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Types of religious certainty implied by Kant's treatment of the problem of God

Barrett, Earl Edward

Boston University

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TYPES OF RELIGIOUS CERTAINTY
IMPLIED BY KANT'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF GOD

by

Earl Edward Barrett


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Approved
by

First reader

Professor of Philosophy

Second reader

Professor of Theology
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTLINE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THEORETICAL CERTAINTY</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. MORAL CERTAINTY</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. EXPERIENTIAL CERTAINTY</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE CORRELATION OF CERTAINTY AND CERTITUDE: THE POSSIBILITY OF A RATIONAL-EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

TYPES OF RELIGIOUS CERTAINTY
IMPLIED BY KANT'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF GOD

INTRODUCTION

I. The problem ........................................... 1
II. Definitions .......................................... 2
III. Literature .......................................... 3
IV. Method ............................................. 3

CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CERTAINTY

I. THE THEORETICAL CERTAINTY OF THE RATIONALISM OF KANT'S DAY
   1. Definitions: "rationalism"; "theoretical certainty" ............ 5
   2. Characteristics of this rationalism .......................... 5
   3. Classes of this rationalism ................................ 7
      a. Dogmatism ....................................... 7
      b. Skepticism ...................................... 8
      c. Critical rationalism .............................. 9

II. KANT'S TREATMENT OF THE TRADITIONAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 9
   1. His purpose: three facts to be kept in mind ................. 9
      a. A member of a Christian community ...................... 9
      b. A man of his age .................................. 10
      c. A foe to false pretensions in knowledge ............... 11
   2. Ontological argument ................................ 11
      a. Statement of the argument by Descartes ................ 11
         1) His rational method and principle .................. 12
         2) His approach to the argument ....................... 13
         3) His reinforcement of the argument ................. 13
      b. Kant's treatment of the argument ..................... 14
         1) His pre-critical position on it .................... 14
         2) The natural course of reasoning ................... 16
         3) Examination of the concept of absolutely necessary being ......................... 16
         4) The criticism of ens realissimum ................. 18
      c. Consideration of Kant's reasoning .................... 20
         1) Narrow in its disregard of the Anselmio
            formula: summary and criticism of Anselm's
            argument ........................................... 20
         2) Somewhat inadequate in its treatment of
            the Cartesian formula ............................. 27
            a) Union of the ontological and the
               cosmological arguments ......................... 27
III. THE TRADITIONAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS AND THEORETICAL CERTAINTY

1. The medieval and modern revolt against intellectualism
   a. Its significance
   b. Its safeguarding

2. The modern disapproval of the traditional theistic "proofs"
   a. Dissatisfaction of some Catholic philosophers
   b. General dissatisfaction of Protestant thinkers
   c. Kant's contribution to this dissatisfaction

IV. THE INADEQUACY OF ALL THEORETICAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS

1. General reason: denial of any theoretical certainty in:
   a. Rejection of a priori (self-evident) propositions
b. Belief that logical necessity is not absolute inevitability ....... 73

c. Doctrine of probability .......... 76

2. Particular reasons .......... 76

a. Common defect of all theoretical theistic proofs—abstractness .......... 76
b. Theoretical arguments not producers of belief .......... 77

c. Not essential to believers .......... 77

1) Lack of formal argument for God's existence during the first two centuries of the Christian Church on the part of Christian writers .. 78

2) Freedom of the Middle Ages from dependence on theistic arguments .......... 81

3) Independence of modern Christians in the matter .......... 82

d. The dependence of Western philosophers upon the Jewish-Christian tradition for their ideas of God 85

e. The value of theoretical "proofs" for the existence of God .......... 90

CHAPTER II
MORAL CERTAINTY

I. TRANSITION .......... 93

1. Relation to theoretical certainty: Kant's Glauben .......... 93

2. Historical antecedents .......... 95

a. Conditions of the time .......... 95
b. Influences on Kant .......... 96


a. Changes in his thinking .......... 99
b. An early hint .......... 100
c. His conception of philosophy .......... 101
d. Practical belief in God .......... 101
e. Strong argument for the freedom of the will .......... 102

II. THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF DEITY, A NEW BASIS FOR RELIGIOUS CERTAINTY .......... 104

1. Implication of Moral Ruler in moral experience .......... 104

a. Kant's opening statement .......... 104
b. Happiness in a moral world .......... 104
c. The Summum Bonum and moral certainty .......... 105
d. Respect for moral law; moral certainty .......... 107

2. Implication of Divine Law-Giver in moral experience: autonomy of will .......... 109

a. Slow transition from law to Law-Giver .......... 109
b. The transition accomplished .......... 112

3. Implication of God in aesthetic experience .......... 116

a. The intuitive judgment of the beautiful, the sublime, and the holy .......... 116
b. The intuitive judgment of a teleological universe .......... 118
c. A rational faith: moral certitude .......... 120
III. DEFECTS OF THE MORAL ARGUMENT

1. Formalism or externalism
2. Impracticality
3. Narrow view of Christianity
4. An arrested hypothesis
   a. Pre-hypothetical faith
   b. Hypothetical faith
   c. Post-hypothetical faith

   1) Make-believe definitions
   2) Make-believe hypotheses
      a) A controversial subject
      b) A fictional "as if"
      c) False hypotheses and hypocrisy
      d) Possibility of knowledge in a true hypothesis
         i) Part faith vs. whole faith
         ii) The distinction, yet connection between "belief" and "knowledge"
         iii) Verification of religious belief
   3) Make-believe moral arguments

IV. VALUE OF THE MORAL ARGUMENT

1. Morally and religiously helpful
2. Personal and existential
3. A guide, thus, to the concept of the God of religion
4. Suggesting a way of approach into the immediate presence of God—the way of faith
   a. The activity of faith
   b. The necessity of faith
   c. The primacy of faith
   d. The reasonableness of faith
      1) Interdependence of faith and reason
      2) Moral and spiritual experience factual
      3) Faith and reason harmonious partners
      4) The seeming irreverence of reason
      5) The general harmony of philosophy and religion
      6) Future partnership of faith and reason
         e. The paradoxical nature of faith
         f. The emotionally-satisfying character of faith
II. CONTEMPORARY EMPHASIS ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
1. An age-old appeal
2. Stimulation by Wesley, Schleiermacher, and modern science
3. General usage of "experience" and "religious experience"
   a. "Experience"
   b. "Religious experience"
4. Transformation of the traditional theistic arguments into empirical "proofs"
   a. Ontological argument
   b. Cosmological argument
   c. Teleological argument
5. Reconstruction of the moral argument into experimental form

III. CERTAINTY IN IMMEDIATE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
1. Meanings of "immediate"
2. Examination of denial
   a. On general grounds: doctrine of probability
      1) Uncertainty concerning the doctrine of uncertainty
      2) Inconsistency in the denial of all certainty
      3) Gradually diminishing vigor of assertion of probability
   b. On particular grounds
      1) Denial of direct or unmediated apprehension of God
      2) Religious experience psychologically less compelling than sense experience
      3) Restriction of "immediacy" to "instantaneousness"
      4) Satisfaction with a reasonable certainty
      5) A modified negation of certainty
3. Affirmation of certitude in religious experience
   a. On general grounds
      1) The age-old contrast between knowledge (certainty) and opinion
      2) The necessity of certitude to the business of daily life as well as to philosophy
      3) The essential characteristic of a datum—non-inference
      4) Duality of subject and object in a unity of experience; knowledge a relation between two distinct terms in intimate union
      5) Some content of knowledge in general awareness without particular attention and reflection
         a) Four types of knowing: awareness, apprehension, comprehension, explanation
         b) No formless given in distinction between given and its interpretation
c) Data of logic, grounds of inference ultimately in immediate experience: cognitive content in intuition and feeling

256

d) Non-rational a bearer of knowledge to the individual

259

6) Dependence of probability upon certitude: the basis of knowledge in true inward conviction

260

7) Denial of the merely hypothetical character of all empirical statements

262

a) "Hypothesis" meaningful

262

b) Validity of distinction between ground and content

263

c) Broad use of "faith"

265

d) "Truth" and "error" intelligible

266

8) Summary

266

b. On particular grounds

267

1) The Kantian foundation for certainty in religious experience

267

a) The strangeness of this fact

267

b) Kant's discontent with his moral argument, and new conception of God as a Person immediately revealed in the soul of man

269

1) Implicit in his first Critique

269

2) Explicit in Kant's Opus Postumum

269

2) The desirability of having certitude

271

a) The urgent call for stress on certitude

271

b) The impossibility of living by uncertainties

272

3) The right of being psychologically certain

272

a) The desire for certainty an innate possession of the race

272

b) The general reliability of experience

273

c) Some absolutes left in an age of uncertainty

275

4) The reasonableness of being certain

276

a) Unshakable certitude versus complete knowledge

276

b) Certitude for self versus proof for others

279

c) Immediate experience of God psychologically more compelling than the facts of science

280

d) Immediate experience of God psychologically more coercive than the facts of psychology

285

5) The psychology of being certain

287

a) Introduction

287

b) Conditioning by:

288
i) Christian community
ii) Bible
iii) Imagination and will
iv) Feeling
v) Faith
6) The experience of being certain: human-divine interaction
   a) Necessity
   b) Awareness: a mediated immediacy
   c) Not an inference but a unique personal encounter: "contact," revelation, confrontation and compresence
   d) Not pantheism
   e) Conscious religious experience: an incontrovertible fact

CHAPTER IV
THE CORRELATION OF CERTAINTY AND CERTITUDE: THE POSSIBILITY OF A RATIONAL-EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY

I. A SYNOPTIC VIEW
1. Introduction
2. Part experience made whole
3. Part reason and part faith made whole
4. True rationalism and true empiricism joined
5. The correlation, thus, of certainty and certitude: Kant's Wissen

II. A VALID BELIEF: VERIFICATION
1. Its meaning and possibility
2. Its need
   a. By the one who has had direct contact with God
   b. By others
3. Its tests
   a) Pragmatic
   b) Logical
      1) Coherence
      2) Logical necessity

III. AN ADEQUATE CERTAINTY
1. For the individual
2. For a rational-empirical theology
   a. Definition
   b. Reasons for rejection of an empirical theology
      1) Self-refuting
      2) Narrowed experience
      3) Abbreviated content
      4) Non-intellectual
   3. Essential elements
      a. Object of experience
      b. Perception of object
      c. Experiment
      d. Reliance on testimony
      e. Analysis, interpretation and systematization
   4. The object of legitimate certainty
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 389
ABSTRACT ............................................ 424
AUTOBIOGRAPHY .................................... 431
INTRODUCTION

I. The problem.--The problem of the dissertation, briefly stated, is whether, in the light of Immanuel Kant's thought, there is any justifiable religious certainty (particularly of God's existence), and if so, to what degree. This involves the subordinate but crucial problem: can logical certainty and psychological certainty be correlated, i.e. is an empirical theology possible? An answer is sought in Kant's treatment of the problem of God, for it suggests three types of religious certainty, namely: 1) theoretical, 2) moral, and 3) experiential. These require for their consideration a passage from dogmatic rationalism to empiricism via Kant's attempted mediation of these extremes in critical rationalism, and lead to a retracing of steps to what is considered a true mean (rational-empirical certainty—the correlation of the logical and psychological aspects), in the Hegelian conviction that the rational is the whole, and that a rationalism which does not consider the whole of experience by the whole reason of a whole personality (intellect, sensibility, will) is not a true rationalism, and that an empiricism which does not include faith and reason as parts of experience is not a true empiricism. That is, basic to the discussion are the contrasts between part and whole reason, part and whole faith, and part and whole experience. The first three of the methods of arriving at religious certainty have been unjustly subjected to the limitations of either one or more of the fragments of
reason, faith, and experience. For instance, it will be shown that Kant's pure reason of the first Critique, even when supplemented by the practical reason of the second and third Critiques, was not whole reason.

II. Definitions.—"Religious certainty" is psychological conviction of the existence of divine realities, particularly of God. This certainty may be merely psychological, or it may be grounded in logical consideration. When it is desirable to distinguish between the logical and the psychological aspects of certainty, "logical certainty" will be used for the former, and "certitude" for the latter. For although The Catholic Encyclopedia views "certitude" as both a state of mind and a quality of a proposition," it points out that Cardinal Newman, for instance, reserved "certitude" for the former, and employed "certainty" for the latter.¹ And Webster, although characterizing "certainty" as either subjective or objective, makes this distinction:

Certitude is almost exclusively subjective, and suggests especially the assurance of the one who believes; as 'My argument is...that certitude was a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of a proposition'.²

The word "God" will be used throughout this dissertation in the same sense in which Kant used the word, i.e. in the general theistic sense—"ein Wesen was alles weiss, vermag und was gut ist will."³

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3. Kant in Buchenau, KOP, I, 50; see KrV, B 725, B 728; explanation of abbreviations used will be found in Bibliography at end.
III. Literature.—No other consideration of the four types of religious certainty treated in this dissertation has been found, either in general or as implied in the works of Kant. The closest approach is found in *Pathways to Certainty*, by William A. Brown. Viewing the loss of certainty in contemporary religion as a real loss, and making the distinction between the certainty attained by science and the certainty of common life, which significantly involves personal factors, such as "persons to be loved and promises to be trusted," Dr. Brown makes certainty of God something more than weighing of arguments; it is a conviction of the whole personality, to be worked for and won by each one for himself.\(^1\) As a subjective experience having an objective reference, and not to be viewed as an end in itself, it is like happiness. Certainty is the consciousness that "there is something that lasts...that gives continuity to my experience and unity to my thought."\(^2\) It is approached by four paths—authority, reasoning, intuition, and experiment.

Mention should also be made of *The Quest for Religious Certainty*, by Harold A. Bosley. He outlined his task thus: "To inquire...into the meaning of certainty, the various types of certainty, and the conditions and extent to which it is possible for us to achieve certainty."\(^3\) He defines it as, "man's consciousness of a reliable relationship, stated in terms of belief, between himself and the world."\(^4\) Holding with Brown that certainty is broader than any one type, Bosley places the types in

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pairs; 1) psychological and logical; 2) certainty of method and certainty of conclusion. He favors the first of each pair, holding that certainty characterizes attitudes rather than beliefs.

IV. Method.—The method followed in this dissertation is as follows: Chapter I, by revealing the inadequacy of the traditional theistic "proofs" and of all theoretical arguments for God's existence, will be a denial of theoretical certainty in religious matters; Chapter II, by accomplishing the same with reference to the moral argument of Kant, will constitute a denial of moral or practical certainty as assurance in the highest degree concerning religious realities; Chapter III, after weighing the claims and counter-claims for probability on general grounds, will move on to consider the claim of experiential certainty due to the direct experience of God in personal relationship; Chapter IV, seeking to remedy the defects of the methods of arriving at religious certainty implied in the preceding certainty-claims, will be an effort to join true rationalism and true empiricism, and to correlate logical certainty and certitude in a degree of certainty that will justify the formation of a rational-empirical theology.

Kant's treatment of the problem of God, as found in his published works, is the basis for the consideration of the questions involved.
CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL CERTAINTY

I. The theoretical certainty of the rationalism of Kant's day

1. Definitions

The relevant definitions of rationalism given in Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd ed., 2066), are:

"Philosophical: a. The theory that reason is a source of knowledge in itself, superior to and independent of sense perceptions—opposed to sensationalism. b. The theory that philosophical knowledge may be arrived at by deduction from a priori concepts or necessary ideas—opposed to empiricism.

Theological: a. Explanation according to reason of what appears supernatural. b. Reliance on reason as the basis for establishment of religious truth."

Thus, "theoretical certainty" would be conviction depending upon logical necessity, or reasoning separated from revelation, faith, will, feeling, and all other aspects of religious experience. Its nature will become clearer in the light of the other certainty-claims to be considered.

2. Characteristics of this rationalism

The characteristics of rationalism as Kant knew it (the true type, as illustrated by the Hegelian concept with its regard for the concrete and the empirical, to come up later) are:

1) "deification of reason" and 2) narrow view of reason.

1. Case, HCD, 158.
By the former is evidently meant an excessive reliance upon reason or an undue stress on the intellectual, at the expense of the non-intellectual, elements of life. Rationalism began with the early Greek philosophers. Later, Plato stressed reason at the expense of sense-experience; the soul remembers rather than creates its ideas out of experience. For him, "the real world is the world of ideas, apprehended only by reason."¹ This opposition between sense and reason was rejected by Aristotle, who modified Platonic rationalism by the introduction of empirical elements. Rationalism was made to harmonize with faith and revelation by Thomas Aquinas. But in the fifteenth century, rationalism "took the form of a great and increasing reliance upon 'the light of reason'" with the result that by the middle of the eighteenth century, it "became no uncommon thing for philosophers and radically-minded theologians altogether to disregard faith and revelation."² "During the enlightenment, abstract reason crowded out revelation and vital religion until the revivals of J. Wesley and J. Edwards."³ In the meantime, speculative apologetics had finally assumed fixed and definite form in Christian Wolff, with whose works Kant was familiar.⁴

3. Classes of this rationalism

Kant divided philosophers into three groups: dogmatists (represented by Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff), skeptics (represented by Hume), and critical philosophers (represented by

2. Baillie, IR, 73; see also DeBurgh, Art. (1926), 419.
4. See Wolff, VG, for his theistic arguments.
himself). Each group was rationalistic in some sense.

a. Dogmatism

The dogmatic rationalists, the deists and their opponents alike appealed to reason; the first group in their theistic arguments believed that it is possible by a priori means to determine the ultimate nature of God, of the soul and of the universe. But the significant fact, the one that brought on the skeptical reaction, was the limited view taken of reason—"the passage from proposition to proposition by the ordinary processes of deduction and induction." Kant's primary purpose seemed to be to attack this system with its false pretensions in metaphysics, in order to save metaphysics, science and religion from skepticism and indifference. For already metaphysics, "die Königin aller Wissenschaften," was the object of "Verachtung."  

b. Skepticism

But skepticism was the inevitable outcome of this theistic and deistic rationalism. As Kant put it, the anarchy following the despotism of dogmatism made possible the inroads of skepticism.  Hugh R. Mackintosh views this rationalism in three stages: first, the belief that the orthodox creed can be, and ought to be, defended by reason; second, there was a gap between what men privately believed and what they publicly professed; and third, that reason (mere understanding and common sense) was put on the throne of judgment to try every Christian

1. Sorley, MVIG, 462.  
2. Kant, KrV, A 11.  
doctrine. Thus, great and reasonable doctrines were hastily pushed aside. "The movement had this curious feature that though professing to prove everything by reason," it did not inquire into the nature of reason.\textsuperscript{1} Reason was supposed to be in normal working order; the possible effects of sin upon it, did not seem to occur to the rationalists. For this type of rationalism, reason seems to stand for "the residuum left in man's higher mental life when we have purged out everything derived from Christianity."\textsuperscript{2}

Hume was a rationalist in the theological sense of the definition given,\textsuperscript{3} and an epistemological skeptic, asserting that sensations arise in the soul "from unknown causes," as we cannot be sure that there are external objects resembling our perceptions.\textsuperscript{4}

c. Critical rationalism

Critical rationalism was Kant's answer to the skeptical rationalism of Hume. According to Shirley Jackson Case, Hume was the clearest voice of the newly awakening empiricism, although Locke had made sense perception the basis of all knowledge.\textsuperscript{5} But Hume's good was mixed with evil: he "freed the individual from the rigid authority of reason but made him the helpless victim of his hopes and fears, pleasures and pains, joys and sorrows."\textsuperscript{6} Seeing the plight of philosophy and religion (and possibly also of science), Kant undertook the task.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Mackintosh, TMT, 16.  
\item Mackintosh, TMT, 17.  
\item Vide supra, 5.  
\item Hume, THN, I, 316-317; see 505.  
\item Case, HCD, 159.  
\item Case, HCD, 159.  
\end{enumerate}
of making secure the well-grounded claims of reason by limiting its activity, taking up a position midway between dogmatic rationalism and Hume's positivistic empiricism.¹

II. Kant's treatment of the traditional theistic arguments

1. His purpose: three facts to be kept in mind

To understand Kant's severe criticism of the traditional theistic arguments, three facts about Kant must be kept in mind.

a. A member of a Christian community.—Kant was a member of a Christian community. He was brought up in a Pietist home and general environment. Naturally, then, he was a believer in God. There is no evidence that he departed from this childhood belief. This is borne out by his writings of both the pre-critical and critical periods. For in the former period, he wrote Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, a modified ontological argument, and in the latter period, Was heisst: sich im Denken orientiren? In this latter work, Kant grants the possibility of the existence of super-sensible entities: "denn Gegenstände der Sinne füllen doch nicht das ganze Feld aller Möglichkeit aus."² He contends that when speculative reason has left the field of the objects of sense-perception, it has left its proper sphere.³ But he further contends that what can not be demonstrated by the speculative reason, can be held as a reasonable belief.

¹. See opening of Einteilung, KrV, A 1-2. ². Kant in Hartenstein, KSW, IV, 343; hereafter all KSW references will be found in this Vol. ³. Kant, KSW, IV, 342.
This is due to self-orientation: "Sehe ich nun die Sonne am Himmel and weiss, dass es nun die Mittagszeit ist, so weiss ich Süden, Westen, Norden und Osten zu finden." This is accompanied by a feeling of the difference between the left hand and the right hand: "Und selbst der Astronom, wenn er blos auf das, was er Acht gäbe, würde sich unvermeidlich desorientieren." What may be regarded as a reasonable belief on subjective grounds, without sufficient objective evidence, Kant calls an hypothesis (of the theoretical reason) and a postulate (of the practical reason). The failure of the traditional arguments to demonstrate the existence of God did not deter Kant from believing in God for, "wo will Jemand durch reine Speculation der Vernunft die Einsicht hernehmen: dass es kein höchstes Wesen...geben." This will suffice to show that Kant believed in God; evidence will be given later that he saw the necessity of belief in "ein Begriff welcher die ganze menschliche Erkenntniss schliesst und krönet." 

b. A man of his age.—Then, Kant was a man of his age, an age of deism. Lord Herbert, known as the founder of deism, believed that a Supernatural God exists, and that He should be worshipped. Not all the deists of the age ending in Kant rejected the testimony of revelation on the nature of God; Descartes, Locke and Leibniz, for instance, accepted in general the teaching of their respective churches, but holding in common with St. Thomas "that reason apart from revelation could

2. Kant, KSW, IV, 341. 5. Kant, KrV, B 669.
assure us by process of argument, independent of any specifically religious experience, of the existence of God." It is doubtful whether Kant any more than Hume ever emancipated himself from deistic influence, at least, not until late in life.

o. A foe to false pretensions in knowledge.—Then it must be remembered that Kant was a foe to false pretensions in knowledge. His purpose was to attack dogmatic rationalism rather than to question the existence of God. He never actually denied the existence of the real or the noumenon (and thus of God viewed as the Noumenon); in fact, noumena are required as bases for phenomena, and although, in Kant's view, in the technical language of the first Critique, noumena are unknown and unknowable, they must be thought and thought truly. His work was to show how inadequate mere speculative reasoning is:

Ich werde dartun: dass die Vernunft, auf dem einen Wege (dem empirischen) so wenig als auf dem anderen (dem transcendentalen) etwas ausrichte, und das sie vergießlich ihre Flügel auspanne, um über die Sinnenwelt durch die bloße Macht der Speculation hinaus zu kommen.  

2. Ontological argument

a. Statement of the argument by Descartes.—Reduced to a simple statement, the ontological argument of Descartes affirms that the possession by man of the idea of the perfect or infinite implies the existence of a perfect being. That is, "That God exists is an analytical judgment. It is involved

2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 47.  
3. Vide supra, 7.  
4. Kant, KrV, B 619.  
5. Descartes, MPP, 11.
in the definition of God, and hence is a necessary truth of reason."1

1) His rational method and principle

Realizing that he might have many false notions, Descartes decided to discard all his beliefs, and to take a fresh start. So he doubts everything, even his own existence, as he might be deceived in this. But the fact that he is deceived, that he doubts, is of itself evidence to him that he exists. His start in epistemology is, then, "I think, therefore I am."2 The combination of "I think" (broadly, "I am conscious") and "Therefore, I am" exhibits his method of recalling discarded notions which he thinks worthy of holding—intuition and deduction. The fact of which Descartes is most certain at the start, is that he exists. This he terms intuitive knowledge. If there are external objects (a question at this stage), they will not be known directly: "Our inquiries should be directed...to what we can clearly...behold and with certainty deduce."3 Now, defining "clear" as that which is intuitively present to the mind, and "distinct" as that which is entirely clear in itself, Descartes announces his positive rational principle: "Everything must be true which is as clear and distinct as self-consciousness."4 This self-evident, first principle, Descartes applies to the idea of God, and to this theistic argument.

1. Knudson, PP, 260; see Kant in Hartenstein, KSW (KAW), VIII,565.
2. Descartes, MPP, 33; all references in this section are to Descartes's works, unless otherwise stated.
3. PWD, 14, 15, 28.
4. Windelband, HP, 392; see MPP, 151.
2) His approach to the argument

Descartes begins with a contrast between "finite" and "infinite." Before he threw overboard all his opinions, he had had an idea of God. Now he reflects that qualities that he had assigned to physical objects—substance, duration and number—might have arisen in his own mind. But this, he decides, could not be true of the idea of God, for the idea of an infinite being could not have originated with him, a finite being. Thus, although granting that the mere idea of God is no proof of His existence,¹ Descartes has introduced the concepts of necessary existence and perfect being, concluding that the existence of God is a valid inference, as necessary existence is inherent in the concept of God, but not in finite things or imaginary concepts.²

3) His reinforcement of the argument

In this contrast between "finite" and "infinite", Descartes has reinforced his ontological argument by the cosmological, which goes from effect (here, idea of an infinite being) to cause (here, infinite being). Obviously under the influence of the medieval principle that the greater the being the greater the reality, Descartes writes: "I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite."³ He concludes that he possessed the notion of the infinite before that of the finite, i.e. before himself. He is more sure of God's existence than of his own.⁴

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¹. MPP, 78-79.
². MPP, 136-137.
³. MPP, 54.
⁴. MPP, 61.
And the idea of God is so clear and distinct, and man's constant dependence on a higher power is so obvious, that Descartes is led to declare that "it is impossible that the human mind can know anything with more clearness and certitude."¹ The greater the objective perfection in our idea of a thing, "the greater also must be the perfection of its cause."² For instance, in a machine great skill is displayed. We have a right to ask how the constructor came by the idea, for "all the ingenuity which is contained in the idea objectively only, ...must exist at least in its first and chief cause."³ Even so, we have a right, declares Descartes, to inquire where we got the idea of God.⁴ It is significant that Descartes in all this has substituted another given for the human self, and has taken a fresh start. God becomes the Given, "the true God, in whom are contained all the treasures of science and wisdom," the basis of operations in the acquisition of all other knowledge.⁵ This opens a path to the external world.⁶

b. Kant's treatment of the argument

1) His pre-critical position on it.—Kant's pre-critical position on the ontological argument as stated by Descartes is indicated in his Principiorum primorum Cognitionis metaphysicae Nova Dilucidatio (1755, and referred to as Nova Dilucidatio). He is in sympathy with the argument, and his method is somewhat rationalistic. The distinction

₁. MPP, 63.  ⁴. MPP, 138–139.
₂. MPP, 138.  ⁵. MPP, 63–64.
₃. MPP, 138–139.  ₆. MPP, 66.
between necessary and contingent being is made; God is the Inbegriff or Schema of the reality of all possible notions, although, following Crusius, Kant sees that the principle of non-contradiction is not sufficient in dealing with matters of fact, and that absolute reality cannot be deduced from absolute necessity. When Kant wrote his Inaugural Dissertation, still somewhat under the spell of the Leibnizian-Wolffian dogmatic rationalism, he held that a certain form of the ontological argument is valid, in fact, the only valid one, deducing the proof "from the inherent quality of absolute necessity." But in Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1763, and referred to commonly as the Beweisgrund), Kant notes the qualitative differences between realities, i.e. he has detected the difference between logical and real relations. But unable to conceive of the non-existence of God, he argues for an absolutely necessary being, although not going as far as Descartes, that is, from possibility to actuality. Such passages as the following are found: "Schlechterdings nothwendig ist, dessen Gegentheil an sich unmöglich ist." "Es existirt ein schlechterdings nothwendiges Wesen." This being Kant describes as one, simple, eternal, a spirit containing the highest reality. F. E. England clarifies Kant's thought in the Beweisgrund:

Existence is no predicate; there is no more in actual things than in possibilities. We cannot pass from a concept to the affirmation of

2. Eckoff, Art. (1894), 38.
3. Kant, BDG, 21, 23.
existence. But he maintains we can and must pass from the inner possibility of things in general to an absolute positing, the affirmation of the existence of that which makes possibility itself possible.¹

Evidently Kant was slow in coming to his critical position. James Ward considers this last work as thoroughly rationalistic in the Wolffian sense.² But this appears to be an exaggeration.

2) The natural course of reasoning.—Preliminary to the discussion of the theistic arguments in the first Critique, Kant describes the natural course of reasoning in these arguments. He describes the Ideal (a word standing for such ideas as God, freedom and immortality), as a regulative principle of human reason, with no objective reality.³ Reason feels the need of presupposing a conception of unconditioned being as a ground of conditioned beings, in order to prevent the thought of infinite regress of causes. For, "Wenn etwas...existirt, so muss auch eingeräumt werden, dass irgend etwas nothwendigerweise existire. Denn das Zufällige existirt nur unter der Bedingung eines anderen, als seiner Ursache."⁴ It is only natural for reason to put existence into this concept.⁵

3) Examination of the concept of absolutely necessary being.—In Kant's examination of the concept of absolutely necessary being, he declares that if this being exists, then it is outside the phenomenal order; if that order

1. England, KGG, 53-54; see 51 and Kant, BDC, I, 396.
3. See Kant, KrV, B 596-599; Watson, FKE, 290-291.
4. Kant, KrV, B 612.
5. Kant, KrV, B 613-615.
were a totality of conditions, it would mean infinite regress of causes.\(^1\) He again grants that the recognition of any one thing as contingent implies something which exists necessarily.\(^2\) But it is a "blosse Idee," although Kant would grant that the idea refers to a Supreme Being (not nature) with a restriction:\(^3\)

Nun ist zwar ein Namenerklärung von diesem Begriffe ganz leicht, dass es nämlich so etwas sei, dessen Nichtsein unmöglich ist; aber man wird hiedurch um nichts klüger, in Ansehung der Bedingungen, die es unmöglich machen, das Nichtsein eines Dinges als schlechterdings undenklich anzusehen... Denn alle Bedingungen, die der Verstand jederzeit bedarf, um etwas als nothwendig anzusehen, vermittelt das Wort; Unbedingt, wegwerfen, macht mir noch lange nicht verständlich, ob ich alsdann durch einen Begriff eines Unbedingtnothwendigen noch etwas oder vielleicht gar nichts denke.\(^4\)

Such a verbal definition, declares Kant, does not tell why it is impossible to think of the non-existence of this being. The examples produced are of judgments, not things, as the judgment that if there is a triangle, it must have three angles, a conditional necessity. Kant grants that the idea of perfect and necessary existence carries with it the idea of existence, but notes that this was not the conclusion that Descartes drew from his illustration. It is true, as Descartes said, that the idea of the triangle entails the equality of its three angles to two right angles. But making the comparison, Descartes said that the idea of an all-perfect being carries with it existence. That is, Descartes

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1. Kant, KrV, B 612.  
2. See Kant, KrV, B 612, 618.  
3. See Kant, KrV, B 614, 620, 640.  
4. Kant, KrV, B 621.
confused logical and ontological necessity.

Whatever involves no contradiction cannot be regarded as "the sole principle of all truth"1:

Einen Triangel setzen und doch die drei Winkeln dessenben aufheben ist widersprechend, aber den Triangel samt seinen drei Winkeln aufheben, ist kein Widerspruch. Gott is allmächtig; das ein nothwendiges Urtheil...Gott ist nicht, so ist weder die Allmacht, noch irgend ein anderes seiner Prädicate gegeben denn sie sind all zusammt dem Subject aufgehoben und es zeigt sich in diesem Gedanken nicht der mindeste Widerspruch.2

If the subject is admitted to exist, the predicate must be granted, but both subject and predicate can be denied without contradiction. Kant now offers a criterion for the impossibility of the conception of unconditioned being: "Ohne den Widerspruch habe ich durch bloß Begriffe a priori kein Merkmal der Unmöglichkeit."3 There was no inner contradiction in Descartes's illustration, although, as we have seen Descartes misapplied it. And a triangle can be drawn on paper, but there is no external contradiction in thinking that there is no objective triangle corresponding to the representation. Kant is following Hume here, for holding that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of anything by a priori arguments, Hume said that what is conceived as existent can be conceived as non-existent.4

4) The criticism of ens realissimum

To the argument that there is one exception to the above line of reasoning, i.e. that there is contradiction in

2. Kant, KrV, B 622. 4. See Watson, IRE, I, 253.
annihilating both subject and predicate in the case of the ene realissimum, as: "Nun ist unter aller Realität auch das Dasein mit begriffen; also liegt das Dasein in dem Begriffe von einem Möglichen,"¹ Kant answers that it is absurd, "wenn ihr in den Begriff eines Dinges, welches ihr lediglich seiner Möglichkeit nach denken wolltet,... schon den Begriff seiner Existenz hinein brachtet."² It is a mere idea, whose objective existence is yet to be established. "Sein is offenbar kein reales Prädicat, d.i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu dem Begriffe etwas Dinges hinzu kommen könnte."³ Then to say, "God is omnipotent," is not to say that God is, for this verb in the quotation is merely a word of relation between subject and predicate. And the content of the real is no more than that of the possible: "Hundert wirkliche Thaler enthalten nicht das Mindest mehr, als hundert mögliche."⁴ An existential judgment is not the same as an attributive judgment.⁵ The idea of a necessary being is possible (as with the hundred dollars), but a possible idea is not the same as the idea of a possible being. That is, Kant has distinguished analytic and synthetic judgments. The ontological argument is analytic in nature, as a priori, adding nothing to the conception of God. Thus, Kant teaches that existence is not derived by analysis of a concept, but by synthetic judgments based on experience.

Perhaps no better summary of the reasons for Kant's

¹. Kant, KrV, B 624.
². Kant, KrV, B 625.
³. Kant, KrV, B 627.
⁴. Kant, KrV, B 627.
⁵. See Dunham, RP, 248.
rejection of the ontological argument can be given than that of G. T. Whitney, namely, 1) that mere absence of contradiction proves no more than the logical possibility of a concept; 2) it is impossible to derive existence by analysis of a concept, as "all existential judgments are synthetical...The existence of a thing can not be determined without experience." But Whitney should have qualified "experience" by prefixing "sense," for that is Kant's qualification.

c. Consideration of Kant's reasoning

1) Narrow in its disregard of the Anselmic formula: summary and criticism of Anselm's argument

In the consideration of Kant's reasoning upon the ontological argument, a summary and criticism of Anselm's argument will be necessary in order to show that Kant's reasoning was narrow as disregarding the Anselmic formula. The two names usually associated with the ontological argument are Anselm and Descartes. But Kant declares that it was Descartes's putting of the case that he treated.2 Perhaps a better descriptive word for the Cartesian form of the argument is "incomplete" rather than "spurious" or even "imperfect."3

Anselm's argument is found in the Proslogium. Commenting on Psalms 14:1, "The fool hath said in his heart, 'there is no God,'" Anselm wrote:

But at any rate, this very fool when he hears of this being...a being than which nothing greater can be conceived--understands what he hears,

1. Whitney, IKP, 204-205.
2. See Kant, KrV, B 630.
and what he understands is in his understanding, although he does not understand it to exist.¹

To illustrate this, Anselm mentions the painter who has the idea of his painting in his mind before it is objectified. Afterward, the painter "both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists."² Assuming that the fool has the idea of God, Anselm proceeds:

And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose that it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater.³

He concludes, then, that the idea is both in the understanding and in reality, and advances to the position that it is impossible to conceive of God not existing:

For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction.⁴

Anselm strengthens this argument: "For if a mind could conceive a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd."⁵ Then, using the concept of degrees of being, Anselm explains why the fool is an atheist:

To thee alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others....Why, then has the fool said...there is no God...since it is so

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1. Deane, SA, 7.
2. Deane, SA, 7.
3. Deane, SA, 8.
evident to a rational mind, that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool.

Anselm recognizes that there is more than one way in which a thing is conceived: "For in one sense an object is conceived when the word signifying it is conceived; and in another when the very entity, which the object is, is understood." In the former sense, God can be conceived; in the latter, not.

Of course, it must be recognized that Anselm is arguing for the logical, not the psychological, impossibility of conceiving of God's non-existence. The fool can hear and utter the word "God" and still conceive of His non-existence. We think many things that we think do not exist. If it can be shown that all men have the concept the greater than which can not be conceived, the concept carrying with it as part of its meaning the actual existence of the corresponding object, then, it might be granted that belief in the actual existence of the object is logically necessary. But Anselm did not prove that the fool got this idea. Saint Thomas saw no logical absurdity in supposing the non-existence of God. That is, the existence of God is not self-evident to men:

Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this name God is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the name signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued

that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.\(^1\)

Anselm himself holds that God does exist. The basis of his whole system was faith. He is famous for the expression, "Credo ut intelligam." ("I believe in order to know or understand.") He held that faith is prior to reason in both logic and value. This is logical, for where could we get in everyday life, in science, and in philosophy without basic presuppositions, hypotheses, givens, and intuitions? Anselm describes himself as one who lifts his eyes to God, and tries to understand what he believes. His order is not the rational order of first understand and then believe; he saw that unless he believed, he would not know or understand, for he is convinced that the effort to understand the problems of the universe without faith is impossible. All this can readily be granted. No philosopher or scientist with his presuppositions could consistently object to it. But the important fact for the ontological argument is that Anselm is already a believer and that he reverses his position when he comes to the fool, for then he asks the fool to place understanding first and faith second. He bases his hope of the conversion of the fool on the idea of the fool's understanding it, on the basis that if the fool has it in the understanding, he has the idea of God. But we may understand something, and still not believe it, and so we have

\(^1\) Aquinas, ISA, 22.
no assurance that the fool gets the idea thus in the sense of getting a belief.

It must be admitted that Anselm is arguing on the basis of no mere idea of God, as do some proponents of the ontological proof. In answer to Gaunilon’s objection that if God is unique, then we have nothing with which to compare Him in order to "conceive" Him, Anselm made the distinction, as did Descartes, and reasonably, between "comprehend" and "conceive":

Inconceivable is conceivable although that to which the word inconceivable can be applied is not conceivable. So when one says that than which no greater is conceivable, undoubtedly what is heard is conceivable and intelligible, although that being itself...cannot be conceived and understood.

It is this idea of God’s uniqueness that gives Anselm’s argument its chief plausibility. For if it can be said that the fool gets the idea of God (as an ordinary idea) because he understands it, then the same can be said of something imaginary, as Gaunilon asserted. But Gaunilon goes on to make an admission by way of a qualification: "Unless it can be shown that this being is of such a character that it cannot be held...like all unreal objects, or objects whose existence is uncertain." This was all the opening that Anselm asked: "For by no means can this being than which a greater cannot be conceived be understood as any other than that which alone is greater than all." Of course

2. Deane, SA, 148.  5. Deane, SA, 163.
this disposes of Gaunilon's "lost island". Anselm continues: "You see then, with how much justice you have compared me with your fool, who on the sole ground that he understands...would affirm that a lost island exists." Anselm then promised Gaunilon that if he could devise anything to exist either in reality or in mind alone (other than that than which no greater can be thought), that he would discover that thing and give Gaunilon his "lost island", a safe enough bargain for Anselm.

C. A. Beckwith seems to have missed this promise.

Denying that anyone can conceive perfection (in the strict sense employed by the argument) in an island or a devil, as a "perfect devil" is nonsense, and an island is not in essence self-sufficient, Charles Hartshorne writes:

The question is, can a possibility be real unless it would, if actual, be an effect of a cause, which is real, of the effect of a possible cause, which if actual would itself be the effect of a cause which...(the series ultimately terminating in a cause which is real)?

As Sorley remarks, the proof of Anselm was "an effort to discriminate between the idea of God and all other ideas." So Gaunilon's objection about imaginary ideas is not valid: it holds only for imperfect or finite things, because existence is not the necessary content of the idea of the finite, as Anselm hints in his rebuttal.

Anselm's mistake is well stated by Windelband:

1. Deane, SA, 164.
2. Beckwith, IG, 97.
3. Hartshorne, MVG, 304.
4. Sorley, MVIG, 311; see Frank, PRT, 36.
5. Deanes, SA, 161; see Taylor, Art.(1929), 268-269.
Anselm proved only that if God is thought (as most perfect being), he must be thought also necessarily as being or existent and cannot be thought as non-existent. But the ontological argument of the Proslogium did not show even in the remotest degree that God, i.e., that a most perfect being must be thought. The necessity for this stood fast for Anselm personally not only because of the conviction of his faith, but also by the cosmological argumentation of the Monologium. When he believed that he could dispense with this presupposition, and with the help of the mere concept of God arrive at the proof of his existence, he exemplified... the fundamental idea of realism, which ascribed to concepts without any regard to their genesis ... the character of... Reality.1

Because of this diversity of reason and faith in the argument, H. R. Smart sees two possible interpretations of it -- rationalistic and apologetic, as "according to the first interpretation the argument is purely rational; according to the second, reason and faith together form the foundation of the argument." 2 Smart concludes that Anselm's real aim is practical, polemical and apologetic, in the combating of skepticism.

What did Anselm, therefore, prove? Essentially what Descartes proved, that the fool, and therefore all mankind, can conceive of the idea of God, and that if God is thought of as most perfect being, He must be thought also as necessarily existent. He did not prove that the idea of a perfect being implies the existence of God; he only proved that such an idea proves the idea of the existence of God. That is, as the Neo-Thomists clearly see, in idea there is no guarantee of

existence.\textsuperscript{1} Or as Watson interpreting Kant states it, "Theoretical reason cannot make objective or synthetical judgments."\textsuperscript{2}

2) Somewhat inadequate in its treatment of the Cartesian formula

a) Union of the ontological and the cosmological arguments.--Kant's treatment of the Cartesian form of the argument is somewhat inadequate in that, first of all, it separates what it found together—the ontological and the cosmological arguments. Due to this Kant did not quite do full justice to the subject of the inconceivability of the non-existence of God. For while Descartes did not succeed in proving the existence of God, he did strengthen his original argument by the introduction of empirical elements in the references to nature and causation.

b) Uniqueness of the idea of God.--The uniqueness of the idea of God has been called the crux of the ontological argument. While Kant illustrated well the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments by referring to one hundred dollars in pocket versus one hundred dollars in conception, yet it must be observed that no contingent being can truly represent an unconditioned being. The ontological argument "was meant to refer only to our thought of God, not to a hundred dollars."\textsuperscript{3} In some sense both the one hundred dollars and the lost island are beside the point. "With dollars the distinction between potentiality and full actuality is obviously

\textsuperscript{1} See Duce, KGN, 236. 
\textsuperscript{2} Watson, FKE, 456. 
\textsuperscript{3} Inge, Art. (1948), 49.
irrelevant."¹ Hegel also criticized Kant at this point: "One hundred Thalers are not related to themselves alone; they are mutable and perishable...with God concept and reality are inseparable."²

In answer to the thought of Descartes that the idea of this unique or infinite being could not have originated with him, Kant takes the position, and truly, that the mere concept of an infinite being can not be identified with the infinite itself. Kant, however, was unfortunate in his expression "casting away (wegwerfen) conditions."³ For it is not necessary to discard conditions in thinking of the unconditioned; a self-sufficient being has all the conditions within; they are self-imposed, not thrown away. As to accounting for the idea of a perfect being on the part of imperfect beings, Kant could have shown that it can arise "from our observation of the positive, but mixed perfections which we think we have detected in men and things."⁴ To be valid, Descartes's argument would have to show that the idea itself needs to be infinite.⁵ It should be noted also that Kant failed to observe the circular argument of Descartes, his clear and distinct ideas both validating and validated by the ontological "proof."

o) Union of thought and thing.—The ontological argument asserts a conception to which Kant in the critical period never attained—the ultimate union or unity of thought

¹. Hartshorne, MVG, 314-315.  
². Maier, HCK, 48; see Hegel, SL, I, 101.  
³. Kant, KrV, B 638.  
⁴. Vance, RT, 76.  
⁵. See Bradshaw, PFF, 42-43.
and thing. On the "hundert Thaler" illustration he simply asserts their difference. But thought has reference to being, and is meaningless without it. "At some point, potentiality and actuality must touch, and at some point meaning must imply existence."¹ Hartshorne explains that while existence is not a predicate, it may be the mode of a thing, and that Kant's illustration of the hundred dollars is actually to the credit of the ontological argument; it has to be opposed by a disjunction between meaning and its referent reality, or between universals and individuals: "Only if there is one individual whose presence is universal, have universals an intelligible ground in actuality."² And if somewhere in the universe there is no ultimate union of thought and thing, there appears to be no ultimate solution of the problem of knowledge, which is simply the problem of the relation of thought and its object. Thus, in the ontological argument, Frank sees a beginning of a new phase in philosophy:

Human thinking in its attempt to transcend the sphere of objective reality discovers its own subjectivity and anxiously struggles to ascertain the truths of its own concepts...how human thought can grasp a reality which lies outside its own thinking.³

How can we be sure of a being who transcends everything, even thought? We can not. Ultimately, thought and being must be reconciled. Hegel's mind could not come to rest until it arrived at their union in God. "For Hegel, therefore, the ontological argument consists simply in showing how the notion

by its very nature negates its barren subjective unity and
attains objective existence.¹ The idea of God is a symbol of
the union of thought and thing, just as He is a symbol of the
union of existence and value.²

Thus, the ontological argument can be viewed as an
expression of the fundamental confidence of reason in itself,
i.e. that one is not justified in stopping with verification
of sensible experience, but should go on to the higher warrant
--confidence of thought in complete rationality.

3) Reasonable in its view of necessary being and
ens realessimum

Then, Kant's reasoning on the ontological argument is
reasonable in its view of necessary being and ens realessimum.
Of course, his insight into the necessity of a transcendent
being is a true one. God can not be simply immanent, a link
in a chain of causes. On the other hand, in the recognition
of contingent beings, as the source of their energy and life,
He can not be a foreign power. The solution of the difficulty
is in the theistic view of an immanent-transcendent Being.

Kant's keen critical philosophical eye caught the dis­
tinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and the
truth that the mere absence of contradiction does not prove
the actuality of an object but only the logical possibility
of its concept. To say bluntly that God is a mere idea

¹ Schilling, ERH, 169; see Hegel, Die Absolute Religion, JUB, XIV, 42-43.
² See Brightman, Art. (1937) 1, 148.
sounds both irreverent and unreasonable, but so far as the ontological argument is concerned, that is a true statement of fact, for the concept of God here is not definite enough to refer to the God of religion. True, the thought of God as a unique Being leads inevitably to the thought of His existence as a consequent of His essence, "so that if any one knows the essence of the necessary being, he knows also on what account the necessary being exists." But the only way for one to know God's essence is through His self-disclosure. It does not come through human speculation; the ontological argument testifies eloquently of this.

Assuming that there is an ens realissimum, no definite connection between it and a necessary being has been made by the argument. "It does not follow that the only necessary being is that which contains all reality within itself." On the basis of Hegel's theory of absolute idealism, of course, God viewed not as the most real of beings (as in the ontological argument) but as the sole real being, all reality can not be denied. But Hegel's contention that to deny the existence of God is to deny all existence, is valid only on the assumption of the truth of his own system; and a personal ens realissimum can be denied. It could conceivably be finite; and even if eternal, it could be nature. Galloway, who sees no sense in denying a sum of reality, is unable to identify it

2. See Aquinas, ISA, 22.  
3. Watson, PKE, 290.  
4. Maier, HOK, 49.
as the God of theism. ¹ If either absolute idealism or panthe­ism were the most rational explanation of reality, this iden­tification could be made. For Spinoza, viewing things on his third level of the orders of knowledge, saw the totality of things, and called it God. But this God is not the God of theism.²

So Kant is reasonable in his assertion that the neces­sary being and the ens realissimum of the ontological argument are mere ideas. That we seem to have ideas intuitively per­ceived which lend assurance of their objectivity is not against Kant's assertion. "My idea of space...I incline to regard as real...causality...beauty...goodness...I attribute these qual­i­ties to the objects." But Hocking makes a significant addi­tion: "These ideas guide me only in so far as they are at the same time idea and experience, the idea in question being no other than the experience recognized."³

4) Significant in its empirical trend

The empirical nature of Kant's reasoning in general is seen in the opening words of the Einteilung in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft: "Erfahrung is ohne Zweifel das erste Product, welches unser Verstand hervorbringt, indem er den rohen Stoff sinnlicher Empfindungen bearbeitet."⁴ England notes the in­fluence of Ohrusius upon Kant in the latter's idea "that the very possibility of a thing depends upon its finding a place

¹ See Galloway, TPR, 386; Ryan, Art.(1935), 134; Maier, HCK, 49.
² See Spinoza, DE, Prop. XV.
³ Hocking, MGHE, 307-308, 568.
⁴ Kant, KrV, A 1.
in the texture of actual experience."¹

Of course, Kant is right in saying that a definition never implies the existence of the defined, a position traceable to Aristotle; a nominal definition is made genuine only by resort to empirical fact: "God may very well be imaginary even if the definition of the imaginary God imagines Him to be real.... Analysis of definitions is not verification."² With the empiricism of Aristotle behind them, Saint Thomas and the Neo-Thomists in general reject the ontological argument because it is a priori rather than a posteriori.³

Maier sees in Kant’s position on experience a challenge of one’s right to include God among scientific objects, on the basis that for an object to be an object of knowledge in the strict sense, appeal must be made first to experience: "Without experience, an object of science is impossible; no mere demonstration will conjure it into existence."⁴ Being is activity, as Bowne held, and activity is a revelation of a person or thing, the evidence of its existence. The actual existence of the being whose essential nature is not a predicate tacked on to a subject, is activity, the empirical basis of the conception of the being. Indirectly agreeing with this, Pringle-Pattison writes: "The nature of Ultimate Reality is to read, therefore in its manifestation, and may be read there

¹ England, KLG, 37.
² Brightman, Art. (1937) 1, 153-154; see Tennant, PT, i, 201-202; Hartshorne, MVG, 317.
³ See Aquinas, ISA, 22-25; Duce, KGN, 234.
⁴ Maier, HOK, 47.
And Hocking is of the same opinion that God can appear in experience only through His activity, and that if "no effect of God were visible in the world, His existence must be always a matter of conjecture." Tracing the God-idea back to its beginnings, Hocking finds that the idea is an inference from very evident effects. Apart from these effects, Hocking sees no reason for belief in an invisible cause: "Men do not first imagine a God in abstracto, then speculate about His possible powers, and then at last enquire whether such a being exists." Thus, Kant's reasoning upon the ontological "proof has been shown to be narrow in its disregard of the Anselmic formula, somewhat inadequate in its treatment of the Cartesian formula, reasonable in its view of necessary being and ens realissimum, and significant in its empirical trend.

3. Cosmological argument

a. Background.—In the tenth book of the Laws of Plato is found the beginning of the cosmological argument. Only the soul has the power of self-motion, and it is the cause of all other motion. Going from finite souls to a supreme Soul, Plato argues that the order and movement of the planets must be the work of an "ordering mind, a Soul that is Supreme and Good." Following Plato, Aristotle hinted that every thing must have "intelligence and nature" as prior causes. Connected with

1. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 175.
3. Hocking, MGHE, 216.
4. Hocking, MGHE, 216.
5. Plato, CPPT, 457, 467; see 455-456.
his name are the doctrines of motion, the Unmoved Mover, and
the four causes (formal, material, final, and efficient) which
implying purpose, imply a personal creative God, Pure Form and
Pure Act. An infinite series of causes involves contradiction;
consequently there must be a first cause which is itself un-
caused;\(^1\) strangely, the "Unmoved Mover" imparts motion.\(^2\)

Under the influence of Aristotle, through the mediation
of Saint Augustine, turning from the a priori argument of An-
selm, and arguing on a posteriori grounds in the belief that
he could demonstrate the existence of God by a consideration
of existing effects in the world ("All our knowledge origi-
nates from sense," sounding very much like Kant), Saint Thomas
argued in five ways: 1) from motion, 2) from the nature of ef-
ficient cause, 3) from possibility and necessity, 4) from the
gradation found in things, and 5) from the "governance" of the
world.\(^3\) The first four of these "ways" are cosmological in
character. Le Roy describes the first way as follows:

Cette preuve, que saint Thomas expose d'après
Aristote et qu'il donne comme la plus claire et la
plus simple de toutes, prétend conclure à l'exist-
ence de Dieu par la nécessité d'un premier moteur
immobile, principe des mouvements que l'expérience
nous montre dans le monde. Elle part d'un fait
d'observation, le fait universel du mouvement, et
consiste en une application du principe de causa-
lité à l'analyse de ce fait. En somme, elle se
fonde sur une théorie du devenir.\(^4\)

Likewise under the influence of Augustine, compelled

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2. See McKaon, BWA, 373.
3. See Aquinas, ISA, 21-27; Garrigou-LaGrange, OG, 96-97; Duce, KGN, 234.
4. Le Roy, Art.(1907), 130.
"to fall back upon the Augustinian conception of the will of
God as the sufficient reason, and indeed the efficient cause
of finite existence," Descartes as has been shown, advanced
the cosmological "proof." Briefly stated, his idea was that
"there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and
total cause as in its effect; for whence can the effect draw
its reality if not from the cause?"2

Among his five "proofs" of the existence of God, Chris-
tian Wolff advocated the cosmological. With Aquinas and Des-
cartes, he believed that God's existence can be demonstrated
by theoretical arguments. It was particularly against the
rationalistic dogmatism of Wolff that Kant reacted in his
treatment of the traditional theistic arguments:

Wolff gibt zwei verschiedene Variationen, im ersten Falle wird aus der Definition des ens a se, das zweitemal aus der Unmöglichkeit eines regressus in infinitum die Außerswelt-
llichkeit Gottes bewiesen...Es muss daher einen zureichenden Grund für unsere Existenz geb-
en, der entweder in uns, oder in einem anderen Wesen liegen muss, aber schliesslich immer aug ein Wesen führt...das den Grund seiner Wirk-
llichkeit in sich in seiner Existenz enthält, also nothwendig wirklich ist:...Von diesem 'ens
necessarium' wird nun bewiesen, dass es von anderen Wesen unabhängig ist.3

b. Statement

A statement of the cosmological argument of these repre-
sentative thinkers is made by Kant himself:

Wenn etwas existirt, so muss auch ein
schlechternngs nothwendiges Wesen exist-
iren. Nun existire zum Mindesten ich selbst;

2. Descartes, MPP, 49.
3. Levy, RCW, 14; see Wolff,

WVG, 574–580, 636–638.
also existirt ein absolutnothwendiges Wesen. 1

o. Kant's treatment, and criticism of it

1) Kant's general criticism,—In the pre-critical period, Kant accepts the Wolffian statement of the argument in general, but is uncertain on the absolute certainty of this independent being as the argument depends upon the principle of sufficient reason, and he regards it as "an absconum that anything should have the ground of its existence in itself." 2

On other grounds, Kant held that God is the logical ground and the producing cause of the finite world. But in his belief in creation, he resembled his rationalistic predecessors:

Hence side by side with the concept of God as ultimate ground from whom all else follows as logical consequent is the concept of God as creator of substances in respect to their existence and their mutual relations. 3

But in the critical period, Kant's general and consistent criticism is that while claiming to be empirical, the cosmological "proof" is really rationalistic in nature:

Das nothwendige Wesen kann nur auf eine einzige Art, d.i. in Ansehung aller möglichen entgegengesetzten Prädicate nur durch eines derselben bestimmt werden, folglich muss es durch seinen Begriff durchgängig bestimmt sein. Nun ist nur ein einziger Begriff von einem Dinge möglich, der dasselbe a priori durchgänglich bestimmt...ens realissime... ein altes Argument in verkleideter Gestalt für ein neues aufstellt...fusset sich dieser Beweis auf Erfahrung...Dieser Erfahrung aber bedient sich der kosmologische Beweis nur, um einen nothwendigen Wesens überhaupt. 4

1. Kant, KrV, B 633; for fuller statement, see Whitney, IKP, 207.

2. England, KCG, 55-56; see Kant, UDG, 4, Betrachtung (V, 1, 142); BDG, II, 157.


4. Kant, KrV, B 634-635.
2) Vital points of consideration
   a) Validity of causal concept in general
      i) Hume's skepticism.—Hume declared that the connection between cause and effect is felt or imagined, not observed,¹ thus, not a matter of human experience, except as a mental one, but only "constant conjunction," an effect being an event that invariably comes after a cause. In the maxim that "whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence," Hume found no mark "of any...intuitive certainty."² This was interpreted by Kant not as a denial of causality as a fact but as an a priori conception. Hume also denied that cause is implied in the word "effect," as it is only a relative term, thus not proving that every being must be preceded by a cause, "no more than it follows because every husband must have a wife, that therefore every man must be married...opinion must arise from observation and experience."³ Granting that necessity must arise "from some impression," Hume asserted that necessity (such as, "two plus two equals four") lies only in the understanding.⁴

   ii) Kant reaction to Hume's skepticism.—In saying that reason requires "the existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress," that reason makes "one step" from the experience of contingent beings "to the existence of a necessary being," and that "everything contingent"

3. Hume, THN, 383; see 78-80 with Perrier, RSP, 72.
in the sensuous world "must have a cause,"¹ Kant asserts the validity of the causal concept in general. He did not answer Hume on the relativity which Hume asserted is in the word "cause." It should be noted that Hume shifted from "effect" to "being." "Husband" and "wife" are correlative terms, just as are "cause" and "effect." Though "being" (the word used) does not suggest "wife," "husband" does, and for the particular effect, likewise, there is a cause. Thus, while "cause" and "effect" are distinct terms, as Hume said, yet they are so related that one does imply the other. Actually, however, Kant fared no better than Hume on causation, being unable to find in experience an adequate basis for it.² But becoming needs a cause, and being (in the sense of coming into existence and remaining in existence) needs an explanation, as the Neo-Thomists teach.³ The contingency of finite beings is aptly expressed in the words of the poet, "Change and decay in all around we see." Thus, there seems to be no decisive reason for denying causation in general.

b) Validity of applying it to the world as a whole.—In all the references above, Kant implies that the principle of causation may rightly be applied to the physical world as a whole.⁴ John Stuart Mill states the case of those who hold the validity of this principle:

> Everything that we know (it is argued) had a cause, and owed its existence to that cause.

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¹ Kant, KrV, B 631, B 635, B 638; see also KpV, 53, 61, 134, BDG, 64.

² La Plante, Art. (1938), 10.

³ Duce, KGN, 249.

⁴ See also Kant, KpV, 130.
How then can it be but that the world which is but a name for the aggregate of all that we know, has a cause to which it is indebted for its existence.1

But Mill's own belief is that this is going beyond experience; all that we know is that every event or change has a cause.2 Laird and Höffding partly confirm this by throwing doubt upon the concept "world,"3 for if God and the world are viewed in external relation to each other as are watchmaker and watch, then the world as distinct, "a totality ruled by law" is a concept to be questioned. But if it is only an unattainable ideal because of the inexactitude of experience, then all concepts are invalid, for they are the products of generalization, of abstract reasoning that goes beyond the concrete objects of man's experience. Laird wonders, therefore, whether it would not be better to rest the proof upon simpler existential premises, such as that certain things exist, but decides that though valid this is inadequate, considering Leibniz's argumentum a contingentia mundi (which Kant analyzes) "stronger than Locke's form: 'I exist, therefore God exists,' or in the still more importunate form: 'Something exists, therefore God exists.'"4 For "to argue upon a cosmic scale" is to argue "to a cosmic scale."5 Laird, however, sees difficulty in proving that the world is an effect as it might possibly be that reality and the world are identical—unless God is reality; but this is the very point

2. See Mill, TER, 145. 5. Laird, TC, 88.
3. See Laird, TC, 24-25; Höffding, TPOH, 61.
to be proved. However, a completely coherent account of the world requires belief in God; but this requires, in turn, rising above physical experience.

Hume had intimated that "the universe...may be self-existent, or as Aristotle held, eternal," not necessarily a denial of the existence of God, but only of a certain relation of His to the world.¹ According to Watson, Hume argued that "That which exists from eternity cannot have a cause, since every cause implies 'priority in time and a beginning of ex-istence.'"² That is, cause belongs to members in a succession and not to a whole, for "if we know the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty, it is very un reasonable to ask afterwards for 'the cause of the whole twenty.'"² To this denial of contingency by the assertion of the eternity of the world, it is sufficient to reply simply that the concept eternity, (as well as the concept of the eternity of the world) is an assumption neither proved nor disproved by theoretical reasoning. So, while causation applied to the world as a whole may be held as a rational belief, because so far as human experience goes, every effect is produced by a cause, yet in view of the difficulties suggested, especially in the concept of eternity, which being uncertain, makes the world regarded as an effect uncertain, it appears that there is no rigid demonstration of the validity of causation as a universal law.

1. See Beckwith, IG, 119; Hume, ET, 548-549. 2. Watson, IRE, I, 254; see Hume, DNR, 190.
c) Validity of calling a halt in regress of causes.—Kant denied the validity of calling a halt in the regress of causes, i.e. the validity of a first cause, for granting in general the causal concept, he limited it to the sensuous world. He speaks of "Die falsche Selbstbefriedigung der Vernunft," "dadurch, dass man endlich all Bedingung, ohne welche doch kein Begriff einer Nothwendigkeit Statt finden kann, wegschafft."¹ As Kant is here referring to the limitation of human experience relative to universal matters, it may be said in reply that, on the same ground, nothing can be proved, as all reasoning is abstract, going beyond the given. In holding a universal law of gravitation, reason (on the part of scientists) allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds. It applies as well to the law of causation which in general Kant accepts. Also it may be replied that conditions are not "thrown away" by the cosmological argument, but put into the concept of a Necessary or Unconditioned Being, who imposes them on Himself.

If there is a first cause or an absolutely necessary principle, it must be transcendent, according to Kant, i.e. "ausserhalb der Welt" and the series of causes, as it can not be discovered in the series, and if it were, it would as a member of the series, be finite, an effect itself needing a cause.² On the other hand, there is no proof of a "hochsten

¹ Kant, KrV, B 638. ² Kant, KrV, B 645; see Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 301-302.
Wesen above the series, but only of "ein regulatives Prinzip."\(^1\) In this Kant is right. But Galloway, Baillie, and Frank point out that an immanent first cause is reasonable, especially with positivists and mechanistic biologists, who are either satisfied to remain in the world or to view it not as "made" but as "alive" and "growing", an organism.\(^2\)

As has been seen,\(^3\) Aristotle, tracing all motion to the Prime Mover, implied that without a First Cause there can be no other cause; but he did not place the beginning of its activity at any point in time.\(^4\) Then, as now, time was a problem. Confronting the possibility that matter as well as motion and the Prime Mover may be eternal,\(^5\) Aristotle thus taught that the First Cause is not necessarily first in temporal priority.

Following Aristotle, Sheen views "the argument from motion as ... independent of the question of the eternity of the world."\(^6\) That is, if the latter is true, it would not dispense with the existence of God. Turning away from the ontological argument, and under the influence of the empiricism of Aristotle, Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas argued from effect (in a finite universe) to First Cause.\(^7\) Although the former attached no weight to arguments from motion, the latter and Neo-Scholastics in general, including Garrigou-Lagrange, have used it: "There is

\(^1\) Kant, KrV, B 637; see Cunningham, TOP, 78; Hocking in Wilm, IK, 38.
\(^2\) See Galloway, TPR, 388; Baillie, IR, 82-83; see Frank, PRT, 30 (Broad, Hibb, Jour., 24 (1925), 45-46).
\(^3\) Vide supra, 34-35.
\(^4\) See McKeon, BWA, 304, 340-342, 367-368, 470-484.
\(^5\) See McKeon, BWA, 355-359, 374.
\(^6\) Sheen, GE, 131.
\(^7\) Harris, DS, 152-153, 160; see Scotus, De Primo Principio; Duce, KGN, 239-240; McKeon, SMP, 307.
no regress to infinity in a series of movers which are actually and essentially subordinate. 1

Likewise, Sorley, England, and Höfding see no solution to the problems relative to God and the world, if there is an infinite regress of causes:

What religion asserts is that existence would be meaningless if we could not ultimately find the origin of the whole causal series, in which our thought can come to rest, where all further questions fall away. ... This line of argument was adopted by Thomas Aquinas from Aristotle... Catholic as well as many Protestant theologians hold it up to the present day. 2

Pointing to alleged gaps in the causal series, Höfding directs attention away from regress of causes to law peculiar to the series and to "the principle of unity to which this testifies," for "the inner motive power of the series—that which is present alike in the totality and in the inner parts—must be the determining factor." 3 Then Höfding asks why there may not be an eternal series. This seems to be the crux of the whole subject. Is there contingency? May it not be that the Necessary Being is the universe itself? To confuse the problem further there is the ambiguity in the terms "contingent" and necessary," probably what Kant had in mind when he spoke of "ein ganzes Nest von dialektischen Anmassungen." 4 Bertrand Russell sees "no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning at all," holding that the idea of creation is "really due

1. Garrigou-Lagrange in Duca, KGN, 244; see Aquinas, ISA, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q 105, a 5; McKeon, SMP, 307; Maritain, DS, 273.
3. Höfding, TPOR, 37, 40; see Gaspard, Art. (1933), 8.
4. Kant, KrV, B 637; see Laird, TC, 97-107.
to the poverty of our imagination." 1 Frank is of the opinion that creation does not imply a beginning of the world in time. 2 And Brunner agrees with him that we can have no adequate notion and no experience of eternity, and also that "a logical thinker will know that as long as he confines himself to thought he cannot speak of creation." 3 No objection can be made to these views on speculative grounds. Creation could be an eternal process. If so, can a finite being speak of it as he can of a temporal event that he experiences? And can he speak of his own being as a creation? But if the universe is related to God as eternal Creator, then it can be viewed as contingent. This would dispense with an infinite regress of causes, which makes the problem of the relation of God and the world insolvable for Sorley and others.

It will not be necessary to give in detail Hegel's conception of the cosmological argument. However, he noted the admission of Kant concerning its strength, and thought it strange that one should attach no weight to it. 4 He declared that Kant was in error in holding that it rests on the ontological proof, and that it is a mistake to maintain that the cosmological argument requires the ontological to complete it, that is in regard to what it has in general to accomplish. 5 But in defense of Kant it may be said that in admitting the

2. See Frank, PRT, 59-60.
3. Brunner, PR, 82-83.
4. Hegel, PR, III, 239.
5. Hegel, PR, II, 246.
The strength of the argument he did attach weight to it, he did show its dependence upon the ontological argument, and did expose its weaknesses in accomplishing its general purpose, viz., the proof of God's existence.¹

The helplessness of the human reason dealing with these problems, particularly the problem of eternity, is obvious. It seems, therefore, that the validity of calling a halt in the regress of causes by a creation in time by a First Cause, has not been demonstrated. It does seem, as Aquinas held, that this is primarily a matter of faith rather than of reason.²

By faith we understand that the new world was discovered by Columbus. As we were not there, if we accept the idea at all, it must be on the authority of others. On the same basis, we may say, "Πίστει νομίζειν Κατηγόρως τοὺς αἰῶνας ἑπιμαθεῖν Θεοῦ." This also is a reasonable belief. But here only one can speak with the authority of experience. Let it be perfectly clear that in either case authority may be rejected, but that with the rejection of the authority goes the rejection of the idea. Plato and Aristotle can not speak with the authority of experience concerning the latter event. A reasonable belief in either the discovery of America or the temporal creation is not derived through abstract speculation. In a case where one can have no experience of his own, it is more reasonable to accept by faith the testimony of a competent eye-witness (or one who

1. See Kant KrV, B 632, 634, 639.  3. Heb. 11:3.
2. See Aquinas, ISA, 249-254.
is regarded so), than to spin a theory out of the flimsy threads of one's own imagination.

4) Validity of identifying the First Cause with God

1) Nature of the First Cause.—The first consideration on the validity of identifying the First Cause with God—the nature of the First Cause (i.e. on the basis of the cosmological argument)—suggests the following possibilities: a mere idea, an unknown but unified Cause, and a personal Being. Which one of these possibilities did Kant favor?

According to the five representative philosophers chosen to state the cosmological argument, and according to Kant himself, there is no necessary connection between the ontological and cosmological arguments in attempting to prove a First Cause. Having rejected the former, Kant naturally insists on keeping all its implications from the latter.¹ For him the postulate of an All-sufficient Being is a device of reason, experience not providing the properties of such a Being.² That is, for Kant, the God of the cosmological argument is a mere idea.

But on the basis of this "proof", Kant argues also for an unknown but unified cause of all existence, "Die unbedingte Nothwendigkeit, die wir, als den letzten Träger aller Dinge."³

2) Indefiniteness of the First Cause.—Kant concisely states the indefiniteness of the nature of the First

¹. Kant, KrV, B 632-638.
². Kant, KrV, B 641; see B 625.
³. Kant, KrV, B 641.
Cause as found in the cosmological argument as an empirical argument, i.e. apart from the assumptions of the rationalistic ontological argument:

Was dieses für Eigenschaften habe, kann der empirische Beweisgrund nicht lehren, sondern da nimmt die Vernunft gänzlich von ihm Abschied und forscht hinter lauter Begriffen: was nämlich ein absolutnothwendiges Wesen überhaupt für Eigenschaften haben müsse.

Later, speaking of Unconditioned Necessity as an indispensable need of the mind, he pictures this idea as an abyss, before which reason stands trembling in dismay:

Selbst die Ewigkeit, so schauderhaft erhaben sie auch ein Haller schildern mag, macht lang den schwindelichten Eindruck nicht auf das Gemüth; denn sie misst nur die Dauer der Dinge, aber trägt sie nicht. Man kann sich des Gedankens nicht erwahren, man kann ihn aber auch nicht ertragen; dass ein Wesen, welches wir uns auch als das Höchste unter allen möglichen vorstellen, gleichsam zu sich selbst sage: Ich bin von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit, auser mir ist nichts, ohne das, was bloss durch meinen Willen etwas ist; aber woher bin ich denn?

Note that here at the end, Kant has come back to the terrifying but necessary idea of eternity, and to the crux of the whole matter; for as we have seen, matter is either eternal (along with or without another eternal reality) or it is dependent upon some eternal reality or first cause.

Some kind of "unbedingte Nothwendigkeit" exists. But if eternal unconditioned necessity is a requirement of the mind, as Kant says it is (and there seems to be no ground for its denial), then it is not "etwas überaus Merkwürdiges; dass, wenn

1. Kant, KrV, B 635.
2. Kant, KrV, B 641.
3. Vide supra, 40–45.
man voraussetz, etwas existire, man der Folgerung nicht Umgang haben kann: dass auch irgend etwas nothwendigerweise existire, "1 (whether it is matter or some other reality), but it is very remarkable that this "ganz naturlichen" conclusion is not "sicheren." 2 That is a case of what Hegel notes in Kant—a degrading of reason. 3 Of course the questions are: What is that something? Has natural reason an answer? It is to be doubted in the light of John Stuart Mill's pathetic attempt to give content to the idea of a Creator as the God of religion, for "the net results of Natural Theology" was "a total blank" on the moral attributes, apart from benevolence, upon which, however, strong suspicion was cast ("no shadow of justice in the general arrangements of nature"). 4

The same thing happens to Kant; the moment he touches the attributes of this Noumenon, he gets into difficulty.

After speaking of an unknown substratum of the systematic unity and order of the world, ("unknown" as incapable of being experienced) Kant remarks that, "Können wir in dieser Idee gewisse Anthropomorphismen...erlabuen," 5 and he goes on: "Können wir doch...einen einigen weisen und allgewaltigen Welturheber annehmen? Ohne allen Zweifel; und nicht allein dies, sondern wir müssen einen solchen voraussetzen." 6 But having admitted the attributes of wisdom and omnipotence as necessary,

1. Kant, KrV, B 643.
2. Kant, KrV, B 643.
5. Kant, KrV, B 725; see B 700, 706, 715, 724.
6. Kant, KrV, B 726.
Kant now denies that we have any conception of this being, "was es an sich selbst sei,"¹ which is in agreement with one of the basic concepts of his philosophical system—the Noumenon and its unknowability. And then after denying that there is any ground for justifying the admission of a being with properties distinct from nature ("über der Natur"), Kant grants that we are justified in introducing into the idea of a supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements, such as "Verstand, Wolgefalten,...Missfallen...Begierde und Willen."² But can a mere idea have these? If this idea does not represent an existence,³ if there is no correspondence between noumenon and phenomenon, then reason has no basis for its regulative principle of unity, so essential in Kant's eyes.

Elsewhere, Kant wavers uncertainly on this point, for speaking of God as "der einzigen und allgenügsamen Ursache," Kant asserts: "Den Gegenstand dieser Idee haben wir nicht den mindesten Grund schlechthin anzunehmen."⁴ But personality is revealed by activity, and apart from activity, Kant has no ground for holding the attributes mentioned above. In another argument, Kant declares:

Die höchste formal Einheit, welche allein auf Vernunftbegriffen beruht, ist die zweckmässige Einheit der Dings, und das speculative Interesse der Vernunft macht es notwendig, alle Anordnung in der Welt so anzusehen, als ob sie aus der absicht einer allerhochsten Vernunft entsprossen wäre.⁵

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¹ Kant, KrV, B 726.  
² Kant, KrV, B 729.  
³ Kant, KrV, B 729.  
⁴ Kant, KrV, B 714; see Kant in Hartenstein, KSW, VIII, 541.  
⁵ Kant, KrV, B 715.
But the cart seems to be before the horse here. An actual unity in the universe due to some unknown being's unity in aim and action is observed, giving the human mind its idea of formal unity. If this is not true, the source of the idea must be sought elsewhere. Kant, brought up in Pietistic surroundings, had the idea of God before he began to philosophize. Thus he had the attributes of God in mind, although his system called for the concept of an unknown but unified cause of the world. In personal belief he held a personal Being with definite attributes; in strict logical reasoning, he had only a mere idea. Kant is correct in maintaining that while the cosmological argument does not provide the attributes of God, one is justified in believing in the God of theism, as a reasonable hypothesis.¹

Thus, while it appears that Kant admits too much of his personal belief concerning the attributes of God into his strict logical or theoretical reasoning, Kant is right that the cosmological argument does not present a full or definite description of God, to say nothing of proof. For neither Catholic nor Protestant philosophers have made out a case for the validity of identifying the first cause with the God of theism.

The final cause appealed to by Annice Donovon (evidently Catholic) while not a part of the cosmological argument itself, gives it some support.² But her dependence upon analogy in presenting the henological argument indirectly comes

¹. Kant, *Who in Hartenstein*, KSW, IV, 348
². See Donovon, *HAE*, 16-17.
under the condemnation of Beckwith and others:

The frequently repeated declaration that we have in human action an analogy of the absolute originative power of God is only another instance of the fatal fallacy of words; whatever else man has done, he has created nothing.1

Hartshorne has shown that the axioms used by St. Thomas to prove God's existence needed themselves to be justified.2 Pollock, a Catholic, writes: "St. Thomas tells us that a rational demonstration of the existence of God must be entirely abstracted from any idea of radical novelty or eternity of the universe."3 But the contingency of the universe is the crux of the whole matter, as we have shown. Of course, as Pollock recognizes, the cosmos can be eternal and still contingent, but not necessarily so.

DeBurgh seems to be one of those opposed to the general Neo-Scholastic dogmatism on the demonstrability of the existence of God. He writes: "I do not think that the facts of non-religious knowledge are sufficient to prove God's existence."4 Speaking of the cosmological argument directly, he adds: "It is not however a valid proof of God; for it gives at best a transcendent Absolute, an unknowable x, of which reason assures us that it is, but as to what it is, it is wholly silent."5

LeRoy is in agreement with his position: "En tout cas, le premier Moteur, a supposer qu'il existe, ne serait aucunement le vrai Dieu, le Dieu de la vie religieuse et morale."6

1. Beckwith, IG, 118; see Calhoun, CCL, 174; Brunner, PR, 83; Frank, PRT, 44.
2. See Hartshorne, MVG, 69.
As a result, the Catholic Church takes a hesitating position, in spite of appearances to the contrary. Garrigou-Lagrange gives a qualified statement, for having said: "The Church declares that God's existence can be proved...from the visible effects," he adds: "Hence the Church in some measure gives her approbation to the validity of the a posteriori traditional proofs of God's existence." And he adds significantly: "It is not, however, formally defined that reason can demonstrate whether reason alone can deduce explicitly the proper attributes of the true God."

As it is well known that Protestants in general oppose even this qualified position of the Catholic (Neo-Scholastic) philosophers, it will not be necessary to go into detail on this. Dr. Brightman hits the point that is being emphasized, because while recognizing that the cosmological is more empirical than the ontological argument, yet he declares that it "requires only a world, any world, and at its best is quite irrelevant to the essence of God." It is the writer's judgment that the cosmological argument, by its silence upon the "effects" of divine activity in men's hearts, is not sufficiently empirical and that in the light of the arguments put forward by philosophers in defense of this proof, the words of Jacques Maritain on the "grandeur et misère de la Métaphysique" are

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1. Garrigou-Lagrange, Og, OG, 110-111; see Dunham, RP, 248-249.
2. Brightman, Art. (1937) 153-154; see Sorley, MVIG, 323; McTaggart, SDR, 191; Hocking, MGHE, 305.
significant: "Sa grandeur: elle est sagesse. Sa misère: elle est science humaine...Elle nomme Dieu, oui. Mail pas par Son Nom...Vous êtes vraiment un Dieu caché."¹

4. Physico-theological argument

a. Statement of the argument.--In Aristotle's assertion of purpose in nature, and doctrine of Final Cause (which has an end in view from the beginning, and which acting as a "pull" from on before rather than as a "push" from behind, co-operates with efficient cause in bringing matter and form together) may be seen the beginning of the physico-theological (teleological) argument:

It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent de-liberating...If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature.²

Hume also recognized purpose in nature, expressed in Aristotlelian fashion that "Nature does nothing in vain," and regarded as a "maxim established in all the schools merely from the contemplation of the works of Nature."³ His statement of the argument as interpreted by Watson is:

The world is 'nothing but one great machine,' subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines which again admit of subdivision, to a degree beyond what human senses can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adaptation of means to ends, through-out all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the production of human contrivance....Since, therefore, the effects resemble

¹ Maritain, DS, 3.
² Aristotle, in McKeon, BWA, 251; see 752.
³ Hume, ET, 580; see 581-583.
each other, we are led to infer by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man.1

Christian Wolff states it as follows:

1. "In der sichtbaren Welt ist eine Ordnung der Natur."
2. "Die Ordnung...is zufällig."
3. "Es einen Urheber der Welt gebe."
4. "Gott...der Urheber der Ordnung ist."2

Kant himself states it thus:

Die Physikotheologie ist der Versuch der Ver- nunft aus den Zwecken der Natur (die nur empirisch erkannt werden können) auf die oberste Ursache der Natur und ihre Eigenschaften zu schliessen.3

b. Kant's general attitude toward it.—Kant's general attitude toward the teleological "proof" is both sympathetic and critical, as it is "der älteste, klärest und der gemeinen Menschenvernunft am meisten angemessene," and yet being based on the other arguments (directly upon the cosmological, and indirectly upon the ontological), proves only "einen Weltbauer...nicht einen Weltschöpfer."4 As Kant's treatment of this "proof" is briefer than that of the others, and as it appears reasonable to accept his contention that it is based largely upon the others, it will not be necessary to go into it deeply.

c. Consideration of the "proof" and of Kant's treatment

1) Design granted.—In both the pre-critical and critical periods, Kant was impressed by the evidence of design

1. Watson, IRE, 254-255; see Hume, ET, II, 518-524, 537.
2. Wolff, VG, IV, 257,261, 270.
4. Kant, KrV, B 651, 655; see DeBurgh, Art. (1927), 360.
in nature,¹ but differently, one difference being that in the latter period he made a distinction in purpose: in the first Critique, purpose is outer, while in the third Critique purpose is inner.² In the latter, also, is expressed the awe, almost religious reverence, that Kant felt in the presence of the sublime, which to him was an evidence of purposive phenomena in nature, in which, prior to reflection, he sensed an "unknown power behind them."³

Others, with varying vigor, sustain Kant in his willingness to grant design in nature. Duns Scotus, tracing the teleological view of nature back to Aristotle, wrote:

> All agents act with reference to an end. But nature is also mechanical. All natural forces act in a determinate manner, and their behavior would not be different even if it were not directed to an end, if, that is, instead of being also purposive, it were merely mechanical. Hence the teleological character of the universe comes not from the laws of nature considered as mere uniformities but from an agent who directs and wills them.⁴

Noting the relation between causality and teleology, Cunningham sees neither proof nor disproof of the assertion of a cause and a purpose for every event, as an absence of an evident cause and purpose is no disproof of their existence.⁵ Inge holds that "The existence of a directive purpose...in nature...cannot reasonably be denied."⁶ And according to Taylor and Cook Wilson, the advance of science has strengthened the argument:

It tends to suggest the picture of a design­
ing mind working with methods curiously like
those of the human mind. It is as if nature
made experiments...and rejecting the less sat­
sisfactory, retained the better and even advan­
ced in knowledge and skill.¹

To see purposiveness is to see intelligibility in the
universe, and to find satisfaction for the demands of reason
that there be rationality at the heart of things. Thus, while
one may not be prepared to accept the argument from design,
and may not even take the first step beyond the granting of
the evidences of design in nature (viz., the step of the need
of a Designer), yet it is difficult to see how anyone can re­
main unfelling and merely scientific before the manifestations
of adaptation and harmony in the world.² Kant was not able to
do so.

2) Need of Designer not proved.—In the pre-critical
period Kant wavers on the contingency of matter and its impli­
cation of a Designer, facing the issue whether matter might
be eternal or not, and thus independent.³ But in the critical
period, he appears surer of his ground:

Nun ist der Begriff eines Dinges, dessen
Existenz oder Form wir uns unter der Beding­
ung eines Zwecks also möglich vorstellen, mit
dem Begriffe einer Zufälligkeit desselben
(nach Naturgesetzen) unzertrennlich verbunden.
Daher machen auch die Naturding, welche wir
nur als Zwecke möglich finden den vornehmsten
Beweiss für die Zufälligkeit des Weltganzen
aus, und sind der einzige für den demeinen

¹. Wilson, SI, 848; see
Taylor, DGE, 57.
². See DeBurgh, Art. (1927), 361,
364; Wilson, SI, II, 571.
³. See Kant, BDG, 64,
99-100.
He goes on to the effect that we do not observe the purposes in nature, but only think them—as guides for our judgment.2 That is, Kant sees no actual design; it is as if "a notion or plan were the ground" of the empirical laws of nature; "the principle of Zweckmässigkeit is a regulative principle for the reflective judgment."3 Apart from moral considerations, physical teleology might lead to a demonology as well as to theism, and so, as England points out, the final purpose must be shown to be consistent with the moral law.4

Bowne, however, presents the case for teleology in more favorable light for theism:

The positive argument for design begins by showing that many processes in nature are determined by ends. The aim of the eye is vision, that of the ear is hearing, that of the lungs is the oxygenation of the blood, that of the manifold generative mechanisms is the reproduction of life. In all these there is a concurrence of many factors in a common result; and

2. See Kant, KdU, 336.
this result, toward which all tend, is viewed as the final cause of their concurrence. Here, then is action for an end. But an end, as such cannot act except as a conception in the consciousness of some agent which wills that end.1

Against Kant, Bowne argued that "we have the same proof that eyes are designed that we have that watches are designed" and that "if eyes are not designed, watches are not designed."2 In a similar manner, Garrigou-Lagrange, following St. Thomas, argued using premises: "Major: Things cannot act for an end, unless they are directed by some intelligent being which knows the end. Minor: Things which do not possess intellect, act for an end."3 In reference to the "Architect," Garrigou-Lagrange insisted that all that is needed as proof of a designing intellect who is absolutely simple, perfect, sovereign and infinite, is in the other proofs, the other "four ways" of St. Thomas, and that in the "five ways" are the five attributes of God, viewed as First Mover, First Efficient Cause, First Necessary Being, the First and Greatest Being, and the First Intelligent Ruler.4 But the problem that Kant faced, and to which in natural reason he found no solution, would be the crucial fact for Garrigou-Lagrange, viz., is there a temporal first cause of any kind? Is the world contingent or is it eternal? In other words, the need of a Designer has not been proved by the teleological argument.

3) Identification of Designer as God not accomplished

Kant appears to be correct also in the judgment that the

4. Duce, KGN, 268-269.
identification of the Designer as God, has not been accomplished by the teleological argument:

Nach bloss theoretischen Prinzipien des Vernunftgebrauchs (worauf die Physikotheologie sich allein gründet) kann also niemals der Begriff einer Gottheit, der für unsere teleologische Beurteilung der Natur zureichte, herausgebracht werden.¹

Even in the early period, Kant recognized that the guesses of man leave him in the dark. In the first Critique, Kant shows that pure reason had not established God as Creator.² Hume had granted some validity to the teleological argument because he saw in design and order evidence of a being with a remote likeness to human intelligence, but he did not attribute to this being any moral attributes; to Kant this was a serious omission.³ Hume could see no justification for the leap taken in the argument, the leap from a finite world to an infinite Author.⁴ Kant, also, while recognizing design in nature, saw in it no strictly logical proof of God's existence, because of the limitations of reason. The Object of speculation "ganz ausserhalb den Grenzen der Naturwissenschaft im Felde reiner Ideen liege."⁵ Thus, Kant makes room for faith. Kant's discussion of the will indicates that while he saw no general teleology on the basis of the speculative reason, he conceded it on the basis of the practical reason.⁶

Thus, teleology for Kant was first of all moral teleology. The moral world is an intelligible world, a concept of

¹. Kant, KdU, 406.
². Vide supra, 55.
³. Kant, KrV, A 817.
⁴. See Watson, IHE, I, 256-258; Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 12-13.
⁵. Kant, KrV, A 745.
⁶. Kant, KrV, A 744.
"reinen Vernunft in ihrem praktischen Gebrauche." The basis of the union of happiness and morality is a Supreme Being, a "weisen Urheber and Regierer," the "höchsten Gut...welches eine solche zweckmäßige Einheit allein möglicher machen kann." This approach of the practical reason has a "particular" advantage over any logical teleological approach:

Diese Moraltheologie hat nun den eigenthümlichen Vorzug vor der speculativen: dass sie unablößlich auf den Begriff eines einigen, allervollkommensten und vernunftigen Urweisens führet, worauf uns speculative Theologie nicht einmal aus objectiven Gründen hinweiset, geschweige uns davon überzeugen konnte. In this view of general teleology, Kant held that the so-called philosophers are but artists; above them is the real Philosopher who, strangely, does not exist, although each man has within him the idea of the legislative power of this Philosopher:

Wesentliche Zwecke sind darum noch nicht die höchsten, deren (bei vollkommener systematischer Einheit der Vernunft) nur ein einziger sein kann. Toward the close of his life, Kant made the connection between general teleology and a personal God more explicit: "Das höchste Prinzip aller Zwecke ist Gott." The teleological argument may be considered in some sense an empirical approach to the problem of the existence of God. "There is no hard and fast distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge...apart from experience there is no

1. Kant, KrV A 808.  
2. Kant, KrV, A 812; see A 813-814.  
4. Kant, KrV, A 840; see A 839.  
activity of reason. Yet it comes far short of the empiricism that is satisfactory to the writer, viz., direct experience of God. It is true that the idea of purpose is a human concept derived from man's knowledge of his own activity, and as such is anthropomorphic; but as all man's knowledge is in terms of his own activity, in terms he can grasp, there is no escaping from all anthropomorphism. An illegitimate anthropomorphism would result from ignoring the fact that by hypothesis the purposive activities of God are in some respects unique. The elements of value, desire and satisfaction cannot be separated from the concept of divine purpose. And to see purpose or unity of purpose in the universe without grasping the purpose of the Designer is perfectly consistent.

Laird, DeBurgh, Taylor, and others agree that this argument does not prove the existence of the God of theism, the God of the great historical religions. The God that Höffding puts forward in his effort to buttress the teleological argument is too indistinct in outline to suggest the God of religion. Taylor regards the argument, even when supplemented by the moral considerations which he advances, as incapable of proof. The writer, with DeBurgh, accepts in general the criticism of Kant, but rejects Kant's conclusion that, "We have not the slightest ground for assuming the objective correspondence"

2. See Tennant, PT, II, 115.
3. See Tennant, PT, II, 117; Taylor, DGE, 77.
4. See Laird, TC, 268; DeBurgh, TRP, 133; Taylor, DGE, 77; Tennant, PT, II, 122-123; Outler, Art. (1947), 517-518; Mill, TER, 176-177; Sorley, MVIG, 327.
5. Höffding, TPOR, 56.
of the idea with reality.¹ So the writer is led to conclude with Brightman that, while the argument is the most satisfactory (as most empirical) of the traditional theistic "proofs", yet like the rest it fails because its "strength is not strong enough to prove," as its "weakness is not weak enough to refute, the reality of God,"² This suggests the next point.

III. The traditional theistic arguments and theoretical certainty

1. The medieval and modern revolt against intellectualism

In relation to the traditional theistic arguments and theoretical certainty, the revolt against intellectualism which began in the medieval period with the mystical stress on feeling and intuition (in the broad sense of these terms), developed in the modern period around such names as Otto (numinous feeling), Schleiermacher (feeling of dependence), James (feeling of objective presence—"something there"), Bergson (intuition), and Underhill (mystic feeling or intuition).

a. Its significance.—Significantly, it was a revolt against the separation of thought and life or of theory and practice,³ a reaction against the spectator type of philosophy with its detachment from life,⁴ a recognition of the non-rational (not irrational) elements of life (with more or less of cognitive content),⁵ and the realization of the central:

1. DeBurgh, Art. (1927); Kant, KrV, A 62, B 651; DeBurgh, TPR, 153-134; 365-366.
3. Herman, MVM, 255.
4. See Goudge, Art. (1942), 14-15; James, VRE, 433.
5. See Herman, MVM, 270-271.
importance of religious experience as essentially religious feeling, or at least, as immediate and the real basis for reflection.\(^1\) It was a dissatisfaction not only with pure reason, but with practical and aesthetic reason (as not going far enough), and a demand for consideration of religious feeling as having rights of its own; it was a leaving of the barren, bleak desert of speculation with all its spiritual "beggary."\(^2\)

Orthodoxy, with its emphasis upon the intellect, with its failure to demonstrate its beliefs, and by its blindness to other than rationalistic elements in the religious life, was blamed for the rise of an unbelieving rationalism.\(^3\) As a result, directly (by being unable to prove its beliefs) and indirectly (through loss of prestige, thereby), there was a loss of "some of the most vital and precious doctrines of historic faith, and a religious decline" and impotence, witnessed by the inability of orthodox rationalism "to make good its claims even with reference to the reduced theological content which it claimed to prove."\(^4\) Orthodox rationalism was on the wrong path to reality.\(^5\)

b. Its safeguarding.—Of course, in any reaction, there is danger that the pendulum swing too far the other way, and in this particular case, that reason not merely be put in its

\(^1\) See Höffding, 74, 431, 433; Windelband, Art. (1913), 204; Bertocci, EAG, 3; Moore, TRE, 164, 166.

\(^2\) See Hegel, PR, III, 156; Hooking, MGHE, 215; Duce, KGN, 458; Kant, Ethics, 86-93; Griffiths, GIE, 13-15; Herman, MVN, 243.

\(^3\) See Otto, IH, 3-4.

\(^4\) Macintosh, TES, 10.

\(^5\) See Baillie, OKG, 147-148; IR, 93-98, 104-105, 208, 219; Windelband, Art. (1913), 203-204; Macintosh, TES, 10-11.
place, but that it be degraded or displaced altogether. But, at least, extremes serve to point out the position of the mean.\(^1\) Herman seeks to take this middle-of-the-road-path:

The most convinced opponent of mysticism is ready to admit that intuition has a large place in the discovery of truth. Even so doughty a champion of the scientific attitude as Mr. Bertrand Russell admits that 'much of the most important truth is first suggested by its means,' and goes on to point out that 'even in the most logical realms it is insight that first arrives at what is new.' He sees an element of wisdom to be learnt from the mystical way...which does not seem to be attainable in any other manner.\(^2\)

Then, as a corrective of present-day mysticism, Herman recalls that "it was when the disciples reasoned together that Jesus Himself drew near."\(^3\) But to see the proper relation between feeling and reason in the matter of immediate experience, it must also be recalled that the disciples got nowhere in their reasoning until they came into the immediate presence of the risen Christ, when "their eyes were opened" and "they said ...'Did not our hearts burn within us?'"\(^4\) It was a heart-warming experience, of an objective reality, as more than one experienced it, and as it was tied in with history, Christ, according to the context, being the subject of a long line of prophecy.

2. The modern disapproval of the traditional theistic "proofs"

a. Dissatisfaction of some Catholic philosophers

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1. See Hocking, MGHE, 57-61; Herman, MVM, 274-275.
2. Herman, MVM, 270-271.
3. Herman, MVM, 263.
Some Catholic philosophers are dissatisfied with the traditional theistic "proofs", for there is not the unity in Catholic philosophy that is often professed. While Catholic philosophers generally follow Thomas Aquinas, there have always been those who have disagreed with him, and "even within the field of Scholasticism these proofs were assailed by critics, especially by Duns Scotus and the Scotists." And Edouard LeRoy, a modern Catholic philosopher, writes: "Ces arguments au fond, prouvent moins l'existence de Dieu qu'ils ne determinent ses attributs, une fois son existence admise." He also says of these arguments:

Elles sont actuellement sans effet; elles ne convainquent personne parmi les philosophes d'aujourd'hui...L'expérience religieus est décisive sur le peu d'importance réelle de la métaphysique savante en cette question.

A denial of the demonstrative force of the theistic "proofs" is made by Francis A. Walsh:

There never was a philosophy, except Christianity itself, which could be called a Christian philosophy or even a satisfactory philosophy of religion....Even in the case of scholastic philosophy, the most that St. Thomas hoped to do, as he states in his Contra Gentiles, was to show that the conclusions arrived at in philosophy were not opposed to Catholic truth as contained in the Scriptures and in the teachings of the Church, and...no philosophy ever justified a particular form of religious cult, nor laid a rational basis for a definite approach to the complete idea of God.

1. See McCall, Art. (1938), 9; Kennedy, Art. (1912), 698; Garrigou-Lagrange, SC, 248.
2. Harris, DS, II, 152.
3. Meyer, PST, 238.
4. LeRoy, Art. (1907), 513; see Garrigou-LaGrange, SC, 242-244.
The same denial is virtually made by Maritain:

Voilà donc la misère de la metaphysique... Elle éveille le désir de l'union suprême, d'une possession spirituelle consummée dans l'ordre même de la réalité, et non plus seulement de l'idée. Elle ne peut pas le satisfaire. C'est une sagesse que nous prêchons.1

In one sense Neo-Thomism is against rationalism as well as agnosticism; for while affirming that reality can be known, it denies that it can be fully understood by unaided (natural) reason.2 Thus, Duce can say that religion "within the limits of mere reason" is not the religion of a Neo-Thomist.3 St. Thomas held that "the human mind can have no pretensions to a proper knowledge of what is beyond corporeal being."4 Duns Scotus agreed.5 One should guard against referring without qualification to the statement of St. Thomas concerning the weakness of argument from authority. For after considering the objection that "proof from authority is the weakest form of proof according to Boethius," he answers: "For although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest."6

Thus, while the majority of Catholic philosophers (as Neo-Thomists) teach that there is a theoretical certainty of God's existence, it is not a certainty based upon abstract reasoning; for while it seems divorced from religious (i.e. mystical) experience, it is not actually so, for if there is, as

1. Maritain, DS, 15.
2. See Duce, KGN, 52.
3. Duce, KGN, 313.
4. DeWulf, SON, 111; see Aquinas, ISA, Summa Theologica, 1a, q 1, a 8.
5. See Harris, DS, II, 150-151.
6. Aquinas, ISA, Summa Theologica, 1a, q 1, a 8.
these Catholic philosophers hold, a divine revelation and a
divine aid in reasoning, they are religious experiences.

b. General dissatisfaction of Protestant thinkers

There is a general dissatisfaction with the traditional
theistic "proofs" on the part of Protestant philosophers and
theologians. It is admirably and tersely stated by Brightman:
"It is unreasonable to expect formal proof of theistic belief."¹
Knudson writes: "There can be no strictly logical demonstration
outside the field of mathematics and formal logic."² James was
convinced that none of the arguments for God constitutes a
"knock-down proof."³ Evidently hinting at the dependence of
mediate upon immediate experience (more of which will be said
later), of seeming to imply, without justice, that what he says
does not likewise hold in other spheres, he added:

The truth is that in the metaphysical and reli-
gious sphere, articulate reasons are cogent for us
only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have
already been impressed in favor of the same conclu-
sion.⁴

Hartshorne, Field, and Sheen witness to the extensive
rejection of these theoretical proofs,⁵ and Hocking, Bennett,
and Proctor, doing the same thing, point the way to a more ade-
quate proof, Proctor declaring: "The trouble with all these so-
called proofs is that they start with something other than God,

1. Brightman, RV, 31;
   see PG, 147; Frank,
PRT, 29; Sorley, MVG,
302; Mill, TER, 151,
155; Rail, CHR, 238.
3. James, VRE, 444; see
   Beckwith, IG, 36.
4. James, VRE, 74.
5. See Hartshorne, MVG,
   57, 178; Field, Art.
   (1928), 324; Sheen,
   61, 22.
and from that try to reach Him"; Proctor concludes that if there is any knowledge of God it is not inferential but immediate.\(^1\)

c. Kant's contribution to this dissatisfaction

Kant's direct contribution to the dissatisfaction with the traditional arguments for God's existence is unquestioned. Pratt says that they "received their death blow at the hands of Kant."\(^2\) Kant's conclusion on the arguments may be summed up in his words:

Das höchste Wesen bleibt also für den bloss speculativen...Vernunft...ein blosses...Ideal... dessen objective Realität auf diesem Wege zwar nicht bewiesen, aber auch nicht widerlegt werden kann.\(^3\)

Kant's indirect contribution to the universal dissatisfaction with the traditional arguments is the evidence (in his own reasoning on the subject) of the inadequacy of mere speculative reason to deal with the subject at all.\(^4\) If the writer were not going beyond such speculation in his own treatment of the subject, he would stand self-condemned here. Just as "Religion within the Limits of Human Reason" demonstrated indirectly that there is a reason within the limits of human (natural) religion—a mere speculative reason, so the Kritik der reinen Vernunft indirectly proves that pure reason (which might be described as "undefiled" by contact with moral and religious

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1. Procter, FKR, 2, 28; see Hocking, MGHE, v; Bennett, PSM, 91.
2. Pratt, PRB, 194; see also Hegel, PR, II, 239; Hartshorne, MVG, 19-20.
experience) needs criticism. And it has received much of it.¹
That it is not all unjust, is seen in the fact that Kant him-
self towards the end of his life realized that his "three
Critiques did not cover experience as a whole, and proposed to
meet the omission by writing another critique."²

IV. The inadequacy of all theoretical theistic arguments

1. General reason: denial of any theoretical certainty in:
   a. Rejection of a priori (self-evident) propositions
   The inadequacy of all theoretical theistic arguments is
   witnessed, first of all, by the quite general denial of theo-
   retical certainty, as in the rejection of a priori (self-evi-
   dent) propositions. This is a contradiction of the rational-
   istic position, for instance, of St. Thomas (who believed that
   there are first principles which are immediately evident, in-
demonstrable "except indirectly or by reduction to absurdity"),³
   of Descartes, (certainty due to clear and distinct ideas, which
   are innate as impressed upon the soul by God, or as intuitively
   present to the mind),⁴ and of Leibniz (who, following Descartes
   and Plato on innate ideas, held a correct view of the conserva-
tion of energy, but with no other proof than the Cartesian de-
duction from the rationality of God).⁵ But for Kant, there were
   no axioms and completed definitions prior to experience.⁶ In

¹ See Hartshorne, MVG, 1920; Vance, RT, 282; Ormond, CP, 78-81.
² Griffiths, GIE, 17; see Ward, SK, 135.
³ Garrigou-LeGrange, OG, 96 96; see Aquinas, ISA, 5, 11, 14, 21.
⁴ Vide supra, 12.
⁵ See Balfour, TH, 225; Leibniz, DM, 29, 34, 41, 44.
⁶ See Kant, KR, B 122, 197, 200, 203; Lewis, Art.(1930), 564.
part, the Neo-Thomists agree with Kant, although holding to the validity of first principles.  

It would be too much to expect that the rationalists would be silent during this attack upon the a priori in the old sense of the term. Nygren, for instance, declares that, "Every age has that which it accepts as self-evident...the profoundest mark of an age." Then there are those who hold that immediate or true convictions are essential to knowledge, for as stated by McTaggart, "If we could know nothing unless it were proved, we could never start at all." Beck, alarmed at the swinging of the pendulum from dogmatism toward skepticism, describes the latter as "a dogmatic disbelief" which suffers "from all the ills of dogmatism in addition to those brought about by failure to seek unconditional certainty, or to justify it where it is found in both science and morals."

C. I. Lewis, on the other hand, although conceding that this danger of skepticism lends weight to the contention that probable knowledge must have its foundation upon some antecedent certainty, without which there would be "an infinite regress of probables" and although holding that there is "a knowledge of nature which is more than probable because it is not merely empirical, or dependent on the content of the given," contends that the traditional rationalist's concept that metaphysical first principles can be shown to be logically indispensable, or "that what is logically prior is thereby proved

1. See Duce, KGN, 52, 89, 162.  
3. McTaggart, SDR, 45.  
4. Beck, CPR, 47.
to be certain, finds no support from logic and mathematics.¹ Vance, referring to Descartes's true propositions, points out that prejudice may be "clear and distinct," and that Descartes traveled in a circle, forsaking the "clear and distinct" criterion to ratify it by appeal to God, whom he said existed because he had clear and distinct ideas of Him.² The kind of certainty to which Wieman is particularly opposed is just this mathematical and logical certainty in original axioms which are held to be incontrovertable. These axioms, faultless in themselves, come under his just condemnation when used apart from experience to reveal the highest values.³ His a priori is the Kantian, operation upon the occasion of experience.

An a priori that somewhat resembles both Aquinas's first principles and Kant's a priori is that of Edmund Husserl. His phenomenological intuitions of truth or of essences beyond the jurisdiction, and yet not prior to experience, differ from Kant's a priori in combining elements of form with those of content. According to Reinhardt, it was Husserl's purpose to get access to Kant's inaccessible realm of things in themselves.⁴

So while the a priori can not be rejected in every sense of its meaning, its rejection in the old rationalistic sense is an evidence of the inadequacy of all theoretical theistic arguments.

1. Lewis, MWO, 311-312, 204.
2. Vance, RT, 74.
b. Belief that logical necessity is not absolute inevitability

The new view of logical necessity is a voluntaristic one, i.e. not implying absolute inevitability. Like the related term, "a priori", "necessity" is an ambiguous word, its antonyms meaning both "contingent" and "voluntary." The terms "unconditional" and "involuntary" must be distinguished, for there are certain necessary relations which, however, do not coerce the mind. Speaking of that which is intuitively certain, Hume declared: "All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same. These relations are resemblance, proportion, quantity, and number, degrees of any quantity, and contrariety." ¹ Whether the ideas remain fixed is a matter of appeal to experience. Then there is necessity in the sense of the truth whose denial is absurd. This requires penetration into the meaning of the denial in order to show up the self-contradiction. Here again, the necessary is not prior to experience, i.e. before "careful inspection of the terms involved," "all terms referring to experience, there being nothing else to which they can refer."²

There is no a priori reason or necessity for accepting a certain type of logic as the true one, but once it has been accepted, and two premises properly used, the conclusion by

¹ Hume, THN, 380-381; see Turner, PBO, 8-9; England, VRE, 18-19.
² Hartshorne, MVG, 70.
intuitive insight necessarily follows. But one is not compelled to accept the conclusion, for while being formally true (as validly following from the premises), it may not be materially true, which is only ascertainable by reference to experience. More than ever, logic is now being related to experience. Speaking of the necessary circular motion in logic, C. I. Lewis makes it clear that he wishes to be understood not as denying that there are any necessary propositions, for "Whoever takes a given logic as true will find its principles undeniable, without contradiction, and therefore necessary." But he hastens to add that this apart from experience, is not inescapability; there is the sense of self-evidence or necessity that is imposed upon the mind by the given, the "brute fact" of immediate experience. Thus, while not denying the a priori, Lewis affirms that it is a creation of the mind, built out of the materials furnished by experience.

Thus, there is a certain sense in which universal propositions are necessary propositions.

Rationalism is right in maintaining that every particular contains and presupposes universals and that every contingent proposition contains and presupposes propositions that are necessary. But empiricism is right in denying that particulars can be completely reduced to universals, and that contingent propositions can be completely reduced to proofs that are necessary.

Here again necessity is based ultimately upon experience.

2. Lewis, MBO, 211.
3. Montague, WK, 126; see DeBurgh, TPR, 4–5.
Commenting upon Dr. Schiller's book Logic in Use, A. C. Ewing, far from attacking it, is on the defensive, fearing for the very existence of formal logic. Declaring that this discipline is not useless, Ewing admits the very point that Schiller makes—that it "cannot claim to give certainty to our reasonings." Schiller in his reply condemns "vicious, abstract thinking" and restates his objection to formal validity:

It is not that every syllogism (or other deductive reasoning) is void because of the ambiguity of its middle term; but that it is voidable; not that it must be invalid, but that it may become so.

Schiller goes on to explain that the ambiguity results from use in two different contexts, thus imposing the obligation on the user, "the duty of showing in each case that in the transfer of the terms from one case to another no relevant ambiguity has arisen to destroy their identity." The empiricism here is plain:

Hence I maintain the completely empiricist position that every syllogistic conclusion needs to be verified in fact, to 'come true' before it can be proclaimed 'true.'

He expresses delight that Dr. Ewing also has abandoned logical necessity in its strict sense, as "the pet theory of logicians" is changed by Ewing into a "logical obligation" in which an "ought" is substituted for a "must." Thus, it is clear that today there is a strong trend away from a coercive

logical necessity, a necessity independent of experience, including the experience of a free and creative activity of the human mind.

c. Doctrine of probability

The third and last aspect of the general reason advanced to show the inadequacy of all theoretical theistic arguments—the denial of any certainty at all—is the doctrine of probability. In fact, subjective probability as a relation between propositions or beliefs, is in part a reaction against dogmatism, as seen in Kant's denial of the Cartesian position that mathematical certainty can be applied to philosophy.¹ But, of course, if all beliefs and propositions are probable only, then the doctrine of probability itself is only probable, and can not be used in any decisive manner against theoretical theistic arguments, which only suffer the fate of all arguments. Before a fuller presentation of the doctrine of probability, it will suffice to admit its truth in the merely speculative field, leaving open the question of its validity when applied to matters of fact or common experience.

2. Particular reasons

a. Common defect of all theoretical theistic proofs—abstractness

The defect common to all theoretical theistic proofs is abstractness, i.e. the attempt to pass from idea to God (ontological) or from nature to God (cosmological and teleological)

¹ Kant, KrV, 741, 754.
instead of from God to God (the experience of God). To try to
determine the existence of a religious object by other than
distinctively, concrete religious experience is just as unrea­
sonable as to attempt to determine the existence of a physical
object by religious experience. Appropriate concrete evidence
is what is needed for the proof.

b. Theoretical arguments not producers of belief

Then, the traditional theistic "proofs" are not produc­
ers of belief; rather they are the products of belief, as has
been observed in the cases of Anselm and Descartes. The ra­
tionalist Anselm taught "that the office of the so-called the­
istic proofs is never to induce belief, but only and always to
provide us with an understanding of a belief already firmly
held."1 Some philosophers appear to have taken themselves too
seriously; not so much depended upon their speculation as they
imagined. Kant was not one of these. To say the least, very
few are won to belief in God by these "proofs."2 They are, as
has been seen, unconvincing to the majority; to others, they
are largely unknown.3 And as will be shown now there are other
and better sources of belief than theoretical arguments.

c. Not essential to believers

Thus it is easily seen that the traditional theistic arg­
ments are not essential to believers. Their faith does not
"stand in the wisdom of men." "Es ist durchaus nöthig dass man

1. Baillie, OKG, 137.
2. See Beckwith, IG, 112;
   Temple, NMG, 19, 29.
3. See Pratt, PRB, 183; Bradshaw, PFF, 136.
sich vom Dasein Gottes überzeuge; es ist aber nicht eben notig
dass man es demonstrire."

1) Lack of formal argument for God's existence during
the first two centuries of the Christian Church on
the part of Christian writers.

There is almost a total lack of formal argument for God's existence on the part of Christian writers during the first two centuries of the Christian Church (when it was nearest the source of its life and beliefs, if not also when it was the purest). This is in accord with the Kantian statement above (on the necessity for formal theistic arguments). But what is of more importance, it is a conscious or unconscious agreement with the example of their own sacred scriptures, and in striking contrast to the practice of their contemporaries. Impressed by the paucity of theistic argument in the writings of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, L. T. Cole remarks:

But the fact is that in most of these apologies no such reasoning is employed, and even when it is found...it is only incidental and by way of illustration, to explain the rational character of the Christian doctrine of God by a sort of *argumentum ad hominem*.

One explanation for this is the practical interest of these writers, their emphasis being on life in their appeal to the non-Christians to judge Christianity by its fruits in the lives of its adherents. For example, Theophilus and Clement

of Alexandria used the design argument, but for the practical purpose of refuting idolatry.

There is another reason—the lesson learned from the history of Greek philosophy—"the absolute futility of any efforts to arrive at a certain proof of the existence of God by purely rational methods" ("rational" as opposed to empirical and not irrational), as seen, for instance, in the failure of the Stoics to convince anyone (except themselves) of the divinity of the world, by the use of their fatalistic and pantheistic arguments from design.¹ There is some effort by Clement of Alexandria to demonstrate God's existence from the Aristotelian point of view, which is that all knowledge is derived from sensation and understanding. But Clement is explicit in denying that knowing is founded on demonstration by a process of reasoning alone.²

Another reason for this restraint on the part of the early Christian writers is that the Christians, who were but infrequently addressed, did not need such arguments. They had their sacred Scriptures (whose invariable assumption is that they did not need argument, its opening verse being typical in taking God's existence for granted); they were near to the time of Christ (for them, God in the flesh) and to the events of His life, death, and resurrection; they were also not far removed from the historic descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost and at subsequent times (demonstrations of

¹ Cole, Art. (1898), 47; see 22.
² Clement, Stromata, II, 4, V, 12, VIII, 31; see Cole, Art. (1898), 36.
spiritual realities and of the presence of God in His Church, and of Christ in the hearts of believers). 1 Shirley Jackson Case offers another, but closely related, reason:

Doctrine was essentially a bold assertion of faith that did not need to be justified by processes of human reason. Its truth was guaranteed by a revelation so overwhelmingly convincing that apologetic arguments on its behalf were entirely unnecessary. 2

The other class of monotheistic believers (who were, however, addressed by the Christian writers) were the Jews, and the strongest argument for them was the simple appeal to their Scriptures which they regarded as authoritative. The other class, although not monotheists, were believers in God:

And when the Church finally turned towards the Gentile world, it was still the popular religion of the poets, rather than the philosophy of the schools with which the apologists first came in contact. 3

Plato had written: "All Hellenes and barbarians believe in gods." 4 He spoke of disbelief in God as a "disorder" and said that those who were unbelievers in youth give up their unbelief later in life. Thus, there was some skepticism, especially among the Sophists, but "it was held by most of the early Christian authors and explicitly stated by many of them that the idea of existence of God is innate in man as a 'natural opinion'." 5 In this they were doubtless wrong, but the

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1. See Knudson, DG, 235-236; Macintosh, RR, 261; Walsh, Art. (1934), 1-2; Baillie, OKG, 119, 121-122, 126.
2. Case, HCD, 3.
4. Plato, Laws, X.
5. Cole, Art. (1898), 30; see Justin, Second Apology, VI; Clement, Stromata, V, 14; Tertullian, Against Marcion, I, 10.
point is that the Greeks, as well as the Jews, needed no formal argument, for the trouble with the heathen world was not atheism but polytheism—belief in too many gods. While Frank may have made an over-statement in saying that atheism was unknown in Greek philosophy, yet it was true that "the world was still 'full of gods'."¹

Thus, there were several perfectly sufficient reasons for the scarcity of theoretical theistic arguments in the writings of the Christians during the first two centuries of the Church.

2) Freedom of the Middle Ages from dependence on theistic arguments.

Likewise, the Middle Ages, "the ages of faith," were free from dependence on theistic arguments, for not only was it natural for men to believe in God, as in the former period, but now philosophy was in the service of the church, and to some extent, at least, subservient to it;² philosophers (as Anselm and Aquinas) sought to express their faith in philosophical terms. The philosophy of the period was practically all religious—Arabic, Hebrew, and Christian. Describing the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as the golden age of Catholic orthodoxy in which "the application of reason to religion reached its zenith," Christianity being subjected to a "most minute and exhaustive" scrutiny, McGriffert declares:

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1. Frank, PRT, 32-33; see Baillie, OKG, 119.  
2. See Perrier, RSP, 33; Duce, KGN, 454-455; Frank, PRT, 32.
But in the Middle Ages as a rule the intellectual atmosphere and the rational principles generally accepted by thinking men were to all intents and purposes identical with those prevailing when the historic system was framed, and so the application of reason to religion meant the confirmation, not the criticism, of the old.1

3) Independence of modern Christians in the matter

So too, modern Christians, although not living in a time which may be characterized as an "age of faith," are not dependent upon the traditional "proofs" for God's existence. For a reason that is above the changes in character of the ages obtains—a reason that has already been noted—that men are religious before they are philosophers. Rall even goes so far as to declare that "No man ever believed in God because God was demonstrated," for the very good reason that "the things that count most in life are not proved; they are experienced."2 In keeping with this, others are convinced that speculative thought has had the task of criticizing and clarifying religious ideas, but not of originating them.3 What has been shown to be true for particular periods of history, holds true in general—for religious persons the source of the idea of God lies elsewhere than in metaphysical argument. Cook Wilson is not alone in holding that religious persons would be dissatisfied, in fact, with theoretical proof, no matter how convincing it might be:

1. McGiffert, RMR, 16.
2. Rall, FT, 53; see CHR. ix; Hocking, MGHE, 304. 3. See Bowne, THE, 7, 35, 37, 248; Leuba, PRM, 302; Galloway, TPR, 381; Pratt, PRE, 185; Hegel, PR, III, 216; Wilson, SI, 836.
If we think of the existence of our friends, it is the direct knowledge which we want; merely inferential knowledge seems a poor affair. We don't want merely inferred friends. Could we possibly be satisfied with an inferred God? 1

For the modern believer, as for believers of all time, belief is a matter of experience rather than of argument. 2 The Christian does not wish to be an "implicit Christian," but a real follower of Christ (who was personally acquainted with God and did not argue His existence). Thus, the modern believer's position can be illustrated by reference to an ancient document. The book of Job in the Christian and Jewish Scriptures represents Zopher, in his reproof of Job, as asking, "Canst thou by searching find out God?" 3 Obviously, as Brightman notes, this implies a negative answer, but it does not imply (even were Job the spokesman) that Job and Jesus are at variance at this point. For the context of the latter's words, to which attention is called, 4 indicates that Jesus was urging people to pray rather than to become philosophers (worthy as that profession is), to seek and find God in prayer. And "finding God" is not synonymous with "finding out God," as Zopher, speaking of the secrets of wisdom, asks further, "Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" 5

Later, according to the record, Job did find God, although

2. Macintosh, RC, 74; Marano, PG, 202; Baillie, IR, 86; Wilson, SI, 858, 850-851.
with appropriate humility (akin to that of Aquinas) he acknowledged that he had not found out God.¹

True, in Jesus one finds no trace of the discounting or rejection of reason, that is, of course, its use within reasonable limits.² But neither do we find in Him any trace of the elevation of reason to the level of the path to God; and Brightman gives a reason (apart from the reason that faith is that path)—"Jesus was not a philosopher...He usually presented His insights in pictures or in questions rather than in arguments."³

While the idea of God should be held reasonably,⁴ and while one might be thoroughly convinced that it would be safe to venture out on the hypothesis that God exists, yet it is not necessary to remain in that hypothetical and unsatisfactory position, but rather by means of faith to come into the immediate presence of God—actually find God. Is God an Ultimate Conclusion for faith—the faith that He can be found, or is He (as an idea) merely an Ultimate Conclusion for reason? That is still the question to be seriously discussed; we are here only on the approaches of the discussion.

But to conclude on the independence of modern Christians from speculative theistic arguments, it is well that religious people have not had to stand in suspense waiting for philosophers to level the speculative doubts which they themselves raised.⁵

1. See Job, 38:1; 42:3; 5-6. Aquinas, ISA, 83.
2. See Brightman, FG, 53; see Matt. 11:25.
4. See Brightman, FG, 55.
d. The dependence of Western philosophers upon the Christian-Jewish tradition for their ideas of God

Instead of Christian and Jewish religionists depending upon philosophers for their (Christian's) idea of God, it is the reverse, as has been noted in the cases of Anselm, Descartes, and Kant, and could be shown to be true with others, as for instance, Hegel. Speaking of the indebtedness of modern philosophy to medieval philosophy and to the theistic argument of Descartes, Gilson traces the credit past Descartes directly to Christian tradition, and adds:

Examples could easily be multiplied to show how the imagination of the classical metaphysicians was absolutely possessed by the idea of the Biblical Creator-God.

One who has read Leibniz can imagine what would be left "if the properly Christian elements" were dropped out. After calling attention to Hume's recognition of the distinction between historical causes of religious belief and theoretical arguments that follow such belief, Sorley explains how scholastic and Cartesian philosophies took over the idea of God; and then calls for fair play: "Philosophy must not take over the religious idea of God without recognizing that this idea has been reached by another path from that of rational thought." Mackintosh declares that "a religion based upon philosophy is an illusion that cannot last once we have seen how the religious elements of philosophy were themselves actually derived from

1. See Maier, HCK, 8.
2. See Gilson, SMP, 13-14.
3. Gilson, SMP, 16.
4. Gilson, SMP, 16.
5. Sorley, MVIG, 304.
the great historic religions."¹

This position concerning the dependence of Western philosophers upon the Jewish-Christian tradition for their idea of God is no more a denial of, than it is discounted by, the facts that early Christian theology was influenced by Greek philosophy, and that the early Christian theologians sought to put their theology into philosophical terminology. Irenaeus, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Theophilus, and others obeyed the Scriptural exhortation, which they viewed as coming from God Himself, "Come, now, and let us reason together," and by that very act recognized the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of coming into the divine presence in order to reason truly. Tertullian taught that philosophy is the "paidagogos" (παιδαγός, boy, and άγω to lead, and thus, not the teacher, originally, but the servant who leads the child to the teacher) who brings the Greek mind to Christ.² He said that the Greek philosophers by divine inspiration sometimes hit upon the truth, and that Plato was indebted to the Hebrews for his knowledge of God.³ The philosophers, he declared, finding a simple revelation of God, began to dispute about Him:

Nor need we wonder if the speculations of the philosophers have perverted the older Scriptures. Some of their brood, with their opinions, have even adulterated our new-given Christian revelations, and corrupted it into a system of philosophical doctrines.⁴

2. Clement, Stromata, I, 5, 16.
4. Tertullian in Roberts and Rambaut, ACL, 131.
What was true and wholesome in Greek philosophy was borrowed, according to Tertullian, as the Greek poets and Sophists drank at "the fount of the prophets," and watered their arid minds there.¹ Then asserting that there is nothing older than the truth, Tertullian called the divine writings "treasure sources" from which all later wisdom has been taken.²

Justin, who did not cease viewing himself as a philosopher when he became a Christian, wrote: "Straightway a flame was kindled in my soul...I found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable. Thus...I am a philosopher."³ He pointed out the differences among philosophers, asking how one desiring to be saved could learn the true religion from those who, in their wranglings, were not able to convince themselves.⁴ Replying to the claim that Plato and Aristotle had the true religion, Justin pointed to their contradictions, especially on the nature of God, and invited the Greeks to come to Christ in order to "partake of the incomparable wisdom," and to be "instructed by the Divine Word."⁵ He appealed to a belief, common among Christians then, that Plato was obligated to Moses, noting the similarity of The Timaeus to the first chapter of Genesis, and asserting that Plato visited Egypt, learning the Hebrew version there, being indebted to Moses even for his doctrine of the Forms.⁶

1. Tertullian in Roberts and Rambaut, ACL, 131.
2. Roberts and Rambaut, ACL, 131.
3. Justin, Dialog. with Trypho, 8.
5. Justin, Discourse to the Greeks, 2.
Tatian, also, was another voice declaring that the Christian philosophy is older than the Grecian; he poured scorn on "the pretended independence of Greek philosophers," arguing for the superiority of Christianity over Greek and Roman religions and philosophies.¹

This expression of the attitude of the Ante-Nicene writers will indicate that Platonic and Aristotelian forms of theistic argument were inadequate for the Christian content. "Clement of Alexandria...shows that any Ontological or Ideological argument can only lead us to an 'Unknown' which may be 'understood' and given meaning 'by the Word alone that proceeds from Him.'"² One may admit, with Gilson, that Plato's doctrine furnished the Church with important elements, particularly the Idea of the Good, which helped in the elucidation of the philosophical notion of God, and still question what Plato really thought of God, whether he believed in a plurality of gods or not, and contend that his conception of God was very imperfect.³

Serious doubt is cast also upon Aristotle's theoretical monotheism when it is learned that:

He gave testamentary disposition that the image of his mother should be consecrated to Demeter, and that there should be erected at Stagira, on account of a vow he had made to the gods, two marble statues, one to Zeus Soter, and the other to Athene Soterra.⁴

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1. Tatian, Addr. to the Greeks, 25.  
2. Cole, Art.(1898), 38; see Clement, Stromata, V, 12.  
3. Gilson, SMP, 44.  
4. Gilson, SMP, 45.
So, Aristotle's contribution to the philosophical idea of God is granted, but with the qualification that "the attributes of the Christian God overflow the attributes of Aristotle's in every direction."1 Speaking of pre-Socratic natural philosophers, and of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Stoics, Cole remarks: "But none of these philosophers attained to a concept of God which could in any real or accepted sense of the word be called theistic."2

Thus, it is clear that whatever indebtedness the early Christian philosophers felt to the Greek philosophers, they did not feel obligated to them for their idea of God. Is the claim of these ante-Nicene writers to communication of ideas in the ancient world unreasonable? The one who affirms it would have the task of proving that the "wandering Jew" did not wander, and that Plato, for instance, never journeyed a number of years in Italy, Cyrene, Sicily, and Egypt, and that, in particular, he did not make three trips to Syracuse in Sicily to the court of Dionysius I.3

St. Thomas owed much to Aristotle, but he did not get God's attributes from Aristotle's concept of the Motionless Mover and Pure Form; Aquinas had to read into the concept a great deal, filling in the "Form" from the Scriptures in order to make it detailed as well as theistic. "The five Thomist

1. Gilson, SMP, 50.
3. See Edman, WP, xiv; Plato's Thirteen Epistles, seventh epistle, posthumous, but generally considered reliable.
proofs are hung expressly from the text of Exodus."¹ Asking whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the divine essence, Aquinas answers, "No."² Meyer in stating the position of St. Thomas, writes:

Because our minds are bound down to the sense world, the nature of God represents the unattainable for our speculative efforts. The boundaries of man's knowledge of God are most narrow, and man is dependent on revelation for his knowledge of God.³

Says Turner: "St. Thomas moderated the claims of reason, set limits to its power of proving spiritual truth, and maintained that the mysteries of faith could not be discovered and cannot be proved by unaided reason."⁴

Thus, the argument for the dependence of Western philosophers upon the Christian-Jewish tradition loses no weight in any generous acknowledgment of the indebtedness that Christian thinkers have felt to Greek philosophy.

e. The value of theoretical "proofs" for the existence of God

While inadequate as proofs, the theoretical theistic arguments do have values which may be summarized briefly. They have value as efforts of the human mind to transcend its limitations, as attempts to give meaning to existence and to the order and arrangement evident in existence, and as endeavors to give content to the idea of God, an idea already held.

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¹ Gilson, SMP, 74; see 75-82. ² Aquinas, ISA, 83; see Duce, KGN, 203; Garrigou-Lagrange, OG, 355. ³ Meyer, PST, 23⁴. ⁴ Turner, Art. (1912), 550.
They have value as giving expression to the conviction of the religious consciousness (a conviction derived from other than theoretical sources), and as both confirmatory and explanatory of this conviction. They show: "on what terms the creed which is in fact adopted can most reasonably be held."¹ They indicate, as in the case of Anselm, a prayerful lifting of the soul towards God in the desire to understand and to know Him, serving thus to help safeguard against misconceptions of God.

These arguments have an indirect value in that the very interest in them is an indication of an interest in religion, and a start toward proof in getting unbelievers to think, and perhaps to see that they actually do believe in God,² at least to realize that a belief that has persisted through the ages should be examined for some possible warrant for its existence and persistence.³

They have indirect value also in that in the very dissatisfaction felt over their failure may lead to the discerning of the distinction between religious belief and religious argument, or between origin of belief and explanation of belief, and to the lesson that "rational considerations by themselves are never adequate to the ultimate problems of life," problems which are never solved "without faith and activity."⁴ They point, in their failure, to something better, indicating that "the roots of religion lie in religious experience itself."⁵

The result of excessive trust in speculation can but lead to the conclusion that religion has been correct and wise in looking elsewhere for its main support.\(^1\) The very Scriptures that ask believers to give a reason for the hope within them, never make any formal argument for God's existence. They point elsewhere, as does this dissertation, for the reason for the hope. The Psalmist was impressed, no doubt, by the argument from design; but his fervent outburst, "The heavens declare the glory of God," are the words of an awed worshipper standing alone out under a starry heaven, and not the cool, calculating argument of a lawyer standing in a courtroom pleading a case before men. The Psalmist found God in his own soul before he found Him in nature.\(^2\) The problem of the distracted Job was not whether there is a God, but why the righteous suffer, a problem not solved by the reasoning of men in several rounds of debate, but by the revelation of God Himself to the debaters. So the "proofs" are evidences "of the unshakable character of certain convictions which experience implants";\(^3\) they do not achieve theoretical or logical certainty.

\(^{1}\) See Hocking, MGHE, V.

\(^{2}\) Psa. 19:1, 14; see Baillie, IR, 84, 86.

\(^{3}\) Waterhouse, Art. (1944), 81.
CHAPTER II
MORAL CERTAINTY

I. Transition

1. Relation to theoretical certainty: Kant's Glauben

Kant describes moral or practical certainty thus: "Nein, die Uberzeugung ist nicht logische, sondern moralische Gewissheit, und... sie [beruht] auf subjectiven Gründen (der moralischen Gesinnung)."¹ It is Kant's Glauben: "Ist das letztere nur subjectiv zureichend und wird zugleich für objectiv unzureichend gehalten."² From this, and from Kant's contrast of "theoretical" and "practical" in reference to both reason and knowledge, it may be inferred that moral or practical certainty as set over against theoretical certainty in Kantian terminology is not based upon abstract reasoning (i.e. reasoning separated from both moral and religious experience) but upon the moral or practical reason (although still separated from religious experience). As described above by Kant, practical certainty is psychological in nature, with a shift of emphasis from the intellect to the will: "Praktisch ist alles, was durch Freiheit möglich ist."³ That is, there are not two reasons, not two "distinct entities";⁴ for as Sorley, describing rationalistic ethics, puts it, "Reason is held to become practical by virtue of its subject-matter, that is to say, by being applied to

1. Kant, KrV, B 857.
2. Kant, KrV, B 850.
practical or moral conduct."¹

But neither method of reasoning is ideal. Theoretical reason is an undue emphasis upon reason, narrowly viewed; practical reasoning is an undue emphasis upon faith and the will, faith likewise narrowly viewed. That is, speculative reason is part reason, just as the faith employed by the practical reason is part faith. Kant by a curious ignoring of his restriction of knowledge to sense-experience, now appeals to other experience—moral experience—failing, however, to extend his postulate to religious experience.

Sorley admits the novelty of Kant's contention for the primacy of practical reason in reference to the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, although he affirms that the method was not altogether new, as Plato in his Republic passes from a consideration of ethical conceptions to the Good.² Tennant is practically of the same opinion: "Moral arguments for theism were put forward before Kant...but they generally held a subsidiary place."³

W. S. Hough clearly grasps Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical certainty:

Thus the Critique of Pure Reason leaves us with the view of the possibility of a knowledge of things-in-themselves, only that we are forced to take this knowledge, not as theoretical, but as practical, to regard its certainty, not as objective, but as subjective or personal, and to

¹ Sorley, MVIG, 9; see Kant, GMS in Hartenstein, KSW, IV, 244; WHO in same Vol., 345; hereafter all GMS & WHO references will be found in this Vol.
² Sorley, MVIG, 2.
³ Tennant, PT, II, 96.
designate it, not as science, but as belief.¹

2. Historical antecedents

a. Conditions of the time

Kant's moral argument for the existence of God was called forth by the conditions of the time; an age was turning away from the claims of reason to skepticism concerning those claims. This illustrates a tendency noted by Mackintosh and Troeltsch that the progress of thought is apt to proceed by way of the pendulum, "with violent dashes from one extreme to another," each new school taking "its guiding interest" from "those elements in the complex problem which its predecessor had tended to overlook."² Thus, Kant reacts to the situation of his time:

Ich behaupte nun: dass all Versuche eines bloss speculativen Gebrauchs der Vernunft in Ansehung der Theologie Ganzlich fruchtlos und ihrer inneren Beschaffenheit nach null und nichtig sind, dass aber die Principien ihres Naturgebrauchs ganz und gar auf keine Theologie führen, folglich, wenn man nicht moralische Gesetze sum Grunde legt.³

Often, old and venerated buildings are torn down, the debris removed in order that a new and larger structure be built upon a solid foundation. Thus, while the Kritik der reinen Vernunft seemed destructive of the great faiths of man, yet in it Kant anticipated his constructive work in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. That is, in the words of Edward Caird, "the intellect, in order to vindicate its rightful claims,

must renounce its false pretensions.\(^1\) Kant seems to have regarded his moral argument as an effective weapon against materialism, fatalism, free-thinking, unbelief, fanaticism, superstition, dogmatism and skepticism.\(^2\) He appears to have abolished metaphysical knowledge as a basis for theism in order to make room for faith and its activity:

Es ist demütigend für die menschliche Vernunft, dass sie in ihrem reinen Gebrauche nichts ausrichtet...Diese Moraltheologie hat nun den eigenthümlichen Vorzug vor der speculativen: dass sie unauflöslich auf den Begriff eines einigen, allervollkommensten und vernünftigen Urwesens führt, worauf uns speculative Theologie nicht einmal aus objectiven Gründen hinweiset, geschweige uns davon überzeugen konnte.\(^3\)

b. Influences on Kant

There were significant influences on Kant at this time. Webb calls attention to the tendency in the period before Kant to elevate morality above religion because the former had greater simplicity and intelligibility than the latter.\(^4\) Then, at home and at school Kant was under the moral earnestness and the strict discipline of the Pietistic sect of Christians, acquiring, thus, a sense of the urgency of the moral law, a belief in the radical evil of human nature, and the conviction of the need of a complete right-about-face in the moral life. On the other hand, he seems to have revolted against Pietism in his "disposition to suspect those who indulge themselves in a supposed personal intercourse with God in prayer...a harmful and demoralizing self-illusion."\(^5\)

1. Caird, PK, 188; see Kant, KrV, B 773.
2. Kant, KrV, B 780-792.
3. Kant, KrV, B 823, 842.
Later, Kant became absorbed in mathematics and science; thus, he was at home in the field of science as well as in the field of morality. This may have had some bearing in his restriction of knowledge to the sense level, a tendency which, in view of his strong sense of his obligation to the moral law, "made him so impressive an exponent of the discord between the deterministic world...and the world of spiritual freedom into which we are summoned by our conscience." His seeking of the resolution of this discord not in revealed but in natural religion, along with his fear of enthusiasm and his unhistorical temper of mind, is another evidence of his reaction against Pietism. It appears that in maturity, he avoided regular religious observances. But he was always impressed by the evidences of design in nature; according to Webb, Kant did not separate the dual testimony to the divine existence, found in "the starry heavens above and the moral law within." Then too, Kant may have been influenced by the philosophical movements and controversies of his day. In 1763, Mendelssohn took first prize from the Prussian Academy of Science on the subject "'Les Vérités métaphysiques sont-elles susceptibles de la même évidence que les vérités mathématiques, et quelle est la nature de leur certitude'?" Mendelssohn's answer to this problem was as follows:

'Ich getraue mich, zu behaupten dass die metaphysischen Wahrheiten zwar derselben Gewissheit, aber nicht derselben Fasslichkeit

fahig als die geometrischen Wahrheiten. Das heisst: man kann die vornahmsten Wahrheiten der Metaphysik durch zusammenhangende Schlusse bis auf solche Grundsätze zurückführen, die ihrer Natur nach ebenso unleugbar sind als die ersten Grunde—und Heischesätze der Geometrie, aber kann diese Kette von Schlüssen nicht so einteuchtend nicht so fasslich machen als die geometrischen Wahrheiten.1

This work was a disappointment to the empirical Jacobi; it seemed to him to follow the dogmatism of Leibniz and Spinoza. In 1785, he wrote Briefe über die Lehre Spinozas, addressing it to Mendelssohn, opposing Spinoza's application of mathematical demonstration to other spheres than mathematics, especially to the problem of the existence of God. That is, Jacobi denied that there is a demonstrable system of philosophy; he emphasized faith in the treatment of supersensible objects, but gradually viewed faith not as feeling but as reason. Thus while his philosophy was known as the Gefühlphilosophie, it was a qualified empirical system, with a stress on faith:

He believed that all knowledge comes by actual experience but that experience is more than mere sensibility. The supersensible is as much the object of experience as the sensible, both being alike given in immediate perception,2

It is not necessary to relate how Kant was drawn into this controversy; the important fact to note is that he came to see that:

Certainty is not a characteristic peculiar only to truths that are mathematical or logical, but that it may pertain equally to moral or ethical truths. Such truths, in other words,

are not excluded from the very outset and in their own nature, from all possibility of attaining to certainty.\(^1\)

But it was Crusius evidently who gave Kant his point of departure for the moral argument:

Crusius's aim, apparently, was to avoid the thorough-going determinism which he took to be characteristic of the Leibnizian philosophy. He sought to establish the fact of freedom, particularly of moral freedom. \(...\) He emphasized the distinction between logical and real ground and prepared the way for the recognition of the problem of objective connection. This positive contribution placed Crusius in the direct line of philosophical advance and incidently furnished Kant with a starting point.\(^2\)

3. Kant's preparation for the moral argument

a. Changes in his thinking

The changes in Kant's thinking during his philosophical career indicate his preparation for the new argument. Mackintosh notes a marked contrast between Kant's theism in the pre-critical period and in the critical period. At first, under the influence of Newton, he rested his whole case for God's existence on the uniformity of nature. Later, in his Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, "he propounded a curiously involved and inverted version of the ontological argument, ascending from the concept of possibility"\(^3\) to an existential conception. But in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, he gave this up. "In the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment, Kant came to rest the whole weight of his faith upon the moral

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1. Turner, PBO, 10.
3. Mackintosh, TMT, 92.
argument."¹ To use a representation taken from Kant himself, we may view the first Critique as the first premise, the second Critique as the second premise, and the third Critique as the conclusion, of the Kantian syllogism, "in which Kant attempts to bring together the apparently antithetic premises, the ideas of nature and spirit, of necessity and freedom."²

In his pre-critical period, Kant was still under the influence of Wolff, even when trying to secure a theism satisfactory to the practical reason, thinking that he had "established a metaphysics of morals from the pure concept of the moral law without reference to empirical content."³ Hough tracing the change in Kant from the first to the last Kritik, observes:

The farther the Kantian investigations advance from the doctrine of knowledge to the doctrine of Ideas, from this to the doctrines of moral freedom and the moral order of the world, from these to the philosophic doctrine of the natural freedom of phenomena (bodies)—which coincides with the critique of aesthetic and teleological judgment—the more distinctly things-in-themselves come into view.⁴

b. An early hint

Kant gives an early hint as to how he is going to emerge from the uncertainties of speculation. For while God is not given on the basis of pure reason, what is inadmissible in speculative reason is permissible in practical reason—i.e., hypotheses for answering questions and supporting dogmatical conclusions.⁵

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¹ Mackintosh, TMT, 92.
² Smith, CCP, 132.
⁴ Hough, Art. (1887), 134.
⁵ See Kant, KrV, B 20–21, 804–805.
o. His conception of philosophy.—There is a further preparation for the new certainty in religious matters in Kant's conception of philosophy. All it can do in the speculative realm is to analyze and define the theoretical and practical situations of life; but the key to the riddle of the universe and of life is in the moral conscience. Like sense-experience, moral experience reveals a systematic unity of presupposed conditions, having a noumenal reference and a function of defining reality as a whole, and postulating a "universe in which the values of spiritual experience are supported and conserved."

Moral choice appears to be basic to the new argument. For Kant, to act rightly means to act in accord with the concept of universality, the need for right action applying to every individual under every possible circumstance. He did not make it clear that what is right for one man is right for another under the same circumstances, but his principle is correct in general. For Kant, conscience is:

An instinct to pass judgments upon ourselves in accord with moral laws. It is not a mere faculty but an instinct; and its judgment is not logical but judicial. We have the faculty to judge ourselves logically in terms of morality.... But conscience has the power to summon us against our will before the judgment seat.... It is thus an instinct...a judge passes judgment, he does not merely form a judgment.

d. Practical belief in God.—Then Kant was heading toward his moral argument and moral certainty in coming to

1. Smith, CCPR, 571.
2. See Laird, PS, 154-155.
3. Kant, LE, 129.
see that belief in God is of practical as well as of theoretical value. Holding that only sense objects can be known, Kant had to explain how metaphysics treated God as existent. An index to the explanation is found in Kant's discussion of the absolute totality of conditions. We can not picture the whole of appearance, but the whole of practical reason can function in our lives in concrete form. For while the absolute totality of all appearances is only an idea, an unsolvable problem ("weil es im praktischen Gebrauch des Verstandes ganz allein um die Ausüb ung nach Regeln zu thun ist.")\textsuperscript{1} yet God can be believed in on the practical basis of the necessity of this belief for reason and its work. Thus, the practical reason imposes a moral compulsion to believe. That is, facing the moral conditions of life, we are commanded by the moral law to think of God. In Grundlung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, beginning with the assumption that ordinary moral judgments are dependable, Kant sought to justify the supreme principle of morality.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{e. Strong argument for the freedom of the will}

Finally, Kant prepared the way for the moral argument and moral certainty by presenting a strong argument for the freedom of both the human and the divine wills. He had declared that God, freedom, and immortality are proper objects for metaphysics, and that every other subject "dient ihr bloss zum Mittel, um zu diesen Ideen und ihrer Realität zu

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Kant, KrV, B 385; unless otherwise stated, all references in this section refer to this work.\textsuperscript{2}
\item[2.] Kant, GMS, 237.
\end{itemize}
Two causalities, nature and freedom, constitute the problem. The second, used in a world-wide sense, is "das Vermögen, einen Zustand von selbst anzufangen, deren Causalität also nicht nach dem Naturgesetze wiederum unter einer anderen Ursache steht, welch sie der Zeit nach bestimmte." Man as belonging to both the sensible and the intelligible worlds is both determined and free; he is free as an intellectual and moral being. The cosmos is God's free act, showing His ability to begin something by Himself—spontaneity. Freedom, human as well as divine, is noumenal and timeless, affecting the phenomenal. It contains no empirical element, is independent of the will, and free from the coercion of sensuous impulses. As noumenal, human freedom is a postulate. Later, Kant came to see that it "is as much given as the moral conscience on which he based it."

"Denn sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten." In that case, nature is "die vollständig und an sich hinreichend bestimmende Ursache jeder Begabung." In denying this, and that the idea of freedom is phenomenal, Kant is seeking a free cause both immanent in nature and above nature: "Wir können...der Sinnlichkeit unabhängig bestimmt." Kant is referring not only to man but to

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2. B 560; GMS, 260.  
5. DeBurgh, FMR, 156; see Kant, GMS, 296; KdU, A xi-xiii.  
7. B 564.  
a necessary Being that is "gleichwohl von der ganzen Reihe, auch eine nichtempirische Bedingung." So determination (as God's method) rules the physical order, but there must be a free Being at the end of the causal regress to set the chain into motion. If the only causality were that of nature, there would be no beginning of things, for the only spontaneity in the universe is that of personality—the spontaneity of freedom so essential to a First Cause.

II. The moral argument for the existence of deity, a new basis for religious certainty

1. Implication of Moral Ruler in moral experience

   a. Kant's opening statement.--Kant's opening statement in the first Critique is as follows: "Praktisch ist alles, was durch Freiheit möglich ist." This linking of "freedom" and "practical" appears to be the real beginning of the argument on a new basis for the existence of God. For now Kant introduces the moral laws, revealed in moral experience, viewed as laws of freedom, as "gehören diese allein zum praktischen Gebrauche der reinen Vernunft, und erlauben einen Kanon." Reason is for the purpose of telling us, "was zu thun sei, wenn der Wille frei, wenn ein Gott und eine künftige Welt ist." So the ultimate purpose of nature is moral.

   b. Happiness in a moral world.--On this foundation of the moral purposiveness of nature, Kant carries on the argument

2. B 828.
by considering the question of happiness in a moral world:

Alles Interesse meiner Vernunft (das specula-
tive so wol, als das praktische) vereinigt sich
in folgenden drei Fragen: 1. Was kann ich wissen?
2. Was soll ich thun? 3. Was darf ich hoffen?

The object of all hoping is happiness, which is defined
as the satisfaction of all desires. Now the motive of happiness
is the foundation of practical or pragmactical law, while the
worthiness of happiness is the foundation of the ethical law.

Having made this distinction in terms, Kant takes up the con-
sideration of the world as moral in nature, "sofern sie allen
sittlichen Gesetzen gemäss wäre (wie sie es denn nach der Frei-
heit der vernünftigen Wesen sein kann, und, nach der notwendig-
en Gesetzen der Sittlichkeit sein soll)."2

c. The Summum Bonum and moral certainty

But there is no happiness for the one unworthy of it;
intelligence is required in order to secure it. In this way,
Kant comes to the Summum Bonum and moral certainty. The Summum
Bonum is the absolutely necessary goal of moral belief; it is
Supreme Intelligence:

Ich nenne die Idea einer solchen Intelligenz,
in welcher der moralisch vollkommenste Wille, mit
der höchsten Seligkeit verbunden, die Ursache
aller Glückseligkeit in der Welt ist, sofern sie
mit der Seligkeit (als der Würdigkeit glücklich
zu sein) in genauem Verhältnisse steht, das Ideal
des höchsten Guts.3

That is, morality "ist nur möglich in der intelligibel-
en Welt unter einem weisen Urheber und Regirer."4 We are in

1. B 833. 
2. B 836. 
3. B 839. 
a Kingdom of Grace, where we may expect happiness unless our actions make us unworthy of it. This is a necessary idea of reason: "Es ist notwendig, dass unser ganzer Lebenswandel sittlichen Maximen unter geordnet werde." But this is impossible apart from reason connecting law with an efficient cause:

Ohne also einen Gott und eine für uns jetzt nicht sichtbare, aber gehoffte Welt, sind die herrlichen Ideen der Sittlichkeit zwar Gegenstände des Beifalls und der Bewunderung, aber nicht Triebfedern des Vorsatzes und der Ausübung.²

Sorley explains the peculiarity of Kant's reasoning here:

The realm of nature and the moral realm... are at first regarded as independent...subject to different laws....Yet the moral order claims unlimited sovereignty, even over the realm of nature, while nature proceeds on its way regardless of the claim. Reconciliation can only be effected by an external power, and God is the Great Reconciler.³

Clark also explains Kant's thought here on the necessity of a union of the conceptions of nature and moral law. In order that the ultimate moral purpose of the world might be realized, perfect virtue and happiness must be fused. It is also necessary that nature be so constructed that it shall converge on man's moral goals, involving a Being distinct from nature and yet its cause, who shall combine "the laws of nature with the moral law."⁴ But in order for this Being to bring about this combination, He must have a consciousness of moral ends, which implies a will. "It follows that the supreme ground of nature is a Being who has acted with intellect and will, or in other

words, God."¹ In Kant's description, this is the God of Theism, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and eternal.² Of the existence of this Being, Kant is morally certain.³ We ought to presuppose God's existence.

The moral argument, which appears in the first Critique in its simple and concentrated form, must be supplemented by references to other Kantian works of the same period.

d. Respect for moral law: moral certainty

According to what is perhaps the most familiar of the sayings of Kant, the moral law within filled him "mit Bewunderung and Ehrfurcht."⁴ This respect for moral law, and its accompanying sense of obligation, are facts of moral experience, constituting the foundation of the moral argument for the existence of God, for as it has been seen, these facts imply a moral order, which in turn, implies a Moral Ruler.

Now obligation is viewed by Kant as involving universal and necessary precepts, i.e. precepts with an objective basis, one beyond the shifting feelings of the individual:

Jederman muss eingestehen dass ein Gesetz, wenn es moralisch, d.i. als Grund einer Verbindlichkeit Gelten soll, absolute Nothwendigkeit bei sich führ-en müsse; dass das Gebot: du sollst nicht lügen, nicht etwas bloß für Menschen gelte, andere vernünf-tige Wesen sich aber daran nicht zu kehren hätten, und so alles übrige eigentliche Sittengesetze; dass mithin der Grund der Verbindlichkeit hier nicht in der Natur des Menschen oder den Umständen in der Welt... gesucht werden müsse.⁵

Boodin agrees with Kant here. The Ought "is not the

¹ Clark, IKP, 282. ² B 843. ³ B 847. ⁴ Kant, KpV, A 289. ⁵ Kant, GMS, 237.
projection of the ideals of the individual or of the race at any time...not my will, but the eternal Ought be done.\textsuperscript{1}

Following Plato, Boodin confers ontological reality upon it, seeing evidence of its objectivity in its operation in the concrete world, and declaring that it does not grow out of our inclinations and impulses.

Evidently to drive his point home, Kant, a little farther on, continues: "Es ist überall nichts in der Welt...was ohne Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille."\textsuperscript{2} That is, the will is good, independent of the feelings playing upon it, and the good actions resulting from its exercise. It shines as "ein Juwel...als etwas das seinen vollen Werth in sich selbst hat."\textsuperscript{3} Even man's love for God is ruled out as having no moral worth, because it does not stem from a sense of duty, i.e. "Nothwendigkeit einer Handlung aus Achtung für Gesetz."\textsuperscript{4} Of course, here Kant goes too far, for he ignores the facts that law is for law-breakers, and that loving God with God's help and by force of habit, is as much a moral act as loving with effort and from a sense of duty. In fact, the man who is loyal to his wife in this latter way is in a precarious moral position.

This sense of binding obligation, joined with a universal viewpoint which is self-imposed, is the well-known "categorical imperative."\textsuperscript{5} In keeping with his thought that only

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. Boodin, Art. (1907), 468, 470; see Rashdall, TGE, 211-212; Perry, Art. (1911), 288-293.
  \item 2. Kant, GMS, 241.
  \item 3. Kant, GMS, 242.
  \item 4. Kant, GMS, 248; see 247.
  \item 5. Kant, GMS, 250; see 262.
\end{itemize}
the good will can, without qualification, be called good, and that only respect for moral law, *qua* moral law has moral merit, Kant guards his use of "feeling" of respect for law; it is prompted by reason, a rational belief based upon data furnished by pure reason, which, while objectively insufficient, is subjectively satisfying. By reason, thus, one can orient himself to super-sensible objects.¹ This idea of respect for moral law will come up again. But as suggesting a Moral Law-Giver, it has within it the seeds of "moralische Gewissheit" concerning the existence of God.²

2. Implication of Divine Law-Giver in moral experience: autonomy of will

a. Slow transition from law to Law-Giver.—At first sight, Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the human will does not seem to imply the existence of a Divine Law-Giver revealed in moral experience, as the transition from moral law to Law-Giver is slow.³ In fact, autonomy of will seems to negate a law-giver other than man, for complete independence of will as held by Kant, means freedom from all external compulsion or restriction. Hence, according to Kant, we should look upon moral precepts as binding upon us not "weil sie Gebote Gottes sind, sondern sie als göttliche Gebote ansehen, darum, weil wir dazu innerlich verbindlich sind."⁴ That is, the laws should be obeyed, not through fear of (nor even through reverence for) God, but out of reverence for the law itself.

Pringle-Pattison interprets Kant's position here:

Man as noumenon or purely rational being, gives the law; man as phenomenon receives it... As long as the authority imposing the law is separate from the conscience to which it appeals, the right to command may be called in question. The moral Sollen is his necessary Wollen.

There are many evidences that Kant "made the transition very hesitatingly." For instance, in harmony with his unreasonable and inconsistent statement that man is a completely independent being ("unreasonable" as not squaring with the actual facts of man in relation with other human, if not also, divine beings, under human, if not also, divine laws, and "inconsistent" in appearing to take God from the throne of supreme rulership over the kingdoms of nature and morality, where he had placed Him to guarantee that virtue be rewarded with happiness), Kant declares that man is a moral legislator, subject to the will of no other being in the employment of his free, practical reason, acting independently of any foreign influence. Likewise, although he believed in "das radicale Böse in der menschlichen Natur," and rejected the ontological conception of perfection on the ground that obedience to moral law should not be for the purpose of realizing one's perfection, Kant still asserts that the latter is better than the theological divine will. Martineau and Lamont object, however, that

1. Pringle-Pattison, PR, 224-225.
3. Vide supra, 104-106; Kant, KpV, A 240; Rashäll, TGE, 149, 154, 172, 174; Lamont, Art. (1931), 106; Gleason, Art. (1934), 229-230; 235-237; Boodin, Art. (1907), 471.
4. Kant, KrV, B 847.
5. Kant, KrV, B 847.
6. See Kant, GMS, 291; see KrV, B 839.
it takes two to create an obligation. Of course, Kant would reply that he viewed ideal man rather than the actual self as the other who shall judge man's actions. But Abbott, in his interpretation of Kant here, shows the logical outcome of this view of the ideal judge:

Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one who knows the heart, for the tribunal is set up in the inward part of man; at the same time he must be all-obliging, that is, must be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as his commands. Now since such a moral being must at the same time possess all power, since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God.

A question obtrudes itself here. Suppose "the subject" whose will "ist in allen Handlungen sich selbst ein Gesetz," on the grounds of Kant's own belief in the radical evil of human nature, and his correlative view that the only absolute good will is God's will, considers it reasonable to accept the judgment of a wiser and holier being, and makes that will his own by a voluntary choice. Could not the "bidding" then be viewed as internal? If so, Kant will be able to reconcile the two views of the autonomy of the will and God as Law-Giver (or, autonomy of will versus the categorical imperative), to break up the apparent antagonism of morality and religion, and

1. Lamont, Art. (1931), 105-106.
4. Kant, RIG, 99; see Brunner, MED, 129.
to dissolve the seeming threat to the autonomy of ethics coming from religion.¹

The opening wedges to Kant's "wide-open case" for God as Moral Law-Giver revealed in moral experience, are his conceptions of the objectivity of moral laws as universal and necessary, and respect for law as essentially respect for personality, together with his (at first) half-hearted and qualified concessions.

According to the second Critique, although the moral incentive, respect for law, is viewed as produced by reason alone, yet:

Achtung geht jederzeit nur auf Personen, niemals auf Sachen....So gar das moralische Gesetz selbst, in seiner fehlerlichen Majestät, ist diesem Vestreben, sich der Achtung dagegen zu wehren, ausgesetzt.²

Then Kant admits that under certain conditions God's commands may be regarded as moral laws.³

b. The transition accomplished.—Although the transition from law to Law-Giver, in the implication of the Divine Law-Giver revealed in moral experience, was slow, it was finally accomplished.

In the first Critique, rulership (which, as has been seen, Kant explicitly affirms)⁴ and morality itself are joined

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¹ See Campbell, Art. (1949), 343-345; Ames, Art. (1928), 295-301; Blake, Art. (1928), 129-133; Schneider, Art. (1939), 50; Fouilléé, Art. (1905), 19; LeRoy, Art. (1907), 156; Hall, Art. (1904), 157, 160; Smith, BC, 73; Beck, CPR, 19-20; Knudson, DG, 229; Knox, Art. (1902), 315-316.
² Kant, KpV, A 135-137.
³ Kant, MS, 24.
⁴ Vide supra, 107.
in the being of God, where moral laws reside:

Ich nenne die Idee einer solchen Intelligenz, in welcher der moralischvollkommenste Wille, mit der höchsten Seligkeit verbunden, die Ursache aller Glückseligkeit in der Welt ist...das Ideal des höchsten Guts...Dieses aber ist nur möglich ...unter einem weisen Urheber und Regierer.  

In the third Critique, God is viewed even more definitively as moral legislator:

Die Wirklichkeit eines höchsten moralisch-gesetzte gebenden Urhebers ist also bloss für den praktischen Gebrauch unser Vernunft hinreichend dargethan.  

Then later, God is declared "holy on the ground of the coincidence of His will with the pure moral law," the latter owing "its validity not to an arbitrary act of volition on God's part, but to its own content."  

Kant had already made it clear in this Critique and elsewhere that he is not asserting that God is the ground of obligation; that is the human reason. What was needed was a deepening of the conception of autonomy in harmony with Luther's new and profounder evangelical explanation of duty.  

In this transition, there is an elevation of morality to the level of religion that adds strength to the implication of the Moral Law-Giver revealed in moral experience:

Auf solche Weise führt eine Theologie auch unmittelbar zur Religion, d.i. der Erkenntniss unserer Pflichten, als göttlicher Gebote; weil die Erkenntniss unserer Pflicht, und des darin uns durch Vernunft auferlegten Endzwecks, den Begriff von Gott zuerst bestimmt hervorbringen.

1. Kant, KrV, B 839-840.  
konnte, der also schon in seinem Ursprunge von
der Verbindlichkeit gegen dieses Wesen unzer-
trennlich ist.1

Thus, in this sphere of religion, there is no external
compulsion, no Tyrant, although, there is an external Legis-
lator (viewed also as immanent).2 By siding in with Omnipo-
tent Will, man recognizes moral theonomy while preserving in-
tact his moral autonomy.3

On this level, Kant also dissolves his difficulty con-
cerning the motivating power of the feelings. He has been in-
terpreted as committing the unpsychological act of wip]~ out
the action of feelings upon the will. It drew from Henry the
charge that Kant's ethics are impracticable:

Take this doctrine into the streets, preach
it to the ordinary man, and what effect will it
have? Say to them you ought; that is the supreme
law for your action. Après?...Is this going to
suppress the multitudinous motions of self-will,
the insistent claims of passion? 'The law is
weak against the flesh', a saner psychologist has
told us, for a mere moral imperative supplies no
power to fulfill its behests...So, then, what
steam is to the locomotive, that the roused and
energized emotions are to the will.4

According to Henry, Kant reached this law-worship of
the Pharisees by losing sight of the Giver of the law. If this
be true, Kant regained his vision of God. It is true that so
radical was his reaction against what he regarded as an undue
emphasis in his day upon feeling (as in Pietism and the Gefühl-
philosophie), and so determined was he to press the point that

1. Kant, KdU, A 471; see RIG, 100-101, 196-197, 238,
240, 250-252.
2. See DeBurgh, FMR, 156-157.
3. See Webb, Art. (1920), 123-124; Royce, PL,
morality is a matter of regard for moral law, and that the
latter determines the will and reason, that he denies that
feeling also determines them. That is, the constraint in
obligation is not feeling but reason. Yet Kant recognized the
inclinig power of feeling. Respect for moral law is a feeling
produced by reason. Now, in addition, on the level of religion,
Kant admits the motivational power of Christian love: "Liebe
Gottes aber, aus eigener freier Wahl und aus Wohlgefallen am
Gesetze (aus Kindespflicht)." 1

Thus Kant, by raising morality to the high level of re-
ligion, has reconciled his conceptions of the autonomy of the
human will and the Moral Law-Giver, by practically identifying
both pure or objective moral law with the objective or trans-
cendent Law-Giver, and also the moral law within man with the
indwelling Law-Giver, by changing his stern conception of duty
for duty's sake alone by honoring the motivational power of
love (still uncommanded, in a sense), and by transforming exter-
nal compulsion into an internal prompting through the voluntary
acceptance of both law and Law-Giver, and by free, loving obe-
dience to both, thus making it possible to do what otherwise
would be self-contradictory, i.e. obey a command with gladness
and with moral merit ("Denn ein Gebot das man etwas gerne tun
soll, ist in sich widersprechend"). 2 In fact, without a divine
Law-Giver and Judge, and the knowledge of Him, there would be

1. Kant, RIG, 282; see LeRoy, Art. (1907), 158; Beck, CPR, 42.
no morality; moral laws, even if they existed, would be ineffec
tual.1 And there would have been no moral argument for the exis-
tence of God had Kant not clearly made the connection be-
tween moral law and Moral Law-Giver.

3. Implication of God in aesthetic experience

a. The intuitive judgment of the beautiful, the sublime, and the holy.—The intuitive judgment of the beautiful, the sublime, and the holy constitutes an implication of God in aesthetic experience. In such a case it is not, "ein blos re-
flexirendes Urtheil" ; "Es ist aber auch ein ästhetisches Sinnenurtheil möglich, wenn nämlich das Prädicat...kein Begriff von einem Object sein kann." The determining ground is "Emp-
findung" immediately bound up with the "Gefuhl der Lust und Un-
lust."2 Kant's concept of the non-cognitive judgment of the be-
tiful and the sublime expressed in his third Critique is a step in the direction of the practical certainty of the exist-
ence of the holy, the immediate apprehension of God. This work, not a part of Kant's original plan, resulted from three later considerations:

to give clear expression to the relation be-
tween the free subject and the phenominal world;
...to provide for the consideration of aesthetics as based upon judgments of taste; and...to deal with the problem of a teleological consideration of the world, as indicated by the peculiar char-
acter of living beings.3

1. Kant, LE, 40.
2. Kant, UPÜ, in Harten-
stein, KSW, VI, 388.
3. Watson, PKE, 390; see Macmillan, ÖGP, 7.
The judgment of the beautiful is intuitive: "Schon ist das, was ohne Begriffe allgemein gefällt."¹

Um zu unterscheiden, ob etwas schön sei oder nicht, beziehen wir die Vorstellung nicht durch den Verstand auf das Object zum Erkenntnisse, sondern durch die Einsbildungskraft (vielleicht mit dem Verstande verbunden) auf das Subjekt und das Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust desselben.²

This direct appeal to the feeling of pleasure is seen also in the sensing of the sublime; it does not depend upon a mental concept. The sublime, an indeterminate concept of reason, is the "schlechthin gross," not merely magnitude, but "was über alle Vergleichung ist."³ The respect that accompanies the vision of the sublime seems to be similar to the respect for moral law and the Law-Giver. And Kant does go on to make the sense of the fearful an aspect of the sublime; God is to be feared, i. e. respected:

So fürchtet der tugendhafte Gott, ohne sich vor ihm zu fürchten, weil er ihm und seinen Geboten widerstehen zu wollen, sich als keinen von ihm besorglichen Fall denkt.⁴

Kant is still clearly in the realm of practical reason, for aesthetic taste ("ein Ästhetisch-praktisches Urtheil"), is not dependent upon proofs, not even upon determinate concepts, although the judgments of the beautiful, the sublime, and the holy are objectively valid, i. e. not being subjective in the sense of private judgments.⁵ Lewis views these intuitive judgments as immediate prizings of the directly presented, and

1. Kant, KdU, BC 32; see A 67; Lewis, AKV, 457, 464, 466.
2. Kant, KdU, A 79; see A 84, 94.
3. Kant, KdU, A 79; see A 84, 94.
as such, not judgments, that is, if expression is not given to
them. He suggests that the value found in the experience is
- the best possible kind of evidence of value in the object, that
the value thus directly found need not be appraised in order to
be revealed and enjoyed, nor compared with any other value, and
that the value is indubitable: "There can be no such thing as
failure of correctness in the apprehension of a value-quality
characterizing immediate experience."¹ Without going further
into detail, it may be concluded that this is a noteworthy ad-
dition to Kant's moral argument,² with important bearings upon
the later discussion of experiential certainty, particularly in
relation to the immediacy of feeling and its relation to cogni-
tion in the intuitive apprehension of God.

Thus the question of the third Critique has been answer-
ed. According to Kant, there is a higher form of apprehension
than the hypothetical understanding; the intuitive judgments of
the beautiful, the sublime, and the holy bring men into touch
with the supersensible.³

b. The intuitive judgment of a teleological universe

In the third Critique, another implication of God in
aesthetic experience is found—the intuitive judgment of a
teleological universe. Kant unites the teleological and moral
arguments, God being regarded as the adequate and supreme Cause
of the natural and moral orders, and "die Welt, als ein nach

¹. Lewis, AKV, 433; see 407, 416-417, 434.
². Kant, UPU, in Hartenstein, KSW, VI, 394.
³. See Macmillan, OCP, 26.
Zwecken zusammenhängendes Ganze und als System von Endursachen anzusehen...auf eine verständige Weltursache.¹ This, however, does not amount to complete proof:

"Es gibt ein physische Teleologie, welche einen für unsere theoretisch reflektierende Urtheilskraft hinreichenden Beweisgrund an die Hand giebt, das Dasein einer verständigen Weltursache, anzunehmen. Wir finden aber in uns eines vernünftigen, mit Freiheit (seiner Kausalität) begabten Wesens überhaupt auch eine moralische Teleologie.²

Watson interprets Kant's thought here:

But as the moral ends or purposes which we pursue, and the laws which express the universal principles of action, are determined a priori, we cannot from the mere consciousness of the moral infer the existence of an intelligent cause outside of ourselves...We cannot conceive of the possibility of the harmony with nature of the end demanded by reason except by presupposing that this harmony is produced by a Being who is both intelligent and moral, in other words, by God.³

Because Kant's moral argument is formal, and more or less theoretical still, Watson's caution concerning this argument is well taken. For apart from God's self-revelation of Himself in special revelation experience and in general Christian experience, we would indeed have "no positive knowledge" of God's existence and would be confined to thinking of Him merely in terms of analogy. A being "who transcends all experience" of course, can not be known, but this is not the transcendent-immanent God of theism. And though we are entitled, or even compelled, to think of God as intellectual and moral, if we think of Him at

1. Kant, KdU, A 409; see A 435. 2. Kant, KdU, A 414; see A 429. 3. Watson, PKE, 467, 471; see 472.
all, "this does not enable us to know Him as He is" nor "to give attributes positively to Him." And if the idea of God is merely a regulative principle, Watson seems right in his conclusion that not only God, but also freedom and immortality are "placed upon a thoroughly rational basis," which means, upon Kant's own limitation of knowledge to the world of sense, that these beliefs, in spite of his denials, are unreasonable. This weakens Kant's argument for God by means of the intuitive judgment of a teleological universe.

c. A rational faith: moral certitude

God is the proper object of a rational faith and of moral certitude. That is, the "gewissheit" of his existence is practical (moral, pragmatic) rather than theoretical (speculative, doctrinal). It is reasonable for men to assume ("anzunehmen") that He exists, taking His existence as a postulate or a ground of explanation:

Folglich müssen wir eine moralische Weltursache (einen Weltpuffer annehmen um uns gemäß dem moralischen Gesetz, einen Endzweck vorzusetzen, und, so weit als das letztere nothwendig ist, so weit... ist auch dassere Sterne nothwendig anzunehmen, nämlich es sei ein Gott.

The last reference has this footnote: "Dieses moralische Argument soll keinen objectivgültigen Beweis vom Dasein Gottes, an die Hand geben."4

This rational faith, while a product of reason, is also,

1. Watson, PKE, 472-473.
strangely (for Kant), an historical and ecclesiastical faith, founded on the Christian Scriptures, revelation being regarded as an experience upon which reason plays and scholarship interprets.\(^1\) Here Kant has a broad view of faith—-not only theoretical and rational (moral, practical, pragmatic), but also historical, and religious (ecclesiastical and "seligmachenden").\(^2\) A fitting conclusion to this thought of rational faith and moral certitude is found in Kant's own words:

Zwar wird freilich sich Niemand rühmen können; er weisse, das ein Gott...sei...Alles Wissen (wenn es einen Gegenstand der blossom Vernunft betrifft) kann man mittheilen....Nein, die Ueberzeugung ist nicht logische, sondern moralische Gewissheit.\(^3\)

III. Defects of the moral argument

1. Formalism or externalism

The first defect that strikes one in the moral argument of Kant is its formalism or externalism. God is not the Given as in the doctrine of the religious a priori or of religious empiricism, but is an external figure brought in from the outside. To Griffiths, this is an unsatisfactory position:

The ideas of religion are certainly not the product of an inference based upon the facts of the world as a scientist sees them, or on the implications as a Kant might discover. The religious valuation of life is as primitive and as fundamental in human experience as the economic or the moral.\(^4\)

That is, the God of the moral argument is not the given

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1. Kant, RIG, 212-213.
2. Kant, RIG, 213.
3. Kant, KrV, B 847; see B 855, B 857.
4. Griffiths, GIE, 164.
God of the religious consciousness, but the inferred God of philosophy. Galloway sees in the postulation of God for the union of the diverse elements of virtue and happiness an artificial arrangement which is untrue to the psychological motives that prompt men to believe in God.\(^1\)

Then, its formalism is seen in the purpose for which God is brought in—as a means to the happiness of man, a purpose at odds with Kant's own ethical principle that a person should never be treated as means, but as an end in himself. In this argument, however, God is "deus ex machina introduced to effect the equation between virtue and happiness."\(^2\) Pringle-Pattison sees the same fault and declares that "the thoroughly mechanical idea of such a Power weighing happiness against virtue cannot be charmed out of the letter of Kant's theory."\(^3\)

Couched in this formalism, also, is the tendency toward the "pragmatic fallacy," i.e. the "confusion between the value and the truth of religious beliefs."\(^4\) However, this is not a denial of a relationship between value and truth, but an assertion that usefulness itself is no criterion of truth, and that there must be coherence among beliefs.\(^5\)

2. Impracticality.—The impracticality of the moral or practical argument is seen in the fact that it is still a theoretical argument. Frank shows that this new argument is not essentially different from that of Descartes, "except that here

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2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 34.  
3. Pringle-Pattison, PR, 267.  
5. See Brightman, Art. (1918), 74.
the existence of God is based on the sovereignty of our moral rather than on that of our logical reasoning.¹ This foundation is not as firm as Kant seemed to suppose: "The supposedly indestructible moral nature of man proves to be extremely vulnerable when confronted with the necessities of practical life."² Then Frank declares that on the basis of ethical autonomy, moral independence may be used as an atheistic argument. This would be true had Kant not gone on and affirmed that God is Law-Giver.

The charge is made practically that seeing the failure of the theoretical reason on the question of God's existence, Kant simply changed the name of this reason, making a division within the realm of thought. Procter holds that the God of the moral argument is a construction of the mind.³ Sorley points out that by his separation of the theoretical and practical reasons, Kant withheld from the former, material that should have been presented to it (data of moral experience), as outside its range; and then Kant made the practical reason the supplement and corrective of the theoretical reason.⁴

The whole attempt to construct a theism which should satisfy practical reason, while remaining unacceptable to strict theoretical reason, indicates that Kant, while rejecting the content of the Wolffian metaphysics, still conforms to its method. He conceives himself to have established a metaphysics of morals from the pure concept of the moral law without reference to empirical content. But since his criticism of the ontological argument had rendered any such metaphysical method

1. Frank, PRT, 39.  
2. Frank, PRT, 39.  
4. Sorley, MVIG, 2.
of deducing reality from concepts invalid, nothing remained but that he should secure himself against his own criticism by separation practical knowledge from theoretical knowledge.

Harris is even more severe upon Kant at this point than Sorley. For he declares that Kant in his first Critique postulates an irrational universe by robbing "human reason of its birthright—the right to know (in principle at least) the Universe, the Eternal Moral Law, and God Himself in their true natures."2 Pointing out—what many thinkers have seen—the inconsistencies of Kant in knowing that external objects are unknowable without knowing something of their true natures and in declaring that external things cause "phenomena" in our minds, when an internal causation (the only one of which he could be sure according to his doctrine of the relativity of knowledge or of the Noumenon) could not be applicable to external "things-in-themselves," concludes that Kant has "no reason whatever for supposing that external things exist." Consequently, Harris raises the question whether Kant as a philosopher was justified in believing in God, for while in the second and third Critiques his arguments seem conclusive, they are only rational on the basis of the assumption of the rationality (especially the moral rationality) of the universe, which basis Kant had practically denied. That is, this assumption is necessary to give "a rational correspondence between theory and practice," for beliefs which are found to be practically necessary for the efficiency of man's.

moral and spiritual life must also be theoretically and speculatively true."

Harris appears to be correct in his contention that if the universe is not rational (i.e. if there is no possibility of objective knowledge), "we are not entitled to assume that what is necessary in practice is also objectively true."2 But it should be recalled that Kant denied a divine rational Ground only in the sense of an inference from the sense world.

Tennant argues that Kant in his second and third Critiques is still on theoretical grounds:

If the sumnum bonum has its possibility of realization guaranteed by the conception itself, Kant in principle employs the ontological argument in ethics after demolishing it in theology.3

From this and from its ignoring of religious experience, it is to be concluded that the "practical" argument is not practical enough.

3. Narrow view of Christianity

The third criticism of the moral argument is that it presents a narrow view of Christianity; it is an undue emphasis upon morality. There is no mistaking Kant's emphasis in the following: "Alles, was ausser dem guten Lebenswandel der Mensch noch thun zu können vermeint, um Gott wohlgefällig zu werden, ist bloser Religionswahn und Afterdienst Gottes."4

England, however, clearly differentiates religion and

1. Harris, CC, 70. 2. Harris, CC, 70. 3. Tennant, PT, II, 97; see Ormond, CP, 135; Maier, HCK, 69. 4. Kant, RIG, 270.
morality:

That which constitutes a moral person is the consciousness of absolute obligation; but that which constitutes a religious person is the awareness of a yet higher order, a spiritual order, which not only lays a powerful constraint upon him but excites in him a feeling of adoration and an impulse to worship.¹

Referring to Kant directly, England also says:

He did not penetrate into the distinction between the sense of sublimity awakened by the physically great and powerful on the one hand, and on the other hand awakened by the apprehension of God....This self reverence, characteristic as it is of the moral consciousness, is not the essential feature of the religious experience.²

In fact, according to Griffiths, "the sense of God is prior to and conditions the sense of duty," and "we could have no knowledge of moral obligation unless we already believed in God's existence":

The voice of duty was and is first of all the voice of God; it was the voice of God before Socrates fashioned the concept of virtue, or Plato formed the idea of the Good, or Kant...duty.³

Morality itself means more than keeping commandments; it is "the quest of the highest and most inclusive ideal which it is possible for man to seek after."⁴ Applied to religion in its narrow sense, however, morality makes for legalism. Thus, Baillie views Kant's description of religion as too "moralistic" in the unworthy sense: "It savours unduly of what Saint Paul

¹. England, VRE, 91; see DeBurgh, FMR, 28-33; Stocks, Art. (1926), 69-70; Alexander, STD, II, 341.
². England, VRE, 90.
³. Griffiths, GIE, 250.
⁴. Baillie, IR, 274.
called 'the righteousness of the law'. Speaking of Troeltsch and his following of Kant in general, Baillie writes:

Troeltsch will have none of Kant's tendency to represent the a priori elements in morality and religion as if they were the whole of morality and religion respectively. In the realm of the theoretic reason Kant did not make this mistake, but always insisted the the matter of experience was no less necessary to it than was the form. But when he comes to treat of the practical reason he seems to forget this... In the realm of religion he seems to speak as if the bare thought of a moral order--'the recognition of our duties as divine commands'--were the whole legitimate content of historic religion. Clearly this is an inheritance from eighteenth century rationalism and deism.

Thus the moral argument presents such a narrow view of Christianity that it is a question whether the God of the argument is the God of religion. Consequently, the charge of Harris that Kant reduced Christianity to ethics does not seem unjust.

4. An arrested hypothesis

Finally, the moral argument of Kant may be described as an "arrested hypothesis." By "hypothesis" is meant "a tentative theory or supposition provisionally adopted to explain certain facts, and to guide in the investigation of others," in contrast to a "postulate" which though frequently used as a synonym is "a proposition which is taken for granted," an "essential prerequisite," an "assumption of the possibility of doing something." The difference between the two words in regard to an objective basis, and to probability and possibility is also seen.

1. Baillie, IR, 274; see Mackintosh, CAG, 27.
2. Baillie, IR, 246; see Sorley, MVIG, 331-332; Griffiths, GIE, 97-106; DeBurgh, FMR, 147, 169.
3. Harris, CC, 17.
in the chart below, where the "possible" is located in the range of pre-hypothetical faith. The postulate represents the unprovable basis, the alternate to infinite regress in seeking reasons, the foundation of hypothetical faith. Kant did not always make this distinction, for while in one setting he denied the use of "hypothesis" in regard to God, in another place, his "Glauben", as a "Voraussetzung" was an "Annehmung", necessary for a "praktische Regel," and given by the "praktische Vernunft," "bei der wir die Möglichkeit der Ausführung" may grasp. "Ein solcher Glaube" being, "es ist ein Gott." Under this so-called "hypothesis" we are to act "als ob" we knew there were a God.¹

By an "arrested" hypothesis is meant one that "remains subjective" and "hardly distinguished from make-believe."² It is a part faith, arrested or cut short in its development toward knowledge or certainty. This can be made clear best by a diagram in which this part faith is located in relation to whole faith:

FAITH

I. Pre-hypothetical   II. Hypothetical   III. Post-hypothetical

a. Psychological:

Disbelief—Doubt—Supposal—Belief—Certainty
(both disbel. (neither disbel.
and belief) nor belief)

b. Logical:

Impossible—Possible—Probable—Contingent—Certain
(factual)

Ignorance—Opinion—Belief—Knowledge as Cert.

¹ Kant, KrV, B 801, B 798; KAW, in Hartenstein, KSW, VIII, 559-560.
² Carmichael, Art. (1949), 55.
Here, at a glance can be seen the broad scope of faith in its various negative and positive aspects. These items shade off into one another, the boundaries not being definitely fixed. In going from I to III (the three types being defined when discussed), there is a progressive increase of knowledge and a decrease of volition (the will to believe). Note that in "b" are the three forms of Kant's "conviction"—opinion (Meinung), belief (Glauben) and knowledge or certainty (Wissen).\(^1\) It should be particularly noted that belief in its narrow sense lies between II and III in both "a" and "b", gradually shading off into each side. That is, belief does not disappear at either of its indeterminate boundaries, but gradually passes over into supposal and opinion on the one hand, and into knowledge and certainty on the other. The failure to see this, as well as the broad expanse of faith has been a prolific cause of confusion. While belief and knowledge (or certainty) should be distinguished, in that in a strict sense belief has for its object that which is unproven (either what is immediately known or not demonstrated),\(^2\) yet it can not be said that the one who knows or is certain is a disbeliever in the object of his knowledge or certainty; rather, his belief is more intense. The conviction may result from an examination of the grounds of the belief.\(^3\)

In the following discussion no distinction will be made between faith and belief on the ground that to consider faith as

1. Kant, KrV, B 850.
more than belief, more than intellectual assent, is an over-refinement. For while "love" is both a noun and a verb, this is not true of "faith"; "believe" must serve as its verb. Then, historically, such a distinction is unwarranted. In the early Christian Church, a "believer" was a follower, one who took "the way", and "believe" was used synonymously with "receive". And "belief" is still used in church circles as a term for life-commitment, and not for a mere assent of the mind. And in ordinary usage, belief is frequently existential and active. If a father in a factory hears that his child at home is dying, and believes it, his feelings are stirred, his will is moved, and his feet start hurrying him home-ward.

a. Pre-hypothetical faith.—By pre-hypothetical faith is meant the weak faith which is based upon little or no evidence, in contrast to the faith of the hypothesis-maker, who, while not having sufficient evidence to amount to knowledge or certainty in their strict senses, still has sufficient, or even strong evidence, upon which it is reasonable to act. While in its unreasoning aspect it amounts to mere credulity, pre-hypothetical faith, when reason enters, describes the psychological area between doubt and disbelief, and the logical area between ignorance (or impossibility) and probability. Kant's narrow definition of faith as "readiness to give assent to testimony" could describe this type of faith. At best, with reason present, it would describe only hypothetical faith. Russell's purposeful narrow

1. See Johnson, PR, 190.
2. See John 1:12.
4. Kant, LE, 90.
treatment of belief, however, refers only to pre-hypothetical faith: "I propose...to treat belief as something that can be pre-intellectual and can be displayed in the behavior of animals."¹ Hickman, on the other hand, with a broad view of belief as running the whole gamut of human history in its higher ranges, including "the most elaborate statements of creed and doctrine, declares: "In its lowest range it amounts to nothing more than credulity, which almost wholly lacks reflective reason," as being spontaneous and taking its objects for granted.² He adds that "a large portion of his system of beliefs the average individual takes over from his group without much reflective thinking."³

Thus, indiscriminate reliance on authority is an example of pre-hypothetical faith. It is a natural and essential course for man before the development of his reasoning powers; in this sense all belief rests at first upon authority.⁴ Yet this attitude need not be uncritical, as even the child's acceptance of the authority of his parents may be based upon a trust due to experience;⁵ he soon learns that his parents are worthy of trust, and so gradually passes out of this pre-hypothetical stage. No man is born with a belief in God, but "we are all born with a tendency to believe what we are told."⁶ As with the infant, the race in its infancy displays this tendency of "unreasoning

trust in authority and blind obedience." Unfortunately, it is a true description of the attitude of some modern adults. And strange as it may seem, the faith expressed in the moral argument by Kant, by implication, has been placed in this category:

He too readily assumed that the convictions about which he was 'morally certain' were the product of 'reason'. . . . It is more than likely that Kant's fervent belief in God was based not on a postulate of practical reason but upon certain psychological conditions originating with his mother, who, he testified, was a sweet-tempered, affectionate, pious woman... who led her children to the fear of God by pious teaching and virtuous example. 2

While this throws doubt upon any belief that Kant's faith in God was the product of reason, pure or practical, it is no denial that his reason later played upon the belief thus acquired. Perhaps Catholics in general are no more examples of indiscriminatory reliance upon authority than was Kant. In the words of a Protestant professor of theology: "Even the Roman Catholic appeals to reason, to conscience, as corroborating his other evidences for being a Catholic." 3 And the Catholic Bauer writes:

However the act of faith is reasonable and rational in itself, for by it we accept truth on the Word of God, just as every day we accept truths on the word of man. The greater part, and the most important part of the knowledge that we possess, is the gift of others... And if we accept truth so freely from men, then it is reasonable to accept truth from God... This authority (for Catholics and non-Catholics alike)... is a truth arrived at by a process of reasoning. 4

But while natural and essential to man under certain

1. Frank, GWU, 17.
3. Faulkner, MCF, 10.
4. Bauer, MNF, 205.
conditions, pre-hypothetical faith is unsatisfactory; it is unnatural and unwise that one's faith should remain in that stage.

b. Hypothetical faith.—By hypothetical faith is meant the "holding for true of something which is not already verified by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion," but which has some grounds of support. As has been indirectly shown, faith in the word of another may represent a stage beyond blind acceptance of authority, as in the advocacy of "traditional" faith by a Catholic in the "submission of the intellect and will to a revealed doctrine on the authority of God revealing." But Bauer appears as confused as Kant was on the hypothesis and the postulate. For while recognizing that the validity of the hypothesis of God's existence "will be determined by our own experience in so far as it does give an explanation of the universe that will give us peace of soul" and while declaring that in faith as a postulate, "we assume that God exists because His existence is necessary to us" ("living out the assumption" rather than testing and "verifying His existence by experience" as in hypothetical faith), Bauer is unfortunate in selecting his first example and exponent of faith as an hypothesis:

One of the leading exponents of faith as an hypothesis is Hans Vaihinger....According to his philosophy all desirable and worthwhile objects must be treated 'as if' they existed even though they do not exist in reality.

1. Inge, FAI, 1.
2. Bauer, MNF, 3.
3. Bauer, MNF, 10.
This is not testing and verifying "just as we test any other hypothesis," for if "Vaihinger would not admit that God really existed," how could he be said to have any kind of faith in God? Later, Bauer does better in giving an example of hypothetical faith, for he interprets Hooking thus: "Hence, if the hypothesis of faith is to have any value for us, God must be known by experience." But again Bauer shows his confusion on the difference between a postulate and an hypothesis by saying:

"Hypothetical" describes one stage or aspect of faith. But the religious man would rebel against the use of this adjective as descriptive of his faith if no other descriptive word were granted him, such as "post-hypothetical". He would rebel if he were told that "The Religious Other" is an object of faith (in its narrow or hypothetical sense), and never can become an Object of Experience or Knowledge. For it is not "the experimental attitude" that repels him; it is the narrow use of the term "faith", i.e. the ignoring or slighting of demonstration as a part of experiment. For thousands, "The Religious Object", while not an Object of "complete proof", is still a complete Personality revealed in "present experience." No

1. Bauer, MNF, 13; see Hooking, MGHE, 214-215.
4. See Brightman, ITP, 45-47.
one can experience a part of God; personality is not divisible. It is a unit, known and recognized by its activity. If God's activity can be located in a human soul, there God is. There would be less objection to the use of "hypothetical faith" if there were more reference on the part of its users to the results of the experiment, as in the case, for instance, of Mackintosh who declares: "Like every other form of knowledge, faith is a response to a reality which evokes, invites and rewards acquaintance."1

Because hypothetical faith is faith that has not been vindicated by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion, it involves an act of will. Kant's stress on the will in his moral argument will be recalled. Of course, Kant would revise the description of Inge's above to read "which cannot be verified by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion" in reference to the existence of God.2 The use of "eine transcendental Hypothese," by the pure reason, he considered inadmissible, except in cases of defense.3 Yet in practical reason, what was theoretically insufficient, could reasonably be held as a belief or "postulate", and he illustrates it by the bet.4 Kant's use of "postulate" is more consistent, as it is generally agreed that a postulate is unprovable, while there is not this general agreement concerning the hypothesis.5

1. Mackintosh, CAG, 64.
2. Kant, KrV, B 778, B 781; see KAW in Hartenstein, KSW, VIII, 558.
3. Kant, KrV, B 801, B 804-805; see WHO, 347.
Kant's stress on the will in faith, and the necessity of action in morals and religion, was carried on by William James. His essay on "The Will to Believe" in the book by the same name, he described as "a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced." He calls it a "voluntarily adopted faith." It has been shown that this does not describe faith in its initial stages, and it will be shown that having been voluntarily adopted, it can not be rejected at will, when it enters the post-hypothetical stage.

Even in the hypothetical stage, there are limits to the activity of the will. James divided hypotheses into living and dead hypotheses:

A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your nature—it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all... To the Arab, however... the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities; it is alive.

James goes on to connect the live or genuine hypothesis with attitude and action. Men must act while they are waiting for proof in moral and religious matters, or as Rall puts it, while they are going after the evidence. Pascal's wager, to which James refers, is a good illustration of this kind of faith. But James shows that it is only a living option for one who has

1. James, WB, 1-2.
2. James, WB, 2-3.
3. Kant, KrV, B 829, B 833; see James, WB, 22; Rall, CHR, 238.
already a tendency to believe. And also, "as a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use."¹ He decides that "our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions" and that "there are passionate tendencies and volitions which run before and others which come after belief."²

In *Pluralistic Universe*, is found the famous ladder of faith:

> It might be true somewhere, you say, for it is not self-contradictory. It may be true, you continue, even here and now. It is fit to be true. It would be well if it were true, it ought to be true, you presently feel. It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers next; and then—as a final result—It shall be as if true, for you.³

While not one step is logically necessary, yet as James goes on to show, life exceeds logic, the practical reason going ahead, and the theoretic reason coming along after the conclusion has been reached. On this basis one could reasonably accept religious beliefs on authority, when he has neither the time nor the ability to study natural theology. For, "the field of cognition does not square with the field of action,"⁴ and "every man must adopt some attitude towards God."⁵ And it is not unreasonable for ignorant men (or men whose knowledge does not equal that of the experts), "to trust and implicitly follow the expert; on the contrary, it is unreasonable to set up an ill-formed judgment in opposition to real knowledge."⁶

Dean Inge applies this to a man's setting up his judgment against that of his God's.

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But it is the contention of this dissertation that an hypothetical faith in respect to the existence of God, even on this high level of accepting the best authority on moral and religious matters (even though that authority be God Himself), is still a part faith, and unsatisfactory, as every man has it within his power (if he carefully follows conditions laid down for a successful experiment), to find out for himself whether God exists or not. There is a post-hypothetical stage of faith.

c. Post-hypothetical faith.--By post-hypothetical faith is meant the faith that one has in the existence of some object or person after he has conducted a successful experiment, such as the faith of one who has come to know God in personal acquaintance. There is no prima facie evidence that this is impossible. No definition can preclude its actuality.

1) Make-believe definitions.--Make-believe definitions, which substitute a conception of part faith for whole faith, have been given and accepted as precluding any possible real knowledge of God or even of His existence. Of course, any one has a right to define a word as he pleases, i.e. in accordance with his purpose and the way he is going to use it (as the writer has done above), but he should be aware of what he is doing, and not use it to settle a question which can be settled, if at all, only by discussion. That is, one should be on his guard against one of the evils of intellectualism, used in what James calls its "vicious sense."
James lays a foundation for his discussion of this evil by going back to the intellectualism of Socrates and Plato, who taught that what a thing really is is told by its definition; since then, we have been taught that "the essences of things are known whenever we know their definitions." So far so good, declares James, but "the misuse of concepts begins with the habit of employing them privatively as well as positively"; for a useful practice becomes a method and then a tyranny which defeats the purpose of the concept, which is to make things intelligible. Concepts are still held when they have become intelligible, and are used to deny facts:

Thus it comes that when once you have conceived things as independent, you must proceed to deny the possibility of any connection among them, because the notion of connection is not contained in the definition of independence.

Thus, a photographer is denied by definition the privilege of doing anything else. Thus, too, a believer can be defined so narrowly as to preclude his being a knower as well. True, "the Christian life is a life of faith," but the question is, what use is going to be made of that concept? Will it be used to deny other descriptions of that life, as by a description of the life in only one stage of it, or by an inadequate description of it even in its initial stage? For there are stages of that life as there are stages of belief. One should not give a static definition of a life that refuses to become static, or ceases by becoming static. And this dissertation

1. James, PU, 218. 2. James, PU, 218-219.
seeks to show that the "believer" (used in the historic sense), is also a "receiver" of Christ, and thus, that the Christian life at its very inception is a coming into contact with, and a reception of, spiritual life and reality. At least no make-believe definition can preclude its possibility or actuality.

2) Make-believe hypotheses

a) A controversial subject.--The subject of make-believe hypotheses is a controversial one, because the subject of hypotheses in general is controversial, at least, at the very start it can be said that the discussion can not be brought to a sudden close by the old and familiar discussion-stopping statement that "scholarship is agreed."  

b) A fictional "als ob".--Kant's "hypothesis" is a fictional "als ob". He should have consistently employed "postulate" in reference to God's existence instead of sometimes using "hypothesis" as he held that there can be no knowledge by man of transcendental reality. For an hypothesis will either work or not work. If it does not work it should be discarded and the name dropped. Kant's arrested and unworkable "hypothesis" of the moral argument is not a real hypothesis. For although admitting the possibility of experience other than sense experience, and gradually rising to the idea of God as Law-Giver revealed in moral experience, and thus heading toward the full conception of the immanence of God (realized late in

1. John 1:12.
2. See Ayer, LTL, 184.
3. See Kant, KANW in Hartenstein, KSW, VII, 558.
4. See Bennett, GVM, 65; Hobhouse, Art. (1904), 93-101; Jones, FE, 63.
life), Kant stops short, not going on to the proper sphere for the discussion of a religious object, i.e. religious experience. For, contrary to Frank,¹ it is precisely in the immanence of God that He can be revealed and become known. The situation today is different than it was when the phenomenalism of Kant was generally accepted: "The maker of postulates on the moral and religious basis has now to recognize that his postulates need to be about realities otherwise known."²

But some have not grasped this. For instance, Bauer, referring to religious experience, writes: "Even admitting experience as a criterion for testing the validity of faith as a hypothesis (which we do not do), it still fails by the defects of its own case."³ But if the data of experience are like "wet clay in the hands of men," and their value, therefore "purely subjective," then it is difficult to explain the general agreement among the scientists and others (including Christians) who have conducted successful experiments. This agreement can only be explained thus: the "given" is given and not created.⁴ The experimenter does not find "what he wants" but the given, which neither the will nor desire of man can change. Were it not for this general agreement on experience, communication among men would be of no value. And if what Bauer says were true concerning objective experience, it would apply with even more force to the more subjective, theoretical, theistic arguments,

¹. See Frank, PRT, 44. ². Lyman in Macintosh, RR, 259. ³. Bauer, MNF, 96. ⁴. Jones, FE, 55.
which he defends.

While Bauer, following Tennant, is undoubtedly correct that "what is called the truth of religion or the validity of religious experience cannot be established by the ipse dixit of that type of experience" (i.e. it must be interpreted in the light of all experience), yet if the hypothesis of God's existence is not a workable one, incapable of being tested by immediate religious experience, then theoretical arguments, even when based on the evidences of God's existence found in nature, will not (contrary to Bauer's belief), prove the existence of the God of religion. As has been seen, Vaihinger is not an exponent of hypothetical faith; an hypothesis is based upon fact, not upon "fiction". So Bauer is not referring to a real hypothesis when, in criticism of Vaihinger's view, he declares: "Thus, the idea of God, and not God is the object of our faith. His existence, if you wish to call it that, is something purely subjective; it is a kind of mental hypnotism by which we call the imaginary real."¹ But this more fittingly describes the theoretical arguments for God's existence; apart from an objective experience of God Himself, these arguments (especially the ontological, the others depending upon it) only prove the existence of the idea of God.

"Truth is not made by the intellect knowing, nor by the fact that the hypothesis... 'works'."² True; granted also that "truth is what it is, despite what we wish it to be," and that

God exists "not because He is 'useful' to us, nor because He satisfies our needs," and that "His ability to satisfy our spiritual needs follows from His existence." But the truth not made by man may be received and known by man through its working. Apart from the verification of God's existence in human existence (the most convincing being in definite religious experience), man has no way of knowing that God exists. Bauer's theoretical argument is unconvincing to the writer. For if, "without God there can be no values," then the presence of values in the working of an hypothesis (especially in mystical experience) can be used toward the verification of the belief in God's existence.

Bauer has obviously confused the truth of an hypothesis with the demonstration of its truth. "A hypothesis is not true because it works," but through its working it can be shown to be true. True, a belief may be "just as true though never verified." But the question is, how will it be known to be true, if it does not work? And granting that "a hypothesis may be proved false at any time," how can it be proved false otherwise than by its not working? Bauer thus does actually believe in verification. And he explicitly grants that the hypothesis of the law of gravitation "was acted upon, tested, and found to be true." Pragmatism is wrong in making "truth a process of verification," for this makes "truth identical with its

3. Bauer, MNF, 98.
verification; what we verify is that a thing which we believe to be true is in fact already true.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, in spite of his words to the contrary, Bauer believes that a true hypothesis is verifiable. On the other hand, in the words of Brightman:

If the experiment leads to results from which nothing rational can be inferred, either the experiment was a failure or some new hypothesis must be devised on which the facts of the experiment can be explained, and on the basis of which future experience can be predicted.\textsuperscript{2}

If, as it is generally agreed, the universe is rational (and this is a pre-supposition of the possibility of any knowledge as well as of all experiment), then nature can be expected to give a rational answer to the inquiring mind. And when a religious hypothesis works in the demonstration of God's activity (and thus, presence) in the human soul in distinctive religious experience, here is proof of the highest order that God exists.\textsuperscript{3} It is strange that those who hold so firmly to the reality of the revelation of God in the Sacred Scriptures (as Bauer and many other Catholics) should stress theoretical theistic arguments at the expense of experimental proof, for distinctive religious experience is an aspect of revelation.

c) False hypotheses and hypocrisy

So-called "postulates" or "hypotheses", if not based on some evidence, and not soon reinforced by more evidence (where this is possible), are in danger of being put to unnatural uses, which, putting an unwarranted strain upon the will-to-believe,

\textsuperscript{1} Bauer, MNF, 188.
\textsuperscript{2} Brightman, Art.(1938)\textsuperscript{2}, 139.
\textsuperscript{3} See McGiffert, RMR, 137.
are liable to land the holder in hypocrisy; an unworkable hypothesis is a false hypothesis and logically transforms the honorable will-to-believe into the unworthy will-to-make-believe, the "als ob" of those who act as though they believe in God even though they know that God does not exist.¹

For after all, there are limits to the natural and reasonable exercise and power of the will-to-believe, conditions in which "faith itself cannot be enforced by any willed effort or intentional decision."² By simply willing it, "we can not believe that Abraham Lincoln's existence is a myth."³ This suggests that the legitimate sphere of faith in its voluntary aspect is where the evidence (of either personal experience or on the authority of the experience and testimony of others) is not sufficient to coerce the intellect, and yet where the hypothesis is "alive". This is psychologically sound:

The will is not something separate from and independent of the intellectual and emotional nature....It is a fact that belief can in some measure be actually brought about by wish and nourished by systematic acts of will.⁴

In this sense, faith reinforced by the will, is a maker of truth:

There are certainly some regions of reality which are unfinished. We are endowed with wills only because there are such regions....In such regions the will-to-believe is justified, because it is no will-to-make-believe, but a veritable will to create the truth in which we believe. What I believe of my fellow men goes far to determine what my fellow men actually are.⁵

¹. Vide supra, 39.
². Frank, P.T, 42.
³. James, WB, 4.
⁴. Hickman, IPR, 446.
⁵. Hosking, MGHÉ, 140.
But granted that there are unfinished areas where the creative power of faith can be effective, where "faith in a fact can help create the fact,"¹ (such as a man's belief that he can come into the presence of God, and come to know, thus, that He exists), yet faith cannot fly into the teeth of evidence or reality and still remain faith. Unsupported faith is not a real faith. A willed act, unsupported by any evidence at all, threatens "belief in its vital nerve," and "a belief that believes only in itself is no longer a belief."²

d) Possibility of knowledge in a true hypothesis

1) Part faith vs. whole faith

One of the reasons for not seeing the possibility of knowledge in a true hypothesis is the failure to detect the difference between part faith and whole faith. An arrested hypothesis is an expression of part faith, which itself represents an arrested development. But in condemning this stage of faith (which has to do with mere probability) as "utterly false,"³ Baillie betrays a narrow view of faith. It is rather an inadequate description, only true as far as it goes. Faith in its more mature stage is more than a bare probability judgment, more than acting on "the nobler hypothesis." As knowledge increases, the voluntary aspect of faith so manifest in its earlier stages, gradually diminishes,⁴ until it requires no "great heave of the will to sustain it."⁵ Certainly the general Christian consciousness will sustain Farmer in his view that faith, at least in its

1. James, WB, 25; see Hocking, MGHE, 143.
2. Frank, PRT, 42.
4. Vide supra, 35.
5. Farmer, TBG, 53.
developed form, has "too much compelling conviction in it for all this." ¹

On the other hand, Sheen in defining faith as "the submission of the intellect and the will to a revealed doctrine on account of God revealing," and by viewing an aspect of faith which is just as traditional as the view which Sheen upholds (i.e. faith as an approach to God), as a recent development, has just as narrow a conception of faith as those who restrict faith to "a sum of possibilities or a hypothesis to be confirmed or else the practical acceptance of some hypothesis which appears more apt than others to satisfy our needs, tendencies and hope."² Kennedy, also under the same Scholastic influence, reveals the same narrowness: "Faith and science i.e. knowledge by demonstration cannot co-exist in the same subject in regard to the same object."³

Galloway, however, rejecting this Neo-Thomistic view, holding that faith enters into knowledge, further envisions the wide range of faith by declaring that it occupies "a kind of middle position in human life," neither "purely practical nor purely theoretical, but something of both," a response of the whole personality to the object," that brings "full assurance."⁴ Thus, "Knowledge and faith" do indeed "relate themselves to one another in the expanding process of human experience,"⁵ resisting any narrow and static definitions. When one

¹. Farmer, TEG, 54; see Jones, FE, 63-64.
³. Kennedy, Art.(1912), 700.
⁵. Galloway, FRR, 331.
says, "I know" with a tone of certainty, it can not be said that he has ceased to believe any more than it can be said that he had a false faith before he could make this statement. Thus, it can not be denied that faith and knowledge, although strictly different, are still related.

11) The distinction, yet connection, between "belief" and "knowledge"

In post-hypothetical faith, there is a distinction between "faith" and "knowledge", but there is also a connection between them. Kant rightly contrasted belief with knowledge, but he also taught that opinion can become knowledge by supplementation of objective evidence.¹ Catholic writers, generally, unlike Protestant thinkers, do not distinguish between faith and knowledge. In this, the Catholics follow St. Thomas in his view of faith as a higher form of knowledge.² Some Protestant writers, as will be seen, see also the connection of faith and knowledge, supporting the view point of this dissertation that in the concept of whole faith there is room for both the distinction between "faith" and "knowledge", and for their joint activity, or their mingling without loss of identity in the case of successful experiment.³ The objection is not to the definitions that separate these words, but to the negative and illegitimate use made of them that negate the possibility of their being joined in post-hypothetical faith.⁴

1. Vide supra, 35.
2. See Aquinas, ISA, 95-96; Aubrey, PTT, 142.
3. Vide supra, 35.
4. See Jones, FE, 63-64.
Taylor, granting the customary distinction between things that we know and the things which we believe but do not know, raises the question whether there is a difference in kind here. Granting the existence of some truths which can never be more than objects of belief (as contingent), he is concerned to assure the connection between belief and knowledge. He says: "None of us would say that a man knows a proposition which he merely holds to be either more likely to be true than to be false." But he adds: "the only intrinsic character which discriminates opinion, belief, and knowledge, must be degrees of assurance and confidence." It is not a question then of kind of difference, but rather of how far one is along on the scale of faith broadly conceived. In agreement with this, Watson in Kantian fashion, distinguishing between credulity (belief resting upon no evidence) and faith ("conviction to which all that is deepest in nature and human life bears witness"), concludes: "Hence faith cannot be abolished by knowledge, but the strongest faith must be the result of the amplest knowledge."

Procter explains the similarity of faith and knowledge on the ground of relationship between a subject and an object, characterized by a common factor, "the peculiar psychical condition called 'belief'." In agreement with the position that faith is broad in its scope, he writes:

It is arbitrary to confine faith to religious objects that transcend the sphere of sense-perception. Besides, there is no class of objects.

3. Vide supra, 35.
5. Procter, FKR, 5.
beyond the legitimate claims of knowledge.\footnote{1}

Furthermore, in Procter's view, no arbitrary distinction can be made between faith and knowledge in degrees of certainty:

Though the knower may speak contemptuously of 'mere' faith, and contrast its subjectivity with the superior objectivity of his knowledge, the believer on the other hand, speaks just as contemptuously of 'mere knowledge' and contrasts the doubtfulness of theories with his own more secure faith.\footnote{2}

Such a situation can only be possible on the ground of a broad conception of faith held by the common man and the philosopher alike. Cunningham recognises that although the one who asserts that he believes that the earth is spherical is not under the same logical compulsion to substantiate his claim as the one who knows it; yet:

We do not ordinarily suppose that belief is entirely arbitrary and unbound by logical considerations. However different knowing and believing may be, and however loose the connection between them, it is commonly assumed that they are sufficiently connected to render belief amenable to knowing.\footnote{3}

Applying this to religious knowledge, and denying that faith is merely a postulate ("a belief we have resolved to cling to because of its indispensable value to our inner life"), Mackintosh declares that Christian doctrines "have been generated in the mind and heart of man by the self-revelation of God."\footnote{4}

A note has been struck that should be emphasized— that whole faith is a "response of the whole personality to the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1}{Procter, FKR, 5.}
\footnote{2}{Procter, FKR, 7.}
\footnote{3}{Cunningham, POP, 51.}
\footnote{4}{Mackintosh, CAG, 56, 57.}
\end{footnotes}
Hickman implicitly is in agreement with those who oppose calling an arrested hypothesis faith in the full sense of the word, on the ground that one "convinced against his will is of the same opinion still," as "the will is not something separate from and independent of the intellectual and emotional nature." As Hickman goes on to elaborate this, he brings out the breadth of faith:

Even a cursory examination of one's belief in regard to anything will usually reveal the presence of all these mental processes: intellectual, volitional and emotional. Some beliefs are strongly intellectual, some strongly volitional.

Inge is also against any division of the faculties of man that destroys the unity of man and his activity:

The normal history of religious feeling is summed up in the words, Fear, Dependence, Love. Love is implicit in Faith from the first. The religion of feeling cannot become true 'till it has passed through the crucible of the will and the intellect.'

Something of this Kant must have felt between the writing of the second and third Critiques, and even the awkward phrase "practical reason" seems to indicate "a haunting suspicion on Kant's part that after all, the will that could dictate to theoretical consciousness is a cognitive function."  

3. Hickman, IPR, 440.
iii) Verification of religious belief

Closely associated with the discussions of part faith versus whole faith, and the distinction, yet connection between "belief" and "knowledge" in the more general subject of the possibility of knowledge in a true hypothesis, is the consideration of the verification of religious belief, which has all along been inevitably touched upon. For even the expression "true hypothesis" is suggestive of this thought:

An hypothesis always presupposes certain characteristic features presented in concrete experience for the elucidation of which, in terms of the intellect, the hypothesis is framed. If we speak of belief in God as a working hypothesis to explain 'facts', the facts must already be, in some sense, relevant facts. An hypothesis is, after all, but an intellectual device by means of which what is given in immediate experience is clarified and made to stand distinctly in consciousness in relation to the wider context of life....The essence of religion lies always in the immediate; religion reacting to the world both before and after the hypothetical stage.¹

Hocking and Griffiths, along with a host of others, have grasped the fact that the essence of belief is its grasp of reality in immediate experience, the sense of standing immediately in the presence of reality, a reality which does not need to be argued. With their conception of the true nature of an hypothesis the expression "hypothetical faith" is no hint that "probability is the guide of life" (a dogmatic denial, by the way, of any other guide of life), for to them faith also has its post-hypothetical aspect, and thus faith verified and vindicated is also a guide of life.²

¹. Griffiths, GIE, 4; see Hocking, MGHE, 150-153. ². See also Hickman, IPR, 448; James, VRE, 58.
Griffiths even gives a caution, thus, concerning the use of "hypothesis":

In religion...our awareness of God...is pre-eminently factual and not hypothetical. It is in concrete experience before it can be in any hypothesis. To speak, therefore, of the idea of God as an hypothesis is misleading, for it gives the impression that the essence and justification of religion must be sought in the constructions of the discursive reason, and not in the immediate contacts of the soul with reality. Any and every suggestion that the ground of religion lies in the intellect and not in the bed-rock of concrete apprehensions...leads us astray and prejudices the inquiry.

DeBurgh, also holds that faith is a whole response, a "response to God's omnipresence" similar to the direct experience that one has of himself, a knowledge thus that is personal and by acquaintance, which means that "the truths of religion carry us, in large measure beyond the range of...probable reasoning," as "religion speaks with a clear assurance where metaphysics is skeptical or tentative or silent."

Only a narrow view of faith could have prompted the following description of the best that man can hope for in this life:

We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces.

On the other hand, Frank, describing just one phase of faith, does it from the vantage ground of a broad view: "Faith

1. Griffiths, GIE, 4; see Niebuhr, MR, 138-139; Jones, FE, 64, 80.
as obedience, faith as trust, faith based upon submission to
authority rests in the last resort upon faith as certainty,
faith as knowledge.\footnote{1} He illustrates this:

Just as the world, if it is not to topple
over, must have its equilibrium based upon
something which does not need any 'support,'
so faith based upon confidence in authority,
must in the last resort, rest upon something
which is certain in itself and needs no prop­
ning up.\footnote{2}

That is, "revelation" should include its literal sense—
"the expression of God Himself." So Frank concludes that faith
down on bed-rock is "the encounter of the human heart with God."\footnote{3}
Here there are no "blinding" mist and snow storms.\footnote{4}

Consequently, in the words of an expert on religious
matters, "\textit{\textit{πιστίς}}" (in the sense, obviously, of knowledge)
"\textit{\textit{εχθρισία}}...\textit{\textit{προσβύτερος}}" (actual nature, substance), and
he goes on to declare that through faith (as an hypothesis),
"\textit{\textit{μάρτυριόν}} οί \textit{\textit{προσβύτερος}},"\footnote{5} the
"good report" coming not from man (not "good reputation")
but from God (as good news). In this sense, it is true that
"\textit{\textit{στίς τέκνων}}...\textit{\textit{εξελικτική μάρτυριν ἐν αὐτῷ}},"\footnote{6}
"τὸ πνεῦμα συνμάρτυρει τῷ πνεύματι έμοί."\footnote{7} in a dual testimony. The hypothesis is justified by the demon­
stration; the believer (in the narrow sense) has become a knower
(an advanced believer).

While Frank is strictly correct in denying that "the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{1}{Frank, GWU, 19.}
  \item \footnote{2}{Frank, GWU, 20.}
  \item \footnote{3}{Frank, GWU, 20.}
  \item \footnote{4}{Vide supra, 153.}
  \item \footnote{5}{Heb. 11:1-2.}
  \item \footnote{6}{John 5:10.}
  \item \footnote{7}{Rom. 8:16.}
\end{itemize}
spontaneous feeling of the proximity" of God is faith in the general use of the term, as having passed over into knowledge, yet one on guard against any narrow view of faith will perceive that a knower becomes more intensely and more rationally a believer. A certain group of people bore witness to this:

"Ωκέτι διὰ τὴν σὲν ἁλιὰν πιστεύόμεν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἀληκόαμεν καὶ οὐδαμὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς ὁ Σωτὴρ τοῦ Κόσμου."  

Thus, to Baillie's question, "In what sense is it true that we are ever able in this life of ours to verify our religious beliefs?" it may be answered, "In experience, particularly the experience of God."

3) Make-believe moral arguments

Make-believe moral arguments are the logical products of make-believe definitions and make-believe hypotheses. Kant's *aest ob* moral argument for God's existence, while of value for unbelievers in getting them into action that may develop into something more convincing, as will be shown, is only a fictional *aest ob* argument when persistently held in the absence of further evidence. Ryan warns of its danger. Using pragmatism as an argument for the existence of God, Ryan guards it:

It is not argued here that recognition of God's existence is expedient as a mere regulative principle of human conduct. Fictionalism is as unwarranted and dangerous in theology as in other fields of philosophy.... Thus the present argument does not urge that men act 'as if' God is real.

1. Frank, PRT, 42-43.  
2. John 4:42.  
An hypothesis of the als ob type, with no hope held out of discovering, or learning, or proving anything, even if it can be conceived as begun by anyone, can not, if carried on, cure anyone of atheism, for if carried on long enough will only result in one becoming tired of the farce. The als ob of itself stands too near atheism. Belief in God was held by Hans Vaihinger as a regulative principle, "necessary for the ongoing of life, but known to be a fiction." Brightman points out that the American pragmatism of Geiger's is even more extreme than that of Vaihinger's, for Geiger asserts "that all our metaphysical ideas are fictitious, but that we are bound to act as if they were true." DeBurgh speaks to the point here:

To appropriate a well-known saying of Dr. Johnson, those who would give 'ardour' to virtue must also give 'confidence to truth.' When religion subordinates the claims of truth to those of practical interests, it sinks below the level of morality. ... But there is further evidence, yet more conclusive of the primacy of theoria in religious experience. Not only is that religious experience generated by knowledge; not only does it in turn react, by way of clarification and enrichment, upon the knowledge in which it has its source; knowledge is also its goal.

So the als ob argument that has value in initiating action that may lead to knowledge and some kind of certainty, becomes fictional when it stops short of that behavior and consequent knowledge. For while it is true, as borne out by the

1. Vide supra, 48-51.
testimony of countless numbers that "Πιστεύετε ης δειν
των προσερχόμενων τῇ θεῷ, οτι 'οτι τίνι,"¹

a belief that is obviously hypothetical (the will-to-believe
being present in the "must"), yet such belief should not be
declared to be the only belief, nor regarded in the same light
as the belief of the believer, who has carried the experiment
through and received the reward of his faithfulness and dili-
gence, for this same multitude also testifies that God "Τοίς
ἐκ οὐτοῦ αὐτῶν μετοθαποδότης
γίνεται."² And the writer of those lines gives ex-
ample after example in evidence. But it need not be taken on
the authority of this writer or of the thousands who will con-
firm it; in fact the authorities on this subject (both God and
man) seem to urge men not to take these statements except as
challenges to conduct the same experiment, i.e. to experience
God in order to find out not only that He is, but that He is
good.

These, then, are some defects of Kant's moral argument
for the existence of God: 1) formalism or externalism, 2) im-
practicality, 3) narrow view of Christianity, and 4) an arres-
ted hypothesis.

IV. Value of the moral argument

1. Morally and religiously helpful

In spite of its defects there is some value in Kant's

¹ Heb. 11:6.
² Heb. 11:6.
moral argument. In the first place, it is morally and religiously helpful. Interpretating Kant's postulate of the moral reason, Royce writes:

Sense and speculation alike fail you. But none the less you must act as if God were your constant and visible companion, as if the moral law, which you must regard as his only direct revelation, were spoken in your ear by him as by your next friend at this moment.¹

Royce is impressed by the heroic in this postulate and in its being followed. It is the attitude of the soldier, sure of his duty, sure that the right will win, but only because "God is at the helm." Life, then becomes tolerable, even glorious, because we make it so by our active faith:

Awake, arise, be willing, endure, struggle, defy evil, cleave to good, strive, be strenuous, be devoted, throw into the face of evil and depression your brave cry of hatred and of resistance, and then this dark universe of destiny will glow with a divine light. Then you will commune with the eternal.²

"This is the victory that overcometh the world, not our intuition, not our sentimental faith, but our live, our moral, our creative faith."³ So it is the idea of the moral order joined with an active faith that not only takes us out of our subjective prisons, but that sends us out into the world to conquer in God's name, but also to be rewarded with victory and fellowship with God. But here, Royce has gone beyond Kant; Royce's hypothesis works; it is not an arrested hypothesis.

¹ Royce, SMP, 113.
² Royce, SMP, 116-117.
³ Royce, SMP, 117.
2. Personal and existential

Then, Kant's moral argument is personal and existential. Through the ages the pendulum of philosophy has oscillated between nature and man. The early Greek thinkers, seeking a clue to the nature of reality, looked outward to the universe, and defined reality in physical terms. The Sophists turned their gaze toward man and the universe within. (Socrates had a like approach). Passing over many centuries, we see the pendulum still swinging. The first age of the period of modern philosophy, the seventeenth century, was naturalistic. God, if believed in at all by philosophers, was viewed as the Source of nature. The second age of this period, while retaining this view, witnessed a return of the pendulum towards man, to "the study of the wonderous inner world of man's soul." In Kant we see the culmination of this trend, and the influence that dominated the third age of the modern period for fifty years. In this age, the personal values were supreme.

This oscillation of thinking, but in one direction only, is evident in Kant himself. At first, and for a number of years, under the influence of Newton, he was very much impressed with the argument of design, an argument concerned with the universe. But in turning to the moral argument, he was turning to human experience and personal values. Then, late in life, as will be shown later, he went farther in the direction of personal experience, religious experience based upon a new conception of the personality of God.

Intrinsic values are personal. Things and the world itself, are instrumental to man.\(^1\) Moral values, in particular, belong only to personality. So when a person describes the world as "good," he means that it is good for something to him; or if he is using "good" in the moral sense, he means that the world ministers to his moral development, duty made manifest to his senses or the raw material of the spiritual life, as Fichte taught. Even Mill's pessimistic judgment of nature, as Sorley pointed out, is due to a personification of nature, or is an argument against nature as a result of an omnipotent, benevolent will, involving a personal view or standard.\(^2\) Sorley regards history as a gradual spiritualization of matter.\(^3\) Perhaps Mill may be regarded as a "speculator" who "in curious self-forgetfulness, fixes his thought on the physical system and forgets himself."\(^4\)

Surely metaphysical speculation, going from idea to existence, will not work. Kant's refutation of the ontological argument spells the doom in advance of any attempt to found ethical idealism on this basis; a movement in the opposite direction, however, is legitimate:

Ethical ideas are facts of the personal consciousness, and they are realised through the will and in the character of persons. They have therefore a place in existent reality...They claim objective validity; and this claim is not invalidated by their being conscious ideas, any more than the objective validity of any other

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1. Sorley, MVG, 118.
2. Sorley, MVG, 122-123.
kind of knowledge is affected by the fact that
the process of knowing is a process in some one's
mind. 1

An argument like this is sometimes styled "anthropomorphic." It has to be guarded. But when human qualities are the
basis of the inference, it is properly called anthropomorphic, in the opinion of Sorley. That is, if one argues that because
man has power, goodness and intelligence, therefore God must
have these qualities, only in a higher degree, then "the proce-
dure is anthropomorphic, and we may say that man is making God
after his own image." 2 But Sorley says that when we think of
God's goodness, we are dependent upon this quality as we know it
in man for our idea of it in God. England uses "anthropomorphic"
in the non-technical sense of "personal." He notes that Ward
viewed Kant's whole system as anthropomorphic in the long run,
as Kant in his Copernican hypothesis finally interprets the
world in personal terms, as the postulates of morality are per-
sonal. Rejecting dogmatic personalism, Kant saw the necessity
of interpreting the highest in terms of the known highest, and
said that "any predicates we may assign to God will inevitably
be tinged with symbolic anthropomorphism." 3 That is, the lan-
guage of eternity must be translated into the language of time,
the known always giving the clue to the unknown. England holds
that Kant's personalism is most evident in Kant's argument,
where he contended "that the facts of man's moral life presuppose

1. Sorley, MVG, 185.
2. Sorley, MVG, 496.
3. England, KCG, 193; see Ward, SK, 192.
a systematic unity of ends," and that "the supreme unity defini-
tely loses its formal character and becomes the intelligent
author and supreme member or sovereign (Oberhaupt) of the
realm of ends."¹ From the point of view of strictly transcen-
dental thought, "God is declared to be a mere Idea. In the
realm of moral philosophy, God is again and again affirmed to
be actual reality."²

Concerning the starting points, methods and goals of
Kant and Hume, Pringle-Pattison sees little in common between
Humes's "critical contemplation of the works of nature" and
Kant's argument from "the intrinsic worth of human personality."³
To Pringle-Pattison, the Kantian idea of value as central and
as a determining factor in philosophical explanation is sound,
the position of all idealistic philosophy since Kant:

Every form of philosophical idealism appears
to involve this conviction of the profound sig-
nificance of human life, as valuable as appro-
priating and realising these values. And with-
such a conviction, argument about God or the
universe would seem to be a mere waste of time;
for the man to whom his own life is a triviality
is not likely to find a meaning in anything else.⁴

This criticism should give pause to those who seek to
minimize the importance of man, as does Schuyler:

There is in all of us a kind of sub-conscious
vanity....We cannot bear to think we are cosmical-
ly unimportant. We can....no longer believe that
we are literally at the center of the physical uni-
verse. Nevertheless it is still possible for us
to believe that we are at the apex of creation...
There is no good reason for believing this; but...

³. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 46.  ⁴. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 236.
men have little difficulty in believing what they wish to believe.¹

Of course, the last statement of Schuyler's is as true of him as of anyone else. And it ignores evolution:

And so Darwin may be taken as replacing man in the position from which he was ousted by Copernicus. Man appears, according to the doctrine of evolution, so interpreted as the goal and crown of nature's long upward effort...and accordingly, man is once more...set in the heart of the world, somehow centrally involved in any attempt to explain it.²

Size is not greater than intellect; avoirdupois does not make the man. Man is gradually achieving conquest over nature in every aspect, prying into its secrets, harnessing it to his purposes. "The very term environment indicates a subsidiary function."³ Man can remain humble with such a belief in his relative importance. It is not Comte's view of the heavens declaring the glory, not of God, but of Kepler and Newton; nor is it "Swinburne's 'Hymn to Man'--'glory to man in the highest' for Man is the master of things."⁴ But it is the belief that there is a likeness between man and his Cosmic Father. If there were nothing in common between the nature of God and the nature of man, no communication between them could be possible. "Idealism takes its stand on the essential truth of our judgments of value and the impossibility of explaining the higher from the lower."⁵ The exclusive claims of sense-perception are negated by the Kantian idea of intrinsic and personal values as pointing to God. He and human persons are bearers, conservators and

5. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 41-42.
increasers of values. We owe a great debt of gratitude to Kant for his part in the development of this idealistic position. He had a marked influence not only upon his immediate successors, but upon later idealists in their fight with naturalism, so that today we owe to them the present philosophical emphasis of value in dealing with theism.\footnote{Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 38-39.} Höffding's theism is an emphasis upon the conservation of value. Pascal's conception of "the thinking reed" as greater in death than the universe which crushes him, is not outmoded in philosophy. Royce and some other absolute idealists argue from the finite self to the Larger Self. It would seem that (for thinking) it is nearer from man to God than from nature to God. It was from Keats that Bosanquet got the significant description of the world as "the vale of soul-making." Mill seemed to have regarded it as "the vale of tears" with his pessimistic treatment of the problem of evil. But Bosanquet "frequently speaks...as if the moulding of individual souls were the typical business of the universe."\footnote{Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 256.}

And being personal, the moral argument is likewise existential. Kroner sees the influence of the moral argument of Kant upon Kierkegaard and his doctrine "that not thought but the existent thinker alone can be related to God" and "that not a philosophical system but the living man alone...he who repents, can judge about the existence of God."\footnote{Kroner, PF, 48.} Kierkegaard taught that the standpoint of the believer must always be existential.

We have not left the thought, then, that moral values

2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 256.  
are personal, but making explicit what has been implicit, for
personal and existential can not really be separated. Existen-
tial values are not cold theoretical abstractions; they have the
warm glow of persons, persons with feelings as well as intellects,
feelings that can be stirred and that stir to action. In one way
or another men fight for moral values, for the things that seem
most worth-while to them. They put their lives behind the things
they prize most in life. It is only natural that men fight in
one way or another, and when they are compelled by moral consid­
erations to fight in any way for that which they value most, the
only ethical question involved is whether they are true values,
i.e. worth fighting for.

Pringle-Pattison holds that we must go to the moral and
religious man himself, and not to some philosopher weaving ab-
stract theories about him, for a conception of moral and reli-
gious experiences. "They may be explained but not explained
away."¹ Some consider that moral and religious persons are vic-
tims of wishful thinking. As a criterion of value, wishful
thinking, no doubt, should be rejected, but it should be recog­
nized at the same time that wishes have a part to play in the
manifestation of reality. "Things reveal themselves soonest to
those who most passionately want them."² James goes on to give
the reason for this: "our need sharpens our wit." Sorley agree-
ing with this, declares that "things are not what they are because
we want them so to be, but they are revealed to the man who has
wit to discover, and his wit is often sharpened by his need to

¹. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 252.  ². James, PU, 176.
This is existential thinking.

Involved in this passionate desire for things is faith, an existential relationship, "expressing the set of the whole self." And Welch means by this a relationship with objective reality which is practical and not speculative, an existential relation between man and God, faith being man's response to God's giving of Himself in revelation in Christ and the Holy Spirit. Thus, the moral argument of Kant is not only morally and religiously helpful but is also personal and existential.

3. A guide, thus, to the concept of the God of religion

In the next place, Kant's moral argument is a guide to the concept of the God of religion. Metaphysical (or abstract) argument as employed both by Kant and the dogmatists, as has been shown, brings us only to a metaphysical God; the moral argument with its appeal to concrete moral experience, however, brings us in our thinking to the God of religion. Bowne speculating upon the attributes of God, faced the fact that those that he considered, were only metaphysical ones, not attributes in any properly religious conception. He illustrates his meaning by a reference to Aristotle, with whom, he says, the idea of God had a "purely metaphysical function and significance," God appearing "as prime-mover, as self-moving, as the primal reason, etc., but not as the object of love, trust and worship." Bowne's conclusion that a God arrived at by logical or metaphysical reasoning is "ethically barren," is supported by the

1. Sorley, MVG, 6-7.
findings of Mill in his natural theology. Granting that the system evident in the universe points to one God rather than to many, yet he views Paley's argument from design (the watch illustration) as not a metaphysical argument but an argument from experience, proving, however, only an intelligent being, as the argument from design is only "an inferior kind of inductive evidence, called analogy." In the adaptations in nature, Mill sees the probability of an intelligent author, but because of the presence of evil in the world, and because of dependence on means, he regards every evidence of design as evidence against the metaphysical attribute of omnipotence. But Mill is even more sure of the impossibility of metaphysical arguments proving moral attributes, i.e. proving the existence of the God of religion. "The only inference that can be drawn from most of it, respecting the character of the Creator, is that he does not wish his works to perish as soon as created." He wavers a bit on benevolence, but quickly concludes, "If we look for any other of the moral attributes, we find a total blank"; he even goes so far as to add, "There is no shadow of justice in the general arrangements of Nature," and "These, then, are the net results of Natural Theology on the question of the divine attributes."

On the other hand, to accept the postulate of a perfect Being is to accept the moral attributes necessarily included in the conception. Kant "played" with this idea a great deal, tossing it back and forth, but it is to be doubted that he ever really

rejected the idea. Had he done so, he would have contradicted himself when he came to the moral argument. Bowne regards the moral qualities as the highest ones: "The true, the beautiful, and the good, love, goodness and righteousness—these are the only things that have absolute sacredness and unconditional worth." Then Bowne proceeds by a moral postulate, i.e. by a mingling of faith in the ideal of a perfect personal being and an appeal to experience, (the experiences of our moral nature, of the structure of society, and of the course of history), to the moral attributes of God. Our moral nature, for instance, must have a moral author, as "there is no way of deducing the moral from the non-moral." But arriving at a concept of a moral Author and the God of religion is not arriving at certainty of his existence through religious experience. It is only an approach.

4. Suggesting a way of approach into the immediate presence of God—the way of faith

a. The activity of faith.—Then, finally, Kant's moral argument for the existence of God suggests a way of approach into the immediate presence of deity—the way of faith, for faith, in the first place, is active. It does things. In the words of a keen observer of human conduct, it builds arks, stops the mouths of lions, and obtains promises, the "witness" (literal for "good report") of the Spirit. Referring to the failure of the traditional theistic arguments, Rall declares: "All this points to the fact that rational considerations by themselves are never adequate

3. Heb. 11:2.
to the problems of life. These questions can never be settled without faith and action. 1 Faith is the tendency toward action, even action itself, for while it is a gift (in the sense of part of the original intellectual equipment of mankind), it is also an achievement, 2 a venture or adventure. The author of the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, a discerning student of Jewish history, indicates that faith is not an insurance policy against the troubles and dangers of life, not a safety-device, but a force that keeps men poised and at their tasks. The faith of Jesus Christ did not keep Him out of trouble, but it kept Him in trouble, in a double sense. True, Christianity does provide shelter in the time of storm, but faith is perverted when one seeks a refuge in the rear when duty calls to the front.

Perry, in contrasting belief and theory, stresses the activity of faith:

Before theory can become belief, it must be assimilated to the plan of life....He who makes plans for the morrow, or constructs a bridge, or prays, believes....Now it is clear that theory can no more take the place of belief than a stone can take the place of bread. Theory does not directly nourish and sustain life, as belief does. 3

Acknowledging the importance of knowledge for life and the desirability of certainty, Rall, however, declares: "Action is imperative." 4 Höfnding, referring to Kant's postulate of God, writes: "Ethically considered, the command is, 'Make life, the life thou knowest, as valuable as possible'." 5 Or, as Rall puts it: "Live and see what life brings to you. This is the empirical

1. See Rall, CHR, 238; Lewis, Art. (1930), 16; Dewey, QC, 205.
3. Perry, PPT, 8.
4. Rall, CHR, 238.
method...Act, try, experiment, observe...Take your best insights and theories and put them to the test of practice."¹

b. The necessity of faith.--Faith is necessary. It is not too much to say with Rall that the "right to believe is the right to live;"² for it can be shown that faith as used in this dissertation in its broadest sense, and as covering the whole range of human life, is necessary to knowledge, activity and religious experience. Faith is faith wherever found and however manifested. Religious faith is not grounded in a special human faculty; it is primarily distinguished from any other faith in its religious Object. Ferre slipped from his usual breadth of vision, when he wrote, "Without faith there can be philosophy, but no religion."³ Now as a matter of emphasis, one might say that reason is primary in philosophy, and that faith is primary in religion. But philosophy presupposes faith in reason and in philosophy itself, if in nothing more. One could say that "Without faith it (anything) is impossible"--philosophy, science, religion, invention, discovery, progress, civilization, and life itself.

Faith, as the primary condition of reason, is necessary to all kinds of knowledge. Idealism has demonstrated the dependence of our knowledge of other persons, even the knowledge that they exist, upon faith. We have to assume, as Bowne points out, "that the laws of intellect are valid for all alike, and that all have the same general objects of experience."⁴ So it is either faith

¹ Rall, FFT, 83.
² Rall, CHR, 241.
³ Ferre, FR, 220.
⁴ Bowne, THE, 128.
or solipsism. And the latter is "absurd to the pitch of insanity."¹ In the form of hypotheses, faith is essential to advance in scientific knowledge. The scientist lives, works and achieves by faith. The great English scientist, Sir Arthur Eddington, speaking of the customary and thoughtless division of facts and faith between science and religion, respectively, acknowledges in strong terms the dependence of the whole science of astronomy upon faith; there are no purely observational facts about the heavenly bodies.² The scientist can not lay claim on all the facts, dumping all faith into the lap of religion. And faith is, likewise, the condition of historical knowledge: "To impeach all historical evidence because it cannot be proved or because the memory is not infallible would render life impossible."³ After speaking of the view held by some that science is the only trustworthy source of knowledge, being free from the "farce of faith," Kerstetter brings out the importance of faith not only in physical science, but also "in the realms that matter most, in ethics, politics, religion and philosophy," adding: "For the truth is that science, philosophy and religion all rest solidly on faith."⁴

We should beware of any feeling, implicit or explicit, expressed or unexpressed, that we should have a neat solution for every problem: "Who dares to say that we ought to be able to explain everything, or that it would be impossible to live if we could not explain everything."⁵ Something, surely should be left for faith or practical reason. All men, including "the just"

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2. Eddington, EU, 25.  
5. Höffding, TP0R, 192.
can live without full explanation, and without impeaching either the goodness or the power of God in the absence of that explanation, but no one can live without faith. "The whole human race ...lives by faith alone." Hence it is well that faith has such marvelous recuperative powers:

But each time that the earthly body of a belief is laid in the dust, it receives a more glorious spiritual body. . . . Faith, which is an active belief in the reality of the ideal, is the very breath by which humanity lives, and it will reconstitute itself afresh as long as the race endures.

c. The primacy of faith.—Faith is primary, both logically and chronologically. It is intuitive, and Kant's teaching that knowledge begins with intuitions, and that the intuitions of time and space as forms of knowledge are ours before their content is filled in by experience, seems reasonable. Without faith philosophy could not get started. Take any philosopher and notice his presupposition or presuppositions. These are foundational, first-truths that save the philosopher from backing off into an infinite regress of argument. Starting with Socrates, rationalist and man of faith, and tracing the progress of philosophy as it becomes more religious (especially under the influence of Christianity), it is to be noted that faith gets an increasingly larger place until in the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages, faith gets primary place. Not only so, but the goal of many philosophers has been God and immortality—matters of faith. All between starting point and goal, there is "the leap of faith," the voluntary and active faith that goes from particular to general,

2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 82.
from the instances, limited in number, to the declaration of universal law; the leap from idea to object; from the given self to the external world which is assumed, but not directly experienced; the active faith that accepts the assumption of the interaction of bodies and of body and mind, the faith with which Kant and Royce postulated God.

Farmer declares that the modern mind is worried epistemologically, for it holds that reasoned thinking is a guide to truth, and yet has feelings of misgivings which are mounting; that we are in a bad way if shut up to this method of arriving at truth, as:

Science and philosophy seem incapable by themselves of guiding and controlling men (including scientists and philosophers) on the issues about which decisions have continually to be made before science and philosophy are ready with the answers, but always they seem to imply or presuppose a 'faith' which goes beyond anything that science or philosophy could ever on its premises fully justify. Moreover, there is a growing awareness that trust in reason itself, even when reason is narrowly restricted to the laboratory method, rests on a species of 'faith'.

Hocking, following Bergson, teaches that nothing can be truly known until it is known intuitively, and that "knowledge begins with intuition; and intuition is always ahead." Herman grants that often intuition is the forerunner of reason, although "intuition comes as the crown and reward of a long process of patient intellectual research" many times. This can not imply a denial that all reasoning must rest on presupposition, some given furnished by faith. "Human reason, then, as modern

2. Hocking, TOP, 208.  
3. Herman, MVM, 276.
Scepticism has shown, does not rest upon itself. Rational conclusions are dependent on certain premises which reason itself is unable to prove. Russell says that "even in the most logical realms, it is insight that first arrives at what is new."

If faith is primary in this general sense, there can be little question about the primacy of faith in the religious realm. Augustine taught that the foundation of reason is faith in revelation which furnishes the data upon which reason works:

For the Augustinian, 'the safest way to reach truth is not the one that starts from reason and then goes on from rational certitude to faith, but...the way whose starting point is faith and then goes on from revelation to reason.'

Faith is the most characteristic attitude of the religious man. The writers of the Jewish-Christian Sacred Scriptures exhibit this in presenting no formal argument for God's existence, but rather putting it forward as a postulate not only for the religious man to stand upon but also as an hypothesis to advance from in the discovery that God not only "is" but that He is good and a rewarder of the diligent seeker after Him.

d. The reasonableness of faith.--In connection with the general subject of the value of Kant's moral argument as suggesting a way into the immediate presence of God—the reasonableness of this approach of faith should be considered. There is plenty of room for this concept in the broad view of faith that has already been presented.

1. Frank, PRT, 39; see Kerstetter, Art. (1948), 42.
2. Herman, MVM, 270; see Russell, Art. (1914), 787-788.
3. Thomas, NC, 3-5; vide supra, 170-172.
4. Schilling, Art. (1948), 15; see Gilson, LPMA, 17.
5. See Gen. 1:1; Psa. 34:8.
1) Interdependence of faith and reason.—One of the constituent elements of this view is the interdependence of faith and reason. On the one hand, faith is the very life-blood of reason. To what has been said on the dependence of reason upon faith in securing knowledge of all kinds,¹ may be added the more general statement of Kerstetter that, "Without faith reason could do nothing."² He concludes:

And thus it is that reason cannot say to faith, 'I have no need of thee.' Without faith reason... is prostrate. It has no legs to stand on. It cannot move. But walking on the ground of such pre-reason convictions it can move out bit by bit and push back the darkness of the dim unknown. But this is not all. Even as it walks on the sandals of faith, reason must be crowned with the crown of faith. If without basic faith, reason has no legs to stand on, then without crowning faith, reason has no arms with which to reach upward or feel its way forward. Reason, to be fruitful, must begin and end in faith.³

On the other hand, "tenable faith ought always to be guided, so far as possible, by the light of reason."⁴ By his qualifying words "so far as possible," Kerstetter has guarded the truth of the interdependence of faith and reason, saving faith from any slavish dependence upon reason, or from any conception like faith coming cringingly into the presence of an austere and absolute monarch or judge for permission to live and to express convictions that transcend those of reason. It is true, however, that reason does faith a favor by examining beliefs and by safeguarding men from credulity:

Reason has the task of examining our beliefs, and of safeguarding us against credulity. Reason insists that belief shall harmonize with our whole

¹ Vide supra, 52-60; see Rail, CHR, 240.
² Kerstetter, Art.(1948), 32.
³ Kerstetter, Art.(1948), 42-43.
⁴ Kerstetter, Art.(1948), 32.
experience. Everyone knows what it means to trust in something or some proposition which could not safely be trusted. Reason takes note of such a disappointing experience, and erects an inhibition against belief at that point. In another direction, reason acts as the critical judge between conflicting believing tendencies.¹

If in sound believing and reasoning there is this interdependence of faith and reason, then it does undermine the position of the irrationalists, such as Barth, who "spurn reason" as well as shaking the foundation of the rationalistic empiricist extremists "who overlook or minimize reason's dependence on faith."²

2) Moral and spiritual experience factual.—The fact is that moral and spiritual experiences are as factual as biological experience. Science, mathematics, psychology, and philosophy use postulates; the postulate of God is as rational as the assumptions of the uniformity of nature, of the existence of other human minds, and of the many faiths of every-day life which are, nevertheless, regarded as facts.

I have not yet straddled a radio message and ridden it from New York to London, yet I have faith such messages are sent. So I do not doubt those truths of God which my reason has not yet lassoed and galloped to the end of time... With youthful faith I accepted the doctrines of the church. With smart learning, I rejected all of them. Now with some wisdom aired by humbled pride and conceived in suffering, I know they are true. Once I assigned to myself the duties of the Supreme-God-Supreme-Court-Justice, to pass on the reliability of God’s statements and the nature of His creation.³

3) Faith and reason harmonious partners.—No doubt

¹ Hickman, IPR, 459.
² Kerstetter, Art. (1948), 39.
³ Landone in Kepler, CRT, 202.
one of the chief causes of the idea that faith is unreasonable is the failure to see not only that faith and reason are inter-dependent, but also (and partly in consequence of this relation) that they are, when working naturally and properly, harmonious partners. In the view of this dissertation, both reason and faith as natural endowments of man, are gifts of God, both being thus essentially reverent in their attitudes. Thus, while at times reason has appeared unbelieving, and while consequently, religiously-minded people have viewed reason with hostile glances, it can be shown that throughout the course of history this essentially reverent reason has been a believing reason.

This was true at the very beginning of recorded philosophy. Although Thales, the first known Greek philosopher was a physicist, it is reported that he declared that all things are full of gods. The Pythagoreans give evidence of the influence of the Orphic religion upon them. Xenophanes, the theological Eleatic, was the first among the Greeks to declare that God is one. This was at a time when the current religion was polytheistic, and when the Hebrew prophets were attacking idols. While this god may have been only supreme among gods, the direction was toward a spiritual monotheism. For Xenophanes, Mind had cosmic significance, Ultimate Reality. He said, "Without toil he (God) rules all things by the power of his mind." So much so was reason reverent for Heraclitus that reason is the name of God, Logos, a concept that after a process of development becomes God incarnate in John's Gospel. Empedocles recognized the cosmic significance of mind;

1. See Bakewell, SAP, 2. 2. See Bakewell, SAP, 8.
it was "flashing through the whole universe with swift thoughts."¹ This spiritual, sacred and ineffable reality he called God. Passing over Anaxagoras and others, we come to Socrates. This philosophical rationalist was a believer. Reacting against the myths of the polytheistic religions of his day, he had a spiritual conception of God approaching monotheism. He believed in revelation (Delphi Oracle and "the Voice") and in immortality. He believed, in fact, that he had a divine mission as a philosopher. There can be no question of the reverence of his pupil, Plato. His followers, the Platonists, and also the Neo-Platonists, influenced the thought of the early Church through its philosophers—Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Tatian and Tertullian.

The philosophy of the Middle Ages was practically all religious—Arabic, Hebrew and Christian: "The existence of God and the reality of divine revelation were truths so evident that the philosopher's task could only be undertaken on the basis of their assumption."² Contending that there was a real Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages, Gilson wrote: "Thus I call Christian every philosophy which although keeping distinct the two orders formally, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason."³

Modern philosophy begins with the name of Rene Descartes. He believed that he had a mathematical demonstration for the existence of God. Many other names of reverent, scholarly

1. See Bakewell, SAP, 46.  
2. Meadowcroft, PS, 42; see Windelband, HP, 264.  
3. Gilson, SMP, 37.
philosophers could be mentioned that belong to this period. One has to go no farther than the titles of many philosophical books of the contemporary period to realize that philosophy has not lost its usual reverence, such as *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* by Hocking, *Philosophical Theology* by Tennant, and *Space, Time and Deity* by Alexander.

4) The seeming irreverence of reason.---Since reason is essentially reverent, why is it that it appears at times as unbelieving? In the first place, it must be remembered that reason is a tool. In the hands of a human being, reason displays limitations. These are due to at least two causes: 1) man is finite, and 2) man is a sinner.

There is a Chinese proverb to the effect that one cannot draw water from a deep well with a short rope. The first reason why the "rope" of ordinary reason is too short to reach the depths of the well of knowledge is that man is finite. Even when he transcends, momentarily, his finitude, his reason never becomes Reason, else he would become God (Rationality, the Logos). A Pauline intellectual moderation is needed today, which in the effort to get the synoptic view, confesses that we see "in part," and that the part seen consists of distorted images because we "look in a mirror poorly silvered."¹

"Man's reason cannot be equated with God's Reason...simply because such an equation fails to take realistic account of our actual state of sin."² Something is radically wrong with

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¹ I Cor. 13:9, 12. ² Ferre, FR, 238.
men's desires. This is implicit in three definitions offered by Brightman. "Value means whatever is actually liked...desired.... The opposite of value is disvalue or evil or worthlessness." Then later he defines true value. For a time the writer was puzzled by these definitions. But is this not the solution? If man were good by nature, his desires would be good, and he would not choose the evil and worthless; then there would be no need to offer two opposites to disvalue, viz., value and true value. As it actually works out, however, here is disvalue at one extreme, true value at the other, with value, a mixture of both, in between, for good men desire the good, and evil men—the evil.

Philosophy, in general, does not take account of sin as sin. But sin (not simply evil) takes account of the philosopher, who can sin in "thought" and "word" as well as in "deed." And there is nothing more unreasonable than sin, unless it be the sinner. This is the type of reasoning that can not be trusted, the reasoning of men who have refused the divine invitation, "Come now and let us reason together," the reasoning of the rich fool, who reasoned within himself.

Thus there is but an appearance of conflict between reason and faith. The real conflict, as Ferré has shown, is between reason and Reason, between the reason of finite, sinful man and the Reason of God or revelation. The philosopher who

1. Brightman, PR, 88-89.  
2. Isa. 1:18.  
refuses to accept the divine invitation to reason in God's presence, who refuses to repent of his intellectual sins (to which philosophers are particularly liable), and be made a "new creature" can not even "see the kingdom of God,"¹ as spiritual things are spiritually discerned just as musical things are musically discerned. If finite reason is our only source of knowledge, then we are condemned to ignorance in large areas of truth. The writer agrees with Ferre' that revelation is ultimate truth, and as such "can never be proved by anything less than itself.² John Salisbury made the complaint that, "The philosophers have rushed to submit the sky to their reason."³ It does seem rather presumptuous, to say the least, for a finite philosopher to invade heaven, trying to enforce the claims of reason upon Rationality.

The term "finite" has been used here to distinguish a narrow conception of reason from the broad one upheld by this dissertation. Here is a sample of the narrow view: "By reason is meant that faculty of the human mind by which man arrives at truth without any supersensuous aid: this implies his understanding conscience and experience, all acting under natural conditions."⁴ With such conceptions of reason (as well as narrow views of faith and experience), it is no wonder that faith and reason have been regarded as foes. When it is said that reason has uttered its voice on the rationality of a subject,  

¹. John 3:3.  
². Ferre', FR, 243.  
⁴. Field, SHC, 3.
it must be remembered that abstract reason does not reason; the question is who has reasoned. Is it some unreasonable wicked man whose reasoning powers have been dulled, if not destroyed, by sin? Is it the ordinary ungodly man (not necessarily wicked but without God in his life)? Or is it the man whose intellectual powers and vision have been quickened and aided by the spirit of God? To talk of such a one trying "to improve revelation by means of reason" is absurd; he would not desire to set "the sun by my old wooden clock,"¹ or "invade heaven," figuratively speaking.

5) The general harmony of philosophy and religion

On the whole, the relation between philosophy and religion has been one of harmony. Reference has already been made to the faith of the early Greek philosophers. The Church Fathers pointed out the disagreements among these philosophers as a proof of the superiority of Christianity over pagan philosophy and religion. What was true, (approximating the Christian revelation), these Church Fathers attributed to the direct or indirect influence of the Old Testament, pointing out the communication and exchange of ideas due to travel in those early days. And there is no doubt of the fact that Platonism and Neo-Platonism aided in the statement of the theology of the early Church.

After a study of the relations of faith and reason in the Church of the first two centuries, the writer found that reason

¹. Field, SHC, 4.
was honored and employed, was recognized as limited, and viewed as relative, that abstract speculation (separated from faith and revelation) was frowned upon and used only to a limited extent, and that faith (faith in general, in Christ, in the Christian Scriptures) was held as necessary, as central, was elevated above reason, and regarded as bringing knowledge and certainty. Reason and faith were so united that Christianity was viewed as both a religion and a philosophy.

At first sight, the claims of faith and reason in these first two centuries in the Church, seemed opposed to one another. But the reconciliation came in the facts that the reason honored and used was not the reason limited by human infirmity, clouded by human sin, and unaided by the Scriptures and the Holy Spirit; and the faith made central and exalted above reason was not credulity, belief with no foundations, and unrelated to knowledge and certainty. A believing reason and a reasonable faith, thus, were joined in mutual agreement and support, rational partners.

Four positions concerning the relation of faith and reason assumed by the Medieval philosophers are: 1) Primacy of faith, held by followers of Tertullian: God has revealed Himself in Scripture, has provided for our salvation, and that is all that is necessary; 2) Primacy of faith, moderated—Augustinian. Anselm made it famous by his "I believe in order to understand"; 3) Primacy of reason. This was not extensive; it was the position of the Latin Averroists, a turning away from the Koran to Aristotle. The Christians who followed them,
found themselves in an inconsistent position; 4) Balance of faith and reason. This was the position of Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, and others. A distinction was made between belief and knowledge. St. Thomas made a distinction also between Preambles to Faith (as the existence of God, His attributes, and immortality, that are both revealed and open to rational proofs), and Articles of Faith (Trinity, Incarnation, etc., accepted by faith alone).

Speaking of the advance that Christian philosophy made over Greek philosophy, Gilson writes: "On the supposition that St. Augustine added something to Plato, and Duns Scotus added something to Aristotle, the history of Medieval philosophy will have a proper object." These words are significant when we remember that Gilson holds that a Christian philosophy relies on revelation; it is also significant in the light of his words:

Thus Greek philosophy, cut loose from Christian revelation, survived in this medley of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism; it lasted for several centuries, from the thirteenth to the sixteenth, and not a single original idea that we know of ever came out of it.

Only one philosopher of the Modern period will be selected to show that mutual contributions were made by religion and philosophy. Kant made an important contribution to Christianity in his position on faith in the Moral Argument for the existence of God. But one is impressed with the fact that the contribution was not one-sided, that the God he was talking about was the God of his contemporaries, whose attributes (discussed by

1. Gilson, SMP, 403-404. 2. Gilson, SMP, 409; see Hegel, PR, II, 159.
Kant) were revealed in the Scriptures read and believed in by those contemporaries.

Concerning the contemporary period, it can be said that since the decline or disintegration of liberalism (Horton calls it "the death" and Ferre describes it as a near death) and the improvement in the position of the conservatives, "the gulf between our liberal and conservative churches" being "visibly narrower," there has naturally resulted an improvement in the relations between faith and reason. In England, liberalism has gone "into solution"; there as well as on the continent, "a steady growth of theological conservatism since the World War" has occurred. Horton points to such divergent thinkers as A. E. Taylor, John Oman, Dean Inge and William Temple who are "unanimously opposed to the type of liberal theology which prevailed before the war," and who, however, are not opposed to reason, holding that "divine revelation and human reason... are not... contradictory... but correlative principles." In Europe, in general, Biblical (in contrast to speculative) theology has become dominant, and the influence of this new movement "is felt very strongly in our country." To W. Norman Pittinger this is a salutary influence:

2. Horton, RT, IX; TT, Part II, 8; Ferre, Art. (1948) 338.
4. Horton, TT, x.
5. Horton, CET, x, 173.
6. Horton, CET, 169; see 149 for Temple's change.
The religion of the Bible is central and normative in Christian faith and life. The theology which emerges from a study of the Bible is indicative of the proper line of development in the intellectual statement of that faith and life.  

Amos N. Wilder speaks of "the generally acknowledged revival of, and interest in, biblical theology." The Agape theological trend, rising in influence, is a movement back to the Bible and to the faith of the early Church.

This general change in the theological atmosphere in recent years has been accompanied by a decided swing toward "the right" on the part of individuals—liberals such as Edwin Aubrey, John Bennett, Robert Calhoun, Walter Horton, and Edwin Lewis. Since his disallusionment over humanism, Aubrey, a self-styled dialectical mystic, has progressed toward a more conservative position. Although influenced by crisis theology, he can not be considered an irrationalist for, like many others under that influence, he still has a trust in reason. This can but spell better relations between reason and faith. Personal tragic experiences, reflection on World War I, with its aftermaths of economic collapse and failure of peace efforts, led Calhoun to see "the shallowness of modernism," and not only to move "from philosophy to theology," but also to move "theologically to the right." Horton declares: "The exigencies of our times is drawing me...theologically to the right." In a letter to the writer (March 17, 1948), he wrote:

4. See Aubrey, LCF, Preface.
6. Horton, RT, ix; see 42.
My earliest writings belong to my liberal period. Realistic Theology and most that follows belongs to a more conservative period.... I sometimes say that I prefer the term 'Neo-liberal' or 'repentant liberal' to the term 'Neo-orthodox' to describe my stand.

Edwin Lewis, "moving from left to right...seems to make out a good case for orthodoxy," his emphasis being "on Biblical and historical fact."¹ His change of position receives perhaps its best confirmation from the criticism he received over the publication of an article, the criticism coming from his liberal friends who felt that he had deserted them and had betrayed "the cause": "In the fall number, 1933, of Religion in Life, I published an article entitled, 'The Fatal Apostasy of the Modern Church.'"² He goes on to admit the change and repeats what he had said in other publications.³ In this, Lewis has not gone over to irrationalism.⁴

Nels Ferre', also, is doing much to strengthen the partnership between reason and faith, occupying as he does a mediating position, critical of the faults, as well as commendatory of the virtues, of both liberals and conservatives. He thinks that conservatives "like Van Til, Henry, Ockenga, G. Wilbur Smith and others" have much truth to tell, and praises fundamentalism for "having held the main fortress while countless leaders went over to the foe." He looks to the future when liberalism with its "stress on reason, experience and love," will "flower once

¹. L. F. Danner in report to class in Syst. Theol., B. U. School of Theol., 1947-1948; for change of Bennett, see report of Tyler Thompson to same class. 2. Lewis, CM, 9. 3. See Lewis, FD, v, vi. 4. See Lewis, GO, 166, 268.
more, when a new and fuller faith gives these their fuller reality-content."¹

6) Future partnership of faith and reason

From this historical survey of the relations of faith and reason, it can be confidently asserted that they can remain partners, for it is still true that reason and faith need each other. They supplement, as well as challenge and check, each other. One reason for the needed co-operation is that reason is primarily grounded in the actual, while faith is primarily grounded in the ideal. Faith is a "will to believe" while reason is a challenge to belief.²

But faith must become more and more reasonable and co-operative. And reason must become increasingly religious and reverent. There is a trend in this direction. Man's self-confidence has received a serious set-back in the experience of two world-wars in one generation, and the fear of a third more horrible still. He stands in conscious weakness facing what seems to be the inevitable, the complete break-down of the efforts for peace. Why does not God intervene? The fact is, God is still saying, "Come now and let us reason together." But as long as man depends on reason, he will not "listen to Reason." And until he does listen to Reason, there seems to be no way out of the present terrible "mess" into which man has gotten himself by his false independence.

But when reason becomes fully reverent, really respectful

of God and His authority, and reason and Reason generally become harmonious, "two basic needs" of the modern world will have been met, adequate authority and intrinsic motivation. They are sadly needed in the present moral slump.

There is a simple illustration of this conception of the partnership of faith and reason. A Christian is walking happily along hand in hand with reason and faith. Suddenly reason stops, saying, "I have gone as far as I can reasonably go. Ahead is unfamiliar land to me. It is the realm of the mysterious, the sacred. Faith is the adventurer, the pioneer; take a firm grip on his hand, and trust him implicitly as a guide." The challenge is accepted and a spiritual discovery is made. Then reason moves up to the advanced position, and puts its endorsement upon the validity of the experience.

It is the writer's conviction that a reverent rationalism is possible. He has adopted the Augustinian-Anselmian type that finds expression in the statement, "I believe in order to understand (or know)." He believes in a reason that looks toward Reason, a rationalism modified by the revelational type, i.e. a religious empiricism. That is, while he believes that man can not "lift himself by his boot-strap" to go from reason to Reason, he believes that the Holy Spirit is able to save man from his impaired vision due to sin, and to inspire him by His indwelling and by His illumination of the Scriptures, so that man can rise above his limitations due to his finitude to

1. Ferre, FR, 240; see Aubrey, PTT, 4-7.
"think God's thoughts after Him" and thus in a measure to approximate Reason. The measure of this approximation would depend only upon the capacity and the willingness of the believer to be helped by the Spirit. Man would believe and rely in order to know and understand, and he would know and understand in proportion to the belief and reliance. This is a modified rationalism, a reliance upon reason—up to a certain point—which makes room for faith, its partner, faith not only in reason but also in Reason (reason inspired and aided by the Holy Spirit, including, thus, special revelation).

e. The paradoxical nature of faith

Then faith is paradoxical. It is both conditioned and conditioning. Socially and psychologically, faith is conditioned. A child grows up in a religious home, church and community; he hears the Bible read; he inherits beliefs. These influences condition his faith, through the exercise of which he is "converted." Knudson holds that Christian theology is as much a source of Christian experience as Christian experience is a source of Christian theology. But it should be noted that in the broad view, it is the faith of the Bible writers, and in turn, the faith of the adult readers of the community, that created the faith of the child. The experiences of the Bible writers, in turn, were conditioned by faith. So the Bible is both a conditioner of faith and is conditioned by faith, as a total revelation experience of those who come to God by faith. Knudson sees this:

"Without belief there would probably be no religious experience"; and "There can be no true faith without revelation and no revelation without faith."¹

Faith is also both determed and free. For people are compelled to believe something, but free as to what to believe. "He that cometh to God must believe," that is if he chooses to know that God exists, but man is not forced to make this choice. Then faith is also paradoxical in appearing to be at the same time both rational and either non-rational or irrational. Perhaps this paradox can not be completely removed. Kierkegaard sees in the story of Abraham's attempted sacrifice of his son Isaac (requested by God) the crowning proof that faith is wholly irrational. Were it so, there would be no paradox at this point. The question enters also, to whom is faith irrational? To the one acquainted with God? Can it be supposed that "the Friend of God" considered the request of God an unreasonable or absurd request? There is no evidence of it; in fact, with no animal sacrifice in sight he declared, "God will provide," believing that if the worst came, God would raise Isaac from the dead.² To some, this is an irrational faith; to the author of the Epistle of Hebrews it is a rational faith; he considered it perfectly reasonable to trust God implicitly and finds evidence for it in this very record. There is a simple illustration of the paradoxical nature of faith, which at the same time illustrates the nature of faith, as a gift from God (as part of man's

¹ Knudson, VRE, 94; PTR, 165.
original equipment—the capacity to believe), as active (a gift to be exercised), necessary (as to reward), and a voluntary act (requiring the exercise of will-power). Christ once told a fisherman, "Let down your nets."¹ Having fished all night without success, he was no doubt wet, cold, tired, and discouraged. In some sense, therefore, experience, reason, and feelings were all against his letting down the nets, but yet, at the mere word of Christ, he did. How can this be explained? It is simply faith, confidence in a Person and in His words, in a Person who inspired confidence. Otto has shown the necessity of this rational, non-rational faith:

By the continual living activity of its non-rational elements, a religion is guarded from passing into 'rationalism.' By being steeped in and saturated with rational elements it is guarded from sinking into fanaticism or mere mysticality.²

So, although it may seem non-rational, or even irrational, "Πιστεύσας γὰρ ἂν προσέρχεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐκθέτοσιν αὐτῶν μὴ θαπτόντας γίνεται."³ This is just as logical as that the hypothesis of the scientist precedes the discovery or demonstration. The atheist who refuses the divine invitation to reason in the divine presence ("Come, now and let us reason together"),⁴ who folds his arms and sits down, saying, "Bring on your evidence, I'm waiting to be convinced," or, "If there be a God, let him prove his existence

2. Otto, IH, 146.  
to me, and then I'll believe," does not know the value of Kant's practical suggestion, "Postulate God," nor does he see that it should mean going out into life, impelled by an active faith to collect the evidence and be rewarded with knowledge. The divine method seems unreasonable in reversing the human "seeing is believing" into "believing is seeing." The idle unbeliever has not adjusted his sails to the heavenly breezes that bear men's boats into the Harbor of God. He does not have the attitude that is necessarily active and venturesome. On the other hand, many an adventurer who has gone out "by faith...not knowing whither he went," has returned, knowing where he has been.

f. The emotionally-satisfying character of faith

Finally, faith is emotionally satisfying. Often, we are not able to give reasons for a belief that we feel is true:

'There is a pleasurable sense or feeling of repose, of inward stability, such as comes from the resolution of difficulties, the demolition of obstacles, the harmonizing of conflicting elements' 

...Bagehot was so impressed with the emotional content of belief that he called belief the emotion of conviction.²

It becomes more than psychological certainty when faith merges into knowledge. Kant implicitly recognized this connection of belief and knowledge in his use of the word Ueberredung, which could rest on either subjective or objective grounds.³

It is seen also in the testimony of a great saint:

1. Heb. 11:8
2. Hickman, IPR, 444.
"Oida yap εἰ τειστευίσα, καὶ πεί-
πειομάλ ὅτι νυνᾶς ἐστὶν τὴν
τάρανη κάν μου φυλάξαν..." 1

Here is a view of faith, past, present, and future, and proof that belief does not cease when it merges into knowledge; "have believed" and "am persuaded" are perfect tenses, indicating that the belief and persuasion of the past had not ceased, but were still in operation when Paul wrote these words in a state of knowledge.

Thus Kant reached the high point of his argument on the moral certainty of the existence of God in what he said and implied about faith, for as has been seen, faith is active, necessary, primary, reasonable (though paradoxical), and emotionally satisfying, leading into the immediate presence of God, and mingling without losing its identity, with knowledge, and perhaps even with certainty. Thus, the consideration of faith has been a natural transition from the subject of moral or practical certainty to the subject now to be discussed—experiential certainty, in which a higher degree of both certainty and certitude will be sought.

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1. II Tim. 1:12 (writer's underscoring).
CHAPTER III
EXPERIENTIAL CERTAINTY

I. Relation of experiential certainty to theoretical certainty and practical certainty

1. Definition: Ueberzeugung.-- Experiential certainty is conviction, predominantly psychological which, in contrast to both the other certainties, depends upon concrete religious experience. As Ueberzeugung, "die subjective Zulänglichkeit für mich selbst," it stands off from Kant's Meinung ("opinion", theoretical), Glauben ("belief", moral or practical), and Wissen, "die objective Gewissheit (für Jedermann)," (to be used later in the correlation of logical and psychological certainties).¹

2. Preliminary comparison of the three methods of arriving at certainty

In a preliminary comparison of the three methods of arriving at certainty is seen the making good, in part, by the experiential, or experimental, method, of the deficiencies of the theoretical and the practical methods. For Kant's pure reason, even when supplemented by his practical reason, was still not whole reason, permitting no play of reason upon religious experience, and involving the incongruity of trying to arrive at knowledge of a religious object through other than religious experience; for moral experience, contrary to Kantian usage, is not strictly religious experience.

¹ Kant, KrV, B 850.
Likewise, in the first two methods, the faith employed was a part faith, cut short in its activity and development either by its restriction to experience of the idea of God or the works of God (in the traditional theistic arguments) instead of being permitted to go on to an experience of God Himself, or by its limitation to a make-believe hypothesis, condemned before-hand to remain unverified, as dealing with a transcendental object, which, according to Kant, cannot be known.

Thus, although Kant's purpose was to save men from skepticism and agnosticism, his limitations upon experience, his doctrine of the noumena, and his impractical, make-believe argument (as founded upon make-believe definitions, and a make-believe hypothesis, that may easily cause the will-to-believe to degenerate into the will-to-make-believe, and faith into hypocrisy), leave his followers perilously close to both skepticism and agnosticism. In fact, Dotterer goes so far as to call Kant's system "Agnostic Realism."¹

In this chapter also will be seen the fulfilment of the high ideal of "practical reason" (Kant's "moral certainty") in a truly "practical" certainty, i.e. experiential certainty; for "in its proper sense, experiment is 'practical'...of the essence of science...a method of discovery of truth...by practical activity", "an ounce of fact" being worth "a ton of theory."² The experience favored will be whole experience.

¹ Dotterer, Art. (1938), 607; see Bennett, DRK, 17.
II. Contemporary emphasis on religious experience

1. An age-old appeal

The contemporary emphasis on religious experience is nothing new; as an appeal to experience in general it is age-old, going back to the dawn of philosophy, although it is Aristotle who stands out prominently; he taught that the first principles of philosophy are derived from experience.¹ As a distinctive religious appeal, it goes back to Job, who declared: "I will lay mine hand upon my mouth; I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye seeth Thee."² This appeal "as affording a more trustworthy foundation for belief than assent to or demonstration of theological propositions has...been a perennial feature of religious history."³ For even during the "dark ages" the mystics kept religious experience aglow, even as "at the dawn of modern philosophy" Berkeley waged war on over-abstraction, and pled for experience.⁴

2. Stimulation by Wesley, Schleiermacher and modern science

The appeal to religious experience was stimulated by John Wesley, Friedrich Schleiermacher and modern science. Ferre, declaring that "no other teacher of the Christian Church" has ever emphasized experience for the "discerning and confessing" of the truth-values of Christianity as did John Wesley, calls attention to Professor Cell's claim that the reference to experience became central in Methodism: "In fact, the appeal to

¹. See Aristotle, in McKeon, BWA, 218, 689-690; Buckham, IW, 81.
³. Martin, EPR, 4-5.
⁴. Buckham, IW, 81; see Berkeley, TD, 98-101, 134.
experience is so pervasive and powerful as to determine its historic individuality.¹ Case thinks that Hume and Wesley had much in common, the former "in deriving knowledge from subjective experience," the latter "in making the emotionally satisfying the ultimate test of convictions."²

Case probably had in mind some such statement of Hume as the following: "All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same."³ To determine whether the ideas remain fixed, however, necessitated an appeal to experience. To say that Wesley made "the emotionally satisfying the ultimate test of convictions" is to ignore the well-known fact that he made a three-fold appeal—to Scripture, to reason, and to experience. He did emphasize experience, finding certitude in it:

The soul as intimately and evidently perceives when it loves, delights, and rejoices in God as when it loves and delights in anything on earth. And it has no more doubt whether it loves, delights, and rejoices or no, than whether it exists or no...an inward proof which is nothing short of self evidence.⁴

Schleiermacher, the father of modern theology, was also a large contributor to the swing from rationalism to empiricism in religion.⁵ Holding that theology is not called upon to prove the existence of God, since there is a universal feeling of absolute dependence upon God,⁶ he declares that

1. Ferre in Benjamin, Art. (1939), 517.
2. Case, HCD, 163; see Hume, ET, 548.
4. Wesley, SS0, I, 88.
5. Schleiermacher, UR, 15, 17, 34.
this God-consciousness in man becomes stimulated by Christ, fellowship with Him being the result of the experience of regeneration. Thus for Schleiermacher, theology was not speculative but descriptive, a setting forth of "the contents of the religious consciousness." Christian theology is "not a system of metaphysics, or an effort to explain the world of man and nature, but a formulation of truths given in the religious experience" of the theologian. But Schleiermacher went further than Wesley in his appeal to experience, in making it the final court of appeal, the seat of religious authority. "As time went on...the feeling of Schleiermacher came into greater prominence." Sheen points out that Sabatier defined religious experience for modern times by declaring that moral and religious truths are known only by a subjective act.

The progress of modern science has also resulted in a greater emphasis upon religious experience, breaking down old lines of conflict between rationalism and empiricism, until today it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a non-empirical philosopher. There is an almost universal appeal to experience, in one degree or another, so that the problem is to find out just how empirical one is. This strong empirical trend can be traced back to Locke and his shifting of interest from subject-matter to scientific method.

5. Sheen, PR, 42-43.
3. General usage of "experience" and "religious experience"

a. "Experience".--In contrast to Kant's narrow view of experience as a consciousness of objects through sense-perceptions, the general usage of "experience" today is marked by breadth. Experience is our entire conscious life, "what is immediately present in the complex, changing field of attention of some particular conscious self either at the focus or in the fringe," "the very stuff of reality." Buckham, considering experience as broad as life itself, seems to warn against making experience per se identical with consciousness, knowledge, pure emotion, givenness or feeling in the sense of non-mental agitation, as:"experience-feeling is cognitive feeling, intuitive feeling, value-feeling." Dewey and Mead are explicit in considering both subjective and objective aspects of experience, as mutually continuous in "one sphere of existence or reality" so that "any question of the possibility of knowledge—knowledge of the subject by the object—is simply nonsense." Brotherston, commenting upon this making of experience antecedent to knowledge, this "heavy-weighing of the object" that threatens the existence of the subjective aspect, sees the remedy in the recognition of the "antecedent unity of subject and object in primal feeling." Ward, also with breadth of vision, notes that any one object is "only a part of a 'presentational continuum.'" Bertocci

1. Brightman, PR, 9, 322; Art. (1929), 560; see RV, 165; King, BB, 317.
2. Buckham, IW, 84-86; see Moore, Art. (1902), 82; Martin, EPR, 114.
observes that Ward has a conception of the complex unity of the subject, and that experience, thus, "cannot without mutilation be resolved into three departments," cognitive, theoretical and practical.\(^1\) This brings out an emphasis very common today—the duality of subject and object in the unity of experience. In this view, while the relations of subject and object are more intimate than is usually the case in epistemological dualism, subject and object are not made numerically one. There is no indication here that Dewey, Mead, Brotherston, and Ward are epistemological monists. Ward, with others, holds that "experience does not begin with a disconnected manifold,"\(^2\) and that the subject has selective powers in experience, justifying Bertocci in his conclusion that for Ward, "experience is the process of becoming expert by experiment,"\(^3\) i.e. in an adjustment to the whole environment by the whole self. Ward enlarges his view to include the "result of intersubjective intercourse ...experience with a capital E, the common empirical knowledge of the race."\(^4\)

In this sketch of a cross-section of opinion on the nature of experience is seen diversity due to different emphasis (especially on subject and object), but no contradiction, as the extremes can be brought together by balancing the just claims of both subjective and objective aspects of experience in the suggested concept of the unity of experience. This has an

\(^{1}\) Bertocci, EAG, 97; see Ward, NA, II, 134-135.  
\(^{2}\) Ward, NA, II, 97.  
\(^{3}\) Bertocci, EAG, 96-97.  
\(^{4}\) Ward, NA, II, 152.
important bearing on the possibility of knowledge of God (as of any knowledge), and the extension of experience to the empirical knowledge of the race is a corrective of possible error in the private experience of God (as of all private experience).

b. "Religious experience"

"Religious experience" as used in this dissertation is that distinctive personal experience, that direct awareness of God, which was championed by William James and others who followed him, who turning from ratiocination as "a relatively superficial and unreal path to deity," consider what religion has specifically to report, the divine being viewed as always present, in relations of actual "give and take."¹

Buckham begins with the "indubitable experience of the reality of selves," raises the question whether the personal realm can be confined to human persons, and concludes that it must include One above all the rest.² Buckham thus elevates religious experience to the level of definite interpersonal relations. This is true also of Brightman.³

Drawing a distinction between the idea and the reality of God, which the older philosophers often ignored in the reverence of "a system of proofs as being God Himself, or as revealing God, or...constituting values which were the supreme ends of life—ends in themselves,"⁴ condemning those who set

1. James, VRE, 448, 454-455; see Broad, Art. (1926), 85.  
2. Buckham, IW, 164.  
3. See Martin, EPR, 34; Brightman, PR, 415; Art. (1929), 557; Ferm, CAT, 61-63.  
4. Wieman, Art. (1931), 4; see Day, GIU, 146.
religious experience apart from the rest of life (a condemnation of only a narrow mysticism), and holding that we must have both a scientific method and mysticism for our knowledge of God, Wieman contends for distinctive religious experience in terms of beauty and love.

When this reality lays hold on a man, and a man gives himself to this reality, the transaction occurs at levels far deeper than any intellectual formula....It is caused by the living God and the living man meeting.....It can be compared to love between human persons.¹

Finally, Hocking champions an individual, selective experience of God, warning against mere dependence upon tradition for ideas of God, on the ground that if God "spoke in times past unto the fathers by the prophets," He can speak to us, for in fundamentally that same manner is God known by all God-knowing men at all times."²

The one who desires to be both a true rationalist and a true empiricist, and thus, to promote the unification of rationalism and empiricism, would not, on general principles, object to a broader view of religious experience. There can be no objection to the breadth of an overflowing river with its ill-defined boundaries—until definiteness, depth and power are needed. So without denying that a man's vision of a sunset, under certain conditions,(as for instance, when "taken in its relation" to God),³ may be a religious experience, distinctive religious experience at its best, i.e.

¹. Wieman, Art. (1944), 57; see RESM, 84, 204, 214, 15-16,
². Hocking, MGHE, 229-230.
³. Brightman, PR, 415.
conditioned, dynamic, direct, interpersonal Christian experience will be placed in the foreground. Such a direct spiritual vision of God is so definite that the qualifying words "taken in its relation to God" are superfluous. General religious experience, in this view, will serve as a background for coherence purposes; for coherence can be secured if nothing inharmonious with the facts of life as a whole are allowed entrance into the discussion, even though all the facts of life are not considered. And religious experience "at its best" would include all values present in such experience on all lower levels.

4. Transformation of the traditional theistic arguments into empirical "proofs"

Further evidence of the contemporary interest in religious experience is seen in the transformation of the traditional theistic arguments into empirical "proofs".

a) Ontological argument.—Considering the ontological argument in its older form as "the most glaring instance on record of the common fallacy of begging the question," and agreeing with Hooking that no theistic proof can be deductive, D. C. Macintosh, a religious realist, views the ontological argument in its true form as a report of experience:

There are some ideas which we never could have had without first having had an experience of the realities of which they are ideas. In such cases one can pass immediately, without doubt or difficulty, from the idea of an affirmation of the existence to that of which it is an idea. Such an idea is that of Absolute Reality as a Whole...
is in the experience that the proof of the existence is to be found.¹

Professor Hooking, an idealist, also has revised the ontological "proof". Recognizing that idealism is confronted with the pragmatic principle, and thus, with "the substantial values of orthodoxy," he pleads for a return to existential thinking:

The doctrine of hell made religion at one time a matter of first rate importance: getting your soul saved made a difference in your empirical destiny. If your idealism wipes out your fear of hell, and with it all sense of infinite risk in the conduct of life, your idealism has played you false. Truth must be transformed; but the transformation of truth must be marked by a conservation of power.²

Consistently with this, Hooking modernizes the ontological argument. It is not enough, he declares, for God to be found at the level of thought; He must be found at the level of sensation also. The old argument had "put the cart before the horse." "My real must already be given in order that my idea may be found real....If my idea of God is real, it is real in experience."³ Revised, then, the argument is: "I have an idea of God, therefore, I have an experience of God."⁴

Then Hooking passes from mind and nature to mind:

Reality can only be proved by the ontological argument; and conversely, the ontological argument can only be applied to reality. But in so far as reality dwells in Self, or Other Mind, in Nature, an ontological argument may be stated in proof of their existence. Thus the Cartesian certitude may

with greater validity be put in the form: I think myself, therefore, I exist, or I have an idea of self, Self exists.¹

Hocking sees an element of surprise in this: looking for man, we come unexpectedly upon God. The way to man is via God, the God of nature through which man is divinely created.²

For Hocking, the object of certain knowledge is three-fold—Self, Nature, and Other Mind; and God, the appropriate object of ontological proof, includes these three:

Thus it is that idea may give back the reality of which idea is forever robbing us: for while idea is the greatest enemy of the actual, it is only through idea that idea can be held firmly to its compelling and controlling object, the real as found in experience.³

So, finding God as a necessary object of experience, Hocking asks what other proof there is of the existence of any being, "than to find, or demonstrate that being in experience? For my power of recognizing existence is summed up in the word 'experience.'"⁴ Not enough detail has been presented to attempt any vindication of the claim here to demonstration; but the purpose of showing Hocking's part in the reconstruction of the old theistic arguments (which effort itself is evidence of the present emphasis upon religious experience), has been accomplished.⁵

b) Cosmological argument.—Macintosh has revised also the cosmological argument. Against Kant, he sees in it no unjustifiable use of causality, for men, including Kant himself,

1. Hocking, MGHE, 314; see Royce, OG, 43-44.
3. Hocking, MGHE, 316; see 315.
5. See also Jarrett-Kerr, Art. (1947), 324-325, on Marcel (Catholic), EA.
apply it beyond the reach of direct experience. But with Kant, Macintosh holds that the old argument could not tell us that the first cause inferred was "what we mean by God":

We are still upon the ground of Agnosticism.

...There is a causal argument, however, which does reach to the God of religion as the ultimate cause.1

He is referring to the argument from individual religious experience.

c) Teleological argument.--Because of the demand today for teleological explanation of the facts of existence, there has been a revival of the old teleological argument, but in revised forms. Field considers that the appeal to purpose as a satisfactory principle of explanation has considerable force. He believes that it points "in the direction of a God or a Highest Purpose."2

Referring to the detraction which teleological explanation suffered at the hands of Kant and Darwin, Macintosh declares that there is a teleological argument which is valid--an empirical one--"the argument from the practical experience of spiritual 'salvation'"3:

Through a critical and sufficiently sympathetic study of the history of practical religious experience there arises an understanding of what it is that the religious Object really can be depended upon to produce, the religious Object being defined as that Factor in human experience which produces, on occasion of man's continued right relation, a definite and qualitatively predictable result.4

1. Macintosh, TES, 95.
2. Field, Art. (1928), 325; see 332-333.
3. Macintosh, TES, 97.
4. Macintosh, TES, 97.
Henry N. Wieman is known as a naturalistic theist or a scientific empiricist. Martin thinks that Wieman's argument for God is a form of the ontological modified by the teleological argument: "He would make the question of 'proof' of God's existence irrelevant by definition, in terms of 'the best there is or can be', or 'that upon which life depends for enhancement and support.'"1 But Wieman is not clear. While, however, he appears to repudiate the whole approach to religion by way of religious experience, he has declared that if God is not an object of sensuous experience, He is a system of concepts. But the latter he denies in saying that God is "not a logico-mathematical entity,"2 adding: "But if He be an object of acquaintance, the system of concepts refers to certain experiences, while if He be not an object of sense experience, He cannot be scientifically known."3

5. Reconstruction of the moral argument into experiential form

Still further evidence of the contemporary interest in religious experience is found in the reconstruction of the moral argument into experiential form. Speaking of the dead-end that one comes upon in going from ends in nature to the end of nature, Outler finds a way out, i.e. "to look away from nature to our own inner personal experience," considering the "meaning of the universal and unavoidable sense of obligation

1. Martin, EPR, 106.  
2. Wieman, RESM, 28, 29; see Art. (1944), 57-58.  
3. Wieman, RESM, 28; vide supra, 202-203.
and right and wrong," for if our moral convictions are not illusory, "we shall have to infer a supreme moral intelligence, whose purpose is to create and sustain the moral order and its values." It can be seen at once that this has its rise in Kant's "practical reason." But this leads beyond mere acceptance of Theism:

It leads to a belief in a Providence concerned with the destiny of every individual person, and to the conviction that behind the visible scene of the world's history lies an unseen secret drama of the dealings of God with the individual soul.

What is implied in Kant is brought out in Pragmatism and Theism. Macintosh states the ground for the pragmatist's postulate of God's existence:

His existence or belief in His existence is morally necessary; not simply, as Kant seems to have felt, to guarantee immortality and the adequate happiness of the virtuous in a future life, but rather for the gaining of that special experience of deliverance, of liberation, of moral up-lift through religious dependence, which in the language of moral religion itself is called 'salvation'. It is thus the feeling that there ought to be a God, transformed by the 'will to believe' into the assertion that there must be, and is, a God.

As the untransformed moral argument is only an unverified hypothesis, verification must come through the revelation of God in the experience of salvation.

Sorley, a theist, does not state the problem as did the old theists, "Does God exist?"; he asks, "How is the universe

1. Outler, Art. (1947), 92; see Rashdall, PR, 62-63, 74, 76.
3. Macintosh, TES, 94.
to be understood and interpreted?"  

The moral order is an expression of the divine nature, and physical nature is "the medium for the production and perfection of goodness in finite minds."  

God is the "final home of values." He wrote *Moral Values and the Idea of God* in criticism of Höffding's *The Philosophy of Religion*. The latter had based his position on Kant's treatment of value apart from that of knowledge, and had viewed the conservation of value as "the characteristic axiom of religion," analogous to the axiom of causality, both being constant in changes. But Sorley goes further. If values are conserved, it must be by something in the order of cosmic forces "favorable or sympathetic to these values." That is: "It is impossible to hold as Höffding does to the faith in the conservation of value, and to justify this belief without being led on to postulate a power and will that conserves them."  

Tennant, also a theist, considering that the fallacy of Kant's moral argument was a confusion of the two senses of "experience," sees no necessary connection between the existence of ideas in a mind with the existence of actual beings, as "ideals and ideas may thus exist without even becoming valid," to say nothing of becoming real. If an idea has not first come from a perception, there is no direct passage to its counterpart. With Pringle-Pattison, Tennant views man as a part of nature, so much so that the latter can not be explained as a

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1. Sorley, MVIG, 309.  
2. Sorley, MVIG, 467; see Galloway, TPR, 392.  
5. Sorley, MVIG, 170-171, 173; see 351.  
6. See Tennant, PT, II, 98.
whole without taking man and his moral values into considera-
tion, as "organic to the world." Tennant guards his words
here; he does not mean that man is an emergent product of cos-
mic evolution, but rather that man is "of one piece with
nature."¹

Nature, then, has produced moral beings, is
instrumental to moral life, and, therefore,
amentable to 'instrumental' moral valuation, and
is relatively modifiable by operative moral
ideas,—or rather, by moral agents pursuing
ideals.²

Thus, causal explanation and teleological explanation
are co-partners: "The imperative of duty can be categorical
without being literally absolute, and without directly bring-
ing us into close relation with the central truth of existen-
tial kind, about the universe."³ The revised moral argument
lies in the general direction of the argument from religious
experience.

III. Certainty in immediate religious experience

1. Meanings of "immediate."--The first requisite in a
discussion of certainty in immediate religious experience is
the determination of the meaning of "immediate." This is not
easy due to the diverse uses of the term, but out of this
divergence arises a general agreement on three aspects of the
term.

The first meaning of "immediate" is "not inferred,"
referring to the datum of knowledge. This is implicit in

¹. Tennant, PT, II, 100-101.
². Tennant, PT, II, 103.
³. Tennant, PT, II, 98.
Russell's use of the term. It is more or less certain experience; for while all data, according to Russell have some uncertainty; and should, therefore, if possible, be referred to other data, yet, "unless these other data had some degree of independent credibility, they would not confirm the original data."¹ So what is taken as a premise must be viewed as undeniable, clearly and distinctly "here and now." "When you pass from the vague to the precise by...analysis and reflection...you always run a certain risk of error."² In contrast to beliefs, errors in facts are impossible.³

Agreeing with Russell that "immediacy" is freedom from the mediation of reflection are Brotherston (holding direct contact with reality),⁴ Whitehead and Dewey, following Bradley in his criticism of intellectualism (ultimates being what are found in immediate experience "if this experience were stripped of all interpretation"),⁵ Tennant (perception having "a foot in both worlds, the subjective and objective"),⁶ Boodin ("experience, the stuff revealed in our immediate feelings and sensations, the starting point of all investigations, "immediate luminosity" and "felt consistency"),⁷ Royce (a direct experience of time),⁸ Höffding (the illusory only arising

"through a false causal explanation which is confounded with

1. Russell, INT, 155.
5. Mack, AIE, 28; see 9, 60.
7. Boodin, RJ, 15; see vii; Art.(1934), 164.
8. Royce, WI, II, 113; see 149.
immediate observation"),¹ Lossky and Macintosh (direct, non-inferential awareness in direct conscious and cognitive relation),² Lowenberg and Tollman ("the immediately given pre-analytical complex"),³ Rashdall (immediate judgments about good and evil "divinely implanted"),⁴ Brightman (immediate reference to the self, the only "given"),⁵ and Balfour, Procter and Wieman.⁶ No philosophers appear to oppose this general view of immediacy, except the Neo-Thomists; to them it is "out of this world," i.e. the beatific vision.⁷

Merging into the meaning of "immediate" as "not-inferred" is "intuitive" the self-evident, the knowledge by acquaintance. John Grote distinguished knowledge by acquaintance from knowledge by judgment:

In all philosophy, this division has been more or less recognized, and the two kinds of knowledge have been called, the one intuitive or immediate, the other mediate, conceptual, symbolic, representative, and by various other names.⁸

He goes on to use "intuitive" and "immediate thought" in the sense of knowledge by acquaintance. For him, knowledge by judgment, on the other hand, is not "of a thing but about it."⁹

Moore shows that in one sense all experience is immediate:

Every item in the passing show of conscious process may be grasped, enjoyed, or lived through

simply for what it is in itself. This is immediacy in its primary and positive significance. Usually, of course, we take the items of our experience not simply for what they are in themselves, but in their meanings and connections....The objects of our immediate experience...take on new meaning as they acquire connections in experience.1

These new connections enrich the content of immediate experience. Bergson, although he made intuition and intellectual analysis complementary, made them also distinct, somewhat like the difference between knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge by description, intuition for Bergson being a method requiring "uninterrupted contact with reality," such as the mystical experience.2

Holding to the intuitive vision, Hartshorne, however, limits it to "a tiny circle of facts," the greater range of reliability of human knowledge being due to "imaginative and inferential leaps...beyond immediacy."3

Oliver Martin lists the three factors of perceptual knowledge as: "1) the given element, that which is intuitively felt; 2) the appearance, i.e. what an object or thing appears to be; and 3) what we consciously and reflectively take it...to be."4 By the first, Martin means the residue "when on analysis all 'mental' elements have been abstracted...the vague sense of the world pressing in upon us....The given is always innocent of error...immediate and certain."5

While as parts of conscious experience all three of these

5. Martin, Art.(1938), 337.
elements may be regarded as immediate, yet the last element being reflective, is not immediate in the usual sense of the term.¹

Dewey also limits the intuitive grasp by warning that often, "immediate knowledge" is confused with knowledge from previous mediation.²

Russell makes a self-evident truth in its absolute sense depend upon "acquaintance with the fact which corresponds to the truth."³ Brightman traces the terms "acquaintance" and "description" in the discussion of immediate experience back to John Grote. These terms were later utilized by James, Russell, Sorley and others.⁴ Wieman declares that it was James who coined the phrases.⁵ At any rate, it is with Russell that the terms are usually associated, for the principle of acquaintance (empiricism) is at the center of his thought, a principle which Sellers traces back to Locke and Aristotle, but applied now to particulars as well as to universals.⁶

Russell defines his position:

We have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or of any knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of my table, I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table—its color, shape, hard­ness, smoothness, etc. All these are things of which I am immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching my table.⁷

¹ Vide supra, 211-213.
² Dewey, LOG, 144.
³ Russell, PP, 12.22
⁴ Brightman, ITP, 83, footnote.
⁵ Wieman, RESM, 25.
⁶ Sellers, Art.(1949), 496.
⁷ Russell, PP, 73.
He makes it clear that our knowledge of the table as a physical object is not direct knowledge, but knowledge by description, involving "some knowledge of truths as its source and ground."¹ "The particular shade of color that I am seeing may have many things said about it....But such statements though they make me know truths about the color, do not make me know the color itself any better than I did before."²

With others already mentioned, Russell lays down knowledge by acquaintance as the foundation of all knowledge.³ The subjective aspects are sense-data, introspection, contents of consciousness, universals, and even some cases of memory, as:

This immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past: without it there could be no knowledge of the past by inference, since we should never know that there was anything past to be inferred.⁴

Brightman, in his favorable comment on Russell's illustration of color perception, writes:

If I am acquainted with the color yellow, I may describe the circumstances under which anyone may have an acquaintance with yellow, but I cannot describe yellow. The only reason that anyone understands yellow is that he has, or has had, an acquaintance with something yellow. Acquaintance, then, is direct or immediate or intuitive knowledge; description is indirect or mediate or inferential. My own present consciousness I am acquainted with.⁵

In so far as memory may be considered a part of present consciousness, there would be no disagreement between Russell and Brightman here on its immediacy. Tennant also uses

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"acquaintance" for immediate knowledge.\textsuperscript{1}

"Instantaneous" is the third meaning of "immediate."

This meaning, although not exactly descriptive, is in general philosophical use. Tennant, for instance, agrees with Russell in his conception of immediacy in this sense—the photographic flash. It is Brightman's "mystical moment" in which there is "an intuitive apprehension of God," logical certainty applying "only to present experience while it is present," the "Situation Experienced" in contrast to the "Situation Believed-in," the former being "actually present in consciousness," and "the only basis we have for any knowledge, belief, faith, truth, or error."\textsuperscript{2}

It is the psychological moment rather than the mathematical instant, the former having content as the latter cannot have; it is the content that distinguishes it from other moments.\textsuperscript{3}

James and Mead called it the "specious present," assigning it no arbitrary length. It is not a mathematical point, not even a moving point; it is rather a line or "a field of vision with fixed limits across which a panorama moves."\textsuperscript{4}

It is the moment of immediate experience upon which all mediate knowledge depends, "the ground of all implications, inferences, assumptions whatever," through whose narrow portals the valid enters human consciousness.\textsuperscript{5}

So while the immediate is called "instantaneous," it is long enough, has to be long enough, "for the genuine

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Tennant, PT, II, 98.
\item 2. Brightman, PR, 169, 166, 347.
\item 3. See Carr, Art.(1916), 1.
\item 4. Carr, Art.(1916), 11; see Werkmeister, HPI, 538.
\item 5. Carr, Art.(1916), 17; see Royce, WI, I, 258-257.
\end{itemize}
apprehension of the data of direct experience, because otherwise there would be no such thing as direct experience of which anyone could be aware.¹ Lewis calls it the "epistemological present."

2. Examination of denial
   a. On general grounds: doctrine of probability
      1) Uncertainty concerning the doctrine of uncertainty

      As might be expected in any consideration of the denial of certainty in religious experience, particularly in its general aspect—the doctrine of probability—there is much uncertainty. This arises from at least three sources: different motives, different views, and inconsistency.

      Without going into detail, it is noted that different motives prompt the adoption of the doctrine of probability: to avoid rationalistic dogmatism, to favor agnosticism, to test hypotheses, to inoculate against skepticism, and to provide an answer to the question, "How true is knowledge?"²

      The lack of agreement on the subject of probability³ is witnessed by the different views on it, particularly on the following question: is probability objective (relation between events) or subjective (relation between beliefs or propositions)? Donald Williams and Hans Reichenbach, for instance, favor the former,⁴ while Tennant and Keynes adopt the latter, Tennant, however, viewing probability as originally and essentially a

1. Lewis, AKV, 331.
2. Nolting, CTP, 122.
3. Nolting, CTP, 51; see Balfour, TH, 178.

4. See Williams, Art. (1945), 67-68; Nolting, CTP, 79.
"characteristic of beliefs rather than of propositions."¹

One aspect of the subjective view is the "frequency theory", originating evidently from games of chance and developed in mathematics. It was at this point that Kant clashed with Descartes, Kant holding that mathematical certainty could not be applied to philosophy, although in the pre-critical period, he granted that one can have certitude in the field of metaphysical knowledge of God.²

Another point of disagreement on the doctrine of probability is on the question whether certainty should be separated from truth or knowledge. Carnap holds the concept of "perfect knowledge", that is, "knowledge which cannot possibly be refuted or even weakened by any future experience," in contrast to "imperfect knowledge" or knowledge "which has only a certain degree of certainty, not absolute certainty."³

Likewise, there is disagreement on the question of degrees of certainty, and whether certainty is merely normative or also descriptive. By implication, Butler was against degrees of certainty,⁴ as is also Nolting in his view of certainty as a limit or standard, for he held that while it is possible that our empirical judgments are absolutely true, we have no way of knowing it, as complete verification is impossible.⁵ On the other hand, Keynes views certainty as both

1. Tennant, PT, I, 278; see Keynes, TP, 3–5.
2. See Kant, UDQ, 284–294; KrV, B 741, B 754.
3. Carnap, Art.(1946), 599; see Kaufmann, Art.(1946), 603–604; see Boutroux, Art.(1916)², 605; Cook Wilson, SI, II, 569; Nolting, GTP, 3–4, 20–21, 26.
5. Nolting, GTP, 48, 49.
normative and descriptive.¹

2) Inconsistency in the denial of all certainty

Then, the denial of certainty in religious experience on the general basis of the doctrine of probability is further complicated by inconsistency, or at least by self-contradiction, on the part of the deniers of all certainty. This is seen first of all in the expression, "Probability is the guide of life,"² uttered sometimes with all the dogmatism of a divine pronouncement. Now while no objection can be raised to probability as a guide to life, the use of "the" in the expression constitutes a dogmatic denial of the existence of other guides of life.

It is supposed by some that scientists subscribe to this dogmatic form of the doctrine of probability, but they seem to hold that certainty is one of the guides of life. There appears to be no uncertainty in their statements concerning the destructive powers of the hydrogen bomb. Judged by their warnings, they are certain that one such bomb of a specified weight would destroy all forms of higher life over vast stretches of the surface of the earth. Thus, certainty, not probability, is what scientists are offering mankind as a "guide" to sustained "life" on the earth. It is hard even for a scientist to refute the logician—until the latter is brought down to earth and made to face concrete fact. To the objection of the logician that the validity of this scientific proposition has not

¹. Nolting, CTP, 70; see Keynes, TP, 10-11.
². Usually attributed to Bishop Butler, AR, 3, but probably a similar statement was uttered by Carneades before him.
been logically guaranteed, and cannot be completely or conclusively proved until all the evidence is in, i.e. until the last man has died, it may be replied that certainty does not require complete proof but only sufficient proof. Scientific certainty is not simply psychological, not simply Überzeugung, "subjective Zulänglichkeit für mich selbst," but also logical, i.e. Wissen, "objective Gewissheit (für Jedermann)."¹ The knowledge of the scientists concerning the atomic bomb has become public knowledge, a matter of race Experience. "It is knowledge which can be verified by anyone who will fulfill the requisite conditions."²

There is another way by which the doubting logician may become certain that one blast of the atomic bomb can prove its effectiveness and its destructive power, and that the conditions of the first explosion can be reduplicated closely enough to produce the same results, and that is by taking his stand near the place of the next test.

Can there be any reasonable doubt that while there may be a gap between the theory and practice of the logician, which in this case undoubtedly would amount to inconsistency if he were unwilling to make this personal test, that there is no gap between the theory and practice of the scientist, and in the case of a show-down, as above, that there is no actual gap between the theory of the scientist and the

¹. Vide supra, 195.  ². Werkmeister, HPI, 169.
practice of the logician, that is, unless the latter is stark mad? The logician knows that the theory of the scientist concerning even the unexploded hydrogen bomb is based upon objective evidence, "objective" in the double sense of not being demonstrated in the mind of one person, but in scientific laboratories by several persons. Here is "objective evidence and certitude...on this moon-lit and dream-visited planet,"¹ evidence worked out in the sunshine and the light of the thoroughly awakened state. And is there any reasonable doubt that these scientists would rather work with the "very fine ideals of objective evidence and certitude" than "play" with atom and hydrogen bombs, or with the finely-spun logical theory that the scientific hypotheses involved have not been perfectly demonstrated? And this certitude or certainty, although very practical is not "practical" in the Kantian sense or in the sense that it is incomplete. For it is not divorced from life, having been worked out in the laboratory, and known to be workable in every-day life.

It is at this point that the Kantian distinction between "theoretical" and "practical" reason is seen to break down. Unless it is made to mean that there are actually two reasons, it is unobjectionable in the sense of holding as reasonable that which can not be demonstrated on objective grounds but which is still satisfying on subjective grounds;

¹ See James, WB, 14.
but it breaks down at the point where objective, concrete evidence is presented to reason, for then theoretical reason either ceases to remain theoretical (i.e. purely abstract and speculative) face to face with objective, concrete facts, or it ceases to remain reason in the refusal to consider such evidence. On the other hand, practical reason ceases to remain either practical or reasonable by rejecting this evidence, and by refusing to apply it to life if it can be made to work. Reason can not be torn apart.

Then, there is inconsistency in the use of "certainty" and "certainly" in the denial of all certainty.\(^1\) The one who is quoted so often as being against all certainty was not only dogmatic on it, as has been shown,\(^2\) but he was also self-contradictory, for he also declared: "However, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of evidence."\(^3\) Dogmatism might be expected and excused on the part of the believer in the possibility of certainty in some beliefs; but of all people the denier of all certainty would not be expected to be certain that there is no certainty, or even to use the term "certainly." If Bishop Butler is to be taken as denying logical certainty, there is inconsistency here, for above he did not say, "I am certain" (certitude), but "It is certain." He did not define what he meant by the term "certainty", probably not detecting any lurking ambiguity in it.\(^4\) Consequently, to

\(^1\) Vide supra, 220.
\(^2\) Vide supra, 219.
\(^3\) Butler, AR, 351-352 (under-scoring is the present writer's); see Wolf, Art. (1913), 329.
\(^4\) Balfour, TH, 178.
quote him as an authority for the fact that there is no certainty of any kind, or even that there is no logical certainty, is but to add a voice to the din and confusion on the subject.

3) Gradually diminishing vigor of assertion of probability

Consequent upon this lack of consistency and clarity, there is a gradually diminishing vigor of assertion of probability. This is seen, for instance, in the qualifications of the denial of certainty. In fact, long ago Bishop Butler qualified his famous statement with these significant words: "where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had." He also said that "this alleged doubtfulness concerning religious matters 'may be men's own fault.'"

Many today, as for instance Tennant, while denying logical certainty, hold to certitude respecting basic postulates so likely to be true that a scientist "would stake his life on them." Brightman, in accord with this position as against Wieman and Knudson, does not apply the denial of certainty to immediate experience, i.e. to any conscious state at a given moment of the self. For Brightman, "this datum self, this present experience is the only indubitable fact we have." Although God thus is not viewed as a datum, in answer to Professor Lewis, Brightman denies that he would deprive the soul

2. Butler, AR, 351.
3. Tennant, PF, I, 278, 282-283.
of its certainty of faith, but rather asserts that he accepts the formula of Karl Gross—"theoretical relativism, practical absolutism."¹ There is no conflict here between certainty concerning the self and certainty concerning its states, as Brightman (and rightly in the opinion of the writer) does not distinguish between the self and its activity.² He declares that "it may be a question whether the object of consciousness is given in the same sense in which the activity is given," as "in all experience, there is, indeed, reference to an object," yet agreeing with Descartes that "while there can be no doubt about the act of referring (the cognito), "there is always some doubt about the accuracy of the description of the object."³ Of course, description is not a part of immediate experience. Without pausing to consider the objection that is raised to the restriction of the term "experience" to consciousness, thus seemingly excluding the object,⁴ it may be noted that Brightman has extended his conception of certainty to apply to present experience while it is present," thus making room for the certitude of the mystical moment, mysticism standing for "an immediate consciousness of God," an "actual contact with the real."⁵

Donald C. Williams also qualifies the doctrine of probability: "Most of our beliefs, including most of our philosophical beliefs, are held not with a warrant of demonstrative certainty."⁶

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¹ Brightman, Art. (1932), 142.
² Brightman, Art. (1948), 295.
⁴ See Martin, EPR, 32-33; Brightman, PR, 413.
⁵ Brightman, PR, 432, 433.
⁶ Williams, Art. (1946), 619.
Tennant also, unable to see why phenomena ("appearings") should be viewed as veilings, and holding to the possibility of a "rapport" between subject and object, denies that all knowledge is relative in the sense of "comparative".¹ Dr. DeWolf, writes: "It must be freely admitted that absolute certainty, regarding most matters of importance at least, is beyond the reach of human reason."²

Today there is a decline in the force and scope of assertions of mere probability, a doctrine which used to be accepted in some quarters as certain, passing as "legal tender."³

b. On particular grounds

1) Denial of direct or unmediated apprehension of God

Then there is a denial of certainty on particular as well as on general grounds, as, first of all, the denial of direct apprehension of God. Contending that all experience is interpreted experience, and that man's mind is apt to err in interpretation, Knudson takes his stand on only a relative certainty in Christian experience.⁴ He questions the position of Rudolf Otto; in fact, the position of Knudson here is largely a questioning one:

It is by no means certain that there is such an original psychological datum as the numinous theory assumes....In any case it remains for the present undecided whether religious experience is ultimately perceptual or inferential. Even if religious experience be perceptual this fact does not establish its validity. Perception may

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¹. Tennant, PT, I, 252, 249; see Lewis, MWO, 154.
². DeWolf, RRR, 119.
⁴. See Knudson, DG, 102, 225-227; VRE, 28; Art. (1935), 449.
be deceptive, and to a large degree is such.... There may be no such divine object or objects we think we perceive.¹

In reply, it may be said that if religious experience is all inferential, i.e. mediate, there would be nothing to infer, and "mediate" loses its right to existence. Religious experience, if it were perceptual, would not of itself be validated by the perceptual element, but other factors might come to the aid of such validation. While perception is often deceptive, the very fact that Knudson has to qualify the statement by the words "to a large degree" indicates that man has learned to correct the false impressions and to make allowances for them. On the basis of perceptual deception there may be no external world, but no sensible person takes that bare possibility seriously. Knudson himself does not take it seriously:

Only through experience do we know what truly exists. Through it we have first-hand knowledge. If we experience a thing we are certain of it. Experience and it alone furnishes a valid basis for certainty....The empirical test is the only adequate test of truth.²

This viewpoint Knudson carries over to religious experience, referring to John Wesley's position that it is "the strongest of all arguments" and "the most infallible of all proofs."³ Then, later, Knudson admits (in agreement with many philosophers) that it is the mind that err in inference rather than that perception deceives.⁴ Strangely, too, he speaks of "the immediacy of perceptual knowledge" as relative. For after mind acts on

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1. Knudson, Art. (1935), 452; see VRE, 72.
perception, it ceases to be an immediate experience. And on his basis, there can be no knowledge until the mind does so act. Yet he also says that perceptual knowledge "carries with it a sense of assurance and conviction or reality that the mediacy of inferential knowledge lacks or possesses in a less pronounced degree."¹

Garrigou-LaGrange believes that common sense ideas (including the idea of God) are the result of spontaneous reasoning, and that for justification the process must be made explicit by a post hoc demonstration.² But he qualifies this in two ways. In the first place, common sense beliefs are justified by the dogmatic formulas of the Catholic Church, and secondly, an idea of common sense (particularly, the idea of God) is a feeling of assurance, which Leonard Duce explains as a rational movement of mind not come to full consciousness, or as spontaneous reasoning.³ In LaGrange's belief in the ontological and immediate presence of God in the human soul, and in his (LaGrange's) denial of immediate awareness of God, Duce rightly sees a contradiction and a problem that LaGrange does not solve. But in putting cognition into feeling and in relating feeling and reason, LaGrange is heading toward a solution, which will come up later in connection with the polarity of reason and feeling. Then, it is strange that LaGrange did not see that in God's presence in the human soul is the illumination so necessary for the reception of religious knowledge,

¹ Knudson, VRE, 72.
² Duce, KGN, 210.
³ Duce, KGN, 199, 200.
the necessity and possibility of which LaGrange recognized—the "supernaturalizing" of the mind as a participation in Deity.¹ Thinking only of those who receive the supernatural revelation indirectly, and ignoring all alleged cases of revelation to and through men (a strange stand for a good Catholic), LaGrange declares that since there is no immediate conscious relation between man and God, revelation must be given indirectly.² Later, however, LaGrange admits that there is a vital and inspiring relation between the soul and Christ or God.³ And while it is true that for the one who receives the revelation from man this relation is, in part, a result of revelation; yet for the one who receives it from God, it is a revelation experience itself, and not of propositions merely, but of God Himself, as will be shown later.

2) Religious experience psychologically less compelling than sense experience

The second denial of certainty on particular grounds is that religious experience is psychologically less compelling than sense experience. This is the position of Knudson. Religious experience, he holds, is conditioned by subjective factors and by antecedent belief in a way and to a degree that sense experience is not.⁴ Aside from the fact that Knudson appears self-contradictory at this point,⁵ it will be interesting to note later the mystics' reaction to this opinion.

¹ Dupe, KGN, 317.
² Dupe, KGN, 331.
³ Dupe, KGN, 334.
⁴ See Knudson, Art. (1935), 452-453.
⁵ See Knudson, VRE, 60-66.
that religious experience is less certain (as psychologically less compelling) than sense experience. In a sense, all experience is immediate as ultimately conscious experience.\(^1\)

But the question to come up later is whether the conscious experience of an external physical object is immediate in the same sense in which the conscious experience of God is immediate.

3) Restriction of "immediacy" to "instantaneousness"

The third denial of certainty of religious experience in a particular sense is found in the restriction of the meaning of "immediacy" to "instantaneousness".\(^2\) To what has already been said indirectly on this,\(^3\) it may be added that Knudsen in this has departed far from the general philosophical usage.\(^4\) Even if a message came to the mind of man as swiftly as lightning, it is not an immediate experience in the strict sense of the word if it is mediated from the outside, as in the perception of physical objects. It is to be questioned, therefore, that Knudsen could have meant the following: "In genuine religious experience the human and the divine intermingle."\(^5\) That sounds more like the mystic who believes that he has experienced God "immediately" in the full sense of the term, and if true it negates all of Knudsen's denial of immediate apprehension of God. And as will be shown more fully later, conditioning of an experience is not against the immediacy claim. For if there be revelation, then in the last analysis

\(^{1}\) See Brightman, PR, 1.
\(^{2}\) See Knudsen, VRE, 74.
\(^{3}\) Vide supra, 217-218.
\(^{4}\) Vide supra, 211-217.
\(^{5}\) Knudsen, VRE, 53.
immediate Christian experience is ultimate, for revelation is a God-experience; theological ideas must have a source, must be received from somewhere before they are passed on in the form of teaching in the conditioning of experience. If there is no immediate experience in the sense of non-reflective knowledge, there will be nothing upon which to reflect.

4) Satisfaction with a reasonable certainty

Then, the denial of certainty in religious experience on particular grounds finds expression in the thought that man should be satisfied with a "reasonable degree" of certainty. This is advocated by Bishop McConnell. His treatment of the subject is more practical than theoretical, for recognizing that the whole mind has demands for certainty that should be satisfied, he ventures to say: "We must insist upon certainty of the same kind as that for which we seek in real life—the certainty that comes out of life, that issues in life."¹ He goes on to show the naturalness of the desire for certainty, as it is a desire for satisfaction, a desire that finds satisfaction in a Kantian attitude of faith: "We learn the truth by venturing to assume it is true, and living as if it were true."² But McConnell carries this postulate farther than did Kant in his second Critique.

¹ McConnell, RC, 7-8. ² McConnell, RC, 9-10.
5) A modified negation of certainty

Finally, the denial of certainty on particular grounds assumes a modified form. For McConnell, for instance, writes: "It is the purpose of this essay to emphasize the claim that Christianity leads to certainty by deepening and enriching the life."¹ This is in line with the viewpoint of this dissertation -- the necessity of a broad view of experience. McConnell is insistent upon satisfaction of the entire life as a criterion of truth. Thus, he recognized that the human mind "sees some truths as necessarily true," refusing to ignore its distinctive interests.² All this should receive the blessing of both the religionist and the scientist, for it takes one out of the hypothetical stage characterized by the description, "ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth,"³ and out of the unscientific position of clinging to hypotheses that do not work out in daily life. In his concluding chapter, McConnell writes: "We conclude that Christian belief is both root and fruit of the Christian life."⁴ Here we get something that was noticeably lacking in his chapter on the scientist--both sides of the experiment. So his fear that the scientist would be "vastly amused at the desperately unscientific character" of his procedure, seems ungrounded, as also his fear that the practical man would be the first to object to this "practical certainty" that comes out of life.⁵ Somewhat in

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¹ McConnell, RG, 53; see 54.
² McConnell, RG, 55.
³ II Tim. 3:7.
⁴ McConnell, RG, 194.
⁵ McConnell, RG, 31.
the spirit of William James, McConnell has one question to ask concerning the experience of the mystics: "Do they mean life? Do they come out of life and make for life?" So, denying any "abstractly infallible standard" McConnell holds a modified certainty with a broad view of experience, "a function of many factors," including the Bible and the Church.

3. Affirmation of certitude in religious experience
   a. On general grounds

1) The age-old contrast between knowledge (certainty) and opinion

The age-old contrast between knowledge (certainty) and opinion, the first general consideration in the affirmation of certainty in religious experience, goes back to Plato and the early Greek philosophers. To Plato, knowledge was infallible and indubitable in contrast to opinion, which is due to sense experience. He held that knowledge is of the nature of intuition, coming like a flash, and due to recollection of experiences in a past life in which the soul had clear and full vision of spiritual realities. Thus one is able to recognize a just act because he has a memory of justice in a past life. Plato, consequently, opposed the doctrine of relativity in knowledge held by the Sophists. Here are intuitive or immediate elements that have survived the crash of dogmatic rationalism.

Locke was on the main line of philosophy historically

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2. McConnell, RC, 210, 213; see Calhoun, GOL, 199.
when he distinguished between knowledge and opinion. In the paragraph on Method in the Introduction to his Essay on Human Understanding, he describes opinion as "that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge." He said, "'With me, to know and to be certain is the same thing; what I am certain of, that I know; what comes short of certainty cannot be called knowledge.'" On empirical rather than on rationalistic grounds, Locke was as certain of God's existence as was Descartes.

Edwin Lewis fairly represents those today who carry on this tradition:

Knowledge and certainty are obviously inseparable. When we say, 'I know,' we are also saying, 'I am certain.' We simply cannot know without at the same time being certain... A situation in which we claim to know, but in which at the same time we confess to some uncertainty, must be described in some other way. We do not know, otherwise we should not confess uncertainty.... On the other hand, there can be certainty where there is not knowledge.... Belief and knowledge are inseparable but not identical. If we believe something, it is because we already know something, and if we know something it is because we already believe something.

2) The necessity of certitude to the business of daily life as well as to philosophy

On general principles, the necessity of certitude to the business of every-day life as well as to philosophy is stressed by several philosophers. Hocking contends that,

1. Turner, PBO, 7; see Locke, Works, IV, 145.  
2. Lewis, PGR, 144; see Maritain, DS, 10.
"The life of knowledge as well as the life of action swings
... in irregular rhythm or alternation between this pole of
certainty and the region of exploration, tentativeness, prob-
able hypothesis."¹ As an idealistic experimentalist, he joins
the experimental idealist Dewey in the quest for the remainder
of reality in the conviction that he has some certainty "in
hand."

Declaring that Descartes was "really as sure of the
stove as of himself," Temple calls academic doubt "an extension
of nursery make-believe," in which philosophers pretend that
they "do not know that there is a sun, or that Napoleon existed
or that selfishness is bad," in order to see whether they can
prove these things.² Of course, the sincere effort of Des-
cartes to understand the basis of knowledge should not be
viewed as infantile; the condemnation falls more justly upon
those who keep up the pretense, i.e. who continue to "pretend"
that they are uncertain concerning objects of experience.

Cook Wilson calls attention to the inconsistency of
those who hold theoretically the mere probability of the exist-
ence of their friends, but whose actions prove otherwise.³
Wilson appears to be saying here that theory and practice can
not logically be divorced thus. It would seem that the man
who says that he is uncertain of the existence of a friend in

¹. Hocking, TOP, 443.
². Temple, NMG, 66; see
Werkmeister, HPI, 173.
whose presence he is standing in conversation, is "leaning over backwards" in defense of some theory, rather than having "practical certainty" in any reasonable sense of the expression. With the three degrees of Überzeugung held by Kant in mind (Meinung, Glauben, and Wissen), England sees little purpose in restricting knowledge as certainty to an "ideal unattainable either in practice or in scientific investigation, for "If I stand without an umbrella in a downpour of rain, I do not simply believe it is raining; I know it is. The belief ...is swallowed up in certitude." ¹

The conduct of life would become impossible "if we did not have the right to treat as certain much that is quite incapable of being proved," but life would become well-nigh unbearable if one's "belief in a friend's honor or a wife's fidelity" were always with the mental reservation, "'so far as I have hitherto tested them.'" ² The presence of one doubt because the evidence is not yet all in (the end of life and experience not having yet come), would create, truly, an "uneasy suspicion which would make me undeserving to have either loyal wife or true friend." ³

3) The essential characteristic of a datum—non-inference

Another general affirmation of certainty in religious experience is the concept that the essential characteristic

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of a datum is non-inference. It may be that all human experiences, except the initial ones, are conditioned, and that our perceptive experiences and everyday words embody theories, yet Russell is far from being a solitary believer in the possibility of "whittling" away the element of interpretation and approaching a "pure datum." Theoretically, one can hold that all data are uncertain, and that they should be confirmed by other data, where possible. But "unless these other data had had some degree of independent credibility, they would not confirm the original data." Thus, Russell, with all his agnosticism, is compelled to admit that there are "classes of statements which are certainly all true." These include not only the given which is immediately known, but also synthetic principles which are known without being inferred.

G. I. Lewis declares in agreement with this that "one cannot be mistaken about the content of an immediate experience." Here "content" should not be confused with the object itself, even though it be the immanent-transcendent God. In this direct experience, coincidence of subject and object is not necessary; what is needed is a transcendence of self. Interpretation after the experience is granted. A question to be treated more fully later is whether there is any cognitive content in consciousness before interpretation, so that it may be truly said that the datum is given, and that the

4. Russell, INT, 155-156.
percipient is aware of its presence. Lewis declares that "apprehension of the quale, being immediate, stands in no need of verification."¹ Lewis is emphatic on this:

There is an absolute certainty of the empirical which has been recognized—the immediate apprehension of the given. Such direct awareness is not indubitable knowledge of an object, but the content of it is an absolutely given fact.²

According to Lewis, the only alternative to skepticism is that some knowledge is more than probable.³ And Widgery declares that in nature, society and religion, the theory that we are always acting on probable hypotheses is inadequate, in fact, "definitely false" as "in each instance there is rather an awareness, a form of direct relation of experient with a reality."⁴

⁴) Duality of subject and object in a unity of experience: knowledge a relation between two distinct terms in intimate union.

Many, dissatisfied with Kant's "artificial cleavage" between sense and thought,⁵ holding that actual experience is not split into subjective mind and objective thing (as interacting freely when thinking is going on),⁶ make a general affirmation of certainty by seeking to show the duality of subject and object in a unity of experience, knowledge being viewed as a relation between two distinct terms in intimate union. This is epistemological dualism,⁷ although

¹. Lewis, MWO, 125; see 134.  5. See Calkins in Wilm, IK, 18-19.
². Lewis, MWO, 310.  6. Grans, PHL, 6.
³. Lewis, MWO, 311.  7. See Lovejoy, RD, 42.
⁴. Widgery, Art.(1924), 488.
subject and object are viewed as more intimate than is often the case in this theory of knowledge. Subject and object are not made identical with each other or with one's experience of them as in epistemological monism:

All that epistemological dualism asserts about the object is that it is not identical with the idea of it; and all that it asserts about the idea is that it refers to, or describes, or (simply) knows, the object.¹

To the objections of epistemological monists that the dualists simply state the problem of knowledge and that if the gulf between subject and object is not crossed, skepticism is the result, the epistemological dualists answer that knowledge is just this situation of subject set over against the object, and that the gulf is actually crossed, but "without the possibility of the idea's ever being one with the object."² One of the principles agreed upon by personalists is the following: "What is present in knowledge is always conscious experience referring beyond itself; no nonmental object is ever present."³

On this broad foundation there is plenty of room for the view of duality in unity of experience. Epistemological monism, inconsistently, has tried to retain belief in the independence of objects.⁴ Partly for this reason, perhaps, it is true that: "Comparatively few thinkers in the history of philosophy have believed that idea and object are

1. Brightman, ITP, 78; see PR, 414.
2. Brightman, ITP, 81; see 80.
3. Werkmeister, HPI, 326.
4. See Brightman, PR, 414; Lovejoy, RD, 188, 256, 264.
necessarily identical in rational knowledge.\textsuperscript{1}

Several bases are offered for this unity in duality. Ormond finds it in the mind's purpose:

The world of the metaphysician, like that of the mathematician and the physicist, is dual, but the terms of its duality are no longer opaque in their inner nature, but are terms which spring directly out of consciousness and conscious experience. If we take them in their verbal form as inception and realization, it will be seen clearly how purpose becomes the natural term of mediation.\textsuperscript{2}

Although the scientist may regard himself as a mere spectator, avoiding "any presumption of community of nature between himself and his object," the metaphysician is not satisfied with this externality: "The subject-nature of which the knower is conscious cannot tolerate the idea of an alien nature in the object."\textsuperscript{3} It is purpose that connects the real and the ideal worlds, for the physical world is regarded as the "realization of the ideal world in which it arises as merely conceived content."\textsuperscript{4}

Ward has developed this concept in terms of the organic unity of experience, of subjective and objective factors as "coöperant members of one whole."\textsuperscript{5} Of course, it is the individual's experience which is first of all the unity. For Ward there is no strictly independent world; it is presented to the knowing mind. Thus Ward expands the idea of unity, going from the individual to nature. Only on this basis where

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} DeWolf, RRR, 132-133.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ormond, CP, 54; see Jones, FE, 53.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Ormond, CP, 9, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Ormond, CP, 58.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Ward, NA, II, 152, 153.
\end{itemize}
"the knower and the known are not utterly disparate" (both being ultimately and essentially spirit), can science become intelligible. Then Ward strikes a note that has often been struck against a false rationalism—the unity of the experient in the unity of experience: "Presentation, Feeling, Conation, are ever one inseparable whole, and advance continuously to higher and higher forms." It may well be that "experience does not begin with a disconnected 'manifold,'" but that the philosophers have severed the connections.

By implication, Tennant holds that immediate experience is "the source of all cognition, the primary interaction between subject and object, which constitutes awareness or direct, involuntary acquaintance." This is true also of Ward, Baillie and Boodin. The last, like Ward, is concerned with getting away from an extreme dualism that would prevent such confrontation:

This concept of consciousness greatly simplifies the problem of energy. It destroys the old conceptual cleavage between mind and body, or physical energy on the one hand and psychological processes on the other, by making consciousness a fact independent of energy. Nature knows no cleavage of energetic interactions. Why should we by our concepts, put asunder what nature has joined?

Brotherston, speaking for pragmatic empiricism, is also interested in bringing subject and object closer together in

1. Ward, EP, 111; see NA, II 185.
3. Ward, NA, II, 97; see Bertocci, EAD, 57-58, with Balfour, Lectures, 257-258.
4. Tennant, PT, I, 28.
thought:

What is antecedent in knowledge is neither subject nor object but the felt and desired unity of both. It is the unity of a tensional field. It is that tension to unity, organic and philosophic, which life-process, when it attains the reflective level, is never without. Thus, it is seen by inner perception.¹

With Ward, Dean Inge contends for the organic unity of the real world, and the "unity in duality of thought and object."² Differing from Ward on the nature of reality, Inge, however, regards it as: "a realm in which thought and thing, fact and value, are inseparable."³ No objection can be raised to this as long as thought and object remain distinct. Nor can one; for a similar reason, reject Shimer's tautological statement that the universe is one or unified, and that it is reasonable to view God, man and the world as "unified in one inclusive whole."⁴ Ulric Morgan finds an illustration for his belief in "one world, psycho-physical from top to bottom," in the unity present in man.⁵ It may be that Vance goes too far in raising the question, "Should we not become what we know for the fleeting moment of our contemplation?"; yet knowledge does demand "some similarity between the knowing person and the known reality."⁶

It would be an extreme epistemological dualism that would violate the Hegelian dictum, adopted by Pringle-Pattison,

2. Inge, in Muirhead, OBP, 193-195; see Schilling, EHR, 100; Hegel, JUB, XII, 294-295.
4. Morgan, in Muirhead, OBP, 278; see 300.
5. Vance, RT, 205, 208.
that "Thoughts do not stand between us and things, shutting us off from things: they rather shut us together with them." For the knower can not be "extruded from the real universe and treated as if he did not belong to it." Pringle-Pattison holds, thus, that there is an essential relation between the knowledge of the knower and the object of his knowledge, not as two unconnected facts, but as "two elements in a single fact."3

Thus, one aspect of the duality-in-unity view is the position that there is self-transcendence in a unity of experience, in which view knowledge is regarded as due to an immediate rapport between subject and object. Watson, rejecting the idea of the original awareness of the mind of its own states only, writes:

The contrast between subject and object is strictly correlative, and where there is no explicit consciousness of the object, there is no explicit consciousness of the subject. What we must say, therefore, is that in the feeling soul there is an implicit or vague consciousness of both subject and object.4

With the others mentioned, he holds that experience is one, that "all distinctions must, therefore, fall within it. We can distinguish phenomena from reality, but we cannot separate them."5 As it is to be questioned whether there is any knowledge of the self apart from knowledge of the not-self,

1. See Bertocci, EAG, 58; Hegel, Die Absolute Religion, JUB, XIV, 33.
2. See Bertocci, EAG, 56-57.
3. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 115; see Maritain, IP, 185-186.
and as these knowledges are inseparable in actual awareness (although separable theoretically), it seems reasonable to hold with Watson that there is one world, a world in which "the rational subject finds himself at home because the world itself is essentially rational."¹

Another general concept in favor of certainty in religious experience is that of the mind's capacity for active commerce with the object of its knowledge. Maritain defends the position that being, not ideas, is the object of intellect:

To maintain...that the object of our intellect is not the being of things but the idea of being which it forms in itself, or more generally that we apprehend immediately only our ideas, is to deliver oneself bound hand and foot to skepticism. For if that were the case, it would be impossible for our mind under any circumstances to conform itself to that which really is, and truth would be unattainable....Ideas...are our instruments of knowledge.²

Of course what is immediately present in the mind is not the "thing" but its perception.³ But instead of ideas being viewed as intervening between the self and its objects of thought, it seems more reasonable to regard them as "instruments" of bringing the unified self into closer relation with its object of thought. Charles A. Bennett rejects the view that because "we know with idea, therefore we can know only idea":

The facts might be exactly as Feurbach describes them, yet it might still be true that ideas reach reality and that we can have valid knowledge of that which is other than idea....

¹ Watson, IRE, II, 106-107; see Crane, PHL, 51-52. ² Maritain, IP, 186. ³ Vide supra, 214.
Ideas, he seems to think, interpose a limiting medium between the mind and its object.¹

In similar vein, G. I. Lewis complains of the error common to rationalism and pure empiricism—the attempt to separate the mind from something else called experience, an impossible task as real experience must include one of its elements, the mind.²

The unity of subject and object, according to Griffiths, is resident in self-consciousness, as any awareness, in the very nature of the case, is a "bridging of the gulf that separates me from it."³ Griffiths saves himself from monism here by seeing subject and object together, but not as identical. And paradoxically, Scott declares: "I can break through the circle of my privacy simply because, as conscious, I am never in it."⁴ In the eyes of Rufus A. Jones, a real mind is in active commerce with a real world:

One thinks his object in the same unified pulse of consciousness in which he thinks himself and vice-versa. There is no self-consciousness without object-consciousness, and there is no object-consciousness without self-consciousness. Outer and inner, knower and known, and not two but forever one. The 'soul,' therefore, is not something hidden away in behind or above our ideas and feelings and will activities. It is the active living unity of personal consciousness—the one psychic integer and unity for a true psychology.⁵

Another phase of the duality of subject and object in

1. Bennett, DRK, 33.
2. Lewis, MWO, 25; see Jones, Art. (1921), 455.
3. Griffiths, GIE, 217; see 214; Temple, NMG, 70-71.
5. Jones, Art. (1921), 456; see (Henry) Jones, FE, 51.
the unity of experience is the unity of subject and object in feeling. Cognition is not an external matter: it is an experience of the soul, and consequently has reference to feeling-value as well as to knowledge of the facts concerning the object. "The most promising theories of the psychological constitution of religious experience are those which find its essence in more complex mental processes containing intellect, emotional and volitional factors."¹ The existence of souls, "living centers capable of feeling the beauty and grandeur of the world...is what is really significant in the universe."² For James, feelings are "the germ and starting point of cognition"; and feeling is used as "a synonym of immediate experience" (God and man having "business together"), "the deeper source of religion," from which translations are made into "philosophical and theological formulas."³

Bradley emphasized what has already been said concerning man's dependence upon immediate experience as the start or the basis of mediate knowledge, and concerning the unity of non-identical elements in that immediate experience, a union so close in the knowing act that subject and object can be "in no sense distinguished." That is:

"We have in feeling diversity and unity in one whole, a whole implicit and yet not broken

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2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 113-114; see Brotherston, Art.(1943), 21; Pratt, PRB, 25, 22-24.
3. James, PP, I, 222; VRE, 431, 516-517; Moore, TRE, 13.
up into terms and relations. This immediate union of the one and the many is an ultimate fact from which we start.1

To some, the idea of the "wedlock" of idea and thing, connotes only an impossible monism. Already, we have seen that in some sense, "they two shall be one" if there is to be any knowledge at all. Robles also explains knowledge as a duality in unity—a unity of purpose and interest in immediate experience:

To know, then, is to make immanent that which first presents itself as transcendent, to receive into the intimate and immediate sphere of the 'ego' the sphere of the 'non-ego' which, irreducible in itself, presents itself in its character of 'otherness.' Contact is thus established between a subject and an object, and a mysterious and ineffable nuptial union is consummated, the offspring of which is 'the known.' For something 'is born' in the act of knowing; in the interiority of the 'ego' the 'non-ego' comes into being, in such a way, however that in spite of the consummated union, the 'ego' and 'non-ego' preserve their irreducible 'otherness.'2

To sum up, it may be said that the reaction from the subjectivism of Kant and others is a natural and reasonable one. For if they are right then knowledge is a miracle devoid of any explanation. But assuming what must be assumed in order even to get started in reasoning—the necessity of assumptions—and assuming, thus further, that the universe is rational and intelligible3 (the irrational being due to the part-vision of man), and taking "universe" in its literal

1. Mack, AIE, 12-13; see Bradley, AR, 105, 569; Lipps in Laird, PS, 82.
2. Robles, MPP, 55; see Maier, HCK, 38.
3. See Russell, Art. (1914), 792-793; Brightman, Art. (1930)2, 75.
sense, the writer is led to take his stand on the duality of subject and object in the unity of experience, and on the possibility of knowledge, therefore, a knowledge due to an intimate union between two distinct terms, a union intimate enough to result in knowledge. That is, he holds that the gulf between the knower and the object of his knowledge can be narrowed until what has been passing freely between them may do so intelligibly as well. It is necessary to bring knower and known close enough in immediate experience to make (mediate) knowledge possible. For if knowledge is not possible, there is nothing to talk about, and no purpose in any argument or discussion (including this dissertation). But, "the most striking fact of experience is knowing that we know." Dr. Brightman raises a relevant question: How much knowledge by acquaintance is there? This can be answered by two words --"much," if "knowledge by acquaintance" is used in the broad sense, for all knowledge by description depends upon it; but "little" if "knowledge by acquaintance" is used in the narrow sense, "knowledge" being distinguished from "knowledge-claim," and "immediate" in reference to physical objects being considered less direct than in reference to God—a distinction to be made later. There is no knowledge by acquaintance of external objects themselves, but only of the direct perception

1. See Maier, HCK, 45; Murphy, UR, 67-68.
2. Jones, Art.(1921), 455.
3. See Brightman, ITP, 85.
5. Vide supra, 214.
of their sense-data. "In immediate personal consciousness, if anywhere, there is a true case of knowledge by acquaintance."¹ One is directly acquainted, strictly speaking, with only that which is immediately revealed to the human spirit.

It may be inferred from this general treatment of duality in knowledge, that if the religious Object does not come within the range of immediate human experience,² then the ideas about Him have no explanation. Resort can not be had to revelation, for to be real it must be an immediate religious experience. In view of the dependence of the knowledge of God and of other realities upon immediate experience, it is not to be wondered at that "the predominating aim of philosophy has been to conquer what Whithead has called 'the bifurcation of nature' for which Descartes is so largely to blame,"³ and which Kant was far from remedying by his doctrine of the noumenon.⁴

5) Some content of knowledge in general awareness without particular attention and reflection
   a) Four types of knowing: awareness, apprehension, comprehension, explanation

   Another fact in favor of certitude in religious experience upon general grounds is that there is some content of knowledge in general awareness without particular attention.

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¹ Brightman, ITP, 86. ⁴ See Knudson, PP, 112;
² Macintosh, TES, 243-244. ⁵ Dewey, IDP, 296-297.
³ Brightman, NV, 26.
and reflection, due in the first place to the existence of four types of knowing—awareness, apprehension, comprehension, and explanation. As all knowing, obviously, depends upon a knower (the ego-centric predicament) and as undoubtedly all experience, except that which is initial, is conditioned as well as conscious, Brightman must be correct in his belief that "it is impossible...to separate any experience from our thought about it," and that "pure religious experience, purged of all idea and belief is an abstraction, as unreal as a 'pure' sensation in psychology."\(^1\) Others agree with this, but from a different angle. For them, there is no experience that is altogether stripped of cognitive elements, however elemental and vague. The distinction between the knowledges of perception and of conception is nothing new. "Plotinus said that sensations are obscure thoughts and intelligible or spiritual thoughts are clear sensations."\(^2\) But this view has received a great impetus from empiricism and from the new theory of perception. In contrast to the view of conception suggested by Kant and developed by G. I. Lewis is the new view that "sense-data are first perceived (i.e. registered in the passive mind) and then conceived (i.e. ordered) under concepts by the activity of the mind."\(^3\) Admitting that the most of what we perceive is simultaneously conceived, or practically so, Nolting sees the importance of the new distinction

2. Kennedy, Art. (1940), 419.
in this, "that what is given in perception is independent of any power of the will to alter or deny," while in conception there is a measure of control. In harmony with this view is the modern conception of knowing as a process in which there is a polarity (not contradiction) between thought and feeling, in which cognitive activity in various stages of development can be recognized all along the line between the extremes; that is, in every awareness there is some thought definite enough to lay claim to the term "knowledge." In this view cognition, in the strict sense, is the consummation of all the various kinds of consciousness: "All experience is cognitive qua known; at least a surface film of knowing plays over every inch of its contour." Kant held that there is some content in immediate experience, "cognition in general, consciousness of the subject without...any particular determination...which makes possible the knowledge of the understanding." An instance of this is found in Kant's view of beauty as a confused or lower form of knowledge, implying that "mere sense-perception is possible in the simple awareness of presentation, without identifying the object in the ordinary association of apperception which we call knowledge." Langley brings out the contrast in

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1. Nolting, CTP, 9-10; see Jones, FE, 55.
2. See Duce, KGN, 567-568; Gallopway, TPR, 258; Ames, Art. (1915), 264; Hegel, PR, I, 132-133; Sahilling, ERH, 63, 95, 54; Hickman, IPR, 440; Hocking, MGHE, 63; Davidson, OIR, 29, 69.
3. Hocking, Art. (1906), 7; see 10.
aesthetic experience between perception and apprehension, the latter being of objects "in their uniqueness and individuality," the powers of the perceiver being "more fully employed" so that "other characters of the object experienced are revealed."¹ For Tennant, also, there is no sharp line between perception and conception.²

A good illustration of general awareness is afforded by the man, who walking along a country road, without particular attention and reflection, has a vivid sense of his surroundings. His knowledge as awareness is of a general field of scent, sound, and sight. Apprehension begins when "something in this field arouses particular attention, say an object moving," which being of special interest causes concentration of one's powers. Afterward, when other information is brought in, there is comprehension. When singularity about the object is noted, explanation is sought. In this, sensation is "but a particular aspect of the whole unified feeling."³ Oman applies this general concept of awareness to religious objects.⁴

b) No formless given in distinction between given and its interpretation

In harmony with this view of cognition in general awareness is the concept that there is no formless or indefinite given in the distinction between the given and its interpretation.⁵

¹See Tennant, PT, I., 165; Bertocci, EAG, 199-202; Martin, EPR, 168; Macintosh, PHK, 312-314, 322-328; McTaggart, SDR, 90; Boodin, Art.(1934), 150.
²See Lewis, MWO, 144; see Mackay, Art.(1928), 71.
³Oman, NS, 120, 185; see 121.
⁴Oman, NS, 142-143.
⁵Lewis, MWO, 144; see Mackay, Art.(1928), 71.
Definiteness is needed for inference of particular meaning:

The implicitly predicated relationship comprised in the conceptual interpretation of what is presented, must be such that further possible experience could verify or fail to verify them. Without the correlation of concept and qualia, no experience could verify or fail to verify anything.1

Also, C. I. Lewis makes it clear that "the given is in, not before, experience," that is, that the essence of the "given" is that it is given, an "identifiable constituent in experience." Grote regards reflection as the passage of the mind from immediate thought to the thought of self and of objects, and on to thought which makes a distinction between thought of self and of its objects, each conception bringing out the other.3 Implicit in this is the presence of thought in feeling, and he states it explicitly: "Immediate thought may be described as the feeling of being...the germ of our notion of being."4 He speaks of a "process" from the immediate to reflection; he recognizes that in thought there is implied "distinguishingness" or reflection, but in his use of "implied" and of "germ" above, he has given himself the right to use "immediate thought" rather than mere "immediateness." He goes on to speak of immediate knowledge as immediate thought plus something like reflection, but lacking the distinct judgment of developed reflection.5 This immediate knowledge, which is knowledge by acquaintance, he makes the

1. Lewis, MWO, 144.
2. Lewis, MWO, 53, 66.
ground of all other knowledge, having "all the elements of truth in it, which the most developed knowledge has, whether these elements are intuitions of sense...of mind...of reason." Thus he has avoided the pitfall that would make knowledge inexplicable, i.e. how thought can evolve out of mere feeling. He elaborates this:

Reflection has to work, not upon a mass of intuition simply sensal, but...of every kind and degree, intellectual and rational as well as sensal. If there is not intuition of these latter kinds to begin with, there is not truthness in any after knowledge....For the activity of our mind, qua bare activity, is the source of error; truthness is something given to it....Trueness is all given to us in the first instance in immediateness.

Others join Grote and those mentioned in this declaration that there is no pure perception or sensation. Martin, for instance, does not oppose the intuitional and the inferential to each other; both are forms of knowledge in a continuous process, similar to the polarity idea of Hocking and others. In this, Martin has expressed the Hegelian view of the unity of the self, in which view, thinking or feeling or willing is simply the predominant activity of the united self at any one time. Martin holds that the "I know" of immediate experience is validated by reflection; that is, we can not go behind the datum as the minimum of knowledge.

Williams denies that there is any cognitive content in

immediate experience. He argues that "givenness is not know-
ingness... The given is as such mere fact, innocent of self-
knowledge, to be known, if at all, indirectly, inductively, 
and inconclusively." But he admits:

   Everything and anything of which the mind is 
   immediately aware, any mental content is given 
   to that mind, in the dual sense that it is an 
   ingredient of consciousness and that it can be 
   a datum or occasion for interpretation.

But if the given did not have cognitive value, i.e. if it 
did not contain the germ of knowledge as well as being a datum 
available for knowledge, there could be no interpretation. The 
untested knowledge, or knowledge-claim, of immediate experience 
differs, of course, from the tested knowledge of reflection. Otto 
holds that there is some content of knowledge in the mind 
before reasoning upon it begins. For him, this knowledge is 
not an inference, but an immediate cognition, more than a 
feeling of "more," a particular aspect of the more. In this, 
he is in agreement with a large number of thinkers that the 
ultimate basis of all mediate knowledge is immediate knowledge.
So what has been said of awareness in general applies to reli-
gious objects: "Religion has never been just faith in an idea 
of God, but faith in God, trust in, including an awareness, an 
apprehension of a reality, God." In harmony with the concept 
of the polarity of feeling and knowledge that recognizes

1. Williams, Art. (1933), 617. 4. Vide supra, 31-32, 36, 40-
2. Williams, Art. (1933), 617; 42, 44, 46-47, 50-55; Mar-
see 618-621; Lewis, MWO, 5. Widgery, Art. (1924), 483.
118.
cognitive activity on different levels, Duce sees an explana-
tion of different levels of religion, the highest level, Chris-
tianity, being a personal "I-Thou relation" resulting from God's
presentation of Himself in Jesus Christ.¹

a) Data of logic, grounds of inference ultimately
in immediate experience; cognitive content in
intuition and feeling

An important consideration in reference to the thought
that there is some cognitive content in general awareness, is
that logic finds grounds of inference ultimately in immediate
experience. DeBurgh writes:

The data, qua logical data, are already
propositional in form, and function as grounds
of inference. Thus immediate experiences,
perceptual or aesthetic, or moral or religious,
in so far as they antecede or defy expression
in judgments, lie beyond the pale....But this
reasoned knowledge is built not upon but out
of the immediate experiences.²

DeBurgh ascribes truth-value to immediate experience as
well as to logical thinking, as the former is an awareness of
content, an apprehension of being, or "in Bradley's language,
of a 'that-what' never a bare 'that'," with the judgment im-
licit until the "'what' has been disengaged and made explic-
it."³ DeBurgh registers a strong protest against reducing such
experiences as "the pre-critical apprehension...the simple
peasant's awareness of duty, or of the presence of God, to terms

¹ See Duce, KGN, 567-569.
² DeBurgh, Art.(1926), 422.
³ DeBurgh, TRP, 422; see 5; England, VRE, 132, 135.
of emotional states."1 In support of this he appeals to the almost universal testimony of those who have had these direct experiences; logical vindication of them does not make them true, for if true at all, they were true in the moment of direct awareness.2

Rejecting with DeBurgh and others the concept of the numinous as a distinctive religious faculty, England with him accepts the numinous experience, in that religion takes its rise in the emotional life, immediate in the sense not of bare feeling but of "living through our experiences," a kind of "implicit reasoning."3 He describes intuition as the feeling of the artist, "the impulse to grasp the nature of reality in its fullness, to apprehend and appreciate...the finer shades and deeper significance of things":

The intuition of the poet, the philosopher, or the religious person, though it may advance to positions still further removed from those which logical inference could justify, is yet of a piece with the non-logical element which lies at the center of all knowing processes.5

For Höfidding the contrast between intellect and feeling is merely a contrast between states where either ideational or feeling elements predominate, as it is impossible to "derive all forms of conscious life from a state of pure feeling."6 Griffiths is of the opinion that Schleiermacher did not intend to be

1. DeBurgh, TRP, 423; see Brown, PC, 127-128.
2. DeBurgh, Art. (1926), 424; see Mackay, Art. (1928), 85.
5. England, VRE, 30; see Davidson, OIR, 133; Watson, IRE, II, 78-80, 102.
6. Höfidding, OP, 221-222; Garnett, GIU, 39; Laird, PS, 89-90, 191-192, 213.
understood as teaching that feeling alone is the root and core of religion, that is, that there are "no cognitive elements present to support the feeling." Rather, what he emphasized was the reaction of the whole personality in immediate experience, where feeling predominates, "and in which the God-consciousness arises."

Buckham, also, teaches that experience is not "pure emotion" nor "non-mental agitation." For Otto, "to know and to understand conceptually are two things...often even mutually exclusive and contrasted." Likewise Hocking holds that "there is no such thing as feeling apart from idea;...that idea is an integral part of all feeling; and that it is the whole meaning and destiny of feeling to terminate in knowledge." In this he sees why "a religion of feeling always and rightly tends to transform itself into a religion of ideas." Hocking shows the connection between feeling and its guiding idea, for when one is afraid, whether it "leads to wild flight or to simply climbing a tree" depends on "the 'presence of mind' in the feeling." Hocking concludes:

All positive feeling...reaches its terminus in knowledge. All feeling means to instate some experience which is essentially cognitive; it is idea-apart-from-its-object tending to become idea-in-presence-of-its-object which is 'cognition' or experimental knowledge.

1. Griffiths, GIE, 244.  
2. Griffiths, GIE, 245; see 247; Bennett, PSM, 69, 74; Wilson, SI, 854-855, 850, 857-858.  
3. Buckham, IW, 84-86.  
4. Otto, IH, 139; see Clark, Art. (1938), 6-14.  
5. Hocking, MGHE, 64.  
d) Non-rational a bearer of knowledge to the individual

Then, in the thought of some content in the immediate experience of general awareness, there is the concept that the non-rational is a bearer of knowledge to the individual. Boutroux referring to Pascal's statement that "the heart has its own reasons of which reason knows nothing," denies that Pascal meant that the heart has nothing in common with reason, and proves it by several quotations. Boutroux finds the explanation in Pascal's belief in two states of reason, the normal and the depraved: the former "becoming corrupt has corrupted everything." Pascal taught that the depraved reason "Claims to understand everything by a mode of reasoning, which in reality is adapted to abstract things." Boutroux thinks that Pascal must be understood in the light of his opponents' conception of reason as geometrical reason, and so revised Pascal's famous statement: "The heart has its own reasons, intelligible to a reason that is both just and complete, but of which a purely geometrical reason has no knowledge." That is:

Where a reason that is infatuated with itself and is modelled on material things, sees only contrariety and incompatibility, the true, superior reason, being attached to the heart and to divine grace, sees continuity, order and harmony.

Thus, Pascal is just another voice teaching that in

feeling (heart) there are cognitive elements, closely related to Otto's position that "the non-rational does give knowledge of an intuitive sort," and that it is "a bearer of knowledge, like the rational, to the experient," the difference being that the one can be conveyed to others, whereas the other, though equally real, remains for the most part private property.¹

Seizing upon James's fourth mark of mysticism—the peculiar poetic quality of direct illumination, and Russell's definition of mysticism ("belief in insight as against discursive reason, in a way of wisdom, sudden, penetrative, coercive"), which is confirmed in general by the students of mysticism, Dawkins holds that mysticism is an "assertion of the knowledge of experience as against ideational knowledge," the mystics being "impregnable in their 'I know'."²

6) Dependence of probability upon certitude; the basis of knowledge in true inward conviction

Finally, in the consideration of the concept that there is some cognitive content in general awareness, particularly of the idea that the grounds of inference lie in immediate experience and that error creeps into knowledge in the act of inference or judgment, it should be stated that it appears obvious in the light of the preceding treatment that probability depends upon certainty, and that the basis of true knowledge is true inward conviction. Any hypothetical statement is an inference, an inference from the non-hypothetical, some intuitive

¹ Griffiths, GIE, 149. ² Dawkins, MEP, 20, 22.
certainty or fact or reality.\textsuperscript{1} It may seem at first sight that Maritain goes too far in saying that "every demonstration rests on some previously admitted certainty,"\textsuperscript{2} but Vance indirectly supports him by declaring that the only reason why the skeptical doctrine that probability is the guide of life is an impossible one is the professed absence of the indispensable basic certitude so essential to any hypothesis, for "Thus the most pressing question how are we to live...receives no answer....With this bankruptcy of reason, reasonable action becomes impossible."\textsuperscript{3}

But for the basic assumptions, postulates that are not open to doubt, there would be no science, no argument and no proof or disproof of hypotheses.\textsuperscript{4} Vance finds in Descartes' "Je pense, j'existe," an illustration of this, for "if all else is doubtful, it is at least certain that consciousness states existence."\textsuperscript{5} Vance suggests that the same method be applied to other certitudes. This Baillie has done: "The primary certainty of duty is the basis of further certitude of faith."\textsuperscript{6} One's knowledge of God becomes basic to further knowledge, and certainty of His existence leads to other certainties concerning Him.\textsuperscript{7}

Then, the theory of probability is faced with the problem of explaining how certitudes and knowledge can be derived from doubts and ignorance.\textsuperscript{8} For even the laws of chance are a source of knowledge, just as to be mistaken implies that one knows at

1. Wilson, SI, II, 536; see Lewis, AKV, 186.
3. Vance, RT, 45.
5. Vance, RT, 72.
7. Brown, PC, 211.
8. See Balfour, TH, 179.
least one case of being in error, and what it is to be right.
If it be answered that "it is only probable that one is mistaken, and only probable that it is only probable," with Rynin one wonders: "whether it is really more probable that it is probable that it is probable...to the end of time and patience" rather than "perhaps at least once one observed as occurring what one stated was occurring."¹

Thus, certitude is as basic to probability as permanence is to change.² Mental as well as physical progress depends upon having "one foot on solid ground" while the other is suspended. But it does seem that in our uncertain, chaotic age, men are trying to make progress with "both feet in the air."
The walker, however, is the best illustration of the possibility of tentativeness and certitude existing side by side, and of probability resting upon certitude.

7) Denial of the merely hypothetical character of all empirical statements

a) "Hypothesis" meaningful

Denial of the merely hypothetical character of all empirical statements—another element in the general affirmation of certainty—in the first place renders "hypothesis" meaningful. Some hold the certainty of an epistemically basic proposition, i.e. one which is foundational for the analysis of knowledge, fulfilling the four conditions: "1) It is (in Russell's sense) a pure perceptive proposition; 2) it designates uniquely

¹ Rynin, Art. (1947), 594; ² See Bennett, CVM, see 596-597.
a single momentary occurrence; 3) it is epistemically indubitable, and 4) it is objectively certain.\(^1\) Ryle has shown that in neither of the usual senses of "hypothetical" is it the case that all singular and general propositions of science and of ordinary experience are mere hypotheses, as in one sense of the word some have been established. He has detected the contradiction in describing a proposition as hypothetical (conjectural) and at the same time established:

Some general propositions are established to be the explanations of others, already known to be true. These are called 'laws' and not 'hypotheses'. And some non-general propositions are known to be true. These are called 'matters-of-fact' or 'facts', and not hypotheses.\(^2\)

MacDonald agrees with Ryle that if every empirical proposition or causal law is hypothetical then the word "hypothesis" has become useless.\(^3\) In such broad usage "all cows are black" at midnight. If a proposition expresses a law, then it can not express the hypothesis that there might be such a law.\(^4\) To call the formulation of what is given in immediate experience "hypothesis" is, as Lewis declares, to disregard the meaning of words.\(^5\)

b) Validity of distinction between ground and content

In the second place, the denial of the merely hypothetical character of all empirical statements gives validity to the distinction between ground and content of knowledge. That is,

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4. MacDonald, Art.(1937), 34.
5. Lewis, AKV, 182; see Jones, FE, 63.
when "hypothesis" has meaning there can be a distinction between the knowledge which prompts, directs, and controls experiment and the knowledge resulting from experiment; an issue is defined and tested.¹

To illustrate, Stace takes the proposition, "This key is made of iron." To call that only a probable proposition is to hold that there must always be some doubt about its truth. And what Stace wants to know is just what are the doubts. He examines the position of Carnap on the proposition in question and shows that Carnap is ambiguous on the kinds of test and the infinite number of kinds of test to get complete verification. The defining characteristics of iron are not infinite in number; all that is needed is to verify them, and this can be done. Thinking, however, that Carnap may mean that a single test of the defining characteristics, as being attracted by a magnet, and that ten thousand tests would give only probability, Stace thinks that Carnap has been misled by an apparent motive of scientists in the repetition of tests, the real motive being not to add weight to the probability of the conclusion, but to be sure that he has satisfactorily established the inductive premises. A single case can prove an inductive conclusion with certainty.² Thus, "hypothesis" and "knowledge" are not identical: "No theory which professes to be knowledge can hope to stand if its truth would render knowledge itself an

¹ See Stace, Art.(1947), 32; Brown, PC, 205.
² Stace, Art.(1947), 31-32; see 29-30.
impossibility."¹ In line with this, Lewis is critical of Dewey's preoccupation with the forward-looking function of knowledge to the neglect of the backward look—to the ground or premises—in which knowledge appears to be identified with "foresight," when actually "the only assured foresight will be hindsight."² That is, knowing should not be made synonymous with finding out, for this confuses the ground and the content of knowledge.

o) Broad use of "faith"

Then the denial of the merely hypothetical character of all empirical statements is a recognition of the broad use of faith, and not its restriction to its hypothetical phase.³ Declaring that faith excludes doubt, and denying that faith is hypothetical merely, DeBurgh writes: "Its proper object is the unproven and the dubitable. This does not mean that doubt is present along with the assurance, for the assent of faith excludes doubt."⁴ Of course the latter is only true at a certain stage in the development of faith.⁵

Faith presents a puzzling union of certainty and uncertainty. On the one hand, it is a state of assurance that seems to the believer self-sufficient. On the other, it always in some sense, goes beyond the evidence, and as if aware of this weakness, seeks to provide itself with rational justification.⁶

Sir Henry Jones declares that the religious consciousness will "revolt against the notion that its faith is just

¹. Scott, Art. (1920), 125; see Bennett, CVM, 69-70.
². Lewis, Art. (1930), 17.
³. Vide supra, 128-138.
⁵. Vide supra, 128.
⁶. Bennett, DRK, 15.
an hypothesis," and that hypotheses "have by no means proven themselves, as religious faith has done, to be of all forces, the strongest in man's history."¹

d) "Truth" and "error" intelligible

Finally, the denial of the merely hypothetical character of all empirical statements makes "truth" and "error" intelligible. At least seven types of answers to the old question, "What is truth?" are being given today. Suffice it to say that the implicit and explicit avowal of immediate experience and of the validity of empirical statements in the broader answers make "truth" and "error" intelligible. So it would seem that probability has not replaced truth. To say that "no one ever correctly and knowingly asserted that snow was white...or that he was attending a meeting of the American Philosophical Association" seems to be flying into the teeth of truth and rationality.² It is the viewpoint of this dissertation that "truth" (as well as "verification" and "hypothesis") has meaning.

8) Summary

While on the basis of a strict interpretation of "immediate" it seems reasonable (as will be argued later) to deny the possibility of logical certainty concerning the existence of physical objects, and of other human minds, yet in the light of the above general affirmations of certainty in contrast to

¹ Jones, FE, 64. ² Rynin, Art. (1947), 593.
the denials, it seems equally reasonable not to deny the possibility of any certainty. The narrowing of the gap between diverse metaphysical and epistemological views seems to have some significance for the assertion of some certitude. In this somewhat lengthy affirmation of certitude on general grounds, a broad and solid foundation has been laid for such an affirmation concerning distinctive religious experience.

b. On particular grounds

1) The Kantian foundation for certitude in religious experience
   a) The strangeness of this fact.--The affirmation of certitude in religious experience finds a secure foundation in Kantian doctrine in spite of the strangeness of this fact. The very one who had limited knowledge to the physical realm, and had regarded God as a Noumenon laid the foundation for certitude concerning God and other spiritual realities in his first Critique. It was Hegel's keen insight that perceived that the very restriction of knowledge to sense-experience signified a crossing of the boundary, "for the subject that sets up these limits, by that very act, admits that it is not enclosed in these boundaries...and is thus in...absolute knowledge."¹ Kant explicitly aimed at certainty:

   Sie ist vom Skepticismus gänzlich unterschieden, einem Grundsatzes einer kunftmässigen und scientifischen Unwissenheit, welcher die Grundlagen aller Erkenntniss untergräbt,

¹ Maier, HCK, 38.
Then, while Kant declared in his foundational pronouncement that all knowledge begins with experience, and while he made it clear that he meant sense-experience, he immediately acknowledges that it does not follow that all arises out of (sense) experience, thus introducing immediate apprehension, an a priori element that arises on the occasion of experience. Furthermore, and rather inconsistently, he departed from his fundamental empirical principle and his almost constant use of "experience" to include moral and aesthetic experience in his second and third Critiques. In the former he declares: "Die Moral kann ihre Grundätze insgesamt auch in concreto, zusammen mit den praktischen Folgen, wenigstens in möglichen Erfahrungen geben." He may not have seen at the time the far-reaching consequences of his departure—his rational endorsement of the possibility of knowledge through religious experience. At least, in the first Critique he never fitted this key into the locked door of his limitation of knowledge to physical objects, for there God remains one of the unknown and unknowable things-in-themselves. But unconsciously, perhaps, he pointed to the door for others to enter, for his third Critique influenced many philosophers, such as Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.

1. Kant, KrV, A 424; see B 35.  
4. See Kant, KrV, B 778, 781.
b) Kant's discontent with his moral argument, and new conception of God as a Person immediately revealed in the soul of man

i) Implicit in his first Critique

Then the Kantian foundation for certainty in religious experience is seen in Kant's discontent with his moral argument, and new conception of God as a Person immediately revealed in the soul of man, a concept which is implicit in part in the first Critique, for the following are facts of personality; a free Being at the end of the regress of cause and effect, eternal duration (utterly incomprehensible apart from an eternal Person to experience it, as Kant would agree that intangible time has no motion of its own to come out of an inexhaustible past and to pass into an inexhaustible future), and morality, which according to Kant, demands a personal Author and Ruler of the universe, respect for moral law being in the last analysis respect due personality.

ii) Explicit in Kant's Opus Postumum

Then Kant's discontent with his moral argument, and his new conception of God as a Person immediately revealed in the soul of man is explicit in Kant's Opus Postumum. After Kant's death fragments of his work were found, and were published by Reicke in the "Altpreussische Monatschrift" (1882-1884). But in 1920, Adickes published a large number of these fragments. His dating of the twelve main sections is important,
as it is seen that the most of the sections belong to the period between 1797 and the early months of 1800, and that the first and seventh sections were written between December 1800 and Kant's death in 1804. Another and later publication, that of Buchenau, in two volumes, is fuller and more accurate in the eyes of some. These fragments indicate a real change in Kant's teachings. It is significant that the use of "Person" and "Personality" in reference to God is rare in Kant's earlier writings, although frequent in the Opus Postumum. While Kant retains his concept of God as idea or thought, and merely an idea in reference to theoretical arguments for God's existence, yet Kant advances beyond this theoretical view and beyond his moral argument to a view of the immanence of God. Webb gives a possible explanation for this change:

Encouraged perhaps by the open immanentism of his younger contemporaries, he was prepared to repudiate more outspokenly the deism which had been so prominent in his youth...But just because he felt less haunted by this kind of deism, he could now more fully than before recognize in the Moral Law itself...His Personality immediately revealed to the soul as the supreme reality.

There are passages that might be quoted, but the climatic theistic empirical reference seems to be the following: "Daher nur ist ein Gott in mir, um mich, und über mir. 'Gott kann nur

1. See Smith, CCPR, 609-610, 636-637; Brightman, Art.(1937), 212; Collins, Art.(1943), 251, 255, 274.
2. See Webb, KPR, 178-179; Smith, CCPR, 609.
3. See Buchenau, KOP, II, 49, 52, 61, 62, 112.
4. Webb, KPR, 201; see 192-193; Baillie, OKG, 131; Adickes, KOP, 778; MacKinnon, FDR, 42.
2) The desirability of having certitude

a) The urgent call for stress on certitude

Leaving the Kantian foundation for certitude in religious experience, the second consideration on particular grounds is the desirability of having certitude, first because of the urgent call for stress on certitude today. Some one has aptly described the situation in the pathetic words of an uncertain, confused soul:

I wish my room had a floor,
I don't care so much for a door,
But this floating around
Without touching the ground
Is getting to be quite a bore.

Shimer referring to the loss of certainties, writes:

"The empty house is, however, haunted by a thousand devils, damning some men to despair and suicide, others to sensuality and crime, and others to an uncreative indifference." This is in striking contrast to the condition a few years ago, when "men knew why they lived and therefore how to live." And while men are "wondering if there be not some unguessed balm of healing, some transcendent word of liberation in the dim and unfamiliar depth of mystical religion," psychiatrists and psychoanalysts are doing a thriving business.

1. Buchenau, KOP, II, 310; see I, 144, 150, II, 55, 62, 108, 118, 120-121; Adickes, KOP, 819; see 824.
2. Shimer, CC, 29.
3. Shimer, CC, 29; Bosley, QRC, 1; Horton in Macintosh, RR, 277-279; Murphy, UR, 5-10.
4. Bosley, QRC, 4; see Lippman in Lewis, GO, 9-11; Aubrey, PTT, 4-7, 120, 126.
b) The impossibility of living by uncertainties

Then men can not live by uncertainties alone. Even Dewey, who thinks that certainty in any realm is undesirable, has his own certainties underlying his program of action:

Dewey recommends a philosophy 'willing to abandon its supposed task of knowing ultimate reality and to devote itself to a proximate human office.' This can never happen, for philosophy can not perform the second function without the first. Men are like tigers in this respect, which is to the credit of both; they can't enjoy food until they can see their way out of the trap.¹

It might not be merely desirable, but highly important to know the exact time of the departure of one's train, and to be certain that one's watch was correct at the time. Although being thus certain is a complicated process, (requiring reference to "Standard Time" and this, in turn, requiring reference to an observatory, where final appeal is made to the skies to determine the exact time), it is a process that can be carried to a satisfactory conclusion.

3) The right of being psychologically certain

a) The desire for certainty an innate possession of the race

Man has a right to be certain as, first of all, the desire for certainty is an innate possession of the race. "Every human being desires certainty."² This, rather than the fact that "the Western intellect has traveled for the past two

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1. Hocking, Art. (1930), 237; see Dewey, QC, 47.
2. Brightman, RV, 114.
millenia on three great truthward roads"—philosophy, theology, and science, each guaranteeing certainty "to him who would accept its discipline," may be "the clue to our refusal to accept as final the disintegration of the bases of certainty\(^1\); thinkers of our day "are anxiously endeavoring to attain it in one way or another."\(^2\):

The uncertainties and increasing abstractions of pre-war German Liberalism was the seeding ground for the dogmatic anti-intellectualist creed of Nazism. The quest for certainty is an imperative demand of human nature. When ideas betray their inability to give intellectual security, the average man is liable to forsake those ideas which fail him... No more startling example exists than our own generation with its anti-liberal revolt of the masses.\(^3\)

Bosley sees a common movement in modernism and Neo-Thomism in re-assigning certainty to Christian theology.\(^4\) What he says about Neo-Thomism would be taken for granted, but what he says about modernism might need support, such as Aubrey's statement of its purpose:

'To lay hold on the vital insights of our Christian tradition and to make them intelligible to the modern mind'... Modernism is committed to the conviction that certainty (certain truths) sufficient for the direction of personal and social life is to be found in traditional Christian thought and practices.\(^5\)

b) The general reliability of experience

In *God and Ourselves*, by Edwin Lewis, is a chapter with the significant title, "The Right to be Certain," in which

1. Bosley, QRC, 10.  
2. Bosley, QRC, 17.  
3. Meadowcroft, PB, 12.  
faith in the reliability of experience is viewed as an indispensible condition of arriving at truth. Lewis applies it to religious truth: "We exercise it at one point, then why not at another....The man who has met God in experience can always say, 'I have known.'"1 Charles A. Bennett is in agreement: "The mystic seeks the one God...and says he has found Him. He has a right to his certainty."2 The mystic's claim to know too much does not rule him out as an untrustworthy witness, for here as in sense-experience the mind can correct its own mistakes, as Aristotle saw "in detecting a golden thread of reliable truth running through this world of illusion."3 Man has thus "a chartered right to certainty as to God...the justification of which is an important part of the main business of philosophy."4 When one sees philosophers "playing blind-man's bluff...keenly excited at not knowing where they are,"5 he is tempted to ask, "Why can't philosophers be people?" Lewis declares: "Great names to the contrary...probability is not the final resting place of the human mind, for it does not represent the limit of his achievement."6

A Protestant, especially, has the right to be certain, Macintosh sets the record straight on the significance of the Reformation; it is not that men are given the right to think

1. Lewis, GO, 18.
3. Ormond, CP, 574-575; see Dotterer, Art. (1938), 610.
4. Ormond, CP, 17.
5. Sheen, GI, 5; see Hocking, MGHE, viii.
as they please. Sane men think "by intention according to fact." The principle introduced by the Reformation was that truth "is made the inward possession of the believing mind by the convincing power of the Holy Spirit," and that, "unless Christ attests Himself to the soul...the Christian religion cannot begin to live."¹

c) Some absolutes left in an age of uncertainty

In an age of relativity and uncertainty, there are still some absolutes, such as absolute values, universally and eternally valid for persons, and "an existential reality so divine in quality and function as to be a worthy object of religious trust and worship."² The astronomer seems certain of the movement of certain planets, being able to predict the exact time of their appearance in a certain locality. The chemist seems certain of what he will get when he puts H₂ and O together. The customer is certain that there are sixteen ounces in a pound, and sometimes makes certain that he gets it by a complaint to the Bureau of Weights and Measures which has absolute, fixed standards. The farmer is certain that seed corn will not produce a wheat crop. The moralist is certain that "whatsoever a man (or a nation) soweth" in moral matters "that shall he (or it) also reap."

Dr. Brightman offers a reason for the "general assault in the intellectual world against everything that pretends to

¹ Macintosh, TMT, 6, 7.  ² Macintosh, PRK, vii.
ultimateness or finality"; it is an "overemphasis on the first half of the apostolic injunction, 'Prove all things, hold fast that which is good.'"¹ And Brightman names obligation as an absolute, approving of Kant's "certainty of law in the moral life."² Dean Inge contends for absolute truth, as "without an absolute standard there could be no relativism" and "There are certain convictions about the universe which a man can hardly doubt unless he is defending a thesis."³ In the apostolic injunction above may be seen the true scientific spirit, tentativeness ("prove all things") and certitude on some things --the things that have stood the test ("hold fast that which is good"), a combination that makes for growth and progress, illustrated by the progress made possible in walking when one foot is firmly on solid ground while the other foot is raised tentatively in the air.⁴ That certitude is consistent with growth and progress will be seen also in the next point.

4) The reasonableness of being certain

a) Unshakable certitude versus complete knowledge

The reasonableness of being certain is seen, in the first place, in the distinction between unshakable certitude and complete knowledge. Confusion exists in some minds between certitude of one fact and perfect knowledge of all facts. In a chapter on the necessity of faith, Trueblood quotes Hume and Saint Paul:

1. Brightman, RV, 38.
2. Brightman, RV, 48; see Murphy, UR, 138-139.
3. Inge, in Muirhead, BCP, 197-198.
4. Vide supra, 262.
'It must certainly be allowed that nature has kept us at a great distance from her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities and objects.'
'I know in part.'

It is significant that these men so far apart in epistemological beliefs use not "believe" nor "have an opinion" but "know" and "knowledge," both implying that we know some things. "Men never claim to know the whole, but they do claim to know things, other persons, value and even God." And Trueblood goes beyond mere certitude: "There is good evidence that we really do have some knowledge." Trueblood's narrow view of faith makes him reluctant to say that men may know beyond a shadow of doubt. One can grant with him, however, that one who is more certain of God than of himself should not be said to have "absolute" certainty as that is a term for God rather than for man. But who can deny to a man the right of being "unshakable" in his certitude about some things? The scientist and agnostic George John Romanes "could not ignore the fact that millions of persons had claimed and continue to claim genuine fellowship with the living God," with the result that he became a believer, a "convinced theist." Why? Because he was an agnostic of the open-minded type who say, "We do not know," rather than the dogmatic type who say, "We can not know." This scientist and one time agnostic must have become convinced that one can become acquainted with God even though doomed by

2. Trueblood, LB, 51. 4. Trueblood, LB, 63-64.
his finitude to remain in imperfect or incomplete knowledge of Him.¹

Using the expression of the Apostle Paul, "the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God," Pringle-Pattison writes:

'Inaccessible' carries us back to the barren abstraction of the substance, hidden behind its qualities. 'Inexhaustible' implies no such unmeaning dualism; it suggests a self-revealing Power, whose manifestation is limited only by the capacity of the recipient.²

That the recipient can experience better than he can express is seen in the apostle's phrase "unlawful to utter." But this same one, the very one who is quoted so frequently as saying "We know in part," also said, "I know whom I have believed."³ The writer ventures to suggest that it might have been difficult to convince the apostle that he had not seen the glorified Christ or that it was only a highly probable event.

Edwin Lewis declares that Lippman is right when he says that a religion that is not completely certain is in process of disintegration:

Brightman takes issue with him but not successfully because of his entirely wrong assumption that complete certainty requires complete proof. All that complete certainty requires is sufficient proof....Statements made about God are not to be put on the same level as the indubitable certainty of the fact of God as yielded by the process of religious experience.⁴

1. See Wieman, RESM, 24; Brown, PC, 24-28.
2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 166; see Martin, GA, 45, 63.
3. II Tim. 1:12 (under-scoring the writer's).
4. Lewis, 60, 24-25; see Martin, GA, 45.
b) Certitude for self versus proof for others

Then, the reasonableness of being certain is seen in the consideration of certainty for self versus proof for others. The mystic Rufus Jones is doubtless correct in his thought that: "No subjective experience, however momentous and significant...for the person who has it, can settle for everybody else the question: Is there in the universe a God who is personal and all loving?"¹

It is a personal matter. As Trueblood says: "If a man were to deny that there is salt upon the table, you could not reduce him to an absurdity."² The man who has tasted the salt, on the other hand, will not be disturbed in his own certainty by the uncertainty or the unbelief of the one whom he is unable to convince.³

'One inner fort there is,' wrote Francis Thompson, 'whose key only God holds, whose gates open only to his nod, whose floor he alone can tread, when God takes possession of that inner fort, the soul knows and there is nothing more to be said.' 'The God who answers, let Him be God.'⁴

After all, "the proof of the pudding is the eating."

With the best formal proof in the world hanging limp, the one who is certain but has difficulty in making another feel a like certitude, has one recourse; he can say, "Taste (experience) and see (find out for yourself) that the Lord is good." It is a self-validating, not another-convincing experience.

¹ Jones, SMR, xxix.
² Trueblood, LB, 36.
³ See Lewis, GQ, 27.
⁴ Lewis, GQ, 27-28.
Immediate experience of God psychologically more compelling than the facts of science.

In the third place the reasonableness of being certain is seen in the view that the immediate experience of God is psychologically more compelling than certitude concerning the facts of science. Strictly speaking, there is no direct experience of that which is external. It is true that some, with reference to physical things, talk of a "direct relation" (realists), "direct knowledge" (natural realists), "direct perception" (neo-realists), "direct presentation", "direct acquaintance", and "non-inferential awareness" (critical realism), "direct apprehension" (Dennes), and "direct cognitive contact" (Adams); but even in the context of such expressions, is often the recognition of a process of mediation or of media between the soul (the real experiencer) and the external object, such as sense organs and the nervous system. Even when the body is in direct contact with the object, it is acknowledged that the mind does not "press its nose up against the material object." In the illustration of Russell, we do not directly experience the table, but only the perception.

1. Vide supra, 210-216; see Rashdall, PR, 16-17.
4. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 126.
5. Macintosh, RJ, 201, 205-206.
9. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 126; see Knudson, PP, 102; Duce, KGN, 127, 161.
of its sense-data.\textsuperscript{1} "The world with which we come in contact is merely a state of our own or anybody's consciousness."\textsuperscript{2} C. I. Lewis states the same fact in another way: "The world of experience is not given in experience; it is constructed by thought from the data of sense."\textsuperscript{3} In the relation between the perceiver and the perceived, there is "a process which is complicated... which involves many changes":

Experience is no longer the immediate apprehension of fact; it is the transmission of a message conveyed from the object to the perceiver by relays of material messengers.\textsuperscript{4}

Balfour declares that the progress of science has made the process more complicated, and that science teaches us that "the physical causes of perception are inferred but not perceived," and that "the real material world has been driven... further and further into the realm of the unseen."\textsuperscript{5}

Thus, there is no direct acquaintance with external objects. We have immediate knowledge of the presentation, but not of the object itself.\textsuperscript{6} Hartshorne restricts immediate knowledge to internal activity.\textsuperscript{7} Russell grants some direct acquaintance with the "I", while rejecting all such acquaintance with an external object:

2. Rashdall, PR, 49.
3. Lewis, MWO, 29; see Inge in Muirhead, CBP, 196; Duce, KGN, 493.
4. Balfour, TH, 158.
5. Balfour, TH, 158; 162.
6. See Lewis, MWO, 292.
7. See Hartshorne, MVG, 183.
There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths.... We know by description.

In contrast to this, much evidence has already been presented that distinctive religious experience is unmediated (i.e. non-inferred, intuitive or self-evident, and in the present), in a degree not true of physical objects, and that consequently the knowledge resulting is by acquaintance rather than by description, i.e. of God rather than about God. Martineau, speaking of revelation, declares that God comes "close to the soul":

It must be immediate, living God with living man, Spirit present with spirit; knowing Him, indeed, but rather 'being known of Him'...The disclosure must be self-disclosure; the evidence self-evidence; the apprehension, as we say, intuitive; something given and not found.

Implied in this, and due particularly to the fact that religious experience is basically feeling and that there is cognitive value in feeling (the polarity of feeling and thought), is the evidence that the knowledge of God is more "coercive" than the knowledge of things and of other minds. This goes beyond the position of Knudson and others. For instance, Trueblood, at one stage in his thought, placed the knowledge of the external world and of God upon the same basis—that of faith. But in view of what has already been said and will be

1. Russell, PP, 78, 74-75.  
3. Martineau, SAR, 305.  
5. Vide supra, 260 (see Russell).  
6. Vide supra, 229-231.
said, it is questionable whether "the bird in the tree," (the perception of which is "as much in my mind as my perception of God") can come so near to man's spirit as can God. For Bradley: "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion... The man who demands a reality more solid knows not what he seeks." Pringle-Pattison and others agree with this. In fact, theologians in general take a stronger stand: "In the common opinion of the theologians there is a greater certitude in Divine faith than in any human science." Griffiths, speaking of the Absolute who is not a notion but an experience, a Reality in which we live and move and have our being, declares:

He is more immediate than perceptive experience. I experience God more intimately indeed when I am known of Him than when I know Him. Being known is the only perfect way of knowing.

Martineau makes a distinction between the immanence of God in the energies of nature and in the authority of conscience. Wiley makes somewhat of the same distinction between the metaphysical immanence of God not only in nature but in man in general, and God's ethical immanence in men not separated from Him by sin. It is this latter idea that is being used in this dissertation in reference to the mystical experience.

Sheen gives the general view of religious experience:

1. Trueblood, LB, 204; see 203.
2. Bradley, AR, 499.
3. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 252; McTaggart, SDR, 84-86; Bowne, THE, 26-27.
5. Griffiths, GIE, 213; see Martineau, SAR, 305.
7. See Wiley, CT, II, 276-277.
A certain experience of God in the heart of man, thanks to which God is attained without a reasoning process and with a certitude stronger than that attaching to scientific truth....Those who have those experiences cannot be moved from them by logic, or science or persuasion.¹

Sheen implies that Professor Alexander has made this immobility reasonable by calling religious experience an "instinct," which like our appetite for food and drink, does not "make its object," but "discovers it."²

Trueblood advances beyond his position that religious experience is as certain as sense-experience by asserting that its "evidence of objectivity is even better than in natural science," and by his use of Newton and Pascal as examples, the former being more certain of his "inward conversion" than that he had hands and feet, and the latter writing "FIRE" as descriptive of "his life-shaking experience."³ Descartes bases certitude upon subjective experience, which as immediate, gave more certitude than the experience of external things. He was thus more certain of God than of his own existence.⁴

This was not merely on the grounds of discursive reasoning: "In spite of the syllogistic form which Descartes gave...this proof is rather intuitive...an immediate apprehension."⁵

Baillie sees in the mystics' conviction that God is revealed to man's "thoughts" (i.e. that through them "we can get closer

1. Sheen, GI, 25; see James, PU, 307–308.
2. Sheen, GI, 25; see Alexander, STD, II, 352, 374, 382, 385.
3. Trueblood, LB, 214, 201.
4. See Descartes, MPP, 54–55.
5. Levy-Bruhl, in Descartes, MPP, xviii.
to God than we can get to the things of sense by seeing and touching and tasting them"), the Platonic vision, God being "visible to the mind alone." 1 Gildea writes in a similar strain: "Now we never stand in the presence of a table or a door; we stand in the presence only of a person." 2 Of course, as the mystics stress, only the pure in heart can stand in the presence of the Lord. 3

d) Immediate experience of God psychologically more coercive than the facts of psychology

Then, the immediate experience of God is psychologically more coercive than the facts of psychology. Without holding a brief for the isolation of human minds (for the knowledge of self depends upon knowledge of the not-self, the will, for instance, needing the clash with other wills in order to come to consciousness of its reality and claims), 4 one can reasonably infer that man has no direct experience of another human person. Those who are investigating telepathy often describe it in terms of mediation. 5 And while Boodin holds that "inter-subjective continuities" are "felt" and "felt to be different from physical continuities," yet when he talks of sending a mental impulse along with the voice over an electrical wire, he is still using the language of mediation while contending for "the immediate character of social companionship." 6

1. Baillie, IR, 227; see Buckham, MML, 123, 144.
2. Gildea, Art. (1890), 50.
4. See Kant, KrV, A 357-359; Boodin, RU, 194-195.
adds that his theory does not support a telepathic hypothesis except as social experience indicates it, and that "our social continuities become no less mediated by a nervous system, end organs and an intervening physical world than before."¹

Ward, also, speaking of a "rapport" between spirits, grants physical mediation.² Likewise Lossky, who holds that independent selves are in "epistemological coordination," maintains that the intuitive theory does not imply that one can "contemplate his neighbor's life without seeing his face or hearing his voice, or perceiving any of his physical manifestations."³ Bennett, who appears at first to teach direct communication of human minds, later introduces the media of sensation and the medium of "an umpire above finite ideas," and "Absolute Knower."⁴ Hooking, while not careful in his use of "immediate" and "direct," teaches that while human souls are in real communication, they "cannot touch each other, cannot experience each other."⁵ Sorley may be allowed to give the conclusion to this point: "Therefore, can no mind directly perceive another."⁶

If, as it appears there is no direct experience by man of other human minds, there is no strict "acquaintance" with them.⁷ So that while some argue that we can be as certain of God as of human beings, making it a matter of inference in both cases,⁸ others declare that we can be more certain of God, as

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1. Boodin, RU, 197-198.
3. Lossky, Art. (1948), 152; see 150, 159.
4. Bennett, CVM, 127.
5. Sorley, MVIQ, 265.
6. Sorley, MVIQ, 265; Russell, PP 76-77.
7. Rashdall, PR, 110-111.
we can become acquainted with Him through immediate experience. Evidence will be presented that they are correct in this belief. But a preliminary consideration is necessary first.

5) The psychology of being certain: conditioning

a) Introduction

As already indicated, there are psychological or conditioning factors preceding immediate religious experience. The psychologist distinguishes between what is immediate, the given, and that which explains it. Psychologically, if not causally, all perception (except perhaps initial perception) is conditioned by apperception; experience can be anticipated. Royce calls attention to the ancient doctrine that the object of thought "is already defined even before we undertake to know it." For the effects found in immediate religious experience there are causes—human and divine: "The 'immediacy' of the mystic has its external relations...some part of the meaning of this experience is to be discovered in its external career."

Functional psychology looks for these conditions, the "original moving impulses which give vitality to any form of experience." Religious perception like all perception is in a complex. The expression "right religious adjustment" suggests the divine side of the conditioning process:

1. Vide supra, 190-191.
2. See Kant, KrV, B 137; Coe, PFR, 157; Macintosh, TES, 31-32, 107; Brightman, Art. (1918), 71-76.
4. Hocking, MGHE, 355; see Hoffding, TPOR, 96, 162.
6. See Martin, EPR, 74; Macintosh, RR, 337-338.
It is the divine as revealed to the individual that has rightful authority over the individual rather than the mere outcome of some other individual's having been inspired by a religious experience of his own...In religion as in logic and morals, the ultimate authority is objective without being purely external, and internal without being purely subjective. We are not obliged to infer, to decide, or to respond religiously, save as our reason, our own conscience, or our own religious nature find what appeals to it as logical, or right, or divine. But...we ought not to feel free to infer, to decide or to respond religiously just as we please, without regard to logic, or moral principle, or revelation.¹

b) Conditioning by:

(i) Christian community

As people in general are conditioned in their thinking at first by their intellectual environment, so the Christian is at first conditioned in his beliefs by the Christian community.² As a member of society, he is to some extent a product of society.³ The mystic accepts the idea of God as held by his generation or "social milieu."⁴ Traditional ideas usually "evoke" religious experience. This shows the value of tradition in its relation to the Scriptures and to the church; its ideas "ready made, have only to be translated into experience." But this is not necessarily a restriction, an imposition, against which Höfding warns,⁵ any more than the laboratory manual is an element of bondage to the experimenter who is

1. Macintosh, TES, 110-111.
2. See Pratt, PRB, 199; Rall, FT, 76; Hickman, IPR, 476-477; Ames, Art. (1915), 256; Rashdall, PR, 109.
guided by it. There should be criteria of Christian experience. "Distinctively Christian religiousness is determined (in part) by distinctive Christian doctrine; Christianity is neither a doctrine nor a life, but a life colored by doctrine." And as implied by Tennant and Aubrey, experience and doctrine act and react upon each other.

(ii) Bible.—The Bible is a conditioner of immediate religious experience. Sometimes it works directly, and sometimes indirectly (as through the Christian community). "From the idealistic point of view all knowledge may be looked upon as a partial communication to the human soul of the thoughts...of the divine Mind." Not even an atheist, however, should talk about "the unassisted human intellect." It is just as possible to make discoveries within the sphere of the inner life as within that of the outer. And it is only natural that the one who desires to make them should follow the instructions of the "Laboratory Manual," the Christian Scriptures, and be conditioned by them, for there is uniformity in the Christian life, the operation of cause and effect, and stimuli and response. If God is to be known, He must reveal Himself; the record of this self-disclosure, in turn, becomes the conditioner of God's revelation in other lives:

1. Tennant, PT, I, 327.
2. See Tennant, PT, I, 327; Aubrey, Art. (1930), 562, 567.
3. Rashdall, PR, 141.
4. See Inge, Art. (1948), 46; Rashdall, PR, 141, 138; Bradshaw, PFT, 27; Balfour, TH, 274; Griffiths, GIE, 16.
Apart from revelation, reason cannot satisfactorily account for the content of religious experience. Reason does not constitute, produce, or create reality... It rather guides, relates, interprets and evaluates what is given in consciousness.\(^1\)

So the Bible, both the record and the source of revelation, "mediates the Christian experience of God."\(^2\)

(iii) Imagination and will.—Imagination and will are conditioning factors in immediate religious experience. "A very considerable number of experimental psychologists doubt that there is any 'imageless thought.'"\(^3\) It is held that there is no ideal "that has not been fashioned by the imagination out of the data of actual experience," and that "the mind can no more create ideals ex nihilo than it can create reality."\(^4\) Montague sees the material of imagination in stored-up traces of past memory inheritance, and calls attention to the power of imagination in the solution of problems:

The chief difference between the mystic and the ordinary man may consist in this: that in the ordinary man, so long as he is awake, the power of imagination is weaker than the sense of perceptual reality, while in the mystic the reverse is true.\(^5\)

Kroner makes imagination the tool of faith in the approach to God. He thinks that Kant made a mistake in assuming that faith "can renounce imagination without losing its character," and that "reason can establish a rational faith".

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1. Schiller, Art. (1931), 16; see Horton, TSS, 16-18; Tillich, IH, 34; Baillie, OKG, 112; Hooking, MGHE, 229.
5. Montague, WK, 56; see 55.
The content of faith is not only supersensuous, it is superrational too. And this...ingredient in the content of faith is furnished by imagination. A purely rational faith is no real faith....Imagination, not reason, is privileged to receive the Word of God; it is the proper region of the mind in which the Holy can appear....The idea of God is not a true concept; it is a holy image.¹

As faith is a voluntary activity,² imagination is a tool of the will; thus will is also a factor in the conditioning process.

(iv) Feeling.—Feeling is also a conditioner of immediate religious experience. Feeling plays upon the material received directly from the community and indirectly from the Bible, and is clothed in the garments of the imagination. Feeling, especially as love, awe, and humility, is preparatory to the activity of faith.³

(v) Faith.—Finally, one is conditioned by faith for the immediate experiencing of God.⁴ A child grows up in a religious home, church and community; he inherits beliefs. "It is not Christian experience that creates faith but rather faith that creates Christian experience."⁵ Baillie says: "We can have no religious experience prior to and independently of religious faith."⁶ Baillie goes on to reverse faith and experience which is simply a recognition that the faith of the reader of the Bible is based upon the religious

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1. Kroner, PF, 133-142.  
2. Vide supra, 191-192.  
3. See Kroner, PF, 2; McCreary, Art. (1948), 81.  
4. Vide supra, 190-191.  
5. Knudson, PFR, 163.  
6. Baillie, IR, 231; see Rall, FT, 54.
experience of others—the writers of the Bible as well as the readers of the Bible. But the revelation experience of the writers of the Bible is in turn ultimately conditioned by faith, faith in the form of an intuitive belief in God or a belief in a primitive revelation. Knudson views revelation and faith as correlative terms: "There can be no true faith without revelation and no true revelation without faith.... The true starting point of theology is to be found in revelation."¹ Thus, "Religion lives not by sight but by insight"; for through insight man "comes into touch...with the Unseen God."² Temple, also, traces faith behind tradition: "In the totality of religious history, tradition and belief depend on experience."³ This is a reasonable attitude:

When we rely on authority, we are, in most cases, doing the most reasonable thing we can do. It is far more reasonable for me to rely on the opinion of Mr. Millikan in regard to cosmic rays than it is to rely on my own unaided and highly amateurish efforts.⁴

Edwin Lewis explicitly applies this to faith in the testimony of God: "But the experience cannot be known until the revelation is accepted."⁵ The revelation is accepted by faith. Lewis has made clear here that faith in one of its aspects precedes the mystical experience.⁶ On the broad platform previously laid down, there is room for faith after the

¹ Knudson, PTR, 165-166. ² Baillie, IR, 232; Pennoch, GCG, 27. ³ Temple, NMG, 336. ⁴ Trueblood, LB, 72. ⁵ Lewis, FD, 14; see Rall, FT, 54. ⁶ Vide supra, 284.
experience, for there is a post-hypothetical faith as well as a hypothetical or conditioning faith.\(^1\) The mystic can still trust in God, even though he no longer doubts the existence of God.\(^2\) The immediacy advocated is a mediated immediacy, as has been implied,\(^3\) and will be explicitly stated shortly.

6) The experience of being certain: human-divine interaction

a) Necessity.--It is necessary that religious experience be immediate. To Hegel religion meant "dass nicht nur wir in der Beziehung zu Gott stehen, sondern auch Gott in der Beziehung zu uns stehe."\(^4\) He taught that if the relation were real, the knowledge will be real, and that there is no a priori reason for denying contact with God. In fact: "If a man does not know God, it is not God's fault, but man's own."\(^5\) To be understood, religion must be experienced:

No merely external historical knowledge of religion suffices....No amount of familiarity with the convictions which have been held about God can fill the place of personal experience of God.\(^6\)

Behind the theistic proofs, Hegel saw immediate consciousness of God, certainty of His existence.\(^7\) Today, many see the necessity for the same background:

If a truth about God is communicated to us, from whatever source, it can carry justifiable

\(^{1}\) Vide supra, 128, 262-263.
\(^{2}\) Bennett, DRK, 18-19.
\(^{3}\) Vide supra, 284-289.
\(^{4}\) Hegel, JUB, xiv, 46.
\(^{5}\) Schilling, ERH, 160; see Hegel, JUB, xiv, 49, 55.
\(^{6}\) Schilling, ERH, 49; see Hegel, JUB, xii, 8-9, 558.
\(^{7}\) See Schilling, ERH, 35-36; DeBurgh, TPR, 138-139.
conviction only as it is corroborated by the immediate knowledge of God as He is revealed to us within.¹

In criticism of the so-called inferential method of knowing God, Procter declares:

Either God is directly given to us in acquaintance or else we find ourselves with an impassable gulf between thought and existence....We have to conclude that, either, the God known in the end is not other than that which is given us in acquaintance from which we start, or else none of these proofs is valid.²

Procter sees no explanation for religion's "obstinate hold upon mankind" apart from its continual refreshment from immediate experiences of God by man: "But tradition explains nothing. One cannot dispose of questions by perpetually referring them to the preceding generation."³ In similar vein, James writes: "Churches when once established live at second-hand upon tradition, but the founders of every church owed their power to the fact of their direct personal communion with the divine."⁴

b) Awareness: a mediated immediacy

The experience of being certain is an awareness of God, a mediated immediacy. Hegel suggests this phrase:

Religious knowledge is essentially a mediated knowledge, but all the same it is not admissible to look in a one-sided way upon mere mediated knowledge as being real and true.⁵

For Hegel, religious knowledge was not "mere mediated knowledge, but all the same it is not admissible to look in a one-sided way upon mere mediated knowledge as being real and true.⁵

1. Garnett, GIU, 89; see Leuba, FTM, 304; Hooking, MGHE, 356-455; Procter, FKR, 13-14. ⁶ Procter, FKR, 14. ³ Procter, FKR, 64; see 63. ⁴ James, VRE, 30. ⁵ Hegel, PR, 164.
knowledge" for he believed in revelation, a knowledge received directly from God. He asserts that if "God" and "I" were One, "there would be immediate religion free from any mediation."¹ If they were one, there would, of course, be no relation, no interaction. But on the other hand, revelation for Hegel is an eternal event, eternally repeated²:

For Hegel, the main evidence of the truth of Christianity, therefore, is...the Spirit himself bearing witness with my spirit...a direct and eternally possible contact between man and God, spirit and Spirit.³

That is, "God is, and gives Himself to men by coming into a relation with them."⁴ Hegel uses the term "immediate" for the knowledge derived from this contact, and calls for the synthesis of the antitheses between the two kinds of knowledge, for apart they are "one-sided abstractions."⁵

In an article largely Hegelian in tone, Dr. Brightman notes that the human spirit seemingly is dissatisfied both with and without immediacy, and decides that it is not an "either-or" opposition but a "both-and" synthesis. He declares that the mystic's claim to direct knowledge of God can not be made apart from mediation before and after the immediate experience:

But the moment when all relations cease, when there is no longer like or unlike, more or less, quality or quantity, is the moment when immediacy becomes nothingness, and all conscience is annihilated....No present

3. Schilling, ERH, 123; see Hegel, PR, II, 200.
moment of intuition or revelation or sense or passion has spiritual meaning by itself alone. ... If we are to be empirical ... we must go beyond empirical immediacy. ... Examine the immediacy which is to escape the claims of reason, and it turns out to contain reason in disguise. 1

But immediacy itself may be said to contain reason in disguise in the sense of reason being implicit in feeling and intuition as has been noted. 2 Brightman practically recognizes this:

Not only is the immediate the necessary starting point of all thought and the point at which all eventual empirical verification occurs; it seems also to be the point at which objective reality is revealed, free from all distortions. In the conviction that immediacy is the truth about the real many types of individuals agree. 3

That the immediate is free from error is quite generally agreed. 4 Brightman does not deny that there is an experience of immediacy in any sense, but only that there is any "absolutely simple and isolated present." 5 Conditioning of the immediate experience of God has not only been admitted in this dissertation; it has been stressed. Immediacy, thus, has not been used in the sense of being out of relations.

Concerning immediacy in the sense of that which is present in consciousness in the "specious-present" (which Brightman accepts), the claim has not been made that the human spirit can

1. Brightman, Art. (1934), 90, 97; see 87, 95.
3. Brightman, Art. (1934), 89; see 92.
4. Vide supra, 212-214; see Lovejoy, RD, 23.
"apprehend in a single grasp all the meaning of God."\(^1\) With Brightman the writer agrees also that while theoretically there may be an active and a passive aspect of the self in immediacy, actually there is no such division of the self, i.e. that the "actual, indivisible whole of present consciousness is all equally present, equally direct and immediate."\(^2\) But with many others the writer holds that there is some cognitive content in the immediate experience of God, and that "God and the soul are brought to a unio mystica of will and of love in a personal relationship closer than that between persons and things or between human persons. Consequently, whereas Brightman thinks that it takes more faith to accept the presence of God as a reality than it does the presence of a human being, the writer thinks it requires less faith; there is general agreement that the mystic claims more certitude concerning God than concerning anything else or anybody else.\(^3\) But the significant fact is that while Dr. Brightman does not use the expression "mediated immediacy" in his article on immediacy, he does declare that "every actual experience is both immediate and mediate."\(^4\)

Bennett views the mystical experience as a coming into the immediate presence of God consequent upon taking certain preparatory steps toward God. It is a mediated immediacy also

1. Brightman, Art. (1934), 91; vide supra, 276-278.
2. Brightman, Art. (1934), 93; vide supra, 241, 244-246, 254-258.
because the mystic does not deny idea but only regards it as insufficient. "Mediate" implies "immediate," for something has to be mediated.\(^1\)

While Ritschl was antagonistic to mysticism, rejecting the traditional ideas of immediacy, he implied that there is an immediate relation to God in his teaching on adoption—a relationship as close as "between the head and the members of a family."\(^2\) On the other hand, mediation is suggested in Ritschl's regarding of history as essential to Christianity, and in his making history and metaphysics criteria of religious truth.\(^3\)

Duce holds essentially the same position, i.e. that in the strictest sense knowledge is immediacy plus rational understanding. He agrees with the Neo-Thomists' insistence on the latter, but differs with them in seeing an awareness of God prior to true knowledge. Knowledge becomes true knowledge when there is reflection upon the experience of "the Presence."\(^4\) It is freely acknowledged that the experience is conditioned,\(^5\) but it is contended that this does not mitigate against its immediateness. That the mystic gets some of the what of his experience from tradition and other instruction, does not invalidate the that of his experience. Knowing God and knowing

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1. See Bennett, CVM, v, vi, 10, 47, 52-54, 145.
2. Brightman, CRT, 19; see 20.
3. See Brightman, CRT, 32, 49.
4. See Duce, KGN, 532, 536.
5. Vide supra, 288-293.
about God are two distinct facts; certainty of God's existence and an exhaustive knowledge of His nature are not the same. One must distinguish the "immediate certainty contained in religious feeling from arguments drawn from the feeling,"¹ as well as from prior knowledge:

For though we trace the ideas of the mystic to some social tradition that he imbibed, the tradition as a whole remains to be accounted for. The religious belief of humanity taken in its grand totality cannot be a product of external suggestion....It is clearly not the result of critical or analytical reflection. It has been evolved somehow from within the mind of man.²

Now that "somehow" must be immediate experience, for nothing can be evolved that is not first involved; ideas, even the ideas of dreams and hallucinations, have their objective causes, even though they are out of proper relation. Naturally then, the mystic "will not admit that his certainty of spiritual things is self-produced."³ Macintosh sees the explanation of the idea of God in the sum total of the religious experiments that have been conducted through the ages, from which there has come some general conclusions concerning God.⁴ Martin questions the scientific character of the religious perception advocated by Macintosh on the ground that it is "colored by personal commitments to certain ideals chiefly associated with a certain religious tradition,"⁵ but what scientist is objective

4. See Macintosh, TES, 242; Martin, EPR, 75-76.
5. Martin, EPR, 276.
and disinterested to the point of having no commitments, "chiefly associated with a certain" scientific tradition, his perception not being preceded by apperception? Is not the scientist also "governed by his expectations"? And neither religious nor scientific commitments need be blind and irrational. The scientist "must first be as unoriginal" as the mystic. That is, both must find out what has been done by others in the field and conform the details of the experiment to the knowledge thus gained. Coe grants that the "convert" to Christ "does not come into his fellowship with God by inferring from the phenomenon of conversion to a personal cause of it," and that conversion makes the things he has been told "real" to him, for now he has acquaintance where before he had "knowledge about them." Thus, "It is no discredit to inward mystical religion to show that social suggestion....has played a great part," for the mystic, like any one else, is "partly a product of the social and intellectual environment." In the sane mystic's dependence upon the Christian Scriptures and his connection with the experience of the race, Jones sees evidence that the mediated immediacy of the mystic is simply Christianity alive and vocal in personal experience.

God is the object of experience in the mediated immediacy of love. Wieman, asking whether God is an object that

1. See Coe, POR, 173; Hooking, MGHE, 479; Murphy, UR, 105-108.
3. Jones, SMR, xxxiii-xxxiv; see Rashdall, PR, 112-113, 118.
4. Jones, SMR, xxxv; see xv-xvii, xxii.
enters into our immediate awareness or is an object of specula-
tion, answers that He "is not a logico-mathematical entity," but rather an object of acquaintance and immediate experience akin to that of love and beauty.¹ As all men are certain of the unseen air, and as many are sure of intangible love, truth, and justice, "so others are sure of God."² Knowledge of love is like the knowledge of one's own soul. Knowledge of both self and the God of love is an immediate intuition, expressed in terms of activity.³ Duce reacts against the Neo-Thomists' limitation of knowledge, holding that there are types of cognition irreducible to sense-knowledge (as for instance, knowledge of self), and that reality is immediately presented in value experiences.⁴ Neo-Thomistic sensory empiricism is a practical denial of all religious experience, as it precludes any investigation of the claims of immediate awareness of God, denies to religion immanence, and substitutes rationalism and externalism. Duce is alert to the significance of this for belief in revelation; this immediate experience is reduced to an abstract dogma, while religious experience in general loses the dynamic element so essential to certitude and life trans-
formation.⁵ While God can not be "sensed", He can be "per-
ceived"; for though He is the Other (in the sense of different), He is also immanent.⁶ Those who desire to make a personal

¹. Wieman, RESM, 27, 29, 204; see Martin, EPR, 91.
². Rall, FT, 85.
³. See Garrigou-Lagrange, ADC, I, 175; Duce, KGN, 390-391.
⁴. See Duce, KGN, 495–
⁵. See Duce, KGN, 207, 331-322, 497.
⁶. See Duce, KGN, 518-520.
verification of facts, do not need to rest content with second-hand knowledge of God. Garrigou-Lagrange, following Aquinas, uses language that implies this spiritual perception of God in direct awareness of Him:

Finalement elle montre comment, par la pratique des vertus et, la docilité au Saint-Esprit l'âme arrive non plus seulement, à croire les mystères révélés, mais a les goûter... à vivre dans une union pour ainsi dire continuelle avec le Sainte Trinité qui habite en nous.

He goes on to speak of infused knowledge or acquaintance, "qui est comme le prélude de la vision beatifique," and of the "third purification" or "third conversion," described in the words of Saint John of the Cross as "an inflowing of God into the soul, which purges it from its ignorances and imperfections and fills it with perfect love.

Viewing the final and all-inclusive function of religion as communion with God, and reacting against "over-intellectualized accounts of religious experience and philosophical doctrines of God," which are "bought with a price," Boodin urges the substitution of the God of intimate personal relations for the abstract and remote God. With the God of simpler souls "men can enter into 'rapport,'" become aware of as one experiences sunshine or beauty, and be sure of, just as "those who experience color and beauty do not doubt the reality of them":

1. See Duce, KGN, 518-520.
4. See Martin, EPR, 54.
5. Boodin, in Macintosh, RR, 479.
Religious experience...presents an immediate aspect of awareness and a mediate aspect of interpretation. The immediate experience of reality in religion is a unique fact, as the experience of music.\(^1\)

The immediate aspect of awareness, he describes as "immediate luminosity,"\(^2\) which, though in need of interpretation and verification, does not find its reality in them. Buckham is in agreement with this:

But the interpretation lies so close to the experience and arises so directly from it that it validates rather than depletes it. It is true also that the experience needs to be awakened by contact with those in whom it has become regnant; but that does not disqualify it....Arguments are after-thoughts...and are wholly insufficient to account for the certainty with which the soul recognizes: Thou art! and I am directly related to Thee.\(^3\)

Buckham illustrates his meaning by reference to the sky in the marginal area of consciousness as an object of general awareness when the mind is dwelling on thoughts which are not "sky-born," but which "by an act of transfer of attention becomes vitally real by being brought within the focus of consciousness." Thus God may become "the Center of awareness, an Object of experience of the most vivid and absorbing character."\(^4\) Buckham seeks to banish the remoteness of the mystical experience of "the immediate sense of Supreme Reality" by giving a modern illustration, that of Charles G. Finney, "when he sat alone in his office and felt the love of God roll over him in waves."\(^5\) Thus, there may be certainty of the "larger life encircling our own"

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1. Boodin, in Macintosh, RR, 479.
2. Martin, EPR, 53.
5. Buckham, MML, 52.
in the feeling of awareness which has either a direct or indi-
rect reference towards the religious Object "in cognition and
endeavor." The God who for some is at the farther end of a
chain of reasoning, is for the mystic an Object of "immediate
intuition," Absolute Reality reached directly by the intuitive
"leap," which gives "first-hand conviction that God is near at
hand and directly operating."2

DeBurgh stands opposed to the Neo-Thomistic view of medi-
ated knowledge, particularly that of symbols and analogy:

And is not the real presence of the divine Spirit exhibited, veritably and not simply by
analogy...in the experience of the individual soul of the mutual love of God and man?3

Baillie speaks of the mediated knowledge of God that he
had as a boy, and points to the concept of history as "something
that happens in the present" as an explanation of the apparent
contradiction in the expression "mediated immediacy":

In Christ we know God not by argument but by
personal acquaintance. In Christ God comes to
us directly. We must not understand our Lord's
mediatorship in such a way as to forget the words,
'I and the Father are one.'4

  c) Not an inference but a unique personal encounter:
"contact," revelation, confrontation and com-
presence

Then the experience of being certain is not an inference5

1. Pratt, PRB, 43, 295, 297;
Laird, PS, 89.
2. Macintosh, PRK, 178; see
Hocking, MGHE, 179; Pringle-
Pattison, TIG, 301-302;
Rall, SM, 63-64.
4. Baillie, OKG, 196-197;
see 183; Hocking, MGHE,
357-360; Bixler, Art.
(1935), 301-303.
5. See Brightman, Art.
(1934), 92.
but a unique personal encounter that is variously described as a contact, revelation, confrontation, and compresence.

In a protest against scholastic intellectualism with its merely inferred God, Baillie agrees with DeBurgh that, "we can no more prove God's existence" than we can prove the existence of our fellow men as "our knowledge of the one as of the other is founded on the experience of their presence." It is not that Baillie would dispense with all inference on the subject, but rather that he is giving a place to non-inferential elements, such as the Kantian a priori, an intuition respecting society and God. He quotes Sir Arthur Eddington in a Swarthmore lecture:

In the case of our human friends we take their existence for granted, not caring whether it is proven or not. Our relationship is such that we could read philosophical arguments designed to prove the non-existence of each other, and perhaps even to be convinced by them and then laugh together over so odd a conclusion.

Eddington applies this to the relation between man and God. Baillie adds that God can be present to man as man can not be, as man is present but God is omnipresent. "Contact" is a word that is often used for this personal encounter. Windelband uses it to describe revelation as held by Neo-Platonism ("source of later mysticism") as an "immediate illumination of the individual by the deity...in immediate contact (ἀφύ) with the deity.

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1. Baillie, OKG, 226; see DeBurgh, TRP, 169; Griffiths, GIE, 6-10, 23; Pringle-Pattison, IG, 246-247; 131-143.
2. See Baillie, OKG, 213.
itself." Farmer uses a similar expression—"the compelling touch of God," illustrating the ineffability of the experience by the difficulty of describing light and color to one who has known nothing but darkness, for "the most that can be done is to get such an one out of darkness into the light." James made it clear that what religion reports is a fact of experience—the presence of God in relations of give and take, "relations that are actual." His personal belief was "that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experience." And James uses the word that Farmer used for this approach of God to the human spirit—"touch":

But just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch of things material so it is logically conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so might be our possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to them. The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy Subliminal might remain ajar or open.

For James, then, it is a psychological fact that the subconscious and non-rational holds "primacy in the religious realm." James describes this contact in personal terms: "We and God have business with each other." In illustration, James quotes James Russell Lowell: "I never before so clearly felt the Spirit of God in me and around me. The whole room seemed

1. Windelband, HP, 227; see Bergson, in Moore, TRE, 145; Brightman, PRE, 433; England, VRE, 27.
2. Farmer, TBG, 41; see 40; Walsh, Art. (1914), 500.
3. James, VRE, 454-455; PRA, 109.
4. James, VRE, 242; see 477, 511.
5. James, VRE, 74; see Moore, TRE, 26.
6. James, VRE, 517; see 516, 58.
It should be kept in mind that for James, as for many others, feeling or immediate experience is cognitive.\(^2\)

In answer to the criticism of Moore concerning the "assumption" of James "that religious experience in the sense of immediate feeling is the essential and origination aspect of religion," it may be replied that the religious experience of the founders of religion antedate all the great religions of the world, and that if it be agreed that these founders had a revelation experience, it must be conceded that immediate religious experience lies at the basis of the great religions.\(^3\)

What has been said of this "contact" with God tends to justify Macintosh in his reaction against an extreme epistemological dualism that holds "that all man can or ever does experience or know is just his own experience," if this is interpreted as a denial of a direct "contact" with God. An epistemological dualist can retain his belief in the interaction of relatively independent persons, and accept the witness of thousands who through the ages have testified that they have "met" God, without calling the experience a miracle.\(^4\) The writer is empirical enough to accept the testimony of experience even in the absence of any satisfactory explanation of it; he would hold with Macintosh:

> In religious experience at its best, divine reality...is presented with sufficient immediacy to make possible for man a genuine acquaintance with (experimental knowledge of) that

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1. James, VRE, 66.
2. See Moore, TRE, 35, 37.
3. See Moore, TRE, 73-74.
4. Macintosh, PRK, 326.
Revelation is a unique personal encounter that has to be experienced in order to be understood. It is not absurd as the neo-supernaturalists would have us believe. With all his stress on reason, Hegel believed in revelation, viewing it as a disclosure of a Person to a person:

We have immediate knowledge of God it is said; this is a revelation in us. This is a great principle, which it is essential we should hold fast.2

DeBurgh, having noted the failure of the familiar "proofs," concludes, "If God be known in religious experience, it must be by His own showing."3

Another term that is being used for this immediate personal and cognitive experience of God is "confrontation." Baillie sees a gain from the Cartesian revolution in the recognition of God as a "Reality who more directly confronts us than do the things of sense," a consequence being that "our certainty of Him became prior to the certainties of science rather than dependence upon them."4 He declares that "the great fact for which all religion stands is the confrontation of the human soul with the transcendent holiness of God."5 Guarding the "subject-hood" of God while speaking of Him as an object, Baillie says:

From the beginning God meets us, not as one among the many objects of our knowledge, but as another Knower by whom both they and we ourselves

1. Macintosh, PRK, 175; see 161.
2. Hegel, PR, II, 164-165; see I, 262-263.
3. DeBurgh, TRP, 40; see Griffiths, GIE, 288-289; Bixler, in Macintosh, RR, 82.
5. Baillie, OKG, 3; see 28, 42.
are known... He confronts us not as an It nor as an inference from all possible Its, but from the very beginning, as a Thou. He is not something we find ourselves speaking about, but Some One we find speaking to us, and whom we then, in our turn, find ourselves speaking to.\footnote{1}

This personal relation is also expressed by the term "compresence." Buckham, with others, views a paradox not as a contradiction but as something to be resolved as in the Hegelian dialectic, with a positive and a negative pole, mutually necessary, the poles finding "contrapletion" ("mutual fulfillment") in the synthesis. One form of this is "compresence," in which "the relationship is wholly personal and conscious, characterized by an awareness that takes these forms: Self-as-subject-object, self-other, self-Supreme Other." The result is "the paradox of an alternate positing of God-consciousness and self-consciousness, the two moving toward that synthesis which constitutes the beatific vision."\footnote{2}

Thus God's relation to man is different from His relation to stones—His creations but not partakers of His nature; God is numerically but not qualitatively, "Wholly Other," than man.\footnote{3} "God is at once present with us in all our spiritual endeavor, and yet infinitely transcends our highest achievement."\footnote{4}

As God confronts man it seems that in some sense He appears on both sides of the relationship, for:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Baillie, OKG, 220.
\item Buckham, Art. (1936), 182-183, 187, 189.
\item See Baillie, OKG, 232, 228; II Peter 1:3-4; Coffin and Wieman, in Kepler, CRT, 176-179, 200; Leon, Art. (1933), 80.
\item Watson, IRE, II, 249; see Wilson, SI, I, I, 855; Brightman, PAR, 28, 29; RV, 137; Garrigou-Lagrange, ADO, 165-167; Sheen, PR, 123; Temple, NMG, 246, 277, 284-285.
\end{enumerate}
Not only does He call me in His grace, but also by His grace, brings the response to birth within my soul. His Holy Spirit is the real author and originator, not only of His address to me, but of my address to Him.¹

Baillie advances beyond this to the thought that one of these subjects is Personality Itself, and that the relation of two good men can not be as close as the relation of a good man to Goodness and Love: "Distant though God be in His transcendence, He may yet be nearer to me than my best friend."² The relation between a particular and its general is different from the relation between particulars. Finite limitations can be overcome in the knowledge of God without going into epistemological monism.³

Thus, while the relation between God and man is unique and non-physical, it is real. God is pure Spirit; and man, the real ego, is also spirit. To the writer the most adequate philosophical explanation of the relation between persons seems to be interaction. It would seem that in general and special disclosures of Himself God has initiated the action, and that man reacts to this spiritual stimulus. Among many other experiences that man may have in co-operating with God (one phase of interaction on the personal plane) is "conversion," the incoming of God, of spiritual life and power, into the human soul.⁴ Although in the subjective experience of man's conversion God is an objective reality in the sense of independent

¹ Baillie, OKG, 220. ³ See Bertocci, EAG, 77.
² Baillie, OKG, 238-239. ⁴ See Brightman, PR, 422.
existence, He is not so in the sense of a physical object. Lovejoy concludes that "since our knowing is characteristically concerned with beyonds, we know by faith." He does not call God a "beyond"; in fact he seems not to refer to God at all in his work, Revolt Against Dualism. But what he says of externals does not mitigate against the kind of direct knowledge of God upheld in this dissertation, i.e. as some cognitive content in direct awareness. For the present writer does not assert the externality of God in exactly any one of the senses mentioned by Lovejoy. Of course, God is "beyond" the idea of God; every object of thought may be said to be beyond thought in the sense, at least, of non-identity. But who is to draw the line beyond which an omnipresent God can not pass in His approach to a human spirit? Who would desire to go against the testimony of multitudes and deny that God can even make a personal "contact" with the human spirit, as long as no claim is laid to an overlapping of personalities? Certainly a theist would not be expected to protest the nearness of God to a human soul. Of course, as infinite and transcendent, God is "beyond" the complete comprehension of man. So while one may have certitude concerning God's existence (and some knowledge of Him as revealed in the photographic flash of the mystical moment) one still has need of the exercise of his faith.

1. Lovejoy, RD, 318.
2. See Lovejoy, RD, 25.
While God is an objective reality, the direct awareness of Him is a subjective experience in a sense different from that of the experiencing of a physical object. Whatever objective factors may have been present in the conversion of Saul of Tarsus, the features he later emphasized were subjective ones, as the following indicates: "For God...hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." In this sense all Christian experience is internal.

Now the interaction between God and man differs from that between man and man. God, having no body and being an omnipresent spirit, finds no intervening body between Himself and the human spirit. Nor is space a barrier. Bowne, speaking of interaction between persons makes it clear that if it were "equally direct and immediate in all cases, there would be no ground for the distinction of present and absent." He adds that while space appears to us as a limitation, that omnipresence is a negation of this limitation:

Immediate action means presence; immediate action which extends to all things means omnipresence. God...therefore, as immanent in all things, is omnipresent. If then, he wills to act upon anything, he has not to cross any distance, long or short, to reach it, and he is not compelled to use media.

The writer accepts omnipresence rather than "semipresence,"

1. II Cor. 4:6; see Gal. 1:16; Brightman, Art. (1934), 99-100.
finding no justification for the limitation of God's presence to physical nature, holding with Miley and other theologians that God's knowledge and power are operative in all realms of existence, and that omnipresence finds its reality in personal agency:

In the plenitude and perfection of these attributes [omniscience and omnipotence] God is omnipresent in the truest, deepest sense of the term.¹

This excludes spatial representation, and gives omnipresence its full meaning in personal, dynamic terms,² while at the same time preserving transcendence intact. This is not outmoded thought. This balancing to transcendence and immanence, being just to both, is achieved by modern theistic theologians and philosophers, conservative and speculative:

The longer I live the surer I am that in quite a few segments of life the truth is to be apprehended not so much be an either-or-approach, as by grasping firmly two opposite poles of thought and holding both in balance and tension.³

Wiley, implicitly agreeing with Miley, and speaking of speculative theism as represented by Parker, James, and Martineau (particularly of their insistence on the distinctness of God from the world), writes:

Theodore Parker says, 'If God be infinite, then he must be immanent, perfectly and totally present in nature and spirit. Thus there

1. Miley, ST, I, 219; see 218; see Macintosh, TES, 186-187.
2. See Strickland, FCB, 179-186.
is no point of space and no atom of soul but God is there. And yet finite matter and finite spirit do not exhaust God.¹

Parker, thus, in using the strongest language for immanence has not identified finite matter and finite spirit with God. To Loomer, "God is as much transcendent as man can endure," and as immanent "as man can gaze upon and not be blinded."² But to substitute "semipresence" for omnipresence is not only to deny to God free access (still in personal terms) to all parts and to all persons of His universe, but also to rob theology of one of its most practical teachings—the most significant aspect of the doctrine of omnipresence—the presence of every person before God, in whom "we live, and move, and have our being," and from whom no person can flee.³

Where is God? Wherever Cosmic Mind, Personal Energy, Reprover, Friend, or Judge is at work.⁴ Neither human nor divine personality can be separated from their respective activities. God is Personal Activity. Both God and man (as well as things) are ultimately what they do.⁵ If God's activity can be found in sin, i.e. in its knowledge, condemnation, restraint, and punishment, God is there. If His activity can be discovered operating upon the human spirit, God is there. This is why Edwin Lewis can make the main argument

¹. Wiley, CT, I, 280; see 344-347.
². Loomer, Art. (1949), 194.
³. Acts 17:28; see Psa. 139:7; Wiley, CT, I, 346; Macintosh, TES, 186.
⁴. See Day, GIU, 47; Brightman, PAR, 28-29.
⁵. Vide supra, 33-34; see Buckham, Art. (1935), 312; Smuts, HE, 41, 52; Strickland, FOB, 173.
of a book (God and Ourselves) the reality, adequacy, and availability of God, and why Macintosh can hold that among the mystics' subjective certitudes that can be verified is the certitude of the "existence, accessibility and sufficiency of God."1 This is why the religionist can join with the poet in declaring that God is closer than breathing and nearer than hands and feet.2 Such "sympathetic rapport" as exists between God and a kindred spirit "needs no go-between."3

d) Not pantheism.—This view of the omnipresence of God in reference to the immediate experience of God, as furnishing more certitude for His existence than is possessed for the existence of things and of other minds, is not pantheism. For while "omni" and "pan" both mean "all," there is a vast difference between "all-presence" and "all-theism." "Omni" connotes some kind of extension, whereas "pan" suggests identity. Monism is usually of an impersonal type. "Pantheism is the conception that the basic reality of the universe is an all-pervading impersonal Divine Life."4 It is similar to theism in its belief in immanence to the full degree:

Theism shares with the cosmic form of pantheism the conception of the immanence of God in physical nature and in humanity, and the conviction that human life and the Divine Life stand in intimate relation to each other.5

While all pantheism is not impersonal, a stress on

1. Macintosh, RG, 225.
2. See Ward, EP, 335.
3. Walsh, Art. (1914), 494; see Temple, NMG, 354.
4. Lyman, MTR, 242 (under-scoring the present writer's).
5. Lyman, MTR, 249 (under-scoring the present writer's).
personality and its activity and freedom, with due recognition of the claims of transcendence, will safeguard against pantheism: "Dieu...est-il immanent ou transcendant? L'un et l'autre, doit-on dire." LeRoy goes on to find the reconciliation of these extremes in a dynamic view of God's presence in immediate religious experience: "Dieu nous est plus interieur que nous-mêmes." Aubrey joins the two aspects thus: "Because He is immanent, we can find Him; because He is also transcendent, we can trust Him."

Interpersonal psychology with its view of personalities interacting, regards religion as a "personal co-operation with a trusted Creator of values," and holds that "psychology in company with every other science must assume an objective reality related to subjective experience." One of this group, Dr. Moreno, has joined forces with the philosophers and theologians who contend for an immediate experience of God. As a theist, and holding, thus, transcendence (God the Father—authority and revelation—separate in thought and deed from all other beings), Moreno stresses immanence—"His immediate presence...in every detail of experience."

Leuba thinks that the great central doctrine of mysticism is "l'unioin de l'âme avec Dieu." But, "cette extravagant identification de l'individuel avec la divinite" is not the

1. Strickland, FCB, 186.  
2. LeRoy, Art.(1907), 512; see Underhill, MS, 40, 55-56, 60; Temple, NMG, 246, 277.  
3. Aubrey, PTT, 205.  
4. Johnson, PR, 30-31, 47.  
5. Moreno, PG, xi; see 161-162, 185, 190.  
7. Leuba, Art.(1902), 7; see 441.
central emphasis of mysticism. That the central doctrine of mysticism is belief in the unmediated experience of God is the witness of the following, some of whom are either mystics or authorities on mysticism: Baillie, Bennett, Brightman, Brown, Coe, (Rufus) Jones, Knudson, Macintosh, Montmorand, Moore, Otto, Rall, Underhill, and Windelband. For instance, Baillie declares: "The central contention for which mysticism stands is certainly that of the direct and ultimate nature of God's presence in our souls."¹ Rufus Jones defines mysticism as "that type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness...direct and immediate consciousness of divine Presence."² According to Jones, this position is found in some degree in all forms of religion, for "first-hand experiences of a Divine and Higher Presence are as old as human personality":³

The fundamentally significant thing which stands out in early Quakerism was the conviction which these founders of it felt that they had actually discovered the living God....From end to end of the Protestant world these 'inner experiences' constitute the only argument actually relied upon for a belief in a God in effective and intelligent relation with men.⁴

And Herman speaks as a theist when she shows how timely the subject is:

Once more the spectacle of a tragically successful materialistic civilization dying in blood and fire is shattering the delusions of a shallow and complacent optimism and driving us back upon the deeps of the soul where God speaks His Creative and Redeeming Word.⁵

¹. Baillie, IR, 227.
². Jones, SMR, xv.
³. Jones, SMR, xv–xvi.
⁵. Herman, MVM, 4.
Even the "union" held by the mystics is not essentially and always pantheistic. Speaking of St. Theresa, Reinhardt writes: "At the acme of contemplation which is called union mystica, the union of the human will with the divine will takes place.... There is no union of substance or nature." Boutoux seizes upon love as the explanation of this perfect union: "Love alone has this virtue of uniting persons without absorbing one in the other, but on the contrary, increasing their reality and the consciousness of themselves as persons."

But although two become one in the union of marriage, wills and personalities are not lost as the records of divorce courts indicate. The union of states does not obliterate state lines. Although the mystical St. Paul declared that Christ indwelt him, the boundaries of personality are still clearly marked in his use of "I" and "Christ." To speak of the personal relationship between God and man as interaction is to deny their identity, for to have any interaction, there must be at least two actions or actors. In fact, to speak merely of a personal relation between God and man is to implicitly deny pantheism: "The mystical experience of Christ is a direct personal relation to Christ." Knudson goes on to describe

2. Reinhardt, Art. (1931), 118; see James, VRE, 425-426.
3. Boutoux, Art. (1908), 185; see Ames, Art. (1915), 258; Underhill, MS, 35, 40; Hocking, MGHE, xvii; England, VRE, 149; Bennett, CVM, 136-137; Duce, KGN, 369; Bixler, in Macintosh, RR, 84, 59-62.
this relation as "the actual presence of God in human life." The addition of the phrase, "in the plenitude and perfection of His attributes," will safeguard this statement from the charge of pantheism:

God enters my experience objectively, but His entrance is not arrested at the outer court. He penetrates to the Holy of Holies, yet He never takes possession of it. He illumines it, and cleanses it, but leaves me in charge all the time....The self cannot exist in isolation.

This is not monism for the reason, also, that the Object is also Subject, the transcendent Knower, knowing the human knower; the latter has the "awareness of being known." Both transcendence and personality are maintained in this view. Coe thinks that "the most baffling item of experience is the fact that persons are present to one another and have experiences in common. This reminds one of St. Paul's statement: "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit," the human and divine spirits sharing an experience in common. In the words of Coe:

"My self-consciousness is social consciousness....This intermingling of mediacy and immediacy...may be paradoxical, but if so, the paradox is in reality itself....'How do I know that other minds exist?' has led many a thinker into a trap by its assumption that we can know one's self without reference to other minds."

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1. Knudson, VRE, 229; see 231.  
2. Griffiths, GIE, 226; see 206; Buckham, Art. (1942), 410; Underhill, MS, 60; Schilling, ERH, 34; Hegel, JUB, xii, 206.  
3. Griffiths, GIE, 212; see 208; Martineau, SAR, 305.  
4. See Martineau, SAR, 307-308.  
5. Rom. 8:16.  
6. Coe, POR, 252, 254; see Norborg, VCE, 80.
Knudson appears to create an artificial mediation, for thinking does not stand between the self and its object of thought.¹ The writer separates neither the divine Self nor the human self from their respective activities, holding with Hegel that the indivisible self is expressed by various modes, such as thinking, feeling, and willing.²

e) Conscious religious experience: an incontrovertible fact

Finally, conscious religious experience is an incontrovertible fact. "Fact" is used here not only as a true proposition, but also as a matter of fact, an existing state of affairs on which rests the "perfect knowledge which cannot be refuted or weakened by any future experience," and which is "innocent of error."³ By "conscious experience" is meant the subjective state of affairs that gives as much certitude as the Cartesian basic certainty--consciousness itself which is beyond the reach of doubt, that impregnable stronghold at the center of man's being:

To say that...the mystic is absolutely certain of the existence of God would be an absurd understatement....But to the mystic God becomes the most real and the most immediately known of all beings. 'I am as certain as that I live,' says Eckhart, 'that nothing is so near me as God. God is nearer to me than I am to myself.'⁴

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¹. See Knudson, Art. (1935), 449; vide supra, 242–245.
². Vide supra, 254.
⁴. Pratt, PRB, 172–173; see Temple, in Muirhead, CBP, 413.
"If our faith is to rest on a foundation that cannot be shaken we must dig deeper and find our evidence in first-hand religious experience."¹ Speaking from the vantage point of such experience, a mystic can answer the question: But can I thus experience and know God? For as von Hügel declares: "The question is, in the first instance, not whether I can, but whether I do."²

Speaking of the certainty of faith due to the consciousness of God, and as having more content than that of a mere idea, Hegel declared:

This content is at once independent and at the same time inseparable from me....Certainty is this immediate relation between the content and myself. If I desire to express such certainty in a forcible manner, I say, 'I am as certain of this as of my own existence....Both the certainty of this external Being and the certainty of myself are one certainty, and I could do away with my own Being; I should have no knowledge of myself if I were to do away with that Being.'³

After the death of Pascal, a scribbled sheet of paper was found sewed in the lining of his coat. On it was a diagram of a cross with the following words:

The year of Grace, 1654....From about half-past ten in the evening until about half-past twelve. FIRE. God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars. Certitude, Certitude, Feeling, Joy, Peace, God of Jesus Christ....Forgetfulness of the World and of everything but God....Joy, Joy, Joy, Tears of Joy.

2. von Hügel, EPR, 52.
3. Hegel, PR, I, 116-117; see 161.
4. Pascal, in Bradshaw, PFF, 129-130; vide supra, 281.
Millions have had similar experiences. To explain them as hallucinations is to deny the existence of God, the God of religion. In a scientific examination of those who reported that they had an immediate experience of God, Pennock found that such an experience "occurs under the most diverse conditions and circumstances," and that neither mental nor physical conditions showed any constancy. "Let the mystic, then, be certain of his 'the truth,'" is the admonition of Hooking and others: "Any mystic who in his main point admits that he may be mistaken does thereby stamp...himself as fraudulent."

Such certitude is not only "unshakable" and "imperturbable"; it is also "unchallengeable." For as internal, the experience may be incapable of being proved to others, but by the same token it can not be disproved. No one can dislodge the experient from his position, for there is no fulcrum on which the "crow-bar" of denial can be rested: "The mystic so long as he merely reports a positive revelation, cannot be refuted." This "positive revelation" is what matters. The actual presence of God in human life, i.e. "actual contact with the real is more fundamental than our rational interpretation of it," Ferre' notes that the mystical experience with its certainty—"God can be experienced"—while central to

1. See Pennock, CGG, 46.
2. Pennock, CGG, 65.
3. Hooking, MGHÉ, 454; see 44; Pratt, PRB, 155, 163-164; Trueblood, LB, 196-198, 200-203; Ames, Art. (1915), 264.
4. See Brown, PC, 181-182; von Hügel, EPR, 69.
5. Russell, KEW, 63-64; see Beck, CPR, 301.
Christianity is a special emphasis of historic Methodism:

Within its more devout circles particularly, even now, 'experience' comes close to being the final standard of truth. A thoughtful and well-trained young Methodist, for instance, when asked what in his widespread observation was the rock bottom truth with most Methodists replied like this; 'Brother, when an honest-to-goodness Methodist tells you that he has had an experience, you don't argue with him.' I venture to suggest, however, that the reason that the heart of Methodism is as sound as it is, is due mainly to its historic stress on experience.

This experience is a direct personal confrontation.

While one may not be able to explain this experience to others so as to convince them, there is no doubting that it is self-convincing. "A vivid sense of reality pervades authoritative religious testimonies." This is particularly true concerning testimonies to Christian Perfection, for which experience Ferré in the context of the above reference has high praise. For there is a distinctness of vision, a directness of knowledge and a demonstration of spiritual realities and values in the Baptism of the Holy Ghost that is well-high indescribable; it has to be experienced in order to be understood. In it, as well as in the initial experience of salvation, through God's working directly upon the soul:

The self is aware of the supreme principle of religion in another form. Instead of being known as in an act of knowledge...the redeemed soul knows itself as being loved...the object of redeeming love.

2. Ferré in Anderson, MET, 123.  
4. Griffiths, GIE, 293.
No wonder, then, that Tillich in speaking of the power of mysticism as lying "in the will to place individual personality in its essence immediately before the presence of God," declares that its influence has been world-wide with the result that "an atmosphere was created in which immediate certitude attached to a mystical concept of God," dispelled materialistic and atheistic views.¹

There is no getting around a fact of experience. A professor when told that a certain fish had been caught, declared that there was no such fish. A few days later, he was the recipient of the fish. This was his comment: "The theory of a life-time kicked to death by a fact." Negative testimony on the other hand, is valueless. The crowning validation of religious experience to the experient himself is the "Witness of the Spirit": "The Spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God."² Here is internal interaction, the co-operative relation of two spirits, their union without loss of identity to either, and their uniting in testifying to an immediate experience and in an immediate experience. This dual testimony makes for unshakable certitude. When the sun has risen on the horizon, one does not grope in darkness, candle in hand, looking for day; the presence of the sun on the horizon is all the proof one needs that day has come. This is a weak illustration, however, of the certitude

¹ Tillich, RS, 125, 127-128. ² Rom. 8:16.
that is greater than that furnished by the facts of science and of psychology, the certitude concerning God's existence that is due to human-divine interaction, that results from the subjective experience of awareness, a mediated immediacy, in which God is not an inference, but a Presence in a unique personal encounter, variously described as a contact, revelation, confrontation, and compresence.
CHAPTER IV
THE CORRELATION OF CERTAINTY AND CERTITUDE:
THE POSSIBILITY OF A RATIONAL-EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY

I. A synoptic view

1. Introduction

It has been shown that by themselves the theoretical "proofs," the moral argument and the experiential approach did not establish logical certainty concerning the existence of God. Certainty depending upon formal arguments proved defective because in them reason, faith and experience were not used as whole entities. In the theoretical argument, it is the intellect that is primarily at work; in the moral argument there is an undue stress upon faith and the will (the will to believe); in the experimental argument, the emphasis is upon the feelings, although they are viewed as with cognitive content. In none is whole personality truly represented. It is psychological rather than logical certainty that is found in the practical and the experiential approaches. Had the practical reason of Kant been practical enough, that is, had it been applied to distinctive religious experience, the full truth that lies in the synthesis of the extremes of theoretical and practical, as commonly used, would have been reached. As it is, it took the experimental, the truly practical, to furnish the theoretical with its complement. With its unshakable certitude, the experimental argument will
provide a good starting point or base of operations for a return over the ground traversed, in order to pick up the partial elements and to weld them into a synoptic view and a correlation of certainty and certitude which will furnish an adequate certainty for the individual and for a rational-empirical theology. This is relevant to the problem of this dissertation which is: In the light of Kant's thought, is there any justifiable religious certainty (particularly of God's existence), and if so, to what degree? This involves the subordinate problem: Can certitude and logical certainty be correlated so that an empirical theology is made possible?

Kant's importance, in part, lies in his attempted mediation between rationalism and empiricism, and his insistence that "whatever the human spirit...requires in order to get ahead with the solution of its problems" must be granted it. According to Roger Bacon, knowledge may be secured in three ways: by authority, by reason, and by experience. If intuition were placed in one or more of these three ways, they would correspond to the pathways to certainty suggested by William A. Brown, and to the types of certainty of this dissertation--theoretical (reason), practical (faith, including reliance on authority), and experiential (experience). To the writer as well as to Bacon and others, knowledge or certainty is a matter of the whole personality, to be won by

1. Vide supra, 8-9.
3. See McKeon, SMF, I, 3.
5. Vide supra, 3.
the individual himself:

But authority is insufficient without reason; and reason is not tranquil in the possession of truth if its data are not confirmed by experience. Experience is therefore the one source of certitude. But experience is of two sorts, external and internal. The mystical knowledge of these internal experiences is of the same type and efficacy as experimental knowledge, for the doctrine of the unity of knowledge is a fundamental doctrine. ¹

Hegel's stress was upon a united and whole personality.² With all his philosophical rationalism, he favored an intuitive knowledge of God, although opposed to the subjectivism that would make immediate knowledge self-justifying:

There is in Hegel little trace either of the empiricism which uncritically accepts the psychological facts of religion as in themselves complete, or of the rationalism which relies on thought apart from experience.³ The rational must be based on the empirical.⁴

In his plea for harmony between the empirical and the rational (a harmony that included authoritative and historical elements), Hegel saw that "the individual must approach divine truth for himself, must know God in his own inner experience."⁵ But while "quite apart from speculative thought" one may have "imperturbable certitude" of God, the theoretical arguments serve "to bring the stages of man's elevation to God to clear consciousness," to reveal "the objective truth in the subjective Vorstellung of God," and to "chart for thought the course

¹. Bacon in McKernon, SMP, I, 3-4; vide supra, 68-69.
². Vide supra, 254.
³. Schilling, ERH, 101-102; see 97.
⁴. Schilling, ERH, 120-121; see Hegel, JUB, XIV.
followed by the human spirit in its rise to God. 1

It is the belief of many that all direct experience is an intuitive grasp of objects as wholes, and that complexity is revealed by reflection later on. Ormond illustrates it by the feeling of homesickness—a reaction of the whole self, emotion being "a feeling-idea that calls forth a feeling reaction of the self as a whole." 2 Langley illustrates it by aesthetic experience in which apprehension is of the objects in their uniqueness and individuality, and differing from the direct experience of perception in a fuller use of the perceiver's powers. 3 Hooking illustrates it by man's intuitive grasp of space (not little by little, but as a whole), and by his introduction to other persons (not by piece-meal, but all at once, the first impression containing a whole idea). 4 In fact, "Any first idea of any dawning consciousness...must be at the same time idea-of-the-whole." 5 Sometimes, as with the mystic, there is difficulty in giving exact expression to the feeling-idea, but for Hooking there are unfinished ideas, so that it is not "deeper than idea is feeling," but "deeper than idea is Idea." 6 This intuitive and mystical grasp of the whole, however, needs to be supplemented by the reference of it to the whole of experience. Of course, this makes for

1. Schilling, ERH, 161-162; see Hegel, JUB, XIV, 55-56; XII, 69; vide supra, 90-91.
2. Ormond, OP, 399.
4. See Hooking, MGHE, 95.
5. Hooking, MGHE, 97.
7. For a somewhat similar view, see Smuts, HE, 21.
coherence, of which more will be said later. But the view of God to be brought into a broad synoptic view is of itself a synoptic view, an intuitive grasp of the Whole.

2. Part experience made whole

In this synoptic view, the first step towards the correlation of certainty and certitude concerning God is making part experience whole experience. This is a denial of two extremes: 1) that experience is self-sufficient, and 2) that empiricism is self-refuting. The former, with its denial of any reference beyond the experient, is a narrow view. "We shall find that our experience, at any rate, seems to depend in many ways upon extra-experiential constitution."¹ The second extreme is found in Russell's criticism of empiricism: "However it may be formulated, it must involve some general proposition about the dependence of knowledge upon experience."² This is a just criticism of a narrow empiricism but not of the empiricism upheld in this dissertation.³ Experience must receive a broader meaning than assigned to it by Kant in his Critiques, or by the positivists; it should "denominate the consciousness of all objects whatsoever."⁴ Kant belatedly seemed to have recognized this defect in his Critiques.⁵

C. I. Lewis sees a common fault in rationalism and pure empiricism in treating knowledge in such a way as to

1. Boodin, RU, 16; see 15.
2. Russell, IMT, 207; see 24, 113, 170, 322.
4. Baillie, in Muirhead, CBP, 16.
5. Vide supra, 70.
make the existence of other minds irrelevant: "Our truth is social."¹ This is the significance of the theistic arguments. As convictions arising out of distinctive immediate religious experience, they pass from the subjective to the objective sphere, are shared, and become, thus, public property. And when there is mutual sharing of such convictions, certitude tends to become logical certainty. In fact, it is to be seriously questioned whether there is a doubt of any kind, psychological or logical, in the mind of one who has had a tooth extracted without an anaesthetic, and who has also heard the testimony of many reliable witnesses on the painfulness of the experience. In the same way, although much more pleasant, religious experience is a universal experience, the "result of intersubjective intercourse...experience with a capital E, the common empirical knowledge of the race," in the sense of being accessible to all.² In this sense religious experience is truly scientific, for as Mead taught: "Science starts with the private experience of an individual, but it never operates in a mind or an experience that is not social."³ This extension of experience beyond the individual corrects possible errors in the report of one experience, the real being "that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you."⁴ In

¹. Lewis, MWO, 25.  
². Vide, supra, 201; see 221.  
³. Werkmeister, HPI, 536.  
⁴. Peirce, in Werkmeister, HPI, 177.
the same connection Peirce declares that the community will continue to reaffirm the real. This has been done concerning the Divine Reality, for there is a "cloud of witnesses" with an unshakable conviction that they have been in God's presence. Mystics from many parts of the world, from many periods, and from many religious viewpoints bear solid and coherent witness to this experience:

I have studied their testimonies for many years, and they are far too cogent, and far too similar to each other, to leave any room for doubt that they are what they claim to be. Their descriptions are often indistinct; how should they not be?...He (the mystic) is attempting to describe what language was never meant to express. But he knows that the vision was authentic.1

Here is a testimony to the authenticity of the mystical experience by one who is both an investigator of the phenomenon and a mystic himself; here, also, is the correlation of psychological and logical certainty in one individual, subjective and objective factors being in organic union as "cooperant members of one whole," and the experience of the individual being a part of universal experience.2 It seems reasonable, therefore, to hold that with the certitude arising from an immediate contact with God one has "the first indispensable note of a criterion of truth," which confirmed by the second indispensable note--the testimony of others to a like experience--would be a well-founded and justifiable certitude:

1. Inge, Art. (1948), 47. 2. See Ward, NA, II, 152-153; vide supra, 238-245.
Two singularly contradictory arguments have been made against intuition, first to prove it to be mere untrustworthy subjectivism, and second, to show that it is only a swift process of sound ratiocination, unconscious of its movement and aware only of its results. If either of these can be proven, it renders the other void. In answer to the first of these objections the mystic virtually replies: 'I know the truth of the spiritual world with a conclusive sense of conviction, as I know myself....Moreover the conviction is not mine alone; my fellow believer has the same sense of certainty and assures me of it.'

Thus, in making part experience whole experience, there is an extension of individual experience into race experience, and an objectivity that makes for a degree of logical certainty.

3. Part reason and part faith made whole

The second step towards the correlation of certainty and certitude concerning God is the making whole of reason and faith. Reference has been made to the confusion and damage caused by narrow views of them, and to the latent danger of hypocrisy and atheism lurking in the moral argument. Both faith and reason have been at fault. At times, the former has been either credulous or unduly cautious; the latter has often been self-sufficient, although its pathetic helplessness, unaided by faith and by Reason (divine) has been seen time and again. As thus used, it is just "one competitor among others of an unqualified primacy in human concerns" with "no special sanctity about it, and is quite as much in need of

1. Buckham, MML, 120; see Vance, RT, 233; Tennant, PT, I, 291; Brown, PC, 204; vide supra, 63-64, 199-202.
2. Vide supra, 6-8, 64, 95, 129-135, 139-148, 155-156, 195-196.
criticism as the rest.

Both reason and faith have been hostile to each other, and both have been guilty of going blindly by the greatest evidence of all for the existence of God—personal acquaintance with Him. Neither faith nor reason is complete apart from the other, nor apart from the unification of personality and life. Both must stay in each other's presence until reason becomes a believing reason and faith becomes a reasonable faith. Nor is this sufficient; they must come into the Presence of Reason, for faith can never be perfected apart from the presence of God, and reason can never become fully reasonable until it listens to Reason. Apart from that, the best that can be looked for is "an unreasonable rationality" as well as an unreasonable faith, and a continuation of the present state of perplexity and uncertainty.

A proposal has been made for recovery from the evils brought on by this uncertainty, namely that faith "supplement the inadequacies and correct the mistakes of a too narrowly conceived reason," and that reason stop both judging and substantiating faith, stepping aside to allow faith to do its healing work. But if reason steps aside it will be because reason itself counsels it, and it will but perpetuate the use of reason in a narrow sense. Hence Murphy rightly concludes: "While, therefore, we shall welcome any aid that faith can bring to reason, we shall have to ask that faith to identify

1. Murphy, UR, 13.
2. Murphy, UR, 13.
3. Murphy, UR, 10.
itself and present its credentials. 1

A better way out of the difficulty—one at which Kant hinted but which was not carried out by him—is for reason and faith to respect the just claims of each other, to respond to the voice of Reason, to come into His presence, to receive His instructions, and to return as partners, fully-equipped, matured and whole personalites, to work upon the whole of experience, unifying and making coherent the whole of life. Then the theistic arguments with new significance will take their place in the total scheme of things. The individual, having found evidence of the activity of God in his own life, and having taken his cue from the traditional theistic arguments, can with better success find evidences of God's activity in the world as well as in the lives of others, i.e. in the physical, moral and religious realms.

4. True rationalism and true empiricism joined

The third step towards the correlation of certainty and certitude concerning God is the joining of true rationalism and true empiricism. This Kant attempted without success in his critical rationalism, because nearly to the end of life he remained a rationalist in the narrow sense. 2 Hegel succeeded better; his concept of the rational as the whole is the cue for the ideal being upheld at this point.

The descriptive word "true" in reference to rationalism and empiricism suggests that apart from their union they are

1. Murphy, UR, 12. 2. Vide supra, 1, 8-9, 123-125.
either false or inadequate. The rationalism of Kant's day and later, especially as used by the opponents of Christianity, consisted in the deification and narrow use of reason.\(^1\) Kant and the proponents of Christianity, including the framers of the traditional theistic arguments, were not empirical enough, and consequently, used a curtailed reason.\(^2\) The advance of science and the increasing popularity of the empirical method has greatly modified the old rationalism.\(^3\)

Empiricism also has been modified since Kant's day, but today there are diverse meanings given to it. Bertrand Russell, a recognized leader of empiricism,\(^4\) the heart of whose philosophy is the principle of acquaintance, declares that empiricists have a common emphasis upon perceptive premises.\(^5\) That is in contrast to the acceptance of the authority of an astronomer that there will be an eclipse, a belief that there is an eclipse, based on personal seeing of it, is a perceptive premise. But Russell contrasts social and individual empiricism:

> What astronomers call an eclipse is a public event, whereas what I am seeing may be due to a defect in my eye or my telescope. While, therefore, the belief, 'There is an eclipse' may arise in me without conscious inference, this belief goes beyond the mere expression of what I see.\(^6\)

According to Dewey, Russell holds that propositions are the subject-matter of inquiry, while Dewey and other

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1. Vide supra, 5.
2. Vide supra, 6-11.
3. Vide supra, 197-199.
5. See Russell, IMT, 168.
thorough-going empiricists declare that it is not propositions but things and events. But Russell denies that he holds propositions as the ultimate subject-matter, since, "My problem has been throughout, the relation between events and the propositions that they cause men to assert." 1

Dewey, following James, holds that truth gives satisfaction, as in the case when the idea as a working hypothesis "is applied to prior existences in such a way as to fulfil what it intends." 2 In the language of Russell, it is a social experience. For speaking favorably of the doctrine of James "that a belief is true when it satisfies both personal needs and the requirements of objective things," Dewey goes on to say of pragmatism:

Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best, and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted. 3

Wieman's idea of religious empiricism is revealed in the statement of purpose in one of his books: "To show that religious experience is an experience of an object, however undefined, which is as truly external to the individual as any tree or stone which he may experience." 4

In the view of Martin, "empirical" means, in short,

2. Dewey, Art.(1908), 94; see 85; see Moore, TRE, 56.
4. Dewey, RESM, 5; see Brotherston, Art.(1943), 14-21.
"to be 'realistic' or 'tough-minded,' to take full account of all the relevant data and to blink none of the significant facts."\(^1\)

Tennant, giving the usual view of empiricism as opposed to rationalism and its claims to knowledge independent of sensory experience, sums it up by saying "that epistemology in order to be a science of knowledge must set out from actual, observable fact-data, and seek, in the first instance, their actual preconditions."\(^2\)

J. E. Boodin, a self-styled "pragmatic realist", stressing the will and declaring that "the intuitive certitude of instinctive religious feeling must be corrected in the light of further experience," espouses the empiricism of James and Dewey, in that, "the test of the truth of a hypothesis is in its working."\(^3\)

E. S. Brightman's empiricism is implicitly affirmed by Pringle-Pattison who observes that the personal idealists "were the forerunners and in some cases the pioneers of pragmatism."\(^4\) Martin's appraisal of Brightman's position in a description of a valid religious philosophy as "definitely empirical in character," is borne out by Brightman:

Our experience consists in our entire conscious life. Religion is one phase of experience. Philosophy of religion is the experience

1. Martin, EPR, 110.
2. Tennant, PT, I, 219; see Lamprecht, Art. (1940), 71.
3. Boodin, PT, 317; see RU, 175-177.
4. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 225; see Brightman, PR, 322.
of interpreting these experiences which we call religious and of relating them to other experiences as well as to our concept of experience as a whole.1

Ayer describes himself as an empiricist, but his empiricism is extreme and positivistic; for he rejects metaphysics, and thinks that he has destroyed the "foundations of rationalism."2 Ormond's view that there can be no rationality apart from experience, and "that what we call the voice of reason is only the voice of experience as a whole," is a better representation of empiricism. While advising that rationalism give up its aloofness from experience on the ground that "there can be no other reliable method than that which is experimental in its data and procedure," he values metaphysics as "an interpretation of experience, with a view of reaching its full significance."3

A conspicuous evidence of the disagreement on the meaning of "empirical" is seen in the so-called "controversy" between S. P. Lamprecht and P. A. Bertocci. Lamprecht is reluctant to grant Brightman, Bertocci, and Tennant the use of "empirical" as descriptive of their methods in connection with their arguments for the existence of God. Lamprecht is particularly critical of Bertocci (who "professes 'to be empirical in method--at least up to a certain stage'"), as one is not empirical just because "he does not make assumptions in contradiction of the facts," or because he "makes no greater

1. Brightman, PR, 1; see 9, 415; PG, 160; Martin, EPR, 29.
2. Ayer, LTL, 89, 92-93.
3. Ormond, CP, 564, 573.
assumptions beyond the facts—well, than to affirm God who is of the nature requisite to support the liberal theology.¹

When one begins to assume even the minimum requisite to make experience intelligible, one is assuming what will make experience intelligible to some one who wants more than experience furnishes. And that I submit, is not empiricism properly at all.²

But this is withholding from the empiricist the use of reason, at least, of whole reason, and is a continuation of the dispute between the old types of rationalism and empiricism—reason versus experience—which makes knowledge according to either method impossible. Lamprecht is against the empiricist going "beyond experience to something else on which experience depends," and appealing "to something beyond experience to 'explain experience:'"³ It would be as unjust to deny to empiricism postulates or axioms for deductive inference (as Lamprecht does deny), as it would be unjust to deny to rationalism the use of experience. Induction and deduction, if they proceed at all, must proceed together.

Bertocci evidently saw this flaw in Lamprecht's criticism, for he replied that the facts must be reasonably interpreted, and that "there is no other more reasonable and economical hypothesis" than the one "which interpreting the available data, goes beyond them without contradicting experience."⁴ As to his commitments, Bertocci replied that the only one he

1. Lamprecht, Art. (1939), 74.
2. Lamprecht, Art. (1939), 74.
3. Lamprecht, Art. (1939), 76.
thought he had was the purpose "to organize the data of experience as coherently as possible."\(^1\) He adds that the empirical philosopher must have postulates, at least, "the faith that he can succeed in organizing every aspect of experience." For Bertocci, empiricism is "a method in which all methods and hypotheses are to be referred to experience for explanation and testing."\(^2\)

Enough evidence concerning the confusion over the correct use of "empirical" has been presented to indicate the desirability of closer relations between rationalism and empiricism. Dr. Brightman, among others, has worked to this end:

A radical change has dominated the decade for me, a change from emphasis on the rationalistic and a priori factors in religious knowledge to emphasis on the empirical. Previously the word empiricism was connected in my mind with a narrow emphasis on sensation alone.\(\ldots\) Now pragmatism seems to me not so much false as incompletely empirical. No empiricism seems to me to be 'truly radical' which minimizes the pervasive fact that all experience comes in, of, and for a person or omits any accessible personal experience.\(^3\)

That is, Brightman realized that "reason and experience are not to be dichotomized," as reason is a part and function of experience, which is "a movement toward rational totality."\(^4\)

William A. Brown approaches this rational whole by a different path. He objects to all theoretical theistic arguments because they separate what belong together, omitting

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1. Bertocci, Art.(1939), 265; see EAG, 10.
2. Bertocci, Art.(1939), 266; see Pratt, Art.(1939), 269; Martin, EPR, 38; Hartshorne, MVG, 73-74.
4. Brightman, Art.(1937)\(^1\), 154-155; see Martin, EPR, 37.
"the most significant part of their data"—evidence of the Christian revelation and experience; he finds the synthesis of the methods of speculation an authority in Christian experience, which is "the only conclusive reason for belief in the Christian God." The writer has already expressed his conviction that the rational is the whole and that a rationalism which does not consider the whole of experience by the whole reason of a whole personality (intellect, sensibility and will) is not a true rationalism, and that an empiricism which does not include faith and reason as parts of experience is not a true empiricism. This means the wedlock of rationalism and empiricism.

The connecting link between them is mysticism. The true mystic insists that his intuitions should be tested by other experience; he is a pragmatical empiricist as will be shown later. Aubrey notes that the mystic meets the naturalist's demand that intuitive apprehension should not be regarded as assured knowledge until it is verified by observation and reason. On the other hand:

\[
\text{The naturalist's demand for such verification implies that the intuition has propositional content—or there would be nothing to verify—which is the mystic's insistence.}\]

5. The correlation, thus, of certainty and certitude:

Kant's Wissen

In the synoptic view which sees together reason, faith

1. Brown, CTO, 125, 127.
2. Aubrey, PTT, 201-202; von Hügel, EPR, 14-16.
and experience as wholes, and a true rationalism and a true empiricism as one organic unit reaches its culmination in the correlation, also; of certainty and certitude. A significant step in this direction was taken when it was shown that in the concept of a whole faith there is room for both the distinction between faith and knowledge and for their joint activity without loss of identity in the case of a successful experiment.¹ Another such step was taken when reason and faith were joined in partnership. Its effects are first manifest in individual experience:

Making it possible for a person to obtain an experience of contact with Something which can be intellectualized by him as representing the real Presence of the divine redemptive Reality is a far superior way of imparting the highest type of certainty, the synthesis of 'objective certainty' and 'subjective certitude.'²

While Kant rightly contrasted belief and knowledge, he also taught that opinion can become knowledge when objective evidence is supplied.³ Furthermore, for Kant the culmination of the steps of Meinung (theoretical opinion), Glauben (moral or practical belief), and Ueberzeugung (subjective sufficiency of evidence for one's self), is Wissen ("die, objective Gewissheit...für Jedermann"). Here is certainty that is both psychological and logical, a certainty that combines subjective and objective evidence, and a synthesis of the inadequate logical certainty of the first chapter of this dissertation,

¹. Vide supra, 35, 148.  
². Tennant, PT, I, 188.  
³. Vide supra, 148.
the partial certitude of the second chapter, the unshakable certitude of the third chapter, plus the logical certainty that is acquired when individual experience merges into race Experience,¹ when the correlation of certainty and certitude is perfected by authority—the living or recorded testimony (including the Christian Scriptures) of a multitude of others who have experienced God.

While this may be described in general terms as "man's consciousness of a reliable relationship, stated in terms of belief, between himself and the world,"² it is a stronger putting of the case for religious certainty because of the broader and stronger meaning given "belief"; and thus, it goes beyond Bosley's psychological and methodological certainty, for it includes also the certainty of logic and of conclusion, i.e. of belief as well as of attitude, and the acceptance of authority, the testimony to the experience of others as well as that of one's own.³

This correlation of overwhelming certitude and strong logical certainty also goes beyond the certainty found in Montague's federation of epistemological methods with its "domains" of authoritarianism, mysticism, rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism and skepticism,⁴ for it has no place for skepticism. For while the writer would not use a term that has reference to the super-finite as "absolute" to describe

1. Vide supra, 200.
2. Vide supra, 3.
3. Vide supra, 3-4; see Bosley, QRC, 37.
this religious certainty he would choose terms that exclude doubt (for doubt and knowledge, in their full sense, are contradictory terms)\(^1\) such as "unshakable" or "imperturbable." These terms are consistent with the open-mindedness of Bosley's "tentativeness," but not with skepticism. The position upheld is nearer that of Brown, with his personal, common life and scientific approach, as there are persons to be loved and promises to be trusted—divine and human; and the conviction that God exists is primarily a personal affair, to be worked for and won by the individual for himself. Brown approaches the certainty of God by four paths—authority, reason, intuition, and experiment. The certainty attained is the unshakable certitude of personal experience plus the adequate certainty coming through wider experience, acquaintance with race Experience "that gives continuity to my experience and unity to my thought."\(^2\) Brown relates authority and intuition, finding their completion in the relation; authority points to intuition, and it points back to authority:

Authority adds to the witness of intuition two elements... universality and permanence. We trust our judgments concerning truth and beauty in part because they are shared by other persons. We trust them still more because they last.\(^3\)

He implicitly agrees with Murphy that there is no incompatibility between the religious experiment and the strictly scientific experiment, for in both the passive side is revealed

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1. Blanshard, NT, I, 486-487.  
2. Vide supra, 3.  
in reliance upon authority (testimony of others), and the active side is revealed in participation in the test. Thus no experient can take an attitude of complete detachment and freedom from antecedent commitments. The true scientific spirit would be revealed by not blindly making such commitments and by not being cold toward relevant information concerning them.¹

Thus a synoptic view takes in the correlation of certainty and certitude.

II. A valid belief: verification

1. Its meaning and possibility

In connection with the correlation of certainty and certitude grasped in synoptic vision, a valid belief is acquired through verification of the religious hypothesis, the first consideration of which is the meaning and possibility of such verification. Broadly speaking, reasoning itself is a process of verification.² Verification marks the limits of knowledge. In its simplest form, it "occurs when I first expect an event and then perceive it."³ Verification, then, is the judging as true of some hypothesis, the function of which is "to afford a standard by which success or failure can be judged."⁴

This implies that verification in general is possible. Ayer holds that a sentence is "factually significant" to one when he knows how to verify it as a proposition, that is, "if

¹. See Brown, PC, 97; Murphy, UR, 105-108.
². See Brown, PC, 153.
³. Russell, IMT, 387; vide supra, 189, 193.
⁴. Brown, PC, 204-205.
he knows what observations would lead him under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false."¹ He distinguishes strong and weak senses of "verifiable," the former capable of being "conclusively established in experience," and declares that the justification of scientific procedure is "the success of the predictions to which it gives rise."² Propositions that do not work should be abandoned, for "a proposition whose validity we are resolved to maintain in the face of any experience is not a hypothesis at all but a definition."³ Flewelling is implicitly pragmatic when he declares: "So some loyalties, some loves, some ideals, some aspirations, some moralities, some visions of time, eternity, freedom, God are necessary to the normal and highest functioning of life..." These, he adds, we take on faith, the only justification needed being the justification of results.⁴

In calling attention to the vast amount of knowledge that has been won by science, Ducasse implies the possibility of verification, and he explicitly declares that the knowledge and progress of science are due to "the method of Hypothesis-Deduction-Verification," whereas philosophy "too often has sought consistency among hypotheses rather than empirical verification."⁵ Carnap agrees with Ducasse that facts are true propositions.⁶

What has been said concerning the making whole of

3. Ayer, LTL, 134-135; vide supra, 140, 143, 144. 
4. Flewelling, RF, 30-31. 
5. Ducasse, Art. (1935), 121, 122; see 123-126. 
experience (including intuition), faith (including authority), and reason (including Reason), and the rational-empirical concept has had a bearing on the meaning and possibility of the verification of the religious hypothesis. For such a position has been taken on experience (particularly immediate religious experience), reason (especially in the presence of Reason), and faith (pre-hypothetical, hypothetical and post-hypothetical) as not to rule out before hand the possibility of such verification (and therefore of certainty), but rather, to render it a defensible position. The writer is in agreement with Brown that to use "hypothesis" in reference to God does not mean "that we have no certain knowledge of God, or even that we know Him only in part," as hypotheses "define...the range of the better possible knowledge which it is our aim by progressive experiment to translate into certainty."¹ There is a place here for tentativeness, in the sense of readiness to receive new evidence, but not in the sense of uncertainty. One personal contact with God is sufficient for permanent certitude of His existence, although not for full knowledge of His nature.² This makes possible progressive revision of the religious hypothesis without loss of certitude, and gives meaning to the declaration that verification is carried on by the entire human race and is not complete until the last man has made his report.³ The religious hypothesis built up through the ages lays down the conditions of a

1. Brown, PC, 211; DeBurgh, TRP, 10.  3. See Brown, BC, 205; von Hugel, EPR, James, WB, 107.
2. Vide supra, 261-262.
successful experiment and predicts the results.\(^1\) A postulate is not the end of knowledge but its beginning. Waterhouse likens religious knowledge to aesthetic and ethical knowledge in that they all involve valuation; he declares that a religious judgment can be as valid as "our knowledge that the sunset is beautiful," and that the inference which has an "intuitive sense of certainty behind it" is "more convincing than a purely reasoned inference."\(^2\)

Sheen, although an advocate of the rationalistic "demonstration" of God, has to concede that the validity of the empirical approach of religious experience "passes almost unquestioned," and that "its general acceptance has been taken as one of the most striking phenomena in modern thought."\(^3\) Yet he appears to be shocked that religious experience has been made the foundation for postulating the idea of God. He quotes some great authorities (H. G. Wells, Alfred Hoernle, L. P. Jacks, and Bradley):

"'The man who demands a reality more solid than religious consciousness knows not what he seeks.'\(^4\) Another one of these quotations is: "'Modern religion bases its knowledge of God entirely upon experience; it has encountered God. It does not argue about God. It relates.'\(^5\) Here, particularly in the word "entirely", Sheen does seem to find evidence of an extreme

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1. Vide supra, 135, 152-155; Ayer, LTL, 139; Benjamin, Art. (1939), 519-525.
2. Waterhouse, Art. (1944), 84, 80; see 81-82; see DeBurgh, Art. (1926), 106-107.
4. Sheen, GI, 24; see Bradley, AR, 449.
5. Sheen, GI, 24-25; Wells, GIK, 24.
religious empiricism, one that is uncritical in its reliance upon religious experience.

2. Its need

a. By the one who has had direct contact with God

In one sense, the belief in the existence of God held by the one who has had direct contact with God needs no verification. His certitude is compelling and complete. His immediate experience is self-validating. As ultimate, there is nothing behind or below it to which appeal can be made. Reason finds in it its strongest evidence, its last court of appeal. "The pre-condition of inference is a ground that is not inferred."¹ For Bradley and many others immediate experience is self-validating.² Whitehead appeals to it "in order to expand the field of thought...and for criticizing and verifying its conclusions."³ For Dewey, also, immediate experience "furnishes the means of testing the results of reflection."⁴ While Bradley, Dewey, and Whitehead differ in some details on this matter, they all make immediate experience the ultimate appeal. This general truth may be applied to mystical experiences:

To the mystic himself, the experience is evidence enough. It lights his lamp and girds his loins for action; it banishes doubt and despair, as the sunrise banishes darkness. He no more wants arguments now to prove God's existence than the artist longs for arguments to prove the reality of beauty or the lover does to prove the worth of love.⁵

¹ Waterhouse, Art. (1944), 79.
² See Mack, AIE, 15, 26; Vance, RT, 233.
³ Mack, AIE, 27.
⁴ Mack, AIE, 52.
⁵ Jones, SMR, xxvii-xxix; see Farmer, TBG, 37; Lewis, AKV, 254.
The impelling power in this experience is the authoritative note in it as well as the feeling of satisfaction and harmony produced by it. It is the thesis of R. H. Strachan in his book, The Authority of Christian Experience, that "the seeds of authority and certitude are planted already in the individual experience itself," and that, consequently, "in such soil alone a religious authority which is really authoritative can grow"; he explicitly calls the apprehension of God "in our own experience" the "ultimate authority in religion."¹

James associated the authority of the experience with its "noetic" quality.² Bennett has shown that there is enough cognitive content in the mystical experience to identify God, that the immediate is not exhausted in the mere "that," and cannot be, as character can not be actually separated from existence; furthermore, if it could be, "mediate" and "immediate" are rendered unintelligible. So what the mystic experiences is not a meaningless, but a certain fact; his personal contact with God is like one meeting a man who has been described to him before. The mystic thus seeks a definite Person. His experience is both mediate and immediate. It is mediate in that he goes from idea to experience; it is immediate in that God appears to him.³ Mystics unite in testifying that they have had an "intellectual apprehension of God's presence."⁴

1. Strachan, ACE, 16, 20; see Galloway, TPR, 264-265.
2. See James, VRE, 380-381.
3. See Bennett, CVM, 43, 148-152; Buckham, HG, 6; vide supra, 287-325.
4. DeBurgh, TRP, 121.
adequately viewed must include intuition; the logical processes or discursive reason simply bring out "the implications present from the outset."¹ Leuba agrees with James that what "has not been mentally elaborated is invulnerable" and notes that agreement of James, Hocking, and the mystic philosophers in general on the meaningful nature of immediate experience prior to its rational interpretation.² Mrs. Dawkins maintains the thesis that mysticism cannot be understood except as a cognitive achievement, and that "no cognitive process, no thinking can be understood except as...a part of the mystical achievement."³ That is, thinking is from part to whole but it requires an intuitive vision of the whole for a start; knowing the goal, true knowledge is possible for us. Consequently, while the mystic blinded by the "full sunlight" cannot see the parts distinctively, yet he "knows...immediately, and that in a way we must acknowledge to be universal, understandable, vastly significant."⁴

Now, it is this cognitive factor that "determines...the quality of validity," and that in one sense renders immediate religious experience self-validating.⁵

b. By others

But while immediate religious experience is self-validating, it is not "others-convincing"; while the mystical experience is coercive proof to the experient, it is not so to

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¹ DeBurgh, FMR, 35-36.
² Leuba, PRM, 308; see 314; Lewis, AKV, 409;
Russell, ML, 9; Rail, SM, 100; vide supra,
³ Dawkins, MEP, 27.
⁴ Dawkins, MEP, 82, 83; see Lewis, AKV, 486.
⁵ DeBurgh, Art. (1926), 105.
others, and so stands in need of verification. The mystic's certitude must be supplemented by logical certainty, for while his experience is direct and unchallengeable, "it is only by means of Thought and trust in Thought that this experience can be extended, communicated, utilized." Bennett, following von Hügel and Hocking, is dissatisfied with the conclusion of James that the mystic's experience is authoritative only for the mystic. In evaluating this experience, Bennett considers the motive of the mystic, which is not to write a new theology, but to commune with God as an Object of love, and supports Hocking in his idea of the community of knowledge or of minds, the necessity of a common object known as common. But this means a similar subjective experience; it becomes authoritative by becoming personal. Thus, contrary to the implication of Waterhouse, the mystic's "inviolate position" is not secured at a price to the mystic, but to the one to whom it means nothing, for it can mean something to such a one—if he will "taste and see."

For as Waterhouse himself declares, "there can be no dispute about tastes." And as Tillich observes, "religious truth is existential truth and to that extent it cannot be separated from practice"; it is "acted—in accord with the Gospel of John."

The need of verification of religious belief can be

1. von Hügel, EPR, 71-72; see DeBurgh, TPR, 121.
2. See Bennett, OVM, iv, 12-15, 91-98; C. I. Lewis, MWO, 116.
3. Waterhouse, Art. (1944), 79.
briefly stated: any hypothesis can be known to be true only because it works; this is true of the religious hypothesis in that it deals with an Object that is public (in the sense of accessible to all), but private in the subjective sense. Therefore, the religious hypothesis, basically and ultimately, can be known to be true only because it works in personal immediate experience.1

3. Its tests

a. Pragmatic

Verification of the belief in God may be found first in the pragmatic test. The names of James and Dewey are generally associated with this test. Viewing truth as correspondence of idea and fact, they hold that this means "the guiding or leading power of ideas by which we dip into the particulars of experience again," so that when the idea "corresponds with the things it means to square with," it is verified.2 It is the "laboratory habit of mind"; that which works is true.3 Questions concerning the meaning of given objects are put to them, as it were, and the answers are found in the effects produced by the objects. To the objection that all that works is not true, James and Dewey would answer that the test is found in the "social and eventual rather than individual and immediate."4 Misunderstanding over their use of "satisfaction"5 is doubtless due to an ambiguity of statement, for it seems to be their

1. Vide supra, 143.
3. See Dewey, Art. (1908), 86-87; James, PRA, 123.
4. Moore, TRE, 56.
5. See Dewey, Art. (1908), 94.
purpose to convey the idea of a cognitive satisfaction "that develops when there is good reason to believe that we are actually finding out what the inquiry set out to discover," i.e. when "the ideas employed have vindicated their usefulness in the discovery of factual truth."¹ For Nolting, likewise, validity means a "rational justification as a basis of action."² The significant fact is that James set this path over against the theoretical as an approach to God.³ Belief in God has already been partially justified by this test.⁴

Macintosh also applies this test to the religious hypothesis. He declares that mysticism and pragmatism can be mutually helpful:

If religious pragmatism can add to its method of testing religious hypotheses...an immediate experience of the divine...it will have taken the longest possible step toward becoming truly scientific. On the other hand, if religious mysticism will but consent to have its subjective certitudes tested by being acted upon as working hypotheses in practical relation and everyday life, it will have ceased to be unduly dogmatic, and will have shown its willingness to become truly scientific.⁵

When intuitionism and pragmatism are thus combined, truth will be "an entity or correspondence of idea with reality...whose sufficiency for all valid purposes...is guaranteed by the confirmation of immediate experience."⁶

The self-discipline, the preparation the mystic makes

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1. Murphy, UR, 88. 4. Vide supra, 135-144, 152-158.
   Buckham, Art.(1935), 311.
for coming into the presence of God has pragmatic value, of itself as well as culminating in higher moral and spiritual living.¹ In this there is a mingling of idealistic elements, for there is a stress on the inner life. The mystic begins "his search for truth and reality from within!²:

It is important to remember that mysticism is not merely in its very nature the timeless religion of inward experience, the perennial witness to the authority of the spirit, the reality of the soul's contact with God. Historically, also, it stands for freedom and inwardness.³

The mystic does not search for truth for its own sake.⁴ First of all he wants to find God and commune with Him. His "high degree of certitude of the reality, accessibility, and sufficiency of God" tends to make religion strongly dynamic in everyday life; "it is the finished mystic who best knows the need of active life and its mediation."⁵ He is individual and contemplative on the one hand and practical and altruistic on the other. To some, however, the essence of mysticism is not contemplation but action. St. Paul, St. Theresa, St. Catherine of Siena, St. Francis, and Joan of Arc are examples of this and of the statement that Christian mysticism can be traced to Christ and the Hebrew prophets as the source of this inspiration to activity.⁶

But two things must be kept in mind here: the first is

1. See Rall, SM, 59-60.  
2. Rall, SM, 94; Buckham, MML, 171.  
3. Hartshorne, NVM, 261.  
4. See Rall, SM, 64-65, 70.  
5. Bockting, MGHE, xix.  
6. See Moore, TRE, 46.
that the secret of this dynamic life is the consciousness of God's presence; the second is that the greatest service the mystic performs is to point out to others the way to God. Mysticism is normal when it stresses the experience of God "as a Personal Presence, and avoids all speculation which does not flow out of and return to this experience" entering "into service of some kind."¹

This sense of "Personal Presence" has made men "courageous in the face of persecution," has sensitized "their consciences to social wrong," and "has suffused their entire lives with joy."² This dynamic force in the man suffused in divine love manifests itself as "a tremendous creative energy making him ready to place his life at the service of the world's need."³ Underhill speaks of the great satisfaction of the mystic as coming from being a creative artist whose business it is now recognized to be to enlighten rather than to delight. In reference to the affinity of Bueken's thought with mysticism, Underhill says: "there is in reality no essential connection between retirement from the world and the mystic view of reality."⁴

Not the least of the contributions that mysticism has made is its spiritualizing of worship. Seeing in normal mysticism a merging into Christianity, Buckham writes:

2. Trusblood, LB, 212.
3. Tennant, PT, 1, 144.
4. Underhill, Art. (1913), 422; see 629-630.
As R. C. Moberly has finely said: 'Had Christians only understood and lived up to their religion, they would all have been mystics'!... Something is wanting in our worship today.... The celestial fire, the divine breath, the invisible presence, the Holy Spirit, call it what you will, it is the one reality, without which worship is a desert waste and with which it is a fountain of life.¹

Pennoch places mysticism alongside of religious institutions in keeping religions alive through the course of history:

In fact, it seems unlikely that religious institutions would continue indefinitely to retain their hold upon men unless along with them went personal experiences more or less mystical in their nature.²

The mysticism of Bucken is seen in Underhill's pointing out of the four stages of his thought: break with the merely natural life, recognition of an autonomous spiritual life, its personal appropriation, and the organization of human life and civilization for the benefit of the spiritual life.³ This reminds one of one branch of mysticism—Quakerism—which throughout its history has been characterized by practical activity, particularly reform and benevolence. Meeting the empirical test of Reinhold Niebuhr, mysticism qualifies as a good: "That is good which not only fulfills our vital capacities in terms of harmony with one another but which fulfills our vital capacities in terms of all people."⁴ Windelband sees the value of mysticism as part of the two main impulses of our age—"a yearning towards an ultimate unity and a deeper spiritualization

1. Buckham, MML, 247-248, 210; see Moberly, AP, 316.
2. Pennoch, OCG, 33.
4. Niebuhr in Kepler, CRT, 52; see Aubrey, PTT, 201.
of our world-view. Recognizing the peculiar significance of rapt experiences and sudden conversions, DeBurgh sees their real value in their being "moments in a coherent course of life," as here is "to be found the verification":

We find 1) that God does reveal himself to his worshippers on rare and transitory occasions, but is known as an abiding presence that informs the most varied situations and occurences of life, ii) imparts to them a significance and a harmony inexplicable save in the assumption of divine providence. We find iii) that the effects of this experience upon his life and character are recognized by his fellow men.2

Finally, on the pragmatic test, it may be noted that tests made by Sinclair on college students revealed a peculiar inspiration present in those who were mystics:

They respond to hints and promptings from those about them, more used to appreciative understanding and perhaps more socially-minded, they go at problems with a positive mental set. Their attitude toward religion is sympathetic; and their continued participation in religious activities implies a striving for that which is ethically and morally right... From their confessions it is evident that the experiences themselves are satisfying, uplifting, and strengthening.3

b) Logical

1) Coherence

The second test in the verification of the belief in God as a valid belief is the logical test, the first aspect of which is coherence. Now, there can be no coherence apart from the conformity of the mind with the object of knowledge.4

There must be a "coherent agreement of experience with reality."¹ That there is such a relation or correspondence between thought and reality has been shown.² One may well ask with Johnson:

Is it not strange that the synthetic philosopher who rejected the false separation of rationalism and empiricism, who insisted that thought without experience is blind, should hold tenaciously to the artificial separation of appearance from reality? ... Reality may be distinguished within experience as well as beyond experience.... The data of experience become the evidence for inference that what is beyond our fragmentary observation is coherent with the samples known.³

Nor can there be coherence without consistency: "No evidence, public or private, can support a contradiction as such."⁴ But coherence goes beyond conformity and consistency:

It lies...in system, and above all in that perfect type of system in which each component implies and is implied by each other.... To know the truth about anything is, so far, to apprehend it in a system of relations that makes it intelligible, and this is what we mean by understanding it.⁵

This is not a declaration that complete understanding of an object is requisite to a certainty of its existence or to a partial knowledge of it:

If the universe is a system of relations, we cannot know all about a specific thing until we know all its possible relations.... To say that the universe is a system of relations which we cannot altogether know until we know all is not to say that we can know nothing.⁶

The synoptic view taken in this dissertation of the

¹. Johnson, Art.(1941), 377.
². Vide supra, 237-254.
⁴. Hartshorne, Art.(1948), 36.
⁵. Blanshard, NT, I, 78.
⁶. Flewelling, RF, 36.
theoretical, moral, experiential and pragmatical elements in reference to religious reality has been a coherent view. A broad view of experience has comprehended all the relevant facts; and there has been an "inter-relation of the elements of experience as a whole."\(^1\) In a synoptic view, Dr. Brightman summarizes the chief evidences of God as: the rationality of the universe, the emergence of novelties, the nature of personality, religious experience, and systematic coherence.

The last Brightman considers the judge of the others:

The best reason for belief in God is that acceptance of the proposition that he exists and manifests himself in the ongoing of experience leads to the most connected and coherent view of our experience as a whole.\(^2\)

Viewing modern theistic arguments as inductive, Johnson sees in them when taken together "a search for meaning in facts," an interpretation of larger significance than now appears, and a judgment of what in the light of the examined evidence is probably true of what lies beyond.\(^3\) But what lay "beyond" for all the traditional arguments drew near in the experiential argument, for the continuity sought between knower and Known has been found, with the result that as part of a coherent whole, the traditional arguments have taken on new significance.\(^4\) For, "a belief is rendered true...by its accord with Actuality or Reality."\(^5\) Where "subjective certitude is objectively

1. Muirhead, Art.(1928), 18-19; vide supra, 195-204.
2. Brightman, PG, 161-162; see RV, 33.
5. Tennant, PT, I, 329.
determined," certainty "can, nay must, be predicated," for "convincedness here is literally being overwhelmed or forced."\(^1\)

In the application of the pragmatic test the power of the mystical experience to integrate life and beliefs has been seen; this is a drive in the direction of coherence. Personal experience has been apprehended as completely as possible, and then grasped synoptically as a system of totality; in "this process of verification," reason and experience have been joined not as "two separate powers," but reason as a "function of experience" and experience as "a movement toward rational totality."\(^2\) In the pragmatic view the idea of God is seen as a symbol of "unity and harmony between existence and value"\(^3\):

Thus while specific religious experiences cannot be used alone as evidence...they may when taken in connection with the total world view derived from a coherent interpretation of all experience be regarded as 'strong empirical confirmation of the belief in God.'\(^4\)

Thus, "any religious belief or attitude must in the long run be tested by its fidelity to human experience in general."\(^5\) A mysticism for which men are hungry, "a sane and heartfelt one, contact with spiritual realities," one that emanates from Jesus and centers in him," and that, consequently, "has power to rejuvenate our age," meets the test of coherence.\(^6\)

It is of great importance that mysticism "persistently

1. Tennant, PT, I, 291.
2. Brightman, Art. (1937)\(^1\), 155.
4. Martin, EPR, 35; see Brightman, FG, 160-161; FG, 94-114; PR, 436-437.
endeavors to express and interpret the experience in rational
and moral terms.1

Theology must relate "religious intuitions to the rest
of experience so as to achieve a "dynamically integrated reli-
gious experience."2 The writer agrees with Brown that as there
is for science reliable knowledge within limits so certain that
events can be predicted, so there is "a trustworthy knowledge of
God" made possible by man's "capacity to act upon his ideals."3

The predication of certainty to theology is unwavering and quite
general today.4 For as revelation is a real presentation of God
to the soul of man, and as faith is not mere assent to truth,
but an adjustment of the whole life to God, one may reach not
only overwhelming subjective certainty but also a degree of
logical certainty.5 That is, belief in God may become a co-
erent belief when it is a synthesis of rationalism, empiricism,
intuitionism, pragmatism, and authoritarianism.

The importance of authority in this regard can not be
minimized. One of the four assemblages of events held by
Russell is the one that depends on the testimony of others.6
It is from this source that most beliefs are first acquired;
"we accept on trust nine-tenths of what we hold to be true,"
being disposed to believe what we hear unless we have "some
positive reason for doubting the honesty or competence" of

1. Buckham, MML, 118.
2. Aubrey, PTT, 201; see
Lyman, MTR, 203; Oman,
NS, 58.
4. See Bosley, QRG, 28;
vide supra, 273, 275,
283.
5. See Duce, KSN, 551.
6. See Benjamin, Art.(1941),
569.
our informants. Matthews sees the importance of this avenue of knowledge for the researcher in both the natural and spiritual realms:

If he were confined to principles which are to him self-evident and experiences which he himself has had he could make no progress towards a science of nature. In the same way, the solitary thinker seeking unaided for the Divine with the support only of his own spiritual experience and power of reflection will get but a short distance on the road and reach but a meagre conception of God.

In the light of the above, truth does, in a sense, contrary to Flewelling, need "the bolstering of authority," for while "it is never true on authority or by reason of authority" alone, the testimony of others to an experience is an indispensable factor in coherence, in the whole truth, only a part of which the individual has when his "truth" is not supported by the testimony of others; thus, "the individual believes that true which fits in with life" (with the life of others as well as his own), and which "works" in this complete sense.

Authority conserves the results of past experience; "we may regard all human history as an experiment in applied religion." To many the value of the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures lies in this conservation of the records of testimony to religious experience:

1. Montague, WK, 39; vide supra, 46-47, 131-137.
2. Matthews, GCE, 46; see Dodd, AB, 133, 136.
3. Flewelling, RF, 32-33.
4. Brown, PC, 203; see 199; vide supra, 292, 299.
5. See Matthews, GCE, 114-115; Dodd, AB, 138.
I base my faith in Christianity mainly on two things. First, the testimony of the heart and conscience (and may I not say, of the heart and conscience of all right-minded people?) that in the New Testament are to be found 'the words of eternal life'...and my second ground is what I call mysticism or personal religious experience.1

Because the testimonies of the mystics and the ordinary believers of many faiths are so "clear and abundant," Brightman finds in them additional confirmation of the existence of God.2

It would be only a narrow authority and a narrow reason that could come into conflict. But a narrow authority (as for instance, when authority is unaccompanied by freedom) is not a real authority; it lives only in the environment of real freedom.3 Balfour has described the disastrous effects of the rejection of authority by any community,4 and has shown that to rely on authority may be a scientific and reasonable act:

At every moment of our lives, as individuals, as members of a family, of a party, of a nation, of a church, of a universal brotherhood, the silent, continuous, unnoticed influence of Authority moulds our feelings, our inspirations and, what we are more immediately concerned with, our beliefs. It is from Authority that Reason itself draws its most important premises. It is in unloosing or directing the forces of Authority that its most important conclusions find their principal function.5

Crooks witnesses to the same point:

It is significant that just in a time when the theoretical explanations of religion had made up their minds that religious conversion

1. Inge, MR, 316.
3. See Rawlinson, AF, 17.
4. See Balfour, FB, 203, 228; vide supra, 289.
5. Balfour, FB, 236; see 238.
was an emotional illusion, the psychologists came forward with irrefutable proofs of the reality and value of this experience. Thus science which has been thought to be the enemy of religion came to its rescue.

First-hand experience of God supported by the testimony of others to the experience is a solid basis upon which to build a valid belief in God. There is "a cloud of witnesses" to the reality and validity of belief in God—mystics, philosophers, psychologists and theologians of various schools—Protestant, Catholic, conservative, liberal, neo-orthodox, idealistic, realistic and pragmatic. To individual experience, thus, is added the testimony of corporate experience, making for coherence and giving a degree of logical certainty. The resulting theistic view is more coherent than that furnished by naturalism:

The great body of our beliefs, scientific, ethical, aesthetic, theological, form a more coherent and satisfactory whole if we consider them in a theistic setting than in a naturalistic one.

Would it not be asking too much to expect the belief in God's existence to approximate logical certainty in the minds of all men? The foundation for it is lacking in the minds of some through immediate experience of God. Then, what is a coherent view for one man is not necessarily that for another. The difference is one of perspective. As Ramsdell has shown, what one regards as reasonable depends upon what he thinks

2. Balfour, FB, 344; see 330-331.
important for understanding: "His perspective is determined by what he evaluates as crucially significant." Inge notes the jealousy of religion, science and art towards one another as "each of them claims in a sense to cover the whole field, that is, to interpret all experience from its own point of view." And speaking of the characteristically modern apologist, Quick writes:

Instead of exhibiting the explanatoriness of religious doctrine or belief, he seeks to establish the inexplicability and uniqueness of the religious experience. Its value, he will contend, can only be known from within by those who have already believed. The non-believer is bound to regard the claims of religion as dangerous nonsense. Thus the whole burden of proof...is shifted on to the shoulders of the critic of religion, who must explain away an experience which by his own confession he has not really entered.

What Kant's ideas of the pure reason (including, of course, God) means to one depends upon his practical estimate of life and duty; value judgments differ. The Christian apologist would be expected to have a different perspective than an atheist, just as the musician would be expected to differ in perspective from the deaf man. Naturally, all existence appears in a different light to the one to whom God has revealed Himself:

To the man who so sees God the problem of the world and self has been solved; and his religious knowledge has a value greater far than all science and all philosophy.

1. Ramsdell, CP, 10.
2. Inge, CW, 227.
3. Quick, GFC, 62.
5. Garvie, CMP, 278.
Thus, to unshakable certitude is added the high degree of logical certainty that comes from taking the most coherent view possible; of necessity, it is no claim to absolute logical certainty:

If no argument which falls short of mathematical or logical proof is accepted as conclusive, then it must be admitted that the truth of religious experience cannot be proved absolutely. If this be true, the most that can be done with the facts of experience is to establish such an overwhelming probability of their validity as is, to the minds of most men, tantamount to logical certainty.¹

2) Logical necessity

Logical necessity is an aspect of the logical test in the verification of belief in God. What is necessary to believe is reasonable to believe.² Belief in God is a necessary belief in that God seems to be a condition of all reasoning. His existence, while ultimately not an inference from any premise (i.e. to the one who has experienced Him), makes possible all inferences.³ A modern follower of Plato has gone so far as to declare that man's intellect could not live unless the universe in which it finds itself were "as rational as itself, seeing that reason could not live in a world where no reason is."⁴ If there is no Rationality at the heart of the universe, if there is no Logos, no Ultimate Explanation of all things, then human reason can have no real confidence in itself. As parallel lines may be said to meet in infinity, so may it be said that thought and thing, existence and value,

¹. Hughes, TE, 20.
². Vide supra, 73-76, 244-248, 256-258.
³. Vide supra, 29-30, 102.
⁴. Tillett, PLG, 214.
reason and revelation may be ultimately joined in an infinite Being. As belief in the uniformity of nature makes possible the work of the scientist, so belief in God makes possible the inferences of the religious man. ¹ From the perspective of the one who has the certitude coming from having been in the immediate presence of God, belief in God is also a logically necessary belief; he cannot discover a more reasonable explanation of the world and history than that there is a universal Mind "in which and for which all so-called material things exist."² A place in the universe must be given to God "if human experience...continues to require" Him.³

Then, "beliefs which are found to be practically necessary for the efficiency of man's moral and spiritual life must also be theoretically...true."⁴ Wieman, holding that the minimum meaning of God is Something of supreme value ("upon which human life is most dependent for its security, welfare and increasing abundance"), maintains that God, as thus necessary, must actually exist.⁵

Theism seems to offer a better explanation of both moral and religious phenomena than does atheism, naturalism or pantheism.⁶ Kant found that belief in a personal Summum Bonum is necessary to morality.⁷ From the pragmatic point of view, Macintosh takes a similar position, which he describes:

¹ See Balfour, FB, 303. ⁴ Vide supra, 124-125.
² Rashdall, PR, 19; see Balfour, FB, 310; Dodd, AB, 133; vide supra, 41, 44, 48-51, 63. ⁵ Wieman, RESM, 9; see 10.
³ Boodin, Art.(1908), 234. ⁶ See Ramsdell, CP, 33; Quick, GFC, 58.
⁴ Vide supra, 124-125. ⁷ Vide supra, 105-107, 115-116.
It consists in the postulate of the reality of God, on the ground that his existence, or belief in his existence, is morally necessary; not simply...to guarantee immortality and the adequate happiness of the virtuous in a future life, but rather for the gaining of that special experience of deliverance...of moral uplift through religious dependence...'salvation.' It is thus the feeling that there ought to be a God, transformed by the 'will to believe' into the assertion that there must be and is a God.1

This is of far greater value, as Macintosh realized, when accompanied by the disclosure of God Himself to man. This is Kantian in the sense "that the very possibility of a thing depends upon its being able to find a place in the texture of actual experience."2

III. An adequate certainty

1. For the individual

The certainty that is the product of logical certainty (the inadequate certainty resulting from the reception of the traditional theistic arguments) and psychological certainty (the partial certitude resulting from assent to the moral argument), plus the overwhelming, unshakable certitude that grips one who has had personal contact with God, and that is further the product of the correlation of these certainties in a synoptic view of experience of whole reason, whole faith and whole experience (which together include intuition, authority and race experience, the union of rationalism and empiricism, and the mystical apprehension of the whole), and in a

1. Macintosh, TES, 94. 2. England, KOC, 194.
further verification by pragmatic and logical tests (by working and by being coherent and logically necessary)—this certainty is adequate for the individual.

2. For a rational-empirical theology
   a. Definition

   The correlated certainty is adequate also for a rational-empirical theology, which is a theology of a true rationalism (a consideration of the whole of experience by the whole reason of a whole personality) and of true empiricism, i.e. one that includes faith and reason as parts of experience, and that is, in a sense, scientific in method.¹

   b. Reasons for rejection of an empirical theology

      1) Self-refuting

      There are reasons for the rejection of an empirical theology that do not hold against a rational-empirical theology, the first of which is that the former is self-refuting²; for the latter can consistently go beyond experience and formulate general propositions. The only alternative is utter skepticism.

      2) Narrowed experience

      Another cause for rejection of an empirical theology is its narrow view of experience. In criticism of Boodin, Brightman, Hocking, Macintosh and Wieman, Martin writes:

      All except Macintosh are professionally designated philosophers rather than theologians and write in terms of 'philosophy of religion.' Yet there seems to be an open question as to whether in their religious

¹. See Aubrey, PTT, 156.  ². See Russell, IMT, 207; Martin, EPR, 122.
philosophies, they are not actually assuming the validity of certain notions associated with specifically Christian faith and theology... Thus there seems to be considerable indefiniteness on the part of our philosophers concerning the basic question whether their systems claim a universal validity which is reached independently of prior commitments to a particular faith or whether they are actual attempts to offer a philosophical defense of a particular faith which is taken to be universally valid. Do these 'natural theologies' presuppose or lead to a 'revealed theology,' or are they offered as universal natural theologies in terms of which all 'revealed' theologies are to be judged?

Only on the assumptions (by critic or criticized) that experience excludes reason and revelation, that it is unscientific for a scientist or anyone else to have any "prior commitments" when he begins an experiment, and that such commitments are made without reason acting upon prior experiences, could a theology be declared unempirical. Martin himself declares that to take a broad view of experience is to be truly empirical. But concerning Hocking's emphasis upon a certain kind of mystical experience, Martin asks:

Is the theory vindicated by the experience or the experience by the theory? Are not experience and theory so intimately and subtly related as to render any defense of the one in terms of the other precarious?

In turn it may be asked: Is it unscientific and unempirical for one to proceed by both deduction and induction, hypothesis and verification? Is it not the very breadth of the

1. Martin, EPR, 123-124; see 122.
view of experience that necessitates this? Martin again seems to view experience narrowly in his criticism of Macintosh's emphasis on liberal Protestantism and a certain type of conversion experience:

Such specifically conditioned experiences cannot in themselves substantiate or verify those theological doctrines which must be presupposed before they may be held.1

But how else could these "conversion" experiences be had apart from conditioning and presupposition? How could a scientist conduct an experiment on any other basis?2 This implied criticism by Martin ignores the possibility that reason and experience are behind the very laying down of the religious hypothesis.

Tennant denies that religious experience is a "self-sufficient and independent path-way to public philosophical knowledge about God."3 Likewise, Boodin seems to be opposed not so much to a strict and correct empirical approach as to a wrong conception of empiricism, i.e. the view of James that "experience is self-sufficient, that our hypotheses lean on 'experience,' but experience leans on nothing but itself."4 Moore's qualified opposition to an empirical theology, i.e. if it has no appeal to experience in general, turns out to be no opposition to a true empirical theology.5 Because of this

4. Boodin, R1, 15; see Art. (1908), 234.
5. See Moore, TRE, 187.
unnatural severance of rationalism and empiricism, Rashdall's rationalistic method probably prevents his favoring an empirical theology.\textsuperscript{1} This is, at least in part, the position of Sheen, although he might be expected to give more favorable attention to experiences of the mystics (particularly the Catholic), believing as he does in revelation.\textsuperscript{2}

On the other hand, Baillie, Macintosh, Wieman and Trueblood represent an empirical and inductive theology, with "a common appeal to religious experience, with or without dependence on secondary authorities."\textsuperscript{3} A broad view of experience in the union of rationalism and empiricism would be a denial of both the self-sufficiency of any one religious experience and the self-refuting character of such an empiricism.

3) Abbreviated content

Then empirical theology (in the narrow sense) is brought into disrepute through the apprehension that its underlying motive is to reduce beliefs or to minimize their importance. Hughes declares that the argument from Christian experience frequently leads to "a depreciation of the importance of the historic facts of the Gospel," and warns that in the interests of Evangelical Christianity this peril should be avoided.\textsuperscript{4}

Sabatier, seeing the tendency to minify doctrine, has this to say:

\begin{itemize}
    \item 1. See Rashdall, PR, 106.
    \item 2. Vide supra, 149-150; see Meyer, PST, 38-39, 41; Baillie, IR, 230-231.
    \item 3. Duce, KGN, 555.
    \item 4. Hughes, TE, 7.
\end{itemize}
To say that 'Christianity is a life, therefore it is not a doctrine' is to reason very badly. We should rather say, 'Christianity is a life and therefore it engenders doctrine,' for man cannot live his life without thinking it. When the sap of piety fails, theology withers.

4) Non-intellectual

Another cause of the disfavor of empirical theology is the view that it is non-intellectual. This view is taken by Sheen, who contrasts the empirical substitute for intelligence with "the intellectual proofs," and declares that "the intellectual approach began with the world," in contrast to the non-intellectual, which "goes to God, not through the world, but through the ego." Yes, the early Greek rationalists began with the world—and ran into a dead end, reaching neither God nor the world, and had to retrace their steps for a fresh start. Several times after such a false start, philosophers had to go to the world via self—in order to understand even the world. It is a question whether the traditional arguments should be called "intellectual" or "speculative," and whether they lead to God or to the idea of God. Sheen declares:

Between the apprehension of the external world and of God, there intervened necessarily a logical process; the bridge between the two was built by the reasoning mind.

But it was unbelief that dug the gulf between God and man; and it is faith, as has been shown, that leads the way

1. Sabatier, OPR, 241; see 249; Moore, TRE, 162. 2. Sheen, GI, 31. 3. Sheen, GI, 31.
back to God. This does not mean that there is no place for reason in the empirical approach; there is a mediated immediacy in that approach. Of course, Sheen is correct that an extreme empiricism does not give enough place to reason, but this does not hold of rational-empiricism. His assumption that persons are known by reason is to be questioned. He quotes D'Arcy to the effect that the God reached by traditional proofs, or from without, is a sterile God, out of relation to our lives. Sheen regards the empirical mounting to God as a labor-saving device, i.e. "why laboriously climb up Jacob's ladder to heaven when we can bring heaven and its God down into our very hearts?"1 This was an unfortunate illustration for Sheen's purpose, for Jacob was not represented as climbing the ladder; rather, the angels are represented as both ascending and descending.2 Naturally "the insistence on immediacy leads "to a diminished interest in the problem of the existence of God," for now the interest is communion with God on the part of those to whom the existence of God is no longer a problem. In this sense, Sheen truly remarks: "Once it is admitted that God is given immediately, the problem of God's existence ceases to be."3 It is strange that in this whole discussion Sheen has not a word to say of the mystics; Garrigou-Lagrange and other Catholic writers, however, are concerned with the task of reconciling

1. Sheen, GI, 34; see 32. 2. See Gén. 28:12. 3. Sheen, GI, 34.
the divergent positions of the mystics and St. Thomas. His question, "If God is to be interpreted in terms of experience rather than in terms of knowledge, how interpret experience?" is a just criticism of those who do not relate their religious experience to the rest of life, but not of those who reflect on their experiences (experiences which being immediate, have implicit intellectual content upon which one can reflect). Garvie, writing of the differing emphases of Hegel, Kant and Schleiermacher, declares: "Within the Christian Church there are still those who lay stress exclusively on doctrine, practice or experience; their Christianity is predominantly intellectual, ethical, or emotional." All this shows the need for a rational-empirical theology.

3. Essential elements
   a. Object of experience

   The first essential element of a rational-empirical theology, viewed as scientific, is an object of experience. Scientific method begins with the postulate that for every effect there is a cause, that for every impression received or response made there is a stimulus, that ideas have sources. "There can be no true idea apart from some relation to ultimate reality." The mind can no more create ideals ex nihilo than it can create reality. For religious ideas and ideals there must be a Corresponding Reality. This religious Object may be defined as "that Factor in human experience which

1. Sheen, GI, 41.  3. Ferré, GF, 88.
2. Garvie, CMP, 113.  4. Vide supra, 287, 293.
produces, on occasion of man's continued relation, a definite result."¹ The chief purpose of one of Wieman's books was "to show that religious experience is an experience of an object...which is as truly external to the individual as is any tree or stone," i.e. signifying something extending "beyond that space-time occupied by the individual."² Although held to be transcendent, this religious Object is known to be immanent, for He comes within the range of man's experience. To this Stimulus men respond characteristicly and uniformly with an "attitude of conscious dependence, awe, wonder" and often with humility, "self-surrender, trust and devotion."³ This, together with the general agreement on the part of the experiencers on their certainty of the existence of this experienced Object, indicates that God is a true Given, given to, but not created by, the experiencer, revealed but not "manageable," i.e. not changed at will.⁴ To form a hypothesis about God's existence and then to put it to the test is scientific, notwithstanding any differences between the religious Object and the objects of the natural sciences. "The assumptions which work are verified and accepted as true."⁵ In the words of Matthews: "The modern scientific temper has no reason for objecting to a theology which starts from experience."⁶ Certainly, science would not be expected to object, if it is

¹ Vide supra, 207, 286. ² Vide supra, 141. ³ Wieman, RESM, 5. ⁴ Vide supra, 134. ⁵ Macintosh, PRK, 170. ⁶ Matthews, GCE, 46.
true, as Wieman and Hocking hold, that mystical experience is
the "parent of scientific endeavor." Thomas H. Huxley was
far from objecting when he wrote:

'If anyone is able to make good the asser-
tion that his theology rests upon valid evi-
dence and sound reasoning, then it appears
to me that such theology must take its place
as a part of science.'

So it would appear that "instead of being rationalized
out of existence" religion when systematized into a rational-
empirical theology is being "rationalized into a universally
valid and finally satisfactory form"; even before religion felt
the impress of modern science, it was proceeding by the "trial
and error" method. Of course, it must be remembered that
science itself can not state the ultimate nature of reality,
and should not be allowed to prescribe the limits of knowledge
to be attained by religious experiment; for knowledge received
through the natural sciences is far from the whole of our
knowledge. But theology and philosophy can safely go, as
does science, from particular facts to general principles,
without becoming subservient to science. For as Brightman in-
dicates, "method" means literally "a road after," or "pursuit."
So "scientific method is a pursuit of facts, laws and truths
in special fields." Calling science "nothing else than the
refined process of knowing," Wieman places mysticism in the

1. Martin, EPR, 99; see
Wieman, RESM, 46.
2. Huxley, in Macintosh,
TES, 25.
3. Macintosh, TES, 5; see ix;
vide supra, 293.
4. See Ferré, CF, 86-87;
Kuizenga, Art.(1948), 558.
5. Brightman, NV, 103.
process as supplying the datum for religious knowledge. 1

b. Perception of the object

The second prerequisite to a rational-empirical theology is perception of the religious Object. As already indicated, while God can not be "sensed," He can be "perceived," broadly speaking. 2 Macintosh uses "perception" as affording data for theology, and as corresponding to the facts of revelation. 3 The term may be used for man's response to the stimuli emanating from the religious Object, 4 any awareness of God as the larger environment surrounding the human soul, 5 an apprehension, intuition, instinct, insight or vision corresponding to the Platonic vision. 6 Broadly viewed, it is an experience defined as the power of recognizing existence, an immediate experience in which there is implicit inference (as in the case of an old sailor "who knows implicitly when a storm is approaching," aware of something "without singling it out for full and specific attention"), 7 no sharp line being discovered between feeling and thinking, 8 a perception akin to the experiencing of love, beauty, music and sunshine, 9 and which results in acquaintance and a certitude which is more compelling than that due to the experiencing of things or of other minds. 10

1. Wieman, RESM, 23; see 15-16; James VRE, 455; Baillie in Muirhead, GBE, 16, footnote.
2. Vide supra, 301; see Blanshard, NT, 1, 53.
3. See Macintosh, TES, 32, 103, 106.
5. Vide supra, 250, 253, 255.
6. Vide supra, 260, 284, 292, 301.
7. Blanshard, NT, 1, 90; vide supra, 249-252.
c. Experiment

The third essential of a rational-empirical theology is experiment. Involved in this is the forming of a live and real hypothesis based upon religious experience,¹ the following of conditions governing the experiment, ² observing of criteria for determining its success,³ and verification.⁴

d. Reliance on testimony

Closely related to experiment is reliance on the testimony of others who have worked in the field. From them the experimenter may get information for the hypothesis and for the conditions and criteria of the experiment. Reliance on testimony is scientific and reasonable.⁵ "Experience," however, has been used by some in such a narrow sense as to give the impression that religious empiricism has been freed "from all dependence upon divine revelation." ⁶ But it may be said that all knowledge is through revelation.⁷ And had God not chosen to reveal Himself, man today would have no knowledge of Him. That He has actually disclosed Himself in general and special revelations through history is the witness of religion.⁸ And philosophy has joined in this testimony.⁹ The third chapter of this dissertation has given much evidence to the effect that God has manifested Himself in special revelation, i.e. in

2. Vide supra, 168, 287–293.
6. Mackintosh, TMT, 49.
7. Griffiths, GIE, 293.
8. Vide supra, 31, 119–121, 144, 150.
religious experience. Thus, to ignore the testimonies found in the Christian Scriptures is an unscientific and narrow view of both experience and revelation. And a theology founded upon experience narrowed down to exclude both reason and revelation is on a very narrow and insecure foundation. Moore has warned of the danger of transforming any religious system by making religious experience (evidently in the narrow sense) the essence of vital religion. This transformation would occur whether it were a reaction either against authoritarianism or against rationalism:

It cannot be assumed that if a type of experience is separated from the beliefs with which it has been associated, it will have sufficient fixity of structure to maintain itself unchanged. Rather as doctrines weaken and beliefs change, experiences also tend to become vague and variable. Those who have minimized the importance of theological beliefs in favor of specific experiences have in the long run tended to destroy both of them.

Christian doctrine is more than the simple product of the Christian experience of one age; both the doctrine and the experience are based on a historic revelation. Modern science has no protest against dependence upon testimony, oral or recorded; science gets part of its data that way. The Reality found in individual experience is the Reality of race experience:

Christianity finds the ideal which is also Reality in history. Its specific historic revelation gives fuller meaning to the general revelation of God.

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1. See Moore, TRE, 162.
2. See Moore, TRE, 163.
3. Moore, TRE, 162.
4. Vide supra, 378; see Hughes, TE, 237-238; Garvie, CMP, 109, 332.
5. See Matthews, GCE, 46; Relton, CPC, 61-62.
6. Ferre, CF, 88; see Hughes, TE, 21, 61-62; Sabatier, UPR, 235, 240, 308-309.
Ferré adds that God may be seen in a historical revelation, as it "discloses what God is and illumines the facts of history"; although it is a partial disclosure, it is a true one.¹ Ferré observes that "radical" comes from the Latin radix meaning "root"; thus radical Christianity is root Christianity: "Every great reform in Christianity has come from going back to the root."² It has been noted that sane mystics have depended upon the Bible, and thus, upon their connection with the race.³ And to ignore the Christian Scriptures is to ignore the testimony of the greatest mystic of all, Jesus Christ.⁴ Our "concept of Deity is fashioned from the data of the religious experience,"⁵ but no one has made a greater contribution to that concept than has Jesus Christ.

The "formidable consequences" of the attempt of modern theologians to draw a parallel between religious and scientific experiment of which Höffding complains will not follow if the experiment is truly religious and scientific, i.e. in the acceptance of relevant testimony from any source, particularly the testimony of the great mystics and saints of all history.⁶ "The history of practical religion may fairly be regarded as a prolonged empirical investigation."⁷ It would be absurd, therefore, to attempt to construct a rational-empirical theology on a basis that is too narrow to include any oral or

1. Ferré, CF, 93.
2. Ferré, CF, 93.
4. See Matthews, GCE, 50-51.
5. Matthews, GCE, 45.
6. Höffding, TPR, 103.
7. Macintosh, TEŠ, 5.
recorded testimony to God's revelation of Himself or of His thought, particularly in religious experience "at its best."¹

d. Analysis, interpretation and systematization

Finally, there must be analysis, interpretation and systematization of the results of experiment. Here again, the experient can not ignore the results of experiments conducted by others in the same field. There is a body of knowledge of God that has been acquired gradually through the ages. This data the modern experimenter must analyze, interpret and systematize, reducing to general truths and translating into scientific-theological terminology. In this, induction and deduction proceed together.

It can be seen, thus, that to ignore the historical elements of Christianity is unreasonable and unscientific. They are empirical elements. Kant recognized historical faith, a faith based upon the Christian Scriptures.² And for Hegel religious history was one of the three phases of the dialectic of religious truth. He taught that in genuine religion the "knowledge of particular facts in the history of religion is essentially a bridge leading...to a direct personal awareness of the eternal truth of God."³ History can not be driven out of religion any more than religion can be banished from history, for not only is man incurably religious, but God does not mock the instinctive craving for the divine

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¹ Macintosh, TES, x; see Rawlinson, AF, 10, 12-14.
² Vide supra, 121.
³ Schilling, ERE, 120-121; see 120; Hegel, JUB, XIV, 174, 182.
that He Himself has planted in the spirit of man. God has
incarnated and reincarnated Himself in history.\(^1\) History is
His story. Revelations of God, general, special and supreme
(Jesus Christ), take place in time; Christian faith and ex-
perience are historical:

The Christian revelation of God is not a
system of truths which remain independent of
the Person who enunciated them or the time
in which they were first enunciated.\(^2\)

As there is general agreement that "in some sense the
New Testament is the fountain head of the Christian experience
of God," it can be reasonably concluded with Matthews that the
New Testament is normative for all time, i.e. as the Laboratory
Manual for the Christian experiment; and that, therefore, "we
are not free to construct our concept of God in abstraction
from history."\(^3\) Here the Christian experimenter is no more
original and creative than the strictly scientific experimenter.
Here speculation can not be substituted for the testimony of
those who during the course of history have conducted experi-
ments in the same field.\(^4\) One cannot place a "ring-fence"
avoid himself and expect to find within it "adequate material
for religious belief."\(^5\)

Wieman sees the danger as well as the absurdity of at-
tempting to divorce religion and history. He commends the
work done by James and Hocking in the analysis of religious

\[^1\] See Walsh, Art. (1934), 3-4; Macintosh, RR, 489.
\[^2\] Matthews, GCE, 83.
\[^3\] Matthews, GCE, 44.
\[^4\] See Matthew, GCE, 48; Macintosh, TES, 5.
\[^5\] Dodd, AR, 136.
experience and declares that science is needed to save religion from sentimentality and from bondage to tradition. But he is careful to add that religion, no more than science, can dispense with the traditional:

Faith...is a deep psychological propulsion. As roots penetrate the earth and leaves turn to the sun, so this propulsion in man seeks the reality which creates more abundant living.... But when man meets God and God meets man, the way is opened not primarily by intellectual understanding. It is opened by actual conditions that have been set up in the past and historically transmitted in the form of a living community in the manner called the Holy Spirit. If philosophy of religion degenerates into the endeavor to construct or find an idea of God... the resulting religion will be so anemic and weak that it will not have energy enough to breathe.¹

Whether there has been any deliberate attempt to cut the life-lines of Christianity and to construct an entirely new (a so-called empirical) foundation is a question. There may have been an effort to break with the past in the modern appeal to religious experience motivated by a desire to simplify dogma and to minimize its importance.² But it is even more questionable whether any so-called empirical theologian has actually broken with history, tradition, revelation and other recorded testimonies to religious experience and belief. Speaking of the modern effort to build empirical religious philosophies or natural theologies, Martin declares that the "divergent methodological assumptions, interpretive schema and personal religious convictions implicit and explicit"

¹ Wieman, Art. (1944), 57; see RESM, 48, 59, 61. ² See Moore, TRE, 162.
are presuppositions rather than conclusions from experiment and that the reflections of the theologian upon general revelation are necessarily guided by his attitude towards certain central convictions or "special revelation" which constitute the subject matter of a "revealed theology."¹

4. The object of legitimate certainty

Of what, then, may one be legitimately certain? He may be certain of both his theology and his experience of God if the theology is a rational-empirical theology. For on this basis a correlation has been effected between certainty and certitude. Individual experience of God has its roots, and thus, its very life, in historical soil. There is no reasonable divorcing of the individual and the historical, theory and practice, and experience and theology²:

The Christian life has two foci—the Gospel facts which reveal the grace of God and the inward experience of their redemptive power. The task of theology is to explain and authenticate the facts and interpret the experience, and to set the two in their right relation to one another.³

Sabatier joins the two foci mentioned by Hughes:

"Religion is simply the subjective revelation of God in man, and revelation is religion objective in God."⁴ Christian experience is conditioned by knowledge of, and faith in, Christ and His promises, revealed in the Christian Scriptures. Faithful following of the conditions laid down there

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1. Martin, EPR, 122.  3. Hughes, TE, 64, 274.
2. See Hughes, TE, 237-238.  4. Sabatier, OPR, 34.
for an experiment results inevitably in a demonstration. There is action and reaction here; the relation between one's theology and experience may be very intimate and vital. Consequently, the certainty—overwhelming certitude plus a high degree of logical certainty—concerning Christian experience naturally reacts in favor of the theory or the theology that made possible the demonstration.

Consequently, the correlation of certainty and certitude by means of a synoptic view (including the various types of theistic arguments, experience, reason, faith, empiricism and rationalism) and verification of the religious hypothesis through its meeting of pragmatic and logical tests, furnish a certainty, that while not absolute, is adequate for the individual and for a rational-empirical theology.
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ABSTRACT

In the light of the thought of Immanuel Kant is there any justifiable certainty (particularly of God's existence)? This problem involves the subordinate problem: can logical certainty and psychological certainty (certitude) be correlated, i.e. is an empirical theology possible? Kant's treatment of the problem of God suggests three types of religious certainty or certainty-claims--theoretical, moral and experiential.

In his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Kant exposed the weaknesses of the traditional theistic arguments as claims to logical or theoretical certainty. Partly as a consequence, there is today a general dissatisfaction with the traditional theistic "proofs." As merely theoretical, they are abstract, the results of belief rather than producers of it, having some value but producing no high degree of logical certainty.

In his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* and *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Kant elaborated upon the idea advanced in the first *Critique* that what can not be demonstrated by the speculative reason can be held as a reasonable belief by the practical reason. He viewed God as the *Summum Bonum*, Supreme Intelligence, who must exist if the happiness of the good is to be guaranteed, as such a guarantee necessitates harmony between the moral and physical orders, a harmony only possible in their union under one Ruler. In aesthetic experience, also, Kant saw
an implication of God's existence, for he put the intuitive judgments of the holy and of a teleological universe upon the same plane as the immediate apprehensions of the beautiful and the sublime, all judgments of the practical reason.

The most serious defect in Kant's moral "proof" is its narrow view of reason, faith and experience; this results in an arrested hypothesis, one cut short in its approach toward a distinctive religious experience. For faith may be viewed not only as pre-hypothetical and hypothetical, but also as post-hypothetical. This last faith is the faith of the one who has conducted a successful religious experiment; he has a certitude that is not negated by make-believe definitions (such as a definition of faith that would prevent a believer from being a knower), make-believe hypotheses (where the will-to-believe degenerates into the will-to-make-believe), and make-believe moral arguments (which stand too near to hypocrisy, disillusionment and atheism). Granted that "he that cometh to God must believe" (the will-to-believe), yet judged by the testimony of countless numbers, "He is a rewarer of them that diligently seek Him."

The chief value of Kant's moral argument is that it suggests a way of approach into the immediate presence of God—the way of faith. This faith may be described as active, necessary, primary, reasonable (although paradoxical) and emotionally-satisfying.

The age-old appeal to distinctive religious experience
as a basis for certitude concerning God's existence has been
stimulated by Wesley, Schleiermacher, James, and more recently,
by the advance in science and by the revision of theistic argu-
ments along empirical lines.

Meanwhile, in dualistic epistemology there is a bring-
ing of subject and object closer together in a "duality in the
unity of experience." There is also a decline in the dogmatic
and unqualified advocacy of the doctrine of probability. Nega-
tively, this is apparent in the disagreement as to its nature,
inconsistency in the denial of all certainty, and the diminish-
ing vigor of assertions of the doctrine. Positively, the de-
cline is witnessed by the pressing of the following considera-
tions: the necessity of certitude for every-day life, non-infer-
ence as the essential nature of a datum, knowledge as a relation
between two distinct terms in intimate union, some cognitive
content in general awareness, dependence of probability upon
certitude, and the denial of the merely hypothetical character
of all empirical statements. In the light of all this, it seems
unreasonable to deny the possibility of any certainty.

It was Kant himself who laid a foundation for certitude
concerning religious realities. For in Opus Postumum is found
the concept of a personal God immediately revealed to the human
soul. Such certitude is desirable in view of the alarming in-
crease in the number of those who are being treated by psychia-
trists and psychoanalysts, and the fact that it is impossible
to live by uncertainties alone. The right of being psychologi-
cally certain is seen by the facts that desire for certitude
is an innate possession of the race, that experience is generally reliable, and that there are some absolutes left in an age of uncertainty—such as absolute moral values and fixed business standards.

Certitude regarding the existence of God is reasonable because unshakable certitude does not signify complete knowledge, certitude for self does not require proof for others, and immediate experience of God is psychologically more compelling than the facts of science and psychology (as an omnipresent Spirit can draw nearer the human spirit than can things or other human minds); this certitude admits of psychological conditioning and is a human-divine interaction, an awareness, a mediated immediacy, a unique personal encounter (not pantheistic), and an incontrovertible fact. As the confrontation is an internal one, there is no fulcrum on which the "crow-bar" of denial can be rested in order to dislodge the mystic from his position.

In immediate experience itself there seems to be an intuitive grasp of wholes. But when individual subjective experience becomes public experience and objective validity is given to the concept of God, an explicit step is taken toward the synoptic view requisite to the correlation of certitude and logical certainty. When, in addition, part reason and part faith are made whole, a still higher degree of logical certainty results. This is intensified when rationalism and empiricism are joined. The connecting link in this
wedlock is mysticism. The true mystic insists that his intuitions should be tested. Thus, the synoptic vision which apprehends reason, faith, and experience as wholes, which takes in rationalism and empiricism, achieves the correlation of certitude and logical certainty—the Wissen of Kant. For with him, the culmination of the steps of Meinung (theoretical opinion), Glauben (moral or practical belief), and Ueberzeugung (subjective sufficiency of evidence for one's self) is Wissen ("objective Gewissheit...für Jedermann"). Applied to the knowledge of God, Wissen is the inadequate logical certainty of theoretical theistic arguments, the partial certitude of Kant's moral approach, plus the high degree of logical certainty acquired when individual experience is confirmed by race experience, when the correlation of certitude and logical certainty is perfected by authority—the living or recorded testimonies of the multitudes who have experienced God.

Belief in God can be verified. One personal contact with God is sufficient for permanent certitude of His existence, although not for full knowledge of His nature. Consequently, certitude and tentativeness can exist side by side, making possible a revision of the religious hypothesis through the ages. In a sense, the direct experience of God is a self-validating experience. For Bradley, Dewey, and Whitehead, immediate experience is the ultimate appeal. But to communicate the experience, to make it others-convincing, the mystic has to supplement his certitude with logical certainty.
Belief in God meets both the pragmatic and logical tests. Mystical experience often culminates in integrated thinking, dynamic living, higher moral and spiritual experience, and practical service. The synoptic view, taking in all the relevant facts—the theoretical, moral, experiential, and pragmatical aspects of religious Reality, has been a coherent view. Belief in God is a coherent belief when it is a synthesis of rationalism, empiricism, intuitionism, pragmatism and authoritarianism. And what is necessary to believe is reasonable to believe. Without the assurance that Rationality is at the heart of the universe, human reason is without real confidence in itself. As parallel lines may be said to meet in infinity, so may it be said that thought and thing, existence and value, reason and revelation ultimately join in an infinite Being. Thus the unwavering and quite general prediction of certainty to theology today is not without warrant. It is a certainty which, while not absolute, is adequate for the individual and for a rational-empirical theology, a theology whose essential elements are: an object of experience, "perception" of the object, experiment, reliance on testimony, and analysis, interpretation and systematization of the results of the experiment.

The chief conclusions reached are as follows: 1) There seems to be no reason for the denial of certainty of any kind and of any degree. 2) On purely theoretical grounds, there is no high degree of certainty in religious matters. 3) Certitude
of the existence of God is both desirable and reasonable.

4) Practical certainty (certitude) of His existence is possible on the basis of the "moral" argument. 5) There is a higher degree of certitude in the experiential approach to God. 6) The synoptic view, comprising theoretical, moral, experiential and pragmatically aspects of religious Reality, is a coherent view. 7) The certainty resulting from the correlation of certainty and certitude in this view, while not absolute, is adequate for the individual and for a rational-empirical theology.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I was born September the 22nd, 1893 in Dayton, New York; my parents are Mr. and Mrs. Edward Martin Barrett of Cuba, New York. I attended Cuba High School, Houghton College, and Asbury College, receiving the A.B. degree from the last institution in 1920. I began my teaching career in the Wesleyan Methodist College, Central, South Carolina, attending summer sessions in Biblical Seminary, Marion College and Harvard Graduate School.

While serving several student pastorates in New England, I did graduate work at Gordon College of Theology and Missions and at Boston University. The former institution granted me the following degrees: B.D., 1927; S.T.M., 1928; S.T.D., 1930. From the latter institution, I received the M.A. degree in 1932.

I returned to Central College in 1934 to serve as dean of theology for two years. Later, I accepted a call to teach philosophy and Biblical literature in Marion College, Marion, Indiana, serving that school six years; during this time I was pastor of two churches.

Desiring to continue my study of philosophy under Dr. Brightman, I enrolled in Boston University Graduate School in the fall of 1946. During the four years here, I supported myself and my family by doing night duty as attendant at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Bedford, Massachusetts.
At present I am Professor of Christian Doctrine in Asbury Seminary, Wilmore, Kentucky.

In 1919 I married Eva Mable Stahl; we have three children, Evangeline, Evelyn and Wesley. Evangeline has rendered valuable--and highly appreciated--service in typing this dissertation.