1939

Character education motivated by ideals

McCacken, David Patton
Boston University

http://hdl.handle.net/2144/4269

Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

CHARACTER EDUCATION MOTIVATED
BY
IDEALS

by
David Patton McCracken
(A.B., Drew University, 1937)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1939
Approved by:  

First reader:  

Second reader: **Professor of Religious Education**

**Earl Marshall**

**Professor of Historical Theology**
CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Statement of the problem............. 1-11
Content of the chapters.............. iii

CHAPTER II. THE PLASTICITY OF HUMAN NATURE

The doctrine of Evolution and human
nature.................................... 1
The Greek interpretation of the earth
and its inhabitants..................... 1-2
Comte de Buffon.......................... 2
Erasmus Darwin........................... 2
Jean Lamarck................................ 3
Charles Darwin............................ 3-4
August Weismann............................ 4
Gregor Mendel............................. 5-6
Mechanism vs Teleology................... 6-8
Henri Bergson.............................. 8
Lloyd Morgan............................. 8
Albert P. Mathews........................ 8-9
Heredity and Environment................ 9-12

CHAPTER III. HEDONISTIC THEORIES

Pleasure from the Greek standpoint... 13-15
British hedonistic thought............. 15-18
Hedonism in evolutionary ethics........ 18-19
Herbert Spencer.......................... 19
Leslie Stephen............................ 19-20
Criticims of Psychological Hedonism... 20-21
Validity of Ethical Hedonism............ 21-22

CHAPTER IV. THE PURPOSEFUL EQUIPMENT OF MAN

Education as an adaptive process...... 23
Habit systems in animals and men...... 23-24
Emotional systems in animals and men.. 24
The hormic drive........................... 25
Purposive Psychology.................... 25
Instinct in Animals and Men............. 26-27
Interest and Sentiments.................. 27-29
CHAPTER V. IDEALS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Plato's goal of education.................. 30
Definition of an Ideal..................... 30-32
Logical analysis of an ideal................. 32-34
  a. The ideal as image
  b. The ideal as a relation
  c. The ideal as purpose
  d. The ideal as desire
  e. The ideal as a motor act
The dynamic of an ideal.................... 34
Gestalt psychology.......................... 35
Ideals and the Christian life................. 36-38
The dynamic of ideals....................... 36
Ideals and the emotional life................. 39
Ideals for Christian character
  training.................................. 40

CHAPTER VI. AIMS AND PURPOSES OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

A norm for aims............................. 41
Biblical Teaching............................ 41
Teaching of Doctrine........................ 42
Practical Churchmanship...................... 43
Need for religious foundation............... 44
Factors in defining aim..................... 44-45
Seven objectives of education for
  Christian character....................... 45-50
  a. God-Consciousness
  b. Christ-Consciousness
  c. Self-Consciousness
  d. Group-Consciousness
  e. Truth-Consciousness
  f. Church-Consciousness
  g. Peace-Consciousness

CHAPTER VII. FINAL SYNTHESIS

Education not a nostrum.................... 51
Necessity for correlating ideas and
  ideals.................................. 52
Necessity for co-operation between
  church, school, and home................. 53

SUMMARY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This thesis will attempt to prove that a person's conduct is not determined by mechanical forces. Individuals possess the capacity to control their moral life according to the ideals which they have learned. Man, alone of all the animals, has the ability to select ideals. The ideals which one tries to realize are the motivating forces behind his conduct. Because this is true, it is the responsibility of Christian religious educators to build their curricula around the Christian ideals of the moral life.

The mechanistic view of human development can have no part in the program of Christian character training. A truly moral life is possible only when individuals have freedom to select their ideals. The late William McDougall has succinctly stated that,

So long as science maintains the strictly mechanistic interpretations of all the processes of living things, making of mind merely a useless by-product of organic evolution, it is mere dishonesty to pretend that such science is not in irreconcilable conflict with both religion and morality. For the very minimum which both religion and ethics (as a regulative philosophy of conduct) must claim and defend, to their last man and his last breath, is that human aspiration and human effort towards ideal
goals count for something in the real world, can make a difference to the course of history. ¹

The argument of this thesis will trace the development of evolutionary theory from the Greeks to the present and it will point out the inadequacy of mechanistic interpretations of moral conduct.

Hedonism has been a popular explanation of human motivation. It is, however, a conception to be used guardedly. The distinction must be made between psychological hedonism which claims pleasure as the sole motivating force of human activity and ethical hedonism which recognizes that objects of desire are primary and that the pleasure they give is secondary.

The final argument will demonstrate that the truly moral life is motivated by Christian ideals and that self-control is more important than sense-control.

Religious education has its roots in prehistoric soil. From time immemorial people have gathered for religious rites which were designed to have some effect upon either the conduct of the Gods or upon persons in the community. Through the processes of education these rites were handed down from generation to generation.

Christian religious education began with the teaching ministry of Jesus. As a moral teacher Jesus has no peer. He not only taught men and women himself but he also commissioned his followers to teach his principles of life and his knowledge of God to all the world. It is this command that we carry out in our programs of Christian character training today.

Chapter Two will consider the bearing of evolution upon human development and conduct. Evolutionary theory and hedonism have had a parallel course since the early Grecian philosophers. The two ideas merged when Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) studied moral conduct from the evolutionary viewpoint. Chapter Three will present various aspects of hedonism from Aristotle to Dr. Albert C. Knudson. Chapter Four dealing with man's purposive equipment presents the physical foundation of man's ability to direct consciously his own conduct. To support the doctrine of human freedom, arguments will be drawn from physiology, psychology, and genetics. Chapter Six presents an analysis of the content of an ideal and shows the relationship between one's ideals and one's behavior. The concluding chapter will describe the aims and purposes which are normative for Christian character training.
CHAPTER II
THE PLASTICITY OF HUMAN NATURE

The position one takes on the possibility of character education under the motivation of ideals is largely determined by one's idea of human nature. If the individual is at the mercy of blind mechanistic forces, nothing much in the way of character education is possible. However, if one believes that the human spirit has a directing role in an individual's life, the possibility for character education motivated by ideals is allowed. The doctrine of evolution as first formulated tended toward a mechanistic view of human life. The inadequacies of the early formulations of evolutionary development are now coming to light and the modern conception offers hope that man will eventually see the vast possibilities in himself.

The Greeks attempted a naturalistic explanation of the earth and its inhabitants and thus started the uniformitarian trend of thought which culminated in the establishment of organic evolution during the past century.¹

Aristotle taught that all living forms arose from a primordial mass of living matter and evolved to the higher forms. He placed man at the apex of creation. Aristotle

¹ Lorande Loss Woodruff, Animal Biology, N. Y.: Macmillan, 1933.
believed that man possessed a God-like nature but he believed that man was only the highest point in one continuous ascent.

Empedocles (495-435 B.C.) advanced a crude form of survival of the fittest which Aristotle rejected. Had Aristotle championed Empedocle's idea, he would have become a prophet of Charles Darwin.

There were no important developments in the theory of organic evolution between Aristotle and Buffon (1707-1788). From the strictly biological viewpoint Aristotle, Buffon, Lamarck, Erasmus Darwin, and Charles Darwin stand preeminent.

Buffon presented his theory of organic evolution in his *Natural History*. He took into account the struggle for existence, natural selection, and artificial selection. Furthermore, he believed that the direct action of the environment caused the modification of structure in animals and plants and that these modifications were transmitted to the progeny.

Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) expressed the idea of evolution through prose and poetry. He is recognized as a prophet of Lamarck in his statement that all animals undergo transformation partly through their own exertion and partly through the environment in which they live. In order to account for animal exertion, he introduced the pleasure-pain principle as the motivating force.

Lamarck (1744-1829) is probably the most important figure in the field of organic evolution with the exception of Charles
Darwin. It was Lamarck who "developed with great care the first complete and logical theory of organic evolution and is the one outstanding figure in biological thought between Aristotle and Charles Darwin."² For the evolution of all living things, nature needs but three things, according to Lamarck—space, time, and matter.

According to Lamarck, nature acted indirectly upon animals because they possess a nervous system. Nature induces animals to react to it and when the reaction has taken place adaptation has occurred. The Lamarckian law consists of two parts. The first part states that the sustained use of any organ will strengthen it while the disuse of an organ will cause it to atrophy. In general, the first law is sound. However, the second law which states that acquired characteristics may be transmitted is questioned today. The late William McDougall attempted to demonstrate Lamarckian transmission of acquired characteristics in rats. He tried to prove that rats with a high degree of intelligence which had been acquired through training transmitted this intelligence to their progeny. The results he obtained were not conclusive enough to establish Lamarckianism. Other scientists have cut off the tails of several generations of rats without successfully breeding a

². Woodruff, AB, p. 453.
species of bob-tails. Furthermore, the Jewish rite of circumcision has not produced shortened fore-skins in all the centuries it has been practiced. However, it must be pointed out that the last two examples are artificial mutilations and therefore are not a fair test of the theory of the transmission of acquired characteristics which have occurred from use and disuse. Moreover, nature brings her changes about over periods of millions of years.

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) appeared a generation after Lamarck and he was born into a world more prepared to receive a thoroughgoing theory of evolution. The development of the evolutionary theory in geology helped to pave Darwin's way. So far in this historical development of organic evolution one may perceive that the principle of evolution was an established fact when Darwin began his work. Therefore, Darwin did not flash like a new planet across the evolutionary sky. He obtained his preeminently place for two reasons. First, he gathered an overwhelming mass of facts which demonstrated that living species had descended with change from previous living species. Secondly, he offered as the explanation of the origin of species the theory of natural selection or the preservation of the favored races in the struggle for life. It was the combination of the facts and the theories to account for the facts that won the thinking world to organic evolution. 3 There

are five main points in Darwin's theory:

1. Variation in nature
2. Power of reproduction
3. Prodigality of nature
4. Struggle for existence
5. Survival of the fittest

Upon considering the enormous reproductive capacity of animals, Darwin concluded that the struggle for existence must occur in which countless millions of organisms lose out and that only those best adapted to live survive.

Darwin presented his theory to the Linnaean Society at its meeting in 1858. In 1859 he gave his theory to the world in The Origin of Species.

The significance of Darwin's formulation of evolution has been well summed up by Will Durant who says:

Here was no mere vague notion of evolution of higher species evolving somehow from lower ones; but a detailed and richly documented theory of the actual mode and process of evolution by means of natural selection or the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life. In one decade all the world was talking about evolution.\(^4\)

Darwin's theory of organic evolution was the starting point for fresh investigation of human and animal descent and led to the theories of the geneticists.

August Weismann (1834-1914) published a series of essays entitled On the Germ Plasm in 1892. He identified the chromatin

---

material in the cells as the bearer of the inheritance factors. He also distinguished between the somatic cells and the germ cells. He advanced the theory that any damage to or modification of the somatic cells could not be transmitted to the progeny. This new conception repudiated Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. According to Weissmann, all the factors of inheritance are carried by the germ cells.

Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) established the science of genetics. He kept a careful statistical record of the inherited characteristics of several generations of pea plants. His researches were practically unknown for forty years and they did not come to light until 1900. What Mendel termed inheritance factors are now known as genes. It is the genes which carry the determiners of the organism. No one to date has successfully isolated a gene nor have they been seen in a microscope. However, the theory does seem to explain facts that otherwise could not be accounted for.

According to this theory new characteristics appear in human organisms through the linkage and crossing of genes individually and by multiples. These accidental crossings give rise to sports or mutations which upon breeding bring about new species.

In a world then where evolution plays such an important
role one is driven to ask:

Is the evolutionary system within which what is called life is manifest, a system of mechanical causation, or is it a system of teleological causation? 5

Mechanistic philosophy holds that man is nothing more than a physio-chemical machine and that he differs from inorganic matter in degree rather than in kind.

The mechanistic arguments lead to the following conclusions:

I. The mechanistic theory denies that the human organism possesses an inexplicable quality which baffles explanation. Life is what life does.

II. The biological sciences have made progress in explaining life's mysteries. That is to say that a mere description of a stimulus-response situation is an 'explanation'.

III. The method in science is mechanistic. So far scientists have been successful in explaining many phenomena in terms of pure mechanism. The synthetic reproduction of organic compounds "laid the ghost" of the idea of vital principle.

IV. Mechanistic description is synonymous with mechanistic explanation.

The argument that life is what life does leads to a behavioristic psychology which takes no account of mind or consciousness. This view has not stood the test of

5. George Watts Cunningham, Problems of Philosophy N. Y., Henry Holt, 1925.
scientists. "Psychologists have for the most part discovered that the doctrine of ideas associated together, or trailed helplessly at the chariot-wheels of all-powerful reflexes, provides at its best but a caricature of our mental life, one which omits all mention of its most distinctive and fundamental features, especially of its active nature, its energetic striving towards this and that goal, the experience of which is the ground of all our conception of activity and of energy."\(^6\)

McDougall has made an important contribution to the problem of explanation and description. Some scientists rest in the belief that their work involves nothing more than mere description. However, says McDougall, "Causal explanation is the chief aim of science, and the forming and testing of causal hypotheses has always been and ever must be the life breath of scientific research."\(^7\) He also points out that there are two kinds of causation: (1) mechanistic and (2) teleological. The former type pervades the inorganic world while the latter type is evident in the organic world.

It is this quest for a conception of teleological causation that sends men like Bergson, Morgan, and Mathews to philosophical speculation and their efforts have not been without fruitage. These men represent the modern revolt against

\(^6\) William McDougall, TRL, p. 20.
\(^7\) Ibid., SOF, p. 241.
materialism.

Henri Bergson (1889) believes that change in biological development is radical and that each moment is new and unforeseeable. Pure mechanism, according to Bergson, is an intellectual delusion. It is important that Bergson assigns an important role to intelligence in the evolutionary process. Will Durant estimates Bergson's position as follows: "He thinks of the world and the spirit, of body and soul, of matter and life, as hostile to each other; but matter and life and the world are merely the materials that wait to be formed by intelligence and will."

Emergent evolution has its champion in Lloyd Morgan (1852). He gives us a chemical conception of the evolutionary process. Morgan looks upon matter, life, and mind as the products of a cosmic retort the fires of which are God. In this case, however, God seems to be an afterthought or a deus ex machina.

Albert P. Mathews writing on The Road of Evolution* supplies the purposiveness in the evolutionary process which Darwin and his followers neglected. He has noted, and rightly I think, that the course of evolution has been in the direction

of intelligence. According to Mathews it is not the fittest which arrives; it is the freest:

The struggle of man with man, of race with race, of country with country, does not lead the human spirit onward and upward. It is in reality man's struggle with the environment which carries him on always to a larger life. Just in proportion as he succeeds and struggles he wins his freedom; he becomes a man, whose spirit cannot be daunted. The spirit within him becomes free. It is victory over our own flesh which is desirable, not over our fellowmen. That is the lesson of evolution. And in proportion as, objectively, environmental freedom has been obtained, subjectively, self consciousness has arisen. It is only when man is completely free that he may say the universe consists of two things, of himself and all else.

Our aspirations, our longings for freedom, our desire to rise superior to circumstances and not to be overwhelmed by them whatever their nature may be, our courage, our hope, all these are but the subjective aspects of that great objective struggle for liberty which we call evolution.

This historical survey shows how evolutionary theory has changed since it was outlined by Charles Darwin. Mechanical causation proved inadequate and gave way to teleological causation in the organic world. Mind as a directing force now occupies a respectable place in scientific thinking. Man is not subject to blind forces which he cannot control or change. Because man is not in the grip of mechanism he is plastic.

and teachable.

In considering the teachableness of the individual, heredity and environment must also be taken into account. It has often been thought the secret of individual improvement can best be promoted by selective breeding. Eugenics holds that race improvement is largely a matter of individual endowment and that it can be most effectively promoted by selective breeding. Carried to extremes eugenicists hold that blood tells the entire human story. Paul Popencoe asks:

Where is the evidence of the existence of these plastic days of childhood? If they exist, why do not ordinary brothers become as much alike as identical twins? How long are we asked to believe, on blind faith, that the child is putty, of which the educator can make either mediocrity or genius, depending on his skill? What does the environmentalist know about these "plastic days"? If a boy has a drunken father or foolish mother, does it not suggest that there is something wrong with his pedigree? With such an ancestry, we do not expect him to turn out brilliantly, no matter in what home he is brought up...It is his nature, not his nurture, that is mainly responsible for his character.11

Within certain limits Popencoe's statement is true. The child who is born with a poor physical inheritance is handicapped. However, it does not follow that a child born of alcoholic parents must himself become an alcoholic. Moreover, it must

here be pointed out that even though two brothers are brought up in the same home, they do not have the same environment. The environment of the first child often changes radically when the second child is born. This brings us to the fact that the dividing line between nature and nurture is not distinct. It is difficult to decide between what a child inherits biologically and what he inherits socially. So long as this confusion exists eugenicists will have to give some credit to the environmentalists who argue that given favorable surroundings an individual may arise above a bad inheritance and make the most of whatever capacities he is endowed with.

Spurred on by the advances made in the improvement of grain and live stock, the geneticists have looked forward to the day when the human race will be scientifically bred in order to bring out its better qualities. Difficulty enters in, however, in deciding which qualities are the desirable ones. Furthermore, there are the technical difficulties of bringing the proper persons together for the breeding. People still fall in love without reference to the genetic ideal.

The conclusion of Popenoe's book is that eugenics and euthenics must work in close cooperation. He says:

Eugenists, in centering their attention on adaptation, have sometimes paid too little attention to the kind of environment to which the race was being adapted. The present book holds that the second factor euthenics is just as important as the first,
eugenics for racial progress; that one leg is just as important as the other, to a pedestrian.\textsuperscript{12}

Therefore, in the present state of the science of eugenics education must continue to bear the burden of character training. At the present time the eugenicist is not prepared to breed the philosopher-king.

This chapter has endeavored to point out that man is not in the grip of a blind mechanical evolutionary process. The process of evolution has been in the direction of a goal and that goal is intelligence. Having achieved intelligence man ought, through proper educational processes, to cultivate his character.

\textsuperscript{12} Op. Cit., p. 416.
CHAPTER III
HE DONISTIC THEORIES

In modern times the evolutionary view of organic development has colored almost every avenue of thought. For the last fifty years there has been a close connection between the theory of evolution and hedonism. Moralists have studied human conduct from the developmental point of view and many of them have concluded that moral conduct can be accounted for by a description of man’s evolution through the principle of pleasure.

Pleasure as a motivating force in human life appeared among the Greeks who termed it \( \text{\textepsilon\Delta\omicron\nu\nu} \) whence its name hedonism.

Aristippus (circa 435-356 B.C.) was the first representative of the movement. He taught that pleasure was the sole good and the sole end of life and that one should seek those things which contributed toward a pleasurable existence. However, Aristippus did not intend that pleasure should become the master of the individual. He did not teach "a wholly uncalculating enjoyment of the moment, or a thoughtless abandonment to the lower pleasures. Prudence is necessary even in gathering rosebuds. And prudence especially dictates a self-control by which one remains master of his pleasures,"
possessing them but not possessed by them."¹ Aristippus's concept was not for everyman, however, because he believed that only the wise know how to select the good things of this world.

Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) presented a form of hedonism which lasted for six centuries. His theory was colored by the declining buoyancy of the Greek spirit due to the passing of the political life. The people saw less and less possibility of finding any lasting satisfaction in the present life. Like Aristippus, Epicurus made pleasure the only good and pain the only evil but, unlike Aristippus, he presented a negative approach to satisfaction. Instead of the active pursuit of positive satisfaction, Epicurus substituted tranquillity and repose of the spirit. Serenity could be secured only through rational reflection "which examines into the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions from which the great part of the confusion arises which troubles the soul."²

Epicurus believed that superstition and popular religion would be done away with and he denied the need of supernatural powers. He accepted the atomism of Democritus and denied that there was any mystery in life or in the universe. He explained every event in nature as the result of forces inherent in

2. Ibid., MV, p. 61.
matter.

Prudence and insight were necessary in order to secure the proper distribution of pleasure throughout the whole of life. One should not seize some pleasure of the moment if he has to pay too dearly for it tomorrow.

Epicurus gave a higher place to the pleasures of the mind than he did to the pleasures of the body because the former linger in the memory and bring lasting satisfaction while the latter are more transient.

Contrary to popular opinion, Epicurus did not advocate indulgence. Popular thought has often looked upon Epicureanism in the wrong light and many have used its doctrine as an excuse for their licentiousness. The epicureans recognized this danger and have pointed out that "when, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good we are not speaking of the pleasure of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely."\(^3\)

In modern times the British moralists have made the most important contributions to hedonism. The British moralists made a transition from the individual conception of happiness as held by the Greeks to a universal conception of happiness.

\(^3\) Everett, MV, p. 63.
An egoistic view was supplanted by an altruistic view. Three factors were responsible for this change. The philosophy of Stoicism during the classical period of Greek thought broke down class barriers and promoted the idea of universal brotherhood. Christianity with its cardinal principle of love was the second factor. In addition to these two ideas, there was throughout Europe a growing feeling of social unity. The idea of universal happiness did not blossom all at once. It underwent an evolutionary development under the thoughts of several moralists.

The problem was first raised by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who accepted the principle implicitly. According to Hobbes man is fundamentally selfish but individual welfare is dependent upon the social order. The social order existed solely as a device for the satisfaction of man's egoistic impulses. He never grasped the organic conception of society.

Later writers attempted to refute Hobbe's doctrine of human selfishness and tried to establish the validity of altruistic impulses.

One of these was David Hume (1711-1776) who claimed that man has a sympathy for the happiness of mankind which causes him to approve whatever traits contribute to social happiness.

4. Everett, NV, p. 65.
5. Ibid., p. 65.
and to disapprove whatever traits produce social misery.⁶

William Paley (1743-1805) like Thomas Hobbes overlooked
the conception of social organicism and attempted to establish
the primacy of selfish motives.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) appealed to four external
sanctions as the regulators of conduct. He believed that the
demands of the body, the obligations of politics, the demands
of morals, and the commands of religion impelled the individual
to do those acts which contribute toward general happiness.

John Stuart Mill established the idea of universal hedon-
ism. He said:

The happiness which forms the utilitarian
standard of what is right in conduct is not
the agent's own happiness, but that of all
concerned; as between his own happiness and
that of others, utilitarianism requires him
to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested
and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule
of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete
spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you
would be done by, and to love your neighbor
as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection
of utilitarian morality.⁷

John Stuart Mill believed that one must look to the inner
life to find the sanctions for conduct. He believed that man
has a sentiment which impels him to regard the welfare of
others and to feel his unity with them.

In addition to the inner sanctions, Mill recognized the

⁶. Everett, MV, p. 66.
⁷. Ibid., p. 67.
external sanctions of law, public opinion, and religious belief. He believed that both sanctions must be present and that the external sanctions must be supplemented by the internal sanctions:

It is not, however, to the external sanctions that we must look for the primal source of altruistic conduct, but to the 'feeling of unity' with our fellow creatures. To this powerful natural sentiment Mill appeals as the source of the real strength of the utilitarian morality. The social, sympathetic instincts of mankind constitute, in his view, a determining factor in moral conduct.8

Furthermore, Mill introduced a new factor into ethics when he considered the qualitative aspects of pleasure. Hitherto, moralists had considered pleasure in quantitative terms. However, he was indefinite in his description of what constituted quality. He was content to term it the preference of one pleasure over another.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) rejected Mill's idea of quality and reverted to the quantitative conception of pleasure. He also introduced the conception of need saying that pleasures should be distributed according to need.

Hedonism in Evolutionary Ethics

The doctrine of evolution has had a profound effect upon the development of ethical theory during the last half century.

8. Everett, MV, pp. 67-68.
Moreover, there has been a close relationship between hedonism and evolutionism.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) studied the evolutionary development of morality from its rude beginnings. Hedonism is an essential element in Spencer's system. He sought to give "biological support to hedonism by attempting to show that pains are the 'correlatives' of acts injurious to the life of the organism, while those acts which further its welfare are normally accompanied by pleasure."  

He projected human conduct toward the enlargement and preservation of life. He believed that judgments of conduct as good or bad can only be explained teleologically. He invoked the pleasure-pain principle as the determinant of the goods of life.

Spencer brought egoism and altruism into a synthesis. He taught that the self-regarding sentiments and the other-regarding sentiments are mutually interdependent.

Leslie Stephen (1832-1904) also stated utilitarianism in terms of evolutionary development. Stephen rejected the atomistic theory of society and substituted the organic view. Stephen "presents most effectively the conception of the social organism, the 'tissue' of which is so modified in the process of evolution as to form the organs needed for the highest

9. Everett, MV, p. 73.
racial efficiency." According to Stephen, health rather than happiness is the *sumnum bonum* of life.

Out of this historical survey one can easily perceive that the hedonistic theory has undergone a broadening process. In the first place its locus changed from the individual's happiness to that of society. Secondly, happiness has wide implications and one can not view it as selfish indulgence.

The type of hedonism which recognizes pleasure as the motivation of human endeavor is known as psychological hedonism. Specific criticism of this type of hedonism shows it to be untenable as the sole explanation of motivation.

In the first place the instincts and impulses compel one to act without regard to either pleasure or pain. "Nature wills to live and does not reckon too nicely the cost to her countless creatures." The will to live induces man to form family ties, to erect governments, to enjoy intellectual activity, and to exercise the functions of mind and body. These are generalized types of activity and are fixed by nature without reference to pleasure or pain.

It has also been pointed out that in conscious beings the mere presence of an idea often results in impulsive activity without reflection upon the pleasantness or unpleasantness of

the act. These are the ideo-motor acts which follow from the consciousness of the idea.

Dr. Knudson points out that psychological hedonism is not true to life as a whole. In *The Doctrine of Redemption* Dr. Knudson says:

As a complete philosophy of action psychological hedonism breaks down...First, the theory assumes that there is a common pleasure which all men seek. But as a matter of fact there is no such common pleasure. The idea is an abstraction. Pleasures are all concrete and they vary quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Second, the theory makes pleasure in abstraction from its causes the direct object of its desire. This too is a mistake. We desire things that give us pleasure, but it is not simply the pleasure they give that makes us desire them. That we desire them is dependent upon our constitution. If we were made differently from what we are, we might not desire them; and if we did not desire them, they would not please us. The pleasures they give us are, therefore, secondary. They result from our desires and our desires are due to our constitution. To make pleasures, then, apart from the concrete objects desired, determinative of conduct, is a manifest error.12

The logical conclusion therefore is that desire is fundamental in human nature and that pleasure is an after effect.

Now to say that pleasure is not the motivation of human behavior is not to say that the objects of desire are not

pleasurable. Ethical hedonism teaches that every value has an element of happiness in it. However, ethical hedonism differs from psychological hedonism in that the former identifies pleasure with the goal or object. It is not even good sense to deny that happiness is essential to the good. "The imagined pleasantness of an object does increase our desire for it, although we cannot by this means explain the origin of the desire itself."¹³

The individual, therefore, does not guide his life on the principle of pleasure and pain. Pleasure rather is a by-product of man's striving toward objects, goals, ideals. Pleasure is a part of the values he strives for but it is not the motivation.

¹³. Everett, MV, p. 112.
CHAPTER IV
THE PURPOSIVE EQUIPMENT
OF MAN

The preceding chapters have shown that the course of evolution has tended in the direction of Mind. It shall be the purpose of this chapter to show the necessity for and the logic of this process. Moreover, I shall endeavor to show that man's physical equipment is purposive.

Education exists for the purpose of adapting the growing child to the world in which it is to live. This theory has its source in the biological principle of adaptation of organisms to their environment. "If any organism can adapt itself to its environment or adapt its environment to its own needs, it will survive, or even flourish; but if it cannot do so it will perish."¹ On the human level education is necessary because man does not possess the specificity of instinct which is characteristic of the animal level. Man's demands upon life are more far-reaching and profound.

The human self possesses all the characteristics of lower animals with respect to habit systems, emotional responses, and glandular processes.

¹ Frank S. Hickman, The Possible Self, Abingdon Press, 1933, p. 9.
Habit systems are essential for the conservation of energy. They make life easy on animal and human levels. Suppose one had to think through each individual movement involved in tying one's shoe laces! "Living things develop habit systems according to the stage they have reached in the evolutionary scale and the complexity of the environment with which they have to cope."²

The emotional responses are also necessary on animal and human levels. The emotion of Fear often forces one to run in the face of danger thus saving one's life.

Whenever additional energy is needed in an emergency the glands pour their secretions into the system to tide one over the emergency.

Man, as well as his animal associates, is endowed with these physical factors. But he possesses the power to think reflectively and the power to seek purposively the goals he desires. In this respect man differs from animals. A person has the power of self originating purpose and he possesses the ability to carry out the purposes he originates.³

It is the task of education to link up the lower animalistic purposes of man with the higher levels of his ideals.

The Hormic Drive

Purposive psychology advanced by men like William McDougall, G. F. Stout, and L. T. Hobhouse makes a place for purposive mental activity. These men are convinced that there is something purposive in the fundamental dynamics of selfhood. Moreover, purposiveness is resident within the individual. It is part of his being per se. It implies awareness of goals and ability to reach them.

Whatever may have been true about the blind mechanism of evolution on the lower organic levels, is not true on the higher levels where Mind operates. The very goal of the process of evolution was created and defined when Intelligence began to function. "In the process of organic evolution the goal of the process is progressively created and defined, as evolution advances and as Mind becomes increasingly capable of conceiving the future in terms of alternatives between which it chooses." This statement means that man increasingly gained his freedom to make choices and to determine his goals as the evolutionary process progressed.

The word hormic is derived from the Greek term horme which means vital impulse or urge to action. McDougall uses this term to express his conception of the purposive drive in human beings.

Instinct in Animals and Men

It used to be customary to believe that animals and men differed in the number of instincts they possessed. However, this distinction has been shown to be false because it is now known that man has as many if not more instincts than animals. Man is not solely a creature of reason while the animals are solely creatures of instinct.

Man is the most richly endowed of all creatures with instincts, and the stiffest problem which education has to face is that of the development and shaping of the instinctive process into unified and consistent character. 5

Man and animal differ, however, in the specificity of instinctive equipment. Lower animals follow set patterns of life which are common to particular species. In the higher levels of life instincts are less predetermined in their specific activity.

McDougall points out that there is a difference between instincts and neuro-mechanical reflexes. He recognizes that reflexes are mechanical in their operation and that they work without any goal. Instincts, on the other hand, work toward a goal. They try to bring about a change in the situation which will satisfy the impulse. In his Outline of Psychology McDougall says:

5. Frank S. Hickman, TFS, p. 53.
We must therefore, define any instinct by the nature of the goal, the type of situation, that it seeks or tends to bring about, as well as by the type of situation or object that brings it into activity. 6

In animals the instincts are highly specialized on the receptive side and they may be aroused only by a particular stimulus. Wherever, as in man, instincts are not highly specialized there is greater need for intelligence to supplement instinct. It seems reasonable then to say that man's instincts lost their specificity and that this loss was counterbalanced by the development of Mind. Man does not have to work out his life pattern on the instinctive plane. Using his intelligence he can satisfy his desires in numerous ways that may be either character building or character deteriorating.

Interest and Sentiments

There is a blind and impulsive quality in instinct that registers in restlessness until some specific object stimulates it to activity. The object may be food, shelter, or another person. However, there need not be a concrete object present. Memory is sufficient to stimulate an instinct. In the memory human beings build up sentiments around various ideas and these sentiments largely determine conduct. The acquisition

7. Ibid., p. 114.
of interests and sentiments is distinctly man's equipment. If they exist on the animal plane it does so only among higher animals and at lower levels. McDougall regards sentiments as units of character. They "denote acquired trends, or the settings of our conative tendencies, that are acquired through individual experience." 8

In the earliest days of childhood the moral self is taking form in the building of sentiments. Shand points out that "Every sentiment tends to acquire the virtues and vices that are required by its system...Every sentiment tends to form a type of character of its own." 9

The importance of forming the right sentiments around the right ideals in the early years of life is apparent. Character forming systems of sentiment do not grow haphazardly. "If the objects of sentiment are unfortunately fixed upon, their corresponding systems of response make for undesirable, not to say highly dangerous character formation." 10 The criminal and the virtuous are both the products of sentiment building processes. It is necessary that parents, church, and school have a part in the task of educating the child in habit forming sentiments that make Christian character.

It is not a question whether or not the child will erect for himself character-form-

ing systems of sentiment; the only question is whether or not he will build the right kind. If, for example, religion holds that a system of sentiment founded upon Christian love is better than one founded upon un-Christian hatred, it must hold the child in the name of the Christian God of love, and through the most wisely conceived and delicately controlled educational process evoke from the child not random expressions of the love tendency but a growing habitual love response.11

11. Frank S. Hickman, TFS, pp. 63-64.
CHAPTER V

IDEALS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Through the centuries man's destiny has not been determined by blind, mechanical forces. He has been able to develop ideals and to set the course of his development according them. Plato believed that the goal of education, religion, and philosophy was the attainment of an insight into things as they are through an intellectual discipline which involved the purgation of human desires and a genuine remaking of the natural man. Dr. Hocking says, "No one can read The Banquet in the light of recent psychology without realizing how completely Plato understood the transformability of passions and desires."¹ The transformation of life as emphasized by Plato is the goal of Religious Education. For the Christian, this transformation is the experience of the Christian life—a life controlled by Christian ideals. This implies that ideals must have a dynamic quality which will aid one in bringing about and sustaining this transformation.

Many attempts have been made to define the meaning of an ideal. Soares says, "An ideal is an imaginary conduct model representing more than usual behavior and requiring some effort to follow."² This definition is not adequate because

it does not stress the dynamic quality of an ideal. It merely tells us that ideals are patterns of action which require effort to follow. Charters carries the definition a little farther when he states that an ideal is a "trait which has become the object of desire." 3 But neither of these definitions are adequate because they fail to consider all the qualities an ideal must possess if it is to be a motivating force in human life.

An adequate definition of an ideal must provide for imagistic, relational, volitional, emotional, and motor factors. Before I present the final definition of an ideal, let us examine the content of an ideal.

I. Ideal as Image

Fundamentally the words idea and ideal mean picture. Our activity is guided either consciously or unconsciously by mental images of the things we desire to do. Voelker describes the imagistic aspect of an ideal as "a generalized notion or general concept used as a plan or standard of action." 4 Dean Roscoe Pound has graphically portrayed the motivating force of the imagery of an ideal when he said:

Take a case which the philosophers have put from antiquity. The old time smith has

his tools and a piece of steel. Also he has in mind the picture of a saw. He applies his tool to the steel and fashions the steel to the picture. Thus the picture is made real in the completed saw. But we have a more striking example in the present generation. Icarus had in mind a picture of a man flying. With wax and feathers he made himself wings. The sun melted the wax and he came to grief, as many aviators have done since. But the picture has urged men and guided their efforts until today it has become a reality in aerial navigation.  

In my opinion it is the imagistic aspect of an ideal which makes religious symbols so valuable. If one can look beyond a crucifix or candle and see the values they represent, then these symbols perform a valuable function in forming Christian lives. It is for this reason that art has been so important in Christian life.

II. Ideal as a Relation

If an ideal is to possess motivating power, the individual who holds it must believe that the ideal is related somehow to his own life. The individual should feel that the ideal is something he "approves" and "ought" to do. Dr. Brightman especially emphasizes this aspect of an ideal. "An ideal is a general concept of a type of experience which we approve in relation to a complete view of all our experience, including all our approvals, and which we acknowledge we

ought to realize."6 It is this feeling of relationship between one's own life and the ideal that makes an ideal a motivating force in human activity.

III. Ideal as a Purpose

Soares believes that ideal lives summon individuals to make a moral effort to live better. "An ideal person is one whose conduct seems better than that which is common and who thereby summons us to better moral effort."7 The challenge offered by the ideal men and women of the race may form a purposeful element in an ideal.

IV. Ideal as Desire

Among the several elements which help to provide the ideal's dynamic none is more important than its emotional content. Samuel Lowell Stevens says that "ideas alone are relatively powerless. They cannot change and modify and mold behavior. They have to have immediate and effective connection with emotional experiences, satisfying in themselves."8 Fear, hatred, and love and all the other emotions form the emotional context of the ideal and make it dynamic in the determination of conduct. Unless our ideals are linked up with

7. Soares, RE, p. 36.
our emotions they will amount to no more than a puff of powder in the open air.\(^9\) Emotion impels one to action and long ago William James pointed out that unless one does "act upon his emotions he is the worse for them and life fails in its realization."\(^{10}\) One's emotional reaction to an ideal determines very largely whether it will be acted upon or not.

V. The Ideal and the Motor Act

If an ideal is to have any value it must compel activity. Only in activity can the ideal be realized. Dr. Edward Scribner Ames points out:

It has been the common notion than an idea is generically different from an act, and could precede that act in time, and might or might not be followed by movement. If, however, as many writers insist, the basic type of conscious control is seen in ideo-motor activity, then the idea is not radically different from the act. It is rather the incipient stage or the preliminary but real rehearsal of the act. In this lies the significance of the doctrine that there is no impression without expression, that every state of consciousness tends to issue in motor adjustment.\(^{11}\)

J. A. Hadfield explains the dynamic of an ideal by terming it the stimulus of the will. Just as instincts are aroused by certain stimuli, so is the will to act stimulated by the

ideal. Ideals, according to Hadfield, are special stimuli which arouse the organized self to activity.

The adequate stimulus of will, the stimulus which is peculiarly adapted to arouse the self to activity, is the ideal, that is, the idea or object which leads to the complete realization of the whole individual.12

A self is an organization of sentiments and dispositions which works toward completeness. In this process ideals are the objects which promise completion or realization of the total self.

Gestalt psychology assigns ideals an important role in human life with its claim that ideals are the field forces which exert pressure upon the individual.13

An ideal, then, is an object of desire, a goal, or an end, which one approves, which compels the individual to act because it promises to make life more complete. Dr. Marlatt's definition has the advantage of complete expression in the space of a few words:

"An ideal is then, an urge toward an act of a whole self, the blueprint of a value, an ideationally-motivated behavior pattern of something-we-ought-to-do."

So far as the motivating force of an ideal is concerned,

the fact is well grounded in psychology. My study compels me to believe that there is a dynamic power in an ideal which compels one to act upon it. If this is true, the acts of an individual are not immutably controlled by that individual's heredity or environment. Man has the ability to make intelligent conquests in the field of the moral life under the motivation of high ideals. It is this very fact that makes Christian life possible.

Ideals and the Christian Life

The majority of people enter the Christian life through the gradual development of Christian experience by means of the processes of education. The Christian life means:

Conduct controlled by Christian ideals; that is, all feeling and thought and activity governed by the ideals which Christ taught and exemplified—all activity involving relations to fellowmen—must be dominated by the feelings and ideas summed up in the word "brotherhood."14

A majority of people enter the Christian life during the adolescent period. It will be remembered that Dr. Brightman says in his definition of an ideal that it is a "general concept of a type of experience which we approve in relation to a complete view of all our experiences." Now adolescence is the period when it is first possible for the individual to

have a complete view of experience. Dr. Hocking brings added strength to this conviction when he says, in speaking of Christian conversion:

Conversion, let us note is possible only when one can get a reflective view of human existence in its natural round, its cost in labor, thought, and pain, and its margin of aspiration. It comes to adolescence because adolescence has for the first time the data for reflection and the capacity for full self consciousness. To be mature is to see the pleasure of life in the setting of its labors; to be adolescent is to have sufficient vigor to welcome it all. To be converted is to achieve this welcome, to catch the spirit of the world in full view of both its hardships and its allurements. It is to perceive the law of the whole process in such a light that to live by it and to promote it takes immediate precedence of every other satisfaction and especially of love and ambition, and passions of the social order. 15

Moreover, the adolescent period is the impressionable period par excellence. Its chief characteristics are growing self-control, development of individual thought, enlarging of the social consciousness, deepening of emotional life, and the growth of ideals.

Entering upon the Christian life is an experience whereby life is changed and regenerated. Lower values and ideals are thrown off and loyalty to higher values and ideals is pledged. Conversion to the ideal must have more than passive acceptance.

One must exert his will to cling to the new ideal.

The Dynamic of Ideals

Our feelings of need and our tendency to idealize are closely related. I think it is true to say that in the higher realms of life, ideals are the boundaries which we try to encompass. Man constantly sees a better world before him and tries to make the present one fit the better pattern he has in mind. Man constantly tries to mold the facts of life according to some inner rule or pattern. It is this larger view of life and the desire to reach it which gives ideals an important place in Christian life and Christian character training. The Christian life induces one to have desires and to mold those desires to more worthy ends.

A human being is capable, not only of desiring this or that thing for the satisfaction of life, but of desiring to be this or that kind of man, to extend the goal of life, and to raise from level to level the requirements as to what will satisfy his life's demands. As man expands his sense of values, he broadens his areas of religious appreciation. He feels his destiny growing upon him, and his conception of the Divine Beings and of his relation to Him opens proportionately.

The ideals of Jesus are adequate for molding Christian character. Jesus' emphasis on love makes a universal appeal that

---

most people desire and attempt to achieve. It is a sentiment with deep emotional content and it is able to assemble the instincts, emotions, and self-regarding tendencies into a unitary whole that is a powerful motivating factor in human life. As Jesus represents Christian love there are powerful imagistic and emotional factors present. His death for society gives one a new conception of the worth of society and also of the individual in society.

Whenever ideals and emotions become related and promise satisfaction for some need, they are motivating forces in human life. Stevens says that "those attitudes of mind which grow out of a Christian perspective with regard to the nature of the world and the meaning of life become dynamic when they are enriched and vivified by the creative power of love and religion becomes an integrative and effective factor in human life as ideals and emotions become related."

If a person's life is enriched by high ideals he ought to use them to measure his achievements by and, if they have any real meaning to him, he will exercise his will toward their realization. In a very real sense one's ideals dominate his actions. Before the action is begun, one plans it by giving consideration to his ideals; and after the action is

completed, one measures it by comparison with his ideals.

Christian character can be developed only through Christian education from the earliest years of life. Ideas and ideals are built up in the mind as the result of education. They cannot be transplanted from one mind to another. One's ideals are the measuring sticks of life. They are the standards which determine the direction of character. They are dynamic in so far as one's emotional life enriches them. Ideals should not be so high and far away that one cannot hope to realize them. On the other hand they should be remote enough to require real effort in their realization. Although one continually falls short of his ideal, one should always feel that the ideal is attainable if only enough effort is expended.
CHAPTER VI

AIMS AND PURPOSES OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Individuals cannot have a truly moral consciousness unless they are free to choose their ideals. In the course of man's long development he has created a multitude of ideals. Some of them represent values while others represent disvalues. The aim of Christian character training is to cultivate in individuals the ideals which are normative for Christian life.

Any statement of the aims and purposes of religious education depends upon the judgment of some person or group of persons. This judgment involves some idea of what is good and what is bad, what is ugly and what is beautiful, what is valuable and what is worthless, in the conduct of human life. There has been and still is much confusion as to what the aims of religious education should be. Some of the goals of the past have demonstrated themselves as being totally inadequate.

"To teach the Bible is an insufficient aim. In recent years we have come to see that this objective by itself is unsatisfactory."¹ Educators soon perceived that a man might

be well versed in all the Scripture and yet be lacking in moral conduct. Mere knowledge of the Bible is not a guarantee of moral conduct.

Closely related to this objective was the aim "to teach a set of beliefs." As in mere Biblical teaching, this aim also fell short because mere affirmation of belief in a correct set of principles was not a sufficient dynamic to motivate human conduct. "A person might have a good intellectual grasp of correct beliefs, and yet for all his knowledge bear no spiritual fruits...Judged by its results, this aim has proved to be insufficient."  

There was also the vogue to build the curriculum from all types of materials. Not only the Bible but also all of literature was utilized in the teaching of moral values. While it is true that sources of spiritual power may be discovered in literature, art, and music, there is also the danger that the objective may be obscured by the mass of material.

The aims which I have outlined were largely centered in the subject matter to be taught. With the development of child psychology the religious educational emphasis shifted from subject matter to the individual child. The slogan "teach the child" became the watchword of religious education.

2. Earle Emme and Paul Stevick, PRE, p. 69.
This idea recognized the fact that children are growing organisms and that there are wide individual differences among children. The aim "to teach the child" is vague no matter how much one recognizes the phenomenon of change.

Nor should the religious educator merely desire to develop good church members. Church attendance is no gauge of one's moral character.

In deciding the aims of a program for religious education one must be sure that the aims are not too narrow. They must embrace the facts of the individual's life in society.

Religious educators agree that God-consciousness is fundamental in Christian character. An individual who feels that his life is bound up with the purposes and the consciousness of God has discovered a powerful motivating factor in his life. It makes him more fully realize that his life not only begins but also ends as part of the eternal plan of God.

Character education merely for the purposes of social control and social control of conduct runs the danger of becoming ethical education without any religious grounding.

Whatever definition one arrives at to describe the purpose of character education must be child centered and not too narrow to include all of the factors which make up human life. "In short, statements of aim which confine themselves to the matter taught rather than to the living personality of
the pupil; or which represents an ideal too narrow for the complicated business in hand; or which does not square with the Christian view of human nature—each and all of them are bound to be thrust aside eventually for others which will better meet the broader requirements."

Emme and Stevick in *Principles of Religious Education* summarize the factors which must be taken account of in an adequate definition of the purposes of religious education:

Account must be taken of the whole gamut of characteristics of human nature. When we say that a statement of aim which will prove satisfactory must reckon with the chameleon qualities and possibilities embodied in human nature, we have in mind many a sad instance of how a hasty or onesided theory of human nature will lead to definitions which are not able to stand the test of practical application in the world as it is. For instance, an objective which remembers that man is human, but forgets that he is akin to the divine, will be rejected out of hand in such a test, which ought to open the eyes of its sponsors to the fact that it does not accurately portray human nature. The same fate would befall educational plans which disregard or belittle the contributions of psychology and sociology to a better understanding of the nature of the human self...

The Christian conception of the value and destiny of the human individual must be recognized. If this factor is omitted, religious education suffers a relapse into a system of moral training, without a satisfying answer to the deepest needs of life...Distinct recognition of man's distinct worth must be apparent...

---

Provision must be made for the use of the laws of growth, as discovered by psychology and sociology. In formulating the aim of religious education, it must be remembered that personality is not a ready-made article, but a product which can be partly made to the pattern selected. Although a teacher cannot 'do anything he likes' with human nature, it does lie in his power to determine to a great extent that the form which it finally takes shall be high grade.  

The religious educator should show the child how to re-construct his ideals and habit patterns as he grows from age to age. This involves the impartation of insights into the meaning of the universe in which the child lives and also insights into the child's own nature. Furthermore, the child should develop a deep love for God and a strong desire to do God's will. Last of all, and most important, the religious educator should help the child to develop his inner sources of control by which the child will be able to become the master of himself in all his social situations. 

There are seven main objectives toward which the religious educator should work. The first of these is God-consciousness. The child should have a live faith in God. A belief in God is a powerful motivating factor in human life and a knowledge of the will of God is a powerful determiner of human conduct. Furthermore, belief in God gives meaning to the universe which otherwise would be lacking.

Religious educators agree on the need for giving the child an adequate conception of God. Paul H. Vieth says that the religious educator should "Foster in growing persons a consciousness of God as a reality in human experience, and a sense of personal relationship to him." Theodore Soares believes that a belief in God "gives the highest meaning to personal life as worthwhile in itself and in its contributions to social ends." The finest way to introduce children to a knowledge of God is through their understanding of Jesus Christ. Early in life the child should be taught to look upon Jesus as the ideal of human selfhood. Jesus embodied in his life all the ideal values which a man or woman of character should cherish and every effort should be made to portray Jesus as an ideal character who really lived and worked among men. William Clayton Bower says:

One of the most significant characteristics of the factors which influence the good life within the religious community is the fact that the way of life which it constantly sponsors is embodied in a personal ideal. Whatever may be said regarding the patterns of attitude and behavior that are commonly held in the minds of those who share in the religious community, their effectiveness in influencing the attitudes and behavior of its members lies chiefly in the fact that they are not

presented as abstract ideals or virtues, but are embodied concretely in a living person. This ideal person becomes an inspiring and releasing model for all of those who are concerned not so much with the abstract ideal of attaining the good life as with the desire to become like him."

This description of the motivating power of Jesus' life does not mean that the child should be encouraged to live exactly as Christ lived. Jesus was a man of the first century and had to confront situations which are different in modern life. However, the values and ideals which he translated into action are still valid and it is these that the child should be taught rather than the specific action patterns found in the life of Jesus. His willingness to depend upon God and his love toward men can still represent a real ideal in modern life.

The third objective of the religious educator should be the development of self-consciousness. The cultivation of inner-resourcefulness is one of the most urgent needs of the present day. We must strive to develop in each individual strong qualities of initiative, accountability, and self-direction. The child must be made to see that he possesses vast possibilities within himself for the cultivation of the powers of self-direction and self-control. Emme and Stevick point out that the educator should "help the growing person-

ality to develop a resourcefulness of its own in the discovery of putting his ideals and his loyalty to God into action."

No one can live a life without reference to society. The child and the adult has to live among people and must constantly adjust his life to their activities. Therefore, Group-Consciousness plays an important role in any educational project. A life undergoes constant social reconstruction from the cradle to the grave. The happiness of society as a whole depends upon how well persons adjust themselves to the activities and the desires of their fellows.

In the first place, a child must be made to understand that he has a part in the building of a better social order and that his contribution is necessary for the wellbeing of himself and others. Secondly, a child should be taught the essential factors in a just society so that he may be better able to criticize intelligently the society in which he lives. In the third place, the child must be made ready to accept the religious and civic responsibilities of the city or village in which he dwells. And lastly, he should have the desire to translate the highest values and ideals he knows into action for the benefit of the social order in which he labors.

Truth-Consciousness is also an indispensable factor in human conduct. Educators should "Lead growing persons to

8. Emme and Stevick, PRE, p. 74.
build a life philosophy on the basis of a Christian interpretation of life and the universe." 9 Emme and Stevick carry this definition farther by pointing out that the growing personality should realize deeper insights into the deeper meaning of the world and human nature.10

Religion cannot flourish apart from the organized church. Men and women keep alive their religious feelings through corporate worship. You can keep embers alive on the hearth but remove one and it dies out and becomes ash. The same is true of the religious life. Therefore, it is an essential part of the religious education program to foster Church-Consciousness on the part of youth. The meaning of church ritual and a knowledge of Church History should be a part of the heritage of every child.

Lastly, every individual should be Peace-Conscious. In an age when many confused doctrines with regard to race are being taught it is imperative that children learn the true significance of racial differences and to learn that all races are part of a great humanity. Respect for people from other lands in spite of their differences cannot be neglected in the program of religious education for peace.

I believe that these seven objectives of education or

educational ministry as outlined by Professor Earl Marlatt provide an adequate basis for the cultivation of Christian character and Christian conduct. They embody the various elements found in all definitions of aim with regard to religious education. These seven factors should provide for all the emergencies of life when they become a part of human personality.
CHAPTER VII

FINAL SYNTHESIS

I have attempted to show in this thesis that human nature is plastic and teachable and that sufficient motivation can be discovered in Christian ideals. Careful investigation into the evolutionary process constantly reveals that the older conceptions of mechanical causation are not adequate on the human level. The end of the process seems to have been the achievement of mind and freedom from the environment. Having gained these, man can and does direct his own life through the processes of education.

One should not expect to bring in the millenium through the process of education. Even in our own day we are constantly aware that education is not a "cure all." Furthermore, education is not transmitted from generation to generation. Each generation must make a new beginning. This very fact places a limitation upon the possibilities of character formation through education. Another limitation comes from the differences among individuals. Some people do not possess a healthy mentality and therefore it is impossible for them to become competent members of the community. However, these persons are in the minority and education has possibilities which have not yet been wholly realized.
An adequate educational ideal must consider the child as a growing individual. The educational process must involve the unfolding of increasing ideal-ism and the cultivation of deeper insights into the meaning of the world and man. Furthermore, the educational program cannot be carried on without reference to the child as a biological organism. The instinctive and emotional functions of a child's life must be utilized in the formation of Christian character. A child's character is not transplanted into the mind of the child from some other person. It is cultivated. As one builds up attitudes and sentiments around ideals Christian character develops and Christian conduct becomes manifest. To a certain extent one can transmit principles of conduct to the life of the child but it is far more desirable to create Christian character within the child's own mind and experience. Transmission of principles and the creation of principles and situations must work together toward the realization of the Christian life in the life of the child.

The cultivation of the Christian life must begin early and remain a constant factor in the whole experience of the child. Furthermore, the home and school as well as the Church must act together. One cannot teach ideals of love in church if those ideals do not prevail at home or in school. Christian character will not develop in a situation where high and low ideals are at cross purposes.
It is noteworthy that the conception of evolution has touched many fields of thought. Not only has it attempted to account for the origin of species but it has also attempted to account for human conduct on the basis of pleasure and pain. It is very important to make the distinction between psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. Psychological hedonism looks upon pleasure as the sole motivation of life and takes little or no account of the desires or goals of the human organism. It is important not to build an educational system on the principle of psychological hedonism. One must ever be aware to subordinate mere pleasure to the conscious striving toward the ideal. In realizing the ideal pleasure may result, but mere pleasure does not impel one to seek the ideal.

Let us recognize then that a person is teachable and that it is possible and desirable to create Christian character through the creation of Christian ideals and attitudes in growing boys and girls.
SUMMARY

One must consider two views of organic evolution in discussing the possibility of Christian character training. If one holds that conduct is controlled by mechanical forces, one cannot say that individuals possess the capacity to direct their conduct towards ideal goals. But, if one believes that man has the ability consciously to select ideals and that he can work towards their realization, character training motivated by ideals is possible. The burden of this thesis is to show the role ideals play in motivating Christian life. The discourse does not present a curriculum nor does it consider the history of religious education.

The Greeks interpreted life from a naturalistic viewpoint. They believed that life is determined by law and this conception gave rise to various mechanistic concepts of human evolution. Aristotle believed that life evolved from a primordial mass of living matter. Empedocles presented a crude notion of the "survival of the fittest" which was later to become the keystone of Darwin's argument for the origin of species. In the eighteenth century Comte de Buffon anticipated Jean Lamarck's doctrine of adaptation to the environment. The historical development of evolutionary theory prepared the way for Darwin's theories of the descent of man and the origin of species. Philosophers and scientists from Aristotle to
Darwin considered intelligence a by-product of the evolutionary ascent.

Interest in man's development spurred men to investigate the phenomenon of inheritance. Gregor Mendel founded the science of genetics after having traced the transmission of characteristics in plant life. Geneticists have held that the human stock can be improved by the mating of men and women who possess sound bodies and good minds. There are difficulties in this program because one cannot determine whether or not recessive genes are present. In opposition to genetics, environmentalists have overemphasized the role of environment in determination of moral character. These two views contain much truth. Heredity and environment help to determine one's character and one must consider them together.

This thesis rejects over emphasis on either heredity or environment. Neither does it view mind as a by-product of evolution. The theory that evolution tended towards the achievement of intelligence gains wholehearted support.

Hedonism is an idea as old as evolution and for the past seventy-five years there has been a close relationship between them. Many theorists have held that evolutionary development was possible through the organism's avoidance of pain. Others have gone further in believing that pleasure is the sole motivation of human conduct. Psychological hedonism makes no reference to the goals which individuals
desire to reach. It professes that all conduct is motivated by mere pleasure. Ethical hedonism, however, assigns the goals, ideals, and values which individuals desire a primary role in human motivation. The pleasure derived from goals, ideals, and values, is important but always secondary. Ethical hedonism has a legitimate place in Christian character training.

Man by nature is a goal seeking animal. His instincts act with reference to some desirable end. There are purposive forces within man which propel him towards objects of his desire. He is so constituted that he builds up sentiments around ideals. Once these sentiment systems have been organized, his conduct tends to conform to them. But being a free agent man possesses the capacity to alter his sentiment systems. This fact makes Christian character training possible. Furthermore, character training must be a continuous process. From generation to generation the task must be renewed because knowledge and character are not transmitted from parent to offspring. The late William McDougall carried on careful experiments in this field and failed to prove that acquired characteristics are transmitted from parent to child.

An ideal is an object of desire, a goal, or an end, which one approves, and which impels one to act because it promises to make life more complete. In order to be dynamic an ideal must be imagistic, relational, purposive, desirable, and active. Ideals become dynamic in human life when one's
emotions become attached to them. Modern psychology gives support to the theory that ideals play a creative part in human activity and that Christian character may be cultivated by inculcating Christian ideals in the minds of young people.

A norm for aims in religious education depends upon human judgment. Through the years the judgment has undergone frequent change. Various goals have been formulated only to be found inadequate. Teaching the Bible or teaching of doctrine have been important goals. It was discovered that one might know the Biblical teachings well and still remain un-Christians. Therefore, emphasis on this goal was slackened.

Human life is too broad and too varied to permit the formulation of a simple aim of education for the creation of Christian character. There are seven objectives which must be utilized in setting a norm for Christian education.

God-Consciousness
Christ-Consciousness
Self-Consciousness
Group-Consciousness
Truth-Consciousness
Church-Consciousness
Peace-Consciousness

These seven objectives cover the whole range of human activity and provide for any emergency that might arise in the conscious direction of one's conduct.

Education is not a nostrum. It is not the contention of this thesis that Christian training will cause the emergence
of a generation of moral individuals. Individual differences must always be recognized. Some people have greater ability to conduct themselves on a higher moral level than others. Many people's moral vision is blunted on account of pathologic- al conditions or because of poor training in the art of living the good life. Nevertheless, given reasonable physical and mental health an individual should be able to live the normal Christian life provided he has had the proper training in his childhood.

The task of Christian character training is not for the church alone. The home is even more important than the church school because in the home the first lessons of life are learned and there the average child spends the greatest amount of his time in the early years. Besides the home, the school shares the responsibility for cultivating the moral life. These three agencies—the church school, the home, and the school—have the joint responsibility of creating within a child ideals which motivate him to live the Christian moral life.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bergson, Henri, Creative evolution, N. Y., Henry Holt & Co., 1923 (CE)

Bower, William C., Religion and the Good Life, Abingdon Press, 1933.

Brightman, Edgar S., A Philosophy of Ideals, N. Y., Henry Holt & Co., 1928 (AP01)

Charters, Werrett W. The Teaching of Ideals, N. Y., Macmillan Co., 1927 (TTI)

Cunningham, George W., Problems of Philosophy, Henry Holt & Co., 1925 (TCPF)


Durant, Will, The Story of Philosophy, Simon & Shuster, 1926 (TSP)


Everett, Walter W., Moral Values, Henry Holt & Co., 1918 (MV)

Hadfield, James, Psychology of Morals, Robert McBride, 1924 (POM)

Hartmann, George, Gestalt Psychology, N. Y., Ronald Press, 1924 (GF)

Hickman, Franklin, Introduction to the Psychology of Religious Experience, N. Y., Abingdon, 1926.

Hickman, Franklin, The Possible Self, N. Y., Abingdon, 1933 (TPS)

Hocking, William E., Human Nature and Its Remaking, Yale University Press, 1933 (HNR)

Knudsen, Albert C., *The Doctrine of Redemption*, N. Y., Abingdon, 1933, (TLR)

McDougall, William, *Outline of Psychology*, Scribners, 1923, (OPP)

---


Stevens, Samuel L., *Religion in Life Adjustments*, N. Y., Abingdon, 1930 (RIA)


Thompson, Mehran, K., *The Springs of Human Action*, N. Y., Appleton, 1927 (TSHA)

Vieth, Paul H., *Objectives In Religious Education*, Harper Brothers, 1930 (ORE)


Woodruff, Lorande Loss, *Animal Biology*, N. Y., Macmillan, 1933 (AB)

**Magazine Article**