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The idea of nationalism in Soviet foreign policy

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Dissertation

THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

by

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INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of the Dissertation. This dissertation is the product of an investigation into the character of Soviet Russian exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy during the period of Lenin and Stalin. It is intended to demonstrate: (1) that Soviet exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy was derived from a revolutionary plan conceived by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the last half of the nineteenth century; (2) that the exploitation of nationalism by Lenin and Stalin has contributed significant benefits to the Soviet interest in world politics; and (3) that it has also contributed in an important way to the recurrent Communist problem of national deviationism.

My interest in this topic stemmed from the observation that the Russian Communist position with respect to the national issue displayed a dual character. Whereas in theory the Communist leaders viewed nationalism as incompatible with socialism, they frequently promoted nationalism as a matter of practical policy. Upon closer examination of this seeming incongruity, I discovered a number of interesting facts about it. For one thing, it did not represent a hidden conflict between the opposing tendencies of internationalism and nationalism, but rather a deliberate scheme
to utilize nationalism in the interest of Communist revolutionism. Secondly, Communist promotion of nationalism as a matter of practical policy was consistent with Marxism, since its roots were contained in a revolutionary plan conceived by Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century. Thirdly, Lenin's adoption of a modified version of the original plan, and his and Stalin's application of it, constituted one of the important reasons for Soviet Russia's successes in world politics since 1918. And finally, the promotion of nationalism by the Soviet leaders contributed significantly to one of Communism's recurrent internal problems, national deviationism.

In the course of my preliminary investigation, one thing that struck me as being curious was the absence of a complete study of this aspect of Soviet Russian foreign policy. To be sure, it had not escaped attention entirely. In several excellent volumes on Soviet politics, I found references to the fact of expedient Communist nationalism. In a few instances, there were detailed descriptions of its nature in connection with particular episodes. But in no case could I find a study of the subject in its entirety, or one that satisfied all requirements for an understanding of its essential nature and significance. In view of Soviet Russia's prodigious success in world politics from
1918 to 1953, and the need to understand the methods by which it was achieved, I undertook the task of filling this gap.

The Scope and Method of the Dissertation. While the focus of attention here will be on Lenin's and Stalin's exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy since 1918, this is not meant to imply that it was their sole, or even their main, tactic, or that they used it in foreign policy exclusively. On the contrary, the fact is that the Russian leaders made use of the Red Army, the Comintern and other international Communist organizations, and a variety of propaganda themes in their revolutionary strategy, the absence of which could not have been compensated for by any additional expedient promotion of nationalism. Furthermore, they also promoted nationalism at home in order to perpetuate their dominion over Russians and non-Russians alike. However, it is my opinion that the purpose here can be served best by avoiding the method of a general survey, and the difficulties of repetition and confusion that it would entail. Consequently, I have elected to consider other aspects of Soviet policy, whether domestic or foreign, only when, and to the extent that, they are considered necessary to illuminate more fully the nature of the exploitation of nationalism and the significance of its re-
The method of the dissertation is historical and analytical. In an introductory chapter, the concept of nationalism as an instrument of Communist revolutionary policy is traced from its origin in the writings of Marx and Engels to its revival and enlargement by Lenin. Thereafter, beginning with the year 1918, attention is centered mainly on the exploitation of nationalism in Soviet foreign policy, first by Lenin, and then by Stalin. Five chapters are composed for this purpose, each defining a major phase of Soviet policy. Within each chapter, particular attention is devoted to a definition of the motives behind the expedient promotion of nationalism, an analysis of its form, and an evaluation of its contribution to the Soviet purpose. Success in each case is measured on the basis of the ability of the Communist leaders to persuade non-Communists of the sincerity with which they espouse the cause of nationalism and the extent to which it contributes to the achievement of the objective sought.

The Method of Research. For the purpose of this study, I began by reviewing available works on Marxism, Communism, Soviet Russian foreign policy, and the Communist International. In this respect, scholarly studies by Max Beloff, Solomon F. Bloom, Franz Borkenau, Edward H. Carr,
David Dallin, Isaac Deutscher, Louis Fischer, Andrew Gyorgy, Barrington Moore Jr., Richard Pipes, Rudolph Schlesinger, Hugh Seton-Watson, and Bertram Wolfe, and the publications of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. were particularly stimulating, and served to clarify my own thoughts on the subject. Their bibliographies were helpful, and, in a few instances, they afforded access to pertinent information not otherwise available to me.

My next step was a thorough examination of all relevant original documentation available to me. Chiefly, this included the writings of Otto Bauer, Eduard Bernstein, Nikolai Bukharin, Friedrich Engels, Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Karl Marx, George Plekhanov, Karl Renner, I.V. Stalin, Lev Trotsky, and Gregori Zinoviev, the Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, the Soviet periodicals Bolshevik (now Kommunist), Istorik Marksist, Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, Novi Vostok, New Times, The Communist International, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, and the published proceedings of the congresses of the Russian Communist Party, the Comintern, and the Cominform.

When found, reliable translations from the original Russian, German, and French into English were employed. In this respect, translated editions of many important works made available by Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., International
Publishers, and Foreign Languages Publishing House were especially helpful, as were translations in documentary volumes compiled by C.K. Cumming and Walter Petit, Jane Degras, Frank Golder, and Xenia Rudin and Robert C. North. Otherwise, I am personally responsible for all translations from Russian into English, and for such translations from German and French into English that were graciously, and gratuitously, provided by close friends and colleagues better qualified than I.

The results of my search were rewarding. I discovered that my needs could be satisfied almost entirely on the basis of original documentation for the period up to 1928. In the early years, the Soviet leaders made no secret of their aims and methods. The major difficulty occurred after 1928, when Stalin consolidated his power in Russia. From that point, Communist documents became very carefully censored, making the definition of Soviet methods somewhat more difficult.

But the problem of defining Stalin's method of exploiting nationalism in foreign policy was not an insurmountable one, nor was it as serious as that which confronted the student of domestic Soviet politics. Even Stalin could not avoid the consequence of an active foreign policy, which is revealing to a considerable degree for the reason that
It involves relations with governments and people beyond the jurisdiction of the Communist censor. Thus, invaluable clues to the character of Soviet foreign policy generally, and the exploitation of nationalism particularly, were found in the published proceedings of the international conferences attended by the Communist leaders and in the official accounts of relations with Soviet Russia published by many governments. Their complement was found in the statements of the Communists, personal accounts of non-Soviet statesmen and diplomats who dealt directly with them, and accounts of those who lived under Communist rule before fleeing to the West. Finally, not overlooked were the penetrating analyses of Soviet foreign policy presented by a host of Western scholars and outstanding newspaper reporters.

In conclusion, I would add that I have been aware at all times of the problem posed by the willful deceit of some Communist writers and the zealous anti-Sovietism of the refugees whose native countries have fallen under Communist domination. In this connection, I can only say that I have tried earnestly to distinguish fact from fiction and to present my subject as objectively and dispassionately as possible. My purpose has not been to attack or defend Communism, but simply to define, as accurately as possible,
the character of Soviet Russian exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy during the period of Lenin and Stalin.
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CHAPTER I

THE GENESIS OF POLICY

As one examines the historical record of Marxism on the national question, it becomes evident that Soviet Russian use of the national idea in foreign policy since 1918 has been a logical extension of ideas first advanced by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the nineteenth century. For one thing, it has been based on the classical Marxian assumption that the nation and nationalism possess no lasting value, that, as the products of capitalist economics, they will disappear with the advent of socialism on a world scale. For another thing, it has also been based on Marx's acceptance of the nation and nationalism as facts to be reckoned with as long as they do exist, and even to be promoted at such times when the paramount revolutionary interest will be served best.

In this first chapter, attention will be centered on the character of the classical Marxian regard for the national question, its eclipse in socialist thinking after Marx's death, and its revival and remolding by Lenin to fit the circumstances of the Russian revolution.

The Marxian Heritage. While evidently aware of the nation and nationalism as inexorable facts, neither Marx nor Engels attempted a systematic treatment of the national ques-
tion as such. Their ideas on the subject were random and informa\ntional. For the most part they reflected the influence of preconceived theoretical notions and were largely negative.

For example, the "world" of the founders of Marxism was Western Europe, whence they drew the bulk of the source material for their economic and social studies; and where, as far as they were concerned, nationality no longer constituted a serious problem. This appeared to them a normal condition, fully supported by the progress of historical forces:

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to the uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.¹

History, according to Marx and Engels, was governed by an underlying "economic law of motion". It unfolded in successive economic stages, each with its peculiar institutional and ideological "superstructure". The nation and nationalism they defined as part of the "superstructure" of the capitalist stage, and they predicted that both would disappear once capitalism had been supplanted by socialism.²

²Cf. Ibid.
Consequently, continuing appeals to patriotism were viewed as anachronistic vestiges of declining capitalism, executed in the interest, and under the direction, of the bourgeoisie. The glorification of tradition, history, the state, and the nation was dismissed as a futile instrument of oppression and exploitation.

In contrast, the proletariat was regarded as naturally free of national prejudice and hostile to all nationalistic appeals. Once the working classes had succeeded in overthrowing capitalism, it was expected that national distinctions would decline more rapidly and would ultimately disappear altogether.3

From their Western-oriented basis, Marx and Engels also deduced "solutions" to nationality problems in other regions of the world. For example, they viewed Eastern Europe as being still a half-stage behind Western Europe in social development, hampered by the remnants of feudalism and the continued existence of innumerable small ethnic groups. Hence, they predicted that feudalism would be replaced by capitalism there and that the small nationalities would be compelled by it into the orbits of such "energetic" nations as the German, Hungarian, Russian, and Serbian, and would be

assimilated by them. They also predicted that, following the example to be provided by the West, socialist revolutions within each of the "energetic" nations would in turn dispense with the nationality issue entirely.

The originators of Marxism arbitrarily excluded Asia and Africa from the stage of social development that gives rise to the nationality question. Both continents were considered as sociologically "static and stagnant", rooted in primitive communal agrarian systems, and hampered by limited domestic industry and backward methods of production. Still in a pre-feudal condition, and held there by Western imperialism, reform from within was held to be an impossibility. The only hope for progress in Asia and Africa, they concluded, was to be found in an enlightened form of proletarian imperialism. It would follow the success of socialism in the West and would bring socialism to both continents without the prerequisite evils of feudalism and capitalism.

Marx and Engels never abandoned their faith in the proletarian revolution in Western Europe as the key to the

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5 Cf. The New York Tribune, June 25, 1853; August 8, 1853.

solution of the nationality problem everywhere. However, their original view of the relationship of nationalism to socialism did undergo a significant modification. This occurred in the wake of the revolutions of 1848, which, according to their estimate, were supposed to have resulted in the overthrow of European capitalism. It grew out of their quest for a method to stimulate new and successful revolutions. Searching about, the self-styled engineers of social upheaval perceived the possibility of deriving important benefits from an accommodation between socialism and nationalism.

According to the founders of Marxism, the revolutions of 1848 had failed for two reasons principally: because of Tsarist Russia's counterrevolutionary intervention and because of a low level of revolutionary enthusiasm among the working classes in Western Europe. In order to eliminate these two impediments from future revolutionary efforts, they adopted the single expedient of promoting the cause of nationalism.

The new revolutionary strategy was a simple one; based on the support of Polish and Irish claims to national self-determination. Polish independence was advocated for the reason that its achievement would mean the establishment of a bulwark against a new counterrevolutionary incursion by Tsarist Russia. Marx wrote:
There is but one alternative for Europe. Either Asiatic barbarism under Moscovite direction will burst around its head like an avalanche, or else it must reestablish Poland, thus putting twenty million heroes between itself and Asia and gaining a breathing spell for the accomplishment of its social regeneration.7

Irish freedom was favored as the means of stimulating the requisite degree of revolutionary consciousness among the working classes of Western Europe, starting with the English. As Marx explained it in a letter to Engels:

The way I shall put forward this matter is this: that quite apart from all phrases about "international" and "humane" justice for Ireland,— which are to be taken for granted in the International Council — it is the direct and absolute interest of the English working classes to get rid of their present connection with Ireland. And this is my most complete conviction, for reasons which in part I cannot tell the English workers themselves. For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working class ascendancy. I always expressed this point of view in the New York Tribune. Deeper study has convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland.8

The conclusion drawn was that the loss of Irish landholdings, which were regarded as the principal pillar supporting British capitalism, would lead to increased exploitation of the working class within England. In turn, it would intensify unrest there to a revolutionary pitch and ultimately

8Marx and Engels, Correspondence . . . , pp. 280-281.
spark an upheaval that would "... react on the Continent".  

The revolutionary strategy propounded by Marx and Engels at this time represented a change from their original position, which had rejected unequivocally the possibility of a correlation between socialism and nationalism. To keep the record straight, however, it did not alter their conception of the two forces as fundamentally incompatible. They encouraged Irish and Polish nationalism in order to exploit it in the interest of the socialist revolution and in no sense conceived of national self-determination as an end in itself. On the contrary, they emphatically denied any future role to the Irish and Poles other than that of assimilation within larger political entities.

Even so, the seeds of revolutionary strategy sown by Marx and Engels bore no fruit in the nineteenth century. This was due chiefly to a general decline of the revolutionary will among the European working classes. In such "key" countries as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, broad-

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10They did allow, however, that the assimilation of the Irish by the English might take a longer time, and that their reunion might first be founded on a federal basis. Cf. Marx and Engels, Correspondence . . . , p. 278.
ened electoral bases and accompanying social welfare programs ameliorated the plight of the workers. Instead of the predicted pauperization and revolution, living standards rose and the appeal of socialist internationalism diminished. Furthermore, now possessing a greater stake politically, the proletariat increasingly identified its interest with that of the state, thus denying in fact the theoretical maxim that it possessed no fatherland. Finally, as if to repudiate the idea of alleged immunity from nationalism as well, the workers of France and Germany, and their socialist leaders, displayed intense hostility during the war of 1870-1871.

The impact of this on the socialist movement generally was devastating. Despite Marx’s efforts as conciliator, nationalistic squabbles and a general lowering of morale was manifested among orthodox socialists. It opened the way to a sharp and bitter division over fundamental doctrine and then to the dissolution of the "First International" in 1876. Embittered by disappointment and despair, Marx died in 1882. He left little more than a variety of suggestions for a revolutionary program that seemed to have been rendered obsolete by social progress. That they could serve as a guide for future action was a hope cherished only by the most stubborn of the remaining disciples of Marx.

Eclipse in "Revisionism". Though Friedrich Engels lived until 1895, he was unable to stem the further impact of the
changing European socio-political order on socialist thinking generally and with respect to the socialist regard for the nationality question in particular. For example, a "Second International" was created in 1889, on a basis of separate and unequal status for the national delegations. Its proceedings were so marked by conflicts over "national interests" that one delegate was prompted to suggest that the organization had the appearance of little more than a vehicle for the expression of national interests and grievances.  

Furthermore, in 1891, the "Erfurt Program" of the German Social Democratic Party, which embodied vigorous demands for additional political and social reform in Germany, indicated the full extent to which parliamentary electioneering had come to be accepted by a major Marxist party as the principal means of gaining power.

Such developments as these evoked Engels' bitter opposition, and he decried them as "opportunism" and "self-deception." But, if anything, his words served as only a temporary brake. Within a year after his death, the new dev-

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12Cf. Marx and Engels, Correspondence . . . , p. 486.
elopments in socialist thinking burst forth into formal state-
ments attacking practically every aspect of Marxism. In the
process, Marx's revolutionary strategy was overlooked com-
pletely.

Not the least of the criticism was directed against
Marx's views on the national question. For example, Eduard
Bernstein, the "revisionist" German socialist, repudiated
outright the idea that the proletariat has no fatherland:

This might, in a degree perhaps, apply to the
worker of the 'forties without political rights, shut
out of public life. Today, in spite of the enormous
increase in intercourse between nations, it has
already forfeited a great part of its truth and will
always forfeit more . . . .

Bernstein also argued that the workers' concern for
national interests had to be accepted as legitimate because
of the political privileges already obtained and because the
democratic national state had become not only an invaluable
vehicle for the attainment of socialism, but one worthy of
the full support of all socialists as well. Finally, he
even allowed for socialist support of European colonial pol-
ices, though with the qualification that it be offered only
in such cases where it might serve to strengthen pacific and
democratic states against reactionary imperialists and aute-

13Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism: A Critic-
ism and Affirmation (London: Independent Labour Party, 1909),
p. 169.
This open disavowal of Marxian internationalism was favorably received by many leaders of the "Second International". They had observed the spread of nationalism among the workers and had heard growing demands for stronger national parties and more active participation in national politics. Having achieved a degree of political respectability for themselves, they were little inclined to risk their gains for the sake of a dubious internationalist solidarity. Consequently, at their congress in London in 1896, they quietly laid the issue to rest with a resolution declaring in favor of the full autonomy of all nationalities.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Austrian "Revisionism".} While satisfactory to many of the West European socialists, the trend to national compartmentalization was viewed as no panacea by the socialists in Austria. Their area of interest embraced the whole of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire, and, as a matter of fact, they were already faced with a serious nationality problem. Ever since 1878, the Czech Socialist Party had been asserting a claim to national self-determination on behalf of all Czechs. Furthermore, similar sentiments were beginning to


be voiced by Poles, Italians, Serbs, and Ruthenians as well.

To check the impending disintegration of the party, the Austrians proposed reorganizing it on a federal basis. It was to be composed of six autonomous national divisions: Austrian, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Italian, and Serbian. Furthermore, looking to the future, Austrian Marxism's chief theoreticians, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, combined their talents for a definition of a socialist multi-national state in which nationalism could be reconciled with the political and economic centralism that fundamental theory prescribed.

In their attempt to satisfy both needs, Renner and Bauer drew a distinction between the nation, which they defined as a "community of spirit", and the state, which they called the vehicle for the nation's political and economic expression. While the nation was fixed in character, the state might assume any one of a variety of forms, depending on the immediate circumstances and needs.\(^1\) And for Austria under socialism, they proposed to combine the different nationalities into a single political entity, according the members of each nationality cultural autonomy on a personal basis. "National councils" were to be elected by the various nationalities as agencies to

oversee their educational and other cultural affairs. Reserved to the political agencies of the state were political and economic matters.17

It is a matter of history now that the Austrian plan failed to satisfy the deep-seated aspirations of the non-Austrian minorities of the Hapsburg empire, or to prevent the latter's complete disintegration in the wake of World War I. Nevertheless, it was not without a certain degree of historical significance. For one thing, the Austrian "solution" to the nationality problem represented the result of the first study by Marxists that squarely faced up to the fact of increasing nationalism and its conflict with socialist aims, and tried to reconcile the two. For another thing, and more pertinent to the purpose here, it provided a bridge over which the debate on the national issue moved eastward into the circle of Russia's Marxists.

**Lenin and Marxism.** In 1895, when Vladimir Ilich Lenin joined Russia's first Marxist organization, Osvobozhdenie Truda (Liberation of Labor), he found the nationality problem already "solved". Led by its founder and chief theoretician, G.V. Plekhanov, the group had accepted as satisfactory for the Russian situation the basic Marxist premise that capitalism would compel the assimilation of the non-Russian nation-

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alties with the Russian and that socialism would ultimately dispense with the issue entirely.\(^{18}\) Also following the original scheme, persistent manifestations of nationalism had been dismissed as merely the result of the still incomplete development of capitalism and the class struggle. As yet, no one had suggested the possibility of utilizing nationalism in conjunction with a revolutionary effort in Russia.

Lenin's appearance on the scene had no immediate effect on this situation. Apparently without knowledge of either the general or socialist literature on the subject of nationalism, he accepted Plekhanov's authority without question. His initial action with respect to the national issue consisted of a simple affirmation of the ideas already advanced. Shortly thereafter he was arrested for distributing revolutionary pamphlets among the factory workers in St. Petersburg. After being held in a house of detention for over a year, he was sent into exile in the Siberian village of Shushenskoe.

Lenin was cut off from the mainstream of Russian revolutionary activity for about five years. And probably because of it, the period proved to be a critical one for him. Owing to the laxity of police regulations, he was able to expand his still meager knowledge of Marxism and revolutionism indep-

endently of Plekhanov's influence. He read extensively and discussed Marxism with other socialists who shared his place of exile.19 Though the national question, as a specific topic, did not enter into the scope of this inquiry, the basis upon which it, as well as all other matters, would be evaluated thereafter did materialize as the principal product.

The focal point of Lenin's developed views consisted of an obsessive regard for the cause of proletarian revolution and an intense desire to see it come to pass as quickly as possible. Toward Marxism, his attitude was one of ambivalence. On the one hand, its bookish and abstract acceptance was rejected as inimical to the revolutionary purpose.20 On the other, as would be demonstrated time and time again, its "truth" was permissible whenever it served to justify a course of action deemed consistent with the paramount goal. Thus, when the budding young revolutionary returned to St. Petersburg early in 1900, he brought with him the basis for a revolutionary doctrine that would be developed completely


20For example, against the "legal Marxists" and other revolutionary factions which believed that Russia's development must follow the Western example strictly, Lenin argued as follows: "We do not by any means regard the theory of Marx as something fixed and inviolable. On the contrary, we are convinced that it laid only the cornerstone of the science that socialists must carry forward in all directions if they want to keep pace with life. We think that the Russian socialists particularly should develop the theory of Marxism independently." V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia (Works) (2d ed.; Moskva-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1926-1932), II, p. 514.
in the light of existing needs and potentialities and to which new conceptions could be added while old ones were being modified or discarded. It was indeed an extreme tactical and ideological flexibility that constituted the physiognomy of Lenin's intense inner singleness of purpose.

It was not long after his return from exile that Lenin first came to grips with the nationality issue. This occurred late in 1901, after the Russian All-Jewish Workers' Union, or Bund, prompted by news of the Austrian Marxists' plan, adopted a resolution calling for the acceptance of national-cultural autonomy as one of the bases of the multi-national Russian state under socialism. Furthermore, claiming to be the legitimate spokesman for all Jews in Russia, the Bund also proposed that it be given immediate autonomy within the framework of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, then being organized as the successor to Liberation of Labor.21

On this occasion, Lenin joined the party leaders in an unequivocal rejection of the Bund's proposals, labelling them un-Marxian, chauvinistic, and impractical. However, he was already fully immersed in his own conception of revolutionary tactics, the militancy of which promised to conflict with Plekhanov's less aggressive posture, and he opposed a sugges-

tion that the Bund be expelled. 22 Cognizant of the need for allies from any quarter, he also followed this up with a secret effort to unite with the Jewish nationalists against Plekhanov. 23

This marked Lenin's first attempt to secure political advantage through the exploitation of nationalistic discontent, and apparently without knowledge of Marx's regard for such a matter. As yet, he was not prepared to meet all demands for the sake of expediency. Over a year later, in February, 1903, in Iskra, he resumed the attack against the Bund for its "serious mistakes" and then struck out against the Armenian social democrats, who had since taken up the national cause as well. 24

The episode proved particularly significant for two reasons. For one thing, it prompted Lenin to recognize that nationalism among Marxists was a more potent force than he had imagined. It could not be quelled merely by repeating


23 Lenin's attempt to exploit Jewish nationalism is revealed in a letter to one F.V. Lengnik, on May 23, 1902: "And so your task now is to create out of yourself a committee for the preparation of the [second] Congress, to admit the Bund member (R. Portnoi) into this committee. . . . All this is extremely important! Remember this! Be bolder in this, more ingenious and in other ways quieter and more cautious. Be wise as serpents and as gentle as doves (with the committees, the Bund and Petersburg.)". Cited in Elizabeth Hill and Doris Mudie, (eds.), Letters of Lenin (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1937), p. 156.

the argument that national-cultural autonomy was un-Marxian, for that served only to generate fresh animosity. Consequently, he altered his tactic a bit. While continuing to oppose the specific demands of the nationalistic socialists, he offered a seeming concession on the general issue of national self-determination:

It is not the work of the proletariat to preach federalism and national autonomy . . . which would lead to demands to create a class state. The task of the proletariat is to join together the broad masses of all workers of all nationalities, to join together for the struggle on the widest scale possible for a democratic republic and socialism . . . . Our concern is not for the self-determination of peoples and nations, but the proletariat of each nationality. 25

Lenin did not bother to explain precisely the difference between the self-determination of the proletariat and that of peoples and nations. Undoubtedly, the former was intended to mean nothing more than the freedom to unite in rejection of all things nationalistic. His silence on this point reasonably can be taken as motivated by a desire to avoid provoking the Bund and the Armenians to a further extent. But it did lead to the second important consequence of this episode. Less than a month later, the Polish Marxists, staunch advocates of union with Russia under socialism, delivered an unexpected and strong attack against what they

termed Lenin's "vague" and "mysterious" treatment of the national issue and his "bourgeois" advocacy of national self-determination. 26

While there is no record of his immediate reaction, Lenin's astonishment at being charged with bourgeois nationalism was no doubt considerable. He was certainly as anti-nationalistic as his accusers, and, in his article, the right of national self-determination advocated had been deliberately vague and mysterious in order to render it meaningless. But expediency still militated against complete candidness. Fearing the alienation of still other socialists with a nationalistic bent, he tried to win over his orthodox accusers. After admonishing them for failing to consider nationality rights as consistent with democratic principles, he assured them that his own acknowledgement of the fact of the demand for national self-determination was not intended to mean the same as bourgeois unconditional support of it. Finally, by way of conclusion, Lenin did drop a hint as to the real meaning of his regard in the matter. This was contained in a remark that Marx and Engels, while confirmed anti-nationalists, had been advocates of Polish independence. 27

26 The Polish charges are summarized by Lenin in his article of reply. Cf. Ibid., pp. 337-338.

27 Cf. Ibid., pp. 338-339.
This represented Lenin's first public acknowledgement of Marx's expedient encouragement of nationalism. But, carefully refraining from spelling out completely an identification of his own position with it, the effort satisfied no one. The Poles continued to hurl invectives against his alleged "deviation" from basic doctrine, while the Bund and the Armenians persisted stubbornly in their demands for national-cultural autonomy and federalism. The issue was far from being a dead one.

The Struggle Against National-Cultural Autonomy Broadens. At least in part, the failure to effect a compromise between the nationalists and anti-nationalists among Russia's Marxists cost Lenin the opportunity to displace Plekhanov. Instead, at the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, he split with Plekhanov, causing the creation of the so-called "bolshevik" and "menshevik" factions. For nearly a decade thereafter, repeated attempts to heal the breach met with failure. Then, at a "sixth" party congress, convened by Lenin in Prague in January, 1912, and attended only by his followers, the mensheviks were "expelled" and an independent Bolshevik Party was proclaimed. 28

During that whole period, Lenin had paid no attention to the national issue. However, seven months after the fate-

ful "sixth" congress, his interest was revived by news that the mensheviks had weakened under the pressure of the demands by the Bund and the Armenian social-democrats to the extent of adopting national-cultural autonomy in principle. Then in Cracow, he undertook an intensive examination of the national problem in general and the theory of national-cultural autonomy in particular, reading all that Marx had written on the subject, several volumes on the minorities of Russia, Bauer's work, and Karl Kautsky's criticism of it. His main purpose was to collect sufficient data for an effective refutation of the idea of applying the Austrian scheme to Russia. But, after compiling voluminous notes, he didn't assume the task of transforming them into a finished literary product. Apparently conscious of his own notoriety among Russian Marxists, and acting on the assumption that his signature would detract from its impact, he turned over the job to an aspiring aide from Georgia, one Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

Except for being a member of one of Russia's minorities, Stalin was not particularly qualified for the assign-


30According to Bertram Wolfe, Lenin's "... main reason for wanting a Transcausadian to write such an article, ... was the fact that the Georgian Social Democracy, the stronghold of menshevism, had just begun a slight but perceptible shift on the national question, and Lenin needed a Georgian to carry his "national" war into Menshevik-dominated Transcaucasia." Ibid., p. 581.
ment. He had not written anything of significance on the national question, or, for that matter, on any other subject. And his lack of experience showed up in the finished work, entitled *Marxism and the National Question*, which presented a thoroughly confused and unconvincing pattern of argumentation.

For example, Stalin opened his attack on the theory of national-cultural autonomy with an arbitrary definition of a nation:

A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.

To it he added the Marxian qualification that a nation is subject to the law of change, has its history, its beginning and end. And then he added a qualification of his own:

... it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be absent and the nation ceases to be a nation.32

From this, Stalin derived two pertinent, and obviously preconceived, conclusions. One, that the Austrians had founded their theory of national-cultural autonomy on the false premise of defining the nation solely as a community of character. As far as he was concerned, it was enough to

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31Up to this point, Stalin's literary products consisted only of short articles expounding ideas originated by Lenin.

invalidate everything they had said about the nation and the nationality question. And two, that the Bund was at fault for the same reason and for the extra reason that the Jews no longer constituted a nation: "... the Jewish nation is coming to an end, and, therefore, there is nobody to demand national autonomy for."33

Stalin's "proof" that national-cultural autonomy was inapplicable to the Russian situation in any case rested on an even more dubious foundation. He began this part of his argument with the reasonable assertion that it was not to be expected that a single solution to the nationality problem would be applicable in all multi-national states. Historical conditions, he contended, would dictate the choice in each case. However, he fell into serious difficulty when he added that the distinctions between the Austrian and Russian situations boiled down to two "facts" essentially: 1) the Russian Marxists were proponents of national self-determination, while the Austrians were not; and 2) the "hub" of political life in Austria was the nationality problem, while in Russia it was the agrarian problem.34

The weakness, if not absurdity, of both "facts" was

33Ibid., pp. 330, 333.

34Cf. Ibid., pp. 316, 318-319.
patent. For one thing, on the issue of national self-deter-
mination, Stalin, either deliberately or unknowingly, over-
looked the fact that his own leader was fundamentally op-
posed to the principle and only supported it for reasons of
expediency. For another thing, concerning the "hubs" of
political life in Austria and Russia, he also overlooked
the very real struggle over the national issue that was
taking place in Russia. His own immersion into it bore dram-
atic testimony of its existence. Finally, his attempt to
divert attention to the agrarian problem in Russia was equal-
ly lacking as an arguing point, particularly as it was not
accompanied by an explanation.35 No Bolshevik writer had
subscribed to the view that the nationality problem, or in-
deed the political problem, was subordinate to the emanci-
patination of the land in Russia. Whether or not he was aware of
it, Stalin was actually espousing the philosophy of the Nar-
odniks, who held the peasants to be the driving force of the
revolution and who Lenin had bitterly denounced earlier.36

Stalin concluded Marxism and the National Question with
his own solution to the nationality problem in Russia, which
contained a few surprises. For one thing, he included an
unqualified acceptance of the principle of national self-det-

35 Cf. Ibid., pp. 318-319.
termination:

It is quite possible that a combination of internal and external factors may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia will find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.

And he added that his plan was not for the Russian state as it was then composed, but for those "... nations which for one reason or another will prefer to remain within the general framework."37

The plan itself centered on the elimination of minority discontent, which Stalin contended was the crux of the problem. Thus:

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass by itself.

A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union, but because it does not enjoy the right to possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience, liberty of movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.

Thus, national equality in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is the essential element in the solu-

37Stalin, op. cit., II, p. 360.
Stalin proposed no creation of nationally delimited territories, no shifting of people in order that larger, more compact minorities be established. Quite the contrary, all were to remain exactly where they were, and to become members of such already "crystallized units" as Great Russia, Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus; the only difference being that each minority would then enjoy full rights of conscience, movement, language, and national schools. Just how this differed essentially from the Austrian scheme was not explained.

Among authorities on Russian Communism, there is considerable disagreement over the importance of Marxism and the National Question to the development of the Communist regard for the national issue. Professor Edward Carr, for one, on the basis of undefined "external and internal" evidence, offers the view that the work "... remained the standard work in party literature on its subject."\(^{39}\) In a similar fashion, Isaac Deutscher, a biographer of Stalin's, arrives at the conclusion that it was consistently Leninist.\(^{40}\)

\(^{38}\)Ibid., p. 362.


However, Richard Pipes, in perhaps the most penetrating analysis, arrives at an entirely different interpretation. By his reasoning, Stalin's errors in fact and in argument, and the absence of any published references to the work by Lenin, points to the conclusion that it "... would long ago have been relegated to total oblivion were it not for the author's subsequent career."41

Of these, the evidence appears to favor the conclusion drawn by Pipes. Textually, of course, Marxism and the National Question was replete with errors in fact and methodology. Moreover, as an examination of Communist literature for more than a decade thereafter reveals, it certainly was not accorded the attention customarily given to a standard work. Finally, within five months of its publication, Stalin's effort was disqualified as both a scholarly contribution to knowledge and a political argument by no less a judge than Lenin. Apparently cognizant of the error made in selecting Stalin for the job, the Bolshevik leader undertook remedial action in the form of an article of his own.

Lenin's article, "Critical Remarks on the National Question," in October, 1913, was devoted to a refutation of the Austrian theory. Though neither Stalin's name, nor his essay, was mentioned once, it was evident from the begin-

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ning that its criticism was intended for his benefit as well as for those who were named.

The tone of the article reflected an intention to avoid stimulating an even wider circle of hostility than existed already. For example, Lenin's argument bore none of the clumsy vindictiveness of Stalin's; no definition of a nation with which to quarrel over fundamentals, or to deny openly the integrity of the Austrians and the Bund, was presented. Instead, always the subtle tactician, cognizant of the need to win friends, he charged the "error" of national-cultural autonomy to "bourgeois pressures" among the minorities in Austria and to "the rabbis and bourgeoisie" in the Bund. Had it not been for such elements, he asserted, "... neither the Austrian, nor Russian, social-democrats would have accepted 'cultural-national' autonomy in their programs." 42

Unlike Stalin, Lenin referred to the Jews without distinction from other nationalities. He even made a special point of reminding the "assimilationists" that history attested to the fact that the Jews had given to the world some of the leaders in the forefront of the struggle for democracy and socialism. 43

The leader of Russia's Bolsheviks also presented a version of his attitude toward minority rights that was decid-

42 Lenin, op. cit., XVII, p. 149.
43 Ibid., p. 141.
edly less generous than Stalin's. Though allowing the right of language to stand, he excluded the right of conscience and implied a denial of the right to national schools. The latter was contained in a lengthy discourse on the problems involved in the creation of separate schools in every community and in the conclusion that the matter should be left open to such time when a law on nationality rights could be worked out on a "realistic basis". 44

Thus having dealt with the "nationalists" of the Marxist movement, Lenin turned his attention next to the extreme internationalists, who rejected absolutely any recognition of nationality rights. In an article entitled "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", published in February, 1914, he began by defining their difficulty with the issue of self-determination in terms of a misconception of the role of the national movement in history. By this he meant that their failure to employ the "historical-economic theory" of Marxism had left them without any appreciation of the fact that the national movement had constituted an indispensable catalytic agent in the transformation from feudalism to a system of bourgeois national states in Western Europe. Furthermore, they were now unaware that the national movement was playing a similar role in the transformation of Eastern

44Cf. Ibid., p. 153.
Europe and Asia:

In Eastern Europe and Asia, the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions only started in 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey, and China, the wars in the Balkans, such is the chain of world events in our period, in our "Orient". And only the blind can fail to see the awakening of a whole series of bourgeois-democratic national movements, striving to create nationally independent and nationally united states in this chain of events. 45

On this basis, Lenin proceeded to develop his principal argument, which centered on the issue of revolutionary tactics in Russia and particularly on the relevance of the national question to it. It turned on three main points. In the first place, inasmuch as Russia was then passing through the stage of feudalism to capitalism, support of national movements within the empire was a matter of historical necessity. It would ensure peace with the bourgeoisie, provide equal rights for the workers, and thus create better conditions for the development of the class struggle. Secondly, to deny the right of nations to self-determination would not only be flouting the democratic principle of equality among nations and the spirit of socialist internationalism, but would also be playing into the hands of the feudal landlords and the Great-Russian Black Hundreds, whose very existence was founded on such a denial. In short, the proletariat of a ruling nation could not properly be an accomplice to the

defense of the privileges of the ruling class of one nation over another.\textsuperscript{46} Finally, drawing on Marxism's authority once again for support, Lenin concluded by reminding his readers that Marx and Engels had been the first to advocate the principle of national self-determination as a means of promoting the world socialist revolution:

The policy of Marx and Engels on the Irish question serves as the greatest example (an example which retains its tremendous practical importance down to the present time) of the attitude which the proletariat of the dominating nations should adopt toward national movements. It serves as a warning against that "servile haste" with which the philistines of all countries, colors, and languages hurry to declare "utopian" all changes in the frontiers of states established by the violence and privileges of the landlords and bourgeoisie of one nation.\textsuperscript{47}

In one respect, of course, Lenin's expressed views on the national issue represented an extension of the original Marxian position. That was contained in the allowance that Asians were capable of initiating their own social progress, which Marx had denied. But the point was not intended as a refutation. Without exploring the matter deeply, a simple accommodation between the theory of the nineteenth century and the reality of the twentieth was worked out. The Asian nations were not regarded as having suddenly come abreast of those in Eastern Europe, but were left in a modified third

\textsuperscript{46}Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 441.

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 464.
category following the pattern of Marx's threefold classification of nations. If not incapable of progress from within, they were still regarded as too backward to catch up with the rest before socialism had been established in Europe. 48

Though such views suggested not only full acceptance of the original Marxian revolutionary scheme but an extension of it to include all colonial peoples in Asia as well, they were in reality only incidental to the main purpose at hand. The reference to Marx and Engels had been made only to support the contention concerning the significance of the national movements in general and the nationalities in Russia in particular. Consequently, Lenin wrote nothing else on the subject at this time.

As yet, Lenin's principal concern was the revolutionary issue in Russia. His purpose was to introduce formally the expedient side of Marx's dualism toward the national question as the basis for his own revolutionary program. That the two were related was contained in the fact that nationalism among the minorities in Russia was already a force threatening the foundations of the empire. But whereas Marx had supported Polish national self-determination in order to thwart Tsarist counterrevolutionism, Lenin now proposed to

48"... we do not know whether Asia will have time before the downfall of capitalism to become crystallized into a system of independent national states like Europe's." Ibid., pp. 430-431.
guarantee it by extending the same consideration to all minorities in Russia and thus destroy Tsarism altogether.

The Leninist Strategy Assumes World-Wide Proportions.

Within six months, and even before he had an opportunity to assess the impact of his argument on Russia's Marxists, Lenin was on the way to the ultimate definition of how the national idea could be exploited for revolutionary purposes. It was prompted by the outbreak of the First World War, which he assumed heralded the socialist revolution in Europe. Consequently, the hitherto exclusive concern for the revolution in Russia was expanded into a world-wide strategy, parallel- ing and expanding upon that which had been expounded by Marx a half-century earlier.

To begin with, the Bolshevik leader drew the conclusion that a socialist revolution would develop out of the war because of the latter's unique character. It was not a national war, he averred, fought strictly for military conquest. Rather, it was an imperialist war, or a struggle for the world's resources and markets between alliances of capitalist states. It represented capitalism's highest stage of development and could lead to no other end but complete destruction. Thus the task for socialists everywhere was to rally the workers for the final onslaught against capitalism:

The Third International [Wrote Lenin on November 1, 1914] is confronted with the task of organizing the forces of the proletariat for a revolutionary onslaught on the capitalist governments, for civil war against
the bourgeoisie of all countries, for political power, for the victory of socialism.49

But, albeit the most fundamental, this was only one aspect of the new revolutionary prospectus. Cognizant of Marx's experience, Lenin was cautious in his acceptance of the proposition that a successful revolution depended merely on the ability of socialists to organize and lead the proletariat in Western Europe against their governments. Accordingly, he proposed to guarantee it on the basis of Marx's revolutionary plan, though modified by his own improvements. On the one hand, to eliminate the counterrevolutionary challenge of Tsarism, Lenin proposed that socialists everywhere lend their support to the quest of Russia's minorities for national self-determination.50 On the other hand, to generate the requisite degree of revolutionary class consciousness among the workers of Western Europe, he advocated the support not only of Irish independence but that of all colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia as well. Their political and economic independence would strike a lethal blow at capitalism in all West European countries simultaneously.51

49Ibid., XVIII, p. 71. The "Third International" mentioned here refers to a proposal of Lenin's to replace the defunct Second International and has no connection with the Communist International created in March, 1919.

50Cf. Ibid., p. 323.

51Cf. Ibid., XIX, p. 169.
As far as Lenin was concerned, Asia had become socialism's vast reservoir of allies against capitalism. The potential ramifications of widespread Asian national insurrections — the curtailment of the supply of raw materials and manpower and the psychological impact on Europe's working classes — were inescapable. Thus, in addition to taking up the slogans of "peace without annexations" and "national self-determination", the duty of Western socialists was to arouse "... to insurrection all the peoples now oppressed by the Great-Russians, all the colonies and dependent countries in Asia (India, China, Persia, etc.) ...".  

With this, the process of bringing forward into the context of the twentieth century the original Marxian revolutionary plan was completed. To be sure, the new version represented an elaboration of the old one. Whereas Marx had championed the cause of independence for Ireland and Poland in order to promote and protect the revolution, Lenin now sought the same ends by encouraging the national aspirations of the peoples in the colonies and semi-colonies of Asia and all the minorities of Russia. But it did not alter the fundamental parallel between their aims and methods.

Unfortunately for Lenin, the parallel between his experience with the national idea and Marx's was destined to

52 Ibid., XVIII, p. 323.
develop to an even further extent. He also failed to evoke an affirmative response among Europe's socialists. In Western Europe, where the war had served to stimulate the nationalistic trend in socialist thinking to an extent greater than before, the call to revolutionary action fell on entirely deaf ears. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, its effect was none other than to provide the Polish Marxists and other proponents of ideological purity with still another excuse for not accepting even that part of the Leninist scheme which applied to Russia. By their standards, acceptance of an alliance with the bourgeois-national revolutionaries of the East was tantamount to heresy of the first magnitude. 53

So vigorously was the anti-Leninist argument pressed, that even Lenin's own followers were prompted to question the validity of his ideas. 54 Consequently, only he remained with the conviction of the importance of the national movements as a revolutionary force. Writing with undisguised bitterness, he warned all disbelievers in the following terms:

National wars waged by the colonial and semi-colonial countries are not only possible but inevitable in the epoch of imperialism. The colonies and semi-colonies (China, Turkey, Persia, etc.) have a population of nearly one billion, i.e., more than half the population of the world. In those countries,


54 Cf. Ibid., pp. 219-221.
the movements for national liberation are either very strong already, or are growing and maturing... The national liberation policies of the colonies will inevitably be continued by national wars of the colonies against imperialism.55

Because he stood alone in his advocacy of the importance of the national question in the East, Lenin had no confidence that he would live to see its correlation with the revolutionary movement in the West. In January, 1917, he told an audience of Swiss socialists in Berne of his doubt that "... we, the old, would live to see the decisive battles of the revolution".56 He could not have known, of course, of the momentous changes about to take place: that, in less than six weeks, a revolution would break out in Russia; that, more than a month after that, the Germans would permit him and a party of twenty to travel across Germany in a guarded railway car to Sweden; and that, on April 16, the party would arrive in the Russian capital of Petrograd.

From Theory to Practice. The revolution in Russia in March, 1917 had a profound effect on Lenin's plans. When the Bolshevik leader arrived in Petrograd, his bearing was that of a man reborn, rejuvenated by the promise of new revolutionary prospects. His first action was negative, consisting of a strong denunciation of practically all Russian Marxists,

55Lenin, op. cit., XIX, p. 204.
56Ibid., p. 357.
including his own followers, as enemies and traitors of socialism. This was due to their expressed confidence in the liberal Provisional Government, which had replaced the Tsarist regime, and particularly because of their continued support of the war effort.

Lenin's second action was more positive, consisting of the issuance of the famous "April Theses". In it he proposed that his followers change their stand from "revolutionary defencism" to "revolutionary action". His new thesis was that world conditions both permitted and necessitated the transformation of the Russian revolution into a socialist revolution. Europe, he concluded, was on the brink of revolution and needed only the Russian "spark" to set it off.57

The new revolutionary prospectus wrote off the Asian aspect of the earlier plan. But its elimination did not rule out the exploitation of nationalism altogether. The immediate tasks, according to Lenin, were to undermine the Provisional Government to the point of collapse and to win a majority of the workers away from the Bolsheviks' chief rivals, the Mensheviks. In this connection, the minorities' quest for self-determination, the peasants' quest for land, the workers' quest for control of production and distribution, and the general desire for peace were to be exploited.

The tactics on the national issue, our concern here,

57cf. Ibid., XX, pp. 95-103.
were announced at a party congress, on May 12, 1917. Once more, Lenin chose a non-Russian as the ostensible spokesman on the national question, and, apparently as a reward for having been one of the first to accept the "April Theses", Stalin was again favored. On this occasion, however, care was taken to avoid a repetition of 1913. Lenin spoke first on the subject, touching briefly on the principal points of the policy to be pursued. Then Stalin, as rapporteur, followed with a bitter denunciation of the Provisional Government for its refusal to grant full autonomy to Finland and the Ukraine. He also informed his listeners that Marxists could not deny the peoples of the Caucasus the right to separation and that the advocacy of national self-determination was in the best Marxian tradition.58

As it turned out, however, the opportunity to bid effectively for the favor of anti-Russian sentiment among the minorities, and to direct it against the Provisional Government, proved more limited than anticipated. For example, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were either under, or about to fall under, German occupation and thus afforded no opportunity whatever. In addition, Finland was eliminated as a potentially fertile ground soon after by the Provisional Government's promise to grant it autonomy. In other regions, the principal obstacle faced was the absence of extreme anti-

Russianism. Among Belorussians and Transcauscians, for example, the popular view opposed a complete destruction of the political unity forged by several centuries of Russian conquest and domination. Most favored some form of federal arrangement, on either a regional or national-cultural basis.59

The only important exception in this respect was provided by the Ukrainians, whose struggle with the Provisional Government over the issue of autonomy remained unresolved. Accordingly, Lenin lost no time in becoming the most vocal proponent of Ukrainian national rights in Russia, even exceeding the Ukrainians themselves.60 And as a further attestation to the sincerity with which the support was offered, he also rebuked publicly the Ukrainian Bolsheviks for failing to support "their" national cause enthusiastically.61 This apparently was enough to convince the Ukrainian nationalist leaders, some of whom were socialists, of the feasibil-


60 For example, in June, 1917, Lenin denounced the Provisional Government for failing in its duty to recognize the Ukrainian right to both autonomy and complete freedom of secession. Cf. Lenin, op. cit., XX, pp. 539-541. For their part, being proponents of federalism, the Ukrainians did not mention separation until after the revolution in November.

ity of an alliance with their self-styled champion.

When they accepted Lenin's offer of assistance, the Ukrainians did not seek to overthrow the Provisional Government. Nor, for that matter, did they anticipate that the Bolsheviks would grow into a formidable revolutionary force. Their sole purpose was to convince Petrograd of the need to meet their demands for autonomy, and, toward this end, they were willing to accept Lenin's nuisance value as an addition to their arsenal in the war of nerves already underway. Thus, without visible signs of reservation, they refused to join the general condemnation of the Bolshevik attacks against the Provisional Government. One of their number, Volodymir Vinnichenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party, even went so far as to encourage Lenin openly by crediting him with being the prime mover behind revolutionary progress in Russia.62

In a situation that dictated a high degree of caution, the nationalist leaders of the Ukrainian Rada displayed an attitude that, in retrospect, was foolhardy. Their estimate of the issue of autonomy as vital was no less presumptuous than the expectation that procrastination would bring victory. Though not without knowledge of Lenin's past, they failed to

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62"One must admit," stated Vinnichenko, "that the revolution would not progress were it not for the Bolsheviks." Quoted in V. Manilov (ed.), 1917 god na Kievozhchine (Kiev in 1917) (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo Ukraini, 1928), p. 166.
appreciate the extent to which they were playing into his hands. Thus, by mid-July, 1917, with no success against the Provisional Government as yet scored, they found themselves being pushed into a more extreme position than they were willing to go. Bolshevik conspiratorial and demagogic work among the workers, peasants, and soldiers in the Ukraine was stimulating national emotions to a higher pitch, causing pressure for unilateral action on the autonomy issue to mount rapidly. Furthermore, at the first All-Ukrainian Workers' Congress, convened by the Rada in Kiev, there was heard not only open criticism of the failure to act decisively, but demands for economic reforms that reflected the Bolshevik bias against private enterprise.63

While this did not result in a complete break between the Ukrainian Rada and the Provisional Government, its effect was registered in another significant way. It divided the Ukrainian nationalists into two factions, one favoring and the other opposing acceptance of a compromise on the autonomy issue. Ironically enough, it was Vinnichenko who, now cognizant of the danger in the alliance with Lenin, alone championed the cause of moderation. In the face of a growing popular demand for action, however, his effort to dissuade his

colleagues in the Rada was to no avail. The anti-Petrograd front of Ukrainian nationalism had become fixed rigidly, and it remained unimpaired until the overthrow of the Provisional Government.64

Realistically, it would be no better than speculative to assert a primary causal relationship between Lenin's contribution to the failure of the Rada and the Provisional Government to resolve their differences and the success of the Bolshevik coup on November 7, 1917. Nevertheless, the extent to which he was able to weaken the Provisional Government by the encouragement of Ukrainian nationalism cannot be rated inconsequential. For one thing, the tug-of-war between Kiev and Petrograd, to which he contributed significantly, made the task of restoring order in Russia much more difficult than otherwise would have been the case, particularly as the Ukraine was the second most important region of Russia. Furthermore, the fruitless bickering not only cost the Provisional Government valuable time and effort, but also provided the pretext on which the liberal Constitutional Democrats

64 Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the degree of Lenin's success in this connection was provided by an incident in Kiev, on November 9, 1917. Then, with the final struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government approaching its climax, the Rada effectively thwarted the efforts of the latter's troops to capture the Bolsheviks there. Needless to say, the Ukrainians were unaware that the Bolsheviks were already plotting to wrest power from them. Cf. Manilov, op. cit., pp. 324-325.
withdrew their support of the Kerenski cabinet in July.65 Finally, though statistical evidence is unavailable, it would be reasonable to conclude that the weakening of the Provisional Government, together with the patronage of the Ukrainian nationalists, enhanced the appeal of Bolshevism not only among the workers and peasants in the Ukraine, but in Russia proper as well.

In Quest of a European-Wide Revolution. On November 8, 1917, when he assumed the duties of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Lenin viewed the nationality problem in Russia as all but solved. His optimism stemmed in part from the theoretical premise that granting the full right of self-determination to the non-Russian nationalities would lead not to their separation, but to their union with Russia under socialism. Given the right to separate, all nationalistically inspired suspicions and hostilities would disappear as a matter of course.66 However, his confidence was also based upon a very important fact; namely, that only a few of the non-Russian minorities had actually stated a preference for separation, while most had favored unity on a fed-


66Cf. Lenin, op. cit., XX, pp. 123, 535; XXI, p. 316. In July, 1917, reflecting this same confidence, Stalin had predicted: "... after the complete overthrow of Tsarism, nine-tenths of the nationalities will not wish to secede." Stalin, op. cit., III, p. 53.
eral basis. The importance of this consideration was underscored dramatically in December, in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Peoples," when he jettisoned his earlier opposition to federalism and became one of its leading proponents.67 In other words, having made use of the destructive potential of the national issue against the Provisional Government, Lenin now sought to exploit its constructive side for the purpose of effecting a peaceful reunification of a major portion of the defunct Russian Empire.

But this did not mean that Lenin was completely finished with nationalism as a weapon of destruction. On the contrary, it remained in the forefront of strategic considerations for the purpose of stimulating proletarian revolutions throughout Europe.68 For example, in the famous "Decree on Peace," issued on November 8, 1917, the right of all nations to self-determination was made a corollary of the demand for a just and democratic peace, without annexations and indemnities.69 And this was followed by the publication of the secret treaties between Tsarist Russia and the Allies.


68According to Leon Trotsky, only a "few revolutionary proclamations" were deemed necessary for this purpose. Cf. Leon Trotsky, Moia Zhizn; opit avtobiografii (My Life; an attempted autobiography) (Berlin: "Granit," 1930), II, p. 64.

69Cf. Lenin, op. cit., XXII, pp. 13-16.
an action designed to prove the latter to be among the chief despoilers of the world's wealth and the violators of the rights of small nations. Needless to say, the inaccessibility of the agreements between the Central Powers did not prevent the Soviet leaders from attributing a comparable character to them as well.70

This first Soviet effort in psychological warfare in international politics was skillfully contrived. The call for peace was likely to evoke a ready response at the popular level in Europe, where the emotional and physical toll of the war was already being translated into restiveness.71 Moreover, the inclusion of the right of national self-determination was designed to add to its general democratic flavor and to stimulate the Poles and Baltic peoples, who were under German occupation, and the minorities of Austria-Hungary, who were threatening the complete destruction of the Hapsburg empire with their demands for independence.

Lenin acted on the premise that no Communist peace proposals, no matter how reasonable their terms, would be accep-


71The United States Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, for example, reacted with the following observation: "... the presentation of (the Communist) peace terms may well appeal to the average man, who will not perceive the fundamental errors on which they are based." Cited in Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1927-1939), VII, p. 444. Cf. also, David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1933-1937), V, p. 110.
table to the Allies and the Central Powers, and that their rejection would provoke a violent outburst on the part of the war-weary European masses.  

72 But on this vital point he mis-calculated. For example, his copyright on the championship of peace was challenged first on November 26, 1917, when the Germans agreed to discuss the peace terms offered, the meeting to take place at Brest-Litovsk.

Though surprised by the German willingness to bargain, Lenin remained unshaken in his conviction that the European revolution was impending. Thus, with characteristic facility, he altered his tactics to meet the requirements of the new situation.

When the Soviet delegation, headed by Adolph Joffe, arrived in Brest-Litovsk on November 29, 1917, its strategy was already established. On the one hand, it was to delay a settlement long enough to allow Western restiveness to mature to an explosive point.  

73 On the other hand, it was to stimulate

72 Speaking before the Petrograd Soviet, in the evening of November 8, 1917, Lenin stated: "This proposal will meet with resistance on the part of the imperialist governments — we don't fool ourselves on this score. But we hope that revolutions will soon break out in all the belligerent countries; . . . ." Cited in John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World (New York: The Modern Library, Inc., 1935), p. 130.

73 As Trotsky described it, the purpose was " . . . to delay the negotiations as long as possible to give the European masses time to understand the main fact of the Soviet revolution." Leon Trotsky, Lenin (New York: Minton, Balch, and Co., 1925), p. 128.
national uprisings in Eastern Europe by making strong appeals to sentiment there. Both purposes were to be served by stubborn insistence on the absolute right of nations to self-determination, which, it was assumed, would be unacceptable to the Central Powers in any case.

At a meeting preliminary to the opening of formal negotiations, Joffe requested that the sessions be conducted with full publicity. After obtaining the Germans' agreement on this point, he then proceeded to speak at length on Soviet peace principles, concluding with the demand that all belligerents agree to an armistice to work out a general peace settlement. And he was followed by Lev Kamenev, who berated the Central Powers for lacking a genuine desire for peace and for violating the rights of small nations.74 But this was only a harbinger of things to come.

The first plenary session of the armistice negotiations opened on December 22, 1917, and Joffe continued the propaganda offensive. For one thing, in response to a suggestion by the chief spokesman of the Central Powers, Baron Richard von Kuhlmann, that the proceedings be conducted in an amiable spirit, he delivered an inflammatory appeal to the multi-far­ious nationalities in Eastern Europe. Then, after a recitation of most of the "Decree on Peace," he demanded a settle­

ment without indemnities or annexations, political independence for those nationalities which had been deprived of it since the beginning of the war, independence for those not hitherto enjoying it, and national plebiscites and full guarantees for the rights of minorities in multi-national states.75

Apparently caught off guard by the precocity of the neophyte Soviet diplomat, who was supposed to be playing the role of the vanquished, von Kuhlmann's retort was as anticipated. Playing into the gambit unwittingly, he offered the quite transparent explanation that the nations under German occupation had already expressed themselves on the subject and had decided in favor of German protection.76 Then, in the face of his demand that the Russians accept this as fact, Joffe took advantage of the situation to suspend negotiations and to return home for new instructions.

The first meeting at Brest-Litovsk provided immense satisfaction for the Soviet leaders, who, bolstered by an infinite capacity for belief in the correctness of their cause, looked forward to the full maturation of the revolution in

75Cf. A. Ioffe i L. Trotski (eds.), Mirnie peregovori v Brest-Litovske (The Brest-Litovsk Peace Negotiations) (Moskva: (n.n.), 1920), I, pp. 6-8.

76Cf. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Europe at almost any moment. At the same time, in the opposing camp, second thoughts reflected serious concern over the obvious propaganda defeat that had been suffered. Wrote Prince Maximilian of Baden:

On December 28, 1917, we made our irreparable mistake. We gave the impression to the whole world and the German masses that, in contrast to the Russian attitude, our agreement to the national right of self-determination was insincere and that annexational designs lurked behind it. We rejected the Russian demand for a free and untrammelled popular vote in the occupied territories on the ground that the Courlanders, Lithuanians, and Poles had already decided their own fate. We ought never to have claimed the arbitrarily instituted or enlarged land-councils as the authoritative representative assemblies. The Russian request for a referendum should either have been accepted without reserve, or replaced by a demand for a National Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage.

The joy in Moscow was only short-lived, however. On January 8, 1918, there fell a second, even more devastating, blow to revolutionary hopes. On that day, the historic "Fourteen Points" of President Woodrow Wilson's were proclaimed, representing the Western democratic answer to the "Decree on Peace." Not entirely by coincidence, it duplic-

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77 On December 30, 1917, Trotsky hopefully wrote: "We conceal from no one that we do not consider the present capitalist governments capable of a democratic peace. Only the revolutionary struggle of the working masses against their governments can bring Europe near to such a peace." L. Trotsky, Sochinenia (Works) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1925-1927), III, 11, p. 206.

ated most of the communist peace terms, including the right of small nations to self-determination.79

Gross indignation was the character of the response to the "Fourteen Points" by the Soviet leaders. They sought to disparage the sincerity with which the American President had acted.80 But the damage was obvious. The American offer was made without revolutionary strings attached, suffered no taint from the secret treaties, and was backed by a respected democratic tradition and promising military might. By comparison, the communist promise of a "just and democratic" peace now sounded a bit hollow. Moreover, it required no great insight to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the probable outcome of the competition for the sympathy of the small nations in Eastern Europe.

Even so, Lenin did not abandon the hope that his overall strategy might yet succeed. To meet the new challenge, he altered his tactics somewhat. For example, just after the

79 One authoritative source offers evidence that President Wilson was pressured from all sides to restate the war aims of the Allies in order to meet the Soviet challenge effectively. Even the Provisional Government's Ambassador to the United States, George Bakmetiev, advised the President that "... any evasion on the part of the Allies in the matter of peace will simply strengthen the Bolsheviks and help them to create an atmosphere unfriendly to the Allies." Cited in Charles Seymour (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), III, p. 330.

"Fourteen Points" were made public, Trotsky was sent to Brest-Litovsk as the new head of the Soviet delegation. By putting in the master of polemics, the hope was obviously to bring the revolutionary situation to a head as quickly as possible, before the full impact of the American action could be registered.

Needless to say, Trotsky did not overlook a single opportunity to exploit the national idea. For example, he added Karl Radek to the diplomatic party. As a Polish Jew, a subject of the Hapsburg Empire, and a well known radical in German socialist circles, his presence symbolized the communist indifference to national distinctions, even when an "enemy alien" was involved. And to dramatize the point, Radek discussed the matter openly with the German soldiers assembled on the station platform in Brest-Litovsk, and even distributed revolutionary pamphlets among them.81

The Germans, still smarting from their propaganda defeat at the previous session and indignant at Radek's effrontery, delivered a verbal lashing when the meetings were formally reopened. But Trotsky remained unperturbed. He

countered with a harangue of his own, which he concluded by challenging von Kuhlmann's claim that the peoples under German occupation had already expressed their will freely on the national issue. As proof, he demanded that all foreign troops be withdrawn and that national plebiscites be conducted.

For nearly four weeks, Trotsky and von Kuhlmann dominated the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk with a full blown debate on the ethics, forms, and principles of national self-determination. This, of course, was exactly what Lenin wanted. And for a while it appeared as though the tactic might indeed satisfy communism's broader objectives. During January, 1918, general strikes broke out in Austria and Germany, while general unrest among the nationalities in Eastern Europe continued to mount.82

Probably as a result of the improved revolutionary prospects, and a desire to set in motion the chain reaction of social upheaval throughout Europe before the full effect of the American entrance into the war could be registered, Lenin undertook to complement the delaying tactic at Brest-Litovsk with a revolutionary offensive. The pretext was contained in the fact that relations with the Ukraine had determined

iorated to the point of open hostility. However, the Soviet declaration of war, issued on January 17, 1918, was addressed not only to the Ukrainians, but to European capitalism as well:

Citizens! The Civil War has started. The Civil War goes on. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, across the Danube toward Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London we shall march with fire and sword, establishing Soviet power everywhere. With fire and sword we shall destroy everything that dares to stand in our way. There will be no mercy for any of our enemies.

Simultaneously, communists in Minsk proclaimed the establishment of a Belorussian Soviet Republic, while those in Helsinki attempted to overthrow the Finnish government.

But January, 1918, did not prove to be the month of communist fulfillment; the expected revolutionary flood in Europe turned out to be only a small tide. The fact of the matter was that the revolutionary offensive caught the imagination of very few. The general strikes in Austria and Germany, in which had been placed great hope, attained no real revolutionary level and the national restiveness in

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Eastern Europe was replaced by a rising hope for peace and self-determination based on the promise of American assistance.

At Brest-Litovsk, also, the tide turned rapidly against the Soviets. Trotsky's rhetoric at the conference table, for all its skill and forcefulness, could no longer cloud the fact of its inherent hypocrisy. And the Germans were able to range a most potent weapon against it. The representatives of the Ukrainian Rada, who had arrived on January 7 to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers, were permitted every opportunity to denounce the Soviet attack on the Ukraine. For example:

The noisy declarations of the Bolsheviks regarding the complete freedom of the people of Russia is but vulgar demagogy. The Bolshevik government, which has dispersed the Constituent Assembly, and which rests on the bayonets of the Red Guards, will never choose to apply in Russia the very just principle of self-determination, because they know only too well that not only the Republic of the Ukraine, but also the Don, the Caucasus, Siberia and other regions do not regard them as their government, and that even the Russian people themselves will ultimately deny their right. Only because they are afraid of the development of a national revolution do they declare here at the peace conference and within Russia, with the spirit of demagogy peculiar to themselves, the right of self-determination of the peoples. They themselves are struggling against the realization of this principle and are resorting not only to the bands of Red Guards, but also to meaner and less legal methods. 86

Though the complete picture of the communist regard for

86 Cited in Ioffe i Trotsky, op. cit., p. 152.
the principle of national self-determination, particularly the use of it deliberately as a weapon of revolutionary strategy, was not presented, there was enough truth in the Ukrainian charges to cause Trotzki extreme discomfort.\(^8^7\)

After the Central Powers had expediently proclaimed their recognition of the Ukrainian Rada as the legitimate government, his words on behalf of the East European nationalities lost completely the sense of devotion to principle. Finally, adding insult to injury, von Kuhlmann brushed aside Trotzki's further efforts to promote a discursive bout on the national issue with the blunt rejoinder that he had not come to Brest-Litovsk to indulge in mere intellectual combat.\(^8^8\)

Lenin, also, was forced to recognize that he had overestimated the revolutionary potential of Europe and the national idea as an instrument of destruction, and had underestimated the ability of his capitalist opponents to make use of the very same weapon against him. Furthermore, the self-effacement of the carefully constructed facade of respect for national rights by the desperate revolutionary offensive made it a foregone conclusion that all minority national-

\(^8^7\) Count Czernin has described Trotzki's appearance under attack as chalky, nervously drawing on his blotter, staring fixedly ahead, and with great drops of perspiration trickling down his forehead. Cf. Czernin, op. cit., p. 246.

\(^8^8\) Cf. Ioffe i Trotzki, op. cit., p. 160.
ities of the former Russian Empire would henceforth view all communist offers of assistance with extreme caution, if not outright hostility. In short, all signs pointed not only to the first decisive setback in the use of the national idea as an instrument of revolutionary policy, but also to the unlikelihood that it could ever be used again.

**Conclusion.** More so than any other claimant to its heritage, Vladimir Ilich Lenin was responsible for the revival and perpetuation of the original Marxian regard for the national issue and therefore of the original revolutionary program as well. Following Marx and Engels, he recognized early the destructive potential of the aspirations to self-determination of the nations dominated by the European powers and the method by which it could be utilized in the interest of the socialist revolution.

When translated into the terms of a specific program, Lenin's revolutionary scheme became an enlarged version of the original, which had been based exclusively on the promotion of Irish and Polish national independence. According to Marx and Engels, the realization of the independence of both nationalities would have denied British capitalism its principal prop and Tsarist counterrevolutionism its main channel into Western Europe. In contrast, Lenin's plan called for the promotion of the aspirations of all nationalities under imperialist rule, which he held would not only
generate the proletarian revolution in Europe more rapidly, but would also guarantee its success through the complete destruction of Tsarism.

One curious fact about the original Marxian revolutionary scheme and its Leninist enlargement was that both failed to win the approval of socialists generally. Marx failed because improved economic conditions in Europe in the last half of the nineteenth century caused socialists to attach greater importance to the national, as opposed to the international, interest. Lenin suffered the same fate in Europe generally for the same reason and in Russia because his advocacy of national self-determination went too far to suit dogmatic internationalists and not far enough for nationally-minded socialists. Thus, while Marx never did have a chance to test the validity of his revolutionary plan, Lenin probably would not have either, except for the unexpected turn of events in Russia early in 1917.

In the process by which the exploitation of the national idea has been developed into an important instrument of Soviet foreign policy, the Russian revolution of March, 1917 must be considered an important factor. For one thing, it made possible Lenin's return from exile in Western Europe, at a time when he had all but given up the revolutionary quest as hopeless. For another thing, it afforded the Bols-
hevik leader his opportunity to discover that the national idea could be exploited successfully for a revolutionary purpose. This was illustrated in the Ukraine, where calculated promotion of nationalism at the popular level made it impossible for the moderate Ukrainian nationalist leaders to agree to a compromise settlement of their differences with the Provisional Government. It undoubtedly contributed significantly to the failure of the Provisional Government to cope with the manifold problems it faced and thus to the success of the Bolshevik uprising in November, 1917.

Once in power in Russia, Lenin attempted to utilize the national idea to set off a revolutionary chain reaction throughout Europe. He included the right of national self-determination in the famous "Decree on Peace" in order to appeal to the European proletarian sense of justice and to incite the subjugated nations of Eastern Europe to revolutionary action. His purpose was the same in publishing the secret treaties between the Allies and Tsarist Russia and in appealing to national sentiment during the armistice negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.

In this case, however, the intended results were not forthcoming. Paradoxically, the main reason for the failure can be attributed to the strength, rather than the inherent weakness, of the tactic. Its implications were both too obvious and menacing to be ignored by either the Central Powers
or the Allies. More than that, it evoked the only effective antidote, one created in the very same image. That was provided by President Wilson's "Fourteen Points," which, among other things, successfully outbid the Soviet leaders for the sympathy of the peoples of Eastern Europe. Against the very same promise of national self-determination, but backed by the moral and material strength of the United States, the revolutionary appeal lost most of its magnetism.

Even in defeat, however, there was one note of consolation for Lenin: once again the usefulness of the national idea as an instrument of policy had been demonstrated. Now faced with the task of defending the first Marxist state against a host of hostile, and much stronger, capitalist states, this was one lesson that could not be overlooked. In view of the record, it was almost a foregone conclusion that it would not be forgotten.
CHAPTER II

IN DEFENSE OF SOVIET POWER

As far as most of Russia's leading communists were concerned, the exploitation of nationalism as a tactical device had been completely discredited with the failure to generate a European-wide revolution. On the one hand, a left wing faction, headed by Nikolai Bukharin, proposed abandoning the psychological offensive in favor of an all out revolutionary war. Standing rigidly on ideological ground, Bukharin argued against what he termed a continuation of the betrayal of socialist internationalism and for a military offensive against capitalism, even if it meant ultimate defeat and destruction. On the other hand, a more moderate group, for which Stalin spoke, accepted the need for peace, but strongly recommended a basic modification in the official attitude toward the national issue. Unconditional support of the right of all nations to self-determination, Stalin contended, had prompted neither a revolution in Europe nor a voluntary reunion of the non-Russian border regions with Russ-

1 "We said and we say," Bukharin argued, "that in the end everything depends on whether the international revolution conquers or does not conquer. In the end, the international revolution — and that alone — is our salvation . . . . In renouncing international propaganda, we renounced the keenest-edged weapon that we had." Sedmoi Sezd Rossiiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Party. Stenograficheskii Otchet. 5-9 Dekiabr, 1919g (Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Stenographic Report. December 5-9, 1919) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1923), pp. 34-35.
sia proper. Henceforth, he concluded, the right of national self-determination should be subordinated to socialist principles and interpreted as a right not of the bourgeoisie but of the proletariat of each nation.²

From the standpoint of fundamental doctrine, the difference between Lenin and his impatient colleagues was more apparent than real. He shared their desire to see a proletarian revolution materialize in Europe and, if conditions had permitted, would have been more than agreeable to the idea of a military-revolutionary offensive. However, his own estimate of the capabilities of the Soviet regime left him with no alternative to the conclusion that the continuation of a war with an infinitely superior foe would be senseless, if not suicidal. Realistically, he preferred to see his first revolutionary effort on a world scale suffer a humiliating setback rather than to have it destroyed altogether for the sake of myopic idealism.³

Furthermore, Lenin's regard for the national issue was

²Cf. Stalin, op. cit., IV, pp. 8, 31-32.

³Lenin's reply to Bukharin was as follows: "We are 'defencists'; we have won the right to defend the fatherland since 1917. We are not defending the secret treaties, for we have torn them up . . . . We do not stand for the state, we do not defend the status of a great power: of Russia nothing is left but Great-Russia. These are not national interests; we affirm that the interests of world socialism are higher than national interests . . . . We are 'defencists' of the socialist fatherland." Lenin, op. cit., XXII, pp. 13-14.
in fact neither less negative than Bukharin's, nor less expeditious than Stalin's. But, on the basis of existing needs, he refused to accept any proposals to disavow or modify the use of the national idea as an instrument of policy. His stand on this point was conditioned by three considerations. First and foremost was the fact that the power position of the Soviet regime, which as yet excluded an armed force of any consequence, left no alternative to the use of whatever weapons were available. Secondly, it could be anticipated that the continued occupation of Eastern Europe by the Central Powers — about to be extended farther into what had been the borderlands of the Russian Empire — would afford some new opportunities to exploit nationalism there. Finally, there was the matter of personal pride. Inasmuch as he had suffered chagrin in seeing his first major defeat result from the use of the very device he had counted on, Lenin evidently was anxious to even the score: "If we fight against Wilson, and Wilson turns the small nations into weapons, we must contend with those weapons."

Even so, it required more than reasoned argumentation before the Leninist conception of immediate needs was accep-

4Lenin underscored this point with the following: "Our military preparedness is still incomplete, and therefore our general maxim remains as before — to tack, to retreat, to wait while continuing this preparation . . . ." Ibid., XXX, p. 384.

5Ibid., XXIV, p. 155.
ted. Its validity was not confirmed until after the Central Powers, in response to Trotsky's tragically comic "no war, no peace" ultimatum of February 10, 1918, had announced the resumption of hostilities and had begun to advance in all sectors with impunity. Thereupon it became necessary to accept new, harsher terms as the basis for peace, which was done on March 3. Exactly three weeks later, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was ratified by the Congress of Soviets. This formally terminated Soviet Russia's very first revolutionary offensive. However, it also opened the first of the defensive wars against hostile capitalism, in which the exploitation of the national idea emerged as a permanent weapon of Soviet foreign policy.

Defense Against the Central Powers. Soviet use of the national idea as an instrument of defensive strategy occurred first in connection with the threat posed by the Central Powers from March to November, 1918. While the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk limited the area of the latter's occupation to the non-Russian borderlands west and south of Russia proper, their obvious distaste for Communism made it likely that sooner or later they would look upon the demarcation line as violable.

Lenin recognized that communist appeals to national sentiment in those regions occupied by the Central Powers would be hampered by fresh memories of the attempts to establish soviet regimes in the Ukraine and Belorussia by force.
Nevertheless, there did exist some basis for hope. For one thing, there were many prisoners of war in the Russian camps, which meant the possibility of recruiting propagandists and agitators who might disrupt the efforts of the Central Powers in the occupied areas after being repatriated. For another thing, based upon the expectation that the Central Powers' occupation policy would sooner or later reveal an anti-socialist bias and imperialistic tendencies, it was possible that a new basis for attractive offers of assistance to socialists and nationalists in the border regions would materialize. In such case, Lenin could exploit the role of the lesser of two evils and forge alliances against the common enemy.

Of the two possibilities, the one involving the prisoners of war was of least immediate consequence; though not for the reason that it wasn't tried. In April, 1918, for example, there were formed in Moscow German, Hungarian, Austrian, and Yugoslav sections of the Russian Communist Party, each with an appropriate "national" head and an assignment to proselytize among fellow countrymen in the prisoner camps. The program did not get very far, however, for it was conducted openly and quickly evoked a formal protest by the Ger-

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6Cf. Iv. Ulianov, "Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i Voennop­lennie" ("The October Revolution and the Prisoners of War"), Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, No. 7, 1929, p. 97.
Thereafter, not wishing to provide the latter with a pretext for repudiating the peace treaty, the search for converts among the war prisoners was carried out on a secret, and necessarily limited, basis.

There is no evidence that any of the converted prisoners were actually sent out on the type of assignment originally envisaged for them. Thus the effort can be said to have been successful only to the extent that it provided communism with a few hundred new German, and nearly ninety Hungarian, adherents. Their full usefulness remained to be demonstrated at a future time, as revolutionary missionaries in their own countries.

The immediate benefits flowed from the second aspect of the strategy contemplated by Lenin; for the Central Powers did play the role of anti-socialist and imperialist expected of them. In Belorussia, for example, the Germans refused to recognize the authority of a provisional government formed in Minsk, which was composed largely of moderate socialists. Instead, they created a puppet regime in Vilna, composed of liberals, conservatives, and clerics, and compelled the Minsk

7Cf. Ibid., p. 107.
group to join it. Soon after, however, the socialists and liberal nationalists resigned in protest of a German decision to support a Lithuanian claim to territory heavily populated by Belorussians.9

The official Soviet policy toward Belorussia at this time was strictly proper. It satisfied the German conception of self-determination by making no protests against the flagrant disregard of Belorussian national rights. Moreover, it met the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by recognizing the German-sponsored regime and by permitting it to establish a consulate in Moscow. Unofficially, however, an underground organization was maintained there for the purpose of encouraging the spirit of resistance and promoting alliances with the partisan groups that developed spontaneously in reaction to the overbearing German policy.10

As a consequence of this latter effort, many Belorussian socialists, liberals, and peasants joined the Communist underground. Others, preferring exile, fled to Moscow, where they were warmly received. Subsequently, congresses of Belorussian refugees were convened in the Soviet capital, which denounced the occupation and encouraged the union of the nationalist resistance movements with the communists against the

10Cf. Pipes, op. cit., p. 152.
common enemy. At least on one occasion, the intention to establish an independent Belorussian Soviet Republic was announced. It was not only to be patterned after the Russian model, but ultimately united with it on a federal basis as well. Clearly, then, Lenin's exploitation of Belorussian nationalism against the Germans was beginning to return very definite benefits.

In the Ukraine, similar efforts produced similar results, though not with comparable speed. The delay was due chiefly to the fact that the Germans did not at first pursue an anti-socialist and imperialist policy there; but accepted the Rada, composed largely of socialists and liberals, as the legitimate political authority. Under the circumstances, Lenin was compelled to rely exclusively on his own devices for a rapprochement with the Rada's leaders. For example, during the last weeks of March, 1918, and for most of April, overtures to the Rada for a settlement of their differences were emitted regularly. In addition, all communists who had been sent into the Ukraine to direct the local soviets under the protection of the Red Army were withdrawn. Then, as


12 The true character of the Soviet action is revealed in a confidential note from Lenin to Antonov-Ovseenko, the commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine, dated May 2, 1918: "The Ukrainian affair must be liquidated at least temporarily, and our cause must wait for more favorable times."
something of a final testimonial to the sincerity of the quest for friendship, the Russian leader announced the intention to draft a constitution for the first Soviet state, one that would include as a basic principle the right of each nationality to decide independently "... whether it desires, and if so, on what basis, to participate in the federal government and in other Soviet institutions." 13

Even so, after nearly six weeks of persistent wooing, the best that the Leninist effort could achieve was to get the Ukrainian leaders to agree to discuss a peace settlement. Negotiations commenced on April 27, 1918, in the border town of Kursk.

In the meantime, Lenin's Ukrainian strategy had become beset by another unexpected problem, posed by doctrinaire Ukrainian communists who refused the new instructions to seek allies among local nationalists by posing as nationalists themselves. The "Kievans," as they were known, led by Gregori Piatakov, were die-hard internationalists who, like the left wing faction in Russia, had little sympathy for any suggestion that the revolutionary banner be lowered, even temporarily. But, by a curious metamorphosis that the circumstances effected, the extreme internationalist argument

V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoj voine (Notes on the Civil War) (Moskva: Vishil voenni redaktsionni sovet, 1924), II, p. 293.

13Pravda, April 2, 1918, p. 1.
of the "Kievans" also generated particularistic, if not nationalistic, ramifications. It resulted in an assignment of priority to revolutionary objectives in the Ukraine over everything else; for Piatakov informed the Russian leaders of his intention to announce immediately the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic led by an independent Ukrainian Communist Party.\(^1\)

Piatakov's action in this case marked the first example of what was later to be called "left" communist national deviationism, or sectarianism. What it represented was an extreme reaction of the stubbornly doctrinaire non-Russian communist upon learning that submission to the Russian leadership on the issue of utilizing the national idea as an instrument of foreign policy carried with it the extra obligation to abandon his revolutionary efforts in his own national homeland whenever the security of the Russian regime was threatened. Whereas the acceptance of the use of the national idea in itself had been distasteful enough, the discovery of its hidden corollary made it absolutely insupportable. And rather than submit to this double infringement upon his personal dedication to fundamental internationalist

principles, he was prepared to pursue a revolutionary policy on his own.

Fortunately for Lenin, Piatakov confined his statement of intentions to party circles, which meant that there existed a chance to prevent the dogmatic Ukrainian from upsetting the plan to promote Ukrainian nationalism against the Germans. And this was achieved by the Russian leader by means of a few expedient concessions. For one thing, he agreed to permit underground revolutionary activity in the Ukraine on the condition that it be carried out in such a way as not to arouse the suspicion of the nationalists. For another, he accepted the idea of Ukrainian independence and even instructed Piatakov's rivals, the pro-Moscow "Kharkov group," to unite under his leadership in the formation of a single Central Executive Committee. Finally, though he didn't accept the idea so readily, Lenin promised to give serious consideration to the matter of a completely independent Ukrainian Communist Party.¹⁵

The wisdom of Lenin's conciliatory effort in this case was demonstrated soon after. Only a few days beyond the opening of peace negotiations with the representatives of the Rada at Kursk, the Germans executed a radical shift in policy. Without warning, they forcibly dissolved the Rada and replaced it with a puppet regime under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadski, an

¹⁵Cf. Ibid., pp. 91-97.
ex-officer of the Tsarist army and an avowed anti-socialist. As for the dispossessed Ukrainian socialists and liberal nationalists, they became determined opponents of the new regime and its German benefactors.

Needless to say, the reaction in Moscow to this development was automatic. Officially, a facade of diplomatic propriety was maintained; the interrupted peace negotiations at Kursk were resumed with Skoropadski's representatives as though nothing had happened. Secretly, however, the Soviet diplomats, Khristian Rakovski and Dmitri Manuilski, met with the ousted nationalists to discuss the creation of an alliance against the occupation. On the basis of a Soviet promise to recognize them as the legitimate authority in the Ukraine, they agreed to cooperate. 16

Lenin made no serious attempt to forge similar alliances with nationalists in the Transcaucasian States, the Baltic States, or Poland, all of which were also under occupation at this time. Distance, the absence of strong local communist organizations, and general suspicion of Soviet motives denied in advance any chance for immediate success. It made little difference, however, for the objective of defending Soviet power in Russia against the Central Powers was real-

16 Cf. Volodimir Vinnichenko, Vidrozheniia Natsii (Death of a Nation), (Kiev-Vienna: Vidavnitstvo Devin, 1920), III, p. 158.
ized anyway in a matter of months.

Lenin could not claim the credit for having eliminated the threat posed by the Central Powers; he had the victory of the Allies in November, 1918 to thank for it. However, his own efforts in this case had provided invaluable experience in the use of the national idea as an instrument of policy. For one thing, he had found out that even nationalists with fresh memories of communist duplicity could be persuaded to accept Soviet offers of assistance, based on new promises of respect for their national rights, against a common enemy. For another thing, he had learned that new appeals to national sentiment in occupied territories could facilitate the development of a resistance movement capable of widespread destruction, sabotage, and assassination.17

17According to the noted Ukrainian historian Hrushevsky, the German policy in the Ukraine opened the way "...for the dissemination of propaganda among the Ukrainian peasants and factory and mine workers against the new regime and its German sponsors. Passive resistance became widespread, breaking out in riots against foreign landlords and German soldiers, and in the northern province of Chernikiv, near the Bolshevik border, into organized rebellions." Michael Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 552. Cf. also, Vakar, op. cit., p. 105. The Germans also testify to the effectiveness of Lenin's tactics. According to Ludendorff: "I anticipated to be able to increase our armies and our food supply; and the raising of new Ukrainian formations was actually commenced. This, of course, required time and brought us no immediate relief. The German troops that were in the Ukraine were urgently needed for the protection against the Bolsheviks and securing the economic exploitation of the country. Whenever we wanted to reduce the
Needless to say, such lessons as these were not lost upon
the calculating Russian revolutionary leader.

The Second Military-Revolutionary Offensive. It goes
without saying that November 12, 1918 was a day welcomed en-
thusiastically in Moscow. But relief was only a part of Len-
in's reaction. Always adapting to the opportunities of the
moment, he also viewed the defeat of the Central Powers as
 conducive to a new effort to extend the revolution into the
separated border regions of the defunct Russian Empire. Buk-
harin and other staunch internationalists no doubt agreed
with him. Hence, only two days later, he declared the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk null and void and issued marching orders to
the commanders of the Red Army units.

By this time, the Soviet Red Army, under the tutelage
of Trotsky, had made significant progress in terms of quan-
titative and qualitative development. Though not yet a first
rate fighting force, its ability to fill the vacuum left in
the border regions by the withdrawal of the Central Powers
was beyond doubt. Even so, to expedite the new revolutionary
offensive by lending it a more legitimate character than the
first one, Lenin utilized the national idea as a screen. The
invasion of each region was proclaimed an effort of national
troops, the Ukraine complained that they were not strong
enough to stand the reduction in numbers." Ludendorff, op.
cit., p. 261.
liberation and was spearheaded appropriately by a "national" army.\textsuperscript{18} And in the latter's wake followed a "national" regime, which, once settled on native soil, received Moscow's recognition, military assistance, and full blessing with respect to its right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{19} The meaning of self-determination in this instance, of course, had already been worked out by the Soviet leaders.

These tactics were immediately successful in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where military resistance was at a minimum and where the expedient display of respect for national institutions and rights benefited by contrast with the policy pursued earlier by the Germans. The same was true in Belorussia, where the Soviet leaders enjoyed the extra advantage of having available a "national" regime whose claim to legitimacy was a very strong one. It was composed of native communists and social-democrats who had fled to Moscow during the occupation and who, by their close identification with the Belorussian resistance movement, had helped to make them-

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Izvestiia, December 13, 1918, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{19} Stalin wrote: "Soviet Russia has never regarded the western regions as its own possessions. It has always considered them as the inalienable possessions of the working masses that inhabit them and possess the full right to determine freely their political destinies." Op. cit., IV, p. 178. What he neglected to say, of course, was that their determination of their political destiny would in fact require Moscow's approval.
selves acceptable as the logical successors to the departed German puppet regime.

But the experience in Belorussia was not without significant incident; for it was discovered once again that the utilization of the national idea involved a risk, even when only communists were concerned. This developed when Lenin decided to take advantage of the favorable situation in Belorussia for the sake of the campaign in Lithuania, where there existed strong sentiment for a territorial restoration of the fourteenth century Grand Duchy of Lithuania. To appease that sentiment, and thus reduce Lithuanian resistance to sovietization to even more manageable proportions, the proclamation of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, on January 14, 1919, was followed shortly after by Moscow's instruction that it unite with Lithuania to form a single state.20

The Russian order, however, was not greeted with any noticeable enthusiasm among Belorussians. On the contrary, the leader of the Belorussian Communist Party, Z. Zhilonovich, who apparently took the idea of proletarian national self-determination literally, objected strenuously to it. In one outburst of anger, in which he charged the Russians with gross violations of both Belorussian and Lithuanian national rights, Zhilonovich refused to have anything to do with the

20Cf. Ibid., pp. 228-229.
new government. His rejection of an offer to head the combined Belorussian and Lithuanian Communist Parties underscored the point.21

Inasmuch as he was resisting an application of the principle of internationalism, Zhilonovich provided a "right" counterpart to Piatakov's earlier "left" communist national deviationism, and, incidentally, the very first example of what was to be called titoism three decades later. His adam­ant defense of Belorussia's sovereignty no doubt was rooted in a mistaken interpretation of Lenin's expedient concessions to nationalism as evidence of a permanent departure from strict internationalism and centralism. But it is equally probable that the intensity of his feelings was heightened by the summary character of the Russian order to unite with Lithuania, which bore a striking resemblance to the Tsarist policies toward the non-Russian border regions, and by the easily obtained impression that the proletarian revolution in Belorussia was being made subordinate to the satisfaction of Lithuanian national sentiment. Needless to say, there were few Belorussians ready to look with favor on even the slightest suggestion of a restoration of the Grand Duchy of

21 Cf. V.G. Knorin, Zametki k istori diktaturi proletar­iata v Belorussia (Notes for the History of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Belorussia) (Minsk: Gosudarstvennoe iz­datelstvo Belorussii, 1934), pp. 29-34.
Lithuania.

Nevertheless, Zhilonovich's "right" national deviationism proved no serious problem to the Russians. Inasmuch as his regime depended on the support of the Red Army, his voluntary abdication simply saved the trouble of removing him by force. Thus, on March 12, 1919, the union of Belorussia and Lithuania was formally proclaimed. The new state was named the Lithuanian-Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the membership of its first Council of People's Commissars was divided evenly between the two nationalities. Also indicative of Lenin's care in balancing national sensitivities was the choice of the Council's chairman. That post went to one Mitskevich-Kapsukas, a half-Belorussian, half-Lithuanian.22

A revolutionary offensive against the Ukraine did not begin at the same time as those against Belorussia and the Baltic States, though not for the reason of Lenin's promise to the Ukrainian nationalists to respect their authority once the Germans had left. It was due to the opposition of the Soviet military leaders, who feared the risk involved in

trying to maintain so broad a front. However, this did not prevent the calculating Lenin from making the necessary preparations for the moment when the largest non-Russian province of the former Russian Empire, with its rich soil, modern industries, and plentiful coal and iron ore deposits, could be "liberated". His first step in this connection took place on November 28, 1918, when a Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Provisional Government suddenly appeared in the border town of Kursk and publicly proclaimed itself the legitimate government of the Ukraine. Attesting to its "independent and national" character was the presence of Gregori Piatakov as its chairman.

Lenin undoubtedly planned to initiate the invasion of the Ukraine by formally recognizing the "Provisional Government", by entering into an alliance with it, and by lending it sufficient military aid. In other words, the attack was to occur without a declaration of war and on the pretext of...

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24 The appointment of Piatakov to head the Kursk regime did not signify that his breach of discipline in the previous summer had been excused. As a matter of fact, in October, 1918, Moscow had reorganized the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party to the extent of demoting Piatakov to the status of an ordinary member, giving a majority of the seats to the "Kharkov group", and introducing Stalin as one of its permanent members. Cf. Ravich-Cherkasski, op. cit., pp. 217-219.
meeting the obligations of an alliance. But an unforeseen development necessitated a slight modification. The Ukrainians reacted to the appearance of a competing regime in Kursk with unexpected vigor. With enough experience to recognize a communist ruse when they saw one, they delivered a stinging protest and followed it up with a declaration of war. 25

Needless to say, Lenin responded in kind. Piatakov, who had been earmarked for removal from all prominent positions ever since his display of deviationism, was replaced by Khristian Rakovski, a Russified Bulgarian. And in much less time than the diplomatic process customarily takes, the Kursk regime was recognized as legitimate, an alliance was made, and the Red Army was sent into the Ukraine to assist the new ally. On February 6, 1919, Kiev was captured by the Soviet armed forces for a second time in a year.

This second military-revolutionary offensive mounted by Moscow did not extend into Transcaucasia, Central Asia, or Siberia. In addition to the limited power of the Red Army, obstacles were present in the form of organized hostile forces. In Transcaucasia, for example, there were British units from Iran. The way to Central Asia was blocked in the northern Caucasus by a "white" Russian army commanded by

General Anton Denikin. And, in Siberia, such obstacles were even more plentiful. Present there were some fifty thousand troops of the "Czech Legion", who, provoked by the communists on their way to Europe by way of the Pacific, had delayed their departure to help overthrow the revolutionary regime. Furthermore, there was another "white" Russian army, under the command of Admiral Alexander Kolchak, and British, French, American, and Japanese military units. 26

Actually it made little difference; for the Soviet victories achieved elsewhere were only short-lived. Within four months of the advance into the western border regions, the Red Army and the "national" soviet regimes were compelled to beat a hasty retreat. In Estonia and Latvia appeared a third "white" Russian army, under General Yudenich, supported by Allied naval squadrons in the Baltic and by German "volunteers", while the retreat from Belorussia and Lithuania was compelled by an Allied-supported Polish Army. And simultaneously, from the east and southeast, the armies of Kolchak and Denikin began their advance against the revolutionary regime. Thus, after a second unsuccessful attempt to

26 The Allies, of course, had landed in Siberia in the summer of 1918 for the purpose of striking against the Germans from the east, guarding supplies given the Tsarist regime, and expediting the evacuation of the "Czech Legion". After November, 1918, they had remained to assist Kolchak's effort against the Soviet regime.
extend the revolution by force, the Soviet leadership found itself on something of a political island against which the waves of anti-Communism mounted menacingly.

**The Defense of Soviet Power Against the "White Russian Counterrevolution.** Perhaps the outstanding single fact about the Soviet success against the "white" Russian counterrevolution was the surprisingly short period of time that it required. Though the combined strength of the Allied-supported "white" forces was much greater than the Red Army's, only several months were needed to defeat them completely. In this connection, one important factor was the Allied decision to play only a supporting, as opposed to a fully active, role on behalf of the counterrevolution, which rendered the balance of contending forces more nearly equal than would have been the case otherwise. Another important factor was Trotsky's masterful job in rapidly building up the strength of the Red Army. But most of the credit belonged to a new use of the national idea as a tactical weapon by Lenin, without which the Soviet success could hardly have been achieved in so short a time, if at all.

Lenin's opportunity to utilize the national idea effectively against the counterrevolution was provided by the unmistakable imperialistic quality of the Allied and "white" Russian policies. The Allies, for example, offered ample evidence that they were as much interested in the economic
opportunities that Russia presented as in overturning the
Soviet regime. In Eastern Siberia, the Japanese hastily
established an elaborate banking system, while the French,
British, and Americans cast openly covetous eyes on the reg-
ion's mineral resources and railway system. In Trans-
caucasia, one of the first acts of the British upon arrival
was to declare the Baku oilfields an exclusive preserve.

27 Even more clearly indicative of Japanese intentions
in Siberia was the activity on the Tokyo stock exchange late
in 1918. In the closing months of that year, more than a
third of all foreign bonds sold were for investment in Rus-
sia. Cf. Kakujiro Yamasaki and Gotaro Ogawa, The Effect
of the World War Upon the Commerce and Industry of Japan (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 38. Cf. also,
Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs: A History
of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World
(1st ed., London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), 1, p. 101; S.V. Vos-
trotin, "A Russian View of Manchuria," The Slavonic and East
European Review, July 1932, p. 25.

28 Cf. A.L. Popov, "Iz epokhi angliiskoi interventsii v
Zaksavkazie" ("From the Epoch of the English Intervention in
Transcaucasia"), Proletarskaiia Revolutsiia, No. 8, 1923, pp.
97-98. The sound of imperialistic drum-beating was even more
pronounced in London. For example, the chairman of the Brit-
ish Bibi Elbat Oil Company, Herbert Allen, issued a call to
action on December 24, 1918 in the following terms: "Never
in the history of these islands was there such an opportunity
for the peaceful penetration of British influence and Brit-
ish trade, for the creation of a second India, or a second
Egypt . . . . The oil industry of Russia, liberally finan-
ced and properly organized under British auspices, would in
itself be a valuable asset to the Empire . . . . A golden
opportunity offers itself to the British government to exer-
cise a powerful influence upon the Grosni, Baku, and Trans-
caspia fields". Cited in Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism
would be regarded as legitimate national economic rights, the Allies also infringed Russia's territorial rights by giving the Poles a guarantee of impunity in the satisfaction of their ambitions at the expense of the Ukraine and Belorussia.29 But perhaps the most blatant abuse of power was that contained in the indignities heaped upon the local population. The Japanese in particular were notorious for their cruelty, perpetrated against Russian civilians and the men and officers of Kolchak's army.30 The British did not go to such extremes in Transcaucasia, but their rigid control over local affairs was undoubtedly enough to stimulate popular hostility. And apparently not to be outdone in this respect, the French, who landed also at the Ukrainian port city of Odessa, not only dictated the composition of the Ukrainian nationalist regime but ordered it to turn over its military units to "white" Russian officers.31

Finally, besides generating enmity at the popular level, the Allied policies frequently evoked bitterness on


the part of the "white" Russian leaders. For example, the latter took exception to an Allied proposal in January, 1919 that all contending factions in Russia, including the Communists, be brought together at Prinkipo for a peaceful settlement of their differences.32 And it goes without saying that Kolchak did not conceal his contempt for the Japanese, who not only mistreated his officers and men, but also supported his chief rivals, Gregori Semenov and Ivan Kalmikov.33 Equally disheartening to the "white" Russians was the action of the French in Odessa, in March, 1919, who summarily dismissed Denikin's choice of local military commander and replaced him with one who was personally disliked by the "White" Russian general.34

While the leaders of the Russian counterrevolutionary movement had sufficient grounds to question the propriety of Allied policies in Russia, they themselves were guilty of serious tactical errors. Most important in this connection


33The ex-Tsarist admiral also took exception to an Allied proposal that a French general be placed in command of the Siberian military theater. Cf. A.W. Knox, "General Janin's Siberian Diary," The Slavonic and East European Review, March 1925, p. 724.

was their unconcealed aim to restore Russian domination over the non-Russian borderlands once the Soviet regime had been defeated. In the Ukraine, for example, Denikin's revival of the name "Little Russia" and his designation of Russian as the official language there served notice to the Ukrainians, as well as to other national minorities of the former Russian Empire, that enforced "russification" was far from a dead issue.35

Lenin, of course, wasted no time in presenting the national idea as the key to his psychological campaign against the Allies and the "white" Russians. Essentially, his tactics followed the pattern established earlier against the Central Powers. However, inasmuch as this new threat was real rather than potential, the intensity and scope of their application were increased considerably. Thus, there was no hesitation on this occasion to depict the struggle as one in which a small, helpless nation was pitted against a combination of powerful imperialists. The "dark subterranean conspiracies" of the imperialists, according to the new propaganda line, were aimed not only at Soviet Russia, but against all small nations. And coupled with this accusation was an impassioned protest against "this wanton ag-

35 Cf. Hrushevsky, op. cit., p. 556.
At the moment when the Entente armies are crossing the borders and the Entente fleets are nearing the shores of what was previously the Russian Empire, the Government of the Soviet Republic protests once more solemnly before the deluded soldiers and sailors of their fleets, before the toiling brothers all over the world against this wanton aggression, against this act of sheer violence and brutal force, against this attempt to crush the liberty, the political and social life of the people of another country.36

The right of national self-determination was espoused with greater vigor than ever before, and the masses of Western Europe were exhorted to force their governments to discontinue their "devilish play".37 On occasion, appeals beamed to the West also included the demand that the working classes overthrow the "bandits of international imperialism". But revolutionary expectations occupied no important part of the Leninist perspective at the moment. What the Soviet leader sought as the immediate objective in this connection was the stimulation of anti-imperialist sentiment in the West, which might cause sufficient anxiety among the Allies to compel them to limit their assistance to the "white" Russians. Though he never publicized his fear, Lenin no doubt was mindful of the possibility that the Red Army might have to fight Allied armies in addition to the "white" Russians.

36Quoted in Cumming and Petit, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

In the non-Russian borderlands, Lenin's exploitation of the national idea was carefully trimmed to take advantage of every opportunity presented. One of its aspects consisted of appeals to the Allied troops landed and to the sailors of the Allied fleets supporting them, which emphasized the point that they were being used as pawns in an "imperialist war" that was so far undeclared and held little interest for them. In addition, the theme of national self-determination was played up constantly for the benefit of the non-Russian nationalities, as a counterpoise to the imperialistic character of the policies of the Allies and the "white" Russians.

In this connection, a special effort was directed to the nationalities of Transcaucasia, who so far had escaped the pain of Soviet aggression and who might at least be willing to test the sincerity of this latest championship of their national rights. To them, Moscow offered understanding and support of their national aspirations, even to the extent of promising material assistance for a joint effort to throw out the Allies and the "white" Russians. Characteristic was one message over the signatures of Chicherin and Narimanov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the Moslem Section of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs:

Comrades, workers, and peasants of Azerbaijan, Daghestan, and Georgia!

Soviet Russia has no intention of marching against your republics. . . . She stands firmly on the principle of national self-determination. She has shown this in fact by granting autonomy even to the backward Bashkirs, Kirghizes, and other peoples. And if you, the Moslems and Georgians of the Caucasus, are satisfied with the form of government of your republics, live in peace, exercise your right of self-determination, and restore good-neighborly relations with us.

Soviet Russia expresses the firm hope that the workers and peasants of Daghestan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia will not allow their freedom to be trampled under the feet of the Tsarist General, and English Executioner, Denikin.39

Similarly worded pronouncements could not be addressed to the nationalists in the Ukraine or Belorussia for the reason that few, if any, could be expected to be taken in by mere avowals of respect for nationality rights. The Soviet record of aggression against those regions militated against it. However, it did not preclude an attempt to win the cooperation of the nationalists by playing upon their fears. Accordingly, the Ukrainians were reminded constantly of the dire consequences portended by the French landing in Odessa and Denikin's attempt to revive the Tsarist policy of "russification". Poland's seizure of Western Ukraine was another point emphasized in this connection.40

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sians, also, were warned about the consequences of a victory for the Allied-supported "white" Russians and Poles:

... the French need the re-establishment of a Poland of generals and are ready to make any sacrifice to accomplish this, while England, because of her economic situation, needs precisely the dismemberment of Russia and a weak Poland for her trade interests and colonial policy.41

In reality, this Soviet propaganda campaign could be likened to the case of "the pot calling the kettle black". But it enjoyed one distinct advantage. Whereas the combined Allied, "white" Russian, and Polish threats to the independent existence of these borderland regions were both clear and present, the Soviet threat to them by contrast was remote. Under such circumstances, Lenin sought the role of the lesser of two evils whose willingness to assist might represent a straw that even the most skeptical Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalist might be tempted to grasp.

Another of the areas in which the Soviet leader sought to stimulate the national emotion and direct its force against the counterrevolution was Russia proper, or, more accurately, that part of it under his control. Temporarily set aside were the familiar anti-national and anti-state sentiments fundamental to the Communist philosophy. In their place — in the press, in resolutions, and in speeches —

patriotism emerged as the dominant theme. The Soviet regime was depicted as the defender of the Russian "fatherland", indeed, as the very embodiment of patriotism itself, and against the "imperialist intervention" and the "traitorous Russians" were all efforts said to be directed. Not unusual for the setting was Lenin's own impassioned plea for a "resolute national character" in the defense of Russia.\(^\text{42}\)

And there was still another aspect to the Leninist exploitation of the national idea against the Allies and the "white" Russians, one that developed quite unexpectedly in April, 1919. In that month, there arrived in Moscow an unheralded emissary from the ruler of Afghanistan, who bore a proposal for a united effort against British imperialism.\(^\text{43}\) Needless to say, Lenin, whose recognition of the importance of national sentiment in the colonies and dependent countries of the East was one of long standing, responded affirmatively. But he did not limit himself to Afghanistan. In June and July, 1919, he sent formal diplomatic notes to Iran and China as well, each containing avowals of respect for their right to national self-determination, offers to repudiate any concessions enjoyed formerly by the Tsarist regime in exchange for diplomatic recognition, and offers to assist mat-

\(^{\text{42}}\)Lenin, op. cit., XVI, p. 155.

erially in their struggles against existing and threatening imperialist domination.44

There was, to be sure, little in the way of material assistance that Moscow could spare at this time, even if the offers were accepted. Thus, no great hope was placed in being able to stimulate nationalist, anti-imperialist uprisings in Afghanistan, Iran, or China. However, the psychological implications of the move were promising; for real or apparent ties between Soviet Russia and those three countries was bound to cause concern in the West. And Lenin undoubtedly expected that it would benefit his own cause most.

One thing to be said about Lenin's exploitation of the national idea at this time was that it could scarcely have been more ambitious; for no opportunity passed unnoticed. More important, however, was that it invariably worked in the Soviet favor. For one thing, the general anti-imperialist theme of the propaganda beamed to the West coincided with demands by British labor and French radicals that the intervention in Russia be stopped. The possibility of their direct connection was not discounted by the Western leaders.45


But its impact was manifested most dramatically in April, 1919, when, due in large part to Communist propaganda and agitation, a rebellion broke out in the French fleet stationed in the Black Sea. As a consequence of that event, the French forces in the Ukraine were withdrawn immediately. A few months later, influenced by the French action, by the continuing demands of anti-interventionists in London, and by concern over the possible effects of Communist propaganda in Afghanistan and Iran, the British announced their intention to do the same in Transcaucasia.

That marked the first major Soviet success against the "white" counterrevolution, and, in a sort of chain reaction, others followed in rapid succession. Besides bolstering morale in Moscow, the withdrawal of the Allies from the Ukraine and Transcaucasia had the opposite effect on the "white" Russians. According to no less an authority than Denikin, the Allied retreat

... produced a most painful impression in the city (Odessa) and upon our troops ... and shattered our last vestige of faith in the possibility of the Allied Command fighting the Bolsheviks, or their desire to do so.47

Denikin also recounts ruefully that the Allied action


47 Denikine, op. cit., p. 245.
provided the Communists with the most telling propaganda, since they were then able to taunt the "white" troops with the fact that they had been abandoned by their "imperialist partners" from the West. Thereafter, he testifies, desertions to the Red Army, or to anti-"white" partisans, mounted at a phenomenal rate.48

Another important consequence of the Allied withdrawal from the Ukraine and Transcaucasia was its impact on local nationalists, of both conservative and radical persuasion. For as long as the British and French had remained, they had served as something of a protective shield against the "whites" and had helped to sustain the hope that separatist aspirations would be recognized. Now, however, their departure made it seem as though the nationalist causes were being abandoned altogether. Hence, left with no alternative, many local nationalists became receptive to Moscow's offers of assistance. For example, soon after the French departed, the forces of the Ukrainian Directory under General Grigoriev went over to the Communist side.49 They were followed soon after by the left wing factions of the Ukrainian Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary parties, both of which had come to accept the idea of an independent Soviet Ukraine as

48 Cf. Ibid., pp. 237-239.

preferable to the reimposition of reactionary Great Russian domination.50

But perhaps the most significant benefit realized by the Soviet leaders in the wake of the Allied withdrawal, and on the basis of new generous offers of national self-determination, was the acquisition of the leadership of virtually the whole of the anti-"white" partisan movement, the Green Guards.51 Hitherto, the partisans had carried out their activities in the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Siberia without co-ordination. Now, under Moscow's direction, they were employed as an important auxiliary of the Red Army. While the latter mounted frontal attacks against the "whites", the Green Guards carried out forays behind the lines.52

A final note here concerns the positive effect of the Soviet nationalistic appeals within Russia itself. The depiction of the struggle as one between Russia and foreign aggressors stirred patriotic emotions and thus facilitated the task of military mobilization. Illustrative of the stubborn will to resist the enemy generated by the Communist propaganda was the battle in defense of Petrograd, in Oct-


ober, 1919, when, standing on the very last line of the city's hastily contrived defense network, soldiers and workers together stemmed the advance of General Yudenich's "white" army and then forced it to retreat. Similar efforts and successes were repeated all along the line that separated Reds from "whites".

By the fall of 1919, the full importance of the exploitation of the national idea to the Soviet defense effort was manifested. Against the weakened enemy on the southern and eastern fronts, the vastly improved Red Army swung over to the offensive for the first time. Its blows not only turned the tide, but rapidly turned the orderly retreats of Denikin's and Kolchak's armies into complete routs. There seemed little doubt that Soviet power in Russia was about to pass its greatest test of strength to date.

Conclusion. In the record of Soviet Russian use of the national idea as an instrument of foreign policy, the period from the spring of 1918 to the fall of 1919 was an extremely critical one. When it opened, there was little reason to expect that the promotion of nationalism would ever again occupy an important place in Soviet strategy. Prompted by the setback suffered at Brest-Litovsk, doctrinaire Communists inveighed strenuously against it as both

53 Cf. Ibid., pp. 274-275.
theoretically incorrect and tactically useless. Though less concerned about the ideological problem involved, moderate Communists also voiced doubts about its tactical value. But Lenin refused to concede defeat on this point, and, abetted by the fact that the desperate plight of the Communist regime in 1918 afforded no practical alternative, he was able to overcome the opposition.

Another failure undoubtedly would have eliminated the exploitation of nationalism from Soviet strategy altogether. As it turned out, however, Lenin's confidence was completely vindicated. For one thing, in the summer of 1918, he was able to demonstrate to his doubting colleagues that, despite past evidence of Communist perfidy on the national issue, the principle of national self-determination still could be used against Western capitalism. At the time when the Ukraine and Belorussia were occupied by the Central Powers, his calculated promises to respect the sovereignty of both regions provided the basis for new alliances with Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalists and widespread campaigns against the occupation. Consequently, the Central Powers were denied every benefit they had sought by eliminating the Eastern front as an active military theater. And inasmuch as this contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Central Powers by the Allies, it also helped to remove the first real threat to Soviet power in Russia.
For another thing, after the withdrawal of the Central Powers, Lenin also had a chance to illustrate how the national idea could be used as an offensive weapon, as a screen for forceful extensions of the revolution beyond the established Soviet borders. For example, when the Red Army swept into Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine in the winter of 1918-1919, an air of legitimacy was created by proclaiming the action to be based on concern for the right of those nations to self-determination. To add to the illusion, fictitious national regimes and national armies were employed.

Lenin's policy toward the Ukraine was of special interest since it exhibited an important variation on the basic tactical scheme. Because the invasion of the Ukraine was not scheduled to take place until after Belorussia and the Baltic States had been secured, and because this afforded the Ukrainian nationalists an opportunity to establish a working regime, the use of national liberation and protection of national rights as pretexts was ruled out. In its place, the Russian leader created his own Ukrainian national-revolutionary government on Russian soil, the "national" army of which consisted of a few detachments from the Red Army. Then, at the propitious moment, diplomatic recognition was extended to it, a military alliance was signed, and all aid necessary to ensure its success against the nationalists was
made available without delay.

Though doctrinaire Communists may have continued to view the use of nationalistic symbols as incongruous from an ideological standpoint, there existed no longer any reason to question its merit on a purely tactical basis. But if any doubts remained, Lenin surely dispelled them with his demonstration of the usefulness of the national idea in connection with the stunning victory over the Allied-supported "white" Russian counterrevolution in 1919. Again aided by unconcealed imperialistic ambitions on the part of the enemy, new Soviet offers to recognize the sovereignty of the border regions resulted in new alliances with local nationalists. This was in spite of the fact that similar offers made in the past had turned out to be purely expedient. Furthermore, the defensive effort of the Red Army gained important assistance from Moscow's appeals to anti-imperialist sentiment in the West, from calculated expressions of sympathy for the national aspirations of dependent peoples in Asia, and from the promotion of national feeling within Russia itself. In short, together with the rapid development of the Red Army under Trotsky's direction and the skill of the Soviet military commanders in the field, Lenin's skillfully contrived and executed campaign of psychological warfare contributed in large measure to the outcome of the conflict.

One final point to be made about Lenin's use of the
national idea in 1918-1919 was that new evidence of its limitations was also revealed. Hitherto, the only known obstacle to the successful exploitation of the principle of national self-determination had consisted of similar efforts undertaken by the capitalist enemy. The experience with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk and with Wilson's Fourteen Points had revealed that Communism's claim to champion the cause of national rights was not regarded by oppressed national minorities as the exclusive hope for salvation. Now, however, there was evidence of potential difficulty originating within the Communist framework itself. On the one hand, as Piatakov had shown, there was danger that the promotion of nationalism for defensive purposes in the future could stir doctrinaire non-Russian Communists into a stubborn resistance to Russian leadership and to damaging revolutionary adventures. On the other hand, as demonstrated by Zhilonovich, the swing back from expedient nationalism to internationalism could produce a similar effect among moderate non-Russian Communists, who, by virtue of their temporary association with it, took the idea of national self-determination literally.

In reality, the actions of Piatakov and Zhilonovich represented early manifestations of what was later to be called "left" and "right" Communist nationalist deviationism. In 1918-1919, however, the implications were easily over-
looked for the reason that no serious damage had resulted and because it was possible to dismiss them as "relics" of the bourgeois era. At any rate, Lenin was not prepared to regard them as sufficient reason for curbing any further attempts to make use of the national idea in foreign policy. As a matter of fact, he already had in mind plans for a new Communist military-revolutionary offensive, and in which the exploitation of nationalism figured prominently.
CHAPTER III

THE SECOND MILITARY-REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSIVE

Late in the fall of 1919, as the Red Army swept south and east after the retreating "white" armies of Denikin and Kolchak, Lenin shifted Soviet foreign policy from the defensive. Prompted by the sudden change in fortune, and exhibiting the same old propensity to make the most of any situation, he went over to the offensive in a grand way. The immediate objective marked out by Lenin was twofold: (1) to extend Soviet power over as much of the former Russian Empire as possible; and (2) to force the withdrawal of the Allied Powers from their positions along Asia's periphery, particularly from Afghanistan, Iran, and China.

In connection with both aims, the exploitation of the national idea again figured prominently as a tactical device. On the one hand, following the pattern developed during the winter of 1918-1919, it was used as a complement to military force, to give a semblance of moral justification and legitimacy to aggression against the independent border regions. On the other hand, in a move that harked back to the pre-revolutionary period, to the importance attached to national rebellions in the East, it was used as the basis for an extensive diplomatic offensive against imperialism.
Generally, that dual effort marked still another astonishing triumph in the record of Soviet exploitation of the national idea in foreign policy. Skillful use of the device provided an effective screen for the conquest of most of the separated border regions. Of equal importance was its employment in connection with the diplomatic offensive in the East, for it compelled a decisive diminution of the influence of the capitalist Powers in certain of their traditional "spheres of influence". However, the whole episode, which extended down to 1927, was not without its negative features. Once again the use of the national idea evoked the phenomenon of Communist nationalist deviationism. More than that, from the standpoint of its extent and impact, it represented by far the most serious outburst to date.

The "Liberation" of the Border Regions. As the Red Army advanced south and east in the fall of 1919, overrunning non-Soviet territory in the process, it bore the banner of national liberation conspicuously. To liberate the peoples of the border regions from "white" Russian imperialism was proclaimed as one of its paramount aims.¹ But, by Moscow's definition, full national liberation could mean nothing less than the establishment of Soviet power in those regions and

their union with the Russian republic. As Stalin explained to an audience of North Caucasians early in 1920:

Autonomy means not separation, but union of the self-ruling mountain peoples with the peoples of Russia.  

Hence, it was a deliberate part of Soviet military strategy to overlook the distinction between the "white" Russian enemy and local nationalists of conservative persuasion. Many of the latter, including some who had allied themselves with the Communists expecting eventual self-determination, were either killed or forced to flee.

Only those local nationalists who could be of further use to the Soviet purpose were spared by the Red Army. They were part of Lenin's scheme to qualify the use of armed force for conquest and to minimize local resistance and the loss of friends in non-Soviet Europe and Asia won during the desperate days of the Civil War. Also at stake was the success of a contemplated attempt to relieve the chaotic economy in Soviet Russia through the establishment of trade relations with Western countries.  

In short,  

\(^2\)Stalin, op. cit., IV, p. 402.  

\(^3\)Evidence of the Soviet interest in trade with the West materialized as early as November 20, 1919, when the following announcement was made: "The British customer and purveyor are as necessary to us as we are to them. Not only
what Lenin had in mind was to slow down the sovietization of the conquered border regions sufficiently to permit the use of the national idea as its smokescreen. His aim was to shroud the fact of military aggression in the cloth of respect for national rights and to make it appear as no aggression at all.

In the Ukraine, for example, a Soviet regime was established in December, 1919, in Kharkov. Following Lenin's prescription, which sought to lend a national character to the new regime, the leading posts were filled by Ukrainians almost exclusively and Ukrainian was declared the official language. Furthermore, to detract from its Communist character, a representative of the Borotbisti, a Ukrainian peasant party of Social Revolutionary complexion, was included as a member of the government and the policies pursued in economic matters were definitely moderate. Finally, the Ukraine was proclaimed an independent Soviet Republic, with its relationship to the Russian republic defined ostensibly on a formal diplomatic basis.

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4 The only exception was Khristian Rakovski, a Bulgarian by birth.

5 Cf. Lenin, op. cit., XXIV, pp. 552-554.
The fact that all but one member of the Ukrainian ruling body were unqualified Communists assured Moscow's effective control over its affairs. But illustrative of the inordinate character of Lenin's scheme from an ideological standpoint was the fact that it failed to please the Ukrainian Communists concerned. For one thing, they objected to the use of the Ukrainian language and to the inclusion of the representative of the Borotbisti in the government. More than that, they were reluctant to pursue a gradualist course in such matters as domestic economic reorganization and union with the Russian Republic.

This represented only a very mild "left" deviationist-type outburst, and Lenin was able to overcome it easily. However, it did suggest once again the difficulty inherent in the tactic that gave temporary priority to the national idea.

In the principal Moslem border regions, located in the Volga-Ural Region and in Central Asia, Lenin employed still other means to conceal the aggressive and fundamentally anti-national content of his policy. For one thing, the Tatar, Bashkir, and Khirgiz regions were assigned the status of republics. They were autonomous in form, but possessed nothing but negligible administrative power in fact.

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6 Cf. Ibid., pp. 557-558, 815-816, 818-819.
Even more extreme in character was the technique employed in Turkestan. Lenin was particularly careful in dealing with that region, since it touched the borders of Iran, Afghanistan, India, and China, and, according to the official view, constituted "the outpost of Communism in Asia". Consequently, greatest stress was placed initially on the need to eliminate all traces of Great Russian imperialism. All Communists in Turkestan were given the strictest orders to establish "comradely relations" with the peoples there. Their languages and local customs were to be honored, while the process of sovietization was to be reduced to the slowest pace possible. It couldn't have been much slower, since Turkestan was left without the title of Soviet Republic until the spring of 1921.

There was one other aspect of Lenin's policy in Central Asia that illustrated the great importance attached to the exploitation of the national idea. This concerned the two ancient khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. Because the ruler of Afghanistan, whom Lenin was courting seriously as an ally against the British, showed particular interest in the fate of those tiny regions, all aspects of sovietism were excluded. In each case, local liberal organizations,

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9 Cf. Lenin, op. cit., XXIV, p. 531.

10 Cf. Ibid., pp. 531, 810-811.
the "Young Khivans" and the "Young Bukharans", were encouraged to eliminate the emirs. In addition, each was given the status of "People's Republic". Their relationship with Moscow was left undefined for several months, but the proximity of the Red Army and its support of local Communists in fact determined the location of the political center of gravity.11

It was impossible in the winter of 1919-1920 to apply similar tactics in all the separated parts of the former Russian Empire for the reason that the range of the Red Army was limited. In Eastern Siberia, its way was blocked by the continued presence of a Japanese army, which, according to Tokyo, could not be evacuated because the "chaotic conditions" in Russia posed a serious threat to its interests in Manchuria and Korea.12 In Transcaucasia, the obstacle was not a more powerful army, but rather the fact that the Western Powers showed a marked interest in the well-being of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In January, 1920, for example, the Allied Supreme Council, acting on the recommendation of Lord Curzon, extended


de facto recognition to the three Transcaucasian states.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, the Crimea was excluded for the reason that it had become the base of a new "white" Russian army, composed largely of remnants of Denikin's forces and headed by Baron Wrangel. Finally, in the west, Belorussia and the Baltic region were cut off by a Polish army and Yudenich's "white" army.

This, however, did not stop Lenin completely. The situation was not encouraging, but it did not lack entirely the opportunity of putting the national idea to work. Two points of immediate interest to the calculating revolutionist were Eastern Siberia and Transcaucasia.

With respect to Eastern Siberia, Lenin's strategy did not aim at the early incorporation of that region into the Russian state. His immediate purpose was to prevent the Japanese occupation from becoming a permanent condition, or, what was more likely, the creation of an independent Siberia under Japanese sponsorship. Thus, early in 1920, he sent out one Alexander Krasnoschekov, a native Siberian and one-time resident of the United States, to promote the cause of an independent republic among Siberian Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Krasnoschekov's initial success was recorded in March, when a "Temporary Local

Self-Government of Pri-Baikalia" was proclaimed. It included some Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, but the majority was composed of local Communists.

Krasnoschekov stayed on in the capacity of Soviet Russia's ambassador to the provisional Siberian regime. However, his activities ranged far beyond the customary diplomatic limits. For example, he drafted the formal declaration of independence, which called for the creation of an "independent democratic Far Eastern Republic". It was approved unanimously by the provisional assembly on April 6, 1920. Then, immediately thereafter, the pseudo diplomat resigned his post, renounced his Soviet citizenship, and became a citizen of the new republic. Not surprisingly, he was also elected the Far Eastern Republic's first president.

The Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic, written by Krasnoschekov, defined a system of government decidedly non-Soviet in character. Generally, it


15 For a description of Krasnoschekov's activities, Cf. Ibid., pp. 135ff.

16 An English translation of the full text of the constitution is contained in Ibid., pp. 282-307.
followed the example of the United States, with government powers divided between three branches. But perhaps its most interesting feature was contained in that section pertaining to the nationality issue. Thus:

All the national minorities of the territory of the Republic shall be granted autonomy in matters pertaining to their national culture.

Autonomy in matters pertaining to the national culture of minorities shall be made effective by their respective self-governing bodies, elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot, on the basis of proportional representation.

The national self-administrative bodies shall be public bodies legally authorized, and their competence shall be limited to matters pertaining to the national culture of the respective minorities.

Anyone at all familiar with the Marxian record on the national question could have easily identified the above provisions as embodying the essential features of the old Austrian national-cultural autonomy scheme. Apparently, that was exactly what Lenin intended. Inasmuch as he had denounced the Austrian plan repeatedly as un-Marxist, its incorporation into the constitution of the Far Eastern Republic dramatically attested to the non-Soviet character of that state and, together with its other non-Soviet features, provided a convenient smokescreen for the actual Communist control that was exercised.

Needless to say, there was more than a bit of irony in the fact that Lenin would make better use of the national-
cultural autonomy idea than either its originators, the Austrian Socialists, or its principal proponents in Russia, the Bundists. For whether Tokyo was actually beguiled by the facade of independence, or was merely compelled to act for the reason that "chaotic conditions" no longer existed on the Russian side of the Manchurian and Korean borders, the ruse worked. On May 11, 1920, the Japanese announced that their troops would be withdrawn from Siberia in the near future. Then, a little more than two months later, on July 17, the Soviet-Japanese "Gongotta Agreement" formalized the acceptance of the Far Eastern Republic as an independent "buffer" state.

At the very time that the Far Eastern Republic was being erected as a barrier against the Japanese, Lenin made his final preparations for the campaign against Transcaucasia. Despite the fact of Allied patronage in that region, he was intent on bringing it into the Soviet orbit immediately. Azerbaijan was his first target. Since it was geographically more accessible than Armenia, militarily weaker than Georgia, and possessed a larger native Communist

17 In that connection, the Communist effort was abetted by the Western Powers, principally the United States, who wanted the Japanese to withdraw from Russian territory and who apparently accepted the independence of the Far Eastern Republic at face value. Cf. The New York Times, January 16, 1920, p. 15; July 29, 1920, p. 1.

18 Cf. Ibid., July 19, 1920, p. 12.
movement than either of those two, the choice was a logical one.

The method of operation against Azerbaijan was neither unique nor complicated. It followed the pattern established a year earlier in connection with the invasion of the Ukraine. For example, on April 27, 1920, the Azerbaijani Communist Party, hitherto an underground organization, created a "military-revolutionary committee", proclaimed it to be the legitimate government of Azerbaijan, and issued an ultimatum to the existing regime to leave Baku in twelve hours. At the same time, according to the official Soviet account, the "military-revolutionary committee" requested a military alliance with Moscow.¹⁹

Needless to say, the speed with which the request was fulfilled would have astonished even the most optimistic view of the process of diplomatic correspondence. On the very next day, an armored train brought Sergei Kirov and Sergei Ordzhonikidze into Baku; and they were followed almost immediately by the main force of the Eleventh Red Army.²⁰

That Lenin did not intend to delay the forcible extension of Soviet power throughout Transcaucasia was

¹⁹Cf. A. Raevski, Angliiskala interventsiya i mussavatskoe pravitelstvo (The English Intervention and the Mussavat Government) (Baku: (Armenian Kommunist Parti), 1927), pp. 188-190.

evident in the fact that the Eleventh Red Army did not confine its area of operation to Azerbaijan. It began to move across the Kura River into Georgia and Armenia early in May, 1920.  

However, this action was halted by the outbreak of war with Poland, occasioned by the latter's decision to invade the Ukraine. For the four months that followed, principal attention was directed to meeting the latest threat to Soviet power.

Though the Polish attack diverted Lenin's attention away from the task of extending Soviet power into the non-Russian border regions of the former Tsarist Empire, it was a foregone conclusion that he would return to it as soon as conditions permitted. In addition, it was assured that the national idea would continue to figure prominently as a tactical device. The record to date was an encouraging one. The Ukraine, the Moslem borderlands, Eastern Siberia, and Azerbaijan were already a part of the Soviet polity in fact, if not in form. Furthermore, the use of the national idea in connection with their acquisition had been sufficiently skillful to forestall a serious Western reaction. As much was evident in the absence of any notable protest against the

\[21\text{Cf. Pipes, op. cit., p. 227.}\]
Soviet aggressions and in a growth of Western interest in Moscow's trade offers.\textsuperscript{22}

Of equal, if not greater, importance was that the use of the national idea had helped to conceal the fact of aggression from the sensitive gaze of nationalists in Afghanistan and Iran, who, while amenable to Moscow's offers of assistance in their own quests for full independence, were certainly not disposed to accept the threat of Soviet imperialism as an alternative to British imperialism. This provided Lenin with the basis for a full scale diplomatic offensive along the periphery of Asia against the Western Powers. It is to this subject that attention will be directed next.

\textbf{Anti-Colonialism Revived.} Back in the summer of 1919, Lenin's diplomatic notes to Afghanistan, Iran, and China hardly fitted into the category of tactical devices of major importance. Considering the character of the struggle with the "white" Russians at that time, which more than not generated doubts about the staying power of the Soviet regime, they were more in the nature of final

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Encouraged by the decision of the Allies to lift the blockade of Russia in January, 1920, a trade delegation headed by Leonid Krasin was sent out to Copenhagen and Stockholm a month later. Cf. Liubov Krasin, \textit{Leonid Krasin: His Life and Work} (London: Skeffington and Son, Ltd., 1929), p. 122.}
straws grasped in desperation. In the winter of 1919-1920, however, after the combined military-psychological effort had turned the tide decisively in the Communist favor, the importance of Asian nationalism in the Leninist strategy rose rapidly. Indicative of the change were the words of the Russian leader before an All-Russian Congress of Moslem Communist Organizations, in December, 1919:

The socialist revolution will not be solely, or principally, the revolutionary proletariat in each country against the bourgeoisie. No, it will be a struggle of all colonies and countries oppressed by imperialism, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism.23

Those words marked the end of one phase of Communism's world-wide strategy and the beginning of another. Gone was the idea that the revolution in Russia alone could set off a general proletarian onslaught against capitalism in Europe. In its place appeared Lenin's pre-revolutionary scheme, borrowed from Marx, in which the aspiration to independence in the colonies and semi-colonies of the East had been conceived as the principal lever against capitalism in the West. As before, it was centered on the assumption that the existence of European capitalism depended almost entirely on the resources made available

23Lenin, op. cit., XXIV, p. 548.
through imperialistic exploitation of the East.

There was one difference, however. The revival of the Eastern strategy was marked by none of the original exuberant optimism, or the expectation that the revolutionary issue could be settled on a "push-button" basis. Experience tempered the view that a successful revolutionary effort could depend on the issuance of a few inflammatory proclamations. Accordingly, in the new setting, Lenin proceeded on a cautious and workmanlike basis. His attention was directed first to the semi-colonial countries like Iran, Afghanistan, and China, where the Western foothold was weakest and where national feeling was strongest. Furthermore, it was concentrated on the promotion of local bourgeois-nationalist interests exclusively.

For example, with respect to Afghanistan, the Leninist policy could not have been less obtrusive. Soviet pronouncements concerning that country, and its nationalistic leader, Amanullah Khan, were completely devoid of revolutionary content. To assuage Amanullah's expressed concern over the fate of Russia's Moslems, the Russian leader promised that it would be determined by national plebescites and that the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara would be granted independence. Furthermore, in a showy affirmation of the great importance attached to the friendship of the Afghans,
they were promised the privilege of transporting across Soviet territory, free and untaxed, goods purchased in Russia or elsewhere. Finally, not overlooking a single detail, the Communist propagandists made a special target out of Amanullah's nationalistic ego. Lenin personally forcasted the Afghan ruler's destiny as one of greatness, assigning to him

... the great historic task of uniting ... all enslaved Moslem peoples and leading them on the road to freedom and independence.

As it turned out, however, Lenin's Afghan policy was not as immediately productive as might have been expected in the light of Amanullah's earlier interest in Soviet assistance. This was due to the fact that Britain, acting late in the summer of 1919, had recognized the independence claimed by the Afghan nationalist leader. Consequently, the latter's compelling reason for seeking aid had all but disappeared -- though not entirely, since he was anxious to continue to play off the British and Russians against one another for whatever benefits there were to be obtained. Furthermore, Amanullah showed signs of concern over the Soviet policy toward his neighbor Iran, a policy which was

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24 This was included in the Soviet-Afghan Treaty, signed February 28, 1921.
more obtrusive and prompted doubts about Moscow's avowed motives in the East. Therefore, he delayed the conclusion of negotiations until he was sure that the maximum benefits possible had been obtained from both the British and Soviet suitors and the seeming danger of a Communist coup in Iran had been dissipated.

The dominant feature of Soviet-Iranian relations in the last half of 1919 and during 1920 was the fact that the Iranian Government, unlike the Afghan, did not seek the displacement of British influence and, consequently, had no need of the type assistance that Moscow was willing to lend. On the contrary, the government in Teheran was more than anxious to retain the British interest in Iranian affairs, particularly as it meant important financial assistance. Thus, on August 9, 1919, a treaty with London gave the British virtual control over Iran's financial system, army, and railways, in return for which the Iranians received a loan of two million pounds.26

Lenin's reaction to the latter development was both immediate and strongly worded. The mask of an interested, anti-imperialistic friend was dropped long enough to permit the issuance of a few revolutionary threats. Characteristic was Chicherin's speech on August 30, 1919, in which he

denounced the treaty as an "illegal scrap of paper" and made a pointed appeal to the masses of Iran:

The time of your liberation is near. The hour of reckoning will soon strike for British capitalism, against which a broad revolutionary movement is spreading ever more threateningly among the working masses of England itself.

The working people of Russia stretch out to you, the oppressed masses of Iran, their fraternal hand. The hour is near when we shall be able to carry out in fact our task of a common struggle against the robbers and oppressors, large and small, who are the source of your suffering.27

To be sure, Soviet revolutionary expectations were hardly as high as Chicherin suggested. But the threat of revolution was one way to attract serious attention. And apparently it did, for, according to one British historian, the impact of the Communist propaganda was to set off a loud clamor among Iran's anti-British nationalists and to force a postponement of the treaty's ratification.28

Encouraged by the knowledge that there existed definite anti-British sentiment among Iran's nationalists, Lenin did not allow the revolutionary-type statements to develop into a barrier between them. Repeated offers of friendship, embellished with typical protestations of concern only for Iran's national rights, were made.29

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As a complement, the small Communist organization in Iran, composed mostly of former workers in the Baku oil fields, were directed to encourage local nationalist sentiment against imperialism generally and the pending treaty in particular. The latter's success was marked by alliances with some of Teheran's nationalists and by favorable notices concerning Soviet intentions in some of Iran's conservative, and influential, newspapers.\textsuperscript{30} One British correspondent then in the Iranian capital was prompted to interpret the sudden rise of Communist influence as evidence of an impending revolutionary uprising in that city.\textsuperscript{31}

There was one other aspect of Lenin's effort to convince the Iranians that a neutralist, if not outright anti-British, policy was in their best interest. It materialized in the spring of 1920, in the form of an alliance with an extreme group of Iranian nationalists, headed by one Kuchik Khan. On May 20, following a raid


\textsuperscript{31}Cf. \textit{The Times}, May 11, 1920, p. 15. In reality, the Iranian Communists were anxious to transform their support of Iran's national interests into more of a revolutionary policy, and were prevented from doing so by Lenin's strict orders against it. Cf. A. Sultan-Zade, \textit{Persia (Persia)} (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1925), p. 86.
by units of the Red Fleet on the Iranian port city of Enzeli to capture ships abandoned there by Denikin, the initial contact with Kuchik was made. He agreed to the use of detachments of the Azerbaijani Red Army for the creation of an independent republic in Iran's northernmost province of Gilan. Two weeks later, Kuchik proclaimed the republic's existence and the intention to extend its jurisdiction southward.32

While the Iranian rebel declared himself to be an "ardent supporter of Soviet Russia" and a "disciple" of Lenin, and promised to preserve the alliance between his regime and Moscow in perpetuity, the attitude of the Soviet leaders reflected no illusions about his loyalty or role. Wrote A. Voznesenskii, head of the Eastern Section of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs:

We do not hide the fact that the new government (in Gilan) is far from being communist. At the present moment, it is composed only of those who have united

As subsequent events were to bear out, what Voznesenskii meant was the Kuchik was important for his provocative national symbolism, which Moscow could manipulate in its own interest and which could be dispensed with for the right price.

The impact of Lenin's three-pronged psychological offensive, particularly the use of Kuchik Khan, on Iranian opinion, was electric. It put property owners in dire fear that the "Bolshevist virus" was spreading rapidly through the populace. Further, it prompted local nationalists to make new demands that the treaty with Britain be repudiated and that the British be asked to withdraw their troops to the south to avoid provoking the Soviet forces. But by far the most important result was the resignation of the pro-British cabinet of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh on June 24, 1920. Its replacement by a cabinet of moderate nationalists, headed by Mushir-ud-Dowleh, marked a major step in the direction of the realization of the Soviet ambition. Mushir-ud-Dowleh was no Anglophile, but he was no

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33 Izvestiia, June 10, 1920, p. 1.
34 Cf. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 98.
35 Cf. Ibid., p. 102.
proponent of Sovietism either. His official reaction to Kuchik's regime was to appeal to all Iranians to rally to the defense of the country and to warn Moscow that he was not blind to its involvement. In return, Chicherin offered assurances that Soviet Russia was a true friend and wished only that the Iranian people should enjoy the full right of self-determination. Then, getting to the point intended right along, the Soviet commissar explained that the troops in Gilan were not Russian, but Azerbaijanian, and offered the use of Russian influence toward the end of their withdrawal provided the British withdrew their forces from Iran as well.36

This proposal to exchange the liquidation of the Kuchik regime for the withdrawal of British forces, however, did not elicit a positive reply from Teheran. Obviously cognizant of its implications, the Iranian prime minister was not prepared to turn his country into a political vacuum, which the Russians might be tempted to fill.

Communist "Left" Deviationism Presents a Mild Threat. In the summer of 1920, stubborn Iranian resistance, Afghan hesitancy, and the failure to establish firm contacts with the Chinese were not the only problems that plagued Lenin's

36 For that exchange of notes, cf. Ibid., pp. 238-239; Soviet Russia, August 14, 1920, p. 174.
Eastern policy.\textsuperscript{37} An additional one consisted of a new outburst of "left" deviationism in Communist ranks. It occurred in July, at the Second Congress of the Comintern, at which the role of Asia's Communists in connection with the diplomatic offensive was spelled out explicitly for the first time.

In view of the highly successful employment of local Communists in the Russian border regions, it was logical for Lenin to seek to make use of Asia's Communists in connection with the anti-imperialistic diplomatic offensive in the East. Writing on the eve of the Comintern's second meeting -- the first since the Eastern policy had been formulated -- the Soviet leader defined their role as an auxiliary one. They were to assist in the promotion of any Asian nationalist cause seeking complete freedom from Western influence. Though proper respect was paid to long range socialist goals in the East, Lenin's emphasis was on the need to eliminate Western imperialism first, and according to the method he prescribed:

\begin{quote}
All the events of world politics are necessarily concentrated around one central point: the struggle
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{37}As noted in the preceding chapter, it was not until the spring of 1920 that the Chinese government in Peking received the initial Soviet communication. It was several months later before a diplomatic exchange was effected.
of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet Russian republic, which inevitably groups about itself, on the one hand, the Soviet movements of the advanced workers of all countries and, on the other, all national-liberation movements of the colonies and oppressed nationalities, which are convinced by bitter experience that there is no salvation for them except in the victory of Soviet power over world imperialism. 38

There was, to be sure, ample justification for Lenin's attitude in this connection, which temporarily ruled out the quest for socialist aims. For one thing, Communism in non-Soviet Asia was still in the stage of infancy. For another, considering the fact of Communist weakness, the elimination of Western imperialistic influences, however achieved, could be regarded reasonably as an important step toward the realization of the ultimate revolutionary goal. It would remove one obstacle thwarting local Communist interests, facilitate the flow of assistance from Soviet Russia, and help, by depriving capitalism of its control over resources in the East, to foment the proletarian revolution in the West. As final confirmation of the validity of the Leninist prescript, there was the record of successes already achieved.

Nevertheless, trouble did occur. Some delegates to the Comintern congress from non-Soviet Asia, confronted

38Lenin, op. cit., XXV, p. 286.
with the proposition for the first time, found it impossible to perceive the logic of serving internationalist interest by supporting the national aspirations of their dedicated foes. Their views echoed the earlier protests lodged by "pure" internationalists. However, like Piatakov, they were also motivated by an intense desire to achieve the socialist goal in their own countries, and thus gave priority to the particular, as opposed to the general, revolutionary interest. The chief spokesman for this group was the youthful delegate from British India, Manabendra Nath Roy.

The serious debate on the issue of Communist tactics in the East took place during the sessions of the Second Congress' commission to study and report on the national and colonial questions. Unfortunately its proceedings have not been made public. Judging by Lenin's advance preparations and the results, however, it is reasonable to conclude that the discussions were heated and that Lenin succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the less experienced Indian delegate by adroitly confusing the issues and playing upon his youthful adversary's ego.

For example, after the commission had completed its deliberations, Lenin delivered its report to the assembled congress. In it he stated that he had modified his original views "for the sake of unanimity". But the change was
actually more apparent than real. What he allowed was that Asian Communists would not be required to support "bourgeois-democratic" movements, only "national revolutionary" movements. And what this meant in fact was absolutely nothing:

> There can be no doubt that every nationalist movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, because the great mass of the population of the backward countries consist of peasants, who are the representatives of bourgeois-capitalist conditions.³⁹

In a similar fashion, Lenin "agreed" to greater emphasis on the socialist revolution in the East. His countervailing note in this connection was contained in the stated need to prove first that a socialist revolution was possible:

> ... the Communist International must set down and theoretically prove that, with the assistance of the proletariat of the advanced workers principally, the backward countries can pass to the Soviet system without an intervening capitalist stage of development.⁴⁰

That anyone could have been beguiled into accepting such "concessions" is surprising. But Roy was, and apparently for the reason of his inability to cope immediately with the Leninist "dialectic". As indicated in a supplementary

³⁹Ibid., p. 353.
⁴⁰Ibid., p. 354.
resolution on the national and colonial questions, which Lenin permitted Roy to write and submit to the congress for approval, the Indian revolutionary actually emerged from the commission's sessions so thoroughly confused as to be unsure of his own stand on the issue. Thus, in one place, he agreed with Lenin's argument that, in the absence of a developed proletariat, the revolutionary will of the East was largely embodied in the aspirations of the native bourgeoisie. However, in another, he contended that the bourgeois-nationalist revolutions should be led by the proletariat nevertheless. Finally, apparently unable to discover the method by which the weak proletarian movements could effectively assume the leadership of the bourgeois-nationalist revolutions, Roy concluded with the seemingly helpless gesture of conceding that nationalist rebellions, even without proletarian leadership, would be beneficial for the reason of their anti-imperialistic character. 41

The Second Congress of the Comintern ended up by endorsing unanimously the resolutions on the national and colonial questions submitted by Lenin and Roy. It signified formally that Lenin had won his first encounter with "left"

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deviationism among Asia's Communists. But the Soviet leader knew that no permanent solution to the problem had been obtained thereby. He had been confronted with that situation before, as the name of Gregori Piatakov served to recall, and he was aware of the implications. Consequently, in a move obviously designed to guard against a repetition of the type revolutionary outburst that had occurred in the Ukraine, in August, 1918, Lenin decided to call a special meeting of all Asian Communists.

"The First Congress of the Peoples of the East", as the meeting was called, convened in Baku three weeks after the Comintern adjourned. In sharp contrast to the latter, it had all the earmarks of a congress dedicated to the single and immediate purpose of promoting Communist revolutions throughout the East. Karl Radek, for example, assured the delegates that Soviet Russia's Eastern policy implied no betrayal of their revolutionary interests, was no mere diplomatic maneuver, but just the reverse.42 And he was followed by Gregori Zinoviev and Bela Kun, both of whom espoused the revolutionary doctrine in its purest form.

Their exhortations were embellished with calls to struggle not only against "foreign capitalists", but against "native profiteers" as well.\footnote{43} The congress created a Council of Propoganda and Agitation, composed of forty-seven members. Its purpose was to develop and direct the implementation of revolutionary strategy in the East.\footnote{44}

The meeting at Baku suited Lenin's purpose for a number of reasons, none of which would have satisfied the Asians had they known. For one thing, it added to his "carrot and stick" approach to the situation in Iran, providing another "stick" with which to prod the nationalists. For another, it provided a vehicle for reassuring the Asian Communists after their disappointing experience at the Comintern congress. Finally, the extreme character of the proceedings notwithstanding, the fact of the matter was that the institutionalization of Communist tactics in the East served to limit the harmful effects of the impulses of the more headstrong radicals. Thus, energies which might have been expended on "unscheduled" revolutionary outbursts in the East were used up within the confines of a Council of Propaganda and Agitation, an organ that was

\footnote{43}Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 73-75.  
\footnote{44}Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 211-213.
short-lived and accomplished nothing of significance.\textsuperscript{45}

That Lenin was able to stifle the revolutionary urges in his Eastern followers without antagonizing them was another tribute to his tactical genius. But the preservation of order within Communist ranks, important in itself, was not the only benefit derived. Apparently, the implied threat of revolutionary action issued at Baku was enough to prompt the Iranians to try to work out some sort of a settlement with Moscow. Early in October, 1920, Mushir-ud-Dowleh informed Lenin of his desire to commence negotiations.\textsuperscript{46}

The War with Poland and the Resumption of Aggression Against the Border Regions. During the summer of 1920, of course, Lenin's main preoccupation was with the defense of Soviet power against the invading Poles. The war lasted for five months, during which time each side had an opportunity to penetrate deep into the territory of the other. Needless to say, the Soviet leader utilized the national idea in conjunction with his own military effort. For example, he attributed to the Poles anti-Russian, as

\textsuperscript{45}The Council, over which Moscow exercised a veto, planned some strategy, but devoted most of its attention to matters of internal organization. But once the organizational scheme had been worked out, and that took more than a year, the Council was abolished and the Comintern was given its duties. Cf. T. R. Riskulov, "Komintern i rabota na Vostoke" ("The Comintern and the Work in the East"), Zhiza Natsionalnostei (Life of the Nationalities), No. 46, December 15, 1920, pp. 1-2; Stalin, op. cit., IV, p. 439.

\textsuperscript{46}Cf. Izvestiia, October 10, 1920, p. 3.
opposed to anti-Communist motives. The struggle was depicted as a "national war" of Russia against a foreign invader, and all Communists were directed to play up the theme of national defense. Typical of the effort to release Russian patriotic instincts and stir chauvinistic emotions was an appeal issued by Karl Radek on July 20, 1920:

Every bourgeois patriot in Russia understands perfectly well that the Poles are not interested in overwhelming the Bolsheviks; for the Bolsheviks would have peace with Poland any day if they would cede enough territory to the Poles and pay a large enough indemnity.... We preach that this is a war for Russian independence; when we assert that we are employing in this war every available source of aid, not primarily to defend the Soviet Government and Communism, but to defend the independence of Russia.... The moment the Entente backed up the Polish reactionaries, it made implacable enemies of the Russian reactionaries. The Soviet government is defending the unity and independence of the territory inhabited by the Russian nation.

As a result of the new nationalistic line, many Russian conservatives -- formerly sympathetic to the "white" Russian cause, but now with no other way to turn -- were able to climb on the Soviet band-wagon without loss of patriotic "face". The most notable conversion achieved in this connection was that of General A. A. Brusilov, the

48 Translated in Living Age, September 11, 1920, pp. 635-638.
former commander in chief of the Russian Army. On May 2, 1920, a special military council, headed by Brusilov, and composed of other former Tsarist officers, was organized and attached to the Red Army's General Staff. Ostensibly, its function was to render military advice, but its actual service was contained in its symbolization of the union of Communism and Russian nationalism. It prompted still other Russian conservatives to offer their services and helped to weld peoples of all social categories together for the single purpose of defending Russia against the Poles. 49

Another way in which Lenin exploited the national idea to advantage during the war with Poland was his formal recognition of the Menshevik government as the legitimate government of Georgia and to promise to honor the Georgian right to national self-determination. Both were incorporated into a treaty, signed on May 7, 1920. 50 For this gesture, which represented nothing more than sheer opportunism on Lenin's part, Georgia's formal recognition of both the Russian and Azerbaijanian soviet regimes was obtained. It


served to stabilize the Transcaucasion front for the duration of the war with Poland, for it meant that the Soviet strategists did not have to concern themselves with the problem of Georgia's possible use as a base for an attack by the Western Powers. Furthermore, the recognition of Soviet Azerbaijan by the Georgian Mensheviks, they being the Transcaucasians who enjoyed the greatest prestige in the West, solidified the Communist grip on that state. And, finally, this same act of recognition also served to becloud the circumstances under which the new Azerbaijanian regime had been born and, consequently, permitted plans for a repetition of the tactic elsewhere as soon as conditions permitted. In short, what Lenin had done was to garb expediency in the cloth of moral principle once again, and with characteristic success.

With this psychological reinforcement, the Red Army was able to halt the Polish advance and then to mount an offensive that took it well into Poland. Only French assistance to the Poles, together with Marshal Tukhachevski's tactical blunder around Warsaw, saved Poland from a stunning defeat. On October 12, 1920, an armistice and preliminary peace treaty ended the conflict.51 By its terms, Poland

got West Ukraine, which had been part of the Austrian Empire before the World War, and the western portion of Belorussia. For Moscow, it meant recognition by Poland, confirmation of its grip on the Ukraine and the remainder of Belorussia, and freedom to pursue the course of conquest further in the borderlands, particularly in Transcaucasia.

Actually, conditions favorable to renewed aggression in Transcaucasia materialized much sooner than Lenin probably expected. That was due to a sudden turn of events in Turkey. In October, 1920, while the settling of accounts with the Poles was still in progress, Mustafa Kemal, the leader of a successful Turkish nationalist revolution, reacted to the harsh terms of the Allied-imposed Treaty of Sevres by invading Armenia. His avowed purpose was to reclaim by force the Turkish territory ceded to Armenia under the terms of the treaty. But apparently the ease with which he accomplished it prompted Kemal to seek even more; for the continued advance of the Turkish troops eastward made it obvious that the goal was all of Armenia.

The immediate Soviet reaction to this unexpected development was profound concern lest Armenia be lost altogether. Implied warnings to the Turkish leader, embodied in such expressions as that of "friendly feelings
for the Armenian people" and "deep concern" for their threatened national sovereignty, were emitted. But it took no time at all for Lenin to recognize that Kemal's action not only posed a threat to the Soviet interest, but presented an opportunity as well. The Turkish invasion of Armenia was an ideal pretext for a countermove of similar character. In such case, the principle of national self-determination could be much more effectively exploited than when applied solely in conjunction with the artificial military-revolutionary committee. Thus, late in November, 1920, as the Turks poised for the complete conquest of Armenia, the Red Army, accompanied by an Armenian national military-revolutionary committee, swept westward from Azerbaijan to take the city of Erivan and to proclaim the establishment of the "independent Soviet Republic of Armenia". On December 3, after the new regime signed a treaty of alliance with Moscow, it terminated the war with Kemal. For his trouble, the Turkish leader retained the territory occupied by his forces. But the lion's share went to the Communists, who got the rest of Armenia and

53 Cf. Ibid., p. 124; Kliuchnikov i Sabanin, op. cit., III, i, p. 75.
the immediate recognition of the new Soviet regime.

It took only two additional months for Lenin to complete his task in Transcaucasia, and for the Georgian Mensheviks to discover just how bad a bargain they had struck in the preceding spring. On February 11, 1921, in a modified version of the basic pattern, a Communist-sponsored rebellion broke out in the Lori district of Georgia, near the Armenian border. Two days later, a Georgian Communist military-revolutionary committee, without attempting to march on Tiflis, proclaimed the establishment of the "independent Soviet Republic of Georgia" and appealed to Moscow for assistance.\textsuperscript{54} To this request, relates the Soviet historian Khachapuridze, the latter replied by ordering the Eleventh Red Army, still under Kirov and Ordzhonikidze, "to the assistance of the Georgian people".\textsuperscript{55} On February 25, Tiflis was captured. Three weeks later, hostilities were formally terminated by a treaty signed by the representatives of the defeated Menshevik government, the Georgian military-revolutionary committee, and the Soviet Russian government.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} Cf. Kliuchnikov i Sabanin, op. cit., III, i, p. 87.


\textsuperscript{56} Cf. Ibid., p. 236-237.
The action against Georgia marked the end of the first phase of the Soviet conquest of the non-Russian border regions of the former Russian Empire. It meant that practically all of the former empire had been won for Communism; a triumph of the first magnitude, to say the least.57 Military force had been the essential feature, but the exploitation of the national idea had served as its vital complement. Though to measure the latter's contribution precisely would be speculative at best, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that it accounted largely for the fact that the initial establishment of Soviet power in the border regions evoked no noteworthy protests in the West.58 At any rate, Lenin believed that the national idea had helped significantly, and he did not intend to curtail its use in connection with subsequent actions.

57 The exceptions consisted of Poland and the Baltic States, which were formally recognized by Moscow in 1920; the western portion of Belorussia, which went to Poland; Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin, which went to Turkey; and Bessarabia, which Rumania had seized on April 8, 1918.

58 Indicative of the uncertainty in the West concerning events in Transcaucasia was the report of the British Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Cecil Harmsworth, to the House of Commons on March 9, 1921. He reported merely that Tiflis had been occupied by "Armenian forces". Cf. The Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1922), Volume 139, cols. 476-477.
The First Successes of Lenin's Eastern Policy.

At the same time that the conquest of Transcaucasia was being completed, Lenin's diplomatic offensive in the East began to bear its first fruit. For example, in February, 1921, apparently having convinced Amanullah Khan that Soviet intentions in the East were not revolutionary, Lenin got the Afghan leader to sign a treaty of friendship.\(^5^9\) It was not all he wanted, since the latter refused to take sides definitely against the British; but it was enough to stimulate Soviet hopes. Commenting on the treaty, the Soviet historian I. P. Trainin had the following to say:

The recent treaty with Afghanistan will undoubtedly be of great value in the consolidation of our political influence in the East.

Two viewpoints have opposed one another in the East and continue to do so. One is the Soviet viewpoint and the other is the Entente (chiefly the British) viewpoint.

England, in an attempt to protect her colonies from infectious Bolshevism, has done everything possible to turn the Near Eastern countries against us. English diplomats in

Afghanistan and Persia have fomented intrigues against us. England has even tried to send troops there, definitely and unmistakable to deal a blow when the opportunity presented itself.

While we were engaged at the (civil war) front, our chances were about equal. To the broad masses of the adjoining states, our Soviet regime was unknown. However, the prestige of the Soviet federation in the East has grown, for our victory made possible the self-determination of the Eastern peoples united with us. And it has become clear that we are not interested in the economic exploitation of those peoples, but, on the contrary, only in the alliance with them for a struggle against our common enemy, world imperialism.

Since then, and without exaggeration, we are proud to say that our Eastern policy has continued to acquire greater weight on the international political scale and that the initiative has passed to us.

Thus, by advancing along the designated path and consolidating our political gains, we shall bring about the complete breakdown of the imperialist policy in the East and the triumph of the international revolution. 60

It was not long after that that the prophetic quality of those words achieved a significant measure of confirmation; in Iran. As noted before, Lenin's policy with respect to Iran had reached the point where, in

60I. P. Trainin, "K dogovorov s Afghanistanom," ("Concerning the Treaty with Afghanistan") Zhizn Natsionalnostei (Life of the Nationalities), No. 7, 1921, pp. 1-2.
October, 1920, Mushir-ud-Dowleh had requested negotiations with Moscow. These commenced in Moscow on the twenty-fifth of October. However, a week later, they were suspended when British pressure forced the moderate Iranian nationalist to relinquish his post.

For three months thereafter, Teheran was the scene of political strife. Sephadar, the pro-British politician who had succeeded Mushir-ud-Dowleh, attempted to convene the Iranian parliament for the purpose of ratifying the still pending treaty with the British. His efforts, however, were blocked by the nationalists, who feared that the country might be turned into a battlefield of opposing British and Soviet armies. As for Lenin, he continued to play with two strings to his tactical bow, utilizing Kuchik and the threat of revolution, on the one hand, and encouraging the nationalists with offers of a compromise, on the other.

The upshot was the development of the very type event sought by the Soviet leader. In February, 1921, Colonel Riza Khan, a staunch anti-British nationalist, seized power in Teheran. And among his first acts were the formal repudiation of the pending treaty with Great Britain and the resumption of negotiations with Soviet Russia.
A Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed on February 26, 1921. Briefly, its provisions included the cancellation of all debts owed Russia by Iran, and a ringing condemnation of imperialism. Moreover, both agreed to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other and to prohibit the formation or presence of any organization or group of persons on the respective territories hostile toward the other. Finally, and most important from Moscow's standpoint, Riza Khan agreed to permit the Russians considerable discretion in connection with the problem of hostile third forces:

... if a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federated Russia or those of its Allies and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out military operations necessary for its defense.

The terms of the treaty included no specific reference to the foreign troops already on Iranian soil. However, two days later, when Teheran inquired about the Soviet promises with respect to Kuchik's republic in Gilan, Moscow replied by invoking the treaty and declaring the British to be a

force on Iranian soil hostile to it, and made the evacuation of the Azerbaijani Red Army conditional on their departure.\textsuperscript{62} This worked also, for, by September, 1921, all British and Soviet forces were out of Iran.

Needless to say, the Soviet withdrawal marked the abandonment of Kuchik Khan as well. Having helped to keep Iranian politics unstable long enough to permit the emergence of a strongly nationalistic regime, Kuchik now represented an obstacle in the way of cordial relations with Iran. Thus, in characteristic fashion, Lenin cast aside the hapless revolutionary, leaving him to his own devices. Not surprisingly they proved to be inadequate. In October, 1921, Kuchik was captured by Riza Khan's troops, tried for treason, and decapitated. Two years later, one Soviet writer curtly summed up Kuchik's importance as follows:

\begin{quote}
The revolutionary movement in Gilan was fed mainly on the slogan "Away with the British". Once the British troops were evacuated from Persia, the movement definitely began to slow down.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

That a basically anti-nationalistic regime should have engaged in the task of compelling a fundamentally

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. Fatemi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{63} S. Iranski, "Sovetskaia Rossiia i Persiia" (Soviet Russia and Persia"), \textit{Novi Vostok (The New East)}, No. 4, 1923, p. 218.
nationalistic one to be even more nationalistic than it wanted to be was indeed paradoxical. But it was the type of paradox from which the Soviet leaders were able to derive significant benefits. In a sense, the diplomatic victory over the British in Iran was comparable to the Communists' achievement in the Ukraine back in the summer of 1917. In both instances, skillful exploitation of the national idea actually compelled the local regimes into more nationalistic postures than they were willing to assume. The latest success, however, was by far the more dramatic, having been achieved despite such obstacles as the initial hostility of the local regime, the absence of a large local Communist organization, and the greater power of the enemy against whom the whole effort was directed. It marked a decisive confirmation of the utility of the national idea as an instrument of policy and, of course, another tribute to Lenin's skill in applying it.

64 With respect to this point, one authoritative account of the Iranian situation concludes as follows: "The combination Communist propaganda and pressure was irresistible. Persian nationalists, listening to Soviet manifestoes and deciding that Russian imperialism constituted a lesser threat to their aims than British, gradually obtained the upper hand in Teheran...." K. W. B. Middleton Britain and Russia: An Historical Essay (London: Hutchinson, 1947), p. 126.
Additional confirmation of those facts was evidenced in the impact of the events in Iran on Soviet relations with the British, who, both apprehensive about the effects of Communist propaganda in the East and anxious to take advantage of the Soviet trade offers, agreed to serious negotiations concerning their differences. As a result, a treaty was signed on March 16, 1921. By its terms, Anglo-Soviet trade relations were established; which also meant British de facto recognition of Soviet Russia. But most significant from a political standpoint, however, was a preliminary provision in which the propaganda issue was settled. According to it:

... each party refrains from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or of the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military of diplomatic, or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the independent state of Afghanistan. The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect to the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent.


66 This was confirmed on May 12, 1921, by a British court. Cf. The New York Times, May 13, 1921, p. 4.
While the above provision of the treaty was purported to deal with the propaganda issue exclusively, its implications were much more profound. The key sentence was the last one, in which the British accepted the independent status of the soviet regimes in the border regions. No distinction was drawn between such non-soviet parts as Poland and the Baltic States and the republics established under the protection of the Red Army. What this meant, of course, was that the British had formally accepted the Communists' definition of their own aggression as acts of national liberation. Furthermore, for the single price of promising to refrain from the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda in the East -- a promise that would be kept only as long as it was useful to do so -- Moscow obtained a free hand in dealing with the "independent" republics further.

At this point, it would appear almost trite to say that Lenin had scored another smashing victory at no price whatever. As a matter of fact, it was on the very same day that the treaty was signed in London that Lenin's next move to force the British out of Asia was taking shape. It consisted of a "friendship treaty" with Turkey, which was signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921.67 In it, each

party agreed to the right of the other to self-determination and to the common cause against imperialism. Also mentioned was the desire to establish

... contact between the national movements for the liberation of the Eastern peoples and the struggle of the workers in Russia....

and the recognition of

... the right of those (Eastern) nations to freedom and independence, and their right to choose a form of government according to their wishes.

Other clauses dealt with the boundary separating Turkey from Transcaucasia. In this connection, Batum was transferred to Georgia, while Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin went to Turkey. Finally, an agreement was made to the effect that the Straits issue would be settled only by a conference of all states bordering on the Black Sea.

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68 An illuminating sidelight on the Leninist policy, and indicative of the Soviet leader's stubborn faith in the importance of exploiting the national idea in his own way, was the fact that the treaty was concluded despite Kemal's undisguised anti-Communism. Even the latter's execution of seventeen leading Turkish Communists, in February, 1921, did not prevent it. Cf. M. L. Veltman (M. Pavlovich), Revoliutsionnaia Turtsiia (Revolutionary Turkey) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1921), pp. 120-123.

69 Kemal later reneged on this point. Though aided by the Soviet leaders in establishing himself firmly in Turkey, he wisely sought a rapprochement with the West, permitting the European Powers to participate in the deliberations on the Straits issue, in the winter of 1922-
The immediate importance of the Soviet-Turkish treaty was contained in the implementation of that part establishing a common effort against imperialism, particularly against British imperialism. It commenced in the fall of 1921, following an invasion of Turkish territory in the west by British-subsidized Greek forces. Thus presented with the opportunity to go to the defense of a weak Asian nation struggling to assert its independence against imperialist aggression, and contrary to the promise not to encourage any of the peoples of the East against British interests, Moscow dispatched aid to Kemal in the form of munitions and military advisers. In December, 1921, Mikhail Frunze, who had just returned from his military mission in Central Asia, was sent to Ankara under the guise of a diplomatic representative of the Ukraine.\(^7\) With

1923, and favoring their plan for a comprehensive convention.

\(^7\)The evidence concerning Frunze's actual role is scanty. The most reliable source is Louis Fischer's account, which relates that Frunze's "... short visit of twenty-three days (in Ankara) was used to arrange for heavy shipments of Russian munitions and for mapping out a detailed plan of campaign against the Greeks, in which, if need be, Red officers would participate." Fischer, op. cit., I, p. 393.
this help, Kemal was able to launch a successful offensive against the Greeks in May, 1922. His complete victory was registered the following September, when the British agreed to negotiate with him on his own terms. Thus once again did Lenin help to deny the British a foothold along the southern periphery of Asia.

The Soviet Conquests Solidified. The complete elimination of British forces from those Near Eastern countries on the Soviet southern flank made the task of solidifying the conquest of the border regions much easier than otherwise would have been the case. Nevertheless, still concerned about developing foreign interests, in both Europe and Asia, Lenin was prudent about pushing the process to its logical conclusion. For example, all soviet republics retained their "independence" for the time being. In the Ukraine, the Borotbisti continued as part of the "coalition" there, while, in Belorussia, Zhilonovich was coaxed into accepting the leadership of the now Lithuania-less republic. In Armenia, a few left-wing Dashnaks accepted a Communist offer of a coalition, while, in Georgia, some Mensheviks did the same. Characteristic of the care exercised by Lenin in this connection were his instructions to the Georgian Communists concerning the importance of the coalition device:
It is extremely important to seek an acceptable compromise for a coalition with Jordania, or other such Mensheviks, who before the rebellion (sic) were not completely opposed to the idea of a soviet regime in Georgia under certain conditions.

I must remind you that the internal and international position of Georgia requires of the Georgian Communists not the application of the Russian stereotype, but rather an original tactic, founded on greater concessions to the petty bourgeois elements.71

The "independent" status of the Far Eastern Republic and the "Peoples' Republics" of Khiva and Bukhara also remained unchanged. However, there was one notable change effected in Central Asia. On April 11, 1921, treaties with both Iran and Afghanistan having been concluded, a Turkestan Soviet Socialist Republic was created as an autonomous unit of the Russian republic.72

In reality, the first step toward the unification of all soviet republics was already in process. On September 20 and December 28, 1920, for example, treaties had been signed between Moscow and the Azerbaijani and Ukrainian regimes. On January 16, 1921, Belorussia was added to the list, and, on the following May 21 and September 30, Georgia and Armenia completed it.73

71Lenin, op. cit., XXVI, pp. 187-188.
72Cf. Izvestiia, April 12, 1921, p. 1.
73Significantly, all of those treaties were published
All treaties were alike in their essential features. Each was signed by the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the manner of established international rules of procedure. Their preambles contained statements of acceptance of the right of all nations to self-determination and affirmations of the independence and sovereignty of the contracting parties. Beyond this, the documents were devoted to the implementation of an accepted task of "uniting for defense and economic construction". And what this meant was the creation of "joint commissariats" to deal with such matters as military and naval affairs, national economy, foreign trade, finance, labor, communications, and posts and telegraphs. In all other matters, the jurisdiction of each was said to be exclusive.

Further progress in the solidification of Russian control was recorded on April 9, 1921, when Lenin instructed Ordzhonikidze to establish a single economic administration. In the following November, this was extended to include

in a volume containing treaties with "foreign governments". Cf. RSFSR, Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsi Zakliuchennikh RSFSR s Inostrannimi Gosudarstvami (A Collection of Effective Treaties, Agreements and Conventions Concluded by the R.S.F.S.R. with Foreign Governments) (Moscow: Narkomindel, 1934), I, pp. 1216; II, pp. 5-8; Kliuchnikov i Sabanin, op. cit., III, i, pp. 22-23.
Then, in December, a veiled move toward general integration was undertaken. Apparently without invitation, delegates from the five "sovereign" sister republics took seats at the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in Moscow. Thereupon, the Congress, noting the action as a "voluntary" choice on their part to have representation in the supreme legislative organ of the Russian republic, approved their admission and voted a corresponding increase in the membership of the Central Executive Committee.

Lenin's gradualist approach to unification, with its voluntaristic facade, paid a dividend also, for it helped to eliminate an important obstacle to full political integration of the Russian and non-Russian Soviet Republics. This developed on January 6, 1922, when the Supreme Allied Council, apparently following the British lead in accepting Communism's pseudo respect for national rights at face value, put a general stamp of approval on the Soviet conquests. It extended to Moscow an invitation to attend a general

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Economic and Financial Conference at Genoa, but without sending the same invitation to the other soviet republics as well.  

As far as Lenin was concerned, the latter omission constituted an invitation of another sort, and he acted accordingly. With familiar dispatch, an agreement was drawn up between all of the soviet republics, the terms of which gave the Russians full responsibility for the foreign interests of all not only at the forthcoming conference, but in the case of

... all international agreements of any kind directly or indirectly connected with this conference, with states represented at the conference, and with any other states, and to take all measures resulting therefrom.  

Thus, for all practical purposes, the obstacle of Western opinion was overcome. And it goes without saying that no time at all was lost in taking advantage of the opportunity afforded. On November 10, 1922, the Far Eastern Republic proclaimed its own incorporation into the Russian republic.  

In the following month, with the Russians acting conspicuously last, each of the soviet republics passed a resolution

77RSFSR, Narodni komissariat po inostrannim delam, op. cit., III, pp. 1-3.

declaring in favor of a union of all.79

The Leninist Policy Develops Another Snag. The full details of the integration of the borderland regions under Soviet Russian domination need not be specified here, since they are properly within the scope of a study of internal Soviet politics. However, one aspect of that process is relevant to our purpose here. It is contained in the fact that the final step in the integration of the soviet republics into a single political entity was marked by a fresh outburst of "right" nationalist deviationism. It illustrated more clearly than before this particular danger inherent in the exploitation of the national idea in foreign policy.

By 1923, the evidence to support the conclusion that Soviet exploitation of the national idea for tactical reasons could breed its own difficulties was not inconsiderable. As we have already seen in the cases of Piatakov, Zhilonovich, and the Asian Communists, the vacillation between nationalism and internationalism, however expedient, could have a very profound impact upon non-Russian Communists. And to this list had been added three more names during

1921-1922. Following the example set by Zhilonovieh, two Georgian Communists, Filip Makharadze and Budu Mdivani, had protested strenuously against the orders to unite the Transcaucasian states economically and politically. The third name had been that of a Tatar Communist, Mirza Sultan-Galiev, who had voiced strong objections to what he had conceived as an untoward development of Russian influence in the Moslem regions.

But the single most serious manifestation of nationalist deviationism among the non-Russian members of the Soviet Communist Party was that which occurred early in 1923, when the final preparations for the union of all republics was taking place. Following the creation of a Russian-dominated constitutional commission, on January 10, 1923, for example, the Ukrainian Communist leaders, Khristian Rakovski and Mikola Skripnik, and the


81 Ultimately, the Tatar Communist arrived at the conclusion that the Marxist priority to "great" nations was invalid. His solution was that the backward nations should be given hegemony over the industrialized ones, and that the Communist International should be balanced by a "Colonial International". Cf. A. Arshurani i Kh. Gabidullin, Ocherki panislamizm i pantiurkizma v Rossii (Sketches of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia) (Moskva): "Bezdozhnik", 1931), pp. 78-79.
Belorussian, Zhilonovich, drew up separate drafts of a constitution, in which they emphasized the principle of equality of all major nationalities composing the state. Then, at the Twelfth Party Congress, held in Moscow, in April, 1923, the anti-Russian argument was pressed with utmost vigor when it was learned that no alternative to the strictest centralism was to be allowed. Skripnik led the attack by accusing the Russians of using the Red Army for the russification of the Ukrainian people, and by demanding as proof of good faith the reorganization of the Red Army, the Communist Party, and the trade unions into separate national components. And he was seconded by Zhilonovich, Makhadze, Mdivani, and Rakovski, the latter also hurling the threat of civil war if the demands were not met:

"Comrades, this is one of those questions that is fraught with very serious complications for Soviet Russia and the Party. This is one of those questions which -- this must be said openly and honestly at a Party Congress --

82 Cf. V. I. Ignatiev, Sovetski Stroi (The Soviet Regime) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1928), I, pp. 123-137.

threatens civil war if we fail to show the necessary understanding with regard to it. It is the question of the bond of the revolutionary Russian proletariat with sixty million non-Russian peasants, who, under the national banner, raise their demands for a share in the economic and political life of the Soviet Union.84

Such an explosive outburst in defense of the national interest by non-Russian Communists was indeed remarkable. On the surface, it appeared not at all unlike a simple manifestation of the patriotic urge, to which most are susceptible by virtue of group ties established during the formative years. And yet it appears that, under the circumstances, its event was not merely a matter of fundamental psychology. Militating against so simple an explanation was the fact that not in all cases could the rebels be properly labeled radical nationalists, or opportunists who had joined the ranks of Marxists only after 1917. To the contrary, most were "old Bolsheviks", whose loyalty to Leninist Marxism could be traced back to the pre-revolutionary period. Some, including Mdivani, Makharadze, and Rakovski, at one point had even been critics of Lenin's views on the nationality question for the reason of their seeming concessions to nationalism.

The full meaning of the developed nationalist ten-

84 Ibid., pp. 529-530.
dency among the non-Russian Communists can be understood only against the background of the Leninist regard for the national issue. For one thing, its basic assumption that the nationality problem was solely an aspect of capitalist economics had had the effect of preventing a realistic appraisal of it prior to 1917. The adamant refusal to give countenance to the problem except in the strictest Marxian terms, despite the fragmentation of West European socialism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and a similar development in Austria and Russia in the twentieth, had served to deny all Communists of even an inkling of what should be done in the event that the revolution in Russia failed to provide the solution in one quick stroke. Secondly, though events in post-revolutionary Russia completely shattered the validity of this premise, there occurred no opportunity to seek a practical way out of the doctrinal myopia. It had been prevented by defensive needs, particularly for the reason that Lenin sought to satisfy those needs under the guise of champion of national rights. Thus, instead of a solution to the dilemma of the contradiction between theory and reality, the non-Russian Communists had been forced into wild and prolonged espousals of the very antithesis of their fundamental faith. Finally, they had
next been shouldered with the responsibility of governing effectively the "independent" soviet republics after having whipped up the national feelings of the peoples inhabiting them.

All things considered, a "right" reaction by some non-Russian Communists should have occasioned no real surprise in 1923. Having made the necessary ideological adjustment to fulfill the requirements of Soviet Russia's defense, they now found it difficult to return to pure internationalism as abruptly as the Russian leaders wished. Indeed, after more than five years of continuous championship of national rights, it was not easy to find in Marxism's centralist and assimilationist tenets the justification for Moscow's seemingly summary action. Moreover, it was nearly as difficult to dismiss lightly the striking resemblance between the Soviet Russian policy and the policy toward the border regions pursued by the successive Tsars. Against the background of Western capitalism's diminishing threat, which both lessened the need for strictest discipline and afforded an opportunity for the demonstration of good faith demanded, Moscow's dictates bore ominous implications.

There is no evidence that Lenin ever did come to grips with the problem that his own vacillation between
nationalism and internationalism had created. Nowhere can there be found evidence that he took aside his non-Russian followers in order to explain to them that Communist internationalism was the only guiding principle in fact and that the support of nationalist aspirations was purely expedient and was not to be taken seriously. It is possible that the Russian leader simply took it for granted that they would understand the meaning of his policy. More likely, however, is the conclusion drawn by Richard Pipes, which holds that Lenin's faith in the curative powers of socialism, in the assumption that nationalism would disappear along with capitalism, rendered him blind to the need for remedial action, except to caution the Russian Communists not to appear to be "chauvinists" in their dealings with their non-Russian brothers. 85

In any case, one thing is clear: Lenin was too satisfied with the results of the exploitation of the national idea, and too hopeful about the prospects of its success in the East, to even consider abandoning it as a tactical device. If a choice had to be made in 1923 between the continued use of the device and strict adher-

ence to the centralist principle, he was prepared to make it in favor of the former. As he explained in a final, unpublished, article on the national question, a copy of which has been preserved by Trotsky:

The harm which can befall our government from the absence of unified national commissariats with the Russian apparatus will be incomparably smaller, infinitely smaller, than that harm which can befall not only us but also the hundreds of millions in Asia who in the near future are to enter the stage of history in our wake. It would be unforgivable opportunism if, on the eve of the emergence of the East and at the beginning of its awakening, we should undermine our prestige there with even the slightest rudeness or injustice to our own minorities. 86

For the moment at least, the promise of further anti-Western nationalist rebellions in the East overshadowed even the problem of solidifying the Soviet world.

Lenin was unable to attend the Twelfth Party Congress, at which the national issue was debated so seriously. He was already disabled by the two strokes of arteriosclerotic paralysis that would lead to his death within a year. Stalin took his place as the party spokesman on the subject, and, as the record reveals, the Georgian demonstrated that he had made significant progress in coping with the nationality problem since his first,

86 Quoted in Ibid., p. 277.
fitful, start back in 1913. For example, he displayed tactical ability and a sense of timing that bore the Leninist trade mark. After disarming his rebellious colleagues from the borderlands with a candid admission of guilt of chauvinism and by sponsoring a resolution condemning it, he turned the whole argument back against them, labelling their demands equally chauvinistic. Singling out the Georgians and Ukrainians particularly, Stalin charged them with putting their own national interests ahead of all others. And to this he added some appropriate anti-nationalistic quotations from Lenin's writings and a concluding appeal to all for mutual confidence and party solidarity.

Reinforced by a number of "concessions" to the border regions -- which included the formation of national militias, equal status for all major nationalities in a second chamber of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, the Council of Nationalities, and an affirmation of the right of secession -- Stalin's appeals for unity produced the desired results. Formal instructions were drawn up for the constitutional commission. On July 26, 1923, the

87 An English translation of Stalin's remarks are to be found in Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942), pp. 148-149, 159.
88 cf. Ibid., p. 161
completed document was submitted for approval. Though formal ratification by the All-Union Congress of Soviets was not obtained until January 31, 1924, the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics actually became effective on the earlier date.

Despite the admission of chauvinism and the concessions made, Stalin's demeanor suggested a new approach to the problem of Communist nationalist deviationism. As compared to Lenin's "soft" policy, which invariably meant excusing the deviationist tendency as a natural mistake, Stalin's was "hard". His condemnation of the Georgians and Ukrainians had been a bitter one, much more so than Lenin's had ever been. And, soon after the meeting, he admitted that he had had Sultan-Galiev arrested. Furthermore, Stalin saw to it that Makharadze and Mdivani were prevented from returning to Georgia; they were "reassigned" to duties in Moscow instead. The rest were permitted to return home, but, even in their cases, the last word had yet to be spoken. Addressing the Fourth Conference of the Communist Party, on June 10,


1923, Stalin had the following to say:

We must whip up the Rights in order to make them, in order to teach them, to fight nationalism, so as to forge real Communist cadres from among the local people. But we must also lash the "Lefts" in order to teach them to be flexible and to maneuver skillfully, so as to win over the broad masses of the population. All this is essential because, as comrade Khodzhanov correctly remarked, the truth lies "between the two", between the Rights and the "Lefts". 91

While Stalin's "hard" approach to the problem was an alternative to Lenin's it remained to be seen whether or not it constituted a satisfactory solution. Inasmuch as his words bespoke the continued exploitation of the national idea in foreign policy, and his undefined "truth" between "right" and "left" attitudes left as big a gap in the definition of the Soviet policy as before, it was clearly obvious that the last of Communist nationalist deviationism had not been seen.

The Chinese National Revolution Initiated. The effective implementation of Lenin's Eastern policy with respect to China, as has been pointed out already, got off to a slow start because of the unsettled conditions in Siberia. The original message of sympathy for Chinese

91 Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, p. 171.
national aspirations was sent out on July 25, 1919, to
the rival Chinese regimes in Peking and Canton, but it
was not before March 26, 1920, that Peking became the
first to acknowledge receipt of it.92 Because delivery
to Canton was further delayed, and due to the enthusiastic
reception it received in Peking, particularly among the
intelligentsia, Lenin decided to concentrate his atten-
tion on the Northern government. Thus, in August, 1920,
Ignatius Yurin, posing as a representative of the Far
Eastern Republic, arrived in Peking.93 Less than two
months later, the semi-official diplomatic exchange was
completed with the arrival of a Chinese military and
trade mission, headed by General Chung Shih-lin, in
Moscow.94

Out of that exchange, Moscow obtained de facto
recognition and Peking secured the formal renunciation
of the "unequal" treaties of the pre-revolutionary period.95

92 Cf. Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution,

93 Cf. R. T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations,


95 Cf. H. G. W. Woodhead, (ed.), The China Year Book,
1924-1925 (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1924-1925),
pp. 870-872.
In addition, judging by an article in Izvestiia, on October 9, 1920, in which the writer alluded to the possibility of an alliance with Peking against Japanese and Western interests in China, Lenin apparently expected that his task would be a relatively easy one. But nothing more substantial materialized. Due to Japanese pressure, Peking broke off the negotiations on October 18. 96

Lenin's reaction to this development was typical in that it was marked by a stubborn determination to find other ways of approaching the problem in China. It was less than unique also for the reason that he tried to duplicate the modus operandi in Iran. The Soviet leader's new tack was designed to exert pressure against the reluctant Peking government through the creation of a nationalist-separatist regime within the territory claimed by it. The site selected for the creation of the Chinese equivalent of the "Republic of Gilan" was Outer Mongolia.

The ostensible pretext for a Soviet move into Outer Mongolia was provided by the presence there of remnants of Kolchak's "white" army, under the leadership of Baron Ungern-Sternberg. 97 But the real clue to Moscow's inten-

96 Cf. Pollard, op. cit., p. 137.

97 In November, 1920 and February, 1921, Moscow did offer Peking aid to combat the "white" forces. The Chinese,
tion was embodied in the proclamation of a "Mongolian People's Republic", on March 19, 1921, and on Russian soil. Following the usual pattern, the latter immediately requested Soviet aid against Ungern-Sternberg and obtained an affirmative reply. It took three months for military preparations to be completed, and then little more than a week to capture and execute the "white" Russian leader and to seize the Mongolian capital of Urga. Completing the process, the newly installed Mongolian government addressed a brief request to Moscow not to withdraw its forces "... pending the complete liquidation of the threat from the common enemy."99

It would not be unreasonable to assume that Lenin did not regard his Mongolian creation as any more permanent than Kuchik's regime had been. More than likely, he however, turned it down. Cf. Izvestiia, January 5, 1921, p. 3; Pollard, op. cit., p. 163.


viewed it as a point to be bargained, as a stick with which to prod the hesitant Chinese. As much can be deduced from the tactical pattern established in the case of Iran, and from the exchange of notes with Peking. The replies to the latter's protests against the intervention in Outer Mongolia were marked by fresh statements of sympathy for Chinese national aspirations and the promise that the Soviet troops would leave Chinese territory when

... the Chinese free themselves from the yoke of their oppressors, when they chase from their borders the soldiers of the foreign imperialist nations. 100

As further evidence of his desire to win the confidence of the Peking regime, Lenin also permitted a few verbal barbs to be directed against Canton. It was accused of

100 Cited in T. R. Riskulov, "Veliki Khuruldan Mongolia -- Pismo iz Mongolii" ("The Great Khuruldan of Mongolia -- A Letter from Mongolia"), Novi Vostok, No. 8-9, 1925, pp. 218-219. As late as January 17, 1924, Moscow assured Peking that: "Our position in the Mongolian question is sufficiently clear and sincere: we consider that Mongolia is part of China and we are ready to withdraw the Red Army detachments stationed at Urga as soon as the Chinese government will give the necessary guarantees for the security of our frontier." Cited in A. A. Ivin, Kitai i sovetski soiuz (China and the Soviet Union) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1924), p. 120.
having an affinity for American capital. 101

Though the "stick and carrot" technique did elicit Peking's request for a resumption of negotiations, it led to no settlement of their differences. When a new Soviet mission, headed by Adolph Joffe, arrived in the northern Chinese capital in August, 1922, it was informed that the opening of formal discussions depended on the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia. In reply, Joffe defined the issue as only a part of the general problem of their relations, the resolution of which could be obtained only through serious negotiations.102

Neither side was willing to concede the point, and five months of futile bickering followed. Then, at the beginning of 1923, Lenin all but gave up hope of getting anywhere with Peking. So far, there existed no evidence that the Chinese were about to accept the need of an alliance against foreign interests, or that the


Chinese equivalent of Riza Khan would emerge. In January, the Soviet leader instructed Joffe to investigate the possibility of establishing close relations with the Chinese nationalist leader in the south, Sun Yat-sen. The moment seemed propitious for the added reason that Sun was then in forced exile in Shanghai, the result of a military coup in Canton in the previous May. Accordingly, Joffe traveled to Shanghai "for reasons of health" and, on January 26, he and the Chinese nationalist signed a pledge to cooperate toward the end of China's unification and complete national independence. On this occasion also, the Soviet diplomat vowed that his government had no intention of encouraging Outer Mongolia to secede from China.103

The agreement apparently had a beneficial effect on Sun's political fortunes; for, in a matter of three weeks, another coup in Canton restored his leadership there. Thereafter, Moscow maintained a diplomatic mission in Peking, and, on May 31, 1924, even reached an agreement with the regime there.104 But it repre-

103Cf. Ibid., p. 863.
104Cf. Ibid., pp. 880-883. In that case also, Moscow formally recognized Outer Mongolia as being an integral part of China and promised to withdraw all Soviet troops whether or not other foreign troops were evacuated from China.
sented nothing more than a screen for the real interest in Canton. Lenin had abandoned his "Iranian" policy in China for a "Turkish" one. Having failed to move the Chinese leaders in Peking through a combination of sweet reasonableness and nationalist-separatist pressure, he had decided to promote Sun-Yat-sen as a Chinese nationalist hero after the Kemalist model.

For the sake of this new opportunity in China, Lenin spared no expense or effort. The assistance he gave Sun Yat-sen far exceeded that given Kemalist Turkey. In August, 1923, for example, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun's protege, was received in Moscow and given a thorough briefing in revolutionary tactics, including party and military organization. Then, in the following month, a group of more than forty Soviet advisers, led by Mikhail Eprodin, arrived in Canton and proceeded immediately to the task of developing the political and military strength of the regime. The Whangpo Military Academy, which Chiang Kai-shek superintended after his return home, was established and the Kuomintang Party was reorganized after the model of the Russian Communist Party. ¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵cf. T'ang Leang-li, Wang Ching-wei: A Political
In addition, Moscow instructed the Chinese Communists to cooperate with the national revolutionary movement, which they did formally in January, 1924, at the Kuomintang Party Congress. On that occasion, their admission to membership was based on the following pledge:

In joining the Kuomintang, the members of the Communist Party of the Third International propose to abide by its constitution and submit to its discipline. Their aim is to take part in the national revolution. They have absolutely no idea of converting the Kuomintang into a Communist Party. Furthermore, they join the Kuomintang not collectively as a party, but separately as individuals.106

Finally, also on behalf of the developing nationalist revolutionary movement in Canton, the Soviet diplomatic mission in Peking secretly conducted negotiations with the warlords of northern China. Among the converts

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Biography (Peiping: China United Press, 1931), pp. 112-113. According to T'ang, it was the Comintern that paid most of the initial expense of the Whangpo Academy and even presented it with a gift of three thousand rifles.
gained, the most important was Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord, whose army was to attack the pro-Peking forces of Wu Pei-fu in the fall of 1924. A second notable convert was Feng Yu-hsiang, Wu's aide, who was to rebel during the conflict with Chang and attack his former commander from the rear.\textsuperscript{107}

All in all, the Soviet-sponsored Chinese nationalist rebellion was growing by leaps and bounds. It gave promise of still another decisive triumph for Leninist diplomacy in the East. But then the unexpected occurred: on January 21, 1924, Lenin died.

\textbf{Communist "Left" Deviationism Wreaks Havoc.} The relevance of Lenin's death to this study was that it revealed in no uncertain terms the extent to which the exploitation of the national idea in Soviet foreign policy had depended upon his presence and personal direction. Once he was gone permanently from the scene, all those in high Communist circles who had harbored doubts about the promotion of nationalism abandoned their restraint. Leon Trotsky, for one, whose extremist

\textsuperscript{107}Authoritative accounts of this aspect of Soviet activity are contained in Wei, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 55-56; Pollard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 180; Malbone W. Graham Jr., "A Decade of Sino-Russian Diplomacy," \textit{The American Political Science Review}, XXII, February, 1928, pp. 45-69.
revolutionary bent had been constrained by an even greater devotion to Lenin, emerged as the spokesman for the "internationalists". Trotsky began to denounce openly the promotion of nationalism as un-Marxist and unworkable as a tactical device. Moreover, he demanded that an order be issued to all Communists in the East to take-over the nationalist movements supported by them, to conclude the national revolutions as quickly as possible, and, without pause, to press for socialist objectives.\footnote{Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1932), pp. 28, 48-59.}

Stalin defended the established policy in the East, and probably for two reasons. He undoubtedly believed that it was the best possible policy under the circumstances. More important however, was his fear that the immediate success of Trotsky's views would constitute a lethal blow to his own power aspirations. Even so, he was unable to stem the rising tide in favor of the changes demanded. For example, at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow from June 17 to July 8, 1924, many Asian delegates eagerly took advantage of the situation to register their own demands.
for an immediate revolutionary effort through the East. Once again the attack was pressed by M. N. Roy, and he was ably assisted by the delegate from French Indo-China, Ho Chi-minh.

Now unimpeded by Lenin's prestige and persuasiveness, both Roy and Ho insisted stubbornly on the primacy of the colonial issue and the need for the Comintern to underwrite a full scale revolutionary program in the East. They criticized a report of Zinoviev's for not having devoted sufficient attention to the East and then repudiated outright Manuilski's contention that bourgeois-nationalist revolutionary movements needed to be supported in all cases in the interest of the world revolution. The Asians insisted that such support, according to their interpretation of Lenin's thesis at the Second Congress, could only be conditional and thus permitted the promotion of Communist revolutions wherever possible. At a later point, Roy added the following:

"We shall support the ruling bourgeoisie in its demands against imperialism, but at the 

same time we shall also carry on our policy according to the interests of the working class. Our tactics must force the native bourgeoisie to present greater demands and to undertake a greater measure of intervention in the power sphere of imperialism. In a word, we must render it impossible for the struggle for independence to be sacrificed on the altar of compromise between native bourgeoisie and imperialists.110

The adamant stand of the Asians was not the sole significant feature of the Comintern's Fifth Congress. Apparently, it was then that Stalin, more out of fear of Trotsky's competition than anything, decided that some change on his part was necessary. He did not act suddenly, for the reason that it might have been interpreted as an act of surrender to Trotsky's wisdom. However, certain events suggested a behind-the-scenes move. For one thing, for no apparent reason, Roy declined an offer to present his conclusions on the national and colonial questions. For another, he remained strangely silent when Manuilski later accused him of being a "nihilist" and of having grossly underestimated the importance of the bourgeois-nationalist movements to the revolutionary cause. Finally, the Asian delegates to the congress ended up by endorsing unanimously Stalin's

110Ibid., p. 650.
policy, which called for the continuation of the Leninist tack. That, of course, amounted to a severe rebuke of Trotsky.

Just what all that amounted to can be seen readily in the proceedings of the Comintern's Executive Committee, which met in Moscow from March 21 to April 6, 1925. It was announced then that Roy, along with Stalin, Zinoviev, and Bukharin, had been appointed to the committee's presidium and to its commission on colonial affairs, and had been named secretary of the Comintern's Eastern Bureau. Roy's sudden prominence in high Comintern circles actually meant more than a simple promotion, or that he had been placated by such attention: it signalled the triumph of the accelerated, as opposed to the gradual, revolutionary policy in the East. Stalin undoubtedly regarded this concession as preferable to seeing the Asians throw their support behind Trotsky. In addition, Stalin was aided in making the decision for a change by the death of Sun Yat-sen, on March 12, 1925. Thus, in a sense relieved of the obligation of Lenin's pledge to the Chinese nationalist leader, it became possible to speak openly of a new course of action.

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The first formal notice of the change also occurred at the meeting of the Executive Committee, when Zinoviev declared:

The problem of the East is maturing at a much greater speed than we could have imagined before. In the course of the nine months which separate us from the fifth congress, the situation in the East has evolved with a particular speed.\footnote{112}{Cited in \textit{Ibid.}, p. 187.}

The outcome of the discussions on the question of the new tactics need only be summarized here.\footnote{113}{All resolutions are contained in a special edition of the Comintern's publication, \textit{International Press Correspondence}, April 28, 1925.} The Chinese and Dutch East Indian Communists were instructed to maintain their contacts with native nationalists and to press the fight against imperialism. At the same time, however, they were to be permitted to develop the proletarian and peasant bases of their organizations as quickly as possible. The Indian Communists, who were much weaker, were given orders to work within the Indian National Congress Party, to win its left-wing over to their side, and to agitate among the workers and peasants for the formation of a revolutionary coalition of workers and peasants. Furthermore, all Arab Communists of the Near

\footnote{112}{Cited in \textit{Ibid.}, p. 187.}

\footnote{113}{All resolutions are contained in a special edition of the Comintern's publication, \textit{International Press Correspondence}, April 28, 1925.}
East, who were barely organized, were assigned the task of supporting all national-revolutionary movements. Finally, for the first time taking a serious view of the Western Hemisphere, the Comintern directed its members in Central and South America to work with anyone against foreign interests.

In a sense, Stalin's new tack represented a logical extension of the policy developed by Lenin. A parallel was possible between it and the type transformation effected by Lenin himself with respect to the non-Russian border regions, wherein the meaning of national self-determination was redefined in "proletarian" terms so as to facilitate the change over to a strict revolutionary course. However, it is unlikely that, had he lived, Lenin would have switched his policy in the East before conditions had become much more favorable. Certainly no Communist Party in the East possessed the physical strength necessary to take over a national revolution and channel it along a more radical course. The barest possibility existed in China, but there the Communists were faced with a strong nationalist army, trained and equipped by the Russians themselves. In the Dutch East Indies, where rebellions were also to break out, no amount of appeals
to the native people, and to the workers of the world to come to their assistance, could compensate for the fact that the Dutch possessed superior forces.\textsuperscript{114}

The outcome of the revolutionary effort was a devastating defeat for Soviet policy. In China, for example, the Communists began with a series of "anti-imperialist" strikes that closed the port of Canton to all ships trading with the British colony of Hong Kong. Under the leadership of Moscow-trained Li Li-san, a strikers' delegates' committee was organized and it invited workers to leave Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{115} In reaction to this obvious violation of the pledge to abide by the Kuomintang's constitution, the right-wing of the Kuomintang ordered the assassination of the Communist leader of the party's Workers' and Peasants' Section, Liao Chung-kai. It was done on August 20, 1925.

This, however, marked only the beginning of the end of the alliance between Moscow and Canton. The com-

\textsuperscript{114}Cf. \textit{International Press Correspondence}, December 2, 1926, p. 1438.

plete rupture was postponed when Mikhail Borodin, who had been careful to conceal his own role in the Communist activities, succeeded in placating the majority of the Kuomintang's members and persuading them to take disciplinary action against the assassins. Nevertheless, mutual suspicions persisted and soon developed into a subtle competition for power. For their part, the Russians maintained an official facade of dedication to Chinese nationalist aspirations and, at the same time, issued new directives to the Chinese Communists to speed the development of a mass worker-peasant following. 116

Meanwhile, the Kuomintang's leaders, among whom Chiang

116 The complete terms of the new Communist policy in China were spelled out by the Comintern's Central Executive Committee, which met February 17 to March 15, 1926. For one thing, it relegated the Kuomintang to the position of ally of the Chinese Communists, and not the reverse. For another, distinctions were made between factions of the Kuomintang with respect to their reliability, with the less reliable earmarked for liquidation. Finally, and most important, the Chinese Communists were assigned the "... historical task of leading China's toiling masses in their anti-imperialist struggle". Cf. Kommunisticheski Internatsional y dokumentakh, resheniia, tezisi i vozvaniia kongressov kominterna i plenumov IKKI, 1919-1932 (The Communist International in Documents, Decisions, Theses and Appeals of the Congresses of the Comintern and the Plenums of the E.C.I., 1919-1932) (Moskva: Partinoe Izdatelstvo, 1935), pp. 619-623. Cf. also, Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 53.
Kai-shek was about to emerge as Sun's successor, maintained a respectful silence in order to keep the flow of material assistance from Russia unimpeded. But they also began to lay plans for the ultimate showdown.\textsuperscript{117}

The final phase of the Moscow-Canton alliance opened in October, 1926, when, with Chiang's army moving northward against Peking, Borodin convoked an extraordinary congress of the Kuomintang in Canton and persuaded it to transfer the capital to Hankow, in Wuhan province, where Communist strength was concentrated.\textsuperscript{118} Chiang's reaction to this obvious bid for power came in the following April. With his military success in the north all but completed, he severed all ties with the Communists, established a new Kuomintang government in Nanking, and declared war against his rivals. Within a few months, it was sufficiently clear that the latter were no match for his troops, which, ironically enough, had been trained and equipped by the Soviets.

\textsuperscript{117}According to Chiang, the turning point for him occurred on March 18, 1926: "... I could no longer put off a decision. Early next morning, in my capacity as Canton's defense commander, I declared martial law and had Li Chih-lung and other (Chinese) communists arrested and members of the Communist-dominated Canton-Kongkong Strike Committee disarmed." Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), pp. 39-40.

\textsuperscript{118} Cf. Eudin and North, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 290.
In China, Stalin lost not only the revolutionary battle, but an ally as well. And the same was true throughout the non-Communist East. Nationalists everywhere were put on guard against Soviet promises of assistance in their struggles for national liberation. In the Near East, the Arab nationalists abruptly broke off their alliances with Communists and came to terms with the Western Powers.119 In Iran, Riza Khan, after forcing the abdication of the Shah and then declaring himself Shah, on December 16, 1925, solidified his ties with the West. In addition, he and Kemal signed a treaty that was clearly a defensive measure against Soviet Russia.120 For his part, Kemal also solidified his own relations with the West and intensified his campaign against Communists in Turkey. Finally, in India, the Communist agitation, when viewed in the light of the events in China, resulted in a decisive reaction by the Indian nationalists and punitive measures by the British colonial administration.121


Thus, by the end of 1927, the Soviet Eastern policy was a shambles. Stalin did succeed in triumphing over Trotsky at home and he could claim the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia as a prize. It remained in the Soviet grip in the wake of Chiang's successful counterrevolution. But the price paid was a very high one. The rapport with Asia's nationalists, which Lenin had cultivated so assiduously, was shattered completely. More than that, the abortive revolutionary effort had helped Western capitalism to solve the problem presented by the rise of nationalism in the East; by forcing the developing Asiatic bourgeois classes to turn to the West for aid against the Communist menace, many even before they had obtained independence. It was indeed a profound setback, recovery from which would necessitate a painstaking process of rebuilding.

**Conclusion.** The importance of the years from 1919 to 1927 in the record of Soviet exploitation of the national idea in foreign policy was contained in the remarkable clarification of the positive and negative qualities of the tactical device that took place. Before his death in 1924, Lenin was again able to demonstrate the validity of his faith in the promotion of nationalism.
However, the Russian leader did more than this: he pointed the way in the development of new forms of the tactic and applied them with consummate skill. The result of his effort was the transformation of a weak revolutionary regime into a vast Soviet empire and a powerful force in world politics.

It would be difficult to cite the outstanding examples of the Leninist skill during this period, since, considered from the standpoint of the obstacles faced and the benefits derived, all were little short of astonishing. Thus, a comparison of the merits of the nationally-based facade of legitimacy that screened the military conquest of the separated border regions and the nationalistic foundation of the diplomatic offensive against Western imperialism along the Asian periphery could be no more than speculative. The same would be true of any attempt to develop a scale of priority that properly assigned importance to such Leninist artifacts as the fictionally sovereign People's Republics, Soviet Republics, national military-revolutionary committees, nationalist-separatist regimes, and the Far Eastern Republic, not to speak of the skillfully contrived general appeals to the national emotions of Russians and
non-Russians alike. About all that can, or need, be said is that, taken together, they added up to perhaps the most remarkable paradox in world diplomatic history; namely, an immensely beneficial promotion of the national idea by a regime whose real policy aimed to eliminate nationalism altogether.

This is not to say that Lenin succeeded in developing the exploitation of the national idea into a tactical device that was foolproof. Far from it, very significant shortcomings were revealed. For one thing, the dual role of theoretical anti-nationalist and practical nationalist, as happened before, proved too much for some Communists to appreciate. "Right" nationalist deviationism manifested itself again, when, after achieving power in their homelands, some non-Russian Communists demonstrated that the extended promotion of national values had caused them to lose sight of Marxism's fundamental "truths". Its "left" counterpart was made up of doctrinaire Communists, who, together with others impatient to attain the socialist goal in their own countries, argued against the promotion of bourgeois-nationalist interests.

The explosive content of both forms of Communist
nationalist deviationism was no more decisively illustrated than in 1923 and 1925-1926. In the first instance, the "rights", from the Ukraine, Georgia, and Belorussia, forced the Russians to retreat on the issues of national assimilationism and political centralism. In the second, the "lefts", in Russia and from the East, compelled a rechanneling of the Soviet Eastern policy into a revolutionary course. That not only proved unsuccessful but cost Moscow practically every non-Communist friend it possessed outside the Soviet world.

For another thing, not all Eastern recipients of Soviet assistance in their quests for freedom from Western domination accepted the pretentious Communist concern for nationality rights at face value. Both Afghanistan and Turkey, for example, displayed reservations about their benefactor's motives and sought to guard against the possibility of a new imperialism as much as against the old. The fact of the matter was that the Soviet exploitation of the national idea in the East was found to be subject to a sort of law of diminishing returns, its effectiveness lessening in proportion to the decline of the threat of Western imperialism. In the wake of the abortive Communist revolutions in China and the Dutch
East Indies, in 1925-1926, in which case the threat of Soviet imperialism became more definitively outlined, its effectiveness disappeared altogether. Thus it appears evident that even if he had lived to avert the modification of his Eastern policy, Lenin would have been hard pressed to develop new methods for the maintenance of the anti-Western alliances with Asia's nationalists.

In the record of Soviet Russian exploitation of the national idea in foreign policy, then, the period from 1919 to 1927 can be described as one of great extremes. The use of the tactical device first permitted the Soviet cause to scale the heights of success and then plunged it down to the depths of defeat. Accordingly, there existed sufficient grounds to argue reasonably both for and against its continued use. That issue was already settled, however, by Stalin's victory over Trotsky. Stalin's interest in the national issue generally, and the Leninist tactics particularly, assured that the national idea would again figure prominently in Soviet foreign policy as defensive needs and offensive opportunities arose.
CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL IDEA AGAINST FASCISM

The abortive revolution in China marked the first crest of the developing wave of Soviet penetration of world politics. For the next five years, the frustration of defeat and exposure as the "devil's advocate" in connection with the principle of national self-determination compelled Stalin to devote his full attention to problems closer to home, principally to the further consolidation of his personal power and to the development of the economic and military strength of the Soviet Union. Its corollary in foreign policy was a defensive posture, couched in the proposition of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states. Revolutionary responsibilities, as the instructions to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 made clear, belonged almost exclusively to the Communist Parties abroad.

But the pendulum of Soviet interest swung back to foreign problems early in 1934. It was prompted by the spread of fascism generally and the rising threat of German and Japanese aggression in particular. Still weak militarily, Stalin's reaction was decisively defensive. And,
for the same reason, his regard for the national idea as an instrument of policy was revitalized.

From the spring of 1934 until June 22, 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the national idea occupied a prominent place in the complex of Stalin's foreign policy. Initially, its exploitation marked the basis of a quest for a network of mutual assistance pacts with European and Asian countries similarly threatened. In order to draw attention to the threat of war and to convince others that the Soviet Union was a worthy ally, national sentiment was promoted at home and appealed to abroad. Then, after 1938, when the collapse of that effort made the acquisition of the western approaches to the Soviet Union a military necessity, the national idea became a shield for territorial aggrandizement.

The importance of this particular chapter in the record of Soviet Russian exploitation of the national idea in foreign policy can be expressed as follows. For one thing, it represented the most comprehensive and thoroughgoing use of the device ever undertaken for a single purpose. For another, the failure of the initial diplomatic effort illustrated the limitations of its usefulness to the Soviet purpose, not all of which, as will be seen,
were due to uncontrollable factors. Finally, its application as a weapon of conquest in Eastern Europe, during the period of the nonaggression pact with Germany, not only provided an excellent example of how it could be applied successfully, but completed the demonstration of the wide range of its manifold uses.

**Diplomacy Begins at Home.** In his quest for a network of mutual aid pacts with other European and Asian countries that would frustrate German and Japanese ambitions, Stalin's first step was to eliminate as a major stumbling block the persistent and widespread suspicion of Soviet motives. Toward this end, he undertook to nationalize Communism completely, beginning with the Soviet Union itself. For example, on March 16, 1934, a joint decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party set in motion a process that was to bring the teaching of history in Soviet schools into line with Western practice. It ordered a sweeping revision of textbooks and the content of oral instruction on the subject of history at all educational levels. Significantly, particular emphasis was placed on the need for the

... observance of historical and chronological sequence in the exposition of his-
historical events, with due emphasis on the
memory of the pupils of the names of
historical figures and chronological dates.¹

Thereafter, abstract Marxist universalism and
globalism, which had dominated the thinking of Soviet
historians, receded rapidly. Its place was taken by a
wholesale revival of pre-revolutionary Russian history,
shorn of its alleged dark, chaotic, and oppressive
character. And with it fell the name of M. N. Pokrovski,
hitherto revered as the father of Soviet historical
research. Pokrovski, who had died in 1932, became the
scapegoat upon whom all "errors" were heaped. The charges
against him and his "school" included narrow economic
materialism, anti-Marxist conceptions of history, under­
estimations of the subjective factor and the role of
personality in history, and distortions of the genuine
historical process of the development of Russia.²

¹Izvestiia, March 16, 1934, p. 2.
²Cf. Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (The
Large Soviet Encyclopedia) (Moskva: Aktsionernoe obshchestvo
also, Max M. Laserson, Russia and the Western World (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 151-152; Stuart
Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought,"
The Slavonic and East European Review, XIII, January, 1935,
pp. 294-319.
The historical reeducation of the Soviet citizenry was not confined to the formal institutions of learning, but was conducted on the broad popular level as well. The vast Soviet communications system complemented the work of its pedagogues; the very same propaganda machine that had been used to eliminate national sentiment now became the principal tool of its revival. According to Bukharin, words like patriotism, motherland, and fatherland, hitherto deprecated as counterrevolutionary, had become not only acceptable but symbolic of the Soviet citizen's duty.\(^3\) An editorial in Pravda, on July 9, 1934, entitled "For the Motherland", played up the theme of "creative and self-sacrificing patriotism" and demanded the destruction of all who would betray the motherland. Three months later, the journalistic chorus on patriotism was officially joined by the chief newspaper of Soviet youth, Komsomolskaia Pravda, which exhorted its readers to foster the love of the motherland among the youth so that they would consider it an honor to die for it.\(^4\)

Such appeals to a common patriotic consciousness

\(^3\)Cf. Izvestiia, March 30, 1934, p. 1

did not preclude attention to the particular sentiments present in the multi-national polity. On the contrary, within the broader unity of Soviet patriotism, specific national unities were encouraged by dramatic concessions to tradition and national greatness. In a veritable flood, books on folklore, art, literature, science, geographic exploration, and technology poured from the Soviet publishing houses. The worship of political, military, cultural, and scientific heroes became the order of the day. Out of the limbo of Marxist historiography appeared such notables as the Russians Alexander Nevski, Dimitri Donskoi, Peter the Great, Alexander Kutusov, Mikhail Suvorov, and Prince Bagration, the Ukrainian Boghdan Emelnitski, the Tartar poet Gahbdullah Tukay, and the Cossacks Stenka Razin and Emelian Pugachev. Furthermore, attention was focused on the contributions of the different nationalities to the creation of the Russian Empire, which, for the reason of its culmination in the first Soviet society, suddenly became "progressive" in character.5

5In some cases, the national histories of peoples inhabiting the vast Soviet community received recognition for the first time. For example, in 1935, at the Samarkand Conference of Central Asian Historians, the peoples of Central Asia, who, both by Tsarist and Soviet definition, had been regarded as tribes of Turkestan, were elevated to the status of Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirghiz, and Turkman nations. Cf. G. A. von Stakelberg, "The Tashkent Conference on: The
Not unexpectedly, there was one obvious note of restraint throughout the kaleidoscopic pattern of the new Soviet patriotism. Deliberately excluded from the list of the rehabilitated were such names and events which might have symbolized the past in a way detrimental to the purpose to be served. Such paucity was particularly noticeable in the case of the non-Russian nationalities, whose political, economic, and cultural histories generally reflected an anti-Russian leitmotif. But partial compensation for this failure was afforded in the form of a simultaneous extension of the patriotic idea into a broader cult of conventionalism, applicable to all nationalities composing the Soviet Union. For example, the Communist view of the family, hitherto defiled as a "bourgeois relic", and which Alexandra Kollantai had proclaimed "ceases to be a necessity", was altered radically.6

Beginning in 1935, freedom of divorce and abortion

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were severely curtailed. Conversely, articles in newspapers began to extol the virtues of marriage and parenthood. Moreover, the child's respect for parental authority was stressed with equal vigor. "One must respect and love his parents, even if they are old-fashioned" was the way Pravda put it on August 4, 1935. And this was extended to include respect for elders generally. School teachers in particular were singled out as worthy of respect, as the old revolutionary system in education fell before the reintroduction of such "bourgeois" institutions as classroom discipline, academic rank, examinations, and grades.

Similarly, conventionalization was the order of the day for the Soviet armed forces. It was a change that Stalin undoubtedly took special pleasure in effecting, inasmuch as the turn from revolutionary military values would help eradicate from the public mind the memory that the Red Army had been organized originally by Leon Trotsky.

First, in June 1934, the Revolutionary War Council, the


supreme military body since 1918, was abolished. All of its authority was transferred to a newly created Commissariat of Defense. Then, a year later, the army and navy were given all the symbols of the old regime: personal rank, iron discipline, and saluting. The new military order was a far cry from the erstwhile "comradely" atmosphere, which had been free of obvious distinctions between officers and enlisted men and in which such "socialist" practices as open discussions of orders at all levels and petitions of grievance against higher officers had been common.

There were still more changes in the Soviet scene to come, particularly in the political and religious areas. These will be discussed at a later point. Suffice it to say here that the character of the changes effected initially was indicative of the extreme end to which Stalin would go for the sake of security against threatened aggression. At the same time, however, not to be over-


looked was the fact of their purely expedient nature.

In reality, Stalin's return to the national idea could be understood completely only in terms of its application within the framework of the Leninist "one step backward, two steps forward" tactical maxim. It was indeed a new example of the calculated Soviet paradoxism, which combined superficial change with fundamental sameness. Following Lenin's prescription, Stalin's reforms were not based on any recognition of Communism's failure, but on the fact of military weakness in the face of an outside threat. The promotion of nationalism-traditionalism at home offered the best hope for a quick welding of the population in the spirit of devotion to the homeland and resistance to all threats from the outside. At the same time, its projection abroad provided the most serviceable basis for alliances with governments, political groups, classes, and national movements similarly threatened.

The National Idea in Diplomacy. Stalin's nationalizing effort at home did not fail to impress a number of observers abroad. For example, on September 25, 1935, the French newspaper Le Temps interpreted it as a "deep change":

Revolutionary habits and customs are giving way
within the Soviet family and Soviet society to the feelings and customs which continue to prevail within the so-called capitalist countries. The Soviets are becoming bourgeoisified.\textsuperscript{12}

But perhaps the best testimonial was that one presented unwittingly by Leon Trotsky, whose bitter denunciations of the changes as a betrayal of the proletarian revolution resounded throughout the West.\textsuperscript{13}

To be sure, subjection to the vituperative pen of Marxism's most persistent revolutionary was not by itself the complete mark of respectability. But it was helpful to the extent of lending a measure of confirmation to the developing impression that the Soviet Union was indeed becoming "bourgeoisified".

The strategy of the Soviet dictator, however, was not based on the assumption that allies could be won merely by altering the Soviet scene along conventional lines. This was only one of its aspects. A second consisted of the extension of the new respect for national rights into diplomacy. The principle of national self-determination, hitherto applied exclusively on behalf of


\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Leon Trotsky, \textit{The Revolution Betrayed} (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1937).
the peoples of the Asian and African colonies, became a moral imperative applicable to any nation, large or small, menaced in any way by German or Japanese aggression. Its first test occurred on May 18, 1934, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, when, taking advantage of a short adjournment, Litvinov held informal talks with the French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou.\textsuperscript{14} Though no record of their conversations has been published, the gist of them can be deduced reasonably from the events that followed. After the delegates reconvened, Litvinov proposed transforming the obviously sterile disarmament conference into a permanent body devoted to the preservation of the security of all nations.\textsuperscript{15} Over a British objection, Barthou seconded the proposal.\textsuperscript{16}

While not producing the general change sought, Litvinov's effort did set the stage for a sharp improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and France. Equally fearful of Germany's intentions, and perturbed by the British reluctance to become too deeply enmeshed in the politics of continental Europe, the French interest


in the Soviet bid for respectability rose by leaps and bounds. Paris suddenly emerged as Moscow's patron, gaining for it, during the summer of 1934, de jure recognition by Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, and admission to the League of Nations.

Even more significant, however, was the French response to a Soviet offer of a mutual assistance treaty. One was signed on May 2, 1935, and it bound each to go to the assistance of the other in the event of an unprovoked attack by a European State. And then its value was enhanced exactly two weeks later, when, with French encouragement, Czechoslovakia became the third party to the budding mutual security system.

From the Soviet standpoint, the results achieved after little more than a year of promoting the national idea at home and in diplomacy were encouraging, though not as yet decisive. The nucleus for a general European mutual security system had been created, and the prospects that the other members of the Little Entente, Rumania and Yugoslavia, would soon follow the French lead seemed bright. But most States of Europe and Asia were still hesitant to lend a hand to the realization of Stalin's ambition. Despite repeated overtures, two key countries,
Great Britain and China remained aloof. Consequently, it was then that the Soviet dictator put into motion the third, and final, aspect of his strategy: the nationalization of the Comintern.

_Communist Nationalist Deviationism Again._ Stalin's recourse to the Comintern in conjunction with his quest for allies in 1935 merits particular attention. For one thing, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which met in the summer of 1935, demonstrated again how that organization fitted into the Soviet scheme to exploit the national idea in foreign policy. For another thing, and also once again, it revealed the inherent weakness of the tactic, particularly its tendency to evoke among non-Soviet Communists resistance to the idea of sacrificing internationalist-revolutionary interests for the sake of expedient narrow nationalism. And finally, close attention to details is necessitated by virtue of the fact that the manifestation of deviationism at the Seventh Congress has been overlooked entirely by most, if not all, students of Communist politics.17

17 For example, in one of the early authoritative works on the Communist International by a Westerner, Franz Borkenau has described the Seventh Congress in the following way: "It was the first world-congress without any disagreement. The debates of this congress are therefore of limited value for the understanding of the new turn to the right."
To begin with, a few comments are in order concerning the true character of the relationship between Moscow and the Communist Parties abroad in 1934-1935. An important clue has been provided by no less an authority than Stalin himself. While many have accepted the idea that his control over Comintern affairs by that time was virtually complete, Stalin's method in broaching the new policy to the international Communist organization clearly suggested the existence of a condition quite different. For example, the Soviet dictator did not get around to doing it until more than a year after the national campaign on the home front and in diplomacy had commenced. Apparently, the idea of convening a congress was considered in the summer of 1934, but, in October, it was postponed until an unspecified time in the following year. 18 Actually, it did not meet until

July 25, 1935.

In addition to this delay, which was inconsistent with the hasty development of the national theme in other ways, Stalin's preparations for the congress were too carefully contrived for circumstances in which acceptance of the new policy could be regarded as automatic. For one thing, it was not until the very end of 1934 that the Communist Parties abroad were given evidence of an impending change in tactics, and at that in a most prudent manner. In December, an article in The Communist International spoke of revolutionary issues in a conspicuously watered down form. Thus, at one point it stated the following:

The revolutionary crisis is maturing, but the process of this maturing does not follow a uniform straight line, but goes in zigzag fashion.

Then it added later:

For the present time, the characteristic feature is the coming of sharp sudden changes. Such changes require changes of tactics.

And finally:

The new situation is now such that we must make bold efforts to extend the tactics of the united front if we wish to take advantage of the favorable objective situation in order to attract to our struggle the broad masses of Social-Democratic workers who are not yet ready to become Communists, if we wish to take advantage of the favorable situation to win over the majority of the working class, to
rally together all the anti-fascist forces, to mobilize the broad masses in the struggle against fascism and the war danger, and to lead these masses to the oncoming decisive struggles for power, for Soviet Power.19

The article did not define specifically the character of the extension of the tactic of the united front, and thus did not explain how it was possible to attract non-Communists to the causes of anti-fascism and Soviet power simultaneously. Instead, the following explanation was offered:

In the present article we have by no means exhausted the questions which will arise at the Seventh Congress. We have practically not touched on the concrete problems and the practical tasks which face the various Parties.20 But there could be no doubt that a sharp turn to the right was in the offing. For the article also contained a section which dealt at length with the twin problems of "'Left' sectarianism" and "right opportunism" in Communist ranks.21 Apparently, it was expected to arise shortly.


20Ibid., p. 867.

21Cf. Ibid., pp. 865-867.
For another thing, in the six months prior to the actual meeting of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, a careful check was made on all Communist Parties abroad. Each was required to submit a written report of its preparations for the meeting, based on an agenda drawn up in Moscow. As they were submitted, the reports were published in The Communist International, under the heading of "Discussions for the Seventh Congress of the C.I." Also printed were Moscow's criticism of their shortcomings and pointed reminders that the Comintern must become fully "bolshevized". Finally, on the eve of the congress itself, a final editorial made it crystal clear that nothing less than strict discipline and obedience to orders would be tolerated:

Now, as never before, ideological firmness, adherence to principle, and purity in the ranks of the Sections of the Comintern, are important. This is why the struggle on two fronts must be waged stubbornly. The Communist Parties were victorious by carrying on an irreconcilable struggle against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and against Right and "Left" opportunists. In order to guarantee further successes, sectarianism, the chief stumbling block which prevents the Communist Party from penetrating into the

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ranks of the masses, must be eradicated. 

In view of this meticulous preparation for the Seventh Congress of the Comintern -- the repeated warnings against Communist "opportunism" and "sectarianism", and the demands that the Comintern be fully "bolshevized" -- it would appear that Stalin's own conception of his influence over the policies of the Communist Parties abroad was marked by something less than a high degree of confidence. The Soviet dictator apparently was possessed by the fear of a possible negative reaction to his projected shift from a left to a right policy, from revolutionism to nationalism, as had occurred in the past. To be sure, since the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, in 1928, many known unreliable elements either had been removed from the scene, or else had been reduced to an ineffectual status. But Stalin knew from experience that an absolute 


24 Notable among the missing were Trotsky and M.N. Roy, the latter having left in 1929 for the reason, as he explains it, of Stalin's anti-Marxist policy toward India. Cf. M.N. Roy, The Russian Revolution (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, 1949), p. 218. Still present, though without effective voice, were Gregori Piatakov and Khristian Rakovski. They, with a host of others, were to be liquidated in the great purges that commenced in 1936.
guarantee against deviationism had not been obtained thereby. Moreover, it required no great power of insight to calculate the probable effect of its manifestation on his effort to convince non-Communists in Europe and Asia of the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally in the struggle against expansionist fascism.

It is a matter of public record that Stalin's fears were borne out at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which met in the Hall of Columns of the Moscow House of Trade Unions from July 25 to August 25, 1935. By the time all business had been completed, and a full month was the longest a congress was ever in session, there was good reason to suspect the reliability of at least one of the Comintern's Sections: the French.

To begin with, the leaders of the French Communist Party apparently arrived in Moscow with a conception of their role in the general scheme of things at variance with Stalin's, the advance warnings against sectarianism notwithstanding. The French attitude was clearly one of revolutionary expectation, which stemmed from significant achievements in the preceding year. Whereas some of the major Communist Parties, like the Italian and the German, had been crushed completely, while others had failed to
register any notable progress in penetrating the working masses, the French successes had been phenomenal by comparison. Party membership had tripled, while that of the Young Communist League had increased fivefold. Furthermore, in advance of the Comintern congress, they had taken the initiative in effecting a rapprochement not only with the French Socialists, but with the Radical Socialists as well. Finally, in the municipal elections of May 5, 1935, they had won forty-three municipalities and had emerged as the single strongest party in Paris.

The French delegation wasted little time in presenting to the congress its view that the situation in France was developing rapidly in the direction of a revolutionary upheaval. This occurred immediately after the opening report by Wilhelm Pieck, in which all Sections (with the exception of the Russian) were roundly berated for culpable sectarianism; which, of course, was Stalin's way of establishing discipline. But it had no effect on the French whatsoever. Marcel Cachin replied to the charges on behalf of his colleagues, and, after repudiating

them, sounded a note that was clearly alien to the intended spirit of the meeting:

... in the stage of decisive social struggles that we have now reached everyone understands that he must devote himself to the defense of the Soviet Union, that he must identify it with his own defense.

... The duty of the Communists is now tremendous; it is their task to prepare themselves to direct these coming struggles in the light of the precedent of the October Revolution in Russia.26

What Cachin had espoused was the "left" deviationist concept of establishing the defense of the Soviet Union through the extension of the proletarian revolution. From the standpoint of long range objectives, it was not without validity. Under existing conditions, however, the idea could be no more appreciated in Moscow than when it had been expressed in the summer of 1918 by Gregori Piatakov.27 Consequently, Stalin, who directed the proceedings from the background, reacted swiftly to put an end to such revolutionary notions. In Pieck's reply to the discussion of his report, Cachin was singled out as one whose speech had revealed a dangerous "spirit of self-satisfaction with the

26 Ibid., p. 97.
27 Cf. above, pp. 69-71.
successes achieved". Moreover, the French delegation was reminded that its task was to fight against fascism on the basis of a united front with the proletariat and a "people's front" with all other anti-fascists. Before he had finished, Pieck made it clear that, for the time being at least, the revolutionary issue was a dead one:

We must learn to lead in a common fight millions of people, holding different views, convictions and outlooks. We must therefore so adapt the style and methods of our work as to achieve the maximum contact with these masses in the shortest possible time.

Before the French delegation had a chance to reply to the latest charge, which it intended to do, the congress was directed to its main business; the formal pronouncement of the new policy. Georgi Dimitrov, a Bulgarian whose recent election to the post of General Secretary of the Comintern was Stalin's way of demonstrating to the world the independence of that organization from Soviet politics, handled this task.

Dimitrov began with a recapitulation of the seriousness of the threat of fascism to the world and to the Soviet Union in particular. He reiterated the importance of the

29Ibid., p. 122.
united front with social-democrats. His main point, however, stressed the need to expand the united front into a broad "people's front" with all anti-fascists, irrespective of political outlook. The "correct approach" toward that end embraced the following points: (1) the cessation of revolutionary tactics; (2) the support of democratic institutions; and (3) the promotion of anti-fascist national sentiment.

The immediate overriding concern of the Comintern, according to Dimitrov, was not the extension of the proletarian revolution, but the defeat of fascism. Accordingly, he advised all in attendance to be strong, militant, and vigilant, and to approach the working classes, the peasantry, and the petty-bourgeoisie with patience, guided by the fact that they "... must be taken as they are, and not as we should like to have them."30 Moreover, he instructed them to explode the "bogey of the Red Peril" by supporting democratic institutions and legitimate national aspirations. For example, the American delegation was told to create a mass party that was neither socialist nor communist, but anti-fascist, while the British was given

30Ibid., p. 138.
the task of cooperating with the Labor Party. Finally, indicating apprehension over the outburst of revolutionary sentiment, Dimitrov singled out the French for instructions specified down to the last detail. No mention was made of revolutionary tactics. On the contrary, the chief emphasis was placed on the need to preserve the Franco-Soviet pact and to support an anti-fascist "people's front" government should one materialize, Communism's fundamental opposition to "bourgeois" governments notwithstanding.

Signifying its importance, if not the fear that it would be the most difficult for Communist internationalists to accept, Dimitrov devoted special attention to the national issue. For example, from Lenin's article "On the National Pride of the Great Russians", he selected a few choice quotations to prove that Communists were not "national nihilists". To demonstrate the point, he extolled

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31 Cf. Ibid., pp. 151-153.

32 Later on, Dimitrov defined sectarianism as "particularly in overestimating the revolutionization of the masses." Ibid., p. 186.

33 Cf. Ibid., p. 155.
his own pride in being a Bulgarian. With this as his basis, he then proceeded to define the essentially complementary characters of nationalism and proletarian internationalism:

Comrades, proletarian internationalism must, so to speak, "acclimatize itself" in each country in order to sink deep roots in its native soil. National forms of the proletarian class struggle and of the labour movement in the individual countries are in no contradiction to proletarian internationalism; on the contrary, it is precisely in these forms that the international interests of the proletariat can be successfully defended.34

Dimitrov's report no doubt was intended as the complete policy package, which everyone, including the French Communists, were expected to accept dutifully. But the results were not entirely according to plan. For one, Maurice Thorez, the fiery French leader, arose to demonstrate that the revolutionary sparks struck by Cachin were as yet unextinguished. Obviously piqued by the implications of the special attention accorded his party, Thorez replied to the report forcefully enough to suggest an open challenge to Moscow's authority in such matters.

Thorez began by adding to Cachin's earlier denial of French sectarianism one of his own. His account of the

34Ibid., p. 182.
French party's record highlighted only its achievements, while weaknesses and omissions within the Communist movement were ascribed to parties in "other countries" and in Germany "above all". This was Thorez's way of getting back at Pieck. Moreover, he credited the Comintern only with "valuable advice" and Stalin with pinpointing the problems facing Communism, and then went on to state his own preference for Marx's thesis, espoused in The Class Struggle in France, as a better basis for evaluating conditions in France.

With that, Thorez went on to deliver what amounted to an open declaration of independence; for his definition of what the French Communist Party intended to do contradicted Dimitrov's instructions on every major point. For example, on the subject of cooperating with non-Communists in the united and people's fronts, Thorez stated his aim to be that of influencing the movement ideologically and politically, of raising it to a "higher stage", and of convincing the masses "... of the necessity of marching

35 Cf. Ibid., p. 200.
36 Ibid., pp. 213, 217.
forward towards a Soviet Republic".\(^{37}\) Then, with respect to the matter of a people's front government, he made it clear that his objective was not merely to support, or join, such a government, when and if it materialized in France, but to interpret its advent as decisive evidence of an intensification of the class struggle. In short, the position of the French Communists would then be altered to the extent that preparations for a revolutionary seizure of power, utilizing all ministerial posts held, would be necessitated:

If, . . . the Communist Party launches, propagates, popularizes, and gets adopted, in time, a minimum of measures of a transitory nature, the drive of the mass movement can impose a People's Front government, which our Party would support and in which, if necessary, it might even participate.

The anti-fascist battle would become fiercer, since the reactionary and fascist assault would be brutal and immediate. But the People's Front and the Communist Party would have occupied new positions, which we would have to utilize to prepare for the establishment of Soviet power, the dictatorship of the proletariat.\(^{38}\)

According to the stenographic report of the proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Thorez's

\(^{37}\)Ibid., pp. 213, 217.

\(^{38}\)Ibid., pp. 217-218.
speech was followed by "Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation." Even more significant, however, was the fact that its central revolutionary theme was echoed by other speakers, including Pollitt, Florin, and Linderot. Their strongly worded anti-capitalist expressions, and references to "new revolutionary perspectives", made it crystal clear that the French position was not exactly an isolated one.40

From Stalin's vantage point in the Hall of Columns, the development was both obvious and disturbing. What he had feared most, had striven diligently to avert, had come to pass. More than that, he was now faced with a serious dilemma. For example, if any Communists returned home to pursue revolutionary policies after the meeting in Moscow, all hope for the success of his quest for allies would be shattered irrevocably, particularly if it was to occur in France. However, he could not prevent them from doing so by force; for it would explode the fiction of the Comintern's independence of Moscow's direction and probably lead to devastating consequences in the field of diplomacy. Furthermore, an added argument against recourse to a swift,

39 Ibid., p. 228.
40 Cf. Ibid., pp. 228, 242, 249.
harsh purge of the rebels against the national policy was the apparent popularity of the French stand. A purge at this time more than likely would have destroyed the Comintern altogether.

The only course open to Stalin was to follow the example set by Lenin in the comparable circumstances of the Second Congress of the Comintern. That was to try to restore unity behind the Soviet leadership through reasoned argumentation and cajolery. For good measure, however, he added a number of obvious threats so as to make sure that everyone knew him to be deadly serious.

For example, on the day after the general outburst of approval for the French revolutionary sentiment, on August 5, 1935, the congress' proceedings were halted for two days. The fortieth anniversary of the death of Friedrich Engels was given as the reason. But, as events demonstrated, the anniversary was secondary to dealing with the more important matter at hand.

Dimitri Manuilski, the first Russian to deliver a major address at the Seventh Congress, was the principal speaker. However, he spoke of Engels only sparingly, and, at that, only to provide authority for his definition of

\[41\] Cf. above, pp. 162-165.
the correct proletarian tactics under existing conditions:

In 1889, in a letter to the Danish Socialist, Trier, Engels recommends that other parties be utilized in the interests of the working class, that "other parties and measures should be temporarily supported which are either of direct advantage to the proletariat, or which represent a step forward in the direction of economic development or of political liberty...".

Without mentioning names, Manuilski went on to accuse "not a few" delegates of conceiving of the proletarian revolution mechanically and not dialectically, of being "pure revolutionists", and of suffering from "'Left-wing' sickness". Then, more directly to the point, he warned that the party which starts out with vulgarized conceptions of revolutionary needs would be regarded as incapable of playing the part of organizer and leader of the revolution in its country.

Evidence of behind-the-scenes activity to stem the deviationist tide among non-Soviet Communists is not available, but its event can be speculated reasonably. When the congress returned to its regular business, there were definite signs of amelioration. The French delegation

42 *Communist International, 7th Congress...*, p. 265.

did not speak at all, not even to reply to a sharp note of criticism leveled against it by the Austrian delegate Koplenig. But the battle was still not over; there remained one more voice to be heard. It belonged to Wang Ming, the Chinese delegate, who, apparently encouraged by the action of his European colleagues, arose to stress the revolutionary importance of the East in a manner reminiscent of M.N.Roy. According to Wang, the people's front in China had to be directed not only against imperialism, but against the Kuomintang as well:

... it is only our Party that can unite all the best, all the honest, and all the revolutionary sons and daughters of the Chinese people, who no longer want to tolerate the transformation of their country into an imperialist colony, the enslavement of their people and the death by starvation of millions of toilers.

When Dimitrov replied to the stormy discussion of his report, on August 13, 1935, he opened with the observation that no previous Comintern congress had displayed such ideological and political solidarity as the present one. He concluded with a promise of Communism's ultimate victory on a world scale. In between, however, he made

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44 Cf. Ibid., p. 340.
it clear that such glowing remarks constituted little
more than a screen to conceal from outside view the fact
that the congress was in the midst of a sharp contest
over the issue of tactics.

For example, it took Dimitrov only four short para-
graphs to dispense with the unanimity theme and to get to
the task of inveighing against the proponents of revolu-
tionary tactics. In the latter connection, he denounced
the weaknesses of the comrades and demanded that they be
corrected immediately. He ridiculed the idea that the
people's front must be raised to a higher level, calling
it sheer nonsense, and reminded Cachin and Thorez person-
ally that the paramount task of the French Communist Party
was to fight fascism and to help defend the Soviet Union
on the basis of the instructions issued earlier by him.
Moreover, to the American, British, Scandinavian, Austrian
and Asian delegations he directed a warning against "cut-
and-dried schemes", which, however consistent with the
Russian revolutionary experience, bore no direct relationship
to existing conditions and needs.46 The correct policy,
Dimitrov stated bluntly, was that the decisions of the

46cf. Ibid., 357, 360-361, 362, 373.
of the congress be carried out in fact:

What Comrade Stalin said at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union about the conditions necessary to carry out the line of the Party can and should be applied also, in its entirety, to the decisions which our Congress adopts.47

Dimitrov was followed immediately by the Italian Communist Ercoli (Togliatti), who delivered still another lengthy address on behalf of the new policy and against deviationism. The struggle for peace and the defense of the Soviet Union were the twin slogans of Communism, insisted Ercoli, from which there could be no deviation. An allowance for revolutionary tactics was made, but only after an attack on the Soviet Union was launched. Until that time, however, he demanded that all Communists, and particularly the French, do everything possible to gain the support of the masses of workers, peasants, and petty

47Ibid., p. 371. The quotation from Stalin's speech was as follows: "Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it from the housetops, enunciate it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and then carry them unanimously in order to make the victory come of itself, automatically, so to speak. This, of course, is wrong. This is a great delusion. . . . After the correct line has been given . . . success depends on the way in which the work is organized, on the organization of the struggle for the application of the line of the Party, on the proper selection of people, on supervising the fulfillment of the decisions of the leading organs."
bourgeois as so as to prevent its occurrence.48

The open pleas for unity and the warnings against deviation, with a probable assist from less open activities, did silence the revolutionary chorus. The French, apparently mindful that Stalin's wrath was no asset, made their amends publicly. Andre Marty, the hero of the Black Sea revolt in 1919, performed this task for his colleagues. In sharp contrast to what Cachin and Thorez had said earlier, Marty's words were conspicuously free of the glorification of the French Communist Party. More important, however, was his definition of the French task, which excluded the need for "ordinary anti-capitalist action":

Of course, we understand full well that only the final overthrow of capitalist domination will abolish wars. But, if we know how to mobilize the masses, we shall be able to postpone or even prevent an imperialist war, and first of all a military attack upon the Soviet Union.

Armed with the decisions of the Seventh World Congress, enlightened and guided by our great Comrade Stalin, we shall redouble our efforts to correct our weaknesses in rapid, shock-brigade tempo, as the present grave

48 Cf. Ibid., pp. 415-416, 450.
situation demands, in order to be ready to conquer new positions that will assure new victories for socialism!49

Marty's words could be taken as evidence that the tactical issue had been settled, and that unity had been restored. But Stalin was not entirely satisfied. Hence, when Dimitrov delivered the closing speech of the congress, the problem of deviationism was touched on once again. This time, lavish praise was heaped on the French Communist Party, and on Thorez in particular.50 The Chinese, too, were accorded recognition for their achievements. But the General Secretary also took time to reiterate the importance of the "new tactical orientation" of the Comintern's, and to warn against deviating from it. Those who persist in their mistakes, he asserted, must be "flayed without mercy", and:

Anyone who tries to break the iron unity of our ranks by any kind of factionalism will be made to feel what is meant by the Bolshevik discipline that Lenin and Stalin have always taught us. Let this be a warning to those few elements in individual Parties who think they can take advantage of the difficulties of their Party, the wounds of defeat, or the

49Ibid., pp. 469, 470.

50Cf. Ibid., p. 552.
blows of the raging enemy, to carry out their factional plans, and to further their own group interests. 51

Thus did the Comintern become an integral part of Stalin's scheme to win allies in Europe and Asia against the menace of German and Japanese expansionism. There could be no doubt, however, that it represented the weakest aspect of the whole strategic complex. In view of the Comintern's general record, in which case it had never responded well to a policy shift from left to right, and particularly in view of the proceedings of the latest congress, the basis for misgivings was present. Nevertheless, short of a complete abandonment of the new policy, Stalin had no alternative but to proceed as scheduled.

Soviet Diplomacy Makes Further Progress. Following the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and almost as if to compensate for its threatened deficiency, Stalin's pursuit of a system of mutual aid pacts was pressed with renewed vigor. On the home front, for example, additional efforts to bring the Soviet society into line with the Western model were undertaken. On February 2, 1936, Izvestiia proclaimed the need to recognize the contributions of the

51 Ibid., p. 558.
Russian Orthodox Church to the historical advancement of Russia. This signaled a sharp toning down of the anti-religious sentiments hitherto frequently expressed by Communists. Even more dramatic, however, was the promulgation of a new constitution.

The Constitution of the U.S.S.R., or, as it is more popularly known, the "Stalin Constitution", was declared effective on December 5, 1936. It preserved the federal form of the Soviet state and the right of each Union Republic to secede. But its departure from the past pattern of Soviet constitutionalism was notable in several respects. For one, the preambular link between the Soviet state and world revolution was dropped. For another, the earlier indirect, open electoral system, favoring the industrial workers, was replaced by direct elections, the secret ballot, and equal suffrage for all, including the hitherto disfranchised "bourgeoisie". This much was intended to demonstrate to the world that the process of "bourgeoisification" in the Soviet Union was profound in its ramifications.

More directly to the point of the diplomatic interest to be served, however, the new constitution for the first time specified Soviet treaty obligations as binding absolutely. Furthermore, the method by which such obligations were to be met was officially accelerated. Henceforth, it was to be possible for the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to proclaim a state of war without first obtaining the approval of the Supreme Soviet in the case of an attack, or

... when necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression.53

The real meaning of the "Stalin Constitution" can be understood only in terms of the singular purpose it was intended to serve. In no fundamental way was the real constitutional arrangement of the Soviet Union altered. The single-party dictatorship, at the apex of which was located the all-powerful secretary-general, controlling the electoral process at the nominating stage, selecting an obedient governmental majority, and imposing his will on all aspects of Soviet society, still remained. As a

53The Constitution of the U.S.S.R., Article 49, Section m.
further example of calculated duplicity, combining superficial change with fundamental sameness, the document represented the ultimate "carrot" in the promotion of confidence in the Soviet regime both at home and abroad. Remarking on the international interest to be served, Stalin offered the following:

The international significance of the new Constitution . . . can hardly be exaggerated.

Today, when the wave of fascism is bespattering the Socialist movement of the working class and beamirching the democratic aspirations of the best people of the civilized world, the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment against fascism, proclaiming Socialism and democracy to be invincible. The new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will give moral assistance and real support to all those who are fighting fascist barbarism today.54

Not surprisingly, there were some non-Communists in the West who accepted the new constitution as further evidence of Soviet "bourgeoisification".55

In the meantime, Stalin's diplomats continued


tirelessly to foster the impression abroad that concern for the principle of national sovereignty and national security for all was Moscow's paramount preoccupation. In the League of Nations, for example, the Soviet delegation became the single most vocal champion of peace based on respect for national rights. By mid-1935, the foundation for this stance had been carefully laid through such acts as the presentation of a dispute with Uruguay before the League Council, an agreement not to export arms to the belligerents in the "Chaco War", Bolivia and Paraguay, and the support of Yugoslav demands on Hungary, which arose out of the assassination of King Alexander. However, this represented merely the prologue to an even greater effort on behalf of national self-determination that developed in September 1935, when the Italian-Ethiopian border dispute was drawing to its fateful climax. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Moscow's chief delegate to the League of Nations, trumpeted the national theme on the behalf of Ethiopia with the fullest possible volume:

Nothing in the Covenant of the League entitles us to discriminate between Members of the League as to their internal regime, the colour of their skin, their racial distinction or the stage of their civilization, nor accordingly
to deprive some of them of privileges which they enjoy in virtue of their membership of the League, and, in the first place, of their inalienable right to integrity and independence.\(^{56}\)

It would not be unreasonable to conclude that Litvinov, as a self-appointed conscience of the League, was instrumental in shaping that organization's reaction to the Italian attack on Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. While the British Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, was publicly for strong action, he was privately against any move which might antagonize the Italian dictator to an extreme.\(^{57}\) And exactly the same could be said of the French Premier, Pierre Laval. Hence, it was more than likely that, without the blunt-speaking Soviet Commissar around, the League membership would have found an excuse for even lighter sanctions than those voted on October 11.

At any rate, Moscow viewed the imposition of sanctions in that light and heralded the event publicly as not only a step in the direction of effective collective action against aggression, but as a triumph for the prin-


\(^{57}\)As much has been borne out by subsequent events and by the testimony of Winston Churchill. Cf. Winston L.S. Churchill, \textit{The Gathering Storm} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 175-176, 182.
ciple of national self-determination. Privately, no doubt, the Soviet belief in the promotion of the national idea as a useful diplomatic technique was reinforced.

There occurred in the next five months developments beneficial to the Soviet cause and new opportunities to strengthen the pose as champion of national rights. For example, when, on December 21, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare was replaced by the more pro-Soviet Anthony Eden, the event was hailed in Moscow as both a victory for British democracy and the cause of international security, and as a decisive step in the direction of improved Anglo-Soviet relations.

To lend impetus to the latter prospect by a showy display of respect for British national institutions, Litvinov and Marshall Tukhachevski were sent to London at the end of January 1936 to attend the funeral of King George V. Then, when, on January 24, 1936, Pierre Laval


59 Cf. Ibid., January 12, 1936, p. 1. Cause for Soviet jubilation on that occasion can be seen in Churchill's thumbnail sketch of Eden: "He was a devoted adherent of the French Entente. He had just insisted upon "staff conversations". He was anxious to have more intimate relations with Soviet Russia. He felt and feared the Hitler peril." Churchill, op. cit., p. 240.
was succeeded by Albert Sarraut in Paris, that event was also greeted affirmatively in Moscow, though with the reminder that the French had not fulfilled the obligation of ratifying the Franco-Soviet pact.60

On March 1, 1936, in a much-publicized interview given to Roy Howard, Stalin personally contributed to his own cause by reiterating the Soviet respect for the right of nation-states to govern their own affairs free of outside interference, and by terming the Western notion of Communism's revolutionary aspirations a "tragi-comic misunderstanding".61 A more important assist, however, was provided a week later by Hitler, who reoccupied the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. In response to that violation of the Versailles Treaty, a treaty that he had long denounced, Stalin offered Paris and London assistance for whatever remedial steps they might decide to take.62

Stalin's seeds of conciliation, fertilized by Hitler's aggressive demeanor, produced a small, though


significant harvest. On February 26, 1936, for example, the French Chamber of Deputies approved the mutual assistance treaty. A week later, the French Senate followed suit, thus opening the way to discussions for a military convention. In addition, relations with London improved to the point where secret naval talks were begun in May, and economic credits up to ten million pounds were acquired.63 Finally, also in May 1936, Rumania and Yugoslavia followed the Western lead with declarations in favor of the principle of collective security and of readiness to improve relations with the Soviet Union still further.64

The spring of 1936 was significant from the Soviet standpoint for still another reason; for it was then that the nationalization of the Comintern registered its most dramatic return. Generally, in the eight months which had elapsed since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the nationalized Communist Parties had not been as successful as Moscow had hoped. Chiefly because memories of past Communist duplicity remained undimmed, most parties

63Both are reported in The New York Times, July 31, 1936, p. 18.

64Cf. Ibid., May 8, 1936, p. 1.
had failed in their attempts to establish either united or people's fronts. It had been true especially in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian States, and China. In those countries, socialists and non-socialists alike had regarded the sudden manifestation of Communist nationalism with the deepest suspicion. 65

Even so, there had occurred two exceptions to the general rule of failure. On the one hand, in France, Communist nationalism had served to weld a firm alliance with the Socialists and Radical Socialists. 66 On January 11, 1936, the three parties, together with the French trade unions, a small Socialist-Republican Party, and four pacifist and anti-fascist groups, had declared themselves


66Alexander Werth, the noted English correspondent, comments on the French Communists' successful propaganda in the following manner: "It tended to reconcile the revolutionary spirit with the national spirit; it touched the sentimental strains of the garantte huitard revolutionism dormant in many a Parisian's heart -- be he a workman or a little bourgeois. Many a French patriot, feeling that the Communists had put something 'dynamic' into the somewhat moth-eaten jacobinism of the Radicals, was tempted to vote for them". A. Werth, The Twilight of France, 1933-1940 (London: H. Hamilton, 1942), p. 72.
the rassemblement populaire and had issued a single program with the threefold aim of struggle against fascism, improvement of working class conditions, and defense of France through collective security. On the other hand, in Spain, the Communists had also achieved an alliance with the Socialists and Republicans, though not with comparable solidity.67 In the general election, held on February 16, 1936, the group had won a majority in the Spanish Cortes. But the Communists had obtained only seventeen seats for themselves, which, although an improvement over the past, had not been sufficient to afford them any voice in the formulation of governmental policy.

The truly dramatic achievement of the Comintern occurred in France in April-May 1936. In the general election, the rassemblement populaire, or Popular Front, won a decisive majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

67 According to one Spanish Communist, J. Hernandez, the Communist Party in Spain suffered the dilemma of dealing with a Socialist Party that was further to the left than it and a Republican Party that was deeply suspicious. Cf. J. Hernandez, "The Development of the Democratic Revolution in Spain," The Communist International, No. 8, August, 1936, pp. 956-969. Cf. also, David T. Cattell, Communism and the Spanish Civil War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955).
Furthermore, the election marked a signal triumph for the French Communists, whose popular vote was increased over the preceding election (in 1932) by more than ninety percent and whose representation in the Chamber rose from ten to seventy-two. This latter development was enough to prompt the Socialist leader, Leon Blum, to invite the Communists to participate directly in the government that he was forming. It was also enough to prompt Moscow to interpret the event as evidence that France was clearly emerging as the West European pillar of a general anti-fascist mutual security network.68

Thus, late in the spring of 1936, Stalin was in a position to view the results of his strategy, as well as its prospects, with some satisfaction. New modifications of the Soviet system had evoked a positive reaction abroad. Moreover, steps taken in the League of Nations and outside had established him as an obvious champion of national rights and of collective security against aggression. And for such efforts, notable returns had been recorded. Hoare had been replaced by Eden in the British Foreign Ministry, Laval had been replaced in France and the treaty with

that country had been ratified, and Rumania and Yugo-
slavia appeared to be on the way to joining the mutual
security system. More than that, despite general failure,
the Comintern had fulfilled its task in one vitally impor-
tant country, France. From that victory could be deduced
two gratifying conclusions; namely, that the French Com-
munists were holding firm in their adherence to the Comin-
tern's policy and that the implementation of the pact with
France was practically assured. All in all, the prospects
were very encouraging.

The Nationalistic Bubble Bursts. But the spring of
1936 marked only the apogee of Stalin's strategy, and not
the threshold of its complete success. At that very time,
the whole effort lost its momentum, began to decline, and
ultimately collapsed.

In part, the Soviet diplomatic defeat that resulted
can be attributed to such factors as the resolute refusal
of one Western Power, the United States, to be drawn into
the whirlpool of European politics and the general failure
of the Communist Parties to fulfill their assigned tasks.
For these, Moscow cannot be held responsible. However,
though contributory, such factors as these cannot be
regarded as exclusive, or even decisive. They did not,
for example, account for the failure of the mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, or the failure to reap the benefits of the rapprochement with the British in 1936. All things considered, a collective security system with at least France, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, Rumania, and Yugoslavia was not beyond the realm of possibility.

Looking back, it appears evident that the Soviet strategy failed principally because of its own inherent weakness and three tactical errors committed by Stalin. To begin with, the facade of Communist nationalism lost one of its major props when, in what can only be regarded as a new outburst of deviationism, the French Communists suddenly executed an oblique turn to the left. Whereas they might have participated directly in the Popular Front government, and thus have enhanced their own position as champions of the French national interest, they rejected Blum's invitation. Furthermore, though they still could have concentrated their efforts on the promotion of the cause of collective security with the Soviet Union against Germany, the French leaders elected instead to emphasize the issue of domestic economic and social reform. They
became involved in the famous "sit-in" strikes which broke out immediately after the general election, posing as the champions of the workers' cause.

It was significant that the negative tack of the French Communists came at a time when Moscow was publicizing its jubilation over the results of the election and advising that support of France's Popular Front government was the paramount task.\(^{69}\) It underscored the discrepancy between the French Communist and Soviet viewpoints. More important from the standpoint of its consequences, however, was the fact that it caused Leon Blum, not to speak of the Radical Socialists, to become extremely wary about the intentions of his Communist allies. On the eve of taking office, for example, Blum's deep misgivings were voiced in the form of the following warning:

> I really hope that the Government which the Socialist Party is going to form will not be a Kerensky Government. But, if it were to be so, believe me, in the France of today it is not a Lenin who would replace it.\(^{70}\)

\(^{69}\)"This victory has shown that successful resistance to fascism and war is possible only along the lines of the united proletarian front and the anti-fascist people's front." \(^{\text{Ibid.}}\) (Italics theirs)

Though the evidence is not conclusive, it is probably correct, as one French observer has reported, that Moscow actually intervened to stifle the internationalist urge of the French Communists.\footnote{Cf. Jacques Bardoux, "Le complot sovietique contre la patrie francaise," La Revue de Paris, August 15, 1936, pp. 721-741.} Nikolai Shvernik, head of the international Communist trade union organization, Profintern, was in Paris at that time and more than likely cautioned Thorez. That would account for the latter's statement, on June 7, 1936, that the Communists had nothing in common with the Popular Front government, and would soon replace it, and his agreement five days later to help settle the strikes.\footnote{Cf. Ibid.}

Even so, Thorez was not deterred entirely. On July 8, 1936, for example, his own internationalist bent pushed the Comintern-styled nationalism aside long enough to threaten to withdraw his party's support of the Blum government over a minor strike issue.\footnote{Cf. The New York Times, July 9, 1936, p. 14.} Then, less than...
three weeks later, after the civil war in Spain had broken out, and particularly after Blum had responded negatively to Madrid's request for arms, it emerged even more prominently. The French Socialist leader became the target of a Communist campaign of vilification, which included new and stronger threats to overturn the government by withdrawing support. And it continued at a very high pitch until the second week in August, when Moscow, doing its best to play an agreeable diplomatic role, consented to Blum's proposal that all governments refrain from interfering in the Spanish conflict.

The effect of the actions of the French Communists on the relations between Paris and Moscow cannot be determined precisely. According to the testimony of the left Socialist Minister for Aviation in the Popular Front government, Pierre Cot, who makes no secret of his sympathy for the Soviet cause, or of his untiring efforts to promote the implementation of the pact with Moscow, the failure of the government and the ultimate nullification of the mutual assistance treaty was due as much to the "mistakes" of the

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Communists as those of any party's. Regrettably, Cot does not bother to specify the "mistakes" committed.

At any rate, two things are clear. For one, by their actions, the French Communists had certainly thrown away whatever chance had existed for a decisive voice in the formulation of the policies of the Popular Front. Blum ultimately concluded that they were nothing more than Moscow's agents in quest of a revolutionary seizure of power. For another, their obstructionist tactics, particularly in connection with the Spanish civil war issue, afforded convenient evidence for the extreme French right wing's anti-Communist and anti-Soviet charges and caused many moderates to doubt the wisdom of an alliance with Communists under any circumstances. Under the circumstances, it was little wonder that the Popular Front government proved hesitant to expand the mutual aid treaty with Moscow into a firm military alliance.


It is more than likely that the Franco-Soviet treaty would have collapsed ultimately under the weight of the French Communist tactics. But Thorez was never made to suffer the pain of the type Stalinist discipline that Dimitrov had threatened at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. He was undoubtedly saved from this ordeal for the reason that Stalin himself committed a few serious errors, which rendered the collapse of the whole nationally-based strategy confusing enough to deny a precise definition of its cause.

Stalin's tactical errors were threefold. Two stemmed from an overestimation of the impact of his exploitation of the national idea on Western thinking, while the third was a pure blunder. For example, at the very time that he was currying favor with Paris and London on the Spanish issue, the Soviet dictator elected to dispute with them on still another one. This occurred in connection with proposals to amend the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the summer of 1936.

Ironically, it was Andre Marty, a Stalinist rather than a deviationist, who, on the occasion of his expulsion from the French Communist Party in 1952, was made the scapegoat for the deviationist "errors" in the 1930's.
The proposals to reform the League's Covenant arose directly out of the failure of the international organization to deal effectively with the Ethiopian crisis. Its logic was contained in the fact that sanctions had not prevented Mussolini from doing exactly what he had intended, and that no member, with the exception of the Soviet Union, was prepared to take the risk of war implied in any stronger remedy. Hence, there was widespread support for a British suggestion, which Chile formally proposed on June 26, 1936, that the League should abandon its coercive powers and leave sanctions to whatever States might be interested. It was also recommended that the absentee Powers, Japan and Germany, be permitted to return to full membership.\(^7^9\)

The Soviet reaction made it plain that Stalin either failed to recognize the popularity of the proposals in the League, or, what is more likely, assumed that the strongest possible demands for the protection of all

nations through effective collective security would compel its acceptance. The Soviet dictator apparently was counting on public opinion in Western Europe to react positively to his stress on the principle of national integrity and the League of Nations as the agency to uphold it. Thus, on August 22, 1936, his reply to the proposed watering down of the Covenant consisted of a counterproposal to permit three-quarters of the Council to commit all members to a policy of sanctions against a future aggressor, including military sanctions. In addition, making it appear as though Moscow was the sole champion of international law and order, the reply rejected the idea of admitting, or readmitting, any government that had violated world peace, international agreements, or decisions of the League.80

No agreement on changing the League's Covenant was ever achieved. The discussions lasted for more than two years, and their only apparent effect was that they

served to erode the relationship between Moscow and Paris and London. The Soviet insistence on turning the League into an effective police agency not only failed to overcome a popular belief that peace could be maintained best without forceful measures, but dampened the ardor of many French and British officials, who, correctly or incorrectly, were also acting on the assumption that a better way to avert a general war was to pursue more temperate policies.

The Soviet action on the reform issue in the League of Nations was, in fact, the first of two parts of Stalin's effort in the latter half of 1936 to accelerate the development of an effective collective security system. Even more dramatic, and disastrous, was his decision in October to declare the Soviet government no longer bound absolutely to the nonintervention agreement with respect to the civil war in Spain and then to dispatch shiploads of food and arms to the defending regime in Madrid. The justification for it was contained in the fact that other parties to the agreement, notably Portugal and Italy, were doing essentially the same on behalf of Franco's rebel forces.

However, Stalin's objective, as told by the Spanish Socialist, Juan Negrin, was not only to aid the Madrid regime, but to compel Paris and London to follow suit.\(^82\)

But Stalin again encountered resistance by the British and French to a more forceful policy toward Italy and Germany, the latter involving itself in the Spanish civil war soon after. For example, in an obvious display of displeasure over the embarrassing Soviet insistence upon a more stringent defense of the principle of national sovereignty, the British, on October 25, 1936, suggested an investigation of three alleged violations of the non-intervention agreement by Moscow. Then, three days later, acting on an earlier Soviet charge, the Non-Intervention Committee in London voted almost unanimously to clear Italy and Portugal of violations. The sole negative vote cast was by the Soviet member, Ivan Maiski.\(^83\)

\(^{82}\) According to Negrin, who headed the government in Madrid when the bulk of the Soviet aid was sent: "Moscow tried to do for France and Britain what they should have done for themselves. The promise of Soviet aid to the Spanish Republic was that ultimately Paris and London would awake to the risks involved to themselves in Italian and German intervention in Spain and join the U.S.S.R. in supporting us." Cited in J. Alvarez del Vayo, *Freedom's Battle* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1940), p. 76.

The effect of the new Soviet policy toward Spain was almost the opposite of what had been intended. It did not cause either Paris or London to become similarly involved. Furthermore, despite Moscow's effort to prevent its action from being interpreted as an attempted Communist coup in Spain, many accepted the widely proclaimed contention of fascists that nothing else was intended. Finally, taking advantage of both factors, the division between Moscow and the Western democracies and the growing belief in the former's revolutionary intent, Italy and Germany, on November 18, 1936, simultaneously extended de jure recognition to Franco as the legitimate head of the Spanish government and lent increased assistance to his cause. Not even Stalin's adherence to a joint British-French proposal, on December 4, 1936, to mediate the conflict in Spain could undo the damage already done.

In the meantime, Stalin's third, and final, tactical error had begun to take shape. It was contained in the

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84 Cf. Micaud, loc. cit.
86 Cf. The Times, December 5, 1936, p. 12.
series of purges, trials, and executions that rocked the Soviet world from August 1936 until the fall of 1938. And it cost Stalin whatever benefits had been obtained through the nationalization-conventionalization of the Soviet Union.

For example, in the first series of trials, which were based on the allegation of a Trotskyist conspiracy, Stalin lost much of the ground gained among Western liberals. The propaganda value of the new Soviet constitution was blunted; its so-called democratic quality was rendered meaningless by the character of Soviet justice displayed. Not only did it raise doubts in the West about the reality of the changes said to have been effected in the Soviet Union, but evoked vigorous protests. In the United States, for example, Professor John Dewey headed a private committee to investigate the charges against Trotsky, and it concluded that they were unfounded. The general feeling, however, was best summed up by The New Statesman and Nation:

There may well have been a plot. But the disadvantage of these methods of justice, coupled with unconvincing confessions and broadcast propaganda, is that they reflect

among those who retain any integrity of judgement, at least as much upon the State which employs them as upon the victims it condemns. 88

By itself, the method of procedure against the so-called Trotskyist conspirators probably would not have been of tremendous consequence. As a matter of fact, skillful handling could have turned the situation to advantage. Whatever losses were incurred among Western liberals could have been compensated for by gains among more moderate and conservative elements. 89 Among the latter, a choice between Stalin's attempted conservatism and Trotsky's continued agitation for a world revolution easily would have favored the former. Thus, Stalin might have played up the theme of Trotskyist subversion, and his measures against it, as further evidence of the sincerity with which the reshaping of the character of the Soviet system and the pursuit of a rapprochement with the Western democracies had been undertaken. The plot could have been


89Interestingly enough, one figure who refused to believe that the great purge detracted from the apparent conversion of the Soviet Union into a conventional type state was Alexander Kerensky. Cf. Alexander Kerensky, "The Turn Toward Freedom," The Slavonic Review, July 1937, pp. 89-92.
depicted credibly as one conceived by die-hard revolutionists for the purpose of seizing power in the Soviet Union, eradicating all of its new conventional features, and seeking to promote proletarian revolutions throughout the world.

But Stalin did not do this. Instead, he compounded his error with a new series of purges, trials, and executions, and with an entirely new charge. The new charge was one of treasonable activity by Soviet citizens on behalf of Japanese and German agents.\footnote{Cf. \textit{The New York Times}, July 11, 1937, p. 15.}

The new Soviet trials and executions added to the rising doubts in the West about the democratic character of Soviet justice. More than that, however, inasmuch as they involved not only political figures, but many high-ranking military persons as well, including Marshalls Tukhachevski and Gamarnik, the result was that many in the West also began to question the hitherto held assumption that Soviet military strength was considerable. The prospect of an alliance with a Power whose armed forces were shown to be riddled with enemy agents was certainly less than attractive. Commenting on that fact, the United
States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, wrote on July 4, 1937:

The pity of it all is that in so doing he (Stalin) has destroyed the confidence of western Europe in the strength of his army and in the strength of his government; that he has also weakened the confidence of both England and France in the strength of the Russian army, and has weakened the democratic bloc in western Europe, and that is serious, for the only real hope for peace is a London-Paris-Moscow axis.91

Though Stalin continued to seek a collective security system for another year and a half, the adverse effects of his, and the French Communists', tactical errors were already apparent early in 1938. For example, opposition within the British Cabinet hampered Eden's attempts to develop an active policy against Hitler at every turn, and, on February 20, forced him to resign.92 Meanwhile, similar pressures were building up in the French Chamber, and with

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92 Churchill recounts the following: "In February 1938, the Foreign Secretary conceived himself to be almost isolated in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister had strong support against him and his outlook. A whole band of important Ministers thought the Foreign Office policy dangerous and even provocative." *op. cit.*, p. 250.
comparable results. On April 8, the Radical Socialists, in obvious disgust with the vacillations of the Communists and apprehensive about the alliance with Moscow, withdrew their support of the Popular Front. Two days later, they took over the reins of government, but with no intention either to continue the Popular Front program, or to implement the treaty with the Soviet Union.

The major blow to Stalin's diplomatic effort came at the Munich Conference, at the end of September 1938, which marked the intention of London and Paris to disregard the interests of the Soviet Union altogether. Cognizant of what was taking place at the expense of the Czechs, Stalin did attempt to dissuade the democratic Powers by threatening that their support of Hitler's invocation of the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Sudeten Germans could have serious repercussions:

In agreeing to robbery at Czechoslovakia's expense and in giving it their blessing, Great Britain and France are playing with fire; for tomorrow the same questions may be put before them with reference to some territories in Asia and Africa under the domination of the "democratic" Powers.93

This obvious play on the national idea could be taken in terms of a twofold threat against French and

93Pravda, September 21, 1938, p. 1.
British colonial interests, posed not only by the Axis Powers, but, in the light of earlier experience, by the Soviet Union as well. However, by this time, both Paris and London had decided to regard anything Moscow had to say as unworthy of consideration. Wrote Churchill:

Stress has also been laid upon Soviet duplicity and bad faith, and the Soviet offer was in effect ignored. . . . Events took their course as if Soviet Russia did not exist.94

The results of the Munich Conference had a double effect on Soviet foreign policy. For one thing, it led to a general toning down of the quest for collective action against German aggression, in which case the use of the national idea also was dropped. Alliances with Britain and France were still sought, but without the high degree of urgency as before. Instead, Soviet propaganda sought to badger them into some form of diplomatic accommodation through alternating accusations of pro-Hitler sympathies and dire warnings of the consequences should the German dictator get control of a sizeable part of Europe's resources. For another thing, aware of his comparative isolation, Stalin came to accept the view that his purpose

94Churchill, op. cit., p. 305.
might be served next best by some formal arrangement with Hitler, provided the Nazi leader could be persuaded to abandon his designs on the Soviet Union for the sake of expansion elsewhere.

For the next eleven months, Stalin played a double hand. Toward both the democracies and Germany, the Soviet Foreign Ministry and press emitted alternating admonitions and conciliatory gestures; the idea being to offer Soviet friendship to the highest bidder. The outcome, of course, was the decision to sign a nonaggression treaty with Hitler, completed on August 23, 1939. By its terms, Stalin agreed to play the role of a benevolent neutral, while Hitler expanded his domain. In exchange, he received a generous piece of Poland and a free hand in the Baltic region north of Lithuania and in unspecified parts of the Balkans. It was more by far than Britain and France had been willing to offer. At the same time, however, Stalin probably regretted the fact that it signalized the complete defeat of his first major diplomatic undertaking in which the national idea figured as the key instrument of policy.

Other Uses of the National Idea. The nonaggression pact with Hitler notwithstanding, Stalin did not become lulled into any high degree of optimism about guarantees
against a future attack. He still viewed the German dictator as the number one threat to the Soviet Union. As much had been written into the secret protocol of the treaty, which Stalin had demanded, and which had divided Eastern Europe into Soviet and German spheres of interest.95

The importance of that piece of Machiavellian virtuosity to the Soviet leader was contained in its promise of a protective zone about one hundred miles in depth along the western border. But the arrangement still lacked the final touch. It was one thing to be the recipient of Hitler's "grant" of territorial rights in Southeastern Europe, in Poland as far west as the Narew, Vistula, and San Rivers, and in the Baltic region exclusive of Lithuania. However, it was something else again to take full advantage of it. At that time, Stalin apparently was unsure of just how his territorial "rights" could be implemented without provoking Paris and London to an extreme. After the German attack on Poland, on September 1, 1939, that problem became an even more perplexing one.

Though Stalin was not surprised by the aggression

of his German counterpart, he was obviously unprepared for two significant developments that accompanied it. For one thing, he did not anticipate the unprecedented speed with which the Wehrmacht was able to sweep across Poland. Consequently, he was not prepared for Berlin's request for similar action by the Soviets, or at least permission to enter the zone allotted to the Soviet Union in pursuit of the retreating, and disintegrating, Polish army. For another thing, he did not expect that the French and British would honor their treaty obligations to Poland to the extent of declaring war on Germany. Thus, when the unexpected occurred, the Soviet dictator found himself caught in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the failure to send the Red Army into Poland promptly could mean the loss of the benefits of the secret protocol, if not an early attack by Hitler. On the other hand, the use of armed forces in any way comparable to Hitler's could result in a new war declaration by France and Britain.

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96 Cf. Ibid., p. 91. According to Leon Noel, Molotov informed the Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Gryzbowaki, that the Soviets were willing to lend Poland indirect assistance. Cf. Leon Noel, L'Agression allemande contre la Pologne (Paris: Flammarion, 1946), pp. 449-450.


To escape his quandary, Stalin turned to the national idea. On September 10, 1939, after evading repeated German requests for a decision one way or the other, he informed Berlin that the Red Army would be given the order to march very soon, and that the action would be based on the ostensible purpose of protecting Ukrainians and Belorussians in Poland threatened by the German advance. When Berlin objected to being made the scapegoat, the blame was easily shifted to the Poles.99 On September 12, the Soviet press opened a strident campaign against the Polish treatment of minorities.100 Less than a week later, the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish frontier with the announced purpose of protecting the Ukrainians and Belorussians in Poland and assisting the Poles in the reconstruction of their national existence.101

Embodied in that recourse to the national idea was Stalin's chief hope of satisfying Soviet strategic needs.

99 According to von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to Moscow: "This argument was to make the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible to the (Russian) masses and at the same time avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor." Sontag and Beddie, op. cit., p. 91.


without becoming involved in a war. The pretext of protecting the rights of kindred nationalities and helping a neighboring nation saved explaining that the action was directed against the Germans primarily. More important as a consideration, however, was that, from a strictly legal standpoint at least, it took the onus of aggression from Soviet shoulders and thus could afford Paris and London a way out of a compelling fait accompli. That loophole was obviously uppermost, since the attempt was made to broaden it as much as possible. On the day of the attack, Moscow informed all governments that it regarded its action as in no way altering its neutral position with respect to the war in Europe.\textsuperscript{102}

Undoubtedly, there were some anxious moments spent in the Kremlin pending the reaction of Paris and London. But the tactic did succeed; for there was no war declaration forthcoming. To the contrary, if anything, the democratic Powers seemed almost satisfied with Stalin's choice of motives. The lightning success of the new German military machine had had an equally profound effect on them, and the obviously wiser course lay in preventing its marriage to the armed might of the Soviet Union. Thus,

characteristic of the French and British response to the Soviet action was an implicit sense of relief at being able to circumvent a declaration of war without the appearance of applying a double standard. For example, almost as if apologizing for the Soviet move into Poland, if not blaming the Poles for it, Churchill, in a paper written for the British War Cabinet on September 25, 1939, offered the following explanation:

Although the Russians were guilty of the grossest bad faith in the recent negotiations, their demand, made by Marshal Voroshilov that the Russian armies should occupy Vilna and Lemberg if they were to be allies of Poland, was a perfectly valid military request. It was rejected by Poland on grounds which, though natural, can now be seen to have been insufficient. In the result, Russia has occupied the same line and positions as the enemy of Poland, which possibly she might have occupied as a very doubtful and suspected friend. The difference in fact is not so great as might seem.\textsuperscript{103}

It goes without saying that Stalin was very much encouraged by the Western reaction, and its implications concerning the usefulness of the national idea. As much became evident on September 20, 1939, when he suggested to Berlin a more definitive settlement of the Polish question. Eight days later, a new Soviet-German treaty,\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103}Churchill, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 448.
also with a secret protocol, concluded that task. It left no residual Polish state. Instead, Berlin got all Polish territory to the west of the Pissa, Narew, Bug, and San rivers, while Moscow took everything to the east and obtained the inclusion of the greater part of Lithuania in its sphere of influence.¹⁰⁴

Stalin continued to make use of the national idea with respect to Poland, even after its conquest. While Hitler made no pretense of the fact that the newly acquired land was to be no more than a part of his developing empire, Stalin's method followed a course of constitutional gestation, with new pretensions of respect for national rights as the screen. For example, though without serious regard for the geographic disposition of the Polish, Ukrainian, and Belorussian populations, the Soviet zone was first divided into West Ukraine and West Belorussia, with Lemberg (Lvov) and Bielostok, respectively, as the capital cities. Then, after a month of intensive work, national assemblies were elected.¹⁰⁵ Their first official acts were to request


¹⁰⁵Cf. Pravda, October 22, 1939, p. 2. On the following day, Pravda emphasized the purely "voluntary" character of the election, reporting that the Count and Countess Potocki, a well-known noble couple, and sixty nuns had participated.
incorporation into the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics of the Soviet Union. Finally, on November 1-2, 1939, both requests were formally approved by an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow.\textsuperscript{106}

The ease with which Eastern Poland had been acquired also had a salutary effect on Stalin's concern for the rest of his territorial allotment. With hardly any delay, attention was turned to the Baltic States.

There existed in the cases of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland no pretext for aggrandizement comparable to that afforded in Poland. There were no kindred minorities there to be defended against either an invading army or an allegedly oppressive government. But that neither deterred the Soviet dictator, nor disqualified the national idea as a primary instrument of policy. Enlarging upon the earlier tactic of acting in the name of minority rights within the State, Stalin's new shield for conquest took the form of ostensible concern for the rights of small nation-states threatened by larger ones. Thus, whether they liked it or not, and they did not, the Baltic countries were earmarked for the bear-like protective grasp that the Soviet monolith was capable of extending.

Mutual assistance treaties, heavily weighted to the

Soviet advantage, were the first objectives of Stalin's diplomacy in the Baltic region. Suggestions to this effect, underscored by charges of unneutral conduct and publicized Red Army maneuvers along the Soviet northwest frontier, had the intended impact. On September 28, 1939, Estonia became the first victim of the latest style of Stalinist conquest.

The Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Treaty obligated each party to go to the aid of the other in the event of aggression, or the threat of aggression, originating in Europe. More than that, however, the Soviets were granted the right to maintain naval bases and military airfields on a number of Estonian islands and to station a limited land and air force in Estonia proper. As one other provision explained, the presence of Soviet forces on Estonian soil was in no way to alter that country's sovereignty. While the Estonians knew otherwise, Moscow characteristically heralded the treaty as further proof of its respect for the principle of national self-determination:

Aggression and oppression of small nations are contrary to the intention of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet people are interested in permanent peace

and brotherly cooperation with other peoples. Such cooperation can be achieved only if it is based on mutual trust and noninterference in the internal affairs of each other's. Because it respects the sovereignty of other states, the Soviet Union will not interfere in their internal affairs. 108

It was but a short diplomatic step to similar treaties with Latvia and Lithuania, signed on October 5 and October 10, 1939, respectively. The only notable departure occurred in the case of the latter, since it contained a clause awarding the district of Vilna to the Lithuanians. Not deterred by the fact that it had just been seized from the Poles, Moscow was quick to proclaim that gesture as the finest type example of respect for the legitimate demands of a nationality. 109

Inasmuch as the extension of Soviet influence into Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian affairs under the guise of defending their national interests provided no occasion for a serious adverse reaction in the West, Stalin had no further cause for satisfaction. 110 But if

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110 The extent of the reaction in the West was to refuse to recognize the new Baltic governments. Cf. The New York Times, August 10, 1940, p. 6.
he was operating on the assumption that the national idea had suddenly emerged as an invisible curtain behind which free rein to all territorial aspirations was possible, subsequent events soon proved otherwise. In contrast to what the early successes seemed to portend, the remaining Baltic country coveted, Finland, proved an extremely difficult nut to crack.

The Finns registered their resolute rejection of the idea of a mutual assistance treaty with Moscow at a meeting held in the Soviet capital the second week of October 1939. Thereupon, after a variety of threats failed to move them, Stalin turned to still another of the manifold ways in which the national idea could be used to screen aggression. On November 30, men and tanks of the Red Army crossed the Finnish frontier, while its planes bombed Helsinki. That action opened a military conflict that lasted for one hundred and four days. From the Soviet standpoint, however, the conflict was no war at all. Instead of declaring war, Stalin explained his action in terms of a desire to protect the "legitimate" interests of the Finnish people. And to complete the tactic, he set up a revolutionary "People's Republic of Finland". Headed

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by Otto Kuusinen, a long time resident of Moscow, the new government requested the "aid" that Moscow was rendering and granted all the territorial concessions sought. 112

Though it can only be speculated, Stalin probably intended the "People's Republic" as the nucleus of a new Finnish government, to be established after the Red Army had defeated the defending army. 113 But that plan was soon thwarted. No sooner had recognition been extended to Kuusinen's regime when the Soviet dictator discovered that the pattern of events in Finland would not be governed by Soviet military might primarily. Contrary to all calculations, the Russian Blitzkrieg became bogged down by its own glaring deficiencies and the stubborn resistance of the Finns. 114

The cost of that delay was a heavy one. It showed


113 Pravda, on December 1, 1939, p. 1, declared that the "People's Army of Finland" would be accorded the honor of bearing the flag of the Finnish People's Republic into Helsinki and of raising it over the Presidential Palace.

114 William L. Shirer has reported that the Soviet Embassy in Berlin informed him that the fighting in Finland was not expected to last more than three days. Cf. William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1941), pp.
up the Soviet military weakness. More than that, it permitted time for popular indignation in the West to crystallize fully. Thus, by the time changes in command had been effected and enough reinforcements had been sent to the Finnish front to allow the Red Army to re-gain the initiative, the intended smokescreen of legiti-
timacy was dissipated entirely.

Whether or not he thought of himself as an aggres-
sor, Stalin soon found out that practically everyone else did. With the exception of the Nazi regime, every govern-
ment in Europe and the Western Hemisphere voiced disap-
proval in some form, while many lodged formal protests and sent material aid to Finland. And if that was not enough, the Soviet leader learned on December 14, 1939, that his was the first government to be expelled from the League of Nations for aggression.

The intensity of the Western storm of protest rose to a peak early in 1940, when there appeared evidence that Paris and London were seriously considering a route through Norway and Sweden in order to provide the Finns with additional military assistance.\textsuperscript{115} Soviet anxiety over

\textsuperscript{115}Cf. Churchill, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 553-554.
the prospect of a war was registered on January 20, when Pravda leveled an accusation against the democracies to the effect that they were planning to attack the Soviet Union. And it reached its climax nine days later, when the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow was asked by Molotov to inform the Finns that a negotiated settlement of their differences had become possible.

This sudden volte face automatically rendered the "People's Republic of Finland" a "Kuchiki" regime; it was earmarked for extinction. Consequently, during the peace negotiations, which were held in Moscow on March 6-12, 1940, and which Kuusinen did not attend, no direct reference to the revolutionary government was made. According to the terms of the treaty, which excluded provision for a mutual assistance pact, all territorial demands made by Moscow originally were met. In exchange, the Finns received territorial and financial compensation. As to the fate of the "People's Republic", Molotov personally disposed of it in typical Communist style on March 18, on the occasion of the treaty's ratification by the Presidium

117 Cf. Ibid., p. 192.
of the Supreme Soviet:

The Finnish People's Government, so as to avert bloodshed and to alleviate the burdens of the Finnish people, agreed that every effort should be made to bring the war to an end at once. The question of dissolving the People's Government then arose. This it has already done of its own free will.\textsuperscript{118}

Since the blame was squarely on the military, the near disaster in Finland had no adverse effect on Stalin's regard for the national idea as a useful instrument of policy. For example, in a postscript to the war with Finland that was apparently designed to satisfy ideological needs, Molotov revived the anti-imperialist theme long enough to remold the characterization of the Soviet action into the form of a defensive move against a "number of imperialist States".\textsuperscript{119} But its use thereafter was redirected to the original channel of aggrandizement. Hitler's rapid conquest of most of Western Europe already had put a new complexion on Stalin's regard for him. With the Nazis in control of the larger part of Europe's resources, the prospect of an attack on the Soviet Union

\textsuperscript{118}Izvestia, March 19, 1940, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{119}Pravda, March 30, 1940, p. 1.
loomed even larger.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, expediency militated for a hasty realization of the full benefits of the secret division of Eastern Europe.

The first step in that connection occurred on July 6, 1940, four days before Italy's entry into the war, in the form of a warning to Rome against interfering in Balkan affairs. The warning was couched in terms of an expressed interest in preserving the sovereignty of the Balkan countries.\textsuperscript{121} Then, three weeks later, with a cynical disregard of the very same rights, Moscow addressed to the Rumanian government an ultimatum for the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. According to its text, the return of Bessarabia after twenty-two years of Rumanian domination was a "simple act of justice". Northern Bukovina, it went on to explain, was included for the reason that its population, historically and linguistically, was bound up with the Soviet Ukraine.\textsuperscript{122}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120}Evidence of a growing Soviet fear was noted by the Germans, who took special pains to relieve it. Cf. Sontag and Beddie, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 145, 147.
\item \textsuperscript{121}Cf. \textit{Izvestiia}, June 7, 1940, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{122}Pravda, June 28, 1940, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
With no choice, Rumania agreed to meet the demands. On August 2, 1940, Northern Bukovina and the predominantly Ukrainian districts of Bessarabia were formally incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine. Furthermore, the Moldavian Autonomous Republic was detached from the Ukraine and joined with the predominantly Romanian district of Bessarabia to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Both actions attested to the "legitimacy" of the Soviet seizure. More important, however, they helped avoid giving the Germans the impression that they were directed against them primarily. Judging by a note sent to the German Foreign Office on July 11, 1940, von der Schulenburg apparently believed an explanation of Stalin's to the effect that the seizure of Rumanian territory really had not been his doing, but rather had been prompted by Ukrainian pressure.

Simultaneously, Stalin was completing the course of conquest in Eastern Europe with the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Preserving the familiar legalistic façade, the action

commenced in the second week of June 1940 with the charge that the three States were secretly plotting an anti-Soviet military alliance and the demands that new governments be installed and additional units of the Red Army be permitted entry.\textsuperscript{125} Thereupon, all three governments resigned and were replaced by new ones, composed of Communists and extreme left-wing elements. On July 14-15, Communist-style general elections were held and, a week later, the parliaments elected met in special sessions for the express purpose of applying for admission to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{126} By August 8, an equally "special" session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow had approved all requests.

Thus did Stalin achieve what he had set out to do after abandoning the quest for a general anti-Axis mutual security system in favor of a nonaggression treaty with Hitler. The western approaches to the Soviet had been acquired through the utilization of the national idea in conjunction with military force. However, as events were soon to prove, that effort was insufficient for the ultimate purpose of preventing a German attack.


\textsuperscript{126}Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, July 18, p. 13; July 22, p. 1; August 4, p. 29; August 6, p. 4.
Conclusion. In a sense, Soviet foreign policy from 1934 to 1941 marked the opening of a new phase in the exploitation of the national idea; the Stalinist phase. Prior to that time, the uses of the device had been conceived and directed personally by Lenin. And, following Lenin's death, Stalin's struggle for power had caused interest in it to be displaced almost completely. Thus, when the decision to revive the national idea as a major instrument of policy was taken in the spring of 1934, Stalin's debut in connection with it commenced.

The result of the Soviet dictator's initial effort, as we have seen, was complete failure. After four years of an intensive quest for alliances with any and all countries threatened by Germany and Japan, and later Italy, based chiefly on appeals to national sentiment, the project had to be abandoned entirely.

But there was one thing to be said for Stalin in that connection. At least from the standpoint of the interested student of Soviet foreign policy, his objective and method left little to be desired. For example, his attempt to convince most non-Communist countries that the Soviet Union was a worthy ally, and after more than two decades in which Communist propaganda had railed constantly
against them as despicable foes of everything politically, economically, and culturally progressive, was about as ambitious an enterprise that could have been undertaken. Its success undoubtedly would have ranked among the outstanding diplomatic achievements of all time. Moreover, his conversion of virtually every internationalist fiber of Communism into its nationalist opposite by far exceeded anything attempted by Lenin in connection with the national idea. To be sure, Lenin had exploited nationalism at home and abroad, through diplomacy and the Comintern, but never so thoroughly for a single purpose.

contained in the latter fact was undoubtedly an important clue to the difference between the tactical abilities of the two Soviet leaders, and to the reason why Stalin failed. Lenin, as was demonstrated time and again, was keenly perceptive. He could strike a balance readily between his needs and opportunities, and without sacrificing entirely freedom of maneuver in the event of an unexpected development. By comparison, Stalin's perceptiveness was obviously more limited, his conception of needs and opportunities was oversimplified, and his modus operandi was rigid.
As a consequence, Stalin was ill-prepared to cope with the major problems that arose. Indeed, the total commitment to a single objective and a single method rendered him virtually a prisoner of his own strategy. For example, when it was discovered that the transformation of the Comintern into an organization of ostensibly nationalistic parties had been too sudden to be credible, it was already impossible to turn back for the sake of a more gradual approach, or to eliminate the embarrassingly sharp line of contrast between the old and the new policies. Consequently, in most instances the Communists found it impossible to achieve either united or people's front alliances in their respective countries.

But that was not Stalin's only miscalculation in connection with the use of the Comintern. In addition, his allowance for the possibility of deviationism was inadequately conceived. Despite warnings in advance, the new national line did evoke dissatisfaction among some delegates to the Seventh Congress. While Stalin might have applied stern disciplinary measures then and there, the obvious danger of destroying the illusion of a real change in Communism's character militated against it. Instead, he merely issued new warnings. As a consequence,
the French Communists, who had shown themselves to be the most reluctant to abandon revolutionism for the sake of expedient nationalism, returned home and deviated just enough from the Comintern's instructions to contribute to the failure of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty.

The Soviet dictator's propensity for oversimplification and methodological rigidity was costly for still another reason. His dedication to the principle of national sovereignty at one point reached a fanatical intensity, and it blinded him to the fact that others would regard his adamant insistence on the creation of a strong collective security system as provocative. Thus, Stalin stubbornly insisted that the League of Nations should be strengthened to deal with aggressors, while practically everyone else favored a less belligerent approach. More than that, after a brief display of self-restraint, he actively intervened in the Spanish Civil War on behalf of the Loyalists.

Generally, Stalin can be credited with more insight into European politics during the thirties than his democratic counterparts. Even so, he obviously failed to match it with an estimate of the effect of his persistence on the outcome of the quest for allies. Instead of
sympathy, it evoked the fear that Europe might become divided into two armed camps, if not engulfed by a general war. Such fear, of course, was not conducive to the achievement of new mutual assistance treaties, nor the implementation of those already obtained.

Finally, Stalin made a serious error when he decided to publicize the famous Moscow trials. Undoubtedly, the intention was to demonstrate the new democratic quality of Soviet justice, Communist anti-internationalism, and a deep concern for the threat of German and Japanese aggression. But its impact was largely negative. For one thing, the trials of the so-called Trotskyist conspirators caused many liberals in the West to question the character of Soviet justice. For another, those involving the alleged agents of Japan and Germany, including the Red Army's Chief of Staff, Marshal Tukhachevski, evoked grave doubts among Western political and military experts about the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally.

The extent of Stalin's contribution to the failure of his own strategy cannot be determined exactly. As contributing factors, his errors were not exclusive. An additional serious obstacle was embodied in the form of relentless and skillful anti-Communist propaganda by
fascists. That undoubtedly had an effect on the thinking of many conservatives and some moderates. Furthermore, one democratic Power, the United States, quite apart from ideological considerations, simply refused to become embroiled in the developing whirlpool of European politics.

Nevertheless, it would appear that the principal fault was the Soviet dictator's. That his aim and method were fundamentally sound was attested in the fair measure of success that marked the high point of the strategy. The mutual-assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, the friendlier relations with Great Britain, and the clear prospect of a rapprochement with Rumania and Yugoslavia were no mean achievements, and further progress seemed assured. Moreover, the decline in the effectiveness of the use of the national idea set in only after the French Communists executed their turn to the left, Stalin's more insistent demands for measures to guard against aggression, and the opening of the Moscow trials. It would be difficult indeed to contend that the relationship between them was purely coincidental.

The totality of the failure of Stalin's initial effort to exploit the national idea as an instrument of foreign policy could have been no more dramatically repre-
sented than in the fact that it ended up with almost the opposite of what had been intended; namely, the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty with Hitler. As it turned out, however, that treaty, particularly its secret protocol, provided the vehicle for still another opportunity for Stalin to test his tactical ability; and he partially redeemed himself.

The method by which Stalin implemented his territorial "rights" in Eastern Europe was essentially military, but he used the national idea to good advantage also. In the case of Poland, for example, he avoided the charge of aggression by acting on the pretext of defending the rights of kindred nationalities. Then the territory was incorporated into the Soviet Union according to an established constitutional procedure. A Communist-type election was held, the national assembly-elect immediately petitioned for admission to the Soviet Union, and the Supreme Soviet in Moscow approved. It was a method that could be used over and over again, or for as long as it was possible to match one of the Soviet nationalities with one found in a neighboring State.

The very same method was employed for the acquisition of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania. And
it served to screen the fundamental purpose -- which was indeed anti-German -- from the Germans.

Stalin tried to do the same against Finland, with the extra precaution of creating a puppet national regime. It was an old device, having been used by Lenin for the conquest of most of the border nationalities. And it probably would have worked again, had not an underestimation of Finnish resistance occurred, causing a delay in the Red Army's military sweep and permitting a Western reaction to build up to decisive proportions. Instead, the Soviet leader had to be content with limited territorial gains, which, following the established pattern, were duly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Finally, the conquest of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was achieved somewhat more crudely. That was undoubtedly due to the fact that conditions necessitated speed and required dispensing with calculated preliminaries. Thus, they were merely charged with violating their treaties with the Soviet Union and forced to form new governments and admit additional units of the Red Army. Thereafter, the regular cycle of election, petition, and admission was executed for their incorporation into the Soviet Union, which, according to the Communist way of thinking, made
it legitimate.

Apparently, Stalin had discovered his particular forte in the exploitation of the national idea in conjunction with military force. But as events were soon to demonstrate, it was a poor second best under the circumstances. Despite the fact that the western approaches to the Soviet Union had been acquired, it failed to prevent Hitler from launching an attack.
Hitler's surprise attack on June 22, 1941 opened still another important period in the record of Soviet Russian use of the national idea as an instrument of policy. It lasted until Yugoslavia's defection from the Communist bloc in the summer of 1948. In the seven years intervening, Stalin's calculated respect for national institutions served as a regular adjunct to his military and diplomatic policies. And as much as any factor, it contributed to the most significant Soviet success in foreign affairs since Lenin's death; namely, the defeat of the German invader and the extension of Communist power farther into Eastern Europe.

But recourse to the national idea in this case was even more important for the reason that it illustrated the essential continuity of Soviet foreign policy. The point is that, under conditions roughly comparable to those of 1919-1924, Stalin's method was typically Leninist. He relied on the national idea initially to win allies at home and abroad against the invader. Then, after the tide of battle had been turned in his favor, he used it to screen the forcible establishment of Communist power in adjacent countries overrun by the Red Army. He also used it against new claims to
national distinctiveness voiced by non-Russian Communists. As many of its details will evidence, the parallel with the pattern of policy developed earlier by Lenin was too close to doubt that it was consciously pursued.

**Hitler Saves the Great Patriotic War.** Stalin's intention to follow Lenin's tactical precedents was evident from the beginning. The announcement of the grim news of the German attack on June 22, 1941 was accompanied by a plea to all Soviet citizens to wage "... a victorious Patriotic was for our country." And it was followed soon after by an appeal to organize guerrilla units behind the enemy's lines. For defensive purposes, the promotion of national unity and partisan resistance had been two pillars of Lenin's policy.

But the response to these appeals was much less than anticipated. Initially, the people of Belorussia and the Ukraine, apparently mindful of past experience, paid little attention to them. They either welcomed the Germans as liberators, or else did nothing to hinder their advance.


Faced with the problem of mass defections, Stalin undoubtedly was hopeful that Hitler would make the same mistake that the "white" Russians and the Allies had made in 1919. And the German dictator unwittingly obliged. The German occupation policy, executed by gauleiters of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, embodied the full measure of Hitlerian barbarity. Thus, bit by bit, and then in a veritable flood, the stories of German brutality against prisoners of war and civilians began to circulate on both sides of the line. Its effect, as might have been predicted, was to cause a wholesale re-orientation of loyalties. 4

This changing tide of popular opinion, propelled even more rapidly by the news of the successful defense of Moscow in December 1941, prompted Stalin to speak with renewed confidence. A note of grim satisfaction was evident in his observation, on February 23, 1942, that "Certain lovers of foreign lands have already felt this (Soviet) might on their hides". 5 This obviously referred to the

4 It is worthwhile to repeat the testimony of the German General, Heinz Guderian: "Unfortunately, the favorable attitude toward the Germans continued only as long as there was military government; the so-called Reichskommissar quickly destroyed the good will of the people". Quoted in Vakar, op. cit., p. 175.

5 Izvestiia, February 24, 1942, p. 1.
Soviet campaign of reprisals against collaborators already underway. But even more illuminating was his address on the occasion of the May Day celebration of that year, in which he publicly acknowledged that many in the armed forces also had been guilty of an unpatriotic attitude and spoke of a "radical change" for the better:

The complacency and heedlessness of the attitude towards the enemy observed among Red Army men during the first months of the patriotic war have disappeared. 6

The stimulation and channeling of the patriotic spirit in the Soviet Union was one of the pillars of Stalin's hope to withstand the terrible devastation that the Nazi war machine was still capable of effecting. He counted on it to compensate for the material deprivation that the Soviet civilians and military personnel would have to undergo. Hence, he employed every conceivable device -- going much further than Lenin had, but short of an open repudiation of Communism itself -- in an effort to raise patriotism to the highest possible level.

These included an endless torrent of stories, songs, poems, plays, movies, speeches, and newspaper articles, all of which emphasized the theme of devotion to the Russian

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6 Ibid., May 1, 1942, p. 1.
"motherland." Special propaganda trains, containing printing facilities in several languages and entertainment troupes, shared the rights to the Soviet rails with military transport. In addition, the list of national heroes, "rehabilitated" out of the Russian past, was enlarged rapidly. Along with the names of Nevski, Donskoi, Minin, Pozharski, Suvorov and Kutusov appeared those of Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, and Catherine. New military honors -- the Orders of the Patriotic War, of Suvorov, and of Kutusov -- and new heroes were created. And still another example of Stalin's method was contained in the religious overtones of Pravda's appeal on July 13, 1942, as the first battle of Voronezh was reaching its climax:

It is the holy tradition of our nation to defend the motherland stubbornly and without consideration of one's own life. Knowing about our glorious traditions and military deeds, our soldiers are without fear in the battle of today. 9

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9 This represented an early instance of Stalin's intention to exploit religious sentiment as well. In addition, all anti-religious museums and publishing houses were closed down. However, apparently for the reason of uncertainty about its impact on die-hard atheists in Communist ranks, it was not until late in 1943 that the Russian
While this intensive propaganda campaign emphasized Russian traditional values primarily, it did not preclude attention to those of the non-Russian nationalities. Several non-Russian national heroes were expediently "rehabilitated", including the Ukrainians Khmelnitski, Shevchenko, and Danilo, the Belorussian, Kupala, and the Georgian, Rustaveli. In addition, writers, playwrights, poets, composers, and pictorial artists were permitted a measure of freedom to express the patriotic theme in the local national idiom. But this aspect was severely circumscribed, undoubtedly as a result of two considerations. On the one hand, there was the problem that most national heroes and holidays of the non-Russian nationalities reflected a definite anti-Russian bias. It would have been difficult, for example, to reconcile simultaneous recognition of Pugachev's rebellion and Catherine's "progressiveness", since it had been she who had put down the rebellion with typical Russian ruthlessness. On the other hand, there was the potential problem posed by the non-Russian Communist, who, called upon to sacrifice his internationalistic urge. This, of course, had been known to happen before.

Orthodox Church was formally recognized as a national body. Cf. Nicholas S. Timasheff, "Religion in Russia," Current History, January, 1945, pp. 105-110.

Cf. Iaroslavski, op. cit., passim; A Protest
As a solution to this problem, Stalin continued the promotion of non-Russian national sentiment on a limited scale and complemented it with the exploitation of popular fears. Thus, agents were sent into the occupied zones to provoke German reprisals against the civilian population and to murder known collaborators. Furthermore, as an example to others, whole nationalities were stripped of their political rights for reasons of alleged disloyalty.

Abetted by the brutal German occupation policy, Stalin's own campaign to unite the peoples of the Soviet Union behind him proved highly successful. By the end of 1941, the general apathy which had been marked with frequent cases of outright disloyalty, was replaced largely by national pride and a profound hatred of the enemy. This was demonstrated in the great battles fought before Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, in which civilians fought heroically alongside the Red Army, and in the great effort that transported whole factories eastward, where they were reassembled to turn out vitally needed military equipment.


12 The first were the Volga Germans, on August 28, 1941. Later, the Crimean Tartars, the Chechens, and the Kalmucks were added. Cf. Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952), pp. 75, 80, 86.
It was illustrated also by the emergence of a vast network of guerrilla units behind the German lines, which, by all accounts, provided an invaluable auxiliary to the Red Army during the critical moments of its desperate defensive effort.\textsuperscript{13} Hitler's "Fuehrer Order" of September 6, 1942 bore poignant testimony to this fact:

\begin{quote}
The (guerrilla) bands in the East have become an unbearable menace during the last few months, and are seriously threatening the supply lines to the front. \textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Thus, once presented with the opportunity by the invading Germans, the Soviet dictator was able to duplicate Lenin's earlier successful application of the national idea as a weapon of defense at home. Inasmuch as it was to be expected that all concessions to national sentiment would be denied effective meaning once the crisis had passed, it meant that Communism once again had gained important allies at practically no cost whatever.

\textbf{Communist Nationalism Fosters the Resistance Movement.}\n
Another aspect of Stalin's defensive strategy that exhibited Leninist influence was his promotion of national sentiment in the countries occupied by the enemy. Whereas Lenin had

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Quoted in Dixon and Heilbrunn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 55.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
found his opportunity in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, Stalin found his in Europe, where the Axis occupation of many countries made it profitable to project the promise of national liberation as an incentive to popular resistance. Characteristic of the propaganda used in this connection was the following pronouncement:

In contradistinction to Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and its Allies are waging a war of liberation, a just war, for the purpose of liberating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U.S.S.R. from Hitler tyranny.

We have not, and cannot have, any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime on the Slavonic and other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in their struggle for liberation against Hitler's tyranny and then to leave them quite freely to organize their life in their lands as they think fit. No interference in the internal affairs of other nations! 15

As a logical corollary, instructions were issued to Communists throughout Europe to abandon their revolutionary programs temporarily and to organize resistance movements on the basis of appeals to patriotic sentiment. Their immediate task was to tie down as many enemy troops as possible, and so relieve pressure on the Russian front.

The results of this effort were impressive and undoubtedly exceeded Stalin's expectations. The Communists

15Izvestiia, November 7, 1941, p. i.
of Europe responded to this call to action with a zeal that even true patriots found difficult to match. In Western Europe, for example, the prestige of the Soviet Union as a member of the anti-Axis coalition, its new championship of national rights, and local Communist dedication to the national cause provided the basis for the recruitment of powerful underground resistance movements, particularly in France and Italy. Smaller, though equally active, organizations were formed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. Together with other resistance groups, they conducted campaigns of widespread sabotage and assassination. Strikes were staged, communications were disrupted, and, on occasion, substantial enemy forces were engaged. The contribution to the war effort was by no means inconsequential.  


17 Indicative of the anguish caused in Berlin is one of the entries in Goebbels' diary: "One might think it would be a good thing if the English were to bomb hell out of Paris and the other western European capitals, so that their inhabitants would at last come to their senses."
Elsewhere in Europe, the Communist response materialized in other, even more dramatic, ways. In Yugoslavia, for example, Josip Broz, or Tito, exploited the national idea to great advantage. Unlike his Chetnik rival, Draza Mihailovich, who acted on the basis of narrow Serbian nationalism, Tito appealed to all Yugoslav nationalities to join the struggle against foreign domination. To compensate for the traditional enmity between some of them, he maintained separate subordinate commands in the national provinces, each of which bore the title of National Liberation Partisan Detachment. As a result, within two and a half years, Tito's forces grew from a relative handful of resolute revolutionaries into a popular army of more than three hundred thousand. Operating out of mountain bases, it harassed the occupation relentlessly and with great effect, causing the Axis to utilize troops there which might have been used on the Russian front or in Italy. 18


19 According to Dedijer, Tito's official biographer, the Germans were forced to divert to Yugoslavia a division from the Russian front, one from France, and a regiment from Greece, all in the fall of 1941. He adds, that by the end of 1943, the total number of Axis forces in Yugoslavia was more than six hundred thousand, including twenty-two German divisions. Cf. Ibid., pp. 116-117, 211. The effectiveness of the Yugoslav Partisans is told also by a member of the British mission in Yugoslavia. Cf. Fitzroy McLean, The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957).
Tito also organized the Communist resistance movement in Albania, in November 1941, and directed its union with local nationalists to form the Albanian National Liberation Movement a year later. While widespread sabotage and assassination hampered the Italian occupation, the most important single contribution of the Albanians to the war effort occurred after Mussolini's downfall in the summer of 1943. By an all out effort to free Albania, the Liberation Army compelled the Germans to divert two and a half divisions from other fronts.

A Communist-sponsored partisan movement appeared in Greece also. Called the National Liberation Movement, its "national" character was established by including left-wing Agrarian, Republican, Popular Democratic, and Socialist members. Its program emphasized national independence, democracy, and resistance to the enemy. Its armed force, the National Popular Liberation Army, bore the initials E.L.A.S., which were identical in pronunciation, and nearly identical in spelling, with the Greek name for Greece.

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During 1942-1943, the Greek Communists contributed to the war effort by promoting strikes in Athens and Salonika, which obstructed a German attempt to conscript workers for the factories in Germany. They also helped a British demolition team, in November 1942, to destroy the Gorgopotames Bridge in the Pindus Mountains. This prevented the Germans from reinforcing Rommel's Africa Corps immediately after its defeat at El Alamein.

In Bulgaria, an alliance of the Communists with Agrarians, Social Democrats, and Zvenos led to the creation of the Fatherland Front. However, their opportunity to aid the Soviet cause at first was very limited. Bulgaria and the Soviet Union were not at war until September 4, 1944. Furthermore, there were no German troops in the country and the Bulgarian regime was neither totalitarian nor disposed to accept German advice in all matters. Under the circumstances, there was little to be done except make life difficult for the local police and a few Bulgarian military units. The Communists had to wait until the fall of 1944 before playing a more important role.

Very small Communist resistance groups appeared also in Slovakia and Poland, but their activities were very small.  

22Cf. Denys Hamson, We Fell Among the Greeks (London: Jonathan Cape, 1946),

limited and their contributions negligible.\textsuperscript{24}

With a view to subsequent developments, it is useful to point out here that the general success of Stalin's plan to exploit the national idea against the Axis in occupied Europe was also accompanied by a fresh incident of Communist "left" national deviationism. The offender on this occasion was Tito, who, apparently encouraged by his rapid success as a partisan leader, failed to hide his revolutionary ambitions completely behind the prescribed nationalistic facade. Tito organized some of his men into a "proletarian brigade", which displayed the hammer and sickle and the five-pointed star conspicuously. In addition, in those parts of Yugoslavia that he controlled, he replaced the old political and administrative system with "people's authorities".\textsuperscript{25}

The Soviet dictator discovered this departure from the prescribed course of action early in 1942, after a

\textsuperscript{24} It is worthwhile to mention that, without the benefit of Moscow's public encouragement, though with its instructions, Communist resistance movements were active against the Japanese in the Far East as well. The most important, of course, was that of the Chinese Communists. Another important one was organized in Malaya and received supplies from the Allied Southeast Asia Command. Less important Communist resistance movements appeared in Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, and the Philippines.

\textsuperscript{25} For an eyewitness account of Tito's system of local government, Cf. McLean, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 112-113.
revolutionary-sounding proclamation of Tito's prompted him to request a report on the Yugoslav tactics. After studying it carefully, the following message was sent as a corrective measure:

Study of all the information you sent gives one the impression that the adherence (sic) of Great Britain and the Yugoslav government have some (justification?) in suspecting the Partisan movement of acquiring a Communist character and aiming at the Sovietization of Yugoslavia. Why, for example, did you need to form a special Proletarian Brigade? Surely at the moment, the basic, immediate task is to unite all anti-Nazi currents, smash the invader and achieve national liberation. 26

The Yugoslav tactics, of course, were a cause for serious concern in Moscow. Past experience with overanxious non-Russian Communists was still too fresh to overlook their implications. But there was little that could be done under the circumstances except try to persuade Tito to restrain his revolutionary impulses. Fortunately for Stalin,

26 Cf. Dedijer, op. cit., p. 180. (The word "adherence" appears in the English translation, though it probably should have been "adherents"). There was one other aspect of Tito's "left" tendency that Stalin was able to correct without even knowing of its existence. The Yugoslav leader wanted to eliminate Mihailovich as early as November 1941; not only for the reason that he represented a stumbling block to revolutionary ambitions, but also because he was getting all the credit in the West for the Yugoslav resistance. What prevented this from happening was a Soviet broadcast overheard, which also extolled Mihailovich and failed to mention the Partisans once. According to Dedijer, Tito was stunned by it, but complied with the evident Soviet desire: "We must not destroy Draza Mihailovich, although we have surrounded him. We must be careful not to cause difficulties in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union." Ibid., p. 168.
this worked; that is, at least until the end of 1943. In the meantime, it was possible to continue using the national idea to good advantage.

The National Idea in Wartime Diplomacy. Stalin's situation differed from Lenin's in one notable respect: his defense of Soviet power against a powerful invader was conducted with assistance from the world's two most powerful democratic States, the United States and Great Britain. But the distinction actually ended there. The fact that they had taken the initiative in offering an alliance in no real sense altered his conviction that capitalism, whatever its political form, was the mortal foe of Communism and the Soviet Union. As far as he was concerned, it meant only that circumstances necessitated a different strategy with respect to them, on the order of the Leninist tactical maxim "one step backward, two steps forward". For the sake of the assistance offered, he would execute a retreat ideologically; he would play the role of a sincerely ally, motivated by the same principles and interests as they. But once the crisis was passed, he would use that aid as a springboard for advancing the revolutionary cause against them.

Reinforced by the nationalist-traditionalist revival...

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27 Cf. below, p. 311.
at home, which he refurbished from time to time with new concessions, and the espousal of the national cause by Communists abroad, the Soviet dictator skillfully executed this phase of his over-all defensive strategy. He began to create the image of himself as a conventional diplomatist in the summer of 1941 by establishing diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav, Polish, Czech, and Belgian governments-in-exile and by recognizing DeGaulle as the head of the Free French. On September 24, he followed this up by publicly subscribing to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. These moves were complemented by public statements emphasizing the solidity of the alliance with the United States and Great Britain and reaffirming his dedication to the common aims. For example:

The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is: the abolition of racial exclusiveness; the equality of nations and the inviolability of their territories; the liberation of the enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes; economic aid to the nations that have suffered and assistance to them in achieving their material welfare; and the restoration of democratic liberties; and the destruction of the Hitlerite regime.

28 For example, on April 5, 1942, the curfew in Moscow was lifted temporarily to permit observance of the Easter service in the churches. And, less than two months later, the Internationale was replaced by a national anthem.


30 Pravda, November 7, 1942, p. 1.
But Stalin also discovered early that relations with the United States and Great Britain did not have to be so one-sided as to preclude the promotion of the Soviet interest altogether. For example, when the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, visited Moscow in December 1941 to negotiate a formal treaty of alliance, he requested recognition of the western Soviet frontier as it had been at the moment of Hitler's attack. This was in spite of the fact that the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Poles had been marked by a formal repudiation of the Soviet-German treaties partitioning Poland. Going a step further, apparently to test Western opinion, he made recognition of his claim a precondition to accepting the treaty.31

Because Roosevelt objected stubbornly to any territorial settlements before the end of the war, Stalin ended up accepting a treaty with the British that excluded reference to the frontier issue. This occurred on May 26, 1942. But he knew that the gambit had been a success nevertheless. For one thing, during the negotiations, Churchill had indicated his willingness to recognize the Soviet claim.32 For another, the obvious eagerness of the British


32 On March 9, 1942, Churchill sent Stalin a note telling him that he was urging Roosevelt to approve the inclusion of recognition of the Soviet frontier claim in the Anglo-Soviet treaty. Cf. Ibid., p. 328.
for a treaty had attested to the effectiveness of his effort to convince the West that Communism was no longer the credo of revolutionary anti-capitalism. Thus, as formally an equal partner in the anti-Hitler coalition, he would be able to make demands henceforth on behalf of alleged Soviet national interests with less fear of their being interpreted as opportunistic.

For the next two years, the Soviet dictator utilized his dual role as defender of Soviet Russia's interests and devoted ally with consummate skill. For example, he reacted with extreme bitterness to Churchill's announcement the following August that the projected Anglo-American invasion of Europe through France was being postponed for the sake of an invasion of North Africa. Speaking in the voice of a political head of state anxious to defend the interests of his country, he even impugned the veracity of his allies. But failing to dissuade them by it, he quickly softened the impact of his words by accepting the

33 In this connection, retrospective comment of Churchill's is relevant: "I could not see twenty years ahead, but we had nevertheless made a treaty for twenty years. I thought Russia would concentrate on reconstruction for the next ten years. There would probably be changes: Communism had already been modified". Ibid., p. 710. Churchill's willingness to reach a formal agreement with Stalin was probably also conditioned by a fear that the Soviet dictator would make a separate treaty with Hitler.

34 Cf. Ibid.
decision with good nature and by offering dramatically a
religious blessing for the success of the African landings:
"May God prosper this undertaking." 35

This conduct was employed with greater success in
April 1943, when the pose as an aggrieved ally was made
possible by the apparent credence that the Polish leaders
in London gave to the German charge that the Soviets had
been guilty of murdering several thousand Polish officers
in the Katyn Forest. Recognizing it as a suitable pretext
for eliminating all obligations to the exiled Polish govern­
ment, Stalin declared their action to be a violation of
international standards of conduct, charged them with seek­
ing to wrest territorial concessions at the expense of
Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belorussia, and Soviet Lithuania,
and promptly severed diplomatic relations. 36 Soon after,
a convention of supposedly representative Poles was staged
in Moscow. Not surprisingly, it denounced the London group
as an ally of Hitler's and announced its own readiness to
co-operate with the Soviet government in restoring an
independent, democratic Poland. 37

35 Cf. Ibid.
36 Cf. Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy:
A Pattern in Poland (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
37 Cf. Ibid., p. 134.
To placate Roosevelt and Churchill, who were piqued at the summary diplomatic break, Stalin postponed recognizing the Poles in Moscow, most of whom were Communists, as the legitimate claimants to power in Poland. Furthermore, he was able to divert attention away from it with another dramatic gesture. On May 22, 1943, he announced that the Comintern was about to be dissolved. But so far as he was concerned, the critical fact was that the basis for a Polish national revolutionary committee, a device that Lenin had applied so effectively back in the twenties, had been established.

Still another illustration of the Stalinist wartime diplomatic strategy was provided by the meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943. On this occasion, Molotov refused absolutely to accept a Western proposal that the small Danubian countries be federated in the postwar period. His argument was that the Soviet

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38 However, the Western leaders did make it clear that they were interested less in defending Polish national rights than in preserving the unity of the "Big Three". Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1946 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), I, pp. 124-125, 129-139; II, p. 61; Eduard Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954), pp. 184-185.

people would be reminded of the policy of the "cordon sanitaire" directed against the Soviet Union in the twenties. But, characteristically, he was careful to balance this with seeming concessions to other Western objectives, including a stated desire to see an independent, democratic Poland restored, acceptance, after expressing concern about its effect on Soviet-Japanese relations, of a Chinese signature on a declaration of intention to create a world organization after the war, and an agreement "in principle" to collaborate closely with the West on such matters as shuttle bombing over Germany; to establish regular air communications, and to exchange meteorological data.

Stalin personally capped these gestures with an unexpected, unsolicited, offer to join the attack against Japan once Germany had been defeated, and with an effect that was electric. Cordell Hull, whose long-standing suspicion of Soviet intentions was well known, was capti-

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41 The concession on the Polish issue was qualified by the proviso that there be "... a Polish Government friendly to the Soviet Union", which ruled out the Poles in London. This implication was overlooked by Hull. Cf. Ibid., p. 1306. Furthermore, the purely expedient character of the agreement "in principle" was later revealed in the difficulties encountered in getting it implemented. Cf. John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), p. 21.
vated immediately by this seemingly unselfish move.\textsuperscript{42} It prompted him, speaking before a joint session of Congress upon returning home, to express great hope that the post-war period would provide the setting for a final elimination of such traditionally troublesome features of international politics as the balance of power, competing alliances, and spheres of influence.\textsuperscript{43} This echo of Wilsonian idealism bolstered hopes in Moscow also, though for an entirely different reason. It meant that the first bid for a voice in postwar Asian affairs had been made effectively.

The first meeting of the "Big Three", held in Teheran in December 1943, marked the climax of the first, defensive, phase of Soviet wartime diplomacy. By this time, Stalin knew that his bargaining position \textit{vis-a-vis} his democratic allies was stronger than ever. For one thing, the Red Army had demonstrated its superiority over the Wehrmacht in the past year, first at Stalingrad and then during the summer offensive, in which more than half the occupied Soviet territory had been recaptured. For

\textsuperscript{42}Hull, who was both "astonished and delighted" by the offer, relates: "The Marshal's statement of his decision was forthright. He made it emphatically, it was entirely unsolicited, and he asked nothing in return." Hull, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 1310.

\textsuperscript{43}Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1314-1315.
another, new factories and those which had been moved eastward were now turning out guns, tanks, and aircraft in sufficient quantity to render the Soviet military less dependent upon outside assistance. Finally, it was no secret that Washington and London were very anxious to secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan.

Reassured by the more favorable conditions, the Soviet dictator began to speak with greater authority. For example, he refused to accept Roosevelt's suggestion that the second front be effected through Albania and Yugoslavia and that the juncture with the Red Army take place somewhere in Rumania. Mindful of its implied challenge to his revolutionary aspirations in Eastern Europe, he dismissed it as an unwise scattering of forces. And when Churchill later brought up the subject again, his temper flared to the point where he charged the British with fear of meeting the Germans in France. This settled the issue of the second front at Teheran.

Subsequently, Churchill and Roosevelt all but formally accepted Moscow's claim to the Polish territory seized in 1939. But it was an error by the Soviet transla-


45 Cf. Ibid., p. 788.
tor in connection with an American proposal on the internationalization of the Kiel Canal that produced an unexpected gain on the question of the Baltic States as well. Stalin apparently thought that Roosevelt was raising this particular issue, for he insisted adamantly that the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, albeit under pressure from Moscow, had already expressed their will on the subject of union with Soviet Russia. 46

The confusion was cleared up without the Western leaders registering a protest against this claim and nothing further was said about it until Roosevelt brought it up in a private conversation with Stalin, explaining that he had to respect the wishes of some seven million Americans of East European extraction. On this occasion, acting obviously on the premise that the earlier silence had sealed the fate of these countries, the Soviet leader offered only a sardonic expression of sympathy and a flip-pant suggestion that some "propaganda work" be done among them. 47 The implication was an obvious one; the issue was considered closed.

Once again, however, attention was paid the task of leaving the impression that the Soviet position was founded

46Cf. Ibid., p. 782.
47Cf. Ibid., p. 796.
upon concern for national, as opposed to revolutionary, interests. Thus, to demonstrate that he was still firmly committed to the principles of the alliance, the Communist dictator reiterated his approval of the idea of a world organization as the institutional basis for lasting peace, his commitment to co-operate fully in the struggle against Hitler Germany, and his promise to enter the war against Japan once the former had been defeated. And to these he expediently added support of the restoration of the British Empire and approval of a British proposal that Poland be compensated territorially on her western border at the expense of Germany.

When the meeting at Teheran concluded, Stalin undoubtedly was sure that his diplomatic strategy had been a success. Over the period of two and a half years since Hitler's attack, the muting of revolutionary propaganda and the adoption of a conventional diplomatic pose had convinced the West that Communism had undergone a profound change in character. His allies had responded by sending

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48 At this time, Stalin was treated to an unsolicited Western offer of access to the Manchurian port of Darien for commercial purposes, which he accepted graciously. Cf. Ibid., p. 792. As later events were to reveal, this was not the only reward he expected for declaring war against Japan.

valuable military assistance and by recognizing what were purported to be the legitimate national interests of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, a notable gain had been scored at the popular level in the West. Memories of the purges of the late thirties and the Nazi-Soviet pact had given way to growing respect and admiration for the "Russian ally".\textsuperscript{51} Whatever anti-Soviet sentiment remained was drowned in a reservoir of good will fed by accounts of changes in the Soviet system and the heroics of the Red Army and the guerrillas. Never before had the Soviet Union enjoyed such prestige in the West.

From Stalin's standpoint, however, the occasion was one for grim satisfaction rather than rejoicing. There was to be no re-examination of relations with the West in the hope of shattering all barriers to peaceful coexistence. The fundamental conviction that Communism and capi-

\textsuperscript{50} Sherwood describes Roosevelt's attitude after the Teheran Conference as follows: "Roosevelt now felt sure that, to use his own term, Stalin was 'getatable', despite his bludgeoning tactics and his attitude of cynicism toward such matters as the rights of small nations, and that when Russia could be convinced that her legitimate claims and requirements . . . were given full recognition, she would prove tractable and co-operative in maintaining the peace of the postwar world." Sherwood, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 798-799. Churchill describes his own in the following way: "Surveying the whole military scene, as we separated in an atmosphere of friendship and unity of immediate purpose, I personally was well content." Churchill, \textit{Closing The Ring}, p. 405.

\textsuperscript{51} Perhaps the most dramatic achievement of Stalin's in this respect was the effect on Alexander Kerensky.
talism were incompatible remained as firm as ever. As far as he was concerned, Western expressions of friendship and sympathy, the willingness to let bygones be bygones, had been useful in the defense against the German invader. It would also facilitate the reintroduction of the temporarily dormant revolutionary offensive strategy, a move that he was already contemplating.

The Third Military-Revolutionary Offensive. The success at Teheran was all the encouragement that Stalin needed to commence the "two steps forward" aspect of his strategy. Its timeliness was underscored by the approach of the Red Army to the prewar frontier with Poland. But his plans were almost upset by an unexpected event. It was learned, that while the meeting in Teheran had been in progress, Tito had taken it upon himself to convene a political congress in Yugoslavia and to declare the Yugoslav government-in-exile, including the monarch, illegitimate.\textsuperscript{52}

Needless to say, this new breach of Communist

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. Dedijer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 207.
discipline on Tito's part was a cause for rage in Moscow. He was charged with "... a stab in the back of the Soviet Union and the Teheran decisions."\(^5\) However, it caused no real complications, for the anticipated chain reaction of protests in the West failed to materialize. Thus, if anything, it demonstrated once again the extent to which the effort to conceal Communism's revolutionary character had succeeded. Nevertheless, Tito was not to be forgiven for this episode.

The gambit in Poland was executed according to Schedule. It was a carbon copy of the old Leninist tactic: pursue the enemy into the adjacent country under the banner of national liberation and then, behind a screen of ostensible respect for national rights, liberate it from all political elements except the Communist. For example, on December 31, 1943, Polish Communists, who had been sent behind the German lines earlier to undermine public confidence in the exiled government and the Western Powers, distributed leaflets announcing the formation of a Polish National Council and a People's National Army and the intention to create a new Polish government.\(^5\) Three days

\(^{53}\) Cf. Ibid., p. 209.

later, the Red Army crossed the frontier accompanied by units of the new "people's" army. The Moscow press declared the liberation of Poland from the Nazi yoke as the sole objective. 55

Also following Lenin's example, Stalin was careful to avoid a premature disclosure of revolutionary intent. He withheld recognition of the Polish National Council. At stake was the continued effectiveness of the nationalistic guise, which he planned to use as a screen for the extension of Communist power throughout Eastern Europe.

The wisdom of this restraint was underscored decisively the following May, when Churchill made all offer to share influence in the Balkans. 56 His purpose was to guard British interests in Greece, and apparently he expected that the Soviet leader would be amenable to an arrangement along lines of traditional power politics.

The British Prime Minister was correct in one respect. Stalin was agreeable to an arrangement of this sort. But his motives were of a different nature. For one thing, it presented an opportunity to duplicate one of Lenin's most striking achievements in foreign affairs: the procurement of British recognition of the Soviet

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interest in neighboring states. It is to be recalled that Lenin had been presented with a comparable opportunity back in 1921 and had obtained British recognition of his interests in the then theoretically independent borderland republics in exchange for recognition of the British interests in Asia.\(^57\) For another, inasmuch as Churchill had not consulted Roosevelt before making his proposal, it provided an unusual chance to divide them over the issue of spheres of influence and thus render their potential common front against the revolutionary advance more difficult to obtain.

With characteristic facility, the Soviet dictator fitted himself neatly into the role marked out. He readily recognized Britain's "primary concern" in Greece and accepted a similar consideration for himself in Rumania. But he also added the qualification that the United States be consulted before final commitments were made.\(^58\) The success of this move was crowned by Roosevelt's initial negative reaction and then, after being assured by Churchill that the arrangement would be only temporary, by his agreement to allow a trial period of three months.\(^59\)

\(^{57}\) Cf. Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* pp. 139-140.


\(^{59}\) Indicative of the displeasure created in Washington at the British expense was Secretary Hull's imme-
But then a curious thing happened: the Soviet leader requested an additional delay. His explanation, on July 12, 1944, was that the American attitude made him reluctant to act hastily. However, the real reason, as can be inferred reasonably from the events, was that he had discovered new evidence of "left" national deviationism, which threatened to upset his plans. It involved the Greek Communists, who had just rejected a British offer to participate with Greek royalists and republicans in a coalition provisional government.

To correct this situation, Stalin risked the displeasure of his allies and sent an unannounced military mission to Greece. Though all of the facts of this episode are not known, the implication of one that is known seems obvious. Soon after the Soviet mission arrived, the Greek Communists suddenly dropped their opposition to the proposal. Whatever they were told, the chances are that it

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61 Writes C. M. Woodhouse about the occasion of the Soviet mission's arrival and the events in its wake: "As if by a magic wand, the angry, anxious, bewildered obstinacy of the early summer was translated into goodwill." Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 199.
didn't include Moscow's willingness to sacrifice their revolutionary interests for the sake of gaining a foothold in Rumania.

The delayed acceptance of the British offer to share influence in the Balkans, however, did not prevent Stalin from taking advantage of it. For example, in August 1944, the Red Army swept across Rumania, arriving in Bucharest on the last day of the month. The pro-Axis regime was ousted and its successor was instructed to declare war on Germany. The armistice was signed in Moscow, on September 12, with the Soviets acting on behalf of the United States and Great Britain. By its terms, authority was vested in the "Soviet (Allied) High Command". As one observer of the Rumanian scene has neatly put it: "They (the Allies) never got out of the brackets".

In Rumania, as in Poland, attention was paid to the need of maintaining a proper facade. With the Red Army appeared Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnaris, Rumanian Communists who had spent the war in Moscow. Together with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who was freed from prison, they comprised the Rumanian version of the national

62 The salient points of the armistice agreement are listed in Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), pp. 166-185.
63 Ibid., p. 185.
revolutionary committee, the nucleus of the Communist regime that would be established in due time. However, their first task was to establish a pseudo-national front, behind which this objective could be pursued "legally". The appearance of such patriotic-sounding organizations as the Union of Rumanian Patriots, Patriotic Defense, Plowman's Front, and a Rumanian-Soviet friendship society called ARLUS soon after attested to their diligence. 64

Simultaneously, Stalin began to raise the tempo of the revolutionary offensive at two other points, in Poland and Bulgaria. On the one hand, encouraged by a public statement of Churchill's on behalf of the Soviet claim to eastern Poland, which contrasted sharply with the refusal of the Poles in London to concede anything, he invited Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to Moscow to discuss their differences. 65 But when the head of the exiled Polish regime arrived, on July 30, 1944, he was presented with a fait accompli in the form of Soviet recognition of a Polish Committee of National Liberation (the "Lublin Committee") as the temporary legal authority in Poland. 66 He was also

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65 Cf. Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R., op. cit., I, p. 242. Speaking before the House of Commons, on February 22, 1944, Churchill had stated the following: "I cannot feel that the Russian demand for reassurance about her western frontiers goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable or just." The Times, February 23, 1944, p. 6.

made to witness the beginning of the destruction of the Polish underground movement in Warsaw by the Germans, brought about by Moscow's encouragement that it rise up in anticipation of the arrival of the Red Army and then the deliberate failure of it to arrive on time. Finally, he was compelled to return to London a month later without having obtained an agreement on any of the points at issue.

On the other hand, a surprise move was made to establish a foothold in Bulgaria. On September 4, 1944, while that country was negotiating an armistice with the British and the Americans, the Soviet leader declared war and called upon the Bulgarian people to overturn the "ruling clique".67 This was the signal for the Communist-led Fatherland Front to perform its most important task for Moscow. Within two weeks, the Red Army had overrun Bulgaria and the Fatherland Front became the provisional government. Its first act was to declare war against Germany. This, of course, rendered the armistice talks with the West superfluous. On October 28, an armistice was signed in Moscow, one that was a duplicate of the Rumanian armistice in its essential features.68

The Soviet conduct in Poland did stir some anger in

the West, particularly on the part of Churchill. But neither it nor the actions in Rumania and Bulgaria dispelled his impression that it was still possible to work out some mutually beneficial agreement on a division of interests in the Balkans. Thus, by September 28, 1944, the British leader had recovered sufficiently from his disappointment to reiterate publicly his faith in "our great Eastern ally" and his conviction that the Russian claim to eastern Poland was justified. This was a preliminary to his trip to Moscow the following month to propose an even broader arrangement in the Balkans than before. According to the new terms, the Soviets were to get a ninety percent "primary concern" in Rumania and seventy five in Bulgaria, while the British were to get ninety percent in Greece. In addition, in Hungary and Yugoslavia, each was to get fifty percent.

It goes without saying that Stalin did not hesitate

69 The British leader noted the "strange and sinister" behavior of the Russians and wished to send them a strongly worded message. However, it was not sent because Roosevelt, apparently anxious about the promise of Soviet aid against Japan, refused to support it. Cf. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 139-143.


to agree on this occasion. The broader delimitation of areas of "primary concern" was even more satisfactory. It provided the element of legal sanction for the projected extension of Communist power into Rumania and Bulgaria and it also afforded a foothold in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Concerning the fact that it necessitated the sacrifice of the revolutionary interests of the Greek and Yugoslav Communists, this certainly was consistent with past practice. But the Soviet leader undoubtedly was even less concerned about them and regarded his action as suitable punishment for their failure to do the utmost on behalf of Soviet Russia's defense.

The Yugoslavs heard rumors about the Anglo-Soviet division of the Balkans into spheres of interest, but, according to Dedijer, refused at first to believe that it had occurred. The Greeks, however, apparently thought otherwise, for they staged an attempt to seize power in Greece late in December 1944.

72 Churchill, who outlined the scheme on a half-sheet of paper and pushed it across the conference table to Stalin, records the climax as follows: "There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down." Ibid.

73 Cf. Dedijer, op. cit., p. 223.

74 Though all the facts are not known, it is likely, as Woodhouse suggests, that the proponents of forceful action in the Greek Communist Party managed to gain the
While the immediate reaction in Moscow to this outburst of "left" national deviationism has not been made public, it is reasonable to assume it was even more violent than the rage that Tito had evoked. But once again, attesting to the effectiveness of the Soviet nationalistic guise, the event provoked neither protests nor suspicions in the West. On the contrary, Churchill attributed it to the Greek Communists exclusively, while Roosevelt put the blame on the British policy in Greece.

At the Yalta Conference, in February 1945, Stalin tested his strategy against the sagacity of the Western leaders once more, and with characteristic success. He reinforced his facade of respect for national rights by accepting the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" and a separate agreement on Poland, both of which embodied upper hand at the time. Cf. Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212. Woodhouse, however, does not note the deviationist implication. Cf. also, George Papandreou, The Third War (Athens: (n.p.), 1948), p. 35.

Evidence of Stalin's reaction can be seen in the dispatch of Nicholas Zachariadis to Greece in the summer of 1945 to become the party's leader and to put its policy back on a more nationalistic course. Cf. Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 243. Later, Zachariadis wrote an article in which he charged those responsible for the uprising with having become "dizzy with success", a disparagement that obviously referred to the "left" national deviationist tendencies. Cf. N. Zachariadis, "The Struggle For Freedom and Democracy in Greece," For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, No. 2, December 15, 1948, p. 4.

principles familiar to the democratic philosophy. Furthermore, taking advantage of the American desire for Soviet participation in the war against Japan and a relatively free hand in dealing with the Japanese after the war, he obtained important concessions in the Far East. The status quo was to be preserved in Outer Mongolia, which meant continued Soviet domination there, Russian rights and properties lost in the war with Japan in 1904-1905 were to be restored, and the Kurile Islands were to be acquired.

Both Churchill and Roosevelt left the Crimea, as they had left Teheran more than a year earlier, confident that Stalin was indeed as good as his word. But as subsequent events were to demonstrate, the Soviet dictator interpreted the results of the meeting as all the encouragement he needed to continue the revolutionary program in Eastern Europe.

78 Cf. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
79 Upon his return from Yalta, Churchill had the following to report to the House of Commons: "The impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in Honourable friendship and equality with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond." Cf. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 400-401. According to Sherwood: "The mood of the American delegates, including Roosevelt and Hopkins,
The Fiction of National Sovereignty in Eastern Europe. The Soviet method in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1948, when the conquests of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were completed, and power was seized in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Czechoslovakia, need not be spelled out in great detail here. This subject is a familiar one. It has been covered in reports by Western diplomats and journalists who witnessed it, in accounts by anti-Communist leaders who managed to escape its terror, and in several excellent studies undertaken by Western scholars. For our purpose, the important point is that Stalin continued to follow Lenin's tactical prototype closely. His objective was to convince his Western allies that the forceful extension of Communism was an expression of the popular will in the countries where it took place. And for this he superimposed a conventional character on the basic revolutionary technique by manipulating nationalistic symbols, by establishing artificial national coalition regimes, and by continuing to display a showy concern for national rights in diplomacy.

For example, in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, where local Communists would have constituted could be described as one of supreme exultation as they left Yalta. They were confident . . . that this had been the most encouraging conference of all . . . ." Sherwood, op. cit., p. 869.
negligible political forces except for the presence of the Red Army, the revolutionary course unfolded with deliberate gradualness. Initially, a phantasy of veneration for national and democratic institutions was carefully fostered. National heroism was freely espoused and national resurrection was promised loudly and incessantly. For the time being, religious freedom was tolerated. Communists also assisted in the re-establishment of prewar democratic parties and played the role of a minority in the provisional national coalition governments.

At the same time, preparations for the ultimate achievement of power were made. The pretext of military necessity was used widely to justify politically inspired actions. Local Red Army commanders, acting purportedly on behalf of public order and the security of their lines of communication and supply, arrested troublesome anti-

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81 Relates Ferenc Nagy: "Of one thing the Communists were especially careful. At every step they sought to clothe their acts in a show of constitutionality in order to invest with a semblance of legality all their terroristic activities until such time as absolute power should be theirs." Nagy, op. cit., pp. 72-73. Cf. also, Markham, op. cit., pp. 213-215; Mikolajczyk, op. cit., p. 132; Andrew Gyorgy, Governments of Danubian Europe (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1949), pp. 115-117, 218-219.
Communists and requisitioned buildings and other facilities in use by democratic parties. They seized large stores of food, which they used for their own troops and distributed to local Communists and fellow travellers. Furthermore, they provided protection for the local Communist organizations, which, not by coincidence, invariably managed to gain control of three key posts in the provisional regimes, the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Agriculture. Through the first two, loyal police forces and judiciaries were created, staged mass demonstrations on behalf of more "progressive" governmental policies and terrorism by armed gangs were protected, and the charge of pro-Fascism was leveled indiscriminately at the opposition. Through the last, using radical land reform programs as bait, the favor of the peasantry was curried. 82

To prevent close Western scrutiny and disclosure of the real situation in the occupied countries, Stalin continued to make use of the national idea. Thus, based on an alleged defense of national sovereignty and dignity, he refused to admit Western observers and exiled nationalists to Poland. 83 The very same argument was used to

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82 For example, cf. Nagy, op. cit., p. 111.

83 In answer to a protest by Churchill, Stalin explained: "You wonder why the Polish military theatre should be veiled in secrecy. Actually there is no secrecy at all. You forget the circumstances that the (Lublin) Poles regard the dispatch of British or other foreign
justify negative replies to British and American requests that elections in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary take place under the direct supervision of the Allies. 84 And whenever the overly-protective nature of Soviet policy was questioned, he switched over to the argument that the Soviet Union had the right to ensure against unfriendly neighbors and possible future attacks. 85 Only when expediency dictated, as will be seen, were such requests as these honored.

As compensation for the unyielding attitude on issues related to Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, other familiar Leninist devices were employed. For example, following the tactical line applied in Central Asia in 1919-1920, when the ostensible independence of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khiva had been preserved for the sake of appeasing Moslem sentiment on the periphery of Asia, Finland and Czechoslovakia were selected as prime examples observers to Poland as an affront to their national dignity . . . ." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., op. cit., I, p. 313.

84 In the same way, on May 4, 1945, Stalin nimbly sidestepped a precedent-setting proposal of Churchill's that a Soviet representative help oversee the Greek election: "Such control of the people of an allied country would of necessity be assessed as an affront and a gross interference in their internal affairs. Such control is out of place in relation to former satellite countries which subsequently declared war on Germany and ranged themselves with the Allies, as demonstrated by electoral experience, for example, in Finland, where the election was held without outside interference and yielded
of Stalinist respect for national rights. Although overrun by the Red Army, they were left unaffected by the revolutionary tide for the time being. Both were evacuated within reasonable periods of time, unfettered elections were permitted to take place, and truly non-Communist governments were formed. But considering Finland's proximity and the fact that the Communist Party emerged as the single largest in Czechoslovakia, there was little doubt that either would be able to act independently of Moscow's influence.

Equally reminiscent was Stalin's recourse to the national-cultural autonomy theory for use as part of his diplomatic smoke screen. This occurred in April 1945, when the aged Austrian Socialist leader, Karl Renner, was named to head a Soviet-sponsored provisional government in Vienna. If the Soviet leader had in mind creating an Austrian equivalent of the Far Eastern Republic, he was thwarted by Western insistence upon zones of occupation.

positive results." Ibid., p. 347.

85 Cf. Ibid., pp. 315, 331.


87 It is to be recalled that Lenin had incorporated the national-cultural autonomy principle into the constitution of the Far Eastern Republic as testimony to its non-Communist character. Cf. above, pp. 111-112.
Even so, the choice of Renner, who, along with Otto Bauer, had been the originator of the national-cultural autonomy scheme and the target of bitter Communist criticism as a result, did enhance the contention that old revolutionary hatreds had been abandoned. 88

Completing the display of Communist respect for national and democratic institutions at this time was the revival of the "popular front" tactic in Western Europe. Its most dramatic manifestations occurred in Italy and France, where, for the reason of their roles in the resistance movements, the Communists emerged from the war with enormous prestige and considerable followings. On orders from Moscow, they concealed their revolutionary interests behind the familiar nationalistic screens. 89 In unprecedented moves, they even participated in the provisional "bourgeois" governments formed. 90


89 Stalin's instructions to the West European Communists are attested to in Dedijer, op. cit., p. 296. An excellent account of the French Communist policy is afforded by Gordon Wright: "The current party line was above reproach. No other group beat its breast quite so violently in protesting its patriotism, or in condemning foreign interference in French affairs." Gordon Wright, The Reshaping of French Democracy (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948), pp. 68-69.

90 For the occasion, the Italian Communists dropped their opposition to the monarchy and, contrary to the
Needless to say, Stalin was not unmindful of the danger of recurrent "left" national deviationism among his Communist followers in non-Soviet Europe. To guard against it, he had sent Togliatti and Thorez back to Italy and France, respectively, with strict orders about the policies they were to pursue. Furthermore, he could count on the Red Army to prevent its occurrence in the countries occupied. But there were, of course, definite weak links in this security chain. The Red Army was not in Yugoslavia, Greece, or Albania, and the Communist leaders in two of these countries already had records of deviationist tendencies.

It was not long before these fears obtained their justification, for Tito, contrary to the general rule of muted Communist revolutionism, hastened to realize his own ambitions in Yugoslavia and prompted the Albanians to follow suit. By the end of 1945, both countries were transformed into monolithic "people's republics", patterned after the Soviet model.91

Under the circumstances, there was little the Socialists and Liberals, voted to renew the very same Lateran Pacts which Mussolini had concluded with the Vatican. Cf. Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 59.

91 The Yugoslav constitution was an exact duplicate of the Soviet Union's, while the Albanian excluded only its national-federal character.
Soviet leader could do to prevent this from taking place. It was extremely important to avoid overt action against the headstrong Yugoslav, for an open rift then might well have resulted in a disclosure of Moscow's real purpose in Eastern Europe. It did, of course, serve to increase his determination to get rid of Tito once and for all, preparations for which were already underway. The Soviet military and economic specialists sent to assist the Yugoslavs had also been given instructions to foment a native anti-Titoist movement.92

Tito's revolutionary antics and those of the Albanian Communists aroused suspicions in London, where Churchill apparently viewed with chagrin the rapid evaporation of his fifty percent "primary concern" in Yugoslavia.93 But there was still time for Stalin to reap additional benefits from the use of the national idea, for it helped to keep alive in American political circles Roosevelt's hopes for the postwar world.94 Thus, early in

92 Cf. Dedijer, _op. cit._, pp. 260-262.

93 Though Churchill was clearly dubious, Stalin was more than likely telling the truth at the Potsdam Conference, in July 1945, when he explained that often he did not know what Tito was going to do. Cf. Churchill, _Triumph and Tragedy_, p. 636.

94 Writes Secretary of State Byrnes about the American attitude in 1945: "It is true that following Yalta we were somewhat disillusioned. Such things as the ... Soviet violations of the agreements on Poland and
the spring of 1945, it was possible to get American acquiescence to a request that the Red Army be permitted to liberate Prague. Then, at the end of June, after expediently admitting Stanislaw Mikołajczyk and four other non-Communist Poles to the Communist-controlled Polish provisional government, the request that it be recognized was also accepted.

Encouraged by the latter, which was viewed as the "legal" basis sought for the Communization of Poland, the Soviet dictator next pressed for recognition of the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian regimes. The aim apparently was to fortify their positions for the forthcoming negotiation of peace treaties with them. Hence, at the Potsdam Conference, in July-August 1945, when the decision to create a Council of Foreign Ministers to draft the peace treaties with Italy, Finland, and the three former Axis satellites was made, he tried to exchange acceptance of

Rumania warned us that in the days to come we would encounter serious differences and would have to overcome deep seated suspicions. However, fresh in our minds were the words of President Roosevelt's last message to Prime Minister Churchill, based on his experience with the Russians, that such difficulties would straighten out."


Churchill advised Truman against this, though without success. He also failed to persuade the President to exploit the advanced positions of the Anglo-American armies for political purposes. Cf. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 506-507, 514-516.
Western favors to Italy for the recognition sought. But when it, and a promise "to discuss" the matter of Allied-supervised elections in these countries, failed to produce the desired results, he switched to a more aggressive tack. The British were charged with interference in Greek affairs and demands were made that Italy's North African colony of Tripolitania be turned into a Soviet trust territory and that the Dardanelles be placed under joint Soviet-Turkish administration.

This open challenge to British interests in the Mediterranean was undoubtedly underscored by the hope that Attlee, Churchill's successor, could be induced to bargain on a balance of power basis. But it failed. Consequently, to forestall an additional hardening of the Western position, the Soviet leader executed a typical retreat, promising to permit greater freedom of movement for the Allied representatives in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

When the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London in September 1945 to begin drafting the five peace treaties, the right of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to recognition by the West was equated repeatedly with Italy's, particu-
larly on the ground that they, too, had aided the Allied cause after surrendering. However, progress on this score was made only with the addition of conciliatory gestures. Hence, the Hungarian regime was recognized the following November, after an election had been held there and allowed to result in an ostensible victory for the non-Communist Smallholders Party. Then, in February 1946, it was obtained for the Rumanians as well, after a commission composed of the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow and Andrei Vishinski "persuaded" them to include representatives of other parties in their government.

A similar result for Bulgaria undoubtedly would have occurred at this time except for an unexpected event. After promising the West "to advise" the Bulgarians to add two non-Communists to their government, Stalin discovered that the invited leaders of the Agrarian and Socialist parties refused absolutely to accept any posts but the Ministries of Interior and Justice. This price turned out to be higher than he was willing to pay, particularly in view of the fact that the "legalization" of the conquest of that country depended on the completion of the

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100 Cf. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 298-299.
peace treaties.

The close connection between the Soviet interests in Eastern Europe and the tactics pursued at the conference table was evident. Up to this point, no significant progress had been made. For the sake of getting the recognition sought, Molotov had challenged the national interests of Britain and the United States repeatedly. Renewed demands for Tripolitania and the Dardanelles were made, and to them were added demands for heavy reparations from Italy and the creation of an Allied Control Commission for Japan, a persistent championship of the Yugoslav claim to Trieste, and a refusal to allow disposition of the Dodecanese Islands without a settlement on the issue of the Italian colonies first.\(^{101}\) For good measure, Stalin had even harked back to the twenties, had invoked the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, to make an issue out of the evacuation of the Red Army from that country.\(^{102}\)

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\(^{102}\) Following Lenin's example, Stalin also used the Red Army to support an Iranian Communist effort to set up an autonomous republic in the northern province of Azerbaijan, in December 1945. Like its predecessor in Gilan, it was allowed to collapse once its usefulness to the Soviet purpose had expired. Cf. George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949), pp. 284-315.
It goes without saying that the Soviet leader would have been pleased to win on each one of these points. But the purpose in raising them was clearly to gain satisfaction on the more important issues alive in Eastern Europe. Thus, after the attempt to gain recognition for the Bulgarian regime failed, the Soviet tack changed decisively. When the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris in June 1946, Molotov began to make important concessions. He suddenly agreed that the Dodecanese Islands should be given to Greece immediately and accepted a Western proposal that a settlement on the issue of the Italian colonies should be postponed for a year. Then, even more dramatically, he made a private offer to Secretary of State Byrnes to drop support of the Yugoslav claim to Trieste if the Soviet demand for Italian reparations was accepted. But all of this turned out to be preparation for still another offer to bargain. The Soviet Foreign Minister did not complete his sequence of concessions until he had asked Byrnes if an agreement on the reparations issue satisfactory to the United States could be exchanged for the signature of all the peace treaties, ". . . including the one with Bulgaria". The success of this astonishing volte face was registered with the latter's

103 Cf. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 133.
affirmative reply, the immediate settlement of the repara­
tions issue, and the subsequent decision of the Council to
call a general peace conference.

At the peace conference itself, which opened in
Paris on July 27, 1946, the Russians almost fell victim to
their haste to acquire the final legalistic trimmings for
their conquests in Eastern Europe. Their desire to obtain
speedy confirmation of the treaties met with a comparably
stubborn Western insistence that each proposal for each
treaty be considered individually and that they be voted
on by the full membership of the conference. Consequently,
the proceedings were delayed three weeks by prolonged
debate on procedural matters, during which time recrimina-
tions were exchanged heatedly.

There is no telling how long this would have gone
on, though it is clear that Stalin did not intend to allow
the stalemate to degenerate into a complete collapse of
the negotiations when they were so close to a conclusion.
Three unexpected events, however, did combine to break the
deadlock and speed the process to a conclusion. Two
originated in the Communist camp and consisted of fresh
outbursts of "left" national deviationism. For example,
on August 19, 1946, the Yugoslavs shot down an American
airplane, killing five of its passengers. Then, apparently
with Tito's encouragement, the Greek Communists initiated
civil war in Greece a month later. 104

Coming at a very critical point in the peace negotiations, these two events undoubtedly were a cause for anxiety in Moscow. It is known, for example, that Tito satisfied the American demand for an explanation concerning the airplane incident only after Molotov's intervention. 105 Less clear is the character of the immediate reaction to the events in Greece. However, considering the importance attached to the signature of the peace treaties, the stony silence of the Soviet press, and the ultimate charge of deviationism against Markos Vafiadis, the Greek rebel leader, it is safe to assume that it was anything but appreciative.

The effect on the peace conference was immediate. The Soviets modified their stand sufficiently to permit completion of its work by October 17, 1946. Then, after

104 The only evidence I found suggesting Stalin's direct connection with the Greek uprising is a report in The Times, August 21, 1946, which attributes to a "reliable source" the fact that a Russian agent laid the plans for it. But against this is ranged considerable evidence to the contrary. For example, an equally "reliable" report in The New York Times, April 20, 1947, VI, p. 8, tells that Markos Vafiadis, the leader of the Greek rebels, was in fact leading a group of dissident Communists. This might explain why Vafiadis and not Nicholas Zachariadis, a Stalinist, was in charge. Furthermore, it is known that Tito was most anxious to include Greek Macedonia in his projected scheme for a Balkan federation and provided the principal assistance to the Greeks. Finally, it is also known that Stalin advised Tito to stop lending them aid on at least one occasion, failed to invite the Greeks to
returning to Moscow for instructions, Molotov arrived in New York for the final session of the Council of Foreign Ministers bearing an even more perceptible conciliatory attitude. Criticism of the United States was dropped completely and personal relations improved significantly. Furthermore, when questioned about a Yugoslav threat to refuse to sign the treaty with Italy unless the claim to Trieste was accepted, the Soviet Foreign Minister agreed that such a refusal should deny Tito all the benefits of the treaty.

The third factor that helped to speed up the negotiating process materialized at this time. It originated in the West and consisted of a surprise proposal by Byrnes privately to Molotov that the negotiations be suspended indefinitely. Whether out of conviction or by design, he justified it with the opinion that agreement on the treaties did not seem likely. And its effect was electric,


106 Cf. Ibid., p. 152.

107 Cf. Ibid., p. 147.

108 Cf. Ibid., pp. 152-153. Though he doesn't explain his motives, it is more than likely that the Secretary of State was in fact engaged in a bit of diplomatic bluffing.
for Molotov then proceeded to accept practically all of the recommendations made by the peace conference. The five treaties were signed on December 11, 1946.

Though it appeared as though he had been forced into it, the signing of the peace treaties, particularly those with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, signalled Stalin's successful duplication of Lenin's earlier success. Using the national idea as a screen, he had been able to gain Western acceptance of the conquest of neighboring countries overrun by the Red Army in pursuit of an enemy invader. To be sure, the treaties did contain provisions for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from those countries and the guarantee of civil rights. However, the Soviets retained the right to station military units in them to ensure uninterrupted lines of communication and supply with their occupation forces in Austria and Germany. This, together with the fact that local Communist organizations were sufficiently prepared to assume full power overtly, meant that the guarantee of civil rights would be given the characteristic Communist interpretation.

Communist National Deviationism Becomes "Titoism". At this point, there is no way of telling exactly what Stalin intended to do with the newly acquired East European countries beyond the formal establishment of Communist power. Just how he planned to tie them to the Soviet Union
remains a mystery. There is evidence that he contemplated their union on a confederate basis. For this it is necessary to go back to the early twenties, when he expressed the following opinion to Lenin as an answer to the question of dealing with future Communist governments in such countries as Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Finland:

... they would regard the Soviet type of federation as a device to reduce their political independence ... I have no doubt that the most expedient form of bringing about a rapprochement would be a confederation, a union of independent states ... 109

But this, of course, does not mean that he subscribed to the same view in 1947. As indicated, the confederate idea was regarded as an expedient only; it did not preclude ultimate union on a federal basis. Furthermore, it was offered at a time when Russia was economically backward and militarily weak, and when it was assumed that revolutions elsewhere in Europe would have to take place without significant assistance from the Red Army. Thus, since Stalin permitted no public discussion of the subject before his death on March 6, 1953, and no answer to the question has been forthcoming since, it is equally possible that the circumstances of the early postwar period may well have caused him to change his mind. 110

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110 Suggestive in this respect was an exchange of
Whatever the case, one thing seems fairly certain: the reason for this enduring mystery can be traced chiefly to a new manifestation of Communist "right" national deviationism, or, as it has come to be known, "Titoism". To begin with, the Soviet dictator still had the task of getting rid of Tito before him in 1947. One aspect of his plan in this connection has already been described: Soviet diplomats and military and economic specialists in Yugoslavia were instructed to recruit an anti-Tito movement among native Communists. But it also entailed measures designed to keep the Yugoslav leader off his guard. For example, interference in the internal affairs of all satellites was held to a minimum; there was no mention of their future status. In addition, favors were heaped on Tito. At the funeral of Kalinin in the spring of 1946, he alone among the foreign visitors was given the honor of standing with the Soviet Politburo on the main stand. 111

Then, in the fall of 1947, at the founding of the Communist ideas between the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Kardelj, and the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Sadchikov, in June 1945. On this occasion, Kardelj expressed the desire that his country be regarded as one of the future Soviet Republics. However, Sadchikov, reflecting Moscow's concern for relations with the West, advised against the expression of such sentiment publicly: "... it was necessary to recognize the facts as they are at present, namely to treat Yugoslavia as an independent state and the Yugoslav Communist Party as an independent Party." Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: R.I.I.A., 1948), p. 38.

111 Cf. Dedijer, op. cit., p. 277.
Information Bureau, or Cominform, the Yugoslav delegation was encouraged to criticize openly the wartime policies of such giants of the Communist world as the French and Italian parties. 112

Before an adequate anti-Tito force in Yugoslavia could be recruited, however, the Stalinist scheme was thwarted by the spread of deviationism. The first evidence of it appeared in the summer of 1947, when the Polish and Czech Communists, without consulting Moscow first, declared themselves interested in the American offer to participate in the drafting of the Marshall Plan for Europe. 113 But it took an even more definite shape the following November, when the Communist Parties met in Warsaw to discuss the founding of the Cominform. On this occasion, Wladyslaw Gomulka, head of the Polish party, argued against following the Soviet example in agricultural matters. At this time, he was supported by the Czechs. Furthermore, Gomulka opposed the organization of the

112 This clearly was designed to serve the additional purpose of generating hostility between the Yugoslavs and the French and Italians. The same was true of Stalin's criticism of Georgi Dimitrov for alleged incompetence in Tito's presence, at a time when they were developing a scheme for a Balkan federation. Cf. Ibid., p. 296.

113 It was stopped, of course, after instructions from Moscow. Cf. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 185
Cominform itself, on the ground that it would depreciate Poland's sovereignty. He later qualified this by accepting the new Communist institution on the condition that it be kept a secret. 114

Attesting to his determination to liquidate Tito, Stalin raised no fuss over Gomulka's obvious opposition to domination by the Soviets. He was simply overruled by the other delegates, who warmly endorsed the creation of the Cominform. However, the absence of harsh retaliation did have its effect on thinking in the satellites. Together with Tito's continued prominence, it encouraged the belief that Moscow did not intend to demand strict obedience to its will and a consequent rush to get on the "Titoist" bandwagon. The Yugoslav leader was invited to visit all capitals and his appearances were greeted with great enthusiasm. On one trip, to Bucharest, he even neglected to advise Moscow of his plans, which apparently was a cause for consternation in the Soviet capital. 115

But this was not enough to cause a change in the Soviet tactics. They remained the same until January 1948, when Georgi Dimitrov spoke publicly on the question of a Balkan

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114 Cf. Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 296-297
115 Cf. Ibid., p. 305.
federation. According to the oldest of the "old Stalinists" in Eastern Europe:

When the question (of federation) matures, as it must inevitably, the peoples, the nations of people's democracy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Greece -- mind you, and Greece -- will settle it. It is they who will decide whether it will be a federation or confederation, and when and how it will be formed. "... when it comes to creating such a federation or confederation, our peoples will not ask the imperialists and will not heed their opposition, but will solve the question themselves, guided by their own interests bound up with the interests and international co-operation necessary to them and to other nations. 116

Dimitrov's statement, which, incidentally, made no provision for assistance from the Soviet Union, was obviously all that Stalin needed to read to convince him that the plot against Tito was becoming too costly on the existing basis. His reaction on this occasion was one of unconcealed fury. Through Pravda, he denounced the Bulgarian leader's ideas unequivocally.117 Then he ordered the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs to Moscow for a meeting, which Dimitrov attended but Tito did not. At the meeting itself, held on February 10, 1948, he heaped abuse on both, charging them with connivance behind his back.118 But,

apparently for the reason that Tito was not there, he conceded to the federative idea on a limited scale. \(^{119}\) Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Rumania and Hungary were to be federated. This was only a calculated retreat, for the full Stalinist fury was about to descend.

Immediately after the meeting in Moscow, open pressure against Tito commenced. Dedijer relates that all pictures of him with Stalin were removed from public places in Rumania and that the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Albania qualified a toast to him with an implied asperson against his ideological integrity. \(^{120}\) Then, at the beginning of March 1948, Soviet-Hugoslav trade relations were severely curtailed and all Soviet military and civilian advisers were recalled from Yugoslavia. This marked the complete abandonment of the subtle Stalinist tack and its replacement by open economic and political warfare.

There is no need to dwell on the details of the campaign against Tito, which culminated in the Cominform's formal denunciation of him as an "imperialist spy" on

\(^{119}\) It is not unreasonable to assume that the results would have been different if Tito had attended the meeting. Stalin probably would have taken measures to prevent his return home.

\(^{120}\) Cf. Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 346-347.
June 28, 1948. The indictment touched on every conceivable point, from the trivial to the most profound ideologically. Appeals to all "true" Communists in Yugoslavia to rise up against their traitorous leaders were issued repeatedly. In reply, the Yugoslav leader pleaded for understanding, acknowledged the leading, if not dominant, role of the Soviets, and requested recognition of his own responsibility as the leader of a non-Russian state in which Communism had been introduced recently.

In this latter respect, echoing sentiments that Stalin certainly had heard before, he revealed clearly the habit of mind that distinguishes the Communist "right" national deviationist from the Soviet "internationalist":

No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his country less, which also is developing socialism—in this case the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, for which so many thousands of its most progressive people fell. 122

Despite the fact that the other satellites echoed Moscow's sentiments and copied its actions against Yugoslavia, Stalin did not achieve his objective. He failed

121 Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., passim. An excellent analysis of this episode is contained in Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform pp. 96-134. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 96-134.

122 Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 19.
for the reason that he had underestimated the national spirit of the Yugoslavs, Communist and non-Communist alike, who could rally against the threat of foreign domination almost out of habit. But he also failed because he had underrated the ability of the West to take advantage of the opportunity to exploit one of Communism's inner contradictions. He did not anticipate that, just three weeks after the publication of the Cominform's explosive resolution, an agreement would be reached between Yugoslavia and the United States, that Tito would be able to exchange compensation for American losses in Yugoslavia due to nationalization and a settlement of the debt for lend-lease and relief assistance for the unblocking of Yugoslav assets in the United States, which included $47,000,000 worth of gold.\textsuperscript{123} He was undoubtedly surprised by the rapid expansion of Yugoslav economic ties with the West generally and then President Truman's statement to the effect that he did not intend to stand aside in the event of overt aggression against Yugoslavia by its Communist neighbors.\textsuperscript{124} This ruled out the initiation of another "war of national liberation".

\textsuperscript{123}Cf. Wolff, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 410.

\textsuperscript{124}Cf. \textit{The New York Times}, December 23, 1949, p. 6
The realization that Tito was to be the first successful Communist "right" national deviationist descended upon the Kremlin with stunning impact. It underscored the need for a thorough purge in Eastern Europe, which was not long in coming. The familiar methods of purge, trial, imprisonment, and execution were employed to expurgate the remaining "Titoist" elements. Thousands comprised the list of those removed, part of which read like a "Who's Who" of the Communist world. Gomulka and Dimitrov dropped quickly from the scene. The former ended up in prison, while the latter was called to Moscow, where he remained until his death on July 3, 1949. And they were followed soon after by the Albanian, Kochi Xoxe, the Hungarian, Laslo Rajk, and the Bulgarians, Traicho Kostov, Anton Yugov, and Dobri Terpeshev. In 1952, the Rumanians, Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, and the Czechs, Rudolph Slansky and Vladimir Clementis were added to the roll of alleged deviationists. In scope, this spectacle of the revolution devouring some of its own progenitors rivaled the great purges of the late thirties.

Stalin's death, on March 5, 1953, halted this process abruptly. Since then, Moscow's control over the Communist satellites has been relaxed to the point of sanctifying "right" national deviationism under the title of "separate roads to socialism". Equally spectacular
have been the abject apologies tendered Tito, Gomulka's complete rehabilitation, and Poland's strikingly independent course of action.\textsuperscript{125} It seems probable that the "new course" in Hungary would have paralleled Poland's if not for the popular uprising that took place in October 1956.

As yet, the evidence is too uncertain for a definitive explanation of this surprising turn of events. For example, sufficient public respect has been paid by the post-Stalinist Soviet leadership to the principle of national sovereignty and the idea of a "commonwealth of socialist nations" to make it appear as though sincere recognition of national convictions among Communists as a viable and acceptable force has finally crystallized.\textsuperscript{126} But it is also possible, in view of the record, to conceive of this as an expedient designed to take the wind out of the sails of latent national Communism during the period of internecine struggle within the Kremlin. Though apparently one of the original sponsors of the new \textit{modus vivendi} with the satellites, Khrushchev, notably in the

\textsuperscript{125}For example, the Polish delegation did not vote against the United Nations General Assembly resolution urging Hungary to admit observers in the wake of the uprising there. Contrary to the action of the other Communist delegates, it abstained. Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, November 22, 1956, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{126}Cf. Khrushchev's statements in \textit{Pravda}, July 16,
cases of Hungary and Poland, has made it abundantly clear that definite limits to the application of the idea of separate roads to socialism do exist.\(^{127}\) He may be biding his time until his own power position is sufficiently strong to permit the reintroduction of a right rein over European Communism.

Finally, not to be overlooked as a factor in this connection has been the rise of Chinese Communism and its assertive quality since Stalin's death. This subject will be considered fully in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that the evidence of Chinese insistence on equality with the Soviet Union in the determination of general Communist policy, particularly its intervention in East European affairs on behalf of the satellite claims to national sovereignty, has added a new dimension to the meaning of national deviationism.

**Conclusion.** In the record of Soviet Russian use of the national idea as an instrument of foreign policy, the period that opened with Hitler's surprise attack on June 22, 1941 and closed with Stalin's death on March 5, 1953 is to be regarded as important for three reasons primarily.


\(^{127}\) On July 21, 1956, Bulganin admonished the Poles for their "... guise of conforming to alleged 'national characteristics' and attempts to undermine the authority of people's democracy on the pretext of 'extending democracy' ... ." Pravda, July 22, 1956, p. 1.
For one, it illustrated again how the Soviet leadership has been able to utilize expedient nationalism in meeting its defensive needs and promoting its revolutionary interests. To a significant, if not decisive, degree, the appeals to national sentiment at home and abroad contributed to the successful defense against the invading Germans. Of comparable value was the affected respect for national institutions that served to screen the forceful extension of Communist power into those countries in Eastern Europe overrun by the Red Army.

For another, the recourse to the national idea and the method of its application furnished an important clue to the meaning of Stalin's policy. Under conditions roughly comparable to those of 1919-1924, its pattern followed Lenin's with sufficient preciseness to make it doubtful that Stalin's purpose from the beginning was anything but a conscious duplication. The parallel was an obvious one from the start, when the call for a patriotic defensive effort was first issued. It was developed further with the organization of guerrilla bands, the utilization of Communists in Central and Western Europe, and the introduction of a conventional diplomatic pose. But perhaps the strongest element of similarity was the automatic reintroduction of the revolutionary policy once
the crisis had passed, which the conversion of the national idea from an instrument of defense to one of revolutionary offense indicated.

Stalin's careful screening of the imposition of Communist power in those East European countries overrun by the Red Army was typical of the tactic applied earlier by Lenin against the separated non-Russian border regions of the former Russian Empire. Furthermore, his expedient concessions to national sentiment among non-Russian Communists in Eastern Europe preliminary to an attempt to eradicate it were also consistent with the tactical precedents. Finally, as will be seen in the chapter following, the parallel was completed with the renewal of serious attention to the task of promoting Communist revolutions in the West by encouraging national rebellions in the colonies in Asia and Africa.

Finally, this episode demonstrated even more dramatically than before the inherent weakness of the Soviet use of the national idea. The paradox of theoretical anti-nationalism and practical nationalism once again proved incomprehensible to some non-Russian Communists. Consequently, the promotion of nationalism to meet wartime military needs evoked "left" national deviationism on the part of the Yugoslav and Greek Communists. Then, as
Stalin prepared to switch back to the theoretically correct internationalist posture in the postwar period, the Yugoslav position immediately became "right." And this tendency spread throughout the Communist satellites with amazing speed, as Stalin's calculated concessions to Tito were incorrectly interpreted as evidence of a decisive transformation of Soviet policy toward new Communist states.

Stalin managed to stem the rising tide of national Communism, but at the highest cost paid to date. Tito's resistance to the Soviet will to dominate absolutely turned out to be the first successful one on record, and it split the Communist world decisively into two parts. Though it is still too early to speak in terms of its full implications, there does exist evidence suggesting that the event may well have marked the ultimate point in the Soviet ability to promote nationalism expediently and still maintain unqualified leadership among Communists who remain ostensibly loyal to Moscow.
CHAPTER VI

STALIN AGAINST THE WEST IN ASIA

Though his attention in the first year after the Second World War was devoted mainly to the consolidation of Communist power in Eastern Europe, Stalin did not overlook developments in Asia. From the Soviet dictator's standpoint, the postwar situation in the East offered the best opportunity for a successful revival of Lenin's anti-imperialist strategy since the abortive Communist revolutions back in 1926-1927. For one thing, there was reason to believe that a good deal of the anti-Communist feeling among Asian nationalists had disappeared. Soviet Russia's wartime alliance with the Western powers against the Axis, Communist resistance to Japanese rule in Asia, and the nationalism displayed by Communists generally were factors favoring this assumption. An offer by Chiang Kai-shek to restore diplomatic relations seemed to confirm it. For another thing, there was reason to believe that new anti-Western alliances with Asia's nationalists could be created. Japan's defeat had set in motion powerful national revolutionary movements in the colonies, which could be expected to seek outside assistance. With these two considerations in mind, then, Stalin set out to attack the West through its soft "underbelly" in the East, to undermine Western capitalism by
forcing it out of Asia and cutting it off from the resources and markets hitherto available.

New Respect for National Rights in the East. The first phase of Stalin's postwar effort to rid Asia of all Western control and influence began on the very day the war in the Pacific ended, and it lasted for about seven months. During this time, the Soviet policy was conditioned by two factors. On the one hand, since the establishment of Communist power in Eastern Europe was still not completed, it was necessary to refrain from the extreme anti-imperialist propaganda in order to keep the Western powers on friendly terms. On the other hand, the situation in the Far East itself demanded a large measure of sobriety, particularly in view of the fact that the United States, with its preponderant power, was actively interested in the region also. Consequently, the Russian leader sought his objective on the basis of a moderate policy, with the traditional Communist polemic against imperialism conspicuously absent. In its place appeared mild encouragement of the Asian quest for full freedom, coupled with a willingness to cooperate with all principals to bring it about peacefully.

Stalin put to good use the skill he had developed since Lenin's death. With respect to China, for example, where Chiang Kai-shek's suspicions and American presence constituted serious obstacles, he worked diligently to
restore the "old spirit of friendship and collaboration" that had marked the relationship between Lenin and Sun Yat-sen, and thus to force the Americans to leave. ¹ His proof of sincerity consisted of a series of concessions to the Chinese national interest. First, on August 14, 1945, he agreed to a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, one that committed Soviet Russia to China's defense in the event of renewed Japanese aggression.² Then, in an exchange of notes relative to the treaty, he promised to withdraw all Russian troops from Manchuria within three months, formally acknowledged Chiang's sovereignty over Manchuria, and gave assurances that he would not interfere in China's internal affairs. By this last point, of course, Stalin meant that he would not assist the Chinese Communists.

The Soviet dictator also offered a compromise on the unresolved issue of Outer Mongolia's status in the form of a bid to let the Mongolians settles it themselves by means of a plebescite.³ Furthermore, in restoring the pre-war joint

³ Stalin could claim this as a retreat from his demand at Yalta that the status quo in Outer Mongolia be preserved, meaning that the Mongolian People's Republic should be recognized. In fact, of course, it represented no real concession, since Communist control over the people made the outcome of a plebescite a foregone conclusion.
Sino-Soviet administration of the Manchurian railway system, he left the security of the railway to the Chinese and agreed not to make use of it to transport Russian troops except during hostilities with Japan. Finally, on the joint use of the Port Arthur area, Stalin agreed to leave the problem of civil administration in Chinese hands.

In the guise of nationalists, the Chinese Communists made their contribution to this effort to convince Chiang Kai-shek and the United States that Communist revolutionism was a dormant issue in the East. Obviously on instructions from Marshal Rodion Malinovski, the commander of the Red Army in Manchuria, Mao Tse-tung responded affirmatively to an American offer to mediate the civil war and, on August 28, 1945, flew to Chungking to begin negotiations. Though a final settlement was not achieved after seven months of bargaining, a formal truce was signed on January 10, 1946. In the meantime, Chinese Communist spokesmen engaged in the familiar practice of emphasizing the purely national and democratic character of their aims. One went so far as to threaten anyone who would attempt to introduce communism into China at that time:

The Communist Party's program for China at present is one of democratic capitalist devel-

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opment, based on state, private and cooperative enterprise. . . .

The program of the Chinese Communists is comparable to the political and economic concepts in the United States at the time of Jefferson and Lincoln. The Chinese Communist Party maintains no liaison with the Russian Communist Party or any other foreign Communist party.

Considering that true communism is not suited to China in the present stage of political and economic development, the Chinese Communist Party would oppose any party that attempted to introduce communism of the classical or Russian pattern into China. . . . 5

Based on this combined Russian and Chinese Communist effort to make Communism as respectable as the philosophies of Jefferson and Lincoln, Stalin gently prodded the United States on the question of withdrawing from China. On November 6, 1945, Izvestiia expressed concern lest the American troops stationed in China complicate the settlement of the civil war by lending inadvertent encouragement to Chiang Kai-shek in his discussions with the Chinese Communists. 6

And the matter was broached formally by Molotov at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, with a tone of urgency that irritated Secretary of State Byrnes. 7

However, when the latter raised the issue at a meeting with Stalin, the Soviet leader qualified the insistence of his

5 Quoted in Ibid., December 5, 1945, p.
6 Izvestiia, November 6, 1945, p. 4.
Foreign Minister with the explanation that it was not to the presence of American troops in China he objected, but rather to the possibility that Chiang Kai-shek would lose prestige at home for the reason of seeming to rely on the support of a foreign power. Though transparent, this excuse was consistent with the general Russian display of concern for national rights. In the meantime, excuses were found for delaying the withdrawal of the Red Army from Manchuria.

The situation in Korea was different than China's. Because Korea had been a part of the Japanese Empire for more than three decades, there was no central government to which Soviet offers of friendship and assistance could be directed. However, there were other factors favorable to the Russian purpose and methods. For one thing, Korea presented a promising field for Communist propaganda. Considering the widespread illiteracy and the years of suffering under Japan's imperialistic domination and exploitation, the Korean people could be expected to respond to the type of patriotic appeals Communism had to offer. For another thing, Soviet access to Korea had been established in advance; the Red Army had been assigned the task of accept-

8Cf. Ibid., p. 228.

ing the surrender of the Japanese armies north of the thirty-eighth parallel by the Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific, General MacArthur. 10 Finally, there were few native politicians with experience in Korea, and no Korean government-in-exile enjoyed the recognition of the Allies. This setting undoubtedly prompted high expectations in Moscow.

On August 14, 1945, with Japanese control over the Korean peninsula completely shattered, and with the United States Army still absent from the scene, the Red Army commander led a familiar procession into Korea. In addition to his own troops, he brought with him a Korean "national liberation army" and the nucleus of a "national government", both composed of Korean refugees who had fled to Russia after the First World War. 11 Most of the returning Koreans were not Communists, but the customary sprinkling of Communists and fellow-travelers provided Moscow with the means for exercising the necessary degree of direction. And behind them, of course, the Red Army remained ready to give effect to their wishes.

Communist propagandists naturally took full advantage of the opportunity to heap credit on the Soviet Union for liberating Korea. Organized demonstrations of welcome paved

the procession of the Red Army down to the thirty-eighth parallel.\textsuperscript{12} And other tasks were performed as well. Very quickly, "people's committees" were organized throughout Korea to handle civil administration at the local level.\textsuperscript{13} Then, on September 6, 1945, just two days before the first American troops landed in Korea, a Congress of People's Committees was convened in Seoul. It proclaimed a "Korean People's Republic", appointed a provisional commission to draw up a constitution, and set March 31, 1946 as the date on which a general election would be held.\textsuperscript{14} Dr. Lyuh Woon Heung, a non-Communist, provided the whole effort with its "nationalist" character.

Stalin apparently intended to confront the late-arriving Americans with a \textit{fait accompli}, following the pattern employed in Eastern Europe. But this time the ruse failed to work. The United States flatly rejected the authority of the Congress of People's Committees; and, when General John Hodge arrived on the scene on September 8, 1945, he eliminated the local "people's committees" south of the thirty-eighth parallel altogether. Not surprisingly, the Korean Communists called this a blatant disregard for

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 259.


the Korean right to national self-determination and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops. 15

But Stalin reacted differently. Though undoubtedly disappointed for having failed to prevent the United States from exercising its prerogatives in Korea, he decided to wait for a more opportune moment to make use of his own national-liberation movement as a spearhead for unification. Consequently, he accepted the American action without protest and played the role of one who was anxious to cooperate with everyone interested in the fate of Korea. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, for example, he proposed the establishment of a four-power trusteeship over Korea and the creation of a provisional Korean government that would assume power at that time. Also, he agreed to the creation of a joint Soviet-American commission to facilitate the economic reunification of the country. 16

By this method, the Soviet dictator undoubtedly hoped to depict himself as still faithful to the principles of the wartime alliance and sympathetic to Korean national aspirations. But, judging by later events, it is also likely that he didn't expect his proposals and agreement to serve

any other future purpose than a basis upon which disagreements could be founded in order to prevent a settlement of the Korean issue on any but Soviet terms.\textsuperscript{17}

The most perplexing problem that Stalin faced in his early postwar effort to limit American influence in the Far East occurred in Japan. The chief obstacle in this case consisted of the adamant insistence of the United States to possess an almost exclusive right to occupy the Japanese main islands and execute the terms of surrender.\textsuperscript{18} This, of course, eliminated the possibility of using the Red Army as an instrument of policy, as was being done in China and Korea. Furthermore, the absence of a central Japanese government and the depression of Japanese nationalism under the impact of total defeat precluded a basis for conducting an effective propaganda campaign for local favor. As a result, the Soviet dictator tried to make use of the national idea in another, though not unfamiliar, way. Following the pattern established during the war, he based his claim to a greater voice in Japan's affairs on a defense of Russia's national interests; on the contention that an alliance between sovereign states obligates each to respect

\textsuperscript{17}Cf. below, p.

the interests, and reward the contributions, of the rest.

In this connection, Stalin automatically accepted an American invitation to join with the United States, Britain, and China to create a ten-power advisory commission to assist in the execution of the surrender terms in Japan.\(^{19}\) It seemed an easy way to satisfy his desire to gain a voice in Japanese affairs without sacrificing the appearance of cooperativeness. But he changed to a more forceful tack soon after. A British objection to the American proposal -- because India was not to be included on the commission, and because the commission's powers were to be advisory only -- offered the opportunity to be slightly more forceful without appearing singularly obstructive. And the Communist dictator was probably hopeful that a beneficial alliance with the British on this point could be developed.

The first sign of Soviet obdurateness appeared in September, 1945, at the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in London. Molotov began it by lodging a complaint against the American occupation policy in Japan. His contention was that the rapid demobilization of the Japanese Army would result in an early renascence of militarism in Japan, and thus posed a serious problem to Soviet Russia.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\)Cf. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

However, the Soviet Foreign Minister did not explain why he thought rapid demobilization was more conducive to militarism than a slower process. Instead, he went on to present what was his main point. This consisted of a proposal that an Allied Control Council, similar to the one in Germany, be created to carry out the terms of surrender in Japan. To underscore the point, Molotov temporarily withdrew Moscow's consent to participate in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.²¹

When this Soviet effort was rebuffed, Stalin added his own voice to the controversy. Speaking in Moscow, and in a manner suggesting the attitude of an extreme nationalist, the Communist dictator offered a version of the war in the Pacific that made it appear as though Russia alone had defeated Japan and then demanded that the Allies respect Soviet fears over the possibility of resurgent Japanese militarism. He also included a pointed reminder that American, British, and French hostility toward Russia back in 1918 had encouraged the Japanese to invade Siberia.²² Shortly thereafter, the Soviet representative in Tokyo, Lieutenant-General Kuzma Derevianko, was recalled to Moscow. Stalin explained this with the statement that it was beneath

²¹ Cf. Ibid.

the dignity of the Soviet Union to be treated as a satellite rather than an Ally. 23

After further negotiation, spiced by new demands on behalf of Soviet Russia’s national interests, a four-power Allied Council for Japan was created at the end of 1945. However, it was not the "control" council that Stalin sought. Like the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, to which approval was given once again, the Council’s role was to be a very limited one, permitting the United States to do whatever it wanted without serious interference. 24 Soviet acceptance was probably prompted by the realization that it was the most to be gained under the circumstances, and by the expectation that it would serve as a convenient rostrum for disputing with the United States and possibly stirring up anti-American resentment in Japan.

It is worthwhile to mention here that the customary supporting role in the Soviet effort to create a respectable national image was played by the Japanese Communist Party. Its leaders, Tokuda and Shiga, were released by the Americans from eighteen years of imprisonment to become virtu-


24 The American Supreme Commander’s power to issue all orders for the implementation of the surrender terms and the occupation and control of Japan was in fact protected by the veto power in the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. Cf. Ibid., p. 218.
ally the only local politicians who could deny convincingly any responsibility for Japanese militarism. Before any other parties could effect the transition to democracy, they reorganized the Communist Party, publicly welcomed the American occupation, staged demonstrations on behalf of democratic development in Japan, and naturally disclaimed all ties with Communist parties abroad, especially with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Such an effort as this "... tended to create generally the impression that the Communists constituted the mainstay of democracy in Japan." Moscow could not have hoped for a better display of political respectability on the part of its Japanese followers.

The range of the early postwar Soviet interest in Asia also included the colonial issue; the purpose being to dislodge the British, French, and Dutch from their colonial holdings. In this case also, Stalin's method was noteworthy for its moderation and caution. Conspicuously absent were the traditional Communist polemics against Western colonialism and the overt encouragement of local Asian nationalist movements. Not even the existence of a strong, Communist-led nationalist movement in French Indo-China,

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and an even stronger Indonesian nationalist movement in the Dutch East Indies, provided sufficient cause for jeopardizing the carefully constructed image of Communist respectability. 26 The main effort in this respect centered on a proposal to solve the colonial problem by placing all colonies under temporary United Nations trusteeship and thus preparing them for eventual independence. 27 Its basis apparently was in a hope that the rising momentum of nationalism in the colonies and an evident reluctance of the United States to help in the restoration of the pre-war empires would make it seem reasonable to the British, French and Dutch. 28

26. The situation in Indo-China was an interesting one, since the leader of the nationalist movement there was none other than the Communist Ho Chi-minh. Earlier, as we have seen, Ho had preferred to pursue a revolutionary policy when Moscow's interests had dictated the opposite. (Cf. above, p. ) While the evidence is scant, considering that the Soviet press paid almost no attention to Indo-China in these early months, it is reasonable to assume that Stalin must have spent some uneasy moments thinking about the possibilities there.


28. Stalin apparently was also counting on American writers like Owen Lattimore, the Pacific Director of the wartime U.S. Office of War Information, to provide unwitting assistance to the Soviet cause in the form of recommendations for a policy in the Far East. A review of Lattimore's book, Solution in Asia (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.; 1945), underscored his proposal that the United States should play an active role in liberating the colonies. Cf. New Times, No. 13, December 1, 1945, pp. 29-31.
The trusteeship plan for the colonies, however, failed to win acceptance; and Stalin resorted to slightly more aggressive tactics. For example, in the United Nations, the Soviet delegate chided the Western Powers for refusing to honor the Indonesian quest for self-determination.\(^\text{29}\) In addition, one Soviet writer accused the United States of setting a new style of colonialism in the Philippines, which he described as a facade of sovereignty screening continued economic imperialism.\(^\text{30}\) Another writer reproved the British for what was termed the paradox of India's membership in the United Nations while lacking the right of national self-determination.\(^\text{31}\) But this was the extent of the pressure exerted. Evidently concerned about the Soviet interests elsewhere in Asia and in Europe, the Communist dictator elected to wait for a more opportune moment before trying the extreme anti-colonial propaganda he was keeping temporarily hidden.


\(^{30}\) Cf. E. Zhukov, "Porazhenie Iaponskogo imperializma i natsionalno-osvobitel'naia borba narodov vostochnoi Azii" ("The Defeat of Japanese Imperialism and the National-Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of East Asia"), Bolshevik, No. 24, December, 1945, pp. 86-87. What the Soviet leader obviously feared at this point was that the independence of a colony would not have the effect of cutting off its economic resources from Western capitalism.

Stalin Changes Tactics. In 1946 and 1947, Soviet policy in Asia exhibited its second phase, characterized by a more aggressive attempt to force the United States and the European colonial powers off the continent. The decision to change tactics was prompted partly by the evident limitations of the moderate policy. Chiang Kai-shek had not responded positively to the Soviet effort to revive the "old spirit" of Sino-Soviet friendship, the United States had not retreated a bit on the Japanese and Korean issues, and the plan to put all colonies under United Nations trusteeship had failed to win approval. But the new intensity of the Soviet effort stemmed from other sources as well. One was Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, which called for an anti-Soviet Anglo-American alliance. Another was the signature of the five European peace treaties on December 11, 1946. And a third was the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1947. What these events meant was that Stalin no longer needed to limit himself by the hope of exploiting the wartime spirit of collaboration, or by concern for the protection of Communist interests in Eastern Europe.

Though tougher, the new Soviet policy in the East continued to rely on nationalism for the achievement of its goals. The change consisted of a revival of some of the
old tactical devices conceived and applied by Lenin. Open encouragement of the nationalist movements in the colonies to press for independence, attempts to compel reluctant nationalists in the independent states to assert their sovereign rights against the West, and vigorous assertions on behalf of Russia's national security were the principal features of the new effort to force the Western Powers out of the East and then deny them access to the resources available there.

The new Soviet policy toward China, for example, was reminiscent of Lenin's policy toward Iran back in 1920. It was based on the premise that Chiang Kai-shek could be coerced into a more agreeable frame of mind, or possibly could be forced out of power by those Kuomintang elements which still wished to achieve an agreement with both Soviet Russia and the United States. With this in mind, Stalin threatened to keep the Red Army in Manchuria until all American troops had been withdrawn from China. He added to this a warning that all Japanese property in Manchuria might be seized as war booty. But he retreated from this stand soon after in the face of anti-Russian demonstrations in several Chinese cities and a stern note of protest from

32 Cf. above, pp.
the United States. For these reasons, he promised to withdraw from Manchuria within three months and offered the Chinese partial ownership of the Japanese assets, in some cases as much as fifty-one percent.

This did not, however, terminate the Russian effort to turn Chiang against the United States, or to force him out of power altogether. Other methods were employed. One consisted of a rising tone of impatience with the Chinese policy, expressed chiefly through the Soviet press. On April 10, 1946, for example, Izvestiia denounced what it termed a "campaign of lies" about Soviet Russia that was being waged by "reactionary elements" in the Kuomintang. Later, these same Chinese "elements" were charged with collusion with the United States to keep American forces in China as protection against the formation of a truly democratic government. And before the year was over, Pravda added the accusation that the real American interest in China was imperialistic, that American monopolists, with the assistance of reactionary Chinese, were seeking to turn

34 Cf. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 316,319.
36 Izvestiia, April 10, 1946, p. 4.
37 Cf. Pravda, June 26, 1946, p. 3; September 15, 1946, p. 4.
the country into a semi-colony. The Communist Party newspaper also decried a Sino-American commercial agreement, made on November 4, 1946, as a return to the old system of unequal treaties:

The conclusion of the American-Chinese agreement represents a new example of the retreat of the Kuomintang Government before the onslaught of the American monopolies. For the security of its anti-democratic regime, the Kuomintang Government is willing to sacrifice the vital interests of the Chinese people.

Throughout 1947, these same charges were repeated by Moscow, and, with a view to turning the Chinese against the Americans, particular attention was devoted to creating an image of the United States as dangerously imperialistic. On one occasion, the United States was alleged to seek the reinstatement of Japan as the dominant military power in Asia. On another, "proof" of current American intentions presented in the form of a detailed history of their imperialistic interventions in the Far East.

The Chinese Communists were also used by Stalin in this connection. When the Red Army withdrew from Manchuria,

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38 Pravda, December 19, 1946, p. 3.
39 Ibid.
the schedule of its departure was deliberately withheld from Chiang Kai-shek in order to permit Communist troops from Yenan to move in; and fighting between the Communist and Kuomintang forces followed. 42 At the negotiating table also, the Chinese Communists resorted to obstructionist tactics. Chiang Kai-shek recounts that his efforts to achieve a cease-fire in Manchuria in the summer of 1946, and a settlement of the larger civil war issue, were met by Chou En-lai's demands that the authority of the Communists in Manchuria be recognized and that the United States be asked to leave China immediately. 43 This brought the negotiations to a standstill. Then, in the fall, additional Communist demands to the effect that the Kuomintang government should be reorganized, with the Communists having a decisive voice in both its reorganization and subsequent policies, caused the discussions to break down altogether and prompted the United States to abandon its effort to mediate the civil war. 44

Throughout 1947, the Chinese Communists continued their forceful tactics. Despite military defeats in south-

42Stalin's explanation for the secret withdrawal was that the simultaneous presence of Kuomintang and Russian troops in the Manchurian cities might generate friction and cause incidents. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., p. 314.

43Chiang Chung-Cheng, op. cit., pp. 164-165.

44Cf. Ibid., pp. 175-178.
ern Manchuria, they managed to retain control of the rural areas in the north. Furthermore, they echoed the Soviet attack against Chinese "reactionaries" and American "imperialism" and promoted popular demonstrations against the continued presence of Americans in China. 45

Stalin, of course, abetted the Chinese Communists. Besides the advantage of the unannounced withdrawal of the Red Army from Manchuria, he gave to them large supplies of arms and ammunition that had been taken from the Japanese. 46 Further, the Soviet press began to distinguish between the "Kuomintang Army" and the Communist "United Democratic Army" in its reports on China. 47 But the Soviet dictator was careful to allow just the suspicion of complicity, without providing the die-hard anti-Soviet elements inside the Kuomintang with a basis for convincing the rest that the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 should be renounced. 48


46 It was impossible to prove that the Red Army turned over the captured equipment to the Communists. However, Beloff's conclusion on this point appears most reasonable: "... it was these arms which must supply the reason why the Communist forces, so poorly armed before the autumn of 1945, appeared to be so well provided in the subsequent campaigns." Op. cit., p. 55.


Under different circumstances, he might have promoted a diplomatic break to add to the tension. But the prospect of drawing the United States wholeheartedly into the civil war on Chiang's side as a result provided the chief deterrent. 49

Toward Japan, Stalin's new forcefulness was manifested on the basis of expressed fears for Russia's national security and a developing concern for the sovereign rights of the Japanese. For example, frequent and sharp criticism was directed at the United States occupation policy, which was depicted as seeking to recreate Japan in the form of an American base against Soviet Russia. The preservation of the Emperor, the failure to indict as war criminals the leaders of Japan's great economic combines, and the slow process of the trial of the major war criminals was offered by Moscow as evidence of an American effort to cater to powerful Japanese elements in order to turn them into anti-Soviet allies. 50 In addition, General MacArthur was accused of repudiating the Potsdam Declaration, of disregarding the advice of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, and attempt-

49 Chou En-lai was undoubtedly echoing Moscow's sentiments when, on September 8, 1946, he expressed the fear that American aid to Chiang Kai-shek would be increased if Soviet Russia openly threatened the Nationalist regime. Cf. The New York Times, September 9, 1946, p. 10.

ing to lighten Japan's reparations responsibilities. There were also charges that the United States was reviving Japanese militarism and, in this connection, was training Japanese pilots in the United States Army Air Force.

Besides this direct assault against the United States, Stalin also opened a campaign of direct appeals to Japanese sentiment, intended to stimulate nationalism and direct it against the Americans. In this connection, the Soviet propagandists centered their attention on the idea that the United States was not only interested in turning Japan into an anti-Soviet military bastion in the Far East, but sought to preserve it as a colony for economic exploitation as well. An alleged failure to provide sufficient work, food, and shelter for the Japanese masses was described as illustrative of a new era of imperialistic exploitation, and the same objective was said to be implied in the American refusal to undertake an extensive land reform program and to provide relief for the small businessman from the pressure of monopolistic capitalism.

In Korea, the main objective of the Soviet dictator during 1946 and 1947 was to protect the Communist foothold.

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north of the thirty-eighth parallel by preventing the implementation of the agreements made in Moscow. His method in this case was very similar to that followed in Eastern Europe after the Yalta Agreement. For example, at the first conference of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, held in Seoul from January 16 to February 5, 1946, nothing of significance was achieved on the issue of Korea's economic unification. The Russian contention was that the creation of a provisional Korean national government must precede it; which, of course, meant that obstructionism was to be accomplished without impairing the Communist image as defender of Korean national rights. To foster this illusion, Moscow issued a direct appeal to Korean national sentiment, arguing that it had prevented a United States plan to place Korea under trusteeship for as long as ten years and to exclude a provisional national government.

At the second meeting of the Joint Commission, which began on March 20, 1946, the head of the Soviet delegation, General Terenti Shtikov, presented Stalin's plan for the creation of a Korean government. Following a familiar pattern, it sought to eliminate in advance practically every

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anti-Communist Korean politician. Aware that only Koreans north of the thirty-eighth parallel and Communists and fellow travelers south of it were on record as favoring trusteeship, acceptance of the Moscow agreement from the time it had been announced was made a qualification for participation in the government. Hence, when the head of the American delegation, General Hodge, persuaded the Korean nationalists in the south to accept trusteeship for the sake of organizing a provisional regime, Shtikov refused to allow their participation on the ground that they were already disqualified. After six weeks of fruitless negotiation on this issue, the Commission adjourned sine die.

The Soviet explanation for the breakdown of the negotiations was carefully spelled out for the benefit of the Koreans in the American zone. The United States was held responsible on two counts. For one, the American military commander was charged with giving preference to reactionary elements in the formation of the provisional government. This was attributed to an American aim to turn Korea into a colony. The second, related to the first, was that the United States refused to permit the formation of a government because it wanted to determine the character of

Korea's economy before any Koreans were allowed a voice in their own affairs. Moscow naturally claimed that its only interest in Korea was to prevent it from falling under new imperialistic domination.

Stalin probably intended this to be the terminal point of the Joint Commission's function; unless, of course, the United States would prove willing to pay for economic unification by accepting a Korean government dominated by Communists and loyal to Moscow. More than a year later, however, he did agree to another meeting. He was prompted then not by any greater hope for success, but rather by a need to forestall an American plan to provide important assistance for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy south of the thirty-eighth parallel. This was evident in his condition for the meeting that the implementation of the American plan be suspended until a provisional Korean government was established. The United States agreed to this, apparently hopeful that a compromise could be achieved.

What was to be definitely the final meeting of the Joint Commission opened on May 21, 1947, and lasted for five months. For the sake of appearing agreeable, the Soviet delegate consented to admit all Korean political leaders to

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59 Cf. Dallin, op. cit., p. 304.
participate in the formation of the provisional government, provided they presented written support of the Moscow decision on the trusteeship question.\(^{60}\) This seemed like a Communist concession to the American position. However, to avoid the possibility of a government in which the Korean Communists would play a subordinate role, the Soviet delegate demanded that the northern and southern zones be represented equally in the government.\(^{61}\)

Inasmuch as southern Korea contained more than twice as many people as were located in the north, the United States rejected this new condition. Stalin probably expected that it would. And he probably anticipated a negative reply to his more radical suggestion, made in September, 1947, that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea. When the United States refused, the Soviet leader used this as a pretext for announcing his decision to cease membership in the Joint Commission. Thus, on October 21, 1947, all members of the Soviet delegation left Seoul.

Though he didn't expect the United States to accept the suggestion, Stalin probably would have welcomed a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. During the twenty

\(^{60}\) Cf. United States Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.


months of inconclusive bickering, he had made significant progress in preparation for the day when the Americans would in fact leave. By this time, the Soviet zone had been given an almost completely sovereign character. A provisional "People's Committee of Northern Korea" had been created as the central organ of authority and a number of economic and social reforms -- including land reform, nationalization of large industries, and encouragement of trade unions -- had been carried out. 63 In addition, in mid-1946, the Communist Party had been merged with the fellow travelling People's Party to form the Korean Workers' Party, which, in typical Communist fashion, provided the nucleus and motive force for a broader Korean Democratic National Front.

Completing this postwar Korean version of the old Communist nationalist-revolutionary committee was its military force, composed of more than a hundred thousand Russian trained and armed members of the People's Militia. Its strength far exceeded that of the fifty thousand policemen in south Korea. 64 It goes without saying that the People's Militia would be transformed into a Korean "nation-

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63 Initially, Dallin writes, the land reform program in the Soviet zone made a deep and favorable impression in the American zone, especially among the sizeable rural population. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., p. 290.

64 Cf. Ibid., p. 292.
al liberation army" once the American forces had been withdrawn.

For his second stage assault against the British, French, and Dutch positions in Asia, Stalin shifted from moderate anti-colonialism to anti-imperialism on a broad scale. Mandates, protectorates, and sovereign Asian countries in which the West enjoyed economic privileges were added to the colonies as prime objects of the Soviet liberating mission. The new approach to the colonial issue, for example, embodied increased criticism of the colonial powers, with the British and Dutch getting most of the abuse. The former were taken to task for their "... desire to restore the former colonial regime (in the Far East) as early as possible." And both the British and Dutch were berated for their joint effort against the Indonesians:

During the (past) five months the effort to reestablish Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia by force proved fruitless, and the role played by the British armed forces as instruments for the restoration of Dutch imperialism has been giving rise to increasing and deserved criticism. 66

Criticism of the French in Indo-China was also expressed, though in a more reserved manner. 67

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restraint in this case was dictated by a need to avoid too close an identification between Moscow and the Communist leader of the Indo-Chinese nationalist movement, Ho Chi-minh. In this particular phase of policy, Stalin aimed to win the confidence of the Asian nationalist leaders, on which basis anti-Western alliances between Communists and nationalists could be founded. Thus his encouragement of their efforts to achieve independence had to be as free of Communist revolutionary sentiment as Lenin's had been.

Within each colony, native Communists were assigned the task of collaborating actively with all anti-imperialist elements. They were to help in the achievement of independence and to gain a voice in the nationalist governments that would follow. National liberation was to take precedence temporarily over the Communist revolutionary interest. However, in this connection, Stalin's strategy encountered two serious obstacles. One was contained in a cool reception that the Communist offers of friendship evoked from nationalists generally. In Indonesia, for example, the Communist leader, Tan Malaka, organized a "People's Front" on February 1, 1946 in an effort to persuade the nationalists to take more forceful action in their negotiations.

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68 Cf. E. Zhukov, "Velikaia oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revolutsiia i kolonialni vostok" ("The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Colonial East"), Bolshevik, No. 20, October, 1946, pp. 38-47. In this article, the Russian revolution is described as similar to the
with the Dutch. Less than a month later, however, he was arrested by them on a charge of having attempted to disrupt the Indonesian state and was placed in prison without a trial. 69 A similar difficulty was encountered in Malaya, where Chinese Malayans, disturbed by worsening relations between Moscow and Chungking, refused to transfer the wartime cooperation against the Japanese to a similar effort against the British. 70 And almost the same problem arose in Burma. 71 What the nationalists obviously feared was a repetition of 1926-1927. It was, of course, not difficult to recall that the Communist offers of assistance in the past had been nothing more than an expedient device, under which lay revolutionary motives.

The second obstacle encountered took the form of a left deviationist tendency among some of India's Communists. This crystallized in the summer of 1946, following an attempt by R. Palme Dutt, the British Communist leader, to bring Indian Communist policy into line with Moscow's. During the spring, it had appeared that Dutt would be successful, for his discussions with both the Communists and colonial rebellions for self-determination.


70 Cf. Ibid., pp. 132, 134.

71 Cf. Ibid., p. 92.
the Indian nationalists gave promise of a fruitful alliance. But, in August, after Dutt had left for home, the radical wing of the Indian Communist Party began to demand that Communists should take the initiative and turn the national, anti-imperialist revolution into a socialist revolution. As a consequence, for the rest of 1946 and during 1947, the Indian Communists vacillated between support and criticism of the nationalistic Congress Party and thus failed to achieve the sort of alliance that Stalin wanted.

Elsewhere along Asia's southern periphery, the Stalinist campaign against the Western powers also displayed new vigor during 1946 and 1947. One very interesting episode in this connection took place in Iran. There the Soviet dictator attempted an almost exact duplication of a

72 One of the leaders of the Indian Congress Party, Sardar Patel, who was noted for his past hostility to Communism, responded to Dutt's overtures with "... full friendliness to the desirability of reconciliation with the Communists and letting the past difficulties be buried." R. Palme Dutt, "Travel Notes Number 2," Labour Monthly, XXVIII, June, 1946, p. 188.


74 The Soviet dictator refrained from overt interference in the affairs of the Indian Communist Party, wishing to preserve its "national" character. However, Soviet commentators did reveal displeasure in the form of references to the leaders of the Congress Party as "left-wing progressives." Cf. Pravda, October 24, 1946, p. 3.
tactic employed earlier by Lenin. The opportunity was presented as a result of the joint Soviet-British military occupation of Iran since August, 1941, which had placed the northern part of the country under the control of the Red Army for the duration of the war plus six months. Following the old pattern, a revolt took place at the end of 1945 in the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan and a "National Government of Persian Azerbaijan" was proclaimed. Headed by Sayed Jafar Peeshahvari, an Azerbaijani Communist who had helped Kuchik Khan back in 1920, the revolutionary regime demanded national autonomy. The Red Army, of course, protected it against the Teheran government.

Stalin's justification for the tight control exercised by the Soviet forces over northern Iran was twofold. It was to defend the Russian oilfields in Baku against sabotage by Fascist elements in Iran and to protect the national rights of the Azerbaijani minority. His demands on behalf of the rebellion naturally were sufficiently extreme to make sure that they wouldn't be accepted in Teheran. In the meantime, he armed the rebels, began to encourage

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77 Cf. Ibid., p. 295.
revolutionary movements in such other provinces as Gilan, Zanjan, Qazvin, and Semnan, and sponsored a "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad." 78

During February and early March, 1946, the prospect for a Soviet success in Iran appeared bright. Due to the Russian pressure, and the demands of the Iranian Communists, organized in the Tudeh Party, a new government was created in Teheran at the end of January. Headed by Qavam-us Saltaneh, who was supposed to be pro-Russian, it represented an important step toward the goal of forcing the British out of Iran altogether. 79 Furthermore, in compliance with the wartime agreement, the British withdrew their armed forces from the country by March 2, thus leaving the way open for Stalin to apply even greater pressure in pursuit of his objective.

Whatever hopes the Soviet dictator had in this respect, however, were soon shattered. For one thing, the Qavam government proved decidedly less pro-Russian than expected. It refused to accept the Russian demands on behalf of the Azerbaijanian rebels. It also protested for-


79 In his discussions with Qavam, Stalin attempted to convince the Iranian leader that Iran's economic development depended on the liquidation of all British assets in the country. Cf. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 294.
mally against the presence of the Red Army on Iran's territory after the March 2 deadline. 80

In reply to the demand that the Red Army be withdrawn, Stalin announced that it would remain in Iran until the situation was clarified. Then, for emphasis, he sent additional units, with tanks and planes, into Iran. The Soviet dictator may well have been preparing to put the Tudeh Party in power, for the Red Army moved to within twenty miles of Teheran and remained there despite protests from Teheran, Washington, and London and a move to bring the issue before the Security Council of the United Nations. 81 But then a second, more serious, obstacle to the Russian purpose appeared. On March 6, 1946, Stalin received what amounted to an ultimatum from President Truman, to the effect that American military and naval forces would be sent to Iran if the Red Army was not evacuated immediately. 82

The Russian dictator knew that he could not challenge the American threat and therefore he retreated. The Red Army left Iran six weeks later. And though continued pressure from Moscow delayed military action by the Teheran

80 Cf. Ibid., p. 295.
82 This note has not been made public; but its existence has been confirmed by President Truman. Cf. The New York Times, April 25, 1952, p. 4.
government against the rebels in Azerbaijan province, they, too, had to be abandoned. In December, 1946, with American encouragement, Iranian troops advanced northward, forcing Peeshahvari and all other Communists to flee to Russia. Unlike Kuchik Khan, they did not attempt to test their strength against the Iranian Army.

Elsewhere in the Near East, Soviet attention was directed to the task of cutting off the British and French from the oil resources and preventing the United States from acquiring concessions. In this connection, Communist propaganda encouraged Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqi, Saudi Arabsians, and Egyptians to assert their sovereign rights against European and American imperialism. They were warned, for example, that Britain intended to turn the Arab League into an instrument for the "... protection of imperial communications, transport and oilfields throughout the whole stretch of territory from Egypt to Basra."83 Another warning was that Britain and the United States were cooperating for the purpose of a more complete penetration of the Near East for the sake of oil and would turn the governments in the region into secret police forces to combat the growth

of democratic movements. 84

In 1946, the Communist Parties in the Near East were still weak; but they performed their task well. On June 28, 1946, Iraqi Communists led a worker-student demonstration in Baghdad against the presence of British troops in the country. 85 In Egypt, a "Democratic Movement of National Liberation" was the chief contribution of the Communists there. Its counterpart in Jordan was called "The League for National Liberation." 86 Except for their nuisance value, however, none of these efforts were of great importance to Moscow. The fact was that although Arab nationalists generally had little respect for the Western powers, their fear of Russia and Communism made them unresponsive to the offers of assistance put forth by Moscow.

The opportunity for success was much more promising in the case of Palestine, since it was still a British mandate. Pressure to force the British out could be exerted both within the country and through the United Nations. At the same time, however, the task was a complicated one, due to the bi-national character of Palestine's population and


the variety of solutions to the problem that appeared as a result. Among Arabs, opinion divided between independence with limited Jewish immigration from Europe and union with a neighboring Arab state. Among Jews, some favored partition into separate Jewish and Arab states while others preferred a bi-national independent state with unlimited immigration. 87

Stalin avoided the problem by merely demanding that the British be forced to give up their mandate. The Palestinian Communists, organized on separate national bases, likewise were vague beyond the demand that the British get out. But difficulties did arise in 1947, when the Jewish Communists attempted to define a solution. They called for an independent Arab-Jewish state, in which Jews would occupy one-third of the key governmental posts. 88 This was rejected by their Arab counterparts. And then both were thrown into a state of confusion and disappointment when Moscow, seeing an opportunity to force the British out with the assistance of the United States, agreed to an American and Zionist plan to create separate Arab and Jewish states. 89 This helped to get the British out in 1948, but it left

88 Cf. Lacqueur, op. cit., p. 113.
the Palestinian Communists without any prestige whatever. While the Arabs were alienated altogether, the Zionists permitted the Jewish Communists to serve merely as an adjunct of their liberation movement. From Stalin's standpoint, however, the effort had been a successful one, and, as one can judge from the record, it made little difference that the local Communists had suffered temporary setbacks.

Communism Takes the Offensive. Before 1947 was over, Stalin's postwar policy in Asia entered a third, and final, stage, becoming even more intensive than before. The Soviet dictator changed again because the results he sought were far from realized and seemed unlikely to be realized on the existing basis. In China, Chiang Kai-shek remained as stubbornly pro-Western as before, while, in Korea and Japan, the United States still refused to bow to Russian demands and intimidations. Furthermore, President Truman's ultimatum on the Iranian issue, and his aid to Greece and Turkey, had made it clear that further territorial gains would be hard to win by purely diplomatic means.

Equally frustrating had been the developments on the colonial issue. Independence had been achieved by the Indians, Pakistani, Ceylonese, and Burmese, and was being achieved by the Indonesians, without Communist participation. Consequently, the governments of these new states were being formed without Communist participation or influence. And,
what was even more disturbing, the new Asian governments were retaining close economic ties with the Western powers. This meant, of course, that Marxist-Leninist expectations on the colonial question were not being borne out by the facts; the independence of the colonies was not resulting in a complete severance of economic ties with the former colonial rulers.

Of necessity, then, Stalin's new strategy went a step beyond Lenin's. Recognizing that the only way to cut off the Western powers from Asia economically was to gain control of the Asian governments first, he assigned to the Communists the task of seizing power by revolutionary means. Henceforth, they were to wage a general offensive against imperialism, against both the Western powers in the remaining colonies and the independent governments which favored the retention of close economic ties with the West. The keynote address in this connection was delivered by Andrei Zhdanov at the first meeting of the Cominform, in September, 1947:

The Communist Parties must therefore head the resistance to the plans of imperialist expansion and aggression along every line. . . . They must rally their ranks and unite their efforts on the basis of a common anti-imperialist and democratic platform and gather around them all the democratic and patriotic forces of the people. 90

90 For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, No. 1, November 10, 1947, p. 4.
Three months later, the new tactical viewpoint was given added emphasis by E. Zhukov, the Soviet expert on Eastern affairs, who denounced the big bourgeoisie in Asia as having betrayed the national interests of their people by coming to terms with Western imperialism. The Indonesian nationalists, on whose behalf Moscow had hitherto argued, were singled out as especially culpable on this score. The sharpness of the tactical shift was underscored also by Zhukov's inclusion of the Indo-Chinese bourgeoisie in the category of national traitors. This represented the first real encouragement to Ho Chi-minh offered by the Soviet leadership in the postwar period.

The precise character of the new Communist offensive in the East was determined by local needs and opportunities and thus varied from place to place. With respect to China, for example, it did not lead to an immediate diplomatic break between Moscow and the Kuomintang government. Fear of American intervention on the latter's behalf obviously was the main factor of restraint. But, in a sharp departure from past practice, the Soviet leadership did begin to

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92 Evidence in this respect was provided by frequent accusations against American plans to intervene militarily in China. Cf. Pravda, August 30, 1948, p. 4; September 27, 1948, p. 3.
show definite signs of bias on behalf of the Chinese Communists. In the Russian press, a sharp increase in the publicity of Communist military successes took place. Pronouncements of the Chinese Communist leaders were prominently displayed and articles on the organization of the "liberated areas" of China began to appear.93 Also indicative of Stalin's partiality was his refusal to accept an offer from the Kuomintang, in January, 1949, to act as a mediator in the civil war. Earlier, under conditions wherein the Kuomintang enjoyed a clear military advantage, such an offer probably would have been accepted as a means to promote the Chinese Communist cause. However, by this time, the balanced of power had shifted, in fact, had almost reversed. In the previous fall, the Communist armies had captured Mukden, hundreds of thousands of Chiang's troops, and a great quantity of American-made military equipment. Manchuria was securely in Communist hands and the chances for a successful advance into north China proper was growing brighter by the day.

Under the circumstances, the Soviet dictator responded with logical negativeness to the offer to act as me-

diator. Typically, he explained his refusal on the ground that the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries prohibited the Soviet Union from undertaking the task. 94 On January 19, 1949, however, such dedication to principle did not prevent Pravda from printing the eight conditions of peace announced by Mao Tse-tung. 95

In the meantime, the Chinese Communists pressed southward across China proper, taking Peking at the end of January, 1949 and crossing the Yantse River three months later. Ostensibly, it was not a Communist revolution, but rather a national liberation movement, combining all true Chinese patriots in a struggle against imperialism. 96 The "national" character of the offensive was emphasized by the Communists in statements promising to cooperate with all countries in the establishment of peace. 97 But the implied neutralism in the cold war between the West and the Soviet bloc was soon dispelled. In an article in the Cominform newspaper, on July 15, 1949, Mao Tse-tung made it clear that his sympathies were definitely on the side of the So-

95 Pravda, January 19, 1949, p. 3.
97 Cf. Ibid.
viet bloc:

... the Chinese people must either side with imperialism or with Socialism. There can be no question of remaining between them, there is no third path. ... Internationally, we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and for genuine friendly aid we must look to this front and not to the imperialist front. 98

In the summer of 1949, almost all public Soviet restraint with respect to the Chinese civil war was dropped. The Chinese Communists began to participate openly in the activities of the world Communist movement. Chinese delegates, for example, appeared at the World Federation of Trade Unions congresses held in Moscow and Warsaw and took part in the World Peace Congress held in Prague. 99 But Stalin still maintained diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang. Despite the fact that the last American marines had left China the previous May, he was still wary lest the United States be prompted to return. This fear lingered for only a few more months, however. On October 2, one day after Mao Tse-tung proclaimed a People's Republic of China, the Soviet leader formally transferred recognition to it. 100 It was the first real Communist success

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99 Cf. Izvestiia, June 4, 1949, p. 3; Pravda, July 15, 1949, p. 4.

in Asia in the postwar period and, quite naturally, it gave rise to the hope that others would follow before long.  

In Japan, also, the rule of greater Communist militancy was applied, though not with the same intensity exhibited in China. The knowledge that General MacArthur would not tolerate any extreme outbursts by the Japanese Communists dictated restraint during the remainder of 1947 and for most of 1948. However, in an obvious protest against the occupation policy of the United States, Stalin kept his chief delegate to the Allied Council, General Derevianko, in Russia for more than a year. The Soviet press continued to attack the American policy as imperialistic, while the Japanese Communists, still maintaining their ostensible independence of Moscow, took every opportunity to criticize the occupation and to promote working class unrest.  

In the fall of 1948, Stalin suddenly switched back to a more moderate tack in Japan: an action that was most  

101 "The Imperialists are now gazing in fear and dismay on the glorious creation of the era ushered in by the October Revolution -- on the Chinese People's Republic, with its 475,000,000 people. The situation in other colonial countries is likewise of a kind to inspire optimism in the masters of the capitalist world." "The Soviet State in the Struggle for Peace and Democracy," New Times, No. 45, November 2, 1949, p. 2.  

likely related to the events in China. The Soviet dictator apparently wished to avoid provoking the United States to an extreme as long as the Chinese Communist victory remained incomplete. Consequently, General Derevianko was sent back to his post on the Allied Council, with instructions to be temperate on the issue of American policy and to appeal to Japanese national sentiment by proposing greater opportunity for Japan's economic development at home and abroad and the conclusion of a peace treaty right away.

The Japanese Communists automatically followed this change in course. Once again they became mainly champions of the cause of democracy in Japan, with new emphasis on their strictly national character. Aided by a rise in unemployment, they even managed to poll about three million votes in the national election of January, 1949, adding thirty-one seats in the Japanese Diet to the four they held in the past.

The relationship of this more moderate line in Japan to the Chinese revolution was pointed up in the summer of

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103 Stalin's desire to protect the Chinese revolution was evident in his fear of provoking the United States as he had in the case of Iran. Cf. above, p.


1949, when, concurrent with the success of the Chinese Communists, and despite the new popularity of the Japanese Communists, Stalin reverted back to a policy of greater militancy. Soviet criticism of American policy appeared again with the old bitterness, and there was also a reprimand for the Japanese Communists for failing to do their utmost to force the Americans out.\textsuperscript{106} Thereupon the Japanese revolutionaries intensified their own efforts to create a united patriotic front of workers, peasants, fishermen, and intellectuals by appealing to national sentiment and by stirring up labor unrest.\textsuperscript{107} This pattern continued throughout 1949, spiced on one occasion at least by an open fight between Japanese Communists and American soldiers.\textsuperscript{108}

In Korean, as in Japan, the new Soviet militancy developed its intensity only gradually through 1948 and 1949. At first, while the general campaign against the West in Asia was rising steadily, Stalin continued on the defensive in Korea for the purpose of protecting the Communist foothold north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Ostensibly on behalf of Korea's national rights, he refused

\textsuperscript{106} Cf. \textit{For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy}, January 6, 1950, p. 3.


to recognize a decision by the United Nations to hold elections in each of Korea's occupied zones and, on this basis, to create a national government. The action of the international organization was decried as a screen for the American policy of turning Korea into a colony and a base for expansion in the Pacific. On April 23, 1948, a conference of North and South Korean "patriots" echoed this denunciation of the United Nations and the United States. And when the United Nations election commission supervised the elections held in the southern zone and was denied access to the northern zone, the Soviet dictator attempted to compensate for his psychological disadvantage by stating that the size of the Soviet occupation force would be reduced.

When the Republic of Korea was proclaimed on June 30, 1948, based on the elections held in the south, Stalin countered by holding elections, drafting a constitution, and establishing a Korean Democratic People's Republic in the north. He recognized the new Communist regime on October 12, and announced that all remaining units of the Red Army would be withdrawn from Korea. With attendant

109 Cf. Pravda, March 17, 1948, p. 4; April 12, 1948, p. 3.
111 Cf. Ibid., May 9, 1948, p. 1.
112 Cf. Ibid., October 13, 1948, p. 2.
fanfare, emphasizing Soviet Russia's true respect for the rights of small nations, the Red Army was evacuated by the end of the year.\footnote{113}{Cf. Izvestiia, December 31, 1948, p. 1.}

The Soviet leader withdrew the bulk of his troops from Korea because the United States had begun a gradual reduction of its forces the previous fall. It was undertaken confidently also because the North Korean army of over a hundred thousand troops, organized, trained, and armed by the Russians, was more than a match for the twenty-six thousand armed police in the south. The North Koreans reflected this confidence by encouraging and supporting guerrilla activities against the pro-Western government.\footnote{114}{Though the North Koreans referred to the guerrillas as "dissatisfied democratic elements" in the south, their knowledge of the guerrilla activities indicated a close relationship between them. Cf. For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, March 24, 1950, p. 3.}

On June 25, 1949, in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, a "United Korean Patriotic Front" was organized, composed of Communists and fellow-travellers from the south. Henceforth, it issued propaganda calling for the unification of Korea and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country.\footnote{115}{Cf. Ibid.; Izvestiia, June 29, 1949, p. 4.} The fact that only an American military mission of five hundred men remained to assist the South Koreans after the end of the month served as encour-
agement to the Communists.

Elsewhere along the periphery of Asia, Stalin faced no obstacles comparable to those posed by the United States in Japan and Korea. Therefore, during 1948 and 1949, a greater militancy characterized the effort to force the European powers out of their remaining colonies and to cut them off economically from the newly-independent countries. Quite naturally, the local Communists responded eagerly to the call to arms. Historically, they had not been enthusiastic participants in Moscow's attempts to win allies among leading nationalists; and they now welcomed the chance to pursue revolutionary objectives with Russian approval.

In India, for example, where the first independent Indian government was operating without Communist participation, the radical wing seized control of the Communist Party and began an open campaign of vilification of the Nehru government, denouncing it as a tool of the "Anglo-American Imperialist Camp." At a Party Congress, held in February-March, 1948, in Calcutta, these sentiments were repeated and joined to an appeal for a "people's democratic front" -- composed of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and progressive intellectuals -- that would wage an all-out struggle to create a truly national government. 116

117 Cf. Ibid., pp. 272-274.
At this very same time, a Communist-sponsored Southeast Asia Youth Conference also met in Calcutta. In attendance were delegates from India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China, the Philippines, North and South Korea, and Soviet Russia. The proceedings of this meeting have not been made public, but it is reasonable to assume that its purpose was to establish the new Communist tactical line uniformly among Asia's revolutionaries.

Within six months, Communist-led armed insurrections broke out in Indonesia, Malaya, and Burma, each one organized as a national liberation movement against Western imperialism and the local nationalist leaders who were charged with supporting it. In November, guerrilla activity by Ho Chi-minh's Indo-Chinese National Union League was intensified, and, in the following month, a full-scale revolution


against French rule developed. Elsewhere in Asia, where the Communists were still too weak to wage guerrilla warfare, an intensified effort to stir local opinion against the West was undertaken.

Despite the greater aggressiveness along the southern periphery of Asia, the Communists achieved very little success. The revolutionary upsurge was met by determined resistance on the part of the local governments or the colonial powers. In India, the national and state governments reacted swiftly and resolutely; the Communist Party was banned in most states, its newspapers were suppressed, and most of its leaders were arrested. Comparable firmness met the Communist effort in Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya, and throughout the Near East. The only exception to the general rule of defeat occurred in Indo-China, where some thirty thousand troops of Ho Chi-minh's army, fighting on a semi-guerrilla basis, presented too great a force for the French to overcome. However, it required six years of fighting before the decisive Communist victory materialized.

Korea: Stalin's Final Effort. In 1950, despite the

122 Cf. Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., pp. 276-278.
numerous defeats of the Communist-led national-liberation movements, Stalin continued to press his own campaign against the West in Asia. On January 31, despite sharp criticism from the Western powers, he recognized Ho Chi-minh's Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. And during the year, the Soviet press became extremely critical of the French and the Americans for their alleged interference in the national affairs of the Indo-Chinese. There was criticism also for the nationalist governments in India, Burma, and Indonesia, which were blamed for the failure of the Asian peoples to achieve true independence. But the major effort undertaken by the Soviet dictator in this year occurred in Korea, when the North Koreans undertook the "liberation" of South Korea from the West.

The North Korean attack, launched on June 25, 1950, was staged on the pretext that the South Koreans had attacked first. Officially, it represented a defensive action. However, the statements of the Korean Communist leader, Kim II Sung, made it clear that the action was intended to be


otherwise. As reported in the Soviet press, Kim's purpose was to free South Korea from imperialist American control and to unite it with North Korea in the formation of the first truly democratic Korean national state. 127

When Stalin set loose the Korean Communists on this liberating mission, he had good reason to expect another success. With the exception of the American military mission, there were no foreign troops in South Korea. And South Korea's relatively small armed force was obviously no match for the well-equipped North Korean army. Furthermore, it seemed unlikely that the United States would cause any more than diplomatic troubles, since, on January 12, 1950, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had given the impression that South Korea was not regarded as particularly significant in the United States' defensive strategy in the Pacific. 128

On the first point, of course, the Communist estimate was correct; the North Korean army had little trouble in pushing the South Koreans back. But a miscalculation did occur on the second point. Instead of standing by and letting the Communists overrun all of Korea, the United States

127 Cf. Izvestiia, June 27, 1950, p. 4.
reacted forcefully. Almost simultaneously, President Truman ordered the Americans in South Korea to help resist the attack and called upon the United Nations to take decisive action. Since the Soviet delegation was temporarily out of the Security Council, owing to a dispute over the continuing membership of the Chinese Kuomintang government, United Nations approval was easy to obtain. As a result, the North Koreans found themselves confronted with the impossible task of overcoming the resistance of a United Nations armed force, composed largely of American troops.

The details of the Korean conflict are not relevant to the purpose here, and need not be spelled out. The important point is that it marked the terminal point of Stalin's attempt to exploit nationalism in Asia after the Second World War, and, for that matter, in his life. The Communist national-liberation offensive had achieved only a partial success. The revolution had succeeded in China and it was still on in Indo-China. Elsewhere it had failed, and, in 1950, it appeared as though the postwar gains in Korea were to be lost. Consequently, the Soviet dictator reverted to a defensive position. "National liberation" was replaced by "world peace" as the dominant theme of Communist propaganda, and Communists everywhere, with the

\[129\text{cf. Truman, op. cit., II, pp. 337-338.}\]
exception of China and Indo-China, set aside their anti-imperialist slogans temporarily for the sake of gathering names for "peace petitions" and staging "peace congresses". Their purpose, obviously, was to force the United Nations out of Korea and to prevent the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance that the Korean conflict had prompted. Until his death on March 5, 1953, the Soviet leader maintained this position.

**Conclusion.** Considering that the victory of the Chinese Communist revolution added China's massive territorial expanse and population to the Communist bloc in 1949, it is not easy to argue that Stalin's postwar policy in Asia was anything but a complete success. And yet, as the evidence indicates, the Soviet dictator accomplished much less than he intended. The fact of the matter is that, contrary to his expectations, he failed to turn Asian nationalism against the West in a manner consistent with the aim and method established by Lenin.

In China, for example, Stalin's effort to revive the "old spirit" of Sino-Soviet cooperation against the West simply had evoked no positive response on the part of the Chinese nationalists. Not even the exercise of moderate pressure had moved them. And the same result had occurred in connection with an attempt to develop anti-
Western alliances with the leaders of the nationalist movements in the colonies. In both China and the colonies, the Russian leader had underestimated the degree to which old suspicions of Communism conditioned nationalist thinking, while, in the colonies alone, he had made the same miscalculation with respect to the ability of the nationalists to gain independence without Communist assistance. In this connection, it might be added that he also misjudged British capabilities on the colonial issue, for the enlightened postwar British policy contributed to the difficulty that the Communists had in generating a truly profound anti-Western feeling among the peoples of Asia.

The setbacks suffered by the Russian leader in Korea, Japan, and Iran also had stemmed from an important miscalculation. In those three cases, he had underestimated the ability of the Western democracies to resist Soviet territorial ambitions when screened by appeals to the spirit of wartime collaboration, by demands put forth in the name of Russia's national interest, or by a propaganda campaign charging the Western powers with rapacious imperialism. To be sure, not since Wilson's Fourteen Points had a Western state shown itself disposed to challenge actively the Soviet claim to primacy in the
championship of national self-determination. But that experience might have served at least as a reminder of its possible recurrence. In such case, Stalin undoubtedly would have been better prepared to cope with one of Wilson's more belligerent successors, Harry Truman. As it turned out, however, the Soviet dictator was surprised to find in President Truman a worthy foe, one who obviously was not to be taken in by Communism's nationalistic pretensions. The American ultimatum in the case of Iran and the immediate forceful reaction in Korea illustrated the point.

When the Soviet dictator switched over to open revolutionary tactics late in 1947, retaining only the slightest nationalistic coloration, it signified his abandonment of the attempt to rely on the exploitation of nationalism as a primary weapon against the West in Asia. The one redeeming feature of this policy change was that it paved the way for the Chinese Communist revolutionary success. However, the cost was otherwise a heavy one. Elsewhere in the East, except for the sustained Communist-led nationalist rebellion in Indo-China, all Communist revolutionary efforts met with decisive defeat. And this, of course, precluded in Stalin's time at least the chance for a new Soviet attempt to make nationalism an effective instrument of foreign policy.
On the surface, Lenin's and Stalin's repeated use of nationalism to extend their territorial dominion and to protect their gains from outside attack appeared quite consistent with the general picture of modern international politics. Ever since France's Napoleon I transformed patriotism from a feeling of devotion to the native land into a weapon of great military and political significance, many political leaders have made use of nationalism for both offensive and defensive purposes. But, in two respects, the Soviet leaders differed from all others in this practice. For one thing, they were not motivated by a positive regard for nationalism; their ultimate goal was not the satisfaction of national aspirations. On the contrary, they acted on the basis of a theoretical bias against nationalism, viewing it as incompatible with socialism and worthy of destruction at the earliest possible moment. For another thing, the exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy by Lenin and Stalin led to successes in world affairs that few modern leaders could match. Since the beginning of 1918, their calculated promotion of
nationalism at home and abroad helped significantly to turn a weak Soviet revolutionary regime into a vast empire and the Communist movement into a powerful force for revolutionary change throughout the world.

The apparent incongruity between the theory and practice of the Soviet leaders on the national issue was not indicative of a hidden conflict between the opposing tendencies of nationalism and internationalism. Although Communism may yet be completely fragmentized by the centrifugal force of nationalism, much in the same manner as many universalist doctrines have been in the past, the actions of Lenin and Stalin were not to be taken as symptomatic in this respect. The dichotomy between theory and practice in their case was a deliberate one; its basis was contained in a calculated scheme to use nationalism as a weapon against capitalism and, since it was regarded as peculiar to capitalism, against nationalism itself.

From Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin inherited their anti-capitalist and anti-nationalist revolutionary doctrine. And from the originators of Marxism they also learned the logic of combining practical nationalism temporarily with theoretical anti-nationalism. They discovered it in Marx's plan to promote successful socialist revolutions in Europe by the simple expedient of encour-
aging the Irish and Poles to rebel against their English and Russian rulers. Marx had assumed that Irish indepen-
dence would deprive British capitalism of one of its prin-
cipal bases, intensify exploitation of the working class in Britain, and thus generate a revolutionary upheaval that would set off a chain reaction of working class rev-
olutions on the European continent. He had also assumed
that Polish independence would guarantee the success of the revolutions by blocking armed counter-revolutionary intervention by Tsarist Russia.

But it took the insight, ingenuity, and perseverance of Lenin to revive the Marxian revolutionary plan, to enlarge upon it by replacing Marx's advocacy of Irish and Polish independence with his own advocacy of indepen-
dence for all colonies, and to prove its validity as a revolutionary weapon. This he did despite the fact that the original plan possessed no tradition of recognition to recommend it, but only a record of rejection by Euro-
pean socialists. Dogmatic internationalists had refused to accept its ideological inconsistency, while "revisionists", whose revolutionary ardor waned under the impact of developing national attachments, had failed to heed its call to action.

Lenin succeeded also despite the active resistance of dogmatists in his own following, who decried the notion
of promoting nationalistic interests for any reason and rejoiced when it failed at first to produce the desired results. But Russia, between the March and November revolutions in 1917, served as Lenin's laboratory, and his effective exploitation of Ukrainian nationalism against the Provisional Government provided the positive result he sought. Not even the setback suffered early in 1918, when Wilson's Fourteen Points and Germany's appeasement of national sentiment undermined the Soviet effort to foster national rebellions in Eastern Europe, deterred the Communist leader from seeking new opportunities and new methods of utilizing nationalism in the quest for global revolutionary objectives. Considering his resoluteness, his refusal to bend in the face of the severest criticism leveled by doctrinaire Communists and the doubts raised by his protege and devotee, Stalin, one can almost conclude that the first ruler of Communist Russia regarded the tactical issue involving the use of nationalism as a personal one, for which he had to vindicate both Marx and himself, and on which he was prepared to stake his own political fate and that of the revolution in Russia as well.

As one can judge by many of the changes in the political configuration of Eastern Europe and Asia since 1918, Lenin did more than acquit himself in the eyes of
the critics and skeptics around him. Until his death in January, 1924, Lenin's exploitation of nationalism at home and abroad contributed significantly to the expansion of the Soviet territorial base from a narrow Russian point of origination to include almost all the territory that had been a part of the former Russian Empire. In this case, success materialized in spite of counter-revolutionary efforts by the Central Powers, the Allied-supported "white" Russian armies, and the Polish army. Also in this brief span of time, Lenin succeeded in developing the Soviet regime into a powerful force on behalf of national independence in Asia, providing encouragement and material aid to Asian nationalists who asserted themselves against Western imperialism. His aid to Kemal in Turkey and Amanullah Khan in Afghanistan helped decisively to limit Western influence in those countries. His skilfully devised pressure against the Iranian government, which helped to generate a nationalist rebellion, forced the British to relax their control over that country. And his policy toward China contributed in large part to the development of the powerful anti-imperialist, national unification movement under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen.

The key to Lenin's astonishing success as a manipulator of nationalistic symbols and exploiter of national
emotions, however, was not only in his determination to prove himself correct. Insight, ingenuity, and an acute sense of timing were additional factors that composed an unusual tactical ability. Among the leaders of the Communist revolution in Russia, only he could have exploited the aspirations of the Ukrainian nationalists for his own benefit on three separate occasions -- twice after demonstrating that his ultimate purpose was to destroy them. Furthermore, Lenin displayed amazing judgement in Asia, where rising nationalism offered several excellent opportunities for his talents. In his anti-imperialist campaign, he skirted the colonial issue to avoid provoking the Western colonial powers. Instead, he centered attention on those countries where Western control and influence already existed on a limited basis, as in Afghanistan, Iran, and China, or was only threatening to materialize, as in Turkey. In this connection, the fictional independence of the "people's republics" of Bokhara and Khiva in Soviet Central Asia provided Lenin with important prestige among Moslems in the Middle East, especially in Afghanistan. The Soviet-supported revolutionary Republic of Gilan in northern Iran served as a vital lever against the pro-British Iranian government and contributed to its overthrow by the strongly nationalistic, anti-British,
Riza Khan. In China, the transfer of interest from the Peking regime in the north to Sun Yat-sen's Cantonese nationalist movement in the south resulted in the creation of a powerful national unification movement there. Finally, Soviet aid to the Kemalist national movement in Turkey unified that country and prevented the Western powers from gaining full control over the Dardanelles.

The list of Lenin's achievements would be incomplete without including consideration of the manner in which the promotion of nationalism and the manipulation of nationalistic symbols contributed to the expansion of Soviet power from its original base in Russia proper. On the one hand, most of the borderland regions of the former Russian Empire were preserved for ultimate Communist control by a number of devices. For example, Lenin's "independent" Far Eastern Republic helped to prevent the Japanese from establishing permanent control over eastern Siberia. Avowed support of the national aspirations of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanians helped to turn the tide of opinion in those regions against the Allied-supported "white" Russian counter-revolutionary armies. And appeals to Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian national sentiment helped to thwart a Polish attempt at territorial aggrandizement.
On the other hand, the borderland regions were later conquered by the Red Army, with nationalistic symbols providing a convenient screen. From a strictly legalistic standpoint, Lenin's conquests were not conquests at all; for no declarations of war were ever issued and no action was undertaken against the interests of others. Thus, the invasion of the Ukraine, described as a defensive action, was undertaken only because the Ukrainian Rada had declared war. What the explanation omitted, of course, was that the Ukrainians had been provoked by evidence of Communist aggressiveness. Elsewhere, Belorussia was invaded and conquered for the ostensible reason of preserving its right to national self-determination, while Armenia was seized in order to protect it against Turkey. And still another method was employed in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In these cases, Communists were sent in first to form clandestine national revolutionary regimes, to proclaim themselves legitimate governments, and then to ask Moscow for assistance. The latter, of course, responded with immediate recognition and a mutual defense pact, which served as the legal basis for sending the Red Army to help them seize full control.

Lenin's purpose in the borderland regions was to extend Communist power by force, but without evoking protests in
the West or providing the Western powers with a pretext for resorting to arms against the Soviet regime. This he achieved by concealing the essentially military operation under a cloak of nationalist symbolism. Then, to foster the illusion beyond the point of actual conquest, he permitted the non-Russian regions to retain the form of independent national states, governed by national coalition regimes. However, the local Communists predominated in each case, and, by virtue of their membership in the Russian Communist Party, provided Moscow with the necessary power of direction. After three years of fictitious independence, and after it appeared that the Western powers would do nothing to prevent it, all of the independent soviet republics "voluntarily" agreed to political union.

Though perhaps indirectly, it was Lenin who made possible Stalin's successful exploitation of nationalism during the Second World War. After seeing its importance as a tactical weapon verified, Stalin became as confirmed as Lenin in his conviction that Communist internationalism could profitably accommodate nationalism on a temporary basis. And the methods he employed were largely those developed by Lenin. The appeals to Russian nationalism and the nationalization of the Communist parties throughout the world helped to cement the alliance with Britain and
the United States and contributed to the successful defense against the German invader. Then, once the tide of battle was turned in the Soviet favor, the familiar nationalistic facade was employed to make the military conquests of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania appear to be legitimate expressions of those countries' rights to national self-determination. This process of postwar Russian conquest, embellished with the slogan of national liberation and carefully constructed national coalition governments, was almost an exact duplication of Lenin's early triumph in the borderland regions.

Despite its great usefulness, however, Soviet exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy was not exactly a foolproof scheme. One of the obstacles confronted, for example, took the form of Western competition for the friendship of nationalists striving for independence against foreign domination. The inclusion of the right of national self-determination in Wilson's Fourteen Points illustrated the problem, for it blunted the effectiveness of the Communist appeals to national sentiment in Eastern Europe in 1918. But this proved to be a minor problem, chiefly for the reason that the Western effort in this respect was contained only in the Fourteen Points and in the subsequent recognition of the new national states of
Eastern Europe at the Versailles Conference. Thereafter, the American interest in applying the principle of national self-determination was stifled by a return to political isolationism. And quite naturally, the European colonial powers were not disposed to give it effect in their principal colonies in Asia and Africa. Consequently, by default, the way was opened to renewed Soviet exploitation of national sentiment, based on an opportunistict campaign against imperialism.

Though it might well have been considerable, there is no way of telling how much Lenin and Stalin would have accomplished in Asia, and possibly in Africa, if not for another obstacle that arose. This consisted of Communist national deviationism, the most serious internal weakness of the international Communist movement, and to which the expedient use of nationalism by the Russians undoubtedly contributed a great deal to its emergence. The problem grew out of the confusing responsibilities that the expedient promotion of nationalism imposed on non-Russian Communists. On the one hand, when Moscow sought to exploit nationalism, it was necessary for all non-Russian Communists to subordinate their own revolutionary aspirations to the task of encouraging bourgeois nationalism. On the other hand, once the purpose of promoting nationalism had
been achieved, or could no longer be achieved, it was necessary for them to swing back to an internationalist posture. The confusion of the repeated switching was compounded by the fact that neither Lenin nor Stalin bothered to spell out for their non-Russian followers the logic of the changes back and forth between nationalism and internationalism. Perhaps they took it for granted that all Communists abroad understood its meaning. Or possibly they withheld a precise description of the strategy out of fear of prompting the West to develop effective countermeasures. Since no explanation has been made available, one can only speculate on this point.

Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that some non-Russian Communists would fail to understand the responsibilities imposed on them. Those who did fail fell into two categories. On the one hand, there were the "left" national deviationists, who refused to accept the need to sacrifice their own revolutionary interests for the sake of supporting bourgeois nationalists and, consequently, ignored Moscow's instructions. Gregori Piatakov, the Asian Communists during 1925-1926, and the French Communists in 1937 were in this grouping. On the other hand, there were the "right" national deviationists, who accepted the need to promote nationalism expediently, but then, after close
association with the idea, found it difficult to make the rapid transformation back to a form of international Communist solidarity that compelled acceptance of Russian direction on all matters. Z. Zhilonovich, the Ukrainian, Georgian, and Belorussian Communist leaders in 1923, and Tito and Gomulka were in this grouping.

The problem of deviationism was not a serious one during Lenin's lifetime. This was due in part to the great respect he commanded among Communists at home and abroad, and in part to the fact that most non-Russian Communist parties were still too weak to resist Moscow's dictates. Thus, the resistance posed by Piatakov and Zhilonovich were two incidents which, since they caused little trouble, could easily be overlooked. And the obstacle created by the Ukrainian, Georgian, and Belorussian Communists in 1923 was overcome without difficulty by the simple device of making meaningless concessions to their nationalistic demands. Ultimately, the problem was solved altogether by liquidating the leaders of the resistance.

It was after Lenin's death, however, that deviationism became a truly serious problem in Communist ranks. Its first major manifestation occurred during the contest for power between Stalin and Trotsky in 1925-1926, and as a result of it. Due to Trotsky's insistence on dropping the
support of nationalist rebellions in Asia in favor of all-out socialist revolutions, the Asian Communists began to demand recognition of their revolutionary rights. As a result, Stalin was forced to concede on this point, and political disaster followed. A series of abortive Communist uprisings in Asia destroyed completely the prestige that Lenin had won for Soviet Russia among nationalists. Asian nationalist leaders immediately turned away from Communist assistance in their quests for independence. The full ramifications of this event were registered as late as the period following the Second World War, when, despite the time elapsed, Stalin's nationalization of Communism during the war, and the efforts of Asian Communists against the Japanese, the leaders of Asian nationalism refused to pay heed to new gestures of friendship made by Stalin.

Another example of costly deviationism was provided in 1937 by the French Communists, who refused to follow the instructions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern to pursue a nationalistic policy. Consequently, the overt radicalism of the French Communists contributed to the defeat of Stalin's effort to develop an anti-Axis alliance with France. And still other examples were provided in the early years after the Second World War. The "right" deviationism of Tito and Gomulka prevented Stalin from effecting
a smooth integration of the new "satellite" states into the Soviet bloc. While Gomulka was punished for his contribu-
tion, Tito carried his policy to an extreme conclusion and executed the first permanent split in the Communist world.

It is possible that, in time, the deviationist ten-
dency will shatter international Communism completely and irreparably. The evidence available from the experience of other universalist doctrines, both secular and religious, and from the experience of Communism so far seems to indi-
cate that it will. However, it is equally possible that the weakening of international Communism by national frag-
mentation will not develop fully before the Communist bloc has been strengthened sufficiently to prompt it to initiate an all-out military assault against the remaining non-Com-
munist portion of the world. Consequently, it is not enough for the Western states merely to hold firm in the face of threatening armed Communism, in the expectation that the threat will wither away in the next moment. It is to be expected that Stalin's successor, Khrushchev, though ham-
pered somewhat by his political inheritance, will make a full effort to implement the strategy formulated by Lenin. Since his rise to power, Khrushchev has given evidence of his interest in this matter. His "de-Stalinization" of Soviet policy, his revival of anti-imperialism and anti-
colonialism as principal propaganda themes, and his efforts to draw the underdeveloped countries into close economic relations with the Communist bloc appear conclusive in this respect.

Under the circumstances, it is incumbent on the West to understand the implications of the Soviet Russian strategy and to meet the threat that it poses. New manipulations of nationalistic symbols and expressions of sympathy for the national aspirations of the people in the colonies and underdeveloped countries will not denote a fundamental change in the internationalist outlook and revolutionary aims of Communism. These remain unchanged. Furthermore, it is to be recognized that, in the absence of an alternative, the people in the colonies and underdeveloped countries will more than likely accept the Communist offers of assistance. This despite the fact that they may be fully aware of Communism's fundamental revolutionary objectives. It is to be recalled that many nationalist leaders in the past accepted the Communist offers with full knowledge of the revolutionary doctrine, and that some of them paid dearly for it. It need not be pointed out here that recent Communist offers have attracted some attention already in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In order to meet the Communist challenge, the West
can make use of the Soviet record on the national issue as the basis for an intensive propaganda counteroffensive. Just as the Communists have exploited anti-imperialism to advantage, it is possible to reply in kind by publicizing the purely opportunistic concern for the welfare of the people in the colonies and underdeveloped countries expressed by Moscow. A definition of the fundamental revolutionary and anti-national aims of Communism, a description of the tactics employed in exploiting nationalism, and some concrete examples of the consequences of accepting offers of Communist assistance in the pursuit of national aims could provide the basis for an effective propaganda campaign in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Also, it is possible to reply to the Communist efforts to subvert the Western military alliances by encouraging the deviationist potentialities of non-Russian Communists. The establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with Communist China for example, may serve to loosen the ties between the Chinese and Russians and help generate differences between them. And offers of economic assistance and trade to the Communist satellite states in Eastern Europe may generate new suspicions in that part of the Communist world and thus encourage the appearance of new "Titos".
Finally, to blunt the appeal of Communism among the people of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the Western countries can coordinate their efforts to eliminate as quickly as possible the remaining vestiges of colonialism and imperialism for which they are responsible. Independence for the remaining colonies and a promise to turn over eventually all major foreign-owned economic enterprise to the governments of the countries in which they are located would help to build confidence in the West. And a similarly coordinated Western effort can be made to provide the people in the underdeveloped countries with the type of moral and material assistance that would reduce the attractiveness of Communism. It must be understood that, in this era of great revolutionary change throughout the world, the old aims and methods of foreign policy are no longer applicable. New aims and methods have to be developed if the challenge of Communism is to be met with effectiveness.
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This dissertation is the product of an investigation into the meaning of Soviet Russian use of nationalism as an instrument of foreign policy during the period of Lenin and Stalin. It is intended to show: (1) that the employment of nationalism was consistent with ideas advanced by Marx and Engels; (2) that the Soviet successes in foreign relations depended to a large extent on the encouragement of nationalism at home and abroad; and (3) that the chief weakness of this method was that it contributed to the growth of deviationist tendencies among non-Russian Communists.

For the purpose of this study, principal reliance was placed on original documentation. This included the works of leading Marxists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the national question, the writings of the Soviet leaders on the use of nationalism in foreign policy, and those of other Communist spokesmen on Soviet foreign policy. To complement these sources, use was made of reports published by non-Communist statesmen and diplomats who had personal contact with the Soviet leaders, and those of political refugees who formerly lived under Communist rule. Also employed were books and articles by Western scholars and reports by leading newspapers.

The method of the dissertation is historical and analytical. Initially, the idea of using nationalism as an
instrument of Communist policy is traced from its origin in the writings of Marx and Engels to its revival and enlargement by Lenin. Thereafter, attention is focused on Soviet exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy from 1918 to 1953. Five chapters are employed, each defining a major period of Soviet policy. In each, consideration is given the particular reason for the use of nationalism, the method of its employment, and its contribution to the Russian purpose.

One conclusion drawn from this study is that the Soviet use of nationalism was consistently Marxist. It was derived from a revolutionary plan conceived by Marx and Engels to promote socialist uprisings in Europe by encouraging Irish and Polish nationalists to fight for their freedom. Irish independence was intended to undermine capitalism in England and, in turn, on the European continent as well. Polish independence was meant to protect the socialist revolutions against intervention by Tsarist Russia.

A second conclusion is that Lenin's adaptation of Marx's expedient nationalism contributed significantly to the success of Soviet foreign policy. For example, the stimulation of nationalism in Russia proper and in the border regions of the former Russian Empire helped to defend Soviet power against the Central Powers, the "white"
Russian counterrevolutionary armies, and the Polish army, in 1918-1920. Furthermore, the use of nationalistic symbols facilitated the Communist conquest of most of the separated border regions, while the encouragement of Asian nationalism contributed to the decline of Western influence in the East. Finally, Lenin's tactics provided the model for Stalin's defensive strategy during the Second World War and for his postwar conquests in Eastern Europe.

A final conclusion is that the expedient Soviet promotion of nationalism also contributed to the growth of "left" and "right" deviationist tendencies among non-Russian Communists. On the one hand, the "left" deviationist refused to accept the subordination of his own revolutionary aspirations for the sake of promoting local national interests. On the other hand, the "right" deviationist, who accepted the encouragement of nationalism as a permanent feature of Communist policy, refused to subordinate himself to Moscow's will after achieving power in his own country. As illustrated by the "left" deviationism of Asian Communists in 1926 and the "right" deviationism of Tito in 1948, to name only two, the problem was a serious one.
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