Whose Beijing? The construction of identity and exclusion in an era of social change

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Thesis

WHOSE BEIJING? THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY AND EXCLUSION IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL CHANGE

by

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I would like to dedicate this work to my parents Qing and Jianmin, my childhood neighborhood Sanlitun, and the immortal hero by the alias Xun Huisheng.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My father once told me that a thesis was the progress report of what its author studied at that period of time. This conversation must have taken place around 2013, because I was writing my BA thesis back then. This thesis was not something fully presentable, as I spent more than three years of my undergraduate time relaxing and recovering from the intensive high school education. Thus, to make up for the loss, I’ve kept his words in my mind from the beginning of my graduate school life. I have tried hard to combine everything that I learned in the past two years into this thesis.

The process took me far longer than I expected. I even thought that my first exposure to what later became the choice of my research interest and my thesis topic dated back to my childhood years when most of my elementary school friends were forced to relocate to farther districts. Ten years later after they were displaced, we reconnected and gathered at a karaoke place very close to our old neighborhood. But now, our neighborhood Sanlitun is the leading and most prosperous recreational area in Beijing. Including myself, we were all victims of the dramatic change. Yet as I thought retrospectively, I realized how my own ancestors must have had an influence on other Beijingers when they first migrated to the city. Both of my grandfathers served in the military and came to Beijing around 1949. I sometimes wonder what identity I should choose if I must: a second generation native or a third generation outsider? This dilemma
inspired me to dig into the construction of identity.

Upon the completion of my thesis, I have a mixture of feelings. I remember that the reason I got stuck on the fifth chapter was because I couldn’t stop crying as I reviewed all the related histories and interview notes. I felt deeply sad. While I just finished the sixth chapter, I heard the news that Xun Huisheng, one of the active members of the organization was killed in a car accident. According to the police, the driver suffered from a psychiatric illness. I could still recall how we communicated on social media, as I learnt from core members that Xun went undercover into a group of politically contentious outsiders and reported many times to the police when and where this group would hold demonstrations. I was told that these outsiders always wanted to locate this traitor which put Xun in a dangerous position. Many Beijingers were suspicious of the car accident. Xun’s death struck me a lot in the later days of my thesis writing.

Apart from these concerns, I would very much like to express my gratitude towards many who have been helping me along the process. First and foremost, I am indebted to my parents who sponsored my graduate education, especially the fourth semester. Both of them went through a lot in the past five years. The other reason I felt grateful for them is that thanks to their years spent in Kolkata, I was able to live in Beijing myself, which allowed me to explore my connection with long term Beijingers and develop my understanding of the world in the way it is today. I especially
want to thank my mom whose help was often out of the blue. Her childhood connection with an interviewee broadened my vision and provided me with rich and solid evidence.

Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude towards my academic mentors and friends. Professor Stone helped me the most. Without him, I wouldn’t even be able to convince myself that this research had certain significance. I was very much reassured every time I had some discussions with him. Professor Stone was not only the major advisor of my thesis, but also my advisor from the beginning of the program. Without his help, I would not have made many improvements over the past two years, although I knew I still was far from a qualified scholar. In addition, I want to thank Professor Liah Greenfeld, Professor Emily Barman, and Professor Luo Xiaoping, who also gave me a lot of help in shaping my understanding of sociology. Apart from the instructors, I feel so grateful for having such a helping cohort that consisted of Ladin Bayurgil, Uravadee (Aim) Chanchamsang, Erin Freeman, Carmen Rowe, Trish Ward, and Jake Watson. Together with Elina Tochilnikova and Kelsey Harris, they offered me academic suggestions and psychological support. I shall value these friendships no matter where I will be in the future.

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I would like to express my gratitude to my interviewees and many long term Beijingers, although I shall not disclose their names here. Wen Bing helped me with the translation of legal documents. I also cherish many close friendships back home, especially the ones with Zhao Yuwei and Du Yang. The thesis is by far the best gift I can give you upon our reunion very soon.
WHOSE BEIJING? THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY AND EXCLUSION IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL CHANGE

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ABSTRACT

As China is undergoing a great social transformation, urbanization has brought millions of domestic migrants into Beijing. After the 2008 Olympics, long term Beijingers have started to express their hostility to the overwhelming population of domestic migrants. This thesis seeks to enlarge our understanding of the nature and dynamics of this local hostility in Beijing, as a case study of the construction of prejudice that results from social change. It is illustrated under a combined framework of Durkheim’s theories of social change and anomie, Allport’s theorizing about prejudice, and Elias’s writings on insiders and outsiders. In order to answer how and why local hostility happened recently in Beijing, I located my ethnographic research on a grassroots organization consisting of long term Beijingers. There are three main findings. First, social change provides the invention of new traditions and norms that long term Beijingers were able to adopt before migrants came and had the chance to get settled. This enabled long term Beijingers to express their hostility by claiming that the migrants were “uncivilized”. Second, urbanization and a
series of urban reforms not only brought migrants into the city, but also
disturbed the existing lifestyles of the long term Beijingers and made them
feel relatively deprived. Nostalgic sentiments aroused among long term
Beijingers blamed outsiders for their perceived deprivation. Thirdly, the
civic participation that the grassroots organization encouraged did not
significantly reduce their prejudice against outsiders. Instead, local
hostility was veiled by active participation and was believed to be
legitimate because of the support of the local power structure, the
mainstream media, and by other government policies.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: BEIJING IN TRANSITION

Having spent almost eighteen hours on Flight AA187, I was finally told by the pilot that the plane would be landing at Beijing Capital International Airport in about thirty minutes. As I was only mindful of “back HOME”, not hard to be noticed from the airport’s name, the city of Beijing is the capital—one of the national central cities, and the political, cultural, and international communication center of the country to which it belongs.

However, Beijing’s term of service as a state capital did not just begin with the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The historical lineage of its being a capital dates back to the Seventh Century BC, and it was not until the year 1153 that the city resumed the status and maintained it for another seven hundred years until 1928. The political and administrative significance of the city was bound to engender population changes, and therefore the opportunity for the introduction of new cultures, and further, cultural exchange and social integration (Meyer, 1991; Li, 1995; Elder, 1997; Naquin, 2000; Dong, 2003; Zhao, 2007; Yu, 2013). Linguistic examinations alone reveal traces of influence on the
Beijing dialect by people of various ethnicities and from surrounding regions (Sun, 1995; Wadley, 1996; Gao, 2003; Zhang, 2007; Guan, 2008; Chen, 2009; Mende, 2015).

Although Beijing historically shared similar transitions with cities in the West in terms of population movements, Weber (1968) incisively pointed out that cities in China differed from the rest because political autonomy and self-government there were absent. This characteristic of China’s cities was maintained in the People’s Republic. Deviating from urban sociologists’ theorizing that urbanization is the spatial form of industrialization and modernization (Sjoberg, 1960; Smailes, 1967; Castells, 1978; Castells, 1983), cities in Mao’s regime played a less important role in the country’s economic system because financial resources were controlled by the industrial system instead of the municipal government, which resulted in “industrialization while minimalizing urbanization” (Naughton, 1995, p. 67). The state adopted the idea of “anti-urbanism”, in order to construct the city as a place for production, rather than consumption; urban resurgence did not occur until the end of the 1980s (Kirkby, 1985). In practice, the ideology was translated into a tight control of population mobility and domicile
nationwide, especially in traditional urban centers (ibid).

Owing to the strict population policy such as *hukou*\(^1\), the one-child policy\(^2\), and Regulations on Resident Identification Cards\(^3\), population mobility and domicile in Beijing was fairly stable from 1949 to 1994. Especially from 1958 to 1970, more than 2.5 million people left the city, outnumbering the migrant population. The term for extraneous population (*wailai renkou*) came into being in 1982, measuring people

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1 The *Hukou* system, or residential permits, adopted into law in 1958, was originally set up to avoid overwhelming the cities with uncontrolled in-migration. Under this system all Chinese received a document that classified them as people of either “rural” or “urban” households. Since the end of the Mao era, this system is regarded by some as an obstacle to the development of China’s cities. On the other hand, many of the more privileged urbanites see it as their entitlement and a protection of their living standard in the face of mass and potentially destabilizing urban growth. Nonetheless, officially the system is being gradually phased out as urban populations tend more and more to be influenced by the “socialist-market economy” in China’s cities (Foggin, 2005).

2 The One-child policy, an official program initiated in the late 1970s and early ’80s by the central government of China, the purpose of which was to limit the great majority of family units in the country to one child each. The rationale for implementing the policy was to reduce the growth rate of China’s enormous population. It was announced in late 2015 that the program was to end in early 2016 (One-Child Policy, 2016).

3 Regulations on Resident Identification Cards (RICs) started to be implemented in 1986. The Regulations were revised in 1991 and 1997, and the Detailed Rules of Implementation were amended in 1999. In compliance with legislation regulations, the items on the Resident ID Card shall include name, gender, nationality, date of birth, the address of the permanent residential place, the number of the Resident ID Card, the photo of the cardholder, the period of validity and the organization that signed and issued the card. The Resident ID Card number is the one and only lifetime code for a citizen’s identity, compiled uniformly by the Public Security Bureau. The Resident ID Card and the identity code are mainly used for the identification of the status of the citizen, to safeguard a civilian’s legal right and facilitate a civilian’s ... conduct of social activities. In June 2003, China adopted the new Law of the PRC on Resident Identification Cards, effective 1 January 2004. Although the Regulations were repealed with the entry into force of the new law, RICs issued under the previous regulations will remain valid until their expiry date. The Resident ID Card is a uniform legal document issued by the state to identify the status of the civilian (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2005).
without Beijing hukou living in the city longer than six months or one year (due to inconsistency of the data). Before that, the residential population consisted of the hukou population and the transient population (zanzhu renkou)—those without Beijing hukou who lived in Beijing longer than three days. Since 1982, the hukou population and extraneous population constitute a residential population. The introduction of the new measurement seemed to signify the permission from the city to accommodate long-term outsiders. Figure 1 provides us with a general population growth trend from 1959 to 1994. Although the amount of new comers kept growing, its proportion in comparison to hukou population was still at the margin.
Another change in 1982 was the General Urban Plan of Beijing by the State Council. The plan made clear that Beijing was by nature the national political and cultural center. Beijing was to develop in the following aspects a) social order and morality, b) cleanliness and hygiene, c) culture, technology and level of education, and d) economic prosperity,
convenience and stability. However, stringent population control was reaffirmed in this plan.

In 1994, the population that either gained Beijing hukou before 1959 or were born with Beijing hukou, which I would call them Beijingers, amounted to 75.6% of the total population in the city (Beijing Bureau of Statistics, 2015). People whose Beijing hukou were offered by their workplace or gained through their family members would not be regarded as Beijingers, but simply domestic migrants. Their children, and, of course, grandchildren, are instead defined as Beijingers in this paper.

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4 I start with the year 1959 because from 1949 to 1958, Beijing expanded its geographical area by including many counties that used to belong to surrounding provinces. By doing this, people who belonged to those counties automatically gained Beijing hukou.

5 I regard outsiders as the sum of extraneous, transient, and cumulative in-migration increases since 1959. Public sources from Beijing Bureau of Statistics and Ma, Hu, and Yin’s Contemporary Beijing’s Population is where I mainly gather my data on Beijing’s population for this thesis. I also use the two sources for Figure 2, 3, and 5. However, I would like to present these data in charts, so as to take a glimpse of the population growth trend.
Despite the increase of *hukou* population\(^6\) through the 1990s being steady, the growth of the migrant population, or floating population used by many scholars, which is the combination of the extraneous population

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\(^6\) Mechanical increase of *hukou* population refers to people who gain Beijing *hukou* by in-migration, instead of by birth.
and the transient population, was tremendous in this decade. The year 1995 saw a critical point, with the extraneous population reaching 1.8 million, or almost three times as much as it was in 1994 (i.e. 632,000). Additionally, the natural growth of the *hukou* population from 1995 to 1999 was only 36,400, compared to the growth from migration in the same time period which was 312,600 (Beijing Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Since then, it is those domestic migrants, rather than existing Beijingers’ reproduction, that contributed to the increase in the *hukou* population. As we can see in Figure 2, the proportion of newcomers into Beijing climbs steadily and fast. In 2008, the amount of newcomers exceeded that of Beijingers.

**Figure 3. Population Density 2000-2014**

(Density measured by person/km²)

Figure 3 tracks the population density trends in Beijing with a special
focus on the time period from 2000 to 2014. While the 1982 General Urban Plan suggested the residential population by 2000 would be 13.2 million and by 2010 14.4 million, the latter had already been surpassed in 2003 (i.e. 14.56 million). Within fourteen years, the population density almost doubled from 934.78 people per square km to 1845.247 people per square km (Beijing Bureau of Statistics, 2015). The news that twenty-three people were living in an apartment of 120 square meters should not be a surprise when an area of 90 square meters were shared by fifty-two people (Shen, Chen, & Wang, 2013). Take Beijing’s transportation system in 2013 as another example. According to the Beijing municipal traffic report, traffic congestion lasted one hour and fifty-five minutes on average that year (Hu, 2014). On March 8th, the passenger volume in the subway system reached 10.28 million within a day, breaking its historical record (Tang, 2013). Subway Line One, the oldest underground line that is parallel to the Chang’an Avenue—an avenue that connects the political, economic, and administrative center from east to west, carried more than 1.5 million passengers every day on average, with the shortest interval between two trains being 2 minutes (Luo, 2013).

Together with all the inconvenience created by the soaring number of
domestic newcomers, an enormous anti-outsider sentiment among long-term Beijing residents was triggered after migration had been negligible for sixty years. The self-proclaimed Beijingers felt themselves being a “minority in their own city” (Dutton, Lo, and Wu, 2008, p. 146). Whereas Western societies often base prejudice and discrimination on race and ethnicity, the marker in China is more usually characterized by localism—defining people by their region of origin (Solinger, 1995). Language, especially dialectal pronunciation, becomes the most intuitive indicator of one’s hometown, before people present their household registration papers.

Localism is aggravated by the hukou system in terms of education, employment, socio-economic status, social security, and social adaptation (Whyte & Parish, 1984; Cheng & Selden, 1994; Knight & Shi, 1996; Hannum, 1999; Zhang & Kanbur, 2005; Wei, 2007; Xia & Gao, 2009; Wang, 2010; Wu, 2010; Yang, 2011; Hao & Woo, 2012). These institutional advantages, in a predictable fashion, convert to “local snobbishness” at a personal level, which could evolve into xenophobia, prejudice, overt discrimination, and open hostility to all outsiders even if some have succeeded economically or elevated their social status (Solinger, 1995, p.
Open hostility is manifest and therefore can be easily tracked. *Waidi bi*, or “outside cunt” being its crude English translation, was invented by Beijingers around 2011 to originally address outsiders who criticized Beijing all the time but still chose to stay in the city instead of returning to their hometowns. Idioms such as *lao waidi*, or “the old outsider”, that did not explicitly convey negative attitudes gradually were reduced in their frequency of use. Beijingers condemned a dating TV show and applied the term *waidi bi* to its hostess who was an Inner Mongolian, holding that this show had intentionally been matching Beijingers with outsiders who could then stay in Beijing in an easier way (Baidu, 2015a). Social media has become the virtual space for Beijingers to identify these critical outsiders. Zhou Jieren, a successful journalist, posted on her social media account that “Beijing is wrecked because people need to wait for hours to be seated in a restaurant and Beijingers must be so inexperienced in their lives that they are eager to eat outside all the time”. Soon, Beijingers called her WDB, short for *waidi bi* in their replies to her. Some even appealed that Beijingers make phone calls to Zhou’s working place—the government news agency to complain (Baidu, 2015b).
Yet, the popularization of the term led to an over-generalization in a way that the “three-letter-word” can be referred to anyone who simply has a different accent (Tianya, 2012). More severely, verbal abuse was sometimes transformed into behavioral violence. Some Beijingers searched for basic information such as the home address and telephone number of outsiders with whom they were in conflict, threatened these outsiders and demanded that they apologize and retract their words. Some made an “appointment” with outsiders that they were in conflict with at a certain place and a particular time, and called other Beijingers to go with them and to help them fight. Using the slogan “The Netherlands for the Dutch”, Beijingers insisted that Beijing be deemed as their hometown before it was considered the nation’s capital and belonging to every Chinese citizen.

The rise of these irrationally hostile phenomena in recent years made me interested in a series of questions: a) What makes these residents hostile? b) Given the fact that Beijing has become an international metropolis, how could residents cope with their identity crisis? c) How do group activities and organization affect their individual antagonism?

Allport (1954) argues that “rapid social change in the prevailing social
situation” can produce riots which stem from group hostility (p. 59). From a macro-social perspective, anomie, or social disorder, occurs particularly in transforming societies where economic development and modernization clash with long-standing values and traditions. As Beijing has only recently become a city with skyrocketing development whose consequences have not yet been touched upon by existing literature, this thesis seeks to enlarge our understanding of the nature and dynamics of local hostility in Beijing as a case study of the development of prejudice resulting from social change. Specifically, I would like to confine my research to a single case study based on long term Beijingers who are members of a grassroots organization. Members of the sampled organization who called themselves “Traditional Beijingers” have been the most prejudiced and influential among the whole long term Beijingers population by far. Long term residents in this thesis refer to people whose grandparents were born or settled in Beijing, and whose parents and themselves were born and raised in Beijing. Although population increase became prominent as early as 1995, which I have previously noted, the study is limited to the time period from 2001 to 2015, in order to examine how the most recent trend of local hostility is related to major social
changes that did not occur in the past.

The following chapters further develop my thesis. The second chapter reviews Durkheim’s analysis of *anomie*, Allport’s elaboration of the nature of prejudice, and Elias and Scotson’s formulation of the established and the outsiders. Methods and data collection are discussed in the third chapter. Chapters Four, Five, and Six examine how prejudice is nurtured by intertwining factors including macro-level structural changes, group mobilization and organization, and daily interactions between Beijingers and outsiders. These three chapters attempt to contextualize the development of prejudice in the processes of acquiring tradition, of perceiving relative deprivation, and of political opportunity changes. The last chapter summarizes the thesis employing a reflexive outlook and some workable suggestions.
CHAPTER TWO: ANOMIE, PREJUDICE, AND THE ESTABLISHED AND THE OUTSIDERS

I would argue that “Traditional Beijingers” hostility against domestic migrants can be linked theoretically to the idea that prejudice emerges as one of the many common outcomes of anomie—a typical result of massive social change. First, I would like to discuss the causality of social change and anomie from a Durkheimian perspective. Then, Allport’s analysis of prejudice will be incorporated into the argument. Last but not least, Elias and Scotson’s analysis of the established and the outsiders will be reviewed.

Primarily concerned with collective solidarity at a societal level, Durkheim (1984) proposes two types of solidarities, namely mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity, which characterize in pre-modern and modern societies respectively. The former type emphasizes collective consciousness and similarities that members of the society share in work and life experiences, while the latter characterizes the heterogeneity yet functional interdependence of social members with the development of the division of labor. Durkheim calls this the shift from mechanical solidarity
to organic solidarity. This is because as the division of labor intensifies, discrepancies in the forms of labor, lifestyles, and life experience among members enlarge, leading to the increasing awareness of individuals and the waning of collective consciousness.

"[T]he collective consciousness leaves uncovered a part of the individual consciousness, so that there may be established in it those special functions that it cannot regulate. The more extensive this free area is, the stronger the cohesion that arises from this solidarity. Indeed, on the one hand each one of us depends more intimately upon society the more labour is divided up, and on the other, the activity of each one of us is correspondingly more specialised, the more personal it is (Durkheim, 1984, p.85)."

The significance of the division of labor does not lie in its destructive effect on mechanical solidarity, nor essentially on its contribution to the growth of productivity, but on its constructive effort of introducing a higher level of social integration that is based on cooperative relationships, restitutive laws, and public opinion.

But why social change? Or, in other words, why is there a division of labor in society? Durkheim again interprets the progress of the division of labor from a functionalist approach, by seeing it “in direct proportion to the moral or dynamic density of society”, rather than due to human happiness or to the enrichment of human knowledge (Durkheim, 1984, p. 201). Durkheim points out that as the volume and density of a society
grows, competition for survival among its members seems inevitable. Pre-modern societies are mostly sparsely populated and have loosely communicated memberships, making competition for survival and the division of labor unnecessary. Yet, when a society becomes “regularly more dense and generally more voluminous”, existing resources and space available for human survival will become increasingly inadequate (Durkheim, 1984, p. 205).

Under these circumstances, the demand for similar resources will lead to fiercer and more brutal competition among members who engage in similar occupations and/or have similar skills and goals. Thus, the division of labor, the necessity for, rather than the result of, well-being, provides new specializations for the majority population who if left in an inferior position could have failed the competition for survival. This makes people collaborate instead of engaging in conflict or oppressing one another. As Durkheim says,

[I]t is easy to understand that any concentration in the social mass, particularly if accompanied by a growth in population, necessarily determines the progress of the division of labour (Durkheim, 1984, p. 210).

In this way, the more population and concentration increase, the further the division of labor develops, leading to an industrialized society with an
intensive division of labor.

The division of labor allows any society to absorb another society of the same kind. If one society is not able to stay independent from the other, which means the two societies may share similar functions, competitions between the two societies occur. It then becomes inappropriate for the people of this society to maintain any “exclusive form of patriotism” because such differentiations between themselves can become attributes that necessitate their cooperation (Durkheim, 1984, p. 222).

To some extent, Durkheim also acknowledges that the greater the mechanical solidarity in a society, the harder and slower the individuals’ movement and the development of the division of labor. Furthermore, as the collective consciousness operates at various levels, the one at the local level can retain individuality and concreteness within the general or the more abstract collective conscious at a more transcendent level. Likewise, the more general the collective consciousness is, the more rational and logical its embedded civilization becomes, the less categorical and “less irksome to the free development of individual variations” (Durkheim, 1984, p. 233).

Consequently, the division of labor in effect weakens traditions which
were popular in societies under mechanical solidarity. Durkheim argues that progress is primarily made in large towns and spreads to other regions because urban environments are the areas with least continuity of traditions (Durkheim, 1984, p. 237). Yet, he points out that the division of labor spontaneously creates a certain measure of social harmony that is “sufficient to maintain order generally” (Durkheim, 1984, p. 216). Besides, it is still individuality that is derived from the social collectivity, not the other way around. Although the “upgraded” organic solidarity values individuality and heterogeneity, no hint of the anti-social shall be found within individualistic societies. Thus, the division of labor itself should not be blamed for the loss of solidarity or for causing anomie. If so, what then is responsible for the generation of anomie in social change?

Anomie, or normlessness, refers to the lack of sufficient and effective social norms which can provide directions and standards for social behavior. According to Merton (1957), “the degree of anomie in a social system is indicated by the extent to which there is a lack of consensus on norms judged to be legitimate, with its attendant uncertainty and insecurity in social relations” (pp. 266-267). When a society experiences change into one that appreciates heterogeneity and individuality through
the practice of the division of labor, morality and norms are often diversely and ambiguously expressed through public opinion.

Functional diversity entails a moral diversity that nothing cannot prevent, and it is inevitable that the one should grow at the same time as the other... The collective sentiments thus become more and more powerless to contain the centrifugal tendencies that the division of labour is alleged to bring about; for, on the one hand, these tendencies increase as labour becomes increasingly divided up, and at the same time the collective sentiments grow weaker (Durkheim, 1984, p. 298).

Unlike rigid laws with established authority, public opinion is often tolerant of evasive and ambivalent obligations that members should obey. As a result, boundaries between just and unjust actions become blurred, while morality is often too equivocal to form strict discipline. Norms that are supposedly used to regulate the changing society and to create solidarity are incapable in most areas of collective life, leaving the society in chaos.

Not all aspects of the division of labor are anomic; the anomic division of labor is only one among several abnormal forms of the division of labor. In a situation of the anomic division of labor, stable and effective social norms that usually regulate participants’ behaviors, rights and obligations, are often invalid. The interdependent and interconnected relationships among participants are not able to secure a cooperative division of labor.
Participants have to settle on norms for their collaboration on each occasion. Otherwise, in order to regain equilibrium among themselves, they need to negotiate or even fight against each other, consequently turning solidarity into continual conflicts. Even the contract, proposed by Durkheim is merely a temporary truce that “suspends hostilities only for a while” (Durkheim, 1984, p. 302). However, Durkheim does not see these conflicts as unnecessary or something that can be completely eliminated under organic solidarity. Instead, solidarity moderates if not abolishes competition (ibid).

Durkheim turns to micro-sociological levels of analysis to solve anomie, as he believes that these levels of analysis “best reveal the ongoing structural foundations of normative culture without the need to abstract either pole from its holistic context” (Marks, 1974, p. 331). Anomie is impossible when sufficient contacts among individuals are achieved. In fact, when a universal market comes into being, it is each industry that provides production for members all over the society.

For each individual, the perception of anomie, derives from the uncertainty of knowing what to do when pursuing a goal (Gurr, 1970). Anomie will lead to deviant behaviors such as crime, suicide, and gang
behavior; alternative norms, or in other words “rebellion”, could also take place (Merton, 1957). Furthermore, the feeling of inferiority within remsentiment also sows extra-punitive seeds that could develop into prejudice (Greenfeld, 1992). Drawing from this, prejudice against out-groups could be one possible outcome of anomie.

Allport offers a systematic and paradigmatic account of prejudice and intergroup relations, despite the fact that his work is originally engaged with racial tensions in the United States. He first points out that prejudice consists of two parts: 1) the affective attitude of either for or against, as is distinguished from merely feeling loyal; 2) a wholly or partially erroneous belief which the affective attitude is based on (Allport, 1960, pp. 220-221). Overgeneralization, or stereotyping, is one kind of erroneous belief, holding that every member of a given group must possess certain characteristics and these characteristics make every one of the group responsible for certain events. By blaming others, those who show prejudice will relieve their fear, anxiety, and irritation. Of course, these characteristics are often negatively and falsely alleged with insufficient warrant and irreversible stigmatization, while structural or impersonal
forces could have been given proportional concern to explain the events.

With prejudice itself being a subjective construct, people possessing it will in return become irrationally and subjectively influenced by it, as prejudice “inflate[s] our perception out of all proportion to the facts” (Allport, 1960, p. 228). Ross (1977) later comes up with the term “fundamental attribution error” to account for the “tendency of people to attribute the inferior status of minority groups to these groups’ inner deficiencies rather than to circumstances beyond their control” (Katz, 1991).

Apart from psychological approaches that involve frustration, ego defense, and aggression, prejudice is also theorized historically as well as socio-culturally. Allport (1954) claims the function of prejudice lies significantly in the fact that it supports the subordination of the minority group under the prevailing social stratification. Similarly from a Marxist perspective, prejudice is employed by the ruling group as an ideological tool to justify and maintain their dominant status and exploitative relationship with the ruled. “The victims must not be known for what they were—involuntary slaves” (Allport, 1954, p. 209). Greed, in Marxist theorizing, replaces fear and insecurity, and becomes the root cause of
prejudice—the foundation of class differences (Cox, 1948). Prejudice, now in another fashion, rationalizes the self-interests of the dominant class. This explanation is especially adopted by DuBois (1990) in his studies of African Americans’ subordinate social status.

The historical and sociocultural explanations of prejudice are combined into a community pattern theory of prejudice. This pattern emphasizes that individuals inherit their judgments, including prejudiced opinions, from their ancestors and take up values that are preferred by the individuals’ community. However, Allport seems optimistic about reducing this form of ethnocentrism as new generations, especially in the United States are always seeking new lifestyles that break away from the old ones.

In terms of sociocultural laws of prejudice, Allport lists a series of social factors that trigger and aggravate prejudice. They are: a heterogeneous social structures, vertical social mobility, rapid social change, ignorance and barriers to communication, a relatively large size and high density of minority group populations, direct competition and realistic threats, exploitation that sustains interests within the community, sanctions given to aggression, traditions that legitimize ethnocentrism, and ignorance about assimilation or cultural pluralism. He elaborates the
causality between rapid social change and prejudice by pointing out that social change produces a feeling of uncertainty and a loss of predictability. Thus, anxiety increases, resulting in the action of scapegoating as an alternative explanation for the deteriorated situation (p. 224). It should be noted that *anomie* here does not have to concern factual disruptions, but only perceived disruptions that the majority believe to have taken place. Besides, it is also emphasized that the aforementioned factors in reality are interconnected with one another and they together pose a combined influence on prejudice in society; no single factor alone would necessarily lead to prejudice.

As for how prejudice is acquired, several options are examined by Allport. First, prejudice results from factors along a spectrum that range from sheer conformity to the maximum degree of functional significance. To conform, one simultaneously chooses to accept an ethnocentric ideology of a particular culture. Only through conformity could individuals be accepted by the group, while at the same time solidarity is enhanced. Of course, apart from conforming to the group, individuals may also conform to a self-image, or ego, or frames of value that they believe they themselves should have. Second, people are influenced by their parents and their
families’ surrounding environment. Prejudice is acquired by involvement in an infected atmosphere as opposed to being inherited from parents. Children of less authoritarian parents show less prejudice against others. Thirdly, in a later period of learning, specifically in puberty and adolescence, traumatic conditioning that is emotionally violent and striking, ensures the later overgeneralization will take place.

However, trauma in many cases only serves as a catalyst of prejudice, rather than a factor that creates new prejudice. For youths are sometimes prejudiced against by others, they often establish their own status, so as to enhance their self-esteem. According to Allport, such class distinctions are “cultural invitations to prejudice” (p. 322). Thus, prejudice is a social construct that needs to be acquired, instead of inherently ascribed, for the sake of satisfying people’s needs. The classroom for people to acquire prejudice is often the social environment where their personalities develop (p. 324).

When talking about prejudiced personalities, Allport suggests that prejudiced people have a rigid demand for morality and are inclined to make moral judgements. These people would also like to be extra-punitive, to externalize their hostility, and to “think of things happening to him
rather than as caused by him” (p. 404). Additionally, prejudiced individuals are more attractive to institutions than tolerant people are, as the prejudiced ones believe institutions are likely to provide them with a sense of safety and definiteness. Last but not least, prejudiced people long for a powerful authority and for the employment of more discipline to exercise control over others. They distrust anyone else and assume others are evil by nature and dangerous.

To reduce prejudice, Allport (1960) proposes 1) an individualistic and democratic-egalitarian perspective which tolerates differences among people of the same group; 2) the invalidity of justifying hostility simply based on group differences (p. 227). Allport also comes up with concrete approaches for prejudice reduction. They include 1) equal-status contact with common ends which indicates that closer acquaintance mitigates unfavorable stereotypes; 2) approaches through vicarious experience in educational programs, so that students can develop knowledge about members of other groups; 3) group retraining through which participants realize their biases and weaknesses; 4) religious exhortation emphasizing a common humanity; 5) individual psychotherapy; and 6) catharsis which allows for self-reflection after tensions have been relieved.
Prejudice can not be understood without applying it to paired groups: whether they are labelled insiders and outsiders, or the established and the newcomers, etc. Norbert Elias and John Scotson (1965) argue that it is the (im)balance of power between the two paired groups and the attempt to perpetuate their power that give rise to what appears on the surface, to be prejudice. They name the constituents of the pair: the established and the outsiders, which provide an “ideal type” of inter-group relationships. Their case selection is located at a suburban setting in the English Midlands called Winston Parva in 1959-1960. The locality had less than 5000 inhabitants and had institutions such as churches and schools that could cater to the livelihood of the whole community.

By comparing three zones in Winston Parva, Elias and Scotson argue that group characteristics of both the established and the outsiders are not confined to class, race, or ethnicity, when it comes to inequality groups. However, Winston Parva is an exception, since length of residence in this case is now an explanatory variable that causes power differences between the established long term residents and the outsiders. Some of them live in the Village Zone 1 and Zone 2, and the outsiders are clustered in the
Estate Zone 3, regardless of the fact that Zone 1 and Zone 2 differ in terms of class. Obviously, the power of the established exceeds that of the outsiders.

Elias and Scotson believed that apart from assigning to institutional positions, another mechanism that is used by the established to dominate the outsiders is group charisma, as well as group disgrace. The concept of “group charisma” is an extension of Weber’s “clan charisma”, as the latter seems to be confined to exotic and theological societies, while the former is a fundamental and universal observation (Elias, Goudsblom, & Mennell, 2008). In addition, the counterpart of the former, group disgrace, argued by Elias, should have been given attention.

Group charisma allows the established group to obtain a sense of power superiority over the outsiders. Power superiority can be moral superiority, as the established believe that they themselves have human values and merits with “special grace of nature or gods”, and are more virtuous or even are a better species than the outsiders (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xxii). According to Elias, this superiority is also applicable to a nationalist consciousness, because oftentimes a given national group will hold a common belief in their “unique national virtue and grace” with
which members of the group unite against outsiders (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xli). Unfortunately, this mindset is often to a large extent internalized by the outsiders.

Understood sociologically rather than from the moral aspect, power superiority is achieved and maintained through conforming to the established social norms. Whereas the established are always able to follow the norms that they have created, outsiders’ deviant behaviors show insiders that outsiders are untrustworthy, undisciplined, and lawless, or in other words exhibit anomie (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xxv). This elaboration can be well incorporated with Elias’s analysis of the “civilizing process”, as the civilized behavioral patterns would always be recognized as the norm within the civilized group and be used by them to show contempt to the uncivilized (Elias, Dunning, Goudsblom, & Mennell, 2000). Thus, what seems to concern the concrete forms of civilization essentially boils down to the power relations between the established and the outsiders.

By conforming to norms, the established insiders strengthen their group charisma and their self-love, which in return forces insiders to stay aligned with their norms and standards. Contrarily, if any insiders disobey,
their self-status will be degraded; they will lose power within the group, so
that the group charisma as a whole will be sustained. As Elias puts it,

The self-enhancing quality of a high power ratio flatters the
collective self-love which is also the reward for submission to
group-specific norms, to patterns of affect restraint characteristic of
that group and believed to be lacking in less powerful, “inferior”
groups, outsiders and outcasts (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xlv).

One of the mechanisms that enable the established to monopolize their
superiority, according to Elias and Scotson, is cohesion. “Oldness” is
defined by Elias and Scotson as “social relationships with properties of
their own” (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. 155). Demonstrated in Winston
Parva’s example, old residents in Zone 2 were more socially cohesive than
newcomers in Zone 3, because the former shared “a stock of common
memories” and had strong ties among one another, compared with the
latter who were loosely made up of Londoners, Welsh, and Irish and hardly
knew each other (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xxxviii). Cohesion not only
helps the supervision of group members’ obedience to norms, but also
lends a hand to the efficiency of stigmatizing the outsiders. When cohesive
insiders were able to stigmatize and defame the outsiders, the outsiders,
due to their inability to unite and to fight back, were like an open palm
only to bear the force of the insiders’ clenched fist.
Elias and Scotson point out that gossip seems to be an effective practice that cohesion takes up. The amount of blame gossips spread among the established to stigmatize the outsiders was disproportionately significant compared to the actual percentage of ill-mannered outsiders in Zone 3. By blame-gossiping which is a concrete form of group disgrace, the group status of the outsiders will be maintained. On the other hand, praise gossip within the insiders allows the established to idealize their grace and virtuous image, so as to enhance group charisma. Since the established are more cohesive, both the blame and the praise gossip have a wider range, thus making the effect more successful, and the group itself more integrated, especially when the spread of the blame gossip reinforces the righteousness of the established group. During this process, children under the influence of the older generation would find it hard to reject gossip, prejudice, and discrimination, which proves Allport’s argument about children’s acquisition of prejudice.

Analytically, the existence of the unequal power relations between the established and the outsider was based on the interdependence of the two groups. “If groups are not interdependent, there is no necessity for struggle over resources or even for interaction” (Hogenstijn, van
Middlekoop, & Terlouw, 2008, p. 148). Consequently, the stability of the interdependent relationship becomes crucial in terms of the intensity of stigmatization and gossip. For instance, when the established are prone to losing their group power, the credibility gap between gossip and truth will surely enlarge. When the established encounter changes, a fantasy shield of their imagined charisma is applied to cling to their superior position. As Elias remarks,

[The established] may know of the change as a fact, while their belief in their special group charisma and attitudes, their behavior strategy which goes with it, persists unchanged as a fantasy shield, which prevents them from feeling the change and, therefore, from being able to adjust to the changed conditions of their group image and their group strategy...the emotional denial of the change, the tacit preservation of the beloved group charismatic image is self-defeating (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xlvi).

Sometimes, the pursuit of the fantasy could engender destruction to both the established and the outsiders. Although Elias touches upon the change of power relations between the two groups, he and Scotson fail to invalidate the common phenomenon of group integration, leaving the relations between the established and the outsiders dynamic in their antagonism but static in their relative distance.

In this respect, Allport’s formulation of prejudice seems to be optimistic as heforesees the possibilities of its reconciliation. Both Elias
and Scotson’s and Allport’s views of prejudice and hostility can be complementary in the understanding of the “Traditional Beijingers”.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND DATA

In order to provide an in-depth account of the issue of prejudice, I chose a grassroots group in Beijing as a case study to analyze the interactions of factors that produce such hostility. Instead of extrapolating a general and monolithic pattern of prejudice, this thesis seeks to understand how individuals’ perceptions of social change and group contact could motivate their negative attitudes and related behaviors (Harper, 1987; Blaikie, 1993; Neuman, 2011). Although this study may lack reliability, since the generation of prejudice is likely to be caused by other factors or factors in other forms, which could bear more statistical significance, a qualitative approach—or one-n case study that this thesis specifically adopts—aims at providing a possible explanation that expands and enriches our existing knowledge of prejudice (Burawoy, 1991; Small, 2009).

My site selection of Beijing and case selection of the “Traditional Beijingers” group are based on convenience sampling, as they are preliminarily concerned with personal interest, prior knowledge, and easy access. More than two years spent observing this group before beginning research on it has assured mutual trust between me and other group
members, especially core members. An ethnographic approach is employed, focusing on “situated knowledge” or contextual understanding of the group being investigated, in order to reveal the specificity of this case (Abbott, 1997; Abbott, 2004, p. 26). Ethnography also allows me to categorize and analyze “unstructured data” collected in the current setting that hasn’t been explored before (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 208). Through inductive conceptualization, this study serves as a case of the development of prejudice under the combined effects of social change and group influence.

My fieldwork began in December 2012 when I learnt this group had protests every Thursday in front of the Beijing Municipal Education Bureau. I went there one Thursday and shouted with them. This overt behavior ensured my access to this group of people since I easily caught the attention of some leaders. Later that night, we started following each other on Weibo, a Chinese social media equivalent to Twitter. After that, I attended their in-group gatherings which were mostly dining and watching talk shows, re-twitted their posts concerning prejudice, and participated in other off-line activities such as cleaning posters in the subway. Participant observation of them cleaning illegal posters in the subway was
carried out bi-weekly from September 2013 to June 2014, and also from July to August 2015. The assumed social role of mine in the field was an alliance with the members (Harrington, 2003).

In order to conform and to perform the role naturally, necessary verbal antagonism was carried out. During these observations, I particularly collected data on behavior and words that demonstrated a) how group leaders instructed and guided group members and the reaction of the latter; b) how group members interacted with outsiders and especially those unwelcome outsiders; and c) how group members interacted with themselves. Each specific action would be counted as a cultural domain for later analysis (Spradley, 1980, p. 101). I did not take notes in front of them, but I would do it whenever I had the chance to use my cellphone. My strategy wasn’t to establish equal distance with everyone in the group, but to be selectively closer with the leaders and some members who were more approachable. Through their introduction and network, I established further connections with other members in the group and gradually expanded my circle, in the hope of a natural and “unintentional” relationship with further group members.

Twenty-six in-depth, semi-structured, and open-ended interviews
with two group leaders and twenty-four members were conducted, as an important source of data for this research and a window for more relevant secondary sources. I started my interviews with these members and leaders that I was familiar with and then ran other interviews through snowball sampling. Interviewees varied in length of membership to this group, age, occupation, education, sex, childhood experience, and so on.

By August 2015, when interviews started to be conducted, sixteen had become members or followed the group’s official online account longer than a year. The other ten had been attached to the group less than one year. Since membership was only granted to adults, all of the interview participants were older than eighteen and younger than thirty-five. Seven interviewees were younger than twenty-five years old, meaning that they were born in or after the year 1990. Nineteen interviewees, who were born in the 1980s, were between twenty-five and thirty-five years old. Only three interviewees were studying for their Bachelor’s degree, while the rest had started working. Together with the three undergraduates, eighteen of them have a Bachelor’s degree. The other eight interview participants graduated from vocational schools. The sex ratio of men to women was fourteen to twelve. Six experienced housing relocation because their
previous community was destroyed. In-depth interviews were carried out to “achieve the same deep level of knowledge and understanding” of the interviewees by comprehending the meanings of their actions (Johnson, 2002, p. 106).

Questions posed to group members were about their purpose of participation in the group, their change of attitudes towards both outsiders and Beijingers, their relations with leaders and other group members, their local identity and idea of “home” in relation to joining this group, and their family and upbringing in forming their local identity. Apart from these questions, leaders were also asked to discuss issues including recruitment, management, organization, achievements, publicizing strategy, interaction with (municipal) government offices and policies. Interviews lasted around two hours on average with members and three hours with leaders.

Adopting a holistic perspective as is required in ethnography (Fetterman, 1998), I also monitored “Traditional Beijingers” Weibo posts and chats in social media especially when they replied to outsiders online. I was mainly engaged in analyzing a) what was written on the “Traditional Beijingers” official Weibo and how group members commented on these
posts, b) random online attacks between “Traditional Beijingers” and certain outsiders, and c) online interactions among group members. I have followed around a hundred members in social media and around thirty of them were highly active and outspoken. I’ve observed their posts since June 2013. Media reports of the “Traditional Beijingers” group were also gathered.

Apart from this evidence, I also collected documents on housing policies, urban planning policies, “moral construction” regulations, and other municipal policies related to Beijing’s urban change. I also interviewed staff of the subway operating company, bus drivers and conductors, and elderly people who used to be volunteers for the Olympics. These data are employed as background knowledge to contextually understand prejudice among “Traditional Beijingers”.

In terms of data analysis, grounded theory was applied to analyze reactive data with open coding, axial coding, and selective coding as the specific strategies. Narrative analysis is also employed since it is able to “address the issue of ‘who are we’ as individual people”, “link us to larger groups, communities, or nations”, and describe how social forces “act on us” (Neuman, 2011, p. 524). With the help of narrative analysis, the
construction of meanings of prejudice among the “Traditional Beijingers” can be explained by a process that is contextually embedded in a series of chronological events. The combination of path dependency and historical contingency, as tools of narrative analysis, are used to examine the contribution of macro factors to group level and individual level hostility.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE OLYMPICS IN GENERATING LOCAL HOSTILITY

The legacy of the Deng economic "reforms" of the 1980s ensured China’s engagement in the capitalist world economy as a semi-peripheral country (Solinger, 1995). Theoretically, it is believed that peripheral and semi-peripheral countries assume their positions in the world system structure and achieve mobility through dependent development (Cardoso, 1973; Evans, 1979). Urbanization patterns of peripheral and semi-peripheral countries are largely dependent on roles these countries play in the world system (Smith, 1996). In 2001, China’s National People’s Congress came up with the tenth five-year plan that required omnidirectional, multilevel, and wide-ranging opening-up. Beijing formulated its municipal five-year plan accordingly and made becoming a “modern international metropolis” its development goal.

Despite the fact that “neo-liberal restructuring” occurs in certain areas around the world (Clarno, 2014, p. 1727), international stimuli for internal urban development are not confined to the sphere of the global market. Although Beijing represented China to host the 1990 Asian Games as a window for China to advance in the world, the image of Beijing
as a cosmopolitan city was far from reality (Brownell, 2001). After all, the state did not plan to turn Beijing into a metropolis in the 1990s. The Olympic Games then exemplified a powerful motivating force for modernization and advancement (Dong, 2001; Keating, 2001; Liu, 2002; Chen, 2003; Wang, 2005; Xu, 2008). As the Olympic Games were regarded as a crucial chance for China to further its active participation on the international stage by inviting foreign officials, media, as well as a worldwide audience to witness its competence in all aspects, Beijing, positioned as the socialist capital and China’s political and cultural center since 1983, took on the responsibility to successfully bid and host the 2008 Olympics. Once again, the city showed that it never belongs to itself but to the whole state. On the domestic side, the national capital is expected to be a model for the whole nation in the long Chinese tradition. From a global perspective, Beijing is “the display window of contemporary Chinese material and cultural achievements, as well as the bridge for international political, economic, cultural and scientific exchanges” (Sit, 1995, p. 321).

With a mission too big to fail, Beijing’s preparation for the coming-out party penetrated each and every aspect of social life of almost all her
citizens. *Renwen aoyun*, or the people’s and cultural Olympics in English, was recognized by the authorities as the essence of 2008 Beijing Olympics, aiming at integrating Chinese culture into the participative spirit of the Olympics (Sun, 2001; Cheng, 2003; Xiao, 2006; Zheng, 2007; Xu, 2008).

As a result, the city was instilled with a double consciousness—envisioning the image of a cosmopolis embodied in the Olympic spirit and exemplifying the country’s excellent values and social atmosphere, as well as “the leading ideology” (Sit, 1995, p. 199). Indeed, the city is partially defined as the conveyor of civilization and represents the highest achievements of humanity (Mayer, 1971). According to *The Opinions on Implementation of The Program for Improving Civic Morality* in 2001, the primary goal of constructing civic morality in the capital, in order to host the Olympics, was to build Beijing into the top-ranking city of civilization and comity both of home and abroad. Thus, constructing “spiritual civilization” that included morality, ethics, and good manners, became one of the top-down tasks that Beijing citizens were assigned to accomplish.

Indoctrinating the awareness of a better society seemed to be first and foremost. Propaganda banners such as “New Beijing, Great Olympics” (xin
Beijing, xin aoyun), “Welcome the Olympics, Improve Manners, and Foster New Attitudes” (ying aoyun, jiang wenming, shu xin feng), “Successfully Hold the Olympic Games, Build a Harmonious City” (juban chenggong aoyun, goujian hexie chengshi), and “Carry on the Olympic Spirit, Build A Better City”(chuancheng aoyu, cujin fazhan) permeated the city, seen on the iron fences of the street, on the sides of crossroads that faced the passing cars, and on bulletin boards of communities and neighborhoods. These propaganda banners contributed to city branding and served as a bonus for assessing the civilization of cities (Parkerson & Saunders, 2005; Cartier, 2014).

Such propaganda was rapidly transformed into massive social actions. The Beijing Olympic Games Training Work Coordination Group was established in April 2005, with Olympic education training sessions being carried out at multiple levels. More than 4.3 million households in Beijing received Popularized Readings on Civility. Publicizing activities concerning civic education were held in over 5000 schools and rural cultural centers, with audiences amounting to five million. In about 200 elementary and middle schools, courses concerning the Olympic culture, Chinese civility, and Peking traditions were designed and taught. Some elementary schools
assigned homework on writing about how to welcome the Olympics with proper courtesy.

Research showed that due to civic instruction held by schools, from 2005 to 2008, elementary and middle school students made significant behavioral improvements as far as singing the national anthem, respecting teachers, actively greeting others, and throwing trash in the dustbin rather than littering the floor; frequencies of spitting on the ground, running the red lights, stepping on the grass, scribbling in public places, and other ill-mannered behaviors among students decreased dramatically; “attached with the Olympics, stay close civility” (qingxi aoyun, wenming liyi ban wo xing) was the guiding slogan that instructed students and teachers on how to behave (Guo, 2009). Elementary and middle schools also held activities such as picking up trash on the street, and tearing down advertisements that were plastered on the walls, in the hope that students could set an example for their parents and neighbors.

Some participants in the current research recalled that these specific behaviors had a tremendous impact on them in their later life, when they could think of doing something to actually and symbolically “protect” and “preserve” Beijing. They in the past either joined these activities as
elementary students, or were informed by TV programs and bulletins that litters and scribbles as a matter of incivility must be eliminated. These past experiences contributed to the later involvement in the “Traditional Beijingers” group. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), invented traditions were always intensified and normalized values and behaviors that had a legacy in the historic past.

In 2006, nine Beijing-based universities, together with eleven universities located in different regions in China, participated in the “2006 National University Student Competition of Olympic Knowledge and Civility”. Developed from the “National University Student Competition of Diplomatic Etiquette” and continuously held for another two years, this competition focused on the spread of civility. All contestants were to impart behavioral manners to a certain target audience of people who by the choices of the contestants turned out to be students who listened to university broadcasts, staff and visitors of Beijing’s World Park, commuters, traffic police, crowds in the downtown area, and kindergarten kids. Contestants were also asked judgment questions. For instance, should two parties should keep each other at a distance of half a meter while talking? Should men initiate the action of hand-shaking? This
particular type of judgment question also appeared at a prize quiz on a TV program called *To 2008* which was held by Beijing Television Station. The Capital University Student Internet Civilization Convention was launched on April 5\(^{th}\), 2007, encouraging university students who were internet users to avoid unlawful acts, maintain social order, spread advanced cultures and public virtues, and build a harmonious society online.

Proposed by the secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party committee Liu Qi, Olympic spirits evolved into five specific themes, namely patriotism, sacrifice, professional ethics, creativity, and team-work. These themes were promoted first among the frontline of Olympic construction works and then expanded to grassroots level work places. Employees habitualized these virtues and turned against outsiders who lacked these particular traits at work. Interviewees complained that outsiders did not sacrifice themselves to their companies especially when outsiders were permitted to go back to their hometowns one or two days before the Chinese New Year holiday officially started, while it was the Beijingers that were required to work until the last minute. Interviewees blamed their workplaces that institutionally allowed outsiders to do so, but they were more inclined to express contempt for outsiders who were able to shirk
their duty “above board”.

As formal institutions such as schools and work places that residents belonged to assured the inculcation of civility, good manners in public spaces became demonstrations of “civilization” as well as tools to maintain public order. Compared with parks, squares and other types of public space, public transportation was the worthiest of examination in terms of the significance of disciplined behaviors. Almost everyone in the city is involved in public transportation which underwent development in the most dramatic way.

Amongst all public transportations, the Beijing subway seemed to be the foremost representative in this regard. The Beijing Urban Comprehensive Plan (2004-2020) proposed that the city was to spatially expand towards suburban areas. Besides, it was estimated in 2003 that the number of automobiles would surpass three million by May 2007 and over eight million people, together with 500 thousand foreigners, would attend the Games. With the emerging problems of traffic congestion and air pollution, advancing rail transit was the cure for all the troubles. From 2002 to 2008, another six lines were built. By July 2008, there were
altogether eight lines under operation, with operation mileage reaching 200 kilometers and stations amounting to 123. The basic formation of the subway network, supplemented with the reduced ticket prices (to only two yuan, equivalent to around thirty cents USD) beginning in 2007, paved the way for a gigantic passenger flow of subway commuting.

Having foreseen the colossal utilization of subway transportation, the Subway Company as requested by the Capital Office of Spiritual Civilization Construction and Beijing Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Department, launched a series of campaigns as early as 2001, to arouse commuters’ awareness of civility. The slogan “civilized commuting starts from me” (wenming chengche, cong wo zuoqi) was put up in 2001, setting up the agenda for implementing specific objectives in the years to come. In 2002, the way in which people in developed countries took escalators was introduced to the Beijing subway. Yet, a spontaneous habitualization of the practice would be undesirably time consuming. Aiming at efficient cultivation, yellow lines were drawn in the middle of every escalator stair, in order to make an obvious division between the left walking section and the right standing section. Passengers saw all forms of instructions, such as broadcasting tutorials, putting up notice boards that
directed people, and recruiting volunteers to channel the passenger flow.

This behavior made a huge impact on Beijingers at that time who later joined the “Traditional Beijingers” organization. A lot of time after volunteering in the subway, group members would find a restaurant on the surface and have a late lunch together. When they took the escalator upstairs to exit the subway station, the one leading the whole group stood automatically at the right side of the escalator. Then, everyone else formed a line and went on the escalator one by one, staying to the right side. No one taught another where to stand, as if they were material elements on the assembly line. Often times, their line was not compact enough to exclude other passengers who also took the escalator. Once, three passengers got themselves in the middle of their line and randomly stood at the left side of the escalator. Suddenly, one member behind these passengers turned his head backward and downward and said, “How come these people are so stupid that they can’t tell right from left?” Having heard that, other members started laughing. Some parroted this sentence to others and the laughter spread, until the three passengers left the escalator. I asked the one member closest to me who the three passengers were. “Outsiders, they must be,” answered the instant interviewee,
“Beijingers will never behave like that. We facilitate others. We know we should leave room for someone who might need to walk in a hurry. We don’t block others’ way.”

In 2005, the Subway Company carried out another campaign that emphasized the chronological sequence of getting on and off the train. Those who wanted to get on the train should wait for all passengers who wished to alight from the train to get off before they themselves could board. Though having been an informal rule for decades, it wasn’t until 2005 that this action was openly required. On the platform edges of Line 1 and 2, yellow tapes in pairs vertical to the train were adhered to the floor every few meters, with arrows surrounding each pair. In the middle of the two lines was a big arrow parallel to the lines. On either outer side of the two lines was a smaller arrow pointing to the tip of the line. When the train arrived, passengers would first get off the train from the middle of the door and walk onto the area with the big arrow, while those who wanted to get on waited at the areas with the smaller areas. As soon as no more passengers got off, those who waited would get on the train from both sides.

7 The rule was firstly written in the 25th Article of Method of Safety Operation Management of Urban Rail Transit in Beijing in 2004. This particular rule was later changed to Article 34 in 2009.
of the doors.

This order was established to save boarding time: since passengers had their routes respectively, they would be less likely to bump into one another or block others’ way. Similar facilities were also found at the platforms at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, particularly where people wait for shuttle buses. Authority with the Subway Company, as I interviewed, stated that the yellow directions in Line 1 and 2 came finally into existence due to the standardization of subway trains. Before 2005, trains were of various models, with different lengths of intervals between each door. Thus, it had been impossible to draw lines. Since 2005, all trains in Line 1 and Line 2 were of the same model. Furthermore, all platforms of other subway lines built after 2008 automatically installed the three arrows as signals telling passengers where to stand and to wait and where to stay clear of.

The custom of security checks was also established in 2008 for safety during the Games and routinized into a compulsory procedure in the post-Olympic period. Any passenger carrying any bags would be required to put their bags onto the security machine. Some stations such as Xidan, Tian’anmen East and Tian’anmen West in the downtown area also
included a body search. In order to avoid liquid explosives and caustics, water which was found stored in water bottles had to be proven safe by its owner being made to take a sip of it. Toilet water, nail remover, and other liquid cosmetics were prohibited on the subway. According to the 32nd Article of *The Method of Safety Operation Management of Urban Rail Transit in Beijing*, which was hung on the pillars in many subway stations, passengers who refused to go through security checks and violated public order would be punished by the police according to related laws. In 2009, the 33rd article was added, regulating that security check personnel should respect passengers under security check and report to the police whenever forbidden items were found.

Prejudice against outsiders broke out during security checks, yet this time from an unexpected direction. In December 2012, innocent women passengers were stabbed by a male randomly. In August 2013, a male passenger was stabbed by another male passenger whose girlfriend believed herself to be harassed, after the three had a fierce quarrel. As journalists reported that security check personnel would find themselves helpless if passengers hid knives in their pockets instead of in bags, members of the “Traditional Beijingers” group proclaimed in social media
that it was because most of the personnel were outsiders that caused these tragedies. Indeed, news revealed at the end of 2012 that the majority of the personnel did not have Beijing *hukou*, and an average age of 20 years old (Zhang & Liu, 2012). Some online advertisement that recruited people for this position did state clearly that only people without Beijing *hukou* would be accepted. A post hoc announcement in April 2015 by the Beijing Human Resources and Social Security Bureau pointed out that more than 95% of the security check personnel were people without Beijing *hukou* (Liu, 2015). However, it was believed by the “Traditional Beijingers” that outsider security personnel lacked work ethics, paid no attention to their supposed duty, and had a terrible attitude, which altogether contributed to these accidents.

They only cared about the form. One morning during rush hour, I went into the subway with a small shoulder bag. The staff stopped me and ordered me to put it into the machine. I did. But when I was about to pick up my bag on the other end of the machine, I saw the staff who should watch the monitor screen was playing with his cellphone. He didn’t even glimpse at the screen. How could I not swear at them? How could I not think it is their problem when these accidents occur?

Some interviewees were treated differently going through the security check, which disgusted them.

I walked into different stations with the same bag. Sometimes, I was asked to put the bag in the security machine; sometimes they
didn’t check it. Sometimes I couldn’t enter because I was carrying some small tools, while migrant workers were allowed to enter with their shovels. No wonder they failed to prevent these things from happening.

These interviewees seemed to over-generalize the behavior of those irresponsible staff to how every non-Beijingese security staff would act.

Another example of over-generalization was found when one interviewee said,

The inspectors are irresponsible which is true. But they should know—I mean every passenger should know—it is the outsiders, not Beijingers, who constitute the vast majority of all commuters. The inspectors should then understand that by being reckless, they harm their own ‘fellow-villagers’, not us Beijingers. Shouldn’t they be responsible for themselves? Oh. And those violators who took forbidden items were often times their ‘fellow-villagers’ too. See, ‘fellow-villagers’ help ‘fellow-villagers’ harm ‘fellow-villagers’. Isn’t it funny?

Among all the online comments on this matter, one virtual dialogue caught my attention.

Lhj: We should cooperate with the security check. But can the subway hire those early retired Beijingers? These people are prudent, and have a good attitude. Passengers would like to cooperate with them. Hiring them can also reduce the number of outsiders who come into Beijing for job opportunities.

Shuang: These machines are radioactive. Do you want your parents to work with them?

Lhj: I don’t like the way you think. My mother used to work in the radiology department in her hospital.

Yika: Reply to Shuang: At least I won’t let my family members work there.

This mindset corresponded with the literature on migrants and migrants’
occupational status in their recipient societies. Migrants tended to lessen the unemployment rate instead of stealing jobs from the natives (Pope and Withers, 1993). Newly arrived migrants were more likely than native or local workers to take up low paid, entry-level, and labor-intensive jobs, or simply menial jobs (Piore, 1979; Briggs, 1993; Appelbaum, Bernhardt, & Murnane, 2003; Stacey, 2005; Bauder, 2008; Salverda, 2008; Boyd & Yiu, 2009; Fisher & Kang, 2013). They were more tolerant and complained less about bad working conditions than native or local workers (Appelbaum, 2010). In the Beijing Subway, working as a security checker was also regarded as menial because it was seen as a threat to employees’ health.

Thus, Beijingers intentionally avoided taking the job themselves. Although the detriment to health was identical to every employee, or even to everyone who would need to walk past the security check machine, Beijingers did not believe that outsiders could also receive injury through this job. They obviously did not think outsiders should work as security check inspectors which was an unfavorable occupation, but neither did they argue that outsiders should be protected from the same harm that they themselves could also suffer. Their prejudice was conspicuously revealed by the assumed differentiations of rights that they thought locals
and outsiders were entitled to.

Members of the “Traditional Beijingers” started to attack passengers with ill-mannered behaviors online. To them, ill-mannered behavior included taking off one’s shoes and putting one’s feet on the seat, lying on the train seats that could be shared by more than one person, helping one’s own child peeing in the carriage, and eating and drinking in the carriage. Whenever behaviors as such came, members would secretly take a photo of the exact person and post it on social media with such commentary as “look at these WDBs,” “go back to your hometown,” “the WDB’s are destroying our home,” “fXXk the WDB,” and so on. Other members would re-tweet these posts with similar comments of their own added. The faces in the photos were not blurred or processed, which the members did on purpose, so that everyone who saw the post would know who the person was.

In addition to WDB, other slang was created and used extensively. *Jianshe zhe*, meaning constructor or erector, referred by the mainstream media to outsiders who worked in Beijing for a noble cause, namely to enhance the prosperity of the city. Cleverly enough, members in this group came up with homonyms but with different Chinese characters. The new
*jian she zhe* literally meant “a sprayer of filth”. It was originally used by
long term Shanghaiese to address outsiders and was very soon picked up
by members of the “Traditional Beijingers”. Whereas Dutton, Lo, and Wu
(2008) depicted migrants in Beijing as “Bohemians” who had no place to
take refuge in the chaotic world and “belong[ed] nowhere and [were] met
with everywhere” (p. 179), migrants in the view of the long term residents
were people who splashed their urine and excrement everywhere in the
city, as they would do in their hometown.

These sprayers want us to tolerate them! They do not know by
shitting everywhere, they can be fined 500 US dollars if they do that
in the United States; they can be flogged in Singapore! [the icon of an
lighting candle]

Lighting up a candle traditionally implied that people were expressing their
condolence and praying for others. This icon was most often used online to
comfort people who were suffering from natural disasters or unavoidable
mishaps. Here, it is used ironically to lament the outsiders as if they were
in countries such as the United States or Singapore. The author of the post
did not expect that the outsiders would go to these countries, but he
assumed that they should be punished as severely as something that
deserved a mourning candle.

The sprayers cannot survive in their hometown, so they leave
their home and rob us of food. They maliciously make up the lie that
they are here to contribute to Beijing. What a fantastic story! You have your own territory right in front of you but you don’t construct. Instead, you enter someone else’s home to please and flatter others. And you want this and that from us? You want us to take care of you? Dare you question the stupid official of your hometown who makes you a homeless stray dog? Coward!

Some interviewees made an analogy of these “sprayers” to historical traitors who helped the Japanese invaders to take over the Mainland. They claimed that the sprayers were even worse than the traitors. “On the one hand they say they contribute to and build the city; on the other hand they do whatever things that are evil when they come inside the city”, said an interviewee, “If the society becomes unstable, they will be the main force of looting and vandalism.” According to Allport’s circle of inclusion (1954), the circle of city has a smaller radius than the circle of nation in the concentric circles that describe the dilution of a person’s identity as the circle grows larger (p. 43). People, suggested by this model, are supposed to have a stronger municipal identity than a national identity. This interviewee here seemed to imply the other way around—it was the belonging to a city that should catch up with the belonging to a nation.

Committing treason, in his worldview, was highly reprehensible, as he was brought up in the ideology that the country’s sovereignty and unity deserved the utmost protection and defense. Thus, when he compared
outsiders with traitors or invaders, he assumed that the importance of his local identity was amplified to or even beyond his national identity.

In addition to comparing outsiders to Japanese invaders and traitors as a way to distance themselves from outsiders as much as possible, Beijingers borrowed jargon used in places other than Mainland China to provide a universalized justification for their local hostility. The most well-known word that was borrowed was “locust”, or huangchong, a kind of pest that Hong Kong locals used to refer to Chinese Mainlanders who “converge[d] in their millions on their territory to stock up on everything from jewellery to milk powder” (Tsang, 2015), or simply who took advantage of facilities, policies, and resources that were accessible to Hong Kong locals alone (Chow, 2012; Hayoun, 2014; Tiezzi, 2015). “Traditional Beijingers” started to quote the term on their social media posts individually and to verbally utter it during underground gatherings. Until November 2013, a mini blog was published by the official Weibo of the Beijing subway, together with a photo taken by an individual social media user that showed posters and trash scattered everywhere in the train:

#Civility by your side# [Let’s talk about civil behavior in the subway.] After “locusts” pass, carriages in Line 10 became a mess... Beijing, the capital, is being praised for her tolerance, but too much tolerance will turn out to be a denouncement. For those who destroy
Beijing the capital viciously, “we do not welcome you” is the only thing we want to say.

Thousands of social media users debated the controversy that was triggered by this post. Obviously on the one hand, this statement was inappropriate, aggressive, and humiliating, particularly in terms of its implication of local hostility, as claimed by some online users and university professors (Zhou, 2013). On the other hand, “Traditional Beijingers” demonstrated that they hardly felt that it was improper to address people with uncivilized behaviors in that way, which had nothing to do with their origin. Although this official blog was soon deleted, conflict over the legitimacy of the words continued.

If malfeasants can be called moths metaphorically, why can’t locust represent people who damage the environment? Some people say “locust” is not an appropriate word. Fine. Then let’s use “animal” or “brute” instead.

Of course, these words were not specifically applied to any region. However, calling someone an “animal” or “brute” was even more offensive compared to “locust”. This comment was proposed by Xiao, a graphic designer in his early thirties. He was also the second boss and the manager of a Western pizza restaurant which was run by his father. Owing to both occupations, Xiao had more exposure to Western advertisements and posters than other Beijingers. To insist on the suitability of “locust”, he found electronic
versions of posters in the Paris Subway that drew misbehaving passengers with animal heads. For instance, a woman who talked all the time had a hen head; a man who pushed others to get into the train in a hurry had an ox head. He re-tweeted these pictures. Xiao argued that locust did not contribute to the stigmatization of Mainlanders, since similar situations also happened in other cultures and other societies, where Donald Trump, the most notorious candidate for US president in the 2016 presidential election, called Mexicans criminals, drug dealers, and rapists (Lee, 2015).

Just as Xiao, “Traditional Beijingers” associated themselves with Hong Kong locals or other places’ long term residents who acquired a higher level of civility. Firstly, by resorting to the similar experiences of others, they conveyed the idea that it was not a peculiarity for Beijing to feel hostility against outsiders. In places elsewhere, local hostility also broke out against outsiders who often behaved badly. Common occurrence as it was, local hostility in Beijing should be understandable and reasonable, which was believed by the “Traditional Beijingers”, especially when fault lay in those outsiders who disobeyed norms of practices “in the first place”. Secondly, borrowing similar experiences from Hong Kong, for instance, did somehow estrange the “Traditional Beijingers” from other Mainlanders,
both of which belonged to the same group of people, namely the species of locust, in the eyes of the Hong Kong folks. Invented traditions could be employed as a type of social control and a practice of exclusiveness to create and spread prejudice against another group that was new to these traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). At this point, the nationalist collective solidarity intentionally rendered by the Olympics (Economy and Segal, 2008; Brady, 2009; Brownell, 2009; Law, 2010; Nyiri, Zhang, &Varrall, 2010; Chong, 2013) turned out to be Beijingers’ alienation from the vast majority of the Mainland. By calling outsiders locusts, however, Beijingers developed the sensation that they were no longer locusts and were at the same “civilized” level with the Hong Kong locals. As a matter of fact, this illusion was neither proven by Hong Kong locals, nor outsiders coming into Beijing. With all the traditions and habits learned, Beijingers were presumably able to raise their group position in the global order.

There were no restrictions on eating and drinking in the carriages before September 2009. In the late September 2009, subway Line 4 was put into operation. As a joint venture between corporations in Beijing and Hong Kong Railway Corporation Limited, it emulated the subway systems
in Hong Kong in terms of hardware facility, construction design, and service. The line also incorporated customs that had been normalized in Hong Kong, which included the restriction of eating and drinking. Above each door of the carriage, an icon with a red prohibition sign crossing out a fast food bottle and a hamburger and with words of *qingwu yinshi* and its English version “no eating & drinking” was pasted along with the sign of no smoking, and the route map of Line 4. Yang Cen, the spokesperson of Line 4 said in an interview in November 2009 that this regulation was intended to avoid the diffusing of strong food odors and to prevent spilling when people were drinking water during train shaking (Liu, 2009). However, she did not acknowledge this regulation as a compulsory rule, but rather simply a suggestion.

Attempts were made to punish passengers who ate or drank on the trains. From February to March 2014, a draft of *The Regulations of Beijing Municipality on Operational Safety of Rail Transportation* was proposed and published on www.beijing.gov.cn, Beijing’s municipal government website portal, in order to collect comments and suggestions for its finalized version. The preliminary draft propounded that repeated behaviors of eating or drinking in the carriage, pathways, escalators, and stairways in
the subway system, after being dissuaded by the subway staff, would result in a disciplinary warning or a fine ranging from 50 to 500 yuan. This potential clause, however, was left out in the later version which was to be viewed by the standing committee of the municipal people’s congress in May. While the measure was not ratified, the discipline remained as moral and ethical guidance for commuters.

Yet, the good intention of advocacy was codified by the Beijingers into a rigid requirement that should be followed by everyone. Otherwise, Beijingers would call whoever committed the moral crimes WDB. It was more likely to see passengers took food that they bought from the street vendors with them on the subway during morning rush hours. Some of them ate the food on the subway while others held the food in their hands all the way. Beijingers complained that neither behaviors were permissible.

Getting up ten minutes earlier and preparing some simple breakfast aren’t hard to do. You can buy milk and bread the night before. You don’t even have to cook. It is disgusting to see some of the WDBs eating in the train with a bowl in their hands. Some of them drink porridge. This is too much. This is overdoing it. They must do it deliberately, on purpose. They think it is convenient and time-saving to buy food before getting the train and eat it along the way. This is the typical WDB way of life. They only do things that are comfortable for themselves. They never think of other passengers who are sharing the same space.
As my participant observation included picking up illegal posters with other members of the “Traditional Beijingers” on the train, I overheard a conversation between two male senior members during a break in the group work.

- Where do you want to eat after we finish? I’m already hungry.
- I don’t know. Let’s see where others decide to go. Didn’t you have your breakfast?
- No. Did you?
- I had half. I bought a pancake. I thought I had the time to eat it at the vendor. But I didn’t finish it because I was afraid of being late. The remaining half is in my backpack. I’ll eat that up when we finish the work.
- (Grinning). Your backpack will be full of its smell.
- I know. But that’s overall better than finishing it in the train. I’m not WDB.

And then they laughed.

Both of them were senior members in the group. Indeed, it was for the purpose of distinguishing them from the disgusting outsiders as clearly as possible that the practice of “no eating or drinking”, as well as any other habits, was strictly followed. Yet, their position within the organization accounted for this level of strictness. Due to their membership seniority, age, and sturdy physical appearance, they were appointed by the organization founders to take turns to walk in front of every other member. Feeling protected and led by them, other members could then follow them and collect posters scattered on the floor. Once being the guide and being
recognized as persons of significance in the group, the two “brothers” quickly internalized their expected role as the constant example for the whole organization and conformed to this “reputed” role (Moreno, 1953; Park, 1955).

Population fluctuations, either increasing or decreasing manner in size, leads to structural changes in interpersonal relations and to a corresponding alteration of the organizational system (Elias, Dunning, Goudsblom, & Mennell, 2000). The emergence of rigid social control such as police ordinances derived from massive rural-urban migrations which made the existing social order difficult to sustain (Oestreich, 1982; van Krieken, 2014). Likewise, setting up rules and regulations for passengers to follow became especially necessary in the over-crowded subway in Beijing since a slight misbehavior could cause great discomfort to a large number of other passengers and hence was more detrimental than when passengers were far fewer in the past. Although the establishment of some rules had a rational basis, the majority of the customs were solidified and strengthened through self-discipline whose primary intention was to not embarrass others during human interaction (Elias, Dunning, Goudsblom, & Mennell, 2000). “Traditional Beijingers” expected their “home”, or the
subway in this context, to be a place where no disorder occurred. As a result, from their viewpoint, disobeying any desirable practices, even the suggested ones, let alone the compulsory ones, should be severely condemned by attributing it to the bad actions of outsiders.

The existence and normalization of certain practices were accompanied by the popularization of technological advancement which was a dimension of modernization. Behavioral patterns were often affiliated with the implementation of the updated technologies. Starting from June 2001, a smart card system was applied with the reading machine installed in 422 Beijing buses on more than 20 routes. Commuters would charge the card beforehand and swipe the card whenever they got on and/or off the bus, according to the charges of different buses, so that the machine would subtract money from the card. The prevalence of card use would surely reduce if not totally ban buying tickets from the conductor, which could be bothersome during rush hour commuting, or unfortunately when both the passenger and the conductor lacked enough change. Using the smart cards, or IC card, was meant to enhance bus operation efficiency, to reduce traffic pressure, and to
improve the city’s image (Gao, 2007).

However by the end of 2005, only 210,000 IC cards were used, making the expected issuance of eight million by 2008 a mirage. To accomplish the task, IC cards replaced monthly passes and became available on all buses and in subway stations on May 10th, 2006. As more than eighteen thousand buses altogether were faced with a daily flow of about some eleven million passengers by then, the bus company learned from the experience of developed countries and immediately required passengers to get on the bus from the front door and get off from the rear door. Particularly since January 2007 when commuters were only charged forty percent of the original ticket price by using IC cards, the potential of an increasing number of commuters warranted the requirement of an organized and efficient way of commuting. By carrying out this practice, the authority envisioned less time spent picking up and dropping off passengers. For buses with three doors, passengers should board from the door in the middle and leave from either the front or the rear door.

As queues formed in the station before the buses arrived, paired white lines with bus route numbers in between were drawn on the ground of each station. This information told commuters that they should find the
painted number of the bus they wanted to get on and stand between the two lines that framed the number and behind anyone who was already there. With pair of lines reaching the edge of the station at one end, buses of the exact route number stopped and opened their front doors that were positioned exactly at spaces between the paired lines. Then, people in the queue could get on the bus one by one. To prevent outliners from getting on the bus which might prolong the time of boarding, metal fences were erected between neighboring paired lines along the edge of the station.

According to a clarification from the IC card company, the front door rule was not invented to facilitate the usage of IC card (Bmac, 2013). On the contrary, passengers were able to swipe their card at either/any machine on the bus without obeying the boarding practice. The purpose of setting up the rule simultaneously with the operation of the IC card system was to cultivate an orderly commuting habit. In this explanation, technology did not need the assistance of new forms of regulated behavior. Rather, technology allowed for the possibility of an orderly way of traveling practices. This corresponds with Elias’s argument that the progress of technology requires participants to keep up with it and to develop a high discipline and standard of self-regulation (Elias, Goudsblom, & Mennell,
Other measures were taken to enforce these rules. On May 10th, 2006, four thousand “Civilization Supervisors” were hired by the bus company to work at certain crowded bus stations every day from 6:45 to 9:45 and from 16:30 to 19:30, organizing people into queues, instructing passengers to get on buses in queues, and answering questions on the IC card. Apart from the four thousand, the Capital Office of Spiritual Civilization Construction recruited another 3300 volunteers to assist the supervisors in maintaining order at the station. Most of the supervisors and volunteers were local Beijingers aging from 45 to 58, wearing yellow or blue uniforms and armbands when on duty. They were equipped with small red flags and sometimes portable microphones, with which they could make their words heard and their instructions effective. The presence of the two offices which have lasted even until today through constant hiring and recruiting consolidated the “Traditional Beijingers” image of themselves as civilized people who gave behavioral guidance to outsiders in a routinized manner.

Some interviewees compared these elderly supervisors and volunteers with the security personnel most of whom were young adults in the subway mentioned above. In their opinion, these supervisors and
volunteers worked in a harsher environment which was outside in the open air without air conditioning, but were more devoted to their work. As I asked why they thought there would be this gap, they said, “because these uncles and aunties are our Beijing locals.” By acknowledging the supervisors and volunteers as Beijing locals, interviewees did not suggest that the elder generation had as strong sense of love and dedication to make Beijing a better place as they themselves did, although they firmly believed that those outsider security personnel absolutely did not love the city at all. Instead, they thought that the reason why these uncles and aunties could have such natural work ethics was because it was a character inherited by Beijingers in their upbringing and culture. They admitted that Beijingers were generally hospitable and considerate which enabled them to help and communicate with passengers easily.

Since February 11th, 2007, the eleventh day of each month became the “Line Up Day” in the city. This day was set on the eleventh because the two-digit number “11” morphologically symbolized people standing in order. Commuters “celebrated” it once a month by conscientiously getting on buses in queues. Preliminarily aiming at an organized environment for the Olympics, the tradition of the “Line Up Day” has been preserved even
until today in the post-Olympic era.

More than eight years of education and adaptation from 2006 to 2014 saw a dramatic development of bus boarding behaviors among Beijingers. Members of the “Traditional Beijingers” during the interviews asserted that they were able to act perfectly according to what had been promoted. Fan, a 24-year-old woman who started working last year said that whenever she did not know where to stand, she would automatically seek for the supervisors or volunteers and ask them for direction. Members made a judgment that those who jumped queues must be outsiders, or WDBs to be specific, just like those who stood and waited at the wrong section in the subway platform.

However, interviewees seemed to forget that before May 10th, 2006, Beijingers did get on and off from the door that was the closest. They denied that they behaved in a disorganized manner before 2006. Neither did they agree with the fact reported in a newspaper that Beijingers back then felt disturbed by and were dissatisfied with the fussy new rule (Zhang, 2006). Likewise, when asked about how they picked up the specific ways of taking escalators and avoiding eating and drinking in the interviews, members in the organization seemed to deny that these practices were
cultivated by the subway environment. Instead, a lot of them insisted that they were granted with the ability to keep order for their collective.

We line up in bus station in the very beginning. This is not something taught by the government. We don’t want the authorities to teach us. If they want to, we will be reluctant to obey. It is not what they let us do; it is what we always know we should do. We always know that we should stay in line in order to get things. We always know we should keep in order... If I must tell you who taught me behaving, they may be my parents, and grandparents. I think I’m influenced by them more.

As Cui, a 26-year-old young male member in the group responded as such, his girlfriend Xing, another group member who met him after they both joined the group and participated in months of activities, agreed strongly and immediately with this response when I group-interviewed them. They opined that it wasn’t the rules which were established for the Olympics and the future Beijing that perfected their manners and comity; they claimed that the awareness of civility was already installed in their minds in the first place long before any of the advocated practices were introduced. In other words, instead of owing all the instructions to undertaking of the modernizing society, this couple, as well as many other interviewees, believed that efforts were built upon their Beijingsese culture and in a micro sense their family upbringing. This seemed to be “pathetic”, as Yue (2007) wrote, “incompletely educated’, we are often too ignorantly
boastful to realize that each of the so-called acquired ‘knowledge’ is merely well-designed trap and bait” (p. 302).

Since prejudice against outsiders was partially reflected in terms of manners and behavioral patterns, this section discusses how the consequences of Beijing hosting the 2008 Olympics strayed from its original intentions. First, the collective and harmonious image of the nation state turned out in Beijing to be local hostility against newcomers in the next few years. To welcome the world with a civilized appearance, propaganda and behavioral patterns in public spaces were established which empowered the local Beijingers, who had acquired the awareness and behavioral habits in advance, to express prejudice against newcomers after 2008 who hadn’t yet been exposed to these changes. Local hostility was raised to a national level, as Beijingers were so eager to differentiate themselves from the outsiders. Moreover, this local hostility also implied the spread of national consciousness. Long term Beijingers found dignity in their home city Beijing—a successful modernization product of China. Yet the growing dignity and pride was strongly contradicted by the migrants’ ill-mannered behaviors which embarrassed and ashamed long
term Beijingers in return (Greenfeld, 1992). Secondly, empirical processes of obtaining behavioral knowledge seemed to be negated by the actors themselves, as they credited their standard practices to their cultural background and heritage.

But why and how would Beijingers value influences from their family or community over that from the larger social environment? The following section continues to explore this paradox in an analytical manner.
It was in the late afternoon of Friday, May, 3rd, 2013, when two of the organizers, three active members, and I spontaneously agreed to have a casual dinner at a time-honored local restaurant famous for its Beijing folk cuisine. It was only then realized something was about to happen. The restaurant was on the Outer Street of Deshengmen, the Archery Tower which was one of the remaining three gate towers that, unlike the other thirteen sets of gates and the surrounding walls, still stood. Most of the time, just like this one, they would pick traditional Beijing restaurants, especially those that were small, down-to-earth, and very local. After phoning them several times to make sure about directions, I arrived at the restaurant ten minutes early.

The manager in his late twenties greeted me in a strong Beijing accent. I told him that I was waiting for some of my friends. He asked me if I was waiting for Huizi, who was one of the organizers and also a well-known social media blogger, as Huizi told him earlier that day that he would come to his restaurant with some friends. I said yes. He told me that Huizi was a frequent customer and they knew each other well. He invited me to sit anywhere I felt comfortable, brought me a cup of tea, and asked if we could
mutually friend each other online. Soon, others arrived. With everyone seated, the two male organizers took the initiative by ordering boiled pig giblets, fried bread made of mung bean flour, and Arctic Ocean Mandarin Orange Soda whose large sizes could generally meet everyone’s need.

Ordering these dishes and the drink was nothing unexpected, since the former two dishes were food that had been consumed by common Beijingers for over a hundred years, while the mandarin flavored soda, though a modern invention, was the most popular drink in Beijing throughout the 1980s. Until 1996 it was the “dream beverage” of every Beijinger whoever at that time was re-living his childhood, teenage, or young adulthood (Zhang, 2012). In November 2011, this glass bottled soda, with the familiar big polar bear logo reappeared in small shops and local restaurants, after fifteen years of absence. Cheaper, healthier, and more emotionally satisfying, the product has won more favor than Coca-cola or Pepsi among long term Beijingers (Yang, 2014).

As we began eating, Wei, one of the organizers asked, “How do you like it this time? Do you think the thickness of the line is better?,” handing his phone to Huizi, the other organizer there. Huizi’s eyes lingered on the screen for about ten seconds as he took the phone, and he replied, “Yeah,
I like it this time.” Passing the phone to the rest of us, he said, “Guys, help us by having a look at it. We are designing wristbands for the organization. This is one of the samples. Let us know if you like it or not.” There were two sketches, one in sapphire blue and the other in bumblebee yellow.

Although the main colors were different in the sketches, the overall style remained the same in each design. Patterns of the “propitious cloud”, as a traditional Chinese design, were depicted on either side of the band. Words such as “old time Beijingers” were written in the middle of the wristband. The rest of us all liked the design, except for the probability that it might be a little too broad on our wrist.

The wristbands themselves never went public, but the designing career persisted and so did their nostalgic style. Still in the same month, May, an old friend of the organizers and graphic designer at a private company, Jiayidie, became the “official” designer of the organization. In June, two of Jiayidie’s classical T-shirts were worn by the organizers and other members on public occasions and sold generally through www.makexw.com, a website created by the “Traditional Beijingers” organizers in order to sell their designed products. “Makexw” would make sense in Chinese, being understood as “made in Xuanwu” which was one
of the four central and oldest districts in Beijing, originally known as “the Western Chinese City” in foreigner-authored books and tourist guides (Odile & Fodor, 1972; Aldrich, 2006; Arlington & Lewisohn, 2015). The district was also home to Jiayidie himself whose ethnic Hui family have lived in the traditional Muslim enclave Oxen Street community for generations.

Back on June 28th, 2010, the State Council approved The Instruction on the Adjustment of Administrative Divisions of the Capital Function Core Area upon the request by the Beijing municipal government. This merged the neighboring Xuanwu District and Xicheng District into a “New Xicheng District”. Also combined were Chongwen District which was geographically symmetrical to Xuanwu District on the east and its northern neighbor Dongcheng District, and hence established a “New Dongcheng District”. The integration was intended to reduce the administrative costs of the municipality and to concentrate resources in expectation of a balanced economic level between the north (where Xicheng and Dongcheng Districts lay) and the south (which included the Chongwen and Xuanwu Districts) and an overall preservation of cultural and historical relics (Sun, 2010).

Although the adjustment did not affect administrative services that
residents were entitled to as claimed by the government of Xicheng District (Jiang, 2010), the nominal extinction of the fifty-eight-year-old Chongwen and Xuanwu Districts ignited anger and a feeling of loss among their long term residents. Locals were worried that the administrative regional integration would render Xuanwu no longer independent from urban planning schemes that regarded Beijing as a whole. Being reconstructed into a municipally integrative urban unit with spatial specialization in different functions, the city abandoned its original forms of communities and neighborhoods that could provide goods and services on their own (Gaubatz, 1995). In the rap song *Xuanwu yongcun* or *The Everlasting Xuanwu*, which became popular a month later in August, the local band mourned Xuanwu’s demise, stressing that Xicheng District represented the capital of a state with national ambitions, while Xuanwu was the heart and soul of the common people of Beijing.

Inspired by the song and his childhood memories, Jiayidie designed his first two white T-shirts with the words *yongcun Xuanwu* and *yongcun Chongwen* translated respectively as *the everlasting Xuanwu* and *the everlasting Chongwen*, on the back of either T-shirt, and surrounded by the traditional propitious clouds. The T-shirt was officially launched by the
organization in June 2013 through both the website and their Weibo account. *Xuanwu* and *Chongwen* were in the middle and in a larger word size than *yongcun* on the left. Clouds were red for the *Xuanwu* T-shirt and yellow for *Chongwen*. The word *tuzhu*, equivalent to *native* or *aboriginal* was printed on the right side of *Xuanwu* and *Chongwen*. Under *tuzhu* were a series of numbers 110103, which were the first six digits of Chongwen *hukou* residents’ ID number, and 110104, the counterpart of Xuanwu residents. On top of the design was the logo “made in Xuanwu”, as if that was the brand. In the front was the word “Beijing” in red and the number 110 that identified any Beijinger.

![A sample T-shirt displaying “the Everlasting Chongwen”](image)

Revised and later versions of T-shirts, cellphone screen pictures, and stickers with a focus on Beijing characteristics were issued now and then. At first, only the keenest members bought the T-shirts and wore them
casually during the summer time in 2013. Occasionally, ordinary members would agree on wearing those T-shirts together for a dinner gathering or a soccer game. There were times when they were caught on the street or in restaurants and were asked where their T-shirts were bought. In response, they said, “Search for ‘made in Xuanwu’ online and you will find the purchasing website.” Gradually, the popularity kept increasing as non-members would also purchase products from the website. Some members bought T-shirts and other accessories for their parents who were in their fifties or sixties and were more than happy to put them on. Female social media users also wore those T-shirts not caring about the fact that their outfits were originally designed for men alone.

The website encouraged buyers to take a photo of themselves wearing the purchased products, and to post the photo on Weibo together with their order number. Buyers were told that by doing this, they would have the possibility of winning a small present from the website. Many of them followed the suggestion. Ninety-two posts of this kind were retweeted by the official Weibo within two months from June to the end of July 2013. One post that included a picture of nineteen people wearing these T-shirts and holding the scarves has been retweeted for sixty-two times.
Although organizers were confronted with constant suspicion and criticism because of the potential of hype and commercialism from some other long term Beijingers, most of the buyers rigorously expressed their excitement and gratitude on their Weibo when first receiving the T-shirts and tried them on without conveying any critical thoughts. They claimed that their T-shirts “uplifted their spirits” and made them proud. They would cherish the outfit forever. More frequently remarks, such as “my big Xuanwu will last forever”, explicitly connected the reason for buying the T-shirt with solidarity with their local identity. Not only the printed contents on the products were symbols of local identity, the efforts that the organizers displayed were also recognized as the spirit of Beijing, since it was not hard to come to the conclusion that the founders were Beijingers.

One person wrote on Weibo:

Order Number 2013062695022. Both the quality and the design are appreciated. No one elsewhere does business as honestly and considerately as us Beijingers. @MadeinXuanwu @#MadeinXuanwu photo for prize draw#

There were a certain number of consumers who were Beijingers living outside Beijing, including London, Washington D.C., and San Francisco. They expressed how much they missed their hometown and were eager to distinguish themselves from other Chinese in their country of residence.
More importantly, they were inclined to display the old Beijing with plenty of traditional characteristics, rather than the most recent modernized Beijing, to the world.

“Traditional Beijingers” gathered at a soccer game with the T-shirt they bought from Teng and Jiayidie. (Source: Yang Yang)

Beijing being the most frequently used word, Jiayidie preferred the term Peking as well, especially associating it with the Forbidden City and stone gate piers in front of siheyuan, the traditional Chinese courtyard. The Peking romanization would evoke the most idiomatic nostalgia among “Traditional Beijingers”. While the use of “Beijing” enjoys wide recognition in nearly all aspects of the social world today, appellations such as “Peking
Duck”, “Peking Opera”, and “Peking University” are still used and imply originality and history. Peking first appeared in the eighteenth century, and was used for postal purposes by Westerners in 1906 and remained as the usual English name of the city even though the city’s Chinese name was switched back and forth between Beijing and Beiping. In 1958, the People’s Republic began to adopt Beijing as the official translation at home and, in 1979, Peking was substituted for Beijing abroad. Interestingly, these two time-points coincided with two major political and social events in Chinese history that Beijing was coercively involved in.

In January 1958, Chairman Mao declared during the Fourteenth Supreme State Affairs meeting that all the old houses in Beijing and another ancient city should better be replaced by new ones. In March, he made another remark that Beijing should learn from Tianjin and Shanghai about pulling down old city walls, since he firmly believed that the old city walls were built by emperors to protect them from peasant rebellions and no longer would have any use. With Beijing playing as “a kind of Vatican City for the Maoist dogma” (Cail & Fodor, 1972, p. ix), The Explanations on the Master Plan of Beijing’s Urban Construction, launched in August 1958,
also revealed that in order to forsake the low productivity it had in the feudal period and to accomplish the socialist vision, the old city should be regenerated into an industrialized, garden-like, and modern capital of a socialist society (Wang, 2011, p. 320).

The Explanations were in line with the Great Leap Forward which was proclaimed earlier in May that year. According to The Explanations, all the city walls and outer walls must be torn down and upon the foundation of the city walls and the moat, the second ring road was to be built (ibid). Cultural and architectural relics, including more than 500 tons of 5381 pieces of metal works, were dismantled and re-cycled for industrial development and construction. By the end of the Great Leap Forward Movement in 1960, outer city walls amounting to 39.75 km in total length, averaging 10 m in thickness had been demolished and only half of the inner city walls remained standing (Wang, 2011, p. 352).

Together with the preparation for potential international wars that demanded the broadening of the previously 15-meter-wide Chang’an Avenue into a possible airport of 120 meters’ width, hutongs, enclosed courtyards, historical streets and zones were designated for demolition. In late 1958, Vice Mayor Feng Jiping approved the demolition and removal of
10,129 houses in one month alone to ensure that the Tian’anmen Square expansion project would start on time (Wang, 2011, p. 382).

Described in Wang Jun’s book *Beijing Record: A Physical and Political History of Planning Modern Beijing*, properly resettling those displaced people in a timely fashion was hard to achieve under the economic conditions of the time, and thus a considerable number of displaced residents were forced to move into make-shift bungalows, mostly around Chongwen and Xuanwu District, and were only able to acquire permanent housing in the middle and the late 1980s (ibid). Courtyards that catered to these people soon became over-crowded with many families. Before being translated into Japanese and English, Wang Jun’s book was first written in Chinese under the title *Cheng Ji*. However, the original title of the Chinese version wasn’t the current *Jì* that means “record” but another *Jì* that meant “condolences”. By 1965, all inner city walls were destroyed. And by 1969, most of the gate towers and arrow towers were dismantled to make way for the construction of subway transportation.

Many interviewees expressed sadness for the vanishing old city. They mostly recalled the rejection of an urban planning proposal in 1950 by two famous Chinese architects, Liang Sicheng and Chen Zhanxiang, who
wanted to leave the old city unchanged and to set up the new government in the western suburbs. “Had the proposal been implemented in the first place, there would have hardly been any concern about the subsequent destruction,” as most interviewees explained. Yet, interviewees deviated from the architects in terms of the motivation for preservation. In the proposal, the old Peking City was preserved as an antique, or a museum of an ancient Oriental capital. Liang even regarded the city walls as national treasures. While both the proposal and the de facto regeneration targeted Beijing as a city belonging to the country, members of the “Traditional Beijingers” held that preservation must be carried out because the oldness the antiquity of the city was a symbol of its heritage. Members did not consider the city as a capital now, nor ever in the past. Instead, they thought walls, hutongs, and other architecture were Beijing specific—not on a national basis but in a way that belonged solely to themselves. Chao argued that all the city walls and gate towers were the legacy of his past ancestors. The city walls should have been inherited by all Beijingers but somehow were gone forever.

The city survived during war times but didn’t make it through the peace. Even the Japanese invaders and the Kuomintang reactionaries were consciously protecting it; it was then deliberately ruined by the presupposed savior. What an irony! Why did it have to be pulled down
only for the sake of being a capital? Do you know why those high-ranking officials were so eager to raze everything? Because none of them were Beijingers! So they don’t think from our side. They were all *waidi bi*. They destroyed what should belong to us! They didn’t care.

In his early thirties, Chao was a descendent of Qing’s bannermen living in the northeastern part of Beijing inside the Third Ring Road with his single mother. They lived on the rent of one of their houses, his mother’s pension, and some random part-time job payments. Chao valued his ancestry deeply, as he talked to me with pride that his grandparents used to possess a handsome treasure that was handed down onto his parents, although he never dared to dream of himself being a prince which could have been the case under the Manchus’ reign. Of course, Chao’s stance, as it was with others of today’s Manchus, did not step beyond reminiscence and the fury it irrationally engendered. Oldness implied “an asset, as a matter of pride and satisfaction can be observed in many different social settings” (Elias & Scotson, 1965, p. 149).

Indeed, the distinctiveness of the old Peking derived from it being an imperial capital whose “consolidated history helped create (and substantiate) a local identity that would be compatible with a place in the new nation” (Naquin, 2000, p. 691). As argued by Li, Dray-Novey, and
Kong (2007), localism in Beijing originated in the Qing Dynasty as the organization of the banner system allowed bannermen in Beijing to stay within a certain region to which they later became attached. Local identity among Manchu bannermen was also strengthened as they were hired as police or military guards taking charge of issues inside of the city during the Republic of China. Beijing’s “independent urban identity” was further rooted in the institutional establishment of a separate administrative entity from the central government, such as the Municipal Office, the Police Board, and the Peace Preservation Brigade (ibid, p. 4).

It was not only Manchu bannermen that were identified as true Beijingers, as those whose previous generations managed to stay in Beijing since the 1950s would also claim affiliation with the city by calling themselves Beijingers. Li, Dray-Novey, and Kong (2007) believed that residents who were mostly cadres and intellectuals living in dayuan housing, or in large newly built residential and office complexes, felt themselves superior to those local commoners living in hutongs. Might this be the case for the first and second generation of new Beijingers living in community clusters with considerable resources? My engagement with interviewees who were later generation dayuan residents somehow
demonstrated the opposite. Members in their young adulthood, whose parents were raised in the privileged communities, were not preoccupied with pride and superiority in terms of their social status in comparison to those who were common residents. Instead, some of them acknowledged that the originality and distinctiveness of the city lay in the pre-modern old Peking and even expressed their admiration for descendents of the common Beijingers who consisted of the offspring of the ethnic Manchu imperial families. Xing, a 23-year-old woman who just graduated last year and started working in a private company said to me,

If you want to know what represents Beijing most, I would definitely think of the old things in the city, like the old city walls, the hutongs, and the courtyards. My parents did not grow up in this kind of environment but in residential complexes provided for people in the military. I did not think being a Beijinger was important until I joined an exchange program in my junior year in South Korea where most of the Chinese international students were from elsewhere other than Beijing. Understanding the importance of where I come from, I then started to come to the realization that the environment that brought me up did not truly represent Beijing. Then I started to buy and read books on the history, traditions, and architecture of the old Peking. Now I feel I am more like a true Beijinger because I have more knowledge of the place I call home and my lifestyle and the way that I handle interpersonal relationships are more or less influenced by the traditional Beijing style.

Xing also told me that the reason she liked Cui and decided to be his girlfriend was because he had a typical Pekingese lifestyle and was
passionate about the city as well. Sharing experiences with Xing and Cui were Xiao Zhou and Yun Er who were both college undergraduates in their earlier twenties. Xiao Zhou and Yun Er were attracted to each other by their similar sets of values and ways of life, such as being loyal to friends and being confident both qualities highly respected in the Pekingese culture.

Apart from the descendent of the privileged Beijingers, common Beijingers, who grew up in districts including Haidian and Fengtai that were outside of the former city walls, also drew themselves close to being authentic by learning the history, arts, and even daily practices of the true Beijingers. Yuan Bo, a married man in his early thirties, developed a hobby of wandering in Xuanwu District in his spare time with his Nikon single lens reflex camera. Whenever he encountered things of historical value, he would record them with his camera and search for their stories later on. He loathed the extinction of the old Beijing, calling it the death of his home, although he had no direct experience of what the old Beijing was like from his circle beyond the “Traditional Beijingers”. Zong Jing, whose home used to be a village in Chaoyang District, was obsessively interested in the urban planning history and customs of the city inside the old walls, rather
than that of her own changing village. During the interview, she mentioned some books related to those topics and told me that her feelings towards her home were aroused mainly by these books,

I know the courtyards and city walls are not my home. The place that I was born and raised was considered as the countryside in the past and still the suburb until perhaps the 1990s. But I do not see huge differences between the old city and where I live. People inside the old Peking and I eat the same thing. We speak the same dialect. We both value relations such as kinship and friendship. We treat people in more or less the same way—putting ourselves into others’ shoes, unlike those selfish outsiders. I think more importantly, it is because Beijing now is referred to the whole municipal region that includes Beijingers both inside and outside the city walls. Besides, the dramatic changes inside the city walls were too apparent. I empathize with people living there as my village suffered from a similar process. Our experiences bind us together. But when it comes to what represent Beijing the best, I would prefer the old Peking region, which is more historically and architecturally rich, to the current entity.

The reason why Zong Jing impressed me wasn’t confined to her responses in the two-hour interview. Since it occurred to her that I was somehow interested in Beijing, she constantly referred me to books, re-tweeted news and information, and reported her current feelings even until the moment that I was busy typing her story. Snapshots of the heavy snow in late November were sent to me through her cellphone along with her comments “snow retrieves the old Peking”. Like Xing, Yuan Bo, and Zong Jing, long term Beijingers who were not native residents surrounded by the city walls
or the later Second Ring Road were inclined to identify themselves emotionally as Beijingers. By learning the historical heritage inside the walls, the group boundary between different long term Beijingers that used to be as concrete as the city walls themselves were blurring.

Zukin (2010) defines “authenticity” as the “moral right to the city that enables people to put down roots (and establish the) right to inhabit a space” (p. 6); the concept also implies a feeling of social righteousness to stand with the least empowered. Like the recollection of the old Peking, authenticity can be changeless, since “cultural images of a specific historical period” can be used as the criterion for people’s urban experience (Zukin, 2010, p. 29). The phenomenon being discussed here resonated with early gentrifiers who established nostalgic feelings about the community’s original appearance and identified themselves as the symbolic owners of the community to protest against “inauthenticity” (Deener, 2007; Brown-Saracino, 2010; Ocejo, 2011).

Drawing a contrast with the vanishing traditional architecture, lifestyles and value systems with Peking characteristics, seen as encapsulating the essence of the old imperial city, “Traditional Beijingers” were fortunately able to be passed down and preserved these qualities
until today. Evidence for this could be found from interviews with Xing and Zong Jing, as well as the foundation of romantic relationships between some other young adult members. In November 2011, the municipal government announced the “Beijing Spirit”—“Patriotism, Innovation, Inclusiveness, and Virtue”—as the spiritual and cultural pursuit of residents in the capital and a basic requirement for a Socialist core value system. Engaging scholars and experts from more than 20 universities and institutes and more than 3 million voters on five candidate plans, the final launch however received fierce criticism and opposition among long term Beijingers.

A counterattack by Beijingers occurred on March 28 2012, when a sports journalist reported the fourth round of the China Basketball Association’s final between the Beijing Ducks and the Guangdong Tigers. The game ended up with 107-98, or 3-1 in rounds, making Beijing reaching its match point of the championship. In his concluding remarks, the journalist Hao wrote,

“Beijing Spirit” is supposed to be “Patriotism, Innovation, Inclusiveness, and Virtue”. Yet in today’s Wukesong Venue, Beijing basketball fans professed “Beijing Spirit” as juqi (loyalty to friends), you mian’er (civility and dignity), houdao (virtue), and jiangjiu (fastidiousness) (Hao, 2012).
Four months later, in July, a revision adapted from Hao’s version was put forward by Beijing Internet users. This new version consisting of juqi (loyalty to friends), houdao (honesty and kindness), niubi (bravo), and hou mian’er (civility and dignity) soon won unprecedented approval and acceptance among long term Beijingers. Quite a few members picked up these four words during the interviews. “They are what truly represent Beijing”, said Zi Fengmiao, a descendent of a Manchu bannerman, “When I say Beijing, I mean Beijing itself. I do not mean Beijing as any sort of capital.” Interviewees more or less all believed that the official version of “Beijing Spirit” was an ideology imposed by the city government, an ideology which featured the core of the state with hardly any degree of municipal autonomy.

Since recent inculcations from the government were intended to convert local Beijingers to citizens of the capital, the “Traditional Beijingers” detested acknowledging that they had been influenced by the government even to a minimal extent. Rather, they said, “These true Beijing Spirits are inherited from the old Peking,” or “These true ones are what my parents and grandparents taught me since I was small and are what I learned from uncles and aunties in my neighborhood.” A few interviewees remembered
that when they were taught some specific practices and habits, their parents would say, “You need to obey these rules because these are what we Beijingers do.” Hearing that, they intuitively made a connection between unquestionable practices of certain manners which were demanded by their parents, and the subconscious reinforcement of their Beijingers identity.

Gu, a freelancer who used to work at McDonald’s recalled his experience and revenge on an outsider. He told me he was taught by his mother that a polite Beijinger should start saying things using people’s titles.

You call people “brother,” “sister,” “uncle,” “aunt” before you start to ask them anything. If you don’t know how to call them, you can start with a ninhao (equivalent to hello but calling someone whom you regard as a superior). But you know what, WDBs don’t do this. Their parents never told them about it. The McDonald’s that I worked in was very close to the Beijing West Railway Station, where 99% of the diners were WDBs. Once there was a woman WDB who ordered a cup of coke. I took her money and walked to the beverage machine. She started shouting, “Hey, hey, hey, no ice, no ice!” Who is “hey?” Is she insulting me? She didn’t use the proper form of address; who knows to whom she was talking to? So I turned my back on her, spat on the coke secretly, and put more ice in her cup. As I handed the cup to her, I said, “shut up idiot” ferociously, and she ran away at once.

Zi Fengmiao explained to me why he thought family and community neighbors were more influential on him than advocacies from the
government,

In the old days (before 1949), true Beijingers lived outside of the Imperial City but inside the walled city. The location provided long term residents many opportunities to be exposed to grand things, or big historical events, right in front of their eyes. These things broadened Beijingers’ horizons, thus making them different from peasants in the countryside who only cared about their petite things and did not know how to behave properly. Then, attitudes and values were passed down from generation to generation, along with the occurrence of more significant events. The current government does not exert much effort. Beijingers like to learn morality and manners as if they were inherited.

Indeed, behavior displaying interpersonal civilities in the ancient dynasties could result in social mobility, and the specialization and sophistication of manners thus became crucial (Chen, 1996). To such significance, the transmission of manners depends on all types of institutions including the family and the school. Despite what the “Traditional Beijingers” firmly believed, a compulsory and important channel of moral education, apart from the Olympics, was courses taught at elementary schools. A course called *Morality and Society*, which used to be labeled *Ideology and Morality* during the years of most interviewees’ primary education, and texts required in *Chinese Language Classes* contained contents through which students were able to acquire a love and sense of belonging for their own community and neighborhood. They
also focused on imperial history and the folk traditions of the old Beijing, as well as fundamental principles and virtues of humanity. Yet from the interviewees’ side, the messages that the courses delivered did not seem to be valid or legitimate.

The disavowal of government authority and the nostalgia for their childhood environment enabled the “Traditional Beijingers” to solidify and secure the legacy of their Peking spirit as a sentiment from the past in fighting against the identity of “capital citizen”. Some interviewees, in their most irrational mood, spoke out that their true Beijing spirit was not learnt, but somehow was given at their birth.

As Peking lifestyles and spirits were deemed as something genetic and inherent, a sense of superiority by nature was claimed. Some interviewees admitted that when seeing outsiders being caught committing crimes such as robbery, they, on the one hand taunted them as WDBs, while, on the other hand were proud of themselves claiming themselves would never behave in that way. This partially explains what has been illustrated in the previous chapter. Apart from the current research, non-fiction and classic fiction about everyday life in Beijing depicted a dignified, well-mannered but superior image of Beijingers (Lao & Howard-Gibbon, 1980; Lao, 2002;
Unfortunately, the ambivalent fusion of a local identity and a capital identity in these works failed to account for the mushrooming hostility of today. This unsuccessful attempt was not hard to understand since the capital in their writings referred not to the current Beijing but to a past Peking. For “Traditional Beijingers”, it was exactly the good old Peking whose revival was what they were passionate about that made up their current local identity. Although they wanted their old Peking back to take over the current capital city, “Traditional Beijingers” nonetheless neglected the fact that Beijing in the past was no less than a capital with substantial functions, however imperial or socialist the states it was serving. Their dilemma was not at all about accepting their home as a common city or as a capital city. It was in essence concerned only that the capital at its present stage estranged long-term Beijingers from what they would like to call home.

Changing the title that was used abroad in 1979 coincided with the start of the Reform and Opening-up Policy which was not formally implemented until 1992, when the socialist market economic system was
officially established. The genesis of the combination of the two seemingly paradoxical systems—socialist economy and market economy—increased the salience of a non-public economy and assured that the market would become the fundamental resource distributing mechanism (The Communist Party of China, 1992). However, the thriving private sector and market economy neither owed nor gave rise to a democratic political transformation, but was again a top-down product of the Party’s decision (Liew, 1995; Burns, 2000; Zhang, 2000; Gallagher, 2002; Lam, 2009).

Theoretically, the disembeddedness of the economy, or market, is only a capitalist invention created by the interference and even coercion of the government (Polanyi, 1957). Analyzed by Arrighi (2007), China’s development fits Smith’s model of a “natural” economic path on which a large national market is used as “an effective instrument” by the strong centralized government (p. 43). The glorious pursuit of wealth, a mischievous ideology that subtly evaded who the pursuers were in this transformative epoch, brought about enormous inequality, corruption, and the erosion of social morality (Qian, 1996; Liu & Link, 1998; Ding, 2000; Lee & Selden, 2007; Arrighi, 2007).

This dark side can be observed through a series of systematic reforms
that included housing, education, and so on. From the end of 1980s, housing, under the legal justifications of the central government⁸, appeared to be another market commodity that gradually drew the attention and favor of real estate developers and the municipal and district authorities in the 1990s. As residents only had the usage right, not the ownership of their lands, municipal and district authorities were able to sell the usage right of residents’ land. Then residents’ houses were defined as “dangerous and dilapidated” according to certain standards, defined by

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⁸ The Constitution proclaimed in 1982 that all urban land is owned by the state. In December 1988, the Ministry of Construction and the Housing Reform Leading Group of the State Council announced *The Notice on Strengthening the Regulation of the Selling Price of State-owned Housing* (No. 375), and required the implementation of this notice at all levels of the country. Meanwhile, the state-owned Housing Sale Price Reporting System and Real Estate Price Appraisal Agency were established.

The Constitutional Amendment in 1988 claimed that the usufruct of land could be transferred according to the law. Thus, usufruct of land became an independent civil right—property right, and this right was able to be separated from land property rights. In 1992, Beijing started to implement *The Interim Regulation on the Assignment and Transfer of Usufruct of State-owned Land in Cities and Towns* which was carried out by the state in 1990. This regulation allowed pricing land through assigning and transferring land usufruct.

In 1994, *The Decision of the State Council on Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System* started to be implemented. The Housing Accumulation Fund System was widely established. Under this system, housing welfare was given to the employees in monetary form, together with their salaries; employees were no longer directly given houses. The Decision triggered the commercialization of urban housing. It also signified the comprehensive marketization reform of housing, since (the usufruct) of state-owned land is saleable. In July 1998, the State Council issued *The Notice of the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System and Speeding up Housing Construction*, which repealed the physical distribution of housing.
real estate developers. Especially after September 1993, this policy empowered governments, at both municipal and district levels, to deliberately appropriate land for real estate development, making residents’ housing destiny more subject to manipulation. Furthermore, the standard for labeling “dangerous and dilapidated buildings”, a project initiated in Beijing since the 1970s that originally aimed at improving housing conditions for Beijingers, was lowered. This was to make way for real estate developers to claim that more not-that-dangerous housing needed to be renovated. This pulled more residents and households into the renovation project.

By studying another developing country India, Schumacher (1975) proposed that urban planning should adopt a human scale of production, namely being small and prioritizing the well-being of people. Critics argued that large-scale renewal was in fact an unsustainable development and that in urban settings, or particularly in Beijing’s case, economic growth should not necessarily override economic development, nor the development of human society (Fang, 2000). Nearly 20% of the Beijing municipal government revenue was gained by selling land usage rights to developers in the 1990s, at the average of 361 million yuan each year.
Two hundred and twenty-one sites including 986,300 Beijing residents were affected by the renovation projects in 1993 (ibid). Indeed, such massive planning would make architects, politicians, and real estate developers rich at the sacrifice of the mass population.

Urban planning in the 1990s shared similarities with the demolition during the 1950s and 1960s, in terms of the vanishing traditional architecture, as the number of hutongs were reduced from 3000 in the early 1980s to 1600 in 2003 (Shi, 2006). Some statistics indicated that 361 hutongs were razed within the single month of September 2007 (Wei, 2015). Following Liang and Chen in the 1950s, scholars today called for the preservation of the traditional architecture by appreciating the aesthetic and practical values of courtyards and hutongs (Kuang, 2008; Wang, 2009; Dai, 2012; Zheng, 2012).

Yet, the recent wave of urban renewal in the 1990s seemed to be more destructive compared to those in the previous decades. Hua Xinmin, an active protectionist of Beijing’s hutongs yet the granddaughter of the architecture and civil engineer Hua Nangui who stood for modernizing the once walled city, firmly believed that preserving the old city should start from “protecting the fundamental rights of residents living in the old city”
(Hua, 2009, p. 210). Most of the so-called restoration projects turned out to be commercial real estate development deals (Fang, 2000). Unlike the original plan that ensured that residents could move back to their renovated homes, profit-maximizing real estate developers built commercial centers, office towers, and fancy apartments that had more than 70% of the residents unable or without sufficient subsidy or compensation to move back (Fang, 2000).

To make the demolition happen, shameless measures were taken by the real estate units including using fake urban planning maps to deceive residents, terrorizing residents, throwing stones and pouring rubbish into residents’ homes. In order to reduce the cost of their investments, real estate developers did not provide displaced residents with minimum compensation which was required by law; for those residents who received replacement from the real estate agents, due to the lack of rigid regulation, their resettlement places were poorly equipped and had defective sanitation, lacking good property management and were mostly located in the suburbs, or the greater Beijing area. Their newly assigned homes were so far away that it took them three or four hours to commute to and from work. Some residents who were self-employed small businessmen lost
their businesses since their old customers could no longer find them (Jiang, 2006; Wang, 2011).

Although 25 historical and cultural protection areas were named by the municipal government in 1990 to be preserved and renewed, and were later approved in 2002 with minor changes, nearly all these 25 areas were essentially cultural relics instead of residential areas which in fact only amounted to 1.9 square miles (Johnson, 2004; Meyer, 2008). In total, 118,000 residents were required to relocate, or 41% of the total population within these 25 areas (Li, Dray-Novey, & Kong, 2007). It was estimated that more than half a million households were relocated from 1991 to 2003 (Menon, 2010).

What was even more of a loss, affecting residents in Beijing was disenfranchised at an institutional level. According to The Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial and Enforcement of Administrative Cases of Housing Demolition, which was passed in April, 1995 by the Beijing Municipal Higher People's Court, people’s courts would not accept for law suits that included:

a. litigation against decisions about regional constructions made by the people’s governments;
b. litigation against people’s governments’ decisions that those whose households are to be relocated shall move out within the time
limit and that relevant departments shall carry out compulsory demolition which are made in cases where those who shall move out within the time limit set by court verdicts refuse to do as ruled without justifiable reasons;

c. litigations against demolition notices issued by departments in charge of demolition about those who shall be relocated, the extent of demolition, time limit of demolitions, etc.

Residents were not only forbidden to legitimize their dissatisfaction, but also restricted from other options such as privatizing their houses (Ian, 2004, p. 148). It did not even occur to most of them that they had other choices apart from those claimed by the developers. Compared with cases where public participation was protected and in effect in preserving communities (Amundsen, 1982; Castells, 1983; Arnstein, 1995), most re-located Beijingers were not able to make themselves heard by litigation (Lu, 2013; Xie et al., 2013).

Among “Traditional Beijingers”, the majority of those who were born in the 1980s experienced resettlement during their elementary or middle school days. Unlike their parents’ generation who were from the beginning unwilling to move as described in previous sections and in these last paragraphs, interviewees had an emotional transition in terms of their attitudes towards relocation before and afterwards. When they first heard that they would be living in apartment buildings, they were looking
forward to it with overwhelming excitement. They admitted that they
couldn’t help imagining themselves getting rid of the bungalow-like
conditions of their upbringing. As a teenager, privacy seemed to be their
primary concern, although they acknowledged that they also appreciated
facilities such as an efficient heating system. Many of the interviewees
longed for living in their own rooms as they reached puberty, so that they
could decorate their walls freely with posters of sports and music stars,
and do things that their parents wouldn’t see.

However, members told me that they soon regretted moving out of
their bungalows. Xiong, a member in his early thirties, was the respondent
who had the worst relocation experience. His family was initially forced to
move from Xuanwu District to Haidian District when he was in fourth
grade. Later he again moved from Zhongguancun, China’s Silicon Valley in
the Haidian District to Qinghe, a town in the greater Beijing suburban area
during his middle school period. This double experience, recalled by Xiong,
stripped him of his friendship ties in his Xuanwu circle.

Nobody knew what was going to happen and could happen. By
the time we realized what was really happening around us, it was
already too late. Many classmates of mine just moved and then
switched to schools that were then closest to them. My classmates’
family and my family didn’t own a telephone at that time, so we
couldn’t exchange contacts. And since we could apply for a telephone
in the relocation place only after we were resettled, no one could know what our addresses or phone numbers would be. Above all, we never thought it could be such a long and absolute parting. We thought since we would still live in the same city, we would not be far from each other after all. But we were so inexperienced. We ended up losing contact. My best friend, with whom I shared a table at school, was nowhere to be found. We used to sit together and play soccer in our *hutong* after school every day. There were many other friends of mine with whom I studied at the same school and lived in the same neighborhood, but I felt closest with that guy. You don’t know what friendship means to people with no siblings! He was like a brother to me, always. But I’ve never seen him again. I tried to find him but there was not even a clue. Friendship with some other classmates were regained by chance, as we registered for the same department in the same university—that was ten years later. What if there had been no such coincidence? If I had only known, I would have not felt happy and excited about moving out! How come I felt excited? How could I expect to leave my brother? If I could make choices, I would rather stay with him than live a comfortable life. Who cares about a larger size apartment? I wanted him.

Xiong was not alone in this regard. To members of the “Traditional Beijingers”, the fateful but helpless grief called a halt to an onward vision.

“There’s always a place for outsiders to go back and live in, a place they call their hometown. If they don’t want to work or stay in Beijing any longer, there is a home that extends its arms embracing their return. But is there a place like that for us? The home where we truly belonged is destroyed and forever gone.” They conveyed how much they missed their childhood experience in the overcrowded courtyards. In their interpretation, overcrowding meant a sense of closeness between themselves and their
neighbors who would always be genial, considerate, and ready to provide small but timely help.

On the contrary, new neighbors in the resettlements were mean and enjoyed taking advantage of others. Fa-ke complained to me, “where I used to live was very crowded but everyone was humble and polite. Now, despite the public area in my apartment building being spacious, everyone wants to occupy these public spaces by putting their own stuff in the corridor.”

When studying urban sociology, researchers were not confined to people as individuals, but also shed light upon the neighborhood that individuals resided in as a whole. Herbert Gans (1962), in his discussion of the relatively long term residents in Boston’s West End, revealed that dismantlement destroyed a holistic sense of community and organized neighborhood relations. Indeed, as a form of public spaces, hutongs functioned in a similar fashion as sidewalks in American cities, creating encounters and connections between neighbors (Jacobs, 1961).

Soon, the sorrow of long term residents’ being driven away from home translated into outrage and resentment when they saw large numbers of outsiders moving into areas where their original homes were located. The sharp rise in population density could be explained in part by the
mushrooming of luxury apartments, commercial complexes, and office buildings which attracted outsiders of various occupations into the old city. Estimated in 1994, the gross population density in the old city amounted to 500 to 600 people per hectare; but in areas under official renewal or real estate development, most of these areas had a population density of 700 to 800 people per hectare, with a few exceptions only reaching 100 people per hectare (Chen, 1994). Figure 4 shows the several-fold boosts of plot ratios of twenty typical Renovation Projects in Beijing from 1987 to 1998, which made it possible to accommodate the growth in the size of population (Fang, 2000, p. 68).

Figure 4. Plot Ratio Change of 20 Typical Urban Renovation Projects in Beijing (1987-1998)

(Fang, 2000, p. 68)
On the other hand after 2003, the loosened migration policy that was designed to promote economic development was also responsible for the large influx of the migrant population. Municipal policies were carried out to attract qualified people to work in Beijing. These elite outsiders were not only allowed residency for at least three years, but also given abundant rights (Ma, Hu, & Yin, 2014, p. 140). In addition, enrollment increased in Beijing-based universities which contributed to the population increase, since university students who were outsiders were given Beijing hukou as if the universities they attended were their registered households (ibid).

Also in 2003, The Measures on Custody and Repatriation of City Vagrants was repealed nationwide. From 2002-2005, restrictions on outsiders in terms of housing rentals, business, labor work, housekeeping occupations, health and epidemic prevention, have been phased out (Ma, Hu, & Yin, 2014, p. 512). Unlike migrants returning to their hometowns in the past, migrants after 2003, who were neither Beijingers nor those with residency permission preferred not to leave Beijing and tried to stay (ibid, p. 159).

This resulted not only in the fact that Beijing hosted an increasing number of migrants, but also that compared with previous migrations, when only the elites were able to stay, Beijing became open to people from all social
backgrounds, from everywhere in the country, and with various family and education backgrounds (ibid, p. 513).

In July 2013, a news report suggested that from 2005 to 2011, a reduction of 72,000 Beijingers in the four center districts were substituted by an influx of 170,000 migrants (Fan, 2013). Many long term Beijingers said they would go to hell rather than pay a visit to where they used to live, even though some of their old neighborhoods were the most flourishing recreational centers in Beijing. Their disgust and loathing, according to some interviewees, did not boil down to the destruction of their homes alone, but also because their homes were full of their most haunting memories and were now occupied by outsiders. The idea that long term residents had to make room for outsiders resulted in mass local dissatisfaction and hostility. “Traditional Beijingers” said they hated WDBs because it was clear that they had stolen their homes from them. “Take a look at the remaining hutongs, you will find those playing soccer are not Beijing kids anymore. They are all bastards of WDBs; they are WDB youth.” While for some people, the development of these feeling started from sadness and ended up with anger, others detested the newcomers first and then sought to base this hatred on the losses that
they themselves or other members had suffered. A typical narrative goes as follows,

All WDBs say the same sentence, ‘Beijing belongs to every Chinese, instead of Beijingers themselves’. This sounds as if we owe them anything. Or as if we don’t deserve to live in Beijing, our home city, but they do! New York is the wildest metropolis in the world. If Beijing is everyone’s, New York should belong to every world citizen, not the Americans, not even the New Yorkers. Doesn’t it make sense? Why don’t they strive to go to New York? Why do they end up lingering in Beijing?

In addition to these allegations, expressed in various forms, Traditional Beijingers pointed to the sacrifices they had made for their city. Oftentimes, the dominant discourse in the nation acknowledged the accomplishments achieved by outsiders, but Beijingers refuted this perspective by providing evidence that their dedication had been largely ignored.

One of the common arguments was the strict implementation of the One-Child Policy for families in Beijing, but too frequently violated by outsiders. As a result, a strong feeling of injustice prevailed among “Traditional Beijingers”, who were often the only child in their families.

-The good lives, beautiful home...everything that the only child in Beijing enjoys today is at the expense of the lives of their siblings. That is a debt of blood. Each of our families is no different from families of martyrs—we are all sacrificing our family members for the country. But the outsiders sacrifice nothing!

-If you see WDBs having two or three children, don’t make a fuss. It’s common to see a family with five children, sometimes even with seven. Women don’t give birth as humans do. What they do is
whelping.
-Every child outside the population plan who entered the city and
plundered the fruits of city residents’ labor owes those urban families
with a single child.

More specifically regarding the One-Child Policy, “Traditional Beijingers”
questioned the supply of beds for pregnant women in Beijing’s hospitals.
They emphasized that pregnant women Beijingers who deliver their first
child should enjoy hospital beds and other facilities, prior to other
pregnant women in Beijing.

Perceived inequality generated by the implementation gap of the
One-Child Policy also extended to the field of education. In 2012
non-Beijing students from 1st to 9th grades reached 419,000, amounting to
40.9% of the total elementary and middle school student population in
Beijing. More than one billion yuan (approximately 159 million dollars)
was invested by the municipal government to secure equal education
among outsider students from the 1st to 9th grades. Long term Beijingers
complained that the majority of students in their children’s classes were
made up of less disciplined outsiders. Teachers spent more time
inculcating proper behavior to the whole class than teaching substantial
knowledge. “I can’t imagine what it will be like one day if the
single-children of Beijing are assimilated by these disgusting kids”, wrote
one of the bloggers.

In November 2013, news came out that more than 400 twelfth grade outsiders applied to take the college entrance exams in Beijing. Despite stringent procedures, the approval of these applications indicated that such students would be able to take exams and be admitted to vocational schools in June 2014. The policy soon triggered objections among “Traditional Beijingers”. While outsiders believed that this move paved the way for education equality, “Traditional Beijingers” were enraged by it, claiming that it was nonsense for children outside of the population plan to demand equal right with children whose parents followed the law obediently. In response to this news, some “Traditional Beijingers” wrote in their Weibo as follows,

-Sameless bitch! What they mean by equality is in reality taking others’ opportunities.
-Now they can only go to vocational schools, but later they will be admitted to universities. Then they will find a job more easily than Beijingers. They shouldn’t be allowed in the first place, or they will always find ways to satisfy their greed.
-Before they ask for education equality, they should first let die all that are not the first child in each of their families. Shit!

As for the equality of college entrance, “Traditional Beijingers” learnt to the information that the chances of admission to top universities in Beijing, namely Peking University and Tsinghua University, were shrinking in
recent years and were far lower than the probability of candidates in Shanghai and Tianjin being admitted to top universities within their own provincial institutes of higher education (Baidu, 2015c). Just as the available places were diminishing, the High School affiliated to Minzu University of China was revealed to have consistently enlarged its high school enrollments from 2005 so that in 2015 six hundred and twenty 12th graders who were ethnic minority outsiders would take the college entrance exam and receive university admission at the same rate as twelfth grade Beijingers.

The existence of this phenomenon in this particular high school was ensured by a directive which was issued by the Ministry of Education in 2003\textsuperscript{9}. Long term Beijingers were stirred up, as they alleged that the 620 students were using up the admission quota that exclusively belonged to twelfth grade Beijingers. In 2015, around 50 students from this “dark horse” high school were admitted to Peking University or Tsinghua University, constituting 14% of the total enrollment of Beijingers in the two institutes. According to parents of some Beijing twelfth graders, over 2000

\textsuperscript{9} The name of the directed is \textit{The Opinion of the General Office of the Ministry of Education on Proposed Agreement that Ethnic Minority Students of the High School Affiliated to Minzu University of China Shall Participate in both the College Entrance Examination and the Admission in Beijing.}
local students could be impacted by these 620 students in terms of their college enrollment (Xu, 2015). It was also found out by these parents that when admitting students, this high school often had the lack of censorship on the students’ ethnic minority identifications (ibid).

In July 2015, after four or five years of complaining online, a letter was written to the Ministry of Education by a group of Beijing local parents. It demanded 1) a separate college enrollment quota for ethnic minority students in the High School Affiliated to Minzu University of China, 2) a resumption of the high school’s reference-based enrollment of a hundred and forty students as was the case before 2003 and a stop to exam-based admission, and 3) consent from Beijingers and scrutiny and approval from the Beijing municipal government regarding the high school’s enrollment practices (Baidu, 2015d). From July to September, over a thousand Beijing parents gathered at the Ministry of Education and Beijing Bureau of Education, demonstrating in favor of their appeals. In August, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission promised that the high school would not keep expanding its enrollment, beyond which no further action would be taken. On the other hand, the State Ministry of Education and the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Education were passing the buck between each other.
In September, parents sued the state Ministry, demanding it would invalidate the 2003 Opinion. A month later, the plaintiffs were informed by the court that the lawsuit would not be processed (Wu, 2015).

Another matter of contention was a comparison of the financial benefit between long term residents and newcomers and the disparity in rewards that this revealed. Illustrated by Jiu, a blogger revered by “Traditional Beijingers”, the self-reported contribution to taxation claimed by outsiders who used this to make it a justification for their foothold and deserved rights in the city. However, this amounted to no more than a drop in the bucket compared to the forty-six years of hard labor (from 1949 to 1995 when a Two-day Weekend Policy was implemented) of Beijingers who received little compensation in return. Jiu alleged that taxes paid by newcomers only became significant after 2005 which was a mere decade ago.

Jiu also believed that these taxes were negligible in contrast to all the benefits newcomers would gain by working in Beijing. “WDBs are like beggars who get numerous things for free while paying only a tiny amount for their ‘occupancy expenses’”, Jiu argued. Besides, Beijingers, as well as any urban citizens, were not proportionately compensated because from
an institutional standpoint, their efforts did not even allow them to acquire usage right of communal land as rural citizens did. According to Jiu, quite a few rural Beijingers were forced to convert to urban *hukou*, making them landless and deprived of the former land rights that they once held. On the other hand, outsiders were able to find jobs in Beijing and enjoy homestead entitlements at the same time.

According to “Traditional Beijingers”, their insecurity derived not only from administrative policies and macro maneuvers that they felt helpless to control, but a constant threat also originated from their daily lives where antagonistic discourses against them prevailed. “Traditional Beijingers” argued that hostility was never emitted in one direction with Beijingers always being the sender and outsiders the recipient. Some respondents told me that their Beijing identity was not crystalized until 2012 when an extraordinary rainstorm hit Beijing on July the 21st. By August 6th, it was reported that more than 1.9 million residents city wide were affected by the storm with 79 fatalities (Ji, 2012). Fangshan, a district located in Southwest suburban Beijing, suffered the most severe impact—800,000 people or more than 80% of the district population, were affected.

My respondents said that they were anxiously concerned about every
Beijinger who could be in potential danger, until they saw outsiders’ online swear words hoping that Beijingers would be drowned. “I don’t understand why they hate us,” said Xiaoqi, a long term Beijinger living in Shijingshan District where the rainstorm had a destructive impact as well. “After the 1998 flood, we donated; for the victims of the 2008 earthquake, we donated and mourned. Whenever something was happening in the country, we did everything on our part to help them. Do we deserve death in return?” Generally, “Traditional Beijingers” said the apathy and coldness that they received alienated them from outsiders who they used to see as no different from themselves. That the outsiders hoped that they would die dawned on them that solidarity must be created among Beijingers and a distance drawn between Beijingers and outsiders—in other words, a boundary between friends and enemies needed to be formed.

Since the rainstorm curse incident, “Traditional Beijingers” saw themselves successively discriminated against in recreational centers and restaurants where preferential treatments were publically granted to outsiders. These places offered outsiders whose ID number started with any number other than 110 a special discount while they charged
Beijingers the original price.

-I wonder who grumbles about Beijingers’ privileges all the time. Outsiders only spend ¥150 entry to the amusement park but it is ¥185 for Beijingers. Now do you still think we are the privileged? Who do you think is really the privileged?

-If these restaurants want to attract outsiders, they should have started their business at the hometowns of the outsiders.

-The boss wants to benefit his folks. He should go back to his village where most of his folks reside.

Also in workplaces, interviewees told me that they were discriminated against simply because they were Beijingers. Some said they had seen companies listing in their job requirements that only outsiders need apply.

A man told me he wasn’t assigned to certain tasks because, as he overheard, his colleagues informed the staff who was giving out these tasks that he was a Beijinger. This respondent continued,

The job required a lot of nightshifts. When we finished the work, it was often 1 or 2 am and there was no public transportation, so I had to drive back home. My parents bought me the car; I didn’t have that much money. There happened to be an outsider colleague who lived very close to me, so I offered him rides most of the time. I could have dropped him where our paths departed, but every time I sent him home first and then drove back to my own place. He never said thank you. Well, fine. But he took all of this for granted. He turned angry at times when I didn’t want to help him. He knew my family owned an apartment in Beijing which was worth millions of yuan today, while his family didn’t. He thought I was much richer than him. But the apartment is for me to live, not to sell. I don’t sell it, so no money is got out of it. What is the point of having that much money while staying homeless? Is this what he means by being rich? WDBs shared the same way of thinking and were convinced that Beijingers must be rich and have cars. And just because we were supposed to be rich enough
to have cars while they didn’t, he thought I was obliged to drive him home. Isn’t it ridiculous? Isn’t he an asshole? Together with many things like this, I couldn’t stand working there anymore. So I ended up quitting the job.

Hong, a woman in her early thirties working in a private company told me that based on her information, some of her outsider colleagues earned a higher salary than she did. Privately, she asked her boss why this was the case. Her boss said in reply that their company needed to take the fact that outsiders needed money on housing into consideration. “I became furious when hearing that,” Hong said to me, “Salary is a reflection of an employee’s performance, not of a boss’s pity. Apart from the housing subsidy required by the government, my colleagues are also getting extra support. If they are incapable of staying here, they can leave and go somewhere else. No one should beg them to stay. But in reality, it is just the opposite.” As our conversation went on, Hong also pointed out that her outsider boss believed Beijingers had no need to buy their own housing and to live separately from their parents,

My boss thinks that outsiders need to save money for renting or buying their housing here in Beijing. Of course, many outsiders have the dream of buying an apartment in Beijing and call it home. But on the other hand, she assumes that since we Beijingers now live with our parents, there is no need for us to buy our own. She believes that we can inherit housing from our parents because we are all single-children in our families. Why should we live with our parents? Why shouldn’t we buy our own? That’s their houses after all. How
For some, dissatisfaction was triggered not by the false assertion that Beijingers were privileged, but more precisely by the reversed reality that preferences were given to outsiders instead of to the locals. Beijingers were always assumed to be superior especially in terms of socio-economic status, which in fact brought them inferiority in their discursive power and other material treatment. It became incomprehensible for the “Traditional Beijingers” that it was the outsiders who should receive primary consideration. In their mindset which was similar to Merton’s concept of locals, locals should receive the most attention and support, regardless of whatever places people were local to (Merton, 1957). But Beijing turned out to be an exception.

-Henanese say they are proud of being Henanese. Sichuanese say they are proud of being Sichuanese. But this sentence can’t be applied to Beijingers. If we say we are proud to be born and raised in Beijing, outsiders will reply that we imply prejudice against them. It’s like Whites are forbidden to say they are proud of being White in front of Blacks whom they will be considered racially prejudiced against. We are not able to express the most simple and innocent feeling of a love for our home. Aren’t we being discriminated against?

-Public figures in the media and entertainment industries that have a predominant influence always hold the opinion that outsiders
contribute exceedingly more to metropolises than locals do. That’s too much! They say this because most of them are outsiders so they want to kick us out and bring their extended families in. The masses are easily manipulated and convinced. Some of them say that without them, Beijingers will all be starved to death. Really? Have we? Instead, when they go back home during the Chinese New Year holiday, we cook at home so there is less worry about food safety. The sky is brighter and the streets are cleaner. We don’t rely on them at all. In fact, it is them who rely on us, on Beijing! Without us, they would be starved to death. That’s why they scuttle back into the city every year even days before the holiday officially ends!

To “Traditional Beijingers”, their city happened to be a special case that deviated from all the established norms of host and guest relations. The presupposed establishment of hosts and locals was nullified, as perceived by long term Beijingers. Indeed, while Beijing was viewed as merely providing home, the city itself also embodied a complex of intermingling social dynamics that produced interests and inequality. Demographically, most “Traditional Beijingers” have been from the lower- or working-class, experienced or witnessed relocation, and lacked in various kinds of leverage that could make their voice heard or plans changed for their sake. As a consequence, Beijingers of this socio-economic status became the least represented and the most marginalized category. Since countermeasures were not taken at a structural level, long term Beijingers blamed their unpleasant experiences on outsiders who have been the most
visible and superficial beneficiaries. Needless to say, top-down policies that promoted a grand urban transition merged outsiders with locals when they were subject to distinct administrative arrangements. These encounters created an environment for local hostility to take place.

What was worse, this marginalization of long term Beijinger’s made outsiders blind to the real situation. Some outsiders believed that all relocated Beijingers must have made a fortune through reparations. In addition, outsiders misconceived “Traditional Beijingers” as no different from some other stake-holders or beneficiaries of Beijing’s urbanization, while in fact they had a completely different and negative set of experiences.

Realizing that they were increasingly disadvantaged in many respects, “Traditional Beijingers” explored their own ways to legitimize and reaffirm their status in Beijing. Signs of exclusion began to demonstrate that “Traditional Beijingers” deemed outsiders the source of all recent urban problems which included air pollution, traffic congestion, and crime.

-There was hardly any air pollution when I was small. But air pollution has become severe in recent years. This is because WDBs arrived and stayed. As everyone expects windy weather to blow the haze away, I also expect the Chinese New Year to come as fast as
possible. Air pollution is caused by WDBs. When they are all gone during the New Year holiday, the sky is so blue and clean. When they come back, the weather returns to something disgusting. They are here causing problems.

-Traffic problems are caused by the outsiders. There are 170,000 outsiders in the core area. No wonder the traffic is so crowded. They make Beijing dilapidated. They destroy Beijing on purpose. Now Beijing is ruined.

-You shall notice how many crimes are committed in Beijing and see who those criminals are. Yes, they are all outsiders, WDBs. Whenever I turn on the TV and switch to legal programs hosted by the Beijing TV station, and I see crimes that are reported on TV are committed by migrants. I didn’t want to hate them. I didn’t hate them in the beginning—it is truly they themselves who ruin their own reputation and respect.

-The news said that before 2005 when there were no WDBs, Beijing was one of the world cities that had the lowest crime rate, and death rate due to road traffic. By the end of 2010 after the WDBs arrived, 89.5% of the crimes were committed by outsiders! Outside cunts, fuck you!

Furthermore, some long term residents also imposed nicknames on migrants from specific provinces. As they learned from TV programs that some thieves who stole manhole covers came from Henan, an agricultural and densely populated province, Beijingers addressed Henanese by the name “manhole cover stealer”. WDB, the abbreviation for waidi bi, used in another manner—wang debiao, without changing the meaning. The newly invented wang debiao can be understood in the Northeastern dialect as a typical name of people from the three Northeastern provinces. Although the three provinces did not together export the largest migrant populations,
Long term residents complained that Northeastern migrants were most visible in terms of their unacceptance.

Elias and Scotson (1965) argue that the success of gossip hinge upon the fact that the unit of prejudice is not aimed at individual’s, but at the individuals’ group. The individuals under attack, or the so-called WDBs in this case, failed to strike back because they were unable to “discard, not even in their own mind, the identification with the stigmatized group” even though individually they were “innocent of the accusations or reproaches” (ibid, p. 102).

Long term Beijingers tended to unconditionally scapegoat outsiders for the root cause of all recent urban problems, ignoring how structural forces, especially state and municipal policies could generate antagonism. Yet over-simplification and ignorance varied from person to person among “Traditional Beijingers”. A large number of the “Traditional Beijingers” hovered at the superficial level without advancing to a deeper understanding. They were convinced that it was the wickedness and greed of outsiders that solely injured Beijing. Some were able to recognize the co-effect of a series of structural factors that divided Beijingers and outsiders socially and economically and made it possible for outsiders to
come and stay. But a majority of them still pointed fingers at the outsiders, instead of to the relevant policies and experts, politicians, and businesspersons who formulated and took advantage of these policies. These parties and systems, they thought, only served as an invitation to the massive unwanted influx.

Other specific measures on a personal level were taken, in order to ultimately “defend the great Beijing”. “Traditional Beijingers” appealed for strict law enforcement on criminal charges and population control. An active member, who nicknamed himself “Bernard Shaw”, publicly advocated that a Repatriation System should be revived, so that criminals would be sent back to and kept in their registered residence (hukou), in the hope that crime rates and the probability of chaos would be greatly reduced. “People who work in the police system say that in Beijing and Shanghai, more than ninety percent of suspects in detention houses are migrants,” he continued, “are we exchanging our safety with the repeal of the system? If nothing is made to change the situation, Beijing and Shanghai will be no different from the countryside.”

According to Bernard Shaw, a Repatriation System not only could keep bad aliens away from Beijing, but more importantly would be effective
in controlling fluid migrants who came and went totally at will and made the location and arrest of such people time consuming. Seemingly, he had a concern broader than just Beijing versus outsiders but more about general stability versus migration. Beijing’s problems were not exceptional; it was one among many administrations subject to the conflicting interests of heterogeneous populations. Bernard Shaw wrote the following in his Weibo,

There is no need to be implicit and roundabout concerning local hostility. Migrants come to Beijing and Shanghai for personal interests, for a better livelihood and higher pay. In today’s overloaded Beijing and Shanghai, the one-way migration pattern migrants created has almost broken the city down, in terms of the allocation of social resources, as well as the supply of natural resources. And this is why xenophobia grows inside of me. You see, both me and the migrants are motivated by realistic self-interests. No one can tell whose pursuit is nobler.

Bernard Shaw’s argument summarized many key points in the quarrels between “Traditional Beijingers” and outsiders. Indeed, a large proportion of debate topics that “Traditional Beijingers” were engaged in were related to realistic issues, about mostly materialistic issues. These issues touched upon marriage, education, and so on.

Zheng, a long term Beijinger doing his doctoral studies in D.C., was native to the vanishing Chongwen District that literally meant “advocating
culture and education”. This engineering student also enjoyed ancient Chinese poems and verses. He once provided his perspective on *The Deserted Wife*, a poem in *The Book of Songs* that left readers in desolation and despair. Depicting a woman who married a man she loved but the husband later turned out to be deceptive and abusive, the poem was understood as an exemplar of gender inequality and the vulnerability of women in marital relationships. Yet in Zheng’s interpretation, the root of the woman’s suffering was simply due to the fact that her husband was an outsider. “A WDB” were the words he used, as he went through the scripts sorting evidence that supported his argument.

As the husband obtained all the supposed advantages from this marriage, there was no need to show sympathy to her, according to Zheng. Zheng said he felt sorry for his school mates of either sex in Beijing’s leading high school and in China’s best university who ended up marrying domestic outsiders, as if the narrative of *The Deserted Wife* would more likely occur in these marriages. Remaining single in his early thirties with no prior romantic experiences, Zheng would stick to the principle of only marrying a long term Beijing woman. He regarded outsiders as guests who would never make an effort to be assimilated to the host culture but simply
steal resources and grab wealth. With these assumptions, Zheng said he would not risk giving any outsider the chance of reducing his passionate love to materialistic disputes which not only ruined his own life but might disrupt his parents’ life as well.

In a similar argument with Zheng’s proposition, some Beijingers also advocated that Beijingers should not marry outsiders unless they enjoyed being taken advantage of. Some Beijingers shared stories about all the ways that an outsider might use to marry a Beijinger, including purposeful pregnancy, and when they proceeded to the preparation of marriage, outsiders began to show their real motivation by requiring an extremely high amount of dowry. Some would demand that housing that was bought by parents of the Beijingers be common property between the couple. After marriage, outsiders would bring his/her family members and relatives of his/her extended family to stay in the “common property”. A comment in Weibo goes, “Don’t marry outsiders unless you want to see your home and family become their embassy. This is a marriage between a human and a predator who is not here to love you, but to consume you”.

Subsequently Weibo accounts emerged aimed at matching long term male Beijingers with long term female Beijingers. These websites were run
by long term Beijingers voluntarily. They would re-tweet posts long term Beijingers wrote with their photos attached. In the post, Beijingers should state clearly that they were long term Beijingers and were only looking for long term Beijingers. No other information was necessary for these accounts to help re-tweet, although some basic information was always crucial for individuals to find the perfect match. After one month of the first retweet, long term Beijingers could request a second retweet of their posts. Posts of some unattached “Traditional Beijingers” were retweeted by Weibo accounts of this kind as well as by other “Traditional Beijingers” who were happy to advertise for them. It was also common to see regular offline dinner parties that were organized by these Weibo accounts and plenty of long term Beijingers frequently attended them in order to seek potential relationships. However, the probability of marrying people that were known through this channel was not high.

Individual resistance against outsiders manifested itself by targeting what long term Beijingers thought of as the source of the pro-outsider industrial chain. Gao Leilei, a Beijing native and former soccer player on the local team, was renowned for his charitable construction of elementary schools and “The 21 Field” for elementary school age children in the
countryside. The latter was named after his number while serving in Beijing Guo’an, the local football club from 1999 to 2006. Together with his excellent athletic performances, this philanthropic undertaking had received recognition among “Traditional Beijingers”. In January 2015, Gao expressed sympathy for migrant kids who could not stay with their parents in Beijing for elementary education but had to return to their hometown for schooling. He also appealed in his Weibo website that adults should do something to create a better livelihood and learning environment for these children.

These lines infuriated “Traditional Beijingers” who immediately turned against Gao. Some Beijingers in their comments reasoned calmly on the impracticality of his wish, since the resources of the city were too limited to be shared by every Chinese citizen. “Beijingers also need jobs and earnings. Do you think it is fair to compete with outsiders inside our own home?” “Look how difficult it is for Beijingers to book an appointment with a physician and to find a job. See how crowded the subway is! I assume you are rich enough to send your son to a private school, so you have no knowledge about the livelihood of common Beijingers. If these kids come and stay according to your wish, what do you want us Beijingers to do?”
One blogger commented, “If migrant workers return home with their children, reunion is achieved. It is their home jurisdiction that should solve employment problems for them and education issues for their children.” After receiving more than 700 responses as such, Gao posted another Weibo, condemning Beijingers who without hardworking migrants could do nothing but “entertain pet birds”.

This follow-up post incited online Beijingers to more emotional, radical, and aggressive responses, as they called Gao a “traitor” and told him to “get out of the city and help ‘your’ folks at ‘your’ home”. “Use your money to send these migrant children abroad!” “It is cruel of you to say that. Don’t you remember who watched your games and made you rich? Now you look down upon people who play with birds.” “Your daddy was playing with birds too! Now you turn yourself against your ancestor!” “You must be brainwashed by your outside cunt wife! You’d better go back to her hometown and stop ruining Beijing.” “I now realize you enjoy licking WDBs’ ass.” “Stupid bastard, son of the outsiders!” “From now on, Gao Leilei perishes from Beijing.”

Less than a day after Gao’s follow-up post, more than 100 unfavorable reviews of Gao’s sushi restaurant appeared on dianping.com, China’s
most popular reviewing website equivalent to America’s Yelp.com. Reviews complained that the restaurant had stale food, horrible service, ridiculous prices, and a mean boss. “I’m the kind of bird-playing loafer who he despises. I’m not going to give him my money anymore.” “I swear I will never go to that restaurant from now on. My money is not to support those outsiders to stay in Beijing. I shouldn’t be writing here anymore. It’s time for me to take care of my pet birds.” According to Gao, 80% of the restaurant’s profit would be used for all his charitable causes. Regardless of his various accomplishments, Gao’s provocative words made him seem like an ungrateful hypocrite in the eyes of many long term Beijingers who had been in the past his premier supporters but were now unlikely to patronize his restaurant.

Nonetheless, the bad reviews only amounted to less than 10% of the total reviews and were completely outnumbered by appreciative comments, while Gao’s restaurant started to earn a growing reputation among outsiders who became the restaurant’s major customers as they supported Gao’s charitable attitude towards migrant children. Thus, spontaneous group reactions ventilated long term residents’ discontent. This time, however, the target was someone other than the outsiders
In this chapter, Beijingers’ local identity is seen as a negotiating process strengthened by macro social changes both in history and in more recent times. So is the local hostility, a dynamic construct made by the particular historical context that could have been otherwise. As most of the changes either symbolically or realistically brought discomfort, degradations and coerced compliance, “Traditional Beijingers” created a nostalgic memory towards the good old days, even though some had not themselves experienced it. On the other hand, “Traditional Beijingers” blamed all the current social problems and their discontent on outsiders, with seemingly plausible arguments and practical exercises. By doing this, “Traditional Beijingers” cleverly evaded challenging structural problems that they felt impotent to modify since they were imposed from above by a top-down administrative system.

Their goal was to kick the newcomers out, instead of confronting the authorities. In fact, it is exactly the authorities that long term Beijingers depended on, in order to accomplish their home defense. The next chapter will take a look at how “Traditional Beijingers” developed their hostility by
molding their focus of expression to stay aligned with the official position.
If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve, in step with the increasing equality of conditions (Tocqueville, Stone, & Mennell, 1980, p. 115).

Tocqueville’s observation on how associations could maintain equality and freedom at the same time was incisive when he analyzed Anglo-American society almost two centuries ago. The source of association relied on the intellectual and moral establishment of civic awareness, which American society seemed to be endowed with if we set religious factors aside. In contrast, it can take other societies a considerable time to gain the ability to combine democracy and participation without sacrificing freedom.

The noble cause of “Traditional Beijingers” evolved from purposes and activities no different from those of hooligans and gangs. As far as I have observed, the soccer arena was highly seen as the cradle of the “Traditional Beijingers”. The exceptional performance of the local team, especially since 2009, was able to unite 30,000 Beijing sports-lovers once a week on average to feel their sense of place in their home city. The Workers’ Stadium, the home court of Beijing Guo’an, was often referred by soccer fans as “Beijing’s last siheyuan”.

That the fans saw their local identity in the soccer arena was
reinforced by organizations that provided an encouraging atmosphere for fans to express their loyalties. By contextualizing local identity, Beijing fans not only celebrated Beijing’s values on the soccer field, but also attempted to declare themselves as the master of this particular urban space (Yang & He, 2013). During the game, cheer leaders set up by each fans’ organizations encouraged their members to participate in chanting, shouting, and sometimes dancing, through which local identity was symbolically manifested. Fans were as open, reckless, and outrageous as they pleased. For them a degree of freedom was secured as long as they followed the cheer leaders’ command and did nothing that undermined the organization’s solidarity.

Fans in these organizations felt equal to one another and even to their leaders due to the fact that membership was voluntary and these groups were loosely organized. They did not mind following or not following the directions of the cheer leaders. Most of the time, fans in these organizations either very much liked the way the slogans were written, or chanted them without caring about their exact meaning. If they didn’t want to shout in the required way, they could just watch the game quietly sitting at back of the stand. The later organization formed by “Traditional
Beijingers” adopted a similar organizational pattern with the fan groups, in terms of the ultimate goal, voluntary participation, and equal status. According to Gilligan (1996), the honor of one’s group and community being a unique desire of humanity, the protection of it and the prevention of “being overwhelmed by the feeling of shame” might be resolved by violence (pp. 97-110).

Apart from the organizational legacy left by these fan groups, what made them a more effective contributor to the formation of the “Traditional Beijingers” was the network effect they provided. Owing to their equal membership status, common dedication to Beijing, and constant interaction through social media, fans of the same organization were able to grow closer in friendship and to bind together in action. The founders of the “Traditional Beijingers” organization, Ting, Wei, Guo, and Huizi, as well as some other members, came to know each other as they all were members of a Guo’an fans organization that was founded in August 2011. As the severe rainstorm added to the anguish of defeat against Guo’an’s old enemy on July 21st, 2012, Guo and his wife drove their car on the street as soon as the game finished, doing their best to give detained strangers a ride home. Weibo connected fans, as fans communicated
online offering help and reporting where help was needed. As they consistently refreshed Weibo tweets for updated information on the disaster, at 2 a.m. the following day, after they just arrived home two hours later, this couple decided to drive to the airport and help the travelers there. Many other fans like the Guos spared no effort to offer help to those in need. Days later, the four joined other fans in a team that volunteered to buy and supply relief materials to the victims in Fangshan, Beijing.

Ting, Wei, Guo, Huizi, and around ten other key figures also coordinated with each other in “counter-attacks” against parents of migrant children during the second half of 2012. Every Thursday morning, these migrant parents stood in front of the Municipal Education Bureau, held posters, and demanded that their children receive equal education rights as Beijing students. By doing this, these parents hoped that the bureaucrats would invite them inside and at least listen to their appeals. It appeared to the Beijingers in the middle of October that these parents did not propose calmly and rationally to the staff members, but started to irritate, to humiliate, and even to threaten a woman staff member after being invited into the office. “The official was doing her duty—whatever she
said was decent and under the law. We should support her,” Ting said to himself, hearing about the situation from those who were on spot, “The staff cannot do anything to the cunts. But we, Beijingers, are still alive. We should stop them because they are harming us. They shall not be fearless and shameless doing whatever they want. Humiliating a woman official—doing things that are illegal and immoral should not legitimize whatever they demand. If it happened, that would be unfair. We should help them know that we aren’t that tolerant. It’s time that Beijingers like us stepped forward, fought back, and gave them a lesson.”

There were things that the staff on duty could not do but these Beijing Defenders could. Indignant as he was, Ting left his workplace right away and headed for the Bureau. He planned to resolve the situation into a good fight on his own. Failing to have Ting answer his phone, more Defenders at work were left no choice but to arrive at the Bureau as soon as possible only to support Ting. They agreed to call the police if necessary, so that the outsider protests could be wiped out immediately. They also reported the incident live via Weibo, as they expected more Beijingers might help out.

From then on until the Spring of 2013, these four and other key Defenders were in front of the Bureau every Thursday as long as the
parents were there. When the parent representatives went into the building, they would follow them and watch them, playing the role of the reception staff’s bodyguards. Those Defenders, who did not follow the parent representatives into the office, would crowd together outside of the building on the opposite side of road where the parent protesters stood. When the parents shouted, the Defenders shouted back. The police would sometimes come and take control, while expressing gratitude for the Defenders’ maintaining social order and cooperating with the government. When journalists came and took videos at times, the Defenders would perform actively but calmly in front of the cameras and microphones, and tell the whole story from their standpoint.

Despite solely aiming at protecting their own interests, the Defenders managed to make their actions seem to be a just campaign against anti-government and separationist sabotage\(^\text{10}\) and succeeded in gaining

\(^{10}\) As argued by the defenders, evidence was found that these migrant parents were organized and sponsored by the Open Constitution Initiative or Gongmeng, which was established in 2003 by a group of lawyers and political dissidents. Advocating for the rule of law, democracy, public interests, and social justice, Gongmeng actively annulled the Repatriation System, drafted 2005 China Human Rights Report, and suggested refinements to China’s Constitution. The organization started to get engaged in the education rights of migrant children in 2006. In 2009, the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau banned the organization. Gongmeng was charged with tax evasion and one of the founding members Xu Zhiyong was arrested for a while. The defenders believed the crackdown resulted from the fact that Gongmeng received 200,000 dollars of foreign aid from Yale University, which might imply their anti-government position. In August 2010, the case of Gongmeng’s tax evasion was withdrawn. In February 2013, Xu spread flyers in
the favor of the police. For the Defenders, the reception bureaucrats symbolized the supposed regional education disparity and the correctness of the state. By protecting the bureaucrats who were also Beijingers, the local Beijingers attempted to metaphorically defend their vested educational advantage over the migrants, as well as the correctness and sovereignty of the state. Recognized by the police, the Defenders avoided acting improperly, since they would follow the police’s directions and always turn to the police for help. It could be possible that the police somehow had an idea of where these migrant parents were coming from, which, as a result, aligned them with the Defenders. What the Beijingers learnt from the rectangular relations among the Education Bureau, the police, the migrant parents and their potential supporters, and themselves was that the only way for them to act safely was to stay in line with the authorities.

A comparison between the volunteerism in the rainstorm and the protection of education rights indicates that the Beijingers involved strengthened their local identity through real action. Gradually, teasing

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the Beijing Subway, calling on migrants in Beijing to gather in front of the Beijing Municipal Education Bureau on the 28th of that month and to express their wish for equal education rights. Months later in July, he was held in custody for assembling the crowd and disturbing public order. In 2014, Xu was sentenced to 4 years of prison.
outsiders and expressing home-loving via Weibo comments and through cheer team participation did not qualify for their loyalty to Beijing. These Beijingers believed the best way to demonstrate their Beijing identity, was by helping or, in their words, “doing something substantial” to their fellow Beijingers—may they be those who suffered from the rainstorm or those who would become less competitive than the migrant children if they both had equal access to high school education. Apparently, helping the victims of the rainstorm disaster and the costs of reconstruction could not feasibly be provided by only a group of altruistic fans, and it wasn’t the Defenders who were entitled to policy making. Thus, what these Beijingers did and called for always involved more symbolic meaning than a practical one and in return contributed to the arousal of a collective awareness rather than an individual local pride.

However, whether the ends justified the means in the two aforementioned events remained debatable. As discussed in the last paragraph, these long term Beijingers believed that in order to protect their life styles, something had to be done on their own. In fact, it seemed that hooligan acts and the practice of brotherhood values were the only elements in their repertoire. In the rainstorm incident as well as other
similar events, long term Beijingers resisted the outsiders’ obscenities on Weibo with massively abusive language in return. Once one Beijinger started the verbal combat and was very soon attacked back in return, all his online friends and relations proclaimed war against the “evil” outsiders, cursing them and hoping this response would silence them. The spirit of this way of defense persisted and further evolved from verbal into behavioral expression.

Ting’s mob-like initiatives seemed to reveal that violence and unlawful behavior were the primary means which the collective used to achieve their goals. That the Defenders showed up at the Education Bureau was aimed at protecting their fellow Beijingese staff and more importantly their comrades. There is no use in trying to predict what would have happened without the police. Nevertheless, even if they were obedient to the police and did not resort to fighting, their weekly presence suggested that they did not trust anyone else, including the police, to protect their educational interests (which obviously was not the duty of the police in the first place). Although “Traditional Beijingers” planned primarily to crack down the migrant parents’ protests, gathering as many as possible at the Education Bureau was nothing but the pre-stage of street fights and gang wars.
Compared with the volunteering response to the rainstorm, the “counter-attack” campaign was more efficient in uniting long term Beijingers. In July, the proponents and opponents were still vaguely constituted as long term Beijingers and newcomers, partly because long term Beijingers did not start their plans to confront the outsiders. The former knew nothing beyond the news that some outsiders hated them, not even who these people were and how to effectively fight back apart from condemning outsiders through Weibo. Besides, long term Beijingers who actually drove their cars and sent supplies to the disaster area were outnumbered by those who supported the “counter-attack” campaign. Thus, the majority of long term Beijingers had a blurred impression of what was going on, or at best some names of those who called for support. Personal connections with these active supporters had yet to be formed.

On the other hand, the weekly Education Bureau experience provided Beijingers with an operational vision of their foes and friends. It was clear to long term Beijingers that in real life, any migrant who would compete for education resources with them was nothing more than their enemy. As they could see parent migrants were directed by human right promoters and were given bottled water and boxed lunches; it became tangible and
the Defenders began to have a clear image of the real conspirators whom they should fight against. Restricting their scope of response to only a few targets would help them come up with focused and purposeful strategies.

As for friends, they connected in personal forms, rather than merely through social media such as Weibo. Of course, Weibo and other web-blogs were the platforms for the general long term Beijingers scattered all over the city to communicate with each other and to learn what was going on in Beijing, but to most of the Defenders, especially to Ting, membership to his personal circle was not earned through friending each other online but rather through presenting oneself in front of the Education Bureau. “Everyone can fight with their tongues and keyboards, but we want everyone to actually do something.” To do, instead of to claim, loyalty to Beijing often meant giving up individual interests, including being absent from work every Thursday and risking one’s life and reputation. It did not require as much sacrifice from long term Beijingers to purchase supplies to help the rainstorm victims, in contrast to confronting the well-mobilized parent migrants and sometimes face the hostile media.

Long term Beijingers felt reassured as they saw senior comrades
consistently coming each week and new Beijingers constantly joining them. However, among these Beijingers who were able to make their way to the Bureau almost every Thursday for five months, many were self-employed small business people and some were college undergraduates. People from these occupations enjoyed more flexible schedules. For those who were regular employees, it would only be possible to show up once or twice a month. On the other hand, their self-employed status also implied their economic disadvantage and insecurity Since Defenders have become personally linked, they invited one another to their vendors, shops, and restaurants at times. By doing this, long term Beijingers were able to entertain each other and to establish closer friendships. In return, Defenders would start bringing their own friends there and individually advertising for these businesses through Weibo. Although each Defender still lived on their own, the relationship amongst everyone was bound together. In other words, an interdependent yet autonomous social network among long term Beijing Defenders was developed. Thus, collective solidarity was built not only based upon the common local identity and educational interests, but also on personal connections through which everyone was able to benefit from others. According to
Hardin (1995), the formation of a group, or a group conflict does not necessarily hinge on an imagined group loyalty, but on the cooperation of each group member who could receive a share of the benefits.

During a late lunch after the counter-attack defense on a Thursday in November 2012 had ended, Ting, Wei, and Guo came up with the idea of officially establishing an organization that would unite as many long term Beijingers as possible and facilitate more home-loving actions collectively. The inspiration of setting up a formal and registered organization came from their well-established relationships with the police and the bureaucracy. “To get registered is to be recognized by the government,” said Ting and Huizi together, “Government being the backup, things are always done more easily.”

Soon, a website was launched by Ting, a computer science professional in his late twenties at the time. He named the website “Traditional Beijingers”, and made it an online forum that welcomed Beijingers to share their common stories, discuss Pekingese culture, and craigslist useful information and resources. Intended to involve as many long term Beijingers as possible, the forum was outperformed in
expanding networks by Weibo which seemed to incubate the former. Most of the forum users heard about “Traditional Beijingers” from their Weibo friends who spread the news on the site. As a system separate from Weibo, users had to be signed up and logged on before writing anything. Most of the forum users would continue using the nicknames they used on Weibo, so as to be identifiable among the circle. However, due to the popularity and technological advantages that Weibo enjoyed, this “grassroots” website was less efficient and thus far less frequently used. Nor did it effectively help long term Beijingers feel closer to each other. At that point, the website became increasingly unnecessary.

As the website was named “Traditional Beijingers”, Ting also proposed a non-profit organization that they planned to establish under the same name. At first, they envisioned it as a volunteer organization that would be targeted at promoting Peking culture. Yet, according to Ting himself, as he applied for its registration in early 2013, the application was soon turned down since the projected mission of the organization was so vague and somehow overlapped with an existing volunteer organization (which was called Beijing City Volunteer Service Center) under the same supervision of the Beijing Municipal Commission of the China Communist Youth
League. Thus, functional redundancy prevented “Traditional Beijingers” from being officially registered or recognized.

Nevertheless, any efforts that seemed unsuccessful on the surface were not at all in vain, in terms of the affirmation of the leadership of the movement. Especially within the Defenders’ circle, the names of Guo and Ting were widespread among long term Beijingers who admired them for their bravery and consistency. Ting was well known for his advocacy of a Pekingese brotherhood and his efforts to make this come true. As a lawyer, Guo had been particularly respected as an authority and the actual coordinator of the Defenders, since he would offer insightful understandings and professional solutions to each situation. When long term Beijingers began to contact someone already in the circle in order to know how to join the “counter-attack” campaign, the response they received was more or less a sentence that said, “Whenever you arrive, contact Master Guo, do whatever he asks you, and everything will be fine,” along with the address of the Education Bureau and Guo’s cellphone number.

Long term Beijingers showed their support for the two, as well as Huizi and other “celebrities”, by following them on Weibo and fanatically
forwarding their posts along with their favorable comments. Huizi would follow every one of his followers as long as they were long term Beijingers, as he thought this could gather and network as many online Beijingers as possible, while Guo and Ting did not friend their followers unless they met them in person, which implied that at least they saw their true participation in the campaign. Plus the fact that he enjoyed listening to pop music and rock music and often shared pictures of his dishes on Weibo, was the way that Huizi projected himself as a teenager with a child-like character that made him a popular and welcoming figure among many long term Beijingers.

In contrast, long term Beijingers saw Ting and Guo as their charismatic leaders whose concentric circles of supporters were believed to rank the followers according to their significance to the campaign. As a consequence, whether one was followed by Ting, Guo and also those who actively interacted with the two core leaders developed by and large into a measure of whether he or she was worth being followed (or followed back). Oftentimes, it was the new Defenders or the ones on the periphery of the online community who initiated friending acts. Though long term Beijingers were implicitly expected to friend each other, so as to enlarge
and consolidate the community, after noticing they were followed by peripheral Defenders, the semi-cored Beijingers had the psychological privilege of disregarding the signals of friend requests. As Ting and Guo consolidated their leadership, which paved the way for more effective collective actions in the months to come, a stratified system of roles fitted long term Beijingers based on their assumed significance and closeness to the key figures was established, notwithstanding personal connections formed individually that created equality and interdependence. As Tilly (2008) has argued, strong repertoires that take up contentious performances greatly narrow claim-making choices, unless political opportunities or other interactive factors have them transformed and evolved as campaigns develop.

Though almost half a year was spent on the education disparity issue, long term Beijingers did not limit themselves to it alone but sought every opportunity which could be used to blame the outsiders to get them to leave Beijing. In the middle of April, 2013, a fifty-seven-year-old sanitation worker was reported to be beaten up by three young adults who were
plastering small advertisements. In the news, Wang, the sanitation worker with stitches in his head said before being attacked, he had a quarrel with the three men, since his duty was to make sure his assigned area was free of litter and small advertisements (Zhan & Li, 2013). This piece of news shocked many long term Beijingers, who were provoked not only by the scattered mess made up of small advertisement in the city, but also by the outrageous acts of the three small advertisements distributers.

They extended their support to Wang for his commitment to work and demanded that the three distributers should be severely punished. To long term Beijingers, Wang symbolized the safeguarding of the city, while the three were seen as bad aliens who invaded the city and even bullied the

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11 Small advertisements, or often called “illegal posters”, are palm-sized commercials that either contain illegal contents such as pornography and fraud or are not authorized to be spread, or plastered on walls. Oftentimes, it is either an individual or company who has unregistered workshops producing these advertisements and pay other individuals to spread them. By so doing, all the three parties can make huge profits, as they shrewdly avoid government supervision and taxation. Apart from the illegality of their contents, small advertisements have long been considered as urban eye-sores, as the Forty-third Article of The Regulations of Beijing City Appearance and Environmental Sanitation, which was passed in 2002, declares that no one is allowed to spread, hang, plaster, and paint advertisements without the authorization of the municipal administrative departments. Violation of this regulation will result in the confiscation of unlawful earnings and a fine up to 500,000 yuan (80,000 dollars), which will be enforced by the Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement officers. The Article also claims that if the content of advertisement violates rules and regulations that concern industrial and commercial administration, health, and public security, the owner of the advertisement is told by the Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement officers to receive punishment from related authorities. Various parties are responsible for the cleanliness of their assigned areas and should make sure these areas are free from small-advertisements. For instance, sanitary units are responsible for the cleanliness of city streets, underground passages, and pedestrian overpasses. A specific urban neighborhood office is responsible for the cleanliness of the residential area of which it takes charge.
protector in broad daylight. Responding in action, a few long term Beijingers started tearing off illegal posters whenever they saw there on their way to work or back home after a couple of days. Some wrote in their Weibo,

Recently a sanitation worker was retaliated against and seriously wounded when he was cleaning up some illegal posters. I have a mixed feeling of grief and resentment! Our home is invaded and damaged. We can tolerate this no more. Being unconditionally inclusive is to appease! To hell with all the weakness, timidity, indifference, and invisibility! From now on, I will tear off small advertisements whenever and wherever I can. I will show the strength of Beijing whenever and wherever I can. Today, I tore off over 30 pieces.

These words and practices soon reached Ting, Wei, Guo, and Huizi through social media, as these long term Beijingers kept tearing off illegal posters and publicizing their deeds every day. The four planned to organize people to tear up illegal posters in a group.

Their goals were twofold. One was to hope, at the most superficial level, that some quantities of posters would be torn up. The other, more essential than the first, was to get ready for a bloody street fight with anyone whom they caught plastering such small advertisements. “If they (who are paid to plaster the advertisements) see us ruining their work, they dare not do what they do to the old Wang because we outnumber them.
This is what we want to see. We want to intimidate them. We want to let them know who really has the say in the city.” Ting said to his followers privately. Ting and Guo did not attempt to take revenge on the three young adults but to declare war on everyone in the illegal poster industry. But again, their defense of the city was backed up by their fists and physical strength, though arbitrarily and opportunistically packaged in the poster-tearing context.

This photo pictures a common occurrence of the mushroom of small advertisements in Beijing. They are all over the two bus station posts. (Guo, 2012).

Lingering on their minds for over ten days, the plan was eventually put into action on Saturday, May 4th, 2013, China’s Youth Day that officially commemorates the arousal of national awareness among the general mass
of the population during the historic May Fourth Movement. The character *qing* in *qingnian* that meant youth in Chinese, had the same pronunciation with a *qing* that meant “to clean up”. The character *nian* shared the same pronunciation with another *nian* in Chinese that referred to “mess”. Huizi quickly picked up this homophonic pun during the activity and informed the rest of the group. From him, this activity started to be called “Clean up the Mess”, as it implied that young adult Beijingers were cleaning up the small advertisements that were stuck to walls, poles, and any public surfaces.

For the first activity, they were able to gather another five long term Beijingers through social media and personal connections. The nine met at Puhuangyu Street, a street in Southern Beijing where small advertisements were pervasive. As planned, they cleaned them up along both sides of this street, making it a pilot exercise for further activities. Guo, and Wei brought shovels and brushes with which they could do the cleaning work efficiently. Huizi brought a video recorder, hoping to record their actions for future use. Apart from all these preparations, Ting also invited two newspaper journalists to join them, with his wife accompanying the two journalists and constantly providing answers to
their questions. Their story came out in the *Beijing Youth Daily* the next day.

Inviting journalists to report on the group’s work was a strategy that significantly publicized their war on small advertisements, resulting in a massive movement of more long term Beijingers to join and participate. During the second action in early August 2013, the group increased to twenty people who learned about the group action through the newspaper and Weibo. The majority of the participants were already friends of Ting, Guo, Huizi, and Wei, as they knew one another in the soccer fans organization or during the time they defended their education rights. The participative response of these “old friends” resulted from their trust in and personal closeness with Ting and the other three, although protecting the city from the outside invaders was supposedly the original concern.

This time, Ting was able to invite a correspondent from the Beijing Television Station to videotape and present their activity on a legal program that often reported crimes committed by outsiders and was well-received by many long term Beijingers. In the episode, Huizi publicized his personal Weibo account. Seeing the episode of the legal program, many long term Beijingers who had also long been annoyed by
small advertisements were impressed by the form of action that Ting and
his friends used to save their home. They started to friend Huizi on Weibo.
As Huizi would friend everyone back indiscriminately and thus they
friended one another, sometimes close virtual relations were established
along with constant chats and comments, making many long term
Beijingers willing to volunteer in tearing down small advertisements and in
meeting Huizi as well as other people offline in person.

During the third action in late August, the number of participants
reached forty-two. During the two and a half years since May 2013, Ting
and his volunteers welcomed over eleven media outlets, including seven
local newspapers, two television stations from other provinces, and a radio
station. However, most of the media afterwards were not invited by Ting or
any members. Instead, it was these media who contacted Ting, asking his
permission for news-reporting and interviews. A year later in May 2014,
more than 500 people volunteered in the small advertisement elimination
campaign. By the end of 2015, 192 activities were held in total on a weekly
basis, and sometimes twice a week; the number of participating volunteers
reached 1608, with total working hours exceeding 15,000 hours. During
the activities, Ting’s group not only voluntarily took charge of cleaning
small advertisements in the street, but also collected those that were scattered in the subway.

The growing involvement of the media complicated the image of Ting and other volunteers and the meaning of the campaign. The focus of media coverage shifted from introducing the activity of “Clean up the Mess” itself to a promotion of Ting’s charisma and volunteers’ heroism. The turning point of the shift was believed to be a feature story that was published on November 20th, 2013, a month before the activity was routinized. The article called on subway passengers to understand the work of the volunteers. When seeing people in teams collecting small advertisements, many passengers would misunderstand them as 1) workers hired by the subway company, 2) people who wanted to make a profit by selling the used small advertisements as printed products, and 3) small advertisements distributors’ accomplices who would recycle the small advertisements for re-distribution. It also reported in the story that volunteers sometime risked being bullied by small advertisement distributors. Since then, special attention was given to Ting and his volunteers per se. On November 17th, 2013, a Weibo account called “Top News” published a post that said,
[Volunteers in Beijing Cleaned up Small Advertisements that Totaled up to 200 kg in Subway Line 10 within 3 Hours] Yesterday, 64 volunteers came to Bagou Station at Beijing Subway Line 10 to clean up small advertisements. 200 kg of small advertisements were collected into trash bags, and were given to subway employees. These volunteers are spontaneously organized young Beijingers. They always take action at weekends. Where there are small advertisements, there is their presence.

The plot of these later feature stories had a similar description of a messy environment with numerous small advertisements in the beginning, an unchanging quotation of “there is a group of youths in Beijing...” or “the founder of the activity is Ting...” to reveal the conflict between the unlawful spread of the advertisements and the group’s positive energy. The rising action would always include some of their hard-working scenarios and interviews with the volunteers, along with the introduction and development of the organization. The climax would sometimes include Ting and a few core members confronting small advertisement distributors face to face. As for the resolution, there would be a scene of the whole volunteer family saying “we love Beijing”, signifying that their campaign went on. Among the reports, was a one on one interview with Ting. A volunteer, who was a university undergraduate majoring in journalism, had her graduation design on this topic and named her project “Clean up the Mess in Beijing”.
Along with the increasing popularity of Ting and the “Clean up the Mess” campaign was the group’s constant pandering to the heroic tone which was established by the media. Now that they were lifted to the moral high ground, Ting, Guo, and Huizi adjusted the rationale of their activity to a discourse of “spreading positive energy around Beijing”. When Ting and Guo were asked why they came up with the group action, Ting said, “I read the news about an old sanitation worker who was beaten up in April 2013. This news firmed up our resolution to kill all the small advertisements. We are determined to fight against them. We decided to clean them up”.

Ting’s response in the interview implied that those who played the devils were no longer the assumed outsiders, but small advertisements themselves. Thus the highest priority was given to cleaning up small advertisements, rather than going after the distributors. Volunteers claimed that cleaning up the small advertisements was to demonstrate by action their love for the city, while cleaning in a group was for the sake of everyone’s safety, so as to prevent Wang’s tragedy from happening again. “Love Beijing with actions” and “You are not alone in Beijing” became the slogans of these activities. Apparently, tearing off small advertisements was interpreted as a concrete demonstration of their devotion to the city,
the emphasis of which submerged the original intention of violence and conflict. Not only did members in the activities not initiate a single fight, none of the volunteers who joined in 2014 had the least hint of an idea that Ting, Guo, Huizi, and Wei had even planned for this in the first place. When confronting small advertisement distributors face to face, Ting and core members would ask them to tear off and clean up what they had just plastered or distributed. If the distributors disobeyed, Ting would threaten them by calling the police. Volunteers often argued that they joined the activity because their home was being ruined so they needed to take such actions to protect it. This was argued in front of the media as well as with the distributors to whom this was not a concern at all.

In addition to the media, the relationship with the authorities was also a powerful force that pushed Ting, Guo, Wei, and Huizi away from violence and pure hatred. As it was getting cold and windy, pursuing the campaign outside in the open air for hours became unfeasible for many long term Beijingers. Lu, a tall and robust young man in his late twenties, suggested to Ting and Guo that they could continue their activity in the subway, where countless small advertisements wreaked havoc. Yet unlike those plastered outside, small advertisements underground in the subway trains
were not stuck to the walls but simply scattered on the window edges, on
the seats and on the floor, and sometimes dangled through the handles,
which allowed for volunteers to clean them up more quickly. Besides, they
did not need tools such as shovels and brushes. They would only need a
pair of gloves if they wanted to keep their hands clean. All of the tools
including the volunteer badges were provided by Ting, Guo, and Wei, while
the volunteers only had to spend 2 yuan (less than 40 US cents) for their
own subway ticket.

A snapshot of Guo’s wife picking up small advertisements on the
subway floor.

Source: Xing Yushi

In order to carry out any activity legitimately in the subway,
organizations had to receive permission from the subway company and the
subway police. Yet unregistered as it was by October 2013, the “Traditional Beijingers” organization was not able to submit their application for these activities. Luckily, Ting had a relative working at the police force in the subway sub-division. Thus, the first subway activity was able to take place under personal consent from this connection. As the number of volunteers increased to sixty in November 2013 and they were able to hold regular activities every week in the subway, it was clear to Ting that sustaining the status quo was heavily depended on their harmlessness to the subway authority and the government. “Any action that resulted in violence could be destructive to the organization”, said Ting (Wang, Wang, Zhu, & Dong, 2013).

Before each activity started after November 2013, volunteers were required to sign a disclaimer within which they were asked not to be contentious. After the disclaimers with signatures were collected, a mid-level member would emphasize this specific rule to every volunteer again and again. That “participants should not start a conflict with anyone” was institutionalized by a code of conduct that was initiated by the managerial members in July 2014 (Bjtale, 2014). In addition, the code of conduct also discouraged volunteers from cleaning small advertisements
alone in their free time (ibid).

Although the subway authority did not pay much attention to the campaign in the beginning, after a couple of activities were held, they started to acknowledge the achievements of the volunteers as a whole. Volunteers were especially spoken highly of by middle aged sanitation workers who were hired by the subway company, since it cost these workers painstaking physical effort to bend down and pick up the small advertisements. Apparently, the emergence of the volunteers saved these workers from much work. According to Ting in an interview, during the second time when underground “Clean up the Mess” was carried out, subway staff welcomed, chatted and took photos with them (Wang, Wang, Zhu, & Dong, 2013). The subway authority from its own point of view also saw the huge potential of voluntary service, and started to seek opportunities to cooperate with “Traditional Beijingers”.

The subway company was able to make connection with Ting and asked him if he could gather a certain number of volunteers and assist with some tasks. In December 2013, the Beijing Subway Company put up an emergency evacuation drill and invited “Traditional Beijingers” volunteers to participate in it. In March 2014, over 20 “Traditional
Beijingers’ volunteers visited the training base of the Beijing Subway Electro-mechanical Company and acquired knowledge of subway mechanics. Although the two pieces of news did not show any sign that they were organized volunteers but simply interested passengers (Beijing Subway, 2013; Beijing Subway, 2014), Ting and Wei regarded the two activities as benefits to their volunteers and a good opportunity for team building.

Furthermore, effective measures were taken by the Subway Company, which essentially affirmed the contribution that “Traditional Beijingers” made. In the latter half of November 2013, more than 400 kilograms or 270,000 pieces of small advertisements were found and cleaned up by subway police and employees in Subway Line 10 where “Traditional Beijingers” volunteers were most active, while more than 35 small advertisement distributors were handed to the police. Volunteers were content to see that their activities were not empty gestures, but ended up pushing the authority to take action. In March 2014, Ting and Guo were invited by The Legislative Affairs Office of Beijing Municipal People’s Government to attend a symposium on the legislation of *The Regulation of the Beijing Municipality on Operational Safety of Rail Transportation*. This
regulation was finally passed in November 2014 and implemented in May 2015. According to the regulation, distributing small advertisements was strictly prohibited, although no fine or penalty was mentioned.

Apart from the Subway authority, the Beijing Municipal Commission of City Administration and Environment and the police force also took measures against small advertisements. From May 2013 to February 2014, more than 30,000 police were engaged in capturing small advertisement distributors; more than 13,000 distributors were caught among whom 2500 were held in custody (Ye, 2014). Still in this period, more than five million pieces of small advertisements were collected by the police; twelve workshops that produced small advertisements were destroyed (Ye, 2014). Making the cleaning up of small advertisements the work focus of the year in 2014, urban management law enforcement sectors punished over 48,000 companies or individuals who produced and spread small advertisements; 4900 people were held in custody by the police (Wu, 2015).

Enjoying official recognition and a cooperative relationship with the government, Ting and Guo decided to take a step forward in terms of strengthening ties with the authorities. Although “Traditional Beijingers”
failed to become registered as a non-profit organization earlier, now that it had 500 volunteers in total and over 60 volunteers available for each activity, as well as a well-earned reputation from the media, it occurred to Ting that registration was unnecessary for the overall development of the organization. Instead, “Traditional Beijingers” remained a grassroots organization, and since May 2014, it gained the favor of and became subordinate to the Beijing Municipal Commission of the China Communist Youth League. Despite fundraising being illegal due to its “unregistered” status, “Traditional Beijingers” was able to more or less sustain itself by selling its service to the Commission.

“Clean up the Mess” was arranged under a charitable program called “Charitable Saturday” that combined over a hundred similar grassroots organizations’ Saturday activity projects. Sponsored by the Commission and Beijing Youth Association Development Promotion Center, “Charitable Saturday” provided each of its projects with some support. Gloves, plastic bags, volunteer badges, and masks that had cost Ting, Guo, and Wei more than ten thousand yuan (equivalent to almost two thousand USD) on their own were now supplied by “Charitable Saturday”. Ting, as well as the leaders of other organizations whose activities were under this umbrella,
would propose a budget of all the needed materials and submitted it to the Commission. The Commission would then pass the combined budget of “Charitable Saturday”, and the total amount would be divided among all the organizations.

That Ting managed to elevate “Traditional Beijingers” in such a quick and smooth way also echoed the work plan of the Beijing Municipal Commission of the China Communist Youth League in 2003. It was planned that volunteerism and the philosophy of public service should be massively promoted among teenagers and young adults, in order to beautify the capital city (China Communist Youth League Beijing Committee, 2013). “Through life practice and social perceptions, teenagers and young adults shall in large numbers form new life attitudes including independence, positivity, responsibility, helping each other, and dedication to society” (ibid). Especially in terms of institutionalizing volunteerism, the Commission planned to establish an extensive network that covered a wide range of organizations and to have over two million volunteers register in its online pool, so that volunteers could sign up for the activities they wanted to participate in and the system would record their volunteer hours.
In this way, the participation rate of volunteer service could be officially measurable and quantifiable (ibid). In the work plan of 2014, “Charitable Saturday” was particularly mentioned as an exemplary program that should be promoted the whole year around, as it could effectively mobilize citizens into volunteering (China Communist Youth League Beijing Committee, 2014). The 2014 plan also proposed to explore effective channels and practical measures of social governance at a grassroots level, and to increase youth organizations’ participation in the social development of the capital city (ibid).

However, since there were over a hundred grassroots organizations that had their activities listed under “Charitable Saturday”, competition among these organizations, in order to receive informal support, appeared to be crucial to Ting. Taking advantage of the human resources that “Traditional Beijingers” absorbed, Ting and Wei started to collaborate with the Commission. When the Commission needed to recruit a large number of volunteers in a short time, Ting would successfully offer help to the Commission by organizing available volunteers. These occasions included providing aid to travelers who were going back to their hometown before the Chinese New Year and picking up litter in temple fairs during this
festival. Volunteers who participated in these activities knew in advance that by doing this, they were not making Beijing more beautiful. Still, willing to participate, they internalized their participation as a charitable gesture and the spread of positive energy.

Although support from the authority and the media’s publicity discouraged Ting and other long term Beijingers who were volunteers of the “Clean up the Mess” activities to express their local hostility against outsiders openly, these social forces did not at all help attenuate the hostility that was embedded in their deep emotions. Instead, long term Beijingers seemed to believe that their hostility was justified, by the encouraging stance that the authority and the media took. In December 2015, Huizi forwarded a post on the official Weibo of “Traditional Beijingers” that denounced an outsider woman who was breastfeeding her baby. The post said that she had inappropriately exposed herself in public. Within two days, thousands of Weibo users became furious and started to verbally attack the official Weibo.

As the argument between volunteers who were in support of “Traditional Beijingers” and other Weibo users degenerated into a heated online debate, Ting received a phone call from an officer with the Beijing
Municipal Commission of the China Communist Youth League. Not knowing it was actually Huizi who was in charge of the “Traditional Beijingers” Weibo account, the officer simply informed Ting that the only problem concerning this farce was that they could have used better wording to address the woman’s uncivilized behavior. As long as the hostile sentiment was not made public, it appeared to these long term Beijingers that it was totally legitimate to have and maintain it.

Long term Beijingers were also able to legitimize their local hostility through a series of population control policies and work plans in recent years. Strictly controlling population size as well as slowing down population growth were made the focus of government plans from 2013 to 2015\(^\text{12}\). Especially in March 2015, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee passed the Beijing Tianjin Hebei Collaborative Development Plan, a national strategic move that aimed to dissolve actions that did not promote Beijing as a capital city and moving peripheral industries into Beijing’s surrounding areas and provinces—Tianjin and Hebei. All these policies and their implementation reinforced long term Beijingers’

ethno-centric views that outsiders should be removed from the city. Whereas the “Clean up the Mess” movement was employed as a strategy to stigmatize all outsiders by implicitly referring to small advertisement distributors as all coming from this group, these industrial policies that made businesses that outsiders worked in as the criterion for their removal created hostility between long term Beijingers and outsiders.

“It is not that they are bad peoples that they must leave; it is because their existence in the city does not match the city’s development and advancement that they shouldn’t stay.” Some of the long term Beijingers believed, “Now they can’t blame us for hating them. Our idea reflects the government’s attitude. We are right on this issue.” Thus, what looked like a formal support from both the municipal and national government policies in fact exonerated long term Beijingers from remorselessly demonstrating their antagonism. In other words, the institutionalization of exclusion fortified individual hostility which acquired structural justification within the system.

Interestingly, when finding policies or actions that were aligned with their local hostility, long term Beijingers would express their appreciation for the (exact sectors of the) municipal or national authority at an
institutional level. Yet, when realizing implementing certain policies clashed with their own interests at times, long term Beijingers would choose to complain about the leader, sometimes the mayor or the Party leader of the Beijing Committee, or specific experts who came up with the policies, who were originally non-Beijing individuals. Long term Beijingers stated that it was because these people were not Beijingers in the first place, which made them formulate and execute preferential policies for outsiders. By blaming experts and officials individually and often at the municipal level without proceeding to the national level, long term Beijingers cunningly avoided confronting the system as a whole.

To partially sum up, although discourse adjustments to “spreading positive energy” were made to serve as media publicity and to gain government support, collaboration with the two institutions was perceived by long term Beijingers, as well as founders of the “Traditional Beijingers”, as a technique for venting their local hostility. As a consequence, Ting, Huizi, and the “Traditional Beijingers” organization were able to consistently express antagonism against outsiders; especially Huizi who was also in charge of the official Weibo account of “Traditional Beijingers”, also who used offensive language to abuse outsiders in a blatant way. Yet,
these external factors accounted for the successive development and expansion of the organization which was the vehicle for the antagonistic sentiment, without explaining why possible hostility was nurtured inside the organization. Apart from the realistic concerns that long term Beijingers encountered, volunteer cohorts also played an important role in introducing and spreading local hostility.

Local hostility rose out of the interior structure of the “Traditional Beijingers” organization. On the one hand, long term Beijingers who joined the “Clean up the Mess” activity shared similar experiences of losing homes as a consequence of social change. On the other hand, as the legacy of an equal and free membership, yet rigid stratification, that was first formed in the soccer fans organization was still preserved, in order to be acknowledged by other Beijing folk, many long term residents would spend huge amount of effort getting along with “senior members” who were personally close to Ting, Guo, and Huizi, and also held somewhat radical views on Beijinger-outsider relations. Weekly contact and online communication with these “senior members” reinforced many long term Beijingers’ hostile attitudes towards outsiders. Convinced by these “senior
members”, some volunteers began to shift their attention from collecting small advertisement to blaming small advertisement distributors. Although there were a few volunteers withdrawing from the organization after a few months of activities, the majority of the volunteers stayed. This was either because they found the organization catered to their feelings of local hostility or because they gradually made sense of the hostility that every other volunteer held. This strongly supported Allport’s demonstration that conformity is powerful of acquiring prejudice (Allport, 1954).

In addition, realistic issues embedded in symbolism that denoted a sense of Beijing would also consolidate long term Beijingers’ local identity. No different from those on the walls and on the poles, small advertisements in the subway were also perceived as a virus that had encroached on the city. However, long term Beijingers generally had a stronger rejection for small advertisements in subway trains than those advertisements elsewhere. From the summer of 2013, small advertisements about real estate began to proliferate in subway trains. Critics said their appearance in the subway reflected a stagnation in the housing market (Li, 2013).
In order to attract potential customers who commuted by subway, these small advertisements would always include pictures of castle-like mansions with surrounding lakes, huge font in Arabic numerals signifying how economical the housing was, and most importantly, how close to or convenient to reach downtown Beijing. Apart from this content, a sentence that said “you buy the house and we offer you hukou” could also be seen on some of the advertisements. According to some volunteers, these messages especially aroused their feelings against outsiders, as the purchase of these houses connoted the intention of living inside Beijing and being a Beijinger, although the credibility of these claims was controversial. To many long term Beijingers who regarded this as a threat to their material life, Tian said the following that demonstrated his local hostility from a unique perspective,

You know, the more I see these small advertisements, the more superior I feel over these outsiders. This superiority makes me feel so good. See, I was born a Beijinger; I was able to live in Beijing from the day I was born. And they are being fooled by these developers only because they want to become a Beijinger and live here! They will never become a Beijinger.

Tian’s hostility did not emerge out of his assumed superiority over non-Beijingers, but out of the fragility of this superiority which outsiders were ambitiously trying to challenge. To many long term Beijingers, the
feeling of superiority, together with their Beijing identity, was an ascribed status that nothing could help with its attainment or loss. When asked, many said that being born in Beijing and holding a Beijing household registration were the two prerequisites of being a Beijinger. Yet, these two conditions were not enough. In order to be a true Beijinger, one had to act like a Beijinger and do things to make Beijing a better place. Although the basketball star Stephon Marbury who helped the Beijing Basketball Team win the national Basketball championship three times was not born a Beijinger, most of the long term Beijingers would emotionally prefer him to any Beijinger who did not make a difference to the city. Long term Beijingers added civic participation into the criteria of local membership which also included ascribed conditions. The fusion of ascribed status and voluntary engagement, in terms of acknowledging one’s identity, resulted from such participatory activities and the social forces that accommodated these activities. Now that civic participation became a required process to demonstrate one’s love of the city, it, however, did not necessarily assist with the reduction of prejudice against outsiders.

Still, to a marginal extent, hostility against outsiders was reduced
among long term Beijingers who participated in the “Clean up the Mess” activity. Before November 2013, as there were less than fifty participants each week on average, Wei, who was in charge of the sign-up, would write a post every Tuesday and invited anyone who was interested in the activity to leave their name and contact information below as a comment. Then, Wei would try to figure out whether these candidates were long term Beijingers or not, mainly through viewing their Weibo post and sometimes asked their ID number whose first three digits would suggest if the holder of the number was a Beijinger or not. Wei would only admit those who he thought were Beijingers to attend the activity on that Saturday, by contacting these admitted volunteers personally on Thursday with the gathering time and place.

As this activity was popularized by the media starting in the late fall of 2013, a growing number of residents in Beijing started to contact Ting and expressed a desire to join the weekly event. It soon became time-consuming for Ting and Wei to admit volunteers in this way. Ting then upgraded his website with a sign-up system, so as to improve their admission efficiency. However, as it went public, this system was supposed to welcome all who signed up for the activities. Anyone who was
interested in joining the activity must create an account on Website, completing their demographic information which included ID number and work place. Although the ID number was required information, Ting could not justify that their activity was exclusive to Beijingers. Ting and Wei were able to tell which candidate was not a Beijinger, and to perhaps inform other Beijing volunteers to behave themselves in front of these non-Beijingers. But they were not able to show their rejection of these non-Beijingers openly, which inevitably opened the gate for outsiders to join the activities. It became harder for Ting and Wei to publically not allow outsiders to join their activity, especially after their positive image was established by media coverage and they were recognized by the government authority.

Every Tuesday, a post was published on their website, saying when and where everyone should meet on Saturday and how many people were needed for that activity. When people clicked on the sign-up button, their names would be listed below chronologically, meaning that everything was recorded impersonally and no one could be excluded from the process. Then, if the activity was only limited to sixty people in that week, the first sixty would be admitted automatically. The webpage would become frozen
and the sixty-first person could not to sign up for that week’s activity.

“Clean up the Mess” was exposed to a number of outsiders through media popularization. As existing volunteers only demonstrated the “positive energy” side of the story, outsiders had no access to the hostile side of the organization. Some believed that since they were now living in Beijing, making the city a better place would be part of their duty. Thus, whenever the activity was held, there would always be a couple of outsider volunteers among the Traditional Beijinger majority. Long term Beijingers who often communicated with these outsider volunteers during the activities showed less hostility than other long term Beijingers. They said that seeing outsiders also participated in these home-loving activities, they realized that outsiders should not be regarded as a single category because, while the majority was here to take advantage of the city’s resources, there were still a group of outsiders altruistically willing to make contribution to the city.

I used to hate all outsiders, with no exception. But after participating in the “Clean up the Mess” activities, I met a few outsiders who were as active as myself collecting these small advertisements. From them, I see their love of the city. I appreciate their attitudes and actions. I also feel thankful for Ting and this activity which allowed me to know that good outsiders exist. Now I think I will at least divide outsiders into good ones and bad ones, before hating all outsiders in general.
Although the attenuation of local hostility was taken up by only a small proportion of Beijing volunteers, this phenomenon indicated that the online sign-up system provided a platform for equal status contact between Beijingers and outsiders. Despite disparities in education, social status, or place of origin, the only formal qualification of membership to the “Traditional Beijingers” organization was one’s desire to make Beijing free from small advertisements, which disregarded all other background factors. In a situation where volunteers actually picked up and destroyed small advertisements, or walked inside the subway trains, no special skills or expertise, apart from the basic ability that any physically-able person should have, was required. This situation was far from a working place environment where individuals had unequal status and conflicting interests or goals.

The individualistic perspective that the equal status contact hypothesis suggests, as opposed to oversimplifying a given groups is again applicable to prejudice reduction when examining interpersonal relationships of people within the same group. It exploded the myth of collective guilt by showing that sometimes we were no better than they. When volunteers began to realize the existence of good outsiders, this
Beijingers reduced their prejudice against outsiders. Since the sign-up function literally welcomed anyone to join and participate, censorship on candidates seemed unreasonable and impossible for Ting and Wei. Moreover, as the majority of the volunteers shared the goal of making Beijing cleaner and tidier, which was what this activity envisioned, most of the volunteers started to believe that every other participant was good by nature and could become a potential friend.

“We are all Beijingers and we have a good heart” was what blinded many volunteers, before some of them ended up being cheated or harassed by a couple of so-called good-hearted peers. Even though victims reported their experience to Wei and Ting, still Wei and Ting could not prohibit these “criminals” from attending the activity. There were only informal warnings about whom everyone should stay away from. In addition to the victims themselves, many other long term Beijingers who also heard of these stories started to become disenchanted about the solidary collectivity of Beijingers. As they realized that some Beijingers were no better than their assumed enemies, local hostility became untenable.

Selfishness could also be seen from those whose participation only served their desire to popularize themselves and to flaunt their own
heroism. Some would only sign-up when they learned from Ting that there would be newspapers or televisions filming or interviewing them. The sharp ethical contrast between the altruistic outsiders and egoistic Beijing insiders showed some of the long term Beijingers in this group that their presupposed categorization had inherent loopholes which should be closed with patches of civic virtue and responsibility.

This chapter examines factors that aggregate and attenuate prejudice as a result of group dynamics. First of all, the case of the “Traditional Beijingers” supported Allport’s equal contact hypothesis that prejudice was reduced when insiders and outsiders performed together in an environment where the diversity of status and background did not make a difference to achieving a common goal (Allport, 1954). Since equal status was shared in the activities, participants were able to regard each other from an individualistic approach, which allowed them to find faults with other insiders. Thus, prejudice against outsiders would be reduced as the assumption of an unparalleled collectivism was empirically put into question. However, the reduction of prejudice was not as significant as the enlargement of prejudice among long term Beijingers in general.
Although equal contact was able to lower prejudice through civic participation, participation *per se*, especially in the current case, did not make much of a productive contribution to mitigate inter-group conflict. For instance, participation adapted to a positive discourse in the media and thus reached and recruited people with similar hostile sentiments. In the same relationship with the authorities, local hostility was veiled by active participation and was legitimized by the support of the superintendent departments and indirectly by some government policies. As local hostility was developed from soccer fans organizations to Ting’s volunteer organization, it did not seem to abate, even though forms of actions that embodied this tension underwent an institutionalized process through which hostility against outsiders grew implicit and less open.

Moreover, the organization of long term Beijingers also led to the intensification of prejudice. In order to form friendships with charismatic members, new members, as well as those on the periphery of the group, adopted the established members’ beliefs and arguments, internalized and spread these ideologies as if they originated from themselves. Apart from the hierarchical structure, personal connections would also tighten the “Traditional Beijingers” network which paved the way for the spread of
hostility.
CHAPTER SEVEN: TO CHANGE OR NOT TO CHANGE?

In late November 2013 when the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) wrote to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Beijing was nominated once again as a candidate city of the Olympics, though this time the Winter Olympics in 2022. From May to October 2014, the five cities in the bidding competition shrank to two, namely Alma-Ata and Beijing-Zhangjiakou, as Krakow, Lviv, and Oslo withdrew from the race. Even if there were still many Chinese officials and citizens passionate about winning the bid, long term Beijingers who could not be more familiar with its consequences voiced their rejection to it once again becoming a reality. As the 128th IOC Session was approaching, the prevailing discourse among “Traditional Beijingers” turned out to be a treasonous prayer for Alma-Ata. “Traditional Beijingers” wrote the following posts in their social media:

Cheer for Alma-Ata! Although I know Beijing will definitely again win the lottery, I am eager for a surprise.
Alma-Ata, I cheer for you. Although we are in a competitive relationship, I sincerely wish that you will win the bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics!

Now that Beijing had become by far the only city in the world that would have hosted both the summer and winter Olympics, long term Beijingers
felt no pride at all. Some other long term Beijingers expressed their admiration for cities such as Krakow and even Boston whose citizens were able to make their opposition to hosting the (Summer or Winter) Olympics heard and approved by the authorities. This was especially true when news came out in June 2015 that both polls conducted separately by the IOC and COC showed that more than 90% of the total population supported the bidding (Wang, Gao, Lin, & Zhang, 2015), “Traditional Beijingers” cried out that they must have been under-represented because they “were” a less than 10% minority.

The reason why long term Beijingers were disgusted with the Olympics is obvious in light of their previous experience. What they were afraid of was not the Olympics per se, but that all the social changes attached to the Olympics would be replayed. For long term Beijingers, the disturbance brought to them by the Olympics outweighed any possible benefits. Some posted on Weibo that they loathed the Olympics because the Games gave them nothing but soaring house prices, an unwilling relocation, crowded subways and buses, and millions of unwanted outsiders. And since they were experienced at this, they claimed that they did not want to go through what they had suffered after 2001 again. Interestingly, as house prices in
Zhangjiakou started to climb in early August, immediately after Beijing-Zhangjiakou was assured of their victory, “Traditional Beijingers” expressed their concern for the local people of Zhangjiakou, worrying that they would repeat their experiences. In contrast, some “Traditional Beijingers” said that Zhangjiakou local people should not be anticipating the benefits of economic development too early, because they would definitely regret the decision in the long run.

Figure 5. Population Fluctuation of Beijingers

Figure 5 compares the percentage of hukou population who are Beijing born in the total population between that in 1959-2001 and that in

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13 There are three ways to acquire Beijing hukou: birth, marriage, and working for
2002-2014. I have made 2001 and 2002 as the boundary of the two year groups because July 2001 was the time when Beijing won the bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics. From the Chart, we can still see a significant difference of Beijingers’ percentages, despite the problem of the statistical validity of a small sample. In 2014, the percentage of Beijing-born residents was only around 40% of the total population, let alone those who were long term, or multi-generational\textsuperscript{14}. As what the population change itself suggests, long term Beijingers believed themselves to already be a minority in their own city. Not only is population change one of the imposed yet most impressive forms of social change, it also triggers changes in other aspects. Long term Beijingers believed that they were the ones who paid the price for these social changes.

Society, social change, and anomie take up Durkheim’s sociological focus and transcend all societies. Anomie could be understood as the pathological outcome of social relations under social change.

Social organization periodically undergoes evolutionary changes that are independent of man, even though it is man who acts them

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\textsuperscript{14} Existing published data does not tell who is multi-generational or/and who is not. So, I test on Beijing-born population and imply that multi-generational Beijingers must be fewer than Beijing-born Beijingers, because there are Beijing-born Beijingers whose parents could be outsiders.
out... It follows that corresponding changes in morality are not only normal but also necessary, and that the absence of such adjustments constitutes a state of pathology. Sometimes the changes in social organization proceed so fast that there is a period of lag before the morality of society becomes readjusted (Marks, 1971, p. 14).

Durkheim’s vision of *anomie* can be applied to long term Beijingers who were inertial in terms of their attitudes towards social change. Just as they were fanatically against a second Olympics which could engender larger and more profound social changes, long term Beijingers had already articulated their dissatisfaction with the legacies that they believed were introduced by the first Olympics. And in order to locate the source of their dissatisfaction, long term Beijingers found a cathartic fix—imputing their unfavorable social changes to domestic migrants, or in their terminology, “outside cunts”.

By conducting participatory observation and interviews among a group of long term Beijingers who called themselves “Traditional Beijingers”, I examined why and how social change facilitated these Beijingers’ prejudice against outsiders. As presented in Chapter 4, 5, and 6, the development of prejudice is respectively correlated with three different processes that include 1) the invention of traditions and norm, 2) relative deprivation and realistic fears, and 3) civic participation and
intra-group relations. These processes are three aspects of macro social change.

In Chapter 4, preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympics and for Beijing later to be a metropolis included cultivating behavioral manners in public, especially in subways and buses. Under the supervision of government institutions, long term Beijingers obtained these “upgraded” behavioral patterns within a few years. And when migrants flooded into Beijing in the post-Olympics years, long term Beijingers employed their acquired “traditions” as an established civility to distance themselves from outsiders who had not been introduced to any of these behavioral practices. As a result, the good intention of creating a harmonious national image ended up with an unintended consequence that a group of locals antagonized the migrant others. In this respect, social change invents tradition and thus brought some kind of advantage which was made use of in the process of generating prejudice.

On the other hand, Chapter 5 shows that social change can also give rise to (potential) realistic degradations which aroused their nostalgic sentiment. Due to a series of urbanization reforms, long term Beijingers felt relatively deprived because they were relocated, were mistreated by
outsiders in daily life, and were challenged in their socio-economic rights and privileges. In response, long term Beijingers missed the “good old days” and blamed the in-migrating outsiders for their seemingly downward social mobility. Negatively impacted by such social changes, long term Beijingers believed whatever existed in the past was better than anything at present and sought to reduce every positive thing down to a ground that was inherently connected with the old Beijing/Peking. In other words, since long term Beijingers perceived social change as unwelcoming and disruptive, everything that they valued, especially those that were morally and courteously constructive, were ascribed to the old Peking spirit. Long term Beijingers denied that certain behavioral patterns that they in reality adopted were a result of government cultivation.

Chapter 6 elucidated the evolution of prejudice in a grassroots organization which developed from local hooligan gangs. Believing that the love for their city could only be expressed through civic participation and actual engagement in making the city better, “Traditional Beijingers” took every opportunity that was offered by events happening in the society and finally became a full-fledged (although un-registered) organization that held routinized activities. However, civic participation did not help reduce
prejudice among “Traditional Beijingers”. As the group put on the “Clean up the Mess” activity weekly, the positive energy released from it caught the eye of the media whose coverage veiled the group’s intended local hostility. Cooperative relationships with the government also implied a gesture in support of the “Traditional Beijingers”.

To be noticed, it is the cooperative relationship, as well as informal/personal relationships with the authorities that brought a degree of freedom to the organization, so that “Traditional Beijingers” were able to maintain their hostility; otherwise if the group kept striving for official registration as they planned in the beginning, their activities and the group could have been totally denied. Hostility did not seem to be abated, even though forms of actions that embodied this hostility underwent an institutionalized process through which hostility against outsiders grew implicit and imperceptible. What was worse, supportive attitudes of the government and media exonerated “Traditional Beijingers” from regarding their prejudice as something unfriendly and antagonistic.

On the other hand, intra-group relations also contributed to the development of prejudice in the “Traditional Beijingers” case. Although membership of the “Traditional Beijingers” was voluntary and independent,
concentric circles of affinity with the founders and core members did exist, as movements and activities continued to take place one by one. The more actively “Traditional Beijingers” participated in these movements, the more highly they would be recognized by the founders and core members, and thus the higher their status was in the group. Therefore, the informal hierarchy of membership status functioned as an incentive for common members to strive for a closer relationship with the core members. In order to gain a higher recognition, many “Traditional Beijingers” were inclined to parrot the discourses of and to pick up ideas from the core members. Besides, equal friendship developed among such members, since they shared with each other not only their hostility against outsiders but also their personal life experiences.

Yet, there was still some hint of optimism among the “Traditional Beijingers”, although it might not bear any statistical significance. Reducing prejudice was not hopeless. The hope lay in equal status contact showing a handful of outsiders who were no less passionate about making their current city a better place than “Traditional Beijingers”. Under the circumstances, it is possible that “Traditional Beijingers” began to favor civic local membership over ascribed local membership. Equal status
contact also enabled “Traditional Beijingers” to shift their idea of viewing persons from a collectivist perspective to an individualistic one. With these being said, potential suggestions for reducing prejudice shall be proposed on the basis of equal status contact, and a civic-individualistic consciousness. Moreover, outsiders should also be encouraged to integrate into their host city. Since assimilating outsiders is more or less hard to achieve in a city where locals have been outnumbered, cooperation and integration must be necessary for the collective solidarity and prosperity of the community.

Social change is inherently fluid yet constant, especially in the modernizing world. Even when history may repeat itself today, the exact repetition can never be put on without dynamism and transition that succeed in pulling the trajectory back to where it was. Like the 2022 Beijing-Zhangjiakou Winter Olympics, what repeats itself is history but more precisely is the history of social change. To adapt to structural changes in society, changes of norms and morality should always be able to keep up, along with constant negotiation of one’s identity in relation to the collective. Otherwise, people will fall into the same abyss that still traps long term Beijingers almost eight years after the 2008 Olympics. Now,
it seems that many of them are missing their second chance to adjust to social change, since they deliberately choose to cling to their “traditional” values.

Although changes in society are normal, prejudice which is constructed by social processes does not have to be inevitable. I’m not in this thesis promoting the idea that love shall win, or that the better angels of our nature shall always prevail, or any discourses that are vulnerable to worldly manipulation. Instead, love and hate are products rather than causes of our reaction to change.
> library(foreign)
> before<- read.csv(file.choose())
> after<- read.csv(file.choose())
> perbefore<- before$Percentage.of.hukou.population.who.are.Beijing.born.in.the.total.population.since.1959
> summary(perbefore)
  Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.    NA's
  0.5996  0.7901  0.8839  0.8489  0.9240  0.9750      10
> plot(perbefore)
> mean(perbefore,na.rm=T)
[1] 0.8489126
> sd(perbefore,na.rm=T)
[1] 0.1015914
> length<-43
> errbefore <- qt(0.975,df=length- 1)*sd(perbefore,na.rm=T)/sqrt(length)
> leftbefore <- mean(perbefore,na.rm=T)-errbefore
> rightbefore <- mean(perbefore,na.rm=T)+errbefore
> leftbefore
[1] 0.8176473
> rightbefore
[1] 0.8801778
> perafter<- after$Percentage.of.hukou.population.who.are.Beijing.born.in.the.total.population.since.1959
> summary(perafter)
  Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.
  0.3910  0.4018  0.4310  0.4624  0.5447  0.5598
> plot(perafter)
> mean(perafter,na.rm=T)
[1] 0.4624047
> sd(perafter,na.rm=T)
[1] 0.07090521
> length<-13
> errafter <- qt(0.975,df=length- 1)*sd(perafter,na.rm=T)/sqrt(length)
> leftafter <- mean(perafter, na.rm=T) - errafter
> rightafter <- mean(perafter, na.rm=T) + errafter
> leftafter
[1] 0.4195572
> rightafter
[1] 0.5052523
> t.test(perbefore, perafter, paired=F, var.equal=F, alternative='two.sided')

Welch Two Sample t-test

data:  perbefore and perafter
t = 15.4387, df = 28.393, p-value = 2.414e-15
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
  0.3352578 0.4377579
sample estimates:
mean of x  mean of y
0.8489126 0.4624047

> boxplot(perbefore, perafter, ylab="Percentage of hukou population who are Beijing born in the total population since 1959", names=c("1959-2001", "2002-2014"))

The “before” file is a CSV excel file that I conducted based on the population data from 1949 to 2001. The “after” file is a CSV excel file that I conducted based on the population data from 2002 to 2014. The limitation of using this figure to demonstrate the significant population difference is that the “after” group does not have enough sample. This is based on realistic reasons. Hopefully in the years to come, this figure can be perfected.
## TITLES OF MEDIA REPORTS ON THE “CLEAN UP THE MESS” MOVEMENT

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<td>&quot;Friends&quot; Agreed to Tear off Small Advertisement s Together</td>
<td>Beijing Youth Daily</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Hard news</td>
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<td>8/13/2013</td>
<td>&quot;Friends&quot; Cleaned Small Advertisement s to Retrieve the City's Beauty</td>
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<td>Stephon Marbury Became A Volunteer of Traditional</td>
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Organization
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