1961

The will and its freedom in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant

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http://hdl.handle.net/2144/19620

Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

THE WILL AND ITS FREEDOM
IN THE THOUGHT OF
PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AUGUSTINE, AND KANT

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1961
PhD
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INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this dissertation is, first, to examine the doctrines of the will in the thought of (1) Plato, (2) Aristotle, (3) Augustine and (4) Kant, and, secondly to relate their conceptions of freedom as applied to their doctrine of will. To achieve this purpose, the procedure will involve two aspects. (1) An attempt will be made to give a clear and explicit definition of the nature and function of the will in the thought of these four thinkers. (2) Stress will be given to a careful and systematic examination and development of the problems involved in each case with the map of the way in which the philosophical journeys have been organized.

The doctrine of a free will has been subjected to a line of reasoning which, through the ages, has been tied into complex and intricate knots. These knots have been debated with varying results. To give consideration to several of the basic formulations of the problem may help to disentangle some of the difficulties and misunderstandings which have arisen.
The need for clear definition is emphasized by the fact that the vocabulary pertaining to the will has undergone numerous variations the reasons for which are not perfectly clear. The *Oxford English Dictionary* lists almost ten full pages of definitions of "will". Such diffusiveness tends to make the project of clear definition either an uphill struggle, or, if oversimplified, a mere scratching of the surface.

Philosophical self-preservation demands the limiting of the scope of this study to the thinkers named and to whatever problems their insights may rightfully raise.

Because of the abundance of speculative activity taking place in the general consideration of free will, it may be of importance to note the related work being done and to distinguish it from the subject matter of this dissertation.

**Related Research**

Many serious studies have been made of the problem of free will. At the present time there seems to have developed a favorable climate for such endeavors. The first gathering of the New York University Institute of Philosophy in February, 1957, was devoted in all its sessions to the
subject of determinism and freedom. In 1958 Austin Farrer devoted his Gifford Lectures entirely to the subject of freedom of the will as contrasted with the doctrine of determinism and necessity. Though Crane Brinton in an imposing volume, *A History of Western Morals*, refers to the freedom of the will as an old chestnut, he yet admits that for the modern Westerner it is impossible not to believe in some sort of freedom of the will.

It is of importance to note certain aspects of what has been done in the special areas related to the primary concerns of this study:

(1) On Plato the discussions and studies of the problem of the will as free have been meager and sporadic. Although Plato's doctrine of political freedom is given some consideration specific treatment of free will seems not to exist and there are no references to such a treatment in any


of the works on Plato. The relevance of the discussion of
the soul must be left to the more detailed examination as
it appears in the chapter on Plato, except to note that
other limited examinations of the will in Plato (such as in
Taylor and Shorey) leave without answer the question of its
freedom and only vaguely suggest that the discussion of free
will is to be left to others later in the history of thought.
In this dissertation a vigorous attempt will be made to dis-
cover what Plato said on the subject and to see if the cate-
gory of freedom may apply to his doctrine of what may right-
fully be called a will.

(2) Aristotle has been treated more extensively than
Plato on the subject in spite of the fact that interpreters
such as Ross and Voegelin suggest that Aristotle has not
given to the subject the thoroughness deserved. Writers like
Zeller, Taylor, Jaeger, Wild, and Grube apply the doctrine
of free will to Aristotle in order to provide for a doctrine
making man responsible for his actions. How much deeper
than this it is possible to go is one of the purposes of
this dissertation to determine.

(3) Augustine has been given more consideration than
both Plato and Aristotle partly because he wrote a treatise
on the subject of Free Will. The only specific treatment
of Augustine's views of free will and freedom\(^1\) severs his
relationship to the "pagan philosophers" from the early
Greeks to Plotinus. Augustine is then made the founder of
the doctrine of freedom developed by Anselm, Aquinas, and
Maritain. Biblical narratives and texts and the church
fathers are carefully interpreted to support Augustine's
conclusions and are shown to be the basis of Augustine's
thought. Although such a work is not to be treated lightly,
it is important for this dissertation to give the rational
sequence of Augustine's views and to evaluate them not only
on the grounds of their inner consistency with the data he
proposes, but to evaluate the data themselves and to relate
his doctrine to the thought of Plato and Aristotle.

(4) The study of Kant poses an entirely different
problem because his doctrine of free will has been the
subject of considerable discussion.\(^2\) Lewis White Beck

\(^{1}\)See Mother Mary T. Clark's dissertation: "Augustine,
First Philosopher of Freedom." (Fordham University, 1955).

\(^{2}\)Two dissertations appear on the subject: William T.
Jones, "Kant's Theory of Moral Freedom." (Princeton Univer-
sity, 1937), published as Morality and Freedom in the Phil-
osophy of Immanuel Kant. (London: The Oxford University Press,
1940.); and Mary-Barbara K. Zeldin, "Kant's Doctrine of Moral
has a chapter on free will in his book on Kant,¹ and writers such as Hartmann, Paulsen, Caird, and Ward do great service in discussing freedom of the will as autonomous causality acting in accordance with a priori laws. Considerable discussion of this problem appears in the text. This dissertation will attempt to show a meaning and importance to the doctrine of free will in Kant's system not so emphasized in any of the interpretations of Kant and to relate such conclusions to what has been previously ascertained in the course of this study. The full discussion of the remaining aspects of relevance must be left to the text of the dissertation.

Limitations

The fact that the Stoics, the Epicureans, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and many others have been largely omitted from consideration is not so much a reflection on their importance as it is a recognition of the immensity of the subject and the necessary limitations which are required in any interpretation of an important problem.

The meaning of the will as applied to a theological interpretation of the will of God is not within the main interests of this study although at some points such as in Augustine and Kant the notion may arise.
CHAPTER I

THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF WILL

LATENT IN GREEK THOUGHT

Alfred North Whitehead has summed up the status of man's thinking in his observation that "mankind never quite knows what it is after." In such a situation he notes that progress may be achieved by systematizing thought in the adventure of trying out ideas, defining limitations and eliciting the remaining core of truth. Thilly suggests that this adventure in thinking is to be carried out by inserting "each world-view in its proper setting," understanding it as part of an organic whole, and then connecting it with "the intellectual, political, moral, social and religious factors of its present, past, and future."

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The Problem to Be Explored

Man's uncertainty as described above by Whitehead is clearly evident in the discussion of the problem of free will. John Hospers points out that the lack of clarity is the result of the numerous definitions given to free will and the extensive data which tend to indicate that human behavior is determined by compelling forces. A free will is thus defined as either illusory or greatly limited. Insight into the problem is not improved much in the doctrine called indifferentism by which is meant a fortuitous will -- haphazard, random, causeless and aimless. Indifferentism would be another name for chaos in the discussion of man's behavior, nature, and destiny. When the doctrine of free will is related to the idea of choice, a working definition begins to appear. Austin Farrer defines a free will as willing one's choice, energy or interest in the performance of one's action. Paul Edwards defines it as the ability to


act according to one's choices or desires.¹ A. K. Stout represents this concept in the basic formulation that a free will is one which "proceeds from the self which is said to will, and is not imposed upon it by conditions external to it."²

These definitions are not widely different from one which may point the direction of this study. Nicolai Hartmann asserts that a free will is that which "gives direction to real conduct, in so far as it lies in the power of man to decide for or against a felt value."³ H. J. Paton simplifies the definition in his statement that an elementary will is "a response to the object apprehended."⁴

A Working Definition of Free Will

It is thus to a degree clear that the problem to be systematically interpreted in the discussion of free will is

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that of the exploration of the power or powers in man which enable him to determine or choose his direction. To uncover the nature and structure of the will so conceived it becomes necessary to investigate the beginnings of what was to develop into man's deepest insights into human nature.

The Significance of Greek Thought

Ancient Greek philosophy need not apologize to any period in philosophic history; for as Warbeke puts it, "ancient philosophy is involved in the most comprehensive and searching thought of which the human mind is capable; Greek language, art and thought defy comparison."¹

The men responsible for the remarkable qualities of Greek philosophy have achieved considerable recognition in the history of the race. They are all the more unique and extraordinary, because they did not give the impression that they owned the truth but rather shared it openly and freely. It is perhaps because of this climate of the give-and-take of ideas, of the open quest for truth, and of the thoughtful examination of data that the golden age of Greek thought developed. Of no small importance was the Greek

language which lent itself readily to the expression of profound ideas.

From The Greek Myths to Socrates

As with the history of other peoples, the beginning of Greek thought in its most primitive forms is theogonic, i.e., concerned with the genealogy of the gods. The myths describing the "lives" of the gods and their effect on human life and destiny played no small part in man's earliest thoughts. Homer, Hesiod, Phercydes of Syros, Epimenides, Acusilaus, and Hermotimus are all reported as achieving prominence in immortalizing the myths of the gods in poetry, song, and literature. However, for the purposes of the present study, it is important to note only that the theogonies placed human destiny in the hands of capricious deities. The theogonies were full of contradictions, arbitrary, whimsical, and sometimes brutal.


The Ionian Physicists

The Ionian physicists began their attempt to construct a better interpretation with the doctrine of hylozoism, by which was meant "the immediate unity of matter and life according to which matter is by nature endowed with life, and life is inseparably connected with matter." Matter was not something the gods threw at each other and at men as in the great Titanomachy. Matter is a unity which man can control, if he understands it. The Milesian, Thales, (ca. 624-546 B.C.), expressed the unity of matter in a single sentence. Ueberweg describes it in the statement, "Water is the original sources of all things." His view is that all things are full of gods. Similarly, Anaximines (588-524 B.C.) suggests that the single cosmic unity is air.

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2 Ueberweg, I, 32.


4 Ueberweg, I, 32.

This was an improvement over water, because it has the additional quality of infinity.\(^1\) Anaximander (ca. 611-547 B.C.) made the notion of infinity the originating principle of all things, calling it \(\text{ʔο ν 
'πεμενον} \), "the unlimited." Within the unlimited were elementary contraries which separated from the unlimited, whereas homogeneous elements were brought together. From this notion one of the only two sentences in existence from his work *On Nature* is clarified. He says, "All things must in equity again decline into that whence they have their origin, for they must give satisfaction and atonement for injustice, each in order of time."\(^2\) Thus, the injustice of life was thought to be caused not by human effort but by separations from the original infinite, and the only way that justice could be restored was for everything to return to the whole.

The Milesians, in affirming a unifying principle which was orderly and, if properly understood, controllable, weakened the doctrine which put human destiny in the hands of warring deities. As a unity, the universe was just and would not interfere with man's striving for justice.

\(^1\)Tbid., p. 33.

\(^2\)Cf. Turner, p. 35; Ueberweg, I, 35; Windelband, p. 28.
Pythagoreanism

Pythagoras (582-507 B.C.), supposedly a pupil of Pherecydes and Anaximander, took the latter's doctrine of separation which accounted for the disorder in nature and systematized it into a theory of ten pairs of opposites related by numbers. Pythagoras agreed with the conceptions of unity and harmony but affirmed that the unity came not from matter and things but from thoughts and relations which constituted the fundamental principles of all reality. Man's destiny also was determined not by things but by relations which could be thought as numbers. Because the universe was a harmony, man had no reason to expect interference from the universe. Rather his destiny lay in harmonizing his numerical relations with those of the universe. Whether the Pythagorean numbers were entities (Thilly) or forms (Windelband) may be debated, because Pythagoras left no explicit statement on the matter. But the harmonizing of the world and man in numerical relations is unquestioned. However, the soul as a harmony was chained to the body similar to the life of one who dwells in a prison.¹ By achieving knowledge in terms of asceticism,

music, and gymnastics, harmony results, and the soul may move from its body to a future life among the stars where the soul expresses its own nature as harmony. In this way, the soul achieves its freedom or escape from the "wheel of birth,"¹ a notion which was encountered in the Orphic doctrine of the "circle of birth," i.e. the fate of being born to a body until purification made escape possible.

It is, thus, vaguely affirmed in Pythagorean doctrine that man escapes from his suffering in the disorder and chaos of life, not as a reward for, but as the product or essence of, his virtue and goodness. If he did not know enough to become virtuous he remained chained to the "wheel of birth" in a continuous process of reincarnation. He could learn to move in the right direction, if he would achieve knowledge.

Heraclitus

Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.) regarded the original disorder of the Pythagorean's view as inadequate, stating that the universe made no sense on a number theory.² To make sense change must be properly understood. The concept of


²Heraclitus, 15, 40, 129, Bakewell, pp. 30ff.
change as basic to the universe subjected human destiny to
that change. Man must shape his destiny in response to the
shifting course of reality.

Change does not mean disorder, "The ordered universe
which is the same for all, was not created by any one of
the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall
be ever-living-Fire, kindled in measure and quenched in
measure." The only way man can understand himself or the
universe is by the logos or law--fixed measure. God is not
the creator, but the description of the primal unity of
things constantly changing into their opposite. The uni-
verse is orderly and just and constantly changing according
to an immanent law in which harmony is the union of oppo-
sites, the product of strife.

The Eleatics

A reaction against the elusiveness of change takes
place in the Eleatics, Xenophanes (570-480 B.C.),
Parmenides (ca. 515-470 B.C.), Zeno (ca. 490-430 B.C.), and
Melissus of Samos (fl. 442 B.C.). They were so preoccupied
with their notion of the eternal unchanging Being that--they

1Heraclitus, 30, Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-
Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

2Heraclitus, 67, ibid., p. 29.
overlooked human destiny except to note that all which man perceived by his senses was an illusion. Human nature is interpreted in terms of man's contemplation of the truth of the One in rational thought. This is truth. Error arises from misunderstanding or from the testimony of the senses, "for it is the same thing to think and to be."¹

Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists

Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus represent interesting and important philosophic positions. Empedocles posits four elements organized by love and hate. Anaxagoras, however, takes the agglomerate of substance out of which he claims all things were formed and organizes them with the moving power of Nous. This power is regarded by Cleve as a mechanical mover.² The name of those motions or functions is called "psyche"—breathing.³ A most important factor in this concept is that Nous is a "self upon itself."⁴ It is self-ruled.⁵ Its will is mechanical in the sense that it cannot create or destroy the elements; it can only push or pull them about in accordance with their given

¹Parmenides, 3, Freeman, p. 42.
³Ibid., pp. 80-83. ⁴Ibid., pp. 19-21.
⁵Anaxagoras, 12, Freeman, p. 84.
possibilities. Nous is a person who sees and works consciously. Anaxagoras imparts to Nous elements which become central to Plato's notion of psyche especially the notion of self-rule.

Leucippus and Democritus take the Being of Parmenides and make of the universe an infinite plurality consisting of atoms each of which is a miniature of Parmenides' Being. Each is independently moved and together they account for all of reality. For Democritus, perhaps as a result of the influence of Anaxagoras psyche and nous are identified and the destiny of man is reached by "uprightness and wisdom." Instruction transforms the man, and in transforming, creates his nature." For, "most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharpsightedness." In this respect the study of man's destiny begins to turn from the study of the world of nature to the ordering of the psyche.

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1Cleve, p. 25. 2Cleve, pp. 26 and 96. 3Democritus, 40, Freeman, p. 99. 4Democritus, 33, Freeman, p. 99. 5Democritus, 119, Freeman, p.104.
The Sophists

The Sophists reflect the breaking down of philosophic morale. So many ideas about what nature consisted of had developed, and so little of it could be substantiated, that it was not surprising that a doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge should arise and gain wide acceptance.¹ Any attempt at reconciling the differences would lead to further confusion. The most sensible solution, to the Sophist, was the rejection of the objective reference of thought and the exhortation to man to say what he believes and believe what he says, regardless of what he says or believes. Thus, "of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not."²

Man, thus, measures both truth and falsehood, not by the rules of evidence, but by proclamation, exhortation, and rhetoric depending on which Sophist is being considered. It

¹Johann Eduard Erdmann, A History of Philosophy, trans. W. S. Hough (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Company, 1893), pp. 75-76, points out that Sophists, like Protagoras and Gorgias, postulated views such as that everything is equally true, and everything is equally false! Gorgias goes so far as to say that nothing exists; if it existed, it couldn't be known; and, if it were known, it couldn't be communicated.

²Protagoras, l., Freeman, p. 125.
is impossible to determine whether the gods exist or not, because man does not have time in this life to investigate so vast a problem.1 Man measures the good or evil of life only to persuade men to a "belief about the just and the unjust." But he is in no position to give "instruction about them."2

The greatest good of man, on this view, is "that which gives men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the power of ruling over others in their several States."3 By affording freedom he means "the word which persuades" judges, senators, citizens, and, in fact, anyone, and by this power the physician and trainer become slaves to him who can persuade the multitude. Thus, the Sophist achieves freedom by gaining power over others, and this is the highest good and is the product of rhetoric. Whatever a man wants out of life is conditioned only by his ability to persuade. His success is limited only by his power of persuasion.

1Ibid., p. 126. Protagoras was banished from Athens for holding this view.


3Ibid., 452.
That the Sophists had powerful influence is clearly evident in the extent of Plato's consideration of their artful rationalization. Plato's defense of the powers of reason against Thrasymachus in the Republic underlines his opposition to the Sophist's methods and conclusions. The valuing of justice as opportunism, or as mere convention, or as a system of rewards and punishments, is, for Plato, the immoral consequence of Sophist relativism and doubt. Not a few of the Platonic writings are attempted answers to the Sophist's claim of "wisdom."¹

The Sophist's Relativism

That the Sophist reduced the philosophy of nature to a mere relativism whereby a minimum of objective validity was attributed to statements about nature was serious in itself. The Sophist's doubt and ridicule had penetrated theology and metaphysics. With equal effect he applied his subjectivism to moral problems and the whole field of ethics. If truth was relative, it followed that ethical propositions must also

¹A clear understanding of Sophism is hard to come by. Eduard Zeller points out that Anaxagoras, Socrates, and even Plato were considered Sophists by their contemporaries. See his work Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, trans. L. R. Palmer (New York: The Humanities Press, Inc., 1931), pp. 97-111.
be relative. For the Sophist the good was what a man measured
good. The measure was purely subjective. The art of rhetoric
and persuasion was more useful to convince men than were logic
and coherence. The Sophist measured his own happiness in
accordance with his own prerogatives and taught men the skills
needed to influence others. In answer to the question
What determines human destiny: the Sophist replied that
man determined his own destiny.

When the Sophist went to the extreme and stated that
all things were both true and false and that nothing existed,
he had in principle (perhaps unwittingly) ascribed to man
complete power over his own destiny.

The doctrine of the will at this stage of its embryonic
development centered on the nature of the determinants of or
powers controlling human destiny. As described, prior to
Anaxagoras, these determinants had been attributed to vari­
ous forces in nature or to the gods. Beginning with
Anaxagoras man was visualized as having among other powers,
the power to determine, in some measure, his own fate. For
the Sophist all the determinants outside of man himself were
denied. The embryonic will as found in the Sophist's phil­
osophy was given sole power over the destiny of man long
before it had matured enough even to be called a will. For
the early Greek philosophers up to and including the Sophists,
the doctrine of what may be regarded as an embryonic will revolved around the question of what forces were at work to determine man's destiny.

On the assumption that man did determine his own destiny to a significant degree the next question to be applied to the problem of human destiny in the history of Greek thought was that of the right destiny. Thus the question posed for the embryonic will in the next stage of its development was What determines the highest human destiny? Without ignoring the determinants, Greek thought began in Socrates to concern itself with the factors involved in the principles of right and wrong.

Thus, the period in Greek thought beginning with Homer and ending with the Sophists formed the background of what was to become the greatest age in the history of philosophy—the age of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Socrates initiated this age with his challenge to the contentions of the Sophists and his search for what was most noble in man. He was principally devoted to the task of arousing in men "the love of truth and virtue," and of helping them "think right in order that they might live right."¹ The exploration of the doctrine of the will in its prenatal state warrants consideration of the observation that "the philosophers themselves, who began with speculations on the origin of the universe, the nature of the gods, the operation of the mind, and the laws of matter

¹Thilly, p. 51.
ended at last with ethical inquiries and injunctions.\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{Socrates' Inquiry Regarding Human Nature}

Philosophy may be viewed as based both on speculative theory and on experience. On the side of speculative theory the emphasis is on consistency and inclusiveness in the shaping of ideals. On the side of experience as Knudson points out, the emphasis is on explaining concrete facts and conditions to which the ideals may rightfully apply.\textsuperscript{2} For this reason, Socrates' speculative insights are best understood when consideration is given both to his thought and to his life. Because he was identified with the search for truth, Socrates inspired the thinking of his age. His influence on Plato is evidence of his inspiring greatness. After describing the circumstances of Socrates' trial and execution, Plato reports Phaedo as saying of Socrates that "of all men of our time, the best, the wisest, and the most just."\textsuperscript{3}

Xenophon says,

\begin{quotation}
No one ever heard or saw anything wrong in Socrates;
\end{quotation}

\begin{footnotes}


\end{footnotes}
so pious was he that he never did anything without first consulting the Gods; so just that he never injured anyone in the least; so master of himself that he never preferred pleasure to goodness; so sensible that he never erred in his choice between what was better and what was worse. In a word, he was of all men the best and the happiest.¹

Breasted mirrors an identical appraisal. He describes Plato's idealized version of Socrates' last hours as "one of the most precious possessions of humanity. He was the greatest Greek, and in him Greek civilization reached its highest level."²

In addition to this, he points out that the "glorified figure of Socrates as he appears in the writings of his pupils was to prove more powerful even than the living teacher."³

That a man so highly esteemed should be put to death by his fellowmen raised a number of questions regarding the character of the forces at work in human nature. Is human nature riddled with evil powers? What is the power of justice in the determination of human destiny? Can man reason about the moral implications of life?

In order to answer these questions among others, Plato


3Ibid., pp. 481-482.
submitted Socrates' life and thought for consideration. As a result several important factors, emphasized by Socrates, appear.

Sophistic Relativism

and the Objective Reference of Truth

The Sophists had made philosophy into an art in which truth and morality were based on sheer power or the power of persuasion. If a man could persuade, first, himself, then, his fellowmen, he thereby achieved the "highest good"—power over others.

Socrates himself did not wholly reject the Sophists' views, for he even sent pupils to them. But with reference to the art of persuasion, the sharp contrast of his position is seen in his statement: "I will be persuaded by the good rather than you."¹

This affirmation of an external frame of reference to the art of persuasion was matched in Socrates by his interest in human excellence.² For, says he, "I spend my whole life in going about and persuading you all to give your first and greatest care to the improvement of your souls, and not


²Ibid., 31. Jowett translates ἀρετή, "virtue."
till you have done that to think of your bodies or your wealth.\textsuperscript{1}

The improvement of one's soul (\textit{\upsilon \upsilon \upsilon})\textsuperscript{2} meant the improvement of the whole of oneself. The complete improvement resulted in virtue or excellence which meant knowledge of the good.

"If a man has this knowledge, he will always act on it, since to do otherwise would be to prefer known misery to known happiness, and this is impossible."\textsuperscript{3}

Socrates' whole philosophy was based on the premise that knowledge is possible. Using the method of clear definition of terms and of the facts of experience, he depended on insight and self-examination (the orderly arrangement of one's thoughts and ideas) to establish the nature of the subject being discussed.

\textbf{Socrates' Ethics}

In the field of ethics, Socrates posited three articles or principles.\textsuperscript{4} A. E. Taylor summarized them as follows:

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 30.
    \item \textsuperscript{3}Taylor, \textit{EB}, p. 999.
    \item \textsuperscript{4}These are found in Plato's \textit{Protagoras}, Xenophon's \textit{Memorabilia}, and Aristotle's \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}. J. Burnet has excellently stated Socrates' ethical view in "Socrates," \textit{Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics}, ed. James Hastings, XI (1921).
\end{itemize}
(a) virtue, moral excellence, is identical with knowledge, and for that reason, all the commonly discriminated virtues are one thing; (b) vice, bad moral conduct, is, therefore, in all cases, ignorance, intellectual error; (c) wrong-doing is therefore always involuntary, and there is really no such state of soul as that which Aristotle himself calls 'moral weakness' (acrasia), 'knowing the good and yet doing the evil.'

Taylor explains that for Socrates, "the attempt to define one virtue ends in something which is no more a definition of that virtue than of another, for the reason that in principle all virtue is one." The knowledge of virtue is achieved by "a process of 'recollection' or 'recognition' (anamnesis) in which particular sensible facts prompt or suggest the assertion of a universal principle which transcends the facts themselves." In this respect the mind will produce the right conclusion from within, by its own action, as though from a store of truth which it already possesses unconsciously. Thus, true virtue is the personal knowledge of the "one single principle behind all its diverse manifestations in the varied situations of life," not a principle

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1 Taylor, Socrates, pp. 141-153. This summary is based on Aristotle's description of what is distinctively Socratic in the field of ethics.

2 Ibid., p. 145.  
3 Ibid., p. 148.  
4 Ibid., p. 149.  
5 Ibid., p. 144.
applicable in some situations but not in others, but the "exhibition of one excellence, steady and assured certainty of the true 'scale of good'"\(^1\) displaying a right attitude to all the situations of life.

The second point cited above that all vice or bad moral conduct is ignorance or intellectual error is founded on the above statement that there is a universal principle. A man who achieves the knowledge of this universal principle cannot possibly err. To err would mean that he did not have the universal principle. Thus, "evil-doing always rests upon a false estimate of goods,"\(^2\) a miscalculation of values of good. A man cannot both know the highest or universal principle and yet deny it. For, to deny it means he does not know it.

To approach the problem in another way, it may be said that no man does an evil because he recognizes it as evil. He does an evil (rationalized into a good) because he believes he can achieve some good as an end, using the rationalized evil or evils as means to that good. Thus, he may murder to satisfy jealousy or wrath, if the satisfaction is considered worth the price (even for a moment). An "evil" is always done in order to achieve a good. In so doing, the individual

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 145. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 143.
may confess the evil act as wrong, even knowing that he will be punished; but he prefers to do the evil he has rationalized in spite of the consequences. He may even risk life or limb to do it; for "a man has temporarily to sophisticate himself into regarding evil as good before he will choose to do it."¹

In the third sense, wrongdoing is always involuntary, because the wicked man does not know any better. There are two aspects to this ignorance. In the first place, what the evil man finally realizes is not what he knowingly willed. In committing murder, he may have willed (not merely intended) satisfaction but he achieves misery. Thus, what he achieves is not what he willed.² Therefore, evil results are involuntary. In another sense, evil is involuntary because a man may claim that he is "compelled" to do the evil in order to achieve the good anticipated. Thus, according to Socrates' opponents, in order to keep the youth from being corrupted, Socrates had to be executed. The evil is not voluntary in the sense that killing Socrates is not voluntary as an end, but conceived as necessary to the achieving of "uncorrupted youth." From the perspective of true

¹Ibid., p. 142. ²Ibid., pp. 142-143.
virtue or true good, the youth need not be corrupted nor
need Socrates be executed, but men resort to wickedness as
a means to good ends.

The following passage makes Socrates' position clear:

Socrates. Is there anyone who would rather be in-
jured than benefited by his companions? Answer, my
good man; you are obliged by the law to answer. Does
anyone like to be injured?

Meletus. Certainly not.

Socr. Well, then, are you prosecuting me for cor-
rupting the young and making them worse, voluntarily
or involuntarily?

Mel. For doing it voluntarily.

Socr. What, Meletus? Do you mean to say that you,
who are so much younger than I, are yet so much wiser
than I that you know that bad citizens always do evil,
and that good citizens do good, to those with whom they
come in contact, while I am so extraordinarily ignorant
as not to know that, if I make any of my companions
evil, he will probably injure me in some way? And you
allege that I do this voluntarily? You will not make
me believe that nor anyone else either, I should think.
Either I do not corrupt the young at all or, if I do,
I do so involuntarily, so that you are lying in either
case. And if I corrupt them involuntarily, the law
does not call upon you to prosecute me for an error
which is involuntary, but to take me aside privately
and reprove and educate me. For, of course, I shall
cease from doing wrong involuntarily, as soon as I know
that I have been doing wrong. But you avoided associa-
ting with me and educating me; instead you bring me up
before the court, where the law sends persons, not
for education, but for punishment. 1

Three points may be noted in the above quotation.

1) Choosing between alternatives of good and evil makes no sense to the person who knows true good; for, to him, choosing evil is an impossible alternative. "Does anyone like to be injured?"

2) Evil is seen as error when in doing good a person finds himself a party to evil results which he did not intend and the evil, therefore, is involuntary. "If I corrupt the young, I do so involuntarily."

3) The correction of wrong or evil is not punishment but education. "Take me aside privately and reprove and educate me." 1

Socrates' Presuppositions to the Problem of Free Will

Although it is almost impossible to distinguish precisely between Plato's thought and that of Socrates in the history of philosophy, certain principles may be stated as having already appeared and which form fundamental presuppositions to the problem of the will and its freedom. The

1Punishment here means the payment of a penalty for a wrong committed. Punishment, for Socrates, may also be disciplinary and corrective. See Apology, trans. Church, 41-42.
question of Socratic authorship does not alter the principles. The nucleus of each of the principles noted may be regarded without certainty as Socratic. On the other hand the elaboration of the doctrines may without serious question be attributed to Plato.¹

The Soul

In his doctrine of the improvement of the soul, Socrates presupposed the soul as a whole—a unity. The soul, as a unity, was equated with the unity of man's life. It is the whole soul which acts, prefers, wills and improves. There is no evidence for the division of the soul into faculties. In fact the unity of the soul precludes any splitting of the soul for Socrates. The soul as a whole chooses between alternatives, accepting and rejecting according to its own insights. The soul as a whole wills the good (also a unity) for "true good is always voluntary; it must be won."²

Virtue as Knowledge

Because the soul is one, and because virtue also is the exhibition of the one universal principle, the soul cannot

¹See "Plato and Socrates" below.

²Taylor, Socrates, p. 146.
be divided into its knowledge of the good and its practice of the good. When the soul knows it acts. When it acts it knows. Virtue is won because it is the soul in action—the soul acting voluntarily—the soul willing. Wrong doing is involuntary because a lack of virtue is a lack of knowledge of the universal good. To make wrong doing voluntary is to make man's soul inconsistent at the highest point of the soul's nature and thereby to destroy its unity.

Moral Responsibility and Achievement

Socrates affirms a consistency in man's nature in between his ethical purposes and the means of achieving those purposes. When an evil occurs, at least two approaches can be made to it. The question may be asked, "Who did it so that he may be punished?" This question, though raised, was not incorporated as part of Socrates' moral theory. A second approach is to ask, "How did it happen so that it may be corrected?" This is part of another question, "What is the true good, and how can it be achieved?" Socrates asked these last two questions, but their meaning and significance were left to be further explored and interpreted by Plato. If punishment is regarded merely as retribution, the question is, "Who is evil that
he may be punished?" However, if improvement of life is desired, the question is "How is the good to be known in order that justice may be achieved?" Because these questions were not understood by his opponents, Socrates was executed. To make the answer to these and other questions clear and vivid for all time as a permanent memorial to Socrates' life and method, Plato dedicated his own life and work. For, as A. E. Taylor has so well put the matter, "For all purposes of importance, Socrates had just one 'successor'—Plato."¹

¹Ibid., p. 173.
CHAPTER II

THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A DOCTRINE OF THE WILL

AND ITS FREEDOM IN PLATO

Plato and Socrates

As noted in the previous chapter, the distinction between Socrates and Plato is not so clear as may be desired by the careful student. But Plato was not especially concerned with making a clear distinction. Thus, in the dialogues, what is spoken from the mouth of Socrates may be what Plato intended more than what Socrates thought. It will not be misunderstood if the whole system as relevant to the basic problem is expressed without special regard for the question which may be raised all along the way as to whether the principle is Socratic or Platonic. With the risk of some strain, it is being suggested that generally Platonic doctrine includes what is attributed to Socrates,¹ and, therefore, what has been said of Socrates may be so accepted and the discussion can proceed

¹Even the oracle at Delphi and the god who persuaded Socrates need cause no problem here. Plato gives Socrates' description of the situation, and that seems to suffice.
from there.

There is no question of the lofty place occupied by Socrates in Plato's life and thought. Socrates' greatness, the tenderness of his affection, the depth and power of his thought, are all found in Plato. At the same time, Plato rises above Socrates to the extent that Wild avers confidently that, "in exploring the dark labyrinths of human reality... we shall hardly find a better guide than Plato."

The fundamental components of Plato's life need little explication here, but Plato's relationship to Socrates is of importance. Seen from Plato's point of view, Socrates was not Plato's master or teacher. Nor was he, as Shorey clearly

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affirms, "a system of philosophy to be learned, elaborated, developed, corrected, and improved. He was rather a person-
ality, a method, an inspiration, a moral and religious ideal." the inescapable conclusion deserving greatest emphasis is that, for Plato, Socrates exemplified an unspeakably profound moral experience. The most wise, the most just, and the best was tried by his fellowmen and executed. The power of this fact is reported as of singular importance and as accounting, in large measure, for the motivation of Plato's teaching and writing. Socrates had said,

When my sons grow up, punish them, my friends, and harass them in the same way I have harassed you, if they seem to care for riches or for any other thing more than excellence; and if they think that they are something when they are really nothing, reproach them, as I have reproached you, for not caring for what they should, and for thinking that they are something when really they are nothing. And if you will do this, I myself and my sons will have received justice from you.

This expressed not only Socrates' ideal for his own children, but for all.

Whatever ethical or moral principles Plato should devise, one fact of life he could not ignore. The interpretation of

1Shorey, p. 22.

2Plato, Apology, trans. Church, 41-42.
the ethical principles of wickedness, of justice, or of the
good life must somehow refer back to circumstances in the
life of Socrates, illustrating the destruction of the good,
by the action of men blinded by their stupidity.

Since knowing the good meant doing it, Socrates would
no more alter his decision to face death than he would ex-
change a hand for a foot. For, since what he was doing was
part of the true good, virtue, and excellence, he could not
compromise it by exchanging it for his continuance on earth
without the privilege of seeking knowledge by asking questions
and discussing problems. Using the myth of Achilles as an
equivalent of one "who thought nothing of danger when the al-
ternative was disgrace," Socrates described his own commit-
ment to accept death rather than never to philosophize, never
to exhort his fellowmen, never to declare the truth, and never
to improve the soul. He made his position clear: "Wherever
a man's station is, whether he has chosen it of his own will,
or whether he has been placed at it by his commander, there
it is his duty to remain and face the danger without thinking
of death or of any other thing except disgrace."1 This

1Ibid., 28-30.
statement reflects the influence of Orphic religion on Socrates: the soul, "in which intelligence alone exists,"\(^1\) departed from the body leaving behind what was useless and unprofitable. The divine part of man which in Orphic religion sprang from the ashes of Zagreus\(^2\) became a basis for Socrates' view of the soul, while the wicked part which sprang from the Titans was linked by Socrates to the body.

Therefore, without depreciating Plato's speculative insight, in respect to the data proffered above, it may be cautiously stated that Plato's ethics was the theoretical extension of the facts of Socrates' life. To say anything less is to ignore Plato's relation to Socrates' life.

**Plato's View of the Soul**

In order to get to the heart of the matter, it is important that the soul in Plato's theory of man be defined. There are many references made to it, but the most important sources for his theory are found in the *Republic*, the *Laws*, the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Cratylus*, the *Sophist*, the *Protagoras*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Timaeus*.

\(^1\)Xenophon, *Memorabilia of Socrates*, Bk. 1, chap. ii, sp. 53-55.

\(^2\)See above, p. 12.
In the Republic Plato gives his most celebrated description of faculties of the soul. It consists of (1) \( \text{Tò δοξιστικόν} \), that which reasons, (2) \( \text{Tò επιθυμητικόν} \), that which desires and affects, (3) \( \text{Tò θυμοειδές} \), spirit or passion. He then questions if this description of the soul means that it is divided into three parts or if it means that the "whole soul" is at work in "every impulse and in all these forms of behaviour?"

**The Meaning of Faculties**

That the soul is one and at the same time has faculties is not to be viewed as a dark mystery. A faculty for Plato is a power which the soul as a whole exercises. It involves a function which the soul performs. The power which makes it possible for the soul to perform that function is referred to as a faculty. However, a faculty may be thought of as a part of a whole functioning as a part for the whole or on behalf of the whole affecting the whole or for which the whole may be responsible. For example, the eye as part of the body is

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1Greek, \( \nu \nu \nu \nu \), meaning life, and in Plato, as will be shown later, the principle of movement and life. Cf. Liddell and Scott, pp. 2026, 2027. See also Erwin Rhode, *Psyche*, trans. W. B. Hillis, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1925), p. 365.

2Plato, *Republic*, (Cornford), 435.
a faculty of sight for the body. As a part of the body it functions for the body and the body among other things is responsible for the actions of the eye. When the eye moves it is not the whole body which moves. On the other hand when the body as a whole moves, it moves as a totality and not as a part as does a faculty. In the same way a faculty of the soul in the second sense would be an activity of part of the soul acting on behalf of the soul, affecting the soul, and including the whole soul as responsible for its activity. The difference between the activity of a soul as a whole and a faculty of the soul is the difference between the whole and its parts. However, a soul acting as a whole is what Plato means by the soul having the faculty or power to do a certain thing. Plato does not wish to use the word, faculty, in the second sense above.

On the one hand, there is no evidence that Plato described the soul as consisting of only three parts. He at no time restricted the functions of a soul by a statement such as "The soul is that which consists of reason, desire, and spirit." On the other hand, the evidence that the doctrine of a tripartite soul is not a complete scientific description of the soul in Plato's thought is overwhelming.
Included in that evidence are the following.

1) That the tripartite doctrine of the soul is not original with Plato but probably Pythagorean, is clearly shown by A. E. Taylor and others.¹

2) The three elements are only illustrative or representative of functions performed by the whole man. Plato states that they represent the highest function, the lowest function, and the mean between them, and it is assumed that there are many intermediate functions in turn between these three. For only when man "has linked these parts together in well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of many, will he be able to go about whatever he may have to do."²

3) Plato does not retain a consistent terminology for the parts of the soul. In the Phaedrus he uses the myth of the charioteer (reason) and the two horses (one a noble white horse which loves honor, the other, the opposite, a heedless, evil dark horse leaping wildly forward dragging its mate and


²Plato, Republic, trans. Cornford, 443. See Cornford's comments, ibid., p. 130. Also Taylor, Plato, 281. Note that Plato says "many" rather than "three." If "three" were the limit, "many" would be inappropriate. Grube, Plato's Thought, p. 134-5, clearly demonstrates that the soul is a unity with a plurality of functions of which the three faculties discussed here are an incomplete listing.
the charioteer toward the soul of the beloved [245-255]).

The terminology is so different from that of the Republic that the two descriptions of the elements of the soul as a complete theory can be harmonized only by distortion. Similarly in the Timaeus, the divine reason as the immortal principle of soul is differentiated from the mortal form of soul "having in itself dread and necessary affections."

Plato lists the affections as

first, pleasure, the strongest lure of evil; next pains that take flight from good; temerity, moreover, and fear, a pair of unwise counselors; passion hard to entreat, and hope too easily led astray. These they combined with irrational sense and desire that shrinks from no venture, and so of necessity compounded the mortal element.¹

The divine reason is englobed in the head; the part which is of manly spirit and ambitious for victory is situated in the heart and lungs; and the part whose "appetite is set on meat and drink" possessing both sweetness and bitterness is situated in the liver and spleen which is the seat of divination and visions.² From this it appears that nothing can be gained


²Ibid., 69-72.
from trying to harmonize these different descriptions. However, the point is that to attribute a tripartite soul to Plato as a final psychology is to overlook the other and richer enumeration of the functions of the soul which are as essential as the three elements described here. 1

4) Plato frequently refers to the mid-point between two extremes to form a triad with the middle factor as the key to the unity of the triad: "since the middle becomes first and last, and again the last and first become middle, in that way all will necessarily come to play the same part toward one another, and by so doing they will all make a unity." 2 He thus is referring not to a soul divided into three parts, but to a soul with many functions at the highest end of which is Τὸ λογιτικὸν; at the lowest end, Τὸ εἴρηματικὸν; and in the middle mediating between the two is Τὸ θυμοειδὲς and together constituting a unity.

5) Aristotle not only does not restrict Plato to a tripartite soul, but in describing Plato's doctrine in the Timaeus suggests the possibility of its having an infinite number of parts in all its thoughts as mind and proceeds to

1Note functions in Laws, X, 896d cited below.

2Ibid., 32a.
establish his own five faculties or powers of the soul: nutritive, sensitive, imaginative, locomotive, and rational.\(^1\)

It may thus be suggested that the Aristotelian method of schematization of the soul into a fixed number of faculties was imposed on Plato, but he himself desired merely to use the existing descriptions\(^2\) of the soul as a basis for those aspects essential for his politics and ethics but not a psychology or metaphysics of the soul.

It has been necessary to prolong this aspect of the discussion of the soul, because fundamental misinterpretations of the nature of the will have been grounded on the meaning of \(\text{To \ θυμοειςës}\) as it appears in Plato's Republic. Thus, for example, Zeller\(^3\) and others suggest that \(\text{To \ θυμοειςës}\) is "the courageous" which includes feeling and will.

\(\text{θυμοειςës}\) has its etymological roots in \(\text{θύω}\) (stem \(\text{Θυ}\))


\(^2\)Joannes Stobaeus quotes Iamblichus (according to Liddell and Scott, p. 2027) to the effect that those around Plato and Archytas and the descendents of the Pythagoreans divided the soul into \(\text{λογισμός}, \text{θυμός} \) and \(\text{εἴρημία} \).

rush) which in the Greek may mean "burning" in the form of sacrifice, or "raging" as in anger.\(^1\) The English *fume* based on the Latin cognate *fumus* from the Indo-European\(^2\) expresses some of the meanings of \(\Theta \upsilon \omega\). \(\Theta \upsilon \omega\) reflects the development of the original idea into "breath" and "life" especially as suggesting strong feeling and passion. The English "thyme" shows the pungency of \(\Theta \upsilon \omega\). The meaning is further extended to include soul or spirit as the principle of life but still retaining strong feeling and passion. \(\Theta \upsilon \omega e\ell e\delta\) (translated literally as "having the appearance of spirit") gathers up its literary heritage in the English "high-spirited" and would tend to mean for Plato the soul "breathing itself out" toward its object.\(^3\) It is a "driving impulse"\(^4\) which calls forth the virtue of bravery, by which he means that "in spite of pain and pleasure it holds fast to the injunctions of reason about what he ought or ought not to be afraid of."\(^5\)

Plato sets \(\Theta \upsilon \omega e\ell e\delta\) in opposition to \(\Theta \upsilon \omega e\ell e\delta\).

\(^1\)Liddell and Scott, pp. 808-813.
\(^2\)As represented in the stem \(\Theta \upsilon\).
\(^5\)Ibid., 441. It should be noted that sometimes \(\Theta \upsilon \omega e\ell e\delta\) arbitrates between \(\delta \omicron \iota \omicron \iota \iota \iota \kappa \omicron \kappa\) and \(\epsilon \iota \lambda \omicron \omicron \nu \mu \omicron \tau i \kappa o\) and sometimes it is the \(\delta \omicron \iota \omicron \iota \iota \iota \kappa \omicron \kappa\) which arbitrates between the other two.
The ἐπὶ adds the idea of "upon," and with the suffix it is literally rendered, "capable of breathing upon." There is no need for a semantic trick to see this translated as "that which desires," and within the Platonic frame of reference it tends to mean the soul capable of "breathing its object toward itself" or, as Plato himself defines it, drawing its object to itself.¹ In keeping with the fact that the etymology may permit the suggestion of exhaling (ἐυπνοεῖς) and inhaling (ἐπιθυμεῖν), the meanings for Plato are the soul's striving after its object (spirit) on the one hand, and on the other the soul's drawing its object to itself (appetite).

Whether ἐυπνοεῖς includes what is meant by willing as previously suggested by Zeller cannot be answered finally and clearly from the data supplied up to this point. What is included in the soul besides the three functions noted here will be discussed after the discussion of what the soul, as soul, is.

The conclusion that the soul has many functions, the fuller explication of which is yet to be made, leaves unanswered the question of what it is. To answer this generally, it is not unfair to Plato's thought to say that the soul's highest achievement in the heavenly vision of the Symposium

¹Ibid., 436.
and its divinest nature in the *Timaeus*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Republic* may best be understood as a description of Plato's view of Socrates' life and its meaning. The good and evil elements in man as seen in the Orphic myth of Dionysus, the body as the prison for the soul, the eternality of the soul in the direction of both the past and the future, making it without beginning and without end in the precise form of the Pythagorean elaboration of Orphism are all assumed, or described, or defended by Plato. The distinction between the body, as seen and destructible, and the soul, as involved in that realm of the unseen and eternal, constitutes an irreconcilable dualism which for Plato is final. But Plato asks, what is the soul? What is there about the soul which makes it different from everything else in all of reality?

Plato's answer to this question has the most far-reaching consequences on all subsequent philosophic thought; for the soul if properly defined can, among other things, account for the very essence of a doctrine of the will.

**The Definition of the Soul**

For Plato, the essence and the basic definition of the soul is "that which is moved by itself."\(^1\) The definition is

so precise and consistently maintained that it is necessary only to examine his meaning of \textit{Kívēg} in order to discover what \textit{vēx} denotes. A. E. Taylor has performed good service in summarizing the meaning of \textit{Kívēg} and relating it to \textit{vēx}. He says,

Ten senses of the word are enumerated. The first five are different forms of actual physical motion: (1) revolution in a circular orbit, (2) rectilinear motion, (3) rolling, (4) aggregation, (5) disgregation. Then follow three "ideal" motions: (6) the "fluxion" of a point which "generates" a line, (7) the fluxion of a line which generates a surface, (8) the fluxion of a surface which generates a solid. These distinctions are merely preliminary to that which is essential for the purposes of our proof. All motions belong to one of two classes: (9) communicated motion, "the movement which can only move other things," or (10) spontaneous motion, the "movement which can move itself" (894b). And it is argued that causally communicated motion always presupposes spontaneous motion as its source (894c-895b). Now when we see anything which exhibits spontaneous, or internally initiated, motion, we call it \textit{alive}, \textit{ēnuvexon}; we say that there is \textit{vēx} in the thing. \textit{vēx}, in fact, is the name which language gives to "the motion which can move itself." Thus, "soul" is the name, or \textit{definiendum}, of which the "discourse" (\textit{phús}i), "movement which can move itself," is the \textit{definition}. The name and the discourse are therefore equivalent, and it follows that the movements of soul, "tempers and wishes and calculations, true beliefs, interests (\textit{ēnuvēkí̂dē}), and memories," are actually the source and cause of all physical movement, since no physical movement is spontaneous (896d).\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}Taylor, \textit{Plato}, p. 491. References in the text are to the \textit{Laws}. 
It follows directly from the above that, for Plato, the very nature of the soul is its self-movement, its spontaneity, its ability to will itself as a unity. The ῥήμα is a unity of self-directing consciousness. Of signal importance in this definition is the fact that the ῥήμα includes τάξις, ἐνοχή, βουλήσις, λογία, σοφία αληθείας, ἐπιμέλεια, and μυνματ. These are just examples of the kind of activities of a soul. Also included are ἡγεσία (choice) and ἀτικά (cause or responsibility) and all related activities. A considerable latitude exists for the inclusion of every aspect of what it means to be a self-directing consciousness.

What Shorey finds as an apparent contradiction between the position found in the Laws (904-905) and that of the Republic (617) is resolved so far as the definition of ῥήμα is concerned. On the one hand, Plato says in the Laws, "...the formation of qualities he left to the wills [βουλήσις] of individuals. For every one of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul."¹ By this he means that souls contain within themselves "a principle of change." By this principle a soul can change for

¹Plato, Laws, 904b and c.
the better or worse moved by its own impulse.\(^1\) It is the prime cause of change.\(^2\)

There is no need to extend the discussion by giving here the passages which repeat this point, but it is of prime importance to emphasize its meaning and relevance as Plato, himself, stated it. Every soul is that kind of reality which moves itself. Every act of the soul is a self-determined act of the soul as a whole. To ignore this point in Plato is to see him only through the eyes of his critics. To introduce concepts which would endanger the soul's self-determination or its unity is to neglect the main fact of Platonism—the meaning of ὑπηκοός. In the light of his definition of ὑπηκοός it would have been a perplexing distraction and obscurity for him to remove the fundamental idea from ὑπηκοός and give it over to another aspect or faculty as a part of the soul.

Plato's doctrine of the soul did not include a separate faculty of explicit choice among alternatives not determined by anything antecedent or present as elaborated by later philosophers. The essence of Plato's definition of the soul

\(^1\)See Shorey, pp. 396-397; 644-645.

\(^2\)Laws, 894e.
was its self-determination as a whole. This understanding of Plato's view of the soul is overlooked because the temptation to make a list of the soul's faculties or attributes is seldom resisted. Plato's view is depicted as that of a tripartite soul consisting of reason, spirited element, and appetite. However, this is not his definition of the soul as noted, but merely a selection of some of its faculties. As pointed out above, it is quite probable that Pythagoras made the list of faculties which is often hailed as Plato's "view of the soul." The popularity of this error is in no small measure attributable to the neglect of the other writings of Plato except the Republic, with the result that when Plato refers to his notion of culpability late in that book he is regarded as having strayed into a deviation from the remainder of his system, so that he has lost his way. But the problems which his doctrine of culpability raise can only be understood in the light of other writings.

To ignore the importance of θύμος is to miss the fundamental fact of Plato's philosophy. In the Cratylus he posits the θύμος as the "ordering and containing principle of all things." In the Phaedrus he sees the soul's spontaneity as

1Plato, Cratylus, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 400.
a motion derived from within itself and, thereby, the first principle of all other things.\(^1\) And as cited above in the Laws this first principle is \(\nu \nu \nu \nu \) as all its activities seen as spontaneous and self-caused. \(\nu \nu \nu \nu \) is thus activity determined by its own nature. As long as \(\nu \nu \nu \nu \) is "motion which is self-moved" there is no problem of a mechanistic determinism for Plato. In this respect the determinism is internal.

It will be recalled that in the Dionysiac myth the soul was born good. Plato does not refute this aspect of the myth. In fact, he presupposes it. In the Gorgias (498) he says a man is good because there is good in him. In the Timaeus (86e) he says that "no one is willingly bad, the bad man becomes so because of some faulty habit of body and unenlightened upbringing, and these are unwelcome afflictions that come to any man against his will \(\delta \kappa \omega \nu \sigma \iota \alpha \) .\(^2\) The Dionysiac myth of creation is again brought to mind by this cleavage between body as the source of evil and soul as the source of good. In this respect Plato recognized external influences

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\(^1\) Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Helmbold, 245. See also Protagoras, 319-320.

\(^2\) Plato, Timaeus, 86.
on the soul which were not assumed to endanger the basic definition of the soul. The soul moves from within.

This led Plato to the doctrine of the tendance\(^1\) of the soul as \(\psi\nu\chi\) by which he meant developing a sound mind.\(^2\) This was achieved by being taught the good, the first step in which was self-knowledge.\(^3\) By such tendance the supreme worth of the \(\psi\nu\chi\) was achieved—knowledge.\(^4\)

Once \(\psi\nu\chi\) is understood in this sense, Plato’s ethics is greatly clarified. Virtue is not found by a sort of hope that a man will light upon it of his own accord.\(^5\) One’s self-motion is never mere drifting and by luck landing at the right place. The soul’s greatest value is for it to be taught. Its food is knowledge. When it is said that for Plato true good is always voluntary, it is being said simply that true good is the soul fulfilling its own true nature. It is impossible for \(\psi\nu\chi\) to choose evil. When \(\psi\nu\chi\) impels itself, it is doing good. The body, the world, and the soul’s own ignorance account for evil. For \(\psi\nu\chi\) to divert itself to evil is impossible. It is \(\psi\nu\chi\) speaking in the Apology (20), “I will never do what I know to be evil.”\(^6\) That the

\(^1\) \(\Theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\rho\iota\varepsilon\iota\alpha\)

\(^2\) \(\sigma\omega\phi\rho\omega\sigma\iota\nu\eta\)

\(^3\) Plato, Apology, 29.

\(^4\) See Taylor, Plato, 145.

\(^5\) Plato, Protagoras, 319-320.

\(^6\) See also Ibid., 357-358.
soul is good but imprisoned in a body is to be presupposed.
So also that souls imprisoned by evil are at work in the
world must not be overlooked.

If the soul is self-determined, born good, conditioned
by unwelcome afflictions and "evil" souls, the problem of
assessing responsibility for evil, raised more seriously by
later philosophers, must be considered in order to put Plato's
doctrine of \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \) into proper perspective. The problem con-
cerns the soul's power to achieve virtue and the consequences
of failure (or success) in such an enterprise.

The Problem of Responsibility

The nature of responsibility may be found in answer to
the question, If a person performs an act, what determines
the extent of his responsibility for the act and are there
consequences which apply to his responsibility? Plato re-
jected the theory that responsibility is measured for the
purpose of retaliation for a past wrong.\(^1\) He held that pun-
ishment exacted for no other reason than that the person had
done wrong was behavior resembling the unreasonable fury of
a beast. Socrates' punishment was a case in point.

Plato approved punishment as discipline but the determi-
ation of responsibility was not in order to punish the \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \)

\(^1\)Ibid., 324.
in retaliation but to educate or tend it. In the light of what has been stated earlier, (1) if a man does evil, (2) he needs to have a punishment, (3) not which fits the crime but which fits the soul, to educate it. The clauses here numbered relate to three aspects of the problem. (1) refers to the principle of responsibility; (2) refers to the theory of rewards and punishments; and (3) refers to the purpose of punishment. Plato held that (1) implies (2) and (3). Wrong doing for Plato was involuntary because it was the result of ignorance. Responsibility in the sense of incurring liability could not apply to the wrong doer acting out of ignorance. Plato opposed the view that establishing responsibility for wrong doing made it possible to judge a person guilty and to mete out punishment to fit the crime. In adjudging a person responsible, Plato was interested in discovering the cause of the wrong doing and the means to correct the wrong so that the same mistake could be avoided in the future. Thus responsibility calls attention to the cause of an effect. If the effect is evil, and a person is responsible, the person may be treated by (2) punishing him in order to (3) correct his behavior. For the to choose an evil means that it does not know it to be evil and, therefore, does not know
true good.\textsuperscript{1} The soul's goodness is not achieved unless the soul is taught. Evil is what a soul (whose nature is good) is not. An "evil" soul lacks or has lost its vision of truth. Once the guilty party to an evil act is found, the next step is to improve his soul by "tendance." "Tendance" leads to virtue; and to have virtue, it is necessary to have knowledge because knowledge is virtue. The battle against evil is a struggle for knowledge and virtue.

Because Plato affirms self-direction as the essence of the soul's nature, he sees no point in holding the power of self-direction responsible. For, to point accusingly at ability to determine his destiny rather than to search for the blinding cause is to get on the wrong track. When the right answer is found, the consequence is not punishing the evil doer but educating him so that he may tend his soul, learn the right answer, improve his destiny, and achieve virtue. It is not the ability to determine one's destiny which causes evil actions but blinding ignorance. When Plato says that the soul can not err (is not capable of choosing wrong), he means that the acts of a soul are acts of knowledge and virtue, and not the evil acts which arise when

the soul is inactive or unaware of the true good. Wrong doing is always the result of a wrong answer which in turn is the product of ignorance. When a man does wrong, it is, for Plato, because of the body's imprisoning the soul or the influence of another soul similarly blinded. The solution to the problem is to gain release from the prison of "existence" by improving the soul in accordance with what Plato calls "tendance."

The first duty of every man who means to enjoy good or happiness is to 'tend his soul,' 'to see to it that his soul is as good as it possibly can be,' that is, to get the knowledge or insight which ensures his using everything rightly. And before a man can develop this quality of soul, he must be brought to 'know himself,' that is, to recognize the imperative need or moral wisdom and the dreadfulness of his present state of ignorance. ¹

When a man fails, he is, for Plato, both disgraced and lacking knowledge. Thus Charmides is presented to Socrates by Critias as a man with both a perfect body and soul. But Charmides has a headache. Socrates proposes a cure he had learned from a Thracian consisting of the use of a leaf along with reciting of a charm. However there is the further condition that to recite the charm, the soul must first be cured. The outcome of the dialogue is that the cure cannot be applied because of Charmides' hopeless confusion. ² Although the dialogue...

¹ Taylor, Plato, p. 28.
closes with Charmides' embarrassment, its central proposition is made early: "The part can never be well unless the whole is well." Spiritual health, the wholeness of the soul, consists in right action guided by truth. It follows that although responsibility for the state of the situation may be determined, no good can come out of a state of ignorance unless the man can be taught. For Plato, a man's moral character or virtue resides (1) in his achieving human excellence by self-examination and (2) in his search for the knowledge of the good, of justice, of beauty, of truth, and of all noble ideals. The destiny of a good man is the accomplished fact of his goodness, which is his divine nature. To reward him with health, wealth, and any other "lesser" good as a criterion of his goodness is to deny the very goodness which is being rewarded.

It is not the ability of the soul to direct its movement which is held responsible and subject to punishment for Plato. The whole of the man is held responsible in order to educate him. To understand what Plato means by education, the meaning of knowledge as virtue calls for examination.

1Tbid. 156.

2Tbid., 171-2.
Virtue as Knowledge for Plato

The reason for the soul's tendance is to arrive at that knowledge which is moral insight and virtue. The question, then, is what is meant by virtue being knowledge? Plato's ethical theory is dominated by the view that virtue is knowledge. The frequent occurrence of this proposition, its defense from many points of view, the variety of its applications, and its ultimate importance to the whole Platonic system constitute ample grounds for a careful interpretation of it.

As noted, Plato states that virtue is knowledge on a number of occasions in the dialogues. Two statements involving this proposition are illuminating. The first defends the power of knowledge and is put in the form of a question:

Now the rest of the world are of the opinion that knowledge is not a powerful, lordly, commanding thing; they do not think of it as actually being anything of that sort at all, but their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or

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love, or perhaps by fear—just as if knowledge were nothing but a slave and might be dragged about by all these other things. Now is that your view? Or do you think that knowledge is a noble thing and fit to command in man, which cannot be overcome and will not allow a man, if he only knows the good and the evil, to do anything which is contrary to what his knowledge bids him do, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the mightiest of human things.

Good, I said, and true, But are you aware that the majority of the world do not share your conviction and mine, but claim that many people know the things which are best, but do not do them when they might?¹

In this passage Plato affirms his esteem for the consistency of truth. When a man knows the truth, that knowledge will not be twisted or deformed by other human experiences. But not only is man consistent in the arrangement of his ideas of the truth but once he has determined true ideas he is bound to live consistently with them. Man lives by his knowledge; he does "what his knowledge bids him do." If his knowledge is in error, he will err. If his knowledge is correct he will do good. Good and evil actions are the products of knowing or not knowing the good. In effect, the whole of man may choose freely between alternatives of good or evil based on what he knows. Plato appears to be saying

that no man is so stupid as to know an act to be objectively evil and yet do it. A man will rationalize it into a subjective good before he does it.

In determining his destiny man is able to choose among alternatives.¹ When man chooses, his choice is based not so much on his fears, anger, pleasure, pain or love, as on his knowledge. If he knows the good, he will, for Plato, thereupon divert his energies to do the good.

This point is further elaborated in the following passage:

No man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To pursue what one believes to be evil rather than what is good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less.²

On this foundation Plato continues to build a rugged and sturdy ethical structure which includes some of the most important principles and problems of ethical theory. Certain points may be noted.

Virtue as knowledge can be taught.³ By this is meant that it was not "given by nature," nor does it "grow spontaneously" of its own free will (i.e. of its own accord).⁴

¹Ibid., 356-357. ²Ibid., 358d. ³Ibid., 361. ⁴Ibid., 323, 319.
Punishment is for the sake of the prevention and correction of evil.¹ It is not inflicted vindictively, nor for the sake of past wrong nor as a payment for wrongdoing. Punishment deters the recipient and others from doing the wrong again by making the lesson more vivid.

The salvation of human life consists in the "right choice" or measure not so much of pleasure vs. pain, as of good vs. evil.² This measuring is a consideration of the presence of good or evil and is both an intellectual and moral activity.

Erring in the choice or measuring of good and evil is from defect of knowledge or from ignorance.³ When, in choosing, man errs, it is because he has exercised choice on the wrong grounds or for the wrong reasons. Wrong grounds or reasons when chosen result in error, wickedness, and evil and are chosen from ignorance.

One who makes the right choice does so on the right information. Having made the right choice, he cannot reverse himself and choose the wrong without destroying his knowledge of the good; for the moment he does so he errs both in action

¹Ibid., 324. ²Ibid., 356-357. ³Ibid., 357.
and in knowledge.\(^1\) Goodness and truth are mutually dependent.

A man will make the right choice voluntarily; that is, he chooses it because he knows it is right. But when he chooses wrong, he has chosen it for the wrong reasons, which means he does not really know the good or the right reasons, and, being ignorant, he may think he is choosing a good thing for the right reasons, but actually he is doing a bad thing for the wrong reasons. In choosing good but doing wrong, his doing the wrong is involuntary. He is not choosing the wrong, for "when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have less."\(^2\) This does not mean what Windelband says Aristotle tried to make it mean; namely, that the wicked is not free.\(^3\) A. E. Taylor points this out with unmatched forcefulness and finality.

Thus the proposition 'all wrong-doing is involuntary,' has nothing to do with the question of human freedom; it is merely the negative way of stating that a man who really knows what his highest good is, will always act on his knowledge. The man who really knows the good but chooses something else is as much of a nonentity as a round square, and it is just because 'there is no such person' that the wildest paradoxes can be asserted about him.\(^4\)

Taylor adds that knowledge of the good is the "only

\(^1\)Ibid., 357-358.  \(^2\)Ibid., 358.  
\(^3\)Windelband, p. 191.  \(^4\)Taylor, Plato, p. 38.
knowledge which cannot be put to wrong use.\textsuperscript{1}

A wicked man must be punished in order to learn not to harm himself or others. He is not held accountable in order

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid. This argument is excellently put in a number of the dialogues but especially The Lesser Hippias, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 370-376. It is important to note that the comparison made in the Protagoras between mathematical choices and ethical ones has a far-reaching effect (356-358). A mathematician who ignores his mathematics is thereby no longer a mathematician. So also it is impossible for a truly good man to choose evil, because he is thereby no longer a truly good man. The question of freedom of the will is, as Taylor pointed out, not in dispute and, for reasons given later, not to be challenged. Plato's emphasis on this point is not minor, for he states it (besides where already cited) in the Meno, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 77-78; Alcibiades, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), i, 124-125; Laws, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), ix, 861-862; Apology, trans. Church, 25-26; Charmides, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 169-175; Gorgias, trans. W. C. Helmbold (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1952), 464-475; Phaedo, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 65-74; Republic, trans. Francis M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), vi, 503-504; and others.
to be punished; rather, he is held accountable and punished in order to be taught. ¹

The notion of choice in Plato as discussed up to this point involves at least two distinctions which have been considered but which need emphasis. (1) The soul seeking and finding the knowledge of the good will think and act consistently with that knowledge. (2) The soul may avoid the intellectual principle² or it may pursue it;³ it may practice virtue or "wallow in the mire of all ignorance."³ Windelband classifies these two distinctions as exhibiting two views of freedom.⁴ The first is the ethical conception of freedom: The wise man is free and the wicked man is not because the wise man knows what he is doing but the wicked does not. The second distinction is the psychological conception of freedom---

¹Gorgias, 507-510; Laws, ix, 862; "Whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of penalties or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just, this is the noblest work of law."

²Plato, Phaedo, 81. ³Ibid., 82.

⁴A History of Philosophy, p. 191.
the freedom of choice between alternatives—a decision between motives. Windelband notes that both distinctions are recognized and developed by Plato. He even goes so far as to suggest that Plato developed the view that man may choose (psychological freedom) to sink into ignorance (ethical non-freedom).¹

The Problem of Choice and Responsibility in the Myth of Er

Toward the end of the Republic, Plato relates a myth which has since been widely used as the basis for philosophic speculation. Er, a bold warrior, the son of Armenius, was killed in battle. When put on the funeral pyre on the twelfth day after he was slain, he came to life, and related the details of what his soul had seen. Several peculiarities are observed in the myth which seem to affirm concepts previously rejected vehemently by Plato. The first of these is the view that the just are rewarded in a clean and bright dwelling place in the sky,² whereas, the unjust are punished "ten times over" for each sin with horrible torment in Tartarus under the earth.³ A. E. Taylor gives the myth no significant

¹Ibid., pp. 191-192.
³Ibid., 615.
status, commenting that it is not really permissible to extract metaphysics from myth.¹ Demos uses it to demonstrate that Plato has no doctrine of the self.² Shorey compares it with the post-resurrection experience of Jesus Christ and suggests that Plato's view is Mill's, in which every man should believe the doctrine of free will of himself but disbelieve it of others.³ No less a philosopher than Zeller suggests that this myth completes Plato's metaphysics of the soul.⁴ Wild ignores the myth altogether.

The appeal to literary criticism is of no avail, since the hard facts of the story are still there. That the myth is Orphic, Homeric, or Platonic does nothing to alleviate the problem.

Of some significance is the fact that those who lay heavy stress on the myth are inclined to balance it against principles clearly expressed in other writings of Plato and to extol the former at the cost of the latter. To make this first point clear, it is necessary to emphasize that everywhere else Plato posits a view of the soul based on "tendance,"

¹Taylor, Plato, pp. 307-308.
education, and its goodness achieved by knowledge, which is its own indestructible reward. In the myth of Er, the vision of the upper and lower regions reveals a soul whose goodness is "reduced" to a system of rewards, and whose evil is "punished" with that same unreasonable fury of a beast\(^1\) which is interested not in correctibility but in accountability for the sake of punishment, a view which Plato strongly rejected.

A second and perhaps more serious problem is that of the choosing of one's destiny.

The souls, as soon as they came, were required to go before Lachesis. An Interpreter first marshalled them in order; and then, having taken from the lap of Lachesis a number of lots and samples of lives, he mounted on a high platform and said:

'The word of Lachesis, maiden daughter of Necessity. Souls of a day, here shall begin a new round of earthly life, to end in death. No guardian spirit will cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own destiny. Let him to whom the first lot falls choose first a life to which he will be bound of necessity. But Virtue owns no master; as a man honours or dishonours her, so shall he have more of her or less. The blame is his who chooses; Heaven is blameless.'\(^2\)

To subject this myth to intensive interpretation is difficult because of its flimsy structure. For example, to find a doctrine of freedom of the will as the basis for accountability requires more imagination than observation. In the

\(^1\)Plato, Protagoras, 324. \(^2\)Plato, Republic, 355.
passage cited, the Interpreter is quoted as saying, "You shall choose your own destiny." That is, before birth the soul is presumed (in the myth) prior to its reincarnation to be in a position to choose the life to which after birth it will be bound of necessity. Thus, man is supposedly free only for the short time between the cycles of reincarnation during which time he makes that decision by which he will be bound for the entire period of his reincarnation, until the same opportunity arises again at the end of the cycle.

On the other hand, Er relates that the souls changed their fate from good to evil or vice versa, because they were not hasty in making their decision and because of the chance of the lot. By this latter statement Er means that when those at the end of the line got to the daughter of Necessity, there were very few "lots" left to choose from. With the alternatives so greatly reduced, the last to choose was left with only the worst alternatives. Once the choice was made in the other world and reincarnation took place man's life on this earth merely unfolded the fate chosen. Thus, to attempt to get a doctrine of moral freedom and responsibility out of the myth is either to make a great thinker

\[1\text{Ibid.}, 619.\]
appear ridiculous or to make an interesting but non-philosophic myth into a pollution of an otherwise brilliant philosophical system.

This is true even of the doctrine of recollection, which Zeller says is inseparable from Plato's epistemology and "the ultimate basis of his Plato's view on ethics, politics, and aesthetics." But on the view of the myth of Er, recollection has no real function, since one's destiny is decided before birth at the choosing of one's lot. This is a choice of which no person is aware in this life. To look to this myth for a doctrine of responsibility is therefore to strain the myth and the intellect. The use of the myth was based on a presupposed meaning of freedom of the will based on the text more than the literature or "context:"

"The blame is his who chooses; heaven is blameless."  

In spite of the difficulties presented by the Myth of Er and its obvious limitations, the myth clarifies several matters of importance to this study. The weaknesses of the myth are not a problem so long as the reader does not insist either (1) on getting a complete doctrine of responsibility

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1 Zeller, p. 154.  
2 Cited above.
out of the myth or (2) on putting a complete doctrine of responsibility into the myth. Equally to be avoided in the exegesis of the myth is the attempt to affix to the act of choosing, itself, the blame for a man's action when in fact it is the wisdom or stupidity of the choice which determines whether or not the choice is right or wrong.

At its most essential point, with reference to the question of responsibility the myth reaffirms Plato's deepest insights. (1) Man is free to, and has the power to, distinguish between good and evil. This power functions according to a man's ability to be taught the knowledge of good or evil. (2) Man is free to choose the best within his reach in keeping with what he has learned to know as good or evil. Plato's doctrine of the soul, freedom, and responsibility does not begin and end with the view that man is free to choose his destiny and choosing wrong is to be punished according to his wrong. Plato holds rather to the view that (1) man is freely capable of discerning right from wrong; (2) man will choose according to his knowledge and ability; (3) man's greatest task and purpose is that of devoting his energy to the gaining of the knowledge of the good which becomes the guide of his best actions in order that his soul
may become just.\textsuperscript{1} Plato has, here, reaffirmed the soul's power of self-determination and has placed responsibility in the book of life as a credit in the education column rather than as a debit in the column of "rewards and punishments."

In this respect the core of the myth is the same as what Plato has affirmed consistently and never denied. The elements of the doctrine of reincarnation, of the choosing of one's destiny by lot, and of the rewards and punishments which await man after he dies cannot be evaluated here. But in order to further the claim that Plato's central view of the soul as described in the Myth of Er (assuming that it is possible to separate the philosophy from the myth) may be more consistently interpreted as having power freely to think and act according to knowledge of good or evil, reference is here made to Plato's view found in the \textit{Laws}.\textsuperscript{2} Here Plato says that the attainment of the degrees of excellence or evil in the soul is left to one's own will. "For in general every man is such as the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] \textit{Republic}, 618.
\item[2] 904c.
\end{footnotes}
volitions of his own soul make him."¹ To this Plato adds that the soul will "go to its own place with the good and do and suffer with its like."² The soul, therefore, freely chooses the best that it knows within its reach.

An Evaluation of Plato's Doctrine of the Soul by Demos

Demos sees in Plato's view that "the soul's acts are voluntary only in the sense that they proceed from knowledge" a teleological determinism, by which is meant that "the soul by its very nature is compelled to love the good."³ Demos contrasts this position with the view that freedom must include the ability to see the good and yet reject it. When he says that the root of Plato's problem is that he has no doctrine of the self, he means that for Plato the motions of the soul follow from the motions of its parts, but, says Demos,

for action to be moral, the unity of the soul should be prior to its parts. A choice between reason and desire is possible only when there exists a self independent of both, and determining the relative place of each in conduct.⁴

Rather than reduce the soul to its objects of choice, a place must be left for an agent of choice, says Demos. He concludes that, although Plato did not reject the notion of freedom, he was unaware of the issue itself.

The importance of this problem in Plato can hardly be overlooked, and Demos' point requires elaboration.

In the first place, Demos says that Plato does not have a doctrine of freedom defined as absence of any necessitation. By this, apparently, Demos means the power to accept or reject alternatives, to see the good and yet reject it. He says that for Plato the soul is determined by its reason and cannot knowingly reject the good. In the fuller exploration of this problem, the following points must be appended.

1) \( \varphi\nu\chi\eta \) is not determined by anything except itself.

2) To claim to see the good (in Plato's view) and yet reject it is not to see the good.

3) The soul for Plato is not (as Demos claims) compelled to love the good. Since the soul is in its nature good, its self-motion is its goodness. To regard self-motion as compelled motion must be carefully understood. Criticism of compelled motion is not a criticism of Plato. An evil soul (if not in itself a contradiction) is one which lacks knowledge of the good. The \( \varphi\nu\chi\eta \) chooses, but, when it is
ignorant, its evil state is the result of what it is not, rather than what it is.\(^1\) To ask how it becomes what it is not is for Plato a problem of "tendance" and "education." He sees no need to go deeper than that.

4) In regard to Demos' need for an agent of choice, Plato did not destroy the soul's unity by dividing the soul into parts. For, \(\psi\nu\chi\eta\) is the whole of the soul consisting of the unity of all its functions, and its ultimate nature is its inner self-movement, its power of self-determination, inclusively considered.

Furthermore, for Plato, there is no gap between the \(\psi\nu\chi\eta\)'s knowledge of its "divine" nature and its choosing its divine nature. For an eye to see in total darkness is an impossibility. Because an eye needs light to see does not mean it is not free. When an eye is in darkness, it is unable to utilize its function as an eye, and, therefore, it is in bondage—a complete slave to the darkness, and thus it is free to see but cannot see. When an eye is in the light, it is able to function as an eye, and therefore is "free" in Plato's sense. If it should shut out the light, it would...

\(^1\)Cf. the Greek verb for "sin," \(\alpha\mu\gamma\omicron\omicron\tau\iota\upsilon\upsilon\), meaning to "miss the mark," used in the New Testament.
lose its freedom to see because to see it must have light.
The question of whether it can choose to see good or evil
is already assumed (for Plato).

So the ἔνειμεν to move itself (that is, to be will
ἐνέπεια) must be in the presence of good. This is the
beginning and the end of the matter. For the soul to turn
to evil is the same as for the eye to shut out its light and
no more. And, again, just as the eye in darkness is blind
and unable to see light, so the soul which does evil is blind
and unable to see the good.

For Plato, the soul's ability to move itself is possible
only if it is in the presence of the good. An evil soul is
one determined by everything except itself, which means no
self-determination.

In order that the nature of the soul's activity may be
more clearly understood, it seems necessary to give more pre-
cise interpretation of Plato's view of the will.

**Plato's View of the Will**

For Plato, "Will cannot be distinguished from the judgment
'this is good,' and this judgment is always, of course,
a deliverance of the 

The striving of the soul to achieve true goodness or virtue so that all that is chosen is the one true excellence is the ethical theory of the will. And just as a man has hands, feet, dreams, feelings, and thoughts, so he also has the ability to choose between ideas, alternatives, and actions and the power to achieve the good as conceived. The ability to choose does not give an action its goodness. The goodness of an act is judged by its excellence or defectiveness. All men are able to choose or refuse to choose. (psychological freedom). The ability to make this choice does not make a man evil. His evil act makes him an evil doer and, therefore, responsible. The good man chooses wisely; the wicked man chooses stupidly. In either case the power of the self-determination of the soul is basic. What a man does is never distinguishable from what he knows. The fact that the "majority of the world claim that many people know the things which are best but do not do them when they might" indicates Plato's awareness of the psychological

1Taylor, Plato, p. 282. See Plato, Republic, iv, 436. 

refers to skill in calculating (as in mathematics) or in reasoning. Applying the skill in judging results in the judgment which guides man's functioning: 

may yield true or false judgments. The will is not a faculty which operates between ideas (or judgments) and actions.

2Plato, Protagoras, 352.
facts. Knowledge of the highest good does not destroy psychological freedom: the power to choose between alternatives. When a man acquires knowledge of the highest good, he cannot live as though he were ignorant of the highest good; for, to do so would be an admission of ignorance. Such an admission is inconsistent with what the man originally claimed.

Socrates chose to think, to ask questions, and to examine his life. When asked to desist from such activities, he preferred to die. His accusers, believing him to be bad, sentenced him to death, while proclaiming that they were preserving piety. The ability to choose possessed by Socrates and his accusers did not determine responsibility; rather, what they chose determined it. Plato's theory is based on the fact that once Socrates had found the highest excellence, he must rationally and logically choose it and all that is consistent with it. Knowledge carries with it the responsibility for action consistent with the knowledge.

In addition to this, Plato's view of the will presupposes that "this is good" is not an evasive concept, changing for every person or situation. Virtue is one. Although the application may vary, virtue is not different in different situations. There is not one virtue for legislators, another
for the physician, another for artisans. There is not one virtue for the poor and another for the rich, another for the just, another for the unjust.\textsuperscript{1} That $2 + 2 = 4$ may apply to apples, pears or bananas, but when it applies to each case it is always the same. The resulting sum is not four for apples, five for pears and six for bananas.

Furthermore, to say "this is good" means good ends are achieved only by good means. A man cannot become good by becoming bad. A man by doing ill cannot become a physician, a skilled artisan, or anything good, because he cannot do good by doing ill.\textsuperscript{2}

At the same time good cannot have evil consequences. "No evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death."\textsuperscript{3}

In the light of these general principles, the question of the specific meaning of the will for Plato and its relation to the soul becomes now a matter of prime importance.

The "will" is not separated out from the other functions of the soul in Plato. Whether there is a doctrine of the will in the tripartite view of the soul has already been

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{1} Laws, ix, 858-864. \item\textsuperscript{2} Protagoras, 345, 352. \item\textsuperscript{3} Apology, trans. Church, 41.
\end{footnotes}
discussed. However, because a theory of the will which may endanger the unity of the soul may be invented on the meaning of θυλήνεσ, it is important to assess the significance of θυλήνεσ.

The stem in Greek is θολ. It is found in this form in the Indo-European. The original stem has come directly into the English (by Grimm's Law) as will, well, weal, wealth, and wild. In the Latin it becomes volo (v. will, wish) and voluntas (n. will, choice). In the Greek it carries many of the meanings of the English "will" including among others, wish, choose, prefer, plan, purpose, plot, consult, advise. That this word had so fruitful a background would have made it easy for Plato to use it, if he had wished to divide the soul and set off a separate faculty not already provided for in the functions of θυλήνεσ. The fact that he used other words (already cited) to express the idea of willing as intention and purpose, reveals the variety of the functions of the soul which were referred to by the appropriately descriptive terms without detaching the functions from the soul as a whole.

The aspect of the soul basic to all its functions— that of self-motion, was thus attributed by Plato to the θυλήνεσ as a whole. Plato included θυλήνεσ with its wide variety
of meanings among the many other activities of the soul. But
the basic principle of self-determination as noted here is
the fundamental principle of the Platonic \( \psi \nu \chi \nu \). All the
other terms used by Plato are descriptive approximations in
no way endangering the fundamental notion of \( \psi \nu \chi \nu \) nor its
unity. \( \delta \nu \xi \nu \sigma \alpha \) describes the soul as a whole "willing."

That \( \psi \nu \chi \nu \) possesses the ability or freedom to choose
between alternatives cannot be denied.\(^1\) But for Plato the
goodness or wickedness of a man does not depend on his act
of choice (as a faculty), but on how much good he has been
able to choose, and this ability is based on how much he knows
about himself and the good. His ability to choose is like his

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\(^1\)As pointed out by Windelband, pp. 78 and 79 above.
To ascertain whether Plato is a determinist or indeterminist
it is necessary to understand (for Plato) (1) that the soul
is free to choose among many possible alternatives—it is
self-directed; (2) that philosophy (the love of truth—knowledge)
is not forced upon the soul but is the self-realization of the soul as a product of tendance or education; (3) that the consistency required of knowledge is both logical
and ethical based on specific definitions and objective validity
and not on a theoretical determinism running contrary to
those facts of experience exhibiting freedom. A person is
free to think, for Plato, but in a sense knowledge is not
optional. A man may accept or reject it, but knowledge has
objective validity and reference. To be free to determine
knowledge's content by choice is a surrender to sophism.
Knowledge is not the result of man's self-determining \( \psi \nu \chi \nu \).
Because of the objectivity of knowledge man's self-determina-
tion cannot decree the content of knowledge nor the conclu-
sions which are to be declared from that content. Man's
self-determination is limited, therefore, but not denied.
ability to think or see, or the fact that he has two hands. Choosing cannot be blamed as if to punish it just as the hand, itself, is blameless. Nor can the man as the agent who chooses be punished merely for possessing the ability to choose. The degree of goodness achieved by man's choice depends on the degree of moral excellence of his soul (δυνάμεις) rather than his power of choice. Δυνάμεις is self-moved regardless. The power of choice as freedom is thus non-moral in Plato and is therefore only another term for metaphysical agency—the power of self-determination. A man may practice virtue or do wrong. His reasons for his actions require substantial interpretation, but most important for Plato and the evaluation of Platonic philosophy in the history of thought is that the power of choice remains as a power of the whole.

Δυνάμεις as Voluntary Action

For Plato, the notion that the voluntary action of the soul means action consistent with knowledge of the good cannot be affirmed on the presupposition of a segmented theory of the soul. Δυνάμεις is in essence a good in the universe and, as such, can respond only to good, just as the eyes can respond only to light. If a man responds to bad or chooses bad, he could not have been good to start with, but, says Plato,
essentially he was. Therefore, he cannot as a good soul strive for evil. \( \psi\upsilon \nu\upsilon \eta \), yielding to the good, will become divine, but, ignoring the good and dragged down by the evil forces, will remain imprisoned. Good can be achieved only when \( \psi\upsilon\nu\upsilon\eta \) does its job well. When \( \psi\upsilon\nu\upsilon\eta \) is imprisoned and unable to function, evil occurs. Ignorance imprisons the soul, renders it helpless, and weakens its power to move itself.

The questions of the moral nature of man are of basic importance at this point since self-motion or self-determination seems on the surface to omit the moral factors per se. Plato's reply to these questions rests on his interpretation of moral excellence in terms of virtue as knowledge of the good. Plato would claim to give the grounds of all ethical theory in his positing of rationally discernible objective standards of right action and justice. True knowledge of the highest good includes the skill to perform it. To ask Plato why a man who could not but follow knowledge, ignores it is not to ask Plato a question which he did not understand. Plato's answer is simple. The question answers itself. A person does not follow the knowledge he claims because he does not have true knowledge in the first place. He is ignorant. If he had true knowledge he could not ignore it. As
pointed out by Taylor, a failure to understand this point is a failure to understand Plato, and it is hopeless to attempt to make sense out of Plato's ethics without the clear insight into the full implications of the relationship of the knowledge of truth to the practice of virtue.

Of special importance is Plato's inclusion of φθορέω as one of the soul's functions. It may be rendered as "choosing" (a thing), and with προθε as it sometimes appears, "before" (another). This means choosing between alternatives. This notion is regarded by many ethical theorists as the very essence of the meaning of free will. In the moral sense freedom means "the freedom to choose between alternative courses of action..."¹ In the most elemental sense this merely means that the doctrine of freedom proposes that man can count beyond the number "one." The moment man is aware of "two" he is aware of alternatives and can then choose between them. Προθεύω means that one of the alternatives may be dealt with, taken, or chosen to the exclusion of or before the other. This differs from ποιεω discussed above in that the latter concerns impulsion or power, whereas the former refers to

¹Titus, Ethics, 87.
selectivity. When the soul functions as \( \underline{\text{προαίρεω}} \), it is functioning in the sense of choosing among alternatives. When the idea of power, or impelling force is assumed as included in the term \( \underline{\text{προαίρεω}} \), (choosing) its difference from \( \underline{\text{βουλομαι}} \) is lost. In Plato both concepts are distinguishable functions and included in \( \underline{\text{ψυχή}} \).

Choice is possible so long as counting is possible for Plato. If there is only the Eleatic \underline{One}, no choice is possible in any sense, morally, intellectually, metaphysically, or otherwise. Strictly speaking \( \underline{\text{προαίρεω}} \) is more limited than \( \underline{\text{βουλομαι}} \). For Plato \( \underline{\text{ψυχή}} \) is limited to neither, but in the process of moving itself it includes all the facts of consciousness in the \underline{Laws} as pointed out by A. E. Taylor (above), and of special importance to this study is the inclusion of \( \underline{\text{βουλομαι}} \) and \( \underline{\text{αγεω}} \). \( \underline{\text{ψυχή}} \) thus thinks, counts, selects, desires, purposes, impels, attracts, and has many other functions which may be considered as the activities of that kind of being which causes itself. Plato sees the moral problem not as a question of the power of choice but of achieving "excellence" through "tendence."

This same problem is, in a measure, seen in current discussions of the subject by the distinction between what Paul Edwards calls "the ability to act according to one's choices"
or desires"¹ and what Brand Blanshard claims in insisting that "the choice itself is open."² On these two concepts stand two different interpretations of moral experience and responsibility. The one rests its case on the power of choice. So long as this power is affirmed, both praise and blame are valid possibilities. The denial of means that the man was not the cause of his own actions, since as noted in the myth of Er is what makes one's actions one's own. On the positive side, if the man knew a certain act to be right or wrong, chose to do one or the other, but could have chosen otherwise, he is thereby held accountable and praised or blamed accordingly. Without virtue and wickedness vanish into each other. With the death of choice, funeral services for both good and evil are also held and the burial of all three is final.

The other view presupposes the choice already made or determined, for if a man knows an act to be good, he chooses it, and thereby achieves excellence, virtue, the good and is


²"The Case for Determinism," ibid., p. 5.
to be praised. The fundamental significance of the Platonic doctrine is that although "choice" is not denied, neither is it to be regarded as that factor responsible for imparting the moral quality to action. The mere power of choice, all-important as it may be, does not establish moral excellence or moral evil. The excellence or evil must be established for Plato on other grounds. For Plato the goodness or evil of an act is assessed by reasoning which includes self-examination. Once through his reasoning ability a man is led to the conclusion that an act is good, rationally he must choose it $\psi\varepsilon\rho\sigma\iota$. Choosing or rejecting a good is not the result of a strength or weakness $\chi\rho\alpha\gamma\delta\iota\alpha$ in the power of choosing (even in the myth of Er). A "strong" choice is possible when the alternatives are sharp and clear. A "weak" choice occurs when the issues are vague and uncertain. The question of character as the determination of will is more aptly applied to the actions of $\lambda\varepsilon\mu\alpha$. Again, suffice it to say that for a known good to be rejected is not the result of a defective power of choice, for Plato. The defect is rather in the man himself whose nature is thereby observed as fouled.
The Significance of Plato's View of the Soul

In summary, \( \psi \nu \nu \phi \) is that kind of causation which causes itself and everything else which does not have its own cause. \( \psi \nu \nu \phi \) includes all the functions of consciousness. When \( \psi \nu \nu \phi \) lifts itself up to rise, it is a soul achieving good. It is self-determined. When it does not lift itself and is dragged down, it is wicked. It is a slave. When it moves it can only lift. When it does not move it can only be dragged down. When it lifts it is acting voluntarily (\( \sigma \sigma \nu \lambda \nu \mu \alpha \) \( \nu \phi \)). When it is dragged down it is not acting voluntarily but is being enslaved by that which imprisons it. \( \psi \nu \nu \phi \) is good; causing and effecting the right choices is what it does and thereby it achieves excellence, virtue, and justice. \( \psi \nu \nu \phi \) discerns by all its acts of consciousness, including thinking and knowing which are its food. When it knows the good, it wills it: it uses all its powers to bring good into being. Its self-determination means that all its powers including what is described as choosing, willing, thinking, deserving, valuing, hoping, purposing, and imagining are within itself and are functions of the whole self. This is \( \psi \nu \nu \phi \). It causes itself and it is the cause of all things which do not have their own cause. \( \psi \nu \nu \phi \) is the divinest kind of being. It is that being which
moves itself to excellence. Its self-determination is its power of impelling itself to good. Since its nature is good, virtue, knowledge, and excellence, when it impels itself it moves itself to good, virtue, knowledge, and excellence.

If a man is tried and found evil it will be discovered that he is not impelling himself as but is being impelled by some other power or activity not such as his body, or the world, or an evil or evil men. The good is not relative, differing for each individual according to his own principles or activities. Assuming that love of one's fellowmen is an absolute good, would include such a love. For a man to know that such a love would complete his nature and yet to reject it would mean that his is not functioning, for if it were to function it would impel him to such a known good.

To discover the degree of goodness in a man means to appraise this condition and to determine how to bring about the desired excellence. On this account, if a man claimed he did his best, he must still be appraised and the gap between "his best" and "the good" must be measured. It is the function of the to enter into such causal activities as will close the gap and establish the good. If man's best is known but the true good in the situation is not known,
then ignorance prevails and responsibility is lost.

The doctrine of reminiscence must not be overlooked in the problem of the moral life for Plato. For in man's previous existence he learned truth only to have lost it. To recover it, he must go to the effort of prolonged and steady thinking. Knowledge is won by "personal participation in research."\(^1\) In so doing, learning means "the following up by personal effort of the suggestions of sense-experience."\(^1\)

**Evaluation of the Doctrine of the Will And Its Freedom from Its Embryonic Stages to Its Development in Plato**

In order to indicate clearly the stage at which the discussion of the doctrine of the will has arrived, it may be helpful to present the main features of the transformations of the doctrine which have developed from its embryonic stages to the notion which is found in Plato. According to the working definition of the problem as established at the outset, the question to be answered concerns the power or powers in man which enable him to determine or choose his destiny.

\(^1\)See A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, pp. 136-137.
In the myths the forces and powers which determined human destiny were largely outside of men and were conceived in terms of the indulgences of the gods based on a human nature composed of divine and wicked elements. Man's dissatisfaction with this conception led him to ask how his destiny was regulated. While reflecting on nature, a wide variety of ideas was proposed. The differences in the ideas extend from the One of the Eleatics at one end to the skepticism of the Sophists at the other. Thus the area of the discussion of the powers determining human destiny covers the distance from the notion of man's contemplating the Eleatic One to the Sophist doctrine of man's thinking and doing anything he wants with the aim of gaining power over others. Between the notion that man has nothing to say about the meaning and destiny of his life since it is all objectively given and the notion that nothing is objectively given and man may say anything he pleases about the meaning and destiny of his life, there is a wide gap.

To avoid the extremes and to fill the gap Plato (following the initiative of Socrates) asked not only the question of how to determine one's destiny but the very basic question of how to determine and choose the right destiny. The discussion
of the functions of the soul in relation to its powers to move itself toward the good warrants a review and evaluation of the development of the doctrine of the soul so that the doctrine of free will may be seen in proper perspective.

(1) Early Greek thought (especially in Plato), viewed the soul as a unity. Activities of the soul were not delegated to faculties set apart from the whole and charged with the task of performing a specific function only. There was not a part which thought, a part which impelled, a part which imagined, a part which remembered, and a part which desired. The activities of the soul were activities of the whole soul performing the functions as a unity. The heterogeneity of human activities suggested a definition of the soul in terms of its versatility as a unity and not in terms of a soul with functions assigned to specialized faculties.

(2) The doctrine of the soul gradually evolved from the early speculation that the soul's destiny was ordained by the power of the gods or the forces of nature to the later insight that the soul as a self-determining reality could utilize all its powers to achieve any attainable goals. For Plato, self-determination did not mean the arbitrary and irresponsible freedom of the Sophists's subjectivism. For example, for Plato, man can think only in the way thinking is
done. The soul's self-determination does not propose that man set aside the rules of thinking. Rather the soul's self-determination urges him to find the rules and to use them.

(3) The essence of Plato's view of the soul was its self-determination. In positing the soul as a reality which moved itself, Plato attributed to the soul as a whole all of its functions including the power to choose among alternatives in the sense that nothing antecedent to or present in the choice completely determined the choice. Even if a soul's acts were conditioned by the past or limited by the act's feasibility, there belonged to the soul the power, however limited, to choose among alternatives. But what Plato described as the central nature of the soul, namely, the achievement of its aims by the power of its own agency, later thinkers overlooked. The power to choose among alternatives (as described above) became for some later thinkers that which was defined as a free will which in turn was one of the several faculties into which the soul was divided. Such a free will cannot be regarded as part of a soul freely willing as a whole. Only the latter view of the soul could coincide with Plato's thought of the soul and the functions of willing.
It may be noted that a free will in the thought of the later philosophers included in the faculty of choice the power of choosing contrary to one's knowledge of the good. But because, for Plato, the power of choice was an activity of the whole soul, the hypothesis that the soul may choose contrary to its knowledge was, for Plato, to divide the soul and thereby destroy the soul's unity.

(4) The activities of the soul when it wills and chooses are, for Plato, two specific functions of the soul as a whole. These activities were later to be described in a doctrine of the will which treated the will as though it had power of its own independent of the control of the soul as a whole. In such a view, the will and not the soul is defective when man does evil.

(5) The soul in Plato as self-moved is free. The soul is not wholly indeterminate (i.e. not completely free). Its limits are defined by all the forces which circumscribe it and by the nature of its own inner structure. However in those areas in the soul's power where there are no limiting external forces, the soul is self-determined and free. If freedom is to be defined as the ability or power to choose
among alternatives, the soul, for Plato, has such ability and power. There remains the serious question of what, for Plato, are the alternatives which may rightfully be considered as optional. The answer to this question is that only those alternatives which are possible to the soul and capable of responding to the soul's act of choice may be considered within the range of the soul's agency, i.e., its power of choice. A soul may choose within the whole area of all its possible activities. In this sense the soul may will freely. But when confronted by true good, the soul, though free, has no alternative except to leave everything else out of account and to choose that good. Two examples illustrate this point. There is, for Plato, no choice in knowledge of the truth because there is no alternative to, and therefore no choice in, knowledge such as that 2 + 2 = 4. There is no choice when true good is known because there is no alternative to, and therefore no choice in true good, such as self-knowledge or self-examination. To expose objective truth (or knowledge) to alternatives in order to make it subject to an act of choice is to deny its status as

\[\text{1Cf. Plato, \textit{Republic}, 618.}\]
objective truth (or knowledge). For Plato, when the good is known, there is no alternative but to do it. To suggest that a person may know the true good but not choose it is to put true good at the mercy of what is less that itself. True good therefore is not optional. It is irresistible and inexorable. A soul's knowledge of the truth involves a command to the soul that it live consistent with its knowledge. Finally, when a man chooses to do wrong, knowledge cannot be involved; for, if it were, it would reveal the truth and compel action consistent with the truth revealed.

(6) The doctrine of \( \chi \) distinguishes between causation resulting in good and the source of evil. For Plato, evil is not caused in the same way good is. Evil is not voluntary or willed—the result of the action of the \( \chi \) or anything else. Evil like darkness is absence or defect. To correct darkness a light must be lighted, and in the realm of good and evil, evil disappears when knowledge is attained and good is done.

However, the doctrine that to know the good is to do it must contend against the experienced fact that there is stubborn rejection of the good by some who readily admit that they know that very good. A severe intellectual strain
results when the individual says that good is always willed but evil is not. The impelling power which does evil seems no less than the impelling power which achieves good. For a man to do an evil, he must sometimes work harder than if he were to do an equivalent amount of good. Evil seems to be no more the result of a vacuum than good is the result of fate. Destructive power is no more deniable than constructive power. Plato attempts to save his philosophy from this dilemma by limiting the notion of the good to meaning true good not relative good. The impelling power to achieve the true good is positive action, intellectual light, and an excellent life. The experience of complete evil is "negative" action, intellectual darkness, and a shameful death. Plato's thought in this area results in a doctrine of perfection rather than of moral good in the sense of choosing among alternatives.

Plato had contributed profound insights to the study of human nature. However, by and large his thinking was not systematically organized. As a result, in presenting his doctrine on any subject, there is always the danger that essential aspects have been overlooked. Final proof that some ideas are truly related to each other is lacking and
in many instances answers to basic problems are left to vague guesses. Plato's followers were aware of this situation and attempted to organize his thought without distorting it in order to make it clearer and more acceptable. Plato's use of myth is an example of the dangers in presenting ideas unsystematically and the confusion which may result because of the difficulty in separating fact from fiction.

The follower of Plato who was most successful in systematizing Plato's thought was Aristotle. Aristotle's greatness must include the proposition that he clearly understood Plato. His differences from Plato are not so much the result of misunderstanding as they are the expression of a sincere effort to correct defects by using exact methods, by collecting data, and by organizing the results.

For those who succeeded Plato, the doctrine of the soul as a unity did not give adequate account of the experienced facts, which tended to exhibit the soul as a plurality. To explore these facts and to discover where they could lead became one of the major efforts of Aristotle. There can be no question that although the central concepts of the nature of the soul were profoundly stated by Plato, the details of the implications of moral choice were largely ignored (perhaps
intentionally) with the result that stubborn questions can only be answered with a weak guess. The presentation of some of these details was made by Aristotle, Plato's successor. Therefore, in turning now to Aristotle, the result may very well be not only to achieve greater insight into Plato's doctrines but perhaps to gain a more profound understanding of the problems of the will and the idea of freedom.
CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL

IN ARISTOTLE

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was born in Stagira, a town on the northwestern shores of the Aegean in 384 B.C., the son of Nicomachus, court physician to Philip of Macedon. In 367 B.C., at seventeen, he entered Plato's Academy and remained as student and teacher in that Academy until Plato's death twenty years later in 347 B.C. when he was thirty-seven. While he was at the Academy, some of the greatest of Plato's works were written, and his complete familiarity with Plato's views is almost unquestionable. With the death of Plato, Aristotle and Xenocrates left the Academy, because of its degeneration into a school of mathematics under the direction of Plato's nephew, Speusippus. They went together to Assos. There Aristotle set up a school with others who had studied with Plato, and, during his three-year stay, married Pythias, the adopted daughter and niece of Hermias, a prince and the ruler of Atarnous, a town of Assos. Pythias died after
bearing him a daughter, and not long afterward he established a permanent but unlegalized union with Herpyllis, a native of Stagira, who bore him a son, Nicomachus, after whom the Nichomachean Ethics was named. He spent two years on the isle of Lesbos studying natural history and marine biology.

In 343 B.C. Philip of Macedon invited him to the Macedonian court in Pella (80 miles west of Stagira) to teach Alexander, who was then thirteen years old. Aristotle performed this task for the next seven years until Philip's death and Alexander's accession to the throne in 335 B.C.

Aristotle returned to Athens, and, with the money and scientific data sent to him by Alexander during the latter's military campaigns which formed his empire, Aristotle organized a school in the Lyceum which came to be called Peripatetic after the fact that he taught as he walked. He collected and interpreted data pertaining to many subjects and continued to teach for the next twelve years until Alexander's death, when he was forced to flee to his mother's home in Chalcis. He died the following year in 322 B.C.\(^1\)

The Nature of the Soul

In the study of Plato the method used to arrive at an understanding of the function of willing consisted of an examination of the nature and functions of the soul. It is, therefore, not surprising to discover that Aristotle was keenly aware of the significance of the study of the soul; for, knowledge of the soul "contributed greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of Nature."¹ Truth was advanced and the understanding of nature was increased because study of the soul was the philosophical study of life. The understanding of nature was among other things also based on the study of causation which in turn was rooted in the subject matter of the soul. But the importance of the soul is almost equally matched by the tendency of studies of the soul to be elusive; for "assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world."¹

In order to acquire the desired knowledge of the soul, Aristotle proposes a definition of the problem: to discover (1) the soul's essential nature, and (2) its properties.¹

The method for determining the soul's properties is simply one of demonstration. But the method for determining the soul's essence is not so explicit. An adequate procedure is to ask, "What is soul?" To answer the question involves formulating the most general possible definition of the soul.¹

The Soul as the Originator Or Cause of Movement Yet Unmoved

Aristotle's predecessors had held to two characteristics of soul which distinguish it from what is not of the nature of soul, namely, movement and sensation.² Those who held that what had soul was moved annexed to this view the additional proposition that what had soul in it was "eminently originative of movement."³ On the other hand those who concentrated on the soul's sensations or perceptions tended to "identify soul with the principle or principles of nature."³

In discussing the question of the soul's movement, Aristotle bases his reasoning on the conclusions he had arrived at in the Physics,⁴ namely, that in the act of motion there are three things—the moved, the mover, and the instrument

¹Ibid., 412a. ²Ibid., 403b. ³Ibid., 404b.

of motion. The moved and the instrument of motion are in motion; but "the movent—that is to say, that which causes motion in such a manner that it is not merely the instrument of motion—must be unmoved." ¹

Aristotle develops his argument as follows: In the first place, there must be a limit in the causal series—a first cause,² since the kinds of motion are limited. In the second place, a thing which moves itself is a thing divided in two parts: that which is moved and that which moves. The whole moves itself. It does this by containing a part that imparts motion and another part that is moved.³ The part which imparts motion is unmoved.⁴ Aristotle was, therefore, able to say that there is a part that is moved and a part that is an unmoved movent.⁵

From the conclusions of the Physics, Aristotle also is able to define four types of movement: locomotion, alteration, diminution, and growth.⁶ But all these movements involve location in space and "it is a mistake to say that the soul is a spatial magnitude."⁷ He corrects Plato's view expressed in

¹Ibid., 256b. ²Ibid., 257a. ³Ibid., 258a.
⁴Ibid., 258b. ⁵Ibid., 257b.
the *Timaeus* that the soul and body move each other\(^1\) by proposing that Plato did not mean *soul* but *mind* there. In contrast he says, "That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said, and if it cannot be moved at all, manifestly it cannot be moved by itself."\(^2\) In these distinctions Aristotle has not only revised Plato's doctrine of the unity of the soul, but he has replaced Plato's definition of the soul as that which is moved by itself with the proposition that the soul's essence consists of an unmoved moment.

On the grounds that he has dismissed all other views of the soul as inadequate, Aristotle proceeds to define it for himself. "The soul," he says, "must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it."\(^3\) It is "substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence."\(^4\) *Man is a unity of soul and body.*\(^5\)

This definition of man expresses the mere fact. To make the definition more comprehensive, the "ground" must be included and exhibited.\(^6\) Aristotle attempts to accomplish this

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\(^1\) See also Plato, *Laws*, 894-896.

\(^2\) Aristotle, *De Anima*, 408b.

\(^3\) Ibid., 412a.

\(^4\) Ibid., 412b.

\(^5\) Ibid., 412b-413a.

\(^6\) Ibid., 413a.
by contending that "what has soul in it differs from what has not, in that the former displays life. Now this word has more than one sense, and provided any one alone of these is found in a thing we say that thing is living."¹ But what must be found in order to say that a thing displays life or is living? Aristotle says that a thing is living when it possesses one or more of the five psychic powers: the nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking.² The soul, however, is not only living but is also the cause of the body in the three senses of causation: (1) the source or origin of movement, (2) the end, (3) the essence of the whole living body.³

Without discarding these contentions, Aristotle reduces his argument to the proposition that a soul has two distinctive peculiarities: (1) local movement and (2) thinking, discriminating, and perceiving.⁴ The latter aspect of the soul is not difficult to define; for, there is in the soul what is called mind, which is that whereby the soul thinks and judges, and it is able to think itself.⁵ The fuller development of Aristotle's concept of mind must wait. More important at

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., 414a. ³Ibid., 415b. ⁴Ibid., 427a. ⁵Ibid., 429.
this point in the argument is that although mind, imagination and nutrition are all involved in movement, the faculty which originates movement is appetite (\(\alpha \varepsilon p e k t i k o v\)).\(^1\)

That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement—mind and appetite—they would have produced movement in virtue of some common character. As it is, mind is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite. Now mind\(^2\) is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates movement, this object may be either the real or the apparent good. To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being. That then such a power in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a sensitive, and intellectual, a deliberative, and now an appetitive part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties of desire and passion.\(^3\)

Now what originates movement is specifically one—the faculty of appetite, and the things that originate movement

\(^1\)Ross, p. 143, translates it as "desire." Liddell and Scott suggest that it be called the impulsive or conative faculty.

\(^2\)Mind = Nous.

\(^3\)Aristotle, De Anima, 433a, b.
are numerically many. Furthermore, "that which moves without itself being moved is the realizable good, that which at once moves and is moved is the faculty of appetite." And in both men and animals the capability of appetite is the capability of self-movement. Movement is thus not originated by the whole soul but by desire or appetite ( ὑδέρτικον).

Based on these data Ross's statement of Aristotle's view that "desire is thus the cause of movement" cannot be refuted. In the Metaphysics Aristotle defines the means whereby the unmoved mover causes motion:

There is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational wish.

Man seeks the good because it attracts him in his rational wishes. The result is a motion from potentiality to actuality. The heart of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul as the originator of movement is that it is the form of a natural body which he defines as an essential attribute. Ross points out that Aristotle means by this that the "soul is a cause of

1Ibid., 433b.  
2Ross, p. 144.  
3Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a.
movement but not self moving; it moves without being moved."¹

"The soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it."² In the light of Aristotle's doctrine of the faculties of the soul and the relation of the soul to the body, the question may be rightly raised as to the status of the soul's unity.

The Unity of the Soul

Although Aristotle lists faculties of the soul (which will be discussed later), he seeks with difficulty to maintain its essential unity. Its unity is not sustained by the body. On the contrary, the body's unity is provided by the soul: "In each of the bodily parts there are present all the parts of the soul, and the souls so present are homogeneous with one another and with the whole."³ In this respect Aristotle suggests that the soul cannot be separated into its parts.

On the other hand, for Aristotle there is division: the soul is as a whole divisible, by which he means that it may be divided not into parts but into complete souls.⁴ Thus, for example, it is not possible to separate an orange section from

¹Ross, p. 132. See also Jaeger, p. 45.

²Aristotle, De Anima, 412a. ³Ibid., 411b.

⁴Ibid., Aristotle affirms that the parts are souls "homogeneous with one another and with the whole".
an orange and still have a whole orange. The parts are indis- 

disseverable without destroying the whole. But, if it were 

possible to cut an orange in two and thereby yield two com-

plete oranges while at the same retaining the whole orange, 

the notion of divisibility for Aristotle would thereby be 

illustrated. The parts or faculties of the soul are wholes 

which are interrelated (or, as Ross puts it), are character-

ized by "interpenetration." ¹

Zeller, unwilling to accept Aristotle's logic, is not 

so sure of the unity of the soul in Aristotle. Zeller de-

scribes Aristotle's doctrine of unity:

Aristotle accordingly sums up his whole doctrine of the 
soul in a single sentence: the Soul is in a certain 
sense all Actuality, inasmuch as it unites in itself the 
sensual and the spiritual, and thus contains the 
Form of both—a description which applies especially, 
of course, to the soul of man.²

In spite of Aristotle's own affirmation of unity, Zeller 

proposes that in Aristotle there is no unifying principle of 

personality by which is meant a power, "which governs while 
it unites all the other parts of the soul."³ Aristotle, in 

his eagerness to preserve the soul's unity, may have been con-

vinced that he had done so, if in no other way than by

¹Ross, p. 132.


³Ibid., II, 120.
proclamation. The soul's unity was affirmed by counting it as one soul and not as many. When the soul was described, a unit of reality was being described which is not divisible into smaller and more basic parts of which it is composed. Nor are its faculties separable from it. As A. E. Taylor states the matter, there is, for Aristotle, "one single continuous process,"¹ which Taylor discusses in terms of the grades of psychical life. At one point Aristotle suggests hesitatingly that "the soul is inseparable from its parts, or at any rate that certain parts of it are."² This statement has led some to the conclusion that Aristotle is here leaving room for the immortality of Nous. For, although Aristotle distinctly says that "the soul cannot be without a body,"³ nevertheless, he seems to have abandoned his desire for unity and has made out of Nous a separable faculty of the soul:

We have no evidence yet about mind or the power to think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as to what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. All the other parts of soul, it is evident from what we have said, are, in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapable of separate existence

¹Taylor, Aristotle, p. 75.
²Aristotle, De Anima, 413a. ³Ibid., 414a.
though, of course, distinguishable by definition.\(^1\)

Because mind is in its essential nature activity, it is "separable, impassible, unmixed."\(^2\) He goes on, "When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal."\(^2\)

Furthermore, "in each and every case that which unifies is mind."\(^3\) In the universe as a whole potential and actual knowledge are identical\(^2\) and at the same time "the faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest."\(^4\)

Without bending the data, Aristotle may be described here as inconsistently providing for the unity of the soul, first in terms of its grades of faculties and powers which develop from the first grade of actuality of a natural body to the most highly developed stage of intelligence. The mind imparts to the soul a separable aspect as Nous.

The key to the problem of the soul's unity in Aristotle becomes the distinction between the soul acting as a whole (as in Plato) or the soul acting through its parts. The unity of the soul for Aristotle is that the faculties are inseparable (except possibly for Nous) from the whole. For Aristotle

\(^1\)Ibid., 413b. See Jaeger, p. 49.

\(^2\)Ibid., 430a.

\(^3\)Ibid., 430b.

\(^4\)Ibid., 433a.
the soul is divided into parts (perhaps souls) which function as parts but not as functions of the soul as a whole. It is not the whole soul which desires, or thinks, or senses. In each case a faculty functions for the soul as a part of the soul. More specific consideration to this problem may be given when the faculties are discussed.

To explore the extent of the divisiveness to the soul created by Nous, it is of importance to give consideration to Aristotle's doctrine of substance.

Soul as Substance

In the definitions cited above, Aristotle uses the word "substance" to mean the essence of a soul. By essence he means the form which is "that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this.'" ¹ Furthermore, he has also defined it as that which cannot be moved and therefore cannot be moved by itself.² Although, in a sense, this appears to be the doctrine of soul as substance, it is necessary to add Aristotle's view of substance as found elsewhere beginning with the Organon. In the Organon Aristotle says that "substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense

¹Ibid., 412a. ²Ibid., 408b.
of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject. There are two meanings of substance: primary and secondary; a secondary substance is one which is not present in a subject; and is predicated univocally or unambiguously. A primary substance is individual, contains no variations of degrees, and admits of contrary qualities. The definitions of the Organon are elaborated in the Metaphysics where he says that substance in its truest sense is substratum by which is meant "that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else." It is that which underlies a thing. In this respect substance is a substratum; whereas motion is a predicate. Since Aristotle defines movement as change from potentiality to actuality, he views movement as predicable and thereby rejects Plato's interpretation of the source of movement as that which moves itself—. For to be the cause of the world it would have to be prior or first. Since it is coeval with the heavens and, in fact, later rather than prior, it cannot be the cause of movement. That which

2Ibid., 3a-4b. 3Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028b.
4Ibid., 1071b, 1072a.
moves without being moved is the object of desire and the ob-
ject of thought (substance); and presumably not Plato's

There is, then, something which is always moved with an
unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this
is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the
first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also
something which moves it. And since that which is moved
and moves is intermediate, there is something which
moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and
actuality. And the object of desire and the object of
thought move in this way; they move without being moved.
The primary objects of desire and of thought are the
same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite,
and the real good is the primary object of rational wish.
But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion
on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And
thought is moved by the object of thought, and one of
the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of
thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance,
that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and
the simple are not the same; for 'one' means a measure,
but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain
nature.)

Aristotle does not end the discussion of soul as substance
here. Having given an account of motion by finding the prime
mover as the first principle behind motion, Aristotle pro-
poses to define more clearly what the nature of the prime
mover is. The first principle upon which all heaven and
nature depend cannot be left merely as a substratum or unmoved
mover without an explanation emulating the importance of the
first principle. Aristotle finds such an explanation by
changing to a theological perspective and making the first

\[\textit{Ibid.}, 1072a.\]
principle God. As the discussion of the first principle develops, Aristotle arrives at the idea of God by introducing the need to explain more than movement if a first principle is to be found. The first principle must also include life, the highest good, duration and thinking. Thus, the first principle explains life, life is seen as the best to be enjoyed. However the best life is the life which is best in itself.

Having arrived at this point in the argument, Aristotle proceeds readily to his conclusion: The best in itself is not just thought but thought thinking itself. Such thought (called also contemplation) is the divine element of the first principle. The life of the divine element is its actuality. This actuality is God. Such an actuality as the best cannot be of finite duration and therefore is eternal. God, therefore, is the first principle understood as thought thinking itself. Life as most good and eternal is God's self-dependent actuality. God, then, is a living being of eternal duration and most good. Man enjoys the state of contemplation which God enjoys but only occasionally and for a short time. Any theory of the will or of freedom in Aristotle will be founded on the first principles outlined above. The conclusions to be drawn from the discussion of the first principle are stated by Aristotle as follows:
Since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses—that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way.

On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are making, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.¹

¹Tbid., 1072b.
After relating the first principle to God, Aristotle returns to the first principle which, defined as substance is not only the source of all good, but the cause of the universe:

The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or accidentally, but produces the primary eternal and single movement. But since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover must be in itself unmovable, and eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing, and since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises), each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal just because it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. Evidently, then, there must be substances which are of the same number as the movements of the stars, and in their nature eternal, and in themselves unmovable, and without magnitude, for the reason before mentioned.\(^1\)

In saying that life belongs to God, Aristotle means life is self-dependent actuality of thought. Although Aristotle has formulated his doctrine of the soul on what he considers are the requirements for an explanation of motion, he has nevertheless found it necessary to relate the concept of the first principle to "self-dependence." The concept of self-dependence has not, however, been applied to motion but to thought. He says, "It must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking

\(^1\)Ibid., 1073a.
on thinking."¹

It is not difficult to see that with reference to God the central idea of Plato's ἐρωτ is embraced by Aristotle in his view of God's self-dependent actuality as thought thinking itself. Even more of Plato's view of the soul appears when Aristotle adds that the object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved. And as if to close the subject, Ross adds that "Aristotle's genuine view is that the prime mover is not in space."² With motion not limited to space, the view emerges that Aristotle's prime mover is not a denial of Plato's view of the first principle: the Aristotelian prime mover comes remarkably close to assuming the role of Plato's ἐρωτ.

The point may be further explored without doing Aristotle an injustice, because Aristotle cannot resolve his own metaphysical problems without accounting for the soul's basic functions. That Aristotle rejects the view that the source of movement is motion is clear. He does so because he wants actuality to be prior to potency.³ But the view of God's thought as thinking itself and as self-dependent actuality would seem to be Aristotle's attempt to bring the motion of self-determination as previously noted into the motion of

¹Ibid., 1074b. Anselm added to this the idea of life as the actuality of thought and thereby derived his ontological argument for God.
²Ross, p. 177.
³See page 129.
substance as it applies to God. The thought thinking itself as a more adequate interpretation of that which moves, but is itself unmoved, removes the difficulty of the paradox (if not the flat contradiction) in the principle of the mover which doesn't move. Having affirmed the unmoved aspect of substance or the substratum as being at rest, the question arises as to the meaning of causation. It is important to discover how a substratum which somehow is at rest can be the cause of motion. When the doctrine of soul as substance is advanced in Aristotle, he is first of all in agreement with Plato that there are things which cannot account for their own existence and therefore must have a cause outside of themselves. For both Plato and Aristotle, therefore, such a cause or mover is by definition the cause of all those things which require a cause. In Plato, that cause turns out to be ὑπόθεσις, which is the only reality which does not have to be caused by something other than itself. Furthermore, those things which are dependent are not self-determining, but those which are independent are.

On the other hand, for Aristotle, the cause required by things which are caused is necessary because of the logic and the facts of the situation. Since an infinite regress is to be avoided, he postulates the cause as uncaused. The words
substance, substratum, essence, and actuality, merely refer to names which with varying emphasis may apply to the cause, which is another way of defining the unmoved mover. In fact, for Aristotle, $\Psi_{\nu}X\nu$ does not function the same causally as it does for Plato. Rather, $\Psi_{\nu}X\nu$, for Aristotle is itself an unmoved mover; for to posit a motion which moves itself merely raises the question one step further back: What moves that which moves itself? Thus that which does not have to be caused by something other than itself is that which does not move and never has or will move. Having affirmed the status of the soul in these terms, he does not elaborate it. Nous and $\mathcal{OEKTINON}$ are posited as faculties which exhibit the situation of an unmoved mover, but the essential metaphysics of the problem is avoided until he comes to the discussion of the nature of God and the First Cause.

In the discussion of the First Cause, the idea of there being many first causes and unmoved movers fades, and the universe is left with one First Cause—God. As such, God is life and mind. He is, as the contemplator of himself and his perfection, unmoved. To be unmoved is to contemplate perfection. Since it is the best, it
is unchangeable, for to change it would be to make it something different from the best and therefore not the best. The unmoved is the knowledge of perfection which being perfect has nothing to move to. Such knowledge excludes knowledge of evil or of anything less than the perfect.

Aristotle has thus not changed Plato's view that evil in the world is not caused or willed; for, by definition all that is is caused by God as the unmoved mover from which evil has been excluded. Ultimately there is no other possibility pertaining to the good in its perfection than for God to know it. The final state is a state of knowing. In man this is the essence of his faculty of Nous moving the soul by its appetitive faculty which longs for the perfection found in the contemplation of the knowledge of the good.

The Aristotelian doctrine of substance may be expressed in the light of the logic of the syllogism. Actuality is both the first and final cause. As in the syllogism there is nothing in the end which was not in the beginning. There is nothing in the conclusion which was not in the major premise. The primal substance is now and will be forever what it was in the beginning.
Looking at substance only, it is difficult to see how to account for moral improvement or metaphysical change. Substance is the first cause. The soul is not in the first cause, but the first cause or substance somehow moves the soul to make choices and thereby do right or wrong depending on whether the object chosen is good or evil.

Aristotle's view of substance results in several notions, depending on the concept to which his view is applied. Applied to God, substance appears to mean "thought-thinking-itself." In this respect Plato and Aristotle do not disagree. Applied to man, substance seems to mean that substratum which moves the soul but which is itself as substratum not moved. At this point Plato and Aristotle differ where soul and the substratum differ. Plato would see no basis for positing a substratum. Applied to nature, substance is the uncaused cause. Here again Plato and Aristotle would differ where Aristotle asserts a substratum which is uncaused but causal. Again, Plato would deny such a substratum.

To understand what Aristotle means by such a notion as a substratum which causes, without itself being a cause, clarification occurs (at least, for Aristotle) in the
understanding of the nature of motion. The description of motion means change. Therefore to understand causation it is necessary to understand Aristotle's view of the problem of change: matter and form.

Matter and Form

The discussion of matter and form describes the process of change. In this respect Aristotle presupposes three kinds of substance: the matter, the nature, and the particular composed of the two. These are also defined as (1) the sensible which is eternal; (2) the sensible which is perishable; and (3) the immovable. These are two different descriptions of the same aspects of substance in which the second and third of the first list coincide with the third and second of the second list.

In reference to immovable substance, there is no problem of change. However, just as easily as the problem of change is eliminated in regard to the immovable, it is complicated in regard to sensible substance. In this respect

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1Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1070a.
2Ibid., 1069a.
3Ibid., 1069b.
he says, "Everything that changes is something and is changed by something into something. That by which it is changed is the immediate mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into which it is changed, the form."\(^1\) Matter is not of one kind. There are different kinds of matter. There is matter, for example, for generation; there is matter for motion and apparently for any of the different kinds of changes involved. There are four kinds of changes: (1) generation and destruction, (2) alteration (quality), (3) increase and diminution (quantity), and (4) motion (location).\(^2\) Furthermore, changes will be from given states to "contrary" states, and the matter must have within it the capacity to change from one of the states into the other.

"Everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually."\(^2\) "Therefore," he goes on to say, "not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of that which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which is, but is potentially, and is not actually."\(^2\) In this respect Aristotle denies that the proposition A is A is final. He is saying that if A is A were final, it would not be possible to explain how A becomes B. Now A becomes B, because

\(^1\)Ibid., 1069b-1070a.  \(^2\)Ibid., 1069b.
B is already in A potentially. Aristotle is thus again thinking the syllogism. It is not possible to find in the conclusion what was not somehow in the major premise.

Matter, therefore, is a kind of raw material which contains within itself all the potentialities of which it is capable. It is eternal and thereby is not potentially non-existent, although every other potentiality is in it.¹

- Now form is the state into which a thing passes. That state is its end toward which potentiality is directed. This end or form into which a thing passes is what, as stated above, Aristotle means by actuality. The principle of individuation is found in the matter which assumes the state or form constitutive of an individual. Furthermore, as cited above, actuality is prior to potentiality as well as its end. Thus, change is the process whereby an individual becomes or turns into an actuality which was already potentially in its matter from all eternity.

If this is the principle of change for all events, the changes in human nature will be on the same ground, but rooted in the faculties of the soul.

¹See Ibid., 1069b-1070a. The last form and matter are eternal. See also Ross, p. 174.
Although Aristotle has defined the soul, the discussion of the soul in terms of its faculties develops from the need to explain its functions. The soul as substance provides a stop to the infinite regress of first causes. At the same time it provides a stop at the end of the process of change. But to explain the wide variety of functions of the soul, Aristotle devises the system of ordering the soul in terms of its faculties. These faculties are described on the basis of an ordering concept of increasing complexity. Thus at one end there is the minimal soul which he describes as the nutritive soul and as one characterized by the faculty of nutrition. At the other end there is the rational soul. The more complex souls include all that is gathered up in the less complex just as the more complex geometric figures include all that is involved in figures beginning with the elemental triangle.\(^1\)

Aristotle suggests that in listing the distinguishing parts of the soul in terms of faculties or powers a very large number are discovered.\(^2\) There are several lists made in Aristotle of the faculties of the soul. It is a cumbersome

\(^{1}\)Aristotle, De Anima, 414b. \(^{2}\)Ibid., 433b.
task to compose a list which may be regarded as fully complete. It must be borne in mind that each time Aristotle summarizes the situation a new classification and list results with a new set of problems. Without getting into these abstruse difficulties, the faculties of the soul as variously listed\(^1\) may be regarded as numerous, but of those with which Aristotle is most concerned, the following deserve to be mentioned: (1) nutritive--including feeding and reproduction;\(^2\) (2) sensitive--including the five senses of taste, touch, smell, sight, and hearing;\(^3\) (3) appetitive--including pleasure, pain, wish, passion, and desire;\(^4\) (4) imaginative--including dreaming, opining, remembering, or any form of an image;\(^5\) (5) perceiving--meaning the power of discrimination as applied to all the senses;\(^6\) (6) locomotive--including bodily movements.

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\(^1\) For instance comparing the list in De Anima, 413b with 414a, 427a, and 433b, the following are the results. 413b: (1) self-nutrition, (2) sensation, (3) thinking, (4) motivity; 414a: (1) nutritive, (2) appetitive, (3) sensory, (4) locomotive, (5) thinking; 427a: (1) local movement, (2) thinking, (3) discriminating, (4) perceiving; 433b: (1) nutritive, (2) sensitive, (3) intellective, (4) deliberative, (5) appetitive.

\(^2\) Ibid., 416b.

\(^3\) Ibid., 417a-427b.

\(^4\) Ibid., 433a and b. See also 414b.

\(^5\) Ibid., 427b-428a.

\(^6\) Ibid., 417a. See also 427b and Ross' "sensus communis," Aristotle, pp. 138-139.
pushing, pulling, turning, etc.;\(^1\) (7) reasoning—including thinking, especially as intuition, knowing, judging, calculating, and speculating.\(^2\) It is important to recognize that this list is no complete enumeration of all the data. The attempt to harmonize the data is beyond the scope of the present study.\(^3\)

With the faculties so listed by Aristotle, the question of the unity of the soul may be resumed. The answer to this question is one of the most puzzling to Aristotle.\(^4\) He illustrates the dividing of the soul into parts by describing a plant a part of which may be cut, separated from the whole, but continue to live "though removed to a distance."\(^4\)

Aristotle promptly qualifies this description of the soul as he affirms that all the parts of the soul (except Nous) are, "in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapable of separate existence though, of course, distinguishable by definition."\(^4\) He seems to predicate unity on the concept

\(^1\)Aristotle, _De Anima_, 433a and b. \(^2\)Ibid., 429b–433b.

\(^3\)Fuller, pp. 185–198, names only three: vegetative, sensitive, and rational. Windelband, pp. 149–154, also names three: vegetative, animal, and reason. Ross, p. 129, lists five: (1) nutritive, (2) sensitive, (3) imagination, (4) movement, and (5) reason. Any attempt to harmonize the many commentators such as Zeller, Jaeger, Cassirer, and the primary sources in Aristotle is not possible here.

\(^4\) _De Anima_, 413b.
of the parts being incapable of separate existence. Each part is united to the whole but functions separately as a faculty. There are two ways of observing the functioning of the parts: (1) as separate (though not separable) functions like the eyes and ears (parts) of the body (the whole); or (2) as parts which are entireties interpenetrating the basic whole like the skeleton, nervous system, and circulatory systems (to mention a few) interpenetrating the body. Aristotle does not reject either description. Furthermore, each of the faculties produces alterations in two ways (1) by substitution of one quality for another or (2) by development from potentiality in the direction of fixity or nature. Thus the faculties of the soul are not the whole soul functioning, but are parts which function in themselves and are able to develop on their own. For Aristotle the soul’s power to achieve its destiny is a function of the soul’s faculties and not of the soul itself as a whole (as in Plato). The functions which are involved in this aspect of the soul are considered in Aristotle’s ethics. It is at this point that the doctrine of the will begins to emerge.

\(^1\)Ibid., 417b.
The Study of the Ethics of the Soul

The Search for Happiness

Ethics for Aristotle is a matter of practical thinking. But practical thinking has a goal: "Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence, it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim."¹ Practical philosophy is the science of politics, of which ethics is a branch. The purpose of practical philosophy is to find the Supreme Good:

If, therefore, among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we wish for its own sake, while we wish the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain what is fitting, like archers having a target to aim at? If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the theoretical or practical sciences it is the object.²

²Ibid., 1094b.
According to Aristotle the highest of all the goods that action can achieve to which the majority of mankind are agreed is \( \varepsilonυδαιμονία \). The proper rendering of this term as suggested by Rackham is well-being or prosperity, but the translation must be Happiness. The reason for the difference between the translation and the rendering is that Aristotle is not describing a state of feeling but a kind of activity.\(^1\)

But the idea of Good for Aristotle is not "good in itself" and the cause of all other goods.\(^2\) A transcendental good has no practical use and would apply to both the absolute and the relative as a category. At the same time there is a wide variety of possible definitions of the good. The good results in a plurality rather than a unity. Aristotle therefore proposes a new definition of the good: "Perhaps we may define it as that for the sake of which everything else is done. This applies to something different in each different art."\(^3\) Because this definition is not precise enough Aristotle offers a more comprehensive interpretation:

Now there do appear to be several ends at which our actions aim; but as we choose some of them—for instance

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\(^1\)Ibid., 1095a.

\(^2\)The Platonic view.

wealth, or flutes, and instruments, generally—as a means to something else, it is clear that not all of them are final ends; whereas the Supreme Good seems to be something final. Consequently, if there be some one thing which alone is a final end, this thing—or if there be several final ends; the one among them which is the most final—will be the Good which we are seeking. In speaking of degrees of finality, we mean that a thing pursued as an end in itself is more final than one pursued as a means to something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means to anything else is more final than things chosen both as ends in themselves and as means to that end; and accordingly a thing chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely final. Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake, and never as a means to something else; whereas honor, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes (since we should be glad to have each of them although no extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our securing it. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, etc. nor as a means to anything whatever other than itself.1

The highest good is "never a means." It is always an end. The key to the nature of the highest good is found in the principle of self-sufficiency: "Happiness, therefore, being found to be something final and self-sufficient, is the End at which all actions aim."2

The Elements of the Supreme Good And the Function of Man

The struggle between the soul and its functions as parts

1 Ibid., 1087a and b. 2 Ibid., 1097b.
of the soul is no less intense in the search for the meaning of happiness. Aristotle declares that the good of man "resides in the function of man, if he has a function."¹ A human being has a certain function which is peculiar to himself, differentiating him from all his parts and all lower forms of life. This function is called the practical life of the rational part of man, which has two divisions: (1) that which is obedient to principle and (2) that which possesses principle in the sense of exercising intelligence. Aristotle accepts this distinction between possessing the rational faculty and exercising it, and defines the function of man as "the active exercise of the soul's faculties in conformity with rational principle, or at all events not in dissociation from rational principle."²

For Aristotle happiness is the result of organizing the faculties of the soul. Happiness occurs when a good man uses his soul's faculties rightly: "The Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them."²

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., 1098a.
Aristotle is pleased that his definition agrees with the "current opinions on the subject," but he probes deeper by dividing good into three classes: (1) external goods, (2) goods of the soul, (3) goods of the body. However, in each class happiness is an activity in conformity with virtue, the results of which are "essentially pleasant." Happiness may depend on external advantages such as good birth, satisfactory children, and personal beauty, as well as wealth, friends, and political power. But the happiness which is won excels that which is divinely given or the result of fortune:

But perhaps it is quite wrong to be guided in our judgment by the chances of fortune, since true prosperity and adversity do not depend on fortune's favours, although, as we said, our life does require these in addition; but it is the active exercise of our faculties in conformity with virtue that causes happiness, and the opposite activities its opposite.

Properly functioning faculties yield a happiness which is lasting:

The happy man therefore will possess the element of stability in question, and will remain happy all his life; since he will be always or at least most often employed in doing and contemplating the things that are in conformity with virtue. And he will bear changes of fortunes most nobly, and with perfect propriety in every way, being as he is 'good in very truth' and 'four-square without reproach.'

\[1\text{Ibid., 1098b.} \quad 2\text{Ibid., 1099a.} \quad 3\text{Ibid., 1099b.}\]
\[4\text{Ibid., 1100b.}\]
Happiness endures adversity and a good man will always act nobly:

Even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience, not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul. And if, as we said, a man's life is determined by his activities, no supremely happy man can ever become miserable. For he will never do hateful or base actions, since we hold that the truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow; even as a good general makes the most effective use of the forces at his disposal, and a good shoemaker makes the finest shoe possible out of the leather supplied him, and so on with all the other crafts and professions. And this being so, the happy man can never become miserable; though it is true he will not be supremely blessed if he encounters the misfortunes of a Priam.¹

Thus happiness is "an end, something utterly and absolutely final and complete."² It is a thing "honoured and perfect."³ Furthermore, happiness based on goodness requires that man examine goodness in terms of human goods and human happiness.

In making such an examination Aristotle accepts a current teaching that the soul consists of two parts, one having no plan or principle, the other having a plan or principle.⁴ The first is divided into that which is of a vegetative

¹Ibid., 1100b-1101a. ²Ibid., 1101a. ³Ibid., 1102a. ⁴Ibid., 1102a and b.
nature and which causes nutrition and growth. It was believed most active during sleep when the soul is neither good nor bad. The other aspect of the part which has no plan (i.e. is not rational), "yet in a manner participates in the rational principle"¹ is the seat of appetite (ἐπιθυμίαν) and desire (δισθείαν). The second part is Nous.

This division of the soul corresponds to a division in the notion of virtue. The virtues matching the two parts of the soul are intellectual and moral. Examples of the intellectual virtues are wisdom and prudence; examples of moral virtues are liberality and temperance.² The concepts of praise and blame are moral, rather than intellectual, for, "when describing a man's moral character we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but gentle or temperate; but a wise man also is praised for his disposition, and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues."²

The central question concerns how a soul as divided in function achieves the goal of acquiring virtues which produce

¹Ibid., 1102b.

²Ibid., 1103a. In the translator's note to this statement Rackham says, "Throughout Aristotle's ethical works, praise and blame are the ordinary tests of virtue and vice." (Ibid., p. 69.)
happiness. The answer to this question in Aristotle embraces (1) the capacities or functions of the soul which produce virtue, (2) the meaning of voluntary and involuntary acts, and (3) the problem of responsibility.

Aristotle's conception of the functions of the soul which produce virtue involves only a brief review of intellectual virtue but an elaborate interpretation of moral virtue. The concepts related to moral virtue are habit and character, the three of which deserve examination.

The \( \varepsilon \theta \omega \varsigma \) (Habit) and \( \eta \theta \sigma \varsigma \) (Character) related to \( \varepsilon \theta \varepsilon \tau \gamma \) (Virtue)

Intellectual virtue for Aristotle is produced and increased by instruction and requires experience and time. Moral or ethical virtue \( \varepsilon \theta \varepsilon \tau \gamma \), however, is the product of habit \( \varepsilon \theta \omega \varsigma \). The virtues are not brought into human nature by nature. Nature has only the capacity to receive them and this capacity is matured by habit so that the end product of the habit of right action is a good character \( \eta \theta \sigma \varsigma \). The faculties of right action are in a potential form first. "We

exhibit their actual exercise afterward." This aspect of human nature may be compared to other faculties and especially those pertaining to the senses. Man was born, for example, with the faculties of sight and hearing. He was able to use them without first having to practice. However, becoming just is another matter. Man becomes just by doing just acts; he learns to become temperate by doing temperate acts; brave by brave acts, etc. But since his actions determine the quality of his dispositions how does he come to act rightly?

To answer this question Aristotle sets down the formula, "to act in conformity with right principle." But such a formula for conduct is too general and thus necessarily inexact. A better formula must be postulated. Aristotle attempts such a formula based on the principle that moral qualities are "so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and deficiency." Where they may be destroyed by excess and deficiency, they can be preserved by the observance of the mean. The moral life is thus based on a formal definition of virtue as a mean. This definition, for Aristotle, implies three states of the soul: (1) an emotion, (2) a capacity, or (3) a disposition.

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1 Ibid. 2 Ibid., 1103b. 3 Ibid., 1104a. 4 Ibid., 1105b.
Emotions are such things as desire, anger, fear, joy, jealousy, pity, etc., and may be characterized by those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The capacities of the state of a soul are the faculties which make it possible for a person to be capable of feeling his emotions. And the dispositions are

the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger and similarly in respect to other emotions.1

The soul becomes virtuous not by its emotions nor by its capacities to feel its emotions. The test of these "states" as creating virtue is whether praise or blame may apply to them. Aristotle avers that neither praise nor blame may apply to emotions nor the capacity to feel emotions. On the other hand, the soul becomes virtuous as choice becomes involved. These views are clearly expressed:

The virtues and vices are not emotions because we are not pronounced good or bad according to our emotions, but we are according to our virtues and vices; nor are we either praised or blamed for our emotions--a man is not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he blamed for being angry merely, but for being angry in a

1Ibid.
certain way—but we are praised or blamed for our virtues and vices. Again, we are not angry or afraid from choice, but the virtues are certain modes of choice, or at all events involve choice. Moreover, we are said to be 'moved' by the emotions, whereas in respect of the virtues and vices we are not said to be 'moved' but to be 'disposed' in a certain way.

And the same considerations also prove that the virtues and vices are not capacities; since we are not pronounced good or bad, praised or blamed, merely by reason of our capacity for emotion. Again, we possess certain capacities by nature, but we are not born good or bad by nature: of this however we spoke before.¹

The key to the problem is in the third state. Virtue is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice (προσόγνευσις) of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it.²

Τὸ μέσον (The Mean)

If virtue is the habit of observing the mean determined by prudence, the concept of the mean is of utmost importance. Observing the mean includes discovering the middle point (Τὸ μέσον) between extremes (Τὸ αὐτόν). The first rule is to avoid the extreme which is more opposed to the mean. The second rule is for the individual to examine his own nature and to note the manner in which that nature is warped

¹Ibid., 1105b-1106a. ²Ibid., 1107a.
and to drag himself away from the besetting error thus compensating for his inner distortion. The result will be that sometimes the individual will lean to the side of excess and sometimes to the side of deficiency, but even though there seems to be a wide latitude in such conduct, by so doing he will find that "this is the easiest way of hitting the mean and right course."  

The soul, thus, has a faculty whose task is to choose the mean between extremes. This faculty is so assessed by the test that it may be praised or blamed. The criterion of praise or blame, for Aristotle, raises first the question of the willingness of one's actions and second the question of responsibility.

\[ \text{\textit{\textit{E}K\textcircled{\textbold{P}}}\textcircled{\textit{O}}} \textit{\textit{\textit{O}}} \text{ (willing), \textit{\textit{\textit{A}K\textcircled{\textbold{P}}}\textcircled{\textit{O}}} \textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{O}}} \text{ (against the will), \textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{A}}}\textcircled{\textit{O}}} \textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{E}}}\textcircled{\textit{O}}} \textit{\textit{\textit{O}}} \text{ (not willing)}} \]

In the third book of the Ethics Aristotle measures the question of moral responsibility in terms of the voluntary and involuntary aspects of one's actions:

Virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference between the Voluntary here and the Involuntary; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments. 

1\textit{Ibid.}, 1109a and b. \hspace{1cm} 2\textit{Ibid.}, 1109b.
The terminology which Aristotle uses here is not very different from Plato's. However he consistently uses the term \( \varepsilon \kappa \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \) to mean voluntary and \( \dot{\omega} \kappa \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \) to mean involuntary. Accordingly, Rackham suggests that \( \dot{\omega} \kappa \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \) suggests unwilling or against the will which is what eventually Aristotle limits it to. Aristotle introduces the negative \( \dot{\omega} \kappa \varepsilon \kappa \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \) to mean not voluntary or not willing, which is used to describe acts done in ignorance of their full circumstances and consequences and thus not willed in the full sense of the word. The significant etymological considerations are pertinent. The form \( \varepsilon \kappa \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \) is based on two Greek words \( \varepsilon \kappa \) and \( \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \). \( \varepsilon \kappa \) is the preposition which can mean either "out of" or "utterly" (meaning completeness). \( \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \) is the noun form of the verb \( \epsilon \iota \mu \iota \), "to be," and as the noun is translated "substance" or "that which is one's own." Thus, literally speaking, an act is voluntary if it is "utterly that which is one's own" and \( \dot{\omega} \kappa \varepsilon \kappa \nu \sigma \iota \omicron \nu \) "involuntary" when it is "not one which is utterly that which is one's own."

Involuntary acts are those done (a) under compulsion or (b) through ignorance.\(^1\) "An act is compulsory when its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent,

\(^1\)Ibid., 1110a.
who is really passive, contributes nothing to it." Aristotle uses the illustration of a cargo jettisoned in a storm. He says that no one voluntarily throws away his property, but, in order to save his own life and the lives of his shipmates, a sane man would do so. Such acts are mixed, and are more like voluntary actions than involuntary ones, because "at the actual time when they are done they are chosen (\(\gamma\nu\rho\varepsilon\iota\nu\))." The factor determining an act's voluntariness is seen in that the end of an act varies with the occasion, so that the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' should be used with reference to the time of the action; now the actual deed in the cases in question is done voluntarily, for the origin of the movement of the parts of the body instrumental to the act lies in the agent; and when the origin of an action is in one's self, it is in one's own power to do it or not. Such acts therefore are voluntary, though perhaps involuntary apart from circumstances—for no one would choose to do any such action in and for itself. Aristotle has thus found it necessary to acknowledge the role of Plato's \(\psi\nu\nu\nu\) as self-motion but he assigns that role to part of the soul as one of its functions. However, before exploring the limits of these concepts in Plato and Aristotle, it would seem to be rewarding to continue to follow the course of Aristotle's argument.

\[\text{1Ibid., 1110a. 2} \tau\varepsilon\lambda\omicron\sigma. \text{ 3} \varepsilon\nu\chi\nu\tau\nu\iota.\]
Aristotle illustrates what he means by relating choice to praise or blame. If a person submits to pain or disgrace in order to achieve a great or noble result, he is praised. Such an instance would be a case of an intrinsically involuntary action where a given alternative as a result of a given set of circumstances is deliberately chosen, even though the origin of the choice lies in the agent. Though the actions are regarded as intrinsically involuntary, nevertheless, they are voluntary because the agent preferred the alternative.\footnote{Nicomachean Ethics, 1110b.}

Such actions are tied to the question of praise or blame:

It is absurd to blame external things, instead of blaming ourselves for falling an easy prey to their attraction, or to take the credit of our noble deeds to ourselves while putting the blame for our disgraceful ones upon the temptations of pleasure.\footnote{\textit{Oυκ Εισο improper}.}

In addition to the acts which are intrinsically involuntary, there are those done through ignorance. Aristotle says that an act done through ignorance is in every case not voluntary,\footnote{\textit{ΑΝΟΥΣ}} but it is involuntary\footnote{\textit{ΑΝΟΥΣ}} only when it causes the agent pain and regret since a man who has acted through ignorance and feels no compunction at all for what he has done cannot indeed be said to have acted voluntarily as he was not aware of his action, yet cannot be said to have acted involuntarily, as he is not sorry for it.\footnote{\textit{ΑΝΟΥΣ}}
The distinction between acts which are οὐκ ἔργον and those which are ἀργοῦ are clear. An act is not voluntary (negation) if it is not willed. It is involuntary (opposition) if the act is done against the agent's will.1 Thus, if in acting through ignorance an agent regrets the act, it is considered that he acted involuntarily. If he does not regret it, it is a non-voluntary situation and the person has acted in ignorance, whereas in the involuntary situation he has acted through ignorance. An act committed when a man is drunk or in a rage is one done in ignorance. However, if he regrets it, it is clearly done "against his will" and is therefore involuntary:

Now it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do and refrain from doing and that this error is the cause of injustice and of vice in general. But the term involuntary does not really apply to an action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice (that sort of ignorance constitutes vice)—that is to say, it is not general ignorance (because that is held to be blameworthy), but particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things affected by it; for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent.2

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1Nicomachean Ethics, 1110b.

2Ibid., 1110b-1111a.
Aristotle counts the circumstances referred to specifically as being six. They are (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thing that is affected by or is the sphere of the act, (4) the instrument, (5) the effect, and (6) the manner.\(^1\) Any one of these may be the circumstance or occasion for establishing that an act is involuntary. Of more importance is the nature of a voluntary action.

Whereas an involuntary action is one done under compulsion or through ignorance, a voluntary action is one which originates in the agent. Choice (\(\textit{prosphorēsis}\)) differs from a voluntary action which is, as has been said, more general. Choice involves reasoning and some process of thought and is therefore preceded by deliberation (\(\textit{boulēsis}\)). Choice is not opinion (\(\textit{doxa}\)), nor wish (\(\textit{doxa}\)), nor desire (\(\textit{ethneuma}\)), nor passion (\(\textit{thumos}\)).\(^2\)

Aristotle's Conception of the Will as Choosing

The will (\(\textit{ekouσia}\)) as choosing (\(\textit{prosphorēsis}\)) differs from the wider range of voluntary actions (\(\textit{ekouσia}\)) in that choice is a voluntary act which includes deliberation. At the same time, not every voluntary act is chosen.\(^3\) The difference is

\(^1\)\textit{Ibid.}, 1111a.  \(^2\)\textit{Ibid.}, 1111b-1112a.  \(^3\)\textit{Ibid.}, 1112a.
that which exists between those actions which originate in the agent and those which he chooses. Activities which cannot be affected by the agent are not deliberated upon and therefore even though they may be voluntary, they are not objects of choice.\textsuperscript{1} Deliberation is employed in matters which, though subject to rules that generally hold good are uncertain in their issue.\textsuperscript{2} For Aristotle to will an action is to be the originator or agent of it. But to choose an action includes deliberation on the possibility or means of accomplishing the contemplated action involving desire
\[\text{\(\delta\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\eta\rho\ov\)}\text{, deliberation (\(\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\))},\] selection
\[\text{\(K\rho\upsilon\epsilon\nu\epsilon\upsilon\)) = to decide) and finally "fixing our desire"\] (\[\text{\(\delta\omicron\epsilon\varphi\rho\omicron\)} = yearn for or grasp at): \text{\(\text{\(\delta\omicron\epsilon\varphi\rho\omicron\)}\) :}

It appears therefore, as has been said, that a man is the origin of his actions, and that the province of deliberation is to discover actions within one's own power to perform; and all our actions aim at ends other than themselves. It follows that we do not deliberate about ends, but about means. Nor yet do we deliberate about particular facts, for instance, Is this object a loaf? or, Is this loaf properly baked? for these are matters of direct perception. Deliberation must stop at the particular fact, or it will embark on a process ad infinitum.

The object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same, except that when a thing is chosen it has already been determined, since it is the thing already

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, 1112b.
selected as the result of our deliberation that is chosen. For a man stops inquiring how he shall act as soon as he has carried back the origin of action to himself, and to the dominant part of himself, for it is this part that chooses. This may be illustrated by the ancient constitutions represented in Homer: the kings used to proclaim to the people the measures they had chosen to adopt.

As then the object of choice is something within our power which after deliberation we desire, Choice will be a deliberate desire of things in our power; for we first deliberate, then select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our deliberation.

Let this serve as a description in outline of Choice, and of the nature of its objects, and the fact that it deals with means to ends.\(^1\)

Aristotle appears to be tying his concepts together loosely; for, on the one hand he has stated that it is the dominant part of man that chooses. This dominant part would ordinarily be taken to be reason, but on the other hand he defines choice as "deliberate desire." Deliberation refers chiefly to any act of thought or reason which is required by the circumstances involved in the choice. At the same time he has maintained that choice refers to means, but as purpose it also chooses ends other than those found in the actions themselves. Choices have to do with means whereas wishes are for ends.\(^1\) But a desire, even a deliberative desire, is not just for a means but for the end. Aristotle escapes endangering

\(^1\text{Ibid.}, \text{1113a.}\)
his consistency by pointing out that the act of choosing or willing does not accomplish the result. Choosing is aimed rather at the means and not at the end. If a man wants bread he does not will the bread. He rather wills to close the gap between himself as he is and the object of his desire by instituting the means whereby the gap may be closed.

The discussion of the nature of voluntary actions has thus led to the conclusion that in Aristotle (1) an act is voluntary or willed if it originates in a man, (2) an act is chosen if it is a voluntary act involving deliberate desire.

Aristotle's division of the soul into parts appears clearly in the discussion of the "part that chooses." Though the dominant part of man, it is not the whole of man which chooses. Like the kings in a Homeric epic poem, the function of the dominant part is to choose and then to proclaim to all the other parts the choices as made. A choice originates in the agent (as will) and after the object has been selected and the means of achieving the object has been determined, the agent fixes his desires on the achieving of the object.

It follows that just as in Homer better choices are made by better kings, so in man better choices are made by improving the faculty of choice. Therefore, in Aristotle the doctrine of soul, as divided, has been made to give birth to a
will as a part of the soul. The parts of the soul may be treated as the parts of the body. The unity of the soul, as the unity of the body, is that the parts cannot exist independently of the whole.

However, the distinction between Plato and Aristotle is crucial. It is the distinction between the soul functioning as a whole and the soul functioning by delegating its powers to its parts. The question of whether the parts are not just faculties of the whole, but interpenetrating souls cannot be answered here. All that can be said with certainty is what has been said above; namely, that the soul of man is somehow divided so that the will as choice becomes a function as part of the whole. Aristotle cannot overlook the doctrine of self-determination as basic to agency. Self-determination or agency is not the essence of Aristotle's view of the soul but merely the factor which assigns responsibility to man for his actions. As responsible, man does what he does because of his choosing which is a faculty responsible for choice.

The doctrine of the will is, for Aristotle, a presupposition of his interest in assigning praise, blame, and responsibility. In fact, as may be recalled, he had made praise and blame the distinctive test of the voluntariness of an act. Light may therefore be shed on the nature of the will when
detailed consideration is given to the question of responsibility.

Praise, Blame, and Responsibility

In order to explain what is involved in a situation of praise or blame and responsibility Aristotle shifts from his use of *Δικαστήριον* to the use of a dative of possession with *Εἴμι*. The importance of the origination of an act and its choice is not lost in the least by this different form. Instead there is thereby introduced the element of the will as that which is "within our power" and therefore "free".

He says:

If then whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation and choice, it follows that actions dealing with these means are done by choice, and voluntary. But the activities in which the virtues are exercised deal with means. Therefore, virtue also depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where we are able to say No, we are also able to say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for doing a thing when to do it is right, we are also responsible for not doing it when not to do it is wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, we are also responsible for wrongly doing it. But if it is in our power to do and to refrain from doing right and wrong, and if, as we saw, being good or bad is doing right or wrong, it consequently depends on us whether we are virtuous or vicious. ...it is true that no one is unwilling to be blessed but not true that wickedness is involuntary; or else we must contradict what we now just asserted and say that man is not the originator and begetter of his actions as he is of his children. But
if it is manifest that a man is the author of his actions, and if we are unable to trace our conduct back to any other origins than those within ourselves, then actions of which the origins are within us, themselves depend upon us, and are voluntary.¹

The value of this conclusion for Aristotle is applied to men's behavior in private life and to the practice of the lawgivers, particularly with respect to the matter of punishing those who do evil except when done under compulsion or through ignorance. Those who do noble deeds are honored and encouraged. But "Nobody tries to encourage us to do things that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntary, since it is no good our being persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or the like, because we shall feel them all the same."¹

Even when an act is done through ignorance, Aristotle wishes to establish the basis for praise or blame. He says if the cause of the ignorance is within the area of the man's ability to choose, then he is subject to punishment. Thus, for example, if a person allows himself to become intoxicated and thereby commits an evil, he is held responsible because he has had it within his power to create the conditions which caused him to perform an evil act. "If a man knowingly acts

¹Ibid., 1113b.
in a way that will result in his becoming unjust, he must be said to be voluntarily unjust."\(^1\) Aristotle wants to make man responsible for his voluntary evil acts. To do this he does not refrain from criticizing Plato: "Not only are vices of the soul voluntary but in some cases bodily defects are so as well, and we blame them accordingly."\(^1\) Aristotle points out that bodily defects, which ordinarily may be regarded as involuntary, may in fact be the results of debauchery or some other avoidable act on the part of the person and therefore blameworthy. Aristotle is adamant on this point because unless the matter of voluntariness is asserted virtue and vice become indistinguishable.

More specifically choice (\(\pi\varepsilon\nu\mu\alpha\gamma\iota\\omicron\nu\nu\varsigma\)) becomes the basis for prescribing the consequences of an act (praise or blame) and therefore the grounds for the differentiation between the moral aspects of good and evil acts. The term referring to the voluntariness of actions or the will (\(\varepsilon\kappa\omicron\omicron\nu\sigma\tau\alpha\omicron\nu\)) is the one most frequently used by Aristotle to express the basis for the causal agent (responsibility).\(^2\) On this basis and in opposition to Plato he emphasizes the fact that both vice and virtue are voluntary in exactly the same way. But

\(^1\)Ibid., 1114a.  
\(^2\)Ibid., 1114b.
voluntariness is a kind of spontaneity (self-dependence)\(^1\) in man's actions, even if not in his choice of an end; for, both our virtues and our vices are voluntary in the same manner.\(^2\)

To illustrate this aspect, it is helpful to consider specific virtues or vices such as courage or cowardice.\(^3\) He defines these virtues in terms of right action as does Plato and affirms the need for allegiance to that which principle dictates and that for the sake of what is noble, which is the end at which virtue aims.\(^4\) However, he emphasizes avoiding extremes by observing the mean, and the intrinsic value of each virtue.

Courage, as a virtue, would be the observance of a mean rationally established between two extremes. The two extremes for courage would be fear at one end and confidence at the other.\(^5\)

The fear of death is the proper test of courage and that man is courageous who "fearlessly confronts noble death."\(^4\) When we fear what we ought not to fear or in the wrong manner

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\(^1\) Translated spontaneity by Rackham. It tends to refer to the origin of the act in the agent.

\(^2\) *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1114b.

\(^3\) Ibid., 1115b-1119b.

\(^4\) Ibid., 1115b.

\(^5\) Ibid., 1115a.
or at the wrong time, we err.\textsuperscript{1} When we fear the right things, for the right purposes and in the right way at the right time we exhibit courage. The determinants pertain to ends and establish merit. In fact "every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition of which it is the manifestation."\textsuperscript{1}

The excesses, in the extremes of courage, are rashness and cowardice. The rash man is the one who exceeds in confidence making a bold show but in reality not enduring terrors.\textsuperscript{1} The coward is the despondent person who has excessive fear to the extent of fearing everything.\textsuperscript{2} But there is still more to courage.

Courage in its truest sense is a mean as described. However, in practice there is, first, political courage—the wish for honor and the shunning of disgrace. Secondly, there is the Socratic view of courage as knowledge of what is formidable and what is not. Such courage is based on the advantages of experience as in professional soldiers who will fight only if they have the advantage. Thirdly, there is the courage which is spurred on by anger, wrath, or spirit. It is like the wild beast who though wounded rushes against the hunters.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 1115b. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 1116a. \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., 1117a.
When this kind of courage is reinforced by deliberate choice and purpose, it may become true courage.\textsuperscript{1} Fourthly, there is the courage of sanguinity. Somewhat like the courage of knowledge or experience, the courage of the sanguine is confident or has a fixed disposition of success and because of a long history of victory is not surprised by danger but is calmly calculative in the face of sudden peril. Finally, there is the courage of ignorance in which the individual appears courageous but only because he is unaware of any dangers which may be encountered.

The virtue of courage, therefore, excellently illustrates the principle that "every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition of which it is a manifestation."\textsuperscript{2} A careful examination of the virtue of courage also reveals its voluntariness: It is an act of an agent. But the habits and character of the agent will determine the way in which the virtue is expressed.

Courage also exemplifies the principle that sometimes a course of action chosen "against one's will" may illustrate a high degree of moral goodness. The choice is made in response to the higher of two principles.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 1117a. \quad \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 1115b.
This may be illustrated when being courageous is not pleasant but may in fact be the occasion for pain. In such a case, courage is a virtue not because it is essentially pleasant but because of the quality of achievement. In fact, the pleasure may be only that of attaining the end and not of enjoying the experiences required to achieve the end. Thus a boxer endures the pain of the blows, but takes great pleasure in the victory. In such a situation courage is justly praised as virtuous. When a man is courageous in the face of pain he is so against his will, but for the sake of doing what is noble and avoiding what is base he endures the pain to achieve excellence. To perform such actions is a matter of moral goodness and therefore is an act of choice: the will deliberately desiring or preferring one course of action as right over against another as wrong.

Zeller points out that for Aristotle moral responsibility is the test of the voluntariness of a man's action. In turn, the voluntariness becomes "the distinguishing mark of the practical as opposed to the theoretic life."¹ Zeller disregards the distinction between willing and choosing, but rightly joins the moral and theoretical aspects of the soul.

¹Zeller, II, p. 159.
in the will: "The ultimate source of moral action is the rational desire or will, and the most essential property of will is the freedom with which it decides between sensual and rational impulses."¹ When freedom so disposed has become second nature by habit or custom, (ἀδύναμος), morality is perfected.²

Taylor also ignores the distinction between willing and choosing and points out the same important elements of moral action as does Zeller. "Will is a process which has both an intellectual and an appetitive element. The appetitive element is our wish for some result. The intellectual factor is the calculation of the steps by which that result may be obtained."³ For Taylor, however, responsibility does not arise from the mere fact that there is freedom to choose between alternatives, but from the fact of choice as agency and therefore causal.

Will may thus be defined as the deliberate appetition of something within our power, and the very definition shows that our choice is an efficient cause of the acts we choose to do. This is why we rightly regard men as responsible or answerable for their acts of choice, good and bad alike.³

¹Ibid., p. 160.
²Ibid., See John Wild, Realistic Philosophy, Chaps. II & III.
³Taylor, Aristotle, p. 96.
The distinction made by Taylor is significant in order to understand Aristotle's view. Responsibility is not determined or based on the power of choice as free. Responsibility is based on the acts of choice as causal.¹

Moral responsibility defined on the basis of acts "in one's power" leads Ross to observe Aristotle's opposition to Socrates (and Plato):

Virtuous actions being not only voluntary but in accordance with choice, it follows that virtue and vice are in our own power. Socrates' saying, 'No man is willingly bad,' is untrue unless we are prepared to say that man is not the source and begetter of actions.²

But just as virtuous actions (though voluntary) are determined by habits and character, so also is vice. Vice may become second nature, though originally a matter of moral choice. "It was in the power of the vicious man not to become vicious; but it does not follow that he can now cease to be so."²

The doctrine of responsibility has therefore demonstrated that the voluntariness or will (EKOUΣIOV) of an action is equivalent in Aristotle to that which is the source, origination, or begetting agency of the action. That such a will or act of voluntariness points merely to the agency and

¹See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113b.
²Ross, p. 196.
therefore includes acts which are not free cannot be disputed since \( \varepsilon \rho \nu \varepsilon \varphi \omicron \lambda \omicron \varphi \omicron \) applies to those situations which are not free (such as in children and animals). But responsibility for action, in Aristotle, leaves room for the principle that the choice is free (the ability to say yes or no to an action, to accept or reject a mode of behavior, to accept or reject possible alternatives).

Ross points out that Aristotle's doctrine of responsibility as meaning "actions within our power" in the sense of the opposite of "impossible to us" is the nearest he comes to a doctrine of free will.\(^1\) It has been clearly shown that the use of the dative of possession with \( \chi \rho \mu \omicron \) expresses for Aristotle the concept of responsibility as meaning "actions belonging to us as agents." To reduce the meaning of this concept to one of responsibility for what is possible is at this point a distortion of Aristotle. However, Ross' evaluation of Aristotle's doctrine of free will (excepting the above qualification) cannot be treated lightly.

The following points are important in Ross' appraisal of Aristotle's doctrine of free will:

1. The doing of a particular act follows necessarily

\(^1\) *Tbid.*, p. 194.
from the apprehension of the appropriate premises.\footnote{1} This point is illustrated by Ross in the statement, "If everything that is sweet ought to be tasted, and this particular object is sweet, a man who can taste it and is not prevented must forthwith do so."\footnote{1} This proposition is not too far removed from Plato's view that ethical principles and actions must be consistent. Plato, however, applied his view to his perfectionist doctrine of knowledge as virtue.

(2) Character, once established cannot be changed at will. It is based on the notion of virtue founded on habit and character.\footnote{1}

(3) Voluntariness is distinguished from freedom of the will.\footnote{1} Freedom of the will is choice. Voluntariness is agency.

Ross, however, discredits Aristotle's doctrine of free will in saying that Aristotle merely "shared the plain man's belief in free will but he did not examine the problem very thoroughly."\footnote{1} It is in keeping with Ross's evaluation of Aristotle, therefore, to point out that the doctrine of responsibility caused Aristotle to posit the plain man's belief in free will in order that praise and blame could be assigned.

A. E. Taylor suggests a more plausible explanation for

\footnote{1}Rbid.
Aristotle's conception of the will. Taylor proposes that Aristotle's view is based more on the doctrine of goodness than on the need to assess responsibility. He declares that Aristotle is led to consider the relation of will to conduct because the reference to will or choice was introduced into the definition of goodness of character. Thus Aristotle's main object is to escape the paradoxical doctrine which superficial students might derive from the works of Plato, that wrongdoing is always well-meaning ignorance. Aristotle's point is that it is the condition of will revealed by men's act which is the real object of our approval or blame. This is because in voluntary action the man himself is the efficient cause of his act. Hence the law recognizes only two grounds on which a man may plead that he is not answerable for what he does. (1) Actual physical compulsion by force majeure. (2) Ignorance, not due to the man's own previous negligence, of some circumstances material to the issue.¹

Taylor has thus made the interesting point that Aristotle's view of the will is that man as agent is responsible for the condition of his will as revealed by his actions. According to Taylor, therefore, the wrong act would be proof of a wrong choice made on the wrong grounds.

Responsibility for an action stems from the agent as cause. Praise (approval) or blame (disapproval) is based on whether the action is right or wrong and therefore not on the

¹Taylor, Aristotle, p. 96.
mere fact that the choice was free. Thus two ideas emerge:

(1) Voluntariness for Aristotle means a will or agency and a will or agency which can do or refrain from doing right or wrong is free. Thus responsibility means that the agent as the cause of his acts is answerable for them. (2) When the agent acts to do right, he may be approved and praised as virtuous; when the agent acts to do wrong he may be disapproved and blamed as wicked. But the conditions of the agent which result in right or wrong actions when he knows good and evil and is free to choose between them are the basic factors in moral behavior and therefore subject to praise or blame.

Thus in order to distinguish between right and wrong action, it is presupposed that the agent exercises the power of moral choice. The problem of moral choice is the problem of the will as free. The problem involves what determines right action when the will is free. This leads to the problem of voluntariness as the problem of the will as cause or agent. In order to bring the meaning of the will into clearer forms, the development of the doctrine of the will in these two senses warrants attention.

The Problem of Free Will and the Problem of Causality

In the sixth book of the Ethics Aristotle discusses the
intellectual virtues and the right principle which determines the mean for moral virtue, and makes the central point which excellently indicates his position both with regard to causality and also with reference to the function of the will and the meaning of moral action. In the area of free will or moral desire is found that function of the soul which Aristotle has referred to as deliberate desire. Zeller directs attention to the developments which take place when desire becomes deliberate. If desire springs from rational reflection, it is practical or deliberative reason. If the desire is irrational, it retains its name as desire. "Desire which is guided by reason Aristotle, with Plato, calls Will in the narrower sense of the word, appropriating the name desire to its irrational exercise." Desire in this latter sense stands in a twofold relation to reason. When it submits to it, it obtains a share in it. However, when it resists the demands of reason, it often overpowers those demands.

Between these two kinds of impulse stands man with his free will; for that we are the authors of our own actions, and that it lies in our own power to be good or bad, is Aristotle's firm conviction, which he supports by the recognized voluntariness of virtue, and by the moral responsibility which is presupposed in legislation and in judgment universally passed in rewards and punishments, praise and blame, exhortation and warning.

1Zeller, pp. 112-113.  2Ibid., pp. 113-114.
3Ibid., pp. 114-116.
The free will described by Zeller is the freedom of the soul as a whole, as the agent responsible for his actions. At the same time, Aristotle seems to say that the faculties of the soul also are free. Desire and Intellect are so conceived. Aristotle says, "Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of Desire correspond to affirmation and desire in the sphere of the Intellect."\(^1\)

Given the freedom of the faculties, Aristotle grapples with the problem of determining the procedure for making choices which result in right actions:

Inasmuch as moral virtue is a disposition of the mind in regard to choice, and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, both the principle must be true and the desire right, and that desire must pursue the same things as principle affirms.\(^1\)

To discover such a procedure, Aristotle proposes a definition of the practical reason as "the attainment of truth corresponding to right desire."\(^1\) The practical reason is the faculty which functions in the area of moral choice (free will). Aristotle abandons the earlier notion that moral choice concerns only means. Choice is also called deliberate desire and desireful deliberation and man is the union of desire and deliberation. In the proper exercise of these faculties (reason and desire) man will succeed in doing right and this is

the function of the practical reason. Aristotle states the whole situation in the following pithy statement:

Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice (τροφοδοσίας) and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end. Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect or thought and a certain disposition of character...

Thought by itself moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action. This indeed is the moving cause of productive activity also, since he who makes something always has some further end in view: the act of making is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and belongs to something else. Whereas a thing done is an end in itself: since doing well (welfare) is the End, and it is at this that desire aims. Hence Choice may be called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect.

(Choice is not concerned with anything that has happened already; for example, no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for neither does one deliberate about what has happened in the past, but about what still lies in the future and may happen or not; what has happened cannot be made not to happen...)

The attainment of truth is then the function of both the intellectual parts of the soul; therefore their respective virtues are those dispositions which will best qualify them to attain truth.¹

Choice works to achieve ends such as right action, future goals, and truth. Free will, moral choice, choice, and free choice are all identical notions consisting of deliberate desire (or desireful deliberation). How to put these notions together either as separate faculties or as functions

¹Ibid., 1139a and b.
of the soul is not an easy task. Zeller made a determined effort to achieve such a goal but failed. His failure is in part due to the fact that he reduces the problem to a search for the seat of the will. He says,

Will cannot belong to Reason as such, for Reason taken in itself is not practical but theoretical. Even practical thought is sometimes regarded by Aristotle as a function of a different faculty from theoretic. Movement and action, in fact, come from desire, which in turn is excited by imagination. Desire, again, can cause movement, but not rational movement, for it belongs to animals as well as man, whereas the Will belongs to man alone. Both Reason and Desire must therefore enter into Will as constituent parts. But in which of these two the essence of the Will or the power of free self-determination resides it is hard to say. On the one hand the power of controlling desire is attributed to Reason, which is defined as the motive force, or more accurately the source from which the resolutions of Will proceed, and immorality is treated as a perversity of Reason.\(^1\)

Zeller is further frustrated to observe that for Aristotle, because reason initiates no movement and is perfect and infallible, it cannot be the seat of the will to which belongs the doing of good and evil. Zeller is unable to locate where, for Aristotle, the will resides.\(^2\)

On the other hand, the problem is further complicated because Reason cannot be implicated in the life of the body, nor can error nor immorality be attributed to reason.

\(^{1}\)Zeller, II, 126, 127. \(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 128.
Furthermore, only what is good in our actions can be deduced from reason, while what is immoral and evil is attributed to the lower faculties of the soul. This disjunction leaves Zeller to say that Aristotle breaks up human nature into two parts "between which no living bond of connection can be discovered."¹

Blinded by his frustration, Zeller upbraids Aristotle for failing to go deeply into the question of self-consciousness and to ask what constitutes the permanent self. This proves to Zeller "more clearly than anything else how imperfectly he [Aristotle] grasped the problem of the unity of the personal life."² In a footnote Zeller adds, "It is difficult, therefore, to say what Aristotle regarded as the seat of the freedom of the will."²

Although the answer to the problem of free will may be found by viewing the free will or choice as deliberate desire achieving ends the question of causality is yet to be answered. The will as cause or agent concerns the problem of the agency producing motion or change from what is to what is to be.

There is no question that what is closest to perfection in the soul, on Aristotle's view, is the intellectual aspect:

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 129.
Nous (mind or thought), the part of the soul which knows or thinks. He describes it in detail:

The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.1

Mind can have no nature of its own except that of having capacity. It is pure from all admixture. Aristotle means by mind that "whereby the soul thinks and judges." Until it thinks, it is not actually any real thing. Furthermore, a unique aspect of the mind is that the mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are. For (a) in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical... (b) in the case of those which contain matter, each of the objects of thought is only potentially present. It follows that while they will not have mind in them (for mind is a potentiality of them only in so far as they are capable of being disengaged from matter) mind may yet be thinkable.2

There are two kinds of reason, active and passive. Aristotle distinguishes between them in that mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors.2

The passive reason, therefore, is that which apprehends its

1 Aristotle, De Anima, 429a. 2 Ibid., 430a.
objects by becoming identical with them. The active reason leads the passive reason to become its objects by apprehending them. The passive reason is affected by the circumstances of life and perishes with the individual. However, the active reason is immortal and eternal since it does not take upon itself any impression from its present conditions.\(^1\)

If the active reason is the originative source and if the passive reason has the role simply of receiving the effects of the agency of the active reason, then agency and self-determination must somehow be related to the active reason rather than the passive reason, a suggestion which was originally seen in relating the act of choice to deliberative desire. But even more significant is the role of the practical reason or mind.

The practical 'reason' is differentiated from the contemplative by having the very principle of moral freedom (choice) as its distinguishing characteristic. This occurs when desire is added to reason:

To perceive then is like bare asserting or knowing; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a quasi-affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object. To feel pleasure or pain is to act with a sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such. Both

\(^1\)Ibid.
avoidance and appetite when actual are identical with this; the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different, either from one another or from the faculty of sense-perception, but their being is different.\footnote{Ibid., 43la.}

Aristotle has thus assigned the faculty of choice within the soul to the practical reason. In fact, practical reason is moral choice. He has suggested that the soul is able to make both an affirmation or negation, to pursue or avoid its object as determined by the pleasure or pain involved. There may be a question in making too much of this concept, in the light of the fact that Aristotle is not too desirous of giving over to the nature of the rational soul any ability to move toward or away from objects. The concept is further complicated when Aristotle suggests that the activity of what has been perfected indicates that the latter is a kind of activity which is different from movement.

As was pointed out earlier, if appetite or desire (the part of the soul lacking principle) is the cause of movement in the Aristotelian system, it is seen to function in combination with practical thought or reason. The practical reason calculates means to an end (imagination).\footnote{Ibid., 433a.} The rationality or goodness of mind (theoretical reason) is always right,
whereas appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. On the other hand, there is that desire which moves toward the good as a wish or rational desire or appetite. That which moves toward apparent good is passion or irrational desire. An irrational desire is one which is influenced by what is just at hand as over against what is a future good or pleasure. In this way Aristotle describes the conditions of the soul which lead to right action. He is describing the function of the practical reason.

The soul functioning rationally becomes practical when it accepts or rejects an object because of the pleasure or pain involved. That the rational mind is capable of setting the good before an individual is apparent. When man’s appetite moves him toward the good, it is rational: a thoughtful desire at work. The appetitive faculty and the rational faculty, together, move the soul to the good. The rational faculty alone (Nous) posits the end or the good which is always right. The appetitive faculty alone is blind and without reason and leads the soul toward the objects which move it more powerfully. When reason and appetite are joined, they together attempt to close the gap between the good as seen by

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1 Ibid., 433b.
reason and the objects irrationally sought after by blind appetite. At this state the rational appetite (or appetitive reason, as these conjoined faculties may be called) becomes the activity of the practical reason whose function it is to choose the means of closing the gap between the goal seen by reason and the state created by desire. The gap is closed in the process of choosing (as deliberative desire) which is Aristotle's name, as was previously seen, for the practical reason which is a free will.

Thus free will or choice is found for Aristotle as the function of the practical reason (which is the name of the faculties of reason and appetite or desire conjoined).

Free will in the sense of moral choices, of accepting or rejecting the right or wrong, is what the soul does, not in the area of its prime substance, but in the middle area between the highest faculties of the soul seen as mind (theoretical reason), and the lower faculties of the soul, the realm of appetite. And just as the finding of happiness is the finding of the mean between extremes, so the faculty which functions to bring happiness to man turns out to be the "middle faculty" of moral choice (free will) located between theoretical reason and desire.
In spite of the fact that Ross points out that Aristotle did not examine the problem of free will very thoroughly, in a preliminary way it is important to note with Demos that Aristotle has defined choice exactly in the same way in which Plato did, namely, as a function of knowledge and appetite.¹

Voegelin, however, describes the period of transition from the earlier philosophers culminating with Plato to the later period beginning with Aristotle as "an intellectual thinning-out."² He points to the Platonic conceptions as the high points and contrasts them with the Aristotelian conceptions as the intellectual thinning-out of Greek philosophy. Thus, for example, Plato's view of the soul as a whole immortal is thinned out in Aristotle so that only part of it, the active intellect, is immortal. Everything else perishes. Voegelin describes the development of the Aristotelian philosophy from Plato as a restrained derailment of the structure of philosophy.³ This restraint he attributes entirely to

¹Demos, p. 335.
³Ibid., 277.
Aristotle's genius, for in the subsequent period (after Aristotle) the derailment becomes almost complete.

In spite of this version of Aristotle's endeavors, Aristotle has given moral goodness status in his doctrine of a free will. Whereas, in Plato, the good in man comes from θυμός, and evil from what is not θυμός, i.e., his body or from some evil or demonic soul which is operating in the world, in Aristotle good and evil are determined in man's moral nature as a result of his act of choice. This is the area where he is able to act or refrain from acting. If a man has done a good thing, his action in doing it imparts its moral quality to the achievement as an act of virtue. In order for an act to be morally good, a man must choose or will the means to achieve the end. Moral goodness is the result of a deliberate desire to achieve a particular goal or result by the choice of the appropriate means. Unless goodness is so achieved, it cannot be praised nor blamed, approved nor disapproved.

A. E. Taylor points out that Aristotle is not correcting a weakness in Plato. Aristotle retains Plato's view that a voluntary action in man means that he is the "efficient cause of his act."¹ Ross points out that where the cause of an

¹Taylor, Aristotle, p. 96.
action is in the agent himself, such an action is termed voluntary, and for it a man is praised or blamed. Ethical virtue is thus not based on the knowledge of moral laws as Socrates may be understood to have affirmed the moral situation, but rather on the application of means to implement those laws as the function of a free will in order to achieve a good result.

Freedom of the will in this sense is arbitrarily presupposed and is validated by the fact that virtue as voluntary is approved and men are universally held responsible for their actions. Although the ideal of the good differs in Plato and Aristotle, the fact that virtue is based on education is something upon which both Plato and Aristotle are in complete agreement. The distinguishing characteristic in this situation is very well expressed by Annie E. F. MacGregor when she says,

1Ross, p. 193.


3Ibid., p. 206.

The Socratic formula 'Virtue is knowledge' is found to be an inadequate explanation of the moral life of man. Knowledge of what is right is not coincident with doing it, for man, while knowing the right course, is found deliberately choosing the wrong one. Desire tends to run counter to the dictates of reason; and the will, i.e. the whole personality, qua selective and active, perplexed by the difficulty of reconciling two such opposite demands, tends to choose the easier course and to follow the inclination rather than to endure the pain of refusing desire in obedience to the voice of reason. Hence more intellectual instruction is not sufficient to ensure right doing. There arises the further need for 'chastisement,' or the straightening of the crooked will, in order to ensure its co-operation with reason in assenting to what she affirms to be right, and its refusal to give preference to desire or the irrational element in man's nature, when such desire runs counter to the rational principle.¹

This is the doctrine clearly developed by Aristotle.

The emphasis which Aristotle places on making a habit of virtue is rashly interpreted by G. E. Moore² as meaning that to maintain that a virtue which includes no more than habit or instinct is good in itself. Moore calls such an idea a gross absurdity of which the ethics of Aristotle is guilty, and comments that the idea that an action must be done for the sake of the good is often allowed to drop out of sight. It seems, however, more in keeping with the


Aristotelian spirit to agree with G. M. A. Grube when he says that "to Socrates and Plato, as to Aristotle, the activities of the soul culminated in the intellect as its highest function."¹

The significance of Aristotle's thought may be outlined in terms of the important points already considered. Such an outline may serve not only as a summary of the important factors in Aristotle's thought seen in the light of his basic conclusions, but also as a preparation for Augustine who built his doctrine of free will more on the Aristotelian foundation of the soul's faculties than on Plato's ἀγαθός.

(1) The doctrine of the Will.--Whereas in Plato the doctrine of the will is a motion (though presupposed) involving the functioning of the soul as a whole, in Aristotle the doctrine is clearly described as a fundamental aspect of his philosophical system. The aspect of soul which he defines as will is the agency of the soul. When an act is done it is seen as the act of a specific individual, such an act is said to be an act of "his will." This is what is meant by an act's voluntariness.

A free will is defined as the faculty which unites reason and desire. When reason and desire function together the united function is also called practical reason, choice, free choice, moral choice, and moral action as well as deliberate desire (or appetite), rational desire (or appetite), desireful deliberation, and moral intellect. An agent exercising free will does right when he uses reason and desirefully seeks the goal pointed to by reason.

A good man is one whose desires are made reasonable. A bad man is one whose desires ignore reason. The practical reason (free will) arbitrates between rational and irrational desire. The practical reason as the union of desire and intellect in a well functioning harmony is assigned the function of moral choice resulting in right action.

Reason knows the truth; practical reason achieves it by calling upon desire to help. Practical reason in adding desire to reason is moral choice.

(2) Responsibility.—Responsibility for Aristotle is the test of the voluntariness of an action. A man is responsible for an act because he is the agent, the originator of it.

(3) Approval and disapproval.—Testing an act in order to assign praise or blame indicates for Aristotle the state of the individual who has used free will or choice. Praise
may be accompanied by rewards; blame, by punishment.

(4) Exemptions from moral affections.—Compulsion exempts the agent from liability. Ignorance also absolves the agent from moral consequence provided the conditions creating the ignorance were not chosen (for example, drunkenness).

(5) The doctrine of the soul.—In Plato, the soul, as the agent, was responsible for doing right. Aristotle adds that the soul is also responsible for doing wrong. At the same time in both Plato and Aristotle man is appraised for what he does and not for the fact that he could have done otherwise. The unity of the soul in Plato means that the soul as a whole performs all its functions. In Aristotle the unity of the soul has three distinct meanings: In opposition to Plato's doctrine of self-determination the unity means (a) an unmoved mover. As distinguished from the soul functioning as a whole in Plato, the unity of the soul in Aristotle means (b) a soul composed of faculties whose functions are inseparable from it. They cannot function while detached from the whole (except for Nous). Whereas in Plato the soul is imprisoned in the body and the cause of the body, in Aristotle the soul's unity is (c) the form of the body. As an unmoved mover, the soul does not move the body. In
fact the situation is reversed. Motion is the actualizing of the body in the direction of reason. The soul is a unity as the form of the body.

The faculties of the soul are parts of the soul (although, at times, Aristotle refers to each faculty as though it were a separate soul such as vegetative soul, appetitive soul, rational soul). Each faculty is not the functioning of the soul as a whole. It is a separate function (like the functions of the parts of the body). Man functions to harmonize the faculties in accordance with the rational principle. But this is the function of the practical reason (choice). Thus Aristotle says that choice is what a man is. In the ordering of the faculties, man moves from matter to form, from body to soul (Nous), from the minimal soul to the maximal soul. The practical reason is man moving from the lowest functions (of the body), as the cause of motion, to the highest functions (Nous).

The achieving of the highest state (Nous) is the action of the practical reason. The result is ἀρετή--Happiness.

(6) Knowledge and virtue.--In Plato knowledge of the good and virtue are one and the same. In Aristotle, however, right action presupposes knowledge of the good, but knowledge of the good does not necessitate right action. A man who does right cannot do so without knowing the good. But the man who
knows the good does not necessarily do it. Right action (virtue) follows from many conditions (besides knowledge), all of which are included, for Aristotle, in the concepts of character and habit. However, if compulsion and ignorance are the only grounds for exempting a man from liability for his actions, then, it follows that freedom and knowledge must be the key powers determining man's actions. Therefore practical and theoretical reason are not only the grounds for assigning liability for failure, but they are the grounds for achieving success. When the practical reason orders the faculties in keeping with the rational principle each virtue is found to have intrinsic value. Whereas in Plato the Supreme Good is the only real good, in Aristotle all goods intrinsically have their place in the well-ordered soul. Thus self-realization for Plato means the achievement of the ultimate good as perfection including separation from the body. In Aristotle self-realization means the ordering of the soul by the practical reason with each faculty doing its best.

Conclusion

It has been observed that the fulfilling of one's destiny has been going through a series of changes. The earliest notion left human destiny to the gods. Subsequently the
doctrine emerged that man could achieve success if he understood the gods or nature. The Sophists had reduced the whole of the moral situation to solipsism. Plato and Socrates attempted to focus moral actions on goals which could be determined by reason. Aristotle developed the question of fulfilling human destiny into one of determining how rationally to choose between alternatives and the resultant assessing by one's fellowmen of consequences in terms of rewards or punishments for one's actions.

Aristotle was not assigning responsibility and liability to the faculty of choice. Approval or disapproval, praise or blame was based on the quality of man's actions. A man could not choose to play Tchaikovsky's Concerto and then be blamed for making a mess of it, because choice as "deliberate desire of things in our power" precludes such an eventuality. It is for this important fact that approval (or disapproval) in Aristotle is based not on the power of choice but on the acts which result from our choices.

In Plato, self-determination meant that the individual was responsible for his own action and the reward was the doing of the good itself. In Aristotle not only is the individual responsible but the reward or punishment was meted out by one's fellowmen. Free will or practical reason,
though a specialized faculty, involved the whole person in the consequences of its functions. It was this latter doctrine more than the Platonic one that Augustine used as the foundation for his doctrine of free will.
CHAPTER IV

AUGUSTINE'S EXPOSITION OF THE WILL AND FREE CHOICE

Augustine's Background

Augustine (354-430) was born in Tagaste, a small town in Proconsular Numidia. The town is now called Souk-Ahras in eastern Algeria. His mother, Monica, was a Christian apparently from girlhood. His father, Patricius, became a Christian late in life. He was enrolled as a catechumen as an infant, and from his mother he learned in a small measure about Christianity. At the age of twelve he was sent to a grammar school at Madaura, where he became steeped in the Latin literature and only vaguely acquainted with Greek. After about four years he returned to Tagaste and spent a year which he describes as filled with sinful pursuits. He went to Carthage in order to study rhetoric and qualify for the legal profession. His education was a liberal one and included literature and philosophy. When he was twenty, he took upon himself a mistress who bore him a son, whom he named Adeodatus. Shortly thereafter he came under the influence of the Manichaean teachers and spent nine years studying
to become one. However he became seriously ill and while unconscious was baptized by Christian rite. He made fun of being baptized while unconscious, and a friend who remains anonymous rebuked him. When his friend died, Augustine was deeply grieved and to escape the scene of his bereavement he returned to Carthage in the autumn of 374. He remained there as a teacher for eight years until he was twenty-eight years old. Augustine took up the study of Manichaenism again, but, when he could not find the answer to the question, Why did God not fight with the evil principle? he started to break away from the doctrine.

In 383 Augustine decided to go to Rome, and, although his mother had planned to go with him, by means of a ruse, he managed to leave her behind to return to Tagaste while he went on to Rome. He spent a year teaching rhetoric there. In his thirtieth year he went to the city of Milan where he was a successful teacher.

Under the instruction of St. Ambrose Augustine became aware of the spiritual interpretation of Scripture, and was thus able to impart meaning to what had hitherto been incomprehensible. He was not yet prepared to embrace Christianity. In fact although his mother had proposed a suitable young woman in order for Augustine to marry and settle down, he
instead took another mistress and continued to teach rhetoric.

In 385 Augustine became strongly influenced by certain neo-Platonic works which helped him to solve the problem of evil, for the first time he became aware of a spiritual realm which he had not found in Manichaeistic materialism. After becoming acquainted with the lives of several Christians, and after studying the Bible, he soon became converted.

Augustine was baptized by St. Ambrose on the night before Easter, April 25, 387 along with his son and his friend Alypius. Augustine decided to return to Africa and become a lay monk in Tagaste. But because his mother died while he was preparing to go to Africa, he decided to go to Rome where he composed his treatise De Libero Arbitrio, along with two other shorter works on The Quantity of the Soul and Morals of the Catholic Church and the Manichaeans.

In 388 Augustine returned to Carthage and then to Tagaste to become a semi-monastic, practicing a moderate asceticism. He wrote several treatises, and in 391 was invited to visit Hippo to discuss the possibility of entering a monastery there. The church was not strong but was led by a bishop named Valerius. When Augustine visited the town, Valerius ordained him at once. Augustine assumed his priestly duties with many questions on his mind, but he was a successful preacher.
The monastery became a theological seminary. Augustine continued to write extensively, especially against the Manichaean doctrines. For this and his preaching he became quite famous, and when Valerius died Augustine became bishop in his own right in 396. His work was marked by enormous scholarship and effort. He completed the Confessions about the year 400 and continued to write many letters and important treatises during the remainder of his life. He entered into a series of debates against the Donatists and sought political assistance in subjecting them to laws which were enacted against heretics. His attack on Manichaeism was at the same time an attack on Pelagianism. In both instances free will was involved. The Manichaeans denied free will. The Pelagians affirmed it ascribing to it the power whereby a man could achieve his salvation.

During the closing years of his life, Augustine spent almost all of his time defending and expounding Christian doctrine. He saw in the Roman Catholic faith the pure expression of religion. On the other hand, his affirmation of the grace of God as the only means whereby man can achieve his salvation was much later to become an important principle
in the Protestant Reformation.¹

But in expounding Christian doctrine, Augustine viewed the problems of philosophy and theology in terms of his own experience. He saw himself chained to his flesh and his mistresses.² Becoming freed from such bondage was one aspect of his problem. But how to account for his bondage in the first place seemed even more difficult to answer. That the Divine Nature was incorruptible was unquestionable. To discover how man came to bondage could only be ascertained by considering man's free will in all its aspects. The importance of free will to his thought is observed in the fact that he continually returned to it throughout his writings. The first question, therefore, would seem to be, what was Augustine's interpretation of free will? To answer this question the nature of will must be determined.


Augustine's Definition of Will

Although Augustine deals with the nature of the will in a number of his writings his work, *De Libero Arbitrio* is basic. However, it was written to answer the Manichaean objection to Christianity that "since the presence of evil is undeniable, it is inconceivable that God can be both almighty and infinitely good." Or, more precisely, he says, if God is the source of all that exists, how can one avoid making Him responsible for evil? Pelagius protested against doctrines which looked to original sin or predestined grace to account for evil. Pelagius affirmed that grace is nothing else than the free will which man has received from God. Pelagius denied that grace predestines man to be a child of God, and that children are involved in original sin.

Augustine does not write in order to analyze the psychological circumstances in which choice is exercised. He is deeply concerned with the problem of evil, and by discussing the will, he attempts to shed light on concepts which will help to answer the problem of evil.

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2Ibid., p. 5. 3Ibid., p. 8. 4Ibid., p. 13.
Augustine's discourse on will does not offer a clear statement, as such, which defines what he means by a will. The term arbitrium is derived from ad plus bito (eo) which means literally "one who goes to." Its basic meaning therefore is "a being near" or "a being present." This is refined to mean "the judgment or decision of an arbitrator" and in some instances means merely "judgment," "opinion," or "decision." With further refinement it came to mean "mastery," "dominion," "authority," "power," "will," or even "free will." By relying on the verb, "arbitror," meaning "to make a decision," "arbitrium" may with latitude be rendered as "choice." Thus De Libero Arbitrio may properly be rendered On Free Choice or more precisely, On Free Decision. To remove the problem confronted at the outset Sparrow entitles his translation of Augustine's treatise, De Libero Arbitrio Voluntatis, and translates it On Freedom of the Will. However in the text itself there appears, "Id facimus ex libero voluntatis arbitrio" (we do it [wrong] from free choice of the will). The use of


Voluntas for "will" and with liber for even "free will" is so frequent in Augustine\(^1\) as to suggest that Sparrow's inclusion of the term in the title in preference to the arbitrium alone is wholly justified. Voluntas, volo, nolo, are all used and have as their basic meaning the ideas of wishing, willing, liking, asserting, and preferring (to mention a few). Volo corresponds to the Greek \(\beta\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\delta\omicron\upsilon\) and carries the same meanings. Since the terms used by Augustine merely provide him with working tools, it was incumbent upon him to define his terms. Although he did not specifically do this with Voluntas nor arbitrium, what he had in mind may be inferred with some accuracy.

He says that "it cannot be denied that we have a will."\(^2\) But his definition of the will must be deduced from what he says about a good will. A good will is one which seeks to "live uprightly and honorably and to attain a supreme wisdom."\(^2\) A good will means one "seeking earnestly" and "wishing" the good. To have a good will means to "earn and live"\(^3\) a good and happy life. Significantly, an evil will means to earn

\(^1\)Ibid., XXXII, 1267.

\(^2\)Augustine, "On Freedom of the Will," i, 12.

\(^3\)Ibid., i, 13.
and live a base and wretched life. The will, therefore, for Augustine, means a kind of ambitiousness in a man whereby he wishes, desires, wants, seeks, earns, and lives.

Now, therefore, when a person wishes or seeks the good, he thereby has a good will. The good in life becomes available to a man by his willing it. The good "needs only to be willed to be possessed."¹ When the will, therefore wills itself it is putting that faculty to work which has the eagerness and power to attain a goal. In this sense, the will is that which is in the individual's power.² Augustine presupposes that the power of the will means the will itself. For, he asks, "What is so fully in the power of the will as the will itself?"² To possess a will one needs only to will it.³

In the scale of the goods which exist as a result of God's creation, virtues are the greatest goods, bodies are the least goods.⁴ However, the powers of the soul are between the virtues and the bodies. Virtues cannot be used wrongly, whereas it is possible to use both the powers of the soul and the bodies wrongly. And just as we know reason by using reason, so also we use free will by the will. When the will cleaves to the immutable good, man gains the virtues. On the other hand, when the will is not oriented in this way, man

¹Ibid., i, 12. ²Ibid., i, 26. ³Ibid., i, 29. ⁴Ibid., ii, 46.
sins. Neither the goods that are sought by wrong-doers, nor free will itself, are evil in any way.¹

Evil is not to be found in the free will, for evil is the turning away from the immutable good and turning towards mutable goods. This turning is not compelled but is what the will does. Since all good is from God, there is no nature which is not from God, and the motion of turning away from God is sin and is a defective motion in that every defect is from nothing, and hence it cannot belong to God.² The cause of sin is not positive but negative. It is voluntary even though it is negative, because it is in our power, and if a person does not will it, it will not be.²

The fact that man is by an act of his will able to sin and that this is foreknown by God indicates that there is no conflict pertaining to the Creator as the source of good. For Augustine all this means is that the Creator knows that which must take place by the will even of sinners, and because God has created a creature who is thus free, He is to be praised.³ The movement of the will is not a necessary movement of the soul when it is moving away from God; it is rather voluntary, for the soul can stop its motion by the

¹Ibid., ii, 47-48.  ²Ibid., ii, 54.  ³Ibid., iii, 1-3.
will. "If the movement by which the will turns in different directions were not voluntary and under our control, a man would not deserve praise or blame."^{1}

Later on, Augustine will use the principle of "in our power" to mean the will's freedom, but within the present context "in our power" means agency and will as will.

The will seen as the power which wills itself^{2} and also as the power which commands itself,{^3} begins to emerge in Augustine as a faculty of the soul. The soul (anima) is a whole and wills as a whole with an "entire will."^{4} Similarly "the mind (animus) commands mind to will."^{3} The mind and will are the same. When one wills to act and has the power to act, the willing is the doing.^{5} When Augustine thus describes the functions of the soul, the relationship of the will to action is developed. For the motion of the soul is controlled by velle ("will"—also "life").

Two other aspects of the soul are esse (being—existence) and nosse (knowing).^{6} In comparing these aspects of the soul

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^{1}Ibid., iii, 31.  
^{2}Ibid., i, 12.  
^{3}Augustine, Confessions, viii, 9.  
^{4}Ibid., viii, 10.  
^{5}Ibid., viii, 8.  
with the bodily senses it is discovered that there is an "interior sense" whereby the individual appropriates what he likes and avoids and rejects what he does not. Though discerned by reason it is not reason. And although left undefined by Augustine it would seem to be velle. The faculties are apparently assumed to function as in Aristotle. The only difference seems to be that the faculties appear to be connected to the soul in the sense that they receive from the soul their fuel or power. When they run out of power, the soul takes the responsibility; for the soul was their source of energy in the first place.

It may be seen from the above presentation that the will consists of the activity of the soul having a faculty to will as a whole and points more specifically to the aspiring of the soul which moves it toward its goal. In order to refine some of the notions which Augustine has presented in a rather general way, it will be helpful to consider the doctrine of will as free.

The Description and Function of a Free Will

Augustine began his treatise on free will with the idea in mind that by positing a free will satisfactorily it will

\[1\text{Ibid.}\]
be possible to exempt God from responsibility for evil in the world. When the free will becomes the culprit for all of evil's crimes, the free will becomes, thereby, the disloyal opposition to all that God is and wills. Although both of these consequences follow from Augustine's starting place, he was more concerned with absolving God than with maligning the will. But once the sequence began, Augustine could not stop it nor did he attempt to. He did the only thing which seemed to him to be left. He compensated the will by making it the power which could become the source of perfection in man's experience. All of these aspects to the discussion may be seen throughout his works. They are more specifically discovered in the De Libero Arbitrio. Except for the first question, Augustine's description of the free will and the moral situation follows Aristotle very closely.

Augustine asks, "Is not God the cause of evil?"¹ Evil may be interpreted as in Aristotle in two ways: (1) doing evil or (2) suffering evil. Augustine chooses to discuss evil-doing. Without the slightest deviation from Aristotle, he goes on to say that evil-doing is the result of the free

¹The Problem of Free Choice, i, 1.
choice of the will. "Everyone who does wrong is the cause of his own wrong-doing."\(^1\) Whenever an evil deed is done, as explained by Aristotle it is because the mind is enslaved by desire. Responsibility is based on the idea that the free choice of the will establishes man as the author of his own evil deeds. The source of evil is not in learning; it is rather in the man's act of choosing.

Augustine, however, is interested to "avoid tracing sins back to God?"\(^2\) Tracing sins back to God would mean that God in creating souls which cause evil would be ultimately responsible for the situation unless some solution can be found. Augustine affirms God's absoluteness and therefore must exempt God by investigating the nature of evil-doing. He continues to follow Aristotle: the source of evil is libido, which may be translated as desire or passion. Thus, "Desire is the principle element in this whole matter of wrong-doing."\(^3\) In this sense libido is established as a desire for things one can lose against his will.\(^4\)

In continuing to exempt God from responsibility he affirms two kinds of law in the world. There is the man-made

\(^1\)Ibid.\(^2\) Ibid., i, 4.\(^3\) Ibid., i, 8.\(^4\) Ibid., i, 10.
law, and there is the law of divine providence or the eternal law of reason.\textsuperscript{1} Even here, Augustine is completely dependent on Aristotle. All just temporal law or law of man is derived from the eternal law, which is that by which all things are most perfectly ordered.\textsuperscript{2} Furthermore, man is distinguished from beasts in the fact that he is able to reason and use the power of intelligence. This is the power that makes him aware of the fact that he lives. Knowledge as the light of the mind derived from reason can only be good, since it is that whereby man knows that he lives.\textsuperscript{3} Man reflects the eternal law when his life is well ordered, and this is brought about by setting reason in control. He says, "When reason, or mind, or spirit controls the irrational motions of the soul, then that element is ruling in man which ought to rule in virtue of that law we have found to be external."\textsuperscript{4} This man so controlled is called wise, and by the exercise of his mind, he discovers that it has more power than desire, because it can dominate desire. So also is soul superior to body. And "there is nothing more excellent than a rational and wise mind."\textsuperscript{5}

At the same time "it is possible for the mind not to be in control."\textsuperscript{5} Libido is capable of making the mind a slave.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., i, 14-15.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., i, 16-17.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., i, 18.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., i, 20.
\end{itemize}
However, it will never do so, for "no other things...can cause a mind to consort with desire than its own will and free choice."¹

Therefore the prelude to the problem of free will is the problem of evil. The doctrine Augustine wishes most to protect is that of the absolute power of God in every direction and in every way. He is the most high and true God, supreme power and prescience.² He is omnipresent, omnipotent,³ eternal, unchangeable,⁴ as well as the supreme good and the fountain of light.⁵ Because this kind of a God cannot be the source of evil in the world, that source must be found somewhere else. But there is also the problem of God's foreknowledge which, in the minds of some (the Manichaean), rules out the possibility of attributing a free will to man. Augustine has thus to contend with the question of the existence of free will as presupposed, otherwise the whole of the structure he has built will tumble into the foundation. To establish man's responsibility either free

¹Ibid., i, 21. ²Augustine, City of God, v, 9.
³Augustine, Confessions, v, 2.
⁴Ibid., i, 3.
⁵Ibid., iv, 15.
will in man is to be affirmed and blamed or foreknowledge must be denied. The cause of evil must be either in God or in some aspect of his creation, and the only suitable candidate in creation is, of course, man (although the devil is made a party to the responsibility late in the discussion). If the responsibility can be placed on man's sinful will, the question then will be that of determining how a will which is created by God comes to arrive at a sinful state. Its freedom will make it possible for man to be blamed for evil consequences and at the same time the righteous may be rewarded.

The question of the relation of foreknowledge to free will is summarily solved by Augustine. The free will is a good created by God; for, without it man cannot achieve righteousness. Foreknowledge, Augustine warns, is not to be confused with predestination, since there is a difference between knowing that tomorrow a man will use his free will to commit a specific act and being the determining cause of his doing so. Both these principles are grounded in the religiously minded in the "faith of piety." 1

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1As suggested in De Libero Arbitrio, i, 10, and also The City of God, v, 9.

2Augustine, City of God, x, 5.
The problem of evil is to be seen entirely from man's side, since from God's side the only statements which properly apply are those in keeping with His perfection and grace. Thus a sin is an act of willing evil and in a strict sense is "not caused" but is "due to the absence of rational causation." ¹

In order to possess a good will it is only necessary to will it. However, "the defect from which a wicked man suffers is due to his own fault." ² When he thus averts the good, he receives the just punishment of his evil deeds, which is misery. ³ The achievement of the good is the summum bonum as Amor Dei. ⁴ It is ponens meum amor meus. ⁵

When Adam sinned the first time he created the state of non posse non peccare. Just as the truth makes man free, Adam's sin makes man a slave to the consequences of that


²Ibid., p. 118.

³Augustine, City of God, xxii, xxiv; see also Simpson, p. 215.

⁴Augustine, Confessions, x, 6.

original sin, which is variously defined as libido, or the will directed toward itself rather than God, and cupiditas, to mention a few.¹ At the same time, man inherits the sinful nature as well which is disobedience, pride, and separation from God.² Of course, God redeems man by extending to him his grace, whereby through his love, which man may respond to in prayer, his sinful nature is overcome, just as original sin was wiped away by Jesus Christ.³

The grace of God, therefore, tends to preserve God's absolute causality especially since his grace includes as a presupposition a difficult interpretation of a doctrine of predestination: Praeparatur Voluntas a Deo. The consequence of this proposition is inconsistently maintained in that, although he holds that some men are free only to sin from the beginning and others to do good under grace from the beginning, nevertheless, God works in men's hearts to make them willing. God, therefore, energizes the man who is in turn the source of energy for the will.

The freedom so referred to is defined in accordance with

¹Cf. Augustine, City of God, xiv, 10.
²Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, iii, 76.
³Simpson, p. 217.
two concepts which are stated as *Libertas*—the power which man's fallen nature does not possess, namely, to choose and accomplish good; and *Libertas indifferentiae*—the absolute power of choice between alternatives.

Now, when God inclines his heart toward man, his ultimate goal is to have man "surrender his will," which means that those who lose themselves shall find themselves. This is done in praise, which means that man will be silent in the presence of the highest good and with the ancient prophet will hear the voice of God say, "Be still and know that I am God."

Although the free will functions to establish responsibility in the moral scheme of things by being the power to consent to or refuse the calling of God, nevertheless, the "loss of will" (perfect freedom) is the highest state for man. For, when moral choice is exercised, the choice is between *amor Dei* and *contemptus Dei*. If man refuses to obey and love, the result is servitude (the loss of perfect freedom). When he chooses to love and obey God, the result is mastery (the achievement of perfect freedom). In one case man serves the "flesh." In the other he serves God. Freedom as obedience to the love of God is found in the principle, *Libertas enim delectat*.

These two kinds of freedom may be seen in another frame of reference. When a man has freedom under the law as Paul
so eloquently described in the New Testament, his freedom means that his actions are his very own. But when man has freedom under grace, he grows in that true freedom or liberty which is the complete love of God. Man cannot earn this gift of grace even by an act of faith. 1 It is unmerited. The will operating without merit means the will freed by the gift of God to do good work. 2 Furthermore, a will lacking merit means that a good will is not rewarded by God. 3 McCabe points out that in the works On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance Augustine was driven by Cassion to reduce the will to a mere automaton worked solely by grace. "Absolutely without regard to the merit of the individual (in the way of cooperation or rejection) God has decreed His distribution of grace on which eternal life or eternal damnation depends." 4


4 Joseph McCabe, St. Augustine and His Age (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1903), pp. 448-449.
Augustine speaks as an introspective psychologist\(^1\) when he says that sin is the perverse use of free will,\(^2\) that in relation to God man moves from woeful alienation to happy reconciliation,\(^3\) and that his own experience proves these principles because Augustine, himself, was freed from passions to love.\(^4\) Thus conversion to God or aversion to Him is rooted in the power of free will. The experience of Paul corroborates this when he asks his followers to "make not provision for the flesh in concupiscence," but "put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ." And whereas in other places Augustine has been seen as advocating a good will—a will capable of choosing what is morally good\(^5\) there is also the factor that the will, by taking pleasure in its own power, leads man to the state of massa damnationis and massa perditionis.

There is no question that Augustine's complexity and natural disregard for system as such may lead to a misunderstanding of his viewpoint. For, there are times when the will

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\(^1\)West, p. 107. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 108. \(^3\)Ibid., p. 109.


becomes the responsible cause of evil and good. Evil results from one's own sin or inherited sin. In either case the will is functioning as power either for good or evil. The human will chooses moral goodness\(^1\) with all the good that results therefrom. And when Osmun sees Augustine's weakness to be his doctrine of original sin, he observes with approval that Augustine's great service was in his stern and unyielding reprobation of all that is sin.\(^2\) He shows that for Augustine accountability is not based on the disposition with which man is born, but with which he dies.\(^2\) Born with a free will to sin, he should die in eternal glory.

A free will, therefore, for Augustine is a faculty of the soul which as master of itself is "all-power": the will moves only by will and all the other faculties depend on the will in order to function. The will gains its power from its function as will. Its energy (fuel) is received from the soul from which it can be distinguished only with difficulty (as the man is indistinguishable from free choice in Aristotle).

The free will is the power to say yes or no to every

\(^1\)Ibid.

alternative including the acceptance or rejection of divine love. In his most philosophical moments Augustine has suggested that free will is the moral choice for right living which makes possible the completing of the unfinished universe.\(^1\) In the same mood Augustine describes the situation of the soul with desire controlled by reason as the highest state. The control however is not the authority of power but the will's recognition of reason's truth.

The free will as capable of winning for man his eternal damnation is the logical consequence of the presupposition that the free will is the only fact of life capable of exempting God (as the omnipotent creator) from responsibility for the existence of evil. The will as "all-power to will itself" is the only way of explaining that the omnipotence of God may be thwarted by a free will.

Augustine, however, vacillates between affirming the free will which does evil as one which finds itself in a moral vacuum (as in Plato and elaborated by Plotinus), and the free will which does evil by asserting itself as the object of its activity (pride). The assumption of the moral vacuum and the stubborn will both have their place. The moral vacuum is presupposed to explain that evil is the effect of what God is not rather than what he is as related to causing man

\(^1\) *The Problem of Free Choice*, 32.
and his will. This principle tended to serve the same function in Plato and Plotinus. On the other hand the pride or stubbornness of the will was retained as the cause of evil in order to account for the fact that the free will was able to thwart the power of God. The will to sin was created by God as the will to love but it became the only defect in all creation because of its power to will itself as will.¹ For God to have forced necessity to obedience on man would be to destroy free will and the source of evil in the universe.

When the mind (as rational faculty) relates to desire, the mind is innocent. It is the free will or choice which sins by bargaining with desire. For the mind cannot be subdued. The mind enters into a relationship with desire through the power of the will. In so doing the will brings to man the penalty for sin, because man by his own will fell subservient to desire. "We believe that man was so perfectly formed by God and established in a life of happiness that only of his own will did he come down thence to the trouble of mortal life."²

The existence of the will is first observed in the desire

¹Augustine, The Problem of Free Choice, iii, 35.
²Ibid., i, 23.
or will to know.\textsuperscript{1} It becomes a good will when man seeks to live rightly and honorably and to attain to the highest wisdom.\textsuperscript{2} This good will is a priceless possession, and, in order to be had, it only needs to be willed. It is not "good intention" but perfect will. A man who has good will "cannot wish evil on anyone."\textsuperscript{3} For a good will is one which "wishes to live rightly and virtuously."\textsuperscript{4} That a good will is a perfect will is seen in the attainment of happiness. In order to attain a happy life men need only to will that which is ordained by eternal law as right. But "Not all men wish to live rightly, which is the only state of will that deserves a happy life."\textsuperscript{5} Because happiness is based on the fact that a person lives by the eternal law and exercises his good will to adhere to it, a good will may be seen as a perfect will. Those who live by temporal things and love them are unhappy, and they must still recognize that they are subservient to the eternal law. However, those who act on the basis of good will and serve the eternal law do not need the temporal law. The temporal law can be just and provide such things as health, human liberty, relatives, friends, the state, money, and honor.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., i, 25.  \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., i, 25-26.  \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., i, 27.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., i, 26.  \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., i, 30.
The temporal law operates through fear, and can be enforced. Thus when Augustine asserts that desire is posited as a desire for things one can lose unwillingly, he means simply that temporal things are things which can be taken away from a person against his will; whereas, the eternal values can never be taken from a person.¹

Sin as the free choice of evil means turning away from godly things toward things changeable and insecure.¹ By divine disposition and right, the soul is given power to control the godly things by its will.¹ Thus what the mind does in terms of choosing the eternal or the temporal depends only upon the will, and if a person misuses it he must be charged with its misuse.¹ This problem brings into question three other points: (1) the existence of God, (2) whether all goods come from God, and (3) is free will to be considered among goods?¹

If God had not given man a free will, man could not have sinned. But Augustine points out that if man was given a free will, it is because he ought to be given such, for "all good is from God."² Since all good is from God, and since all that is just is good, for sinners to pay the penalty and

¹Ibid., i, 35.  
²Ibid., ii, 1.
for the righteous to be rewarded is just, and, therefore, God has seen to it that sinners are wretched and the righteous are happy.1

God is good, and all that God creates is good. God created man. Man as man is good because he can live rightly when he wills. Man's free will is justified though capable of sin because without it he would be incapable of right action.2 God did not give man free will in order for him to sin. God gave man free will, because without it man could not live rightly.2 To choose good man must be free. But being free does not mean man must choose evil. Why, then does man pervert his free will.3

Would that man distort his nature who also reasons the existence of God,4 establishes the existence of immutable truth superior and more excellent than man's mind?5 Man's happiness and joy are to be found in such truth. In truth the highest good is known, and since this truth is wisdom it is to be beheld and in it is grasped the highest good.6 A man may thus use his freedom to obey the truth: "Our freedom consists in submission to the truth, and it is our God himself

1Ibid., ii, 2. 2Ibid., ii, 3. 3Ibid., ii, 4.
4Ibid., ii, 14. 5Ibid., ii, 33-34. 6Ibid., ii, 36-37.
who frees us from death." The death from which we are freed is the state of sin. This principle is found in the Gospel of John. Jesus addressing his disciples says, "If you have abided by my word, then truly you are my disciples and you will know the truth and the truth will make you free." Why would a man surrender all that just to sin?

The case for righteousness is even stronger. For no one can ever lose truth and wisdom against his will. Augustine's reasoning is indirect: "No thing can form itself, because no thing can give itself that which it has not, and assuredly a thing is formed that it may have form." But all things are governed by providence whence they derive their form from that Form which always exists, which is God. Now, free will is among the goods which have been formed by God. It is given only by the Giver of all goods and among the many goods which exist there are some that man can misuse. For example, a man can misuse his body, his hands, his feet, his eyes, and so also his free will.

The will is a free will, because it is "within our power."

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1Ibid., ii, 37.  
2John 8: 31-32.  
3Augustine, Free Choice, ii, 37.  
4Ibid., ii, 45.  
5Ibid., ii, 46.  
6Ibid., ii, 128-132.
God also foreknows all. Both these propositions are true: that we will what we will, and that God foreknows all that is future.¹ God's foreknowledge of sin does not contradict free choice in sinning. It merely means that he has a foreknowledge that someone is going to sin, but he does not compel him to sin; for God's knowledge is unlimited. He knows that certain individuals are going to sin, but when they sin, they do so through their own wills. Therefore, "God is just and has foreknowledge of all things of which he is author, but nevertheless He is not the author of all things of which he has foreknowledge."² If this were not so, he would not be in a position to punish sinners nor give rewards if foreknowledge meant foreordination.³

A person sins because he will not be master of himself. Someone stronger or weaker will get him under his power. This is another aspect demonstrating that free will determines whether a person does right or sins. Souls are unhappy because they have willed to sin. But sin and unhappiness are not necessary to the perfection of the universe, although souls are. Souls may sin if they will to.⁴ The disgrace of

¹Ibid., iii, 6-8. ²Ibid., iii, 9. ³Ibid., iii, 11. ⁴Ibid., iii, 29-32.
a sin is corrected by punishment, so that when a sinning soul is punished, it contributes to the order and perfection of the universe. Therefore, the first man brought sin into the world and the adornment of the penalty suited to sin, whereas, Christ brought the adornment of mercy to grant freedom from sin.¹

The reason man sins is that sin originates from two sources. One is one's own thinking, and the other is the persuasion of another. The worse sin is to sin of one's own volition and to persuade another than to yield to another's persuasion. In this latter respect the prince of this world who is the prince of all sinners and the one who presides over death also is the temptor who persuades men to sin.²

By striving to understand the invisible things "the Word among men" man may overcome the devil.

But the original source of man's sinning is found in the cause of man's present suffering. Men suffer as a result of the original sin of Adam and Eve. For vague and mysterious reasons a single sin is evil enough not only to establish responsibility in the free will of the agent (Adam) who did it, but the responsibility is passed on to every member of

¹Ibid., iii, 32. ²Ibid., iii, 31-32.
the human race. The sin consisted in the act of Adam and Eve (as narrated) in disobeying the express command of God: "You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree which is in the garden lest you die."¹

Not only does moral responsibility devolve from this original sin, but a punishment of such immense proportions as to stagger the whole human race.

The story itself merits comment, and the interpretation given of it by Augustine is laden with difficulties.² They may best be treated systematically as follows:

(1) The story of Adam and Eve consists of two phases;
(a) God issued a command which was clearly understood and yet not performed as commanded. Nothing is said in the story to the effect that the disobedience was a sin nor the reason for the punishment later meted out.
(b) The command pertained to the acquiring of the knowledge of good and evil, upon eating of the fruit of the tree bearing such knowledge as its fruit. Therefore, Adam and Eve did

¹Genesis 3: 3.

not know the difference between good and evil before they ate the fruit of the tree (v. 22). It is thus obvious that at the time of the issuing of the command Adam and Eve were not free as Augustine claimed. Furthermore, it was not "the will taking pleasure in its own power" by producing a false imitation of God which motivated Adam and Eve, but (1) the observation that the tree was good for food; (ii) the similar observation that the fruit was a delight to the eyes; (iii) the desire to be made wise.

The danger of extracting a careful theology or philosophy from the story is seen in the story's status as a legend based on mythological fragments. The defects in the legend become important only if the story is taken too seriously. For example, after eating the fruit, their eyes opened for the first time. Yet before eating it they saw it as "a delight to their eyes." This defect is of little or no consequence except to indicate the nature of the story which Augustine used to explain basic problems in life.

There is no way of stretching the story into a doctrine of original sin, moral responsibility or of free will. The story is a legend about disobedience.

(2) According to the account the punishment of Adam and


Eve and the whole human race follows the discovery by God of what happened. Among other things, the serpent is cursed; woman is made to suffer more intently in childbearing; and man is destined to a life of toil on cursed ground. To keep man from eating from the tree of life which would permit him to live forever, God banished him from the garden of Eden, the reason being that God wished to keep man from becoming like Him; this, in spite of the fact that God had made him in His own image to start with.

Thus Augustine proceeds from Aristotle's simple and self-contained doctrine of free will, involving responsibility and fair and just punishment for evil, and fair and just reward for good, to the doctrine of original sin. The story is not the whole foundation of Augustine's theory of the will. He rather used the story as a basis to account for a fact in human life.

That fact pertained to what Augustine regarded as a defect in the relationship of the will to the mind. Are the will to do and the power to do the same?

If the nature of the will is to will itself, Augustine asks, Why is it that when the will commands itself to will the will "obeys not?"1 When the mind commands the body, the body "obeys forthwith."1 But when the mind commands the will the results are "monstrous." The will, whose nature is to be

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1Augustine, Confessions, viii, 9.
itself, does not obey itself. "The mind commands itself, and is resisted."\(^1\) If a will is that which wills itself, then what a will wills is done, and what a will does not will is not done. But such is not the case. The mind "commands itself to will, and would not give the command unless it willed; yet is not done that which it commands."\(^1\)

Although the doctrine of original sin exemplifies the status of man's will, the problem of the unwilling will indicates that there is an infirmity of the mind. The mind does not "wholly rise, sustained by truth."\(^1\) The mind neither wills nor commands entirely. Were the mind entire, the mind would not command, because what was commanded would already be.

The effect of the mind's infirmity results in a doctrine of eternal damnation and eternal reward on the same kind of evidence used to explain the status of the mind. When, however, Augustine declares the mind's infirmity as the explanation for the disobedient will, he is not far from Plato's doctrine of virtue based on knowledge.

Augustine has also added the factor of *meum peccatum*, which is a significant concept for systematic thought. Aristotle's view of punishment was pointless except as discipline for the wicked man or his fellows. Augustine fills the void

\(^1\)Augustine, *Confessions*, viii, 9.
to overflowing by describing the feeling of guilt which man has when he is alienated from God. This feeling of guilt is the feeling which results from the knowledge of the sin and its consequences after the commission of it and, of course, is not a truly new addition to the circumstances since the sinner had the same factors present before he sinned; otherwise he could not have sinned. The addition to sin of a "guilty conscience" adds factors of vague meaning and purpose to an already overloaded situation.

To Will or Not?

Augustine's doctrine of free will raises many important questions. One of these questions results from the attempt Augustine made to harmonize the doctrine in Aristotle of a will which acts as its own agent and the doctrine in Paul\(^1\) of a will which is obedient to God. On the Aristotelian side of the question a good will chooses good. An evil will chooses evil. On the Pauline side, as interpreted by Augustine, a will as will is a sinful will. A will which uses itself as its measure is one which thereby defies good. All else in the world is perfect.

\(^1\)Romans 6.
The presentation of Augustine's own arguments on whether or not the will should be exercised indicates how he shuffled his notions regarding a doctrine of the will among his presuppositions of the Divine Nature and the nature of man. Augustine points out that the will in its freedom has a choice. But the choice becomes clogged by its own power. Augustine's argument follows:

The only defect in the whole of creation is the will to sin,¹ However, God has given the sinful nature the power to act rightly if it so will. He grants unhappiness if it does not act rightly and happiness if it does.² God lacks nothing, and therefore if a man does not turn to him, it is not God who loses, but man. Therefore since man has a free will, he ought to give it proper use.

Now, is there something more basic than the will as the cause of the will? Augustine affirms that to ask for such a cause is to be led into in infinite regression. The will itself is the first cause of sin.³ Based on Paul's experience related in Romans, Augustine asks whether or not compulsion against the will may be the first cause. Paul had stated, "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I

¹Free Choice, iii, 35. ²Ibid., iii, 44. ³Ibid., iii, 49.
want, but I do the very thing I hate. I can will what is right but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do."¹ Augustine declares that there is no sin in such a situation, because the will as the first cause of sin has not willed evil but good in the experience described, even though man has yielded against his will.² As man determines his destiny, he chooses among the things seen, either those from God or from the devil. "If the soul goes out of its way to produce a false imitation of God, and to will to take pleasure in its own power, then the greater it wishes to becomes the less it becomes in fact. And that is pride, the beginning of all sin; and the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God."³

The devil imitated pride, whereas, Jesus Christ imitated humility, and through the latter eternal life is promised if we cleave to him so that nothing can separate us from him.³

In a "retraction" which Augustine published pertaining to the De Libero Arbitrio he says,

Because all good things come from God, it follows that from God comes the good use of free will, which is virtue and is counted among the goods. Then I spoke of

¹Romans 7: 15-19. ²Augustine, Free Choice, iii, 52. ³Ibid., iii, 76.
the misery, justly inflicted on sinners, from which the grace of God frees them, because man could fall on his own accord, that is by his free choice, but could not rise in the same way.¹

A free will, therefore, means freedom to sin, but here he clearly affirms that man cannot rise by an act of his will. To exercise a free will for good is virtue, but virtue, it would seem, cannot save a man. Salvation can come only by the grace of God.

In Augustine's treatise On Grace and Free Will, he shows that it is not necessary to defend God's grace by denying free will nor to defend free will by denying God's grace.² Augustine gives as the basis for positing the free choice of will the presupposition of scripture and the need to assign responsibility for one's actions. There one discovers that free will and sin are not one and the same. There are sins which are the result of ignorance, and there are other sins which are based on knowledge and an act of will. Grace means simply the name applied to God's gift or help directed toward


man's benefit, and the relationship of grace to man's free will is a part of the problem only because the question is whether or not the grace of God presupposes that man is free or that he is captive. Man's free will does not interfere with the grace of God, since God is able to bend man as it pleases him. Man's free will is not a limitation on the power of God. God does whatever he wills, even to an evil or wicked man.\footnote{Ibid., I, 767.}

Augustine wants his doctrine of free will to include both willing and not willing. Each serves aspects of his system. The act of God's grace demands that man's will should be stilled. Foreknowledge weakens the will's freedom (in spite of Augustine's denial) because sure foreknowledge would presuppose that the outcome of events involving choice were fixed. And though it is true that foreknowledge is not foreordination, foreknowledge could not be valid unless foreordination were a fact.

Furthermore, when Augustine attempts to save the goodness of God by proposing the free will as the source of evil, it is inconceivable that he could have salvaged the will's goodness. In the light of Augustine's goods, the consequence
of attributing the moral quality to the act of choosing perse unavoidably led to denying the will as a power for good, and to affirming sin as the will which takes pleasure in its own power. The will as will is not only no longer a potential power for good but the very power which resists good. ¹

But in Augustine free will is weakened not merely by the doctrine of predestination and grace. It is weakened in the psychological description of its nature and functions. As the power of the will functions, its product is alienation from God. When Augustine forgets Aristotle and the early De Libero Arbitrio, he says, that it is only when man's will becomes submissive, even silent, that good is produced. It is little wonder, therefore, that Martin Luther should have made this aspect of Augustine's doctrine central: "Man without grace can will nothing but evil."²

But no matter how far St. Augustine may seem to stray from his original position that because God created all things, including a free will, they are good:


Tamen si etiam ipsa peccaret, sufficeret Dei potestas ineffabilis potentiae ad regendam istam universitatem, ut omnibus congrua et condigna retribuens nihil in toto imperio sui turpe atque indecorum esse permitteret.¹

Augustine qualifies his position by asserting that although the universe is all good, there are degrees in it:

"Quid enim majus in creaturis quam vita intelligens, aut quid minus potest esse quam corpus."²

Free will is not destroyed by the doctrine of grace.

Rather it is established by grace:

Liberum ergo arbitrium evacuamus per gratiam? Absit: sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus. Sicut enim lex per fidem sic liberum arbitrium non evacuatur, sed statuitur.³

The free will as the original power of choice has been displaced by the perfect freedom granted by the product of God's love whose only true freedom is a divinely ordained love of

¹Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, III, 35. (Even if it [a creature itself destined never to sin] should sin, the inexpressible ability of God's power would still suffice to govern the universe so that, while rendering to all what is fitting and proper, He would permit nothing base or unbecoming in His whole realm.)

²Ibid., II, 46. (For what can be greater in creatures than an intelligent life, or what less than a body.)

³Augustine, De Spirito et Littera, 52. (Do we cancel free will by grace? On the contrary we establish greater free will. For just as the law is not cancelled but established by faith, so also free will.)
God. Man is free not when he does his own will but when he obeys the will of God.\(^1\)

The danger of Augustine's view is well reflected in Knudson's criticism of the modern Barthians: "To argue, as the strict Barthians do, that our weakness and sinfulness must be absolute, and that the recognition of any independent strength of our own leads to godless pride, is a piece of closet theologizing."\(^2\)

The will as free choice has, for Augustine, only the ephemeral status of a rationalization for the existence of evil. And though in his more philosophical mood, Augustine affirms the will as functioning to choose good, his frequent tendency to ascribe opposition to God as the function of the will forces the will in its error, figuratively speaking, to commit suicide.

Augustine restores the will (without its freedom) only if it obeys God. When it does this, it is a perfection of perfection.

If man's free will had retained its original nature as free choice, the question of predestination would have become serious. But, when a man does the will of God, he is not

\(^1\)W. Cunningham, S. Austin (London: C. J. Clay and Sons, 1887), p. 95.

free in the same sense as before he does it.\textsuperscript{1} God sees how everything has been ordained, and because he has perfect knowledge and will, he has no questions to be answered. Augustine attempts to retain both predestination and free will.\textsuperscript{2} His authority for his thinking is scriptural, but in the explication of free will resulting in perfect freedom the controversy disappears. For when man achieves that state of the good life where his life in the City of God is a perpetual Sabbath, his life will be one of perpetual praise. And whereas before Adam's sin the first freedom was the power to choose to be good or evil, in the last state he will be able to choose only not to sin. This will be the perfect expression of the people of the City of God.\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum}.

Views of the Will Presupposed by Augustine

Augustine interpreted the problem of free will in the light of several presuppositions. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Paul are basic.

The Platonic Presuppositions to Augustine's Doctrine of Will

Augustine used as the foundation of his theory of the will certain notions which he found in Greek philosophy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Cunningham, pp. 92-93.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 127.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Augustine, \textit{The City of God}, xxii, xxx.
\end{itemize}
especially in Plato and Aristotle. Augustine saw these notions, admittedly in some instances, through the eyes of Plotinus. He was very much impressed with the specialized treatment Plotinus gave to the subject of free will. Aspects of Platonic conceptions found in Plotinus which became part of Augustine's theory of the function of the will are (1) in order to do good man must know the good; (2) the will functions to mediate between reason and desire; (3) the body is a source of evil to the soul; (4) the soul is free to choose between alternatives (including moral choices); (5) the soul which has achieved its perfection has that perfect freedom which comes from the doing of acts which are perfectly virtuous; and therefore (6) evil is deficiency (alienation from God, in Augustine) measured by the distance the soul must go to achieve its perfection, (7) the soul's actions are in its own power.

The Aristotelian Presupposition to Augustine's Doctrine of Will

Although Plato's doctrines find their way into Aristotle's

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conclusions, Augustine leaned more to the Aristotelian perspective. Except for the sixth point above, Aristotle adopted, with some modification, Plato's interpretation of those functions of the soul which may be related to a will. The notions in Aristotle which appealed to Augustine include (1) praise and blame (approval and disapproval) test whether the soul's actions are "in its power" rather than compelled; (2) evil is willed as is good; (3) free choice arbitrates between reason and desire; (4) desire drags the soul to evil; (5) the body is the lowest aspect of man; reason is the highest function of man; (6) the well-ordered life of free choice (good will in Augustine) is the rational control of desire moving the soul to its perfection; (7) evil and good acts are blame-worthy and praiseworthy and therefore include punishment or reward.

Five Views of Free Will in Plotinus

The fact that Augustine viewed Plato and Aristotle through Plotinus suggests the appropriateness of affirming several factors in Plotinus which were important to Augustine.

(1) In order to release the One from responsibility for the existence of evil, men (though actually not desiring to sin) are the doers (agents) of evil by their own own choice.¹

¹Plotinus, Enneads, III, i, 4, and III, ii, 9-10.
(2) A free will is one in which (a) "we are master to perform"¹ (the agential power being in the individual) and in which (b) man is self-disposed to do or not do any act "in ourselves."¹

(3) A free will is choosing right or wrong acts with knowledge but under no compulsion.

(4) In true knowledge the free will acts as right reasoning and thereby exerts its effort to do good in obedience to its highest insights.²

(5) Thus, freedom springs from the activity of Divine Mind and functions in obedience to the proposals emanating therefrom.²

Plotinus has developed the doctrine of freedom from its most primitive elements to its highest and most complex functions. They may be outlined as follows:

(1) Will as self-causation, the originating power (metaphysical freedom) = (2a) above
(2) Will as the ability to choose (psychological freedom) = (2b) above
(3) Will as the ability to choose right or wrong (moral freedom) = (3) above

¹Ibid., VI, viii, 1. ²Ibid., VI, viii, 4.
(4) Will as the choice of (obedience to) the right when the opposite (choice of wrong) would be spiritual slavery (ethical freedom) = (4) above
(5) Will as obedience to the proposals (Will) of the Divine Mind (Theological freedom) = (5) above

Plotinus sees in the functions of the free will the growth of the soul from (1) its earliest power of blind causation by whim, to (2) arbitrary choice, to (3) moral choice, to (4) the right choice, to (5) obedience to the One. The will moves from its own individuality into unity with the One—the flight of the alone to the Alone.¹ For Plotinus, each of the five doctrines of the will has its proper place in the scale of human achievement. One doctrine does not exclude another, but, in fact, in its proper place, presupposes the others. The one at the beginning becomes perfect by unity with the One at the End.

¹Tbid., VI, ix, 11.
aspects in Paul's thought which may appear to be relevant. To what extent theology has strained the texts of scripture cannot be examined here. What can be examined are the factors upon which Augustine depended in order to weave his system using the categories he had understood in Plotinus. Only the briefest consideration is possible to this study.

There are many factors to which Augustine referred as foundation principles. Among these there are several deserving emphasis.

(1) "In everything God works for good." Therefore the existence of evil in the world must be seen as the just wrath of God working against the wickedness of men who have brought suffering.

(2) A sinful will is one which has chosen iniquity (to live "according to the flesh"). When that choice is made, "it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me." The philosophical definition of the will is not explicit but apparently presupposed.

(3) The will is in every instance related to a moral judgment. The will is related to goods or evils already

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1Romans 8: 28. 2Romans 1: 18.
3Romans 6: 19; 8: 15. 4Romans 7: 17.
known or defined by scripture or experience. The will is therefore obedient to a standard.\textsuperscript{1} It sets its mind on the Spirit which is "life and peace."\textsuperscript{2}

(4) A will which obeys the standards of right living is thereby no longer itself functioning. Christ enters in and dwells there. This is the spirit of God in man which makes men His sons. Thus Christ had said "he who loses his life for my sake will find it."\textsuperscript{3} Or again, "whoever humbles himself will be exalted."\textsuperscript{4} And, finally "You will know the truth and the truth will make you free."\textsuperscript{5}

(5) The obedient will is not measured by righteous acts. It is rather measured inwardly by "searching the hearts of men."\textsuperscript{6} Righteous acts are the fruits of an obedient will—a man led by the Spirit of God.

(6) Sin and suffering separate man from God in fact bringing death to man as their wages.\textsuperscript{7} But this is man's original state. His complete or true state is to be made perfect by yielding to God; for in man's final state, nothing can separate him from the love of God in Christ.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{1}Romans 6: 17. \textsuperscript{2}Romans 8: 6. \textsuperscript{3}Matthew 10: 39b. \textsuperscript{4}Matthew 23: 12b. \textsuperscript{5}John 8: 32. \textsuperscript{6}Romans 8: 27. \textsuperscript{7}Romans 6: 23. \textsuperscript{8}Romans 8: 39.
(7) Man's righteousness or sin is not his own affair nor even the affair of his fellowmen. Man's liability for his moral life is not from men but from God. Therefore the consequences of sin are not in man (Plato) nor one's fellowmen (Aristotle) but directly controlled by God.

(8) God's foreknowledge and predestination are identified in a single concept. Foreknowledge applies to God's prior knowledge of the "people whom he foreknew." That is, the Jews in particular, the prophets, the remnant, the "children of the promise," even Christ, were sent by God into the world to redeem it. In this sense he foreknew them. But these men were predestined to perform what God commanded them. They were eternally committed to the will of God. God called them to their task; he gave them a will to perfect righteousness (he justified them) and rewarded them with eternal glory. Thus Paul says,

We know that in everything God works for good with those who love him, who are called according to his purpose. For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first born among many brethren. And those whom he predestined he also called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified.

1Romans 14: 10a.  2Romans 2: 29b; 3: 19; and 14: 10b.  
3Romans 8: 26.  4Romans 9: 8.  5Romans 8: 28-30.
Predestination thus does not apply to the whole human race but only to "the elect" whose function it is to reconcile the whole world to God.¹ It is only by distorting this passage pertaining to foreknowledge and predestination in order to make it conform to the tales of the Last Judgment that a doctrine of the predestination of sinners to eternal damnation can be ascribed to Paul. But Paul had such utter faith in God's power to reconcile the whole world to himself that he urged men to the moral principle of overcoming "evil with good."² For a doctrine of predestination to be extended to include a realm of the eternally damned is not only not to overcome evil with good but to create an eternal realm of opposition to God who was worshipfully conceived as working for good in all things.

(9) The feeling of guilt is added to the act of sin. But so also is the feeling of salvation added to the right actions of the will. The doctrine that sin alienates man from God and that a good will (right action) reconciles man to God implies a doctrine of guilt and salvation which Paul makes explicit. For sin becomes a state not an act. In fact an evil act is a proof that the man is in a state of guilt.

¹Romans 11. ²Romans 12: 21.
When he becomes aware of his evil act, his state of guilt becomes a feeling of guilt—of accountability to God.\(^1\) In feeling guilt the sinner also feels rejected by God.\(^2\) When man has willed alienation from God by sinning, his state of sin is the fact that the power of his will has been displaced by the power of his flesh. Reconciliation to God occurs when the power of the flesh is displaced by the spirit of God. Man's first state is one where he exercises a primitive will to choose between alternatives. His second state is one where he sins. During his second state he develops feelings of guilt. Man's third state is one where he has the perfect enjoyment of the glory of God. Man's will is not involved in the third state. Man achieves the third state by the grace of God and not by his works.\(^3\)

(10) The act of sin as the rule of the flesh is an act of self-exaltation, of putting one's self first. This, therefore, leads to the conclusion of defining sin as pride. But such acts of sin as pride which result in the feeling of guilt are given historical foundation in the doctrine of original sin.

(11) Paul posits the doctrine of original sin based on

\(^1\)Romans 3: 19. \(^2\)Romans 11: 15. \(^3\)Romans 11: 5-6.
the story of Adam and Eve. All men share the fact of the
guilt of Adam and Eve and also the feelings of guilt and re-
jection. But the grace of God acting through the gift of
Jesus Christ brings justification. God's sense of justice
is pacified, his wrath is soothed and man can be reconciled
by believing with his heart and confessing with his lips
thereby making Jesus the Lord of his life and God the ruler
of Jesus' life. Man, therefore, must remove his will to
sin (by "putting his body to death") and replace his will
with the reign of Christ who in turn is ruled by God.

Two Kinds of Free Will in Augustine
and Basic Questions Involved

There is some validity to the view that Augustine's
unique function in the history of thought was to unite the
two streams of thought which represented two movements in
history (1) the Judeo-Christian and (2) the Graeco-Roman.
The ideas presupposed above were as was seen woven into a
single system. Although the major aspects of Augustine's
theory of the will have been presented as a single unit, it
is important to evaluate his concepts by singling out those
which need careful scrutiny.

1Romans 5: 15-21.  2Romans 10: 9.
Can the Will Do Good?

As was noted there are two states of the will in Augustine: (1) the first state of the will which is Aristotelian free choice (moral and psychological free will) and (2) the last state of the will which is the Pauline love of God (theological and ethical free will). The will in the first sense may be called the free will, in the second sense, the freedom of the will.

That there is a good will in Augustine based on the Greek philosophy in his background is difficult to deny, but that perfection means a loss of will is even more difficult to deny. It is equally inconceivable that Augustine would approve of his critics forcing both these ideas into congruency. Happiness is not attained by human effort. It may be desired, but is not "in our power." Happiness is a gift of God. When a soul achieves happiness, it lacks nothing.

In answer therefore to the question, Can the will do good? Augustine would say that man's will is the cause both of moral evil and of moral good. As the cause of moral evil man's will accounts for the wrath of God and the natural evil of the world. The good will is not the source of perfect happiness. God is the cause of everything and everything is on the whole perfect. When the soul has achieved the beatific
joy of loving God, all its actions are expressions of the will of God and therefore are not only good, but perfect.

Although Augustine speaks of a will which wishes to follow truth and another will which is an "unwilling will" he is not dividing the will in two. The will is one faculty which as sinful is unwilling to follow truth and yields to desire, but, as good, yields to God. The willing will desires truth, the unwilling will is the victim of bad habits and passions.

The Loss of Free Will vs. The Loss of Perfect Freedom

Free will, in Augustine, has been seen as the most elemental function of the will as agent. When it is lost the result is that the will loses its stubbornness and pride and achieves perfection. By asserting free will to make it its own object, the result is the loss of perfect freedom. Sin, therefore is the act of will which separates man from God. Sin does not result in a loss of free will, but in the loss of that perfect knowledge which was the gift of God to an obedient will. To an obedient will, free choice is not lost. It would be irrelevant to an obedient will that there was a.

1Free Choice, iii, 1.
bad alternative in the choice.

When a man has perfect freedom, his soul is in perfect order. To ask that he have the power to choose evil in such a situation is irrelevant.

**Free Will and Predestination**

Augustine has affirmed a doctrine of foreknowledge but he has denied the doctrine of predestination. It would seem that the only way of sustaining such a dichotomy would be if God were not the cause of all things. Foreknowledge in Augustine's usage means that the events of the future are fixed. If God did not fix them, how did they get fixed? Augustine merely answers dispassionately that to know the future is different from determining it.

It is of importance to note that Augustine has strayed from Paul in asserting a doctrine of eternal damnation for the evil doers. Paul had asserted that only the elect were predestined to reconciling the world to God.

Augustine is not disturbed by this difference. He accepts the vision of God in Paul and notes that when the will is ignited by love, it is bound to God and all the imperfections of free will are removed.
The Measure of the Power of Free Will

The exemptions on liability for the acts of a free will are in Plato, Aristotle and Augustine (1) ignorance and (2) compulsion. Though Augustine asserts free will to be a kind of omnipotence thwarting even God, ignorance and compulsion are limitations both on liability for actions and on the will. The cosmic consequences of sin are based on the cosmic power of sin. But ignorance and compulsion are both capable of relieving the will of its liability because they have relieved it of its power. Augustine adds that the will may also do what it knows is wrong by an act of sinful will. This (sinful) will is enslaved by desire—a desire strong enough to turn the will away from godly pursuits to its degradation. The will's true freedom cannot be gained by knowledge, nor by exchanging compelling powers, but as a gift of the grace of God.

The feeling of guilt

Although the doctrine of original sin has already been evaluated, one aspect of it deserves brief comment. The state of alienation from God caused by Adam's sin is repeated in every sin of man. The sense of alienation from God in sin and the feeling that the commission of a single sin means
that man is a sinner becomes the source of a feeling pervading man's soul which may best be described as a feeling of guilt.

In rectifying the factors relating to sin man must deal (1) with the act of sin, (2) with his fellowmen who hold him responsible, (3) with God who has been offended and must avenge Himself, and (4) with himself and his feelings of guilt. ¹

**Conclusion**

It is clear from the interpretation of the data that there appears to be an obscurity in Augustine's thought which, if clarified, could resolve several important problems. The free will as "all power to will itself" is the power to choose to be good or evil in the sense of being the first freedom (as, for example, in Adam). In this respect the power of the will to choose between alternatives seems to be free only before it has made its choice. Once the will has chosen, it is no longer free. It has, by its choice, either become a slave to sin or obedient to God. Again, a free will is free only before it chooses. After its choice, depending on what it chooses, it becomes either sinful or perfect, and there is no ¹

¹Sacramentally he does this by baptism and conversion.
longer a question of choice or free will involved, but only a state or condition. Man cannot escape from this state or condition by his own power for the very reason that he has lost his power of choice. Only God can interfere and redeem man in his helplessness by an act of grace.

Before it commits itself, the will is free to choose between sin as exerting itself toward itself and salvation as yielding in obedience to God. A good will is the state which follows from the choice of righteousness and virtue. But the will which has chosen temporal things is unhappy. It sees the value of the eternal law but lacking a free will is unable to do anything to become subject to that eternal law. In a sense the free will of choice can only be exercised once, after which it is no longer free. Its choice will be either of itself as will or of the will of God as its perfect peace.

That the free will can only act once is expressed by Augustine most clearly with regard to the doctrine of original sin as pertaining to Adam and Eve's disobedience. In the same way, however, during his lifetime man has the opportunity to exercise free will, himself, and thereby decide his destiny. After he makes his decision, he is no longer free. Therefore, the will is within its power and free once. The will will have
no other opportunity to choose either to be obedient to God or obedient to itself alone.

It is possible to deduce from this that, in willing, a free will loses its freedom either to God or the devil. When the will chooses God, and obeys him, it is stilled and receptive. The will, exerting itself, is evil because its proper object can only be God and not itself. Prior to choosing between good or evil, there is free will. A choice of evil, which brings condemnation, would be a choice of bodily desires or of putting oneself first. A redeeming choice would be the putting of the body to death and becoming obedient to Christ and God. Again, a free will which chooses to sin thereby alienates itself from God, whereas the will that yields to God achieves perfect freedom. The singular act of original free choice is between conversion and prideful sin.

This interpretation of Augustine is not, however, without problems. At times Augustine seems to say that man as man is capable of free will,

However, the view that free choice is exercised only once is more consistent with (1) Augustine's doctrine of foreknowledge, (2) his view that the sinner is in a perpetual
state of sin and suffering, and (3) his view that the man who has achieved perfect freedom is in a state of eternal peace and joy. There is not in the course of life an alternation of good and evil acts. Damnation is eternal because an originally free will has chosen disobedience. Similarly, eternal reward follows from choosing to obey God.

Prior to the will's willing the alternative, free will is capable of choosing either obedience or disobedience. If the will is disobedient, only the grace of God can save man because he has lost the very power of choice which could have saved him if originally used properly.

In the same way, from this conclusion, an explanation can be given to the problem that when the mind commands the will to will, the will does not obey. Augustine attempts to explain this on the basis, first, that there is an infirmity of the mind. However, when the mind's infirmity is interpreted, it is seen that it results in a doctrine of eternal damnation or eternal reward. This is explained by the fact that the mind's infirmity is the result of an originally defective free choice after which it is no longer free. Thus, if the will wills defectively (wills to sin) at the only time when it is capable of functioning freely, the result obviously
is that the will can not follow its own commands. Rather it is a slave to itself but, even more, to evil. But the evil will apparently conceives itself as free and capable of commanding itself. Thus it commands itself without success because in reality its original choice condemned itself to a state of eternal damnation awaiting the redemptive power of the grace of God. If the choice which results in the human state of sinfulness destroys the power of the will to determine itself, then the mind in its slavery to its sinful state can do nothing except sin. Therefore no matter how much the mind commands the will to will, nothing comes of it because having chosen sin the will can only thereafter sin.

One difficulty remains. Augustine claims that sin does not result in a loss of free will but only in a loss of perfect knowledge. That man can fall on his own accord by free choice, but cannot rise in the same way increases the difficulty. If man is allowed only one choice for good or evil in his lifetime then the statement that man does not lose his free will when he chooses sin is clarified. Free will in this sense on the part of the sinner means (1) that the will is capable of defying God with a resulting alienation from God; and (2) because the will is free to defy God it is therefore
responsible for human suffering and exempts God from responsibility.

Free will, in Augustine, conceived as an act which brings salvation or damnation in its original choice can thereby explain problems (such as those cited) which on other presuppositions become obscured. With this interpretation and the distinction between free will and freedom, the discussion of Augustine's doctrine of free will may well, for the time being, come to a close.
CHAPTER V

FREE WILL IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT

Background Data

Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, Germany, on April 22, 1724. His parents were Pietists; his father worked as a master saddler in Königsberg. From his earliest youth Kant showed great promise and was especially interested in the Latin classics and mathematics and physics. He was a tutor in private families in the area until 1755, when he became a privat dozent at the University of Königsberg where he lectured on such varied subjects as mathematics, physics, anthropology, logic, ethics, metaphysics, and natural theology. He was also the assistant librarian at the Royal Library. In 1770 he became professor of logic and metaphysics at Königsberg and eleven years later, in 1781, his Critique of Pure Reason in its first edition was published (the second edition, in 1787). Kant's Critique of Practical Reason appeared in 1788. The preliminary work done in The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals which appeared in
1785 cannot be ignored. Because of the fact that his philosophy did not adhere to the strict doctrines of the Lutheran Church, he was subject to attack. He tended toward a moral rationalism contrary to the current theology. His popularity which had grown immensely from the time of the publication of the Critique in 1781, reached the point where some even hailed him as the second Messiah. He was a man of extreme and rigid regularity in his personal habits and his thought shows painstaking labor and rigid complexity.¹

The evolution of his thought can be traced from the early period when he followed the philosophical thinking of Leibniz and Wolff to the influence of the English empiricism of John Locke. These thinkers had merely speculative influence on Kant. He was not completely brought to life philosophically until he was awakened by the work of David Hume. As a result of this latter influence Kant developed the problem of his critical philosophy: How is experience possible for the

conscious subject?

This question was the starting point for Kant. To answer the question reason must undertake the task of self-knowledge in order to discover its lawful claims.¹

**Kant's Fundamental Problem**

Kant's basic problem is to formulate a critique of "reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience."¹ In another sense the question is "how much we can hope to achieve by reason, when all the material and assistance of experience are taken away."² To answer these problems means to explore the faculty of understanding in order to determine its rules and limits.³ Kant is impressed with the results reason has achieved in the fields of mathematics and physics. Reason used in this way he calls theoretical reason. Kant observes that when the theoretical reason functions, it brings with itself *a priori* principles by which it determines what it finds in experience, the world of sense or phenomena. The


²Ibid., A, xiv.

³Ibid., A, xvi.
theoretical reason uses its own laws or categories to measure experience. But its laws or categories can only measure objects of actual or possible experience. Objects, such as God, freedom, and immortality, are not possible to experience and therefore, theoretical reason cannot apply to them because it has nothing to use as a measure. Speculative reason may pretend "transcendent insight" but its principles cannot apply to "what cannot be an object of experience."¹ Thus the practical extension of pure reason is impossible.² The theoretical reason has excellent success in the sciences and mathematics.

Kant suggests that knowledge can be related to its object in another way than that of the theoretical reason which, in the broadest sense, measures its object. The knowledge of its object may be that of "making it actual."³ This is the practical knowledge of reason. Both kinds of reason must be dealt with separately.

In dealing with the a priori knowledge of the theoretical reason it is found that the knowledge derived therefrom "has to do only with appearances."⁴ The theoretical reason may be

¹Ibid., B, xxx. ²As speculative. ³Kant, Pure Reason, B, ix-x. ⁴Ibid., B, xx.
applied to the world of experience (appearances) but cannot transcend the "limits of experience and of all appearances."¹

When it attempts to do so, it reports failure and confesses that the thing-in-itself, the real per se, is "unknown by us."¹

But man is not satisfied with this answer and is forced by the unconditioned to go beyond the appearances in order to posit things-in-themselves which reason demands for the completion of the series of conditions.¹

But when theoretical reason attempts to treat the unconditioned, the thing-in-itself, in the same way that it does objects of empirical knowledge the result is hopeless contradictions. The contradictions vanish when the theoretical reason recognizes that its mode of representation of its objects applies to the appearance of its objects but not to the thing-in-itself.

Therefore, when the supersensible is declared off limits to the theoretical or speculative reason, man still insists on getting beyond the appearances to the thing-in-itself.

The answer to this problem may be found in the practical data of reason.² From a practical point of view and in the

¹Ibid., B xx.

²Ibid., B, xxi-xxii; these data are the moral acts of a free will discussed later on pp. 259-263 of this study.
practical knowledge of reason, the data may be found to give reason a transcendent concept of the unconditioned, the thing-in-itself.¹

The Critique of Pure Reason therefore gives the limits to the speculative reason so that the practical reason may do its work assured that reason will not be "brought into conflict with itself."² But there are two presuppositions basic to the functioning of the theoretical reason: (1) "Nothing in a priori knowledge can be ascribed to objects save what the thinking subject derives from itself."³ (2) Pure reason is a wholly separate "self-subsistent unity."³ Metaphysics is the complete explication of these two principles.

When the principles of the thinking subject are defined and their limitations ascertained, because of the unity of pure reason, the result will be a complete description of the possible employment of pure reason in its speculative functions in experience and also in its practical applications in the supersensible. Thus, for example, a free will taken as appearance is subject to the laws of nature and therefore not free, but as belonging to the thing-in-itself, a free will is not subject to the laws of nature and therefore is

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., B, xxvi. ³Ibid., B, xxiii.
The soul, as free, cannot be known by the speculative reason but only by the practical or moral employment of pure reason.

Kant, therefore, has limited the speculative reason in order to make possible the "inner experience"—the practical extension of pure reason—faith.

Kant's Method

Kant calls his method transcendental or critical. In the examination of reason a priori rules are discovered in persons "to which all objects of experience necessarily conform." The nature of these rules or principles, their relation to all other rules and principles and their universal and necessary application to the objects of experience are all part of the procedure involved in transcendental or critical philosophy. The method is applied to the question "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" Based on the proposition that "we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them" Kant's method "consists in looking for the elements of pure reason in what admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment." The elements or

1Ibid., B, xxviii. 2Ibid., B, xi. 3Ibid., B, xxx. 4Ibid., B, 27. 5Ibid., B, xviii. 6Ibid., B, 73. 7Ibid., B, xviii.
principles are tested for application (1) to objects of the senses and the understanding, (2) to objects of mere thought.

The outcome of the discussion of the problem of the principles which reason applies to the realm of appearances is that those aspects of life which are not appearance are left to be considered in another way. The speculative reason (scientific cognition) is limited to the realm of nature and can in no sense provide information pertaining to the realm of self-consciousness as such, or what is more inclusive, the concepts of duty and morality. The aim, therefore, of the practical reason, which in a measure is like the practical reason in Aristotle, is to determine the meaning of a free self-consciousness and how it is to be understood in the light of the practical reason. The *Critique of Pure Reason* made the point that the conceptions of God, freedom, immortality, morality, and all of the experiences of self-consciousness or self-determination cannot be found as objects of the scientific cognition which interprets nature. The use of the critical method reveals the divisions of knowledge.

In the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant proposes three studies into which philosophy has been divided: Physics, Ethics, and Logic. Rational knowledge is divided into what is material and what is formal. The
formal aspect is the concern of logic. The formal philosophy discusses the form of the understanding and of the reason in order to establish the universal laws of thought. The material philosophy, however, is concerned with an object. In the study of the determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject it is affirmed that they are either the laws of nature or of freedom. The science which studies the laws of nature is physics (natural philosophy) and that which studies the laws of freedom is ethics (moral philosophy). ¹

Logic, in establishing the universal and necessary laws of thought, can not have an empirical part. However, natural and moral philosophy each have an empirical part since natural philosophy is concerned with the laws of nature as an object of experience, whereas moral philosophy deals with the laws of the human will in so far as it is affected by nature. The laws of nature describe things as they happen, whereas the laws of moral philosophy are "the laws according to which everything ought to happen." ¹ When the study of ethics bases its doctrines on a priori principles alone, it is referred

to as pure philosophy and because it is restricted to the objects of the understanding it is called metaphysics. Thus Kant's subject is a metaphysic of morals.¹

Such a study is not based on the knowledge of man himself (anthropology). It is rather a study which gives man laws a priori as a rational being.²

The Distinction Between a priori and Empirical Judgments

Kant describes a judgment as "nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception."³ Judgment is the "mediate knowledge of an object."⁴ A judgment is a priori if it is universal and necessary.⁵ A judgment "borrowed solely from experience"⁶ is an empirical (a posteriori) judgment.

Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

Kant makes a further distinction between judgments. Analytic judgments are those in which the connection between the subject and the predicate is thought through identity. The predicate adds nothing to the subject. Synthetic judgments

¹Ibid., 4.   ²Ibid., 5-6.  ³Pure Reason, B, 141.
⁴Ibid., B, 93.  ⁵Ibid., B, 3.  ⁶Ibid., A, 2.
are those in which the connection between subject and predicate is thought without identity. The predicate adds to the subject what was not in the subject. ¹

Speculative and Practical Reason

These preliminary statements of Kant's method indicate his interest in investigating the function of reason and the procedure he uses in that investigation. The methodological considerations were aimed by Kant at building a high wall around the world of appearances (phenomena) which could be exploited by science without restraint. Beyond that wall was the realm of the unconditioned, the inner self, God, freedom, and immortality and the highest good. The restrictions placed on speculative reason were put there in order to give room to the practical reason. ²

It must be clearly understood that there are not two reasons, one functioning in experience and the other functioning in the supersensible. The pure practical reason and the pure speculative reason are ultimately one and the same reason distinguished merely in reason's application. ² The speculative reason has its a priori principles by which it judges its empirical objects. These were fully discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant proposes to explore the principles which reason applies to the

¹Ibid., p. 10. ²Kant, Morals, 8.
thing-in-itself. The most important of these involves the Highest Good.

The Highest Good

The Highest Good belongs to the realm of the thing-in-itself. Kant reasons that two characteristics make an action morally good. First, it must conform to the moral law; second, and more important, it must be done for the sake of the law.¹ A will based on such actions is found to be a pure will if it is "determined solely from a priori principles without any empirical motives."² The ascertaining of such a will involves beginning with a "good will." Thus, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a good will."³ A good will is not the only good. It is the only absolute good, i.e., a good called good without qualification.⁴

Now a good will means a will determined by rational principles. On the one hand, Kant observes that "everything in nature works according to laws."⁵ On the other hand he

¹Ibid., 6. ²Ibid., 7. ³Ibid., 11. ⁴Cf. A. D. Lindsay, Kant (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1934), P. 211. ⁵Kant, Morals, 36.
notes that "rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws—that is, according to principles, that is, have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason."¹ When the reason imparts laws which are aimed at determining the will, the will from its nature is not required of necessity to follow these determinations of reason. The laws, therefore, are not laws of necessity but of obligation.

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative.

All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is, on principles which are valid for every rational being as such.²

A holy or divine will is a volition which is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law, and, therefore, the idea of obligation or ought does not apply.

¹Tbid.
²Tbid., 37.
A good will is, therefore, one which does good without limitations. It is the only absolute good. It consists of the "conception of law" and is possible only "in a rational being."\(^1\) It must be emphasized that it is the conception of law and not the effect which determines the quality of the will. Such a law is a law in general and does not assume particular laws applicable to certain functions. The principle of such a law is a maxim and more specifically the maxim that "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law."\(^2\) A good will is good not because of its utility nor any inclinations but because it is good in itself. The object of a good will is not the happiness or satisfaction of life,\(^3\) but to produce a will good in itself. And though this is not the only or complete good, it is the supreme good and the only unlimited or unqualified good and the condition of all other goods including the desire for happiness.

Such a will is not only not tested by utility or by the inclinations, but is devoid of both. Since it "exists already in the sound natural understanding," it is a notion to be "cleared up" rather than "to be taught."\(^4\) It is reason's

\(^1\)Ibid., 21. \(^2\)Ibid., 22. \(^3\)Ibid., 14. \(^4\)Ibid., 16.
"highest practical destination to establish a good will."\(^1\)

Such an achievement is the good will's own satisfaction derived from the attainment of an end determined by reason.\(^1\)

A man's goodness, therefore, is measured by the degree to which his will is subject to reason. The attainment of the supreme good is not achieved by effects or results; for, the supreme good, as the will of the rational being, is the conception of law "already present in the person who acts accordingly."\(^2\)

Man, however, is not governed at all times by reason. Sometimes his wants and inclinations (in the name of happiness) oppose his reason and attempt to corrupt and destroy the worth of the laws which reason proposes. But reason carries on with disregard and contempt for the opposing claims of the wants and inclinations.\(^3\) Thus Kant attempts to give a philosophical explanation to Paul's experience provocatively expressed in the book of Romans: "I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do."\(^4\) To explain this moral fact of life, Kant turns to the notion of duty.

**Duty**

For Kant, the concept of duty involves three propositions:

\(^1\)Ibid.  \(^2\)Ibid., 21.  \(^3\)Ibid., 26.  \(^4\)Romans 7: 15.
(1) The genuine moral worth of an action requires that it be done not from inclination but from duty.¹ For example, happiness may be defined by those who disregard the concept of duty as the combination of all inclinations in one total.

But if a man acts to satisfy an inclination in order to secure happiness, his action has no moral worth because he should "promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty."² A will tossed about by the inclinations or wants is not a moral will. Philanthropy performed from sympathy or from self-interest may deserve praise and encouragement, but not esteem which is based on moral worth.

The second proposition pertaining to the concept of duty is

(2) That an action done from duty derives its worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.²

Thus, the purpose or effect of an act does not give the act moral worth. Assuming will to mean purpose, Kant insists that the unconditional or moral worth of an act does not lie in the will or in the effect of the act. The worth lies in the "principle of the will" without regard to the ends which

¹Kant, Morals, 18. ²Ibid., 19.
can be attained by the action."\(^1\) In this case the will stands between its formal \textit{a priori} principle and its material \textit{a posteriori} principle.\(^1\) An action done from duty is so determined, after every material principle has been withdrawn, by the formal principle of volition.

The third proposition is that (3) "duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law."\(^1\) Kant's interpretation of this proposition is more fully expressed as follows:

An action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and every object of will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.\(^2\)

By a maxim Kant means "the subjective principle of volition." The practical law is the objective principle which is that principle which would serve as "a practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the faculty of desire."\(^3\)

Therefore, Kant has defined duty as the awareness and the commitment to one's moral obligations regardless of the influence of the inclinations. Duty is motivated by nothing except itself, i.e., the conception of law it finds in itself.

In this respect duty and the good will are motivated in the same way, that is to say, each is self-motivated. To be motivated otherwise is to strip all moral worth from both the good will and duty.

Kant has here given a profoundly significant answer to Aristotle's criticism of Plato in which Aristotle made praise and blame the test of the moral significance of an action. This implication of the Kantian position is derived from Kant's contrast between prudence and duty. Duty, as the "necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law"\(^1\) gives an action its moral worth for the very reason that its moral significance is its very own and not derived from some other aspect of the act. Moral worth is assigned to duty for its own sake. In the case of prudence, the act's worth is based or derived not from the act as prudent but from the consequences.

Therefore, if a person performs a good act not for the sake of that act but from fear of consequences or apprehension of injury, the moral aspects of the act are lost. To be truthful for the truth's sake is morally significant, but to be truthful because to be otherwise means receiving

\(^1\)Ibid., 24.
punishment is morally empty. Praise and blame may relate to matters of public utility, but they can never, for Kant, be the grounds for genuine moral worth. Prudence may suggest that a man tell the truth in one instance and that he lie in another. To have a principle which leads to such contradictions is to have a principle that "destroys itself."¹

Thus although society may function on the basis of rewards and punishments, there is no genuine moral worth in an action done for a reward or rejected because of punishment. In a truly moral act motivation must be intrinsic to the act and not to an external aspect or consequence of the act. What a good will or bad will is cannot be discerned by whether the will is praiseworthy or blameworthy, but by a condition in the will itself. By reasoning man discovers what he must do to be honest, good, wise, and virtuous. "What a man is bound to do, and therefore also to know"² is in the reach of every man, including the commonest. Accordingly, in revealing to man what he is bound to do, reason is dealing with obligations which it issues as commands or imperatives.

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., 25.
Reverence for the Law

To disclose how the reason functions in rendering its commands, Kant asserts that a command (of reason) is "the conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will."¹ An imperative is the formula of the command. More comprehensively, Kant declares that "Imperatives are only formulae to express the relation of objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, for example, the human will."² Imperatives are either hypothetical or categorical. The hypothetical have to do with means; the categorical have to do with actions which are necessary in and of themselves. The imperfection of the will is the will dependent on subjective causes such as inclination and interest. A desire dependent on sensation is called inclination, and gives rise to what Kant refers to as a want. An interest, on the other hand, is "the dependence of a contingently determinable will on the principles of reason."²

Although everything in nature works according to laws, rational beings alone have a will—"the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws."¹ But a will that is

¹Ibid., 36. ²Ibid., 38.
not thoroughly good is a rational will which is determined (obligated) by principles of reason which the will by nature does not of necessity follow. Hence the formula for the principle obligatory to the will is the Categorical Imperative: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law."¹ Kant couples this principle with the imperative of duty which reads: "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature."¹

Kant's principle of reverence for law per se is not only reflected in his definitions of a good will, duty, and the Categorical Imperative. He defines another instance of his principle in his conception of the kingdom of ends by which he means that "all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as ends in themselves."² In the kingdom of ends everything has value or dignity.³ The law based on the principle of the kingdom of ends, when applied to the will, leads to the most important principle of all morality for Kant, namely, the principle of the autonomy of the will.

¹Ibid., 47. ²Ibid., 63. ³Ibid., 64.
Doctrine of the Will

The principle of the autonomy of the will presupposes a clear understanding of what Kant means by the will. He appears to be saying that the faculty which translates principles into action is the will.\(^1\) Because the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, "the will is nothing but practical reason."\(^1\) The principles which deal with the means for attaining some possible purpose are called imperatives of skill.\(^2\) When a person turns his skill in choosing means to the greatest well being for himself, he is called prudent.\(^3\) The will, accordingly, is conceived as "a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws."\(^4\) The end "serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination."\(^4\) The means is the "ground of the possibility of the action." The spring is the subjective ground of the desire; the motive is the objective ground of the volition.\(^4\) The autonomy of the will is that property of the will "by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)."\(^5\) The principle of autonomy then is: "Always so to

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\(^1\)Ibid., 36.  
\(^2\)Ibid., 39.  
\(^3\)Ibid., 40.  
\(^4\)Ibid., 55.  
\(^5\)Ibid., 71
choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law. In discussing the autonomy of the will, Kant says,

We cannot prove that this practical rule is an imperative, that is, that the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to it as a condition, by a mere analysis of the conceptions which occur in it, since it is a synthetical proposition; we must advance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical examination of the subject, that is, of the pure practical reason, for this synthetic proposition which commands apodictically must be capable of being cognized wholly a priori. This matter, however, does not belong to the present section. But that the principle of autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative, and that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very autonomy.

Kant thus has affirmed that the whole purpose of the metaphysic of morals is to prove the autonomy of the will. He says,

An absolutely good will, then, the principle of which must be a categorical imperative, will be indeterminate as regards all objects, and will contain merely the form of volition generally, and that as autonomy, that is to say, the capability of the maxims of every good will to make themselves a universal law, is itself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes on itself, without needing to assume any spring or interest as a foundation.

Having thus established that the autonomous will is the foundation of all morality, Kant says,

1Ibid., 71-72.  
2Ibid., 77.
The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently on foreign causes determining it; just as physical necessity is the property that the causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes.¹

The doctrine of freedom is therefore inevitably involved in the nature of the conception of causality.

Since the conception of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something that we call cause, something else, namely, the effect, must be produced [laid down]; hence, although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity.²

The fact that Kant here has removed the realm of free will from its dependence on physical laws is of utmost significance. He says,

Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law—that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself?²

The will is free in such a way as to display its nature in terms of the categorical imperative. By freedom, Kant means that the will is not dependent. It is self-determining, not

¹Ibid., 78. ²Ibid., 78-79.
as a matter of chance, but as a law. He says, "The proposition: The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law."¹

Hence the categorical imperative is the very essence of the freedom of the will and as such it is the principle of morality so that "a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same."² Kant urges that freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings. For, he says,

We cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgment not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles independent on foreign influences. Consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must regard itself free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom. This idea must therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being.²

Reason's absolute independence must be affirmed. Reason cannot be dependent on any other experiences or influences than itself for to do so would put the "foreign influences" above reason. Reason is supreme.³

¹ Ibid., 79. ² Ibid., 81. ³ Ibid., 80-81.
Kant is using freedom of the will to mean (1) that the will belongs to the agent himself, (2) that the will determines itself to action, and (3) autonomous causality. The first two he describes as follows:

We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be actually a property of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw that it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, that is, endowed with a will; and so we find that on just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its freedom.¹

When the problem of causality is explored it is discovered that the causal conception and the moral conception must be viewed according to the principle of equivalence:

It must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle here from which it seems impossible to escape. In the order of efficient causes we assume ourselves free, in order that in the order of ends we may conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws; and we afterwards conceive ourselves as subject to these laws because we have attributed to ourselves freedom of will; for freedom and self-legislation of will are both autonomy, and therefore are reciprocal conceptions, and for this very reason one must not be used to explain the other or give the reason of it, but at most only for logical purposes to reduce apparently different notions of the same object to one single concept (as we reduce different fractions of the same value to the lowest terms).²

²Ibid., 83.
Imbedded in this quotation is a conception which has caused extreme difficulty in Kant's system of thought. There is the autonomy of causation and the autonomy of the effect. The autonomy of causation has to do with the free will which explains the heteronomy of the efficient causes in which physical necessity is involved. Free will is also that which explains the kingdom of ends in order to make morality possible. On the one view he says, we think ourselves "as causes efficient a priori," and on the other view "we form our conception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we see before our eyes."¹

Before discussing the metaphysical aspects of the notion of the will in Kant, it is of vital importance to clarify two meanings of will in Kant: Wille as practical reason which includes the legislative function and Willkür which is the executive faculty of man. The freedom of Wille is autonomy and it gives, in its autonomy, a law to Willkür.² This law is determined by its own nature and not by anything else in the world including human nature or the will of God. Beck, influenced considerably by the study of Kant made by Hartmann observes that, for Kant, "the moral law is a synthetic a priori

¹Ibid., 83-4.

²Thomas K. Abbott in Kant's Practical Reason, 268, equates Wille, Πληκτρον as elective will; and Willkür, Πληκτρον as rational will. See also Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 12.
statement of what a Willkür would necessarily do if it were exclusively rational; it is a law or imperative of duty for a Willkür which does not do by nature what the law requires.\textsuperscript{1}

The practical reason besides discovering and formulating moral laws has the logical function of deriving rules of action from the moral laws and from human desires and the laws of nature.\textsuperscript{2}

The freedom of Willkür is spontaneity, the faculty of initiating a causal series in nature.

Willkür exercises its freedom by doing one of two things. It can take the law of the pure practical reason as the limiting condition on its maxims out of respect for the law of the rational personality which decrees the law. In this respect Willkür is a good will and is acting out of duty. If it does this merely by struggling against the sensuous impulses it is a virtuous will. If it acts out of duty without any internal struggles but by its own inner nature it thereby is a holy will. On the other hand, the free Willkür may take some other principle than the law of the pure practical reason as its formal principle. If it does this and takes a principle which


\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 203.
is not opposed to the legislation of reason than it is a prudent will, but if it takes a principle that is opposed to the law of the pure practical reason, it is an evil will. Although a Willkühr acting in accordance with the law of pure practical reason is a good will, the question of an evil will is not difficult to resolve. For an evil will is one in which the Willkühr adopts principles which are in opposition to the maxim of the pure practical reason. When the Willkühr disobeys the moral law its freedom is not destroyed, for the Willkühr has always within itself the absolute spontaneity which causes it to act according to the principles which it adopts. The disposition to evil or to good is always freely chosen.¹

When Willkühr, in the exercise of its spontaneity acts on maxims which are incompatible with the moral law, it does moral evil. It is only the freedom of the will as pure practical reason that is analytically connected with morality, but this will does nothing but issue orders which may or may not be obeyed. It neither sins nor does virtuous actions, because it does not act at all. Only because it was believed that there was one function of will and one kind of freedom was it erroneously thought that the Critique identified free and moral acts. When Kant spoke of moral evil therefore it was natural that he should be thought to have fallen into serious inconsistency.²


²Beck, *Commentary*, p. 205.
In this respect there are distinguished two kinds of freedom of choice. There is the freedom of choice of maxims of action (Wahl) and there is the freedom in the choosing of the lawful or the unlawful.¹ Thus the freedom of choice of principles and the freedom of choice of action constitutes a further differentiation of what is meant by a free will in the Kantian philosophy. One final distinction of the meaning of freedom in Kant is made with reference to freedom as a condition of the moral law and as a condition of the summum bonum. Although freedom as the condition of the moral law refers to the will's spontaneity and autonomy, freedom as a condition of the summum bonum is an object of faith in that it is the faith "in the achievability of the summum bonum, i.e., the belief in virtue as adequate to achieve the highest good. In this sense it is 'autarchy of will.'"²

There is a question as to whether or not Kant would enjoy having his doctrine of freedom segmented in the way in which the interpreters of his doctrine have done. The interpreters have been mostly interested in taking the Kantian

¹Kant, Opus Postumum, XXI, 470, cited in Beck, Commentary, p. 205.

²Ibid., p. 208.
doctrine which Kant used to solve specific problems of tremendous importance to philosophy as he understood it and applying it to other problems which make it a sojourner on foreign soil. It would seem that many of the difficulties in the problem of interpreting free will in Kant result from this approach. Such has been the case in Kant's doctrine of a free will defined in terms of spontaneity and autonomy thereby getting beyond the empirical facts of nature understood in the narrowest possible sense. For as Jones has well stated the situation, freedom "means that our recognition of the value which a certain kind of active will has as realizing personality is itself sufficient to move us to act in that way."\(^1\)

\textbf{Kant's Metaphysics of Will}

The act of free will as a realization of personality and as a noumenal cause has striking implications. The importance of freedom as an ethical concept in terms of human nature can hardly be overvalued as it applies to Kant's whole system of philosophy. That the ethical aspects of freedom

deserve greater and more extensive interpretation is not to be denied. In the attempt to discover the proper solution to the fundamental problems of life, it is significant that Kant gave the highest status to a spontaneous and autonomous free will which at the same time became the ultimate principle of the most important aspects of his whole philosophical and metaphysical system. Hence Royce contends that Kant was held fast by the things in themselves whose existence he acknowledged although he could know nothing about them. Nevertheless Royce tells us that Kant paused at the threshold of the show world and said, "Beyond dwells, as we must faithfully believe, a God whom we serve but who is forever the unknown God."¹ The fact that life is deeper than knowledge is for Kant most clearly envisaged in the Critique of Practical Reason where the structure of the free will is seen as the realization of personality and also as the only definition of noumenal reality capable of accounting for both the causal sequence of the natural laws of necessity and the intelligence, spontaneity, independence, and self-causation found in the noumenal world.

The Predicament of Man in a World of Phenomena and Noumena

The solution to the question of the nature of freedom of the will must in the final analysis depend on the nature of man and his predicament in a world of phenomena and noumena. And there are few points more emphasized in Kant than the relationship of the faculty of reason to phenomena and noumena. The rational faculty's knowledge is limited to the phenomenal world — the world of sense. The data of the phenomenal world presented to the subject arrive involuntarily and all that can be done with these data is to unite them into one consciousness under rules. Consequently,

All the "ideas" that come to us involuntarily (as those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects otherwise than as they affect us; so that what they may be in themselves remains unknown to us, and consequently that as regards "ideas" of this kind even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding can apply to them, we can by them only attain to the knowledge of appearances, never to that of things in themselves.¹

The world of sense, accordingly, is represented to the rational faculty as knowable objects affecting man in their own way. What the objects of the natural world of sense

¹Kant, Morals, 84.
show to man's reason is all that man can know about them. This function of reason is brought to man's attention as an "obscure discernment of judgment which it calls feeling."

The differentiation between what is known about objects and what the objects in themselves are is thereby established and by distinguishing between these two areas it begins to become apparent that the rational faculty cannot function in the same way in both areas. As producing knowledge, the rational faculty can apply only to the world of sense, though aware that there are "things-in-themselves" which the rational faculty can never know:

As soon as this distinction has once been made (perhaps merely in consequence of the difference observed between the ideas given us from without, and in which we are passive, and those that we produce simply from ourselves, and in which we show our own activity), then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume behind the appearance something else that is not an appearance, namely, the things in themselves; although we must admit that, as they never can be known to us except as they affect us, we can come no nearer to them, nor can we ever know what they are in themselves. This must furnish a distinction, however crude, between a world of sense and the world of understanding, of which the former may be different according to the difference of the sensuous impressions in various observers, while the second which is its basis always remains the same.¹

¹Ibid.
However, when man observes himself, he finds a clue to the way in which the faculty of reason must function when it applies to the things-in-themselves. Kant observes that when reason applies to man's ego (i.e., his own nature deeper than what he sees of himself as part of the world of sense), reason thereupon appears in consciousness as pure activity, reaching consciousness immediately and not mediated through the senses. This pure activity is man's "inner sense".

Even as to himself, a man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by internal sensation. For as he does not as it were create himself, and does not come by the conception of himself a priori but empirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by the inner sense, and consequently only through the appearances of his nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected. At the same time, beyond these characteristics of his own subject, made up of mere appearances, he must necessarily support something else as their basis, namely, his ego, whatever its characteristics in itself may be. Thus in respect to mere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon himself as belonging to the world of sense; but in respect of whatever there may be of pure activity in him (that which reaches consciousness immediately and not through affecting the senses), he must reckon himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, he has no further knowledge.\footnote{Ibid., 84-5.}

When reflecting men have recognized the faculty of reason functioning as an inner sense, they have (as in Plato)
attempted to explain this function as based on something "invisible, and acting of itself." But they have "spoiled" the value of what they observed by making the thing-in-itself an object of intuition. But the intuition produces a blank and therefore man's understanding of the faculty of reason as inner sense is not advanced in the least.

Now, Kant has already clearly stated that the world of sense is a world of "irrational beings" acting according to laws of physical necessity. But the "inner sense" does not only reveal the unity of consciousness seen as the function of the understanding, but, what is more important, reveals a spontaneity in man which is the independent causality of his own will, his freedom. Kant has, therefore, restated the Platonic notion of self-causation as the essence of man's nature and, for Kant, this is a free will. The discussion of this factor is so central to the entire study of the will that Kant's own presentation of the argument in its entirety as it applies to man's nature must here be stated:

\[1\] Ibid., 85. \[2\] Ibid., 78.
Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes himself from everything else, even from himself as affected by objects, and that is reason. This being pure spontaneity is even elevated above the understanding. For although the latter is a spontaneity and does not, like sense, merely contain intuitions that arise when we are affected by things (and are therefore passive), yet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions than those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense under rules, and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, and without this use of the sensibility it could not think at all; whereas, on the contrary, reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I call "ideas" [Ideal Conceptions] that it thereby far transcends everything that the sensibility can give it, and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of understanding, and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding itself.

For this reason a rational being must regard himself qua intelligence (not from the side of his lower faculties) as belonging not to the world of sense, but to that of understanding; hence he has two points of view from which he can regard himself, and recognize laws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his actions; first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being independent on nature, have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone.

As a reasonable being, and consequently belonging to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will otherwise than on condition of the idea of freedom, for independence on the determining causes of the sensible world (an independence which reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom. Now the idea of freedom is inseparably connected with the conception of autonomy, and this again with the universal principle of morality which is ideally the foundation of all
actions of rational beings, just as the law of nature is of all phenomena.¹

The causality of physical necessity is one which is determined by "foreign causes." But the causality of free will is independent of the determination of foreign causes, a law to itself (autonomous). Accordingly, Kant has found in human nature what he regards as the key to the deepest problem of his metaphysics: the deep chasm separating phenomena from noumena.

Although it appeared that nature had been bifurcated, the concept of freedom in Kant gives an account of causality, provides the grounds for morality, and what is even more important makes possible a bridge between the appearances and the things in themselves. Kant says:

Now we see that when we conceive ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as members of it, and recognize the autonomy of the will with its consequence, morality; whereas, if we conceive ourselves as under obligation, we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense, and at the same time to the world of understanding.²

¹Ibid., 85-86. ²Ibid., 87.
Human consciousness, within itself, reveals how it is possible to conceive of the world of phenomena and the world of noumena. In man's nature these two worlds are seen in the difference between reasoning as meaning to know the objects of sense externally caused in accordance with the laws of nature, and reasoning as meaning to act as a free will self-caused in accordance with the laws of morality (specifically the Categorical Imperative). 

The application of the above factors revealed by a study of human nature is based on the consideration that there is more than human consciousness involved in the discovery of the meaning of free will. There is a world (of understanding) beyond the "ego" (outside of man) which corresponds to the will of man just as there is a world of nature corresponding to the sensations of man:

Since the world of understanding contains the foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws also, and accordingly gives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows that, although on the one side I must regard myself as a being belonging to the world of sense, yet, on the other side, I must recognize myself, as an intelligence, as subject to the law of the world of understanding, that is, to reason, which contains this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will; consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as
imperatives for me, and the actions which conform to them as duties.\textsuperscript{1}

What Kant has found in man applies also to nature. In nature, as seen by speculative philosophy, there is a seeming contradiction between natural necessity and freedom. The conception of the system of nature or its necessity results in the view that everything which takes place is fixedly determined according to the laws of nature. Though reason, for speculative purposes, must assert physical necessity, nevertheless, for practical purposes, and, in order to apply to conduct, reason must assert freedom. The key to the problem of the world as caused in accordance with laws and also as exhibiting freedom is found in man's consciousness of himself as intelligence and free will, i.e., self- causation.\textsuperscript{2}

Philosophy must then assume that no real contradiction will be found between freedom and physical necessity of the same human actions, for it cannot give up the conception of nature any more than that of freedom.\textsuperscript{3}

Consequently, in the realm of the thing-in-itself (the noumenal realm) there is found a causality which is the causality of the inner nature of man as intelligence, free

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 87-88.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 92; See also Practical Reason, 105.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., 90; See also Practical Reason, 104-106.
will, and self-causation. The nature of reality is patterned after the two-fold nature of man: the natural self of instincts, desires, and sensations and the proper self of intelligence, rational cause, and free will. Kant is eager to make the distinction clear and unmistakable:

Man considering himself...as an intelligence places himself thereby in a different order of things and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind when on the one hand he thinks of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will, and consequently with causality, and when on the other he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also), and affirms that his causality is subject to external determination according to laws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good, nay, must hold good at the same time. For there is not the smallest contradiction in saying that a thing in appearance (belonging to the world of sense) is subject to certain laws on which the very same as a thing or being in itself is independent; and that he must conceive and think of himself in this two-fold way, rests as to the first on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses, and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an intelligence, that is, as independent on sensible impressions in the employment of his reason (in other words as belonging to the world of understanding). ²

Free Will as Causality

Free will, defined in the above sense, is the pure practical reason. It cannot be comprehended or understood

¹_{Ibid.}, 93-94. ²_{Ibid.}, 92.
empirically because only those explanations which can be determined according to the laws of nature" can be comprehended and understood. The free will holds good

only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being that believes itself conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from mere desire (namely, a faculty of determining itself to action as an intelligence, in other words, by laws of reason independently on natural instincts). 1

Hence, a causality of reason is an intelligent will: "A faculty of so acting that the principle of the actions shall conform to the essential character of a rational motive, that is, the condition that the maxim have universal validity as a law." 2

Thus the causality of a free will is the practical reason. For Kant, reason, appearing in consciousness as an intelligent will (practical reason), thereby makes possible an interpretation of supersensuous nature: "Supersensuous nature, so far as we can form a concept of it, is nothing else than nature under the autonomy of the pure practical reason." 3 To understand this it is necessary to consider the difference between the will as subject to nature and nature as subject to the will. In the former,

1Ibid., 94. 2Ibid., 93. 3Kant, Practical Reason, 43.
the objects (of nature) cause the conceptions which determine
the will. In the latter the will causes the objects.\textsuperscript{1} In
this respect the practical reason determines whether pure
reason is a law of "a possible order of nature which is
empirically unknowable."\textsuperscript{2} To this Kant replies that the
practical reason determines that the pure reason is just
such a law:

> The possibility of such a supersensuous nature, the
> concept of which can be the ground of its reality
> through our free will, requires no \textit{a priori} intuition
> of an intelligible world, which even in this case
> would be impossible to us, since it is supersensuous.
> For it is only a question of the determining ground
> of volition in its own maxims.\textsuperscript{3}

The question, therefore, becomes not whether nature deter-
mines the will, but whether and how reason determines the
will.\textsuperscript{4}

Kant's answer is that the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}
"begins with pure practical laws and their reality."\textsuperscript{5} The
foundation of these laws is the concept of their existence
in the intelligible world—their freedom. The consciousness
of the moral laws (the consciousness of freedom) is postulated
as such and "cannot be further explained."\textsuperscript{6} Moral law is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 44.
  \item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 45.
  \item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., 46.
  \item \textsuperscript{5}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{6}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
"firmly established of itself."\(^1\) It is

a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of
the possibility of a supersensuous nature, just as
the metaphysical law of events in the world of sense
was a law of the causality of sensuous nature; the
moral law thus defines that which speculative philo-
sophy had to leave undefined.\(^2\)

Free will, therefore, provides the answer to the problem of
causation which speculative reason could not solve:

The determination of the causality of beings in the
world of sense as such can never be unconditioned, and
yet for every series of conditions there must be some-
thing unconditioned, and consequently a causality
which is entirely self-determining.\(^3\)

Speculative reason has the "right" to describe causality
from conditioned to conditioned \textit{ad infinitum}.\(^4\) But, specu-
lative reason leaves a vacuum at the end of the series of
causal conditions. Kant fills that vacuum with the uncondi-
tioned which is the "law of causality in an intelligible
world (causality through freedom)."\(^5\)

The moral law thus defined is a \textit{causa noumenon}. It is
not theoretical but "exclusively practical, since the idea
of the law of a causality (of the will) has causality itself
or is its determining ground."\(^6\) Theoretically, the intel-
ligible world, \textit{a.e.}, "unconditioned causality and its faculty,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(^1\text{Ibid.}, 47.\)
  \item \(^2\text{Ibid.}\)
  \item \(^3\text{Ibid.}, 48.\)
  \item \(^4\text{Ibid.}, 49.\)
  \item \(^5\text{Ibid.}\)
  \item \(^6\text{Ibid.}, 50.\)
\end{itemize}
freedom and therewith a being (myself) which belongs to the world of sense and at the same time to the intelligible world, "is transcendent and problematical, but for practical purposes the intelligible world is immanent and "determinately and assertorically known."¹ Thus Kant has given an explanation for causality through the concept of freedom which is impossible for any other concept. "Only the concept of freedom enables us to find the unconditioned for the conditioned, and the intelligible for the sensuous without going outside ourselves."¹ When reason applies the "supreme and unconditioned practical law" to the individual (i.e. "our own person"), reason sees itself and the individual as "belonging to the pure world of the understanding."² When reason so functions, it "can lift us above the world of sense and furnish cognitions of a supersensuous order and connection."²

Causality as applying to a series of conditioned phenomena does not require the concept of a free will. Things

¹Tbid., 105.
²Tbid., 106.
as appearances do not require an "absolutely unconditional determination of causality."\textsuperscript{1} The supposition of a freely acting cause requires defense only when a being in the world of sense is "regarded also as noumenon."\textsuperscript{1} Kant defines free will so conceived as "a" faculty of absolute spontaneity."\textsuperscript{1}

But this conception of free will is not limited to the Critique of Practical Reason. Professor Beck points out that, in Kant, freedom as spontaneity or the faculty of initiating a new causal series in time is the doctrine of freedom established in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Metaphysic of Morals the concept of autonomy and lawgivingness was added to freedom and these were discussed under the one name of "will".\textsuperscript{2} Beck points out that Kant does not consistently distinguish between these two views of freedom although occasionally he uses the word Willkur to mean spontaneity or causality and Wille to mean the lawgiving autonomy of freedom.

At any rate, the fact, for Kant, is that the laws of nature cannot apply to human actions (the actions of the

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 48.

\textsuperscript{2}Beck, Commentary, p. 177.
proper self). The laws of nature can only apply to man as an appearance and not as "intelligence as a thing in itself."¹ The proper self is the thing in itself: the will as intelligence,² the pure practical reason. And although the speculative reason may not enter the domain of the thing-in-itself nor the world of understanding, the practical reason as causality of will as intelligence is not restricted to the noumenal realm but may think itself into the "world of understanding."³

For Kant, the practical reason is able to define what the speculative can never know, namely, causality as free will: "Practical reason itself, without any collusion with the speculative, provides reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, i.e., to freedom."⁴ And again,

The strange but incontrovertible assertion of the speculative Critique that the thinking subject is only an appearance to itself in inner intuition, now finds its full confirmation in the Critique of Practical Reason; the establishment of this thesis is here so cogent that one would be compelled to accept it even if the first had not already proved it.⁴

¹Ibid., 95. ²Ibid., 96. ³Ibid., 93. ⁴Kant, Practical Reason, 6.
Kant makes it difficult to split reason in two as some have attempted to do with his doctrine of the realm of free will and the realm of nature. He says:

The union of freedom and causality as the mechanism of nature, the first being given through the moral law and the latter through the natural law, and both as related to the same subject, man, is impossible unless man is conceived by pure consciousness as a being in itself in relation to the former, but by empirical reason as appearance in relation to the latter. Otherwise the self-contradiction of reason is unavoidable. ¹

The practical reason unites what the speculative separates:

(1) the "reality of the categories as applied to noumena which is denied in theoretical knowledge but affirmed in practical"; and (2) the "paradoxical demand to regard one's self, as subject to freedom, as noumenon, and yet from the point of view of nature to think of one's self as a phenomenon in one's own empirical consciousness." ¹ For Kant, noumenal reality is a free will, a causa noumena:

The objective reality of a pure will or of a pure practical reason (they being the same) is given in the moral law a priori, as it were by a fact, for the latter term can be applied to a determination of the will which is inevitable, even though it does not rest on any empirical principles. In the concept of a will, however, the concept of causality is already contained; thus in that of a pure will there is the concept of causality which is freedom, i.e., of a causality not determinable according to natural laws and consequently not susceptible to any empirical intuition as proof of the reality of the free

¹ Ibid., footnote.
Nevertheless, it completely justifies its subjective reality in the pure practical law a priori though it is easily seen that it is not for the purpose of the theoretical but for that of the merely practical use of reason. Now the concept of a being which has a free will is that of a *causa noumenon*; and we are assured that this concept does not contradict itself because the concept of a cause originates exclusively in pure understanding and its objective reality with reference to objects in general is guaranteed by the deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason.

That some of the interpreters of Kant have exaggerated the meaning of the spontaneity of the *causa noumenon* to the point of distortion is brought to light by William T. Jones. *Causa noumenon* as free will is both spontaneous and in accordance with law. It is without question recognized that "Kant regarded the will as a kind of cause." Furthermore, the will as such is not to be differentiated in any distinctive way from the proper understanding of freedom because "Kant identifies freedom with noumenal causality." Free will concerns the acting of a being, for, "to say that an act...

1Ibid., 55.
3Ibid., p. 5.
is free is equivalent to saying that it is the product of noumenal causality.¹ Thus freedom is a supersensible cause. It is a causality not subject to empirical principles of determination.

Relying to a degree on the principles expressed in the third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason, it becomes clear that cause is non-temporal, that the kind of causality involved in freedom as a supersensible cause is transcendental freedom which is the power of beginning a state spontaneously, that is, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality.² An act of will is, in Kant, a practical thought (praktische Erkenntnis).³ A practical thought is a thought which is a cause and, therefore, a free will is a practical will as causal. Therefore, a good will is also causal and free.⁴ Hence a will is called practical because it is a faculty of ends⁵ and when the interpreters of Kant equate freedom of the will with noumenal causality as spontaneity only, they have

¹Ibid., p. 6.
²Ibid. See also Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A, 533, B, 561.
³Ibid., p. 29. ⁴Ibid., p. 31.
⁵Kant, Practical Reason, 58-59.
ignored Kant's emphatic doctrine that rational creatures move by a plan, meaning that causality includes a plan or law.

Freedom of the will is thus expressed in terms of the concept or notion of causality but freedom also includes the concept of autonomy, as self-legislation which means that a free will is a law to itself—that the will as itself is an end. "When the will is self-legislative, reason is no longer merely an instrument for obtaining some empirical object of desire; it is itself actually the end the thought of whose worth moves us." Kant clearly defines what he means by causation in almost every respect identical to Plato's definition of the soul. "The will is a kind of cause, and what is originally meant by saying that it is free is simply that its causality is independent of any external (fremd) factor. But this does not mean independence of all determination, for this would be mere lawlessness and would contradict the very meaning of causality." Kant therefore includes the principle

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1 Ibid., pp. 32-3. See also Paulsen, Kant, p. 294: Free will is self-determination through the idea of the law.

2 Ibid., p. 102. 3 Ibid., p. 103. 4 Ibid., p. 105. Also Kant, Practical Reason, 59.

5 Ibid., p. 107.
of law in his view of causation as spontaneous and a noumenon. Although freedom means self-determination (eigene Gesetzgebung) it is important that the self-determination be understood in terms also of the principle of autonomy which includes the idea of law.\(^1\) The nature of the law involved in his doctrine of noumenal cause as free will relates to the proper recognition of a theory of value in which personality derives the highest significance. Thus when the faculty of a free will is interpreted as an act of the practical reason it means that "we are only free if what moves us is our recognition of the worth personality has in itself."\(^1\) For Kant, therefore, a free act is "a realization of personality.\(^2\)

In order to establish a doctrine of free will, it is necessary to introduce ideas and concepts different from those which are available to the speculative thought of the pure reason. Ethics requires a concept of the practical reason in order to differentiate noumenal causality from the external functions describable by a natural law. The concepts of ethics require the internal self-determining aspects of the practical reason as free will (Willkür).\(^3\) The law of a free will is

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\(^1\)Ibid.  
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 109; Kant, *Practical Reason*, 161-162.  
\(^3\)Beck, *Commentary*, p. 179.
not a mere restriction on freedom but is itself a product of freedom.\(^1\) A free will is self-legislating. The advance in the practical reason over the pure reason is in a distinction between Willkür and Wille. For the will of the practical reason is not purely legislative as that of the pure reason but includes the ability to act.\(^2\) Hence the will includes a kind of freedom in the positive rather than the negative sense. When the free will as autonomous is referred to as the property of the will to determine itself according to a self-legislated principle and therefore not lawlessly,\(^3\) this means "that our recognition of the value which a certain kind of act of will has as realizing personality is itself sufficient to move us to act in that way."\(^3\) The will, therefore, as the realization of personality involves the ultimate metaphysical meaning of causality in Kant.\(^4\) Thus:

pure practical reason spontaneously creates an Idea of a natura archetypa, and Willkür, taking this as its object, can become an efficient cause of giving to the world of nature the form of such an intelligible world. In this respect therefore the concepts of freedom as a legislative Wille, and as an active Willkür, are not contradictory in Kant but indicate the full spontaneity of efficient

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\(^1\)Ibid. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 180; Kant, Practical Reason, 48.

\(^3\)Jones, Morality and Freedom, p. 108.

\(^4\)Cf. Ward, A Study of Kant, 177.
causation which is "governed by a rule given by the pure practical reason, which is its legislative office."¹

Kant's doctrine of noumena has been greatly disparaged because of his interpretation of the noumenal realm as consisting of transcendental objects which are unknowable.² The difficulty which is created by the idea of the unknowability of the noumenal realm can hardly be exaggerated. Bowne is greatly concerned with the problem of the division of reality into phenomena and noumena. Bowne suggests that Kant's definition of the noumenal realm and his restriction of the activities of pure reason to the phenomenal realm are self-destructive.³ Bowne says of Kant's noumenal realm that it "vanishes, leaving only verbal phrases in its place."⁴ He interprets Kant as positing the noumenal world of reality apart from mind and antithetical to it: "The static world of unclear speculative thought, or that world of things in themselves which thought can never

¹Beck, Commentary, p. 180.
³Bowne, Kant and Spencer, pp. 124–137.
⁴Ibid., p. 137
reach, is unknowable for the sufficient reason that it does not exist." On the other hand Bowne wishes to make it perfectly clear that Kant's contribution to speculative thought lies in his concept of the activity of the mind in knowing. In thus summarizing the results of the Critique of Pure Reason, Bowne respects its value. But Bowne cannot accept Kant's rejection of the speculative reason as applying to the knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality as developed in the Critique of Practical Reason. He accepts one aspect of what he interprets Kant's view to be, namely, that conviction in the areas of God, freedom, and immortality must be reached in life but he is not favorably impressed with Kant's limitations on reason.

That a fair interpretation of Kant has been given by such an analysis is seriously to be questioned, since Kant does not limit human effort in every respect pertaining to the noumena but only the unknowability of the noumenal realm when knowledge is the result of the same type of speculative reason involved in the interpretation of natural phenomena. Because the interpretation of natural phenomena by speculative reason

\[1\] Ibid., p. 159.
depends upon the establishment of necessary causal connections and rela-
tions, Kant tends to avoid the resultant staticising impact of such an interpretation of the ultimate reality. Concepts of dependence and connection, for Kant, cannot account for intelligence, spontaneity, morality, and self-determination. Accordingly, Kant looks for something which can explain such factors. He, therefore, rejects the aspect of consciousness which is limited to relation and connection, namely, speculative reason, and turns to the more acceptable Willk"ur which includes a free will as spontaneity and intelligence. For Kant a free will is one which is not only causal, but one which "must recognize as necessary a priori a law according to which its freedom is restricted to conditions which render it consistent with itself."\(^1\) The interpretation of free will as possibly a kind of Bergsonian elan vital is precluded because a free will is not the product of an impulse.\(^2\) It is in a sense the self-causation of Plato's soul.

Two factors stand out. Pure speculative reason gives statements about things. Practical reason gives statements about


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 262.
about the moral personality. Greene stresses these two factors as resulting in a dualism in Kant which makes Kant unable to render his concept of freedom intelligible.¹ Greene points out that Kant gives a purely mechanistic interpretation of determinism and then instead of enlarging determinism into an idealistic system in which self-determination can take place, Kant cuts man "off from all influences, divine, human and physical alike."¹ Thus, in the end, Kant is unable to explain how the same man can be both free and yet not free "in one and the same act."¹ Ultimately, according to Greene, Kant is left with a mystery not to be fathomed by the human mind.

It seems almost impossible that Kant could have left himself open to the weakness of such a gaping dualism as Bowne, Greene and others have attributed to him. Kant, in fact, denies that there is a contradiction between the world of phenomena and the world of noumena which cannot be resolved. A being acting in the world of sense:as conditioned and at the same time in the world of noumena (understanding) as absolutely unconditioned is "not self-contradictory."² Kant's reasoning is not too different from Plato's at this

¹"Kant's Religion," p. lv.
²Kant, Practical Reason, 48; See also Ibid., 104.
point. As may be recalled, Plato observed the different kinds of motion and concluded that the motion which is capable of explaining all other motion is "that which is moved by itself," i.e., a soul. Kant similarly observed the same situation. However, Kant called what he observed a series of conditioned causes. But conditioned causes lead to more conditioned causes ad infinitum. Kant concluded that "there must be something unconditioned, and consequently a causality which is entirely self-determining." Kant finds such a being in a self (or person) which at the same time belongs both to the world of sense and to the world of intelligence. Therefore, freedom or free will (in the sense of a moral personality) is not in conflict with natural necessity because, in the first place, as Jones appropriately points out "the understanding has been 'limited' precisely in order to make a place for the non-spatial, non-temporal reality of which freedom in this sense is now seen to be an instance." The understanding becomes aware of its limitations when it attempts to interpret the world of intelligence with concepts which apply only to the world of intelligence.

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1Ibid., 104.  
2Ibid., 105.  
3Jones, Morality and Freedom, p. 175.
sense. As a result, the understanding does not posit a contradiction between the acts of a person in the world of sense and the acts of the same person in the world of intelligence; for concepts appropriate to natural necessity cannot be made to apply to unconditioned causality.

In the second place, the concepts which a person derives inwardly in the world of intelligence are sufficient to explain both the world of intelligence and the world of sense. These concepts apply to noumenal reality (whence they are derived) and to phenomenal reality. Concepts derived from phenomenal reality do not apply to any reality except phenomenal reality.

In the third place, the inner personality, the invisible self, free will, or self-determining causality are incomprehensible to the understanding limited to the phenomenal world. There is no contradiction, however, unless the understanding attempts to use its cognitions, applicable to the world of sense, in order to explain such concepts as the moral law, free will, and unconditioned causality.

Furthermore Beck has attempted to show that even in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ Kant avoids a dualism. There he
defines the principle that "if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of its conditions must also be given, and therefore the absolutely unconditioned, which is either this sum or some member of it, must be given." Kant then applies this principle to causality. Thus,

in respect to the causal dependence of one thing upon another, we apply the principle just enunciated, that if the conditioned is given the unconditioned must likewise be given, else the conditioned, which can only occur when the totality of its conditions is given, would not occur.

The problem of causality in the Critique of Pure Reason suggests two alternatives: (1) That the series is as a whole infinite and therefore unconditioned; or (2) That the series of causes is finite and has its first member unconditioned. In the latter alternative the first member of the finite series is what Kant refers to as an absolutely spontaneous causality of freedom whereby the cause proceeds in accordance with the laws of nature and begins of itself. Freedom thereby refers to the power to effect absolute beginnings.

Norman Kemp Smith calls this freedom in Kant

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1Beck, Commentary, p. 183.
2Ibid., pp. 183-184.
"transcendental freedom" which he describes as the power of making a new beginning.\textsuperscript{1} This freedom is also called a free cause.\textsuperscript{2} The spontaneity of causality of will is not psychological choice.\textsuperscript{3}

Phenomena and noumena suggest, for Kant, a doctrine of causality which can comprehend both realms in a unity. Unity comes about in self-consciousness where there is both the necessary causality in nature and self-causality which is a free will. Beck brilliantly demonstrates that, for Kant, freedom does not contradict natural causation. It rather makes natural causation comprehensible:

Every appearance is the appearance of a reality; its appearance is connected with other appearances under the causal law of nature and is predictable with certainty. But in its relation to that which is not appearance, i.e., the noumenon, and not a member of the temporal series, it is an effect of a freely acting cause, where freedom is defined as the power of being a cause without being an effect. Hence, in principle, every event in the world is a product of both natural and free causation. We do not understand it in its latter relation; all our knowledge is knowledge of the connections of phenomena among themselves. We cannot apply the category by analogy to the relation of noumena to phenomena and think of the former

\textsuperscript{1}Norman Kemp Smith, \textit{A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason} (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1918), p. 570.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 512-513.

as a free cause of the latter without infringing on the principle of mechanical causation so far as our possible knowledge is concerned.\(^1\)

In order to resolve the conflict between phenomenal causality in space and time and the noumenal causality of unchanging substance,\(^2\) Beck suggests that it may be done by holding not to a "two-world theory" but rather to a theory of one world with two aspects. This is done by contrasting the observing, theoretical attitude and the acting, practical attitude with the result that "supersensuous nature is nothing else than nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason."\(^3\) In the Critique of Judgment Kant suggests that the distinction between natural and moral law is dependent upon the peculiar nature of our understanding.\(^4\) Kant applies the conclusions of the Critique of Judgment to the Critique of Pure Reason so that the third antinomy is seen as a maxim for procedure and not a constitutive principle of nature.\(^5\) Thus the realm of experience is seen in one perspective as the moral or practical realm and in another perspective

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\(^{1}\)Beck, Commentary, p. 187.

\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 191.

\(^{3}\)Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A. 550, B. 578, quoted in Beck, Commentary, p. 192.

\(^{4}\)Beck, Commentary, p. 192.

\(^{5}\)Ibid., p. 193.
(the categories) as the realm of nature. Theoretical freedom distinguished from causation refers merely to two aspects of the one reality. In this way Kant assumes that he has solved the problem of the gap between noumenal and phenomenal reality on the grounds that what seemed to be a gap was not a gap in fact. Free will in man expresses itself both as a free will and as empirical consciousness, and a noumenal causality in the universe expresses itself both as noumenal cause and as natural necessity.

A Summary of the Meaning of Will in Kant

In order to give a more distinctive description of the will in Kant, it may be helpful to recognize that Kant has used the doctrine of will and freedom as the most versatile and important of his conceptions. To show the fact that Kant has used the doctrine of will and freedom extensively and to describe the functions the doctrine has performed, the full list of the meanings and uses of the will are as follows:

(1) as a good will (acting for the good in itself)
(2) as a holy will (a completed will in harmony with law)
(3) as the Categorical Imperative
(4) as the power to translate principles into action
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(5) as noumenal causality (intelligence—Aristotle's Nous)

(6) as thing-in-itself

(7) as action according to the conception of law (Wille)

(8) as pure practical reason

(9) as self-determination

(10) as the agent's own power

(11) as autonomous causality

(12) as choice of maxims of action (Wahl)

(13) as spontaneous causality (capable of making an absolute, i.e., new, beginning—(Willkür)

(14) as self-legislation

(15) as faith in the achievability of the sumnum bonum (autarchy of will)

(16) as practical thought

(17) as self-consciousness

(18) as the supersensible (transcendental— independent from everything empirical)

(19) as the timeless, spaceless, unchanging substance

(20) as the faculty of ends

(21) as the unconditioned.

With so many different shades of meaning, it may seem that Kant has created more problems than he has solved.
However, it may be more accurately stated that the achievement of his central purpose did not require him rigidly to restrict the definition of free will. It should be stressed, rather, that for Kant the human personality is active and brings to nature the concepts it finds within itself. In so doing, the human personality posits laws and concepts which it applies to nature as the world of sense. In the same way, the human personality finds moral principles and is conscious of free will as absolutely spontaneous causality. In applying these principles and practical activities to nature, the human personality affirms moral laws and posits a self-determining causality as the noumenal side of nature. That this view of the free will in man and the self-determining cause in nature is, for Kant, closely parallel to the doctrine of the soul in Plato and of Nous in Aristotle is apparent. In the same sense, the definition of will as "in one's power" in Augustine finds its way into Kant's doctrine of self-determining causality as free will.

More specifically, for Kant, the central reality of the noumenal world is the power which creates absolute beginnings. Any world view which claims to account for the facts of life and the universe should not discount the self-determining
cause capable of creating such beginnings. Kant arrives at the conclusion that the power which creates absolute beginnings is none other than the consciousness of self-determining causality which is another name for a free will. He discovers this principle by observing the consciousness of man, the self-personality. On the one hand, the mechanism of nature can be interpreted in terms of a series of conditioned causes. On the other hand, the proper self is the will—intelligence as a thing in itself. Only the proper self can give an account of itself. In so doing it can also give an account of the conditioned causes of nature.

Thus for Kant free will is to be classified neither as psychological, moral, ethical, nor theological freedom, but as metaphysical freedom in the sense of will as self-causation (originating power). As metaphysical freedom, the free will, for Kant, is capable of adequately interpreting not only all the causes which are dependent on other causes, but those causes which cause themselves (acts of free will). Kant's view, on this point, is essentially Platonic in the sense that the unconditioned cause is a self-determining itself, and not Aristotelian in the sense of an uncaused cause.

In raising the doctrine of free will to the level of
metaphysical freedom, Kant has not only given an account of morality, self-consciousness, and causality, but he has emphasized the point that only a free will is capable of creating absolutely new beginnings. Absolute spontaneity can be explained only if conceived as an act of consciousness functioning as the self-causation of a free will.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Free Will in Retrospect

From Embryo to Skepticism

The notion of free will has developed from its slight beginnings as an embryo in Greek thought to include the vastness of God and the universe. In its earliest form the notion of free will meant the consideration of the factors which determined human destiny. Since those factors were found outside of man in the caprice of the gods or the elements of nature, there was little to be said for a doctrine of the will. How to determine human destiny concerned how to cope with the gods or nature.

The Sophists created a revolution in thought because of their denial of the objectivity of truth. The result was to make man the measure of all things so that his destiny was completely in his own hands. There was no doctrine of will, free or otherwise, because man had not defined nor counted his functions. But the denial of objectivity had
left truth in a shambles and man's destiny in confusion and chaos. Though man's freedom was yet undefined, he was, in fact, in spite of the shambles of his thought, left to build in any direction he could. He was unrestrained and it became the task of philosophers to build both the foundation and the structure for understanding human nature and human destiny.

Plato

Plato (and to a lesser degree, Socrates) attempted to correct Sophism by giving his attention to the struggle to discover objective truth. Man as the master of his destiny would utterly fail if he did not know his true destiny—the highest good. If he failed, his evil state was his punishment. If he succeeded, his good condition was his reward. His responsibility was measured by his own actions. Regardless of praise or blame, success or failure, the individual determined his own destiny and took the consequences of his actions upon himself. Man's will was one function (among many) of his whole nature. When man willed, he willed as a whole. He also chose between alternatives, reasoned, desired, imagined, and purposed in the same way. The doctrine of the will was born, but it had no
name, no sight, and had as yet been given no specialized attention. For, the pursuit of moral worth in Greek philosophy overshadowed the problems of moral freedom. The maxim, "Virtue is knowledge," was not an expression of freedom but rather of moral worth.¹

Plato and Aristotle understood well that this maxim could not be accepted without qualification. It did not accord altogether with experience. For very often we seem, at any rate, to choose the worse course knowing the better. For this Plato found an answer, satisfactory to him in the distinction between genuine knowledge and opinion.¹

For Plato, educating and tending the soul would result in true knowledge—the knowledge of the Good.

The soul was the only factor in all reality which was capable of moral worth. The soul, also, was found to be the only reality which did not need something else to move or determine it. The soul, in fact, not only moved itself but was the source of all other motion. This aspect or function of the soul came to be called a free will.

Aristotle

Aristotle was concerned with the fact that man not only impelled himself to a good destiny, but with more frequency

impelled himself to an evil destiny. Aristotle objected to a doctrine which limited man's liability to himself because he was interested in making a man also liable to his fellow men, for both his good and evil acts. Because of the seriousness of the liability for actions which could include severe punishment, Aristotle concerned himself with how men chose their destinies and the grounds for assessing liability. By permitting only ignorance and compulsion to exempt man from liability, Aristotle made it possible to proclaim knowledge and free will as king and queen of the realm of human destiny. Free will was made a separate faculty so that its errors would not reflect on the basic goodness of the human soul. When he decided to give free will a name he gave it at least a dozen, the most important of which were free choice, practical reason, and the union of reason and desire.

In proving his case, Aristotle showed that persons often hold on to their fallible beliefs with the same tenacity as to certain knowledge. Even more important, there are times when a person will calmly and deliberately do what he knows is wrong. In either case the problem for Aristotle (as for Plato) centered in the pursuit of moral worth, which
was more in terms of devotion to the good than a study of the inner workings of the nature of the man pursuing it. Thus ideals such as justice and courage were more appropriate because they made possible the attainment of a good which in turn revealed to the pursuer his true self.

But Aristotle, though recognizing the value of the pursuit of knowledge, turned to the investigation of the problem of why man refuses to pursue the good especially when he knows better. The result of this investigation was to note that when men rejected the good, they did so by free choice and therefore could be held responsible. This made it possible to assign praise or blame and to mete out rewards or punishments.

Because the quality of an act arises from free choice, Aristotle studied the power of choice and its results. A free will was seen to be a part of the soul which functions in the "middle area" between the extremes of reason and appetite. The free will is the practical reason whose function it is to put the soul in order. Ultimately the soul moves from its lowest faculties, appetites, to its highest faculty, mind. This is accomplished by the practical reason functioning as a free will.
Augustine

Augustine attempted to interpret and unite two currents of thought by basing his answer on the struggles of his own soul. He looked at Plato and Aristotle more through Plotinus than through themselves. He saw Christianity through the eyes of Ambrose and the Church more than through the simpler experiences of the Jesus of history. He, therefore, attempted to harmonize Greek philosophy with Christian faith: uniting the *summmum bonum* with the submission of the will; the wickedness of evil with the sin of alienation from God; the weakness of an imprisoned will with the sin of pride; and the goodness of the soul with the doctrine of eternal Salvation.

For Augustine, man, therefore, was not only to surrender his will, but he was to be held accountable to his fellow men and liable to God. What man did was not the product of his own action answerable to himself for the consequences. What man did reflected on the character of God and determined his acceptance or alienation from God and his eternal reward or eternal punishment by God.

The intensity of impact of such a principle on the interpretation of the powers in man which determine his destiny can hardly be overrated. The addition of the feeling of guilt
to the doctrines of original sin, sin, and eternal damnation shows the seriousness of man's lot. Augustine took Aristotle's doctrine of free will as a unit and by adding Christian thought and his own biographical experience to it made it responsible for man's status and his precarious destiny. But Augustine saw in Plotinus' mysticism a doctrine of the will which could undo all the damage man had done himself: the free will of perfection. The harmony of perfect freedom with the doctrine of "the truth making man free" made the doctrine of perfect freedom the more acceptable and gave man a destiny of eternal happiness in the love of God.

To achieve the state of perfect freedom meant a new definition of moral worth. The standards, principles, ideals, values and truths were not clearly discernible in self-examination but issued as commands or revelations from God and readily available in holy writ. Moral worth is so clearly defined that the interpretation of the moral problem was not in finding objectively true ideals worth striving after, but rather in discovering why man refused to obey God. And, although Augustine nodded to the "good will" in passing, his talents were more easily and vividly portrayed in the discussion of man's internal make-up which alienated him from God.
The evil side of human nature interfered with the mystical expression of man's total submission to the will of God.

Augustine looked at human nature to convert it. But this was an impossible task, first, because of the stubborn pride of the will, and, second, because God set the whole of creation going all at once in his own way. A study of man's inner soul showed that when man looked to God he felt elation, but when he saw himself he felt remorse and guilt. It was in the feelings of elation or remorse that man could see the barometer of his spiritual state. And where, for others, such goods as justice, beauty, goodness, and truth were sought as the solution to man's predicament, Augustine turned rather to the question of how conversion took place. Conversion meant the recognition of sin as an evil will, the resultant feeling of guilt in the acknowledgment of the sin, and the experience of alienation from God driving man to his final state in the service and love of God.

Kant

As in the case of Augustine, Kant also could not turn away from Aristotle. Kant took the practical reason, the doctrine of causal agency (spontaneity), the notion of
faculties, and the laws of reason from Aristotle and bound them together to account for man's moral nature and destiny and to give the key to the deepest problems of metaphysics—free will as spontaneity and law. Not only is the practical reason a description of the nature of man, it is the key to the noumenal reality of the universe. The same experiences, concepts, and laws apply both to man and the universe. The implication in Augustine that man operated by one set of principles and God by another could not satisfy the mind of Kant. Kant's moral principles answered the problem for him. He did not reject the Platonic view of directing the soul toward the Good, Aristotle's praise and blame of the free will, and Augustine's interest in conversion. He added the conception of a Categorical Imperative in the nature of reality to which not only man but even God must comply. ¹

Just as natural science consists of a healthy respect for natural law, so the spiritual life must include a devotion to moral law. And though on the surface the spiritual life appears to be defined as a search for principles outside one's self, nevertheless, when the principle is held up for observation, it turns out to be "the very essence of a free will"

as a highly philosophical rephrasing of the Golden Rule. That such a rephrasing improves upon the principle is debatable, but at least the philosophical form of the Golden Rule is not so easily attacked, since it is barricaded with a high wall of systematically phrased ideas of the most inscrutable complexity. The critics, however, were not overly impressed by the barrage and at times ridiculed the maxim of the Categorical Imperative by pointing out that the excellence and mediocrity could become identical, if they were performed with the will that they both should be universally practiced.\(^1\)

In Kant, the doctrine moved from free will as unintentional guilt (culpa)\(^2\) to free will as the power to effect absolute beginnings,\(^3\) but through it all there ran the concept that a man's goodness was a question of character, and this was founded on the moral will. Man achieved his completeness when his action was motivated by the ratio cognoscendi.

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 601-602.


Conclusion

As a result of the consideration of the four thinkers involved in this study, several factors stand out as needing emphasis and correlation. By giving consideration to these factors some of the basic elements may be clarified, and the relationship between these thinkers may be made more explicit. In order to accomplish this result, three aspects of the problem will be given: (1) the psychology of free will, (2) the morality of free will, and (3) the metaphysics of free will.

The Psychology of Free Will

The relationship of the doctrine of free will to the soul is most significant. In seeking ultimate reality Plato finds it in the soul which he defines as "that which is moved by itself." There is nothing more basic than the soul's ability to will itself as a unity of self-directing consciousness. When the soul acts, it is acting as a whole. Its faculties or powers are not related to it as the parts to a whole but rather as the functions of the soul as a whole. When the soul functions as a unity of self-directing consciousness, it is exercising its function of willing.

The fact that the soul directs itself means that it is psychologically free.

The validity of this definition of the soul is strongly challenged by Aristotle on psychological, moral, and metaphysical grounds. Aristotle asserts the psychological aspect of the argument on the ground that Plato's definition of the soul is not adequate. In the first place, if the soul is an ultimate reality as a first cause, it cannot be moved. By definition a first cause, for Aristotle, cannot be moved. If the soul cannot be moved, it cannot be moved by itself, and therefore the soul is an unmoved mover.

In the second place, the soul does not function as a whole, as claimed by Plato, because there are functions of the soul which are opposed to each other. In order, therefore, to account for this opposition, the soul must be defined as possessing faculties which are parts of the soul and which function separately though not separable. The faculties, therefore, account for the variety of the soul. They are defined either as parts of the soul or as inter-penetrating entireties. For Aristotle, the definition of the soul in terms of its faculties can more readily account for movement by the faculty of appetite than by the soul as self-moving. A free will becomes a faculty rather than a function of the whole soul. In the final analysis the soul is observed as displaying life in terms of local movement.
and thinking. These two aspects of the soul describe the
two faculties with which the faculty of free will must
bargain in the performance of its function. The notion of
the soul as described by Plato appears to have been largely
discarded except when Aristotle is found describing the
faculty of thinking (mind) as thinking itself. That thought
thinking itself may be supreme does not prevent it from
being enfeebled by desire or appetite. The faculty of free
will as the practical reason arbitrating between the other
faculties while the soul itself remains unmoved is involved
in still greater contrast when considered morally and meta-
physically. This discussion, however, must wait.

When Augustine defines the will as that which is in
the individual's power, he gives the impression that his
definition of a free will psychologically will be Platonic.
However, though the power of the will is the will itself,
it soon becomes defined as that faculty which has the power
to attain a goal. As a faculty the will can voluntarily
turn in different directions. Furthermore, the will is the
faculty upon which all other faculties depend. The will,
in turn, receives its energy from the soul. That the will
is not the self-directing unity of the soul is clearly indi-
cated for Augustine, as in the case of Aristotle, by the fact
that the will does not always will successfully, nor does
it obey its own commands. Furthermore, when the mind commands
the will, the will does not necessarily obey. In mediating
between reason and desire there is no clear way for the will
itself to control the outcome of its decisions functioning
merely as a will.

Kant applies the faculty of reason in order to dis-
tinguish between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. When
reason applies to man's own nature seen to be deeper than
what is observable in the world of sense, reason appears
as a pure activity revealing man as belonging to the intellect-
ual world. The inner sense of reasoning functioning as
described reveals the unity of consciousness and man's free-
dom or free will as the spontaneous and independent causal-
ity of his own will. Thus the psychology of free will began
in Plato as self-directing consciousness, became in Aristotle
a faculty bargaining with or warring against the other
faculties, developed in Augustine to a self-defeating faculty
which cannot obey itself and which also neither obeys nor
commands the other faculties consistently, and finally in
Kant returned to the Platonic doctrine defining the soul in
precisely the same way as did Plato and referred to as Kant's
document of free will.

The Morality of Free Will

The moral and ethical aspects of the doctrine of free
will seem to have more serious consequences than the psy-
chological. The fact is, however, that the moral and ethical
aspects of the doctrine of free will are rooted in the psychological definition.

For Plato the soul as a whole is free to choose between alternatives. Since the choice is not the function of a faculty but the soul as a whole, the factors which make for a right choice must apply to the whole soul and not to a faculty. Since the whole soul is a self-directing unity of consciousness, its tendency or education aimed at assisting the soul to make right choices will be concerned with knowledge of the good. If the choice were the function of desire, then the measures to be taken to make for the right choice would have to be aimed at the meaning and the action of desire. Therefore, to say that virtue is knowledge is merely another way of saying that the choice of the good is brought about by healing the whole soul and not by the training or strengthening of a faculty. When the whole soul functions freely to choose the highest good, it must do so on the grounds of what it knows. The soul will choose the good because it is functioning rationally. To say that virtue is found by free choice would be an arbitrary capriciousness in which the soul is running hither and thither trying to find virtue by guesswork rather than by knowledge. Thus, for Plato, responsibility does not apply to the power of self-direction. Responsibility for an evil act requires tendence of the whole soul in the form of education or dis-
cipline. Discipline or punishment aimed at a faculty to strengthen or weaken it cannot apply to the Platonic doctrine of tendance in which the soul's self-motion is the soul's self-knowledge and self-determined act of virtue. Knowledge commands the soul, and the soul cannot do anything else but act. Again, virtue is not found by a capricious act of free will but by a knowledge which is taught. The result is that the right choice is based on the right information. Knowing the good but not doing it is an error both in knowledge and in action. A free will cannot choose the good unless it is the action of the whole soul directed to the good by its knowledge.

Aristotle agrees with Plato that the mind is always right but points out that the appetite can and does originate movement contrary to mind. The mind may reveal the highest good, but it is not the whole soul. It is a faculty of the soul. The appetite, on the other hand, is also a faculty and is energized by the soul. In its blindness appetite does not see what the mind sees and therefore wars against the mind. This combination of the appetite and the reason is defined by Aristotle as the practical reason.

Aristotle agrees with Plato that intelligence is derived by instruction, but he applies it not to the soul but to the faculty of mind. On the other hand, moral virtue applied to the faculties is brought about by habit which in turn
produces character. The faculties, therefore, are trained by habit to choose the mean between extremes. Knowledge of the good does not necessitate doing good for the very reason that the soul as an unmoved mover includes its faculties which can subdue the faculty of knowledge. That man is the author of his actions means for Aristotle that man's self-determination earns for him responsibility for the consequences of his actions. Both vices and virtues are voluntary in the sense that the action originates in the agent. This quality of the act makes it a will. It is voluntary because it is in one's own power to do it.

Virtue is achieved by choice or by free will (the practical reason) which is the habit of observing the mean determined by prudence. Moral freedom alone does not qualify as the basis for man's moral nature. The choice must be educated by prudence in order that the mean between extremes may be deliberated on, selected, and desired.

Augustine takes the same approach to Plato's doctrine of the soul and its self-determination as did Aristotle. For Augustine, if Plato's definition of the soul in terms of its self-motion were adequate, when the soul willed itself it would do what it willed. Although Plato urged that when the soul does not do what it ought to it is because it does not know the answer, Augustine asserts that the soul's self-determination is not ultimate but subject to the command
of other forces. Evil action is not the result of ignorance of compulsion. Both of these factors are exemptions for moral evil. Moral evil is the result of an act of choice. The act of choice is an act of free will involving only two alternatives: \textit{amor dei} and \textit{contemptus dei}. The free will may choose either conversion to God or aversion to God. By willing itself the will has all power to thwart the will of God. The faculty of desire enslaves the will, and the mind therefore can only achieve its salvation by an act of the grace of God.

Kant is keenly aware of the problem that the most respected criticism of the self-determining power of self-consciousness arises from the fact that the mind commands but the will does not obey. That the mind commands the will in the Platonic sense is the starting point for Kant in the discussion of the morality of free will. Kant accepts the proposition that reason reveals commands, imparts laws (imperatives) which are aimed at determining the will. He repudiates both Aristotle and Augustine at the point where the practical reason or free will is viewed as being tossed about by other forces. A will rocked back and forth by inclinations or wants is, for Kant, not a moral will. The worth of an act is measured by the principle of volition. Thus a good will means the will determined by rational principles. When Kant says that the will is autonomous, he means
that the will is a law to itself. Reason, therefore, commands the will. This autonomous will is the foundation of all morality. To make the free will subject to anything but itself is to make it dependent on the physical laws of nature or the capriciousness of an irresponsible indeterminism. The soul finds within itself a law by which its sense of duty is motivated. Praise and blame are not determined by the external consequences of an act but by a condition in the will itself. The will as the practical reason is free and autonomous. The will determines itself not in the free choice of chance but in the absolute independence of reason. The will is free in that it belongs to the agent himself, determines itself to action, and is autonomous causality. The categorical imperative reaffirms the principle that the soul is a self-conscious unity freely willing itself and is a denial that the practical reason cannot do what it commands itself to do. The executive power of the will always has within itself the absolute spontaneity which causes it to act according to the principles which it adopts.

The Metaphysics of Free Will

The metaphysical conclusions relating to the doctrine of free will are the most important factors in the whole discussion. The metaphysical aspects of the doctrine begin with the psychological definitions.
For Plato the soul is the source and cause of all physical movement. Since no physical movement is spontaneous, there is a cause which is the prime cause or principle of change. This prime cause is a soul moved by its own impulse. It is the ordering and containing first principle of all things. It is self-caused and determined from within itself. In its internal determination it is the cause of itself and everything else that does not have a cause. Evil as the absence of good is not caused.

Aristotle affirms that there must be a limit in the causal series, a first cause. This first cause is a whole which moves as the cause of motion but is itself unmoved. Except for the mind which can be separated from the soul, the soul's unity consists in the inseparability of its faculties.

Movement is predicatable and therefore does not belong to the primary substance. The primary substance, or first principle is God as the self-dependent actuality of thought thinking itself. By this definition of the first principle the contradiction of an unmoved mover is removed. The definition of unmoved is thereby revised to mean not uncaused or causeless but rather to be thought thinking itself—the contemplation of perfection. Under these circumstances there is nothing to move to.

Man functions as practical reason when reason and appe-
tite are joined as deliberative desire. This is free will or choice. The appetitive faculty and the rational faculty move the soul to the good.

Whereas for Plato the soul is a self-determining unity of consciousness, in Aristotle it is an unmoved mover composed of faculties whose functions are inseparable from it (except for mind) and the form of the body.

For Augustine there are two laws in the universe (1) man made, (2) the law of divine providence. God's power is absolute and perfect, energizing man who in turn provides the energy for his will. The first cause is not self-motion but God. Everything is perfect with natural evil explained by the wrath of God resulting from moral evil. When man defines himself in terms of his own self-consciousness, he is failing to recognize the will of God, and, as such, he alienates himself from God. The primal reality is not the self-consciousness of man but the eternal will of God.

In Kants the autonomous free will is not determined by foreign causes such as physical necessity but is free and self-determining. As supreme, reason is not biased but rather free and practical. The free will discovers its own laws on the one hand and is spontaneity as the power of initiating a causal series in nature on the other. The free will as the inner sense not only reveals the unity of consciousness seen as the function of the understanding but,
what is more important, reveals a spontaneity in man which
is the independent causality of his own free will. The
concept of freedom, therefore, bridges the gap between the
appearances and the things-in-themselves. Thus the world
of understanding contains the foundation of the world of
sense. The key to the problem of the world as caused in
accordance with laws is found in man's consciousness of
himself as intelligence and as free will—the causality of
the inner nature of man as intelligence. Noumenal reality
appears in consciousness as an intelligent will. Applied
to reality freedom is spontaneity or the faculty of initiating
a new causal series in time. As in the case of Plato, for
Kant the self-determining cause is sufficient to account
for the facts of life and the universe and is the central
reality of the noumenal world with the power to create
absolute beginnings. Kant arrives at the conclusion which
has been here attributed to Plato; namely, that the power
which creates absolute beginnings is none other than the
consciousness of self-determining causality which is another
name for a free will.
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THE WILL AND ITS FREEDOM
IN THE THOUGHT OF PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AUGUSTINE, AND KANT
(Library of Congress No. Mic. 61)

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Boston University Graduate School, 1961

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1. Problem. The problem of this dissertation is to examine the doctrines of the will in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant and to relate their conceptions of freedom to their doctrines of the will.

2. Method. The method consists in examining primary sources which define and interpret the will and its freedom.

3. Summary. Plato defines the soul as that which is moved by itself. There is not a will as a self-determining faculty which is free, but rather a self-determining soul which wills itself freely as a unity.

In Aristotle the soul itself does not move. What moves are the faculties. Free will as the faculty of moral choice is the "middle faculty", the practical reason, between the extremes of theoretical reason (maximal soul---Nous) and moving desire (minimal soul--body).

In Augustine the will is that which controls the motion of the soul from which, as a faculty, the will
derives its power. The will selects among alternatives. In man's first state he is free, but once he chooses he is no longer free. He has only two choices: to obey God, or to sin. Either choice costs him his free will. Salvation can come only as the gift of God's grace. Salvation is perfect freedom.

For Kant, the will is a cause which functions as a law to itself--the pure practical reason. Free will as an entirely self-determining causality acts in the world of sense as conditioned, and, at the same time, in the world of noumena as absolutely unconditioned.

4. Conclusions. There are three aspects to the problem of free will: the psychological, the moral, and the metaphysical aspects.

In relation to the psychological aspect of the problem, Plato's view of the soul's ability to will itself as a self-directing unity of consciousness is the point of departure for subsequent doctrines of free will. Aristotle, however, claims that the soul cannot be moved as a first cause and that the varieties of functions of the soul are due to the parts of the soul acting as faculties for the soul. Augustine points out that the will neither wills successfully nor obeys its own commands. Kant builds on the Platonic foundation.

Morally, free will in Plato concerns making a right
choice. Virtue is not found by a capricious act of free will. A free will cannot choose the good unless it is the action of the whole soul directed to the good by reason. Augustine and Aristotle point out that the soul's self-determination is not ultimate but subject to the commands of other faculties and forces. Kant reaffirms the view that the mind commands the will.

Metaphysically, free will helps define first principles. For Plato, the first principle is self-motion. For Aristotle, free will applies to the faculties the soul uses. For Augustine, the first principle is the absolutely free will of God. For Kant, free will is the central reality of the noumenal world with the power to create absolute beginnings.
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Peter V. Corea

I was born in Boston on April 4, 1924. In 1934, my father died, and my family moved to Woburn. I graduated from Woburn High School in June, 1941, and entered Boston University in September, 1941. In August, 1944, I received the Bachelor of Arts Degree with a Major in Philosophy. During this time, I was tutored in Greek and German three hours a week by Professor William G. Aurelio, and continued until 1948. After graduation from Boston University, I attended Andover Newton Theological School, receiving the Bachelor of Divinity Degree in 1947, with a major in Theology. In 1947, I studied General Semantics with Alfred Korzybski under the auspices of the International Society of General Semantics at Harvard University.

While an undergraduate at Boston University, I was elected to the Honor Society of Scarlet Key and held the office of President of the Boston University Young Men's Christian Association, the Protestant Club, and the Junior Class. I also belonged to or held offices in the Debating Club, the Choral Arts Society, the Philosophical Club, to mention a few.
In December, 1947, I was ordained into the Christian ministry and was called as Pastor of the Houghs Neck Congregational Church, a position I have held to the present. I have held the following positions: Chairman, Social Action Committee, Quincy Council of Churches; President, Protestant Social Service Bureau; Executive Secretary, South Shore Council of Churches; Dean, Pilgrim Fellowship Summer Conferences; Scribe, Suffolk South Association of Congregational Churches; Board of Directors, Woodward School for Girls; Chairman, United Nations Week Committee; Board of Directors, United Fund; Steering Committee, United Fund; Board of Directors, Boston Seaman's Friend Society; Chairman, Quincy Literary Review Board; Committee to establish a Community College; Chairman, Andover Newton Class of 1947 Alumni Fund; Chairman, Committee for Community Planning, City of Quincy; Chairman, Social Work Conference; Commission on Evangelism and Devotional Life, Massachusetts Congregational Christian Conference; Delegate to the National Council of Churches; Visitor; World Council of Churches, Evanston; Research Worker, American Civil Liberties Union; Committee on the Ministry, Suffolk South Association of Congregational Churches; Board of Directors, Norfolk County Health Association; Evaluation Committee, Visual Aids, National Council of Churches.
In 1954-55, I was elected Borden Parker Bowne Fellow at Boston University; I was a Graduate Assistant in the Philosophy Department at Boston University; I had the position of Lecturer in Appreciation of the English Bible at Boston University; I was Instructor in Pastoral Psychology at Andover Newton Theological School, and was Assistant to Professor Peter A. Bertocci at the Harvard Extension Classes, and Editor of the Philosophical Forum. I have authored religious articles for denominational publications, and occasional book reviews.

The following is a list of the more important organizations to which I belong: American Association for the United Nations; Clinic on Alcoholism; Quincy City Hospital; Boston University Philosophical Club; American Association of University Professors; American Philosophical Association; Committee for Education of the United Nations Council; Wollaston Lodge, A.F. and A.M.; Knights Templar, Grotto, Fellowship of Reconciliation.

On June 1, 1946, I married M. Alicia Coffin, who is now Associate Minister of the Houghs Neck Congregational Church. She has been active in religious, civic, and fraternal organizations. Indication of her activities is represented by the fact that she has been a Trustee of the Massachusetts Congregational Christian Conference, Moderator of the Suffolk South
Association of Congregational Churches, is Chaplain of the Quincy Girl Scouts and of the Quincy Federation of Women's Organizations.

Our son, William Charles Corea, born April 15, 1952, is at present a third year student at the Lower School, Milton Academy.