The philosophical problem of political liberty, with special reference to the social philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau

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Dissertation

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF POLITICAL LIBERTY

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU

by

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"C'est moins la force des bras que la modération des coeurs qui rend les hommes indépendants et libres."

—Rousseau, *Emile.*
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

James Bryce, in his chapter on "Liberty,"\(^1\) observes that an analysis of the concept of liberty together with the various meanings which the term has borne is a subject vast enough to need a treatise and "no one seems to have undertaken the task."\(^2\) This dissertation is an attempt to provide for a certain portion of that analysis. It is not, however, the purpose of this dissertation to give an account of all the meanings which have been attached to the term liberty in the course of human affairs. This treatise does not deal with the historical problem of liberty. Neither is its purpose to interpret the meaning and implications of the notion of liberty in relation to the problems of any specific state at any given time. The political problem of liberty is not the problem. The province of this present investigation is philosophical rather than historical or political, though, as a matter of fact, the three approaches cannot be finally held apart.

The philosophical problem of liberty is the problem of determining the general features or predicates of the concept of liberty which are permanently valid, together with the proofs to which these predicates are amenable and the assumptions upon which they rest. The philosophical problem of liberty, as contrasted with the historical, is normative rather than descriptive; it is not so much the investigation into what men have meant by liberty as the delineation of what liberty ought to mean if men are to be consistent in the

\(^1\) Bryce, MD, I, VI.

\(^2\) Ibid., 51.
INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Some thinkers in the opinion of the psychologists who have studied the development of intelligence in children say that the growth of intelligence in children is an essential part of development. Intelligence, according to some psychologists, is the ability to think, reason, and solve problems. It is not to be confused with the acquisition of information, which may be learned through education, but rather an innate ability that is developed through experience and practice.

The psychologists also believe that the development of intelligence is not a sudden change but rather a gradual process that occurs over time. They believe that intelligence is not something that can be measured by a single test, but rather a complex ability that is influenced by many factors, including genetic, environmental, and social factors.

The psychologists also believe that the development of intelligence is a lifelong process that continues throughout a person's life. They believe that the development of intelligence is not limited to children but can continue to develop throughout a person's life, provided that they continue to engage in activities that challenge their minds and encourage them to think and learn.

The psychologists also believe that the development of intelligence is not a passive process but rather an active process that requires effort and commitment. They believe that the development of intelligence is a process of continuous improvement, where the individual must work hard to develop their abilities and improve their performance.

In conclusion, the development of intelligence is a complex process that is influenced by many factors, including genetic, environmental, and social factors. It is a life-long process that requires effort and commitment, and it is a process of continuous improvement, where the individual must work hard to develop their abilities and improve their performance.
use of the concept. As contrasted with the political problem of liberty, the philosophical inquiry is the search for first principles rather than the application of these principles to cases. The political problem of liberty bears the same relation to the philosophical problem of liberty which the science of casuistry bears to theoretical ethics.

The concept of political liberty implies liberty in the context of a social group, and it is within this frame of reference that the present investigation will proceed. The problem of political liberty is thus the problem of the relation of the individual to the group. It is doubtless true that every social philosophy deals with this problem,¹ but a complete social philosophy deals also with aspects of the problem which lie outside the scope of the more limited topic of liberty. The concept of equality, the notion of rights, the place and function of institutions, etc., all find place in a complete social philosophy. The point is that although the problem of liberty is a problem of the relation of the individual to the group, one may not, therefore, expect a complete social philosophy to be presented in an analysis of the concept of liberty.

In the light of these remarks the problem may be rephrased to state that the purpose of this investigation is to determine whether in social organization there are to be found any general principles governing the relation of the individual to the group of such a character that these principles can be regarded as valid for a consistent definition of liberty, and to inquire into the nature and limits of this validity.

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¹ "A complete theory of individual liberty and the function of the State is a complete political philosophy; and a philosophy of politics involves a philosophy of things in general" (Montague, LIL, vii).
PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY

The term "political liberty" is used to distinguish the kind of liberty under discussion from metaphysical or moral liberty, which is the liberty involved in the free choices of persons. Political liberty is to be distinguished also from what might be called "psychological liberty," by which is meant the freedom of an integrated personality. Neither of these is our problem.

The adjective "political" in the term "political liberty" is to be understood in a broad sense similar to that in which Aristotle used the word when he described man as a "political animal." The term "political liberty" in the context of this discussion is not to be confined to the technical meaning which this same term bears in the science of government, namely, the right of the individuals of a state to share in the government of the state. This is only one part of what is here meant by political liberty.

The extension which this term is to enjoy may best be set forth by noting the various kinds of liberty which have been described. James Bryce, in the chapter noted, describes four kinds of liberty as follows:

1. Civil Liberty, the exemption from control of the citizen in respect of his person and property.
2. Religious Liberty, exemption from control in the expression of religious opinions and the practice of worship.
3. Political Liberty, the participation of the citizen in the government of the community.
4. Individual Liberty, exemption from control in matters which do not so plainly affect the welfare of the whole community as to render control necessary.

In this dissertation the term "political liberty" is not to be understood

2. Bryce, MD, I, 53-54.
in the restricted (and more usual) sense described above but is to be understood as including all the above classifications. In the present writing, the term "political liberty" means the same thing as the term "civil or social liberty" used by Mill.\(^1\) The adjective "political" is thus used to indicate any or all of those actions on the part of the individual which have a significance for the life of the group and conversely any or all of those actions on the part of the group which are significant for the life of the individual.

These remarks are, of course, only a preliminary definition of the term; they merely describe an area from which a critical definition is to be derived. A final definition at this stage of the investigation would be inappropriate since the task of arriving at a definition is the object of the investigation and its natural conclusion.

**IS THERE A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF POLITICAL LIBERTY?**

The implication of much contemporary writing about liberty is to the effect that every instance of liberty is one in which the term means something particular and the particular things which it means are various, and often contradictory. Mr. Walton H. Hamilton asserts, for example, that "there are, in fact, as many freedoms as there are persons to declaim its greatness or to invoke it in the name of humanity."\(^2\) He points out that freedom means different things to the negro, the industrial worker, the farmer, and the business man; the liberties they fight for are different, if not contradictory. This writer's opinion is that "... we can no more define freedom than we can realize it ... what it is, what it means, what

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it promises vary with the circumstances of society, the institutions under which we live, and the thoughts which variously lie within our several heads." Mr. Horace M. Kallen points out the same kind of relativity, and Everett D. Martin adds that "in the abstract the term liberty has no generally recognized content, for liberty is always the right to enjoy some specific condition, or to do, say, or think something to which it is presumed somebody else objects." These statements are correct in so far as they point to an actual state of affairs; liberty has meant a great many things and these things are often in conflict. To the classical liberals it meant freedom of economic enterprise; to modern liberals it often means a denial of such freedom. What this fact establishes, however, is not that a philosophical interpretation of liberty is impossible, but that above all things it is most necessary. And why a philosophical interpretation? Because in the nature of the case we are seeking a normative rather than a descriptive interpretation and a normative interpretation is philosophical rather than scientific. Nothing could be more impossible than to try to arrive at a definition of liberty by simply describing all the different meanings which the term has borne in history. As Kant might well say, such a method is merely "blind empirical groping," and a student, after making his way through such a list of meanings, would at the end inevitably ask, "Well, what does liberty really mean?" The demand which such a question embodies is the demand for some standard by which particular or private liberties, often defended in the name of "Liberty," can be evaluated. Persons who have argued for specific liberties and persons

3. Martin, LIB, 75.
who have written on the notion of liberty in general have inevitably assumed such standards although the assumption is not often made explicit nor is the task of rendering it clear and consistent often undertaken. This, however, is the basic issue and until this issue is met it will be true that "we can no more define freedom than we can realize it." There is, therefore, a philosophical problem of political liberty.

REASONS FOR CHOOSING ROUSSEAU

The reasons for choosing Rousseau as the thinker in whose writings the problem of liberty is to be studied are readily defensible. His importance in the history of political philosophy would partially justify the choice. It has been said that Rousseau was the "first, in modern times, to state the problem of civilization effectively."¹ A more significant reason, however, is that the problem with which he wrestled was the problem of liberty. Hegel's judgment was that Rousseau, in answering the question of the foundation of the state, shifted the emphasis from force to freedom.² It is probably correct to say that almost no one in the history of political philosophy was a more passionate defender of freedom or searched more diligently for the lasting foundations upon which to erect the edifice of liberty than Jean Jacques Rousseau.

1. Höffding, JJR, vii. The author of the statement is Leo E. Saidla, translator of Höffding's book and author of the Introduction. Bergson's estimate is that Rousseau is "la plus puissante des influences qui se sont exercées sur l'esprit humain depuis Descartes" (quoted by Schinz, LPR, I, 2). D.A.G. Fuller (HMP, 240) declares that Rousseau is "by far the most important" of the political and sociological thinkers of the eighteenth century. C.E. Vaughan (FWR, I, 92-93) finds Rousseau "richer in speculative ideas than any other man of his century" excepting only Kant, and Kant himself felt in Rousseau a "rare penetration of mind" (quoted by Wright, MR, 5).

Still another reason for choosing Rousseau is the fact that although he made gigantic strides in the direction of his goal he did not finally arrive. "The great problem— which Rousseau raised with more sense than the critics have usually recognized... he did not solve."¹ A most rewarding approach, therefore, to the problem of liberty is an analysis of the cause of Rousseau's failure, and this is especially rewarding in view of the fact that Rousseau by his failure opened a way to success. His was a seminal mind, quick to formulate and generalize the manifold feelings of his sensitive nature. His failure to achieve a nicely-balanced system is less serious than it might be in view of the fact that he created the basic elements out of which such a system can be constructed. To discover these elements and set them free for a new combination is to go a great distance toward the solution of the problem at hand.

A final reason for concentrating on Rousseau is the fact that the contradictory character of even the most recent interpretations of Rousseau's political thought is prima facie evidence that the interpretation of Rousseau is not a closed issue and that there may still be opportunity for fresh insights. These considerations doubtless warrant the devotion of the greater portion of the space of this dissertation to the thought of Rousseau.

METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

The first objective in this study is a review of the work of previous investigators. The writing on liberty is almost inexhaustible, but a review of all this writing is not relevant to the problem since the literature deals, almost without exception, not with the philosophical problem but with some special phase of the problem of liberty, e.g., the historical, the economic, political.

¹ Höffding, JJR, preface, xxiv.
or it deals with a particular liberty like religious liberty, individual liberty, the liberty of thought and expression or of free association and assembly. Occasionally it happens that a writing which purports to be a philosophical treatment of the problem turns out to be a treatment which merely combines several of these aspects and notices only incidentally, if at all, the basic principles which any one of these aspects must presuppose. The literature dealing with the particular problem of this investigation is, therefore, comparatively limited.

Studies of the problem of liberty in the political philosophy of Rousseau are even fewer. Nearly every biography or criticism written on this author has, to be sure, some reference to liberty, but discursive analyses of this phase of his thought are rare. The first aim, therefore, will be to give an account of the work which has been done on this phase of Rousseau's thought and on the philosophical problem of liberty in general. This will constitute the final portion of the present chapter.

The second objective is an expository and critical review of the writings of Rousseau which bear on the problem at hand. The writings to be reviewed are the following: *Discours sur les arts et les sciences; Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité; Émile; Économie politique; Contrat social.* This list includes some writings which are not strictly political and it omits others, the occasional pieces like the writings on Corsica and Poland, and the writings on war and peace, which are political. The reason for omitting these is that they contain no systematic principles relevant to the problem other than those presented in the *Contrat social,* and the reason for

1. F. C. Montague's book, *Limits of Individual Liberty,* is an essay of this kind. The point reached by this analysis is, as the author himself admits, only "one or two stages beyond the point reached by those whose sole interest is in party politics" (prefatory note, vii).
including the others is the fact that they do contain such principles. The chronological order of the writings is not observed because the logical order is more important. The first three belong together logically, as do the last two. The critical review of these writings will be the content of chapters two and three.

Chapters four and five will be devoted to the interpretation of Rousseau and the object of this interpretation will be to present the various approaches which the author makes to the problem of liberty and to arrive at some conclusion about the final status of liberty in his system. This problem will be studied from the standpoint of the relations existing between individualism and collectivism in Rousseau's system and from the standpoint of the reactions of various critics to these two phases of Rousseau's thought.

Chapter six will embody an attempt to reconstruct a valid definition of liberty using, in so far as possible, the insights of Rousseau.

The final chapter will be devoted to the summary and conclusions of the investigation.

A study of this nature ought properly to include some reference to the classics on liberty, especially Mill's essay, On Liberty. A review of this writing and the other classics will, therefore, be included in the appendix. These are not treated in the main body of the dissertation because of limitations of space and because of the logical necessity of preserving the unity of the study. The conclusion, however, of Mill's essay, the only one of the classics dealing with the philosophical problem explicitly, is considered in the sixth chapter dealing with a reconstruction of the concept.
WORK OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATORS

To review all of the writing on Rousseau would be attempting to travel through what Professor Wright has called "the Serbonian bog of Rousseau criticism." Much of this criticism revolves around issues irrelevant to the present investigation and needs not, therefore, to be reviewed. Specific investigations of the problem of liberty in Rousseau are rare, but the judgments which the critics pass upon individualism and collectivism in Rousseau's writings bear upon the problem of liberty. They are, as a matter of fact, the crux of the problem, because final judgment about the status of liberty in Rousseau's system cannot be made until a conclusion about the relation between the individual and the group is reached. Rousseau's critics comprise two general classes: (1) Those who find some way of synthesizing individualism and collectivism in his writings and thus proclaim the unity of his thought, (2) those who find a synthesis impossible and thus proclaim the disunity of his thought. The arguments on both sides of this problem will be reviewed in the chapters on the interpretation of Rousseau and in that connection the contributions of the critics will be noted in fuller detail. The general attitude of the works which are related to this problem, however, may be noted here.

Among the papers read in 1878 at the centennial commemoration of Rousseau's death, one is significant for our problem, that of Joseph Hornung on "Les Idées politiques de Rousseau." This paper traces the disunity of Rousseau's writing to a contradiction in Rousseau between the man and the citizen, the former being a capricious individual of absolute liberty, the latter being a rigid disciplinarian like Calvin.

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Émile Faguet, one of the guiding lights in Rousseau criticism, reiterates Hornung's thesis in his *Dix-huitième siècle, études litteraires* (1890). M. Faguet holds that the political ideas of Rousseau embodied in the *Contrat social* contradict the ideas of Rousseau's other writings and that the final outcome of his political philosophy is "the most precise and the most exact organization of tyranny that can be." ¹ This same conclusion is repeated and expanded in Faguet's later book, *La Politique comparée de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire* (1902), a study which charges Rousseau with being the defender of "popular despotism" and Voltaire with being the defender of "royal despotism," while Montesquieu is credited with being the upholder of the liberal view in the eighteenth century.

Monsieur A. Espinas, a less friendly critic, gives a biting analysis of Rousseau's inconsistencies in "Le 'système' de J. J. Rousseau" (1895). Instead of a system, he finds in Rousseau a collection of fragmentary pieces artfully placed together end to end, the whole being "incoherent to the point of impertinence." ² This attack was answered by M. Edmond Dreyfus-Brisac in the same year with an article under the same title.

M. Gustave Lanson, who stands along with Émile Faguet and Edmond Dreyfus-Brisac as one of the fountainheads of Rousseau criticism, tends to minimize the contradictions of Rousseau and to unify his work by showing its internal consistency and its close relation to his life. In his *Histoire de la Littérature française* (1896) he finds that the following theme unifies the whole work of Rousseau: Nature makes men good and society makes men evil; society, therefore, should be and can be reformed, as can the evil individual whom it has produced. The individual can be free in society because to be

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¹ Faguet, DHS, 391.
² Espinas, Art. 1, 436.
free means to submit to one's proper will, which, for the civil man, is the general will.

Harald Höfdding's Jean Jacques Rousseau and His Philosophy (1896) throws some light on the politics of Rousseau in the summary given of his thought. The main interest of this volume, however, is biographical and expository with some analysis and interpretation.

M. Henri Rodet follows Faguet rather than Lanson in his Le Contrat social et les Idées politiques de J. J. Rousseau (1909) and holds that in the end Rousseau effaced the last vestiges of individual liberty.

The bicentennial celebration of Rousseau's birth (1912) brought forth many articles on the various aspects of Rousseau's thought. Lanson's article, "L'unité de la pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau" (1912) repeats the conclusions of his earlier study and contends that the contradictions of Rousseau are merely the clash of critical formulas which are substituted for the works of the author. His works are one with his life, Lanson contends.

Monsieur G. Beaulavon, in "La doctrine politique de Contrat social" (1912), agrees with Lanson, asserting, but without giving the detail of the proof, that the contradictions of Rousseau are "purely apparent and verbal." The unity of Rousseau's doctrine is found in the central preoccupation of the author, which is above all a moral preoccupation. Émile Boutroux, in his "Remarques sur la philosophie de Rousseau" (1912), follows Lanson in contending that Rousseau's criticisms of society are directed against the abuse of the social condition and not against society as such. The regenerated

1. These are published in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 20 (1912), or some may be found in Baldensperger, J.R. Sachmann, Art. 1, is a review of these anniversary articles with some added material.

The present is the time to make a change in life. It is the right time to take action and make your dreams a reality. Don't wait for tomorrow, because tomorrow never comes. Today is the day to seize the moment and make a difference.

Restoration of the Environment

It is crucial to restore the environment and ensure sustainable practices. The Earth is a precious gift that we must cherish and protect. Let's work together to create a greener future for generations to come.

The Importance of Education

Education is the key to a brighter future. It opens doors to opportunities and empowers individuals to make a positive impact on their communities. Let's invest in education and support those who need it the most.

The Power of Love

Love is the most powerful force in the world. It can heal wounds, bring people together, and inspire greatness. Let's express love in our daily interactions and create a world filled with kindness and compassion.

The Cycle of Life

Life is a cycle of birth, growth, decay, and renewal. Each stage has its own beauty and purpose. Let's embrace the cycle of life and find意义 in every moment.

The Gift of Time

Time is the most precious gift we have. It is finite and不可再生. Let's make the most of our time and use it wisely. Set aside moments to reflect, learn, and grow.
political state will restore the benefits of the natural order. But Boutroux
notices a radical dualism in Rousseau between sensibility and intelligence,
between the individual and the universal. He corrects Rousseau's theory at
one point by holding that the barrier between the individual and the group is
not as impenetrable as Rousseau supposes. The article of Jean Jaurès, "Les
Idées politiques et sociales de J. J. Rousseau" (1912), gives the general
lines of Rousseau's thought and is expository rather than critical.

Of all the bicentennial writers it remained for Monsieur M. Bourguin
to call strict attention to the discontinuity of Rousseau's thought world in
his article "Les deux tendances de Rousseau" (1912). The individualistic
spirit of Rousseau's literary works is opposed to the collectivism of the
political writings. Following Faguet, Bourguin says that the conciliation
of these contradictory tendencies is merely verbal in Rousseau. Other aspects
of Rousseau's thought exhibit the same double tendency, e.g., the abstract
and the concrete tendencies.

Albert Schinz, who is perhaps the leading American critic of Rousseau,
introduced a new element in the interpretation of Rousseau with his book,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Forerunner of Pragmatism (1909). In this work Schinz
traces parallel developments in the thought of William James and Rousseau,
contending that Rousseau's last great effort to unify his thought is to be
found in the Émile and that the Émile is pragmatic.

Gaspard Vallette's Jean Jacques Rousseau Genevois (1911) calls atten-
tion, not to the pragmatic attributes of Rousseau's thought, but to its
Genevan characteristics, and concludes that the main influences shaping the
philosophy of Rousseau came, not from Paris, but from the city of John Calvin.

C. E. Vaughan did the students of Rousseau a great service by publish-
ing his two-volume edition of The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau
Orf* (1963) and the Comenian

Law of Knowledge of Nature and the Knowledge of Culture

It is the principle of knowledge that leads to the concept of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. The concept of knowledge is the foundation of the principles of culture. 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(1915). His interpretation of Rousseau as a strong collectivist is an important contribution to Rousseau criticism.

Émile Durkheim, in his lengthy article, "Le Contrat social de Rousseau" (1918), gives a history and an interpretation of the Contrat social. He joins the group of Lanson and Beaulavon by contending that collective life, according to Rousseau, is not contrary to the natural order and that one can find continuity in the thought of Rousseau.

M. Daniel Mornet, noted critic of the Nouvelle Héloïse, presents a brilliant brief analysis of the writings, the intellectual development, the system, and the influence of Rousseau in his Histoire de la Littérature et de la Pensée Française (1924). Another general exposition, important for providing the background of the problem before us, is E. H. Wright's The Meaning of Rousseau (1929). The essentials of Rousseau's system are clearly expounded in this work, but emphasis is allowed to rest upon ideas which, in the opinion of the present writer, are marginal rather than central in Rousseau; but it happens that these marginal ideas are more consistent than the ones which Rousseau makes central so that Professor Wright's exposition carries conviction. He finds unity in Rousseau's system by stressing, for example, that type of individualism in which reason is central, leaving to one side the type of individualism in which nature is central. The crucial question in the interpretation of Rousseau's political philosophy is the question of which type of individualism underlies the theory. We shall attempt to show that Rousseau's most constant appeal is to the type of individualism in which nature rather than reason is basic.

Probably the best general interpretation of Rousseau is Albert Schinz's La Pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1929). The second volume particularly presents a philosophical criticism of Rousseau's work, and the interpretation
holds that the life and the writing of Rousseau exhibit an alternation or a mixture of "romantic" and "Roman" traits. In the end, the austere, Roman pattern dominates the romantic pattern, and in Rousseau's politics this means that freedom is surrendered to constraint.

Another general work of superior merit is the two-volume exposition of Charles W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau Moralist (1934). This work might be called a biography of Rousseau's ideas. It shows the development of his thought and the origin and background of his writings. The thesis is that the orientation of Rousseau's philosophy is moral throughout.

A more strictly political analysis is found in Alfred Cobban's Rousseau and the Modern State (1934), a book which was intended as a refutation of C. E. Vaughan's description of Rousseau as a collectivist. A study of Cobban's contentions for the individualism of Rousseau makes a welcome point of departure for the study of two important questions: (1) What type of individualism is basic in Rousseau's system? (2) Is the final outcome of Rousseau's theory favorable or unfavorable to the individual and his liberty? These questions will be studied in this dissertation by making a comparison of the arguments of Cobban and Vaughan.

A recent contribution to the problem of freedom in Rousseau is the inaugural dissertation of Erich Schwarz, Freiheit und Staatsomnipotenz in Rousseau's "Contrat social" (1936). Herr Schwarz concludes, in a manner familiar in totalitarian philosophies, that the individual is not surrendered in Rousseau's collectivism because the individual finds his freedom in fulfilling the general will, and finds his protection in the unity of his will with that of the state. This interpretation is faithful to the main emphasis of the Contrat social, but it suffers from being derived from that writing alone. The French criticisms of Rousseau are also neglected.
Apart from Rousseau, the writing on the philosophical problem of political liberty is small in amount, although the writing on liberty in general is almost endless. The classical literature on this subject, with the single exception of Mill’s essay, On Liberty, deals, not with the philosophical problem, but with some special aspect of liberty. Thus, Junius Brutus’s Vindiciae Contra Tyranos (1579) was a tract on religious liberty addressed to the French Huguenots. Milton’s Areopagitica (1644) is a plea for the freedom of printing. Locke’s Four Letters on Toleration (1685-1704) are a defence of the freedom of worship. The writings of Thomas Paine, particularly the Common Sense (1776) and the Rights of Man (1791-92), are mainly an attack on monarchy and a defence of the American and French Revolutions. Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience” (1849) is a plea for individual liberty.

Mill’s essay, On Liberty (1859), is a philosophical analysis of the problem of individual liberty. His view is that “liberty consists in doing what one desires,” subject to the restraint that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others one may be held accountable by society. As will be shown later, the difficulty with Mill’s definition is that it is oriented toward the desires of the individual rather than toward the properties of social organization. This unfortunate orientation results in the fact that the obligations which the group owes the individual are omitted entirely.

Last in the list of the classics is Sir James Stephen’s Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873), which is an anti-liberal, anti-democratic denunciation of Mill’s essay, coupled with a vigorous defence of coercion. It has no principles to contribute to a philosophy of liberty.

2. Ibid., 167.
In the wake of the triumph of the Revolution, the new society was faced with the task of transforming the entire social and economic structure of the country. The immediate goal was the establishment of a socialist order, which would provide for the well-being of all people and ensure the development of the country.

The first steps towards this goal were the nationalization of the means of production and the restructuring of the economy. The state became the owner of all means of production, and the workers were given a role in the management of the enterprises.

The new society was characterized by a high level of social equality and freedom. The workers were given the right to participate in the decision-making process and to have a say in the running of their enterprises.

The new society was also characterized by a high level of cultural development. The arts and sciences were given a prominent role, and the people were encouraged to educate themselves and to develop their skills.

The new society was thus a truly revolutionary society, which showed the way to a new world order. It was a society that was based on the principles of democracy, equality, and freedom, and it was a society that was dedicated to the well-being of all its members.

The new society was a society that was truly revolutionary, and it showed the way to a new world order.
Mr. Walter Lippmann, whose writing on liberty bears mostly on the economic aspect of the problem, makes the suggestion in *Liberty and the News* (1920) that the familiar arguments for liberty are narrow because they plead for toleration in matters which their authors regard as of "indifferent" importance, while at the same time introducing qualifications which deny tolerance in those matters to which the writers are opposed. Indifference, he concludes is too feeble a foundation for liberty.

Mr. Harold Laski, in his *Grammar of Politics* (1925), links liberty with equality, or the absence of special privilege, and defines liberty as "the right of personal initiative in the things that add to our moral stature," or as "that atmosphere in which men have the opportunity to be their best selves."¹ One chapter in *Liberty and the Modern State* (1930) presents the view that "liberty is essentially an absence of restraint. It implies power to expand, the choice by the individual of his own way of life without imposed prohibitions from without."² In the article on "Liberty" (1933) in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, however, Mr. Laski emphasizes method, and makes the existence of liberty depend upon "our willingness to build the foundations of society upon the basis of rational justice, and to adjust them to changing conditions in terms of reasoned discussion and not of violence."³

Professor John Dewey also stresses the importance of method in his paper, "The Future of Liberalism" (1934). He holds that method is the central thing in liberalism. The weakness of earlier philosophies of liberty was their atomism. Liberty was conceived as a ready-made possession of the individual, rather than as an achievement which stands in relation to physical,  

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1. Laski, GOP, 143.  
2. Laski, IMS, 1.  
3. Laski, Art. 2, 446.
economic, legal, political, and other conditions.

Professor W. E. Hocking's paper on "The Future of Liberalism" (1934)\(^1\) outlines a view which was later developed in his book, *The Lasting Elements of Individualism* (1937). His contribution to the problem of the individual-group relation is the conception of the "co-agent state," which is characterized by the "commotive function" and the "incompressible individual." The former signifies the ability of individuals to move together in those domains in which all have an interest. The latter refers to the fact that neither the state nor the individual is free to deny the irrepressible nature of conscience. This conception of the state may be described as aiming at a society of free beings, a society in which state policies are formed out of the ideas of the competent members of the state itself. There is to be freedom, but not the atomistic freedom of *laissez-faire* liberalism.

The 1930's brought forth a number of books on liberty. Among them were Everett Dean Martin's *Liberty* (1930), Herbert Hoover's *The Challenge to Liberty* (1934), Walter Lippmann's *The Method of Freedom* (1934), John MacMurray's *Freedom in the Modern World* (1934), Bertrand Russell's *Freedom vs. Organization* (1934), William F. Russell's *Liberty versus Equality* (1936), and George Scoul's *The Future of Liberty* (1936). These works deal, not with the philosophical problem of liberty but with some special phase of the problem, usually the economic or the historical.

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1. The papers by Dewey and Hocking are parts of a symposium on Liberalism sponsored by the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. The other papers may be found in the *Jour. Phil.*, 32(1935), and in the *Int. Jour. Eth.*, 45(1935).
CHAPTER II
THE WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU

THE DISCOURSES

Rousseau's first discourse was an essay on the question proposed by the Academy of Dijon: "Has the Restoration of the Arts and Sciences Had a Purifying Effect Upon Morals?" The answer of Rousseau is direct and unqualified: "Our souls have been corrupted in proportion as our sciences and arts have advanced toward perfection." The product of this advance, so far as man is concerned, is artificiality and deceit, which we are compelled to follow rather than "the promptings of our own nature." Historically, societies which have become civilized have become physically weak, and been conquered. The physical and military virtues flourish or fade in proportion as the arts and sciences are absent or present.

The sciences have sprung from our vices and their progress has added nothing to our real happiness. Luxury has corrupted our morals and vitiated our taste. This is a state of affairs which nature, left to her own

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2. Bosanquet complains that the title of this Discourse is rarely stated correctly and he cites Morley (R, I, v) and Saintsbury (Ency. Brit., Art. "Rousseau") as offenders. The French for "Restoration of the Sciences and Arts" is "Rétablissement des Sciences et des Arts." He contends that this refers explicitly to the Renaissance so that it is a question of the moral outcome of the Renaissance (Bosanquet, Art. 1, 323-24).

3. DSA, in Oeuvres, I, 5.

4. Ibid., 4.

5. Ibid., 5-10; 12-14.

6. Ibid., 13, 15.
CHAPTER II
THE WRITINGS OF CONRAD

THE DOCTRINE

Rosencrantz's true doctrine is never as easy on the surface as

they teach us to differ. The doctrine of the Verne and

Rosencrantz, however, have been connected in contradistinction to our

understanding. They have been connected in contradistinction to our

understanding.

The doctrine of this nature, this doctrine, has been connected in contradistinction to our understands.

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devices, would have snatched men, "as a mother snatches a dangerous weapon from the hands of her child."\(^1\) This "weapon" has operated to destroy "the simplicity which prevailed in the earliest times," the image of which "may be justly compared to a beautiful coast, adorned only by the hands of nature; toward which our eyes are constantly turned, and which we see receding with regret."\(^2\) The departure from the state of nature is a departure from the state of virtue, because the principles of virtue are graven on the heart of the natural man. To learn the laws of virtue we need only to "examine ourselves and listen to the voice of conscience, when the passions are silent."\(^3\) The artificiality, the immorality, and the corruption of modern societies are due to the departure from this early state of simplicity, and the cause of that departure is the advancement of the arts and sciences.

Such is the line of the argument. Civilization, instead of bringing the individual a larger liberty has brought him only a more vicious bondage. Bosanquet interprets the attack here as against civilization under the aspect of intellectualism, an indictment of the view which holds that the panacea for the evils of the world is the extension of our knowledge of the laws of nature and the advancement of science, while the attack in the second Discourse is against society under the aspect of social servitude.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Ibid., 10.
\(^2\) Ibid., 13-14.
\(^3\) Ibid., 20.
\(^4\) Art. 1, 326.
The problem of the way to organize the educational process in a democratic society is a fundamental issue of the educational reform. The idea of a new educational system that can adequately address the needs of the modern society is gaining increasing attention in various educational circles. The concept of a flexible and adaptive educational system that can accommodate the diverse needs and interests of students is becoming more prevalent. This requires a reevaluation of traditional educational methods and the development of innovative approaches to teaching and learning.
The second Discourse, like the first, was written as a prize essay on a question proposed by the Academy of Dijon: "Quelle est l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes, et si elle est autorisée par la loi naturelle?" This particular form of the question implies a reference to the "state of nature," and Rousseau followed this suggestion in drafting his answer. As in the first Discourse, his answer here is a glorification of the state of nature at the expense of civil society. He summarizes his argument as follows:

Il suit de cet exposé que l'inégalité, étant presque nulle dans l'état de nature, tire sa force et son accroissement du développement de nos facultés et des progrès de l'esprit humain, et devient enfin stable et légitime par l'établissement de les propriétés et des lois. Fully half of the second Discourse is occupied with a description of the benefits of the state of nature. Some have lamented the vagueness of Rousseau's conception of nature but the account in the second Discourse seems adequate enough. The state of nature is a state of natural goodness and not, as Hobbes conceived it, a state of bellum omnium contra omnes.

Plusieurs se sont hâtés de conclure que l'homme est naturellement cruel, et qu'il a besoin de police pour l'adoucir; tandis que rein n'est si doux que lui dans son état primitif, lorsque, placé par la nature à des distances égales de la stupidité des brutes et des lumières funestes de l'homme civil.

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1. Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes (DSI), 1755, in Vaughan, PFR, I, 125-220.
2. Vaughan, PFR, I, 125 note. This Discourse, unlike the first one, did not win the prize.
4. W. A. Dunning, for example, says that "seeking to comprehend clearly his conception of 'nature' is like trying to visualize the fauna of the Apocalypse" (HPT, III, 13).
5. Vaughan, PFR, I, 174-75.
In the state of peace, an important consideration is new economic progress. If we are to maintain prosperity and welfare, it is necessary to develop new industries and improve existing ones. This can be achieved by promoting scientific research and technological innovation.

In the same state, the role of education is crucial. We must invest in quality education to ensure that our children and future generations are well-equipped to meet the challenges of the modern world.

Furthermore, the importance of social justice cannot be overstated. We must work towards creating a society where everyone has equal opportunities to succeed, regardless of their background or circumstances.

In conclusion, the state of peace, economic progress, and social justice are interdependent. By focusing on these areas, we can create a brighter future for all.
the basis of civil society is the source of "crimes, wars, and murders." ¹

Mais, dès l'instant qu'un homme eut besoin du secours d'un autre, dès qu'on s'aperçut qu'il était utile à un seul d'avoir des provisions pour deux, l'égaleité disparut, la propriété s'introduisit, le travail devint nécessaire; et les vastes forêts se changèrent en des campagnes riantes qu'il fallut arroser de la sueur des hommes, et dans lesquelles on vit bientôt l'esclavage et la misère germer et croître avec les moissons... Ce sont le fer et le blé qui ont civilisé les hommes et perdu le genre humain.²

The happiest epoch in human history was that semi-social period intermediate between the absolute savagery of the primeval state and the modern civil society, a period in which, although it represented some expansion of the human faculties, nevertheless kept "a just mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our egoism."³

This state, as near to the state of nature as it is possible for human beings to be while at the same time depending on each other for the simple necessities, was "the happiest and most stable of epochs," and the departure from it must have been "only through some fatal accident, which, for the public good, should never have happened... All subsequent advances have been apparently so many steps towards the perfection of the individual, but in reality towards the decrepitude of the species."⁴

Rousseau traces the progress of inequality through three stages:

1. The establishment of property;
2. The "institution of magistracy";
3. The "conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power."⁵

The growth of civil society is thus a growth in exploitation. Injustice, on this view,

¹. Vaughan, FWR, I, 169. Cf. also 179.
². Ibid., 175-6.
³. Ibid., 175.
⁴. Loc. cit.
⁵. Ibid., 190.
The relationship between the spatial geography of the human being and the modern spatial society's texture is a topic of interest. The spatial structure of the modern society reflects the new spatial organization of our environment. This aspect of the spatial nature is to be possible to understand and to study. The modern society is an organism that reacts in different ways to changes in its environment. The interdependence of the spatial organization and the human activity of the society is an essential aspect of the interaction of these elements.

In essence, the geography of the society

1. The establishment of the gradient (s) of the reproduction of the processes of reproduction
2. The formation of the reproduction into reproduction processes
3. The reproduction of the society as a result of reproduction processes.
is the inevitable product of the civil state; government is an instrument of oppression serving the rich against the poor. This is not an accidental state of affairs arising in a situation where the aims of government have been prostituted and the powers of government abused, but it is a natural and inevitable condition necessarily conjoined with any government whatsoever. "Car les vices qui rendent nécessaires les institutions sociales sont les mêmes qui en rendent l'abus inévitable."¹

Such then is the contrast between the state of nature and the state of society in the second Discourse. Society and law have destroyed natural liberty, and the civil state, instead of conferring advantage upon the individual, destroys utterly the advantages which the individual enjoyed in a state of nature.

**THE ÉMILE**

A third writing, which Rousseau considered as forming a whole with the two already mentioned, is the Émile.² On this work Rousseau spent twenty years of meditation and three years of labor.³ He regarded it as the best as well as the most important of his writings.⁴ It is a treatise on education but the last book is presented as an abstract of the Contrat social.

¹ Vaughan, PWR, I, 190. Cf. also 180-81 and Émile, IV in Oeuvres, II, 206.
² "Ce premier Discours, celui de l'inégalité et le Traité de l'éducation; lequels trois ouvrages sont inséparables, et forment ensemble un même tout" (Lettre à Malesherbes in Oeuvres, X, 301. Cf. PWR, II, 137n).
³ Confessions, livre, VIII in Oeuvres, VIII, 275.
⁴ Ibid., Livre, XI in Oeuvres, IX, 22.
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4. Ibid., Livre, XI in Oeuvres, IX, 22.
The reason for linking this writing with the two preceding is doubtless that the thought familiar in the two Discourses, that nature is good and society is bad, is taken up again in the Emile. It has been said that the central thought of the Emile is expressed in the opening sentence: "Tout est bien, sortant des mains de l'Auteur des choses. Tout dégénère entre les mains de l'homme." This work, like the earlier writings, is a plea for more nature and less society. "Everything should therefore be brought into harmony with these natural tendencies," says Rousseau in the first Book. "Observe nature and follow the path which she traces for you," he commands. The usual description of the system as "education according to nature" is therefore, accurate and in keeping with the author's own estimation of his system. The goal or aim of education, says Rousseau, is the same as that of nature. "Quel est ce but? C'est celui même de la nature; cela vient d'être prouvé." Education is only habit, and the problem, therefore, is to cultivate habits which are conformable to nature.

This plea for nature is balanced by a correlative condemnation of society. "Tout n'est que folie et contradiction dans les institutions humaines." Society is the cause of weakness in man because society places

1. Vaughan, PWR, I, 15.
2. Oeuvres, II, 3.
3. Ibid., 6.
6. Ibid., 5.
7. Ibid., 49.
8. Ibid., 51.
a restriction upon the natural strength of man while at the same time increasing his desires through the stimulation of the imagination, this latter being the work of "human prejudice and human institutions." Man must call back his life to within himself if he is to escape his misery. Prevailing standards violate nature, destroy individuality and prohibit freedom.

In this contention Rousseau was undoubtedly right. Artificiality was the cult and fashion of the period. Education, instead of producing men, produced "embroidered, gilded, pompadoured, and powdered little gentlemen" who were well versed in the empty art of "striking charming poses, repeating compliments learned by heart from the tailor, the hairdresser and the dancing-master." A stand against the moral futility and the political injustice of the period of Louis XV was in order and Rousseau's was the voice of the prophet. "All our wisdom consists in slavish prejudices," he cried. "Civil man is born, lives and dies in slavery. At his birth they sew him up in swaddling clothes; at his death they nail him down in a coffin. So long as he maintains the figure of a man he is chained by our institutions." Speaking of the habit of midwives in rubbing the head of the infant to give it a better shape, he taunted them with believing that "our heads would be bad as fashioned by the Author of our being; it is necessary for us to fashion them on the outside by midwives, on the inside by philosophers."

Rousseau proposed to cut through this net of slavery spun by convention and begin with the "primitive dispositions" of the individual. He planned to

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1. Oeuvres, II, 52.
2. Ibid., 50.
5. Ibid., 6.
In the context of research, the introduction of the dissertation is an important part. The work of reviewing existing information and previous research is essential. The introduction section should provide a clear, concise, and coherent overview of the research objectives and the significance of the study. It should also outline the methodology and research design. The introduction is a critical component of the dissertation, setting the stage for the subsequent discussions and analyses. It is crucial for the reader to understand the context and purpose of the research, which will guide them through the remainder of the dissertation.
"train a man for himself" and not "for others," thereby allowing the individuality which nature has given him to come to a full, free, and natural expression. The circumstances of the period were set against such an aim and the contempt which Rousseau felt for those circumstances penetrated his innermost being. This fact would naturally give rise to a polemic against society. The polemic is there; the difficulty is to know whether it is directed against the society of the time or against civil society as such. Whatever may be the judgment upon this matter with respect to any single utterance, an analysis of the principles upon which the system of education rests will show a confusion. Even if one grants the assumption (and it is not always easy to grant it) that in any given anti-social utterance Rousseau is speaking only of the society of the time, the fact remains that the principles of the system are not always consistent with the principle of social life. In order to make this clear it is necessary to spend some time with the detail of the system of education.

The first step in the education according to nature is to let the child alone. Do nothing until his individual bent or his natural disposition has been discovered. Having discovered this, one then chooses the "fittest moral training." The first period of training extends up to the time when reason manifests itself and this training is purely negative, purely natural. The pupil is allowed unrestricted freedom to do as he pleases, with the single exception that the means of doing damage are to be placed out of his reach. Any fear about the child's doing evil in this state of natural liberty is dispelled with the statement that in nature there is no evil. "Posons pour maxime incontestable que les premiers mouvements de la nature sont toujours

2. Ibid., 61.
The problem is referred to an international body of experts, who are to meet in due course. The question is: how can the United Nations be made effective? How can the United Nations be made to operate? How can the United Nations be made to function? How can the United Nations be made to work? How can the United Nations be made to achieve its purposes?
droits; il n'y a point de perversité originelle dans le coeur humain . . ."¹

The second step in the training of the child is to establish the
notion that the child's liberty must be limited by what is necessary in the
nature of things. In accordance with this principle the pupil is to be "put
in his place and kept in it." His whims and caprices are to meet with the
stern opposition, not of another will, but of necessity. He is to feel upon
his proud head the hard yoke which nature imposes upon man, the yoke of
necessity.² The desires of the pupil are, therefore, to be limited until
they are consistent with what is possible in the nature of things. This is
equivalent to extending one's strength, for to limit our desires comes to the
same thing as to increase our strength.³

The third step in the training limits further the liberty of self-
assertion, and the limitation now is in accord with what is necessary in the
nature of society. The elaboration of this principle reveals a new concep-
tion of society and this conception is more reasonable and restrained than
any heretofore presented. According to this new view the consciousness of
society is to arise naturally in the child's mind and it is to come from a
recognition of the importance of the industrial arts, which are social in
character because they require the cooperation of many hands.⁴ Through

¹ Oeuvres, II, 60. Nature "does everything for the best" (Ibid.,
47). This is one of the teachings which placed Rousseau against the accepted
doctrine of the time, for the prevailing belief was in the Christian doctrine
of original sin. Here he came into conflict with thinkers on the right. He
incurred the opposition of the intellectuals on the left when he made reli-
gion central in the life of the state. By this curious circumstance he
suffered attack from both the religionists and the atheists.

² Ibid., 58.

³ Ibid., 135.

⁴ Ibid., 156-57.
an acquaintance with these arts the pupil learns the mutual dependence of mankind. He also comes to see that society is a natural association in which each man reaps a reward for himself as the result of the specialization of talent and effort in general. This is the plain principle of all our institutions. "Sur ce principe, un homme qui voudroit se regarder comme un être isolé, ne tenant du tout à rien et se suffisant à lui-même, ne pourrait être que misérable." The state of society, once established, makes it impossible for an individual to live in a state of nature. Consequently, he must find his freedom in the social state. But this also is natural since man is not made to live alone. The study of his relation to his fellow men is, therefore, just as natural as the study of his relation to the physical world.

In these passages, which show with remarkable clarity that society is a natural and rational form of association, Rousseau asserts the Aristotelian notion that man is a political animal. The social state is one which answers a need in his nature. Rousseau recognizes this fully. He says: "Émile n'est pas fait pour rester toujours solitaire; membre de la société, il en doit remplir les devoirs. Fait pour vivre avec les hommes, il doit les connaître." Knowing how to live with his fellow men is "the most necessary

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1. Oeuvres, II, 164.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., 164.
4. Ibid., 300.
The social state is thus natural to the individual and a part of the education of the individual consists in learning to subordinate his self-assertiveness to social necessities. Hence, Rousseau calls for the subordination of the particular will of the individual to the volonté générale.

This idea is developed in Book V of the Émile, and this book is "mostly extracted from the Treatise on the Social Contract." We are not concerned at this point with the details of submission to the volonté générale. These will be considered when we come to this doctrine in the Contrat social. The point of importance at the moment is: In the notion of submission to the general will we have an explicit statement of the subordination of the individual to society. The language in which the formula of the contract is couched, moreover, indicates that this subordination of the individual is thoroughgoing. It extends not only to the property of the individual but even to his person and his life. It is too obvious to need remarking that this is at the uttermost extreme from the other things which Rousseau had written about society.

The final result of the system of education, Rousseau tells us, is to be individual freedom. It is a freedom which is consistent with the "eternal laws of nature and of order." These "eternal laws" are not to be confused with the chimerical laws of civil society because the free man is one who owes his freedom to no government but finds it in himself. He would be free even "in Paris" while the vile man would be a slave even "in Geneva":

3. Ibid., 432.
C'est en vain qu'on aspire à la liberté sous la sauvegarde des lois. Des lois où est-ce qu'il y en a? et où est-ce qu'elles sont respectées? Partout tu n'as vu régner sous ce nom que l'intérêt particulier et les passions des hommes. Mais les lois éternelles de la nature et de l'ordre existent. Elles tiennent lieu de loi positive au sage; elles sont écrites au fond de son cœur par la conscience et par la raison; c'est à celles-là qu'il doit s'asservir pour être libre; et il n'y a d'esclave que celui qui fait mal, car il le fait toujours malgré lui. La liberté n'est dans aucune forme de gouvernement, elle est dans le cœur de l'homme libre, il la porte partout avec lui. L'homme vil porte partout la servitude. L'un serait esclave à Genève, et l'autre libre à Paris.

We may say, then, that the principles which underlie the system of education are, first, the principle of individuality and, secondly, the principle of subordination to natural necessity and to social necessity. The problem still remaining is that of a further examination of the principle of individuality, for it is at this point that Rousseau's basic inconsistency is to be found.

There are two quite different conceptions of the individual, each of which contends for supremacy throughout the émile without ever being brought into harmony with the other. The first of these is one in which the nature-principle is subordinated to the rational principle, and the beginning of a harmony between nature and reason is definitely outlined. The second is a conception in which the nature-principle is granted dominion over the rational principle, thus making any harmony between them impossible. For the sake of convenience we shall differentiate these two conceptions of the individual by applying the caption, "l'homme vraiment libre," to the first and the caption, "l'homme naturel" to the second. We turn now to an analysis of these two conceptions.

It might be said that the subordination of nature to reason is presupposed by the idea of education itself and that Rousseau in writing the

Emile must have had in mind l'homme vraiment libre. However much the book may be an appeal on behalf of nature, it must be remembered that Emile, from beginning to end is accompanied by his tutor and is under constant cultivation. Moreover, the aim of this cultivation is to teach the pupil to become subject to a twofold necessity, the necessity of things and social necessity.

In the conception of the individual now under consideration, the harmony between nature and reason is achieved in two ways, the first of which affirms a compatibility between nature and reason. Nature in the individual is consistent with training, and nature is good. The thing continually insisted upon by Rousseau is that education is merely wise habit, and wise habit is that which is in accordance with nature. As a gardener trains a vine without violating the nature of the vine, so must the tutor train the child. Education is thus no more a violation of nature than is cultivation.

A still closer compatibility between reason and nature is found in Rousseau's doctrine that nature is good. This had already been implied in the second Discourse in his objection to Hobbes's view of nature and in his own notion of "compassion." In the Emile the implication becomes explicit. We have noted that nature "does everything for the best" and that "the first movements of nature are always right," this latter being an "incontestible maxim." The opening sentence of the treatise declares that "everything is good as it leaves the hands of God." A good system of education is one which allows these good tendencies to come to expression without being corrupted. When education has done its

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work, liberty is something which is "in the heart of the free man." ¹

A second ground of harmony between nature and reason is found in
the notion that nature includes reason. In the development of this idea
Rousseau gives perhaps his clearest exposition of what he means by
"nature" as well as his soundest defense of l'homme vraiment libre. The
first pages of the Œume point to the necessity of carrying everything
back to the "primitive dispositions."² In defining "primitive dispositions,"
Rousseau says that as soon as our sensations become active we are attracted
or repelled from objects, in the first place, because of pleasure or pain.
Later, attraction or repulsion is determined by whether the objects "suit
us" or not. Finally, attraction or repulsion is determined by "ideas of
happiness and goodness which reason gives us." These tendencies are ex-
tended in proportion as we become "more sensible and more enlightened,"
but they are altered by our opinions more or less. What is called "nature"
in us is what these dispositions are before they are altered by "opinion".

Sitôt que nous avons pour ainsi dire la conscience de nos sensations,
ous sommes disposés à rechercher ou à fuir les objets qui les pro-
duisent, d'abord, selon qu'elles nous sont agréables ou déplaisantes,
puis selon la convenance ou disconvenance que nous trouvons entre nous
et ces objets, et enfin, selon les jugemens que nous en portons sur
l'idée de bonheur ou de perfection que la raison nous donne. Ces dis-
positions s'étendent et s'affermissent à mesure que nous devenons plus
sensibles et plus éclairés; mais contraintes par nos habitudes, elles
s'altèrent plus ou moins par nos opinions. Avant cette altération,
elles sont ce que j'appelle en nous la nature. ³

It may be concluded, therefore, that our "nature" is our "primitive
dispositions" of attraction or repulsion for objects which are presented by

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¹ Supra, p. 31.
² Œuvres, II, 6.
³ Ibid., 5-6.
desire or by notions of suitability or by reason. It is worthy of note that reason has a place in what is "natural." What is contrary to nature on the other hand is the restraining power of habits which are the result of mere "opinion" or convention, which is "slavish prejudice." When "nature" is defined in such a way as to be consistent with training, with reason, and with the rational requirements of social life, and when the individual is characterized as one having such a nature, then it may be said that the individual is conceived in terms which make his life compatible with the life of society, and society, in turn, becomes the rational fulfillment of his life. From the foregoing citations, which together may be taken as giving a description of l'homme vraiment libre, it may be seen that Rousseau is not far from such a conception of the individual. In these passages the individual is conceived, not as a being with an inalienable right of self-assertion, but as a being whose self-assertion much be within the limits of what is possible. The notion of "what is possible" moreover, defines an area which is bounded by the circumstances of nature and the just claims of society, that is, it is defined by reason. The self-assertion of the individual is amenable to such rational limitation because, as we have seen, his "ideas of goodness and perfection which reason gives" are a part of his nature. Such rational limitation is thus not a curtailment of liberty but a means to the self-

1. Oeuvres, II, 9. Rousseau, however, was not always consistent in his views on reason. He causes Julie to write, "J'ai plus de confiance à mon instinct qu'à ma raison" (Nouvelle Heloise, partie II, lettre 18). Höffding (JUR, III) quotes the following from the second Discourse: "I should venture to assert that the state of reflection is a state opposed to nature, and that the man who thinks is a depraved animal." Cf. also Höffding, JUR, 64-65. In the Letter to Mirabeau (Vaughan, FWR, II, 160) Rousseau wrote that man "conducts himself very rarely by his reason and very frequently by his passions." Cf. also L'état de guerre in FWR, I, 298.
realization of a free being. It leads from the chaotic and self-destructive freedom of self-assertion to an orderly and defensible freedom under law.

The definition of liberty at which Rousseau himself arrives is a definition which presupposes, in part at least, this more rational conception of the individual. He says, "L'homme vraiment libre ne veut que ce qu'il peut, et fait ce qu'il lui plaît."\(^1\) This definition is not as unequivocal as one might like it to be. It lends itself to two possible interpretations, but it is worthy of notice that on one interpretation the definition reflects the first conception of the individual. It is not the man who does what he pleases who is truly free unless he happens to please to will what he is able. This, of course, places some limitation upon his self-assertion and calls into play the restraining action of reason. In the same way, the second reference to \(l'homme vraiment libre\) reflects the necessity of rational restraint.

Mais les lois éternelles de la nature et de l'ordre existent. Elles timent lieu de loi positive au sage; elles sont écrites au fond de son coeur par la conscience et par la raison. . . La liberté n'est dans aucune forme de gouvernement, elle est dans le coeur de l'homme libre . . . \(^2\)

The "eternal laws of nature and of order," written on the human heart "by reason" is an even more explicit reference to the restraining power of reason and a stronger denial of the freedom of self-assertion.

In this first conception of individualism, therefore, we have excellent materials with which to provide an adequate synthesis between the individual and the group. This synthesis, anticipated in the delineation of \(l'homme vraiment libre\), is partially sketched in the definition of freedom

\(^{\text{1}}\) Oeuvres, II, 51.

\(^{\text{2}}\) Ibid., 445.
The definition of "parallel" in the context of geometric figures can be understood as two lines being parallel if they never intersect, no matter how far they are extended.

In mathematics, parallel lines are described as lines in a plane that do not intersect at any point. This definition is crucial in understanding concepts such as angles formed by parallel lines and transversals, and it forms the basis for various theorems and proofs in geometry.
based on this delineation. The freedom here presented is one which looks away from the isolated self-assertion of the individual man in a state of nature toward a larger liberty which includes all the advantages of collective endeavor and at the same time affirms that collective life is a means of self-fulfilment for the individual. The individual is so constituted by nature as to find in this collective life the natural end of his existence.

But this is not the only conception of individualism in the Emile, and, as a matter of fact, we may have read more into the notion of l'homme vraiment libre than the author intended. The definition of the liberty of the truly free man is not as unambiguous as we should like it to be. It lends itself to quite another interpretation and may just as readily be the reflection of quite another type of individualism. This other interpretation of the definition permits attention to center, not upon limitation in accordance with what is necessary, but upon activity up to the limit of what is possible. The man who is truly free is one who wills, not only what he is able, but he is also one who "does whatever he pleases." Moreover, the limitation placed upon self-assertion by the first part of the definition may, or may not, be in accordance with what is rational. It depends upon the meaning of "qu'il peut." Does "what he is able" mean "what he is able to will within the limits of reason" or does it mean "what he is able to will within the limits of his power"? The two are far from being the same.

The same ambiguity may be seen to exist in the passage on the sage who finds his liberty in no form of government. The reference to "the eternal laws of nature" in this passage is a clear-cut reference to limitation by

1. Cf. supra, p. 35 for the definition under discussion.

2. Supra, p. 31.
by reason in accordance with what is necessary in the nature of things. It
is thus consistent with the conception of l'homme vraiment libre. But why
is there lacking a parallel reference to limitation by what is necessary in
the nature of society, which is also consistent with this conception? Why
the slighting reference to "loi positive"? and the denial that liberty is in
any form of government? Why is the sage compelled to find his freedom within
himself and not in civil society?

The answer to these questions is that in this passage there is an
antithesis between the free man and the citizen, between the individual and
the group. Instead of finding his liberty in the group the individual finds
it in himself. Instead of yielding to the laws of the state, he follows the
law of his conscience. Instead of joining readily and naturally in the
collective enterprise, he stands off and will not join.

The question now arises: Why should there be an antithesis between
the individual and the group? We found that the first conception of individ-
ualism is consistent with the collective enterprise. The fact of a dis-
crepancy would, therefore, seem to indicate the presence of an individualism
of another kind. Grounds for holding this are not wanting.

We know that Rousseau had knowledge of an individualism of another
kind for he described it at the beginning of his work. It is the individual-
ism of l'homme naturel:

L'homme naturel est tout pour lui; il est l'unité numérique, l'entier
absolu, qui n'a de rapport qu'à lui-même ou à son semblable. L'homme
civil n'est qu'une unité fractionnaire qui tient dénominateur, et dont
la valeur est dans son rapport avec l'entier, qui est le corps social.
Les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles qui saivent le mieux dé-
naturer l'homme, lui ôter son existence absolue pour lui en donner une
relative, et transporter le moi dans l'unité commune . . . 1

1. Œuvres, II, 6.
Two things are significant in this passage: The natural man is described as a self-sufficient unit who is "all for himself" and the antithesis between the natural man and the citizen is reaffirmed. This passage, therefore, suggests a kind of individualism which is incompatible with the collective enterprise. It is the individualism of the state of nature, the characteristics of which are self-sufficiency and self-assertion. In other passages it is the latter which is emphasized and the emphasis revolves around the notion of power.

La société a fait l'homme plus faible, non seulement en lui ôtant le droit qu'il avait sur ses propres forces, mais surtout en lui rendant insuffisantes.¹

Avant que les préjugés et les institutions humaines aient altéré nos penchants naturels, le bonheur des enfants ainsi que des hommes consiste dans l'usage de leur liberté... Quiconque fait ce qu'il veut est heureux, s'il se suffit à lui-même; c'est le cas de l'homme vivant dans l'état de nature.²

These descriptions of l'homme naturel reflect power as a central feature of the natural man, and weakness as a central feature of civil man. A child in the state of nature is not self-sufficient; he is weak. But what the child is in a state of nature, man is in civil society.

Les enfants ne jouissent même dans l'état de la nature que d'une liberté imparfaite, semblable à celle dont jouissent les hommes dans l'état civil. Chacun de nous, ne pouvant plus se passer des autres, redevient à cet égard faible et misérable. Nous étions faits pour être hommes; les lois et la société nous ont replongés dans l'enfance.³

Throughout these passages there runs a strong antithesis between the natural man and the citizen, between the state of nature and that of society, an antithesis similar to that presented in the earlier Discourses. The

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¹ Oeuvres, II, 51.
² Ibid., 52.
³ Loc. cit.
Two features are essential to good presentation: the material may be interesting, and the audience engaged. A self-sufficient mind is not for "ill" to the listener, and the audience will not listen. This presents a problem, and the solution is self-sufficiency. In the language of psychology, it is the process of internalization which is important. The atmosphere is the atmosphere, and the process of internalization is the process of engaging the audience. In a similar vein, self-sufficiency is the process of engaging the audience. To quote from the text: "The atmosphere is the atmosphere, and the process of internalization is the process of engaging the audience."
significance of this is twofold: (1) The antithesis reflects the notion of l'homme naturel as a self-sufficient and self-assertive being, and (2) it affirms the incompatibility of l'homme naturel with civil society.

Attention is called to the fancy which Rousseau shows for the notion of power, which is a part of the notion of l'homme naturel. In the Contrat social Rousseau reminds Grotius that power or might is not a principle of right, but he does not abide by his teaching in the Émile, for here he declares that if we had the power to do everything we would never do wrong:

Mais quand Hobbes appelloit le méchant un enfant robuste, il disoit une chose absolument contradictoire. Toute méchanceté vient de faiblesse; l'enfant n'est méchant que parce qu'il est faible; rendez-le fort, il sera bon; celui qui pourroit tout ne feroit jamais de mal.\(^2\)

This startling conclusion is buttressed with the reminder that goodness is the attribute most commonly associated with the Divinity, who is almighty (toute-puissante), as if, in some way not explained, God's goodness derives from His power.

Rousseau also establishes a connection between power and freedom. The boundaries of one's freedom are determined by the extent of one's natural strength: "Ta liberté, ton pouvoir, ne s'étendent qu'auxoisi loin que tes forces naturelles, et pas au delà; tout le reste ne'est qu'esclavage, illusion, prestige."\(^3\) Consequently, the only one who gets his own way is the one who does not need, for that purpose, to place the arms of another beneath his own. He is the person who is sufficient unto himself: "Le seul qui fait sa volonté est celui qui n'a pas besoin, pour la faire, de mettre les bras d'un

\(^1\) Livre I, Chs. II and III.

\(^2\) Œuvres, II, 35.

\(^3\) Ibid., 50.
Men are weak and unhappy in the social state because they cannot dispense with the help of others; they are no longer self-sufficient and, consequently, no longer men: "Chacun de nous, ne pouvant plus se passer des autres, redevient à cet égard foible et misérable. Nous étions faits pour être hommes; les lois et la société nous ont replongés dans l'enfance." In the state of nature this was not the situation. The natural man does whatever he wants to and is happy: "Quiconque fait ce qu'il veut est heureux, s'il se suffit à lui-même; c'est le cas de l'homme vivant dans l'état de nature." These considerations our author finds very "important" for they "serve to resolve all the contradictions of the social system"—a modest claim for considerations which are themselves in utter contradiction of the social system itself! In pursuance of this claim, however, we have the dénouement of the fortunes of l'homme naturel. Rousseau does not draw the logical conclusion from the premises which he so firmly establishes; he does not recommend the abolition of society and a return to the happiness of the natural state. Instead, he attempts, with remarkable determination to force the natural man into society and the logic of the attempt is interesting. Having established the principle that submission to what is necessary in the nature of things is no infringement of liberty, Rousseau proceeds to argue that if the same necessity could be attached to the operation of civil law as prevails in the operation of natural law the same result would obtain, namely,

2. Ibid., 52.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Loc. cit.
there would be no infringement of liberty. Therefore, he argues "arm the general will with a real strength superior to the action of any particular will," so that the power of civil law approximates the power of natural law and dependence upon it becomes the same as dependence upon things. In a footnote to this passage, the author declares that in his Principles of Political Right (Contrat social) "it is demonstrated that no particular will can be integrated (ne peut être ordonnée) in the social system." In a context which contended for a shift in the locus of sovereignty from the sovereignty of a personal will to a sovereignty of law this quotation would have significant meaning. But in a context dealing with the socializing of independent, self-sufficient atoms its logic is curious. It proposes to accomplish social unity by subjecting the recalcitrant individual to a force so great that he cannot resist it. It is as if two mutually incompatible elements were forced into unity by a pressure of overwhelming strength.

The cause of liberty is hereby lost and the possibility of a synthesis between the individual and the group is cancelled. The cause of the failure is that Rousseau tries to form the social group (in this instance) by combining anti-social elements. The groundwork of the failure lies in his conception of the individual, which is faulty. The conception is that of l'homme naturel who is characterized by the qualities of self-assertion and self-sufficiency. These attributes render him incapable of harmonious participation in civil society and the attempt to force him into social relations is tantamount to compelling him to swear allegiance to a foreign power. A civil group composed of such individuals is a rebellious composition, and in various places throughout the Émile the pages tremble with the rumble of this

1. Œuvres, II, 52.
rebellion. It is worth pausing to notice an instance.

Within the first eight pages of the Émile there is a clear case of conflict between basic principles. The formulation of the problem anticipates the individualism of l'homme vraiment libre, but the solution which we are told to expect is given in terms of l'homme naturel, whose description is provided in these pages together with the exposition of the manner in which the natural man differs from the citizen. The opposition between these two types of individualism is clear and bold. Nor is this the full account of the conflict. Existing alongside these two types of individualism and opposed to both there is approval of the strongest kind of collectivism, that of Sparta and Rome. A few citations will support the contention.

In an early section Rousseau describes the three kinds of education, the education of "nature," of "men," and of "things," and explains that they are in conflict because "in the place of training a man for himself, they wish to train him for others." He contrasts the education of nature:

Reste enfin l'éducation domestique ou celle de la nature; mais que deviendra pour les autres un homme uniquement élevé pour lui? Si peut-être le double object qu'on se propose pouvait se réunir en un seul, en étant les contradictions de l'homme, on étoit un grand obstacle à son bonheur. Il faudroit, pour en juger, le voir tout formé; il faudroit avoir observé ses penchants, vu ses progrès, suivi sa marche; il faudroit, en un mot, connaître l'homme naturel.1

Here we have a statement of intention to produce the citizen by removing the self-contradictions of the man, which may be interpreted in terms of the pattern of l'homme vraiment libre. But in order to see the possibility of this, it is necessary to know l'homme naturel. Two pages earlier Rousseau had given us the description of l'homme naturel which we noticed above.2

1. Oeuvres, II, 8.
2. Supra, p. 37.
This description presents a being who is independent and self-sufficient. He is an absolutely complete numerical unity as contrasted with the citizen whose value is only fractional. He must be "denatured" by good social institutions before he can become a citizen. His absolute existence must be supplanted; he must become the numerator of a fraction the value of which depends upon the denominator, the social whole. Thus the same paragraph begins a paean of praise for the institutions of Sparta and Rome which attained remarkable success in cancelling the independence of the individual. 

True citizens are never individuals; they are Spartans or Romans. The citizen is one whose self does not belong to him; it has been "carried over into the common unity." There is little wonder that Rousseau observed, "Celui, qui dans l'ordre civil veut conserver la primauté des sentiments de la nature, ne sait ce qu'il veut." The gulf between the natural man and the citizen, if we may take the author seriously, is impassible, and the candor with which he recognizes and repeats this theme is the reductio ad absurdum of his theory.

One is "forced to combat (either) nature or social institutions," he writes, "It is necessary to choose between making a man and a citizen; for one cannot make both at the same time." This is the warning with which he introduces the description of the natural man, ten lines later. A defender of Rousseau might contend that he is here speaking, not about society as it ought to be, but as it is, that he is criticizing the education "of men,"

1. Oeuvres, II, 6. For other instances of Rousseau's veneration of Sparta and Rome Cf. Emile, IV; Contrat,III,XI; Lettres de la Montagne, VI.

2. This is an anticipation of the doctrine of the corporate self (le moi commun).


4. Ibid., 6.
which, on account of its artificiality, makes it impossible to produce both men and citizens. The defender might point out that our reformer intends to correct this abuse and restore the harmony between the education of nature, of men, and of things. The defender would continue that the onus of the attack is against contemporary education and contemporary society, both of which violate "nature" and fail to produce either men or citizens.

Perhaps so; common sense would seem to be in favor of such an interpretation and the writing is sufficiently ambiguous to permit of doubt. But one thing, however, may be said with certainty: Whether Rousseau is talking here about society as it was or about society _per se_, the conception of the nature of man which he unfolds in these pages is incompatible with any society whatsoever, and the incompatibility is precisely of the kind described by the author, that is, it is such that one cannot at the same time train both the man and the citizen because independent self-sufficiency is the nature of man and that cannot be reconciled with citizenship. It is difficult, therefore, to escape the suspicion that Rousseau places this unwelcome consequence of his theory in the context of a criticism which can be construed as a criticism of the times for the sake of the protective coloration which such a context provides.

One feels some sympathy for Rousseau because of the dilemma which he manufactures for himself in his dealing with the notion of "nature." To expect a philosopher of the time to avoid the use of this concept would be expecting too much; it was a pervasive category in political thought. Consequently, Rousseau uses it, and it is to his credit that his picture of the natural man is more plausible than the pictures offered by his predecessors, Hobbes, Locke, or Spinoza. Rousseau's natural man at least "answers to his name," as Professor Vaughan has said. He is not the "wolf"
The question of how to measure "the American" or how to define the American identity has been a matter of debate and discussion for many years. The concept of "American" is often seen as a blend of cultural, political, and social factors that contribute to the identity of the American people.

One approach to measuring "the American" is through the use of statistical data and demographic information. This approach helps to identify the characteristics and behaviors that are common to the American population. However, it is important to note that the concept of "American" is not static and evolves over time.

Another approach to measuring "the American" is through the use of qualitative data and interviews. This approach helps to understand the subjective experiences and perceptions of the American people.

In conclusion, the concept of "the American" is a complex and multifaceted one, and it is important to consider both statistical and qualitative data in order to fully understand the characteristics and behaviors that define "the American."
which Hobbes declared him to be, nor the incipient Christian as Locke described him, nor yet the sagacious bargainer of Spinoza. The natural man, according to Rousseau, was merely a self-interested individual, independent and impulsive but at the same time peaceful and even compassionate. Rousseau placed himself under heavy obligation to his own conception of l'homme naturel because he made it the instrument of attack upon Hobbes.

But this conception came to be an embarrassment when the natural man was made the object of education and even more embarrassing when he was called upon to become a member of society. "But how can a man who is trained for himself ever come to be for others?" Rousseau asked. That is the question which springs the trap. If it is admitted that the natural man is not fit timber for the construction of a social edifice, then the conception is as good as surrendered. But if the conception is surrendered the heaviest artillery against Hobbes is silenced. Rousseau is thus between Scylla and Charybdis, and the unstable character of his position is clearly revealed in the opening pages of the *Emile*. "How can one who is trained for himself ever come to be for others?" We have in these pages no concise answer to the question, but it may be supposed that the writings which are more strictly political will provide the answer.

17. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 222.
18. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 221.
27. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 212.
28. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 211.
32. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 207.
34. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 205.
35. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 204.
38. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 201.
40. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 199.
41. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 198.
42. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 197.
43. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 196.
44. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 195.
45. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 194.
47. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 192.
49. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 190.
50. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 189.
51. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 188.
54. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 185.
55. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 184.
57. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 182.
60. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 179.
62. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 177.
63. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 176.
64. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 175.
68. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 171.
70. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 169.
73. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 166.
74. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 165.
75. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 164.
76. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 163.
77. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 162.
80. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 159.
81. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 158.
83. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 156.
84. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 155.
87. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 152.
89. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 150.
90. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 149.
92. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 147.
93. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 146.
94. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 145.
95. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 144.
96. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 143.
97. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 142.
98. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 141.
100. *Outline of Political Theories*, p. 139.
Mr. Hopkins' question is to be, "what is the influence of training on the nervous system?" The nervous system and its function are briefly described. The nervous system is a network of neurons that communicate through electrical signals. It is involved in a wide range of functions, including sensation, movement, and emotion. The nervous system is divided into the central nervous system (brain and spinal cord) and the peripheral nervous system (nerves throughout the body). The peripheral nervous system is further divided into the somatic and autonomic nervous systems. The somatic nervous system controls voluntary movements, while the autonomic nervous system controls involuntary functions such as heart rate and digestions.

As the question is raised, it becomes clear that the nervous system plays a crucial role in the body's ability to function. The nervous system is responsible for sending signals to various parts of the body, allowing for coordinated movement and communication between different systems. The nervous system also plays a role in the body's response to stimuli, allowing for a range of reactions from a simple reflex to a complex emotional response.

The nervous system is also involved in learning and memory, allowing for the ability to form new connections and adapt to new situations. This is an important aspect of the nervous system, as it allows for the brain to learn from experiences and adapt to changing circumstances.

The nervous system is also involved in controlling various bodily functions, such as the respiratory system, cardiovascular system, and endocrine system. These systems are controlled by the nervous system, ensuring that they function properly and maintain homeostasis within the body.

In summary, the nervous system plays a crucial role in the body's ability to function and adapt to changing circumstances. It is involved in a wide range of functions, including movement, sensation, and communication. The nervous system is also involved in learning and memory, allowing for the ability to form new connections and adapt to new situations. It is a vital system that is essential for the body's proper functioning.
CHAPTER III
THE WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU, CONTINUED

THE ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE

The Économie politique  was published in the same year (1755) as the second Discourse, although the latter was written about a year and a half at the most before the former. The main argument of the Économie politique anticipates the Contrat social and the treatises are the same with the exception of certain minor differences. One such difference is that the idea of contract, important in the Contrat is incidental in the earlier writing. There is a difference in the doctrine of property. In the earlier writing, property is regarded as prior to the state and the foundation of it, while in the Contrat property is the creation of the state. Another difference lies in the fact that each includes or emphasizes matters eliminated or mentioned casually in the other. The later writing, for example, contains a section on civil religion lacking in the former. The earlier writing has an extensive treatment of taxation omitted in the latter and the same is true of public education. But the emphasis is the same in both and that emphasis is collectivistic rather than individualistic. As contrasted with the writings already reviewed, Rousseau now illuminates, not the rights and character of the individual, but the prerogatives and powers of the state.

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1. In Vaughan, PWR, I, 237-73.
2. Vaughan, PWR, I, 14.
4. Ibid., 159: "... La propriété est le vrai fondement de la société civile, et le vrai garant des engagements des citoyens."
5. CS, I, IX.
CHAPTER III

THE  WRITINGS  OF  RUSSIAN  CONTINUED

THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES

The economic policies in the same year (1926) as the

invasion of the army, although the official and express accord of

the occupation forces was the formal end of the economic policies,

stabilization of the country and any progress are the same with the

one of certain minor differences.

5. The acute economic crisis is such a life of

consequent, important to the country's economy in the short

period, there is a difference in the situation of property. In the

former situation, the property is regarded in terms of its state and

the occupation of it, while in the current situation, it is the action

of the state. Another difference is the fact that each individual

is free to look for each income or opportunity for greater

elimination of one or another. Hence, for example, the

property of the country, or for example, the

The greater writing on the occupation and the former situation is a

departure from a different point of view. In the former situation, the

property of the country is considered in terms of its state and the

occupation of it, while in the current situation, it is the action

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elimination of one or another. Hence, for example, the
It is probably no exaggeration to say that the *Économie politique* is as sincerely collectivistic as the first two *Discourses* were individualistic. The unconcealed opposition in point of view existing between the *Économie politique* and the *Discours sur l'inégalité*, both of which were published within six months of each other, is surprising. At the time when Rousseau may have been correcting the proofs for a discourse on "full-blooded individualism" he must have been preparing the outline for a writing which is the negation of individualism—a fact not readily explained even on the best theory.

The collectivism of the *Économie politique* is evident in at least five points: (1) The organic conception of the body politic, (2) the doctrine of the corporate self, (3) the doctrine of the general will and law, (4) the theory of education, and (5) the theory of taxation.

The conception of the body politic, Rousseau explains by an analogy with "an organized, living body, resembling that of man," though the comparison is not exact in all respects. The sovereign power represents the head of the body; the laws and customs are the brain; judges and magistrates represent the will; commerce, industry, and agriculture are the mouth and stomach; the public income is the blood; etc. The connection between these parts is so close that the destruction of any part affects the whole.

The soul of the body politic is the "corporate self" (le moi commun). "La vie de l'un et de l'autre est le moi commun au tout, la sensibilité réciproque et la correspondance interne de toutes les parties."  

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2. Ibid., 241.  
3. Loc. cit.  
4. Loc. cit.
The soul of the body politic possesses a will, which is the general will: "Le Corps politique est donc aussi un être moral qui a une volonté; et cette volonté générale, qui tend toujours à la conservation et au bien-être du tout et de chaque partie . . ."¹ The first and most important rule of legitimate government is to follow in all things the general will, for this is the "premier principe de l'économie publique et règle fondamentale du Gouvernement."²

The notion of the general will is explained³ by pointing out that the political society as a whole (toute société politique) is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds. The will of these particular societies stands in two relations: For the members of the association it is a general will; for the political society as a whole it is a particular will. Because of this, it often happens that such a will can be right in the narrower context and wrong in the larger context. To use Rousseau's example, it is possible for a person to be a good soldier and a bad citizen.

It follows from this that the particular societies, since they are always subordinate to the larger societies which contain them, must, therefore, be subordinate to the general will, the will of the society as a whole. The basic rule of public economy is thus to follow in all things the general will, for it represents, not our personal interest, but our duty. Personal interest is always in inverse ratio to our duty.⁴ The general will, since it represents our duty and not our interest, always stands for and is

¹ Vaughan, PWR, I, 241-42.
² Ibid., 244.
³ Ibid., 241-45.
⁴ "Mais malheureusement l'intérêt personnel se trouve toujours en raison inverse du devoir . . ." (PWR, I, 243).
synonymous with the common good.

In practice the general will is to be discovered by the method of majority vote. This method is justified by the contention that the will which is the most general is also the most just, and in practice the thing which determines generality is the voice of the people.¹ "... La volonté la plus générale est aussi toujours la plus juste, et ... la voix du peuple est en effet la voix de Dieu."²

We are not at the moment concerned with the validity of this contention but only with the collectivism which it implies and the shift of emphasis which it signals. In the *Économie politique* it is not the individual, not "nature's man" who is the captain of his fate; it is the citizen and his fate is hardly in his own keeping. There is substituted for the individualism of separate units the collectivism of the group. Instead of the will of the individual we have the general will of society as the principle of action.

This is brought out clearly in the notion of law, the law being the embodiment of the general will. "The first rule of public economy is that the administration shall conform to the laws,"³ and in a well-regulated government "no exception to the law shall ever be made."⁴ The law is the "celestial voice" which teaches a man to act in accordance with his judgment and thus avoid behaving inconsistently with himself. It is the "most sublime of all human institutions," establishing "the natural equality between men."

1. In this justification one detects a slight (but unconfessed) shift in the meaning of the term, general will. In this instance the will is general, not because it stands for the common good, but because it is the will which prevails generally.

2. Vaughan, PWR, I, 243.

3. Ibid., 247.

4. Ibid., 246.
The law accomplishes the miraculous feat of laying a constraint upon the will while at the same time preserving freedom from constraint. These ideas are embodied in the following passage:

. . . Il est certain que, si l'on peut contraindre ma volonté, je ne suis plus libre; et que je ne suis plus maître de mon bien, si quelque autre peut y toucher. Cette difficulté, que devait sembler insurmontable, a été levée, avec la première, par la plus sublime de toutes les institutions humaines, ou plutôt par une inspiration céleste, que apprit à l'homme à imiter ici-bas les décrets immuables de la Divinité. . . . C'est à la Loi seule que les hommes doivent la justice et la liberté; c'est organe salutaire de la volonté de tous qui rétablit dans le droit l'égalité naturelle entre les hommes; c'est cette voix céleste qui dicte à chaque citoyen les préceptes de la raison publique, et lui apprend à agir selon les maximes de son propre jugement, et à n'être pas en contradiction avec lui-même.1

A careful analysis of this passage will reveal that it is one in which individualism and collectivism are at war with each other. The first sentence is individualistic; it supposes that liberty is the absence of constraint upon my will and the integrity of my own control over my property. Yet, along with this atomistic individualism, not unlike that of the first two Discourses, there is presented an apostrophe to Law, the tone of which is strongly collectivistic. There is, of course, a rational connection between liberty and law, but it is not the romantic connection which Rousseau here anticipates and later expounds in the Contrat social— the conception in which the law is identical with the will of the natural man, who is a law unto himself. The conception of liberty here presented is the romantic conception of the liberty of the natural man who is free of any constraint by others. While seeking to preserve a liberty without constraint Rousseau evolves a theory of law, the essence of which is constraint. The law does precisely those

1. Vaughan, PWR, I, 245. This passage reappears in the first draft of the Contrat social. It is significant historically because it presents the conception of an impersonal sovereign. A government of laws rather than of men is axiomatic now, but the prevailing belief, which Rousseau here opposes, was the belief in the necessity of a personal sovereign—laws cannot command; only men can command (Cf. Hendel, MO, passim).
two things which Rousseau declares must never be done if one is to remain free: It places a constraint upon the will in accordance with the "precepts of the public reason," and it "touches" one's property. How heavy a hand the law lays on property we shall see when we consider the principle of a liquida-
ing tax on superfluities. The point at issue here, however, is that we have before us an instance of the lack of connection between individualism and collectivism. Both elements exist; both are mixed, but they form no compound. It is a juxtaposition without harmony.

The fourth instance of collectivism in the Économie politique is the theory of education. In the first Discourse Rousseau had held that virtue is "the sublime science of simple minds" and that one needed to do no more to learn the laws of virtue than to "examine ourselves and listen to the voice of conscience." He is of a different opinion, however, in the Économie politque. Here he exclaims, "Make men, therefore, if you would command men: if you would have them obedient to the laws, make them love the laws." The task of "making men" is the task of education, and for this task, strangely enough, the most efficacious means is patriotism, this "fine and lively feeling" by which the greatest miracles of virtue have been produced. Patriotism, "a hundred times sweeter than the love of a mistress," gives to self-love a force which makes of it "the most heroic of all the passions."

If individuals, the author continues, were sufficiently trained in never regarding their individuality except in connection with its relations to the body of the state, and never perceiving their own existence except

3. Ibid., 250-52.
Il problema di collettivizzare le colonie sarebbe mai veramente risolto se non fosse per il fatto che i diversi gruppi, ognuno dei quali ha il proprio piano e la propria visione di futuro, non riescono a trovare un consenso. Ciò è dovuto alla tendenza umana a preferire lo sperimentalismo avventuroso rispetto alla prudenza e alla stabilità. Pertanto, non è facile raggiungere un accordo che tenga conto dei diversi interessi e aspirazioni.

Il compito dell'autorità locale è quello di garantire che tutti i gruppi siano equamente rappresentati e che i diritti di ciascuno siano rispettati. Ciò richiede una conoscenza approfondita delle diverse realtà locali e una volontà di compromesso.

Nel tentativo di risolvere il problema, è stato proposto uno schema di collettivizzazione che prevede la formazione di consigli locali composti da rappresentanti di tutti i gruppi interessati. Ogni consiglio locale avrebbe il compito di determinare la politica collettiva della collettiva.

Tuttavia, questo schema ha suscitato critiche da parte di diversi gruppi, che sono ritenuti insufficientemente rappresentati. Però, sebbene ci siano ancora molte difficoltà da superare, si è avviato un processo di collocazione che si spera porti a una soluzione radicale del problema.
as a part of that of the state, they would finally arrive at identifying
themselves with the whole. ¹

L'éducation publique, sous des règles prescrites par le Gouvernement,
et sous des magistrats établis par le soverain, est donc une des max-
imes fondamentales du Gouvernement populaire ou légitime. ² Not only are these ideas on education the very opposite of those which form
the basic doctrine of the Emile, they are also the ready allies of the total-
itarian state. ³ If the object is to teach individuals to think of themselves
only as a part of the state and if their individuality is to be appraised
only in connection with the body of the state, then individuals, in any
meaningful sense of the word, are in the process of extinction. The collec-
tivism of the Économie politique is immeasurably strengthened by this treat-
ment of public education.

We pass now to the last instance of collectivism in the Économie
politique, that is, taxation. Some of the utterances on this subject are
strongly socialistic, as, for example, the statement that protecting the poor
against the tyranny of the rich is a thing "most necessary and perhaps most
difficult." ⁴ As a means of attaining this end, Rousseau endorses a high tax
on luxuries which may extend even to confiscation of superfluities: "Celui
qui n'a que le simple nécessaire ne doit rien payer du tout; la taxe de celui
qui a du superflu peut aller au besoin jusqu'à la concurrence de tout ce qui
exède son nécessaire." ⁵ To this Rousseau adds that it is futile for the

¹ Vaughan, PWR, ²⁵⁵-⁵⁷.
² Ibid., ²⁵⁶-⁵⁷.
³ It must be remembered, however, that these ideas are not absent
from the Emile. The patriotism of Sparta and Rome praised in the Emile is on
all fours with the ideas presented here.
⁴ Vaughan, PWR, I, ²⁵⁴.
⁵ Ibid., ²⁶⁷. A more strongly socialistic utterance may be found in
I have been informed by the Prime Minister of the government of Australia that they are not opposed to the proposed action of the Chinese government.

The Australian government has been working closely with the United Nations to ensure that the situation is handled in a peaceful and constructive manner.

I trust that this cooperation will bring about a positive resolution to the conflict.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Prime Minister of Australia
victim of higher taxes to object that what might be a superfluity for a man of inferior station would only be a necessity for him, "for a grandee has two legs just like a cow-herd, and, like him again, but one belly."¹

But, as Rousseau was not consistent in his teaching about property, so he was not consistent in his teaching about taxation. If in one passage he proposes a confiscatory tax on luxuries, in another he opposes it:

C'est donc une des plus importantes affaires du Gouvernement de prévenir l'extrême inégalité des fortunes, non en enlevant les trésors à leurs possesseurs, mais en étant à tous les moyens d'en accumuler.²

The injunction against "carrying away the treasures from their possessors" is contrary to his theory of taxation but it is consistent with his teaching that property is "the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship and even more important in some respects than liberty itself."³ Another curious contradiction arising from the property concept appears in Rousseau's acceptance of Pufendorf's maxim that the right of property does not extend beyond the life of the proprietor. But, having accepted this teaching, Rousseau, instead of holding that at the death of the proprietor his property passes into the hands of the state, or instead of advocating a surtax on inheritances, advocates that the goods shall pass from father to son and from relative to relative:

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the Project for Corsica: "Far from desiring the State to be poor, I should wish, on the contrary, to see all property in its hands, and no individual admitted to any share of the common stock, save in proportion to his services. . . . My desire is not absolutely to destroy private property—for that is impossible—but to keep it within the narrowest bounds: to give it a standard, a rule, a curb to restrain it, direct it, subdue it and keep it always subordinate to the public good. In a word, I desire that the property of the State should be as large, as strong, and that of the individual as small, as weak, as possible" (in Vaughan, PWR, II, 337).

2. Ibid., 254-55.
3. Ibid., 259. Cf. also 265: "... Le fondemem du pact social est la propriété..."
The information remains the same, just the context has changed.

In the context of the previous paragraph, it seems important to note that the property is located in the area of the company's operations, which is significant for the company's business. Additionally, the company has a unique advantage in that it has access to a range of resources, including a variety of equipment and personnel. This advantage is crucial in ensuring the company's success.

Furthermore, the company has a well-established infrastructure in place to support its operations. The company has invested heavily in the development of its facilities and is committed to maintaining them in top condition. This commitment is evident in the company's routine maintenance and repair of its equipment.

Finally, the company is well-connected with other organizations in the area, which is important for its growth and development. The company has established strong relationships with suppliers, customers, and other businesses in the area, which has helped it to thrive in the competitive landscape.
relative. They should go out of the family as little as possible "and be as little alienated as possible."¹ This, of course, is consistent with the individualistic view of property but it does not harmonize with the collectivistic view of taxation.

From such a medley of opinion it is difficult to draw a concise conclusion, but in so far as any conclusion is possible it would doubtless be that Rousseau’s view of taxation is collectivistic while his view of property is individualistic—-in spite of the fact that taxation and property are only two phases of the same topic. As a final estimate, do we not, therefore, have to say that in the matter of taxation and property we have a cross-play of individualistic and collectivistic ideas without any real synthesis between them?

The prevailing temper of the Economie politique is undoubtedly collectivistic, but there is also individualism in the writing. It exists, not only in the ideas about property, but also in the ideas about the general will and law for although the law is defined as the embodiment of the volonté générale, the discussion of the topic implies that it is identical with the will of the individual. This implication is a necessary part of the theory because Rousseau holds that "if anyone is able to constrain my will, I am no longer free."² As to the relation between the two strains present in this writing, we may say that the individualism which appears is of such a character that it contradicts the prevailing collectivism of the writing. It is a foreign strand which cannot be assimilated into the general pattern; hence, the lack of synthesis between the two.

¹ Vaughan, PWR, I, 259.
² Supra, p. 50.
THE CONTRAT SOCIAL

Du contrat social (1762) is commonly regarded as the product of Rousseau's mature political thinking; it is his most systematic attempt to formulate the "principles of political right." Our purpose at the moment is to present a summary of the argument as it bears on the problem of liberty, leaving the analysis and evaluation until a later chapter.

There are two versions of the Contrat social, the first and earlier version being known as the Geneva manuscript. Professor Vaughan has concluded that the differences between the two drafts "hardly extend beyond the cancelling of two important chapters" in the final version. Book I of the Geneva manuscript contains a chapter (Ch. II) entitled, De la société générale du genre humain, and another (Ch. V) entitled, Fausses notions du lien social. These chapters deal with the ideas of contract and common advantage as the basis of the state. They are less abstract and more concrete than most of those of the final version. In this manuscript the idea of contract is treated as an idea of right and not as a historical fact. Another difference, too often unnoticed, is the fact that the final version

1. Jules Lemaître, however, holds that "Le Contrat social est, avec le premier Discours, le plus médiocre des livres de Rousseau. Il en est, sous une forme sentimentale, le plus obscur et le plus chaotique" (JRR,249). But Lemaître's estimations are consistently unfriendly. Cf. pp. 250, 251, 265, 266, 267. He finds the Contrat to be the work of a "maniac" (267).


3. This is a difference which Vaughan emphasizes (PWR, I, 439). But there is no good reason for supposing that the final version treats the contract as anything other than an idea of right. The chapter on the social pact (CS, I, VI) says explicitly that the clauses of the contract "have perhaps never been formally set forth," which could hardly be the case if the contract was a historical fact. The emphasis in the Contrat from the very first is not upon historicity but upon legitimacy.
THE COMMON SENSE

Do not assume, because a person makes a policy statement, that he is the same person who receives the policy. In fact, many times, policy writers do not know the names of the people who receive policies. In such cases, the policy writer is often called "the policy giver." To receive a policy, a person must agree to the policy. The policy giver is often called "the policy receiver."
contains a chapter on civil religion not included in the first version.

The idea of contract is the point of departure in Rousseau's political masterpiece, as is implied by the title which he finally chose for the work. The idea of contract was, of course, not first used by Rousseau. Locke, Hobbes, and Grotius all used it and in the second Discourse Rousseau referred to it as a common opinion which he was content to adopt. It has been suggested that the idea of contract serves a double purpose in political theory. It provides a natural explanation of the origin of the state and a rational justification for the continuance of the state. The idea holds that individuals freely consented to leave the state of nature and surrender their wills to the constraints of civil society. The idea is thus both individualistic and collectivistic in character, and writers vary in respect to the part of the idea which they select for emphasis. Locke stresses the individualistic element while Hobbes and Spinoza stress the opposite. Rousseau's first emphasis is closer to Locke than to Hobbes because he elects to use the pact as an instrument of individual freedom, but it must be admitted that under the terms of the pact the individual surrenders to a collectivism which is almost without limitation.

Rousseau states the fundamental problem as follows:

1. "The successive stages of the title in the Geneva MS. are Du contrat social (cancelled); De la société civile (cancelled); and finally Du contrat social (restored)," Vaughan, PWR, I, 22 note 3.

2. Early versions of the contract-theory go back at least as far as Epicurus, who taught, against Aristotle, that the state is a human construction and not a natural one. Cf. Barrett, ETH, 276. For a history of this theory, Cf. Ritchie, DAH, Chapter, VII.

3. Vaughan, PWR, I, 47 ff. contains a comparison of the contract in Rousseau and Locke.
The role of the committee in the body of government is to represent the people's interests. The committee is composed of members of the legislature who are elected by the people. The function of the committee is to advise and to enable the body of government to improve the laws and to improve the lives of the people.

The committee's role is to advise and to enable the body of government to improve the laws and to improve the lives of the people. The committee is composed of members of the legislature who are elected by the people. The function of the committee is to advise and to enable the body of government to improve the laws and to improve the lives of the people.
Trouver une forme d'association que défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même, et reste aussi libre qu'autrefois.

The focus in this formulation is upon the individual, his person, his property, and the liberty which he enjoyed "before," that is, in the state of nature.

The liberty of the individual is a persistent theme in the Contrat. The nature of the free man and the means of realizing this can indeed be regarded as the ruling motif of nearly everything Rousseau wrote, which is not strange since this was the preoccupation of his personal life. "Renoncer à sa liberté," he wrote in the Contrat, "c'est renoncer à sa qualité d'homme, aux droits de l'humanité, même à ses devoirs." He, therefore, formulated the problem of his political inquiry in terms of individual freedom.

The solution offered is the "social pact," the clauses of which are reducible to one: "The total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community" (l'aliénation totale de chaque associé avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté). This total alienation is equally binding on all and the individual, "in giving himself to all gives himself to nobody."

This idea is embodied in the following:

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1. Vaughan, II, 32.
2. Ibid., 28.
3. Ibid., 32.
4. Ibid., 33. Jeanne Mairet's translation of Lemaître's work on Rousseau contains an error of considerable proportions at this point. She translates the clause of the contract as consisting in "the total separation of each member with all his rights from the whole community" (Mairet, LJR, 259). "Separation from" and "alienation to" are quite different.
5. Rousseau's statement, "... Chacun se donnant tout entier, la condition est égale pour tous..." (PWR, II, 33) is probably the ground for W.A. Dunning's remark that all become equal by reducing themselves to zeros. Cf. Vaughan, PWR, I, 56.
Enfin, chacun, se donnant à tous, ne se donne à personne, et comme il n'y a pas un associé sur lequel on n'acquière le même droit qu'on lui cède sur soi, on gagne l'équivalent de tout ce qu'on perd, et plus de force pour conserver ce qu'on a.  

By the act of association there is formed the body politic, which, in language reminiscent of the *Économie politique*, is possessed of a corporate self.  

À l'instant, au lieu de la personne particulière de chaque contractant, cet acte d'association produit un Corps moral et collectif, composé d'autant de membres que l'assemblée a de voix, lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son moi commun, sa vie et sa volonté.  

Thus, the first result of the social contract is the creation of the corporate self with a will of its own, a self which stands "in the place of the the particular person of each contractant." This substitution anticipates the subordination which is to follow, a subordination of the individual to the general will. 

"... Quiconque refusera d'obéir à la volonté générale y sera contraint par tout le Corps: ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera d'être libre."  

This description of the social contract and its results sounds strangely negative of the original freedom which it set out to preserve, but Rousseau offers against such a conclusion at least two considerations: (1) The sovereign to which the individuals surrendered was composed of those individuals themselves and (2) the will of the sovereign was to be the general will, which was defined as the will to right or to the common good. In the chapter on "The Civil State" Rousseau admits that as the result of the pact the 

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2. Loc. cit.  
3. Ibid., 36.  
4. Loc. cit.  
5. Ibid., 36-37.
individual loses his "natural liberty" but in exchange he gains "civil liberty." He loses the unlimited right to everything which he is able to get, a right which is restrained in nature only by the strength of the individual; but he gains civil liberty which is restrained by the general will. Civil association makes of the individual "an intelligent being and a man."  

It may be seen from this that everything depends upon the general will, the characteristics of which we must now note. The first characteristic is that the general will aims at the common good.

La première et la plus important conséquence des principes ci-devant établis est que la volonté générale peut seul diriger les forces de l'État selon la fin de son institution, qui est le bien commun.  

The object for which the state was established is the common good. The general will is that alone which is able to direct the state toward this end. The general will differs from particular wills in that the former has regard only for the common interest while the latter have regard for private interests. What generalizes the will is not the number of voices voting but the common interest which unites them: "On doit concevoir par là que se qui généralise la volonté est moins le nombre des voix que l'intérêt commun qui les unit."

Another characteristic of the general will is that it is always right.

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1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 36. The view of society presented in this chapter is exactly the opposite of that presented in the first Discourses.  

2. Ibid., 39. The idea of a general will, Professor Vaughan thinks, made its first appearance in political thought in Diderot's article, "Droit naturel," whence Rousseau may have received his inspiration, though there are some reasons for thinking that Rousseau may not have borrowed the idea from Diderot (Cf. Vaughan, PWR, I, 425). C.W. Hendel finds elements of Rousseau's conception in Pufendorf, Bodin, and Grotius (Hendel, RM, 99-101).

3. Vaughan, PWR, II, 42.

4. Ibid., 45.
"Il s'ensuit de ce qui précède que la volonté générale est toujours droite et tend toujours à l'utilité publique." 1 When an opinion contrary to my own prevails, it proves that I was mistaken; what I thought to be the general will was not so.

Quand donc l'avis contraire au mien l'emporte, cela ne prouve autre chose sinon que je m'étais trompé, et que ce que j'estimais être la volonté générale ne l'était pas. Si mon avis particulier l'eût emporté, j'aurais fait autre chose que ce que j'avais voulu; c'est alors que je n'aurais pas été libre.

Rousseau sometimes describes the general will as indestructible. It is indestructible, not because the individuals from whom it proceeds are persons of infallible rectitude, but it is indestructible in spite of their fallibility. In writing on the question of whether the general will is able to err Rousseau answers roundly that "the general will is always right." He adds, however, that "it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are always equally correct." 3 The people can never be "corrupted" but they can be "deceived" and only when they are deceived to they "seem to will what is bad." 4 The reader will, of course, recognize that what we have to deal with here is a mere matter of words. The argument, in so far as there is an argument, is circular: The general will is always right; if a will prevails which isn't right, it is no longer general. Moreover, Rousseau himself did

1. Vaughan, FWR, II, 42. Mr. Hillaire Belloc (Art. 1,165) points out that Rousseau's phrase, "toujours droite" means "always direct," but by an "extraordinary blunder" it has been translated by the "howler," always "right." Bosanquet, however, replies (Art. 2,195) by insisting that "direct" is morally too neutral, although "straight" in the slang usage is close to the meaning intended. "Right" comes as near as anything in English to giving the correct nuance of Rousseau's meaning, he concludes.

2. Vaughan, FWR, II, 106.

3. Ibid., II, 42.

4. Loc. cit.
It's a good idea to change the topic at the beginning of the meeting. If there is no other business, we can move on to the next item on the agenda.

By the way, I have a suggestion for a new project. If we could start working on it soon, we might be able to finish it by the end of the month.

I also wanted to bring up the issue of our upcoming conference. We need to make sure we have enough time to prepare for it.

In the meantime, let's focus on completing the current tasks. If everyone is ready, I think we can get started.
not really believe that the people can never be corrupted for he later considers a possible situation in which the state is on the verge of ruin, the social bond is broken in every heart and private interest becomes the basis of every law—a corrupt situation if there ever was one. With this situation as a test, he asks: "Does it follow that the general will is exterminated or corrupted?" The answer is instructive: "Non; elle est toujours constante, inaltérable et pure; mais elle est subordonnée à d'autres qui l'emportent sur elle."¹ A discerning critic, estimating this contention, remarks, "Elle demeure intact,—mais inefficace: aussi bien dire qu'elle n'existe pas; ou disons mieux qu'elle ne compte pas."²

Another characteristic of the general will is that it is discoverable by voting. "... Et du calcul des voix se tire le déclaration de la volonté générale."³ In the chapter on "Voting" Rousseau presents again the ideas of the Économie politique, holding that the will which is the most general is most just and that this will is determined by the vote of the majority. This chapter declares that the nearer the opinion of the assembly approaches unanimity, the greater the dominance of the general will. The presence of debate and dissention is the sure sign of the ascendancy of particular interests.⁴ The social pact is the only matter which requires unanimous consent;

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1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 103.
4. Ibid., 104. Bosanquet, who draws upon but modifies Rousseau's notion of the general will, introduces a modification at this point when he declares that the general will is "not merely the de facto tendency of all that is done by members of the community" (Art. 3, 315). For another modern account of the general will Cf. R.M. Mölven's Community, of which Norman Wilde has said (Art. 1, 361), "No one has more clearly expressed the real meaning of the classic doctrine of the general will."
aside from this, the majority rules. "Hors ce Contrat primitif, la voix du plus grand nombre oblige toujours tous les autres."\(^1\) By this method the general will is discovered because "the general will is found by counting votes."\(^2\)

Another characteristic of the general will is that it is general in its origin and general in its scope, or as Rousseau put it, "general in its object as well as its essence."\(^3\) "General in its origin" means that the will of the state must proceed from all the members of the state. "General in its scope" means that the general will must not be directed to a particular object, but must aim at laws which embody a general interest of the state. For example, the general will may decree that there shall be a government, but it may not, as the general will elect the officers. This latter, because it is particular, is an act of government, but not of sovereignty.\(^4\) As may be seen, however, this contradictory situation would call for an act of government before the government existed. Rousseau recognizes the difficulty but his solution has been described, not unjustly, as "artificial."\(^5\) What happens is that the political body merely changes its name from "sovereign"

\(^1\) Vaughan, FWR, II, 105.
\(^2\) Ibid., 106.
\(^3\) Ibid., II, 44.
\(^4\) Careful distinction is made by Rousseau between the sovereign and the government. Sovereignty belongs to the people; it is indivisible and inalienable (CS,II, I & II). The government is composed of the "deputies" of the people, but the deputies of the people are not their "representatives" for sovereignty cannot be represented (CS,III,XV). The sovereign power in Rousseau's system would correspond to the legislative power in a modern democracy, while his governmental power would correspond to the executive.
\(^5\) CS, III, XVII.
\(^6\) Durkheim, Art. 1, 157.
to "government," a fact which Rousseau describes as "one of the astonishing properties of the body politic."¹ Be that as it may, the illustration serves to show that the general will is to be general in its object and not particular.

The intent of this restriction upon the scope of the general will was to deny the right of the state to pass any law which was discriminatory or which did not apply to all persons and sections of the community alike. The stipulation is a reflection of the idea of equality which Rousseau always associated with liberty. But Professor Vaughan has pointed out that, with the complexity of modern states at any rate, laws regulating particular groups are essential.² And even Rousseau favored a discriminatory tax, heavier for the rich than for the poor.³

The notion of equality is also present in the stipulation that the will must be general in its origin; the sovereign is composed of all the members of the state and the voices of all must have a hearing. "The constant will of all the members of the state is the general will."⁴ It is in this connection that Rousseau makes his satirical remark about the people of England who regard themselves as free. They are free, he says, only during a general election, but when the members of Parliament are elected "slavery" overtakes the people; they are at the mercy of their representatives. The use which the people make of their short moments of liberty "shows indeed that it deserves to lose them."⁵ Rousseau held that sovereignty

¹ Vaughan, PWR, II, 100.
³ Supra, p. 52.
⁴ Vaughan, PWR, II, 105-106.
⁵ Ibid., 96.
The intent of this statement is to ensure that the scope of theency will be limited to the right of the state to pass any law with respect to the community despite the new interpretation of the Constitution. The House of Representatives and the Senate have taken a resolution that requires a reasonable and necessary measure to prevent the spread of disease. The House of Representatives is considering the resolution to ensure that the state can act reasonably and necessary in the interest of public health.
cannot be represented and that "every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void." The general will, therefore, proceeds from all the people equally.

We have seen that the general will is the will in the state which aims and the common good and is always right, but it also is the will of the majority discovered by voting. The objects of this will are always general and never particular. The general will proceeds from all the members of the state equally. These may be said to be the main characteristics of the general will as Rousseau presents them. It is by submission to this will that the freedom of the individual is to be preserved. Rousseau's contention is that moral and civil liberty become the heritage of the individual when he makes a total alienation of himself to the general will. Are there any considerations which would tend to validate this contention?

Rousseau would doubtless claim in his defense that the general will is defined as the will to Right, and the liberty of the moral man is not infringed by the laws of Right. These are the object or the motive of the moral man's actions. If the matter could be left there the defense of liberty would be stronger than, as a matter of fact, it turns out to be. The matter cannot be left there, however, because the general will is described, not only as the ideal will to Right, but also as the actual will of the majority discovered by voting. Not only are these definitions inconsistent, but in practice the latter cancels the former. There may be a vast difference between the volonté générale and the volonté de tous, as Rousseau contends, but it is the latter which prevails in practice and it may or may not

coincide with the ideal will to Right. The arguments by which Rousseau seeks to make it appear that the ideal will still remains incorruptible and pure even when particular wills have corrupted the state, and the argument which seeks to make it appear that the individual is wrong in what he thought to be the general will when the majority overrules him are merely verbal subterfuge. The logic of the system calls for the plain admission that in practice the individual makes a total alienation of himself to the will of the majority. Unless one wants to hold, against common sense and the teaching of history, that the majority is always right and that "the voice of the people is the voice of God," one must admit that the final result is the surrender of individuality or individual freedom to the will of the group.

Before passing final judgment upon the consequences of this view for liberty it is necessary to pay some attention to the provisions which may be construed as checks upon the sovereign power. If we count as the first check the definition of the general will as the ideal will to right, then there are altogether four. Our estimation of this first check, however, is that it is cancelled by the further definition of the general will as the will of the majority.

A second provision which may be construed as a check is that which we have noticed as another character of the general will: It must come from all. We shall have more to say of this when we come to consider the romantic elements in Rousseau's approach to the problem of liberty. As a check against the tyranny of the majority it is sufficient to say here that it reduces in the end to a matter of words, for, as we have noted, Rousseau says that when a will contrary to my own prevails it proves that I was wrong. This implies that the majority is always right, a consequence which Rousseau both accepted and denied. The general will is always right, but if a will
which is not right should come to prevail, it is not then the general will—
by definition. This does not provide much protection in practice.

A third provision which may be construed as a check is that character
of the general will by which it cannot apply to particular objects, and
cannot, therefore, become preferential or discriminatory. We have found that
this is not only impossible of application in a complex society but also that
Rousseau himself indicated exceptions to it in the matter of differential
taxation on the the rich and poor, and in the matter of instituting the
government.

There is a final check which we have not heretofore noted. It might
be called the principle of the public utility. Rousseau says:

Le droit que le pacte social donne au soverain sur les sujets ne
passe point, comme je l'ai dit, les bournes de l'utilité publique. Les
sujets ne doivent donc compte au souverain de leurs opinions qu'autant
que ces opinions importent à la communauté.1

Another reference to the principle of the public utility, however, contains
a qualification which destroys the principle:

On convient que tout ce que chacun aliène, par le pacte social de sa
puissance, de ses biens, de sa liberté, c'est seulement la partie de
tout cela dont l'usage importe à la communauté; mais il faut convenir
aussi que le souverain seul est juge de cette importance.2

The principle is sound, even liberal, but the qualification destroys it.3

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1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 131-32. This passage is reminiscent of a lengthy
one in the Économie politique (PWR, I, 252) in which Rousseau says that "in
point of right" the social pact would be dissolved "if, in the State a single
citizen perished who might have been succored, if a single one was held in
prison wrongfully, and if a single one were cast away with manifest injus-
tice."

2. Vaughan, PWR, II, 44.

3. As indicating a drift toward collectivism, it is worth noting that
this qualification is not present in the first version of the Contrat, and
that the passage from the Économie politique does not reappear in the final
version of the Contrat.
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Émile Faguet has observed that the sovereign will always judge important "everything which the individual possesses."¹ We may agree that at least there is nothing in the principle to prevent the sovereign from so judging if it deems it important.

Some, however, defend Rousseau at this point. C.E. Vaughan, for example, says that the right of the state to judge what is important is a right which will be persistently abused, but he adds:

The answer to this is that from that danger there is no sound way of escape. . . . The only remedy is to divide the sovereignty, and that--as the experience of the United States shews--is a remedy worse than the disease. It puts the State at the mercy of the individual. . . .²

Putting the individual at the mercy of the state is, he believes, a lesser evil than putting the state at the mercy of the individual. Without entering upon a debate as to the wisdom or the folly of dividing the sovereignty, one may fairly observe that if political theory in the last analysis reduces to two evils, the lesser of which is to sacrifice the individual to the state on terms which the state and not the individual shall lay down, then political theory is indeed in a bad way. Be that as it may, Vaughan's reference to Rousseau's qualification at this point as a sacrifice of the individual to the state is, we believe, a fair estimate of the significance of this provision as a check upon the general will.

We may conclude, therefore, that, so far as the general will is concerned, there is no check which can be relied upon in practice to save the individual from the collectivism of the general will or a possible tyranny of the majority. Whether this conclusion shall stand as the final estimation of the fortunes of liberty in the Contrat social will depend upon what

¹ Faguet, MRV, 21.
² PWR, I, 67.
results are obtained from an examination of the further ramifications of the problem of liberty in this writing. This will be reviewed in connection with the interpretation of Rousseau.

CHAPTER IV

INTERPRETATION OF ROUSSEAU

The writing of Rousseau lends itself to two different and opposed interpretations, each of which has been frequently presented by the critics. To some, Rousseau is an individualist; to others he is a collectivist.¹ Within the last two decades this problem has been argued afresh in the writings of G.S. Vaughn and Alfred Cobban, the former affirming the collectivist interpretation and the latter denying it. It may be doubted whether anything new or instructive can be said on a subject already so widely treated, but the very fact that two such opposite views of Rousseau’s work exist would give rise to the suspicion that perhaps the most adequate view would contain references to both individualism and collectivism.² The purpose of this interpretation is to test that suspicion and to determine also the kind of individualism which must be understood when Rousseau is credited (or charged) with being an individualist.

For a clear and adequate understanding of these opposed interpretations it is fortunate that we have at hand the writings of two British scholars whose works came before the public in 1916 and 1934 respectively, the latter being almost obviously intended as a refutation of the former. Professor

1. Cf. Cobban, EMS, 3-6. E.H. Wright says, “It is hard to say whether (the Contract social) has been oftener indicted for an individualism that will run to anarchy or for an absolutism that will bring the final tyranny.” Anglo-Saxon opinion, he points out, is usually dependent upon the “marvelous doctrines of Burke” who held that the book dissolved France in the individualism of the Terror (MR, 172).

2. C. Selig Bums has written, “The fundamental point for me is that Rousseau is too great to be either collectivist or individualist” (Art. 1, 885).
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² C. Delisle Burns has written, "The fundamental point for me is that Rousseau is too great to be either collectivist or individualist" (Art. 1, 556).
THE INTERRELATION OF RACIAL

The article on "Racial Interrelation" focuses on the difficulties and challenges faced by the African American community, particularly in the context of segregation and discrimination.

However, the article mentions that "the problem of racial interrelation is not a simple one. It involves not only the question of how to live in a society that is divided along racial lines, but also the question of how to create a society that is truly integrated." The article argues for a more inclusive approach to interrelation, emphasizing the importance of education and understanding in fostering a more harmonious society.

Furthermore, the article highlights the role of government in promoting racial interrelation, suggesting measures such as affirmative action and equal opportunity policies as ways to address the issue.

Overall, the article provides a comprehensive analysis of the complex interplay between race and society, advocating for a systemic approach to creating a more equitable future.
C. E. Vaughan's masterful and scholarly edition of The Political Writings of Rousseau was the first to appear, and whatever vicissitudes the author's view of the work of his hero may undergo, his collection of all that Rousseau said on the question of politics will remain an invaluable aid to students of Rousseau, both because of the completeness of the edition and its authenticity.¹

To find Rousseau classified as a collectivist comes as a surprise to anyone who has associated the name of this writer with the Romantic Movement and its glorification of the individual.² Professor Vaughan, however, classifies Rousseau as a collectivist. "Strike out the Discours sur l'inégalité with the first few pages of the Contrat social," he says, "and the 'individualism' of Rousseau will be seen to be nothing better than a myth."³ He finds Rousseau to be the "most powerful assailant" of the individualist theory,⁴ his signal service to political philosophy being "to attack and vanquish it (individualism) in its stronghold, as a speculative theory of Right."⁵ For Vaughan, Rousseau becomes in the end "the father of modern collectivism."⁶ The political writing of Rousseau, taken as a whole,

¹ Vaughan was T. H. Green's cousin. H. W. Schneider declares that "Vaughan was able, as (W. A.) Dunning was not, to see the philosophical settings and implications of the various political theories he describes" (Art. 1,155). But Schinz had written earlier, "Professor Vaughan has an altogether too scanty knowledge of the work of French scholars on Rousseau" (Art. 2,215).

² "One of the most commonly accepted ideas is that Rousseau is the father of individualism" (Schinz, Art. 2,219).

³ Ibid., I, 1.

⁴ Ibid., 2. Cf. also PWR, I, 97 note.

⁵ Ibid., 111.

⁶ "Collectivism" is not to be understood in an economic sense.
"presents an unbroken movement from one position almost to its opposite. He starts as the prophet of freedom, in the most abstract sense conceivable," which is the ideal of the second Discourse. From the abstract individualism of this writing he moves to the abstract collectivism of the Contrat social, beyond which he moves further, in the writing on Poland, to a recognition of external circumstances and concrete conditions. "And Rousseau now stands at the opposite point of the compass from that at which he started."\(^1\)

It is necessary to examine the grounds on which it may be seen that the individualism of Rousseau is "nothing better than a myth." There are four major arguments supporting this position, and they are: (1) The early writings are moralistic, not political; (2) the "state of nature" is hypothetical, not historical; (3) the idea of "contract" is secondary; (4) the Contrat social is unquestionable collectivistic. These arguments need evaluating.

Vaughan holds that Rousseau first came before the world as a "moral reformer" and that the first Discourse has no reference at all to "political theory in the strict sense."\(^2\) Moreover, the second Discourse cannot be regarded as a call to political action or to political reform because the only conclusion to which it can logically lead is the conclusion that we should return to the state of nature, and Rousseau himself repudiated this deduction.\(^3\) Neither can this writing be regarded as a theory of Right, a rough draft of the Contrat social, because the events leading up to the formation of civil society are "a tissue of injustice and wrong," and, moreover,
the writing argues that all forms of society lead sooner or later to the "slavery of the many and the yet more hateful despotism of the few."¹ Nor is the Discourse a sketch of historical origins because Rousseau insists that the origins assumed are hypothetical.² There remains, therefore, the necessity of considering this and the first Discourse as "the despondent wail of the moralist denouncing evils which neither he, nor any other man, has the power to remove."³

Vaughan calls attention to the fact that when Rousseau himself recorded the history of those years during which these writings were composed, he dwelt on the moral and religious side of the argument and not on its political aspect.⁴ Book VIII of the Confessions bears this out to some extent. Of the first Discourse Rousseau himself said that it was "totally lacking in logic," and was, of all the writings which proceeded from his pen, "the weakest in reasoning."⁵ Moreover, he recognizes the presence of a "bitterness and ill-humor" in the first works, which he traces to the circumstances of life at the moment as well as to a psychological attitude of rebellion against social usages which he affected to despise because he was unable to practice.⁶

The psychological factor is more particularly present, however, at the time of the writing of the first Discourse, which followed upon the crisis or trance which took place near Vincennes. In the letters of 1762 to

2. Ibid., 13.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Ibid., 15.
5. Conf. VIII in Oeuvres, VIII 250.
6. Ibid., 261-2.
Malesherbes the description of his state of mind furnishes ample ground for regarding this as an occasion of "conversion" or "auto-hypnosis." The idea which came to him in this ecstatic vision was that "man is naturally good and that it is by those (social) institutions that men become evil." His mission was to make good this idea.

The first Discourse is the product of a feverish enthusiasm born of this incandescent period of psychological integration. The scattered fragments of a new idea became suddenly crystallized in the theme of this Discourse and a basic idea in Rousseau's philosophy was born. The writer himself was aware of the extravagance with which this idea was first presented, but the significant thing is not the extravagance but the idea. It was the idea of the "natural man."

In the second Discourse the basic theme is the same: In the state of nature men are self-sufficient, independent, equal, and good; society makes men corrupt and destroys their natural equality. It is important to notice, however, that Rousseau does not regard this Discourse as the product of any unusual psychological condition, nor does he think of it as "totally lacking in logic." His estimation of it was higher.

The circumstances of the writer's life at the time of this composition were pleasant. He tells us that after deciding to write on the question of the origin of inequality he went to Saint-Germain for seven or eight days of meditation. Here, freed from all anxiety, he buried himself in the forest where he sought to find "the picture of primitive times" of which he was to trace the history.

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1. Cf. Josephson, JFR, 155-58. Also Wilde, Art. 2 and Vallette, JFR, Bk. I, Ch. IV.
3. Conf. IX in Oeuvres, VIII, 298.
... Je faisais main basse sur les petits mensonges des hommes; j'osais dévoiler à nu leur nature, suivre le progrès du temps et des choses qui l'ont défigurée, et comparant l'homme de l'homme avec l'homme naturel, leur montrer dans son perfectionnement prétendu la véritable source de ses misères. Mon âme, exaltée par ces contemplations sublimes, s'élevait auprès de la Divinité. ... ¹

A note added later to this exposition admits a "harsh tone" and "gloomy air" in connection with one passage ² but this passage is aside from the main argument. He blames its presence on Diderot, whose influence gave the writing a "melancholy tinge." ³ If there are other vagaries, the author does not mention them. Indeed, with the exception of the passage mentioned, the attitude of the author toward this work is one of satisfaction and pleasure. He praises its insights as having lifted his soul to the Divine.

What then of the contention that holds the earlier writings to be "the despondent wail of the moralist"? This view might apply to the extravagances of the first Discourse, as Rousseau himself would admit, but it hardly does justice to the main idea of both works, the unity existing between them, or to the author's recorded estimation of the significance of that main idea. We may admit with Vaughan that the second Discourse cannot logically be regarded as a theory of political right, a history of political origins, or a call to political action. The earlier writings cannot logically be interpreted under any of these three heads and for the reasons which Vaughan cogently adduces. But at the same time it is not necessary, indeed, it is a mistake to discount the political reference of these works and the importance of their place in Rousseau's political philosophy as a whole.

The reason for this is the fact that in these writings there is

1. Conf. VIII in Oeuvres, VIII, 276-77.
2. It is a passage against the philosophers, in Vaughan, PWR, I, 162.
3. Conf. VIII in Oeuvres, VIII, 277 note.
presented an idea which was to have a definite bearing on Rousseau's political thought, an idea which was destined to embarrass even his most mature political writing, namely, the idea of man in a state of nature, the idea of l'homme naturel.

To set these early writings aside as "moral declamation" is to introduce a gap in the work of Rousseau as a whole, a gap of which the author himself was unaware and which it is unnecessary to assume. We have already noted that for Rousseau the first two Discourses and the Émile "are inseparable, and form together a single whole." Since the Émile contains a summary of the Contrat social, and since the Contrat social contains traces of the ideas of the first Discourses, it is not incorrect to assert that all the works belong together. The first Discourses do not violate this unity, for their main argument is never absent from Rousseau's thought. It seems, therefore, a false interpretation to set aside the early writings as the "despondent wail of the moralist."

The attempt to dissipate the individualism of Rousseau by assigning the idea of the state of nature a place of secondary importance is likewise not entirely convincing. We may admit that Rousseau regarded the state of nature as hypothetical and not historical. It is also true that Rousseau never proposed what seems to be the most obvious inference from much of his writing, namely, that we should return to the state of nature. Whenever he was accused by his critics of advocating this, he always repudiated the


3. The Preface to the Discours sur l'inégalité describes it as "a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which probably never will exist."
He did not use this idea, which was "the keynote of all eighteenth-century thought," as an explanation of the historical origin of society. But from these facts it cannot be deduced that Rousseau did not use the idea of a state of nature at all. There is no major writing from which traces of the idea are entirely absent, and it is the central theme of the first two Discourses and the Emile. It would be hardly likely, therefore, that this conception should not be found in Rousseau's political writing. As a matter of fact, the thing we shall attempt to show is that Rousseau's conception of man in a state of nature is the conception which plays havoc with his political writing, and in spite of this fact he held the conception to the end.

Associated with the notion of a state of nature is the idea of contract. A great deal is made of the fact that Rousseau, in the first draft of the Contrat social, repudiated the conception of "natural Law," the logical consequence of which is the fall of the idea of contract also. Thus, "the conception so dear to the individualists and so essential to their plea had been expressly repudiated."

It needs to be pointed out, however, that in overthrowing Locke's and Diderot's conception of "natural Law" or "natural Society" Rousseau used an argument more utterly individualistic than either Locke's or Diderot's. His argument proceeded from his own conception of the state of nature. We may admit that Rousseau reduced the idea of a state of nature to the status of a "fiction" and the historical importance of this advance in thought may

2. Cobban, RMS, 216.
4. Ibid., 42.
rightly be amplified. But it is not to be overlooked that this is a fiction which Rousseau employed and approved. This is evident even in the first draft of the *Contrat social*, for here, and this is where the "repudiation" is said to take place, the argument is not against the state of nature as such but rather against a particular conception of the state of nature, namely, Diderot's.

The best studies which have been made of the relation between the two drafts of the *Contrat social* are probably those of Professor Albert Schinz and M. René Hubert. From these studies, as well as from the original itself, it is clear that Rousseau is opposing the point of view of the article, "Droit Naturel," written by Diderot. The problem on which Rousseau meditates in the first draft (and in the final draft also) is that of finding a motive which will lead a man to consent to obey the law when it is to his disadvantage and when he could both disobey and escape punishment. The answer given to this problem by Diderot had been that man is by nature sociable. Rousseau assailed this answer by holding that society is a human convention rather than a natural condition. His object was to oppose the doctrine of a social contract to the idea of natural sociability, and in doing so he drew a picture of man as naturally unsociable rather than sociable. This picture is the familiar one of *l'homme naturel*.

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1. Schinz, Art. 1 and LPR, II, 369 note. J. W. Haberl suggests other reasons that Schinz has pointed out that after writing the preliminary version Rousseau had openly broken with Diderot, a matter which he regretted almost as much as he had done it. As a matter of taste, he expressed the record of his own intellectual controversy with the preface that accompanied the Third Book and whatever happened to the book was the Third Book and whatever happened to the book was the Third. Contract also fell short of what he had wanted to achieve.


3. See excerpt from "Droit Naturel" and comments thereon in Hubert, REE, Ch. III.

4. Cf. the title of Bk. I, Ch. II, first draft: "De la société générale du genre humain."

5. Cf. Hubert, REE, 48.
The page appears to be a section of a legal document, possibly a contract or agreement, discussing rights and responsibilities between parties.

For example, it mentions the phrase " rights and duties of the parties to the agreement. This is not to be considered a contract in a legal sense."

The text is formatted in a formal, legal style, with sections and subsections, indicating it is a formal document.

Vaughan is, of course, correct in holding that the same arguments which are valid against Diderot's theory of natural law are also valid against Rousseau's theory of a social contract, since the contract calls for the free consent of the individuals participating and if the individuals participating are naturally unsocial they would be as unlikely to participate in a social contract as they would be to obey laws to their disadvantage. It was for this reason, Vaughan suggests, that Rousseau tore the manuscript in half and left out of the final version the material of the fatal chapter (chapter II) of the first book of the Geneva manuscript. He "felt that his only course was to silence the battery which he had incautiously unmasked."¹ Schinz had arrived at essentially the same conclusion in his article which appeared three years earlier.²

As to the first draft, therefore, we may say that instead of repudiating "the conception so dear to the individualists" Rousseau uses a most individualistic form of this conception as a weapon against Diderot and as a fulcrum to pry overboard the notion of natural law. The state of nature, as Rousseau presents it, is a state of solitude, a state of independence

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1. PWR, II, 441.

2. Cf. Schinz, LFR, II, 379 note. C. W. Hendel suggests other reasons for the suppression of the first draft. He points out that after writing the preliminary version Rousseau had openly broken with Diderot, a matter which he regretted almost as soon as he had done it. As a matter of taste, therefore, he suppressed the record of his own intellectual controversy with "the philosopher"—a designation which no reader could mistake (Hendel, RM, II, 185). Hendel also points out that it was unsafe to write against monarchy while residing in France. "Perhaps it was because the Third Book and whatever followed it in the manuscript of the Social Contract also fell short of that prescription of safety that made him destroy it and revise the whole treatise. (It seems to the present writer, however, that this view is negated by the unfavorable criticism of monarchy which appeared in the published version.) But it is also very likely that the making of these studies of government in the projects of St. Pierre really advanced his own thinking . . . which forced him to discard what had already been written in the previous essay" (Op. cit., I, 223).
"complete and absolute."\(^1\) But Rousseau destroyed this first draft. Does this not indicate that he surrendered the conception of a state of nature? Not necessarily, for the correlative notion that society rests upon a convention or a contract was not surrendered, although Rousseau quite probably saw that it was logically undermined. We have not only the title of the final version to vouch for the preservation of the idea of contract but also his clear statement in the opening chapter that society "does not come from nature and must, therefore, be founded on conventions."\(^2\) This indicates that Rousseau had not, when he wrote the final version, abandoned his attitude of opposition to Diderot's notion of natural sociability, which is another way of saying also that he had not abandoned his own conception of the state of nature.

The weight of the evidence, therefore, seems in favor of those critics who, like M. Henri Rodet and Mr. Alfred Cobban, hold that two master ideas lie at the base of Rousseau's whole system, his theory of the state of nature and his theory of a fundamental pact.\(^3\)

This conclusion and the evidence upon which it rests serves to answer also the criticism that the idea of contract, like the idea of a state of nature, is secondary in Rousseau. There is little doubt that Rousseau had misgivings about the contract. These are manifest, as Vaughan points out, in his uncertainty about the use of the term "contract" in the title of his treatise,\(^4\) in his suspicion that the contract in reality provides no guarantee

\(^{\text{1}}\) Rodet, LCS, 31.
\(^{\text{2}}\) Vaughan, PWR, II, 24.
\(^{\text{3}}\) Rodet, LCS, xi. Cobban, RMS, 215.
\(^{\text{4}}\) Vaughan, PWR, I, 22 note 3.
The conclusion of the conference at a time of difficulty, for necessity, for the circumstances make that society, however, have not only the right of the right to alter the constitution of the state of nature. The materials of the balance, what, seems in a state of nature, and an effect of force.

The constitution and the balance how much it respects to ensure the constitution and the balance how much it respects to ensure. There is little good that government and government want the material, as Van Campen, and the power of the power of the power of the power. In the material, a great use of the power. The power of the power in the material, a great use of the power. The power of the power in the material, a great use of the power.
for civil obligations, in his temptation to substitute "common advantage" as the basis of the state, \(^1\) and in his repudiation of natural law which carries the logical rejection of the idea of contract. \(^2\) In spite of these misgivings, however, his final decision was to sweep them all aside, tear up the refutation of natural law, use the term in the title of his treatise, and write the following defense of the idea in the Letters From the Mountains:

\[... J'ai \text{posé pour fondement du Corps politique la convention de ses membres; } j'ai \text{refusé les principes différents du mien.}
\]

\[\text{Indépendamment de la vérité de ce principe, il l'emporte sur tous les autres par la solidité du fondement qu'il } \text{établit; car quel fondement plus sûr peut avoir l'obligation parmi les hommes, que le libre engagement de celui qui s'oblige? On peut disputer tout autre principe; on ne saurait disputer celui-la.}^3\]

Why Rousseau should have retained the notion of a contract when his stand against Diderot on the question of natural law refuted alike both himself and Diderot has been a matter of speculation. Some critics, impatient with such an obvious contradiction as that implied in the notion of a natural man voluntarily entering an agreement contrary to his nature, have called Rousseau's sincerity into question and because of such contradictions have concluded that he wrote only because he wanted fame or money. \(^4\) This, however, is not the most charitable or even the most logical supposition. It

\[^1\text{Cf. Vaughan, PWR, I, 444.}\]
\[^2\text{Schinz holds that Rousseau did not derive social obligation from the contract, and that his effort to free himself from this idea is evident in the Contrat social itself. Feeling his own idea weakened by his attack on Diderot, he tried the Roman method of "forcing the individual to be free," but rejected that as the method of might. He then tried the expedient of the Lawgiver, but saw that such a one would have to be nearly divine. In despair he turned to the conventional method and derived obligation from religion. Hence, the "Civil Religion" is not a digression but the "keystone of the whole structure." (Schinz, Art. 2,225. Cf. Art. 1 & LPR,II,Ch.V.)}\]
\[^3\text{Lettre VI in Vaughan, PWR, II, 200.}\]
\[^4\text{So M. Espinas. Cf. Schinz, Art. 1, 780 note.}\]
The following sentence of the text in the letter from the contractor:

"...to cover any special conditions or special treatment."

The next sentence of the text in the letter from the contractor:

"...will not be necessary..."
is inconsistent with Rousseau's high moral sensitivity about other matters of a similar nature. Better reasons are given by Professor Schinz. He points out that Rousseau had undertaken to solve the problem of social constraint upon philosophical rather than upon theological grounds; he began by laying aside the conventional method of invoking obedience to laws because they represent the will of God and resorted instead to the rationalist principle of a social contract. In so doing he could battle his enemies, the "philosophes" upon their own ground. Moreover, he wished to modify the notion of contract from a principle of constraint (Hobbes) to a romantic principle of social freedom. That is to say, he believed in his pact as a foundation of a state where man would find social happiness without constraining himself. He could not bring himself to give up this which "in a splendid vision, prolonged during several months" appeared to him as the marvelous key which would resolve all difficulties.¹

The idea of contract furnished one element which Rousseau was convinced must be present in a political system if liberty is to be preserved. That element was the consent of the individual. It was this to which he pointed when he defended his use of the idea. "For what more reliable foundation can obligation among men have," he asked, "than the free agreement upon that which obligates them?"² As C.W. Hendel has pointed out, Rousseau was firmly convinced that "the only basis of any human association is the agreement of the persons concerned... It was his belief that all obligations, duties, laws, regimens must be self-imposed."³ Hendel adds that

¹ Schinz, LPR, II, Ch. V passim, esp. p. 381.
² Supra, p. 80.
³ Hendel, RM, II, 164.
obligation, contract, equality, freedom were the chief values of his own life. They were the principles on which he acted in his personal affairs. Wealth, influence, position he had held up in scorn as the instruments of oppression. By contrast, the notion of an obligation freely undertaken he held up as the instrument of liberty. Our opinion, therefore, is that Rousseau found it impossible to surrender that bulwark of liberty which he discovered in the notion of consent, and on that account he retained the idea of a social contract even though he had become aware of its difficulties.

It is possible to show that the idea of contract contradicts some other things Rousseau said about common advantage as the basis of the state; it is possible to show that his theory has difficulties, of which he himself was probably aware; it is possible to show that his theory would have been more consistent if he had eliminated the idea of contract and its related ideas; but it is not possible to show that in his final judgment the idea of contract is secondary or unimportant.

It may be concluded, therefore, that the arguments against the individualism of Rousseau from the allegedly secondary character of the state of nature and the idea of contract are not convincing.

This leaves us with the final point in Vaughan's case against the individualism of Rousseau and that point is the unmitigated collectivism of the Contrat social. With this point, however, there is no possibility of cogent disagreement and for the moment it is necessary only to notice the arguments upon which it rests. The first is the fact that the social pact calls for the "total alienation" of the individual as the result of which he


2. The words of his defense, "Indépendamment de la vérité de ce principe," cast suspicion upon a wholehearted acceptance of the idea. Cf. supra, p. 80.
becomes only a part of the corporate self.\(^1\) Secondly, partial societies within the state are banned.\(^2\) Thirdly, the supposed guarantees for the freedom of the individual are either a matter of mere words or they come to nothing in practice.\(^3\) It is not possible to dismiss Rousseau's collectivism as readily as this, however, since it is a bone of major contention in the interpretation of Rousseau. Even Professor Vaughan seems none too certain of the stand which, in the first place, he had so definitely taken when he said that Rousseau made the idea of contract "the porch to a collectivism as absolute as the mind of man has ever conceived."\(^4\) "For the purpose of founding the State," Vaughan wrote before the War, "he had reduced the individual to a cipher."\(^5\) Then came the war, and new account was taken of the prophets of nationalism who, like Treitschke, had unleashed against mankind the doctrine of the absolute state. Whether Vaughan recoiled at having identified the name of Rousseau with the vainglorious swaggerings inherent in the philosophy of Staatsomnipotenz we do not know. But we do know that after 1914 he wrote and Epilogue to his study of Rousseau\(^6\) and in it he pointed the finger of blame, not at Rousseau, but at Fichte. In so doing he brought forward against his earlier interpretation of Rousseau every consideration within reach to show that the collectivism of the Contrat social was not nearly as absolute as he had first described it. True, Rousseau

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1. Vaughan, FWR, I, 48; 57-61; 70; 111-12; 455-57; II, 33; 44; 145-46; 200-01; 350. The pages underlined are in the writing of Rousseau.

2. Ibid., I, 59-60.

3. Ibid., 64-67.

4. Ibid., 39.

5. Ibid., 56. Cf. also p. 59.

because with a part in the contemporary social structure. It is likely that the ongoing dynamics for the time
were not the same in the 18th century. However, an analysis of the literature on economic developments at the
time shows that it is necessary to examine economic developments as a whole.

In the meantime, an article in the Scientific American, written by J. M. L. 
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had called for the total and absolute surrender of the individual and had
forbidden the existence of partial associations within the state, but
Rousseau introduces qualifications.\(^1\)

It is in support of this new interpretation of Rousseau for which
Vaughan himself had generously prepared the way that Doctor Alfred Cobban
enlists his energies. "It is not fair," he writes, "to take this (collectivism) for granted. . . . The effect on political liberty of a closer con-
nection between the individual and the state can be judged only after a de-
tailed examination of the nature of that connection."\(^2\) One of the arguments
in this detailed examination is that which is dedicated to the proposition
that Rousseau did not really forbid partial associations within the state.\(^3\)

In view of Rousseau's words on the subject it would seem somewhat hazardous
to assert such a proposition. Rousseau said, "Il importe donc, pour avoir
bien l'énoncé de la volonté générale, qu'il n'y ait pas de société partielle
dans l'état . . . ."\(^4\) What are Cobban's grounds for the assertion of the con-
tradictory view?

The first reason he gives is that Rousseau acknowledges the utility
of subordinate corporations within monarchies in the **Contrat social**, Book
III, chapter VI.\(^5\) Rousseau says, in this passage, that in a monarchy there
must be "intermediate orders" of princes, personages, and nobles. But these
are necessary because of a condition which he does not approve, that is,

\[\text{\footnotesize \begin{enumerate}
  \item Vaughan, **FWR**, II, 520-21.
  \item Cobban, **RMS**, 136.
  \item A point made also by Vaughan in the Epilogue.
  \item In Vaughan, **FWR**, II, 43.
  \item Cobban, **RMS**, 72.
\end{enumerate}}\]
because "il se trouve une trop grande distance entre le prince et le peuple, et l'État manque de liaison." Furthermore, he adds that such intermediate orders are not suitable to a small state, and it is the small state which Rousseau approves. If one adds to this consideration the further fact that throughout this same chapter Rousseau presents a thoroughgoing criticism against monarchy itself, it will then be hardly possible to cite any passage in it as one giving to partial associations a basis in right.

A second reason given in support of the proposition in question is that Rousseau praises the Polish Confederation. But the praise accorded this partial association is that which would be accorded a necessary evil. "It is evil extremes which render violent remedies necessary," says Rousseau. It is not to be supposed that Rousseau denies that partial associations exist in fact or that under certain (evil) conditions they have a useful purpose.

Cobban's citation of the passage in the Économie politique to mention his third reason in support of the argument, admits that partial associations exist in fact. One feels, however, that this circumstance is introduced here by Rousseau to illustrate what he means by the volonté générale, for he points out that the will of these "particular societies" stands in two relations, for the members of the society it is general; for the society at large it is particular. It often happens that the will is right in the first respect but vicious (vicieuse) in the second. The teaching of the paragraph is that particular societies are to be subject to the whole society which contains

1. CS, III, VI in Vaughan PWR, II, 78.
2. Cobban, RMS, 72. The reference is to the Poland, IX in Vaughan, PWR, II, 470-72.
them. Cobban admits that even in this citation there is no "recognizing in so many words a right of association." Even so, it is necessary to take exception to Cobban's further statement that the passage "does what is even more important in acknowledging a necessary social fact." There is nothing in the paragraph which states that partial associations are "a necessary social fact." Indeed, how could Rousseau regard them as "necessary" when he admits that there is every possibility that they may pervert the general will? The most Cobban could legitimately derive from Rousseau's words is that partial associations are actual social facts, not that they are necessary.

A similar criticism meets Cobban's last citation. He holds that in the Contrat social (Bk. II, Ch. III) Rousseau proposes an alternative to the abandonment of partial associations and this proposal is for the multiplication of them. Strangely enough, this citation takes us to the paragraph, the first sentence of which is, "Il importe donc, pour avoir bien l'annoncé de la volonté générale, qu'il n'y ait pas de sociétés partielles dans l'État." It is the next sentence which contains the alternative; "Que s'il y a des sociétés partielles, il en faut multiplier le nombre et en prévenir l'inégalité, comme firent Solon, Numa, Servius." The thought is: It is important for an expression of the general will that there be no partial societies within the state, but if there must be, then it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from becoming unequal, for if one became powerful.

1. In Vaughan, PWR, I, 242-43.
2. RMS, 73.
3. Loc. cit. Cf. also Wright, MC, 76. Wright agrees at this point.
4. Vaughan, PWR, II, 43.
it could influence the expression of the general will. In other words, the
alternative is: Have so many that none is effective—which would produce a
result no better than that produced by banning them all at the outset. More-
over, even if we admit the fact or the possibility of partial associations
we are still far from finding any indication that Rousseau granted them a
right to exist.

For these reasons, therefore, it is necessary to reject Cobban's
contention that Rousseau "does not deny to associations the right to exist
and to regulate their own affairs."¹ There is nothing in Rousseau's
Principles of Political Right which would guarantee partial associations the
right to exist. If it is a question of right, then Rousseau's judgment of
the matter is: "It is essential . . . that there be no partial societies
in the State."

In seeking to clear Rousseau of the charge of being one of the prime
founders of the despotic state, which represents "the weight of opinion,
even today,"² Cobban asserts that although we may admit that Rousseau grants
power to the state, this tells us nothing "unless we know what are the
conditions he lays down for the exercise of the authority of the state."³
He observes that Rousseau takes a strong stand against the despotic system
because it is a government of men rather than a government of laws.⁴
One of the conditions, therefore, which he imposes upon the powerful state
is that its power shall always be exercised only in accordance with law.

¹. Cobban, RMS, 75.
². Ibid., 45.
³. Loc. cit. Cf. also Wright, MR, 76. Wright agrees at this point.
⁴. Ibid., 50-52.
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That this is a basic theme in Rousseau and that it is a check against the despotism of personal government there is no denying. His hatred of privilege and those who enjoyed it was genuine. His appeal to law against privilege was thus a genuine thrust against that which he despised.

The problem cannot be dismissed here, however. It is necessary to inquire about the conditions which he lays down for the rule of law. In Rousseau's theory the law is the expression of the general will and its organ. Consequently, the rule of law is the rule of the general will and the general will, as Cobban correctly states, is the central doctrine, not only of the Contrat social but also of Rousseau's whole political system.\(^1\) The power of the body politic under the direction of the general will is sovereignty.\(^2\)

The character of sovereignty is that it is "unlimited." Not only did Rousseau affirm this as a basic principle in the Contrat\(^3\) but he reaffirmed it in the Lettres de la Montagne.\(^4\) Cobban minimizes the importance of this principle, however, by declaring that Rousseau "hardly does himself justice in describing it as an unlimited power, for in fact it is limited most effectively by the terms of its own definition."\(^5\) This remark refers to Rousseau's statement that the general will is always the will to Right, on the basis of which definition Cobban affirms, "Thus the state is sovereign for him only so far as it is the embodiment of social justice . . ."\(^6\)

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2. Contrat social, III, IV.
3. Loc. cit.
5. Ibid., 122.
6. Ibid., 124.
Although we may appeal to the fact that Rousseau defined the general will as the will to Right, we must remember also that for Rousseau the will of the people is a synonym for the general will, and in actual practice it is that, rather than the abstract conception, which prevails. Cobban does not omit to notice this second definition of the general will, but he fails to follow out the implications of it; he bases his case rather on the abstract definition alone.

Much of the debate in the interpretation of Rousseau arises at this point, and it is encouraged by the ambiguity in Rousseau himself. In the ideal or abstract delineation of the volonté générale he concentrated on the requirements of social organization and apparently forgot for the moment the kind of men who constitute society. He admitted as much himself:

Je ne serais pas étonné qu'au milieu de tous nos raisonnements, mon jeune homme, qui a du bon sens, me dit en m'interrompant: 'On dirait que nous bâtissons notre édifice avec du bois, et non pas avec des hommes, tant nous alignons exactement chaque pièce à la règle!' Il est vrai, mon ami; mais songez que le droit ne se plie point aux passions des hommes, et qu'il s'agisse d'entre nous d'établir d'abord les vrais principes du droit politique.

In establishing the principles of Right, Rousseau concentrated on the ideal aspect of the volonté générale, abstracting his description from the contingent aspects of human behavior. The result was a principle which has been compared by Charles William Hendel to Plato's principle of Justice, and Hendel adds, "in thus preserving the general will as the supremely perfect and ideal will, he was obeying some of the most ancient impulses of his own

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1. "Yet we must remember that for Rousseau the will of the people is a synonym for the General Will..." (RMS, 145). But contrast the following: "Far from being open to the charge of identifying the will of the sovereign with that of the majority, one might almost claim that Rousseau is one of the few modern authors whose theory of government is immune from it" (RMS, 130).

Although we may choose to use our free speech to ridicule and demean our leaders, we must recognize that such behavior is not only unproductive but also counterproductive. It is important to remember that our leaders are human beings, just like us, with their own strengths and weaknesses. To focus on their flaws and failures is not only unfair but also debilitating to the very system we are seeking to improve. It is essential to foster a culture of constructive criticism and positive engagement to bring about meaningful change.
Thus Hendel, concentrating on this aspect of the matter, would agree with Cobban, for he holds that sovereignty cannot exist "save as a power directed by the general will for the good of the community." Otherwise, "the power is not sovereign and the citizens are not in the least obliged to obey."  

This contention is true from the point of view of political right, but not from the point of view of political practice. The difficulty arises from the fact that Rousseau gives an interpretation of the volonté générale from both points of view. He does not remain in the domain of abstract idea and pure speculation. M. Henri Rodet, an able critic, has pointed out that he would have been found less full of contradictions if he had so remained. "But his reflections on the volonté générale descend from the metaphysical heights to the domain of common men (hommes vulgaires)."

Had Rousseau ended his account of the volonté générale with the ideal description which he gave of it, he would then have been the exponent of the view with which Cobban, Hendel, and Stammler credit him. But Rousseau was

1. RM, I, 119.

2. Ibid., II, 193. Rudolf Stammler emphasizes this point in contending that the volonté générale must be distinguished from the volonté de tous, the former being "qualitative" the latter being "quantitative." He adds, "... Même en allemand on a souvent traduit 'volonté générale' par 'allgemeiner Wille,' alors que l'on devrait dire 'allgemeingültiger Wille' c'est-à-dire volonté legitime ..." (Art. 1,386). It must be noted, however that "allgemeiner Wille" often carries the meaning which Stammler pleads for. Consider the following from Hegel: "Das Missverständniss über den allgemeinen Willen fängt aber da an, dass der Begriff der Freiheit nicht im Sinne der zufälligen Willkühr Jedes genommen werden muss, sondern im Sinne des vernünftigen Willens, des Willens an und für sich" (GdP,III,528). "Der Wille is nur als denkender frei" (Ibid.,529).

3. As Bosanquet points out (PTS,98), Rousseau vacillates between the notion of a will which is general but not actual, and a will which is actual but not general.

4. Rodet, LCS, 135.
the following statement: "The homeowner's insurance policy may not cover certain types of damage or loss. It is important to read and understand your policy carefully."

This cooperation is more than a basic view of policy limits. The difficulties these items face are not just limited to the homeowner. Many homeowners are not aware of the potential damage their policies might cover. If a homeowner is caught off guard, they may find themselves in a difficult situation. It is important to take the time to understand your policy and the potential coverage it offers.
too much of a pragmatist to propound principles unrelated to practice. Consequently, when he came to the application of his principle, when he came to consider the individuals who make up society and not the principles which underlie it, he felt the necessity of giving a new interpretation of the volonté générale. It is precisely this attempt to make the principle of political right also a matter of political fact that makes the difficulty, for the volonté générale then becomes the will of the group which is discovered by voting, and one ought not to forget that the individuals voting are "by nature" interested in their private rather than in the public good. A different account of the "nature" of man would have served admirably to soften the impact of this clash, but given the individual as Rousseau most frequently described him, and given Rousseau's conviction of long standing that society tends to render all men corrupt, it is little wonder that his ideal principles appeared to himself as being "wooden" when he placed them alongside the individuals to whom they were meant to apply.

We may conclude, therefore, that this attempted union between the general characteristics and the actual characteristics of the volonté générale is an attempt which ends in ambiguity and even contradiction. We are inclined to agree with A.D. Lindsay's assertion that Rousseau's "account of the general will as everyone, including Bosanquet, has pointed out, is ambiguous. Bosanquet points out that although Rousseau distinguishes between the general will and the will of all, he continually speaks as though the two

1. E. H. Wright provides us with this "better" account of the nature of man. His book, which has been heralded as "a welcome statement of essentials" (Hendel, RM, ix), goes far toward unifying the thought of Rousseau by holding that "conscience and reason" are parts of nature. They are its better parts "and are appointed to control desire" (MR, 7. Cf. also p. 32). We have noted above that these are the qualities of what we have called l'homme vraiment libre. The question, so far as the interpretation of
were identical." Given the statement that the sovereignty of the general will is unlimited and the further statement that the general will is the will of the majority discovered by voting, the practical outcome of a possible tyranny of the majority is inevitable. Cobban's contention, therefore, that this sovereignty is limited by the definition of the volonté générale as the will to right is negated by Rousseau's further definition of it as the actual will of the people.

Cobban notes a similar restriction upon the general will when he asserts that the general will is the rational will. He contends that Rousseau would distinguish as strictly as Burke himself between the passions of the populace and the voice of a people judging deliberately, in accordance with the light of reason, and under right guidance, on its own proper and permanent interests. In support of this a passage from the first version of the Contrat and one from the Lettres de la Montagne are cited. The latter reference, however, contains also a repetition of the slogan that "the voice of the people is the voice of God." Cobban himself notes that this slogan was "one that was to be used to justify every sort of popular imbecility in the course of the subsequent century." This being the case, how can it be maintained

Rousseau is concerned is the question of whether Rousseau, when he speaks of the individual, most often has in mind the characteristics of l'homme vraiment libre or those of l'homme naturel. Before the interpretation of Rousseau is completed we hope to have shown that it is the latter which underlies the Contrat social.

1. Lindsay, Art. 1, 34.
2. RMS, 145.
3. In Vaughan, PWR, I, 452.
4. Ibid., II, 256.
5. Loc. cit.
6. RMS, 145.
that the general will, being also the will of the people, is also and always the rational will or the will to right?

It would seem especially difficult for Cobban to maintain this thesis for he praises Rousseau for his recognition of the rôle of passions in the state. He cites from Rousseau "an argument . . . of considerable efficacy against the Idealists, whom some have accounted his disciples."¹ This argument is from the État de guerre where Rousseau pays his respects to those who have dared to assert that "the body politic is without passions and that there is no other reason in the state besides reason itself."² Such a condition, says Rousseau, is that of a "dead body." On the basis of this, and other passages, Cobban concludes, "It follows that, the essence of society consisting in the activity of its members, the state itself can be no more free from passion than the individuals of which it is comprised."³ Now, since Rousseau himself freely admits (sometimes boasts) that passions as well as reason operate in the state⁴ and since history shows the will of the people often in support of "every popular imbecility," how much encouragement can be drawn from the fact that Rousseau defined the general will as the rational will?—not forgetting that he also defined it as the will of the people.

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¹ RMS, 165.
² Vaughan, PWR, I, 298.
³ RMS, 160.
⁴ The fault he found with the writings of Saint-Pierre was the fact that the Count could not get rid of the notion that men act in accordance with their lights rather than their passions. "He labored for imaginary beings," said Rousseau, "while believing that he was working for his contemporaries" (Conf. IX in Oeuvres, VIII, 302). Cf. also Josephson, JJR, 365.
A further step calculated to break down the collectivism of Rousseau is found in the denial that Rousseau thought of the state in terms of that unity which constitutes an organism. A study of this point provides the student with ample amusement over the way in which the contradictions of Rousseau throw his critics into a veritable furor of debate. Vaughan, with the taste of a historian for historical development, watches the progress of Rousseau from a radical individualist to a rigid collectivist. Consequently, he fastens upon and makes capital of all the passages referring to the organic character of the state, noticing, of course, that a certain allowance has to be made for what Rousseau said in other connections. Cobban, on the other hand, who is interested in establishing, not only the unity of Rousseau's work, but also the fact that Rousseau is to be classed along with Burke as a romantic individualist, fastens upon the passages denying the organic analogy, noticing, of course, that a certain allowance has to be made for the times when Rousseau said the opposite. For example, Cobban, in taking strong exception to Vaughan, lays himself under obligation to show that Rousseau "expressly repudiates the analogy between the state and the animal organism." But, he adds, "at first sight he does not appear consistent in his observations in this connection, and a passage of the Économie politique certainly utilizes the analogy between the state and the human body." This citation, however, he dismisses as no more than a "useful analogy, and thereupon turns to the Contrat social to show how Rousseau "expressly repudiates the analogy." His best citation from this writing is

1. RMS, 136.

2. Ibid., 136-37.
the following: "Mais, outre la personne publique, nous avons à considérer les personnes privées qui la composent, et dont la vie et la liberté sont naturellement indépendantes d'elle."¹ Unhappily, however, this citation occurs in a chapter which contains just as explicit an affirmation of the organic conception. The opening paragraph of the chapter asserts:

Si l'état ou la Cité n'est qu'une personne morale dont la vie consiste dans l'union de ses membres, et si le plus important de ses soins est celui de sa propre conservation, il lui faut une force universelle et compulsive pour mouvoir et disposer chaque partie de la manière la plus convenable au tout. Comme la nature donne à chaque homme un pouvoir absolu sur tous ses membres, le pact social donne au Corps politique un pouvoir absolu sur tous les siens ... ²

It would be easily possible to cite other passages from the Contrat social affirming the organic view in perhaps even stronger terms. The chapter, "Du Pacte social"³ asserts that the clauses of the social contract reduce to one, namely, "the total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the entire community."⁴ The same chapter asserts that the act of association produces "in the place of the particular person of each contractant" a collective body with a unity, a corporate self (moi commun), a life, a will.⁵ It is passages such as these which give Vaughan just ground for asserting the collectivism of the Contrat social,⁶ and to these others from Rousseau might be added.⁷

¹. CS, II, IV. Cobban, RMS, 137.
². Vaughan, PWR, II, 43.
³. CS, I, VI in PWR, II, 32.
⁴. Ibid., 33.
⁵. Loc. cit.
⁶. Cf. PWR, I, 48, 70, 111.
That Rousseau made statements which are opposed to the organic view there is no denying, and Cobban commits no error in calling attention to those statements. It is an error, however, to leave the collectivist passages out of account and conclude on the basis of statements to the contrary that the attempt "to read (an organic theory) back into Rousseau would be a perversion of his thought."1 One does not have to read it back; it is there.

It is possible to note other qualifications intended to mitigate the absolutism of the state. Vaughan, in the repentant mood of the Epilogue, finds one such qualification in Rousseau's assertion that "the state is not entitled to exact from the subject anything beyond what is necessary for its service."2 Vaughan had treated this qualification before,3 however, and on the former occasion had observed that it was a qualification which, in practice would "come to nothing"4 because of the amendment which Rousseau adds to the qualification, "Mais il faut convenir aussi que le souverain seul est juge de cette importance."5 In his first treatment of this "check" upon collectivism Vaughan concluded, and we have followed his conclusion,6 that the amendment destroyed the check. In the treatment in the Epilogue, however, Vaughan omits to notice the troublesome amendment, presenting the principle itself as a qualification of the absolutism of the state.

2. Vaughan, PWR, II, 521. Reference is to CS, II, IV.
4. Ibid., 66.
5. In Vaughan, PWR, II, 44.
6. Supra, p. 66.
A further check which Vaughan notes (and Cobban follows) is that the general will which Rousseau has in mind "is not that which overrides, but that which has inspired and penetrated itself with, the needs and interests of the members taken as a whole." As Cobban puts it, Rousseau does not conceive society as a "super-individual" whose interests are opposed to those of the members of society. From this Cobban concludes that Rousseau was "in a general sense utilitarian and individualist." It is true that Rousseau affirms an identity of interest between the individual and the group. The argument by which he achieves this identity of interest is most instructive:

Or, le souverain, n'étant formé que des particuliers qui le composent, n'a ni ne peut avoir, d'intérêt contraire au leur; par conséquent la puissance souveraine n'a nul besoin de garant envers les sujets, parce qu'il est impossible que le corps veuille nuire à tous ses membres; et nous verrons ci-après qu'il ne peut nuire à aucun en particulier. Le souverain, par cela seul qu'il est, est toujours tout ce qu'il doit être.

The sovereign cannot wish to injure the subjects because it is impossible that the body should wish to injure its parts. Here we have the identity of interests resting entirely upon an argument from analogy with the biological organism (which Cobban found to be repudiated in the Contrat social).

This qualification on state absolutism, like the former, is one which in practice "comes to nothing." Cobban sees its weakness for while he admits that the identity of interest between the individual and the group is an "essential step in his argument," he has to add that "it is regrettable that he (Rousseau) does not emphasize or specifically justify it; he simply takes

1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 521.
2. Cobban, RMS, 139.
3. Ibid., 141.
4. In Vaughan, PWR, II, 35.
it for granted." The wonder is that having made this admission, Cobban should be found, ten pages later, asserting that Rousseau "does not assume any automatic connection between the two principles of individual and social welfare." It is true that Rousseau does not assume that the selfish interest of the individual is allied to the well-being of the group. What Rousseau does assume, however, is even more impossible, namely, that individuals, who by nature act only for themselves, will in the group relation act only for the good of the group, and by so acting reveal the identity of interest which prevails between them and the group. This, as we shall see in the next chapter, is an aspect of Rousseau's romantic approach to the problem of liberty.

From the preceding analysis, therefore, it may be concluded that the attacks on Rousseau's collectivism, from Vaughan and Cobban alike, are unsuccessful. Partial associations are denied any right of existence, and considerations to the contrary are insufficient to set aside this conclusion. The qualifications placed upon the general will, by which it is defined as the will to right or as the rational will, are qualifications which cannot be made effective in practice; they are, therefore, merely verbal, since the general will is also and at the same time defined as the will of the people. The notion of the state as an organism is an idea which Rousseau both affirmed and denied, the affirmation being consistent with his conception of civil society and the denial being consistent with his conception of the individual. The checks in favor of the individual

1. RMS, 131.
2. Ibid., 141.
3. Lanson has observed: "Mais cette volonté générale, on le sait, Rousseau en postule la bonté; il ne connaît aucun moyen de faire que la
The man who is your master must give you orders, commands, and directions to follow, and you must obey them without question. If you do not follow the orders, you will be punished. The master's authority is absolute, and any disobedience will be met with severe consequences. You are not to question the master's decisions or actions. You must follow them without delay and without any thoughts of defiance. The master's will is law, and you must comply with it at all times. Any deviation from the master's commands will be considered a breach of duty and will result in severe penalties.

It is your duty to carry out the master's orders promptly and efficiently. You must be diligent and attentive to your duties and responsibilities. Failure to do so will result in punishment. You must always be ready to serve the master, and you must be willing to sacrifice your own interests for the sake of the master's welfare. The master's satisfaction is your first priority, and you must do your utmost to ensure that the master is pleased with your performance.

You must be loyal to the master and to the master's family. You must never reveal any secrets or information to outsiders. You must be discreet and careful in all your dealings with others. You must always be mindful of the master's reputation and ensure that you comport yourself in a manner that reflects credit on the master.

You must be physically strong and capable of performing the tasks assigned to you. You must be prepared to work long hours and to endure hardships. You must be able to handle the physical demands of your work without complaint. You must be willing to work hard and to push yourself to achieve the master's goals.

You must be prepared to face any challenges that may arise, and you must be able to handle any emergencies that may occur. You must be quick to think and quick to act, and you must be able to make decisions under pressure. You must be able to work independently and to take initiative when necessary.

The master's household is your home, and you must treat it with respect and dignity. You must be mindful of the master's possessions and ensure that you do not cause any damage or destruction. You must be careful not to waste any resources, and you must be diligent in your work to ensure that the master's expectations are met.

In summary, you must be a dedicated and loyal servant to the master. You must carry out the master's orders without question, and you must be prepared to work hard and to endure hardships. You must be quick to think and quick to act, and you must be ready to face any challenges that may arise. You must be a model of discipline and dedication, and you must always strive to serve the master with distinction and honor.
and against the absolutism of the state are checks which provide no restraint in practice. Thus, whether one includes the organic analogy or leaves it out, it cannot be successfully denied that the Contrat social is predominantly collectivistic, tending in the end, toward the sacrifice of the individual to the state.

But individualistic elements are present even in the Contrat. The romantic approach to liberty in this writing is, as we shall see, individualistic in character. The problem, therefore, arises of the relation between individualism and collectivism in Rousseau’s thought. Vaughan, with keener appreciation than Cobban, recognizes more fully the problem of individualism versus collectivism. He writes:

We are therefore compelled to ask: Is there any means of reconciling the two strains which answer to each other throughout the writings of Rousseau: the one represented by the two Discourses and the main body of Émile; the other by the Contrat social, the Économie politique and the introductory paragraphs of Émile? Vaughan solves the problem by holding that the thought of Rousseau developed from individualism to collectivism. Proof of this thesis calls for showing that the Émile is less individualistic and the Contrat social less collectivistic than at first they seem to be. But there are difficulties in the way of this view. We have already seen what obstacles lie in the way of any attempt to mitigate the collectivism of the Contrat social. Vaughan’s original conclusion on this point, that Rousseau made the contract the porch to a rigid collectivism, was so well established by himself that his emendations are hardly adequate to change it.

A further objection to this interpretation is that if there is a

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volonté du peuple soit cette volonté générale, idéale, et non une expression de l’égotisme d’une majorité. ..." (Art. 1, 22).

I. Vaughan, PWR, 157.
In the section on legal considerations, the text reads:

"The information presented in this article is as of April 2023. It may be important to consult the original sources for current information."

The text continues with various legal and informational points, noting the importance of consulting original sources for current information.
straight-line development in the thought of Rousseau from individualism to collectivism, it becomes necessary to find one of these elements gradually fading while the other is appearing on the horizon. Vaughan finds this metamorphosis taking place in the Émile.¹ Not only is the individualism of this writing less individualistic than at first sight it appeared to be, but also the collectivism here is less collectivistic than it is in the Contrat social. The treatise on education, says Vaughan, does not present individualism unrelieved, because Émile is constantly under the direction of the tutor, and he is constantly subject to restraint in accordance with culture. But is not this restraint in the interest of individualism—not the individualism of the savage in the woods, to be sure, but the individualism of the savage in the city? It is a training which begins with an emphasis on the natural man and which, in the end, leaves Émile independent and unsocialized. Émile is trained "for himself" and not "for others." Even after social training has been administered, Rousseau declares that the wise man finds his freedom, not in society but in himself. Émile, in this respect, is not unlike Wolmar or Julie in the Nouvelle Héloïse. The conscience of Wolmar or of Julie, says Gustave Lanson, would never know how to give to the volonté générale the absolute right of prescribing for him or of regulating her.²

What is presented, therefore, in the Émile, taking all restraint and training into account, would seem to be, not the individualism of man in a state of nature, it is true, but a tutored individualism which nevertheless leaves the individual very independent of the group.

¹. Some embarrassment to this thesis would seem a priori to arise from the fact that the Émile is contemporaneous with the Contrat social, both having been published in 1762. (Schinz, LFR, II, 510, refers to these as the two works which are "properly philosophical.")

². Lanson, HLF, 783.
As for the collectivism of the *Émile*, Vaughan holds that what is a "strongly collectivist theory" in the *Social Contract" has taken individualist varnish" in the *Émile*, because, in the latter, the doctrine of the communal self is entirely suppressed and the notion of the general will is "virtually" suppressed, giving an effect "strangely different." A comparison of the passages in question, however, will show that this is hardly the fact.

**Contrat social**

Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale; et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout.

**Émile**

Chacun de nous met en commun ses biens, sa personne, sa vie et toute sa puissance, sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale, et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout.

It may be seen from this that not only is the general will mentioned in both forms of the formula for the social pact, but also that the form in the *Émile* is, if anything, more collectivistic than that of the *Social Contract* since it calls for the surrender of property and life, not mentioned in the other. Moreover, the doctrine of the corporate self is also clearly present in the *Émile* although not explicitly named:

À l'instant, au lieu de la personne particulière de chaque contractant, cet acte d'association produit un Corps moral et collectif, composé d'autant de membres que l'assemblée a de voix, lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son moi commun sa vie et sa volonté. Cette personne publique, qui se forme ainsi par l'union de toutes les autres, prenait autrefois le nom de Cité, et prend maintenant celui de République ou de Corps politique.

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1. Vaughan, FWR, II, 137.
2. Ibid., 33.
3. Oeuvres, II, 432.
4. Vaughan, FWR, II, 33-34.
5. Oeuvres, II, 432.
It may be seen from this that there are verbal differences between the two accounts. The explicit name for the corporate self, moi commun, is omitted in the Émile but the idea is clearly there, and a synonym is given in the expression "corps moral et collectif."¹ It seems then that there is no ground for inferring any esoteric intent on the part of the author by the omission noted, and there hardly seems any basis for assuming that the accounts are "strangely different," or that the strong collectivist account in the Contrat social takes on an "individualist varnish" in the Émile. It is true that there is more said about individualism in the Émile than in the Contrat social and more said about collectivism in the latter than in the former, but there is collectivism in the Émile. It is the collectivism of Sparta and Rome, the collectivism of the property, person, life, and power of the individual under the direction of the general will—a collectivism as strong as that of the Contrat social.

Professor Cobban seeks to unify the work of Rousseau, not by having him develop from an individualist into a collectivist, but by contending that he remains an individualist from beginning to end. This argument holds that although Rousseau started with the "natural man" he modified, but did not nullify, the character of the natural man so that he could become a member of civil society. This membership was consistent with his nature as a natural man and it afforded him a larger freedom than that which he lost by leaving the state of nature.²

In order to make the natural man fit for society and society desirable for the natural man several obstacles have to be removed. It has to be

¹. Cf. also Œuvres, II, 6 (Émile, I), supra, p. 37.
shown that there is no basic contradiction between the natural man and society, and that the liberty of the social state is greater or better than the liberty of the natural state. It has to be shown that there is in Rousseau no philosophical condemnation of the principle of social life. A critique of these conclusions brings us to the heart of the problem of the relation between the individual and the group, and this critique, together with a study of liberty in the civil state, constitutes the content of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

THE INTERPRETATION OF ROUSSEAU, CONTINUED

Professor Alfred Cobban, as previously noted, asserts the consistency between the natural man and society, and he fortifies this assertion with the contention that there is no philosophical condemnation of the principle of social life in Rousseau. All that he said against society was "the view of his more pessimistic or paradoxical moments," or it was "most often . . . a criticism of the society of his own day." This is a moderate, middle-of-the-way interpretation of the extravagant utterances of Rousseau and, if it could be accepted it would go far toward reducing the inconsistency of the Citizen of Geneva.

In the opinion of the present writer, the most difficult point in the interpretation of Rousseau's thought is the problem of arriving at Rousseau's real attitude toward civil society. Did Rousseau really intend by his denunciations no philosophical condemnation of social life, and when he wrote the second Discourse, which Voltaire dubbed his "second book against the human race," was he speaking merely of the deformities of society and not of society itself? That this was the true intention of the writer is borne out by the chapter in the Contrat social on "The Limits of the Sovereign Power" where he asserts that an individual gains liberty and security in the civil state as contrasted with the independence and insecurity of the natural state. Further confirmation may be found in the same work in the chapter

1. Cobban, RMS, 219-20. Cf. also Wright, MR, 23. M. Henri Rodet says (LCC, 55) that Rousseau in the Discourses is attacking only the deformities of society and not society itself. But M. Rodet does not neglect to add that society for Rousseau is an "accidental result and an unhappy one," a "necessary evil." Émile Boutoux holds (Art. 1, 267) that "It is in reality
The purpose of the Committee on the Expansion of the Library is to encourage and facilitate the acquisition of books and other materials in all fields of knowledge. The Committee, through its various subcommittees, is responsible for reviewing proposals for the purchase of new materials. The committee meets regularly to discuss proposed acquisitions and to make recommendations to the Library. The committee's work is guided by the Library's collection development policies and by the needs and interests of the users of the Library. The committee also considers the cost of the materials and the resources available to the Library. The committee's recommendations are then reviewed by the Library's director and the Board of Trustees.
on "The Civil State" where the author contends that the civil state substitutes justice for instinct and makes man a moral being instead of a stupid animal. Further confirmation of the moderate interpretation of Rousseau's attitude toward society comes from the a priori consideration that if Rousseau had really been opposed to the principle of social life he would never have taken the trouble to propound the true principle of social right; he would not have written the Contrat social.

But if this moderate interpretation of Rousseau's attitude is the true interpretation, why did Rousseau speak so grudgingly of the civil state? Why did he use language, which, if it does not apply to society as such, certainly sounds as if it did? A fragment exists in which Rousseau faces directly the question of whether society "in itself" is good or evil. He answers that the reply depends upon the comparison of good and evil which comes out of society, and he adds that "on that count the question is only too easy to solve." Society presents a spectacle both "hateful and dangerous." The fragment is, thus far, in keeping with the anti-social utterances

the abuse of the social condition, not this condition itself, which has caused (man's) loss." Yet M. Boutroux adds that the most contestable part of Rousseau's system is the notion that there appertains to the individual as such an "absolute and naturally independent existence" (271), and that, as a result, the state becomes "purely formal and external" to the individual (273).

1. Vaughan finds in this chapter "the most crucial passage in the whole treatise" (PWR, I, 26). The point of view of this crucial passage involves "nothing less than a revolution in political speculation," because the individualistic bent in politics for two hundred years prior to Rousseau had sought to make politics independent of ethics. Rousseau, in asserting the moral character of the civil state reverted to the sounder doctrine of Plato and Aristotle that "man is a political animal" and finds the full realization of his moral being only in the civil state (PWR, I, 41. Cf. also pp. 50-52). Rousseau presents the same idea in chapter two of the Geneva MS.

of the Discourses. It is in keeping with the letter to M. Philopolis in which Rousseau asserted that "society is natural to the human species as decrepitude is to the individual." It is in keeping with the thought of the letter to Voltaire on the Lisbon earthquake in which Rousseau contended that the damage of the disaster was increased by the fact that men were living crowded together in a social community; it could not be blamed entirely on God, for had men been living in a natural state, the terror would have been greatly diminished.

Some critics have pointed out that Rousseau celebrated the primitive condition of man because he lacked faith in the possibilities of social improvement. This lack of faith, says Jean Jaurès, is "the key of those apparent paradoxes on the progress of civilization." Even the Contrat social, which is more friendly to society than any of the other writings, is regarded by some of the ablest critics as being, not a treatise on the principles of social improvement, but an "abstract study of the logical constitution of a social contract," or a utopian presentation of "an absolute ideal." Its

1. It is particularly reminiscent of the second Discourse where "the attack throughout is directed, not against any one form of Government but against civil society as such" (Vaughan, PWR, I, 13).

2. In Vaughan, PWR, I, 223.


5. Loc. cit.

6. Mornet, HLF, 166.

7. Lanson, HLF, 782.
reference is theoretical rather than practical. In the Contrat social, says Monsieur M. Bourguin, Rousseau's rôle is to "trace models of perfection and not to descend to the realities of the application."¹ Are we to believe then that even when Rousseau spoke a kind word for society he was thinking of a utopian state of affairs far removed from the practical world, and that his opinion about actual society is at best that it is a necessary evil? Some critics, and the more able ones are included among the number, seem to draw this conclusion. Albert Schinz declares, "Toute sa conception de la société repose sur ceci, que la société dicté un langage opposé à celui de la nature."²

Gustave Lanson finds this idea lying at the base of all of Rousseau's thought:

La nature avait fait l'homme bon, et la société l'a fait méchant: la nature avait fait l'homme libre, et la société l'a fait esclave; la nature a fait l'homme heureux, et la société l'a fait miserable. Trois propositions liées, qui sont des expressions différentes de le même vérité: la société est à la nature que le mal est au bien. Là-dessus se fond tout le système.³

Émile Faguet agrees with this estimation and holds that "the eternal thought" of Rousseau is to be expressed in the double idea, "man good, society iniquitous."⁴ The state of nature is the primitive paradise from which man departs, and having departed becomes wicked. In Rousseau's system, says Faguet, "the fall of man is his transformation into a social animal."⁵

What now of Cobban's contention that there is in Rousseau no philosophical condemnation of the principle of social life? Does not the weight of

¹. Art. 1, 366. Cf. Mornet, HLF, 166: "Dans la pratique, il n'a jamais songé à donner les rigueurs systématiques du Contrat comme un méthode réelle de gouvernement."

². LPR, II, 362.

³. HLF, 770.

⁴. DHS, 334.

⁵. DHS, 336.
of critical opinion speak against it? Such would seem to be the fact, but the critics are neither as unanimous nor as consistent in their opinions on this point as might be supposed. Their expositions often reflect, unavoidably perhaps, the double-minded attitude of the writings they explain. M. Lanson, for example, after having told us that "society is to nature what evil is to good," then raises the question of whether Rousseau thought that all the evil in the world can be imputed to society. "Is not society a natural fact, therefore good if nature is good," and "was not society founded in order to remedy evils already existing?" asks Lanson. He replies that Rousseau would not contradict the answer implied by these questions. 1

Returning to Rousseau himself, we find that the fragment 2 which charges that society presents a spectacle both "hateful and dangerous" contains a significant addition. Rousseau does not stop with this denunciation. He adds:

"But on looking at it closer, one soon sees that there are other elements in the solution of the problem, which philosophy ought to take account of, elements calculated to modify very much so melancholy a conclusion." 3

The writer does not in this fragment elaborate this suggestive remark but one may assume that in the Contrat social perhaps he presented some of those elements "which philosophy ought to take account of," elements which modify his earlier "melancholy conclusion." It is worth noting also that even in the second Discourse there is a significant concession made on behalf of society. The conclusion of the First Part of this work carries the implied

1. HLF, 780.
admission that the social virtues are potential in the natural man. One of
the sentences of this Discourse begins as follows: "Après avoir montré que
la perfectibilité, les vertus sociales, et les autres facultés que l'homme
naturel avait reçues en puissance . . . "¹ Thus Émile Durkheim, recalling
this passage, declares, "Il ne faut pas dire de l'homme considéré à cette
phase (l'homme naturel) de son développement qu'il est insociable mais qu'il
est a-sociable."² And Lanson, who found Rousseau's anti-social tendency
basic to his system, comes later to the conclusion that Rousseau's real aim
was not to substitute the state of nature for the civil state but only to
restore to civil man "la bonté, la liberté, le bonheur qui furent les attri-
butus naturels de l'homme primitif."³ This work of restoration falls into two
parts: The restoration of the individual (Émile) and the restoration of
society (Contrat social).⁴

Concentration upon this line of thought would lead one to agree with
Cobban that there is in Rousseau no philosophical condemnation of the prin-
ciple of social life, but if we contrast with this line of thought the cita-
tions already considered, opinion would tend to turn to the contrary. As a
matter of fact, therefore, one would have to say that Rousseau both affirmed
and denied the principle of social life. His personal need for independence
(or better, his personal failure to adjust) led him to rebel against the
the principle of social living, but the common necessities of life made any
such rebellion futile.

Before leaving this problem, however, it is necessary to note that

¹. Oeuvres, I, 104.
². Art. 1. For a treatment of the relation between the natural man
and the citizen, vide pp. 4-11.
³. HLF, 772. Cf. p. 780.
⁴. Ibid., 772.
regardless of what Rousseau may have said for or against society, there is one principle in the logical structure of his thought which amounts to a philosophical condemnation of the principle of social life. This principle may be called sociological materialism. According to Rousseau, society is not the logical extension of the internal nature of man. The passage from the second Discourse which began by implying that the social virtues are potential in the natural man continues to point out that society does not result from these natural potentialities but rather from the "fortuitous concurrence of many external causes." The potentialities, says Rousseau, "could never develop of themselves," and had it not been for chance circumstances there would have been no such thing as civil society, for man would have been left "eternally in his primitive condition".

Lanson, therefore, is perfectly correct in saying that what Rousseau meant by saying that society is unnatural was that "it does not result from the internal nature of man, but from an external necessity." Recurrent evidences of this sociological materialism can be found in the Contrat and in the Émile. In the former writing, Rousseau says, in the chapter on "The Social Compact," that the change from the state of nature to that of society may be supposed to occur because "obstacles" in the way of self-preservation in a state of nature become greater than the resources of each individual. The opening chapter of the Émile declares that the social order does not come

1. Oeuvres, I, 104.
2. Art. 1, 12n.
The page contains text that is not legible. It seems to be a mixture of English and other languages, possibly including French or German. The text appears to be discussing concepts or ideas, but the specific content is unclear due to the handwriting style and quality of the image.
from nature. Emile Durkheim gives what seems to us an accurate interpretation of Rousseau on this point. Referring to the causes which produce society he says,

Mais la société ne pas pour cela chose naturelle, parce qu'elle n'est pas impliquée logiquement dans la nature de l'homme. L'homme n'était pas nécessaire par sa constitution primitive à la vie sociale. Les causes qui ont donné naissance à cette dernière sont extérieures à la nature humaine; elles sont d'ordre adventice.¹

Does not Rousseau's sociological materialism then compel us to admit that there is in principle a philosophical condemnation of social life in Rousseau's system? If society is the product of causes external to the nature of man and if society would never have developed except for these causes, is this not tantamount to a philosophical condemnation? If man is not by nature a political animal, as Aristotle said, it is difficult to see how the operation of causes external to man could ever form a society. They might force men into an aggregation; they could never produce among men an association. In Rousseau's view man becomes a civil being only when a series of natural catastrophes, famines, floods, and the like,² make it impossible for him any longer to remain in the state which is conformable to his nature. How man becomes a civil being as the result of these causes is far from clear.³

We may conclude, therefore, that between Rousseau's notion of sociological materialism on the one hand, and his belief in the moral character of the civil state on the other there is an irreducible inconsistency. It is possible to hold, as Cobban does, that Rousseau proclaimed the superior

¹. Art. 1, 15-16.
³. Emile Faguet declares (DHS, 344-45) that Rousseau never explains how man, born in a state of nature, departs from it.
benefits of civil association. The logical corollary of this is, of course, that the individual realizes his highest potentialities only within society and the individual, therefore, needs society. Rousseau himself asserted this but it is one thing to copy Rousseau's assertions and quite another thing to validate the logic upon which they rest. Taking all things into account, one is extremely hesitant to admit that Rousseau's thought is a consistent development of that kind of individualism which finds its completion in society, and that Rousseau in his conception of society did not "nullify" the individualism of the natural man. It is precisely this fiction of the state of nature and the natural man which stands in the way of a coherent development of the social point of view. Had it not been for this fiction, which makes civil life foreign to the "nature" of man, there would have been no need for assuming that society is the product of causes outside the individual. But given the fiction of the natural man, the origin of civil life must be found in external causes. And given this notion of origins, how can one maintain that Rousseau's thought is a consistent development of individualism? A more valid interpretation would seem to be that Rousseau's thought represents a failure of synthesis between the individual and the group in its logical structure, this failure arising from the fact that the individual is conceived initially as one who is unsuited for society. In other words the cause of the failure is the pervasive fiction of l'homme naturel.

Let us review now the considerations by which Rousseau sought to establish his assertion that the liberty of the social state is greater or better than the liberty of the natural state. We have already noticed Rousseau's expression of this claim;¹ it now remains to be seen whether he

¹. Supra, pp. 104-5.
made it good. Cobban takes Rousseau's claim at its face value, observing
that Rousseau hoped to create a form of society in which the natural man "in
the place of his lost independence should gain a greater freedom." 1

We might, without undue disparagement, refer to Rousseau's first at-
ttempt to establish this "greater freedom" as his adventure in social roman-
ticism. The designation is a precise one if we understand by social roman-
ticism the theory which holds that the individual fulfills his social obligations
merely by following his own nature. Rousseau's development of this theory
consists in showing, first, that the social pact, and later that the volonté
générale created by the pact, are merely the extensions of the wills of the
individuals in the group, and that in submitting to both they are in reality
only submitting to themselves. In both instances duty and interest are made
to coincide, and justice is the simple product of the wills of the individuals
who are both sovereign and subjects.

Rousseau serves notice of his intention to use the pact as a romantic
principle of social freedom 2 in the formulation of his problem. He phrases
it as follows:

Trouver une form d'association qui défende et protège de toute la
force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle
chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même, et reste
aussi libre qu'auparavant. Tel est le problème fondamental dont le
Contrat social donne la solution. 3

The individual is to obey only himself and to remain as free as before. He

1. RMS, 227.

2. This is Professor Schinz's description of Rousseau's intention.
Vide supra, p. 81 note 1.

3. CS, I, VI in Vaughan, PWR, II, 32. Attention is to be called to
the fact that the words "Contrat social" are not to be italicized as G.D.H.
Cole's translation of this passage implies. Rousseau is not speaking of his
book of the same name as giving the solution, but of the idea of contract
itself. As the next sentence implies, the context, as well as the manuscript,
calls for this interpretation. Vide Cole, SCD, 14.
is to find preserved in the civil state the original liberty which he enjoyed in the natural state. The social contract is the guarantee for this. Let us see how.

We have already noted that Rousseau retained the notion of a contract because that notion made it possible to ground society upon the consent of the individuals. The liberty of an individual is not denied if the individual gives his consent to the constraint imposed upon him. Hence, consent is basic in the contract. "Civil association is the most voluntary of all acts," wrote Rousseau, and on that account, consent to the original pact must be unanimous. Rousseau's belief was that "man is not a machine and that free choice is a sacred thing for the dignity of man as for his well being." The definition of liberty presented in the *Contrat social* is a reflection of this same belief. Liberty is defined as "obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves."

Connected with the idea of consent in this romantic delineation of the contract is the notion of an identity between duty and interest. The contract was supposed to effect this identity. Rousseau announced his purpose to unite duty and interest by showing that individuals perform their social duty because to do so is in their interest and individuals naturally pursue their interests; they do not have to be constrained. "In this inquiry," he wrote, "I shall endeavour always to unite what right sanctions with what is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and utility may in no case be divided." As long as he was under the spell of his social

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1. Supra, p. 81.
2. CS, IV, II in Vaughan, PWR, II, 105.
3. Rodet, LCS, 97.
5. CS, I, Intro. in Vaughan, PWR, II, 23.
romanticism, he spoke as if he had accomplished his aim. "Duty and interest equally oblige the two contracting parties,"¹ he said, speaking of the sovereign and the subjects.

But almost on the same page he called attention to that part of his theory which in reality makes any identity between public duty and individual interest impossible:

En effet, chaque individu peut, comme homme, avoir une volonté particulière contraire ou dissemblable à la volonté générale qu'il a, comme citoyen. Son intérêt particulier peut lui parler tout autrement que l'intérêt commun; son existence absolue, et naturellement indépendante, peut lui faire envisager ce qu'il doit à la cause commune comme une contribution gratuite, dont la perte sera moins nuisible aux autres que le payement n'en est onéreux pour lui . . . il jouirait des droits du citoyen sans vouloir remplir les devoirs du sujet . . .²

Because of the private wills of "absolute and naturally independent" individuals, Rousseau admits that the Sovereign "would have no security that they would fulfil their undertakings . . ." In other words, Rousseau sees that his romantic notion of a social pact is logically in the same position as Diderot's theory of natural law. If men do not naturally and spontaneously consent to obey the laws because their "absolute and naturally independent existence" makes them consider their private advantage first, then there is little ground to suppose that such men would find it to their natural bent to consent to a social pact or the laws proceeding from it. In answering Diderot, Rousseau had answered himself. His admission indicates that he had not yet abandoned the conception of the natural man which he urged against Diderot although that conception plays havoc with his own romantic notion of consent.

Besides the notion of consent, liberty is related to another notion

¹. Vaughan, PWR, II, 35.
². Ibid., 35-36.
The image contains a page of text with multiple lines. Due to the nature of the content, extracting meaningful information is challenging without understanding the context. However, here is a transcription of the visible text:

"...and his mother, who was brave and kind, saw to it that their child received the best education possible."

This text appears to be part of a narrative or descriptive passage, possibly discussing the upbringing of a character. The exact context is not clear from the image alone.
in Rousseau's system, that of equality, and there are romantic elements present in the development of this theme similar to those in the preceding. Equality is the condition implied in the acceptance of the pact. Each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all. As Professor Laski points out, freedom was for Rousseau "a function of equality." In the second Discourse Rousseau had contended that men in the state of nature were free and equal but that freedom was lost when inequality supervened. It is not surprising, therefore, that he should attempt to transfer the equality of the state of nature to civil society.

The difficulty of performing this transfer is readily observable if we remember that on coming into the civil state the individual makes a "total alienation" of himself, "his person and all his power . . . together with all his rights." Rousseau, however, seeks to show that the individual does not really lose anything by this renunciation, but that he "remains as free as before." He says:

Enfin, chacun, se donnant à tous, ne se donne à personne; et comme il n'y a pas un associé sur lequel on n'acquière le même droit qu'on lui cède sur soi, on gagne l'équivalent de tout ce qu'on perd, et plus de force pour conserver ce qu'on a.

On Rousseau's terms, therefore, we are expected to believe that since all the individuals equally alienate their liberty there is, therefore, no alienation at all. Each, "in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody." Or, if the individual does lose something, "he gains an equivalent for everything he loses." As Professor Wright says, interpreting Rousseau, "Each man

2. Laski, Art. 3, 52.
4. Loc. cit.
acquires over all the others the same power he surrenders them, and thus recovers the equivalent of what he loses. . . "

The interpretation is faith-to the contention interpreted, but, strictly speaking, if the contention represented the actual situation, we should then be left with the conclusion that liberty is the surrender of one's own freedom in return for the privilege of curtailing the freedom of everyone else.

Actually, however, Rousseau's contention is false. The individual does not recover the equivalent of what he surrenders. I do not receive, as a result of the pact, the liberty which another associate loses, nor does he receive the liberty which I lose. If, in the state of nature, I was free to do as I please, and if I surrender that privilege on coming into the civil state, my loss is not anyone's gain because my privilege is not transferred to any other. On the contrary, all alike surrender the same privilege. There is equality, yes. But, as Professor Schinz has pointed out, it is an equality of loss.

We may, of course, admit a point which Wright urges in justification of Rousseau, namely, that the surrender which the individual makes of his liberty in such a matter as the payment of taxes, for example, issues in a condition which is advantageous to the individual himself as well as to others. He receives in return the advantages made possible by taxes and, therefore, gets back something from what he loses. This justification is true apart from Rousseau, but it is difficult to see how it can be allowed as an interpretation of Rousseau at this point. If we may take the writer at his word, what he is trying to establish is the contention that the individual is just

1. Wright, MR, 73. Cf. also the note on this page.

2. Schinz, LPR, II, 394.
The Johnsons' 1920s home was on a corner lot in an older neighborhood.

The Johnsons' property was a point of interest during the 1920s due to its historical significance. The home was built in 1920 and was considered an asset due to its architectural style and materials used. It was located in a relatively quiet neighborhood, away from the hustle and bustle of the city.

The Johnsons were known for their hospitality and their willingness to share their home with others. They often held small parties and gatherings at their home, which were enjoyed by many. The home was also used as a meeting place for local community groups, and it served as a hub for social and cultural activities.

The Johnsons were proud of their home and the community they lived in. They took great care in maintaining and preserving the home, and it remained a landmark in the neighborhood for many years.

Despite the passage of time and changing social and economic conditions, the Johnsons' home remained a symbol of the past and a reminder of the values and traditions that defined the community. It continues to stand as a testament to the enduring spirit of the neighborhood and the people who called it home.
as free in the social state as he was "before," that as a citizen he suffers no diminution of his natural liberty. The appeal to equality is a part of Rousseau's attempt to establish the pact as a romantic principle of social freedom, and the aim of the whole argument, as he himself said, is to establish the conclusion that it is "untrue that in the social contract there is on the part of the particulars any real renunciation."^1

So far as the logic of the matter is concerned, one has to admit that Rousseau's romantic approach to the problem of liberty is inconsistent. The attempts to make the individual yield to all and yet to none, to make him obey the laws while obeying only himself, and to preserve in the civil state the freedom of the natural state are attempts which are doomed to failure at the start. The chapter on "The Social Pact"^2 is thus a chapter of enigmas, in which Rousseau gives us the romantic formulation of his problem and the confusing justification of his solution. Emile Faguet, a philosophic and impersonal critic,^3 declares that "neither Rousseau nor any one else has ever clearly comprehended this text."^4 By the pact, he promises to preserve the freedom which the individual enjoyed "before," but the same pact calls for the total alienation of the individual, which, in turn, is justified on the grounds that it is not really an alienation at all since everyone submits to it equally and since the individual gets the same as he gives.

The cause of the incoherence in Rousseau's social romanticism is

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1. "Ces distinctions une fois admises, il est si faux que dans le Contrat social il y ait de la part des particuliers aucune renonciation véritable . . ." (Vaughan, PWR, II, 46. CS, II, IV).

2. CS, I, VI in Vaughan, PWR, II, 32-34.

3. Schinz, LPR, I, 12.

plain enough. It is the persistent use of the fiction of the state of nature and the natural man. This fiction underlies the formulation of the problem; because "obedience to himself alone" is a main characteristic of the natural man, and the desire to have him remain "as free as before" is reminiscent of the state of nature. But if the fiction of the natural man underlies the formulation of the problem, it also nullifies the solution of the problem. Rousseau faces with disarming candor the logic of his position in the chapter where he treats the relation existing between the sovereign and the subjects. Here he admits that the sovereign must have guarantees that the subjects will fulfill their undertakings, and the reason for this is instructive. The reason is that there is actually no dependable identity between what the sovereign requires and what the individual will freely consent to give. "As a man," each individual has a particular interest deriving from his "absolute and naturally independent existence," and this interest is often contrary to the common welfare. Here again we encounter the fiction of the natural man. This time the fiction intrudes in such a way as to make it plain that a romantic solution to the problem of social constraint is impossible.

Rousseau himself seems aware of his position for his thought now takes a turn in another direction. Having failed to make interest lead logically to duty, he tries the reverse procedure of laying the emphasis upon duty and for the next four chapters he talks about "The Civil State," the mastery which it holds over all the goods of individuals, its inalienable and indivisible sovereign will. The emphasis now is upon what the state can expect of its members, rather than upon the freedom which the members will obtain from the state. This rising tide of collectivism is introduced by an

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ominous threat to the pre-established liberty of the natural man.

Afin donc que le pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement, qui seul peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d'obéir à la volonté générale y sera contraint par tout le Corps . . .

And Rousseau hastens to add, "ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera d'être libre."¹ Let us make no mistake about the measure of constraint, for in this matter Rousseau does nothing by halves. A little further on he says, "Comme la nature donne à chaque homme un pouvoir absolu sur tous ses membres, le pacte social donne au Corps politique un pouvoir absolu sur tous les siens."² This absolute power which belongs to sovereignty is both indivisible and inalienable; it is exercised without benefit of constitutional restraints or the restraints of checks and balances through a division of powers. It is beyond the reach of partial associations. It stands for a constraint which is limited by nothing except the wills of those who wield it. It is "absolute, sacred, inviolable."³

How could Rousseau, individualist and romantic, ever have made a place for a constraint of such formidable proportions. The answer is ready and clear: He specified that this sovereign power must always be the expression of the volonté générale, and he intended that the volonté générale should be "always right." He held that if the individual did not voluntarily surrender himself to that which is morally right, then no real harm could be done such an individual by forcing him to surrender. It would only be compelling him to do his duty, which, if he were a moral man, he would do without constraint. No one is ever injured by doing what is right. Consequently,

¹. Vaughan, PWR, II, 36.
². Ibid., 43.
³. Ibid., 46.
if the individual, for the moment, was opposed to submission to the sovereign power, his momentary feeling could not represent his "real will," for a moral man cannot "really" be opposed to doing his moral duty.\(^1\) Hence, the constraint is a favor to him; it means only that he is being "forced to be free." Freedom for Rousseau then consists, as Herr Ernst Cassirer points out, not in capricious action (Willkür), but in "a powerful and unbreakable law which the individual sets over himself."\(^2\) Liberty, said Rousseau, is "obedience to the law which we prescribe for ourselves."\(^3\) Thus Professor Wright raises the question of whether a people under law can be free, and he answers, interpreting Rousseau, "Yes, in exact proportion to their obedience to the law. It is their own will, and whoever obeys his will is free."\(^4\)

At this point we encounter the moral orientation of Rousseau's political philosophy and his teaching that through the state man acquires "moral liberty," by which he becomes "master of himself."\(^5\) As contrasted with Locke,

\begin{enumerate}
\item Thus Bernard Bosanquet, giving a metaphysical interpretation of the general will, contends that we find liberty in submission to it because "liberty, as the condition of being ourselves, cannot simply be something which we have, still less something which we have always had—a status quo to be maintained. It must be a condition relevant to our continued struggle to assert the control of . . . our real self. . . . Thus it is that we can speak, without contradiction, of being forced to be free" (PTS, 118-19).

Had Rousseau been content to give only a metaphysical account of the general will, Bosanquet's interpretation might well stand as an interpretation of Rousseau also. But Rousseau was impatient of metaphysical speculations and the general will became, much to the embarrassment of his system, something more concrete than a metaphysical principle.

\item Cassirer, Art. 1, 192.
\item CS, I, VIII, in Vaughan, PWR, II, 37.
\item Wright, MR, 79.
\item CS, I, VIII, in Vaughan, PWR, II, 36-37.
\end{enumerate}
who held that politics is entirely divorced from morals, Rousseau believed in the moral character of the civil state, a belief which, in the judgment of Professor Vaughan, presents "nothing less than a revolution in political speculation." But it is necessary to notice that the sovereign will of the state is not only an ideal moral will which directs the state always to justice and the common good, but it is also the will which proceeds from the members of the state. Any state in which a will external to the citizens is imposed upon the citizens is a state which has no basis in right. Rousseau was enough of a romantic still to decree that sovereignty must be related to consent. But this must not be taken as meaning that Rousseau is still operating with romantic notions and grounding obligation in the free consent of natural men. There is a new tone in the chapter on "The Civil State." The natural man undergoes a transformation. Duty takes the place of instinct and appetite, and the individual is forced to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. Civil association makes him an intelligent being "and a man." There is no mention here of the "absolutely independent existence" which he enjoyed "before." One may say that the individualism presupposed by this chapter is not the individualism of l'homme naturel but that of l'homme vraiment libre, the type of individualism in which society is internal rather than external to the nature of man. Had the conceptions of this chapter been made basic in the Contrat social, Rousseau could have been credited with a consistent development of his revolutionary insight into the moral character of the civil state.

1. Vaughan, FWR, I, 40.
2. Ibid., 41.
We have noticed how the individualism of l'homme naturel intrudes and nullifies the romantic emphasis in idea of the social pact. It must be noticed now that this same individualism nullifies also the emphasis upon the moral character of the civil state. It is not to be supposed that because there are remnants of the individualism of l'homme vraiment libre in the chapter on "The Civil State" that this type of individualism, therefore, becomes basic to the remainder of the writing. Having written the chapter on "The Civil State," Rousseau then proceeds, five chapters later to annihilate his more consistent approach to society by making another parade of those romantic elements which he brought forth in the consideration of the social pact. In this chapter, which is entitled "The Limits of the Sovereign Power," the conflict is, if possible, more violent than before. Individualism and collectivism stand in the relation of open warfare.

The first reference in this chapter is to the state and "the universal and compelling force" which attaches to its sovereignty. But the next paragraph refers to the individuals composing the state, individuals "whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it." Then follows a mystifying explanation of how justice originates "in the preference each man gives to himself," and how it is that the general will is always right and how "all continually will the happiness of each one," because "there is not a man who does not think of 'each' as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for all." Here we encounter again the ideas made familiar under the heading of Rousseau's social romanticism, the identity of interest and justice, the idea that although the sovereign power is "absolute, sacred, and inviolable" there

2. Vaughan, PWR, II, 43-44. Italics mine.
This exhibit illustrates the mathematical function of the equation that relates the variables. It shows how the values of one variable affect the outcome of another. The graphs demonstrate the relationship between these variables, providing insights into their interactions. The data collected from various experiments is plotted, allowing for a visual representation of the trends and patterns. This analysis is crucial for understanding the underlying principles and making informed decisions. The results are further discussed in the following section, where we delve deeper into the implications of these findings.
is no "real renunciation" on the part of the individual when he submits to it, and the idea that justice can be based upon the "preference each man gives to himself." The notion of equality is again appealed to as a reason for submission to the sovereign power. ". . . Every authentic act of the general will binds or favors all the citizens equally."1 Equality of right creates the idea of justice. Apart from the context, these ideas on equality have their proper validity, but Rousseau presents them as "proving" that obligations are binding "only because they are mutual."2 Logically this contention is on all fours with the previous argument that because all the associates equally alienate themselves under the pact there is, therefore, no real alienation.

Faguet calls this "the most unsolvable chapter" of the book,3 and Schinz deplores it as "a chapter of excuses or explanations."4 The incompatibility between the omnipotent power of the state and the original freedom of the individual, which this power is alleged to conserve, is too obvious to need comment. Schinz concludes that Rousseau "prétend du commencement à la fin parler d'un contrat de liberté et il définit constamment un contrat de constrainte."5

The termination in constraint is not a surprising outcome for a pact which was intended to lead to freedom if we remember that the individuals who are the contracting parties are conceived by Rousseau as being individuals who are themselves unfit for society by their very nature. The romantic

1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 45.
2. Ibid., 44: "...Ne sont obligatoires que parce qu'ils sont mutuels."
3. Faguet, MRV, 21.
4. Schinz, LPR, II, 393.
5. Ibid., 392-93.
attempt to present social obligation as the free choice of individuals goes to pieces on the fiction of the natural man, according to which individuals are primarily interested in their private advantage.

The grain of truth which underlies this confused and confusing chapter four is the fact the formation of a society is a matter with which the interest of each associate coincides, inasmuch as continued existence in the state of nature has become, ex hypothesi, impossible any longer. But to assume that since interest coincides in this one particular, it, therefore, coincides in all is plainly illogical and it is especially so in this case because the nature of the associates in question is atomistic rather than organic. "This admirable agreement between interest and justice"¹ is thus established by a tour de force.

We may conclude, therefore, that Rousseau's romantic attempt to solve the problem of liberty ends in failure. The reason for this is simple: The problem as he formulated it is insolvable. It is impossible to find a form of political association where an individual "may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before."² The impossibility is due to the fact that the freedom which the individual had before is a freedom which is incompatible with civil society and political association. Rousseau, however, spared no consideration which would in any way aid him establishing this contention. The obligation to accomplish this was laid upon him by his firm conviction freedom cannot be preserved unless the conditions of civil life are those to which the individual can freely consent; the sovereign will must bear a relation internal to the will of the citizens. In so far he was right, and no

¹. CS, II, IV in Vaughan, PWR, II, 45.
². CS, I, VI in Vaughan, PWR, II, 32.
political philosophy ought to take lightly this basic insight. The development of this truth, however, terminated in an impasse for Rousseau because he could not free himself of the persistent fiction of the natural independence of man. His first thought was to make this fiction serve a social purpose, to establish the romantic proposition that the natural man in obeying himself fulfills thereby his social obligations. This romantic solution undergoes a two-fold development, in which, first, the social pact, and after it the volonté générale are presented as the will of the individual.

Both lines of development rest upon a supposed identity between justice and interest, and both are contradicted by the supposed character of the natural man, as a result of which such an identity becomes impossible. The romantic approach to the problem, therefore, ends in failure, and Rousseau is faced with the prospect of a society which is constantly under the pressure of flying apart into the original atoms of which it is composed.

Rousseau himself is more than dimly aware of this failure, for we detect the use of at least two ideas which would be useless and unnecessary additions to the theory if the romantic contentions were really valid. The fact that Rousseau turned to these ideas lends some support to the belief that he himself was dissatisfied with his first attempt to reconcile liberty and constraint. The first of these ideas is that of the Legislator; the other is the preference shown for aristocracy as a means of salvation from the rule of the mob. Both ideas are resorted to in order to escape the blindness and the partiality of particular wills within the state. They are a dike against the flood of individualism which a collection of natural men would inevitably release. Both are a tacit confession that a civil society cannot be formed out of natural men.

These devices lead one to agree with Schinz, who declares that Rousseau
"despaired of the generous folly of reconciling an absolute romanticism of man with an organized social state."¹ He did precisely that in the chapter which immediately precedes the one on the legislator. He was there speaking of the high office of the Law as an act of the general will and repeating the notion that we can be both free and subject to laws because they "are but registers of our wills." That is the romanticism which we found embodied in the volonté générale. But Rousseau did not leave the matter there. With disarming candor he raises the following question:

Comment une multitude aveugle, qui souvent ne sait ce qu'elle veut, parce qu'elle sait rarement ce qui lui est bon, exécuterait-elle d'elle-même une entreprise aussi grande, aussi difficile qu'un système de législation? De lui-même le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-même il ne le voit pas toujours.²

Then he speaks of the "seductive influence of individual wills." Thus arises the need for a Legislator.

The Legislator, that divine but enigmatic character, is eulogized by Rousseau as a "superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men without experiencing any of them."³ He is the kind of person who could best write the laws of the state. Likewise the "best and most natural" form of government is that in which the wisest govern the many.⁴ One cannot miss noticing that in the devices of the lawgiver and the preference for aristocracy Rousseau is far removed from the romantic notion of a general will which "can always direct the force of the state toward the common good."

1. Schinz, LPR, II, 408.
2. CS, II, VI in Vaughan, PWR, II, 50.
3. Vaughan, PWR, II, 51. Gaspard Vallette, who concentrates upon the Genevan traits in the character and thought of Rousseau, sees in the Legislator a recollection of Calvin. Other marks of Geneva upon the Contrat social are set forth by him (JJR, II, III).
4. CS, III, V in Vaughan, PWR, II, 75. Preference for aristocracy is another Genevan trait, according to Vallette.
Professor Schinz points out that here, as in the Économie politique, the state is arranged against the individual. This must necessarily be the case since, on Rousseau's principles, there is opposition between the state and the individual. This is evident in the chapter on "The Legislator," where Rousseau points out that the legislator "ought to feel himself capable, so to speak, of changing human nature, of transforming each individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary whole..." He must be capable of "altering man's constitution" giving him new resources which are "alien to him."

Celui qui ose entreprendre d'instituer un peuple doit se sentir en état de changer pour ainsi dire la nature humaine, de transformer chaque individu, qui par lui-même est un tout parfait et solitaire, en partie d'un plus grand tout, dont cet individu reçoive en quelque sorte sa vie et son être; d'altérer la constitution de l'homme pour la renforcer; de substituer une existence partielle et morale à l'existence physique et indépendante que nous avons tous reçue de la nature. Il faut, en un mot, qu'il ôte à l'homme ses forces propres pour lui en donner qui lui soient étrangères...

In this chapter, therefore, we meet again that ubiquitous fiction, l'homme naturel. Rousseau is still conceiving the individual in terms which render him unfit for society. Apparently neither the social pact nor the volonté générale was successful in accomplishing its purpose. If Rousseau himself had thought that either had achieved its purpose, why should he have appealed to the legislator? Why should he have resorted to aristocracy?

Another factor is present to indicate Rousseau's "despair" with romanticism, namely, the intrusion of a new element heretofore explicitly excluded, namely, religion. The legislator, as Rousseau described him, was the possessor of divine characteristics. He was one who "must have recourse

1. Schinz, LPR, II, 408.
to divine intervention and credit the gods with (his) own wisdom, in order that the peoples submitting to the laws of the State . . . might obey freely, and bear with docility the yoke of the public happiness."1 "Might obey freely"—that is the problem with which Rousseau had wrestled up to this point. The social pact was supposed to give the answer, but it didn't. Neither did the volonté générale when it was conceived as being the actual will of the individuals as well as the ideal will in the state. In other words, the elaborate attempt to unite obedience and freedom romantically, the attempt to present the issue so that it appeared that the individual freely consented to obey because it was in his interest to do so, was now quite frankly abandoned. A new answer to the problem of obedience was now forthcoming—new at least in Rousseau's system, because hitherto he had set himself against a religious or theological answer to his problem. This new answer was the last and the best he was able to give. The individual must consent to obey the laws because the laws embody a religious sanction. "The Civil Religion," therefore, and at long last, provides the answer for which he searched.

"Without religion, no civil society can be maintained," Pufendorf had written. Montesquieu had expressed agreement, and, says Professor Hendel, "Rousseau was the disciple of both of them."2 In writing his first draft of the Contrat, Rousseau had proposed to carry his problem away from the court of religion to that of philosophy.

Lassons donc à part les préceptes sacrés des religions divers, dont l'abus cause autant de crimes que leur usage en peut épargner; et rendons au philosophe l'examen d'une question que le théologien n'a jamais traitée qu'au préjudice du genre humain.3

To acquire knowledge, one must study; but to master it, one must suffer.

"The greatest glory in life isleness, not success, and the greatest failure is inglorious activity."

To act is to suffer; to suffer is to act.

"The greatest glory in life is being used for a purpose greater than oneself."

I have always been one to believe in the power of magic and the inherent goodness of humanity.

"The world is a book and those who do not travel read only a page."
One hardly believes, however, that this exclusion of religion represented his own inner conviction, for despite his heterodoxy he was ever religious.\(^1\) The exclusion of religion from political theory was more probably a necessity which he came to accept as a result of his contacts with the naturalists, Diderot, Voltaire, and others at Paris. He began his political treatise with a criticism of Diderot's theory and doubtless thought it wise to attack Diderot with his own weapons, which committed him to a philosophical rather than a religious treatment of his problem. Moreover, as the first draft reveals, he thought he had an adequate philosophical principle in the volonté générale.\(^2\) Rousseau was not able, however, to make the exclusion of religion final, which may account for the fact that hurriedly sketched on the backs of some of the pages of the Geneva MS. is the material which forms the first draft of the chapter on "The Civil Religion." There is no explicit chapter under this title in the Geneva MS.\(^3\)

With the failure of the romantic approach, the need for religion became pressing. As the chapter on the legislator admits, some force had to supervene in order to modify the nature of the natural man and give him a character compatible with civil society. The "Civil Religion" was, in the end, this force, and on this account Professor Schinz regards this final chapter of the \textit{Contrat social} as the "key of the arch" in his political

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{1.} "I have always said to (unbelievers) that I did not know how to combat them, but that I would not believe them," he wrote to Vernes (Feb. 18, No. 474, cited in Hendel, \textit{RM},II,4). The optimism of his Letter to Voltaire left this famous philosopher without an answer for a time. Voltaire "bided his time in order to plan out his \textit{Candide}, as a retort to such optimism" (Hendel, \textit{RM},I,240).
  \item \textbf{2.} Cf. Vaughan, \textit{PWR}, I, 452.
  \item \textbf{3.} Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, 499, note 3.
\end{itemize}
The return to religion is taken by Professor Schinz to indicate a gradual drift away from romantic principles toward Roman virtues. In the *Emile* and the *Contrat social*, Schinz holds, Rousseau gave up the hope of happiness, and opposed reason to romanticism, coming out dogmatically for a return to religion as an absolute guarantee.  

What then of the fortunes of liberty? So far as the chapter on "The Civil Religion" is concerned, one may say with Hendel that the practical intention was "to exclude intolerance and to establish religious liberty." The animus of the chapter is against that form of orthodoxy which dares to say, "Outside the Church is no salvation." Such orthodoxy ought to be "driven from the state." Rousseau had written in *Julie* that a professing Christian who persecutes others belies his faith and that if he "were a magistrate in a State where atheism was punished by death he would 'burn the first informer who forced him to put such a law into execution.'" Intolerance is "the warfare of humanity," he wrote in the Geneva MS, and the maxim that "It is necessary to think as I do to be saved" he described as an "infernal dogma"

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1. Schinz, LFR, II, chapter V, esp. pp. 365 and 376; also Art. 1. M. Rodet agrees that the "Civil Religion" is not an accidental addition to a work already finished but is an integral part of Rousseau's system, "the last stone in the edifice." His reason for this, however, is different from that of Schinz. Rodet holds that the purpose of the chapter was to guarantee that the sovereign power should always be "rigorously inspired by the desire for absolute justice" (LCS, 99-100). C. W. Hendel, on the other hand, refers to the chapter as "hastily added ... a piece written ambiguously" (Hendel, M0, 279).


which, for the sake of the peace of the world ought to be taken out of the city.

Regardless, however, of Rousseau's eloquence on behalf of tolerance it is to be noted that this chapter prescribes certain positive dogmas and the state may banish whomever does not believe them. If anyone having publicly professed these dogmas later behaves as if he did not believe them, he commits the crime of lying before the law and may be punished by death.

Aside from the few specific dogmas of the civil religion a person is to be free to believe what he chooses. But the prescription of the positive dogmas leads one to conclude that this chapter terminates in an intolerance not very different from that which it was intended to avoid. Freedom to question, doubt, or disbelieve these dogmas is not open to the citizen. The state speaks and the individual must listen. It is "the state against the individual," as Professor Schinz has phrased it.

What may be said now of the fate of liberty in Rousseau's system? Schinz's survey of Rousseau's politics leads him to conclude: "...La vie politique (comme la vie sociale où l'homme veut réaliser le bonheur) est une vie de contrainte et non de liberté..." Herr Ernst Cassirer declares that "Der _Contrat social_ verkündigt und verherrlicht einen schlechthin ungebundenen Absolutismus des Staatswillens." M. Rodet concludes that in the end Rousseau effaced the last vestiges of individual liberty. These

2. A matter which he later admitted might have been an "error in politics" (Lettres de la Montagne, I in Oeuvres, III, 131).
5. Rodet, LCS, 98.
which, for the sake of the health of the body, must be performed in the act of

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conclusions are in agreement with those persistently voiced by Émile Faguet. His comparative study of the politics of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire leads him to the conclusion that "Rousseau est le théoricien du despotisme populaire..." and the Contrat social is "la Bible du despotisme démocratique." Rousseau, he contends, rests his case upon a "sophism" which Montesquieu had refuted before him:

Rousseau est... le fondateur de la République despotique et l'inventeur précisément de cette doctrine, que Montesquieu avait refusée d'avance, que quand le peuple est libre il est impossible que le citoyen ne le soit pas, puisqu'il n'obéit qu'à une volonté qui, en définitive, est la sienne. Ce sophisme emplit tout le Contrat Social, s'il n'est le Contrat Social lui-même."

Faguet finds that in the eighteenth century Montesquieu was the defender of the liberal doctrine, Rousseau was the defender of the doctrine of democratic despotism, and Voltaire was the defender of the doctrine of royal despotism. So far as political liberty is concerned, we are obliged to concur in these conclusions and assert that the practical outcome of Rousseau's theory would be to destroy such liberty. When Faguet declares, "Il n'y a pas un atome ni de liberté ni de sécurité dans son système," we may object that this judgment does not do justice to Rousseau's intent, or we may say that it does not take account of those elements which he provided for the construction of a liberal system, but we can hardly deny that, in the last analysis, this would be the outcome of Rousseau's theory in practice.

1. Faguet, MRV, 59.
2. Ibid., 19.
3. Ibid., 17.
4. Ibid., 279. Schinz names the following as believers that Rousseau's theory is an aid to despotism: Benjamin Constant, Royer-Collard, Lamartine, Quinet, Taine, Scherer, Nourisson, Rodet, Dide, Faguet.
5. Faguet, DHS, 388.
T.H. Green is quoted as saying that the practical result of Rousseau's theory is a "vague exaltation of the prerogatives of the sovereign people, without any corresponding limitations of the conditions under which an act is to be deemed that of the sovereign people . . ." The reason for the truth of this view is the fact that on Rousseau's terms the individual is required to make a total alienation of himself to the state without receiving any effective guarantees that the state will not misuse its power. It is true that Rousseau speaks of checks on the sovereign, but, as we have seen, they are checks which come to nothing in practice. The state is not to exact anything not important for the public utility, but the state alone is the sole judge of what is important. Partial associations are banned; the sovereign power is not to be divided; and it cannot be alienated. Rousseau felt undisturbed by this Staatsomnipotenz because, as Faguet's analysis suggests, he believed that if the people were free the individuals must be also. He took insufficient account of the fact that if the people are sovereign collectively they are subjects individually. He rested too securely in the romantic notion that the sovereign will and the will of each individual could be identified.

The degree of constraint in Rousseau's system is intensified by the conception of the individual with which he operated. He sought to reconstruct in society the lost paradise of the state of nature in which the individual was free because he could do whatever he wanted to do; he "obeyed only himself." One can trace in the Contrat social almost the degrees by which Rousseau came to the realization that state unity cannot be built out of

1. Cobban, RMS, 128. Cobban, of course, holds that this is a "misinterpretation of Rousseau." Cf. Laski's criticism of the general will: "... The will of the state is general when the conditions of generality are fulfilled. It does not tell us when they are fulfilled. ..." (Art. 3, 53).
In...
such material, but the more Rousseau realized his predicament, the more he talked about constraint. He did not consider the alternative of modifying his conception of the individual, or rather he did not consider the alternative of making basic the other conception of the individual which he had formulated. The final flight to religion was occasioned by the same necessity which prompted his appeal to the legislator: He had to find some means to "make" the individual love his duty. The Civil Religion was erected upon the belief that religion matters to the community because it is that which will make the citizen love his duty. "Or, il importe bien à l'État que chaque citoyen ait une religion qui lui fasse aimer ses devoirs."

The state is against the individual in the last analysis because the individual is against the state in the beginning. He is the kind of individual who has to be "denatured" and given a character "alien" to himself; he has to be "made to love his duties."

If the idea of l'homme naturel, the sworn foe of society and the civil state, was the idea, the first contemplation of which plunged Rousseau into an ecstasy and the later contemplation of which lifted his soul to the divine, it is also the idea which reduces his political theory to inconsistency and prevents him from attaining that rational synthesis between the individual and the state at which he aimed. The fiction of the state of nature and the natural man is the central theme of just about everything Rousseau wrote outside of the Contrat social and the Économie politique. The thought of the first two Discourses revolves around this fiction. It was thrown at the world in the defiant manner of the first Discourse and reiter-
in the logical, argumentative manner of the second Discourse. The fiction

reappears in the *Lettre à Philopolis*, which immediately followed, and again in the *Preface de Narcisse*, "which is one of my best productions."¹ The fiction is predominant in the *Émile*, the opening pages of which give us the explicit description of l'homme naturel. It was this fiction which won him fame and recognition in the eyes of the world, and provided him with a basis of attack against Hobbes and Diderot.

It would be expecting the impossible to suppose that an idea of such magnitude should be absent from his political writing, and, we believe, it is not absent. The formulation of the problem in the *Contrat* and the attempt to answer it on the basis of romanticism are alike filled with the fiction. In fact, it is our belief that with the exception of the chapter on "The Civil State," the prevailing individualism of the *Contrat social* is not the individualism which is compatible with civil society (as Cobban, for example, assumes throughout)² but it is the individualism of l'homme naturel who has been forced into civil relations.

We may agree with Vaughan and Cobban that "A free citizen in a free State--that, on the sum of the whole matter, is the ideal of Rousseau."³ But we are compelled to add, however, that it is an ideal which Rousseau was prohibited from realizing on account of the fact that he could not bring himself to repudiate the fiction the logical weakness of which we have reason to believe he was aware.

1. Conf. VIII in Oeuvres, VIII, 277.
2. Cf. Cobban, RMS, esp. p. 245. Cf. also Durkheim, Art. I, esp. pp. 129-31, 140, 143, 159-61. Durkheim finds the "perfect continuity which the thoughts of Rousseau present" by refusing to make the individualism of the natural man basic. But he is driven to admit that Rousseau ought to show that collective life is not contrary to the natural order. He says, however, that the points of attachment are so few that he does not see clearly how it is possible (160).
The political writing of Rousseau exhibits a cross-play of two irreconcilable tendencies; one represents the individualism of the natural man and the other represents the collectivism of the sovereign state. These two strands lie side by side throughout the *Contrat social*; they are never successfully united because they cannot be united. It is, therefore, incorrect, in our opinion, to represent the work of Rousseau either as a straight-line development from individualism to its opposite, collectivism, or as a consistent defence of individualism from start to finish. It is rather an unsynthesized presentation of both individualism and collectivism.

A clear example of this conflict may be found in Book II, Chapter IV, "Les bournes du pouvoir souverain." The chapter begins with a paragraph voicing organicism. The state is to have a "universal and compelling force" in order to move each part to the best advantage of the whole. But the next paragraph is just as unqualifiedly atomistic. Besides the state we are asked to consider the persons composing it and these are "naturally independent." After this thesis and antithesis, the next paragraph provides, not a synthesis, but a conflict. Each man is to alienate only what it is important for the state to control; but the state is the sole judge of what is important. It is this same chapter which tries to show how we work for others by working for ourselves. The association, on analysis, turns out to be a mere collection of particulars which are external to each other. The thesis and the antithesis are of such a kind that they cannot be transmuted into a higher synthesis. If social unity is to be obtained, therefore, the thesis must annihilate the antithesis, and this, in the end, takes place. Collectivism overpowers individualism.

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1. Joseph Hornung (Art. 1, 150-55) points to this dualism as grounded in the personality of Rousseau himself.
Those who have attempted to unify the thought of Rousseau under either the heading of collectivism or of individualism have usually had to admit that such unification is incomplete. Vaughan, for example, admits that Rousseau as "a stern assertor of the State upon the one hand, a fiery champion of the individual upon the other . . . could never bring himself wholly to sacrifice the one ideal to the other." Cobban too concedes that "the incompleteness of his political thought is patent."

The critic who seems to us to give the most accurate account of Rousseau's thought is Monsieur M. Bourguin, who wrote in 1912 on "Les deux tendances de Rousseau." He had been occupied with the study of Rousseau's politics since 1897, but he died before developing the idea expressed in this article. He found that the individualistic spirit which is diffused through the literary work of Rousseau contradicts the classic spirit of the political writings. This latter spirit leads to the ancient conception of the state as the sovereign master of the individual. In the Contrat social the conciliation of these two tendencies, in so far as there is conciliation, is made through the volonté générale, which is always right "by definition."

In this ideal state "les vices de la nature humaine sont supprimés par hypothèse . . . l'opposition de l'égoïsme et de l'altruisme disparaît."

Professor Schinz's scholarly two-volume work might be considered as a further elaboration of the thesis of M. Bourguin, for Schinz represents

1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 141-42.
2. Cobban, RMS, 214.
4. Schinz, LPR, I, 47.
5. Bourguin, Art. 1, 368.
the thought of Rousseau as a cross-play of "romantic" vs. "Roman" traits.\(^1\)

Schinz concludes that the real Rousseau is not the romantic Rousseau of the
dramas of literature; the real Rousseau is a pragmatist\(^2\) who searches for a
formula to reconcile romanticism in man with the necessity of disciplining
human nature.\(^3\) Hence, the alternation between the romantic and the Roman
emphasis in his writing. The Roman Rousseau, Schinz concludes, carries away
more and more the romantic and sentimental Rousseau.\(^4\)

The presence of contradictory strains in Rousseau's thought is, of
course, not a new discovery. As early as 1890, and doubtless before, it was
heralded by the able scholar, Emile Faguet. Comparing the Contrat social
with the other works, he concluded, "Les idées politiques de Rousseau me
paraissent, je le dis franchement, ne pas tenir à l'ensemble de ses idées."\(^5\)

Faguet takes account of the critics who try to reduce the inconsistency of
Rousseau by discounting the anti-social utterances of some of the writings
and by taking the Social Contract as the one writing which it is necessary to
read. Faguet replies: "If there was only the Inequality on the one side and
the Contract on the other, I should say that Rousseau had had two general
ideas so different that they are contradictory (contraires), and I should

\(^1\) Volume I deals with the social and psychological conditions of the
time. Volume II deals with the philosophic work of Rousseau, attempting to
determine the nature of the lack of philosophical cohesion therein.

\(^2\) Cf. his Jean Jacques Rousseau: A Forerunner of Pragmatism.

\(^3\) Cf. Emile Boutroux: On ne saurait trop insister sur la nécessité de
croire avec Rousseau, que le problème ne peut être judicieusement résolu par
l'anéantissement pure et simple de l'une de ces puissances au profit de l'autre.
The two powers mentioned are sentiment and reason. Art. 1, 270.

\(^4\) Schinz, LFR, II, 506-14. H. H. Clark reports: "... Rousseau con-
fessed that his head and his heart did not seem to belong to the same person." Art. 1, 396.

\(^5\) Faguet, DHS, 383.
stop there."¹ If the analysis of this dissertation is correct, we may go further and say that it is not necessary to place the Contrat against the second Discourse in order to find a conflict between individualism and collectivism; it can be found within the Contrat itself.²

Not all scholars, however, are agreed on the lack of unity in Rousseau's work, just as they are not agreed about a great many other matters pertaining to him. Gustave Lanson, for example, takes exception to the interpretations made by Faguet, Lemaitre, and Espinas, who find Rousseau all contradiction and incoherence and make him by turns an "exasperated individualist" and an "authoritarian socialist."³ In the case of M. Espinas, and perhaps of Lemaitre also, the criticism is doubtless justified since both tend to be abusive.⁴ Lanson's contention, however, is that the critics reduce the works of Rousseau to an abstract formula and then evaluate him in terms of the formula which is substituted for his works.⁵ Moreover, the method appropriate to the interpretation of Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant or Hegel is inappropriate for the interpretation of Rousseau, for his thought does not form an abstract system; it is a "living thought" developed under the

¹ Faguet, DHS, 384.

² Gaspard Vallette has remarked that this work, although it glorifies Genevan institutions, often presents theories contrary to the personal temperament of Rousseau and to the general tendency of his individualist spirit. "Souvent, en lisant le Contrat social, on a l'impression pénible que Rousseau s'efforce d'exprimer et de marquer fortement les idées d'un autre bien plutôt que les siennes. De là l'incohérence, l'incertitude, les contradictions irréductibles d'un livre, qui n'est rigidement logique que d'apparence et de ton" (JJR, 209).

³ Lanson, Art. 1, 1-2.

⁴ Espinas finds Rousseau "incoherent to the point of impertinence" (Art. 1, 436).

⁵ Lanson, Art. 1, 3.
conditions of his life. Pass from logic to life and the contradictions disappear is Lanson's thesis in general. One may admit that there is a close unity existing between Rousseau's thought and his life but one hardly sees how that fact should either establish a logical unity among his thoughts or diminish in any way the inconsistencies which may be found there. Moreover, we may grant that Rousseau was not a builder of systems, but does that mean that his ideas are, therefore, exempt from systematic appraisal? One is reluctant to attribute such a meaning to Monsieur Lanson, for he also finds a possible inconsistency in Rousseau's having proposed individualism in two senses very different. The inconsistencies may perhaps extend further.

M. Georges Beaulavon finds the unity of Rousseau's doctrine to lie in the central preoccupation of Rousseau, which is above all a moral preoccupation. Professor Schinz speaks of "the Utopian loftiness of his moral ideals, and ... his hopeless inconsistencies ..." Monsieur L. Delaruelle declares, in a similar vein, that among the sources of Rousseau's ideas for the first Discourse are those moderns who subordinate everything to the observance of the elementary rules of morality.

It is undoubtedly possible to find the work of Rousseau exhibiting

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1. Lanson, Art. 1, 7.

2. Cf. also Lanson, HLF, 775.

3. Cassirer says that Rousseau found his picture of human nature "in seinem eigenen Herzen" (Art. 1, 189)

4. Lanson, HLF, 783.


6. Schinz, RFP, Foreword.

certain general characteristics. It exhibits the character of a moralist. It also exhibits the character of a Genevan, as Monsieur Vallette has shown. In certain respects it exhibits the character of a rationalist, or again of a pragmatist, as Professor Schinz has shown. Our concern, however, has been, not so much to discover the general characteristics of Rousseau's work as a whole, but rather to test the consistency and coherence of his political ideals as they bear especially on the problem of liberty. The arguments from the general character of the writings or from the relation of the writings to the life of the writer do not touch the question of consistency of ideas and these arguments, therefore, would not call for any change to be made in the original conclusion that there is conflict and incoherence between the basic ideas embodied in the political writing of Rousseau. The author himself seemed aware of the lack of unity in his work, if one may judge by his famous word to Dusaulx: "Quant au Contrat social, ceux qui se vanteront de l'entendre tout entier, sont plus habile que moi. C'est un livre à refaire; mais je n'en ai plus ni la force, ni le temps."\(^1\)

The result of this conflict in his writing is that the liberty of the individual, which Rousseau had pledged himself to preserve, steadily gives way before the power of collective constraint. Rousseau, late in the treatise,\(^2\) seems aware of the misfortunes of liberty, for he writes a passage which reveals impatience with the logical outcome of his theory. He raises the question of how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. The question itself reveals an awareness on his part of the logical impasse into which his theory had lead. The answer which

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1. Dusaulx, RAR, 102.
2. GS, Book IV, Chapter II.
he gives reveals his impatience with the situation.

Je réponds que la question est mal posée. Le citoyen consent à toutes les lois, même à celles qu'on passe malgré lui, et même à celles qui le punissent quand il ose en violer quelqu'une.¹

He goes on to add that when an opinion contrary to my own prevails it proves that I was mistaken and that what I thought was the general will was not so. Even at the end, Rousseau tried to present constraint so that it looked like consent. But the reader is not readily convinced that the individual is following his own will when he submits to constraints to which his vote had registered him as opposed. It will look like constraint to the reader, just as it would feel like constraint to the citizen.

Thus, we conclude that the liberty of the individual, of which Rousseau remained the champion in spite of himself, is cancelled by a possible tyranny of the majority. We conclude that Rousseau failed to attain a rational synthesis between the individual and the group, and that the main factor in this failure and in this cancellation of liberty is the conception of individualism with which the writer operated, namely, the individualism of l'homme naturel.

¹ Vaughan, PWR, II, 105.
CHAPTER VI

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY

If one were to draw the lines of a possible solution to the problem of political liberty he could do no better, we believe, than to begin where Rousseau began, that is, with the individual. In the solution of any philosophical problem it is wise to begin with what is given, and in the case of anyone what is given is one's own experience. The individual is thus prior to the state both logically and chronologically. If there were no individuals there could be no state; every person is an individual before he is a citizen. This may be taken as the grain of truth embodied in the fiction of the state of nature, but political philosophy does well if it remains unentangled with that fiction.

Starting with the individual, then, the significant thing to note is the will of the individual, or the character which the individual exhibits in the pursuit of his own desires and the satisfaction of his own needs. It is not necessary to raise the question of whether there ever was a time when individuals were free to pursue their own desires without interference, and thereby to obey only themselves. Such a question is irrelevant to the problem. The fact is that there are individuals and that their character is to pursue their own ends.

Some may object at this point that we are going too fast to be proceeding in a strictly logical fashion for we are now speaking of "individuals" when only the "individual" is given.1 The question of the proof

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1. Strictly speaking, not even the individual is given but only the immediate consciousness of any given moment. The individual or whole self is an inference from this given, made on the basis of linkages, past and future, within it.
of the existence of other persons is a proper philosophical question, but it
is, however, a metaphysical rather than a political question and the consider-
ation of it does not, therefore, fall within social philosophy. All questions
in the end are related, but one need not address himself to the considera-
tion of all questions before he ventures upon a consideration of those direct-
ly before him. Whatever conclusions the metaphysicians may reach about the
existence of other persons, it is sufficient to say that any social philos-
ophy must start with the assumption that there are other persons, and that
their desires and experiences are similar to our own.

If we were to frame a conception of liberty with the materials now
before us, it would be the liberty which Rousseau believed prevailed in the
state of nature. It would be that liberty in which each individual does
precisely as he pleases. Following his own will, the individual would do
everything he wished, and would be constrained to do nothing he did not wish
to do. But strictly speaking such a liberty would be impossible even in a
state of nature. If there were only one individual on earth, and if he were
responsible to none but himself he would find it impossible to do everything
he wished. The character of desire is that it is chaotic and contradictory
so that our wish at any moment is often contradicted by another wish of the
opposite kind. It is not impossible to imagine that Rousseau's man in a
state of nature should wish himself well fed and at the same time wish him-
self free from the work of obtaining his food. The individual who regards
liberty as the absence of any restraint upon the will is likely to find him-
self in bondage to false values, and may discover that he has exchanged a
greater good, which discipline and constraint would have made possible, for
a lesser good which he obtained without constraint. The conclusion from
this is that liberty cannot be defined as the absence of all restraint even
if the definition were held to apply to the individual alone and not to the individual as a member of society.

Despite the difficulties arising from defining liberty as "the absence of restraint," some writers show a liking for the clean-cut, unqualified terms of this definition. Thus Mr. Horace M. Kallen writes that "speaking and eating and drinking are not freedoms until someone tries to prevent their happening,"¹ the reason being that freedom implies the idea of a restraint removed.

Positively, Freedom seems to involve the way you feel when you are let go ... and as feeling is always an individual experience, the social definition of Freedom involves prohibiting interference, forbidding or removing obstruction or restraint, rather than characterizing a feeling.²

But the freedom to do as one pleases has been properly called the "freedom of the wild ass."³ However attractive it may be as a romantic ideal, as a practical principle it is a snare and a delusion, for even the wild ass is not free without qualification, for he is constrained by those conditions which are a necessary part of the nature of things. This definition represents an extreme ideal, which is especially impossible of application in a social context. With respect to it, the advice of Max Eastman is appropriate and timely. He advises that extreme idealists "go out and find some other beautiful thing in the world to fall in love with."⁴

This romantic definition, however, suggests a truth which is important. If the individual cannot find freedom by the simple method of removing

¹ Kallen, Art. 1, 2.
² Ibid., 3. Cf. Clarence Darrow: "Liberty only means having the chance to do what you want to do" (Art. 1, 117).
⁴ Eastman, Art. 1, 180.
In the first place, we may refer to the fact that the present economic and social conditions are such as to make it inevitable that in the future the problem of the relation between the individual and the collective will be of the greatest importance.

The problem of the relation between the individual and the collective is, in fact, one of the most fundamental problems of modern society. It is a problem that has been discussed by philosophers, economists, sociologists, and others, and it has been the subject of a great deal of controversy.

The problem of the relation between the individual and the collective can be approached from many different points of view. One of the most important of these is the question of the nature of the collective. The collective is a group of individuals who share a common interest or goal. The nature of the collective is important because it is the basis for the relation between the individual and the collective.

The relation between the individual and the collective is important because it is the basis for the development of society. The individual is the basic unit of society, and it is through the interaction of individuals that society is formed. The collective is the group of individuals who share a common interest or goal, and it is through the interaction of individuals within the collective that society is formed.

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restraints, it is equally true that he cannot find freedom in obedience to a will which is not his own. A constraint imposed upon the individual in defiance of his rational will is slavery. The notion of consent is basic in a philosophy of liberty, and although Rousseau's particular treatment of consent is faulty, what he implied about the importance of the relation between consent and liberty may be taken as true. The Kantian idea of autonomy, which Rousseau did so much to inspire, is the idea which embodies the importance of consent. According to this idea the individual places over his conduct a law to which he must conform. The law, it must be noted, proceeds from the individual; it is self-prescribed. Kant expresses his idea as follows:

Autonomie des Willens ist die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst (unabhängig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände des Willens) ein Gesetz ist. Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also nicht anders zu wählen als so, dass die Maximen seiner Wahl in demselben Wollen zugleich als allgemeines Gesetz mit begriffen seien.\(^1\)

Autonomy is that character of the will by which it is a law unto itself; its restraints must be self-imposed. Conduct in accordance with a self-imposed law was the Kantian formula for the morality of free beings. Obedience to a self-imposed law was Rousseau's formula for the conduct of free citizens. The truth represented by both ideas is the point from which any philosophy of liberty must start. Autonomy, therefore, is the first principle of liberty.\(^3\)

At this point it is necessary to make a departure from the thought of Rousseau. He held that by the terms of the social contract the individual

\(^1\) Cf. Delbos, Art. 1.

\(^2\) Kant, GMS, 67.

\(^3\) Cf. Martin, LIB, 45 and 123 where autonomy is cited as the contribution of Christianity, the Reformation in particular, to liberty.
makes a total alienation of himself. From a moral point of view, the individual cannot make a total alienation of himself and remain a responsible moral agent. If he surrenders his will to another, whether it be a personal sovereign or the majority, he no longer remains an autonomous individual; he becomes an automaton, and a collection of automata, although they make an army cannot make a civil society. Rousseau was deeply contemptuous of Hobbes's notion of the surrender of the individual's will to that of the sovereign, but his own demands for total alienation are hardly more commendable.

Some allowance must be made at this point, however, because Rousseau sought to make the sovereign will identical with the individual's will, and great credit is due him, as Professor Hendel has pointed out, for phrasing the problem in new terms: "It is not a question," said Rousseau, "of a power we are forced to obey, but only one we are obliged to recognize." This formulation of the problem does not imply a surrender of the individual's autonomy; it rather implies that political obligation is, in a rational view, a part of that autonomy.

This is the principle which Rousseau aimed to establish but which he was prevented from establishing because of the fiction of the natural man. The absolute independence of the natural man leaves no place in his nature for political obligation. This structural error in Rousseau's thought is fair warning against making the concept of nature basic to political philosophy. The ambiguity of this concept is an unfailing source of confusion. "Man is by nature independent and egoistic." Yes, but man is also "by nature" altruistic and sociable. How could society exist and how could

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altruistic acts ever be performed if man had no natural capacity for these things? "Nature" comes to mean, therefore, whatever the author thinks significant.\textsuperscript{1} If the author is an individualist and a rebel against restraint, then the "natural" man bears the characteristics which Rousseau attributed to him. If, however, the author prizes other virtues, the "natural" man bears different characteristics. Locke's natural man, for example, is one who had "pored himself pale over the Sermon on the Mount," as Vaughan says.\textsuperscript{2} The state of nature for Locke, consequently had the characteristics of a Christian society. It was quite otherwise with Hobbes, who wrote of a natural "bellum omnium contra omnes." In the exchange of political thought, therefore, the concept of nature is a deceptive coin; its value is never the same. A concept which can mean everything means nothing. It is better to outlaw it.

But how is one to get man into society? If man is an individual before he is a citizen, by what artifice does he become a citizen? The answer is: By no "artifice." A part of his individuality is his need for society. As Aristotle said, "Man is a political animal." But is this not the same as saying that man is "by nature" sociable, and are we not, therefore, in the predicament of resorting to a form of the fiction which we have outlawed? Not precisely, because Aristotle's dictum need not be interpreted as a judgment about what all men by nature are, in which case we should have to conclude that all men are pre-determined by nature to become civil beings and any who exhibit anti-social or a-social characteristics are, therefore, monstrosities, deserving, as Diderot said, to be stifled. In order to

\textsuperscript{1} This judgment is to be taken as applying to the concept of nature in seventeenth and eighteenth-century political thought rather than to the modern problem of natural tendencies or instincts. In view of the vagaries of the instinct theory, however, it may have some application there.

\textsuperscript{2} FWR, I, 16.
obtain the social order it is not necessary to resort to the determinism implied in the concept of nature.

Aristotle's dictum may be taken as an hypothesis or postulate, which, while it is not open to conclusive proof, is nevertheless open to some verifica- tion. It is, in any event, not capable of disproof. The fact there are and have been societies is sufficient evidence to verify the assumption that there is a social reference in the notion of individuality. This assumption, moreover, continues to be verified, when acted upon, in the majority of instances. That is to say, if we assume that individuals are meant for society and if we direct the development of individuality in the direction of society, the usual outcome is that individuals find their best interests preserved by a life within society rather than in a life apart from it. No more is needed to support the notion of a social reference within individuality.

In this supposition we are appealing to a neglected strain in the thought of Rousseau, that which we have noted as l'homme vraiment libre. Under this heading Rousseau gives us the picture of the individual as one who finds his fulfilment in the life of society; he is the one for whom civil existence, rather than existence in the state of nature, is congenial. He is amenable to social cultivation. This is the conception of the individual which it is necessary to make basic and not the conception of l'homme naturel.

We have, therefore, up to this point, two elements necessary for a philosophy of liberty: (1) The principle of autonomy, or the primacy of the individual, (2) the principle of a social reference within individuality.

It is necessary to appeal now to another neglected strain in the thought of Rousseau, that in which common advantage is made the basis of the state. This is the emphasis of the first version of the Contrat social and
remnants of the view remain in the definitive text in the chapter on "The Civil State,"1 and in the first chapter of the second book.2 The latter reference informs us that it is "the agreement of particular interests" which makes society possible and that "the common element in these different interests forms the social tie." The unruly individualism of Rousseau unfortunately intrudes immediately, spoiling what might have been developed into a basic principle. He contends that it is almost impossible for a particular will to remain in agreement with the general will; "it is at least impossible for the agreement to be lasting and constant." Perhaps under the terms of his definition of a "particular will" the contention is true, but the main embarrassment to his theory is that very definition by which the particulars in society are repugnant to society. Why not abide by the assertion that society represents an area of experience in which there is an agreement of interest among particulars, that particulars are not forever recalcitrant to the group but are bound to it, the tie being the common element in their different interests? No theory of political liberty can be constructed on the basis of an atomism which renders society itself impossible.

We find, then, in this neglected strain a third element necessary for the construction of a society of free beings. We may call that element the common advantage or the common good, understanding by this term what Rousseau spoke of as the element which is common to particular interests. Professor Hendel, following Rousseau, has given a very acceptable definition of the common good as "that in respect to which the interests of men are no

1. CS, I, VIII.
2. "That Sovereignty is Inalienable."
longer opposed but in accord ... "1

We have, therefore, these elements with which to begin a solution of the problem of liberty: (1) The autonomy of the individual, (2) the postulate of the social reference within individuality, (3) common advantage as the basis of the state. The relations between these elements remains to be considered.

We have noticed that the idea of autonomy dictated Rousseau's definition of liberty: "Obedience to a self-prescribed law." We have contended that this is the place where it is necessary to begin in any philosophy of liberty. The question now is: Is it possible to stop here? Can it be supposed, as Rousseau sometimes seems to suppose, that the exercise of autonomy leads always to the common good? Can we suppose that individuals, by obeying the law which they prescribe for themselves, will also conform to the law which guides the state to the general welfare? This presupposition would be reasonable only if we could rely upon individuals to possess the insight and the good will both to see and to submit to the requirements of the common good as a part of the law which they prescribe for themselves. If we could rely upon this double necessity, Rousseau's definition of liberty could stand as satisfactory for individuals in a social relationship.

From the standpoint of both theory and practice, however, it would be safer to assume that individuals do not infallibly see nor freely submit to the restraints imposed by the common good. The experience of almost any society will support Rousseau's contention about the nature of particular interests. Allowance, therefore, must be made for this troublesome fact. The principle of autonomy has always produced dissenters and among them there

have been both good and bad. Dissenters against civil obedience range all the way from the criminal who refuses to comply with the constraints which good citizens voluntarily adopt, to conscientious objectors who refuse to obey on the ground that obedience is detrimental to the best interests of society. These latter are usually a very small minority who disagree with the majority as to what constitutes the best definition of the common advantage; they disobey for no private advantage which is likely to come to them. Criminals, on the other hand, and others whose conduct is like their in principle, place their private advantage above the common welfare for the sake of a gain which is likely to come to themselves.

In a sense, the conduct of all civil dissenters may be described as "autonomous," because they are obedient to a law which they prescribe to themselves. This would apply to criminals and self-interested individuals, as well as to conscientious objectors. But in the case of the former it could not be said that their conduct was autonomous in a moral sense, nor could it be said that it was autonomous in the sense intended by Kant, for he stipulated that the agent should test his conduct by the rule of universality, and obey those maxims only which could be made universal laws for all men.

Careful analysis, therefore, calls for a distinction to be drawn between civil dissenters who oppose constraint on moral grounds and those who oppose it on grounds of self-interest. Here we come upon the first relation between the principle of autonomy and that of the common good, namely that in which society overrides the autonomy of the individual.

Societies have universally assumed the right to constrain, subdue, or, in some cases, destroy the criminal who sets his own advantage up against the common advantage. Such constraint may be said to have a basis in right if the activity of the individual is clearly incompatible with or destructive
The page appears to contain text in Chinese characters. It's not possible to accurately transcribe or translate the content without specialized knowledge in Chinese. If you have any specific questions or need assistance with a different aspect of the page, please let me know!
of the common life of the group. To deny this right of society would be to
give a lesser good precedence over a greater good and to inaugurate a prin-
ciple which would destroy the life of society itself. Those properties which
the lives of individuals exhibit in their collective aspect have a claim
over the conduct of the individuals who constitute the group. The reason for
this is the fact that these properties represent values which are real in the
lives of the individuals themselves. Just as there is no justification, from
a moral point of view, for the individual's allowing a lesser value-claim to
dominate a greater value-claim, so there is no justification, from a political
point of view, for the particular claims of an individual to take precedence
over the common claims in which the remainder of the group have an interest.
The basic needs of individuals and the basic desires of individuals are the
same. Society serves the purpose of being an instrument by means of which
these basic needs and desires can be satisfied. The satisfaction of these
needs is a desire which is common to all members of the social group. When,
therefore, the action of one member of the group places in jeopardy a desire
which is common to all the other members of the group, that member may be
rightfully constrained.¹

But is not such constraint a violation of the principle of autonomy
already adopted? The answer depends upon whether "autonomy" is defined
loosely or strictly. If "autonomous" is to mean merely "independent" or
"self-governing" without respect to the nature of the independence or the
principle of self-government, then such constraint is a violation of the
autonomy of the individual. And, by the same token, it is a violation of

¹ For this reason it cannot be admitted that consent is the only
or even the central element in a philosophy of liberty. The properties of
of civil life and social organization, by which the behavior of civil beings
is determined, remain what they are independent of the consent of individuals.
The primary issue of the day, one that has long fascinated me as an individual and a collective, is the nature of the individual. The concept of the individual as a unit of analysis has been a cornerstone of my work and a guiding principle in my approach to understanding societal phenomena. I am particularly interested in the role of the individual in shaping collective behavior, and how individual actions and decisions can lead to broader social outcomes.

In recent years, I have delved into the study of interactions between individuals, focusing on how these interactions can lead to emergent phenomena. I have observed that the dynamics of these interactions are often complex and non-linear, with small changes in individual behavior leading to significant changes at the collective level.

To explore these dynamics, I have been working on developing models that can simulate individual decision-making processes. These models allow me to test different scenarios and understand the potential outcomes of various strategies. I am particularly interested in how these models can be used to inform policy decisions and help predict the effects of proposed interventions.

In conclusion, the study of the individual is crucial for understanding the social world. By examining the interactions between individuals, we can gain insights into the mechanisms that drive social change and identify strategies for positive intervention.

References:

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liberty also, if liberty means only obedience one's own will. But if autonomy is defined more strictly, if it is taken in a moral sense, then there is no violation of autonomy, for the conduct of criminals is not the kind of conduct a moral man could approve or would choose in any event. If, therefore, we are to speak intelligently about liberty and autonomy we must understand throughout that autonomous beings are moral beings.

From the standpoint of political theory, the moral man is any individual who is willing to subject his own desires to reason. This means merely that he will eliminate those rebellious preferences which are incompatible with a rational system of desire. This rational system of desire, from the standpoint of political theory, must be understood to include among the data to be synthesized by reason, not only the desires of the individual, but also the desires of other individuals in the group. The moral man, therefore, from this point of view, is one whose conduct is subservient to the common good, for the common good is the rational synthesis of individuals' desires in their social aspect.

We may now formulate a principle, which, for the sake of convenience we shall call the principle of just constraint. The principle may be stated as follows: It is the right of society to constrain the individual when the conduct of the individual conflicts with the common good. Such constraint is only a guarantee of the continued existence of a society of free moral beings.

It may be seen from this that everything depends upon what is understood by the "common good." It is probably no exaggeration to say that the liberty of a people depends, in the last analysis, upon the sagacity with which they interpret the idea of the common good and the diligence with which they pursue it. It is not unusual in politics to find prejudices of
the most rancid kind masquerading as the common good, as, for example, when private and powerful interests defend states' rights or the freedom of contract as necessary to the common good. It is not possible to define the content of this concept of the common good with a precision which will meet all problems and adjust all conflicts in advance. It is a concept, the content of which necessarily varies with different cultures, but whatever the content, it may be described as those things in which the interests of individuals are no longer opposed but agreed. A part of the content of this concept, however, is relatively fixed as, for example, the interest which all have in obtaining the basic necessities for the maintenance of life or the elementary instruments necessary for the self-realization of individuals. The common good in any society would imply the opportunity for receiving these necessities and instruments by all the members on terms equitable for all.

But economic considerations do not exhaust the content of the common good. Culture, as well as economics, impinges upon the common good. For this reason, the formula, "economic regimentation with cultural freedom," may be found open to criticism as a formula for establishing the limits of social constraint. Such a principle would undoubtedly be a great improvement over the economic anarchy of laissez-faire practice which delivers multitudes into the bondage of unemployment and wage slavery. But if "cultural freedom" means immunity from constraint in matters of morals, or religion, or other cultural pursuits, then we must say that, while this is a wise policy as a general rule, it must not be supposed that the principle of cultural freedom shall take precedence over the principle of the common good. The latter is.

1. For an excellent study of this pernicious phenomenon in American politics see Soule, FL, especially the chapter on "The New States' Rights."
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in all cases, the master principle. An example will clarify the meaning. Many persons, on religious grounds, have scruples against seeking the services of a physician in sickness, or against educating their children, or they are prompted to other forms of activity equally fantastic or fanatical. So long as such whimsies are not any more disastrous than the refusal to eat pork or the desire to go without clothes, such people may be left to their own devices in the pursuit of their convictions. But if their activity should lead to the spreading of a contagious disease, or to the denial to children of their right to self-development, then the activity of such persons might rightly be constrained at the point where it is harmful to others, and the principle of such constraint would be the principle of the common good.

Under the heading of the relation between autonomy and the common good we have thus far been speaking of the restraint which the group has a right to impose upon the individual. It is necessary now to speak of the guarantees which the individual has a right to expect from the group. Liberty is a two-sided problem. If it is necessary to protect the free society from the encroachment of particular interests, it is also necessary to protect the particulars from the encroachment of an omnipotent sovereignty.

The principle which governs this side of the relationship may be stated as follows: The sovereign power must be such that a moral man can obey it. We are now at the heart of Rousseau's contribution to political theory, for this principle may be said to summarize the most important element in his political philosophy. It is the conclusion toward which he pointed when he formulated his problem as a question of a power "we are obliged to recognize," and when he called his treatise a work on the "principles of political right." Jules Lemaitre exhibits a singular immunity to the essentials of
If we assume the present situation as an example with further emphasis on the same, we find ourselves at a point where a change in policy is necessary to accommodate the needs of an ever-changing society. The rapid development of technology and the advancement of communication have led to a situation where traditional methods of education and information dissemination are no longer sufficient. It is imperative to adapt our approaches to learning and teaching to meet the demands of the modern world.

In conclusion, the principles that underlie the acquisition of knowledge and skills are timeless. However, the methods and tools we use to achieve these goals must evolve with the times. By embracing innovation and technology, we can create a more effective and engaging learning experience for all students.
Rousseau's thought when he dismisses the idea of the moral importance of the civil state as "Calvinistic confusion of politics and morals."^1 C.E. Vaughan is nearer the truth of the matter when he hails the moral reference in politics as constituting "a revolution in political speculation."^2

The reasons for insisting upon the moral character of the civil state are not difficult to discover. If the individual is to remain a free moral being, the maxims of his choice must be self-imposed; that is what it means to be a free moral being. It follows from this that any power outside the individual which the individual recognizes must be one which the free, rational choice of the individual can approve. Otherwise his autonomy is violated when he is compelled to obey it. The moral character of the civil state is thus an implication of the autonomy of the individual.^3

This account differs from Rousseau's in one respect. Rousseau held that the individual derives his character as a moral being from the fact that he enters society; apart from society he is not a moral being, for moral distinctions are born of the social order.^4 The notion that society creates morality is, happily, not essential to the main thesis regarding the moral character of the civil state; it is one which we can, and must, reject, but the rejection does not impair the basic contention that the sovereign power must be such that a moral man can obey it.

A clarification of terminology is necessary at this point. When it

^1. Lemaître, JJR, 226.

^2. Vaughan, PWR, I, 41.

^3. Hendel describes Rousseau's theory thus: "Law and obligation were being conceived (by Rousseau) not as an effect of the will of a superior, but rather as an expression of the will of the persons who feel obligated" (Art. 1,265).

^4. Cf. Émile, IV in Oeuvres, II, 190: "Tant que sa sensibilité reste bornée à son individu, il n'y a rien de moral dans ses actions ..." etc.
The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a page from a document, but the content cannot be accurately transcribed.
is said that the sovereign power must be moral, that statement is not to be
interpreted as meaning that the sovereign must be committed to any specific
form of moral theory. It is both unnecessary and dangerous to liberty to
suppose that the sovereign must be committed to hedonism or Puritan ethics
or any other specific ethical theory as the one by which subjects are to be
judged. Subjects are to be left free to work out their own ethical theory
and their own forms of ethical behavior in accordance with the dictates of
their own reasons and subject only to the constraint which we have noted
before as attaching to cultural freedom. The prevailing culture of a commu-
nity may provide the detail of the ethical orientation of the subjects. This
culture may be uniform or it may be a patchwork of various or even contradic-
tory ethical theories. Neither state of affairs is necessarily a challenge
to liberty, but it is worth noting that difference of opinion among subjects
does not necessarily mean disunity within the state and it is more often an
asset than a liability.¹

The moral character of the civil state means that if the moral man is
one who is obedient to the common good, then the moral society is one in
which all constraint is from the principle of the common good. The laws,
said Rousseau, are "only the conditions of civil association."² Translated
into the language of the present exposition this truth would read, "The laws

¹. Contrast Rousseau's (and Plato's) preference for unanimity as
exhibited in Rousseau's chapters on "The Censorship" and "Voting" and in
his Letter to M. D'Alembert. Totalitarian states, in the interest of unanimi-
ity, resort to regimentation of ideas by means of force and propaganda. Such
practice can be viewed only as threat to autonomy or, if it is successful, a
cancellation of individuality. It represents the imposition of the will of
those in power upon the whole group; it is domination by a partial society
through means which are repulsive to free beings. Professor Hocking has
observed that Italian fascism makes the citizenry "the tail of the state
kite" (LEI,148).

². CS, II, VI in Vaughan, PWR, II, 50.
are only the enabling provisions for the realization of the common good." This is the idea at which any society must aim if its power is to be one which subjects are "obliged to recognize." The common good thus becomes, not only the principle by which constraint may justly be imposed upon the individual, but also the principle by which that constraint is limited. We may claim for it what Rousseau claimed for his principle of the social contract: It is the principle by which liberty may be preserved.

The principle which governs the limits of the sovereign power, is not essentially different from that which Rousseau proclaimed when he wrote that the individual yields to the group only in those matters which are "important for the community." ¹ In the matter of both theory and practice, however, it is necessary to diverge sharply from Rousseau's further teaching that the sovereign is "the sole judge of what is important."² The problem, if liberty is to be saved, is to get the common good defined as it really is, and not as the sovereign sees it, for the two may be quite different. For a true description of the common good, the insights of a single individual may be more valuable than the conclusions of the sovereign. The free society must be so organized that such insights can come to expression and finally be incorporated in the laws passed by the sovereign. The final appeal in every case is to reason and justice and there is no ground for supposing that the sovereign has a monopoly on these.

For the purpose of defining the common good objectively, a tradition of respect for the autonomy of individuals is essential. No one can so quickly detect the evils of unjust constraint as he who will have to bear

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¹ CS, II, IV in Vaughan, PWR, II, 44.
² Loc. cit.
them. As a matter of political practice, therefore, feasible methods must be devised whereby the judgment of individuals upon acts of sovereignty can be made known to the ear of the sovereign. For this reason, Rousseau's proscription of partial associations must be avoided as the first instrument of tyranny.¹ The freedom of assemblage is a practice of the greatest importance. Along with it, and equally important, may be ranked the other basic freedoms, freedom of the press, of thought, of speech, and of religious worship. These rules of practice are significant as means for realizing the principle of autonomy, and this principle, in turn, serves as a check upon an irresponsible definition of the common good at the hands of the sovereign.

It is not to be supposed, however, that a perfect harmony can be achieved between the principle of the common good and that of autonomy. It might be achieved if the reason which guides the sovereign and the reason which guides the subject were alike infinite. All possible consequences and connections, and all relevant data would then be included in every judgment upon the common good. But reason is finite, whether in the sovereign or in the subject and on that account genuine conflicts between autonomy and the common good may arise. A person who objects to military service on religious grounds might conceivably be at the same time the citizen of a country suffering from an unprovoked invasion by an aggressor power. His government would call upon him to fight; his conscience would call upon him to resist. As a moral man he could not do otherwise than obey the law which

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¹ Rousseau resorted to this extreme measure partly because he observed the injustice arising from the liaison between the state and one dominant partial association, the Church. Better than proscribing all partial associations, however, would have been the alternative of providing a way whereby small minorities opposed to such domination could arise and make their influence felt.
his reason and conscience dictate, with the result that an irreconcilable conflict arises between what the law prescribes and what autonomy requires. It seems that in such situations one is compelled to say that liberty must be sacrificed. It is the penalty of finitude. It is the result brought about by the inability and failure of either the sovereign or the subject or both to see clearly what the common good is. But for finitude there is no ready cure, in spite of the fact that its consequences are disastrous.

If, however, liberty in such a situation must be sacrificed, it must be sacrificed ever so cautiously. If the state, in the interest of its own safety, is compelled to curb the individual it may well remember that it need not stifle him. If it is necessary to withdraw some of his rights it is not necessary to destroy him. The reason for such caution is two-fold. In the first place, the state is not omniscient, which is proof of the possibility of an error in judgment on its part. The fault which gives rise to the irreconcilable conflict may lie in the state itself. Secondly, in violating the principle of autonomy, the state is laying heavy hands upon a corner stone in its own structure. No state can lay any claim to existence by right if it is a state which disregards the principle of autonomy. Moderation, circumspection, and caution are, therefore, minimum requirements for the exercise of constraint in cases of such conflict.

We may now summarize the principles thus far enunciated as those necessary for the control of the relations between the individuals and the group in a society of free beings. There is, first, the basic principle of individuality with the corollary of autonomy and the postulate of a social reference within individuality. By this principle, the will which comes to expression in the state is the will which proceeds from the individuals within the state. Secondly, there is the principle of the common good, on
the basis of which the sovereign, on the one hand, may exact obedience from
the subject, and the subject, on the other hand, may expect a moral exercise
of sovereignty.

On the basis of these principles and their exposition let us now see
whether a definition of liberty can be framed. As an approach to such a
definition, let us first consider what purports to be a common definition of
political liberty, one which is thoughtful as well as simple. The extremely
simple definition of liberty as the absence of restraint we have already
found inadequate for social or political purposes. Careful thinkers have
taken pains to avoid this oversimplification and when they have made the
idea of this simple definition in any way basic to their own definition they
have taken the pains to add at least one further element, namely, the right
of constraint by society when the liberty of one individual infringes upon
the rights of other individuals. Thus J.S. Mill in his brilliant essay,
"On Liberty," observes that "all restraint qua restraint, is an evil," and
he defines liberty as "doing what one desires."¹ But he adds that "for such
actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is
accountable."² The common notion of liberty embodies these ideas of Mill
for the common notion is that an individual is permitted to do what he wishes
so long as no other individual suffers harm as the result of his acts.

Immanuel Kant found fault with this notion of liberty, because, on his
showing, it is tautological. He says, "Rechtliche (mithin äussere) Freiheit
kann nicht, wie man wohl zu tun pflegt, durch die Befugnis definiert werden:
alles zu tun, was man will, wenn man nur keinem unrecht tut." The reason

¹. Mill, LIB, 168, 170.
². Ibid., 167.
why liberty cannot be defined as permission to do everything one wills if
he does no evil is that it is tautological and the tautology arises because
permission (Befugnis) means "the possibility of an act in so far as one does
by it no injury." Kant suggests an alternative definition of "legal free-
dom": "... Sie ist die Befugnis, keinen äusseren Gesetzen zu gehorchen,
als zu denen ich meine Beistimmung habe geben können." This definition,
like Rousseau's, bears a marked relation to the notion of autonomy or consent,
and, like his, suffers from the lack of consideration for those properties of
social organization which are independent of consent.

Aside from Kant's criticism of the common definition of liberty, there
is another fault which it embodies: It is too negative, and too atomistic.
It is not oriented with respect to the common good completely enough. It is
attentive to the restraints which must be removed, but not to the positive
conditions which must be provided before individuals can be free beings.
If society says to the prince and to the pauper alike, "You are free to do
as you wish provided you harm no man," has society said anything very sig-
nificant to the pauper? Freedom means nothing to an individual from whom
the means of exercising his freedom are withheld. Some reference, therefore,
must be made to the positive conditions necessary in society for the exer-
cise of freedom. The state is obliged, not only to remove the restraints
which may prevent the realization of the good life, but it is obliged also
to provide, up to the limit of what is possible and upon terms which are
equitable, the conditions or the opportunities necessary for the realization
of the good life. This, of course, is a part of the concept of the common

1. Kant, Zcit, 435.
2. Loc. cit.
3. This assertion may arouse the question of whether it is the proper
business of the state to promote morality. We should have to reply that the
good. A more satisfactory definition may be had by making the common good, rather than the absence of restraint, the central conception.

The following may serve as a definition from this point of view:

Political liberty is the right of the individual to self-expression or self-realization in relation to other individuals who are organized as a society and who both permit and provide for such self-expression subject to the restraints imposed by the common good and by the recognition of the same right and restraints as extended to all the members of the group.

This definition begins with the individual, but not with the individual conceived as naturally independent of society. The individual is regarded as one whose life depends upon society and is internal to society. Hence, the need for recognizing both the obligation which the individual owes society and the obligation which society owes the individual. This double obligation reflects the common advantage as the principle of social life. The definition further recognizes the common good as the limiting principle by which a boundary is placed around the self-expression of the individual, on the one hand, and around the expansion of sovereign power, on the other. This limit upon the sovereign power is the provision which is intended to guarantee that sovereignty shall be exercised within moral limits. The definition

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promotion of morality among its citizens is not the business of the state. Two reasons may be suggested for this view: (1) A state morality (or religion) would necessitate interference with the self-expression of the individual in a realm outside that of the common welfare for the most part. An individual's moral practices may, of course, have a bearing on the common welfare and in so far, but only in so far, is the state justified in interfering. (2) Morality (and religion) are such that by their nature they cannot be prescribed, but it is difficult to see how a state morality or religion could be inculcated without prescription, either by force or by propaganda—both of which defeat the ideal aims of morality and religion alike. To make the state the custodian of morality and religion, therefore, is opening the way for the demise of liberty. For a very discerning article on this question, see A.K. Rogers, Art. 1. His solution stipulates that the state shall provide the conditions of the good life for all alike, leaving "the individual man to take advantage of these in the degree to which his own inclinations may prompt him" (466). Promotion of morality to this extent is not only permitted but required. This is quite a different thing, of course, from a systematic state morality.
The following was made a presentation based on the research of...

In the following segment, we will analyze the implications of...

One area of interest which emerged was the...
closes with a provision not hitherto stressed explicitly, the requirement for an equitable exercise of privilege and constraint. The idea of impartiality is implicit in the notion of the common good, but it seems wise to make it explicit since this is one predicate of the common good which remains constant.

It may be noticed that the appeal to impartiality or equality is an appropriation of another idea from Rousseau, but reference to equality in the definition is widely different from the romantic account of equality given by Rousseau in the final version of the Contrat social. The idea of equality given in the definition is that of impartiality or equality before the law.

We may summarize the teaching of the present chapter, therefore, by saying that it provides a definition of liberty which is intended as a synthesis of the following elements: (1) The notion of individuality, which includes (a) the idea of autonomy and (b) the postulate of a social reference; (2) the notion of the common good, which includes (a) the principle of just constraint and (b) the limitation of sovereignty to a moral exercise of the same and (c) the idea of equality or impartiality in both privilege and constraint.

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1. "Si l'on recherche en quoi consiste précisément ce plus grand bien de tous, qui doit être la base de tout système de législation, on trouvera qu'il se réduit à ces deux objects principaux la liberté et l'égalité. La liberté, parce que toute dépendance particulière est autant de force ôtée au corps de l'État; l'égalité, parce que la liberté ne peut subsister sans elle" (premiere version du Contrat social, II, VI in Vaughan, PFR, I, 497.
COMPREHENSIVE ABSTRACT

The philosophical problem of political liberty is that of discovering the basic principles which govern the individual-group relation together with the assumptions upon which these principles rest and the proof to which they are amenable. A study of this problem in the political philosophy of Rousseau, therefore, takes the form of an inquiry into the relations between the individual and society. It is the study of individualism and collectivism in the writings of Rousseau.

The earlier writings of Rousseau, the Discours sur les Arts et Sciences and the Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité, are strongly individualistic. The Émile, which forms a unity with the two preceding, is both individualistic and collectivistic, although the prevailing emphasis is individualistic. The Économie politique and the Contrat social are predominantly collectivistic, although the individualistic elements of the earlier writings can be found in both.

The interpretation of Rousseau as a collectivist rests upon an affirmation of the collectivistic character of the later political writings, and upon a denial of the individualistic elements which may be found in these same writings together with a denial of the political significance of the earlier individualistic Discourses. The affirmation can be maintained, but the denials cannot. To deny the political significance of the Discourses is to introduce a gap into the work of Rousseau, a gap which Rousseau himself denied. To deny the significance of the individualistic ideas of contract and the state of nature in the later writings is to set aside ideas which lie at the base of Rousseau's system. The state of nature is a theme which dominates the whole of his writing, and the idea of contract, which is its
counterpart, is an idea which Rousseau himself defended as basic to his political philosophy. It is not possible, therefore, to cancel the individualistic elements in the political writings even though these writings are predominantly collectivistic.

The interpretation of Rousseau as an individualist rests upon a disparagement of the collectivistic elements in his thought, and this is likewise a falsification of his thought as a whole. This interpretation holds that Rousseau allows partial associations the right to exist within the state, that he defines the general will as the rational will or the will to right, that he introduces checks upon the general will in favor of the individual, that he conceives the interests of the state to be identical with those of the individual, and that he does not regard civil association on the analogy of an organism. In answer to these contentions, however, it may be pointed out that Rousseau acknowledges the existence of partial associations as a fact but that he does not allow them an existence by right. He defines the general will as the will to right but he also defines it as the will of the majority and the attempt to unite the ideal and the actual characteristics of the general will is contradictory. The proposed checks in favor of the individual are checks which come to nothing in practice. The identity of interest between the individual and the state is an identity which is either assumed as an automatic connection, or supported by an argument from analogy with the biological organism. The organic conception, therefore, is one which Rousseau both affirmed and denied.

A correct interpretation of Rousseau's thought would have to begin by ascertaining his true attitude toward society. The problem is almost impossible of clear solution, because Rousseau both praises and condemns society, and when he condemns society it is difficult to say whether he is
speaking of contemporary society or society per se. In the systematic structure of Rousseau's thought there are, however, two principles which amount to a philosophical condemnation of society, namely, the materialistic principle according to which society is conceived as the product of fortuitous circumstances external to the individuals composing society, and the principle of individuality called *l'homme naturel* according to which the individual is conceived in terms which make his existence incompatible with civil life.

The fiction of the natural man pervades the whole of Rousseau's work and renders his most mature political conceptions inconsistent. The social pact, the general will, and the romantic approach to liberty in the *Contrat social* are all negated by the individualism of *l'homme naturel* which underlies these conceptions. Rousseau's writing, therefore, may best be described as exhibiting a failure of synthesis between individualism and collectivism.

Society is the product of causes external to the individual and the individual is by nature recalcitrant to society.

This failure of synthesis between the individual and the group results in the fact that there are two conceptions of liberty in the philosophy of Rousseau. One is the liberty of man in a state of nature; the other is the liberty of man in society. The liberty of the natural man is the freedom of self-assertion which is limited only by the power of the individual. The liberty of civil man is a liberty under law, a liberty which Rousseau described as greater and better than the liberty of the natural state. In the *Contrat social* the validation of this contention about the greater liberty of the civil state is given in the first instance in romantic terms in which Rousseau attempts to show that the individual fulfills his social obligations by merely following his own nature. The main lines of this romantic approach to liberty are revealed in the contention that the social
past and the volonté générale are the extensions of the wills of the individuals and that in submitting to both they are in reality submitting only to themselves. Duty and interest coincide and justice is the simple product of the wills of the individuals. The idea of consent is prominent in this romantic approach and the definition of liberty as "obedience to a self-prescribed law" is based on this idea. The romantic approach embraces also the idea of equality, on the basis of which Rousseau argues that there is no loss of liberty for any one particular individual because all surrender equally. The individual yields to all and yet to none, he obeys the law by obeying only himself, and finds preserved in the civil state the freedom which prevailed in the natural state.

This romantic approach, however, is rendered inconsistent by the fiction of the natural man and the state of nature. The freedom of the state of nature cannot be preserved in the civil state because this freedom is lawless. The natural man cannot fulfill the law by merely obeying his will because his will is lawless. The romantic approach ends, therefore, in contradiction and the precise cause of the contradiction is the fiction of l'homme naturel, which underlies the approach.

There is in the Contrat social a second approach to liberty, namely, liberty by the way of constraint. The appeal to the legislator, the preference for aristocracy, and the Civil Religion are the elements in the second approach to liberty. The legislator and aristocracy are appealed to for the purpose of delivering the state from the prejudices of individual wills and for the purpose of transforming individuals who are by themselves "complete and solitary." The Civil Religion serves the purpose of "making the individual love his duty." Obedience to the laws, in the last analysis, is obtained through a religious sanction and this fact, taken in connection
with the absolute sovereignty of the state, leads to the conclusion that the state is arrayed against the individual in the Contrat social.

These two approaches to liberty in the Contrat social represent the same cross-play of individualistic and collectivistic factors which was found to exist in the Emile and in the Économie politique. The whole writing of Rousseau may be described as a mixture of these two factors without any final synthesis between them. The cause of the failure of synthesis is the fiction of the state of nature and the natural man, which gives rise to a kind of individualism that is incompatible with any form of collective life. If a society is to be obtained, therefore, collectivism must triumph over individualism, as it does. Liberty is sacrificed and the original freedom which Rousseau set out to preserve is lost. What purported to be a pact for freedom ends by becoming a pact for constraint.

Any philosophy of liberty must begin with what is given, and, as Rousseau well saw, it is the individual which is given. The idea of autonomy is a first principle of liberty. But individuality must contain, in addition to autonomy, the postulate of a social reference. The individual must be conceived as one whose life is internal rather than external to the life of society. The basis of the state is the common advantage, by which is meant that area of experience in which the needs and desires of individuals meet and are congruent. It is the area of coincidence in the interests of particulars. The principle of the common good, therefore, becomes the central principle in a philosophy of liberty, because this principle provides the standard of just constraint which society may exercise over individuals and it provides also the limit of constraint by which individuals may be protected from unjust subordination by society. Positively, this principle calls for the state to provide the conditions and instruments necessary for
The changes in the labor, income, and spending patterns of society have affected the labor market and the economy. The shift in the balance of power between employers and employees has led to changes in the nature of work and the quality of life for workers. The rise of globalization and the growth of the service sector have also played a significant role in shaping the labor market.

The importance of education and training has increased as the labor market becomes more competitive. Workers need to acquire skills and knowledge to remain competitive in a rapidly changing job market. The need for lifelong learning has become more pronounced as the pace of technological change accelerates.

The government has taken steps to improve the education and training opportunities for workers. The expansion of vocational and technical training programs has provided workers with the skills they need to succeed in the labor market. The government has also implemented policies to encourage employers to invest in the development of their employees.

The role of unions in representing the interests of workers has also changed. The rise of the ‘gig economy’ and the growth of freelance and contract work have made it more difficult for unions to represent the interests of their members. However, the unions have adapted to these changes and have become more flexible in representing the interests of workers.

The changes in the labor market have also had a significant impact on the family. The rise of the two-income family has led to changes in the role of women in society. The increased participation of women in the labor market has led to changes in the gender roles within the family. The changes in the labor market have also had a significant impact on the environment. The growth of the service sector has led to increased pollution and the use of natural resources.

The changes in the labor market have also had a significant impact on the economy. The rise of globalization has led to changes in the structure of the economy. The growth of the service sector has led to changes in the balance of trade and the distribution of wealth. The changes in the labor market have also had a significant impact on the government. The need for increased funding for education and training programs has led to changes in the tax policy. The changes in the labor market have also had a significant impact on the social welfare system. The need for increased funding for social welfare programs has led to changes in the tax policy.

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the self-realization of individuals.

Liberty, therefore, may be defined as the right of the individual to self-expression and self-realization in relation to other individuals who are organized as a society and who both permit and provide for such self-expression subject to the restraints imposed by the common good and by the recognition of the same right and restraints as extended to all the members of the group.

As to the writings here selected to represent the classical production on liberty, it may be said that the list is not intended to be final. Others may be inclined to make additions or subtractions from the list. The only claim made for the present selection is that it includes some of the more important and influential pieces in the literature on the subject. In John's *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* is included for the sake of showing a source answer to Mill as well as for the sake of showing how an anti-liberal attack on liberty might be formulated.

A list of the classics on liberty would doubtless include the

2. The one called "de Plaisir-Denier" or "Imaginaire-dining" as Laist requires to write it.

3. For the manuscripts and dates of the writing see *Laist*, note 8, 304-305, September, 1950, 1959.
APPENDIX

THE CLASSICS ON LIBERTY

JUNIUS BRUTUS'S VINDICIAE CONTRA TYRANNOS (1579)

Among the classics on liberty, few can be classed as discursive analyses of the problem or the concept of liberty. One of those reviewed here can be so described, that is, Mill's essay, "On Liberty." The others are special pleas for particular liberties, but they are none the less important on that account. Their particularity often serves to illuminate important portions of the general problem.

As to the writings here selected to represent the classical productions on liberty, it may be said that the list is not intended to be final. Others may be inclined to make additions or subtractions from the list. The only claim made for the present selection is that it includes some of the more important and influential pieces in the literature on the subject. J. F. Stephen's Liberty, Equality, Fraternity is included for the sake of showing a common answer to Mill as well as for the sake of showing how an anti-liberal attack on liberty might be formulated.

A list of the classics on liberty would doubtless include the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos of Junius Brutus. This tract, written under the pseudonym, Junius Brutus, was probably published in 1579 and the author is generally believed to be one Philippe de Mornay (1549-1623), a French Protestant leader, and counsellor to King Henry IV of France. The tract was

1. He was called "du Plessis-Mornay" or "Duplessis-Mornay" as Laski prefers to write it.

2. For the authorship and date of the writing Cf. Laski, Art. 1, 57-60. Contrast Coker, RPP, 205n.
THE CIRCUMCISION HABIT

A.H. S.Y.

1. The practice of cutting "the foreskin and the skin of the prepuce" as taught
2. The practice of cutting "the foreskin and the skin of the prepuce" as taught
3. The practice of cutting "the foreskin and the skin of the prepuce" as taught
4. The practice of cutting "the foreskin and the skin of the prepuce" as taught
first written in both Latin and French, then being translated into English in many editions, the most available of which is the anonymous translation which was published in London by Robert Baldwin in 1689,¹ and reprinted under the editorship of Harold Laski in 1924 under the title, "A Defence of Liberty Against Tyrants."

Originally the tract was addressed to the Huguenots for the purpose of encouraging them in their persecutions rather than for the purpose of refuting their opponents.² Its importance and influence may be measured by the fact that the theory of the state upon which it rests "determined the character of political speculation from the end of the sixteenth century until the advent of Rousseau;³ and also from the fact that through Locke its ideas became the foundation both of the political thought of Price and Priestley and of the American Revolution.⁴ It belongs to the Monarchomachic tradition, which is the liberal point of view opposed to absolute monarchy, though not opposed to monarchy itself.⁵ The contention of the Huguenots for the right to worship God in their own way drew its intellectual strength from two writings. One was the Franco-Gallia of Hotman; the other was the Vindiciae. Although the latter is mainly a summary of ideas already in circulation, it "surpassed all other essays of the time in the vigour and lucidity with which

¹ F. W. Coker finds this translation "crude," but he derives assistance from it "at some points" (RPP, 207n).
² Laski, Art. 1, 59.
³ Ibid., 54.
⁴ Loc. cit.
⁵ "Monarchomachs" is the name given by Barclay (De Regno) to those who opposed unlimited royal power. Théodore Beza was among the first of this group. His treatise, The Rights of Magistrates Over Their Subjects, advocates popular sovereignty. Cf. Laski, Art. 1, 24-25.
it restated them."^1

The subject matter of the treatise may be summarized under the four questions which the treatise discusses:

I. Whether Subjects are bound and ought to obey Princes, if they command that which is against the Law of God.

II. Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law of God, or ruin the Church, by whom, how, and how far it is lawful.

III. Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth oppress or ruin a publick State, and how far such resistance may be extended, by whom, how and by what Right, or Law it is permitted.

IV. Whether neighbour Princes or States may be, or are bound by Law, to give succours to the Subjects of ther Princes, afflicted for the Cause of true Religion, or oppressed by manifest Tyranny.^2

The first question is answered with the contention that kings must be obeyed "when they serve and obey God and not other ways"^3 for kings are under contract to God as the people are under contract to the king and if kings "violate their oath, and transgress the law, we say that they have lost their kingdom."^4

The second question is answered by saying that it is lawful to resist a king who would overthrow the law of God but resistance must come, not from the people as a whole, but from their representatives, the magistrates.®

Passive resistance or voluntary exile are the weapons recommended for use by the people.® They may not as private men resist by arms unless commanded by their magistrates.® The use of arms, however, is not absolutely forbidden

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1. Laski, Art. 1, 34.
2. From the facsimile title page to the edition of 1689 in Mornay, DLT, 61.
3. Mornay, DLT, 70.
4. Ibid., 74.
5. Ibid., 96-97.
7. Ibid., 110-11.
The effect of the stress of the environment on the performance and learning of the student.

In order to understand the impact of stress on learning, it is important to recognize the role of the environment in shaping the learning process. The environment can influence the student's ability to absorb information and retain knowledge. This is because the environment can provide stimuli that either facilitate or hinder the learning process.

While the environment can pose challenges, it can also offer opportunities for growth and development. It is important for educators and students to recognize the positive aspects of the learning environment and how they can be leveraged to enhance the learning experience.

1. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the current learning environment.
2. Developing strategies to enhance the learning environment.
3. Encouraging students to take an active role in shaping their learning environment.
4. Collaborating with educators and administrators to improve the learning environment.

By taking these steps, we can create a more effective learning environment for all students.
The discussion of the third question yields the following principles: That kings "hold their power and sovereignty from the people"; that "the officers of the kingdom receive their authority from the people"; that the purpose of kings is "to procure and provide for the good of those who are committed to them"; that the "king receives the laws from the people"; and the king himself is not above the law, nor may he pardon or condemn except in accordance with the law; that "kings are neither proprietors nor usufructuaries of the royal patrimony, but only administrators." The good king abides by these principles while the tyrant subverts them. If the tyrant is one "without title," that is, if he is a usurper who rules tyrannically, the proper method of dealing with him is tyrannicide. If, on the other hand, the tyrant is not a usurper but a "tyrant by practice" and if methods of wisdom and caution do not avail to turn him from the ruin of the state, then it is lawful to call the people to arms for where virtue and fair means

1. Mornay, DLT, 114.
2. Ibid., 118.
3. Ibid., 126.
4. Ibid., 143.
5. Ibid., 148.
6. Ibid., 150.
7. Ibid., 152-55.
8. Ibid., 172.
9. Ibid., 190-92.
10. Ibid., 195-99.
The phenomenon of the visual perception of the following paragraph:

"I can't imagine why people use the same language to describe different things. It's like they're trying to force the shape of a square into a circle. If you can't fit a square into a circle, why do you even try?"

is important to understand the nature of language and perception. It highlights the complexity of human cognition and the challenges in communicating effectively.
have not power to persuade, there force and terror must be put in use to compel."¹ The initiative for action rests, however, not with the people but with their representatives.²

As to the last question, if a prince find a neighboring people oppressed by a tyrant he "ought to yield succour as freely and willingly to the people, as he would do to the prince his brother if the people mutinied against him."³

And to conclude this discourse in a word, piety commands that the law and church of God be maintained. Justice requires that tyrants and destroyers of the commonwealth be compelled to reason. Charity challenges the right of relieving and restoring the oppressed. Those who make no account of these things, do as much as in them lies to drive piety, justice, and charity out of this world, that they may never more be heard of.⁴

Regarding the final significance of this treatise one may say that so far as the problem of liberty is concerned, it has greater historical significance than philosophical. Its primary aim was to secure a limited kind of religious freedom by means of principles which the writer had the keenness to see might be applied to civil as well as to religious persecution. But this application was incidental, if not accidental, as may be seen from the fact that only one of the four questions of the treatise has a civil and not a religious reference. The insistence upon an ethical basis for politics is a commendable advance over the absolutism of Bodin's doctrine of sovereignty or the irresponsible despotism of Machiavelli's The Prince, but the ethical emphasis in the Vindiciae suffers the limitation of being deduced as

¹ Mornay, DLT, 204.
² Ibid., 209.
³ Ibid., 228.
⁴ Ibid., 229.
a corollary from a theological premise rather than being derived from principles internal to the nature of the state.

This work is a plea for freedom from "that which is against the Law of God," but there are no principles evolved which would guarantee freedom to those who might differ with the Huguenots on what the "Law of God" is, should the Huguenots win their plea for freedom and come to power. Thus the religious freedom sought is only a limited freedom, and there is no reason to believe that this treatise is exempt from the criticism brought against both the Catholic and the Protestant Monarchomachs: "Each was at bottom entirely indifferent to freedom."

In the history of freedom, therefore, this classic has its importance; in the philosophy of freedom, it has, more noticeably, its inadequacies.

**MILTON'S AREOPAGITICA (1644)**

John Milton's Areopagitica is a brilliant and noble plea for the freedom of unlicensed printing. It is a writing addressed to Parliament in criticism of the licencing ordinance which was to regulate printing so that no publication could be printed unless approved by a licencing board. The argument points out that the origin of the practice of censorship is loathsome, since it comes from the Inquisition; that men ought to be free to read since knowledge cannot defile unless the conscience be defiled already; that, moreover, error is of service in knowing truth and evil in knowing good.

Censorship, in any event, is futile, since if effective it would destroy all learning, but not the evil manners which can be learned without books; and, in order to be effective, it would have to be controlled by noble men,

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1. Laski, Art. 1, 51.
but censorship is distasteful to noble men and would, therefore, be left to men of another kind. Finally, the result of censorship is always to enhance the demand for that which is censored.

This remarkably able and modern plea for a free press closes with the challenging exclamation, "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."¹

LOCKE'S FOUR LETTERS ON TOLERATION (1685-1704)

Locke's Four Letters on Toleration are, like the preceding writings, an extended plea for a particular liberty, the liberty to worship in accordance with the dictates of one's conscience.

Authorities differ as to the date of publication of the first Letter but it was either 1685 or 1689. Its publication precipitated a controversy and the second and third Letters are long and tedious answers to the arguments of opponents. The fourth Letter, much later than the others, is only fragmentary, its composition having been interrupted by the death of the author in 1704.

The first Letter has been called a "business-like piece of argument."² The thesis which the argument supports is that "neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, because of his religion."³ The Letter draws a sharp distinction between the province of the state and that of the church. Such interests as life, liberty, health, property, and "indolency of body"⁴ belong to the state

¹. Milton, ARE, 58.
². H. Barker, Art. 1, 119a.
³. Locke, FLT, 35.
⁴. Ibid., 5.
while the church is concerned with "the salvation of souls" and the interests of the Future Life. The jurisdiction of the magistrate does not extend to this latter realm; the care of souls does not belong to him because it has never been given to him; his jurisdiction is temporal, not eternal.\(^1\) Between the church and the state, and between branches of the church toleration is to prevail. "No body, therefore, in fine, neither single persons, may nor even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other, upon pretence of religion."\(^2\) The magistrate may not interfere in the internal life of churches for the purpose of regulating the forms of worship or for the purpose of imposing penalties, except so far as such penalties would be imposed for immorality or crime in the regular course of civil life irrespective of religious connection.\(^3\) The magistrate may not suppress even idolatry.\(^4\)

Among the reasons for religious liberty, Locke gives first the one already noted, the natural division of purpose between the church and the state. Another, equally important, is the fact that truth cannot be revealed or enforced by law so that the effort to impose "true religion" is self-contradictory. "But if truth makes not her way into the understanding by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her."\(^5\) These points form the core of the argument, although there is the additional observation that intolerance is nowhere commanded in the

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1. Cf. also second Letter, FLT, 79.
2. FLT, 12.
3. Ibid., 19-22.
4. Ibid., 23.
5. Ibid., 27.
I don't understand the document.
New Testament, whereas tolerance is.¹

This classic plea for religious liberty is brave, straightforward, and cogent. It is tarnished, however, by the fact that its principles are denied entirely to atheists and granted only grudgingly, if at all, to Catholics. "Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God."² This, of course, is an ugly streak of intolerance, having nothing stronger than a fallacious argument to support it: "Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist."³

The attack on the Catholics is similarly illiberal, but it raises a genuine problem. Locke's objection to tolerating the Catholics was that in joining the Catholic Church they had ipso facto delivered themselves up to the protection and service of another prince and could, therefore, no longer be loyal citizens.⁴ The assumption cannot, of course, be granted, but it raises the problem of how far, in the interest of liberty, the state must tolerate an association which is dedicated to the overthrow of the state. How far can intolerance be tolerated? Locke's answer was: Any group which does not teach the duty of toleration is not to be tolerated. This principle has its limitations⁵ but it cannot be denied that Locke's answer is an attempt at solving one of the most difficult of all the problems connected with the task of making liberty real in practice. Locke's critics, in pointing to his

¹. Locke, FLT, 9.
². Ibid., 31.
³. Loc. cit.
⁴. Loc. cit.
⁵. In cases of social conflict it is not toleration but reason which gives hope of a solution.
The emphasis on the educational quality in terms of academic performance, and the importance of proper educational methods, cannot be overstated. It is essential to prioritize the development of critical thinking and problem-solving skills. This can only be achieved through a well-rounded curriculum that includes practical applications and real-world scenarios. The role of the educator is crucial in fostering an environment where students feel engaged and motivated to learn. Continuous evaluation and feedback mechanisms are necessary to assess progress and make necessary adjustments.
illiberalism, have frequently overlooked this point.

THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINÉ (1776-1795)

The writings of Thomas Paine have played a conspicuous part in the historical struggle for liberty, having borne fruit in England, France, and America. His *Common Sense* (1776), the *Dissertations on Government* (1786), the *Dissertation on the First Principles of Government* (1795), and *The Rights of Man* (1791-92) are among his most significant works in this respect and the first and last of these are probably more significant than the other two, which, on account of their close similarity in the treatment of government, may be grouped together. In so far as these works deal with the problem of liberty, they deal with it mainly in terms of the historical events of the time and the exigencies of the moment. The basic argument is the same in all; it is an argument in favor of representative government and against monarchy. Certain principles of liberty are adopted as the basis of the attack and these may be summarized under three recurring ideas: Natural equality of rights, a social contract, and representative government. With the exception of the *Common Sense*, which is a combined refutation of monarchy and a plea for the separation of the New England Colonies, all three of these ideas appear in each of the writings noted. In no case, however, do these ideas receive such a discursive treatment as they receive, for example, in the writing of Rousseau. Paine rather sets them down as a fulcrum by which to pry loose the aristocratic, monarchic tradition; and, if one may pursue the figure, the lever is rather longer on the end of attack than on the end of defense.

The thesis of the *Dissertation on the First Principles of Government* may be stated as follows:
THE NATURE OF COVERED WAGE (1938-1945)

The nature of Covered Wage, as defined by the Board of Compensation, covers a membership that is the Board's responsibility. The Board may also consider wages that are not covered by the Board's jurisdiction, such as wages earned outside the Board's jurisdiction.

The Board of Compensation may, in its discretion, adjust wages that are not covered by the Board's jurisdiction. The Board may also consider wages that are not covered by the Board's jurisdiction, such as wages earned outside the Board's jurisdiction.
First, that hereditary government has not a right to exist; that it cannot be established on any principle of right; and that it is a violation of all principle. Secondly, that government by election and representation has its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man.  

The Rights of Man has been described as a "counterblast" against Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). The ingredients composing this "blast" are the three ideas previously mentioned plus a generous dash of sarcasm and satire. Paine finds that Burke's treatise, "written as instruction to the French Nation . . . is darkness attempting to illuminate light." The argument follows the usual pattern. It is a spicy and spirited attack on monarchy and aristocracy with an equally spirited defense of the representative principle. The backbone of the argument is to be found in Paine's contention that the rights of man have their origin, not in society nor in any concession from the sovereign power, but in nature. They are the gift of the Creator, not the gift of the king, and they originated with the divine creation of man at the beginning of the world. The civil rights of man are based upon his natural rights and "every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual." Natural rights give way to civil rights only because the state of nature is an imperfect condition for the realization and preservation of the rights of man. The civil state supplies this power of realization in the case of such rights as security and protection. Other rights man retains in the civil state in the same way in which he held them in the state of nature.

1. Paine, FPG, 272.
2. Ernest Barker, Art. 1, 530
3. Paine, RM, 281-82.
4. Ibid., 303-307.
5. Ibid., 306.
The foundation of the civil state is a social contract.¹

Paine's basic ideas are thus strikingly similar to those of Rousseau but Rousseau's treatment of them is much to be preferred for it is more complete and more carefully reasoned.²

THOREAU'S "CIVIL DISOBEEDIENCE" (1849)

Another writing which might well be included in a list of the classics on liberty is Henry D. Thoreau's essay, "Civil Disobedience," first published in 1849 under the title, "Resistance to Civil Government."³ This essay, like Mill's, is a defense of individual liberty, but, unlike Mill's, it lacks the careful reasoning and the clear presentation of principles by which individual liberty may be attained. Thoreau's counsel is the more hasty one of disobedience, or more accurately, non-cooperation with a government whose laws are unjust, especially if those laws make the citizen a party to injustice against another person.⁴ The individual's first duty is not to his country

¹ The idea of contract receives fuller treatment in the other writings, e.g., DG,138 and FPG,272-3, but the treatment of the idea is scant in any event.

² Paine, however, said that Rousseau's writings animate the mind with a love for liberty without describing how to attain it (RM,334). The strength of Paine's view over Rousseau's lies in the fuller development of the constitutional and representative principles to be found in the former. For the relation of Paine to Rousseau (and Voltaire) see Clark, Art. 1, where the following similarities are noted: (1) Both (Paine and Rousseau) start from the conviction that contemporary civilization is indescribably bad; (2) both exalt the simplicity of the state of nature against the complexity of the civilized state; (3) both resolve to test fact by right; (4) both (unlike Burke) disregard the restraints of tradition; (5) both had faith in the people.

³ Thoreau, MIS, ix.

⁴ Thoreau, CD, 146. Thoreau held that tariff laws, slavery laws, and the laws aiming at the prosecution of the Mexican War were unjust (CD, passim and Emerson, Art. 1, 9).
The importance of the child at the site of his daily activity is often overlooked.

(Translation) "CIO/PROGRESS" (Page 1)

An issue of "Progress" recently published, "Child Development," points out that in a rural development program, "The child's daily activity is often overlooked.

It is important to recognize the role of the child in the development process and to include him in the planning and implementation of the program.

We must also ensure that the child's environment is safe and supportive, as well as providing opportunities for education and development. The child's participation in decision-making processes is crucial to their growth and well-being.

In conclusion, the role of the child in rural development initiatives should be recognized and included in the planning and execution of these programs.
but to his conscience; he must be a man first and a subject afterwards.¹ Pursuance of this underlying principle causes the thought at times to verge conspicuously on anarchy. The opening paragraph, for example, affirms the belief that "that government is best which governs not at all," but the paragraph implies also that men are not yet ready for this kind of government, although when they are ready this is the kind of government they will have. The authority which the writer grants government in the end is granted grudgingly:

The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to . . . is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it.²

As a plea for the autonomy of the individual and as a reminder that law must be consistent with justice, the essay is not without its significance. Beyond this, however, its limitations exceed its merits. The iconoclastic spirit of the writing issues in contempt, not only for the injustices of government but for government itself. The writer feels that with respect to the government of his day, a person "cannot without disgrace be associated with it."³ This attitude toward government embodies the essential weakness of the position. The government, says Thoreau, "does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it."⁴ A search for any concessions which would justify government leaves the student with the conviction that Thoreau succeeded too well in his aim. There is no notice of the legitimate uses of government, because, for the writer, it is an evil to

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¹ Thoreau, CD, 134.
² Ibid., 169.
³ Ibid., 136.
⁴ Ibid., 165.
be rid of; it is hardly worth trying to reform. He spurns the consideration of ways for removing an unjust law with a flourish— which turns out to be self-contradictory when examined: "... I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man's life will be gone." 1 The method should be more direct: The individual should refuse to cooperate with the government by refusing to pay his taxes whenever the laws are judged unjust by the dictates of the individual's conscience.

Whatever may be said in behalf of conscientious objectors, and much can be said in their favor, it must be acknowledged that when conscientious objection combines with contempt for government and indifference toward the rectification of law, it takes on a character inimical to social life itself. Thoreau may have been right in his opposition to slavery, the tariff, and the Mexican War but even when one is right he does not help his position by wrong arguments. To assert a principle which, consistently carried out, would destroy the society to which the principle is addressed is undoubtedly a wrong argument.

MILL'S ESSAY ON LIBERTY (1859)

Unlike any of the writings considered thus far, the classic essay of John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, is a philosophical analysis of the problem of individual liberty. The subject of his essay is "the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." 2 Two maxims constitute the solution at which Mill arrives.

1. Thoreau, CD, 146.
At the time of the project's initiation, it was realized that the use of a system designed and developed for the purpose of reducing the amount of information to be processed and transmitted would greatly improve the efficiency of the process. The system was designed to operate in a way that minimized the amount of data that needed to be processed, thereby reducing the workload on the human operators. The system was also designed to be flexible, allowing for easy modification to accommodate changes in the data being processed.

The system was implemented using a combination of hardware and software components. The hardware consisted of specialized processors and storage devices, while the software included algorithms for data processing and transmission. The system was tested extensively to ensure its reliability and performance.

The results of the project were extremely positive, with a significant reduction in the amount of time required to process and transmit the data. The system was also found to be highly reliable and easy to maintain.

Overall, the project was a great success, and the system developed is now in use in a variety of industries. The implementation of this system has provided a significant boost to the efficiency of data processing and transmission, and it is expected to have a lasting impact on the way that data is handled in the future.
The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. . . . Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection. ¹

The introductory chapter of Mill's essay deals with the nature of liberty and defines the domain of human liberty as "the inward domain of consciousness." The chapter demands liberty of conscience, "in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical and speculative, scientific, moral or theological."²

The second chapter, "Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion," undertakes a detailed examination of this branch of the general subject, giving arguments which do not differ greatly from those of Milton.

The third chapter, "Of Individuality as One of the Elements in Well-Being," inquires whether the same reasons which establish freedom of opinion do not also establish the freedom of men to act upon their opinions "so long as it is at their own risk and peril."³ The principle laid down is: "... In things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself."⁴

The fourth chapter, "Of the Limits of the Authority of Society over the Individual," offers the following principle as a solution: "To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual

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2. Ibid., 27-28.
3. Ibid., 100.
4. Ibid., 102.
The Intensification of the Dilemma: The Importance of Context and Its Relevance to the Current Scenario

In the context of the current situation, it is crucial to understand the implications of the dilemma we face. The intensification of the dilemma highlights the necessity for a comprehensive approach to address the challenges we are facing. The importance of context cannot be overstated, as it plays a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of our decisions.

To fully grasp the significance of the dilemma, we must consider the various factors that contribute to its intensification. These factors include political, economic, social, and environmental considerations. Each of these factors must be carefully analyzed to ensure that our responses are effective and sustainable.

In the following sections, we will explore the implications of the dilemma in greater detail. We will discuss the strategies that can be employed to mitigate the impact of the dilemma and the steps that need to be taken to ensure the long-term viability of our approach.

1. The Importance of Context
2. Strategies for Mitigation
3. Long-Term Viability

By understanding the context and its implications, we can develop a more effective strategy to address the dilemma. This approach will not only help us to overcome the current challenges but also ensure the sustainability of our responses for future generations.

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The table below summarizes the key points discussed in this document:

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For more information, please refer to the attached resources:
that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society."¹

It is worth noting that Mill takes full account of the objection that a distinction between that kind of conduct which concerns only the individual and that which concerns society cannot be made. In opposition to his principle he points out, with sufficient completeness almost to carry the reader's conviction against him, that many allegedly individual acts have social consequences, and even when the individual harms only himself his example is bad for society.² Mill's answer to this objection is two-fold: "Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law."³ But in the case of conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.⁴

As examples of conduct of the latter kind, Mill notes⁵ such religious practices as eating pork, or such behavior as drinking fermented liquors, or indulging Sabbath amusements, agitation against some of which is due to those "intrusively pious members of society, the stricter Calvinists and Methodists." In the same category of merely individual conduct he places, in the last chapter, such practices as fornication and gambling, although not without noting that the existence of bawdy houses and gaming places presents a problem less clear and more difficult. It is little wonder that Mill's essay

1. Mill, LIB, 133.
2. Ibid., 142.
3. Ibid., 145.
4. Ibid., 146.
5. Ibid., 151-62.
provoked the righteous indignation of the Puritan Sir James Stephen, whose rebellious answer to Mill we are soon to consider.

If the individual has a right to be protected from the moral meddlesomeness of the group or from the tyranny of a prevailing but objectionable social custom or opinion, the group of society, on the other hand, has a right to demand certain things of the individual, but it must be admitted that Mill's treatment of this side of the problem is sketchy. He notes two conditions which "society is justified in enforcing, at all costs, to those endeavor to withhold fulfilment." These two obligations are, first, that no individual injure those interests of another individual "which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights," and, secondly, that each individual bear "his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation." There are, in addition, certain positive acts for the benefit of others which the individual may rightfully be compelled to perform.

The final chapter, "Applications," presents some illustrations or "specimens of application" of the maxims which form the teaching of the essay. It also presents an extension of a principle already laid down. The principle established thus far is that society may rightfully interfere against an individual only for the sake of protecting other individuals from injury. But, Mill adds, although this is the only reason which can justify such interference, it does not follow, therefore, that this reason always does justify such interference. He gives an example to show that if the general

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1. Mill, LIB, 133-34.
2. Ibid., 26.
The federal government's reliance on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the current and future operations of the government has increased significantly. The integration of AI into various sectors of government operations, from decision-making processes to public service delivery, has become a crucial aspect of modern governance. This document explores the implications of AI in the federal government's decision-making processes and the potential benefits and challenges associated with its implementation.

The use of AI in the federal government allows for more efficient and effective decision-making, as it can process large amounts of data and identify patterns and trends that are not easily discernible by human analysts. This can lead to more informed decisions, reduced errors, and increased accuracy. Additionally, AI can be used to automate routine tasks, freeing up time for government officials to focus on more complex issues.

However, the implementation of AI in the federal government also raises concerns about privacy and data security. As AI systems rely on vast amounts of data, there is a risk of data breaches and the potential misuse of personal information. Furthermore, the use of AI can lead to biases in decision-making, as the algorithms used by AI systems are often trained on historical data, which may not reflect current societal norms.

To address these concerns, it is essential to develop robust ethical guidelines and regulations for the use of AI in the federal government. These guidelines should ensure that AI systems are designed to respect individual privacy and data security, and that they are transparent and accountable in their decision-making processes. Additionally, efforts should be made to address any biases in AI systems and to ensure that they are fair and equitable in their applications.

In conclusion, the use of AI in the federal government presents both opportunities and challenges. While it has the potential to improve decision-making and efficiency, it also raises concerns about privacy and data security. It is crucial for the government to develop strong ethical guidelines and regulations for the use of AI, and to ensure that these systems are designed to be fair and equitable in their applications.
welfare necessarily involves an injury to the interest of an individual, the individual has no "right" to protection. If two persons compete in an examination for an appointment which both desire, the one who fails suffers an injury to his interests but he has no claim to protection.¹

Among the problems treated in the last chapter is the problem of government interference with trade and commerce, the wisdom of which is denied, not because such interference is outside the province of government, but because such interference does not accomplish the end aimed at. In any event, this problem does not involve the question of individual liberty since it falls within a jurisdiction in which society has the right to interfere. Likewise, the question of whether the government should intervene to do something for the benefit of individuals is not strictly a part of the question of individual liberty but Mill treats it and the reasons he gives for opposing such intervention are instructive. He says, in substance, that the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government, that even if it were not better done by individuals it still should be done by them for the sake of their own mental education,² and that adding unnecessarily to the power of the government is a great evil because it tends toward bureaucracy and the absorption of the principal ability of the country into the governing body, which is "fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself."³ To find the way between the evils of bureaucracy and the advantages of centralized power and intelligence "is

¹ Mill, LIB, 167.
² Ibid., 193.
³ Ibid., 194.
⁴ Ibid., 195 ff.
one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government."¹ Mill offers the following principle for guidance in this matter: "The greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency, but the greatest possible centralisation of information, and diffusion of it from the center."²

Mill's treatment of the problem of governmental interference is patently individualistic, belonging to the _laissez-faire_ tradition. It closes with the following passage:

The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it (the government) substitutes its own activity for theirs. . . . The worth of a State in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and. . . a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished . . .³

The same individualism which leads Mill to look with fear upon the power of centralized authority leads him to fear education by the state. "That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating."⁴ The state may require that children receive a minimum of education and it may require examinations to ascertain whether this minimum has been achieved, but such examinations are to be confined to the factual content of these topics. In view of the manner in which totalitarian states in modern times dominate education for the purpose of indoctrinating individuals with the purposes of the state, Mill's warning is not altogether untimely.

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1. Mill, LIB, 201.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., 204.
The document contains text that appears to be discussing a project or study, possibly related to a scientific or technical field. The text is not legible enough to extract meaningful content accurately.
A final instance of the individualism of Mill's view is to be found in his treatment of those forms of individual conduct which may be classed as self-indulgence, e.g., the use of intoxicants, gambling, and fornication. Mill holds that these are matters in which legislative interference is not legitimate, although the individual who does harm to others while intoxicated is rightfully liable to punishment. The problem created by the existence of groups which profit from these forms of indulgence, however, is a problem the difficulty of which Mill notes but for which he offers no detailed solution. The principle underlying the attitude of society toward persons addicted to intoxicants and gambling is:

Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment.¹

This statement, like others which are more parenthetical, shows the point of departure of Mill's whole philosophy of individual liberty. In one parenthetical remark we are told that "... liberty consists in doing what one desires..."² and in another that "... all restraint, quâ restraint, is an evil..."³ We may summarize Mill's view, therefore, by saying that individual liberty is the absence of restraint in so far as such absence of restraint is consistent with no injury to the rights of other individuals and with no injury to society as a whole.

¹ Mill, LIB, 178.
² Ibid., 170.
³ Ibid., 168.
One of the most notable and detailed answers to Mill's essay comes from the pen of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen (1829-94), who was a British legal and political theorist, antidemocratic in his point of view. His book, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, offers a point-by-point criticism of Mill's essay and presents as an alternative the thesis that force is not only necessary but justifiable, if the end to which it is directed is true or good, if the use of force is not too costly in proportion to the end achieved. This principle is taken to justify religious and moral coercion for society must be alert to "keep both young fools and old fools out of harm's way. If freedom does not like it, let her go and sit on the heights." The attack on Mill is a curious medley of cogent reasoning, misrepresentation, and dogmatic utterance. Let us turn to some of the main points of Stephen's criticism.

One point made early in the attack is that morality and religion are both coercive systems, and the coercion is for purposes which cannot be included under Mill's principle of "self-protection." Moreover, if Mill's

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2. Stephen, LEF, 49.
3. Ibid., 15-16 ff. and 142-56.
4. Ibid., 188.
5. For instances of dogmatism consider (a) the assertion that men are to be forbidden to deny the truth of the doctrines of God and the future life, (b) the contention that the belief that persecution is alien to Christianity is a belief which is popular "with the class who feel more than they think" (100-101), and (c) the outburst against fornication (128).
If $V, v; f$, then $I$.

The proof is straightforward. We first observe a point-polygon algorithm to find the intersection of two lines. This is then used to divide the polygon into simpler shapes. The area of each of these shapes can then be computed using standard geometric methods.

In summary, the algorithm works as follows:

1. Decompose the polygon into simpler shapes.
2. Compute the area of each shape.
3. Sum the areas to find the total area.

This approach is efficient and can handle polygons of any complexity.
principle were applied to religion and morals it would destroy both.¹

The only moral system which would comply with the principle stated by Mr. Mill would be one capable of being summed up as follows: "Let every man please himself without hurting his neighbour;" and every moral system which aimed at more than this . . . would be wrong in principle. This would condemn every existing system of morals.²

A similar argument is used in the case of religion.³

One might answer Stephen at this point by calling attention to the fact that Mill's principle is not intended to apply to morals and religion but to politics. That the principle, "Let every man please himself," is destructive of morality is, of course, true, but it is irrelevant. Neither is it to be supposed that Mill proposed this as an adequate moral principle—as anyone who has read Mill's Utilitarianism knows. As to the coercive character of religion and morality, it may be said that coercion under the stress of reasons which the individual is free to accept or reject is one thing, while coercion under the stress of punishment from the sovereign power is quite another. Nothing but confusion comes from implying that the two types of coercion are the same.

An argument in Stephen's second chapter against Mill's argument in favor of freedom of thought is similarly beside the point. By recasting Mill's argument in a less cogent form Stephen finds it easy to answer. He correctly quotes Mill as holding that "If any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility."⁴ He notices Mill's further proposition

¹ Stephen, LEF, 11-15.
² Ibid., 11.
³ Ibid., 34.
A unitary government is needed in the case of partition to

ensure a smooth transition period and to maintain

peace and stability in the region. The

proposed partition plan should include

measures to address the concerns of

minorities and ensure their rights are

protected.

Furthermore, efforts should be undertaken

to bridge the gap between

communities and promote

cooperation and dialogue.

In conclusion, a unitary government is

necessary to achieve long-term

peace and prosperity for the region.
there is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.¹

Stephen, however, affirms that these two propositions from Mill imply the following: "No one can have a rational assurance of the truth of any opinion whatever, unless he is infallible, or unless all persons are absolutely free to contradict it."² Stephen is sure that we have a rational knowledge of a great many things (the existence of London Bridge, or the river Thames) whether others are, or are not at liberty to contradict them. This is, however, a shoddy analysis. Mill's contention that certain knowledge of the falsity of an opposing opinion implies infallibility, is true. But Stephen's assertion that rational assurance of any opinion implies infallibility, is a different assertion altogether; it is not implied by the former contention; and it is false. Likewise, the free presentation of rational considerations against an opinion is not the same thing as the right of "all persons (to be) absolutely free to contradict ...".

Stephen's criticism of Mill's remaining arguments in favor of freedom of thought reveal the essential weakness of Stephen's whole attack, namely, his confidence in force and his lack of confidence in reason. He summarizes Mill's last two arguments by saying that they apply exclusively to "that small class of persons whose opinions depend principally upon the consciousness that they have reached them by intellectual processes correctly

2. Ibid., 36.
performed."¹ Stephen finds this objectionable because "the incalculable majority of mankind form their opinions in quite a different way, and are attached to them because they suit their temper, and meet their wishes . . . ."² Moreover, freedom of thought destroys "zealous" belief. "If you want zealous belief, set people to fight . . . . Unlimited freedom of opinion may be a very good thing, but it does not tend to zeal . . . ."³ It hardly needs remarking that the substitution of zeal for reason in the settlement of social questions is the surest way to cancel all possibility of an intelligent settlement.

As a descriptive statement of how the multitude behaves Stephen's assertion would carry more weight. But the assertion is not descriptive; it is normative. "The minority," he tells us, "gives way not because it is convinced that it is wrong, but because it is convinced that it is a minority."⁴ He holds that "though compulsion and persuasion go hand in hand . . . the lion's share of the results obtained is due to compulsion . . . ."⁵ Coercion for the purpose of establishing and maintaining morality, and coercion for the purpose of establishing and maintaining religion are common and legitimate forms of coercion as are coercion for the purpose of establishing alterations in existing forms of government and coercion for the purpose of altering social institutions.⁶ It is true that Stephen holds that coercion is not justified unless its end is true or right, but does this mean that

¹ Stephen, LEF, 40.
² Loc. cit.
³ Loc. cit.
⁴ Ibid., 28.
⁵ Ibid., 27.
⁶ Ibid., 15.
...
the ends of coercion are to be formulated in the free court of rational discussion? Not at all: "Each is a case of coercion, for the sake of what the persons who exercise coercive power regard as the attainment of a good object."  

. . . Every one who has to do with legislation must find, that laws must be based upon principles, and that it is impossible to lay down any principles of legislation at all unless you are prepared to say, I am right, and you are wrong, and your view shall give way to mine, quietly, gradually, and peaceably; but one of us two must rule and the other must obey, and I mean to rule.  

Admitting that "laws must be based upon principles," the main question from the point of view of a philosophy of liberty is: What are those principles? Mill faces that question; Stephen side-steps it. He gives us instead a justification of the practice of coercion which contains no principle that could be regarded as rational, just, or adequate as the foundation for a philosophy of liberty. When a minority comes to power and when they "have made up their minds as to what is true, they will no more tolerate error for the sake of abstract principles about freedom than any one of us tolerates a nest of wasps in his garden." Whether the minority happens to be right or not is beside the point since reason has little or nothing to do with the decisions about which they are so "zealous." Stephen says, "I should say that doctrines come home to people in general . . . in so far as they happen to interest them and appear to illustrate and interpret their own experience."  

The analysis might be pursued further, but what has been said is sufficient to reveal the principles at work. A moment's reflection will show that these principles are sufficient to justify the Spanish Inquisition  

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2. Ibid., 57.  
3. Ibid., 82.  
4. Loc. cit.
The main message to be conveyed is that the data collected are useful for understanding the effects of various factors on the outcome of interest. It is important to ensure that the data are thoroughly analyzed and that any potential confounders are accounted for. The results should be interpreted with caution, and further research is needed to confirm these findings.

In conclusion, the data collected provide valuable insights into the relationship between the variables under study. The researchers should continue to refine their methods and collect additional data to further our understanding of this important topic.
or the tyrannical dictatorship of a power-intoxicated minority, although
Stephen personally would have no part of either. What he would prefer to
endorse, however, and what his principles commit him to are unfortunately
very different things. Had he had the advantage of the political experi-
ences of Europe in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century
to guide him rather than experience with British Imperialism in the last
decades of the nineteenth century he might have been more scrupulous in the
formulation of his principles, for the events of those years of the twentieth
century in Germany, Italy, and Russia are the logical extension of his
principles and we can now see that instead of preserving liberty those prin-
ciples have crucified her.
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