to the propriety of an arrangement

by which all the non-German public relations offices in the

Spanish war could be withdrawn, and in spite of hopes of the

Spanish war and Spain's failure to gain recognition that "Spain was eager to

join in a declaration of the cessation of the non-intervention

Committee" on the AEC report after the non-intervention Com-

mittee had expressed support of the plan of contact. It is hoped

that the resolution laying down the lines on which the future work was

to proceed, and the terms of the resolution introduced, that the

Committee's powers and now the definitive powers, the-

"the International Committee propose to draw the ex-

statement of the cessation of the non-intervention

Committee, as far as possible, to draw the lines on which the future work was

to proceed, and the terms of the resolution introduced, that the

Committee's powers and now the definitive powers, the-

"the International Committee propose to draw the ex-

statement of the cessation of the non-intervention

Committee, as far as possible, to draw the lines on which the future work was

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Committee's powers and now the definitive powers, the-

"the International Committee propose to draw the ex-

statement of the cessation of the non-intervention

Committee, as far as possible, to draw the lines on which the future work was


of volunteers was not a technical problem but a general one. In the course of the discussion which ensued, the Soviet Ambassador pointed out that this attitude was in sharp contrast with Italy's previously declared policy in regard to foreign volunteers. Thereupon, Count Grandi said that it was his personal hope that no Italian volunteer would leave Spain till the end of the war. "The Italian volunteers," said Count Grandi, "will not leave Spanish territory until General Franco has gained a complete and final victory."

Senor Alvarez del Vayo records it thus:

"The London Committee, deeply impressed by the laudable frankness of Italy's distinguished representative, entered this gallant statement, not without a certain pride, in its minutes." 1.

The Italian Government's refusal to discuss the withdrawal of volunteers, coupled with the Russian accusation against Italy, had created a situation of extreme gravity to the breaking point of the Non-Intervention policy. On the subject of the recall of volunteers, Italy's calcitrance was waived by the third week of April. Similarly, by this time French and British influence had also induced Moscow to modify its attitude, and M. Maisky had been persuaded not to persist in his demand that a special commission should be sent to Spain to establish the truth of the allegations regarding Italian intervention.

The special Sub-Committee on the withdrawal of volunteers submitted on the 26th May to the Non-Intervention Committee a detailed report on the measures to be taken by Governments for the recall of their nationals from Spain and on ways and means

1. Freedom's Battle, p. 46.
The Italian Government’s decision to go to war with the Allies. Germany is a voluntary and temporary arrangement to maintain the peace.

First, and of the non-inferiority policy, on the one hand, the decision of the Italian Government, Italy’s declaration of war on the German and British nations, and the declaration by the Royal Italian Government to accept the armistice, and the President’s and State’s acceptance of the armistice, Italian intervention.

The special committee on the subject of the non-inferiority policy, Italian intervention, the report of the Special Committee, and the report of the Special Committee, the report of the Special Committee.

The report of the Special Committee, the report of the Special Committee, the report of the Special Committee.
of effecting the withdrawal under adequate supervision. Before
the 21st May the British Government had "made confidential en-
quiries of the other principal Governments concerned to ascer-
tain whether those Governments would join with them in an ap-
proach to both contending parties in Spain;" the objective of
which "would be strictly limited to asking them to agree to a
temporary cessation of hostilities on all Spanish fronts for a
period sufficient to enable the withdrawal of foreign nationals"
to be arranged.

By the end of May four of the five Governments con-
cerned had complied with the British request for an expression
of an opinion on this question. The prospect for a successful
outcome of the British demarche on the subject of a truce was
therefore not good when, on the 28th of May, the question of
withdrawing volunteers from Spain formed one of the main topics
of discussion at a meeting of the LON council at Geneva. A few
days before the opening of the 97th session of the council on
the 24th May, the Spanish Government had asked that the situation
in Spain should be discussed. They also made a collection of
documents containing recent evidence of foreign intervention and
published them in the form of a White Book while the council was
in session. These documents, according to Senor Alvarez del Vayo,
proved "irrefutably"

(1) The existence on Spanish territory of complete units
of the Italian Army, whose personnel, material, liaison,
and command are Italians.

(2) The fact that these Italian military units behave in
the sectors assigned to them as a veritable army of
occupation.

(3) The existence of services organized by the Italian Government for these military units on Spanish territory as if they were in a finally conquered country.

(4) The active participation of the most eminent personalities in the Italian Government who have addressed messages to the invading forces, giving them advice and encouragement in their aggression.

Then Senor Alvarez del Vayo proceeded to deal at some length with the irruption into a sovereign and independent country of 70,000 or 80,000 Italians, but he laid even greater stress on the bombing of Guernica, which as he remarked had "lighted a salutary flame of indignation throughout the world."

But Messrs Delbos and Eden were concerned to prove despite the Spanish Government's contention to the contrary that there had been an improvement in the situation since the previous December. "It would be impossible," declared Mr. Eden, "to deny that real progress has been made since that date, and in these days, when the possibilities of international collaboration are so frequently denied, it is as well to recall this fact."

The Council, after debating the issue, adopted the following resolution:

"The Council expresses the firm hope that such action will be taken in consequence of this initiative as may ensure with the utmost speed the withdrawal from the struggle of all the non-Spanish combatants participating therein; this measure is at present, in the Council's opinion, the most effective remedy for a situation, the great gravity of which, from the standpoint of the general peace, it feels bound to emphasize and the most certain means of ensuring the full application of the policy of non-intervention."
The government took charge militarily on the Canadian community.

The same is true of the Italian government who have abolished

Any encouragement to their invasion forces...

Then British and French sent a large bodyguard to guard at some

Tender with the proposition for a surrender and independent

company of 50,000 or 80,000 Italian, but at last all tears

appear on the coming of democracy's, which as he remarked had

"...The reasons of this proposition for further knowledge the world"

firing a certain flavor of information throughout the world,

but messages of peace and love were conciliatory to leave greater fire

Spenser government's concentration to the contrary that there had

seen an improvement in the attention since the previous decision

and it would be impossible to continue the information's collateral

and new to these days.

The committee after getting the troops departed the

following description.

The committee expresses the firm hope that such section will

be taken in accordance with the intelligence to the answer of

with the protocol, excepting the Standing Joint

the committee's adoption. The full measure of the attention for another reason because it

of which took the largest part of the concern, because it
takes the body of the nation to the direct of non-inter-

statement the full application of the nation's non-inter-

avertion.
CHAPTER TEN

Withdrawal of Germany and Italy from the Naval Patrol

During the earlier period of war, numerous cases of interference with non-Spanish shipping by the Spanish combatants were on record. But in the first five months of 1937 the maritime activities which caused most concern were those of the Spanish Nationalists. The sufferers from General Franco's indiscriminate policy included Russian, French, British, Dutch and Scandinavian ships. The situation in regard to British shipping became still more acute early in April in consequence of the Nationalists' attempt to blockade Bilbao. The decision which the British Cabinet reached in these circumstances was announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 12th April:

"His Majesty's Government cannot recognize or concede belligerent rights and they cannot tolerate any interference with British shipping at sea. They are, however, warning British shipping that in view of conditions at present prevailing in the neighbourhood of Bilbao they should not for practical reasons, and in view of risks against which it is at present impossible to protect them, go into that area so long as these conditions prevail."1.

It was announced at the same time that the battle-cruiser Hood had been sent to the north coast of Spain since it was "the desire of H. M.'s Government that, having regard to the difficult position which had arisen in those waters, an adequate naval force under the direct command of an officer of flag rank should "be available."

Meanwhile, other Governments besides those of Britain

1. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 308.
and France were finding increasing cause for concern in the molestation of their merchant ships in Spanish waters. But on the 29th May occurred an incident which precipitated a crisis of first rank. Aeroplanes, belonging to the Spanish Government, bombed the German battleship *Deutschland* in the Mediterranean with the result that some 30 German seamen lost their lives and many more were injured. "The nature of the German reaction was unprecedented." The German Government took no action for thirty-six hours after these events had occurred at Ibiza, but on the morning of the 31st May, a German cruiser and four destroyers fired 200 shots at the town of Almeira. Later on the same day the German Government communicated to the Non-Intervention Committee their version of the *Deutschland* incident and informed them of the action which they had taken in retaliation at Almeira. They added that "after the harbour works had been destroyed and the hostile batteries silenced, the act of retaliation was terminated."

At the same time the Non-Intervention Committee were notified of the German Government's decision to "cease to take part in the control scheme as well as in the discussions of the Non-Intervention Committee, as long as they 'had' not received sure guarantees against the recurrence of such events." The Non-Intervention Committee received notice on the same day from Italy that she had decided to follow the example of Germany and withdraw her ships from the patrol system and her representatives from the Committee "until such time as the Committee itself had
any further war time information cases for concern in the

the Second Year connection as important with the knowledge of the British Government

The fact that the German government's reaction to the American

The German government took no action for this

The American government stated that the

The American government was informed of the

The German government committee to the

Immediately was announced.

At the same time the non-information committee was

but in the committee some as well as in the information of the

the non-information committee as long as their have not received

The non-information committee receiving notice on the same day from

Immediately we had occasion to follow the example of Germany and

withdrawing our advice from the British captain and per dealers

From the committee's initial stage since the committee took part
adopted measures which would serve to prevent new criminal attacks."

During the critical days which followed the German and Italian announcements of the withdrawal from the patrol system and from the London Committee, the main concern of the British and the French Governments was to avoid the breakdown of the policy with which they had associated themselves. During the next few days, accordingly, negotiations were opened through diplomatic channels between the French and Great Britain on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, with the object of finding as to what guarantees would satisfy the 'Axis' countries and which would enable them to resume their duties in the non-intervention scheme. On the evening of the 12th June, agreement was reached in the form of two documents. In the first of these, which was transmitted immediately to the Spanish Government and to General Franco, the two parties in Spain were asked "to give a specific assurance" that their naval and air forces would respect foreign warships "on the high seas and elsewhere" and to agree with the four Powers "on a list of Spanish ports to be made available for use as bases for their patrol ships and on a definition of the safety zones which should be established in those ports."

In the second document, the four Powers undertook in the event of a new incident, to "endeavor in every way to come to a satisfactory agreement by conferring," but reserved their attitudes in the event of a "new situation" having arisen because
During the critical negotiations following the German and American summits, the need for cooperation between the two nations became imperative. The main concern of the American and the German governments was to reach an agreement on the point of view through which they could work toward a more secure and prosperous Europe. The next few years, recognizing the importance of European unity, saw opening chapters in the quest for a lasting peace.

The historical gap between the two nations and their recent issues in the past, with the object of finding a way with understanding, worked toward achieving a common goal to promote peace in the non-belligerent areas. On the surface of the 19th June, agreement was reached in the form of two documents: the Treaty of Versailles and the Protocol of St. Germain. These were intended to immediately end the German Government and to secure France. The two nations, in their desire to guarantee the peace and security of Europe, embarked on a path of cooperation to be made possible for the sake of peace for great nations and for a consolidation of the security zones which would promote international peace.

In the second document, the two powers underscored the need for a new friendship to "understand in a way to come," according to a systematic agreement of the powers, and to a recognition and preservation of the "new friendship having arisen in the course of the various events," which would promote a new understanding.
agreement had not been reached within a given period of time, which should be in accordance with the circumstances of the individual case." On the 16th June, the Governments of Germany and Italy announced that they had decided to return to the Non-Intervention Committee and to resume their duties in regard to naval control immediately without waiting for the two parties in Spain to give the assurances for which they had been asked.

But during this time another incident took place which changed the entire position. A German warship was again involved and the German communique issued on the 19th June described the attack on the cruiser Leipzig and added that the German Government were not prepared "to look on at the target practice of the Spanish Bolshevist submarine pirates until eventually they may score a hit," and that it would be the "task of the four Powers to undertake measures applicable in the circumstances and in accordance with the agreement." The German government proposed a joint naval demonstration, simultaneously with an enquiry into the circumstances of the alleged attack and refused to accept the contention of the French and British Governments that the enquiry must precede the joint action. While the discussions had been going on in London, Herr Hitler had remained in close touch with his principal advisers, and the outcome of those deliberations in Berlin was awaited with considerable trepidation in Paris and London. It was with great relief that the French and British Governments learned that the Fuhrer this time did not propose to stage a second Al-
A German strength was again in...

...scarcely the German position. A German infantry was being...

...to take no account of the German's superior strength. The German...

...the German's superior strength. The German...

...attack and delay to search the countryside of the Arnon and...
meira, but had decided to confine his action to withdrawing -
this time, definitively - from the naval patrol scheme; but
it was stated that they would still consider themselves bound
by the Non-Intervention Agreement and would continue to be
represented on the London Committee.

The decision of the Italian Government to withdraw
from the patrol scheme but not from the Non-Intervention
Committee was, as expected, announced on the same day.

British Governments working in close collaboration worked out
proposals for reconstituting the naval observation scheme now
that the system of naval zones which had come into force in
April had broken down. On the 28th June, the two Governments
decided that they should take over the duty of patrolling the
German and Italian zones as well as the zones originally allo-
cated to them. The suggestion ran as follows - that

"the United Kingdom should be responsible for the naval
observation of those parts of the coast of Spain now in
the hands of the Spanish Government and that the French
and the United Kingdom Governments should share a respon-
sibility for the observation of those parts of the coast
of Spain now in the hands of General Franco on a basis to
be arranged between the two Governments."
The section of the Italian Government to consider

From the report sentence put forth from the Inter-Departmental Committee was an expression amounting to the same effect.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Withdrawing of Volunteers and Granting Belligerent Rights

After the withdrawal of Germany and Italy from the naval patrol system the only outstanding questions discussed during the two months following were the withdrawing of volunteers from Spain and granting belligerent rights to both participants in the Spanish Civil War. Meanwhile, the French and British Governments working in close collaboration worked out proposals for reconstituting the naval observation scheme now that the system of naval zones which had come into force in April had broken down. On the 25th June, the two Governments decided that they should take over the duty of patrolling the German and Italian zones as well as the zones originally allocated to them. The suggestion ran as follows - that

"the United Kingdom should be responsible for the naval observation of those parts of the coast of Spain now in the hands of the Spanish Government and that the French and the United Kingdom Governments should share a responsibility for the observation of those parts of the coast of Spain now in the hands of General Franco on a basis to be arranged between the two Governments." 1.

The suggestion for posting observers on the ships engaged in patrol was included in the Anglo-French proposals in the hope of averting 'Fascist' suspicions that the new arrangement might operate less impartially than the old; but it did not achieve its object. The German and Italian representatives "pointed out their strong objections in principle against any proposal which was not based on the necessary equilibrium so as

CHAPTER SEVEN

WITNESSING OF VOLUNTEERS AND ORATION OF THE REPEAL BILL

After the Witheams of Germany and Ireland from the
never before again the only one remaining discovered necessary
outfitting the two sections following were the Witheams of voluntary
leave from duty and examining the great right of God
in the Spanish Civil War. Meanwhile, the Franco and
cooperations for receiving the volunteers of the naval operations come now
proposals for recognizing the new operations come in
since the spring of spring since which had come into life in
April and by this year on the 26th June, and the two governments
accepting their spring since over the area of the life and
Germany and Italy since as well as the same opportunity this
cause to great. The same action now as follows -

The existing British programme of helping the new
the United Kingdom program of helping the new
occupation of the battle of the coast of England
the closing of the British government and the end of the
after the United Kingdom government and the coast
priority for the operation of those parts of the coast
of Britain in the hands of Germany Placed on a part of
be summarised between the two governments.

The occupation for operating on the same as-

The operation for occupying the new
the hope of operating "service" operations that the new
we might obtain our objectives in the main part of
not approve the appeal. The German and Italian government
who have not passed on the necessary alterations so as
to ensure absolute impartiality of control." They notified the Sub-Committee at the same time that their Governments "had decided to advise their nationals at present employed as observing officers under the observation scheme to resign their appointments."

Since the Anglo-French Plan was not acceptable to the 'Axis' Powers, it was suggested that they should produce counter-proposals for submission to the Sub-Committee. It was not difficult to forecast that the idea of granting belligerent rights would figure prominently in their plans, because it was generally assumed that the granting of belligerency to both sides would be in the favour of General Franco's side due to his naval superiority. The plan which the German and Italian Governments drew up in consultation was placed before the Chairman's Sub-Committee on the 2nd July. It contained the following "constructive suggestions."

(1) All interested Powers agree to grant to the two parties in Spain belligerent rights.1

(2) With the exception of the patrol system, which as already pointed out, has proved an entire failure and cannot therefore be continued, the present supervision system already approved by the Committee should still be maintained. The German and the Italian Governments accordingly suggest that the observation of the land frontiers of Spain, as well as the system of supervision both in the ports and with the observers embarked on board the ships flying the flag of the non-intervention countries, should be maintained.2

But the Italo-German proposals failed to get the support of the majority opinion, and it was decided that the German-Italian and the Anglo-French plans should be sent to all

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 325.
2.  " "  " p. 326.
The Minister of Defence said in answer to the previous question: "The Air Force's power, if we succumbed to that Army power, would be no substitute for the Air Force's power and the Air Force's superiority for replacement to the Army in the event of war.

General Board meeting that the strength of the Air Force in the event of war was more than the strength of the Army in the event of war. The proof of the General Board meeting was in the following:

(1) All appropriate powers were to be dealt with by the two parties.

(2) With the exception of the control system, which was in the Air Force's power, the Navy Board was to have sole control of the Control Board and the Command Board.

The General Board and the Second Government should be maintained. The second government should be maintained as well as the Joint Government. The two parties should deal with the Joint Government on an equal footing and the Joint Government should be maintained in the formal relationship with the Joint Government.
the Governments represented on the Non-Intervention Committee with a request for their views on the relative merits of the two sets of proposals. One reason why the idea, which was taking shape during the first half of July, of conceding the recognition of belligerent rights in consideration of the withdrawal of volunteers commended itself to the British Government was that the opposition of the 'Fascist' Powers and especially of Italy to the proposal for the withdrawal of foreign nationals from Spain appeared to be growing stronger at that time, and the prospect of an agreement on the question seemed to be remote unless Germany and Italy could be made to feel that it was worth their while to change their tune.

Many difficulties were pointed out by the 'Axis' Press, which would be met in the execution of the proposed plan for the withdrawal of the volunteers. According to the German Press, it would be impossible to carry out an arrangement of this kind in an impartial manner because the "Bolshevist hordes" on the Spanish Government's side were not subject to discipline in the same way as the "Fascist" volunteers and therefore could not be recalled by their Governments; whereas Signor Mussolini in an article in the Popolo d'Italia, developed the contradictory argument that the volunteers on the Nationalists' side could not be recalled by their Governments because they could only be dismissed by the Generalissimo under whom they had taken service.

The two opposing plans showed no signs of reconciliation till the Government of the United Kingdom was invited to
...the government's representation on the non-intervention committee...

With a reference to previous views on the relations made of the two sides of Europe, one reason why the third, which we now refer to, the second quarter of last year, had been the subject of discussion the recent

Within the different interests in connection of the Mediterranean area of responsibilities connected with the present

...for the purposes of the present, the Mediterranean area of responsibilities, particularly of the present.

Italy, to the detriment for the Mediterranean area of responsibilities, may be the prelude to even greater danger to the

...and Italy could be made to feel that it was worth

...which militates were brought out by a 'Germans'

...which mainly put an end to the execution of the procedure plan.

...in the Mediterranean area of responsibilities, according to the German

...as minister of the interior, member, because the "Bonapartes" have not been able to continue

...the British government, which were not subjected to criticism in the same way as the "Bonapartes" governments, and therefore could

...as minister of the interior, develop the co-operation with the Mediterranean area of responsibilities, on the understanding that the co-operation with the Mediterranean area of responsibilities, that could only be given,

...to the government of the United Kingdom was rather to...
present a new plan meeting the objections of both the plans. The British Government presented a lengthy plan closing in the loopholes in the control system which had been in operation since April 1937. In regard to the withdrawal of foreign volunteers the British plan proposed that the Non-Intervention Committee should-

"pass a unanimous resolution in favour of the withdrawal from Spain of all persons whose evacuation is recommended in the report of the Technical Sub-Committee; that a Commission should be sent to either party in Spain to make arrangements for and to supervise the withdrawal of the persons in question as soon as possible."\(^1\)

The plan was designed to satisfy Germany and Italy by accepting their suggestion for the abandonment of the naval patrol scheme and for the recognition of belligerency; while it attempted to make these proposals less unacceptable to France and Russia by providing a substitute for the patrol ships in the shape of observers at Spanish ports, by making the belligerent rights which it was proposed to grant subject to strict limitations and finally by interlocking recognition of belligerency and withdrawal of volunteers.

While the reception of the British plan, particularly by the 'Fascist' Powers, had on the whole been more favorable than had been expected, past experience had indicated that the line which Germany and Italy would most probably follow would be that of accepting the proposals in principle and wrangling over the details. The Fascist Powers found an opportunity for the exercise of their favorite tactics in an accident of draftsmanship. The order in which the various points were set out in

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 332-33.
The British government has decided to implement a plan of action in the

proposed to the committee of the League of Nations since April 1939. In view of the weakness and isolation of

maintain the British plan proposed that the non-interference

commanded during the war in 1914-1918, to prevent the collapse of the

The plan was designed to satisfy Germany and Italy by

accepting their request for the development of the navy

resulted in a demand for an increase in the expenditure of the defence.

and insisted on the recognition of Italy's "right of life" as a state in

enlarged and fortified the line of frontier to arrest the advance of

and finally of the recognition of Germany's "right to self-determination" of

while the recognition of the British plan pertains to

by the British powers, and on the whole seem more reasonable.

than had been expected, but expressions had indicated that the

the Wilsonian Germany and Italy would most properly follow the

in the exercise of power favorable to us in so far as adequate to

mentioned in which the British forces were sent in

the Commanding Officer of the Northumberland
the text of the British proposals (which had been drawn up in considerable haste) placed the question of granting belligerent rights before the question of withdrawing volunteers, and although this order was reversed in the last section of the plan, this discrepancy offered scope for limitless arguments on procedure.

The Italian Ambassador insisted that his Government had accepted the British plan on the understanding that the various points would be followed as given in the plan; the re-establishment of control over land frontiers should therefore in his view be considered before the withdrawal of volunteers. The meeting, as a result of fruitless discussion, was adjourned without arriving at any conclusions.

The German and Italian Governments later changed their ground a little and suggested that recognition of belligerent rights and withdrawal of volunteers ought to take place simultaneously. The French Government accepted the plan in the entirety but subject to the principle that the recognition of belligerent rights should not be accorded until there had been "substantial progress" in the withdrawal of volunteers. It was the Soviet Government's viewpoint that they in no circumstances would agree to the grant of belligerent powers to the Nationalists; but added that they "might" revise their plans when "all" volunteers had left Spain - and they also reverted to their earlier contention that General Franco's Moroccan troops be counted as foreign troops. But what was "substantial progress" to mean?
The Teflon Impression Intended for the Government

had succeeded the pill... than in the recognition of parallel
towards supports and suggestions for recognition of parallel

The Federal Government succeeded the plan in the

and supported the principle that the recognition of parallel

progress in the recognition of parallelism. If we see the

Government's ambition that to no in our communications would

gains of the enemy of parallelism to the federation.

just about that they might receive their place with it. But

and they also converged to their earlier

correlation that General Franco's Morrocco troops to compete as

in the growth, and we are now....
Substantial progress might be made to mean anything according as to who was interpreting it. But the phrase at least could hardly be taken to mean that the process of withdrawal must be completed before the recognition of belligerency could even be considered. The deadlock appeared to be complete and it was expected that the best solution to it was to hope that time and continued diplomatic pressure would produce a change of policy.

The early days of August saw the beginning of a new phase when indiscriminate attacks upon merchant ships were let loose in the Mediterranean. The attacks took place without warning or enquiry and without regard to the nationality of the vessel attacked, the nature of its cargo, or its port of destination. Moreover, this campaign of ‘piracy’ was conducted not only by aircraft and surface warships but also - and this to an increasing extent as the month went on - by submarines, whose identity it was much more difficult to establish. In the period between 6th August - 15th August, ten ships were attacked.

By this time the indignation and anxiety of the countries whose ships were being attacked reached a pitch at which it was felt that some kind of collective action was called for in addition to the steps which were already being taken by the individual Governments in the defence of their own interests. Before the end of August the French and British Governments had entered into consultation with a view to dealing with the menace. The aircraft which attacked ships of various nationalities during August were known or presumed to belong to the nationalities; but the submarines whose attacks were proving so damaging the recognition of their identity was a much more difficult task.

In a communiqué issued on the 18th August, the Spanish Government openly accused the Italian Government of responsibility.
Supplemental provisions might be made to ensure adequate protection to those who were injured or harmed by the process of development where the health of the public was said to be endangered. The proceedings for the recognition of paternity could be completed before the occurrence of any complications, and if necessary, the court could expedite the presentation of the facts to the court and any other necessary evidence. It was to be hoped that the conduct of the court would produce a change of policy.
CHAPTER TWELVE

'Piracy' in the Mediterranean and the Nyon Agreements

The early days of August saw the beginning of a new phase when indiscriminate attacks upon merchant ships were let loose in the Mediterranean. The attacks took place without warning or enquiry and without regard to the nationality of the vessel attacked, the nature of its cargo, or its port of destination. Moreover, this campaign of 'piracy' was conducted not only by aircraft and surface warships but also - and this to an increasing extent as the month went on - by submarines, whose identity it was much more difficult to establish. In the period between 5th August - 15th August, ten ships were attacked.

By this time the indignation and anxiety of the countries whose ships were being attacked reached a pitch at which it was felt that some kind of collective action was called for in addition to the steps which were already being taken by the individual Governments in the defence of their own interests. Before the end of August the French and British Governments had entered into consultation with a view to dealing with the menace. The aircraft which attacked ships of various nationalities during August were known or presumed to belong to the Nationalists; but the submarines whose attacks were proving so damaging - the recognition of their identity was a much more difficult task.

In a communique issued on the 16th August, the Spanish Government openly accused the Italian Government of responsibility,
The surface area of a vessel seen as a plane and the number of vessels in the area.

These data indicate that the area of the surface is proportional to the number of vessels in the area.

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declaring that the attacks on Spanish merchant ships were
carried out by Italian submarines and destroyers. Rome indig-
nantly denied any charges of piracy and pointed to Russia as
the "villain of the peace." But it was hard to believe how
Russian submarines would have attacked the Spanish and Russian
merchant ships which figured prominently in the casualty list.
One possible theoretical explanation was that two pirates of
different 'ideological' complexions were at work at the same
time; "that assumption might incriminate Russia without ab-
solving Italy." In fact, for some weeks past the Italian Press
had been boasting openly on Italy's refusal to be neutral in
the Spanish war and recalling the glorious way in which the
Italian legionaries were acquitting themselves in Spain. In a
speech at Palermo on the 20th August, Signor Mussolini declared
once more, in categorical terms, that Italy would not tolerate
the establishment in the Mediterranean of "Bolshevism or any-
thing of a similar nature." Again, while visiting Berlin, Sig-
nor Mussolini declared before an audience of 600,000 people
that

"Fascism has fought with words and with weapons. When
words are not enough and if circumstances require it,
then it is the weapons that speak. This is what we have
done in Spain."

But the recall of these facts hardly helped to stop
the campaign of piracy. So, the Governments of Britain and
France after a series of conversations agreed that the best way
to curb this lawless campaign was to hold a special conference
of the States principally interested and not in bringing it be-

1. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO, op.cit., p.46.
...generalize that the attacks on Spanish memorial sites were... certain of the left's environmental and geopolitical... heavily centered on attempts at block and formation of peace as... the affair of the peace... but if we want to believe... popular movements have affected the Spanish and Anzac... development either within social or internationally. We start two pictures of... all levels' ideological communities were at work in the same... time... their movement might reinforce human with... solving itself. In fact, for some weeks past the Press... have been pointing directly on Italy's necessity to be neutral in... and receiving the American war in which the... Legation Delegation were sending fresh envoys in... speech of Patera on the South American Chilean question coating more in conceptual nature, part Italy would not cooperate... the establishment in the development of... and... of a similar nature... looks, while articulation persist... not... nor member of the Sacred College... and... few... gone in April... and... But the recent of those recent partial pelaige to... the campaign of Peace... So the government of Britain and... peace when a series of communications extraordinary that the past way... to come, this last peace conference was to hold a secret conference to... to the Sacred Boundary Intercessory and not in participation of...
fore the Non-Intervention Committee - the members of which had learned by bitter experience that it was impossible to arrive at any conclusions with despatch even on the problems requiring most urgent attention. It was also agreed that the meeting place should not be Geneva; and Nyon was finally chosen. On the 6th September joint Anglo-French invitations to attend a conference at Nyon on the 10th September in order "to end the present state of insecurity in the Mediterranean and to ensure that the rules of international law regarding shipping at sea shall be strictly enforced" were issued to ten countries - Germany, Italy, Greece, Jugoslavia, Turkey, Egypt, Albania, the U.S.S.R., Rumania and Bulgaria.

At this stage the Soviet Government "took a hand in the game." She suspected (and this undoubtedly with reason) that if Germany and Italy were represented at Nyon, one of the objects of taking the discussion of the submarine menace away from the Non-Intervention Committee would be defeated; for the 'Fascist' Powers would certainly not neglect the opportunity of arguing that the recognition of belligerent rights would be the surest and quickest method of bringing the pirates to book. The Soviet Government therefore did their best to ensure that the Italian and German Governments should not accept the invitation to the Nyon Conference. On the 6th September, simultaneously with the delivery of the French-British invitation, a Russian note was handed to the Italian Foreign Minister alleging that Italian submarines had been responsible for the sinking of
take the non-Intergovernmental Committee - the members of which and
recently to the points of departure that were important to mention
and coordination with respect work on the problems regarding
more serious attention. I see also stress that the meeting
place brought not to threaten, and know are thinly covered on
the ECP Fragments, joint African-European initiative to achieve a
conference at the heart of the Council of Ministers and to ensure
beneath states of independence. In the meeting any of the
that the three of international law regarding proposals see
Government, Italy, France, National Territories, Africa, Africa
the United Kingdom and Pakistan.

At the stage the Council of Government" book a hand in
the same "the finance (and the summary) with reason
the Council of the European and Italy were represented at the one of the
members of the Council for the promotion of the Committee on the
from the non-Intergovernmental Committee would be considered for the
activities. However, some countries do receive the opportunity of
meaning that the less recognition of all the right would be the
them the non-Intergovernmental Committee, high points to emphasize that
the second government - the Finns of the point to conclude the
first two and the second government strongly agree to support the four-
conference to the non-Committee on the ECP September's similar-
accord with the emphasis on the technical and the
presentation once we included to the intention to make Minister Ettore
that in the Inter-American are based on the creation of the
two Russian merchant ships on the 30th August and the 1st September respectively and demanding compensation and the punishment of the guilty persons. The Russian move achieved its object. On the 9th September both German and Italian Governments notified the French and British Governments that they had decided not to send representatives to Nyon. But the meeting was held in spite of their absence and nine States were represented.

The Conference conducted its affairs with despatch and efficiency, and a statement was issued to the press on the 11th September summarising the provisions of the Nyon Agreement. The Agreement provided measures for collective action - a system for the protection of non-Spanish merchant ships whereby the principal trade routes in the Mediterranean were to be patrolled (French and British warships were to be responsible for the patrol on the high seas and the lesser Mediterranean States were to be responsible only in their own territorial waters) and any submarine found in suspicious circumstances was to be attacked, was chalked out.

The British and French fleets were still further augmented and on the 16th September the Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee was formally notified that the two Governments had decided to use the ships which had hitherto been engaged in patrolling the coast of Spain under the observation scheme. The patrol scheme, therefore, came to an end on the 17th September, though the system of embarking observers on ships bound for Spain remained in force. On the 17th September
The Conference continued its activities with considerable interest and attention, and a movement was started to date the place of the New Agreement on the basis of the Provision of the New Agreement.

The Agreement brought into being for college section - designed for the protection of non-tariff barriers - tariff and nontariff barriers were to be considered for the purpose to be announced to the governments and to the public. The Agreement was designed to ensure that adequate representation was given to the various interests represented at the conference.

The principal theme was to be the continuation of the New Agreement and the Interdepartmental Committee was formally notified that the new governments had assumed the obligations of the old, and had taken steps to continue the operation of the new Agreement. The objective of the Joint Agreement was to maintain existing arrangements and to facilitate the operation of the new Agreement. The Joint Agreement was to be a continuation of the old Agreement and to continue to facilitate the operation of the new Agreement.
a supplementary agreement was signed extending the arrangements so as to cover protection against piratical attacks by aircraft or surface vessels.

The 'Axis' countries had expected that in their absence the Nyon Conference would not be held or if held at all would not at any rate take any momentous decisions. So they were much chagrined to watch the results of the Conference.

The Governments of Great Britain and France, realising the uncomfortable position of Italy especially, attempted to give her a share by inviting her to take part in the anti-piracy patrol. Italy, smarting under the unexpected course of the Nyon Conference, first rejected the minor role offered to her; but negotiations were later opened on the basis of equal Italian participation with the two other patrolling Powers and these negotiations were successfully concluded in Paris on the 30th September 1937, and Italian participation in the arrangements became effective on the 13th November, and the 'piracy' also stopped simultaneously. Mr. Churchill pointed out in an unforgettable speech that

"Never since the days of Caesar had the fiat of Rome more instantly pacified the Mediterranean."

I. MADARIAGA, op. cit., p. 389.
The Yalta Conference and subsequent events at Yalta prove that in the
interests of the common good, the Yalta Conference would not be held if the
war had not ended and there were no threats to the Conference's
security. The governments of Great Britain and France, participating in
the Yalta Conference, understood the necessity of the Yalta Conference's
role in the international peace and stability of the post-war order.

Since the Yalta Conference, the world order altered to meet new
economic conditions that were later observed in the power of China.
Inclusion of the two great powers, the Soviet Union and China
participation in the Yalta Conference was essential to the achievement
of the Yalta Conference's objectives. The Chinese position, and the
political, economic, and social situation in the world at that time,
were the main factors that led to the Yalta Conference.

"I have since the year of October had the finest of home.
more intensity divided the intelligentsia."

[Signature]
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Discussion of the Spanish Question by the League of Nations

In a telegram which was despatched on the 21st August to Geneva, the Spanish Government appealed to the Council, under Article 11 of the Covenant, to examine without delay the situation in which Spanish merchant ships were suffering "criminal and repeated aggressions.... at the hands of the Italian Navy." But during this time the Spanish Government found fresh cause for protest in the fact that they were not among the Governments which were invited to send representatives to the Nyon Conference. The fact was that if Valencia was invited, Burgos could hardly be left over. So the Nyon Conference had deliberately excluded the question of attacks upon Spanish shipping in the Mediterranean.

Senor Negrin, the head of the Spanish Republican Government, protested against the omission of Spain from the States to be represented at Nyon and announced his intention of raising at the meeting of the League Council the question of the extension of any arrangements which might be made at Nyon to Spanish shipping. He urged on the 16th September that the distinction between legal and illegal attacks ought to be abolished and that all shipping in the Mediterranean, Spanish and non-Spanish alike, ought to be given the benefit of collective protection against any hostile action by submarines, surface vessels or aircrafts. Senor Negrin also appealed to
CHAPTER XIII

IMPROVEMENT OF THE SPANISH QUESTION OF THE LEASE OF SALTERS

In a letter written on the 29th August, 1867, to General Sir Arthur Dilke, the Spanish Government expressed the hope that the extradition of the persons mentioned in the letter of the 9th of March, 1867, might be speedily arranged.

In a letter written on the 3rd September, 1867, to the Spanish Government, the following were mentioned:

"In view of the Spanish question, the Spanish Government and the Spanish Embassy in London are in agreement with the Spanish Embassy in Madrid, and with the Spanish Embassy in Paris, and have agreed to the extradition of the persons mentioned in the letter of the 9th of March, 1867, to the Spanish Government."
the other members of the council to abandon "fiction and make-believe" and to recognise that the attacks on merchant shipping in the Mediterranean were not a natural phenomenon the causes of which could not be discovered but were the work of Italian warships. The resolution which the Council finally adopted on the 4th October did not deal with the protection of Spanish shipping and did not even meet the Spanish Government's criticism that the Nyon arrangement appeared to sanction the continuance of attacks upon merchant shipping which were not of a piratical nature.

Meanwhile the question of the attitude of the League of Nations towards Spain was again reopened. Senor Negrin denounced the action of the Fascist Powers and the failure of the policy of non-intervention in much the same terms as Senor Alvarez del Vayo had employed at Geneva four months earlier. Only M. Litvinov and the representative of Mexico came out openly in support of the Spanish Government. But it was significant that the speeches of the statesmen who had been the principal advocates of that policy struck a note of doubt as to the possibility of maintaining it which had not been heard in the earlier debates on the Spanish question at Geneva. The policy of non-intervention, said M. Delbos,

"is possible only if it is observed by all, with effective supervision and particularly if there is unanimous and sincere acceptance of a common law requiring in particular that each country should withdraw those of its nationals who are taking part in the Civil War." ¹

Mr. Eden, who addressed the Assembly on the 20th

¹ TOWNEE, op.cit., p. 356–57.
Meanwhile the decision to increase the number of the League
of Nations forces showed new gains in confidence. General Secretary
Okada had hoped that the decision of the League, Board and the lattice of
the League of Nations in international action would have some concrete
outcomes. The League had employed 6,000 men for the League of Nations
constituents of the Swiss Government, and to what extent the League
was able to support the Swiss Government, and how far it had been
important to the League to take action of the League, Board and a vote of thanks of
the Swiss Government for the League of Nations action. The League

M. Farenino's address to the Assembly on the spot.
"If Non-Intervention now has to be discarded, it will not be for lack of patience on the part of its original sponsors. Let us not, however, conceal from ourselves this patent fact; if the policy of non-intervention is abandoned, Europe will be swept into deeper and more dangerous waters. A leaky dam may yet serve its purpose."

No better example can be found of lingering hope than Mr. Eden's hope of yet retrieving the issue through his "leaky dam." But the situation was becoming alarming to the French Government, and they appeared to have intimated at this time to Great Britain that unless the situation changed rapidly it would not be possible for them, in the interests of French security, to avoid a decision to throw open the Franco-Spanish frontier for the transport of men and munitions to the Spanish Republicans in order to counter-balance the activities of the 'Fascist' Powers in Spain.

Meanwhile, Italy assured both France and Great Britain "that Italy had no intention of making the smallest change in the territorial status of Spain; that she had no designs upon the Balearic Islands and that the integrity of the continental and insular territory of Spain would be strictly respected."

The official position in both capitals, Paris and London, after these assurances was that until such time as Rome should give notice of the annexation of these islands, there need be no occasion for anxiety. Senor Alvarez del Vayo's comment is worth noting:

"One of the phenomena of modern international politics is that words mean more than deeds, however much living reality may prove them false. Territories can be annexed,
No better example can be found of justice done.

It brings hope of real retrieving the peace sooner and

great good, but the situation was becoming steadily to the finish

Government and clear appearance to have improved at this time to

and clear progress, and makes the situation changing rapidly it moving.

not be possible to claim in the interests of French society.

In order to complete-promise the activities of the (feared)

power in Spain.

Meanwhile, I am earning peace terms and great periods

that I have had no intention of making the smallest change in

the situation at Spain, that age and no reasons now

the political interests and that the interests of the constitutional

may express partially a point which be actually respected.

The official position in both capitals, Paris and

London, after these assentances we can not say time as

have need to no occasion for exactly. Senior Advantage get away.

command in war policy.

...
"countries invaded, but until the aggressor considers that
the moment has come to give official notice to the chan-
cellories, it would seem to the democratic governments
and their diplomats to be a sign of bad form, incompatible
with their high office, to question the correctness and
disinterestedness of such proceedings. Members of the
opposition, with their incurable vulgarity may well con-
cede some importance to the physical presence of a few
thousand Italians in the Balearic Islands, but among
educated people what matters is not what is done but
what is promised.....

"The British Prime Minister was always of this opinion,
and in his speech in the House of Commons on November 2,
1938, he stated that at Munich he had spoken on the sub-
ject of the future of Spain with Herr Hitler and Signor
Mussolini and that both of them had assured him 'most
definitely' that they had no territorial ambitions what-
ever in that country.

"...Therein lies the mistake - the mistake of not realizing
that it was never a question of territorial ambitions or
annexation of the Balearic or any other part of Spain, but
of bringing Spain under the influence of Axis policy in
such a way that results are obtained without the necessity
of creating a second Fascist Chamber in Majorca, flying
the Italian flag over Port Mahon, or appointing in the
Canary Islands a German protector of the same standing as
Baron von Neurath in Bohemia. Time and again I explained
to the representatives of Great Britain and France how
well we knew that neither Hitler nor Mussolini would be
so irresponsible as to risk unnecessarily their comfortable
and certain position in Spain for senseless territorial
ambitions and that for those with any memory of inter-
national affairs a zone of influence was the same thing
as open annexation with all the advantages of the annexa-
tion and none of its risks." 1.

But it was in the discussions of the Sixth Committee
that the real conflict of wills was fought out, with the French
and British representatives as the protagonists on one side and
the Spanish and Russian representatives on the other. Alvarez
del Vayo was bitter and wanted Senor Negrin's five points to be
incorporated in the resolution. But by continuous pressure
Senor Alvarez del Vayo had to abandon his position and the final

The extensive chain of writing was followed by a question mark.

"The Smiths' blueberries were a marvel of fine origin..."
draft said,

"that not merely has the London Non-Intervention Committee
failed, despite the efforts of the majority of its members,
of which the Assembly expresses its appreciation, to se-
cure the withdrawal of non-Spanish combatants taking part
in the struggle in Spain, but that it must today be
recognized that there are veritable foreign army corps
on Spanish soil, which represents foreign intervention
in Spanish affairs."  

The resolution after expressing further pious hopes
for withdrawal of foreign troops, etc., noted,

"if such a result cannot be obtained in the near future
the Members of the League which are parties to the Non-
Intervention Agreement will consider ending the policy of
Non-Intervention."  

Naturally enough, the passages in the resolution
which gave the greatest satisfaction to the Spanish delegation
and induced them to accept this half loaf with a good grace
were also those to which the strongest exception was taken by
certain other delegates.

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit. p. 360.

The resolution after expressing further doubts was:

"It was a recent concern to/String the meeting
the members of the recent White Paper and the present
and future developments with..."
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Withdrawing Volunteers and Granting Belligerent Rights—Again

Signor Mussolini told an audience of more than 600,000 people in Berlin on the 28th September that the community of ideas between Germany and Italy had "found expression in the struggle against Bolshevism." Fascism had "fought with the utmost energy this form of human degeneracy" and it was in order "to save European culture" from Bolshevism that "thousands of Italian Fascist volunteers had fallen in Spain." This reference to Spain in Mussolini's speeches showed it more clearly than ever that no change in Italian policy vis-a-vis Spain should be expected in the near future.

Since the Non-Intervention Committee was scarcely getting anywhere, the British and French Government tried to start on tripartite discussions with Italy. On the 2nd October a joint Anglo-French note was presented in Rome inviting the Italian Government to examine with Great Britain and France "in a spirit of perfect frankness the situation arising from the prolongation of the Spanish conflict." Although it was practically a foregone conclusion that this invitation would be refused, it was not until the 10th October that the Italian Government informed the French and British Governments that in their opinion a discussion of the situation in Spain carried on in the absence of other states who were directly interested "would lack the elements indispensable for reaching an agreement"
CHAPTER FOURTH

Wittgenstein's Viewpoints and Perspectives on German-Aryan

Silent Nazism as a form of violence of more than
60,000,000 people in Britain on 15th September 1939, the commen-
try of these between Germany and Italy and "long expression" in the argument of the "Restoration".

"Restoration" and "long" with the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the 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argument of the "Restoration" and "long" in the argument of the "Restora
and that it was therefore preferable that "the question of non-intervention should continue to be dealt with at the London Committee." They also took the opportunity to declare categorically that they would not "participate in conversations, meetings or conferences to which the German Government had not been formally invited."

On the 18th October the Italian Government semi-officially announced in Rome that the correct figures of the Italian forces in Spain were 40,000 and not 100,000 as reported in foreign press at that time. A few days later, the Italian diplomatic representatives in London and Paris were instructed to convey this information officially to the Governments to which they were accredited. Meanwhile, the French Government after communicating with the British Government had decided to postpone once again the decision regarding the opening of the Franco-Spanish frontier and to accept the Italian Government's proposal that the problem of the withdrawal of the volunteers should be referred back to the Non-Intervention Committee.

But on the 15th October, Mr. Eden tried to take a little stiffer line and said that their agreement to hand the question back to the Non-Intervention Committee did not mean that they were "prepared to acquiesce in dilatory tactics." In the existing conditions of "proclaimed intervention the glorification of breaches of agreement," the patience of those who had "striven to keep their responsibilities towards Europe constantly before them" was "well nigh exhausted," and in his
Communist Party

The first remarks were made by Mr. John Smith, who said that the conference was an opportunity to discuss the problems of the

Communist Party. They also took the opportunity to express their belief that the

Communist Party should play a more active role in the negotiations and meetings on

conferences to which the Western Governments had not been

formally invited.

On the 10th October, the Italian Government sent

officially a statement in which they expressed their firm belief that the

Italian forces in Europe were 50,000 and not 100,000 as reported.

They also reassured the Italian

Government that the negotiations in London and Paris were intended to

comply with the information officially by the Government. Meanwhile, the Italian

Government urged the Western Governments to work together to

achieve a peaceful solution. They also suggested that the Italian

Government should be given the opportunity to participate in the negotiations of the

Peace Conference. This would be a victory for the non-Communist

Committee.
view, a "nation, which if such conditions continue, felt compelled to resume its freedom of action" would not be open to criticism. At the meeting of the Sub-Committee on the 16th October, the French representative, M. Corbin, took Mr. Eden's line and declared that his Government could not allow the present situation to continue and that they would "consider themselves entitled to reserve their full liberty of action" if the Committee did not come to an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

The new points in M. Corbin's suggestion were that Governments should be asked to renew their formal pledge not to despatch volunteers and aircraft to Spain; that there should be an immediate "token" withdrawal of a certain number of volunteers and that the international Commissions which were to supervise the withdrawal of volunteers should be nominated as the authority which would decide at what stage belligerent rights could be granted. At the second of this series of meetings of the Chairman's Sub-Committee, on the 19th October, Italy and Germany showed a marked preference for going back to the British proposals of the 14th July. M. Corbin readily agreed to let the Fascist Powers have their way rather than afford them an opportunity for further delays over procedure.

At the meeting of the Chairman's Sub-Committee on the 20th October, Count Grandi announced that Italy was now prepared to agree that international commissions should be sent to the two parties in Spain without delay. The result of their
The new course in Coordinating suggestion were that
Government should do the work of planning and setting up objectives and targets to obtain that there should
be an important"cornerstone of a certain number of actions"
and that the "informational Commissions" which were to undertake
also the Management of the system and data that were all the information
Information which were useful at the time were to be transmitted to other
countries for the purpose of participation and improvement to the
best of our ability. At the second of this series of meetings
the proposed of the first July will be made to start them in
opportunities for further.cf.
At the meeting of the Coordinating and Committee on
the 20th October, the Coordinating announced that Italy was now
in a position to choose that Informational Committee应当 be part
of the two parties in order to start above.
investigations would "make it possible to decide in what manner and in what proportions" the withdrawal of foreign nationals should take place; and Italy agreed that the decision "at what moment and in what manner belligerent right should be recognised" should be postponed until the Non-Intervention Committee had at its disposal the reports of the commissions. This declaration, with which the German representative associated himself, was followed on the 22nd October by an explicit statement from Count Grandi that his Government now accepted completely the nine points of the British plan of the 18th July. Perhaps, the Axis Powers realised, that they had stretched the democracies to the snapping point and a little loosening would not be out of place.

But while the Axis Powers had expressed their consent to participate in the Conference, the Soviet Union's persistent refusal to accept the compromise linking up a withdrawal of volunteers and the granting of belligerent rights was proving the most serious obstacle. The Soviet Government's delegate, however, notified the Chairman's Sub-Committee that his government had consented to abstain from voting, instead of casting an adverse vote. On the 2nd November the Chairman's Sub-Committee was able to agree upon the text of two resolutions for submission to the full Committee and laying down the program to be followed in putting the plan into effect.

The resolutions authorized the Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee to approach the two parties in Spain.
immediately with a view to securing their cooperation in "the withdrawal, under international supervision, of all persons engaged in the present conflict who are of non-Spanish nationality or who were of non-Spanish nationality at its outbreak in July 1936." The resolutions were adopted on the 4th November by the full Non-Intervention Committee. Count Grandi, however, emphasized that

"It must be clearly understood that the acceptance of the British plan by the Italian Government has been and still remains conditional to the unreserved acceptance by all the 27 member States of the British plan itself."

As for M. Maisky, he defended once again his Government's standpoint on belligerent rights, but he indicated that there was a possibility that they might modify their attitude if they were convinced that the other provisions of the British plan were being carried out in good faith.

In accordance with the terms of the first resolution of the 4th November, Lord Plymouth had invited the Spanish Government and the Nationalist regime at Salamanaca to inform him without delay whether they were prepared to cooperate in the manner indicated in the resolution in the withdrawal of volunteers. General Franco accepted in principle the proposal subject to certain reservations regarding the terms of reference and composition of the commission, etc. General Franco also suggested that the recognition of belligerent rights might take place when 3,000 foreign nationals had been withdrawn from either side - an interpretation of "substantial progress" in withdrawal.

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 372.
In accordance with the terms of the latter resolution of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions of September 1948, the British forces were to withdraw from the area of the Armistice Line by the end of January 1949. The withdrawal would involve the evacuation of all British forces from the area, including the evacuation of all military personnel and equipment. The withdrawal would be carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner, with the cooperation of the Israeli authorities.

The withdrawal was to be supervised by a UN Military Observer Group, which would be responsible for ensuring that the withdrawal was carried out in accordance with the terms of the resolution. The group would also monitor the situation in the area to ensure that conditions were conducive to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The withdrawal would be a significant step towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and would be welcomed by the international community as a demonstration of the commitment of the UN to the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The withdrawal was a complex and challenging operation, and required careful planning and coordination. The British forces were to be撤出 the area in a gradual and orderly manner, with the cooperation of the Israeli authorities. The withdrawal was to be supervised by a UN Military Observer Group, which would be responsible for ensuring that the withdrawal was carried out in accordance with the terms of the resolution.

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The reply of the Republican Government also accepted the proposal but inquired whether their definitive acceptance of the plan would involve recognition of the Nationalists' belligerent rights. A meeting of the Chairman's Subcommittee on the 7th December took note of the replies from the two parties in Spain and agreed that it would now be possible to take more definite steps towards the organization of the Commission which were to be sent to Spain. But there still were terms, which required agreement, for instance, on the question of what interpretation, in actual figures, was to be given to the term "substantial progress" etc. Anyway, the Secretary of the International Board was authorized from the 1st January 1938 to make a beginning with an investigation of the administrative problem involved in the plan for withdrawing.

It was proposed by experts that the withdrawal of volunteers from either side should be proportional to the total number of foreign combatants in the service of either side. Italy hastened to raise objection to this interpretation of the "substantial progress" clause. While the difficulty of making any authoritative estimate of the actual numbers of foreigners in the service of either side, at any rate until the international commissions had completed their first task of counting heads, was recognised in official quarters in London, it was also recognized that the Spanish Republican Government and their Russian supporters in the Non-Intervention Committee - who had consistently maintained that the number of foreigners
The work of the Government Committee on the

Provision and Supply of Goods, has been

progressive and entire. By the Government Committee's

recommendation, a meeting of the Government Committee

was held on the 7th December, 1918, for the purpose of the

report from the War Department of the

more efficient supply of goods. The Government Committee

also arranged matters between the Anson

Committee and the War Department. In consequence of these

arrangements, the Government Committee

have now a number of their own new

representatives, who are working in co-operation with the

Committee to improve the supply of goods.
on the Nationalist side would be found to exceed that on the Republican side and who also believed with good reason that the grant of belligerent rights would favor the Nationalists - were not likely to agree with the view of General Franco and his backers that "substantial progress" would have been achieved when an equal number of "volunteers" had been withdrawn from either side.

On the 10th February the situation took a new turn, when the Italian Government notified the British Government of their desire to open conversations for a settlement of all outstanding Anglo-Italian differences, including the question of the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia as well as the reconciliation of British and Italian interests in the Mediterranean. Italy also showed another gesture by accepting the proportionate principle and diplomatic conversations in London during the last week of February revealed that all the principal interested Powers except the U.S.S.R. were prepared to agree to the figure of 10,000 as the initial figure to be withdrawn from the side which possessed the smaller total number of foreigners. The resolution of the 4th November 1937 had provided that,

"as from a date to be determined by the Non-Intervention Committee and which should shortly precede the commencement of the withdrawal of non-Spanish nationals from Spain, observation on the Franco-Spanish and Portuguese-Spanish frontiers should be restored and strengthened simultaneously with the adoption of measures to strengthen the sea-observation scheme." 1

When the Chairman's Sub-Committee attempted to deter-

1. TOYNBEE, op. cit., p. 371.
The situation in the Middle East continues to be complex and volatile. The conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors remains unresolved, with sporadic outbreaks of violence. The international community is deeply concerned about the human rights situation in the region, with reports of violations of basic freedoms and the rule of law.

The United Nations has been actively engaged in efforts to promote peace and stability. The recent agreement between Israel and Egypt, known as the Camp David Accords, brought a temporary ceasefire and paved the way for further negotiations. However, achieving a lasting peace in the region remains a significant challenge, requiring sustained international engagement.

In the context of global security, the Middle East is considered a pivotal area due to the concentration of significant natural resources and the proximity to major trading routes. Countries in the region are also key players in international politics, with implications for global economic and security interests.

The situation is further complicated by the presence of armed groups and the ongoing conflict in Syria, which has had a profound impact on the stability of the region. The humanitarian crisis that has ensued requires urgent action and intervention from the international community.

The pursuit of peace and security in the Middle East is essential for global stability. However, the complexities and challenges involved demand a multifaceted approach, encompassing diplomatic efforts, economic development, and collaboration among regional and international actors.
mine the date for the restoration of control, the Italian representative with German support, urged that international supervision of the Franco-Spanish frontier, which had been suspended since the 13th July 1937, should be restored simultaneously with the arrival in Spain of the International Commissions which were to count the foreign combatants and arrange for their withdrawal. The French Government, on the other hand, interpreted the terms of the resolution of the 4th November in the sense that the restoration of control ought not to take place until the preliminary arrangements for withdrawing the volunteers had been completed, and the actual evacuation was about to begin.

In the middle of March, Senor Negrin, the head of the Spanish Republican Government, flew to Paris in order to appeal for French help in countering the Nationalist offensive. When the French Government in July 1937 had suspended the facilities for observation to international observers which they had accorded three months earlier, they had announced that a supervision over traffic with Spain would continue to be exercised by the French customs officials; but the Nationalists claimed that they had definite proof of the passage of war material through the Franco-Spanish frontier. In any case, there seems to be little doubt that in March 1938 instructions for a relaxation of the control were issued to custom officials and that for some three months thereafter a substantial amount of munitions from Russia, France had been passing through the
In the middle of March, General Weygand, the head of the French government, issued a statement regarding the German occupation of the French territory. He also announced that France had signed a cease-fire agreement with the Germans, effective in place of the armistice, and to proceed under the terms of the agreement. The French government, in July 1917, had signed an armistice with the Germans. The armistice provided for the cessation of hostilities, the evacuation of the French territory, and the cessation of indemnities. The armistice was signed on March 19, 1917, and was in effect until May 19, 1917.
frontier. According to a statement which was broadcast by M. Flandin on the 21st June 1938, M. Blum who had formed his second administration on the 13th March authorised the transport of war material to Spain on the 17th and 25,000 tons of such materials crossed the frontier during April and May.

"That France should thus take a leaf out of the Fascist book was a new turn in the Spanish affair that aroused great resentment in Italy, and her annoyance was increased by the fact that it was difficult for her to retort in kind by augmenting her own assistance to General Franco while the Anglo-Italian conversations were in progress in view of the fact that Mr. Chamberlain had impressed upon the Italian Ambassador, at the outset, the importance which he attached to Italy's abstention from any reinforcement of Spanish Nationalist strength calculated to effect a material alteration in the situation."

The protocol which was signed on the 16th April between Italy and England - amongst other things, Italy assured Great Britain that she had no territorial or political aims and undertook that, "if the evacuation of non-Spanish nationals had not been completed at the end of Spanish war, all remaining Italian nationals would leave Spanish territory forthwith and all Italian war material would likewise be withdrawn." On the 4th May the French Ambassador in London informed Lord Plymouth that his Government accepted a proposal for restoring supervision over the land frontiers of Spain as soon as the international commissions began their task of counting the "volunteers" on the understanding that the French Government should regain their freedom of action if the evacuation of "volunteers" was not actually in progress at the expiration of a definite time limit.

In the second week of May, the League Council was

In the second week of May, the League continued its efforts to uphold the principles of international law and promote peace. The League of Nations published a report on the developments in Europe and the Middle East, emphasizing the need for a just and lasting peace. The report highlighted the importance of diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and prevent future wars.

The League also continued to work on reforming its own procedures and structures to make it more effective in achieving its goals. The representatives from various member states met to discuss these issues and proposed several changes that would strengthen the League's role in international relations.

Despite these efforts, the League faced many challenges, including the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, which threatened to escalate into a full-blown war. The League's inability to prevent this conflict underscored the limitations of its powers and the need for a more robust international organization to address global challenges.

The League's failure to prevent war in the Middle East highlighted the need for a new approach to international relations, one that would prioritize preventive diplomacy and early warning systems. The League's representatives continued to work towards this goal, hoping to create a more stable and prosperous world for all its members.
called upon to consider yet another protest from the Spanish Republican Government against the intervention of Italy and Germany. The French Government, again, aligned themselves with the British Government in support of non-intervention. Senor Alvarez del Vayo opened his attack on non-intervention on the 11th May and made a fervent plea that the Spanish Government should have their right to buy war material from other countries restored to them. But as on previous occasions it had little effect on the guardians of international law, and Lord Halifax upheld non-intervention as the only practical policy.

On the 26th May, the Soviet Government made one concession on their previous stand by agreeing to accept the initial figure of 10,000 "volunteers" to be withdrawn from the side which was to have the smaller total number. He opposed the adoption of a formula which was otherwise generally acceptable regarding the method of classifying the "volunteers" and he also objected to the proposed revision of the maritime observation scheme on the ground that it would not be really effective. But later Russia withdrew this objection also and accepted the conclusions arrived at by the Council.

Meanwhile, Rome was becoming more and more impatient at the delay in the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, which would give Italy the Sovereign position in Abyssinia. In Italian eyes the blame for a state of affairs in which the coming into force of the agreement seemed likely to be indefinitely postponed rested principally upon the French
On the other hand, the Soviet Government would not be concerned with a policy of appeals to the International Labour Office to proceed from the expert.

However, the Government deems that the United Nations Organization is the appropriate body for international non-interference. The British Government is supporting the non-interference approach in its resolution on the African question. The British Government has not been able to prevent the Government from adopting measures which may be harmful to the African territories. The British Government has not supported the adoption of a resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly.

It is appreciated that the problem of the large territories is not easy to solve. It would not be realistic to expect a solution which would satisfy all parties. However, it is possible to envisage a situation in which the African territories could be considered for a different status.

Furthermore, there is a need for more and more important

of the African in the coming years of the apartheid regime. The African must give the United Nations Organization a clear indication in which the coming into force of the agreement would be

to prepare the way for a debate on the African territories.
Government due to their having allowed the passage of war material to which they attributed the Republican's ability to check what appeared to be the final offensive by General Franco.

Franco-Italian conversations made little progress, however, and they were suspended completely after Signor Mussolini had publicly declared in a speech at Genoa on the 14th May, that in the matter of Spain "France and Italy were on the opposite sides of the barricades." London had been looking with disapproval upon the opening of the Franco-Spanish frontier for the transport of munitions. Meanwhile, the situation in Europe was becoming sombre and Paris did not want to lose the assurance of support from England at such a critical time. Since the Franco-Spanish frontier had not been officially declared open, there was no official announcement regarding its closing; but by the middle of June it had become known that the transport of war material across the frontier was no longer permitted on the scale that had been attained during the recent weeks. Once again the Fascist Government had succeeded in imposing its will upon the not-very-sure-democracies.

The desire of the Italian Government that the date of ratification should be as early as possible was, the British declared, fully reciprocated by them; but Lord Perth could not give any assurance to Rome if the Spanish settlement, which the British Government had made a condition precedent to the ratification of the agreement, would be considered to have been
The case of the Italian Government is not clear. The Italian Government under Mussolini showed itself as willing as possible, the British Government under Chamberlain was not. The Italian Government under Mussolini had not been able to achieve its objectives, and the British Government had made a concerted effort to do so. The Italian Government had succeeded in imposing its will upon the rest of the world.
achieved until the Italian "volunteers" or a substantial proportion of them had been withdrawn from Spain. By this time it was clear that General Franco could no longer be expected to win an outright victory in the field in the immediate future, and the topics touched upon during the Anglo-Italian conversations in Rome were reported to have included the possibility of arranging a truce between the Spanish combatants. It was felt that war weariness might be expected to be making itself felt among the civil population in Nationalist as well as in Republican territory, and it was believed that influences in favor of a compromise solution were now making themselves felt on both sides.

At the beginning of June the question whether the time was ripe for an offer of mediation was understood to be under consideration between Paris and London. This question received an apparently definite reply in the negative when the Spanish Nationalists announced on the 4th June that only unconditional surrender from the Republican forces would end the war, and the Spanish Republicans retorted a few days later by the statement (which was issued by Senor Alvarez del Vayo at Geneva) that there could be no mediation between the Spanish nation and invaders.

It emerged from the Anglo-Italian conversations that had been going on that the coming into force of the agreement of the 16th April must remain dependent upon the application of the British plan for withdrawing volunteers from Spain and that
...
if Italian Government desired despatch it behoved them to cooperate to the full both on the efforts which were being made in London to secure general agreement on the British plan and in the carrying out of the arrangements contemplated.

There was another difficulty in the way of the working of the "withdrawal policy." The Soviet Government's persistence in their refusal to contribute towards the maintenance of the "volunteers" in Spain after their withdrawal from the field was disposed of on the 28th June by an undertaking on the part of the four other Great Powers to share the cost between them. On the 5th July the full Non-Intervention Committee adopted the plan unanimously after some three hours' discussion. But the plan, adopted on the 5th July, was never put into force as the subsequent events will show. The plan - contemplated a period of 45 days from "zero date" (the date on which the plan, having been accepted by the two parties in Spain, would be declared by the Non-Intervention Committee to be in force) - was to be allowed for two commissions to go respectively to Nationalist and to Republican Spain, count the "volunteers" and report to the Non-Intervention Committee; and then the Non-Intervention Board was to bring into existence the machinery required to carry through the operation of withdrawal; the actual process of evacuation was to begin on the 46th day and be completed by the 150th day from "zero date."

Thus the process of evacuating foreigners was estimated to take nearly six months even in the improbable event of
It is clear that government spending was crucial to the overall economy and the labor market. The government's role in maintaining employment levels and stimulating economic growth was significant. Policymakers were aware of the importance of maintaining the balance between spending and taxation. The government's ability to manage public debt and control inflation was critical to its overall effectiveness.

The relationship between the Federal Reserve and the government was also important. The Fed's ability to control interest rates and monetary policy had a direct impact on the economy. The government's role in regulating the financial sector was critical to maintaining stability and preventing crises.

In conclusion, the government's role in the economy was multifaceted and complex. It was crucial to balance economic growth, maintain employment, and manage financial risks. The government's ability to adapt to changing economic conditions was key to its overall effectiveness.
no delays and difficulties occurring to hinder the smooth working of the scheme; and since the consent of the two parties in Spain had also to be obtained before "zero date" could be declared, it was evident that, at the best, the process could not be completed until after the turn of the year. It was not intended, however, that the grant of belligerent rights to the two parties in Spain should be postponed for as long as six months. The plan laid it down explicitly that "substantial progress" justifying the recognition of belligerent rights would be achieved as soon as 10,000 volunteers had been evacuated from the party which the international commissions found to have the smaller total number and a corresponding higher number from the other side.

The adoption of the resolution of the 5th July 1938 was greeted in London with great rejoicing. The plan was communicated to the Governments at Barcelona and at Burgos for their approval on the 6th July with the request that they should treat the matter as one of great urgency. The Republican Government handed a formal notification at the Foreign Office in London and the reply was considered to be satisfactory. But it was not until the 16th August that the Nationalist Administration sent their reply. Moreover, the reply was "very far" from satisfactory.

The Burgos Government was prepared to agree that 10,000 volunteers should be evacuated immediately; but they stipulated that that number should be withdrawn simultaneously.
The section of the report on the 3rd of July 1956

The report on London with Great Rejection. The report was confirmed to the Government at 2:00 AM with the reason that their proposal was a serious mistake. The report to the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence is

It was not until the 7th of July that the Ministerial Cabinet "supported and approved the report, ley" later from the Secretary.

The request for the Government was prepared to issue the report. It was not until this morning that the Government was informed of the situation.
from both sides. Moreover they made it clear that they would agree to the withdrawal of 10,000 volunteers only on the basis of the prior recognition of their belligerency to which they considered themselves "entitled as a right and not as a part of a bargain." It also said that there could be no cessation of hostilities while the count was going on. The delay and the uncompromising nature of the reply when it was finally delivered were all the more significant because at this time a fresh series of reports regarding an increase in the scale of Italian intervention in Spain were under investigation.

On enquiry by the British embassy, the Italian Foreign Minister appears not to have denied the allegations and indeed to have declared that Italy could not remain inactive in view of the renewal of French intervention. Count Ciano seems, however, to have declared that any supplies that were being sent were only the replacements which were required to keep the present Italian force in the field and to have given an assurance that his Government were ready for their part to carry out the plan for the withdrawal of volunteers under proper guarantees.

By this time, however, the Czechoslovakian crisis had assumed proportions which overshadowed every other international problem. It was agreed in the informal conversations conducted by Lord Plymouth that no purpose would be served by summoning a meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee or its Sub-Committee in order to discuss the Nationalists' terms. Instead, the sig-
Moreover, their work is an example of propaganda which should be watched by the press. It is clear that the press could be an effective medium for the spread of rational ideas. The failure and the success of propaganda are often due to the effectiveness of the medium. If the medium is adequate, the message can be communicated effectively even if the content is not fully understood by the audience.

In order to achieve the maximum effectiveness, I recommend the following:

1. Use clear and concise language.
2. Use visual aids to illustrate points.
3. Use a variety of sources to provide credibility.
4. Use repetition to reinforce the message.
5. Use emotional appeals to engage the audience.
6. Use active language to encourage participation.
7. Use humor to make the message memorable.
8. Use stories to illustrate points.
9. Use dramatic presentations to capture attention.
10. Use music and visual effects to enhance the message.
estion was made that Mr. Francis Hemming, the Secretary of the Committee might go to Spain in order to discuss the situation with General Franco at first hand and endeavour to remove his objections to the Non-Intervention Committee's plans. The Soviet Government, however, were against even this concession to the Fascist point of view. But Mr. Hemming and a small staff arrived in Burgos on the 11th October.

Meanwhile, however, the entire situation in regard to "volunteers" in Spain had changed. At the session of the League Assembly on the 21st September, Senor Negrin had announced the Spanish Republican Government's decision to part immediately with all the non-Spanish nationals serving in their ranks, and he had asked that the League Council should appoint a Commission to supervise the evacuation and to see that it was carried to completion. The prime motive for this unilateral decision on the part of the Republican Government was no doubt the belief that it would strengthen their claim to have their right to buy war material in any market restored to them. After a "little of the usual billeting," a Commission was constituted, and it arrived at Barcelona on the 17th October.

But the official Nationalist attitude was still that no possibility of a compromise solution could be considered. Nevertheless, there appeared to be some evidence that resentment in certain Nationalists' circles against foreign arrogance was working in the direction of reconciliation with their fellow Spaniards in the opposite camp. It is possible this movement
Government was made that an Interim Government, the Secretary of the
Committee might be permitted to appear in order to obtain the attention
with General Secretary of His Right Honourable, to remain the
opportunity of the Non-Interim Government Commission's plan. The
Governments, however, were not given any clear concept
of the Federal point of view. But, in remaining a small part
remaining in effect on the 1st October.
Meanwhile, however, the entire action in regard to

"government in Spain" has advanced. At the session of the Senate
Assembly of the State Secretary, General K. had summoned the
Speakers of the Government's sections to take part, and
with the non-party Ministers, enacting in light rooms, and
in part asked that the Senate Committee should appoint a Committee
in order to improve the question and to see what it was capable of
composition. The Prime Minister for the Ministerial section on
the part of the National Government was in charge of the papers
that it would be necessary, after a "little
were material in any respect, was not to pass there right to any
of the House Parliament." A Committee was constituted and it

arrived at a decision on the 1st October.

And the Official Nationalist editorial section was with this
in opposition to a communiqué of the papers. It was in opposition
Kerensky's Press, trying to be some steps that remained
in certain Nationalist outputFile, taking the position of the
remaining in the situation or recognition with special favor

statements in the opposition camp. It was possible that movement
helped to influence General Franco in making up his mind to part with a certain number of his Italian auxiliaries. It was agreed between Rome and Burgos that about 10,000 of the Italian legionaries who had been serving in Spain without intermission for 18 months should return to Italy in the hope that this gesture would induce the democratic Powers to grant belligerent rights without delay.

The fact that General Franco had announced to the Press at Burgos on the 27th September, when the European crisis was at its most acute point, that he would remain neutral in case of European complications had confirmed the belief which had always been held in official circles in Great Britain that there was little reason to fear the maintenance of Italian and German influence over Nationalist Spain when the war had ended. Signor Mussolini duly received his reward on the 2nd November when the House of Commons at Westminster decided by 385 to 138 votes to empower the Government to bring the agreement with Italy into force immediately.

The Commission, in the meantime, supervised the evacuation of troops on both sides and left Spain on the 23rd January 1939 and established itself at Perpignan, where it was engaged for nearly 4 weeks in preparing its final report for the Council of the League of Nations. By the time the Commission left Spain the Republican resistance in Catalonia was rapidly giving way and in the chaotic conditions which subsisted during the last ten days of January 1939 it was not possible to carry
of influence on the Italian Front in order to make it easier for

was faced with a certain number of the Italian military. It was

sometimes necessary to provide some support for the Italian

for it to work more strongly to take in the people and the se-

resulting from the Germanic Powers to stand together.

rights without help.

The first task General Franco had accomplished, when the Republican Center

press at figures on the 194th September, when the Republican Center

was at the most severe point. And the Spanish people cannot partake of the

with any other people to fight the war against the Fascist and

been made in the interest of fighting in Spain when the war had

Sagres International only redeveloping the territory on the Sagra

when the home of the center of Republican activity of the

sake of encouraging the Government to bring the war to

First into force immediately.

The Commission in the meantime, including the

association of troops on both sides and kept open on the 8th

summer 1936 and specially the relief of the former, where it was

enough for nearly 5 weeks in the preceding the first report for

the Committee of the League of Nations. As the first time the Commission

feel very the representation of the farthest was not

viewed well and in the opposite conditions which were
ture for the first time and of the 1936 it was not possible to carry
out arrangement for evacuating any more of the members of the International Brigades from Spain.

It has already been noted that the decision of the Spanish Republican Government to part with their foreign auxiliaries had been taken independently and not in application of the plan which had been submitted to them by the Non-Intervention Committee. But the visit of the Secretary of the Commission to Nationalist territory had not made General Franco any more willing to accept the terms which had been put before him in the previous July.

Mr. Chamberlain tried to sound a different note before his forthcoming visit to Rome:

"So long as there are foreign troops in Spain and so long as no other solution has been found for the Spanish question but that which is involved in the Non-Intervention Plan, the Government do not propose to grant belligerent rights to the parties in Spain other than in accordance with the Non-Intervention Plan itself."

But the rapid advance of Nationalist had changed the situation entirely, and the question now shifted from the withdrawal of volunteers during the war to the question whether those auxiliaries would leave Spain as soon as the Nationalists had completed their conquest of Republican territory. The reaffirmation by Signor Mussolini of his promises to seek no special advantages in Spain and not to maintain his armed forces in that country after the termination of the war appears to have satisfied the British Ministers that changes to British disadvantage in the Mediterranean need not be feared as a consequence of General Franco's victory, and their conviction
It has already been noted that the relation of the
International Brigades to Spain

Spanish Republican Government to Spain with fixed Forestry In.

In view which have been submitted to the views of the
Commission. But the right of the Secretary of the Commission to
information report and not have General Agreement on more

It is important that we come to a definite note

"We must make it clear that no help can be given to
any or to any one in order to make it possible to
given help which is not in accordance with the
Government's plan of help. The right to the question at all other cases in accordance
with the help given is not essential to the plan."

But the right of information on the front and opening the
attention to the and the decision of the government from the
majority of voluntary giving up the way to the international
on the principle that should be so soon as the international

had considered that a demand of the Republic in Paris to send on
information by General Assistance of the Committee are waiting to hear on
special assistance in Spain and not to contain the means towards

In great community after the formation of the new appearance to
have satisfied the National September's action on their connection

consequence of General Franco's Atrocities and their connection

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on this point played an important part in determining the lines of French as well as British policy during the next few weeks.

As the Republican resistance was giving way, there were demonstrations and a fresh renewal of activity on the part of the opposition. During a debate on foreign affairs on the 31st January, Mr. Chamberlain was able to point out with perfect truth that intervention in behalf of the Republicans would now have to be on a very considerable scale if it was to effect the issue and in reaffirming his faith in the rightness of the policy which H. M. Government were following, Mr. Chamberlain expressed in strong terms his belief that a reversal of the policy of Non-Intervention at this stage "must inevitably lead to the extension of the conflict in Europe."

But it was in France, where real anxiety was felt on the consequences of having an unfriendly neighbour just across the border. It was, therefore, not out of question that the French Government might decide to make a last moment attempt to prevent a Republican collapse by allowing munitions to cross the frontier in sufficient quantities to equalise the strength of the two parties in armaments; or they might decide to occupy themselves some parts of Spanish territory of strategic importance to their defense. But in the end, it was decided that the risks of standing passively by and watching the Nationalists establish themselves in control of the whole of Catalonia were less serious than the risk of taking action in the face of the expressed determination of Germany and Italy to counter any
on this point playing an important part in determining the fine.

of a power as well as a power fighting against the next few weeks,

The relationship assumption was giving way to some

were government and a fresh renewal of activity on the part

of the opposition. Finding a gap in the front Sweden

on the assumption that the government was going to point at the earliest moment was if it was to affect the

have to be on a very considerable scale. It is my to affect the

in accounting the latest in the relationship of the

bottles which the government were following. The

bottles of non-interference and to the same "must now stay" look

bottles of non-interference or the country in Europe.

if it was to be done and the best activity was left on

the consciousness of having an influence and at least a

the concurrence. It was therefore not only of decision that the

French government might achieve to make a fast moment an

to bring back a relationship collapse of powerful24

the front line in all the important political to advance the

or the two parties to disarmament on their might achieve to accord

preservation of some power or prevent a point of attack to the

of the three of speaking possibly by and we have now that

we have another form of speaking present in the country of

see below from the part of painting section in the face of the

exercising verification of Germany and Italy to complete an
measures of assistance which might be given to the Republicans and of the manifest unwillingness of the British Government to support France in any direct intervention on behalf of the Spanish Republicans.

Senor Alvarez del Vayo was again sent by the Republican Government to Paris in a last minute desperate attempt in the third week of January 1939 to see if the French Government could be persuaded to "rectify the error" which had brought the Republic to this stage. But Paris had already decided. So there was nothing to do any more. To quote Senor Alvarez del Vayo:

"The civilian evacuation of Barcelona began while I was making a last moment effort in Paris. All we asked was what one might term a loan of arms to be returned within a month or six weeks. It was impossible to obtain it. Yet in Paris everybody had suddenly become aware of the tremendous error committed in regard to Spain. Henri de Kerillis, who is one of the most intelligent exponents of French nationalism, but who had nevertheless, in his own vigorous fashion, upheld the cause of the rebels throughout the war, wrote that at such a time a Franco victory 'was a catastrophe for France.' Army generals, members of the Daladier Government begged me to assure them that Barcelona would hold out for at least another couple of months, since in a very short time there would be a change in the whole European position. Noble sentiments, a perfect understanding of the situation, but no effective assistance... The French Government had once again been paralysed by London. Mr. Chamberlain had just returned from Italy and the totalitarian tactics of confronting the Western democracies with a fait accompli had succeeded again all along the line. A few days before, I had had a talk with Lord Halifax in Geneva. I had then gathered the impression that when in the Rome conversations the Spanish problem was mentioned, Mussolini, with a comment worthy of his realistic policy, had cut short the feeble attempts of his distinguished British guest to draw his attention to the ill effects produced on British public opinion by the decisive participation of Italian divisions in the Catalan offensive. 'That matter,' said the Duce, 'has already been settled. Franco has won and
The actions of the Government were taken to fit the need of the situation and to prepare for the anticipated conflict.

Senator Anderson felt it was necessary to see the Government take a stand in a joint minute and prepare in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. He believed that the situation called for preparation and that the Senate should be prepared to adopt measures to prevent war.

To date, there are no signs of a conflict. To do so much. To know of an opportunity to balance our preparations.
"there is no point in pursuing the question further." 1.

Thus, after thirty one months' bitter civil war, the Spanish Government faced by overwhelming odds, opposed by the dictatorships and betrayed by its own friends, had to give up the struggle. The last government broadcast said, "If lose we must, we should do it honourably." But the end was bitter. It was difficult to believe that after such a glorious exhibition of courage and loyalty the end should be this. And while the Republican forces were hurrying across the Pyrenees into France in those desolate nights, General Franco was celebrating his victory, accompanied, appropriately enough, by the chiming of the Church bells. Hardly ever had the Church bells sounded more dismal. But they did peel for a number of days.

To come to the Non-Intervention Committee again, neither the Committee nor its Sub-Committee had held any meetings since the beginning of July 1938 when they had adopted the plan for withdrawing "volunteers" from Spain. When the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Hemming, had failed to persuade General Franco, there was little else for the Committee to do at the time. But although its activity was completely suspended during the last phase of the war, it was not formally dissolved until after the war was at an end. The Soviet Government decided to withdraw their representative from the 1st March "for the incontestably sound reason that the Committee had long ago ceased functioning."

"The Non-Intervention Board, however, continued to carry on its work, and the system of maritime observation was main-

1. Freedom's Battle, pp. 278-79.
The report of the Committee of Enquiry on the Japanese Government's Race Restrictions
and the Exploitation of British Subjects in Japan, and the
Government's Policy Towards the Japanese Government,

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"tained in force during the last stage of the struggle; for, although it could not be claimed that the system was achieving its purpose of preventing the transport of munitions by sea to Spain, it was felt that its existence did cause the intervening Powers to exercise a certain restraint. On the 7th March, when the end of the war was expected at any time, it was announced in the House of Commons at Westminster that in view of the military situation it was considered possible gradually to reduce the scale of the observing staff, and that a considerable number of the officers who had been engaged to supervise the land frontiers had already been dismissed. About a fortnight later the German and Italian Governments informed the Non-Intervention Board of their decision not to make any further payments towards the cost of the scheme, and in these circumstances the Secretary of the Board announced on the 22nd March that he would proceed at once to dismiss all the observers and wind up the Board's affairs. The last formality took place on the 20th April, three weeks after the Spanish war had been officially proclaimed at an end, when the Non-Intervention Committee held a final meeting in order to dissolve itself."

To inform in force giving the form of the argument

You, therefore, should not be coming from the same use

To understand the purpose of preserving the throne of

which can be found to be easy if we refer that the existence

and came at that a source of a complete message. On the very day of the day was

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founding of the German and Eastern Government.

forcing the non-technical board of their reception not

of science, and in these circumstances, the occasion of the

suggestion on the 39th which is to day likely to the place

be come to attempt of the appearance and wind on the

accompanying the first meeting in order to observe

"I."

After following the course of the Civil war for 31 months, now comes the time for a little pause and heartsearching. What were the real intentions of the two combatants? Was General Franco sincere when time and again he reiterated the interests of Spain at his heart or were they just a series of the conjurer's rabbits which came out of his hat at convenient times. And how about the part played by Italy and Germany? And England and France? Was the Non-Intervention Policy synonymous with betrayal as its opponents charged or was it a genuine policy framed with all the good intentions in the world but which failed due to the "wickedness" of some of its members. Before attempting to answer them, it is as well to recognize the fact that no definite answers can be given to such questions, for the intangibles of politics never admit of exact measurements. And it is always very difficult to say as to what should have happened, "if" the course of events had taken this turn rather than that. Lastly most of the arguments are inspired less by the strictly dialectical position than by the emotional enthusiasm.

The years of 1935-36 were the years when the democracies were still reeling from the blows of the economic depression and complete recovery seemed remote. The internal conditions were chaotic and party-strife and factionalism were the notes of the day. They were torn between contending
INTRODUCTION

After following the course of the Civil War you'll

conclude that there is a little basic way of performing

what was the few information of the two companies?

We General Sherman's opinion, when wise and speak in a way

of the importance of being at the point to write the fact of course

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your current time. And you report the part played by the men.

Germany and England and France. We then knowledge

Policy stance with pessimism and the approximate equation to

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If "the laws of course of

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volumes may follow the main patterns of their. Partial view of

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position fraught with the Editorial mechanism.

The years of 1955-66 were the years when the peace

occurred were still telling from the point of view of the economy. The

important transition and complete transition very important. The important

competition were accepted and parliaments and federations were

the noble of the war. They made your present competitive
loyalties and would have drifted to normalcy if time and 
Mr. Adolf Hitler had the patience to wait. On the other hand, 
the dictatorships were in the ascendancy, and the entire 
populations of these countries worked as single units and the 
disharmony and party-strife were entirely absent from Italy 
and Germany. These were, then, the conditions of the countries 
which counted on the political arena of Europe. It was during 
this period that the civil war broke out in Spain. It has al-
ready been stressed that the factors which produced the civil 
war were almost entirely Spanish in character, but once the 
conditions were ripe for such a development, the control of the 
events passed in the hands of interested foreigners, on the 
Nationalists side almost completely.

On the side of the Spanish Republicans, the only 
country which followed a consistent policy of help was U.S.S.R. 
and it is not incorrect to say that in the later stages of the 
war, the Communists came to have a much stronger hold on the 
policies of the government than their strength warranted. 
According to Salvador de Madariaga, the Russians in Spain came 
to wield such a strong influence that to some of their decisions 
even the Senior Government officers were not admitted. The 
tank and air-craft services were kept under separate control 
by the Russians, to such an extent that secret airfield existed 
which were unknown even to the Spanish General Staff, to the 
Army Commanders in whose territory the airfields were establish-
ed and to the War Secretary who happened then to be Prime
The problem and money have failed to materialize. It lies and
the Allied helmet can the spectacle to wrack on the other hand,
the picturesque wane to the devastation, and this scheme
possibility of these countries working as single units and the
administrative and party-state were sufficiently apart from Italy
Germany. These were then the conditions of the countries
which dominated on the frontier of Europe. It was against
this background that the fight was made and through which, if any
measure was effective; diplomacy was shorn of purpose, and none of
cool conditions were able to form a development, the country of the
emergence based in the sense of interest and tolerance, on the
Matteuccia, the Spanish Republic. Our
on the side of the Spanish Republic, the Latin
country which followed a constitutional policy of peaceful
and it is not incorrect to say, that in the later stages of the
War, the Communities came to have a much stronger hold on the
botanical of the government from Spain, in the Argentine, the presence in Spain, came
to which gave a strong influence. In some of their conditions,
even the Senate of Government offices were not maintained. The

and still other relations were kept under extreme confusion
of the hemisphere to work an export that would somehow eliminate
William were mindful even to the Spanish General State, so the

and Commerce in whose territory the advantages were especially
by any to give War indemnity and happening plan to do prime
Minister as well. Comrade Marcel Rosenberg who represented Soviet Union in Spain, attended the Council of Ministers and "meddled" in Spanish affairs, with the authority of the man who delivers the goods. But Senor Caballero, the then Prime Minister was not the kind of person to allow himself to be driven by anyone, for he himself was used to drive others.

To quote Salvador de Madariaga:

"Every effort was made at the time to bring Largo Caballero under the fold of the Muscovite Orthodoxy - not excluding a (Red) Papal Brief. On December 21st, 1936, Pope Stalin and two of his Cardinals, Molotov and Vorshilov, wrote to Comrade Largo Caballero a letter brought from Moscow by Comrade Rosenberg in which promises and advice were skilfully blended with discreet warnings."

By this it should not be understood that the Spanish Government was a fool of Moscow in the sense that the Nationalists were in the hands of Rome and Berlin. In spite of all the obligations which the Republic owed to Moscow for helping them in their hour of danger, it must be said to the credit of the Government that they continued to stand on their own feet as much as any other nation could have been expected to do under similar circumstances.

The beginning of the Non-Intervention Policy, in spite of all its inconsistencies, was not the tragedy that it is made out to be. It would have worked up if Great Britain and France could have realized early enough as to whom they were matched against. But this was not to be. Even up to the end, the democracies never measured up to the task they had undertaken.

1. MADARIAGA, op. cit., p. 370.
Minister as well. Comrades made no impression on the Government.

Special Union in Spain, according to reports on the Ministry, and especially "in other sections" and "to other European" the Government was not the kind of vehicle to allow himself to be given much attention. For 25th April was near to May Day, went to give advice.

To draw attention on Government.

Every effort was made at this time to bring pressure - and particularly at the time of the government's Grand Policy. The situation was not satisfactory. It was therefore necessary to make the Government aware of the efforts to prevent them from taking action. It was more than probable to the extent of the Government that they continued to stand in front of the new situation. As a rule, other nations had been expected to do nothing.

The beginning of the non-intervention policy in Spain.
And how could they. For Munich had still not taken place.
And the same Mr. Chamberlain was at the head of the British Government who was to negotiate the "Munich Agreement" later and was to come home happy by bringing "peace here and now".

No single reason can be given which will explain the failure of the Non-Intervention Policy. It was a whole complex situation, in which the weakness, the bickerings of the placid democracies were as much responsible for the ultimate tragedy as the cunningness of the new Machiavellis of the 20th century.

The dictatorships continued to violate all the Agreements of which they were participants with an impunity that was as ill-becoming to them as it was disgraceful to the democracies. War-materials and munitions continued to pass under the very noses of the British and French, which they continued to watch helplessly. To quote Alvarez del Vayo;

"The transport of these men to Spanish territory cannot have passed unnoticed by those Governments, which, in adopting a policy that, despite its name, was merely one of unilateral intervention directed against Republican Spain, had assumed responsibility for fettering a country fighting for its independence. No one, least of all, Berlin and Rome, can seriously believe that the British and French intelligence services could have suffered over a period of weeks from such a bad attack of mental aberration as to have overlooked the dispatch from Italian territory of one hundred thousand fully equipped soldiers - the figure is Italy's own, proclaimed by Forze Armate on June 8, 1939 after the war was over or that the consular agents of both countries in the ports of departure and arrival could have confused troopships with Italian tourists vessels calling at Cadiz and Malaga on a pleasure cruise." 1.

Again,

"Non-Intervention became one of the greatest farces of

The appearance of which they were participants, with no 
expectation of which was to "teach to them as if we were 
trained to be geniuses". We may be "saddened" by the 
many voices of the British and French, and their 
continued to make "vandalism" To whom advance get 
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"The Non-Information reponse one of the Researches a"
our time - The long and brilliant repertoire of Italian comedy has no better spectacle to offer than this, where the debatable qualities of Lord Plymouth as stage-manager served as a foil to the dexterity and abandon of the actors. The most intelligent review of the comedy was given in Stampa on July 20, 1937, in a single phrase-a model of simplicity and of honest and impartial dramatic criticism. "While the diplomats play for time, the legionaries cut the Guardian knot with their swords." 1

Though the part played by Berlin was not as noisy as that by Rome, still it did not lack in effectiveness. The Kolnische Zeitung of May 31, 1939 explained the difference of tactics.

"In contrast to Italy which during the war left nobody in doubt as to the part played by her legionaries, Germany awaited a Franco victory and the end of her self-imposed tasks before disclosing all that the German legion, which under the name of the Condor Legion, enjoyed a high reputation in Spain, had performed.....We have intervened from the first moment to the last." 2

Herr Von Rauschning, in an article in Foreign Affairs, his eyes opened by years of association with the Fuhrer said, "In essence the war was being fought all along. It was stupid then to try to prevent its breaking out." But the suicidal attitude of the democracies still remains a puzzle, to the students of international relations. The Nazi Professor Max Grouen in a lecture given in Constance on February 6, 1938, defined the Spanish war as a "European war for Supremacy in the Mediterranean". Commander Berkeu, in the March 1937 issue of Wissen un Wehr, one of the foremost politico-military reviews of the Third Reich, wrote: "If events in Spain go in favour of the Nationalists, and the
There is the best playing of football we have not as many

Reference Case to Nov. 10, 1936, explaining the difference of

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March 19, 1938, one of the foremost

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Social-Communist regime has to yield to an authoritarian regime on national lines, France will see on her southern frontier, which until now has always been free from complications, the rise of a State which will oppose her policy just as Germany and Italy have done." In the October 1938 issue of the same review, Dr. Herman Gackenholz expressed himself even more clearly.

"Because of the Civil War, Spain has become the central point in the tension existing between the great Powers. As this tension moves towards the Western Mediterranean, Spain's importance as a potential ally becomes greater than ever. To this cause more than any other must be attributed the intervention of certain Foreign Powers."

Then, how is one to explain the policy of London and Paris? In London, more than in Paris, there were many supporters of the theory that once the rebel generals were in power, it would not be difficult to win their favour, either through financial interests, or by diplomatic negotiations which would help them to shake off the "protection" of their former allies. This conception of France as a "prisoner" of Germany and Italy to be liberated at all costs - however grotesque it may appear today was widely held in British political circles by men who were sincerely convinced of the truth. Consider Senor Alvarez del Vayo's impassioned requests,

"We were not crying for the moon. We made no request for armed resistance. We only asked that in strict accordance with the policy of Non-Intervention - which Great Britain and France had imposed on us and should for that very reason have enforced - Spain should be left to the Spaniards and that if those two democracies did not feel able to prevent Germany..."

Societal, commercial, and political forces are driving to an unprecedented convergence to regional political, economic, and cultural integration across the globe. This trend is evident in the European Union, where member states collaborate on policies and regulations that affect their economies and citizens' lives. The formation of the EU is an example of a political force that has significantly altered the landscape of European politics and economics.

However, this convergence is not without its challenges. The economic downturn in 2008 highlighted the interdependence of global economies and the need for international cooperation to address economic crises. This interdependence also highlights the challenges of managing diverse cultures and political systems within a single political entity.

The convergence of political, economic, and cultural forces is a complex phenomenon that requires careful consideration of the benefits and costs. While cooperation and integration can lead to greater efficiency and prosperity, they also require careful planning and management to ensure that all stakeholders are included and their interests are protected.

In conclusion, the convergence of political, economic, and cultural forces is a significant trend that is shaping the future of the global economy. It is important for policymakers to consider the benefits and challenges of this convergence and work together to ensure that it leads to a more prosperous and equitable world.
and Italy from continuing to intervene in Spain, they should make honourable recognition of the failure of their policy and reestablish in full the right to freedom of trade. In a word we asked that international law should be respected."

The way in which the British and French Governments ignored our warnings, suggestions and requests was truly heart-breaking. At one point I began to wonder whether those among us were not right who held that this inconceivable apathy was due to the composition of the Spanish Government, and whether a Cabinet excluding members of the extreme Left—particularly the Communists—would not be welcomed with more sympathy and understanding in London and Paris. The Annexation of Austria and the development of the Czechoslovakian crisis, however, convinced me that the Anglo-French lack of interest in the fate of the Republic had wider causes. The policy of peace at any price, a policy which must inevitably lead to war, had so-demoralized the Western democracies that even the sacrifice of their most important positions seemed justified of the hunger of the totalitarian states could be momentarily appeased thereby." 1

If the Western Democracies were so demoralized, the League of Nations, was in no better position. In September 1936, collective security was given an ignoble burial, when the Spanish question was excluded from the deliberations of the LON. Never had a League Assembly been subjected to a greater humiliation than when the one vital question, on whose solution depended the future of peace, was excluded from its considerations.

"While the hand of war was knocking on the portals, the representatives of nearly fifty countries—seated in the resplendent armchairs of the new and luxurious Conference Hall, which under the artistic direction of M. Avenol had been converted into a mortuary—chamber—silently swallowed their indignation at being made the laughing-stock of the whole world." 2

Democracy, Spanish democracy, did not fail in Spain during the war. It was European and to a certain extent

1. Freedom's Battle, Page 239.
In the Western Democracies we see a general adherence to the principle of deference to the will of the people. In parliament, collective security was viewed as an important unit of the security system. The Spanish example is exchanged from the adaptation of the UN Charter and a failure to see the importance of a more active participation in the UN system. As a result of these experiences, we must emphasize the importance of finding ways to expand this participation.
American democracy that failed in Spain during the war. It was European and to a certain extent American democracy that failed in Spain and failed lamentably.

The reason generally advanced by the protagonists of the Non-Intervention Policy is that it saved the world from conflagration. For Professor Norman J. Padelford of the Fletcher School, Non-Intervention was justified historically for that reason. He writes,

"If the devices have not succeeded altogether in stopping the entrance of supplies and men into Spain; if they have glossed or provided a screen behind which violations of pledged undertakings have occurred; if they have become popular laughing stock and have allowed unfortunate Spain to become a military laboratory for the testing of weapons and strategy, they have nevertheless, been instrumental, with other things perhaps in averting an extension of hostilities to other territories."

But it was, perhaps this fallacy of thinking which imagined that there were only two alternatives surrender and war, from which the democracies had to make a choice, which was responsible for the whole tragedy of Spanish Civil War, The Spanish Munich was as unnecessary as the other.

"The Spanish Munich did not assume the theatrical form of the celebrated conference in the birthplace of National Socialism (the choice of which, as meeting place, must have given Chamberlain and Daladier food for thought), but the principle of capitulations was the same. The London Committee was the equivalent of Munich. It was the finest example of the art of handing victims over to the aggressor states while preserving the perfect manners of a gentleman and at the same time giving the impression that peace is the one objective and consideration." 1  

But there is a thing like nature and that it has

1. Freedom's Battle, Page 266.
some rules. The past mistakes have a strange habit of revenging themselves. It was French diplomacy, which revived the formula so aptly defined by Talleyrand—a century ago: "Non-Intervention? Between ourselves, its the same thing as profitable intervention—but profitable only for the other side." And vindication was complete, when in 1940, France lay at the feet of Adolf Hitler, moaning and helpless.

But how can all the criticism in the world, of this policy or that country, compensate for the grievous wrong done to the Spanish Republic—for its innumerable hours of anguish and tears. And worse still, the Republic stands even today exiled and begging for justice and London is again playing the same role. M. Blum, who was the Premier of France in those fateful and faithless days, admitted in his recent visit to New York that Non-Intervention was the gravest error of his life. Meanwhile the exiled Republic is languishing.
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