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Roy Wood Sellar's criticism of idealism

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Dissertation
ROY WOOD SELLARS’ CRITICISMS OF IDEALISM

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submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
1945
APPROVED

by

First Reader. [Signature]

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Professor of Systematic Theology
DEDICATED

TO

MY WIFE, MARGARET CALDWELL MUNK WHO BORE WITH ME THE HEAT AND BURDEN OF THE DAY

AND TO

TWO GREAT PIONEERS OF THOUGHT WITHOUT WHOSE KINDLY HELP THIS VENTURE WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE

DR. EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN
Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy in Boston University

AND

DR. L. HAROLD DEWOLF
Professor of Systematic Theology in Boston University School of Theology
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

1. Two Opposing World Views

Today, as since the dawn of speculative thought, two world views face each other. "These two systems have been like doughty champions in the lists ready at all times to break a lance together."\(^1\) The one, idealism holds that reality as a whole and in all of its parts and phases is essentially of the nature of mind. Fragile human reason, according to most idealists is not a chance spark resulting from the clash of blind forces, but the flame, however small, that enables us to see with Plato the Supreme Reason inherent in the very organization and in the functioning of the universe.\(^2\) Moreover idealism holds that human ideals and values do not inhere and glow in feeble man alone, but form "an essential part of the objective structure of the universe."\(^3\)

Opposed to idealism stands the equally ancient system of materialism or naturalism. It denies almost everything that idealism so boldly affirms.

Naturalism, challenging the cogency of the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments, holds that the universe requires no supernatural cause and government, but is self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating; and self-directing;

2. Plato, Laws, Book X, 897C.
that the world-process is not teleological and anthropocentric, but purposeless, deterministic (except for possible tychistic events), and only incidentally productive of man.4

Human reason and values have meaning and existence only within the narrow range of human experience. These general ideas all forms of naturalism can be said to have in common. However there are many forms of naturalism, as well as of idealism; and the naturalisms of today, such as that of Roy Wood Sellars, are much more refined and are willing to concede far more to idealism than the older and cruder forms. Yet the sharp contrast between idealism and naturalism, has not and cannot be obliterated. The fundamental issue is simply whether in the final analysis the universe is or is not of the nature of mind.

Perhaps it is not too much to say that Roy Wood Sellars is the most objective representative of naturalistic thought in America today. Not only is he one of the keenest and fairest critics of idealism, but more than that he has not been satisfied with mere negative criticisms as is too often the case with naturalists. His significance consists primarily in the very interesting as well as comprehensive system of thought which he has formulated. Before considering his fundamental criticisms of the various forms of idealism relative to the basic philosophical problems of the

day, it is imperative that some consideration be given to the outstanding features of his system.

2. The Essentials of Sellars' System

i. Method

To understand any philosopher's system it is important first of all to grasp his method. Perhaps Sellars' method is best understood in contrast to that of a fellow naturalist, Dewey. In the first place, as over against Dewey, Sellars does not over-emphasize, (one might almost say glorify), method as Dewey does. Yet no one can doubt that he fully recognizes the importance of sound method. Then, in the second place, Sellars' method is not one-sided as Dewey's. Dewey's method is confined to the experimental—"the method used to secure consequences." As a result, for Dewey thought is no more than an instrument of adjustment, to enable the organism to adjust itself to its environment. Sellars also recognizes the importance of the experimental method, the method of the sciences, but beyond science there is philosophy. Science prepares the way for philosophy by specializing in various fields and by thus "doing more of the experimenting and of detailed observation." Science therefore is of vital importance to philosophy. Philosophy is dependent upon it for certain vital information which it can make and must make use of.

5. Sellars, PFP, 6, 180
7. Sellars, PFP, 6.
8. Ibid., 6.
in its wider generalizations. Science is the handmaiden of philosophy; it prepares the way for it. But science is not philosophy. "Philosophy, itself, is a persistent reflection upon these facts and concepts developed by the sciences." 9 "Philosophy is not something superimposed upon science so much as something which science culminates in." 10 Consequently philosophy while making use of the experimental method of the sciences cannot confine itself to this method, but in harmony with its profounder and more comprehensive task must find a more comprehensive method.

Sellars makes use of the method of analysis, as do neorealists such as Perry, and sometimes he appears too analytic nevertheless, his ultimate aim is always a synthesis. He seeks to combine analysis and synthesis. Speaking of the task of philosophy he says:

In short, the method of philosophy is an analytic-synthetic reflection upon the world as it is spread out before a mind full of the knowledge gained by the sciences. It aims to be a penetrative survey of reality as known. It does not so much have a source of knowledge all its own ... as a duty to bring human knowledge to its stage of clarification and synoptic synthesis.11

Again he says: "For me, the task of the philosopher is to analyze concepts and principles and to perform a labor of synthesis." 12 He criticizes the coherence test of truth,

9. Ibid., 6. 11. Ibid., 181.
teaching it to mean mere consistency.

Consistency with other propositions is not by itself a sufficient criterion of truth. An assertion may follow with due logical necessity from temporarily accepted premises, but such an internal relation cannot guarantee the system as a whole.\textsuperscript{13}

Again in his \textit{Essentials of Philosophy} he points out that there are two objections to coherence as mere consistency; first "self-consistency cannot be founded on itself," and second, "more than one system of beliefs may be internally coherent." It is obvious that he does not, like some thinkers, consider inclusiveness as a part of coherence. But he certainly makes use of the two together as is clearly revealed by the following statement: "Such is the final status of an accepted proposition. It must be \textbf{self-consistent and cover the facts}."\textsuperscript{14} Thus Sellars' method can be said to be basically \textbf{synthetic}, not, however, without a definite trend in the direction of a too exclusive use of analysis, at times. It is this element that turns him away from idealism in the direction of physical realism.

Sellars' method may also be said to be \textbf{critical}. He is critical, on the one hand, of all forms of idealism, but on the other no less of naïve realism, of neorealism and of all forms of positivism. One of his favorite methods of building up his own system is to expose the weaknesses and inadequacies of all other systems, and to show that the

\textsuperscript{13} Sellars, \textit{Logic}, 298.  \textsuperscript{14} Sellars, \textit{EOP}, 168.
truth in them marks them as nothing more than half-way houses to his own more comprehensive system. Sellars tries to be fair to the systems which he is criticizing and usually succeeds, but sometimes one detects a tone of dogmatic finality. This gives point to the following criticism of Sellars' *Philosophy of Physical Realism*: "The tone is polemical, and one after another of the worthies of philosophy—past, present and future—are introduced at the point of a sword, and pierced by Sellars riding on the charger, Physical Realism."16

On the whole, however, Sellars' method may be said to be positive rather than negative. Unlike Russell he takes no special delight in tearing down the defences of idealism. He does not destroy merely for the sake of destroying. His purpose is far more serious. He tears down and makes use of what he considers usable and thus builds what he considers a more comprehensive system.

We shall concern ourselves very little with the refutation of idealism. The development of a coherent realistic system is of far more value, even from an argumentative point of view, than a continuation of the more or less dialectical struggle between idealism and realism.17

### ii. The Three Chief Characteristics

Sellars' system may well be summed up in the three words:

Realism, Naturalism, and Humanism. He is first of all interested in epistemology, to the extent in fact, that one critic in reviewing his Essentials of Philosophy complains that it is "a bit top-heavy in epistemology." Some philosophers such as Bradley lay little stress upon epistemology, but taking it for granted plunge at once into the fathomless depths of metaphysics. But not so with Sellars.

Epistemology is like a keystone to an arch, a sign that a view of the world is complete and well-constructed. Can a view of the world be possibly considered final until it has shown its ability to explain how we know that the world is as our theory states? Sellars is a realist, but neither a naïve realist nor a neorealist, but a critical realist. He is never tired of reminding the reader that he is an epistemological dualist, that in the act of knowing subject and object are not one as subject as the epistemological idealist would have it or one as object as the panobjectivist would say, but that in the knowing process subject and object are two, separate and distinct.

Our position, which we call epistemological dualism, agrees, then with the so-called 'axiom of independent reality.' The idealist, perforce, denies this axiom.

For Sellars it is impossible to intuit objects as naïve

18. See Muelder and Sears, DAP, 431
20. Sellars, PPR, 45.
realism together with neorealism and also with epistemological idealism would have it. For Sellars as for Bowne, knowledge is essentially interpretation. Knowledge is not an intuition of the stuff of things, but rather an apprehension of their essential characteristics as disclosed by science. "We shall with science measure their dimensions and decipher their organization." Even more definitely and clearly he says:

> In knowing, we are not concerned with the question of stuff either on the side of consciousness or on the side of the physical object known, but with characters and meanings, on the one side, and characteristics such as structure and behavior on the other side.

Knowledge about things is mediated by ideas, and comes in terms of ideas, but nevertheless this translation and transcription of the characteristics of things in terms of ideas is none the less a true version of the characteristics of things. We cannot think about things in any kind of fashion that we fancy. It is in the data that arise in the interaction of environment and mind "that the ultimate control of judgments lies."

Sellars like Brightman, the personalist, holds to correspondence as "an implication of the knowledge-mediating capacity of ideas and not as a test of

True ideas are knowledge-giving ideas and corresponding ideas. They are such that they disclose the denoted object because agreeing with it. They are such that we can think the object as it is by means of them. To think the object as it is is to think truly. 27

The mind then is capable of knowing objects, not, however, as they are in themselves, but in terms of their essential characteristics and properties as the mind is able to reproduce and reflect them. But by virtue of being a mediated knowledge it is never complete or pure, though capable of continual increase.

Even though Sellars lays so much stress on epistemology yet he realizes full well that the philosopher cannot rest in epistemology, but that epistemology has ontological "implication," 29 pointing beyond itself; for the moment that the inevitable question is raised, as to the nature of the object of knowledge which epistemology affirms is possible, then the thinker has crossed the frontier and entered the realm of metaphysics.

Sellars calls his system an evolutionary naturalism, (the
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title of the book in which he makes the first really comprehensive attempt to formulate his system). He defines naturalism as follows: "Naturalism stands for the self-sufficiency and intelligibility of the world of space and time." Nature is not dependent upon any kind of supernatural order. It exists in its own right and must be accepted as so existing, as a fact beyond which thought must not dare to attempt to venture, for there is no beyond. "Another way of putting it is to affirm the intrinsic endurance of physical systems in their very becoming." This of course raises the question as to the explanation of the order, the organization, and the creative impulse in nature toward novelty and value. This is the rock upon which naturalism has always been shattered. Can Sellars escape shipwreck? Can he accomplish that which naturalists of the past have failed to accomplish? He thinks that he can, and here is where the evolutionary part of his naturalism becomes evident. Emergent evolution is his principle of explanation.

The chief difficulty with past naturalisms and materialisms was that, finding it impossible to fit novelties and values into their systems, they went to the absurd extreme of denying their existence, and ended in reducing the richness and diversity and glory of the world to the bare facts of

30. Written in 1922.  
31. Sellars, EN, 2.  
32. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 53(1944), 361.
physics. "In brief, past naturalism did not take evolution seriously nor did it take mind seriously."33 Sellars tries to cut the Gordian knot by endowing nature itself with creative power. "Matter I take to be creative, dynamic, relational and self-organizing."34 "Back of pomp and circumstance, back of love and beauty and tragedy and happiness, lies--matter. In short the physical is but another term for being."35 Nature then is ultimately matter with its wonderful, miraculous creative powers.

In his emphasis upon emergent evolution Sellars' thought is related to that of S. Alexander and that of Lloyd Morgan. He is, however, far closer to that of S. Alexander, for both are naturalists, while Morgan is a theist. There are, nevertheless, two interesting differences between Sellars and Alexander. First, while Sellars, as has been shown, endows matter as the basic structure of nature with creative power, Alexander, on the other hand similarly endows Space and Time.36 Secondly, Alexander thinks of the universe as a whole as evolving seemingly without end or limit,37 while Sellars conceives evolution as no more than a local process, or a series of local processes, not affecting the universe as a whole. Hence he is far more pluralistic then his English comrade.

In the autumn of the year, the vegetable garden is usually in full swing, with a variety of produce ready for harvest.

The garden is a place of tranquility, away from the hustle and bustle of the city. The air is fresh, and the sounds of nature surround you.

As the sun sets, the garden is bathed in a warm, golden light. It is a place of peace and serenity, where one can escape the stresses of daily life.
Being a believer in the eternity of the universe and skeptical of linear and cyclical notions, I am naturally led to suppose that the universe has always been much as it is now, a variegated existential domain with a floor, much the same everywhere, above which rise here and there mountain peaks of emergent becoming followed in time by recession. The picture is that of a qualitative rising and subsiding in quite plural and local ways with a cosmic floor woven of particles in their dynamic relations.\(^{38}\)

Finally, as has already been said, Sellars differs from Lloyd Morgan in that the latter is frankly theistic. For Morgan, not only does the universe as a whole evolve, but it evolves by virtue of a "scheme."\(^{39}\) It is not independent and self-explanatory, and emergence occurs simply because behind it all and in it all there is God "as directive activity within a scheme which aims at constructive consistency."\(^{40}\)

And this leads to Sellars' humanism, the third characteristic of the system. Holding that nature is self-existent and independent, and endowing matter with creative powers, Sellars, as has been seen, of course must reject theism. The hypothesis of God fails "to explain the facts to which it is relevant"—chiefly the facts of evil,\(^{41}\) and besides there is a woeful lack of direct evidence for supernatural activity.\(^{42}\) Purpose and the realization of ends there is

40. Ibid., 33.
41. Sellars, NSR, 160.
42. Sellars, RSC, 147-148.
indeed in nature, but it is only an empirical teleology such as one finds in the functioning of organisms. It is local and relative. To attempt to postulate teleology as relevant to nature as a whole, in terms of guidance from a supernatural Agent or agents is to go beyond what the facts warrant.43 "There is no central, brooding Will which has planned it all."44 Nevertheless, Sellars believes in values, that is he accepts them as facts which cannot and must not be reduced to the merely quantitative as the old materialism was in the habit of doing. Valuation is "an intrinsic aspect of living."45 The "world of valuation" is as real on its own right as the "world of description."46 But values are in no sense transcendent; that is they have their origin and root and abode only in the soil of human life. They have no cosmic rootage.47 It is at this point that Sellars' humanism enters.

Religion is loyalty to the values of life. The idea of the spiritual must be broadened and humanized to include all these purposes, experiences and activities which express man's nature. The spiritual must be seen to be the fine flower of living, which requires no other sanctions than its own inherent worth and appeal. We must outgrow the false notion that religion is inseparable from supernatural objects, and that the spiritual is something alien to man which must be forced upon him.

43. Sellars, EN, 337-338. 44. Ibid., 343.
45. Sellars, FPP, 451. 46. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
47. Sellars, FPP, 464-469.
from the outside. The spiritual is man at his best, man loving, daring, creating, fighting loyally and courageously for causes dear to him.48

iii. Relation to the Older Forms of Materialism and Naturalism

Materialism like idealism has had a long history. As all forms of idealism can be traced back to Plato so likewise all forms of materialism and naturalism find their source in Democritus who about 420 B. C. taught that "only the atoms and the void are real."49 Materialism has varied greatly throughout its history, but its ultimate principle of explanation has always been matter conceived in some fashion after the manner of Democritus. Throughout its history it has been far more successful in attacking the weaknesses of idealism than in establishing its own system as a comprehensive philosophy. Old-fashioned materialism with its hard atoms, not unlike pellets of shot, has proven incapable of explaining such facts as order, organization, interaction, novelty, mind, values. In sheer desperation to save its own system from total collapse, it has usually attempted either to deny these facts or to explain them as accidental and chance occurrences without any real rootage in reality. But the idealist could always retort that, in so doing, materialism was not empirical in its treatment of

whole fields of human experience; and more fundamentally still the idealist could insist that since mind is known directly and immediately while matter is known only secondarily and mediately and always in terms of mind, that mind must therefore be the more real of the two. Thus old-fashioned materialism was never able to meet the idealist in fair and open combat, especially after Berkeley's devastating attack. More will be said about this in the chapters which follow.

However old-fashioned materialism lingered until the advent of modern physics. Modern physics with its electromagnetic theory of matter gave the older form of materialism its deathblow beyond all hope of recovery. After discussing the revolutionary changes in the conception of the atom, Eddington adds: "Whatever further changes of view are in prospect, a reversion to the old substantial atom is unthinkable." As a result materialism has either had to close shop or else undergo a radical transformation. It is in answer to this challenge that systems such as those of Roy Wood Sellars and S. Alexander have arisen.

Sellars never tires of emphasizing the differences between his system and that of the older materialists. He would not agree with Democritus that "only the atoms and the void are real"—that is the atoms interpreted in the 50. Eddington, NPW, 3.
sense of hard shotlike pellets. As has been pointed out
Sellars rejects the older forms of materialism and natural-
ism which sought to reduce all the rich and varied facts of
the world to the bare facts of physics. He also seeks to
interpret his "reformed materialism," as he sometimes calls
his evolutionary naturalism, in a way that is consistent
with modern physics.

It goes without saying that I am not
seeking to resurrect an outmoded type
linked inseparably with an outgrown
form of physics, Democritean or classi-
cal. No; it must be a reformed material-
ism; it must be a kind of materialism
which is philosophically and scientific-
ally sophisticated.\footnote{51}

Sellars' epistemology is closely related to his metaphysics.
Thus in reinterpreting matter he relies on his epistemology.
Since he is a critical realist, he holds that matter is not
and cannot be intuited as a stuff. The most that the human
mind can do is to interpret the given sense data by means
of ideas. Therefore the result is not the intuition of a
stuff, or hard atoms, but rather a thing is apprehended in
terms of its essential properties and its essential charac-
teristics. In his interesting article, "Dewey on Material-
ism," Sellars says, in opposition to Dewey's rejection of
epistemology and metaphysics:

\textit{My own line of procedure...was to inte-
grate epistemology and ontology in terms
of a physical realism based on the dis-}

\footnote{51. Sellars, \textit{Phil. and Phen. Res.}, 3(1943), 361.}
tinction between sensing and a denotative and characterizing perceiving. I was thereupon led to take such categories as substance, causality, space, time, organization, and emergence seriously and to move in the direction of a reformed, qualitatively, and differentiated materialism. 52

Again, in his outstanding book, *The Philosophy of Physical Realism*, he says:

One of the past weaknesses of materialism was its epistemological simplicity. In this respect it was very like classic physics, as Eddington has pointed out. The ontological imagination was stultified at the start by an almost perceptual pictorialism of microscopic billiard balls. Both physicist and philosopher are agreed to-day that scientific knowledge is abstract and conceptual and that there is no such intuition of being as was once supposed. 53

It will be readily seen then, that Sellars attempts to square his ontology, his conception of matter with the facts of physics by means of his epistemology, just as over against the old materialism he makes room for values and for mind and novelty in general by means of the doctrine of emergence. "The physicalism of which I am going to give an exposition demands an approach through critical realism and the theory of emergent patterns." 54 This statement is fundamental for the understanding of Sellars' system.

As has been made clear, Sellars is everywhere critical of the old materialism. Yet he avows his intellectual kinship,

52. Ibid., 382.
53. Sellars, Ibid., 5.
54. Sellars, Ibid., 5.
otherwise he would not call his own system, "a reformed materialism." In what then does this kinship consist? He himself asks the same question and answers it as follows:

But why materialism? My answer is that I believe in ontology, in a theory of existence; and I know of no other term which, in the last analysis, is more candid, more indicative of a readiness on the part of naturalism to grapple with ontology, then the term materialism....If material things exist, we must be either materialists or dualists.55

The new or reformed materialism is akin to the old first of all in the fact of the use of the term matter, even if, as has been seen, it means by matter, a glorified, almost mystical entity.56 Nothing is more important in understanding this reformed materialism than to grasp its conception of the nature of matter, but at this most essential point Sellars is not too clear. On the one hand he "would give existential status to atoms and electrons;"57 on the other hand he insists, as has been shown that the human mind can never really grasp the ultimate nature of things, but only their characteristics and properties as such are disclosed to mind through ideas. This rightly provokes the very relevant question of Brightman;

When you say, 'why materialism,' you seem to me to avoid a very important issue. If by material you mean only

'extra-mental' (i.e.) beyond the human mind, all idealists believe in matter; if you mean something absolutely non-mental, as I think you do, you should say so. 58

In short Sellars' conception of matter does not seem to be too clear. But in his most realistic moods he conceives matter in terms of basic structures out of which the complexity of the universe arises, and which endure as simply organized systems. He speaks of these as "primary endurants which form what I called secondary endurants," which, however, must not be "pictorized in billiard-ball terms." 59

Again he speaks of these atoms "particles in their dynamic relations," and as such composing the "cosmic floor" from which more complex structures arise. 60 It seems evident, then, that while Sellars rejects the hard solid atoms of Democritus he certainly does hold that material atoms really exist in their own right and that they possess the marvelous creative power which nature displays. In so far as he holds to matter as something non-mental and as the final principle of explanation he is certainly related to Democritus and can rightly call his system, "reformed materialism."

In so far as Sellars recognizes mind with its capacities as unique and creative, and efficacious he certainly breaks with the old materialism. But in the final analysis he makes mind absolutely dependent on the physical, on the

60. Ibid., 380.
In sports competition, especially in track and field events, to win or lose is not the sole criterion by which success or failure is measured. It is the spirit and effort put forth that truly matters.

"Victory is not just about winning or losing, but rather about the journey and the experience. It's about pushing our limits, learning from our mistakes, and growing as athletes." - Unknown

"The greatest victories are those won within ourselves, not a medal but the feeling of accomplishment and the pride of knowing we gave our best." - Unknown

"Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts." - Winston Churchill

"We may not always succeed, but we can always try. The only way to achieve success is to take the first step. No matter how small it may seem, every step brings us closer to our goal." - Unknown
brain, and on the physical order of which the brain is a part. The following passages taken from various writings are interesting confirmations of this fact. "Consciousness is in the brain in the sense that it is part of the nature of the brain when it is functioning." 61 "To me with my view of the identity of mind and brain, spirits are impossible," 62 "The mind as a continuant is the brain and the brain is spatial and in spatial relations with other physical systems." 63 "The mind is the brain as known in its functioning." 64 Finally, "that which is physical is real, and that which is real is physical." 65 In other words like Democritus, and the whole school of older materialists, Sellars holds that mind as such has no real or metaphysical standing. It is but an aspect of matter upon which it is finally absolutely dependent. This gives point to Professor Pratt's contention that Sellars has done nothing "to help Materialism out of its old dilemma of being forced either to identify consciousness with the brain or to deny its efficacy." 66

iv. Summary

Before turning to the discussion of the various systems of idealism which Sellars criticizes it may be well to give a brief summary of his system in terms of the following theses. First, relative to his epistemology:

61. Sellars, CR, 59. 64. Sellars, EN, 300.
63. Sellars PPR, 434. 66. Pratt, MAS, 46.
(1). The object exists apart from the mind as something separate and distinct.

(2). Knowing is a relation then, between two realities, mind and object—epistemological dualism.

(3). Things cannot be directly intuited, but their essential properties and characteristics can be denoted.

(4). Knowledge is essentially interpretation in which the mind selects its objects and mediates the characteristics of such by means of ideas.

Second, relative to his metaphysics:

(1). It constitutes a frank rejection of the older forms of materialism in so far as it sought to reduce mind and values to the level of physics.

(2). It is naturalistic pluralism resting on the self-sufficiency of the natural order as composed of certain very simple, basic enduring structures out of which all else arises.

(3). It seeks to explain mind in terms of the inner functioning of the brain and thus making it merely in the last analysis an attribute and a form of physical process.

(4). While holding to values as germane and essential to man and to human life, yet it conceives them as having no reality or meaning apart from man in the sense of cosmic rootage.

(5). Matter is endowed with a creative power which finds expression in the facts of emergent evolution.
CHAPTER II
PHILOSOPHIC IDEALISM

1. Significance and Meaning

In order to understand and evaluate Sellars' criticisms of idealism properly, an understanding of idealism in general, and of its many particular types becomes imperative. Now, as Brightman has pointed out, "it would be safer to admit that it is impossible to define the generic term idealism with precision."¹ On page 1 of this dissertation idealism was designated as the system which holds that the world is an expression of mind, more exactly idealism is the belief that reality is of the nature of mind, and that values are objective. If mind is taken in the very broad sense of the psychical this definition will be inclusive enough to cover all types of idealism, including types such as that of Bradley in which reality is conceived in terms of a unity of experience or feeling. Perhaps the best working definition of idealism is the following proposed by Brightman: "All idealism is characterized by belief in the ultimate reality or cosmic significance either of mind (using the term in the broadest sense) or of ideals and values revealed to and prized by mind."²

Since idealism tends to regard reality as of the nature of mind or idea the charge of solipsism is sometimes brought

1. Brightman, POI,172. 2. Ibid.,172.
against it. But aside from certain indiscreet expressions on the part of idealists this charge is groundless as far as the fundamentals of idealism are concerned.

Idealism...which is confessedly monistic, need not be subjective; acknowledged idealists deny the reduction of the world to a phase of one's mind....The differentia of idealism from subjectivism is the belief in a Great Mind who is more than any of us; subjectivism fixes upon the private mind as the last term in metaphysics.®

Arthur Schopenhauer came perhaps as close to solipsism as any idealist. He begins his book, The World as Will and Idea, with the strange words:

"The world is my idea"--this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness.®

But that Schopenhauer is not a solipsist is evident from the fact that he holds that something lies back of nature and produces it--the Idea, the Will.® Leibniz and Berkeley too have been accused of solipsism, but as will be seen in the discussion of their philosophy, both taught the dependence of nature and of human minds upon a Supreme Mind. Consequently it will be maintained throughout the dissertation that any identification of idealism with solipsism on the part of naturalists or realists rests on a mistaken notion of the real nature of idealism.

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integration to provide the best service possible. The company's mission is to

deliver quality products and services to our clients while maintaining ethical

principles. We are committed to developing long-term relationships with our

customers and partners.

In order to achieve our goals, we continuously seek feedback from our customers

and make improvements accordingly. Our team is dedicated to providing excellent

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and are committed to addressing any concerns promptly.
The word idealism, as Hocking has said, is perhaps not the best one to express the great historic system under consideration. Hocking thinks that mentalism or spiritualism might serve better. It is interesting to note that Sellars uses the latter term as a synonym for idealism in general. In fact he goes so far as to say that it might be a better term in view of the fact that "idealism has come to be identified in exact philosophy with epistemological idealism," and also because it has been associated too much with "ethical and religious idealism, that is, with eulogistic attitudes, to serve well as a technical metaphysical expression." However, as Hocking observes, spiritualism, too, has "been drafted to other uses." At any rate the term idealism is "so embedded in the history of philosophy" that any attempt to eradicate it will probably fail. Consequently the time-honored name will be retained in the dissertation.

2. Origin and Development

Though the term idealism was first used in the Seventeenth Century, yet idealism, as a philosophy has its roots much farther back in the past. In fact it is not too much to say that it can be traced back to its source in primitive animism—"the belief in mental agencies as causing natural phenomena"—man's first trembling step toward

7. Sellars, EN, 15, 84.  
8. Sellars, PPP, 192.  
9. Hocking, TOP, 249  
11. Hocking, TOP, 252.
philosophy.

It would seem that from a very remote period men of almost all races have entertained the belief that the living man differs from the corpse in that his body contains some more subtle thing or principle which determines its purposive movements, its growth and self-repair, and to which is due his capacity for sensation, thought, and feeling. For the belief in some such animating principle, or soul, is held by almost every existing race of men, no matter how lowly their grade of culture nor how limited their mental powers; and we find evidences of a similar belief among the earliest human records.12

Idealism has had a long and worthy history. Long does not exaggerate when he says:

Inasmuch as pure or basic Materialism has been an infrequent doctrine among major thinkers, the history of philosophy broadly understood, is largely the history of idealism.13

There are intimations of idealism in Xenophanes, the Theological Eleatic who flourished 570-480 B.C.,14 especially in the following passage:

There is one god, supreme among gods and men; resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind. The whole of him sees, the whole of him thinks, the whole of him hears. Without toil he rules all things by the power of his mind.15

There are intimations of idealism likewise in Anaxagoras

who flourished about 428 B.C. According to this pioneer of thought, "Mind knows all things", and "mind also regulated all things." Plato, who will be discussed later, may be said to have given the world the first comprehensive philosophical system, a system which in spite of realistic and dualistic elements, yet is basically idealistic.

However idealism in its most characteristically modern form did not appear until the Seventeenth Century. It can be said to have begun with the speculations of Descartes and Locke. As has already been made clear, idealism tends to emphasize the significance of mind as the clue to reality, as the explanation of the universe. It owes a great debt to Descartes, in that he clearly brought to the modern mind the significance of self-consciousness as the starting point for philosophy. Being able to doubt all else, he found it impossible to doubt the existence of the doubter. This basic fact was assumed in the very act of doubting. "I am, I exist, that is certain." This together with the persistence of ideas coming to him from without leads him to the farther fact, the existence of an external world, and of God. But there is a basic dualism in Descartes which he is never able to overcome, namely that existing between mind and nature, and mind and body. His philosophy is only

16. Thilly, HOP, 33. 18. Descartes, MEP, 78
a half-way house to idealism.

Taking his cue from Descartes as to the primacy of thought, of idea, Locke went a step farther and insisted that thought has ideas as its objects. There are no innate ideas. "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters without any ideas." How then is knowledge possible, according to Locke? His answer is that ideas come through experience. Objects impress themselves upon our senses which in turn gives rise to ideas as representations of objects. But one can know objects only through these ideas which are externally aroused. Locke also denied the objectivity of secondary qualities, but held on to the objectivity of primary qualities as being inherent in the substances underlying objects. Consciousness of these primary qualities arises in the mind through direct impressions upon it. Locke's reduction of secondary qualities to subjective factors and his theory that thought has ideas as its objects, lead to the mentalism of Berkeley, in whom idealism appears for the first time in a pure form. As is well known the mentalism of Berkeley in turn aroused the sensationalism of Hume, and Hume served to awaken Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers," which lead to the Critical Philosophy. The Critical Philosophy in its turn provoked the movement which, beginning with Fichte

19. Locke, EHU, Book II, 121.
20. Ibid., 122-125.
22. Kant, PTPM, 7.
reached its logical conclusion in the absolute or logical or organic idealism of Hegel and his school. The excesses of the absolutists finally lead to the rise of personalism which drawing elements from Berkeley, Leibniz, Hegel and Kant, as well as from Plato and the great Hebrew Christian tradition, may well be termed the culmination of the whole idealistic movement. And as such, it will be seen that it bears the brunt of Sellars' criticisms of the metaphysics of idealism though he calls it by name only a few times.\(^3\)

3. Principles of Classification

Idealism, as has been seen, is hard to define, for it is a great stem from which many shoots have sprung. Some of them are so distinct that it is hard to recognize them as belonging to the same parent-stem. What contrast could be greater than that between personalism on the one hand which finds the clue to reality in the self-conscious self, and Bradley's system on the other which looks upon the self as mere appearance, and thinks of the highest reality as an unconscious, impersonal Absolute? Plato's system, Berkeley's mentalism, Kant's Critical Philosophy, Hegel's absolutism, and personalism all have a right to the name idealism. All are anti-materialistic and regard reality as basically mental or psychical as at least dependent on mind, as in the case of Kant.

Perhaps the two best classifications of idealism are

\(^2\) See, for example, Sellars, PPR, vii.
those of Hoernle and Brightman. It is interesting to note that both divide idealism into four chief forms. According to Hoernle, idealism consists of the following:

(a) Spiritual Pluralism, which interprets Reality as a Society of Spirits; (b) Spiritual Monism, which interprets Reality as the manifestation, or objectification of a single Spiritual Energy. (c) Critical (Kantian) Idealism, which avoids offering a theory of Reality but makes clear that every form of experience, because of the universal and necessary principles of 'Reason' in it, has a contribution to make to the theory of Reality. (d) Absolute Idealism, which attempts a synthetic, or synoptic, interpretation of Reality in the light of its various 'appearances.'

"There are...," says Brightman, "at least four main types of idealism."

The first, the Platonic, asserts the objectivity of value. The second, the Berkeleyan, holds that all knowable reality, and perhaps all reality überhaupt, is of the nature of consciousness. The third, the Hegelian, points to the coherence of one absolute system as the only true value of existence. The fourth, the Lotzean, finds in selfhood or personality an ultimate fact of fundamental significance.

Both classifications have their merits, and their defects. Hoernle's is especially deficient in not having a place for Platonism, and in separating (b) from (d). Again in Brightman's classification the place of Leibniz's philosophy, which is certainly a form of idealism, is not clear, though

privately he has informed the student that he regards it as a form of the Lotzean. Consequently in the pages that follow, both classifications will be made use of. The classification will be as follows, first Platonism, second Berkeleyan mentalism, third speculative, divided into two branches, the Kantian and the Hegelian, and fourth, personalism with its two kinds, the pluralistic of Leibniz, and the Lotzean.

4. A Brief Consideration of the Four Chief Types
   i. Platonic Idealism

Plato was the first great idealist who made any attempt at the formulation of a comprehensive system. In the earlier stages of his thought he seems to have been less idealistic than in his later. In his earlier stages he is more realistic, as for example, in the stress that he laid on the forms and other realistic factors. Again in the earlier stages of his thought his conception of God as Mind is not nearly so explicit as in his latter. His conception of God in The Republic, and especially his relation to the forms is far less clear. Though in one place Plato speaks of them as created by God, there are other passages in which one gains the impression that they exist external to Him.26 However in The Laws, he is more definitely ideal-

26. Compare, Rep., Book X, 597b with Book V, 476a, where Beauty is spoken of as an essence, also with VI, 508 where the Good is almost deified.
istic in the modern sense.

Soul is prior to body, body secondary and derivative, soul governing in the real order of things and body being subject to governance....Soul, then, by her own motions stirs all things in sky, earth, or sea.27

But Plato to the last remains a dualist or pluralist.

"Plato is a dualist or pluralist. The Receptacle (certainly) and the Pattern (probably) are external to God."28 The conception of the ideas or patterns or forms and other factors beside God constitute the unique element in Platonic philosophy which have served to distinguish it from other forms of idealism. But Plato's insistence on the primacy of mind, and on the objectivity of value, and his opposition to materialism certainly mark him as the first great idealist.

Plato has been and continues to be an influence to be reckoned with, not only in philosophy as such, but in the general stream of thought which nourishes life. Sellars is right in pointing to Plato's influence on the Transcendentalist Movement in American Literature.29 No one can understand modern idealism adequately without first tracing the course of this mighty river back to Plato. It is interesting to note that Sellars recognizes Platonism and Kantianism as his two chief enemies.

29. Sellars, PPP, 434-437.
As we pass from problem to problem, we shall see that the two great enemies of an evolutionary naturalism are Platonism and Kantianism. Both deny this self-explanatory character of nature. In a sense, they are both supernaturalistic. They desire to transcend space.

ii. Berkeleian Mentalism

Berkeley's revolutionary philosophy embodies three fundamental concepts, his conception of matter, his conception of God, and his conception of the nature and status of human spirits. Now philosophers since the days of the Greeks had conceived matter as real in one of two ways. Those who followed Democritus conceived it in terms of indivisible atoms, the stuff of the universe, of which all things were made, even minds. Idealistic philosophers on the other hand tended to conceive it after the manner of Aristotle as a substratum. This substratum was thought of as a core of being which held together the accidents or qualities of things, and as persisting amid all change as the absolutely fixed abiding center of being. Locke in his Essay on Human Understanding separated primary from secondary qualities. The latter such as hot, light, color, taste, pain he regarded as subjective, produced in the individual as an effect of things. But primary qualities he conceived as inquiring in things. Bulk, figure, number, situation and motion and rest are really existent in things. At the basis

30. Sellars, EN, 2.
of things there is substance, an unknown and unknowable thing which must be postulated as the "support" of the primary qualities. Berkeley goes a step further than Locke. Locke admitted that substance is unknown and unknowable. Berkeley, while retaining spiritual substance, rejects substance altogether in the sense of a mysterious material support or a core of being holding together the qualities of things. The only substance which he admits as the support of things is spirit. "That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident." Berkeley dissolves things into sensations. He utterly rejects Locke's division of qualities into primary and secondary. The former are as subjective as the latter. As a matter of fact the human mind does not know primary qualities as existing objectively in things. Such are known only as sensations arising within the mind itself. "Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities." Things are just as they are experienced in the perceiving mind. "Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them." However there are two kinds of ideas, active and passive. The

34. Ibid., 31-36.
former are due to the will of the individual and can be excited and shifted at pleasure,37 but the latter the individual must receive as given, for such are none other than the unchangeable order of nature "the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author."38

For Berkeley, then, since material reality is given in terms of idea and in no other way, it is idea. As a result Berkeley, as was stated on page 23 of this dissertation, has been frequently charged with solipsism. But this has been due to a misunderstanding of his system. Back of the fixed ideas there is God who causes these ideas to arise. There is a fixed order in the ideas due to the activity of God upon minds. This order remains as unchangeable and constant as for the most confirmed materialist, and what is more such an order is certainly far more intelligible.39 Without God, the Supreme Person, Berkeley's whole system would be left hanging in the air, but grounded in the purpose and activity of God, it needs no other ground of support.

Finally there is his conception of human spirits. Matter is nothing more than an orderly series of sensations, but the same is not true of human spirits. "I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that

37. Ibid., 273.
39. Berkeley, DHP, 62-64, also PHK, 273-274.
perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas." In other words as God is the Supreme Agent, so likewise human spirits in their limited fashion are also agents, and not mere complexes of sensations after the manner of things. A self is not an idea, but a being capable of having and using ideas.

Berkeley has been discussed at length for three obvious reasons. First, because of the purity of his idealism. He absolutely disposes of the materialistic concept of matter. Second, because of his emphasis on the nature and unique status of personality. He is a personalist before Lotze and Bowne, though most personalists would refuse to follow him in his epistemological idealism. Third, next to Kant there is no philosopher whom Sellars criticizes more frequently and more thoroughly, for he realizes that he cannot vanquish idealism until he first disposes of Berkeley.

iii. Speculative Idealism
(1). The Critical Idealism of Kant

No modern philosopher with the possible exception of Hegel has been more influential than Immanuel Kant. In Kant both "idealistic and realistic tendencies are at work." Though second to none in emphasizing the dynamic power of mind, yet Kant definitely rejected epistemological idealism. He criticizes idealism for assuming that "the only immediate

40. Berkeley DHP, 95.
41. Paton, KME, 68.
experience is inner experience," and contends that there is a permanent element in perception which is not of the mind's making, but to which the mind must of necessity conform.42

However, in spite of his emphatic rejection of epistemological idealism Kant is essentially an idealist. Both Brightman and Hoernle classify him as such,43 and Ewing even goes so far as to say, "He was indeed, much more than Berkeley, who had hardly any followers prior to Kant, the founder of the 'idealist school'"44 Likewise Pringle-Pattison designates Kant as an idealist in the "metaphysical sense."

The Kantian scheme might, indeed, be described as idealism in the metaphysical sense, inasmuch as it regards the kingdom of ends--the ethical commonwealth of self-legislating spirits--as the noumenal world or ultimate reality, of which the world of sense is the phenomenalization.45

Finally Sellars in recognizing Platonism and Kantianism as the "two great enemies" of evolutionary naturalism, designates them both supernaturalistic, that is idealistic in the metaphysical sense. "Both deny this self-explanatory character of nature. In a sense they are both supernaturalistic. They desire to transcend space."46

An analysis of Kant shows at least four idealistic

42. Kant, CPR, B275-276.
43. Brightman, POI, 170, Hoernle, IAP, 306.
44. Ewing, "Kantianism," in Runes, TCP, 258.
46. Sellars, BN, 2.
elements. First, there is his emphasis on the dynamic creative nature and role of mind in the organization of experience. At times in fact Kant is definitely a self-psychologist.  

Second, at times he hints at an idealistic doctrine of things-in-themselves as the result of the Divine energizing.  

Third, as Smith in his excellent Commentary to Kant's Critique insists, the modern theory of coherence so closely identified with idealism has its beginning in Kant.  

Fourth, and in a real sense most evident of all, as Pringle-Pattison points out, there is Kant's ethical theistic idealism. The pure practical reason links man with the kingdom of ends with the real order of things which lies back of the phenomenal order, and finds it an order of Mind. As Kant himself puts it:

Thus the moral law, by means of the conception of the summum bonum...as the object of a pure practical reason, determines the concept of the First Being as the Supreme Being; a thing which the physical (and in its higher development the metaphysical); in other words, the whole speculative course of reason, was unable to effect. The conception of God, then, is one that belongs originally not to physics, i.e. to speculative reason, but to morals.

However, in spite of the presence of these genuine idealistic elements, which make Kant essentially an idealist, yet

47. See especially, Kant, CPR, B32-136.  
48. Ibid., B567-569.  
49. Smith, Ckpr, xxxviii-xxxix.  
The text on this page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to contain a paragraph of text, but the content is not discernible from the provided image.
he is not a pure idealist like Berkeley. Recognition must be given to the fact which Paton points that in Kant both "idealistic and realistic tendencies are at work."\(^52\)

(2). Absolute Idealism

Absolute idealism is singularistic or monistic in the quantitative sense. Reality is conceived as organic, the parts and phases of which are a part of the all-inclusive One, the Absolute. Absolute idealism went through five stages of development. The first is found in Fichte, who rejecting Kant's thing-in-themselves, made the self-conscious self his primary metaphysical principle.\(^53\) But Fichte took from Kant the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, and conceives the universe of finite beings as united under the dominion of one sovereign Will.\(^54\) Fichte, while reminding one of Descartes in his emphasis upon self-consciousness, yet definitely rejects all dualism. Matter does not exist apart from mind. "Reason alone exists; the Infinite in Himself,—the finite in Him and through Him. Only in our minds has he created a world."\(^55\) For Fichte the whole theater of nature exists but for one purpose, the realization of duty.\(^56\)

The second stage of the development of absolute idealism came with Schelling. This in reality represented a turning

52. Paton, KME, 68.
54. Ibid., Ill, 151-154.
55. Ibid., 158.
56. Ibid., 161-162.
back to Spinoza; for Schelling conceived the Absolute impersonally, as "complete indifference." The third step came with Hegel who along with Plato, Aristotle and Kant shares the honor of being one of the greatest minds that humanity has produced. In Hegel absolute idealism, which in its modern form at least begins with Fichte, finds its classic expression and realization.

The consummation of this whole rich and varied development is formed by Hegel's logical idealism. He signified in the main a return from Schelling to Fichte, a giving up of the thought that the living wealth of the world can be derived or deduced from the 'Nothing of absolute indifference.'

The central idea of Hegel's system is that Reality is an organic Whole, the parts of which considered in isolation are mere abstractions, and can be understood only relative to the Whole. "The truth is the whole." It is not a static whole as is often supposed. "It is self-becoming, self-development." Nor is reality a mere flux. It is a dialectical process in which Spirit, representing the higher rational and spiritual capacities, is ever seeking fuller expression, and fuller realization. Again it is a rational process heading toward a goal, and that goal is Freedom, conceived not in terms of caprice but in terms of a state of affairs in which the highest capacities of man will

57. Windelband, EOP, 608. 60. Ibid., 11, 16.
find the fullest possible realization. The dynamic factor behind the whole process, the all-inclusive unity in which it is embraced, and in a sense the goal toward which it is heading is the Absolute, who is ever seeking fuller and fuller expression of His inexhaustibly rich potentialities.

Sometimes Hegel makes it appear that this Absolute is the blind impersonal All of pantheism, a return to Spinoza. But a consideration of Hegel's system as a Whole with its emphasis upon Reason and Purpose weighs the balance in the direction of a possibly more personalistic conception of the Absolute. However Hegel is not clear at this point and as a result two well known schools of Hegelians have appeared, one emphasizing the personalistic elements and the other the impersonalistic.

The fourth type of absolute idealism is that of thinkers such as Bradley. Following in the footsteps of Hegel, Bradley uses the synoptic method and seeks the ideal of seeing reality as an organic Whole. But Bradley out-hegels Hegel. He is not as empirical and concrete as Hegel. He has little regard for history but builds his system upon logic, upon the principle of coherence. "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion." Anything and everything which is contradictory and relative belongs to the realm of appearance. It pos-

62. Hegel, POH, 34-35; Also 101. 64. Hegel, POM, Vol.II, 330-331
63. Ibid., 101.
sesses a relative existence and reality, but no absolute or ultimate reality. Bradley takes up one thing after another, beginning with secondary and primary qualities, then material things, space and time, and ending up with mind and values, and by critical examination and analysis reveals contradictions which relegate each in its turn to the limbo of appearance. No naturalist has ever dealt more severely with the concept of the self than Bradley, the idealist.\textsuperscript{66} Sellars, the naturalist, does far more justice to the facts of mind.\textsuperscript{67} For Bradley, in short, nothing is truly real except the all-embracing Absolute, conceived as the totality of experience. "That Reality is one system which contains in itself all experience."\textsuperscript{68} Relations for Bradley are internal so that he can easily imagine all distinctions as mere appearances which are broken down and transcended in the Absolute so as to form a harmonious Whole. "Reality, consists... in a higher experience, superior to the distinctions which it includes and overrides."\textsuperscript{69} In the Absolute good and evil, truth and error and all the distinctions of our ordinary human experience somehow flow together as many rivers flow into the sea and lose their identity.

The fifth type of absolute idealism is the personalistic. Those absolutists taking their cue from the personalistic element in Hegel develop personalistic absolutisms. Among

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 101-102, 81, 94, 119.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Sellars, EN, 16-18.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Bradley, AAR, 536.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 195.
\end{itemize}
to explain to the President how nonaggressive war might be conducted, and how it might be won.

When we consider the great and important interest of the advancement of knowledge, and the prevention of its stagnation, we cannot but feel the pressing necessity of bringing to light the truth, and exposing the fallacies of all parties. It is for the advancement of science that we must strive, and the cause of knowledge is the cause of humanity. The progress of science is the progress of civilization, and the progress of civilization is the progress of humanity. It is for the advancement of science that we must strive, and the cause of knowledge is the cause of humanity. The progress of science is the progress of civilization, and the progress of civilization is the progress of humanity.
these none are more typical than Josiah Royce and Hocking. For both the Absolute is conceived as the world Self embracing all other selves as parts who yet, however maintain their self-identity something like the Gulf Stream maintains its identity in the Atlantic. "There is, then, at last, but one Self, organically, reflectively, consciously inclusive of all the other selves, and so of all truth." 70 "I shall go farther with idealism, and say that the world is a self...Within the Selfhood of substance there is room for all the unfathomed majesty of reality." 71

iv. Personalism

(1). Leibnizian Pluralistic Personalism

It is interesting to note that both Hocking, the idealist, and Sellars, the naturalist regard Leibniz as the "first thorough-going idealist." 72 Many thinkers would seriously question the accuracy of this estimate; for there is a mechanistic or deterministic element in Leibniz, which as Morris rightly puts it: "he never harmonizes with "the main spiritualistic tendency." 73

Leibniz is definitely a pluralist, and a panpsychist. The universe is many. It consists of a hierarchy of monads at the head of which is God. The monads or simple substances owe what degree of perfection they possess to "the influ-

70. Royce, SMP, 379.
71. Hocking, TOP, 440-441.
72. Sellars, EN, 194; Hocking, TOP, 254.
73. Morris, KCRP, 31.
ence of God, but...their imperfections come from their own nature which is incapable of being without limits."74 But having "no windows" the monads should not be able to interact if it were not for the Divine intervention.75 God for Leibniz is "Power, which is the source of all; also knowledge, whose content is the variety of ideas; and finally, Will, which makes changes or products."76 He distinguishes sharply between God's relation to human beings (spirits), and the rest of creation. While ordinary monads according to their capacity can in a measure reflect the universe, spirits are "images of Divinity itself," by virtue of being "capable of knowing the system of the universe." Consequently human beings are capable of entering into a real fellowship with God which is impossible to the rest of creation. The relation of God to human beings then, is not like that of an inventor to the machine which he invents, but more like that of a "prince to his subjects, and indeed, what a father is to his children."77

Both in his stress upon God as Will and as Power, and in his conception of human personality as unique, and as constituting a unique personal relationship to the Creator, Leibniz is definitely personalistic, a personalist before Lotze and Bowne. However he is more definitely and radically pluralistic. In this as well as in the mechanical or

74. Leibniz, TM, 240. 76. Ibid., 244.
75. Ibid., 220-223, 246. 77. Ibid., 266.
deterministic element which appears in his system he differs from the Lotze-Bowne School. 78

(2). The Lotze-Bowne School

In the Lotze-Bowne School of personalism many of the things which are dark in Hegel become clear. For example, Hegel's concept of personality is not too definite. The genius of personalism lies in its insistence that only persons, selves, are metaphysically real.

Thoroughgoing personalism is idealistic. It finds in personality the key to reality. Only the personal is metaphysically real. The material world is phenomenal. 79

The personalist does not speak of "the Ideas" as Plato might or "the Idea," as Hegel does. Ideas are products of mind and have no reality apart from such. Moreover the universe is but the energizing of the Supreme Person, God.

Personalism faces the facts with the hypothesis that the unity of the universe is due to one Supreme Person or Mind, so that all the laws of nature, the relations and interactions of things and persons are dependent on his will and purpose. If unity be conceived as the expression of mind, such unity is compatible with as much difference and plurality as mind is capable of. 80

Personalism of the Lotze-Bowne School is more monistic than Leibniz. It steers between the Charybdis of extreme metaphysical monism and the Scylla of extreme metaphysical

78. Compare Leibniz, TM, 266-268 with Bowne, Met., 137-138.
79. Knudson, POP, 76.
80. Brightman, ITP, 220.
The true value of any education is to equip the learner with the ability to continue learning on their own. This is achieved by fostering curiosity and critical thinking, rather than simply transmitting information. Education should encourage students to question, to explore, and to form their own conclusions. It should equip them with the tools to navigate the complexities of the world, not just the answers to its problems.

In this age of rapid technological advancement, the traditional model of education - one that centers around rote memorization and standardized testing - is becoming increasingly outdated. The focus must shift to more interactive and personalized learning experiences. This will require educators to adapt their teaching methods and to incorporate a variety of tools and technologies to enhance the learning process.

Moreover, the world is becoming more interconnected than ever before. This presents both opportunities and challenges for education. One opportunity is the ability to connect with learners from around the globe, to share ideas and experiences, and to gain new perspectives. The challenge is to ensure that these connections are meaningful and beneficial, and that they do not perpetuate existing inequalities.

In conclusion, education is not just about imparting knowledge. It is about empowering individuals to become lifelong learners, to think critically, and to contribute positively to society. The goal is to equip students with the skills and mindset to navigate the complexities of the world and to make a meaningful impact on the issues that matter most.
pluralism. It seeks to embody the best that is in both Hegel and Leibniz. "We have--apart from personalism--either a block universe or a sawdust universe." Persons for personalism are not in the same category as things. Things are not equally real. Personalism would not agree with Sellars that "stars, plants, ants and human beings are equally real." Persons are created and endowed with a large measure of freedom, while things are produced and have no freedom in the personal sense. The pluralistic tendency in personalism consists in the freedom with which the Supreme Person endows the persons which He creates, so that the universe becomes a society or community instead of a mere order. The monistic element consists in the fact of the recognition of an order in the universe, and that persons, as well as things in the final analysis, are subject to that Order, and wholly dependent upon it, as the expression of the Supreme Person through whom alone, and in whom alone, all things exist.

Modern personalism is closely related to classical theism in three ways. First, in holding to the absoluteness of God in the sense of being "the one independent causal ground of the world," second, in holding to the doctrine of creation, and third, in holding like classical theism to a dualistic theory of knowledge. It differs from the latter

81. Ebid., 220. 83. Bowne, Met., 100-101
82. Sellars, PPR, 6.
in three interesting ways. First, in conceiving nature in purely idealistic terms. Nature for personalism does not have the "quasi-independent" existence that it is inclined to have for traditional theism. Second, personalism lays more stress on personality as the ontologically real. Third, while traditional theism has been more rationalistic, personalism is inclined to be more voluntaristic.®

It lays more stress on the will than the intellect and inclines to the view that life is deeper than logic."®

Though relatively modern as a distinct philosophical movement, yet as a tendency personalism is as old as philosophy itself. Flewelling finds personalistic elements as far back as Heraclitus.

The trend toward naming qualities of personality as ultimate reality began at least as early as Heraclitus (536-470 B.C.) who affirmed mind as the fundamentally real because it alone had the power to differentiate itself from the objective world and from its own experiences.®

But personalism is even more evident in Anaxagoras as Flewelling recognizes.

These personalistic elements appear also in the cosmogony of Anaxagoras (500-430 B.C.) who gave philosophy an anthropocentric trend by affirming that mind is the foundation of existence, the force which arranges and guides.®

84. Knudson, POP, 64-67.
85. Ibid., 67.
86. Flewelling, "Personalism," in Runes, TOP, 327.
87. Ibid., 327.
Regarding modern personalism it has been truly said:

Roughly speaking, it owes its spiritual individualism and activism to Leibnitz, its immaterialism to Berkeley, its epistemology and ethical conception of personality to Kant, and its general and distinctive formulation to Lotze.88

Lotze holds that God is a self-conscious Being, and that the Laws of nature are but His ways of acting. Moreover for Lotze as for personalists generally not only are "minds Real," but "all that is Real is mind."89 Moreover Lotze as Bowne after his emphasized the idea that abstractions have no reality apart from mind, and do not exist as conditions upon which mind is dependent for its reality. Mind for Lotze is the deepest, the most basic reality. This is the very essence of personalism. Lotze had a tremendous influence both in England and in America. In fact Knudson goes so far as to say:

It is largely to his influence that the revival of atheism during the past thirty or forty years is due, a revival so marked that it is acknowledged to be the most striking movement in contemporary philosophy of religion.90

In America personalism was especially developed by Bowne who further purged the concept of personality from substantialistic elements, "grounded it in the Kantian epistemology, developed its implications in a comprehensive way, and made it the center and constitutive principle of a

88. Knudson, POP, 62.  
90. Knudson, POP, 62.
...
complete metaphysical system." 91 Personalism continues as one of the most vigorous philosophical movements in the world today. In England the influence of personalists such as James Ward, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, H. Rashdall, W. R. Sorley, C. C. Webb and others has been tremendous. Likewise Charles Renouvier in France and Rudolf Eucken in Germany have made impressions which continue. In America the two chief centers of the movement are Boston University, where Knudson, Brightman and DeWolf exercise a great influence, and the University of Southern California where Ralph T. Flewelling is the directing figure. E. S. Brightman's conception of God as Infinite-finite, God as containing an irrational element, "The Given," is an interesting variation and one of the most unique and interesting solutions of the problem of evil ever attempted in the whole history of the personalistic movement. 92

Personalism has been discussed at length for two reasons. First, because it seems to be the system in which idealism must culminate when all the facts are taken into consideration. Both Plato and Kant represent a hopeless dualism which they never transcend. Hegel is vague at the place of greatest concern, the nature and status of individual personality. Bradley does violence to the most concrete and evident facts of human experience in attempting to dissolve

91. Ibid., 85-86
92. Brightman, POR, 336-337.
the riches and glories of the universe in a colorless Absolute, termed the totality of experience. How experience is possible apart from a mind or self, Bradley never really made clear. Again Berkeley was skating on thin ice when he insisted that the world is no more than a series of presentations which the Divine Mind makes to the human. He needed to ground his thinking in the idea of the world as the Divine energizing, and as consequently something more than mere presentations. Thus he might have saved his system from the constant charge of subjectivism. In short, personalism in its concept of the Self as not only thinking, but willing, active, creative, and space and time transcending seems to represent idealism at its best, and as such constitutes the greatest challenge to naturalism today.

The second reason for emphasizing personalism is that Sellars recognizes that the greatest challenge to his system is the mind-body problem, along with the problem of value. Personalism more than any other form of idealism emphasizes, as has been shown, the unique status of personality, of the self, as an empirical fact laden with profound metaphysical import. Again personalism realizes the significance and status of values and gives such the place in reality which they seem to demand. In the words of Flewelling:

The cosmic order, being personal is also ethical and the moral mandates are written
into the nature of things. The moral laws are held to be as inexorable in their outworking as any other laws of nature.... Aesthetically, Personalism maintains the cosmic and personal character of the forms of beauty to which normal personality can respond and in which it can find pleasure and self-expression because of an inherent harmony between persons and things.... Values are thus given a standing in the nature of things as certain and as direct as that of natural or physical phenomena.  

Thus the final issue in this dissertation is not between Sellars and Plato, or Kant, or Hegel or Bradley. The final issue is between naturalism at its best as represented by Sellars, and idealism at its best as represented by personalism. Sellars' clashes with the other systems will but be in preparation for the final battle with personalism which will center in the mind-body problem and the closely related problem of value. For the critical naturalist feels himself "on his mettle" \textsuperscript{94} when he approaches the mind-body problem.

It is true, of course, as has been stated before, that Sellars mentions personalism by name only a few times. In fact in his discussion of the mind-body problem he directs his immediate attack against Bergson more directly than against any other philosopher. Bergson is not a thorough-going personalist. There are definite realistic and prag-

\textsuperscript{93} Flewelling, "Personalism," in Runes, TCP, 324-325.  
\textsuperscript{94} Sellars, EN, 286.
It is clear that the main issue is the lack of clarity in the requirements. The project is not properly defined, and the scope is not clearly stated. The team is working without clear goals and objectives. It seems that the project is not well organized, and the resources are not being used effectively.

In order to address these issues, it is recommended to:

1. Conduct a thorough requirements gathering session to clearly define the project scope.
2. Establish clear goals and objectives for the project.
3. Organize the project team and resources effectively.
4. Implement a project management plan to ensure timely delivery of the project.

The project should be re-evaluated to ensure that the necessary changes are made. It is important to address these issues promptly to avoid further delays and cost overruns.
matic tendencies in his philosophy. However, especially when it comes to the mind-body problem he is in many ways in accordance with personalism. In fact in his last book the note is definitely personalistic. However he does not stress personality as a metaphysical principle in the definite as well as comprehensive way that personalists do. Hence the contention that the final battle is between personalism and Sellars' naturalism. But before a discussion of Sellars' criticisms of idealism is attempted some attention must be given to the many points of agreement between his system and idealism. To this important question the next chapter will be given.

95. Bergson, TSMR, 240, 228, 305.
CHAPTER III

FUNDAMENTAL LIKENESSES AND DIFFERENCES OF EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM AND IDEALISM

1. Methodological

One of the fundamental differences between idealism and naturalism is that of method. The idealist stresses synopsis. Convinced with Hegel that "the truth is the whole," he seeks the widest and most inclusive knowledge. The whole of human experience in all of its richness and diversity is his goal. The naturalist like the neorealist, on the other hand, is inclined toward analysis. He is dominated by the idea that the truth can be found by picking things to pieces in the hope of finding simple, ultimate units with which analysis must stop. The modern naturalist is inclined to be an extreme analyst to the extent of belittling reason. John Dewey is at times very strongly inclined in this direction.2

Sellars is decidedly more analytical than the idealists.3 This leads him to find in the atom, not in the old Democritean sense of a hard substance, but in the sense of the simplest form of organized energy, his ultimate principle of explanation. He simply picks matter to pieces with the scientist until he comes to the simplest structures which science at this stage recognizes, the atoms, and then

3. Sellars, EN, 134.
proceeds to take them as his ultimates.\textsuperscript{4} Sellars is more likely to accept the latest conclusions of the sciences as the last court of appeal than is the idealist. He is inclined to be less critical of the sciences. He very greatly admires "science and its methods."\textsuperscript{5} However, as was pointed out in Chapter I, Sellars does not identify philosophy with science or attempt to make philosophy a mere handmaiden of science. Philosophy uses the material of the sciences as its starting point for the purpose of its wider generalizations. Science cannot explain "its own existence and nature."\textsuperscript{6} It makes certain basic assumptions such as the capacity of the human mind to know the world which philosophy alone can justify.\textsuperscript{7} In so far, then, as Sellars does not identify philosophy with the sciences, and even proposes that in certain vital respects science must look to philosophy, he is in harmony with idealistic method. However it still remains true that he is inclined to be less critical of the sciences than is idealism and even to look to science for his ultimates.

Again though Sellars is more analytical than idealists, yet he is at the same time more synthetic than most naturalists. He makes it plain that he holds that it is the business of philosophy to gather together the findings of

\textsuperscript{5} Sellars, Jour. Phil., 41(1944), 543.  
\textsuperscript{6} Sellars, Res., 3(1943), 389, 392.  
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 46
all the sciences and to seek "coherence in their synthesis."\(^8\)

"The philosopher is a synthesist by profession."\(^9\) And again he says: "For me, the task of the philosopher is to analyze concepts and principles and to perform a labor of synthesis."\(^10\) It is in his use of synthesis along with analysis that makes it possible for him to do more justice to the facts of mind and value than most naturalists are inclined to do. In so far then as Sellars makes use of synthesis, he is definitely approaching the synoptic method of idealism, though he stops short of synopsis in the full sense of the term.

Moreover not only in his stress upon synthesis, but also in his high regard for reason Sellars approaches idealism. He is never guilty of belittling reason as Dewey is. He respects reason as much as most idealists as far as method is concerned, and is the untiring foe of all forms of positivism and agnosticism. In fact he goes so far as to say: "I am myself a rationalist and sceptical of the self-contradictoriness of reason."\(^11\) Relative to method then, while Sellars is far more analytic and radically empirical then are the idealists as a group, yet in so far as he gives a paramount place to reason and to synthesis he is approaching the basic method of idealism.

8. Sellars, PPP,14.
9. Ibid., 15.
11. Sellars, PPR,341.
2. Epistemological

As was seen in Chapter I, in the discussion of Sellars' epistemology, Sellars is an epistemological dualist. He is the untiring foe of all forms of epistemological monism, be they idealistic or realistic. In the next chapter consideration will be given to his chief criticisms of epistemological idealism.

However all forms of idealism are not monistic as far as their epistemology is concerned. Personalism is in fact frankly dualistic. Knudson in his *Philosophy of Personalism* names "the dualism of thought and thing, or idea and object" as the first principle of personalism. He names "the creative activity of thought," and the "trustworthiness of reason," as second and third principles.12 In the discussion of method it was shown that Sellars is certainly in sympathy with the trustworthiness of reason, and later in this chapter it will be shown that he allows much room for "the creative activity of thought." Much then as Sellars differs from personalism as far as the final issues of metaphysics are concerned, yet relative to the fundamentals of epistemology he sees almost eye to eye with personalists. Perhaps it is not amiss to compare his epistemological views with those of Bowne at this juncture.

For Sellars the mind cannot intuit objects. Nor can

objects stamp themselves upon the mind as the old materialists thought.\textsuperscript{15} Objects are indeed capable of stimulating the mind to an activity, that can arouse sense-data which are valid for thought; but, nevertheless, sense-data are not knowledge as some thinkers vainly imagine. It is only the "material for knowledge." "Knowledge must be quarried out of it by patient comparison and ingenious experimental control."\textsuperscript{14} Hence knowledge is for Sellars a translation of sense-data into the medium of thought. Knowledge is essentially an interpretation in terms of the mental. "The knowledge content is a direct interpretation of the physical reality, that is, we are compelled to think the physical realm in terms of predicates which we have achieved in our experience."\textsuperscript{15}

For Bowne, likewise, objects are not directly intuited nor is sense perception knowledge. Objects through their impressions upon the senses may indeed serve to awaken the mind to activity, but sensation is not knowledge. It is only the raw material of knowledge.

Thought does not rest in the apprehension of sensations as having simple and identical qualitative contents, it proceeds to relate them variously and interpret them. Only thus does thought reach a world of reality and a rational system.\textsuperscript{16}

There are two implications of Sellars' epistemology which seem to be clearly idealistic. Sellars, like Bowne, believes that the mind can know things, or at least their basic characteristics. "If we are not to be agnostics, we must hold that knowledge does reveal the object." This knowledge while never complete is yet valid. In other words there is a definite correlation between thought and thing. The best explanation of this strange correlation, so suggestive of Cosmic Purpose that Sellars can offer, is the following which seems to be more of an assumption rather than a serious attempt at explanation: "The critical realist makes mind a part of nature and, therefore, with the same categorical structure as nature." Bowne, on the other hand, finds the explanation of this strange correlation in the idea of a purposive arrangement. Things "are cast in the molds of thought." Thus idea and object fit together as hand and glove because they were made to fit together. Things can be understood by human reason because there is a reason, an order in things that answers the reasonings of the human mind. "Over against the human reason whereby nature exists for us is a supreme reason, through and in which nature has its real existence."

But there is a still more directly idealistic implication in the epistemology of Sellars. He holds that things do not

17. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 35(1924), 361
18. Sellars, EN, 37.
21. Ibid., 343.
impress themselves directly on the mind. He rejects the copy theory. In fact, he goes so far as to say: "We shall never see the face of external things." And yet he believes that human knowledge is valid for objects, that is the mind can denote the essential characteristics of things. But since this does not involve a direct intuition of the thing the thing itself it must involve a representation of the thing in mental terms, in terms of mind or ideas.

"Knowing involves mediation by appearance or content." This content of knowledge is of course essentially mental. If things then cannot be known except in terms of their characteristics which are known only in terms of mind and in no other way, the conclusion seems to follow that things are in their essential nature of the order of mind. In criticism of Sellars' chapter, "Knowledge and Its Categories," in Essays in Critical Realism, Miss Calkins justly makes the criticism that Sellars, along with Lovejoy and Pratt, seems to approach the idealistic instead of the realistic point of view. In answer, all that he has to say is: "I find the statement ambiguous. If she had said mentalistic instead of idealistic I would have agreed with her." Sellars tries hard to distinguish between idea and

22. Sellars, EN, 37.
25. Sellars, EN, 51.
the mental as for example in the following:

When I have said that the appearance is mental, I have meant that it is a presented complex within the complex act of knowing. The complex, structured pulse of consciousness is for me a variant or creation of the brain-mind...in knowing, the content is not an 'idea' but a character-complex which we are assigning to an object as its characteristics. But the whole act of knowing is, nevertheless, a complex pulse of consciousness.28

Here Sellars seems to mean by the term mental nothing more than the functioning of the brain or at best a "presented complex" within that functioning. Nevertheless he has a hard time getting rid of the term idea with all of its idealistic implications. For example in the chapter on "The Categories of Knowledge," referred to above he "holds that knowledge of objects is mediated by ideas which are in some sense distinct from the objects of knowledge."29 And again he asserts: "All that the postulate of knowledge seems to me unequivocally to demand is that the object have a structure and relations and powers which can be revealed in the content of the idea."30 Here he certainly speaks of the mental content as '"idea"'. On the basis of his epistemology one can rightfully draw the conclusion that at times he is not far from the Kingdom of Idealism; for objects are

28. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 23(1924), 584
30. Ibid., 198-199.
never directly intuited nor are they copied, but rather revealed in terms of ideas or mental contents. He must either admit that objects are of the nature of mind or else frankly hold with Kant, the existence of things-in-themselves. The criticisms of Sidney Hook, a fellow naturalist, but of pragmatic bent, is relevant at this point:

My impression is that he does not escape the epistemological trap set by Locke. He tries to break out of it by fiat and a new set of terms. I do not understand what his 'objectives' or 'denotables' are, why he is entitled to them if perception is the basic act of knowledge rather than a guided phase in the activity of judgement, and by what right he assumes that their nature is 'disclosed' (another ambiguous term) by 'sensory symbols' in recognition. He says it is meaningless to talk about things-in-themselves, but it seems to me that on his view they would have to exist anyhow since the sensory elements which in some way 'disclose' objectives are not regarded as part of their nature.31

On the one hand, as has been pointed out repeatedly, Sellars certainly chooses the alternative of postulating things-in-themselves, however much he may deny the existence of such. The following statement certainly does imply that there exists something which makes appearances possible: "We shall never see the face of external things."32 The implication here is that there lies something beyond the appearances which the mind cannot grasp, since things

32. Sellars, PPR, 5.
always appear in the garb of thought yet are distinguishable from the mental content through which they reveal themselves. This gives point to Hook's criticism that on Sellars' view things-in-themselves would "have to exist anyhow since the sensory elements which in some way 'disclose' objectives are not regarded as part of their nature." In an article in *The Journal of Philosophy* Sellars attempts to answer Hook by asserting that "the responsive reference" (of perception) "is directed and direct," toward things and that the same thing is true of "the characterization." "Knowledge does not impinge on phenomena but on things in commerce with the organic knower."33 Nevertheless Hook's charge that Sellars cannot rid himself of things-in-themselves seems to hold. If things are known only in terms of thought and yet are not of the nature of thought but something other than thought then Sellars must postulate things-in-themselves lying back of appearances.

But while, on the one hand, Sellars seems to presuppose unknown things-in-themselves, on the other hand, he contends that the human mind can know things—that is their essential characteristics and pattern. "It is not the stuff, or being, of external things that we grasp but their pattern."34 In what then does the essential nature of a thing consist? "To be a thing is to be a that-what, that

is, something which can be denoted, because having existence, and, by that very fact, determinate in its nature." 35 It will be seen that Sellars makes good his case against Berkeley, that is, in so far as Berkeley tends to regard things as mere presentations; but on the other hand Sellars' epistemology certainly seems to imply idealism in the personalistic sense—that is if he is to escape the Kantian idea of unknown and unknowable things-in-themselves. Either there is an unknown something which lies beyond the reach of thought, or else, since mind can grasp more and more of their characteristics and order and pattern and nature in terms of mind, things are the result of mind, "cast in the molds of thought." 36 It would clarify much that is vague in the epistemology of Sellars if he would try to come to grips with personalism, with which he has so much in common, especially in epistemology, but which is also his strongest foe, especially when it comes to the basic issues of metaphysics to which epistemology leads, and to which some attention must now be given.

3. Metaphysical

Sellars, as was shown in Chapter I, has definitely rejected the old Democritean atomism, as indeed he must on two counts, first, on the basis of his own epistemology which, as has been seen, causes him to insist that "it is not the

35. Ibid., 284.
36. Bowne, TTK, 296.
stuff, or being, of external things that we grasp but their pattern;"37 and second, the electro-magnetic theory of modern physics. Yet he styles his system as "the new materialism," or better still as "the new physicalism." He does this for three reasons, first in contrast to other naturalisms such as that of Dewey "which is thin in its ontological possibilities," second, the term "physicalism," or "physical realism," "brings into relief the basic and perennial questions of philosophy, such as the place of mind in the physical world," and third, "it is time that the newer conceptions of matter find their philosophical interpretation."38 Basically it is the third which makes the name, "the new physicalism," or "the new materialism" appropriate to his system.

Now in so far as Sellars is a materialist he of course differs fundamentally from idealism. However, as he develops his conception of matter he seems to travel a road which may end in idealism. Sellars believes that there is a stuff of which existing things are made, but this stuff cannot directly impress itself on the mind as the older materialists would have it. This stuff discloses its characteristics only through the interpretative processes of the mind. "It is...possible to have a positive, categorical notion of matter or stuff."39 Our concepts disclose

38. Ibid., 4.
the characteristics of things, which are to be recognized as expressions of the stuff of existence. 40 Whatever this mysterious "stuff" may turn out to be, yet atoms exist, not as hard uncuttable substances but as definitely organized energy—the simplest and most basic conceivable which constitute as it were a floor to nature. 41 "At the very least, matter is of the stuff of electricity." 42 This certainly is a concession to idealism; for matter that is not hard and inert, but in the last analysis of the nature of energy can much more easily be understood as the activity of objective Mind as idealists from Leibniz to Bowne have insisted. God for Leibniz is not only "knowledge," but also "Power," and "Will, which makes changes or products." 43 If matter is in the final analysis of the nature of "stuff of electricity" it seems to be best understood as the expression of a "Power" or "Will". It seems logical to conclude with Bowne that "the material world...is...a product of one infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is continually supported, and from which it incessantly proceeds." 44 Relative to Sellars' ascription of activity to matter, Parker, his colleague at the University of Michigan makes the following interesting comment:

The ascription of activity to matter,

40. Sellars, PPR,viii-ix. 42. Sellars, PPR,321.
41. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 53(1944), 371, 380. 43. Leibniz, TM,244.
Also Phil. and Phen. Res. 3(1943),389. 44. Bowne, MBT, 242-243.
is I believe, the most radical of Sellars' reforms, and deserves therefore careful consideration. I would not quarrel with him on account of it; quite the contrary, I would welcome it, but I insist that it utterly destroys the concept of matter as a negation of spirit. For again I ask the Jamesian question, What is activity known as? What is the 'base' of the concept?...When therefore Sellars says, There is activity in nature, either what he says has no meaning for me...or else he means, There is in nature something the like of which I experience in volition.45

Sellars attempts to answer Parker's keen thrust in a later number of The Philosophical Review. He contends that the categories are not derived from mind but are definitely empirical in the sense of being derived directly from things, and that the most basic is the concept of matter as both active and enduring.

Do not these functional operations of the organic self give rise to such meanings as agency, endurance, capacity? And must we not consider these categorial meanings empirically significant? I think they are; and that is why I am a materialistic substantialist.46

The doctrine of the categories is through Kant rather than around him. Hence the categories are conceived as empirical and not as a priori. And, Parker and Brightman notwithstanding, it is thus possible to have a positive categorical notion of matter or stuff.47

The fundamental question as to the derivation of the categories will be discussed in a later chapter. Suffice it to

47. Ibid., 556.
say here that Parker still seems to have the best of the argument for a number of reasons. First, there is the question as to who is the most empirical, the idealist or the realist. But since mind is known at first hand, and matter only at second hand, and as Sellars himself admits, only as it is translated into mental terms, therefore it would appear that the idealist has the better of the argument. Then, in the second place, the fact still remains that Sellars ascribes activity to matter, and that an active matter which Sellars must conceive in terms of energy is best explained in terms of objective Will.

But Sellars does not stop with the ascription of activity to matter. As was seen in Chapter I he ascribes activity and organizing and pattern-forming power to matter. "Matter I take to be active, dynamic, relational and self-organizing."48 And more than that as was also pointed out in Chapter I he ascribes all the wonder and grandeur of the universe to matter so that it becomes something altogether different and far more wonderful than the much more simple concept of matter as conceived by modern physics. In short at this point Sellars seems to be approaching idealism by thus endowing matter with all the powers and qualities which are directly observed in mind alone. At any rate if he is not at this point approaching idealism in the personalistic

sense he is certainly not far from some form of panpsychism. The "new materialism" then may not turn out to be quite as materialistic as it seems at first sight. In fact Parker goes so far as to say, "Each step he has taken in the reformation of materialism is a step nearer to spiritualism--one more and he will be there."49 In so far then as Sellars defines matter in activistic terms, he approaches idealism; but in so far as he insists that the universe is basically non-mental and that a mysterious non-mental "stuff" lies at the base of things of which matter in the form of atoms is the simplest structure out of which more complex structures rise, he is certainly at odds with idealism. But again as in the consideration of Sellars' epistemology it must be emphasized that he has really never grappled to the finish with the most formidable type of idealism--personal idealism.

It is in the mind-body problem, as was pointed out in Chapter II, that Sellars and personalism will really have to come to grips. His criticisms of the basic concept of personalism will be dealt with at length in a later chapter. It becomes necessary now to consider how much Sellars holds in common with idealism and just where he differs, relative to such novelties as mind, organization, teleology, and values.

49. Parker, Phil. Rev., 53(1944), 385.
It will be remembered from the discussion in Chapter I that the older types of materialism and naturalism finding no place for novelties in their systems sought to reduce all such—all the complexity and glory and grandeur of the world to the dead level of the world of physics. These systems sought to explain the higher in terms of the lower as over against idealism which tends to explain the lower as a stage of the higher. As a result the older materialisms and naturalisms simply could not withstand the assaults of idealism and had to give way to the newer forms which try to make room for novelties. It was also shown in Chapter I that Sellars recognizes this utter failure of the older forms to do justice to the fact of the rise of novelties. He rejects reductionism and seeks to do justice to mind and organization, the facts of seeming purpose in nature, and finally values. In fact he goes so far as to say: "I would not be understood as refusing to recognize the truth of much of that for which idealism stood in opposition to the older naturalism."50

First of all, he tries to do justice to the fact of mind. He definitely rejects behaviorism. In fact one can detect a measure of scorn in this rejection.

If...any psychologist comes to me and says that there is no such thing as consciousness, I simply reply that he does not know what he is saying. He

50. Sellars, EN, 19.
It will be necessary to establish the necessary interactions and connections.

If properly managed, the system can be quite stable and reliable.

In order to ensure the desired outcome, it is crucial to monitor and adjust as needed.

The process requires careful planning and execution to achieve the intended results.
may be a very good student of animal behavior. But behavior is not a premise from which the denial of consciousness can be deduced.51 He likewise rejects epiphenomenalism: "The old, deductive, mechanical necessitarianism which thought of man as a machine and consciousness as a mere psychic illumination has received a shrewd blow."52 He takes pains to make it clear that he recognizes mind as unique, efficacious and creative. "The situation is unique. Only in consciousness does nature know itself."53 "The conscious self sits in the watchtower of the brain to guide the organism's behaviour."54 Again speaking of consciousness Sellars says, "Literally, it assists the brain to solve problems."55 These passages might well come from a self-psychologist, and have led some thinkers such as Pratt to question whether Sellars is after all a naturalist, whether he does not give mind such a significant place as far as its efficacy and creativity are concerned that he has really overthrown his own naturalism.56 And certainly it cannot be denied that in so far as Sellars emphasizes the uniqueness, the efficacy and the creativity of mind he is at one with idealism. Nevertheless, as was made evident in Chapter I, he still holds on to his naturalism by enlarging the concept of the brain as a

51. Ibid., 18.
52. Ibid., 278.
53. Ibid., 310.
54. Ibid., 318.
55. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 27(1918), 158.
56. Pratt, Phil. Rev., 45(1936), 164.
physical system so as to make it capable of all the wonders of consciousness. Basically consciousness is no more than a "character of the neural system in action." It is an emergent from matter. How matter can come to know itself and guide itself is of course a mystery which Sellars does not attempt to fathom. He accepts it as a fact beyond which the thinker must not probe.

Sellars stresses the place of purpose and organization in his system. Purpose of course finds its highest expression in man's self-consciousness. But even far below man in the smallest organisms there is organization and a correlation of processes which shows evidence of purpose of a kind.

When the biologist carefully studies the internal working and even the behavior of organisms he witnesses processes so ordered in relation to each other that the welfare of the particular organism is furthered or the survival of the species is aided. This internal economy by means of which certain processes function in relation to others as means to end may be called empirical teleology.

In so far as Sellars recognizes teleology in nature, even if it be only an "empirical teleology" he is certainly in far greater agreement with idealism than the older forms which tried to explain away the facts. Sellars even goes so far as to say: "We who have stressed the objective significance of organization do not think of the organism

57. Sellars, EN, 311.
58. Ibid., 315-317.
59. Ibid., 337.
The text on the page is not legible.
as a product of purely random combinations." He speaks of there being a "cumulative determinism."60 By this he seems to mean interaction and mutual correlation in an otherwise pluralistic universe. But why there is interaction and correlation and unity on such a vast scale he does not attempt to explain, except that "the evolutionary naturalist sees no need to postulate an élan vital creating organization out of recalcitrant matter,"61 and that "to underestimate the physical world is a mistake."62

In Chapter I attention was called to the fact of Sellars' interest in values. Unlike the older materialists, Sellars does not try to explain them away in terms of the bare world of physics.

"We call acts good and bad; pictures, beautiful or ugly; things, useful or harmful. We speak of the desirable and the valuable. And all these statements seem to us to be in some sense justified. To reject them is to talk nonsense."63

Moreover values somehow fit into things:

"It is obvious that I hold that value judgements do and must fit into the cosmos as this is revealed in knowledge. Values concern man's response to, and estimation of things. They are always guided by knowledge though they contain other elements of a more effective and volitional nature."64

Sellars, as was pointed out in Chapter I, in keeping with

60. Sellars, EN, 338. 63. Sellars, PPR, 444.
61. Ibid., 324. 64. Sellars, EN, 342.
62. Ibid., 338.
his naturalism does not conceive values as transcendent or objective in the cosmic sense. However there are statements in his *Next Step in Democracy*, where he speaks of justice as a growth "which is continually being bettered as the result of more knowledge and of finer sentiments,"65 and of the "vision of a justice beyond the actual justice,"66 which suggests the idea of an ideal of justice existing objectively toward which man is striving and which he seeks to realize more and more perfectly. Sometimes when naturalists grapple earnestly with social problems as Sellars does in this interesting little book they are willing at times to ascribe more objective reality to their ideals than when they are theorizing about naturalistic metaphysics. At any rate in recognizing the unique status of values, in trying to fit them into the world of nature as the outgrowth or flowering of the process of evolution, and in some measure at least recognizing their objectivity, Sellars is in harmony with idealism. However idealism, at least of the Platonic and personalistic types would go much further and ascribe their objectivity to their origin and ground in a transcendent spiritual world, or as personalists would put it, in the mind of God.

4. Conclusion

The results of this brief investigation show that Sellars

65. Sellars, NSD, 164. 66. Sellars, NSD, 162.
In the certification year following the first, the names and addresses of the

applicants to the Board and to the Secretary, and the number of the paper

on which they are to be printed, shall be made known to the public in

the first of the year, and to the Board. The Board shall be furnished by

the Secretary with the papers, and the Secretary shall make known

the papers to the public in the following manner: In the first place, a

notice shall be printed in the Secretaries' office, stating the number of

the paper, the number of the applicants, and the number of the

papers. The Board shall be furnished with the papers, and the

Secretary shall make known the papers to the public in the following

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is in harmony with idealism both implicitly and explicitly at many points. In his epistemological dualism he is in agreement with personalists though in disagreement with all idealistic epistemological monists such as the Berkeleyan mentalists and absolutists. The next chapter will deal with his criticisms of these types. It must also be pointed out again that Sellars' epistemology is not only in agreement with the epistemology of a considerable number of idealists, but that it has at least two implications which seem to approach idealism. First, he assumes a correlation of thought and thing which is at least consistent with the theistic and personalistic hypothesis, and, second, he insists that things can never be directly intuited as things but only in mental terms. If he is to avoid things-in-themselves it seems that he might well adopt the personalistic view of things as the activity of objective Mind.

Again, in so far as Sellars stresses the importance of reason and synthesis in his method he is certainly approaching idealistic method. Then, finally, in his metaphysics certain very interesting idealistic elements were discovered. In his interpretation of matter as active, in his stress upon the uniqueness, the creativity of mind, in his recognition of the facts and role of purpose and organization, and in his emphasis upon values not only as unique and irreducible, but also as in some sense objective, he
to be continued with appropriate data presentation and analysis.

The research was performed with the collaboration of several experts in the field. The data was gathered through various methods, including experiments and surveys. The results were analyzed using statistical software, which provided valuable insights into the phenomena under study.

These findings have significant implications for further research and practical applications. They highlight the importance of interdisciplinary approaches in addressing complex issues and suggest new avenues for future investigations.
certainly approaches idealism.

But these factors do not make him an idealist parading under another name. In spite of many likenesses there are two great irreconciliable differences which must not be forgotten. First, there is his insistence with all naturalists that nature is a self-sufficient system, independent of all mind. And second, closely related to the first there is Sellars' choice of matter as over against mind as the ultimate principle of explanation. Sellars of course raises it and endows it with attributes, as has been seen, which go far beyond the concept of the physicist. But in spite of these differences it cannot be denied that Sellars has much in common with idealism. Perhaps not the least is his glorified conception of matter which certainly seems to point in the direction of a kind of pan-psychism.
CHAPTER IV
CRITICISMS OF IDEALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL MONISM

1. Significance of Idealistic Epistemological Monism

In Chapters I and III it was made clear that Sellars is a militant epistemological dualist. In this respect he agrees with the personalists and also with Kant and Plato. It is certain then that epistemological dualism does not settle the metaphysical question as to the nature of the object. The epistemological dualist may be either a spiritualist or a naturalist.

There are at least two schools of idealists who are epistemological idealists, and since epistemological idealism involves an idealistic metaphysics they are idealists both in the epistemological and in the metaphysical sense. They hold that in the act of knowing idea and object are not two, but that they are one as idea. Sellars sometimes uses the broader term idealism when he really has epistemological idealism in mind. The root of the difficulty is probably the following definition of idealism which is none too clear: "When used as a technical term in epistemology, idealism means that everything known is mental and that nothing exists which is not known or experienced by some mind."¹ Again in his Problems of Philosophy he recognizes only two types of philosophy, subjective and objective, 1. Sellars, EOP, 147.
Berkeleyan mentalism and absolute idealism, both of which are idealistic in the epistemological sense. Moreover he goes on to say: "In all idealism the object of knowledge is regarded as dependent on the knowing of it." It is obvious that this statement is inaccurate. Few, if any idealists, as was shown in Chapter II, have ever been as subjectivistic as the above statement seems to imply. Certainly epistemological dualists such as the personalists would revolt at the idea that "in all idealism the object of knowledge is regarded as dependent on the knowing of it." In the dissertation epistemological idealism shall be distinguished from all types which are idealistic in the metaphysical sense only. In other words the term epistemological idealism shall be applied only to those idealists who are monistic in their epistemology, who insist, as has been pointed out, that in the act of knowing idea and object are one as idea.

Now there are two schools of epistemological idealists, the Berkeleyan or mentalistic and the Hegelian or absolutistic. Along with Berkeley and Hegel, Bradley must also be mentioned, since Sellars centers some of his attacks on him. However Bradley is in reality a child of Hegel, though one, as was seen in Chapter II, who introduced so novel, so rigid and unique a system of his own that it is not always true

2. Sellars, PPP, 141. 3. Ibid., 141.
easy to trace his lineage. But in the discussion which follows Sellars' criticisms of Bradley shall be considered along with his criticisms of Hegel, since both are absolutists, and most of Sellars' criticisms will be seen to apply to Bradley.

2. Criticisms of Berkeleian Mentalism

As far as the epistemological issue is concerned Sellars finds his chief enemy to be Berkeley and centers most of his attacks upon idealistic epistemological monism rightly upon him. In an article written in 1927 he declares: "I had pondered Berkeley long and carefully." And in Critical Realism he goes so far as to say:

Every realist who wishes to justify the faith that is in him must meet the arguments of Berkeley, not only his more formal principle that to be for the sensible world is to be perceived, but also his argument from content that all objects can be analyzed into sensations.

Sellars attacks Berkeley often and at many points but the chief points at which he attacks him are indicated in the above statement, namely the insistence of Berkeley that things are mere presentations which the Divine Mind makes to the human, that "their esse is percipi," and that "sensible things...are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities." Sellars thinks that Berkeley's doctrine that "esse is percipi," is

nothing short of scandalous. "Being is not the same as being
known."\(^8\) He accuses Berkeley of denying the existence
of a material world,

The cardinal principle of idealism is
that being is dependent upon knowing.
Berkeley stressed perception and formu-
lated this principle in corresponding
terms as to be is to be perceived...Thus
his idealism is a denial of the existence
of a material world and the assertion
that spirits and their ideas, alone exist.\(^9\)

Berkeley's basic error is a misunderstanding of the
complicated nature of perception. Perception is not a mere
effect—a mere reception of ideas but it involves a complex
act of response and interpretation. The doctrine that ideas
are only effects he calls "the treachery of the causal
approach."\(^10\)

The stress is laid upon mental states
or upon brain states as mere entities,
or events, having no capacity to look
beyond themselves. They are what they are,
just like other effects. The active,
interpretative side of perceiving is
lost sight of and an artifact put in its
place.\(^11\)

Again he says: "Berkeley begins with the Lockian idea in
its purely sensory meaning, ignores perceiving as an in-
terpretative reference, and directs his deadly criticism
against inferential passage from ideas to things."\(^12\) In
other words, Sellars contends that the stuff and substance

\(^8\) Sellars, PPR, 185.
\(^9\) Sellars, EPP, 72.
\(^10\) Sellars, PPR, 38.
\(^11\) Ibid., 38.
\(^12\) Ibid., 33.
of things is never given in perception, but that perception instead of being an intuition of the essence of things is but an interpretation of the characteristics in terms of the medium of thought. Sellars is never tired of pointing out that Berkeley makes the mistake of confusing the object of perception with the content of perception. Because things are known by means of thought is no sign that they are nothing more than ideas. Thus the basic fallacy of idealism turns out to be that of confusing "the content of perception" with "the object of perception." It is not only false to attempt to pass from the fact that things are given in thought to the conclusion that things are merely ideas, but this also contradicts one of man's most certain convictions, one of man's basic conceptions, namely the conception of thinghood, of the object of thought as existing in its own right independent of our thinking it.

For Berkeley a thing is simply a complex of sensations. A thing is an idea, a collection of its apparent qualities. The realistic meanings of thinghood are largely belittled or ignored. We have argued that this thinness of his view of perception was due largely to his refusal to make the distinction between the content of perception and the object of perception.

Berkeley's insistence that "esse is percipi" as far as material things are concerned, and his reduction of things to complexes of sensations leads Sellars even to charge

The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a page from a document, possibly a letter or a report, but the content cannot be accurately transcribed.
Berkeley with solipsism.

If we take the basic principle of subjective idealism to be this, to be is to be perceived, we find that it asserts an internal relation between subject and object. In ordinary language, this means that we can know only the states of our mind... The logical outcome is solipsism, that is, the position that an individual can know only his own ideas and that he has no logical reason to believe in other individuals.15

He makes the same charge in his Critical Realism: "In short, for idealism, the body, like any other physical thing, becomes my idea."16

Now in Chapter II it was made clear that any identification of idealism with solipsism on the part of naturalists rests on a mistaken notion of the real nature of idealism. It was also shown that Berkeley believed in an objective order back of the world of phenomena resting on God who causes ideas to arise. Is Sellars so unfair to Berkeley or else so unacquainted with his thought that he gives no consideration to it? No, not at all. He recognizes that Berkeley attempts to secure objectivity for his system by grounding it in God.

By destroying the organism, Berkeley left the self a homeless ghost, a mere spiritual substance. And since the physical world and sense-organs do not exist Berkeley was forced to postulate a supreme self to arouse ideas in us.17

In his Critical Realism as well as in later writings,

15. Sellars, PPF, 141. 17. Sellars, PPP, 142.
Sellars recognizes that Berkeley tried to ground his epistemology in an objective order. But Sellars makes two attacks on this attempt and tries to prove that it did not succeed. First there is the rather superficial attack in his earlier writing, Critical Realism:

So far as the individual is concerned, the outlook is decidedly realistic. But this attempt to throw a sop to the Cerbeus of realism is little more than a confession of weakness; for ideas are not and cannot be the same for distinct individuals. Our study of the advance of the Personal has surely demonstrated this beyond possibility of doubt. Whose idea shall we consider really existent? The suggestion of the difficulty is enough.

It is doubtful whether Sellars can vanquish Berkeley in this easy manner; for Berkeley would have no difficulty in answering that while some ideas it is true are purely individual, the ideas which the thinker himself initiates, yet when it comes to the passive ideas such are common to all and must be accepted as such. Why are they common to all? Simply because the individual must receive them as given since they constitute nothing other than the unchangeable order of nature which is grounded in the Mind and Will and Purpose of God.

But Sellars has another argument whereby he seeks to overthrow Berkeley's system, by depriving it of objectivity and

19. Ibid., 177.
thus driving the Berkeleian to the edge of the precipice of solipsism. It is a revival of Hume's old argument against the reality of the self on the one hand as the source of productive and creative ideas and on the other as a true unity. Hume contended in his famous Inquiry that though the self receives ideas it cannot produce them. "We only feel the event, namely the existence of an idea, consequent to a command of the will."21 Since it is impossible for human selves to discover any power by means of which it is possible to generate ideas within themselves it is illogical to use the human self as an analogy of the Divine, or as a means of proving that such a Divine Source of energy exists.

We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other....All that we know is our profound ignorance in both cases.22

Thus Hume appeals to a keener analysis of experience than Berkeley had made to refute the latter's superficially persuasive argument. We are unacquainted with anything of the nature of productive or creative, activity as much in ourselves as in sensible nature. ...By means of this extension of analysis, Hume showed that Berkeley's arguments against the existence of a

21. Hume, ECHU, 70.  
22. Ibid., 75.
physical world apply equally against the existence of a creative spiritual source of ideas.\(^{23}\)

Then there is Hume's reduction of the self to a mere complex of sensations:

> When I turn my reflection on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self.\(^{24}\)

Sellars comments:

> After Berkeley had rejected genuine external things as objects of knowing, Hume went him one better and rejected the knower. It seemed to him—and I agree with him—that selves as knowers have no better status than things.\(^{25}\)

The conclusion follows that if selves are no more than ideas, that is complexes of sensations just as things are, then selves are no more real than things and it is vain to appeal to a Supreme Self as the ground of phenomena since He too could be no more than merely a complex of sensations without real unity, purpose, and creative power. And if Hume and Sellars are correct Berkeley's whole system falls to the ground since it has nothing to support it.

But this raises the question whether Hume was right in his analysis of mind, and if his great weakness after all was not his method. Mind cannot be comprehended, its true nature remains hidden if one endeavors to catch it in the

\(^{23}\) Sellars, PPP, 88.  
\(^{24}\) Hume, ECHU, 261.  
\(^{25}\) Sellars, PPR, 134.
net of analysis. Only as analysis is supplemented by an observation of the functioning of mind both from without and from within can its true nature be disclosed. Sellars, in following Hume, is altogether too exclusively analytic when he attacks the problem of the self, the knower. After all selves seem to have a unique status. They have ideas, and a large measure of control over these ideas. And by virtue of these ideas they are able to know—a function which cannot be predicated of things. Thus Berkeley seems to be far nearer right and more empirical than Hume and Sellars.

A Spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea, or like an idea is evidently absurd. 26

Thus Sellars fails just as Hume before him failed in his attempt to undermine the unique status of the self and because he fails in this attempt he also fails in his attempt to prove that Berkeleian mentalists in the last analysis are driven to solipsism—that the knower cannot get beyond his own states. Sellars insists that idealists such as Berkeley play "fast and loose" with their principles by their "one sided application" of their theory of knowledge in their endeavor to escape solipsism. 27 But if minds have a unique status as being knowers as well as being known, 26. Berkeley, PHK, 334. 27. Sellars, CR, 203.
The fourth step in the development of a public image is to establish a consistent pattern of behavior that is perceived as positive and beneficial to the public. This involves careful planning, coordination, and execution of activities that align with the organization's values and goals.

In addition to these efforts, it is important to monitor and evaluate the impact of these strategies on the public's perception of the organization. Through ongoing assessment and feedback, organizations can refine their approaches and ensure that they are effectively meeting the needs of the public.

Finally, it is crucial to maintain a transparent and open relationship with the public. This includes being honest and responsive to questions and concerns, as well as actively seeking feedback and input from the public. By fostering this type of relationship, organizations can build trust and credibility, which are essential components of a strong public image.

In conclusion, the process of building a strong public image is complex and multifaceted. It requires a concerted effort on the part of organizations to develop and execute effective strategies that align with their values and goals. By following the steps outlined in this guide, organizations can improve their public image and achieve lasting success.

References:


For more information, please visit our website at [www.publicrelations.com].
whereas things are only known but cannot know, are incapable of having ideas, then perhaps the idealist is justified in this so-called one-sided application.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that many of Sellars' criticisms of Berkeley are justified. His attack upon Berkeley's proposition that "esse is percipi" that to be is to be known, is well directed. Objects in the ways in which they affect us seem to be more than mere presentations, even if these presentations are those of the Divine Agent, and they seem to be more than a mere complex of sensations.

Things, when not perceived, are still said to exist, because of the belief that, though not perceived, they are in interaction with one another, mutually determining and determined. Real things are distinguished from things having only conceptual existence by this power and fact of action. When this is omitted, the things vanish into presentations; and unpresented things are only the ghosts of possible presentations.28

It would have been better for Berkeley to have designated things not as mere thin presentations, but as the Divine energizing. Thus he might have been an epistemological dualist without giving up his metaphysical idealism—a distinct gain. Among other things it would have saved him from the all too frequent charge of solipsism, which though false, as has been shown, yet has a certain plausibility as far as the rather unfortunate choice of certain terms is

28. Bówne, MET., 16.
concerned.

It must also be said that Sellars' criticisms of Berkeley's idea of perception are unusually keen and seemingly valid. Even at the level of perception more is involved than a mere givenness. Even the most elemental perception seems to involve a measure of interpretation. Objects are not so much given and intuited as thought. We live in essentially a thought world. This is the weak point in the armor of the epistemological idealist. The moment that he concedes that perception involves interpretation he must also concede the dualism of thought and thing in the act of knowing.

3. Criticisms of Absolute Idealism

Sellars, as has been seen recognizes only two types of idealism, the subjective, Berkeleian mentalism which has been discussed, and the objective, by which he means absolute idealism in its various forms. Now though Sellars recognizes his chief enemy in Berkeleian mentalism, yet he is no less set against all forms of absolute idealism. However he singles out two representatives of this movement for special attack, namely Hegel and Bradley. By virtue of this fact and also because these bold thinkers seem to represent the dominant tendencies of the movement the discussion shall center on Sellars' criticisms of these two primarily.

As the basis of "subjective idealism" was found to be
"to be is to be perceived," so Sellars finds the "basic thesis" of "objective idealism" "that thought is reality." He thinks that objective idealism was founded on two things, namely, "Kant's assumption of a universal consciousness, and the inability to solve the problem of knowledge in a truly realistic fashion, common to Hume and Kant."  

From the standpoint of epistemology the principles of objective idealism to note are (1) the denial that it has any meaning to try to transcend experience, (2) the treatment of perception as essentially a question of the interpretative supplementation of a partial datum by perceptual judgement until it fits in with a system of knowledge, and (3) the doctrine of internal, or modifying relations, which brings it about that the part is transformed in the whole. Truth and reality are identical, and anything short of the whole truth is partially error and illusion. In short, experience is the ultimate term; and the really real is the absolute, or comprehensive, experience.

Sellars' basic criticism of absolute idealism that which perhaps comprises all others is simply that absolute idealism is not empirical. Of the movement which Fichte, Schelling and Hegel represented he says: "Unfortunately there was not enough cooperation with science in this romantic wave of speculation." Again, in Critical Realism, he states this criticism as follows:

It is too evidently unempirical and a

29. Sellars, PPP, 141. 32. Ibid., 143-144.  
30. Ibid., 143. 33. Ibid., 106.  
31. Ibid., 143
The text on the page is not clearly visible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a page from a document, possibly a scientific or technical report, but the content is not legible enough to transcribe accurately.
pis aller to awaken the allegiance of the modern thinker trained in science. Moreover, it fails miserably whenever it is asked to solve a concrete problem like that of the mind-body relation. It moves too much in the region of abstractions, such as 'experience-in-general,' to be able to appreciate and to state in rugged and meaningful terms a problem which always threatens a dualism. 34

It will be noted that the absolutist's assumption of "experience-in-general," which is especially evident in Bradley, is one of Sellars' points of attack. He makes this very relevant criticism: "Idealism has only too often been satisfied with the promotion of experience to the position of an ultimate term without demanding whose experience is in question." 35 Moreover that the idealist is unempirical is evident in his extreme rationalism.

Hegel was a rationalist and tries to work out the inner logic of an absolute reason. All of them believed that intense speculation could by itself lead the thinker into the heart of reality. They had gotten rid of an independent physical world and were convinced that reality was akin to that in themselves which seemed to them central and important. 36

It will be noted that the last sentence makes it evident that Sellars charges the absolutists no less than the Berkeleians with the denial of a physical world. Ultimately they reduce all of the complexity and massiveness of the

34. Sellars, CR, 161.
35. Ibid., 161.
36. Sellars, PPP, 105-106.
world of nature to thought or experience, to mental terms, and hence deny its objectivity, according to Sellars.

Another very important point of attack is the coherence theory of reality, that reality, the ultimate, is a consistent logical unity of which the seeming diversity and plurality of things is but a mere appearance. This is to some extent a criticism of Hegel in so far as he stressed organic wholeness, but it is primarily a criticism of Bradley, who as was made evident in Chapter II out-Hegels Hegel in his lack of regard for the significance of the concrete and in his insistence that ultimate reality is one consistent whole. The essence of Sellars' criticism of the coherence theory of reality is the appeal to the facts of experience. Sellars objects to the theory of internal relations upon which the coherence theory of reality rests.

For the idealist no fact is complete by itself. Hence, every fact leads to every other fact, and so implies the whole universe. Personally, I have never been able to see this. As a realist, I would make a sharp distinction between the relations of objects and the logical relations of my propositions. Thus the relations of objects seem to me largely spatial, temporal and causal, while the relations between my propositions are those of indifference, identity and contradiction. For instance, the two propositions, 'Charles I was beheaded' and 'Washington was the leader of the American troops' seem to me to have no logical relations. 37

37. Sellars, PPP, 159.
Finally Sellars makes the following interesting criticism of absolute idealism in general and of Bradley in particular.

It is my opinion that idealism is akin to illusionism. It is replete with the tendency to cast aside the ordinary categories, such as space and time, as appearances. And appearance does not mean here that which reveals the external world because it appears in the data of our experience, but that which is illusory and misleading. It is a term of condemnation.

4. Conclusions

In the discussion of Sellars' criticisms of Berkeley the conclusion was reached that at least two criticisms were unsound, namely Sellars' endeavor as over against Berkeley and in accordance with Hume to reduce knowers to the same status as things, and second, Sellars' attempt to drive Berkeley to solipsism. On the other hand two criticisms seem entirely justified. The first of these is the basic criticism of the unhappy phrase, "esse is percipi." There is a stubbornness in things that seems to defy all attempts to dissolve them into mere presentations to the mind. This seems to justify the statement: "When we express what we perceive in judgments, we deal with things and their qualities and not with presentations." Whatever the ontological status of things yet from the standpoint of epistemology in the act of knowing things seem to stand over against the

38. Sellars, PPR, 16.
39. Ibid., 148.
knowing mind. Idealistic epistemological monism seems to do violence to this basic stubborn fact of universal human experience. This is the rock upon which the wave of idealistic epistemological monism is destined to break. Again, Sellars' criticism of the Berkeleian idea of perception appears to be valid, that is in so far as Berkeley insisted that the perception of things involves a mere givenness, and in so far as he ignored the important factor of interpretation which all perception worthy of the name seems to involve.

In view of the above estimate of Sellars' criticisms of Berkeleian mentalism what can be said of his criticisms of absolutism, that other type of epistemological idealism? First, it can be justly said that his charge of ultra-rationalism and lack of empiricism seems to be a relevant criticism of absolute idealism. However Hegel is far less deserving of this criticism than absolutists such as Bradley. Hegel has a philosophy of history, and however much at times he may appear to stretch the facts upon the procrustean bed of his dialectic, yet he cannot be accused of giving no attention to the facts. A careful reading of his *Philosophy of History* is a revelation of how well he did know the facts as far as they were known in his day, and how he did attempt to do justice to them. Hegel makes no mere boast when in his introduction to the *Philosophy of*
In view of the fact that the population is being increased at a rate of one per cent per year, it is to be hoped that the government will give the necessary attention to the production of food as a matter of urgency. It is evident that the need for food will become more pressing as time goes on. The government should take steps to ensure a steady supply of food for the people. It is not enough to rely on imports; it is necessary to develop local agriculture. There is a need for research into agricultural methods and the production of new crops. The government should encourage the use of fertilizers and the introduction of new varieties of crops. It is also important to educate the farmers in efficient farming practices. This will not only increase the food production but also improve the quality of the produce.
History he states:

What I have said thus provisionally, and what I shall have further to say, is, even in reference to our branch of science, not to be regarded as hypothetical, but as a summary view of the whole; the result of the investigation we are about to pursue; a result which happens to be known to me, because I have traversed the entire field.... We must proceed historically--empirically.

Bradley, as over against Hegel, has very little concern for the concrete and must rightly bear the brunt of Sellars' criticism. This is also true, in the second place, relative to Sellars' just criticism of the coherence theory of reality resting upon the doctrine of internal relations, and also of the charge of illusionism which Sellars levels directly at Bradley without mention of Hegel. Hegel's great fault is not so much a false rationalism which has no place for the empirical, but rather a certain ambiguity, a use of expressions that may be understood in two ways. It was this element in Hegel which gave rise to the various schools of Hegelians with such diverse and varied views.

Perhaps no criticism made by Sellars is more justified than his objection to the term "experience," so much used by both absolutists and pragmatists, the latter having borrowed it from the former. His question, "whose experience?", exposes the impossibility of this term as a designation of ultimate reality without further specification.

40. Hegel, PHN, 36.  
41. Sellars, PPR, 16.
There is no experience apart from a self possessing the experience. Consequently if Bradley's ultimate is "Experience" it seems logical that he ought to go all the way with personal absolutists such as Hocking and Royce and also assert that the Absolute is a Self. But, a naturalist such as Sellars would not be interested in forcing Bradley to such a personalistic conclusion. However Sellars has done philosophy a real service in exposing the shallow foundation of a term which has been the occasion of much loose thinking in philosophy and a real hindrance in the pressing of the metaphysical quest to its logical conclusion.

Most of Sellars' criticism of absolute idealism bears on Bradley. But in justice to Bradley there is one criticism which ought to be questioned. He accuses Bradley of illusionism. There seems to be more truth in this charge than in charging Berkeley with solipsism, but it is not the whole truth. Bradley after all like Kant insisted that men must take the world of ordinary experience as valid for the practical affairs of life. He also insisted that it had a measure of reality and that in so far as it constituted a phase or measure of reality it is not illusion. "Everything is error, but everything is not illusion." 43

Finally when Sellars criticizes absolute idealism for taking reality to be of the nature of thought he is striking

42. Sellars, CR, 161. 43. Bradley, AAR, 549.
The phrase 'in a whisper' seems to be inconsistent with the context. It is unclear what is being whispered.

It seems important to count on an API to get accurate records. The importance of accurately recording events cannot be underestimated. Such a systematic approach ensures that the information gathered is reliable and can be trusted.

The methodology used in the research is a key aspect of the study. The accuracy and reliability of the results depend on the methodological approach taken. Further analysis will be conducted to refine the findings and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the topic.

We refer to previous studies for a deeper understanding of the importance of accurate data collection.
at the basis not only of absolute idealism, but of all idealism. But this fundamental issue cannot be decided on the basis of epistemology alone. However epistemology does give the idealist one of the major reasons for his conviction that reality is of the nature of thought, namely the strange fact that since reality always reveals itself in terms of thought it may well be that it is of the nature of thought.
CHAPTER V

CRITICISMS OF THE IDEALISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES

1. The Nature and Significance of the Categories

Both idealists and naturalists have used the term category, though they have been inclined to define it somewhat differently. Thus Brightman, the personal idealist, defines a category as "something universal and necessary (or a priori, as Kant put it) about the world that we experience."\(^1\) And again, "a category, then, may be identified by the fact that, if it be not true, a whole system of experience is impossible."\(^2\) Sellars, the naturalist on the other hand defines the categories as "fundamental features of the world."\(^3\) And again he says: "They are not forms to be deduced from the self in some peculiar fashion, they are features to be discovered in objective knowledge, abstracted and analyzed."\(^4\) Both idealists and naturalists realize the tremendous significance of the doctrine of the categories in any system of philosophy. Sellars in his basic writings spends whole chapters in their interpretation and explication, and Brightman goes so far as to say that the nature of any philosophy whether it be materialistic, agnostic, idealistic, realistic, theistic or atheistic depends on its doctrine of the categories.\(^5\) With this state-

1. Brightman, ITP, 95.
2. Ibid., 97.
4. Sellars, EN, 50-51
5. Brightman, ITP, 96.
A REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE POOR.

In this report, I aim to provide an overview of the economic situations faced by the poor. The data collected suggests that poverty is not just an issue of income but also encompasses factors such as access to education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. The current economic climate exacerbates these issues, leading to a cyclical pattern of economic vulnerability.

The report highlights the importance of policy interventions that focus on sustainable development, education, and health care. These measures are crucial in breaking the cycle of poverty and ensuring long-term economic stability. The examples from different regions demonstrate the effectiveness of targeted interventions in improving the living standards of the poor.

In conclusion, the economic circumstances of the poor are multifaceted and require a comprehensive approach to address. The recommendations provided in this report are intended to serve as a starting point for policymakers and stakeholders to develop strategies that can lead to sustainable economic progress.

[End of Report]
ment naturalists even such as Denns would agree:

How, then, are philosophical positions (such as those called naturalistic, idealistic, and so forth) distinguished from one another?...Many gifted philosophers have lately converged upon one sort of answer to these questions. They have argued that philosophic positions are distinguished essentially by the different basic categories which they employ in interpretation, and by consequent differences in the interpretations which they develop. An examination of the relations that hold between the basic categories employed in explanatory statements and the content of these statements is therefore important for the understanding, not only of naturalistic philosophy, but of any philosophy.6

If philosophers, then, both idealistic and naturalistic seem to be agreed as to the significance of the doctrine of the categories then nothing can be more important in the dissertation than to carefully distinguish between the fundamentally idealistic doctrine as held by idealists generally, and the naturalistic as held by Sellars in particular. This will be necessary before any attempt can be made to designate and to describe and to evaluate Sellars' basic criticisms. To this important subject consideration must now be given.

2. The Fundamental Difference

The definitions of the term category given in section I of this dissertation really imply the fundamental difference between the idealistic and the naturalistic doctrines of 6. Dennis, in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 270.
in File Information, and that it will also be necessary to include the text of the current document. The document contains several paragraphs discussing the importance of file information, and how it is used in various applications. The text is clear and legible, and the layout is standard for a printed document.
the categories. It will be noticed that whereas Brightman emphasizes the mental by the use of the word "experience," Sellars emphasizes the non-mental--"the fundamental features of the world." In other words the fundamental difference between naturalism and idealism as far as the categories are concerned is simply this--that while the former looks for the categories in the realm of mind or experience, the latter seeks for them in things. Thus for the great idealist, Leibniz "the soul contains within itself Being, Substance, Unity, Identity, Cause, Perception, Reasoning and Quality," while for Sellars, as will be seen, the categories are primarily the characteristics of things as reflected in and by means of the medium of mind.

As a matter of fact, for idealism mind is not only the source of the other categories, but mind itself is also the fundamental category. This is especially true of personalism. "Mind, says Bowne, "is the only ontological reality." 

Intelligence is and acts. This is the deepest fact. It is not subject to any laws beyond itself, nor to any abstract principle within itself. Living, acting intelligence is the source of all truth and reality, and is its own and only standard. And all the categories, as abstract principles, instead of being the components of the mental life, are simply shadows of that life, and find in that life their only realization.

Immanuel Kant, though he did not go all the way with

7. Thilly, HOP, 378.
9. Ibid., 425.
idealism, yet had a profound influence on its later developments, and certainly, in his emphasis upon the mind as the source of the categories, he was in accordance with idealism. "Kant," says Hoernlé, "gives positive character and content to mind by making it the seat of the categories in knowledge, of the moral law in conduct, of aesthetic pleasure in contemplation."¹⁰ Bowne freely concedes his debt to Kant as well as to Berkeley,¹¹ and as will be seen, in his criticisms of the idealistic doctrine of the categories Sellars concentrates so much of his criticism on Kant that a special division of this chapter has been deemed necessary to deal with his criticisms of Kantianism. In Kant Sellars recognizes the father of the idealistic theory of the categories at least in so far as he emphasized the creative role of mind as the basic factor in knowledge. However most idealists do not follow him in his subjectivism—that the categories of thought cannot reach beyond the world of phenomena. They tend rather to hold with Leibniz that each soul is in some sense "a living and perpetual mirror of the universe."¹²

Naturalists no more than idealists are in complete agreement as to the precise nature of the categories. It is interesting to note that some naturalists of a pragmatic and phenomenalistic trend such as Dennes even set aside the

older categories "employed in naturalistic philosophy"—"matter, motion, and energy." They even refuse to use such terms as "substance and attribute" and speak rather of "events, qualities, and relations (or process and character, or essence or flux)" as the basic categories. And they define categories as "all sets of occurrences which are visible or audible or otherwise sensible and are used as signs for entities (or sets of entities) different from themselves." But this appears rather thin philosophy—an attempt to avoid the unavoidable ontological question as to what lies back of experience. It seems a refusal to think, to sound the depths, to explore the deeper meaning of experience. Instead it contents itself with the blanket-term "experience"—a heritage from absolute idealism. It is refreshing to know that Sellars does not deal in such superficialities and in such inadequacies. He is willing to probe deeper than mere appearance in the belief that something lies beyond. He is not afraid to raise the ontological question. Having rejected mind as the fundamental category and the source of all the other categories and refusing to use the thin expression "experience" he designates "thinghood," as over against mind as the fundamental category. In his Principles and Problems of Philosophy he describes the origin and nature of this category as follows:

On the known, or object pole of consciousness there develops... the category of thinghood. The essential meanings, or elements, of this category are not difficult to discover. A thing is a continuant, something which endures much as we do and which is spatial and resistant. It moves as a unit and can be pointed at.16

This category is present in all of our experience of external things. "It is independent and enduring things which we suppose ourselves to perceive, and not presentations."17

In his Philosophy of Physical Realism Sellars describes the category of "thinghood" further as follows:

The category of substance is but an explication of the category of thinghood which, in its turn, includes the species of selfhood. It stands for continuants which may change and enter new relations with other continuants. It means that chronological time or, as it is usually phrased, the passage of time has by itself no devouring effects.18

It is evident from the above quotation that the category of substance and of thinghood are one and the same. Again it is evident that the category of thinghood or substance is for Sellars synonymous with matter, for he says, "The essential notes in the category of substance are endurance and being;"19 and at the base of all things and as the cause of all things there is matter conceived in terms of simple organized systems out of which more complex systems arise.20

18. Ibid., 274.
Thinghood or substance or, in the final analysis, matter, is Sellars' fundamental category.

For Sellars, however, thinghood is no more the only category than mind is the only category for idealists. Space and time, and causality he calls "primary categories" along with "thinghood."\(^{21}\) Nevertheless it is evident that "thinghood" as representing matter or the physical world is fundamental. As for idealists space and time and causality together with the other categories are attributes of mind, so for Sellars these are attributes of thinghood, of the physical system which underlies all else. Thus space is not a real existent in its own right. "Space is purely adjectival. The physical world is dynamic and concrete."\(^{22}\) "Physical space is, then, the physical world known as spatial."\(^{23}\) The same thing is true of time. Time does not exist as an entity any more than space. It has no existence except as the order of succession or change in nature. "Instead of nature being in time, time (change) is in nature."\(^{24}\) "Physical space and time are characteristics of the physical world."\(^{25}\) Moreover the two are closely related as "characteristics of the physical world." "Instead of nature being in time, time, that is events or changes, is in nature. We must think nature in four dimensions and thus

\(^{21}\) Sellars, EN, 80.  
\(^{22}\) Sellars, PPR, 286.  
\(^{23}\) Sellars, EN, 101.  
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 121.  
\(^{25}\) Sellars, PPP, 241.
bring physical space and physical time together."\(^26\)

The category of causality is also an attribute of the physical order, and related to space and time. "The category of causality must be put in its ontological context, which is that of a substantive being both endurant and spatial."\(^27\) "It is important to connect causality with substance in order to deepen the latter by absorbing processes, activities, powers, and potentialities."\(^28\)

Again he says: "Material systems are extended, structured, massive, causally effective. It is in this fashion that we must think them."\(^29\) In other words in the final analysis all the categories are characteristics of the physical system, of matter which constitutes the fundamental category as mind constitutes the fundamental category for idealism.

One more thing needs to be said. In discussing the idealistic doctrine of the categories it was pointed out that idealists, though freely acknowledging their indebtedness to Kant, yet for the most part do not follow him in his subjectivism. They hold that the categories are relevant both to mind and the objective order, which is conceived as the activity of objective mind. Likewise Sellars, while holding that the categories are primarily characteristics of things, yet in so far as these characteristics are

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 240.
\(^{27}\) Sellars, Phil. Rev., 53(1943), 27.
\(^{28}\) Ibid., 19.
\(^{29}\) Sellars, PPR, 286.
disclosed through the medium of thought grants that they are also attributes of thought or mind. "We think in the world and the world thinks in us."30 The categories "give, as it were, the structure of nature as this is projected into consciousness."31 He also speaks of the categories as "intrinsic to consciousness," and of his psychology as a "thing-and-self psychology."32 In fact the only way that he saves himself from idealism is by reducing mind itself to the status of "a physical category."33 "The category of substance is but an explication of the category of thinghood which, in its turn, includes the species of selfhood."34 In other words it is matter or thinghood which constitutes the fundamental category which swallows up everything else.

In the battle then between idealism and naturalism as far as the categories are concerned it is mind versus thinghood. This of course raises the final issue, is the real of the nature of mind and matter merely the activity of objective Mind, or is reality of the nature of matter, and mind merely a physical category, an aspect, an attribute of matter? It is obvious that this question can only be answered in the next three chapters which concern Sellars' criticisms of the idealistic philosophies of nature, of value, and most

30. Sellars, FPR, 214.
31. Sellars, EN, 80.
33. Sellars, EN, 300.
34. Sellars, FPR, 274.
In the history and development of the Brazilian steam engine, the influence of foreign factors has been significant. During the colonial period, Brazil was supplied with steam engines from Portugal and Britain, which played a crucial role in the foundation of its industrial infrastructure. The introduction of efficient steam engines allowed for the expansion of the sugar cane industry, a key sector in the Brazilian economy. The 19th century saw the rise of the iron and steel industry, which also benefited from the availability of advanced technology.

As the economy grew, so did the demand for more powerful engines that could meet the increasing industrial requirements. This led to a period of local innovation, with Brazilian engineers and entrepreneurs adapting foreign technologies to suit their needs. The establishment of the first steam engine factories in the late 19th century was a testament to this self-reliance. These developments laid the groundwork for Brazil to become a major player in the global industrial market by the early 20th century.
fundamental of all of mind itself. With these significant facts in mind the discussion will proceed with Sellars' criticisms, first of the doctrine of the categories as conceived by the purer forms of idealism, and second with his criticisms of the view of Kant. Kant, it will be recalled did not claim to be an idealist, and definitely rejected idealistic epistemological monism, yet in Chapter II certain definite features of his system were disclosed which mark him as an idealist in the metaphysical sense. Moreover he has had such a profound influence on idealism in general that special consideration must be given to Sellars' criticisms of his system, particularly his doctrine of the categories.

3. Criticisms of Idealism Proper

By idealism proper is meant those forms of idealism which as over against Kantianism are relatively free from realistic elements. The chief types are mentalism, absolutism and personalism.

Sellars may be said to make two important criticisms of the idealistic doctrine of the categories. The first is the criticism that idealism is mistaken in thinking of the categories as developing from the mind or self. "The conscious self does not spin the categories from itself." The mind does not produce "ideas of reason" out of itself.  

35. Sellars, EN, 71.  
36. Sellars, PPP, 103.
The mentalists, the absolutists and the personalists are wrong. Why are they wrong? In what precisely does their mistake lie? Sellars answer is that they are not empirical enough. That if they were empirical enough they would see for themselves that instead of rising out of the mind the categories rise out of the interaction of mind with things, with its environment. It is thus that the mind comes to a realization of the characteristics of things. But the idealist concentrating on introspection has failed to see that the categories do not and cannot arise out of mind, but only as it interacts with its environment, with the physical order.

Categories and sensory presentations and classificatory concepts grow up together. It is the task of the genetic psychologist to note the growth of these distinctions. Yet it is clear to me that it is only as the living organism is thought of as reacting as a patterned complex to its environment that we have ground for the understanding of what I call the natural basis of the categories.\(^{37}\)

We shall find that experience has a pattern from the beginning and that, as the mind grows in response to the world and its problems, this pattern acquires meanings and passes to the interpreted thought of bodies in relation to one another. In short, the categories are implicit in perceptual experience and are elicited and developed by thought rather than segregated by a mysterious internal self.\(^ {38}\)

With Hegel and Fichte and Schelling especially in mind, Sellars says:

All of them believed that intense speculation could by itself lead the thinker into the heart of reality. They had gotten rid of an independent physical world and were convinced that reality was akin to that in themselves which seemed to them central and important. Unfortunately there was not enough cooperation with science in this romantic wave of speculation. 39

Again in criticism of types of idealism influenced by Kant and Descartes and Leibniz he says:

Instead of categories growing up in experience under the control of the external world and therefore inevitably significant for it, we have ideas of reason produced by the mind out of itself and not in cooperation with the external world to which they are to apply. What wonder that their cognitive significance must be a matter of preestablished harmony, as it were, to be guaranteed by God, or a mystery which we humbly accept because God would surely not deceive us and implant in us clear and distinct ideas which are not true! It is obvious that we are to-day largely free from these sets of assumptions and approach the problems of philosophy in a more empirical and inductive spirit and in the light of the biological setting and function of mind. 40

Sellars' criticism then is that idealists are not empirical enough when they look to mind as the source of the categories. They do not give due consideration to the facts of objective reference, to the fact of "thinghood." He also

39. Ibid., 106.  
40. Sellars, PPP, 103.
criticizes idealists for reducing space to a form of the mind.

Space is a strategic category. The physical realist is called upon to defend its validity and self-consistency against the attacks of idealists.\(^1\)

When the critical realist thinks of space as a category, he does not mean that space is a physical reality. He means only that valid knowledge of physical reality contains elements which can be universalized under such headings as distance, position, size, etc.\(^2\)

The idealist does violence to one of the most obvious facts of experience when he seeks to reduce space to mental terms; for it appears in experience as a basic characteristic of the physical order. "Space" is "a property concept," "a term for the extensiveness of physical systems." "The physical world is intrinsically spatial."\(^3\)

Moreover, Sellars, as has been pointed out, goes so far as to insist that mind, the basic category of idealism is itself but an aspect or an attribute of the physical order.

If, then, we use mind as a physical category, we should mean by it the nervous processes which find expression in intelligent conduct. The mind is the brain as known in its functioning.\(^4\)

Due consideration will be given to the problem which this raises in the chapter on the mind-body problem.

The second important criticism which Sellars makes of the

\(^{1}\) Sellars, EN, 84.  
\(^{2}\) Ibid., 84.  
\(^{3}\) Sellars, PPR, 317.  
\(^{4}\) Sellars, EN, 300.
idealistic doctrine of the categories is the criticism which Perry also makes in his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*. The criticism is, briefly, that while idealism thinks that it is taking its categories from mind, it is in reality deceiving itself. It is really taking them from the object.

In its actual working, objective idealism—whether neo-Kantian or Hegelian—has discovered the categories in the object of thought instead of in the subject. Why? Because that is where they develop.

Sellars' two fundamental criticisms of idealism proper, that is aside from Kantianism with its subjectivism as well as with its realistic elements, are then, as has been shown, two fundamental ones. First, that idealism is mistaken in seeking the categories in the mind or self. And second, as a matter of fact it actually discovers them not in the mind or self, but in the object of thought. Reserving the necessary evaluation of these criticisms until later Sellars' criticisms of Kant, to whom idealism owes so much, must next be considered.

4. Criticisms of Kantian Subjectivism

Next to Berkeley there is no thinker whom Sellars attacks more constantly than Immanuel Kant. "Kantianism and critical realism are incompatibles. The two have entirely different

45. Perry, PPT, 160.
46. Sellars, EN, 75.
notions of knowledge." 47 For Kant the mind is the home of the categories. 48 And only as it brings the manifold of experience under its categories is knowledge possible. Knowledge for Kant is always categorized experience. 49 But the categories are relevant only as principles of thought, not also as principles of reality. The categories are relevant for the world of appearances but they do not apply to what lies beyond, to the world of things-in-themselves, these are thinkable, but not knowable. 50 Knowledge then is a very complex act for Kant. First of all there are the unknown things-in-themselves. The role that they play is that of affecting the senses and thus giving rise to the appearances. Then, in the second place, it is only as mind takes these appearances and orders them according to its categories that knowledge arises as a product. Thus knowledge for Kant is not an apprehension but a construction.

Sellars makes many criticisms of Kant. But in this dissertation the aim is to single out the basic criticism or criticisms. These are two. First, he of course criticizes Kant along with idealists in general for making mind the home of the categories. "We have tried to show that the categories are not contributed by the self in the Kantian way." 51 The second criticism attacks the weak spot in

47. Ibid., 50.
49. Ibid., B137, B142.
50. Kant, CPR, A42, B60, A129-130.
51. Sellars, CR, 150.
Kant's armor, his subjectivism, his insistence that the categories of thought are not valid for the world of things-in-themselves. Sellars thinks that the second weakness stems from the first—that since for Kant categories spring from the self or mind it is therefore natural to suppose that they are valid only for mind.

Kant shuts himself into agnosticism. by his very approach. He taught that the categories exist only in the mind and have significance only for phenomena in experience. To refer them beyond experience is to misuse them.\(^52\)

Sellars objects to this subjective view of Kant. "For Kant, the phenomenal world, a world of construction, is the physical world—a view diametrically opposed to our own outlook."\(^53\) He rejects Kant's view of "a spider-like ego" weaving together the disconnected manifold into a connected order of experience. An empirical investigation of experience as that undertaken by genetic logic and genetic psychology in their study of the complex of experience even

52. Sellars, PPP, 100-101.
53. Sellars, in Drake and Others ECR, 211.
from its simplest stages find neither a disconnected manifold, nor the "spider-like ego." 54

Kant's schema suggests the working of a machine into which raw material is fed and there worked up. But is not the analogy false? We have to do with an organism with remarkable capacities under complex stimulation. 55

Sellars thinks that it is nothing short of scandalous to assume as Kant seems to that "the purely qualitative side of nature" is "dependent on the arbitrary modeling of the mind." 56 His point is that there is an order in these things which the mind discovers and to which it must conform if it is to play the game.

To put sounds side by side in space and to arrange colors in octaves would hardly be a successful method of procedure; yet, upon the Kantian basis, one would be as easy as the other. 57

Moreover it is impossible to account for the "synthesis to be found in knowledge," for the "continuities and unities which characterize experience as such or those powers of analysis and of organization which render knowledge possible" apart from the existence of an objective order to which mind must conform. 58 "It is a mistake to regard intelligence as creative apart from that which calls it forth. It is a servant, not a despot." 59 Sellars thinks that the real basis of Kant's trouble is his failure to rid

54. Sellars, EN, 66. 55. Ibid., 72. 56. Sellars, CR, 147 57. Ibid., 147. 58. Ibid., 149. 59. Ibid., 149.
himself completely of the old Wolffian rationalism. As a result he was not empirical enough. He failed to distinguish "between the real employment of the intellect in knowing existence and its logical employment."  

As nearly as I can make out, Kant learned from Leibniz that the intellect is active, but, in accordance with his subjectivism, he interpreted this activity as intrinsic in its reference and performed. After all, Kant's phenomenalism is akin to Leibnizian monadism. The windows of the monads let in light for subjective dreams.

Kant's basic weakness then is his lack of a thorough-going empiricism. If he had been more empirical he would have seen that the categories have their root not in the subjective processes and forms of the mind, but in the objective order of nature of which mind too is a part, and that they develop in the interaction that goes on between mind and nature.

"The main point to be stressed in contrast with the Kantian logic which I have in mind is the control of constructive thought by precepts and thus, indirectly by the environment."  

The empirical analysis of experience... is wholly against the Kantian separation of form from matter. Instead, relations and categories appear immersed in the objective continuum spread out before us and are analyzed out and used by thought in the solution of problems which concern the interpretation of the continuum.... The point to grasp is the growth of the

60. Sellars, PPR, 214.  
61. Ibid., 214.  
62. Sellars, CR, 146.
Our knowledge of the laws of nature and their interrelation is limited and fragmentary. We do not yet know how to apply these laws to practical problems.

The study of the laws of nature and their interrelation is a constant source of new knowledge and new problems.

In order to advance our knowledge of the laws of nature and their interrelation, it is necessary to carry out systematic investigations in the field of physics, chemistry, and related sciences.

These investigations will help us to understand the nature of the universe and its laws better.

It is important to note that the knowledge of the laws of nature and their interrelation is not only of theoretical interest, but also has practical applications in various fields of human activity.
categories from immediate experience and the fact that this growth is immanently controlled by experiences which lie deeper than our caprice.  

But Sellars' most telling blow at Kant's subjectivism is one which most idealists also can appreciate. It is the appeal from Kant ill-informed to Kant well-informed. "Even Kant," Sellars points out, "was forced to admit that particular uniformities were given to the mind rather than laid down by it."  

This is certainly implicit in Kant's interesting refutation of "idealism," that is, Berkeleian mentalism.  

Much more could be said relative to Sellars' criticisms of Kant. He particularly criticizes his conception of space and time as subjective. But his basic criticisms which involve all the others are his criticisms of Kant's conception of the mind as the seat of the categories and above all else his subjectivism.  

5. A Brief Criticism of the Criticisms  
Most thinkers would agree with Sellars' criticisms of Kant's subjectivism. Most idealists hold that some of the categories at least are relevant to reality as well as to mind. Again much of Sellars' criticism based on the failure of idealists to be empirical enough is valid. Often idealists, especially Hegelians, have sat in their ivory towers

63. Sellars, CR, 148-149  
64. Sellars, BN, 266.  
65. Kant, CPR, B275-276.
speculating when they should have been doing some very much needed investigation; for after all there are but two routes to the truth, one is the rational and the other the empirical, and these two are one. The true philosopher will aim at a combination of the rational and the empirical.

Much of Sellars' criticism of idealists based on their tendency to be unempirical at times is perfectly fair. But when he seeks to use this as a lever to dislodge idealism's basic doctrine, namely that mind is the basic category, and that all other categories are attributes of mind, then it is time to call a halt; for it is doubtful whether this argument proves his point. As a matter of fact all idealists are not unempirical. Many of them in the most comprehensive sense may, in fact be called more empirical than many naturalists who tend to become rather analytical in the narrow sense when it comes to the nature of mind, and the case for mind as the fundamental category in terms of which all other categories must be conceived. After all the most fundamental fact of experience is simply this— that all information about the natural order, the physical universe comes in terms of mind, and in no other way. As was pointed out in Chapter III in criticism of Sellars' theory of knowledge, even he has to admit and makes much of the fact that physical things cannot be directly intuited, but that their very existence and character must be inferred.
from the processes whereby mind interprets reality. It seems that his own epistemology should drive him in the direction of idealism. And, as was pointed out in section 2 of this chapter the only way in which he saves himself from idealism is by reducing mind itself to the status of a "physical category." How far he is justified in so doing will be decided largely on how well he is able to provide a solution to the mind-body problem where the final battle between the claims of idealism and those of naturalism must be decided. As matters stand, however, it would seem that idealists are just as empirical in regarding mind as the basic category and the home and source of all the categories as naturalism is in regarding the physical order, matter as the basic category, and the source and home of all the categories. In fact in view of what has been said it may be that the idealist is more empirical; for the facts of mind are known at first hand, matter always at second hand, and matter always in terms of mind. And if this is true then Sellars' and Perry's contention that idealism really obtains its categories from the object falls to the ground, except of course in the sense that the object itself is regarded as the activity and embodiment of objective Mind. The truth in realism may lie just here—that the categories seem to be in things rather than in mind, because things as the activity of the Divine Mind have an
order and a reason which answers to the order and reason which finds its completest manifestation only in mind. As a matter of fact justice can be done to all that the experience of "thinghood" actually calls for, when nature is thus regarded as most idealists have regarded it, not as the subjective dream of the individual thinker but rather as the manifestation of the activity of objective Mind. More consideration will be given to this important question in the next chapter on Criticisms of Idealistic Philosophies of Nature.
CHAPTER VI
CRITICISMS OF IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES OF NATURE

1. The Two Basic Problems

In any discussion of the philosophy of nature two closely related problems present themselves. The first of these is the nature of things. Both idealists and naturalists along with human beings generally are convinced that things exist in some form or fashion. But this raises the question as to their real nature. Are things mental or non-mental? The crux of the problem is simply this—that while things only and always manifest themselves in terms of subjective mind, yet they also manifest an objectivity that refuses to allow itself to be reduced to a mere phase of subjective mind. Things then must be either the activity of Objective Mind as idealism insists or else they must be essentially non-mental and mind itself a phase of things, as Sellars claims.

And this leads to the second important problem relative to the philosophy of nature. Things are not inclined to act in isolation. Even the simplest change is far more complex and involves far more factors acting in unity than is at first apparent. The fact of unity, order, organization in nature is evident to human experience everywhere, and it is also the basic postulate of science. In short both ideal- and naturalists are agreed that there is an order in nature to which the human mind must conform. Naturalists such as Sellars are even willing to grant a kind of "empirical
telesology" in nature. Both idealists and naturalists such as Sellars, then, are in agreement as to the empirical facts of order and teleology. The basic difference is simply this--Is this order and seeming purpose in nature intrinsic to nature, and is nature self-sufficient and independent or is it dependent on Mind, is it the expression of Mind? Must we then, with Sellars, accept nature as the ultimate fact beyond which the mind cannot probe because there is no beyond or must the mind of the thinker, with Hocking, "penetrate through the blank otherness of Nature to the spirit that is its support"? Sellars states the crucial problem well:

Naturalism stands for the self-sufficiency and intelligibility of the world of space and time. Supernaturalism maintains that this realm is not self-sufficient and that it can be understood only as the field of operation of a spiritual reality outside itself.

The phrase, "a spiritual reality outside itself" suggests that Sellars ascribes dualism to all theistic idealists. This suspicion is strengthened by what he has to say on page 15 of *The Philosophy of Physical Realism*. But he is certainly mistaken, since theistic idealists put the space-time order within God, not outside of Him.

1. Impersonal and Personal Idealistic Philosophies of Nature

As was pointed out in Chapter II, all idealists have one fundamental fact in common. They regard reality as of the

1. Sellars, EN, 337-338.
2. Hocking, MGHE, 289.
nature of mind. Impersonal idealists such as Bradley along with many pragmatists think of reality in terms of "experience". Personal idealists of all types prefer to think of it as the manifestation of Mind conceived as personal and self-conscious. Hence nature for the impersonal absolutists is essentially an aspect of the totality of experience—the Absolute, but for all personal idealists it constitutes "the activity of objective mind". Perhaps then it is well to divide idealistic philosophies into two groups, the impersonal and the personal.

The great question relative to Hegel remains as it has always been whether he was personalistic or impersonalistic. The evidence seems to incline toward the former, but at best he was vague thus giving rise to two schools. But there is no question relative to absolutists like Bradley. He reduces the world of things, nature, to an aspect of the impersonal Absolute conceived as the totality of experience. He indeed speaks of "Reality" as spiritual as in the following interesting passage with which he closes his great work, Appearance and Reality:

We may fairly close this work then by insisting that Reality is spiritual. There is a great saying of Hegel's, a saying too well known, and one which without some explanation I should not like to endorse. But I will end with something not very different, something perhaps more certainly the essential message of Hegel. Outside of spirit there cannot be any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real.

But it is evident that by "spiritual" Bradley does not mean personal. The Absolute within which all experience falls is essentially impersonal. In contrast to the all-inclusive Absolute, nature is mere appearance. And yet by virtue of being an aspect of the Absolute it has a degree of reality; it is not an illusion. But at the same time it does not have the same degree of reality that mind has.

Bradley, however, as was pointed out in Chapter II, Section (2), rejects mind as the fundamental metaphysical category. But in contrast all personal idealists accept mind in terms of the self-conscious self as the fundamental reality. There are three chief types of personal idealists. First, there are the followers of Berkeley, the mentalists, who have been sufficiently discussed for our purposes in Chapter II and Chapter IV of this dissertation. In brief, Berkeley conceives nature as wholly dependent on the activity of the Mind of God, and reduces matter to complexes of sensations, mere presentations which the Divine Mind makes to the human. It is no wonder, then, that Sellars attacks Berkeley again and again; for the latter strikes at Sellars' basic concept—matter.

Then there are the personalistic absolutists whose views were briefly discussed in Chapter II. Royce and Hocking were singled out as outstanding representatives of this group. Both of these great thinkers look upon Reality as an

6. Ibid., 531-532.
7. Ibid., 144.
8. Ibid., 530.
all-inclusive Self of which all selves are parts. But this Self is conceived as self-conscious and nature is a realm of meaning dependent on the Supreme Self.

As simply as Nature presents itself as objective, just so simply and directly is the Other Mind present to me in that objectivity, as its actual meaning. I do not first know my physical world as a world of objects and then as a world of shared objects; it is through a prior recognition of the presence of Other Mind that my physical experience acquired objectivity at all.9

Closely related to both Royce and Hocking and also to Berkeley is that group of personal idealists who call themselves personalists. This group was discussed at length in Chapter II. However it is necessary at this juncture to attempt a brief summary of their philosophy of nature. As was made clear in Chapter II, there are two types of personalists. The first is the predominantly pluralistic type of Leibniz who conceived the whole of reality including nature as composed of psychical units, monads, souls under the direction of a Supreme Monad, God. Leibniz displaces the concept of matter with the concept of monad or soul. Reality is a hierarchy of monads under a Supreme Monad. The second is the Lotze-Bowne School who call themselves personalists by virtue of their emphasis upon the self-conscious self as the key to reality. With Leibniz they hold that nature is the expression of the Will of God and consequently is more than just a system of meanings or of mere presenta-

9 Hocking, MGHE, 238.
tions. Moreover human selves are not regarded as parts of
God, but by virtue of being created by God they are in a
large measure other and distinct from Him, as centers of
creativity. Personalism is on the one hand more pluralistic
than absolutism, but on the other more monistic than Leibniz.
To the personalist nature has only phenomenal existence and
reality. It is not illusion but it is appearance; for it has
no existence in its own right, that is apart from the Divine
Energizing.

There is universal agreement among both
scientists and philosophers that a large part of
the sense-world has only phenomenal existence.
When we inquire into the causality and ontologi-
cal ground of that world, we are taken behind it
into a thought-world, and are told that this is
the truly real. But at the same time the phen-
omenal world remains real in its way. It forms
the contents of our objective experience, and is
the field in which we all meet in mutual under-
standing. It expresses, then, a common element
to all, and is no private fiction of the indivi-
dual. Concerning it the proper question is not,
Is it real? but rather, What kind of reality does
it have? 10

Again Bowne says: "Thought is rapidly reducing this world to
phenomenal existence, and making it the manifestation of an
energy not its own." 11

It will be readily seen that all types of idealism regard
the world of nature as phenomenal, in the sense that it is
not complete in itself or self-existent, but rather a mani-
festation of something deeper, of mind in some form or fashion.

11. Ibid., 64.
3. A Brief Resume of Sellars' Philosophy of Nature

Sellars' philosophy of nature has been touched on again and again. But no doubt a brief summary at this point will be of value. Sellars holds in the first place that nature is self-sufficient and independent. It must be accepted as existing in its own right. The explanation of the order, organization, novelty, value he finds in nature itself. These are intrinsic to nature. Emergent evolution is his principle of explanation.

Moreover nature is more than mere appearance. At the base of nature there is matter. Matter, he defines, as has been seen, in terms of the simplest existing systems, as revealed by the sciences; and out of these simple systems he insists the more complex systems emerge. Thus he ascribes all the complexity, the wonder and glory of the universe to matter. One of his most interesting statements relative to matter is the following:

Matter is now conceived as dynamic, organized, socially inclined to new unions under favorable energy-conditions. And this view expresses an immense amount of active exploration based on new methods in physics and chemistry made possible by radio-activity, X-rays, and the analysis of spectra. Matter has been opened up to the human mind in a most wonderful way.¹²

Sellars thus holds that in the last analysis only material things are real and enlarges his conception of the physical to include the psychical. "I don't believe in matter and mind but in an evolutionary minded matter."¹³

¹² Sellars, RCA, 174.
4. The Five Chief Criticisms

(1). Idealists Reduce Nature to the Phenomenal and Even the Illusionary

In considering the various criticisms which Sellars levels at idealistic philosophy, it is best to begin with his most extreme—that idealists reduce nature to an illusion. "It is my opinion," he says, "that idealism is akin to illusionism."\(^{14}\) Of course he has Bradley chiefly in mind as was made clear in the special consideration given to his criticisms of idealistic epistemological monism in Chapter IV of this dissertation. "We may say that Bradley was the last great champion of Eleatic illusionism."\(^{15}\) But even Bradley as was shown in Chapter IV of this dissertation believed that nature had its degree of reality and consequently he cannot be accused of holding that nature is illusory. Sellars also brings the same charge against Berkeley. "I would add that it is the belief of the critical realist that Berkeley was within the tradition of illusionism when he rejected the categories of substance and physical thing."\(^{16}\) But this charge is even more unfair against Berkeley than against Bradley. For Berkeley certainly believed, as was made clear in Chapter II, in a fixed order of ideas, the order of nature which rests back on God and which man must accept and cannot change. One wonders if Berkeley does not have a better basis for real objectivity than Sellars. For if back

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14. Sellars, PFR, 16.
15. Ibid., 16.
16. Ibid., 17.
of the order of nature is the purpose of God then that order can be more trusted to continue than if it is grounded in unthinking matter. How can Sellars on the basis of his philosophy be certain that nature may not change and change very radically so that its order give way to utter chaos? After all, for him evolution is a local affair. "The picture is that of a qualitative rising and subsiding in quite plural and local ways with a cosmic floor woven of particles in their dynamic relations." 17

Sellars is on surer ground when he charges the idealists with regarding nature as phenomenal. He quotes from Brightman's Philosophy of Ideals, criticizing it in the following manner:

The point I wish to make is that physical realism cannot cavalierly disregard the category of stuff, or substance, as the idealist is persuaded that he can. As an illustration of the latter, I take the following from a recent book by Professor Brightman: "For the reasons given, and for many other reasons, the positivistic view of nature seems preferable to the metaphysical. By nature, as the object of the sciences, then, we mean simply the fact and the laws of actual and ideally possible experience." By nature, the critical realist means a realm to be known in terms of fact and law. And so we have here a basic divergence. 18

All idealists look upon nature as phenomenal. By this they do not mean that it is maya, illusion, as some oriental philosophies allege, but rather that it is not real in the metaphysical sense, that it is not self-existent, self-sufficient and self-explanatory—-that it is the manifestation of something deeper, more basic and fundamental. As

18. Sellars, FPR, 291. See Brightman, POF, 55.
Brightman puts it:

Sensationalistic positivism, if taken as a complete account of nature, is indeed solipsism. But critical positivism does not identify nature with the particular facts of my experience. For it, nature is the whole system of the laws of the actual and ideally possible experiences of all human minds. Furthermore—and this is even more important—positivistic science does not pretend to reveal the inner nature of reality or the power which produces it. On this view, then, physical nature is, as G. A. Wilson holds, the resultant ideal construction in conscious experience when mind is stimulated in a certain way by the creative powers of the universe.19

Such views strike at the very basis of Sellars' system; for it is built upon the basis of the self-sufficiency of nature, and upon matter as the ultimately real. But Sellars makes certain criticisms of the idealistic doctrine of the phenomenalism of nature, which must now be considered more adequately.

He especially objects to the idea expressed in the above citation from Brightman that nature is a construction.

Idealism maintains, on the one hand, that physical nature is a realm of causal determinism and so contradicts man's freedom; on the other hand, that nature is a construction and not an independent reality.20

Here his criticism is that to regard nature on the one hand as a "realm of causal determinism" and on the other hand as a construction constitutes a fundamental contradiction and so the idealistic theory of nature must be rejected. But many idealists do not regard nature as deterministic in an absolute sense, and what is more when they speak of it as a

20. Sellars, EN, 4.
construction they do not mean in an arbitrary personal sense, subject to the caprice of the individual mind. It is the Divine Mind which constructs both the order of nature and the order of mind. Hence the individual mind cannot construct nature in any way that it fancies without courting disaster. It must be true both to the subjective order revealed in its own basic structure and also to the objective order which two orders seem to correspond in every act of rational thought thus furnishing the idealist with one of his arguments for regarding nature as also an order of thought. Thus it seems most logical to assume that the thought and thing series can be brought together in the knowledge relationship because the thing series is "cast in the molds of thought." In short the same Power that made the objective order, the idealist contends, also made the subjective so that the interaction of the two constitutes the experience of an orderly world. And he may also contend, especially in the light of the most recent discoveries of the sciences that nature is not nearly so deterministic as was once thought, that its Author so ordered it as to leave enough room for the creative role of mind. Consequently Sellars' keen thrust fails of its objective. But this only leads to his more fundamental criticisms which must be considered next.

Sellars tries to overthrow the idealistic doctrine of 21. Bowne, TTK, 296.
nature by an appeal to science which he conceives as having ontological reach.

We have rejected phenomenalism by justifying knowledge: and we have justified scientific knowledge by showing the nature and reach of it. Scientific knowledge, so interpreted, has ontological reach even though it involves no apprehension, apelike, of the concrete in the Eddingtonian sense of the concrete.22

By scientific knowledge Sellars does not mean that science can in any literal sense reveal the very stuff of nature, that is literally reveal it as non-mental and thus confute the idealist. This would involve a contradiction of Sellars' epistemology; for he insists as was stated in Chapter III of this dissertation that the mind cannot directly perceive the stuff of being but can only represent its basic characteristics in terms of the medium of thought.

Knowledge gives insight into the knowable characteristics of bodies, their structure and behavior, and does this metrically; but it does not involve any literal participation in the being of the object.23

Knowledge is not an intuition of the very content of external things nor a participation in their being but rather a decipherment of their characteristics as these are disclosed through sense-data and concepts. Given the otherness of the object and the mediatory mechanism of knowing, the nature of descriptive knowing becomes evident.24

We must glean from knowledge of ourselves and from knowledge of all sorts of physical things the general nature of material things. And we find that we think in terms of basic categories like thinghood, causality, spatiality, properties, organization, and change.25

...
In other words, as was seen in Chapter V of this dissertation, Sellars' fundamental category is "thinghood" which finds confirmation both in science and in all the ordinary experience of nature. Nature is "fact" as well as "law."²⁶ And the factual element in nature is "thinghood" "substance" or simply "matter". Sellars contends that ultimately science in its analysis of nature comes to matter conceived as composed of simple, indivisible patterned units.

But science finds that the complex is composed of the simple. The double task ensues of understanding the emergence of the complex continuant and thinking properly the simple. A correct thinking of complex substances should at least help us in thinking the simple, that is, that which does not seem to be further decomposable. We would expect it to be even more of a continuant than the complex. In fact, we would expect it to exist in its own right, in se, in a more enduring sense than the complex. That has always been the logic of materialism. Matter has inevitably been assumed to be eternal or enduring. The empirical task of science was to find the units. It is no part of the task of the philosopher to anticipate science in its search.²⁷

So it turns out that scientific knowledge discloses nature as composed of ultimate units which must be conceived as existing realistically in their own right, and therefore idealism is wrong in conceiving nature phenomenally. Beneath the appearances there lies matter as their foundation and cause. "Matter" or "substance" is the solid foundation upon which nature rests as over against the illusory basis which idealism finds in Mind. In speaking of substance or

²⁶. Ibid., 291.
²⁷. Ibid., 297-298.
matter, Sellars says, "I have defended the term as standing for being as against phenomenalism". 28

It is exceedingly doubtful if the idealist will be thus easily convinced. Hard as it sometimes seems to think of nature with its vast forces and its seeming hardness and massiveness as the manifestation of Mind, yet when all the facts are considered the naturalist certainly has to exercise far more faith than the idealist. Matter conceived in terms of simple units or systems seems altogether too simple an explanation. It takes a vast stretch of the imagination to conceive the actual order, design, organization, and unity, not to speak of mind and values, as emerging from a matter that in its simplicity cannot exercise the forethought and purpose which the facts seem to require. Matter seems altogether too simple and poor a concept to contain such riches. And these are not Sellars' only difficulties. The idealist might well remind him that the atom is conceived today as a center of energies and that it looks more like an expression of mind and will and fits in far more easily with the theistic hypothesis than did the old hard atom. Science which in its infancy seemed hostile to theism appears to be far more favorable today than ever before.

There is another interesting point which must be considered in Sellars' criticisms of the idealistic theory of the phenomenalism of nature. It is contained in the following passage 28. Sellars, PPR, 297.
from his *Evolutionary Naturalism:*

But the assumption which modern realism will not
denit is that nature is phenomenal. We know nature
through the data it controls in our minds. The
data, not nature, can be called appearance.29

The idealist would agree with the second sentence, "We know
nature through the data it controls in our minds." As has
been emphasized before the idealist contends for an objective
order as much as the realist but conceives it in terms of the
manifestation of Objective Mind instead of in terms of the
appearances of matter as the naturalist does. The last
sentence of the citation from Sellars involves his epistem-
ology, namely that things cannot be directly intuited, but
can only be known at second hand as they disclose themselves
through the medium of mind. This view it was contended in
Chapter III appears to involve idealistic conclusions,
namely that if nature cannot be known save in terms of mind
that it may well be that it is of the nature of mind. In
fact in the final analysis, as was pointed out in Chapter V,
the only way he escapes idealism is by the drastic method of
reducing mind itself to the humble status of a physical
category. Whether such procedure is justified will be con-
sidered in the next chapter on the mind-body problem, around
which problem together with the problem of values must center
the final conflict between idealism and naturalism.

(2). Idealists are Unempirical

This fundamental criticism appears again and again,
29. Sellars, EN, 16.
and may in fact be said to underlie most of Sellars' criticisms of idealism. Idealists do not give due attention to the concrete facts of experience and they tend to belittle science while physical realism does justice both to the facts of ordinary experience, that is to the common, persistent, indubitable facts, and also to knowledge as disclosed by science. Thus in Chapter IV his basic criticism of absolute idealism was found to be the tendency to speculation without a secure empirical grounding in the facts of scientific knowledge. Again in Chapter V it was made evident that Sellar's objection to the idealistic doctrine of the categories was finally based upon the contention that such a view is not empirical. It does not pay enough attention to the facts of ordinary experience on the one hand and to the facts of science on the other. As a result, idealists neglect the important objective factor of "thinghood" to which both science and ordinary experience give testimony. It will now be seen that this same argument underlies much of Sellar's criticism of the idealistic philosophies of nature.

As has been made evident before Sellars as over against the idealists holds that science has metaphysical reach. In fact in a sense science alone can speak the last word relative to the ultimate units of nature.

Matter has inevitably been assumed to be eternal or enduring. The empirical task of science was to find the units. It is no part of the task of the philosopher to anticipate science in its search.30

30. Sellars, PPR, 298.
which is limited to same extent as that in other
information of similar nature. The problem is to
find ways and means to make the best use of
such limited information. The answer must be
found in the process of analysis and decision.
Consequently he criticizes the idealist, particularly the religious idealist, the theist, with belittling science:

Religious idealism displays a disposition to belittle science itself and to build upon the fact that its tremendous tasks have not yet been completed. But those who comfort themselves in this way are like squatters who fear that the rightful owner may at any time appear and claim his property.\(^31\)

Spiritualism has been avid to prove that science deals only with phenomena. Granted this by bewildered science, it has gone on to argue that orderliness and intelligibility of phenomenal arrangements implied an orderer.\(^32\)

Again relative especially to the general forms of idealism prevailing during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth he says: "It did not face up to the facts discovered by the sciences, and seemed to consider itself an escape from their pressure."\(^33\)

No doubt, as was made evident in considering this criticism in Chapter V, section 5, it is richly deserved by many philosophers who fly the banner of idealism. Many of them, following in the footsteps of Fichte and Schelling, have spun out beautiful theories about nature without giving enough attention to observation and especially to the results of scientific investigation and experiment. But this hardly applies to the outstanding idealists of our day who can hardly be said to have neglected science. In fact the amazing fact of our day is the number of scientists of the first magnitude such as Eddington who on the basis of the newest revelations of the sciences have turned toward idealism.

31. Sellars, EN, 15.  
32. Ibid., 15-16.  
Sellars himself admits this fact and also the further fact today, even in science, once considered its impregnable castle which no idealist could ever scale, the naturalist is on the defensive.

Naturalism is being challenged to state and defend its postulates. Theologically inclined physicists have entered the lists; and, in the realm of technical philosophy, we find such distinguished thinkers as Maritain, Gilson, Whitehead, Montague, Parker, Northrop, and Hartshorne, standing for some form or other of theism.\textsuperscript{34}

In \textit{Physical Realism} it is interesting to note how much space Sellars gives to criticisms of the scientist, Eddington,\textsuperscript{35} and of the scientific philosopher, Whitehead,\textsuperscript{36} who has been called, "the greatest philosopher of our day".\textsuperscript{37} Whitehead is of course not a thorough-going idealist, but he is a theist, and his philosophy contains many idealistic aspects along with realistic elements.\textsuperscript{38} In view of these interesting developments it can hardly be said that idealism is unempirical today. Moreover, as to the ontological reach of science, the idealist can always answer that any ontology worthy of the name must investigate the total field of human experience much of which, such as the realm of values, hardly falls within the domain of science. The philosopher is dependent upon the scientist for certain facts relative both to physical nature and also to human nature; but if he builds

\textsuperscript{34} Sellars, \textit{Phil. Rev.}, 53 (1944), 361.
\textsuperscript{35} Sellars, \textit{PPR}, 41-44, 240-248.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 299-301.
\textsuperscript{37} Dr. E. S. Brightman, in a course, "Twentieth Century Philosophy", Fall, 1944.
\textsuperscript{38} Whitehead, \textit{PAR}, vii-viii, 68, 374, 377, 526.
his system on science alone he builds as truly on foundations of sand as if he neglected the facts of science. The philosopher must be truly synoptic; he must take into serious consideration all of the fundamental facts of human experience.

(3). Idealists Have Not Solved The Problem of The Distinction Between Physical and Psychical

There is no doubt, Sellars argues, that there is a real distinction between the physical and the psychical which idealism ignores.

Real fire burns, mental fire does not. There can be no doubt then, that there is ample empirical foundation for the distinction between the physical and the psychical. 39

The physical realm claims to be independent of mind, and there are valid motives which differentiate it from the psychical. These motives must secure satisfaction in any adequate philosophy, and idealism is unable to offer it. 40

The reason why idealism finds itself in this difficulty is simply that it has in the first place made the false inference that since things appear in mental and personal terms exclusively they must therefore be mental.

Because appearances are personal and intervene between the individual percipient and the physical thing, it does not follow that we have any less reason to believe in the existence of the physical thing. An effect cannot be more real than the cause. So long as we retain the contrast we must remain realists. 41

Must not our conclusion be, that the facts do not furnish a basis for the empirical principle of

39. Sellars, CR, 165. 41. Ibid., 52.
40. Ibid., 166.
idealism (that all objects of knowledge are mental)?...Knowledge as such makes no discrimination between the mental and the non-mental; this distinction is one between the objects of knowledge.\footnote{42}

If the idealist objects that if things are not of the nature of mind then it is impossible for mind to know them Sellars has his answer.

Some years ago I pointed out that the essential fallacy in the principle, that the mental cannot know the non-mental, was the assumption that to know a thing was somehow to be it.\footnote{43}

Is this chain of reasoning conclusive against idealism? At first sight it seems to be. It especially seems unreasonable to suppose that things are of the nature of mind. "Real fire burns, mental fire does not." Here Sellars distinguishes between the concept, fire, which he admits is purely mental, and the concrete experience of fire burning which he somehow holds to be a substance and in nature distinctly non-mental. Now every idealist who is an epistemological dualist would grant the distinction between the concept, fire, between the idea of fire and the concrete experience of burning sensation or the appearance of rapid oxidation in nature which is known as fire. Fire is not just the experience of the individual. There is something going on out there in the objective order which is distinct from my idea and yet when I describe it, I find that I can do so only in mental terms. Apart from a perceiving and

\footnote{42} Ibid., 185.  
\footnote{43} Ibid., 186, note 1.
interpreting mind fire has no meaning. Its attributes in terms of its color, the sensation of heat, its consuming power all have no meaning apart from a perceiving mind. What fire-in-itself may be it is impossible to discover; but our surest clue, since it reveals itself through mind and in terms of mind, seems to be that it is the activity of Objective Mind.

Of course Sellars objects that the fact that a thing is known by means of and through the mental or personal is no proof that it is of the nature of mind. That is, it is no absolute proof. This is what he should have said. And the idealist unless he is a dogmatist would have to grant this. But he could return the attack and insist that in the light of the best knowledge that is possible to human beings it seems more probable that things are of the nature of mind than that they are essentially non-mental. How the atoms can produce appearances is a rather knotty problem for the materialist; and worse yet how they can produce mind which even Sellars in this connection has to recognize as something different from things.

This leads up to Sellars' final attack—that the idealist in holding that things are of the nature of mind assumes "that to know a thing" is "somehow to be it". Of course this holds true of the subjectivist, but objective idealists, as has been pointed out before, do not hold that things are due to the activity of personal, subjective mind, but are
manifestations of Objective Mind which controls both the order of things and the order of subjective mind. For personal idealists, and especially for the type known as personalists, however, persons as centers of creativity and freedom have a unique status which things do not have. Hence the final struggle would, it appears, take place between naturalists and personal idealists, especially personalists.

In the light of all the facts then, it seems reasonable to hold that idealism on the one hand has a better explanation of the distinction between the mental and the physical. The mental is distinct from the physical because it has certain unique endowments such as consciousness, purpose, memory which things do not possess, since things have not been similarly endowed by the Creator but serve as mere means for the achievement of His purposes. Things are not basically as solid as they seem, for at the basis of things there is a dynamic process—those primeval energies which have their source in The Will and Power and Purpose of God. Hence things too are of the nature of mind and will since they proceed from the same source as these but there is not the same endowment. Consequently things and minds constitute two orders with an entirely different status. But while on the one hand the idealist can furnish the best explanation of the distinctness of minds and things, he can on the other hand also best explain their unity in interaction in that both
orders fall within the province of Objective Mind. Hence the force of Bowne's contention that things are "cast in the molds of thought." This leads to Sellars' next criticism, one that is often brought against idealists in general, but particularly against personalists.

(4). Idealists Are Anthropomorphic

He insists that man has read his conscious purpose into nature. "Man in his reflection upon the universe read this human level of conscious purpose into nature at large by means of the postulation of a God acting somewhat as man does, planning and contriving." He gives a number of reasons why he considers this an illegitimate procedure. First of all, because human categories are valid not for the universe but only for human life.

The new cosmic perspective simply refuses to project into the universe at large in a theologically priori fashion a magnified group of social and human categories like rulership, justice, plan, purpose. These categories are significant and valid in their proper place, which is human life, but they are not relevant to the universe at large. Traditional religion tried to humanize the universe and got into all sorts of difficulties for its pains.

Then in the second place he contends that the idea of personal agency in the universe is out of harmony with both science and philosophy.

The old idea of a personal agent working in nature but not of it fades and the attention is focussed upon actual events and things. For modern science and philosophy, nature seems self-sufficient and vast.

44. Bowne, TTK, 296
45. Sellars, RCA, 224.
46. Sellars, RCA, 154-155
47. Ibid., 160.
The physicist thinks that matter is originating today out of positive and negative grains of electricity. Such creation is all the time going on.\textsuperscript{48}

In the third place there is no real evidence today for "superpersonal agency."

What evidence have we for superpersonal agency? Has not such evidence dwindled and vanished upon scrutiny? Action \textit{in} nature is one kind of a thing; action \textit{into} nature something quite different.\textsuperscript{49}

In the fourth place, and more profoundly, personality is not adequate as the category of reality. Here is where Sellars comes to grips with the basic concept of personalism. Personality, in the sense of the self-conscious self, he contends is too "evanescent and passive, too little self-explanatory." "It is relative to an organism and that organism's activities." \textsuperscript{50}

"Are we so certain today that only mind can be active? Indeed, is not the inclination the other way, so that consciousness is often thought of as passive and ineffective?"\textsuperscript{51} He also contends that the interpretation of nature in terms of a particular part is one-sided. Animism is interpreting the whole in terms of a particular part.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 163-164. \hspace{1cm} 50. Sellars, \textit{EN}, 316.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 147-148. \hspace{1cm} 51. Sellars, \textit{EOP}, 178.
has been giving way to a naturalistic interpretation of mind which cuts loose from the ghost-soul.  

In his *Religion Coming of Age* he even goes so far as to say:
"Man is no more real than a dog; he is simply different and able to do things that a dog cannot do." And even in his *Philosophy of Physical Realism* he goes so far as to say:
"Stars, plants, ants and human beings are equally real. So far as existence is concerned, it is meaningless to speak of higher and lower." Moreover it is not true that the human will alone is active. There is no great Will at work in the world, but activity is native to nature. Hence it is false to ascribe such to nature after the analogy of the human will. This is anthropomorphism of the worst kind. "The history of metaphysics is full of the easy assumption that only the will is active and that nature must be interpreted in analogy with the active and conscious self." 

Finally Sellars criticizes the theistic arguments from order and design. He contends that the facts of order in the universe do not imply an orderer:

We are now prepared for our reply to the perennial theistic argument. Order, it is said, implies intelligence. An orderly world is a rational world, and a rational world implies reason. But do we not have here again one of those double words? A rational world is a world that reason can grasp; and, because of this, it is associated in our minds with reason and

52. Sellars, EN, 323  
53. Sellars, RCA, 13  
54. Sellars, PPR, 6  
55. Sellars, EN, 234
thought of as akin to it. But, as a matter of fact, the relation between intelligence and order is just the reverse of the one the idealist suggests. It is intelligence which presupposes order and not order which presupposes intelligence. Without order in the world, the human reason could neither have arisen nor could it have got leverage upon the world. An orderly world is rational only in the sense that it is suited to reason. It is the kind of world in which reason can arise and operate.\footnote{56}

The \textit{crux} of his criticism of the argument from design is the old contention that Darwin gave it the death-blow.

It remained for Darwin to give the death-blow to the hypothesis of design, whether external and creative or internal and guiding. Cannot all those admirable adaptations be explained as a result of their survival value?\footnote{57}

Darwin's contribution was the idea of natural selection, a mechanism, so to speak, which permits us to think of nature as unconsciously selective and directive from behind.\footnote{58}

As the last citation suggests, Sellars really thinks of design as intrinsic to nature. "What I am arguing for is a teleology of self-direction rather than a teleology of finalism, a teleology intrinsic to an economy which is both spatial and temporal."\footnote{59} He even goes so far as to say that there may be "a non-vitalistic \textit{elan vital}" in the following interesting passage from his \textit{Evolutionary Naturalism}.

There may be many stages between random aggregates and intelligent planning. There may be creative adjustments in the germs which, while not guided by ideas, are yet broadly coordinate. If function helps to determine structure, it is quite possible to conceive a non-vitalistic \textit{elan vital}. The part played by organization in

\footnotesize{56. Sellars, RCA, 220  
57. Sellars, EOF, 272  
58. Sellars, PPP, 273  
59. Sellars, \textit{Phil. Rev.}, 52 (1943), 26}
instinct and in intelligence may easily have its counterpart in the more obscure processes which geneticists study. To underestimate the physical world is a mistake.60

Likewise order and organization are intrinsic to nature.

The argument from design had more logical force in the days before Newton, LaPlace and Darwin. These and those who come after them have succeeded in showing that a certain measure of order and organization is intrinsic to nature. Why should it not be? But we must not exaggerate the amount of order in the world. There is devolution as well as evolution. The essential point is that we now think of order in nature as a growth and an adjustment rather than as something made on purpose as a machine is made by an artisan. The older tradition seems to us very anthropomorphic.61

Nothing is more fundamental to Sellars' system than the ascription of order and organization to nature as intrinsic. In the above passage he takes it for granted that Newton, LaPlace and Darwin have proven this. But no idealist would grant this. The ascription of order and organization to nature is clearly an assumption, and one less conceivable in the light of all the facts than the theistic hypothesis.

Though Sellars' criticisms of idealism based upon its anthropomorphism seem rather impressive when viewed as a whole, yet analysis shows their essential weaknesses which makes them far from conclusive. The first criticism namely that human categories are valid only for human life, is largely an assumption based upon too little evidence. It is certainly valid against much crude anthropomorphism of which theists have so often been guilty, but it can hardly

60. Sellars, EN, 338
61. Sellars, PPP, 481
be said to be conclusive against theism at its best. If man arises out of nature as a conscious rational being it seems reasonable to suppose that there must be more to nature ultimately than matter accounts for. Sellars himself makes some rather interesting statements along this line. In his *Philosophy of Physical Realism* he says: "I shall seek to show how man is a part of the fabric of the world and that his doing, his knowing and his valuing cannot be understood apart from his status."\(^{62}\) Again he says:

> If man is a genuine part of nature, nature must be a much more complex, rich and profoundly real thing than we have sometimes supposed. If man has evolved from nature, his presence casts light back upon it. It must be the sort of thing that could produce him. It must be kin to him.\(^{63}\)

If nature is "kin" to man then it stands to reason that human categories may be valid for nature, especially "if his presence casts light back upon it." This constitutes a real concession to idealism. More to the point yet in his article, "An Approach to the Mind-Body Problem", he goes so far as to say speaking of the efficacy of consciousness: "Here and here alone, are we present to some real in contrast to phenomenal, causality."\(^{64}\) And again in the same article, "The fact that consciousness is not alien to the physical world at its highest level throws a light upon the stuff of nature from the inside."\(^{65}\) And once more he says:

62. Sellars, PPR, 1.
63. Sellars, EOP, 222
64. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 27 (1918), 158
65. Ibid., 162. This idea of knowing nature from the "inside" goes back to Schopenhauer, the idealist. See, WWI, Vol. I, 129.
I have long maintained that, in consciousness—and there alone—we are on the inside of nature, that is of a highly organized system, the human brain. The situation is unique, and it is no wonder that it puzzles the psychologist.\(^{66}\)

If in consciousness—"and there alone—we are on the inside of nature" then nature may well be of the nature of consciousness and human categories not so irrevelant after all. It is statements such as those quoted above which lead Maurice Picard to say in criticism of Sellars' \textit{Evolutionary Naturalism}, "If, as the author himself avers, in conscious activity alone we are 'on the inside', evolutionary naturalism might lead more readily in the direction of pan-psychism or Haeckel's monism."\(^{67}\) At any rate such statements considerably weaken whatever criticisms Sellars makes of the anthropomorphism of the idealists based on the idea that human categories are alien to nature. In the final analysis much as he seeks to reduce mind to a merely physical category, yet when he considers the facts of consciousness he must at times admit that it reveals the nature of the real. From this it is but a step to the admission that personality as the highest development which nature manifests, as nature's highest product it may well disclose the heart of nature as personal. Much was said in the chapter on the categories on the status of mind as the fundamental category of reality. More will be said in the next chapter on the mind-body problem.

\(^{66}\) Sellars, \textit{Phil. Rev.}, 47 (1938), 483

\(^{67}\) Picard, \textit{Jour. Phil.}, 19 (1922), 587.
Sellars' argument that the idea of a personal agency in nature is out of harmony with both science and philosophy will not be taken seriously by idealists these days when there is a definite trend even among scientists in the direction of theism, and when the electro-magnetic theory of matter has made it far easier to conceive matter in terms of energy, as the activity of the Divine Will whose ways of acting constitute the laws of nature. Again confronted both by the facts of mysticism and the facts of order and design the theist will not give up in despair to Sellars' insistence in his earlier popular writings that there is no real evidence for a "superpersonal agency." What he should have said is that it is not possible to demonstrate the existence of God logically, nor does He manifest Himself in a physically visible fashion. Only to the eye of reason and of faith is God manifest. This is what theism at its best has always held. Sellars' chief difficulty seems to arise from conceiving the God of theism in far too anthropomorphic and external a way. And after all if human persons are agents in nature, a superhuman person might also be such an agent. Neither need He be conceived as operating in a crudely external and anthropomorphic fashion.

Finally Sellars' critique of the arguments from order and design have nothing especially new. As a matter of fact in trying to show that order is native to the world as a necessary presupposition of the growth of reason he fails to see
how the presence of an order on the one hand under which reason can develop and the development of reason on the other can be shown to imply an Orderer. If there were no Orderer whence this strange correlation which seems to imply a purposive arrangement?

Why, man, if the whole path and movement of heaven and all its contents are of like nature with the motion, revolution, and calculations of wisdom, and proceed after that kind, plainly we must say it is the supremely good soul that takes forethought for the universe and guides it along that path.68

Thus Sellars plays into the hands of the theists. It is easy for them to turn his argument against his own system.

Moreover, it is very highly questionable if Darwin gave the teleological argument its "death-blow". Natural selection is not creative. As Bowne puts it:

When the unfit is defined as unable to survive, we can readily see that it cannot survive; but the arrival of the fit, and its arrival in so many forms, are left quite unaccounted for by the great principle of natural selection. Yet these arrivals contain the knot of the problem. A few cases of arrival and survival may make no impression of purpose, but when the sum of arrivals and survivals is the orderly system of living things the case is different.69

(5). Idealists Cannot Explain the Dysteleological Facts

The discussion of the teleological argument always brings to mind the dysteleological facts along with the teleological. No idealist can deny that Sellars is right when he says that there has been and is "devolution as well as evolution". Theists have been more puzzled by the fact of evil than by anything else. It is a fact which at times leaves even the

wisest of them dumbfounded. Even Bowne, dogmatist that he was at times, is humble in the face of the problem of evil:

And here all human wisdom is at an end. The problem of evil to which these questions belong admits of no speculative solution at present. We cannot give up our affirmation of purpose, but we must admit that the purposes of the system are mostly inscrutable.70

Perhaps the most unusual fact about Sellars' criticisms of idealism is that he has so little to say about the problem of evil—the greatest obstacle to theism. And what Sellars does say is found almost altogether in his lesser and more popular writings. In his Next Step in Religion, Sellars insists that the facts of life do not harmonize with the religious view of the world and of God. "I am free to confess that theodicies of all sorts strike me as proofs of the inapplicability of the religious view of the world."71 And again he says:

Christianity is on the horns of a terrible dilemma. God must be totally responsible for all physical evils, at least; or else he must be thwarted by something independent of himself, whether this be an evil spirit or matter......Science has helped to do away with the devil; but in so doing, has it not also undermined the idea of Providence? Must not the same arrow transfix an effective God that does away with an effective Devil?72

It is interesting to note that Sellars confesses that he would have "less difficulty in believing in a deity" if he could believe in immortality.73 He also mentions the idea of a Finite God as a possible wolution which has at times been suggested, but he does not give it much consideration.74

70. Bowne, MET., 296. 73. Sellars, RCA, 201.
71. Sellars, NSR, 160. 74. Sellars, NSR, 162-164.
72. Ibid., 159-160.
Many theistic philosophers today are finding an answer to the problem of evil in the idea of a Finite God.75

5. Conclusion and Summary

As was pointed out at the beginning of the chapter the struggle between idealistic and naturalistic philosophies of nature centers about two great central problems, the nature of things, and the nature of the order which underlies the world of things. The naturalist holds that things are basically non-mental while the idealist contends that they are of the nature of mind. Again while the naturalist holds to the independence and self-sufficiency of nature, the idealist holds that it is dependent upon Objective Mind.

From a consideration of Sellars' philosophy of nature as over against that of the idealists, especially the personalistic, and from a consideration of his criticisms two conclusions emerge. First, today as in times past naturalism appears wholly inadequate as a comprehensive explanation of nature. Difficult as theism may at times appear, yet one turns back to it hopefully when it is a matter of choosing between it and naturalism. Second, idealism can endure criticism and prosper. For when the most comprehensive and coherent view of all the facts is taken, the case for idealism far outweighs that for naturalism. Mind can explain more facts than matter. The discussion must now proceed to the important mind-body problem with which the next chapter will deal.

75. See Brightman, POR, 336-341.
CHAPTER VII
CRITICISMS OF IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES
OF MIND

1. Significance of the Problem

Throughout the dissertation it has been assumed that the final issue between idealism and naturalism is the mind-body problem. In the chapter on the categories it was seen that while mind is the key category for personal idealism, the concept of "thinghood" is the chief, the ultimate category for Sellers' naturalism. The two concepts of mind and thing as ultimate stand over against each other in sharp contrast. In the final analysis one or the other must be most relevant as the clue to reality. And it is in the mind-body relation that the two come into the most intimate relationship for the purpose of philosophical investigation.

Sellers everywhere recognizes the importance of the mind-body problem. In Evolutionary Naturalism he says that the naturalist feels himself "on his mettle" when he approaches this problem.1 "My thinking," he confesses in Critical Realism, "has, from the first, been very much influenced by the mind-body problem. I have always thought that this age-old problem would be the crucial test of any philosophical system."2 Again he says: "It is still--as it always has been--my opinion that the adequate handling of the mind-body problem is the final issue between idealism and naturalism. In the chapter on the categories it was seen that while mind is the key category for personal idealism, the concept of "thinghood" is the chief, the ultimate category for Sellers' naturalism. The two concepts of mind and thing as ultimate stand over against each other in sharp contrast. In the final analysis one or the other must be most relevant as the clue to reality. And it is in the mind-body relation that the two come into the most intimate relationship for the purpose of philosophical investigation.

1. Sellars, EN, 286.
body problem represents the synthetic stage of any philosophy and is at the same time a supreme test and indication of its power." In another article he speaks of it as the most crucial problem for both science and philosophy. "Here the physical world and mind somehow come together." Finally in his most important book, *The Philosophy of Physical Realism* he says, in the very first sentence of Chapter XVI, "Consciousness and the Brain-Mind:" "The questions to be discussed in this chapter are crucial for naturalism."

2. The Crucial Issue

The crucial issue involved in this most significant of problems is well stated in the first two sentences of Chapter XVI of Sellars' *Philosophy of Physical Realism*. "The questions to be discussed in this chapter are crucial for naturalism. They sum up to this one, How precisely are we to think of consciousness as in the brain?" With Sellars' excellent statement of the crucial issue before us brief summaries are now in order both of Sellars' conception of mind, and also of those of his chief opponents, the personal idealists.

Now it was made clear in Chapter III of this dissertation that Sellars definitely rejects behaviorism. He also

5. Sellars, PPR, 406.
6. Ibid., 406.
rejects parallelism, and interactionism. He makes mind a physical category. "The 'under-the-hat' theory of mind, as it is derisively called by both idealists and Cartesian dualists, makes mind local, emergent, physical and conscious." What then is the significance of consciousness? In the first place it does not constitute the whole of mind but only a part of it.

Our conclusion is that consciousness is a feature of mind but by no means the whole of mind. It is too evanescent and passive, too little self-explanatory, to be so considered. It is relative to an organism and to that organism's activities.

In the second place consciousness is not a "stuff" nor a form of energy nor a form of motion but an "event" resting upon "mind-brain" activity. More precisely, he states: "Consciousness is a qualitative dimension of cerebral activity." In the third place, consciousness is "a denotative term for the total field of a person's experiencing as it shifts and changes." "In consciousness, we participate in the activity of the brain." As such consciousness is unique because here and here alone the individual is "on the inside of nature." He knows nature at second hand but consciousness is something that he experiences at first.

7. Sellars, PFR, 326-333. 11. Sellars, PPR, 424.
9. Sellars, EN, 316. 13. Ibid., 421.
also Phil. Rev., 47(1938), 484.
hand. In the fourth place consciousness "is not an independent event but a feature of a physical event. The conscious kind of brain event is invariably conscious." Since it is "but a feature of a physical event" consciousness is basically dependent upon brain changes. Sellars has no place in his system for a consciousness which shows any independence of the brain, that is, independent in the sense of being an entity of a different order acting upon the brain. In the fifth place Sellars insists that consciousness is efficacious. "The conscious self sits in the watch-tower of the brain to guide the organism's behavior." This guidance is not from an entity acting externally upon the brain, but rather acting from within as a part of brain process, a certain aspect of brain process directing the rest. This is how he seeks to escape determinism by grounding freedom as it is experienced within the brain itself.

We are led to reject the dualist's notion that consciousness is something which is forced to insert itself causally from the outside into the brain in a transeunt fashion. No; we have here to do with immanent causality, with functioning.

Consciousness by itself has no efficacy. It never occurs merely by itself. It always occurs in relation to something else. And for Sellars this something else is always the non-mental physical brain process of which consciousness

is an aspect. "It is obvious that we cannot assign efficacy to consciousness by itself, since it is merely a feature of the cortical event. The causal reality is the conscious physiological process."\(^1\) 

"By itself, no feature of consciousness has efficacy, for it is an abstraction."\(^2\)

Consequently, in the sixth place, consciousness is regarded as intrinsic to the physical system, the brain. "In short, make consciousness intrinsic to the brain event, and its efficacy cannot conflict with the facts of physiology and behaviourism."\(^3\)

This of course raises the question if consciousness is intrinsic to the brain, and but a feature of a brain event why is this not evident in our experience? For as a matter of fact one never experiences a brain movement, but a thought or feeling something altogether different from a brain movement. Sellars attempts to explain this strange fact in terms of his "double-knowledge" theory. Man knows consciousness and the facts of conscious experience at first hand, an absolutely unique thing occurring nowhere else in the whole realm of nature. But he knows the brain and all physical facts only at second hand. Hence he cannot possibly discern the ontological linkage of the "brain-mind." "We are precluded from witnessing the ontological linkage of consciousness in the brain."\(^4\)

20. Sellars, PFP, 382.  
We have knowledge of the brain but no intuition of the stuff of the brain, that is, no vision of what physically is. Consciousness, on the one hand, is a term for data open to inspection and analysis. Of it, alone, do we have acquaintance. It follows that the setting of consciousness in the brain cannot be given in the same way that the psychical is given. In other words by the very nature of the case we are precluded from witnessing the ontological linkage of consciousness with the being of the cerebral process. The situation is unique. Only in consciousness does nature know itself. The world as idea is in the brain.22

But one of the most interesting ideas of Sellars is his contention that consciousness is extended and as such spatial.

I would assert, then, that the extensity of sense-data and of spatial experience in general is grounded in the extensity of the cerebral patterns to which they are intrinsic. They are participatively as extended ontologically as the patterns of which they are features.23

I hold that the psychical can be extended ontologically in the same sense that an activity or an event can be. That is, it can permeate, and be integral to, a process which is as extended as the physical system which is its locus.24

Again he says in Critical Realism:

Consciousness is in the brain in the sense that it is part of the nature of the brain when it is functioning; it is what we have called a functional variant of the cortex. As such, there is no valid reason to deny that consciousness

22. Sellars, EN, 310.
24. Ibid., 421.
information, and to seek new information. In order to obtain a complete and accurate picture of the situation, it is necessary to consult various sources of information. This may include interviewing experts, conducting surveys, or analyzing data. However, it is important to be critical of the information obtained and to verify its accuracy. By doing so, we can ensure that the information we rely on is reliable and valid.
is an extended manifold. It arises in and is effective in the physical world. Its unity is that of the integrative activity of the brain which it helps to direct, hence, it is as extended as the brain is.25

Sellars thinks that by means of this peculiar theory of the extensibleness of consciousness that he can save himself from dualism. "Consciousness is extended after its kind...This implication of our analysis enables us to break with the Cartesian contrast between the extended and the unextended."26 Sellars then regards mind as physical and consciousness as an aspect of mind and as such an event in a physical system. Consciousness is wholly grounded in and at the mercy of the physical and beyond the physical, beyond matter there is nothing. Consciousness is nothing but a quality of matter which emerges under certain favorable conditions when a certain type of organization has been effected.

The best our reason can do--it seems to me--is to ground consciousness in this basic qualitativenss of all substance. Here is its emergent potentiality. We cannot inspectively trace it in a genetic way, for the last term alone is open to inspection. But I can see no reason to assume a complete discontinuity. Consciousness, as I see it, is adjectival, expressive, intrinsic to functional activity. If emergent causality signifies the generation of high-order substances we must expect basic novelties.27

Personal idealists, both of the absolutistic and of the non-absolutistic types, differ from Sellars in two respects. First, they regard consciousness not as one aspect of mind but as of the very essence of mind. "The essence of mind," says Hocking, "is thinking." 28 Obviously this definition of mind as given by Hocking is too narrowly intellectualistic, yet it stands in sharp contrast to that of Sellars, for thinking along with memory is conscious process. Brightman defines mind or self as "any conscious experience or process taken as a whole and as experiencing itself." 29 And again he says: "The self is indeed confined to conscious experience; it is no unconscious entity or mere capacity." 30 Finally he says: "Mind is consciousness. All experience, from the rawest sensation to the most intellectual reasoning, is the realm of mind." 31 It is evident that Brightman's definition is more adequate because it covers not only thinking but all other aspects of mind such as perception, memory, and willing. And this leads to the second great difference between Sellars' conception and that of the personal idealists. Instead of reducing mind to a physical category, a mere aspect of things idealists regard things as an aspect of Mind, and both mind and things as two orders resting ultimately upon the activity of Objective Mind which creates and imparts to both their distinctive

natures. In the words of Hocking: "God then is immediately known, and permanently known, as the Other Mind which in creating Nature is also creating me."32

The personalists as over against the personalistic absolutists lay more stress upon the uniqueness of the individual consciousness as in a real sense separate from its Creator while of course ultimately dependent upon Him. They also tend to set mind or consciousness in sharper contrast to nature and to that part of nature which exists as the immediate environment of mind, namely the body and its brain. Consequently, as over against the absolutists, they incline toward a relative dualism. Mind and body are two definitely distinct orders, absolutely irreducible to each other, yet so formed as to be capable of interaction. Hence personalists for the most part are definitely interactionists. After dismissing various other theories, Brightman says:

Interactionism is the only other theory that has been proposed. It is the belief that mind and body act on each other; that sometimes the initiative comes from one side, and sometimes from the other. This is what the common man takes for granted; and for once he may be right!33

Similarly Bowne points out:

The physical and mental series are separate and incommensurable; it is conceivable, however, that there should be a correspondence between them, such

32. Hocking, MGHE, 297. 33. Brightman, ITP, 204.
that a given state of the one should always attend a given state of the other. 34

Hocking criticizes interactionism as out of accord with experience, the experience of the felt unity of mind and body, and hence adopts a monism which is in accord with his absolutism. 35 Brightman, on the other hand, contends that interactionism is in accord with experience.

Experience speaks in favor of interactionism. If the word cause has any meaning, it is just as true that we observe causal relations between mental and physical states as that we observe them within the physical series. 36

At this juncture it will be well to consider an interesting solution of the mind-body problem suggested by L. Harold DeWolf in an article in The Philosophical Forum, entitled, "Toward a Conciliation of Personalism and Behaviorism."

First of all, he makes it clear that he is in no sense to be considered a behaviorist, as far as the metaphysical issue is concerned.

To reconcile personalism with all the doctrines commonly taught by behaviorists is obviously impossible. The personalists are agreed in stressing the reality of purpose and the validity of moral obligation. Such teachings are incompatible with the behaviorists' assertion that every bit of human behavior is completely determined by causal laws. Moreover, the personalists insist on the reality of consciousness as observed by introspection, while John Watson and the more

34. Bowne, MET., 370. 36. Brightman, ITP, 205.
35. Hocking, TOP, 233-236.
radical of his disciples flatly deny that consciousness is real.37

The essence of Dr. DeWolf's view is this—that even as personalists do not object to describing the Divine Activity in nature in terms of physical process, without reducing the Divine to physical process, so they should not object to describing the human mind likewise, in so far as it is externally observable, in terms of bodily process.

It is difficult to see why personalists have not anticipated the behaviorist doctrine that a man's mind can be described in terms of physical categories. It would seem an almost necessary element in their own theory. For they contend that God and man are both minds, each appearing to himself as a stream of consciousness. But then they say that in man's sense experience the very mind of God appears as the spatially ordered events which we call the physical world. Now if this is true, is it not probable that man's mind, too, will appear to the senses of other men as a form of physical activity?

It seems strange that any idealist should believe that God's active consciousness strikes human beings as a system of physical events, and yet should view with horror the thought that human consciousness strikes other human beings as a system of physical events. A double-aspect theory of God, such as personalists hold, would seem to suggest strongly a double-aspect theory of man.38

However much personalists may vary from personalistic absolutists, and however much personalists may vary among themselves as far as individual interpretations of the

difficult mind-body relation are concerned, yet as over
gainst naturalists such as Sellars they all hold in common
that mind is the fundamental category. They hold that nature
must be interpreted in terms of mind, not mind in terms of
nature. Both nature and mind are of course basically mental
as proceeding from a common source, but they have a
different status. Mind, by virtue of its attributes,
affords the best and most adequate principle of ultimate
explanation. As Hocking puts it: "The idealist believes
that our alternatives are really but two; we must either
explain mind by physical nature, or we must explain physi-
cal nature by mind. And since we have found the former
impossible...we must adopt the latter."39 "Materialism,"
says Brightman, "models its universe on physical things;
the new realism on universals; idealism on consciousness."40
And again he says: "Idealism is the belief that mind or
consciousness is the truly real, and that everything exists
only in relation to mind."41 The crucial question then is,
as was stated at the beginning of this section, What is the
nature of consciousness? Is it but an aspect of a physical
system, the brain, or is it something other and greater--
the clue to the nature of things? Sellars insists that it is
but an aspect of the brain, of a physical system while all
personal idealists insist that it is of such a nature as to

40. Brightman, ITP, 236.
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furnish man's best clue to reality. With this basic difference before us a discussion of Sellars' specific criticisms of idealistic philosophies of mind is now in order.

One further word, however, is in order before Sellars' specific criticisms are considered. The dissertation concerns itself primarily with Sellars' criticisms of personal idealism, because relative to the mind-body problem the crucial issue lies between his naturalism and personal idealism. Impersonal idealists such as Bradley are even more radical in their criticisms of mind than Sellars. As far as the mind-body problem is concerned then, the issue seems to lie not only between naturalists and personal idealists, as was stated above, but equally between personal idealists and all impersonalists.

3. Sellars' Criticisms of Interactionism

Most of Sellars' criticisms of idealistic conceptions of mind are directed against interactionism, though all idealists are not necessarily interactionists in the strict sense of the word. Rocking criticizes interactionism as has been seen, and DeWolf does not draw the distinction between mind and body nearly as sharply as do interactionists such as Brightman and Bowne.

Scattered throughout Sellars' many writings one finds not less than seven criticisms of interactionism. The first of
these is the usual argument employed by impersonalists based upon the fragmentary nature of consciousness and the instability of the self. The gist of the argument is simply that the self or consciousness cannot be an order in any sense distinct from the physical series and conceived as interacting with it because consciousness is too easily affected by the least change in conditions. This Sellers would say, is a matter of indubitable fact and is fatal to interactionism, and in fact not only to interactionism but to the total idealistic viewpoint as well.

Consciousness, is so evanescent, seemingly so little conserved, that it scarcely strikes our reflection as being the foundation of the gigantic processes of the physical world. Prevent oxygen from being conveyed to the brain, and we faint and lose consciousness. It is something unsubstantial, something qualitative rather than quantitative. 42

Again relative to the instability of the self he says: "The 'I' is, however, not a stable entity. It enlarges itself at times with the full content of the 'me,' and at other times diminished to not much more than the felt bodily presence." 43 Again he says: "In truth, it is very probable that the assurance of personal identity depends in a large measure upon the sameness of the objects with which we deal." 44

A second criticism is that interactionism rests on out-

42. Sellers, PFP, 335-336. 44. Ibid., 93.
43. Sellers, CR, 97.
grown traditional assumptions. There are three of these, first, "the acceptance of a dead-level, unevolutionary view of the physical world" which made it impossible to conceive the physical as the source of the mental, second, dualistic animism coming down through man's religious heritage from the savage, and third Cartesian dualism as the philosophic expression of the first two assumptions. 45 "Evolutionary naturalism does not believe that the higher levels of nature are purely mechanical; it accepts critical points with resultant new properties. The struggle between animism and naturalism centers here." 46 Again he says in criticism of Cartesian dualism:

Thus my position differs from Descartes, first, in the enlargement of the concept of the physical world as regards texture and content, and, second, in consequent ability to locate consciousness in it. From these differences it follows that the Cartesian motives for an immaterial soul no longer are valid. 47

Closely related to the criticism that interactionism rests on traditional assumptions which have been outgrown is the contention that there are four motives which lead to interactionism. The first, the "epistemological," expresses itself in the assumption that the physical world "is exhaustively revealed in the knowledge gained by the sciences." Since the physical world is therefore regarded as mechanical and quantitative there is obviously no place

45. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 27(1918), 151-152. 46. Sellars, EN, 292. 47. Sellars, PPR, 429.
for mind in it. Hence a "separate realm" must be found for mind, and the result is the dualism which interactionism assumes. The second is the "categorical" which expresses itself in the disparity between the content of the knowledge gained by the physical sciences, mass, energy, space, size, shape, behavior, and the categories of introspective psychology, content, fusion, association, recall, attention. Faced with this disparity the mind naturally turns to dualism. The third, the "methodological," reflects the methods and interests of the physical sciences in contrast with introspective psychology and thus continues the categorical motive. The fourth, "the theological," has been influential since the beginning of philosophy and has suggested the notion of spiritual substance "co-equal with matter and having consciousness as its attribute." Sellars thinks that these motives can be "turned aside" by his "double knowledge" approach to which consideration has already been given.

My argument is, that two kinds and directions of knowledge separate for the knower the indissolubly connected. Let me put the situation as I understand. Suppose consciousness were in the brain as a changing flow of quales, and that, in it and by it, the individual had knowledge about the brain, on the one hand, and of it, on the other; would not the situation be exactly that indicated by the above motives? We should expect the categories of two kinds of knowledge to differ fundamentally and, if the first kind of knowledge were regarded as entirely penetrative, we
should be led into dualism.⁴⁸

A third criticism of Sellars is his contention that for interactionism consciousness exists as something apart from and external to the organism. This assumption Sellars insists is absurd, for consciousness apart from an organism is an abstraction.⁴⁹ But personalists would not take this argument seriously, because they do not think of consciousness as existing without relationship to an organism, an "environment."⁵⁰ "The personalist believes that the organism is to the human individual an order of experience, and in itself an activity of God." And it is conceivable that even after death that the mind may still exist in relationship to an organism, in the sense of a different order of experience than the present order which is called matter.⁵¹

A fourth criticism is the contention that to regard consciousness as distinct from the physical brain-processes is to do violence to the essential unity of the functioning organism. Sellars charges that the interactionist makes of consciousness a self-existent substance which acts upon the neural processes externally and mechanically.⁵² But, as a matter of fact, he insists, the organism is not a duality but an indissoluble unity.⁵³ Above all else Sellars seeks

⁴⁹ Sellars, PPR, 429, 440.
⁵⁰ Brigatman, ROI, 25.
⁵³ Sellars, PPR, 429.
The information provided is not legible due to the quality of the image.
to avoid a dualism as far as the mind-body problem is concerned. In his Critical Realism in describing the development of his thinking in the direction of realism, with the mind-body problem in mind he admits:

There can be no doubt that constant brooding over this tantalizing question exerted a pressure on me in the direction of realism and, at the same time, controlled my thinking. How could I obtain a realism without a dualism?54

This was his problem, and he solved it by making consciousness simply an aspect, a qualitative aspect, of the fundamental underlying physical processes of the brain. Interactionists think that he achieved his end at the cost of doing violence to the facts, some of which will be considered in the criticism at the end of the chapter. Moreover except for the Cartesians Sellars' argument, that interactionists do violence to the essential fact of the unity of the organism, is not of necessity valid. Modern interactionists do not regard the mind as something external to the body, but as essentially correlated with it by the plan and purpose of the Creator, and as proof of interactionism they appeal to experience which every conscious moment adds additional evidence.55 Moreover interactionists of the personalistic type reject the idea of the soul as a self-existent substance. They think of it rather as the conscious self which every moment of consciousness is in

direct relationship with the body, its medium or instrument. And the self is not conceived as owing its being to a mysterious substratum in which it inheres, but rather as directly dependent upon God who is the Author of both mind and body. This view it would seem provides for the unity which Sellars wants to preserve without doing violence to mind by reducing it to the status of a mere aspect of things.

In the fifth place, Sellars contends that interactionism is unempirical. Three criticisms may conveniently be considered under this general heading. First, in both his Evolutionary Naturalism written in 1922, and in Principles and Problems of Philosophy written in 1926 he uses the old argument from the conservation of energy. "The brain-event acts upon the soul, and the soul reacts; and so the physical system ceases to be self-contained." 57

The objection which science has usually advanced concerns the conservation of energy. For modern science, energy is neither lost nor gained but merely transformed. Yet here is the hypothesis: the brain-event acts upon the soul and so energy disappears from the physical world into an immaterial world. And, in volition, just the reverse happens. But such an open boundary of a physical system is quite opposed to the ideas of science. 58

But while making use of this argument in the two books

57. Sellars, BN, 291.
mentioned above it is interesting to note that in his earlier book, *Critical Realism*, he admits that this argument is far from conclusive and in fact goes so far as to say:

> We shall not lay stress on the hackneyed argument against interactionism based on the principle of the conservation of energy. Were this principle all that stood in the way, it could not be adjudged a sufficient obstacle. The real obstacle which interactionism must meet is the justification of a soul.  

59

This leads to the second criticism namely that as far as the empirical evidence is concerned the thinker has no right to assume the existence of a soul that the brain is not adequate to perform all that the soul is supposed to. In his *Evolutionary Naturalism* he asks what right the thinker has to suppose that the brain cannot perform these functions. 60 And in *Critical Realism* he challenges the whole idea of the existence of the soul on empirical grounds.

The real obstacle which interactionism must meet is the justification of a soul. We know nothing of a mind or soul substance coordinate with the physical world. Experience indicates consciousness, the mind and the physical. The question is: How are they related? Until it is proved that they cannot be united without a dualism, theories, like parallelism and interactionism, are out of order. 61

Here it is obvious again that when Sellars speaks of the

60. Sellars, *EN*, 292.  
soul he means the old substantial soul which personalists would freely grant him cannot be found. The only soul, as has been pointed out before, that personalism recognizes is the conscious self. "This soul," says Bowne, "is neither in the heights nor in the depths; it is very high indeed, for it is simply the living self." It is this soul, the personalist would insist, which carries out the functions which Sellars assigns to the brain. And the fundamental reason for affirming its existence as something other than the brain is simply that every moment of conscious existence cries out against Sellars' conclusion that the brain a physical object and organ can perform functions such as thinking and willing and remembering which seem clearly to belong to a different order of being. "That brain and nervous system are environment and not mind itself is evident from the fact that most of the time the mind is not even conscious of having a brain and nervous system." But Montague has given the best answer to Sellars. First of all he explores the brain with the "untutored eye" and finds it "a slippery and complicated object with strange convolutions on the outside and queer caverns within" and with strange connections with all parts of the body. Next he explores it with the trained anatomist and physiologist and finds it an organ of undreamed-of complexity with "its

millions of interconnected neuronic elements" organized in
hierarchies of sensori-motor arcs," "the more or less well
marked levels of these hierarchies" corresponding "most
instructively to the successive levels of cerebral develop-
ment displayed by the species in their evolutionary ascent."64
But in order to get closer yet he next views the brain
through the eyes of the chemist.

Viewed through the eyes of the chemist
the cerebral landscape undergoes a
rather curious change. In place of organ-
ized hierarchies involving the whole
organism or large tracts of it, we get
multitudes of narrowly localized chemical
reactions. The atoms in the complex
organic molecules are continually dis-
solving their associations and forming
new ones.... For the chemist, the nervous
system and the rest of the body is a
vast conglomerate of comparatively
independent and separate processes, in
perpetual interaction with one another,
to be sure, but lacking the benefit of
any presiding genius or controlling
organic structure.65

Finally in his search for the ultimate structure of the
brain he views it through the eyes of the physicist.

For us it is sufficient to view the
brain as a swarm of quintillions of tiny
particles, pushing and pulling each other
about and continuously moving with in-
credible velocities in all directions.
This is the physicist's picture of the
brain.66

Montague rightly asks the naturalist the embarrassing
question:

64. Montague, CSD, 40-42. 66. Ibid., 45.
65. Ibid., 42-45.
Where in this picture can we find the Gestalt, the ground for the self-regulat-ing and self-perpetuating unity of pattern that does so surely pervade the nervous system as a whole? And where indeed can we find in these scudding clouds of spatially separate particles, with their motions governed by the beautifully simple laws of attraction and repulsion, any basis or ground for explaining the thing called mind—the hidden thing, stored with rich and cummulative memories of events that no longer exist, and capable of purposeful actions directed to what does not yet exist?  

Montague rightly concludes: "Surely in the light of this intimate 'close-up' of the brain the chance of reducing the mind to a bodily adjective seems rather remote."  

Sellers of course would reply that the reason that the brain is capable of all the functions which idealists attribute to mind is because of the marvelous organization of the brain. To this the idealist may well reply that this very organization itself cannot be explained by naturalists, that organization on such a vast scale and in such a delicate and marvelous manner as one finds in the brain can only be explained in terms of the plan and purpose of Objective Mind. Moreover that organization of itself cannot be conceived of as creating thought, that the organization of the brain rather looks like a marvelous instrument made for the use of mind. Montague compares the body and its brain to a

67. Montague, CSD, 46.  
68. Ibid., 46.
delicate musical instrument made for the use of mind.\textsuperscript{69}

Sellars' third criticism on empirical and scientific grounds is the contention that the mind is wholly dependent upon the organism. In his \textit{Philosophy of Physical Realism} in speaking of mind he says: "It has become attached to the organism, absorbed by it, in some sense spatial."\textsuperscript{70} And again he says: "The emergent evolutionist with his belief in the significance of organization regards thinking as a nervous operation."\textsuperscript{71} Similarly in \textit{Evolutionary Naturalism} he contends:

\begin{quote}
Is it not truer to the empirical facts, and simpler, to say that in instances of intelligent behavior we know how the organism behaves and that, until the contrary is proved, the conditions of this behavior must be assigned to the organism? Is there anything in the facts which demands the assumption of two objects of knowledge? My conclusion is that knowledge of what mind does is really knowledge about the organism. The burden of proof rests on dualism.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

Referring Sellars back to Montague's interesting analysis the personalist would insist that mind cannot be reduced to a mere aspect of physical process, that the organism consisting ultimately of particles of matter in motion offers no satisfactory explanation for the facts of mind. Moreover he would also remind Sellars that the idealist is really the most empirical, for as Sellars himself admits

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} Montague, \textit{CSD}, 26-28.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Sellars, \textit{EPR}, 411.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 429.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Sellars, \textit{EN}, 300.
\end{itemize}
mind is always known at first hand, brain and organism at second hand, and these latter always and only in terms of the former. This seems to indicate the greater reality of the former.

A sixth criticism which Sellars makes is closely related to the charge that interactionism is unempirical, the argument just discussed in its three aspects. The sixth criticism is the use of "Occam's Razor"—"Why multiply entities?"

Why multiply entities if the brain and the self have analogous abilities and if epistemology indicates simply two kinds of knowing having in all likelihood, the same ultimate objective?73

Though the idealist might freely admit that as far as external appearances are concerned it does seem that the operations of mind are merely bodily and physical, yet he need not admit that this is the whole story. The facts of introspection are against such a superficial interpretation. Sellars himself in his "double knowledge" theory admits that knowledge of consciousness is knowledge at first hand, while knowledge of the brain and body and all physical systems is knowledge at second hand. In justice to him it must be said that he speaks of knowledge of participating in brain process as being knowledge at first hand. "In my consciousness, I am literally a participant in that brain which physical science can know only by a descriptive

73. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 47(1938), 480.
translation. "If my theory is correct we are, in consciousness, in some measure participants in the actual process of the brain-mind." But as a matter of fact in consciousness one is aware only of consciousness as itself efficacious, not as a mere function of brain. "That brain and nervous system are environment and not mind itself is evident from the fact that most of the time the mind is not even conscious of having a brain and nervous system." The deepest truth seems to be that mind is itself directly experienced as mind, as something other than body and brain and yet in vital relationship to these. The external appearances indeed would make it appear that the functions of the hidden mind are merely bodily simply because the body is the medium or organ through which mind must express itself. This view can be said to be superior because it explains both the facts of introspection to which Sellars' view does not do full justice, and also the facts of external observation. Hence the interactionist could well answer Sellars' question, "Why multiply entities?" by reminding him that on the other hand one must not be sparing in his principles or entities if the facts demand it. The chief difficulty with naturalism is that it does not give due consideration to all the facts, especially the facts of introspection which are more direct, immediate and

evident than the facts of external observation.

Finally Sellars insists that interactionism is inconceivable. He is concerned about such questions as whence the soul and how does it know when and where to act upon the brain to produce the desired results.  

We seem to ourselves to have gained some measure of insight into physical processes, but we are nonplussed in any attempt to understand how a soul can regulate physical processes from outside. The contact of the two is like the thought of a round square. The idea, itself, is not self-contradictory; it is just vague and puzzling.

The idealist would first of all insist again that he does not conceive the soul as something mysterious operating from the outside, but simply as the conscious self interacting with the physical system to which it is related; and he would further insist that wonderful and mysterious and puzzling as the interaction of mind with body may seem yet it is less puzzling than to conceive simple systems like whirling atoms as the cause of mind.

Finally, interactionism, like vitalism, must postulate an agency peculiarly well informed about the brain and its paths. This agency must know what nerve to quiet and what nerve to excite. It must be like a pilot or a pianist in this respect. The empirical self does not have this knowledge.

The idealist would quite agree that "the empirical self

77. Sellars, EN, 291.  
78. Sellars, PPP, 330.  
79. Sellars, PPP, 330.
does not have this knowledge."

This is a real difficulty so long as mind and body are regarded as belonging to utterly different orders of being. But if we...regard body itself as the expression of a Supreme Mind, the difficulty vanishes; for the problem of interaction between mind and body becomes the problem of the interaction between human minds and the Supreme Mind, and nature is, as Berkeley says, the divine language.80

Sellars' chief difficulty seems to be that he conceives modern interactionists as holding with Descartes that mind and matter are entirely different from one another, that mind is something mysterious and foreign and external somehow projecting itself into the brain and causing all of its movements in some strange way to correspond with its desires and purposes. But this is to misunderstand the modern idealistic interactionist. He conceives both orders as distinct as hand and glove and yet so fitted together by the Supreme Mind upon which both orders rest, as to be capable of making all the necessary adjustments which interaction demands. The idealist holds that mysterious as this is, still it is far less mysterious than to conceive mind as but an aspect of matter; and that when one is confronted with two mysteries a greater and a lesser he had better take the lesser.

4. Sellars' Critique of Hocking

80. Brightman, ITP, 205.
In his *Philosophy of Physical Realism* (pp. 443-436) Sellars subjects Hocking's conception of mind as found in his *Types of Philosophy* (pp. 98-100) to an interesting series of criticisms. Sellars first states each proposition as made by Hocking and then proceeds to criticize each in its turn. In the dissertation Sellars' procedure will be followed.

"(1). The mind observes itself; the brain does not. Hence the superiority of the mind over any merely physical thing."81 His criticism of Hocking is simply that the latter "substantializes the mind apart from the brain" in speaking of "the 'mind' as observing itself."82 In so doing Hocking involves himself in an unnecessary dualism, a dualism which Sellars thinks he happily escapes by means of his "double-knowledge" approach. The mind is known at first hand as a series which is seemingly unique, and the brain is known at second hand, and thus a dualism is set up.

"Philosophy must press deeper and grasp the brain as active, directional and conscious."83 In other words to escape dualism the thinker must go deeper than the direct experience of mind and this indirect second-hand knowledge of the brain and in so doing it will be readily seen that after all it is only the brain that is conscious. But it is extremely doubtful whether Sellars is justified in so doing;

81. Sellars, PPR, 433. See also 82. Sellars, PPR, 433. Hocking, TOP, 98. 83. Ibid., 434.
for there does not seem to be anything beyond consciousness, no deeper fact, and everything seems to be given in terms of consciousness. It seems as though the idealist is more logical in assuming the relative duality of thought and thing but finding their ultimate ground in unity in the Supreme Consciousness. Naturalists try to find unity too near the surface. They do not press deep enough.

"(2). The brain is in space; the mind is not. If it were, where could it be? Is the mind in the head? Is the thought of a cube a cubic thought?" 84 Sellars tries to answer Hocking by asserting his theory of the identity of mind and brain and the resulting spatiality of mind. "The mind as a continuant is the brain and the brain is spatial and in space relations with other systems." What is involved here is a different definition of mind. For Hocking as was noted earlier in this chapter "the essence of mind is thinking," and thought as such can hardly be called spatial. A thought cannot be measured, cut to pieces, perceived with the physical eye as a brain cell can. However if the whole mental process is reduced to an aspect of brain movement it follows logically that the mind is extended and spatial. But Sellars will still have consciousness on his hands which stubbornly refuses to allow itself to be reduced to physical terms as Hocking contends.

84. Sellars, PPR, 434. See also Hocking, TOP, 98.
"(3). The brain is in the present only, the mind is extended in time to the past and the future. Nothing can locate an image in the past except a mind which holds the past before it."\(^{35}\) Sellers is justified in the following criticism of Hocking's careless use of terms:

To say that mind is extended in time to the past and the future is a careless way of saying that a present act of knowing claims to know what may happen in the future or what has happened in the past. ... The mind does not literally extend to the future and the past. It thinks the future and the past.... I would say that Hocking is talking nonsense if he suggests that we literally locate an image in the past.\(^{36}\)

What Hocking should have done is to point to the power of mind to think the past and to explore the future and thus to link past, present and future together in one flash of thought. He might also have pointed to the power of mind to preserve its unity amid change and thus in a little way at least transcend time.

"(4). The brain is a set of facts; the mind is a set of facts and their meanings. In the brain there are facts but no meanings."\(^{37}\)

We need not linger upon this objection since it merely rests on the assumption that consciousness is not intrinsic to the brain. Hocking admits that connections, reintegrations, conditionings are developed by the brain, but affirms that

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85. Sellers, PPR, 434. See also Hocking, TOP, 99.  
87. Sellers, PPR, 435. See also Hocking, TOP, 99.  
86. Sellers, PPR, 434-435.
these are not meanings. In other words, he desires to limit meaning to the inner experience which comprehends together, in the way of sign and that signified, objects of thought....I am persuaded that this kind of meaning connection in my thought is founded on mental operations of an integrative sort. There is a brain-mind organization back of meaning-experiences.88

Thus Sellars in endeavoring to answer Hocking re-affirms his naturalistic creed that the mental is an aspect of the physical. But the differences between the two which Hocking points out still remain--the chasm which no naturalist can bridge. There is a vast difference between the mind's idea of the brain, and the brain. The brain is of the order of facts only whose changes mind can study, but mind is also of the order of meanings--it is capable both of knowing and of being known. The great truth in Sellars' view seems to be that mind as such is not independent and self-sufficient but that it rests and has its basis in something beyond itself, something more abiding than the flickering candle of human consciousness. Sellars' basic fallacy seems to be that of making matter, the basis of mind and all the order and organization and glory of the universe.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion it may be well to point out that Sellars' endeavor to reduce mind to the level of a physical category, 88 Sellars, PPR, 435.
to a mere aspect of matter has not succeeded, especially in the light of Montague's damaging analysis of the brain. It seems impossible that whirling atoms could ever of themselves have given birth to mind. It may be well to point out some of these aspects of mind to which Sellars does not do full justice.

First, he does not do full justice to the fact of the uniqueness of mind as knower. The thought series stands out in experience over against the thing series. Mind can know things, things cannot comprehend mind. Moreover things come in terms of thought, not thought in terms of things. Thought is primary, as Sellars himself admits, things secondary. Thought and things are related it cannot be denied. Things to a remarkable degree condition thought, but thought also affects and uses things. And since things can be conceived only in terms of thought, and since by virtue of this fact as well as by virtue of the organization and order which they display they seem to be products of Mind--then the fact of the human mind's dependence upon things may have a deeper meaning. It may mean only that in the final analysis mind is not dependent upon things conceived as substantial and non-mental, but upon an Order that sustains both minds and things. If this is true, as it seems to be when all the facts are considered, then the materialist's contention that minds,
knowers are but aspects of things and at the mercy of things is undermined.

Then in the second place Sellars does not do justice to the non-spatial aspects of mind. Now it may well be that mind is as extended as the organisms through which it functions. Materialists are not the only ones who hold this view. This seems to be the implication of Dewolf's interesting conception of body "as a system of physical events" through which mind expresses itself and makes contact with other bodies and with the physical order.\(^89\) Similarly Montague insists that mind is extended, and as a matter of fact is partially physical.

Suppose, however, that res cogitans, instead of being hopelessly alien to the material world, were what I believe it to be—a field of potential energies within the world? Then, no matter how faint or attenuated such a field might be, it would be not only possible but necessary that any and all energies traversing it should be in some degree causally modified by it....Though physical in its constitution, it would function as a spiritual substance—a veritable res cogitans within the larger re extensa.\(^90\)

The mind is a very complicated and special kind of physical field. The mind is an organism within an organism. It is attached to the brain and pervades it, and if it is a field, it is not one whose primary function is the direct forming of material structures....Its stuff is the stuff of memory, the accumulated traces

\(^89\) Dewolf, *Phil. For.*, 2(1944), 4.  
\(^90\) Montague, WOT, 509.
of sensations; and such field-like activity as it may possess seems concerned (1) with imposing patterns of self-transcending meaning upon the sensory contents, and (2) with imposing patterns of purposeful action upon the intercourse between the body and the environment. 91

Likewise Rocking speaks of the self as "a system of purposive behavior". 92 And relative to the mind-body relationship he goes on to say:

"We conclude that the self cannot be itself without its body. We must regard the body not as an appendage of the mind nor as a detachable instrument, but as an inseparable organ. The self is a system of meanings, but not of meanings without facts....All the categories of the body are required in the structure of the self." 93

All of these thinkers think of the self as in some respect extended by virtue of possessing a body, but not one of these three thinkers draws the materialistic conclusion. They do not reduce the self to a physical category and no more. They do not make it a mere aspect of matter as Sellars does. They give due need to the non-spatial aspects of minds as well as its spatial aspects. And all three believe in immortality. Sellars of course tries desperately hard to do justice to the facts of mind within the narrow framework of naturalism. He can be said, as has been said before, to do more justice to the facts of mind than an impersonal idealist like Bradley. But ultimately he reduces it to a

91. Montague, CSD, 58. 92. Rocking, SBF, 46. 93. Ibid., 95-96.
physical category. It is spatial in the sense of being merely adjectival to physical process. If mind be spatial by virtue of being attached to a physical body which it uses as its instrument of expression, yet it is not its spatiality which makes it most significant. It is consciousness—this persistent non-spatial factor which really makes mind the significant thing that it is. And consciousness can hardly be said to be spatial. Brain patterns are no doubt related to thought, but thought seems to be something altogether different. Thought cannot be weighed, measured or cut to pieces as brain cells can. "Body and mind," says Hocking, "are different: we have no intention of denying this proposition."94

In the third place Sellars does not do justice to the time transcending capacities of mind. This is one of the unique aspects of mind.

Self-experience is not confined to the present moment; it is time-transcending. ... The fact of personal identity thus abides through changing processes, and even crosses chasms of intervening unconsciousness, or abnormal consciousness, to assert, I am the same I that was before. No theory can be adequate that fails to recognize this time-transcending aspect of the self.95

One of the weaknesses of Sellars' theory of mind is his neglect of giving due consideration to this significant aspect of mind. It is indeed surprising how little he has

to say in his writings on memory, which is considered by many as one of the most important aspects of mind; for in memory past and present are linked together in a strange bond of unity and meaning. This is a very important aspect of mind which distinguishes it from things. Closely related to this is the wonderful capacity and power which mind alone possesses of being able to a remarkable degree to preserve its unity and identity amid a storm of states. Things cannot do this. They change amid their changing states. Perhaps the best reason for regarding mind as the key to reality is because here and here alone in nature do we find unity amid diversity, and diversity amid unity.

All impersonal devices are failures. Thought remains in deadlock here until we carry the problem up to the plane of free intelligence, and find in thought the source of both change and identity, of unity and plurality, and of all outgo whatsoever.96

Naturalists even such as Sellars with all of their good intentions to overcome the faults and inadequacies of the old naturalism yet in the end fail to do justice to some of the highest capacities of mind.

In the fourth place Sellars is not clear as to the efficacy of consciousness. At times he affirms the efficacy of mind in terms that almost provoke one to ask, Is Sellars also among the personalists? For example he says: "Intelli-

gent integrations of the brain need consciousness to guide them.\textsuperscript{97} "Human behavior is conscious behavior. We look before and after. Our responses are guided by experience."\textsuperscript{98} Evolutionary naturalism holds to the "creative power of intelligence....With pragmatism's rejection of epiphenomenalism I whole-heartedly agree."\textsuperscript{99} "The conscious self sits in the watch-tower of the brain to guide the organism's behavior."\textsuperscript{100} But these passages and many others like them are off set by the many passages such as were noted in Chapter I in which he makes consciousness so utterly a phase of the activity of the brain as to approach determinism. This as has been pointed out before gives force to Pratt's criticism, that Sellars has done nothing "to help Materialism out of its old dilemma of being forced either to identify consciousness with the brain or to deny its efficacy."\textsuperscript{101} Pratt goes so far as to say that "Professor Sellars is unwilling to commit himself to either of these difficulties; and ends by falling a victim of both."\textsuperscript{102} Perhaps this is a bit extreme yet there is truth in it. On the one hand in so far as Sellars identifies the mind with the processes of the brain, and the laws which govern these processes he does not do justice to the capacity of the human mind for freedom.

\textsuperscript{97} Sellars, EN, 313.  
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 313.  
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 313.  
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 317-318.  
\textsuperscript{101} Pratt, MAS, 45.  
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 46.
Let matter be as highly evolved as you like; if its processes completely determine action, the efficiency of consciousness goes by the board. To seek to dodge this uncomfortable fact by glowing accounts of the subtlety and fineness of modern matter on "its higher levels" is like trying to console the condemned criminal on his way to the gallows by assuring him that the rope with which he is to be hung is not made of common hemp but of the finest and strongest silk.\footnote{103}

In so far then as Sellars identifies the mind with brain processes he seems to deny the efficacy of consciousness. But on the other hand in so far as he affirms the efficacy of consciousness he tends away from naturalism in the direction of idealism or some form of dualism.

Sellars then not only does not vanquish idealism as far as his specific criticisms are concerned, but he fails to establish his own theory of mind as a physical category, an aspect of matter. He fails to do justice to the unique status of mind as knower, he fails to do justice to the non-spatial aspects of mind, he fails to do justice to the time transcending factors of mind, and finally he fails to do full justice to the efficacy of mind. The truth in Sellars view of mind seems to be that mind as such is not independent and self-sufficient but that it rests and has its basis in something beyond itself, something more abiding than its flickering candle. Sellars' basic fallacy

\footnote{103. Pratt, MAS, 45.}
seems to be that of making matter, the whirling atoms, in the last analysis the basis of mind as well as of the order and organization and glory of the universe. The deepest truth seems to be that both mind and matter as observed are dependent on a third order which causes both of them and also makes possible their interaction.
CHAPTER VIII
CRITICISMS OF IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES OF VALUE

1. The Meaning and Significance of Value

Sellars and modern idealists are agreed as to the general meaning of the term value. For both it signifies anything man desires or cherishes. Sellars defines it as "anything which we desire, need, want, enjoy either for its own sake or as a means."¹ "By a value (or worth, or good)," says Brightman, "is meant whatever is desired, or enjoyed, or prized, or approved, or preferred."² Similarly the idealist Mackenzie says: "When we value anything, we generally like it: we are pleased by its presence and more or less pained by its absence."³ Likewise Hocking defines values in terms of interests: "Our actions drive incessantly to their ends, and these ends we call values."⁴ Sellars and the idealists too are agreed that there are lower and higher values. Thus Sellars begins with bodily values as lowest and lists religious, moral and intellectual values as the highest, giving the last names the very highest place following in the tradition of Aristotle.⁵ Brightman's list does not differ greatly from Sellars' except that he gives the religious the very highest place as "the values which are experienced when man takes an attitude toward value

1. Sellars, PPP, 434.  
2. Brightman, ITP, 126.  
3. Mackenzie, UV, 126.  
4. Hocking, MGHE, 125.  
5. Sellars, PPP, 457.
experience as a whole and toward its dependence on powers beyond man.\textsuperscript{6} Mackenzie on the other hand makes use of Kant's famous division of values into "Market value," "fancy value," and "dignity." The last he conceived as underlying all relative values and all conditions of value, as the absolute value.\textsuperscript{7} Sellars along with Brightman and Mackenzie distinguishes between instrumental and intrinsic values, although Sellars, as will be seen, as against all idealists, rejects the idea of an absolute value or values.

Both Sellars and the idealists are convinced of the central place and the significance of values in life and in philosophy. "That value is central to human living," says Sellars, "we soon realize when we grasp the fact that values are objects valued."\textsuperscript{8} In The Philosophy of Physical Realism Sellars devotes one whole chapter of over thirty pages to the discussion of values, and in The Principles and Problems of Philosophy two chapters which cover over thirty pages. The importance of the subject is well expressed by Mackenzie as follows: "So much has been written about values in recent times that it may seem almost a work of supererogation to attempt any fresh discussion of them."\textsuperscript{9} He rightly traces this interest in values today to the question on so many lips: "is life worth living?"\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{6} Brightman, POR, 99.  
\textsuperscript{7} Mackenzie, UN, 118, see also Abbott KTOE, 52.  
\textsuperscript{8} Sellars, PPF, 434.  
\textsuperscript{9} Mackenzie, UV, 13.  
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 14.
Finally Brightman goes so far as to say: "Ever since man began to think he has been concerned about the question, What is truly good or valuable?" Both Sellers and the idealists are agreed then as to the meaning and significance of value. But there are certain important differences between the naturalistic view of Sellers and that of the idealists to which the discussion must now turn.

2. The Crucial Issue

Parker in an interesting passage lays his finger on the crucial issue between naturalists and idealists relative to value.

According to the Platonic-Christian tradition, which constitutes the intellectual framework of our civilization, the authority of the ethical idea rests on a basis, if not supernatural, at least ethical and transcendent... But slowly another view is gaining ground, and even those who live under its influence hardly realize how revolutionaty it is. It has many forms and many names,—but all alike maintaining that the basis of ethical standard is human, or possibly subhuman.  

Certainly the relativistic pragmatic, humanistic, naturalistic conception is not so new as Parker seems to suggest. It is at least as old as the Sophists; for Protagoras of Abdera who flourished about 440 B.C. is credited with the saying: "Man is a measure of all things, of things that are, that they are; and of things that are not, that they are not."

12. Parker, HV, 3.
This was the issue between Plato and the Sophists. Plato insisted: "It is God who is, for you and me, of a truth the 'measure of all things,' much more truly then, as they say 'man'."¹⁴ It is interesting now often much that parades under the name of naturalism appears novel, even to idealists, when as a matter of fact it is something very old dressed in the garb of modernism. At any rate Parker in the passage quoted certainly defines the crucial issue as between the naturalistic and the idealistic version of values. The former conceives values as entirely of human origin and relative to the human only, as "of the earth, earthy,"¹⁵ while the latter insists that values have their origin in the Supernatural, the Spiritual Order, in God upon whom everything is dependent. Brightman truly says:

Thinkers who agree on many points, disagree about this fundamental question. Are values simply and solely relative to human desires and pleasures, customs and institutions; or are they in some way permanent, objective aspects of the universe?¹⁶

Now Sellars' philosophy of value, like many other aspects of his philosophy is a half-way house to idealism. Unlike many naturalists he recognizes that values are as real and genuine as other aspects of human experience. In his very interesting article, "Cognition and Valuation," Sellars makes the valid distinction between the world as known and the world as appreciated.

Is there a world of description? The realist is convinced that it is truer to the facts to speak of the world as known and the world as appreciated. In both cases we are objective in our references and deal with the same kind of objects. 17

As the above quotation indicated Sellars conceives values as being in some sense objective. In The Philosophy of Physical Realism he goes so far as to say: "I shall myself take as objective a view of value as possible." 18 Moreover he rejects factualism, though recognizing elements of value in it.

I am going to stress the question of factualism in theory of value because it seems to me basic. Its implications are expressed in the old tag that there is no disputing about tastes. Tastes are ultimate facts to be recognized as such. 19

The inadequacy of ethical and aesthetic relativism, or subjectivism, has been that it has left us with brute facts without possibility of revision through discussion and investigation. Discussion would seem to be meaningless because irrelevant. Each one would take the position that he has exhausted all that was to be known about the object and his capacity for sensitive and intelligent reaction to it. ... But surely this is a big assumption for any one to make. It is at this point, I take it, that the inadequacy of mere factualism in the field of value is to be found. It presupposes a dogmatic attitude of finality and disregards the possibility of new knowledge and creative development in experience. ... The factualist is a dogmatist. ... The real difference be-

17. Sellars, Phil. Rev. 19. Ibid., 451-452
18. Sellars, PPR, 445
tween him and the authoritarian is that
the latter is in power. In neither is
there the willingness to appeal to rea-
son and experience and open up ques-
tions for more developed response. 20

No idealist could give a more conclusive criticism of
ordinary relativism or factualism. Moreover the idealist
could heartily endorse Sellars' criteria of value. He sets
aside both factualism and authoritarianism for a "new
attitude." "The keys to the new attitude would be love and
knowledge." 21 Again he says:

In judgments of value we are estimat-
ing it with respect to its bearing upon
human life. We ask such questions as
the following: How would it affect human
life under such and such conditions? Would
it make for human welfare? Would people
get an aesthetic experience from it? 22

Again he looks to "educated and reflective men" 23 to set
the standard. But the difference of his point of view from
that of idealism is clearly expressed in the two following
passages:

There is no one universal _summum bonum_
or highest good. It is in biography
and in the sympathetic delineations of
human living by great literary artists
that we obtain our best glimpses of
the modes of life that in some measure
satisfy. 24

I see no reason to assume transcendent,
absolute values. Rather do we have the
growth of a more adequate basis for
value-interpretation in the emergence
of well-informed and sensitive persons. 25

21. Sellars, PPR, 455. 24. Sellars, PPP, 408
22. Ibid., 446. 25. Ibid., 457-458.
Comon with any investigation in human affairs...
The last quotation in particular points to the crucial issue between naturalism and idealism. This is even more clear in the following passage: "We may speak of idealism in regard to values as transcendentalism or the cosmic location of values, while the opposing view may be called humanism."

The crucial issue between the two opposing systems can easily be illustrated from the writings of idealists. All objective idealists hold to the metaphysical objectivity of value. The chief difference between idealists is that existing between Platonists on the one hand, and deists, theists and personalists on the other. The former think of values as impersonal entities of which concrete human values are pale reflections. Since Sellars has very little to say about modern Platonists, but attacks the Master himself, it will be in order to briefly summarize Plato's theory of value. Plato believed that human values are reflections of ideal forms, perfect patterns which exist in heaven. These ideas or forms or patterns constitute an ideal order at the head of which there stands the Good, the Supreme Idea. Plato describes the Good as follows:

> You will agree that the Sun not only makes the things we see visible, but also brings them into existence and gives them growth and nourishment; yet he is not the same thing as existence. And so with the objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their

26. Ibid., 436.
very being—and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power. 27

In the Republic, Plato at times thus exalted the forms seemingly above God, though even in the Republic there is at least one interesting passage in which he speaks of the forms as the work of God, 28 and it may even be that he identified the Good with God, and conceived it less impersonally than his word imply. At any rate as he became older he tended to think more and more personalistically until in the Laws the forms tend to disappear for the most part or rather to find their home in the mind of God as the Source of all existence. 29

Taking their one both from the great Hebrew-Christian tradition and from Plato the personalistic absolutists and the personalists ground values or the norms or patterns of ideals toward which our human values aspire in the Mind of God.

Speaking of beauty Sir Henry Jones says:

The beauty of the natural world seems to carry one further even than its obvious order. Beauty comes as something gratuitously generous. It is a benevolent redundancy, having a value that is quite different from mere utility....Its purpose seems to be to enrich life, and not merely to preserve life, and its appeal is to reason. It is thus difficult to conceive of beauty as proceeding from an unintelligent source. We seem forced to conclude that, if not God, then surely some kind of cause at once intelligent and benevolent has brought it

28. See especially the remarkable passage in Laws, Book IV, 716c-d.
about that the world shall be clothed in beauty, and thus fill humanity's cup till it runs over.30

Similarly, Mackenzie says:

The interpretation of the Universe suggested by Sir Henry Jones in his recent Gifford Lectures, based largely on the teaching of Edward Caird, is essentially at one with the view that I am here advocating. It contains at least the conception (not altogether novel) of the Power that shapes the Universe as containing the three aspects of ultimate Worth that I have been seeking to emphasize.31

Likewise, Sorley states:

Wherever there is intrinsic worth in the world, there also, as well as in moral goodness, we see a manifestation of the divine. God must therefore be conceived as the final home of values, the Supreme Worth—as possessing the fulness of knowledge and beauty and goodness and whatever else is of values for its own sake.32

Finally Brightman says: "Only for persons can ideals, obligations, values, be real."33 "The objectivity of values would then mean their existence as purposes of the Divine Mind."34 Moreover for the idealist from the days of Plato on values form a system. "If we are to compare values at all, we must give up the idea of a scale for that of a system."35 The idealist thinks of a system of values containing all values and itself the Supreme or absolute value. "No value has

30. Jones, FTI, 220-221. 33 Brightman, RV, 125.
32. Sorley, MVIG, 474. 35 Sorley, MVIG, 51.
sovereignty in its national territory; only the league of values is sovereign."36 By the objectivity of values the idealist means two things: "(a) That an objective value is one that all minds that think reasonably ought to acknowledge (logical objectivity)," "(b) That it is valid not only for human individuals and groups, but for the universe... (metaphysical objectivity)."37

The crucial issue then as already intimated turns out to be twofold. First, are there absolute standards or norms discoverable by the human mind toward which it may progressively move? Second, what is the status of values in the cosmos? Do they have cosmic rootage, or are they merely human?

3. Four Criticisms

Sellars makes four criticisms of idealistic philosophies of value. The first is simply that idealism tends to reify values, to make entities out of merely human concepts. Speaking of Plato's system Sellars says:

This ethical metaphysics reifies human concepts. It does not realize the proper and relevant place of ethical ideas. Surely these have significance only in human affairs as changing ideals of the good life. It seems to me that evolutionism and pragmatism have given the deathblow to a Platonic metaphysics.38

It will be seen that this criticism applies only to Platonism. Personalists do not make entities out of human concepts. This is something that they are as much opposed

to as Sellars. They regard such entities as mere abstrac-
tions. But in so far as Sellars in the second and in the
third sentence designates ethical ideals as merely human
he is of course attacking all forms of idealism. To the
third sentence in which he insists "that evolution and
pragmatism have given the deathblow to a Platonic meta-
physics," the answer may well be made, that this is true
perhaps of Platonism in the strict sense, but it is not
true of personalistic theories of value. Values may well
exist as ideals, norms, patterns, purposes in the mind of
God, but which He can only imperfectly and gradually real-
ize. Once assume the idea of a limited God and the diffi-
culty vanishes. But it is hard to see why an omipotent God
cannot perfectly realize His ideals and purposes in concrete
form, and why it takes Him so long with so much waste and
suffering.

Sellars' second criticism is directed against idealism's
insistence that objective values are absolute. Idealists,
as has been seen, think in terms of a system of values com-
posed of all the values from the lowest to the highest, the
supreme, the absolute value. Sellars admits that there are
lower and higher values, but he denies the existence of a
supreme or highest, an absolute value.

There are controls and demands which
the group always stresses, such as con-
sideration of the common good and concern
for what is generally regarded as admirable.
But when we come to describe the good we can never be formal. There is no universal
summum bonum or highest good. It is in biography and in the symathetic
delineations of human living by great
literary artists that we obtain our best
glimpses of the modes of life that in
some measure satisfy. 39

Here he seems to abandon any attempt to achieve a rational
standard for estimating values and to fall back on mere
satisfaction as a kind of standard or absolute. But else-
where he has emphasized the role of "love and knowledge" 40
in discerning values. And he goes so far as to say in another
passage, "It would seem that, in criticism, we have a sense
of goals, directions, potentialities, developments, princip-
pals, methods." 41 Here he would certainly make use both of
empirical investigation and of rational criticism. But in
further criticism of absolute values he brings the old charge
that values are always relative. "Is not value always with
respect to? Is not a thing a good because it is such that
it can enter significantly and desirably some one's life?... A
good which is not a good for some one strikes me as mean-
ingless." 42 This passage contains a personalistic note. Val-
ue is relative to a person's life. The idealist then can
freely admit much of this and also hold that values as ex-
perienced point away from the subjective experience to some-
thing that lies beyond it that gives it meaning, to objective
norms. Better still he may contend that while all value is

39. Sellers, PPP, 408. 41 Sellers, PPR, 457.
40. Sellers, PPR, 455. 42. Sellers, PPR, 459.
always experienced relative to the wants and tastes of an individual, yet by means of rational criticism and experiment, which Sellars himself advocates, the race is more and more coming to certain general norms or standard which seem to have universal application. In the words of Sorley:

The universal of morality is contained in particulars and at first concealed by them; and the moralist's problem is to elucidate the universal by reason of which these particular cases are appropriate subjects for the moral judgment. 43

Sorely proposes the criteria of "universality, system, and comprehensiveness." 44 Through the application of these tests he rightly insists standards can be discovered. Even Sellars when he proposes the criticism of educated men as a means of reaching agreements must acknowledge the existence of possible objective standards which intelligent man can discover and to which they can sincerely give their allegiance. Thus his arguments against the absoluteness seems to fall to the ground.

A third criticism which Sellars makes is also directed against the idealists contention that values are absolute. He contends that the effect of such a contention has been that of destroying individual initiative in the quest of the good life. Morality tended to becomes something external, to which the one must rigidly conform, instead

43. Sorley, IVIG, 91. 44. Ibid., 106.
To announce any new measures or regulations affecting you in
any manner, I shall be pleased to
inform you of the same.

I have also been instructed to
make known to all interested
parties the necessity of
adhering to the
appointed
rules.

Yours truly,
[Signature]
of a quest for the most intelligent way of living together.

It is well, I take it, to relinquish the belief in fixed, external norms to which we must bend our lives. To conceive values as critical expressions of our nature and situation at a certain cultural level is to give them naturalness and relevance. It is to make them tentative and responsible, something to be examined and, if possible, to be improved. 45

In the light of what he says on Pages 424-425 of the same book, Principles and Problems of Philosophy, he has in mind the rigid commands as found in the Old Testament and similar codes. No modern idealist would hold such a conception of the absoluteness of values. He conceives values not as something handed down from heaven as a rigid formula to be conserved and obeyed to the letter without question, but rather as being based on or springing from norms and standards—the purposes of God which man can never completely grasp or express but which he can progressively discover and embody in his human codes. As a result it is impossible for him to be dogmatic in the old authoritarian sense while at the same time he can avoid the dangers of relativism which has no fixed stars to steer by. The idealist of today like the wise Ulysses steers between the Scylla of dogmatic authoritarianism and the Charybdis of a treacherous relativism, and avoids the dangers of both extremes. As a matter of fact relativism has never yet built a civilization. The lesson of history seems to be that its 45. Sellars, PPP, 468
appearance on a large scale is a sign that civilization in decaying, that it no longer has any fixed stars to guide it and hence it heads for the rocks. One cannot seriously survey our contemporary civilization without asking the question whether that is not where it is headed. It may be that the idealist with his insistence on the existence of absolute norms or standards progressively discoverable by man, may have the means that can save civilization from shipwreck. It seems certain that naturalism cannot provide such means, nor can it for long provide the necessary dynamic and enthusiasm. Men will not continue to die and to sacrifice for mere vague human dreams which in the bitter end may appear to be nothing but a will o' the wisp. Man does not need absolute certainty. This is impossible for the frail human mind to attain upon this earth. But man does need a sense of moral and of practical certainty which a sense or conviction of the absoluteness of the moral and spiritual ideal alone can provide. And this brings the discussion to Sellars' most fundamental criticism.

In the fourth place Sellars criticizes the contention of the idealist that values are transcendent, that is that they have cosmic rootage--that they are more beautiful human flowers and have their source in the mind and purpose of God. Sellars quotes the following passage from Windelband in which the existence of a Cosmic Mind is affirmed as the home of values.
Ethical and aesthetic judgments display, in the mind of any unprejudiced observer, an extremely great diversity when one surveys the various peoples of the earth in succession. Here again, however, we try to set up a final standard of values; we speak of higher and lower stages of morality or of taste in different peoples and different ages. Where do we get the standard for this judgment? And where is the mind for which these ultimate criteria are the values? If it is quite inevitable to rise above the relativity in individual appreciations and the morals of various peoples to some standard of absolute values, it seems necessary to pass beyond the historical manifestations of the entire human mind to some normal consciousness, for which these values are values.

He criticizes Windelband and idealists generally for thus assuming the existence of a General or Cosmic Mind as the home of values. The crux of his criticism is simply that there is no "empirical reason" for assuming the existence of such a Mind.

Have we any empirical reason for setting a general mind over against the individual mind? In the chapter in which we examined this question in some detail we saw reason to deny a general, or social, mind.... Of course, cultural developments make cultivated and reflective individuals possible. But I see no reason to assume transcendent, absolute values. Rather do we have the growth of a more adequate basis for value-interpretation in the emergence of well-informed and sensitive persons.

In answer to the question, "Have we any empirical reason for

46. Windelband, ITP, 215-216. 47. Sellars, PPP, 467-468
setting up a general mind over against the individual mind?," the idealist following in the footsteps of Kant would answer. No, not in the sense of demonstration. But he would also answer that a coherent interpretation of the evidence that is available such as the existence of order, organization, and design in nature, the facts of mind, of mystical experience and of the seeming objectivity of value together constitute reason enough to make the existence of such a Mind a practical and a moral certainty. Moreover returning to the attack the idealist would insist that Sellars has no adequate basis for values if he grounds them merely in the subjective consciousness of "reflective" and "sensitive" individuals. In so far as they assist each other in "thinking and feeling things through" and arrive at a common basis of thinking and acting they have come upon something beyond themselves to which they must give recognition as a discovery of the nature of things. The very fact of thinking men being able to think things through assumes the existence of the very thing which Sellars denies—the existence of a rational order which both must recognize as the goal of their thinking.

Moreover the idealist can also insist that the highest values such as duty and beauty and love have always inspired men to a devotion which seems to imply that there is something beyond them which makes such devotion understandable.

48. Sellars, FPP. 467.
Sellars is by no means an exception, but one of the best examples we have of a man who is interested in the search for truth and in the establishment of social justice.

Ideals have a power over men far beyond what the naturalist's creed even at its best would allow. There is altogether too much of such to ascribe it to chance emergence. The emergence of sensitive, reflective, valuers in a universe that in the final analysis has no real place for them seems the supreme miracle. And the fact that even the glory of one sunset means the convergence of so many forces working in unity and harmony, forces both in nature and in the body and mind of man, makes it extremely unlikely that such could have come about as the result of a mere chance emergence. Values of which one witnesses countless numbers every day seem to involve purpose and plan which point to the activity of a Mind which alone could assemble such a multitude of forces to produce such strange and wonderful end results.

Sellars makes a criticism of Mackenzie, Jones, and Sorley that is similar to his criticism of Windelband. After charging Mackenzie with anthropomorphism because he interprets the universe in terms of value he immediately proceeds to criticize the three philosophers as follows:

The suspicion will not down that these writers bow to the space-time system, call it real--more real than Plato admitted--and then delve underneath it
to a Power which is the real reality.... It is the assumption that physical systems are contingent and existentially secondary, that there is a sort of fourth dimension back of them in which the springs of change are located. In short, that changes are not expressions of the nature of the spatio-temporal system but of something more real underlying it. Let me frankly say that I cannot—with the best desire in the world—see adequate grounds for this assumption that physical systems are not self-sufficient.

Here the basic issue between naturalism and idealism again appears. But granted that the idealist cannot finally demonstrate the dependence of the universe on a Source of Power and Purpose underlying, even less can the naturalist demonstrate, as Kant clearly saw, that the universe is independent and self-existing and creative. Not only from the realm of nature, not only from the realm of mind, but also from the realm of value the idealist gleans evidence which seems to point to the dependence of the universe on a Supreme Mind. Again this time throwing down the challenge the idealist would ask how the atoms could have the wonderful power of bringing about the necessary arrangements both objective and subjective which make values on so vast a scale possible? Clearly idealism seems to outweigh naturalism.

Sellars makes one other criticism in the same vein of two of the thinkers discussed above, namely Jones and Mackenzie:

49. Sellars, PPP, 445-446. 50. Kant, CTJ, 11,1,392; 1, 378,22; 11,395.
...
Sir Henry Jones in his recent Gifford Lectures, based largely on the teaching of Edward Caird, advocates a position very much like Mackenzie's. It contains the conception of a Power that shape the Universe in accordance with truth, goodness and beauty. But how can we pass from such a transcendent Power to our actual human values? Mackenzie admits the difficulty and, like Sir Henry Jones, falls back on the poetic insights of Browning.\textsuperscript{51}

The passage to which Sellars refers in which Mackenzie admits the difficulty of passing from God as the transcendent Source to concrete human values reads as follows:

The interpretation of the Universe suggested by Sir Henry Jones in his recent Gifford Lectures, based largely on the teaching of Edward Caird, is essentially at one with the view that I am here advocating. It contains at least the conception...of the Power that shapes the Universe as containing three aspects of ultimate Worth that I have been seeking to emphasize. It is perhaps less satisfactory in explaining how these aspects can be supposed to produce human values.\textsuperscript{52}

Mackenzie's difficulty seems to be that of conceiving the "three aspects", that is "Truth, Beauty, ... and Goodness"\textsuperscript{53} in too abstract and Platonic a sense. Conceived in terms of ideals or standards or purposes in terms of which God works, a God who is both immanent and transcendent, and the difficulty becomes less real. However no idealist would be so bold as to say that he has entered into the inner councils of the Most High and knows just

\textsuperscript{51} Sellars, \textit{PPP}, 445 See also Jones, \textit{FTI}, 226-227, and Mackenzie, \textit{UV}, 160-161

\textsuperscript{52} Mackenzie, \textit{UV}, 160

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 145.
I
how being is made. Nevertheless he will again remind the naturalist that it is far easier to see how a Mind can produce valuers and concrete values than to see how matter can accomplish such a miracle.

4. Conclusion

In view of what has been said, the idealist is not too seriously worried about his position when he reads:

There is no central, brooding Will that has planned it all. The good is not the sun of things from which they get their warmth and inspiration. Ethical metaphysics results from wrong ordering of categories, a neglect of their setting and context. 54

For he also reads from the same writer:

It is obvious that I hold that value judgments do and must fit into the cosmos as this is revealed in knowledge. Values concern man's responses to, and estimation of things. They are always guided by knowledge though they contain other elements of a more effective and volitional nature. 55

Thus Sellers unlike many naturalists, especially those of the Nineteenth Century admits that value is organic to the universe. Of course in the next breath he asserts:"Though they are conditioned objectively by the nature of their objects, they are yet primarily personal and social, that is, human." 56 Man in other words is the locus of value.

Moral categories have a limited area of application. They apply primarily to human beings since these alone, seem capable of judging the value of their acts. morality and personality go together. 57

54. Sellers, EN, 342.
55. Ibid., 342.
56. Ibid., 342.
57. Sellers, PPP, 396.
In order to achieve your goals, the following steps can be taken:

1. Prioritize your tasks based on their importance and urgency.
2. Break down large projects into smaller, manageable tasks.
3. Create a schedule to allocate specific times for each task.
4. Eliminate distractions and maintain a focused environment.
5. Celebrate your progress and accomplishments regularly.

The most important aspect of achievement is consistency. It requires dedication and perseverance to reach your goals.
The ultimate, rational sanction of morality is the fact that it is grounded in the nature of man. He who is social and selective in his valuations is by that very fact a moral agent. It springs out of, and cannot be removed from, intelligent living.

The gist of our conclusion, then is that morality and its categories are intrinsic to that level of nature which we call human living. The area of human living is small in the ocean of existence but the fact is quiet irrelevant to the validity of its categories in their field. Nothing can rob us of the fact that we are men and women or make it seem rational to us to act like unthinking brutes even were we able so to act.

"Personality and human nature play a justified role in value-experiences and value-judgments."60 "It is my opinion that such normative expressions as should and ought indicate that we have to do with personality as a special kind of reality."61 But for Sellars man is also a part of nature." I shall seek to show how man is a part of the fabric of the world and that his doing, his knowing and his valuing cannot be understood apart from his status."62 If man is a part of the "fabric of the world" then the idealist may not be so far mistaken when he insists that values are not merely human but are grounded in the Cosmic order which can best be understood in terms of a Supreme Mind as its ground and Source. If "ultimately, a living value is the expression

56. Ibid., 428. 61. Sellars, PPR, 456.
60. Ibid., 426.
of personality in contact with things," whence this strange correlation? Is it too much to conclude that not only is Sellars unable to answer the idealists, but that he is himself not far from idealism in this as well as in some other respects?

63. Sellars, PPP, 462
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

There are three primary conclusions which emerge from this present study. The first consists of the fact that when naturalism tries to become really philosophical today, as in the case of Sellars, it finds itself forced to make many concessions to idealism. Sellars repudiates the old reductionistic naturalism which found no place for mind and values, but sought to reduce all the richness and complexity of life to the level of the bare world of physics. Likewise he finds himself compelled to renounce the old hard atoms and he substitutes for them a glorified matter that seems to be definitely psychic; for it is dynamic, self-organizing, and out of it emerge all the complexities and wonders of the universe, order, organization, design, life, mind, values. It seems as though Sellars is definitely heading toward some form of panpsychism. But more than this he repudiates behaviorism as a doctrine of mind and tries to make a place for mind in his system, even to the extent of making statements about its efficacy that cause some thinkers such as Pratt to suspect that he may be imperilling his naturalism. Moreover he recognizes value as unique, as having an equal status with other facts of experience, and as having it locus in man. Since man is a part of the fabric of the world for Sellars, he is at this point definitely approaching idealism. Finally there is his epistemology. Though he
contends desperately for the primacy of the category of "thinghood" yet he has to admit on the basis of his own epistemology that things always come in the garb of thought, and that knowledge of the mental comes first. Even the very atoms for which he contends come in terms of the mental. From this point it is not far to idealism. If things always come in terms of thought it is reasonable to suppose that they are of the nature of thought.

The dissertation concludes then that Sellars is moving in the direction of idealism. His repudiation of reductionism, his conception of matter which seems definitely psychic, his repudiation of behaviorism and his emphasis on the efficacy of mind together with the idealistic implications of his theory of value and his epistemology, all these tendencies at these many points seem to indicate that he is moving toward idealism.

The second conclusion is the inadequacy of the best form of naturalism as a philosophy. Sellars' naturalism is inadequate because matter however conceived is inadequate as a principle of explanation. As has been pointed out again and again it cannot explain order, organization, the many evidences of design in the universe, and least of all mind and value. Matter as over against mind is too poor a principle of explanation. Of course one may endow the simple structured systems which science postulates with the attributes
of mind, as Sellars does. But then it seems to be something different than what he started out with.

The third conclusion is that idealism with mind as its principle of explanation has a principle that is rich enough to explain the facts which matter cannot. Mind unlike matter possesses and does not have to import order, unity amid plurality, purpose, consciousness, will and value.

If we are right, we escape the universe of perpetual miracle, on which the atheist sets his heart. The organized structures and currents of ascent and evolution, from the atoms themselves to the lives of men, cease to be outrageously improbable runs of luck and become the normal expression of something akin to us. Material nature makes altogether too many winning throws for us not to suspect that she is playing with dice that are loaded, loaded with life and mind and purpose.64

64. Montague, BU, 73-74.
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ROY WOOD SELLARS' CRITICISMS OF IDEALISM

Abstract of a dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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The problem of the dissertation is threefold. First, it attempts a clear statement of the fundamental features of Sellars' system and of the various idealistic systems which he criticizes taking into account important likenesses and differences. Second, it attempts a statement of the various criticisms which Sellars makes of idealism. Third, it ventures a criticism of criticisms, a criticism of Sellars' criticisms of idealism with a view toward a final appraisal of the two systems.

Chapter I begins with a statement of the fundamental issue between idealism and naturalism. Is the universe of the nature of mind and dependent on it, or of matter and independent of mind? This is followed by a discussion of the three characteristic features of Sellars' system, Realism, Naturalism, Humanism. The discussion begins with an exposition of his epistemological dualism. Knowledge is not a direct intuitive process, but a mediated, interpretative process. The essence of his metaphysics is the concept of matter. The ultimate structure of matter is not conceived in terms of the hard atoms of Democritus but in terms of the simplest organized enduring systems of energy as disclosed by science. From the atoms thus conceived in terms of primary endurants emerge all the complexity and novelty in the universe, a new quality appearing at each new level of organization which dynamic, self-organizing matter is
capable of achieving. By means of this theory of emergence, Sellars seeks to save himself from the tendency of the old materialism to reduce reality to the bare level of the world of physics. Sellars then conceives the universe as pluralistic, self-existent and self-sufficient. Values are conceived as unique and irreducible but at the same time as having no cosmic rootage, as relevant only to human life.

In Chapter II idealism is broadly defined as the system which holds that reality is of the nature of mind and that values are objective. Four forms are recognized and discussed, the Platonic, the Berkeleian, the Speculative comprising both the critical idealism of Kant and the absolutistic types stemming from Hegel, and the Personalistic composed of two types, the Leibnizian and the Bowne-Lotzean.

Chapter III explores the likenesses and differences between idealism and Sellars' naturalism. The likenesses are as follows: (1). In common with many idealists, notably the personalists, he is an epistemological dualist. (2). He holds that matter is always revealed through mind and in terms of mind. (3). His concept of matter as dynamic and self-organizing tends toward panpsychism. (4). He rejects reductionism. The fundamental differences are twofold: (1). Nature as a system is independent of mind, self-existent and self-sufficient. (2). Matter is the ulti-
mate principle of explanation.

Chapter IV consists of Sellars' criticisms of idealistic epistemological monism. He attacks Berkeley at two vital points, the latter's insistence that "esse is percipi," and that things are sensations. He fails in his attempt to drive Berkeleians to solipsism, but is more successful in revealing the defects in Berkeley's theory of perception, and in his view of things as mere presentations. Sellars' charge against the absolutists as being unempirical is more relevant to Bradley than it is to Hegel. But he is mistaken in charging Bradley with reducing the phenomenal world to illusion. He is more convincing in his attack upon the coherence theory of reality, and upon the tendency of absolutists to fall back upon the blanket-term, "experience."

Chapter V deals with Sellars' criticisms of the idealistic doctrine of the categories. The fundamental issue is whether the categories are to be derived from mind or from things. Sellars makes two criticisms, first that idealism is unempirical in its search for the categories in mind, and second, following Perry, he insists that idealists in reality derive categories from the object.

Sellars singles out Kant for special attack. He is convincing in his criticisms of Kant's subjectivism. But in so far as he criticizes Kant along with idealists in general for looking to mind as the seat of the categories he is far from
convincing. The chief reason for this failure is the fundamental fact that mind is known at first hand, things at second hand, and things always in terms of mind. Things being products of Objective Mind reveal certain aspects of reality, but what things reveal dimly at second hand mind reveals at first hand and more clearly.

Chapter VI concerns a discussion of Sellars' criticisms of idealistic philosophies of nature. The issue is twofold: (1) What is the nature of things? (2) Is the natural order independent and self-sufficient or dependent on Mind? Sellars makes five criticisms: (1) Idealists reduce nature to the phenomenal and even the illusory. (2) They are unempirical. (3) They have not solved the problem of the distinction between the physical and the psychical. (4) They are anthropomorphic. (5) They cannot explain the dysteleological facts. These criticisms are significant, searching and penetrating, but not conclusive. The order, unity, organization, and design which nature displays seems to outweigh these criticisms and to point in the direction of idealism. The fifth, usually considered the most weighty, can be answered on the assumption of a limited God.

Chapter VII constitutes an approach to the difficult but fundamental problem of the mind-body relationship. The crucial issue is the nature of consciousness. Sellars regards it as but a part of mind, as only a qualitative aspect of the functioning of the brain. Personal idealists differ in regarding
consciousness as of the essence of mind, and in regarding mind as the fundamental reality of which matter is an aspect.

Though directing certain criticisms to non-interactionists such as Hocking, Sellars directs not less than seven criticisms at interactionists. (1) The self is fragmentary and unstable. (2) Interactionism is based on traditional outgrown assumptions. (3) Consciousness apart from an organism is an abstraction. (4) Interactionism does not do justice to the essential unity of the organism. (5) It is unempirical and unscientific. (6) It presupposes the needless multiplication of entities. (7) It is inconceivable.

Though significant and searching, Sellars' criticisms betray two weaknesses: (1) He tends to think of modern interactionism in terms of the old rigid dualism of Descartes. (2) Sellars takes for granted the truth of his theory of mind as merely an aspect of brain process. Since the brain in the last analysis is composed of atoms in motion, mind cannot be explained in terms of brain process. Sellars does not do justice to at least four vital aspects of mind: (1) the uniqueness of mind as knower, (2) the non-spatial aspects of mind, (3) the time-transcending capacities of mind, (4) the efficacy of mind and its implications.

Chapter VIII consists of Sellars' criticisms of idealistic philosophies of value. The issue is the absoluteness and the metaphysical objectivity of values. Sellars makes four
criticisms: (1) Idealists tend to reify values. (2) Values are relative. (3) Absolute values hinder progress. (4) Values have no cosmic rootage. But in spite of these criticisms he is nearer the idealistic view in at least three respects than he realizes. (1) In spite of his relativism he holds that reflective men can arrive at objective standards and norms. (2) Man is the locus and center of values--values are personal. (3) Man is a part of the fabric of the world.

The main conclusions of this dissertation follow:

I. As naturalism ceases to be naive, as it develops into a comprehensive system as in the case of Sellars the tendency is in the direction of idealism. This is evident in Sellars in five ways:

1. His repudiation of reductionism.

2. His repudiation of the old "lumpish" matter. Sellars' atoms are simple enduring systems of energy conceived as dynamic, self-organizing, and laden with the possibilities of mind. Hence he approaches panpsychism.

3. At times he gives such prominence to the efficacy of mind that one suspects that he has advanced beyond naturalism.

4. Values have their locus in man. Man is a part of the world's fabric.

5. Matter does not stamp itself on mind in the
fashion of Democritus. It is only known through mind and in terms of mind.

II. Matter is insufficient as a principle of ultimate explanation.

1. It cannot explain the facts of order, organization, unity, and seeming design in nature.

2. It cannot explain the facts of consciousness.

3. It cannot explain values which do not seem to be material.

III. While there are difficulties in taking mind as the ultimate principle of explanation, yet the difficulties are far less real than those of naturalism. Mind by its very nature possesses order, organization, unity amid plurality, purpose, dynamism in the form of will. These factors do not have to be imported, as seems necessary in the case of so restricted a concept as matter. Hence when a comprehensive, coherent view of the whole is attempted, mind seems to be the more adequate principle of final explanation.
The candidate was born at Kingsbury, Texas, April 26, 1909. He is the son of Mr. and Mrs. W. H. Munk of Fentress, Texas. His interest in philosophy began while he was still in high school springing partly from his wonder at the mystery of things and also from the necessity of finding a more adequate basis for his religious faith than the prevailing fundamentalism afforded.

The candidate graduated from the high school at Lockhart, Texas in 1927 and during the fall of the same year entered Southwestern University, Georgetown, Texas. He took an active part in intercollegiate debating and also qualified and became a member of the Scholarship Societies of the South. In 1931 he received his B. A. degree and began his work in the School of Theology of Southern Methodist University. He received his B. D. degree in 1933 majoring in Old Testament and using as the subject of his thesis, The Hebrew People and Their Religion in the Light of Archaeology and History. On June 9, 1933 he married Miss Margaret Caldwell and soon afterwards was assigned to his first church at Rockport, Texas. For ten years the candidate served various rural churches in the Southwest Texas Conference of the Methodist Church, and in his ministry stressed a sound theology as the basis of a vital religious faith and the application of Christian ideals to the field of social relations.

In 1942 the candidate realizing the need for a more adequate philosophical foundation decided to go to Boston University to study under Dr. E. S. Brightman whom he considers one of the greatest and most original thinkers in America. During the last three years the candidate has been working on his Doctorate and serving as an Assistant in the Department of Philosophy at Boston University. He also has taken an active part in the Boston University Philosophical Club serving in the capacity of Vice-president during 1944-1945. An article written by the candidate appeared in the recent issue of the Philosophical Forum, entitled, "The Problem of the Philosophy of History: Hegel and After." He is at present Pastor of the First Methodist Church of Northampton and Chaplain to the Methodist Students of Smith College.