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Relations between the Netherlands government-in-exile and occupied Holland during World War II

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE
AND OCCUPIED HOLLAND DURING WORLD WAR II

by

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INTRODUCTION

The existence or exiled regimes of one sort or another is a frequently recurring historical fact. Some were eventually able to return in triumph to their home territory, others languished in alien surroundings and then were slowly forgotten.

The Second World War saw a remarkable growth of such governments-in-exile. In London were to be found governments of Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Yugoslavia. A Greek Government-in-exile was located in Cairo. In addition there were émigré groups from other countries which, while not recognized as valid governments, furnished a rallying point around which both nationals of the country and Allied officials could concentrate such efforts as might be undertaken with regard to the territory in question.

This dissertation is an examination of the relations between one government-in-exile and its occupied territory. The regime chosen is that of the Netherlands, which was located in London from May, 1940, until May, 1945.

The reader is cautioned from the outset that the facts and such underlying principles as seemed to have governed relations of the Netherlands Government in London with the occupied territory are not necessarily applicable to all other exiled regimes, either those operating in World War II or at other times in history. Factors such as the geographical location of Holland in relation to England, the social composition of the population, administrative arrangements of
the occupying power, which varied from country to country, and the
progress of the Allied war effort, all served to make the Dutch case
at least a little different from that of other exiled regimes. The
writer does believe that some obvious principles of fairly general
application may be drawn from this dissertation, particularly in re-
gard to the maintenance and operation of communications with an occu-
pied territory.

The problem of the government-in-exile is a continuing one. The
example which most readily comes to mind at the present writing is the
Republic of China, which is still recognized by one major power and
several minor ones as the valid government not only of the island of
Formosa but of mainland China as well. A number of emigre organiza-
tions made up of refugees from eastern European countries is also to be found
in various western countries. While none of these can accurately be
described as a government-in-exile, many of them attempt to maintain
at least some sort of contact with their former countries of residence
and hence share some common problems with a bona fide government-in-
exile.

The reader is again cautioned that both the Republic of China
and the various émigré groups mentioned find themselves in radically
different circumstances than the various London governments in World
War II. They are not a part of a war effort which has as its short
or long term objectives the liberation of their respective home ter-
ritories. Note must also be made of the fact that both present and
future governments-in-exile or émigré groups find or will find them-
selves faced with a rapidly changing technology, so that the methods
of maintaining contact with an occupied territory appropriate to the conditions of 1942 may be completely obsolete in 1961.

Scope

This dissertation is limited in subject matter and geographic area to various sorts of contact between the London Government of the Netherlands and the German-occupied territory. It is limited in a temporal sense to the period between the German invasion of the Netherlands in May, 1940, and the German capitulation of May, 1945. Occasional reference is made to events prior to May, 1940, for purposes of supplying background information.

Premises

This dissertation seeks, in essence, to examine the question of whether one particular government-in-exile in World War II, that of the Netherlands, was actually able to govern its absent population, and what sort of contact it was able to establish with that population.

One might begin with the basic postulate that the Dutch Government in-exile would have been able to maintain contact with the occupied territory, so as to keep itself informed of the state of Netherlands society; see to the maintenance of domestic order; take some measures to provide for the common economic welfare; protect its population against excesses of the occupying power; serve as a focus for national unity; and maintain its existence in order to assume authority at the time of liberation. This thesis will be tested and an analysis made of the extent and nature of those attributes of government which the Dutch regime in London actually demonstrated in its relations with the occupied territory. It will be necessary, the writer believes,
to include more material of a descriptive or narrative nature than would ordinarily be appropriate to a doctoral dissertation, as the subject matter is likely to be almost entirely unknown to the American reader.

In the first section the establishment of the Netherlands Government-in-exile is outlined, as is the establishment of German civil agencies in Holland. Various views of the raison d'être of the London Government are presented. The Ordinances of 1937, which contained guide lines for civil servants in the event of an enemy invasion or occupation of the Netherlands are described, together with the Commentary of 1943, which served to amplify and make more specific the earlier Ordinances.

The nature of the authority of Dutch civil servants left behind in Holland, particularly the acting department heads, the Secretaries-General, is examined, together with their experience both with the London Government and the occupying power. It is in the light of this vital experience that the basic postulate dealing with the actual functions of the London Government will be tested.

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\(^1\)Hereafter to be referred to as, "The London Government". Where reference is made to the United Kingdom Government this will be so indicated.
CHAPTER I

FORMATION OF THE LONDON GOVERNMENT

The German Invasion

The London Government came into being less as the result of any long range planning than as the immediate result of improvisation in the face of sudden danger.

Studied Netherlands neutrality in the Second World War came to an unpleasantly abrupt end on May 10, 1940, at approximately 4:00 A.M. Central European Time. At that hour German aircraft attacked the Hague, doing limited damage in three different neighborhoods. In less than half an hour reports were received indicating that severe damage had been done to air fields located at Schiphol (Amsterdam), Waalhaven, Bergen, and Vlissingen (Flushing). German parachutists, it was reported, had landed at various points.\(^2\)

The Dutch Council of Ministers met at 5:00 A.M. at the home of the Minister President Mr. D.J. de Geer and soon agreed on the text of a proclamation to be forwarded to Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina for her signature. It read as follows:

My Fellow Countrymen:

Although our country has anxiously observed strict neutrality

these recent months, with no intention of deviating from this course, we were suddenly attacked last night by German armed forces, without any warning whatsoever. This occurred in spite of the solemn assurances we had received that our neutrality would be respected so long as we respected it ourselves. I hereby protest in the strongest possible terms against this unprecedented breach of trust and this assault on the principles binding civilized states in their relations with one another. Both I and my Government will do their duty. We expect you to do yours, in whatever circumstances, at whatever post you serve, with the utmost industry, and with the inner peace and dedication which a clear conscience affords.

WILHELMINA

Soon after the Council of Ministers agreed on the proclamation it was signed by Queen Wilhelmina. At 6:00 in the morning, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. E. N. van Kleffens, received the German Ambassador, Herr Zech. Herr Zech reiterated Germany's peaceful intentions, saying that if free passage through Holland was granted to German forces, the constitutional form of Dutch government would not be disturbed. Germany had a sacred trust to protect the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg from an imminent invasion by Great Britain. Should Holland resist Germany's altruistic efforts, however, all possible means would be employed against her. The German Ambassador was given his passport and informed that a state of war existed between the Netherlands and Germany. He departed shortly thereafter.

After another meeting of the Council of Ministers, Mr. E. N. van Kleffens, together with Mr. C. J. I. M. Welter, drove to the seaside resort of Scheveningen where, about noon, they boarded a sea plane and flew to England to request British military assistance.


4E. N. van Kleffens, May 18, 1948, 11997.

5M. P. L. Steenberghe, May 19, 1948, 12194.
During the next day, May 11, Dutch defenses crumbled rapidly. Continued resistance, at least for a period of several days, did appear possible in the southern province of Zeeland. Some discussion took place in the Council of Ministers about the possibility of urging the royal family to retire to Zeeland.\textsuperscript{6}

In London, meanwhile, Mr. van Kleffens delivered to Prime Minister Churchill a telegram which the Dutch Embassy in London had just received from Minister-President de Geer in Holland:

\textit{Situation so bad that, if immediate Allied help to stem the German advance is not forthcoming, we must surrender. Immediate assistance can still salvage the situation.}

\textbf{IN THE NAME OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,}

\textbf{D. J. de GEER}\textsuperscript{7}

Winston Churchill advised Mr. van Kleffens that very little help was available owing to pressing British commitments elsewhere.\textsuperscript{8}

By May 12 the Council of Ministers was discussing the possible departure of the Government for England.\textsuperscript{9} On that same day, in the evening, Princess Juliana, Prince Bernhard, and the two Princesses, departed for England. By later that same evening the Minister of Defense had become convinced that Queen Wilhelmina should also leave the country.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{6}P. S. Gerbrandy, April 14, 1948, 8196.


\textsuperscript{8}ENQ, IIA, appendix, cxxxvii.

\textsuperscript{9}J. van den Temple, April 13, 1948, 7171.

\textsuperscript{10}H. G. Winkelman, April 14, 1948, 7704.
While hostilities continued the Council of Ministers debated whether such a continuance was desirable. Although the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (not a member of the Council) stated his opposition, it was decided that capitulation was inevitable and that little was to be gained by prolonged resistance.\footnote{Ibid., 7711.}

On the morning of May 13 the British Admiralty advised that by 10:00 it would have in position near the Hook of Holland five destroyers of the Royal Navy. At 9:00 in the morning Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina departed for the Hook. Meanwhile, in the Hague, the Council of Ministers tried to decide whether to depart for nearby or more distant points. Two Ministers failed to agree with the majority, the rest left for the Hook of Holland.

In the temporary seat of the Government, in a fortress at the Hook, the Portfolios of Trade, Industry, and Shipping, as well as Agriculture and Fisheries, were thus unrepresented. Conferences with these absent Ministers were held by telephone, a service that seemed to deteriorate by the minute.\footnote{Dijxhoorn, loc. cit., 7405.} From this vantage point the Netherlands Government issued the following communique:

\begin{quote}
At this time, in view of the nature of hostilities, the Government considers it necessary, in the national interest, in the interest of the overseas territories, and for the protection of freedom and trade, to transfer the seat of government.

Accordingly, Her Majesty the Queen and Her Ministers have decided to go elsewhere.\footnote{ENQ, IIA, appendix, cxxxiii.}
\end{quote}

The Council of Ministers decided that the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General H. G. Winkelman, would be given the task of arranging the capitulation of the armed forces themselves. This was not...
to be a capitulation of the Government. General Winkelman was to be entrusted with sufficient civil authority, of an essentially temporary nature, to accomplish this task. This decision was accordingly communicated to the two Ministers who had remained behind in the Hague, who then personally vested General Winkelman with this special authority. Then the Ministers, Messrs. Steenbergh and van Rhijn, departed to join their colleagues at the Hook of Holland.\(^\text{14}\)

**Departure of the Government from Holland**

In the afternoon Queen Wilhelmina left the Hook, on board the British torpedo boat H. M. S. Hereward. Her immediate destination was still not England, but Breskens, in Zeeland. Word was soon received on board the Hereward that Breskens had been bombed by German aircraft, hence the Hereward proceeded directly to England, reaching there about 7:00 in the evening. At about that same hour the Council of Ministers was departing the Hook of Holland on board a British destroyer, H. M. S. Windsor. Left behind in the Ministries were the Secretaries-General, the second in command.\(^\text{15}\)

At around 8:00 Queen Wilhelmina arrived in London, to be met by King George VI, Queen Elizabeth, Princess Juliana, Prince Bernhard, and the two earlier arrived Ministers, van Kleffens and Welter.\(^\text{16}\) Later that same evening Queen Wilhelmina released from Buckingham Palace the first official proclamation of the Netherlands London Government, directed to the Dutch people:

\(^{14}\)Dijxhoorn, *loc. cit*.

\(^{15}\)F. Beelaerts van Blokland, May 20, 1948, 12728.

\(^{16}\)Kleffens, *loc. cit.*, 12057.
After it had become abundantly clear that We and Our Ministers could no longer freely continue our Government, it was necessary to make the difficult decision to move the seat of the Government abroad for so long as it was unavoidable, with the intention of returning to Holland as soon as possible.

The Government is now located in England. In this way they will forestall a Government capitulation. In this way Netherlands territory, whether in Europe, the East or West Indies, remains one sovereign state, whose voice, as a full-fledged member of our allies, can continue to be heard.

The military command, and in [the] highest position, the Commander-in-Chief, will take such measures as are necessary from a military point of view.

There, where the usurper dominates, local civil authorities must continue to do what is necessary to further the public interest, and, primarily, cooperate for the maintenance of peace and order.

Our heart goes out to our countrymen in the fatherland who shall experience hard times. But Holland, with God's help, shall one day reconquer its European territory.

You will recall earlier disasters centuries ago, out of which Holland has arisen. That shall happen this time again.

Do not despair. Do, all of you, what is in the national interest. We will do ours. Long live the fatherland!

WILHELMINA

Establishment of the Government in London

The Council of Ministers arrived in London the next morning, May 14, around 9:00. At about this hour, in Holland, General Winkelman, issued a proclamation wherein he clearly described himself as, "...[The] highest authority in the country representing the [London] Government...". This proclamation had the prior approval of the London Government.

During the afternoon of the same day the German Luftwaffe bombarded Rotterdam, doing considerable damage. Utrecht was similarly threatened. General Winkelman notified the German military attaché in the Hague of his

17EN2, II, 67. 18Ibid., 145. 19Kleffens, loc. cit.
intention and desire to capitulate. He signed the articles of capitulation at around 9:20 the next morning.20

After three weeks residence in Buckingham Palace, Queen Wilhelmina moved to her own house in Eaton Square.21

The Council of Ministers established lodgings and offices in Grosvenor House Hotel in London's West End. Meetings of the Council were held in an unused and nearly unfurnished suite. All correspondence and all directives were typed by the Ministers themselves on Grosvenor House stationery. After a time the British Ministry of Supply lent a stenographer-typist, who it rapidly developed, could neither take dictation nor type, even though English was employed as an official language at this point. Royal proclamations were painfully dictated by a full Minister, a letter at a time, to the type setter.22

Soon the British Unilever Company, a subsidiary of the Dutch parent, took pity on the London Government and lent suitably trained personnel. For a time Unilever and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands seemed almost synonymous. One person recalls that the Bank of England refused to honor a currency exchange order signed by Mr. de Geer, the Dutch Minister-President. The order, Bank officials persisted, must be signed by Mr. Beyen, a Unilever official.23

After a few weeks the Government moved to Stratton House, a residence-hotel better suited to its needs.

20J. T. Furstner, April 21, 1948, 9083.
21Blokland, loc. cit., 12722.
22J. R. M. van Angeren, April 20, 1948, 8845.
23T. R. M. Schaepman, April 21, 1948, 9226.
In the early days in London, the Netherlands Minister of Education, Arts, and Sciences, Dr. G. Bolkestein, noted what seemed to him to be the reasons for the establishment of the London Government. It came into being, Dr. Bolkestein felt:

- So that Germany could not gain control of Dutch colonies.
- So that the Netherlands navy could proceed to England and continue to take part in the war.
- So that a Netherlands legion (composed of ground forces) could be raised, equipped, and managed.
- So that Dutch enterprises abroad could not be expropriated by the Germans or German agents.
- So that the end of the war would find a Netherlands Government capable of functioning to protect Dutch interests.24

Once the German occupation of the Netherlands became an accomplished fact, the Rules of Land Warfare, as embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907, were binding.25

Relevant portions of the Rules of Land Warfare are reproduced below:

**Article 25.** The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.

**Article 42.** Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

**Article 43.** The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

**Article 46.** Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.

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24 ENQ, IIA, 137.

25 Both the Netherlands and German Governments regarded the Rules of Land Warfare as binding on May 10, 1940. Neither Government specifically renounced this instrument subsequently.
Article 47. Pillage is formally forbidden.

Article 52. Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in the military operations against their own country.

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the territory occupied.

Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.

Article 55. The occupying state shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile state, and situated in the occupied territory. It must safeguard the capital of these properties and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.26

On the possibility that the government of an occupied territory might remove itself to another country, the Rules of Land Warfare are, regrettably, silent. The statement in Article 43, "...The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant...", seems to imply that while "authority" passes into the hands of the occupying power, sovereignty may reside elsewhere.

After World War II an Inquiry Commission of the Second Chamber (lower house) of the Netherlands Parliament, which examined the London Government in considerable detail, addressed itself only rather obliquely to the problem of whether such a regime possessed competence under international law to attempt to give direction to those in the occupied territory. Several Dutch experts with special knowledge of the law took the general view that the technical realities of communications, as

they existed at the time of the framing of the *Rules of Land Warfare*, were such that it must have seemed that an exiled regime would possess no adequate means of communicating with the occupied territory. Dr. J. H. W. Verzijl, of Leiden University, stressed the role which radio communication could and did play in the process, both in making the wishes of the exiled regime felt and in bring messages from the occupied territory to London by means of clandestine transmitting stations. Professor Verzijl further maintained that in attempting to block such communication an occupying power would have to employ larger numbers of personnel than might be spared from other duties. As a result the exiled government might continue successfully to reach the population in the occupied territory, even though satisfactory technical counter measures were theoretically available.27

Baron F. M. van Asbeck, also of the Leiden faculty, stressed the role of air power in the maintenance of communications. He described the value of air transport to the exiled regime as affording a means of transporting goods and persons to occupied Holland.28

As far as its status under the *Rules of Land Warfare* was concerned, the most the London Government could claim was that its creation was not specifically forbidden by that instrument. Changed circumstances do not, of themselves, dissolve particular international obligations. Neither the German government nor the London Government renounced the *Rules of Land Warfare*. Indeed, in a radio broadcast of May 20, 1940, to the Netherlands people, the then Minister-President, Mr. D. J. de Geer,


28F. M. Baron van Asbeck, August 30, 1950, 83770.
specifically stated the Netherlands Government's intention to adhere to the Rules of Land Warfare. 29

Whether of dubious legitimacy or not the London Government did in fact exist and operate. It was established for the soundest of utilitarian reasons. Dutch property of every description existed in abundance outside of European Holland. A sizeable merchant marine stayed free. A large portion of the Netherlands Navy was able to reach Britain or British Commonwealth ports safely. The Dutch East Indies, the West Indies, and Surinam were still free to be governed.

The London Government was accepted without question by both the Netherlands overseas possessions and most other governments. It raised a volunteer army, to which recruits came from all over the world. 30 It rescued and continued to operate nearly all units of the Netherlands Navy. 31 It supplied aircraft for Dutch squadrons attached to the British Royal Air Force and assisted in their training. 32 Arrangements were made so that the Netherlands merchant marine and the Dutch airline (K.L.M.) would not fall into enemy hands and would continue operation. 33 The London Government took steps to insure that the overseas assets of Dutch concerns would not fall into enemy hands, 34 and collected an income tax imposed on Dutch nationals living abroad. 35 A semi-official Dutch radio station was located in London, utilizing transmitters of such power that it could be clearly heard over the entire world. 36 A court of law,

29 Vrij Nederland (London), October 25, 1941, p. 388.
30 Ibid., July 4, 1942, 725. 31 Ibid., June 7, 1941, 583.
32 Ibid., November 16, 1940, 370. 33 Ibid., May 2, 1942, 420.
34 Ibid., September 7, 1940, 138. 35 Ibid., October 8, 1941.
36 Ibid., August 3, 1940, 11.
with jurisdiction over Dutch subjects was established in London.\textsuperscript{37}

As will be seen, the London Government made virtually no attempts to operate through the still-existing Dutch civil service in German-occupied Holland. It was able to make its influence felt indirectly through an impressive array of private organizations, many of them clandestine in nature. By means of radio communication it was able to give direction and advice to the general public. For example, in 1944 when the London Government decreed a general strike of railway employees in the occupied territory, the Netherlands public obeyed. The strike continued in force for the duration of World War II and seriously impeded German communications in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{38}

It is not the purpose of this dissertation to ascertain whether the Netherlands London Government possessed competence in the law of nations or not. germane to the discussion is the de facto existence and operation of the organism.

In 1937 the Netherlands Council of Ministers promulgated certain ordinances, commonly known as the \textit{Ordinances of 1937}, to govern the policy of civil servants of the national, provincial, and municipal governments, as well as those of various special-purpose districts, in the event of an enemy invasion or occupation. Covered also by the \textit{Ordinances} were the employees of transportation systems in the service of any of the governmental units already mentioned. The \textit{Ordinances}, reproduced below, deal specifically with the nature of the duties of Dutch civil servants in occupied territory.

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}, June 27, 1942, 698.

\textsuperscript{38}A subsequent section deals with the railway strike of 1944.
Article I. General.

1. As a general rule, the persons who make up the competent organs of the Royal Government, Provincial Governments, Municipal Governments, Boards of Surveyors of Dikes, Marshland Districts, and Marsh Polders, including transport workers under the direction of the foregoing, are, in the event of an enemy invasion, to remain at their posts...

These civil servants shall strike to work in the national interest so that their services may adapt themselves to the necessarily changed circumstances [which are likely to prevail].

Above all, the civil servants are, in so far as they have jurisdiction, to be charged with:

a. Informing the civilian population in regard to the attitude which it shall take towards the enemy and his various agencies.

b. The distribution with equity among the population of the burdens normally associated with an occupation.

c. Acting, when necessary, as an intermediary between the enemy and the civilian population.

d. Registering immediate and strong protest with the proper authorities whenever either these authorities or those acting under their direction commit acts in violation of the rules of international law.

2. In regard to the general rule stated above, that administrative organs and those serving them are to remain on duty in the event of an enemy invasion, an exception is to be made of those individuals whose continuance of their regular duties would serve the interests of the enemy more than those of the civilian population. Persons whose duties are of this nature are to be so informed by the proper authorities.

3. It is of particular importance that, for the adequate performance of the duties described in Paragraph 1, civil servants be thoroughly familiar with the rules of international law, particularly the Rules of Land Warfare, . . .

Article III. Relation of the authorities of the army of occupation to the Netherlands administrative organs in the occupied territory. . . .
6. Although by consequence of the occupation actual power may rest in the hands of the occupying power, the Netherlands Government still remains the legal sovereign. 

Anyone in the occupied territory, irrespective of whether he is in an administrative position or not, is strictly bound to follow the orders of the Netherlands Government. He is absolved of this responsibility only when the action taken by the enemy against him makes the performance of his duties literally impossible.

Article IX. The action to be taken by civil servants. ...

31. The reason for which a Dutch civil servant remains at his post [in time of occupation] is that this is in the interest of the civilian population. The damage that results from his service to the enemy is in general less than the greater damage which would result from the civilian population not having its own administration. In the event that the civil servant, by remaining in his position, is of greater service to the enemy than the need that the civilian population has for his services, then that civil servant must leave his post.³⁹

The Ordinances of 1937 came into being because various Cabinet Ministers in the Netherlands feared that a second world war was possible or probable, and that Holland might, after the fashion of Belgium in the 1914-1918 conflict, be occupied by German troops. Thus it was with Belgian experience in mind that the Ordinances interwove portions of the Rules of Land Warfare and general administrative directives, applicable to Dutch administrators should Holland be occupied and treated in the manner of Belgium in World War I. While German conduct in its World War I occupation of Belgium had left something to be desired, the Rules of Land Warfare had formed a fairly satisfactory working basis for governing relations between the Belgian administration, much of which continued to function, and the occupying power.⁴⁰

Civil servants gradually discovered that, under the German occupation
of the Netherlands, the Rules of Land Warfare were not to be an accurate guide for the behavior of the occupying power. Civil servants generally were thrown off their guard by the first few weeks of the occupation, during which the Germans generally behaved in a "correct" fashion. Unfortunately this German policy did not continue. Property of all sorts, private and public, was taken with little or no compensation. A system of voluntary labor whereby Hollanders could work in Germany at non-belligerent tasks gave way, by degrees, to one of forced conscription for all sorts of work to be performed all over the "Greater" Reich. Special German officers headed "press" gangs which roamed the countryside in search of additional laborers. Dutch Jews, regardless of age or sex, were collected and transported to Poland for extermination. Substantial numbers of prominent Hollanders were held as hostages for past or possible future illegal acts against the occupying power.

Thus, it will be readily observed that the Ordinances, in so far as they were based on the Rules of Land Warfare, were not a particularly pertinent guide for civil servants in the occupied territory.

The civil servants themselves had varying views on the value of the Ordinances of 1937 in practice.

It will be recalled that when the Ministers departed for England the seconds in command, the Secretaries-General, remained behind. As will be seen, these Secretaries-General continued in the somewhat anomalous and divided position of being in a caretaker position for the London

41 Vrij Nederland (London), August 1, 1942, p. 3.
42 Ibid., July 11, 1942, 750. 43 Ibid., August 1, 1942, 3.
44 Ibid., July 11, 1942, 752.
Government and, at the same time, being charged with certain aspects of civil administration by the occupying power. We are concerned at this juncture with the reaction of these Secretaries-General to the Ordinances of 1937, so clearly intended to serve as a guide for their conduct during the occupation.

In the view of Mr. Bosch van Rosenthal, not himself a Secretary-General, but Royal Commissioner for the Province of Utrecht, the Ordinances were one of the few sources of guidance that a civil servant possessed. He recalled how, after he was removed from office in February, 1941, "countless" visitors in various civil service capacities came to him seeking guidance as to their future conduct under the Ordinances. To him the Ordinances possessed almost incalculable value in guiding the civil servant in the attitude that he or she must take in various situations.45

One Secretary-General felt that the Ordinances were useful in that they made the provisions of the Rules of Land Warfare much more widely known and understood than would have otherwise been the case.46

Others regarded the value of the Ordinances as "nil". Some argued that those portions of the Ordinances based on the Rules of Land Warfare, as they had been pertinent to Belgian experience in World War I, were largely irrelevant. No complex legal verbiage was needed to tell anyone that he should resign or depart his post if his actions benefited the enemy more than the Dutch population.47

45 L. H. N. Bosch ridder van Rosenthal, August 26, 1949, 64335.
46 H. M. Hirschfeld, January 15, 1952, 95431.
47 D. G. W. Spitzen, January 22, 1952, 95901.
Article I, Section 2, of the Ordinances, provided that civil servants whose duties were, ipso facto, likely to be of greater benefit to the enemy than the civilian population, were to be so informed by the proper authorities. None of the Secretaries-General knew of any instance in which any civil service post was so designated by authorities.48

In 1943 three Hollanders in the occupied territory prepared the Commentary of 1943 which attempted to clarify and bring up to date the Ordinances of 1937. Dr. L. H. N. Bosch ridder van Rosenthal, the former Royal Commissioner for the Province of Utrecht, and Dr. J. H. W. Verzijl, Professor at the University of Utrecht, were assisted in their task by Mr. M. L. van Holthe tot Echten. They were faced with several aspects of the Ordinances which needed urgent clarification. Since London could scarcely publish its official acts and resolves in the occupied territory it had taken to broadcasting them as a part of the programs of the Dutch radio station in London, Radio Orange. While these could be heard on any ordinary radio they offered a special problem: Were civil servants in the occupied territory bound by these broadcast pronouncements, particularly in view of the fact that listening to Radio Orange was a punishable crime? Other problems plagued the civil servant who tried to follow the Ordinances. The Germans had used or attempted to use parts of the Dutch administrative machinery in their forced-labor recruitment service. What was the responsibility of Dutch civil servants in these administrative areas? What of the German-proclaimed policy of "total war"—how were the Ordinances to be applied? These were some of

the questions which the Commentary of 1943 sought to answer.\footnote{Rosenthal, \textit{loc. cit.}, 64366.}

In the beginning, it should be stressed, the Commentary of 1943 was not an official document. It was circulated among some civil servants in the occupied territory and reached London by microfilm. London approved the Commentary and Minister-President Gerbrandy announced that it was to have an official status.\footnote{\textit{Vrij Nederland} (London), October 30, 1943, p. 429. Excerpts of the Commentary are to be found in the appendix to this dissertation.}

Reactions to the Commentary were as mixed as they had been to the earlier Ordinances. Some reasoned that it placed unreasonably severe restrictions on civil servants, restrictions devised by "irresponsible" resistance workers who had no understanding of either the conflicting interests to be evaluated or the risks to the civil servants involved.\footnote{Rosenthal, \textit{loc. cit.}, 64369.}

Others felt that the Commentary could as readily be used by a civil servant as a justification for remaining at his post longer than the Ordinances taken alone, might have permitted.\footnote{J. C. Tenkink, March 18, 1952, 96327.}

The extent to which the Commentary was actually circulated, either in clandestinely duplicated form or via Radio Orange, was raised by several. Some never received a copy but heard "mention" of it in London radio broadcasts.\footnote{Spitzen, \textit{loc. cit.}, 95942.}

Others never learned of the existence of the Commentary until after the war,\footnote{C. E. W. Six, January 30, 1952, 96007.} or came to understand its substance through articles appearing in the underground press, along with
radio broadcasts, while still others received copies sent to them by persons unknown.

It will be recalled that, in the period immediately before the capitulation of the Netherlands armed forces located in Holland, civil authority was temporarily entrusted to the Dutch General H. G. Winkelman. The Secretaries-General were to continue as acting department heads, in the absence of the responsible Minister. This continued to be true even after the installation of Artur Seyss-Inquart as Reichs-Commissioner, on May 29, 1940. The responsible Ministers, of course, continued to be "absent" for the duration of World War II, as they stayed in London. Administrative acts were, Herr Seyss-Inquart informed Secretary-General Tenkink of the Ministry of Justice, no longer to be done "in the name of the Queen" but "in the name of law".

On or about June 21, 1940, there was posted in all public places in the Netherlands one or the first of a seemingly endless stream of proclamations, with Dutch and German in parallel columns:

ORDERED:

By the Reichs-Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territory, regarding the authority of the Secretaries-General of the Netherlands ministries.

In accordance with Paragraph 5, of the Führer's indulgence regarding the competence of governmental units in the Netherlands territory, dated May 18, 1940, I hereby order:

Paragraph 1.

(1) The Secretaries-General of the Netherlands Ministries are empowered, within the limits of their responsibility, to take such measures as are necessary for the maintenance of public order and discipline. They are authorized to take any action necessary to carry out the orders of the Reichs-Commissioner and of the Government of the Netherlands, including the enforcement of the laws, the maintenance of public order, and the protection of property.

55 J. van Dam, April 1, 1952, 96669.

56 R. A. Verwey, April 1, 1952, 96619. 57 Tenkink, loc. cit., 96281.
of public order and safety; in particular they are authorized to charge their subordinates with such responsibilities.

(2) If the authority granted in (1) is exceeded those responsible are liable for the most severe punishment.

Paragraph 2.

(1) The Reichs-Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territory reserves the right to, in particular circumstances, reduce or take away the authority delegated in Paragraph 1.

Paragraph 3.

(1) This order becomes effective immediately.

The Hague, June 21, 1940.

The Reichs-Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territory, SEYSS-INQUART

There thus began a sort of fencing, at first polite, then more determined, that was to continue for the duration of the war, between the Dutch administration left in Holland and the Reichs-Commissioner and his subordinates. The Secretaries-General still tried to act as though they functioned in trust for the absent Ministers in London. The Germans sought to involve or implicate the Secretaries-General in every possible phase of the occupation. Wherever possible the endorsement of a German-sponsored regulation by a Dutch Secretary-General was sought. The Secretaries-General signed some regulations, still others were signed after desired changes had been incorporated, and a number were not signed at all.59

On the basis of his order of June 21, 1940, just quoted, the Reichs-Commissioner appointed four Commissioners-General, all of whom were German. They were: Wimmer, for "general order and justice"; Rauter, for "public

58 ENQ, VIIa, appendix, xvii.

59 Tenkink, loc. cit., 96234.
safety; Fischboek, for "economy and finance"; and Schmidt, for assorted
tasks, particularly the dissemination of National Socialist "ideals".
The Secretaries-General were linked to the Reichs-Commissioner and to
the Commissioners-General by means of a sort of liaison officer, called
a Referent ("reporter" or "reviewer"). While the German Referent was
interposed in theory, in practice the Secretaries-General frequently
dealt with both the Reichs-Commissioner and the Commissioners-General
directly. This is not to say that these contacts were cordial. 60

Secretary-General Tenkink, then in the Ministry of Justice, re-
called "endless" debates with the Germans over proposed regulations
that appeared to be in conflict with the Rules of Land Warfare. When
the Germans desired a particular ordinance they would forward the draft
text to the Ministry concerned by way of the Referent, "...to ascertain
if it is technically correct". 61 Any changes to be made by the Ministry
had, of course, to be approved by the Reichs-Commissioner. Mr. Tenkink
reported that, on occasion, Dutch civil servants were able to effect
changes in regulations which were of real value. 62

Mr. Tenkink's successor in the Ministry of Justice, Mr. J. P.
Hooykaas, regarded any changes in ordinances which he was able to make
as of very little importance. It made no difference who signed the
ordinances, Hooykaas maintained, they were still German ordinances and
they, the Secretaries-General, were German civil servants, deriving
their authority, such as it was, from the Reichs-Commissioner. 63

60 J. H. Posthumus, "Order and Disorder," Annals of the American
Academy, CXLIV, p. 2.

61 Tenkink, loc. cit., 96546. 62 Ibid., 96351.
63 J. P. Hooykaas, March 19, 1952, 96416.
Dr. G. A. van Poelje, the former Secretary-General of Education, Arts and Sciences, still felt that, as a sort of caretaker for the Minister in London, he had a legal responsibility to the London Government, as well as those obligations to the occupying power which were imposed on him by the Rules of Land Warfare. Dr. van Poelje on several occasions refused to prepare ordinances desired by the Germans. This often accomplished nothing, he rapidly discovered, as the same ordinances might very well be proclaimed directly by the Reichs-Commissioner. 64 Thus, in his view, Dr. van Poelje had two masters to serve: The Reichs-Commissioner, who had de facto authority, and the Government in London with whom sovereignty rested. 65

Mr. C. Ringeling, Secretary-General of the Department of Defense on May 10, 1940, never felt that he had two masters — he began his career under the occupation by refusing to draw and sign an order, based on a request dated June 9, 1940, whereby a Dutch army arsenal would manufacture artillery shells for the Germans. This was also the end of Mr. Ringeling's career as a Secretary-General during the occupation. When he came to work on June 11, 1940, he found the way barred by several German soldiers who blandly informed him that his successor had been chosen and already installed in office. 66

Mr. D. G. W. Spitzan, Secretary-General of Transport and Waterways, never looked on his position as one in which he had two masters. He had one, the absent Government in London, whose interests he tried to protect, while an intruder, "...A madman who held a revolver to my head...."

64 C. A. van Poelje, January 22, 1952, 95881. 65 Ibid., 95854.
gave him various orders. Mr. Spitzen wished to make clear that the position of the Secretaries-General was far from one of powerlessness, however. His Ministry was in a particularly vital position, as it helped provide a working system of transportation, needed in feeding the city populations of the highly-urbanized Netherlands. Mr. Spitzen was able, for example, to delay the enactment of a new German transport law for a period of one year, and he was able to effect various changes in this law before it went into force.67

It was never simply a matter of the Germans replacing the frequently recalcitrant Secretaries-General or other civil servants with Dutch Nazis. As in Germany, the Dutch National Socialist movement was sometimes called, "The revolution of the retarded". With few exceptions Dutch National Socialists were men and women of extraordinarily limited intellectual or professional accomplishment. Many Dutch civil servants were turned out of office and National Socialist replacements readily located. Many other loyal Dutch civil servants remained at their posts because both the Germans and the Dutch National Socialists realized that no adequate replacement was available. Thus special qualifications which made some individuals partially indispensable gave them a limited amount of bargaining power.68

At the end of 1941 the Dutch National Socialist Party was declared by the Reichs-Commissioner Seyss-Inquart to be the only political party in the Netherlands.69

67 Spitzen, loc. cit., 95954.
In December, 1942, the Dutch Nazi leader, Anton Mussert, was proclaimed "leader" of the Netherlands people. While his supporters held elaborate ceremonies, his installation seems to have met with little public acclaim. 70

In February, 1943, Mussert installed a "Secretary of State", who was supposed to preside over a "cabinet" of sorts. 71

Time was soon to prove that the Mussert "cabinet" meant nothing. It possessed no executive power, its only duty being to advise German officials in the execution of their occupation duties. It was accorded scant respect by either the Dutch people or German occupation authorities. 72

The original Dutch Ministries and subordinate bodies remained more or less intact, although a number of civil servants resigned for fear their remaining would lend prestige to the Mussert "cabinet".

A brief examination of several instances of more extreme German pressures on the Secretaries-General and their departments will serve to demonstrate the limited nature of possible resistance measures or delaying actions available to the Dutch civil servant.

That only a small minority of Dutch Jews survived the Second World War is mute testimony, finally, to the inadequacy of attempts by the Secretaries-General to offer protection to their fellow countrymen. That these attempts were made is worthy of mention.

In May of 1941 there came to the attention of Mr. J. P. Hooykaas, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, the fact of an extraordinarily high death rate among young Dutch Jews who had been interned and

70 Ibid., December 14, 1942, 3. 71 Ibid., February 9, 1943, 1.
72 Posthumus, loc. cit., 4.
were sent to a camp at Mauthausen. Of some 300 internees between 80 and 100 had died, with "heart failure" being offered as the cause of death in all instances. Since this seemed a rather high incidence of cardiac trouble among young adults, both Mr. Hooykaas and his colleagues registered strong protests with the German Commissioner-General, Rauter. Rauter promised to see what he could do, and shortly thereafter the Jewish Council (Joodse Raad) in Holland reported that there had been, indeed, substantial improvements brought about in the conditions of internment of Dutch Jews in Mauthausen. These changes had occurred, the Council reported, shortly after a visit to the camp by Commissioner-General Rauter. These improvements continued in force for about one year. 73

Secretary-General Frederiks was present at meetings of the College of Secretaries-General, a semi-official consultative body, when the question of the German order to remove all Jewish civil servants was discussed. It was decided, with considerable reluctance, to comply with the order on the grounds that, given the German attitude toward Jews, a Jewish civil servant would find it impossible to discharge his duties. Dr. Frederiks felt that the civil servants were able to stall and delay many anti-Jewish measures, indeed wholesale persecution and deportation did not come until 1943. Had the civil servants taken a firm stand on the issue of the discharge of Jewish civil servants the result, he argued, might very well have been simply the removal from office of all concerned. There was talk of the resignation of some or all of the Secretaries-General over this issue— Dr. Frederiks recalls having communicated with a Mr. Cohen of the Jewish Council on this question and being told in return: "In the name of God

73 Hooykaas, loc. cit., 96434.
stay at your post, otherwise all is lost.  

In the Department of Social Affairs it was possible to delay the discharge of Jewish civil servants for a number of winter months, thereby preserving their means of livelihood as long as possible.  

In 1943, when the wholesale deportations of Jews took place, there was tragically little that the surviving Secretaries-General could do. The entire process was completely in the hands of various German police, intelligence, and transport agencies and not even wilful sabotage on the part of the Dutch administration would have affected the process one iota.  

In opposing forced recruitment of Dutchmen for service in the Greater Reich the most that could be done by the Secretaries-General was to fight a delaying action. Informed conjecture suggests that the Dutch administration may have been able to alter German actions so that relative improvements did result. In 1942 the Germans promulgated an ordinance providing that both Dutch men and women within wide age limits would be liable for forced labor outside of the Netherlands. Secretary-General Verwey, of the Ministry of Social Affairs, conferred with his colleagues, including the directors of regional employment offices. He discretely excluded those who were Dutch National Socialists. Substantial agreement was reached on a course of action. Mr. Verwey then went in person to Commissioner-General Schmidt with the information thus collected. Herr Schmidt was told that if Verwey and his associates were forced to proclaim the ordinance in question they would resign. Mr. Verwey pointed out that the ordinance was a blatant violation of the Rules of Land.  

74 Frederiks, loc. cit., 95721.  75 Verwey, loc. cit., 96626.  76 Spitzen, loc. cit., 99272.
Warfare, and that its application would remove sufficient agricultural workers so that the task of feeding the Dutch civilian population would become very difficult. While Herr Schmidt did not seem impressed by the arguments based on the Rules of Land Warfare, he promised to make certain changes if Verwey and his colleagues would not resign. Dutch women would be completely excluded from the operation of the ordinance, and special consideration would be given to persons engaged in the production or distribution of food. Mr. Verwey and his colleagues, apparently feeling that this was all that could be accomplished, agreed. While those in the production and distribution of food were frequently included in the labor draft, Dutch women were apparently not drafted for service in Germany.77

The affair which Dr. H. M. Hirschfeld, then Secretary-General of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Agriculture calls, "De tweede distributiestamkaart" ("The second ration card"), was significant because it produced just a ration card and no more. Rations in the German-occupied Netherlands, when they were available at all, were obtainable only with the surrender of the inevitable ration stamps, based, in turn, on a ration card. The cards themselves were based on the vital statistics registers maintained by the municipalities. It was common knowledge, both on the part of the Dutch and the Germans, that all was far from in order in the maintenance of the vital statistics registers. The registers frequently disappeared completely, or at the very least a page or two might be missing. Ration cards were issued to false entries in the registers, actually for the benefit of Jews or resistance personnel in hiding. Thus, in late 1942 or early 1943, when it became known that the

77Verwey, loc. cit., 96624.
Germans favored the issuance of an entirely new ration card, many civil servants feared that such a document would be used as a device to correct errors in the municipal vital-statistics registers, or that it would be used to collect the names of additional persons for service in forced-labor units. Dr. Hirschfeld was able to "stall" the issuance of the new cards for several weeks. Finally the Germans suggested to him that, unless his "thinking" became more "constructive", force might be applied against his person. Dr. Hirschfeld went to the Nazi police chief, Commissioner-General Rauter, and said: "We do not trust your motives in regard to this contemplated second ration card— we fear that you are going to use it to try to locate persons in hiding or as a means of drafting persons for service in Germany." Dr. Hirschfeld was told that the card would not be so used if he would acquiesce in its issuance. He did agree to such an issuance, with the express understanding that information gained in this way was not to be made available to any police agency of any sort. Dr. Hirschfeld agreed, when asked about this after World War II, that his action may have been sheer naivety on his part, but in any event the German promise was honored and the second ration card never abused.78

The College of Secretaries-General was created by inter-ministerial agreement, and met more or less regularly to discuss governmental matters common to the Ministries.79

The College tended to meet frequently at the start of the occupation, and to do as much as possible as a unit, both to present a stronger front to the Germans and because the occupying power at times spoke of the col-

78 Hirschfeld, loc. cit., 95484.
79 A. M. Snouck Hurgronje, April 20, 1948, 8705.
lective responsibility" of the Secretaries-General, even though they
granted no official recognition to the College.\textsuperscript{80}

Mr. Tenkink reported that the Secretaries-General met to discuss
a wide range of subjects. The oppression of the Jews, riots caused
by Dutch National Socialist organizations, forced-labor recruitment,
growing shortages of fuels and foodstuffs, and the transportation
system were among the most frequent topics treated. Such measures as
could be taken to influence or alter German actions were frequently
discussed in meetings of the College.\textsuperscript{81}

Dr. van Poelje remembers the informal character of the College
during this period. He feels that it had no real official status but
served more as an informative, consultative gathering. There was an
episode that cast less than complete credit on the College—it did agree
to sign unanimously a statement requested by the Germans which urged
Dutchmen to refrain from acts of sabotage, suggesting that retaliation
of a severe nature might result were such acts committed. While this
statement was actually in accord with the Rules of Land Warfare, its
appearance in the traditional double-column form, Dutch on one side,
German on the other, did nothing to increase confidence in the College,
either in Holland or in London.\textsuperscript{82}

When more and more National Socialist Secretaries-General appeared
as replacements for those who had resigned or were driven from office,
meetings of the College grew steadily less frequent and shorter. The
loyal members held one of their last meetings at a dinner in the

\textsuperscript{80}Tenkink, \textit{loc. cit.}, 96292. \textsuperscript{81}Ibid., 96316.

\textsuperscript{82}Poelje, \textit{loc. cit.}, 95867. \textsuperscript{83}Spitzen, \textit{loc. cit.}, 96906.
Hotel de Doelen in Appeldoorn. 83

Dr. Hirschfeld recalls that Reichs-Commissioner Seyss Inquart, on receiving an involved written complaint signed, "The College of Secretaries-General", replied that he did not recognize the College of Secretaries-General as an official administrative body, but if the Secretaries-General wished to gather to discuss administrative or ministerial matters he had no objection. 84

Dr. Hirschfeld recalls that the last meetings of the College, by that time badly infiltrated by Dutch National Socialists, were held in the summer of 1943. He feels that the College definitely contributed assistance in countering German actions in such fields as the forced recruitment of labor, and in developing policies concerning food distribution. 85

During the Second World War direct contact of any sort between the London Government and the Secretaries-General and their departments was practically non-existent. Although the Ordinances of 1937, as has been noted, provided for both the continuance in office of civil servants, subject to certain contingencies, and for the possibility that the sovereign in London might give orders to the administration, this almost never occurred directly through orders or messages sent to the Secretaries-General. As things developed London preferred to work through a vast array of clandestine resistance organizations, some created unilaterally in Holland, some the work of London agents or persons in contact with London.

Secretary-General Spitzen never received a communication from London during his entire tenure of office, which terminated in August,

83 Spitzen, loc. cit., 95908. 84 Hirschfeld, loc. cit., 95389.
85 Ibid., 95411.
Mr. Spitzen did not believe that it would have been a wise course of action for London to have attempted to give concrete, detailed instructions to the administration in Holland. The exiled regime had too little knowledge on day-to-day administrative problems in the occupied territory. Moreover, even if consultation had been technically feasible, it would have been of little use in many instances. The Germans, he pointed out, sometimes followed the practice of announcing at 4:00 P.M. that a certain measure was to become effective at 6:00 A.M. on the following day. In 1952 Dr. Frederika was asked about his contacts, as a Secretary-General, with the London Government:

Question: Did you receive any instructions from London?

Dr. Frederika: No. The Government left us to our own devices when it departed. They went to London and then sent messenger after messenger to the continent, to Jan, Piet, and Klaas, [ordinary resistance figures] but they never sent any messengers to me. No one ever even delivered a copy of the Commentary of 1943 to me. I found a copy of it one day which was lying in the street.

The Government and the resistance stood shoulder to shoulder. Magnificent! But not one word was said to the administration. We remained as the trusted servants of the London Government, at least until they specifically withdrew that trust. As far as we knew, until the last day of the occupation we had the legal right to be regarded as trusted servants of the Government. The Government placed the administration in Holland in the most difficult position imaginable by stabbing it in the back with the dagger of the resistance movements. I do not criticize the resistance as such, but the resistance press, which launched vicious attacks on us, caused our administration to lose a great deal of prestige, not so much with the civilian population as with the Germans.

It happened one day that I complained to a German official about a particular proposed regulation on the grounds that it ran contrary to the spirit of the Netherlands people. Do you know what he did? He pointed to a pile of illegal, clandestine newspapers on his desk and said: "You can't speak in the name of the Netherlands people. Do you know what these papers, which are nothing but..." 35

86 Spitzen, loc. cit., 95945. 87 Ibid.
mouthpieces of the London Government, say about you?" 88

Dr. Frederiks believed that most civil servants during the period of the occupation would have loyally cooperated with direction given them by the London Government. Dr. Frederiks realized that the frequent communiques from Radio Orange, some of them containing specific orders for all persons in the occupied territory, were addressed to the civil servants as well. Dr. Frederiks regarded this as a dangerously public way of communicating with the administration, and felt that more coherent policies might have been evolved in London had the Secretaries-General been consulted. 89

Dr. Hirschfeld could recall no single occasion on which instructions were received by the administration in Holland from London. Now to be sure, this happened during the railway strike of 1944. On another occasion in 1943, London gave general instructions via Radio Orange that on no account were civil servants to cooperate in any way with the German Arbeitseinsatz ("Labor Pool"). Dr. Hirschfeld regarded this order as clear evidence that London had insufficient data on the matter. By this time, Dr. Hirschfeld explained, fully seventy-five per cent of Holland's mayors had been replaced by Dutch Nazis. Local servants, largely loyal to London, served under them. These civil servants, rather than their Nazi superiors, had actual charge of the crucial vital-statistics registers, so important to the concealment of persons who had fled the occupying authorities. These functionaries granted the Ausweise ("Exemptions"), documents excusing the bearer from the Labor Pool, and thus needed by any person who had to move about at all in occu-

88 Frederiks, loc. cit., 95670. 89 Ibid., 95455.
pied Holland. Since these civil servants were able to sabotage the Arbeitseinsatz from within it made no sense for them to refuse to work with it -- they would simply be replaced by Dutch Nazis, were they to resign. Accordingly, these civil servants were prone to say, "Yes, in this area we are insubordinate, but we can judge better than the gentlemen in London who are not as close to the misery as we are."90

Through indirect contacts that Dr. Hirschfeld had with the London Government he got the impression that the departed Ministers themselves continued to trust their subordinates who had remained behind. The passage of time brought into office in London some persons who had not previously been Dutch Ministers. They, it seemed to Dr. Hirschfeld, were less likely to be well disposed toward those in the administration in Holland.91

Dr. Hirschfeld regarded the order of the London Government to suspend all Secretaries-General, announced at the time of liberation, as manifestly unfair. If London had felt displeasure it could have taken steps to notify the Secretaries-General and other civil servants of this fact, telling them that their services were no longer required. As it was, London left them to make the best of a nearly impossible situation, and to do so within the framework of vague and badly-drawn instructions.92

Secretary-General Verwey did encounter one attempt on the part of the London Government to give instructions to his Ministry. London had forbidden all civil servants to ask, give, or accept Ausweise to the German labor conscription drive being conducted in the winter of 1944. The Germans offered Ausweise for civil servants engaged in the process.

90Hirschfeld, loc cit., 96246. 91Ibid., 95473. 92Ibid.
of providing essential services in the distribution of food. The Dutch administration had established an elaborate system for the supply of food to the Dutch cities, where starvation was already widespread. This activity had been made much more difficult since the Germans requisitioned not only most available vehicles, but stocks of repair parts and fuels as well. The Ministry of Social Affairs, through the elaborate ruse of maintaining two complete accounting systems on stocks of replacement parts and fuels, one false for German inspection, one accurate for operational use, had been able to steal and hold back just enough supplies to keep road and barge traffic moving, albeit at a greatly curtailed level. Thus it was that the civil servants concerned with this work needed the German Ausweise very much indeed.\textsuperscript{93}

Under these circumstances Vorwey telephoned Dr. Hirschfeld for advice. Dr. Hirschfeld urged him to ask for Ausweise for the personnel concerned, without including the address of the person for whom it was claimed. This was done, and a great many Ausweise for civil servants engaged in this category of work were requested and granted. Vorwey felt that he had adhered to the spirit of the Government's directive, apparently intended to forestall the Germans using the Ausweise as a means of collecting names and addresses for possible future labor recruitment. At the same time Vorwey was keenly aware that he had not adhered to the letter of the London order. By a round-about route he presently received a message from the London Government to the effect that it approved his action. It was the only such communication he received from London during the entire war—he prized it highly.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{93} Verwey, loc. cit., 96631.  \textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 96636.
According to Minister-President Gerbrandy of the London Government, the possibility of giving direction to civil servants in the occupied territory was considered. However, in the early days of the occupation communications between England and Holland were so poor as to rule out this possibility. Later, when limited, reliable channels of communication were established, it seemed of more immediate value to devote such facilities to the gathering of military information which might be of direct value to the Allied war effort. After time passed, Gerbrandy recalled, the College of Secretaries-General became infiltrated with Dutch Nazis, making any remote administration efforts out of the question. The appeal, signed by all members of the College, urging the populace to refrain from acts of sabotage, had done nothing to increase confidence in London in regard to the administration of the Secretaries-General.95

In regard to the accusation of Dr. Frederiks, that London had left the civil servants to their own devices, sending messengers to, "Jan, Piet, and Klaas", but never to Dr. Frederiks, President Gerbrandy replied that, on more than one occasion, Radio Orange had given directions that were particularly for the attention of civil servants, and that any instructions sent via radio to the Netherlands people as a whole were for the advice and attention of civil servants as well. This fact made Dr. Frederiks' complain seem less than valid, President Gerbrandy argued. Time after time, when messages had been sent to the occupied territory via Radio Orange, London subsequently learned that the word had been spread with "incredible speed" over the entire country.96

95P. S. Gerbrandy, July 21, 1963, 97583. 96Ibid., 97572.
According to Minister-President Gerbrandy the general reaction of the London Government to reports that came from the occupied territory regarding the activities of Messrs. Frederiks, Hirschfeld, and Verwey, was that they were not "good" and must be removed. The question then arose of whether it was opportune to announce this intention and how such an order could be implemented. Making a public announcement of their removal could, the London Government reasoned, be unwise, as implementation might prove impossible. In any event, according to Gerbrandy, the consensus of London opinion in regard to these three Secretaries-General was, "Away with them!"\(^97\)

To the then Minister of Justice in the London Government, Mr. J. R. M. van Angeren, there was the basic problem of whether London had sufficient information in regard to administrative problems in occupied Holland. Testifying in 1953, Mr. van Angeren noted that London had no knowledge of the restrained, "correct" manner in which the Germans conducted themselves in their relations with civil servants for the first few months—a thoroughly disarming experience for many civil servants. Mr. van Angeren had asked the Government as it went into exile in May, 1940, several questions: "Must not the Secretaries-General be given some instructions? What is to be the extent of their authority? What of their day-to-day decisions, be they good or bad? Are their acts to be accepted?" Mr. van Angeren said that he never got any answers to these questions—indeed, no one even tried to answer—he still felt they were good questions, however.\(^98\)

In any event no instructions were specifically prepared for the in-

\(^{97}\)Ibid., 97592. \(^{98}\)Angeren, loc. cit., 98139.
formation of the Secretaries-General. This did not mean, Mr. van Angeren felt, that the Secretaries-General could say, "We had no instructions. We did not know what we had to do." They had the Ordinances of 1937 and the 1943 Commentary on the Ordinances, vague though they were in places. They had the constant direction of the Government as expressed in Radio Orange broadcasts. It did seem to Mr. van Angeren that the Secretaries-General could and should have been given specific, direct instructions during the time of the occupation, above and beyond those already mentioned. 99

Minister of Waterways, J. W. Albarada, thought that instructions communicated through secret channels may have actually been sent to the Secretaries-General, but that these would have gone through the office of Minister-President Gerbrandy, who might be the only person who would know of such action. Albarada could recall no specific instances of such communication. On several occasions he made "telegraphic" inquiries of his subordinates in Holland in efforts to learn of the condition of certain waterways and dikes. Several times he received replies, although the nature of the replies in nearly every instance made him question the reliability of his channel of communication. 100

Minister Albarada said that radio broadcasts from time to time enunciated basic principles to be followed in the occupied territory, principles that could be implemented by the Secretaries-General. These broadcasts defined the national interest in general terms, and as such were subject to various interpretations by the civil servants and others, who had to apply them to concrete situations. Mr. Albarada did not believe that Dr. Gerbrandy's statement in regard to Messrs. Hirschfeld, 99 Ibid. 100 J. W. Albarada, September 3, 1953, 98050.
Verwey, and Frederiks, ("Away with them"), was an accurate summary of the London Government's position. While there was sharp criticism of these gentlemen and their policies in Ministerial circles in London, they could not simply be discharged without a thorough investigation. Minister Albarda seemed to imply that the thorough investigation would have to be held in Holland at the conclusion of hostilities, although he did not say precisely that.¹⁰¹

Conclusions

One must, on the basis of the evidence presented in Chapter I, reject part of the original postulate that the London Government was or could have been able to see to the maintenance of domestic order in the occupied territory, to provide for the economic welfare, or to protect its absent population against the excesses of the occupying power. It must be postulated instead that the London Government could not really run affairs through some sort of remote administration, that the most it could do vis-à-vis the occupied territory was to maintain contact and gather information from that territory, lending assistance to selected organizations there, some of which might perform tasks in the general welfare which in other circumstances a government might be expected to perform. It may be further postulated that London was more likely to be successful in these endeavors when it utilized the services of person or organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory, rather than attempting to dispatch persons to Holland or create such organizations from the vantage point of London. Valid functions of the London Government, it can still be assumed, continued to be those of acting as

¹⁰¹Ibid., 98061.
a focus for national unity and the maintenance of its own existence,
in order to be available to govern the Netherlands at liberation.

As Minister Bolkestein saw the original purposes of the London
Government (supra, p. 12), almost none had to do with the occupied
territory at all, but with Dutch persons and property outside Holland.
This was, after all, the personal opinion of one individual. Moreover,
there was nothing to prevent the London Government from performing func-
tions and fulfilling purposes that were not envisaged or expressed at
the time of its coming into being.

The blunt fact of the matter is that no one made any real plans
for the formation of a Dutch Government in London in advance of its
actual formation. The Ordinances of 1937 were intended to cover a
possible military administration of the sort which Belgium had under-
gone in World War II. The authors of the Ordinances could scarcely
have imagined that Holland would not have a military administration
but a supplemental German civil administration grafted onto the Dutch
structure already in operation. There is no evidence that the authors
of the Ordinances of 1937 foresaw the possibility of the "total" war
that was waged, with civilian populations mobilized as part of the in-
dustrial potential of the occupying power, and with bombardment directed
as much against industrial and civil objectives as those of a military
nature. Note must also be made of the fact that the Ordinances of 1937
were very little known both within and without the Dutch administration.
Although they were an act of the Netherlands Council of Ministers they
apparently made so little impression on those involved that the Dutch
Minister-President of 1940, D. J. de Geer, did not know of their exist-
The position of civil servants was one difficult of precise definition. It is doubtful if either the Ordinances of 1937 or the Commentary, which sought to explain and amplify the Ordinances, were of any great use. The most guidance any meaningful formulation could offer was that, unless told the opposite by London, a civil servant was to stay at his post as long as the sum total of his acts served the interests of the Dutch populace more than it served those of the occupying power. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to pass moral judgment on either those who may have departed prematurely or stayed at their posts too long. It is probably true that some Dutch civil servants possessed in this connection some room in which to maneuver, as the Germans often preferred to have the endorsement by Dutch administrators of German actions, even at the price of making changes in proposed regulations, as has been seen. Some other Dutch civil servants possessed special technical skills, so that their replacement would have been a difficult task for the Germans, who seldom had any illusions about the real ability of Dutch National Socialists. The oft-repeated arguments made by civil servants, that to stay at their post would keep it from being filled by a Dutch Nazi, may not have always been germane. There were undoubtedly times when the public interest might have better been served if undesirable German regulations were promulgated by a Dutch Nazi who was known to the public as such.

The nature of the creation of the Commentary on the Ordinances of 1937 tends to support the thesis that London's contacts with the occupied area were most satisfactory when the services of persons or or-
ganizations already located or in being in the occupied territory were utilized, since the Commentary of 1945, as has been noted, was the work of persons then in Holland.

The Secretaries-General received no instructions intended for them personally, although as Dutch subjects they were included in general directives broadcast by Radio Orange. Thus they might be told, along with all Hollanders, not assist in any way with the deportation of Dutch Jews, or to refrain from giving any assistance to the recruitment of laborers for service in Germany.

One can only conclude from the evidence presented in Chapter I that any detailed remote administration by the London Government was impossible. The simple fact of the presence of the German civil organs, with a loosely-defined but very extensive grant of authority, plus the progressive Nazification of the Dutch civil service, would have precluded this possibility ab initio.

Moreover, in order to issue any detailed instructions to civil servants, London would have had to be in possession of detailed information on conditions in the occupied territory. As will be seen in subsequent sections, the London Government lacked such detailed information in any significant quantity until at least the latter months of 1943. Such Allied intelligence contacts as were laboriously and perilously brought into being in the early part of the occupation were utilized for the gathering of military rather than economic, political, or social information.

A single episode of remote administration by the London Government, the railway strike, is to be examined in a later section.
CHAPTER II

THE LONDON GOVERNMENT AND CONTACT WITH RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS--I

Introduction

The second chapter begins with an outline of those London Government agencies established to maintain contact with German-occupied Holland. Various types of resistance activities engaged in in the occupied territory are then described.

There follows a section devoted to the National Support Fund, a very special sort of resistance organization which financed many varied sorts of underground activity and whose payments were guaranteed by the London Government. The National Support Fund serves as a model to test the thesis that London was able to function best through the utilization of persons or organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory.

The second chapter is completed with detailed examinations of two large and very different armed resistance organizations, the Council of Resistance and the Order Service. The formation, evolution, activities, relationship to the London Government and to other organizations of each is traced. Both also serve as models to test the thesis referred to above.

Both the Council of Resistance and the Order Service operated armed resistance organizations and engaged in military espionage as well. The espionage activities of both organizations are treated in a later section. This chapter deals with them and their relationship to
the London Government in their capacity as armed resistance organiza-
tions only.

Intelligence and Contact Agencies in Outline

As has appeared from the material previously presented, direct ad-
ministration by the London Government acting through the existing ad-
ministrative structure in Holland was virtually non-existent.

Dr. Frederiks, as a Secretary-General, correctly stated that Lon-
don sent messengers to resistance workers ("Jan, Piet, and Klaas").

During the Second World War the London Netherlands Government and the
United Kingdom Government sent quite a few "messengers" to German-occup-
pied Holland. Some were engaged in the ancient art of espionage.
Others were entrusted with technical missions involving specialized aid
to be given to the resistance organizations, particularly in the field of
sabotage. Still others had missions combining a score of objectives,
embracing both categories of activity. It was customary in Allied
circles in London to refer to most or all of the governmental agencies
directing this activity as "intelligence agencies". "Intelligence and
other contact agencies" might serve as a more apt description. Note
must be made of the fact that a clear-cut distinction between the two
activities sometimes was not made in the actual administration of in-
telligence work and other "contact" activities, however the formal
lines of organization may have been drawn.

A short historical outline of the "intelligence" and "contact"
agencies must be offered at this point.

When the Netherlands Government arrived in London it brought with

102 Frederiks, loc. cit., 95670.
it no real intelligence service. Division G. S. III of the Dutch General Staff, charged with military intelligence, had made no advance plans having to do with the possible establishment of an exiled government. Thus no ready-made channels existed to provide contact with the occupied territory. 103

G. S. III was allowed to remain dormant in London. An intelligence organization, the Centrale Inlichtingendienst ("Central Intelligence Service"), was established on July 19, 1940. The Central Intelligence Service was placed under the control of the Minister of Justice. 104 On August 14, 1941 it was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 105 and from Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Marine Affairs, this last change taking place on February 5, 1942. 106 By the summer of 1942 the position of the Central Intelligence Service was more or less one of suspended animation, partly as the result of frequent changes of its direction, partly because it had not enjoyed the best relations with its British opposite number, the Secret Intelligence Service. A study of Dutch intelligence organizations was made at the request of the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy, with the result that the Central Intelligence Service was abolished and in its place was substituted the Bureau Inlichtingen ("Intelligence Bureau"). 107 The Intelligence Bureau was placed under the control of the Minister of War, with important charges made to try to ensure that reports gathered from the occupied territory would promptly reach the appropriate government departments in London, a field in which the old Central Intelligence Service had often left much to be desired.

103 Dijkstra, loc. cit., 19982. 104 EM, IVa, appendix, v.
105 Ibid., appendix, vii. 106 Ibid., appendix, viii.
107 Ibid., appendix, x.
An agency with a more specialized purpose, the Bureau Voorbereiding van de Terugkeer naar Nederland ("Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to Holland"), was established on December 20, 1941. As its name implies, it was concerned with the collection of data pertinent to the eventual return of the government to Holland. The Bureau for the Preparation of the Return thus was not concerned with general intelligence gathering. In May, 1942, the non-military aspects of its work were transferred to the newly-created Departement voor Algemene Oorlogvoering van het Koninkrijk ("War Conduct Department of the Kingdom"). Its purely military functions were passed on to another new organization, the Bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer ("Military Bureau for Preparation of the Return").

With the creation of the Intelligence Bureau, described above, that organization was given sole control over agents to be sent to the occupied territory. Before that time some had been sent by the Central Intelligence Service, and some by the Military Bureau for the Preparation of the Return, the latter organization often acting in conjunction with the British Special Operations Executive, a body concerned almost entirely with sabotage activities rather than the gathering of intelligence. This division of authority had often made for coordination that was either poor or entirely lacking.

The Intelligence Bureau was instrumental in exploiting routes of communication to the occupied territory operated through neutral countries, and maintained what it often called "observation posts" at Berns, 108 Ibid., appendix, xvi. 109 Ibid., appendix, ix. 110 Ibid., appendix, xiv.
Stockholm, Lisbon, and Madrid. When, in the fall of 1944, the Netherlands Government returned to Holland, following the liberation of the southern provinces, the Intelligence Bureau was able to establish offices in the south, at Eindhoven, from where communications with the remaining occupied territory were established. 111

In a final development the Dutch established, on March 15, 1944, the Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten ("Special Service Bureau"), their own sabotage organization. The Special Service Bureau worked closely with its British counterpart, the Special Operations Executive. The Bureau was charged with sending agents to contact resistance organizations engaged in sabotage work, as well as those agents sent to perform special sabotage assignments without enlisting the aid of specific groups. 112

The Various Types of Resistance Organization

In the lexicon of many people in Holland the word "resistance" meant and continues to mean "armed resistance", used to describe those organizations which engaged in active, more or less violent opposition to the enemy. Thus, by their definition, an organization which concealed fugitives, as long as it had no "armed" aspects to its work, would not qualify as a "resistance" organization. Such a body might be described as "illegal", or "clandestine", or "underground", but not as "resistance" in character. The writer has used the word "resistance" in the broader sense, to denote all clandestine organizations engaged in the act of opposing the occupying power or aiding those who engaged in such opposition.

111 The northern provinces were liberated in May, 1945.

112 EMQ, IVa, 10.
Brief note must be made of the fact that sources dealing with resistance organizations are necessarily incomplete. Some resistance organizations maintained archives, although the risks involved made them the exceptions rather than the rule. Many potentially important witnesses did not survive. Some of those who did, in relating events already several years in the past, were often less than completely accurate. There was often a human desire to justify past actions. Those resistance organizations whose primary function was that of gathering intelligence information are dealt with in a subsequent section devoted to the intelligence activities of the London Government. The reader should not assume, however, that resistance organizations all confined themselves to a single type of activity. Some engaged in intelligence work and performed other tasks as well.

While the phrase "resistance organization" conjures up a romantic picture, Dutch resistance organizations were often engaged in activities that were not immediately dramatic.

Unarmed resistance organizations included the clandestine press, those concealing persons, clandestine technical services which kept the Dutch transportation system in partial operation, the forgery of identity papers, and the supplying of money needed to finance all resistance work. Only after mention of these types of activity, and the list is illustrative rather than inclusive, can one add the more expected example of the armed resistance organization.

The armed resistance organization was not nearly as prevalent as one would suppose. That the requisite courage was not lacking can be seen in both the fact that daring acts of violence were entered into,
and in the risks taken by the various organizations already outlined. Faced with the sober realities of the occupation, discretion dictated moderation in a number of instances. There were few acts of sabotage that were worth the risks of reprisals, particularly the German habit of "stockpiling" numbers of hostages in anticipation of illegal acts. Since the persons selected as hostages were often prominent citizens, persons with unusual and varied professional skills, there was all too often the possibility that a given list of hostages might not only include the innocent but might, quite unknown to the Germans, include vitally important resistance workers, thereby seriously crippling a specialized underground organization whose daily work might be of vastly greater importance than any simple act of violent resistance. Political assassination, that most potentially beneficial of all crimes against the person, was not nearly as attractive in the German-occupied Netherlands as elsewhere. As has been said, Dutch Nazis were, with few exceptions, persons of meager intellectual or professional attainment. Thus their removal scarcely seemed worth the effort.

It must be noted that there was by no means total agreement among armed resistance organizations with the concept of moderation just expressed. While at least one military-type resistance organization felt that its main task was to maintain public order at the moment of liberation, others believed that immediate, violent action taken against the occupying power was worth the risks, both to participants and to potential hostages. The disorganization and demoralization that could be caused within enemy ranks by such activity, it was argued, was greater than was commonly believed. The outcome of the war was by no means sure,
particularly in the first two years or so of the occupation. Waiting until the moment of liberation to strike was senseless, they reasoned, if there was to be no liberation. Short of a total German victory, there was always the possibility that a negotiated peace might leave the country either occupied by or in a position subservient to Germany.

As will be seen, one organization which was affiliated with the largest of the groups devoted to the concealment of persons, employed acts of violence in achieving limited objectives.

The National Support Fund

The Nationaal Steun-Fonds ("National Support Fund" or "N.S.F.")

The Nationaal Steun-Fonds ("National Support Fund" or "N.S.F."), which paid out several hundred million guilders to aid resistance organizations and individuals, may have been the most important of all resistance activities. Through its efforts many resistance activities flourished which might otherwise have been unfeasible. The National Support Fund came into being originally with one special purpose in mind—the granting of aid to dependents in Holland of Dutch seamen in the Allied service. In a Radio Orange broadcast of April 17, 1941, Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. M. P. L. Steenberghes noted that German authorities had threatened Dutch sailors in the Allied service with the withdrawal of support payments still being made to their families resident in Holland, should they continue in such service. It was in this connection, Mr. Steenberghes stated, that the London Government stood ready to guarantee the eventual repayment of all sums advanced in the occupied territory for the support of the dependents of merchant seamen in the Allied Service. 113

113EN W VIIa, appendix, xxxi. Portions of this broadcast are to be found in the appendix to this dissertation.
In the occupied territory, an Amsterdam banker, Mr. Gijsbert van Hall, who had earlier organized a fund for survivors of those conducting a protest strike of February, 1941, set about arranging that relatives of seamen were paid regularly and that an accurate accounting of amounts disbursed was kept. It early occurred to Mr. van Hall and his brother, who assisted him in this work, that the money paid out represented a claim against the Netherlands Government, and could be used as security for a further loan of funds to finance resistance activity. Outright gifts were also paid into the fund, so that a sizeable surplus was accumulated. So it was that the National Support Fund came into being. The institution from which it evolved had its origins in London, the structure was erected in the occupied territory and, in due course, recognized by London. Even in this early period the National Support Fund was able to borrow modest amounts of money. Still the need was greater than the funds available.114

Mr. van Hall had known the Minister-President of the London Government, Dr. Gerbrandy, before the war. It seemed likely to Mr. van Hall that, if someone who had his confidence were to travel to London and present the problem to Minister-President Gerbrandy, suitable guarantees of financial assistance would be forthcoming. Such an individual was found in the person of Mr. H. P. L. Linthorst Homan, the Royal Commissioner for the Province of Friesland, who was about to undertake the perilous journey. Mr. Linthorst Homan did arrive safely in London, at the end of 1943, and presented the problem to the Netherlands Government there.115

114 G. van Hall, March 24, 1950, 77119. 115 Hall, loc. cit., 77123.
As he reported to the Inquiry Commission after the war, Mr. Linthorst Homan was by no means certain that his efforts did, indeed, result in the rather massive support for the Fund which the London Government announced shortly after his arrival. He discussed the matter with various officials in the London Government, but persons other than himself, possibly the Minister of War, Mr. C. C. A. van Lidth de Jeude, may have been much more influential in the whole matter. Mr. Linthorst Homan got the distinct impression that London had a more or less regular contact with the National Support Fund, through the intermediary of an intelligence agent who employed radiotelegraphy. He received a telegram from Holland, forwarded by the (Dutch) Intelligence Bureau, that clearly indicated his safe arrival was known in Holland and, none too politely, inquired into the status of his mission to raise money for the resistance organizations.\textsuperscript{116}

In any event, copies of the following letter were soon delivered in Holland, carried on the person of a parachuted agent:

\begin{center}
War Conduct Ministry, \\
Regent 2141, \\

dated Arlington House, \\
Arlington Street, \\
London, S.W.1, \\
10 January 1944.
\end{center}

\textbf{VERY SECRET}

The Netherlands Government guarantees the repayment of a sum not to exceed thirty million guilders, which is intended for the support of persons in hiding, persons who have avoided reporting for internment as prisoners of war, persons avoiding the labor draft, for the support of their families, and for the support of related objectives to be expended at your discretion, with the understanding that there is to be made available immediately at most ten million guilders. The remainder (at most twenty million guilders) is not to be made available until your National Support Fund accounts of disbursements for a given period of time are reported to this office and approved here.

\textsuperscript{116}H. P. Linthorst Homan, August 23, 1950, 82588.
The Minister of War Conduct,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
P. S. GERBRANDY

When the first ten million guilders had been expended, the National Support Fund sent a request for authorization of the expenditure of the remaining twenty million. The reply, dated August 2, 1944, was delivered by another agent parachuted into the occupied territory.118

While distribution of the sum requested was authorized, London expressed its concern at not having complete reports concerning the expenditure of the first ten million. At the same time it broadened the scope of Fund activities which it intended to support:

The Government wishes to express as a goal, [the principle] that the money will be used for support of all persons who in any way find themselves financially involved in resistance activity—this is to apply equally to their dependents or survivors.

For further distribution it is desirable, where possible, to utilize existing organizations; the [National] Support Fund, the L.O., and others. It should be ascertained to what degree the financial distribution agencies of Medisch Contact ("Medical Contact"), those of the L.O., and others can be incorporated.

The Government is aware that, in the interests of security, it is not feasible to keep accounts of the money paid to individual persons or families. It will be satisfied with a rough accounting of sums expended, at your discretion.

The bearer of this letter is authorized to initiate an investigation, in accordance with the above-enunciated principles, into the expenditure of the first ten million guilders. He will advise the Government of the further progress of the support activity.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers.119

117 EM, VIIa, 225. 118 Ibid., 226.

119 Ibid. The "L.O." mentioned here refers to the Ijandelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers ("National Fugitive Aid Organization"), the largest of the groups devoted to the concealment of persons.
Mr. van Hall reported to the Inquiry Commission that, the broad terms of the grant above notwithstanding, the National Support Fund made a substantial effort to determine both the real needs and actual validity of prospective recipients of N.S.F. aid. Mr. van Hall has no doubt that this caused more than a little resentment, particularly among smaller resistance groups. When one was undertaking dangerous work, it seemed like an insult to be asked the precise purpose to which aid was to be devoted and then to be asked for a subsequent accounting of funds expended. Mr. van Hall received the energetic and capable assistance of his brother in this work. His brother, unfortunately, did not survive the occupation.\footnote{120}

After the twenty million guilder sum was also exhausted, some time in the fall of 1944, the need for additional funds was rapidly on the increase. Communications with London were by no means certain, and the arrangement of additional authorizations was always uncertain. After consultation with the College van Vertrouwensmannen ("College of Bonds­men")\footnote{121} it was decided to go ahead with the distribution of additional funds, the authorizations would simply have to follow. Follow they did, although they generally seemed to have trailed expenditures by a considerable margin. The Railway Strike, alone, cost some seven to eight million guilders per month.\footnote{122}

After September, 1944, with the Allied liberation of the southern provinces of the Netherlands, less accurate records were kept by the N.S.F. Mr. van Hall believes that the organization had, by May, 1945

\footnote{120}Hall, loc. cit. 77134.  \footnote{121}To be discussed later.  \footnote{122}Hall, loc. cit.
paid out 100 million guilders. 123

Until September, 1944, all receipts for N.S.F. aid were collected and recorded in a central card file in Amsterdam. This was done, as Mr. van Hall puts it, "...Less out of love for bookkeeping perfection..." than because the N.S.F. wanted to be certain that those persons supposedly in receipt of aid were, in fact, being paid regularly. Experience in making payments to the dependents of seamen, the earliest of these activities, had shown that messengers sent to deliver funds soon developed the habit of deliberately arriving at irregular intervals, partly to avoid the very appearance of regularity. When it appeared that someone earlier in receipt of aid was not being paid, a letter of inquiry was promptly dispatched to the organization members concerned. The Allied invasion of September, 1944, (the northern provinces remained under occupation till May, 1945), meant that centralized records could not be maintained. Accordingly, local National Support Fund officials were instructed to collect receipts on a local basis. By this time the number of persons receiving N.S.F. aid was in the tens of thousands. 124 Many of the receipts themselves were standard, printed forms which, if they fell into German hands, would appear to be for payment of rent. Others were prepared to resemble those of a life insurance company, complete with a "damages paid for accidental injury" table printed on the rear. 125

The N.S.F. dealt, essentially, in claims. It kept track of money advanced by private persons or institutions for the use of other private persons. 126

123 Ibid. 77135
124 The population of the European Netherlands at the time in question was about 9,000,000.
125 Hall, loc. cit.
persons or institutions. In keeping track of creditors and the sums that would eventually be paid to them, it was obviously necessary to arrange account books in such a fashion as to make possible the future identification of the persons in question and yet not maintain an incriminating list that could be seized by the Germans, making possible the apprehension of the persons in question. Mr. van Hall recalled having considered the theoretical possibility that he might be captured, his account books located, and their true purpose discovered. How could the identity of accounts be preserved in an anonymous fashion? Initially, the lenders were identified with the sum due and a minute description of some personal possession of distinctive character. Then, on the future day of payment, the owner of the possession would simply offer it for identification. As the books of the N.S.F. took on the appearance of the records of a lost property department, another device was adopted: The creditors were identified with the sum due and the serial number of a piece of paper currency which they held. This, Mr. van Hall explained, meant that no amount of German pressure could force him to disclose who held a one-guilder note number such-and-such, for the simple reason that he did not know. The holder could simply appear for "redemption" after the war. 126

Apart from its direct financial aid to individuals, the N.S.F. gave out a great deal of assistance to resistance organizations, some of which, in turn, aided individuals. A word describing the organizations receiving aid is, thus, in order.

A major organization receiving N.S.F. assistance was the largest of those devoted to the concealment of persons, the Landelijke Organisatie

126 Ibid.
voor Hulp aan Onderduikers ("National Fugitive Aid Organization", or "L.O."). In an agreement reached in 1943 between Mr. van Hall of the N.S.F. and Messrs. Slomp, Dienske, and Coops, of the L.O., the N.S.F. was to provide aid to the relatives of those who had gone into hiding, while the L.O. would be primarily responsible for the support of the fugitives themselves. The L.O. in those days was able to raise a considerable amount of money through direct donations, including special church offerings collected on their behalf. This money was expended with no expectation of repayment, whereas the N.S.F., of course, dealt largely in funds borrowed from individuals, with post-war repayment guaranteed. By the summer of 1944, when the number of persons in hiding under L.O. auspices had reached truly staggering proportions, and was soon to be increased still further by the railway strikers, the organization was receiving £100,000 per month from the London-guaranteed National Support Fund. Part of this went for the support of an organization affiliated with the L.O., the Knokploegen Ploegen ("Knuckle Gang"), a strong-arm body devoted to breaking and entering buildings in search of ration stamps or cards, community vital-statistics registers, and other documents needed for the survival of those in hiding.127

The underground press was a major recipient of N.S.F. aid. A number of different papers received N.S.F. funds, although some were not aware of the source until after the war.128

Those armed resistance movements receiving N.S.F. assistance were several. The Orde Dienst ("Order Service), a military organization, had as its principal goal, as much as one can be certain, the maintenance of

law and order at the time of liberation and the orderly restoration of civil authority. The Red van Verzet ("Council of Resistance"), was devoted to active sabotage, as well as physical violence directed against the persons of Dutch Nazis and German security police. The Nederlandse Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten ("Netherlands Forces of the Interior"), was organized in 1944 on direct orders from the London Government. It was formed from three large military-type resistance organizations, the Order Service, the Council of Resistance, and the Knuckle Gangs. This Netherlands Forces of the Interior organization was to provide a militia for both combat and police work, to be employed at the time of Allied invasion and liberation.129

The National Support Fund aided at least two organizations that were, in turn, primarily intended to coordinate the activities of various resistance organizations. The Nationaal Comite van Verzet ("National Resistance Committee"), placed particular emphasis both on the exchange of technical information between organizations and the problem of keeping the Dutch public sufficiently well informed of its role in resistance activity.130 The Contact Commissie ("Contact Commission"), was formed in 1944 at the request of the London Government, to coordinate and, where possible, combine the activities of numerous resistance organizations, and to act as a sort of liaison between the resistance organizations and the London Government, both during the occupation and at the time of liberation.131

Two organizations supplying special technical assistance received N.S.F. assistance. The Persoonsbewijscentrale ("Forgery Central"), an organization devoted to the complex job of counterfeiting an incredible 129 Ibid., 77156. 130 Ibid., 77157. 131 Ibid.
variety of personal identity cards and official German documents of every
description, was almost entirely supported by the N.S.F. during its
period of greatest activity. The Natura Group, also aided by the
N.S.F., supplied food and clothing both to those engaged in resistance
activity and to their dependents. It had its origins in an earlier
operation which supplied these same commodities to the dependents of
Dutch seamen in the Allied service, the original beneficiaries of the
Fund.

The National Support Fund was very actively engaged in the assist-
ance and support of intelligence-gathering groups, some of which were in
direct, almost daily contact with London.

A number of miscellaneous groups were also aided by the National
Support Fund. That these organizations are placed in such a classifi-
cation is not to suggest that they were necessarily of minor importance.
These included: Medisch Verzet ("Medical Resistance"), made up, as its
name implies, of physicians; Kunstenaarsteun ("Artist Support"), a group
helping artists who did not wish to affiliate themselves with the Nazi-
impired Cultuurkamer ("Chamber of Culture"); Professorenverzet ("Pro-
fessor Resistance"), for and by persons in academic life; and Student-
enverzet ("Student Resistance"), similar in character to Professoren-
verzet.

An accounting of National Support Fund disbursements, broken down
by recipients and believed to be reasonably accurate, is located on the
following page.

Neither the writer nor those persons who were active in the work of
the National Support Fund would like to leave the impression that the

132 Ibid., 77164. 133 Ibid., 77166. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid., 77157.
### TABLE 1
NATIONAL SUPPORT FUND DISBURSEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount in guilders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support of individuals</td>
<td>39,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;J&quot; Group, concealment of Jews</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Fugitive Aid Organization</td>
<td>676,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic, medical, cultural groups</td>
<td>837,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway strike of 1944</td>
<td>37,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed resistance organizations, including the Order Service, Council of Resistance, Knuckle Gang, and Netherlands Forces of the Interior</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground press</td>
<td>531,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature organization (food and clothing)</td>
<td>825,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence-gathering organizations</td>
<td>973,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various support groups under the supervision of the National Fugitive Aid Organization, not including the &quot;J&quot; Group</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to the dependents of Dutch seamen in the Allied service</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery Central</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,242,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fund was the only support organization or that all support funds were disbursed by it. Numerous organizations were entirely self-supporting. Some organizations deliberately avoided the N.S.F. as they feared the Fund's accounting methods might place them in a hazardous position. In Meppel, for example, the N.S.F. was never active because the Meppelaren frankly said that they felt N.S.F. activities to be conducted in such a

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136 Ibid.
fashion as to make detection by the German security police too easily possible. There were several entirely separate support organizations in the southern provinces of the Netherlands. 137

Since the National Support Fund was the main link between some resistance activity within the occupied region and the London Government, N.S.F. "security" was, indeed, a most important matter. Presumably the arrest of Mr. van Hall at any time prior to September, 1944, particularly if some or all of his records were captured, would have done at least some damage to the organization. No doubt payments would have been continued, as they were after the Allied invasion of September, 1944, following a greater decentralization of the accounting operation. As a matter of fact, as far as can be determined, no arrests of N.S.F. personnel had any real influence on its work. A number of N.S.F. workers in Hilversum were arrested and executed, but the organization was sufficiently separated into individual "cells" so that a single arrest could not lead in turn to arrests in other regions. 138

The Council of Resistance

While the precise date of the formation of the Raad van Verzet ("Council of Resistance"), can not be determined it grew out of meetings held in the second half of 1943. Instrumental in the founding of the Council was a famous resistance personality, Jan Thijsen, often called, Lange Jan ("Long John"). Thijsen headed the radio branch of the Order Service, which linked the Service not only with England but also with its local affiliates in Holland. Thijsen had become increasingly unhappy with the Order Service, and with its strategy of

137 Ibid., 77180. 138 Ibid., 77166.
reserving its main effort for the moment of liberation. Thijssen was willing to agree that the maintenance of peace and order at the time of an Allied invasion was important, but he regarded the successful conclusion of hostilities against the Germans as of even greater importance. To this end acts of sabotage and armed resistance seemed to be of more immediate value.139

The Council, as it was originally organized by Thijssen, was intended to coordinate the work of small, local groups. After the fashion of many another resistance organization the Council came into being as a body of coordination and developed into a full-fledged operating organization in its own right.140

The Council did include, among other bodies, the Communist resistance organization, the Militaire Groep ("Military Group"). The Military Group was brought into the Council by one of its own founders, Gerben Wagenaar, who subsequently became a leading personality on the Council. The Group had yet another name, one bestowed on it by Dutch-speaking German security police, Moord Central ("Murder Central"), in recognition of the fact that it sometimes eliminated German personnel, as well as sabotaging German communications and installations.141 The Communists did not, however, come to dominate the Council of Resistance, as they did a number of other resistance movements in various German-occupied countries. The presence of Communists on the Council, plus the fact that the Council was oriented to the left of center quite apart from anything else, was a cause of concern, both in Holland and in England. One could say most accurately that the Council tended to "submerge" its Communist members, rather than.

139J. A. Engel, November 12, 1954, 98803. 140Ibid., 98805.
141G. Wagenaar, December 19, 1961, 95219.
the reverse taking place.

Thijssen, Wagenaar, and Jacob van der Gaag, a geophysicist employed by the *Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij* ("Batavian Petroleum Corporation"), made up the high command of the Council. All three travelled extensively and came into frequent contact with the leadership of local groups. Jan Thijssen, with his experience gained as head of Order Service radio communications, set up the Council's radio system, which served to link the organization with London and to interconnect various Council branches within the Netherlands, in much the same fashion as the radio division of the Order Service. Council meetings held at the top level were presided over by Jan Thijssen. Items likely to appear on the agenda included sabotage assignments; information on aiding fugitives; the supply of ration cards and coupons; current changes in identity papers, and related subjects. To the Order Service, with its military members, the Council was incredibly badly organized. There was no neat chain of command, with corresponding channels for transmission of material from below to headquarters. There was no general staff, other than the Council itself, and there were no orderly promotions on the basis of seniority. A local Council commander might be a Dutch army officer who had gone "underground", but he would have to prove himself to be a capable officer for Council purposes before he was chosen, and he might as easily find himself serving under a grocery delivery boy who had proven to be better qualified for the task in question.\footnote{Added light on the exact "character" of the Council appeared after World War II in testimony given by Mr. van der Gaag.}{\footnote{J. van der Gaag, March 31, 1950, 77763.}}\footnote{Portions of this testimony are to be found in the appendix.}
In October, 1943, the London Government received from the occupied territory a rather fiery Council Manifesto, the work of Jan Thijssen, which urged the populace to aid in acts of resistance; castigating those who in one way or another stood in the path of resistance work, and offering practical suggestions to those who would confound the occupying power. The Manifesto had been transmitted to London on microfilm, through the "Swiss Route", operated in Geneva by the Dutch General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft. Accompanying the Manifesto was a commentary supplied by the Amsterdam terminus of the Swiss Route, operated by the staff of the clandestine newspapers, Vrij Nederland ("Free Netherlands"). The commentary described the plans of the Council as "pretentious" and indicated that the Council enjoyed the support of Communists.

In a series of telegrams exchanged between the London Government and the Order Service, London first inquired into the reliability of the Council of Resistance and then advised the Order Service that an organization of the London Government would shortly place itself in contact with the Council directly. The Order Service, for its part, characterized the Council as having a tendency to act rashly, but did not, in the exchange in question, ascribe to the Council a questionable political character.

London apparently did not consider the Council of Resistance to be a Communist-dominated organization. Minister-President Gerbrandy reported

144 ENQ, VIIa, 267. Excerpts of the Manifesto are in the appendix.
145 Ibid. Excerpts of the "cover" letter from the staff of Vrij Nederland (Amsterdam) are in the appendix.
146 ENQ, VIIa, 268.
that the impression in London, particularly as time went on, was that
the Council was "oriented to the left," but was non-Communist in nature.
This feeling was strengthened late in 1944 with the arrival in London
of Mr. van der Gaag, of the Council. Van der Gaag was, in the words
of Dr. Gerbrandy, "...Certainly no Communist!"

That London came to accept the Council of Resistance is a simple
fact. It dispatched numbers of agents with the express task of working
with and aiding the Council. It gave the Council specific sabotage
assignments and furnished it with the weapons and supplies necessary
for their completion. Agents dropped came from both the Intelligence
Bureau and from the Dutch Special Service Bureau, the sabotage agency
organized in 1944.148

London's freight "shipments" presented many problems. Allied
aircraft were, first of all, faced with the problem of reaching a given
point in the Netherlands—no easy matter when conditions of war made
many ordinary radio navigational devices unfeasible, when a German-
imposed blackout extinguished nearly all lights in a country with
practically no distinctive landmarks as viewed from the air. "Check"
points often were lakes, rivers, or canal intersections, and there
are a great many of these in Holland. To Allied airmen they often
seemed all alike.

A prospective "dropping" terrain had to be chosen with very great
care indeed. If the adjoining property was owned by a Dutch Nazi
the area in question was, obviously, unsuitable. It had to be suffi-
147 P. S. Gerbrandy, July 21, 1953, 97670.
148 Engel, loc. cit., 98832.
ciently secure so that heavy, bulky consignments of arms, ammunition, explosives, and the like could be removed for storage and distribution. Shipments had to be prepared in such a way that they could be broken down into loads which one person, often not in very good physical condition, could carry. By 1943 private vehicles were virtually all out of operation. The mere use of a motor vehicle would have been enough to arouse very great suspicion.

Blinking lights were used to guide aircraft to "dropping" sites at first, then a triangular formation of dim red lights was employed. Visible red light was later supplanted with invisible infra-red sources, which could be made visible to Allied aviators by means of a special viewer. A final refinement came in the form of a British-designed radio transmitter, called "Eureka", which was supplied to ground parties and directed aircraft to its location by broadcasting automatically a tight "bundle" of very high frequency waves directed in a narrow arc skyward.

Altogether the material delivered to the Council of Resistance must have been on the scale of thousands of weapons and corresponding quantities of explosives expressed in kilograms. 149

Clandestine arms shipments were not only intended for receipt by the Council, but were also dispatched for the use of the Knuckle Gang, a sister organization of the National Fugitive Aid Organization.

In the middle of April, 1945, the German Reichs-Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands, Artur Seyss-Inquart, let it be known that he was willing to enter into negotiations with a Dutch representative. Mr. van der Gaag, of the Council of Resistance, was chosen as the

149 One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds.
the Dutch emissary, and crossed from the liberated south into the occupied territory. Mr. van der Gaag held conversations with Seyss-Inquart who, while he was not yet prepared to surrender, was willing to make certain concessions, on specified conditions. Seyss-Inquart was willing to permit food shipments to travel to the large Dutch cities, where a German embargo on such shipments, instituted in retaliation for a strike by Dutch railway workers, had resulted in widespread starvation. In return the Allies were to promise, for the time being, not to try to occupy the northern and western parts of the Netherlands. If these conditions were not met, Seyss-Inquart threatened, explosive charges placed on dikes would be detonated in such a fashion as to flood a number of places in the occupied territory. The Allies had ten days in which to accept these conditions. Mr. van der Gaag, proceeding under German "safe conduct" arrangements which he did not entirely trust, returned to the unoccupied territory and delivered the German terms which were forwarded to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. General Eisenhower announced acceptance of the German conditions, providing they were not referred to in writing as "conditions", shortly before the expiration of the time limit. This agreement, as it turned out, was largely meaningless, as it went into force at the end of April, 1945, less than a week before the final German capitulation. That this would be the case was by no means certain when Mr. van der Gaag entered into the negotiations, however.

The Council, which greatly assisted van der Gaag in this enterprise, deserves considerable credit for the successful conclusion of a delicate series of negotiations. 150

150Gaag, loc. cit., 77873.
Mention must be made of the disagreement which existed between the Council of Resistance and the Order Service. This was a feud of classic proportions, one that was reflected, at times, in London policies.

Sources of the disagreement were various. One was clearly based on differing philosophies of resistance. To the Council the Service’s basic plan, that of reserving its main effort for the moment of an Allied invasion, represented a waste of personnel and materials. With the war yet to be brought to a successful conclusion, the Service “sat” on precious stocks of arms and ammunition. To the Service, the Council’s policy of active, armed resistance before any invasion or hint of German departure was simply reckless. Many acts of sabotage or violence, the Order Service believed, did little to further an Allied victory and might call forth excessive German reprisals. Another source of discord was ideological. The Council regarded the Service as authoritarian, more or less reactionary, and sometimes suspected that the Service planned to establish a military dictatorship after the Allied liberation. To the Service the Council appeared to be under the domination, if not of Communists, of men of the extreme left. Another source of friction lay in differing philosophies of the proper organization of a resistance body. To the Council the staff and chain of command of the Order Service seemed most unwise. It might be a proper arrangement for the Dutch armed forces but it was reckless for a clandestine organization. German arrests of any personnel of the higher echelons could too readily lead to the demise of large parts of the entire body. To the Order Service the loosely-articulated, sometimes informal relationships involved in the Council’s plan of organizations were very badly adapted to the tasks at hand. If the Council
had to maintain a campaign of active warfare at least it should try to take advantage of the accumulated experience of the military in this regard. A personal factor served to divide the two organizations. Jan Thijssen, the founder and head of the Council of Resistance, was not one to brook criticism. He had a talent for underground work, this was generally agreed, but many people found him difficult to work with, including some in his own organization. He was often at odds with Colonel Six of the Order Service.

The Order Service had a special grievance having to do with weapon deliveries. Since the Service was not the direct recipient of arms shipments from London, it was agreed in meetings between the Service, the Council, and the Knuckle Gang that some of the weapons received by the latter two organizations would be shared with the Service. This agreement was not, apparently, adhered to.\textsuperscript{151}

Mention has already been made of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, created on September 4, 1944,\textsuperscript{152} established so that the big resistance organizations, the Council of Resistance, the Order Service, and the Knuckle Gang might be accorded combatant status by the enemy. London may very well have had another motive in placing these bodies in the same organization, that of neutralizing the suspicions that they had of each other and, as well, any political ambitions they harbored. London did hope that the three organizations might work together more harmoniously under this new arrangement. This hope was not entirely

\textsuperscript{151}Engel, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 98780.

\textsuperscript{152}P. A. van Hilten, \textit{Van Capitulatie tot Capitulatie} (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1949) p. 244.
realized, as will be seen.153

While His Royal Highness, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, was named as Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, it was also necessary to find a commander to serve as his deputy in the occupied territory. This was no easy task. Since the officer in question would be dealing with resistance workers it was felt preferable to choose someone who had spent the war years in occupied Holland. He should be of sufficient stature to command respect and yet not be affiliated, if this could possibly be avoided, with any of the three organizations comprising the Forces of the Interior. Moreover, since it was expected that the Forces might engage in combat, the commander for the occupied territory should have formal military experience. Since a number of high Dutch officers were in prisoner-of-war camps, finding such an individual was no easy task. Of those qualified, many had some formal affiliation with the Order Service. The persons required was located in the person of General Henri Koot, a reserve officer in the Netherlands East Indies Army, who was accordingly appointed. General Koot was not in any way a part of the Order Service, although as an officer in the military service he had many personal contacts with Order Service members. Even an indirect connection with the Order Service was enough to make the Council uneasy about General Koot. The Council simply did not completely trust the "military mind".

By the fall of 1944 Jan Thijsen had had a falling out with his own organization and was no longer its head. Since he was a man of undoubted ability in the field of resistance work, efforts were made to find a

153 Gaag, loc. cit., 77185.
position worthy of his talents. He declined an offer of the post of head of ordinance of the Forces of the Interior, on the grounds that he was more of a combat commander and less suited for such a task. He probably also regarded the post as a more minor one than he deserved.\textsuperscript{154}

Efforts were still being made to find an acceptable role for Jan Thijssen when, as he was driving between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, he was arrested by German security police. He was eventually executed.\textsuperscript{155}

Much has been said about the alleged "betrayal" of Jan Thijssen. Some persons reported that the German security police had been told in advance of the route and time of his last trip. The Council said he had been betrayed by the Order Service, or at least hinted as much. The Service thought it likely that Communists had done the deed. The writer has heard persistent rumors indicating that the German officers arresting Thijssen had no advance warning of his route, itinerary, or even that he was to be present. According to this version the vehicle which he was driving was stopped for a routine check and the investigating officer recognized Thijssen from photographs appearing on "wanted" posters which had been widely circulated.\textsuperscript{156}

A description of the Council of Resistance, particularly as regards its relations with the London Government, would not be complete without a few notes on the Rotterdam Council of Resistance.

The Rotterdam branch of the Council of Resistance came into being at about the same time as the rest of the organization. It enjoyed a com-

\textsuperscript{154}Hoogeweegen, \textit{loc. cit.}, 96103. \textsuperscript{155}Wagenaar, \textit{loc. cit.}, 95228. \textsuperscript{156}The writer has been unable to confirm this latter account, although he believes it to be the correct version of what transpired.
siderable degree of independence from the Council's national organization, indeed, after the death of Jan Thijssen, Rotterdam had no ready contact with the rest of the organization. Jan Thijssen alone kept the body in touch with the headquarters in Amsterdam. The Rotterdam Council of Resistance felt itself more under the command of London than of Amsterdam. London had assigned it certain specific tasks, in particular it was charged with the protection, particularly against German sabotage, of the electrical, water, and gas works, as well as other specific objectives. The Rotterdam Council of Resistance had its own "dropping area" for the receipt of arms shipments from London, and its own radio communications with London. It was to a considerable extent financially self supporting. On several occasions London even sent instructors to train Rotterdam Council workers in the use of firearms, explosives, radio equipment, and other needed skills.

Cooperation between the Rotterdam Council and other organizations in the port city appears to have been excellent. A division of labor was made with the Knokele Gang, whereby each organization would be responsible for certain tasks. One would see to the intermittent, "accidental" sinking of small boats so as to obstruct German navigation in the port, the other would protect the vital vehicular tunnel under the Maas (Meuse) River, and so on. A unified command of the two organizations was set up under Mr. Staal, the Commissioner of Police in Rotterdam.

Rotterdam was the one place, possibly the only place, where the Council and the Order Service worked well together. This may have been

157 Hoogeweegen, loc. cit., 96099. 158 Ibid.
161 Hoogeweegen, loc. cit., 96088.
due in part to the fact that the personality of Jan Thijssen was less involved with the Rotterdam scene. While Thijssen was, as has been said, virtually the sole tangible link between the Rotterdam Council and the organization elsewhere, Rotterdam Council workers had much less contact with Thijssen than those at other places in Holland. This history of cooperation in Rotterdam was of special value to London when the time came to join the Council, the Order Service, and the Knuckle Gang in the Netherlands Forces of the Interior. This combination was achieved much more harmoniously and much more rapidly in Rotterdam than elsewhere.\textsuperscript{162}

The Order Service

Something of the character of the Orde Dienst ("Order Service") has been presented in connection with the discussion of the Council of Resistance. While its avowed purpose, during most of its history, was the performance of certain tasks at the time of German departure and/or Allied invasion, the Order Service did, in fact, engage in various activities prior to liberation. One of its principal contributions, that of operating a highly efficient espionage network for the benefit of the London Government, will be described in a forthcoming section dealing with intelligence organizations.

The Order Service was best known to the operators of the "Swiss Route", the clandestine network that forwarded material from Holland to London via Switzerland, for its having spied on the latter organization for a protracted period. This episode will be dealt with briefly in connection with a discussion of the Swiss Route.

After the manner of so many other organizations one of the earliest\textsuperscript{162}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, 96112.
purposes of the Order Service, which really came into being in late July or August, 1940, was to coordinate the activities of other resistance organizations. One of the founders was Lt. General Willem Röell, who seems to have given the Order Service its name. The original intent of the Order Service soon came to be modified, so that it was that of creating a sort of clandestine army that would, when it appeared at all possible, eject the German occupying force. It was assumed that this would be done in connection with an invasion, real or threatened, by British forces. General Röell felt it expedient to let it be known that the task of the Order Service was the maintenance of peace and order within the country once the Germans departed, whatever the reason for such a departure might be. This was intended as a "cover" story, according to General Röell, since it seemed probable that the Germans would learn of the organization, and would be less likely to take severe countermeasures if such a limited purpose seemed to be the true intent of the organization's founders. 165 This version of the Order Service's raison d'etre may have saved General Röell's life. Before the end of August, 1940, he was in the German concentration camp at Buchenwald, trying to further clarify the position of the organization.

When I was in Buchenwald the gentlemen asked me: "Is it your intention to create a new army?" I replied: "I'd be glad to try if you would give me some weapons, but with pitchforks and sickles this unfortunately isn't possible." 164

General Röell's position at Buchenwald was apparently something less than that of an ordinary prisoner. The Germans, who habitually referred to him as their "guest," were collecting prominent Dutchmen 163 W. Röell, October 24, 1951, 94337. 164 Ibid.
as hostages, in reprisal for the internment in the Netherlands East Indies of numbers of German nationals resident there. One such hostage, and fellow prisoner with Röell, was a former Dutch East India physician, who carefully schooled General Röell in the symptoms of a heart attack, so that such manifestations could be reported to the Germans. They were so reported and General Röell's captors promptly returned him to Holland via a special railway car and took him to his home. 165

While Röell had been released by the Germans, the Order Service was naturally rather reluctant to attempt to make contact with him. General Röell did contact the organization through the agency of his son-in-law, Johann Schimmelpenninck, a wine dealer who was studying for a graduate degree in economics. Röell's successor as commander of the Order Service was Lieutenant Colonel Westerveld, who continued in this capacity until his own arrest in April of 1941. 166

In the second or third week of June, 1941, the Order Service was amalgamated with a larger organization, the Legion Oud Frontsoldaten ("Legion of Old Front Soldiers"). The resulting organization continued the name of the Order Service. The Legion of Old Front Soldiers, according to one of its founders, Mr. J.-A. van Heerde, was founded immediately after the capitulation of 1940, with the purpose of continuing hostilities by means of armed resistance. A service to engage in espionage and to set up radio contact with England was also planned by Mr. van Heerde, then employed by the Department of Public Works in the Hague. Mr. van Heerde worked closely in this effort with his friend and colleague, Mr. de Tourton Bruijns, of Amsterdam. The Legion felt that its...

165 P. J. Six, October 26, 1954, 98512. 166 Ibid.
mission included the creation of an armed force that could rise and
fight the Germans at the correct moment, presumably at the time of an
Allied invasion. The Legion appears to have differed from the Order
Service in that the former organization felt that acts of armed resist-
ance prior to the time of an invasion might well be worth carrying out
in certain circumstances, whereas the Order Service is generally believed
to have felt that the risks attendant on such activity did not justify
possible accomplishments. The Legion had available some 180,000 rifles,
hidden in a military small-arms cache located near Schiphol (Amsterdam)
Airport. The Legion constructed and tested clandestinely a number of
highly successful flamethrowers. Carefully engineered components were
actually supplied by the Germans, who labored under the illusion that
the project in question was legally manufacturing, "... a new type of
installation for spraying and ridding Dutch agriculture of troublesome
insect pests..." There was, Mr. van Heerde observed, a certain amount
of trust in this description.167

The Legion actually had very limited contact with London. It had,
just at the time of merger with the Order Service, supplied some espi-
onage material to Mr. J. J. Zomer, a parachuted agent of the (Dutch)
Central Intelligence Service.168

The Legion, during the twelve or thirteen months of its separate
existence, never received any direct material assistance from London,
nor did it receive any aid from the National Support Fund.169 Arrests
of both Order Service and Legion officers took place with increased
frequency during this period.170

167 J. A. van Heerde, October 24, 1961, 94292.
168ENQ, IVa, appendix, lxviii. 169Heerde, loc. cit. 170Ibid.
Following the arrest of Colonel Westerveld, in April of 1941, the Order Service came under the command of Lt. Colonel Versteegh of the Royal Constabulary. Colonel Versteegh was assisted in this work by Colonel Quarles van Ufford who, in spite of very poor health, continued to serve almost until his death, which occurred in March, 1942. Colonel Versteegh brought into Order Service work Colonel Pieter J. Six, who became Chief of Staff of the Order Service District for Amsterdam.171

Since Colonel Versteegh considered his own arrest as inevitable, he trained as his adjutant Jonkheer Johann Schimmelpenninck, who was to serve as his successor.172

This provision turned out to have been a wise one, as Colonel Versteegh was arrested on September 12, 1941. Jonkheer Schimmelpenninck, who had long been active in Order Service affairs, assumed command. Often designated by the code name, "Uncle Alexander", presumably because he lived on the Alexanderstraat in the Hague, Jonkheer Schimmelpenninck provided a vigorous, expert leadership for the brief period in which he was in command. He, in turn, was arrested by the Germans in November, 1941. The next commander, who served on an "acting" basis, was Midshipman G. A. Dogger of the Royal Netherlands Navy. The Order Service was rapidly exhausting its supply of officers.173

Colonel Six, who held a reserve commission in the Royal Cavalry, found himself approached by two officers of the Order Service, Navis, an artillery Lieutenant of the Netherlands East Indies Army, and Cornet of Cavalry, Dudok van Heel. Messrs. Navis and van Heel were, it appeared empowered to offer Colonel Six no less than the perilous pleasure of

171p. J. Six, loc. cit., 98512ff. 172Ibid. 173Ibid.
succeeding Midshipman Dogger who, by some miracle, had survived as acting
Order Service Commander from November, 1941, until January, 1942, when he
departed for England on a special mission. Colonel Six at first declined
the offer, saying, "You must have a staff officer." He was told, a little
tartly, that the surviving "staff" consisted in toto of Navis and van Heel.
Thus he was the ranking officer. 174

Colonel Six assumed his new duties as Commander of the entire Order
Service. Among the more pressing matters facing him was the need for
establishing some sort of regular contact with the London Government.
Midshipman Dogger's mission was thus of vital importance. 175

Dogger departed for England on the night of January 30, 1942,
together with Peter Tazelaar, who had earlier arrived in Holland as a
part of a special mission sent by the London Government, a matter to be
discussed presently. They travelled by rail to Switzerland, thence to
Bilbao in Spain, where, "Thanks to the stinginess of the Netherlands
Consular Service," they ran out of money. The Netherlands Consul in
Bilbao, a Mr. Blitz, regarded Dogger and Tazelaar as persons of very
little importance, and in several afternoon conferences refused to give
more than the barest financial support for the continuation of their
journey. They finally proceeded on their way as crewmen of an antique
Spanish merchant vessel, the Cabo de Hornos. They left the Cabo de Hornos
at Lisbon and reported to the Dutch Legation, where they were given air
passage to London. 176

Dogger arrived in England at a time when an active Netherlands
intelligence service scarcely existed. This did nothing to facilitate

174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 ENQ, VIIa, 240-245.
the speed or efficiency with which his mission was handled. He was soon granted an audience by Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina, who urged that he prepare a report on the Order Service. Dogger complied with this request, and submitted his report on April 17, 1942.177

One might have expected that the Dogger report would have caused a certain amount of consternation in London. With its naive distrust of political parties and its faith in a militaristic organization headed by either one or three men, the Order Service, as described by Dogger, must have seemed like the ideal of all military autocrats everywhere. Surely no one with any clear understanding of the role of political parties in a democracy would seriously have proposed such a device as the Recommendations Committee, to consist, in part, of political leaders who would be expected to give public endorsement to the every act and pronouncement of the ruling clique.

Certainly in the Order Service view of things as presented by Dogger the London Government had a limited future. It was, first of all, asked to supply various sorts of aid to the Order Service, then it was expected to step gracefully aside while the Service provided a "temporary" administration, since Hollanders would not want to be governed by those who had spent the war years outside of the European Motherland. At some indefinite time in the future a "reborn" kingdom was then to be proffered to Her Majesty the Queen. One is led to suspect that, whatever Midshipman Dogger’s strong subjects at the Royal Netherlands Naval Academy may have been, constitutional law was not among them. In Holland, as in the United Kingdom, the monarch is in actual fact merely ceremonial.

177 Portions of this report are to be found in the appendix.
head of state. This being the case, what of the political regime that would actually form the real Netherlands government, when the arisen kingdom was finally to be "returned" by the patriotic Order Service to the House of Orange?

The plain fact of the matter is that there were a number of things in the Dogger report of which other members of the Order Service had never heard. The Triumvirate, for example, while apparently discussed by some Order Service personnel as a theoretical possibility, never existed as a formalized institution in the sense described in the Dogger report.

Jonkheer Röell, one of the founders of the Order Service, and the person who gave the organization its name, had never heard of the Triumvirate until the Inquiry Commission asked him about it after the war.178

To the extent that Dogger overstated the authoritarian aspects of the Order Service he may have done the organization a positive disservice in London. Yet, as will be seen in another section, there were repeated reports of alleged Order Service designs on the democratic life of the postwar kingdom, usually emanating from other resistance organizations, so that London would never have lacked such accounts.

Some indication of the spirit in which the Dogger report was received in London can be inferred from the treatment accorded Midshipman Dogger. After his reception by Queen Wilhelmina, and after he rendered his report and was interviewed by various intelligence organizations, he was for some time simply ignored. His only source of sustenance for a while seems to have been funds given him by the head of the British Special Operations Executive, Colonel Rabagliatti, an organization with which Dogger had no

178 Roell, loc. cit., 94344.
formal connection. 179

Dogger was finally attached to the War Conduct Ministry where, on August 1, 1942, he received a commission in the Netherlands Navy. He was subsequently detached for duty with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and sent to Gibraltar as Vice-Consul, to help deal with the growing number of Dutch refugees who were appearing in Spain and finding their way to the British fortress. As the result of a rather incredible mistake Dogger never reached Gibraltar. He was misunderstood by the Netherlands Legation in Lisbon as having been sent as a replacement for their departed First-Secretary, Mr. Luns. Accordingly, Dogger served as First-Secretary of the Dutch Legation until March or April of 1943, when he requested and was granted a return to active sea duty. Dogger was later to feel that "political considerations" had prevented more serious attention being given to his report, to his personal future in intelligence work, or to the creation in London of closer links with his beloved Order Service. 180

Aside from the treatment accorded Dogger after he presented his report, other evidence of London's reaction to this document is available. Minister-President Gerbrandy said this about the Dogger report:

Gerbrandy: It was repeatedly a point of discussion in the Government. Therein was reported the entire history of the Order Service. We had just about come to the conclusion, perhaps an incorrect one, that the Order Service intended to maintain peace and order just after liberation and was not, in the ordinary sense of the word a "combat" resistance organization, as many people believe [it to have been] today.

Question: You did not see the Order Service as a "combat" organization in the same sense as the Council of Resistance or the Knuckle Gang?

Gerbrandy: It came down to about that, yes.\textsuperscript{181}

Minister-President Gerbrandy could remember that the London Government was greatly disturbed by the authoritarian appearance of the Order Service. Some of his colleagues had used the word "fascist" in this connection. Dr. Gerbrandy wished it made clear that he himself had always had "faith" in the Order Service.\textsuperscript{182}

That London's suspicion of the Order Service was not uniformly shared by all Dutch Ministers can been seen in a telegram which the Order Service received from the Netherlands Minister of War in London, on August 13, 1943:

\textbf{From Minister of War to G.H.Q. Order Service:}

Consider every action you take with eye towards forming a nucleus of authorized administrative persons, approximately 40 in number, trained and prepared, to be replaced after short service, then to serve, if needed, as advisers.

Can you also provisionally keep in mind the possibility of supplying the following persons:

First: Twenty officers or militarized civilians with general experience, at least 40 years of age, for high office in provinces and large cities.

Second: For each province one to three individuals to govern medium-sized cities.

Third: For each province three to twelve authorized officers or civilians, to be militarized, possessing general knowledge.

Persons in the first category would serve under a military government, those in the second and third categories would be under the direction of those chosen for service in the first category.\textsuperscript{183}

The Order Service apparently considered this communication from the

\textsuperscript{181}F. S. Gerbrandy, December 13, 1954, 98915.

\textsuperscript{182}Ibid., 98976.

\textsuperscript{183}EMQ, VIIa, 251.
Minister of War as an order. In any event, they set about the task of collecting and training such persons. Since, in nearly all cases, a civilian administration was smoothly and fairly promptly restored at the time of liberation, no extensive apparatus of the sort described in the telegram was required. As a result, numbers of persons who had been selected and trained for such posts received none at all. Mr. Calje, who had recruited some of the potential administrators in the Order Service, succeeded in prevailing on authorities of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior to take into their organization some of those in question, with the understanding that they would be utilized in such temporary administrative positions as might be available.

Mr. Calje, testifying after the war, acknowledged that the Order Service may have misinterpreted the communication from London, particularly in not regarding the phraseology in the first paragraph, "...to be replaced after short service...if needed, as advisers...", as controlling. Mr. Calje could recall only too well his embarrassment at realizing that elderly, retired General van Nijnatten, who expected to become "Military Commissioner" for the Province of Brabant, would have to be told that his services were not required for that job or for any other position. Realizing the dilemma in this case, Mr. van der Scheuren, Royal Commissioner for the Province of Overijssel, asked General van Nijnatten to serve him as a "special adviser".

Dogger's mission, as stated in terms of his report, should not be seen as a total failure. He gained a sort of royal recognition of the Order Service, in that communications were frequently sent to the Service.

184 J. F. Calje, March 30, 1950, 77338. 185 infra, appended report.
by the London Government, acting in its official capacity. While he gained no immediate financial support, the pattern of aid recommended by Dogger is strikingly similar to that eventually incorporated into the London-guaranteed National Support Fund. During nearly all of the period following Dogger's arrival, reasonably reliable communications were maintained between various of the London intelligence and contact agencies and the Order Service in Holland. As will be seen in another section, the Order Service made a very real contribution in the intelligence field. Colonel Six handled this phase of the operation very well indeed.

There remained the important question of whether London was to arm the Order Service. Some of the reserve of arms taken from private supplies or inherited from the Legion of Old Front Soldiers had since been captured by German security police. The question was eventually decided by London in the negative.

Minister-President Gerbrandy explained that, since the Order Service was apparently not a "combat" resistance organization, but primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace and order at the time of liberation, it seemed reasonable to exclude it from arms shipments, as both the Council of Resistance and the Knuckle Gang would have more immediate use for weapons.186

Colonel Six did not know why the Order Service had been so excluded. He had heard that the London Government feared the Order Service and denied it weapons as a result. Another variation on the theme had it that British officers, possibly those of the Special Operations Execu-

186 Gerbrandy, loc. cit., 98915.
cutive, advised the Dutch to withhold weapons from the Order Service in view of their own experience in other countries where London-supplied weapons had been put to uses other than those for which they were originally intended. Colonel Six did not know if either of these versions was true. He was told by the Inquiry Commission of the testimony of another witness, Mr. Klijzing, who quoted a British intelligence officer as saying that the Special Operations Executive advised the Dutch against arming the Order Service, as it appeared that German infiltration of the latter organization was too extensive. Colonel Six had no knowledge as to the accuracy of Mr. Klijzing's account.

Once the need for weapons became of utmost importance, at the time of the Allied invasion, the Order Service was able to get some arms by virtue of the fact that it had become entitled to the same supplies as other members of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, in which it had been incorporated. Three days after the Forces came into being, Colonel Six was finally able to restore his disabled radio circuits to London and send a "sharp" telegram protesting his not having received arms shipments. He received an "equally sharp" reply. By November 2, 1944, the Netherlands Forces of the Interior command was in a position to smuggle into Amsterdam, from the Province of North Holland, some 10,000 weapons, most of which had earlier been dropped to the Council of Resistance and to the Knuckle Gang, both of whom were designated to receive arms shipments from the London Government. These 10,000 weapons were distributed in Amsterdam to Forces of the Interior personnel.


188 P. J. Six, March 10, 1949, 44838.
without regard to their earlier affiliations. As it turned out the Order Service did rather well in this distribution. While Amsterdam-North was in the hands of the Knuckle Gang, Amsterdam-South was almost entirely Order Service, with the eastern and western sectors mixed, containing many members of both organizations.

Colonel Six sharply resented his not having received weapons earlier. This caused him to lose "face" with other organizations. 190

Colonel Six also resented the fact that the Dutch Special Service Bureau, created on March 15, 1944, specifically to assist resistance organizations, took very little notice of the Order Service. Colonel Six could recall all too clearly having gone to the so-called Thursday Noon Meetings, where the Service, the Council, and the Knuckle Gang met to discuss mutual problems, and being told that the Council and the Knuckle Gang both had received detailed instructions from the Bureau. Colonel Six had had to admit that the Order Service had received no such instructions from the Bureau or from any other source in London. 191 In view of the success of the Order Service in its intelligence work it seemed unreasonable to exclude it from Bureau directives. 192

As far as London was concerned the Service was still primarily an organization to maintain peace and order at the time of liberation, although once it was incorporated into the Netherlands Forces of the Interior it assumed the same character as the rest of the organization, that of a sort of combined home guard and auxiliary police force.

Minister-President Gerbrandy stated the official view on the Order Service in a letter of February 5, 1944, forwarded by the Swiss Route:

189 Ibis., 44837. 190 Ibis., 44835. 191 Ibis., 44809. 192 Ibis.
The relation of the Government to the Order Service can be simply stated. We will very gladly make use of their services aimed at the maintenance of peace, law, and order, providing that they, immediately upon assuming their duties, place themselves under the command of a military organization to be provided for [by the London Government]...

From data now available some additional information on the organization, operations, and membership of the Order Service must be offered. Some of this information, it should be pointed out, was not available to the London Government, either through the Dogger report or from other sources.

As Dogger reported, the Order Service organizational plan divided the country into Regions. The Regions were, in turn, divided into Districts, the Districts into Localities. District Commanders tried to see that a Locality existed for each inhabited place of village size or larger. In spite of the relatively formal relationships implied, with their apparent defects in terms of security considerations, relationships were essentially based on a "cell" system, with a Commander at one level not knowing the identity of his equals, or for that matter, of all of his subordinates. The most that any given District Commander was likely to know was the number of men organized in the Groups in his various Localities, together with the identity of some of his Locality Commanders. "Cover" names, or aliases, were used as much as possible. The total number of Order Service members by August, 1944, was 100,000, making the Service the largest clandestine organization in Holland.

While the personnel of the Order Service is primarily thought of as

193 EMQ, VIIa, 252.

194 Nineteen in number and not twenty, as reported by Dogger.

195 P. J. Six, loc. cit., 44768.
being military by profession, particularly because of the sizeable infusions from the Legion of Old Front Soldiers, note must be made of the numerous persons of a purely non-military background found in the organization. To be sure, the Order Service contained many military personnel, including a number of military cadets, some of whom were used as couriers. When, on May 15, 1942, the Germans arrested all career military officers, Order Service ranks were seriously depleted. This order did not include reservists, retired officers, officers of various Netherlands East Indies military units, or persons holding certain specialized commissions. Only a few of the regular officers were able to avoid imprisonment. They were the subject of a thorough and continuing Gestapo hunt. The German occupation authorities ordered mobilization of reservists between May and July of 1943. A great number of those so ordered simply did not report and continued their duties with the Order Service. Colonel Six felt it necessary, in testifying after the war, to emphasize the use the Order Service made of persons with no military background, particularly when this was the best means of establishing vital personal contacts.  

There were, since the Order Service was nation-wide in scope, areas in which practically no military persons were to be found, particularly in the Province of Zeeland.

Members of the Order Service in some areas were frequently members of other organizations as well. In the Province of Drenthe, for example, there appears to have been a great deal of dual membership between the National Fugitive Aid Organization and the Order Service.

Whether the Order Service was really a resistance organization in...
the "active" or "armed" sense, as it claimed when protesting its exclusion from London arms shipments, or whether it was simply intended to maintain law and order after a German departure, a role which it also frequently claimed, is a question not easily answered. One must not lose sight of the intelligence activities of the Service, that they were very real is a fact to be presented and described later.

Different individuals within the leadership of the Service had varied views of its true nature, some shifting with changing conditions. Thus, while Jonkheer Röell might well feel, shortly after the group was founded, that he was building a clandestine army to directly influence a German defeat or departure, and that the "law and order" version was simply a good "cover story", others in the Service might regard such an objective as an accurate statement of the organization's true aims, and all that might eventually be expected.199

By the same token, Midshipman Dogger, in his report written in London in April, 1942, might honestly believe that the organization was devoted only to duties to be performed after the German departure, since extensive arrests which the organization had experienced just prior to his leaving Holland had made any wide-scale armed resistance seem a most perilous activity.

As Mr. Calje remembers it, Colonel Six held, with remarkably little variation, to the view that the Order Service's activities were to be devoted to the time of liberation, and that assorted acts of sabotage engaged in by teams of resistance workers, while heroic, might accomplish little in the total war picture and might engender reprisals out of all

199 Röell, loc. cit., 94338.
proportion to their limited value. Colonel Six did wish it clearly understood that this did not mean that the Order Service was non-combatant in the sense that it refused the hazardous task of clandestinely assembling firearms, ammunition, explosives and related supplies. This it did do, and the sheer problem of storing such weapons and supplies was one of major proportions. At one point in Amsterdam the Order Service issued a written "camouflage" order, urging members to turn in their weapons, largely acquired through theft from arsenals. This order, Mr. Calje explained, was intended purely for German consumption and was never executed. It served its purpose admirably, with various copies known to have fallen into the hands of the German security police.\footnote{200}{Calje, loc. cit., 77310.}  

Colonel Six shifted ground somewhat as the war progressed and an Allied victory seemed close at hand. By the spring of 1944 he had come to feel that, while sabotage engaged in by resistance workers operating against the German war effort in general was still not a fruitful sort of endeavor for Order Service attention, sabotage by workers regularly employed in factories working on German orders could be a valuable undertaking. Order Service assistance in such work was, therefore, lent.\footnote{201}{P. J. Six, loc. cit., 44780.}  

By May or June of 1944 Colonel Six had decided that his "troops" could at least be used to harass German communications. Accordingly, orders went out to the Regional Commanders that small groups were to be organized to hinder and impede German activities, particularly, it was implied, if the enemy should be forced to withdraw from part or all of the Netherlands. These activities were, for the time being, to be confined to any that did not involve the direct use of weapons. As examples
of appropriate acts he suggested the disabling of German motor vehicles and the strewing of sharpened spikes on roadways. 202

The writer has been unable to ascertain whether the contents of this Order Service directive became known in London. Communications between the Service and the London Government were not in the best order during this period. In June, 1944, the Order Service lost to the German security police its last radio operator. Accordingly, important Order Service messages were given to an independent intelligence-gathering organization, the Group Albrecht ("Albrecht Group"), which the Order Service had earlier helped and, on occasion, supplied with radio operators. The Albrecht Group reported having forwarded to London the messages in question, but, according to Colonel Six, this was not the case, the Order Service messages were never transmitted to London. It was not until late September or early October that Colonel Six was able to reestablish direct radio contact with London. 203 By this time the Order Service had been incorporated into the Netherlands Forces of the Interior. 204 In any event, had London been aware of this directive there would have still existed sufficient grounds to question the "armed resistance" character of the Order Service, as the directive specifically excluded actions involving the use of weapons.

A legitimate function performed by the Order Service was that of objecten-behoud ("object protection"), or the guarding, as much as possible, of vital objectives such as transportation terminals, civil-

202 Calje, loc. cit. 203 P. J. Six, loc. cit., 44809.

204 Another Order Service channel to London, the Swiss Route, was much slower. During the period in question London was seriously behind in processing material received via the Swiss Route.
ian communications centers of various sorts, and public utilities. 205

It was widely feared and believed that the Germans, on their departure, planned a program of wholesale destruction and sabotage of both civilian and military centers of vital importance. 206

Once it has been stated that the Order Service did not, as an official policy, organize or even condone acts of armed violence by its members against the enemy, note must be made of the simple truth that a very great many such acts, including various sorts of very active sabotage, falling into every conceivable category of resistance activity, were engaged in by Order Service members, acting not only as individuals but in groups as well. Like all individual acts of armed resistance these had varying degrees of real value. Whatever the intrinsic value of these acts may have been they were committed without the support or direction of the Order Service, and were engaged in in direct violation of its orders. 207

This writer has been unable to determine the precise political character or ultimate aims of the Order Service. Some opinions from witnesses more or less intimately involved with the Services are offered herewith.

Minister-President Gerbrandy said that he never doubted the basic loyalty of the Order Service. He noted that numbers of his colleagues had serious reservations in this regard, however. 208

205Callie, loc. cit., 77308.

206That this was not simply an ideal fear is shown by the fact that the Germans eventually did do just what was feared.

Dr. Willem Drees, Dutch Minister-President for several years after World War II, first met Order Service officers, including General Röell, when he and they were inmates of the German concentration camp at Buchenwald. As individuals he had the highest regard for them. He felt that there were many varying viewpoints within the Order Service itself, that it could not be simply characterized. There were authoritarians, particularly among the military, there were also many persons thoroughly devoted to the free processes of a democratic society.209

Critical views of the Service are not difficult to find. Mr. H. M. van Randwijk, editor-in-chief of the underground newspaper Vrij Nederland (Amsterdam), worked with the Swiss Route, helping process material to be sent to Switzerland and thence to London. He had numerous contacts with the Order Service, as the Swiss Route had transmitted much Order Service material to London. Mr. van Randwijk could remember forwarding a detailed blueprint of proposed post-war Netherlands governmental structure, prepared by Order Service members in Haarlem. Under the plan all units of local and provincial self-government were to be abolished and replaced by provincial and town "directors". He further recalled a solemn Order Service communication to London, reporting the discovery, in the Dutch Province of Brabant, of a French pretender, and recommending that this fact be transmitted to General de Gaulle so that the person in question could become French monarch. Mr. van Randwijk did feel that, since the circumstances of war sharply limited normal communications, both between individuals and organizations, the Order Service may have been subjected to undue and unfair criticism due to simple ignorance of its ultimate

aims and character. 210

Jonkheer L. H. N. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal, former Royal Commis-

sioner of the Province of Utrecht, and Chairman of the College of
Bondsmen, a resistance-coördinating organization set up the London Gov-
ernment, most decidedly believed that the Order Service desired a mil-
itary dictatorship. This was, Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal said, "no
secret" in Order Service circles. Too many Order Service people were
unable to distinguish between Social Democrats and Communists, regard-
ing both as an equal menace. 211

Mr. J. J. Vorrink, a prominent member of the Dutch Social Demo-
ocratic Party, as well as an active resistance worker, had had numerous
contacts with the Order Service. He felt that many Order Service work-
ers were "magnificent persons" but that they had not properly recog-
nized, "What went on in the minds of Böll and Six." Mr. Vorrink had
felt it necessary on several occasions to warn the London Government
about the "reactionary" political views of the Order Service. He re-
called a conversation with a young naval officer, in hiding from the
Germans and working with the Order Service, a "good man" but a "pol-
itical illiterate" who wondered if a return to free elections after the
war in Holland would be possible or desirable. 212

Mr. van der Gaag, of the Council of Resistance, often came in con-
tact with the Service. At times "contact" and "conflict" almost seemed
synonymous. Yet, in the end, in spite of misgivings, Mr. van der Gaag

210 H. M. van Randwijk, September 9, 1949, 66937.

211 Rosenthal, loc. cit., 64383.

212 J. J. Vorrink, September 21, 1949, 67973.
had the definite feeling that the Order Service did not really strive for an authoritarian system of government. While he, "Couldn't look into Order Service souls," he felt that whatever preferences the Service expressed or felt for such a system were intended to bridge over a difficult transition period, one in which the formation of a popularly-elected parliament would be well-nigh impossible.213

Mr. Jan Meijer, former co-editor of the clandestine newspaper, Het Parool (The Watchword), remembered that it was popular during the occupation to criticize the pre-war political parties, since there was a considerable tendency on the part of many Netherlanders to blame "politicians" for the disaster of 1940. This being the case, the Order Service's oft-repeated statements about being "non-political" or "above politics" simply reflected a very widely held view.214

General Böell stated most emphatically that a military government had not been one of the aims of the Service. The organization had been careful to avoid identification with any political party so that all persons might feel free to affiliate themselves with the Service. General Böell had never felt that, in the event of a "political vacuum", a "triumvirate" or any similar body should assume power, temporarily or otherwise. He had never heard of the "triumvirate" concept described in the Dogger report, until after the war.215

Mr. C. J. F. Calje, an Amsterdam insurance man, and officer of the Algemeen Hoofdkwartier ("General Headquarters"), of the Order Service

213Gaag, loc. cit., 77896.
214J. Meijer, September 1, 1960, 84009.
215Böell, loc. cit., 94355.
was certain that the Service had never contemplated "taking over" the
government in any way. Mr. Calje could remember that, on very many
occasions, Colonel Six had reminded all those associated with him that
Order Service members, as much as any other Hollanders, were citizens of
a democratic country, and, as such, were bound to observe both the forms
and spirit of democratic political processes. 216

Conclusions

The National Support Fund was an activity whose value was very ex-
tensive indeed. In supporting organizations which sheltered, fed, and
provided Hollanders with identity papers, even if it had done no more,
it was to make possible the saving of very many lives.

In terms of the thesis that London's efforts were most successful
when the services of persons and institutions located or already in
being in the occupied territory were utilized, the National Support Fund
represents a special case. While founded and administered in Holland it
might well not have come into being as soon or on as comprehensive a
scale without the original London guarantee to the dependents of mer-
chant seamen in the Allied service. Moreover, its continued active op-
eration was dependent on repeated fiscal guarantees by London. Thus this
was not a simple instance of the London Government taking advantage of a
preexisting situation in the occupied territory, any more than it was one
of the Government's having established the organization from without.
Rather, it represents a unique case of interdependence between London and
the occupied territory, and as such serves only to partly prove the thesis
advanced above for such situations.

216 Calje, loc. cit., 77346.
It is to be doubted that London could have played any more active a part in the financing of resistance activities than it did through the National Support Fund. The London Government could hardly be expected to have any detailed knowledge of the day-to-day problems of such finance. As concerns the many and varied enterprises aided by the National Support Fund, this was again a realistic relationship between the London Government and the occupied territory. Lacking accurate information on the problems facing these organizations, or even on the organizations themselves in some instances, London supplied or guaranteed the one thing most needed for their continued operations—the requisite funds.

Later authorizations of additional funds by the London Government, it will be noted, specified some of the purposes for which the monies guaranteed were to be expended. From the final accounting of the Fund, it will be observed that numerous purposes never specifically authorized by the London Government were served. It was London's good fortune that the direction of the National Support Fund was in the mature, able hands of the van Hall brothers, and that few funds were expended on frivolous purposes. It was further fortunate that the Communist contingent within the resistance movements was smaller and less significant than in some other German-occupied countries.

The Council of Resistance represented a special dilemma for London, indeed, it was in some respects a catalog of problems faced by the exiled Dutch regime in its dealings with armed resistance organizations. In the Manifesto of Jan Thijssen the problem of uncompromisingly violent resistance offered to the occupying power is squarely faced—was it in
the interests of the Netherlands people for the London Government to underwrite acts of armed resistance which might lift the morale of the participants but might also engender German reprisals out of all proportion to the damage inflicted on the enemy? London was similarly faced with the problem of how desirable it was to support an organization known to be to the left in the political spectrum. London's reaction for some time was one of uncertainty, hence little initially was done vis-à-vis the Council, a fact that its members bitterly resented, as arms and related supplies would have been of very great value during the early period. To a certain extent this resentment may be taken as symptomatic of a problem endemic in the relations between London and the resistance organizations. To those in the resistance organizations London was distant, inept, ignorant of their aims, problems, and accomplishments. Requests for aid or recognition were likely to be treated with indifference or not even acknowledged. From London's vantage point it saw a mass of unknown resistance organizations, staffed by faceless persons of varying degrees of competence, some with unrealistic aims, who sometimes approached the Government with grandiose claims of strength or membership not based on fact. In the early period London often failed to send arms, ammunition, or explosives that were urgently requested, as they were simply not available. The Dutch might have the requisite funds to pay for them, but the British lacked sufficient weapons for their own use, let alone for the benefit of others.

The London Government was probably fortunate in the political composition of the Council, since, in effect, that organization took some of the more militant Communist resistance workers and submerged them in
an organization which, while leftist, was not Communist. It was extremely fortunate that the Communists did not capture control of the Council.

By 1944, London, convinced of the reliability of the Council, employed its services both in an espionage and sabotage capacity; as has been noted. Once again the exiled Netherlands regime employed an existing institution in the occupied territory rather than creating one of its own, a utilization which was further extended when the London Government selected the Council of Resistance for inclusion in the Netherlands Forces of the Interior. The Council Chairman, Mr. van der Gaag, was commissioned by the London Government to enter into direct negotiations with the German Reichs-Commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart, an assignment which was carried out.

In the collective person of the Order Service the London Government was once again faced with the problem of an organization whose true aims appeared to be in doubt. It was very difficult for London to tell if the Service intended simply to maintain law and order at the moment of German departure or capitulation, as it said, or to establish some sort of junta "above politics", a standard military reaction to the complexities of political life in a democratic society. Surely the report rendered to the London Government by Midshipman Dogger did nothing to reassure one. Resistance organizations frequently deplored the lack of any sort of personal contact with London and sometimes sought to send their representatives to London. Midshipman Dogger represented in some respects a convincing argument against this sort of personal representation, as he ascribed to the Order Service authoritarian sentiment not as
widely or as intensely held in the organization as his report indicated.

London utilized the Order Service in the field of military espionage, in which capacity the organization served with very great distinction.

In the area of armed resistance activity, London finally followed a tack with the Service which may have been arrived at by Machiavellian cunning or by sheer chance but still represented a practical solution to the problem of the Service's ultimate aims. The Order Service said that its aim was to maintain law and order at the time of liberation, very well, it was to be taken at its word. It was to be largely excluded from London arms shipments as it would not serve as an active armed resistance organization. When the London Government created the Netherlands Forces of the Interior the Order Service found itself in largely "non-combatant" units, relegated, with some exceptions, to various sorts of guard duty.

As nearly as this writer is able to determine, the telegram which the Order Service received on August 13, 1943, from the London Minister of War, was not intended as a radical departure from the London Government's policy in regard to the Service but was rather an inquiry intended to determine whether the organization could render assistance to a possible interim administration, should this be established.

A recurring problem for London was the mutual antagonism between various resistance organizations. There were few feuds of the resistance period of the magnitude and scope of that between the Order Service and the Council of Resistance. There was little London offered or could offer in the way of practical solutions. Since the two bodies not only had sharp ideological differences, but were in disagreement over both
the appropriate forms of organization for resistance work and its proper objectives, it was insufficient to simply urge them to work together and forget their differences. This was doubtless part of London's motivation in forming the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, in which the Council and the Service were placed under one command. This effort, it must be noted, was by no means a complete success. A little after the manner of two old regiments with long and distinctive histories, combined in a wave of military reorganization, the two resistance bodies continued to display some independence.

The Order Service, like the Council of Resistance, had come into being in the occupied territory at the impetus of local people, each with its own view of the problem of resistance and each with its own very different solutions. Once again they have served as models of activity which London could encourage, of which it could and did take advantage, but in whose creation it played no part. This experience would seem in accord with the basic assumptions advanced in this connection in the conclusions to Chapter I, that the London Government was best able to function when it took advantage of persons or organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory.
CHAPTER III

THE LONDON GOVERNMENT AND CONTACT WITH RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS--II

Introduction

The third chapter begins with an examination of another of the largest armed resistance organizations, the Knuckle Gang. As a resistance organization whose operations were limited to a more or less precisely defined area of activity, the Knuckle Gang offers additional insight into the problem of what sort of contact London could best maintain with the armed resistance.

The section immediately following explores the role played by the London Government in regard to resistance organizations engaging in more highly specialized services. Included are the National Fugitive Aid Organization, various groups specializing in the forgery of identity papers and other vital documents, and the clandestine press. All of these groups offer additional models to test the thesis that London was best able to function in its contact with the occupied territory when it utilized local people and local organizations, rather than importing its own personnel or superimposing organizational forms from without. The technical organizations included here offer a particularly intriguing field of study since they often found themselves short of both materials and the specialized knowledge needed to perform their tasks. The extent to which London found it possible to render technical assistance to some of these organizations is considered. The actual development of these
services and their relationship to London is also treated.

There then follows an examination of London's relationship to various political and/or intellectual resistance organizations, as well as those aiming at the coordination of resistance activity. Some of these organizations could be of use to London, both in long-range planning and in helping bridge a possible political "vacuum" occurring at the moment of liberation. Some also had political ambitions, thus posing a special problem for the London Government.

The extent to which London utilized the specialized organizations is examined here, together with the first example of London's creating an organization, the College of Bondsmen, to replace one already in being in the occupied territory.

A second example of London's creating an organization, the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, follows. This section seeks to determine to how great an extent the Forces of the Interior offers an exception to the thesis of London's finding it more efficient to utilize organizations already in being in the occupied territory.

Chapter III concludes with the only major act of remote administration attempted by the London Government, the railway strike which London ordered in September, 1944. Pertinent to the subject is an examination of whether the railway strike episode tends to undermine the thesis advanced in the conclusions to Chapter I, that remote, direct administration by the London Government was impossible, or whether the affair in question simply represents a special exception.

The Knuckle Gang

While the English phrase "Knuckle Gang" is a reasonable translation of the Dutch *Knokploegen Ploegen*, the reader should not infer that the
organization represented the criminal element of Netherlands society, or that it was in any way loosely or informally organized. Far from being a loosely-articulated agglomeration of toughs, it was a carefully organized body, nation-wide in scope, containing a number of sober and respectable citizens.

The Knuckle Gang came into being as the result of special needs of the National Fugitive Aid Organization, which, by the late summer of 1943, had developed several uses for a "strong arm" auxiliary. By this time the number of persons in hiding under the auspices of the Fugitive Aid Organization was considerable. Ration coupons were needed in order to feed many of those concealed, thus raids on ration offices were engaged in by members of the Fugitive Aid Organization as a means of securing such coupons. Later some counterfeit coupons were to be produced, but this was never a very attractive course of action as the bona fide coupons were, after all, intended to facilitate the fair distribution of available foodstuffs. Raids on vital-records registries were another early activity, in that the removal of such records was often necessary in order to conceal the existence of persons who had gone into hiding, or the fact that persons were employing fictitious names. While the production of forged ration coupons was a comparatively late development, the preparation of fake identity papers began much earlier. Their existence gave rise to yet another activity, that of forcibly removing from Government offices blank identity papers and the numerous rubber stamps employed in their authentication.

By late August or early September, 1943, it became obvious to the leadership of the National Fugitive Aid Organization that these activ-
ities of a more forcible nature needed to be separated from the parent organization, devoted as it was to the shelter and care of those in hiding. Accordingly, the Knuckle Gang, devoted to more violent occupations, came into being at that time.217

Soon the organization had extended its activities still further, to include raids on the agencies administering the German forced-labor program, and to acquire the blank forms for preparation of the *Ausweisse*, or "Exemptions" to forced labor service. On occasion, the Knuckle Gang resorted to political assassination, again with the limited objective of protecting persons in hiding. Those liquidated were often the Dutch-Nazi heads of local vital-records registries who were betraying sensitive data. Several raids on jails and prisons released numbers of political prisoners.218

By December, 1943, the Knuckle Gang had expanded its activities sufficiently so that it could justly be called "national". National coordination was attained through several inter-provincial coordinators, one for each of the northern, southern, western, eastern, and central regions into which the Netherlands was divided by the Gang. Serving under the coordinators were provincial leaders, who in turn commanded leaders of the individual, local groups.219

Mention must be made of the fact that the Knuckle Gang, for much of its early period of existence, was desperately short of weapons. Frequently raids were made with a total armament of one loaded pistol which


219 Ibid., 77214-77216. Leaders of local groups had considerable discretionary power and could exercise influence over the provincial leaders.
might contain one or two live rounds of ammunition, plus one or two unloaded weapons. A successful raid on a ration office in Twente was conducted with no conventional weapons at all. Ration office guards were held at bay by men displaying ordinary building bricks in a menacing fashion. On July 11, 1944, the Knuckle Gang entered a Gestapo prison at Arnhem and released successfully fifty-six prisoners, again virtually without armament. Included among those released was Frits de Zwerver, one of the founders of the National Fugitive Aid Organization. Fortunately for de Zwerver, who had just been captured, the rather bulky Gestapo dossier covering his recent past had not yet reached Arnhem, so his captors were unaware of the prominence of their prisoner. The escapees made their way to the railroad station and took the next outgoing train. Some, as they proceeded to the station, walked respectfully behind the cortège in the funeral procession of a German officer. 220

The extreme shortage of weapons which plagued the Knuckle Gang raises the inevitable question of contact with and aid from the London Government. Mr. Scheepstra, the only surviving Knuckle Gang leader of the first rank, felt that the original goal of the body, using force to protect persons in hiding, was such that contact with London was not really vital. He would have liked to receive some small arms and ammunition, however. The Knuckle Gang did come into contact with the parachuted agent Koos Mulholland, and his radio operator, Nol van Duin, operatives of the Dutch Special Service Bureau in London. Mulholland was sent out primarily to deal with the Council of Resistance, but van Duin had been dispatched to serve both Mulholland and another agent.

220 Ibid., 77209.
Bert de Goede, who was supposed to contact the Knuckle Gang. Mr. Scheepstra felt that Messrs. Mulholland, van Duin, and de Goede were oriented too much along military lines and had no real appreciation of the sort of work the Knuckle Gang had to do. Mr. Scheepstra and his associates doubted that the agents in question had very ready access, via their clandestine transmitter, to high officials in the London Government. It appeared that the material transmitted to London was processed by lesser military officers who might have lacked the knowledge or initiative to deal with non-military matters. 221

Note must be made again of the fact that the Knuckle Gang was in receipt of extensive amounts of financial assistance from the London-guaranteed National Support Fund. The total value of this aid was about fl. 1,000,000. 222

By July of 1944, after the Allied landings in Normandy, with the obvious sabotage possibilities that were presented to armed resistance organizations, there had arisen the problem of whether the Knuckle Gang should extend its varied activities to include general sabotage assignments. Among the leadership extensive doubt existed as to whether the Knuckle Gang might not imperil the performance of its primary task, that of safeguarding fugitives. Several of those in authority consulted the internationally known jurist, Dr. Jan Donner, in order to find out precisely what status the Knuckle Gang possessed in international law, and whether he advised engaging in general sabotage activities or not. Mr. Scheepstra felt that the Knuckle Gang, made up of civilians, had no protected status at all. Dr. Donner, after several days of reflection,

221 Ibid., 77238-77239. 222 Hall, loc. cit., 77180-77183.
declined to try to answer, urging that the Knuckle Gang contact the London Government and get its views on the matter. If the communications system of agents Mulholland and van Duin could deliver no answer from London, then Dr. Donner suggested that the Knuckle Gang try to establish contact via a clandestine transmitter operated by Colonel Six's Order Service. While the Knuckle Gang had its differences with the Service, relations with the latter organization were sufficiently good so that Dr. Donner reasoned that there would be no question of the willingness of the Service to transmit the query. The message was sent by both means but was no more productive than had been earlier questions of a general nature. Eventually London did decide that the Knuckle Gang was to take part in sabotage work.

The Special Service Bureau in London did give highly specific sabotage assignments to the Knuckle Gang, many of which were successfully carried out. In the last months of the war a number of Bureau agents arrived to assist the Knuckle Gang and various supplies were delivered. Advance word of a special train, containing prisoners being transferred from the German concentration camp at Amersfoort to the Veluwe district, made possible the carefully timed destruction of rails on the line in question and the release by the Knuckle Gang of the captives. This seemed a particularly appropriate assignment to have given the Knuckle Gang, in view of its past experience in protecting fugitives. Sabotage supplies, particularly various explosives, were supplied by the Special Service Bureau sufficiently in advance, as a rule, so that those employing them might gain some acquaintance with the materials in question.

223 Scheepstra, loc. cit., 77233-77239.
There were occasions on which Knuckle Gang operatives found themselves using explosive compounds of British origin with which they were totally unfamiliar, and for which no directions at all had been supplied.\(^{224}\)

That these explosives must not have proved too difficult to employ can be seen in the successful blocking by the Knuckle Gang of the vital North Holland Canal, built to carry the largest ocean-going vessels. In similar operations various canals elsewhere were blocked. Portions of railway lines were also destroyed.\(^{225}\)

The supplies received from London arrived by parachute at special "dropping" areas, arranged in advance.

One might well inquire as to the apparent reasons for the Knuckle Gang's having received no arms from the London Government for the first year of its existence. The answer appears to lie in the simple fact that there was no appropriate agency of the London Government to supply the type of assistance required. Until the Dutch Special Service Bureau was created (on March 14, 1944), the various Netherlands intelligence agencies were devoted to the collection and evaluation of strategic information. Since the Knuckle Gang, unlike many another Dutch resistance organization, did not deal with intelligence matters, they had not had occasion to contact such London agencies—not had the reverse ever transpired.

The (Dutch) Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to Holland might have been expected to do something of this sort, however it chose to perform this activity, "in co-operation", with the British Special Operations Executive, which meant in actual fact that the Dutch recruited, during this

\(^{224}\)Ibid., 77248. \(^{225}\)Ibid.
period, Netherlands nationals who performed clandestine tasks in German-occupied Holland under British direction. During the period in question the Special Operations Executive, working in cooperation with the Bureau for the Preparation of the Return, concentrated its major Dutch effort on the so-called Plan Holland, to be described elsewhere. Unfortunately, every single Plan Holland agent and all of the thousands of pounds of supplies relating to Plan Holland were captured by the Germans.

A brief examination of the relations between the Knuckle Gang and the other two large resistance organizations should be made. The Knuckle Gang had more than a few reservations about both the Order Service and the Council of Resistance.

The Knuckle Gang was composed originally almost entirely of members of the Dutch Reformed Church, although it later acquired some Roman Catholic members. The readily identifiable religious affiliations of the members may have influenced the Order Service, which did not regard the Knuckle Gang as politically suspect. In Knuckle Gang circles more than a few doubts about the Order Service existed. There was less of a fear that the Service planned to "take over" after the war—Order Service tactics of delaying the main effort until actual liberation seemed unwise and unrealistic. Too often the Order Service seemed to be simply "sitting on" weapons which the Knuckle Gang needed most urgently for current use. 226

When it was finally determined that the Knuckle Gang was to engage in general sabotage work, some of the instruction and assistance which it received came from the Order Service. 227

The attitude of the Council of Resistance towards the Knuckle Gang

226 Ibid., 77225-77226. 227 Ibid., 77230.
was generally one of good will. On several occasions suggestions went out from the Council that the two organizations amalgamate. The attitude of the Knuckle Gang toward the Council was somewhat more complex. The fact that the Council had or appeared to have a leftist political orientation, communicating with the public by means of a "manifesto", caused some reserve to be shown it by the Knuckle Gang. This was not precisely because there were Communists on the Council, although this was widely known and did nothing to reassure many Knuckle Gang members, rather the feeling was more one of believing that the work of the Knuckle Gang was a national task, one that should be divorced from political or ideological considerations. Although the Knuckle Gang was certainly devoted to direct, forceful, and on occasion, violent action, it shared with some others an aversion to the sort of relentless resistance offered by the Council, which approached the spirit of a holy war. Too often, Mr. Scheepstra felt, the Council engaged in acts that were of themselves of little or no value to the Allied war effort or to the Dutch national struggle, acts which brought forth a hornets nest of German reprisals, many of them directed against innocent hostages. There was an occasion on which the Council posted a placard announcing that, for every Dutch hostage executed by the Germans, the Council would kill two or three Germans. This kind of feud, the Knuckle Gang felt, was the sort of thing it would do well to avoid. The basic arithmetic of the proclaimed arrangement seemed faulty, as in the end there was a greater supply of Hollanders than Germans in the Netherlands. Clearly the Council was no organization with which to become too deeply involved. The basic responsibility of the Knuckle Gang remained the safeguarding of the hunted, hungry souls in its care. A side diver-
sion could only imperil those in hiding.228

The Knuckle Gang also objected to the Council on the grounds that the latter body was too authoritarian. Mr. Scheepstra said that the Council was, "...Constructed from the top down," with local leaders being no more than arbitrarily designated agents of the national organization. He used an English phrase, "brain trust", to describe the Council leadership. The entire atmosphere was far less democratic than that of the Knuckle Gang. The leader of an individual Knuckle Gang group was in his position because he was competent and, above all, because he enjoyed the confidence of his group. Local group commanders included a baker, a police corporal, a clerk in a notary office, and a gardener. Where former military persons held positions of authority it was based on their aptitude for underground work and not on their pre-war rank. The Knuckle Gang feared that amalgamation with the Council would be likely to result in an organization much less democratic and much less responsive to the feelings of its membership.229

The National Fugitive Aid Organization

No account of the relations between the Netherlands Government in London and the German-occupied territory would be complete without a brief description of the activities of the Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers ("National Fugitive Aid Organization"). At the same time it must be noted that there was virtually no direct contact between the London Government and the National Fugitive Aid Organization. London's help was of a very real sort, and of the sort more needed by the Organization than any other, that of financial assist-

228Ibid., 77263. 229Ibid.
ance. The funds in this case from the London-guaranteed National Support Fund and totalled at least fl. 7,000,000.230

The National Fugitive Aid Organization came into being as the result of the fusion of various local groups, all devoted to the concealment and care of fugitives. In the eastern and northern provinces a sort of exchange was created, whereby representatives from various areas were able to come together to trade information on likely spots for the concealment of fugitives. This organization, which became the National Fugitive Aid Organization, was created at the initiative of Mrs. H. T. Kuyper-Rietberg, of Winterswijk, and Dr. F. Slomp, himself a fugitive concealed in the Winterswijk area.231

By the late spring and early summer of 1943 the National Fugitive Aid Organization acquired additional scope and size when it was joined by various groups in the southern (and Catholic) provinces, particularly in Limburg. This came about partly as the result of urging by the Roman Catholic clergy and hierarchy. Particularly active here were two Roman Catholics, J. Naus and Mr. Jan Hendrikx, who was known under the "cover" name of "Ambrosius". 232

The earliest fugitives were Jews. They were soon followed by resistance workers fleeing the German security police. These were, in turn, joined by an increasing number of men of all ages seeking to escape forced labor in Germany. Dutch officers, supposed to report to German authorities for internment, also went into hiding in some numbers. The National Fugitive Aid Organization was particularly effective in connec-

230 Hall, loc. cit., 77180-77183.
231 H. van Biessen, July 13, 1950, 81614. 232 Ibid.
tion with the last great German labor drive, the so-called "Liese" action. Many carefully planned raids by German press-gangs yielded not a soul, an achievement due in part to a special clandestine telephone-warning network.

A veritable flood of fugitives descended on the Organization in the fall and winter of 1944-1945, when the strike of railway workers made the concealment of tens of thousands of additional persons imperative.

The total number of persons in hiding by that last winter of the occupation was estimated at between 200,000 and 400,000.

There were many special problems. Should fugitives be housed in rural areas or in the cities? There was something to be said for both. Urban areas offered anonymity, together with the dangers inherent in dealing with unknown persons. Rural areas offered the advantages of dealing with known persons, as well as the disadvantages of dealing with persons who inevitably would learn a great about the fugitive aid work of their neighbors. While they might themselves be reliable, if they had a tendency to gossip their listeners might prove to be less reliable.

Aid in ration matters and in the correction or removal of vital records from registries was provided, as has been noted, by the Knuckle Gang, which also removed by assassination persons who betrayed or seriously imperiled the safety of fugitives.

In time a separate organization, the so-called "J" Group, came into being with the special task of concealing Jews. Since it was not at all times possible to keep fugitives hidden from view, if a fugitive had

233 So-called after its principal instigator.

234 Riessen, loc. cit., 81622-81624. 235 Ibid., 81626-81627.
markedly Semitic features his concealment was a much more difficult activity, and his presence automatically imperiled all others hidden with him.236 The "J" Group received some 4,500,000 guilders from the National Support Fund.237

The total number of members in the National Fugitive Aid Organization was about 15,000.238 Security in an organization of this size was a peculiar problem, made more extreme by the nature of the activity. Any German agent provocateur could gain some sort of entrance into the organization by simply posing as a fugitive from the security police or from labor recruitment. Losses were about 1100 in the Fugitive Aid Organization and approximately 500 in the Knuckle Gang.239 In October of 1943 the Organization suffered a severe blow in the arrest, during a meeting, of a number of provincial leaders. In April and May of 1944 all but two of the top leaders were arrested. The Germans apparently felt that these arrests had crippled or totally disabled the organization. As has been suggested, the National Fugitive Aid Organization was decentralized to a considerable extent, with its main strength in its broad base and not in the higher echelons, an arrangement worked in anticipation of just such a group of arrests.240

In June, 1944, the Organization's "exchange", which by this time was not only exchanging places of concealment but persons as well, was supple-

236 Features supposedly Semitic are shared by numbers of persons not of the Jewish faith, thus it was that the "J" Group on occasion concealed Protestants or Catholics whose mere appearance might arouse suspicion.

237 Hall, loc. cit., 77160-77163.

238 Riessen, loc. cit., 81626-81627. 239 Ibid., 81631.

240 Ibid., 81670-81671.
mented by a central coordinating bureau, an organization which turned out to be of particularly great help after the Allied liberation of the southern provinces, since the central bureau was able to process incoming information and transmit this to both the occupied and unoccupied parts of the Netherlands, an arrangement that was more practical under the circumstances than that of the exchange, which could no longer meet on a nationwide basis. 241

Contact between the National Fugitive Aid Organization and the London Government was limited, as has been noted. In essence this was probably to be expected. While London was aware of the existence of the Organization and approved highly of its aims, there was nothing that the Organization could do that was of immediate, direct assistance to London. It did not, as did many another specialized organization, operate an intelligence-gathering unit. It could not carry out any sabotage assignments as it was not an armed resistance organization, aside from the special duties of the Knuckle Gang. London, in turn, had little to offer the Fugitive Aid Organization. It had no need of weapons or explosives. Neither was there any specialized training which could be supplied by agents sent from London. The Organization was in a far better position to analyze its own problems and devise solutions than the London Government, and both parties recognized this fact. London could and did supply money. In the second grant or guarantee of repayment of monies to be expanded by the National Support Fund, London specifically mentioned the Organization as one of the intended recipients of such aid. 242

It was partly in connection with the activities of the National

241 Ibid., 81618-81620. 242 ENQ, VIIa, 226.
Support Fund that one contact between the National Fugitive Aid Organization and the London Government came into being. During the night of April 18, 1944, Father H. Bleys, whose illegal name was "Lodewijk", departed for England. Father Bleys, who left from the Limburg branch of the National Fugitive Aid Organization, wanted the positive assurance of the London Government that the money paid out by the National Support Fund would positively be repaid. Father Bleys also desired an opportunity to give the London Government a "fuller" picture of the part played by Catholic organizations engaging in resistance work, a subject on which he felt the Government to be particularly badly informed. Much of London's material on resistance activity reached it by the famous Swiss Route, channeled through the agency of the Dutch General Secretary of the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft. Father Bleys felt that Dr. Visser 't Hooft had withheld or edited Catholic material unnecessarily before passing it to London.

Father Bleys, on reaching London, was told that the National Support Fund obligations would, indeed, be honored. How much effect his description of Catholic resistance work had on the London Government was difficult for him to ascertain. He was quoted as saying that those with whom he spoke in London paid very close attention and took voluminous notes.

Dr. Visser 't Hooft, testifying in 1948, reported that the Swiss Route, far from withholding or cutting down any Catholic material, had actively sought more such material. He could recall having written repeatedly to his friend Father Stokman, whose illegal name was "The man

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243Ibid., 218. 244Riessen, loc. cit., 81640.
245Ibid., 81680.
with the good cigars," requesting that more material on Catholic resistance activity be sent. Father Stokman at one point had said, "If I had more I'd send more." Dr. Visser 't Hooft recalled that several Catholic political reports had been transmitted to London via the Swiss Route, and he could recall having not only forwarded several pastoral letters by Dutch Catholic clergy, but causing them to be published in all Swiss newspapers as well.  

When, in September of 1944, the Netherlands Forces of the Interior was called into being by the London Government, the National Fugitive Aid Organization was not specifically included. This was to be expected, since the Organization was not of the armed resistance variety. Its related organization, the Knuckle Gangs, was made a member. Cooperation between the Forces of the Interior and the Fugitive Aid Organization was, nevertheless, close. The Commander of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior commissioned the Organization to supply the Forces with food during the "hunger winter" of 1944-1945. This commission the Organization was able to carry out to some extent. A modest amount of food, coming from Friesland and various places in the Provinces of Utrecht, North Holland, and South Holland, was delivered.  

Mention must be made of the Vrije Groepen ("Free Groups"), a coordinated association of Amsterdam resistance groups, some twenty-five or thirty in number, part of which specialized in the concealment and care of fugitives, as did the National Fugitive Aid Organization. Several of the Free Groups specialized in sheltering Jews. The Free Groups felt

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246 W. A. Visser 't Hooft, December 8, 1948, 37164.
247 Riessen, loc. cit., 81622-81624.
that they had received an insufficient share of ration coupons, taken by
the Knuckle Gangs, in spite of an agreement with the Organization whereby
they were to receive some such coupons. \(^\text{248}\) Generally the National Fugitive Aid Organization and the Free Groups did work well together, however. \(^\text{249}\)

The Free Groups received from the London-guaranteed National Support
Fund sums totalling well over fl. 2,000,000. \(^\text{250}\)

**The Forgery Organizations**

At first glimpse the role of the forger in resistance work would
seem minor. In the Dutch case this was most emphatically not so. The
work of various forgery organizations could be literally said to have made
the resistance possible. Not only were forged identity papers necessary
for illegal workers to move about at all, special passes were necessary
for such persons to enter into restricted areas or to operate during
curfew hours. Forged papers of various sorts were also needed to aid
wide numbers of Dutchmen who were not engaged in illegal work but needed
to escape the effect of this or that German regulation. The identity of
Jews might be concealed so that they escaped deportation and extermination.
Workers might be permitted to escape service at forced labor in Germany,
students might be given "special" permits allowing them to continue their
studies. \(^\text{251}\)

Various organizations were active in this work. Among the earliest
of these was one headed by Eduard Veterman, who began the production, in

\(^\text{248}\) J. Sommer, October 28, 1954, 98699.

\(^\text{249}\) A. van Moock, November 12, 1954, 98888.

\(^\text{250}\) Hall, loc. cit., 77180-77183.

\(^\text{251}\) C. J. Rübsaam, August 30, 1950, 83615.
Amsterdam, of forged identity passes, commencing early in 1941. A separate Amsterdam group came into being at about the same time, headed by Gerrit van der Veen. Van der Veen's group developed into the well-known Persoonsbewijscentrale ("Identity Forgery Central"), and was able to continue operating after his death, in June of 1944. As will be seen the Identity Forgery Central produced a very wide range of products indeed.

Performing related work was the Persoons Bewijzen Sectie ("Personal Identity Section"). The Personal Identity Section, a branch of the National Fugitive Aid Organization, had as its primary task one of changing the names or other data in already prepared, otherwise legitimate identity papers. The Personal Identity Section filled in a few blank identity passes when these could be obtained. When entirely false materials had to be prepared, these came from the Identity Forgery Central, even though the latter organization was independent of the National Fugitive Aid Organization.

Still other groups were active in this field. In Utrecht there was the Vervalsingsbureau Utrecht ("Utrecht Forgery Bureau"). The Free Groups, mentioned in the previous section, also engaged in the preparation of forgeries.

The National Fugitive Aid Organization, in addition to the Personal Identity Section, referred to above, produced some complete forgeries on its own. This activity was generally on a smaller scale than that of the Identity Forgery Central. Particularly worthy of note, 252ibid., 253ibid., 63620-63621. 254ibid., 63623-63626.

255ibid. 256ibid., 63627.
however, was a forgery ring which was operated in Germany by Dutch students who had been sent there for forced labor. The group, which the Fugitive Aid Organization satirically called by the German word, Ausenministerium ("Foreign Ministry"), rented an office in, of all places, Berlin, and proceeded to manufacture identity papers authorizing Dutch students in Germany to return to Holland. They regularly acquired paper of various sorts from factories in the vicinity of Berlin, including that used in the preparation of Swedish visas.257

Myriads of different things were forged or counterfeited. Among the most important of these were identity passes or papers. This required a precise printing job on the correct paper, with approximately the correct color of ink,258 with the fingerprint of the bearer, and official authenticating signatures. Genuine passes bore a water-mark, the device of the Dutch lion. Each pass was numbered, with a corresponding number being entered in the community vital-records registry. Finally, a special authorizing stamp of the municipality was affixed. Each community used a different stamp, some with different styles or sizes of lettering, some with the same type styles and sizes but with different spacing. The Identity Forgery Central published a catalog, showing the correct authentication stamp for each community. This catalog contained one thousand examples. To make matters more complicated the Germans had a habit of transferring the stamps of one community for use in another at the opposite end of the country.

257Ibid., 83651.

258Fortunately there was a good deal of color variation among the genuine identity papers.
These and any other changes had to be noted.\textsuperscript{259}

The saving factor in some cases was that the administration of identity papers was left, of necessity, partly in the hands of "safe" Dutch civil servants, who regularly entered and maintained in good standing in the vital-records registries fictitious persons.\textsuperscript{260}

A particularly troublesome feature was the watermark. The earliest forged identity passes contained no watermark at all. Those preparing them were neither proud of nor satisfied with their product, but felt that it was at least safer to use such a pass rather than a legal one bearing the dreaded letter "J" for "Jew". Later a watermark was simulated by glueing together two thin pieces of paper, with the image of the supposed watermark printed lightly on one side of the resultant sandwich. This arrangement was little more satisfactory, as the passes produced by this process could be "split", a discovery that the Gestapo made almost immediately. Eduard Vetterman solved the watermark problem for a time, at least, by openly ordering from a paper manufacturer stock of the proper grade, color, and weight, with the correct lion watermark as well. This, he explained, was to be used in printing the wrapper for a fictitious Löwenseife ("Lion's Head Soap").\textsuperscript{261}

On May 31, 1944, members of the Identity Forgery Central raided the State Printing Office, and carried away "thousands" of blank identity cards. Not only were the cards in question not missed, the security head of the State Printing Office was not aware that his premises had been entered illegally.\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{259}Rubsaam, loc. cit., 83640. \textsuperscript{260}Ibid., 83653. \textsuperscript{261}Ibid., 83620. \textsuperscript{262}Ibid., 83618.
Forged identity papers were not limited to those of the German occupied Netherlands. The Identity Forgery Central turned out such exotic documents as Czarist Russian baptismal certificates and Paraguayan passports. Such obscure papers offered one important advantage: They were virtually impossible to authenticate. Eduard Vetterman produced Brazilian birth certificates without ever having seen such a document. He reasoned that German security forces would never have seen one either. His estimate proved to be correct.263

Other "fantasy papers", as they came to be called, certified that the bearer worked for a Dutch company doing work on German contracts, or that he had a special mission with this or that German agency, sometimes extant, sometimes not. On occasion a resistance worker travelled in the restricted area back of the dune near the Hague, apparently to inspect German fortifications. He employed a "fantasy" paper, a supposed letter from the Reichs-Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, authorizing the bearer, Curator of the Amsterdam Rijksmuseum, to enter the area to examine paintings stored there for safekeeping. The person making the trip in question actually was the Curator of the Rijksmuseum.264

By the winter of 1944-1945 the Germans came to require various sorts of special "legitimation" papers in rich abundance for every conceivable purpose. Of particular importance were the so-called "bicycle" papers. With no transportation available other than the bicycle, its use could well spell the difference between life and death, as it was often necessary to cycle from the large cities to the countryside in search of food. In Amsterdam alone the Identity Forgery Central collected examples

263Ibid., 83623. 264Ibid., 83655.
of seventy different bicycle papers. German security forces apparently had decided on such a wide variety as a method of forestalling forgery. The result was inevitable: The Forgery Central dutifully produced all seventy. In the end this multiplicity of forms worked to the disadvantage of the Germans, as no one person at any check point could possibly be acquainted with more than a fraction of those employed. 265

The Identity Forgery Central produced the necessary papers for rescuing Dutch Jews from the German concentration camp at Westerbork, Holland. Gerhard Badrian, himself Jewish, employed a set of these papers one afternoon when, wearing a German uniform and doing his best imitation of a Gestapo officer, he entered Westerbork and removed to safety his own nephew. 266

The Identity Forgery Central did a brisk business in the production of forged Ausweise, or cards certifying the bearer to be exempt from forced labor in Germany. 267

Ration stamps were not counterfeited by the Forgery Central until the desperate "hunger winter" of 1944-1945, for use by the National Fugitive Aid Organization. Production never exceeded one or two percent of those coupons legally produced. Ration coupons proved most difficult to produce. Each series legally produced deliberately bore a slightly different shade of color from its predecessors. Those legally manufactured were printed by off-set. Since no off-set presses were available for this clandestine project, various of the customary methods of simulating off-set had to be tested and evaluated. That this was successful can be seen in the fact that, as far as the writer

265Ibid. 266Ibid. 85650. 267Ibid.
is able to determine, the forged ration coupons were never detected as such.268

The Forgery Central was made up of four technical groups. Each technical group had its own artists, photographers, engravers, and printers. Each also had a representative which met with other group representatives for daily technical discussions under Forgery Central auspices, wherein, for example, information on the latest authentication stamps of identity passes was exchanged. Security arrangements were such that no representative of a technical group knew the identity, for example, of the printer of another group, so that if a single group should be arrested the others could continue unimpeded. The Germans never penetrated the Forgery Central, although some members were arrested for other activities, and the head, Gerrit van der Veen was arrested on June 1, 1944 (the day after he participated in the successful raid on the State Printer) when he attempted to rescue a friend imprisoned in a German jail in Amsterdam.269

Mr. Cornelis J. Rubsaam, who played a very important role in the Forgery Central, testifying in 1950, wished that the vital role played by printers in forgery operations be made clear. Artists, photographers, even engravers could move themselves and their equipment on short notice, but printers had to stay "put", as printing presses are among the least portable of all man made objects. The printer's location not only was almost surely known to the authorities, he undoubtedly also did a great deal of "legal" work, and had to fulfill his forgery assignments in odd hours, when he stood at least a chance of running afoul of

268 Ibid., 83650-83651. 269 Ibid., 83677.
various German labor inspection programs or curfews. He might be equipped with special permits enabling him to operate at unorthodox hours, he may have printed those permits as well. 270

Contact with the London Government was virtually non-existent during the early years of the Forgery Central's operation. Again, London supplied money through the National Support Fund, in the case of the Identity Forgery Central some fl. 2,500,000 worth. After the death of Gerrit van der Veen, in June of 1944, the activities of the Central were financed completely by the National Support Fund. 271 Indeed, in its second authorization of additional money for the National Support Fund, the London Government specifically mentioned the Forgery Central as one of the intended recipients of its aid. 272

To many a Dutch forger in those days the London Government seemed a logical source of false identity papers, since Britain at least was free. The London Government did supply identity passes to the agents dropped under its auspices. To say that these forgeries prepared in London were very bad indeed is probably something of an understatement. 273

At one point a Mr. Cas de Graaf, of the Forgery Central, went to London with one of Gerrit van der Veen's better products, displayed it to the appropriate officials, and said, "This is what they can do [in occupied Holland]. Why can't you do it?" 274

By January, 1945, the National Fugitive Aid Organization sent a representative to London to inquire if the Netherlands Government could

270Ibid., 83640. 271Hall, loc. cit., 77180-77183.
274Rübsam, loc. cit., 83637.
possibly prepare identity papers for use with a new system about to be instituted by the Germans in connection with another forced-labor drive. This time a pass book was to accompany the identity pass. The Fugitive Aid Organization apparently feared that this new document might prove to be beyond the resources of domestic counterfeiters. As a result, London did deliver forged identity passes, of greatly improved quality and in considerable numbers. The watermark was excellent and the general appearance nearly as good. Unfortunately the paper stock was too coarse, so that they could not be employed. Inquiries were made of London as to when deliveries of improved quality might be expected. 275

In reply the Forgery Central received its only telegram from the London Government:

March 27, 1945.

There have already been sent from the liberated area thousands of identity passes and identity-pass seals, together with blue identity passes. A forgery specialist... from the occupied area has been in London for quite some time. Identity passes will be dropped regularly.276

London apparently made other legitimation papers for the occupied territory, including some that certified that the bearer worked for food distribution services.277

Still later Mr. Rübsaam received from an anonymous source a quantity of blank identity cards for completion. Although the quality was excellent and his curiosity was greatly aroused he restrained his initial impulse to try to ascertain their true origin. They may have come from London, he had no way of knowing.278

275 Ibid., 83632. 276 Ibid.
277 Ibid., 83629-83636. 278 Ibid.
Dr. J. M. Somer, who was in charge of the Bureau Inlichtingen ("Intelligence Bureau") in London, was well aware of the shortcomings of the identity passes with which agents were equipped. The situation did improve while the London Government was still entirely in England, it improved still further when the southern provinces were liberated in the fall of 1944. The sources of his forgery difficulties were various. The London Government had and continued to have the utmost trouble in getting hold of any copies of identity passes for reproduction. Engelandvaarders, whose who crossed from the occupied territory to England, almost never brought their identity passes with them, having discarded them in the interests of security should they be apprehended by the Germans, he reported. Time after time he petitioned the underground through all sorts of contacts to send him a blank identity pass, if one could somehow be obtained. This they never did. He knew only too well that various forgery organizations in the occupied territory turned out excellent identity passes by the hundreds or even thousands. He sought to have a few of these counterfeits sent to him so that he might use them in equipping his agents. He could recall having requested fifty or so at one point. The "underground" sent clandestine newspapers "by the bale", until his office was piled with more than he could read in weeks, but not until the very end did they forward an identity card.279

Dr. Somer had no direct contacts with printers during the time the Government was in London. Forged identity passes were prepared by a British agency that had a small staff and prepared identity papers for

use in nearly every country in Europe and several elsewhere. It did the best it could but was faced with serious shortages itself. Dr. Somer expressed something approaching irritation at the suggestion that London was, by virtue of the technical resources that it must have had at its disposal, in a better position to produce good forgeries than persons in the German-occupied territory. Once the Dutch Intelligence Bureau established a field headquarters in the liberated south, at Eindhoven, a marked improvement took place in the realm of forged identity papers, Dr. Somer reported. It was true, he said, that in the spring of 1945 a number of vastly improved identity passes were delivered to the occupied territory. He felt certain that at least a portion of these were so good that their recipients must have found them of use. They had been prepared with the aid of experts from the occupied area and with the assistance of a chemist, Dr. van Wijk. Dr. Somer could recall having prepared for use in the occupied north forged copies of a particularly elaborate German Ausweis. They were produced at a considerable expense by a large Brussels printing and engraving firm. So good was this forgery that one had great difficulty in telling it from the original.260

The Clandestine Press

Holland has long been noted for its publishing industry. Aside from large orders for foreign account, produced in nearly every conceivable language, a steady stream of all sorts of printed matter is turned out for home consumption. The international character of Dutch commerce has inevitably meant that the Hollander's interests were both

260Ibid.
varied and cosmopolitan. An internal social division further increases the complexity of Dutch interests and affiliations. Not only are there various sorts of liberals and conservatives, there are Roman Catholics, Orthodox Calvinists, not-so-Orthodox Calvinists, Protestants, Jews, Free Thinkers, to name but a few.

The clandestine press was an inevitable development, and it was inevitable that it reflected many of the divisions existing in Netherlands society.

The writer makes no claim that he is presenting here an account of the underground press as such. Those papers selected have been so chosen because they were representative of a type or particular philosophy, or because they illustrate specific aspects of relations between the clandestine press and the London Government.

It was to be expected that publishing an illegal newspaper was a particularly hazardous profession. One should and often could place as great a distance as possible, in terms of personal contact, between the editorial staff and those actually duplicating or printing the copy which had been supplied them. In like manner, an ideal arrangement involved a similar distance between the stenciller or printer and those actually distributing the individual copies. Bundles of the finished product could be passed to individuals of unknown identity, who then broke them down into smaller bundles, again transferring them through intermediaries to the individual reader. No arrangement of anonymity was perfect. Sooner or later chance would have it that a reader would receive his copy from a known verspreider ("spreader"), who might in turn actually know the identity of his distributer, and so on.
Agents provocateur or others who were disloyal could and did find their way into the most sophisticated of the clandestine papers. There was, quite literally, no way of positively identifying in advance those disloyal. There may have been nothing about their behavior or appearance to betray them. They may have been the most conscientious and dedicated of workers. One might have known them and/or their families for years before the war. Their references might well be of the highest order, entirely genuine and based on a deep trust and confidence. The plain fact of the matter was that arrests, imprisonments, and executions were a very common feature of the trade. Most of the underground press was seriously hampered in this fashion, some so much so that publication was never resumed.

Some mention must be made of the value of the clandestine press. It signified more than a gesture of impudence, a romantic, if possibly foolhardy way of "putting one over" on the Germans. A central feature of the occupation period was the fact of intellectual isolation from much of the rest of the world. The information services of the Thousand Year Reich were never noted for either the objectivity or the completeness of their coverage. Persons in all walks of life in the Dutch nation had an almost pathetic interest in any news at all from countries outside the Axis sphere of influence. Agents parachuted into the occupied territory often found as much interest expressed in recent events in the Allied world as in their own particular official mission. On secret radios men listened to London, Moscow, Boston, and, until early in 1942, to the Netherlands East Indies. Many, of course, did not have such an opportunity. For them the clandestine press was the
only link with any sort of objective reality. When the London Government did choose to address itself to the occupied territory in specific terms the clandestine press published such communications. It was through underground papers that the Netherlands public first became aware of the Ordinances of 1937 and the later Commentary. Through the illegal press Hollanders could learn of the latest German measures in such matters as the labor draft. Advance knowledge of such measures, when it was available to the editors, made possible their prior publication, giving those most likely to be affected a chance to take whatever counter measures might be feasible. In a very real sense the clandestine press, at least in the earlier period of the war, had to teach the public to resist. A population generally accustomed to obeying government regulations had to learn disobedience. University students, for example, had to be told not to complete German applications for "exemption" from forced labor service, rather to fill out no forms at all and go into hiding as rapidly as possible. Laborers being taken to Germany by train had actually to be told, incredible though it may seem, to try to escape from such transport.

The underground press undoubtedly contributed, at least in the earlier period of the occupation, to general Netherlands morale and to the general level of expectations. By the fall of 1940 many persons in the occupied territory were convinced of a final German victory. The mere existence of such fiery publications as Johan Doorn's one-man Oranjekrant ("Orange Paper"), which actually was printed on paper stock of an orangeish hue, served as a constant reminder of the possibility of Allied victory and of the existence of the Netherlands
Government in London, however much of an artificial creation it must have seemed to be in 1940. Despair and general forebodings of defeat were, if anything, more intense by the early spring of 1942, which saw the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies. With the Axis defeats in North Africa, events well covered in the clandestine press, general hope revived. Underground editors took a considerable delight in describing the German fiasco at Stalingrad. After these events it was clear that a complete Axis victory was unlikely, in any event.

A final introductory note must be one of caution in assessing the circulation figures offered for the clandestine press. In at least some instances these are based on ex post facto estimates. It is impossible to guess the number of readers of any single copy of a clandestine newspaper. The writer was told of copies having passed through scores of hands until they were literally in tatters. Figures presented here are based on the given or estimated output of all known printing or stencilling plants. On occasion a single copy of a paper reaching a distant town or village might be reproduced locally without the knowledge of the publisher, sometimes in quite impressive numbers.

Het Parool (The Watchword), was a clandestine newspaper of independent socialist persuasion, whose politics, greatly muted in the interests of national unity, appear to this writer to have been similar to those of the British Labour Party. The Watchword was founded in January of 1941, appearing weekly in stencilled form. Later it was printed and may have been the first large clandestine
newspaper to have been printed. Although The Watchword appeared later in Amsterdam and environs as a daily, the weekly continued. By 1944 the weekly, which was printed at The Hague and at Eindhoven, was available on matrixes from which type could be set. A total of four different type styles and two different choices of format was available. Every Thursday morning the matrixes, mercifully easy to conceal and transport, since they were both light and flexible, were sent to additional printing plants at Almelo, Leeuwarden, Maastricht, Breda, Utrecht, and Groningen, where they were set into type.

After World War II Mr. Meijer, one of the editors of The Watchword, was shown, by the War Documentation Service, a collection of underground newspapers, including a pile of back issues of The Watchword of totally unfamiliar format. He could only conclude that an independent printer or group must have produced the issues in question.

The source of news for The Watchword, aside from local informants, was largely Allied radio broadcasts. Radio Orange, since it was the official Dutch station in London, was listened to with great interest, although for quite a portion of its earlier life it carried no news broadcasts. Local, German jamming of Radio Orange made its reception often quite difficult, so that the Home and Forces Program of the B.B.C. was frequently utilized, since it was broadcast on too large a number of wavelengths to make jamming effective. The Watchword operated its own radio listening post, complete with a battery-operated receiver, where London broadcasts were copied stenographically in somewhat

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281 J. Meijer, July 26, 1950, 82083-82084.
282 Ibid., 82083. 283 Ibid.
abbreviated form. Other clandestine newspapers made similar use of Allied broadcasts.

The Watchword, and other papers as well, were able to utilize a valuable network of clandestine telephone and teletype stations in Holland operated by a private intelligence organization, the "press branch" of the Centrale Inlichtingen Dienst.

The "press branch" of the private Central Intelligence Service operated at The Hague the so-called Centraal Bureau Keesen, thus named since its two heads both bore the name of Kees. The Kees combination lovingly gathered Allied radio broadcasts, including particularly those of Radio Orange, on dictaphone cylinder recordings, thus the texts were usually letter-perfect.

The Watchword got more than a little assistance from the so-called legal press, those papers that appeared with German approval. While the legal press took varying positions that were at the least extremely cautious and at the most simply pro-Nazi, it is not to be supposed that the persons thus employed were, by any manner of means, automatically collaborators or Nazi sympathizers. Some of them regularly supplied extraordinarily valuable material to the clandestine press, including important German pronouncements, in advance of their official publication. One such "legal" journalist, Mr. H. Beishuizen, took down and supplied to The Watchword, for an extended period, the entire (British)

284 Ibid., 82085.

285 W. E. Sanders, September 13, 1949, 67055. This private "Central Intelligence Service" should not be confused with the Netherlands Government agency of the same name, located in London.

286 Ibid.
By the time *The Watchword* appeared on a daily basis in the Amsterdam area a vast, institutionalized conspiracy was available for its production and distribution. Each edition closed with the 8:15 A.M. news broadcast of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Make-up was decided on, and then twenty-eight stencils were cut and twenty-seven dispatched by courier. The couriers met still other couriers, of unknown identity, in churches, offices, and other public places. Thus the stencils reached twenty-seven different duplicating machines. Each machine produced between 1,000 and 1,500 copies, which were divided into packets of 100 for distribution by couriers to the "spreaders". The "spreaders" effected delivery to the reader. By evening some 30,000 copies had been delivered. 288

It was a melancholy fact: The larger the circulation of an underground paper, the more likely Gestapo interest, penetration, and capture. *The Watchword*, as a means of misleading the Germans, found it useful to publish and distribute through its own organization papers of various names and format, some for only a short time. This device was also employed by other clandestine papers. 289

*Christofoor* was a stencilled Catholic monthly, founded in 1942, with a circulation of between 5,000 and 10,000 copies. 290

Mr. L. F. W. Jansen, one of the founders of *Christofoor*, stated
that the paper was not created because it was felt that Catholics should specifically have one of their own, but since so many other publications appeared under various banners there might as well be one that was Catholic. Christoffor worked well with other papers of various persuasions. There was a good spirit in those times, Mr. Jansen felt. Since Christoffor was Catholic, Mr. Jansen explained, it could use its "own means" in furthering the resistance. Catholics were thus told that they were required, as an article of faith, to resist the Germans. Portions of Papal pronouncements and pastoral letters by Catholic Bishops were presented in support of this view. Mr. Jansen felt that London placed too little value on the Catholic resistance.291

Publication of Vrij Nederland (Free Netherlands) began in September of 1940, with an issue dated August 31, 1940, the birthday of Queen Wilhelmina.292 Vrij Nederland originally appeared in stencilled form at irregular intervals in Amsterdam, Hilversum, and at the Hague, with a total output of a few hundred copies.293 In spite of arrests it grew, so that by 1944 editions appeared in nearly every major population center in the country. Each issue must have numbered well in excess of 100,000 copies.294

The "politics" of Vrij Nederland were Christian-Protestant (rather than orthodox Calvinist). In terms of social attitudes one might equate


292The clandestine newspaper Vrij Nederland, here described, must not be confused with a magazine of the same name published during World War II in London.

293F. Hofker, August 30, 1950, 83457-83464.

294Randwijk, loc. cit., 66903-66908.
this view with the more liberal elements of the present day (1961)
British Conservative Party. Vrij Nederland maintained close contact with
Dr. Visser 't Hooft, of the Swiss Route in Geneva, since part of the staff
of Vrij Nederland operated the Dutch terminus of the Swiss Route, which
ran from Holland to London via Dr. Visser 't Hooft. The Swiss Route,
as has already been noted, conveyed a prodigious amount of intelligence
material of varied nature. 295

Vrij Nederland felt that it had a duty to protest against some of
the passive attitudes taken by the Netherlands people in regard to the
occupying power. Mr. C. Troost, as a managing editor of Vrij Nederland,
published editorials urging Hollanders to be as distant in their relations
with the Germans as possible. He remembered an article concerning the
legal paper, De Standaard, entitled, "Twilight at De Standaard", in which
he criticized the employment by De Standaard of Max Bloksijl, a pro-Nazi
journalist. 296

Relations with much of the rest of the resistance press were excel-
lent. On an occasion when German arrests made the publication of The
Watchword impossible it was printed for several issues on the presses of
Vrij Nederland. 297

Trouw (Faith), an orthodox Calvinist clandestine newspaper, came into
being, in part, out of dissatisfaction with the liberal views of Vrij
Nederland. It appeared that some of the distributors of Vrij Nederland
in more northern (and more orthodox Calvinist) areas either refused to
295 The Swiss Route is the subject of a later section.
296 C. Troost, August 30, 1950, 83513-83515.
297 Randwijk, loc. cit.
distribute the publication or were reluctant to do so, on grounds of "con-
science". Some were quoted as saying that they found Vrij Nederland "too socialistic".

Part of the initiative for the creation of Faith also came from the
Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party.

Faith began publication in January, 1943, and continued its illegal
operations until the end of World War II. After the war it continued to
publish, as did several other of the clandestine papers.

Faith campaigned particularly against the "Nazification" of Dutch
public life. At the same time it rejected any sort of absolutism in
post-war Dutch government. Generally implied was an aversion to paternalist,
or socialistic attitudes in government, or to "excessive governmental
interference with the free economy". Faith, as might have been
expected, suffered greatly from German counter measures. In 1943 alone
twenty persons were sentenced to death and executed as the direct result
of having participated in the publication of the paper.

Of a quite different viewpoint than that of Faith was the Communist
underground newspaper, De Waarheid (The Truth, or Pravda). The Truth
was created at the behest of Dutch Communist Party leaders in hiding, in
in October, 1940, at least according to the testimony of its first editor.
The first issue, however, was not published until November 7, 1941.

298 G. H. J. van der Molen, July 26, 1950, 82197.
299 J. A. H. J. S. Bruins Slot, July 26, 1950, 82018.
300 Molen, loc. cit., 82197-82202.
301 Bruins Slot, loc. cit., 82031-82035. 302 Ibid.
304 A. J. Koejembers, December 19, 1951, 95256-95261.
Mr. Saul de Groot, the editor in question, said that the long gap between foundation and the appearance of the first issue of The Truth was due to the fact that its founders realized that printing and distribution facilities would have to be carefully established before it could begin regular publication. 305

Mr. de Groot denied that the Nazi-Soviet pact of the period had had anything to do with the slowness with which The Truth appeared on the Dutch scene. He said that the Dutch Communist leadership had never been fooled by Soviet "conferences" with the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, that there was "no question" that the Soviet Union and the Nazi regime could ever be allies, that "logical deduction" as well as the public speeches of Soviet leaders made it clear that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Germany. 306

Truth may have produced as many as 100,000 copies of a single issue, although the figure is uncertain. 307 The paper was stencilled in a central edition and then duplicated elsewhere, often under other names, such as De Vonk (The Spark, or Iskra), or Het Signaal (The Signal), with local news often included in these editions. 308 In spite of the quite respectable size of the issues Truth did not appear in printed form until just before May, 1945. 309

The sources of news for The Truth were radio broadcasts from London and Moscow, local informants, and the German press. Mr. de Groot, who served as editor from the foundation of Truth until April, 1943, found it

309 Koejemans, loc. cit., 95270.
very helpful to read between the lines of the German publication, Das Reich. Mr. de Groot was able to receive Moscow on an ordinary radio, although it was necessary to listen very late at night.310

The Truth proceeded on the general assumption that the Soviet Union was a power whose interests were friendly to those of the Netherlands. In April, 1943, Mr. de Groot was removed from the editorship of Truth and exiled to Overijssel to become editor of a provincial edition. Mr. de Groot had felt that an overriding consideration should be an Allied victory, and that issues of postwar social and political organization should be stressed less. His successor, Mr. Koejemans, felt that more stress should be laid on such issues.311

During the tenure of office of Mr. de Groot Truth had no real contact with any other illegal paper. It was not, he reported, an easy matter to get in touch with the editor of, for example, The Watchword.312

Once Mr. Koejemans assumed office The Truth enjoyed somewhat closer relations with other clandestine newspapers. The Truth cooperated with Vrij Nederland, Faith, and Christofoor in the joint publication of an illegal brochure, Om Nederlands Toekomst (About the Future of the Netherlands).313

Another clandestine newspaper, De Vonk (The Spark), was founded in February, 1941, as a left-wing, socialist, non-Stalinist publication. It appeared in stencilled form until 1944, and then was printed. The printed issues were further reproduced by stencil in several local areas. Until 1945 each issue numbered about 5,000 copies, after December, 1944

312 Ibid., 96961-96967. 313 Koejemans, loc. cit., 95287-95290.
the total number of copies equalled about 10,000 or 12,000.  

The Spark took the attitude that socialists must pursue goals transcending the nation state, that the post-war economy of the world must be organized along lines truly international. In addition to its newspaper, The Spark published a number of brochures, some of which were in German, stating their point of view and urging the German military to desert. A few Germans actually did desert, to be hidden by the organization surrounding The Spark.

Je Maintiendrai, a title drawn from the motto of the Netherlands, was something almost inconceivable in Holland—a newspaper, albeit it clandestine, without fixed political or religious affiliation. Je Maintiendrai began in stencilled form in 1940 under the name of B.C. Nieuws. In 1942 B.C. Nieuws became Je Maintiendrai. It was stencilled in a number of places, the most important being in the Peace Palace at the Hague. It first appeared in printed form at Leeuwarden in July, 1943, and appeared printed after that time. At first a typical issue numbered about 15,000 copies, this was later increased to as much as 25,000.

The editors found that some persons were confused and bewildered by a non-political, non-sectarian paper. The editors learned that Je Maintiendrai had been described as a publication representing the interests of

314 W. F. Storm, August 30, 1950, 83740-83762. This independent paper, De Vonk, should not be confused with local editions of the Communist The Truth, some of which also bore the name, De Vonk.

315 Ibid.

316 The writer has tentatively identified the initials "B.C." as having been derived from Groot-Burgercomite ("Grand Citizens Committee"), an early resistance organization.

317 K. Viehoff, October 23, 1951, 94091-94095.
young Catholic civil servants, or, alternatively, as a socialist publication. This turned out to be particularly true of the Government in London, where one found at least these two contrasting points of view in regard to *Je Maintiendrai*. The trouble with the London Government, the editors felt, was that it felt an urge to place everything in nice, neat compartments, a method not always well suited to the German occupied Netherlands. 318

Such contact as did exist between the London Government and the clandestine press must now be described.

The London-guaranteed National Support Fund paid a total of £1,531,000 for the direct benefit of the clandestine press. 319 That London held the underground press in high esteem is indicated in the fact that the second authorization of money for the National Support Fund specifically included the underground press as one of the intended recipients. 320

Doubtless some of the help which the National Support Fund gave to other organizations indirectly benefited persons publishing clandestine newspapers. This must have been particularly true of funds given to the Forgery Central and the National Fugitive Aid Organization. Some of those employed in the work of the clandestine press had no other employment, and led more or less of an outlawed existence. Consequently they needed both forged identity papers and the assistance which the Fugitive Aid Organization could offer.

Several of the leading clandestine papers reported that they had been able to function largely independent of National Support Fund assistance. Many received regular contributions from their readers and 318 Ibid. 319 Hall, loc. cit., 77180-77183. 320 ENQ, VIIa, 236.
other interested persons.

The Watchword used National Support Fund help only once, in the
winter of 1944–1945.321

Similarly, Vrij Nederland apparently made very little use of such
aid, except for that same winter.322

Faith described itself as "self supporting" and, apparently, never
received any direct assistance from the National Support Fund.323

The Communist paper, The Truth, received no money from the National
Support Fund and was not even aware that London-guaranteed funds were
available for the use of the clandestine press. The Truth did create a
Solidariteitsfonds ("Solidarity Fund"), which apparently was not intended
for the support of the paper but for the assistance of the surviving
families of deceased resistance workers.324

All of the clandestine press had contact with London in the sense
that all employed London radio broadcasts. Contact other than this
varied sharply from paper to paper.

The Watchword and Vrij Nederland both commissioned Mr. G. J. van
Heuven Goedhart to travel to London as their representative, so that the
Government might become better informed on the role of the clandestine
press. Mr. van Heuven Goedhart, who departed on April 24, 1944, went to
London via Belgium, France, Andorra, Spain, and Gibraltar. In addition
to his mission for the clandestine press he had several other resist-

322A. H. van Namen, July 26, 1950, 82150.
323Bruins Slot, July 26, 1950, 82068–82071.
324Koejemsans, loc. cit., 95333.
Aside from the contact via Mr. van Heuven Goedhart, The Watchword made no other effort to contact London directly. Shipments of The Watchword, beginning in 1943, travelled regularly to London via the Swiss Route. Back to The Watchword, as well as to some other clandestine publications, came various British and American periodicals, together with assorted clippings. It was in this fashion that The Watchword received copies of the Dutch magazine published in London, Vrij Nederland.

Mr. Johan Grim, an agent of the (Dutch) Military Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to Holland, was parachuted into the occupied territory on the night of October 18, 1943. Grim had several missions, among them one of contacting the clandestine press. He was able to establish such contact, and met with Mr. van Heuven Goedhart before the latter's departure for England. Grim brought with him copies of the Ordinances of 1937, with their standards of conduct for civil servants, a document almost totally unknown to civil servant or private citizen alike.

Grim was captured by the Gestapo at the moment he was on his way to meet with a staff representative of The Watchword.

Johan Grim, miraculously alive after World War II, recalled that he was received by Mr. van Heuven Goedhart who, fresh from a most painful experience with an organization that had been betrayed by a clever and resourceful agent provocateur, one Anton van der Waals, was understandably suspicious. When Grim offered to send a telegram to London, request-

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325 J. van Heuven Goedhart, November 9, 1948, 32929. One motivation for his departure doubtless lay in the fact that a current Gestapo bulletin offered a reward of Rm. 10,000, promotion of rank, and the Iron Cross (Second Class) for his capture.

326 Meijer, loc. cit., 82089. 327 Ibid., 82090-82095. 328 Ibid.
ing that any message chosen by Mr. van Heuven Goedhart be broadcast by Radio Orange, this did not allay the fears of Mr. van Heuven Goedhart, as van der Waals, employing a Gestapo-penetrated telegraphic network actually in contact with the London Government, had caused Radio Orange to broadcast a number of such messages by request.329

Mr. Meijer of The Watchword, doubted that there had been any deliberate hostility directed at an agent known to be from London. Everyone in those days, he reiterated, feared agents of the German security police.330

Hans Bialosterski, who had worked with The Watchword, escaped to England in November, 1943. As far as this writer is able to determine he went with no mission from The Watchword. During the night of April 1, 1944, Bialosterski was parachuted into the occupied territory, together with a quantity of supplies for the clandestine press. Something went wrong with the "freight" portion of this shipment, so that he was unable to locate any of his supplies. Although he had the assistance in his search of Mr. C. J. van Paaschen of the Groep-Pieter ("Peter Group"), a resistance organization based in the Peace Palace at the Hague, the search was fruitless. Bialosterski was able to deliver to Mr. van Paaschen a sum of money intended to assist the clandestine press, and an engraving containing a photograph of Queen Wilhelmina, together with a message from the monarch for publication in the underground press.331

The text of the brief article is as follows:

329 J. Grun, October 20, 1948, 30029.


331 C. J. van Paaschen, March 10, 1950, 76726.
My fellow countrymen:

Regularly now I address you by radio, and when, in these extraordinary times, I was offered the opportunity to contact you via the underground press I did not want to let this special medium go unused, as everything that can serve the cause of our unity must be utilized. I read in the underground press and in other documents how you live and struggle in these times, but I am able to follow even better your life through refugees who are living witnesses to your sufferings and struggles, to the hope that lives in you, but above all they are witnesses to your unshakable belief in victory...Know that you do not stand alone. We strive, shoulder to shoulder, for the same cause, the cause of truth and justice, the cause of liberation. We strive for a fresh, new Netherlands, that must be forthcoming from this war...that, finally, with God's help shall come.332

Mr. van Paaschen delivered both the engraving and the money to the Perskern ("Press Kernel"), a press-coordinating body.333

Agent Bialosterski looked to the establishment of a regular traffic between the clandestine press and the London Government, whereby regular shipments of underground papers would, in effect, be exchanged for periodicals and books from the Allied world. Part of the traffic was to proceed by microfilm, some of it by "droppings" at previously-arranged dropping areas. Such a service did come into being, part of it operated via the Swiss Route.334

In the middle of April, 1944, Bialosterski returned to England to try to secure replacements for the supplies lost when he was dropped by parachute.335

332 ENG, VIIa, 213.

333 While several of the clandestine papers utilized the services of the Press Kernel, others held it in less high esteem, as membership in such a body was felt to entail extensive security risks.

334 Just how much material was actually delivered by this means the writer has been unable to determine. After September, 1944, with the liberation of the south, much could be smuggled through the lines.

335 Paaschen, loc. cit.
Bialosterski was subsequently parachuted a second time into the occupied area, this time as a liaison officer to serve between the Netherlands Forces of the Interior and the press. He was established in Amsterdam, with the particular assignment of developing and expanding the use of areas as sites for "dropping" purposes.\textsuperscript{336}

The Watchword found after the first Bialosterski visit that it could get supplies from the London Government by contacting the liaison officer of the Press Kernel, a Mr. Wüthrich, of \textit{Je Maintiendrai}. After the arrest of Mr. Wüthrich the organisation moved from Amsterdam to the Hague, keeping at an Amsterdam address a Mr. Marius de Bruin.\textsuperscript{337} Through this contact, The Watchword was able to receive battery-operated radios for the reception of London broadcasts, batteries, and various Allied periodicals. Mr. Meijer remembered with particular affection several issues of the \textit{New Statesman}. Yet another "priceless treasure" which London supplied was bicycle tires, a commodity upon which one's life might depend, quite literally, during the last "hunger winter" of 1944-1945.\textsuperscript{338}

Mr. Meijer, of The Watchword, while readily acknowledging the technical assistance rendered by agents Grün and Bialosterski, felt that London could have been of almost more assistance in another fashion. While it was true that the clandestine press was faced with material shortages and problems of every sort they were, in the main, able to meet these from their own internal resources. A more severe problem, in the broader

\textsuperscript{336}ibid., 76729-76730.

\textsuperscript{337}The writer believes this name to be a pseudonym.

\textsuperscript{338}Meijer, \textit{loc. cit.}, 82098-82108.
sense, was that of intellectual isolation. Allied news broadcasts were helpful but they were, of necessity, short. Mr. Meijer could remember with painful clarity how every printed word received from an Allied country was devoured by him and his colleagues. It might have been of greater assistance, he felt, if London had sent men with the vision and intelligence to interpret current happenings from the point of view of the general intellectual atmosphere prevailing in the Allied countries. It could have been of great assistance if, for example, Mr. van Heuven Goedhart could have returned to Holland after spending a few months in London. Agents Grund and Bialosterski, while they rendered valuable services, had no more than a very general knowledge of what went on in the outside world. They were able to detail only the latest political intrigues in progress in the Netherlands community in London, a matter of less than absorbing importance to those in the occupied territory.339

Vrij Nederland, which helped process material to be sent to London via the Swiss Route, was thus in almost constant contact with London.

Mr. A. H. van Namen, of Vrij Nederland, had indirect contact with the London agent, Johan Grund. There existed a certain reserve towards this agent, although Vrij Nederland was able to employ the Swiss Route in his authentication.340

Mr. van Namen felt that the clandestine press, with its power to influence public opinion, had a tremendous responsibility. He could recall serious editorial discussions as to policy that had continued for hours or even days. There were problems facing the underground press in

339 Ibid.
340 Namen, loc. cit., 82144-82147.
which London was involved, or at least implicated. When writing an article on the acts of civil servants still functioning in the occupied territory, for example, one was faced with the difficult fact that London had said little or nothing about this subject. From February, 1943 on, after London had issued the Commentary, and began to speak in much clearer language in support of acts of resistance, life for the clandestine press was less complicated, at least in the sense that one could usually tell with some degree of accuracy what the views of the London Government on a given subject might be likely to be.

Mr. van Randwijk, also of Vrij Nederland, recalled that the same agent bringing the Queen’s article of May, 1944, also brought some fl. 50,000 or fl. 100,000 for the use of the underground press.

Mr. van Randwijk recalled having been given an article for publication from, "The Allied High Command", which he thought might have arrived via Bialosterski. The article, directed to the general public, urged the commission, without any further consultation or authorization, of acts of sabotage. It also urged that Hollanders fire on Germans from concealed positions on every occasion possible. If nothing else this proposed item for publication stimulated consultation and agreement between the clandestine papers. All of them agreed not to publish it! Publication, they reasoned, without any qualification, might cause the Germans...

The Ordinances of 1937, as has been said, were unknown to the public and to civil servants as well.

Mr. van Randwijk, loc. cit., 66909-66912. Reference here is clearly made to Bialosterski. While the Queen's article apparently was published in May, Bialosterski arrived in Holland on April 1, 1944.
to correctly regard any and every Hollander as a *franco-tireur.*  

Faith, the orthodox Calvinist paper, had virtually no contact with London. It sent copies of its publication to London regularly via the Swedish Route, and received word of their arrival. After the Swedish Route was closed it continued to send material through the Swiss Route. The publishers of Faith had the very definite impression that both Vrij Nederland and the organization in Switzerland of Dr. Visser 't Hooft deliberately withheld or edited material forwarded to London through its agency. The staff of Faith prepared, on occasion, elaborate reports on special subjects for the information of appropriate authorities in London. There never seemed to be any evidence of these reports having reached those to whom they were addressed.

Dr. J. A. H. J. S. Bruins Slot, who became editor of Faith in January, 1943, never had any contact with either agents Grün or Biaslosterski. He recalled that, on occasion, Faith was offered funds supposed to have come from the London Government. The offers were refused as the paper was self-supporting.

Je Maintiendrai had contact with London in the sense that it sent copies regularly to London via the Swiss Route, and, in the later period, received regular deliveries of foreign publications from the London Government, including the magazine *Vrij Nederland,* published in London.

From the beginning those on the staff of *Je Maintiendrai* were rather


348 *K. Viehoff, October 23, 1951,* 84107.
critical of the London Government. From the earliest Radio Orange broadcasts it was most apparent that London was very badly informed on a number of aspects of the occupation. Some improvement was apparent in the later period. 349

Je Maintiendrai appreciated the material assistance received from London, including some engravings that were supplied for its use. London radio broadcasts had been of very great value. In criticizing their content Je Maintiendrai did not want to seem to be in the position of belittling the vast importance of both Radio Orange and other Allied broadcasts. At the same time Je Maintiendrai was amazed at the use which London made of articles clipped from its publication. This was particularly true of the London magazine, Vrij Nederland. Once underground papers became available to the London Vrij Nederland excerpts from them were regularly reprinted. Mr. Viehoff, of Je Maintiendrai, could recall that some humorous material was reprinted, but that London almost never reproduced "major articles of importance". 350

The Communist paper, The Truth, had no direct contact with London. As has been noted, The Truth relied in part on London radio broadcasts. The original editor, Mr. de Groot, found Radio Orange to be deficient, a sentiment he shared with a great many people of every political persuasion. He stated that the best and most inspiring broadcasts were those delivered by, "Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina." 351

Mr. de Groot's successor, Mr. Koejemans, had not established contact with London, nor was any assistance received by The Truth from the National Support Fund. 352

Mr. Koejemans did receive and publish the photograph of Queen Wilhelmina, together with its accompanying message. It came to him in matrix form from an unknown source. Other than this London never told him at all what he should publish or what it might like stressed, or anything of the sort.353

Mr. Koejemans did feel that it would have been of help to the clandestine press if London had given it periodic reports as to what transpired there and what its views on events of the day were.354

The Spark, the left-wing, international socialist paper, had no contact with the London Government.355

Fairly early in the occupation the Netherlands Government Information Service in London, in at least a certain sense, went into the field of clandestine publishing itself. Publication was begun of a Dutch language newspaper of small format entitled, De Wervelwind (The Whirlwind), printed on onion skin paper and scattered in Holland by Allied aircraft. The Whirlwind read very much like a transription of an earlier Radio Orange broadcast, not a surprising fact since both were produced by the same organization. After the manner of Radio Orange in the earlier period, The Whirlwind reflected a massive ignorance on the part of London of conditions in the occupied territory. The successor to The Whirlwind, De Vliegende Hollander (The Flying Dutchman), was no great improvement.356

Political and Intellectual Organizations

Before World War II there were fifty-two political parties in the

353 Ibid. 95292-95296. This matrix probably came from the Press Kernel.

354 Ibid., 95303-95305. 355 Storm, loc. cit., 83740-83762.

356 Interview with C. H. Evers, April 21, 1960.
Netherlands. While the figure is an impressive one, it must be noted that less than a dozen of these possessed any real importance.

The Rooms-Katholieke Staats-Partij ("Roman Catholic State Party"), one of the largest, was more or less in the tradition of Christian Democrats found in other European countries and was moderately conservative.

The Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders-Partij ("Social Democratic Workers' Party"), closely resembled the pre-Hitler Social Democratic Party in Germany.

The Christelijk-Historische Unie ("Christian Historical Union"), and the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij ("Anti-Revolutionary Party"), were both Protestant, and both rather conservative.

The Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond ("Liberal Democratic Association"), and the Liberale Staats-Partij ("Liberal State Party"), were both "liberal" in the customary European sense of the word.

Of minor pre-war importance was the small Nationaal Socialistische Beweging ("National Socialist Movement"), the Dutch Nazi party.

At the other end of the spectrum was the Communistische Partij Nederland ("Communist Party Netherlands"), without representation in Parliament and in more or less constant trouble with the police.

Contact between the London Government and political or intellectual groupings of persons in the occupied territory was slow in coming. In the earliest period communications of any sort between Holland and London were, of course, meager. Since the Dutch body politic had been a badly fragmented one it was quite understandable that London was going to be very cautious in dealing with any single party or group
for fear it would become too closely identified with the organization in question. It would have been a brave prophet indeed who would have predicted that the Socialists, the Catholics, the Anti-Revolutionary and Christian Historical parties, would have all gotten together with the Liberals and held clandestine discussions. Incredible though it may seem, this is precisely what happened, in the form of the Politiek Convent ("Political Convention"). The Convention met, discussed a wide variety of probable postwar problems, and arranged a postwar political truce. Members of the Convention travelled throughout the country, urging their fellow party members not to remain in administrative or civil service posts after their authority was seriously weakened by the infiltration of Dutch Nazis into key positions.

The Political Convention did not attempt to come into contact with London until the assassination of the Dutch Nazi, General Seyffardt, head of the Netherlands "S.S." units. From London, Radio Oranje editorialized that, while the sudden passing of Seyffardt had engendered little grief in Netherlands Government circles, it was felt that this sort of activity could not be approved as a general means of altering the political future. Radio Oranje spoke out against those who, "Want to be their own judge," and advised that attacks of this sort constituted a "flagrant violation" of both the general law of nations and of specific conventions to which Holland was signatory.

Several members of the Convention felt that London was quite ill-advised in

357 J. Schouten, September 20, 1950, 85062-85063.
358 Vorrink, loc. cit., 68019-68020.
359 ENQ, VIIa, appendix, xxx.
delivering an admonition of this sort. While a very great many top Dutch political leaders had legal training, some of them having served as professors of law as well, they felt that the precise legal status of the occupying power was less important than the "changed circumstances" in which the Netherlands people lived. London, in a communication smuggled through Switzerland via microfilm, was rather tartly told that the day to day realities of the occupation might transcend the strict letter of the law. The Convention received no reply to this letter, although it is believed to have reached its destination.

Subsequently, the Convention sent a series of most elaborate communications to London, outlining the consensus of the body on a wide range of problems, indeed on nothing less than the entire postwar social and economic organization of the Netherlands. A number of more specific reports were sent, as well.

The Convention was irritated at receiving no specific acknowledgment from London concerning its efforts. The postwar policy studies were known to have been received in London and were studied there.

The Groot-Burgerscomité ("Grand Citizens' Committee"), and the Nationaal Comité ("National Committee"), both came into being as the

The Swiss Route is believed to have been employed for this communication.

The writer believes that the letter in question reached London and was lost somewhere in the labyrinth of agencies there.

G. E. van Walsum, July 26, 1950, 81942-81947.

P. S. Gerbrandy, July 21, 1953, 97620-97621.
result of consultations between members of the Political Convention and those of the Groep Scholten ("Scholten Group"), a predominantly Protestant organization devoted to resisting in a spiritual sense the increasingly pervasive efforts to "Nazify" Dutch public life. The Scholten Group, named after Professor Paul Scholten, a famous Amsterdam University figure, included some political leaders. The Group made studies of Netherlands society, and of constitutional government, in addition to those of a religious or philosophical nature. 364

It is apparent that the Scholten Group and the Political Convention had more than a little in common. In part to avoid the obvious security hazards entailed in holding joint meetings of the two organizations there was formed a liaison body, the Grand Citizens' Committee, made up of some fifteen members of the two organizations. 365

Since a group of fifteen persons was still too large to meet without arousing at least routine suspicion in German-occupied Holland, a working committee of some five persons, the National Committee, was formed. The National Committee contained one representative from the Catholic, Socialist, and Anti-Revolutionary Parties, and two non-political members. The National Committee, made up of Messrs. Schouten, Verschoor, Vorrink, Ringers, and Menten functioned during all of 1942, and until April 1, 1943. 366

The aim of the National Committee was to temporarily assure authority sufficient to keep order if a political "vacuum" existed at the time of liberation. If there was no vacuum there was to be no assumption of

366 Ibid., 65147-65149.
power. Nothing was to be done in a manner not consistent with Dutch constitutional traditions, the Committee insisted. The members of the National Committee knew that such an assumption of power, in the absence of specific Government authorisation, would not be constitutional in itself, but might be excusable under emergency conditions. Any administration which the Committee would institute would be temporary, and would not function in such a manner as to impair the prompt, orderly restoration of normal democratic processes. 367

Members of the Committee feared that liberation might signal a bijkjedag ("hatchet day"), on which widespread violence might be directed against not only collaborators but innocent persons as well.

The National Committee was not intended to rival the Order Service, also engaged in the business of providing for a temporary administration in the event of a "vacuum", as said Mr. E. E. Menten, one of the Committee members. The National Committee, he pointed out, came into being at a time when the Order Service, particularly in the Hague, had suffered very severe losses and was nearly extinct, or so it seemed at the time. 368

The National Committee sent to London in November, 1942, a detailed description of its aims, together with an offer of its services and a request for official authorization. The message, which travelled via the Swiss Route, also explored legal aspects of a possible state of siege, to be proclaimed at the time of liberation, and recommended the furloughing of the Secretaries-General still left in charge of the administrative departments, owing to their alleged acquiescence in acts of benefit to

367 Schouten, loc. cit., 85084.
368 E. E. Menten, November 20, 1951, 94544.
the Germans. The message also proposed the creation, at the time of liberation, of a single, national radio station for the "transition period". A single "unity" newspaper was also suggested, and if this was not to be the case, it was urged that newspapers of an "extremist nature" might be regulated during this period by allocation of paper supplies and the physical control of printing presses. Various fiscal measures to be taken at the time of liberation were also proposed.369

The National Committee urgently sought contact with London by the use of radio. Such a contact seemed to have been located in the person of Anton de Wilde, believed by the Committee to be an agent dropped by the London Government. Mr. de Wilde was able to readily authenticate himself, since he could, on request, have Radio Orange transmit whatever message might be desired. Thus it seemed clear that de Wilde had a trustworthy radio contact with London. The first messages for London from the National Committee to be sent by this radio link were given to de Wilde at the beginning of 1943.370

The advent of the National Committee was greeted with uncertainty in London. Doubtless by this time the London Government must have felt that organizations intended to provide order and fill a possible vacuum were becoming a glut on the market. The National Committee's lengthy message outlining its aims had been received, and Minister-President Gerbrandy wondered what sort of recognition, if any, should be extended to the organization. If such recognition, whether partial or full was to be extended, what of the timing? Should it be formally announced in the shape of a telegram or letter addressed to the National

Committee or in a public pronouncement? The matter was apparently discussed in the Cabinet, although no written record of such a discussion has survived. In the end a telegram sent in the name of Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina was dispatched, dated April 1, 1943. Her Majesty "observed with approval" the formation of the National Committee. She shared the National Committee's aversion to possible violence or disorder at the time of liberation. She hoped that the Committee would cooperate with the Order Service, which clearly shared at least some of the same objectives, or if not, state why such cooperation was not desired. She stated that, at the time of liberation, the then-present London Cabinet was to be replaced by a "transition or emergency cabinet" to consist, in so far as practicable, of persons drawn from the occupied territory. It was the aim of her government, in any event, to root out untrustworthy elements, (i.e., collaborators), and to restore the orderly, constitutional processes of Dutch government.\textsuperscript{371}

Unfortunately this telegram never reached its destination. At 6:00 P.M. on April 1, 1943, at precisely the same moment all over the country, German security police arrested all of the members of the National Committee,\textsuperscript{372} and a majority of members of the Grand Citizens' Committee.\textsuperscript{373}

This disaster had been caused by Mr. Anton de Wilde, who, it appeared, was really Anton van der Waals, an agent provocateur. Van de Waals had, indeed, been able to send telegraphic messages to London,\textsuperscript{371ENQ, VIIa, 163. 372Asbeck, loc. cit., 83808-83815. 373Drees, loc. cit., 65150-65160.}
requesting that Radio Orange broadcast this or that message, since his employer, the Gestapo, had penetrated, through the simple expedient of capturing the agent-operator, a "line" of radio-telegraphic communication leading to London. Messages sent over this circuit were not transmitted by gallant "agent" de Wilde, or even by the traitor van der Waals, but by a seasoned telegraphist of the German Kriegsmarine, rounding out his thirtieth year of service.374

The Fatherland Committee

The Vaderland Comité ("Fatherland Committee"), was the direct successor to the late National Committee. After the demise of the latter organization the surviving Netherlands political leaders were more than a little pessimistic. They asked one another, "What's the use? The Germans penetrated the organization, they know everything."375

Soon a telegram from London arrived through genuinely "safe" channels, urging that the Committee be reconstructed. Accordingly, another five persons were given the dubious pleasure of constituting the second National Committee. To avoid confusion with another resistance organization, the Nationaal Comité van Verzet ("National Resistance Committee"), London suggested that the second National Committee be called the "Fatherland Committee".376

The Fatherland Committee regarded itself as the successor to the National Committee, but in actual fact it came to care less for the concept of assuming temporary power at the time of liberation, partly because the new Committee lived in drastically changed circumstances.

374Menten, loc. cit.
375Drees, loc. cit. 376Ibid.
When, in late 1941 or early 1942, the first Committee had come into being, resistance groups were still very lightly organized, coordination efforts had not really begun. By the time the Fatherland Committee was established any such projected assumption of power would have made for automatic conflict with other resistance groups, notably the Order Service, which had arisen anew from its earlier losses. To one of its members, Dr. Willem Drees, the job of the Fatherland Committee now seemed to be more one of keeping London informed on resistance activity. He felt that the Fatherland Committee could not, strictly speaking, be characterized as a "resistance" organization, since it did not engage in acts of armed resistance, but existed more as an information center. The reconstituted Committee again consisted of five members, three representing as many political parties, two who were without political affiliation.377

The Fatherland Committee entered into contact with the London Government via the Swiss Route and, when speed was of the essence, employed clandestine radio circuits reaching London.378

On January 7, 1944, Dr. Visser 't Hooft, proprietor of the Geneva link of the Swiss Route, forwarded a paraphrased message from the Fatherland Committee for Minister-President Gerbrandy. The message was cast in the form of several questions: Did London regard the work of the Committee of any real value, and if so, was the Government prepared to recognize the Committee as the central source for coordination and advice in non-military matters pertaining to resistance organizations? Were there matters about which London sought further information or regarding which London desired specific action to be taken? If so, what were they and

377 Ibid. 378 Ibid.
which were to be the subjects of further information and which of action? What sorts of subjects were to remain outside the competence of the Fatherland Committee? 379

On April 12, 1944, the Fatherland Committee received a reply, again via the Swiss Route, from Minister-President Gerbrandy. The London Government, Gerbrandy reported, did place real value on the work of the Committee, and urged that it take into its group representatives of other underground organizations. If this was done, then the Government was willing to regard the Fatherland Committee as the central agency responsible for coordination and advice in matters pertaining to resistance organizations. London, the Minister-President said, desired information on or action regarding those things on which, in London's opinion, it was not well informed, or those matters most likely to be urgent problems at the time of liberation. At the moment information was sought as to the extent of economic repair and replacement likely to be required in Holland; the regulation of unclaimed assets of persons deceased or deported; the extent of aid required by the destitute; the giving of aid to families of deportees and other war victims; and the nature of assistance to be given the unemployed. Outside the sphere of operations of the Fatherland Committee were to remain matters pertaining to martial law, and the arraignment and prosecution of collaborators. The London Government, Minister-President Gerbrandy stated, would have later questions concerning a wide variety of subject matter. 380

The Fatherland Committee replied that it would strive to join with other organizations, that it appreciated London's desire to have as much

379 ELF'a, VIIa, 171. 380 Ibid., 172.
coöperation as possible, but that this coöperation might best be achieved through an intermediate representative who was well informed on the activities of various organizations. The Committee wished to make it clear that it was not in a position to try to coördinate future resistance activity, that current conditions were all it could cope with. This was particularly true, the Committee stressed, in regard to some of the clandestine organizations of a necessarily anonymous character, about which too little data might be available.381

During the months that followed the Fatherland Committee wrote reports on a wide range of subject matter. One such report urged legal changes in the status of Dutch police, and requested that the Order Service be restricted to lending "technical assistance" in the maintenance of law and order at the time of liberation, and that the Service not be permitted to assume power on its own but remain under Government control.382

The Committee made recommendations to London in regard to proposed changes in the forms of Provincial and local government, monetary and fiscal policy, agriculture, labor-management relations, and emergency public health measures.383

The Fatherland Committee also made recommendations as to the treatment of persons who had collaborated with the enemy.384

In a tart message of June 2, 1944, the Committee informed London of the "present status" of pre-war political leaders, who had been a target of bitter attacks in the clandestine press, for their supposed passivity. The message indicated that nearly all of the party leaders of every

381 Ibid., 173. 382 Ibid., 174-175. 383 Ibid., 178ff. 384 Ibid., 178ff.
persuasion had been active in resistance work. The "current addresses" of the men and women in question were listed, with a result resembling a directory of Nazi concentration camps.385

Dr. Willem Drees, who was Minister-President of the Netherlands for several years after World War II, felt that if London had paid more attention to the reports of the Fatherland Committee, some of which were painstakingly prepared by persons who were experts in their particular fields, things in the postwar period might have gone better.386

Others were irritated at having prepared elaborate studies which had gone unacknowledged and, if policies followed were any indication, unread. Among those were the studies dealing with the legal status of collaborators, changes proposed in the Dutch criminal code, and so on.387 London also requested special studies, which were duly prepared and sent on their way. These reports, too, often went unacknowledged.388

From London's point of view it was inevitable that expert suggestions would go apparently unheeded. Minister-President Gerbrandy sometimes received two or more conflicting advisory opinions from experts in the occupied territory. If the issue was one that the London Government could and did translate into policy, needless to say, someone in Holland was going to be disappointed.389 The position of the Fatherland Committee was, after all, only advisory in nature. London had no obligation to follow the suggestions of the Committee.390

385Ibid., 161. 386Drees, loc. cit., 65234.
390J. R. M. van Angeren, September 3, 1953, 98156-98157.
Coordination: The Nucleus.

The Kern ("Nucleus"), was a nationwide resistance-coordinating and technical assistance body which came into being in 1943 as the result of discussions between Mr. J. Buys of the National Fugitive Aid Organization and Mr. van Hall of the National Support Fund. These two groups became the first members of the Nucleus. It was apparent that coordination between the groups in question was vital to the services they performed. The Fugitive Aid Organization needed money to care for its charges, the National Support Fund needed help to see that the aid it provided reached the intended recipients and that no one received double assistance. Later Nature, an organization providing food and clothing for resistance organizations, joined. It was followed by the Identity Forgery Central, the newspaper Faith, which also operated a resistance organization, the National Committee of Resistance, the Order Service, and, somewhat later, the Council of Resistance.391

The Nucleus customarily held meetings in both the morning and afternoon. The morning gatherings discussed general matters of mutual importance. In the afternoons the agenda was devoted to more detailed questions. Such problems as the projected need for ration stamps to be acquired by the Knuckle Gang, or a likely increase in the number of fugitives in a given area were discussed.392

In addition, the Nucleus coordinated distribution of all sorts of identity papers, disseminated general technical information relating to resistance work, particularly so that mistakes, once made and recognized

391J. Buys, January 16, 1952, 95498-95530.
392Ibid., 95512.
as such, would not be repeated. 393

The Nucleus was never a grouping of all the underground. It never included, for example, the clandestine press. It was not a political or legal discussion group, and it included neither the political National Committee nor its successor, the Fatherland Committee. It never discussed the problems of the period of liberation, being absorbed in the day to day operation of the resistance.394

The Nucleus kept in close touch with business and industry, advising them on such matters as the methods which an employer could use in helping his workers avoid the German labor conscription. 395

The apparent absence of any contact between the Nucleus and the London Government, prior to the summer of 1944, leads this writer to suspect that, since those organizations represented had their own contacts with London, the Nucleus saw no point to entering into the additional contact involved, complete with its hazards. The work of the Nucleus was largely one of coordination and there was clearly little London could add. The Nucleus received no aid from the National Support Fund, nor is there any evidence to indicate such aid was required. Since the head of the National Support Fund, Mr. van Hall, regularly sat on the Nucleus there was certainly no lack of contact.

A telegram of June 8, 1944, received from the London Government, and believed to have been sent through the radio network of the Order Service, put the future of the Nucleus in at least some doubt. The Netherlands Government did desire the coordination of all resistance.

393 L. Neher, October 26, 1954, 98484. 394 Ibid., 98488. 395 Ibid.
groups on as broad a basis as possible. The body thus formed was to choose from its number representatives who would serve in a caretaker capacity to maintain peace and order at the time of liberation, particularly in the event of the oft-discussed "vacuum", and to be continued in this capacity until the arrival of the Ministers and the Militair Gezag ("Military Authority"), which London planned as a temporary administration for the transition period. This same group of delegates, the telegram continued, was to serve as Royal advisers for the transition period following liberation.396

This communication immediately caused some concern and irritation in the Nucleus. Administrative problems of the transition period were more or less political matters and the Nucleus had sought to avoid "politics". Moreover, it was clear that London intended a body with a considerably wider membership than the Nucleus included, and that membership by the political Fatherland Committee was clearly inferred.397

The Calvinist paper Faith sent to the London Government a letter, dated June 28, 1944, in which it was claimed that some Nucleus members had represented, perhaps as the result of wishful thinking, their organization as being more all-embracing than it in actual fact was. Faith noted that the Nucleus did not include the clandestine press, the political party resistance, various study groups, professor and student resistance groups, or the medical resistance.398

Faith felt that expansion of the Nucleus to include many more groups

396 Beq, VIIa, 289.  397 Buys, loc. cit., 95332.

398 Some of the groups referred to here have not been dealt with elsewhere in this dissertation as they had no contact with the London Government and thus are outside the terms of reference of this study.
might entail grave security risks. Faith doubted that the Nucleus, with its predominantly technical job, was very well suited to enter into political duties, tasks which might in turn impair its considerable technical efficiency. Faith hoped that the London Government would not try to "push" the Nucleus into being the central representative body for the resistance. Notes appended to the Faith letter by Dr. Visser 't Hooft, of the Swiss Route, indicated that the liberal Protestant paper Vrij Nederland and the Socialist Watchword were in basic accord with its contents.399

The Nucleus apparently worked well and harmoniously, a fact that was not necessarily to be expected, in view of the presence of such diverse groups as the Council of Resistance and the Order Service, noted for their disagreement with each other. The Council, a late arrival to Nucleus work, had originally had more than a few reservations, but in the end had high praise for its operation.400

The Contact Commission, the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission, and the College of Bondsmen

It was decided, as might have been expected, that the Nucleus was not a feasible organization for coordination on the scale desired by London. In order to give effect to London's telegram of June 8th, a meeting of a score or more of representatives of resistance groups was held on July 3, 1944. This was the representative body that was to become the Grote Adviescommissie der Illegaliteit ("The Grand Resistance Advisory Commission"), although it was not to call itself by this name for a number of weeks. At this meeting were representatives of several

399ENQ, VIIa, 272. 400Engel, loc. cit., 98845.
clandestine newspapers, Faith, The Watchword, Vrij Nederland, The Truth, and Je Maintiendrai, the National Fugitive Aid Organization, the Council of Resistance, the Knuckle Gang, the Order Service, the National Resistance Committee, and the Fatherland Committee. A number of other organizations were represented by one or another of the delegates of those groups already listed. These included: School Verzet ("School Resistance"), The National Support Fund, Zeeliedenfonds ("Seamen Fund"), a support organization out of which the National Support Fund had grown originally, Studentenverzet ("Student Resistance"), The Identity Forgery Central, and Medisch Contact ("Medical Contact"), a physicians' resistance organization. Also represented in this indirect fashion were several other clandestine newspapers, including, De Vrije Katheder, (The Free Catheter), De Vrije Kunstenaar (The Free Artist), Ons Volk, (Our People), Christofoon, and De Katholieke Kompas.401

This body was clearly too large to hold regular meetings. Indeed, merely holding the first meeting was a very great risk to have taken. Accordingly, a working committee of some five members was chosen, to be known as the Contactcommissie ("Contact Commission"). The Contact Commission's membership consisted of one representative from the Fatherland Committee, one from the Order Service, with the three remaining members representing three wings or "segments", as they came to be called, of the larger membership of the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission. The "left" segment was composed of The Watchword, Vrij Nederland, The Truth, Je Maintiendrai, the Council of Resistance.

401 ENQ, VIIa, 289.
The Free Catheter, The Free Artist, Christofoor, and De Katholiek Kompas. The "middle" was made up of the National Resistance Committee, the National Support Fund, the Seamen Fund, Student Resistance, the Identity Forgery Central, and Medical Contact. The "right" segment comprised the Calvinist paper Faith, the National Fugitive Aid Organization, and the Knuckle Gang.402

The formation of the Contact Commission was announced in a telegram sent to the London Government, dated July 12, 1944, in which the work of the Commission was described. The message said that, after "majority consultation" the Commission had asked the London Government to designate a person to serve as a "government representative" on the Commission, together with an alternate or two. The Contact Commission would, the telegram stated, be willing to assist in a caretaker capacity in the event of a "vacuum" at the time of liberation.403

The "left" segment of the Contact Commission was not at all pleased with this turn of events. They conceived of the Contact Commission as a necessary form of organization, in view of the excessive size of the parent body. However, they had not expected that the Commission would serve as a sort of executive council for all the resistance, or that some sort of union had thus been formed. Coordination was a splendid idea, but the individual organizations had their own role to play and the emphasis should still be on the organizations as such. The majority rule principle, apparently established by the majority of the Commission appealed to the "left" not at all. As

402 Ibid., 290. 403 Ibid.
they had only one representative a hostile majority, fashioned of the right segment, the Order Service, together with any other member, could easily out vote them. Matters dealing with the postwar transition period were "political" questions and, as such, had no place in a body which had been assembled to coordinate. The presence of the Fatherland Committee was resented by the left as this "political" body was not, in their view, really a resistance organization at all.404

The majority of the Contact Commission informed London of the composition and views of the dissenting minority, and of the continued desire of the majority of the Commission that the London Government designate its own representative. It made no difference that the "left" resented the presence and the vote of a "political" body. London had specifically asked for a body that had as broad a base as possible and that was what had been fashioned. To be sure problems of the period of liberation were "political", but London had specifically requested that the larger body designate some of its members to serve in essentially a "political" capacity in the event of a "vacuum" at liberation.405

Herein lay something of a dilemma for the London Government. It wanted the "resistance" not only coordinated, but, as much as possible, united. The much discussed "vacuum" could well occur, with a period of some little duration intervening between the time of a German departure or surrender and the establishment of the Military Authority planned. Some sort of caretaker body would have to assume authority in such an event, and London wanted as much control over it as possible. At the same time the "left" segment of the Contact Commission had a valid com-

404Tbid., 291.  405Tbid.
plaint. In a body which, apparently, was to have political responsibilities, they seemed to be heavily outnumbered. If the London Government designated a representative, as the majority of the Commission desired, and if this person should prove unfriendly to the "left" segment, the latter body might conceivably depart the Commission.

London's solution was, in effect, to partially by-pass the Contact Commission and form its own "vacuum" committee, the College van Vertrouwensmannen ("College of Bondsmen").

A telegram from the London Government, dated August 2, 1944, created the College of Bondsmen and empowered Mr. L. H. N. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal, former Royal Commissioner of the Province of Utrecht, to go about the task of formation. The members, who were named in the telegram in special code form, were instructed to, "...Prepare measures for the maintenance of order and peace in the event of a vacuum...." The Government was careful to make it clear that the College was to serve in a temporary capacity only, and to hand over its functions when return of the Cabinet became feasible. Members were not to be described in terms of forming a "temporary administration", this London wished to make clear. This phrase, (Voorlopige Bewind), may have had an unfortunate connotation, although London did not refer to it specifically, in that it had been employed in some Order Service circles to describe their form of "vacuum" administration.406

Chosen to serve on the College of Bondsmen, in addition to Mr. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal, who had been well known for his own efforts in coordinating resistance activities, were: Dr. Willem Drees, of the

406Ibid., appendix, xxxiii.
Fatherland Committee, and a Socialist; Professor R. P. Cleveringa of Leiden University; Mr. J. Cramer, member of the Assembly of the Province of Drenthe, politically a liberal Protestant; Professor Oranje of the (Protestant) Free University of Amsterdam, a famous resistance figure; Father J. G. Stolman, a Catholic member of Parliament and very active in resistance work; Mr. Lambertus Neher, representative on the Contact Commission of the "middle" segment; and Mr. Jacob van der Gaag, of the Council of Resistance.407

Clearly the "left" segment had not fared too badly in the College of Bondsmen. The academic community, in the persons of Professors Cleveringa and Oranje, would support them in some matters. They could count on the normal support of the Socialist, Dr. Drees, and of the Council of Resistance representative, Mr. van der Gaag. Since two Catholic newspapers had been counted among the "left" segment they might well find an ally in Father Stokman, as well.408

The Contact Commission continued to function and when, by the summer of 1944, the parent organization had begun calling itself officially the "Grand Resistance Advisory Commission", none of the "left" segment members had departed.409

In September, 1944 a telegram from Queen Wilhelmina let it be known that the London Government was in accord with both the formation and the composition of the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission and the Contact


408 Some special problems involving the College of Bondsmen will be noted in the section dealing with the Netherlands Forces of the Interior.

409 Later the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission came to be known as the "National" Resistance Advisory Commission.
The "left" segment continued to object to the "political" activities of the majority, and expressed concern that less attention was paid to the ideological aspects of the struggle against fascism, two points of view perhaps not entirely consistent.411

The Contact Commission did consider a variety of "policy" questions, many of them in response to urgent requests from the London Government for information and advice. Included were such things as the postwar role of the resistance, tactics concerning the latest German labor recruiting drive, the advisability of personal attacks on Dutch Nazis, whether Allied aircraft should deliberately fire on the Dutch personnel of German-operated railway trains, and problems of supplying food to the cities.412

The Netherlands Forces of the Interior

On September 3, 1944, the London Government created a Dutch military unit containing the three largest resistance organizations, when it called into being the Nederlandse Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten ("Netherlands Forces of the Interior").413

The new organization, created by Royal Decree, was to contain the Order Service, the Knuckle Gang, and the Council of Resistance. The word "contain" is used advisedly. It was not the original intent of London to immediately amalgamate or fuse the three organizations.

Motivations in the creation of this new body were various. As has been seen, a veritable forest of organizations devoted to studying, advising, or coordinating resistance activities was already in existence.

410 ENQ, VIIa, appendix, xxxiii. 411 Ibid., 297.
412 Meijer, loc. cit., 84079. 413 ENQ, VIIa, 322.
London finally had its own body, the College of Bondsmen, to provide for the expected "vacuum". There still remained the problem of what to do with the large armed resistance organizations, particularly since rapid Allied advances in western Europe suggested that the services of these groups might soon be required or utilized in some sort of maquis or militia capacity.

In 1959 the former Queen, Her Royal Highness Princess Wilhelmina, recalled the creation of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in these words:

...In good time I read in the English press that the Maquis in France had become an official part of the Allied armed forces. They had acquired in their creation...the status of combatants, and they had acquired their own commander, General Koenig.

...I called Minister-President Gerbrandy and asked him if he did not feel that an initiative from our side would be a good idea. I also asked Mr. Gerbrandy if he did not think it was desirable that my son-in-law be charged with the command. He agreed completely.

...From the Allied command, from which the real initiative must proceed, we got complete cooperation...Our boys could no longer be shot down by the Germans as franc tireurs. Now the enemy was obliged to treat them as prisoners of war...

General Eisenhower named my son-in-law as commander-in-chief of our armed forces, as far as those portions that came under his command were concerned. As far as this was a Dutch prerogative I issued a Royal Decree so designating him.414

One motivation which the London Government had in creating the Netherlands Forces of the Interior must have been based on the internecine warfare between the Council of Resistance and the Order Service, particularly as exemplified in the running feud between Colonel Six of the Service and that peppery figure Jan Thijssen, of the Council, disagreements already discussed. Doubtless London also felt that any political

aims the Order Service might possess would be likely to be neutral-
ized by the induction into the national service of the latter organ-
ization. Important in this connection was the simple fact that many
other resistance organizations distrusted the ultimate objectives of
the Order Service, whether justly or not. The incorporation or inclu-
sion of the Service in the Forces of the Interior would serve to pacify
some of those who were most distrustful.

Colonel Six himself felt that the formation of the Netherlands
Forces of the Interior was inspired, at least in part, by the head of
the National Support Fund, the Amsterdam banker, Mr. Gijsbert van
Hall. Van Hall, whose organization supplied funds to many varied
organizations, had become greatly concerned with the disagreements
between the various resistance groups.415

To Mr. Calje, of the Order Service, the sort of cooperation and
coordination provided by the Nucleus had been something less than
ideal. Clearly some sort of closer union was necessary. He recalled
that the Council of Resistance had celebrated the birthday of Queen
Wilhelmina, on August 31, 1944, by disabling a large number of Dutch
telephone circuits in all parts of the country, thereby greatly
hindering the work of the National Fugitive Aid Organization and
the National Support Fund, both of which made extensive use of the
telephone.416

Mr. C. H. J. F. van Houten, head of the Netherlands Forces of
the Interior section on the staff of Prince Bernhard, the Commander-

415P. J. Six, March 10, 1949, 44808.
416Calje, loc. cit., 77384-77390.
in-Chief of the organization, stated that some of the impetus for the formation of the body had come from the occupied territory, from whence had arrived various telegrams requesting the creation of something of the sort. 417

Mr. van Houten recalled that there had originally been little enthusiasm in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force for the whole concept of a Netherlands maquis. The plain fact of the matter was that the French Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur was an arrangement that had not worked out well in practice. Its commandant, General Koenig, did not have the situation well in hand at all. In Paris, for example, the maquis had begun their action several days too soon, placing the operational plans of the Americans in grave danger. 418

Mr. van Houten believed that the concept of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior had a friend in S.H.A.E.F. in the person of General Bedell Smith, who was able to convince General Eisenhower of the value of such a proposed body. General Bedell Smith argued that the Dutch case was sufficiently different and that the Netherlands was less of a house divided against itself than France. 419

The same Royal Decree which created the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, on September 3, 1944, named Prince Bernhard, son-in-law of Queen Wilhelmina, as Commander-in-Chief. 420

417 C. H. J. F. van Houten, April 27, 1950, 78461-78463. 418 Ibid. 419 Ibid. It is to be doubted if General Bedell Smith had any real idea of the real fragmentation of Dutch society. 420 ENQ, VIIa, 321.
On September 5, 1944, it was announced that, "...Members of the various resistance organizations..." making up the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, were officially recognized by Royal Decree as members of the Netherlands armed forces. The phrase, "...Various resistance organizations..." was commonly taken to mean the Order Service, the Knuckle Gang, and the Council of Resistance. This was so stated in a letter of November 18, 1944.421

A special order issued by the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht to German forces in occupied Holland, dated September 30, 1944, decreed that members of the Dutch resistance who were served with regular Allied lines, providing they wore identifying insignia (arm bands were considered acceptable), were to be treated as regular combatants within the terms of the various Hague conventions and not dealt with as franc-tireurs.422

On September 9, 1944, the Contact Commission telegraphed London that the three organizations, the Knuckle Gang, the Order Service, and the Council of Resistance had, after several meetings, agreed on formation of the so-called Drishoeck, ("Triangle"), or Delta, which was to represent and closely coordinate the three groups, in accordance with instructions received from Prince Bernhard.423

While Royal Decree may have placed the Council, the Service, and the Knuckle Gang under one roof, disagreement between the three was still very much the order of the day. Some consultation and cooperation had been found in the earlier Donderdagmiddagvergaderingen.

421 Ibid., 322. 422 Hilton, op. cit., 246.
423 ENQ, VIIa, 319-320.
"Thursday Noon Meetings"), in which the three had periodically discussed mutual problems.

In a telegram dated September 12, 1944, His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard noted the comprehensive lack of unity and unwillingness to agree of the three groups. This was, he observed, particularly true at the local level. He authorized the Contact Commission to designate a Netherlands Forces of the Interior commandant to serve in any local area where no agreement among the three could be reached. Under such circumstances the commandant so chosen need not be a member of any of the three. Where even greater disunity prevailed, the local Order Service, Knuckle Gang, or Council units were not even to be considered part of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior.424

A Radio Orange broadcast of September 18, 1944, ordered the Netherlands Forces of the Interior to assist Allied parachutists in those areas where landings had been made or were about to be made, providing such assistance was requested. Forces members were to identify themselves with armbands bearing the word, Oranje. They were to render whatever guard or patrol services the Allied forces might request, or to perform manual labor. They were also, where necessary, to arrest and guard those persons in Allied-occupied territories who would be likely to aid the enemy.425

On September 20, 1944, the Triangle organization in the occupied territory asked General Henri Koot, an officer in the Netherlands East Indies Army, to head the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in the occupied territory. On October 20, 1944, London confirmed this

424Ibid., 320. 425Ibid., 322.
The continued separate character of the three component organizations was affirmed in a telegram from Prince Bernhard, received November 2, 1944.427

His Royal Highness noted the differences in resistance philosophy between the three component organizations, and declared that there were, henceforth, to be no such differences. General Koot was specifically designated as an adviser to the Triangle, with a "deciding" voice.428

On November 4, 1944, the radio operator of the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior copied the following telegram, received from an unidentified British source:

To all resistance forces in Holland:

It is with grave misgiving that we have followed the exchange of messages relating to the disunity which apparently exists between certain underground organizations.

We, the British, have been doing our best to supply you with arms with the object of your helping us kick the Germans out of your country, when the right time comes. By their present attitude underground organizations are doing exactly what the Germans would like them to do. They are wasting valuable time, please get together and long live your Queen. From your British allies.429

Prince Bernhard drafted in English and dispatched the following reply:

To our British allies:

As commander of resistance forces in occupied Holland, in name of them all, I thank you for your earnest pressing admonition which I issued today unambiguously as order of the day to my forces. Your authoritative appeal will be redeeming word to bring forth the indispensable unity in our midst.430

426H. Koot, September 16, 1949, 67879-67886.
429Hilten, op. cit., 240. 430Ibid., 241.
As it was constituted in both the northern (occupied) and southern (liberated) portions of Holland the Netherlands Forces of the Interior was divided into two kinds of units, the so-called *strijdend gedeelte* ("combatant units"), and the *niet-strijdend gedeelte* ("non-combatant units").

The divisions did, as it turned out, correspond roughly to those separating the more active resistance activities of the Council of Resistance and the Knuckle Gang, who largely made up the "combatant" units, and the Order Service, relegated to "non-combatant" service. Herein may have been represented a special sort of irony: The Order Service, with a military form of organization, and containing more persons of military background, was given largely non-combatant assignments, while the "unmilitarized" irregulars of the Council and the Knuckle Gang were selected for a more active role.

General Koot recalled, after World War II, that the distinction between "combatant" and "non-combatant" forces had caused more than a little discord and prompted charges of "discrimination". He had let it be known at the time that more "combatant" units would be created when weapons became available. The distinction in his own mind had always simply been one of those units which were already armed and those yet to be armed.

The separate character of the three component units of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior continued until March, 1945. Colonel Six stated that he had been willing to give up the separate existence of the Order Service but that the Knuckle Gangs and the Council were unwilling.

431 Koot, *loc. cit.*, 67922-67924. The *niet-strijdend gedeelte* later came to be called the bewakingstroepen ("guardian troops").

to do so at the time.433

In that same month of March, 1945, Peter Zuid was sent to the north by Prince Bernhard and made commandant of the "combatant" units. Placed in charge of the "guardian troops", as the "non-combatant" units had come to be called, was Colonel Six.434

The actual activities of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in the liberated south can be briefly stated. The Forces performed a variety of services for the Allied forces, which included the Dutch Princess Irene Brigade, recruited by the London Government and serving under the command of Field Marshall Montgomery. Members of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior served in combatant capacities, in part, participating in patrols and various special missions. Their general efficiency won them high praise from Allied officers and a number were killed in action.435

Regular communications were, by this time, maintained by radiotelegraphy between the Forces in the occupied territory and Allied headquarters at Eindhoven and Brussels; those units in the north, and London. Some of the material sent from General Koot in the north to the unoccupied south travelled via an agent dropped earlier by the London Government, Hans Bialosterski, who operated a clandestine radio transmitter.436

The "combatant" units in the north were primarily sabotage units. The Knuckle Gang and the Council of Resistance, as has been noted, largely

433 P. J. Six, loc. cit., 44829. The writer is unable to discover whether, in fact, the Knuckle Gang and the Council were willing to abandon their separate existences at this time or not.

434 ENQ, VIIa, 328. "Peter Zuid" is a pseudonym for Major J. J. F. Borghouts.

435 Houten, loc. cit., 78511. 436 Koot, loc. cit.
made up the "combatant" units, a useful division of labor, since they had far more experience in the field of sabotage than the Order Service.437

Peter Zuid also ordered the "combatant" units to stand ready for actual fighting, if required, in the protection of installations that were particularly likely to be destroyed by the Germans in the event of a general retreat. Thus the "combatant" units cast a protective eye over the electrical power "central" in Amsterdam-North, as well as various other facilities.438

In Amsterdam "combatant" units destroyed German bunkers, vehicles, and railway tracks used by German military trains.439

The Netherlands Forces of the Interior was supplied by air through an agency of the London Government, the Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten ("Special Service Bureau"), with which it worked very well.440

Materials for sabotage operations were dropped in previously designated areas. The supply of such materials was apparently very uneven from area to area.441

"Combatant" units of the Forces of the Interior in the occupied territory were particularly active in carrying out assignments to sabotage Wehrmacht installations and German communications.442

Later, in the spring of 1945, the Commandant of the Netherlands

437Scheepstra, loc. cit., 77284.  438Ibid., 77286-77287.

439Ibid., 77268. By this time the railway strike was in progress, so that the only trains operating were those under direct German control.

440J. J. F. Borghouts, September 1, 1950, 83973-83976.


442Borghouts, loc. cit.
Forces of the Interior ordered the "combatant" units in the occupied territory to "temper" their activities, as negotiations were under way with German occupation authorities. 443

Mr. van Houten believed that the main value of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in the occupied area may have been its general effect on German morale. When an armistice affecting German forces in the Netherlands was being discussed with German officers, those present readily observed an almost pathological preoccupation on the part of the Germans with the Forces of the Interior. The occupying power seemed willing to and did agree with virtually any Dutch condition, including the granting of very wide powers to the College of Bondsmen, providing only that the Netherlands Forces of the Interior was neutralized. 444

Accordingly, the Commander of the Canadian forces which liberated most of the northern provinces, General Foulkes, drafted an order with which the Commandant of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior immediately agreed, and caused to have distributed as widely as communications permitted:

Commandant... of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior announces that, in consultation with the commanding German General, the following has been agreed upon:

1. Until the moment that the occupation is taken over by the Canadian army the German Wehrmacht remains responsible for the maintenance of peace and order.

2. The Commandant of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior assumes responsibility, as much as he is competent to do so, for the maintenance of order among Dutch subjects.

3. It therefore follows that the Netherlands Forces of the Interior is charged with the maintenance of order, as agreed upon with the above mentioned [German] General.

443 Ibid. 444 Houten, loc. cit.
4. The maintenance of order includes opposition to all acts of aggression against the German armed forces, both its members and its property, as well as all objects for which it is responsible.

5. Until the moment that the occupation is taken over by the Canadian army the activities of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior are to be restricted to the maintenance of order.

The proclamation went on to remind and warn the Forces of the Interior not only of the opportunities which the moment of liberation might afford thieves and other criminal elements, but also of the more general possibility that "irresponsible" elements might try to take the law into their own hands and in so doing call forth German reprisals, whereby the lives of innocent civilians might be needlessly imperiled. The proclamation called for the Dutch populace to, "...[Exercise] self-discipline and behave in a manner befitting a civilized people."446

Mr. van Houten, in his position on Prince Bernhard's staff, had opportunity to observe the effect of this order. It was complied with about "95%" of the time. There was no "hatchet day", as everyone had feared there might be. Nor did the long-expected "vacuum" ever materialize. There were, Mr. van Houten stated, many persons in the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in the occupied territory who felt more than a bitter at this turn of events. They had patiently and often perilously, over a period of five difficult years, built up sizeable organizations which were intended to help serve in the liberation of the Netherlands. Now they had been told, in effect, "Put away your guns and make it as little apparent as possible that you were ever any part of the armed forces."447

445 Ibid. 446 Ibid. 447 Ibid.
Mr. van Houten felt that former members of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior who served in the occupied north, whether "combatant" or "non-combatant", should be made to understand that their organization had not, in fact, been created in vain, that by its very existence it had greatly accelerated negotiations with the Germans and made them much more amenable to suggestions. He recalled that the commanding German General, General Blaskowitz, had himself been very apprehensive about possible action that might be taken against his troops by the Netherlands Forces of the Interior. Only weeks had elapsed since the hated "green police" had, quite literally, hunted all Dutch adult males in a final drive to recruit additional laborers to serve in Germany. While the "green police" had usually been personnel of the Gestapo rather than the Wehrmacht, this was a distinction which General Blaskowitz feared many a Hollander might not too readily grasp or observe. Quite suddenly the hunted had acquired the status, accorded official recognition by Berlin, of members of an armed force. They were everywhere, of nearly all ages, and some of them carried weapons and were proficient in their use. General Blaskowitz complained of not having slept well for several nights. He voluntarily drove his own automobile from command post to command post of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, distributing copies of the proclamation just quoted, as well as other Forces material. He had left with an automobile "half full" of printed matter and he continued on his mission until all was distributed.\textsuperscript{448}

Criticism of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, both at the time and later came from many quarters.

Some felt that the Triangel organization was too large, particularly.\textsuperscript{448} Ibid.
since it contained the Order Service, with its large and somewhat cumbersome staff system. Jan van Bynen, who represented the Knuckle Gang on the Triangle body, held this view. Van Bynen, a gifted planner and organizer, who, unfortunately, did not survive the war, held that it would have been far better had a single head been placed over the three organizations at the start. He felt that their separate existence should have been more sharply curtailed, and that the Triangle or Delta organizations were no more than clumsy outgrowths of the earlier Thursday Noon Meetings. 449

Others felt the idea of having a Netherlands Forces of the Interior at all to have been a mistake. Mr. Hoogeweegen, of the Council of Resistance, said that the organizations represented in the Triangle were too diverse and too firm in their views to work harmoniously together. To him the situation was comparable to a jungle. One could as logically order, "King Lion, you are to form a unified command comprising the panthers, the elephants, the jaguars, and so on..." 450

Then there was the matter of weapons. Most of the dropping areas remained in the hands of the Council of Resistance, although the Knuckle Gang controlled some of its own. As has been noted already in another connection the Order Service resented this arrangement very bitterly. Mr. Wagenaar of the Council had been placed in charge of ordnance of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior. This did not please Mr. Soeepstra of the Knuckle Gang at all, since Wagenaar made no secret of the fact that he was a Communist. Mr. Soeepstra received reports that Communists in the Amsterdam area were collecting weapons. The course of events in

449 P. W. Hordijk, September 8, 1950, 84370-84371.
450 Hoogeweegen, loc. cit., 96098-96099.
Greece, where Communists had employed British-supplied weapons for their own ends, was known at the time in Holland, Mr. Schepstra reported.  

Colonel Six, of the Order Service, said that some 30,000 weapons had been dropped for resistance use in Holland. Approximately 10,000 were delivered into Netherlands Forces of the Interior custody and accounted for. Colonel Six quoted General van Hilten, a distinguished Dutch military historian, as saying that the Germans captured another 10,000. This left another 10,000 small arms unaccounted for.  

Mr. Klijzing who, as senior officer of the (Dutch) Special Service Bureau, dealt with weapon droppings, stated that the Germans had not captured merely one-third of the arms dropped but closer to two-thirds. Thus, if 10,000 of the weapons in questions could be accounted for through Forces records, there must have been very few remaining in private hands.  

Other persons complained that many local commanders of the Forces of the Interior had a very inaccurate concept of their precise legal position. Some, apparently, regarded the Forces as an overkoeplingsorganisatie der illegaliteit, that is a body that united under one command all underground organizations. It naturally followed that the Forces acted as though it was in command not only of the Council, Service, and Knuckle Gang components, but of all clandestine organizations. Since many of these other organizations performed valuable services, it was a matter of grave importance that their activities were sometimes hindered or disrupted by various local Forces commanders or persons serv-

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451 Schepstra, loc. cit., 77265-77266.  
452 P. J. Six, loc. cit.  
ing under their command. 454

Still other Netherlands Forces of the Interior officers felt that they were shortly to assume administrative duties in some sort of caretaker capacity after liberation, possibly under the temporary Military Authority which was planned. Such a scheme of things was most emphatically not the intent of the London Government. 455

The Contact Commission complained with some bitterness that, even in the top echelons in the occupied territory, there was exhibited a marked tendency to ignore both the advice of the Commission and the College of Bondsmen. 456

In another sensitive area, local Forces of the Interior commanders had brought pressure to bear in an effort to restrict or suspend publication of some clandestine newspapers. 457

Particularly unfortunate in this connection was the initial effort made by the Forces Commandant for the occupied territory, General Koot, to become acquainted with the underground press. Acting, apparently, in perfectly good faith, General Koot selected as his "contact" man virtually the only journalist of his acquaintance, Mr. Groeninx van Zoelen, a man apparently noted before the war for authoritarian and anti-Semitic utterances. General Koot subsequently established relations with the press through more acceptable channels, but his initial effort scarcely made a favorable impression. 458

General Koot, testifying in 1949, could see that his contact with the press via Mr. Groeninx van Zoelen might have one to think

454 ENQ, VIIa, 359. 455 Ibid. 456 Ibid. 457 Ibid.
458 Meijer, loc. cit., 82111-82113.
he espoused a particular point of view in a political sense. General Koot would cheerfully admit to being and having been, "politically a blank page". That being the case, how could he possibly have taken any political point of view?459

Mr. Jan Meijer, one of the editors of the clandestine paper, The Watchword, regarded the Triangle apparatus, with its numerous bureaucrats, as having reached proportions where its sheer bulk may have seriously hampered the operation of the entire resistance movement. In March of 1945, Mr. Meijer recalled, Hollanders were still being led away by the "green police" in very long lines. Often these columns were guarded by only one or two persons, thus attacks on the guards by the resistance could well have resulted in the liberation of at least some of the captives. That this was done all too rarely was due in part to the fact that the underground, as he put it, "...Dead still, trying to read its way through a sea of paperwork and instructions..."460

As Commandant of the Forces of the Interior in the occupied territory, General Henri Koot often had to serve as a sort of group diplomat in trying to get his factious and quarrelsome charges to work together. That he succeeded in this capacity remarkably well and that all Hollanders owe him a very large debt of gratitude cannot be doubted. At the same time it must be noted that there were those who were by no means pleased with the Koot appointment. It had seemed logical that, since the Forces in the occupied territory might be par-

459 Koot, loc. cit., 67950-67953.
460 Meijer, loc. cit., 82111-82112.
ticipating in military operations, a military man of some distinction should be in command, and General Koot certainly qualified. If possible, the person in question should not have or have had an active affiliation with one of the major resistance organizations, in order to insure as much impartiality as possible. Again, General Koot qualified. Inevitably, however, since he was of the military and the Order Service best typified the military point of view, it was to be expected that he would have been surrounded by many Order Service people.461

Some felt that the Order Service definitely exercised undue influence over General Koot.462

The Council, while it had no strong objections to the choice of General Koot, was not consulted ahead of time about his selection. This, quite naturally, caused some resentment.463

As has been said, General Koot was not affiliated with any major resistance organization. While this may have been a desirable attribute, in the sense of his being more likely to be impartial, it sometimes meant in actual practice that there were very large gaps in his knowledge regarding resistance matters, matters which were both complex and important.464

The Great Railway Strike of 1944

As the reader may have begun to suspect, the London Government did not engage in frequent attempts in the field of remote administration. The sole significant exception was the railway strike of 1944.

461Gaag, loc. cit., 77816-77817.
Radio Orange, in a broadcast dated September 17, 1944, ordered all employees of the Nederlandsche Spoorwegen ("Netherlands Railways"), to cease work, effective immediately. Also involved were some bus and streetcar workers, and some other persons in related activities, such as a number of employees of a chain of restaurants operated by the Netherlands Railways. The employees struck, nearly to a man, and in so doing caused the German occupation forces, in a country where rail transport was a very important affair, substantial inconvenience. The strike, despite alternate German blandishments and threats, continued until the liberation of those provinces still under enemy occupation, in May, 1945. A number of railway workers were executed but the trains did not again move under Dutch direction, although a few German troop trains continued to operate with imported crews and a limited number of Hollanders who assisted in their operation.

When Holland was invaded in May, 1940, the Netherlands Railways were initially occupied by about 4,000 German railway personnel, who were subsequently withdrawn. The German military and several civilian German engineering firms repaired assorted damage which the brief period of Dutch-German hostilities had inflicted on the Netherlands railway system. Once this was accomplished the railways were handed back to the Dutch management. The Manager of the Netherlands Railways, Mr. G. F. H. Gießerger, remained at his post. Such transport as the Germans required was ordered in advance through Mr. Giesberger, who was required to hold more or less daily conferences with the Bahnbevollmächtigte ("Railway Plenipotentiary"), of the Deutsche Reichsbahn ("German Railways");

465 ENQ, VIIa, 378.
the Transportkommandant of the Wehrmacht; and a representative of the Reichsverkehrministerium ("Reich Transport Ministry"). These three individuals were at all times rather difficult to deal with, Mr. Giesberger discovered. However, they seemed satisfied to leave the Netherlands Railways under largely Netherlands control. As long as operation continued smoothly this appeared an easier course of action than taking over the rather extensive network of Dutch rail lines and then, of necessity, importing numbers of German railway workers, many of whom were needed elsewhere.\footnote{G. F. H. Giesberger, August 18, 1953, 97778-97786.}

Mr. Giesberger's attitude in regard to the continued operation of the Netherlands Railways by their Dutch management was that while they worked "with" the Germans, on occasion, they did not work "for" the occupying power. In the main, he argued, the continued Dutch operation of the Railways served Netherlands interests, as the great bulk of the traffic was solely for the benefit of the Hollanders.\footnote{Ibid.}

The attitude of the Nederlandse Vereeniging van Spoor-en- tramwegspersoneel ("Netherlands Union of Train and Streetcar Employees") was one of substantial agreement with Mr. Giesberger, according to Mr. G. Joustra, Chairman of the body. The Union felt that the continued Dutch operation of the railways would tend to safeguard the public interest. This did not mean that the Union was at all amenable to rather friendly German overtures, including suggestions that the Union "merge" with the microscopic Nationaal Arbeidsfront ("National Labor Front"), a Nazi organization. Later the Germans failed in an attempt to replace the Union with the National Labor Front by force, and drew a rather irritable
response from Berlin, in which it was suggested that the Front be "buried" as inconspicuously as possible.468

Mr. Joustra reported that the question of continued operation of the railways by Dutch personnel was dealt with in the Personeelraad ("Personnel Council"), a consultative body which represented both the management of the Netherlands Railways and the various Protestant, Catholic, and non-sectarian railway workers' unions. The Personnel Council had similarly agreed that the railways continue to operate. Mr. Joustra said that 80% to 90% of the facilities of the Netherlands Railways, as they were utilized during the occupation, served the direct interests of the Dutch population.469

The core of the problem of continued operation, and a matter that immediately involved the London Government, was that of the deportations. Dutch Jews, demobilized Dutch army officers who were being ordered to Germany as prisoners of war, civilian hostages, and persons impressed for forced labor in Germany nearly all travelled by rail on trains operated by Dutch personnel. The Germans would simply contact Mr. Giesberger, placing their "order" for a train to be delivered at a given place and time. The moral question presented by the deportations was not an involved one: Should Dutch railway personnel continue to operate the railways and simply acquiesce in the tragic traffic of deportees?

Mr. Giesberger recalled that, on many occasions, he received visitors who particularly urged that he try to put a stop to the transportation by Dutch railway workers of compatriots of the Jewish faith. Mr. Giesberger remembered Dr. Cornelis of the Medicus Verzet ("Medical Resistance"), who visited him on at least ten occasions, saying,

468G. Joustra, August 19, 1953, 97846. 469Ibid., 97357.
"You must simply say [to the Germans], 'We won't do that any more'." Mr. Giesberger replied: "Do you have orders [from London] to this effect? Then I'll do it immediately."470

Mr. Giesberger was in contact with London through the agency of Mr. I. J. van den Bosch, of the National Support Fund, who had access to a clandestine radiotelegraph transmitter.471

Apparently, while the management of the Netherlands Railways was originally in contact with London through Mr. van den Bosch, communications from about the end of 1943 proceeded via other transmitters, probably at least in part those operated by the Order Service.472

Mr. Giesberger, utilizing the van den Bosch contact, repeatedly asked London for guidance on the question of deportations and continued operation. London, he said, always answered, "Do nothing. Go ahead with your work."473

It was argued by Mr. Giesberger,474 and others,475 that a general strike declared by those in the occupied territory, prior to London's decision to call such a work stoppage, would have resulted in a complete German seizure of the Netherlands Railways, so that the Dutch direction would lose any and all control. In an earlier period of the war the Germans might well have had sufficient personnel to reorganize operations in such a fashion that a majority of the Dutch personnel could have been forced, at gun point if necessary, to continue at their posts. This very

472W. Hupkes, August 18, 1953, 97716-97718.
473Giesberger, loc. cit. 474Ibid.
475F. P. A. Landskroon, August 19, 1953, 97915-97916.
thing did happen in France, Belgium, and most of the other German-occupied countries.

The view of the London Government was by no means at all clear. The wish of the Government, which Mr. Giesberger understood correctly in his indirect contact with it, was that the railways continue to operate, a view based on decisions made repeatedly in the Netherlands Council of Ministers, where a possible work stoppage was frequently discussed. 476

While London apparently desired the continued operation of the Dutch railways by their Dutch personnel, Radio Orange did broadcast on several occasions definite Netherlands Government directives forbidding Dutch police officers and "all others" from participating in any way in the deportations. 477 It can be assumed that London knew that Dutch railway personnel were involved in these tasks and that nothing short of a general strike could really interrupt the traffic.

Both the personnel and management of the Netherlands railways understood and agreed that an eventual strike would be called by London, that it was simply a question of timing. The management of the Netherlands railways did manage to secrete in the safes of nearly all stations an extra month's salary for all personnel, intended as "strike" or "invasion" money. 478

The Council of Ministers had, indeed, decided "in principle" on a railway strike, with only final timing to be arranged. The decision as to timing was taken at a meeting held on the evening of September 16,

476P. S. Gerbrandy, December 13, 1954, 98946-98947. 477Ibid.
478Hupkes, loc. cit., 97745-97749.
1944, with the strike to be proclaimed the next day. Only three Ministers were present, not including the Minister of Waterways, Mr. J. W. Albarda, under whose jurisdiction the Netherlands Railways had been placed. Albarda was more than a little annoyed when he first learned of the strike, in the Radio Orange broadcast of the following morning:

Government call for a general railway strike:

In response to suggestions received from Holland, in consultation with the Allied command, and in connection with military actions begun today in Holland, the Government regards the correct moment for a general strike of railway personnel as having been reached, with a view to hindering the movement of enemy troop concentrations as much as possible.

The Government takes full account of the heavy responsibility which it bears for this decision, which was taken only after careful consideration. The Government believes that, in the given circumstances, this action is of such overriding military importance that it can no longer be postponed.

The Government, in full realization of the difficulties that will be occasioned, leaves the methods of implementing this directive to you, and wishes all of you, faithful and brave Fatherlanders, the strength to carry out this action to the best of your abilities.

This message will be repeated in the Dutch news of the B.B.C. at a quarter of twelve. In any event listen to this transmission, in which important announcements may be made.

Mr. Giesberger's initial reaction in the occupied territory, once he became convinced that the strike order was authentic and not a German "trick", was one of irritation that London had not used existing clandestine communications networks to give the Railway management some advance warning of the strike. Time was needed to make advance arrangements, to pay out the "strike" money, and so on. In

\[479\] L. de Jong, June 30, 1948, 16134.

\[480\] J. W. Albarda, September 3, 1953, 96106.  
\[481\] ENQ, VIIa, 378.
most instances he was able to effect payment.482

In its initial stages, at least in Amsterdam, the Germans may have actually helped to make the strike more effective, as they almost immediately forbade all railway personnel access to the shop and yards, perhaps preventing sabotage, but also keeping any workers who might be inclined to report to work from doing so.483

In a broadcast dated September 18, 1944, Radio Orange appealed to railway workers to go underground, and appealed to the Netherlands people to provide shelter, food, and clothing to the fugitives, as well as giving financial assistance to the families of railway workers.484

No one needed to tell the railway workers to go into hiding at this point in the occupation. Those vast, institutionalized conspiracies, the National Fugitive Aid Organization and the National Support Fund, had considerable experience in this work. The railway strike of 1944 was to be their biggest effort, and one marked with considerable success.

German reaction, as might be expected, was rather violent. Railway workers were tracked down in a number of instances and executed. In the closing days of World War II the Germans were to further exhibit their displeasure by destroying much of the physical property of the Netherlands Railways, including track, rolling stock, buildings, and shops.485

482 Giesberger, loc. cit., 97795-97797.
By October the railway strike was being felt extensively by the Dutch population. Radio Orange, on October 5th, stressed the value of the railroad work stoppage to the Allied war effort, and pointed out that the acute shortages of coal in the occupied territory would have existed whether the railways operated or not, since the State Mines in the Province of Limburg were in the liberated area, and thus were effectively isolated in any event. Radio Orange did not address itself to the growing food shortage, made much more acute by the railway strike, since some food shipments would normally have reached the cities from areas which remained in the German-occupied territory. Railway workers were warned that if they abandoned the strike they could expect no general pardon from the Germans.486

When the strike continued and the month's "invasion" money was clearly not going to be sufficient, additional arrangements had to be made. The National Support Fund, guaranteed by the London Government, spent a total of fl. 36,000,000 on the railway strike.487 The Netherlands Railways themselves contributed an additional fl. 28,000,000.488

The remaining events in the affair can be simply chronicled. At various times during the remaining long months of the German occupation the London Government considered stopping the railway strike. Its original purpose had been to impede the German defenses at Arnhem, however the Allied attack at Arnhem had failed. Each time the decision was made to continue the strike, partly because it was felt that pub-

486BNR, VIIa, appendix, xxxiv.
487Hall, loc. cit., 77180-77183.
488Rupkes, loc. cit., 97749-97750.
Public morale would suffer should it be discontinued, partly because of fear of German reprisals. The Railway Personnel Council, in hiding, was asked by London if it favored continuing the strike. The reply was in the affirmative. A query directed by London to the College of Bondsmen received a similar response.

Techniques employed by the Germans varied. They threatened the cities in the occupied territory with starvation, a fact at the time and not a mere future possibility. They offered to the railway workers that all would be forgiven, that they would receive "good food" and "double salary". These efforts met with little success.

To many the railway strike of 1944-1945 stands as a national monument, as a final test of the Dutch nation in the months before liberation.

To others it seemed and still seems to have been an ill-considered act that did more damage by far to the people of the Netherlands than it ever inflicted on the enemy. Minister Albarda felt that the London Government had not thought the strike problem through carefully, and that insufficient attention had been paid to the probable isolation of the Dutch cities from their food supplies. He believed that the Government had not adequately considered the problems involved in liquidating the strike if the attack at Arnhem should fail.

489 Joustra, _loc. cit._, 97878.
490 L. Neher, _August 19, 1953_, 97961.
491 Hupkes, _loc. cit._, 97740-97741.
492 Albarda, _loc. cit._, 98108-98110.
Conclusions

In terms of the thesis advanced at the conclusion of Chapter II, the Knuckle Gang offers few special problems. As much as it was of benefit to London at all, in its capacity as a special auxiliary of the National Fugitive Aid Organization, London could claim no credit in its formation. London could scarcely have been expected to lend very much intelligent assistance, as the nature of the tasks performed by the Knuckle Gang was such that only persons on the scene could possess sufficient knowledge on which to base a reasoned assessment of the problems of the Gang. The specialized nature of the Knuckle Gang was such that it was to be expected that London agents sent to assist the body had a very incomplete understanding of its tasks. London was of real assistance in one major sense, that of supplying funds through the National Support Fund. Later, when the Knuckle Gang became part of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, it was of much greater use to the London Government, and at that point becomes more relevant to the thesis advanced for such contact situations.

Since they were coordinate organizations, the above conclusions in regard to the Knuckle Gang are equally applicable to the National Fugitive Aid Organization, which received only financial assistance from the London Government, being specifically mentioned as an intended recipient of such aid in the second authorization of funds for the National Support Fund. It also was the creation of persons in the occupied territory. The Fugitive Aid Organization could certainly have been said to have been of benefit to the London Government during the railway strike of 1944, an immense national project
which would have been impossible but for the Organization.

The forgery organizations stand in essentially the same position as the National Fugitive Aid Organization. They were locally founded, they received aid from the National Support Fund, they rendered an invaluable service absolutely essential to resistance work, and thus benefited the cause of the London Government. In regard to the forgery organizations, it appeared at first glance that both London and the groups in the occupied territory might have been of assistance to each other. Note has been made of the fact that both material and technical assistance might have aided the forgery organizations, had London been able to supply them. That London often, apparently, had poorer facilities than persons in Holland has also been noted. Organizations in the occupied territory, in turn, might have supplied London with forged identity papers, as was often requested.

In examining the contact between the London Government and that prodigious journalistic effort, the clandestine press, one encounters few better examples of an activity that tends to support the efficiency or preferability of London's utilizing persons or institutions already located or in being in the occupied territory. London's own entry into the field of clandestine publishing, in the form of the Wervelwind and its successor, the Vliegende Hollander, those twin disasters of Dutch journalistic effort, is clear enough evidence of this.

That both the clandestine press and the London Government came to be of real value to each other, particularly in the last years of the war, is clear. With the creation of the Swiss and Swedish Routes, making possible the regular receipt in London of copies of underground
papers, the Government came increasingly to rely on the press, not only as a partial source of Radio Orange broadcasts, but for intelligence information as well. With the improved quality of Radio Orange the clandestine press came to rely on that organization quite extensively. As has been noted, London supplied some material assistance to the press, as well.

The various political and/or intellectual resistance groups, such as the Political Convention, the Grand Citizens' Committee, or the National Committee, represent institutions which London could have been said to have "utilized" only in a very limited sense. These organizations, it must be noted, were nearly all created at the initiative of people in the occupied territory. That the work they engaged in was of value cannot be doubted, although some legitimate doubt can certainly exist as to the extent which London really took advantage of the studies and reports which it received from such bodies. Certainly some of them offered the advantages in a long term sense of making possible a postwar truce in matters political, a fact of use to the Dutch nation but of no immediate value to the London Government. That London regarded them of value can be seen in the request which it made in urging the formation of the Fatherland Committee, after the demise of its predecessor. London was understandably cautious in reacting too enthusiastically to the efforts of any of these groups, lest it be accused of bias. The National Committee, quite clearly, had political ambitions in its own right.

The experience of the London Government with various resistance coordinating bodies tends to prove an exception to the general thesis
advanced in regard to the utilization of the services of persons or organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory. London began by utilizing the locally constituted Contact Commission and the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission, but eventually found it necessary to by-pass these bodies, owing to their fatal factionalism, and set up its own separate agency, the College of Bondsmen. London's departure from its usual practice of utilizing local organizations, it might be concluded, was occasioned by the special nature of the two Commissions. Both possessed a fatal weakness for Holland, in that they were broadly representative of a great many divergent organizations. Factionalism was the inevitable result as this was still Holland. The general success of the College of Bondsmen indicates that London's utilization of locally-formed organizations was not imperative but simply preferable. Note must be made of the fact that in creating the College of Bondsmen London utilized persons already in the occupied territory.

The Netherlands Forces of the Interior offers another variation. In that it was made up of organizations already in being in the occupied territory, it tends to substantiate the general thesis as advanced. In as much as London was able to create a new organization from the component bodies of the Forces, it could not be said to have simply utilized organizations already in being in Holland. A person not already in the occupied territory, Prince Bernhard, was designated as commander-in-chief. Thus this case resembles that of the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission and the Contact Commission, that is, London sought to counter the disunity among the component members. This attempt when applied
to the Forces of the Interior took the form of placing the component members under one command.

The railway strike of 1944, while undeniably an act of successful "remote" administration, represents not so much a denial of the general rule that remote administration was unfeasible. That this particular act of remote administration was possible at all was due to special circumstances. London had successfully urged railway workers to stay on the job, in itself an act of remote administration, albeit in response to urgent and repeated queries from Holland. But it was officials in Berlin who made the decision to permit continued Dutch operation of the Netherlands Railways, in contrast to the policy followed in many other occupied countries. The railway strike does little to support the view that remote administration might have been possible on an expanded scale. It was the sort of action that could have been carried out only once. Had London ordered a stoppage of rail operations in 1942 or 1943, it would not have again been possible to do so in September, 1944.

While the railway strike is viewed here primarily as an act of remote administration, one must seriously question the wisdom of the policy. Certainly it may be doubted whether the inconvenience caused the Germans outweighed the privation inflicted on the civilian population. The writer finds himself in agreement with Minister Albarda in this respect, that the London Government should have given more careful consideration to the problems involved in ending the strike, should the attack at Arnhem fail. Since ending the strike at all appeared almost immediately to be impossible it would appear that the very grave risks involved should have been apparent.
CHAPTER IV

THE LONDON GOVERNMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY

Introduction

The fourth and final chapter deals with the maintenance in various forms of communications between the London Government and the occupied territory.

The initial section describes a unique and valuable means of reaching the occupied territory, that of the Netherlands Government radio broadcasting station in London, Radio Orange. Its relation to persons and organizations in the occupied territory is explored.

There then follow sections on the Swiss Route and the Swedish Route, channels for the transmission of material between the occupied territory and London, operated through two neutral countries. Once again both serve as models to test the thesis earlier advanced in relation to such contact.

Following the material on the Swiss and Swedish Routes the history and development of Dutch intelligence organizations in London is described, and their activities are outlined, with sections on both the Dutch Central Intelligence Service, and its successor, the Intelligence Bureau. Both of these sections are of particular importance in that they tend to either disprove or offer an important exception to London’s being able to maintain contact best when it utilized persons or organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory. Both organizations sent agents
from London to the occupied territory who were parachuted "blind", i.e.,
without any reception committee, and who were able to subsequently
accomplish a great deal. Also included is a brief account of intelli-
gence organizations formed by persons in the occupied territory, together
with a short evaluation of the Dutch intelligence effort. Appended
tables summarize the activities of all agents of the (Dutch) Intelligence
Bureau.

The final chapter concludes with a study of the England-Spiel, wherein
an Anglo-Dutch operation was organized to establish, partly with the
assistance of over forty agents sent from London, a vast organization
whose form and activities were specified in considerable detail by London.
As such, this offers a prime chance to test again the thesis that London's
efforts vis-a-vis the occupied territory were most successful when persons
or organizations already located or in being in Holland were utilized.
This was the major example of a London effort which did not observe this
rule. Its outcome offers considerable insight into the general problem of
maintaining contact with the occupied territory.

Radio Orange

On the evening of July 28, 1940, listeners to several short and
medium wavelengths of the British Broadcasting Corporation heard the old
Netherlands melody, *In Naam van Oranje* ("In the Name of Orange"), played
on trumpets, and then heard a Dutch voice proclaim, "Hier Radio Oranje,
de stem van vrijde Nederland!" ("Here is Radio Orange, the voice of free
Holland!"). Queen Wilhelmina was among the speakers in the original
broadcast. The voice of Radio Orange was heard every day until after the
conclusion of World War II, first once and then later twice a day.493

In a way it was singularly appropriate that the London Government of the Netherlands should use international broadcasting to address itself to its absent population, since foreign broadcasting originated in Holland. Starting in 1925, a Dutch station using the call sign PCGG (later PCJ) broadcast on medium wavelengths a regular Sunday concert, introduced in English, and intended for reception in Great Britain. Two years later the world's first regularly scheduled shortwave radio program began from transmitters located at the Philips Electrical Company plant at Eindhoven, Holland. Produced and presented by the multi-lingual Edward Startz, the "Happy Station", as it was called, attracted wide attention, since it could be received clearly all over the world.494

In a ministerial sense Radio Orange came into being at least in part through the efforts of Dr. Gerbrandy, not yet the Minister-President, in spite of strong opposition on the part of some of his colleagues. Minister-President de Geer was particularly opposed to the creation of such a program, as he felt that it might irritate the Germans. De Geer, a pacifist and a firm believer in strict adherence to international law, believed that the London Government should be correct in all respects in its dealings with the Germans, and that such behavior might well be reciprocated.495

Ministerial approval was given to the creation of Radio Orange, originally as an adjunct to the Regeringsvoorlichtingendienst ("Netherlands Government Press Service"). A significant provision was attached to this approval, however. All scripts were to be submitted to the Council of

494As these lines are copied in January, 1961, the Happy Station program is still begin broadcast every Sunday from Holland by Edward Startz and has a world wide audience of thousands.

495L. de Jong, June 30, 1948, 16073-16076.
Ministers for clearance. This was faithfully done twice a day. Frequently alterations were made, usually by Minister-President de Geer, who was particularly cautious about material which he felt might cause German resentment. Dr. L. de Jong, of the staff of Radio Orange, told of the time the script editor, Mr. Boas, had written a text containing approximately this language:

...Holland must persevere, because eventually there will come the day, after victory, when the Netherlands people will again receive their freedom.

This clause had been returned with the penciled notation from Minister-President de Geer:

This is pure rhetoric. As my colleague Dijxhoorn has said in the Council of Ministers, there is no indication that Germany can still suffer a defeat.

Minister-President de Geer forbade Radio Orange to use the colloquial Dutch word for the Germans, moffen, which means much the same as the American, "krauts." It was, he said, undignified for use by cultivated, civilized people. Later, after the removal from the scene of de Geer, the Dutch were to hear no less a person than their Queen employ the word moffen.

The correction of scripts by the Ministers lasted a year, although after de Geer departed and Dr. Gerbrandy became Minister-President, there was a considerable improvement. No other Minister ever included corrections of the sort de Geer did.

Mr. J. W. Lebon, the original director of Radio Orange, felt it was

496 Ibid. 497 Ibid. 498 Ibid. 499 Ibid., broadcast of April 24, 1943, recorded by the writer at Redlands, California.

500 Ibid.
"disillusioning" to have to submit every broadcast word to the Council of Ministers. Since scripts had to pass a British censor after they were scrutinized by the Council, this might mean a delay of a day or two, so that any sense of the immediate seemed to have been lost.501

Radio Orange used transmitters of the British Broadcasting Corporation, placed at its disposal by the British Government. Radio Orange was under the control, immediately, of the London Government, in distinction to the broadcasts of some other governments-in-exile which were part of the regular European Service of the B.B.C. The Dutch did seek to avoid broadcasting material which was in sharp conflict with current trends in British ideological warfare. To this end there was constant contact and consultation with both the B.B.C. and the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Service. Cooperation with the British in this matter seems to have been satisfactory.502

Initially, the B.B.C. imposed one rather important restriction on Radio Orange: It could transmit no news broadcasts as such. Commentaries were permitted, as was literally any other type of program Radio Orange cared to devise, but straight news was left to the regular Dutch language service of the B.B.C. which continued to function. The B.B.C. came to modify its views on this subject, at least sufficiently to permit Radio Orange to broadcast a short news bulletin not exceeding one minute in duration.503

503 Ibid., 98710-98712. The writer had understood, apparently incorrectly, that the duration of news bulletins permitted Radio Orange was lengthened in 1943, but he possesses a recorded broadcast of September, 1944, containing a news bulletin of only one minute in length.
In the earliest period the *prima donna* qualities of the Dutch Minister-President and the injunction against news broadcasts were not the only troubles plaguing Radio Orange. There was virtually no one who had had any previous radio experience. Mr. Lebon had been secretary-treasurer of one of the various broadcasting societies which shared and still share time on Holland's two radio stations, but this experience was of little value in operating a broadcasting station as such. The Hollanders in England were a heterogeneous lot, there mostly by chance. There were more than enough journalists, including the stranded London correspondents of newspapers in Holland, many of whom could write a script, but finding announcers was a major problem. The voices of nearly the entire Dutch colony in Britain were "tested". Eventually two officers of the Netherlands diplomatic service, Messrs. Stuyt and Star Busmann, agreed to serve as announcers.504

In 1942, after the Council of Ministers had abandoned its requirement that all texts of Radio Orange broadcasts be submitted for clearance, the station was placed under more complete control of the Netherlands Government Information Service, with Mr. Pelt of that organization assuming full responsibility for the contents of the broadcasts. The operational head of Radio Orange continued to be Mr. Lebon. He was subsequently replaced, in the fall of 1942, by Mr. H. J. van den Broek, who had headed a Dutch language radio program of the B.B.C., the *Brandaris*, intended for reception by Dutch merchant sailors. Radio Orange at this time was placed under a commission, which set forth lines of guidance, within the boundaries of which the director had complete discretion. 504

The commission was chaired by the Minister-President, but was not a creature of the Council of Ministers. It contained representatives of the Ministry of Social Affairs, the merchant marine, a Roman Catholic priest, a Protestant minister, and others of diverse interests and background.

No account of Radio Orange can ignore the Brandaris. The operation and spirit of the Brandaris was intimately linked to the person of Hendrik Johannes van den Broek. In May, 1940, Mr. van den Broek was in Paris, where he had served as correspondent of the Amsterdam daily newspaper De Telegraaf, a post he had held since 1933. Three Dutch cabinet ministers were in Paris the day after Holland capitulated, enroute to London, and Mr. van den Broek got their permission to establish a Dutch radio station in Paris. French authorities placed at his disposal medium wave transmitters which could be heard clearly in Holland. Vrij Nederland, as the station was called, broadcast fifteen-minute programs in the morning, and at noon, as well as one of twenty minutes in the evening. Operation began on May 19, 1940 and continued until the German occupation of Paris, on June 11th. There was talk of continuing Vrij Nederland broadcasts from Poitiers, along with the Belgians who had a mobile broadcasting station there, but the French capitulation ended this possibility.

Van den Broek then went to London, travelling via Spain and Portugal, arriving on September 18, 1940. He worked as a news editor for a time at Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau ("General Netherlands Press Bureau"), a Dutch wire service. On or about May 1, 1941, he was approached by offi-

505L. de Jong, June 30, 1948, 16073-16076.
cials of the B.B.C. who urged that he assist in the creation of a special radio broadcast to be directed to Dutch merchant sailors. The British Government felt, he was told, that morale among Dutch merchant seamen was not high. There was always danger, apparently, that they might desert the Allied service for berths on neutral vessels or even take up other occupations. Since a merchant vessel is normally equipped with several short wave radio receivers, broadcasting seemed a particularly effective way of reaching seamen. With the approval and complete agreement of the Dutch London Government the service, known as the Brandaris, began on July 1, 1941. Administratively speaking, the Brandaris was a creature of the B.B.C., operated by Hollanders who remained in the Netherlands Government service but were "lent" to the B.B.C. Mr. van den Broek became the first director of the station.507

The Brandaris had certain advantages over Radio Orange. It never had to submit its scripts to the Dutch Council of Ministers and it was never forbidden to broadcast regular news bulletins. It was generally true that the Brandaris could broadcast material based more on conjecture or hearsay evidence. The station could and did broadcast items beginning, "We were told the other day by someone...." As an official Netherlands Government station Radio Orange was not permitted to do this. While the Brandaris was intended primarily for merchant sailors, it was listened to by numbers of Hollanders in the occupied territory and elsewhere on terra firma, a fact duly noted in the opening announcements of each broadcast.508

507Ibid. The name Brandaris is that of the fire towers on the Dutch island of Terschelling.

Before the fusion of Radio Orange and the Brandaris there existed some resentment of the latter by Radio Orange. At the 100th broadcast of the Brandaris, held in a theater auditorium, the entire Dutch Council of Ministers was present. This was the sort of support which Radio Orange had found difficult to muster. 509

In November of 1942 the Brandaris was absorbed by Radio Orange, with the director of the Brandaris, Mr. van den Broek, becoming the director of a "new" Radio Orange. 510

Dr. L. de Jong, of the staff of Radio Orange, felt that the fusion had done much to enliven and improve the quality of the broadcasts. Both the persons of Mr. van den Broek and another associate of the Brandaris, the talented Mr. Cornelis J. G. Spoelstra, an author with a considerable international reputation earned under the name of "A. den Doolard", had represented valuable additions to Radio Orange. 511

Mr. van den Broek regularly spoke in the broadcasts of Radio Orange as the Rotterdammer, a name deriving its significance from the fact that Mr. van den Broek was a native of Rotterdam, and intended to signify the determination of the Netherlands people to rise above such adversity as the destruction of the center of the city of Rotterdam. 512

As head of Radio Orange Mr. van den Broek found that he had ready access to the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy. They met regularly each week to discuss problems relating to the broadcasts. 513

When, in the fall of 1944, Mr. van den Broek was sent to the liber-

509 Ibid. 510 Broek, loc. cit., 64244-64248.
512 Broek, loc. cit., 84275-84276. 513 Ibid., 84268.
ated south of the Netherlands to head a new broadcasting station located there, *Herrijzend Nederland* ("Emergent Netherlands"), Mr. Spoelstra became head of Radio Orange, a position he held until the end of World War II.514

Another problem facing Radio Orange, and one over which it could exercise no real control was that of German jamming. Jamming is the practice of broadcasting noise, often a squealing or buzzing sound, on the wavelength of the station with which one wishes to interfere. Since Radio Orange broadcast on only one long wavelength and two medium wavelengths,515 as well as over several shortwave transmitters, the Germans found it practical to set up jamming stations to interfere with Radio Orange. The jamming activity often made reception of the long and medium wavelengths difficult or even impossible, particularly in the areas of the large cities, near which the Germans located most of their jamming stations. As any broadcast station operator will testify there are certain "dead" spots, not necessarily too distant from the transmitter, in which his signals will be received very badly or not at all. This applied of course to the German jammers. A listener might well be in a "dead" spot for the jammer but be able to receive Radio Orange perfectly well. Some listeners found the shortwave frequencies more attractive, in that shortwave radio "skips", so that jamming signals might be regularly inaudible a relative short distance away in all directions from the jammer operating on these frequencies. The main difficulty was that, while many

514 Spoelstra, loc. cit., 99040-99042.

515 The medium wave stations fall within the American broadcast band, the long wave station was on 200 kilocycles, a frequency employed for broadcasting in Europe, although not in the United States.
radios made in Europe receive shortwave broadcasts as a matter of course, failing components, not defective enough to affect medium wave reception, might make shortwave reception impossible. With critical shortages of all sorts of electronic supplies, particularly radio tubes, many Dutch radios by 1943 or 1944 were ailing. Some gallant substitutes for unobtainable components were devised, but most listeners lacked the technical knowledge necessary for such improvisation.516

Aside from purely technical problems Radio Orange was faced with yet another major difficulty: That of reliable sources of information to use in preparing broadcasts. During the earliest period the (Dutch) Central Intelligence Service was not able to supply much information to Radio Orange on conditions in the occupied territory, a state of affairs not surprising since it lacked such information. The earliest copies of clandestine newspapers from Holland were made available to Radio Orange only in the summer of 1942. The staff of Radio Orange could and did monitor the Nazi controlled domestic Dutch radio stations and was able to infer some things as a result. They regularly received copies of the legally-published Dutch press which travelled to London via Sweden or other neutral countries. Also available to Radio Orange was a daily publication of the British Ministry of Information, the News Digest, a compendium of excerpts from leading European newspapers, including some published in German occupied Holland. Once the Dutch Bureau Inlichtingen ("Intelligence Bureau"), the successor to the Central Intelligence

516 Interview with Will Baumgarten, August, 1959. Baumgarten, who spent the war years in the Hague, told the writer that reception of Radio Orange in the Hague was so difficult that he listened instead to the Home Service of the B.B.C.. The Home Service was carried on so many wavelengths that German jamming was a practical impossibility.
Service, was functioning efficiently it was able to supply considerable material to Radio Orange. This was particularly true after the Swiss Route for intelligence information came into being. By 1944 the traffic of clandestine newspapers, intelligence reports, commentaries on all sorts of political, social, and economic matters, had reached avalanche proportions, with hundreds of pages a week being delivered. 517

Mr. Spoelstra was rather unsatisfied with the quality and extent of material supplied to Radio Orange by the Dutch Intelligence Bureau prior to September, 1944. He reported that Radio Orange made extensive use of the B.B.C. Monitoring Report, in which resumes of important broadcasts made that day in various countries were included, having been prepared from transcriptions made by the B.B.C. Monitoring Service. 518

Communications with the occupied territory improved greatly after the liberation of the southern provinces, so that word of a projected German action, particularly if related to something in the nature of new German forced labor recruitment measures, would reach an intelligence gathering agency in the unoccupied area in the middle of the morning and would be included in the next program of Radio Orange or the Dutch service of the B.B.C., whichever happened to be sooner. 519

A very limited source of information, although one drawn on particularly in the early years, was the Engelandvaarders ("Travellers to England"), the refugees who went to England from Holland. Dr. L. de Jong found these individual reports of very little value. The Engelandvaarders were generally simple people, "...who could report about conditions at a

517 L. de Jong, June 30, 1948, 16087-16088.
518 C. J. G. Spoelstra, July 23, 1948, 20108-20109. 519 Ibid.
pot and pan factory...and tell who the Dutch Nazi in their village was, but could give no idea of broad movements or currents of thought in Dutch public life..."520

Often the travellers, when they had reached England by way of neutral countries, had been weeks or months enroute, so that their information was badly out of date.

Thus, since there were no clandestine papers or intelligence reports available in the earliest period, Radio Orange broadcasts for some time tended to be filled with accounts of the life of the Dutch colony in London, including such things as "actuality" reports of the commissioning of officers in the Princess Irene Brigade. The staff of Radio Orange was not proud of these programs, but had little else to offer in their place. They were well aware that there were numerous things of more immediate interest and importance to their listeners.521

An early problem facing the staff of Radio Orange was whether they should make attempts to broadcast instructions to civil servants. Correctly speaking, this was a matter of policy for the London Government to decide and then relay to Radio Orange, but Mr. Lebon could see no harm in trying to "prod" the Government a bit into making up its mind on this policy issue. Certainly this neither the first nor the last time in history when officials concerned with news publication would themselves have a hand in the formulation of policy. Mr. Lebon got nowhere with his initial efforts, indeed Minister-President de Geer complicated matters by taking the attitude that civil servants in the occupied

520 L. de Jong, October 28, 1954, 98710-98712. 521 Ibid.
area should simply cooperate with German authorities.522

Mr. Lebon went to the London Government repeatedly to try to get a clear statement of opposition to the Nazi-inspired Winterhulp charitable drive, a direct Dutch counterpart of the German Winterhilfe campaign, known more for the Hilfe, or "assistance", which it rendered to its Nazi collectors than to the supposed recipients of the funds. Mr. Lebon was never able to get such an expression of opinion from the London Government in the earlier period. On his own initiative he prepared a series of broadcasts criticizing the Winterhulp, trusting to luck that no one listening in London would realize that he was not necessarily expressing a view officially held. Good fortune prevailed and he was later able to mock the dismal failure of the Winterhulp campaign in succeeding broadcasts.523

As will be seen, instructions to civil servants were forthcoming in later broadcasts.

An even more serious problem was one of whether Radio Orange should inspire acts of resistance or not. Again the problem was one of the London Government's really having to take a stand before Radio Orange could express a viewpoint, and again the London Government was pressured for a public stand. Since Radio Orange had some independent discretion, particularly after the departure of Minister-President de Geer, Mr. Lebon and his associates readily recognized that they possessed a considerable responsibility. Suggestions to persons in the occupied territory that bore no relation to the real situation there would be likely to be rejected by large numbers of persons, thereby damaging the prestige of both Radio

Orange and the London Government. Since London was badly informed during the earlier period about conditions in the occupied territory, and no one knew this better than the staff of Radio Orange, it naturally followed that very little advice on resistance activity was offered. 524

In April of 1942 Radio Orange was faced with a highly specific problem along the lines just mentioned. It was learned that the German authorities intended to institute the use of the Star of David, to be worn by all Dutch Jews, effective May 1, 1942. Since this was an event of major importance Radio Orange could scarcely ignore it. At the same time it was decided that no major effort would be made in broadcasts to organize opposition to the measure. Such an action could scarcely be planned in London in view of the sparse information available and might lead to very extensive German reprisals, all the more so because it had been instigated by Radio Orange. The station did broadcast a brief item protesting the German regulation. Listeners were not specifically urged to take any action but they were told, without editorial comment, of recent events in Belgium, where the earlier application of an identical German ordinance had resulted in many gentiles donning the Star of David themselves. 525

Mr. van den Broek was at all times deeply aware of the terrible responsibility which he bore in regard to broadcasts urging resistance activity. It appeared to him that Radio Orange could be most effective by both fully publicizing and urging resistance to those German measures intended to couple the Netherlands economy to the Nazi war effort. These measures included the labor draft, the requisitioning of stocks of raw materials, and others. 524

524 L. de Jong, loc. cit. 525 Ibid., 98723.
materials and finished goods, and similar activities.526

Minister Alarda, of the London Government, was very dubious of the value of broadcast instructions to the resistance. The enemy was, after all, also included in the audience.527 He felt that men who,

...sit safely at a table in front of a microphone and give instructions to the underground are in a less adequate position to assess a complicated situation than people on the scene in Holland....528

The essential problems have been stated, what of the actual broadcasts? They did attempt to give instructions to civil servants, to the resistance, and to the public in general. They also attempted to further a sense of national unity in a country which had always been divided to some extent.

Of major importance were the numerous broadcasts over Radio Orange of Queen Wilhelmina. As much as any single thing the House of Orange was a symbol of Dutch unity during the period in question. Her scripts, which were invariably her own creation, remind one of the direct prose of Winston Churchill. It may not be an exaggeration to say that, but for the obscure language in which they were delivered, they might have attracted widespread international attention. They reflected, even in the face of the worst disasters, an unshakable belief in the ultimate triumph of the Allied cause. Religious themes or allusions frequently appeared, although the Queen, a Protestant, tactfully avoided references which

526Broek, loc. cit., 84256-84260.

527The Germans often left one Radio Orange frequency clear of jamming in order that they might listen themselves. An alert listener could sometimes locate this channel in time to make use of it.

528Alarda, loc. cit., 98065.
might offend Holland's large Catholic population. Widespread criticism of
Radio Orange was offered and continued to be offered, but critics nearly
always specifically exempted the royal addresses. Part of this attitude
undoubtedly simply represented respect for the sovereign, but part also
reflects the single minded determination of one person which in itself
came to be a central symbol of Dutch hopes. Even the Communist leader,
Mr. Saul de Groot, who could scarcely be accused of harboring an ex-
cessive royalist bias, paid high tribute to the speeches delivered by
Queen Wilhelmina over Radio Orange.529

The writer has selected as representative a royal address of May 6,
1942, delivered on the occasion of the German execution of seventy-two
Dutch hostages.

My fellow countrymen:

With you, with our compatriots in east and west, and with
the entire civilized world, I was deeply shocked at the news of
the execution of seventy-two of our fellow countrymen.

With you I wish to pay homage to their memory, homage to
their courage and their love of country.

Holland shall never forget the martyrs who fell for her
liberation. Name by name, person by person, their memory shall
continue to live with us.

We know the executioners of the seventy-two who have just
fallen. Many of us know, unfortunately, that there are many
others who have been murdered, the deaths of whom are unknown
to us and may not become known until later, if then.

Even though we do not know their numbers we must remember
and honor them.

My countrymen, I have an urgent assignment for you. So
that you may all enjoy maximum personal security you must see
that no incautious word is uttered which can lead to the im-
prisonment or murder of a countrymen...I must ask you in these
difficult days to keep silent on all subjects which can be of

529Groot, loc. cit., 96968.
value to the enemy, again, regardless of the person to whom you are speaking.

See to it that when you telephone you are not overheard. Realize that when you write letters the enemy lies in wait. Remember that the same is true when you use public conveyances or are in other public places where people gather together.

Only a few days separate us from the 10th of May. I do not need to say how much I will be united with you in my thoughts on that day. In the past, the past that has brought so much suffering both for Holland and the Dutch East Indies, the indestructible will of the people to be free has not been bent or broken. In these days that will serve as a most convincing witness for all. In the future, the blood and tears of the present will bring the birth of a new, united free Holland in all areas.

And now my countrymen we will not despair, we will remain steadfast, we will triumph, because we fight against the forces of darkness with a clear conscience, for a cause that is just and for justice itself.530

There were, as has been noted, many government messages which did not come from the Queen. Some were read for the guidance of civil servants by the regular announcers, some by the Minister-President Dr. Gerbrandy. Whatever the ramifications of the early period and Minister de Geer's proposed honeymoon with the Germans, by November 17, 1942, civil servants in the occupied territory were being told in plain language that they had been "left behind" in order that they might protect the citizenry from hunger, forced labor, deportation, robbery, murder, and Anton Mussert and his Dutch Nazis. Anyone who failed to do his duty in this connection was likely to be regarded as insubordinate or worse, they were warned.531

Eight days earlier, on November 9, 1942, civil servants had been warned specifically not to cooperate with the labor draft, with any measures mistreating Jews, or with the "Nazification" of the schools.532

530ENQ, VIIa, 412. 531Ibid., 416. 532Ibid., 415.
In a broadcast of October 2, 1943, civil servants were specifically placed on notice of the existence of the *Commentary of 1943*, which amplified the earlier *Ordinances of 1937*, providing guides for the conduct of civil servants in their dealings with the occupying power. They were told that copies of the *Commentary* were widely circulated within the civil service. 533

Frequent warnings were subsequently directed to civil servants not to cooperate with various German measures calculated to recruit additional laborers for service in Germany. In a broadcast of October 21, 1943, both civil servants and the civilian population as a whole were warned not to cooperate in any way with the deportation of Dutch Jews. 534

On May 14, 1944, Radio Orange called two Utrecht policemen,Messrs. Huizinga and Blumen (or "Blumen") by name, and said that reliable reports indicated that they had assisted a German press gang in raids on the local population to forcibly recruit laborers for work on *Wehrmacht* installations. Huizinga, Blumen, and any others who engaged in such activities faced a possible death penalty or life imprisonment after the war, the broadcast stated. 535

Radio Orange, as has been noted, was used both to proclaim the railway strike of 1944 and to give additional instructions to railway workers and other concerned.

When the Netherlands Forces of the Interior was called into being by the London Government Radio Orange was repeatedly used to transmit messages, some of them quite involved, to personnel. Extensive use was also made of the station in the liberated south, *Eerrijzend Nederland*, (*Emerg-533*ibid., appendix, xvi. 534*ibid.* 535*ibid.*, 428-429.*
Aside from messages directed to civil servants or others in public positions, Radio Orange very frequently addressed instructions or advice to more general groups of the Netherlands people. Many of these messages tended to stress the obvious, although as it turned out what might seem obvious to a less law-abiding people than the Dutch had to be meticulously spelled out.

The Dutch public was frequently urged not to donate to the Nazi-inspired Wintehulp, as has been said. They were told in massive detail of the "high operating expenses" of the organization, and given the names of Dutch Nazis who were regularly siphoning off a part of the funds for their own use.537

Workers were repeatedly urged not to voluntarily accept employment in Germany. In the earlier period of the war the Germans had some success in getting Dutch laborers, lured by supposedly attractive working conditions and compensation, to do just this.538

Dutch employers, some of whom had adopted a "business as usual" attitude towards the occupation, were urged to help their employees escape the labor draft, otherwise, as Radio Orange bluntly pointed out, they might not have any employees after the war. To budding Dutch industrialists a reminder was given that, if Germany should win the war, it appeared highly unlikely that the Dutch region of the Reich would be the scene of any industrialization on the scale that Hollanders had contemplated.539

On April 7, 1943, Dutch students were warned by Radio Orange not to sign any agreements with the Germans, supposedly enabling them to continue their studies. Such agreements had served as little more than a handy registration device for labor recruitment in the past. 540

In a broadcast of April 10, 1943, Radio Orange quoted from the underground press, urging resistance to the forced labor draft. In a sense the media of information had come the full circle, since the clandestine press had often drawn from Radio Orange. Increasingly, as time went on, Radio Orange was to quote items from the clandestine press, some of them quite lengthy. 541

On April 30, 1943, demobilized officers and men of the Dutch army were given advance warning that they faced re-internment in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany. 542 On May 19, 1943, Radio Orange warned them not to report for such re-internment. Some, although perhaps too few, heeded this warning and went into hiding. 543

Following the murder of General Seyffardt, a leading Dutch Nazi leader, presumably by resistance workers, Radio Orange broadcast a warning to those in the underground not to "operate their own judicial system". The broadcast, thus phrased since excessive reprisals for attacks of the Seyffardt sort were feared, clearly expressed no grief at the sudden passing of the General. 544

On July 31, 1944 Radio Orange broadcast detailed instructions to Hollanders on how to go into hiding. Since a general strike of all railway employees was ordered scarcely two weeks later this advice was un-

540 Ibid., 417.  541 Ibid., 419.  542 Ibid., 421.
543 Ibid., 422.  544 Ibid., appendix, xxx.
doubtedly quite timely.\textsuperscript{545}

On January 2, 1945, word had arrived of the beginning of the last of the great German labor recruitment programs. Radio Orange urged its listeners in the occupied territory not to request or apply for the official exemptions, as these were not always honored when granted and too often turned out to be, in effect, simply another registration device. This broadcast was directed specifically to both civil servants and the general public.\textsuperscript{546}

And, on May 6, 1945, this final instruction from the London Government was broadcast over Radio Orange:

\textit{Warning of the Government:}

Reports reaching us from the western part of the Netherlands are such that the following points are brought to the attention of the Netherlands people by the Dutch Government:

1. The unconditional surrender of the Germans is a fact.
2. Citizens should remain quiet as long as Allied troops have not arrived.
3. Citizens should avoid all deeds and demonstrations which, in these last hours, could lead to unnecessary blood letting among the populace in the northwestern provinces.
4. The Netherlands Forces of the Interior should undertake only those assignments that are given to it by its designated Commandant.
5. It is forbidden for anyone to appear on the street in an old Dutch army uniform.\textsuperscript{547}

Criticism of Radio Orange was massive and widely expressed, both in the occupied territory and elsewhere.

If one is to believe their founders, several agencies which supplied intelligence information to the London Government came into being at

\textsuperscript{545}Ibid., 426.  \textsuperscript{546}Ibid., 429.  \textsuperscript{547}Ibid., 432.
least in part as the result of the dissatisfaction of their proprietors with the quality and content of Radio Orange broadcasts.

Dr. A. L. Oosterhuis, a Delfzijl physician who created the "Swedish Route", reported that he was originally motivated to do this by Radio Orange. He had, he said,

...Listened with a friend to the nonsense that Radio Orange peddled... [and come to the conclusion] that something should be done... to better inform the people [in London].

One of the reasons which moved Dr. Visser 't Hooft to set up the Swiss Route was the widespread criticism of Radio Orange which reached him from the occupied territory.

The Council of Resistance, which operated an intelligence agency that frequently sent material of a military, economic, political or social nature to London, felt that little or none of the data which it had gathered was reaching Radio Orange, as broadcasts frequently presented subjects in such a way as to clearly indicate no acquaintance with information with which the Council had sought to supply it. The staff of Radio Orange appeared to the Council to be misinformed on a wide variety of subjects.

Midshipman Dogger, in rendering his report on the Order Service when he arrived in England, was a little more tactful in his criticism, saying that he felt "favorable alterations" in Radio Orange might be effected. He also criticized the satirical Watergeus ("Sea Beggar") program of Radio Orange, which used limericks to poke fun at the Germans.

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549 W. A. Visser 't Hooft, December 8, 1948, 37106.
550 Wagenaar, loc. cit., 95159-95160.
and their Dutch assistants, describing its humor as "grove "coarse").

An intelligence group operated in conjunction with the clandestine newspaper, The Watchword (Het Parool), came into being because Radio Orange seemed to reflect the lack of information available in London. At the most critical moments in the war, it seemed, one tuned in Radio Orange, in itself a perilous activity, and heard a running account of a soccer match between an English and a Dutch team. By 1941 the "wildest" sort of rumors were being circulated by the man in the street in Holland, and it seemed to The Watchword that Radio Orange should begin to broadcast something a little more pertinent and authoritative so that the information vacuum might be filled, to some extent at least.

Former Minister of Waterways in the London Government, Alvarda, made the criticism that some of the material broadcast by Radio Orange had its origin in official acts of the London Government, some originated with writers and commentators of the station itself. The difficulty was that it was sometimes impossible to tell whether persons speaking on Radio Orange programs presented their own views or those of the Netherlands Government.

Dr. L. de Jong, speaking in defense of Radio Orange, pointed out that domestic Dutch radio broadcasting both before and after World War II had been organized to serve various religious, political, and regional groupings within the Netherlands, but that such a service was beyond the scope or capabilities of Radio Orange. Since it had to broad-

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551 EMQ, VIIa, 671.

552 F. J. Goedhart, February 16, 1949, 41648.

553 Alvarda, loc. cit., 98054.
cast a single program to the entire population it was inevitable that, along with its other shortcomings, there would be those who would be bound to find its programs unsatisfactory.554

In addition Dr. de Jong found that there were critics of Radio Orange who disliked the very process of interpretation involved in broadcast commentaries. They were, as he put it, using an English phrase, "...Those who want to make up their own minds..."555 The difficulty with these arguments was that the broadcasts were not intended just for the reception by a select group of intellectuals but by the broad mass of the Netherlands population as well, which included a great number of people who totally lacked the background information to, "...Make up their own minds...," and needed to have things explained to them. Also, of course, Radio Orange was not allowed to broadcast news bulletins for quite some time. Since this was true, commentaries were a rather desirable form of program.556

In addition to the ban on news broadcasts in the early period Radio Orange had not been helped any by the need to submit scripts to the Council of Ministers or by the general defeatist attitude of Minister-President de Geer.557

Dr. L. de Jong felt that there had been a substantial improvement achieved in the program in late 1942 and early 1943 with the coming of Messrs. van den Broek and Spoelstra, both of whom were well suited for the work and had experience gained in operating the Brandaris.558

554L. de Jong, loc. cit., 98706-98707. 555Ibid. 556Ibid. 557Ibid., 98710-98712. 558Ibid.
Mr. van den Broek had known full well at the time that there had been bitter criticism of Radio Orange. The British postal censors, who read all mail sent from England to foreign countries, frequently gave Mr. van den Broek excerpts from letters written by resident Hollanders to persons abroad, excerpts in which Radio Orange was often spoken of in terms that were anything but complimentary. Mr. van den Broek was willing to agree with many of their criticisms, particularly the one sometimes voiced that the tone of the broadcasts may have been unduly optimistic. The point had to be made, in this connection, that Radio Orange often reflected the tempered optimism of British news agencies, of which Radio Orange naturally made extensive use. Mr. van den Broek had a high regard for the accuracy of these British sources. Such an outlook was bound not to please the "all is lost" school of thought, a body of opinion particularly sizeable after the loss of the Dutch East Indies.559

Radio Orange was, on occasion, better informed on events in the occupied territory than was apparent in its broadcasts. Mr. Spoelstra received a report from the (Dutch) Central Intelligence Service of a revolt of sorts in the area of Twente, Holland. He was told that the report had been received from a Central Intelligence Service agent on the spot who had transmitted it from a clandestine station to London. No mention of the revolt had appeared in the press legally published in Holland. Under the circumstances Radio Orange refrained from any mention of the uprising, which had not been publicized by the Germans fearing that otherwise the existence of the agent might come to be

559Broek, loc. cit., 34271-34274.
suspected. 560

The former Minister of Justice, van Angeren, acknowledged that Radio Orange sometimes seemed to be presenting the views of the London Government when, in actual fact, the opinions expressed were those of commentators or script writers. This was the reason for the frequent conferences between Mr. van den Broek and Minister-President Gerbrandy. At the same time Mr. van Angeren firmly believed that Radio Orange had to be given a certain amount of latitude. As he put it, "...If [Radio Orange] had had to run to the Council of Ministers...to ask the Gentlemen if this [or that] could be said..." then both the morale and the quality of programs would suffer. 561

Radio Orange was criticized for the fact that it frequently had broadcast authenticating messages used by the agent provocateur Anton van der Waals in infiltrating underground organizations. Neither the staff of Radio Orange nor Mr. Reyneske van Stuwe, a Dutch B.B.C. employee who had the job of forwarding messages for the resistance to Radio Orange, had any notion of their real meaning other than that they were secret messages which had originated with the intelligence agencies. 562

Minister van Heuven Goedhart felt that the Netherlands people had been well served by Radio Orange. He had lived in the occupied territory until April 24, 1944, when he had departed for London. This, coupled


561 J. R. M. van Angeren, September 3, 1953, 98184-98185.

562 ENQ, VIIa, 728. Using captured codes and transmitters the Germans penetrated several circuits of communication with London. One such circuit was used to "authenticate" van der Waals.
with his extensive resistance experience, put him in a better than average position to assess the value of the broadcasts. 563

Finally, note must be made of the fact that, although the Council of Resistance was one of the numerous critics of Radio Orange, its founder, Jan Thijsen, regarded Radio Orange highly enough so that in his Manifesto, cited earlier, he urged his readers not only to listen to the broadcasts but, if possible, to take them down stenographically. 564

The Swiss Route

Repeated mention has been made of the clandestine Zwitserse Weg ("Swiss Route"), the clandestine channel of communication running through Switzerland which linked the occupied territory with the London Government.

Like many another instrumentality of the London Government, as the Swiss Route in time came to be, the organization did not initially come into being as the result of initiative taken by the London Government. Rather it was first conceived of by a Dutch subject resident in a neutral country. Dr. Willem A. Visser 't Hooft, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, was at his headquarters in Geneva when German forces occupied Holland. He continued in this capacity during and after World War II. Dr. Visser 't Hooft soon found himself receiving reports on conditions in German-occupied Holland. Some such material came in letters passed through the German censor, some letters were smuggled out. Representatives of Dutch business

564EtQ, VIIa, 267.
firms, particularly those working for German account, were sometimes permitted to travel to Switzerland. Such commercial travellers often visited Dr. Visser 't Hooft, bringing him further information on current life in the Netherlands. From his visitors he was able to learn of the earliest resistance efforts, particularly those engaged in by churches and by the universities. Later he received more material of a general nature. He passed on information thus acquired to London and to the Dutch East Indies. He was given an added impetus in this connection as he received many complaints from the occupied territory about Radio Orange, reports which stressed the apparent lack of understanding on the part of the London Government of conditions in Holland.565

Dr. Visser 't Hooft was in correspondence with Minister-President Gerbrandy in London, so that he was happy, in early 1942, to accept an invitation from Gerbrandy to travel to London and hold discussions on his contact with Holland. In London Dr. Visser 't Hooft met with Dr. Gerbrandy and with various other officials of the London Government. Among those he found he was best able to work with was the Secretary-General of the War Conduct Department, Mr. A. H. J. Lovink. Dr. Visser 't Hooft entered into a written agreement which acknowledged the criticism and shortcomings of Radio Orange, and the need for a determined effort to increase and strengthen what it called "spiritual" contact between the London Government and the Netherlands people. It was further affirmed to be of the utmost importance that persons of prominence in Holland be informed of the plans and intentions of the London Government. To this end a "center" was to be established in

565Visser 't Hooft, loc. cit.
Switzerland, with the cooperation of the Dutch diplomatic establishment there and, "...Various resident Hollanders..." which would act as a two-way link between the Dutch population and its absent Government. This center, to be responsible to the War Conduct Department, was particularly to concern itself with:

...The collection and processing of reports regarding spiritual movements [in Holland], spiritual resistance to National Socialism, the battle on the church and school fronts, changing views of the social and political future, and the attitude toward Germany...

The forwarding, possibly summarized, of important books or periodicals which may still appear in Holland.

The forwarding to Holland, at least to leading persons, of material giving a closer insight into the views of the Government on the present and future.

A sum of money, the exact amount not specified in the document, was to be made available for the center.

On his return from London Dr. Visser 't Hooft was "extraordinarily delighted" to receive in Geneva Miss Hebe Kohlbrugge, who had managed to make her way from Holland to Switzerland, bringing with her a large collection of very valuable intelligence material. She was ready to return immediately to Holland and set up there a center for the assembly of material to be sent via Dr. Visser 't Hooft. This she did, and the Swiss Route really came into being.

Miss Kohlbrugge arrived back in Holland on August 2, 1942, making her way illegally across the border, through "barbed wire and rhododendrons" near the village of Putte.

566Ibid.  567Ibid.  568Ibid.

569H. Kohlbrugge, February 17, 1949, 42252-42253.
The desired center was established in Amsterdam. Since the use of regular couriers seemed to involve too great a risk, a photographer was found who could produce greatly reduced copies of the original documents. These microfilms were then secreted in the bindings of books sent to Switzerland by ordinary mail. Mr. H. van Randwijk of Vrij Nederland, with which Miss Kohlbrugge also had an association, was to help collect the material to be sent via this new Swiss Route. Since political items were desired, Miss Kohlbrugge, who did not feel competent to evaluate such material, enlisted the assistance of Mr. Stufkens, a member of Parliament. This was in accord with the wishes of Dr. Visser 't Hooft. Miss Kohlbrugge believed that Dr. Visser 't Hooft desired that Mr. Stufkens alone be charged with this responsibility.570

Miss Kohlbrugge had gone to Switzerland with introductions from Dr. J. Kooymans and Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine. Dr. Visser 't Hooft had particularly asked that Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine read through the material to be forwarded. This Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine agreed to do.571

Miss Kohlbrugge regularly received and passed on to the Swiss Route military intelligence reports from the Order Service, having established contact with that organization through Mr. van Randwijk of Vrij Nederland.572

Thus the Dutch end of the Swiss Route was, in large measure, operated by persons closely associated with Vrij Nederland. This made for some friction with the Order Service, which had its reservations about both Vrij Nederland and the fashion in which the Dutch

570Ibid., 42245. 571Ibid. 572Ibid.
terminus of the Swiss Route operated. This suspicion was reciprocated, since the staff of *Vrij Nederland* had its own reservations about the Order Service.573

As things developed much of the Swiss Route material travelled from Holland to Switzerland by courier rather than through the mails. Miss Kohlbrugge, as has been noted, preferred postal shipments in the interests of personal safety. Others, including Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine, felt the courier service to be superior, since one definitely knew through return of the courier of the safe arrival of shipments.

The organization and operation of the courier service is very nearly a dissertation topic in itself. Not only did couriers have to cross the Belgian, French, and Swiss frontiers, they also had to have either a German-approved reason for such a journey, or else be equipped with very carefully forged papers. Both methods were employed. Mr. W. E. A. de Graaff, of the Philips Electrical Works of Eindhoven, Holland, made some twenty-two trips on legitimate business from Holland to Switzerland, travelling with completely valid identity papers and carrying with him a great many rolls of microfilm destined for Dr. Visser 't Hooft and his assistants. Others travelled on forged identity papers of the Belgian Chamber of Commerce. Several persons were notable in helping establish the courier route and keeping it functioning smoothly, particularly Mr. J. H. Weidner, a Dutch businessman resident in France; Mr. J. G. le Jeune, a Dutch student at Louvain University; and a Mr. Bartels.574


574 G. H. Slotemaker de Bruine, December 7, 1948, 36543.
As far as can be determined the Germans never intercepted a courier shipment of the Swiss Route. They did arrest one of the couriers who was finally released with his shipment still intact, concealed in a tube of toothpaste which he had among his personal effects. 575

An escape route was also operated by a related organization, whereby persons were conveyed from Holland to either Spain or Switzerland. Mr. Weidner estimated that the organization had safely conveyed about 1,000 persons, including 118 American aviators, 200 persons of French nationality, about 580 Hollanders, and another 100 or so of other nationalities. 576

Fortunately the escape line and the document courier service of the Swiss Route were sufficiently separate so that when, in February, 1944, the Gestapo broke up the escape line, arresting about 100 of its personnel, the courier service could continue to function undetected. 577

At the same time the postal shipment of material from Holland to Switzerland continued. As nearly as this writer can determine, in 1944 one postal shipment was intercepted by the Gestapo, owing to someone's having tried to secrete too long a length of microfilm in a book binding. Whether the Gestapo appreciated the full significance of their discovery is even less certain. Shortly thereafter the Allied invasion of southern France, which began on August 15, 1944, put an end to passenger and mail connections linking Holland and Switzerland, thus terminating both the courier and postal services of the Swiss Route and effectively discontinuing the activities of the

575 J. G. le Jeune, June 16, 1949, 58569.
576 J. H. Weidner, June 17, 1949, 58603. 577 Ibid.
By late 1943 Dr. Visser 't Hooft found himself faced with an increasing flood of material. Amsterdam frequently added a commentary to items it forwarded, as often neither the original authors nor their relation to current Dutch society were known or understood in London. Dr. Visser 't Hooft also added commentaries on occasion. Military items received by the Swiss Route were processed by the Dutch military attaché in Bern, General A. G. van Tricht, with whom Dr. Visser 't Hooft found he was able to work very well indeed.

All material received from Holland that was to be forwarded was photographed a second time in Geneva and then "thinned" by a special process developed by a Dutch engineer resident in Switzerland, Mr. Eisma. These films, which could contain a great deal of printed matter in very little space, were bound into books and consigned by a Swiss publisher, via the German Lufthansa airline, to a bookstore in Stockholm, where they were collected by Dutch consular officials and forwarded to London.

Once material reached London it was usually processed, sorted out, and dispatched to the appropriate agencies by the Bureau Inlichtingen ("Intelligence Bureau"). On occasion, as will be seen, this presented special difficulties.

578 Kohlbrugge, loc. cit., 42259-42260.
579 Visser 't Hooft, loc. cit., 37175.
580 J. G. van Niftrik, December 7, 1948, 36651ff. The writer believes this "thinning" technique involved dissolving most of the film base away with an appropriate solvent, possibly amyl acetate.
581 A subsequent section deals with the Intelligence Bureau.
During its operation the Swiss Route conveyed a vast amount of material. Part of this consisted of military intelligence reports, some gathered by domestic Dutch intelligence agencies, private groups of persons who assembled intelligence material, and others by London-dispatched agents active in Holland, agents who often contacted the Swiss Route through the Order Service or some intermediate organization.582

Non-military reports came from a wide variety of sources and covered nearly every conceivable subject. It was through the Swiss Route, in large measure, that the London Government received copies of the clandestine press. The Dutch, as a nation, are very much given to the printed word. Such energies as were not channeled into the clandestine press or other forms of resistance activity, often went into "study" groups and into the preparation of discussion papers, monographs, and the like.583

As has been noted, the Swiss Route was intended to be a two-way street, with London's reactions to materials sent to it to be expressed, together with the views of the London Government on matters of both current and future interest. Unfortunately questions from the occupied territory, some of them of an urgent nature, all too often simply met with silence from London.

The Amsterdam office repeatedly requested of London instructions on both the sort of material desired and whether the types of material

582 The activities of these organizations are discussed later.

583 A partial list of non-military items forwarded by the Swiss Route in its first year of operation is to be found in the appendix. It represents only a fraction of what was to be conveyed in later years.
provided were useful. No reply to these questions was ever received.  

The well known international jurist, Dr. J. H. W. Verzijl, together with a group of his colleagues, prepared and sent via the Swiss Route to London a lengthy report on various legal problems. He never received any reply at all. After the end of the war, in June, 1945, Dr. Verzijl complained of this, and was told by the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. van Kleffens, that the report had never been received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, Dr. Verzijl wrote Dr. Visser 't Hooft informing him of this fact. Dr. Visser 't Hooft made inquiries of his own through the Dutch Intelligence Bureau and was told that Dr. Verzijl’s report had most decidedly been delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a receipt had been obtained.  

Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine, of the Amsterdam terminus of the Swiss Route, got the impression repeatedly that the London Government could only have filed away some important documents which had been sent without ever reading them at all.  

Prior to the liberation another report, one on postwar monetary policy, was prepared by a leading Dutch fiscal expert, Mr. Ridder, working in conjunction with others. The report cautioned against certain monetary "mistakes" which should be avoided in the postwar period. After the war the Government proceeded to do precisely what Mr. Ridder and his associates had cautioned against. Since he felt that his advice would have been accorded careful consideration Mr. Ridder also made inquiries. He was told by the officials in question that

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584Slotemaker de Bruine, loc. cit., 36608ff.  
585Ibid.  
586Ibid.
his views would have been highly regarded, had any such report been received. A further investigation did reveal that the report had reached London, but had not been recognized for what it was and had been carefully locked up in a safe as of "no significance". 587

Inquiries sent by the Amsterdam office of the Swiss Route on any subject almost invariably went unanswered. A person totally unknown in Holland was chosen by the London Government to serve as Minister of Finance. Amsterdam asked for particulars and received no answer. On December 6, 1942, Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina made a radio address which seemed to indicate proposed changes in the postwar status of the Dutch East Indies. Owing to technical difficulties the broadcast was badly heard in Holland and consequently a text was unavailable. 588 In the Wervelwind (Whirlwind), a Dutch language newspaper published in London and scattered at irregular intervals by the Royal Air Force in Holland, there had appeared an account of the address. A summary of the speech had also appeared in the London weekly, Vrij Nederland, which reached Holland. The two versions did not agree. Amsterdam naturally asked London for an authentic text of Her Majesty's remarks. No reply was received to this inquiry, either. 589

On occasion the Swiss Route in Amsterdam received requests from the London Government for specific information which had been given to the Belgians in London, transmitted through a clandestine radio circuit to Belgium, and then forwarded through the Dutch contacts of a Belgian 587Ibid.

588This was before the period when any systematic effort was made to prepare dictaphone recordings of Radio Orange broadcasts.

589Slotemaker de Bruine, loc. cit., 36610.
underground organization to Amsterdam. During the entire period in question the Swiss Route was in good working order in both directions. Whatever motivated London to act in such a devious fashion was beyond the comprehension of anyone in Amsterdam.590

All told, Amsterdam did receive via the Swiss Route some 700 separate items. While some of these did originate in London, including regular shipments of the London Vrij Nederland, much of what Holland received had not been collected or dispatched by London at all but was the result of the patient, untiring efforts of Dr. Visser 't Hooft. Many articles appearing in Swiss papers and magazines were microfilmed and sent to Holland, as were items originating in other countries and available in Switzerland.591

In Geneva Dr. Visser 't Hooft was having his own, similar troubles with London. As long as Mr. Lovink, with whom Dr. Visser 't Hooft had made the agreement setting up the Swiss Route, remained as Secretary-General of the War Conduct Department, Dr. Visser 't Hooft found that when reports were sent to London he received in response an answer, giving the reactions of the London Government. This was particularly useful in that it gave Dr. Visser 't Hooft a clearer idea of what types of material London desired. Once Mr. Lovink was sent off to China, as Dutch Ambassador, much less was forthcoming from London. This event, which coincided with the German occupation of Vichy France, also marked a considerable slowing down of the courier route, which had operated through Vichy territory as much as possible.592

Dr. Visser 't Hooft, who soon was in receipt of numerous complaints

590 Ibid., 36611. 591 Ibid., 36610.
592 Visser 't Hooft, loc. cit., 37114.
from Holland about London's wayward silence, felt that the London Government may have sometimes spoken or behaved as though it had not received material forwarded to because the initial processing of Swiss Route reports in London was conducted by the military, persons who might not grasp the true significance of non-military material, and thus fail to forward it to the appropriate agency. Dr. Visser 't Hooft observed that the (Dutch) Intelligence Bureau sent communications to the occupied territory that were in complete conflict with material which the Fatherland Committee had sent via the Swiss Route, and which, indubitably, had reached London. Under the circumstances, this seemed all the more reason to add a commentary to forwarded material. 593

In the meantime a storm of formidable proportions was brewing in Amsterdam. By 1943 the Dutch terminus of the Swiss Route had more or less decided to form a "political commission", which would lay special stress on ideological problems in the analysis of material to be forwarded via the Swiss Route. The body, to be composed of Slotemaker de Bruine, van Randwijk, Stufkens, Cramer, and van Namen, all of whom were markedly liberal or even socialistic in outlook, would give political or ideological material more intensive attention. To this suggestion Miss Kohlbrugge dissented most vigorously. A "commission" had not been authorized for the Dutch terminus of the Route, much less a "political" commission. If there must be a political body it should at least include representatives of the Anti-Revolutionary, Christian Historical, and Catholic parties. Miss Kohlbrugge was told that the commission would forward Catholic and Anti-Revolutionary material, that it made no difference to

593 Ibid., 37175.
those concerned that material sent on did not agree with their own particular points of view. She protested that the persons in question did not "outrank" her, that the London Government had intended that the Swiss Route function only as a "mail box", and that since members of the commission were socialistically inclined, the Route would be changed so that the London Government would be "informed" from a socialist point of view. She contacted Dr. Visser 't Hooft through a Dr. Koopmans, who wrote Geneva telling of the projected changes. Apparently Dr. Visser 't Hooft refused to take sides, so that Miss Kohlbrugge, outnumbered, was over-ridden. Shortly thereafter she departed the Swiss Route, having earlier given up her work with Vrij Nederland in order to devote full time to the Route. 594

The political commission, which did come into being, had a few reservations about Miss Kohlbrugge. They did not ask her to serve on the commission itself as it was felt that her background information was insufficient for the task. Moreover, they were wary of her close ties with the Order Service, not because of any alleged shortcomings of the latter organization in a political sense, but because the Service, in their view, had had a very bad record of losses to the German security police. Thus it was felt that any fresh information which reached the Service, via Miss Kohlbrugge or any other means, could all too likely find its way into German hands, even though the Order Service had the best will in the world. 595

That the political commission made a determined effort to forward

594 Kohlbrugge, loc. cit., 42245.

595 N. Stufkens, March 15, 1949, 45158.
material of every ideological complexion was repeatedly stated by its members. 596

After Miss Kohlbrugge departed the Swiss Route she took her feud with the Amsterdam management of the organization to Colonel Six of the Order Service, who, not unexpectedly, agreed. It was decided by Miss Kohlbrugge and Colonel Six that several entire "shipments" of the Swiss Route would be monitored, so that it might be determined if items were being misused or withheld. This they were able to accomplish by getting the photographer who prepared the Swiss Route microfilms in Amsterdam, Mr. Prins, to prepare an extra copy of each for Kohlbrugge and associates. Miss Kohlbrugge's point of view was that it was imperative that the "changed" nature of the Swiss Route become known in London as speedily as possible. 597 A first attempt was made to send this information to London with the cooperation of an agent of the Intelligence Bureau, Mr. G. A. van Borssum Buisman, who was working with the Order Service's intelligence organization and was soon to return to England. At the time he accepted uncritically the thesis that the Amsterdam end of possibly the Geneva office of the Route withheld items of importance destined for London. Upon reflection, and he had more than ample time for reflection, since the Gestapo had arrested him before he was able to return to England, it seemed to him that the evidence of the intercepted microfilms had not really substantiated this allegation. One item had been returned from Geneva, to be sure, but with a notation that it con-

596 Ibid., also: Slotemaker de Bruine, loc. cit., 36543.

597 Kohlbrugge, loc. cit., 42287.
flicted with an earlier report.598

Someone else was soon to have ample time for reflection, in this instance Miss Kohlbrugge, who tried to make the journey to England, carrying with her a choice selection of the purloined microfilm. Miss Kohlbrugge, equipped with a defective and forged identity card, was arrested by the Gestapo, specifically on the train going from Tilburg to Amsterdam, on or about April 3, 1944. As she saw the Gestapo agent approach she placed the roll of microfilm in the handbag of the woman seated next to her in the train, a total stranger, and hoped for the best. It was her good fortune that her action was not observed and that the woman turned out to be trustworthy. Thus it was that Miss Kohlbrugge was simply arrested for having forged identity papers, a far less serious charge than that of espionage. She was, after a time, released. She was later told by associates that the woman to whom she had given the microfilm had close contacts with Vrij Nederland and was thus able to see that the film was kept from the hands of unauthorized persons.599

As it turned out, Miss Kohlbrugge's informants were badly informed. Weeks after her arrest Mr. J. le Poole, active in underground work and associated with the Swiss Route, was approached by a Mr. Theo Verhaar of Amsterdam who said, "Relatives of mine have given me a little matchbox with microfilms, which they received from a third party...I don't know if it is of any importance but take a look." Mr. le Poole did take a look and discovered, to his amazement, that he had been given

598 G. A. van Borssum Buisman, June 9, 1949, 57473.
599 Kohlbrugge, loc. cit.
a Swiss Route shipment of some months before. The organization had, in his words, "...sprung a leak". 600

It had seemed to Colonel Six that a reading of the copied dispatches did not support the view that political censorship was involved, although some items given to the Swiss Route in Amsterdam for forwarding might have been withheld. The correspondence between Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine, in Amsterdam, and Dr. Visser 't Hooft indicated that there was definitely a bias involved. Colonel Six said that all he had attempted to do was to inform London of the changes in the mechanism of the Swiss Route, i.e., the creation of the political commission in Amsterdam, and of its probable effect, and let London decide for itself. 601

Colonel Six did approve of Amsterdam adding a commentary to material forwarded, he would readily agree that this was necessary. As an example of material withheld by the Swiss Route in Amsterdam he offered a report prepared by persons associated with the clandestine press and quoted a letter from Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine to Dr. Visser 't Hooft, saying that the item in question had been withheld as it was of "too little importance". 602

Apparently some items of a sufficiently minor or obscure character were not forwarded by Amsterdam. A report on the importation of draught horses in the North Veluwe district was withheld as being of no conceivable interest to the London Government. The author of the report

600 J. le Poole, June 7, 1949, 56856.

601 P. J. Six, March 10, 1949, 44935. 602 Ibid., 44952-44957.
apparently agreed that it need not be sent to London.  

The disasters befalling Miss Kohlbrugge and Mr. van Borssum Buisman apparently did nothing to deter Colonel Six. His espionage conducted against the Swiss Route continued until about April 20, 1944. Mr. van Namen of the political commission believes that the espionage conducted by Colonel Six and Miss Kohlbrugge upon the Swiss Route was discovered before Miss Kohlbrugge's arrest.

Some of the Order Service complaints about the Swiss Route subsequently did reach London, enough so that the head of the Intelligence Bureau, Dr. Somer, became temporarily convinced that the Swiss Route was withholding material, specifically military reports sent by the Order Service. This view Dr. Somer expressed in a letter to the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy, dated August 12, 1944.

In a flood of ensuing correspondence Dr. Visser 't Hooft explained that some material that might appear to have been "withheld" from the microfilm traffic consisted of letters exchanged with Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine pertinent to the operation of the Route itself and of no other importance, and that no single item of Order Service origin had ever been withheld, abridged, edited, or anything of the sort. He further explained that when the Swiss Route added a commentary, as it often did to forwarded items, it was clearly labelled as such. It was a riddle to Dr. Visser 't Hooft why any official fuss should have been made of his not forwarding to London what were essentially inter-

603N. Stufkens, March 15, 1949, 45158.
606ENQ, IVa, appendix, lx.
office memoranda exchanged between Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine and himself. 607

On October 29, 1945, after the liberation of the Netherlands, Dr. Somer wrote the Dutch Minister of War, stating that he had finally come to realize that any material withheld by Dr. Visser 't Hooft consisted solely of correspondence between Visser 't Hooft and the Amsterdam terminus of the Swiss Route. 608

The Swedish Route

To some extent the Zweeds Weg ("Swedish Route"), came into being as a result of the apparent shortcomings of Radio Orange. The Germans had permitted Dutch coastal shipping to continue to travel between the Dutch port of Delfzijl and other points, particularly Sweden and Finland. This traffic was in the German interest, and Delfzijl offered a particularly attractive route in terms of efficiency, linking the Low Countries and parts of Germany with several Swedish ports. A Delfzijl physician, Dr. A. L. Oosterhuis, had earlier used this continuing link with a neutral country to smuggle persons out of Holland. Sometime in the spring of 1942 he listened with a friend to Radio Orange and observed, "...The nonsense they peddled..." 609 Accordingly, he decided to try to use his contact with Sweden as a route for intelligence information, in order that London in general and Radio Orange in particular might be better informed. This did not seem to be a difficult thing to do. As any port inspector or customs official will testify the average merchant vessel comes well equipped

607 Ibid. 608 Ibid., lxxvi.

609 Oosterhuis, loc. cit., 36867ff.
with places of concealment. In this contest the ship's officers and men have a signal advantage in that they are likely to know the craft far better than most inspecting officials. Thus it was that Dr. Oosterhuis came in contact with the Netherlands Consul-General in Stockholm, Mr. A. M. de Jong. Mr. de Jong had just established an intelligence contact with London. This had come about as a by-product of a journey by de Jong to London in May, 1942. His principal mission had to do with numbers of Dutch refugees then resident in Sweden. If possible he would like to arrange for the transportation of these persons to England. During his visit in London Mr. de Jong was approached by Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service, who wondered if de Jong would be willing to help in gathering reports relating to conditions in the occupied territory. Mr. de Jong was willing, and a Mr. van Bylandt of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs sat in on some of the talks so that the London Government was appraised of the matter. It was agreed that Colonel Rabagliatti would forward to the London Government all reports received in the connection.610

Accordingly, some time in June of 1942, the new service came into being. Dr. Oosterhuis collected copies of underground newspapers, intelligence reports gathered by several private intelligence organizations, including the Dutch Luctor et Emergo group and the Belgian Wim organization. "Shipments" from these two organizations to be forwarded to Stockholm were delivered to Dr. Oosterhuis in the form of microfilm. This was the exception rather than the rule. Dr. Oosterhuis himself did not have facilities to prepare microfilm. Most of

the material was thus sent in the form of documents, sometimes quite sizable bundles of them. These packages were given to the captains of the coastwise ships for concealment and delivery. 611

Although discovery of these relatively bulky shipments would seem to have been a real hazard, as far as this writer can determine no such event did occur. The efforts of Dr. Oosterhuis were eventually thwarted by the Gestapo, as will be seen, but not as the result of the discovery of a concealed package or packages.

Dr. Oosterhuis also forwarded to Sweden for shipment to England replacement parts for the engines of Dutch vessels which had departed Holland and were then operating in England as coastwise shipping, either fishing or hauling freight. Their large numbers meant that they played a vital role in the British economy. "Spares" of one sort or another were often unavailable in Britain. 612

Dr. Oosterhuis had available for his use the services of a clandestine transmitter which was operated by a Mr. Koning, also of Delfzijl, a member of the Merchant Marine Academy of that city. The station, which was in contact by radio telegraph with London, was used to transmit intelligence reports that were of an urgent nature, including such things as German troop movements or the location of ships carrying ammunition. 613

Dr. Oosterhuis employed the regular sea route to warn London of the arrests, in April of 1943, of members of the National Committee. Included in this warning was a statement of the fact that the National Committee had been betrayed by the provocateur Anton van der Waals.

611 Oosterhuis, loc. cit., 36867. 612 Ibid. 613 Ibid.
together with a description of van der Waals and a reminder that he had been able to "legitimate" his activities by causing authenticating messages to be transmitted over Radio Orange.614

The clandestine radio station brought word of the coming arrival from London of the agent of the Dutch Intelligence Bureau, Mr. G. A. van Borssum Buisman, who was to establish contact between the Intelligence Bureau and the Order Service. Mr. van Borssum Buisman did arrive and was introduced to the Order Service by Dr. Oosterhuis.615

In Stockholm Consul-General de Jong received and forwarded the Swedish Route shipments. He also regularly interviewed the captains and crews of Dutch vessels calling at Swedish ports, to gain from them new information on conditions in the occupied territory. Questions from London were regularly sent back to Dr. Oosterhuis in the inevitable hidden packages.616 Included were instructions for the construction and operation of another clandestine radio transmitter, complete with a transmission schedule and two new codes for use with the new station.617

The new transmitter was assembled, but Mr. M. Vader and Mr. H. Deinum, who were charged with its operation, were unable to establish contact with England owing to technical difficulties.618

Early in 1943 Consul-General de Jong made a second trip to London.

614Ibid.

615Ibid. The writer is unable to determine which agency in London was in contact with the Koning transmitter, although he believes it to have been the (Dutch) Intelligence Bureau.

616A. M. de Jong, loc. cit., 43945ff. 617Ibid.

618M. Vader, May 5, 1949, 49212.
There he was told that he would now receive instructions directly from the new Dutch Intelligence Bureau, which had come into being in November, 1942, after his first trip. He was introduced to Major Broekman, in charge of the Intelligence Bureau. 619

Consul-General de Jong had not gotten along too well with Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service and he did not get along much better with Major Broekman. The two-way traffic continued, with bicycle tires, coffee, flour, sugar, and cognac being included in some of the shipments destined for Holland. 620

In July of 1943 Major Broekman, who was in poor health, resigned from his position as head of the Intelligence Bureau and was succeeded by Dr. J. M. Somer. Dr. Somer soon came to feel that all was not well in Stockholm and travelled there to discuss matters with Consul-General de Jong. While feeling that Consul-General de Jong had done valuable pioneer work in establishing an important link with the occupied territory Dr. Somer had several specific complaints about Mr. de Jong's methods. The Intelligence Bureau had sent to Stockholm for forwarding to Dr. Oosterhuis several rolls of microfilm. It was expected that Mr. de Jong would forward the actual films. Instead he had an enlarged copy made of each frame of film and forwarded, therefore, a large bundle of the resulting paper prints. Since Stockholm was a forwarding point for the Swiss Route, and one in which the microfilms concealed in books consigned to a Swedish address were sometimes re-processed, de Jong had ready access to facilities enabling him to

619 A. M. de Jong, loc. cit.
620 Ibid.
Consul-General de Jong had made the enlarged prints, he told Dr. Somer, because Dr. Oosterhuis lacked facilities with which to process microfilm. De Jong felt that he had no authority to order Dr. Oosterhuis to establish such facilities.622

Dr. Somer disagreed with de Jong's unwillingness to use microfilm. De Jong seemed to have a passion for sending great packets of paper to Holland, on which the message was written in "huge" letters.623

Then there was the episode of the Order of Orange Nassau. Dr. Oosterhuis had reported to de Jong that further military espionage reports, which he had forwarded from a man in the Dutch Province of Friesland, would not be forthcoming, as the man in question, Mr. van Straten, was dying of cancer. London authorized the awarding to Mr. van Straten of the Order of Orange Nassau, a decision which it announced both by radio to Dr. Oosterhuis and, later, through Consul-General de Jong. De Jong sent to Dr. Oosterhuis a miniature Order to be given to Mr. van Straten personally. This was delivered.624 Dr. Somer disapproved of this action since he regarded the security risks involved as excessive. Awarding the Order would create a favorable impression in Friesland, to be sure, but this was also the sort of thing people were too likely to talk about.625

On July 23, 1943, German security police arrested Dr. Oosterhuis.

621M. Somer, June 16, 1948, 14938.
622M. de Jong, loc. cit., 43992.
624Oosterhuis, loc. cit. 625Somer, loc. cit.
and several of his associates. They had been betrayed by the captain of one of the vessels which had helped them with the Swedish Route, a Mr. F. J. M. Aben. Both Dr. Oosterhuis and Consul-General de Jong had known that, long before the war, Captain Aben had been a member of the Dutch Nazi Party, but both felt this to be a thing of the past and that he was basically reliable. He had been willing to take considerable risks and seemed to be able to accomplish anything. Both had had at least momentary doubts about his loyalty but one had to take some calculated risks, under the circumstances.626

The activities of the Swedish Route continued for a time at least. Mr. D. Boerema took over the work of assembling material to be forwarded to Stockholm, while contact with ship captains was reestablished by Mr. P. Veninga, who was assisted by a Mr. Hammingh.627

In September, 1943, Dr. Somer relieved Consul-General de Jong of his intelligence duties. This work was taken over by two others, Mr. Lindenburg and Mr. Gevers Deynoot, with de Jong remaining in his old post as Consul-General.628

There followed an episode about which there is some disagreement. What is agreed is that between September 20 and October 5, 1943, de Jong, acting in his capacity as Netherlands Consul-General, interned some four Dutch coastwise vessels in Swedish ports, together with their crews. This occasioned a sharp response from Mr. Lindenburg, who promptly telegraphed London, expressing the fear that further

626Oosterhuis, loc. cit., 56445.
627E. A. C. Meijlink, June 2, 1949, 56489ff.
628Somer, loc. cit., 76415.
activity of this sort might sever the intelligence contacts operating through such maritime traffic. De Jong was subsequently forbidden by the Minister of Trade, Agriculture, and Shipping to engage in further internments.629

This action very nearly put an end to the intelligence traffic of the Swedish Route. The Germans, understandably enough, were reluctant to allow Dutch vessels to travel to Sweden when they faced possible internment. German vessels continued to make the journey, and since they often had at least partly Dutch crews some intelligence information was smuggled out. It has been estimated, however, that fully 98% of such Dutch crew members carried no intelligence information.630

The all important question remained, of course, one of motivation. Why did Consul-General de Jong intern the vessels? Why did he choose this particular time for their internment?

The most immediate conclusion, not necessarily correct, is that, irritated at having been relieved of his intelligence duties, he decided to retaliate by closing the Swedish Route. This conclusion has been denied most vehemently by Mr. de Jong, who had had the matter of internment under advisement for several years and felt that the time for such action had finally arrived.631

Since Dr. Oosterhuis and his immediate associates had been arrested in late July of 1943 it was obvious to Mr. de Jong that the


Germans were well aware of the existence of the Swedish Route. Captain Aben, in betraying Oosterhuis, had delivered to the Germans a packet of intelligence materials destined for Stockholm. This being the case, de Jong reasoned, the internment of some of the coastwise vessels was necessary to protect the captains who had participated in this work from German reprisals. Since Swedish vessels also traded with German-occupied Holland de Jong hoped that the Route might be maintained by their agency. This never came to pass, however.632

In 1942, apparently, the captains of several of the vessels concerned had formed a deputation and approached de Jong with the suggestion that he might intern their vessels. There seemed worse places to spend the war than Sweden. They were told by Consul-General de Jong that, while he did indeed possess the authority from the London Government to intern Dutch vessels, he felt the value of the Swedish Route to exceed any advantage accruing to the Germans from the trade in which they were engaged.633

There is some evidence available to indicate that Mr. de Jong might have had other valid reasons for refusing to intern the vessels in an earlier period and then decide to intern them subsequently. For such an internment to be effective the cooperation of Swedish port and coast patrol officials was clearly necessary. It appears that Swedish officials were sounded out on several occasions before October, 1943, about the possibility of internment, and their response was negative, since they were under incessant pressure from the Germans. Reasonably reliable evidence suggests that the fall of 1943 was about

632 Ibid. 633 Lindenburg, loc. cit., 370ff.
the time at which the Swedish authorities in question became convinced that Germany would lose the war and that German pressure and threats could be paid less heed.634

Apparently the Germans had removed some Dutch coastal vessels from Holland to Norway where they were undergoing conversion for service as minesweepers, a fact of which Consul-General de Jong was aware.635

The Central Intelligence Service

Before the German invasion of the Netherlands in May, 1940, Dutch intelligence services, as much as those of a military character as were active, existed under Section G.8. III of the Dutch General Staff. The work of this organization did not, apparently, include plans for the maintenance of communications with a possible exiled regime, should Holland be occupied by one or another of the belligerents in an armed conflict.

In 1939, the month is uncertain, Mr. L. H. N. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal, the Royal Commissioner for the Province of Utrecht, was visiting in Portugal and held personal conversations with an American military attache whom he had met socially. The American expressed the opinion that a war was in the offing, and that on this occasion the Netherlands would be occupied by German forces. He told Mr. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal that the Allies in World War I had had very great trouble establishing intelligence contact with German-occupied Belgium as there were no pre-existing contacts upon which they could build. He urged the Hollander to use his influence to try to get the

634 H. Schuur, September 9, 1949, 66788. 635 Ibid.
Netherlands Government to set up some sort of system which could be used for communications with British or American intelligence agencies should future need arise.636

Mr. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal himself felt that Holland was likely to be engulfed in the prospective conflagration, so on his return to the Netherlands he established contact with the head of G.S. III, Major-General J. W. van Oorschot, telling him of what the American military attache had recommended.637

Neither General van Oorschot nor his colleagues in G.S. III made any such advance effort to provide for a nucleus of possible agents, to equip them with radio transmitters, or anything of the sort. They did not, as General van Oorschot remembers it, even think about such a possibility. To even consider it, let alone recommend such a course of action, would have been futile. Such action would have conflicted with Holland's policy of studied neutrality, or so the Government would have argued.638

General van Oorschot's one activity involving a departure from strict neutrality turned out rather badly, although through no fault of his own. This was the so-called Venlo incident.

In brief, in October of 1939, British intelligence officers came into contact with officers of the German General Staff who had their doubts about the ability of Germany to wage a successful war. Captain S. Payne Best, of the British Secret Intelligence Service, arranged for meetings to be held with representatives of the German group in Holland at Venlo, near the German border. The contact had come into being with the help of

636Rosenthal, loc. cit., 35926. 637Ibid.
638J. W. van Oorschot, July 6, 1949, 59777.
a German refugee resident in Holland, a Dr. Franz Fischer. Although Holland was neutral the arrangement of such meetings was not as simple as one would suppose. The Dutch Army was deployed along the entire German border as a precautionary measure. While the frontier was open numerous Dutch road blocks and military check points had been established.

Clearly the cooperation of Dutch authorities was going to be required. Captain Payne Best, together with Major R. H. Stevens, a British military attache at the Hague, approached General van Oorschot with his problem. General van Oorschot agreed to lend his cooperation to this activity, and detached one of his officers, a Lieutenant Klop, who was given authority to pass through the Dutch military cordon and assist the Germans to enter Holland. Arrangements were completed and several meetings between the Germans and the British were held. The British learned of extensive dissatisfaction within the German officer corps and they were told of a plan whereby a junta of officers would take Hitler prisoner, form a substitute government, and negotiate an "honorable" peace treaty with Great Britain and France. Unfortunately for nearly all concerned the Gestapo became aware of the negotiations, penetrated the German organization, and substituted its own negotiator, in the person of Walter Schellenberg, for the talks. On November 9, 1939, German security forces crossed just over the frontier and on Dutch soil arrested (or kidnapped) Messrs. Best, Stevens, Klop, and Lemmens, their Dutch chauffeur. All were carted off to jail in Germany where they spent the duration of the war, with the exception of Lieutenant Klop, who was wounded in an exchange of gunfire with the Germans and died within a few hours.639

639S. Payne Best, from a B.B.C. radio broadcast of 1949, quoted in: ENQ, IIa, appendix, lxxxviii.
Following the Venlo incident the Netherlands Government promptly disowned General van Oorschot's action. He was removed from his command as head of G.S. III. He was replaced by J. F. M. van de Plassche, who had been head of the foreign section of G.S. III. Both General van Oorschot and van de Plassche were present in London when the Dutch government-in-exile came into being. General van Oorschot, although still under something of a cloud as the result of the Venlo incident, was placed in charge of the Dutch military mission which was sent to London at the start of the German invasion of the Netherlands. Van de Plassche continued to preside over G.S. III.640

A Royal Decree of July 19, 1940, set up the Centrale Inlichtingen­dienst ("Central Intelligence Service"). The organization, which was to be given control over the intelligence activities of the Ministries of Justice, Defense, and Foreign Affairs, was made responsible to the Min­ister of Justice. At its head the Decree placed a counsellor of the Ministry of Justice, Mr. F. van 't Sant, who was elevated to a rank "corresponding to that of Major General".641

Viewed from various points of view the appointment of Mr. van 't Sant was a strange one. He was a person of undoubted ability and those who worked with him had a high regard for his skill. At the same time there would appear to have been others with more experience. Mr. van 't Sant came to England as the head of Queen Wilhelmina's personal security force.642 He had had earlier contact in World War I with the British Secret Intelligence Service. There were those who felt that Mr.

641ENQ, IVa, appendix, v.
642Oranje-Nassouw, loc. cit., 274.
van 't Sant was particularly well suited for the position in that these previous contacts should make harmonious cooperation with the British more likely. 643

Neither General van Oorschot nor van de Plasche was consulted or employed in the work of the Central Intelligence Service. The writer has yet to encounter an entirely satisfactory explanation as to why General van Oorschot was not entrusted with at least some of the responsibility entailed in the Central Intelligence Service, if not its command. From the creation of that body the work of G.S. III was effectively suspended, with its officers performing other tasks. 644

The reason most frequently offered for General van Oorschot's being passed over was, needless to say, the Venlo incident. That this may have been an indiscretion, at least in view of the Dutch posture of neutrality, is not to be doubted. By the same token one might have supposed that an ex post facto appraisal of the Venlo incident, in the summer of 1940, might have caused someone to realize that General van Oorschot had had a clearer view of Holland's probable future with her Nazi neighbor than that held by the Dutch Government of the time. The head of an intelligence organization is not likely to be in the public view, particularly in war time, so there could have been no question of his selection being bad from a publicity point of view. At this point one did not need to worry about possible offense to the Germans.

While there were those who found General van Oorschot "too elderly" in 1940 (he was sixty-five), it is interesting to note that, four years

643P. van 't Sant, November 3, 1948, 31880.

644Dijxhoorn, loc. cit., 20028.
later, General van Oorschot was not considered too old to be placed in charge of the Bureau Bijsondere Opdrachten ("Special Service Bureau"), a Dutch sabotage agency entrusted with tasks which at the time were much more extensive and exacting than the initial requirements of the Central Intelligence Service in 1940. Nor was there any serious suggestion that the British had any objection to General van Oorschot. That the Venlo affair had ended in disaster was not ascribed to General van Oorschot, indeed Payne Best quite candidly argued that the fact that he and Stevens had failed to recognize the Gestapo agents provocateur for what they were had resulted in the debacle.

There was no accord in London on the subject of the Central Intelligence Service. The Minister of Justice, Mr. Dijxhoorn, wished that the work of G.S. III simply be continued and expanded. Messrs. van Oorschot, van de Plassche, and Major C. M. Clifiers, also of G.S. III and in London, had the required experience, why not let them continue? As far as Mr. Dijxhoorn was concerned Mr. van 't Sant had no particularly visible qualifications as the head of an intelligence organization. Mr. van 't Sant had become head of Queen Wilhelmina's bodyguard only at the time of the German invasion—before that he had been Police Commissioner of the Hague. Possibly Mr. van 't Sant might have some uses in arranging the selection of agents in cooperation with the British, Dijxhoorn was willing to concede.

645 J. T. Furstner, July 30, 1948, 23597.

646 Payne Best, loc. cit. The reader is advised that no detailed British documentation on specific aspects of joint Dutch-British intelligence activities is available. British subjects involved are usually barred by the Official Secrets' Act from relating events of their own knowledge. Thus the writer has had to rely on Dutch sources for such information and acknowledges that they may be incomplete.
as much. Dijxhoorn suspected that Mr. van 't Sant, with little experience with government or politics, would have a fearful job simply finding his way around the three Dutch ministries concerned. 647

The Central Intelligence Service, as might be imagined, was charged primarily with acquiring information concerning the German-occupied territory and establishing and maintaining contact with Holland through the use of agents employing radio. 648

Since no agents had been left behind in Holland some had to be sent. The first of these might conceivably have been Mr. van 't Sant himself, since he originally had the courageous plan of being parachuted into the garden of his friend Mr. Menten, a banker residing at Warmond. Mr. van 't Sant was deterred from this proposed operation as it was pointed out that the precision of night parachuting was not great and one was extraordinarily lucky to actually land anywhere in the vicinity of a desired spot. It was further pointed out that Warmond and environs consisted largely of water and that better dropping sites might be found in the northern provinces. 649

Before the summer of 1940 had come to an end the first agent of the Dutch Central Intelligence Service had been successfully parachuted into the Netherlands. L. A. R. J. van Hamel was parachuted during the night of August 28, 1940. 650

Van Hamel's background and training, as things turned out, set a pattern for future operations. He was, as were nearly all Dutch agents dispatched by both the British and various London Government agencies, a

650 P. J. Six, March 10, 1949, 44787.
Dutch subject. Van Hamel was trained in espionage techniques in a special British school, the British supplied him with a code, a radio transmitter, and training in its use. The messages which he sent to England, after his arrival in Holland, were received at a British station and then passed on to the Dutch Central Intelligence Service. "Traffic" from the Dutch destined for van Hamel took the reverse route. It was sent at the appointed hour when the British station, which communicated with scores of agents in a number of enemy-occupied countries, had a schedule with van Hamel. This was in no way regarded as unfair or unreasonable by the Dutch. They were on British soil, after all, and it was understood by both parties from the start that radio communication with the continent would have to be channeled through the agency of the host power.

Van Hamel had been given as a mission the task of setting up a series of espionage centers, each independent, and each operated in conjunction with a radio transmitter which would carry the data thus collected to London. They were to collect material primarily of a military nature. It was hoped that it might be possible to return van Hamel to England, where, it was expected, his experience would enable him to play a leading role in the Central Intelligence Service.

Agent van Hamel was to be all too typical in yet another sense: He was captured within a very few weeks of his arrival, on October 14, 1940.

Otto M. Wiedemann, a Bureau Inlichtingen agent sent out on the night of September 19-20, 1943, was a British subject of Dutch origin.

to be exact. However this is not to say that his mission was a failure. His activity in the brief period given to him was extensive and he left behind at the time of his arrest a large espionage apparatus which was to aid the Allied cause and plague the Germans for many months to come, and, indirectly, for the duration of the war.

Most later agents were dropped with radio operators. The agent would gather information, code it, and the radio operator would then contact London and transmit the data thus prepared. Some radio operators were also supplied with their own separate codes. Van Hamel, dropped alone, was his own radio operator. While hastily trained in the technique of transmitting Morse code, van Hamel had no knowledge of the inner workings of radio. On his arrival he found his set inoperative. He enlisted the assistance of Mr. J. C. A. van den Hout, who had been a radiotelegraphist in the Dutch Army, and was able to get the transmitter on the air and contact London before the end of August. Military reports were transmitted to London, with contacts occurring two or three times daily on occasion.

Van den Hout was provided with a copy of van Hamel's code and continued to remain in contact with London after the arrest of van Hamel. Soon after van Hamel was arrested, van den Hout took a second transmitter, which he had constructed, to the Hague and left it with

655 From a dossier collected by the Netherlands Ministry of Justice on the arrest of van Hamel, in: ENQ, IVA, 47-48.

656 "Morse" is the popular designation for the dots and dashes used in telegraphic code, but actually the dot-dash system used in radio for many years is not the original system of Morse but the so-called international code, better adapted for radiotelegraphy than true Morse.

Mr. A. J. J. Buys, so that Buys could help continue the work. This
turned out to have been a wise precaution as van den Hout was arrested
by the Gestapo on October 21, 1940, a week after van Hamel.658

Mr. Buys, in the meantime, continued to maintain contact with Eng­
land. Buys' transmitter was used to tell London of the location of
German ammunition dumps and powder magazines. London was also informed
of the departure from Rotterdam of a number of amphibious vessels loaded
with German troops. It was suspected that this was a training exercise
for the projected invasion of England. Thus alerted, the Royal Air Force
was able to locate and attack the vessels in question, apparently in­
flicting serious damage on them.659

A Mr. van Gruting also assisted Buys in carrying on the work of
van Hamel. When it became apparent that the Gestapo was energetically
seeking van Gruting his work, was in turn, passed on to Mr. W. J. M. J.
d'Aquin. Much of the information that the organization was passing on
to London at this point was actually collected by still another organ­
zation, the van Hattem Group, an extraordinarily active body headed by
a student named van Hattem. The van Hattem Group, which gathered both
economic and military reports, was later to develop into the "spy" sec­
tion of the Order Service, a very important intelligence organization
indeed.660 The Buys-van Grutin-d'Aquin organization continued to
function for the best part of two years after the arrest of van Hamel.
Mr. d'Aquin and his associates were arrested on July 23, 1942, after

658 Ibid.
659 A. J. J. Buys, March 10, 1950, 76870.
the ubiquitous *agent provocateur* Anton van der Waals had succeeded in
penetrating their organization.661

The financing of van Hamel's operations came from within Holland.
Just after his arrival van Hamel appeared at the office of Mr. E. E.
Menten, a Warmond banker. Van Hamel displayed credentials in the form
of an unfixed photographic print, which would darken when exposed to
light unless it was specially treated, and informed Mr. Menten that his
address had been given him in London as one who might be able to help
him with funds needed for the fulfillment of his mission. Mr. Menten
gave him money and continued to supply funds as long as they were needed.662

Van Hamel also created directly another group to carry on radiotele-
graphic communications with London. This organization, which was headed
by Mr. P. B. M. ten Bosch, with Mr. Sloth Blaauwboer serving as radio
operator, forwarded the dispatches of another private, "free enterprise"
intelligence organization, the so-called "A.C." Group. The very exten-
sive "A.C." reports were passed on to the ten Bosch group by Mr. H. J. de
Koster.663

The "A.C." reports apparently originated with Dr. Meindert Brouwer,
a Bilthoven physician who built up quite an extensive private espionage
apparatus with a number of assistants. The "A.C." organization had
close contacts with the espionage branch of the Order Service, indeed
the "A.C." group deserves some of the credit for the formation of the
former organization. Some of the "A.C." reports were thus forwarded

661 Ibid.

662 E. E. Menten, May 2, 1950, 79164ff.

663 H. J. de Koster, June 7, 1949, 56676.
by the Order Service to London, about which more will be said later.
The Gestapo eventually caught up with the "A.C." group. Very few of the organization, made up of a number of talented souls, survived their imprisonment. Dr. Brouwer, an alumnus of several concentration camps, was one who did, although he was formally sentenced to death by the Gestapo on at least three separate occasions.664

Surrounding the "A.C." group and Dr. Brouwer's sanatorium Plantwijk is more than a touch of mystery. Patient Willem van Tuyn, who was subject to fits and seizures, presided over a clandestine radio transmitter which sent coded "A.C." reports and received in return various messages, including some addressed to the Order Service. After the war it became painfully apparent that the "A.C." station had not been in contact with any Allied station. The obvious remaining possibility, unless van Tuyn had been the victim of a cruel hoax on the part of some other clandestine group with its own transmitter, was that he was unwittingly in touch with the Germans. While German counter-intelligence and security forces were later to establish a very elaborate network of contacts with London, using the codes and wavelengths of captured agents, there is no tangible evidence that this was the case in the "A.C." affair.665 The Germans most concerned with such matters, Giske and Schreieder, were more than willing to furnish complete information on their extensive and varied activities; moreover, the data which they supplied, some of which can be corroborated from other sources, appears to be correct. If an official German agency was "playing" the "A.C." station neither officer was aware of it. A regular unit of the German

664M. Brouwer, March 30, 1949, 46036. 665Ibid.
army, devoted to the detection and location of all unauthorized radio
transmissions did track down the transmitter in question, thus leading
to the arrest of those concerned, but there is no evidence which points
to replies being sent by a German unit located in Holland. Gikes
doubts very much if such an activity could have been conducted from
Belgium or Luxembourg without his knowledge. It is barely possible
that units in Germany or in some other German-occupied country might
have been responsible. 666 As nearly as the writer can determine the let-
ters "A.C." were arbitrarily chosen by van Tuyn as a designation for
his transmitter. It was a pathetic fact that numbers of Hollanders
built clandestine stations on their own initiative, seeking to
contact London. Such transmissions were sometimes received in England
but, for obvious reasons, went unanswered.

The "A.C." reports that were sent to England via Mr. ten Bosch's
agency reached him through an intermediary, Mr. H. J. de Koster. 667

Through van Hamel's own station, operated with the assistance of
van den Hout, arrangements were made with the Dutch Central Intelli-
gence Service, which was acting in conjunction with the British Secret
Intelligence Service in the van Hamel assignment, to return van Hamel
to England. It was provided that van Hamel was to be picked up on the
Tjeukemeer, a large lake in the Province of Friesland, by an amphi-
bious aircraft during the night of October 12-13, 1940. Van Hamel
appeared at the appointed time and place, as did the aircraft, but the
weather was so unfavorable that a landing could not be attempted. He

666 J. Schreieder, March 11, 1949, 45075-45079.

667 Koster, loc. cit.
tried again on the night of the 13th and 14th. The aircraft, a two-
engined Dutch Fokker plane, flew overhead, apparently attempted a land-
ing, found this unsafe, and departed. Van Hamel and his accompanying
party were arrested by Dutch "lake" police who turned them over to the
Gestapo. 668

In spite of very extended questioning the Gestapo was able to get
nearly nothing out of van Hamel. Under threat of having all his living
relatives in Holland put in a concentration camp he would tell the Ger-
mans precisely one thing: The exact location where he had been para-
chuted in Holland, information which was of no particular value in any
event. He refused to divulge his code or his security check, 669 the
names of his assistants, or the source of his financial assistance.
In Warnond, van Hamel's personal banker, Mr. Menten, spent the entire
winter and spring momentarily expecting a visit from the Gestapo. Van
Hamel never betrayed him. 670

The agents of the Central Intelligence Service who followed van
Hamel were of widely varying quality. The next to follow was Mr. C. H.
van Brink, who was parachuted into the occupied territory during the
night of November 18, 1940, with the assignment of reporting on both
military objectives and civilian matters with military implications.
Van Brink made extensive use of friends and family in providing him-
self with lodging, intelligence information, and quarters in which to
668 EMQ, IVa, 47-48.

669 The security check consisted of agreed-upon "mistakes" in a
telegram, such as a mistake every sixth character. If the check was
omitted, London was to understand that the agent had been captured.

670 Menten, loc. cit.
set up his transmitter. His reports dealt primarily with defenses in and around the harbor of Rotterdam. Van Brink did not build up an organization which carried on his work after his departure. After the failure of a plan to pick him up by amphibious aircraft, he proceeded to England via France, Spain, Portugal, Curacao, the United States, and Canada, a journey which consumed about ten months. At the time of his arrival in England, in September of 1942, there was no Dutch intelligence agency in operation. The Central Intelligence Service was dormant and its successor had not yet come into being. Those Dutch officers receiving him displayed very little interest in his accomplishments.

Agent W. E. Schrage and J. J. Zomer, who served as Schrage's radio operator, arrived in Holland on the night of June 13, 1941. Schrage's mission consisted primarily of collecting military information and data on the Dutch transportation system, although it was hoped he would gather some economic data. Both Schrage and Zomer contacted and worked with a number of the groups which the original agent, van Hamel, had created. Their mission could be described as quite successful. They transmitted to London masses of useful material, including quantities of classified Wehrmacht documents assembled by a German soldier of pro-Dutch sympathies, Feldhaus von Ham, who later managed to reach England and joined the Dutch army there. Agent Zomer's transmitter was located by the Germans, with the result that he was captured on August 31, 1941.

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674 F. van 't Sant, November 3, 1948, 31979ff.
After a time it was noticed in London that messages, which continued to arrive from Zomer's transmitter, did not contain the proper security checks. Thus London assumed that he had been captured, was being forced to transmit, and, according to, terminated the contact. 675

Schrage, left without a radio operator, continued to collect military material of a most elaborate and varied nature, including plans of German air fields, anti-aircraft installations, harbors, coast defenses, searchlight batteries, and military telephone exchanges. Even if Zomer had still been free to transmit messages to London, much of the material collected by Schrage could scarcely have been communicated by telegraph. Schrage then came into contact with Cornelis Sporre, an agent of the British Special Operations Executive, with whom he had been trained in an English parachute school. Together they set out for England in a twenty-four foot boat equipped with an outboard motor, departing Holland on November 13, 1941. No trace of them was ever uncovered and they are assumed to have been drowned. 676 The writer believes that some of the material gathered by Schrage reached London by another route. Schrage did establish telegraphic contact with London after the arrest of Zomer, using a transmitter set up by van Hamel and operated by P. B. M. ten Bosch, over which he sent some forty-three messages to London.

Mr. A. H. Alblas, of the Central Intelligence Service, was parachuted in July, 1941, with the mission of gathering data on the effects of Allied air raids on Holland, ascertaining the locations of various 675 Ibid.

676 D. Q. R. Mulock Houwer, June 10, 1949, 58116ff.
specific German factories in Holland, and the collection of information on the production and consumption of petroleum products in the Netherlands.  

Alblas contacted a number of groups gathering intelligence information, and brought the resistance group surrounding the clandestine newspaper *Het Parool* into contact with London. Alblas helped make arrangements whereby a British vessel would pick up and bring to England several Dutch political leaders. That this operation ended in failure was due to no fault of Alblas. Alblas was able to fulfill much of his mission, partly with the assistance of others who helped gather some of the desired information.

At some point in the winter of 1941, probably in December, Alblas received a new code which had been brought him from London by another agent, W. J. van der Reyden, who delivered in Holland by means of a clandestine coastal landing on December 9, 1941.

Shortly thereafter, on February 13, 1942, van der Reyden was captured by the Germans. He divulged Alblas's new code as well as his own, so that the Germans, who had already picked up and transcribed Alblas's transmissions, were now able to decode them. It was decided not to arrest Alblas for the moment, rather to "control" his messages and see what information he was sending. When it became apparent that Alblas had come dangerously close to unraveling a special operation of German counter-intelligence, the so-called *England-Spiel*, he

677J. Idema, September 16, 1949, 66708.

678F. J. Goedhart, February 16, 1949, 41644.

679W. J. van der Reyden, July 30, 1949, 62811.
was arrested. 680

That van der Reyden was not a wise choice as an agent was widely believed in Holland after World War II. He had been a member of the Dutch National Socialist Party at one time, a fact which the Dutch had originally pointed out to the British, who were eager to employ van der Reyden's talents as a professional radio operator, a job he had held on various merchant vessels. The Dutch had additional reservations about van der Reyden, as an even cursory examination of his personal life indicated extended involvement in financial transactions of a questionable nature. 681

On July 23, 1941, Mr. S. E. Hazelhoff Roelfzema reached London from the occupied territory and presented to the Dutch and British intelligence services a rather ambitious plan for the establishment of regular channels of communication whereby persons could be transferred to and from the occupied territory. Particularly distinctive was the proposal that clandestine landings on the Dutch coast be employed, as earlier schemes had invariably preferred the use of aircraft or travel through neutral countries. 682

Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service was quite enthusiastic about the Hazelhoff Roelfzema proposals, an enthusiasm which seems to have been fully shared by Mr. van 't Sant, head of the Dutch Central Intelligence Service. It was agreed, on August 8, 1941, that the Central Intelligence Service and its British counter-

681 ENQ, IVa, appendix, xxvi.
682 S. E. Hazelhoff Roelfzema, November 26, 1948, 34971.
part would cooperate in the creation of the sort of arrangements envisaged by Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema. 683

Anglo-Dutch agreement on the matter was to have been expected, as Mr. van 't Sant seemed to work well with Colonel Rabagliatti. This was, it will be recalled, one of the reasons behind the choice of Mr. van 't Sant for this post.

Six days after accepting the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organizational plan, on August 14, 1941, Mr. van 't Sant resigned as head of the Central Intelligence Service. 684 Few personalities or events in the entire period of the war caused more comment and controversy in Dutch circles than van 't Sant and his leadership of intelligence activities. Thus an examination of the subject must be made.

The reasons for Mr. van 't Sant's departure at this time seem to have been various. Although he tendered his resignation he was, in effect, discharged from this position by the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy. Basically, Dr. Gerbrandy was motivated by the lack of confidence which Mr. van 't Sant enjoyed in a wide variety of places and among varied members of the Dutch community.

Some of this lack of confidence was based on Mr. van 't Sant's having received payments from the British Secret Service during and just after World War I. The sum which was widely quoted was £20,000. 685

Since there was substance to these reports, even Dr. Gerbrandy was willing to concede that van 't Sant's value had thereby been decreased. 686

683F. van 't Sant, July 27, 1949, 61785. 684Ibid.
Mr. van 't Sant was certainly widely distrusted by underground organizations and their members in Holland. Some travellers from Holland had specifically been warned to have no dealings with van 't Sant when they reached London.

Apparently there also existed considerable dislike and distrust of Mr. van 't Sant in the Dutch East Indies. This was very definitely a factor in his removal, indeed it may have been the deciding factor.

Mr. van 't Sant himself explained that monies paid him by the British Secret Service in World War I were not in the nature of compensation for services rendered but were simply to reimburse him for personal expenses incurred and for the reimbursement of others who had assisted him in this work. He undertook these activities with the prior knowledge and express approval of the Dutch Government of that day.

All information which he gathered and supplied to the British was also given to the Netherlands Government. On occasion he gathered material primarily for the Dutch military intelligence organization, G.S. III, which was also made available to the British. If expenses for a given intelligence operation were assumed by the British the Dutch ordinarily paid a portion of the costs, as they had benefited from the information as well. In the reverse situation the British would compensate G.S. III for part of the costs of what was, essentially, a Dutch activity.

As far as the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy, was concerned, the reason for the discharge of Mr. van 't Sant was that he both

687 W. den Boer, July 27, 1948, 21527.
688 E. N. van Kleffens, August 22, 1949, 63378.
689 R. van 't Sant, November 3, 1948, 31923ff.
lacked the confidence and engendered the active suspicion of numbers of persons in London and elsewhere, so much so that his usefulness had come to an end. Dr. Gerbrandy spoke to van 't Sant in this vein:

...You have served me well, I am satisfied with you. You have been cautious and you have been prudent in dealings with the British. Co-operation has been excellent but, unfortunately, I cannot save you because you are too vulnerable. It is unfortunate that our co-operation has become impaired by the mistrust of [others]... 690

Mr. van 't Sant's successor, who was chosen as acting head of the Central Intelligence Service, was Captain R. F. J. Derksema, who had assisted Mr. van 't Sant earlier. The same Royal Decree 691 which accepted the resignation of Mr. van 't Sant and installed in office Captain Derksema also moved the Central Intelligence Service from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior. It was further provided that contact between any official Dutch agency and the British intelligence agencies would be channeled either through the Ministry of the Interior or the Central Intelligence Service directly. 692

This point in the history of the intelligence agencies marks an added deterioration of relations between the Dutch and the British. While Mr. van 't Sant had worked well with Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service he had worked much less well with the British sabotage organization, the Special Operations Executive. Under Captain Derksema relations with the Special Operations Executive underwent very little improvement and, in addition, it rapidly appeared that Derksema and Colonel Rabagliatti did not get on at all well.
Since the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization was a creature of Colonel Rabagliatti and Mr. van 't Sant, it did not receive the friendliest reception from Captain Derksema, who was finding that his rank contrasted sharply with that of Major-General, which Mr. van 't Sant had held, and that he had great difficulty in gaining ready access to both Dutch Ministers and British officials.

Captain Derksema did agree to proceed with the Hazelhoff Roelfzema activity, although it was almost entirely an affair regulated by Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema, who was placed in charge of the operation; by Colonel Rabagliatti; and by Mr. van 't Sant. Mr. van 't Sant continued to concern himself with individual agents to be dispatched, even though he was, once again, a counselor attached to the Ministry of Justice, from which the Central Intelligence Service had been officially divorced.

Several Hazelhoff Roelfzema amphibious operations to Holland were arranged without Derksema exercising any control over them or even having any detailed knowledge of what was to take place.

Even the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy, looked on the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization as simply a "continuation" of the van 't Sant intelligence regime.

Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema recruited agents with a certain minimum amount of cooperation from Captain Derksema. The British Royal Navy

693 Hazelhoff Roelfzema, loc. cit., 34841ff.
694 R. P. J. Derksema, July 30, 1948, 23170.
695 Hazelhoff Roelfzema, loc. cit. 696 Derksema, loc. cit., 23200ff.
697 P. S. Gerbrandy, May 20, 1949, 53724.
attended to the details of delivery by sea. Since plans called for a British vessel of about motor-torpedo boat proportions to lie off the Dutch coast, with a rowboat to be used in the actual landing, extensive training operations in this sort of activity were held on parts of the English coast which most nearly resembled those areas that would be used in Holland. Those persons involved received the usual training in radiotelegraphy and in cryptography. They were also trained in the use of small arms. Cooperation with the British in all these activities was excellent.698

The formal operations of the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization really commenced on November 24, 1941, when Pieter Tazelaar, who had travelled to England with Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema, was delivered ashore in Holland with a specific mission from the London Government. He was to escort to London, via a sea connection of the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization, two people, a Captain P. M. H. Tielens, of the Dutch General Staff, and Dr. Wiardi Beckman, of the staff of the underground newspaper Het Parool (The Watchword). Dr. Beckman, together with Mr. F. J. Goedhart, had written a rather spirited critique of the London Government in general, and Radio Orange in particular, which had found its way to London via the services of agent Alblas. London had told Alblas to "stop playing politics" but had, none the less, read his telegrams and noted the particular interest and apparent talents of Dr. Beckman. Tazelaar was not accompanied by a radio operator, nor did he take any radio equipment with him, hence he continued to communicate with London through the transmitter of Alblas.699

A rather more controversial agent, W. J. van der Reyden, who was landed in Holland by the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization on December 9, 1941, had as his mission the training in new cryptographic methods of agents and groups set up by earlier agents. Note has been made earlier that van der Reyden was captured and did divulge information which seems to have led to the capture of the agent Alblas. Before the dispatch of van der Reyden there occurred an exchange of letters between Captain Derksema and Colonel Rabagliatti over the utilization of van der Reyden. Captain Derksema was most strenuously opposed to the employment of van der Reyden, pointing out not only his past adherence to the Dutch National Socialist Party but the fact that he was energetically sought by creditors and seemed to be in various sorts of other personal difficulties as well. Rabagliatti replied that both the Secret Intelligence Service and the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization were aware of van der Reyden's shortcomings, but felt that his qualifications, particularly in the field of radio, were so outstanding as to merit his receiving special consideration. As luck would have it van der Reyden's radio equipment was lost in landing in the surf and he was able to send only one telegram to London, forwarded through the transmitter of an earlier agent of the Central Intelligence Service, whose code name was "Vermeulen" and who was associated with the Order Service. 700

Meanwhile, Pieter Tazelaar had encountered an unexpected difficulty, in that Captain Tielens refused to go to London. Tielens had, it appeared, taken an oath to the Germans when, at the time of the

700ENQ, IVa, appendix, lxvii. The writer is, quite frankly, unable to account for "Vermeulen".
armistice of May, 1940, Dutch officers were paroled and kept from being sent to Germany as prisoners of war, providing that they swore that they would not participate in hostilities against the Reich. Mr. Tazelaar contacted Dr. Beckman through an intermediary, his colleague, Mr. F. J. Goedhart. Beckman was willing to depart and London designated Mr. Goedhart as Tielen's replacement. 701

Thus it was that, on January 18, 1942, a party made up of Tazelaar; Dr. Beckman; Mr. Goedhart; Midshipman Dogger, who later wrote a report about the Order Service; and a Mr. Pasdeloup, proceeded to the beach resort of Scheveningen, where the amphibious landing was to take place. 702

While a reconstruction of precisely what transpired has proven to be difficult it appears that the British motor-torpedo boat which was to have made contact never reached its destination, since it went aground on a sand bar near the Hook of Holland. A German patrol captured Dr. Beckman, Mr. Pasdeloup, and Mr. Goedhart, who carried with him a complete file of the clandestine newspaper, The Watchword. Mr. Tazelaar and Mr. Dogger evaded capture. 703

On the following evening a landing was effected. Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema rowed ashore and went to a public telephone to try to contact Tazelaar. A curious side effect of the poor collaboration between the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization and the Central Intelligence Service had been that Hazelhoff Roelfzema had never learned that Dutch coinage had been replaced, and that the silver coins which he tried to use in the telephone had been replaced with zinc ones of different size. 704

701 Goedhart, loc. cit. 702 Ibid. 703 Ibid. 704 Hazelhoff Roelfzema, loc. cit., 34890.
This time Tazelaar and Dogger were actually captured by a German patrol, but managed to elude their captors after a few minutes. Both had had enough of the "sea route" and informed London of their intention to proceed to England via Switzerland, which they did successfully, arriving in London on April 13, 1942. 705

On February 2, 1942, the Central Intelligence Service acquired a new head, Colonel M. R. de Bruyne of the Royal Netherlands Marines, who had been brought from the Dutch East Indies originally to head the Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to Holland. At the same time the Central Intelligence Service was moved from the Ministry of the Interior, where it had resided for less than five months, and placed under the control of the Netherlands Navy. It was felt that a person with greater military experience should run the Service. Apparently no consideration was given, even then, to the possibility of employing those officers already in London from G.S. III, or using or revitalizing the G.S. III apparatus, which had been allowed to become dormant. 706

Colonel de Bruyne had been transferred from the Indies, as has been noted, to head the Bureau for the Preparation of the Return, in which capacity he had already acquired some intelligence experience in the London sphere. This experience the Central Intelligence Service inherited. Also inherited was a feud of sizeable proportions between Colonel de Bruyne and Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service. 707

The Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization continued its operations for a time. During the night of February 23, 1942, it set on shore two agents, Jonkheer E. W. de Jonge and his radio operator, E. Radema. De Jonge and Radema were, in effect, joint agents of the Dutch Central Intelligence Service and the British Secret Intelligence Service.708

De Jonge's mission was that of collecting military, naval, and economic data.709 He was successful in sending a great number of telegrams to London, as well as reports which eventually reached London via the Swiss Route.710 He was largely instrumental in establishing the Kees intelligence gathering organization which functioned for the duration of World War II.711 Radema had, it appeared, been given an exceptionally bad identity card in London, a defect which was speedily remedied by forgers in Holland. Radema continued to act as de Jonge's radio operator. Of major importance in the organization which de Jonge created was Mr. C. Dutilh, a man of exceptional talents. Eventually Dutilh had the misfortune to come in contact with the ubiquitous agent provocateur Anton van der Waals, with the inevitable result, Dutilh was betrayed and arrested. De Jonge was arrested on May 23, 1942, and Radema on May 29, 1942.712

Upon his capture de Jonge followed the instructions he had been

708SNQ, IVa, 107.
709SNQ, G. May, July 21, 1945, 18748ff.
710SNQ, IVa, appendix, lxix.
711SNQ, IVa, appendix, lxix.
712SNQ, IVa, appendix, lxix.
given in London. He apparently gave at least part of his code to the Germans, as he was authorized to do, but he did not divulge the authenticating "security check" which was to be included in each telegram. Gestapo code specialist E. G. May, who interrogated de Jonge, found him "decidedly uncommunicative". 713

The Gestapo, using de Jonge's transmitter and as much of his code as they were able to piece together, tried to establish contact with London, desiring both to "feed" the enemy false or misleading reports and learn, if possible, of Allied plans. 714

The last genuine telegram from de Jonge was received in London on May 16, 1942. London, of course, had no way of knowing, at least immediately, of the arrest of de Jonge on May 23rd. However the receipt over the de Jonge circuit, on June 6, 1942, of a badly coded telegram lacking any security check, caused immediate suspicion in London. Altogether London received some nine telegrams sent by the Germans over de Jonge's transmitter. They were speedily identified for what they were, and the Dutch section of the British Secret Intelligence Service, through whose hands wireless communications with agents passed, pointed this out in a special memorandum to the Dutch intelligence officials concerned. 715

During the night of March 12, 1943, the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization delivered ashore agent J. Emmer and his radio operator, Jonkheer F. D. Ortt. Emmer, who arrived with faulty identity papers

713 May, loc. cit.
714 J. Schreieder, July 13, 1943, 17148.
715 EMQ, IVa, appendix, xxviii.
which had to be replaced locally, had as a part of his mission the gathering of data on the coastline of Holland, pertinent to more landings of the Hazelhoff Roelfzema sort.\footnote{K. Bolle, March 10, 1950, 76903.} He was also given a mission of military reporting by Colonel de Bruyne.\footnote{M. R. de Bruyne, October 20, 1948, 30268ff.} It is known that Emmer and Ortt were in contact with agents Radema and de Jonge. Emmer and Ortt apparently were captured by means of German radio direction finders which were able to pinpoint the location of Ortt's transmitter.\footnote{ENQ, IVa, appendix, lxix.}

Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema did not have the highest opinion of the security arrangements of Colonel de Bruyne. One day he went to visit the Central Intelligence Service, and found in a room "with swinging doors", accessible to any passer-by, a large map of the Dutch coast on which the sites of his amphibious landings were prominently marked.\footnote{Hazelhoff Roelfzema, loc. cit., 34973.}

After the "delivery" of Emmer and Ortt by the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization nothing seemed to go properly. In a subsequent operation a small boat was supposed to land near Katwijk and pick up a number of people to be assembled by a sailor named Maassen. The party assembled on shore ran into a German patrol and, in the ensuing gun battle, Maassen was killed. The final operation occurred on May 11, 1942, when a small boat was supposed to meet agent de Jong and deliver something to him, probably a radio set. The British vessel bearing the Hazelhoff Roelfzema party had scarcely gotten in position...
when it found itself in the middle of a naval engagement between another unit of the British Royal Navy, conducting separate operations nearby, and some nine German "E" boats seeking to disrupt these operations. By "lying low" the Anglo-Dutch force was able to escape detection by either side in the encounter and, eventually, depart the scene. Contact with agent de Jonge, however, proved impossible. 720

Mention must be made at this point of a Central Intelligence Service agent sent out just before this period who bore no relationship to the Hazelhoff organization nor, for that matter, to any other operation.

While Captain Derksema was still in charge of the Central Intelligence Service Jonkvrouwe J. C. C. Röell, then a secretary in the Dutch Legation in Pretoria, Union of South Africa, travelled to London to offer her assistance to the intelligence services, arriving in Britain on December 31, 1940. She was accepted and trained as a joint agent of the Central Intelligence Service and the British Secret Intelligence Service. She was trained in cryptography but not in the use of radio or in parachute jumping. Her instructions were to go to Lisbon, pose as a pro-German Hollander and thereby gain permission to travel to the Netherlands. Once she reached Holland she was to contact officials of the Netherlands Railways and gather reports on German troop movements. This latter mission appears to have been a British one, as the Dutch gave her the additional task of gathering data on the political trustworthiness of Dutch civil servants. 721

720 Ibid., 34963-34965.

She was given neither contact addresses nor any special means of establishing her identity as an Allied agent, other than the names of one or two Dutch officials known to be in London.722

Jonkvrouwe Röell departed England by air on August 14th or 15th, 1941. In Lisbon she got in touch with German consular officials, and after six weeks of posing as a Nazi sympathizer she was able to obtain a visa for Holland. She made the journey to the Netherlands, traveling by way of Munich. She arrived in the Netherlands on October 1, 1941, and almost immediately contacted Mr. Posthumus Meyjes of the Netherlands Railways. She had, as has been said, no special method of identifying herself as an Allied agent, other than simply saying, "I have an English friend."723

Mr. Posthumus Meyjes, as a loyal Hollander working with the Netherlands Railways, was faced with something of a dilemma. His underground contacts told him that Jonkvrouwe Röell's name appeared on a list of untrustworthy persons, largely on account of her pro-German utterances in Lisbon and her return to Holland with German approval. There was every likelihood, he was warned, that Jonkvrouwe Röell was an agent provocateur, possibly sent by the Gestapo to test out the reliability of Dutch personnel and confirm the wisdom of having left the operation of the Netherlands Railways in Dutch instead of German hands. There was a possibility, he acknowledged to a colleague at the time, that this woman was a genuine London agent, but it seemed doubtful that London could possibly have engineered an approach to him that was so completely amateurish. It seemed that if the Gestapo was send-

722 Jonkvrouwe J. C. C. Röell, May 24, 1949, 54313. 723 Ibid.
ding a provocateur this might very likely be the way he or she would behave. In any event Posthumus Meyjes reported to the Germans that he had been approached by Jonkvrouwe Böell, whereupon she was arrested. She was detained for a time in Holland and, in 1942, transferred to Germany where she spent the rest of the war in various concentration camps. 724

The death of the Hazelhoff Boelfzema organization foreshadowed the passing as well of the Central Intelligence Service. Matters were made somewhat more difficult and more complex since the person of Mr. van 't Sant again was added as a complicating factor. Mr. van 't Sant had continued to concern himself with the dispatch of agents during the Hazelhoff Boelfzema interlude, as has been noted. Following this he sent a memorandum to Minister-President Gerbrandy in which he requested that he again be given control over agents to be sent to Holland. To make matters worse Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service and Mr. van 't Sant entered into a so-called "gentlemen's agreement", whereby neither the Secret Intelligence Service nor any Dutch agency would send agents to Holland without the advance knowledge and approval of both gentlemen concerned. Mr. van 't Sant, from his position in the Ministry of Justice, had no authority to enter into any such agreement at this point. Needless to say the agreement was not binding on the London Government. Minister-President Gerbrandy appointed Mr. A. H. J. Lovink, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. C. J. Warners, one of his personal advisers who had formerly been Head of Technical Services, Post, Telephone, and Telegraph, Netherlands

724P. T. Posthumus Meyjes, March 10, 1950, 76835.
East Indies, to study the entire problem of intelligence services and make basic recommendations. At the moment Dutch government agencies concerned with clandestine contact with the occupied territory were two in number: The Central Intelligence Service, which was concerned with gathering information; and the Military Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to Holland, which was concerned both with making military preparations for the period of liberation and the establishment of contact with resistance organizations, including sabotage organizations. This division of labor corresponded to that of the British Secret Intelligence Service and the Special Operations Executive. The first recommendation made by Lovink and Warners was that the Dutch form one combined "spy and assorted purposes" agency, as the Americans had done with their Office of Strategic Services. This proposal was turned down, partly because the British preferred to maintain two services themselves and felt it would be awkward to have the Dutch employ a radically different form of organization.\textsuperscript{725}

The final report of Messrs. Lovink and Warners consisted largely of an attack on Mr. van 't Sant, in which even his loyalty was impugned. It was proposed that a new intelligence agency be set up.\textsuperscript{726}

On June 1, 1942, Colonel de Bruyne departed the Central Intelligence Service.\textsuperscript{727} Mr. Warners and Mr. Lovink were installed as joint acting heads of the Central Intelligence Service. Intelligence activity came to a virtual halt. When, on September 18, 1942, Mr. C. H. van Brink, one of the earliest Central Intelligence Service agents to

\textsuperscript{725}ENQ, IVa, 170-171. \textsuperscript{726}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{727}M. R. de Bruyne, May 10, 1949, 50419.
be sent to Holland, returned to London after a journey through neutral
countries, he found very little interest expressed in him or his mis-
sion. It seemed to him that there was, in effect, no Dutch intelli-
gence agency at the moment. This was a correct estimate.

The Intelligence Bureau

On November 28, 1942, by Royal Decree, a new Dutch intelligence
agency, the Bureau Inlichtingen ("Intelligence Bureau") was created,
to begin operation immediately.

The Intelligence Bureau was to be under the control of the Ministry
of War and was to have the task of assembling and transmitting to the
appropriate ministries all reports that were of importance to the secu-
rity and peace of the Kingdom, the conduct of the Allied war effort,
and the preparation of the return to Holland and the restoration of
orderly government. Stress was laid in the Royal Decree on the duty of
the head of the Intelligence Bureau to report promptly to the appropriate
Ministers information gained that was of particular importance to their
departments. The Intelligence Bureau was to have exclusive control over
the sending of agents and other persons to the occupied territory, pre-
sumably a provision included with the extracurricular activities of Mr.
van 't Sant in mind.

Major H. J. Broekman became the first head of the Intelligence
Bureau, a position he held until he became ill in March, 1943, so that
he was replaced, at first temporarily, by Dr. J. M. Somer, who also held
the rank of Major. Dr. Somer officially succeeded Major Broekman in

729 ENQ, IVa, appendix, x. 730 ibid.
July, 1943. Dr. Somer had arrived in London the previous January, after an escape from the occupied territory.\textsuperscript{731}

The Intelligence Bureau, then, was concerned not only with purely military reports to be acquired from the occupied territory in one way or another but with strategic information in the broadest sense. Herein lay a special difficulty that was never really resolved: While the Intelligence Bureau was charged with informing appropriate ministries of material that was of importance, since it was manned by persons predominantly military in experience or outlook, items of a non-military nature might be handled with less than consummate efficiency. One approach to the problem might have been to have a committee to screen incoming material, to be composed of the military, economists, and those with special political knowledge. An even better solution would have been to employ individuals with sufficient knowledge in the three fields described so that they could at least realize what was of vital import. A principal difficulty with this approach was that such persons were simply not available in London. The London Government, as was the case with other governments in exile, was in many respects an amateur affair. While it was headed by Dutch political leaders who had left Holland many of its other members were persons who happened to be living or travelling abroad at the time of the German invasion, plus those who managed the perilous business of escaping from the occupied territory.

It was the Intelligence Bureau which sat at the London end of the Swiss Route and the Swedish Route. On more than one occasion the

\textsuperscript{731}\textit{ENQ, IVa, appendix, xii.}
Bureau simply failed to recognize as vital reports forwarded to it, with the result that they were buried and forgotten. It will be recalled, for example, that a Dutch fiscal expert, Dr. Ridder, prepared, in conjunction with his colleagues, a comprehensive study intended to warn the London Government against possible or probable "mistakes" which it would be likely to make in monetary policy just at the end of the war. This study was forwarded to London via the Swiss Route and the Intelligence Bureau. It should have reached the Ministry of Finance but it clearly never did. The Government went ahead and made precisely the mistakes of which Ridder and his associates had warned. After the close of hostilities Ridder complained of this and was told that his views would have been most highly regarded but that they were never received by the Ministry of Finance. The report in question definitely had reached the Intelligence Bureau in London.\textsuperscript{732}

One must note in all fairness that the problem was one partly of bulk. From the very sparse contact with the occupied territory that characterized the early days in London things progressed to the stage where the Swiss Route offices in Berne and Geneva were photographing and passing on to Stockholm, for forwarding to London, hundreds of pages per week. At various times the backlog of unprocessed reports was substantial, sufficiently so to necessitate the acquisition of additional storage space.

It was also the Intelligence Bureau which operated the Swiss Route processing station in Stockholm. Stockholm functioned, in addition, as a kind of observation post. Travellers to and from Germany

\textsuperscript{732} Slotemaker de Bruine, \textit{loc. cit.}, 36608ff.
and German-occupied countries were common in Sweden and they could often supply useful bits of information. Stockholm was a useful place to purchase copies of German-controlled "legal" newspapers published in Holland, publications likely to be quite revealing when read with a practiced eye.

Another "observation" post operated by the Intelligence Bureau was one at Lisbon, with much the same purposes as that at Stockholm. The Lisbon post is well remembered in Holland for another reason, in that it was headed for some time by Mr. Maas Geesteranus. Maas Geesteranus appears to have functioned well as an intelligence officer, and was apparently very talented indeed in facilitating the evacuation of Dutch refugees, who frequently appeared in Spain and Portugal. 733

Unfortunately, what caused more than a little unfavorable attention to be paid to Mr. Maas Geesteranus seems to have been that he had a very poor money sense. He purchased automobiles which remained in a garage since no diplomatic number plates were available for them. He also seems to have purchased in 1942, at a price of approximately $14,100, a vessel which, from photographs, gives something of the impression of a smaller commercial fishing boat. This craft was supposedly intended for use of the Intelligence Bureau staff in arranging a quick escape should the Germans invade Portugal. Altogether Mr. Maas Geesteranus appears to have a shortage in his accounts totalling approximately $26,700. 734

733 ENQ, IVa, appendix, x.

734 R. E. Sanders, July 30, 1949, 62755. Values given are in 1942 dollar currency, derived from accounts kept in Portuguese escudos.
In September, 1944, the Intelligence Bureau established an observation post in the liberated south of Holland, at Eindhoven. This post had several tasks. It was to serve as liaison with British intelligence, since British and Canadian troops were the first to enter Holland. It was to help "connect" the London Government with various clandestine radio networks used in the occupied territory for domestic communications in coordinating resistance work and exchanging intelligence information. The most important of these were those operated by the Council of Resistance and the Order Service. The Intelligence Bureau was also able to make extensive use of clandestine telephone networks which linked the occupied and unoccupied parts of the country. In all these functions the Intelligence Bureau was moderately successful and functioned with distinction. These contacts via Eindhoven were to be used particularly to gain information on the general economic state of the occupied territory; on the state of supplies of food and medicine; on any German destruction of property, actual or contemplated, including inundations; and, finally, information on any German troop evacuations. In these endeavors the Bureau was also moderately successful and gathered much material that was of considerable value not only to the conduct of the war but in the transition period after the German capitulation as well.

The reader is directed to an appended chart of agents of the Intelligence Bureau which is largely self-explanatory.

Intelligence Bureau agents were usually recruited by Major Broekman of the Bureau, who often asked the opinion of Mr. Seymour, his

735 C. L. W. Fook, July 27, 1948, 21387. 736 Ibid. 737 Ibid.
opposite number in the British Secret Intelligence Service, of the fit-
ness of the candidate. Agents came from units of the Dutch armed forces
in England, the merchant marine, and from the ranks of refugees from
Holland. Some were spotted by their commanding officers, who were in-
structed to be constantly on the lookout for likely candidates. Others
were suggested by security officers who screened civilians of Dutch na-
tionality who arrived in Britain. On occasion persons volunteered their
services for the Intelligence Bureau without any prior recruitment or
recommendation and were accepted.738

Nearly everything the Dutch received in the way of agent training
or supplies came from the British. This was part of the price Holland
paid for not having made any sort of advance preparations for a German
occupation. There were in the Netherlands community in London no ex-
erts in wireless, cryptography (save for one in the Foreign Ministry),
parachute jumping, or in the general field of agent training.739

No special psychological examinations were given to prospective
agents, at least as far as this writer is able to determine. Persons
selected for training as agents were, to be sure, subjected to several
weeks of training during which they were exposed to a wide variety of
different situations and their reactions noted. This was done in ad-
ance of their specifically being told of the purpose for which they
were selected, although most had long since managed to guess their pro-
spective role. There can be little doubt that persons who were emo-
tionally or psychologically unfit were selected and did become agents,


but an examination of the appended chart will suggest that the rate of success was quite respectable. Several were shot down in flying to Holland or had the bad fortune to drown in parachuting, but the vast majority of Bureau agents were delivered dry, alive, and of sound limb and of these none was captured on arrival. A few were prevented by assorted disasters from operating, usually through the loss of their radio equipment or radio operator, or the nearness of the Gestapo, but most carried out at least part of their mission. Even agents who survived a few scant weeks, as can be seen, still might make major contributions. They left behind functioning organizations, some of which continued in full operation until the end of World War II. Radio equipment which agents delivered to intelligence-gathering organizations often survived their own arrest, having been secreted elsewhere, and continued to be operated by persons trained by the London agents, tapping out vital telegrams for the attention of London.

Agents were trained in parachute jumping by the Royal Air Force; and in general intelligence-gathering techniques and in cryptography by the British. 740

The specific missions which were assigned to agents were determined by the Intelligence Bureau, in cooperation with the London Government. There were no more agents with dual missions from the Dutch and from the British Secret Intelligence Service. 741

Where an agent was to work with clandestine organizations in Holland he was given special training by the Bureau itself, since the British Secret Intelligence Service lacked personnel sufficiently

740 ibid., 76332ff. 741 ibid.
trained in the lore and circumstances of underground organizations peculiar to the Netherlands. Instruction in this subject would virtually have to be given in the Dutch language and almost none of the British personnel knew any Dutch at all.742

Forged identity papers were also supplied to agents by the British. While much of the training received by Intelligence Bureau agents was at the hands of the British, the Bureau was in frequent touch with its trainees, who were often visited by Dutch officers.743

Most of the agents were accompanied by a radio operator. The earlier practice of training a single person in both espionage techniques and in wireless telegraphy was largely abandoned. This offered at least an advantage in time, since both an agent and his radio operator could be trained simultaneously and be ready for the field sooner. Some persons might not be suitable for both tasks. A recurrent disadvantage was that, as can be seen from the chart, agents were sometimes seriously handicapped by the capture or disability of their radio operator. One particularly difficult case was that of J. E. van Loon, who was dropped as radio operator with Agent A. W. M. Ausems on the night of February 29, 1944. Van Loon was temperamentally completely unsuited to serve in this capacity, and has the dubious distinction of having been, as far as this writer can determine, the only agent sent to Holland by any service to have been formally discharged from the employ of the London Government while in the field. In this case

742 Ibid. Some of the agent-trainees knew less English than was supposed at the time and, on occasion, failed to grasp part of what was told them by their British instructors.

743 J. M. Somer, June 16, 1948, 14790.
Ausems was able to find assistance from the radio operators of successive agents, although with great difficulty, since they already had a considerable work load. The Ausems-van Loon problem was aggravated by the fact that it was van Loon who had been instructed in cryptography, not Agent Ausems. As a result London had on two occasions to send special cryptographers to assist Ausems.\footnote{These were J. de Blooys, who arrived on May 7, 1944 and G. B Buunk, who arrived on June 5, 1944.} In addition, the van Loon affair was partly the concern of a "check" agent, K. A. Mans, dropped on the night of August 4, 1944, who had as part of his mission to make inquiries into the matter.

Radio operators were trained in wireless telegraphy and given at least a cursory knowledge of radio theory. They generally knew enough to set up their equipment, erect a suitable transmitting antenna, and establish contact with London. There were, it will be recalled, radio operators of the earlier Central Intelligence Service who had been unable to establish contact without enlisting local technical assistance.\footnote{Bureau agents may have been no better in this respect. In the later period resistance groups often had technical specialists available who could effect repairs immediately, thus making the lack of knowledge on the part of the agent less apparent.} Should a London-trained radio operator be confronted by damaged or inoperative equipment he might lack the knowledge to effect repairs.

A number of frequencies were made available by the British for clandestine Dutch use. After portions of France were liberated, in the summer and fall of 1944, a number of additional channels were withdrawn from their former use by the French Maquis and placed at
the disposal of the Dutch. Agents or others operating clandestine transmitters who wished to communicate with London, assuming they were in possession of an approved code, had to have crystals calibrated to oscillate on the London-approved frequencies. These crystals had to come from the British. This was not an arbitrary rule laid down by London, it was simply that the crystals were not available at all in the occupied territory. More than one transmitter was silenced, either temporarily or permanently by lack of a crystal.746

An agent with material of less than top priority would probably send it by the Swiss Route, often through a "cut-out" or intermediate person. The ever-present menace of mobile German radio direction finding stations made the transmission of lengthy telegrams a most perilous activity, although this was done on occasion. The agent might code the telegram himself or this might be done by the radio operator. In addition to the code, supplied by the British who used a uniform system of codes, each agent or operator had a security check, that is some sort of departure from the text which was used to authenticate the telegram as being prepared and sent free from duress. The security check, and each was different, might consist of making a mistake in the text every eleventh character, or making a stock mistake in the letter "r" or something of the sort. The security check was supposed to be inconspicuous, but still recognizable, so that if the agent was to be captured and forced to transmit under duress, or if any unauthorized person employed his code, this fact would become immediately apparent. All telegrams from agents of the Dutch Intelligence Bureau

746Somer, loc. cit., 14621.
were received, together with those of all other Allied intelligence agents in Europe, in a central station operated in England by the British Secret Intelligence Service.\textsuperscript{747} This "central" could also, of course, transmit to the agents telegrams for their information or guidance. Once the central station received a telegram from a Dutch Intelligence Bureau agent it was decoded and then passed to the Dutch as it stood at that point, without paraphrasing, without correction or interpolation. Whether the security check was included, partly included, or omitted was also stated on the face of the decoded telegram. Since the security checks consisted, in the main, of certain predetermined mistakes, and since many telegrams were received only very imperfectly owing to the low power of the portable transmitters supplied the operators and to interference, it was often impossible to tell whether security checks had been included or not. Often more than the security check was lost in transmission. The Dutch would spend hours puzzling over badly mutilated telegrams, trying to ascertain the sense of them. "Dummy" letters had to be inserted for trial purposes--eventually most could be figured out to some extent. There was frequent consultation between both the Bureau and the British Secret Intelligence Service as to the content of some messages. Dr. Somer, who did much of this work, found that, after a few messages, he could recognize the style of the sender and identify the person preparing it without seeing the signature, a helpful facility since the signature might well have been "buried" under static at the receiving station. He did receive telegrams sent by the Germans. This was expected as agents

\textsuperscript{747}\textit{Ibid.}
generally were instructed to give their code to interrogators after some questioning, but, if possible, not to divulge their security check or checks. Some of these messages transmitted or inspired by the Germans were received with sufficient clarity so that the omission of the security check was immediately apparent. Others contained obvious "Germanisms", the stock mistakes make by Germans using Dutch or even by Hollanders used to employing German in their daily work.

From the chart it will be noted that most of the agents worked with some intelligence-gathering organization in Holland. Some did so at the express direction of London, others because a given organization was conveniently at hand.

Generally the intelligence organizations in the occupied territory can be placed in three categories: Those which were founded by London agents, those founded by a resistance organization originally established for some other purpose, and those established by private persons solely as intelligence agencies.

Among those founded by London agents were the Kees group, founded by E. W. de Jonge, put ashore as an agent of the Central Intelligence Service in the Hazelhoff Roelfzema days, the Albrecht group, founded on the initiative of the first Intelligence Bureau agent, H. G. de Jonge, and the Barbara group founded by Intelligence Bureau agent G. A. van Borsum Buisman after his arrival in June, 1943.

The best known of the intelligence organizations founded by groups originally established for some other purpose were those operated by the Order Service and the Council of Resistance. That
of the Council was sometimes called the Radiodienst, ("Radio Service"), and had originally been a part of the Order Service. It was presided over by Jan Thijssen. The proprietor of the Order Service, Colonel Six, was awarded, after World War II, the Military William's Order, the highest Dutch decoration. It can be guessed that this award was granted more for the intelligence services rendered by the Service than for its other activities. Since it did contain numbers of persons with a military background, the Order Service was ideally equipped to engage in espionage, particularly as concerned military matters. The Order Service had an admirable record for protecting the radio operators assigned to it from capture by German direction finding stations. Since direction finders could only give the approximate location, it was always necessary for such German units to send a vehicle into the area, followed by persons on foot equipped with portable receivers. The Order Service organized for transmitter locations an elaborate system of lookouts, some fixed and some on bicycle, who could warn the transmitter operator, sometimes by telephone, of the approach of such activity.

The Parool, (Watchword) group was founded by the clandestine newspaper which bore the same name, as was the Spijker group, which published an underground weekly.

The Dienst Wim was unique in that it was founded by a foreign

749 Interview with C. H. Evers, April 21, 1960.
750 P. J. Six, November 30, 1948, 35705.
751 E. Deinum, May 17, 1949, 52208. The Spijker was a brand of automobile made in Holland, which was ancient and much loved.
resistance body, the Belgian Rinus organization, which operated its own courier route for documents which ran through Lisbon.\textsuperscript{752} The Dienst Wim had contact with London through Dutch agents, as well as through the Rinus organization. The Dutch B.R. group was formed from a remnant of the Dienst Wim which had survived Gestapo arrests.\textsuperscript{753}

Generally intelligence organizations were not formed by underground organizations which had specialized functions, with the exception of the clandestine press, already noted. One finds no intelligence organizations established, for example, by the National Support Fund, the Forgery Central, or the National Fugitive Aid Organization. By their very nature they would have imperiled the lives of thousands had they taken on such a hazardous function. One exception must be noted: The Rolls Royce intelligence groups grew out of a support and shelter organization that specialized in assisting the inmates of prisons and concentration camps.\textsuperscript{754}

Finally there were those groups established by private persons solely as intelligence organizations. Of importance in supplying London with valuable material was Luctor et Emergo, a group which later became Fiat Libertas.\textsuperscript{755} The Packard intelligence group operated, among other things, a transmitter which supplied meteorological data to London, useful in planning air force raids on European targets.\textsuperscript{756}

\textsuperscript{752}J. le Poole, June 7, 1949, 56860ff. Rinus was the code name of a Belgian named Vandermeerssche.

\textsuperscript{753}Ibid., 56886ff.

\textsuperscript{754}K. L. de Vries, June 7, 1949, 57043.

\textsuperscript{755}J. M. Kielstra, February 17, 1949, 42349.

\textsuperscript{756}M. Vader, May 5, 1949, 49260ff.
Still another intelligence group which was formed as such was the
Marinier organization, which, as can be seen from the appended chart,
had several regional branches and was quite active. In the same cat-
egory was the Geheime Dienst Nederland ("Secret Service Netherlands"),
an organization which collected a prodigious amount of material, some
of which was very highly valued by the British and Canadian forces at
the time of the liberation of the Netherlands. Although the Geheime
Dienst Nederland was the organization from which Dr. Somer himself had
some prior to travelling to England, relations were not close with the
Dutch Intelligence Bureau at the start, although, as the chart demon-
strates, they improved greatly later. At one point the Geheime Dienst
Nederland sent its own representative, a Mr. Jansen, to London. After
a harrowing trip over the Pyrenees, on foot and in the dead of winter,
he was arrested by police in Spain. From his prison cell he managed to
get the Dutch Consul to send a wire to Dr. Somer, requesting assistance
in proceeding to London. The reply was short and to the point: "B.I.
[the Intelligence Bureau] is no travel bureau." Later the Bureau
did assist Mr. Jansen in reaching England but he had less than fond
memories of the whole affair, in spite of this fact.

Without trying to detract from the most valuable services rendered
by the Geheime Dienst Nederland, note must be made of the fact that it
did represent a source of some financial difficulties just at the end
of the war. Recognizing that some of the private intelligence organ-
izations had sizeable staffs who had done nothing but gather information
for Allied account for months or years, utilizing aid from the National

757 W. J. E. Jansen, February 16, 1950, 51866.
Support Fund and moving on forged identity papers, the Bureau made available to most of the private intelligence organizations varying amounts of money for the orderly liquidation of their organizations. It was widely felt that the Geheime Dienst Nederland had had expenditures in this regard far in excess of reasonable limits. 758

Those serving in these various private intelligence organizations came from all walks of life, with the academic community being extraordinarily well represented. Some of the work involved was as dramatic as that of preparing a plan of a German airfield, some of it was as prosaic as the preparation of a statistical abstract of diesel fuel consumption figures, supplied by a loyal Dutch civil servant who had access to German records.

It is difficult to determine the precise importance or significance of the Netherlands intelligence gathering effort, whether participated in by agents from London, private intelligence organizations in Holland, or a combination of the two.

It is an undeniable fact that, by the closing year of the war, what had been a trickle had become a flood; that by telegraph and microfilm Major Somer and his staff were receiving a vast quantity of material on military, economic, social, and political subjects from the occupied territory. That this material was of value in the immediate postwar period can scarcely be doubted, although by the nature of the processing given material received in London some important items of a

758 J. M. Somer, February 24, 1950, 76044.

759 It once happened that the Bureau discovered that several different groups had independently mapped the same airfield, with results which were, fortunately, in almost exact agreement.
non-military nature were certainly mislaid.

As has been noted the operation of the British Official Secrets Act makes impossible any attempt to assess the precise value of information gathered by the Dutch to the Allied war effort. It is known, for example, that the Keer intelligence group supplied London with detailed reports on the German V-1 and V-2 weapons which Dr. Somer described as "very exact and very useful". One has no way of determining whether these particular reports were really of use or not. Much would have depended on whether they reached London in advance of similar reports of other derivation, and on the exact nature of the material contained therein.

When the First Airborne Division dropped into what appeared to be a German trap at Arnhem, there were those in London who wondered how or why the elaborate Dutch intelligence network had apparently failed. The fact of the matter is that some advance word of warning of the German deployment was given by the Dutch intelligence organizations, as the First Airborne's commanding officer, Major-General R. E. Urquhart relates:

...Already, however, Dutch resistance reports had been noted to the effect that "battered panzer remnants have been sent to Holland to refit", and Eindhoven and Nijmegen were mentioned as reception areas. And during the week an intelligence officer at SHAEF, poring over reports and maps, came to the conclusion that these panzer formations were the 9th and possibly the 10th Panzer Divisions. It was likely that they were being re-equipped with new tanks from a depot in the area of Cleves, a few miles

760 Somer, loc. cit.

761 There is no evidence to support the view that the Germans had any advance warning of the Arnhem attack. It was apparently just a matter of chance that German armored units were stationed in the area, since they had been sent there for recuperative purposes. The writer feels this point should be made clear, as a very widely believed account has it that a person or persons disloyal betrayed the Allied cause by "leaking" word of the battle plan to the Germans.
over the German border from Nijmegen and Arnhem. The SHAEF officer's opinion was not shared by others and, even as our preparations continued, 21st Army Group Intelligence were making it plain that they didn't see eye to eye with SHAEF over the panzer divisions. Nothing was being allowed to mar the optimism prevailing across the channel. 762

In this instance whoever gathered and prepared the original report in the field had underestimated the German strength. However, it was up to SHAEF to make its own assessment of the situation, to ask for further details (and there is no evidence to show that it had done this), since the warning had been given.

The England-Spiel.

While the Dutch intelligence agencies had gone through the development just described, another sort of Netherlands "contact" activity was experiencing a parallel growth. On the British side there was, in addition to the Secret Intelligence Service, the Special Operations Executive (or "S.O.E.") a sabotage organization which also sought to establish contact with resistance organizations in various German-occupied countries and promote their growth. The closest thing to the S.O.E. which the Dutch developed prior to March 15, 1944, when the Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten ("Special Services Bureau"), a nearly-identical twin for the S.O.E., came into being, was the Bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer ("Military Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to Holland"). The Military Bureau for the Preparation of the Return (or "M.V.T."), still had pretensions of being partly an intelligence organization, since it was initially supposed to collect reports relating to the military aspects of the return of the London Government to Holland. The British were less than entirely fond of

this arrangement, a view consistent with their aversion to "hybrid" contact agencies. 763

The M.V.T. also formulated plans for the creation of a "home front" type of military organization which might be employed in the occupied territory at the time of liberation. In charge of the M.V.T. was Colonel M. R. de Bruyne, late of the defunct Central Intelligence Service.

One of Colonel de Bruyne's first tasks as head of the M.V.T. was to examine a British plan for a joint S.O.E.-M.V.T. operation to be known as, Plan-Holland. 764

Briefly, under the terms of Plan-Holland, organizers were to be parachuted into Holland, and were to train groups of men to carry out certain sabotage missions at the time of a "United Nations" invasion of the continent. The organizers would also enter into communication with London by means of radio and arrange for dropping sites, where quantities of explosives and related sabotage supplies might be delivered by parachute. Numbers of men would have to be recruited to carry these stores away from the dropping site. Altogether the delivery of some 22,950 pounds of supplies was contemplated. It was estimated in the Plan-Holland summary that a total of 1,070 men would have to be recruited, and that participation in other underground activities would have to be rigorously excluded. The plan envisaged the disruption of railway communications by blocking and destroying rail

763 The M.V.T. was an outgrowth of the earlier Bureau for the Preparation of the Return. The non-military aspects of the earlier Bureau were transferred, on May 21, 1942, to the newly-created War Conduct Department.

764 EMQ, IVa, appendix, cvi.
lines; obstructing road communications in a fashion similar to rail lines; disabling telecommunications, with explosives in the case of underground cables, falling poles where wires were overhead. The grounding of German fighter aircraft was contemplated by means of armed attacks on German airfields, wherein both the aircraft and their fuel supplies were to be destroyed.

The Dutch reaction, in a letter from Colonel de Bruyne to the Special Operations Executive,\(^765\) was not entirely favorable. Colonel de Bruyne began by noting Plan-Holland assumed a closeness of contact between the London Government and the armed resistance groups which did not, at the time, exist. He pointed out that densely populated Holland was not the place for extensive armed guerilla activity. There was, as he expressed it, no place to hide. In his view the ends desired, those of disrupting various forms of German communication, could be as efficiently accomplished by means less spectacular. One could, for example, stop communications by rail by mixing carborundum in the oil of Diesel locomotives, or by cutting the power supply of electric railway lines, of which there were a number in Holland. Similar, less direct methods could be employed with telecommunications. Colonel de Bruyne doubted if armed attacks against German airfields could succeed at all, as he was certain the Luftwaffe would have taken precautions against just such a possibility. Colonel de Bruyne felt that the idea of making advance preparations for the disruption, at a given signal, of German communications was still an excellent one. He believed, however, that it would be better to

\(^{765}\)Ibid., cviii.
supply the leaders of armed resistance units already in Holland with the objectives desired and let them recommend more of the means, requisitioning those necessary supplies.766

As it turned out agents were dispatched by the S.O.E., working in cooperation with the M.V.T., to see what could be arranged along the lines suggested by Colonel de Bruyne. Once they made contact with the armed resistance they were then to advise London and arrange for the dropping of supplies. The agents were trained entirely by the British, and were given British codes and identity checks, as had been the case with the Intelligence Bureau agents. They virtually never saw Dutch officers during their training. Some of the Special Operations Executive instructors, unlike those of the Secret Intelligence Service, knew Dutch, and in some cases had clearly lived in Holland or the Dutch East Indies. As before, the agents were instructed to divulge their code if pressured, but to withhold their identity check. If instructed to do so they were to transmit for the Germans. The omission of their identity check would be sufficient to alert London to their capture.767

The first regular operational team of two agents dispatched in this connection, H. M. G. Lauwers and Thijs Taconis, was dropped on the night of November 7, 1941. Lauwers was sent primarily as the radio operator, Taconis was an expert in sabotage.768 In actual fact one earlier team, that of Cornelia Sporre and Ruib Albert Homburg, had

768 Schreieder, loc. cit., 17014.
been sent out in September to examine the possibilities of the sort under consideration. Homburg was arrested, eventually escaped, and returned to England. He had little to report on his mission, but apparently the Germans had failed to learn of its nature. Sporre was drowned in an attempted crossing of the North Sea. 769

Taconis contacted a Captain van den Berg of the Order Service, who offered the assistance of men who would help secrete the supplies to be contained in a "dropping", a parachuted freight shipment of sabotage materials. Lauwers, after some trouble with his radio transmitter, contacted London and arranged for the delivery. The ground party was on hand at the appointed time and place and the first shipment apparently arrived without incident. Unknown to van den Berg or Taconis the ground party contained an agent provocateur, not of the Gestapo, but of the Abwehrstelle Niederlande (German military counterintelligence), one George Ridderhof. Ridderhof reported to the head of Abwehr III, Oberstleutnant H. J. Giskes, telling of the S.O.E.-M.V.T. operation, of which he, Ridderhof, had learned a great deal. That the plans of this joint Dutch-British operation should be so readily available seemed to Giskes to be a little too good to be true. His first reaction was to say to Ridderhof, "Gehen Sie zum Nordpol mit diesen Geschichten!" (Go to the North Pole with these tales!). Later, when the Wehrmacht, in its counter-intelligence capacity, had become rather extensively involved in the affair it came to be called Fall Nordpol ("North Pole Affair"). The German Sicherheitsdienst, which was also involved, called the episode the England-Spiel ("Eng-
land Game"). Too good to be true or not, the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst simply moved in on the operation. Captain van den Berg and his associates were arrested. Direction-finding units had detected Lauwers almost immediately and transcribed his transmissions. It was a relatively simple matter to determine the place of operation, take Lauwers prisoner, and seize his transmitter. Under pressure Lauwers supplied some of the details of his code, little was needed as the information obtained from the earlier captured agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, van der Reyden, was sufficient to make breaking the code feasible.

Lauwers agreed to transmit some messages for the Germans, using the dictated English language text given him by Giskes' assistant, Huntemann, whose facility with English was reasonably good. After a few sessions, in which he was "controlled" by a German radio operator, who sat next to him wearing a headset with which he could hear the Morse transmission, Lauwers was replaced by a German military operator. Those immediately supervising the operation felt Lauwers not to be entirely trustworthy, a suspicion in which they were correct. He had omitted his security checks and, in addition, worked the characters, "CAU**GET" and "WORKED BY JERRY SINCE..." into two of his messages. This went unnoticed by the German monitor, who apparently knew no English and took any departure from the text as a simple mistake made by an inexperienced radio operator. Unfortunately it would seem that the operator who copied the message at the Special Operations Executive "central" in England knew no English either, as these extra characters
were either ignored as errors in transmission or "decoded" along with the rest of the message, in which case they would have become, of course, meaningless gibberish. 771

The Anglo-Dutch plan was to drop a series of sabotage instructor-radio operator teams, using each to build a new "line" over which supplies could be delivered, each with its own radio link, its own dropping sites, its own store of explosives, and its own personnel. This, starting with the Lauwers-Taconis "line", was precisely what was done. The S.O.E.-M.V.T. dropped agents and their radio operators, one after the other. Each one set up communications with the S.O.E. "central" station, each arranged for "droppings" and the necessary personnel to convey away and hide the shipment. From London things seemed to be going smoothly. From Berlin's vantage point they were also going smoothly. The Wehrmacht and the Sicherheitsdienst met each new group of arrivals, who, after extensive questioning as to their missions, codes, et cetera, were carted off to imprisonment in a former Roman Catholic seminary, now a Gestapo prison, at Haren, Holland. The canisters of explosives, small arms, ammunition, clothing, and even food were laboriously trucked to warehouses, and, with typical German thoroughness, exhaustively cataloged and indexed. Each "line" was supposedly independent, but London had made the fatal mistake of having each new team of organizer and radio operator received by a reception committee made up of members of the "line" to have been most recently established. Thus there was an unbroken chain stretching back to Lauwers and Taconis (who was arrested a few days after

771Lauwers, loc. cit., 20511.
after Lauwers). All the Germans had to do was to keep straight which "line" they were supposedly operating at the moment, and which code was applicable. Agents of the Dutch Intelligence Bureau, even those of the old Central Intelligence Service, had been dropped "blind", partly in recognition of the hazards of reception committees. Some of the earlier S.O.E. agents, and there had been a few before the Plan-Holland was developed, had also been dropped "blind".

In London the omissions of some of the agent security checks were noted. As had been the case with regular intelligence agents, the heavy interference on the low power radio circuits meant that many telegrams were received in badly distorted form, so that it was often quite impossible to be quite certain about the security checks.

A former official of the S.O.E., speaking for the head of the Dutch section, explains the decision regarding the security checks in this fashion:

...The most important result of the penetration of these operations was that, as it took place at an early stage it led to complete German control. An important contributory cause of the penetration, and particularly of its continuance was that the omission of the security checks by certain W/T operators was ignored.

...Investigations were held at various periods after the original penetration had begun, but in each case a decision was taken to continue the operations. These decisions were reached after taking into consideration the personalities and characters of the agents, and with the knowledge that the security checks had been proved in other cases to be inconclusive as a test...772

The British seemed satisfied, and the Dutch, not having any different evidence to present, were willing to go along with this view.

The telegrams sent by the S.O.E.-K.V.T. agents (or by the Germans, 772728Q, IVa, appendix, cxxii.)
depending on one's point of view at the moment) were received by the Dutch after they had been decoded and paraphrased, with a notation as to whether the security check had been given or not. 773

Meanwhile, in Holland, the Germans were having some problems of their own. On the night of June 26-27, 1942, George Jambroes and Joseph Bukkens were dropped into their midst. It appeared that these latest arrivals had as their mission the construction of a large sabotage organization, to contain some 1,067 men and, in its general lines, greatly resembling the familiar Plan-Holland. However it was provided that the Order Service would be placed in charge of carrying out this mission. This precipitated a major crisis for the Germans. If the Order Service supposedly became a part of the operation, traffic with London would soon be at an end, since an organization as big as the Service was bound to have contacts of its own with London. A telegram was sent to London, arguing that the Order Service was "not suited for this task" and urging that "agents from London" create the proposed organization on their own. London, to the relief of the Sicherheitsdienst and the Wehrmacht, agreed. 774

Another crisis arrived by parachute during the night of September 24-25, 1942, in the person of one Roelof Christiaan Jongelie, a new agent who had been sent with some sort of special mission having to do with Plan-Holland. He had carrier pigeons, special photographic equipment, and he looked suspiciously like a "control" agent, whose job it was to verify the state of health and freedom from imprisonment of earlier agents. Many of the captured agents, on being confronted

773 Bruyne, loc. cit., 30532. 774 Schreider, loc. cit., 17000ff.
by the German penetration of the network, talked quite freely, feeling that they had been betrayed in London and that, if this was not the case, the absence of the security check in their telegrams would serve to alert the British. Jongelie refused to tell much of his mission at all. So London was told that he had suffered a "brain concussion". Daily medical bulletins were sent, with a final one reporting his tragic passing. Jongelie was, however, very much alive.775

London began to give the organization which, as far as it knew, was doing nicely, some minor sabotage assignments entirely aside from any projected Allied invasion plans. On the night of July 23, 1942, there arrived Gerard Jan van Hemert, with a mission of destroying a radio transmitter at Kootwijk, Holland, which was used by the Germans in regulating "U" boat traffic. Accordingly, Schreieder caused a story to be fed into the network of the German wire service, the Deutsches Nachrichtenbureau, of an unsuccessful attack on a radio transmitter in Holland. At the same time the correct "line" to London carried a similar account. This seemed to satisfy London. Later, acts of the genuine Dutch resistance and ordinary industrial or railway accidents were reported to London as acts of the S.O.E.-M.V.T. agents.776

Another problem soon arose. The famous agent provocateur, Anton van der Waals, came to Kriminal Direktor Joseph Schreieder of the Sicherheitsdienst and reported that he had penetrated the operations of one Willem Johan Niermeyer, a parachuted London agent. Niermeyer, his

775 Ibid., 17156. 776 Ibid., 17137.
code, and his transmitter were captured forthwith. Niermeyer, as it turned out, had nothing to do with the S.O.E.-M.V.T. operations at all. He was an intelligence agent, apparently sent by the British Secret Intelligence Service with the tacit approval of the Dutch. Schreieder was tempted to add yet another "line" to his collection, but Niermeyer represented a special problem: He had not been sent to Holland to act as a sort of clandestine freight agent, as had so many now in Haren prison. His job was supplying military information. Schreieder could give the British and the Dutch incorrect reports, and this was a tantalizing possibility, but London might discover that the reports were incorrect and come to suspect other "lines" as well. Schreieder could give them accurate information, in which case he would be guilty of treason. He could give them bits of minutia, or information that was badly out of date. There seemed no point to this. A few telegrams were sent over Niermeyer's circuits after his capture and then no more. Since Niermeyer had nothing to do with the S.O.E.-M.V.T. operation, London suspicions were not aroused, for London Niermeyer was just one more intelligence agent who had been caught.

Still another crisis arose when London requested the return to England of agent Taonis. "Taonis", or the Germans to be more precise, sent a message, highly recommending an "assistant", a certain "Antoon", and urging that "Antoon" be sent. "Antoon", a German agent, travelled on his way supposedly to London, via Paris, where he was "captured" by the Gestapo in a restaurant in full view of French resistance workers, who dutifully reported this fact to London.

777J. Schreieder, February 18, 1949, 42607-42609.
778J. Schreieder, July 13, 1948, 48227-48241.
In an even more resourceful operation the Gestapo forwarded to London via a penetrated courier route a perfectly loyal Dutchman, a Mr. H. Knoppers who, as far as he personally knew, had been contacted by a fellow resistance worker who arranged for his clandestine travel to London. What Knoppers did not know was that his "colleague" was the agent provocateur Ridderhof. The departure of Knoppers was announced to London over one of the "lines" and he was billed as playing a "leading role" in the Order Service. Knoppers duly arrived in England, having, completely unknown to him, been shepherded painstakingly along the way by a veritable corps of Gestapo agents, Wehrmacht officers in mufti, et cetera. He was closely questioned by the Dutch and the British in England, who could certainly find nothing wrong with him. It did appear that he knew practically nothing about the Order Service. Someone in London might have wondered about this strange lack of knowledge for a supposed expert, but apparently no one did.\footnote{Knoppers, May 3, 1948, 48227-48241.}

Haren prison, in the meantime, was slowly filling with agents from London. One would have supposed that word of the debacle might somehow have leaked out, as there were both Dutch employees and civilian Dutch hostages in Haren as well. As a matter of fact various messages intended for London do seem to have been smuggled out.\footnote{J. E. M. Steyns, February 16, 1949, 41244.} Simple bad luck seems to have accounted for none of these reaching London for some time. Some were apparently delivered to persons who claimed, perhaps a little too grandly, to have good resistance con-
nections. Still others seemed to have been sent over "private" transmitters which were not actually in contact with London. One or two may have been received in London over legitimate circuits but in such garbled form that identification of the prisoners in question was impossible. London received warnings of "betrayal" or of supposed Gestapo "infiltration" at least once a week, and would have given such warnings only passing attention if they did not name names clearly. 781

One report from imprisoned agents did reach an Order Service transmitter, so that on June 23, 1943, the following telegram arrived in London:


TRANSLATION

For Colonel de Bruyne. Eight parachutists, among them Doulin and Drake arrested weeks ago. Code-recognition word, "Friend Marius known [in London?]" 782

The British were not able to make immediate sense of this, but it is to be said to the credit of Colonel de Bruyne that he immediately spotted "Doulin" as one of the S.O.E.-M.V.T. agents, Pieter Dourlein, who had been parachuted on the night of March 9, 1943. The warning was actually received after the last agent sent in connection with the Plan-Holland operation was dispatched, on May 21, 1943. Altogether some fifty-two men and one woman had been dropped in this undertaking, not counting Homburg and Sporre, who never became enmeshed in the machinery of the England-Spiel. Forty-seven were even-


782ENQ, IVa, appendix, cxv.
ually to die in a camp in Germany. One, Jan Molenar, was killed when he parachuted, on March 3, 1942. The Germans released Lauwers, and George Dessing, of the second "line", after the end of the England-Spiel. Beatrice W. M. A. Terwindt was spared because of her sex, although she spent the war in German prisons. Two agents escaped from Haren and made their way to England. 783

On the night of August 29-30, 1943, two agents imprisoned in Haren, Johan Bernard Ubbink and Pieter Dourlein, escaped. The Germans now had to face the real danger that London would learn of the England-Spiel in this fashion. London was advised over one of the "lines" that the two had been "captured" by the Gestapo and were, it was feared, being groomed as agents provocateur and should be treated with extreme caution. Dutch and German police were circularized to the effect that Messrs. Ubbink and Dourlein were "escaped street robbers". Their photographs were widely distributed and even included in the weekly newsreel shown in motion picture theaters. 784

Ubbink and Dourlein stayed hidden in Holland for several weeks, during which time they sent another telegram to London describing the plight of their comrades in Haren, and then departed for England, travelling via Switzerland, France, and Spain, including a harrowing crossing of the Pyrenees. They sent telegrams to London from Switzerland and Spain, so that by the time they reached London in early April, 1944, their fame had certainly preceded them. Thanks in large part to their efforts the German penetration of the S.O.E.-M.V.T. network had been discovered. After two or three days in England they were both

783 J. B. Ubbink, July 23, 1948, 20704. 784 Ibid.
thrown in jail. Ubbink in particular, who had suffered greatly in the crossing of the Pyrenees, was in ill health. Neither would quite say that they were treated as badly as they had been by the Germans, but British jails were clearly not a vast improvement. Both believed later that they were imprisoned as a security precaution since they arrived shortly before the "D" Day invasion of the continent. During their imprisonment they had been questioned almost entirely by the British, and at least one Dutch officer, Major Somer of the Intelligence Bureau, had tried to gain their release. 785

For a time after the first telegraphic warnings reached London neither side was certain that the other was aware of the true state of affairs. The Germans were still trying to achieve the principal purpose of the England-Spiel, not that of simply playing an elaborate and deadly trick on the Anglo-Dutch contact organizations, but rather one of learning something of Allied invasion plans. In terms of its true objective, then, the England-Spiel was a German failure. Not even a good hint of the desired nature was ever forthcoming from London.

The British and the Dutch, once they felt the German penetration to be a fact, were inclined to see just how far their German "colleagues were prepared to go in appearing to carry out Allied orders. Thus London directed its "agents" to liquidate several leading Dutch National Socialists. This order, needless to say, was not carried out. It was Gikes, of the Abwehr, who had the last word, in a tele-

785 J. M. Somer, June 16, 1948, 14362. The writer has been unable to determine whether the German warning about the "defection" of Ubbink and Dourlein ever reached London, and, if so, whether it caused London to question the loyalty of the two men when they themselves finally reached England.
gram dated April 1, 1944, directed to the heads of the Special Operations Executive in London. It was in English:

Messrs. Blunt Bingham and Suco Ltd. London

In the last time you are trying to make business in Netherlands without our assistance stop we think this rather unfair in view our long and successful cooperation as your sole agents stop But never mind whenever you will come to pay a visit to the Continent you may be assured that you will be received with same care and result as all those you sent us before stop So long.786

Conclusions

Radio Orange, needless to say, stands apart from much of the rest of this dissertation, in that if offers little evidence on the desirability of London's employing persons or organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory. Rather the experience of Radio Orange is relevant to another postulate advanced as part of the conclusions to Chapter I, that one of the main tasks which the London Government could perform was the maintenance of contact with the occupied territory, as well as the procurement of information from that territory. Through radio broadcasting it was technically possible to establish such contact, and the history of Radio Orange indicates that this was feasible in other respects as well. While persons in the occupied territory were not directly utilized in the transmission of these programs, it must be noted that Radio Orange did not achieve great effectiveness until it had wider access to reports from the occupied territory, reports gathered in large part by persons and organizations already there.

One might safely conclude that the London Government did have a

786 ENQ, IVa, 878.
symbolic value and that Radio Orange, as a dramatic symbol of Dutch nationhood, tended to dramatize the very fact of the London Government.

There can be no better example of London's having utilized persons or organizations already located in or in being in the occupied territory than the Swiss and Swedish Routes. While it is true that Dr. Visser 't Hooft was himself located on neutral ground, in Switzerland, part of the impetus for the establishment of the organization which he helped create came from Holland proper. Furthermore, without the painstaking work of those assembling materials at the Amsterdam terminus of the Swiss Route it would have represented little more than a listening post which relayed the impressions of an occasional traveller. Similarly, impetus for the Swedish Route, minor though it was compared to its Swiss counterpart, came from the occupied territory, in this case almost entirely so.

As the reader is reminded above, one of the chief functions of the London Government, vis-à-vis the occupied territory, was the establishment of lines of communication facilitating the bilateral flow of information. That London, in taking partial advantage of the opportunities afforded by the Swiss Route and the Swedish Route, did just that, is obvious. Note must be made of the fact that these routes were, as has often been charged, too nearly in the nature of a one-way street. London, possibly to avoid appearance of partisanship, too often failed to reply to important communications from the occupied territory, when an innocuous word of acknowledgment would have been in order.
The intelligence agencies offer no special problems in terms of this dissertation. They do, of course, represent an example of the maintenance of communications with the occupied territory, as would any functioning intelligence agency under the circumstances. That they repeatedly made extensive use of both persons and organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory has been made abundantly clear. The intelligence agencies did dispatch agents from England for service in Holland, and, in this sense, use was not being made of local people or organizations exclusively. The explanation of this apparent exception appears in the simple fact that, in the relationship in question, the London Government possessed a certain technical monopoly, an attribute which it lacked in most other clandestine activities. Before effective espionage work could be done, at least if radio communications were to be employed, both the correct code and the all-important crystal, necessary for successful operation, were required. These could not very well be delivered by any means other than that of an agent from London. It can be seen, as illustrated in the example of the first agent, van Hamel, that persons already in Holland could carry on with the code and radio gear of a departed agent, once the essential items had been delivered. As has been noted, in many important resistance activities of a technical nature London could supply only money and moral support, as persons on the scene had a monopoly of the special knowledge necessary for success. Espionage represents, therefore, a special exception.

The England-Spiel appears as an excellent negative example of London's having functioned more efficiently in its contact with the
occupied territory when it utilized those already present in that territory. The operation plan of this S.O.E.-M.V.T. (England-Spiel) activity envisaged the creation of a vast organization of London's design and to be motivated by London's plan. It was to be set up not by local people but by agents dispatched from London. One can certainly assume that the German capture of all agents and supplies dispatched in connection with the England-Spiel operation qualifies it as a complete failure from the Anglo-Dutch point of view.

It is true that the missions of the original England-Spiel agents had been tempered in accordance with Dutch objections to Plan-Holland, so as to get the advice of persons in the occupied territory before proceeding further, but it must be noted that subsequent agents were given instructions closely following the original Plan-Holland. It is also true that Plan-Holland, as it was originally drawn, provided that the organization to be set up would make wide use of resistance forces already in being in the occupied territory. However, when it was pointed out in London that these resistance forces did not, at the time in question, exist in sufficient numbers, preparations were still continued. Thus the effect was one of an organization planned from London.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The final conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:

1. The London Government could not provide for the maintenance of domestic order, for the economic welfare, or for the general safety of its citizens in the German-occupied territory. Thus "remote" administration was generally unfeasible, save for the special exception of the railway strike of 1944.

2. The London Government could serve to maintain communications with the occupied territory. Examples offered of this activity are the Swiss and Swedish Routes, Radio Orange, and the various intelligence agencies.

3. Another feasible activity of the London Government was the granting of assistance to selected organizations in the occupied territory, some of which might themselves perform tasks benefiting the general welfare. The following are prime examples of this activity: The National Support Fund; the National Fugitive Aid Organization and the Knuckle Gang; and the forgery organizations.

4. The London Government served as a focus of national unity and maintained its own existence in order to be available to govern the Netherlands at the conclusion of hostilities. Radio Orange served as an important instrumentality in bringing the Government and its absent population into closer contact, particularly in its presentation of addresses by the Dutch sovereign.

5. The London Government was most likely to be successful in performing all of the functions described above when it utilized the
services of persons or organizations already located or in being in
the occupied territory, rather than attempting to dispatch persons to
Holland or create such organizations from the vantage point of London.
Among those organizations or activities tending to support this thesis
are the following: The National Support Fund; the National Fugitive
Aid Organization; the Knuckle Gang; the Order Service; the Council of
Resistance; the Swiss and Swedish Routes; the clandestine press; and
the various political, intellectual, and resistance-coordinating bodies.
The England-Spiel episode is offered as important negative proof of this
postulate. As partial exceptions to the rule appear London intelligence
agents and the creation by London of the College of Bondsmen
and the Netherlands Forces of the Interior.
APPENDIX

Partial text of the Commentary of 1943 on the Ordinances of 1937.

1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is at war with Germany. Occupation of a portion of Dutch territory does not alter this fact.

2. The Ordinances of 1937 remain in force unimpaired.

3. While the double responsibility of the civil servants to the occupying power and to the Netherlands Government presents difficulties, the Queen and Her Government remain the lawful sovereign and continue to possess the right to draw the boundaries of activity on the part of civil servants so that their authority may not be exceeded or so that they may not commit acts of treason.

4. The force of sections 2 and 3 of the Ordinances of 1937 cannot be diminished by mere enemy proclamation.

5. In particular the following is of importance:
   a. While Netherlands civil servants have to refrain from acts or omissions in the line of duty that injure the German war effort they may not in any respect cooperate in such a fashion as to further that war effort.
   b. The administrative organs may not be incorporated as part of efforts that further the German war effort.
   c. Every measure which has the effect of furthering this war effort must be refused.
   d. While the Ordinances provide for resignation of a civil servant when he may be furthering the enemy war effort, this may in some circumstances be an unwise course of action since the civil servant resigning may be replaced by a collaborator.

6. While, by the proclamation of total war, Germany seeks to add the total Netherlands war potential to her own, under no circumstances may Dutch cooperation be extended. This has been specifically provided in the name of the Netherlands Government in a radio address by the Minister-President, February 4, 1943.
7. The following German measures are intended to draw the Netherlands war potential into the German war effort:

a. The *Arbeitseinsatz* ["Labor Pool"]. In connection with the *Arbeitseinsatz* the following sorts of activity are forbidden:

   (1) The utilisation of Dutch labor exchanges to recruit workers for service in the German war effort.

   (2) Disclosure of material contained in municipal vital-statistics registers so as to benefit the recruitment of workers.

   (3) Co-operation of rationing services with the forced-labor service, so that rationing coupons are withheld from those who do not report or register in the various age groups.

   (4) Co-operation of the Dutch police in the location of those Dutch workers who decline to go to Germany or to other destinations.

b. The requisition of goods and raw materials: The *Rules of Land Warfare* permit requisitions, including those from municipalities, only for the benefit of the army of occupation. This limit must not be exceeded...

c. The taking of hostages as a coercive measure: Co-operation in the location, arrest, or imprisonment of persons intended as hostages is forbidden.

d. Taking Dutch citizens into the German military service: It is forbidden to co-operate with any measure that makes possible or furthers such recruitment.

8. Under the obligations imposed by international law the occupying power is obliged to respect the laws of the territory occupied, except when it is absolutely impossible to do so. In addition, the occupying power is bound to respect the honor, family bonds, faith, and the open conduct of religious worship. The deportation of any resident of the occupied territory to Germany or anywhere else outside Holland is in direct conflict with the *Rules of Land Warfare*. The deportation of Jews, or the use of deportation as a measure either of coercion or punishment, is likewise forbidden.

9. In observance of the *Ordinances of 1937* very serious shortcomings have developed, in part due to the following:
The infiltration of the administrative service by collaborators; the presence in the administration of civil servants who are not conscious of their duties under the Ordinances; the unexpected length of the occupation; and the widespread circulation of enemy propaganda expressing contrary views.

10. The responsibility for the implementation of the Ordinances of 1937 rests on every administrative organ and on every civil servant individually and personally. 787

Partial text of broadcast delivered over Radio Orange, April 17, 1941, by Minister of Economic Affairs, M. P. L. Steenberghe, promising repayment of sums advanced in the occupied area to the dependents of Dutch merchant sailors in the Allied service.

Compatriots! Last week the [German controlled] Hilversum radio station spread the report that the British Government, through the Netherlands Shipping Committee in London, is supposed to have threatened Dutch sailors with the withdrawal of support for their families if they fail to continue to sail in the Allied Service. After this came the announcement that the Germans, for their part, would stop support being given to the family of any Dutch sailor who sails in the British service or in any ship which serves British interests.

It appears that the above-mentioned German announcement came from someone who calls himself the "Commissioner for Sea and Inland Waterways". He appears to ignore the fact that there is a legal, Royal Netherlands Government, that has the complete support and agreement of those in both the occupied territory and the overseas territories in its fight against the usurper.

...In this connection I can report the following: The Netherlands Government stands ready to guarantee, indeed guarantees, all payments which have been intended for the families of seamen or are to be made to them in the future. This government guarantee applies to the entire amount of sums that have already been agreed on for payment on a weekly or a monthly basis. In the event that enemy activity permits payment, I urge all Hollanders in the occupied territory to help support those left behind by the seamen. In this connection they can rest assured that the sums which they expend will be paid back.

787 ENQ, VIIa, 60.
Now a short word to the sailors themselves:

On a number of occasions already I have expressed the gratitude of the Netherlands Government for the valuable work you are doing, so much in our best traditions, traditions that are also being maintained in the occupied territory by the resolute attitude taken against the oppressor. We could never permit a state of affairs to arise in which those you hold dear would suffer because you did your duty in the struggle for the liberation of our country. You can continue to perform your duties in the magnificent manner in which you have acted so far, safe in the assurance that you will be thanked for your contribution by those you have left behind. 788

Excerpts of testimony of Mr. J. van der Gaag, delivered before the Inquiry Commission of the Netherlands Parliament, March 31, 1950, relating to the "character" of the Council of Resistance.

The Chairman: I think it would be useful to proceed to the character and goals of the Council of Resistance...We would like to have your views on this subject.

Mr. van der Gaag: "Character" is not a good word. "Character", as we use it today, carries more of a connotation of a specific political color. I joined the Council of Resistance exclusively to engage in resistance. One could better speak of the "task" of the Council of Resistance. It seems that there was a certain distribution of tasks between the various resistance groups. As far as I can ascertain the distribution of tasks was approximately this: The K.P. [Knuckle Gang] was primarily occupied with raids on ration-distribution offices. The O.D. [Order Service] concerned itself with the period after liberation, while the Council of Resistance devoted its energies to sabotage and the removal from the scene of traitors and S.D. [German security police] agents.

The Chairman: The K.P. did that too!

Mr. van der Gaag: Yes, but the K.P. was primarily concerned with attacks on ration-distribution offices, partly because the Council of Resistance did not consider this within its goals. That is not to say that, from time to time, the Council didn't take part in these activities. The organizations were not as sharply separated as that.

The Chairman: You said that the word "character" was not

788 Enq, VIIa, appendix, xxxi.
appropriate that one should speak of "task".

Mr. van der Gaag: Yes.

The Chairman: I really wonder about this now: Is that really so? There was not really any agreement between the organizations as to purposes and goals, was there? I still think the word "character" is better, because each group carried out the "task" for which, by its own peculiar circumstances, it was best equipped. The phrase "distribution of tasks" implies that there was some sort of agreement—that is to say that one group would do this and another that, while I have the impression that the "task" evolved on its own, within each group individually...

Mr. van der Gaag: You mean, therefore, that the direction of work of a particular resistance organization spoke of the character of that group? I can only state that acts of sabotage and the removal of specific persons were done principally by the Council of Resistance, that raids on ration-distribution offices were carried out in nearly all instances by the Knuckle Gang. An actual agreement was never reached, but in the Thursday Noon Meetings [Council of Resistance, Order Service, Knuckle Gang], the distribution of tasks was a very definite item of discussion.

The Chairman: It came under discussion, then, whether a given act was more within the nature of a given group?

Mr. van der Gaag: Not within the "nature" but the "experience". When, for example, it was known that a specific group was experienced in the handling of dynamite, to be used in the destruction of a railway, let us say, or was equipped with the tools for the loosening of rails, then it stands to reason that this group would do that sort of work. Therefore [in this example] they would say, "Let the Council of Resistance do it!"

The Chairman: How was the Council of Resistance organized?

Mr. van der Gaag: Nationally.

The Chairman: How was...[the national organization] related to the local units?

Mr. van der Gaag: Communications with some districts were difficult. From time to time someone went to the east or the south to ascertain how many people were available for Council activities; at the same time local commanders delivered reports of actions in which they or their group had participated. How
many people belonged to the Council of Resistance I shall never be able to say with any certainty—after the war people told me that they had belonged to the Council of Resistance—people of whom I, as Chairman of the Council, had never heard.

I travelled from time to time [on Council business] to Friesland. Freerk [Gerben Wagenaar] took a particular interest in the "dropping" areas in North Holland. Lange Jan [Jan Thijssen] was in charge of radio communications. Thus there was a division of labor. In meetings of the Council we would decide that someone would go, on the following week, to, let us say, North Brabant, to make contact with Jan, Piet, or Gerrit to blow up this or that railway or this or that factory.

The Chairman: There was, then, a direct contact between the leaders of the Council of Resistance and the different group commanders? It would seem logical that the contact would be maintained by couriers, so that the group commanders would not know the identities of the Council leaders.

Mr. van der Gaag: Well, I did go personally to Groningen, Friesland, and Brabant on various occasions.

The Chairman: But an effort was made to preserve as much anonymity as possible in the organization.

Mr. van der Gaag: We did have in mind the principle of having as little personal contact as possible. At the same time people were often afraid of dealing with a person totally unknown.

The Chairman: You said that you cannot say with certainty how many people took part in the Council of Resistance. For example, the Order Service appears to have had some 100,000 persons in its organization. At the same time the Knuckle Gang numbered some 1,000 to 2,000. When you hear those figures could you classify the Council as to size?

Mr. van der Gaag: I would guess the total to be about 2,000 active, working members, who regularly carried out Council of Resistance assignments. There were perhaps another 20,000 who, when a given assignment was in their own immediate neighborhood and within their competence, took part. Beyond that, there were perhaps 50,000 who said, "I belong to the Council of Resistance," and the simple fact of that statement constituted their entire contribution. The core consisted then, of no more than 2,000 people, including our couriers.

The Chairman: How was your work carried out? When, for example, there was an act of sabotage or something of some specialized sort to be carried out, in, let us say, Fries-
land, did you send a specialist or use someone in the local area?

Mr. van der Gaag: That cannot be simply answered. Things were so arranged that in the leadership of the Council we had a combat commander [gevechtcommandant]. First it was Lange Jan [Thijssen], later Freek [Gerben Wagenaar]. They saw to the implementation of Council policy decisions...The sabotage assignments that were to be carried out were usually received from England by radio. Lange Jan and Freek saw that they were carried out.789

Excerpts of the Manifesto of the Council of Resistance, published about September, 1943.

Council of Resistance in the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

Declaration:

For an extended period of time the Netherlands people, and, in particular, resistance workers, have felt the lack of a central body that could offer direction to the general resistance of the Netherlands people. In order to fill this serious void, the greater part of resistance organizations in this country have decided to accept common representation in the Council of Resistance. The goal of the Council of Resistance is: The coordination of the acts of resistance in the Netherlands through central determination of the time, place, method, and nature of acts of resistance. To that end the Council will keep itself informed through the aid of pertinent specialists in the fields of military affairs, transportation, and economics. The Council of Resistance in its entirety accepts responsibility for all deeds that are done in agreement with its policy decisions.

Policy decisions in regard to specific acts of resistance are to be communicated only to the commanders of resistance groups. In connection with the demands which the Council of Resistance makes of the Netherlands people at least the following shall be valid: The Council is unalterably opposed to extortionate prices being charged for food, in violation of price controls, and it shall not hesitate to employ the most severe means of punishment against those engaged in such acts. Similar action may be taken against those irresolute persons in the administration who shirk their true duty to the community. Our war for liberation can only be successfully completed if every member of the community is willing

789 Gaag, loc. cit., 77775.
to lend his or her fullest cooperation.

The Council wishes to stress that, no matter how difficult it may seem, it must count on the complete support of all Dutch subjects. There is only one alternative: One is for or against our national liberation. The possibility of pursuing a third course, one of watchful waiting, has past. We stand on the eve of very difficult decisions—the Netherlands people must be united, united in their ideals, united in their active resistance so that future acts of the enemy can be faced squarely.

We ask our countrymen to support completely the general principles laid down here...

**General Principles of the Council of Resistance for:**

**The Recapture of Prisoners of War and Forced Labor.** Do not report. In so far as is possible, manufacture false documents to give the impression of having been given official exemption. Do not reside at home, but other than that try to continue a normal life; neighbors and acquaintances of such persons should curb their curiosity, and not try to learn details of each particular situation, while at the same time lending as much aid as possible, even if it is not solicited. If you are forced to go to Germany miss no opportunity, either on the trip to Germany or in Germany itself, to escape and return to Holland.

**Radio.** Don't brag about hidden radios. Practically all police discoveries of hidden radio equipment have resulted from someone's talking too much and the subsequent betrayal of secrets disclosed in this fashion. Hidden radios can be discovered up to a distance of about half a meter by means of an ordinary magnetic compass, which is attracted by the magnet in the loudspeaker. He who possesses the security to listen regularly to Radio Orange broadcasts should, if possible, take them down stenographically.

**Registration.** Do not answer official forms that may be sent you for completion, even if punishment for non-completion is threatened. If officials follow in persons to complete such forms, avoid them by not answering the door, or, if impossible, give them false answers. If possible be absent.

Destroy forms which you receive, denying receipt. If you are forced to fill them in do so as badly as possible, and/or write letters to the agency concerned, asking a very great many questions. In this fashion the work of administration can be made more difficult.
The Pillory:

The Cringing Persons. The Council of Resistance will place in the pillory of public opinion those who still give no sign of knowing what their duty is in these times. Reference is here made to some leading functionaries in both the civil service and in private business. This is to serve as a last warning.

Presence at the Commission of Deeds of Resistance. Repeatedly it has come to our attention that the public, civil servants, or the police have stupidly and ungratefully tried to hinder acts of resistance, or to arrest resistance workers. The Council warns such persons that they may expect punishment and that, in their neighborhood, the Council will place them in a pillory of public opinion.

The Council asks the cooperation of Hollanders in the distribution of its bulletins.790

Letter prepared by the editors of the staff of Vrij Nederland, to accompany the Council of Resistance Manifesto forwarded to London via the Swiss Route, dated about October, 1943.

From the Manifesto it will clearly appear what view of life the authors take. Many persons in this country feel that the Council of Resistance represents a Communist activity. We are not in a position to positively ascertain the true facts. To be sure, both the Signaal, which is clearly a Communist newspaper, and the Oranjekrant (Orange Paper), which has unmistakable Communist sympathies, have published the Manifesto in its entirety. Various members of the Council of Resistance are known to us by name and are, in general, immature persons.

In our view, the Council of Resistance is a war phenomenon, an indication of a sort of Balkanization of resistance movements, a kind of counter-terror or reprisal, that, in the field of resistance work, does have a certain sense to it. Warning should be given against the pretensions which the (Council) has of speaking with apparent national authority. The Government can decide for itself how far this mentality is to be rejected for other resistance objectives.791

790ENQ, VIIa, 267ff.
791ENQ, VIIa, 267.

Report

Shortly after the capitulation there appeared in the Netherlands a number of underground organizations. This led to a great deal of confusion. Jonkheer S. [chimmelpenninck] undertook to "roof in" these organizations. He proposed to do this by choosing three outstanding Hollanders as a sort of collegiate directorate, and to contact representatives of the leading organizations and induce them to serve under the leadership of this Triumvirate, as it was to be called. At that point Jonkheer S.'s own task would be completed.

He began to seek the membership of this board. He had to try to find prominent citizens who had not acquired their prominence through earlier leadership in a political party. Jonkheer S. did this so that anyone could, regardless of his convictions, enter the organization. Since Jonkheer S. further realized that our people would be timid if faced with an organization "led by the military", he had, as one of his strongest principles, the requirement that the majority leadership must be civilian. He proposed, therefore, the choice of a Triumvirate composed of two civilians and one military man...

Jonkheer S. possessed organizational ability of a high order, together with an exceptional human understanding. During a year and a half he gave of his fullest. Two and a half months I lodged at his house, while the Gestapo sought me most energetically. His own capture may well have been hastened by his sheltering me, as there is some possibility that evidence located at my former residence may have led security police to his home. Jonkheer S. never referred to this hazard. This was an indication of his courage...

The Triumvirate described above acted on these assumptions: If German collapses, and, as a result, the Germans leave Holland, or if the country should be freed by some other means, a vacuum would exist in the Government of the Motherland. In this period the Netherlands people would have to be ruled by Hollanders who themselves had experienced the occupation. They could better appreciate the feelings of the Netherlands people...The Netherlands people would wish nothing else, they would be afraid that the London Government would not understand them any longer.

The Triumvirate accordingly accepts its duty to:
Immediately after liberation take control of the Motherland for Her Majesty the Queen; to strive for the preservation of peace and order in the country—if necessary by force—and, immediately after that has been achieved, to offer a reborn Netherlands to Her Majesty and further implement Her will.

In order to install this "Temporary Administration" a militarily organized apparatus had to be built up. The Triumvirate...decided to begin by bringing unity into all existing military organizations.

Jonkheer S. now divided his task:

1. Preparation for the assumption of authority by the Triumvirate.

2. The combining of existing military organizations.

Since he himself was not a military man, he left the latter task to Lieutenant-Colonel Versteagh...who assumed the title of "Chief of Staff".

Towards the attainment of the former objective, conferences were held with numerous prominent Hollander...

Agreements were made with experts in the fields of public nutrition, transportation, et cetera.

Lieutenant-Colonel Versteagh built up the militarily-organized Order Service in consultation with Jonkheer S., who had over-all direction. To that end the country was divided into approximately twenty Regions...The Regions were further subdivided into Districts, under the direction of a District Commandant, who further divided his District into Localities, and so on, down to groups of ten or fifteen persons.

Those personnel of the Royal Netherlands Navy still surviving were organized by Rear Admiral H. Jolles, who promised his complete cooperation. The mission of the Royal Navy was made that of protecting harbors so that invading ships could land there.

The municipal police were tied into the organization, as were the Royal Constabulary...Each Regional Commandant received instructions to organize, in addition to his ordinary Order Service Groups, reserve units, consisting entirely of military persons. These reserves were to be organized into battalions, divided into regiments, platoons, et cetera. All of this was provided in the "General Orders",...
in which a very important point was the rule that the reservists were to assume active status only on orders of the Regional Commandant, after he was properly authorized to do so by the [national] Staff.

There was to be created, although it was to be separate from the Order Service, an intelligence service, charged with the collection of all reports that would be of importance for the direct conduct of the war: Plans of air fields, data concerning factories working on German account, et cetera. At the same time this organization sought and seeks contact with England.

A clandestine network of radio transmitters and receivers was established to insure that the General Staff would be able to maintain constant contact with all parts of the Netherlands.

In addition to those facilities already described, others are urgently required. Some means of making the Order Service known to the entire Netherlands people, at the appropriate moment, is needed.

Mention should also be made of the extraordinarily expensive character of underground work. Arrangements for the acquisition of false identity papers, ration documents, travel money, all are items in great demand.

On November 13, 1941, Jonkheer S. was arrested... We have continued his work.

On November 25, 1941 I met Peter Tazelaar, who told me of his mission. Regardless of how much it disturbed us that London asked for [the transportation to England] of a politician, we gave him the fullest help... It was decided that on his return to London he would take with him a representative of our organization, a task for which I was chosen, since I was a member of the Triumvirate. I was given the following mission:

To report to Her Majesty and request support and help for the work in Holland, particularly support and help to be rendered by the following means:

1. Recognition by Her Majesty of the Order Service.
3. Financial support to be rendered by the London Government.
4. The establishment of reliable, safe communications
between London and the Order Service [in order] to carry out the objectives just listed...

1. Recognition.

Along side the Order Service stand other groups, among them one formed by the earlier leaders of political parties. These political leaders have concluded a truce, to be effective for a period of three years following the liberation of the Motherland.

While there have been attempts made from both sides to come to agreement considerable differences still exist between the Order Service and the political group. Among others, was the reluctance on the part of the Order Service to admit to membership those who were not going to serve simply as good Hollanders but as Socialist Party members or as adherents of some other political faith.

At the same time this political group distrusted us, since, after the first negotiations, they came to the conclusion that we desired a "military dictatorship". From the foregoing it should be obvious that this is not even being contemplated. It also appeared that the Order Service had very little enthusiasm for the political parties. There exists in Holland considerable public distrust and dislike of the pre-war political parties. In order to avoid, in such circumstances, a divided country, a "Temporary Administration" was proposed. Unity would be achieved in the following fashion: Along with outstanding Hollanders, the earlier political leaders would form a "Recommendations Committee", which, after the proclamation of the "Temporary Administration" as the lawful government, would make its voice heard to explain to the Netherlands people that they, the politically or otherwise prominent persons, were in complete agreement with the Triumvirate and the Temporary Administration. Such an announcement would reach nearly the complete population and everyone could understand the basic reasonableness of actions and regulations of the Triumvirate. In this fashion everyone who wanted to follow his own little road to freedom would be restrained by the leader of his own political party. The negotiations between the Service and the political group were resumed at about the time I left Holland, so I do not know of further developments.

2. Arming of the Order Service.

To achieve our objectives (the maintenance of law and order at the time of liberation, by force if necessary) weapons must be available. In order to make possible the clandestine shipment of weapons from England to Holland a special arrangement has been devised in Holland. This ar-
rangement is under study by authorities in England.

If the organization is supplied with weapons, there is the possibility that, with eventual Allied landings in Holland, the Order Service could be of positive assistance in a military sense.

3. Financial support.

Underground work is inordinately expensive. Until now, that help most urgently needed has been assembled and contributed by Dutchmen of good will and adequate means. The whole question offers the greatest problems—no one is inclined to donate funds for unknown purposes, particularly since persons have obtained money under false pretenses in this fashion. At the same time an organization's security is weakened in so far as secret information is divulged to potential contributors. As a result, there is not nearly enough money available in Holland for underground activity. In addition, funds are needed for the support of relatives of resistance workers, including particularly those imprisoned. Upon my departure from Holland I made an agreement with those remaining behind, whereby a given code phrase broadcast by Radio Orange would indicate the extent of help to be forthcoming. With reference to method, the London Government could guarantee the repayment of loans to the resistance organizations. Sufficient funds could be borrowed on this basis.

4. Safe communications.

By means of the already-existing radio network operating between Colonel Rabagliatti and one of his Dutch agents in Holland, the organization which I represent can be contacted...

(Signed) G. A. Dogger,
Midshipman, Naval Service.

Partial list of items forwarded by the Swiss Route in the first year of its operation, compiled by Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine, Amsterdam.


2. Letter from Professor Oranje. (Famous resistance worker, Free University of Amsterdam).

792 ENQ, VIIa, 245ff.


5. A Letter from the Editors of Vrij Nederland.


7. Netherlands Youth After the War. (A report.)

8. Theses. (Several of a series of monographs on a variety of subjects prepared by members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party).

9. Declarations of the Netherlands Reformed Church and the Roman Catholic Church. (Both dated February 21, 1943, a protest relating to Nazi interference with hospitals).

10. Special Regulations Pertaining to Jews in the Netherlands. (With an accompanying commentary).

11. Society After the War--Report VI. (One of a series prepared by a group of the Dutch Reformed Church).


13. Monetary Developments in Holland Since May 10, 1940.

14. Legal Status as of 1943. (A report prepared by Indonesian nationalists resident in Holland on their present status and future plans).

15. Economic Life in the Province of North Brabant.


17. Insulinde. (An anonymous report on questions relating to Holland and her relations with her overseas territories).
18. **Netherlands Agriculture After the War.**

19. **The Student Question.** (Including a few copies of De Gau (The Beggars), a clandestine student newspaper of the day).

20. **Civil Servants.** (Copies of a clandestine publication by and for civil servants, seeking, among other things, to further amplify the Ordinances of 1937).

21. **The Jewish Question.** (A report).

22. **Law at Restoration.** (Legal and constitutional problems likely to be attendant to liberation).

23. **Situation in the Prison Camps as of February, 1943.**

24. **Letter from the Members of the Amsterdam District to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice.** (Dealing with the "unpatriotic" acts of Dutch judicial authorities).

25. **Drugs Most Urgently Needed.** (A list prepared by the Medical Resistance in case drugs should be sent to Holland).

26. **Anti-Revolutionary Concepts.** (Prepared by members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party).

27. **The Church and International Reconstruction.** (Observations prepared by a Reformed Protestant church study group).


29. **Main Elements of the Social and Economic Program of the Netherlands Union.** (The "Union" here is the "national unity" group founded in 1940, described previously).

30. **Organization for Health Care.** (A report issuing from medical circles).

31. **Principles of our Foreign Policy.** (Prepared by the Netherlands Union).

32. **Youth; the Economic Question; the Church, and the International Rule of Law.** (Source uncertain).

33. **Some Dutchers on the Future.** (An anonymous report which, in the opinion of those persons operating the
Swiss Route, represents the views of many).

34. **The Conditions in Amersfoort and Vught.** (A report on German concentration camps in Holland).

35. **The Question of the Physicians, July, 1943.** (A description of a protracted, although unsuccessful attempt by Dutch Nazis to secure control of the Dutch Chamber of Medicine).

36. **Imprisoned Officers.** (A report by the Order Service).

37. **Critique of Radio Orange.** (A report).\(^{793}\)

\(^{793}\) Slotemaker de Bruine, loc. cit., 36549-36550.
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<tr>
<td>Jonge, H. G. de;</td>
<td>March 12, 1943</td>
<td>Collect military and economic reports. Contact National Committee, bring same into contact with O.D.</td>
<td>Formed successful intelligence organization. Worked with Alb. Used radio, written reports. Arrested, November, 1943, while crossing Pyrenees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergman, A.</td>
<td>March 24, 1943.</td>
<td>Organize an escape route through Spain.</td>
<td>Fatally wounded, same day, when aircraft delivering him shot down, crashed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerbranda, P. R.</td>
<td>March 24, 1943.</td>
<td>Same as Bergman.</td>
<td>Survived above crash; mission accomplished. No formal group affiliation but had contact with Mar., and Kees. Returned safely to England.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hoekman, P.</td>
<td>September 19, 1943</td>
<td>Same as Letteboer above, also to contact Swedish Route.</td>
<td>Few particulars available. Worked with O.D.; used radio. Killed on November 5, 1943.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grisnigt, R. A.</td>
<td>September 19, 1943</td>
<td>Same as above.</td>
<td>Sent many telegrams, worked with O.D., used radio. Located by German radio direction finders, arrested, February 2, 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiedemann, Otto M.</td>
<td>September 19, 1943</td>
<td>Establish contact with F.L.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished, worked with F.L., R.V.V., Mar., used radio, written reports, arrested, July 18, 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[British subject]</td>
<td></td>
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### Agents of Intelligence Bureau

**Legend:**
- O.D.: Order Service
- R.V.V.: Council of Resistance
- Alb.: Albrecht
- G.D.N.: Geheime Dienst Nederland
- F.L.: Fiat Libertas
- Mr.: Marinier
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<tr>
<td>Schreinemachers, W. J.</td>
<td>October 8, 1943</td>
<td>Economic reporting, bring messages and advice to O.D.</td>
<td>Lost baggage in dropping. Worked with G.D.N., radio contact with London via van Borssum Buisman. Returned to England, August, 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alebeek, J. L. T. M. van</td>
<td>October 8, 1943</td>
<td>Radio operator for Schreinemachers.</td>
<td>Lost radio set on dropping, inactive. Arrested on December 5, 1944 (may have been 1943, fact is disputed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verhage, M.</td>
<td>November 6, 1943</td>
<td>Microfilm expert for Barbara Group founded by van Borssum Buisman.</td>
<td>Owing to numerous arrests in Barbara Group had little contact with same. Worked with O.D. and G.D.N. Reported to liberated area, Eindhoven, September 9, 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesfeldt, J. H.</td>
<td>November 6, 1943</td>
<td>Radio operator for Barbara Group.</td>
<td>See above. Worked with O.D., sent a great number of telegrams to London. Located by German radio direction finders. Arrested, July 12, 1944, executed at Vught.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steen, H.</td>
<td>January 10, 1944</td>
<td>Contact R.V.V., regulate financial arrangements of &quot;support&quot; organizations, deliver various radio sets.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished. Worked with R.V.V. and &quot;Hein&quot; organization (probably set up by him), used radio. Located by German radio direction finders, arrested, March 14, 1944, executed, September 5, 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adriaansen, J.</td>
<td>January 10, 1944</td>
<td>Radio operator for Steen.</td>
<td>Worked briefly for Steen, then Ausems (below), ran into difficulties, worked with R.V.V., used radio, towards end sent locally-gathered reports. Arrested, July 14, 1944, executed, August 8, 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausems, A. W. M.</td>
<td>February 29, 1944</td>
<td>Contact R.V.V., help set up intelligence service of R.V.V., coordinate various intelligence efforts, deliver message from Minister-President Gerbrandy.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished, greatly hampered because of lack of radio operator. Worked with R.V.V., various other groups. Continued to function until end of war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loon, J. E. van;</td>
<td>February 29, 1944</td>
<td>Radio operator for Ausems.</td>
<td>Fell out with Ausems, sent only reports which he himself had collected. Incredibly inept, placed on nation-wide police &quot;wanted&quot; list for stealing bicycle of German officer. Discharged as agent by London, December 11, 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faber, J.</td>
<td>April 10, 1944</td>
<td>Deliver instructions for O.D., R.V.V., (political) National Committee, Fatherland Committee, and illegal press.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished. Sent many telegrams, worked with R.V.V., Spijker, Alb., contacted organizations operating escape lines, had contact with College of Bondsman. Used radio. Active until liberation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waal, M. W. van de;</td>
<td>May 7, 1944</td>
<td>Contact G. de Jong.</td>
<td>Inoperative, arrested May 10, 1944, died in German camp at Sandorstel, April 27, 1945.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**A**gents of Intelligence Bureau. **Legend:** O.D.: Order Service; R.V.V.: Council of Resistance; Alb.: Albrecht; G.D.N.: Geheime Dienst Nederland; F.L.: Fiat Libertas; M.I.: Marinier; "B.R." is full name of group.

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<tr>
<td>Blooys, J. de</td>
<td>May 7, 1944</td>
<td>Deliver four radio sets to R.V.V., deliver microfilms to Ausems and act as cryptographer for same.</td>
<td>Worked as cryptographer for Ausems, had contact with R.V.V. Arrested December 31, 1944, shot and killed trying to escape.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandjes, J.</td>
<td>June 5, 1944</td>
<td>Radio operator for G.D.N., deliver microfilms to G.D.N.</td>
<td>Had little contact with G.D.N. Worked with Alb., used radio, reported back in liberated territory at Eindhoven, November 5, 1944.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mooiweer, K. C.;</td>
<td>December 31, 1944, mission &quot;B&quot;</td>
<td>Instructions for Alb., deliver radio set to Smid (see below), financial mission (nature uncertain), preparation dropping areas eastern Netherlands.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished. Worked with Alb., Rinus, and with British Special Air Services, (a pilot escape line). Helped survivors of the battle of Arnhem escape.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dijckmeester, F. T.;</td>
<td>June 5, 1944</td>
<td>Contact O.D., help coordinate resistance organizations.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished. Worked with O.D., Mar., Alb., R.V.V., Kees, used radio-telephone as well as radiotelegraph, relayed messages in this manner to low-flying aircraft, first to do so. Active until end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buunk, G. B.;</td>
<td>June 5, 1944 (or July 5, 1944, uncertain)</td>
<td>Establish contact with Ausems, work as cryptographer for same, deliver radio sets to various groups.</td>
<td>Worked with Ausems, O.D., also with an intelligence group in Overijssel. Also had contact with Special Air Services (see Mooiweer, above). Used radio, also communicated with London through agents of the (British) Special Operations Executive. Arrested, January 10, 1945, executed, April 4, 1945.</td>
</tr>
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**Agents of Intelligence Bureau. Legend:** C.D.: Order Service; R.V.V.: Council of Resistance; Alb.: Albrecht; G.D.N.: Geheime Dienst Nederland; F.L.: Fiat Libertas; Mar.: Marinier; "B.R." is full name of group.

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<tr>
<td>Hooyer, G. F.</td>
<td>June 5, 1944</td>
<td>Deliver microfilms to Kees, act as radio operator for Kees, coordinate resistance activity.</td>
<td>Sent a large number of telegrams, including an exchange of ideas between the London Government and the College of Bondsmen. Worked with Kees, used radio. Arrested December 1, 1944, executed March 8, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mans, K. A.</td>
<td>August 4, 1944</td>
<td>&quot;Control&quot; agent sent to verify reliability of contacts with Mar., Spijker group, also freedom from imprisonment of agents Visser, Mociweer, Ausems, Adriaansen, van Loon. Deliver radio sets to Spijker, work with Mar.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished. When work with Mar. was completed worked with Packard and O.D. Used radio, arrested November 10, 1944. Escaped, arrested again, escaped again, worked with intelligence groups, active until end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutherland, M. A.</td>
<td>August 4, 1944</td>
<td>Radio operator for Mans.</td>
<td>Mission accomplished. Worked with Alb., O.D., used radio. Arrested, November 11, 1944, escaped, reported back in May, 1945.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brauw, Jonkheer R. de</td>
<td>August 7, 1944</td>
<td>Establish contacts dealing with financial arrangements of &quot;support&quot; groups, contact B.R.</td>
<td>Worked with B.R., and Kees, later collected and forwarded military reports himself. Used radio-telephone (see Dijckmeester, above). Arrested, October 14, 1944, died May 4, 1945 in German camp at Neuengamme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smid, M. A.;</td>
<td>August 7, 1944</td>
<td>Radio operator for de Brauw, built up radio group for B.R.</td>
<td>Badly separated from de Brauw in dropping process. Had contact with Alb. Active until end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijsewijk, A. A. M. van;</td>
<td>September 1, 1944</td>
<td>Radio operator for O.D., deliver five radio sets to O.D.</td>
<td>Mission apparently accomplished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemmel, C. H. van;</td>
<td>October 5, 1944</td>
<td>Same as Kouwenhoven above.</td>
<td>Worked with Knuckle Gang in Assen, used radio, also contact with Mar. Killed in gun battle with Gestapo, March 28, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoogewooning, F. J.</td>
<td>December 30, 1944.</td>
<td>Radio operator for Alb.</td>
<td>Established contact, worked with Alb. Located by German radio direction finders, arrested February 27, 1945, executed March 8, 1945.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vries, W. de;</td>
<td>April 4, 1945.</td>
<td>Radio operator for Weelinck.</td>
<td>Same as Weelinck.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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794 Based on lists found in: ENQ, IVa, 325; ENQ, IVa, appendix, lxviii; and on a file of London Government agents prepared by the writer from the testimony of approximately 100 witnesses.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS


These volumes, the work of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission which examined a number of phases of the London Government, contain the testimony of 573 witnesses, delivered over a period of seven years, and occupy the equivalent of 17,908 standard, double-spaced typewritten pages. Also included are Netherlands Government documents, those from numerous private and organizational archives, plus selected British and German papers, which occupy the equivalent of 10,980 pages.

BOOKS


This is a definitive account of Dutch military action in the European Netherlands during World War II.


   An excellent account of the forgery of identity papers.


ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

   Deals with the period 1940-1945.

   Deals with occupied Holland.

   Deals with occupied Holland, 1940-1945.

   Deals with occupied Holland, 1940-1945.

   Deals with occupied Holland, 1940-1945.

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   Deals with occupied Holland, 1940-1945.

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Deals with the period of 1940-1945.

Deals with occupied Holland, 1940-1945.

Deals with occupied Holland, 1940-1945.

Vrij Nederland (London), 1940-1945.
In addition to providing a narrative account of a wide variety of events occurring in both London and the occupied territory, Vrij Nederland regularly reprinted in its pages issues of the underground press received from Holland. Also reprinted were official London Government documents and some scripts of Radio Orange broadcasts.

Deals with occupied Holland, 1940-1945.
OTHER SOURCES

______. Personal interview with Wilhelm Baumgarten, August, 1959.

______. Personal interview with C. H. Evers, April 21, 1960.
ABSTRACT

The present study deals with the relations of the Netherlands "London" Government with the German-occupied territory during World War II.

The writer begins with the postulate that the London Government might be expected to provide in some measure for the maintenance of domestic order, for the welfare and safety of its citizens in the occupied territory; that it would be able to maintain communications with that territory; to serve as a focus for national unity; and to maintain its existence in order to assume authority at the time of liberation.

Owing to the nature of the German occupation, the London Government could neither directly engage in "remote" administration nor provide directly for the welfare and safety of its citizens. A single major exception appears in an effective railway strike ordered by the London Government.

London was able to assist organizations which did act in the general welfare. These include the National Support Fund, which expended $68,000,000, repayment of which was guaranteed by London; the Fugitive Aid Organization, which concealed and fed as many as 500,000 persons at one time; and groups preparing forged identity papers. Examples of London's maintenance of communications with the occupied territory include clandestine "routes" for intelligence gathering purposes, operated through neutral countries; Radio Orange, the
Netherlands government broadcasting station in London; and the dispatch by the London Government of agents to Holland to gather information there.

The London Government did serve as a focus of national unity, as well as remaining intact to be able to function at the conclusion of hostilities. Radio Orange served as an important instrumentality in bringing the Government and occupied Holland into closer contact, particularly in its presentation of addresses by the Dutch sovereign.

One of the principal conclusions of this dissertation is that (with a few exceptions) the London Government was most successful when it utilized the services of persons or organizations already located in the occupied territory, rather than attempting to dispatch individuals to Holland or create such organizations from London. Among those examples supporting this postulate, in addition to the aid and contact organizations listed above, are three large armed resistance coördinating bodies. The England-Spiel episode is offered as negative proof, in that it represents an extensive activity planned and executed by London which ended in total disaster. As partial exceptions to the rule appear London intelligence agents who, for technical reasons, were alone able to arrange initial contact with England; London's creation of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, a militia composed of members of the three largest armed resistance organizations; and the establishment by London of the College of Bondsmen, a resistance coördinating organization called into being to replace a locally-formed organization in which a political deadlock existed.

Sources are largely official Dutch documents, the testimony of
persons concerned, and published personal accounts.
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