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The Roman administration of Asia under the Republic

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THE ROMAN ADMINISTRATION OF ASIA UNDER THE REPUBLIC

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Upon the death of Alexander's great general Antigonus in 301 B.C., Alexander's empire fell into three main parts in Europe, Asia, and Africa with one of his generals or one of their successors at the head of each. Macedonia, in Europe, was in the hands of Antigonus who attempted to maintain control of Greece; most of the territory of the former Persian Empire in Asia was under the rule of Alexander's general Seleucus; in Africa, Egypt was held by Ptolemy, one of the cleverest of Alexander's Macedonian leaders. Besides these there was the kingdom of Pergamum in western Asia Minor, ruled by Attalus I (241-197). Since Attalus was not descended from one of the genuine successors, the Attalidae were not recognized as equals by the occupants of the three great thrones. Bithynia ruled by Prusias was likewise a meaner power. The greater part of northern Asia Minor had never really been conquered by Alexander while the inland district traversed by the upper waters of the Sangarius and the Halys Rivers was held by the Galatians, a barbarous people who devastated Macedonia and penetrated far into Greece.

Seleucus and his descendants were the chief heirs of Alexander, for they held the larger part of his empire, extending from the Aegean to the frontiers of India. Its boundaries were not fixed and its enormous extent made it very difficult to govern and maintain. The Seleucidae gave special attention to the region around the northeast corner of the Mediterranean reaching to the Euphrates and
here on the lower Orontes, Seleucus founded Antioch, a city which became the commercial rival of Alexandria and the greatest seat of commerce in the northern Mediterranean.

Antiochus III had succeeded to what was left of the vast dominions of Seleucus. The core of his kingdom was Syria to which he added some of the lost eastern provinces and "Hollow Syria" which had been annexed by the Ptolemies. Then, he turned his ambitions to the West to restore the shaken authority of his house in that direction. The fleet of the Ptolemies hampered the commercial development and prosperity of the Seleucidae who found it difficult to reach Greece for trade, troops, or colonists. Likewise the Egyptians held complete command of the Aegean and thwarted Antigonus II in every effort to control Greece.

As a result, Philip V and Antiochus in 203 B.C. formed an alliance against Egypt and made a secret agreement to divide between themselves all of the possessions of the Ptolemies except those in Egypt.

Antiochus seized Palestine and Philip occupied Greek cities and islands on the Asia Minor border, some of which the Ptolemies had ruled and some of which were now actually free. Egypt, whose present King was a mere boy, was wholly helpless and begged Rome for aid. Aetolia, angered at the loss of Thessaly, did likewise. Rhodes and Attalus, who were already at war trying to block the plundering expeditions of Philip, asked help from Rome. Furthermore, Rome remembered that Hannibal had induced Macedonia to combine with him against her and since a combination had been arranged
between Philip and Antiochus, the Romans felt obliged to turn eastward and crush Philip, lest an increase in his power might prove disastrous to Rome.

The Greek states had no reason to support the rule of Macedonia over them and Antiochus was too busy seizing the Asiatic territory of Egypt to send any help to Macedonia so that a year after the close of the Hannibalic War Philip found himself without strong allies, face to face with a Roman army. Finally, the massive Macedonian phalanx was obliged to meet the onset of the Roman legions and on the field of Cynoscephalae in 197 the Macedonian army was routed and Macedonia became a vassal state under Rome. As allies of Rome, the Greek states were then granted their freedom by the Romans.

This war with Macedon brought the Romans into conflict with Antiochus the Great, the Seleucid King, who now tried to seize some of Philip's former possessions along the coast of Asia Minor, some of which the Romans had declared free and others of which they intended to give back to Ptolemy. Furthermore, Antiochus proceeded to occupy the Thracean coast of the Balkan peninsula which Philip was surrendering. The Romans viewed with anxiety a war with this powerful Asiatic empire especially since Hannibal, expelled from Carthage, was now in Greece advising Antiochus. Then, too, the Aetolians, who had not been permitted by the Romans to occupy Thessaly, sent envoys to Antiochus who with a hastily collected army sailed for Greece in 192 B.C., but was defeated at Thermopylae. He therefore sailed for Asia Minor.
to gather a large army, but found little help in the undispatched troops of the East when confronted by a Roman army under the two Scipios. At Magnesia, in 190 B.C., Rome overthrew the East led by Antiochus and the lands of Asia Minor eastward to the Halys River submitted to Roman control. In the distribution of the spoils Rhodes was granted most of Caria and Lycia. The King of Pergamum, Eumenes II, gained the Thracian Chersonese, Lydia, Phrygia, and part of Caria.

Rome showed great wisdom in the division of the spoils in this way for she was not burdened by the retention of territory which she did not want and which would strain her resources to occupy and protect. This burden was laid upon Eumenes II who would be a protection against Antiochus and a rival to watch Philip. On the other hand, the new kingdom of Asia, formed of twenty different nations, without unity, without military strength, without frontiers, and surrounded by powerful rivals, had none of the conditions requisite for a durable state. The alliance with Rome was only disguised dependence - the authority of Rome now extended to the Taurus.

From 188 B.C. to 133 B.C. not a Roman soldier appeared in Asia, but the commissioners of the Senate were always keeping watch upon the Asiatic princes and intervened with authority in all affairs with the design of degrading the native rulers in the eyes of their subjects, exacted rich gifts in order to keep them always burdened and forbade them to enter war.
During this period in Pergamum Eumenes II was left on the throne till his death in 159 and was succeeded by his brother Attalus II who reigned until 138 B.C. in perfect accord with the Roman government. He had supported the Roman nominee in Cappadocia, had been a check on troublesome movements in Bithynia, and had intervened in the affairs of the Syrian succession in obedience to Roman wishes. At his death the kingdom passed to his nephew Attalus III who reigned until 133 B.C. and bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people as a free protectorate.

The kingdom of Attalus was not large, but was very rich, for through it passed all the most frequented trade routes between the East and the West. Here were contracts to farm, tribute and taxes on the land, customs and excise duties to collect, more valuable than in any other province of the empire. It can easily be seen that the gift of Attalus was to be a fatal one if its consequences are to be judged according to the ideas which moved Tiberius Gracchus and his friends to propose the agrarian law. By accepting this bequest Rome was setting foot in the East which according to some Romans was the seat of corruption. Then, an opportunity was offered for the extension of Roman commerce, that other vehicle for dangerous riches and evil example. Tiberius proposed that the treasures bequeathed to the Romans by Attalus should be used to furnish the poorer of the new colonists with agricultural implements and that the organization of the new province which was to be known by the name of Asia should be handed over to
the people. The second proposal which deprived the senate of the control of the new province was highly revolutionary, for it threatened one of the most ancient and important prerogatives of that assembly.

The less important powers of Asia Minor during this period were Bithynia, Pontus, Cappadocia, and Syria. The people of Bithynia were of Thracian origin and the wealth of the kingdom grew with the development of Greek or semi-Greek cities, encouraged by the wily and ambitious kings. It lay on the line of the Euxine trade and the Bithynians were sea-faring people. But the kings were often in trouble with their neighbors with the result that this kingdom never became a power of first rank.

In 90 B.C. on the death of the king of Bithynia, Mithridates dispossessed his legitimate successor, Nicomedes III, and with the help of Tigranes, King of Armenia, he reconquered Cappadocia, whence he had been expelled by the Romans in 92 and placed one of his sons on the throne. The Roman senate sent an embassy to restore the two exiled kings to their thrones and Mithridates was forced to submit.

Manlius Aquilius, the consul, was not at all pleased with the complaisance of Mithridates, for he had hoped to conduct a lucrative war against Pontus. On the other hand, the King of Bithynia while in exile had contracted many debts and to secure the sum required Aquilius urged Nicomedes to make a raid into Pontus. The result was war between Rome and Mithridates. Mithridates reconquered Cappadocia, defeated the Roman troops in Bithynia, drove out Nicomedes III, captured
captured the Roman fleet, and invaded the province of Asia. From Pergamum where he had established his capital, Mithridates turned to Greece where those who had been oppressed by the Romans looked toward him as their liberator.

In 89 Mithridates despatched an army across Thrace to Macedonia and a fleet to the Aegean. At this news a great part of Greece including Athens, which had hitherto been Rome's most faithful friend in Greece, rebelled. The parts which did not rebel were easily conquered by the army of Mithridates because the Gauls and Thracians, instigated from Pontus, had invaded Macedonia and the governor of that province could send no assistance. In short, the whole Roman empire in the East was tottering. Under the command of Sulla Athens was conquered and at Chaeronea in Boeotia the Mithridatic forces were conquered. This produced a profound impression on the whole of the East and put new courage into the pro-Roman party throughout Asia. In the Spring of 85 the Romans invaded Asia, defeated the forces of Mithridates, and took Pergamum. Lucullus appeared off the coast of Asia and was inciting the cities to revolt so that it was best for the King of Pontus to conclude peace immediately and the treaty was signed at Dardanus in the Troad in 84. According to this, Mithridates was to retain the ancient kingdom of Pontus, receive the title of friend and ally of the Roman people, and pay an indemnity of two thousand talents in addition to dismantling a certain number of warships. Sulla granted an amnesty to the revolted
cities of Asia, but left them to the mercy of the money
lenders and the barbarous raids of the Eastern pirates.

At the end of 75 the King of Bithynia died leaving
his kingdom to the Romans. To accept the legacy was
equivalent to declaring war on Mithridates, for he could
never allow the Romans to establish themselves in Bithynia.
The senate hesitated and was rather inclined to refuse
this succession, but could not resist the pressure of
public opinion and so annexed Bithynia. The death and
will of Nicomedes brought Mithridates to immediate action
and in 74 he sent one part of his army to Bithynia; with
the rest he invaded Asia, this time as the ally of Sertorius
whose representative led the way. This representative, Marcus Marius, entered the cities of the province
wearing the insignia of a pro consul, liberated them in
Sertorius' name, and proclaimed a partial repudiation of
debt. Under Lucullus who had served with Sulla in the
first Mithridatic War, Asia was freed and Bithynia was
conquered.

Unless the Kingdom of Pontus was destroyed, it was
obvious that Rome could not securely possess the province
of Asia. Already Mithridates was retiring into the in-
terior of his kingdom to prepare a new army and was summon-
ing to his assistance Tigranes, King of Armenia, Macarus,
Viceroy of Taurus, and the Scythians. The Romans realized
that if a final conflict with the King of Pontus was in-
evitable, it should come now while he was still weak from
the blows he had received in Asia and Bithynia. Therefore,
Lucullus without waiting for instructions from Rome crossed Bithynia and Galatia, entered Pontus and defeated Mithridates who fled to Armenia. That country under Tigranes had extended the borders of its kingdom to the north as far as the Caucasus and had conquered practically all the dominions of the Seleucidae, Cilicia, Syria, and Phoenicia and had invaded several provinces of the Kingdom of Parthia. Lucullus now wished to invade and conquer Armenia and for this purpose while he awaited the complete subjection of Pontus, he sent to Tigranes to demand the surrender of Mithridates. In 69 B.C. Mithridates won the aid of Tigranes of Armenia, but Lucullus won a battle at Tigranocerta without being able to force any concessions. Again in 68 he defeated the two kings at Artaxata, but his soldiers would not follow up success. They thought that he avoided reasonable terms in order to extend his command, and in this attitude they were encouraged by secret emissaries sent out by his enemies in Rome. In 67, while Lucullus delayed in Mesopotamia, two of his lieutenants, who were holding Pontus, were defeated. The news of this was enough to decide his enemies at Rome to act. Pompey's coalition was now in power and Lucullus was recalled, for his conduct implied a real political revolution, which destroyed a vital part of Sulla's restoration. For the senatorial policy which was traditionally prudent he was substituting an aggressive imperialism, a bold policy of expansion which courted dangers and difficulties.
While Pompey was busy clearing the sea of pirates, Manilius, the tribune, working in the interest of Pompey and the capitalists, proposed that Pompey be given charge of the war against Mithridates with full command over the East for an indefinite term, and with full power to make whatever terms he saw fit with all states and nations concerned. The senate opposed this partly because it gave extraordinary powers to one man, partly because the Senate felt that it alone should control foreign affairs, as it had in the days of the great wars. The people, on the other hand, were tired of the long war and wished to see it finished; they also desired to honor Pompey, who had restored tribunician legislation, and they wished to establish another precedent in support of the theory of popular sovereignty by passing the measure in the tribal assembly. The capitalists were, however, most intimately concerned, for Pompey was in a position to open several new provinces, and might be induced to introduce in them the old contract system of tax-gatherine which had formerly proved so lucrative to the equestrian corporations. Here is a striking instance of business interests laboring in favor of territorial expansion. The command was given to Pompey by popular vote.

Toward the end of 66 when Mithridates had gained con-

Ferrero & trol of Pontus and Tigranes was ravaging Cappadocia, Pompey invaded
Barbagallo Pontus and succeeded in driving out Mithridates. Then, he
p.383 began the conquest of Armenia, but Tigranes voluntarily
submitted and was received as the friend and ally of the
Roman people. Mithridates escaped beyond the Caucasus to the Greco-Scythian settlements about the sea of Azov where he planned to raise new forces with which to invade Italy. In 64, Pompey set up an Oriental court at Ferrero & Amisus where he distributed, enlarged, and altered kingdoms. He gave Paphlagonia and Colchis each a new monarch and divided the territory of Pontus among eleven cities in each of which he placed a Roman governor. Next, he directed his attention to the conquest of Syria which freed by Lucullus from Armenia had reverted to a condition of complete anarchy. The Greek cities in Syria called for help and Pompey proclaimed it a Roman province.

In 63 B.C. Pompey went to Damascus to settle a great internal dispute which had arisen in Judaea and which had resulted in a civil war among the pretenders to the throne. Those who were in power did not wish to bow to the decision of the Roman general and he was therefore compelled to lay siege to Jerusalem which was annexed to the province of Syria. While in Palestine Pompey received the news that Mithridates, failing to raise an army of invasion in the far North, had committed suicide. Pompey now devoted a year to the complete reorganization of Asia. Bithynia and Pontus became a province, Asia remained as it was, Cilicia was enlarged. Thus Rome now had four provinces in the East: Asia, Bithynia, Cilicia, and Syria. Galatia, Cappadocia, and various small states were made into buffer client-kings. Armenia was reorganized as a friendly kingdom and Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, was permitted to reign in Tauris.
In ten years the consequences of the momentous step taken by Rome in accepting the legacy of the King of Pergamum had matured. Rome had become an Asiatic power. She was now the greatest power in the East and she had become so thanks to two men, Lucullus and Pompey, seconded at Rome by small but active groups of politicians.

Perhaps it may be interesting to review the condition of Asia before the Roman rule to see what benefits were derived from the Romans. During the fifty years which preceded the establishment of the Romans in Asia, we know very little of the local history; writers speak of it only in its relation to national history. According to Olivier Rayet, "The two centuries which elapsed between the conquest of Alexander and the death of Attalus were a time of greatest prosperity in all the cities and towns of Asia Minor." The wars of the Attalidae, Seleucidae, and Ptolemies were not disastrous for the country and the authority of the conqueror was always too insecure to be able to become too oppressive. In the midst of these continuous struggles the populous and rich cities succeeded in managing their own affairs and obtaining privileges by putting their fidelity at a high price. The greatest commercial security and industrial progress was the compensation which they received in return for the taxes which they had to pay.

Under the rule of the house of Attalus, wars diminished; the people were not driven by the mad impulse to conquer and they did not attempt to resist Rome. Except for an expedition against the Galatians under Eumenes II and a
successful campaign in Bithynia, we do not find the life of Pergamum in a state of disturbance. In fact many of the towns were free from tribute in 130. Certain of the kings even attempted to benefit the finer arts of the country. Attalus II used his riches to protect art and literature; he took the lead in great industrial and commercial enterprises. Eumenes II, the predecessor of Attalus, was a great builder to whom Pergamum owed much. His desire to create a library which would rival that of Alexandria had been responsible for the invention and use of parchment.

This comparative peace was not accomplished by the rulers of the country alone, for during the second century the hand of Rome continued to be felt in Asia. She was already the mistress; she had forbidden Antiochus III to wage war. She dictated her wishes to the kings of Pergamum as well as to their neighbors, for more than one ambassador of the Attalidae brought back from Italy a definite policy to follow. Thus, the Roman regime began with a disguised protectorate and we shall see that this first form of rule had been more satisfactory and milder than the direct government of the Romans.

When Rome received the bequest of Attalus in 133 B.C., the Senate conformed to the desires of Attalus by giving autonomy and immunity from tribute to the Greek cities of the kingdom. The royal estates were large and these the censors were ordered to rent out
for what they would bring; the country districts settled by oriental peasants of mixed stock were ordered to pay their tribute to Rome as they had in the past to the King. But the Senate with characteristic dislike of extending Rome's rule over troublesome tribes, assigned the eastern portion of the kingdom of the Attalidae to the client kings so as to release the Romans from the defense of the frontier and thereby from the necessity of maintaining a standing force in Asia. Eastern Phrygia was given to Mithridates of Pontus; Lycaonia to the King of Cappadocia; the Pamphylian and Pisidian tribes were set free to misrule themselves. The European possessions in Thrace were annexed to the province of Macedonia. The rest of the territory including Mysia, Lydia, and Caria was organized as a new Roman province which was designated by the name of the continent in which it lay. The land was released from the taxes which had been paid to Pergamus and was treated with the same moderation as Hellas and Macedonia. Thus the most considerable state in Asia Minor became a Roman province.

The neighboring princes and most of the Greek cities which had been under the control of the Attalidae acknowledged the validity of the will. But Aristonicus, the natural son of Eumenes II, claimed the throne. Phocaea and other towns joined him, but he was defeated at sea off Cyme by the Ephesians, who saw that a steady adherence to Rome was the only way of preserving their privileges, and he was obliged to flee into the interior. The movement was believed to have died away when he suddenly reappeared at
the head of an army of slaves whom he had called to freedom, mastered the Lydian towns of Thyatira and Apollonis as well as a portion of the Attalic townships and summoned bands of Thracian free-lancers to join his standard. The struggle was serious. There were no Roman troops in Asia; the Asiatic free cities and the contingents of the client-princes of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Pontus, and Armenia could not withstand the pretender. He penetrated by force of arms into Colophon, Samos, and Myndus, and already ruled over almost all his father's kingdom when at the close of 131 B.C. a Roman army landed in Asia. Its commander, the consul and pontifex maximus, Publius Licinius Crassus Mucianus, was about to besiege the pretender in Lucae, but during his preparations he allowed himself to be surprised and was made a prisoner in person by a Thracian band. A short time afterwards, Aristonicus was attacked by Marcus Perpenna, the successor of Crassus; his army was dispersed, he was besieged, taken prisoner in Stratonicea and was executed in Rome.

The war seemed ended by the capture of Aristonicus. According to the custom constantly observed for arranging the condition of conquered countries, the Senate appointed a commission of ten members to organize the new province with the consul M. Aquillius. All the information which we have about the government of M. Aquillius, which lasted more than two years, is contained in two lines from Florus:

"Aquillius Asiatici belli reliquias confecit, mixtis
(necess! veneno fontibus ad deditio nem quarumdam urbi um." The consul merely brought the war to a close. This war did not end with the defeat of Aristonicus; even after his surrender, his partisans continued the struggle in the upper part of Mysia and Caria did not seem to the consul Perperna sufficiently pacified to withdraw the whole army. From the inscription of Cyzicus we find that the Roman legions did not fight alone but were supported by contingents from the allied Greek cities who were ordered so often by the generals to send additional troops that cities like Bargylia appealed to have their burdens lightened. We also find that decrees were issued to celebrate by festivals and sacrifices the successes of the Romans.

While he was bringing to submission the last partisans of Andronicus, M. Aquillius was busied with the construction of roads in the new province. Under his rule were built the main roads of the province, for several thousand mile-stones have been found bearing in Greek and Latin the inscription: "M. Aquillius M'f. cos." The starting point was Ephesus and we know that there were main roads from Ephesus to Sardis, to Tyre and from Ephesus to Pergamum by way of Smyrna. Of the several secondary roads one is found which starts at Elaea and joins the road to Ephesus at Pergamum. Of course, all these main roads existed before M. Aquillius under the Attalidae and Seleucidae, for under the Persians and the kings of Lydia the main roads connected
the principal cities; the work of the consul consisted in improving and keeping in repair the old roads and in erecting mile-stones which indicated the distance. If the roads of Asia, like those of Italy, were then paved with those great flag-stones which characterize the Roman roads, the work of M. Aquillius must have been enormous. The government of Aquillius lasted for three years, from 129-127. At his return to Rome he received the honor of a triumph which is recorded in the Corpus Latinarum Inscriptionum I, p. 460 "M. Aquillius M. f. M. n. proc. ex Asia, anno DCXXVII, III Idus Novembres."

According to ancient custom, it was the Senate which determined the program to be undertaken in the province. If we accept the letter of Strabo, the constitution of the province of Asia did not change from the time of the conquest until the reign of Tiberius. We should, however, make a great mistake to assign to the time of Aquillius all the conditions which we know about the period after the war with Mithridates, for in addition to the territorial changes which were considerable, there were great changes in the local government, especially when Sulla reorganized the province.

The Roman people, the heirs of Attalus III, were considered to have the right to dispose of the possessions which had been bequeathed to them and so they divided the territory which had composed the kingdom of Pergamum. In the time of Cicero, the Chersonnese and the Thracian districts were part of the province of Macedonia. The
island of Aegina was added to the province of Greece (Corpus Inscrip. Peloponn.); in Asia, Lycia was given to the son of the king of Cappadocia who had perished in the war; Phrygia was given to the king of Pontus, Mithridates VI, but was retaken at his death in 120, and definitely annexed as a province. Pisidia, which had to be reconquered, was later included in the province of Cilicia. Caria, south of the Maeander, which had never belonged to the kingdom of Pergamum, was added to the province of Asia.

In the province we must distinguish the native people whose organization we do not know, but who were subjects of Rome and the Greek cities which were nominally independent as a result of the liberation which Attalus bequeathed to them in his will. The Roman Senate confirmed all the bequests of the King and his predecessors and there is nothing to indicate that Aquillius and the ten commissioners who had been appointed to determine the program for the province had changed the decision of the Senate; on the contrary, in a decree to the people of Pergamum they are called the allies of the Romans. As for those cities whose freedom and autonomy had been confirmed either after the defeat of Antiochus or when Caria was recaptured by the Rhodians, their condition was not changed since the will of Attalus transferred to the Romans no power over them. The Greek cities in Asia were in the same situation as Athens and Sparta in Greece. They kept their municipal government, council, assembly
of magistrates, the management of their finances as well as their individual laws and their courts. They had the right to send ambassadors and to have recourse to foreign arbitration to regulate their external differences. Two examples of this are given to us: the first is a decree of Bargylia, engraved on a stone on which was found the inscription of Posidonius. This inscription goes back to the years which followed the war against Aristonicus and is the continuation of the decree which enumerates the services of Posidonios. He had settled the differences which arose between Rhodes and Stratonicus by making them submit their grievances to the arbitration of Bargylia. The cause of the dispute between the two towns is not indicated in the fragment which has been preserved, but we know that several cities had voted to send an ambassador to the Senate when Posidonius persuaded them to submit to his country the task of settling their dispute. In this case there is no question of the intervention of the governor of Asia. Rhodes was then free and an ally of the Roman people; Stratonicus had likewise the same independence since she could address herself directly to the Senate, waive the decision to a foreign city. Bargylia, likewise, sent ambassadors to Rhodes and to Stratonicus and accepted the role of arbitrator in their quarrel and did all this without the approval of Rome being necessary.

The other example is still more striking because it dates from the pro-consulship of Mucius Scaevola i.e.
from the time when the province of Asia was formed. It is a convention between Sardis and Ephesus through the intervention of Pergamum when some people of one of the cities were injured in the other city. Other conventions of the same kind were held to arrange between these two cities reciprocal obligations in case of war. Finally, the people of Ephesus and Sardis promised that none of their inhabitants would permit enemies to cross their territories, favor the levy of mercenaries, or lend help in any way. If either of these two peoples should break this agreement, the other would have the right to call the offender to judgment before a third city, drawn by lot from a list which they drew up together. This proves that these states were free and independent and acted as such. On the other hand, the Greek cities of Asia were not entirely independent, for they were too anxious to conciliate the favor of the Roman governor.

Rome had a unique method of keeping these cities under her control, for they were bound to her either as friends or friendly allies. This last title demanded that they furnish ships in case of war or the suppression of piracy, send contingents of soldiers, furnish supplies of wheat, clothing, or money to Rome. The privileges of Roman citizens and especially of the negotiores, who formed powerful companies everywhere, and after 123 the transactions of the publicans put the Greek of even the free cities at the mercy of the Roman magistrates and the Republic. It is certain, however, that during the first years the Greek cities in the province of Asia had to pay neither tribute
nor a tax to the Roman people. Some had enjoyed this exemption since the defeat of Antiochus; others, as the kingdom of Pergamum, were freed from the tribute which they paid to the Attalidae.

During the Republican epoch from the beginning of the Roman occupation of Asia until the war with Mithridates (130-90) there was a period of peace. For forty years the Senate was absorbed by civil disorders and paid little attention to the East. The provincial governors exercised almost uncontrolled powers in the provinces and seem to have considered Asia as a treasure-house where Roman avidity might be satisfied.

One of the first objects of the Romans was to put an end to all leagues and combinations which might prove dangerous to their rule. In this they only followed that rule of "divide et impera" which had proved so successful in Italy. To break up a province as far as possible into a number of isolated units was the key-note of their policy. Even before Rome had fully taken over a country and submitted it to her rule, we find her at work destroying any national unity it might possess and subdividing it and isolating its different parts. Thus Strabo writes: "The places situated next to these towards the south and extending to Mt. Taurus are so intermingled that parts of Phrygia, Lydia, Caria, and Mysia running into one another are difficult to be distinguished. The Romans have contributed not a little to produce this confusion by not dividing the people according to tribes, but following
another principle have arranged them according to jurisdictions in which they have appointed days for holding courts and administering justice." The same ends were secured by the immense variety of rights and privileges that existed over the area of a single province. The towns might be either free towns or allied towns, or Roman colonies, or municipia with Roman or Latin rights, or simply ordinary provincial towns without either special privilege or special disqualification. It is obvious how isolated and independent would become the interests of each single town within a Roman province. From Rome a town might get everything, but from its neighbors nothing.

Directly after the annexation of Asia, the Senate dispatched a commission of ten senators whose business it was, in combination with the general, to settle the future government of the province. The norm of administration thus established was called the "lex provinciae." The Lex Aquillia divided Asia into judicial and administrative districts; it defined and regulated the status and privileges of the component parts of the province; it established the principles and methods of taxation applicable within the province; it laid down the rules for the conduct of trials and administration of justice with special reference to the extent and procedure of local jurisdiction; it supervised and created or amended the system of local government in the urban and rural districts which strictly belonged to the province. Much, however, remained which the "provincial law" did not or could not determine. Every governor, therefore,
on his appointment to and before his arrival in a province issued an edict which explained his proposed method of administration in financial and legal questions. Such an edict tended to be largely traditional in character and was also founded on the principles of Roman law, which, moreover, the governor could declare he proposed to observe in all cases not covered by the edict. On the whole, the system tended towards an increasing uniformity of administration and wider diffusion of the principles of Roman law.

Cicero says, "Let Asia consider this, that no calamity of foreign war or intestine discord would have been wanting to her if she were not protected by this Empire." Rome put an end to riots in the towns and to brigandage in the country. She exacted a tribute, but then, says Cicero, the Asiatics paid tribute before, and some of them more than they do now. It was no loss to the country that it should be rid of its petty kings; Roman rule at its worst was better than that of a Pharnaces. "In the whole peninsula of Asia Minor the Roman conquest had nowhere suppressed a truly independent, rich, and powerful political life, because nowhere had it met with such a life." Where such a life did in some measure exist in these countries, it was not national but municipal and Rome interfered to a very slight extent with the internal affairs of the towns. Where they found municipal arrangements existing, the Romans let them alone and even encouraged them; where they did not exist, they made it their first object to introduce them. The amount of
independence enjoyed by these towns was considerable and all the evidence goes to prove that the life that went on in them was a busy and active one.

The heaviest duty imposed upon the province was the tax which was payable in different forms. At the moment of annexation the heirs of Attalus in order to conciliate the favor of the population had promised the abolition of the ancient tribute which they had paid to the sovereign of Pergamum. Many of the towns helped in the uprising of Aristonicus and in return the tribute was relieved upon them by Rome. From the beginning it was understood that Asia was to be the source of much wealth for the republic. Tiberius Gracchus proposed to distribute the wealth of Attalus among the new-landholders of Italy so that they might procure the implements and stock which were needed. Under the direction of Gaius Gracchus, in 123, the Sempronian Law was passed which organized the financial system of the new province and not only burdened the province, which had hitherto been almost free from taxation, with the most extensive indirect and direct taxes, particularly the ground-tenth, but also enacted that the collection of these taxes should be exposed to auction for the province as a whole and in Rome - a rule which practically excluded the provincials from participation and called into existence an association of capitalists for the collection of the tribute.

While a gold mine was thus opened for the mercantile class and the members of the new partnership constituted a
great financial power, a "senate of merchants", a
definite sphere of public action was at the same time
assigned to them in the jury courts. The field of
criminal procedure was among the Romans from the first
very narrow and was still further narrowed by Gracchus.
Most cases, both those which related to public crimes
and civil cases, had been decided either by judges or by
commissions. Gracchus, however, transferred the func-
tions of jury men both in strictly civil cases and in
cases of standing and temporary commissions to the
equestrian order, and directed a new list of jurymen
to be annually formed from all persons of equestrian
rating; the senators were directly excluded from judicial
functions and the young men of senatorial families by
fixing a certain age limit. It is not improbable that
the selection of jurymen was made to fall chiefly on the
same men who played the leading part in the great mer-
cantile associations, particularly those who farmed the
revenues in Asia and elsewhere just because they had a
very close personal interest in sitting in the courts.
If the lists of jurymen and the societies of publicans
thus coincided, we can readily see that the moneyed
aristocracy was not only united into a compact and priv-
ileged class on the solid basis of material interests,
but also as a judicial and controlling power, formed
part of the state and took its place almost on a foot-
ing of equality by the side of the ruling aristocracy.
When the provincial governors were called to a reckoning,
the senator had to await a decision involving his civic
existence at the hands no longer of his peers but of the great merchants and bankers.

Gracchus warmly disapproved the disgraceful spoliation of the provinces and not only instituted proceedings of wholesome severity in particular cases, but also procured the abolition of the thoroughly inefficient senatorial courts before which Scipio Aemilianus had vainly staked his whole influence to bring the most noted criminals to punishment. Yet he, at the same time, by the introduction of courts composed of merchants, surrendered the provincials with their hands fettered to the party of material interests and therefore to a despotism still more unscrupulous than that of the aristocracy had been. He introduced into Asia an unbearable form of taxation just because he needed the party of moneyed men and also required new and comprehensive resources to meet his distributions of grain and the other burdens newly imposed on the finances.

Furthermore, the Lex Sempronia of Gaius Gracchus provided that the Senate should each year decide before the election of the consuls what provinces they were to govern. It did not deprive the senators of their power to decide what the provinces for the consuls of the current year should be, but by obliging them to decide this point before the elections, it sought to prevent favoritism in one case and unfairness in another and thus to deprive them of means of influence.
The governor of a Roman province united in his single person civil and military authority. He was commander-in-chief and supreme judge and largely interfered in matters of finance. The special feature of the Roman system was its union in one single head and hand of functions which the modern system takes care to separate. The governor was absolute lord in his own domain with supreme military control over all the troops in the province. His civil jurisdiction was limited only by the lex provinciae, by his own edict, and by provincial rights and privileges of recognized validity. If he chose to disregard these limits, there was no one in the province to prevent him. His criminal jurisdiction was subject to appeal only when he condemned Roman citizens and then only by custom and not by law. There were laws which forbade him to accept presents, to make purchases in his province, and to exact other than strictly defined official requisitions. He could turn the flank of, or mock at, these laws with good hope of impunity. Only native worth, not his own education, or the example of others, or the appeal to some familiar standard of honor, or any religious sanction, could deliver a Roman from the temptations in which such a position was certain to ensnare him. Though all due allowance must be made for exaggeration, the evidence that the condition of the provinces under the Republican government was evil is conclusive. The long series of laws to punish extortion, the "leges de repetundis", may show that the government was alive to
the evil, but they also show that the passing of laws provided no real remedy. However the composition of the jury at Rome might vary, every Republican jury had interested and selfish motives, pecuniary or political, which disposed it to condemn the upright governor who sought the provincials' good and to acquit the extortionate. Neither law, nor any effective control by the home government, nor to any great extent fear of consequences had power to deter the provincial governor from walking crookedly. There existed no public opinion in favor of uprightness. Neither Roman religion nor any Roman code of morals cared for the interests of those who were not Romans.

It was a defect in the arrangements of the imperial Republic that the home magistracies and the provincial governorships had never been properly correlated to each other. Praetors ruled provinces abroad or discharged departmental duties at home. In case of a foreign war, such as those with Jugurtha, the Cimbri, or Mithridates, the practice was to send out a consul. The frequent necessity for extension of commands had long been turning the pro-magistracy into a normal appliance of Roman government for which it had not been intended. In short, it was largely a matter of chance whether a magistrate or a pro-magistrate at any given time presided over any given province. The praetors at home had enough to do and Sulla had in hand schemes that would find employment for several more. He undertook to get rid of the inconveniences of the present haphazard
practice by a reform which offered a simple and logical solution of the difficulties. He accepted the pro-magistracy as the normal status of provincial governorships: a man was to serve first as a magistrate at home, then as a pro-magistrate abroad. This meant the creation of an imperial provincial service beside the home service. The former would be the crown of the latter, the consummation of an official career. It was a momentous step, for it openly recognized the imperial character of the Republic as its most important quality.

The scheme of Sulla in 85 B.C. provided that the number of praetors should be raised from six to eight; with the two consuls there would thus be ten regular magistrates with "imperium" every year. These ten were all to spend their year of office in Rome, discharging administrative or judicial duties; after this, their imperium was to be prolonged and they were as pro-consuls or pro-praetors to fill the ten provincial governorships. The Senate was to decide which provinces were to be pro-consular and which pro-praetorian for the year following and the consuls and praetors were to apportion each class respectively among themselves by lot or private arrangement in the usual way.

Pompey did little to change Rome's "laissez-faire" policy in provincial administration. He "Romanized" no more than had his predecessors; indeed it may rather be said that he continued Alexander's policy of Hellenizing, for when in the rural districts he founded cities in order
to facilitate administration, he thereby formed centers of Greek culture since Greek was the language of intercourse and trade in that region. In such towns, schools, theaters, and libraries sprang up, but no one for a moment considered imposing the Latin language upon them, the Romans least of all. Even the pro consuls sent to the East translated into Greek such public decrees as they issued. With the local governments Pompey interfered not at all unless he was called upon to do so. The towns, and there were some five hundred in Asia alone, were generally democratic; the town-meeting was the law-making body, not a curia of one hundred city fathers as in Italian municipalities. Except when he was asked to frame a new charter, Pompey allowed this democratic system to stand. When, however, he founded or refounded a town, he was apt to adopt the more oligarchic Italian plan, for like all Romans of position he instinctively believed in the steadying influence of property and in the superior wisdom of those who had property. In general, then, Pompey disturbed existing customs as little as possible. The towns continued to manage their own affairs and the native courts to settle disputes as before without reference to Roman law. All that the Roman governor was called upon to do was to see that law and order prevailed and that the tithes due Rome did not fall into arrears, that the frontiers were protected, and that such Roman citizens as happened to be in the province should in case of dispute have access to his presence for an interpretation.
according to the principles of Roman law.

From the time of Gaius Gracchus the theory took shape that all provincial land was the actual property of the Roman people and that the usufruct alone was enjoyed by the inhabitants. For this privilege they were required to make payments to the real owners either in money or in kind. Hence the idea of taxation became inevitably associated with that of "provincia". As a result, when the Romans received Asia as the bequest of Attalus, they felt that they were privileged to enjoy all the fruits of taxation in that country.

Gaius Gracchus needed to find a source of income to meet the increased state expenses. If we are to believe the words which Appian puts into the mouth of Antony at Ephesus in 41 B.C., the people of the new province had been free from taxation since they passed under the dominion of Rome, and the imposition of taxes was the work of Roman demagogues, especially of Gaius Gracchus. But this should not be taken for serious history. That a reduction of the dues paid to the kings took place is quite possible and the local authorities may have been left to collect them. The important change introduced by the Lex Sempronia de provincia Asia was the introduction of the contract system of tithe-gathering instead of the Attalid system of fixed community contributions. The public companies at Rome were asked to bid for the collection, deposit the cash for the whole contract at Rome, and then collect from
the communities one-tenth of the annual produce of each farmer. This is the Gracchan law which has been most severely criticized. It was not long before the companies began to collect more than was due them and to lend money at usurious rates of interest to the communities which did not command the ready cash. The publicans, as the tax-gatherers were called, came to be looked upon as the leeches of the province, but there is no charge in ancient authors that Gracchus had foreseen this evil and had intended to betray the provincials to unscrupulous Roman business men. At first sight the new device seemed good to Rome and provincials alike. The communities found it difficult to pay even a small cash tribute in years of drought which were frequent in Asia. In their climate it would seem an act of mercy to require a percentage of the crop rather than a fixed sum, which was difficult to find in lean years. Rome would benefit since the companies would bid in cash so that the treasury would know what to count upon. To foresee the evils of extortion was not easy, for the companies had carried many public contracts in the lifetime of G. Gracchus and even under his supervision and they had done excellent work honestly. Why should they not be trusted with work abroad? If any abuses should arise, it would be the pro consul's business to complain and guard the interests of the communities. The real evils arose in a later day when the system spread all over the East. Then, the companies grew so powerful that they became a strong political influence which pro
consuls feared to oppose. We are almost certain that Gaius could not foresee this. His law was meant to aid the communities and Rome alike, and it was devised on the basis of the faith that he had gained in the public corporations through his dealings with them. The Senate's chief objection to his measure was based not on a desire to aid the provincials, but on the fact that the law extended political recognition to a class of wealthy people generally disregarded by the nobility, and that, though an administrative measure, it was submitted not to the Senate but to the assembly.

Let us examine the influence of the publicani upon Roman politics. The publicani are best known as collectors of provincial taxes, but this was by no means their only or original function. They undertook the erection of public buildings and the performance of other services to the State. The history of the later Republic illustrates the enormous influence which these great societates could exercise on Roman politics. By 167 B.C. it could be said:

"Ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut ius publicum vanum aut libertatem sociis nullam esse" and when Gaius Gracchus in 121 B.C. gave to the equites the right of sitting on juries, he provided the publicani with a weapon which they were not slow to use. Cicero's speeches against Verres show in great detail what iniquities they were able to practice in a province if they obtained the cooperation of a governor whom they could terrorize by a threat of a prosecution on his return to Rome.
The companies of publicani were very highly organized. The actual bidding was done by a mancipes who provided the censor with securities for the execution of the contract. The nominal chief was the annually-changing magister, resident in Rome, who was represented in the province by a pro-magistrate under whom was a numerous staff of officials "qui operas dabant publicanis". The most influential class of publicani were the "decumani" who collected the tithes of Sicily and Asia "principes et quasi senatores publicanorum", as Cicero calls them. Inferior to these were those who collected the "scriptura" and "portoria", but sometimes the same company contracted for all three kinds of tax.

There is considerable evidence for the existence of numerous shareholders with a distinct financial interest in the operations of the publicani. Polybius says that almost all the citizens were interested in the letting of State contracts. The term "pars" is frequently used in Cicero in the sense of a share in a public company. According to him, one of the honorable ways of making an income was "publicis sumendis" and it has been suggested that his own enormous fortune was partly the result of profitable investments. If this is the case, it helps to explain the highly laudatory terms in which Cicero speaks of the publicani, whenever he can possibly do so, and the language which he employs to show that the welfare of the Roman people was bound up with that of the Asiatic publicani is most naturally explained if we suppose that
many of his audience were directly interested in their operations. No reform in the methods of provincial government was likely to occur without a revolution, so long as men of all classes reaped a pecuniary profit from the continuance of the evil system.

A fixed tax would have offered few advantages to the publicans, for the risks of business were not great; there were only the risks of insolvency of certain taxpayers which could influence the course of the bidding. Quite the opposite with the tithe, for cheating was easier when determining the tithe. Even in bad years, they would collect the tenth and in others they would try to get still more. The collection of this tax reached exorbitant figures with the result that the companies of the publicans crushed the province.

A municipality, in normal times, was surely entitled to borrow a reasonable amount of money on reasonable security. The evil came in the fact that the pressure of the publicani made such loans painfully frequent, and that no law regulated the rate of interest as in Italy. The community must pay its taxes; otherwise the tax gatherers supported by the governor's lictors — if need be, cohorts — would be seizing the holy statues in the local temples, and perhaps the estates of the town council. Recourse must be had to the nearest man with ready money — an Italian negotiator who was usually very unscrupulous. He would not hesitate to demand 24, 36, and even 48%. The provincials could do nothing but
accept his terms. Henceforth they were a community of serfs. The load of interest would become intolerable. No one could be more implacable than the lender. The governor would be on his side. If by a great good providence one or two communities managed to discharge the loans before they became unendurable, many succumbed. It would have been better to have submitted to the tax-gatherer and avoided several years of misery.

Against the exactions of these capitalists the provincials had only one effective protection, the firm and just administration of upright governors. It was at best a lucky chance when such a man succeeded to the post and remained uncorrupted by the temptations of absolute power. An ordinary governor was unchecked by fear of the court of repetundae: acquittal could at need be purchased, and in provincial extortions it was easy to exact enough to meet incidental expenses of the kind. The system was scandalous, but the poor provincials had little to hope from any change. When the capitalist class acquired the direct control of the Roman courts, they were able to punish any governor who tried to stand between the greedy capitalist and his prey. We may still well believe that the possible interference of tiresome governors, either virtuously acting on principle or greedily eager to keep the plunder for themselves, was not left out of sight in tax-farming circles. In the view of the "publicani" a governor's proper function was to keep the provincials quiet under systematic extortion. Thesepillagers would not tolerate an honest governor. An example of this is
shown in the case of Q. Mucius Scaevola whose dignified position of great pontiff freed him from reprisals. But a victim was needed for the knights and they chose the quaestor, Rutilius Rufus who, after the departure of Scaevola, had charge of the government of Asia, awaiting the arrival of the new governor. He had tried to stop the extortions of the tax-gatherers who then accused him of extortion; his judges, the knights, supported the publicans and condemned to exile their censor who had, in their opinion, been too strict. No one at Rome could deny the truth of the situation, for too many writers have discussed this subject.

For several years, however, we have no right to believe that the complaints of these unfortunate provincials remained useless. In addition to the ordinary tribunals at Rome, the Senate offered another expedient for the unfortunate provincials. On an inscription at Adramyttion we find an account of an appeal of the people of Asia to the Senate. We also have on an inscription a decision rendered by the consul or the praetor, by order of the Senate, on the advice of a commission of thirty-five senators whose names are still preserved. This decision was the result of an appeal of the people of Pergamum against the oppressions of the publicans. From the evidence on the inscription we believe that the appeal was made at the end of the second century or at the beginning of the first century—quite possibly at the time of the revolution against Gaius Gracchus.
inscription is shattered just after the names of the commissioners and so we do not know the result of the appeal; the decision given was at least partially favorable to the request since the people of Pergamum had the decision engraved and posted.

When Sulla assumed control of Asia, he rewarded those who had fought or suffered for Rome; on the disloyal he laid a heavy hand. His proclamation provoked local risings which were put down with bloodshed. He levied on the province a contribution of twenty thousand talents, the taxes for five years were to be paid at once, and a war-indemnity as well. The wretched provincials could not raise the amount without recourse to loans and far and wide the public property of the cities was mortgaged. The capitalists whom the news of Sulla's victory had brought to Asia reaped a rich harvest, and for many a year, beside the normal oppression and extortion, the curse of poverty and hopeless debt rested on what had been one of the most prosperous regions of the ancient world. But for the moment there was a further infliction. Sulla's men are said to have grumbled at the peace. Mithridates, they thought, had been let off too easily. Perhaps the opportunities of plunder had not come up to their expectations and no doubt the king had skimmed the cream of local opulence. To reward their exertions and prepare them for following their leader in the coming civil war, he put them into comfortable winter-quarters in provincial cities. No doubt the most disloyal cities were selected to bear the greater part of
this detested burden. The local treasuries had to pay their tormentors at a rate four times the military wage; even the common soldier received about sixteen drachmas a day. The householder on whom he was billeted had to feed the soldiers and his guests and put up with constant violation of all he held most dear in private life. Many were thus reduced to beggary and there is no doubt that in the winter of 85-84 the Asiatic provincials drained the cup of misery to the dregs. But whatever their sufferings, they had to bear them as best they might. So long as the Roman Republic lasted, the financial interests of individuals stood in the way of any material alleviation of their lot. The administrative arrangements of Sulla remained in force for several centuries; the farming of tithes in kind, the chief field of extortion, was only exchanged for a system of fixed tribute by the wisdom of Julius Caesar.

Sulla divided Asia into a certain number of new divisions and apportioned the tax among them in proportion to their resources. This sum was not collected by the publicans; the governor substituted for the contract system that of direct taxation and the collection was to be made by local magistrates. The amount fixed was not excessive although it was enormous; many cities in order to discharge their debts were forced to borrow money at high rates of interest, to forfeit their theatres, gymnasia, and as they had formerly been fleeced by Mithridates, by Fimbria, and by pirates, they were
completely crushed. Landed property suffered such de-
preciation that arrangements had to be made for the
liquidation of mortgage debts.

The exactions of Sulla had compelled the cities
to raise large sums of money on loan at exorbitant
interest and the Roman financiers, backed by corrupt
and rapacious governors, held the provincials in their
grip. Good care was taken that the debts should not be
paid off but go on mounting. The amount of the public
debts is said to have been twenty thousand talents at
first, and after twelve years to have now reached one-
hundred twenty thousand talents. The amounts are only
worth mentioning as a record of Roman usury which Plu-
tarch found in Sallust and does not seem to have felt
any difficulty in believing. Of the private indebted-
ness we have no estimate, but it was enormous. As the
cities were constrained to see their public property,
so men with families had to part with marketable sons
and daughters. Slaves they had to be somewhere or
other; and once they belonged to a Roman owner, they
had at least a maintenance and protection. This was
one of the ways in which the Roman brokers obtained the
works of art and attractive slaves for which Roman so-
ciety could always supply rich purchasers.

Lucullus was not the man to tolerate a system of
such infamous oppression. If Mithridates was to be
put down effectually, Asiatics must be taught to look
upon Roman sovereignty as better, or at least not worse
than the absolute monarchy of a great king. We must remember that the constitution of Rome provided no standing army to overawe the province in time of peace. He probably saw that continual wars would consume more than the revenues of the province could supply. Asia was meant to be a mainstay of the Roman treasury. But complete exhaustion was manifestly near and the province would be a burden if the process were allowed to go on. Romans in the name of Rome were for their own private gain ruining one of Rome's most valuable assets. Like all Romans, Lucullus believed in the sacred rights of property, nevertheless he had conscience enough to comprehend that a Roman province must be protected from choking to death. And so he set to work with drastic measures of relief and declared the interest rates exorbitant, disallowed two-thirds of the debts, and decreed that the residue was payable in four annual installments without further interest. The public debt was to be discharged in double - forty thousand talents for twenty thousand - instead of six-fold as claimed by the Roman capitalists. His drastic solution worked like magic and we are told that the communities were free of debt in four years. If there was joy in Asia, there was a bitter cry in Rome. The rage of disappointed greed only drove the capitalist knights into closer alliance with the "popular party" and there began in 73 B.C. a series of attacks upon the absent pro consul which only ended with his recall. It did not matter that the money-
lenders had richly deserved his interference or that the grateful provincials founded festivals in his honor. He was now held up to the Roman mob as a typical noble, full of pride and ambition, and he was accused of protracting the eastern war for his own glory. There can be little doubt that one of the strong factors in the success of Pompey over the Senate in 70 B.C. was this bitter determination of the knights to rid themselves of Lucullus and to weaken the Senate which kept him in command.

The trial of L. Valerius Flaccus for extortion in the province of Asia is a striking illustration of the connection of Roman politics with the abuses of provincial administration. It shows clearly that the subjects of Rome had practically no chance of obtaining redress of their grievances unless the classes represented on the juries had reasons of their own for wishing to punish the party accused. Flaccus was a man who had seen service in various parts of the Roman world. In 62 he was governor of Asia. There can be no reasonable doubt that he was guilty of great extortion in the province, which was only just beginning to recover from the troubles and miseries of nearly thirty years, yet he might have escaped prosecution if he had not chanced to offend a Roman financier who was doing business there. This man gathered evidences and bided his time for revenge. In 61, Flaccus was succeeded by Q. Cicero who was a much better governor
and certainly abstained from doing some things that Flaccus had done. The enemy of Flaccus saw his chance in the political situation of 59. The charge was laid and the approval of Pompey secured. No doubt it was really a move of Caesar, who was busy chastising those who had borne a hand against Catiline. Cicero defended his former associate and Hortensius was with him. When we examine his speech for the defence, it is at once apparent that in relation to the actual charge of extortion he had no case. He pointed out that the prosecution was essentially an attack on the interests of Rome as interpreted by himself and the jury to whose class-feeling he dexterously appealed. He attempted to discredit the other side by imputing to them unfair conduct in getting up their case; he asserted the utter worthlessness of evidence furnished by the Greeks of Asia whose resolutions and decrees he said had no real value, for their mass-meetings would vote anything. Moreover, it was certain that they hated Rome and would swear anything to ruin a Roman. As for account-books and other records brought to prove the exactions of Flaccus, he declared that the entries were forged. The real answer to the accusations in general was contained in the appeal to the jury not to let the Catilinarian reaction triumph, not to condemn one who had maintained the cause of order and the rights of property, not to discourage patriotism. Cicero's brilliant speech, one of his most interesting pieces, was followed by the
acquittal of Flaccus. There was an end for the present of the hopes of the wretched provincials.

The "Lex Iulia Repetundarum," passed in 59, seems to have been a genuine attempt to improve the administration of the provinces. Coming after a series of laws dealing with the same subject, it of course incorporated a number of earlier enactments on various points. It restricted in various ways the free action of governors, particularly in respect to the power of making war, often assumed with bad results. It also shortened procedure by limiting the time allowed for the speeches of counsel. To guard against the falsification of official accounts, it provided that besides the copy placed in the Roman treasury, two others should be made and kept in two cities of the province. Other clauses provided for the safe custody of documents sent from a province for the purposes of a particular trial. The law long remained in force, supplemented by later interpretations and made the subject of juristic comment, down to the time of Justinian. Yet it can hardly be said that the law put an end to extortion. The corruption at Rome, the enormous expenses incurred in following an official career, forbade any such result. Money had to be constantly streaming from the provinces to the centre to decide who should come out to exact more money. And the new law still took account of senators only. The financiers, the source of half the mischief, remained exempt as before.

It is generally supposed that Sulla intended,
to take away from the knights the collection of taxes by introducing a fixed annual tribute based upon the produce method of the former farming of taxes by the censors; if this reform was made, it did not last very long, for we still have many proofs of the activity of the publicans in the following years and of the bitter complaints which this system wrested from the Asiatics.

Caesar was the first to modify this situation in the year 48. We learn this from a speech of Antony:

"The people to whom the Senate has granted the collection of this tax insulted you and demanded of you much more than you owe; and so C. Caesar has remitted to you a third part of what you paid to them and has stopped their insolence; for it is to you that he has entrusted the care of collecting this sum." Dion Cassius says the same thing: "Having driven out the publicans who abused them, he established a fixed contribution in place of the various taxes". Thus there was no more farming of taxes and no more tithes; a fixed tax was substituted and in place of a contribution in kind, the people of Asia had to pay a sum of money which was equivalent to a third less than they paid under any other form to the publicans.

During the civil war which followed the death of Caesar, Cassius demanded the province of Asia to pay the tax in advance for ten years. The pro-consul Sex. Appuleius gave to Brutus sixteen thousand talents in money. This proves that the former contribution in products was abolished and was replaced by a sum of money which was
furnished by the various cities who had to gather in the tax and deliver it to the governor. The triumvir Marc Antony some years later demanded of the same province ten years tribute in advance, but was finally satisfied with nine annuities payable in two installments. The free cities under the Republic were not harassed severely by the tax; Plutarch estimates at two hundred thousand talents the entire amount which Antony levied on the province of Asia - one hundred forty-four thousand talents paid by the subject cities and fifty-six thousand talents furnished by the free cities. The Asiatics were forced to make other contributions: the "scriptura" or the right of pasture, farmed in a lump sum by the publicans, and the "portoria" or the customs, likewise collected by the tax-gatherers. The customs tax was levied according to the value of the merchandise. The rate varied in the different provinces: in Asia, it was two and one-half per cent whence comes the name "quadragesima" or fortieth part. Furthermore, we believe that a personal tax existed, for Cicero in his report for the year 54 mentions an "exactio capitum atque ostiorum" i.e. a tax on each person in proportion to his wealth, the number of slaves which he possessed and the number of doors which his house had. In concluding the account of the collection and levy of taxes in Asia, we should remember that the coming of the Empire put an end to most of the peculiar abuses of the republican regime, nor would the misdoings of governors, "publicani", and usurers have permanent significance.
except for two reasons:—first, these abuses tended to concentrate the capital of the world at Rome and made possible the vast fortunes and prodigal spending of the later republic and early Empire; then, these extraordinary opportunities for ill-gained and easily gained wealth deepened the lust of the ruling classes for money, and their willingness to gauge honor and happiness in terms of money.

There are but few inscriptions in Asia which give us any definite information about the Roman administration of that country during the Republic, for the vandalism of the Turks who devastated Asia during the Middle Ages destroyed many valuable remains. The most important inscriptions are reproduced in the third book of the "Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum" and are inscribed in both Latin and Greek, for the Romans never attempted to replace the native language of the Greeks with the Latin tongue. In the Turkish cemetery at Denar, the site of Apameia in Phrygia, was found an epitaph which stated:—"qui Apameae negotiantur"so we have evidence that, under the name of Celaenae, it was the capital of Phrygia and in Roman times, though not equal in political importance to Laodicea, which was the residence of the pro consul of Asia, it was inferior only to Ephesus as a centre of commercial transactions.

From an epitaph found at Apameia we know definitely that the legionaries were stationed here, for to L. Valerius Maximus, a soldier of the seventh legion, was dedicated
an epitaph by his father. Likewise, we find the epitaph of Valerius Iulianus of the seventh legion which furnishes additional proof of the activity of the legionaries. Furthermore, many inscriptions are found which record the interest of rulers, pro consuls, and local citizens in the restoration of the temple of Diana at Ephesus.

As a result of the study of the Roman administration of Asia certain outstanding facts come before us. First, the great difference between the Italian and the provincial town was the fact that the chief burden of the Italian town was to furnish military aid — soldiers and ships; the provincial town was to furnish tribute — money and grain. Another difference was that Italian land was generally free from taxes, while provincial land was subject to taxation. Then, the governors of Asia, who were in early times praetors elected by the people, but in later times pro-praetors or pro-consuls, were the supreme military and civil rulers of the province. They were commanders-in-chief of the army and were expected to preserve the territory from internal disorder and foreign invasion and administer justice between the provincials of different cities. Although the governor was responsible to the senate, the welfare or misery of the provincials depended largely upon his own disposition and will. All the towns of Asia were subject to Rome, but it was Rome's policy not to treat them all in exactly the same way. Like the cities of Italy, they were graded according to their merit. All these towns, however,
possessed local self-government, so far as this was consistent with the supremacy of Rome - that is, they retained their own laws, assemblies, and magistrates.

A large part of the Roman revenue was derived from Asia, but instead of raising these taxes directly through her own officers, Rome let out the business of collecting the revenue to a set of money dealers, called "publicani", who represented large stock companies at Rome and not only collected more than was due them, but with the "negotiatores" lent money at usurious rates of interest to the communities which did not command ready money. Grave evils eventually arose from this system when the companies grew so powerful that they became a strong political influence which pro consuls feared to oppose; in short, the moneyed interests became the ruling force at Rome.
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