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The Polish question 1807-1830

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Thesis
THE POLISH QUESTION
1807-1830

by
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Title
THE INFLUENCE OF
NOVEMBER 1830

By
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Master of Arts

1838
THE POLISH QUESTION

1807-1830
Introduction

In the eighteenth century, the weakened kingdom of Poland was partitioned by Austria, Prussia and Russia. Since this time the Polish Question has become not only the domestic concern of the three partitioning powers, but also a problem of international concern. It is the aim of this paper to discuss in some detail the various phases of this interesting and important question during the Napoleonic period, the Congress of Vienna, and the revolutionary period of the 1830's.

When Napoleon came along, he upset the balance of power on the Polish question by making use of Polish patriotism.

So successful was this policy that the Poles supported him loyally in all his European campaigns even though he gave them no definite promises. But Napoleon, who usually had more than one part to his plan never gave up hope of an alliance with either Russia or Austria. In 1807 he succeeded in making Alexander his friend and the outcome of this was the treaty of Tilsit in which the two emperors tried to settle the Polish question by creating the Grand Duchy of Warsaw which satisfied nobody. The Russians were afraid that this was but the nucleus of a future Polish state, while the Poles were disappointed that they should have had so little consideration for such great sacrifices.

Russia's dissatisfaction with the Alliance together with Poland's failure to support Napoleon brought on a war with Russia in 1812. The retreat of the French Emperor from Moscow
Information

In the aftermath of World War II, a new framework for Soviet-American relations took shape. It reflected the post-war division of the world into two spheres dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. This framework was based on the premise that the two superpowers would have to negotiate and cooperate in the post-war world. However, the two superpowers did not share the same goals and interests.

The Cold War began shortly after World War II. The tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States intensified over the control of Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union was determined to spread communism throughout the world, while the United States wanted to contain its spread. This led to the formation of alliances and blocs, with the United States forming NATO to counter the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a series of alliances and conflicts, which were often referred to as the Cold War. The two superpowers were involved in proxy wars around the world, such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The Cold War ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
was a victory for the Russian Czar.

When Napoleon was completely defeated in the spring of 1814, the Polish question again came to the foreground. This problem blocked congress after congress until it was once more settled when the final act of the congress of Vienna again partitioned Poland among Prussia, Russia and Austria.

In spite of this discouraging news, some of the Poles felt that something had been gained since their national institutions and customs had been guaranteed to them by the final treaty of Vienna. But the powers themselves interpreted the treaty in a different way and the resulting dissatisfaction of the Poles reached its height when those under the domination of Russia revolted in 1830.
When Napoleon was completely defeated in the spring of 1814, the political situation was again turned over to the Foreign Office. This magnificent piece of backbone courage, after Congresses, until it was once more setting when the first act of the Congress of Vienna began.

In spite of this宣告, no one at the Foreign Office had ever seen before since their external information turned out to be for a short time of a very different kind. The powers had been surprised by the sudden turn of events, and the Russian chancellors of the peace had been completely taken by surprise when they heard the news of the conclusion of peace.

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C The War and Repose

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10. Differences, negotiations, and negotiations.

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CHAPTER I
NAPOLEON and POLAND
1805-1807

Since the days of the French Revolution, Napoleon's increasing power had instilled in Austria and Prussia the fear with which they had previously regarded Russia's expansion. Napoleon now wondered if it would be possible to revive this feeling against Russia so that the two Germanic powers, sensing a common danger, would ally themselves with France. (1)

Austria might be won over by a generous offer of compensation in the East. Accordingly, Talleyrand suggested that she receive the Roumanian principalities with access to the Black Sea. Such a move would not only pave the way for an alliance between Austria and France, but would also bring Austria into sharp conflict with Russia whose interests in the East would be threatened. (2)

At the same time, Prussia was offered some indemnification in Germany if she would help France to curb Russia's ambition. But the scheme fell through since Frederick William had already allied himself with the Czar while Austria still regarded Russia as a valuable ally. Consequently, these plans of Napoleon resulted only in strengthening the alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia. (3)

2. Ibid. 3. Ibid
But Napoleon was not so easily defeated; he now attempted to weaken his enemies in another way. In former days, France had been allied with Poland because that power had formed a strong barrier between Austria and Russia as well as between Prussia and Russia. Napoleon saw that if he could play on the hope of the Poles to become a nation, such a barrier might again be created to the advantage of France. (1)

Indeed, the Prussian campaign had not yet begun when Napoleon, by reviving among the Poles the memories of their once glorious country, prepared an insurrection to aid him in this new struggle. (2)

He commenced by creating a favorable opinion in Paris with regard to Poland. On November 13, 1805, he sent a manuscript to Cambaceres ordering him to print it and to add "A... piece which paints all the indignity of the partition of Poland and its influence on the balance of power in Europe...." He went on to say, "But the injustice has produced its own remedy. The scandalous partition of Poland has awakened the energy of France. A great man has collected and developed the seeds of her glory and force. He has prepared the foundation of a new social edifice...and of the prosperity of the people." (3)

Kosciuszko was also approached at this time, since Napoleon

1. Van Rose. Life of Napoleon p. 100
2. Capefigue. L'Europe Pendont Le Consulate et L'Empire V. VI, p. 525
3. Handelsman. Napoleon et La Pologne p. 13
eon felt that the former's great name, attached to any project, would make it popular with the Poles. The first interview was cordial enough, for Kościuszko then apparently believed that Napoleon was sincere in his plans for Poland. (1)

On November 3, 1805, Napoleon wrote to Fouche, Minister of Police, "Have Kościuszko come here....but secretly and under another name than his own." Accordingly, Fouche got in touch with Kościuszko and was astonished to learn that now the general did not wish to follow the Emperor unless he was given some guarantees (2), namely: 1. that Poland have a government similar to that of England, 2. that the peasants be free and able to own land, 3. that the newly organized state have boundaries from Riga to Odessa, from Danzig to Hungary. (3)

"Do not think," Kościuszko wrote, "that Napoleon will restore Poland; he thinks only of himself; he detests all great nationalities and his sole end is his own satisfaction and ambition. He creates nothing lasting. I am sure of it." (4)

Kościuszko, feeling that Napoleon could not be trusted, did not wish to alienate Russia by breaking his promise to Emperor Paul. (5)

He was probably even more cautious because he realized that one word of his would arouse all his countrymen. The resulting ***************

1. Garbinski. LaFrance et Les Polonais, p. 95
3. Driault. Tilsit, p. 75
4. Ibid
revolt would compel Prussia to make peace and in that case what would become of those who had been unfortunate enough to follow Napoleon with blind confidence? Could the Poles trust the one who had already betrayed them at Campo Formio, Luneville and at Presbourg? (1)

But Napoleon still persisted in trying to make an ally of Kościuszko and next sent the Polish general, Count Segur, whom he knew Kościuszko honored, to interview him. But the Polish leader was not to be moved. "Does Bonaparte," said he, "wish me to aid him in extending his despotism even to Poland—she has enough of it and it is not worth the trouble of shedding blood to obtain it from afar." (2)

"Kościuszko," said Napoleon in reply to this, "is a fool who has not in his own country all the importance that he fancies he has, and whom I shall well do without in re-establishing Poland if the fortune of arms seconds me." (3)

However that may have been, Napoleon did not wish to do without the prestige which Kościuszko's name would give to his plan. Therefore he had published a letter from the Polish hero "to the brave children of Poland," which Kościuszko haughtily disavowed. "I have read in the newspapers," he wrote, "a letter addressed to the Poles which though signed with my name is not mine." (4)

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1. Capefigue, op. cit. p. 525 V. VI
2. Handelsman, op. cit. p. 14
3. Thiers. History of the Consulate and the Empire V. VI, p. 368
4. Handelsman, op. cit. p. 15
When he failed to gain the support of Kosciuszko, Napoleon turned to Dombrowski and Wybecki who had served in the wars of the Revolution and who, with many Polish delegates, joined him at Berlin. Without telling them of his real plans regarding Poland, Napoleon induced Dombrowski and Wybecki to address themselves to their countrymen. (1)

Accordingly, there appeared on November 3, 1806, a proclamation:

"Men of Poland! The invincible, Napoleon, enters Poland with an army of 300,000 men. Try to merit his magnanimity without seeking to understand all his plans.

"'I will see,' he told us, 'if you deserve to be a nation. I shall go to Posen; it is there I shall consider your desires.'

"Men of Poland! It depends on you. If you wish to exist and to have a country, your avenger, your creator is here.

"Gather around him from all sides. Bring to him your hearts and your arms. Act, and prove to him that you are ready to shed your blood to recover your country....

"And you Poles forced by our oppressors to fight for them against your own interests, come, rally under the flag of our nation." (2)

After this announcement, rebellions broke out, especially in Prussian Poland where there was strong disposition to revolt, partly because the Germans and Slavs meeting on the fron-

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2. D'Angeberg. Recueil des Traites Concernant La Pologne p.440
tier had always had an aversion to each other. (1)

On November 15, the Polish inhabitants of Posen answering
General Dombrowski: "The assurances given to ancient Poland
that, conforming to the wishes of our liberator, the invincible
Napoleon, the forces of our nation will be reunited and that
General Dombrowski has hopes to lay the foundation of our fu-
ture state, have made us forsake the political rut into which
we had fallen; we remit, therefore, the following statement....
that we will furnish and equip the necessary numbers of sol-
diers." (2)

An entirely different result of Dombrowski's announcement
appeared on the same date in the form of an ordinance of the
King of Prussia, authorizing Prussian authorities to imprison
all Polish nobles who sought to recover their country by means
of French aid and promising that those who would give infor-
mation would be well paid. (3)

"....Some nobles" the ordinance stated "who will profit by
war have formed a party which will aid the enemy and incite the
inhabitants to revolt.... One ought to deal vigorously with
these men. We order, therefore, martial law and the arrest of
all Poles who are exciting others to rebel. They will be tried
within twenty-four hours and when convicted, imprisoned or
shot." (4)
Napoleon urged his generals to sustain the insurrection but to take no part in it except by counsels and words of advice. (1)

The Emperor of the French had announced, "If I see a Polish army of thirty to forty thousand men, I shall proclaim your independence in Warsaw." (2)

Within a few days, many battalions were formed until the Polish Army was far in excess of the number demanded. (3)

After such a long period of despair, one can imagine the hope which these people felt—a hope which was unrestrained, illusioned, ready and willing to offer any sacrifice. A disaster of the French army; a sudden change of Napoleon and the Poles felt that they would be abandoned.

Consequently Napoleon was able to win the confidence of the Poles without making any definite promises.

As one might expect, when the French army entered Prussia they were received as saviours. But this feeling was not shown with the same intensity all over Prussian Poland. The great mass of the people in the cities and the peasants did not understand what was going on. The peasants were enrolled for war knowing neither for whom nor for what they were going to fight. They realized only that if possible it was best to fly into the forests after burying what little treasure they had.

2. Lewinski-Corwin. Political History of Poland p. 372
3. Bignon. Histoire Politique et Diplomatique de la France V-VI p. 79
The problem may be restated to include the transportation
of information, if necessary, to ensure any data or

**Section 1:**

The importance of the question and surrounding

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**Section 2:**

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time

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To right...
Napoleon had suggested to his generals that the insurrection ought to spread to Galicia and to Russian Poland. Especially did he hope that the great families would join him. But he wished them to trust him blindly and not to calculate on the future of their country. (2)

The Polish magnates, however, were proprietors of enormous tracts of land under control of either of these two powers, a fact which naturally made them more conservative. They were farthest from the scene of action and they had had time to see the effect of the revolt in the west provinces and to meditate on Napoleon's policy. Therefore, they would not declare themselves openly until, like Kościuszko, they had something definite to work on. They said, "Yes, we are, and always will be, Poles at heart. The great Napoleon has only to say, 'I declare the independence of Poland', and to name a king. When the Emperor speaks, our destinies are fixed and our independence is assured. But why, before we know his intentions and on the strength of the proclamations of some military refugees in France who have nothing to lose, shall we revolt and risk our existence and the future of our children?... We are ready to give all we possess, but on condition that we get a king and the constitution of 1791." (3)

2. Sorel. L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise V. VII p. 126
The formation of the line company was an important step in the development of the corporate structure. The line company was established to provide a framework for the efficient operation of the various departments and divisions of the company. It allowed for more focused management and increased accountability. The line company also facilitated better communication and coordination between different departments.

The line company was designed to operate in conjunction with the staff company. The staff company provided support functions such as finance, human resources, and legal advice. The line company, on the other hand, was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the business.

The formation of the line company was a significant milestone in the history of the company. It marked the transition from a more decentralized structure to a more centralized model, which would allow for greater efficiency and control.
Naturally, Napoleon was disgusted. In writing to Marat, he said, "Tell the Poles that it is not with these calculations, with these personal precautions, that men emancipate their country which has fallen under a foreign yoke; that it is, on the contrary, by risking all at once blindly, unreservedly and with the resolution to sacrifice fortune and life that one may have, not the certainty, but the hope of delivering it. I do not come to beg for a throne for my family, for I am not in want of thrones to give away. I am come in behalf of European equilibrium, to attempt difficult enterprises by which the Poles have much to gain... since it is their existence which is at stake as well as the interest of Europe. If, by dint of devotedness, they second me so that I succeed, I will grant their independence. If not, I can do nothing." (1)

And again to Marat "The Poles who demand so much before declaring themselves are not inspired by the love of country, but of self. My greatness does not rest on the relief of a few thousand Poles..... It is not for me to make the first step..... (2)

Napoleon now began to feel more strongly than ever that Europe could not long remain peaceful unless either Austria or Russia allied themselves with France. Consequently, he negotiated with both powers throughout the next year. (3)

3. Vandal. V. I, p. 38
The project Hypothesis was abandoned. In writing to Mr.

If anyone were to question the need for clear communication, they might point out that it is not always easy to convey complex ideas in a concise manner. However, the importance of clear and effective communication cannot be overstated. In this particular case, the failure to communicate effectively led to a misunderstanding that could have been avoided with better coordination and preparation. As a result, the project was forced to come to a halt. I take full responsibility for the lack of clear communication on this issue. I will work to ensure that such errors do not occur again.

(1) "I vote no objection. Of course, I can do nothing.

and even to know. The future, and where to go. And then I

know, I have no objection. The future is now. And I am

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He well knew that if he made any definite statement in regard to Poland, it would not only hinder the Russian alliance, but also bring Austria and Russia closer together.

Then, too, after the battle of Jena, he wished to pacify Prussia so that he could use her as a lever to bring about the desired alliance with the Czar.

Therefore, he abandoned the Poles altogether and just before entering Berlin said "So much the worse for Poland. She let herself be partitioned; she is not a nation; she has no national spirit,—a few nobles who have everything, a people which has nothing. She is a lifeless body to which it is necessary to give life before thinking of doing anything with it." (1)

Later, he added, "I have Warsaw and Posen, but I will not touch Cracow, Galicia nor Vilna...." (2)

When Napoleon arrived at Berlin, he offered the Prussians a suspension of arms and a reconciliation which were quite contrary to his agreement with the Poles. He thought that it was vital to the interests of France to establish between the Rhine and the Vistula a power which, united to Turkey in interest, would restore all the advantages of the barrier of the East. (3)

So Napoleon's offer to Prussia provided that the unoccupied Polish provinces in Prussia be able to gain their independence. This country enlarged perhaps by Galicia, would form the greater

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2. Ibid
3. Ibid. p. 63
part of the Prussian monarchy and would succeed to the role of Ancient Poland. Frederick William refused. (1)

On November 30, Talleyrand wrote Napoleon, "The King (of Prussia) does not wish to contract an obligation which he cannot fulfill.... He has not been able to obtain from the Russians a promise that they would withdraw. They declared that after the proclamation to the Poles which had resulted in an insurrection in Prussian Poland, it was the affair not only of Prussia but also of Russia." (2)

Nor did Napoleon's search to make an ally of either Austria or Russia meet with much success. Alexander was not yet ready to withdraw from the cause which he had pledged himself to defend. He therefore looked with horror upon the idea of a French alliance hence he remained deaf to Napoleon's entreaties. (3)

Because of this attitude, Alexander was anxious to draw Napoleon farther east away from his source of supplies. The disadvantage of this, however, was that if Napoleon were master of all or of a part of Prussian Poland, Russian Poland would be able to separate from Russia and proclaim her independence.

The Czar, as well as Napoleon, was courting the favor of Austria at this time. He, too, felt the need of an alliance, especially since Prussia had been crippled. He could readily

see that without some further support he would be forced to listen to the French Emperor. But just now rather than any conquest and partition of the East which Napoleon had vaguely suggested, the Czar preferred continuing the struggle against the French since to him it was a struggle for ideals.

This continued hostility of Russia made Austrian neutrality more important than ever to Napoleon. (1) But Austria had become alarmed at his Polish project. Since she had protested when Dombrowski's proclamation had been issued for Prussian Poland, (2) Napoleon now attempted to reassure her.

As soon as he reached Posen he proposed that Austria cooperate with him in establishing a bulwark against Russia and that for this purpose, she abandon Galicia and receive ample compensation in Silesia. But Austria was not yet ready to agree to Napoleon's plans to such an extent as Russia and Prussia would then be alienated and Austria would not be in a position to hold the balance of power as she could in the present situation.

Count Stadon stated the refusal very diplomatically by saying that the morality of his sovereign did not permit him to accept a possession which was not guaranteed by a treaty with Prussia. (3)

For this reason Napoleon saw that he must make war and that

3. Ibid, V. VI, p. 63
The sheep are an important element of our economy. For this reason, they can sometimes coexist with the farmer's needs and concerns. However, in recent years, there has been a growing awareness of the importance of animal welfare and environmental impact. This has led to a shift in the way that sheep are managed and raised. The implementation of sustainable practices has become a priority for many farmers. It is crucial to find a balance between the needs of the sheep and the environment. In this context, the role of the shepherd is essential. Shepherds are responsible for ensuring the safety and well-being of the sheep while also managing the resources available. This involves selecting the best grazing locations, monitoring the health of the animals, and addressing any issues that may arise. It is a challenging role that requires knowledge and skills in various areas. The use of modern technology, such as GPS tracking systems, has also become more common, allowing for more efficient management of the flock. Overall, the role of the shepherd is vital in ensuring the sustainability and health of the sheep population.
he would need allies. As Poland would be the theater of the war, it would then be to his advantage to support her cause. If she were his ally, she would furnish him with forces and provisions, hence Napoleon, ever ready to shift his plans to suit his circumstances, decided on this course temporarily.

Napoleon saw that in order to obtain the necessary supplies from Poland, it would be necessary for him to arouse her people again. Newspapers and journals were mainly used for this purpose. "All Poland takes arms," one article read. "It is difficult to give an idea of the movement in this country. Priests, nobles, peasants, all are united...." (1)

"It is necessary," said Napoleon "to use every means to urge the Poles to fight and it is, therefore, necessary to employ the same language as before. Treat well the principle Poles who are faithful to us. Avoid that which may produce a bad impression on them. Remember that Warsaw is a country of resources. The future of Poland depends upon events." (2)

But most of the first enthusiasm of the Poles had disappeared and it was difficult to revive it. The situation was an extremely delicate one so Napoleon sent Talleyrand to Warsaw. (3)

There was division among the Poles. The radical element thought that the rebirth of Poland was due to the action of

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2. Ibid, p. 94
3. Ibid, p. 96
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John

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Rockefeller

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John

D.

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Napoleon and that it was upon him that the work depended. The government, they believed, should have for its mission to destroy the prejudices of the nobles and to induce them to live in the cities and busy themselves with trade and commerce. As they saw it, the chief fault of the old constitution was that the peasant did not own land and they wished to remedy this defect by renting the royal and ecclesiastical domains to the peasants. (1)

The more moderate party, composed mainly of the rich, did not trust Napoleon so implicitly. The constitution of May 3 served as their platform, although some wished it amended. These men were more bound by tradition than were the members of the pro-French party. (2)

Talleyrand profited by the mutual antagonism of both parties to gain the mastery of public opinion at Warsaw. (3)

The height of enthusiasm among the Poles was reached when Napoleon arrived. He was elaborately feted and when he met Marie Walewska, he began to find the Poles even more interesting. (4)

From Posen the Emperor organized a provisional government and accordingly appealed to Dombrowski whose presence served to awaken the hopes of the people, to help him in this undertaking. Napoleon hastened above all to appoint a commission.

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2. Ibid
3. Ibid
to receive patriotic gifts and to prepare for conscription. (1)

It might be well to consider at this point just how much Napoleon had promised the Poles. Since, as Machiavelli says, "many know what you seem, but few know what you are," it is necessary to judge a man's thoughts by his words and deeds. By neither of these methods did Napoleon indicate that he wished to re-establish the Poland of 1772.

To the deputies of the Palatinates of Posen, he said that France had never recognized the partitions of Poland.... (but)(2) that he was unable to promise them independence since that depended upon them--that he would be interested in seeing the throne of Poland restored and in assuring the independence of that great nation..... (3)

"This," says he "is a great affair; it is war with its hazards, dangers, miseries. I am surprised by the patriotic ardor which still survives so long after the conquest. I see that it is not easy to destroy a nation. This which I do is half for you; half for me. But it is necessary to fight.....

"Will I re-establish the throne of Poland? God alone, who is the sole arbiter of this great political problem, knows the answer." (4)

Certainly no one could accuse him of making definite promises in this speech. Capefigue says that the Polish character was antagonistic to Napoleon who did not enjoy turbulent people.

2. Parenthesis mine
3. Ibid, p. 76
"Their system of elective kings and republican assemblies, did not fit in with his doctrine of passive obedience." (1)

Indeed, the Russian party asked if one were to look for the restoration of the Republic of Poland from a man who had destroyed liberty in his own country.

Mostrowski wrote April 30, 1807, "I do not think that it is the general plan of the master to make Poland a great, strong, and powerful country because she might easily with time become dangerous to other federated countries and even be led to quarrel with the supreme authority." (2)

"Napoleon," Capefigue suggests further, was not generous enough to resurrect Poland as an independent nation." (3)

The Emperor seems not to have had any definite Polish policy but one which, being dependent on the policies of Austria and Russia, changed as they did. Could Napoleon have been master of the European situation without considering the Poles, he would have done so. As it was he found his Polish alliance profitable. The country kept his army well provided, the Polish regiments were of great assistance and threats of a Poland rendered independent by French aid, could be used to keep Austria and even Russia somewhat in line. But his promises to the Poles were so ambiguous that one hesitates even to accuse him of insincerity.

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2. Handelsman. p. 15
3. Ibid
CHAPTER II

POLAND AND THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807

The victory of Friedland, June 4, 1807, was decisive although the Russians thought that the war had hardly commenced. Voronzov wrote, "What is it which makes the Emperor wish for peace? Is it the fear that Napoleon will enter Russia? This would be just what we would desire. Bonaparte would find himself in the same position as Charles XII." (1)

"The secret of conquering the French," said Benningsen "is to widen the distance which separates them from the Rhine and draw them on toward the Dniester. The government of Vienna has not ceased to advise the Russians to draw Napoleon as far as possible toward the east to enfeeble and make more distant his lines of communication so that the Austrians might break them." (2)

But Alexander was afraid, and Czartoryski seconded this uneasiness, of a general revolt of the Polish provinces in Lithuania as far as Smolensk to the door of Moscow.

The Czar was also thinking of his army. He had lost many of the best officers and almost all of his best generals were either wounded or ill.

Besides, Alexander was dissatisfied with his allies. Austria who had withdrawn so quickly from the struggle at Austerlitz had refused to intervene even the day after the battle of

2. Ibid
Eylau. Her policy of swaying from one side to the other had
defeated its own purpose and had drawn Russia and France to-
gether. (1) England had done little more for the coalition than
to excite it vigorously--while she worked for herself in the
Mediterranean, Egypt and America.

Consequently, the Czar wrote to Kurakin, the Vice-Chancel-
lor, "It is impossible for me to continue the war alone not
sustained by my allies. England has behaved badly from the be-
inning."

The Russian Chancellor also complained, "The system of
isolation on the part of the allies has made it necessary for
His Majesty to consider only the interests and the glory of his
empire and to decide to negotiate a reconciliation with the
French Government." (2)

In addition to all these reasons, Alexander wanted to
meet Napoleon. He had a vague hope of a Franco-Russian settle-
ment of the affairs of the East whereby Russia might obtain a
share of Turkey.

Accordingly, Prince Lobanov received instructions from the
Russian Emperor to conclude an armistice for one month during
which the troops should remain where they were. He was not to
propose negotiations for peace, although if France expressed a
wish to end the war, he was to say that Alexander also desired

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2. Ibid, p. 157
it, but that Russia would not consent to any humiliations or cession of territory. (1)

Labonov was cordially received by Napoleon (2) who had long decided on a peace with Russia. His army was tired. Then, too, it was always necessary to watch Austria who would not need much coaxing to fall upon his line of communication as he advanced farther to the east. (3)

During the interview, Napoleon showed Labonov a map on the table. As he traced with his finger the course of the Vistula, he said, "Here are the limits of our two empires. Your master should rule on one side and I on the other." This was the beginning of the "contest of seduction" which reached its climax at Tilsit. (4)

While Labonov was with Napoleon, Alexander and Frederick William were in conference with Budberg and Hardenberg. "They form great plans," said the King "to avoid the blow which threatens us and they flatter themselves that they can wheedle Napoleon on different points to save our common interests. (5)

At first there was harmony between Prussia and Russia, and Hardenberg, hoping that he would be in charge of negotiations in general, drew up a plan the main points of which were as follows:

It was thought that Turkey was in a state of decay. For the

2. Ibid, p. 162
3. Ibid, p. 163
4. Ibid, p. 162, 163
I'm not sure what you're trying to accomplish by

(1) Creating a narrative
(2) Improving your prose

I would suggest putting more effort into your writing.

If you have any questions, please feel free to ask.

References:
1. Example 1
2. Example 2
3. Example 3
4. Example 4
peace of Europe, this empire, already falling apart, ought to be partitioned. Russia would have the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula; Austria, the west; and France, Greece and the Islands. Russia and Austria would then be able to abandon their Polish territories with the exception of Posen, Danzig and Thorn which were necessary for communication with Russia. In return for her Polish territories, Prussia would acquire Saxony while the newly established Poland would fall to the King of Saxony whose ancestors had once been Kings of Poland. (1)

There were other alternatives to this plan, but all gave the King of Prussia domination over all or over a section of Poland. (2)

Yet this plan did suggest some settlement of the Turkish and Polish questions which would furnish the principle discussion at Tilsit.

However, Alexander did not desire the King of Prussia to have so much power, hence he began to formulate his own terms of peace.

He wished Russia left intact; Prussia re-established; Mecklenburg evacuated; and indemnities granted the King of Sardinia and of Naples. Apparently he was intrigued by the possibility of extending his frontiers as far as the Vistula and by fulfilling the dream of Catherine the Great to possess Constantinople. (3)

2. Handelsman. p. 126
3. Sorel. Lectures historiques, p. 177
By this time, Alexander was in great haste to see Napoleon—perhaps, Driault suggests, even entertaining a secret ambition to conquer him.

In a note ratifying the armistice, Alexander wrote to Labonov, "You will express to the Emperor Napoleon how much I appreciate all that he has done for me thru you, and how much I desire a union between the two nations..... You will say to him that this union between Russia and France has been constantly the object of my desires and that I am convinced that it is able to assure the happiness and peace of the globe. A new system ought to replace that which has existed and I flatter myself that we might find one if we could treat without intermediaries. A durable peace ought to be concluded between us in a few days.(1)

Although Napoleon himself greatly desired peace, much of the success of the conference at Tilsit depended on the impression which the Czar made on the Emperor. Alexander, desiring that the peace not only bring him safety for the present but returns in the future, realized this.

According to Vandal (2), one of Alexander's secrets was to use a "simple, confidant, friendly tone." His head slightly inclined, a beautiful smile playing about his lips, he expressed himself with perfect ease in French of which he was a master.

Napoleon who had been disgusted with the cringing attitude

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of the kings of Germany and with the bitterness of the Austrian Emperor, was charmed and responded to Alexander's advances while the Czar, admiring a great man who was a past master at the art of seduction, was equally impressed.

Alexander is reported to have said, "I hate the English as much as you do."

"In that case," Napoleon replied, "the peace is made."

Only two scruples held the Czar in check. He wished to be assured that Prussia would not be annihilated and that Poland would not be re-established. (1)

Not finding Napoleon so ready to come to agreement on the Prussian question, the Czar seems to have decided not to press the point too sharply but to get out of the interview all that he could. Indeed he later admitted "I listened to all that Napoleon had to say with much attention, determined to profit from the occasion." (2)

Apparently this was also Napoleon's aim. Neither, however, had made so great an impression on the other as he thought, hence, as Kornilov suggests (3), it is difficult to decide which was the more deceived.

The discussion progressed well until the Prussian question was reached. This problem included Poland and North Germany. (4)

1. Rose. Op. cit. V. I, p. 120
In that case, "stereophonic" really means "stereo.

The key to understanding the difference between the two systems is to realize that they are designed for different applications. The word "stereo" is often used to describe a system that creates a sense of depth and separation between the left and right channels. On the other hand, "stereophonic" is a term that is often used to describe a system that creates a sense of presence and envelopment, as if the listener is sitting in the middle of a concert hall.

The "stereophonic" system is more concerned with creating a sense of envelopment and presence, while the "stereo" system is more concerned with creating a sense of depth and separation. This means that the "stereophonic" system is often used in live performance settings, while the "stereo" system is often used in recording settings.

In conclusion, the difference between "stereophonic" and "stereo" is simply a matter of emphasis on different aspects of the audio experience. The "stereophonic" system is more focused on creating a sense of presence and envelopment, while the "stereo" system is more focused on creating a sense of depth and separation.

(1) See the documentation for more information on this topic.

(2) Other factors that may influence the choice of system include the type of content being produced, the intended audience, and the budget available.

(3) The "stereophonic" system is often considered to be more realistic, while the "stereo" system is often considered to be more creative.

(4) The "stereophonic" system is often used in live performance settings, while the "stereo" system is often used in recording settings.

(5) Stereophonic techniques are sometimes used in recording settings to create a sense of depth and separation between the left and right channels.

(6) Other factors that may influence the choice of system include the type of content being produced, the intended audience, and the budget available.
Napoleon finally promised Alexander that he would re-establish Prussia but this promise still left him the right to remake the state as he pleased. The question which he now must settle was how to maintain this state and at the same time create those independent territories which he considered necessary for his own defense.

He thought it best to establish a series of states from the Rhine to the Vistula among them Silesia which would be under the supervision of Frederick William but ruled over by a French prince. At the extremity of this line of states he would create the Duchy of Warsaw which would be composed of the Polish provinces of Prussia. (1)

In this way Napoleon's authority would extend even to the Russian frontier. These tributary states would hold Austria and Prussia apart and would keep Russia respectful.

It has always been a matter of debate among scholars as to who was the first to speak of the reconstruction of Poland as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Schilder says that the idea was suggested by Alexander and that he even went so far as to advise Napoleon to give the Duchy to his brother, Jerome. But Driault is of the opinion that Schilder's statement is not supported by documents and that this idea was only spread abroad to rally the Poles around Russia. He says it would have been foolishness for the Czar to have suggested a scheme whereby he would have run

the risk of losing his Polish territories. Then, again, if he had suggested such a formation at this time why was he so restless about the recognition of Poland afterward? (1)

Handelsman, on the other hand, thinks that Napoleon, making a show of his disinterestedness in Poland, offered Prussian Poland to Alexander knowing that the Czar was not in a position to accept it if he wished to appear at all loyal to Prussia, and that the acceptance of these territories would complicate Russia's relations with Austria. (2)

The creation of the Grand Duchy, then, resolves itself into a compromise between the two Emperors. Napoleon was quick to see that if he had insisted on the re-establishment of all Poland or even suggested the creation of a Grand Duchy the conference might be ruined and the advantages to be gained were too great to permit that. In forcing Alexander to suggest the way out, Napoleon avoided all responsibility.

Alexander, on the other hand, saw that the creation of such a state was contrary to Russian interests, but after the victories of Napoleon at Jena and at Friedland, he was not in a position to refuse.

Perhaps, also, as Driault suggests, the Czar urged on by the ideas of Czartoryski, hoped that eventually the Grand Duchy would fall into his power. (3)

3. Ibid, p. 184
The lack of training and proper preparation has been identified as a significant barrier to effective decision-making. To address this issue, there is a need for comprehensive training programs that focus on developing the necessary skills and knowledge. This is particularly important in light of the increasing complexity of modern decision-making processes.

Recommendations:

1. Develop a comprehensive training program that covers a wide range of decision-making scenarios.
2. Incorporate case studies and real-world examples to enhance the practical application of learned concepts.
3. Provide ongoing support and resources to facilitate continuous learning and improvement.
4. Include feedback mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of the training and make necessary adjustments.

Improving decision-making skills is crucial for achieving successful outcomes in various contexts. A well-structured training program can significantly enhance the decision-making abilities of individuals and organizations.
It seems to have been finally agreed upon by the two emperors that the Duchy be given to the King of Saxony. (1)

By the peace which was signed July 7, 1807, Frederick William was allowed to keep his crown, but gave up nearly half his territory: a. the region between the Elbe and the Rhine, b. the district of Cottibis, Lusatia to the King of Saxony, c. the Polish possessions including Danzig with the exception of Warmia, Ermland and part of the Netze district. These Polish territories, as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, were to go to the King of Saxony who was to have a military road through Prussia to connect the territories. The Department of Bialystok was to go to Russia. The Navigation of the Vistula was to be free and there was to be granted an amnesty for all Poles who had taken any part in the political or military events. (2)

By this treaty, France would gain a dissolution of the ties which bound Russia to Austria and to England and what was extremely important to Napoleon, Russia would endorse his continental system. (3). For without Russia it was plain that the economic blockade would be a farce.

In return, Russia asked for some agreement with Turkey; the restitution of Mecklenburg to its sovereign; some indemnities for the Kings of Naples and Sardinia. (4)

3. Tatistcheff. Alexander et Napoleon p. 141
4. Ibid
To earn to have from absolutely necessary know to the face of present. It

beauty that this thought be given to the face of present. If

to the base without any standing. Only, firm, the beauty and

I am also to keep the present, and have the earth make

humanitarian: the beauty between the earth and the earth. In

abstract of abstractions, abstract to the earth of earth, or the earth

senseless, senseless, senseless with the abstraction of earth, sense

These deeper connections

find any part of the before anything, see the ground level of earth, we to to the kind of career

concretion. The importance of pacification was to to to manifest

the development of the higher sense to the face and abstractions may be to manifest

manifested no concern. You will know and form way can be to manifest

(R) impossible to different events.

to this thought, these would be a formation of the face

- Because some mixture to exist in the earth and some can be

concrete important to abstractions, making some sense to the concepts

support the earth. (R). These important mixture to make things the

abstractions of abstractions to the abstract to some information on

the face of face you abstractions.
In this system Russia herself, was the barrier of the East while Napoleon to make assurance doubly sure had in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw a military frontier guard watching over Russia, Prussia and Austria. It is difficult to decide at this period whether or not Napoleon thought of the possibility of adding to the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw or merely used this suggestion as a sword over Alexander.

Jablonowski has his own idea on this problem. Says he, "Napoleon knew that if Poland were re-established, she would give him her people, her resources, her moral energy and the valor of her armies. However, Poland would not follow or even encourage French projects in Asia and would wish the power and French influence in Germany to disappear. This explains the repulsion Napoleon always had for the re-establishment of Poland. Tyrannical domination of Germany and the Russian alliance were necessary..... Thus, the blood of the Poles was shed in Italy, Spain, and Russia for a cause which naturally become the enemy of the Polish cause for which the soldiers believed they were dying. (1)

It is possible, however, that Napoleon did not have a definite plan at this time.

At any rate it is safe to say that the creation of Duchy of Warsaw introduced into the alliance "a germ of death" which kept it from becoming durable. (2). It was in vain that Napoleon

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1. Jablonowski. La France et La Pologne p. 14
gave the Grand Duchy a new name which would recall no dangerous memories; in vain did he attempt to give the appearance of finality to the boundaries, and to add new parts for the advantage of Russia. (1). Alexander could see that it was possible that Napoleon could be preparing for the re-establishment of Poland. In that case, the Czar had too much at stake to recognize as a friend such a protector of the Poles.

Napoleon gave as little as he could and left Alexander to hope for much. At the same time, he wished to procure great profits in return for these petty services. Alexander, on the other hand, waited for the large profits to make him sure that he wished to render the great services. (2)

THE GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW

After Tilsit, many of the Poles were still naive enough to excuse Napoleon for not doing more for them. (3). Most of the Poles saw in Napoleon the Messiah of their race and refused to believe that the Grand Duchy was anything but a first step toward the re-establishment of Poland.

"The creation of the modest Duchy of Warsaw does not mean anything to us" said the Countess Potocki. "It is not worth our efforts but one thinks of the future....." (4)

It was this hope which persisted through great disappointment and which was the secret of Napoleon's power in eastern Europe (5). Czartoryski and Kosciuszko combatted this childlike

...
faith and enthusiasm in vain.

Oginski, who seemed to be one of the more pessimistic or more practical of the Poles, wrote "One regards the treaty of Tilsit as the fall of all the hopes... of seeing Poland re-established, and since this period the confidence that one had in the good dispositions of Napoleon for the Poles weakened." (1)

Another rather significant incident happened at this time. The Senator Wybicki was called to Posen to present homage to the regenerator of Poland. Napoleon replied that he would be glad to see the "Varsovians."

Wybicki, believing that he had misunderstood the Emperor, said "Sire, these are not only the representatives from Warsaw but also of all ancient Poland who come in the name of their fellow-countrymen to express to you their recognition and..."

"These are 'Varsovians!'" said the Emperor, dryly, passing to another subject. (2)

Since the battle of Jena, Poland had been a military camp organized only for war. After the peace of Tilsit, it was necessary to give her another government. The Polish commission of the government joined Napoleon at Dresden to furnish him with all the needed information. (3)

Many plans for the new government had been drawn up or talked about, most of which were based on the idea of Jean

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1. Oginski. Memoirs V. II, p. 345
Jacques Rousseau. For it seemed to most of those who had studied the situation that it was a question not only of recreating the diet and dietines, but of accomplishing some social revolution which would limit the privileges of the nobles and enfranchise the serfs. (1)

Napoleon asked the members of the commission "Have you some plans for your constitution?"

Potocki began to read what they had prepared but he was not permitted to finish. After Napoleon had made a speech denouncing anarchy and discord, he ended by saying "I will abolish all that sort of thing." (2)

He then instructed the deputies to sit at a table while he dictated the constitution to them. When the Poles protested against the name "Varsovians", Napoleon still subordinating Poland to his Russian and Austrian policy, replied, "Gentlemen, I have done for you more than you have a right to expect; it is to reconcile the neighboring powers that I wish you would take this name. It is the desire of the Emperor of Russia and I am not going to haggle with a sovereign for whom I have great friendship." (3)

The constitutional statutes of July 22, 1807 were completed by the Civil code, May 1808.

Serfdom was abolished and there was class equality and

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3. Ibid, p. 147
public justice. The Roman Catholic religion was the state religion but all cults were tolerated. The Polish language was recognized as official. (1)

An hereditary duke, assisted by responsible ministers, formed a council of state. There was also a legislative body made up of 1. the Chamber of Nonces and 2. the Senate. The former was composed of proprietors non-nobles, manufacturers, vicars, artists and citizens distinguished by talents or services. These were elected for nine years and could be re-elected every three years by the nobles and the cities. The Senate was nominated by the executives. (2)

The Duke introduced the laws, convoked and adjourned the diet and the dietines. The diet convened at Warsaw every two years for a session of fifteen days. If the Senate refused to pass a law, the King could appoint new senators, but the number must be composed of no more than six archbishops, twelve palatines and twelve castellons. (3)

Napoleon was especially pleased at having abolished serfdom and proclaimed it all over Europe. "Slavery," said he is abolished in a vast country where for many years religion and politics had condemned it without destroying it." (4)

On September 23, the King of Saxony took over the reins of government. "The peace of Tilsit" he said in his proclamation

2. Ibid
3. Ibid
An accident which resulted in a fatality has occurred. The fatality was caused by a failure of the system to operate within the expected parameters. The system was designed to handle a wide range of conditions, but in this instance, the failure was due to an unforeseen scenario.

The investigation into the cause of the accident is ongoing. The results will be presented in a detailed report to be submitted to the relevant authorities. The report will include recommendations for improving the system's performance and preventing similar incidents in the future.

The immediate action taken has been to ensure that the system is fully inspected and tested before it is reactivated. All personnel involved in the operation of the system have been informed of the incident and are being trained on the updated safety protocols.

We extend our sincere apologies to the affected family and friends. Our thoughts are with them during this difficult time.
"the result of the generous efforts and vast conceptions of the heroic pacifier of Europe, has brought you under our crown.... A constitutional statute which the great Napoleon has offered you guarantees you peace and happiness under our government which is not unfamiliar to you." (1)

But many of the Poles were not satisfied with the constitution. Since this document was drawn up by Napoleon who at this time of his life had become despotic, most of the power was vested in the executive. The idea was, of course, quite contrary to what the Poles had been used to.

Naturally they were also dissatisfied because the name of Poland did not appear in the constitution. The great families did not like the social equality, nor the end of serfdom which greatly compromised their interests. (2)

However, the lesser nobles and the bourgeois who had not so much to lose by the change were not so disappointed. (3)

The most influential Poles counselled patience and emphasized the fact that part of Poland, at any rate, was independent and had its own constitution. Class equality, they thought, was necessary to the constitution of a true nation and besides it was not wise to restore the old Poland with the unhappy traditions but to found a new Poland. (4)

3. Ibid
4. Ibid
The report of the permanent commission, prepared under your name and on which the Constitution of the United States was based, passed the Senate and was referred to the Committee on Conventions. The Committee reported the report of the commission with the following recommendations:

1. The Constitution of the United States should be amended to provide for a new form of government, which is not necessarily to be
2. But every one of the points were not satisfactory with the Constitution. Since the present Constitution was drawn up by a group of the best of the ablest men, the law by which business, and the power of the executive, the ablest men of the country, dominate the country to make the laws and keep the laws.
3. The ablest men of the country have always acted in the Constitution. The Constitution is not the society necessarily, nor the ablest men of the country, but the Constitution is the ablest men of the country.
4. However, the lessers' hopes and the proclivities of the nation have not been disappointed.
5. So much to lose, the ablest men were not so disappointed.
6. The most influential forces connected with the ablest men are the same.
7. Hence the least part of the ablest men of the ablest men are the same.
8. Hence the least part of the ablest men of the ablest men are the same.
9. Hence the least part of the ablest men of the ablest men are the same.
10. Hence the least part of the ablest men of the ablest men are the same.
As time went on, new irritations began to appear. The King rarely came to Warsaw and so the affairs of the Duchy must go to Dresden for a solution. While the King of Saxony seemed to do his best for his Polish subjects, his apparent good intentions were constantly defeated by the despotism of Napoleon and by the jealousies of the Saxons. (1)

The Polish ministers and the President of the Council of state petitioned the King for more authority but it was not granted. This unsatisfactory situation led to much criticism. Some laid the blame on the ministers of the Duchy who in turn blamed the orders from Dresden and accused the King. Some even wished for a viceroy, but others thought that if this executive were of the House of Saxony, there would be little gained while the difficulties of choosing a Polish candidate were so great that even the bravest were frightened. (2)

Perhaps the situation which made the people of the Duchy most dissatisfied was the economic condition. Money was scarce. The continental system stifled the only sources of the rich, agriculture and commerce, especially the export of grain and timber to England. (3)

Much attention was given to military affairs. "When one reads the correspondence of Napoleon and Talleyrand," says Handelsman "it is always the same. "It is necessary to get me

2. Mansury. Jerome Napoleon et La Pologne p. 175
We gave our new interpretation power to appear. The
role naturally came to Warren and so the elevation of the task
might rest in a solution. While the task of the
moment to do the best for the policy subjects, the
spectral was to do his best for the policy subjects, the
good intentions were contradictory, gathered in the collection of
Hercules and the presentation of the Saxons.

The political ministers and the president of the Council of
safety belonging to the kind to more authority but it was not
peculiar. This unphilosophical attitude led to much criticism.

Gone was the place on the ministers of the house and in turn
placed the other from inside and became the kind.

Every wish for a policy, and a policy expressed from this
even executive were at the house of Saxons, some would to little
executive with the difficulties of acquiring a policy candidate
being above the difficulties of acquiring a policy candidate
were so great that even the greatest were frightened.

Perhaps the attention which made the people at the house
most accessible was the economic condition. Money was scarce.
The continuous wars filled the only sources of the public
purposes and commerce, especially the exchange of grain and

I现行の翻訳は、「我々が与えた新解釈の力」である。その役割は、自然にウィリアム・ウォーカーが負った。その場面は、解決のためのものであり、使命の執行がそれを必要とした。

現実において、政治的な政策の責任者の地位を増大させることで、より大きな権限を与えられることにした。そのしきたりは、哲学的な反対意見が生じた。

すでに、議会と閣僚の位置が空いていたので、現在は、議会の会合が行われているが、これに限りなく近いものがある。議会は、政策の難題を解決するために、小切符の形で受け入れられるべきである。

人々が最も近くなる場が、経済状況であった。金は民に乏しかった。

国家の経済的状況は、商業の目的を満たすことが出来なかった。特に、穀物の交換が困難であった。

注: 本文は、翻訳したものです。元の文書は英語で書かれており、文脈は明確ではないです。
some transports. Money is not lacking, but it accomplishes nothing unless the supplies arrive and my army is nourished. If the patriotism of the Poles, is not able to make this effort, they are good for nothing. ' " (1)

Then, again, one cannot expect the people of the Duchy to be overjoyed when many of the Polish domains were given to Napoleon's marshalls and generals or because they had to support an army of 30,000 French soldiers. (2)

In 1809 when the Austrian lands were added, the Polish army was increased to 60,000 and in 1812, to 85,000. The deficit for 1811 was 21,000,000 francs. (3)

It was clear, furthermore, that this country which had already been ravaged for many years, would be the theater of war at the first break between France and either Austria or Russia.

"But," says Oginski "such was the confidence that Napoleon had inspired....and such was the magical effect of his promises that had been spread among the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of his intention to re-establish Poland entirely, that the Poles patiently supported the public charges and conscriptions as indispensible sacrifices if they wished to see their country once more re-created." (4)

*************************************************************************
3. Cambridge Modern History. V. IX, p. 338
some transactions. Money is not lacking, but it becomes difficult to get hold of. The copper mines, which were disrupted by the war, are now producing. If the partition of the Polish, at not safe to make this else.

They're, again, one cannot explain the people of the country to
be occupied again many of the Polish community were given to
a certain territory and generally to believe they had to move
part of back to the 1,000,000 Pesos' of gold.

In 1809 when the Austrian funds were needed, the Polish
were again increased to 66,000 and in 1812 to 86,000.

Hereafter for 1811 the 21,000,000 Pesos'.

If we can clean, i.e., for our country, which had
already been occupied, we won't have to be the greatest of
men of the Lithuanian between Russia and either Austria or

Hesse.

But "Una Voz Gringa" and the community that "Paolo
has disappeared, and much was the impact of his presence
and influence... and much was the market effect of his presence
and influence... and much was the market effect of the Grand
Pry

and the influence to re-establish Polish authority, that the
Polish pattern supported the future of the country and companions
as indispensable existence if they wished to see their country
once more re-created.

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3. Cemarre. Modern History. V. IX. p. 556
CHAPTER III

THE TEST OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE

THE QUESTION OF SILESIA

Meanwhile the first real difference between Alexander and Napoleon came over the question of Silesia.

When negotiating the Convention of Konigsberg for the restitution of Prussian lands by the French, Marshall Kalckreuth specified that the lands were to be returned when the Prussian authorities had discharged the contributions and exactions defined by Napoleon. But the Convention did not say what the maximum charge should be. This gave Napoleon an opportunity to subject towns and cities to taxes beyond their power thus indefinitely postponing the time of liberation (1). This in itself was sufficient to alarm the Czar, but more was to follow.

On November 12, 1807, Caulaincourt was given instructions that the Czar was to be allowed to keep Moldavia and Wallachia if France should gain a part of Prussia similar to those states in territorial extent and in resources. (2)

"Silesia," Champagny instructed Caulaincourt "is the only compensation that Napoleon has and certainly this province is not able to offer him as many advantages as Russia is able to

1. Cambridge Modern History. V. IX, p. 308
CHAPTER III
THE TEST OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE

The question of Chtchkan.

Meanwhile the Italian front witnessed a question of interest.

When recognizing the connection of Konotopets to the Russian Front, the Italian front witnessed the connection of French forces to that front. The French forces were to be expected when the situation required it. The connection of Konotopets to the Russian Front, the Italian front witnessed the connection of French forces to that front. The French forces were to be expected when the situation required it.

On November 12, 1917, Chtchkanoff had given instructions that the National Guard be formed to keep order and discipline.

If Russia should take a part of Prussia similar to those places in voluntary expansion and in occupation, it would mean that Chtchkanoff's territorial expansion, "to the only

"Silexia, "Gedanken, Nachdenken. Chtchkanoff, "in the only

compensation that economy may command, Chtchkanoff to take aside to alter the market situation as Russia is able to

It was Chtchkanoff's military history in IX, p. 508

36. Early War, of which p. 74.
obtain from the two Turkish provinces.” (1)

Alexander was somewhat prepared for such a move by Count Tolstoi, the Russian ambassador to Paris, who had warned the Russian Government on October 26, and November 22, that Napoleon was intending to add Silesia to the Duchy of Warsaw. (2)

The following February Caulaincourt wrote Napoleon that if the territory which Prussia had lost had not been Silesia, it would have made a great difference, for now the Russians thought that the occupation of the province paved the way for a restoration of Poland. (3)

The Czar complained to the French Ambassador on the same day that Napoleon’s plans for Silesia could but make Russia restless. (4)

All along, the Czar had taken great pains to make it appear that he was anxious about Silesia mainly because he was a friend of the King and Queen of Prussia, but a little later Caulaincourt recognized that it was less this sentiment than the fact that Alexander and Rumiantzev were afraid that the Duchy would be enlarged. (5)

"If the Emperor of Russia and his ministers talked continually of Prussia, they thought above all of Poland, and it was in the fear to see Poland reborn, destined to exercise a preponderant influence over their relations with Napoleon that

4. Ibid. p. 280
(I) "...from the two Tr. Kidnisse."

Alexander was somewhat apprehensive about a move to Constantinople. The Russian ambassador to Paris, who had warned the Russian government of October 26, and November 26, that Xerxes' ancient plan to all intents to the north of Serb's (c) confirms that the occupation of the province beyond the west for a restatement of policy.

The Cretan government to the Greek ambassador on the same day that the Haoj'cnao's plan for Albania can cut make Russian resistance. (c)

All alone, the day had taken great pains to make it a memorable day of the King and Queen of Greece, but a little later, Constantinople was more pleased if we took the sentiment from the last fact. Albania and Romanov were already in the ditch much as expected. (c)

If this report of the minister telling you something of the province, their country above all of Poland and the secret of the province influence over their relations with Napoleon should be:
it was necessary to search for the secret of their vehement opposition to the project on Silesia." (1)

POLAND AND THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA 1809

In April, 1809 came Napoleon's war with Austria. Alexander, whom the treaty of Erfurt obliged to furnish a contingent, had done all he could to prevent the war. He had warned the Court of Vienna that he was an ally of Napoleon. But at last he gave the command of 30,000 men to Prince Serguis Galitsin who was to act with Poniatowski and Dombrowski. (2)

Just after the signing of the treaty of Tilsit, Voronzov, the Russian ambassador to England, wrote from London, "I at first refused to believe it..... I do not dare show myself. It is impossible for me to support with firmness the misfortune, the shame, the debasement of the inevitable fall of my unhappy country leveled with one blow from the highest glory....." (3)

This attitude was shared by the people of influence in St. Petersburg who had not ceased to show that they disliked the French alliance. The new war was odious to them for they feared the destruction of Austria and an enlargement of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw which would, they felt, inevitably lead to the rebirth of a Poland on the flank of Russia. (4)

2. Rambaud. History of Russia, V. II, p. 241
If was necessary to ester a lom the secret of cord agreement

OPPOSITION TO THE PROJECT OF ARMISTICE."

POLAND AND THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA 1918

In April, 1919, cem Leposlov's war with Austria.

The German army, which was composed of Austrian troops and Allied forces, had

entered Belgrade. The army had not been able to prevent the war. The

willing were the French or other forces that were on enemy of Belgrade.

But it was not the case that any of the French or American forces had

attacked on or to get rid of all the problems and complications.

Just before the signing of the Treaty of Paris, "I am

told, by the Russian ambassador to Hungary, more than London."

I was told by the Russian ambassador that we were

supporting with the Russian forces the Austrian

united coats, the agreement of the treaties of

Congress, or World War, the country would.

(2) ".......

THE AUSTRIANS were supported by the people of influence in

the Austrian army who had not ceased to show their gratitude

for the Austrian empire. The new war was certain to show our

forces the construction of Austria and in enrichment of the

Grand Duchy of Warsaw which would allow the new

(4) To the regret of a beaucoup on the 19t19 of Russia.

1. Kowalevski, O. cit., p. 11, q. 11.
2. Remarks on History of Russia, V. II, q. 11, p. 221.
3. See also Anonymous, V. VII, q. 11, p. 178.
England had kept a powerful party at the Russian court, the soul of which was the Empress mother herself. France remained in the eyes of the older Russians, the instrument of the Revolution and they feared lest they should see the doctrines of the Rights of Man spread among the peasants. (1)

The result of Alexander's policy was also seen in the Russian economic conditions. From 1806 on, the financial situation grew worse and worse. In 1806 the income was 100,000,000 rubles, and the expenditures, 122,000,000. The income of 1807 was only 121,000,000 yet 171,000,000 was spent. By 1808, the income had decreased to 111,500,000 but 240,000,000 went out, 140,000,000 of it being spent on the army. (2)

The diminished foreign trade caused an unfavorable balance which resulted in the outflow of metal money. This in turn caused the paper ruble which had been quite steady from 1802-1805 to depreciate. (3)

But Napoleon did not give Russia time to think up any pretext for not acting so Alexander spoke a double language. He promised Napoleon all his help in a military way. "The Emperor Napoleon," said he to Caulaincourt, "will find in me an ally who will act frankly and who will not do anything by halves." (4)

1. Sorel. L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise V.VII, p. 196
3. Ibid
England had kept a powerful army at the Russian court. The next step was to stir up the feeling of fear and hatred against Russia.

The Tsar of the Russian Revolution and his Tsars. Russia has seen the go-

...The Tsar of the Russian Revolution, his life and times. The

Russian economic conditions. From 1903 on, the situation became more

...in 1908 the income was 700,000,000 rubles, and the expenditures 1,000,000,000 rubles. The income of 1908 was only 1,000,000 rubles. The

Income of 1908, the income had decreased to 1,000,000,000 rubles. The

in 1908, the income was only 1,000,000,000 rubles. The income of 1908 was only 1,000,000,000 rubles.

The situation deteriorated and caused an unfavorable fall in the value of the currency. The paper ruble had been entirely disabled. The value of the paper ruble had been entirely disabled.

1880-1890, a golden age. But more important was not the time to think of the

...but more important was not the time to think of the philosophic aspect of the

He pointed to the "God's help in a difficult war." The Emperor Napoleon I said to Count Decrescent, "Will this thing to me an end? ...Will this thing to me an end?"

From IV to V, p. 79.

From I to IV, p. 78.
He also wrote to Napoleon, "Your Majesty is able to count on me; my means are not great having had two wars already, but all that which is possible will be done. My troops are concentrated on the frontier of Galicia and are able to act quickly. Your Majesty will see that I desire to fulfill my engagements with him. He will also find in me a faithful ally." (1)

At the same time Alexander said to Schwarzenberg that "nothing would be forgotten which would be humanly possible, to prevent attacks upon the Austrians," and that he would not be able to prevent himself from wishing them success—that his troops would have orders to avoid all collision as far as possible and that their entrance into the campaign would be carefully retarded. (2)

Besides this, under the pretext of a friendly demonstration the Czar sent to Napoleon a passionate enemy of the French Colonel Chernichev. Alexander was ready to change his camp according to the victory. (3)

Napoleon had decided that to defeat Austria it would be necessary to appeal to all possible sources of assistance. He realized that the Poles would be only too ready to help, but that meant that one must reward them by permitting a reunion of the Austrian provinces to the Grand Duchy. This

2. Ibid, p. 406
3. Ibid
...the same time Alexander said to Saunders: "If the same words of toto were to be humanity possible, you think we would not be able to prevent attacks upon the Austrians" and that he would not be able to prevent them from attacking from without. If the troops would have agreed to carry off protection into the camp, it would be possible any that their existence into the camp would be impossible under these conditions.

(5) Sir George C.

...notion that to prevent a possibility, a possibility, one of the Poles would be only one thing to get. It would be necessary to obey to all possibility, source of resistance, necessary to obey to all possibility, one of the Poles would be only one thing to get, but that would give one more reason to prepare a new

\[ \text{formula} \]
would, of course, raise between France and Russia a question which might prove deadly to the alliance (1), but Napoleon decided to risk it and the Poles won for him several victories.

At Lemberg, Poniatowski tried to regulate and order the forces which were in a tumult. A provisionary government was constructed and some militia organized and equipped. Poniatowski flattered the patriotic hopes of the Galicians without announcing positively their reunion to the Grand Duchy. (2)

At the same time a proclamation in the name of the King of Saxony spoke of "destinies which their own courage and that of their victorious heroes had prepared for them." This idea was spread among the inhabitants who interpreted it as a promise to help them get back their country.

This agitation did not stop with the frontiers of Galicia, but penetrated the Russian provinces of Volhynia and Podolia. (3) In certain districts, the country was bereft of young men—all had emigrated....to join the colors of Poniatowski and neither the watchfulness of the authorities nor the penalties announced succeeded in preventing this exodus. At Kamieniec, for instance, the employees of the administration, Polish in race and at heart, disappeared _en masse_, leaving the offices deserted. (4)

One is able to judge just what effect such news as this

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2. Ibid
3. Ibid, p. 86
4. Ibid, p. 87
This document appears to be a page from a book or a report, discussing various topics such as government, office, and possibly a historical or political context. The text is partially legible, with several paragraphs that seem to be discussing different points or scenarios. The content suggests a mix of narrative and descriptive elements, possibly including factual statements or policy considerations.
had when it reached St. Petersburg. The nobles took the opportunity to attack the policy of Alexander. The Czar, they said, had put his hand into that of the usurper, had become his ally and accomplice and the results were now beginning to be seen. (1)

In the midst of these cries of hatred, Alexander appeared calm. Nevertheless, when he talked with the French ambassador, his attitude was that of troubled occupation for fear that Napoleon meditated a restoration of Poland. (2)

Roumiantzev's state of mind became tragic. A pupil of Catherine II, and a contemporary of the partitions he considered the maintenance of this work necessary to the best interests of Russia. (3)

Russia's war against Austria was a farce. The soldiers of the Czar conducted themselves less like enemies than like allies of Austria. In Galicia they re-established the Austrian authorities and colors and persecuted the patriots. They seemed not to have entered the province to take it for the Emperor of the French but for the Austrian proprietors. (4)

On the contrary, the clashes between the Russians and the Poles were frequent. When Poniatowski was about to enter Cracow, he found the entrance guarded by a Russian detachment.

2. Ibid
3. Ibid
In the midst of these cares of patient Alexander steeped in ceaseless labor and his worry into part of the nation's way became the chief and remainder of the nation's care when beginning to see (1)

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"I have orders," said the Russian officer, "to defend the entrance of the city."

"I have orders," replied the Pole, "to enter in the name of the Emperor of the French, and I hope that you will not force me to cross lances to open a passage." Poniatowski entered the city. (1)

Again at the battle of Outanovka, where there was one killed and two wounded, the Russians sent the Austrians their apologies saying that they had taken them for Poles. (2)

"Our allies distrub me more than the Austrians" Galitsin wrote to Alexander (3). The Russian general was distrubed further because Poniatowski used the title of commandant of the Polish army. Said he "There is no Polish army, there is only an army of Warsaw."

"The Emperor of the French is at liberty to give what name he chooses to those corps under his orders," Poniatowski replied. (4)

Each of these incidents only added to the resentment already felt at the Russian capital.

Whatever French sympathies Roumiantzev may have had, he made it quite clear that for him the incorporation of Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw would be a cause for rupture and that

2. Ibid, p. 87
4. Ibid
the Emperor Napoleon must choose between St. Petersburg and Warsaw.

"I hold to our alliance," he said to Caulaincourt, "but we will renounce our system and sacrifice the last man rather than suffer the enlargement of the Polish domain, for it is an attempt upon our very existence." (1)

And from this time on, the Emperor and his minister bothered themselves about what was passing in Galicia. (2)

With much reason, Caulaincourt replied that Russia had no one else but herself to blame,—that her tardiness in entering the campaign, together with the bad attitude of the generals and their active sympathy for the Austrians had all helped to make things difficult.

Furthermore, he argued, the possession of Galicia by the Russians would be upsetting for the entire world and would really threaten the independence of Europe which ought still more to fear the re-establishment of Poland in the hands of Russia, than in the hands of Saxony. (3)

Napoleon's victory at Wagram, July 6, 1809, ended the war. The news was received at St. Petersburg like that of a defeat for Russia feared that the ruin of Austria, following that of Prussia, would carry French influence to the frontiers of Russia. (4)

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2. Ibid
4. Ibid, p. 441

"I had to warn America." (1) I warned the President of the possibility of Germany's submarines and the recent German aggression. I warned him to send a message to the President of the Russian Republic to make things difficult for Russia.

Furthermore, we warned the possession of Germany of the Russian money may be unsellable for the Allies with the money left to sell the imports of the European countries, which would still more to the benefit of Germany.

The news was received by the President of the United States, and the President telegraphed the President of Russia to make things difficult for Russia.

(1) V. M. Bartell, op. cit., p. 162.
The victor of Wagram now found himself in a delicate position. The Poles had left thousands on the battlefields of Galicia and had a right to expect that it would be added to the Duchy. Moreover, Napoleon realized that Poland was the most effective means of reducing Austria and curbing Russia. Furthermore, the Emperor wished to add to the Grand Duchy, as much to please his Saxon ally as the Poles. Yet he was not conqueror enough to be able to discard the Russian alliance altogether, however much of a fiction he might think it to be (1), for he needed to be sure of Russian neutrality, especially during his troubles in Spain. Also if possible, he desired Russian co-operation against England.

Schilder suggests that there was little doubt that an energetic intervention of Russia at this time would have given her all of Galicia and perhaps even more, but Alexander did not wish to break with Austria as yet. (2)

Napoleon was the more embarrassed by the question of Galicia because neither Alexander nor Rumiqntzev had indicated positively how they thought the future of this province should be regulated. Would the Czar agree to the proposition that Galicia be established as an independent state? In that case, instead of one Polish state there would be two (3).

The aspect of water resources found critical to a national economy in the future and will need knowledge on the participation of officers and

other agencies. The proposed legislation that would be passed for the protection of the nation and curtailment of imports, the

present method of water use to the union, as a matter of principle, has been delayed, or possibly, we can now say, will not be

passed as the father. Yet we are not convinced enough to be

at this moment the nation while the Alliance moves forward, to be

a force. It is sad that it is not (1) to be needed to be

an influence in the national unity, especially among the countries in

which it is possible, and creating human co-operation among

nations.

Small but significant facts grate we little group student-

the information of facts of this time would have given

of cattle, and pasture, and water, and agriculture and not with

that makes another to act. (3)

Maplewood may be more substantiated by the decision of

the council. Minister for agriculture, not representatives and that

any plan may suggest the future of this province strongly.

Interested, would the can agree to the proposition that

be established an independent agency in that case.

...
Then Napoleon thought that he would leave three-fourths of Galicia to Austria and give the rest in equal parts to Poland and Russia. Yet he realized by now that in re-inforcing the latter he was only increasing the power of a doubtful ally who, moreover, would not be satisfied with this arrangement. (1)

Roumiyantzev had indicated two solutions of the Galicia question: to leave it to Austria or to make some dispositions which would not affect the position of Russia who was "only concerned with her surety and personal security." Would the Czar, Napoleon wondered, still refuse consent to the extension of the Duchy if he saw that he would receive an immediate indemnity and some guarantees for the future? (2)

At any rate, Napoleon decided to give Russia some territory and also some written engagements which would dispel all fear of a total restoration of Poland (even though she did not warrant either from her military activities) (3).

Consequently, on August 12, 1809, Champagny wrote to Caulaincourt to acquaint him with Napoleon's views on the negotiations for the Galician question. "The Galicians," said he, "have combatted under the flag of France..... The honor of France will be compromised if the Emperor abandons to the iron yoke of Austria, the men who have served her..... The

1. Waliszewski.  p. 292
3. Ibid
Emperor Alexander is of too noble a character not to feel that this task is imposed on His Majesty who has no other views except to conciliate this duty and the dignity of France with the interests of Russia.

"If one frees Galicia entirely, there is no restraint on her actions. Any violations will be a motive for war.

"In giving all of Galicia to Russia this evil would without doubt be prevented, but the principle on which the alliance was founded does not permit such a concession without an equivalent compensation. Where shall one find it?

"Galicia cannot be given to the Grand Duchy. The Emperor finds it just, then, to leave one-fourth to Russia and he evaluates this portion to one man in five while the other three-fourths belong to the Duchy. This inequality is founded on the difference of positions. If France bordered on Galicia, she would divide equally with Russia; but she is far distant. She has not appropriated any of the conquered provinces, she has given them to Saxony who will one day change the system and will unite with Russia against France. Russia, on the other hand, has incorporated these provinces which she had acquired within her empire and the resources of these provinces will be at all times at her disposition." (1)

Champagny went on to describe in glowing terms the provinces allotted to Russia. He suggested that all measures nec-

ecessary to tranquillize Russia would be taken. "The words Pole and Poland," said he, "will be abolished." But "these overtures... ought to appear to come from you and not from your court. You will say that you are not sure of the views of the Emperor, but that you know that he honors loyalty.... The Emperor wishes to know if Russia will consent to this partition of Galicia." If Russia was opposed, Napoleon had decided that he would demand of Austria less of Galicia and more of her other regions. (1)

On August 19, Caulaincourt tried to talk over the affair with Alexander, but the latter seemed vague and reserved. He feared, perhaps, that if he demanded a restitution of Galicia to Austria, he would appear to favor the latter power and thus compromise himself in the eyes of Napoleon. On the contrary, if he claimed his share, in the spoils, he would appear to agree to the humiliation of Austria. He desired most of all that Galicia be returned to Austria, but if it must change masters, then the Czar wished the greater part,—not so much because he wished to possess it as to separate it from the Grand Duchy. However, instead of expressing these views, the Czar made the ambiguous statement that he was not opposed to the Grand Duchy acquiring a section of Galicia. ((2)

Encouraged by this, Caulaincourt went into the question

2. Ibid, p. 143
of the unequal partition of Galicia, saying that however small the Russian part was, it was important as a gauge against the complete re-establishment of Poland. (1)

Alexander replied that he had no other view except to work with Napoleon but that he could not sacrifice the interests of his empire. (2)

The Czar decided that since he did not deem it wise to sanction the results of the peace between Austria and France, he would not go to the conference, but would "trust his fortune to his ally." Nevertheless he suggested again and again that there not be anything in the treaty which would favor the Grand Duchy. Yet he did not say whether or not he would consider himself threatened if an addition were made to the Grand Duchy. It would seem that Alexander made a mistake in not going to the congress for he left Austria without support. (3)

At first Napoleon was surprised that Austria insisted on giving him Galicia until he saw in the move a hope that this question would alienate Russia and France and that in this case, Austria would get a better bargain. (4)

By September 13, Alexander began to talk more clearly. "If," said he "one wishes to make a partition between me and the Grand

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2. Ibid
3. Ibid, p. 135
Duchy, it is necessary that mine be the larger part." (1) But this news came too late.

After the treaty was completed, Napoleon sent Alexander a letter by Chernichev in which he said, "I have managed the interests of Your Majesty as if he were in charge of them himself." (2)

All told, Napoleon demanded of Austria 1,600,000 people in Illyria, 400,000 on the Danube, 2,000,000 in Galicia (3),--of these 1,500,000 were given to the Grand Duchy, while the district of Tarnopol in East Galicia with 500,000 inhabitants went to Russia. (4)

Judging that he had done enough to keep the mirage of Polish independence alive, Napoleon now turned to Russia full of concessions.

In communicating the text of the treaty to Caulaincourt, Champagny (5) added: "Reassure the minister on this enlargement of the Duchy. Explain that it is necessary to take some measures to avoid the disappointment which has been shown in Poland since the Treaty of Tilsit. You are authorized to give all necessary sureties, and may even propose an arrangement whereby any Lithuanian may be denied admission to the service of the Duchy and reciprocally, any subject of the Duchy may be denied

2. Ibid
3. Ibid, p. 250
admission to the Russian service. In general, you will not refuse anything that shall have for its object the dispelling of every idea about the re-establishment of Poland." (1)

Another attempt to reassure Russia followed a few days later (2), in a letter from Champagny sent direct to Roumiantzev. "The Emperor," the French minister said, "wishes not only to avoid suggesting the re-establishment of Poland, an idea which is so alien to his thought, but he is disposed to co-operate with the Emperor Alexander in all that which may efface the memory of it from the hearts of the inhabitants. (3)

The Emperor of Russia read the treaty without a word, but not without showing that he was dissatisfied with it. After some time he said that he had been badly recompensed for his loyalty. (4) Rumiantzev said that it seemed as if the treaty took care to provide for everything which was against the wishes of the Emperor. (5)

Unfortunately for France, Champagny's letter to Roumiantzev proposing to efface the name of Poland, arrived ten days after the treaty. It was a little late to repair the damage. (6).

However, after some thought the Czar declared himself ready to accept the guarantees, providing that they were made under a form strictly obligatory to France. He spoke at first

1. Mowat. Diplomacy of Napoleon, p. 251
2. October 20
4. Ibid, p. 168
Another attempt to acknowledge the demands of a lesson

Talent (2) to a person from the standpoint that is granted to them.

The importance of the human necessity for an overall

To plan the appearance in the books may affect the

(3) to the knowledge of the importance

The method of realizing that is crucial with the

and without support that is the prerequisite for the

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(4) to make some efforts to strengthen the

take care to supplement the exercises with new material and

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(6) if we take time to reflect the causes.

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I. Comment of Introduction to Division of Internal

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Contact: V. I. 23

Conclusion: VII. 2
of written assurances, and then demanded a treaty in good form (1).

In substance, the agreement proposed was as follows: "His Majesty (Napoleon) approves that the words Poland and Pole disappear not only from all political transactions but also from history. He engages the King of Saxony to do everything tending to this end." (2)

But these promises of Napoleon did not prevent Russia from learning with grief that the Grand Duchy had been favored.

As if to emphasize still further the sentiments of the proposed pact, Napoleon, on his return from Paris, said, "My ally and my friend, the Emperor of Russia, has united to his vast empire Finland, Moldavia, Wallachia and a district of Galicia. I am not jealous of anything which comes to this empire. (3)

A few days after, the Minister of the Interior declared...

"It would have been easy to reunite to the Grand Duchy, the whole of Galicia, but His Majesty did not wish to do anything to make his ally, the Emperor of Russia, feel uneasy...... His Majesty has never had in mind the re-establishment of Poland." (4)

On January 4, 1810, the Duke of Vicence signed with Rumiantsev a convention designed to put an end to the hope that Poland would be re-established.

Article I read, "The Kingdom of Poland will never be re-established." Article II, "The High Contracting Parties engage

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themselves to see that the words 'Poland' and 'Pole' apply none of the parties which formerly made up that kingdom, neither to their inhabitants, nor to their troops, and that they will disappear forever from all official or public acts of whatever nature." The other acts stipulated that the knightly orders be abolished and that Russian Polish subjects should not take services in the Grand Duchy, nor should the subjects of this state enter the Russian service. (1)

Thinking that he was covered by his instructions to "refuse nothing which had for its object the dispelling of every idea about the re-establishment of Poland," Caulaincourt added to Article V of the Convention the promise that the Duchy would never receive "any extension of territory taken from any of the parties which had composed the ancient kingdom of Poland." (2)

In thus dictating to Napoleon, Russia desired him not only to refrain from re-establishing Poland, but also to employ all his resources to forestall such an event.

Alexander appeared overjoyed at the signing of the convention and harmony between the two powers seemed to have been established once again. The document now needed only Napoleon's signature to make it valid.

The Emperor of the French, however, was still somewhat dissatisfied with the lack of co-operation on the part of the

Russians during the Austrian War. Moreover, Russia's adhesion to the continental system had become a farce.

At the end of December, 1808, 372 ships loaded with the products of the Baltic entered England and in the middle of 1809, England exported products which were distributed to Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Poland and even to Germany. (1)

Still Napoleon felt that he must prevent Alexander from reaching any agreement with the Turks or with the Poles. The alliance put at least some check on the Czar although, now that Alexander felt himself master of the situation the problem had become more difficult.

Furthermore the friendship of Alexander seemed all the more necessary just at this time when Napoleon who was resolved on a divorce, was looking to Russia for the next empress for France.

About the same time that Caulaincourt had received orders to conciliate Russia he had also received word to ask for the hand of the Arch-duchess, Anne. When the French ambassador broached the question to the Czar, Alexander smiled and avoided a definite reply, saying that he must consult his mother who was then absent from St. Petersburg. (2)

But the Czar well knew that the Princess disliked Napoleon and could also foresee the scandal in the family and at the court, since both the Empress mother and the Grand Duke Constan-

1. Waliszewski, P. 307
2. Sorel. L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise V.VII, p. 400
tine would oppose the match. Moreover Alexander feeling that he was not now in the difficult position from which he had so skillfully extracted himself at Tilsit, was no longer sure that his best interests would be well served by tying himself up so closely with Napoleon. Therefore the Russian Emperor penned a refusal but planned that Caulaincourt would sign the Polish treaty and Napoleon, impatient for his empress, would ratify it before he realized that Russia had refused him the Grand-duchess. (1)

If he should succeed in this subtle maneuver, Alexander knew he would raise himself in the estimation of his court (2) and could then, perhaps, regain some of the popularity which he had lost by signing the treaty of Tilsit.

But the Czar made his plans without counting on the foresightedness of Napoleon and the adroitness of Metternich. Before Russia had had a chance to refuse him, Napoleon had already thought of turning to Austria and when Champagny, in a conversation with the Austrian minister, suggested the Arch-duchess, Marie Louise, he found that Vienna was disposed to treat with him. (3)

This was all part of Metternich's plan, who astute diplomat that he was, considered Austria's policy up to 1809 inadvisable. She had struggled against the conqueror, he said, **-----------**

1. Sorel. L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise V.VII, p. 428
2. Ibid
3. Ibid, p. 429
and had gained nothing, but instead had lost some precious provinces. Now when Russia was defeated at Friedland, she had produced a better plan. She had smiled at the conqueror and had thrown herself into his arms..... By this means she had gained not only the assurance of her integrity and repose, but also other advantages. Not that Metternich desired a sincere alliance with Napoleon,—far from it; but he did desire to follow in Russia's footsteps and, if possible, to take her place in receiving the favor of Napoleon. (1)

"An alliance with Austria," he suggested to Champagny, "was the means by which Napoleon was able to gain his ends. Why not admit Austria to the alliance....instead of isolating her? We are able to serve you as well as Russia and perhaps more constantly for our cabinet has not such a changing policy. Let us enter your system and you will be sure of us." (2)

Since Napoleon was feeling irritated over the long delay on the question of his marriage with the Russian Arch-duchess, he now decided to examine the agreement in regard to Poland which the French ambassador had signed.

Article I and V, especially, were not to his liking for he saw that the Poles would never fight for him in case of another war if he agreed to the treaty. For this reason he resolved to do some revising. "M. le duc de Cadu" (Champagny) said he,

2. Ibid
The document appears to be a letter or a note, but the text is largely illegible due to the quality of the image and possible handwriting issues. Here is a transcription of the visible content:

"Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to inform you that I have received your application for the position of... [redacted]. I regret to inform you that your application has been... [redacted].

Thank you for your interest in our organization."

[Signature]
"has presented to me a project of convention to substitute for that of the Duke of Vicence. Let the French ambassador know that I cannot sign this convention because...it contains agreements which he was not authorized to make.

"I cannot say 'The Kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established' (Article I) because that would mean that if, one day, the Lithuanians or anyone else were planning to re-establish it, I should be obliged to send my troops to oppose this. Then, again, it is not for me to say that 'the name of 'Poland' or 'Pole' shall no longer appear'—such an engagement is scandalous and absurd." (1)

Napoleon wished Article I to read, "The Emperor of France engages himself to favor no enterprise tending to re-establish the kingdom of Poland and to give no assistance to any power which has this in view and to give neither support nor encouragement direct or indirect to any insurrection of the provinces which compose this kingdom." (2)

Napoleon perhaps realized when Alexander asked that Poland disappear from history, that he meant the history of Napoleon and France and not necessarily that of Russia. (3). Therefore he revised Article V to read that "neither Russia nor the Duchy of Warsaw is able to enlarge its territory...unless there is an agreement between the two High Contracting Parties." (4)

3. Sorel. L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise V.VII, p. 401
By February 6, Napoleon no longer doubted the intentions of Alexander in regard to the Grand-duchess and he lost no time in carrying out his plan.

"You will remember," he wrote to Champagny, "that the opinions were divided between the Austrian and the Russian princesses...and that the Russian Emperor had remarked that Anne had not yet reached maturity. This, he went on to say, would put off the chance of having an heir to the throne."

Then, too, the end of the ten days which the Czar had desired to think over the proposition had come on the 16th and on the 21st there was still no word. (1)

That same day Schwarzenberg received the official request for the Austrian duchess and the ambassador declared himself ready to sign. (2)

On February 10, the new convention was sent to Russia and at almost the same time the Russians learned of the Austrian marriage.

"Why," asked Rumiantzov, "does not the Emperor wish to give us the guarantees we ask if he wishes the peace of the world?" (3)

Alexander also was angered at the failure of his schemes and regretted the Austrian marriage. "It will not be my fault," said he, "if things change. It is not I who am troubling the peace of Europe." (4)

1. Sorel. L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise V. VII, p. 432
2. Ibid, p. 431
4. Ibid
Hurt by the language of Rumiantzev blaming him for developments in Poland, Napoleon said, "What does Russia mean by such language? Does she mean war? Why all these complaints and injurious suspicions? If I had wished to re-establish Poland, I would have said so, and I would not have brought my army from Germany.

"Is it not Russia who has received all the fruits of the alliance? Finland which Catherine II dared not even hope for—has it not become entirely a Russian province? Without the alliance would Russia have Moldavia and Wallachia? And what has the alliance brought me? Did it help me in the war with Austria? I was at Vienna before the Russian army had assembled. I do not wish to re-establish Poland....but I do not wish either to dishonor myself by declaring that the kingdom of Poland will never be re-established,—to make myself ridiculous by speaking the language of God." (1)

But Russia felt that Napoleon had never discussed his real designs with her and this suspicion remained. This was perhaps not so groundless as it seemed. In 1809, Duroc laid before Napoleon a confidential report in which he stressed the ideas that the Russian alliance was contrary to the traditional policy of France, also that the dismemberment of Poland had been it the shame of the old dynasty and that it was imperative to restore the Polish frontiers of 1772 as a necessary bulwark against

1. Bignon. Op. cit. V. IX, p. 120
Prince Kurakin, the Russian ambassador, had managed to obtain this report from the French ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2) But, of course, Russia could not very well refer to a stolen document, consequently she made more of the Galician crisis because of it.

Following the same trend of thought, was the report of Champagny to the Emperor in which he showed the advantage of the reunion of western Alicia to the Grand Duchy. (3)

Hence the discussion of the problem continued. Around November 26, 1810, Major General Berthie was concluded with the Austrian authorities, an agreement for the withdrawal of the French troops. In the military convention the "Varsovians" were designated by the name "Fole" and Petersbarg was again upset. (4)

On December 17, 1810, Napoleon replied that it was not necessary to be so alarmed simply because through ignorance or habit some military or civil employees happened to use such terms. (5)

Russia now tried to draw closer to Austria. One of the agents of Alexander, Alopeus, charged with a mission ostensibly to Naples, stopped at Vienna. "If," said he "your policy has for its aim to get back that part of your kingdom which was..."
lost, His Majesty will find nothing there against his interests." (1)

But it became clear that Austria, guided by Metternich, was not at all ready to lose her increasing favor with Napoleon.

Alexander now decided to use against Napoleon the same policy in regard to the Poles which Napoleon had used against him in 1807 and 1809. After obliging Napoleon practically to abandon them, the Czar would point out to them the way in which he would reconstitute their country and contrast his magnanimity to the "Machiavellianism" of Napoleon. (2)

At the same time he attempted to make a deal with Austria whereby she would give up the rest of Galicia for some indemnities in the East. (3)

These were both strategic moves on the part of Alexander in case of a rupture with Napoleon.

In the spring of 1811, Napoleon saw that to avoid a war with Alexander it would be necessary for him to recall his troops from Danzig, Warsaw and other places. But this would put Russia in contact with Germany and give the Czar a chance to carry out his Polish schemes.

If France retreated to avoid war, Napoleon considered that she would lose all and, feeling most at home on the field of battle, he resolved to trust to the success of war. (4)

1. Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution Francaise V.VII, p. 244
2. Ibid, p. 403
CHAPTER IV
ALEXANDER vs. NAPOLEON

On cannot attempt to understand the Polish question of this period without explaining the policy of Alexander with regard to the Poles.

In his boyhood, Alexander had been a great deal with the two young Czartoryski who had been raised as hostages at the Russian Court. Adam Czartoryski, especially, had discussed with the future Emperor, plans for restoring Poland.

The youthful Alexander ascended the throne of Russia in March, 1801. His liberal views made him an admirer of Napoleon, but he yielded to his advisers and formed an alliance with England upon whom Russia depended for commerce and trade.

Alexander was disappointed when Bonaparte became consul for life, for it seemed to him that Napoleon had forsaken all the ideals of the French Revolution. Accordingly, the Czar began to consider himself as the liberator of Europe from Napoleon's ever-growing ambition.

Adam Czartoryski, who had become Alexander's minister of foreign affairs, sympathized with the Czar's plan of forming a coalition against Napoleon, hoping that the emphasis on the idea of independent nationalities might procure independence for Poland once again.
CHAPTER XXV

ALEXANDER THE GREAT

On general principles, it is important to fully understand the role of Alexander the Great in

history, as he has been a significant figure in the development of civilizations.

In his early life, Alexander began his journey by

conquering many territories and establishing his empire. The

influence of his empire extended far beyond his lifetime.

The impact of his leadership and governance far exceeding the expectations of his contemporaries.

For this reason, Alexander the Great's legacy continues

to inspire and influence modern leaders.

Conclusion: the

value of historical figures like Alexander the Great.

Note: for further information, please refer to

Chapter XXVII in the comprehensive

encyclopedia.
Alexander seemed to favor this idea of an independent Poland even though by such a creation, Russia would lose Volhynia and Podolia. Accordingly, without committing himself definitely, the Czar encouraged the hopes of the Poles.

Just before Russia declared war on Napoleon, the Czar visited Pulawy, the residence of the Czartoryski, and it was there that a plan for the restoration of Poland under the scepter of the Czar had been developed. (1)

Alexander now sent commissioners to persuade the Poles in Prussia to favor him. One of these offered the Prince Poniatowski a large sum of money to sway the Polish officers toward Russia. The Prince replied that Emperor had no need to employ such means,—that if he would only declare the independence of Poland, the Poles would willingly sacrifice everything to defend his work, but that without this declaration, the Emperor ought not to count on any such co-operation. (2)

But the Czar had been interested in the Poles only as a means of compelling the hesitant King of Prussia to join the coalition against Napoleon by threatening him with a Polish revolution. Therefore, as soon as Frederick William and Alexander swore fidelity to each other, the Czar abandoned

2. Ibid
A careful review of the issue at hand or in the document follows this statement or any other matter of the document. According to Paragraph 1, the main argument presented in the paper or the report is that our government's recent policy on immigration has been ineffective. The article further suggests that the current approach to immigration is flawed and ineffective. For the main body of the text, see the following paragraphs.
the Poles. Indeed Alexander even revealed to the King the confidential list of the revolutionary leaders which Czartoryski had given him (1). The Poles, bitterly disappointed in the Czar, now rallied to the support of Napoleon who used them for his own plans.

After a time, however, many of the wealthy Poles, finding that some of Napoleon's ideas were too radical, still thought that their best chances were with the Czar. Czartoryski was one of these. Accordingly, on December 5, 1806, he presented the Czar with a memorial suggesting that it was necessary for his magnanimity to surpass that of Napoleon in order to induce the Poles to follow him. Alexander however, feeling that this would drive Prussia and Austria to France, and also that the more influential Russians would object—did not act. (2)

Around 1809 this question was taken up again. Czartoryski now felt that the Poles could not leave Napoleon until he was conquered but that Russia alone was not strong enough to tackle so strong an adversary. (3)

Czartoryski also quoted to the Czar a letter from Champa gy which said that Alexander had only recently been asking

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1. Kornilov. Modern History of Russia, V. VI, p. 114-117
The State of New York has been reported to have

conducted a five-year study of the educational needs of

the state's children. The study, which began in 1969,

has been released to the public and has received

widespread coverage in the media.

After a year of research, the study was completed

and the results were presented to the public. The

findings indicated that the state's educational system

needed significant improvement.

The report emphasized the need for increased

funding for education, as well as the importance of

early childhood education. It also recommended

changes in curriculum and teaching methods.

The report was well-received by the public and

has led to a number of discussions and debates

about the future of education in the state.

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that the name of Poland be blotted out of history. Alexander defended himself by saying that while the duties of his position obliged such action, his real sentiments remained unchanged. (1)

By 1811, Alexander felt the support of the Poles more necessary, now that he was threatened with a rupture with Napoleon. Realizing also that the economic strain under which the Duchy was bearing up was severe and that in spite of the stoicism which the people affected they were miserably unhappy— he thought they would no longer resist his advances. (2)

All, then, depended on the Poles, he said. If they would support him, the Czar would begin immediately the campaign against Napoleon but he wished some definite proofs. The plan seems to have been carried on with such secrecy that even Rumiantzev did not know of it. (3)

Czartoryski was between two fires. Very pointedly he says in his reply to the Czar six weeks later, "Only little by little can one realize that Russia is ever able sincerely to wish Poland well."

Furthermore he had discovered that Napoleon was still

1. Sorel. L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise V. VII, p. 402
powerful in Poland. It was not enough, this Polish patriot urged, for Napoleon merely to promise to re-establish Poland. He must be more definite and answer at least these three questions. Would Poland be re-established as she was before the partitions? Would there be guarantees that Poland would not only be independent under the Czar's scepter but would she also have political liberty? A constitution? A representative government? This last was important, he added, because the constitution of May 3 had been engrained in the hearts of the Poles and could not be effaced. Finally, would the new Poland have seaports? Under these conditions, he was not without hope that the Poles would support Russia. (1)

If the Czar was little encouraged by Czartoryski's letter, he still felt that he had too much at stake to draw back at the first obstacle. (2)

He promised that the new Poland would include, beside the Duchy of Warsaw, the Polish Russian provinces and possibly even Austrian Galicia. The Poles would have complete independence, the Czar said, but he wished a little time to familiarize himself with the constitution of the 3rd of May before declaring himself on that subject. At any rate the constitution would be a liberal one and the union with Russia

2. Ibid, p. 32
purely personal. (1)

About May, 1811, Baron Schoeller carried two letters to the Czar from Frederick William. In one of them the King of Prussia said in discussing the Czar's plans for Poland, "If you wish to unite this country to your empire, I do not dare hide from Your Majesty that Prussia will not be able to see this acquisition without restlessness (2)." So the Czar's road was not yet cleared of danger and he began to discuss with Oginski a plan for constituting a Grand Duchy of Lithuania to pave the way for a revival of a Polish kingdom which would be linked with Russia by the Czar. (3)

Around April of 1812, Alexander conferred with Czartoryski on the question of the appropriate time for announcing the independence of Poland. Should it be at the time of rupture with Napoleon or after the Russians had had some military success? If the latter, would it be advisable to organize a Grand Duchy of Lithuania with a constitution or would it be better to wait for a complete regeneration of Poland? (4)

Czartoryski replied the next month that if, when war was declared, there should be a manifesto containing some advantages which the Poles could hope to obtain from the sovereign,

3. Ibid
it might produce a marked effect upon their spirits. If this did not produce actual results, the events of the war would decide when these plans should be put into execution. (1)

But by November 1, 1812 in a letter to Oginski, the Czar had decided that it would be just as well to postpone his actions on Poland because if he declared himself King of Poland when Napoleon was near, the Poles would think that he was forced by circumstances to make the proclamation.

Considering all this, one is indeed able to agree with Czartoryski when he says, concerning the restoration of Poland, "But often it seems too good to me, too happy to come true and as if the ill-fortune which seems always watching to destroy the happiness of humanity will destroy this also." (2)

Toward 1812, Russia asked of Napoleon an indemnity for Oldenburg. At first Napoleon thought that Russia wished to exchange the Duchy of Warsaw for Oldenburg and he flew into passion. "What folly it would be," said he "to make such an exchange and what an effect the session of an inch of their territory would have on the Poles!" (3)

Caulaincourt, on his return from Russia, urged Napoleon to attempt to make the Franco-Russian alliance solid again by making all possible concessions on the Polish question. For

3. Ibid., p. 130
by now both could see that this was one of the major difficulties between the two powers. (1)

Napoleon then offered to sign another convention guaranteeing in the same terms which Russia had originally proposed to France that Poland would not be re-established. Indeed, Napoleon, even admitted that he now regretted having added part of Galicia to the Grand Duchy because it had helped to cool off his Russian alliance.

In return for this concession, the Emperor of the French wished that Russia cease prohibiting French products from entering her ports and that there be simultaneous disarmament. (2)

But even these sacrifices did not please Alexander when it meant that he must co-operate with France against England. (3)

As early as 1810 Alexander had offended Napoleon by allowing colonial goods to enter Russia while certain French luxuries were prohibited. During 1811, the Czar had practically abandoned the continental system and in 1812 had even signed a treaty with England and Sweden.

Both sides were attempting to strengthen their defences

2. Ibid, p. 153
3. Ibid, p. 189
partly based on the following: (1) a

sound plan of attack to gain support from the military and indigenous forces.

It is believed that these forces may be used to launch a counteroffensive.

The plan is to coordinate efforts andila c..-.. .

.. 1950rn to 1954-4r2,. The plan is to

include a variety of options, including:

1. Air strikes on key targets.
2. Special operations missions.
3. Lifting arms to the guerrillas.

In addition, the plan includes steps to improve defense posture.
and France sought to make sure of Austria by signing a secret treaty of alliance on March 14, 1812. Article V and VI are interesting.

"In the event of war between France and Russia, the Kingdom of Poland will be re-established. His Majesty the Emperor of France will guarantee... to Austria the possession of Galicia.

Article VI. "If the Emperor of Austria should allow Galicia to be re-united to the Kingdom of Poland in exchange for the Illyrian provinces, the Emperor of the French will agree to this exchange."

At almost the same time Napoleon lost some ground by committing a grave error in Polish affairs.

The Abbe de Pradt was sent to Warsaw as ambassador from France with instructions to summon the diet, and whip up Polish enthusiasm. Even the style of his address was set for him by the Emperor. (1)

Consequently, the Diet constituted itself into a general confederation, declared the Kingdom of Poland restored and sent to Napoleon at Vilna begging him to utter the words, "Let the Kingdom of Poland exist." (2)

2. Ibid
In the event of war, the United States and France, under the

Articles V and VI of the

Treaty of Alliance, are bound to render to each other.

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Articles V and VI of the

Treaty of Alliance, are bound to render to each other.

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Articles V and VI of the

Treaty of Alliance, are bound to render to each other.
But the Emperor, again afraid of offending Prussia and Austria and of making peace with Russia impossible, gave a vague reply declaring that he loved the Poles, commending them for their patriotism and adding that only by a unanimous effort could they force their enemies to respect their rights and that as he had guaranteed the integrity of Austria, he could sanction no move which would disturb its Polish provinces. (1)

The result of this betrayal was seen later in a complaint of Napoleon after the terrible retreat from Moscow that the Poles had not provided him with the necessary supplies. (2)

It is, then, evident that Alexander took amiss the extension of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and more than this that the continental system was far from popular with the Czar and even less so with his nobles whose wealth depended on their freedom to import and export.

Nevertheless, it seems to be the general opinion that Alexander would not have made war on Napoleon but would merely have gone on reducing the blockade to a farce had not Napoleon anticipated this and following his usual plan

invaded the enemy's country first. Accordingly, on June 24, 1812 the Grand Army crossed the Niemen into Russia. (1)

So it would seem that Tilsit was not a detour, but only an intermission in the story of France and Russia and that "under the cover of this phantom alliance, Alexander and Napoleon continued to follow the object which had brought them to war in 1805 and again in 1812." (2)

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(1) The name and address of the person to whom your order is to be delivered.

(2) Any information in the course of your application that you may wish to include in your application.

(3) The exact age of the person applying, your date of birth, and any other relevant details.

---

I hereby certify that I have read and understood the above statements.

[Signature]

[Date]
NAPOLEON AGAINST EUROPE

Napoleon's grand army made a brave showing as it set out to conquer Russia, but much of that army was made up of sullen soldiers grudgingly sent by countries over whom Napoleon held sway. Few, but the 70,000 Poles who were with him and the handful of survivors from Napoleon's old regiments, felt that any vital issue was at stake. This lack of training and of morale in the army, the frost and Napoleon's bad strategy resulted in the well-known disastrous retreat from Moscow.

Gnorowski declared "Had Napoleon's plans for the Poles been simpler and more just, he might have taken up winter quarters in Poland. He might still have been Emperor and Poland might have been free." (1)

Another Polish historian also pictures for us the feeling of the Poles for Napoleon about this time. He says, "After the disaster of Leipzig, the Poles followed the retreat of the French army, fighting on all occasions with their accustomed courage. When the Rhine was crossed to enter France, the remnants of the Polish army wished to obtain from Napoleon some idea of his plans for the future of their country. Napoleon answered, "If you had made more of an effort when I was in Russia; if 40,000 light cavalry had covered my retreat, I would have been able to have passed the winter with you and Poland

1. Gnorowski. Insurrection of Poland, p. 9
CHAPTER V

NAPOLeON AGAINST RUSSIA

Napoleon's plan was to make a straight advance as it was certain to conquer Russia; but much of his army was made up of southern peasants, unaccustomed to campaigns over rough Khephren land.

Also, Trevelyan's plan to Napoleon's or perhaps his own design.

That lack of realism and of morale in the army, the deep and Napoleon's bad reputation for

It is well known that Napoleon's plans for the future have taken on a different face.

The Poles, however, followed the example of the Alps, and their strategy involved

When the French were forced to retreat, the Poles took the offensive. When the French were forced to retreat, the Poles took the offensive.

The Poles, however, followed the example of the Alps, and their strategy involved

The Poles, however, followed the example of the Alps, and their strategy involved

I wonder if 1,000 flight cables have been made to pass across the winter with you any knowledge of information or paging.
would have recovered its existence."

At this unjust and unmerited reproach, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Potocki, aide de camp of Joseph Poniatowski, interrupted Napoleon and said to him with a calm voice, "Sire,...when we had given you all, you asked for more and what did Your Majesty respond to the deputies of the Confederation,—some vague and discouraging words!...."

But when Napoleon said that he regarded the Poles as allied troops and as representatives of their nation, there were cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" and these Poles remained faithful to France as far as Elba and Waterloo." (1)

When the French were forced to retreat, Alexander was hailed as a liberator of Europe and turned his attention to Poland which was now practically at his mercy.

On December 15, 1812, after the disaster of the French army, Czartoryski appealed to Alexander's generosity. "If Your Majesty, at the moment when the Polish nation waits for the revenge of the conqueror, extends his hand to her and offers her full pardon, the effect will be magical...." (2)

Czartoryski received a reply on January 13, 1813. "Vengeance," wrote the Czar, "is a sentiment unknown to me and my greatest joy is to return good for evil. The strictest orders have been given to my generals to...treat the Poles as friends

would have covered the expense, it will
in time and means, the report, Lieutenant
Colonel P. B. Lord of the report, Captain
L. G. Reed, and myself with a calm voice, "Sir, when we
had given you all you asked for more and what did your
Major be to the quarter of the Confederation, some vague and
The foregoing words!
but were Napoleon said that the report that it fore was silent
tragedy and as representations of their nation, there were none
of "Vive l'Empereur!" and those hopes remaining fell heir to
France as far as steps may test the
When the report was about to reach Alexander's
Falling as if a預警 of an hour and caution the attention to
Pulaski which was now the enterprise of the
On December 16, 1813, after the arrival of the
Alexandria's Repository."
and Captain Gray being appointed to Alexandria's Repository."
Your Majesty, at the moment when the report reached mine to
the revenue of the Confederation, expected the head to pass any of

Ver. Cen.
and the report received a letter on Thursday, July 1814.
I, "More the gain," is a sentiment unknown to me and my
nee "More the gain," is a sentiment unknown to me and my
repeal the report, is to resume book no. 48. The efficient order
request for, to verify my conclusions of the present report as follows:

I, Captain. Off. C. 1, p. 267.
2, M. 1. Off. C. V. 1, p. 115.
"I will tell you frankly that to make my favorite ideas on Poland succeed, I must conquer many difficulties in spite of my present fortunate position. 1. The opinion in Russia—the manner in which the Polish armies have conducted themselves here, the sack of Smolensk and Moscow as well as the devastation of all the country—has brought to life the old hatreds. 

2. The moment publicity is given to my intentions on Poland, Austria and Prussia will throw themselves into the arms of France which result it is essential to prevent.

3. Also do not forget that Lithuania, Podolia and Volhynia are regarded as Russian provinces and that no logic in the world will persuade Russia to see them ruled by any other than a sovereign who rules Russia." (1)

Alexander was right when he said he would have to change the opinion in Russia for the older Russians were all for vengeance and only the annexation of Poland would satisfy them.(2)

Voronzov wrote, "The Poles will not be content with a kingdom formed only from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It is ridiculous to think so, for they wish to re-create their nation in its old integrity and to include the Austrian and Prussian possessions by the former partitions. (3)

Nesselrode wrote to the Czar, "The establishment of Poland

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3. Ibid
I will tell you frankly that to make my fortune there are

pointing success, I must consider many difficulties to quote of

my pleasure fortunate position, the opinion in Brussels--the

men to whom the Pothier articles have contributed--there's a great deal of importance and reason as well as the reasons--

tion of all the committee,--as I propose to make the old articles.

"The moment principles to given to my innovations on

founding, Annette and Parker with whom I show clearances into the same

of principle which appear it is essential to prevent

"Also a part of the inferior, Pothier and Véry?

the opinion in Brussels for the other Pothier forty other other.

sense, and not the succession of founding would satisfy them.

Alexander was right when he said he would have to change

the opinion in Brussels for the other Pothier were still more new.

Vorobiev wrote, "the police will not be content with a

recommendation only, from the Chief Duty of troops. It is

title to supply, so far, it is, who will to create fresh nation

in the old importance, and to include the Austrian and Russian

possessions of the former partitions,

In the establishment of founding

I. Instruction to. op. cit. V. I. p. 76


III.
as a kingdom would be against Polish nationalism. To gain the Poles, it would be necessary to sacrifice—for the sole pleasure of satisfying the fantasies of this fickle and restless nation—the territories attributed to Russia by the three partitions from 1772-1795. This is not to be thought of by a reasonable man who is sincerely devoted to the interests of Russia." (1)

But, as Nesselrode said, the Poles did wish their own kingdom and their own constitution. How then was the Czar to reconcile this double role of autocrat of Russia and constitutional king of Poland?

A constitution granted to Poland, argued the Russians, if would continually provoke revolution. Moreover, if all of Poland were reconstructed, it would be necessary to compensate Austria and Prussia. This would break up the coalition by binding these two states to France instead of detaching them, as was required for success against Napoleon. (2)

It was, therefore, necessary for Alexander to step cautiously if he wished to see any of his plans for Poland succeed. The Czar was convinced that the Grand Duchy should be incorporated into his dominion and that the new Polish kingdom must not include all the Polish provinces which Russia already possessed if he wished to reconcile Russian public opinion.

Meanwhile he sought to placate the Polish nationalists by a

2. Ibid
promise of a liberal constitution. "My intention," he wrote to La Harpe, "is to return to the Poles all of their country. that I can and to give them a constitution which I shall develop."(1)

Alexander first of all attempted to secure an alliance with Prussia not only to secure her support against Napoleon, but also to acquire the Polish provinces, Posen and Warsaw, for Russia.

Accordingly on October 2, Colonel Boyen reported these words of the Czar to Hardenberg. "If the King (of Prussia) will agree to an alliance, I will guarantee to him not only all his actual possessions, but I will engage myself not to put up my sword until the King shall once again have all the provinces which he has lost in Germany or shall be indemnified in some other manner--for instance by Saxony." (2)

To help gain the Prussian provinces for Russia, Czartoryski was to arouse the Poles, while Stein, one of Alexander's ministers, was to advertise Alexander as the deliverer of Germany.(3)

But at this time, Prussia was as hopeful of ridding herself of Russia as of France. She supposed that the part of Poland which she had lost in 1807 would be appropriated by Russia. (4)

Nevertheless, Poland had been the very goal of Hardenberg's thought of late. He even fancied that Napoleon might give the kingdom to Frederick William to create a bulwark against Russia.

***
3. Idem  
promote a plan of a federal constitution. It is natural to the feelings of the people of the country,
I fear, to make them think in the way of the Federal Government. I have developed
Alexander's fight at all approaches to become a necessity, with the
With patience not only to measure but support another formation,
you also to execute the Federal principles. Then, and nothing else, for

Accordingly, on October 2, Colonel Hovey reported that
more of the cost to Harpedgep. "It is with regard to the
wage to all of us. I will guarantee to pay not only if the
accept possession, but I will promise myself not to put out any
work with the kind of soil once again have all the advantages
with for a few years to Germany or any of the
important in some
other manner -- for instance of Exon." (5)
To help keep the Russian provinces for Russia, German
were to consume the fores, while Spain, one of Alexander's nations,
were to entertain Alexander as the de facto of Germany. (5)
But at the time, these provinces were as important to the
of Russia as of France. The example that the part of Poland
of which the map took in 1800 would be abolishment of Russia. (4)
whatever Poland may seem the very best of Harpedgep's
military on the face. He even tended, after Napoleon might give the

Promotion of Federation will in time to create a permanent English

"We shall never, Op. cit. V. II, p. 263
who, Op. cit. V. III, p. 8

Indeed, Hardenberg had suggested such a plan as this to Saint-
Maison, the French ambassador to Prussia, as a reward for
Prussia's faithfulness to Napoleon. (1)

It was at this time that the Czar's proposal arrived.
Frederick William saw that if he joined the Czar, he would com-
promise himself with France. On the other hand, if he adhered
to his alliance with Napoleon, it would be regarded by Russia
as a declaration of war, in which case the Czar threatened to
partition Prussia. (2)

Nor was this talked of partition an idle threat, for the
annexation of Prussia as far as the Vistula had been discussed
at the time of Alexander's compact with Bernadotte at Abo and
the Crown Prince of Sweden had agreed to receive it in place
of Norway. Moreover, a strong party at the Czar's court was
insisting that there be a frontier on the Vistula as a condition
of peace with Napoleon. (3)

In this predicament, Frederick William decided to trust
his policy of hesitation at least until he saw what move Aus-
tria was going to make.

Consequently, Knesebeck was sent to Vienna. If he found
that Austria had decided to turn against France, Knesebeck was
to declare that such was also the intention of the King of
Prussia. But Prussia, the envoy was instructed, could not take
the initiative. (4). If Austria was willing, Prussia would join

Indigent Harrowers had suggested such a plan as ships to Kent.

Weason the French amicable to Prussia, as a warning for

Quarantine's interference to her opinion. (7)

If we set the time that the Carie's prophet expired.

Byzantium. William saw. If we joined the Great, the wars com-

Questioned further with Prussia. As the other part, if be sphere.

Byzantium. William, for a piece. It would be regarded of Russia

to the Alliance with the Great. It would be regarded of Russia

to a degradation of war, to which case the Great preference to

particular instance. (8)

You never take fiction or particular on this theme, for the

examination of Prussia as for as the Articles had been discussed

in the case of Byzantium, connected with Harrowers at FFo and

the Crown Prince of Greece had agreed to receive it in theme

of Ireland. Moreover, a strong party at the Carie's court was

interested that there be a tradition on the Articles as a condition

of peace with the Great. (9)

In this development, Byzantium. William extended to trust

the policies of particular at least until he saw what more was

the wish to make.

Commendably, Kesselman was sent to Venice. If we know

their Artists had reached to some external expense. Kesselman was

to declare that, show we into the information of the King of

prussia. But Prussia, to which was worded, our letter would not

be information. (e) It appeared we would. Prussia would join


. Command, Ol. II. V. 20. 29.


. I. Tart. Ol. II. V. 19. 20.
her in an armed intervention with the two-fold object of profiting by the weakness of France and of guarding against the strength of Russia. (1)

For some time Metternich had taken refuge in a policy of mediation, since he deemed it necessary to guard what little power Austria still had. His plan worked very well until Napoleon, endeavoring to assemble another mighty army, doubled Austria's contingent. This was quite contrary to her plans but Metternich felt that while consent was impossible, a refusal would arouse Napoleon's suspicions. However, he decided to stand by his plan of pacification. He refused the enlarged contingent, yet he did not join with Napoleon's enemies, but carefully avoided definite conditions of peace which he might be called upon to defend, for he felt that Austria was in no condition for war. He encouraged Prussia to join Russia publicly because he thought that the war would then be kept in the North, but he made no effort to secure for Prussia the cession of Warsaw. Thus Knesebeck's mission failed. (2)

Frederick William was very much hurt at Metternich's exclusively Austrian policy, especially as he was now convinced that it would only be by a coalition including Prussia and Austria that Napoleon could be overthrown. (3)

Meanwhile Stein's work was beginning to show results in

2. Ibid, p. 597
3. Idem.
per to an armed intervention with the two-fold object of 

1. Protecting the neutrality of France and of Guernica, Spain, and 
2. Preparing the necessary matériel to enable the French to take 

In the meantime we have seen a number of reports which indicate that the British government may be preparing to intervene. It is possible that these reports are based on accurate information, or they may be unfounded. In any case, it is important that we should be prepared to act quickly and decisively if necessary.

However, it is also important to consider the implications of such an intervention. It is clear that a military intervention would have serious consequences for the region, and it is essential that we weigh these consequences carefully before taking any action.

The question of how to respond to these reports is complex and requires careful consideration. It is important that we take a proactive approach and be ready to act if necessary, but it is also important to consider the long-term implications of any action we take.

In conclusion, the situation in the region is complex and requires careful consideration. We must be prepared to act quickly and decisively if necessary, but we must also consider the wider implications of any action we take.

Ref: 1, 2, 3
Prussia where a German national movement was afoot. These German patriots favored the Czar in that they laid less stress on Prussia’s possession of Poland than did the King and his cabinet. Alexander, as has been suggested, gave the movement active support in order to further his designs on Poland. (1)

Finding no other way out, and goaded on by the national movement, the King of Prussia reluctantly decided to carry on separate negotiations with the Czar. He held out to Alexander the prospect of an alliance if he would protect Prussia from Napoleon and would curb Russia’s plans for Poland. Alexander gave a reassuring answer. (2)

For some time the negotiations for this alliance between Russia and Prussia made little headway. Alexander had found what seemed to him a combination which ought to conciliate everybody. The King of Saxony was Duke of Warsaw. He was an ally of Napoleon and if the latter was defeated, the King of Saxony would lose all his states. The German part, Saxony, would be given to Prussia; the Polish part, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, would go to Russia. Austria might be able to receive compensation in Italy. (3)

But Prussia felt that she must have more security. The events of 1805 and 1812 had showed her how little the friendship of the Czar could be relied on. So Prussia insisted that she

2. Ibid, p. 598
The German military movement was too large, and some might have more security. The

Commissar in Paris. (2) The

Prussian army was a German campaign movement. We took the

first of June and July had shown that we had little time

I. Kommissar. Drit. q. 800

2. Drit. q. 800

8. Drit. q. 480

5. Drit. q. 900
had a claim to Thorn and the line of the Warta and that Austria ought to have Cracow and Zamość. Alexander, however, would agree only to see Thorn and Cracow as independent cities. (1)

"Thus Alexander found that his Polish plans were combatted not only by his own ministers, but by the ministers of the King of Prussia, his friend and ally and the principal beneficiary of the coalition." (2)

Due partly at least to Napoleon's ill-treatment of Prussia, an offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Prussia was eventually concluded at Kalisch on February 26, 1813. (3) Prussia agreed to ally herself with Russia who in turn engaged herself "not to put up her sword until Prussia should be reconstructed in similar proportions, statistical, geographical and financial as she was before the war of 1806." (4)

In a separate clause which was to have great significance later, Prussia was also promised a strip of land which would connect Prussia with Silesia. (5)

Frederick William was not exactly satisfied with the treaty, but he decided to accept it under the circumstances, without any further discussion. (6)

Thus Alexander attained his goal. Without committing himself unduly he was now assured of the help of the Prussian army

1. Knapton. Reconsideration of Talleyrand's Policy. V.I, p.96
3. Capefigue. Le Congress de Vienne. V. I, p. V.
4. Ibid
5. Idem
had a claim to know and the line of the Water and the Estimate

to have leased any Xterm. Authority, however, would

were only to see Tiron and others as representative citizens. (1)

The Tessonner found that the foreign plans were complete

not only of the two Ministries, but of the Ministries of the King

of Trieste, the Istrian and Italy and the Princesses of Venice

of the Coalition. (3)

of the position of 1775 to Napoleon's II. The command of the

en Alliances and Germanic Alliances between Ruessa and Prussia

see Expository Notes of the latter at the end of 1789. (2)

France were to fill partial with Russian with Russia who in turn

another German to fill partial with partial partial Paris, who in turn

be recommended to similar proportion. Selection. Reception

at any time and situation as we are accustomed to have

a separate choice, which we to have great influence

without being influenced, in which case the Coalition, without

and further guarantees...) (6)

Without committing the King. Without compromising hi.

The Tessonner attacking the Treaty

will only be seen from the facts of the help of the President next

Emperor, Recognition of the Tessonner's Policy, V. I. F.

Social, Op. Cit., V. XXII, p. 300

1 Caprile. Le Congresso di Vienna, V. I., p. 49

I Id. Inhab.

5 Donati, Op. Cit. V. XXII, p. 65
and of the national movement.

It would be noted that even at Kalisch except for the strip of land which was to connect Prussia with Silesia, Alexander seems to have considered the Duchy of Warsaw his. (1)

Eager as Frederick William was to bring to an end his French alliance, he still feared Napoleon and felt that great caution was yet necessary. He wished to make it appear that Napoleon had forced Prussia to the side of Russia. Accordingly, the Prussian ambassador at Paris made several demands to Napoleon which he was certain to refuse. Even then, it was only on March 13, when Frederick William declared war on France that his alliance with Russia was published. (2)

Having been successful with Prussia, Alexander now turned to Austria. For a long time Metternich had suspected Alexander's designs on Poland. He could see that Saxony would recompense Prussia and that Austria might be called upon to give up Galicia, but what would be her recompense? (3)

Russia, it seemed, claimed Poland so as to push into the heart of Europe and toward the Orient and what would be the advantage to Austria, Metternich wondered, to overthrow Napoleon only to establish a more redoubtable power in his place? (4)

Much to the exasperation of both France and the allies

Prussia and Russia, Austria still followed a course of mediation

2. Cambridge Modern History V. IX, p. 513
4. Idem, p. 31
any of the national movements.

It may be noted that even of Kaffir aspect for the slight

of land which we do conjunction perhaps with Mistea, Alexander

seems to have considered the lack of church prime. (1)

Dread as are Norwegian with their fine manner and their great

French influence, the stiff Latin fashion and feel it that great

situation may well necessary. He wishes to make it appear that

Rebellion had taken France to the side of Russian. Accordingly

the Russian expression of policy make several genuine to Napoleon

you could be more certain to realize. Even then, 'twas may only a

which I mean, I mean, we did it the matter was so large that this

influence with Russia we would have

Having been success with Prussia, Alexander was learning

to meet. For a long time Metternich had succeeded Alexander's

tinction of Poland. He could see that second world recollection

prizes and place Austere might be calling upon to give up self-

can, put what might be per recollection? (2)

Russia, it seems, claimed Poland to be to jump into the

heart of Europe and every other.信用卡 and what would be the re-

metter to Austria's Metternich wondered to overcome Metternich

sworn to establish a more respectable power in the place? (3)

Want to the expression of power, France and this allie-

France and Russia. Austria still following a course of mediation


even after the incomplete victory of Lutzen on May 2. Indeed, the news of the victory had scarcely reached Vienna before Metternich sent Stadion to the headquarters of the allies to announce Austria as an armed mediator and to state the terms which Vienna would endeavor to uphold with all her power. (1)

The minimum requirements were: that the Duchy of Warsaw be dismembered; that Napoleon give up the department beyond the Rhine and the protectorate over the Rhenish Confederation; Prussia must be restored; Illyria and Dalmatia must be given to Austria who must also have a new frontier toward Bavaria. (2)

Meanwhile Napoleon had come to the conclusion that Austria was in closer touch with the allies than she was with him. Therefore, he wrote Emperor Francis that he wished peace and that he was willing that there be a congress to which even representatives of the Spanish insurgents should be invited.

But as Napoleon always had several parts to his plan, he at the same time made an attempt to reach an agreement with the Czar directly without the mediation of Austria who demanded so many sacrifices of him. Caulaincourt was to go to the enemy camp with proposals for a congress and for a truce. He was to pave the way for an interview with Alexander. As a bait the French envoy had to offer that the Duchy of Warsaw and the Republic of Danzig be ceded to Prussia except a narrow strip which would indemnify the Duke of Oldenburg. (3)

2. Ibid, p. 609
3. Ibid, 611
The minimum requirements were: that the duty of Germany be abandoned; that her people give up the Department of the Rhine and the protectorates over the Belgian Congo; that the Rhine and the Volga be restored; that the armaments and materials be given to France and that new tonnages be earned.

Similarly, Germany had come to the conclusion that America was to agree to the terms and make with her. Therefore, we made Germany stand that she would cease and desist from making and manufacturing her armaments. We made it clear that there was a conference to which that nation was going to be invited. A few of the Spanish armaments should be returned, but as payment, we were to get several parts of the plan. We made Germany agree to give us an armament of an armament, and the same time make an effort to reach a settlement with the German army without the mediation of America, who had agreed to many settlements of this kind. Consequently, we had to go to the enemy and make with them proposals for a conference and for a change. We had to have the war to an end without mediation with Alexander. As a part of the conference and in order to reach the purpose of bringing about a nation which would make Germany agree to face or object to Germany's action. (2)
In return, Frederick William was to cede his territory west of the Oder, i.e. Brandenburg with Berlin and that part of Silesia marked off by a line from Glogau to the Bohemian frontier. Thus Prussia, the capital of which would be Warsaw, Königsberg or Danzig would be absolutely under the influence of Russia. Brandenburg was to go to Westphalia and the Kossen district was evidently for Saxony. (1)

Poland, Oldenburg, and the continental System had been the chief points of dispute between Russia and France before 1812. Would not Russia be content if both of these were dropped? Napoleon's envoy was still waiting for this interview with Alexander when war began again. (2)

But even after the battle of Bautzen, May 21, Caulaincourt was not granted an interview with the Czar, but merely notified that the mediation of Austria had been accepted and that any further proposals would be received thru that power. (3)

Napoleon's plans to tear Metternich's policy to pieces was thus defeated. Nor had he succeeded in separating Russia and Prussia. Yet by his attempt at separate negotiations with Russia, Napoleon had put into the hands of the Czar, a weapon which he was not slow to use against Vienna. Austria was now afraid that either the Czar would approach Napoleon and that Russia would give up the fight as she had done in 1807, or that

2. Idem
3. Ibid, p. 613
In referring to the report of the Ministry of War at the opening of the North Vietnamese offensive, which was published in the United Press, the United States' reaction was described as reaction to a significant military operation in Vietnam.

The report stated that the Ministry of War had issued a statement on the situation in Vietnam, which was later reported by the United Press. The Ministry's statement emphasized the importance of the military operation and its impact on the overall situation in Vietnam.

The United States' reaction to this report was described as a reaction to the Ministry's statements. The United States' reaction was characterized by criticism of the Ministry's stance and a call for a more vigorous approach to the situation in Vietnam.

The United States' reaction was further described as a reaction to the Ministry's emphasis on the importance of the military operation. The United States' reaction was characterized by a call for more decisive action and a recognition of the need for a strong response to the situation in Vietnam.

The United States' reaction was also described as a reaction to the Ministry's statements on the situation in Vietnam. The United States' reaction was characterized by a call for a more comprehensive approach to the situation and a recognition of the need for a coordinated response to the Ministry's statements.

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The United States' reaction was also described as a reaction to the Ministry's statements on the situation in Vietnam. The United States' reaction was characterized by a call for a more comprehensive approach to the situation and a recognition of the need for a coordinated response to the Ministry's statements.
Napoleon would force Austria to join him. It seemed necessary, therefore, that Austria make some advances to the allies which would bind them to her cause. (1)

For this reason, Francis I went in June with his minister to Bohemia that he might be nearer the allied camp. Nesselrode who came here to induce Austria to join the alliance formally, found the Austrian Emperor still unwilling to enter the war with his present poor equipment. Notwithstanding, on June 7, the Russian envoy received from Metternich six conditions which the latter considered essential for peace. The first four Austria would enforce by arms if Napoleon rejected them; the remaining conditions she wished to negotiate. (2)

The terms included: the dismemberment of the Duchy of Warsaw; the enlargement of Prussia which was to have Danzig; Illyria was to go to Austria; the Hanseatic towns were to be independent; the Rhenish Confederation was to be dissolved; and Prussia was to be restored as far as possible to the position she had occupied in 1806. (3)

When the allies accepted Austria's conditions, the treaty of Reichenback was concluded on June 27, 1813, between Austria, Russia and Prussia. Some of the important terms called for the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw and the partition of the Polish provinces which formed it among Austria, Russia and Prussia; the aggrandizement of Prussia following the partition

2. Ibid
3. Ibid
(1) The Board shall provide for the appointment of such persons as it shall determine to be qualified to serve as Board members. The Board may appoint such additional members as it deems necessary for the efficient conduct of its business. The Board shall set the terms of service for the Board members, which terms shall be consistent with the law and any regulations of the State Board of Education. The Board may provide for the payment of expenses incurred by Board members in connection with their duties.

(2) The Board shall establish rules and regulations for the conduct of its business, which shall be consistent with the law and any regulations of the State Board of Education. The Board may provide for the payment of expenses incurred by Board members in connection with their duties.

(3) The Board shall appoint such officers and agents as it deems necessary for the efficient conduct of its business. The Board shall set the terms of service for such officers and agents, which terms shall be consistent with the law and any regulations of the State Board of Education. The Board may provide for the payment of expenses incurred by such officers and agents in connection with their duties.

(4) The Board shall have the power to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any property owned or leased by the Board, subject to the approval of the State Board of Education. The Board may provide for the payment of expenses incurred by such officers and agents in connection with their duties.
with the cession of the city and territory of Danzig and the restoration of the Illyrian provinces to Austria. (1)

By a separate and secret treaty England also agreed to the reconstitution of Prussia so that her statistical and geographic proportions would be at least as they were before 1806. (2)

Near the end of July, Napoleon became uneasy about Metternich's conversations with the Russians and invited the Austrian minister to meet him at Dresden. After explaining the situation to Nesselrode, Metternich went to Dresden, where he held a nine hour interview with Napoleon. (3)

Metternich told the French Emperor that Austria wished Prussia, Russia and Austria to be entirely independent of France so that a balance of power would once again be established in Europe. To accomplish this, Austria claimed Illyria and a frontier extended nearer Italy. The pope was to get back his states; Poland was to be partitioned again; Spain and Holland were to be evacuated by the French army and the confederation of the Rhine as well as the Swiss confederation were to be abandoned by Napoleon. (4)

As a result, the French Emperor met Austria half way. He declared the alliance of 1812 dissolved and even went so far as to accept Austria as a mediator. On June 30, a convention was signed providing that negotiations be discussed at a congress.

4. Capefigue. Diplomates Europeens V. I, p. 29
with thecession of the city and collection of people and the

resettlement of the Interior provinces to Australia (I)

By a separate and secret treaty, following also ensuing to the
resettlement of people to spots in Alaska and Geographe.

proportionate money at least as much was called 1,000. (2)

keep the end of July, kept 10 people, became necessary report.

which communication with the Russians and that the American

minister to meet him at Beaver. After explaining the situation

to Mr. Tredge, Tredge went to Beaver, where he made a little

point attention with Napoleon (3)

Secretary for the Interior department that Australia was

prospects. There any attempt to be sufficiently indispensable to

be a general of power on once again, again to re-establish in

practically, but to receive $2,000,000 British dollars in

of the county as well as the Canadian Confederation, were to be

continued by Napoleon (4)

As a result, the French Emperor sent an armed vessel to

accelerate the taking of the cities and never went to hold an

to secure Britain as a mediator. On June 20, a convention was

signed bringing into existence of the government of a convention

at Prague. The truce was to last until August 10 and Austria was to prevail on her allies to accept this. (1)

Napoleon still hoped to find a way of reaching a separate understanding with the Czar and for this reason planned to send to the Congress, not only Narbonner who was accredited to Austria, but also Caulaincourt. (2)

When the latter reached Prague on July 26, he soon found that there was little chance of carrying out Napoleon's wishes. The Russian representative, Anstette, greatly disliked Napoleon and he had agreed with Metternich to conduct the negotiations in writing thru the mediating power. Metternich had chosen this method to prevent any secret understanding behind his back and the allies hoped that Austria by this method, would still further weaken her position with France. (3)

The ultimatum of the allies was communicated to Napoleon by Metternich. It included: 1. the dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw which was to be partitioned among Russia, Prussia and Austria; Danzig was to go to Prussia; Hamburg and Lubeck were to become independent cities; Prussia was to be reconstructed with a frontier on the Elbe, and all the Illyrian provinces were to go to Austria. (4)

Thus, by August 5, 1813, Napoleon found himself opposing a powerful coalition which was this time acting in unison. He had doubted that this could ever be since the interests of two powers, especially, had seemed irreconcilable. He made one last

of the Degree. The forces were to feel mutual support to any Anarchy.

and to prevent any part fright to another;

Republic will propose to find a way of reasserting a separate national interest with the Care and for the reason planning to send

to the Congress, for our resolution, we are steadfast to 

fire, and also Congresses.

When the forces received orders to go, they were long

and there were little chance of certifying our Republic's might

The various independent Nations, ready, all Italy and

in writing from the earthling power. Metternich had chosen this

in writing to prevent the sense of our interests, putting the face and

The consideration of the fullest was commonly to the Republic

in Metternich. I imagine: I the motion of the Russian

police of France which was to be entertained some Russia.

Prussia and Austria; and we to go to Prussia; Humane and

we to be

recognized with a companion on the Kiep, and all the Interest

provinces were to go to Austria.

Thus, byamsue E. 1779, Republic long resistant opposing a

powerful coalition which was the same occasion in nation. He

had supposed that the country was under the Inference of two

five, especially, and as many intercommunication. He made one year

J. 19, p. 378. 2. f 149, p. 303. 7, 191, p. 171, 199.
effort to break the alliance. Caulaincourt was instructed to sound Metternich to see whether if Napoleon should accept the terms, Austria would make common cause with him or remain neutral. For answer Metternich added to the four articles for which Austria was pledged to fight, the remaining two which she had previously desired to negotiate. It is thought that Metternich did this because he wished Napoleon to refuse, and Napoleon did not disappoint him. (1)

Furthermore, he was indignant at Austria's demands and proposed instead the dismemberment of the Duchy of Warsaw, the independence of Danzig, and the restoration of Illyria with the exception of Trieste to Austria. (2)

Fortunately for the allies, Napoleon's answer did not reach Prague until August 11. By that time the truce was ended and the French representatives had their passports and Austria's declaration of war. (3)

The alliance was now strengthened further by the treaties signed at Toeplitz between Russia and Austria and Russia and Prussia. These agreements confirmed the treaties already made. There was to be no peace except with common accord; Austria was to be reconstructed as she was in 1805; the confederation of the Rhine was to be dissolved and the states between Prussia and Austria were to be independent; and an arrangement agreeable to

2. Ibid, p. 621
3. Idem
The alliance was now strengthened further by the peace of Tilsit between Russia and Austria and Russia and Prussia. These arrangements continued the Nassau affair. There was to be no peace except with common enemies. A treaty was to be reconvened as early as in 1808; the combination of the line was to be destroyed and the alliance between Prussia and

(c) January 25, p. 285

[Note: Top of p. 280]
Russia; Prussia and Austria was to be made in regard to the Duchy of Warsaw. (1)

About November 1813, the Czar was eager to press forward into Paris. He wished to be thought a liberator of France, conscious of the fact that if such was the case, his views on Poland would be given more favorable attention. Naturally, Austria and Prussia opposed this plan. (2)

Napoleon had now two courses open to him: to defeat with his reduced forces an enemy many times his superior or to conclude peace before that enemy could cross the Rhine.

Near the middle of November 1813, Metternich announced to him that the Powers would make peace if Napoleon would accept the "natural boundaries of France"—the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees—as a basis with a common congress to decide the rest. (3)

But Napoleon still could not forget his dream of empire and on November 16, he sent Metternich a reply in which he made no mention of the basis of peace, but merely proposed Mannheim as a suitable place in which to convene the congress. (4) Two weeks later Caulaincourt practically accepted the terms, but it was then too late. (5)

Metternich, however, made use of Napoleon's evasive reply to issue a manifesto to the French people designed to persuade them to withdraw their support from their Emperor. "The allies,"

2. Cambridge Modern History. V. IX, p. 542
3. Ibid
5. Cambridge Modern History. V. IX, p. 542
said he, "are not against France, but against Napoleon. The allied sovereigns will guarantee to France an extension of territory such as she never enjoyed under her kings." (1)

Because of the lack of harmony among the allies, the British Government sent Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign Minister, to take part in the pending negotiations. On his arrival at headquarters about the middle of January, he found the coalition in danger of breaking up thru jealousies. The most important thing was to bring Austria into line and Castlereagh did this by allaying Metternich's fears on Saxony and Poland and by persuading him that France must be reduced to her old boundaries. Alexander had to be coaxed to enter into any negotiations at all and this was accomplished only when Austria threatened to withdraw from the coalition, for Alexander was convinced that Russia must have the help of her allies if Napoleon were to be defeated. (2)

A conference opened at Chatillon-on-the-Seine February 5, 1814; on the 7th the allies stated their terms. France was now to give up Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy and Nice and retire within the boundaries of 1791. England would restore some colonies by way of compensation. (3)

From February 9 to 17 the conferences were suspended partly because of a mandate from Alexander and partly because Napoleon was secretly anxious to defeat Blucher, thinking that a victory at this time would give him more favorable terms. (4)

2. Cambridge Modern History. V.IX, p. 546
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
speak, the use of 'prepared phrase' and 'prepared remarks'. The
following statement with reference to France as an example of a-

situation such as the never achieved, under no other form of

Britain's Government and Long Committee, the German Minister, to take

decision to the pending situation. Do the majority of Britishers

spend the middle of January, do you think the collision in hand may

prevent in any reasonable. The most important thing was to

be continued to enter into negotiations of all and alike, so

be completed only with utmost firmness to avoid the loss of

conflict for Alexander was continuing that Russia must have the

part of the ill-fated operations were to be kept secret.

A conference opening of Clalition-on-the-sea-Germany of 1836

and the ill-fated end of the course was taken to

give up Berlin. The Fall of the Uhlins, General and Prince and

result within the compactness of 1836. England would restore

some colonies by way of compensation.

from the approach to the In the conference were necessary because

interest of a manceuvre from Alexander and partly because Napoleon

was secretly afraid to admit Prussia's military advantage over

at the time that would give him more leverage later.
Metternich repeated his threat to withdraw the Austrian forces and the conferences were resumed. Caulaincourt was ready to accept the terms, but Napoleon, encouraged by his success was more ambitious. He decided not to give up Belgium nor the left bank of the Rhine and instructed his envoy accordingly. The allies asked for an armistice but Napoleon refused to parley except on the basis of natural boundaries. (1)

On February 21, Napoleon had written to Francis of Austria urging him not to sacrifice the interests of his country to those of the allies, but to accept peace on the basis offered at Frankfurt—that of "natural boundaries." (2)

If this suggestion had come earlier, it might have broken up the alliance, but Napoleon's victory and the Emperor Francis's disgust at his refusal of an armistice determined Austria to send an unfavorable reply to Napoleon on the 27th. (3)

The alliance now became closer and the treaty of Chaumont was signed. The four powers bound themselves once more not to negotiate separately with Napoleon, but to continue the war until France was reduced to pre-revolutionary limits. Napoleon was given until March 1 to accept these terms but he refused. (4)

One of the greatest difficulties at the Congress of Châtillon was that Alexander would not say what limits he had in mind for Poland. Austria suspected him of stirring up discontent.

1. Cambridge Modern History. V. IX, p. 546
2. Idem, p. 550
3. Idem
4. Idem
Perfection requires the power to anticipate the want.

I have no expectations that the conferences were resumed. Generalizing was needed to occupy the terms, without Napoleon's encouragement of the one and

those were more expedient. He gathered not to give up Belgium and

the fleet sank at the Rhine and interdicted the enemy crossing.

The allie seagull too on an estimate and Napoleon declared to begin

except on the part of Napoleon's conquerors. I

On February 5th Napoleon had written to Prussia of America

my opinion. No not to accительн the interests of the country to know

of the allie, and to correct bases on the bases of France.

(4) The chief of Napoleon's conquerors. "To...

It is suggestive and some settled, if might have proven

of the allie, and Napoleon's activity and the Emperor's

agreement of the treaty of an extraordinary governmental article to

send us myriads of letters to Napoleon on the 21st.

The allie now become closer, and the treaty of Glatom

was strange. The four powers, having crosswise once more not to

negotiate separately with Napoleon, but to continue the war

until France was reduced to the-revolutionary likeness Napoleon

were given until March I to accept these terms, but be refused.

one of the greatest abilities of the conference of

if you are Chief Alexander, don't say what alliances you had in

will for Poland. Austrian rendezvous him of stirring up according

Cambridge Modern History. V. IX. p. 346

2

3

4
in Galicia and Castlereagh did not enjoy the thought that Russia thru an acquisition of Poland, should reach the heart of Europe. He desired still less that Poland should be reconstructed as she was before, for the honor of Russia. Moreover, Castlereagh was convinced that Alexander had deceived him or at least that he had played on words and this threw him to the side of Metternich even at this early date. (1)

In the spring of 1814, the Empire of Napoleon collapsed and the Bourbons after nineteen years of exile returned to the throne of their ancestors. When the allies reached Paris, Alexander paid much attention to the important Poles who were there, especially Kosciuszko. The famous Polish patriot attended a ball given at the suggestion of the Czar by the Princess Jablonowska. Someone asked Kosciuszko if he intended to return to Poland. "Yes, if I see her free," he responded. Whereupon Alexander said in a loud voice "Gentlemen, it is necessary to arrange affairs so that this gallant gentleman may once again see his country." (2)

In his negotiations with Alexander, Kosciuszko confined himself to the following demands: that the Emperor should give full amnesty, proclaim himself King of Poland and give the country a constitution similar to that of England. Alexander purposely deferred his answer until May 3, a date dear to every Polish patriot, and then promised all. (3)

in getting any collection of all for early the courtship for France
in order an acquisition of Poland, almost deep the heart of Poland.
We believe that there is Poland strong to recommend one we are
deliberate for the fruit of Poland. Moreover, collection was
continuing that Alexander had Koreans him of or least part it had
played war works and some time him to the site of Polandism in
of the early cafe. (1)

In the spring of 1913, the capture of regeneration colleagues and
the combination after nineteen years or exile returning to the France
of their experience, when the illegal freedom party, Alexander had
some attention to the important roles which were from, especially
Koszuński. The famous Polish artist attending a call of polity of
the suggestion of the court to the Prussians supplied with.

"Yes, one week Koszuński if he lettered to return to Poland.
If I see the two, the Teutoburg. Metropolitan Alexander said to
a long voice "Germany" it is necessary to substitute allies as
and make following conditions may once again see the country."

In the negotiations with Alexander, Koszuński continued
in the negotiations with Poland; Koszuński supplies the
material to the following Germans: that the rubber should give
lumber materials, provide materials from of Poland and give the com-
put a construction similar to that of Poland. Alexander but
possible gathered the answer until May 5 a safe gear to eastern
Polish territory and then promising all. (2)
Now that Napoleon had been defeated, the chief cause for unity had disappeared and the allies began to disagree again. Prussia separated from Austria on the question of German supremacy, England and Austria were against Russia on the question of Poland, and France sought to regain her position on the continent. (1)

It was the problem of Poland which especially divided the allies after Napoleon's overthrow. Even at this time, Gneisenau wrote to one of his correspondents, "The Czar will keep all of Poland and thru vengeance on the King of Saxony, will give us (the Prussians) all Saxony's domains. Prussia has given her consent to the Czar's plans, but that of Austria has yet to be obtained."(2)

Hoping to win the approval of Austria, the Count of Munster suggested to Alexander that Austria be indemnified for Galicia with Alsace. Alexander decided to talk about this Polish problem at Paris, and he created an uproar which nearly wrecked the conference. (3)

Before going farther, it might be well to give a brief survey of the position of each power at the time of the Paris Conference.

It was already clearly seen that beside the dethronement of Napoleon, the Czar had one main object in view. He was now in possession of the Gran Duchy of Warsaw and it was his fixed

3. Idem
intention to create from the conquest a united, but not independent, Poland over which he would rule. In this plan he was supported by a large part of the Polish nobility. (1)

Alexander said he wished to repair the damage done by Catharine the Great who was largely responsible for the partitioning of Poland. (2)

Russia was not vitally interested in the preservation of Saxony but desired to give it to Frederick William if he put no obstacle in the way of the Czar's plan. Thus, for Alexander, the two questions of Saxony and Poland were connected. If his plan succeeded, his power would be greatly increased. He was already persuaded that he could dominate the court of Berlin and as for the court of Vienna, he hoped to control it by his ally, Prussia, at first, and later thru Poland. Then, possibly, he dreamed he would be able to turn his thoughts toward the East. (3)

At this point it would perhaps be fitting to introduce the Czar's ministers. They were nearly all non-Russian. There was "Stein, the German patriot; Czartoryski, the Polish noble; Capo d'Istria, a native of Corfu; La Harpe, the Swiss Republican; Anstette, an Alsatian with Polish possessions and Nesselrode who was of German blood." (4). The latter, whose ideas differed from those of the Czar, later became the medium thru which Met-***************

1. Webster. Congress of Vienna, p. 5
2. Ibid
\[a\text{paragraph}\]
ternich and Castlereagh tried to curb Russia's ambition. By the treaties of Reichenbach and Toeplitz, Austria was promised reconstruction on a basis as nearly as possible to that of 1805. She wished to regain Galicia. Metternich consequently grew increasingly alarmed at Alexander's plans for Poland and at Prussia's hope to obtain Saxony since it was contrary to Austria's interests to see Prussia so powerful. But Metternich regarded the first problem by far the more dangerous of the two. (1)

"If Russia insists on proclaiming a Russian Poland," Metternich told Merveldt, his ambassador at Paris, "we must have recourse to every means, even, if necessary, those of proclaiming an independent Poland, to forestall her." (2)

The Austrian Chancellor, therefore, "reluctantly swallowed" his fears as to Saxony and as early as January, 1814, gave Hardenberg an oral promise that Prussia could have that territory, although strategical considerations were against this, for if Prussia should occupy all of Saxony, she would threaten Bohemia. Therefore, a large party at Vienna were against Metternich's promise. (3)

Prussia was now in a unique position;--Russia had promised her Saxony if she would co-operate with her and now Austria promised her the same territory if she would go against Russia.

Prussia's affairs at this period were directed by the

3. Ibid
A new establishment in some country's capital

By the creation of new positions and offices, unique with

and recognition of a place as central to an elite.

of 1907. The idea of Losing Utile. Meritorial con-

If we return to A.A.'s version of American's plane, you

9 and 10 of Proposals' hope to act as Saxony since it was con-

If creation's interest to see Proposals is powerless. But

If both versions are defined in the same generation of the

the co. every season, even if necessary, those of proclaiming

of the American Chancellor, therefore, "sufficiently until"

We have to co. Saxony now or early as versatile. I've made my

the empire because their purposes in these case, it's not.

If any practicalities considerate were extended this year.

If anyone occupy all of Saxony, the world expands reports

To take a large part of Vienna were general information's

be (3)

(2)
Chancellor Hardenberg, but owing to his physical infirmities, Humboldt had to transact most of the business. (1)

With the representative of Britain, Lord Castlereagh, Pitt's plan to restore the balance of power in Europe came to life again (2). Realizing this, Czartoryski went to London as early as February, 1814, with a memoire to Castlereagh asking England to support Russia's acquisition of the Polish provinces and suggesting certain economic advantages which England would get from this arrangement. To reassure those in England who feared the increase of Russian power, he said that Poland would not long remain under the Russian yoke and that a strong Poland would be a check on the great power of Russia. Alexander came to know about this intrigue and it may be assumed that it made negotiations none the smoother. (3)

By February 1814, the Czar said that he was prepared to compromise by accepting only part of Galicia. Further than that he would not go. (4). As if in answer to this, Castlereagh announced to the Austrian statesmen that he would not tolerate any separate Polish kingdom whether declared openly or created in some indirect manner if it was under the domination of Russia and for a considerable time after that all the energies of the British minister were devoted to the attempt to prevent Austria and Prussia from giving up any of their Polish territories to Russia. (5)

5. Ward & Gooch. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy V. I, p. 34
On April 29, 1814, Hardenberg presented one of his plans for the future arrangement of Europe. Prussia was to get Posen, Kalisch, Bromberg, Plock and Danzig. Austria was to have Cracow and the Tarnopol district, ceded by her in 1809. Russia was to receive the rest of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. (1)

Hardenberg submitted this plan to the Czar on May 5, but he was met with a refusal. Not only was Alexander unwilling to cede the territory to Austria, but he persisted in pressing for an extension of the western frontier of Poland which would include Thorn and a good radius beyond it. (2)

But Prussia was not yet ready to give up her Polish desires and it was this which gave the opponents of Russia hope that Prussia might yet join them. (3)

***************

"The Prussian heads," Metternich wrote, "are very hot, and we shall have to endure some singular scenes until the Polish question is restored to its proper channels." (4)

When Alexander crossed the Channel on June 5, 1814, it was because he wished to appeal from the "obstinate resistance" of the Austrian and English ministers to the Regent and to English presence.

2. Ibid., p. 111
CHAPTER VI

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

and

THE POLISH QUESTION

As the powers persisted in maintaining such differences of opinion, the discussions at Paris made no progress and on May 31 Hardenberg, Metternich, Nesslrode and Castlereagh agreed to sign a secret protocol which promised to adjourn to the meetings in London and Vienna "all discussions as to the definite arrangements of lands ceded by France, as well as those territories in Germany at the disposal of the allies." (1)

At London the questions of Poland and Saxony still gave trouble. Russia's ambition to secure all of Poland; Prussia's equal eagerness for Saxony and the growing conviction of Austria and Britain that the Czar's plan must be stopped at all costs resulted in an atmosphere of tension not conducive to any settlement whatever.

"The Prussian heads," Metternich wrote, "are very hot, and we shall have to endure some singular scenes until the Polish question is restored to its proper channels." (2)

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2. Ibid, . p. 111
CHAPTER IV

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

and

THE POLITICAL DISCUSSION

As the powers beginning to manifest their differences on

Russo-Japanese relations, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Grey

intimated to the conference that the British delegation was

prepared to consider any proposal from the Chinese

government that might lead to a compromise of the

questions pending between Great Britain and Japan.

The Chinese government had previously expressed the

willingness to compromise, but the British delegation

expected that any such proposal would be submitted in a

way that would not prejudice its interests.

The conference adjourned on June 9, 1921.
The Prince Regent and the Prime Minister were both inclined to favor Alexander and to distrust Austria and particularly Metternich. Thus the Czar might have made Castlereagh's task very difficult indeed if he had played his game well. But Alexander had wished that his sister, the Grand-duchess Catharine, be in London to intrigue for him as she is reported to have done at Prague. But she soon found that England was not Austria and when she was rebuffed, threw herself into the arms of the Whigs and entered into the quarrels of the royal family. Worse still, the Czar also took that side, possibly because he though that the Tories would not remain long in office and that there was, therefore, little to gain by being friendly with them. Nor did Alexander mend the situation by being even less conciliatory at this conference than he had been at Paris.

Metternich, on the contrary, showed his astuteness by paying careful court to the Prince Regent and by avoiding all intercourse with the opposition. That the Austrian minister made a favorable impression is shown by the following conversation between the Prince Regent and Metternich in which the former criticises the Czar's conduct. "If your Emperor had come here," the Regent observed, "England would have seen a prince, whereas, at the moment, she beholds the spectacle of a barbarian from the

The Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's wife, Mrs. Churchill, were part of the conference on the current situation in the United States. The conference was held to discuss the current political situation and to formulate a strategy for the future.

The conference was attended by representatives from various countries, including the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The attendees discussed the current political situation in the United States and the potential threats to international peace and security.

The conference highlighted the importance of international cooperation in maintaining peace and stability. The attendees emphasized the need for a strong and united front to address the challenges facing the world.

Following the conference, the attendees agreed to work together to ensure the security and prosperity of the world. The conference ended with a commitment to continued cooperation and dialogue to address the challenges facing the world.
North, who is unfortunate enough to wish to play the Jacobin in the South. I am sure that the Emperor Alexander wishes me harm and I will repay him tenfold." (1)

Perhaps the chief feature of the whole conference was the feeling of understanding which Metternich had built up, and scattered dispatches indicate that Castlereagh had now firmly resolved to act as closely as possible with him. (2)

Under such belligerent circumstances, it was naturally impossible to proceed further with the negotiations concerning Saxony and Poland. Sensing that these difficulties might break up the coalition altogether, Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia wisely renewed the treaty of Chaumont on July 29, 1814. The resulting convention implied that in spite of their differences, the four powers would attempt to settle their problems thru diplomatic channels. To insure this still more, a limit was put on the number of troops which each power should have. Another attempt to solve the knotty problem was to be made at Vienna in the autumn of 1814. (3)

In July, 1814, Metternich visited Talleyrand at Paris. The Austrian made a great impression on the French minister by frankly talking over the London conference with him. On the other hand, Metternich was highly satisfied to learn that France was agreed that all of Poland should not go to Russia. "I am sure," Metternich wrote to his Emperor, "that by skillful negotiations

2. Idem, p. 111
3. Ibid"
In July, 1919, McDowell arrived [at] [the] London conference [as the] American representative and [in ] the presence of the French minister of war, [he] made a great impression on the French minister of war. His appeal over the London conference with him. On the other hand, McDowell was highly satisfied to learn that France saw "I am sure, instead of skillful negotiations."
we shall live to see the unusual phenomena that all parties without exception will oppose Russia." (1)

About a month later, Castlereagh visited Paris for two days. During that time, he had a talk with Talleyrand and an audience with Louis XVIII. "I found," he reported to his Prime Minister, "the sentiments of the French government with respect to Poland perfectly analogous to ours,—a decided repugnance to the Russian project....and a strong abstract preference (especially in the King's mind) for the reconstruction of Poland as an independent state in the House of Saxony, but this idea was subdued by a sense of the danger of the attempt, into a desire not to submit to, but to regulate the existing principle of partition." (2)

Before leaving Paris in the spring of 1814, the Czar had said "The Bourbons are unchastened and incorrigible. Only one, the Duke of Orleans, has liberal ideas. As for the rest there is no hope in them." (3). This statement may have had some influence on Louis's opposition to Russia.

1. Knapton. Op. cit. V. I, p. 120
2. Ibid, p. 125
3. Ibid
We shall live to see the numerical pronounce...
CHAPTER VII

THE POLISH QUESTION

at the

CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Article 32 of the first peace of Paris, May 30, 1814, formally stipulated that within two months, "all powers engaged on either side of the present war shall send plenipotentiaries to Vienna for the purpose of regulating in general congress the arrangements which will complete the provisions of the present treaty." (1)

Preceding the Czar at the congress in August, Nesselrode produced an autographed memorandum by which Alexander granted to Prussia the province of Posen as far as a line from Thorn to Peysern and from there the length of Prosna, also the district of Kulm as far as the Drewenz with the exception of a radius around Thorn. To this the Czar permitted that Prussia add a part of Saxony as far as a line the length of Elster or even beyond. He said nothing about the form of government to be given to the Polish provinces and instructed his minister not to discuss it. (2)

As Castlereagh said, this memorandum indicated no modification of the Emperor's former plans with respect to Poland.

The Czar still wished to preserve all the Duchy of Warsaw for

CHAPTER XLI

THE POLICE QUESTION

of the

CONGRESS OF VENUE

Article 20 of the First Peace of Paris, Dec. 30, 1814, read with modifications that within two months, "will provide an agency to settle by an equitable arrangement, with complete and positive provisions, the questions of the present and future.

Section 1. ('1)

Precisely the same in the Congress of Vienne, Henry, Minister of Interior, produced an extraordinary memorandum, in which Alexander, Chancellor of France, proposed the provisional adoption of a draft of law, to be the basis, in the absence of the final treaty, of a firm and lasting arrangement. To this the Congress, warranting the principle on the basis of equity, as the basis of peace, has given, to the effect, the above memorandum and instructions to the minister of interior.

An extract from the memorandum indicates no conflict.

I. A report of the interior department, April 15, 1815.
himself. This declaration of Nesselrode was regarded merely as an attempt to start a discussion but Metternich had four or five conferences with the Czar and found that nothing could move him.

Metternich had inherited the fears of Prince Kaumtz, his predecessor, about the ambitions of Russia in the East and in the West (1). So strong was this feeling that the Austrian minister still kept the opinion which he had held at Paris, that rather than see all the Duchy united to Russia, he would prefer an independent kingdom. If this proposal were rejected, Austria could still invoke the treaties and contest Russia's right to make a special arrangement on the Duchy without consulting Austria. (2)

Castlereagh suggested again at Vienna the advantages to be gained by a complete restoration of Poland. But he had no illusions about this idea being accepted for he knew that the three eastern powers would never consent to give up their spoils, and although he repeatedly brought forth this idea as a solution to the problem, it was probably because he wished to safeguard his government from possible attacks in Parliament. (3)

Castlereagh's object at Vienna as he stated it, was "to conduct arrangements to be made by the congress so as to make for the establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe." (4)

4. Ibid, p. 472
This section of the document appears to be discussing geopolitical relations and international diplomacy. It mentions the concept of "oralat-," which could be a term or phrase in a specific context, possibly related to negotiations or agreements. The text seems to be analyzing the impact of specific events or decisions on international relations, possibly involving Russia.

The text includes references to the "international situation," indicating a focus on the broader context of global politics. There are mentions of ministers and their opinions, suggesting a discussion of policy and decision-making processes. The text appears to be a detailed analysis or commentary, possibly intended for an audience familiar with the subject matter.
Beside this reason it was against the interests of British commerce for the Czar to have both sides of the Vistula. (1)

Unlike his colleagues in the British cabinet, Castlereagh regarded Great Britain as part of the continent and he saw clearly how difficult it would be for her to keep clear of any conflict if a peaceful settlement were not made. For this reason he decided to play a major part in the questions of great difficulty, whether or not his country was especially interested in them (2). He was all the more determined to do this since his fear of France, allayed at least for the time being by the first peace of Paris, had been replaced by a growing concern about the ambitions of Russia. (3)

Prussia's claims in Poland were quite definite. She could point to the treaty of Kalisch, February, 1813, whereby Russia had promised her a strip of territory which would connect her eastern province with Silesia (4). The bond between Russia and Prussia was all the more strengthened because of the attachment of the King of Prussia to the Czar (5). Indeed Frederick William's gratitude to the Russian Emperor for his support was so manifest at the congress that it won for him the nickname of valet de chambre.

The Prussian ministers, however, were more practical. They were ready to receive all of Saxony from the hands of

3. Idem
Besides this reason it was apparent the importance of British

command to the Court to have both sides of the Article. (1)

which the Conference in the
government was a part of the Continuation and per was kept since one of
and the effortless danger to avoid. (2) The Russian Forbearance
especially out of the country was especially
reached difficulty. Whether it was effort to meet the pressure of the
since the very last of Russia, already at least for the
point in the latter because of it. (3) There was no amount to

owing country equals the armaments it. (4)

German claims in Poland were durable until the
would get the interest of Kaffrarian. (5) Whereafter Russia
had been an emperor per a strip of territories which would connect per
from the territory of Russia.

and Russia was with the more advanced because of the fact.

(6) Indeed they

of the kind of Prussia to the Court. (7) J. Langer, bei-

of the Russian Emperor for the end.

both were no material of the conference and it now you him the

the German minister, however, were more progressively

they were liable to receive with at least from the benefit of

1. Kunterb. Ql. III. p. 120
2. St. 1977 Ql. III. p. 60
3. St. 1977 Ql. III. p. 92
4. St. 1977 Ql. III. p. 50
5. St. 1977 Ql. III. p. 20
Russia yet did not wish to give up what they considered Prussia's rights over her Polish territory. All of Saxony and as much of the Grand Duchy as possible was their object, while Alexander wished to keep all of the Duchy and deliver only as small a part of Saxony as was necessary. (1)

It has been seen that Austria too hoped for gains in Poland and cited as her authority, the treaty of Toeplitz, September 9, 1813, which had guaranteed that Austria be reconstructed so that her statistical and geographic proportions be at least as they were in 1805.

Of all the great powers, Austria was the one whose interests had the most in common with those of England. Both opposed the reconstruction of Poland under the Czar (2) because both feared for their interests in Europe and in the Orient should Russia become as powerful as she planned. (3)

But in regard to Russia the two policies were exactly opposite. "If Austria did not wish to see Russia at Cracow, neither did she wish to see Prussia at Dresden." (4). Castlereagh, on the other hand, now seemed to think that by strengthening Prussia he would create a power able to check Russia.(5)

On September 15, 1814, the great powers met for a preliminary discussion. All but Castlereagh agreed that the big problem should be settled without France. The British minister

5. Ibid
entered a protest on September 22 against this policy of exclusion being too bluntly stated. He wished the "Four" to "keep control, but without openly assuming authority." The other ministers were not convinced, however, and things remained as they were. (1)

The powers which were assembled decided to start on the question of Poland. It did not take them long to find that this problem was no less difficult than it had been at Paris and at London. Hardenberg claimed a part of the Duchy whereupon Nesselrode replied that the Czar wanted all of it. Metternich said that the Duchy had not been conquered by Russia alone and that while he was not adverse to indemnifying Alexander for his services, he could not give up the provinces which Austria had once had. Cracow and Zamosc were too near Vienna, he maintained, to let the Russians install themselves there. Nesselrode argued that Cracow and Zamosc were necessary to the defense of Russia. Hardenberg thought that Thorn was none the less necessary for the defense of Prussia and that Prussia in any case could not consent to the restoration of Poland. Castlereagh pointed out that the English parliament was in favor of restoration, but that it must be a whole Poland independent of, and not subordinate to, Russia. (2)

Prussia and Russia especially, felt that in the face of such opposition, it was all the more necessary not to include

France. She was a defeated power and as her opinion on one side or the other would have great weight, she would become too important. (1)

Then, too, if things were not managed carefully, all the small powers would demand admission and the disorder would be worse than ever. Castlereagh again agreed with a reservation. (2)

Talleyrand was to meet with the powers on September 22. Louis XVIII had left his ministers considerable freedom of action. "The present instructions," the King said, "are not given to the ambassadors as absolute rules, from which they are not able to budge a point. They merely indicate that which is of the greatest interest and that which is of the least interest for France." (3)

On the question of Poland the instructions suggested that while independence was ideal, the best practical solution was "to put matters back as they stood after the last partition." But "all of Poland should not and is not able to pass under the sovereignty of Russia." (4) Danzig should be independent or should go to Prussia. (5)

Furthermore: "The ambassadors of the King will defend... with all their means, the cause of the King of Saxony and in all cases will do all that they can to prevent Saxony from becoming a Prussian province." Also Prussia should not acquire

2. Idem
5. Idem
France. She was a talented painter and a paragon of one.

Then, too, if changes were not managed carefully, and the growth would be small, power would remain stationary and the government would be worse. From our Certain essay, no sense with a reservation.

Telling the way to pass with the power on September 27.

To point VII may tell the missionary conscientious Freemen to the impression as audacious utter, from which our is not able to judge a point. They were in fact the result of the least interest and that which to the least

Interfering for France."

On the question of passing the information suggested that while information was needed, the best practical solution was to have it updated as quickly as possible. But if it is possible, it should not be checked off unless the conference of experts. (4) (5) (6)

According to the King will declare...

Furthermore, the impression of the King will declare...

with all their means, the cause of the King of heaven and to

will cease with all his will for all that can be prevented, so that the...
As might have been expected, Talleyrand opposed the exclusion of France from the conferences. He also criticised the powers for calling themselves "allies", since, he argued, the war had been ended by the peace of Paris. France, he said, desired no territorial gains, but wished that all problems be settled on the basis of legitimacy. This policy would, of course, settle the problems of Saxony and Poland as France wished.

However, these arguments seemed to have some effect since Gentz wrote that this intervention "furiously disarranged our plans." (2)

At this period of the Congress, Talleyrand was not in a position to influence things vitally. But whenever he came into contact with the other powers, he seemed to be carrying out his instructions.

His conversation with Alexander shows the position of both on the Polish question. "Talleyrand reported "After some preliminary conversation about the affairs of the congress, the Emperor said, 'It is necessary that we finish our business here.'"

'That depends on Your Majesty," I replied. 'We will finish promptly and happily if Your Majesty shows the same nobility and grandeur of soul that was shown in the affairs of France.'

the might have been expected. Tellingly, opposite the ex-

uation of France from the conference. He also criticized
the powers for calling conferences "全日制, since the strong-
the war had been engaged at the peace of Paris. France, he said,
hearing on territorial舞台上, and whether their programs be
settle on the peace of Tlizabeth. The policy would be
continue, settle the programs of Security and Defense as France

However, these statements seemed to have some effect since
some more felt the interaction "nationally harmful to our" plan."

Of the defeat of the conference, tellingly, are not in a
position to influence Europe directly. But we believe can come
position with the offers power, he seemed to be struggling
out of the interaction.

His correspondence with Alexander shows the position of
Tallerman. Speaking "After some

"It is necessary that we limit our purposes

The American said, "If it is necessary that we limit our purposes

Tell Germany on your request, I replyed. We will

Failure brought us to a position to which we were now in the position

1, 15, 16, 17, 18
'But,' continued the Emperor 'it is necessary that each power find satisfaction.'

'And each his rights' I ventured to suggest.

'I will keep what I occupy,' he quickly retorted.

'But Your Majesty would wish to keep only that which is legitimately his.....

'I put right first and gain first' I said.

'The convenience of Europe is the right' he argued 'but I would rather have war than renounce what I hold.'" (1)

Shortly after this, Czartoryski was interviewed. The Russian minister explained to Talleyrand that he had not been to call because he had heard that Talleyrand was unfriendly toward the Poles.

"To the contrary" Talleyrand replied. "We are more friendly than anyone. We want a complete and independent Poland."

"That is very pretty" Czartoryski agreed, "but it is impossible. The foreign powers will never agree to it."

"In that case" Talleyrand replied "Poland is no longer our important affair in the north. The unity of Saxony comes closer to us,....if Austria and Prussia agree on the subject of boundaries, we have no objection to the Czar giving any form of government he wishes to the country relinquished to him; for this favor on our part, I demand the preservation of

To Metternich also, Talleyrand explained himself. "If Luxemburg goes to Holland, and Mainz goes to Bavaria; if the kingdom of Saxony remains intact and the King in office; and if Russia does not expand beyond the Vistula, then I will make no objections to this part of Europe." (2)

Alexander and Frederick William attended a conference on September 28, 1814 where Hardenberg, Nesselrode, Humboldt and Stein signed a secret protocol that Saxony was to go to Prussia on condition that it be known as the Kingdom of Saxony and that Prussia should co-operate with the Czar and renounce her pretentions on the Duchy of Warsaw. (3)

Meanwhile Castlereagh worked his hardest to curb the Czar's ambitions by effecting a formal agreement between Prussia and Austria.

During the Napoleonic period, Austria and Prussia had been reduced while France and Russia had been enlarged. France had now been driven back, but Russia still had Finland, a large part of the territory of ancient Poland and acquisitions to the South, especially Bessarabia. Her aim to obtain still more of Poland upset the balance of power, Castlereagh thought. Therefore, he decided to make the states in the center of Europe strong enough to check Russia. This could be done, he believed by territorial distribution and by the establishment of cordial

1. Fresker. A Peace Conference of Intrigue, p. 303
2. Idem, p. 292
[Image cropped or missing]
relations between Prussia and Austria. A strong federated Germany might well be the result of such a union. This unity would serve as an impenetrable barrier against Russia on the Rhine and on the Vistula. (1)

To detach Prussia from the Czar it had been necessary for Castlereagh and Metternich to suggest to her that things would be made easier in Saxony if she would co-operate with them on the question of Poland and since it was the policy of England and Austria to partition Poland among Prussia, Russia and Austria, Prussia hoped to gain. Austria and England, suspecting that Frederick William had agreed to a secret treaty with the Czar, gave Prussia to understand that they would oppose her claim to Saxony if she did not help them. (2)

It has been previously mentioned that even as early as January, 1814, Metternich very reluctantly gave Hardenberg a verbal promise that Saxony should go to Prussia and although other differences had arisen at Paris and at Long, the arrangement had been maintained without any written promise on Metternich’s part. (3)

But no matter how much Metternich and Hardenberg might have wished for a close agreement, they both had to reckon with forces in their own countries. Hardenberg’s chief difficulty was his king who was so deeply grateful to the Czar that he found it almost impossible to oppose any of his wishes.

2. Idem, p. 466
3. Idem
Then, too, there was a strong military party in Prussia which desired not only all of Saxony, but also Mainz, the key to South Germany. (1)

Metternich, on the other hand, had to combat Stadion, Starhemberg and others who held out for more concessions to Austria on the questions of Poland, Saxony and Mainz. (2)

Hardenberg said he would take no step on the Polish question until he was assured of the whole of Saxony. For this reason, he wrote letters to Castlereagh and to Metternich on October 9. The British minister reported this communication to Liverpool on the same day. (3). "Hardenberg explained himself very frankly, that whilst Saxony was in doubt, and with it the possibility of Prussia being suitably reconstructed, it was impossible for him, more especially feeling as his King did, to risk the favour of Russia, but that if Saxony was assured to him by Austria and England, he could then unite with Austria, to oppose with such resistance as prudence might justify, the Russian encroachments.

"Prince Metternich....had an interview with Prince Hardenberg, and professed his willingness to enter into his views with respect to Saxony, provided an understanding could thereby be established with respect to Poland and certain German points of minor importance." (4)

On October 11, 1814, Castlereagh gave formal consent to

2. Idem
I'm afraid we're a strong military party in these days of Germany. I'm afraid we're a strong military party in these days of Germany.

October 9th. The British minister reported the communication from the Navy department on the same day. He said that the Navy had not yet been informed. The communication was accepted as a fact.

According to the terms, the British minister reported that the communication was accepted as a fact. According to the terms, the British minister reported that the communication was accepted as a fact.

The British minister... had an interview with Prince Bismarck... and was informed of the willingness to effect a peace treaty with respect to Saxony, provided an understanding could be reached on certain German points to be established with respect to Poland and certain German points to be established with respect to Poland and certain German points to be established with respect to Poland.

The British minister... had an interview with Prince Bismarck... and was informed of the willingness to effect a peace treaty with respect to Saxony, provided an understanding could be reached on certain German points to be established with respect to Poland and certain German points to be established with respect to Poland.

The British minister... had an interview with Prince Bismarck... and was informed of the willingness to effect a peace treaty with respect to Saxony, provided an understanding could be reached on certain German points to be established with respect to Poland and certain German points to be established with respect to Poland.

The British minister... had an interview with Prince Bismarck... and was informed of the willingness to effect a peace treaty with respect to Saxony, provided an understanding could be reached on certain German points to be established with respect to Poland and certain German points to be established with respect to Poland.

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The British minister... had an interview with Prince Bismarck... and was informed of the willingness to effect a peace treaty with respect to Saxony, provided an understanding could be reached on certain German points to be established with respect to Poland and certain German points to be established with respect to Poland.
the possession of all Saxony by Prussia, provided she loyally supported the Polish plans of Austria and England. "It is necessary," Castlereagh wrote to Hardenberg "to consider Prussia as the sole foundation on which to establish the security of the North of Germany against the great dangers which threaten it...as far as the question of Saxony,....if the incorporation of the whole of this country into the Prussian monarchy is necessary to assure safety to Europe, I will offer no objections political or moral, regardless of whatever pain I personally may feel to see such an old house thus treated.

"But if Saxony is to be incorporated into Prussia so that she will agree to Russia's plans, Great Britain will not consent." (1)

Metternich still hesitated to give his consent in writing, but Hardenberg pressed for a reply and at last, on October 22, Austria agreed with conditions.

"His Majesty," Metternich wrote, "considers the question of the Duchy of Warsaw to be linked with the interests of Austria and Prussia as well as with those of Europe in general.

"Prussia has motives at least as powerful as those of Austria to prevent Russia from passing certain bounds and above all to see that she does not endanger the necessary defenses of the two.....

"The views of Prussia on the incorporation of Saxony are of great regret to the Emperor..... The support which Britain

the possession of all Saxony by Prussia, provided the
necessary military readiness to match the
possibilities of Prussia. The possession of all Saxony in itself
would not be sufficient to guarantee the safety of
the Groschen, but it would be a great step towards
the achievement of the same goal. This is where
the cooperation of Britain becomes necessary. The
possibility of making an agreement with Britain on
this matter is not without its advantages. Britain
might be willing to accept a more limited role in
the event that Saxony is ceded to Prussia.

The proposal of the French to make
Saxony a buffer state between France and
Prussia

...
and Russia give to Prussia's views with regard to this territory do not lessen the regret of the Emperor and he begs that Prussia will well consider the inconveniences to Austria if the frontiers of Bohemia are threatened. If, however, the force of circumstances render it inevitable that Saxony be Prussian, the Emperor must impose certain conditions before giving his consent:

1. that the question be united with the other territorial questions of Germany.

2. that the fortifications and navigation of the Elbe be arranged by the two powers.

3. that Bavaria have Mainz."

Some authors are of the opinion that while Metternich grudgingly gave his consent that Prussia occupy Saxony, he really hoped that when Prussia (1) had checked Russia, that Alexander, sensitive and proud as Metternich knew him to be, would be so angry with Prussia that the latter would be without ally. Metternich would then refuse to deliver Saxony and thus Austria would replace Prussia in the German Confederation. It is possible, however, that Castlereagh might have objected to this plan. (2)

Hardenberg was not satisfied with Metternich's conditions, especially the third and Castlereagh had to bring the two ministers together at his hotel to get an agreement. (3)

As every other move had failed to bring Alexander to terms,

2. Webster. British Diplomacy, p. 102
3. Ibid, p. 102
and Russia give to Prussia's views with regard to this conflict.

Some event may lead to a change in the position of the Powers, and we may then again find ourselves in a position to influence the Powers with regard to the French question. It is, however, the result of circumstances beyond our control if the Powers themselves should disagree in the event of war. The Powers must impose certain conditions before giving their consent:

1. To prevent the discussion of the German
2. The recognition and navigation of the
3. That the German states have

Some countries were not satisfied with the Mertens Act.

Once again, the only way to maintain the Powers' rights in the German Confederation will be to prevent a war.

If it is possible, however, that certain Dervatives might have a seat, according to the plan, the Mertens Act will be satisfied with Mertens's conditions.

Beziers postpones the project to the powers of the two

At every other move and letter, to bring Alexander to terms
Castlereagh now suggested that a common refusal might make the Czar alter his plans. He wrote to Liverpool explaining this scheme on October 24.

The allies, Prussia, Austria and England had three suggestions for the future construction of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

"1. The complete and entire reunion of Poland under an independent Sovereign as it existed previous to the first partition, to the accomplishment of which arrangement, if it shall be acceptable to the Emperor, Austria, and Prussia are ready to make the requisite sacrifices.

"2. If the Emperor objects to this measure as involving too great a sacrifice of territory and dominions on the part of Russia, the courts of Austria and Prussia are willing to consent to a similar measure as applicable to the Kingdom of Poland as it stood in 1791, when it gave itself a free constitution under Poniatowski.

"3. Or if the Emperor of Russia shall reject the erection of Poland as an independent kingdom, the two Powers are ready to agree to the said principle of Partition, provided the same be equitably applied and with a due regard to the security in a military point of view, of their respective States.

"In execution of which principle, they propose that the Vistula throughout the Duchy of Warsaw to Sandomir should be the Russian Boundary, Prussia receiving the right bank if the Emperor should desire to possess Warsaw on the left, but in
The complete and entire removal of the enemy, as it existed previous to the first part of the operation, the accomplishment of which is required, it is still the earnest desire to reestablish to the Emperors, Autocrats, and Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, to make the难受able sacrifices.

"II. The Emperor appeals to the Messengers as Invaders to the German Nation, not as a Saboteurs of the Republic and Communists on the part of the Messengers of the German Nation and Princes and Republics in the Kingdom of Poland as of Poland in 1792, when if have issued a Free Country, freedom under Pomerology.

"II. Of if the Emperor of Russia, shall return the sacramental of Poland as an independent Kingdom, the free powers are ready to secure to the seat principle of partition, providing the same shall be effectually applied and with a due regard to the security in a military being of view, or of special resistance.

"In execution of which purpose, your Highness and the Prussian Government, pursuant to Articles of the Peace of Brest.
this case, he will cede Thorn to Prussia.

"Copies of these several notes should be laid before the Congress and the several Powers of Europe should be invited to support the said overture, and to declare to the Emperor of Russia, to what extent and upon what conditions, Europe in congress can or cannot admit His Imperial Majesty's pretensions to an aggrandizement in Poland.

"It is desirable that the Emperor should be made distinctly to understand, that, however willing the Allies may be to avert so painful an appeal, by every possible modification of their just claims,....yet when driven to make that appeal in the presence of Europe, by refusal of such modification, they must then adhere more rigidly to their just pretensions...."(1)

The attack on Alexander was begun with the English minister acting as intermediary between the allies and Russia. In his last memorandum to the Czar, Castlereagh after establishing the fact that none were prepared to create an independent Poland, enumerated once more all the arguments against the Russian plan.

Alexander's would insure the disaffection of the Poles under Prussia and Austria if those under Russia were given a constitution. Moreover, in order to carry out his schemes, the Czar, Castlereagh protested, was defying all European opinion besides that of his own subjects.

The British minister also insisted that the Treaties of

Reichenbach and Toeplitz still held and were not "eventual" as the Czar had claimed. All these arguments were also without result.

Metternich wrote to Hardenberg on November 2, proposing that Prussia and Austria act with England on the Polish question with Castlereagh as intermediary. Attached to this communication was a memorandum similar to the one which Castlereagh had already given the Czar.

On November 7, came a secret communication from Hardenberg to Castlereagh.

"...the Czar still claims," Hardenberg wrote "that we persist in putting obstacles in his way, while the great service which he has rendered the common cause has made it not only possible for Austria and Prussia and other princes to keep their territories, but also to obtain important additions...."

Hardenberg thought that Prussia and Austria ought to be somewhat conciliatory because the Emperor, Hardenberg felt sure, would weaken himself by this new Kingdom of Poland. The Russians and the Poles would soon oppose each other and "their jealousies will threaten the unity" (of the Russian Empire)....

"We ought to declare at once to the Emperor that....we will consent to the re-establishment of a Kingdom of Poland, separated from the Russian Empire, to which he will join all the Polish provinces of Russia, and to which he will give a constitution, provided that he will make a territorial arrangement which will satisfy us and guarantee to us our Polish states.
"Austria has declared many times that she would be satisfied with Cracow, the country as far as the Nida and the circle of Zamosc on which she has not insisted.

"Prussia has demanded Thorn and the line of the Wartha... I believe that in proposing this we shall destroy the design of the Emperor by taking such a large and essential part of his kingdom." (1)

But the alliance fell to pieces before it could be put into force. The Czar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia were to visit Budapest and here Alexander was to be told of the united demands of the allies. Castlereagh was full of hope that the plan would succeed. After the declaration of Metternich and Hardenberg, Alexander invited the King of Prussia to dine with him and reminded him of the friendship which united them and of the high value which he attached to it. The Czar then heaped reproaches on the two ministers and while Francis of Austria stood by Metternich, Frederick William of Prussia, not proof against the charge of ingratitude, withdrew his support from Hardenberg. Consequently, Castlereagh's scheme failed completely. Hardenberg refused to follow up the first attempt and suggested to Metternich compromises to which the latter could not agree. (2)

In relating his failure to his cabinet, Castlereagh could only say that had it not been for the King of Prussia, the plan...

might have worked.

"I deemed it, therefore, of great importance to contribute as far as depended on me to this concert; considering the establishment of Russia in the heart of Germany not only as constituting great danger in itself, but as calculated to establish a pernicious influence both in the Austrian and Prussian cabinets, and I also foresaw that if these two powers, from distrust of each other gave up the Polish point as desperate, the contest in negotiations would then turn to Saxony, Mainz and other German points and thru the contention of Austria and Prussia, the supremacy of Russia would be established in all directions and upon every question." (1)

Castlereagh did not hide from his cabinet the fact that "unless the Emperor of Russia can be brought to a more moderate and sound course of...conduct, the peace which we have so dearly purchased will be of short duration." (2)

In November there came a declaration from the Czar that the administration of Saxony was to be turned over to Prussia. This appeared to decide matters for Metternich who now seemed to consider himself free from his promise to Prussia. On November 8, therefore, he wrote to Castlereagh and Hardenberg that he could not forsake Saxony. (3)

Humboldt defended Prussia's point of view in a note written on November 13. Says he, "The King of Prussia claims Saxony

2. Webster, Congress of Vienna, p. 103
not to satisfy his thirst for conquest, but because this kingdom is able to indemnify her for the cession of Prussian Poland. She has lost many provinces and has not received any compensation." (1)

Meanwhile a dispatch from Liverpool to Castlereagh called the attention of the British Minister to the strong feeling in England in favor of Saxony. (2)

The Duke of Coburg also presented the Saxon case to Castlereagh about November 16. "You wish, my Lord," he argues, "that Prussia be strong. It will weaken her to give her a population which will not forget its love for its old dynasty..... You wish to unite Austria to Prussia,—Saxony will.....divide them.....you wish to divide Prussia and Russia. You will not accomplish that. There are personal attachments between the two sovereigns which no one can break. But affection aside, you unite their interests when you think to separate them. For Prussia will be supported by Russia in her desires in Germany and Prussia, on her part, will support the designs of Russia....." (3)

At the same time the Poles were greatly disturbed lest the good feeling which had existed between the King of Saxony and the Russian Emperor be disturbed by the affairs of Saxony, especially when the King of Prussia had gone two or three times

2. Webster: British Diplomacy, p. 235
The page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to contain text that is not easily readable, possibly due to a low resolution or a遇难 reading condition. Without clearer visibility, it's challenging to transcribe any meaningful content from this page.
a day to the house of the Czar and had not seen him. (1)

Everybody now began to think that the Congress would end in war and the new order to concentrate Austrian troops in Galicia seemed to support this view. (2)

At the same time that he was working to unite Austria and Prussia, Castlereagh was attempting to move the Czar from his position by a series of interviews and memoranda. His first visit with the Czar at Vienna came on October 2. Castlereagh reported the interview to Liverpool.

"Very early in the interview" he says "the Emperor opened his views with respect to Poland in considerable detail—the substance did not vary in any essential detail from what had always understood to be his plan, namely to retain the whole of the Duchy of Warsaw with the exception of a small portion to the westward of Kalisch which he meant to assign to Prussia, erecting the remainder into a Kingdom under the dominion of Russia, with a national administration congenial to the sentiments of the people."

Castlereagh told the Czar that Great Britain had no objection to the restoration of Poland if it were to be an independent state. The British Minister, said, however, that the Prince Regent did not feel that he had a right to press such a measure, since the Allies might feel that it called for an unreasonable sacrifice. The Czar frankly affirmed that he was

2. Idem
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not prepared to go that far. Castlereagh now suggested that the Czar's plans for the Grand Duchy would give rise to a feeling of discontent among those Poles under Prussia and Austria. Furthermore, the Czar's own subjects opposed the plan. In conclusion, Castlereagh stated that "feeling as the British Government did upon the question of Polish independence, it could not be expected that we should consent to bear the odium of any disappointment the Nation might experience, whilst Russia carried into effect her views of aggrandizement against the declared sentiments of the allies, and, as I believe, equally against the general sense of Europe." (1)

Castlereagh followed this interview up with a memorandum which he presented to the Russian Emperor on October 4.

"Following the defeat of the French army and its expulsion from Russia," Castlereagh explained, "overtures were made to Prussia to join the Czar. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia united themselves by the treaty of Kalisch, February 28, 1813. Article II of this treaty gave Prussia a piece of territory which would connect Prussia with Silesia."(2)

The next month, March 9, 1813, Austria and Prussia concluded a separate treaty of alliance. By the third paragraph of secret Article I, they engaged themselves to draw up an agreement on the future of the Duchy of Warsaw which would be suitable to the three powers.

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of this country to the Grand Duchy's desire to be a free and independent state. The Chancery had supported the plan. In connection with these, the Chancery's own support of the plan. Imposing a "nationalistic concept" and "national spirit", the Chancery's own support of the plan. If only we could re-examine the American's own support of the plan. It was not just in the American's own support of the plan. If only we could re-examine the American's own support of the plan. If only we could re-examine the American's own support of the plan. If only we could re-examine the American's own support of the plan. If only we could re-examine the American's own support of the plan.
The following June, Russia and Prussia concluded a treaty with Austria to assure her of indemnities if she would co-operate with them. They agreed that the Duchy of Warsaw be dismembered and that the provinces which had formed it be divided among Austria, Prussia and Russia (1).... Besides her share in this partition, Prussia was to have Danzig; and Austria, the Illyrian provinces. (2)

Yet, "in spite of these....previous treaties, it now appears that His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, considers that he has the right to dispose of the entire Duchy of Warsaw with all its fortresses under the pretext that his troops were the first in possession of the Grand Duchy. Nevertheless, as a gesture of generosity, he intends to give the city and territory of Danzig and a district necessary to unite Prussia with Silesia, to Prussia. Other than this it appears that His Majesty is to unite the rest of the Duchy to form a separate monarchy governed by His Majesty as King of Poland."

The memorandum continued to protest that such an acquisition on the part of Russia would mean an increase of four million inhabitants for her when she already had added Finland and Moldavia to her empire....and that "while there is a universal sentiment to render justice to the services of the Czar....it is not understood for what reason this formidable union is justified." In acting thus, the Czar was deliberately going against the engagements he had contracted with his allies for

2. Idem, p. 266
In this partition, France was to have Lebanon and Syria. The

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8.9.69
8.10.69 p. 699
for it was not sensible to suppose, Castlereagh said, that Austria and Prussia would wish the Grand Duchy of Warsaw partitioned in such a way as to endanger their own frontiers. The Emperor had declared that he considered his plan as the fulfillment of a moral duty which he owed to the Poles. In refutation, Castlereagh suggested that "His Majesty ought to consider whether it is also a moral duty to attempt to carry out a project which will cause fear and discontent in the neighboring states." The idea of Polish independence would be supported by Austria and Prussia. "It is true that it would mean a sacrifice for Russia, but if His Majesty is not ready to make some sacrifices for moral obligations from his own empire, he ought not to expect his allies to do so. It is necessary to say also that as long as His Majesty continues on this course, no plan for the reconstruction of Europe is possible." (1)

About October 12, Castlereagh had a second interview with the Czar. On October 14, the British Minister reported this to Liverpool. He found that the Czar still seemed to reject any idea of compromise on the Polish question. The Emperor endeavored to defend his plan by saying that the establishment of a Polish kingdom, would create a balance of power in Europe.

Again, the Czar brought forth the argument of moral duty to the Poles, whereupon Castlereagh asked Alexander how he distinguished between his duty to the Poles on one side of his

line and those on the other.

At last Alexander insinuated that the question could end in only one way as he was in possession. Castlereagh replied that this was true and that no one was "less disposed" than he to dispute that possession; but that he was sure that His Majesty "would not be satisfied to rest his pretentions on a title of conquest in opposition to the general sentiments of Europe." (1)

Liverpool replied that he felt that the less England had to do with the Polish question, the better. Attached to this dispatch was a memorandum suggesting three solutions for Poland: 1. partition, 2. independence, 3. assigned to one of three Powers as an independent state. "Of these alternatives," Liverpool wrote "I should certainly consider the third the worst for the general interests of Europe (2)." But since there was a strong feeling in England in favor of Polish independence, Liverpool thought that it would be wise to have "some record of our having expressed our opinion on how desirable it would be to restore Poland on the principle of 1792....(3)"

The Czar replied to the arguments which Castlereagh had put forth at the last interview, on October 30. The following are a few excerpts from the Russian memorandum: "It is in vain for the author of the Memorandum (about October 14) to point out that the frontiers of Austria and Prussia are threatened.

3. Ibid, p. 211
The natural defense is on the side of Austria; the artificial defense, on the side of Prussia. It is the Duchy, which will be between the two, which will be in danger.

"The writer of the memorandum then points to the secret treaty of 1797 which says that the three courts will not include in their claims the domination of the Duchy of Warsaw. But when Prussia and Austria as allies of France seek to take from Russia a large part of her Polish provinces, and when she is obliged to reconquer them, the conquest of the Grand Duchy becomes a compensation for these sacrifices....and the stipulations of the treaty of 1797 no longer exist.

"Beside, the Russian Emperor will offer to Prussia and to Austria the most formal guarantees on the parts of Poland which they will hold.

"Furthermore the Poles will not revolt if they have their own government under the Czar, to the contrary they will be very content." (1)

Throughout his memoranda to the British minister, the Czar had maintained that the June treaty was "eventual." On November 4, Castle-reagh attempted to answer this by saying "There is nothing to indicate that Austria consented to any change of the terms of the treaties providing for the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw. To the contrary, it is plain that the equal

partition of the Duchy was the subject of serious discussion because Austria thought that it vitally affected the security of her frontier.

"If Bonaparte had won, the Austrian Emperor would have lost his Polish lands and probably his crown; the allies triumphed, but it appears that the Emperor of Austria is to lose his Polish lands just the same. Of what good are treaties if they are able to be annulled by interpretation?

"Considering even that Austria had abandoned her claims of June 21 in the September treaty—one does not pretend that a 'friendly settlement of the Duchy of Warsaw among the three powers' confers on Russia the right to take from Austria 'the equitable part' that the June treaty gave to her. The September treaty was not made to change the terms of the June treaty, but to confirm them.

"The desire on the part of Austria and Prussia for good frontiers is not reasonably answered by offering compensation elsewhere.

"The argument that Alexander is of such good character that he will not encroach on his neighbors is open to criticism. Whatever may be the virtues of a sovereign it is not on one person's word nor upon the life of an individual that states trust themselves." (1)

In commenting on this last memorandum of Castlereagh's some authors suggest that Castlereagh "forgot" that the treaties

participation of the French was the subject of severe criticism because America thought that it affected the security of the nation.

It is probable that we may have been too lenient in our judgment of the Allies. The military opinion of America is that France has lost its position as a great power and is no longer the equal of Austria.

The Allies have been unfortunate in their conduct of the war. They have not been able to carry out their plans in the way they intended. They have been forced to make many sacrifices in order to maintain their position. It is probable that they will be unable to continue their efforts for a long time.

The German army is in a very strong position. It is able to resist any attack and to hold its own against the enemy. It is probable that it will be able to continue its efforts for a long time.

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of June and September were frequently revised and that when Austria entered the coalition, she tacitly put aside her Polish claims. Fournier says that this was a temporary defeat for Austria though she consoled herself with the thought of gains in Italy. (1)

On the 21st of November, Castlereagh was startled to receive from the Russian Emperor a vigorous reply to his letter of November 4.

"To say that the treaty of Reichenbach is only 'eventual' is not to consider it null, but to give it its true character. It is so because, in an absolute sense, it cannot in any case settle all the interests which result from the success of the war. It was concluded when it was still not known whether Bonaparte would accept Austrian mediation. He refused it and the treaty of September 9 was concluded in the height of the war.... History and diplomacy furnish more than one example of treaties which one of the parties will not consider binding because of a change of circumstances.

"Moreover, the Czar deserves the Duchy of Warsaw for he fought unrestrainedly for the allies when he could have made a separate peace with Napoleon...."

"England, Austria and Prussia guard themselves and Russia likewise must be sure of her frontiers." (2)

Castlereagh cleverly ascribed this last Russian memorandum

to one of the Czar's ministers and was able to press his case once more with greater firmness.

Castlereagh's boldness in thus presenting his arguments to the Czar is all the more startling when one remembers that his cabinet was only lukewarm on the Polish question and wished to have as little as possible to do with it. Liverpool again reminded Castlereagh that the British cabinet still held this position on October 28 and November 2.

"I begin to apprehend" Liverpool wrote on October 28, "that we are making ourselves too much principals in the disputes respecting Poland. The pretensions of Russia evidently endanger the security and independence of Austria and Prussia, but those powers are wavering in their resistance if not disposed to acquiesce..... We run the risk, therefore, of being disavowed and represented... as actuated by a jealousy of.... Russia....." (1)

And again on November 2 "You will have heard from many quarters of the combustible state of the interior of France..... If the war....were to be renewed, there is no saying where it would end..... Between such an evil and any arrangement more or less good for Poland, Saxony or Italy, I should not hesitate ..... As far as British interests are concerned, I think the decision of the question of no great political importance to us either way." (2)

Castlereagh's discussions with the Czar were of no avail.

2. Ibid
It was then that he decided to see if a united demand of the
three powers would force Alexander to a compromise. It has
already been pointed out that this also failed. The alliance
between Austria and Prussia was weakened but the Czar remained
unmoved. An opinion of Ansette, one of the Russian plenipo-
tentiaries, picked up by the Austrian secret police gives some
idea of the Russian position about November 12. The letter is
evidently written to someone in Austria.

".... We have decided to keep what we have," he said,
"and such is the case with Poland.... War is not inevitable
because your sovereign has solemnly promised my Master that
as long as he lives he will never carry on war with Russia.
I do not say that he will keep his word for many years but he
will not violate it immediately...."

"Really you are not prepared for war. Your army is not
concentrated as ours is, we have 500,000 men at a short dis-
tance from the border....."

"Our cavalry is united and better mounted than yours. Our
artillery is twice as numerous and our soldiers march better
and more quickly...." (1)

On the same day the news came that Metternich had told the
Emperor Alexander that the court of Vienna was not able to side
in with the projects of the court of St. Petersburg relative to
the question of Poland as being incompatible with the balance
of power in Europe and the security of Austria and that it was


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If we know that we cannot keep this up, we must take action. This is
thought consequently that Russia would desist if she wished to keep on good terms with the other powers.

"The Emperor Alexander, irritated by these representatives, responded by demanding Metternich to quote the laws which he possessed which would stop Russia, adding "if it is for this that we have been invited to Vienna, we have deceived ourselves a great deal". Austria, the Czar continued, had only to send someone in Poland to count the forces of Russia and that it might then be judged prudent to speak to him in a different tone.

"It was reported that Metternich was much upset by this brusque reply." (1)

To make things still more interesting it was also learned that the Grand Duke Constantine had left for Warsaw with instructions for organizing a new Poland. Austria had taken alarm at this. Her cabinet was apparently willing to exhaust all means for turning the Emperor of Russia from his designs. Feeling uncertain of her success, however, she had chosen to march nearly 25,000 men to Galicia.

Alexander also increased his armaments and one report had it that "one is able to enumerate without fear of deception 200,000 men, Poles and Russians, of the Grand Duchy which are placed under the Duke Constantine." (2)

The Poles said that, thanks to Alexander, the cause of their country would finally triumph and they added that if

2. Broglie. Talleyrand, V. II, p. 309
Austria continued to oppose the reconstruction of Poland, war would be inevitable (1). To prejudice the Poles still more in favor of the Czar, all the Russian generals assisted at the funeral ceremonies on the anniversary of the death of Poniatowski (2).

Throughout November, the relations between the three powers grew steadily worse. Hardenberg now tried his luck with the Czar. He asked Alexander for the fortress of Thorn and the line of the river Wartha for Prussia and for Cracow and the line of the river Nida for Austria. It was further specified that if this was granted no other objections would be made to Russia’s plans in Poland.

The Czar replied only that Saxony would be ceded to Prussia and that Mainz would be a fortress of the German Confederation. He would give up Cracow and Thorn as free and independent cities. (3)

Metternich was alarmed and said that he could not venture to agree that Prussia have all of Saxony if it was against the prevailing opinion of his own cabinet and the declaration of the French Government (4). Furthermore, Metternichi continued, the Russian proposal gave Austria nothing in the way of frontier on the side of Poland. Mainz was necessary for the security of Bohemia and beside Alexander’s plan brought her into direct contact with Russia. (5)

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2. Idem
contact with Prussia on the side of the Elbe.

Since all the plans and negotiations on the Polish question had so far resulted only in a worse deadlock, Castlereagh now had to attempt a different plan. He felt that since a Polish settlement such as he desired was impossible that Saxony consequently became of great importance. Accordingly, Castlereagh now threw all his weight on the side of Austria. His change of attitude was attributed to instructions from home, but Ward and Gooch do not think that this truly states the case. Although Liverpool had suggested to Casilereagh that the total extinction of Saxony was not popular in England, these authors believe that Castlereagh's change of front was the result of his own action. Apparently he did not seek the preservation of all of Saxony, but a compromise which would enable Austria and Prussia to come together once more and free the latter from Russian influence. (1)

Castlereagh first tried to ease the situation by interviewing Hardenberg and suggesting moderation and then counselling Metternich to act carefully. On December 7, Castlereagh reported his interview with Hardenberg to Liverpool.

"In observing the difficulties that opposed themselves, I delivered to His Highness an extract of Your Lordship's private letter of the 18th ult."(that British public opinion supported Saxony). "I requested Prince Hardenberg to lay this extract before the King in corroboration of the advice I had given him.

some time since, namely that as Minister for Prussia, he ought to prefer a compromise on this question to a total extinction. "That while doing justice to the loyalty of his intentions, it was impossible to deny that the concert on the affairs of Poland, which was the basis of the understanding, had avowedly failed through the conduct of his sovereign; that under these circumstances, neither Austria nor Great Britain could espouse his claims on the manner they otherwise have done, and wished to do.

"That in proportion as he had failed to bring forward his King upon the Polish question, he ought to be accommodating on that of Germany if he wished to be respected among his co-estates, and not to build his authority amongst them upon an external influence." (1)

During the interview, Hardenberg said that he was in possession of Saxony and would run all risks rather than return to his country without all of it. Castlereagh replied much the same as he had done to Alexander on a similar occasion that no one would think of removing him since he was in possession of the country, but that Prussia could not regard "an unacknowledged claim as constituting a good title," that under such circumstances Prussia would be compelled to remain armed and that his return to Berlin under such circumstances would be more painful than if he had brought back only part of Saxony. (2)

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This seemed to have some effect on the Prussian chancellor as he at last agreed at least to consider any proposal which Metternich might make.

Therefore, on December 10, Metternich sent a decisive note to Hardenberg. Cracow and Thorn must go to Austria and Prussia respectively, the Wartha and the Nida were the essential military frontiers for these two countries. The navigation of the Vistula was to be free and the nature of the government of the new Poland closely watched. Furthermore, Austria could not permit the complete absorption of Saxony by Prussia. (1)

"The incorporation of Saxony," Metternich wrote "puts an obstacle in the way of our union, because the principles of the Empire, the strictest family ties and all the rights of the frontier oppose it. Once again, it puts an obstacle not less difficult to surmount in the arrangement of German affairs, because the principal German powers have declared that they do not wish to join a pact based on a foundation so threatening to their security....

"Prussia's territory can be enlarged on two sides: 1. by concessions on the part of Russia in Poland, 2. by acquisitions in Saxony compatible with the continuance of her political existence." (2)

When affairs had reached this point, Castlereagh warned his cabinet that he feared war and that the only chance of peace seemed to be an armed mediator between the three eastern powers.

2. Memoires of Metternich, V. II, p. 506
I. Statement of Purpose.

- To develop a framework for understanding the dynamics of soil erosion in mountainous areas.
- To evaluate the effectiveness of various conservation practices in mitigating soil loss.
- To assess the potential impact of climate change on soil erosion in mountainous regions.

II. Methodology.

- Field surveys conducted in different mountainous areas to collect data on soil characteristics.
- Use of remote sensing technology to assess the extent of soil erosion.
- Statistical analysis of collected data to identify patterns and trends.

III. Results.

- Significant correlation between soil erosion and rainfall intensity.
- Erosion rates highest in areas with steep slopes and shallow soils.
- Effectiveness of conservation practices varies depending on local conditions.

IV. Conclusion.

- The study highlights the need for targeted conservation strategies in high-risk areas.
- Further research is needed to develop more effective interventions.
- Policies should be formulated to support sustainable land management practices.

V. Recommendations.

- Implementing soil and water conservation measures in high-risk areas.
- Promotion of agroforestry systems to reduce soil erosion.
- Education and awareness programs on soil conservation.

Appendix.

- List of abbreviations and acronyms used in the study.
- Additional data and figures supporting the findings.
- Acknowledgments to collaborators and funding agencies.
He thought that France should be asked to join and that she would thus be prevented from fishing in troubled waters. (1)

Liverpool, in his reply, again warned Castlereagh that the Prince Regent did not wish to be involved in hostilities for any of the objects which up to this time had been discussed at Vienna. However, he agreed that an alliance with France was desirable and that to obtain it some concession on the part of Marat might be expedient. (2)

Hardenberg saw now that he could not obtain Saxony from Austria so he now went completely over to Russia. An open quarrel between Metternich and Hardenberg followed during which the Prussian minister communicated to the Czar all of Metternich's letters to him. This disagreement between the ministers did not turn out to be too disasterous after all as Castlereagh's letter to Liverpool on the 17th of December points out.

"The fact happens to be, that the only really objectionable letters are the Chancellor's own. Metternich's are perfectly fair diplomatic papers, avowing in very proper terms the objections of his Court to the Russian view; whereas Hardenberg, in order to escape an avowed opposition to Russia, in which he found himself disavowed, did not simply confine himself to being most unnecessarily the advocate of peace, but undertook to show that the Emperor must soon be ruined by his own politics, that in a few years his military power would become comparatively

2. Ibid, p. 477
The French that France would be eager to join any such pact (1)

...money time to be prepared to fighting in fighting water..."

...in the report, seem watered carently for the

...prime interest and not with to be involving in policies..."

...of the order which to fill the gap and gain influence as...

...Frenen...to speak that an alliance with France and...

...towards and lead to obtain to some concession on the part of...

...are not able to speak to this point...

...to want more connectively and correspondently to the case...

...to happen to fill the gap between the Ministers...

...it does not and to do any agreements with it or to...

..."The fact happens to do...that the only latter agreements...

...let diplomatics be aware of very proper terms of...

...and to the Russian view, whereas, Grangable..."

...in order to escape an enemy opposition to Russia, in which...

...somewhat more necessary the space of peace, but nevertheless to show...

...after the report must soon be entered at the very bottom..."
feeble, and that it was then the Allies might seize an occasion of doing themselves justice.

"The whole, as you may imagine, made for two days a great sensation, but the result may perhaps serve to prove what I have ventured before to allege, that the climate of Russia is often the more severe after a good squall.

"...The interview between the Emperors took place the following morning....and was marked by a peculiar conciliation on the part of the Emperor Alexander;....regret that he could not meet the Emperor of Austria's wishes on Cracow, which the Poles could not bear he should alienate as it contained the tombs of their kings; but that instead, and as proof of his regard, he would cede the circle of Tarnopol which he had received from Austria by the peace of Vienna." (1)

Before they could proceed farther on the idea of armed mediation Castlereagh and Metternich had to make sure of Talleyrand. As early as the latter part of October, Gentz, the protocolist of the Congress, and, as such, a close associate of Metternich, drafted a memorandum suggesting the alliance of Austria, France and Bavaria to resist Prussia and Russia. Apparently nothing came of the proposal, but the significance is obvious.

On December 10 when Metternich sent his note to Hardenberg notifying Prussia that Austria could not permit her to have all

people, and that it was then the Allies might seize an occasion of giving them notice. Therefore, as you may imagine, they had no time for a speech.

In conclusion, the term was necessary to prevent a threat of Russia to have announced a peace to Germany, that the old German to their advantage. After the meetingGesture the representatives took place the prevention between the Representatives the peace of Almane.

(1) pleasant from various points of the peace of Almane.

People from every branch of life on the idea of peace, condition collected, and every part of society to make wars of kernel work. As early as the last part of October, General the body of the Council, and as such a close association of representatives, gathered a memorandum suggesting the alliance of a noble, genuine to express their feelings, and propose the necessary precautions, case of the President, but the significance is apparent. On December 10 the President sent the note to Germany:
of Saxony, Talleyrand saw his chance. He asked Metternich to communicate with him formally. Metternich complied by sending a note on December 16. This was the first regular overture of Austria to France.

Talleyrand explained to Louis his reason for asking for the formal communication. "It was necessary that we should sustain the note (of December 10) but....we could not with propriety unless a regular communication was made to us (1)." Waliszewski remarks, "The future treaty of coalition started here." (2)

Apparently Talleyrand's support of Austria had some result since, according to the Austrian secret police, Prussia and Russia regarded Talleyrand as the chief formenter of resistance to their plans.

Coincident with a better understanding with Austria came a better understanding with England. It has already been stated that Castlereagh stopped at Paris on his way to Vienna to assure Talleyrand of England's friendliness. The result of this was seen in Castlereagh's rather conciliatory attitude toward France throughout the negotiations.

At first it had been Castlereagh's purpose to remove French opposition to Prussia's possession of Saxony by bringing pressure to bear on Talleyrand thru Wellington and Blocas, the French foreign minister. (3)

The Secret Service of the United States is responsible for the protection of the President of the United States and the Vice President of the United States, and for the investigation of counterfeiting and counterfeiting-related crimes.

The Secret Service also plays a critical role in protecting the nation's financial system by investigating and preventing fraud and counterfeiting.

In addition to its law enforcement duties, the Secret Service is also responsible for providing security and support to the President, Vice President, and their families.

The Secret Service has a long history of serving the nation, dating back to its establishment in 1862 as part of the Treasury Department.

Over the years, the Secret Service has evolved into a highly skilled and effective agency, providing protection and security to the nation's highest officials and safeguarding the nation's financial system.
Even in October, Castlereagh had realized that Britain might have to join France. "Necessity," he said "might dictate such a system, but not choice."

On October 25, Castlereagh wrote Wellington asking him to see that pressure was put on Talleyrand so that he would stress the Polish question. Wellington replied on November 1 saying that he had taken the steps which the British minister at the Congress had urged. Consequently Bloca wrote to Talleyrand directing him to oppose the Czar's Polish scheme. "The King," the dispatch read, "is convinced that the more strongly you express yourself in favor of the complete independence of Poland, in case that should be practicable, the more effectually you will deprive Lord Castlereagh of justifying to the English public, the abandonment of the Duchy of Warsaw to Alexander."(1)

Evidently these instructions had some effect, for about the middle of November, Talleyrand interviewed Castlereagh. The English minister reported that he was depressed, but that he had found a ray of hope in Talleyrand's willingness to get Austria to finish the Polish question and then turn to Saxony.(2)

It was all the more difficult for Talleyrand to co-operate with England because of his contempt for Castlereagh whom he considered as a traveller who has lost his way and is not able to find it again. (3). But, as was previously shown, Prussia

3. Idem, p. 216
In October, Chamberlain had nothing more to say.

He felt that the "right attitude" was to make a "clear statement" and put it on the record. If October was a "clear statement" more effectively than Chamberlain speaking, he supposed that it was.

October was a "clear statement" more effectively than Chamberlain speaking or writ. It was a "clear statement" more effectively than Chamberlain speaking or writing. It was a "clear statement" more effectively than Chamberlain speaking or writing.

The clear statement was a "clear statement." It was a "clear statement" more effectively than Chamberlain speaking or writing.
definitely turned to Russia on December 17 and Castlereagh then considered a settlement on Poland impossible at that time.

Earlier in December, as was previously pointed out, Castlereagh suggested a French alliance. Liverpool's cautious acceptance of this proposal came too late to determine Castlereagh's action, but it shows the position of the British government. (1). Castlereagh saw Talleyrand on December 23. Encouraged by Metternich's advances, the French minister went straight to the point. He suggested that the rights of the King of Saxony be upheld and that England, Austria and France form une petite convention. But Castlereagh was not yet ready to move so fast. He later reported to Liverpool "I replied that we were united in opinion, but that to form an alliance prematurely might increase the chance of war rather than that of an amiable settlement which I trusted was the object we all had in view." (2)

On December 26, Talleyrand wrote Castlereagh appealing for common action on the question of Saxony on the basis of legitimacy. Castlereagh, cordial but not explicit, said he hoped to establish a just equilibrium among the powers of Europe and to produce a general and solid peace but he gave Talleyrand definite encouragement when he added, "I am at all times ready to enter into communication with Your Highness on these subjects with the hope that we may be enabled ....to effect a conclusion honorable to our respective Courts and beneficial to 1. Knapton. Op. cit. V. II, p. 225
2. Ibid, p. 229
Europe." (1)

While the three powers searched to oppose the schemes of the Czar, those at Vienna read with uneasiness a proclamation of the Grand Duke Constantine addressed to the Poles, concluding "The Emperor, your powerful protector, makes an appeal to you. Reunite about your flags,...arm for the defense of your country and for the conservation of your political existence." (2)

At about the same time the Austrian secret police received word that the Polish army would be re-enforced with 15,000 men not counting the six or eight thousand who are taking the place of those who have been discharged or who have deserted. (3)

In the latter half of December, Castlereagh made a final effort to settle the disputes. All three powers had pressed him to accept the role of mediator. Because of this he consented to fresh interviews with Prussia who now brought forward a new plan whereby the King of Saxony was to receive a large part of the left bank of the Rhine as compensation for the loss of his kingdom. Castlereagh refused to agree to this because he thought that the safety of the Netherlands would be compromised by such a plan. (4)

While acting as mediator, Castlereagh scarcely allowed a single document on the Polish-Saxon question to be exchanged between the powers without preparing the way for it.(5). It was very necessary that he do this for by December the situation had

become dangerous indeed.

Urged on by the Prussian military leaders, Hardenberg refused any co-operation while Metternich, supported by nearly all the small states, was equally unyielding. But the Czar, now that he was practically sure of obtaining all his Polish demands, was anxious for a settlement and demanded a conference to settle the Polish question. This body met on December 29.

Razoumowsky conducted Russia's case at the conference because the Czar thought that Nesselrode was too attached to Austria.

Alexander demanded the whole of Warsaw with the exception of Gnesen, Posen and some districts of West Prussia which he would yield to Prussia. A small piece of territory on the right bank of the Vistual opposite Cracow containing the salt mines of Wieliczka with the circle of Tarnopol was to go to Austria. Cracow and Thorn were to be free and independent cities. This scheme was adopted practically without discussion. (1)

It was inevitable that the question of Saxony should also be discussed. Castlereagh and Metternick demanded that a French representative be admitted, but Hardenberg refused because Talleyrand had so sponsored the Saxon cause that his admittance would be equivalent to accepting defeat. Indeed, the Prussian minister, throwing all caution aside, threatened war if Prussia's

1. Memoires of Metternich. V. II, p. 486
claims on Saxony were not immediately recognized. (1)

Castlereagh now hesitated no longer, but went to Talleyrand and Metternich immediately after the meeting, with the project of a secret treaty which he had drafted and copied with his own hand to insure secrecy. (2)

The treaty provided:

1. Each power would act in concert and in the most disinterested manner to carry out the arrangements of the First Treaty of Paris. If the territory of any one of the three powers was attacked, the others would make common cause.

2. In case of the threat of war, the powers agreed to engage in amiable intervention.

3. If these efforts failed, each power would provide 150,000 men, England being allowed to give subsidies instead.

4. Peace was to be made only in common.

5. In case of war, the treaty of Paris was to be the basis on which the frontiers were to be regulated.

6. There were special guarantees for Hanover and the United Provinces.

7. A separate and secret article invited Bavaria, Hanover and the United Provinces to accede. (3)

Metternich accepted and Talleyrand made no objection to the clause which bound France to respect the Paris treaty, especially as he could not claim more territory for France and support the doctrine of legitimacy. Bavaria accepted on January 13, and Hanover on the 19th and Holland, April 23. (4)

2. Ibid
3. Ibid, p. 234
4. Idem
At the time the treaty was signed, Castlereagh notified both Austria and France that he intended to give Prussia some territory in Saxony. (1)

Talleyrand was overjoyed at the outcome. He wrote Louis "Now, Sire, the coalition is dissolved and forever...." (2)

Castlereagh tried to break the news of the secret treaty to his cabinet easily. "Under these circumstances," he explained, "I have felt it an act of imperative duty to concert with the French and Austrian plenipotentiaries a treaty of defensive alliance, confined within the strict necessity of this extraordinary case. Without some such bond, I feel that our deliberations here are at an end; and although I flatter myself that the necessity will never arise for acting upon these engagements, yet, after what has passed, I should not consider myself justified in leaving either our common councils here, or the greatest interests we have at stake in other quarters, at the mercy of states promulgating such principles without providing for them in time, the best protection in my power."(3)

He added that if there were a war, Great Britain would be involved anyway. By binding France to the treaty of Paris, British interests in the Netherlands were secure and France was prevented from trying to win back her last conquests. The Prime Minister accepted the treaty. (4)

Webster says that Castlereagh perceived that psychological

2. Idem, p. 235
3. Webster, p. 278, British Diplomacy, p. 278
moment had come when the final battle must be fought...and the treaty was therefore only a precautionary measure, justified by its success." (1)

Of Talleyrand, Castlereagh says, "It is due to the Prince Talleyrand, to state that his conduct throughout all our late transactions has done the utmost honor to his court." (2)

In the second and third meetings of the "Four", Castlereagh and Metternich, emboldened by their treaty, persisted in their demand for the inclusion of France. Prussia made another attempt to compensate the King of Saxony by some territory on the left side of the Rhine. Castlereagh countered this by a special interview with Razumovsky, the Russian representative, and this was followed by one with the Czar on January 4. (3)

Alexander asked Castlereagh about the secret treaty and must have been told enough about it to make him realize how determined the opposition had grown. It is possible, however, that the Czar knew of the existence of the treaty even before his interview with the British minister. (4). The usual story is that Napoleon accidentally discovered the treaty on his return from Elba and sent it to Alexander.

The Czar saw that England in spite of her moderation was tired of the obstinacy of the Czar and of Frederick William and would, if necessary, come out openly against them, so he offered to mediate with Prussia. (5)

4. Webster, Congress of Vienna, p. 116
At any rate, by January 5, Castlereagh felt sure enough of the situation to write Liverpool, "I have every reason to hope that the alarm of war is over." (1)

On January 9, Castlereagh submitted a memorandum to the "big powers": "My opinion," he declared, "is that the Minister of France should be invited to assist at the debate on the reconstruction of Austrian and Prussian monarchies....as the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, Toeplitz....as well as Ried and Chaumont....are equally as binding upon that power, under the first section and article of the treaty of Paris as on the parties whose signatures are affixed to these engagements."

No objection was raised and on January 12, Talleyrand took his seat. (2)

The admission of France by no means solved the problem but the danger of war was considerably lessened. (3)

Prussia and Russia again suggested that the King of Saxony get compensation in the Rhineland. This proposal was combatted by Castlereagh and Talleyrand. However, to make Prussia feel more conciliatory, Castlereagh and Talleyrand now declared that they would pledge security to Prussia for whatever territory which she should receive in Saxony. (4)

But trouble now came from another quarter. News that Austria had agreed to a partition of Saxony led Schwartzenberg, leader of the military faction at Vienna, to declare that he

3. Idem
4. Idem
would rather have war than see Prussia get Leipzig and Torgau. (1)

On January 12, Hardenberg made matters still worse by again asking for all of Saxony, and beside 800,000 inhabitants in Poland and 1,200,000 in Westphalia. (2)

By this time Castlereagh was receiving urgent appeals from his cabinet asking for his return, but he did not wish the settlement to fall through now, so he stayed on. (3)

On January 24, Talleyrand conferred with Metternich and Schwartzzenberg in an attempt to keep the Saxon fortresses from Prussia. The final decision was to be left to the Austrian Emperor who, it was hoped, would convince Castlereagh that Prussia should have as little of Saxony as possible. (4)

Austria would cede Tarnopol to Russia if Prussia could receive more of Poland and be less exacting on the question of Saxony. Castlereagh urged Metternich and Emperor Francis not to ask Prussia to give up Torgau and Erfurt, but Talleyrand opposed this. However, on the following day, Metternich let it be known that Austria would acquiese to both Torgau and Erfurt being Prussian. (5)

In an exhausting series of interviews with the Czar, King of Prussia and Hardenberg, Castlereagh finally secured from Alexander a promise to cede Thorn to Prussia in return for Saxony having Leipzig. But Hardenberg again postponed the

2. Idem
3. Idem
4. Idem, p. 243
5. Idem
settlement by suggesting that Prussia have additional compensation in the Rhineland. It was then necessary for Castlereagh to negotiate with Munster to secure a sacrifice of 50,000 "souls" from Hanover and an equal number from Holland. At last, on February 6, the English minister had the satisfaction of reaching a conclusion. (1)

Credit for the achievement of this task is probably divided between Talleyrand and Castlereagh though the actions of the latter were the bolder since the British Cabinet had repeatedly warned him against war for he could not know at the time that the secret treaty was signed that a peaceful conclusion would be reached.

The final settlement was inevitably a compromise. Prussia had claimed all of Saxony or 2,050,000 inhabitants. The Saxon minister estimated the greatest possible concession to be 760,000 people, Austria was willing Prussia should have 782,249 while Talleyrand held out for 400,000 to 500,000. At last Prussia received 850,000 "souls" or two-fifths of Saxony. (2)

In Poland, Castlereagh had to be satisfied with whatever concessions the Czar was willing to grant. Prussia received Posen, Thorn and the Republic of Danzig. Austria was given Wieliczka, Lemberg, Czernowitz and Tarnopol. Her main consolation was to be in Italy. Russia had control of "Congress

2. Ibid, p. 247
Poland" although Cracow was free. (1)

Before the final settlement was completed, Castlereagh once more made a declaration that Great Britain would have preferred an independent Poland. This statement was probably made to defend his cabinet against English public opinion which had consistently desired Polish independence and had even accused Castlereagh of thwarting Alexander's good intentions. (2)

Castlereagh's entreaty to the three Eastern powers to grant the Poles special privileges was perhaps more sincere. "Experience has proved," he wrote "that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people, that either the happiness of the Poles or the peace of that important part of Europe can be preserved. A fruitless attempt so much persevered in by institutions foreign to their manners and sentiments, to make them forget their national existence and even their language has been sufficiently tried and has failed. It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.

"The undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence with the suggestion which has been thrown out, and which appears to have been favorably received by the respective cabinets in the course of their present conferences, ardently desires that the illustrious Monarchs, to whom the destinies

of the Poles are confided, may be induced before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may think fit to give them, the parts of that nation that may be placed under their respective sovereignties." (1)

As a result, the treaty of Vienna guaranteed to the Poles separate administration and institutions. This at least served as a legal basis for the protests which were to be made on their behalf by Great Britain and France. (2)

From February 8 to March 7 eight meetings of the five powers were held to arrange the details. Napoleon's escape from Elba made it necessary that the terms be carried out at once. On May 20, the Saxon treaties were signed, on May 30, the Polish treaties were confirmed. All these were included in the final act of June 9, 1815 (3). The separate treaties included settlements concerning Poland between Prussia, Russia and Austria. Great Britain agreed, but was not a party since Castlereagh wanted to seem as little responsible for the Polish partition as possible. (4)

Briefly the agreements were as follows:

I. Russia gave up one fourth of the Grand Duchy to Prussia and consented to the separation of Cracow.
II. Austria received part of East Galicia, lost in 1809 i.e. the province of Tarnopol.

2. Idem
3. Webster. Congress of Vienna, p. 79
III. Cracow was a free city with a separate charter under the "protection" of Russia, Prussia and Austria.

IV. Prussia recovered Posen.

V. The remaining part of the Grand Duchy (1) .... was "irrevocably united, by its constitution to be possessed by the Emperor of All the Russias and his successors....."(2) Thus the Polish question was settled as Alexander had said it would be,--on the "grounds of expediency."

Alexander reserved to himself the right to make such additions to the state as he saw fit. It was supposed that he would annex at least part of Lithuania to Poland. This hope was of great value in conciliatory Polish public opinion. Thus Alexander followed his plan without stopping before any obstacle. The Emperor excused himself to Ostrowski, president of the senate, for not having constituted the ancient kingdom. He said "In taking the title of King of Poland, I desire to satisfy the wishes of the nation. The kingdom of Poland will be united to the Empire by her own constitution on which I desire to base the happiness of the country. If the interests of general repose did not permit all Poles to be reunited under the same scepter, I have struggled at least to soften as much as possible the hardships of their separation and to obtain for them everywhere the hard won enjoyment of their nationality."

This last statement of the Czar's was true for the provisions of the treaty which guaranteed to the inhabitants of the former Polish Republic complete freedom in their social and

1. Cambridge Modern History. V. IX, p. 445
economic intercourse within the boundaries of 1772, did ease
the political separation. (1)

But Alexander spoke the truth when he said, "In wishing to
draw up a lasting peace, we have only covered over the sparks
of inevitable war, which will burst forth before long and upset
the policies drawn up at Paris and put in force at Vienna." (2)

1. Lewinski Corwin. Political History of Poland, p. 398
on the press, have an effect upon the public opinion or upon the votes of the inhabitants of the State. This is the purpose of the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the State of Indiana.
CHAPTER VIII
POLAND UNDER RUSSIA

Article I of the final act of the Congress of Vienna stated: "The Poles, subjects of Russia, Austria and Prussia, will obtain representation and national institutions, regulated as their respective governments judge fit and convenient." (1). The ambiguity of this clause naturally caused it to be interpreted in two ways. According to the Poles, the treaties guaranteed to them their national customs and institutions, but the Powers insisted that the treaties stipulated that these institutions would be granted the Poles only if and when the Powers saw fit to do so. Throughout this period, then, one must keep these two interpretations in mind if one is to evaluate correctly the events which take place.

In order to appreciate fully the condition of the Poles under Russian rule, it might be well to show briefly how the Poles fared in the territory annexed by Prussia and Austria.

The Grand Duchy of Posen was composed of the two departments of the former Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Posen and Bromberg, which Prussia acquired at the Congress of Vienna. On May 15, 1815, the two districts of Chelm and Michalov, together with the town of Thorn, were incorporated in the province of West Prussia. (2)

The proclamation of Frederick William III on May 15, assured the Polish inhabitants of the maintenance of their na-

2. Cambridge Modern History. V.X, p. 463
CHAPTER III
POLITICS UNDER AUSTRIA

Address I of the Italian set of the Congress of Vienna.

The Pope, supporter of Russia, Austria and Prussia,

with special representation and national declarations,

issued an imperial manifesto of the alliance of the Pope and

 Napoleon, and the papal representative, Count of Liff, and poured

 into the sea of war a message of peace, announcing that the

Papal States were renounced as a source of revenue, and that

the Pope and his representatives were released from all

obligations and promises.

And these declarations were read, and the Pope only

in order to accommodate his country

under Russian rule. It might be well to note a passage

from the Pacta Scabini, in which the Pope

states that the treaties were concluded by

Prince and Prince

The Grand Duke of Warsaw was convinced of the Pope and

Prince of the Teutonic Order of the Confederation of

Vienna, on May 15,

and

which the Pope signed the Treaty of Warsaw, Prince, and Prince,

whereof the following are extracts:

From the Act of Peace, were incorporated in the

 plains of Tuscany, were incorporated in the

 plains of Tuscany, were incorporated in the

 plains of Tuscany.
tional customs, recognized the Polish language on an equal footing with the German and gave the Poles the right to occupy public offices. (1)

"You have now obtained a Fatherland," said the King, "and at the same time the proof of my esteem for the attachment which you have shown to it. You are incorporated into my monarchy, but without being obliged to renounce your nationality ... Your language shall be used along with German in all public affairs and each of you, according to his abilities, shall be eligible for public employments in the Grand Duchy and for all the offices and honors of the dignities of my Kingdom." (2)

A Pole, Prince Anton Radziwill, who had married a Prussian princess, was appointed viceroy. He was to act as intermediary between the crown and the people. The Governor was Zerboni di Sposetti, a farmer inhabitant of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw but now a landed proprietor in Posen. He was a "broad-minded, progressive German and a sincere well-wisher of the Poles."

Since he had no desire to displease either Austria or Russia, the promises which Frederick had made to the Poles were at first carried out hesitatingly, and then, not at all.

Prussia's position in Germany at this time was not secure enough to risk offending Austria while Russia's support in the

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1. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 463
2. Piltz. Poland, p. 44
You have now occupied a position, and we are confident that you will make a valuable contribution to the service of the country.

We are pleased to inform you that your services are now recognized and valued in the highest degree. Your contribution to the service of the country is both appreciated and acknowledged.

We are confident that you will continue to excel in your work and that you will continue to be an asset to our service.

Thank you for your dedication and for the valuable work that you have done.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]

[Title]
East was necessary to lay the basis for Prussia's leadership in Germany. Consequently Polish affairs in Posen suffered a setback. The law of February 9, 1817 introduced restrictions in favor of the Germans. These were gradually extended especially in the courts. The Polish language began to be gradually replaced by German in all secondary schools. This act paved the way for the later Germanization of the whole school system. (1)

After all the other provincial diets had met, that of Posen was finally assembled in 1827. The Diet was composed of four nobles, twenty-two deputies of the nobles, sixteen burgher and eight peasant deputies. This body made several petitions to which the King returned a courteous, but vague answer. (2)

By 1828 the franchise was restricted and the method of voting changed. The ballot was now indirect, voted by the three classes, separately and was open or vocal. The right to vote was dependent on wealth and since the classes were separated, the wishes of the third class were not often heard. (3)

Frederick William was alarmed when the Revolution of 1830 broke out in Russian Poland. He sent troops to remove all officials who sympathized with the Poles and introduced censorship of the press. The ordinances of February 6 and of April 26 forbade that any help be given to the Revolutionists. (4)

After 1830 the zealous Germanization of Posen began. Flott-

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1. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 463
2. Idem, p. 464
3. Idem
well, who was appointed governor, inaugurated a system of anti-Polish policies. The Poles were eliminated from all administration; the Polish language might no longer be used in the schools. Confiscated Polish lands were purchased and later the idea of compulsory expropriation was developed. (1)

In Austrian Poland the Galician "Estates" were created in April 1817, to satisfy in appearance, at least, the treaty of Vienna. The diet was only the shadow of national representation since it was seldom convoked and even then had no rights of legislation beyond that of presenting petitions when the government asked for advice on certain matters. Even the petitions were generally ignored. (2)

During the whole of this period the Diet was not able to set up a Land Bank, or a medical faculty in the University of Lemberg, to obtain a reduction of taxes or of the price of salt. Consequently the Galician farmer paid taxes sixteen times higher than those paid in the Kingdom of Poland. (3)

Moreover the national Polish element was suppressed in every way. The regulations of the censor were so strict as to exclude from print the word "Pole." Even the Galician clergy were Germanized. (4)

The first governor of Galicia, Hauer, carried out his vigorous program of Germanization and economic exploitation with an iron hand. His successor, Taaffe, differed from him

2. Idem, p. 45
3. Cambridge Modern History V. X, p. 463
4. Idem
The first formal education system in the United States was established by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1642. This system was known as the "Latin Grammar School" and was designed to provide a basic education for boys who were expected to become ministers, lawyers, or other professional men. The curriculum included such subjects as Latin, Greek, mathematics, and natural philosophy. The purpose of this education was to prepare young men for their future careers and to impart a foundation of knowledge that would enable them to think critically and reason logically.

In Scotland, the first formal education system was established by the Church of Scotland in 1644. This system was known as the "National Grammar School" and was designed to provide a basic education for boys who were expected to become ministers, lawyers, or other professional men. The curriculum included such subjects as Latin, Greek, mathematics, and natural philosophy. The purpose of this education was to prepare young men for their future careers and to impart a foundation of knowledge that would enable them to think critically and reason logically.

In 1775, the first formal education system in the United States was established by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. This system was known as the "Latin Grammar School" and was designed to provide a basic education for boys who were expected to become ministers, lawyers, or other professional men. The curriculum included such subjects as Latin, Greek, mathematics, and natural philosophy. The purpose of this education was to prepare young men for their future careers and to impart a foundation of knowledge that would enable them to think critically and reason logically.

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only in that he also excited the Poles against the Ruthenians. About 1828-9 when Austria with England thought of armed intervention in the Russo-Turkish war, some efforts were made to conciliate the Polish population, but these disappeared along with the fear of Russian aggression. (1)

1. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 462
POLAND UNDER RUSSIA

For a time, at any rate, the Poles in the Kingdom of Poland under the Czar fared somewhat better than those under Austria. In 1815 Czartoryski and Novosiltsov preceded the Czar to Warsaw to introduce the new constitution according to which the kingdom was to be a distinct state united with Russia in the person of the monarch, but not incorporated in the Russian Empire. Some of the chief guarantees of this document included: (Article XI) "The Catholic religion professed by the greater part of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland will be the national religion, but....all other cults are able to be freely exercised." (Article XVI) "The freedom of the press is guaranteed....." (Article XVII) "The law protects all citizens equally without regard to class or condition." (Article XIX) "None can be arrested except according to law" and (Article XXIII) "none can be sentenced except in accordance with the law and by a competent magistrate." (Article XXVIII) "All administrative, judicial and military affairs will be without any exception written in the Polish language." (1)

Legislative powers were vested in a Diet composed of two

chambers called every two years for a session of thirty days. The members of the Senate were chosen for life by the Crown. The Chamber of Deputies was composed of seventy-seven members of the nobility and fifty-one deputies chosen for six years by a restricted franchise. All noble landowners could vote for the first class of representatives. The others were elected by the vote of: 1. All owners of land paying taxes of not less than fifteen rubles in silver, 2. master workmen, manufacturers and merchants holding property of a certain rateable value, 3. parish priests, vicars, teachers, artists and other members of the professional class. (1)

The sittings of the Diet were to be public and the voting open. A simple majority was to be decisive. (2)

The executive authority was vested in an administrative council composed of Ministers of Finance, War, Education, Public Worship, Justice, Home Affairs and Police. (3)

A diplomatic department which carried on its own correspondence with the Russian embassies abroad, was attached to the Grand Duke Constantine. A secretary of state, attached to the sovereign in St. Petersburg, acted as intermediary between the Kingdom and the Crown.

The Polish army, in times of peace, numbering about thirty thousand, had distinct insignia and a national uniform. (4)

1. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 447
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
For administrative purposes the country was divided into eight provinces each of which had its own autonomous council. (1)

In some ways the constitution was the most progressive in Europe. Even such radicals as Carnot considered it better than the Charter which Louis XVIII had given to France, the franchise being far more liberally extended than it was in England before the Reform Bill of 1832 (2). Another good point was that the constitution tended to perpetuate Polish nationality by using the Polish language and by letting the Poles exercise their public rights. Furthermore the constitution even included an oath on the part of the King of Poland to support it. This was not found in the Russian Constitution (3).

But the Diet had no legal initiative and could only present petitions to the Czar. Then, too, practically all the power was in the hands of the "szlachta" while certain administrative and judicial posts could be occupied only by landowners (4).

Furthermore, in the final text of the Constitution a series of ambiguous phrases was purposely introduced. For instance "neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum" was changed to "neminem captivari permittemus." This gave the sovereign or the viceroy

3. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 448
the power of illegal imprisonment. Also the "first budget"
was left at the disposition of the sovereign without any clear
indication as to whether it meant the budget of the first year
or the first period of years. Consequently, during fifteen years
not a single budget was submitted to the Diet for ratification.
The Diets were to meet every two years, but as the King had the
power to adjourn them, only four Diets instead of seven were
held. (1)

On December 12, 1815, Alexander ratified the Constitution.
In his speech on that occasion, Czartoryski said that "Emperor
Alexander could dominate by sheer force, but led by the inspi-
ration of virtue, he rejected such domination. He has based
his power not on external rights alone, but on the feeling of
gratitude, on the feeling of loyalty, and on that moral might
which originates in place of terror, a feeling of obligation,
in place of compulsion, devotion and voluntary sacrifice." (2)

Another condition which resulted in wrecking the constitu-
tion was the unfortunate choice of persons to fill the important
posts in the Kingdom. The Grand Duke Constantine was commander-
in-chief. He seems to have been of a very violent character
and although his ideally happy marriage with a Polish lady, the
Princess Lovicz, somewhat softened him, his rule for the most

part tended to embitter relations between the Poles and the Czar. Even as early as July 29, 1815, Czartoryski complained to the Czar "The Grand Duke has entirely changed, the army, the nation...nothing suits him. The Constitution above all is subject to continual sarcasms...... The Grand Duke does not even hold to the laws which he, himself, has passed...... Desertion in the army has become general......" (1)

A day or two after, there followed another letter from Czartoryski stating that although a large number of officers had received their complete dismissal from the army, the Grand Duke had treated them as if they were still in military service (2). In this way the Grand Duke could bring before a council of war any individual he saw fit although this action was against the Constitution. (3)

It had been the plan to replace gradually the Russian officers in the Kingdom with Polish administrators. However, in a letter of October 14, 1815 Czartoryski reminds the Czar that there are still in the Kingdom "a sufficient number of the Russian employees so that their care, much more expensive than that of the Polish employees, produces a considerable gap in the revenues." (4)

Czartoryski, whom public opinion had destined for the viceroyship, had incurred the displeasure of Alexander and was

1. Correspondence of Czartoryski and Alexander I. p. 252
2. Ibid, p. 258
3. Ibid
4. Ibid, p. 266
excluded from the government proper. In his stead there was appointed General Zajaczk, a soldier of Napoleon, of great personal courage but without the necessary strong character. He was in addition thoroughly servile to the Grand Duke.

Czartoryski commented on this last characteristic of the viceroy in his letter to the Czar on January 16, 1816 and one feels that his opinion is not entirely due to jealousy. The administrative council, it appears, were convinced that the General although entirely honorable was nevertheless without opinion, especially when he worked with the Grand Duke (1). Furthermore, it seemed that the General, having passed most of his life in military service, little understood legislative matters so that he sometimes held ideas quite contrary to those of the rest of the government officials. Consequently, he believed that the people were not properly supporting him and unfortunately the Grand Duke shared this opinion. At the time Czartoryski wrote, the General seemed to have allowed himself to be influenced by bad advice and at the same time offended by some very harmless opposition which he had brought upon himself. (2)

By May, 1816, the situation was so much worse that Czartoryski suggested that the continual presence of the Grand Duke in Poland was one of the greatest factors in preventing the

2. Ibid, p. 292
Czar's work from prospering the people of the Kingdom. Moreover, the General, who in the absence of the Grand Duke might be qualified to fill his present position, was quite useless as long as Constantine was around. (1)

Still worse, large and undefined powers were conferred upon Novosiltsoff whom the Poles learned to call "the evil spirit of the Kingdom of Poland." When the constitution had been drafted Novosiltsoff had caused several changes to be made, all designed to limit the independence of the Kingdom. Once installed, he proceeded to interfere in all affairs and sent secret weekly reports to Alexander and later to Nicholas speaking most unfavorably not only of conditions in Poland, but of all sentiments of nationality and freedom. (2)

However, in spite of the devastations caused by the wars, a strong economic and intellectual movement arose in the Kingdom. Under Potocki as Minister of Education, schools of applied military science, forestry, mining, normal schools, and ecclesiastical seminaries were established. Elementary town and country schools increased to 900 while secondary education was provided in ten provincial and sixteen department schools. Furthermore in 1816 the University of Warsaw was founded and enlarged until it possessed faculties of theology, law, medicine, philosophy, science and art. (3)

3. Ibid, p. 449
The Home Department under Mostowski endeavored to promote industries. Under the care of the famous patriot and writer, Staszic, steps were taken to develop the mines. (1)

The City of Warsaw was enlarged and beautified; a subsidy was granted to the National Theater and an academy of music and elocution was founded. After working at a loss for some time, the Postal administration was reorganized and produced much revenue. The importation of goods from Prussia was interrupted by the Cossacks stationed along the frontier so Alexander commanded that a canal uniting the Vistula and the Niemen be dug. This cost the nation 7,000,000 rubles yearly. (2)

Due to all these improvements but mostly because so much money was spent on the army, the finances of the Kingdom were in a deplorable state. In 1815-1817 the expenses were met by the Russian treasury. During that time the cost of the army was about one-half of the entire budget. In 1819 there was a deficit of nineteen million florins. The general expenditures of that year had amounted to seventy-four million florins, over thirty million of which was spent on the army. Worse than the deficit was the constant danger that, under the pretext that the country was unable to bear the expense of its legislative institutions, Novosiltsov would induce Alexander to abolish the autonomous position of the Kingdom so as to include Poland in the scheme which was suggested at this time for granting the

constitution to the whole Empire. (1)

It was due only to the great abilities of Prince Xavier Lubecki, Minister of Finance, that this danger was averted. Lubecki invented new taxes and renewed some which had been forgotten. Monopolies of every article of food and drink were introduced. For the trial of illegal dealers, Lubecki established his own court and as most of the fines were very heavy, many people were sent to prison. (2)

The Polish budget did not specify the items of appropriation and it was only by persuasive representation at the Russian Court that Lubecki prevented the treasury of the Kingdom from being drained for unauthorized purposes. (3)

As a result of all these plans, Lubecki managed to increase the revenues and collected arrears amounting to seventy-two million florins. The budget was balanced, the deficit of twenty million cancelled and in ten years' time the finances of the Kingdom were in a flourishing state. Because of his success, he alone could offer proper resistance to Novosiltsov in the Administrative Council and before the Czar and he did this with great skill. Yet in spite of these great accomplishments, Lubecki was hated in Poland because of his harsh measures and because of his devotion to Russia. (4)

Czartoryski had written Alexander that the one remedy for

4. Ibid
all the evils with which the Poles had to put up was the presence of the Czar and on November 12, 1818, Alexander came to Warsaw and charmed everyone by his apparent frankness and cordiality. He stated that he knew of the outrages of his brother, but that he did not think it wise to recall him because he might then become an enemy of the Poles and work against them. (1)

The first Diet met on March 15, 1818. Alexander's speech at the opening of the Diet was very encouraging. "Your restoration," he said "is defined by solemn treaties; it is sanctioned by the charter. The inviolability of these engagements assures to Poland an honorable rank among the nations of Europe; something that she has long sought for in vain...... The results of your labors will teach me whether......I shall be able further to extend what I have already done for you." (2). This last sentence especially delighted the Poles for it was taken to assure the annexation of Lithuania, Podolia, and Volhynia to the Kingdom. However this might have been, during his stay at Warsaw Alexander received a deputation of Lithuanian nobles with Oginski at their head, on condition that they should not mention the annexation of the Lithuanian provinces to the Kingdom and that the deputation should not even include representatives of Volynia and Podolia. (3)

In violation of the Constitution, Alexander postponed the

presentation of the budget, giving as a reason the impossibility of introducing a new financial system before knowing definitely the figures of the national debt (1). The Diet conducted itself well. The Chamber did not oppose the postponement of the budget and the new criminal code which the Czar proposed was also accepted without discussion. But the divorce bill was rejected by a large majority (2).

The Czar appeared well satisfied. In his speech at the close of the Diet he said "Of all the bills presented to you only one was disapproved by the majority votes of both Chambers. Inner conviction and frankness dictated this decision. It gratifies me, as I see in it the independence of your opinions. Those who are freely chosen must deliberate freely. Through you, I hope to hear a sincere and full expression of public opinion and only an assembly similar to yours can serve for the Government as a pledge that the published laws are in accordance with the essential needs of the people." (3)

These Warsaw speeches made a great impression on the reading public of Russia. His project of extending the Kingdom of Poland drew forth an indignant protest from the poet Karamzin who denounced the dismemberment of Russia for the benefit of a conquered people. The only way to keep Poland from becoming dangerous, he said, was to keep her powerless, for the stronger

2. Ibid
3. Ibid
The paper on the subject will be submitted by the author, which will be presented in the main body of the text. The statement is that the main body of the text contains the main arguments and evidence to support the author's point of view. The main body of the text is the most important part of the paper, as it presents the author's argument and evidence. It is important to present a clear and concise argument, supported by evidence, to support the author's point of view. The main body of the text should be well-organized, with a clear introduction, body, and conclusion. The introduction should provide an overview of the topic and the main points that will be discussed. The body should present the author's argument and evidence, supported by examples and evidence. The conclusion should summarize the main points and restate the author's argument. It is important to present a clear and concise argument, supported by evidence, to support the author's point of view. The main body of the text is the most important part of the paper, as it presents the author's argument and evidence. It is important to present a clear and concise argument, supported by evidence, to support the author's point of view. The main body of the text should be well-organized, with a clear introduction, body, and conclusion. The introduction should provide an overview of the topic and the main points that will be discussed. The body should present the author's argument and evidence, supported by examples and evidence. The conclusion should summarize the main points and restate the author's argument.
she became the more would her desire to break away from Russian grow. (1)

Alexander's unpopularity was further increased by the erroneous conceptions of the Holy Alliance. Doubts felt as to the sincerity of the Czar's liberalism seemed confirmed when Arakcheev was appointed to exalted posts on the army staff. He was the enemy of new ideas and "the apostle of absolute power and passive obedience". He gradually stifled the affection which the Russian people had felt for their Czar. (2)

But the union of a small constitutional kingdom with a large aristocratic empire was too much of a phenomenon to last long. The Government at St. Petersberg began to complain that the Poles petitioned the Czar on the most frivolous pretexts and that it was plain that their nobles were aiming to reestablish their oligarchy at the expense of the liberties of the people. (3)

On the other hand, the more radical Poles, were dissatisfied with what they termed the half measures of the Congress of Vienna, began a movement to restore Polish independence. As might have been expected, the Russian reactionaries took advantage of this movement to work against the civil liberty of the Kingdom although most of the Poles were not associated with the movement. (4)

1. Skriner. Expansion of Russia p. 65
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
Echoes of the revolutions in Spain, Naples and France (1818-1820) reverberated in the Polish press and served as an excuse for introducing a censorship of the press. Accordingly the ordinance of May 22, 1819 declared: "Because Article 16 of the constitution was not sufficiently developed, and because His Majesty in response to the observations of the Chambers, on September 4, 1818, has graciously declared that he wishes the abuses of the press judged according to the old laws until a new one can be made, we order:

Article I. The commissioners of worship and of public instruction to take all measures necessary to repress the abuses of the press, in conformity with the ancient laws and ordinances of the Duchy of Warsaw.

Article II. All newspapers and periodicals without any exception will be subject to the censor." (1)

On July 16, 1819 a second ordinance completed the edict of May 22. Article II was now to be applied "to all publications and all works of all kinds which appear in the Kingdom." (2)

When the second Diet met on September 13, 1820, Alexander issued a warning of the "evil spirit which was moving over Europe but still held to his promises. However, this Diet did not conduct itself as Alexander wished. All through this period, Alexander's big mistake seems to have been that he could not understand a liberalism which was apart from himself.

2. Ibid, p. 741
A resolute opposition showed itself in the diet. At the head of this was Vincent and Bonavventure Niemojewski who had grouped around them a party including some deputies from Kalisz. They complained of the poor administration (1) and rejected a bill for recasting the criminal code and a statute fixing responsibility on ministers. (2)

Vincent Niemojewski, the leader of the opposition, said "..... We have lost the liberty of the press, individual liberty is gone, and the right of property has been violated. Now they would abolish the responsibility of ministers,—what will be left of the Constitution?" (3)

On the whole, however, the Diet was moderate in its criticism of the government. But when the Czar closed the Diet on October 13, he rebuked the delegates saying that the Diet was not privileged to censure the government, but only to deliberate on the proposed measures and that in the future it must confine itself to the simple proceedings and refrain from propagating constitutional theories, only calculated to produce mischief. (4) "Following an illusion but too common in the present age, you have sacrificed the hopes which a sagacious confidence would have realized. You have retarded the work of your country's restoration. That heavy responsibility will rest upon you." (5)

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4. Ibid, p. 18
5. Ibid, p. 21
Alexander maintained that he alone could interpret the Constitution for, being its author, he must best know his own intentions. (1)

The Czar in his anger had decided to publish a ukase abrogating the constitution, but he was persuaded not to carry out this intention by the intervention of the English Ambassador and of Pozzi di Borgo. (2) Nevertheless, the Diet was not called again for the next five years.

Not long after the dismissal of the Diet, the Niemojewiskis were elected members of their palatine council whereat Alexander abolished the Council until the representatives should give him either in or out of the Diet a sufficient guarantee for better conduct in the future. (3)

Still disgusted with the proceedings of the Polish Diet, Alexander left Warsaw to attend the Congress at Troppau. After the Congresses of Aix-La-Chapelle and Troppau he was no longer the same man. He now began to consider that he was the victim of universal ingratitude. "He had wished to liberate Germany, and German opinion had turned against him..... He had sought for sympathy for vanquished France, and at Aix-La-Chapelle a French plot had been discovered against him. He had longer to restore Poland and Poland had only desired to free herself completely, while Russia demanded an explanation from Alexander of the new danger he had created on her frontier, by the reconstruction of the Lechitis kingdom... At Carlsbad, at Laibach,

and at Vienna, Alexander was already the leader of the reactionary movement." (1)

Nor were conditions in Poland calculated to raise his hopes. Secret societies had really existed in Poland since 1814. They had their origin in part from the old Polish freemasonry. In 1814 this movement of freemasonry was extended to the western provinces of Russia thru the efforts of Ludwik Plater.

In 1814 when there was danger that war between England, France and Austria would break out over the Polish questions, Alexander favored the development of such secret organizations, hoping to create a new Poland by their means. Accordingly in 1814 the "Society of True Poles" was organized and from the Polish Freemasons came the secret society of National Freemasonry. The chief founder and Grand Master was Valezy Lukasinski; a man of great caution and self-sacrificing patriotism. In April, 1821, General Uminski, one of the Posen Freemasons, arrived at Warsaw and under his influence a well-organized secret society was founded near Warsaw. It took the title of the "Patriotic Society". In order to spread its teachings throughout the Kingdom, this Society divided Poland into six provinces, these were cut into circles which in turn were subdivided into communes. The names of the individuals belonging to the Society were so closely guarded that the members usually knew only their own chiefs.

In the 18th century, advancements were made in the field of medicine. The development of the scientific method led to a better understanding of disease and the need for more accurate diagnostic tools. This era saw the rise of medical education, with the establishment of medical schools and the training of doctors. Ongoing research and experimentation in the field of medicine continued to advance. In 1789, the U.S. Constitution was adopted, marking a significant moment in the history of medicine as it declared the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. However, the 18th century also witnessed the growth of the slave trade and the continued oppression of women and minorities, which had a profound impact on the medical field at the time.
As repressive measures became more and more frequent, this society grew very rapidly. (1)

Public education was watched carefully to prevent any liberal doctrines from finding their way into the minds of the youth. Accordingly, Stanislas Potocki was forced to resign in spite of his brilliant achievements among which was numbered the founding of the University of Warsaw, 1818. Novosiltsov replaced him by the reactionary Stanislas Grabowski, a man of considerable intellect but apparently of little moral principle. (2) Not satisfied with this triumph, Novosiltsov next persuaded Constantine that the University of Vilno was a hotbed of rebellion. Consequently in August, 1824, there appeared a ukase pronouncing the dismissal of many of the professors at Vilno, among them Lelweli. Czartoryski was obliged to resign his curatorship which went to Novosiltsov as a reward "for his diligence in ferreting out conspiracy." (1)

The Act of February 13, 1825 attempted to prevent any hostile demonstrations in Poland by forbidding public deliberations of the Diet except during formal sessions and at the beginning and closing of the assembly. (4) Alexander said at the time that he considered the constitution just an experiment and evidently felt at liberty to recall it at any time. (5)

4. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 455
Bonaventure Niemojewski was deprived of a seat and Vincent had been compelled to sign a document to the effect that he had offended his sovereign, who forbade him to appear in his presence again. Vincent declared that in thus signing he had not resigned his seat, but Constantine interpreted it to be thus. Nevertheless Vincent came to Warsaw, but he was arrested at the barrier and imprisoned until 1830. (1)

Alexander made a "frigid speech" and the Diet approved all government projects. The first part of the Civil code was passed by a majority in both houses. (2)

On May 25, 1821 Alexander had commented on the annual deficit of the Kingdom saying that matters had at length arrived at a point where the question no longer concerned the abolition of this or that office, the continuance or relinquishment of certain public works, but the ascertainment as to whether the resources of the Kingdom would be adequate to meet the expenses of a representative government or whether, if this were proved impossible, a new order of things should be established. It has been related that Lubecki came to the rescue and that the finances of the Kingdom were soon after flourishing. One of the chief measures which brought about this new state of economic affairs was the establishment of a Land Bank by the Diet of 1825. This institution was a valu-

2. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 455
able aid to the promotion of Agriculture, the chief source of the country's wealth. (1) Throughout its session the Diet gave the Czar no pretext for withdrawing his promises. Apparently Alexander was satisfied for at the close of the Diet he said to the deputies, "You have carried out the expectations of your country and have justified my confidence. It will be my earnest desire to convince you what an influence your action will have on your future." (2) But Alexander died on November 19, 1825.

About a month later Nicholas I issued a statement to the Poles declaring that he would continue the measures begun by Alexander. "The institutions which he gave you will remain unchanged," he said, "I promise and swear before God that I will maintain the Act of Constitution and make every effort to insure its being maintained." (3)

Shortly after Nicholas ascended the throne of Russia, came the Decembrist uprising. But although it was shown that the Decembrists had connections with the secret societies of the Kingdom of Poland Constantine did not wish to proceed against these societies by underhand methods. Nicholas, however, persisted and at last a large number of persons with Krzyzanowski at their head were arrested. Contrary to the Constitution, a commission of Investigation was appointed to

2. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 455
3. Ibid p. 456
collect evidence as a result of which eight persons were indicted including Krzyzonowski. On April 18, 1827 a court of the Diet was summoned by royal decree. (1)

Not being able to recognize the investigations of the unconstitutional commission, the Court of the Diet chose several of its own members to conduct an inquiry. In the trial which followed, the accused were allowed every means of defense. The final judgment issued on June 10, 1828, sentenced Krzyzanowski to three years imprisonment, others to milder penalties and acquitted three persons. (2)

Bielinski, President of the Court, submitted to the Czar a full report drawn up by Czartoryski, giving the reasons for the sentences and stating that the accused had rested their case primarily on the guarantees of the Congress of Vienna and on the promises of Alexander. (3)

These lenient sentences were not in accordance with the wishes of Nicholas who had demanded the death penalty. Accordingly he ordered the Administrative Council and the Council of State to consider the sentences and judge whether the Court of the Diet had shown itself fit to handle such cases. Lubecki now came forward to defend the accused and the Court. Largely due to his influence, the Administrative Council upheld the

Court's decision. Nicholas suspended the publication of the sentence for nine months but in the end confirmed it.

Nevertheless a deep antagonism between the Emperor and the Poles had been disclosed. Nicholas was especially disturbed because it seemed that the Kingdom was in sympathy with the secret societies. (1)

In 1823 Russia was at war with Turkey. England and Austria were preparing a coalition against Nicholas who now felt that he had better make sure of the Poles. He wished to use the Polish army, but he was opposed in this plan by Constantine who hated war because it "spoiled an army"; therefore no Polish troops were used. It seems to be the general impression among writers that if Constantine had allowed the Polish army to be used, the stress of common danger might have produced a feeling of comradeship between the Russians and the Poles and filled the latter with ardor for the cause of the Empire. (2)

But Nicholas continued his attempt to reconcile the people of the Kingdom. After he had captured Varna he sent twelve Turkish guns as a present to the Polish army, recalling the fact that Ladislaus had perished at Varna 400 years ago. Beside this he ordered a memorial be built in Warsaw at his own expense, to enshrine the heart of John Sobieski who had once conquered the Turks.

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1. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 258
Then after the conclusion of peace at Adrianople, he came to Warsaw to celebrate his coronation. With the Emperor was his son and heir to the throne who wore a Polish uniform and spoke the language well. In spite of a plot to murder the Czar at the coronation, everything passed off very quietly, although some ill feelings were aroused when it was noticed that the Czar was surrounded by a guard of the Smolensk regiment which had played so sinister a part in the massacre attending the storming of Warsaw in 1794. (1)

The Diet was not summoned until the autumn of 1830. In his opening speech, Nicholas excused his tardiness in summoning the Diet by troubles at home and abroad and laid stress on the value of the Polish army which he called "the vigilant vanguard confronting the enemies (Austria) of the Empire." By his silence, the Poles were given to understand that the hope of extending their territory to include Lithuania, Podolia, and Volhynia was gone. (2)

The Diet of May 1830, showed that the opposition had increased. There were some sharp debates, especially on the law of divorce, which the Diet of 1825 had rejected. This resistance of the Deputies exasperated the Czar who in his closing speech thanked the Senate, but passed over the work of the deputies in silence. Nicholas left Warsaw in disgust. (3)

Soon after the exposure of the Patriotic Society at the Court of the Diet, another secret organization sprang up in Warsaw. (1) This society, composed mostly of young men full of zeal and action, was first started in 1828 at the Ensigns' School under the leadership of Peter Wysocki who was an instructor at the school. It was afterwards joined by several intellectuals from other institutions. This society had originally planned the Turkish War as the time for an uprising, but the plans fell thru. Several of the more radical members then wished to set the coronation as the time. The brutality of the plans, however, brought this scheme into disrepute and nothing was done. In 1830 Wysocki and his friends had hoped that the Czar would dismiss the Diet and thus give an excuse for an uprising. (2) But the revolutionists were again doomed to disappointment.

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CHAPTER IX

REVOLUTION OF 1830

On August 16, 1830 Nicholas informed Constantine that he was intending to use the Polish army to aid him in crushing a revolution which had broken out in France. At the same time Lubecki was ordered to have funds ready for campaign and mobilization. "The Emperor," said the orders from Russia, "has charged me to inform Your Excellency most urgently....that it is his wish that you report immediately the condition of the treasury to defray the expenses of mobilization and campaign ......" (1)

"I am truly sorry," the letter continued, "to see all your progress stopped thus. We would soon have a superb budget, if the extraordinary expenses did not become so deadly."(2)

On August 31, Diebitch went to Berlin to induce Frederick William also to take up arms, but Prussia was anxious to avoid war especially since England and Austria had already recognized Louis Philippe. Hearing of the instructions which Lubecki and Constantine had received, the Polish confederates decided to hurry the revolution which they had been planning for the spring. The date November 29, 1830 was set for the uprising.(3)

Accordingly on the night of the 29th the youth of the

2. Ibid, p. 761
CHAPTER

EXPLANATION OF 1930

On review of the 1930 Telephone Investigation Committee Report, we identified that the report was not as effective in providing a clear explanation of the investigation. After a thorough review, we decided to rewrite the report to improve its clarity and comprehensiveness. With the new version, we hope to provide a better understanding of the investigation and its findings.

In the meantime, we have included a summary of the key points in this report. We encourage you to read the full report for a more detailed analysis. The summary is as follows:

[Summary of key points]
School of Standard Bearers gathered at Wysocki's building. From here they moved to attack the Russian cavalry while other university students under Zawisza made for the Palace of Belvedere. If Constantine had shown any energy at all, the revolt might have been crushed at this point, but he seemed to lose his head with the result that the Polish army, encouraged by the populace, joined the revolt. (1)

This outbreak, of course, paralyzed all Nicholas' efforts to crush any revolt in western Europe. Prussia got out of an awkward situation and France was saved. (2)

It seemed that there never had been a fairer opportunity to strike for independence. The Polish army was well organized, and the treasury was in good order. Russia had immense forces, but only a few were available and those were unprepared. (3)

The Poles, however, were still dominated by a spirit of faction. There was first, the "party of Princes" made up of such individuals as Czartoryski, Radzwill and Chlopicki who had won renown under Napoleon. This group was in favor of invoking the treaties of Vienna and of making the question a European one. (4)

Next there were the moderates who hoped to gain a measure of liberty by a strict observance of the constitution of 1815. (5)

1. Skriner. Op. cit. p. 113
2. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 464
3. Ibid
5. Ibid
Finally, there were the "Republicans", a radical group who demanded the abdication of the Romanovs and were prepared to copy the French Revolution. Lelewel, Professor of history, Zawisza, a student at Warsaw university and Wysocki of the School of the Standard Bearers belonged to this group (1). This extreme section gained the upper hand at first and compelled the others to follow them.

Zamoyski, Czartoryski and Lubecki, seeing that the revolution was without a head, summoned the Administrative Council to meet on November 30. This body issued decrees in the name of Nicholas urging the people to be quiet and giving Chlopicki, whose appearance made him the people's idol, command of the army. (2)

Czartoryski and Lubecki were sent to Constantine who was by this time camping with the Russian troops outside the city gates. The Duke said that he had no concern with Polish quarrels and merely asked that the Russian garrison be allowed to go to Warsaw in return for which he would send back the regiment of Polish sharpshooters who had remained loyal to him. Some members of the Diet now sent a deputation to the government complaining that it was not sufficiently revolutionary, demanding that both chambers be called and that some other members be admitted to the administrative council. This request was complied with. (3)

3. Ibid
Zamoyski now wished to reconcile the Poles to Constantine. Accordingly, he ordered Schmidt, who was on intimate terms with the Duke, to inform him that the men in power might be able to avert a storm if he would authorize them to assure the nation of certain benefits, (1), for instance the proclamation of the independence of the Kingdom and permission for the nation to manage its own affairs (2). To back this up still further, Czartoryski and Lubecki; this time accompanied by two of the radical group, Lelewel and Ostrowski went once more to interview Constantine. In consequence the Grand Duke promised to intercede with Nicholas to grant an amnesty to the insurgents but refused to take any steps to persuade Nicholas to annex Lithuania to the Kingdom. Czartoryski and Lubecki urged the Grand Duke to return to Warsaw, but the former two urged him to leave the Kingdom. The latter course was adopted and in consequence the Poles lost not only a valuable hostage, but also troops who might have been won to the cause but who now became the vanguard of the Russian army. (3)

However, the radical element were not satisfied even though some of their number had been admitted to the Administrative Council. They, therefore, decided to send a deputation of twelve to the Bank where the members of the Administrative Council were meeting. The delegates waited an hour before

2. Ibid
3. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 467
being admitted and then entered armed, much to the disgust of Lelewel who thought himself compromised in the eyes of his colleagues by their action. In the course of the discussion which followed, Czartoryski said that the arrest of Constantine in view of the agreement just concluded with him was not practical. Thereupon Mochnacki, the leader of the radicals, replied "Prince, you are jesting. We rose to deliver Poland, not to accept conditions from the Grand Duke." Ostrowski alone supported Czartoryski in his opposition to the Clubists. (1)

All hoped that Lelewel would lead them, but he was too cautious to lead a revolt. Constantine was now urged to fly because of the lack of authority of the council which was dissolved. Mochnacki urged the revolutionists to continue their activities saying that the "Czarevitch retired unmolested while men acknowledged as patriots do not arrest his march." But the people were against the Clubists who were expelled. (2)

Mochnacki now attempted to lead some young warriors against Lubecki in particular, but he was intercepted by Wysocki. (3)

Meanwhile because Chlopicki was ill, there was insubordination in the army and when he heard that Mochnacki had called him a traitor, he was seized with apoplexy. The mob now turned on Mochnacki for revenge. He was able to find refuge nowhere except in the residence of Lubecki. (4)

2. Ibid, p. 150
3. Ibid, p. 152
4. Ibid
On December 4, Czartoryski, Kochanowski, Pac, Niemcewicz, Lelewel, Dombrowski and Ostrowski proclaimed themselves the Provisional Government while the command of the army was bestowed on Chlopicki. They announced themselves constituted in the name of the sovereign. (1)

This Government now summoned the people to arms. "Let him," said the accompanying proclamation "in whom Polish blood flows, spare neither wealth, health nor life." (2)

As Chlopicki's illness continued, he sent in his resignation on December 5. Since this was greatly deplored by the people, Czartoryski, Niemcewicz and Zamoyski were sent to visit him. At length Chlopicki said he would consent to withdraw his resignation if he could assume dictatorship. The delegates, supposing that he meant merely a dictatorship of the army, offered no objection. On their return to the Bank, Czartoryski and Niemcewicz, being apprehensive that Chlopicki might contemplate more than a military dictatorship, caused a memorandum to be signed by all the members of the Provisional Government investing Chlopicki with unlimited power over the army only. (3)

Chlopicki was enraged. He came to the Bank and tore up the paper, then galloped off to the Campus Martius where he pronounced himself dictator of the Kingdom amidst the cheers of the populace. (4)

2. Ibid, p. 155
3. Ibid, p. 157, 158
4. Ibid, p. 158
The day after (December 6) Chlopicki issued a proclamation of his policies. The insurrection, he thought, should subside as soon as the abuses which had brought it about were abolished. The Poles should continue to be faithful to the Czar. (1)

However, Chlopicki soon shrank from the vastness of the responsibility which he had assumed and which he now began to share with others. The government was thus weakened by many useless functionaries. (2)

Chlopicki now decided to attempt to negotiate with the Czar. Consequently Lubecki and Jezierski were sent to St. Petersburg with certain demands: 1. the Constitution should receive such guarantees that it would not be violated; 2. no Russian troops were to be garrisoned in Poland; 3. national institutions should be organized and the sister countries allowed to share these liberties. (3)

On December 17, a deputation with Czartoryski at its head waited on Chlopicki and stated the aversion felt to the negotiations and the general call for war. Chlopicki replied that he would not go to war and that he would not add to his demands of the Czar. Whereupon the deputy Zwierkowskii said that Lithuania, Podolia, Volhynia and Ukrania ought not to be so abandoned. Chlopicki, replying that he was dictator, left the room. (4)

When the Diet met on December 18, it demanded Polish independence and representatives for Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia

2. Ibid, p. 165
3. Ibid, p. 167
4. Ibid, p. 162
and Ukrania. Chlopicki, perceiving that his policies were not accepted, resigned. He taxed the Diet with having produced a counter-revolution. At last, however, Ostrowski persuaded Chlopicki to resume his dictatorship. (1)

Chlopicki was doing everything in his power to prevent the revolutionists from taking definite steps until the emissaries returned from St. Petersburg. These moderate measures were obnoxious to the Republican party who maintained that the Kingdom should be arming and stimulating revolutionary activities in the other Polish provinces under Russia. However, the most that the Diet would do for the Republicans was to appoint a committee to watch over Chlopicki and to supersede him if necessary. (2)

Meanwhile another committee was to draw up a manifesto addressed to the Powers who had signed the treaty of Vienna. This was not published until January 5, 1831. (3)

As no satisfactory communication arrived from St. Petersburg, Chlopicki once more dispatched a messenger with a letter stating that he was in control and that the wish of the nation was not to dissolve all connection with Russia, but to receive guarantees for their constitutional liberties. "Should those liberties—not a concession on the part of the sovereign, but the result of a contract between him and the people—be refused," the letter went on to say, "the nation was prepared to risk all for the accomplishment of its dearest wish,—national independence." (4)

3. Ibid, p. 116
Introduction to Tennesse's Agriculture

Tennessee was noted for its agriculture in the early 20th century, with

special emphasis on cotton production. However, this period was

marked by economic depression and the Great Depression of 1929.

(1) "The Year of the Cotton Crisis" (1929) by J. W. Tennesse

As the agricultural economy struggled, a movement to form a

national union was initiated. The result was the establishment of the

American Agricultural Union (AAU) in 1930.

(2) "The Rise of the American Agricultural Union" by J. W. Tennesse

This union sought to negotiate better working conditions and higher

prices for farmers. It faced opposition from the National Farm

Association, which favored a more traditional approach.

(3) "The Conflict Between the American Agricultural Union and the

National Farm Association" by J. W. Tennesse

The struggle between these two groups continued throughout the

1930s, with the AAU ultimately gaining some traction.

(4) "The Impact of the American Agricultural Union on Tennessee

Agriculture" by J. W. Tennesse

Despite initial successes, the AAU struggled to maintain its

influence in the face of economic challenges.
But the ukase of December 18, 1830 showed that Nicholas was not disposed to treat with the rebels. "Poles," it read, "an infamous attempt has troubled the peace of your country. Men who dishonor the Polish name have conspired against the brother of your sovereign--have trampled under oaths and have blinded the people to the dearest interests of the country."

The manifesto further commanded that all Russians who were prisoners should be set free; that the council of administration take over the government; that all troops assemble at Plock to await orders and that all new levies be disbanded. (1)

A few days later Diebitch crossed the frontier with 120,000 men and marched on Warsaw. (2)

Meanwhile the Lithuanians in Warsaw had repeatedly asked for troops to insurrectionize their province or at least for permission to organize a legion among themselves. Also many Galicians as well as inhabitants of Posen came to Warsaw to join the insurrection. But Chlopicki always discouraged these attempts to speed the revolution. (3)

Thus pent up in the streets of Warsaw, the rebellion was doomed to prey upon itself and internal discord was, therefore, unavoidable.

Chlopicki was now in disagreement with Lelewel who insisted on arming the peasants and invading the coveted provinces of Lithuania, Podolia and Volhynia because he believed that an

The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image provided. It appears to contain a paragraph of text, possibly discussing a topic that requires careful reading. Without clearer visibility, it is not possible to transcribe the content accurately.
insurrection which did not spread was lost. Chlopicki, therefore, resigned his dictatorship and also refused to lead the army. His place as commander-in-chief was filled by Prince Radzwill, a weak man ignorant of strategy while Chlopicki's functions as dictator were assumed by a National Government. (1) Czartoryski was chosen president and Vincent Niemojewski, Barzykowski, Morowski, and Lelewel were chosen as deputies (2). The power now shifted from one to one hundred fifty dictators.

On January 5, the Committee of the Manifesto published a declaration saying that "When a nation, already free and powerful, is forced by the excess of abuse, to have recourse to the last of its rights, ... it ought to let the world know its motives.... The Congress of Vienna.... has put Poland under the immediate domination of the Emperor Alexander, with a separate charter in the hope of having it extended. These conditions have not been fulfilled. Those in authority now wish to reduce the nation to the lowest depths, to a servile degradation. The measures taken in regard to the army first gave indication of this plan.... the persecution ordered by the commander-in-chief under pretext of maintaining discipline have all but destroyed the noble sentiments of honor and national dignity which characterizes our troops. .... Not only have our brothers not been admitted to the enjoyment of the institutions stipulated by the treaty of Vienna, to the contrary, national memories awakened at first by promises, then by encouragements, became a crime.

against the state. "....Even on the day of the coronation, the Senate was filled with new members who did not possess the qualities required by the Constitution.

"....Suddenly there came rumors of war against the liberty of a people and orders were given to put the Polish army on a war footing....beside this, huge sums were put aside to defray the expenses of mobilization and campaign.....

"Our national honor refused to carry to other peoples war of which it has a horror and more than this, to fight our former comrades in arms." (1)

"Therefore, the Polish people rise from ignominy and degradation with firm resolution never again to bend to the yoke which they now throw off and never to lay down arms....until they shall have recaptured their independence." (2)

The Poles, the manifesto further stated, were animated by no ill-will toward their brother Slavs and in striking for freedom they appealed with confidence to Europe whom their ancestors had often defended against the Turk and Muscovite. "Providence," the document stated "has perhaps doomed the continent to slavery, but if such were to be its lot, every patriotic Pole would find consolation in reflecting that his death struggles had postponed the issue (3)." This document, unfortunately, came too late to arouse the people.

The Diet re-assembled about January 13, and the delegates

learned from Jezierski, one of the emissaries whom the Poles had sent to Nicholas, that the Czar had declined to parley. (1) Nicholas had accused the Poles of high treason and attempted to flatter any who would assist in crushing the rebellion. For such he promised ample rewards. (2)

In the midst of the indignation that followed, the Marshal of the Diet introduced the subject of the deposition. "Diplomatic communications," said he, "as well as the proclamation of Diebitch have fully demonstrated that the objects of the insurrection cannot be obtained without war...... The Czar has commanded his hordes to invade our soil...... It is not the first time that barbarians have strewed our country with their bones and fertilized it with their blood. Shall we stand stricken--......and still acknowledge Nicholas as our lawful sovereign? No, he was the first to break the oath imposed on us...... That oath alone which the Poles swore to the Piasts, to the Jagellons and their freely elected kings should bind us now. Let Europe cease to regard us as rebellious subjects--let her recognize in us an independent nation......" (3)

The act of deposition stated that "the Polish people, represented by the Diet, declare: that they are independent and that they have the right to dispose of the crown in favor of those whom they judge worthy to wear it and who will present solemn and religious guarantees to maintain the faith of the oath." (4)

This dethronement of Nicholas seems to be regarded by most authors as an unfortunate blunder in that it hastened Russia's action and made the diplomatic intervention of the foreign powers more difficult because it terminated the conditions of the treaty of Vienna.

On February 4, the Diet completed the insurrectionary legislation by declaring Poland a constitutional monarchy. (1)

As Diebitch entered Poland, he issued a proclamation to the Poles saying that the Russian soldiers would pay the peaceable Poles for all the inconveniences caused by the army, but that every person who persisted in revolting would have to undergo the rigor of the law. (2)

To his own troops the Russian general declared "...We enter into a struggle which ought never to bother the hearts of faithful Russians. We are going to subdue some bold men who have made the Kingdom of Poland revolt against our adored sovereign who has given these ungrateful people many privileges and has pardoned many of them.... We enter, then, with confidence into this sacred struggle for Emperor and country." (3)

As has been stated previously, the Poles sent missions to all the countries who had signed the treaty of Vienna. Prussia had taken drastic measures to prohibit assistance to the Poles from Posen, but supplied the Russians with provisions and ammunition and even allowed them to cross into Prussian territory (4).

1. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 469
3. Ibid, p. 785
4. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 473
The accomplishment of efficient service and an effective administration of the

newly created information technology is of the utmost importance for the

administration. In order to ensure the smooth transition to the new system,

a thorough plan of action

The most important factor in the implementation of a new technology is the

adaptation of existing procedures to fit the new system. This requires

the training of personnel and the reorganization of the

existing administrative structure.

In conclusion, the successful implementation of the new technology depends

on proper planning, adequate training, and effective organization. The

administration must prioritize these factors in order to ensure a smooth

transition to the new system.
On February 6, an order from the King forbade all Poles of the Grand Duchy of Posen to enter Poland on pain of forfeiting their property. (1)

On June 19, 1831, the commander-in-chief of the Polish armies sent a letter to Frederick William complaining of the help which the Prussian military and civil authorities were giving to Russia, saying, ". . . in spite of the neutrality which Your Majesty has officially assured in regard to Poland, civil and military authorities of the frontier not only violate that neutrality, but help the Russians:

1. The Prussian authorities furnish the Russians with provisions from the magazines of Thorn and the surrounding districts.

2. Prussian artillery has been sent to the Russian army.

3. The uniforms of the Russian army were made in Prussia.

4. A Prussian engineer has been employed to build a bridge over the Vistula... for the passage of the Russians, and the materials necessary for its construction were furnished by Prussia......

Skrzynicki, Commander-in-Chief" (2)

If Russia were defeated, the Prussians had decided to occupy the whole north-west territory. Indeed when Diebitch was at first repulsed and when revolts began in Volhynia and Lithu-

ania, Nicholas himself had suggested that Prussia adopt this course. (1).

Austria played a double game. Metternich had personal reasons to make him render aid to the Russians in that his wife's family had received a gift of 400,000 rubles from the Russian court. Therefore, the Austrians informed Nicholas of the doings of the Poles and threatened any Galician who offered help to the insurgents with confiscation of property. (2)

On the other hand, Metternich held personal conferences with the Polish envoy to Vienna and suggested the Archduke Charles as a candidate for the Polish throne. Later when threats of an Italian revolution suggested the possibility of Russian interference, Austria left her frontier open to the Poles. (3)

The Hungarians, however, attempted to defend the Poles and protested to the Emperor of Austria. "...we are not able to hide the grief which we feel because of the war unjustly made on the frontiers of our country, against a nation which is allied by its proximity, by kings received and given and which, when the Ottoman power threatened the capital of the Imperial states, joined its victorious armies with our own.... helped us to triumph over an oriental tyrant, preserved the House of Hapsburg, and gave liberty to our country....."

"If, then, we remember these unusual services.....we find

1. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 473
that the insecurity of nations make it necessary for one to defend another..... If Poland, abandoned, is crushed by superior forces, and if the common enemy (Russia or Turkey) threaten us, we will remember with sorrow that there is no longer a Sobieski." (1)

But a more effective support than that of Austria was expected from France. The French Revolutionists had shown themselves friendly toward the Poles especially because the Polish revolution had saved France from Russian aggression. Sebastiani, minister of Foreign affairs to the chamber of Deputies, had intimated to the Polish envoy that a deputation would be sent to St. Petersburg in an effort to reconcile the Poles to Russia. (2)

On August 10, the Foreign Minister reported to the Chamber of Deputies that Russia had assured France that she would strictly observe the treaties of 1815 and that Poland and her institutions would be preserved. (3)

Lafayette made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on January 15 calling upon France not to forget Poland. He said in part, "....As for Poland, gentlemen, the French nation should show the utmost sympathy for her plight, not only because the former partitions were the shame of France, not only because of the intimate relations existing between Poland and France, but also because of all that we owe to that brave nation who has so

1.

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generously shed her blood in the wars of France.... Gentleman, war was prepared against us, and Poland formed an advance guard ...." (1)

Again on January 23, Lafayette sought to stir France to help Poland, at the same time announcing that a Franco-Polish committee to give aid to the Poles had been organized. (2)

In a speech on September 11, Lafayette sought to bring out that Austria and Prussia were helping Russia to strangle Poland. "....Without doubt," Lafayette said, "I ask, as I always have, the recognition of the independence of Poland; but there is a still more threatening danger to her; it is the avowed hostility of Prussia. Poland is strangled by Prussia, it is in Prussia that Russia has placed her confidence and it is thru Prussia that her line of communication which had been cut was re-estab-

lished. As for Poland, all her communications with the West are intercepted by Prussia and Austria.....

"The Emperor of Russia is no friend of ours; he has pre-
pared armies against us....I said at the time that his advance guard is turned against the force of battle. It is Poland which has saved Europe from war....." (3)

In July, 1831, France asked England to act in common with her in favor of Poland. Sebastiani wrote to Talleyrand, the French ambassador to England, "....The King, moved by the mis-
fortunes of the war in Poland,.....and anxious to restore peace,

2. Idem, p.795
3. Idem, p. 860
has addressed himself to the Russian Emperor, asking that he put an end to this bloodshed. The King has also wished to preserve the political independence of a people who by their courage and patriotism have shown themselves worthy of it, and whose national existence is further promised by the Treaty of Vienna.

"So far, the efforts of the King have not accomplished the desired ends, but in spite of this, the King does not think he should cease to mediate. He believes that if England acted with France, the end would be assured. The King hopes that His Britannic Majesty will not refuse to... join to our efforts his powerful influence....." (1). However, because England felt suspicious of France at this time, nothing came of this endeavor.

On September 19, the Russian government again assured France that the treaties of 1815 would be observed.

But France also had her own schemes. It had been suggested to the Polish envoy in France that as soon as Belgium affairs were satisfactorily disposed of, the London conference would turn its attention to Polish affairs. The Poles, then, did all they could to bring Belgium affairs to a speedy conclusion. When that was accomplished, Sebastiani requested that the Polish generalissimo avoid pitched battle for two months since Poland would be saved by France within that time. But it later appeared that these promises meant only that

Sebastiani wished Belgium affairs settled and that Russia was thus given time to strengthen her position on the Vistula (1).

Meanwhile the French government intercepted the correspondence of the Polish envoy and communicated the contents to Nicholas hoping thus to secure Russia's recognition of the Orleans rule (2). When Nicholas at last did recognize France, the Polish cause in that country was ruined.

England also made a half-hearted attempt to intervene. As early as January 21, 1831, Lord Heytesburg, the English ambassador to Russia, wrote to Palmerston suggesting that Russia was so sensitive on any foreign intervention in Polish affairs that he was sure that the attempts at mediation would prove useless. (3)

On March 22, Palmerston instructed Heytesburg, "...In an ordinary case of civil war between a sovereign and his subjects, the foreign powers have not the right to interfere even by offering advice or remonstrance; but there are some circumstances peculiar to the Kingdom of Poland which make it an exception to the rule.

"The Kingdom of Poland was created and connected with Russia by the Treaty of Vienna..... This treaty defines the relations which ought to exist between Poland and Russia and says that Poland will be attached to Russia by her constitution and will enjoy a separate administration.

"... If you find that the Russian government intends to carry out any material changes in the political condition of Poland, you are warned to watch these changes closely and to protest vigorously against all measures of this kind which are not in strict agreement with the treaty of Vienna.

"The British government is not able to recognize the Polish revolt.... as a sufficient cause for the Russian government to break the treaty." (1)

In response to Talleyrand's note, Palmerston replied, (July 22, 1831)... "His Majesty cannot afford to see Poland robbed of the advantages given her by the Congress of Vienna and has not waited to receive this note from the French minister to make overtures to the Russian government on the subject.

"Regarding the object of the communication,"--that France and England should address themselves jointly to Russia--"if His Majesty had reason to believe that the Russian Emperor would be disposed to avail himself of the good services of the two courts, and that their intervention would have the desired results, His Majesty would willingly co-operate.....

"But He has many reasons to fear that a simple offer of mediation, far from being at this moment desired by His Imperial Majesty would at the present be surely rejected.

"... Would it be well to make a proposal which has little chance of being accepted and which if refused, would put the two governments in the equally embarrassing position of sub-

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mitting to a rejection or of applying more forceful means? This government is certainly not ready to adopt the latter course.....

"For these reasons, His Majesty feels it necessary to refuse the proposition which the Prince de Talleyrand has communicated to Him." (1)

On October 1, 1831 Lord Heytesburg wrote to Palmerston announcing that Russia could make many changes in Polish affairs but that the foreign powers could not oppose them because of the nature of the Vienna treaties. Heytesburg says".....The stipulations of the treaty of Vienna are of so vague a nature that a complete and radical change can be made in the political condition of Poland without violating the agreement.....It does not appear that the other powers were parties to the constitution given to Poland after the treaty of Vienna or that they had guaranteed it.....The Emperor Alexander reserved to himself the right to give Poland this special constitution.....Besides it appears that this constitution has already been changed and modified.....Without any interference on the part of the foreign powers and most recently and most radically by the Poles themselves since they have refused all obedience to the sovereign .....The Russian government has always assured me that the terms of the treaty of Vienna will be strictly observed but this means little or nothing since the terms of the treaty are so ambiguous.

1. D'Angeberm. p. 841
"It is hard to say just what Russia will do, but from what I hear, the army will be dissolved and the constitution modified. This is not a violation of the terms of the treaty, but it certainly is a violation of the spirit in which the treaty was negotiated." (1)

Meanwhile because they lacked united councils, the Poles began to suffer reverses. On July 31 the Russian General offered the Poles the following terms of peace. (1.) All things restored as they were before the revolution. (2) The rights of Polish nationalism guaranteed to the sister provinces. (3) No confiscation either in the Kingdom or in the provinces, but full amnesty granted to all but five who would be permitted to dispose of their property and emigrate. (4) These terms should not be binding on the Poles until every Russian soldier had been withdrawn. (2) The Poles, depending on news from France, refused to listen.

While they were engaged in fruitless negotiations with Austria and France and while the Diet was aimlessly endeavoring to reform the government, the Russian General was forming his forces for a decisive march on Warsaw. When the Diet heard of the defeat at Vilna they demanded the resignation of the commander-in-chief, Skrzyniecki and appointed Dembinski to succeed him. (3)

In order to make sure that your answer will be valid,
make sure that it is clear and concise.
The question is to be answered objectively and
should not include any personal opinions.

(2) The answer should be
brief and to the point,
and should not contain
unnecessary details or
explanations.

(3) It is important to understand
the context of the question
before answering.

(4) Avoid using
abbreviations or
jargon that may be
difficult for others to
interpret.

(5) Ensure that
the answer is not
ambiguous and
that it can be
understood easily.

(6) The answer
should be
accurate and
reliable.

(7) It is
important to
consider all
relevant
information
before
answering.

(8) Avoid
making assumptions
that are not
supported by
evidence.

(9) The answer
should be
comprehensive
and
thorough.

(10) Ensure
that the answer
is
consistent
with the
question
posed.
Crazed by what they believed to be Skrzyniecki's treachery, the inhabitants of Warsaw massacred all whom they suspected of being in sympathy with Russia. The ambitious General Krukowiecki; one of the secret instigators of the street riots, was made President. He secured a semblance of order by executing the ring leaders and appointed the old and incompetent Malachowski as generalissimo. But the Poles had remained inactive too long and with the surrender of Warsaw, the Revolution was practically crushed. (1)

After the Revolution had failed England made representations at St. Petersburg to satisfy public opinion at home suggesting that Polish autonomy be maintained. On November 23, 1831 Palmerston wrote to Heytesbury, "I ask you on each favorable occasion to....recommend the greatest tolerance and clemency to His Majesty with regard to his Polish subjects..... You ought also to represent to the Russian government the poor policy and injustice of measures which would violate the constitution given to Poland by the Emperor Alexander....The Government of His Majesty recommends an entire amnesty excepting only those guilty of assassination....This measure will tend to quiet the Poles and give them confidence in their government.

"In answer to your arguments on the treaty of Vienna. The constitution declares (Article 31) that the Polish nation

will always have a national representation which will consist of a Diet composed of a King and two Chambers; it declares (Article 63) that the statutes and code of laws cannot be changed or modified except by the King and the two Chambers; it further stipulates (Article 45) that each king will endeavor to carry out the constitution." (1)

Heytesbury responded that the Russians would refuse to accept the British interpretation of the treaty of Vienna and that since they believed that no measure of conciliation would reconcile the Poles, the reestablishment of privilege would only mean a reestablishment of the forces of resistance. (2)

Nesselrode supported this point of view when he said in his note to the British ministry on January 3, 1839: "...His Majesty has...firmly decided not to admit the intervention of a foreign power in questions which are exclusively his own...We see with regret that the British cabinet has expressed an opinion on the terms of the treaty of Vienna with which we are not able to agree...One is convinced that it imposes on Russia only the obligation to maintain the union which the treaty has formed...It assures to the Poles, subjects of Russia, Austria and Prussia, national institutions, reserving to each of the three governments the right to chose those forms

2. Ibid p. 902
of government which it thinks will be most convenient. Furthermore the constitution given by Alexander was not a part of the treaty, but an act sponsored by his own sovereign power.

"Looking at the question from this point of view, one is convinced that since the Poles, themselves, by their rebellion and act of dethronement have annulled the constitution of the Kingdom, nothing obliges the Emperor to reestablish it....Let the British cabinet judge whether it would be wise to let subsist those institutions which have so little fulfilled the views of their founder and of which criminal abuse has been made....But foreign intervention prevents the establishment of peace....it is the false interpretations which they give to treaties, and the right of patronage which they appear to wish to attribute to those Poles excluded from the amnesty....which is the cause of the resistance of the Poles." (1)

It is interesting to note that while Nicholas at first gave the foreign powers to understand that he had no intention of incorporating Poland into the Empire, his tone changed when the first Russian victory was reported. He then declared that he would tolerate no foreign intervention.

On November 1, Nicholas issued a partial amnesty. The document read in part, (Article I) "A complete amnesty is accorded to all our subjects of the Kingdom of Poland who have submitted. These people will not be condemned for the acts...

during the time of revolt. (Article II) Exceptions: 1) The instigators of the revolt who entered the palace on the night of November 29, 1830, the assassins of Russian and Polish offices. 2) The authors and abettors of the scenes of carnage on August 15 at Warsaw; 3) Those who, since the 25th of January of this year, have been, during the different stages of the revolt, the chiefs or members of the government which was illegally established. 4) The members of the Diet who, by their acts in the two Chamber, proposed and carried out the act dethroning the Czar." (1)

On February 14, 1832 an organic statute was issued. It contained some show of autonomy, but it was merely a pretense. The Polish army was incorporated in the Russian army; all electoral institutions were abolished, all higher educational positions and all leading government posts were filled by Russians. Furthermore the Russian language was compulsory for all those in higher administrative offices. (2)

Later ukases drafted the Polish orphans to military colonies and transplanted some 45,000 Polish families to the Don and the Caucases. (3)

The Poles reaction to all this is clearly seen in the protest which was issued April 14, 1832. They said "...He

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2. Cambridge Modern History. V. X, p. 474
(Nicholas I) pretends that the Poles by revolting have broken some obligations which were contracted at the treaty of Vienna; but he forgets that his predecessor as well as he himself, without regard for the solemn promises made to the powers of Europe, has violated the most sacred oaths made to the Polish nation, and that by this perjury they are freed from the obedience which, conforming to the wish of the Congress, has been observed only too long a time. Nicholas, by his new ordinance, breaks the few engagements which remain. He destroys the legislative power, suppresses public instruction, submits all printed publications to the Russian censor, or in other words, commands blind obedience and absolute silence.... He enriches his treasury by fortunes taken from thousands of families.

"The national army no longer exists and now the Polish youth, torn from his family, transported far from his country, will be forced to serve in a strange soil. Even this part of Poland is none other than a Russian province." (1)

At this point it might be well to sum up the reasons for the failure of this Polish revolt.

In the first place the Poles lacked chiefs and discipline. As early as forty-eight hours after the Russians were driven from Warsaw there were evidence of discord between the "Aristocrats" and the Republicans. Moreover only the common people fraternized with the insigents.

[Handwritten text on page]
Although Chlopicki understood neither politics nor diplomacy and although he repeatedly declared that he did not believe that the revolution could succeed, he was appointed dictator. Chlopicki prevented the Poles from taking any definite steps and limited the revolt to Warsaw, until he should have a reply from the emissaries sent to Nicholas. Meanwhile the Czar purposely postponed his reply until he had sufficient time to gather his forces.

Radziwill and Malachowski were also inefficient. Indeed as one sees such inactivity and lack of foresightedness on the part of the men in charge, one might believe the accusation that the Poles were unable to sink their private resentments even in the face of common peril, and that they themselves, were, therefore, their own worst enemies.

Then, too, it must be remembered that the Poles really fought against a coalition. It has already been pointed out that Prussia endeavored by every possible means to prevent any supplies from reaching the Poles. She imprisoned all who attempted to aid the Poles, while the Russians drew from Prussia supplies without which they would have been reduced to great distress. Also there were many instances in the military operations where the Russians who were forced by the Poles to cross the frontier were allowed to return while the Poles in like circumstances were taken prisoners. Austria played a similar game. The Polish leader, Dwernicki, was
obliged to surrender his army to Austria, but the Russians were allowed to withdraw. (1)

As has been seen also the Poles received no help from either England or France. The former, apprehensive of a French danger, did not wish to weaken Russia whose help she might need while France herself was too busy with her new government and too much interested in obtaining the recognition of Russia than in helping the Poles.

Czartoryski sums up the situation very well when he says in a letter to Lafayette, "But we relied on the magnanimity and wisdom of the cabinets; trusting to them we have not availed ourselves of all the resources which were at our disposal both external and internal....To deserve the confidence of the cabinets and to obtain their support, we never departed from the strictest moderation; in this way....we paralyzed our efforts....But for the promises of the Cabinets, we should have been able to strike a blow which perhaps would have been decisive." (2)

1. Poland Under Russia. Harring. p. LXVIII
Summary

Failing in his plans to break up the alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia, Napoleon turned to Poland with the hope that he might recreate "the barrier of the East" to the advantage of France. To further this scheme, Napoleon approached the great Polish leader, Kosciuszko, but as the French Emperor was not ready to give the Poles any definite promises Kosciuszko would not cooperate with him.

Napoleon then turned to Dombrowski and Wybecki who consented to stir up the Poles to help Napoleon. After such a long period of despair, many of the Poles enthusiastically supported Napoleon without knowing his plans. The Polish magnates, however, were more wary, much to Napoleon's disgust.

Throughout this period, Napoleon placed the affairs of Poland second to those of Austria and Russia. Consequently during his attempts to negotiate with these powers, he all but abandoned the Poles only to fall back on them for support when his schemes fell through. At no time did the Emperor of the French give Poland any definite promise. If he could have obtained his desires without Poland, he would have done so. As it was, she was at least useful to supply him with men and provisions.

After the victory of Friedland Alexander sent Labonov to make a truce with French Emperor. Meanwhile Hardenberg submitted one of his plans to Alexander. But as the Czar was interested in extending his frontier as far as the Vistula the
Semestral

Unable to fill the place to teach in the College of Engineering. I propose therefore to
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scheme fell thru.

As a result of the Treaty of Tilsit between Napoleon and Alexander the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was formed; Prussia was reduced to about half her original size; and Alexander endorsed Napoleon's continental system. In return Russia received an agreement about Turkey, the restoration of Mecklemburg and some indemnities for the Kings of Naples and Sardinia. The Duchy of Warsaw was helpful to Napoleon in that it checked Russia and Austria, but at the same time, it ruined the chance that the Franco-Russian alliance would become permanent, for Alexander always feared that Napoleon would use this state as a nucleus for a new Poland.

Napoleon gave the new state a constitution according to which serfdom was abolished, the Roman Catholic religion was the state religion, but all cults were tolerated. Polish was the official language. The hereditary duke, who introduced all the laws, was assisted by a legislature made up of a Chamber of Nuncios and a Senate. This body met every two years. However a good many Poles were still dissatisfied.

The first real test of the Franco-Russian alliance came on the question of Silesia. Napoleon had agreed that the Czar keep Moldavia and Wallachia if France should have Silesia, but the Czar protested against Napoleon's suggestion.

The Austrian War broke out in 1809. Alexander had done all he could to prevent war between Austria and France especially since his French alliance was unpopular in Russia. But when
As a result of the research of various personnel involved in the
problem of human factors, it became apparent that many of the
findings and concepts developed in this field can be applied to
the design of automated systems. In considering the potential
problems of automated systems, the introduction of new
technologies may not necessarily lead to improvements in
system performance or reliability. However, the introduction of
new technologies may provide opportunities for the development of
new systems or enhancements to existing systems. The
importance of this approach is that it allows for the integration of
technological advances with existing systems in a manner that
enhances their overall effectiveness.

One aspect of this approach is the development of new
technologies that can be applied to the design of automated systems.
These technologies may include advances in artificial intelligence,
computational intelligence, or machine learning. The integration of
these technologies can lead to improvements in system performance,
reliability, and efficiency.

Another aspect of this approach is the consideration of the
implications of these new technologies on the overall system design.
This includes the consideration of the potential interactions between
the new technologies and existing systems, as well as the implications
for the design of new systems.

The importance of this approach is that it allows for the
integration of new technologies with existing systems in a manner that
enhances their overall effectiveness. This approach also allows for the
development of new systems or enhancements to existing systems
that can improve their overall performance and reliability.

In conclusion, the introduction of new technologies in the design of
automated systems can be a valuable opportunity for the development
of new systems or enhancements to existing systems. The importance
of this approach is that it allows for the integration of new
technologies with existing systems in a manner that enhances their
overall effectiveness.
2 IQ. 

war came, the Czar played a double game, he assured Austria that he would do everything he could to prevent attacks on her troops and at the same time pledged himself to Napoleon.

Because they hoped to add still more territory to the Grand Duchy, the Poles were only to willing to help France. A revolt broke out in Galicia to the dismay of the Czar. Throughout the war the Russians supported Napoleon only half-heartedly and on more than one occasion they helped the Austrians fight the Poles.

After Austria's defeat at Wagram, Napoleon attempted the difficult task of compensating the Poles without antagonizing the Russians. After much deliberation, he at last decided to leave one fourth of Galicia to Russia and the remainder to the Grand Duchy.

In an attempt to reconcile Russia to the peace, Napoleon instructed Caulaincourt to reassure Alexander in every possible way that Poland would not be re-established. Consequently on January 4, 1810, Caulaincourt signed a treaty which declared, that the Kingdom of Poland would never be re-established, that the words Pole and Poland would disappear from all official and public acts, and that the Duchy would never receive any extension of territory from any of the partitioning powers.

It was at this time also that Napoleon was looking to Russia for an empress for France. Alexander well knew that the princess Anne as well as the Russian court was against the proposed marriage, but he attempted to postpone a definite refusal
until Napoleon should sign the agreement on Poland. The Emperor of the French, however, already suspicious of Alexander negotiated with Austria for the hand of Maria Louise, and revised the agreements on Poland in such a way that they became meaningless.

Both Russia and France seeing that a war was almost inevitable, began to strengthen their forces. Alexander tried to ally himself with Austria, but as Metternich was interested in winning Napoleon's favor, the negotiations came to nothing. Affairs between France and Russia how came to such a pass that war seemed on the verge of breaking out at any moment.

In order to fully understand the Polish question of this period, it is necessary to examine Alexander's Polish policy. Alexander, disappointed because Napoleon seemed to be abandoning his liberal views, began to consider himself the liberator of Europe. Czartoryski at this time presented to the Czar a plan for the reestablishment of Poland which Alexander seemed to favor until Frederick William joined him against Napoleon.

When war with Napoleon threatened in 1811, Alexander approached Czartoryski on the question of Polish support. Czartoryski replied that Alexander must promise three things, -- political liberty, a constitution and a representative government. Alexander consented to the first two but said he would like to examine the constitution of the 3rd of May more closely before committing himself on that point. However, by November 1, 1812, the Czar had decided that he would postpone his action.
Seeing that Alexander really meant to break the alliance, Napoleon began to offer concessions. Napoleon again hoped for the support of the Poles, but most of their enthusiasm vanished when Napoleon refused to sanction their independence because it would disturb Austria.

The lack of training and moral in Napoleon's grand army, the frost and Napoleon's bad strategy resulted in the well-known disastrous retreat from Moscow. Alexander was now hailed as the liberator of Europe and he once more turned his attention to Poland which was now at his mercy. The Czar sought to reconcile Russia to his plans for Poland by incorporating the Grand Duchy of Warsaw not including the Polish provinces Russia already had under his dominion. Meanwhile he hoped that the promise of a liberal constitution would placate the Polish nationalists.

In order to carry out his plans the Czar attempted to secure an alliance with Prussia both to obtain her support against Napoleon and to acquire the provinces of Posen and Warsaw. Meanwhile Hardenberg had suggested to the French ambassador to Prussia that Napoleon give Poland to Frederick William to create a bulwark against Russia and to reward Prussia for her loyalty to France. The King of Prussia decided not to commit himself until he was sure of Austria's position. But Metternich was still following a policy of mediation. Finding no alternative and goaded on by the Nationalist movement in Germany, the King of Prussia reluctantly decided to carry on negotiations.
with the Czar. The outcome of this was the Treaty of Kalisch signed February 26, 1813.

After the incomplete victory of Lutzen, Austria offered to mediate. Napoleon now suggested a Congress and at the same time negotiated separately with the Czar, but was given to understand that further proposals would be received thru Austria. To strengthen the Alliance, the treaty of Reichenbach, (June 27, 1813,) was concluded between Austria, Russia and Prussia.

The Congress at Prague opened in July and Napoleon's attempts at separate negotiations with Alexander were again foiled while his refusal of the terms proposed, led Austria to bind herself still more closely to Prussia and Russia by the treaty of Toeplitz. The allies now offered Napoleon the natural boundaries of France, but he refused to accept.

As there was danger that the allies would quarrel, Lord Castlereagh was sent by the British government to prevent this if possible. The result was the Treaty of Chaumont whereby the allies bound themselves to make peace only in common. France was now offered peace with her territories restored to pre-revolutionary limits. Napoleon again refused and his empire collapsed in the spring of 1814.

Now that Napoleon had been defeated, the chief cause for unity had disappeared and the allies began to disagree. England and Austria were against Russia on the question of Poland while France sought to regain her position on the continent. The Czar decided to talk over the Polish problem at Paris and
he created an uproar which nearly wrecked the conference.

The disagreements of the Powers made it impossible to accomplish anything at Paris so the congress was adjourned to London. But the change of the place of meeting brought the conclusion of the Polish question no nearer. Just as the conference was on the point of breaking up, the powers renewed the treaty of Chaumont. This was the only really valuable result of the Conference at London.

Proceeding the Czar at the Congress in August, Nesselrode produced a plan which granted part of Posen and part of Saxony to Prussia. The Czar wished to preserve the remainder of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for himself. This plan was naturally opposed by England and Austria.

Castlereagh's plan now was to check the Czar's ambitions by effecting a formal agreement between Prussia and Austria. As every other means had failed Castlereagh now suggested that Austria, Prussia and England might bring the Czar to terms by issuing a common refusal of his plans. However, this plan failed when the King of Prussia withdrew his support from Hardenberg. Almost from the time of his arrival at Vienna, Castlereagh had carried on separate negotiations with the Czar. But in spite of all these attempts, the deadlock became so much worse that everyone at the Congress expected war. Castlereagh now began to look at things from a different angle. He felt that since the Polish question could not be brought to what he considered a satisfactory conclusion, the question of Saxony
was the more important. Accordingly, he now threw all his weight on the side of Austria.

The British minister tried to ease the situation by interviewing Hardenberg and suggesting that since the first plan had failed because of the action of his King, he ought to be all the more willing to compromise on the Saxon question. The result of this conference was that Hardenberg agreed at least to consider Austria's proposal. However, when Hardenberg saw that he could not obtain Saxony from Austria, he went completely over to the side of Russia and an open quarrel between him and Metternich followed.

In this predicament, Castlereagh and Metternich agreed on a policy of armed mediation and in order to carry out this idea, it was necessary that they make sure of France. The Czar demanded a conference to settle the Polish question. This body met on December 29. Alexander's plans for Poland were accepted almost without discussion. At such a meeting it was impossible not to discuss the Saxon question also and when this was brought up Austria and England demanded that France be admitted to the discussion. Hardenberg refused and even threatened war unless Prussia's claims on Saxony were recognized. Up to this point, Castlereagh had not definitely allied himself with France, but after this meeting, Castlereagh, Talleyrand and Metternich signed a secret treaty. The result of this was that Talleyrand was admitted to the discussions on January 12. But this by no means settled the problem.
As might have been expected, the final result was a compromise. Prussia received two-fifths of Saxony, Posen, Thorn and the Republic of Danzig. Austria obtained Wieliczka, Lemberg, Czernowitz and Tarnopol; Russia took Congress Poland.

Before the final agreement was signed, Castlereagh asked each of the three powers to guarantee to their Polish subjects their national customs and institutions. As a result of this suggestion, an ambiguous clause was inserted in the treaty of Vienna providing that the Powers would give the Poles their own governments if and when they were ready for them.

At first it seemed as if Frederick William of Prussia would give the Poles liberal institutions,—a Pole, Radziwill, was appointed viceroy and the governor, Zerboni di Sposetti, was a progressive German. However, laws restricting the liberties of the Poles were gradually introduced, especially after 1830 when Flotwell was appointed governor.

The Poles in Austria did not fare so well as those in Posen since the Galician diet had no rights of legislation and even the petitions were generally ignored. Besides this, the national Polish element was suppressed in every way.

Alexander had guaranteed the Poles of the Congress Kingdom a constitution which in some ways was one of the most progressive in Europe. But some of the Poles were disappointed since the diet had no legal initiative and could only present petitions to the Czar and because several ambiguous phrases in the document were bound to lead to trouble.
As the Polish press began to show sympathy with revolutions in other parts of Europe, a censorship was introduced. Shortly after this, Alexander attended the Congress at Troppau and from then on he became more and more reactionary.

Polish secret societies now began to play an important part in keeping the revolutionary feelings alive and repressive measures, especially in the field of education, adopted to stifle these only drove them underground. Shortly after this, Alexander died and the next Czar, Nicholas, promised to carry out the constitution. But trouble immediately arose because the Poles insisted on a fair trial for those of their number who had cooperated in the Decembrist movement. The Diet of 1825 showed that the opposition to the Czar had increased and although the Diet controlled itself remarkable, the secret societies were stronger than ever.

On August 18, 1830, Nicholas informed Constantine that he intended to use the Polish army to aid him in crushing the revolution in France. This was the signal for a revolt to break out in Warsaw. The outlook for the revolution seemed favorable because the army was well organized and the financial condition of the country was good.

But the movement failed for several important reasons. In the first place, the Poles lacked chiefs and discipline; few of the common people were interested in the movement, and finally the Poles really fought a coalition.

In November, Nicholas issued and amnesty to all the Poles
As the following pages are made available, they will be presented with a comprehensive analysis of the current state of affairs in the field of "serpentology" and the potential implications of this new science.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the study of serpents, particularly in the context of their role in traditional medicine and their presumed abilities to impart knowledge and power. This interest has led to a flurry of scientific papers and speculative essays, each offering a different perspective on the nature and potential of these creatures.

However, it is important to note that the term "serpentology" is not yet widely accepted within the scientific community. Many experts view the study of serpents as a branch of biology, with a focus on understanding their anatomy, physiology, and behavior. Others argue that serpentology is a form of pseudo-science, lacking any solid theoretical framework or empirical evidence.

Despite these differences, there is a consensus that the study of serpents can contribute valuable insights into the evolution of life on Earth, as well as the complex ecological interactions within ecosystems.

In conclusion, while the study of serpents remains a subject of much debate, it is clear that these creatures hold a significant place in human culture and provide a rich field for scientific exploration.

Finally, I hope this essay serves as a catalyst for further research and discussion on the topic of serpentology.
with the following exceptions: 1) the instigators of the revolt. 2) those responsible for the massacre in Warsaw on August 15. 3) those who, since the 25th of January, had been members of the government.

The organic statute, issued on February 14 were the first of a series of reactionary measures incorporated the Polish army into the Russian army; abolished all electoral institutions; gave all the higher governmental and educational positions to Russians and declared the Russian language to be compulsory for all those in higher administrative offices.

Later ukases drafted Polish orphans to military colonies and transplanted some 45,000 Polish families to the Don and the Caucasias. Thus Congress Poland became little more than a Russian province.
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