Josiah Royce's interpretation of Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel

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JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF
SPINOZA, BERKELEY, KANT, AND HEGEL

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Josiah Royce undertakes the interpretation of the primary philosophical theories because of his firm conviction that a thorough knowledge and understanding of the trends in the history of thought is essential as the basis for any undertaking in the realm of philosophy.

Our common dependence upon the history of thought for all our reflective undertakings is unquestionable. Our best originality, if we ever get any originality, must spring from this very dependence.1

Royce surely followed his convictions, for he is, first of all, a thorough scholar in his field. "His procedure was first to gather and digest whatever the sciences or the devil might have to say."2 His interpretations are marked with an excellent employment of the principle of selection, for he chooses only those parts of historical systems the interpretation of which seem essential to him.

This paper will proceed, first, with an account of Royce's interpretation of four prominent thinkers in the history of philosophy, namely, Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and

1 Royce, SMP, vii. (A list of the standard abbreviations to be used in this thesis may be found in the bibliography.)
2 Santayana, COUS, 99.
Hegel. No attempt will be made in this thesis to consider all the contributions made by Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel to philosophy; the concern is only with Josiah Royce's interpretation of these four philosophers. This account of Royce's interpretations will comprise four chapters. The concluding chapter will contain a criticism of Royce's interpretation by the employment of Royce's own philosophical theories as points of reference, and a summary of the thesis.
CHAPTER II

JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF SPINOZA

Royce's treatment of Spinoza may be divided into two parts; first, the religious aspect of Spinoza, and second, a study of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus with reference to Spinoza's life and time.

As the best representative of the Absolutism and Naturalism of the seventeenth century, Royce chooses Spinoza, because of the extreme nature of Spinoza's position and its illustration of the trend of the time. Three main ideas were current in the philosophy of the century, according to Royce: first, that nature is a mechanism; second, that human reason is capable of grasping the truth of nature; and third, that philosophy must imitate the principle of mathematics for precision. Because this era appears to be coldly scientific, one might suppose any profound religious passion to be lacking. To prove the error of this supposition, Royce examines the religious aspect of Spinoza, and never ceases to marvel at the paradox in Spinoza's nature, exemplified by the strange combination of his cold

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1 Royce's chief discussions of Spinoza may be found in the following books: Royce, SMP, 32-67; Royce, FE, 290-299. This chapter is based on the material cited.

2 Royce, SMP, 41.
love of mathematics and his adoration of the Eternal.

According to Royce, all deep religious beliefs come from two sources. The first source, which Royce describes almost ironically, is the desire to find an authoritative, moral God. It originates in a wish to fight on the Lord's side, to find something to serve and for which to work vigorously. The religion which is the outcome of these desires is the Religion of Duty. The second source, and this seems to be more to Royce's taste, originates in the groping of a disappointed individual for some great objective truth that is perfect and that embodies all the strength which is lacking to this seeker of truth, that is victorious where he fails. It is that for which a man looks who has been baffled by the transient nature of the finite, or disillusioned by worldly failures. The outcome of these desires for a perfect truth is the religion of the mystic.

It is to this second, mystical belief, that Spinoza attaches himself, and a brief glimpse at his life will explain this position, according to Royce. Spinoza was an outcast. His own race denounced him as a heretic, and, despite the fact that he was called to Heidelberg, Europe ignored him to a large extent because he was a Jew. Consequently, he was a recluse, and lived a life of lonely contemplation. Despite his isolation, Spinoza was able to
formulate a happy spiritual outlook, and Royce considers this admirable. As a matter of fact, Royce observes, the only serious limitation caused by Spinoza’s loneliness was his inability to cope with the deeper social problems. The religion of the mystic is not an inspiration to those who desire to serve or to fight for a cause; rather it is a comfort to the disillusioned and downcast. Thus Spinoza, the outcast, forgets his own disappointments in a mystical adoration of a perfect order.

The mystic always tells the story of the emptiness of the sensory life and of the finite world, says Royce:

His polemic is against the sharp outlines of the world of Independent Beings, against the fallacies of all finite ideas, and against the possibility of worldly satisfaction.¹

Spinoza repeats the tale of all mystics, and yet remains a true philosopher. Anyone who has experienced disillusionment may share Spinoza’s mystical passion to worship something great and perfect, Royce goes on to say, but to be a true philosopher, one must justify this passion. To justify a mystical belief in the cold, clear-thinking seventeenth century would seem to present a difficult task,

¹ Royce, WI, I, 176.
yet Royce believes that Spinoza has succeeded in doing what might well be considered the impossible.

Spinoza bases his mystical belief on the axiom that whatever cannot be explained by its own nature must be explained by some higher nature which forces it to be what it is. To illustrate this axiom, Royce suggests that, since two mountains are precisely the same height for no obvious reason, there must be some higher force that causes them to be what they are. Cause and explanation mean the same thing to Spinoza. Proceeding from this axiom, then, Spinoza holds that there must be some highest nature of things. This highest nature he calls Substance, and this is confusing, Royce believes, since Spinoza's meaning of Substance is foreign to that of any other thinker. This Substance of Spinoza's is infinite and self-evident, it is self-determined and eternal, and we individuals and all of our doings are merely the result of it. All happenings in the world follow from it. This eternal Substance is Spinoza's God. In the infinity of this God Spinoza's finiteness is submerged, and he loses sight of his worldly disappointments in contemplation of the perfection of his God.

But, Royce suggests, we may inquire of this Substance, is it dead, is it a blind thing? According to Royce, Spinoza's answer is original; Substance is like a holy scripture, the
teachings of which have been translated into many languages, and which are complete in each different language. Royce tells of the two knowable aspects which Spinoza attributes to these self-expressions: the material world, or bodily substance, and the world of thought, or thinking substance. These two aspects are equally real, equally independent, and completely parallel. As far as the body extends, so does the mind, and as far as the mind extends, so does the body, and no further. God's thought produces our thinking and we are a part of the whole.¹

The optimism of the mystic belief lies in the fact that the eternal possesses an infinitely perfect mind of which our minds are only small parts. Spinoza's idea of the wise man is a picture of an individual making his way through the maze of finite disillusionments as if hypnotized, adoring the perfection of the Eternal.

It is interesting to note that, for all his sympathy with Spinoza's concept, Royce discards the mystical theory in his examination of the historical concepts of being, because it renders the eternal inaccessible and does not even endeavor to escape subjectivity.²

¹ Royce, SMP, 58-65.
² Royce, WI, I, 186-195.
In dealing with the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* with reference to Spinoza's life and time, Royce examines briefly the attempts made in the seventeenth century to formulate ethical theories. The chief characteristics of these theories are that they were made on the basis of reason, and that in them there was no reference to theology. The naturalistic trend of the time is to be seen in the natural laws that are mentioned in the ethics. By studying man and all of his desires, rights and duties, it was supposed, laws could be determined with mathematical precision. Royce points out that although these natural laws are out of favor now because of their subjectivity, they are a definite contribution to philosophy in that they violate the moralistic, theological tradition.

To clarify his interpretation of Spinoza's natural rights, Royce compares Spinoza's ethical and political theories with those of Hobbes.

Hobbes bases his theories on the belief that man is innately and fundamentally selfish by nature. Because of this selfishness, the state of nature is one of constant warfare and conflict. The only way to cope with this natural warfare, according to Hobbes, is to set up a government which is similar in nature to a social contract in that, adopting
this method, men sacrifice a certain portion of their individual freedom for the purpose of eliminating conflict. This form of government, Hobbes holds according to Royce, would be more successful in granting each individual the natural rights to which he is entitled, and at the same time in eliminating struggle in society for selfish ends, if it were controlled by one sovereign. This one sovereign would make laws to avoid war and create a harmonious unity within the state. Hobbes holds that the very selfishness of man will offset any revolutionary movements that might be made under this form of social absolutism, for if an attempt were actually made to overthrow the government, failure to succeed in the undertaking would mean punishment for those concerned, and success would mean a return to the old chaotic state of warfare.

Royce criticizes Hobbes because the very core of his political system is one-sided and pessimistic. How awful, Royce feels, to base any theory on the assumption that man's nature is so selfish a thing, and how gloomy to go on to say that the social contract, which is Hobbes' solution of the matter, will succeed primarily because of this selfishness.

Spinoza, like Hobbes, believes man to be a selfish being. But, while Hobbes solves his problem by social
absolutism—the single sovereign in power—Spinoza more happily holds that, just as selfishness is present in man's nature, so is the impulse to sacrifice a certain amount of individual freedom. Royce tells us that Spinoza's theory is that, while selfishness will create in each individual a desire for self-preservation, the inevitable end will be caused by the impulse to sacrifice—the desire of each person to see the preservation of his neighbor also. Consequently, Spinoza's state is founded on laws of justice and freedom. Contrary to Hobbes, Spinoza favors the republican form of government, but though both agree that revolutions are hazardous, Spinoza's reason for so believing is more optimistic, according to Royce. Spinoza holds that government is a public habit and that habits are hard to change, while Hobbes is convinced that revolution would result in punishment or chaos.

Royce almost congratulates Spinoza for making selfishness his starting point only:

With Hobbes the State is the last desperate resort of war-weary savages; with Spinoza it is the expression of the higher consciousness of mankind.

Although many critics doubt whether Spinoza ever read Hobbes before writing his Tractatus, Royce thinks the

1 Royce, FE, 297.
influence of Hobbes is so clearly marked in the similarities discussed, that Spinoza must have had some knowledge of Hobbes' theories.

According to Royce, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus contains principles of toleration and of liberty, and views on religious strife that are far in advance of the time. The first part of the Tractate deals with the relationship of religion and morality. Because he had been cast out of his own church, Spinoza was able to look at this problem more objectively in his remoteness. His very loneliness gave him a point of view that is more wise and certainly more advanced than that of any other man of his time. He saw that the fundamental virtues and duties were emphasized alike by all churches, but that in relation to one another, the various denominations completely forgot these principles. Royce thinks that one of the most bitter observations Spinoza made was that the small sects were in constant strife over small, trivial matters in which they differed to some slight degree. Spinoza uses, for example, the fact that each denomination interpreted the Scriptures in any way which was most pleasing and useful to them, and fought for these interpretations. This smallness destroyed any opportunity for moral helpfulness that the churches might have had.
The second part of the Tractate has to do with the attitude of the State toward the religious sects, and here also, Royce thinks Hobbes influenced Spinoza. Having proven the helplessness of the churches by his exposition of the trite quarrels of the various denominations, Spinoza concludes that there is danger lurking in the misplaced emphasis on small details in the relation of the churches, one to another. To divert the attention of society from basic moral truths to unimportant differences in ritual, seemed to Spinoza to be extremely dangerous. Consequently he determines, as the only way to lessen the danger, that no sect should be permitted to intrude any of its peculiar beliefs into the affairs of government.

Royce explains this position of Spinoza and the purpose of his State quite precisely:

In a single sentence the sum of the whole is: it is not the ultimate purpose of government to rule, nor to put men under the restraint of fear, nor to subject them to external authority; but on the contrary to free everyone from fear, and to secure him his life, his natural right to existence, and that apart from any hurt to himself or to another.¹

¹ Royce, FE, 298.
assumptions current in the seventeenth century.

Royce does not anywhere attempt to interpret Spinoza's entire complicated system. Rather, he uses the principle of selection, and from Spinoza's philosophical system he chooses only those parts the interpretation of which seem essential to him. Royce treats the religious aspect of Spinoza, not only because it is consistent with the mathematical precision of the century, but because it is also unusual in respect to the cold reasoning of the time in its almost passionate nature. Spinoza's political theory and the content of the Tractate have been selected because they indicate the naturalistic revolt of the time against the influences of theological tradition. It would seem, therefore, that Royce interprets Spinoza in this selective manner for one reason mainly—that is, to show the general trend of seventeenth century philosophy. It might be remarked that Royce takes obvious pleasure in illustrating this trend by the theories of a lonely Jew who was denounced as a heretic by his own race.
CHAPTER III

JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF BERKELEY

The thinkers of the eighteenth century turned from the naturalism of the previous period to a new sort of humanism. Emphasis was placed on the mind of man rather than on the problems of the outer world. While the mathematical naturalists had used reason as an instrument by which to solve the problems of the physical sciences, the new humanists swung about to examine reason itself with a critical attitude. The reaction to naturalism resulted in a detailed study of the inner world, and was termed by Royce, in his Spirit of Modern Philosophy, "the rediscovery of the inner life."2 It cannot be said that Royce treats Berkeley with a great degree of seriousness. The contribution of the "ever-fascinating Bishop Berkeley"3 is called by Royce a "grandly simple accomplishment."4 Royce pictures Berkeley as one of those young, enthusiastic thinkers, musing gently and prettily on this or that inspiration, keeping the sweeter musings for their own private enjoyment. A child of Plato, Royce calls Berkeley, who sees God with no fear, and tells of his marvelous

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1 Royce's chief discussions of Berkeley may be found in the following books: Royce, SMP, 86-93; Royce, WI, I, 246-247; Royce, WI, II, 234-237. This chapter is based on the material cited.
2 Royce, SMP, 68
3 Ibid., 71
4 Ibid., 87
experience skillfully and charmingly in terse, sensitive essays.

Because Berkeley states his idealism so simply, his works are well-liked by the young students of philosophy, says Royce. Upon first reading one would think Berkeley wildly paradoxical and quite opposed to common sense. Upon further reading one would marvel at the clarity and charm of his system. Still later one would think: how very obvious all this is, everyone thinks these things. Royce holds that one's mood changes many times upon studying the works of the poetic Berkeley.

Why, then, if Berkeley has this fickle effect upon Royce's mood, does Royce treat him at all? Berkeley's importance lies in his position on the period concerned with the rediscovery of the inner life. He observed that the world of experience and the world of sense had within them no discoverable substance at all. Royce uses the example of a fruit to explain Berkeley's position: all we know of this fruit, its taste, smell, appearance, and so forth, is our idea of it. The taste does not seem to be there unless we are experiencing it. Royce believes that the importance of Berkeley's position lies in the fact that the analysis of the inner life is carried into a new field---the process of knowledge. Dealing with the problem of vision at an
early date, Berkeley claimed that he really didn't see distance at all, only the signs of it. Blueness, smallness, haziness of a distant object are only manifestations of its distance. Distance and solidity are both read as a language, and experience teaches one to read this language. This reading is merely the putting together, rationally, of the ideas produced in us by the world. Up to this point, what Berkeley claims is obviously true, says Royce, but Berkeley goes still farther. Whose language is this? Things would have no existence at all when no-one thinks them, unless these things are constantly in the mind of a great external being. This being is Berkeley's God. God forces on our minds, according to Berkeley, the succession of our ideas, and we are further impressed by the words of our fellow-beings, who seem also to be learning this language of God.

This theology of Berkeley's is, Royce claims, a realistic theology, for Berkeley's God, in relation to experience which is merely an assertion and only possible, is a real, independent power, reflected by the souls of men. Royce thinks this realistic theology is faulty in Berkeley's thought.¹

¹ Royce, WI, I, 247.
In his discussion of the fourth conception of Being, Royce contrasts his theory with that of Berkeley, and says more of Berkeley's realistic theology:

Berkeley was, with regard to the material world, an idealist, although he viewed the existence and relations of individual minds in a fashion which seems to me to be essentially realistic, since the Spirits of his world are entities apparently conceived as, in their essence, logically independent of one another, and as linked merely through laws of causation and through Over-ruling Providence.  

Berkeley does agree with the usual view of the idealist in believing that material substance does not exist without minds. But, Royce objects, when Berkeley goes on to say that matter is only an appearance, with no basis other than the experience and ideas of men, and the influence of God upon these experiences and ideas, Berkeley's position seems precarious. For, if matter appears only to minds in the form of ideas, which ideas are ordained by God, there would be no material world existent at all, were God not real and His influence on the minds of men other than it is, or were men organized in any other manner.

Royce does not, in his own theory, reduce Nature to something so abstract as Berkeley's Nature. Nature is

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1 Royce, WI, II, 234.
something quite real to Royce.

And we do not suppose with Berkeley that Nature has existence solely in our human experience, in the valid laws of succession which govern our experiences, and in the purpose of a Providence which is directly producing in us the experience in question.¹

The limited range of extra-human life, which Royce considers as existing concretely with only a universal identity with the Absolute, is suggested to us by the experience which we have of Nature. The life of Nature, to Royce, is essentially different from the human life, the relation between the two being brought about by communication and linkage between events occurring in the various realms of Nature. Thus, unlike Berkeley, Royce's Nature is nothing illusory, but quite real, despite the fact that present experience hints quite inadequately as to the true reality of the inner life of Nature. To Royce, Nature exists in the same relation to the Absolute that all life, however large or small, exists --identical with the Absolute Life in a universal sense.

As I have stated before, Royce treats Berkeley in a highly selective manner, simply narrating Berkeley's spiritual experience to illustrate one step in the procedure of eighteenth century philosophy. Royce uses Berkeley's

¹ Royce, WI, II, 236.
theory of Nature as a contrast to his own fourth conception of Being. To Royce, then, Berkeley's significance lies in his part in the rediscovery of the inner life. Berkeley was not at all revolutionary, according to Royce, nor was he by any means the great speculative thinker that some would have him. Royce ranks him as the third of the great British speculative thinkers, placing Hobbes and Hume before him in importance, respectively. Berkeley's work seemed to Royce to lack deep research and elaboration, although the easy flow and poetical nature of his essays deceive the young reader.

In that he, along with others of his century, was dissatisfied with the cold mathematics of the preceding era, and turned inward for contemplation, treating life with a confidential, humane attitude, Berkeley is significant. Royce's attitude toward Berkeley may be summed up in one word; Royce terms Berkeley's idealism "preparatory."¹

¹ Royce, SMP, 351.
CHAPTER IV

JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF KANT

Royce's treatment of Kant, the man, is extremely sympathetic in its tone. He pictures Kant as a kindly old bachelor, whose life was so systematic in its regularity of habit, that the neighbors set their clocks by his movements. Royce quotes a remark of Heine's which comments on the paradox in this strange man's nature—a kindly neighbor, a gentle old bachelor, yet a philosopher who mercilessly destroyed a world of thought. Royce says of him:

This odd and gentle little man was, as you already see, a singular combination of the keen-witted analyst and the humane lover of all things human.2

Kant's philosophy is considered by Royce as most difficult to study. Kant seems to have aroused more suggestions than any other thinker. His philosophy has often been called dangerous, which is a most inviting challenge to the young student of philosophy. Royce himself admits that he was seriously baffled by the Critique of Pure Reason, and more than once has found that he had misinterpreted Kant.

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1 Royce's chief discussions of Kant may be found in the following books: Royce: SMP, 103-139; Royce, LMI, 1-62; Royce, WI, I, 233-238. This chapter is based on the material cited.

2 Royce, SMP, 109.
Despite the difficulties in the *Critique*, Royce says that it is "nearly, if not quite, the most important philosophical treatise ever written."\(^1\)

The essential doctrine of the *Critique* is that man's nature is the true creator of man's world, according to Royce's interpretation.

When rightly interpreted, Kant's world where the inner reason is lord over the outer sense, will prove to be as hard and fast a world of fact, of law, and of eternal majesty, as ever the seventeenth century had conceived.\(^2\)

In presenting the idea that man is the source of the laws of nature, Kant meant that the external world isn't the deepest truth, but the inner structure of the soul which manifests itself in nature. Royce says that the main interest of this presentation is the mercilessly clever resourcefulness of Kant's treatment.

In discussing Kant's religious belief, Royce admits that he disagrees with several critics who have treated this side of Kant. Heine, for instance, believes Kant's religious life to be divided into three definite periods; the first, a period of faith, the second, a revolutionary period, and the third, a period of tired withdrawal from the conflict. This

\(^1\) Royce, SMP, 34.
\(^2\) Ibid., 35.
theory of Heine's, Royce believes, is not at all true. Royce emphatically holds that Kant's religious beliefs remained quite consistent throughout his life.

Royce compares the religion of Kant to that of Spinoza. While Spinoza adhered to the mystical belief, as a comfort to him in his disillusionment, Kant attached himself to that other group of worshippers, the striving, active exponents of the Religion of Duty. Kant would have nothing of the sentimental or the mystic. Therefore he could know nothing of Spinoza's mystical adoration of the Eternal.

Kant, this genial and bloodless old hero of contemplation, wasting away in his cheerful asceticism, reverences, as everyone knows, duty and the stars, but has no time for romance.¹

Kant's God is lofty and majestic, with no liking for sentimentality. Kant's God's revelation is to the conscience. Conscience shows us the moral law. One must act always as though God were constantly present in one's conscience. This is what Kant calls postulating God's existence. One believes in God because a man sure of the right knows that the right should win, and since the right is surely not the victor in the sense-world, there must be a God at the head of a vast universe in which the right does actually conquer. If you wish him to be, God is a certainty in your

¹ Royce, SMP, 112.
own consciousness. Royce holds that Kant is no optimist, for Kant certainly is aware of much evil about him, and even makes fun of the man who pretends to enjoy this life. The only good thing in this world, in Kant's estimation, Royce points out, is a person with a strong will to do his duty. Kant, then, gives us faith as an active postulate.

Kant certainly is sure that he will win, but neither experience nor intuition tell him this. He is actively, manfully positive that he will win. Royce compares him to an army going into battle with set teeth and a will to win, no matter what the odds. Truth comes as we ourselves make it.

In the *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, Royce traces Kant's reflective fortunes. This Kant, says Royce, was extremely self-critical and "skeptical above all men."\(^1\) He formulated ideas early in his career, only to break them down and discard them later. Kant was full of the tradition of the preceding century when he first began his contemplation. Reason, formal and logical, was the master over all thinking. Science, however, fascinated Kant, and after extensive study in this field, the thought came to him that perhaps, after all, logical philosophy did not give place to a real world. Thus, stimulated by

\(^1\) Royce, SMP, 119.
his scientific study, Kant began his search for truth, only to become discouraged many times because of his merciless self-criticism.

Finally he came to the conclusion, Royce shows us, that all the truth of the physical world depends on the truth of time and space. Laws of matter must conform to laws of space, but laws of space do not have to conform to laws of matter. Space and time are paradoxical and self-contradictory. Space isn't real at all, but just an idea, for it is both infinitely divisible and not infinitely divisible. Kant calls this doctrine the ideality of time and space. As an example of the meaning of Kant, Royce describes our relation to time and space as comparable to our view of the world through rose-colored glasses—when we wear rose-colored glasses the world appears to be the color of rose, but when we wear green glasses the world appears to be green. Time and space are only conditions of our sense-understanding of things. So they are not real, but are facts in our own consciousness. This theory of Kant's led to his later assumption that things in themselves are unknowable, says Royce. We are aware of things through the medium of our senses, but cannot tell what they are since our senses cut us off from the chance of knowing.

It was Hume, Royce tells us, who gave Kant the final impetus that resulted in the transcendental deduction of the
categories. Hume had stated that the facts in the world are only conjoined but not really connected. In answer Kant said, the transcendental unity of apperception, which is rational consciousness, involves self-recognition, which means the binding of fact to experience. The difference between the sane and the insane man, Royce illustrates, is that the sane man binds his impressions and ideas together in orderly fashion, while the insane man cannot do this. And since the world is what we make it with our ideas of it, then the sane man's world is a world of connected facts after all.

If I am myself, as I think I am, then the phenomena of my world will follow the truth of my categories. A table, illustrates Royce, is a fact in my sense world of space and time, and must agree with that which I have seen before, because I am myself and my experience must be coherent. Therefore I make out of this object, because of what my experience tells me, a table. But this process is performed almost unconsciously by the sane man. This process Kant calls constructive imagination, which builds on the foundation of our sense experiences. Royce says that this process "builds our world as a genius makes a poem."¹

Thus we have a right to believe in great faiths which

¹ Royce, SMP, 130.
cannot be proved, claims Kant. The theoretical view of things is morally not enough. Therefore we must postulate God over and above it.

The unknown things in themselves give us sense experiences. These we first perceive in forms of space and time, because that is our way of perceiving. Then, being coherent creatures, we order this our world of sense according to the laws of causation and the other categories which are forms of thought. Thus we all alike get a world, which, while it is in all its sanity and order an inner world, is still for each of us an outer world—a world of fact, a world of life.¹

Kant’s moral law, Royce, touches briefly. Kant believes the moral law to be rigidly correct. To do right means to Kant, to do as you would, if what you did were to be made a universal law. Kant dislikes submission to an absolute plan, says Royce. Rather he trusts in the certainty of the moral law. Universality of action, meaning, acting in a universal manner with an outlook that is universal, is Kant’s belief.

Absolute truthfulness, absolute respect for the rights and freedom of everyone of your fellowmen, utter devotion to the cause of high-mindedness, of honesty, of justice, of simplicity, of honor,—such is Kant’s ideal—²

That Kant’s moral outlook is rigid, Royce admits,

¹ Royce, SMP, 131.
² Ibid., 133.
but that it is sincere he never doubts.

This is, indeed, the wonder of Kant, that, born and reared in the midst of pedantry, a mere man of books, a system-maker, a metaphysician, he would still express the very heart of the high-minded man of the world.¹

Kant was chiefly a critical philosopher, says Royce. He believed that the contrast between the success of the empirical sciences and the failure of metaphysics is one to be understood, not condoned. Consequently he makes a systematic inquiry into the nature and limits of human knowledge.

The general answer to the question, what are men fitted to know, is usually the same, Kant held. We know only what our experiences teach us---this is the probable answer. And this reply would explain the failure of metaphysics, for the metaphysician seeks for the ultimate truth, and experience does not present things to us in that way at all.

Kant thought this account to be quite true, but incomplete, Royce points out. There are two reasons for Kant's criticism. First, this explanation does not adequately define experience. Second, there is no account in this theory

¹ Royce, SMF, 118.
of the results of the combination of reason and experience which are not mere facts of experience. The theory that Royce is discussing here is that of Hume, and Kant casts aside this empirical explanation.

Kant believes that the conditions upon which experience depends are not empirical at all, but a priori, and to be found through an analysis of the process of knowledge. When we examine these conditions of experience we learn of nothing ultimate, nothing that exists beyond the knowing self. Therefore metaphysical knowledge of things beyond the self is impossible, claims Kant.

Royce points out that the empirical facts which we believe to be true are of two kinds, according to Kant. The first kind are present perceptions, or the present actions on your senses. The second kind of empirical facts are called conceptual constructions. Illustrations of this second kind are given by Royce; the acceptance of the moon's existence with no knowledge at all as to what is on the other side of it, and tomorrow's happenings. We accept as true the fact that the moon is really in the sky, yet we know very little about it. The same with tomorrow's happenings—we know there will be a tomorrow full of events, but how do we know?
When is experience not experience?
The answer is: When its facts are what most of your acknowledged facts of the realm of experience nearly always are, namely, conceptual constructions.¹

There are two aspects to these conceptual constructions, Royce points out. First, in forming them we employ time, space and the categories. Something remains constant wherever change occurs; this is the category of substance. Events are always caused by universal laws; this is the category of causation.

The second aspect to conceptual constructions is that we link our conceptions of invisible phenomena with our present experience, making a unity. Conceptual constructions are possible experiences of mine.

Royce points out quite carefully that nowhere does Kant hold this unity of consciousness to be anything absolute or superhuman. Kant meant it to be merely human intelligence. Conceptual constructions must be related to categories, and then must be regarded as possible experiences.

Royce says that in the deduction of the categories Kant tries to prove that all natural events must conform to conditions of our intelligence, according to the transcendental unity of apperception. Natural facts are phenomena

¹ Royce, LHI, 18.
and would not be thus if no one was aware of them. All phenomena must conform to laws of unity of consciousness.

Kant's deduction of the categories made known four thoughts, according to Royce. First, we only know things as they appear to us. Second, we can know through contemplation the conditions upon which knowledge depends. These conditions are time, space, and the categories. Third, a priori forms are useless except as they fill in the outlines of experience. This is all they are capable of doing. Fourth, we think of all our experience as a unity, related to categories and possible experience, time, space, etc.

We can know only such phenomena as are fit to be known—-an expression which contains Kant's whole deduction in a nutshell.1

It is interesting to note that the table of categories precipitated investigation and criticism by the post-Kantians. They examined each category in its own order in an effort to find out just why rationality insists upon specific categories. Time and space were, to Kant, irreducible, and apart from the categories; yet when the post-Kantians completed their rigid examination they found time and space to be much closer in relation to the categories than Kant had admitted---in fact, even definable

1 Royce, L&I, 48.
in terms of the categories.

Of the deduction of the categories Royce says the following: "the Kantian deduction of the categories is the portal to the dwelling of modern philosophy."¹

According to Royce, Kant truly believed that there are things in themselves, existing in a byond, transcending the senses, and apart from the knowledge of man. We ourselves belong to that world of things in themselves. Our consciousness never shows us that we are real, and yet that we are real is not to be doubted. We ourselves are rooted in something outside of present consciousness, and are real in quite a different sense than physical or mental phenomena are real. Consequently, my true self is not the self of which I am aware through my consciousness, but a deeply grounded will, the present of which is indicated by my doings in the world of phenomena. Royce asserts that Kant's ethical philosophy made this view particularly noticeable. Here Kant asks us to regard our inner selves. We cannot truly know our real self, and yet know that we have one. Kant holds that we do possess a true self which is real and unknowable. One says, "I did this," and believes it. This is Kant's postulate of the freedom of will. Now, exactly as in his ethics he believes there is a true ego, so he believes

¹ Royce, LII, 5.
that there exist things in themselves, without which we
would have no basis upon which to organize our ideas.

Kant's followers find this unstable. Royce's objec-
tion is as follows: it is one thing to say that we know things
as they appear to us, but quite another to say that we know
there are real things which do not appear to us and never
will. How can we know so much and yet so little about these
things in themselves?

Kant's "marvelously subtle thought"\(^1\) started a con-
troversy such as has been rarely equalled in philosophy.
In one respect, however, all the post-Kantian idealists
agreed; they desired to revise the deduction of the cate-
gories.

To deduce the categories from the nature
of the self, and in doing so, to reduce them
all, and, if possible, the whole of philo-
sophy to a system of results derived from
a single principle---this undertaking con-
sequently became, for the post-Kantians, a
characteristic ideal.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Royce, SMP, 132.
\(^2\) Royce, LII, 49.
CHAPTER V

JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF HEGEL

Of all philosophers, Hegel's character seems to be the least impressive to Royce. The only glory that should come to Hegel, according to Royce, is that which arises from the results of his work, for as a man Hegel was not all that could be desired. He was neither a patriot, nor a dreamer, nor a poet, and he used his friends for his own advantage. Wily and masterful in his relations with his fellows, he was merciful toward those who opposed him, and genial to those who flattered his vanity.

To the end he remains a self-seeking, determined, laborious, critical, unaffectionate man, faithful to his office and to his household, loyal to his employers, cruel to his foes.2

As to Hegel's style, Royce marvels at his great accuracy, and depth of original skill, but says that his style "is notoriously one of the most barbarous, technical, and obscure in the whole history of philosophy."3 Royce does not think that this complicated method of exposition

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1 Royce's chief discussions of Hegel may be found in the following books: Royce, SMP, 194-227; Royce, LMT, 136-231. This chapter is based on the material cited.
2 Royce, SMP, 196.
3 Ibid., 196.
is a mere misfortune, but believes that Hegel deliberately chose to make his style difficult. Hegel never did appear to enjoy proceeding over an easy road.

But Hegel's type is one of the rarest, the one, namely, whose representative man will, so to speak, tell you in a few preternaturally accurate, though perhaps highly technical words, all that you ever did, who will seem to sound your heart very much as a skillful specialist in nervous diseases would sound the mysterious and secret depths of a morbid patient's consciousness; but who, all the while, is apparently as free from deep and personal experiences of an emotional type as the physician is free from his patient's morbid and nervous web-spinning.¹

Not a trace of a deeper inner experience of any sort may be found in Hegel's diary. He seems to be almost completely objective, Royce observes.

Hegel was not content with leaving things as Kant had, and merely saying that philosophy depends upon who and what we are. He tries to analyze the matter, and thus creates his theory of the nature of self-consciousness.

Royce shows us that to Hegel the paradox of consciousness is; we know what is happening to us this minute, although we can only guess as to the past and future, yet even as we try to tell what it is that is occurring in the present moment, that instant has passed, the note has sounded

¹ Royce, SMP, 199.
and died, and we cannot say that we know, but must say that we just knew. How, if the instant has passed, can we know the experience at all? We constantly change our minds. We know only if we realize the presence of another self of the past moment. For an example of this paradox Royce says, we do not really know that we are happy at the precise moment when we are happy. We can only reflect on it afterwards. We review happiness. We do not even know who we are at any moment, we only know what we were.

This paradox is not only to be found in moments, Royce points out next in his treatment of Hegel's consciousness, but is existent in all of life. Life exists inasmuch as we can contemplate upon it from a distance. Youth, for instance, Royce says, is never fully appreciated nor understood until one reflects on it in maturity. "My existence is in a sort of conscious publicity of my inner life."

One thought that Royce believes struck Hegel with much force is the fact that, left alone to ourselves we shrivel and become nothing at all but atoms. There is an analogy here, Royce points out, between the paradox of the inner life and social life. A life of loneliness is empty. As far as my inner life goes I live only if I reflect on

1 Royce, SMP, 207.
my past experiences. The only way I exist in social life
is in relation to my fellow beings. All awareness is de-
pendent on other consciousnesses. "Spirituality is just
intercourse, communion of spirits."¹ Spirituality exists by
a sort of diffusion into opposing forces. The struggle and
conflict are the roots of the deeper self; this is the basis
of Hegel's system, Royce holds. Royce says of the different-
tiation of consciousness:

> As the warrior rejoices in the foe man
> worthy of his steel, and rejoices in him
> just because he wants to overcome him and
> to slay him; as courage exists by triumph
> over terror, and as there is no courage
> in a world where there is nothing terrible;
> as strength consists in the mastery of ob-
> stacles, as even love is proved only through
> suffering, grows deep only when sorrow was
> with it, becomes often the tenderer because
> it is wounded by misunderstanding; so, in
> short, everywhere in conscious life, con-
> sciousness is a union, an organization, of
> conflicting aims, purposes, thoughts, stir-
> rings. And just this, according to Hegel,
> is the very perfection of consciousness.²

The Absolute, to Hegel, is the lord over all this
conflict, a lord of war, who comprehends all and who wins
the final victory. The absolute exists within the conflict.

Hegel, as we see, makes his Absolute,
the Lord, most decidedly a man of war.
Consciousness is paradoxical, restless,
struggling. Weak souls get weary of the
fight, and give up trying to get wisdom,
skill, virtue, because all these are won
only in the presence of the enemy. But

¹ Royce, SMP, 208.
² Ibid., 212.
the absolute self is simply the absolutely strong spirit who bears the contradictions of life, and wins the eternal victory.1

Here, too, the paradox of consciousness must be followed in order to understand the Absolute. In order to become aware of what I truly am, I must enlarge myself through relationships and conflict, in a sort of evolution, until I come to know the Absolute as the inner core of my life. The realization must come to me that I am one with the Eternal.

The Absolute is essentially a self—not any one individual human self, but a completely self-determined being, of whom our varied individuality is an expression.2

Royce points out that Hegel attempted to solve all the other problems of philosophy by the recognition of this same paradoxical opposition. Of Hegel's task of solving the problems of philosophy in this manner, Royce says, "this stupendous undertaking was but indifferently executed."3

Royce tells us that to Hegel the consciousness of finite life takes three forms: art, which illustrates the union of the finite and the infinite by presenting an object which expresses an ideal which is absolute; religion, which shows this same knowledge on a higher plane, and

1 Royce, SMP, 214.
2 Royce, LMcI, 226.
3 Royce, SMP, 218.
philosophy, which realizes the necessity of an Absolute Being, active and rational.

Royce calls Hegel "a modern Aristotle"¹ because he tries to unify the total results of human knowledge. Parallel to his belief that the dialectical method is the only sound method, is Hegel's assertion that error is an essential part of absolute truth. In the Phaenomenologie Hegel states that whatever is truly essential is in the world for some good reason.

By the dialectical method, Hegel expounds his theory of logic. He believes that definition alone cannot be said to tell the truth of a conception; only by considering constant flux, conflict, ebb and flow of life, can problems be solved. In the Logic he tries to put thought into an organic system. To Hegel, the laws of thought are the souls of all things. Royce does not seem to think Hegel's logic to be the best part of his system by any means.

There are in recent philosophy two Hegels: one the uncompromising idealist, with his general and fruitful insistence upon the great fundamental truths of idealism; the other the technical Hegel of the Logik, whose dialectical method seems destined to remain, not a philosophy, but the idea of a philosophy. With this latter Hegel the author feels a great discontent...²

¹ Royce, LMI, 214.
² Royce, RAP, X.
Most people, says Royce, call Hegel cold and rigid, logical and dead. But Royce himself would not characterize him in quite this way. That Hegel dealt with the paradoxes of the spiritual life in a very complete, understanding manner, Royce is quite sure.

His great philosophical and systematic error lay, not in introducing logic into passion, but in conceiving the logic of passion as the only logic, so that you in vain endeavor to get satisfaction from Hegel's treatment of outer nature, of science, of mathematics, or of any coldly theoretical topic. About all these things he is immensely suggestive, but never final.¹

By the logic of passion Royce means Hegel's dialectical method. Royce holds that Hegel, in looking at anything, sees in it self-conscious strife. This analysis which Hegel makes of self-consciousness, this excellent description of spiritual life and human passion, has in it much of value, and yet, Royce asks, does it, as a system, explain nature or science to a satisfactory degree? Believing that the logic of passion would explain the nature and solution of not only spirit, human and absolute, but of every philosophical problem, was Hegel's mistake, according to Royce.

To Royce, the most characteristic part of the Hegelian doctrine is the theory of concrete universals. It is

¹ Royce, SMR, 226.
through this theory that Hegel tries to come to the unification of all things into one great universal. In this manner he tries to overcome dualism and create a philosophy which is complete in one great Absolute.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters consist of an account of Royce's interpretations of four important thinkers in the history of modern philosophy. It may be seen quite readily that Royce does not attempt to make a thorough analysis of the entire systems of these thinkers, for Royce does not intend to be an historian. Rather he selects from the theories of Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant and Hegel just those assertions which he can most practically use in the exposition of his own philosophy. There are, however, certain criticisms to be made on Royce's treatment, as well as some comments to be made concerning the relationship of his own system to those of the men whom he interprets.

Royce's interpretation of Spinoza deals with the religious aspect of Spinoza and his ethical and political theories. The mystical religious passion of Spinoza is treated in a most sympathetic manner by Royce. He pictures Spinoza as a lonely and wonderful figure, lost in his adora-

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1 It would be impossible to footnote these conclusions completely and adequately. They are the result of ideas gleaned from lectures on the history of philosophy by Alban G. Widgery of Duke University, from various lectures by Dr. E.S. Brightman at Boston University, and from reading in various histories of philosophy, all of which are included in the Bibliography.
tion of the Eternal. It is interesting to note, however, that despite his sympathy for Spinoza's mysticism, Royce discards the mystical theory of being in his examination of the historical concepts. He charges that the mystical view is entirely too abstract because of its subjectivity. The mystic, Royce holds, makes no attempt to grasp the idea of the external. Royce's own theory of being is a unity of the external and the internal, in which the external carries out the purpose of the internal meaning. One cannot see the entire fulfilment of the internal idea in the experience of the here and now, Royce holds, and therefore there must be some all-seeing mind that witnesses the larger completion of meaning.

Royce fails to mention the fact that, though he pretends to be a rationalist, Spinoza really relies upon empiricism in his description of Substance. Spinoza belonged to the seventeenth century, a time when reason prevailed above all else. Of the philosophy of this century Royce says, "it founds its loyalty, indeed, upon reason." Yet Spinoza, the cold rationalist, depends upon experience when he names the attributes of Substance as being bodily substance and thinking substance. Royce does not seem to

1 Royce, WI, I, 186-195.
2 Ibid., 345-470.
3 Royce, SMP, 30.
regard this as significant at all. Spinoza states that the attributes of Substance are infinite in number, and yet can mention only two. And why does he mention only these particular two attributes? The only answer seems to be that Spinoza selected these knowable phases of Substance because he had experienced them as an empiricist.

There is, perhaps, a slight analogy to be found in the Absolutes of Spinoza and Royce. Spinoza bases his religious belief on the axiom that whatever cannot be explained by its own nature must be explained by some higher nature which causes it to be what it is. In the same manner Royce, when he sees that the meaning of the internal cannot be fulfilled in present experience, turns to a higher mind which can explain and see the internal idea. Santayana says of Royce—and this might well have been said of Spinoza too—

If the impression he left on your mind was vague, this was partly because, in spite of his comprehensiveness, he seemed to view everything in relation to something else that remained untold.¹

When he interprets Spinoza's theory of government, Royce clarifies his account by comparing the theories of Spinoza and Hobbes. Both thinkers start off by considering man's nature to be innately selfish, but while Hobbes

¹ Santayana, COUS, 98.
adheres to this characteristic of man as the basis for even his political theory, Spinoza parts company with him, and attributes an instinct of self-sacrifice to man's inner self. Consequently, as a reason for the protection of the state against revolution—which both Hobbes and Spinoza regard as hazardous—Hobbes holds that man's innate selfishness will frustrate any such attempt to overthrow the governing power for the simple reason that punishment or political chaos, whichever the result of the revolt would be, would prove much more bothersome than the existing political system. Royce, as has been said, considers this view of Hobbes' to be quite gloomy. As a result Spinoza's reason, namely, that government is a public habit and habits are hard to change, looked much more optimistic to Royce, who welcomes this more pleasant outlook after the pessimism of Hobbes' opinion of man's nature. It does seem that Royce misses the absurdity of Spinoza's soporific assertion. For if the mere fact that habit is hard to change were sufficient reason for Spinoza's assurance of the stability of his government, then surely there would be little hope for improvement of conditions, either social or political. What possible hope would there be for Christianity or for any social reforms; if Spinoza's attitude were commendable? Progress itself is
little more than a matter of breaking outworn habits and reestablishing the order of things. It seems upon reflection that Spinoza's outlook is even gloomier than Hobbes'. Possibly one explanation for Spinoza's strange attitude might be the fact that he led such a secluded life that he was unable to cope with political and social problems as adequately as under other conditions. Royce does speak of a limitation in this respect, although he does not enlarge upon it:

One limitation remains, however, especially noteworthy in Spinoza's case. His form of isolation renders him a poor critic of the deeper social relationships.¹

Royce has marveled, nevertheless, at the healthy outlook of Spinoza in spite of his isolation. This might be partially explained by a psychological factor. Spinoza was isolated insofar as he was exiled from his own people and ignored by many Europeans because of his race. He did, however, enter into and enjoy the simple life of the people about him, and was reasonably serene in his relationships. Economic stress did not ruffle the serenity of his existence after his exile from the Jewish religion, and financial independence is a great aid to a happy understanding and toleration, according to psychology.

¹ Royce, SMP, 45.
In the meanwhile he earned his own living by his skill as a practical optician, and was a burden to no-one. He thus accomplished one of the hardest of all tasks, viz., to be a prophet without being a prig, and to be a saint without being a sponger. 1

Except for his position in the rediscovery of the inner life, Berkeley is not treated in detail by Royce. Berkeley represents to Royce a step in the history of idealism, and not a very important one as can be gathered by Royce's application of the epithet "preparatory" 2 to Berkeley's idealism. It hardly seems that Royce has treated Berkeley with a proper degree of seriousness.

It seems to me, however, that Berkeley has hardly received justice in this sketch. Grandly simple as was his thought, it was yet so deep that it was misunderstood by all the philosophers of his time. And although this system may appear to be one-sided and incomplete when compared with later expressions of idealism, we still have to remember that they are but fuller developments of that principle which he was the first to emphasize. 3

Thus Creighton speaks in his review of Royce's Spirit of Modern Philosophy.

Berkeley's primary aim, mentioned by Royce but in passing, was to overthrow the theory of the

1 Broad, FETE, 51.
2 Royce, SMP, 351.
3 Phil. Rev., I, 323.
materialists. In order to do so, Berkeley reasoned, he must prove that material things are non-existent outside of the mind.

In the midst of the philosophical and popular prejudice that Matter could do this or that—could make minds perceive, and could even evolve from itself all the reason and rational life that exists—Berkeley loudly called for an answer to certain previous questions, the answers to which had been, and still were, too dogmatically assumed.¹

It is interesting to note that the poetic Berkeley, whose greatest desire was to wipe out the skepticism and agnosticism characteristic of a materialistic era and to re-open the inner life, was, quite without his knowing it at all, a definite step in a three-fold movement toward pure skepticism which commenced with Locke and ended in Hume. It is said of Berkeley:

.....was really, against his own intention, opening a door for the most thorough-going skepticism and agnosticism ever offered to the world.²

In dealing with Kant, Royce mentions the many movements in philosophy which came out of Kant's system; but more might be said of this remarkable precipitation of con-

¹ Fraser, Berkeley, 56.
² Ibid., 15.
troversies.

Kant's philosophy has been termed a Copernican Rev-
olution, for the changes that he wrought in the field of
philosophy are almost as remarkable as the changes brought
about in the astronomical revolution of that name. Out of
Kant's philosophy the following movements sprang up: the
movement of classical German idealism in the nineteenth
century with Schelling, Fichte and Hegel reaching the heights
of idealism; the Common Sense School of Scottish thinkers
who attempted to break down the skepticism of Hume; the
idealistic movement in England started by Carlyle and Coler-
idge; the St. Ouis movement which was primarily Hegelian and
yet came indirectly out of Kant; the bombardment of the class-
ical idealists in Germany by Schopenhauer and the naturalists;
and the American movements, Pragmatism and Personalism.

A relationship between Kant's will and that of Royce
can be seen. Both thinkers give will a definite place in
their systems.

Royce says little of Kant's limited belief in know-
ledge. Kant destroys the cosmological, teleological, and
ontological arguments for the existence of God by emphasizing
the limitations of knowledge. Knowledge, for Kant, is due
to the functioning of the mind; but God is not an object of
sense, and since most of our notions come to us through the medium of sense, we can have no real knowledge of God. Yet, he reasons, there are no arguments which can possibly prove that God cannot exist, and since it is essential to believe in God, why should we try to prove or disprove his existence? This argument in itself is formally fallacious, since it is an Argumentum ad Ignorati~un, the substitution of the mere lack of disproof for actual proof.

Kant postulates his God. We all have the conviction, he claims, that virtue and happiness ought to go together, likewise vice and misery. Since often in this world one does not accompany the other, then there must be another world, ruled over by a just God, in which world virtue and happiness do belong together.

Thilly says of Royce's book, The Philosophy of Loyalty, and the discussion therein of the existence of God:

We have here a moral argument for the existence of God, similar to that presented in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.¹

Royce does not discuss Kant's doctrine of Rational Freedom. Kant had two theories of Freedom, Rational Freedom and Neutral Freedom. The latter theory seems to be quite satisfactory from an ethical point of view, but the

¹ Thilly, HP, 561.
doctrine of Rational Freedom seems to be unethical in its implications. If a man is free only when he acts in accordance with reason, as the theory states, a criminal on trial could say that he had not acted in a rational manner, and his crime would be excusable. This does not seem to be ethically stable.

The natural and spiritual orders, the physical and the moral orders, the divine and the human, the fatal and the free, may, according to Royce, be reconciled on Kant's doctrine of the transcendental or extra-temporal freedom, and the temporal necessity of all our actions.¹

In his theory of moral obligation, Kant assumes that man is by nature double, in that he is sensuous, and at the same time a rational being.² The rational nature of man is the more important aspect. This is somewhat similar to Royce's belief.

Although his philosophy seems to be Hegelian in many respects, Royce refuses to acknowledge the influence of Hegel.

He disclaimed the suggestion that he was a follower of Hegel and asserted that he found more resemblance between his own view and those of Schopenhauer.³

¹ Thilly, HP, 560.
² Broad, FTET, 135.
³ Townsend, PIUS, 161.
Royce's alleged relation to Schopenhauer, which the students of Royce's philosophy fail to see, might explain to some extent the rather merciless treatment which Royce gives to the character of Hegel. Schopenhauer wrote rather cruelly of Hegel, the man, and Royce, it seems, must have been familiar with this treatment, for his own analysis of Hegel is not at all sympathetic.

Rogers says of the relationship between Royce and Hegel:

Josiah Royce . . . departs less widely from the Hegelian position. But by a new emphasis upon the teleological nature of the world whole, and a consequent getting away from pure intellectualism, he represents what is essentially a new type of theory. In particular, he has tried to solve more accurately the problems of the nature of the individual, and to harmonize its reality, and especially its ethical reality, with a fundamental monism.¹

In a review of Royce's book, The Philosophy of Loyalty, it is said:

The subject matter of the book is, broadly speaking, the content of the moral ideal. This for Professor Royce, as for Hegel, consists in the identification of the individual will with the universal will.²

Royce's resemblance to Hegel in several other theories

¹ Rogers, SHP, 505.
² Jour. Phil., VI, 77.
His relation to Hegel is very close, though he rightly objected to being considered a disciple. He resembles Hegel in his reliance on the historical approach to philosophical problems, in the conscious acceptance of metaphysics as the heart of philosophy, in the general employment of the dialectical method, and in the sweep of his constructive imagination.\(^1\)

Another noticeable relationship of Royce with Hegel is the belief, common to both, that logic and metaphysics are inseparable.

As an interpreter of Hegel, Royce seems far more competent in his view on Hegel's Absolute than does William James. James sees Hegel's Absolute as a static, dead thing. He says of it:

> It seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the vast slow-breathing unconscious Kosmos with its dread abysses and its unknown tides.\(^2\)

Royce interprets Hegel's Absolute as a living thing, rather than static and blocked:

> No, Hegel's Absolute is, I repeat, a man of war. The dust and the blood of ages of humanity's spiritual life are upon him; he comes before us pierced and wounded, but triumphant,—the God who has conquered contradictions, and who is simply the total spiritual consciousness that expresses, embraces, unifies, and

\(^1\) Townsend, PIUS, 185.

\(^2\) James, ERE, 277.
enjoys the whole wealth of our human loyalty, endurance, and passion.¹

Both Hegel and Royce emphasize the social character of reason, and both look to a unitary Absolute. Negativity is a major factor in the systems of both Royce and Hegel. Royce seems to take a position between the Hegelians of the Left, with their quantitative pluralism, and the Hegelians of the Right, with their quantitative singularism; for in his emphasis upon the oneness of the Absolute, Royce is essentially a singularist, yet in his later philosophy he attempts to give a definite place to the individual will and seems almost to become a pluralist, the result of which is a sort of pluralistic singularism.

Although some few criticisms have been made concerning Royce's treatments, his interpretations, as a whole, are clear, sympathetic, and profound, and are presented in scholarly yet pleasing style. Royce's own philosophy, like Hegel's, joined the traditional theories together in a coherent unity, yet Royce was not at all biased by historical concepts. With a thorough knowledge of the history of philosophy, Royce coupled his own originality and ingenuity to create his philosophical system.

He carried his past with him, not dropping early conceptions, but evolving them continually into richer significance.²

¹ Royce, SMP, 216.
² Barrett, CIA, 5.
SUMMARY

Royce has interpreted four leading thinkers who illustrate, respectively, four important steps in the history of modern philosophy: Spinoza, the naturalist and absolutist; Berkeley, the romantic idealist; Kant, the rational intuitionist and seer of the inner life; and Hegel, who combined the doctrines of all three philosophers in a unitary relation to one another.

Two aspects of Spinoza are treated, his religion and his political theories. As a thorough-going mystic, Spinoza abandons the finite world and its transient nature, and looks to a great and perfect Eternal for comfort in his disillusionment. Basing his mystical belief on the axiom that whatever cannot be explained by its own nature is to be explained by some higher nature that forces it to be what it is, Spinoza proceeds to name the higher nature Substance. Spinoza's Substance is infinite and self-evident, self-determined and eternal, and is the cause of all the happenings in the world. The two attributes of Substance are bodily substance and thinking substance.

In treating Spinoza's political and ethical theories,
Royce, for the purpose of clarification, compares the theories of Hobbes and Spinoza. Both thinkers base their views on the assumption that man is by nature selfish, and that the state of nature is one of constant conflict. Hobbes solves the political problem by declaring that for his own comfort, man should sacrifice a certain amount of his individual freedom for the sake of eliminating warfare, and should submit to a political system of social absolutism. Spinoza founds his state on laws of justice and freedom and does not hold, as does Hobbes, to social absolutism. Royce discusses the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in which Spinoza considers the place of religion in the state and concludes that religious sects should not intrude their trite quarrels into the affairs of government.

Royce treats the poetic Berkeley as being typical of the reaction of the eighteenth century against naturalism. With his rather elementary idealism, Berkeley takes his place in the rediscovery of the inner life. Observing that the world of experience and the world of sense had within them no discoverable substance at all, and that things would not exist unless they were being thought about, Berkeley solves his problem by believing in the existence of a great eternal mind, his God. This God is constantly thinking on all things,
and to His all-seeing mind, the succession of our ideas owes its existence. Royce holds that Berkeley's theology is realistic, and objects to his theory that matter exists only in the form of ideas forced upon our minds by God. This theory seems precarious to Royce. Berkeley's Nature is too abstract and illusory a conception to Royce who, in his own philosophy, holds that Nature exists as identical with the Absolute in a universal sense.

Royce considers Kant's contribution to philosophy as extremely important. Mercilessly analytical and self-critical, Kant broke down worlds of thought and abandoned some of his own earlier theories. Admitting that he found difficulty in his study of Kant, Royce attempts to restate those portions of Kant's thought which seem of primary importance. To Kant, man is the source of the laws of nature. Royce compares Kant's Religion of Duty with the mystical passion of Spinoza. Kant's God is a God without sentiment, whose revelation is to the conscience, which, in turn, reveals to man the moral law. Faith, to Kant, is an active postulate.

To Kant, space and time are self-contradictory and only conditions of our sense-understanding of things—this is the doctrine which Kant called the ideality of time and space, and it was this theory which led to his later assumption
that there exists a world of things in themselves which are unknowable. In answer to Hume's statement that the facts of the world are unconnected, Kant presented his theory of rational consciousness, or the transcendental unity of apperception, which involves self-recognition and binds fact to experience. The post-Kantians saw time and space in a much closer relation to the categories than did Kant, and even thought of them as definable in terms of the categories.

Investigating the nature of human knowledge, Kant objects to the general opinion that we know only what our experience teaches us. This theory does not define experience nor does it take into account the results of the combination of reason and experience. Metaphysical knowledge of anything beyond the self is impossible, according to Kant. Empirical facts are of two kinds, he believes: present perceptions and conceptual constructions. To form the second kind we employ time, space, and the categories, and link our conceptions of invisible phenomena with our present experience. This makes for unity of consciousness, or human intelligence. The deduction of the categories made known four thoughts, according to Royce: that we know things only as they appear to us, that we can know through reflection the conditions upon which knowledge depends, that a priori forms merely fill in the
outline of experience, and that all of our experience is a unity, related to the categories, time and space, and all possible experience.

Regretting the fact that Hegel as a man was not of a particularly commendable character, Royce examines Hegel's analysis of matter and his theory of the nature of self-consciousness. Hegel sees that there is paradox in consciousness, it is differentiated. Life truly exists only when we contemplate on it from a distance and recognize the existence of another self of the past moment. To make for the unification of consciousness, Hegel makes his Absolute a man of war, a spirit which bears the contradictions of life. The Hegelian doctrine of concrete universals is the attempt to come to the unification of all things finite into one great universal. In this manner Hegel strives to overcome dualism and unify life in the Absolute.

It is obvious, that in his treatment of these four philosophers, Royce does not attempt to be thorough, but selects the essential theories from the system of each thinker.

Despite his sympathy for Spinoza's mysticism, Royce discards this mystical theory of being in his discussion of historical concepts. The mystical view seems to Royce to be too abstract and too subjective to be valid. Royce neglects
to consider the fact that Spinoza, though supposed to be a rationalist, depends upon his experience in order to name the attributes of Substance. Both Royce and Spinoza look to a great Absolute to explain that which cannot explain itself by its own nature. Royce fails to comment on the weakness of Spinoza's reason for the stability of his government. Royce marvels at Spinoza's healthy religious and social outlook despite his isolation. This healthy attitude might be partly explained by psychology, for in spite of his loneliness, Spinoza was financially independent and enjoyed to a certain extent the simple life of those with whom he lived.

Royce does not treat Berkeley with a great degree of seriousness, and dubs his idealism as preparatory. Royce fails to see that, though Berkeley's thought has been enlarged to quite an extent, Berkeley was, after all, the first to emphasize certain principles. It is interesting to note, and Royce makes little of this point, that though Berkeley's primary aim in philosophy was to break down the skepticism and agnosticism of the materialists, he was the second figure in a three-fold movement which ended in complete skepticism.

Much may be said in addition to Royce's treatment, of the effect of Kant's philosophy upon history. Kant's thought has often been called a Copernican Revolution because
it precipitated such wide controversy. In his discussion of Kant's limited belief in knowledge and his postulating of God, there is a logical fallacy which Royce does not mention. There is analogy between Royce's and Kant's moral argument for the existence of God. Royce neglects, too, Kant's view of rational freedom, which seems to be unethical in its implications. Kant's theory of moral obligation is similar to Royce's belief in the double nature of man.

For some peculiar reason Royce will not acknowledge the influence of Hegel upon his own philosophy. In treating Hegel's character, Royce is obviously influenced by Schopenhauer. Both Hegel and Royce believe in the value of the historical approach to problems of philosophy, that metaphysics is the center of philosophy, that the dialectical method is most desirable, that logic and metaphysics are inseparable. Both thinkers hold that the identification of the individual will with the universal will is the content of the moral ideal, both emphasize the social character of reason and both look to a unitary Absolute. Negativity is of major importance in the theories of both Royce and Hegel. Royce's interpretation of Hegel's Absolute is much more understanding than is that of James. While James sees the Absolute as a static thing, Royce interprets it as a living man of war.
Royce takes a position between the Hegelians of the Left and the Hegelians of the Right as his pluralistic singularism would indicate.
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