The experience of American military government in German reeducation

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"The way to learn democracy is by applying it."

General Joseph T. McNarney
American Military Governor of Germany
During the long years of World War II, much plain nonsense and much intelligent thinking regarding the serious problem of German political, social, and intellectual "reeducation" captured the minds of Americans in every sector of the United States. On the one hand, there were scores of grandiose, sugary schemes to "reeducate" the misled Germans with patience and diligence, in order to lead them to the enjoyment of the panacea of enlightened democracy. On the other hand, there were numerous schemes to eradicate everything relating to Germany's past and to plunge the bleeding nation into a new credo designed to produce a penitent, definitely reformed Germany. Between these two extremes, there were, of course, thousands of more moderate plans.

What is American Military Government's long-awaited solution to the problem of reorienting the German mind? Does the solution tend to be harsh and ruthless, or does it tend to be gentle and even innocuous? Is there, in fact, a concrete working plan at all?

My problem, then, is to ascertain what American Military Government in its first three years of operation has accomplished in regard to the "reeducation" of the German nation. The success of the first three years is important to measure, because it will be an excellent criterion by which the possibilities of additional, more important successes for the future may be estimated. In order to define the problem more
11. I have decided to limit my investigations to what I consider the most important phases of the problem; namely, education, the political parties, the press, and youth. A detailed investigation of these four facets of German life will indicate very completely what Military Government has accomplished in Germany and what remains to be done. It is undoubtedly true that other phases of German life impinge on this general problem of "reeducation," but there should be no grounds for controversy in the statement that education, the political parties, the press, and youth lie closest to the core of "reeducation."

My sources of information have been many and varied. A basic source of material has been the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone. Because the military is interested in general over-all appraisals, in simple reports of performance rather than weighted, profound analyses, an uncritical acceptance of its tabulations and observations without a great deal of careful evaluation would result in an exceedingly false picture of what is happening in Germany today. Books by Harold Zink, Gustav Stolper, Julian Bach, and many others, as well as articles by numerous Military Government officials, educators, political scientists, and sociologists, have assisted me to become far more objective than I otherwise should have been. Discussions with people who were familiar with Germany in her pre-occupation days and with other people who have witnessed
and studied her in her present occupation forces have performed the invaluable function of making possible a more rounded, a more pragmatic study of the process of "reeducation."

The plan, then, is to utilize military facts and figures as a superficial outer shell, within which subjective impressions and objective data from numerous critical sources will be correlated in an attempt to measure current German democratic attainments, however insignificant, and also future democratic aspirations, however optimistic and conditional upon favorable factors.
A BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY
Before going on to study and interpret the work of American Military Government in its zone in Germany in its attempt to reeducate for democracy, it is necessary to visualize what American Military Government is. During the war a Military Government section was set up in the Office of the Provost Marshal-General and the Civil Affairs Division in the War Department. A school for higher officers in military government was inaugurated in 1942 at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Other prospective civil affairs officers were sent to Fort Custer, Michigan, for one-month training before proceeding to Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) at leading American colleges for a two-month term before going overseas or to replacement centers to await assignment. Enlisted men received somewhat the same college-level military government training. The idea of training men especially for occupation work was excellent; however there was an enormous lack of up-to-date maps and materials on which to base the instruction. Because the knowledge imparted by the instructors was general, the rank and file of the officers found themselves "woefully lacking in their knowledge of German institutions, culture, and psychology upon arrival in Germany."1

Early in 1944 a German Country Unit was established in England with an initial strength of 150 American and British officers. It was assumed at that time that military government

would be a joint American-British venture. At first the German Country Unit acted as a special staff of Supreme Headquarters; then it became a military government unit under the European Affairs Division (ECAI). The plan was to make the unit similar to the actual German Government's administrative organization, so that American and British personnel could step into the vacated German ministries as soon as the war was over. This unit had to operate in the dark, because there were no declarations of policy forthcoming from London or Washington.

In the summer of 1945, the American and British Governments decided to handle military government affairs on a national basis. To implement this new decision, a United States Group, Control Council for Germany was organized with 150 officers and 250 enlisted men. The conclusion of hostilities forced a rapid growth on this unit so that within a short time 2000 officers and 4000 enlisted men were assigned to the unit. By midsummer of 1945, the unit moved from Nuremberg to Berlin. The organization responsible for planning and control was called the United States Forces, European Theater (USFEI), whereas the United States Group, Control Council became the Office for Military Government, United States Zone (OMGUS), which was immediately under the American deputy military governor. The eastern district of Military Government was placed under G-5 of the Third Army, and the western division was placed under G-5 of the Seventh Army. The deactivation of
the Third Army forced G-5 of that unit to turn responsibility for military government affairs to the Military Government unit in that area.

The Military Government units themselves were out of proportion in regard to the jobs before them. For instance, the legal and financial divisions had far too many officers and men, whereas the educational, public welfare, and public safety units were understaffed to such an extent that in the summer of 1946 there was still only one educational officer for every 270,000 Germans in the American Zone.

Unfortunately, too, the civil affairs officers were given a great deal of combat tactical training, but little peacetime occupation training; therefore these officers began to feel that one or two months after the end of hostilities their work was accomplished. Actually, however, in a very real sense, their work was just beginning. When the problems of reactivating German political parties, labor unions, or cultural groups presented themselves, a large number of these supposedly trained officers did not know what to do. General Patton in Bavaria had such a small amount of respect for his Military Government personnel that he usually assigned tactical officers to do Military Government chores and to hasten the flight into chaos.

In addition to the insufficiencies of Military Government officers, there was another factor that radically restricted
the chance of Military Government to do a satisfactory job. As soon as hostilities ceased in the Asiatic Theater, many of the higher officers requested assignment to Military Government to avoid reassignment to and demotion in the United States. These high-ranking officers assumed the commands that civil affairs officers had been exercising, and the result of the substitution could never be anything but more and costlier mistakes. A vast number of trained enlisted men were lost somewhere between the colleges and the European Theater. Even in Washington there was confusion in Military Government, because the Civil Affairs Division looked to the War Department for its operating procedures and to the State Department for its policies.

American Military Government maintained that from the first it had not planned to operate the German Government directly, because that undertaking would require the services of far too many men. Whether that was the reason or whether the untoward demobilization forced Military Government's hand, responsibility was gradually being turned over to the Germans by the fall of 1945. As the German governments began to function more efficiently, military detachments were removed from the rural counties and smaller cities to be replaced by small liaison and security teams installed in key locations. Within Military Government itself, civilians composed two-thirds of the staff by August, 1945, according to General Clay.
Berlin, occupied by the Four Powers jointly, is governed by an Allied Control Council, which is also supreme in Germany itself; however since its decisions require unanimity, its performance record has been limited in scope. The Council itself consists of the ranking representative of each Ally; the Coordinating Committee, the second echelon of power, consists of the deputy military governor of each zone; and the third echelon of power, the Secretariat, does the housekeeping chores, maintains the records, and prepares the agenda, assisted by twelve directorates of military, naval, air, and economic matters, political affairs, finance, legal affairs, manpower, internal affairs, communications, prisoner of war and displaced persons division, and reparations. These directorates obtain their representatives from the respective Military Government headquarters of the various powers. Needless to say, such complicated government in which one veto kills a measure has been somewhat successful in routine matters, but has failed conspicuously and often when important decisions involving high-level policy are to be made.
THE REACTIVATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The line of attack American Military Government officers were to follow in German political affairs was outlined for General Eisenhower in April, 1945, in the "Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding Military Government in Germany" (JCS 1067):

1. 3. c. "The administration of affairs in Germany shall be directed towards the decentralization of the political and administrative structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end you will encourage autonomy in regional, local and municipal agencies of German administration...

b. "It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany's ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.

c. "Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a definite enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives...You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population.

f. g. a. "No political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you. You will assure that your military government has not become committed to any political group."

The famous Potsdam Declaration had several things to say about future political affairs in Germany as follows:

"It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to

prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis.

111 9. "Administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) "Local self-government should be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of the military occupation;

(ii) "All democratic parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) "Representatives and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) "For the time being no central German government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by state secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. "Subject to the necessity of maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press, and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted." 2

2. Occupation of Germany, Policy and Progress, the Department of State, Publication 2793, 1947, pp. 177-178.
as far as bargaining and compromise are concerned, but it has discouraged accomplishments.

When the American Military Government forces moved into control of Germany after the cessation of hostilities, their first step was to suspend all activity, whether political, informational, or educational. To prevent American Military Government from stepping into fairly well-constituted governmental administrations, the Nazis had divided records and officials so that one-half of the administrators and their records went south, and the others took their records north. Harold Zink reports that Central Government records were found all over Germany, but most of the officials themselves remained in hiding. Probably never in history had there been such a complete disintegration of a nation and its government.

There was for several months a vast political vacuum which no one was able to fill. Military Government's policy was to select reasonably acceptable Germans to be chief administrators, often as a result of several consultations with leading local clergymen. The Office of Strategic Services and Counter-Intelligence were supposed to supply Military Government with lists of acceptable Germans, but did not have time or means to do so. The clergymen, for their part, often recommended Nazis. Another difficulty was that the acceptable Germans were also inexperienced Germans (as far as administration was concerned); therefore there was a refusal to make even day-to-day, routine
decisions, thus forcing Military Government to intrude on purely personal German affairs. For the German officials, it must be admitted that Military Government often entrusted to local German officials responsibilities that never could be handled on a local level.

By late May of 1945, some Military Government detachments were beginning to set up regional and local governments, even though they were supposed to limit themselves to local administrative functions. The American policy was to reconstruct the German units ultimately in a federal system, not just to set up units in a hit-or-miss fashion. In order to institute wholly new governments, Military Government had to find men who were imaginative, efficient, capable of assuming leadership, reliable; however it found that these qualities were exceedingly uncommon after the Nazi regime's collapse.

Military Government was given Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg, and Hesse to administer. Because Bavaria remained a geographical unit, it was the easiest for Military Government to handle administratively, if not politically. At one time Bavaria's government, with the blessings of the American authorities, was entrusted to a clique with close ties with the Nazis and the militarists. General Eisenhower had to order the eviction of the whole German administration. Since existing political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries were completely ignored, the task of managing the
other German states was immeasurably more difficult. For instance, Württemberg was divided into two sections: France was given much of the western half; the United States received the capital, Stuttgart, without the hinterland to feed it. Hesse was butchered in the same illogical manner; as was Baden, of which the southern part was given to France and the northern part to the United States. Several of the military leaders set up small kingdoms of their own and competed with one another for territory and power.

In the first few months of the occupation, military government concerned itself mainly with repairing water mains, clearing some of the less devastated buildings, providing for the resumption of street car service, etc., because these kinds of jobs the American military men understood, whereas many of them feared the political, social, and economic tasks which required an understanding of Germany and her problems. Industry received little encouragement, except for a few plants which produced war materials for use against the Japanese. In the summer of 1945, only about 2-3% of the German industry was allowed to resume operations. 3

Food soon became an acute problem. The daily food ration was set at between 900 and 1100 calories a day, though 2000 calories are considered an absolute minimum to sustain life. The loss of Germany's breadbasket to Poland, combined with poor transportation, a lack of seeds, worn out machinery, 3. Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 113.
has kept the German people is a constant food crisis. Every-day problems soon became so pressing that Military Government found little time for planning the long-run and perplexing questions of education, politics, youth, reorientation, and denazification.

To further complicate Military Government's attempts to solve its pressing problems was the lack of coordination between the different army headquarters and their field units.

At this time American Military Government was presented with a golden opportunity to marshal strength against the undesirable Nazis and to attract support from the anti-Nazi or non-Nazi elements in a giant clean-up crusade. In the wake of the retreating and later defeated German armies, Working Committees offered their services to fight Nazism, help in the reeducation of the Germans for peace and democratic living, and provide food for the starving and homes for the homeless. Among those who volunteered to assist Military Government were many reliable skilled laborers whose pre-Nazi fidelity had been given to the Social Democrats or the Christian Democrats. Military Government repelled most of these groups and treated "good" and "bad" Germans for a long time nearly alike. Military Government continued to stifle any political activity of any description.

Finally, on August 6, 1945, General Eisenhower gave the signal to the Germans to reinstitute local political activities;
however, by that time, the Working Committees had foregone their missionary zeal and had subsided into a mood of sullen silence. The fraternization ban had been instrumental in defeating the Committees. In those dark days of the summer of 1945, any possibility of honest political effort among the German people was difficult to envision; everywhere the Germans were concerned only with food, clothing, and shelter.

In fact, as the economic situation worsened, the hope for a political revival seemed to grow weaker. The average German wondered what good a political party was, when it could not effectuate any worthwhile program. Moreover, the German feared to trust inexperienced political leaders during such critical times. Instead, the average German decided to climb onto the American bandwagon, but he was disappointed to find that at first there was no such thing. The officers and men of Military Government could offer no guidance and inspiration; they themselves were, in large measure, in a political vacuum of their own.

In his speech, General Eisenhower had spoken of initiating political activity "at the grass roots," but this term was wasted on a large percentage of the German people, for they possessed neither the understanding nor the interest necessary to follow the dictates of this phrase. There was then a general disassociation of many people from all manner of political activity; on the other hand, those who did take an interest
in politics became unnaturally preoccupied with "questions of organization and personality" to the detriment of the more important question of fundamental policies. For instance, several of the party leaders spent their time criticizing one another for their actions during the Weimar Republic or squabbling about the municipal water and electric rates. This, during those first months, most of the political activity seemed to take place among the party leaders, while the mass of followers remained skeptical and cynical about politics.

The fundamental reason for suspicion of democracy seemed to lie in the feeling that democracy is a system which promotes active class warfare, ineffectual government, and social laxness—a system of government which a completely paralyzed country cannot afford. Many Germans felt, in other words, that the encouragement of party politics would encourage the growth of political leaders whose every effort would be concentrated on fighting one another rather than working for the reconstruction of Germany. Many Germans were willing to have a strong leader to make Germany's vital decisions. Although the middle class is especially doubtful about democratic parties, it dared not turn completely from the offerings of the western Allies, because the threat to its economic and social order by the Russians in the East remained.

The Western Allies, for their part, dared not feel smug and sure that the Germans would turn their way, since the exis-
tence of a political void meant that any powerful movement could move in to capture the German minds and bodies; namely, a neo-Nazi or strong nationalistic movement. There was no liberal tradition of local self-government and strong individualism to which the Germans could turn for strength and guidance.

On November 6, the Council of States, the Laenderrat, was formally organized. Its function was to organize the work of the states so that the advantages of uniform legislation and administration could be passed on to the German Laender, as well as to American Military Government. The three original members of the Laenderrat were the three Minister-Presidents—Wilhelm Hoerner of Bavaria, Karl Seiler of Greater Hesse, and Reinhold Maier of Wuerttemberg-Baden—all of whom had been originally selected by Military Government to administer their respective zones in the name of the Occupation. The Laenderrat met at Stuttgart under the auspices of Dr. James E. Pollock, American director of the Regional Governmental Coordinating Office, the man who had prepared the directive bringing the Laenderrat into existence.

Although the Laenderrat at first was little more than a discussion committee, it did manage to clear up much of the confusion which characterized early American Military Government activities in Germany. After the Laenderrat showed itself to be of value, a directorate to handle the routine matters was added, leaving to the Laenderrat the significant decisions.
For its participation in the retreat from incipient chaos, the Laenderrat with its German officials and American supervisors deserves a great deal of commendation.

From the time of General Eisenhower's "grass roots" speech in August, 1945, the United States had begun to plan the first rural elections, even though it was somewhat reluctant to allow the resurrection of political parties.

What were the social classes around which the political parties were to form?

The class structure of Germany influenced the content and policies of the contesting parties so very strongly that a brief discussion of the classes is necessary to widen the understanding of the parties. The class structure in Germany was nearly the same as it had been in 1933, for the Nazis had not altered the class structure, just frozen it.

The upper class forms an infinitesimally small group in terms of actual number, but in terms of power it is exceedingly large, especially in the American Zone where the status quo has been maintained to a larger extent than elsewhere. The upper class, consisting of the landed aristocracy, the leading militarists, and the very wealthy industrialists, does not mingle in the social and political life of the communities or the parties; yet it definitely makes its wishes known from outside the political ring. The members of the upper class speak and associate with other members of their own group only; in
fact, since the occupation of Germany, they seem to stay more removed from politics and the community than during the Weimar Republic period. Many of them seem to prefer the Liberal Democratic Party, because that party seems to reflect the most rabid nationalism of any of the parties.

The middle class, which forms less than ten percent of the total population (maybe less as a result of the levelling process of the war), is itself divided into several groups, including the intellectuals, the professional men, the teachers, the public administrators, the members of the clergy, the political leaders of all the parties, the students of the higher schools and universities, and the journalists. Because this group arrived on the scene only after the retarded industrial revolution in Germany, it had no opportunity to develop as the protector of democracy as it had in the other western powers. Some of the members of this group might have had the will for democracy, but they lacked the political power to effect it.

The middle class as such still controls much of the economic wealth of Germany. It has been slow to recover since the collapse of 1945, partly because of the fact that it was very closely aligned with the Nazis and partly because of the severe material damages it suffered during the war. Its position of leadership in society through its control of many of the German institutions, like the schools, banks, et., remains

relatively unimpaired. Moreover, it has a near monopoly of the technical and administrative skills which Military Government with its heavily depleted staffs desperately needs.

The middle class has not retreated one iota from its feeling of class unity, in spite of the fact that its standard of living has slumped sharply since the conclusion of World War II. The nearer the members of the middle class find their incomes being approached by the working people, the tighter they attempt to hold their distinctiveness. That the working class through the two parties of the Left is increasing its political strength and economic power is increasingly evident to the middle class. Since the western powers have maintained the status quo in their zones of Germany, the middle class feels confident that it will soon reassume its position of preeminence.

Another writer feels that the middle class is extinct. It has been based on "property which is destroyed, on trade which has ceased, and on superior education which has disappeared." Mr. Trevor-Roper writes that Germany, a proletarian state, has only two classes that count, the "unpolitical peasants and the dispossessed."

Although it is true that some of the middle-class members supported the liberal parties during Weimar days, it is also true that a much larger percentage fell prey to the German Nationalist Party of Alfred Hugenberg and the National

Socialist Party of Adolf Hitler.

The peasant is not much interested in politics. His interests are extremely parochial, in that he seldom sees beyond the limits of his individual farm or at most the individual community of which he is a member. He values his privacy highly, and he, therefore, dislikes the Social Democrats and Communists, who intend to invade his bailiwick when they are in power. He prefers to support those parties which will help him receive higher prices for his goods and pay lower prices for the goods he purchases.

The peasant is evincing a distinct hostility toward democracy, partly because he associates it with the ills of Germany today, partly because a large number of soldiers are returning to the farms and promoting Nazi ideology and a strong German nationalism. The traditional leaders in the local farm community—the school teacher, the mayor, and the clergyman—have contributed relatively little to the fight to overcome these hostile ideas. The teacher in many cases has failed to pass the denazification board's examination and has been replaced by a woman who does not have the high social standing in rural society which her predecessor had. The mayor, being of the peasants, stands with the peasants; as does the clergyman, who has helped the peasant to resist Military Government rationing orders or refugees-resettlement orders. The peasant simply cannot understand why the Nazis, not the present
government, are responsible for his difficulties.

The number of peasants has been sharply increased by the presence of three million expellees from other nations. Although two-thirds of the expellees are not farmers, most of them with their pro-Nazi propensities have been sent to the countryside where they will further propagandize the ignorant peasants. Military Government has approved a law to provide small farms and garden plots for expellees, evacuees from bombed-out cities, and other needy persons. The law also intends to make more land available to farmers whose present holdings are too small to support them and to industrial workers in rural areas whose incomes from industrial employment are insufficient.

The workers of Germany receive the smallest remuneration for their toils, both economically and socially. They stand at the very foot of the social ladder. Because the workers have had such hard sledding financially, they tend to be interested mainly in "work and bread," rather than the socialistic program of the Social Democratic Party. The percentage of those who attend the so-called "middle schools" or, later, adult education classes is so small as to be insignificant. The workers have not forgotten their debacle under the Nazis. They tend to identify the employing groups with the Nazis, because they (the workers) suffered a great deal under the Nazis. The workers wish to increase their stake in industry by attaining some measure of representation and power over the management and
control of economic enterprises.

The procedure outlined by Military Government for the formation of political parties was neither complex nor unreasonable. In order to form, a party needed on the local level ten sponsors and on the Land level twenty-five sponsors who were proved politically reliable. After an examination of the sponsors and a study of the party creed, Military Government officers issued a provisional license to allow the approved party to commence forming, subject to approval at a later date by higher headquarters. To avoid any militaristic show, no party was allowed to parade or to wear distinguishing uniforms, but non-inflammatory party insignia and emblems were acceptable. The funds of each licensed party were subject to Military Government's periodic scrutiny through reports. All political literature, radio broadcasts, and public meetings had to be approved beforehand. The candidates themselves had to be cleared by denazification boards, before they could present themselves as aspirants for public office. The law of each Land prescribed the qualifications a candidate must have for each office and required each candidate to present a petition signed by a certain number of voters and filed a prescribed period before the day of election.

The mayor on the local level chose the committee on elections, a committee which had to be composed of at least one member of each main party. Some two weeks or more before the day of election, the mayor was required to post a list of the eli-
The mayor and the committee on elections listened to appeals from people who felt, for one reason or another, that they had been discriminated against in one way or another in the matter of voting. No names could be added to the voting list within seven days of the election.

A special election law decided what the voting precincts were to be, how the precinct election board was to be selected, how the ballot was to be prepared, how voting was to take place, how the election returns were to be certified, and how the successful candidates were to be notified. The law of the Land had already specified the length of the term of office and the duties of the office.

Military Government, after seeing that the different German governments had set up an elaborate election law, made certain rules in regard to the formation and administration of parties. The terms of office for party members was set for one full year with elections for office by secret ballot and by majority vote. All meetings and conventions had to be announced at least one week in advance, unless an unforeseen emergency arose. If two or more parties agreed at their convention to amalgamate, then such a fusion was acceptable. Each union was required to keep adequate and regular financial records, subject to periodic audit. Each member in good standing in a party had to be presented with a statement or card proving his claim to membership. If the party wished to expel a man, it
had to give that man a hearing before an impartial party board.

What parties formed in the American Zone? What were their principles and practices?

The Social Democrats were and still are faced with an almost insuperable problem, in that their political history has been continually marred by the conflict between their theory which is Marxist and socialist and their practice which so far has been bourgeois-democratic. The Social Democrats' strength lies in their control of the trade union movement, a movement which once ranked as one of the strongest and most progressive in the world, before Hitler placed it under the labor dictatorship of Robert Ley. As of November, 1947, the strength of the trade union membership stood at one and one-half millions in the American Zone. The Social Democrats in the West have been striving to bring their theory in line with their practice; whereas in the East to compete with the Communists, they have attempted to identify their practice with their theory—a difficult Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde maneuver. The party itself opposes revolutionary measures to gain its reforms, preferring to reach its gain of a socialized state through moderate land reforms; the nationalization of banks, mines, insurance companies, cooperatives; legislative curbs upon the abuses of capitalistic enterprises; and the general improvement of the worker's status. It has favored adequate denazification measures, partly to win Western approval and partly because it

6. Occupation of Germany, Policy and Progress, the Department of State Publication 2733, p. 54.
remembers very well that it, as the only party to vote against Hitler's notorious Enabling Act of 1933, was driven ignominiously out of existence by the Nazis.

Following the program of the Second Internationals and the British Labor Party, the Social Democrats favor the breaking up of large estates for the needy, the restriction of inheritance rights, and the policies of the Four Freedoms. Logically, they oppose the removal of heavy industry from Germany, because they are certain that such a course will make mere paupers of their working class adherents. They explain Nazism as "the last phase of capitalism," as does Franz Neumann; however because they are cooperating with the Allies as they did in 1915, they are considered by their enemies to be American mouthpieces and anti-German.

In foreign affairs, they oppose vehemently the revision of Germany's frontiers and the internationalization of the Ruhr and the Rhineland.

This party is definitely in line with the realism of Germany's present. In fact, many experts feel that this party is the best friend that the Allies have in Europe. Many of the party members are "men of education and with a pan-European orientation."7

The leader of the Social Democrats was and is Kurt Schumacher, a man who spent ten years of his life in concentration camps. He is a socialist through and through, a born leader.

whom the British seem to be grooming as a possible candidate for the leadership of united Western Germany when it is formally activated. He is considered to be the most powerful foe of Communism in Germany today. He is an internationalist who fears a revival of German nationalism, yet opposes the preference for a federal German state of several of his subordinates.

The Christian Democratic Union (the Christian Social Union in Bavaria), an outgrowth of a political union of the Protestants and Catholics to oppose the growth of Nazism, seems to have inherited the principles of the old Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party, except now it is making an attempt to be non-sectarian. Its membership, essentially a middle-class religious one, is drawn from the business, clerical, peasant, and moderate labor groups. It is making a strong appeal to women, possibly because of its religious associations with Catholic and Protestants groups. It bases its main hopes for German revival on "Christian morality" and a return to the tenets of private property and individualism. Unfortunately, its middle-of-the-road policies seem to displease both its conservative members from the old German Nationalist Party and its liberal members from the old Center Party. There is the distinct possibility that the party will one day lose its lower middle-class support to the Social Democrats and its upper middle-class support to the Liberal Democrats.

The Christian Socialists and Democrats support the Social

8. Occupation of Germany, Dep. of State Publ. 2753, p. 54.
Democrats in demanding more employee representation in the management of individual firms, but they reveal more clearly their desire that the consumer be represented in the large "industrial agencies." In keeping with its strong clerical support, the party supports a continuation of the denominational school system still in force in Western Germany. Politically, the party is much interested in furthering professional representation, rather than geographical representation; however it does stay loyal to formal parliamentary democracy. The party has supported what many consider to be an intelligent solution of the denazification mess which has plagued the American Zone for the past three years. It asks that passive Nazis be returned to active German life to prevent their becoming ostracized malcontents whose very presence in the German nation would eat away the work of the "right" Germans as a cancerous growth. It joins the Social Democrats in proclaiming that Germany's participation in a future Western European Federation is its goal.

A main weakness of the party is that its opponents consider it to be the tool of the Vatican which supports religious divisions and cannot unify the German nation as a whole.

The Christian Social Union of Bavaria reflects the strong Bavarian Catholic preference, strong Bavarian conservatism, and strong particularism. In fact, the Christian Social Union talks often of making Bavaria a state independent of the rest of Germany.

The Communist Party continues to be the same disciples of
revolutionary reform as it has been right along. It seeks to promote a radical reform in Germany's social structure by wiping out the old Junker-militarist ruling clique, dividing the large land holdings among small holders, and socializing much of the German economy. Its strength is derived from rural labor and the more unskilled members of the trade union movement.

The members of the Communist Party are in general well indoctrinated, and they understand their party's strategy and hopes much more clearly than the members of the Social Democratic Party do. The Communists in the western zones feel that they are the rejected ones, the unwanted, but that the unbelievers of today will sometime take cognizance of the rightness of the Communist stand. In other words, the Communists are certain that the knowledge and foresight which they alone possess will enable them to seize power and build for themselves a happier life than is now their lot. They know the necessity of having well-trained leaders in their ranks; they were the very first ones to set up schools for the training of their leaders and organizers in the American Zone, Hesse. The Communists, too, have made many direct appeals to women, because the party leaders feel that unless women are given a satisfying status in German life, they will again succumb to Nazism or the Neo-Fascists.

The fourth "major" party is the Liberal Democratic Party, the inheritors of the traditions of the pre-1933 German Demo-
ocratic and German People’s Parties. It is strongly right-wing and middle-class. Its strength stems from the business elements, the civil service, and the intelligentsia, who are determined to rebuild Germany according to the tenets of laissez-faire with a strong authoritarian government and a professional bureaucracy. The party looks as far Right as it dares, considering the present unpopularity of the Nazis, who were themselves the product of conservative manipulations and promotions. Numerically it is very weak, especially in the American Zone, because the middle class itself is numerically weak. Many of the younger Germans approve of it, for it dares to be so openly nationalistic and anti-American.

This party, the Liberal Democratic Party, was first organized in the Soviet Zone in June, 1945, while the American Zone lay in a political, social, and economic vacuum. Its Soviet ancestry does nothing to commend it to the American authorities. The man who leads it, Wilhelm Kuelz, is a "gentleman of the old school," a man who seems unable to cope with the dynamic ruthlessness of the parties in Germany. To the western powers, he and his party seem to be the puppets of Moscow; to the Russians, he and his party seem to be the tool of the reactionary West. In trying to be all things to all people, his party has become in some ways limp and shapeless. Many people feel that it is a genuine friend of free enterprise and that it is an intelligent rallying point for those who fear 9. Joachim Joesten, Germany: What Now? (New York, 1948), p. 106.
moderate socialism. It wants to break the close relationship between church and state which has existed in Germany for many years and which is still existent in the western zones. The close relationship between the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats in order to present a stronger front against the forces of the Left is temporary and will not endure.

Although most of the American authorities have been attempting to discourage splinter parties, several have grown up. A general statement about most of them would have to include the information that they are Rightist in outlook, though liberal in name to satisfy the American Military Government authorities. (The Allies had agreed unanimously that no Rightist or nationalist party would be tolerated in any of the four zones.) The National Democratic Party (the key word is National, not Democratic) under the leadership of Dr. Heinrich Leutchens is small and unpopular with the occupation authorities, because Dr. Leutchens' record during the Nazi regime's life was far from unblemished.

Another splinter party is the Economic Reconstruction Association of Alfred Loritz in Bavaria. If any German party leader employs obviously Fascist political tactics, Alfred Loritz does. To him, his party followers are mere tools to be used and thrown aside when their usefulness is over.

Another still insignificant party is the Democratic People's Party, which looks backward to the liberalism of the nineteenth century for its inspiration. It supports, of course, private
property, a moderately responsible government. Its strength lies in the professional and merchant class of Wurttemberg Protestants.

When the parties first started to operate, there were few who were not discouraged. The ablest of the leadership were not available, since the Nazis had imprisoned or killed a large majority of the strong leaders of the opposition. The parties, because they had no paper or presses to issue party propaganda, were unable to inform their members and prospective adherents of their policies; they had no buildings to use as headquarters or for public meetings; they were restricted in movement, since they had no vehicles to operate as a political party should. American Military Government did little or nothing for them in the way of providing special privileges.

The start the parties made was poor. The audiences which the parties attracted were middle-aged and uninformed. The future bulwarks of the parties, the youth, were not present, except in very limited numbers. At the public meetings the party leaders could discuss only relatively inconsequential local issues and could do little more than call for "democratic" patience. The really important issues of food, reparations, trade barriers, boundaries, unification, etc., were forbidden topics for discussion. The German audiences asked few questions; they were apathetic.

When, therefore, Military Government called for the first
local elections in January of 1916, the party leaders were dis-
mayed, especially the leaders of the Left, who argued that
the leftist parties had been the last to organize and had not
been given a sufficient amount of time to inform the voters as
to their policies. The Communists and the Social Democrats
feared that twelve years of Nazi indoctrination had weakened
their positions beyond the possibility of restitution; whereas
the liberal and conservative groups remembered vividly the
temporary plunge to the Left which Germany took in 1918.

Military Government officials denied a postponement of the
first rural elections, declaring that the parties had had time
to enlighten their constituents about their platforms and their
candidates. It was, then, with much trepidation that the par-
ties prepared for the first elections, knowing that the elec-
tions were taking place too soon after the activation of the
parties and that there was little room for clear differences
of opinion within the parochial subjects allowed to be dis-
cussed.

Just before the election, the Communists made a good im-
pression on a large number of German people by signifying their
willingness to forego their distinctive party label and become
merged with the Social Democrats. They were willing, they as-
certained, to unite for the good of working-party unity. This
attempt by the Communists and the subsequent refusal of the
Social Democrats in the western zones to merge frightened the
opposing parties. The latter knew that such a merger for the
future would remain a distinct threat, especially since the leaders of the Social Democratic party favored the merger. At this time Military Government remained aloof from the merger discussion, but it did insist that no merger would be acceptable until the members of the two parties had been given an opportunity to vote on the issue. When the vote was taken, the members of the Social Democratic Party voted almost three to one for an alliance to prevent a civil war in working-class ranks, but they did vote more than four to one against an outright merger, much to the relief of Military Government.

Although the parties labored under the many hampering difficulties and shortcomings which I have been emphasizing, I should be eminently unfair if I did not admit that the parties did much to clarify some of the issues of the day. They did succeed in bridging the gap between the people and the government; they did more to explain the purposes of the occupation than did all the informational services of Military Government during the first eight months of occupation. 10 For instance, the parties explained denazification to the people so that it made sense, for Military Government had failed dismally to demonstrate to the Germans how the Weimar Republic had been destroyed by the disloyal elements within the government. Also, the parties were able to call the people's attention to democracy, at least to its forms. They gave the mentally starved Germans something to think about and discuss. 10 Moses Moskowitz, "The Political Reeducation of the Germans," Political Science Quarterly, No. 61, 1946, p. 553.
In January, 1946, the rural elections were held in the American Zone in areas where the population was less than 20,000. The election functioned under the list system of proportional representation. In Baden, Bavaria, and Hesse, a voter was permitted to vote for only one list—a "straight ticket"; however in Wuerttemberg he was allowed to vote for any candidates on any list—a "free list." In Wuerttemberg and Baden, when there was only one valid list or no list at all, the voters were permitted to write in the names of any candidates they preferred. Any group could put up a list of candidates, provided it met the requirements of a regular political party. There were, as a result, many private lists, such as "Liste Schmidt," "Liste Braun," etc.

In the election, the Christian Democratic Union (Christian Social Union) garnered 1,434,713 votes, or 37% of the votes. The Social Democrats, who traditionally have found their strength, not in the rural areas but in the cities, polled 930,001, or 22% of the votes. The Communists had to content themselves with 136,733 votes, or 3% of the votes. The Liberal Democrats and two other splinter parties displayed extraordinary weakness in this first trial of strength, for they registered a puny 99,230 votes, or 2.4%. Only 3-5% of the votes were invalidated because of ignorance of instructions or carelessness. The participation in the election was unbelievably good—over 65%.

Many of the German voters seem to have lapsed into their
pre-1933 voting habits. It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to measure the true political sentiment, because there were many write-ins and many candidates running on a non-partisan slate. Some political writers have expressed the opinion that a large number of the non-partisan slates or candidates really favored the Christian Democratic Union, thus pushing the vote for that party well over 60%. Other political writers interpreted the 37.7% which the independents polled as a vote of non-confidence in the political parties, as a fear of many voters of being aligned with any of the parties, and as an indication of serious organizational weaknesses within the party structure. As a result of the election, the Christian Democrats, the non-partisans, the write-ins, and several miscellaneous groups contrived to control 83% of the seats in the rural areas.

In April of 1946, the elections for the county councils were held throughout the American Zone. This time there were relatively few non-partisans and write-ins, because it is difficult for an independent candidate to be well enough known in a large area to be elected. The Christian Democrats and the Christian Socialists counted 1,964,041 votes, or 56%; the Social Democrats increased their following over the first election, receiving 1,036,183 votes, or 29%; the Communists continued to run a very poor third, polling only 195,439, or 5.5%; and the Liberal Democrats and two other splinter parties had to be satisfied with 143,999 votes, or 4%. 

In keeping with the exceedingly heavy election schedule which Military Government placed before the Germans, the city council elections fell in for six cities—Stuttgart, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Ulm, Heidelberg, and Pforzheim. This time the Social Democrats were only a few thousand votes behind the Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists. The Social Democrats received 709,529 votes, or 37% of the total, whereas their main competitors amassed 723,166 votes, or 33%. The Communists' percentage jumped to nine, as a result of receiving 173,082 votes; and the Liberal Democrats' percentage approached eight, with 151,327 votes, but the votes of two minor splinter parties were included.

Now American Military Government called for the appointment of commissions to draft constitutions for the Laender. It felt that if the Germans were to learn about democracy, they had to adapt their lives to democratic rules. Several eminent German jurists began to work on preliminary drafts of the proposed constitutions. On the last day of June, 1946, the people of all three Laender went to the polls to select their representatives for the Constituent Assemblies to write the new constitutions. Nearly half of the votes went to the Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists, and the Social Democrats went one-third of the votes. The reception of such a large popular vote by the conservative Christian Democrats and Social Democrats meant that the Germans were not prepared to make any kind of a radical change.
During June, as the Germans were preparing to select their representatives for the constituent assemblies, the military Governor propounded certain conditions which would have to be met if any future German Government was to be considered democratic by the United States. These conditions, though ostensibly applied to a future German central government, must have been taken to heart by some of the Germans as they labored over their new constitutions. These were the conditions:

a) "All political power must be recognized as originating with the people and subject to their control.

b) "Those who exercise political power are obliged regularly to renew their mandates by frequent references of their programs and leadership to popular elections.

c) "Popular elections must be conducted under competitive conditions in which not less than two effectively competing political parties submit their programs and candidates for public review.

d) "Political parties must be democratic in character and must be recognized as voluntary associations of citizens clearly distinguished from, rather than identified with, the instrumentalities of government.

e) "The basic rights of the individual, including free speech, freedom of religious preference, the right of assembly, and freedom of political association, must be recognized and guaranteed.

f) "Control over the instrumentalities of public opinion, such as the radio and press, must be diffused and kept free from government domination.

g) "The rule of law must be recognized as the individually greatest single protection.
against a capricious and wilful expression of government power, and against the arbitrary domination of temporal agencies of government control."

Finally in October, 1946, the work of the three conventions was completed. Although Military Government had sent a group of consultants to the respective conventions, the American representatives did not dictate in any way to the conventions. Military Government emphasized that the constitutions were the product of "German work and German thought." Military Government in Germany and the War Department in Washington, which approved the constitutions, declared that the constitutions represented "a high concept of a democratic state." There were a few small changes recommended, only one of which incited a determined reaction from the writers of the constitutions. The one clause which Military Government expressly disliked was Article 41 of the Hesse Constitution, providing for the automatic socialization of mines, iron and steel works, power production and distribution, rail and wire transportation, and state supervision of large banks and insurance companies. Military Government, for its part, suggested that such a fundamental change be made "permissive rather than mandatory." The Social Democrats had incorporated this clause in the constitution, for they stated that they had to win the confidence of the people by standing solidly on matters of

principle, as they had failed completely to do throughout the Weimar Republic days. The Social Democrats argued that Article 41 was not intended to give full state control over industry and the workers, but that it was intended to distribute control among several agencies, such as the communities, the workers, the quasi-public corporations, the investors, and, of course, the state. Actually a large part of the socialization which Article 41 envisioned was a day-to-day fact, since the state had already introduced wide social reforms.

After being accepted by a 136-47 vote in the Bavarian convention, by an 80-1 vote in the Wuerttemberg-Baden convention, and by a 62-6 vote in the Hessian convention, the constitutions were presented to the German electorate on November 24, 1919, in Wuerttemberg-Baden and on December 1, 1919, in Bavaria and Hesse. The majorities in favor of the constitutions were substantially the same in each Land—63.6% in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 62.4% in Bavaria, and 67.2% in Hesse. Article 41 of the Hesse constitution received a substantial 62.7% in its favor.

What did these constitutions attempt to accomplish?

Since these constitutions were framed under the aegis of an American Army of Occupation with Americans sitting in at the conventions as advisers, there should be little surprise occasioned over the announcement that the Laender constitutions are in many respects similar to their American counterpart and, too, the Weimar constitution.

Land Hesse, with its slightly more than four million
people and 6221 square miles, is considered the most progressive state within the American orbit. Its constitution, as do the other two, provides for elections by proportional representation, for a temporary suspension of civil rights in case of an emergency, and for a supreme court which can rule a law to be unconstitutional at any time, without waiting for a case involving a certain law to be presented to it. The framers of the Hesse constitution provided for a unicameral legislature to be elected every four years; however Article 155 provides that the constitution may be amended to add a second body. The legislature, the Landtag, may be dissolved by a majority of its members. Dissolution takes place automatically in Hesse if after the resignation of the Minister-President, the Landtag within twelve days does not vote affirmatively on a motion expressing confidence in the new cabinet. Thus, Hesse does have cabinet government which must maintain the confidence of the Landtag or resign. A vote of non-confidence against the Minister-President must be cast by at least one-half of the legal number of the Landtag's membership. The right of the Landtag to force the resignation of the cabinet is not reciprocated by the right of the cabinet to force the Landtag to resign. In order to be eligible to run for the Landtag, a candidate need be only twenty-five years of age. Article 41, as was previously stated, contains moderately widespread socialist features. This constitution, as do the other two, contains an elaborate bill of rights at the urgent "request" of
Military Government authorities; however it will not become effective in any state until the tentative date of January 1, 1949, by which time denazification should be completed.

In order to discourage the formation of splinter parties, the Hessian constitution provides that the Landtag may pass a law refusing any representation to a party receiving less than a certain percentage of the total vote of Hesse; however that percentage may not be set higher than 5.

On December 20, 1946, the new Hessian legislature chose the Social Democrat Christian Stock, a former trade union leader, to become Minister-President to succeed the Military Government appointee, Dr. Karl Seiler. Dr. Stock selected five Social Democrats and four Christian Democrats to fill the nine cabinet posts.

Württemberg-Baden's constitution is considered more democratic than Bavaria's, though less socialistic than Hesse's. Carl Schmidt brought his exceptional talents to bear on this constitution for the three and two-thirds millions of people in an area of 5900 square miles. The constitution contains a preamble which expresses trust in God and a wish to honor the dignity of man and his "eternal rights." The legislature is a unicameral body consisting of one hundred representatives elected for a four-year term of office. A candidate must be twenty-five years of age in order to be eligible to try for legislative office. The representatives selected by the
people to go to the Landtag are reminded in the constitution that they are responsible to their consciences for their acts, not to party instructions and domination. The constitution allows the Landtag to set a minimum percentage of votes to be cast in the state, not to exceed ten percent, in order to receive representation in the Landtag. General Clay found this provision especially incompatible with democratic principles. The Landtag may be dissolved by popular referendum upon popular initiative. The government of Wuerttemberg-Baden performs as a cabinet government, even though the constitution professes a belief in the separation of powers, which is completely irreconcilable with cabinet government. To continue in power, the cabinet must have Landtag confidence. The Minister-President is elected for four years by the Landtag, but he may be dropped by a no-confidence vote at any time.

The incumbent minister-President, Dr. Reinhold Maier, was reelected by the Landtag on December 16, 1946, although he is a member of the relatively unimportant German People's Party. All four of the major parties are represented in the new government.

Bavaria, the largest German state, has almost nine million persons within its borders, a 23% increase over its population figures for 1939. This large increase in population is largely attributable to the influx of German refugees from other countries. The Christian Socialists dominated the convention and thus the constitution. The product of their work is
considered the most removed from democratic ideals. The Bavarian preamble admonishes the state to be God-fearing, not just political and social in its outlook. It is worthy of mention that democracy was mentioned in the preamble, apparently as an afterthought to please the Americans. Bavaria specifically states in its constitution that the representatives are not merely party spokesmen, but rather are responsible to the dictates of their consciences. The legislature of Bavaria was set up as a bicameral one—the Senate made up of functional and occupational representatives elected for six-year terms and the Landtag made up of geographical representatives. The Senate was not elected until one year later, but its sixty members represented industry, agriculture and forestry, welfare organizations, labor unions, religious bodies, educational institutions, municipalities, counties, provinces, and even trade and farm associations. The Senate may introduce bills in the Landtag; advise the cabinet when so asked, especially in regard to budgetary matters, constitutional amendments, and laws to be referred to the people for approval; and review Landtag legislation before promulgation. The Senate must return the bills within one month to the Landtag if an ordinary matter, or within one week if an exceptionally important matter. The Landtag is bound not at all by the Senate's recommendations.

The famous "ten percent" clause means that the composition of the Landtag is limited to members of parties which are
able to poll at least ten percent of the votes in any district. The Landtag may be dissolved by a majority vote of the members, by popular referendum upon popular initiative, or by the President of the Landtag if, upon resignation or death of the Minister-President, a successor has not been selected within four weeks. The Landtag cannot be dissolved by the cabinet, nor can the Landtag force the resignation of the cabinet. Article 64 requires the resignation of the Minister-President if "political relationships make cooperation between him and the Landtag impossible." The Minister-President, then, reserves to himself much of the decision as to when he wishes to resign. There is no provision which allows the Landtag to take a no-confidence vote to force the resignation of the cabinet. Bavaria's constitution provides for a mixture of cabinet government and presidential government. Like the other constitutions, Bavaria's stipulates that there be denominational schools; however, in an area if a reasonable number of parents or guardians responsible for the education of children request special schools, they may be granted that wish. Bavaria like the other two Länder provides for social insurance, protection of labor's right to collective bargaining, socialization of certain basic industries, etc.

Military Government's previous selection, Dr. Joegner, was replaced as Minister-President by Dr. Hans Ehard, a lawyer, who organized his cabinet to make it a coalition of Christian Socialists and Social Democrats; however in September
1917, the Social Democrats decide they could no longer tolerate continual compromises, and all of them resigned, allowing Dr. Ehrard to replace them with Christian Socialists.

Do these German-formulated constitutions have any advantages over dictated constitutions? A recent report of the Brookings Institution has this to say:

"The wisdom of some method of consulting the wishes of the German people can hardly be doubted, not only to conform with the principles of a just peace, but to engage the knowledge of the Germans in the complexities of constitution-making and their support of the final product. A perfect constitution is highly improbable in any event and if it has German support, the German problem of the future will be so much the simpler because the resentment against the peace settlement may then be centered on the conditions attached to German authority rather than diffused in criticizing the imperfections of a foreign made constitution."13

The results of the Land legislative elections, which took place on the very same day that the constitutions were being accepted, found the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union amassing \( \frac{4}{10} \) of the votes; the Social Democratic Party, \( \frac{3}{10} \) of the votes; the Communists, \( \frac{3}{10} \) of the votes; and the Liberal Democratic Party and two other splinter parties, a bit over \( \frac{2}{10} \).

On January 12, 1917, before the newly elected Landerrat,

the Deputy Military Governor said that it was Military Government's policy to "maintain a high degree of local responsibility and to hold national legislation to the essential minimum. It will continue to be the policy of Military Government to consult with the Laenderrat to the fullest extent possible in the preparation of quadripartite legislation which must be issued by Military Government decree or ordinance for application in each of the states."14 In the fields where four-power agreement could not be attained, the Laenderrat would be asked to prepare such legislation subject to the approval of Military Government. "It must continue to study, comment, and recommend"15 on quadripartite legislation to be made applicable to Germany as a whole. Each Minister-President is charged with executing Laenderrat and zonal legislation. "Thus it seems to me that you have been given now the full measure of self-responsibility which is possible until some form of provisional government is established for Germany as a whole."16

On January 21, 1947, Bremen was admitted by Military Government Proclamation No. 3 as the fourth United States Land, with the provision that the existing government in Bremen and Wesermünde was to continue until a new constitution could be created and an election held. That arrangement was not harsh on the people of the Fourth American Land, because

15. Ibid, p. 4.
there had been an election on October 13, 1946, for the legislature and on November 28, 1946, for the Senate. The Social Democrats were by far the strongest at that time.

On October 10, 1947, the voters of Berlin trooped to the polls to express their wishes. The newly created constitution received the approval of 72.6% of the voters, but Article 41, which grants "certain management rights to work councils," passed by a mere 9,000 votes of a total of well over 200,000 cast. The Social Democrats ran ahead of their nearest competitors by almost 2-1, but they were not as strong as they had been under the solicitous eyes of the British.

Because the city of Berlin is divided into four zones of occupation and because it is the scene of constant four-power bickering, I have decided to do little with Berlin. Moreover, compared to the more than seventeen million inhabitants in our zone in the West, the million-odd persons whom we control in Berlin form only an insignificant part of our stake in Germany. More than that, four-power control of Berlin via the Kommandatura has watered down our basic American policies so much as to make them indistinct and even contradictory.

Following their first political defeats in the American Zone, the Communists have sought numerous ways to make their program more radical and therefore, they hoped, more appealing to the German voters. So far that policy has born little fruit, for the Communists do not have within their power the ability to grant what the Germans most desire; namely,
At about the same time that the Communists decided to tighten their belts for a long ideological war, the Social Democrats began to make plans for a leaders' conference in the West. It had become apparent before this time that the Social Democrats were beginning to fear too close an alliance with the Western Powers; for that close identification in 1918 had been their downfall, as soon as their conservative opponents had recovered their wits and had begun to point to them as collaborators and anti-German. To implement this policy of disassociating themselves from the occupying powers, the Social Democrats issued a manifesto which was supposed to sever all the bonds tying them to the "reactionary" policies of the occupiers and stated that their main objective was to bring socialism to the German people by the class struggle. In spite of the manifesto, there is little doubt that the party will continue to prefer socialism within a capitalist system over socialism within a totalitarian system.

Secretary of State Marshall issued a statement in which he indicated the concept of the United States in reference to the future German state. The statement is important, because Western Germany, a state about to be born, will be governed partly by the principles he enunciated. He visualized the German central government as one with limited powers, so that each state could have in its grasp a large number of residual powers to enable to have its own police, to control religion,
to manage its internal security, etc., he also visualized an independent judiciary to protect the individual and to decide cases involving the state and the central government. 17

Finally on July 11, 1947, the Department of State issued a "Directive Regarding the Military Government of Germany," which was practical and workable and which superseded the unwise "JCS 1057/6," issued in April of 1945. The paragraphs relating to the political life of Germany are quoted:

IV. 5. United States Political Objectives in Germany

"It is an objective of the United States Government that there should arise in Germany as rapidly as possible a form of political organization and a manner of political life which, resting on a substantial basis of economic well-being, will lead to tranquillity within Germany and will contribute to the spirit of peace among nations.

"Your task, therefore, is fundamentally that of helping to lay the economic and educational basis of a sound German democracy, of encouraging bona fide democratic efforts and of prohibiting those activities which would jeopardize democratic development.

6. German Self-Government

a. "You will continue to promote the development in Germany of institutions of popular self-government and the assumption of direct responsibility by German governmental agencies, assuring then legislative, judicial and executive powers, consistent with military security and the purposes of the occupation.

b. "It is the view of your Government that the most constructive development of German political life would be in the establishment..."

throughout Germany of federal German states (Laender) and the formation of a central German government with carefully defined and limited powers and functions. All powers shall be vested in the Laender except such as are expressly delegated to the Central Government.

c. "Your Government does not wish to impose its own historically developed forms of democratic and social organization on Germany, and believes equally firmly that no other external forms should be imposed. It seeks the establishment in Germany of a political organization which is derived from the people and subject to their control, which operates in accordance with democratic electoral procedures, and which is dedicated to uphold both the basic civil and human rights of the individual. It is opposed to an excessively centralized government which through a concentration of power may threaten both the existence of democracy in Germany and the security of Germany's neighbors and the rest of the world. Your Government believes finally that, within the principles stated above, the ultimate constitutional form of German political life should be left to the decision of the German people made freely in accordance with democratic processes.

a. "You will adhere to the policy of authorizing and encouraging all political parties whose programs, activities and structure, demonstrate their allegiance to democratic principles. Political parties shall be competitive in character, constituted by voluntary associations of citizens in which the leaders are responsible to the members, and with no party enjoying a privileged status.

b. "You will likewise give support to the principle that military government and the German authorities should afford non-discriminatory treatment to duly authorized political parties. Every authorized political party should have the right freely to state its views and to present its
candidates to the electorate, and you will tolerate no curtailment of nor hindrance to the exercise of that right; if, however, you find that an authorized party is adopting or advocating undemocratic practices or ideas, you may restrict or withdraw its rights and privileges.

c."You will urge in the Control Council the recognition of nation-wide political parties and the uniform treatment of all authorized parties in all zones of occupation. You will advocate quadripartite supervision of political activities and of elections throughout Germany as a whole."18

The "democrats" held a conference in October, 1947, to consider their organization and their policies. The parties represented included the Bavarian Free Democratic Party, the Democratic People's Party of Württemberg-Baden and Bremen, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Hesse, not an exceedingly important party in German politics today. There was a great deal of discussion as to whether the "democratic" parties "should stand as a centrist organization representing the 'golden mean between reaction and Marxism' or take a strong anti-socialist stand, perhaps even to the right of the moderate Christian Democratic Party."19 The consensus seemed to declare for the latter stand.

By November, 1947, the Military Governor seemed to be more confident that everything in Germany was going to "work

out" after all. He told the Laenderrat, "If dismantling and
denazification can be placed behind you, if the foundation is
laid in the repair of plants that remain in Germany, if you
remain steadfast in your determination, spring will find you
with nothing but a constructive job on your hands. You will
finally have an atmosphere in which democracy can grow and in
which the German people can demonstrate their determination
to regain their place among the peoples of the world. I cannot
but feel and hope that in spite of the fact that you face an-
other hard winter, it is a winter to be faced more cheerfully
and with more certainty of your own future than at any time
since the surrender."20

Although Military Government talked courageously of the
growth of democracy in Germany, it continued to decide matters
for the Germans, matters which they themselves should decide
if they are ever to grope to a dim feeling for the democratic
spirit. In Wurttemberg-Baden, a cabinet bill in regard to
municipal elections called for a nine-year term for members of
the Landrat and mayors, a six-year term for the municipal
councillors, and a four-year term for county councillors.
The Social Democrats and the Communists objected that these
terms of office were far too long and demanded four-year maxima
for all offices. After some consideration, Military Govern-
ment handed down the pontifical decision that six-year terms
were sufficient for the executive officers and four-year terms
long enough for legislative officers to conform to the policy
of forcing those who execute political power "to regularly renew their mandates by frequent references of their programs and leadership to popular election."21 The final bill carried the provision that all elected local officers were to be elected for six-year terms, but half of the councillors were to be elected every three years for six-year terms.

On December 7, 1917, Wurtemberg-Baden conducted its second local elections, which were of great interest as a means of tracing changes in political power since January, 1916. Participation in the rural areas continued surprisingly high—70%, to 90%, but in the cities participation in the elections slumped as low as 50% to 60%, much like the rate in the United States. The list system was combined with the individual candidate system. In terms of actual ballots, there were large gains for the Social Democrats; but in the number of seats, the Social Democrats made only slight gains in the municipal and county councils. The Democratic People’s Party gained some of the votes which the Christian Democrats and Communists lost. As usual, in the rural areas, there were a large number of independent candidates elected, partly indicating a lack of trust in the parties and partly as a result of the fact that the parties had no slates in some of the very small communities.

In conclusion, it must be admitted that American Military

Government has led other zones in setting up the forms of democratic living in Germany. It was the first to have elections in Germany, the first to start the Germans' writing of constitutions, but observers in Germany are sure that the Germans are watching what is going on in their bailiwick without understanding or even caring much about what is being accomplished for them from above. There is no dedication to democracy as a "passionate ideal," but rather it is regarded as something the conquerors dragged in with them to be given lip service for as long as they remain. There is a strong suspicion that the "democracy" of the Christian Democrats will be cast aside when subjugation to its ideals is no longer a requisite—and the Christian Democrats are the strongest party in Germany today.

In fact, the powerful social and economic bases for a Neo-Fascist movement are being preserved in the western zones so that when the people feel no more compulsion to support the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, the drive to the Right and Fascism can be accomplished with relative ease. The occupying powers must work together to extirpate the bases of influence of the well entrenched ruling groups that remain anti-democratic. Unless these anti-democrats can be robbed of their ability to destroy democracy, or the German version of democracy, party democracy is bound to remain a vain hope. The fact that Germany has once followed collective doctrines to the bitter end gives one the basis for hoping
that the Germans will try other paths before the Nazi solution will be again accepted, either by the tight ruling clique or the people. One way that we can assist the Germans to make the desired turn in the road is to drop the "collective guilt" theory, because in a manner of thinking, this theory is simply the Nazi "master race" theory in reverse.22

If we succeed in convincing the Germans of the validity of democracy for them, we should then have real hope for a successful "reeducation" of the "problem children" of Europe. The Germans have always been known as extremists. If they would accept democracy, there is little doubt that they would become democrats in the extreme.

That Germany's democracy would have to be socialist seems inevitable, since the task of reconstruction in Germany, both of private and of public property, is so tremendous as to be beyond the economic prowess of individual Germans. The state will have to assume the burden of reconstructing Germany, just as it has in Great Britain.

Moreover, if democracy is to have a chance of success in Germany, it is essential that the Germans be convinced that they are not really different from and superior to their neighbors, as they think they are. Their similarities to their neighbors must be emphasized, rather than their dissimilarities, if the Germans are ever to develop a feeling of

"Belonging" in Europe.

In regard to the number of political parties, Military Government's policy of discouraging the growth of splinter parties is, I think, wise. The German likes to vote for a party label that conforms exactly to his own political thinking; nevertheless his desire to promote more and more parties increases the weakness of parties in general. If every democratic government has to be a compromising coalition government, then the constant necessity of diluting actions and policies can mean difficult sledding for the democratic process. The big need of Germany, however, is for rapid, clear-cut action.
On April 23, 1945, more than one week before the actual surrender of Nazi Germany, the very important "Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding Military Government of Germany ("JCS 1067") was issued. Section 1(a), entitled "Education," was formulated as follows:

a. "All educational institutions within your zone, except those previously established by Allied authority, will be closed. The closure of Nazi educational institutions, such as Adolf Hitler Schulen, Napolis and Ordensburgen, and of Nazi organizations within other educational institutions will be permanent.

b. "A coordinated system of control over German education and an affirmative program of reorientation will be established, designed completely to eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to encourage the development of democratic ideas.

c. "You will permit the reopening of elementary (Volksschulen), middle (Mittelschulen) and vocational (Berufsschulen) schools at the earliest possible dates after Nazi personnel has been eliminated. Textbooks and curricula which are not free of Nazi and militaristic doctrine shall not be used. The Control Council should devise programs looking toward the reopening of secondary schools, universities and other institutions of higher learning. After Nazi features and personnel have been eliminated and pending the formulation of such programs by the Control Council, you may formulate and put into effect an interim program within your zone and in any case you may permit the reopening of such institutions and departments which offer training which you consider immediately essential or useful in the administration of military government and the purpose of the occupation."
d. "It is not intended that the military government will intervene concerning denominational control of German schools, or in religious instruction in German schools, except insofar as may be necessary to insure that religious instruction and administration of such schools conform to such Allied regulations as are or may be established pertaining to purging of personnel and curricula."1

This directive, then, set the basic tone for the entire occupational program in regard to education. With sweeping suddenness the schools, courts, and universities were immediately closed; all usual German informational agencies ceased to exist. For a time Germany was completely decentralized. People waited with bated breath to see what the American military authorities’ plans were and what they were going to do in defeated Germany.

What were the problems which the American authorities faced in regard to the German educational system? What was that system?

The German educational system, which had begun during the Weimar Republic years to become somewhat decentralized and under an increasing amount of local community control, and which had striven for full individual freedom and self-expression, was gradually forfeiting its eminent position of World War I days. As soon as Hitler came to power in 1933, he immediately began to stifle individual development combined with decentralized control. The academic freedom for each

professor, for which Germany had incurred the debt of the rest of the world during the first years of the turn of the century, was effectively outlawed by making each professor an "official" of the Reich subordinate to the university rector appointed by the state Ministry of Education, which was in turn responsible to the Reichs Ministry in Berlin.

The form of the German system of education, which was not appreciably altered by the advent of hitlerism, was constituted as follows:

In general, every child was required to launch his educational training in the elementary school, though boys and girls attended separate schools. The process of funneling children into different schools began when the children were ten years of age. At the age of ten, some of the students went to technical schools; a small number of students, five to ten percent taken from the middle and higher classes, were sent to the classical Gymnasium; the masses went to regular higher schools where the instruction and curricula were much less formal and conservative than they were in the
Gymnasium. During the Hitler regime, every child at the age of ten became a member of the Hitler Youth. The National Political Educational Institutes and the Adolf Hitler Schools were open to certain twelve-year-old youths selected from the Hitler Youth Movement to receive special National Socialist education and indoctrination to prepare them for local, state, and national positions where "good" Nazis were required. Until the graduates of the two schools were twenty-four or twenty-five years of age, they attended universities or practiced a profession; then a carefully selected few were allowed to attend leader schools (Ordensburgen) for three and one-half years to prepare them for important positions of leadership. The Aufbau schools were exclusively preparations for later university training and were restricted to a small number of twelve or thirteen year old boys who successfully passed a special examination.

Another point in regard to Weimar schools and, to a less extent, Nazi schools was the break-down of schools into three broad classifications; namely, the general community school which was attended by members of all religions and where the religious instruction was separate from the school work, the denominational school, and the secular school. The great lack of facilities forced Military Government in the first year to insist on the establishment of community schools, except in Bavaria, for the general school could best accommodate
the general school populace under conditions of extreme scarcity of all kinds of facilities.

The foremost German educational system was not to be reformed by Military Government, a regulatory agency, but by the Germans themselves. Military Government Regulation 8-216 made that policy clear: "The Germans must reorganize their own schools and create a new school system out of their own intellectual and spiritual resources." Franz Neumann, a well-known authority on German affairs, interprets the American directives and regulations as clear admissions that Germany was not to be "reeducated" by Military Government. On the contrary, Military Government's role was to be restricted to a control function of the most negative kind— a control of Nazism and military doctrines.2

Because of the vastness of the administrative plan involved and because of the redeployment of forces to the Pacific Theater of War, the Army in the first few months of occupation was forced to alter its plans constantly to prevent complete chaos.

A main problem in those first difficult months was the removal of all unsuitable personnel from the main German institutions and the forcing of adherence to the newly superimposed American policies before the militant fascist elements were able to cripple the reorganization.

The elementary schools, most of them, reopened on October

2 Franz Neumann, Commentary, "Reeducating the Germans," June,
1, 1945. Military Government's policy was not to interfere with the types of schools opened, but, as was before mentioned, the community school was favored because it was usually larger and could utilize the few teachers in the most economical manner. Later on, the denominational school gradually became the most prevalent in Bavaria and very common elsewhere.

When the elementary schools reopened, they were staffed by less than one-half of the numbers of teachers required; and of those actually employed as teachers, many were mere school helpers who had not been trained as teachers at all. These helpers, who comprised about one-fifth of all the teachers employed, were given emergency teaching courses of a very few weeks' duration; then they were sent to teach on a full- or part-time basis, reporting Saturdays for superficial in-service training.

The abnormal shortage of teachers—65% of the 36,000 teachers were dismissed—was a direct result of the denazification proceedings carried on by means of the highly publicized questionnaire. The eight-page questionnaire forced each teacher to lay bare the events and the philosophies of his entire life. He was asked to enumerate the organizations, secret and non-secret, of which he had been a member, to give in detail his employment record, his different and varied sources of income, his writings, his speeches, his church affiliation, his military record, his travel, and the methods by which he had acquired his property. In addition to these
questions, there were 131 other questions to be answered. If
the teacher was a member of the Nazi party or one of its
affiliates, he was automatically removed from the teaching
profession as a practitioner. Hitler had required his
teachers to be members of the Teachers' League (Lehrerbund)
on penalty of dismissal; therefore the automatic expulsion
rate was high. The answers to the questions asked by the
questionnaire were evaluated by a board comprised of United
States Army personnel who had lived in Germany before the
war, of displaced persons, and of Germans whose sympathies
were unquestionably anti-Nazi. The members of those boards
recommended to the local American Military Government Educa-
tional officer "dismissal," "discretionary dismissal," or
"retention."3 Military Government in its denazification
policy realized that "a democratic teacher will work for demo-
cracy even under a dictatorship, while a Nazi will work for
totalitarianism even under the most liberal government and
curriculum."4

A second wave of dismissals, which came several months
after the schools had been opened, caused especially heavy
casualties among the teachers of the higher schools and
threatened the very existence of some of the universities and
colleges. The necessity of a second wave of dismissals was
3. Many Germans were forced to fill out the questionnaire as
often as six times; therefore they soon lost all respect for
it.
Youth," February 1946, p. 102.
based on the not-surprising discovery that many of the teachers who had cleverly worded their answers to the questions in the questionnaire and had passed the busy boards had really fought for Nazi and militaristic ideologies before and during Hitler's assumption of power.

As the dismissal of German teachers continued at a fairly rapid rate of speed, the German authorities reluctantly called on more and more helpers to carry on as regular teachers. This decision to use helpers further affected the quality of school instruction, because the helpers were far from prepared to handle the large classes foisted upon them. In all fairness to the helpers, it must be admitted that even experienced teachers cannot perform creditably when there are no teaching materials, no textbooks, and no reference materials, especially when they are asked to instruct as many as thirty to forty hours a week. The teaching load of the helpers was finally cut to twenty hours a week in 1937. Many of the school assistants, swept into German schools by the emergency, resigned within a relatively short period of time to work in other fields or to continue their studies in higher institutions. In an effort to keep the most able helpers in the schools, the German educational authorities have decided to enroll them in various teacher training institutions to enable them to qualify as full-fledged teachers in future years.

In the face of continued emergencies, the German educa-
tional authorities with the consent of military government hired secondary school teachers to teach in elementary schools, flying against the strict German practice of maintaining iron-clad differentiations between elementary and secondary school teachers. Possibly this action will lessen the jealous strife which has always influenced the relationships between these two groups. The secondary school teachers were available for work, because the reopening of the secondary schools lagged behind the reopening of the elementary schools by several months; however the advantage which the authorities gained by using the secondary school teachers must have been lost as soon as the secondary schools opened and claimed them. In fact, the use of these teachers on a temporary basis and their return to the higher level of instruction must have compounded the administrative headaches, instead of relieving them.

To ease the teaching shortage, the Coordinating Committee of the Allied Control Authority issued a general rule-of-thumb measure by which persons from other professions who were willing to enter the teaching profession might be accepted. Of course, their general educational qualifications had to be suitable, and their teaching had to be "in the democratic spirit." Those two prerequisites were meant to exclude former members of the Nazi Party and other fascist organizations, as well as former members of the German armed
forces and full-time leaders of the Hitler Youth movement. This policy did attract a number of professional men from other fields into the teaching profession, but the low salaries for teachers, the large classes, and other considerations apparently limited the scope and success of the policy.

In addition to the severe shortage of teachers and the low standard of teaching contributed by the assistants, there was another problem to harass the military Government and the German educational authorities; namely, the advanced age of the retained teachers. For the male teachers, the average age was 55-60; for the women teachers, somewhat less. The heavy teaching loads, combined with the advanced age of most of the teachers, further impaired the quality of school instruction. Losses of many school days because of the illness of teachers and their constant requests for permission to retire were not uncommon. The problem of replacing nearly every one of these teachers within a few short years will be discussed in another section and is a vital factor in any discussion of the German schools, now and in the future.

The situation in Mannheim's schools as reported by George T. Trial and N. F. Goldsmith will serve as an excellent case history to emphasize the general (and sometimes difficult to visualize) statements about the extent of the teacher shortage. When school reopened in Mannheim, there were only sixty-eight teachers fit to teach about 7000 students in the first four grades, and there were only fifty classrooms ready for use.
Many teachers who were not really "suitable" as far as the questionnaire was concerned, had to be used to reopen the schools. Some children were able to attend classes for only two hours a day because of the teacher shortage. Not a satisfactory situation. Dr. Trial and Mr. Goldsmith feel that, despite Army claims to the contrary, the teaching shortage will continue for an absolute minimum of six years, even though married women are being accepted as teachers contrary to long German custom.

Coupled with the serious shortage of qualified teachers was the serious shortage of "suitable" textbooks. What had Military Government done to provide replacements for the millions of Nazi textbooks which everyone knew would have to be scrapped? More than a year before the final surrender of Germany, a group of American and British educators were formulating plans in regard to texts for the German students. A survey of pre-Hitler school texts revealed them to be superior in several fields. The German primer, for instance, was replete with outstandingly excellent illustrations and well-chosen passages for the edification and enjoyment of its readers. The geography texts were also very good. The Anglo-American group of educators found that the vast array of language books tended to be excessively formal and insipid. The history books quite naturally stressed an extreme nationalism and

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a glorification of German war might. In 1937, the fourth year of Nazi rule, the republican books of the Weimar period were replaced on a wholesale basis by textbooks emphasizing and reemphasizing nationalism, racialism, deification of Hitler, and all the other shop-worn tenets of National Socialist ideology. Leaflets were generally appended to history texts to prove that the Greeks were "aryans" and thus of the same stock as the modern Germans.

The Anglo-American Commission decided, then, to reprint Weimar texts, because it was felt that the Germans probably would not feel the same high degree of repugnance to the German-written texts of the familiar Weimar period that they might feel toward textbooks written by Americans and British. Copies of German texts were obtained in England and from the library of the Teachers' College, Columbia University. By agreement with the Control Commission for Germany (British Element), printing began in Aachen and Bonn of a 40,000 set edition. In late spring, 1945, a larger printing was completed in Munich, helping to make over five million newly printed and old textbooks available to German pupils by the middle of October. German authorities strained every energy to uncover the relatively few pre-Nazi textbooks which had not been pulped with the advent of the new Nazi textbooks in 1937.

Military Government had to examine every textbook formerly

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used in German schools and had to authorize its continued use before plans for its reprinting could be made. Most of the books submitted to the Americans by the Germans for certification after examination were reading texts. Of all the textbooks submitted for approval, the largest percentage of rejections fell on the history, geography, and arithmetic books respectively. The German educators and administrators who submitted books for censorship did not bother to request the examination of books strongly suspected of being Nazi; for that reason, the percentage of rejections in relation to acceptance was not high. There is a great deal of reason to suspect that the low percentage of rejections was indicative of the laxness and sloth of Military Government in the accomplishment of a highly important task. By the spring of 1946, the censorship phase was nearly over, because relatively few textbooks remained on the docket for examination. By that time all efforts were being concentrated on meeting publishing goals for new textbooks scheduled to be distributed to school children in October of that year.

Nor are the new textbooks as good as an enlightened pedagogue would wish. The German teachers who wrote the new textbooks had little or no source material upon which to ground their works, and as a result many of the so-called new textbooks are merely superficially revised Weimar textbooks. The lack of source materials available to textbook
writers was attributed to the limited functioning of the libraries, as a result of the extreme war destruction and the Nazi burnings of many German and foreign books. Also, the Nazis refused to accumulate for popular perusal certain foreign books and periodicals. When the textbook writers went to the public or school libraries for material, they often learned that the libraries' collections were void of many important books and magazines published after 1933. Military Government officials found, then, that the mass of the new books were lacking in creativeness, in a scholarly background, and, not surprisingly, in a modern political liberalism.

To assure writers of new textbooks of a modicum of reference material, nine Curriculum and Textbook Centers were gradually set up in several sections of the American Zone in Germany. These centers were designed to be workshops for writers. Collections of reference books were assembled from Great Britain, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, in addition to American books and materials, such as War Department educational manuals, Armed Forces Institute books, and other miscellaneous books and pamphlets from Special Service collections. More important than these contributions may be the scientific literature, totaling over 400 tons, which the Smithsonian Institution had endeavored to ship to Germany for a long period of time. The requirement that these books had to pass quadripartite screening will undoubtedly keep them out of German hands for a long period of time.
The severe shortage of paper in the American Zone further hindered the process of textbook publication and necessitated at a Stuttgart conference of German administrators and Military Government representatives the introduction of a system of priorities for the publication of new textbooks. In the first priority stood primers, readers, and arithmetic books, whereas in the last priority group were music, natural science, and geography books. The initial allotment of paper for educational uses was scaled down to seven hundred tons for the second and third quarters of 1945, an amount which was insufficient to meet the publication quota of even the first priority group. Even with a system of priorities, the shortage of paper for all uses grew progressively more alarming as the months of occupation passed. After the first full year of the occupation, the supply of paper was estimated to be less than one-tenth of the total amount necessary to meet the requirements of German schools. In some schools, as many as six children had to learn from the same textbook. Gregor Ziemer reported, on the basis of personal observation, that one class of reader was being used in Bavaria by almost two million school children of all elementary school ages.

Two years after the defeat of Germany, Military Government reported that a total of eighty-two titles of school books comprising a total of over two million textbooks had been distributed from the printing presses. Unfortunately,
although the two million textbooks seem to be an entirely impressive figure, one needs only to realize that there are over two million children in the elementary schools alone; therefore the first two years' publication is apparently enough to supply on an average of less than one book for every schoolboy and schoolgirl. One educational authority wrote that he had not been in a single German classroom in which every child possessed a textbook. Certainly, our achievements in textbook publication have been dismal.

Our pulping program did benefit the German children in the way of school supplies, but it did arouse strong political animosities. On May 13, 1945, the Coordinating Council of Allied Military Government issued a directive calling for the pulping of large numbers of confiscated Nazi books. Allied generals were to judge which books were to be destroyed. Naturally the scope and the extent of the directive was interpreted by each power in its own zone. Some observers felt that books containing only a minimum of Nazi material should have been preserved for their valuableness as historical data. The Army did preserve copies of all Nazi books destroyed; therefore scholarship will not suffer. The hysterical outcries against pulping were typically as follows: "It (the pulping of Nazi books) will convince most Germans that Allied minds and methods are not much different from Nazi minds and

methods...it will be a witch-hunting task on Military Government which cannot be discharged with charity and wisdom."

Despite the large amount of vocal opposition, the policy of pulping Nazi textbooks and other publications was carried out, and the pulped books were converted into sorely-needed notebooks and writing paper for the German school children.

The lack of plant facilities because of war damage and requisition for other uses was a further tormenting factor for Military Government and the German educational officials to contend with. The requisitioned school plants were vitally needed as quarters for American troops, for displaced persons, or for the vast number of expellees from the East, as well as for German administrative functions. These requirements were so essential as to preclude the possibility of the return of many school buildings for many years to come, especially as long as German construction remains at a complete standstill.

What did Military Government do to reopen the secondary schools?

The reopening of the secondary schools did not materialize as quickly as had the opening of the elementary schools. The first secondary schools did not begin to open until early in 1946. From the very first day of the occupation, Military Government was most concerned about removing the younger children from the streets at the first possible moment and sending...

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than to school; moreover, military government was vitally and acutely conscious of certain additional problems inherent in the operation of the German secondary schools.

All the frustrations, the disappointments, the compromises which tormented the administrators of the elementary schools plagued the secondary school administrators too. These problems need not be rediscussed. One of the main reasons for the retarded reopening date of all schools of higher education related to the military authorities' insistence that these schools were likely to be trouble spots and required, therefore, a sharper surveillance of teachers and students before being reopened. Military Government educational officers realized that the teachers and students had been literally pounded by aggressive Nazi indoctrination over a period of several years or more, indoctrination not easily to be eradicated and superseded by new, foreign-inspired doctrines.

On the other hand, the monthly reports of the military Governor, U.S. Zone, reported blandly that relatively little was being done to educate teachers for secondary school work. Instead of launching a sorely needed program to recruit secondary school teachers, the educational authorities were willing to hire representatives of other professions to supply the instruction for which no regular teachers were available. Teachers recruited in this manner could offer only disjointed
and spotty instruction. More important, this expedient allowed
the educational boards to postpone their recruitment of new
teachers and of First-class teacher candidates. This unen-
lightened policy of postponement and procrastination may
well lead to disastrous consequences, both for idealistic
American plans and for the relatively small nucleus of German
educators who are committed heart and soul to a democratic
future for Germany based on German school leadership.

One incident may serve to delineate the possible results
of this short-sighted American policy. Late in 1946, over
23,000 copies of the Hessian and American constitutions,
printed in the German language, were distributed to each
school in Hesse. The idea of making these constitutions
available to the German school children for study and under-
standing was excellent. The individual attitude of each
teacher conditioned the value of a study of these constitu-
tions, because a cynical, sneering reading and discussion of
these documents by some of the teachers whose sympathies re-
mained loyal to Nazi ideology rendered the study of these con-
stitutions not only useless, but actually pernicious to the
democratic cause. This simple instance serves to illustrate
how heavily Military Government and the German educational
authorities had to depend on the teachers to further their
political and educational objectives.

If the teacher remains thoroughly nazified, he is able to
neutralize all American efforts to recast young German minds and to preach National Socialist doctrines in a backhanded, difficult-to-prevent manner. Gregor Ziemer knew of definite cases in which unreliable, improperly-screened teachers were able to spread Hitler's theories by means of insincere, hollow commendations of the democratic system.9

It must be admitted that--on paper and as far as shallow statistics are concerned--Military Government attained nearly complete efficiency in maintaining the operations of all schools on a high quantitative level, but it did its own cause immeasurable harm by its willingness to compromise and accept unreliable teachers, merely to keep the schools in full operation, just as though the German schools were similar to a manufacturing plant. As long as Military Government is willing to shrug its shoulders and say, "Yes, we know that Herr Schmidt is a Nazi, but we can't get anybody else," it is contributing to the gradual deterioration of all educational efforts, however admirable.

As a matter of record, there were 221,512 secondary students in school being taught by 7,979 teachers, including more than 1200 assistants in 1947. The proportion of students to teachers was about twenty-seven to one; yet teaching aids, textbooks, and supplies remained so radically insufficient that class schedules continued to limp along at a substandard level.

level. Two or more schools were often combined to make one overcrowded school, an indication of the continued severity of plant unavailability.

The seven universities and the numerous technical schools in the American Zone were slow to reopen, not because the damage to plant facilities had been inordinately severe, but because Military Government realized that the professional and administrative classes had been educated in the universities almost without exception. In recent, lamented Weimar Republic days, the universities, both Catholic and Protestant, had been Nazi bulwarks. Although American authorities were exceedingly desirous of accomplishing a restitution of higher German education as soon as possible, they wished to select the future leaders of Germany by carefully denying the admission of corrupting Nazi influences. After faculty-student committees had screened candidates according to Allied and American directives, the faculties (usually theological and medical) were allowed to reopen to offer at first the American-styled refresher courses and then to continue with regular courses of study. Students who had completed part of their college or university training before the exigencies of the war forced their withdrawal, formed a large percentage of the post-war student bodies, because they were nearer to graduation than the other students. Germany had and still has great need of their services.
On January 23, 1945, a Four Power Agreement established definite categories of unacceptable students for enrollment in institutions of higher learning. The reception of this directive necessitated the resubmission of all university and college candidates to a second process of screening. Faculty members were subjected to constant rescreening, because additional information about them was being received from time to time.

By the spring of 1945, all universities were partially reopened with their pre-war "corporate autonomy" restored, except for bombed-out Gießen, which will not reopen at all, other than to offer a few courses in veterinary medicine.

Although there were more than 20,000 students attending the eight universities, more than 2,000 in the University of Munich alone, the universities were not able to accept more than a fraction of the candidates who sought admission to these institutions of higher learning. There was, for that reason, a strong reaction to a ruling which allowed displaced persons to comprise ten percent of the total enrollments, and there was a grumbling acceptance of the edict of the Coordinating Committee which condoned the acceptance of nominal Nazis for university and college training, as long as the total did not exceed ten percent. It must be realized that the acceptance of former German Army officers contributed heavily to the general debasement of the student bodies. The officer-
class in Weimar Republic days was a notoriously anti-republican group.

The universities were subject to the same woes that hampered all educational institutions. In addition to serious faculty shortages, the universities were impeded by a lack of plant facilities, by textbook shortnesses, by run-down or useless technical equipment, by a lack of supplies of all kinds, by the almost absolute non-existence of recreational opportunities, and by a student housing shortage of the most desperate nature. A few figures in regard to the destruction of university libraries will indicate the severity of the problem. The University of Munich lost 620,000 of its one million-book library; Frankfurt University lost 620,000 of its 700,000-book library; Giessen, 90% of all of its books. Also, the physiology and chemistry laboratories of the University of Munich were 70% destroyed. Heidelberg was forced to discontinue 50,000 student hours of lectures and discussions, because there was not a single room available for large groups.

All four colleges of engineering were reopened in due course. Their resumption of activities had been feared and therefore delayed, for there was no concrete plan to handle the research activities of these colleges. The Allied Control Council issued an order on April 1, 1946, outlining a general program to control the research of the scientific colleges.

from the point of view of guaranteeing the liquidation of the German war potential. Applications by technical colleges seeking permission to reopen were to proceed from the Land Education officer to the Chief Regional educational officer of Military Government. Of course, the colleges which had resumed their activities before the issuance of this general policy were forced to apply for permission to reopen. The law permitted the extension of tentative approval for commencing research activities subject to the submission of a petition and separate reports of each project to a special research commission to be created at a later date.

Military Government was greatly impressed by the evidences of an insatiable appetite for learning and for detailed knowledge about other countries and events, about which nearly all students in German higher institutions felt an incomparable ignorance. This interest in people and events outside Germany prompted the students to clamor for a restitution of the pre-war, international student exchange; however the acute transportation shortage has so far frustrated this desire. Political forums and discussions based on historical, political, and sociological topics could have done much more to launch German students toward democratic thinking. Student committees in each university have done much to promote extra-curricula activities, to establish connections with colleges and universities within and without Germany.
The universities have appeared to become more liberal and democratic by scheduling certain courses desired by the military government; however, most of them for one reason or another are not offered. There were no courses in sociology, comparative literature, or political theory. The professors feared these courses, for they realized that few of them were prepared to handle these courses. Germany's professors have been renowned as great scholars who have chosen to detach themselves from all political life and most association with students outside the classroom. The professors seem unable to change their ways. The universities are still turning out specialized experts, but not educated citizens. Observers have found the German lectures to be, as before, stiff and formal and often boring. The new German professors must be inculcated with the feeling of responsibility for the social and political growth of their students, not merely for their bookish mental growth. The present lack of interest in politics is reflected in the fact that at the University of Munich there were only thirty members out of a total student body of 11,000 in the International Club.

The apathy of the German students may be partially explained by the food ration. The average day's ration of a German student at the University of Frankfurt during the winter of 1946-1947:

- 21½ grams of bread (4 slices)
- 7 grams of fat
215 grams of meat (1 slice of sausage)
3 " " cheese
1 1/10 liter of skimmed milk
1 grams of sugar (3 pieces)
100 " " potatoes (1)
4 " " ersatz coffee

Proof that American educational authorities are not interested in broadening the base of German education may be found in the results of a survey of the University of Frankfurt's student body. The distribution of scholars according to social and economic measurement was approximately the same as the distribution which had existed under previous political regimes. Families of civil servants, professional men, and independent workers contributed the majority of the students, although some of the students did come from the "white collar" group. The wealthier groups comprised a large percentage of the students as they did in Weimar Republic days, when more than one-third of the students came from the upper classes and much more than one-half from the middle classes. The base of German higher education must be broadened to include more than two to five percent of the lower working classes if democratic education is to have a "fighting chance" for success.

The remaining important educational institutions will be grouped together for brief discussion. Both American and German educational leaders strove to resuscitate adult education.

tion, which the Nazis had perverted and operated through their "Strength through Joy" movement. The first such school to re-open under American supervision was the Frankfurt Association for Adult Education, the oldest school of its kind in Germany. In 1947, there were over 20,000 students from Wurttemberg-Baden and over 30,000 adult students from Hesse.

Most of the courses which the adults (of which a large percentage were women) were studying were practical or cultural--stenography, home economics, languages, etc. For a reason which no intelligent observer can comprehend, few courses based on the social sciences have been offered. Since the German mind was not trained during the Nazi regime to think deeply about politics, administration, or foreign relations, there was relatively little interest in these matters when the adult educational program was launched. Military Government, by not propagandizing and inciting interest in the social sciences, overlooked a tremendous force for making a new Germany. Here again a lack of a plan and military inertia have combined to hobble the occupation's impact on the people.

Two very encouraging aspects of adult education were the participation of universities and their faculties in the adult education program (though to a limited degree) and the joint efforts of the two major religious groups and the various political parties in community and land education.
The adult educational schools are not encumbered by vast networks of traditions; therefore these schools adapted themselves to democratic methods of free discussion to a far greater extent than the elementary and secondary schools succeeded in doing.

If the adult educational program is ever going to assume its rightful position of importance, it will need the advantages of German public libraries. The libraries suffered a great deal as a result of the war, of large-scale removals, and during the National Socialist regime from the public burnings of books alien to the Nazi philosophy. Nothing could contribute more toward American success in Germany than a concrete plan to restock German library shelves, especially with at least a modicum of social science books, the supply of which was and is fantastically insignificant.

In normal times, 92% of all the boys and girls in the 14-18 year group were vocational school students, either on a full-time or a part-time basis. By the spring of 1947, some 314,525 students were attending these schools. The concentration of the majority of these schools in urban areas accounted for the relatively more severe physical damage which these schools suffered during the war.

The agricultural schools suffered a 70% loss of teacher personnel. Relatively few students were attending agricultural schools. Boys in the advanced schools were allowed to
attend one term only. The teachers in the rural agricultural schools were usually teachers who had been brought up on farms and were familiar with general agricultural practices; whereas the teachers of the advanced agricultural schools had to be graduated from pedagogical institutions.

What are the educational policies of the German Land governments and how are the new teachers being trained? These questions are vital. The Ministers of Education of the Land governments presented to Military Government their educational programs for approval. Two divergent programs were formulated by Dr. Schramm, Minister of Education of Hesse and by Dr. Fendt, Minister of Education of Bavaria. Both programs sought to extend educational privileges to children according to their abilities, not according to wealth, family backgrounds, etc. Dr. Schramm's proposals placed the emphasis of education on modern cultures; Dr. Fendt's proposals, on the traditional German classical tradition in the secondary schools. Both envisioned the entry of superior students to the university by way of vocational and adult schools, not merely by the usual method of relatively expensive secondary schools like the Gymnasium. Only in Hesse, then, was free education to be provided from the elementary school to the university for deserving young students, subject to the Land's power to charge the wealthy students fees. In May, 1917, the Ministry of Education of Hesse issued an order to school
officials to collect no further fees for tuition from secondary and university students. Also, Dr. Schramm was instrumental in securing the ratification of a policy which all liberals will applaud; namely, the setting up of a 100,000 Reichsmark fund to assist university students who had suffered persecution on religious, racial, or political grounds. The school reform bills of all but Bavaria were accepted by Military Government.

A paramount political-educational policy of the American and German educational leaders was to foster democratization by encouraging cooperation between the elementary and secondary school teachers by means of teacher associations. The Nazis forced all teachers to join one teachers' association (Lehrerbund) on a national scale; Military Government desired to heal the breach by a democratic rapprochement to improve German education. As long as elementary teachers continue to be trained in special teachers' colleges and the secondary school teachers in universities, there will be only a show of cooperation between the two groups. Every enlightened educator has pressed for uniform training, but it must be admitted that not one concrete step has been taken in that direction. Ineffective discussions are not sufficient. The Bavarian Minister of Education has announced himself to be completely opposed to the plan, and the other Ministers of Education are silent.

Education for teachers was recognized very early to be
a very vital problem, both in the restricted field of German education and for Germany as a whole. Thirty-two teachers' colleges, having an enrollment of 4,000 students, were in operation in the spring of 1945, and 2,000 of these students were to be graduated by the end of 1946—a further example of American streamlined education. Was one year of preparation enough to prepare teachers for their roles in a confused, leadership-lacking country like Germany?

Host plans for teacher education call for a summary return to pre-Hitler forms. Some groups feel that a two-year program beyond the secondary school will be sufficient; others are requesting the complete adoption of the Bavarian plan of a five- or six-year normal school education after graduation from elementary school; still others envision a one-year program to follow graduation from secondary school.

But the form of these schools did not worry the authorities nearly as much as the selection of the students for teacher-training colleges. The average age of the applicants was twenty-four years of age. These applicants had been subject to a thorough Nazi indoctrination, to the varied influences of the Hitler Youth program, and to the attitudes of the Nazi Party membership. Since all youths were Nazis of the active or inactive kind, Military Government authorities and the German authorities were faced with the absolute necessity of using some of these young people as teaching can-
diplomates. Many of these young people were given brief indoctrination courses (six-weeks), the value of which appears exceedingly doubtful.

Somewhat too glibly, Military Government expressed an opinion that a reorientation of this generation would not be excessively difficult, provided that correct leadership was supplied and provided that economic conditions were favorable to the growth of new ideals. This specious reasoning seems to merit attack from all quarters and shades of opinion.

Will these so-called redeemable Nazis be able to accomplish one of the occupation's most difficult and important assignment, the reeducation for democracy of other Nazi-indoctrinated youths? Is this assignment doomed to failure?

Just as many students of German education had predicted, the German universities have so far shown either lukewarm or no interest whatever in the proposals of the Allied Control Authority to establish higher pedagogical institutions closely associated with the universities in order to train teachers to staff teachers' colleges. It is desired that the teachers' colleges concentrate on producing competent leaders in diverse fields of education--teachers of education in colleges and universities, school administrators--and in general do a much-needed job of improving German educational methods, research, and curricula.

The universities themselves have taken no positive steps
to train the newly-acquired members of their teaching staff or prospective instructors. The return on a temporary scale of German professors, who were driven from Germany by the Nazis and the exchange of German and American professors, which are being debated, will do much to reacquaint present professors in Germany with educational standards and practices outside of Germany. During the summer term of 1947, a number of Swiss and American guest lecturers spent some time in German universities trying to help the Germans to bridge the gap between Germany and the rest of the world.

At the rate that new teachers are being trained and de-nazified teachers are resuming their posts, Military Government predicts that there will be a sufficient pool of teachers available in a year or two to fulfill requirements. The fact that this goal is expected to be attained, even though large numbers of teachers are resigning because of old age and sickness, indicates that the reinstatement of teachers previously considered politically unacceptable is moving at a fast pace. Certainly the thirty-nine teachers' colleges are not equipped to provide more than a small proportion of the number of teachers required. Again the Army shows itself to be more interested in restoring the German ship of education to a superficially even keel than in rebuilding with newly-trained teachers who would give our democratic policies a chance for ultimate victory in Germany.
What have Military Government and the German educational administrators accomplished? In the winter of 1945-1946, Military Government announced the following achievements:

"1. 'The Laender Ministers of Education and necessary school superintendents have been appointed for every position.

2. 'The U.S. Control Element maintains complete supervision of the German educational system by the use of educational specialist branches at the Land level.

3. 'All educational personnel in the U.S. Zone have received questionnaires.

4. 'All Nazi and militaristic books and teaching materials have been removed from the schools. By October 15, 1945, emergency textbooks were supplied for elementary schools.

5. 'All the schools which reopened were forced to undergo a thorough purge of curricula before permission to reopen was forthcoming.

6. 'By February 1, 1946, 96% of the 1937 total of elementary schools; 65% of all secondary schools, and 65.7% of all faculties at universities or institutions of similar rank were either open or authorized to reopen as soon as possible.13

Yes, Military Government has restored the form of German education.

The spirit has not changed, though. That Military Government has a long road to travel to incorporate a democratic spirit into the schools may be gleaned from the scope of the recommendations of the Zook Committee. In August, 1945.

George J. Zook, President of the American Council on Education, brought a group of professional educators from the United States to make a survey of the German educational scene and to make reports. Some of the main recommendations embodied in the Report of the U.S. Education Mission to Germany were as follows:

1. "A comprehensive school system for all children and youth below the university level be developed in the U.S. Zone of Germany;

2. "All children remain together for six years in the elementary school without being segregated according to sex, social class, race, vocational, or professional intentions;

3. "The whole school program make a significant contribution to democratic experience;

4. "Additional time needed for social studies and cultural subjects be provided in the schedule of the vocational schools;

5. "Special help in the way of materials and consultants be provided the German Ministries in writing textbooks and in planning curricula;

6. "Efforts be made to aid libraries and to secure adequate teaching aids such as films, maps, globes, and the like;

7. "A vigorous program of leadership training be undertaken with young adults who are potential advisers to youth groups and that youth committees on Kreis and Land levels extend their work in establishing new groups and in leadership training;

8. "A large number of young German teachers
and students be sent to America for the purpose of study and reeducation along democratic lines."

One or two concrete examples will serve to illustrate what the Zook Committee report seems to emphasize—the lack of spirit to attain the democratic educational goals. The Bavarian Minister of Education (the same one who refuses to allow women teachers to teach boys) issued an order which clearly violated the spirit of democratic education. According to the law, all teachers of non-Bavarian origin were to be barred from giving instruction in that Land. Naturally and wisely, Military Government was forced to order the minister to rescind his ruling on the basis of the teacher shortage and because of the heavy influx of Germans from other sections of Germany, as well as from other countries like Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, etc. The main reason for forcing a rescission of that order—that it was undemocratic and irritating and opposed to all American efforts, however ineffectual, to eliminate petty educational squabbles and certain tendencies to break off into narrow, uncooperative units—was not even mentioned by Military Government, perhaps for political reasons. The German authorities have "obstructed, opposed, and whittled down" the creation of school reforms of all kinds because the unification of the school system and other reforms would tend to lower their

"high standards."¹⁵

On the higher education level, Erlangen authorities debated for months the desirability of admitting working-class youths who gave evidence of special proclivities for university training, but who could not present the required educational backgrounds. Nothing, so far as is known, ever came of that suggestion. Erlangen was the last German university in the American Zone to establish a "Senate," the ruling body of an institution of higher learning according to long German practice. The Germans will not widen the educational base unless they are subject to strong external pressures.

In many classrooms, wrote one observer, there were "no textbooks, no spontaneous discussion, no free play of questions and answers, no exchange of ideas."¹⁶ Because there appears to be in Germany such a profound ignorance of what constitutes democratic procedure, it seems wise for Military Government to encourage policy-making officials in the United States to allow the return to Germany of former German professors who desire to contribute their bit to the restitution of an adequate educational program. In addition, those American professors and teachers who feel a desire to contribute their services to the German program should be be encouraged

¹⁶ George Ziemer, American Mercury, "Our Educational Failure in Germany," June, 1946, p. 726.
As the months and years of the occupation pass, the total number of students increase, because the population is becoming more stabilized to the extent that the parents are returning their children to the classrooms in increasing numbers. Also the ranks of school children are being swollen by the large numbers of German expellees from Austria, Czechoslavakia, and Poland. Military Government reports now state that more schools are in temporary quarters than previously. The increased enrollment has not been matched by a comparable increase of plant facilities. There is, of course, almost no new construction.

The new directive concerning Military Government, which on July 11, 1947, superseded the old "JCS 1067," contained two paragraphs further defining American educational policies in Germany:

23. Education

a. "In recognition of the fact that evil consequences to all free men flow from the suppression and corruption of truth and that education is a primary means of creating a democratic and peaceful Germany, you will continue to encourage and assist in the development of educational methods, institutions, programs and materials designed to further the creation of democratic attitudes and practices through education. You will require the German Land authorities to adopt and execute educational programs designed to develop a healthy, democratic educational system which will offer equal opportunity to all according to their qualifications."
5. "You will continue to effect the complete elimination of all national Socialist, militaristic and aggressively nationalistic influences, practices and teachings from the German educational system." 17

In December, 1945, Military Government took another step forward. It accumulated two million marks for periodicals and materials for the Curriculum and Textbook Centers, for the publication of educational bulletins and periodicals, for "grants-in-aid" to certain institutions for "reorientation" according to the new democratic plans, for scholarships and fellowships for promising students, and for the use of technical assistants and consultants within the educational system of Germany.

To sum up the educational situation, a person is first struck by the totality of indirect rule. Each Land has its own constitution, its own parliament, and its own Ministry of Education, which is, in actuality, in almost complete charge of educational policies. What power Military Government has is on the Land level, for lower echelons merely "observe, analyze, and report" to the Land Military Government. In other words, the Germans seem to possess the outward form of democracy in education, but the spirit, which must lie within the hearts and minds of the German people, has not been created, nor can it be created by mere observation.

The paltriness of the American accomplishments in

education is a source of continuous amazement to all observers, because it apparently indicates a lack of understanding of how much the United States has at stake in the "reeducation" of Germany.

"The moral and intellectual problem is, however, difficult and involved. It consists of creating conditions for democracy in a youth that has not known it, does not particularly want it, does not have teachers with the spirit of democracy, and lives in an environment unpropitious to democracy.\[^{13}\] In the schools, "there is no authority, no spirit, no conviction, no heart in the undertaking."\[^{19}\] The impulse to learn for many students is very weak after twelve years of Nazism. Many students have sought despair and cynicism as their only refuge. They realize that their teachers are inadequate and that the new authorities have given them no new convictions to replace the old. Pessimism and existentialism are for many the philosophies of the day.

Many of the teachers and students whose hearts are with Military Government in its fight for a change from the old ways dare not support us, because they have the sound fear that the end of the occupation will coincide with their defeat. We are not winning the teachers to fight for our educational ideals, nor are we succeeding in winning the

\[^{19}\] Gregor Zierer, op. cit., p. 727.
students to a full effort to apply our reforms. We must provide the tools if our democratic education is to succeed. We must challenge the youth if we expect to capture their hearts and minds, and we must help students so that they do not have to take notes for twenty-one other students (because of the shortage of notebook paper) in a drafty, poorly illuminated room.

It seems evident that Americans are unable to agree on the type of education and the type of Germany which we wish to see arise. We have not set a policy concerning the subject matter to be taught; we have no real, energetic plan to win over the young people in the schools; we have not attracted into Military Government administration capable Americans who have the intelligence and the foresight to convert general, all-inclusive directives into pragmatic action. We have not insisted on the organization of German school life to provide experience in genuine, cooperative living, such as student clubs, discussion groups, classroom committees, etc.

A roll call of American inadequacies in German education is enlightening and discouraging.

A large number of people feel that a part of our planning should include a method of breaking down German isolation in all matters, educational or otherwise. *"Above all, Germans..."*

need a ray of hope as well as a sense of firm and purposeful guidance. Germans must again become Europeans."

21. Ibid.
INFORMATIONAL CONTROL
Since the conditions which Military Government found when Germany was first occupied have been discussed, this section will do little more than outline what has been done in regard to the German informational services.

As with political parties, military government decreed a complete absence of all activity by the Germans. Printed material could neither be published nor distributed. In order to reopen, printers and booksellers had to register with the occupational forces, whereas publishers were required to obtain licenses.

The process of registering was relatively simple. After the regular questionnaire and application had been filled out and filed with the local military government unit, there was a period of delay while military government authorities tried to decide whether the applicant's political record was clean. If his record was satisfactory, the applicant was granted a registration certificate subject to later review by Publications Control.

The licensing procedure, on the other hand, was much slower and more rigorous. The petitioning publisher had to file three military government questionnaires and three business and personal questionnaires of a rather detailed nature for consideration by Publications Control. If the publisher's record managed to survive this phase of the procedure, the publisher himself was called before the Publications Control
officer, who interviewed him and asked him to submit a publishing program for the coming year. Exact titles of books had to be named. The Intelligence branch then took charge of proceedings and interviewed the candidate and his references. If the officials of both Publications Control and Intelligence agreed that the publisher was acceptable, he was recommended to the commanding officer of the Information Control Division, who issued a license, unless there were last-minute objections.

In spite of the complicated procedure, three hundred publishers were licensed to produce 400 books and pamphlets and 50 periodicals, usually in units of 5000 copies each, without prior censorship. Sometimes, oversized printings for books with "high educational potentialities" were allowed upon special application to Military Government; however such printings were rare; for, although the American Zone has several large paper mills, it does not have the necessary chemicals to fill even minimum publishing requirements.

Military Government tried to keep three principles in mind: 1) keep the Nazis from publishing anything; 2) give publishing rights first to those who had been closed down by the Nazis; and 3) try to tie the books and the purposes of the occupation together. In fulfilling these principles,

2. Ibid, p. 2312.
Military Government decided to move slowly in creating publishing rights before reliable employees could be found whose sympathies for democratic methods would be unquestioned.

During the first months of the occupation, Military Government disseminated news through its own newspapers; but by the end of 1945, only one United States-published newspaper, Die Neue Zeitung, remained in circulation. That one paper was to be continued indefinitely to explain to the Germans the policies and the acts of the occupying forces.

By fall of 1945, Military Government contrived to create a German news-gathering agency, DAPA, (later changed to DEMA), which contrived to train its "clean" personnel according to policies set down by Military Government. There was no pre-publication censorship. Military Government has tried to show the editors how to keep their news and editorials separate as in Anglo-Saxon countries. The military also attempted to teach the German editors to label the source of the news and to identify political "handouts." The early life of DAPA was replete with legal difficulties, because its practices were bound to conflict with the Trading with the Enemy Act. After the legal difficulties were cleared, DAPA was permitted to buy and sell news to other news agencies.

By February, 1946, there were twenty-nine licensed newspapers in the United States Zone, issuing over four million copies of newspapers, or one for every five Germans. The newspapers then and now appeared on the street either two or three
times a week and are often no more than abbreviations of regular papers, four pages in length. Military government has repeatedly emphasized the many difficulties to be overcome in "educating" the German informational media, partly because of the previously-mentioned lack of newspaper and periodical; partly because of the lack of equipment and space; partly because personnel problems are especially severe, since information propagation was a favorite Nazi tool for the subjugation of others and the Nazis made every effort to ferret out the lukewarm adherents to National Socialism. If an applicant for a newspaper job had been a party member, he was sometimes used by military government in non-executive or non-creative capacities; if an applicant had been an active party member, he was allowed to perform nothing more than ordinary labor.

Only July 1, 1946, military government turned the licensing procedure over to special Land licensing offices with the admonition to heed the following criteria in issuing licenses:

"Applicant must give an account of his personal and political career, especially as a journalist or publisher to show he will cooperate positively in building a democratic Germany."3 He must display high qualities of character and

leadership, be professionally able, be unobjectionable as far as his private economic situation is concerned, and pledge not to use his paper to further the selfish interests of a privileged group.

In October, 1948, Directive No. 40, "Policy to be followed by German Politicians and the German Press," amended existing rules and permitted the development of free discussion of German political problems, made comment on the policy of the occupying nations, and the dissemination of factual information about world events unless the statements contribute to a spread of "nationalistic, pan-German, militarist, Fascist, or anti-democratic ideas," spread rumors attempting to disrupt unity among the Allied nations, incite distrust and hostility toward any of the Big Four, criticize decisions born in Allied conferences on Germany, or appeal to the Germans to act against democratic measures taken by the respective zone commanders. To administer the law, a Press Council, appointed by the Land's Minister-President upon nominations received from the political parties, professional organizations, and from the governments of the Länder themselves. According to the law, the editor of each paper was made responsible for the articles which he published. The Press Law was to lapse after the new Landtags of the three Länder had formulated satisfactory laws of their own.

The change in the United States's official policy toward Germany in cultural affairs was made known in a
directive issued on July 11, 1947. Section 22, entitled "Cultural Objectives," Section 26 entitled "Public Information," and Section 27 entitled "Reestablishment of International Cultural Relations" are quoted:

22. "Your Government holds that the reedu-
cation of the German people is an inte-
gral part of policies intended to help
develop a democratic form of govern-
ment and to restore a stable and peaceful econ-
omy; it believes that there should be no
forcible break in the cultural unity of
Germany, but recognizes the spiritual
value of the regional traditions of Ger-
many and wishes to foster them; it is con-
vinced that the manner and purposes of
the reconstruction of the national German
culture have vital significance for the
future of Germany.

"It is, therefore, of the highest impor-
tance that you take every effort to se-
ure maximum coordination between the
occupying powers of cultural objectives
designed to serve the cause of peace.
You will encourage German initiative
and responsible participation in this
work of cultural reconstruction and
you will expedite the establishment of
these international cultural relations,
which will overcome the spiritual isola-
tion imposed by National Socialism on
Germany and further the assimilation
of the German people into the world commun-
ity of nations.

26. a."You will, in the United States Area of
Occupation, supervise, encourage and as-
sist in the development by the Germans of
media of public information designed to
advance the political and cultural ob-
jectives stated in this directive.

b."You will arrange through the Allied
Control Council for the implemen-
tation of the decisions of 23 April 1947 of the
Council of Foreign Ministers on the free
exchange of information and democratic ideas by all media in all of Germany.

27. "In furtherance of the program of the reorientation of the German people and the revival of international cultural relations, you will permit and assist the travel into and out of Germany of persons useful to this program within the availability of your facilities. You will also permit and assist, to the extent of your facilities, the free flow of cultural materials to and from Germany."

Military Government encountered powerful opposition from former Nazis who owned most of the printing establishments and refused to rent them to "clean" Germans, licensed by military Government. Because this impasse began to threaten the existence of the licensed publishers, military government was forced to step in and force the recalcitrant Germans to lease their properties for five years. If, at the end of the five-year period, the publishers still do not succeed in finding printing plants, military Government will arbitrarily extend the leases for another three years.

The attacks on the United States and the Marshall Plan by Russia became so severe in October, 1947, that the United States military Government decided to launch an educational

and informational program to explain to the German people the basic concepts of democracy as contrasted with communism. The United States-licensed agencies were noteded to enter the propaganda jousts, but many of them did voluntarily.

Since the booksellers and printers did not have to wade through very much red tape, they were registered and allowed to operate in much larger numbers—some 2500 of them within the first eight months. Nevertheless, there were in the first year of the occupation very few books to be purchased.

The American military government decided at first to burn all the Nazi books, but there arose such an outcry against this typically Nazi expedient, both from the Germans in Germany and the Americans in the United States, that the final decision was to pulp the books for writing materials for the German school children. The Nazi books which the Germans held in their private home libraries were at first threatened with seizure, but finally not removed. Over 2200 German authors have been banned in Germany; therefore the constant raiding of bookstores and libraries has caused much bad feeling and many serious American blunders.

Some of the new books which appeared in 1945 were Question of Guilt by K. Jasper, Soldiers of the Poor by Wolfgang Langhoff, Moabit Sonnets by A. Sauckhofer, who was shot by the Nazis, and God in the Concentration Camp by Kurt Walter. Some of the American books translated into German were

In the magazine field, military government has been producing three magazines of its own and allowing licensed magazine publishers to print others. Today (Heute), which at first featured German guilt and received German indifference, is a news and picture magazine; The American Observer (Die Amerikanische Rundschau) is supposed to reflect serious American thought; and the Jet Stream (Die Neue Aufsee) is a digest of literary and world news articles, published in conjunction with the British—these are the American-sponsored magazines. The German magazines published and sponsored by Germany reflect the many and varied interests of the German people. Magazines dealing with religion and sport are two of the most common on the newsstands.

Germany is experiencing, then, a deluge of periodicals unprecedented elsewhere, but many publishers say that which is being written is inferior—at least so far.

The United States contributed very little to the re-estimation of film production, a vitally necessary tool for the
reorientation of German thought. Many of the pre-war German film studios were in the Russian Zone, and so the United States did not press very much about producing films. The British and the Americans did combine to produce and distribute a weekly newsmagazine, The World in Film, which was rather coldly received by the Germans—too partial to the Allied camp. Some of the American films which were given American subtitles and shown to the Germans were The Limey, Indiscretion, The Keys of the Kingdom, You Can't Take It with You, All This and Heaven Too, Louis Pasteur, Our Town, Holiday Inn, Ben-Hur, Harvest, Join My Way, and many more. By March, 1947, over 600 theaters were presenting film productions.

Julian Bach recounts an incident that serves to illustrate that the American film policy has not always been perspicacious. One film that was presented to the Germans depicted a German submarine crew machine-gunning the survivors of a torpedoed merchantman. That scene caused a great deal of displeasure, for no self-respecting audience would tolerate a film showing its people to be cold-blooded killers.

In May, 1947, two years after the beginning of the occupation, work was begun on a German film production entitled Between Yesterday and Tomorrow in Munich. There can be no argument that the democratizing influence of one indigenously produced film will wield a greater influence over S. Julian Bach, America's Germany, (New York, 1946), p. 230.
German mince than will many foreign films.

American documentary films have been highly praised, both by Germans and Americans.

During the first year of the occupation, Military Government failed to do much of a propagandizing job via the radio. The 165,700 German radio owners in the U.S. Zone were given some unsubstantial reorientation materials, including popular music "to combat Dr. Goebbels' campaign against foreign popular music." The radio did play an active part in the 1946 elections, for it did present the candidates and their policies to the people.

As the months passed, however, Military Government began to plan some of the radio programs around the vital problems of postwar Germany. There was a genuine attempt to encourage round-table discussions and to encourage "Town meeting kind of program to explain denazification, a free press, the Geneva Trade Conference, etc.

However, in the constant broadcasting of one of the biggest shows in all of Germany, Military Government made the mistake of overplaying the Nuremberg Trials. German guilt and criminal acts were dwelled on so constantly as to cause a distinctly negative reaction. In fact, because of the Nuremberg Trials and for other reasons, most Germans have become convinced of the guilt of the Nazi leaders, but not of the system as a whole, the important concept.
Military Government in its Freedoms, Totalitarianism series, presented in conjunction with the newspaper campaign to nullify the effects of militant communist propaganda, began with three talks entitled "The Place of Labor Unions in a Free Society," "The Role of the Political Party in the Democratic State," and "Non-political Organizations in a Free Society." The local radio stations discussed these and similar topics on a local level.

The establishment of American Libraries of Information, starting in the first year in Stuttgart, Berlin, Munich, and Frankfurt, helped the United States to tell its story to the Germans and to open the West to the Germans again after twelve years of Hitler's Iron Curtain. In addition to the reading rooms open to the public, there are reference rooms made available to licensed editors, script writers, clergymen, teachers, and other professional people. Unfortunately, most of the books are written in English. Although the idea of these libraries is excellent, it has not been expanded nearly enough. In July, 1947, there were about 700 books in circulation from each of the twenty libraries or centers as they were later named. Such a minuscule distribution of books will scarcely rouse over seventeen million Germans.

The drama in Germany has undergone a tremendous growth. Buildings to act as theaters were among the first to be repaired. American plays like Our Town, The Skin of Your Teeth,
112.

On "Borrowed Time," "Under Foot," "Three Men on a Horse," and many others have become very popular. The output of indigenous German plays is still small.

Effective Jan. 31, 1947, military government suspended the requirement of registration for conductors, directors, stage managers, dramatizers, stage designers, performers, and chiefs of theater departments. Special political standards remain only for key personnel.

If a person were forced to name the greatest obstacle in the path of military government to reorient the Germans according to United States plans, the obstacle named would undoubtedly be the paper shortage. The forty-four licensed newspapers still publish only two or three times a week, except in Berlin where the competition between East and West has produced a galaxy of newspapers. Paper requirements for books and magazines can be satisfied only 30% by the amount of paper available. Bad weather, and a world shortage of cellulose, coal, and transport have conspired to restrict the amount of foreign paper available for purchase.

Very little is being accomplished in the way of giving Germany the right books. Instead, the wrong books have been banned. The radio, movies, pictures, newspapers, and lectures are not satisfactory substitutes for books which can be carefully read, studied, and discussed before being passed on to friends. There should be something done to get the right books.
books into German libraries where they can be available for all. Germany must have her eyes opened to the outside world, if she is to overcome her groping, unsure ways. For instance, at the famous Heidelberger Historical Seminar, there has not been received one single issue of any American historical journal since 1939. The Germans must be allowed to possess some criteria by which they can adjust their new thoughts if those thoughts are going to take root and endure.

Definitely as important as the liberalization of women's education, the restitution of responsible political parties, and the reorientation of informational services is the perplexing problem of Germany's anchorless youth. Of all the former youths, those in the twenty to twenty-five year age bracket present the most vexing stumbling blocks. For the members of this group have been subjected since their tenderest years to complete Nazi indoctrination and have been shaped by the regimentation and rigors of German military life.

Frau von Zahn-Harnach, civic leader in the American Zone of Berlin, has attempted to classify youth into three very general classifications. In her first group are those who are doing suitable work or are in schools. There are at least two reasons for worrying about the members of this group—overwork and malnutrition. Those young people are interested in political parties; but they fear the parties, as do many Germans, because membership in a party (Nazi) has meant disaster and suffering for many Germans. The second group is much larger and includes those not doing the work they are interested in or preparing for the professions they wish. Because many of the people in this group are performing tasks which they are cordially hate, they are executing their toils badly and thus hindering reconstruction. The girls have become acquainted with easier methods of
earning a few cigarettes or a mark or two. In Frau von
Jahn-ternach's third group are those young people who have
no work at all and no desire to work. "They are a great
moral and social danger; they spread diseases; many of
they are becoming criminals...If we could give them suffi-
cient food and clothing, more than half of our youth problems
would be solved."

In each Land there is a minister of Cultural Affairs,
who is responsible for the work of youth committees made
up of adults active in the church, the local administration, the
trades, sports, etc. The minister and his staff are responsi-
ble for counseling youth, mainly the 30s who belong to
some kind of a youth organization; for protecting youth orga-
nizations from subversive, nationalistic tendencies; for re-
istering all youth units; and for insuring the direct con-
trol of all youth organizations by their constituted member-
ships. In addition to this German organization, American
officers have been appointed by military government to coop-
erate with German youth officials to attain the goals of the
occupation. To encourage camping, these officers were instru-
mental in assisting the German officials to obtain two hun-
dred tons of American military equipment and facilities to
be charged to the German economy. "The grave danger is that
we shall assist materially to strengthen German organizations,

but will not succeed in inculcating a different set of ideals, in this case, morally tenable ideals. These are difficult to inculcate and the process takes time.\textsuperscript{12}

Although military government has disapproved the affiliation of youth organizations with political parties or political programs, Hesse has allowed several youth organizations with definite political interests to form, as long as there was no definite political affiliation with a party. Unfortunately the growth of youth organizations with definite political proclivities seems not to be the result of spontaneous youth enthusiasm, but rather the result of considerable prodding by adult committees. Later, in the spring of 1947, military government announced that the youth organizations could be assisted by political parties, but not dominated; however military government still opposes the indoctrination of youth under eighteen years of age by political parties. Military government has preferred to encourage the growth of non-partisan groups and the cooperation of religious and political groups as a unit.

The famous Edelweiss-Partiten, who had been opposed to Hitler during the Nazi regime, were quick to resume their activities. This strongly decentralized organization is not, however, cooperating with military government, but on the contrary is doing everything within its power to make

The position of Military Government and the German authorities untenable and ridiculous, by attempting many kinds of harassing actions.

The younger elements of German life constitute a major problem, not political, but social. There are in the American Zone 300,000 children in foster homes, under guardianships, or in correctional institutions. Children who must grow up without the many facets, comforts and realities of love and security concomitant with family life are going in acute adult maladjustments only with supreme difficulty.

Military Government, it must be admitted, was extremely slow to realize the magnitude of the youth problem. Not until April 1, 1946, were youth activities launched in the American Zone. By April, 1947, there were 7000 youth groups serving 300,000 young people, of which 10% of the total belonged to religious groups and 37% to sport enthusiastic groups.

The youth of Germany, just as have many other German elements, has made the incredible mistake of associating true democratic life with life under the conditions of the occupation. The starvation, the low standard of living, the unemployment—these and many more are considered by youth to be the necessary evils to be suffered under democratic rule for Germany. Military Government and the German authorities have so far failed to correct this false assumption. It is true
Many writers have mentioned the large number of conspiracies of youth against the established fascist governments; however, the vast scale of juvenile delinquency among those that profess to be anti-fascist seems to be more a search for food and excitement, rather than political action against fascism and the American forces.

Military government must decide to consider youth, not as public charges to be controlled and watched, but as instruments to assist in thecondition of a better German life. Our failure to enlist the cooperation and the confidence of German youth is bound to produce either indifference to political matters or a retreat into neo-fascism, both of which are extremely undesirable possibilities. The essence of military government's failure, then, apparently lies in its inability to replace national socialist doctrines with a faith that will interest and challenge youth. In fact, German youth distrusts democracy and what it stands for; the long years have produced a difficult-to-eliminate lethargy and nihilism. A distrust of authority has produced an inability to trust anything or anyone.

If military government carries through its proposed plan to grant an amnesty to all youths under twenty-seven years of age, many German youth people may no longer feel like outcasts and may then return mentally to the German community to take their places as responsible citizens. An
amnesty created in December, 1945, included those born after January 21, 1919, who were neither major offenders nor offenders, and certain disabled people who were also neither major offenders nor offenders; however there was a six-probationary period to contend with. If a general amnesty would be accompanied by an improvement in economic conditions, then a chance to regain some of the "lost youths" would appear. 3 "Many (youths) have not found their way into a new philosophy of life in a new political world... We cannot ram American values down their throats when they don't want them... But we can be ourselves, live these values, and represent them to the Germans, and I think it will pay very large dividends." 4 Unfortunately, however, American soldiers and civilians have not lived the kind of life which German youth can emulate with much advantage. Our representatives in Germany have often been greedy, loud, impolite, and sexually aggressive.

Dr. Himes feels that the greatest needs of the youth program are more training for future German leaders in youth organizations, more attention to girls' youth organizations, more attempts to bring German youths and youths from foreign countries together, more opportunity for youths to assume more important positions in the youth committees, more success in having university students from their strong-
nationalistic tendencies, more and stronger development of trade union youth groups, which had been democratic outliers during the Weimar period, and the translation into German of better youth literature of foreign democratic nations.

Until unemployment, lack of housing, the inflation, the black market, and the lack of recreational facilities are eliminated, there cannot be much hope of removing boys from criminal and anti-democratic actions and the girls from prostitution. Until they have "decent homes, a normal environment, and a hope for the future," it is idle to consider the regeneration of German youth and the fashioning of Germany into a democracy.

A \textit{step evaluation}
Before attempting to make a quantitative and qualitative analysis of American military government's achievements and failures in Germany, I think that the magnitude of Germany's downfall must be emphasized. There can be no doubt that the country which waged two devastating technological wars is finished. It is true that the physical destruction of the industrial plants can be repaired over a period of time; however, the nearly six million loss of manpower; the loss of many leading scientists to Russia, the United States, and Great Britain, probably forever; the rapid falling birth rate combined with the heavy toll of disease which will reduce Germany to a fifth-rate nation in size; the loss of the vast German "bread basket" in the East and the Saar industry in the West: the separation of Germany into two nations, a process which is being rapidly accomplished at this time; these are factors that will continue to debilitate Germany's power of recuperation. Germany is 'kaput'--at least for many years to come. As Winston Churchill has said, "The task of holding Germany down will not be a hard one--it will be more difficult to hold her up."

An important factor in tying military government's hands in effectuating the State Department's policies for Germany is the overwhelming fiasco, denazification. Denazification is a prime example of our spending far too much time and

effort on negative aspects of our democratizing process and
not enough time and effort on affirmative, constructive mea-

ures. When General Eisenhower signed Public Law No. 1, the
law which set the denazification process into motion, he
said, "Reduced to its fundamentals, the United States entered
this war as a foe of Nazism; victory is not complete until we
have eliminated from positions of responsibility and, in ap-
propriate cases properly punished, every active adherent to
the Nazi Party." Military Government soon found the task
of denazification too difficult to handle, and so in keeping
with policy, the assignment was given to the Germans them-
selves in March of 1946. The penalties for those convicted
were to range from two to ten years of forced labor on rep-

arations and reconstruction work and exclusion from public
office and disenfranchisement for those in the major offender
class to payments to a reparations fund by the followers.

Thus, for three years while this process has been going on,
the German nation has been held in a state of suspened ani-
mation, in a feeling of uncertainty and doubt. For instance,
as of the fall of 1947, over eleven million cases of a possi-
ble twelve million persons had had their cases decided. Of
those eleven millions, nine millions were judged not charge-
able and two millions were given amnesties. Most of the
million persons, whose cases have not yet been heard, comprise

2. Quoted by Julian Sach, America's Germany, (New York, 1946),
p. 161.
the Germans with Nazi affiliations, cases which will take a long period to dispose of.

Many people cannot understand why public servants like street car conductors, railroad employees, etc., have been removed from their non-political jobs by the elaborate denazification. Why not select people who profited greatly by the Nazi regime and force them to bear the brunt of denazification?

Lord Beveridge has said, "The policy of denazification that we accepted in Potsdam is a policy fit only for a totalitarian state." Professor Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago is quoted, "Our denazification methods are making martyrs out of insignificant little fellows, are hitting too many wrong people, bar the road toward conversion of the former Nazi who has learned his lesson, retard economic rehabilitation, thus prolong starvation; i.e., the worst possible climate for democracy, and are driving into sterile hatred and resentful opposition millions of people who might otherwise have been sincere democrats.

Thus, in addition to the many other handicaps and shortcomings of American policies in Germany, military government is tremendously restricted by a fanatical adherence to a completely impractical policy of denazification.

What are the possibilities of nudging the Germans into

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the democratic camp? For the policies of Military Government to be effected? It must be noted that much of the American State Department policy for Germany formulated for Military Government's proclamation is sincerely dedicated to the creation of democracy in Germany; however the economic conditions, coupled with the unhealthy political climate created by Nazism and post-war defeat, leave the future very much in doubt.

The Germans must be given their agricultural East if they are going to solve the food problem and have the inclination to think about democracy. The Germans must be given an opportunity to rule themselves by removing Military Government from Germany, except for small demilitarization units and other units to insure the inability of the Nazi element to seize power again. This increase in authority for the German representatives will increase their confidence in themselves, will enable them to earn the respect of the German masses, and will, above all, sharply curtail Military Government's intervention in purely German affairs. If the German authorities have real power, maybe then they will be willing and desirous of supporting and fighting for democracy.

The American Government is dedicated to the creation of Western Germany as a loose federation with power residing in the local states, except for certain limited powers given to the central government. As a loose federation of small states, Germany made her greatest contributions to mankind;
possibly, a loose federation for present-day Germany will guarantee the growth of the local traditions and loyalties that can insure a peaceful future for the Germans. If strong local government is to prosper, the political parties must learn to cooperate as they have failed conspicuously to do in the past. There must be a willingness to "play the game" within reasonable limits. The parties must prove to the voters that democratic life does not mean paralysis, insecurity, hunger, and frustration, that democracy and Christianity working together can produce a fuller, happier life than totalitarianism, whether Fascistic or communistic, can effect. Democracy must be shown as the way to open full opportunities for all. If, however, the parties cannot win the full confidence of the German people, then reeducation for democracy is a vain hope, as indeed it may be in any case. "To become fully effective as representative government, democracy must cause its spirit of mutuality to run deep in the family, to permeate the playgrounds of youth, to reach high in the church, and to inform the humblest processes of livelihood."

Since America's Germany is populated by women in a vast majority (ten women for six men in the 20-40 age group, and ten women for seven men in the 40-60 age group), there is a necessity that Military Government inaugurate and the German authorities carry out a process of convincing German women.

that their interests should no longer be restricted to the church, children, and the kitchen. They must be taught an interest in democracy and its appurtenances; they must do better than offer candidates for less than one percent of the public offices. German women have for too long a period retained their political immaturity.

The youth of Germany must be drawn into the democratic circle as soon and as completely as possible. There must be no chance for them to form the dispossessed and classless groups in opposition to democratic government, as they did (that is, their fathers) after 1918.

German newspapers must be furnished enough paper and newsprint to enable them to appear on the streets every day and in large numbers. Outside materials from other countries must be imported in ever-increasing numbers. The Germans must be given an insight to understand what democratic life really means.

It is tragic that as in 1918 the parties of democracy have come to power amid the conditions of defeat and at the behest of the occupiers. For that reason, the political parties must be offered as much political autonomy as possible and an opportunity to build strong democratic foundations as the Marshall Plan assists in building a stronger economic foundation for Germany. The parties must be made strong if they are to withstand the onslaughts of their opponents when
the occupation is over. The political parties realize only too well that the present economic depression is breeding the same dissatisfactions that led to Nazism in 1933. Thus, if the parties can contribute strongly and effectively to the rebirth of Germany from the present nadir, then they are bound to be immeasurably stronger during the years that lie ahead. If democracy gets the benefit of better economic conditions and the assistance of rejuvenated trade unions and liberal education, the seedy, infinitesimally small seed which military Government has planted to inculcate democratic feeling into the German mind has a "fighting chance" to germinate and grow, fertilized by the long-standing German reversion toward the communistic solution, into a Germanized version of democratic living.
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