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The criterion of religious truth in the theology of Albrecht Ritschl (A. B., Brown, 1906; A. M., Brown, 1908; S.T.B., Boston 1910)

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The Criterion of Religious Truth in the Theology of Albrecht Ritschl

By

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Analysis of Dissertation

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The Criterion of Religious Truth in the Theology of Albrecht Ritschl

A Introductory.

I The Problem.

It is the aim of the present investigation to state and evaluate independently the criterion of truth expressed and implied in the theological writings of Albrecht Ritschl, and to compare the result with the most significant German criticisms of that thinker.

II The Presuppositions of the Investigation.

Because of the specific aim of our study, we shall presuppose -

a a knowledge of Ritschl's theological system, as a whole and in its structure. Our interest is only in such aspects of the system as are normative. We presuppose further -

b some general knowledge of philosophy, in particular, of logic and theory of knowledge.

III The Sources.

The sources which we shall use are -

a Ritschl's own writings, in so far as they contain constructive material and not mere historical research. In our original investigation we shall confine ourselves to this source, except that we shall use "Die Entwicklung in Albrecht Ritschl's Theologie von 1874 bis 1889," by C. Fabricius
Tübingen, 1909), as source for the differences in the editions of Ritschl's chief works, and that we shall occasionally cite Ritschl's letters and other data from "Albrecht Ritschl's Leben" (2 Bd., Freiburg 1892 and 1896). In all cases we use our own English translation from the German.

b The German criticisms on Ritschl.

1 We exclude criticisms made by non-German writers because—

α some limitation of the field is necessary, if any fruitful result is to be attained.

β Ritschl's system, furthermore, is so peculiarly a growth on German soil, out of German history (see Wendland 25-32), that it is natural to treat it exclusively from the German point of view.

2 The later developments of Ritschlianism, in the so-called "Neo-Ritschlians," we leave out of account, except in so far as their writings contain a specific criticism of some phase of Ritschl's own system that is related to our problem.

3 Because the great majority of the criticisms made during Ritschl's life-time lack the perspective of his completed writings and are, on the whole, too heated, partisan and ephemeral to be of permanent value, we leave them out of account; with two exceptions. We shall note, so far as our subject requires it, the criticisms to which Ritschl himself replied; and also such contemporary criticisms as were published in new editions after Ritschl's death.

c We shall further make occasional use of illustrative and parallel material from the fields of philosophy and theology in general, in so far as such material seems particularly illuminating.
B Formulation and Criticism of Ritschl's Criterion of Truth.

I Experience, as being or containing a Criterion of Truth, with critical Analysis of Ritschl's views.

We have pointed out that we presuppose a knowledge of Ritschl's theology; if it had been our aim to give a systematic account of the structure of the system, that structure would have dictated the disposition of material in our investigation. But, since we are approaching Ritschl from a definite and limited point of view, precisely this point of view must determine, in large part, our method of treatment.

What, then, is Ritschl's criterion of truth? Since the days of Kant, at least, anyone who asks this question, or any other question relating to logic or to philosophy in the widest sense, must seek his answer, first in the data of experience; in the experienced facts. The obvious starting-point is thus furnished. And after answering this question, after having canvassed the field of immediate experience, we find another large group of data, which cannot strictly be described as experience in the narrow sense, surely not as immediate experience; but which constitutes a very essential part of the given material of the theologian. We mean history, the religious experience of the race. In discovering Ritschl's attitude toward experience and history, we shall expect to find many indications of the criteria which he employs to distinguish between "true" and "false" in the given material. History and Experience themselves, however, are facts and not theory. It will be our next task to ascertain the criterion of truth which Ritschl uses in his theory about
the inner nature of reality. Such a theory we ordinarily call
metaphysics. At this point, our theologian's use of terms is
curious and unique. It will be our double task to ascertain
what he means by metaphysics and how, in non-metaphysical ter-
minology, he undertakes to answer the metaphysical problems of
his theology; and we shall always seek thereby to discover and
formulate his implicit criterion of truth. There will then re-
main his own statements of logical principles. We shall thus
be ready for the final task of formulating and evaluating the
criterion (or criteria) which we shall have found in our investi-
gations. Our original investigation will then be complete; and
there will be left only the task of comparing our results with
those of other critics.

In our discussion of the first main theme, experience, we
shall follow the order, first Ritschl's criticism of other views,
then his own conception of experience; for our goal is the formu-
ation of his theory. And we shall discuss first the subjective
aspects of experience, and second the emphasis on the relation
between the soul and God, because of our principle of beginning
with the immediately given (cf. experience, then history).

a Ritschl's Criticism of the traditional Account of religious
Experience.

1 The subjective Aspect of Experience.

α The experience of repentance.

At the beginning of the Christian life, and to a degree, con-
tinuing through it, Luther and Melancthon, and, since them, par-
ticularly the Pietists, place an essential experience, the terrores
conscientiae or Busskampf. (R. V., III 3A., 153f; G. P., I 36i, II 344,
III 43 etc; and R. V., I 155, 355).
This type of repentance or penitence, Luther described as consisting of "torturing feelings of the most extreme kind"; it is not mere ethical repentance, but a crushing, humiliating experience of worthlessness and inner corruption (G. P., I 439, 583, II 155). Luther found in this mental suffering a presupposition, the Pietists, a constant test, of justification by faith (G. P., I 361).

Ritschl rejects this experience unconditionally.

i He sees in it an anxious, legalistic method, exactly contradictory to the real purpose of the Reformers (R. V., I 361), which could only tend to make faith pathological, weak and insecure (R. V., III 155). It did not appear in Luther's early teachings (R. V., III 158).

ii He finds it hostile to the conception of education in the Community (we capitalize, in order to distinguish the word as a translation of "Gemeinde"). The terrores are purely "natural" emotions of fear and horror, of a type that all education must seek to restrain, "in order to render it possible for the will to tend consistently toward the good" (R. V., III 157). This very ideal was also held by the Reformers (ib. 160).

iii In the experience, he views the subject as passive, as individually inspired by the Spirit. This implies indifference to the general promise of grace to the Community as a whole.

Results.

In these objections, the Christian Community, its needs, its history and particularly the ideals of the Lutheran Reformation (as a whole) are the criterion over against the psychological experience of the individual. We note the appeal from
Luther's words to his meaning, from the real to the ideal. The polemic against the terrores is found in G. P. and later works.

Conversion.

The experience of conversion has never been prominent in Lutheranism. Many Pietists, however, from Francke (G. P., II 251) on, have insisted on it as an experience of sudden and ecstatic joy (G. P., II 257, 274, 583, R. V., III 148). Ritschl rejects it.

i In some expressions, Ritschl seems merely indifferent toward the subject (R. V., III 150, 160).

ii He views the demand for dating the new birth, characteristic of Pietists and Methodists (so Ritschl) as absurd (R. V., III 618f).

iii As against the ecstatic type, he approves Bengel's ethical conception of conversion, as a return to the principles of the Reformation (G. P., III 65f).

iv His argument (I a I ii) against the terrores on the ground of the concept of education in the Gemeinde included a protest against conversion.

Results.

It is clear that he does not rate conversion as a test of truth, as a real experience in which one knows God. The Community (iii, iv) and not the individual is authoritative.

Religious Experience as individualistic.

The theological systems of Thomasius, Philippi, Hofmann and Lipsius took as their starting point "the religious need of the individual" and made "the subjective experience the logical foundation for the truths of dogma and theology" (R. V., I 641f, II 7).
Ritschl's objection to such presuppositions are instructive.

i The standpoint is likely to "compromise the objectivity of the doctrines" (R. V., I 642).

ii The history of the last three hundred years (cf. Pietism) has proven that the principle is too individualistic to have churchly character (ib. 643).

iii It is indifferent to Scripture; it posits doctrines on the basis of experience and then "proves them afterward out of the Scripture, come what may!" (ib.).

iv It overlooks the fact that the real object of theology is Christianity "as a movement common to all" (R. V., II 7).

v Even Lipsius had to concede that Christ and the Community were necessary as norm and explanation of this experience (ib.)

vi It has no protection against fanaticism.

vii It is a type of feeling. But, in at least one passage, he rejects all feeling in religion because it is "indifferent to will, reason, imagination and memory", and because it marks an enervated faith (R. V., III 151f).

Results.

The religious experiences of the individual, his feelings, are in no sense a criterion. The only protection against subjectivism is to be found in the history of the Community, and its faith in Christ.

2 The personal Relations between the individual Soul and God (or Christ).

We now turn our attention to those aspects of religious experience which view themselves as actual personal relations between the experiencing soul and the divine Being, - God or Christ.
The emphasis on love.

Ritschl's chief motive in G.P. may be difficult to formulate; certainly one element in it is his polemic against that form of religious experience that moves in the sphere and uses the language of love. He contends that the mutual love of God (or Christ) and the soul is a Roman Catholic type of piety; that its origin lies in the writings of St. Bernard and the Song of Solomon. That the Pietists viewed love for Christ the Bridegroom as the deeper meaning of faith was a phenomenon for which Ritschl had neither sympathy nor tolerance (G. P., I 192 etc).

Arndt was the first Lutheran to express the thought of love to God in sentimentally passionate and sensuous figures, such as that of the mystical marriage with Christ (G. P., II 42f, R. V., I 357). The characteristic element in this, for Ritschl, is the equality which it presupposes between Christ and the soul; a mutual love, an interchange of affection which excludes any thought of the exalted and divine nature of the loved one (R. V., I 360, G. P., I 345, 436, II 25, 44 etc). God is "the friend of the heart"; Jesus, "the sweetest." The language used was, doubtless, often trivial, irreverent and disgusting (G. P., II 63-93). The cult of the wounds of Jesus led to love for the whole mutilated, physical person of the martyred Savior.

It will be our endeavor to make clear Ritschl's reasons for rejecting this ideal of experience in all its forms.

i It is Catholic, and hostile to the spirit of the Reformation (G. P., I 142, 490). "The Reformers invalidated the concept" (R. V., III 2=3A 560f).

ii Faith is a form of obedience to Christ and God. Love,
however, implies a coordination of human and divine, which excludes the subordination of obedience (R. V., III 171f. 560).

iii It is a practical denial of the deity of Christ; for one cannot view one's equal as one's God; and further, it must always have "the fairest among the sons of men" as its object, thus involving a complete break between the divine and human natures in Christ (R. V., III 2=3A., 367ff. 561).

iv It cannot be permanent. It requires high tension of feeling, which must ultimately relax and be followed by a desolate reaction (R. V., III 2=3A., 171).

v Finally, it is based on our unclear definition of the concept of love. Love is, he teaches, a permanent will, which, moved by the feeling of the value of its object (spiritual personality), aims either to appropriate the same or to further it in its characteristic form of existence. This latter can happen only when both have the same life-purpose. But, Ritschl insists, even this notion of love, which is very different from that which the Pietists mean, is not an accurate description of the attitude of the soul toward God implied in faith. Love leaves the question as to possible coordination or subordination of the persons concerned still open; whereas faith necessarily implies the subordination of obedience (R. V., III 263f, Unterr.,9, R. V., III 2=3A., 560). This was the idea of the Reformers (G. P., I 436).

Results.

Ritschl's main argument (i) is that the characteristically Catholic is to be rejected in favor of the characteristically Lutheran. He specifically rejects feeling as a criterion (iv). A clear definition of the terms faith and love is essential
(ii, iii, v), in order that one may understand the implications of the Community teachings (such as the Deity of Christ). -

Testimonium spiritus sancti.

The doctrine of the witness of the Spirit has been one of the historical treasures of Christianity, and the experience has been for many an essential test of the truth of the Christian religion. In the dogmatics of Lutheranism it has played a significant part. In all of the forms which the doctrine has assumed, our theologian finds one common element: the divine Spirit is always conceived as active, the human spirit as passive (R. V., I 354, II 2=3A., 22, 160).

Ritschl's criticism of the doctrine is instructive.

i The doctrine is unthinkable. The essential mark of the human self is self-assertion; but this doctrine represents the human spirit as passive, as object of a mechanical activity "without its essential characteristic of self-assertion" (R. V., I 355).

ii It weakens the ethical element and so is one factor in "the breaking-up of the doctrine of justification and atonement" (R. V., I Ch.VII, 347-363).

iii The problem as to "how one is filled or affected by" the Spirit is insoluble, because lying outside the realm of observation (R. V., III 2=3A., 22).

iv The root of the matter, however, lies in the fact his definition of the Holy Spirit removes all significance from the traditional doctrine of the testimonium. Ritschl's doctrine of the Spirit is to be found as early as 1874 in R. V., III 1A., 61, 534 (Fab., 54); it is also to be found in Unterr., 1A., 55.
In these passages, the Holy Spirit, God's knowledge of Himself and the knowledge of God in the Community are equated; so also in R. V., III 2=3A., 444, 502 and 3A., 571. More specifically, it is "the knowledge of God as our Father" (R. V., III 562) or "of the Son of God as our Lord" (R. V., III 2=3A., 502).

The question arises as to whether this common knowledge of God and man has in any sense a personal existence, is the thought of a subject. The Ritschlian answer is negative. In R. V., III 1=3A., 562 the clear statement was made that the Holy Spirit, metaphysically speaking, is merely a category or formal term, just as justification and atonement, as judgments of God, are for Ritschl purely formal. But even this statement was too "metaphysical" for the later Ritschl and he dropped it from 3A., at W. Herrmann's suggestion (communicated to the writer by Prof. Herrmann). The later phrasing is: "the Spirit of God is also an attribute of the Christian Community as the power of the exhaustive knowledge which is common to all believers in Christ, and also as the motive of the life of every Christian" (R. V., III 3A., 571f.). The Spirit, he goes on to say, cannot be experienced by an individual in isolation from others. Individualism would cause all manner of fanaticism. No, the Spirit is precisely "the ground of the cooperation of individuals in the Community", and it is its work to guarantee "the agreement of the impulses (of believers, to free activity as children of God) with the purpose of God, and the likeness of these strivings in all individuals". Still more plainly, it is "the common spirit in which the members of the Community win their common knowledge of God and their common impulses toward the Kingdom of God and toward becoming children
of God" (Unterr., 37, R. V., III 501).

Prof. H. Weiss of Tübingen, criticising this concept declared that according to it "the Holy Spirit is in no sense anything real or substantial." Ritschl replied that Weiss used "real" in the sense of "something that must be asserted prior to and apart from any particular activity." This criticism is unjust on Ritschl's part; but it reveals his own tendency to find the only religious reality in the activity of the Community-consciousness (cf. T. M. 71). With such a view it is no wonder that he found the testimonium sancti spiritus something superfluous.

Results.

All four considerations are based on the activity of the self as the only criterion of truth and reality. The testimonium cannot be true in any sense that would involve the assertion of the existence of the Spirit prior to or apart from its activity in the Community (iv). The denial that the spirit of man can be "object of a mechanical activity" (i) would logically involve the denial of any real knowledge of the world in sense perception. The criterion in this whole discussion is immediate, subjective, active experience: only this is true or real, if Ritschl's words are to be taken seriously. "God's knowledge of Himself" is a phrase that Ritschl has no logical right to use, as specifying something apart from the activity of that knowledge in human consciousness. —

y Mysticism.

The term "mysticism" is so vague that it might be extended to include all that we have yet discussed as Christian Experience; or narrowed to exclude everything except the most abnormal ecstatic experiences of self-identification with the absolute.
we use it here in a quite arbitrary manner, to designate the experiences that Lutherans have associated with the term *unio mystica*.

Ritschl distinguishes three elements in mysticism: personal relation to God, contemplation of Him, union with Him.

By a personal relation to God, Ritschl means that conception which views trust, humility, patience, prayer and gratitude as inadequate expressions of the Christian life, that need to be supplemented by "a still converse of the soul with the Savior", a "communion of prayer with question and answer". The emphasis on love (cf. above I 2) is one phase of this relation (R. V., I 347, T. M., 77).

By the contemplation of God, Ritschl means a state identical with the goal of the Neo-Platonic philosophy (R. V., I 360, III 2=3A.,467f.); more specifically, "the contemplative appropriation of Christ."

The union with God is the highest stage, in which, as Zinzendorf said, "the poor creature becomes one soul and one body with his creator, by renouncing his own free will" (R. V., I 596). In "the mystical union with God, the bliss of heaven is anticipated in a brief experience of joy" (R. V., I 121) (cf. also R. V., III 95, 2=3A., 108).

Ritschl waged incessant polemic against all forms of the *unio mystica*, and for the following reasons.

1 Mystics are indifferent toward the history and the historical revelation (R. V., I 372, III 2=3A., 225-227). This is fatal to sound religion, for in historical knowledge we have our only criterion of religious sanity and protection from fanaticism (T. M., 77).
2 The experience is of Catholic origin (G. P., I 28); and was not Luther's teaching (R. V., III 96, G. P., II 22). All early Lutherans treated the unio mystica as the union of Christ with the Church, not with the individual believer (G. P., II 98). According to Lutheran standards, it is "apocryphal" (R. V., I 357, G. P., II 21f.).

3 It is unethical. Firstly, because it is spasmodic and erratic, whereas ethical principle must be steady and permanent (G. P., I 337); and secondly, it leads to a renunciation of the will, whereas the will is the center of ethics (G. P., I 473ff.).

4 It is antisocial, as Arndt and the Anabaptists prove (G. P., II 47, 155). "It can thrive only in the cloister or in the hermit's cell" (R. V., I 124).

5 It is otherworldly. It aims at salvation through negation of the world, it longs to be free from the world. But this contradicts the Reformation doctrine of justification, which demands a relation to the world, i.e. a mastery over it (R. V., I 121-123, III 95).

6 It is based on the absurd scholastic psychology, which asserts the soul-in-itself (apart from all activities) as the location of the unio mystica (R. V., III 2-3A., 21, T. M., passim, cf. Metaphysics below).

Results.

Negatively the result is clear. No experience of any individual, apart from the Community, can, of itself, be regarded as a relation to God.

We find three positive criteria implicit in the discussion:- first, the history and ideals of the Community (1, 2, 4, 5); second, the metaphysics which denies a soul apart from mental
activity (6); and third, ethical sanity (3). The first is, as we have seen, Ritschl's characteristic norm for rejecting all subjectivism (cf. above I=1αβγ2α).

b Ritschl's own Theory of religious Experience.

In spite of the fact that Ritschl rejects the traditional formulations of religious experience, it is far from his purpose to build up a purely objective system, out of relation to the concrete facts of the inner life of individuals. Let us then try to discover his positive conception, starting from the same two general standpoints that guided us above.

1 The subjective Aspect of Experience.

α The Activity of the Subject.

In his attack on the testimonium spiritus sancti and the unio mystica, Ritschl had occasion to assert the doctrine of the activity of the human subject over against the scholastic psychology. In all experience, the human self is acting, not acted on (R. V., II 6). In a personal life, reality pertains to the spiritual causality, and to nothing else. (T. M., 55, 74). Nothing really belongs to the subject which the subject itself does not do.

Result.

The activity of the subject is a characteristic, if not a criterion, of all true religious experience. —

β Immediacy.

A conception of Ritschl's related to the preceding is that all religious truth must be verifiable in present experience. He rejects every notion that cannot be experienced as untrue because unpractical (T. M., 50). "A sound religious sense finds
its support in experience" (R. V.,III 349). It is a fundamental principle that "all theological propositions are valid for the present" (R. V.,I 1). There should be nothing in dogmatics that cannot be used in the pulpit and in the relations of Christians with one another (R. V.,III 3A., 573). These passages are typical.

Results.

Here the criterion of truth is verifiability in experience. As stated it is unrelated to the claims of history and of the Community.

2 The personal Relations between the individual Soul and God (or Christ).

After Ritschl's decisive rejection of an immediate relation of the soul to God (or Christ), it would appear that any relation which he would concede must be mediated by some agency. And, in view of the prominence of the Community in his thought, we should expect that agency to be some aspect or aspects of the Christian history.

α As mediated.

i Through Revelation in Christ.

What sort of relation to Christ can one experience? Ritschl says: "In so far as Christ, on the one hand through the historical recollection of Him which is preserved in the church, on the other hand, as the continual author of all Christlike influences and inspirations in other men, is efficacious for the individual believer, this takes place necessarily in personal and not in impersonal form" (R. V.,III 558, cf. 514). And so the present, personal, exalted Christ is efficient cause of human experiences? By no means! We know Christ only through the historical tradition; the present influence of Christ must be stated as the
influence of a personality, it is true—but the personality is precisely a "form". The content lies in the history and in our activity. It is one of the main ideas in T. M. that "the religious connection of our life with God" is mediated by the accurate historical recollection of Christ (T. M., 76, 77). Similar teachings are to be found in Unterr. (66ff). In other words, the only Christ with whom we have to do is the historical Christ, as the empirical occasion and cause of all the Christian history, and as present in that history in the same sense in which, e.g., the historical John Wesley may be figuratively thought of as immanent force and efficient cause in the history of world-wide Methodism.

Result.

The accurate tradition of the facts regarding the historical Christ is the criterion of the truth of all judgments which assert a relation of the soul to God (or Christ). No experience guarantees its own validity. —

ii Through the World.

It is a commonplace of the Ritschlian system that Christianity involves a relation to the world. "One experiences oneself as an individual superior to the world in the real fellowship with the true spiritual God, by testing the spiritual value of one's individuality through the mastery over all possible hindrances from the extended, natural world" (R. V., III 474). "In Christianity one is religiously dependent on the supramundane God only in so far as one experiences one's religious freedom over against the world, and confirms it in one's world-view and estimate of one's self. (The form of religious experience) finds its content in all the relations of man to the world" (R. V., III 555, cf. Schl. 43).
Results.

Here the criterion takes the form: We know that our Christian salvation is fellowship with God, because in it we experience freedom from the world. The experienced fact is the victorious relation to the world; the relation to God is not experienced, but inferred. —

iii Through the Community.

We have found that our relation to God is not an immediate one, but is mediated through the historical revelation in Christ, and through our relation to the world. But we should not know God through either of these means, were they not mediated to us through the Community. Ritschl accepts Schleiermacher's conception of Christian experience as one "possible (only) in the church, in spite of its prevailing entanglement with sin, in which he distinguishes a personal and a social element" (R. V., III 530, 532). For further proof we refer to the discussion of the Community below.

Result.

The criterion of the truth of the fact that certain experiences are a relation to God is the fact that they are experienced within the Community. —

β As immediate.

After the rejection of all traditional notions of an immediate relation to God or Christ and after the proof that Ritschl views all religious experience as mediated through the Community one would not expect to find belief in any immediate relation of the soul to God in Ritschl's thought. It is true that his opposition to all forms of Mysticism grew sharper with
the years (cf. G. P., Fab., 16 etc.). Against J. Kaftan, who taught that "the life of the soul hid with Christ in God is the heart of the Christian religion, the relation to the world a side, a specification of this life in God" he waged an earnest polemic (T. M., 69; Fab., 17; Th. L. Z., 1881).

Nevertheless, the thought of an immediate personal relation to God is not one that a Christian man easily abandons. It is implied in Ritschl's teaching as to adoption. "Inasmuch as εἰς-Θεόσια refers to the most inward spiritual communion between man and God, (it) agrees precisely with the normative analogy of the relations in a human family. The fellowship which sinners may have with God is as close as that between the head and the members of a family" (R. V., III 94). The language of immediacy would scarcely be stronger. A Mystic might be speaking, when he says: However much regard one may have for the forms of life in the fellowship of the church "yet in the personal sanctuary of this peculiar knowledge of God, of the world and of one's self, which consists more of states of feeling than of intellectual reflections, one is absolutely independent over against men, or, if not, one has not yet attained the enjoyment of reconciliation" (R. V., III 617). In relation to the faith in divine Providence, Ritschl emphasizes again the purely personal character of religious experience. Here "one comes to one's conclusions not by observation of the attitude which others take to the world, but purely through one's own experiences" (R. V., III 583).

The editions of R. V. reveal "a steadily growing sympathy for the need of contemplative faith in Christ" (Fab., 27). But he insists that such contemplation always presupposes education in
the Community, which is overlooked in the act itself. Nevertheless Fabricius characterizes the changes made by Ritschl in a number of passages as marking "an approach toward Mysticism" (Fab., 80f.).

Result.

Ritschl's language regarding adoption, faith in Providence, and the "personal sanctuary", as well as his partial tendency toward contemplative Mysticism, imply an immediate experience, independent of men (even of the Community) as criterion. —

II History, as being or containing a Criterion of religious Truth.

We have seen hints of an experience which is a direct relation to God. But our prevailing impression is that religious experience is not known as a relation to God except in so far as it is grounded in the history of the Christian Community. In what sense, then, does that history contain a criterion of truth?

a Orientation.

Before we discuss the concrete aspects of history which may be normative for Ritschl, it is fitting to put to him two questions:— first, why he views history as essential to religion, and second, what theoretical significance he attaches to this essential relation.

1 Why History is essential to Christianity.

a Historical Founder.

Christianity has an historical founder to whom is assigned a place in the Christian view of the world (R. V., III 364 ff.). That is, Ritschl teaches that in order to know the religious truth about the universe, we must know the historical founder of Christianity. He is "the center of the organization of the
universe”, "the exhaustive ground for our appropriating the Christian world view” (R. V., III 559). Further, "believing is necessarily dependent on its historical ground, the revelation of God in Christ and consequently on the preaching of the gospel in the church" (Fid. impl., 73). This second consideration leads us to the thought of doctrine as tradition.

Doctrine as historical Tradition.

A religion, so runs Ritschl's argument, needs more than man's position in the world and the use of reason in order to secure adequate foothold. If Kant had been consistent, he would have had "to give up the standpoint of the mere reason and assume that of historical empiricism" (R. V., I 451 f.). "There never was a 'natural' religion" (G. A., II 175). This idea recurs often (Ch. Voll., 17, R. V., III 589, etc.). "Beliefs and feelings seem to be 'natural' only because we are at once familiar with and forgetful of their historical connection." "Every social religion is a tradition of doctrine" (R. V., III 2=3A., 189).

Results.

Every religious judgment that is true in the Christian sense finds its source in the Community tradition about the Founder.—

2 The Problem which arises from the Relation of Christianity to History.

We search Ritschl's pages in vain to find any hint that he has felt the scepticism of modern thought toward the security of historical fact as a basis of religion. The only religious difficulty that Ritschl finds in the contemplation of history is in the question as to whether the delay through the ages in the realization of the Kingdom indicates an imperfection in God (R. V., III 284). This problem cannot be solved by any empirical examination
of the facts of history, and further, the Ritschlian presuppositions exclude any solution of the fate of those nations that stand outside the course of the historical development of Christianity (R. V., III 291 f., cf. 591).

Result.

Ritschl is not aware of the problems inherent in the relation of Christianity and History. In so far as he realizes them, he does not attempt a serious solution. —

b Revelation as being or containing a Criterion of Truth.

1 Definition.

α In the universal Sense.

The positive historical content of a religion is called revelation (Unterr., 66). A definition of the term we find in the essay "On the Conscience" (1876). "By the term revelation of God we mean the particular origin of a complete world-view which becomes the conviction of a religious Community and consequently leads many individuals to a common type of self-evaluation and character" (G. A., II 182).

This is a definition of a general concept of revelation, which is indifferent to the uniqueness of Christianity. It is purely empirical. But Ritschl does not view non-Christian revelations as true. This definition, then, does not help us to an understanding of revelation as a criterion of truth.

Result.

Revelation is what a religious Community believes.—

5 In the Christian Sense.

The Christian revelation is for him, final and "concides with God's knowledge of Himself" (Unterr., 37, cf. above I 2 ).
In the context of the proposed research, it is important to understand the implications of the new findings. The data collected in this study provides strong evidence in support of the theoretical framework. Furthermore, the results have implications for future research in related fields.

The methodology used in this study is robust and reliable. The results are consistent with previous findings, and the data has been validated through various statistical tests. The implications of these findings are significant for the field of study, as they offer new insights and perspectives.

In conclusion, the research conducted in this study has yielded valuable insights. The implications of these findings are far-reaching, and they will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming publication. The results are promising, and further research is encouraged to explore the potential applications of these findings.
In the overwhelming number of cases where the word "revelation" is used, we find it coupled with the phrase "in Christ." Now this final revelation in Christ is true because "Jesus judged the inner unity of life, of which He was conscious, as the means of the complete self-revelation of God" (R. V., III 411 f.).

Result.

The final Christian revelation is the content of the self-consciousness of Jesus. —

2 Its Place in the Christian Religion.

Essential.

It follows from the general and the specifically Christian definitions that revelation is something essential for the Community of those who believe on Him who gave it. Indeed, "no religion can be completely represented, if the attribute of revelation is either denied or set aside as merely indifferent" (R. V., III 192, 508, 559).

Ritschl holds (with Luther) that "genuine and sincere faith is exercised only in reference to the genuine revelation of God" (R. V., III 2±3A., 203). The exclusive authority of the Christian revelation and history is the only supreme criterion of truth.

Result.

The Christian revelation is the sole criterion of religious truth. —

Its Limits.

We have found Ritschl describing the revealed knowledge of God in the Community as equivalent to God's knowledge of Himself (Holy Spirit). Such an utterance makes the impression of being
extravagant and one-sided. And yet we search Ritschl's pages in vain for any material limitation of its scope. He concedes, it is true, that the fact of sin is known outside of Christendom and independent of the revelation (G. A., II 177 ff; R. V., III 311). He points out that the relation of God's will of love to our individual fate, bound up as it is with the history of different groups and of all humanity, is something which we can scarcely grasp (R. V., III 591); if our religious knowledge is identical with God's knowledge of Himself, this difficulty is strange. But such limitations are exceptional. Christianity is for him "the perfect knowledge of God" (Unterr., I). The emphasis is on the unlimited and final character of the revelation. Result.

The Christian revelation is a perfect criterion of religious truth.

Its Relation to Conscience.

In the essay "On the Conscience" (G. A., II 177-203), Ritschl distinguishes between the accusing conscience (pangs after the wrong act) and the law-giving conscience (scruples in advance of the act, p. 201). Both types, he admits, may in a sense be called "the voice of God." On account of this similarity to revelation, conscience has been considered by many as of equal authority with revelation. But, for three reasons, this view is untenable. First, conscience does not correspond to the general definition of revelation (II b 1a). Second, the voice of God in conscience applies only to the individual who hears it, whereas the founder of a religion receives the word of God with the specification that he proclaim it to others. And third, conscience is always a
result of the ethical education of the individual in the Community. The difference between conscience and revelation is, accordingly, greater than their resemblance, and it is impossible to use the phenomena of conscience as the key for the understanding of divine revelation or as norm of the peculiarity of social religion (G. A., II 183). In another passage Ritschl says that there is "no universal ethical conscience" (ib., 192).

Now, the only unerring conscience in history, which did not need to bow before any external authority is that of our Lord Jesus Christ. It was in the strength of the conscience of Jesus, not his own, that Luther at Worms resisted the highest worldly power (ib., 200 f.). The ground for this unique position of Jesus is that He was conscious of a calling which required Him to realize the comprehensive whole of the ethical life, the Kingdom of God.

Results.

On the one hand, it is clear that conscience is for Ritschl in no sense a criterion of truth. Revelation is unconditionally superior to conscience, except in the case of Jesus, where alone the two coincide. —

§ Its Relation to Reason.

Ritschl stands on Kantian ground in regard to the affirmation of the rational possibility of revelation (R. V., II 460).

1 Ratio and revelatio.

But what is the relation of the actually given revelation to the reason? Ritschl replies in the terminology of Scholasticism, that the revelatio supra rationem holds true in the sense that the former must be given and is not a product of reason; and that
revelatio contra rationem is true of reason as "a connected view of the world" (framed) in forms of knowledge which are indifferent toward the Christian religion" (R. V., III 2=3A., 24).

Result.

Whatever the criterion of religious truth may be, it is not rational. —

ii The Rationalizing of Revelation through Theology.

In spite of the separation of reason and revelation in the above-mentioned formulae, we find an attempt to bring the two together in theology. Revelation itself is, indeed, "not a system of dogmas, but the merciful will of God revealed in Christ" (G. A., I 91). But intellectual formulation is necessary. "The logical, epistemological and psychological principles which make up the ratio or intellectus (are forms) without which the divine revelation can not be understood at all, at least not theologically expounded. (As Hollatz says), sine ratione nihil intelligimus" (R. V., III 23). But after all, the theoretical form does not touch the essence of the matter; "systematic theology - up to the present - has been expressed in concepts which, as regards their form, must arise outside the fact of Christianity, in so far as scientific reflection about Christianity is, as such, no element of Christian faith and life" (R. V., I 616, cf. below IV b2).

Result.

Theological, rational form is necessary, but this form is no element of Christian faith or life, and so is no criterion of their truth or validity. —

3 How the Revelation is mediated to Individuals.

We have seen that revelation is, according to Ritschl, an
essential element in Christianity, a complete knowledge of God, superior to conscience and reason. If the revelation is so important and so independent of the natural, spiritual and intellectual equipment of the individual, it becomes of the utmost importance to ascertain and evaluate the medium or media through which the individual comes into possession of this revelation. These are three, — the Community, the Scriptures and Christ.

α Through the Community.

The immediate social environment in which the individual stands and in which he finds the revelation given is the Community, which "itself is part of the revelation, for "no revelation of God is complete, except when the believing Community is recognized" (R. V.,III 520).

β Through the Scriptures.

In the Community the record of the historical revelation is preserved in the form of the Scriptures. "It is a fundamental principle of the evangelical church that Christian doctrine shall be based on Holy Scripture alone" (Unterr.,1, R. V.,II 10). Are, then, the Scriptures the criterion of truth, by virtue of the fact that the revelation is contained in them? We can answer this question only by a definition of what Ritschl means by the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures.

i Inspiration.

He rejects the doctrine of verbal inspiration, because in order for it to have significance, an infallible interpretation is necessary, and this can be asserted only by affirming the testimonium spiritus sancti in exegesis - that is personal inspiration (R. V.,II 5, 6). Ritschl rejects this conception absolutely
(cf. above I n 2). The formula that Scripture interprets itself is a subterfuge, for it is always "we who interpret the Scripture" (G. A., II 22).

After refuting verbal inspiration, we expect to find our author giving some definition of his own as to what inspiration is. But instead, he tries to show that the specific advantage of the N. T. writings lies in their authentic understanding of the religions of the O. T. (R. V., II 10, 16, based on Alt. K., 282 etc.). "With this criterion", he thinks that he can "go without a theory of inspiration for these writings, (so long as) one can actually distinguish (them) from all others in respect to their superior value" (R. V., II 17f.).

Results.

The criterion of the inspiration of the N. T. books is their comprehension of O. T. religion. This criterion is purely empirical. It proves Ritschl’s own inspiration, for it presupposes that he too understands the O. T. No theory is necessary. —

ii Authority.

How far authoritative?

Ritschl's account of inspiration does not tell us how far the Scriptures are for him a criterion of truth. We must put the question to him in another form. How far, we ask, are the Scriptures authoritative? His only answer to this question is the statement that the N. T. is the only authentic source of the fundamental principles of the Christian religion (R. V., II 18, 379). The Scriptures alone are the test of truth, over against any "possible or probable success" (G. A., I 54). "In the Word of God, God is subject, in religious confession, man" (G. A., I 118).
The Scriptures contain the essential truth of Christianity. How far qualified?

In the first place, Ritschl rejects the infallibility of Scripture. Paul, for example, is not a good exegete (R. V., II 308f, 311.) and has Gnostic tendencies (ib., 314). In the writings of James and John and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, he finds a marked descent from the height of the thoughts of Jesus (R. V., II 301). The N. T. has no clear and unanimous teaching, even about such matters as the deity of Christ (R. V., III 378).

In the second place, he teaches that the authority of the N. T. is relative. The value of the N. T. can be expressed only relatively to the later Christian literature (R. V., II 12). The N. T. is theologically inadequate, because Christian life in Catholicism and Protestantism has "grown beyond the standpoint of the N. T. writers" (R. V., II 25). Therefore the theologian stands also under the leading of the doctrinal standards of his church, because theology is in the service of the church (R. V., II 18).

Result.

Scripture is criterion only in so far as it is appropriated by the Community.

Through Christ.

Content of the Revelation in Christ.

Christ reveals "that God is love, and that His own final goal and that of the World is the Kingdom of God" (R. V., II 101). The consciousness of the universal moral law was first incorporated into human consciousness through the revelation in Christ (G. A., I 175); and thence human love derives its meaning (R. V., III 2=3A., 226).
ii Authority.

The revelation "in Christ" is the only authoritative one (cf. above I a 2, II a 1, II b 1). It is perfect and complete (R. V., II 13, Unterr., 19, cf. above II b 2). It is unsurpassable perfection (R. V., II 101). Jesus founds His religion with the claim of revealing God completely, so that no further revelation is thinkable or to be expected (R. V., III 2=3A., 367). This revelation is the given and authoritative source for all theology (R. V., III 6, 192, 225, 308; T. M., 30, 47).

Result.

The given revelation in Christ is the ultimate and final criterion of all religious truth. —

C Christ as Criterion of Truth.

Our study of revelation has led us to Christ as the bearer of the absolute, perfect and final revelation. And as we propose now to interrogate Ritschl as to his estimate of the person of Christ.

1 Essential to Christianity.

We know "God in Christ, only in Christ" (T. M., 31; so Luther R. V., III 2=3A., 202 and Melancthon). "The thought of God must always be in connection with the recognition of the bearer of the revelation" (Unterr., 1).

Ritschl bases the abiding significance of Christ for His Community on three facts. First, Christ is the only one who was capable of carrying out His calling of founding the Kingdom of God. Second, His life-purpose was the same as God's purpose in the world. Third, the mastery over the World has been given to Him, as is shown by His independence and faithfulness (Unterr., 16, 17, 18).
Let us consider these points. Christ was the only one who could found the Kingdom. Yes, but we ask why? Ritschl's answer is simply, because He did; not because He was the only one who could do it. "If", he says, "another could be pointed out who were materially like Him in grace and truth, in world-conquering patience, in scope of purpose and success, this other would nevertheless stand in historical dependence on Christ, and so be formally unlike Him" (R. V., III 438). (That the supposition of a person materially like Christ is by no means remote with Ritschl is clear from R. V., III 366, note 1). If this means anything, it means that the material authority of Christ is derived from the significance of the ideas which He embodied, not that the ideas (revelation) derived their significance from His person; and that His uniqueness lies in the chronological accident that He was the first to embody these ideas and so found the Community. (cf. above II a 1).

The assertion of Christ's knowledge of God's purpose either implies a mystical relation between Christ and God (which Ritschl, of course, denies) or else places Christ's self-consciousness on a level with the ordinary human conscience (which is not authoritative, cf. above II b 2).

Neither of the first two points, Ritschl admits, proves Christ's uniqueness over against Mohammed. Each founded a Community and each believed that he was embodying God's purpose. But Christ alone possessed the "mastery over the world" (R. V., III 2=3A., 367). Here, however, Ritschl's argument does not show why the sinlessness of Christ is any more essential to religion than is the abstract ideal of sinlessness.
Christ is supreme criterion of truth; His uniqueness lies in the facts the He founded His Community and was sinless.

2 The Significance of the historical Facts about Christ.

We ask Ritschl for his estimate of the historical Christ and we are struck by his relative indifference to the concrete facts in regard to Jesus, - both words and deeds. R. V.,II is far more a discussion of Paul than of Jesus (see index). That through the death of Christ we have peace is "an aesthetic judgment, not a necessary religious idea" (Unterr., 32, R. V.,III 537f.); the death on the cross was simply an illustration of Christ's obedience in His calling.

His indifference to the history may also be observed in his attitude toward miracle. Miracles are "effects which have not yet been explained according to law" (R. V.,III 582). Christ was "dependent on the natural laws that condition human life", although "we do not know how far Christ's power over external nature extended" (R. V.,III 430). But in no case is miracle inconsistent with "the probability of the systematic connection of the whole world according to natural law" (Unterr., 12). He makes occasional (but rare) mention of the resurrection (R. V.,III 1 A., 489; T. M., 57) as a proof of Christ's relation to God or as completion of His revelation (Unterr., 2=3A., 18). The virgin birth he never mentions. Indeed, no historical miracle is religiously significant, "for everyone will himself experience miracles through his religious faith, in comparison with which nothing is more unnecessary than to speculate about miracles that others have experienced" (Unterr., 12).
Ritschl emphasizes, it is true, the need of accurate and detailed recollection of the historical Christ in the Community (T. M., 76, R. V.,III 2=3A., 377). Here, however, the total "Portrait of Christ" not the individual historical facts, is the heart of the matter.

Result.

There are many details in the tradition about Christ that are not essential to the normative Christ. —

3 The ethical and religious Interpretation of Christ.

"What we recognize in the historically complete portrait of Christ, as the real value of His life, attains, through the peculiarity of this phenomenon and through its normative relation to the purpose of our religious - ethical life, the value of a permanent rule; because we perceive at the same time that we are able to enter into His relation to God and the World only through the stimulating and directing force of this Person" (R. V.,III 366). This sentence contains Ritschl's attempt to mediate between the historical and the ethical - religious elements. The stress is not laid on historical fact, but on ideal worth.

Result.

Not the personal Christ but the Christ-ideal in the tradition is here the ultimate criterion. We have only to "recognize" it.—

≈ As royal Prophet.

Nevertheless, he proposes to interpret the traditional doctrine of the "offices" from the point of view of Christ's self-consciousness, and so reduces the traditional three to two; Christ is royal Prophet and royal Priest (R. V.,III 407, 415, 417). Here he lays a great deal of stress on the validity of the history.
Apart from the conscious purpose of His life, His sufferings, for example, far from being our salvation, would be either merely indifferent (ethically) or symptomatic of sickness (R. V., III 419). Now His purpose was to be royal prophet, to realize the ethical rule of God (R. V., III 421 f.). His task was the founding of the universal ethical fellowship of men as the goal in the World (R. V., III 423). Christ's very obedience and faithfulness are of themselves proof that He is supported by God and the revealer of God's will of love (R. V., III 425 f.). The ethical interpretation of Christ involves the religious.

It is at this point that Ritschl introduces his theory of the divinity of Christ. The attribute of Christ as royal prophet, — His grace and faithfulness — are for the Christian religion precisely the essential attributes of God. The correct evaluation of this perfect revelation of God through Christ is secured in the predicate of His divinity (Unterr., 2=3A., 19).

i Divinity.

As prophet, Christ reveals God and so is Himself God (Unterr., 35). Nevertheless, Christ the royal Prophet is divine only in relation to the actual existence and success of His Community (R. V., III 437). "The recognition of Christ's uniqueness can be grounded only in the combination between Him and His Community" (R. V., III 438). If the Community did not recognize Christ as its Head and Lord, then He could not be properly described as divine (R. V., III 259f, 393). This thought occurs in Ritschl's earliest (Alt. K., 84) and latest (Fid. impl., 63) period.

Otherwise expressed, the divinity of Christ is known through the confidence which the Community has in Him. So Ritschl interpreted Luther: "I honor Christ as God by trusting the efficacy
of His benevolent goodness for my salvation" (R. V., III 2=3A., 376); "the confidence in Jesus Christ or in the Holy Spirit is the recognition of the divinity of Christ or the Spirit, because such confidence can be directed only to God (R. V., III 3A., 370). "An authority which regulates exhaustively all human confidence in God has the worth of divinity" (R. V., III 383). Whatever one supremely trusts in one's God; our "confidence" is the criterion of divinity.

All doctrines of the two natures and the three offices are to him an abomination (R. V., III 371, 374f, 417). The fact of Christ's relation to God is given; we must renounce all attempts to explain how it is possible (T. M., 57, R. V., III 426).

Nevertheless, he contends against theological opponents that he does not regard Christ as a "mere man". It is true that he had said: "As God sees it, this human Life is viewed as the final revelation of God, because the good of the world, to which Christ's life is consecrated, is grounded in God's purpose" (R. V., III 437). "This human Life"; and yet Christ is not a "mere man", "for by a 'mere man', if I ever used the expression, I should mean man as a natural being, without reference to any marks of spiritual and ethical personality" (R. V., III 3A., 375f.). But Ritschl thus appeals to an involved theoretical consideration, an abstraction which never existed outside of Australian forests: - a wholly undeveloped man.

Result.

Ritschl views Jesus as a man of extraordinary purity and constancy of life, who revealed God by doing His will, and whose "divinity" is know essentially in the trust that the Community which He founded directs to Him with such confidence as one gives
to God. Christ is the criterion of truth. We have only to trust Him. No metaphysical explanation of this fact is necessary or possible.

ii In statu exaltationis.

Ritschl believed that the orthodox theology had undertaken the nonsensical task of establishing an idea of God and Christ wholly a priori and apart from experience; Ritschl himself always started from the concrete, empirical reality. Consequently he was methodologically opposed to the traditional account of Christ in statu exaltationis. A recognition of Christ's post-existence "apart from what He actually does for the salvation of His Community is no faith in Him" (cf. R. V., I 291).

The exaltatio must be thought in terms of the historical existence of Christ (R. V., III 383f., 433). It is the permanent working of that existence (R. V., III 406). Faith overlooks the temporal interval between Jesus and the present (R. V., I 291). Still more; faith does not regard Jesus as one who has existed, but as one who still exists (R. V., III 378). This present existence must be thought as personal; for the memory of Christ and the thought of Christ as working in the Church must assume personal form (R. V., III 558).

Now Ritschl says that everything in the N. T. that goes beyond the "practical meaning" of the lordship of Christ "belongs in the realm of the γνώσις that raises more problems than it solves" (R. V., III 379). The query is whether Ritschl's principles should lead him to place the actual present existence of Christ in the scope of such γνώσις. First, his eschatology is very vague. A doctrine of Heaven is missing from his writings; the
life after death is a mere appendage to his system (cf. below III a 4β). It is natural that his conception of the personal existence of the exalted Christ should also be vague and uncertain. Second, the *exaltatio* is "a mystery, which is recognized by the Community as the guarantee that His life-purpose was not frustrated by His death, but was completed." The "revealed side" of this mystery is "the recollection of His life-work" and His personal influence in the life of the Community (Unterr., 20). This belief in "mystery" is a piece of γνωσίς, which appeared late in his thought (Fab., 97). He was driven to it by his need for a living Christ. Third, all positive descriptions of the work of the Exalted One are in reality descriptions of deeds of the Community; so, the recollection of the historical Christ, the present influence of Christ (as ethically appropriated). The personal existence of Christ is γνωσίς.

Result.

Ritschl is inconsistent in his treatment of the *exaltatio*. At first he uses the empirical criterion of immediate present experience, and seems to reject the γνωσίς that Christ lives with God; later, he comes into closer touch with the Church tradition and asserts the γνωσίς.

iii His preexistence.

In 1874, Ritschl was hostile to the doctrine of preexistence. It is a mystery, a "truth - in - itself". (R. V., III 1A., 356-358). This attack was not repeated in 2A. Even in 1A., Christ, as founder and Lord of the Kingdom, is eternal object of the knowledge and choice of God, just as the Kingdom itself is; except that He really precedes the Kingdom in the divine foreknowledge. In an
addition of 2=3A., he goes further: "by deducting the difference (for God) between willing and doing, the formula results that Christ has eternally existed for God as the One who for us is revealed in temporal limitation. But precisely for God; as preexistent, Christ is for us hidden" (R. V.,III 2=3A., 443f.).

Results.

In 1A., the criterion is immediate experience and that alone. Mystery is denied. In 2=3A., he approaches the traditional view. Mystery is affirmed. —

β As royal Priest.

The royal Priesthood of Christ is "the justified expression of the fact that Christ, as subject of the perfect, spiritual religion, stood in the closest possible communion with God (R. V., III 447). He speaks of "the solidaric unity" of Jesus with God (Unterr., 17). "Jesus undoubtedly experienced a unique relation to God" (Unterr., 17).

This communion with God was nothing transcendent or metaphysical, but consisted in obedience and love (Unterr., 17, 31-34).

Result.

The criterion of truth is the ethical self-consciousness of Jesus. —

d The Community as being or containing a Criterion of Truth.

Our discussion of Christ as royal Prophet left us with the result that His work must be thought in relation to the Community of the Kingdom of God (cf. above II c3x etc.) As Ritschl puts it, "If the founding of the Community by Christ and the justification and atonement of sinners coincide, then the exposition of these deeds of Christ is the center of a properly arranged system of Theology" (R. V.,I 2).
1 As historical.

This Community has had a history. Is that actual historical development normative for the present?

Now the Community that Ritschl means is not identical with the historical Roman Catholic Church (R. V., I 145). Yet Ritschl finds it important to prove that the Reformation did not mark a complete break with the past, but was in a sense the continuation of the ideal tendency of the Roman Church (ib.). The actual, outer unity of the Church was to him a real value. G. P. was a polemic against all separatism (G. P., I 184, 356, 398 etc.) "The unity of the worshiping Community is so necessary a link in the World view of the Christian religion, that the division of the church into 'sects' is a great hindrance to the persuasive power of that religion" (Unterr., 70). The only actual unity is a unity of development under Christ's influence (R. V., III 3A., 267).

Contemporaneous with this ideal development, is a development of sin. The Community of Christ is composed of sinners, forgiven, it is true, but still sinners (R. V., III 515). "The experience of the power of sin in Christianity ... cannot (be) cast aside simply because such experiences were unknown to Paul and John" (R. V., II 378f.). In several passages, he expresses himself very strongly as to the pettiness and sinfulness of the historical church (R. V., III 434, 529, G. A., II 199, P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 12, 599-609). He confesses that he cannot reproach Schleiermacher "for (yielding to) the temptation to belittle everything which appertains to public ecclesiasticism". But - and here is the Ritschlian solution of the difficulty — "I am conscious of resisting this temptation"; for if, as Schleiermacher admits, men in the church
are somehow seeking religion, that very fact implies a certain possession of religion (Schl., 50f.). Religious experience is "possible in the church, in spite of the prevailing entanglement of the church in sin (R. V.,III 530).

Result.

Not the empirical Community, but the ideal tendency of the church is the Criterion. —

2 As a social Institution.

Ritschl, with Schleiermacher, viewed the social aspect of the Christian religion as an illustration of the social character of all spiritual, religious and ethical life. Apart from "the social group", this life cannot exist (R. V.,I 488f.,491), for ethical life implies relations among ethical subjects. Because the Enlightenment had viewed religion from the standpoint of the individual, Ritschl condemned it as inadequate (R. V.,I 387).

Result.

The ethical need of man is here the Criterion.—

α The Community as Unity.

The Community is the social unit. But in what sense is it a unity? Ritschl gives us two answers, the first of which we shall call realistic-formal and the second nominalistic-social.

i The realistic-formal Unity.

"Justification or atonement ... refers in the first place to the totality of the religious Community founded by Christ" (R. V.,III 132). Predestination relates to the totality of the "new creation", but not at all to individuals (R. V.,III 123). The individual always finds the Community "existing as that within which he receives his character as believer in Christ" (R. V.,III 576).
Result.

The Community as a realistic unity is here the criterion; this appears in all A A. of R. V. —

ii Nominalistic-social Unity.

But Ritschl also lays stress on the conception of the Community as made up of individuals (R. V.,III 132). He compares the Community to an organism and to a family (R. V.,III 132, 90-96) and calls attention to the mysterious character of the reciprocal influences between the freedom of the individual and the influence of the Community (R. V.,III 545).

In this group of utterances, the coloring is nominalistic, the emphasis is on the individuals (Fid. impl., 74). Fabricius points out that this "Christian socialism" is a fact that receives constantly increasing emphasis in Ritschl's thought (Fab., 16, 27, 35, 55 etc.).

Result.

Here the ethical-social nature of man is the criterion. —

3 The Kingdom of Sin.

Sin-opposition to the good - is not necessary, but it is universal (Unterr., 21f.). On account of its social character, the immoral world of men is called the "Kingdom of Sin" (Unterr., 23). All human beings are implicated "in the immeasurable reciprocity of sinful conduct" (R. V.,III 363). So far as sinners are objects of redemption, their sin is judged as ignorance" (R. V.,III 363).

3 The Relations among the Terms Community, Church and Kingdom of God.

α Community.

The word Community is used by Ritschl to designate the fellow-
ship of all who believe in Christ (R. V., III 8 et passim); of all who own Him as Lord (Unterr., 65; R. V., III 3A., 267). All who belong to the Community are born again, are Children of God, have the Holy Spirit (Unterr., 38). It is a general term that may designate either Church or Kingdom, or an abstraction from both (R. V., III 3A., 275; III 271, 407, 437, 455, Unterr., 68, P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 12, art. Reich Gottes).

Result.

Christ is the one supreme criterion for the Community.—

β Kingdom of God.

Ritschl compares the Christian religion to an ellipse with two foci—the Kingdom of God and Redemption; the latter 'dogmatic', the former 'ethical' (R. V., III 11). Dogmatics views "all the facts of Christianity in the schema of divine causality"; whereas ethica, "presupposing dogmatics, understands the realm of personal and Christian life in the schema of personal activity" (R. V., III 14). This use of terms is constant in Ritschl's writings (cf. 1869 G. A., I 109).

The Kingdom, although predominantly ethical, a deed of man, is also (subordinately) a deed of God.

i The Kingdom in the dogmatic Sense.

In 1 A., Ritschl said that "we can place ourselves only temporarily at God's standpoint", and that we have to think of religion as ethical (R. V., III 1A., 20f.). But in 2=3A., the Kingdom is "a direct religious concept", "a causal activity of God directed toward men" (R. V., III 2=3A., 30f.). In Unterr., 1A., the Kingdom was the goal of the Community. In 2=3A., it is the greatest good, guaranteed by God (Unterr., 2=3A., 2). That it is ethical ideal is here subsidiary (cf. Fab., 9, 88).
God carries it into effect as the supramundane goal of the World (P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 12, 604; R. V., III 2=3A., 196). The activity of God is given increasing stress.

Result.

In so far as the causality of God is emphasized, man has only to receive. There is, then, no criterion of truth save receptivity.—

ii The Kingdom in the ethical Sense.

Nevertheless, the Kingdom is also, even in 3A., declared to be chiefly ethical (R. V., III 11, 271, 301, 303, 317, II 300; Th. L. Z., I col. 437). It is the Community, so far as its members act out of love (R. V., III 271, 275, 453; Unterr., 6; P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 12, 599 ff.).

It is in a measure actual (T. M., 47) but even its actual presence is invisible, an object of faith (Unterr. 6). And it is also ideal, the ethical goal of the Community (Unterr., 2; P. R. E., ib.; R. V., III 10, 196; Unterr., 43 1A.).

Result.

From this point of view, the ethical ideal of universal love is the ultimate criterion.—

y The Church.

Ritschl (G. A., I 100-146) applies to the Church the same distinction between the dogmatic and the ethical points of view which was fundamental in his treatment of the Kingdom. The Word, the Sacraments, and the Community life considered from the point of view of God as given are the essentials of the dogmatic-religious conception of the Church; this view (from the year 1869) excludes impious and hypocritical persons.
The Church in the dogmatic Sense.

After 1869, this clear use of the term disappears. The same criteria of Word and Sacraments recur, it is true. In 1883, he still says, "The unity of the Church depends on the pure preaching of the Word and on the lawful dispensation of the two Sacraments, and on nothing else in like measure" (R. V., III 2=3A., 105). In Unterr., he "aimed at equilibrium between the ethical and dogmatic material" (P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 12, 599 ff.). Now, Unterr. treats the Word and the Sacraments simply as two of four criteria of the Church (65-67); and concedes that the Sacraments are not at the present time actual criteria, because the Lord's Supper is the slogan of party strife, and because there is no unified practice of baptism (ib., 70). The dogmatic conception of the Church no longer stands out clearly as a separate fact; possibly because it included only the righteous in the Church, whereas Ritschl tended more and more to recognize sin in the Community.

Result.

The Word - and the Sacraments - are the criterion of God's presence.

The Church in the ethical Sense.

The mark of the Church in the ethical sense is prayer, - the confessing of God and Christ in religious activity (G. A., I 116). Contrary to R. V., III 2=3A., 105 (cf. above i), he makes it the essential characteristic of the Church (R. V., III 271, so also Unterr., 65).

The Kingdom in the ethical sense was visible only as "object of faith" (II d 3 ii); so too, the Church in the dogmatic sense
(G. A., I 68-99). What is ordinarily termed "invisible", Ritschl calls "visible for faith", and contrasts this with "visible to every observer". Prayer he views as "visible to every observer", whereas love is "visible only to faith" (R. V., III 271). But if prayer is ethical activity, wherein is it more external than love? Prayer assuredly wins its character as such only through the presence of faith. Perhaps Ritschl's motive for this utterance was an increased regard for the worship and organization of the empirical Church; although he still points out that the Church is an object of faith only when one leaves "all the legal forms of its existence (privileged clergy, ecclesiastical law etc.) out of account" (Unterr., 68).

The Church is necessary to salvation. In a sense, this is a petitio principii. If it is, by definition, the Community of believers in Christ, considered from a special point of view, then manifestly all believers belong to the Church. But Ritschl calls express attention to the validity of the principle extra quam nulla salus (R. V., I 256, cf. also Th. L. Z., VI, col. 627). The Church is a necessary part of the Christian view of the World (Unterr., 70). The problem arises as to how far this evaluation applies to other visible activities of the Church besides prayer.

Result.

Prayer presupposes the dogmatic criteria. It is based on the validity of the Word.—

iii The Church in the empirical-legal Sense.

In what sense is the actually existing Church, with its legal forms, an authority for us?

Calling to mind the pessimistic judgment which Ritschl passed on the historical Church (cf. above II d 1), we should be tempted
to say that a man who condemned it so severely would hardly be expected to make it his ultimate authority.

Even apart from actual sin, "legal forms are not objects of any value for religious faith" (Unterr., 68). This assertion is precisely the peculiarity of the Evangelical as opposed to the Catholic conception. Catholics view the institution as cause and the Community as effect. For Evangelicals, the relation is teleological, that is, "the Community of believers is final cause and ground of the institution" (R. V.,I 202). He repudiates the charge that he approached the Catholic estimate of the Church (R. V.,I 313), and holds that believers need fellowship, but not "the support of an ecclesiastical institution (R. V.,I 176). The existence of a clergy, with special privileges, does not follow from a religious need, but "from the earthly, historical conditions of the Community" (R. V.,III 410, P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 12, 599 ff.). In 1869 he had said that "law and religion were contrary standards of human fellowship, which absolutely exclude one another" (G. A.,I 134). For that reason, he would do away with the word heresy and with all legal discipline in matters of faith (G. A.,I 121, II 18).

In view of this unambiguous depreciation of legal forms, it is nothing short of astounding to note Ritschl's entirely different position in other passages. He asserts that the worshiping Community "needs legal forms and ordinances for its own sake" (R. V.,III 1=2=3A., 271). In an addition of 3A., the legal ordinances are made as essential as the worship (R. V.,III 3A., 275). Word and Sacrament, as objective facts, are essential to the salvation of the individual (R. V.,I 2A., 313f.). Now Fabri-
cius has pointed out that the Lutheran "standards of doctrine" gradually became more normative for Ritschl. In R. V., la. (1874), he had taught that the only source of the content of the Christian religion was the N. T. In 2A., he adds, "But... the theologian stands also under the guidance of the doctrinal standards of the Church" (R. V., II 2=3A., 16). Theology, he says in 1881, is "governed by the doctrinal treatises of the Reformation" (Th. L. Z. col. 627f.). The creed becomes final authority (Fab., 90, 22, 42, 53, 112, 122; R. V., III 2=3A., 182). Ritschl said, in a letter written in 1883, that a chief motive of the revision of R. V. was a "more pronounced dependence on the symbolical books" Leben, II 410). For instance, in R. V., III 60, we note: "Ritschl occupies a rational position in 1A., which extends beyond the Christian tradition; in 2=3A., he submits to the authority of the positive Christian revelation, as Luther and the creeds of the Reformation (interpret it), and permits his theory of knowledge and of values to be regulated by them and not by his reason" (Fab., 101). This change of emphasis is partly due to a suggestion given to Ritschl by W. Herrmann (as Geheimrat Herrmann informed the writer, Winter 1911), to the effect that the philosophical discussion was unsound and based on a misunderstanding of Kant. There is, however, no doubt that Ritschl's tendency was toward a greater sympathy with orthodoxy (cf. his late friendship with Kurtz, Leben II 447, and Tholuck, Leben II 291ff.).

By way of contrast, let us compare Ritschl's essay of 1854, "On the Relation of the Creed to the Church" (G. A., I 1-24). There, the creed is subordinate to the experience of salvation (14); a church "without a legally fixed creed" is welcomed as comparable to the conditions prevailing in the first three Christian
centuries (8); "the Church has its existence not in its own changing acts, but in unchangeable, divine deeds" (20); the correction of the creed must always be recognized as possible. In short, Ritschl had in 1854 a freedom of attitude toward the creed which cannot be reconciled with his later subordination under it.

Result.

In his earlier writings, the legal forms of the empirical Church are regarded as foreign to religion. Later, the forms (especially the creeds) are accepted as necessary to religion and as normative.—

§ The Kingdom of God and the Church.

What is the relation of the two great facts, Church and Kingdom? Ritschl is clear. "The Church is in no sense the Kingdom" (R. V.,III 3A., 275, 2=3A., 332). "The Kingdom of God is indeed not hindered (by) legal forms, but is absolutely independent of them" (R. V.,III 271). Even in N. T. times, the fellowship of worship was not identical with adequate brotherly love (R. V.,II 301). Catholicism wrongly identifies the two (R. V.,III 12). "The most significant activity in the service of the Church may be absolutely worthless for the Kingdom" (R. V., III 275).

Nevertheless, in his later writings, he seeks to bring the two nearer together. The paragraph added in 3A. at the end of R. V.,III 35 asserts that the one Community is "Church" (worship and laws) and is gradually becoming "Kingdom" (love); the worship is an opportunity for Christians to become acquainted with each other, - a necessary precondition of love; and the love will labor
for the extension of the Church (cf. also Unterr., 6). But Ritschl merely assumes that true worship is present reality, true love future ideal; are not both equally unattained as ideals and both equally present as relatively attained states of spiritual life? Ritschl's assertion can only be grounded in the extraordinary identification of visible acts of worship in the empirical Church with the necessary presence of the sincere spirit of worship. To view worship as the opportunity for Christians to meet and become acquainted is trivial and reveals the external character of the union of the two elements. The contention that love can work through the forms of the Church is perfectly sound, but establishes no distinction in this regard between the Church and the World (cf. below III d2, e3), and Ritschl himself teaches that the legal organization of the Church is a part of the World; so, too, must the acts of worship be (R. V., III 332). This unsuccessful attempt to relate Church and Kingdom was first formulated in 1883 (art. Reich Gottes P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 12).

Results.

Ritschl's original view was that the Church and the Kingdom were both (in some sense) authoritative in Christianity, but essentially different. The later attempt to relate them was a failure. —

III Metaphysics as being or containing a Criterion of Truth.

In asserting that truth is to be won out of the history - the historical revelation in Christ and His Community, - Ritschl joins one great stream of the Christian tradition. But parallel with that stream, there has been another current of thought in Christendom, which, insisting that Christian truth is not simply a relation
in history, an empirical process, but also a relation to the
suprahistorical, had further held that Christianity has relations
with every other activity of thought that aims to know the supra-
historical; and so cannot be severed from a connection with
metaphysics.

With this tradition Ritschl following Luther, as against
Thomas Aquinas and orthodox Lutheranism, intended to break. In
the abstraction of the Absolute he could perceive little or nothing
that inspired in him the cry "Abba". In the metaphysical methods
and results, he saw no points of contact with the methods and
results of Christian faith. These facts are full of significance
for our problem; did he, then, reject the criterion of truth
employed by metaphysicians in favor of another sort of criterion?
Or did he leave metaphysics a certain field and a certain right,
while he simply viewed religion as a different subject-matter?
Did this division lead him to anything like a doctrine of a
double truth? And did he consistently carry through his rejection
of metaphysics? For these questions and others relating to the
subject of our investigation, we shall try to find and evaluate
Ritschl's answers.

a Definition of Metaphysics.

l Ritschl's View.

We have first to inquire what Ritschl means by the term
metaphysics; for few terms are more subtly difficult of definition.

He points out that he intends to adopt Aristotelie's definition
of terms (R. V.,III 16, T. M., 32), since he was the founder of
the discipline and has so largely determined its history.
Aristotelie's "First Philosophy" is "devoted to the investigation
of the common elements of all being" (T. M., 32). It is the elementary knowledge of things in general (T. M., 56). It is knowledge a priori; it determines the forms of knowledge in which it is possible for the subject, in the stream of feelings and perceptions, to have objects (T. M., 33). It is divided into two disciplines, ontology, the theory of the thing; and cosmology, in which the manifold of things is brought into the unity of a World (T. M., 33).

The characteristic of metaphysics to which Ritschl calls chief attention is that it is indifferent to the distinction between Nature and Spirit which Ritschl finds essential for religion (T. M., 32f., 56; R. V., III 17, 227). From this observation, he infers that metaphysics is necessarily a superficial form of knowledge. Natural science and ethics are more worthful than metaphysics because more specific, concrete, exhaustive (T. M., 32, 56; R. V., III 16). "In scientific knowledge, the definite is more valuable than the indefinite (G. A., II 213).

Results.

Ritschl's definition of metaphysics and its relation to natural science and ethics implies that the more general a concept is, the less true it is; and the more concrete, particular, specific it is, the more truth it contains. Then, all laws, generalizations, concepts are really untrue; only individual facts are worthfully true. Any explanation which goes "beyond" or "behind" the empirical fact is not so true as the fact itself was. Cf. his rejection of any theory of inspiration or of the deity of Christ and his emphasis on present experience.—

2 Rejected Definitions.

We shall understand better his definition of metaphysics, if
The statement of the problem is as follows:

Let \( f \) be a function defined on \( (0, \infty) \) such that \( f \) is continuous and \( \int_0^\infty |f(x)| \, dx < \infty \).

Prove that there exists a subsequence \( \{x_{n_k}\} \) of \( \{x_n\} \) such that \( \lim_{k \to \infty} f(x_{n_k}) = \infty \).

Hint: Consider the function \( g(x) = \frac{1}{x} f(x) \) and apply the dominated convergence theorem.
we observe why he rejects other definitions. He rejects without
ceremony the opinion of those who "think that any scientific
definition of the idea of God, even in positive theology is
metaphysical knowledge" (G. A., II 213); so also the notion that
metaphysics is such a total knowledge of the world as would be at
once elementary (formal) and also final and exhaustive knowledge
of all existence (R. V., III 17). But in both cases the rejection
is summary, without stated ground. He also mentions the Herbartian
definition, as stated by Flugel, that metaphysics is the attempt
to express the given facts (of life) without contradiction. But
this definition he finds indifferent to the distinction between
Nature and Spirit; and to the Christian idea of God (T. V., III
2=3A., 18). It is then no better than the Aristotelian definition.

Result.

Again, the criterion of completeness demands the retention
of the distinction between Nature and Spirit at all hazards.--

b Ontology or Theory of Knowledge.

1 Definition.

Ontology is, as we have pointed out, that part of metaphysics
which deals with the theory of the thing (T. M., 33, cf. above a 1).
Ritschl identifies it with the "theory of knowledge" (R. V., III
2=3A., 16). And so it is "the definition or fixation of the
objects of knowledge" (R. V., III 2=3A., 16, T. M., 57) or "the
use that one makes of the concept of the thing as object of know-
ledge (T. M., 58), or "the conditions of experience through which
the special character of the things is known" (R. V., III 2=3A., 10).

Ritschl's concept of ontology, as made up of rules of the
conditions of experience, contains no more than an incomplete
type of thought and knowledge; it does not try to tell what
being is.
2 The Theory of the Thing.

Ritschl views three types of ontology (theory of knowledge) as significant; the Platonic-scholastic, the Kantian, and the Lotzian. The first views the object of knowledge, the "thing in itself", as unchanging behind its changing properties. But, says Ritschl, the unchanging universal is, after all, only "the retained memory-picture of repeated perception of the activity of the thing" (R. V., III 2=3A., 19), which is really less true than the activity was. The second teaches that our knowledge is confined to the phenomena; that we really do not know the things themselves. But the phenomena, he contends, could not be thought as objects of knowledge unless there were some reality postulated in them. Ritschl accepts the Lotzian view. It teaches, as he states it, that we know the things in the phenomena as cause of its properties that affect us, as end which they serve as means, and as the law of their constant changes (R. V., III 2=3A., 20). Ritschl clearly does not mean to be a solipsist. In phenomena is something real, outside our knowing process (ib. 18). But it is equally clear that he denies the existence of "things in themselves" (T. M., 64) and that he makes no ontological use of the Lotzian notion of activity; he applies it only to psychological questions (q. v.). The thing is cause, end and law in the phenomena, yet outside ourselves; he seems to interpret this as meaning that reality is in the relation of phenomena. "We can rightly posit the thing as real only just as it stands before us in the shape of phenomenon" (T. M., 60). The impression that the thing is one, he says, springs from the continuity of our self-consciousness in our changing experiences; and the notion that it is efficient and final cause is based on the
fact that we experience ourselves as such. Ritschl did not mean to use the Lotzian theory in the sense of modern Personalism; nowhere does he make the inference that this unity, causality and purpose which we think into things is supported by personal life back of the phenomena and constituting their reality. For him the phenomena as given are the reality. This theory of things is ordinarily called Positivism.

Result.

Only phenomena are real. The criterion of truth is immediacy in phenomenal experience, the fact of being "given". —

3 Its use in Theology.

Things are real in any sense only in their experienced relation to us. Ritschl views the application of this theory as an essential and justified use of metaphysics in theology. His theological method, he says, depends on his theory of knowledge and so is metaphysical (T. M., 66). His opponents are wrong because they presuppose a false ontology, namely the existence of things in themselves out of relation to the knowing subject (T. M., 58). The issue between Luthardt, for instance, and himself is not as to whether metaphysics has a place in theology, but simply as to what kind of metaphysics shall be used (T. M., 66). Previous to T. M., which his closest followers viewed as a failure, and the strife with Luthardt (and others) which occasioned its composition, we find only isolated traces of this view. It was, however, developed in connection with the discussion of the "two natures" in R. V., III 1A., 343-345. His positivistic ontology was not, then, wholly new in T. M. It may be that he was mistaken in regarding it as the foundation of his system. Yet one could hardly assume
that the idea came to him as a sudden revelation and out of all relation to his other thinking.

An examination of our previous results reveals that he has applied the positivistic criterion in many fields. His doctrine of the Spirit is based on the rejection of the scholastic ontology and on the assumption that only the experienced knowledge of God in the Community is real; although, at the same time, he speaks of "God's knowledge of Himself", which can never be a part of human experience (I a 2β); he rejects mysticism at least partly because the mystical experience is so closely allied with the notion of the thing-in-itself as applied to the soul in its relation to the Absolute (I a 2γ); he views relation to God in terms of the mediation through the historical Christ, the World, and the Community (I b 2α) - all phenomenal facts - although there are traces of an immediate relation to God which transcends phenomenal experience (I b 2β); accepting the value of the Scriptures for Christian living, he renounces any attempt at a theory of inspiration (II b 3β); accepting the religious and ethical value of the person of Christ, he refuses to attempt any explanation of "how Christ came to be what He is", although he does make late in life certain formal concessions to the preexistence and exaltatio (II c 3 entire); the whole scheme of Christian doctrine - justification, atonement and the rest - can be understood only from the point of view of the existence, tradition and life of the Christian Community which performs all its functions within the realm of "possible experience" (II d). Our relation to God, he teaches, cannot be supported or explained by any reference to things-in-themselves, "those pale and variable memory-pictures", but must be based on
accurate and full recollection of Christ". God deals with us, so runs one extreme statement, only through this medium of the phenomenal history (T. M., 66).

Over against all this, stands the curiously contradictory assertion: "Just as Christianity is neutral toward the differences between Jewish and Hellenistic ways of thinking, it is also, as religion, neutral toward the different theories of knowledge, in which its intellectual content may be scientifically expressed" (T. M., 72). This means, taken literally, that the entire Ritschlian theology has nothing to do with Christianity as religion; an assertion which Ritschl would be the first to deny. Indeed, he believed that he was under divine protection, and that, if the World be not wholly lost to evangelical Christianity, his work would not be in vain (Leben, II 283, 282). Manifestly there are "water-tight compartments" in his thinking. Nevertheless, we can assert that Ritschl's positivistic ontology represents one characteristic tendency of his mind.

Results.

Any judgment, in order to be true, must be "metaphysical"; that is, must be grounded in a theory of knowledge; and must refer to data of the world of phenomena, and not to things-in-themselves. —

4 Psychology.

We discuss psychology as a part of ontology, because, for Ritschl, it is simply an application of the principles of his theory of knowledge to the life of the soul (R. V.,III 2=3A., 20). The notion that the soul is a thing-in-itself, a something ever abiding in its own identity and changeless in the changes of the
of the conscious life, he rejects (T. M., 50). This (as Ritschl calls it) scholastic psychology speaks of a reality which is not present to experience, and therefore, according to Ritschlian principles, is not real. The theory that, back of feeling, knowing and willing, the spirit is a kind of 'Nature' or substance is a useless play with words (R. V., III 167f.).

He teaches that the essence of the soul is its activity; it is never passive (R. V., III 2=3A., 22). And so God's influence on us can, in the nature of the case, be known only through our self-conscious activity, as aroused by the revelation and the means included in it (ib., 22). The assertion that God is in these activities of ours, is based on the fact that the outer occasion of a feeling or sensation in us is always different from the sensation itself; consequently there is an outer occasion, God, for our self-activity in religion.

Results.

The soul is not a thing-in-itself or a unit, but consists of activities. He did not see clearly the unity in the activity of the conscious life. Every true judgment about religious experience is an assertion about our conscious activity. That is, the positivism applies also in psychology.—

c Cosmology.

1 Its Relation to Theology.

Ontology has an important place in Ritschl's system. One would think that cosmology, "in which the manifold of things is brought into the unity of a World" might also belong within the realm of theological interest. Such is, however, not the case. He recognizes, indeed, that religion has long been viewed as "the metaphysics of the people" (G. A., II 214), but "only he can accept
such a view who believes that Neoplatonic abstractions from the World mingled with a few forms of the religious idea of God are of equal value with the peculiarly Christian knowledge of God" (G. A., II 214). The whole relation between religion and cosmology is a matter of chance; and comes entirely from the fact that "Aristotle happened to choose the term God to attach to the concept of the final cause of the World" (T. M., 34f.). Thence arose the improper interference of cosmology in the religion of revelation.

The chief concepts with which cosmology deals are the World and God. We must note more fully what Ritschl says about each.

2. The Concept World

Cosmology uses the concept World in the sense of the totality of the Cosmos, but without reference to the distinction between Nature and Spirit. But Ritschl's definition of terms is very unsatisfactory; he does not relate the terms World and Nature (cf. R. V., III, 474); and he speaks of the World both as object of cosmology and as obstacle for spiritual life to overcome (T. V., III, 434) without clear-cut distinction. The latter is important for theology; the former is not.

3. The Concept God.

Ritschl is relatively clearer in defining what he understands cosmology to mean by God. God is Aristotle's idea of the world-purpose, "the expression of the unity of the World" (R. V., III, 2=3A., 17), "the conception of the first cause and the final goal (R. V., III 2=3A., 205). Cosmology names the 'World-ground' God; but it is really the idea of the World which is posited as the ground or rather as the causal unity of all things" (T. M., 37). This thought has nothing whatever to do with God. The so-called
"cosmological" proof establishes only the unity of the World, if it establishes anything" (T. M., 36; R. V., III 2=3A., 205); even if it could prove the existence of a will back of nature, to call that will God would be over-hasty (R. V., III 2=3A., 208); it is the great X, the endless thing, the aimless force,— but not God (G. A., II 214). The metaphysical concept of God is neutral over against every religion (T. V., III 2=3A., 17). From the thought of the unity of the World, one derives no assurance of salvation (R. V., III 389). Any proof, to be satisfactory, must abandon the method of cosmology and take up the religious idea of God (R. V., III 2=3A., 210f.), which was revealed in Christ. The Absolute is no shelter in the time of storm (T. M., 43). The so-called "natural Theology" is rejected because it is neutral and objective (R. V., I 220); it is simply a continuation of the teachings of Dionysius the Areopagite, which really explain nothing and contain neither scientific nor Christian knowledge (R. V., III 258f.). It furnishes no starting point for theology (P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 16, 742-748).

Results.

The chief criterion for the rejection of cosmology is that it does not furnish the Christian idea of God.—

d. The Christian World-view.

Instead of the traditional Aristotelian- Neoplatonic cosmology Ritschl teaches what he calls the Christian World-view (christliche Weltanschauung). He does not name his theory a cosmology. Nevertheless, as the application of the principles of his ontology to the universe as a totality, as an attempt to give a connected account of the meaning of things, it might well even from Ritschl's stand-point be called the Christian cosmology; all
the more, in view of the fact that "every attempt to produce a total world-view arises from a motive of religious nature" (R. V., III 2=3A., 197).

In the Christian cosmology, as in every religion, there are three essential elements, - God, man, and World (R. V.,III 2=3A., 29); "religion is in all cases interpretation of the relation of men to God and to the World from the standpoint of the exalted power of God for the purpose of the blessedness of men" (R. V.,III 2=3A., 185, 166).

1 God.

The idea of God is the decisive factor in theology (R. V.,I 60) and contains the real criterion of any theological system (R. V.,I 61). The source of the Christian idea of God is the Community tradition (R. V.,III 2=3A., 17).

Result.

The idea of God in the tradition of the Christian Community is a criterion of truth. —

α Love.

God is first and foremost love. That He is love is no hypothesis that needs to be tested or proved, but is "given" in the Community (T. M., 47). In Unterr., I=2A., the only name of God is "love" (11, cf. R. V.,III 268, 308). In 3A., it is expressed as "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," but this does not have the force of any change from the definition of God as love; the Father - name retains love as constitutive principle; the new element is the special emphasis on the fact of revelation through the Son (R. V.,III 2=3A., 259f.).

Frank attacked this definition as inadequate. In the mere
concept of love, there is nothing essentially divine; nothing to point out that love is the love of God. Ritschl's answer refers Frank to R. V.,III 2A., 263, where he had said, "God is love in so far as He sets His life-purpose in the bringing of the human race to the Kingdom of God as the supramundane goal of man" (T. M., 41; R. V.,III 268). "God is love" means, the purpose of God is to bring the Kingdom to pass among men.

In accordance with this is his fundamental definition of love. It "is will which seeks, out of the motive of the feeling of an object's value, either to appropriate the object or to further it in its manner of existence". Four specifications are added; first, the object of love must be spiritual personalities; second, the will must be constant; third, it must be directed toward the known or assumed life-purpose of the other; and fourth, it must take up the life-purpose of the other into its own personal life-purpose (R. V.,III 263f.). In this sense, God is love and "faith in His fatherly providence is the Christian world-view in abbreviated form" (Unterr., 41).

Result.

That God loves the Community of the Kingdom we know exclusively through the revelation in Christ.

β Personality.

God is personal. The gods of all religions are spiritual personalities (R. V.,III 2=3A., 190); and the personality of God is, as Lotze shows, thinkable without contradiction (R. V.,III 222-224). But it is not for these reasons that we believe in a personal God. "Personality is the form in which the idea of God is given by revelation" (R. V.,III 2=3A., 225). Our knowledge that God is personal is not independent of our knowledge that He
is love, but is simply the form for the content (R. V.,III 261). That is, the personality of God is the necessary formal inference from the revealed fact that He is love (cf. T. M., 40).

Result.

The criterion is the revelation in Christ.—

_y Will._

God is essentially will. We might almost designate Ritschl-ianism as a system of voluntaristic metaphysics. But this voluntarism is only an inference from the revelation that God is love; for love means the will of love (R. V.,III 268f.). This is an analytical judgment in which revelation furnishes the subject; other such analytical judgments are the assurance that the will of God is constant (R. V.,III 284, 303); the statement that "we attribute states of feeling to God" (R. V.,III 305); and that "the unity of the divine will is the inviolable condition of all confidence in God" (R. V.,III 445).

Result.

The only criterion of truth about God is the revelation, which itself is assumed, and needs no proof.—

§ Knowledge.

For Ritschls view on the knowledge of God, we cite his doctrine of the Holy Spirit (cf. above I a 2 ), where the knowledge of God in the Community and God's knowledge of Himself are equated (R. V.,III 571f.); it is, in other words, identical with the content of revelation. In accordance with this, Ritschl the positivist is able to make what one would ordinarily term metaphysical statements about God. "Not only is God sure of His purpose and His World-plan, but (He also) . . . experiences at every point (of its development) the realization of the whole" (R. V.,III 287f.).
So also his treatment of divine prescience (R. V., III 117); and he is able to speak of "the synthetic form of God's judgment in regard to justification" (R. V., III 16 title). Indeed, every judgment that does not relate to phenomena, every judgment about God, is in defiance of his positivism and is metaphysical.

**Results.**

Revelation is here the criterion of truth. But it is inconsistent with his positivism; for he clearly states that the living God must be distinguished from His purposes and His creatures (R. V., III 471), and so essentially admits a God-in-Himself.—

**Relation to the World.**

Ritschl's idea of God is not for him a necessary result of the contemplation of our position in the World (R. V., III 508). The World is not a revelation of the divine nature. Indeed, Ritschl believes that an objective observation of the course of events reveals so much that appears purposeless, that one might be tempted to believe, with the Greeks, "in the envy or indifference of the gods" (R. V., III 584). The belief in the providence of God is no law of the phenomenal World which can be reached through induction. God is not in the World, but outside it; and has little contact with it, so one would infer. Here we have the deistic view of God, as implied also in the sharp separation between Nature and Spirit, to which we have often called attention. This deism is, in a sense, scepticism; for no God is to be seen in the course of Nature.

Therefore we are quite unprepared for another and quite different group of utterances about the relation of God and World.
to which Ritschl is led by his Christian doctrine of the providence of God (R. V., III 583). Here he explains the World out of the will of God (R. V., III 284). God is Ruler and Upholder of the World (ib., 353) and the Christian cannot view God's World with indifference. The fact that God is Father implies that He is first cause and final goal of the World (R. V., III 2=3A., 205). Every individual changing detail is willed by Him (R. V., III 116; "nothing that comes to the divine Spirit is originally foreign to Him; He needs to appropriate nothing; every thing that the World means for Him is fundamentally an expression of His own self-activity, and what comes back to Him in the progress of things, He knows as the course of the reality which is possible only through Him" (R. V., III 224). Here we have expressions of the divine immanence, verging almost on the pantheism that he condemns (R. V., III 201, Schl.).

From a still different point of view, he attempts to bring God into some sort of relation to the World. Nothing, he asserts, can explain the facts of our experience except the religious idea of God. Even theoretical, scientific knowledge has to recognize the reality of Spirit as well as of Nature, and the validity of the peculiar laws of each realm; and so it must recognize the religious instinct as fact. But its demand for unity leads it to undertake further to discover the law underlying the coexistence of these different kinds of reality—Nature and Spirit—in the same World. Reason demands an explanation, and yet can find none except in the assumption of the Christian idea of God. Up to this point, all three A A. of R. V. agree (III 211-215). But 1 A. goes on to assert that this conclusion proves the scientific
character of theology and its relation to the other sciences. 2A. weakens the scientific character of the proof, and 3A. not only expressly denies the theoretical nature of this proof (ib., 214), but also asserts that if the step of using the Christian idea of God for the explanation of the World were not taken, the religious (practical) faith in God would not be hindered (ib., 213); whereas 1 A. had stated that such a course would make theology impossible (ib. 1A., 191f.).

Results.

The deistic view results from the contemplation of phenomena. There the criterion is positivistic. In the emphasis on immanence, the criterion is the Christian idea of God, that is, revelation as to the relation of the scientific view of the World to the God of Christianity, Ritschl taught, in 1A., that the former must use the latter as explanation of the World, or else that we must renounce the possibility of theology; in 3A., he taught that the revealed idea of God was independent of all need of contact with the science of the World. In 1A., the criterion was the inner demand for unity or "mastery over the World"; in 3A., revelation is absolute criterion.—

2 The World.

Ritschl offers two quite different estimates of the significance of the World, corresponding to his deistic and his theistic conceptions.

On the one hand there is the view that the World is something quite indifferent and external; a something whose use is "to be overcome", not to be understood or appreciated. "Nature follows laws quite different from those of Spirit, exists independently
of it, and hinders it" (R. V.,III 213). It is the business of religion simply to assert the independence of Spirit over against Nature (R. V.,III 23A., 17). The World is our foe, which we must master and from which we must be free (R. V.,III 431, 575).

Ritschl's emphasis on evils is in accord with this aspect of his system. By natural evil, he means "any such working of mechanical causes as either makes our physical organism wholly or in part unserviceable for its object of executing our purposes, or disturbs or destroys our ability to use the legitimate means for our ends"; and by social evil, the disturbance of our freedom or of the intended consequences of our action "through the acts or judgments of other men" (R. V.,III 244). But since social evil always works on us through natural causes, all evils are events in Nature (R. V.,III 333). They are a hindrance to our freedom, but can nevertheless be overcome in our communion with God (R. V.,III 333 ff., 595). Yes, the very essence of Christianity is the overcoming of these evils (R. V.,III 476).

There is, it is true, another side. He holds that the relation to the World is not accident, but substance in religion (R. V.,II 23A., 17). He recognizes, too, a divine teleology in the evils of Nature (R. V.,III 388). He conceives that the World serves the purposes of making social life and exchange of thought possible (R. V.,III 473). Nature is to be interpreted wholly as a means to the end of spiritual life (R. V.,III 211f.). The goal of the World is "the bringing forth of the World of spirits" (R. V.,III 265f.), and of producing the Kingdom of God.

But after all, this attributing of a positive purpose to the World does not do justice to the demands of the idea of immanence,
out of which, as implied in the Christian revelation, it doubtless arises. The World shall, indeed, serve to bind men together in the Kingdom; but of the idea that it also serves to bind men directly to God and that He lives and moves in all the processes of Nature—that the World is a revelation of God—we find as good as nothing at all. Revelation lies wholly in the past.

Result.

Both attitudes toward the World seem to be dictated wholly by Ritschl's conception of the content of revelation. The World itself is no revealer of religious truth. The hostile attitude toward the World as something to be overcome may imply man's ethical nature as criterion.

3 Man.

α His Position in the World.

The third element in Ritschl's world-view is man. Man finds himself in the World, on the one hand as a part of Nature, dependent on its limits, hindered by environment; on the other as independent, free Spirit (R. V., III 2=3A., 189f.). To accept, with D. F. Strauss, the fact of the natural mechanism as ultimate, and to view religion as the consciousness of a merciful oil in the world—machine is no comfort and no solution of the problem (R. V., III 564f.). "The self-consciousness of man, over against the whole World is the final answer to every merely mechanical World-view" (R. V., III 586). Ritschl formulates this situation by asserting that, although man is a part of the World, yet he is a unity over against the whole World and worth more than it (R. V., III 472 f., Unterr., etc.).

Result.

Man's sense of his own spiritual dignity is the answer to
mechanical views, and so is a criterion of the truth of the Christian view. This line of thought is based on a rational ethics and not on revelation.

β His Mastery of the World.

The Spirit's self-assertion over against Nature, to which we have had frequent occasion to refer, Ritschl calls "Mastery of the World". He conceives of it as being expressed in faith in the fatherly providence of God, humility, patience and prayer (Unterr., 41-45 etc.); which is equivalent to Christian Perfection (Ch. Voll., 10). As the presence of prayer in the list suggests, the mastery of the World is essentially religious.

Considered from one point of view, it is the experience of eternal life (R. V., III 477, 634, 2=3A., 94), which also implies the continued existence of the spiritual life in an adequate body in the life after death (R. V., III 575), although our conceptions of that life must be indefinite, because the scriptural data are indefinite (Unterr., 62).

Considered from another angle, it is blessedness in the possession of the "greatest good". Fabricius has shown that the increasing stress on this thought marked a tendency toward eudae- monism in ethics (Fab., 29 etc.). 2=3A. make "God, the World and Blessedness" in three main elements in all religion; whereas I A. had formulated them as "Idea of God, World-view and Self-estimate" (R. V., III 27). The later editions go so far as to assert specifically that this mastery over the World grounds the possibility of activity in the Kingdom. That is, feeling is rated higher than ethical conduct (cf. Fab., 84f.).

Results.

"Mastery of the World" is thought as predominantly emotional
(humility, patience, blessedness). In later years it is put prior to the ethical Kingdom. Here feeling, in some sense, seems to be a criterion of truth.—

IV Logic.

We have followed Ritschl in his treatment of the data of experience and history, and of the theories of metaphysics; we have undertaken to determine according to what criteria of truth he judged the religious truth of this material. We turn now to his own exposition of the methodological and logical principles which he intended to follow. It will be our aim to formulate these principles as clearly as possible and then to pass on to the evaluation of our results.

a Presuppositions.

There are two characteristic presuppositions of all Ritschl's thinking to which we desire to call attention; one formal, and one personal.

1 Formal.

Any judgment to be true must be formally correct; it was Ritschl's feeling that theology had suffered greatly from loose thinking. He felt it as his mission to clear the air, to insist that every religious truth must be expressed in logically understandable forms of thought. For the orthodox argument "that what was impossible with men was possible with God" he felt only contempt. Thus one could prove all sorts of nonsense (R. V., III 233). Theologians must speak a human language. If we talk of Christ in forms of knowledge which are applied to no other object, then we make Christ simply incomprehensible (R. V., III 2=3A., 440). This necessity of clearness in solving the dialectic problem of
theology is one of Ritschl's favorite themes. Accuracy in scientific terminology is not a matter of indifference (R. V., I 251, III 409). We may view his positivistic ontology, with its reaction against the mysteries of mystical and speculative theology, as a typical illustration of this trait (cf. R. V., III 2=3A., 23), and may also point to his principle that "the formulae of theology are valid for the present." In a sentence, "the scientific knowledge of the separate truths of Christianity depends on their correct definition" (R. V., III 2=3A., 14).

Result.

Correctness and clearness of definition is a formal element in the criterion of truth.—

2 Personal.

One must further, he insists, have inner sympathy for and appreciation of theology before one can think or write intelligently about it (R. V., III 390 etc.).

Result.

Feeling is an element in the criterion of the truth of Christianity.—

b The two Types of Knowledge, scientific and religious; 1 Distinguished from each other, with Respect to α The logical Conditions of Knowledge.

Ritschl's statement of logical principles turns on the distinction between scientific and religious knowing.

It was not Ritschl's task to define the logical conditions of scientific knowledge. He simply presupposes acquaintance with the methods of science. Only incidentally does he characterize it as demonstrable, unified and simple, reasonable, i.e., "con-
sistent with itself and with experience" (R. V., III 236) (cf. also R. V., III 210, I 653).

Over against scientific knowledge is the realm of religious knowledge (R. V., III 2=3A., 439). For it, proof and demonstration are unnecessary and impossible (R. V., I 590, III 2=3A., 210). Religious knowledge or faith is, as Ritschl showed most fully in Fid. impl., not an imperfect genus of the species knowledge (ib., 69f. etc.) but is an altogether different type of certainty from the theoretical.

Result.

In the case of scientific knowledge, logical form is the criterion of truth: whereas the certainty of religious knowledge springs from some source outside the realm of logic and cannot be established by logical methods.—

β The ethical Conditions of Knowledge.

Scientific knowledge is free from ethical considerations; it is neutral, objective, disinterested (cf. R. V., I 220, III 2=3A., 195). It is not, indeed, absolutely disinterested. Without some sort of interest, men do not trouble themselves about anything whatever (R. V., III 2=3A., 195). But this interest is merely attention, in the psychological sense (R. V., III 98). It does not spring from ethical motives nor lead to ethical results; does not move the will to appropriate goods or to avoid evils (R. V., III 2=3A., 195). It proceeds cold-bloodedly and abandons all reference to the practical consequences of the theory in question (R. V., III 2=3A., 34). All such knowledge has the peculiarity of subordinating ethical interest to pure knowing (R. V., III 2=3A., 280).
Religious knowledge on the other hand is in every detail precisely the opposite. For it, there is no neutral, objective knowledge; a disinterested, metaphysical knowledge of God "implies an ethical fault on the part of the knowing subject, namely a lack of confidence in God" (R. V., I 220). If a judgment about God is to have value as knowledge, it must be "supported by" confidence in Him (R. V., III 219). The religious knowledge of God is precisely this confidence, an ethical attitude. In teaching that "unconditional confidence" is the only knowledge of God, Ritschl believes that he is reviving the true meaning of Luther's teaching (R. V., III 2=3A., 6). The attempt to ground religious knowledge on any other foundation is simply hostile to truth (R. V., III 2=3A., 203). In all religions the norm is practical and ethical (R. V., III 3A., 186). We cannot, then, understand dogmas as religious truth outside of "the activity of the subject in which he receives the influence of God and applies it for his salvation" (R. V., III 2=3A., 34).

This "confidence" is, without doubt, an act of the will and so ethical. Now the denial of any disinterested, objective grounding of religious knowledge seems to make this "confidence" something very subjective. And yet, in all A A. of his great work, Ritschl calls attention to the fact that ethical willing cannot win us the means of the mastery of the World (R. V., III 473). This would lead us to inquire whether religious knowledge does not include something more than the mere subjective-ethical state of confidence. An examination of the passages which we discussed above reveals the fact that the context points clearly, in each case, to the revelation of God in Christ as the object of the confidence; with the single exception of R. V., III 186, where
the universal concept of religion, not the Christian concept, is the subject under consideration. "Confidence" means, then, the unconditional ethical acceptance of the revelation, without reference to rational considerations. Our interpretation is supported by Ritschl's final definition of faith: "Faith in Christ means that we appropriate the value of the love of God which is revealed in Christ's work for our reconciliation with God through the confidence that we display in Christ when we submit ourselves to God as His and our Father; in this fact we are certain of eternal life and blessedness" (R. V., III 3A., 558).

Any interpretation of Ritschl which would overlook the reference of his religious knowledge to the revelation is unfair to his plain meaning.

Result.

Religious knowledge renounces the objectivity of science, and finds its peculiar method in ethics. A criterion of the truth of religion is the ethical spirit of confidence directed toward the God revealed in Christ. We note, as an assumption implicit in this position, that the revelation is presupposed as absolutely given, so that no manner of "objective knowledge" is necessary for establishing it. From this we infer that the revelation is the final criterion, absolutely superior to reason and to all human ethics; "confidence" is, after all, not a criterion, but only the subjective means of appropriating the revelation; for the confidence itself is indicated in the revelation as the manner of approach to God.

The psychological Conditions of Knowledge.

Just as scientific knowledge is ethically indifferent, so is it also free from any influence of emotional-psychological character.
It is disinterested (R. V.,III 2=3A., 34).

Religious knowledge, however, recognizes the psychological factors. Ritschl, indeed, is careful to limit the realm of feeling in religion. "A merely psychological definition of religion, especially the interpretation of religion exclusively in terms of feeling, is no solution, but a mere abbreviation, of our problem" (R. V.,III 2=3A., 188). Each of the three functions, knowing, willing and feeling is necessary, and no one is more fundamental than any other (R. V.,III 2=3A., 189). But feeling cannot be dispersed with:- because it is the form of our selfhood (ib., 194), because the will is affected through the feeling that a thing is worth desiring or destroying (ib.), and finally because feeling cannot be reduced to knowing, nor be expected to submit to its law (ib., 200). And so he comes to quote with approval Calvin's definition of faith as "the emotional persuasion of the connection between the dispensations of divine will and the most specific interests of man" (ib., 98); Ritschl's own definition combines the emotional element with the consciousness of forgiveness of sins (ib., 104f.); but through the stress that he lays on the educative function of the Community, he insists that feeling be ordinarily of the steady, constant type (ib., 564f.). It is noteworthy that 1A., 526f. contained no reference to feeling in this context; and that 2A. included the sentence: "If .. every believer should act with strong emotion every minute, then there would be no peace in the Community" (Fab., 26), which 3A. dropped in favor of a stronger emphasis on feeling.

The passages which we have so far quoted are from R. V.,III 2=3A., to which the emphasis on feeling is chiefly limited. But there are other hints of it. The only reliable subjective argument
for the existence of God he finds in our need for harmony between ourselves and the World (R. V., I 462). Even if religion arises from "a need of the human heart," as Feuerbach points out, so does Natural Science, too, grow out of "a need of the human reason" (R. V., III 582), and so religion, as aspect of the assertion of the entire personality (R. V., III 2=3A., 98) is no more unreasonable than reason itself. But this is inconsistent with the position that science is free from psychological considerations; and does not presuppose the standpoint of the Community and revelation, but of the human personality as such.

In one passage, as early as 1874, Ritschl seems to give feeling a rank higher than knowing, in saying that unclear mental states have more religious value than clear-cut ideas; feeling is the hearth for the flame of confidence in God and humility (Ch. Voll., 20).

Results.

Feeling or emotion is an essential aspect of all religious knowledge and is in some sense a criterion of religious truth, for what satisfies the demand of the heart is true. In 2=3A., Ritschl laid more stress on it than before.—

§ The Object of Knowledge.

Ritschl's portrayal of the methods of scientific and religious knowledge is calculated to produce the impression that the two types have absolutely no relation to each other. He undoubtedly means to have his readers draw this inference, so far as the subjective conditions are concerned (although he does try to find common elements, "attention", "need of human life"). The question might arise, why, then, any reference to the foreign topic of
scientific knowledge in a book which treats of its antipodes? Ritschl replies (not altogether frankly), "Collision between the two is possible because both refer to the same object, the World" (R. V., III 2=3A., 193); or "Because both religion and philosophy intend to produce a view of the World as a totality" (ib., 197), whereas to wish to know a totality is a purely religious motive (ib., R. V., III 581, Ch. Voll., 12).

These explanations are hardly acceptable. Firstly, the attitude of the Christian toward the World is only here described as "knowledge of the World"; it is usually "mastery over all possible hindrances in the World" (so meant in Ch. Voll., 12). Secondly, the normal object of religious knowledge is God, although a relation to the World is included. Thirdly, the assertion is inconsistent with Ritschl's original position in lA. There, both kinds of knowledge aimed at mastery over the World, but the object of science was the observable facts of experience, where the dualism of Nature and Spirit is fundamental; whereas the object of religion was a totality, "the unified purpose and goal of things in God" (R. V., III lA., 178f.). That is, the difference as regards that object was emphasized (cf. Fab., 111). Fourthly, as we shall show below, the actual reason for the collision does not lie in the object, but in the attempt by the subject to combine the two irreconcilable types of knowledge in the discipline of theology, which shall be both science and religious knowledge. Ritschl's reference to the object as the ground of collision is in so far true as theology does make inferences in regard to the World which religious knowledge as such does not make.

That Ritschl realized this problem is clear. "If", he says,
any proof can be brought for the scientific validity of the idea of God which is not merely a reflection of the religious consciousness on its own inner connection", it would have to be the proof which we discussed above (III d l e) and which involves the acceptance of the religious idea of God as the explanation of the World, but which religion does not need for itself. Here, the object of science is the World; of religious knowledge" the inner connection of the religious consciousness". But Christianity is equally valid, whether we think a relation between the World and God or not. Needless to say, this contradicts Ritschl's view of God as creator.

Results.

The connection of Ritschl's system contradicts his assertion that religious knowledge has the same object as scientific knowledge, namely, the World. The object of the former is either God or simply "the inner connection of the religious consciousness". The criterion of truth is twofold; reason, for knowledge of the World, and the demand of the religious consciousness, for religious knowledge. The two are thought of as absolutely independent; the attempt to reconcile them cancels itself.—

2 Theology, as partaking of the Nature of each Kind of Knowing.

Religious knowledge, we have seen, must be clear, must consist of ethical confidence in God and the appropriate degree of feeling; and involves the mastery of the World, together with the confidence that the World is ruled for a purpose by God. Scientific knowledge is disinterested, theoretical, superior to ethical and emotional motives; its object is the World in space and time, its results are completely foreign to the results of religious knowledge.
In spite of the thorough-going dualism of subject-matter, method and spirit between the two types of knowledge, Ritschl sees in theology a discipline which unites the two, by expressing religious knowledge in the forms of scientific knowledge.

Elements in common with other Sciences.

That Ritschl viewed theology as science is beyond all question (R. V.,I 616, II 1, 4, III 217 etc.). It is precisely science in the sense in which science is different from religious knowledge. It is "not devotion, but as science is disinterested knowledge" (R. V.,III 2=3A., 203). It has the following traits in common with all sciences. First, it is its aim to discover laws in the material which constitutes its subject-matter; it is bound to hold to the method of law (R. V.,II 1). Second, it is a self-consistent system. The fact that theology is a science is to be grounded in the proof that the idea of personality can be applied to God without contradiction (R. V.,III 233, 217ff.,); and that other concepts, like atonement, can be thought without contradiction (R. V.,III 309). This systematic aspect distinguishes dogmatics from Biblical Theology (R. V.,I 2A., 615). The latter secures, it is true, the correctness of Christian ideas in their original meaning (R. V.,III 15); but this is not the correctness of theological form, which can be attained only from the point of view of the systematic connection of theology,- and (adds 3A.), precisely because every theological definition can be formulated only in the connection of the whole, we have the guarantee that the theological propositions that are rightly defined will not stand in contradiction to each other (R. V.,III 3A., 15).

The formal concepts which bind the system together are not
In order to achieve the objective of promoting broad public awareness and understanding of the importance of effective communication, it is essential to employ a variety of strategies and techniques. These may include workshops, seminars, and educational programs aimed at different audiences. The goal is to foster a culture where communication is valued and practiced at all levels, from individuals to entire organizations.

Effective communication requires clear, concise, and culturally sensitive language. It is crucial to address the needs and perspectives of diverse audiences to ensure that messages are understood and internalized. This involves not only selecting the right words but also considering the context and cultural nuances of the situation.

Collaboration with stakeholders is an important aspect of effective communication. By involving various parties in the process, it is possible to gather insights and perspectives that can enhance the effectiveness of the communication efforts. This approach also helps to build trust and credibility, which are essential for long-term success.

In summary, promoting broad public awareness of the importance of effective communication requires a multifaceted approach that includes workshops, seminars, educational programs, and collaboration with stakeholders. By addressing the needs and perspectives of diverse audiences, it is possible to achieve the goal of fostering a culture where communication is valued and practiced at all levels.

The importance of effective communication cannot be overemphasized, and it is crucial to continue to explore and develop strategies that can help to achieve this goal.
in themselves Christian. Ritschl points out that when theology is formulated wholly in such extra-Christian concepts (natural theology), Christianity is really in danger (III c 3), but insists nevertheless that theology needs terms which, so far as their form goes, arose outside the fact of Christianity (R. V., I 2A., 615f.).

Results.

Theology is a science because it aims to discover laws in a specific realm of reality and because it is a self-consistent system. The significance of the laws will manifestly depend on the nature of the reality of which they are an expression. Since the systematic form refers only to consistency within the system and expressly excludes its relation to other knowledge (R. V., III 2=3A., 24), that form cannot be viewed as a criterion of the truth of the system, but only as a regulative principle. The criterion must, then, be sought in the subject-matter itself.—

G Its special Subject-matter.

As science, theology is entitled to its special field, its definite subject-matter. That subject-matter is not, as Schleiermacher taught, the current doctrine of the Church (R. V., II 1-4) nor, as Thomasius and others held, the religious experience of the theologian himself (R. V., I 642ff.).

It is rather (in all A A.) the faith of the Community that it stands in the relation to God which is essentially conditioned by forgiveness of sins that is the immediate object of theological knowledge (R. V., III 3). And so, the aim of theology is validly to characterize universal Christianity (R. V., II 8). Christianity, then, is primary, is given as true; theology is secondary.
Theological theory has value only in so far as it corresponds to faith" (G. A., I 133, in 1869), and vice versa. "Nothing should be incorporated into dogmatics which cannot be used in the pulpit and in Christian life" (R. V., III 3A., 573). Faith, Christian life, is plainly what Ritschl has called "religious knowledge"; this is the subject-matter of theology.

Results.

The subject-matter (and constitutive criterion) of theology is the faith of the Community in God (cf. above IV b 2 ).— Theology not scientific.

We have found Ritschl (in all A A.) asserting the scientific character of theology as disinterested knowledge. But (esp. in 2=3A.) we find him asserting precisely the contrary. Objective, disinterested knowledge has its place in natural science; but the objective account of religion is neither exhaustive nor satisfactory,—indeed, the more objectively the truths of Christianity are narrated, the nearer we are to scepticism (R. V., III 2=3A., 34). Objectivity, in the sense of an "even momentary indifference to the Christian religion .. serves to undermine Christian faith" (R. V., III 3A., 187). Christianity survived Scholasticism and orthodox Protestant theology only in so far as it left the scientific conditions of the doctrine of God inoperative (R. V., III 216). It is precisely this scientific character that made the theology of the Greek Church a failure (R. V., III 2=3A., 184) and constituted "the secularization of Christianity" (Fid. impl., 75). If, then, theology is scientific, it is not Christian.

Further, Ritschl's theology does not correspond to his definition of science. The latter is disinterested. The former is
in the service of the Community, and presupposes an interest more than mere attention; yes, an interest that requires the theologian to belong to the Community, and that makes "the freedom from presuppositions" in our study of the history of Jesus (for instance) both impossible and unnecessary (R. V., III 1-4, Unterr., 20c). 3A., in contradiction to 1=2A., specifically denies the character of scientific knowledge to the acceptance of the idea of God, on which theology rests (R. V., III 3A., 211-215). The (late) recognition of "mysteries" in theology would further tend to distinguish it from science (cf. above II c 3 ii).

Results.

In opposing the traditional separation of natural theology and revelation, Ritschl says that the truth cannot be put together out of two essentially different halves (T. M., 32). We may apply the same principle to his own attempt to combine scientific and religious knowledge in theology. Religious knowledge is the normative element in theology. The scientific form is non-essential, incomplete and even harmful.—

c Value judging.

We have found theology, as Ritschl conceives it, to be essentially different from any other science; for in it alone of all sciences, the form is something relatively non-essential; the relation between form and content is, as it were, accidental and external; the content alone contains the criterion of its truth. The content Ritschl expresses quite simply in the one word confidence - confidence that is, in the God revealed in Christ. He also describes this confidence by another term. "All truths of religious character are direct value judgments" (R. V., III 2=3A., 376).
In view of the well-known phenomenon that the value-judgment theory is popularly considered to be the characteristic element of Ritschl's system, it is interesting to note that the use of the phrase is not original with Ritschl; on the authority and at the request of Prof. W. Herrmann of Marburg, it may be pointed out that both Fabricius, who (Ill note 1) attributes the introduction of the phrase to J. Kaftan, and O. Ritschl ("Werturteile"), who asserts that W. Herrmann was the first to use it, are wrong. Ritschl, Kaftan and Herrmann derived the term from a common source in the philosophy of Lotze.

1 Criteria of Value.

The word "value" is one of the most elusive and least susceptible to definition in the entire philosophical vocabulary. We must, then, be careful to ascertain Ritschl's criterion or criteria of value.

α Practical Results.

In one of his discussions of fundamental principles, he identifies value-judging with the act of establishing the efficiency (Wirken) of a divine truth in producing blessedness in us (R. V., III 2=3A., 376f.). This thought, that the meaning and value of truth is to be found only in practical results, is one that occurs frequently in Ritschl's writings (R. V.,III 2=3A., 23, II 160, etc.). It is implied in his teaching that the deity of Christ can be understood only in terms of the actual experience of the Community (II c) and is related to his positivistic "ontology" in that each emphasizes immediate experience. The notion that "complete" knowledge is the most valuable, which leads (as we have shown) to the conclusion that thinking is entirely superfluous, is likewise an emphasis on concrete results, on the present-in-experience
Ritschl evidently views concrete practical results as a test of the truth of doctrine.—

At the conclusion of his theological methodology, Ritschl shows that the starting-point for all scientific proof in theology must be, as Spener had already shown, the ethical standpoint of John 7, 17 (R. V.,III 2=3A., 8, 24f.). For theology, the Ethos has an unconditionally higher value than the Kosmos (cf. Schl., 42f., and above III c). The fundamental concepts must be ethical, not physical (G. P., III 143). The moral-religious new birth must be the condition of the religious knowledge of God and His revelation in Christ (G. P., II 410). In the article on Ecclesiastical Law (1869), he had pointed out that "only persons and personal influences of an ethical nature are able to preserve and perpetuate the Community" (G. A., I 144). In criticising the theology of A. H. Francke, he expresses regret that that thinker was prevented by his Scholasticism from recognizing his consciousness of ethical power as the criterion of his justification (R. V., I 361f.). This ethical criterion of religious truth was clearly asserted in all periods of his life.

Fabricius holds, indeed, that in I A. the ethical ideal of the Kingdom was the criterion of truth, and that I A. in general represented an ethical rationalism, which was in later A A. qualified by metaphysical ideas and by the authority of revelation (Fab., 134). Fabricius has doubtless proved, in specific passages, the fact of this change of emphasis. But over against his results, stands the fact that the ethical criterion was, as we have shown,


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clearly asserted in all periods of Ritschl's work, including the present aspect of the value-judgment theory of 2=3A.; and, on the other hand, the fact that the essay "On the Conscience" (G. A., II 177-203), denies that the conscience (and so ethics) is an authoritative criterion and affirms the need of the revelation in Christ as the objective support of our conscience (cf. Unterr., 52). We conclude that both ethics and revelation were always (conflicting) elements in Ritschl's criterion of truth.

Ritschl's earlier thought, as Fabricius has shown, tended towards a "duty ethics" (formalistic); his later thought towards a "goods ethics" (eudaemonistic, cf. Fab., 28f., 41). The tendency would seem to be away from the subject toward the object. But his positivistic theory of knowledge implies a tendency precisely the opposite. The increased emphasis on the "religious" concepts as opposed to the "ethical" is again a tendency away from the subject. These cross currents seem to indicate that Ritschl's thought in regard to the problem in question was never in equilibrium; and that his method was empirical.

Results.

The ethical will to practise a truth in life is always for Ritschl a fundamental criterion of value. But this subjective - individualistic view finds a rival in the emphasis on the objective revelation (history, Christ, Community) and tends itself to become more objective (goods ethics).

2 The Subject of Value-judging.

It would seem as if practical results and ethics were criteria which any human being is constitutionally equipped to apply to any given judgment. Is there any other restriction than that given by
the criteria, the nature of the object and the insight of the person judging? Is the human individual as such competent to judge, or is his value-judging dependent for its validity on special conditions? Is he actually the subject of value-judging?

α The Individual.

On the one hand, he makes statements which seem to assert that man by virtue of his innate constitution is competent to judge of values. Ritschl's program of principles asserts that he intends to prove that "the Christian ideal of life and no other absolutely satisfies the claims of the human spirit with reference to the knowledge of things" (R. V., III 2=3A., 25). Value is to be measured by its significance for self-consciousness,- by the effect of a given truth in developing it or hindering it (R. V., III 2=3A., 194, cf. II 352, III 586). The spirit's self-evaluation is the fundamental fact (R. V., III 213, cf. 201).

Results.

Ritschl asserts in the passages of which our quotations are typical that the human spirit makes "claims" which are "satisfied" in Christianity;— that is, the human spirit as such, every individual in his deepest nature. Any human being is a competent subject of value-judging.—

β The Member of the Community.

But there is another group of passages, which is much larger and more characteristic than the individualistic utterances, and in the light of which the latter must be interpreted. If we recall all that we have proven regarding the Community as source and criterion of truth, and regarding the fact that all theology is in the service of the Community, then we shall be prepared for the
statement that, "If one can know God truly only in Christ, then one can know Him only by joining the Community of believers" (R. V., III 2=3A., 8). The ethical proof (cf. above IV c 1) can only succeed when undertaken from the standpoint of the Community of believers" (R. V., III 2=3A., 8). The gospel exists for unbelievers merely as an act of men; it is real, as act of God, only for believers" (G. A., II 14). The revelation is normative "for the Community" (T. M., 30).

The differences, for instance, between a Buddhist and a Christian are so great that the religious points of view of a Christian are scarcely accessible to a Buddhist (T. M., 39). The superiority of Christianity and the corresponding evaluation of other religions is something which only a member of the Christian Community could be expected to accept; it is merely a means of "mutual understanding among Christians". As scientific proof it would not convince Buddhist or Mohammedan (R. V., III 3A., 188). The need for forgiveness of sin is purely Christian (R. V., I 60), and Ritschl's proof of its reasonableness presupposes the acceptance of the whole Christian World-view (R. V., III 498f.). Scripture has its value "for us Christians" (Fid. impl., 71, 74).

Results.

Only members of the Christian Community can be subjects of value-judging in the Christian sense. That is, one must first accept the entire World-view of Christianity, including its estimate of man (need for forgiveness) before one's value judgments can avail to show the truth of Christianity. This is clearly the argumentum in circulo.—

3 Kinds of Value Judgments.

We have yet to note the distinction between the two kinds of
value judgments, "accompanying" and "independent".

The former are present and essential in all theoretical knowledge and observation in the form of "interest", attention to the subject-matter. Of the latter class - the independent value judgments - Ritschl gives two illustrations. The first is "all knowledge of ethical purposes, in so far as it arouses satisfaction or dissatisfaction". The second class is "religious knowledge." It cannot be reduced to the ethical type. "It consists of independent value judgments, which refer to man's relation to the World, and produce feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, in which man either enjoys his mastery of the World through God's help; or is painfully conscious of the lack of that help" (R. V., III 2=3A., 195).

It is the second class which demands our attention. The term "independent value judgments" is an enigmatical one. It raises of itself the question, independent of what? The mere terminology would lead one to say, independent of reference to any object apart from the idea of value. But the phrase "independent of objective reference" would manifestly not correspond to Ritschl's meaning; firstly, because he states that the distinction is one in the realm of the subject (R. V., III 2=3A., 194), and secondly, because the definition of value-judging presupposes reference to two objective realities besides man, namely God (and His help) and the World (and man's relation to it). Value-judging, in the Ritschlian sense, does not mean to prove religious truths by a subjective method, but simply presupposes the objective realities.

What, then, is the distinction between independent and accompanying value judgments? The latter, we find, are present in, or accompany, theoretical knowing and technical observation and
The course can be viewed as consisting of two parts: theoretical and practical. The theoretical component involves the study of mathematical principles, while the practical component focuses on hands-on experience. Students are encouraged to engage in self-directed learning, utilizing a variety of resources such as textbooks, online materials, and interactive software. The course aims to develop critical thinking skills and foster a deeper understanding of the subject matter. Through a combination of lectures, discussions, and group projects, students will gain a comprehensive knowledge base that is applicable in a variety of fields.
combination. The independent judgments would then mean those independent of such theoretical knowing and technical observation. In them, we express the relation between our will (and feeling) and the presupposed or known object. If the independence of value judgments is to mean their independence of theoretical knowing, nevertheless their very nature as value judgments implies their dependence on some kind of knowing, of positing of an object, that is not merely practical evaluation. These judgments are not in the form, if Christianity is true, then it has value; but it has value and is therefore true. The form is rather, Christianity is given as true, and has value, is practical.

The problem arises, what kind of knowledge is that which is not theoretical, nor yet value-judging, but a presupposition of the latter?

The answer that this knowledge may be called hypothetical is excluded by our interpretation above and by Ritschl's specific rejection of the idea after 1A. (III d 1ε), that is to say, ever since his formulation of the value-judgment theory. There is only one alternative. We must view this type of knowledge as a bare assertion, a mere taking for granted, a renunciation of all proof.

Results.

Ritschl's definition of value-judging does not permit us to view it as the assertion of the objective existence of a reality on account of its worth for our subjective life. Neither can we view it as a criterion of truth; for it presupposes knowledge about the objects in question. It does not even serve the function of hypothesis.—

4 The Relations of the two Elements in Value-judging.
We have already pointed out that value-judging in Ritschl's opinion involves the relations of two elements—willing and feeling—to the presupposed knowledge of God, World and man. We ask now, what is the relative stress on each of these two elements?

R. V., III 27, on "The Nature and chief Characteristics of Religion" is a comparison and evaluation of the different religions. In 1A. (cf. Fab., 107), the treatment was philosophical and ethical. The revision of 2=3A. canceled this standpoint and substitutes for it the criterion of the "given" Community tradition. The new criterion is, indeed, not feeling, but resembles it in so far as it is not product of thought or ethical activity and is something that we "suffer" not "do".

Let us take another example. In R. V., III 321, Ritschl defines sin as "the opposite of the ethical Kingdom of God", and it is the consistent view of 1A. that sin is essentially an offence against the ethical. But 2A. and still more emphatically 3A. regard it as essentially a religious offence (Fab. 44); that is, the element of feeling plays a larger part.

Or let us examine Ritschl's definition of Christianity. In 1A. it ran: "Christianity is the completely spiritual and ethical monotheistic religion, which, on the basis of the life of its founder, who established the Kingdom of God, exists in the freedom of the relation of Sonship to God and includes the impulse to conduct from the motive of love; its aim in the ethical organization of humanity" (R. V., III 1A., 9, Fab., 29). It is, then, predominantly ethical. 2=3A. added to the above, "and grounds blessedness in the relation of Sonship to God as well as in the Kingdom of God" (R. V., III 2=3A., 14). This emphasis on blessed-
ness is characteristic of 2=3A. as against the more purely ethical conceptions of 1A. (cf. R. V., III 1=2A., 583 and 3A., 593). In R. V., III 1A., 457, the eudaemonistic idea of the kingdom is judged unfavorably; 2=3A., 490 holds precisely the opposite opinion. It is not necessary to multiply examples. It is clear that Ritschl first viewed the Kingdom as predominantly ethical; but that a different standard of value led him to view it later as the fact within which the feeling of "blessedness" is experienced.

There is no question that there is a striking change away from the primacy of the will toward the primacy of feeling. Blessedness is "the feeling of joy in eternal life", which is permanently bestowed in the present along with forgiveness of sins (R. V., III 2=3A., 95). How important he held this point of view to be is evident from the fact that he insisted on it in spite of its not being made plain by the reformers. As we have shown above, the tendency was for Ritschl to draw nearer to the symbolical writings of the Lutheran Church. Here, however, is a change in the other direction, a change so significant that Ritschl could describe the blessedness which it served to emphasize as "the highest value concept, which determines everything else" (R. V., III 2=3A., 25).

Results.

In 1A., willing was the supreme value, in the form of ethical participation in the work of the Kingdom; in 2=3A., feeling is the highest value, in the form of "blessedness". –
Conclusions.

We are now ready to interpret the results of our investigation. Our method has been strictly inductive; we have presented in detail all aspects of Ritschl's thought in connection with which, either implicitly or explicitly, we find any material fruitful for our theme. Our separate investigations have led us to many different, even contradictory, formulations of Ritschl's criterion of truth. Quite intentionally, we have renounced every effort to systematize and relate these results, but have left them fluid, in order to attain the utmost objectivity of treatment.

As we approach the task of the generalization of our results, it will be with certain presuppositions. Our results, although manifold, are nevertheless the thoughts of one man, an intellectual leader; we presuppose, then, that we shall probably find a measure of unity in our apparently confused material. On the other hand, scarcely any productive mind ever attained perfect unity and harmony, even in fundamentals, and every living mind is subject to the law of development; we presuppose, then, that we shall probably not find any one criterion of truth which Ritschl applied with equal consequence in all parts of his system or at all stages of his career.

We take as our starting-point Ritschl's discussion of the nature of theology as a science (IV b 2α, β, y) where, if anywhere, we should expect to find enlightenment as to fundamental principles. There we find that theology is a consistent system (α), the subject-matter of which is the faith of the Christian Community (β), and the aim of which is the service of that Community (y). Not the scientific form, which is neither complete nor normative (y), but the religious knowledge or faith or confidence of the
Community is the supreme content and criterion of truth.

With this criterion in mind, let us review our results as a whole. We have found that Ritschl rejected the traditional subjectivistic experience of repentance by appealing to the needs, ideals and history of the Christian Community that stands under the influence of the Lutheran Reformation (I a 1α), the Community and not the experience of conversion is authoritative (β); the history and faith of the Community are normative as against the religious experience of any individual (γ). Individualistic feelings and Catholic piety must be rejected in favor of the clearly understood view of the Lutheran Community (I a 2α). These views are characteristic of G. P.

Ritschl's account of the testimonium is less unambiguous, but at any rate, in spite of an emphasis on the activity of the self, the knowledge of God in the Community is so significant that it is described as equivalent to the Holy Spirit or God's knowledge of Himself (a 2β). The same ambiguity obtains in the discussion of mysticism; but the history and ideals of the Lutheran Community are obviously normative as opposed to individual mystical experience (γ). Our relation to God (or Christ) must be mediated through the tradition of the historical Community (I b 2α i, iii).

So real is the content of this tradition to him that he does not feel any of the theoretical difficulties arising from the fact that a historical Community is the source of religion (II a 2). This uncritical attitude toward history leads him to apply the term "revelation" to any complex of ideas that is held as true by any religious Community (II b 1α). The Christian revelation, the final and complete one, is the content of the self-consciousness of Jesus, which he presupposes that the Community possesses
In order to understand the nature of the problem, it is necessary to consider the following points:

1. The nature of the problem involves understanding the underlying causes and mechanisms.
2. The problem requires a comprehensive analysis of all relevant factors.
3. The solution must be based on a detailed examination of the situation.
4. It is important to consider the implications of the problem on various aspects of society.

In conclusion, a comprehensive approach to the problem is necessary to ensure a successful resolution.
in the tradition (also II c 3β). The Christian revelation is the exclusive and perfect criterion of truth for the Community (II c 2α, β), unconditionally superior to conscience (except in the case of Jesus, where conscience and revelation coincided) (y); and not to be proved (or disproved) by the use of reason in theology or in any other field (δ i, ii). We become acquainted with the revelation through the records of the early Community (II b 3α) in the N. T. The inspiration of the N. T. means that it was written by members of the early Community who understood the O. T. (II b 3β i); it contains the essential truth of Christianity (ii λ), although it also contains errors and is authoritative only in so far as it is appropriated by the later Christian Community (ii Λ).

The essential criterion in the history is not the N. T., but Christ, who is at once the content of Scripture and the head of the Community. The revelation in Him is complete and unsurpassable perfection, and is given, authoritative source for all theology (y i, ii), although the emphasis is more on the fact that Christ founded the Community and incorporated the ideal of sinlessness, than on His person (II c 1); indeed, the actual, historical Jesus of Nazareth receives very little attention at Ritschl's hands—neither His death nor His miracles are particularly significant (2). Not the personal Christ, but the Christ-ideal in the Community is then the ultimate criterion (3). The divinity of Christ is really only an expression for the fact that the Community has supreme trust in Him (3x i cf. II d 3α). In 1A. he rejected the exaltatio, regarding it simply as an expression of the fact that the influence of Christ is still active in the Community; later,
he tended to accept the actual present existence of Christ with 
God as a mystery (ii); the first view dissolved the exaltatio 
into experiences of the Community, the second accepted the Com-
munity doctrine as normative. So, too, at first he rejected the 
preexistence as meaning nothing in the present experience of the 
Community; later he approached the traditional view (iii).

Ritschl begins R. V. with the assertion that the founding of 
the Community by Christ coincides with the justification and 
atonement of sinners and that the center of theology is to be 
found in these facts (II d). The actual history of the Community 
has been marred by sin; nevertheless, the unity of the historical Community is, in some sense, necessary to Christianity, and no 
matter how sinful it may have been, true religious experience is 
always possible within its borders (II d 1). This Community is 
sometimes (in all A A.) thought as the realistic unity, which is 
the object of Christ's work and the mediator of the same to the in-
dividual (II d 2 x 1); when he looks on it as a nominalistic-social unity, the emphasis is rather on the ethical nature of the in-
dividual; and the Community has less the nature of authority (ii). 
The dogmatic - religious conception of the Kingdom, which Ritschl 
tended to accept later in life, means that divine causality in the 
Community is emphasized (II d 3 β i). The Word and Sacraments are 
the works of the Church (in the dogmatic sense) and are the cri-
teria of the presence of God; the ethical act of prayer is 
essentially a confessing of God and Christ (y i, ii); the visible 
Church is necessary to our salvation (ib). Toward the legal 
organization of the Church his attitude is contradictory; at times 
(1A.,) he views law and religion as diametrically opposed to each
other, and regards legal forms as belonging to the World rather than to the Church. But later he declared that legal ordinances are just as essential as worship itself; and he makes it a principle to submit to the doctrinal standards of Lutheranism (II d 3 y iii).

As we turn to his discussion of metaphysics, we note a relation between his positivistic ontology and his attitude toward the Community. All that Ritschl has said regarding Christian faith from the Community standpoint (with the exception of the later concessions to exaltatio, preexistence, etc.) means to move in the realm of "positive" knowledge, that is, of immediate experience. But precisely because he views the ontology as establishing the conditions of all knowledge, including that of Christianity, the ultimate formal criterion lies in the reason, not in Christianity (cf. III b 2). But cosmology is rejected, not from rational considerations, but because it cannot arrive at the Christian idea of God as revealed to the Community (III c 3). The positive Christian World-view is not built up on the basis of rational induction, but from the point of view of the revealed idea of God in the Christian Community (III d 1). That He is love, personality, will; that His knowledge is ever present, we know only out of the Christian revelation and from no other source (III d 1α, β, y, ε). If science is to explain the coexistence of Nature and Spirit, its only recourse is to accept the God of Christianity - so 1A. 3A. went to the fanatical extreme of asserting that Christianity would be religiously and practically true, even if the idea of God were not used to explain the World - that is, even if there is no relation thought between God and World! (III d 1 ε). The Christian idea of God leads him to an immanence theory, and this positivistic
ontology to a deistic position. And yet he never thought through the implications of immanence. The World is for him chiefly a something to be overcome (III d 2).

We turn now to Ritschl's logical principles. The content (the faith of the Community) must be clearly and fully defined and studied with sympathy (IV a 1, 2). Logical form does not establish the truth of religion (IV b 1α); true religious knowledge takes the form of confidence directed toward the God given to the Community through revelation (IV b 1β); the revelation is an absolute criterion that cannot be proven either by reason or by ethics, but is given to both (ib.).

The famous value-judgment theory is by no means clear and unified. It is at present important to note that only members of the Community are competent to be subjects of value-judging; such judging is, then, not a proof of the truth of Christianity, but is rather a practising of Christianity on the basis of its assumed truth (IV c 2β). The fundamental definition of "independent" value judgments presupposes the Christian World-view as the given object of confidence (IV c 3).

We may summarize by saying that the faith of the Community in the God revealed in Christ is the fundamental criterion of truth with Ritschl. That agrees with it is true.

This criterion must be formulated with the utmost care. It would, for instance, for inaccurate to say that Scripture is Ritschl's ultimate norm of truth; he excludes much that is there (miracles, eschatology, errors in Paul) and includes much that is not there (Community); and finally, expressly rejects Biblical theology as an adequate account of Christianity. It would also be inaccurate to say that the revelation in Christ is the final
authority for him, unless we define that revelation as including the historical existence and development of His Community.

However, when we say that the faith of the Christian Community was for Ritschl the source of ultimate and final truth, we have not yet reached a completely adequate formulation. The Community of believers precisely in so far as it has retained faith in its Lord, in spite of pettiness and sin, is the authority for us; that is, the ideal tendency of the Community. In the last decade of Ritschl's life, he was inclined to identify this ideal tendency with the actual formulations of the Lutheran doctrinal standards (Lutheran as opposed to Catholic, symbolical books, extra quam nulla salus).

But we have not yet found a unification of all the material which our analysis had discovered. The criterion which we have established may be described as intellectual and social; intellectual, because the faith of the Community is expressed in an idea about God, a traditional World-view, an accurate recollection of the historical Christ; and social, because these ideas exist only in the Christian Community and have truth and power only for individuals who are identified with that Community. There are, however, passages yet to be considered in which the criterion is essentially neither intellectual nor social; in which not ideas but experiences or deeds are ultimate norms; and in which the individual as such (not as member of the Community) is the subject.

Returning to the results of our investigation of experience, we find certain elements that did not fit into our discussion of the Community faith as criterion. Ritschl's chief reason for rejecting the testimoniun spiritus sancti and Mysticism was his
belief that they denied the activity of the self; he assumed that only that is true and real which represents the subject as "doing" \( I = 2\beta \) (cf. \( y \text{.} \) ). This is an ethical criterion; the active self and not the Community or its faith is the subject. The rejection of Mysticism was also based partly on the fact that it lacks ethical sanity, denies the will its full right \( I 2\, y, \, 3 \). There is absolutely no true religious experience in which the self is not ethically active \( I b\, 1\alpha \).

In so far as Ritschl interprets the Community as a "nominalistic-social" unity, his ultimate criterion is the ethical nature of the individuals making up the Community, and not the Community itself as given \( \text{II d}\, 2\alpha \text{ii} \). The great thought of the Kingdom, the final goal of God, the World and the Community, is an ethical ideal of universal love \( \text{II d}\, 3\beta \text{ii} \). We must note the qualification that the ethics presupposes the dogmatics, although neither can be reduced to the other \( \text{II d}\, 3\beta \text{and}\, \delta \). That is, the ethical activity of love cannot be reduced to the religious activity in the Community of believers. In some sense, ethics is a separate field, with a peculiar criterion. On the other hand, the so-called ethical activity of prayer is purely a confession of the faith of the Community \( y \text{ii} \).

Ritschl's psychology belongs under this same category. For him, conscious activity was the only psychological reality - this is ethical, even if it does deny the soul-in-itself \( \text{III b}\, 4 \).

In his attitude toward the World as something to be overcome, and toward Christianity as furnishing the means to the mastery of the World, the argument seems, in part, to proceed from a universally rational ethical standpoint \( \text{III d}\, 2 \); but (cf. \( \text{III d}\, 1\varepsilon \)
although this view prevailed in IV, the tendency of III was to emphasize the absolute supremacy of Christian revelation, over against the claims of a rational ethics, and to interpret the mastery in terms of feeling (3β). Nevertheless, all editions retain the ethical argument that man's sense of his own spiritual dignity is the final answer to all mechanical World-views (3α). The "religious knowledge" of II-III, however, presupposes that the ethical confidence be directed toward the God of revelation; here the ethical attitude is simply the means of appropriating the revelation (IV b 1β). But some expressions of the theory of value-judging do not seem to imply the necessary reference to the revelation, but look on the "consciousness of ethical power" as an immediate and sufficient guarantee of truth; the ethical standpoint of John 7, 17 is the starting point for all scientific proof in theology; but this criterion does not reach a pure expression or a systematic development. It is apparently too subjective completely to satisfy Ritschl (IV c 1β, cf. 2α and β).

This ethical criterion, which our second sifting of the material has revealed, may be expressed as follows: any religious idea is true provided it satisfies the ethical nature of man; or provided it furnished adequate motives for the activity of the self. Sometimes this criterion is expressed as love; sometimes as self-activity. It is essentially teleological. Something to be done, some aim or activity, some ideal goal that calls forth man's ethical best is the ultimate test of whether an idea is true or not.

But there is still a large body of the results of our investigation that cannot be classified as belonging to either of the two criteria that we have so far discovered. It remains for
us to examine these passages and to ascertain whether they contain any common logical principle.

If we turn to Ritschl's account of the subjective aspect of religious experience, we shall find the first of those passages. There a new criterion is formulated, which is different from either of the other two that we have discussed: namely, immediacy, verifiability in present experience. Only the practical, concrete and usable shall be viewed as true (I b 1β). The power of the line of argument or type of piety expressed in this criterion is clear from the fact that in spite of Ritschl's repeated rejection of all Mysticism and all notions of an immediate relation to God or Christ, he nevertheless asserts an experience, immediate and concrete, independent even of the Community; a personal sanctuary in which we realize the presence of God (I b 2β).

When we examine Ritschl's utterances regarding metaphysics, we find the same principle playing an important part. His evaluation of that discipline implies that the worthfully true is to be found not in abstractions, but in the concrete, particular and specific (III a 1). Particularly the concrete distinctions between Nature and Spirit must be retained (2). The Ritschlian ontology is formulated from this same point of view. Phenomena, as they are given in experience, and only so, are real. The criterion of truth is immediacy in experience. Anything is to be viewed as true if, and only if, it is concretely and immediately "given" in experience (III b 1, 2, 3, 4). Things-in-themselves are not "given" and so are not real.

Here belong also most of the utterances regarding "mastery of the World". It is predominantly conceived as a religious
emotion, the feeling of freedom from the World (I b 2αii) which accompanies the consciousness that we are Sons of God. It cannot be attained by any effort of will, but is a datum of consciousness-blessedness - which, in later years, Ritschl rates specifically higher than the ethical criterion of love (III d 3β). This, in common with the positivistic ontology, emphasizes the "given" in consciousness, the immediately experienced, as opposed to the objective character of the Community and the active character of ethics. This feeling of blessedness is characterized in 2=3A., as the highest value concept which determines everything else (IV c 4).

Along with many passages (in all A A.,) limiting the place of feeling in religion, we have found that it is (especially in 2=3A.) an essential part of all religious knowledge and in some sense a criterion of religious truth; for what satisfies the "heart" - the longings, the "given" demands of human nature - is true (IV b 8, cf. c 2α).

One aspect of the theory of values belongs under the present criterion. In so far as "practical results" are a test of value (and so of truth), the concrete, the actual-in-experience, that is, the "given" is the criterion (IV c 1α).

We have now found three different criteria of truth implicit in Ritschl's fundamental thinking. First, the ideal tendency of the Community of believers in Christ (as formulated in Lutheran doctrinal standards); second, the ethically good; and third, that which is concretely "given" in experience. We shall refer to these hereafter as 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

The question naturally arises as to whether, after all, these criteria are really so different from each other as to be contra-
dictory. We shall undertake to bear in mind the presuppositions of our investigation and seek for unity, without trying to force really different principles into an unnatural agreement.

The fairest test as to the relation of these criteria to each other would be to call to mind some of Ritschl's own utterances that bear on the subject. Thus it becomes clear that in so far as Ritschl held fast to 1, he qualified or denied 2 and 3. "The Essay on the Conscience", for instance, is a flat rejection of 2 in favor of 1. In so far as he thought clearly the Christian idea of God in 1, he was led to direct contradiction of 3; e.g.- the assertion that the living God is to be distinguished from His purposes and His creatures (III d 16)- an admission of God-in-Himself! Again, his concessions to the preexistence and exaltatio, were contradictory to the objections that he himself had formerly raised from the standpoint of 3. Again, the "personal sanctuary" of 3, he accompanied with expressions of indifference toward 1. 1 leads to an immanence theory, and 3 to the distinction between Nature and Spirit and so to Deism (III d 1e). And one of the more characteristic features of Ritschl's thought is his conscious and continued distinction between 2 and 3, - between the ethical Kingdom and the "given" emotional experience of the mastery of the World (III d 3c). It is further clear that 3, with its "given" facts of experience, violates the demand of 2 for the subordination of the Kosmos under the Ethos.

It is clear that the three criteria do not coincide; that they, in part at least, contradict each other; and that Ritschl was aware of the incongruity. This last fact is one which may afford us, to a degree, an explanation of the inconsistencies. We have
found that clearness and accuracy meant a great deal to Ritschl. But it was the clearness and accuracy of a man who demanded religious life and rated it higher than theological form; who could look on the consistency of a theological system as something purely formal and regulative; in short of a man who was fundamentally an empiricist— as is already clear from his positivistic ontology. Such a man might be expected to construct a theology that is intended to be confined to the realm of history (although the Christian idea of a personal and transcendent God makes the undertaking impossible), which brings the Kingdom out of the eschatological future and down from the heavenly heights to the earthly present and to actual struggles of man, and which sees in the concrete, given facts of external phenomena and inner feeling the immediate guarantee of the Christian truths. Such a view, expressed in widely differing, often contradictory formulae is what we should expect from a theological empiricist.

In a description of his method of work, he reveals the illogical, intuitive type of mind which we may well call empirical. In the preparation of lectures, he wrote to Wesemann in 1879, he always felt uncertain; his intellectual confidence came only with the actual delivery (Leben, II 362).

In a sense, Ritschl's empiricism was his strength and his glory. It gave him a certain freedom of motion; a disregard for the hair-splitting of formal logic; a freshness and reality (of conception; unfortunately not of expression) in the handling of theological problems in their relations to the actual life of the Christian Community. It permitted him to be what he became: the teacher of a generation, who inspired thousands, and compelled all to reconsider fundamentals, and yet a teacher who had not one submissive disciple.
But, precisely the empiricism that was his strength was also his weakness. First of all, it prevented him from understanding the only philosophers to whom he was willing to lend a hearing - Kant and Lotze: surely - the proof of this assertion lies outside the aim of the present treatise - neither of these great thinkers would stand sponsor for the curious positivism of T. M.

Secondly, it closed his eyes to the essential fact of the unity of self-consciousness and of truth as an expression of the attitude of a total personal life over against the World. The Kantian teaching of the activity of the self he accepted; but the unity of the knowing subject he did not grasp. The three criteria, as we have discovered them, are an illustration of this fact. We know the faith of the Community, we will the Kingdom of God, we feel the presence of given phenomena and emotions. But these three facts stand separate, almost unrelated; as could not be the case if Ritschl had felt strongly the unity of the thinking, willing and feeling subject. For this same reason, Ritschl could tolerate a double truth - theoretical and religious - and (in his later writings) distinctively repudiate any need for relation between the two.

Thirdly, the empiricism which hindered him from recognizing the unity of the self permitted him to commit the fallacy of seeing a unity where no ontological unity exists: namely, in the social group of the Christian Community. Overlooking the fact that the only real entities in that Community and its history were the individuals, he was led, by his "historical empiricism" to attribute an importance to the idea of the Community that quite seriously hampers the ethical individualism of Christianity. All that the individual receives from God (according to 1) he has through the
the medium of the Community. His justification and atonement
mean simply that he is a member of the Community - of that real-
istic unity which exists "without reference to the counting of its
members". He cannot be said to be really a believer in Christ un-
less he is identified with the Church, the worshiping Community.
With all due regard for the significance of the social aspect of
Christianity which Ritschl rightly brought to the attention of the
Christian World, we have no doubt that his opponents, who charged
him with approaching the Catholic conception of the Church as the
institution through which alone salvation is mediated, were moved
by a sound instinct.

Fourthly, as we have shown, Ritschl's empiricism led him to
a doctrine of the transcendence of God, whereas his Christian train-
ing led him to a doctrine of immanence. On the whole, the former
conception dominated his thought. Once in the history and only
once has the transcendent God come into touch with man: namely in
Christ. The development of the Christian Community and the realiza-
tion of the Kingdom must be thought, it is true, as caused by God;
but the only actual point of contact between God and the history
is in the Christ; all else is effect of this cause, inference from
this premise. There is very little room for Ritschl to see God in
the O. T., according to his principles; and he flatly refuses to
think about the fate of the nations that do not come under the
influence of the historical Community. Revelation is, then, a fact
of the past, a matter of tradition and nothing else; although we
gladly call attention to the fact that his empiricism also led him
to recognize (inconsistently) the "personal sanctuary". In general,
however, God's presence in the World and in experience is the
exception and not the rule; God's existence can be known only by
disregarding and overcoming the world, while one accepts the faith of the Community. His empiricism, then, was a grave limitation of his ability to recognize divine truth in the actual experience of life.

Finally, Ritschl's empiricism led him to another serious limitation; namely, a decided retrenchment of the missionary and evangelistic character of Christianity. He conceived his task as limited to the bounds of the Community; the Christian estimate of other religions as purely a matter of mutual understanding among Christians, and shall not be thought of as having validity for others. Once in the Community, the Ritschlian theology may have a message for us; but if we stand outside, what then? Ritschl proposes to describe the religious environment in which he finds himself; but his empiricism does not have the vision to see those who do not yet stand within the gates. Ritschl found it difficult to forgive Luther for adapting his theology to the needs of "the common, ordinary man" who does not go to Church; and he entertained no hope of being able to bring the Buddhist and the Mohammedan to an understanding, much less to an acceptance, of the Christian viewpoint. The nations outside the movement of occidental history in which Christianity has, up to the present, chiefly flourished, fare ill in Ritschel's hands. His empiricism could not, or at least did not, rise to the universal point of view.

If we correct Ritschel's empiricism by a personalism (of Professor Bowne's type), that recognizes the unity of the subject, and looks on the harmonious, consistent realization of the total personal life as the ultimate criterion of truth, then we shall be enabled to revise the three Ritschlian criteria, recognizing the truth in them, but avoiding their errors. In 1, we shall be able to
retain the emphasis on revelation, history and Community; we shall, however, be led to interpret them not as the only knowledge of God in a World where God is not, but as, on the whole, the clearest signs of the nearness of God in a World that is really full of Him, when rightly thought. We shall conceive the human reason not merely as a formal tool for arranging the materials of theology, hopelessly divided in itself between theoretical and religious interests; but as an essential element in the one harmonious personal life,—something that really helps us on our way to divine truth. In 2, we can retain the inspiring faith in the Kingdom and the goodness of God; but we shall not fall into the error of making the absolute contrast between what ought to be and what is; our personalistic criterion will insist on seeing the tokens of the eternal Ethos of things precisely in the Kosmos as we experience it. And in 3, we can recognize the worth of the emphasis on the given in experience, and on feeling as one expression of the personal life; and yet insist that the need of harmonizing the elements of that life forbids us to take either the given phenomena or the experienced feelings as a final criterion of the truth. We believe that the way that we here indicate is the key to a sound estimate of Ritschl's work.
In a similar manner, if one might say, the state assembly involves itself in the problems of the legislative body, the state school system endeavors to serve the educational needs of the state. The school system, in turn, seeks to provide a quality education to the students, which ultimately benefits the society and the nation. The relationship between the legislative body and the school system is reciprocal, with each influencing the other in various ways. The state assembly, through its laws and regulations, sets the framework for the operation of the school system, while the school system, through its educational outcomes, impacts the effectiveness of the legislative body in serving the interests of the people.

In order to improve the educational system, it is essential to ensure that the legislative body provides adequate support in terms of funding, resources, and policies. The school system, in turn, needs to ensure that it is providing a quality education to all students, regardless of their background or circumstances. This requires continuous improvement in teaching methods, curriculum development, and infrastructure. The government and the school system must work together to create a conducive environment for learning and development, where every child has the opportunity to reach their full potential.

Moreover, it is crucial to involve the community in the educational process. Parents, teachers, and other stakeholders should be actively engaged in shaping the educational policies and programs. This will ensure that the educational system is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the community. Collaboration between the government, the school system, and the community is essential for achieving educational goals.

In conclusion, the relationship between the legislative body and the school system is a dynamic and ongoing process. It requires mutual understanding, cooperation, and commitment from all parties involved. By working together, we can ensure that our educational system is effective, equitable, and responsive to the needs of the society.
C Examination of German Criticisms of Ritschl in their Relation to the present Results.

As we approach the task of examining the more important German literature in regard to Ritschl, and of evaluating it in its relation to our present results, we seem to be entering a realm of almost hopeless confusion. The literature published during Ritschl's lifetime we shall in general leave untouched (as stated above) because it is too ephemeral and too partisan to be of present value. The bibliography for this period is given in E. Nippold's otherwise practically worthless volume, "Die theologische Einzelschule im Verhältniss zur evangelischen Kirche" (1893). A brief bibliography will also be found in L. Haug's "Darstellung und Beurteilung der Theologie Ritschls" (Stuttgart, 1A., 1886; 2A., 1895), a booklet which seems to have met the needs of Lutheran pastors who desired an acquaintance with the works of Ritschl, without recourse to the sources, but which does not display any marked degree of critical acumen.

Ritschl's death, March 20, 1889 did not put an end to ephemeral and partisan writing about his theology; but from that time on the criticisms become gradually more objective and serious. It is our present aim to describe and evaluate the features of significance that these criticisms contain for our problem. Our task is complicated by the fact that no treatment which we have found approaches Ritschl from the point of view of the attempt to ascertain his criterion of truth. The material does not lend itself to any natural classification from this standpoint. We choose, therefore, the chronological method as one which has the advantage of following in general the course of the development.
If 1 to a1, then: If 1 to a1, then:

\[ \text{Let } a, b, c, \text{ and } d \text{ be real numbers.} \]

\[ (a + b)(c + d) = ac + ad + bc + bd \]

\[ (a - b)(c - d) = ac - ad - bc + bd \]

Then we have: Then we have:

\[ (a + b)(c + d) = ac + ad + bc + bd \]

\[ (a - b)(c - d) = ac - ad - bc + bd \]

Therefore, the product of the sum and the difference of two numbers is equal to the difference of the products of the numbers.

In conclusion, we have shown that the product of the sum and the difference of two numbers is equal to the difference of the products of the numbers.
By way of introduction to the material, we direct attention to the fact that there is relatively little unanimity among writers on Ritschl, whether friendly or hostile to him. However, in three points, which are a worthwhile orientation, we find agreement. Firstly, all justly condemn Ritschl's German style as extraordinarily difficult, heavy and obscure; a fact which, in part, accounts for the many misinterpretations of his ideas. Secondly, all recognize the bitter and almost coarse character of the polemic on both sides of the controversy. The majority, even of Ritschl's friends, admit that he was, in large measure, to blame for this condition, chiefly through his pamphlet T. M. He called himself a controversialist in theology (Leben, II 270). This fact adds to the difficulty of a correct evaluation of essentials. Thirdly, all concede that Ritschel had no disciple; that he did not found a school, in the sense that Arminius or Calvin founded a school. None of the "Ritschlians" is a mere follower of Ritschl's; all are independent thinkers, who depart, more or less, from Ritschl's fundamental principles.

The first criticism of our theologian to appear after his death was written by O. Pfleiderer, and appeared in the "Jahrbucher fur protestantische Theologie" in April and December 1889 and in June 1891; published in one volume "Die ritschlsche Theologie kritisch beleuchtet" (Braunschweig, 1891). The first two essays were written before Ritschl's death; but Pfleiderer seemed almost to take a certain pride in having them published in the following month nevertheless, in spite of their often discourteous tone. He points out, correctly, the failure of Ritschl's positivistic ontology; and therefore feels justified in characterizing him freely as sceptic
(27) and atheist (7). This inference is, doubtless, the logical consequence of positivism; but Ritschl did not make it, and we have found that the faith of the Community was far more fundamental in Ritschl's thinking than his positivism, which came late to expression and is full of self-contradictions. Pfleiderer fails to note the connection between the emphasis on phenomena and on feeling, as illustrations of the concept of the "given". In his judgment of the theory of values, he sees only the subjective side, and fails to note that Ritschl's definition of the theory assumes the revelation as given (19, 21f.). He calls attention to the faultiness of Ritschl's exegesis (35ff.). His fundamental criticism is the fact that religion and ethics have no essential connection in Ritschl's system (V, 79, 93); or in the terms of our results, 2 has no inner connection with 1 and 3. But when he declares that this antithesis, in the form of the dualism of Nature and Spirit, is the motive power of Ritschl's thought - although neither a Christian nor a religious idea - then we reply: not this distinction but our criterion is the center of Ritschl's thought; and further, although this dualism was undoubtedly a grave flaw in Ritschl's thinking, his interpretation of the mastery of the World (blessedness or Christian Perfection) was a legitimate recognition of the place of feeling in religion even if expressed in a theoretical form that must be rejected. And Ritschl's failure to reconcile ethics and religion was a theoretical failure; his religious faith (1) reconciled them. Pfleiderer's criticism, although often led by sound philosophical instincts over against Ritschlian empiricism, does not betray an objective grasp of Ritschl's thought nor the ability to single out what, for Ritschl, were the essentials.
Quite from Pfleiderer's point of view, and so not needing further attention is Lemme's "Die Prinzipien der ritschl'schen Theologie" (1891).

At the beginning of the Winter Semester 1889, W. Herrmann of Marburg made his Rectorial address on the subject "Der evangelische Glaube und die Theologie Albrecht Ritschl's" (Marburg, 1A., 1890, 2A., 1896), as close friend, personal and theological, of the deceased master. Strongly subjective, ardently religious, Herrmann is always at his best in stating his own views; not in criticising others. The present pamphlet contains, in reality, but one thought of significance for us. Ritschl's idea of faith, so Herrmann tells us, is of submission to the power of the revelation of God (16). We have no doubt that Ritschl would accept this formulation; although he would explain it from the standpoint of the Community and history, whereas Herrmann would give more significance to the inner and immanent revelation in conscience. Herrmann's essay is a sympathetic and correct, but incomplete depiction of one aspect of Ritschl's view by a follower whose own views had developed beyond his master's.

The conservative theology, especially in the persons of Frank and Luthardt, had engaged in an active criticism of Ritschl during his life time. In 1891, G. Schnedermann published his lecture on "Frank and Ritschl" (Erlangen und Leipzig 1891), which he had delivered Sept. 24, 1890 in Hohenstein - Ernestthal. Although written from the standpoint of Frank, the lecture is noteworthy for its objectivity. It makes three points that we must note. First, Schnedermann calls attention to Ritschl's empirical theory of knowledge, in accordance with our result. Second, he holds that Ritschl had no firm foundation for the structure of his
dogmatics. "We have here a systematization of modern Christianity, in so far as it is always learning and never arriving at a knowledge of the truth". He admits that, for Ritschl, God is known only out of His revelation, but declares that Ritschl gives no answer to the question as to why Jesus Christ is revelation (17). Schnedermann, like many others, overlooks the importance of the Community - idea for Ritschl; Christ is revelation, he would say, because the Community believes Him. This may not be for Frank or Schnedermann or for us the final word on the subject; but it was for Ritschl the guiding principle and furnished him with what he believed to be a perfect, complete and unsurpassable knowledge of God as the firm foundation of his system. Schnedermann's criticism is, then, fundamentally unfair. And third, he repeats the charge heard so often during Ritschl's lifetime, that he was a rationalist, his theology a "warming-over" of the principles of the Enlightenment (23). To support this, he asserts that Ritschl's strength and significance lay in the reconstruction of theology from the point of view of philosophical criticism. That Ritschl's insistence on experience, his separation of Nature and Spirit and his demand for clear definition of theological terms show Kantian influences, we freely admit. But a thinker whose chief polemic was against Catholicism on the one hand and abstract and metaphysical formulations on the other; who found God in the history and not in the reason, - cannot rightly be described as being chiefly led by rationalistic motives. He did not attempt to deduce theology from any rational principle. Nevertheless, Schnedermann's criticism is sounder and less bitter than Pfleiderer's.

The next work that we have to review is a small monograph by
O. Ritschl, the son of our theologian, "Über Werturteile" (Freiburg und Leipzig, 1895). The essay is chiefly historical, and represents, as might be expected, a close approximation to the paternal view. He rightly identifies the value judgments with the feeling of confidence in the Christian revelation (25); and holds to the exclusion of all theoretical knowledge, quite in his father's spirit (24). Nevertheless, we have to note two points of difference from A. Ritschl's attitude. First: "From the very first, all knowing is exclusively in the form of value-judging" (34). But this is really a blow at the distinction between theoretical and religious knowledge, which O. Ritschl meant to retain. If all judgments are of one kind, namely value judgments, where is the distinction? And second, O. Ritschl views our value judgments regarding Christianity as a confession of the fact that the strife among the religious and philosophical World view is not settled, and as an anticipation, in hope, of the victory of Christianity. He takes a position dictated by general rational considerations, in contrast to his father's position within the Community. We have already called attention to the fact that O. Ritschl is wrong in asserting that A. Ritschl was influenced by W. Herrmann in his theory of value-judging.

O. Flügel, a representative of the Herbartian realistic metaphysics, published in 1895 the third edition of his "A. Ritschls philosophische und religious Ansichten", a work which, in the first edition, had been merely a criticism of Ritschl's philosophical views, but which in the second and third editions was enlarged to include the theological. Flügel insists, as Pfleiderer and Schnedermann had done (we believe unjustly) in regarding Ritschl
more from the philosophical than from the theological point of view (Preface to 3A.). From this standpoint, he accuses Ritschl of materialism and pantheism, - that is, of the two World-views which he most decisively rejected. Flügel supports the former charge by the assertion that it is the principle of materialism to recognize nothing but "the given"; and that Ritschl's positivism (our 3) should logically draw the atheistic inferences of materialism. We maintain, however, that Flügel's criticism is one-sided: it is, indeed, sound, if "the given" in phenomena be regarded as the only type of "given". But our criterion 3 shows that Ritschl viewed religious feeling and experience (Spirit) as just as truly given and valid as phenomena (Nature). And, in a wider sense, he viewed the whole content of criterion 1 as "given" in the Community, and therefore true. Such a use of the concept "given" is not justly described as materialism. Flügel also charges Ritschl with pantheism. He attempts to prove this by an identification of Ritschl's emphasis on the Spirit as over against Nature, on self-activity and independence with Fichte's theory of the ego and non-ego; and offers as principal evidence the fact that Ritschl never mentions Fichte, although he refers to Schelling, Hegel and Schleiermacher. The argumentum e silentio is always dangerous; especially so in this case, because the two criteria with which Flügel reproaches Ritschl actually contradict each other. On the one hand, he tells us, Ritschl says that only the phenomenally given is true; on the other, that only what the self has created is true. Flügel has laid too great stress on subordinate lines of thought. Finally, this critic fails to understand Ritschl's theory of values. He recognizes only that aspect of the theory which teaches that Christianity satisfies the heart
of man, and overlooks the side of the theory which presupposes the Christian revelation as given and true. Flügel is wrong when he says (substantially as Schnedermann had done) that Ritschl's grounding of the authority of Jesus would take only the Fichtean form "The Gospel deserves to be true and so is true; dignity is the ground of reality" (60). Not such an argument leads Ritschl to the recognition of Jesus; no, he finds Jesus in the Community tradition and, therefore, (fundamentally) accepts Him. We are unable to share the opinion of the "Theologischer Jahresbericht" that Flügel is the most significant opponent of Ritschl.

In the year 1892, C. Ritschl had published the first volume of his "Albrecht Ritschls Leben" (Freiburg); in 1896 appeared the second and more significant volume (Freiburg und Leipzig).

Conscientiously and carefully worked out in detail, with an abundance of valuable material, this biography has many praiseworthy features, not the least of which is the splendidly complete bibliography of A. Ritschl's writings at the close of each volume. The many quotations from Ritschl's letters are of the utmost significance for an understanding of his intellectual development. It is in such painstaking detail - work that this book excels. From the standpoint of criticism, it accomplishes little. It regards the development in Ritschl's thought as a steady improvement. With Wendland, we have to confess that we find no critical evaluation of Ritschl's thought in this book.

In R. Wegener's "A. Ritschls Idee des Reiches Gottes" (Leipzig, 1897), we have a curiosity of criticism. Flügel's tracing of Ritschl's ideas to Fichte was a dangerous combination of the arguments from silence and analogy: here we have the hypothesis that Ritschl's idea of the Kingdom was derived from the theologian
Staudlin; is it not very suspicious that Ritschl never mentions this man's name? And does not Staudlin view the Kingdom as "the religious formula used by the speculative reason for the teleological contemplation of the World and history" (38)? But there are two fatal objections to this interpretation. First, Ritschl's whole life-work was a protest against the right of the speculative reason in theology; and second, his failure to unite the ethical and the religious elements of his system forbids the opinion that so rationally unified a view as this lay at the basis of his thought. Further, we may judge of Wegener's competency by such utterances as these: "Ritschl moved exclusively in the realm of dialectic imagination" (66); "Kant would never have risen from the dead, if Schopenhauer had not resurrected him" (97). The chief merit of this book is that it calls attention, as Pfleiderer had already done, to the faulty exegesis on which Ritschl's conception of the Kingdom is based (74).

It would seem as if the criticism of Ritschl had reached its lowest ebb in this book. From this point on, the discussions become perceptibly more objective and fairer. In 1897 appeared a volume by O. Ecke, "Die theologische Schule A. Ritschls und die evangelische Kirche der Gegenwart". At the time of its appearance, so Kattenbusch says, the critics regarded it as being too late for any further investigation of Ritschl's thought. As a matter of fact, the book was a token that men were just beginning to understand Ritschl. The author, an orthodox Lutheran Bibliclist, was able, as no one before him had been, to appreciate the significance of the Ritschlian system as a whole. He points out as Ritschl's most significant contribution "The energetic combination of the facts of the practical spiritual life with the historical
revelation in Christ, accompanied by a sharp refutation of all unjustified claims of the theoretical reason". Ecke is the first to see clearly that Ritschl is to be understood from the point of view of the Christian revelation (our 1) and not from that of his philosophical principles. In so far, our criterion 1 is a confirmation of Ecke's result. What Ecke did not see was the significance of the Christian Community for the interpretation of what the revelation meant.

A. Harnack's review of Ecke's book (published in the "christliche Welt" 1907, no. 37 and 38, republished in Harnack's Aufsätze, Bd. II 347-368, Giessen 1906) was, although brief, perhaps an even more important contribution than Ecke's own. Harnack expresses his substantial agreement with Ecke - excepting his orthodox dogma of inspiration. He calls attention to the Ritschlian anticatholic polemic, particularly in G. P., - a work which most discussions of Ritschl ignore; and emphasizes the Ritschlian demand for a clear use of terms. We have mentioned both of these aspects frequently. There are, however, two points in which Harnack comes to a conclusion out of harmony with ours. First, he insisted that Ritschl's goal was, emphatically, a unified system (352). It is, of course, true that he desired a theology free from contradiction; but we contend that theological form was not his goal; the given faith of the Community and the given data of phenomena and feeling meant more to him than the demand for systematic unity. He was an empiricist in the fullest sense, not a rationalist. Harnack himself concedes, later on, that Ritschl did not emphasize sufficiently the need of unity and consistency in the theology won from the Bible (357). Ritschl wrote in a letter to his son (May 5, 1888) that in the revision of R. V., he was abso-
lutely astonished at some of the things he had written fifteen years before; "so little is my memory able to master all the details of the structure that I built then" (Leben, II 510). These are not words of a man to whom system was everything. Harnack's second assertion seems to us even more misleading. He says that Ritschl wanted to erect a universally valid system (358). But we hold that the traces of that desire in Ritschl, such as the use of the idea of God for the scientific explanation of the world, and a rationalistic ethics (2) are precisely not characteristic. For the defence of our position, we have only, as above, to quote Harnack against Harnack. He says that Ritschl's theology is constructed "from the standpoint of the Community", and so simply sets aside many important problems (361). Now, Ritschl's Community - theology clearly disdains validity for Buddhists and Mohammedans. It is true that a theology which is to satisfy mankind must strive for universal validity; but it is not true that Ritschl aimed at that goal.

J. Wendland's "Albrecht Ritschl und seine Schüler" (Berlin, 1899) was the next significant treatment, from the point of view of a somewhat rationalistic scholar of Lipsius. It is valuable for its bibliographies; for the breadth of vision which seeks to relate Ritschl to the general culture and history of his times; and for the combination of sympathy and critical insight in his attitude toward the details in Ritschl's system. Unfortunately, he lacked the ability to pick out and emphasize the larger aspects of Ritschl's thought; he is, however, right in pointing out (as Pfleiderer and others had done) that the ethical (our 2) and religious (1 and 3) elements are not reconciled by Ritschl (96); to a clear understanding of the reason for this, he did not come.
He does good service in calling attention to Ritschl's indifference to the concrete historical facts and historical investigation of the life of Jesus (84-89); but, like other critics, fails to recognize the central importance that the historical Community assumed in Ritschl's thought (traces in 78, 84).

One of Ritschl's former students, E. Vischer, published in 1900 a lecture on "Albrecht Ritschl's Anschauung von evangelischem Glauben und Leben" (Tübingen), a popular, almost eloquent, plea for his conception of Ritschl's idea of faith. He believes that Ritschl protested "against the opinion that views faith as the acceptance of a series of dogmas, the holding of certain historical facts as true" (8); and that he insisted on the person of Christ as the revelation of God. This is Herrmann's interpretation, also. Vischer recognizes that the Ritschlian antithesis to Pietism and Catholicism is a fundamental element, and that it is an emphasis on the Community and the history as opposed to the individual soul (35). But because Vischer does not relate the protest against viewing faith as mere acceptance of dogma (which we do not find clearly expressed in Ritschl) and the emphasis on the historical Jesus to each other, his interpretation is, after all, not very illuminating.

Ritschl's friend, also a former student, D. Kattenbusch published a lecture "Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl" (Giessen), which reached its third edition in 1903. C. von Schultess in Th. L. Z. 1893, No. 3, called Kattenbusch's point of view the decisive one for the understanding of Ritschl. Wendland, on the contrary, regards it as "completely wrong". The position is this: Schleiermacher, and all theologians influenced by him (except Ritschl), made the religious consciousness or experience the start-
One of the primary areas of focus is the adoption and expansion of informational technology in education. This involves the integration of technology into the classroom and the use of digital resources to enhance learning.

In many cases, this can include the use of online platforms, educational software, and interactive tools to provide students with a more engaging and effective learning experience. Additionally, there is an emphasis on the development of critical thinking and problem-solving skills through technology-driven activities.

The integration of technology also allows for the creation of more personalized learning experiences, as students can work at their own pace and receive immediate feedback on their progress. This can be particularly valuable in areas such as math and science, where students may benefit from interactive simulations and virtual experiments.

Overall, the adoption of informational technology in education is a crucial step towards preparing students for the future and ensuring that they are equipped with the skills needed to succeed in a rapidly changing world.
ing point of theology (14). Ritschl broke with this method, and made the gospels his starting point (55, 59). This result is a partial statement of our criterion1, and in full agreement with it. Wendland attacks it on the ground that value judgments are feelings, inner experiences; but we reply, fundamentally the value judgments presuppose the Christian world-view, as the ethical presupposes the dogmatic. Kattenbusch's criterion corresponds to the more characteristic side of Ritschl's theory.

Among the writers interested in popularizing the results of the Ritschlian theology, Constantin von Kügelgen occupies a significant place. A second edition "Grundriss der ritschlschen Dogmatik" appeared in Leipzig in 1903. Although not intended to be more than an exposition of the master's system, it is noteworthy in marking an advance in the ability objectively to understand Ritschl's thought. Kügelgen sees, for instance, that the revelation in Christ (137) and not Kantian rationalism (134) was the basis of Ritschlian dogmatics; and emphasizes Ritschl's return to the classic origins of the Lutheran reformation. In other words, Kügelgen lays practically exclusive stress on our criterion 1; but does not perceive the presence of 2 and 3.

Arnold Köster, the pastor of the Erlöserkirche in Hamburg-Borgfelde delivered a lecture in June, 1904 on the subject, "Worin besteht die bleibende Bedeutung Ritschls für die protestantische Theologie?" and published it later in the same year. Köster's net result is as follows: the permanent significance of Ritschl consists in his systematic theology which is founded on the "science of the Reformation". Like Kügelgen and Ecke, Köster recognizes our criterion 1 as the essential aspect of Ritschl's thought. Köster sees implied in this a protest against intellectualism,
mysticism and against all hierarchies; positively, he characterizes Ritschl's view as Confessionalism. It is true, he does not mean this to be an exhaustive account of the entire system, but only of the permanently significant elements in it. Fosler attains to this result in the heat of a political campaign regarding the status of the Confession in the schools. His neglect of our criteria 2 and 3 is, then, adequately explained.

The stream of literature on our theologian continued at flood tide. In 1905, Prof. Herrmann, Ritschl's most brilliant interpreter, wrote an essay on "Protestant Dogmatics", which appeared in the series "Die Kultur der Gegenwart, in the volume "Die christliche Religion". This essay contained important references to our subject. It points out three ideas as fundamental in Ritschl. The first is that religion lives from history. This is implicit in the reference to the Community in our first criterion. The second is that he did not feel the problem of the relation between criticism and historical faith. This we have called attention to in our exposition. The third is (as Kattenbusch had previously taught) that revelation, the gospel, not the fact of faith, is Ritschl's ultimate. By faith, Herrmann means the overwhelming confidence in God wrought by God Himself in a human soul. Our analysis of the Community faith in Ritschl's system would lead us to accept Herrmann's formula at this point. But Herrmann, partly on account of his own polemic against mysticism, did not properly evaluate the elements, partly mystical and partly positivistic, in which Ritschl made "the given" his implicit criterion of truth.

Professor Carl Stange's book "Der dogmatische Ertrag der ritschlachen Theologie" (Leipzig, 1906), is a criticism of J. Kaftan
rather than of Ritschl himself. But the very self-assurance with which Stange asserts that the Ritschlian theology has been laid on the table, and his ironical apology for a new work on Ritschlianism as an anachronism, betray the fact that the subject was still a living issue. But Stange misunderstands Ritschl; he commits the fallacy, exploded by Kügelgen and others, of supposing that Ritschlianism is essentially rationalism; or at any rate consists of an oscillation between positive Christian and rationalistic elements. We do not need to point out again the injustice of such a conception (1). He is, however, right in pointing out the loose relation between the two parts of theology - religious faith and scientific form (4).

The most recent work, "Die Entwicklung in Albrecht Ritschls Theologie von 1674 bis 1689" (Tübingen, by C. Fabricius, 1909), although devoted to one special problem, is perhaps the most valuable and thorough work that we possess. His inductive method and his mastery of the material are surpassed by no writers on Ritschl. In his results, Fabricius agrees with O. Ritschl (Leben) and with our conclusions in the fact that, while both ethics and revelation were in R. V., 1A. normative, in E. V., 2, 3A. the emphasis was laid more strongly on revelation. Fabricius, however, sees in this a deterioration, while O. Ritschl saw natural growth and improvement. But from the point of view of our criticism of the Ritschlian empiricism, we are unable to see any fundamental change in this shifting of emphasis. So long as Ritschl remained an Empiricist, he was bound to fail in the attempt to attain a satisfactory system. We call attention to the fact that both O. Ritschl and Fabricius fail to give the central place to the Community to which we were led by our investigations, and that neither
recognizes the concept of the "given" as we have found it.

The two criticisms on O. Ritschl and Fabricius are also true of the other critics whose writings we have discussed. Our conception, then, supplements that of previous investigators, and on the other hand, we have found no cause for altering any of our conclusions. Our final verdict is, then, that Ritschl was an empiricist with three different criteria of truth, of which the faith of the historical Community in the revelation of God in Christ was the most significant; ethics and the concept of the "given" being of minor importance.

Ritschl attained no unity in his thought. But his own words regarding Schleiermacher apply so fittingly to himself that we close by quoting them:

"It is a frequent experience that that fruitful idea that a man discovers ventures forth only in abbreviated or half-concealed form, like a bud which is not yet opened by the full light of knowledge; or that some aspect of the idea that is being developed is slighted, because there is in the mind of the thinker a vision of the whole that is too mighty not to overshadow, as it were, a part of itself" (Schl., 11). With Ritschl, it was the intellectual that was overshadowed, the religious that was mighty.
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