EasyUC: using EasyCrypt to mechanize proofs of universally composable security

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Boston University
EasyUC: Using EASYCRYPT to Mechanize Proofs of Universally Composable Security

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Abstract—We present a methodology for using the EASYCRYPT proof assistant (originally designed for mechanizing the generation of proofs of game-based security of cryptographic schemes and protocols) to mechanize proofs of security of cryptographic protocols within the universally composable (UC) security framework. This allows, for the first time, the mechanization and formal verification of the entire sequence of steps needed for proving simulation-based security in a modular way:

- Specifying a protocol and the desired ideal functionality.
- Constructing a simulator and demonstrating its validity, via reduction to hard computational problems.
- Invoking the universal composition operation and demonstrating that it indeed preserves security.

We demonstrate our methodology on a simple example: stating and proving the security of secure message communication via a one-time pad, where the key comes from a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange, assuming ideally authenticated communication. We first put together EASYCRYPT-verified proofs that: (a) the Diffie-Hellman protocol UC-realizes an ideal key-exchange functionality, assuming hardness of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, and (b) one-time-pad encryption, with a key obtained using ideal key-exchange, UC-realizes an ideal secure-communication functionality. We then mechanically combine the two proofs into an EASYCRYPT-verified proof that the composed protocol realizes the same ideal secure-communication functionality.

Although formulating a methodology that is both sound and workable has proven to be a complex task, we are hopeful that it will prove to be the basis for mechanized UC security analyses for significantly more complex protocols and tasks.

I. INTRODUCTION

Cryptographic protocols are magical: they allow us to conjure alternative realities where information is created, shared, evolved, analyzed, combined, separated, seemingly destroyed, and then reconstructed elsewhere in idealized and abstract ways that defy physical common sense—and then, amazingly enough, they show us how to actually realize these alternative realities on our laptops.

This magic comes at a price: to make it work, we must resign to the fact that guarantees might be imperfect and allow for small probability of error. Furthermore, the guarantees might only hold against resource bounded adversaries; consequently, proofs may need to rely on reductions to the intractability of some underlying computational problems.

Additionally, one has to know how to align one’s spells: verifying seemingly natural properties like correctness, secrecy, information flow, knowledge, influence, or bias becomes delicate and error-prone. Indeed, even formalizing such concepts requires arguing about the capabilities and knowledge of computationally bounded adversarial entities that interact with multiple algorithms in a distributed, multi-component system.

Then, proofs (or reductions) that a protocol possesses a property must show how to translate the capabilities and knowledge of a computationally bounded adversary in one distributed, multi-component system to adversarial capabilities and knowledge in another system, which might also be distributed and multi-component. Indeed, cryptographic modeling and analysis has time and again succumbed to subtle but devastating mistakes (see e.g., [1]–[3]).

Cryptographic approaches to defining security: Several methodologies for “magic control”—i.e., specifying and analyzing security properties of cryptographic protocols—have been developed over the years.

One such methodology is the game-based security approach in which a hypothetical adversary interacts with a “tester” or a “game master” who mediates the adversary’s access to components of the scheme and who also determines at the end of the interaction whether the adversary succeeded in its goal. A cryptographic scheme is deemed to satisfy game-based security if no sufficiently bounded adversary succeeds with probability more than allowed by the game. This is a relatively simple formalism that involves only a single universal quantifier (asymptotics aside).

However, plain game-based security definitions often have limited expressive power. Specifically, in situations where the security requirements combine both secrecy and correctness in non-trivial ways (such as zero-knowledge proofs, secure computation, garbling, functional encryption and others) plain game-based definitions do not seem to suffice. In such situations the more expressive formalism of simulation-based security (often called the real/ideal paradigm) turns out to be more useful. Simulation-based security can be thought of as an interaction between a game-master and
three entities: an adversary, a simulator, and a distinguisher. The game master chooses at random to play either the real game with the distinguisher and the adversary, or else to play the ideal game with the distinguisher and the simulator. The definition of security requires that for any (bounded) adversary there exists a computationally bounded simulator such that no computationally bounded distinguisher will be able to tell the real game from the ideal one with significant advantage. Here the ideal game typically represents the desired behavior of the system, whereas the real game represents the actual execution environment under consideration.

Even simulation-based notions of security can fall short of capturing security properties nimbly enough. Indeed, time and again such notions have failed to preserve security when schemes and protocols are composed with one another in adversarially coordinated ways (see e.g., [4]–[6]). Still, a special class of simulation-based notions of security, namely notions of universally composable (UC) security, do allow capturing security properties of protocols so that these properties are preserved even when the analyzed protocols are composed with arbitrary other protocols [7], [8].

UC security can be thought of as a variant of simulation-based security, where the interaction among the distinguisher, the adversary (or simulator), and the game master is stylized in a specific way that allows the distinguisher “maximum interaction” with the adversary (or simulator). Furthermore, UC security has an alternative (and mathematically equivalent) formulation which considers only a single, simple adversary. We are thus left with the structurally simple requirement that there exists a simulator such that no distinguisher can tell the real interaction from the ideal interaction with the simulator.

More specifically, the ideal game represents an interaction of the distinguisher (who is now called the environment) with the simulator and an entity, called an ideal functionality, that represents the desiderata from the task at hand by way of an idealized mechanism. The real game represents an execution of the analyzed protocol within the model of computation under consideration. This means that, to demonstrate that a protocol complies with the specification, the analyst should exhibit a simulator, and then demonstrate that no environment can tell whether it is interacting with the protocol in the real game, or else with the ideal functionality and the simulator in the ideal game. In that case we say that the protocol $UC$-realizes the ideal functionality.

Beyond providing an expressive way of formulating security and functionality specifications for protocols, universally composable (UC) security is attractive in that it allows for security-preserving modular design of protocols, or more generally complex systems—thus significantly simplifying the overall design and analysis process. Indeed, UC security has become the method of choice for formulating and proving security of cryptographic protocols, whenever possible.

There are a number of frameworks that allow representing protocols and formulating UC security properties with varying levels of expressivity and generality, e.g., [3], [7]–[11].

**Formal and mechanized analysis:** Although formulating adequate notions of security for simple tasks and proving the security of simple protocols based on simple-to-state computational intractability assumptions can be a fun challenge for a creative mind, doing so for even moderately complex protocols (let alone at the scale of real-world systems) is a daunting task. Formalisms such as the UC framework or the sequence-of-games formalism [12]–[14] make proofs more modular and structured; still, even with these mechanisms in place, the complexity of manual proofs is far beyond the reach of human capabilities.

Several approaches to mechanizing the verification of cryptographic security properties have been proposed. The works of Abadi-Rogaway and Micciancio-Warinschi [15], [16] demonstrate that game-based cryptographic properties in the symbolic model can be formulated in a logic that can be mechanically verified. Indeed, the ProVERIF Tool [17] of Blanchet was able to verify these (and other) properties mechanically. Backes and Pfitzmann [18], and later Canetti and Herzog [19], demonstrate that a similar translation can be done for universally composable notions of security. However this approach turned out to be limited in scope, since it required separating the analysis to two disjoint parts: an “abstract” part where the analysis is purely combinatorial (and typically deterministic) without computational hardness considerations, and the remaining “computational” part that translates algorithmic constructs that rely on computational hardness to abstract constructs with idealized security. Furthermore, only the “abstract” part is mechanized.

An alternative approach, taken in CryptoVerif [20]–[23], and later by other proof assistants such as EASYCRYPT [24]–[31], FCF [32]–[34], and CRYPTHOL [35], [36], applies to cryptographic proofs that are based in the sequence-of-games formalism. These tools provide probabilistic programming languages to formalize the games in the sequence, and support the automatic or machine-assisted generation and verification of the transitions between games, as well as the overall proof. This approach proved very successful and allowed formally and mechanically verifying game-based security notions of many primitives, schemes and protocols. Some simulation-based security analyses have been carried out as well, with a variety of challenges being reported [29]–[31]. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these tools have been used so far to mechanize UC-style security analyses (with the potential exception of the concurrent work of [37]).

**A. This Work**

We report on an ongoing effort to show how EASYCRYPT can be used to formally specify and mechanically verify security properties of protocols, expressed within the UC framework. The overarching goal is to be able to specify
protocols, ideal functionalities, and simulators within the EASYCRYPT language and mechanize proofs of UC security. In more detail, we seek to:

- Represent cryptographic protocols within the UC framework, or rather a variant of UC that replaces interactive Turing machines with EASYCRYPT modules.
- Specify security requirements for cryptographic tasks, by way of formulating appropriate ideal functionalities within the same variant of the UC framework.
- Formally verify that a protocol UC-realizes an ideal functionality under appropriate intractability assumptions. This requires defining an appropriate simulator and then proving a concrete upper bound $\epsilon$ on the ability of the environment to distinguish an interaction with the protocol from an interaction with the ideal functionality and the simulator. The bound $\epsilon$ can either be stated in absolute terms or relative to the concrete ability of breaking the underlying computational assumption.
- Apply the universal composition operation to protocols and formally prove using the EASYCRYPT tool that the operation preserves security, as predicted by the universal composition theorem.

In this work, we make significant steps towards this overarching goal. Specifically, we formulate a somewhat restricted variant of the UC framework (essentially, we assume static and known subroutine structure and hierarchical addressing). Still, this variant allows expressing a rich class of cryptographic protocols and ideal functionalities. Next we provide a library of EASYCRYPT modules that allows expressing executions, within the UC model, of (1) a given protocol with arbitrary environment and adversary, and (2) a given ideal functionality, with an arbitrary environment, and a given simulator that interfaces with an arbitrary adversary. Furthermore, the library allows expressing as an EASYCRYPT goal the statement that, given a protocol, an ideal functionality, and a simulator, no environment and adversary can distinguish between an execution of the protocol, and an execution of the ideal functionality alongside the simulator. Finally, we give a generic way to express the universal composition (UC) operation, and we provide a general methodology for proving its validity.

Remarks: Four comments are in order at this point.

First, this work inherits EASYCRYPT’s informal treatment of runtimes. That is, we do not provide any formal mechanism for verifying the runtimes of components, most prominently of the simulator; this analysis is left to be done manually. While for our restricted case this does not appear to be a severe limitation, adding an EASYCRYPT mechanism for formally asserting runtime bounds would be useful.

Second, recall that the UC operation takes descriptions of three protocols—$\rho$, $\phi$ and $\pi$—and returns the protocol $\rho^{\phi \rightarrow \pi}$ where each instance of $\phi$, when called as subroutine of $\rho$, is replaced by an instance of $\pi$. For simplicity, in this work we only treat the case where a single instance of $\phi$ is replaced by an instance of $\pi$. We note that no generality is lost since the general case can be obtained by iterated applications of this single-instance case. Crucially, this holds since the complexity of the simulator in the UC framework is always bounded by the complexity of the adversary plus a fixed polynomial overhead.

Third, while our case study does not use subroutines that are globally accessible or share state with other protocols, we are not aware of any limitation that would prevent our framework from being adapted to handle such cases as well.

Fourth, we note that, throughout this work, we stick with the formulation of UC security that directly models an arbitrary adversary, rather than restricting attention to the dummy adversary model. This is done for convenience: With an arbitrary adversary, UC security is trivially transitive, which is very useful as exemplified in the case study (see below and and in Section V). Furthermore, since UC simulation is black-box and in-line, the added complexity incurred by the analyst due to working with an arbitrary adversary is minimal; see Section VI for discussion.

B. Case Study

We demonstrate the validity of our methodology on an example which, while relatively simple, contains all the components mentioned above. Specifically, we give an EASYCRYPT-aided formal analysis of UC-security of a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol, followed by the one-time-pad encryption of a message with the resulting key—assuming ideally authenticated communication. That is:

- We give EASYCRYPT formulations of an ideal secure message communication (SMC) functionality $\text{SMC}_{\text{ideal}}$, an ideal key-exchange functionality $\text{KE}_{\text{ideal}}$, and an ideal message authentication functionality $\text{Forw}$.
- We give EASYCRYPT formulations of two different 2-party protocols: Diffie-Hellman key exchange, $\text{KE}_{\text{Real}}$, and a secure message communication protocol, $\text{SMC}_{\text{Real}}(KE)$, in which the parties use as a one-time pad the shared key produced by an abstract module $KE$. Both protocols use $\text{Forw}$ to transmit all messages.
- We formally verify that $\text{KE}_{\text{Real}}$ UC-realizes $\text{KE}_{\text{ideal}}$ under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. This requires construction of a simulator $\text{KE}_{\text{Sim}}$, construction of a DDH-breaking adversary from the environment and adversary, and proving that the ability of the environment to distinguish $\text{KE}_{\text{Real}}$ and the adversary from $\text{KE}_{\text{ideal}}$ and the application of $\text{KE}_{\text{Sim}}$ to the adversary is upper-bounded by the ability of the DDH-breaking adversary to distinguish the DDH games.
- We formally verify that $\text{SMC}_{\text{Real}}(KE_{\text{ideal}})$—that is, $\text{SMC}_{\text{Real}}$ where the abstract module $KE$ is instantiated with ideal key exchange $KE_{\text{ideal}}$—UC-realizes $\text{SMC}_{\text{ideal}}$. That is, we construct a simulator $\text{SMC}_{\text{Sim}}$ and formally verify that no environment can distinguish between the two interactions. (Here there is no reduction.)
We formally verify that SMCReal(KEReal) UC-emulates SMCReal(KEideal). This amounts to verifying an instance of the universal composition theorem. (UC-emulation is a generalization of UC-realization to the case where the emulated protocol is not an ideal functionality.)

Using transitivity, we deduce that SMCReal(KEReal) UC-realizes SMCideal.

The EASYCRYPT code for the case study can be downloaded from the EasyUC project’s GitHub repository: https://github.com/easyuc/EasyUC

C. Reflections

Building a framework that is EASYCRYPT-compatible, a faithful representation of (a subset of) the UC framework, and at the same time also workable, turned out to be a highly non-trivial challenge. We view our work so far as a first step towards the general goal, outlined above, of being able to generate tool-assisted, formally verified proofs of UC security with relative ease.

Immediate goals include further extending our library of EASYCRYPT modules, formalizing and verifying the UC composition theorem more generally, and providing additional support to facilitate the expression of UC protocols, ideal functionalities, and simulators as well as the generation of EASYCRYPT proofs. Here developing a domain-specific dialect of the EASYCRYPT programming language will prove useful.

In Section VI, we describe some of the main difficulties we faced in our work, and point the way toward future work.

II. RELATED WORK

There are a number of analytical frameworks that allow representing protocols and formulating UC security properties with varying levels of expressivity and generality, e.g., [3], [7]–[11]. While these definitions differ in many details, their high-level structures are very similar. Our work can be viewed as providing a way to mechanize security proofs in any one of these models.

Böhl and Unruh [38] introduce a variant of UC Security for the symbolic model, working within an applied π-calculus.

Interactive Lambda Calculus (ILC) [39] is a process calculus formulation of UC, consisting of the π-calculus with an affine typing system enforcing that only one process is active at a time. In the metatheory, they introduce randomness by supplying processes with bit sequences, and then define UC-realizability, the UC composition operation, and prove the UC composition theorem. They leave as future work interfacing their framework with a mechanized proof system.

Blanchet [40] has proved composition theorems that may be stated and used in CRYPTOVERIF, allowing one to give modular security analyses of the composition of key-exchange protocols with symmetric-key protocols that use the exchanged keys. These composition theorems work with a game-based notion of security.

Constructive cryptography [41] is a paradigm for defining the security of cryptographic schemes and protocols that focuses on constructing resources with stronger security properties from ones with weaker security properties. Security in constructive cryptography is defined via simulation, and constructive cryptography has a composition theorem. A CRYPTOHOL formalization of elements of constructive cryptography can be found in [37]. As a case study, this work (which is concurrent with our work) securely composes one-time pad encryption with message authentication.

III. BACKGROUND

A. EasyCrypt

EASYCRYPT’s programming language has modules, which consist of procedures and global variables. Procedures are written in a simple imperative language featuring while loops and random assignments.

EASYCRYPT has four logics: a probabilistic, relational Hoare logic, relating pairs of procedures; a probabilistic Hoare logic allowing one to prove facts about the probability of a procedure’s execution resulting in a postcondition holding; an ordinary Hoare logic; and an ambient higher-order logic for proving general mathematical facts, as well as for connecting judgments from the other logics. For instance, one may use the probabilistic, relational Hoare logic to prove an equivalence between the boolean-returning main procedures of two modules whose postcondition says the procedures’ results are equal, and then use the ambient logic to prove that the two procedures are equally likely to return true. One may prove facts involving abstract modules, e.g., ones representing adversaries or environments.

Proofs are carried out using tactics, which transform the current proof goal into zero or more subgoals. Simple ambient logic goals may be automatically proved using SMT solvers. Once found, an EASYCRYPT proof script can be replayed step-by-step, or checked in batch-mode. Proofs may be structured as sequences of lemmas, and EASYCRYPT’s theories may be used to group definitions, modules and lemmas together. Theories may be specialized using a process called cloning.

B. Universally Composable Security

Universally Composable (UC) security is a framework that formulates security properties of cryptographic protocols by way of “emulating” an idealized process where the desired behavior of the protocol is guaranteed by fiat. A main ingredient in the idealized process is the ideal functionality, where the desired behavior is specified by way of a program. One salient property of UC definitions of security is their robustness to the execution environment: If a protocol π emulates some ideal functionality F, then π continues to realize F in any context.
In this section, we follow the simplified UC model in [8, 2018 version, §2]. The framework consists of the following components: (1) a model for executing a protocol, (2) an idealized model for running an ideal functionality, (3) a definition of UC-realizability that requires that interactions with the protocol and ideal functionality are indistinguishable, and (4) a security-preserving composition operation.

**Model of protocol execution:** The model for executing protocol \( \pi \) consists of a set of computational entities (called *machines*) that run \( \pi \), together with two adversarial entities: an *environment* and an *adversary*. An execution is a sequence of activations, where the environment is activated first, and during each activation the activated machine sends a message to one other machine, which is activated next. There are three types of messages: input messages, output messages, and adversarial messages. The environment provides input messages to the protocol machines and to the adversary. The adversary can send output messages to the environment or adversarial messages to the protocol machines. The protocol machines can send inputs to other machines, outputs to other machines or to the environment, and adversarial messages to the adversary. While the general UC framework permits creation of new protocol machines on the fly, in this work we restrict ourselves to systems with a fixed number of machines. The execution terminates when the environment generates a single-bit output. The adversarial messages capture both adversarially controlled communication and also corruption of machines.

**Ideal model:** An ideal functionality is a machine \( F \) that captures the desired behavior of the protocol. The ideal model is the same model for protocol execution, where the protocol is now an “ideal protocol” that consists of \( F \) plus a number of “dummy parties” that transfer inputs (coming from the environment) to \( F \) and outputs (coming from \( F \)) to the environment. All adversarial messages from the adversary are directed to \( F \).

**UC-emulation and UC-realization:** A protocol \( \pi \) UC-realizes an ideal functionality \( F \) if for any environment and adversary there exists a simulator such that the environment cannot guess (with probability significantly more than \( \frac{1}{2} \)) whether it is interacting with the adversary and \( \pi \) (the “real” game), or with the simulator and the ideal protocol for \( F \) (the “ideal game”). More formally, we want that the absolute value of the difference between the probabilities that the environment returns true in the real and ideal games is not significantly more than \( 0 \). The definition naturally generalizes to the case where the latter protocol, \( \phi \), is a general protocol rather than an ideal protocol for \( F \); in this case we say that \( \pi \) UC-emulates \( \phi \). From its definition, we can see that UC-emulation is transitive.

We note that this definition of security is equivalent to the seemingly more relaxed variant (the “dummy adversary model”) where the adversary is restricted to only forwarding messages between the environment and the parties (on their adversarial links). It is also equivalent to the seemingly more restrictive variant where the simulator only has black-box access to the adversary; this is the variant that we formalize within EASYCRYPT.

**Universal composition:** The universal composition operation considers three protocols: protocol \( \rho \) that includes calls to a “subroutine protocol” \( \phi \), and another protocol \( \pi \). The composed protocol, denoted \( C_{\phi \rightarrow \pi} \rho \), is the protocol where subroutine calls to \( \phi \) are replaced with subroutine calls to \( \pi \). The universal composition theorem states that, if \( \pi \) UC-emulates \( \phi \), then \( C_{\phi \rightarrow \pi} \rho \) UC-emulates \( \rho \). That is, for any protocol \( \rho \), making subroutine calls to protocol \( \pi \) (instead of the potentially idealized \( \phi \)) does not change the overall behavior. This is indeed a strong guarantee with far-reaching consequences.

**IV. Our Modeling of UC within EASYCRYPT**

A. Our Variant of UC

Our UC model makes four changes from prior works for ease of instantiation within EASYCRYPT: moving from interactive Turing machines to EASYCRYPT modules, restricting to statically created functionalities, formalizing the UC message routing system, and designing an interface module to firewall the environment, a functionality, and the adversary from each other.

First, because EASYCRYPT’s programming language is based around a module system, it is natural to represent the environment, protocol instances, ideal functionalities, and adversaries as EASYCRYPT modules, which have local, private state. Although the usage is non-standard, we refer to (real) protocol instances as “real functionalities”, so that both real and ideal functionalities are functionalities. All of the parties of a real functionality live within the same EASYCRYPT module, and functionalities can have sub-functionalities. Because EASYCRYPT has parameterized modules, functionalities can be parameterized by other functionalities, and we can realize UC’s composition operator as module application.

Second, modules in EASYCRYPT are statically deployed, before proofs are developed (or, in the semantics, code is run). Consequently, we work with a restricted version of UC in which the environment and functionalities cannot dynamically create new functionality instances. We can, however, statically create (using EASYCRYPT’s cloning mechanism) as many instances of each functionality as are needed.

Third, we designed a formal addressing system for message routing between the environment, functionalities and the adversary. In this system: functionalities have *addresses*, which are hierarchical (like postal addresses); and the addresses of sub-functionalities are sub-addresses of their parent functionalities. We give messages destination and source addresses, and the environment, functionalities and the adversary must route messages to their destinations. We have two kinds of messages:
• direct messages, which are used when supplying inputs to functionalities, and when returning results from functionalities; and
• adversarial messages, which are used for communication between functionalities and the adversary, and between the adversary and the environment.

We employ a hierarchical addressing system in order to simplify message routing. E.g., when a functionality receives a message from the environment (or a parent functionality) that’s addressed to one of its sub-functionalities, it routes the message to that sub-functionality. Although this addressing system is sufficient for this paper, we may explore alternatives in future work. On top of our addressing system, we have built a simple naming scheme; see the discussion of ports in Subsection IV-B.

Fourth, the environment doesn’t directly communicate with a functionality and adversary; instead it communicates with a special routing device we call an interface, as illustrated in Figure 1. An interface contains a functionality and an adversary. Direct messages from the environment that come to the interface must be destined for its functionality part; adversarial messages must be destined for its adversary part. The interface allows its functionality to send direct message to the environment, and adversarial messages to the adversary. It allows its adversary to send adversarial messages to both its functionality and the environment.

A simulator is a parameterized adversary: it may be applied to (wrapped around) an adversary, with the result being an adversary. Simulators pass messages from the environment on to the adversary (its parameter). They catch messages coming out of the adversary that are destined for a real functionality, responding to them in an attempt to fool the adversary into thinking it’s interacting with the real functionality. But they don’t restrict the adversary’s communication with the environment. This is illustrated in Figure 2.

Interfaces must be configured—via what we call input guards—to restrict which adversarial messages can flow from the environment to the adversary. Their role is (1) to stop the environment from being able to send arbitrary messages to simulators—messages that must only come from ideal functionalities, while (2) allowing messages through that are needed to support modular proof.

Functionalities can also employ input guards, controlling which messages they are willing to accept. Normally, a functionality will handle all allowed direct messages at the top-level, not allowing the environment to send direct messages to the functionality’s sub-functionalities. But it will allow adversarial messages to flow back and forth between the adversary and sub-functionalities.

The parties of a real functionality only communicate via sub-functionalities. E.g., they may employ forwarding sub-functionalities, allowing their communications to be observed and controlled by the adversary. Or they might employ key-exchange sub-functionalities, in order to agree on keys with each other.

Even though EASYCRYPT’s module language has a stack-based procedure call semantics, we can easily program real and ideal functionalities, simulators, adversaries, interfaces and environments, using message routing. In this way, we naturally realize UC’s coroutine communication style within EASYCRYPT’s procedural language. In Figures 1 and 2, when messages travel down, this is realized via procedure calls; when messages travel up, it’s via procedure returns.

B. Formalization in EASYCRYPT

Now we consider the formalization of our UC variant in EASYCRYPT. Addresses are simply lists of integers:

\[
\text{type } \text{addr} = \text{int list}.
\]

If \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are addresses, we define \( \alpha \leq \beta \) iff \( \alpha \) is a prefix of \( \beta \), and we read \( \beta \geq \alpha \) as \( \beta \) is a sub-address of \( \alpha \). The destinations and sources of messages are actually ports, which consist of pairs of addresses and port indices:

\[
\text{type } \text{port} = \text{addr} \times \text{int}.
\]

A message with destination port \((\alpha, i)\) is to be delivered to the functionality with address \(\alpha\), and the functionality is free to interpret the port index \(i\) however it wishes. Typically, each party of a real functionality has one or more port indices associated with it.

The values included in messages are elements of a recursive universal datatype
Some is what the functionality (or one of its sub-functionalities) maintains its state, and initializes all of its sub-functionalities. Eventually, it will return either to indicate it has failed, or whatever other global variables the functionality uses to invoke procedures, which hold its private, persistent state. And messages themselves are four-tuples:

\[
\text{type msg} =
\begin{cases}
    \text{mode} \times \text{univ} & \\
    \text{port} \times \text{univ} & \\
    \text{univ} & \\
\end{cases}
\]

Source ports are informational; depending upon where the message has come from, they can't necessarily be trusted. The root address [] (the empty list) is reserved for the environment.

For what follows, we need the notion of an option type. Given a type \( t \), the type \( t \text{ option} \) consists of \( \text{None} \) plus all values of the form \( \text{Some} \, x \), where \( x \) is an element of \( t \). We have a polymorphic operator \( \text{oget} \) : \( 'a \text{ option} \to 'a \) so that \( \text{oget} \, (\text{Some} \, x) = x \), and \( \text{oget} \, \text{None} \) is some unknown but fixed value.

The following module type will be used for ideal functionalities, real functionalities, and adversaries:

\[
\text{module type \text{FUNC} = }
\begin{cases}
\text{proc init(self adv : addr) : unit} \\
\text{proc invoke(m : msg) : msg option} \\
\end{cases}
\]

A module with this module type implements at least the procedures \text{init} and \text{invoke} with the indicated types. It will have global variables (local to the module, but global to its procedures), which hold its private, persistent state. \text{unit} is a placeholder type, with a single element, so \text{init} doesn’t return anything of interest. It is called—at \text{initialization time}—with its own address (\text{self}) and the address of the adversary (\text{adv}). It will store those addresses in global variables, initialize whatever other global variables the functionality uses to maintain its state, and initialize all of its sub-functionalities. The procedure \text{invoke}, on the other hand, is called at \text{runtime} with a message \( m \) addressed to the functionality or one of its sub-functionalities. Eventually, it will return either \text{None} to indicate it has failed, or \text{Some} \( m' \), where the message \( m' \) is what the functionality (or one of its sub-functionalities) wants to send to some other functionality, the adversary, or the environment (depending upon its destination address). A real functionality will have an internal distribution loop that routes messages within the functionality, letting the functionality’s parties and sub-functionalities communicate with each other.

An adversary is just a module with module type \text{FUNC}. (I.e., from the point of view of the module system, adversaries and functionalities are interchangeable.) When an adversary’s \text{init} procedure is called, its second parameter (the adversary’s address) is normally set to the root address of the environment, [ ]. A simulator is an adversary that’s parameterized by an adversary. I.e., it’s a parameterized module whose parameter has module type \text{FUNC}; once we apply a simulator to an adversary, the result also has module type \text{FUNC}. When a simulator’s \text{init} procedure is called with its address and the root address of the environment, it initializes the adversary it’s been applied to, using the same addresses. There is no address hierarchy within adversaries/simulators, but there is a port index hierarchy. A simulator handles messages destined for its port index, passing other messages on to the adversary—or to a nested simulator. Multiple port indices are associated with nested simulators—one for each level of simulation.

An interface, which we should think of as containing within itself a functionality and an adversary (or simulator wrapped around an adversary, . . .), is a module with the following module type:

\[
\text{module type \text{INTER} = }
\begin{cases}
\text{proc init(func adv : addr, in guard : int fset) : unit} \\
\text{proc invoke(m : msg) : msg option} \\
\end{cases}
\]

As with functionalities, \text{init} is called at initialization time, telling the interface the addresses of its functionality and adversary, and allowing it to initialize its global variables and initialize its functionality and adversary. But what of the third argument to \text{init}, which consists of a finite set of port indices? Well, it’s an \text{input guard} detailing the port indices of the adversary that the environment can communicate with. The standard interface only allows messages addressed to those indices of the adversary’s address to go through, plus the special port index 0, which is always accessible to the environment. Indeed, communications between the environment and adversary often go between ports ([], 0) and \( (\text{adv}, 0) \), where \( \text{adv} \) is the adversary’s address.

The procedure \text{invoke} is called at runtime with a message destined for either the functionality or the adversary, and it eventually returns either \text{None} or \text{Some} of a message destined for the environment. The standard interface enforces these message communication rules:

- the environment can send direct messages to the functionality, and adversarial messages to the adversary at port index 0 plus the input guard port indices;
• the functionality can send direct messages to the environment, as well as adversarial messages to any port index of the adversary other than 0;
• the adversary can send adversarial messages to both the functionality and the environment.

When communication rules are violated; the standard interface returns None, indicating failure.

An interface’s input guard is used to stop the environment from being able to send messages to the port index of a simulator—messages which should only come from an ideal functionality (or, in the case of nested simulators, from an outer simulator). Otherwise, the environment would be able to trivially distinguish the real and ideal games. On the other hand, to support modular proof, some messages from the environment destined to port indices other than 0 must be allowed to flow to the adversary.

The parameterized module `MI` (for `make interface`) builds a standard interface from a functionality and adversary

```
module MI (Func : FUNC, Adv : FUNC) : INTER = { ... }.
```

An environment implements the following module type,

```
module type ENV (Inter : INTER) = {
    proc main(func adv : addr, in_guard : int fset) : bool { Inter.invoke }
}.
```

which means it is parameterized by an interface, and it implements a main function with the indicated type that is only allowed to call the `invoke` procedure of the interface (i.e., the environment may not initialize the interface). `main` should be called with the same arguments that are passed to the interface’s `init` function, and `main` returns the environment’s boolean judgment.

Finally, the `Exper` module (for “experiment”) is defined as follows:

```
module Exper (Inter : INTER, Env : ENV) = {
    module E = Env(Inter) (* connect Env and Inter *)
    proc main(func adv : addr, in_guard : int fset) : bool = {
        var b : bool; Inter.init(func, adv, in_guard);
        b @< E.main(func, adv, in_guard); return b;
    }
}.
```

(EASYCRYPT uses `<@` for the assignment to a variable of the result of a procedure call.) It is parameterized by an interface and an environment. Its `main` function should be called with the addresses of the interface’s functionality and adversary (which should be incomparable) as well as the interface’s input guard. It then initializes the interface (which will initialize the functionality and adversary), before calling the main function of the environment (which has been given access to the interface). The environment may call the `invoke` procedure of the interface as many times as it likes, before eventually returning a boolean judgment, which is returned as the result of the experiment.

V. Case Study: Secure Message Communication

To see how we could carry out modular proofs of security using our UC in EASYCRYPT architecture, we formulated what we hoped was the simplest interesting case study that would let us prove a UC security theorem and then apply it in a larger system. We wanted the proof of the security theorem to employ a cryptographic reduction. We settled on the application being secure message communication (SMC) using a one-time pad that was agreed using Diffie-Hellman key-exchange.

A. SMC Protocol

The SMC protocol uses the following types and operations:

```
type key. (* group of keys *)
op (\hat{ }) : key \rightarrow key. (* binary operation on keys *)
op kid : key. (* identity key *)
op kinv : key \rightarrow key. (* key inverse *)
type exp. (* commutative semigroup of exponents *)
op (\ast) : exp \rightarrow exp \rightarrow exp. (* multiplication of exponents *)
op dexp : exp distr. (* full, uniform, lossless distribution *)
op g : key. (* generator key *)
op (\hat{ }) : key \rightarrow exp \rightarrow key. (* key exponentiation *)
type text. (* plain texts *)
op inj : text \rightarrow key. (* injection *)
op proj : key \rightarrow text option. (* partial projection *)
```

First of all we have a type `key`, together with a binary operation `\hat{}`, a constant `kid` (key identity), and an unary operation `kinv` (key inverse), satisfying the group axioms. Then we have a type `exp` (exponent), together with a commutative and associative binary operation `\ast`. Next, we have a probability distribution `dexp` on exponents in which every exponent has a non-zero and equal weight in the distribution—i.e., equal chance of being chosen in a random assignment from `dexp`—and where the sum of those weights is 1. Next, we have a generator key `g` plus a key exponentiation operation `\hat{}` together with axioms saying that every key is determined in a unique way via raising `g` to an exponent, and that for all exponents `q_1` and `q_2`, `(g^{\hat{q_1}})^\ast q_2 = g^{q_1 \ast q_2}`. It follows there is an operation `log : key \rightarrow exp` (the discrete logarithm) such that `log` and the result of raising `g` to an exponent are mutual inverses. EASYCRYPT has no cost model, i.e., no notion of how expensive it might be to compute the discrete log. We can show that `(k^\ast q_1)^\ast q_2 = k^\ast (q_1 \ast q_2)` for all keys `k` (not just for `g`). Finally, we have a type `text` of plain texts, together with an injection `inj` from `text` into `key`, and a partial projection back the other way—partial because some keys (group elements) will be mapped to `None`, i.e., won’t correspond to plain texts. This means that the cardinality of `text` will be strictly less than that of `key`. In practice, we can instantiate the injection/partial projection pair with `text` as a set of fixed-length bitstrings and `key` as either a multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime or one of a number of elliptic curve groups [42].
\(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) are the addresses of the functionality and adversary, respectively. 1–3 are port indices. The thicker circles around 1 and 2 indicate that direct messages are received from, and/or sent to, the environment on these port indices.

Figure 3. SMC Ideal Functionality

To be able to send messages involving exponents, keys and plain texts, we instantiate (via theory cloning) the type base of our universe type univ with this datatype:

\[
\text{type } \text{base} = [\text{BaseExp of exp} | \text{BaseKey of key} | \text{BaseText of text}].
\]

The secure message communication (SMC) protocol has two parties. Party 1 has a plain text \(t\) it wants to communicate with Party 2. We are assuming an adversary who can observe and delay communication, but cannot corrupt communication. The two parties first agree on a key \(k\) using Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (see below). Party 1 then sends \(e = \text{inj} \, t \, k\) to Party 2 (recall that \(\text{inj}\) is the group operation), which computes \(\text{ogt}(\text{proj}(e^{-1} \, \text{inv} \, k))\) to recover \(t\). Here, \(\text{proj}\) will produce a non-None optional value, and \(\text{ogt}\) will just strip off the Some.

In Diffie-Hellman key-exchange, Party 1 generates a random exponent \(q_1\), and sends \(g^* q_1\) to Party 2. Party 2 then generates a random exponent \(q_2\), and obtains the shared key by computing \((g^* q_1)^* q_2 = g^* (q_1 * q_2)\). It then sends \(g^* q_2\) to Party 1, which obtains the shared key by computing \((g^* q_2)^* q_1 = g^* (q_2 * q_1) = g^* (q_1 * q_2)\).

B. Functionalities

We now describe the UC functionalities for SMC, starting with the ideal functionality for SMC, and then working up to the SMC real functionality. The SMC ideal functionality, SMCideal, can be visualized as in Figure 3. In the figure, \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) are the addresses of the functionality and the adversary, respectively (they were passed to the functionality’s init procedure). SMCideal has no sub-functionalities, and it employs three port indices, numbered 1, 2 and 3. Port index 1 corresponds to Party 1, port index 2 corresponds to Party 2, and port index 3 is used for communication with the ideal functionality’s simulator. The input guard for the functionality allows direct messages to port index 1 (port \((\alpha, 1)\)), and adversarial messages to port index 3; all other messages are rejected (meaning \text{None} is returned).

SMCideal has three states:

1. In State 1, it is waiting for a direct message to port index 1 from a port \(pt_1\), asking to communicate a plain text \(t\) to a port \(pt_2\), where \(pt_1\) and \(pt_2\) may not be \(\geq\) either \(\alpha\) or \(\beta\).\(^2\) It then sends an adversarial message containing \((pt_1, pt_2)\) (but not \(t\)) from port index 3 to port \((\beta, 3)\), and switches to State 2. The SMC simulator expects to receive messages from the ideal functionality on port index 3.\(^3\)

2. In State 2, it is waiting for an adversarial message from port \((\beta, 3)\) to port index 3. It responds by sending a direct message containing \((pt_1, t)\) to \(pt_2\) from port index 2, and switching to State 3.

3. In State 3, it rejects all messages.

Next we consider an ideal forwarding functionality, Forw, as illustrated in Figure 4. In the literature, this is a version of \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{auth}}\) in which the adversary can observe and delay, but not corrupt, message forwarding. Its input guard allows both direct and adversarial messages on its single port index, 1. Forw has three states:

1. In State 1, it is waiting for a direct message to port index 1 from a port \(pt_1\), asking to communicate a universe value \(u\) to a port \(pt_2\), where \(pt_1\) and \(pt_2\) may not be \(\geq\) either \(\alpha\) or \(\beta\). It then sends an adversarial message containing \((pt_1, pt_2, u)\) from port index 1 to port \((\beta, 1)\), and switches to State 2. Port index 1 is the port index of the adversary that handles forwarding requests.

2. In State 2, it is waiting for an adversarial message from port \((\beta, 1)\) to port index 1 approving the forwarding request. It responds by sending a direct message containing \((pt_1, u)\) to \(pt_2\) from port index 1, and switching to State 3.

3. In State 3, it rejects all messages.

The ideal key-exchange functionality, KEideal, is illustrated in Figure 5. Its input guard allows direct messages to port indices 1 and 2, and adversarial messages to port index 3. It has five states:

1. In State 1, it is waiting for a direct message to port

\(^2\)The values of all messages must be encoded as elements of our universal type, but we omit the details. When unexpected messages are received, failure results (\text{None} is returned).

\(^3\)The index 3 isn’t hard coded in the EASYCRYPT code, but for simplicity we’ll use actual numbers in the paper.
index 1 from a port pt₁, asking to agree on a key with a port pt₂, where pt₁ and pt₂ may not be ≥ either α or β. It then sends an adversarial message containing (pt₁, pt₂) from port index 3 to port (β, 2), and switches to State 2. Port index 2 will be the port index of the key-exchange simulator that expects communications from the ideal functionality.

(2) In State 2, it is waiting for an adversarial message from port (β, 2) to port index 3. It responds by generating an exponent q, sending a direct message containing (pt₁, g^q) to port pt₂ from port index 2, and switching to State 3. (g^q is the key exchanged in the ideal functionality.)

(3) In State 3, it is waiting for a direct message to port index 2 from port pt₂, initiating the second phase of key-exchange. It then sends an adversarial message containing no data from port index 3 to port (β, 2), and switches to State 4.

(4) In State 4, it is waiting for an adversarial message from port (β, 2) to port index 3. It responds by sending a direct message containing g^q to port pt₁ from port index 1, and switching to State 3.

(5) In State 5, it rejects all messages.

The real key-exchange functionality, KEReal, is illustrated in Figure 6. It has two forwarding sub-functionalities, with the indicated sub-addresses (α1 means to add 1 at the end of the list α). Its input guard allows direct messages to port indices 1 and 2, and adversarial messages to α1 and α2. Port indices 1 and 3 correspond to Party 1 of the functionality, whereas port indices 2 and 4 correspond to Party 2. The functionality has an internal distribution loop that routes messages from the outside to the parties and sub-functionalities (if allowed by the input guard), and allows the two parties and the sub-functionalities to communicate. Both parties have three states.

Party 1 behaves as follows:

(1) In State 1, Party 1 is waiting for a direct message to port index 1 from a port pt₁, asking to agree on a key with a port pt₂, where pt₁ and pt₂ may not be ≥ either α or β. It then generates a random exponent q₁, sends a message from port index 3 (its internal port index) to Forw₁ at port (α1, 1), asking it to forward (pt₁, pt₂, g^q₁) to port index 4 (Party 2’s internal port index), and switches to State 2.

(2) In State 2, Party 1 is waiting for a direct message to port index 3 from (α2, 1) (Forw₂) containing the data ((α, 4), k₂). (k₂ will be g^q₂, where q₂ is Party 2’s private exponent.) It responds by sending a direct message containing the key k₂^q₁ (g^q₂) · q₁ = g^q (q₁ + q₂)) to port pt₁ from port index 1, and switching to State 3.

(3) In State 3, it rejects all messages.

Party 2 behaves as follows:

(1) In State 1, Party 2 is waiting for a direct message to port index 4 from port (α1, 1) (Forw₁), containing the data ((α, 3), (pt₁, pt₂, k₁)). (k₁ will be g^q₁, where q₁ is Party 1’s private exponent.) It then generates a random exponent q₂, sends a direct message containing (pt₁, k₁^q₂) to port pt₂ from port index 2, and switches to State 2. (k₁^q₂ is the key (g^q₁ · q₂ = g^q (q₁ + q₂)).

(2) In State 2, Party 2 is waiting for a direct message from port index 2 to port pt₂, initiating the second phase of key-exchange. It responds by sending a message from port index 4 to Forw₂ at port (α2, 1), asking it to forward g^q₂ to port index 3, and switches to State 3.

(3) In State 3, it rejects all messages.

Here is the sequence of message transmissions of a successful execution of KEReal:

pt₁ \xrightarrow{pt₂} (α, 1)/(α, 3) \xrightarrow{((α, 4), (pt₁, pt₂, g^q₁))} (α₁, 1) \ldots
\xrightarrow{((α, 3), (pt₁, pt₂, g^q₁))} (α, 4)/(α, 2)
\xrightarrow{(pt₁, g^q₁+q₂)} pt₂ \rightarrow (α, 2)/(α, 4)
\xrightarrow{(α, 3), g^q₂} (α₂, 1) \ldots (α₂, 1)
\xrightarrow{(α, 4), g^q₂} pt₁ \rightarrow (α, 3)/(α, 1) \xrightarrow{g^q_1+q_2} pt₁,

where single arrows are direct messages, and double arrows are adversarial messages, and where the elided steps involve the forwarders’ interactions with the adversary.

Finally, the SMC key-exchange functionality, SMCREal, is illustrated in Figure 7. It has two sub-functionalities, with the indicated sub-addresses: a forwarder and a key-exchange functionality KE, which is a parameter to SMCREal. Technically, SMCREal is a parameterized functionality, not a functionality: we have to apply it to KEReal or KEideal or some other functionality, in order to obtain a functionality. Its input guard allows direct messages to port index 1, and adversarial messages to α1 and α2 (and their sub-addresses). Port indices 1 and 3 correspond to Party 1 of
the functionality, whereas port indices 2 and 4 correspond to Party 2. As with KEReal, the functionality has an internal distribution loop. Both parties have three states.

Party 1 behaves as follows:

1. In State 1, Party 1 is waiting for a direct message to port index 1 from a port pt₁, asking to securely communicate a plain text t to a port pt₂, where pt₁ and pt₂ may not be \( \geq \) either \( \alpha \) or \( \beta \). It responds by sending a direct message to Party 1 of the key-exchange sub-functionality at port \((\alpha, 2, 1)\) from port index 3 asking to agree on a key with port index 4, and then switching to State 2.

2. In State 2, Party 1 is waiting for a direct message to port index 3 from \((\alpha, 2, 1)\) (Party 1 of the key-exchange sub-functionality) containing the data \( k \) (the agreed upon key). It responds by sending a message from port index 3 to Forw at port \((\alpha, 1, 1)\), asking it to forward \((pt₁, pt₂, inj(t−k))\) to port index 4, and switches to State 3.

3. In State 3, it rejects all messages.

Party 2 behaves as follows:

1. In State 1, Party 2 is waiting for a direct message to port index 4 from port \((\alpha, 2, 2)\) (Party 2 of the key-exchange sub-functionality), containing the data \((\alpha, 3, k)\) (\( k \) is the agreed upon key). It responds by sending a direct message from port index 4 back to \((\alpha, 2, 2)\), initiating the second phase of key-exchange.

2. In State 2, Party 2 is waiting for a direct message to port index 4 from port \((\alpha, 1, 1)\) (Forw) containing \((\alpha, 3, pt₁, pt₂, e)\). It responds by sending to pt₂ a direct message from port index 2 containing \((pt₁, oget(pro((e−k)×k)))\) (whose plain text is equal to \( t \)), and switching to State 3.

3. In State 3, it rejects all messages.

Here is the sequence of message transmissions of a successful execution of SMCReal:

\[
\begin{align*}
pt₁ & \xrightarrow{(pt₁, t)} (\alpha, 1)/(\alpha, 3) \xrightarrow{(\alpha, 4)} (\alpha, 2, 1)/(\alpha, 2, 2) \\
& \xrightarrow{(\alpha, 3, k)} (\alpha, 4) \rightarrow (\alpha, 2, 2)/(\alpha, 2, 1) k \rightarrow (\alpha, 3) \\
& \xrightarrow{((\alpha, 4), (pt₁, pt₂, inj(t−k)))} (\alpha, 1, 1)/(\alpha, 1, 1) \\
& \xrightarrow{((\alpha, 3), (pt₁, pt₂, inj(t−k)))} (\alpha, 4)/(\alpha, 2)/(pt₁, t) \xrightarrow{pt₂},
\end{align*}
\]

where the elided steps involve (1) the key-exchange functionality’s (either real or ideal) interaction with the adversary/simulator, and (2) the forwarder’s interaction with the adversary.

C. Road-map for Proof of SMC Security

In the rest of this section, we describe our tool-assisted formal proofs of the following statements: (1) SMCReal(KEReal) UC-realizes SMCIdeal; (2) KEReal UC-realizes KEldeal; (3) SMCReal(KEldeal) UC-realizes SMCIdeal; and (4) SMCReal(KEReal) UC-emulates SMCReal(KEldeal). (1) is our overall goal. In Subsection V-D, we describe the proof of (2). At the beginning of Subsection V-E, we describe the proof of (3). Then we describe how (2) is lifted to a proof of (4), instantiating the UC composition theorem. Finally, we show how (4) and (3) combine to give us (1), instantiating transitivity of UC emulation.

D. Proof of Security of Key-Exchange

In our proof of the security of key-exchange, we need to define a key-exchange simulator, KE\text{Sim}, and give an upper bound (hopefully a small one!) for the absolute value of the difference between the probabilities that the real and ideal experiments return true:

\[
\begin{align*}
Pr[&\text{Exper(MI(KEReal, Adv), Env).}]

\text{main(func', adv', in\_guard) @ &m : res} - \\
Pr[&\text{Exper(MI(KEIdeal, KE\text{Sim}(Adv)), Env).}]

\text{main(func', adv', in\_guard) @ &m : res}]
\]

In the above, res stands for “result”—the boolean result of the experiment. Env and Adv will be restricted to adversaries that don’t read or write the variables of each other or MI. KEReal, KE\text{Ideal}, KE\text{Sim} and another module to be introduced shortly. The addresses of the functionality and adversary, func' and adv', will be assumed to be incomparable. The restriction on the input guard \text{in\_guard} will be described in the next paragraph. &m is the initial memory. KEReal, KE\text{Ideal} and KE\text{Sim} initialize their own global variables, and so their operation is independent from &m. But Env and Adv may fail to initialize their own global variables, and so their operation may be dependent upon &m.

KE\text{Sim} is parameterized by an adversary; we have to apply it to an adversary Adv in order to get an adversary KE\text{Sim}(Adv). Its job is to let the environment and adversary communicate normally, and to fool them into thinking they are interacting with KEReal and not KEldeal. The input guard in\_guard must not include port index 2, because the ideal functionality communicates with the simulator on that port index. When the simulator gets its first message from the ideal functionality, it learns the address of the ideal (and also real) functionality, and so learns which messages from the adversary it should intercept. It will play the role of the two forwarding sub-functionalities of KEReal, and will generate the needed random exponents, \( q₁ \) and \( q₂ \), itself. The problem to overcome in the proof is that the key \( g^q \) sent by KEldeal to the environment will necessarily have no connection to the key agreed by the parties of KEReal.

This is where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption comes in:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{module type DDH\_ADV} &= \{ \text{proc \text{main}(k₁ k₂ k₃ : key) : bool } \} \\
\text{module DDH₁ (Adv : DDH\_ADV) = \{ } \\
&\text{ proc main() : bool = } \{ \text{var b : bool; var q₁, q₂ : exp; q₁ <$ dexp; q₂ <$ dexp; } \\
&b @ \text{Adv.main(q₁, q₂; exp)}; q₁ <$ dexp; q₂ <$ dexp; \\
&\} \} \\
\text{module DDH₂ (Adv : DDH\_ADV) = \{ } \\
&\text{ proc main() : bool = } \{ \text{var b : bool; var q₁, q₂, q₃ : exp; } \\
\}
\]
(EASYCRYPT uses $<$ for random assignments from distributions.) A DDH adversary is given three keys, and must return a boolean judgment. The two DDH games are parameterized by a DDH adversary, and their main procedures return its boolean judgment. The first two keys passed to the adversary’s main procedure in the two games are the same: $g^q_1$ and $g^q_2$, where $q_1$ and $q_2$ are randomly chosen exponents. But the third arguments are different: $g^{q_1+q_2}$ versus $g^q_3$, with a random $q_3$.

The idea for applying the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is to start from the real experiment, and move in a sequence of games to a game $G_1$ in which $q_1$ and $q_2$ are chosen at the game’s beginning, and there are precisely three places where they are used, as $g^q_1, g^q_2$ and $g^{q_1+q_2}$. We can then build a DDH adversary $DDH_{Adv}$ as a function of $Env$ and $Adv$, in such a way that $G_1$ can be shown to be equivalent to $DDH1(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv))$. Then we can switch to $DDH2(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv))$, adding

```
1 |Pr[DDH1(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv)).main() @ &m : res] − Pr[DDH2(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv)).main() @ &m : res]|
```

The probability the constructed DDH adversary wins the DDH game to the cumulative upper bound of our sequence of games, and then move from $DDH2(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv))$ to a $G_2$ that’s just like $G_1$ but where $g^{q_1+q_2}$ has been replaced by $g^q_3$, where $q_3$ is also randomly chosen at the game’s beginning and only used once. Because the random exponents used by $KEReal$, $KEideal$ and $KESim$ are not chosen at the games’ beginnings, we must use EASYCRYPT’s eager/lazy sampling facilities to accomplish the above. But thankfully, there is an existing library and methodology for doing this.

Consequently, our key-exchange security theorem ($KEReal$ UC-realizes $KEideal$) will be the following:

**lemma ke_security**

\[
\text{ke_security} \quad \text{(Adv} \ll \text{FUNC}(\text{MI, KEReal, KEideal, KESim, DDH_{Adv})) \\
\text{(Env} \ll \text{ENV}(\text{Adv, MI, KEReal, KEideal, KESim, DDH_{Adv})) \\
(\text{func'} \ll \text{func'} \text{\textbackslash addr, in\_guard} \ll \text{int fset}) \& \& : \text{expre_pre func' adv' } \Rightarrow \{ 2 \\text{\textbackslash in\_guard}} \Rightarrow \\
DDH_{Adv}.func'(m) = \text{func} \Rightarrow DDH_{Adv}.adv'(m) = \text{adv} \Rightarrow \\
DDH_{Adv}.in\_guard(m) = \text{in\_guard} \Rightarrow \\
\text{Pr[Exp(MI)(KEReal, Adv), Env].} \\
\text{main(func', adv', in\_guard) @ &m : res] − Pr[Exp(MI)(KEReal, Adv), Env].} \\
\text{main(func', adv', in\_guard) @ &m : res] \leq \\
\text{Pr[DDH1(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv)).main()] @ &m : res] − Pr[DDH2(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv)).main()] @ &m : res].
\]

The lists of modules inside the assumptions

\[
\text{(Adv} \ll \text{FUNC}(\text{MI, KEReal, KEideal, KESim, DDH_{Adv})) \\
\text{(Env} \ll \text{ENV}(\text{Adv, MI, KEReal, KEideal, KESim, DDH_{Adv}))
\]

detail the restrictions on what modules Adv and Env may read or write the global variables of. Note that $DDH_{Adv}$ has been added to the lists of module restrictions. The assumption `expre_pre func' adv'` says that `func'` and `adv` are incomparable. Finally, the assumption

\[
\text{DDH}_{Adv}.func'(m) = \text{func} \Rightarrow DDH_{Adv}.adv'(m) = \text{adv} \\
\text{DDH}_{Adv}.in\_guard(m) = \text{in\_guard}
\]

says the initial values of the global variables `func`, `adv` and `in\_guard` of $DDH_{Adv}$ are `func`, `adv'` and `in\_guard`. Because EASYCRYPT modules may not be parameterized by ordinary values (as opposed to modules), there is currently no other way to give our constructed DDH adversary access to these values.

When assessing whether the upper bound

\[
\text{Pr[DDH1(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv)).main()] @ &m : res] − Pr[DDH2(DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv)).main()] @ &m : res].
\]

is small enough, one must consult the actual code for $DDH_{Adv}$ and make additional assumptions about $Env$ and $Adv$. For instance, one might assume that $Env$ and $Adv$ run in probabilistic polynomial time, and then give a paper-and-pencil proof that so does $DDH_{Adv}(Env, Adv)$. EASYCRYPT doesn’t help us in this analysis.

Here is what our overall sequence of games for the key-exchange security proof looks like: Because $KEReal$ has sub-functionalities, it is convenient to begin our sequence of games by formulating a version of the real functionality, $KERealSimp$, that has no sub-functionalities. The difficulty of proving such a step is that the source and target experiments are structurally dissimilar. This involves working with a relational invariant tracking how the source and target experiments evolve. At the top-level of the proof, we can reduce the equivalence of the experiments to an equivalence between their interfaces—and so no longer have to consider the environment at all. Then we can do the same thing with the interfaces, no longer having to consider the adversary.

When the source and target functionalities are in a relational state, we need to show that in all the ways they can evolve, we will return to both sides being in a relational state, and that eventually we’ll return from the functionality. The way that we do such a proof is via symbolic evaluation—essentially running the code via proof tactics. We can push assignments into the precondition, and we can inline calls of concrete procedures. If the next statement to run is a conditional or while loop where we know enough to prove that its boolean expression is true or false, we can reduce the conditional to its then or else part, or reduce the while loop to either nothing (the false case) or the body of the while loop followed by the while loop itself. When we don’t know enough to say whether a boolean expression is true or false, we have to resort to case analysis. There is more discussion of the challenges of symbolic evaluation in Section VI.

This gets us to the point where we can deploy the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, starting from an experiment involving KERealSimp. The proof of the final step of the sequence of games involves moving from an experiment involving a version of KERealSimp—KEHybrid—in which the agreed upon key is generated from a random exponent (like in KEideal) to the experiment involving KEideal and KESim(Adv):

\[
\text{Pr[Exper(MI(KEHybrid, Adv), Env).} \text{main(func', adv', in_guard') @ &m : res} = \\
\text{Pr[Exper(MI(KEideal, KESim(Adv), Env).} \text{main(func', adv', in_guard') @ &m : res].}
\]

As usual, this step involves working with a relational invariant and symbolic evaluation guided by case analysis, but there is a twist. Because we are working with adversaries that may or may not return to the environment after being invoked, we have a phenomenon in which—a call to the adversary—the same relational state may hold in two distinct situations:

- when the call to the adversary was after the relational state was first established by execution of the real functionality or ideal functionality/simulator;
- when the call to the adversary was initiated by a call to the interface (by the environment) when the relational state already held.

We must unify these two cases, as otherwise the proof effort would double at each relational proof step, and so would increase exponentially over the entire sequence of relational state changes. We accomplish this by proving a single lemma that’s applicable to both of these situations. The lemma for the last relational state is first proved, the lemma for the penultimate relational state uses the lemma for the final one, and so on. We would have to do all of this using induction, if we didn’t have a finite sequence of relational states. See Section VI for more discussion.

E. Proof of Security of SMC

The design of the SMC simulator—SMCSim—and the proof of the following lemma, which states that SMCSim(KEideal) UC-realizes SMCideal,

\[
\text{lemma smc_security2} \\
(\text{Adv} <: \text{FUNC}(\text{MI}, \text{SMCReal}, \text{SMCideal}, \text{SMCSim}, \text{KEideal})) \\
(\text{Env} <: \text{ENV}(\text{Adv}, \text{MI}, \text{SMCReal}, \text{SMCideal}, \text{SMCSim}, \text{KEideal})) \\
(\text{func' adv' : addr, in_guard' : int fset}) \& m : res} = \\
\text{Pr[Exper(MI(KERealSimp(KEideal), Adv), Env).} \text{main(func', adv', in_guard') @ &m : res} = \\
\text{Pr[Exper(MI(KEideal, KESim(Adv), Env).} \text{main(func', adv', in_guard') @ &m : res].}
\]

is similar to the final step of the key-exchange security proof. Messages to SMCSim from the ideal functionality come on port index 3, and thus we must assume that 3 is not an element of the input guard, in_guard'. In the proof’s sequence of games, we start out by moving to a version of SMCReal(KEideal)—SMCRealKEidealSimp—that has no sub-functionalities. The other and final step of the sequence of games—the one that involves SMCSim—is similar in structure to the last-step of the key-exchange security proof. To handle the use of one-time-pad encryption, we use EASYCRYPT’s tactic for handling random assignments with an isomorphism on the deep distribution involving the plain text chosen by the environment. This is a familiar EASYCRYPT technique.

What remains is to lift our proof that KEReal UC-realizes KEideal to a proof that SMCSim(KEReal) UC-emulates SMCSim(KEideal). This is an instance of the UC composition theorem. In pictorial terms, we need to relate two instantiations of the diagram in Figure 8, where the port index 2 of KESim is not an element of the input guard \( X \). In the first instantiation, KE is KEReal and Adv is Adv; and in the second one, KE is KEideal, and Adv is KESim(Adv). We accomplish this by proving a “bridging” lemma showing the equivalence between this diagram and the one in Figure 9. This second diagram involves a composed environment, which is parameterized by an environment and interface:

\[
\text{module CompEnv (Env : ENV, Inter : INTER) = \{ · · · \}.}
\]
Given an environment \( Env \), CompEnv(\( Env \)) is itself an environment—it’s waiting for the interface \( \text{Int} \).

In the diagram of Figure 9, the real environment is inside the composed environment. The experiment of the composed environment makes use of two “stubs”, one for the key-exchange functionality, and one for the adversary. In normal operation, the stubs pass messages through, calling the \( \text{invoke} \) procedure of the interface for \( \text{KE}/\text{Adv} \), or returning a message returned from that \( \text{invoke} \) procedure to their caller. We need that the “lower” input guard \( X \) is a subset of the “upper” input guard \( Y \), so that messages to the adversary from the real environment that are allowed by \( X \) can flow through \( \text{AdvStub} \) and make it to \( \text{Adv} \). Because SMCRal’s forwarder, \( \text{Forw} \), needs to be able to exchange adversarial messages with the adversary, we also need that \( Y \) includes port index 1, which is used for forwarding control. If SMCRal made use of other sub-functionality, the port indices by which those sub-functionality communicated with the adversary would also have to be included in \( Y \).

There is a subtlety regarding the definitions of KEStub and AdvStub. Suppose that SMCRal calls KEStub with a direct message destined for \( \text{KE} \). KEStub passes this message to the interface for \( \text{KE}/\text{Adv} \), which routes it to \( \text{KE} \). KE and Adv may then exchange adversarial messages, and it may happen that, at some point, \( \text{Adv} \) returns an adversarial message that’s not destined for \( \text{KE} \) (it might be destined for the real environment), and so is returned out of the interface for \( \text{KE}/\text{Adv} \) to KEStub. KEStub is programmed to work specially when an adversarial message has been returned to it. It stores the message in a mailbox it shares with AdvStub, and then returns an adversarial message with address \( \beta \) back to SMCRal, which returns it to its interface, which routes it to AdvStub. AdvStub is programmed to then recognize that the mailbox it shares with KEStub is full, and to return the contents of the mailbox to the interface, as if the message had been returned to it in the first place. Similarly, when a direct message is returned from \( \text{KE} \) to its interface, and then to AdvStub, AdvStub uses the shared mailbox to arrange for the message to be returned from KEStub to SMCRal.

Because the internal distribution loop of SMCRal is written to be resilient to badly behaved implementations of its parameter KE, we would ideally like to prove the equivalence between the two diagrams for an arbitrary functionality, KE. Unfortunately that’s impossible with the current version of EASYCRYPT. The problem is that Adv and KE could exchange messages forever, so that execution would never return back to the environment. In Section VI, we speculate on how EASYCRYPT might be improved so as to allow a single and simple proof of the bridging lemma. But in our case study, we had to fall back on a more cumbersome approach. We proved two bridging lemmas, one for \( \text{KE}/\text{Real} \) and one for \( \text{KE}/\text{Ideal} \), and in the \( \text{KE}/\text{Real} \) case, we did the core work using \( \text{KE}/\text{Real}/\text{Sim} \). In both cases, we defined a termination metric on the key-exchange functionality’s state, and we proved that its invoke procedure either decreases the metric by one, or preserves the metric and returns None. Then we proved the bridging lemmas by a rather complex mathematical induction whose property, \( P(n) \), is the conjunction of three probabilistic relational Hoare logic judgments, one for each of the three repeating code configurations of the two experiments. The proofs involved a great deal of guided symbolic evaluation. The real and ideal proofs are identical up to some textual substitutions, but there is no way at present of unifying them.

Our bridging lemmas are:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \text{lemma} \text{smc\_sec1\_ke\_real\_bridge}
\item \text{lemma} \text{smc\_sec1\_ke\_ideal\_bridge}
\end{enumerate}

From these lemmas, plus our security of key-exchange lemma (\text{ke\_security}), we can immediately get that SMCRal(\( \text{KE}/\text{Real} \)) UC-emulates SMCRal(\( \text{KE}/\text{Ideal} \)).
Then we can combine \texttt{sme\_security1} and the instantiation of \texttt{sme\_security2} to \texttt{KESim(Adv)} to get our overall security result that \texttt{SMCReal(KEReal)} UC-realizes \texttt{SMCIdeal}:

\begin{verbatim}
lemma sme\_security
(Adv <=< FUNC(MI, SMCReal, SMCMid, SMCSim, KEReal, KEReal, KEideal, KESim, DDH Adv, CompEnv))
(Env <=< ENV(Adv, MI, SMCReal, SMCMid, SMCSim, KEReal, KEideal, KESim, DDH Adv, CompEnv))
(func' adv' : addr, in\_guard' : int fset) & m : res
exper\_pre func' adv' == 1 (2 \` in\_guard' == 1 (3 \` in\_guard' ==
Comp\_Env\_in\_guard\_low\_m()} = in\_guard' =>
KeyEx.DDH\_Adv\_func\_m() = func' ++ [2] =>
KeyEx.DDH\_Adv\_adv\_m() = adv' =>
KeyEx.DDH\_Adv\_in\_guard\_m() = in\_guard' =>
\{Pr[Exper(MI(SMCMid, SMCSimComp(Adv))), Env)
main(func', adv', in\_guard') @ & m : res
- Pr[Exper(MI(SMCReal, SMCSimComp(Adv))), Env)
main(func', adv', in\_guard') @ & m : res] <=
\{m @ & m : res\} & m
\}
end
end
\end{verbatim}

where the composed simulator \texttt{SMCSimComp} is defined by

\begin{verbatim}
module SMCSimComp (Adv : FUNC) = SMCSim(KESim(Adv))
\end{verbatim}

This realizes an instance of the transitivity of UC-emulation. Because the universal quantification of \texttt{Adv} of \texttt{sme\_security2} includes SMCSim in its restriction, when we apply \texttt{sme\_security2} to \texttt{KESim(Adv)}, this necessitates a check that \texttt{KESim} and SMCSim don’t read or write each other’s global variables. The overall restriction on the input guard is that it not include either 2 or 3, as those are the port indices excluded by \texttt{sme\_security1} and \texttt{sme\_security2}, respectively.

\section{VI. Lessons Learned and Future Work}

Through our case study, we have validated our \texttt{EASYCRYPT} architecture and methodology for stating and verifying statements within the universally composable security framework. We were able to naturally define real functionalities (namely, protocols), ideal functionalities, and simulators. We: mechanized proofs of UC-realizability, one of which employed a computational reduction; applied the UC composition operation; proved an instance of the UC composition theorem; and used an instance of the transitivity of UC-emulation.

Despite the relative simplicity of the protocols of our case study, pushing it to a successful conclusion took an immense amount of work (nine months of effort resulting in some 18,000 lines of definitions and proofs). Since this is clearly not a scalable amount of effort, we present a number of lessons learned, as well as potential directions for tool development that will support more efficient and streamlined proof generation.

\textbf{Domain Specific Language for Defining Functionalities:} Because \texttt{EASYCRYPT}'s programming language is procedure-based, as opposed to directly supporting the coroutine-based communication of UC, defining functionalities and simulators involves a large amount of “boilerplate”: they need internal distribution loops that route messages from the outside to the parties and sub-functionalities, and allow the parties and sub-functionalities to communicate. Simulators have to manually route messages between the environment and adversary.

Writing this boilerplate code is tedious and error prone, and could be avoided given a domain specific language (DSL) for writing functionalities and simulators. Then a functionality designer could focus on the interesting parts of their design, relying on the DSL’s implementation to automatically generate the boilerplate. We are in the early stages of designing and implementing such a DSL.

The implementation of our DSL will automate the checking of various properties that must currently be manually checked by the designer: ensuring that all messages sent by functionalities have accurate source addresses; ensuring that simulators do not observe or interfere with communication between the environment and adversary; and ensuring that the parties of a functionality only interact with each other via sub-functionalities (not, e.g., by modifying each other’s states).

Our DSL will be usable by crypto theorists lacking a formal methods background, allowing them to more easily express functionalities and simulators. In the short-to-medium-term, our plan is to implement a tool that translates the DSL into actual \texttt{EASYCRYPT} code. But in the longer term, it may be possible to develop \texttt{EASYCRYPT} tactics that work directly with the DSL programs.

\textbf{Support for Symbolic Evaluation:} Simulation-based arguments naturally involve working with structurally dissimilar programs. Such proofs make use of relational invariants. When the real and ideal games are in program states satisfying a relational invariant, one must employ symbolic evaluation—essentially running the programs using proof tactics—to get both programs back to points where they again satisfy the relational invariant. As explained in Subsection V-D, we can push assignments into the precondition, inline calls of concrete procedures, and reduce conditionals and while loops when we can prove the truth/falsity of their boolean expressions.

\texttt{EASYCRYPT} currently lacks support for automating symbolic evaluation, and this will have to be rectified for complex simulation-based proofs to be feasible. One possibility is to implement a proof tactic that works as follows. The user will specify an upper bound on the number of steps of program evaluation they would like to carry out. When confronted with a conditional or while loop, the tactic will use SMT solvers (using user-specified lemmas) to establish the truth or falsity of the boolean expression of the conditional/while loop. When this process fails, the tactic will terminate early, giving the user an unsolved goal to peruse. But when it succeeds, the truth/falsity can be recorded, enabling an optimized version of the tactic that makes use of the previously learned sequence of truth/falsity
observations.

Proving or Mechanizing the UC Composition Theorem:
In our case study, we didn’t prove the UC Composition Theorem, but simply proved the needed instance of the theorem. This involved the definition of a composed environment, and proving a “bridging” lemma involving the composed environment. As explained in Subsection V-E, this process is—we believe—completely general. Proving the general composition theorem in EASYCRYPT itself won’t be possible, because it generalizes over all possible protocol contexts, and there’s no way to do a structural induction over modules in EASYCRYPT.

There are two possibilities for handling the composition theorem in EASYCRYPT. One is to do a proof in EASYCRYPT’s metatheory, e.g., a proof in the existing Coq development of EASYCRYPT’s metatheory. Then the UC composition theorem could be safely added to EASYCRYPT, as a tactic or tactics. The other possibility is to automate the process of finding EASYCRYPT proofs of the needed bridging lemmas. Then support for the composition theorem could be added to EASYCRYPT without adding anything to its trusted computing base.

As explained in Subsection V-E, were were unable to prove a single bridging lemma involving an arbitrary black box (key-exchange) functionality, due to possibility that the functionality and adversary could exchange messages forever. Instead, we had to prove a pair of lemmas, which were identical up to textual substitutions—one for the real functionality and one for the ideal functionality. This approach allowed us to define termination metrics on the functionalities’ states, and to prove the bridging lemmas using a complex mathematical induction. We believe that the unrestricted bridging lemma is true, however, and we intend to investigate improvements to EASYCRYPT’s logics allowing the unrestricted lemma to be proved.

The Dummy Adversary Model: The formalization of UC-realization in terms of an environment and adversary, as opposed to a single entity playing both roles, has the pleasing consequence that UC-realization is obviously transitive—a fact we used in our case study proof (see the end of Subsection V-E). However, proofs of UC-realizability are normally done in the so-called dummy adversary model (see Subsection III-B), i.e., for an adversary that is controlled by the environment. The dummy adversary lemma says that security with reference to the dummy adversary implies UC-realizability in general.

In our case study (see the discussion in Subsection V-D), we carried out our proofs of UC-realizability assuming an arbitrary adversary. This meant we had to deal with the fact that the same relational state might hold in two distinct situations, after a call to the adversary:

(1) when the call to the adversary was after the relational state was first established by execution of the real functionality or ideal functionality/simulator (in which case the dummy adversary would return control to the environment, asking for instructions); or

(2) when the call to the adversary was initiated by the environment’s call to the interface when the relational state already held.

We unified these goals into a single lemma, that was proved once, but applied twice. As future work, we have in mind a simplification of this approach in which such lemmas don’t have to be explicitly stated or applied. In their proofs, users will only have to explicitly handle instances of case (2), with the framework automatically recognizing and handling instances of case (1). In other words, they will be able to work as if they were working in the dummy adversary model.

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